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Skip to Search Results- 5Koslicki, Kathrin
- 2Brigandt, Ingo
- 2Linsky, Bernard
- 2Wilson, Robert A.
- 1Abedinifard, Morteza
- 1Black, Danielle
- 14Philosophy, Department of
- 9Philosophy, Department of/Journal Articles (Philosophy)
- 7Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies (GPS), Faculty of
- 7Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies (GPS), Faculty of/Theses and Dissertations
- 3Philosophy, Department of/Book Reviews (Philosophy)
- 2Philosophy, Department of/Book Chapters (Philosophy)
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2017
This is the first English translation of Leon Chwistek’s “Tragedia werbalnej metafizyki (Z powodu książki Dra Ingardena: Das literarische Kunstwerk),” Kwartalnik Filozoficzny, Vol. X, 1932, 46–76. Chwistek offers a scathing critique of Roman Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk (translated into...
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Fall 2013
Drawing upon Marie McGinn's non-metaphysical interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, this thesis attempts to make a connection between the book’s opening and ending remarks. I argue that McGinn's non-metaphysical reading helps us, more than the metaphysical reading, to make a consistent...
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2017-10-14
SSHRC Awarded IG 2018: Essences have traditionally been assigned important but controversial explanatory roles in philosophical, scientific and social theorizing. For example, why is it possible for one and the same organism to be first a caterpillar and then a butterfly? Why is it impossible for...
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2003
Introduction: How do the familiar concrete objects of common-sense –houses, trees, people, cars and the like-- persist through time? According to the position known as ‘four-dimensionalism’ or ‘the doctrine of temporal parts’, ordinary concrete objects persist through time by perduring, i.e., by...
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2011
Introduction: Philosophical questions about biology have been addressed by philosophers and scientists for centuries. Yet as a genuine discipline within philosophy, philosophy of biology started to emerge in the 1970s (Byron, 2007). One motivation for this was the fact that much of traditional...
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2005
This paper concerns a fundamental dispute in ontology between the “Foundational Ontologist”, who believes that there is only one correct way of characterizing what there is, and the ontological “Skeptic”, who believes that there are viable alternative characterizations of what there is. I examine...