Regret Minimization in Games with Incomplete Information

• Author(s) / Creator(s)

  • Bowling, Michael
  • Johanson, Michael
  • Zinkevich, Martin
  • Piccione, Carmelo

• Technical report TR07-14. Extensive games are a powerful model of multiagent decision-making scenarios with incomplete information. Finding a Nash equilibrium for very large instances of these games has received a great deal of recent attention. In this paper, we describe a new technique for solving large games based on regret minimization. In particular, we introduce the notion of counterfactual regret, which exploits the degree of incomplete information in an extensive game. We show how minimizing counterfactual regret minimizes overall regret, and therefore in self-play can be used to compute a Nash equilibrium. We demonstrate this technique in the domain of poker, showing we can solve abstractions of limit Texas Hold'em with as many as 10^12 states, two orders of magnitude larger than previous methods. | TRID-ID TR07-14

• Date created

  2007

• Subjects / Keywords

  • Poker
  • Computer Games
  • Regret minimization
  • Game theory
  • Extensive games

• Type of Item

  Report

• DOI

  https://doi.org/10.7939/R3Q23R282

• License

  Attribution 3.0 International