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Skip to Search Results- 10Poker
- 7Game theory
- 4Computer Games
- 2Artificial Intelligence
- 2Artificial intelligence
- 2Extensive games
- 4Johanson, Michael
- 3Bowling, Michael
- 3Zinkevich, Martin
- 1Abou Risk, Nicholas
- 1Bard, Nolan DC
- 1Billings, Darse
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2007
Johanson, Michael, Bowling, Michael, Zinkevich, Martin
Technical report TR07-15. Adaptation to other initially unknown agents often requires computing an effective counter-strategy. In the Bayesian paradigm, one must find a good counter-strategy to the inferred posterior of the other agents' behavior. In the experts paradigm, one may want to choose...
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2013
In the field of computational game theory, games are often compared in terms of their size. This can be measured in several ways, including the number of unique game states, the number of decision points, and the total number of legal actions over all decision points. These numbers are either...
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2013-02-26
In the field of computational game theory, games are often compared in terms of their size. This can be measured in several ways, including the number of unique game states, the number of decision points, and the total number of legal actions over all decision points. These numbers are either...
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2009
Bowling, Michael, Zinkevich, Martin, Waugh, Kevin, Lanctot, Marc
Technical report TR09-15. Sequential decision-making with multiple agents and imperfect information is commonly modeled as an extensive game. One efficient method for computing Nash equilibria in large, zero-sum, imperfect information games is counterfactual regret minimization (CFR). In the...
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Spring 2016
Ideal agent behaviour in multiagent environments depends on the behaviour of other agents. Consequently, acting to maximize utility is challenging since an agent must gather and exploit knowledge about how the other (potentially adaptive) agents behave. In this thesis, we investigate how an...
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Regret Minimization in Games and the Development of Champion Multiplayer Computer Poker-Playing Agents
DownloadSpring 2014
Recently, poker has emerged as a popular domain for investigating decision problems under conditions of uncertainty. Unlike traditional games such as checkers and chess, poker exhibits imperfect information, varying utilities, and stochastic events. Because of these complications, decisions at...
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2007
Bowling, Michael, Johanson, Michael, Zinkevich, Martin, Piccione, Carmelo
Technical report TR07-14. Extensive games are a powerful model of multiagent decision-making scenarios with incomplete information. Finding a Nash equilibrium for very large instances of these games has received a great deal of recent attention. In this paper, we describe a new technique for...