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Calibrating Intuition: A Defense of Standard Philosophical Analysis

  • Author / Creator
    Jalea, Justin
  • Intuition has fallen from grace. Its authority to act as a source of evidence in philosophical discourse has recently been called into question by philosophers and cognitive psychologists alike, who claim that because of the many difficulties that plague intuition, it should not hold the evidential role it does presently. This is exceedingly troubling, since appeals to intuition are pervasive throughout, and infiltrate every level of, philosophical discourse. This paper explores the extent of intuition’s infiltration in philosophy and whether intuition is warranted in those positions. I argue that by focusing on virtues exhibited by philosophical methodology, many of the arguments made against them are defused. In spite of this, we can largely carry on utilizing the methodology which houses intuitions – Standard Philosophical Analysis – while continually attempting to revise and refine that methodology.

  • Subjects / Keywords
  • Graduation date
    2009-11
  • Type of Item
    Thesis
  • Degree
    Master of Arts
  • DOI
    https://doi.org/10.7939/R3X143
  • License
    This thesis is made available by the University of Alberta Libraries with permission of the copyright owner solely for non-commercial purposes. This thesis, or any portion thereof, may not otherwise be copied or reproduced without the written consent of the copyright owner, except to the extent permitted by Canadian copyright law.
  • Language
    English
  • Institution
    University of Alberta
  • Degree level
    Master's
  • Department
    • Department of Philosophy
  • Supervisor / co-supervisor and their department(s)
    • Morton, Adam (Philosophy)
  • Examining committee members and their departments
    • Hunter, Bruce (Philosophy)
    • Morton, Adam (Philosophy)
    • Welchman, Jennifer (Philosophy)
    • Dixon, Peter (Psychology)