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Skip to Search Results- 4Koslicki, Kathrin
- 2Brigandt, Ingo
- 2Linsky, Bernard
- 2Wilson, Robert A.
- 1Koslicki, K.
- 1Morin, Marie-Eve
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Cohabitating in the Globalised World: Peter Sloterdijk's Global Foams and Bruno Latour's Cosmopolitics
Download2009
This paper seeks to present a comprehensive and systematic picture of Peter Sloterdijk's ambitious and provocative theory of globalisation. In the Sphären (Spheres) trilogy, Sloterdijk provides both a spatialised ontology of human existence and a historical thesis concerning the radical shifts in...
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2011
Introduction: Philosophical questions about biology have been addressed by philosophers and scientists for centuries. Yet as a genuine discipline within philosophy, philosophy of biology started to emerge in the 1970s (Byron, 2007). One motivation for this was the fact that much of traditional...
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2003
Introduction: How do the familiar concrete objects of common-sense –houses, trees, people, cars and the like-- persist through time? According to the position known as ‘four-dimensionalism’ or ‘the doctrine of temporal parts’, ordinary concrete objects persist through time by perduring, i.e., by...
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A Puzzle About Material Constitution and How to Solve It: Enriching Constitution Views in Metaphysics
Download2007
Two Intuitions and a Puzzle “Constitution” may be a philosophical term of art, but the idea of one thing’s being materially constituted by another thing (or other things) is one that ordinary folk are perfectly familiar with. When we talk explicitly of something’s being made up of, being made of,...
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[Review of the book Words Without Objects: Semantics, Ontology, and Logic for Non-Singularity, by Haycock]
Download2007
Introduction: Many languages mark a distinction which is commonly referred to as the “mass/count- distinction”; e.g., the distinction between the two occurrences of ‘hair’ in ‘There is hairin my soup’ and ‘There is a hair in my soup’. Often, the mass/count-distinction is drawn primarily with...
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2005
This paper concerns a fundamental dispute in ontology between the “Foundational Ontologist”, who believes that there is only one correct way of characterizing what there is, and the ontological “Skeptic”, who believes that there are viable alternative characterizations of what there is. I examine...
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2002
Introduction: Imagine David Lewis, David Armstrong and Peter van Inwagen involved in a debate that starts with the hypothesis “If One is” and purports to deduce from it the conclusion “Then, chopped up by Being, it is many and unlimited in multitude”. Verity Harte’s groundbreaking and insightful...