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Skip to Search Results- 3Game theory
- 2Computer Games
- 2Extensive games
- 1Continuous-time games
- 1Equilibrium characterization
- 1Folk theorem
- 2Bowling, Michael
- 2Zinkevich, Martin
- 1Bernard, Benjamin
- 1Johanson, Michael
- 1Lanctot, Marc
- 1Piccione, Carmelo
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Continuous-time Repeated Games with Imperfect Information: Folk Theorems and Explicit Results
DownloadSpring 2016
This thesis treats continuous-time models of repeated interactions with imperfect public monitoring. In such models, players do not directly observe each other's actions and instead see only the impacts of the chosen actions on the distribution of a random signal. Often, there are two reasons why...
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2009
Bowling, Michael, Zinkevich, Martin, Waugh, Kevin, Lanctot, Marc
Technical report TR09-15. Sequential decision-making with multiple agents and imperfect information is commonly modeled as an extensive game. One efficient method for computing Nash equilibria in large, zero-sum, imperfect information games is counterfactual regret minimization (CFR). In the...
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2007
Bowling, Michael, Johanson, Michael, Zinkevich, Martin, Piccione, Carmelo
Technical report TR07-14. Extensive games are a powerful model of multiagent decision-making scenarios with incomplete information. Finding a Nash equilibrium for very large instances of these games has received a great deal of recent attention. In this paper, we describe a new technique for...