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2010
Introduction: Once upon a time, empirically-informed, philosophical work on the mind was pretty straightforward. Mental activity went on inside the head, and we were pretty sure that it, along with all the good stuff associated with it -- consciousness, intentionality, mental representation,...
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2006
Introduction: This book articulates and defends a view of cognition that contributes to the loose network of approaches to understanding the mind that fall under the headings of situated, embedded, and dynamic cognition. Andy Clark's Being There (1997) is perhaps the best-known philosophical work...
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2005
Introduction: This is a book that challenges the current orthodoxy, both in the philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences, that thinking (construed broadly to include perceiving, imagining, remembering, etc.) is a mental process in the head. Such a view has been largely taken for granted...
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[Review of the book The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought, by Parruthers]
Download2008
Introduction: Recent cognitive developmental psychology lend support to the idea that the mind consists of distinct domain-specific modules (e.g., a folk physics, a folk biology, and a folk psychological mind-reading module), rather than a single all-purpose reasoning system. In evolutionary...
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1997
Pelletier, Francis J., Elio, Renée
This study examines the problem of belief revision, defined as deciding which of several initially accepted sentences to disbelieve, when new information presents a logical inconsistency with the initial set. In the first three experiments, the initial sentence set included a conditional...