Deficient causation in Leibniz

• Author / Creator

  Kardosh, John

• Leibniz scholars have difficulty reconciling Leibniz’s metaphysical account of causation with his theological account, since the former claims that creatures are the source of their own actions, and the latter seemingly undercuts this claim by ascribing to God all that there is of positive reality in creaturely actions. If God is the sole source of positive reality in creaturely actions, then all that is left for the creature to contribute to the causal nexus with God is negative reality – limitations, but then the conclusion is close to hand that creatures are not causally efficacious. The present work avoids this conclusion by showing that, for Leibniz, the ontological status of limitation comes in degrees, and some limitations, for example those produced by free creaturely actions, though not positive realities proper, are not merely negative realities; creatures are causally efficacious insofar as they are responsible for limitations of this latter type.

• Subjects / Keywords

  • Concurrentism
  • Causation
  • Leibniz

• Graduation date

  Fall 2011

• Type of Item

  Thesis

• Degree

  Master of Arts

• DOI

  https://doi.org/10.7939/R3BQ53

• License

  This thesis is made available by the University of Alberta Libraries with permission of the copyright owner solely for non-commercial purposes. This thesis, or any portion thereof, may not otherwise be copied or reproduced without the written consent of the copyright owner, except to the extent permitted by Canadian copyright law.