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Skip to Search Results- 1Buenting, Joel M
- 1Buleandra, Andrei
- 1Contreiras, Andrew
- 1Ion, Octavian
- 1Islam, Shaheen
- 1Jalea, Justin
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Fall 2009
Intuition has fallen from grace. Its authority to act as a source of evidence in philosophical discourse has recently been called into question by philosophers and cognitive psychologists alike, who claim that because of the many difficulties that plague intuition, it should not hold the...
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Spring 2012
The Naïve Theory is one the dominant accounts amongst philosophers of language. This theory has much to offer, however it does not in all cases bode well with intuitions. Two puzzles are raised and investigated here. The first is a puzzle regarding certain simple sentences. The Naïve Theory does...
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Simulating Strategic Rationality
Spring 2010
This project explores the intersection of three topics: games, rationality and simulation. There are four major results produced by this exploration. First, it is argued that whether or not a particular process can count as a simulation for a particular person is entirely dependent on whether or...
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Fall 2009
The problem which spurred this thesis has three components. First, there are entities which we may call stuff – alluded to by uncountable nouns; these entities seem to have a duality for behaving like both (i) an object or a discrete middle size substance – which are supposed to be non-repetitive...
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Fall 2011
One way of “doing” philosophy is to choose a topic of investigation, proceed in depth narrowly on an analysis of that topic; then to apply the results widely. I follow this strategy in my dissertation. The topic I investigate narrowly is “questions”; then I emphasize its applications in...
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Fall 2011
In my dissertation I explain and defend the claim that conscious beliefs are essentially prescriptive. I argue that norms of conscious belief are explained by the fact that consciously believing p involves a commitment to the truth of p, a commitment analogous to the one involved in the act of...
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Fall 2010
Moral virtues need intellectual virtues. I support this claims by (1) proposing a response in terms of intellectual virtues and other psychological factors to situationalist critiques against moral virtue, (2) arguing that intellectual virtues must assess moral contexts for proper manifestation...