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2010
Introduction: Once upon a time, empirically-informed, philosophical work on the mind was pretty straightforward. Mental activity went on inside the head, and we were pretty sure that it, along with all the good stuff associated with it -- consciousness, intentionality, mental representation,...
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2006
Introduction: This book articulates and defends a view of cognition that contributes to the loose network of approaches to understanding the mind that fall under the headings of situated, embedded, and dynamic cognition. Andy Clark's Being There (1997) is perhaps the best-known philosophical work...
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2005
Introduction: This is a book that challenges the current orthodoxy, both in the philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences, that thinking (construed broadly to include perceiving, imagining, remembering, etc.) is a mental process in the head. Such a view has been largely taken for granted...
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1994
Individualists claim that wide explanations in psychology are problematic. I argue that wide psychological explanations sometimes have greater explanatory power than individualistic explanations. The aspects of explanatory power I focus on are causal depth and theoretical appropriateness....
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2001
David Sloan Wilson has recently revived the idea of a group mind as an application of group selectionist thinking to cognition. Central to my discussion of this idea is the distinction between the claim that groups have a psychology and what I call the social manifestation thesis-a thesis about...
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2004
This paper surveys some recent work on realization in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science.
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2000
This paper points to some problems for the position that D.M. Walsh calls \"alternative individualism,\" and argues that in defending this view Walsh has omitted an important part of what separates individualists and externalists in psychology. Walsh's example of Hox gene complexes is discussed...