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Deficient Causation in Leibniz

by

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Dedication

To my supervisor, Amy Schmitter, without whom this thesis would not have been possible.

Abstract

Leibniz scholars have difficulty reconciling Leibniz's metaphysical account of causation with his theological account, since the former claims that creatures are the source of their own actions, and the latter seemingly undercuts this claim by ascribing to God all that there is of positive reality in creaturely actions. If God is the sole source of positive reality in creaturely actions, then all that is left for the creature to contribute to the causal nexus with God is negative reality – limitations, but then the conclusion is close to hand that creatures are not causally efficacious. The present work avoids this conclusion by showing that, for Leibniz, the ontological status of limitation comes in degrees, and some limitations, for example those produced by free creaturely actions, though not positive realities proper, are not merely negative realities; creatures are causally efficacious insofar as they are responsible for limitations of this latter type.

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Abbreviations

[Unless otherwise noted, in text parenthetical citations are to the page number of the work cited. All citations to texts not abbreviated here follow the standard MLA guidelines.]

AG	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, *Philosophical Essays*, ed. and trans. by Roger Ariew and Dan Garber, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989.
G	…, *Die philosophischen Schriften von G.W. Leibniz*, ed. C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols., Berlin, 1875-1890, reprinted, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965. Cited by volume and page
Grua	…, *Textes inédits*, ed. Gaston Grua, 2 vols., New York and London: Garland, 1985. Cited by volume and page.
L	…, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. and trans. by Leroy Loemker, 2nd ed., Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969.
LR	…, *The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence*, ed. and trans. by Brandon Look and Donald Rutherford, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
M	…, *Monadology*, in *Philosophical Essays*, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Dan Garber, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. Cited by section.
DM	…, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, in Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Dan Garber, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. Cited by section.
MP	…, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. and trans. by Marry Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson, London: Everyman's Library, 1973.
NE	…, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, ed. and trans. by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
T	..., *Theodicy*, trans. E.M. Huggard, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985. Cited by section, and page number in Huggard (H).
WF	..., *Philosophical Texts*, Ed. and trans. by R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Franks, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

E	Spinoza, B., *Ethics, in The Collected Works of Spinoza vol.1*, trans. Edwin Curley, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Cited by part (1-5), definition, (D), proposition, (P), Corollary, (C), Scholium, (S), or Demonstration (d).
ST	Malebranche, Nicholas, *The Search After Truth*, trans. Thomas Lennon and Paul Olscamp, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
CSM	Descartes, René, *The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes*, 3 vols., Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., Kenny, A., and Murdoch, D., trans. Cambridge University Press, 1984. Cited by volume and page.

--§1 Introduction --

Leibniz's theory of causation is stated, in bits and pieces, throughout his physical, metaphysical, and theological writings; there is no single text that states the whole theory of causation, not even a single text that states a whole branch of the theory – be it physical, metaphysical, or theological. Not surprisingly, the sprawling nature of Leibniz's theory of causation makes it difficult to determine whether it is wholly consistent – whether each branch connects to a common base, that is.

Although I do not aim in the present work to show that Leibniz's whole theory of causation is consistent, I do aim to show that two branches, or at least to pieces of two branches, are consistent – the metaphysical and the theological. More specifically, I aim to show that Leibniz's version of *realism* about secondary causes is consistent with his version of divine concurrentism – his theological account of causation.

There is little doubt that Leibniz maintains that created substances or monads (simply creatures[i], hereafter) have *real* causal powers – creatures are the source of their own actions and passions. There is also little doubt that Leibniz is a divine concurrentist: he maintains that creaturely action is inefficacious without God's causal cooperation. But there is room to doubt whether Leibniz can maintain both his realism about secondary causation and his concurrentism, since his concurrentism seems to preclude a type of *real* causation – efficient-productive[ii] causation (simply productive causation, hereafter), to which some scholars claim Leibniz is committed.

Sukjae Lee (2004), however, presents a novel solution to the apparent inconsistency between Leibniz's realism about secondary causes and his concurrentism. According to Lee, Leibniz is only committed to secondary formal and final causation, and not to secondary productive causation; hence, Leibniz's concurrentism, which seems to preclude secondary productive causation, is not inconsistent with his theory of secondary causation. In the present work, my approach to dissolving the apparent

inconsistency between Leibniz account of secondary causation and his concurrentism is much the same as Lee's; I avoid the apparent inconsistency by avoiding attributing productive causation – more accurately, full-blown productive causation, which involves the transmission of *perfection* – to Leibnizian creatures. However, unlike Lee, who holds that Leibnizian creatures are only formal and final causes, I hold that they are final-*deficient* causes – a deficient cause being the ontological inverse of a productive cause.

The present work is divided as follows. In section two, I discuss Leibniz's metaphysics of secondary causation. What emerges out of the discussion in section two is that, for Leibniz, creatures are both final and efficient causes. While explaining Leibniz's theory of divine causation in section three, I present textual evidence that creatures, for Leibniz, are not productive causes, although, as I will show, this does not rule out their causal *efficacy*. In section three, I also explain Leibniz's main reasons for rejecting the competing theories of divine causation – occasionalism, the theory that God is the only causally efficacious agent within the natural order, and conservationism, the theory that God does not act causally within the natural order. In section four, I present an objection stated by Adams (1994). According to Adams, if God is the only productive cause, then creatures must be merely passive causes, since activity requires productive causation. In section five, I present Lee's interpretation of Leibniz's account of concurrentism, along with my reasons for rejecting his interpretation. Section six addresses an objection against my own interpretation of Leibniz's account of secondary causation. I attribute to Leibniz the position that creatures cause imperfections, but, according to Lee, this position is incompatible with the neo-platonic account of evil that Leibniz supposedly holds; however, when Leibniz's account of evil is examined in detail, the incompatibility Lee sees disappears, and a space for my own interpretation opens up. I present my own interpretation in section seven; the interpretation I present is very much in the spirit of Robert Sleigh (1990).

There is an issue that I should discuss before proceeding to the task at hand. Since Leibniz's views with respect to many topics change significantly from his early to late writings, Leibniz scholars must often focus their discussion of a topic to a specific period within Leibniz's intellectual development, unless their discussion is a genealogical one. I approach Leibniz's metaphysical and theological views on causation systematically in the present work, rather than genealogically or chronologically, and I do so only within the scope of a specific period in Leibniz's intellectual development, what is sometimes called Leibniz's "mature philosophy," ranging from around 1686, the time of the *Discourse on Metaphysics* and the *Correspondence with Arnauld*, until the end of Leibniz's life, 1716. I restrict my discussion to this period for two reasons. First, Leibniz seems to have flirted with, if not endorsed, occasionalism up until 1680[iii]; thus, the task of this paper would be difficult, even more difficult, to accomplish unless restricted until after this date. Second, and perhaps more importantly, I am concerned with Leibniz's settled position on concurrentism and secondary causation, and the time of the *Discourse* just so happens to be the time when this position starts to settle.

--§2 Leibniz's Metaphysics of Causation --

Leibniz, like most Christian theologians and philosophers, distinguishes between a primary or universal cause – God and secondary or creaturely causes. In the present section, I will focus on Leibniz's account of secondary causation, without examining how it relates to his account of primary causation. Leibniz's account of secondary causation is quite novel, even in relation to the accounts of secondary causation proposed by his contemporaries, mostly because it denies the possibility of inter-substantial causation. It is to Leibniz's rejection of inter-substantial causation that I now turn.

2.1 Pre-Established Harmony and Spontaneity

The only *real* type of secondary causation, for Leibniz, is intra-substantial causation. For Leibniz, that is, each substances is the source of its own internal actions and passions:

> In my system every simple substance (that is, every true substance) must be the true immediate cause of all its actions and inward passions; and, speaking strictly in a metaphysical sense, it has none other than those which it produces. (T 400: H 362)

Leibniz famously denies all types of inter-substantial causation between creatures – mind-body, mind-mind, and body-body causation, that is. Scholars debate why Leibniz denies inter-substantial causation, and whether the arguments Leibniz provides against inter- substantial causation hit their mark. Although I do not wish to enter into these scholarly debates here, I will provide some relevant background information about Leibniz's rejection of inter-substantial causation, while avoiding scholarly controversy as much as possible.

It is relatively uncontroversial that Leibniz's initial motivation for rejecting inter-substantial causation in general results from his rejection of mind-body dualism in specific. Leibniz, like many of his contemporaries, sees a problem at the core of substance-dualism, since substance-dualism seemingly cannot explain how a substance of one type, a mind in this case, interacts causally with a substance of

another type, a body. If the modes of mind – thoughts, imaginings, and perceptions – are not material, it is difficult to see how they cause motion in a body, and, likewise, if motion in a body is not mental, it is difficult to see how it causes a mode in the mind. Descartes infamously attempts to explain the interaction between the mind and body by way of the pineal gland – the only center in the brain not mirrored in both hemispheres (CSM I: 340); of course, this does little to help his case, since the gland itself is still material. Leibniz sums up his final position on the problem of body-soul interaction clearly, claiming that there is just no way of explaining mind-body dualism without a "complete derangement of the laws of Nature" (T 61: H 156).

In addition to rejecting inter-substantial causation between minds and bodies, Leibniz also rejects inter-substantial causation between bodies and bodies and between minds and mind, body-body interaction actually *reducing* to mind-mind interaction in Leibniz's mature metaphysics, since all that exists in Leibniz's mature metaphysics are "simple substances [minds], and, in them, perception and appetite".[iv] Although there is no consensus about the specific reason, or reasons, why Leibniz rejects causation between substances of the same type, a commonly agreed reason is that inter-substantial causation, of any kind, requires an *influx* from one substance to another; real inter-substantial causation, that is, requires one creature to *produce*[v] something – a substance or mode, or a *perfection* or *reality* more generally – in another (AG 213-14, 219). For Leibniz, however, there is no explanation for how a mode, of any type, can, in a manner of speaking, wander about from one substance to the next; he claims that "if we examine the matter in strict metaphysical rigor," there can be "no real influx from one created substance into another" (WF 162).

While it seems sufficient to discount mind-body interaction because of the lack of an explanation for how the one can transfer something to the other, it seems insufficient to discount interaction between substances of the same type for the same reason. To use the example of bodily substances, one body

contains the same kinds of modes as any other, motion, and all operate according the same laws; so, there does not seem to be a good *prima facie* objection against bodily causal interaction.

Unfortunately, it is just not clear whether or not Leibniz has a good argument against interaction among substances of the same type, at least not one that meets the proponent of causal interaction on their own ground.[vi] One suggestion that is sometimes offered is that Leibniz rejects interaction between substances of the same type because substances, on at least some accounts, are indestructible by natural means, and constituted solely by their causal efficacy; thus, the transference of causal efficacy, in the form of modes, from one substance to the next could result in the potential destruction of the substance, which is inconsistent with some accounts of the nature of substance.[vii] Regardless of Leibniz's reasons for rejecting interaction between substances, it is perfectly clear that his own notion of substance is incompatible with real influx, since "monads have no windows through which something can leave or enter" (M 7; AG 214); creatures (or monads) are causally isolated.

Despite denying inter-substantial causation, Leibniz's theory of "pre-established harmony" allows him to explain the apparent interaction between creatures, in a way that satisfies common sense, at least to some extent, while also remaining consistent with his metaphysical presuppositions. According to Leibniz, God sets the world up such that each creature's internal actions are governed by what every other creature does, even though no creature causally influences another (M 79: AG 223; DM 14: AG 46-7; AG 143-44). Put differently, a mutual harmony exists among the actions of any one creature and those of every other, such that if the actions of even one creature were to change, so would those of every other. Leibniz often illustrates his theory of pre-established harmony in opposition to the theory of *influx* and the theory of occasionalism, using an analogy of the various ways a clock maker might ensure that her clocks keep good time: according to the way of *influx*, the clock keeps good time because the various gears interact with one another, ensuring that the hands of the clock always read accurately; according to the

way of occasionalism, the clock requires the continual employment of the clockmaker to ensure that the hands read accurately; lastly, according to pre- established harmony, the various gears of the clock were so finely tuned to one another at the time the clock was built that whenever one gear moves by its own internal action, the others never fail to move by their own internal action as well, and so the hands read accurately without the gears ever interacting (WF 192-3). At the *phenomenal* level – the level of perceptible objects in space and time – the theory of pre-established harmony behaves just like the theory of *influx*; when, for example, a creature *x* bumps into *y*, and *y* is set into motion as a result, both theories explain that *y* moves *because* of *x*. However, at the metaphysical level, pre-established harmony behaves very differently from the theory of *influx*, and the theory of occasionalism, for that matter, since pre-established harmony explains all causal activity and passivity intra-substantially: the *cause* of motion of *x* resides within *x* itself.

If Leibniz's thesis of pre-established harmony explains how creatures act as if in relation to one another, then Leibniz's thesis of "spontaneity" explains how creatures act internally, in causal isolation from one another. According to Robert Sleigh, spontaneity, for Leibniz, is the thesis that "every non-initial, non-miraculous state of every created substance has as a real cause in some preceding state of that very substance" (Sleigh, 1990, 162).[viii] While Leibniz is clear that creaturely causation amounts to a present state of a creature being caused by a preceding state, he is less clear about the types of causation that are involved in this process. While his contemporaries rely on mechanical causation almost exclusively at the secondary level, Leibniz eschews mechanical causation, at least as a type of real causation. The most likely candidates for types of real secondary causation, for Leibniz, as we will see in this section, are productive and final causation. In order to determine what types of causation count as types of real secondary causation, we will need to first get a grasp of some of Leibniz's causal terminology.

2.2 Substances and Modes: Forces, Appetites and Perceptions

Leibniz describes the *real* internal actions and passions within each individual substance using two distinct, but conceptually related, sets of terminology, the terminology of forces, on the one hand, and the mentalistic terminology of appetites and perceptions, on the other hand. In what follows, I will give a brief explanation of both sets of terminology.

Leibniz makes two distinctions with respect to forces, both of which are relevant to our discussion. First, forces can be carved up according to their ontological status, as either primitive (i.e., substantial) or derivative (i.e., modal). Second, forces can be carved up according to their causal status, as either active or passive – a force is active insofar as it produces an effect or change in a substance and passive insofar as it facilitates the reception of an effect or change in a substance.

Primitive forces, both active and passive, correspond to the fundamental nature of the substance – the substantial aspect of the substance, which is divided *conceptually* into form and matter. In *Specimen Dynamicum*, as well as in many other texts, Leibniz identifies primitive active force with the "*soul or substantial form*" of the substance (AG 119; emphasis in original). Primitive active force, or the form of the substance, sits somewhere between a 'bare faculty' for action and 'action' itself – it is a striving endeavor, or, to use Leibniz's terms, *conatus* or *nisus*, for change (AG 118; also, see, LR 11):

> Active force differs from the mere power of the Schools, for the active power or faculty of the Scholastics is nothing but a close [*propinqua*] possibility of acting, which needs external excitation or a stimulus, as it were, to be transferred into action. Active force, in contrast, contains a certain act or entelechy and is thus midway between the faculty of acting and the act itself and involves a conatus. It is thus carried into action by itself… (L 433; quoted in LR, 403-404, fn. 5)

The continual striving for action is the 'principal attribute' of the substance, for Leibniz– it is what makes a substance a substance; hence, Leibniz's claim, "that which does not act does not merit the name of substance" (T 393: H 359).[ix]

Leibniz's notion of primitive passive force, the "*force of being acted upon* [vis primitiva patiendi] or of *resisting*" (AG 118; emphasis in original), is the intrinsic inertia of the substance (AG 120); put differently, it is the property of the creature that allows it to delimit the range of effects that an agent produces in it. Primitive passive force, moreover, corresponds to what the 'Schools' call the "*primary matter*" of the substance (AG 119). These two components – substantial form and primary matter, or primitive active and passive force – makeup what Leibniz calls an 'organic unity', or, from about 1698 onward, a "monad[x]."

Derivative forces are ontologically less fundamental than primitive forces, since the former are modifications or limitations of the latter:

> Furthermore, we must consider derivative force (and action) as something modal, since it admits of changes. But every mode consists of a certain modification of something that persists, that is, of something more absolute. And just as shape is a certain limitation or modification of passive force or extended mass, so derivative force (and motive action) is a modification, not of something merely passive, otherwise the modification or limit would involve more reality than that which is limited), but of something active, that is of a primitive entelechy. Therefore, derivative and accidental or changeable force will be a certain modification of primitive power that is essential and that endures in each and every corporeal substance. (AG 254)[xi]

Although this passage is concerned primarily with modifications of active force, it illustrates Leibniz's position that derivative forces, both active and passive, modify something fundamental, "absolute," or

"persisting." Outside of Leibniz's 'dynamics', however, derivative forces rarely come up. Rather, the 'modal' terminology Leibniz uses more frequently is mentalistic – that of appetite and perception, where appetite corresponds to derivative active force and perception to derivative passive force.

Each creature, from rational minds to basic bodies, for Leibniz, contains perceptions and appetites, and nothing else (M 17: AG 215; AG 181). A perception is the transient state in the substance that "involves and represents a multitude in the unity or in the simple substance" (M 14: AG 214). For Leibniz, each perception is a complex of many simple perceptions (*petites perceptions*) – each perception contains, in a manner of speaking, a representation of each past, present, and future state of not only the creature to which it is tied, but also to every other creature in the world – although the representational structure or content of perception is not very important for our purposes. What is important for our purposes is the causal nature of perceptions. For Leibniz, the only change in a substance is the change from one perception to the next (M 17: AG 215).

The change of perceptions is brought about by appetition – the "action *of* the internal principle [primitive active force]" (M 15: AG 215). Each individual appetition is connected to a perception that it aims to bring about. Commentators sometimes carelessly run appetition together with primitive active force, before explaining the distinction between the two, but the distinction is worth pointing out. The distinction between primitive active force and appetition is best understood as the distinction between attribute and mode, where the former is an attribute of the creature, or something essential to the creature, and the latter a mode of this attribute: appetition is the "action *of* the internal principle [of change]" (ibid., emphasis my own), not the internal principle itself, since the internal principle itself is a constant striving (M 9-13: AG 214), and each individual appetite is merely an expression of this striving.

In what follows, I will explain how appetite, for Leibniz, seems to be a type of productive causation, whereas perception, insofar as it is tied to appetite, seems to be a type of final causation.

2.3 Real Causation: Efficient-Productive and Final

Unlike many early modern philosophers, Leibniz accepts secondary final causation. There is no doubt, moreover, that, for Leibniz, secondary final causation enjoys a privileged ontological status – it's a type of *real* causation. Leibniz often distinguishes between two realms or kingdoms, a "kingdom of grace" and a "kingdom of nature," the former governing 'souls' and the latter governing 'bodies'. Leibniz claims that, "[s]ouls act according to the laws of final causes, through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient [mechanical] causes or of motions" (M 79: AG 223). Since bodies turn out to be in the realm of mere *phenomena*, mechanical causation is merely phenomenal. Since souls, substantial forms, or active forces, are the metaphysically real objects in Leibniz's ontology, and since Leibniz attributes final causation to souls, we know that, for Leibniz, final causation is a type of *real* causation.

Although Leibniz does not consider efficient-mechanical causation to be a type of real causation, he does consider efficient-productive causation to be one. The distinction between two types of efficient causation might seem peculiar, and, indeed, it is not a distinction that you will find made often, but the distinction is important to raise, nonetheless. Productive causation, normally, involves the communication of *perfection*[xii] (or *esse*, or *being*), in the form of a substance or mode, from an agent to a patient. In the technical vocabulary of the medieval scholastics, productive causation involves raising a state in a patient from *potentiality* to *actuality*. Alfred Freddoso points out that the scholastics also maintain that productive causation requires the communication of some *determinate* perfection, rather than a determinable one, since it does not make sense to speak of an agent causing a general effect in a patient (Freddoso, 1994, 137): if John pokes Smith in the arm with a stick, John does not cause some determinable effect in Smith, but rather a determinate one–a pain in the arm. Productive causation, thus, involves two distinguishable aspects: (1) raising a state from potentiality to actuality, or, what I will call, the communication of

perfection-in-general, and (2) the communication of a determinate perfection, or, what I will call, the communication of perfection-in-specific; these two distinguishable aspects of productive causation will become more significant in later sections.

Mechanical causation, for early modern philosophers who treat material bodies as ontologically real, is, in a sense, just a species of productive causation, since it involves both of the above conditions of productive causation. However, even for these early modern philosophers, since mechanical causation applies only to bodies, all instances of mechanical causation are instances of productive causation, but the converse does not hold, since there are instances of productive causation that are not mechanical–God's creation of the world being a paradigmatic example. For Leibniz, the two types of causation are more distinct, since, as mentioned above, he holds that bodies are merely phenomenal–grounded in real substances, but not themselves real. Thus, for Leibniz, no instance of mechanical causation *is* an instance of productive causation, although, it would be accurate to say that all instances of mechanical causation, for Leibniz, *correspond* to instances of productive causation.

There is a good deal of controversy over whether or not Leibniz accepts productive causation at the secondary level. As we will see momentarily, when discussing secondary causation in isolation from divine causation, Leibniz sometimes implies, if not explicitly asserts, that productive causation operates at the secondary level. As we will see in section three, however, when discussing secondary causation in relation to divine causation, Leibniz explicitly states that creatures are not productive causes.

For Leibniz, there is an inter-dependence between productive causation and final causation, such that an agent must be directed at some specific effect in order to bring about any effect whatsoever, and an agent can only bring about a specific effect if the agent has the means for doing so–*aims are not efficacious on their own*. Nevertheless, it is, at least, initially plausible that the source of the final cause of an effect reside in a different agent from the source of the productive cause; there is no *prima facie*

objection to maintaining, for instance, that effects within the natural order are brought about through a joint effort between two agents, whereby one agent directs another's productive causal power. As I will explain in section five, this is the model of concurrence that Sukjae Lee (2004) attributes to Leibniz; God is the sole productive cause of natural effects and creatures only final causes of them. Ultimately, I reject the view that creatures are merely final causes, for Leibniz, because final causation alone is insufficient to distinguish concurrentism from occasionalism in at least one important respect, but I wait until section five to explain this further. For now, we will assume that Leibniz is capable, in theory, of locating the final cause in a different source from the productive cause, in which case, we need either textual support or good philosophical reasons for why creatures are productive causes, in addition to final causes, for Leibniz. In fact, we can find both textual evidence and good philosophical reasons for attributing productive causation to creatures for Leibniz. Let's start with the former.

Take the following frequently cited passage from *Theodicy*:

> M. Bayle asserts, for instance, 'that by purely philosophical meditations one can never attain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause of our volitions'. But this is a point which I do not concede to him: for the establishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the course of nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that it is free of all physical influence from every other substance, save the customary cooperation of God. (T 300: H 309; quoted in Bobro, 2008, 332)

This passage does not explicitly identify creatures as efficient-productive causes, to be sure, but it comes close to doing so. As Marc Bobro points out, Leibniz responds to Bayle's claim that it is impossible to determine whether or not creatures are the efficient causes of their "volitions" by stating that his pre-established harmony shows "beyond a doubt" that creatures are the "cause" of all of their own actions, and, presumably, "cause" here means efficient-productive cause, given the earlier reference to efficient-

productive causation. While there seems to be a natural way of reading the above passage such that it supports that Leibniz maintains a type of secondary productive causation, at least some of this support diminishes when reading the passage in its greater textual context.

The above passage comes from a section of *Theodicy* where Leibniz discusses the problem of *necessitarianism*, in addition to weaker forms of *determinism*.[xiii] Leibniz addresses in the above passage the issue of whether or not creatures are determined by external-physical influence, or a type of causal determinism. According to Bayle, this is not an issue that we can decide with any certainty through philosophical, or *a priori*, methods, but only through an investigation of the physical-causal structure of the world. But, according to Leibniz, pre-established harmony, on the basis of purely philosophical reasoning alone, ensures that creatures are not influenced by external forces, and, thus, also that there is no "doubt" that creatures are the causes of their own actions, save "the customary cooperation of God" (ibid.). But if in the above passage Leibniz is only concerned to show that we are free from external determination, the missing use of "efficient cause" at the end of the passage might then be significant. Leibniz might hold that Bayle's position is disproven by his pre-established harmony, both because creatures are free from external influence and because creatures are the 'source of all their own actions', while still denying that creatures are productive causes. Ultimately, it seems that this passage on its own provides insufficient evidence that Leibniz accepts a type of productive causation at the secondary level.

Nevertheless, there is a passage from Leibniz's *Specimen Dynamicum* that shifts the evidential balance in favor of the view that Leibniz maintains secondary productive causation:

> I accept that all corporeal phenomena can be traced back to mechanical efficient causes, but those mechanical laws as a whole must be understood as themselves deriving from higher reasons. Higher efficient causes are therefore appealed to only in establishing those remote and general explanations, and once they have been established, entelechies

> or souls have no place in discussions of the immediate and specific efficient causes of natural things, any more than do useless faculties and inexplicable sympathies. (WF 163; quoted in Bobro, 2008, 333-334)

This passage occurs in a context in which Leibniz discusses how even the ordinary subject of physics – pushings, pullings, or mechanical causes, more generally – is itself derivable from higher explanatory principles – "higher reasons," or higher "efficient causes" (ibid.), ones that reside in the fundamental attributes of creatures, their 'primitive forces'. Although Leibniz eschews recourse to these higher "efficient causes" in the ordinary explanation of natural phenomena, it is clear that they operate at a fundamental metaphysical level, providing the ultimate, or "general," explanation of creaturely mechanical causation. Since higher efficient causes are not mechanical, and since efficient causation seemingly has to be either mechanical or productive, it seems likely that higher efficient causes are productive.

However, if productive causation operates at the secondary level, then why does Leibniz fail to include it along with final causation as a type of causation that is proper to the "kingdom of grace": "[s]ouls act according to the laws of final causes, through appetitions, ends, and means" (M 79: AG 223). The answer, I take it, is because final causation, for Leibniz, is inextricably tied to productive causation, such that the one never takes place without the other.[xiv] We can see how intimately tied the two types of causation are, for Leibniz, if we look at how he spells out final causation.

Like a standard Aristotelian[xv], teleological account of final causation, Leibniz's account treats final causes as *ends* towards which an agent aims. Leibniz's account of final causation, however, adds a certain degree of complexity to, or perhaps departs from, the traditional account both because it locates all causation intra-substantially and because it relies heavily on mental concepts in order to explain causal interactions. For Leibniz, perceptions within creatures serve as the 'ends' towards which appetitions in

those same creatures strive: a perception is an 'end' insofar as it provides a "reason" for its existence (N 475). More specifically, for Leibniz, it is the representational content of a perception that stimulates *conatus*, an appetite for the state represented in the perception. But the *striving* of the appetite must terminate in a new perception, in order for perceptual change to take place, otherwise the appetitive nature of the creature would be such that it always *strives* for new perceptions, but never actually *acts* to bring them about. Recall, I mentioned previously that primitive active force, *conatus*, or *striving* is an *activity*, which, according to Leibniz, sits somewhere between a "faculty of acting and the act itself" (L 433); *striving*, then, is not an *action*. But appetite, or derivative active force, is an action: it is the "*action of* the internal principle [of primitive active force]" (M 15: AG 215; emphasis my own). While final causation would seem to explain striving in the creature, it does not seem to explain action – the termination of striving in a new perception; again, aims alone are not efficacious. And while we could resort to primary causation to explain *all* action within Leibnizian creatures – creatures could merely be fonts of activity or striving, without ever acting, by constantly *aiming* or *attempting* to realize new perceptions – this would leave unexplained the passages where Leibniz associates appetite with action itself. In order for each component of the causal structure of the creature to have an explanatory purpose, it would seem that the following picture must hold accurate: perceptions and appetites operate according to the 'laws of final causes', insofar as perceptions stimulate *conatus*, and *conatus* is sufficient for appetites, and appetites aim at new perceptions; aims alone, however, are insufficient bring about perceptual change, and, therefore, there must be an efficient causal component to appetites, which accounts for the (specific) *actions* of the creature.

There is a problem, however, with describing the efficient causal component as a type of productive causation. If the efficient causal component were productive, then appetites, presumably, would have to communicate perfection to perceptions; put differently, appetites would have to *produce*

new perceptions. Leibniz, however, is quite clear that creatures do not *produce* perceptions. Rather, each perception that a creature will ever have is contained within it from the moment of its creation (T 360: H 341; M 22: AG 216). In addition, we will see in section three that Leibniz is quite clear that God is the sole source of perfection in creaturely states.

There is, nevertheless, another sense of *production* in Leibniz, one that I will explain more fully in section seven, which takes place through a process of *limiting*, or a process of setting bounds on *perfections* (*esse* or *realities*). Perceptual change, according to this notion of *production*, takes place when a creature actualizes one of a set of possible perceptions – when, that is, a creature delimits the range of its possible perceptions to a single one. This process, of course, does not meet the conditions on productive causation listed above, strictly speaking. Although a creature raises a state from potentiality to actuality on this latter type of causation, it does not do so by communicating perfection. Thus, we might think of this latter notion of causation as the inverse of *productive* causation–a type of deficient causation. It is deficient causation, I will argue, that supplements final causation at the secondary level. And, as we will see in the next section, Leibniz's model of concurrentism provides good initial evidence that creatures are deficient causes.

-- §3 How to Steer Between Conservationism and Occasionalism --

Christian theologians and philosophers of the medieval and early modern periods disagree about how to reconcile Divine, or primary, causation with natural, or secondary, causation. On one side of the debate, mere conservationists (simply conservationists, hereafter) maintain that God conserves creatures and their causal powers in existence, while also maintaining that secondary causal powers are *sufficient* to bring about effects within the natural order.[xvi] On the other side, occasionalists maintain that God's is the *only* efficacious causal power within the natural order, and, consequently, that secondary causal powers do not exist. Concurrentists attempt to blend elements of both conservationism and occasionalism, maintaining that secondary causes are efficacious, but only when combined with God's causal cooperation–God's "concurrence." Concurrentists, therefore, face a unique dilemma: if they assign too great a role to secondary causal powers in bringing about effects within the natural causal order, they risk lapsing into conservationism; if they assign secondary causal powers too little a role, they risk lapsing into occasionalism. And, of course, neither horn is acceptable.

There is little doubt that Leibniz is a concurrentist. He claims, "I myself recognize God's concurrence to be so necessary that, whatever creaturely power is assumed, no action would follow if God were to withdraw his concurrence" (LR 11). Leibniz scholars disagree, however, over what model of concurrentism Leibniz ascribes to, and over whether or not Leibniz's model of concurrentism is entirely consistent. In this section, I will first explain some of the challenges to formulating a consistent theory of concurrentism, and then show how Leibniz's own model of concurrentism meets some of these challenges. I conclude the section by looking at Leibniz's reasons for rejecting conservationism and occasionalism.

3.1 God's Cooperation is Immediate and Special

> Some have believed, with the celebrated Durand de Saint-Pourçain and Cardinal Aureolus, the famous schoolmen, that the co-operation of God with the creature (I mean the physical co-operation) is only *general* and *mediate*, and that God creates substances and gives them the force they need; and that thereafter leaves them to themselves, and does naught but conserve them, without aiding them in their actions. (T 27; 139; emphasis my own)

According to the above passage from *Theodicy*, conservationists, such as Durandus and Aureolus[xvii], maintain that God acts mediately on effects within the natural causal order, while God immediately conserves[xviii] creatures and their causal powers, which bring about effects within the natural causal order through their own immediate agency. The notion of immediate action is usually understood as a type of productive causation. In its barest form, an agent *x* is *an*[xix] immediate cause of an effect *y*, if and only if (1) *x* is an *active* cause of *y*, (2) no intermediary[xx] *z* separates *x* from *y*, and (3) *x* gives perfection to *y*.[xxi] Conditions (1) and (2) are straightforward: (1) states the obvious–immediate *causes* are agential, and (2) sates that no mediate causes are immediate causes. Condition (3) states that an immediate cause is one that *produces* an effect: when one billiard ball strikes another, setting it in motion, the one billiard ball is said to *produce* motion in the other. It is important to note that condition (3) only requires a limited type of productive causation: it requires that an immediate cause give perfection-in-general to an effect, but it does not necessarily require that it give perfection-in-specific to an effect. Moreover, all parties agree that all immediate causes are productive, but not all productive causes are immediate, since it is possible for an agent *x* to mediately produce an effect in *y* by immediately producing an effect in *z*: conservationists, for example, hold that God is the mediate cause of all effects within the natural order because God is the immediate cause of creaturely causal powers.

In addition to claiming that God is only a mediate cause of effects within the natural order, conservationists maintain that God gives perfection-in-general to the creature and its causal powers – God gives creatures *being* and supplies them with the force to act, but the creature, of its *own* accord, then uses this force to bring about *specific* effects within the natural order: fire produces a heating rather than a cooling because of its nature and its causal powers, not because God adds heat to the fire.[xxii] There might be some slight disagreement among conservationists over precisely how we should spell out the generality and mediacy of God's conserving activity, but for our purposes, these disagreements are of no concern.

In complete opposition to conservationism, occasionalism maintains that God acts on effects within the natural causal order both immediately and specifically. This result follows directly from the denial of causal powers to creatures. Since creatures lack the ability to both give perfection to effects and to specify[xxiii] which effects come about within the natural order, God alone must accomplish both of these tasks, so long as we assume that there are causal interactions within the natural order. And many, if not most, occasionalists do assume that the world is filled with real causal interactions; these interactions, however, are just not ones that creatures have their hands in.

Although there is no widespread agreement among concurrentists[xxiv] over whether or not God's cooperation is immediate or mediate, general or special, Leibniz is clear that God's cooperation is both immediate and special:

> God's concurrence (also the ordinary, that is, the non-miraculous) is both immediate and special. It is immediate not only because the effect depends on God, since its cause arises from God, but also because God does not concur less or more remotely in producing the effect than in producing its cause. It is special because it is not only directed to the existence of the thing or of the act, but also to the way and the qualities (*modum et*

> *qualitates*) of existing in so far as there is in them some perfection, which always flows from God, the father of light and the giver of all good. (GP VI 440; quoted in Vialti 222)

As we see from this passage, the causal nexus between God and the creature, for Leibniz, is such that God acts immediately both on the creature and on the effects that he produces with the creature. Moreover, we see that God, by helping to determine the qualities of the effect – that is, by giving *perfection-in-specific* to effects – acts specifically to bring about effects within the natural order. There is a looming danger with Leibniz's immediate- specific account of concurrentism, however, since with respect to God's causal activity in the nexus, it is identical to occasionalism.

I already mentioned, briefly, that an internally consistent account of concurrentism must weave together carefully elements of both conservationism and occasionalism: if God's cooperation with creatures leaves God no influence over the effects within the natural order, then conservationism is inevitable; if God's cooperation leaves the creature with no influence, then occasionalism is inevitable. A common option for avoiding this dilemma requires that *both* God and creatures act immediately and specifically on causes within the order of nature. This option is problematic, however, and leaves the concurrentist in risk of lapsing into a derivative form of the same dilemma.

Recall, a condition on immediate action is that an immediate cause is one that gives perfection to an effect, and a condition on acting *specifically* is that the agent produce a specific effect in a patient. If the Concurrentist maintains that both God and creatures act immediately on effects within the natural order, then the concurrentist maintains that God's action on effects within the natural order is similar in kind to those of God's creatures. But this leads to a dilemma, with conservationism looming on one side and occasionalism on the other. Leibniz puts the dilemma as follows:

> Properly and accurately speaking, the correct thing to say is not that God concurs in an action, but rather that he *produces* it. For let us suppose that God concurs in some action

> in such a way that it is produced not only by God, but also in part by man; from this supposition it follows that this particular concurrence of the man does not require the cooperation of God, which is contrary to the hypothesis. For that particular concurrence is also an act; therefore, it follows in the end that all acts are produced in full by God, in the same way as are all creatures in the universe. He who produces half the thing twice over, produces the whole. Or, more accurately, he who produces half the thing, and, in turn, half of the remaining half, and, in turn, half of the remaining half of the preceding half – to infinity – produces the whole. This takes place in any act whatsoever, according to God's manner of operation. For let us suppose that God and a man concur in some act; it is necessary that God concur with this very concurrence of the man, and either it will proceed to infinity…or, rather, it will suffice to say from the beginning that God actually produces the act, even if it is the man who acts. (Grua 275; quoted in Sleigh, 184; emphasis my own)[xxv]

Imagine that the joint productive effort in the above passage results in the motion of a bicycle, a two-person bicycle, and that the action that produces the motion is a pedaling, one that both God and the creature take part in. The dilemma that Leibniz generates occurs because the two actions are homogeneous – they are both *productive*, and both productive in the same way – allowing us to dissect the unitary effect and attribute a portion to each agent separately. In other words, since the creature pedals the bike, rather than, say, steering it, it stands to argue that the creature causes a portion of the total effect by itself. It then makes sense to ask whether or not the creature requires God's assistance for its portion of the total effect: if we answer affirmatively, we face a regress that leads to occasionalism, inevitably; if we answer negatively – if the creature's productive action is sufficient on its own to bring about its portion of

the total effect, we arrive at conservationism. Of course, the concurrentist should find neither horn acceptable.

In order to avoid the negative consequences of this latter dilemma, the concurrentist must retain a unitary effect in light of the fact that it is brought about through the conjunctive effort of God and the creature. One option for avoiding the dilemma is to maintain that God's cooperation with the creature to produce effects is *general*, not *special*. If the creature were merely steering a bike that God pedals, say, then the creature would not require God's cooperation to bring about its portion of the effect, since the creature acts only by directing or *specifying* God's productive input; pushing the metaphor to its limit, God's general cooperation on effects would be a scalar quantity, so to speak, whereas it is a vector when combined with the creature's specifying activity. Perhaps a better example, at least one more common among medieval scholastics, is the case of conception, where it is argued that God produces the *esse* of the fetus – God gives the fetus *being*, that is – but the parents make the fetus, say, a rabbit rather than a turtle. According to this model of concurrentism, then, it does not make sense to ask whether or not the creature requires God for its causal contribution to the total effect, since its causal contribution to the total effect is not separable from God's contribution. This strategy is not without its own problems, however.

Recall, in section two I explained that productive causation, normally, meets two conditions: (1) a productive cause must give perfection-in-general, and (2) it must give perfection-in-specific. Conservationists argue that since the above route for avoiding the dilemma requires that God's causal role in the natural order does not meet (2), the above route ultimately lapses into conservationism (Freddoso, 1994, 143-151). The reason, ultimately, that the conservationist claims that failing condition (2) leads directly to conservationism is because without (2), supposedly the *immediacy* condition discussed above fails as well, and of course without either condition conservationism follows. If God does not act specifically on effects, then it stands to argue that God's action is mediated by the creatures causal

contribution, since it is only through the specifying causal contribution of the creature that God's contribution is efficacious, even though the creature would not be able to bring about any effect whatsoever without God's causal contribution. Whether or not this argument succeeds in convincing is disputable.[xxvi] Regardless, it is clear that Leibniz does not accept the aforementioned account of concurrentism, and it would be safe to bet that part of the reason he does not accept it is because of the objections against it that the conservationist raises.[xxvii]

Leibniz's own model of concurrentism is unique; it states that both God and creatures act immediately and specifically on effects within the natural order. But Leibniz does not run into the dilemma of the 'dual productive model', since he maintains that God is the *only* productive cause, at least as productive causation was spelled out in the preceding section, within the order of nature. Although it is disputable, there is textual evidence that Leibniz maintains that creatures are *deficient* causes – they cause the"limitation" or "imperfection" in effects within the natural order. Here is a representative sample of passages in which Leibniz expresses his perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism:

> This consideration will also serve to satisfy some modern philosophers who go so far as to say that God is the only agent. It is true that God is the only one whose action is pure and without admixture of what is termed 'to suffer': but that does not preclude the creature's participation in actions, since *the action of the creature* is a modification of the substance, flowing naturally from it and containing a variation not only in the perfections God has communicated to the creature, but also in the limitations that the creature, being what it is, brings with it. (T 32; H 142)

> I have already proved that the cooperation of God consists in giving us continually all that is real in us and in our actions, in so far as it involves perfection; but that all that is

> limited and imperfect therein is a consequence of the previous limitations that are originally in the creature. Since, moreover, every action of the creature is a change of its modifications, it is obvious that action arises in the creature in relation to the limitations or negations which it has within itself, and which are diversified by this change. (T 377; H 352)

I will explain how to best interpret the above, and similar, passages in section seven, especially insofar as they relate to the action of the creature, but, for now, I want to address a few features of these passages, and the model of concurrentism that they attribute to Leibniz, that are relevant to the present section.

It is clear enough that Leibniz maintains that God is the *sole* productive cause within the order of nature: "the cooperation of God consists in giving us continually *all* that is *real* in us and in our actions" (T 377; 352; emphasis my own). And although it is a contentious matter, one that will be discussed in subsequent sections, there is room to argue that creatures solely cause imperfection in effects within the order of nature – a proposal that, on the surface at least, challenges some of the passages in section two that seem to suggest that creatures are efficient-productive causes.

This perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism, as I will call it from hereafter, which is suggested by the above passages, avoids the pitfalls of the dilemma of the 'dual productive model' of concurrentism in much the same way as the model that treats God as an immediate-general cause. If the creature causes the limits in effects – say, in the way that the perimeter of a circle limits its area – and God causes the perfection in effects – say, the area inside the circle – then the conjunctive effort terminates in a unitary effect – a circle. Although we might wonder whether or not the creature requires God's cooperation to cause limits or imperfections, thus, generating the same dilemma (Again!), according to Leibniz, the creature only requires God's cooperation to cause limits insofar as there is some reality in them – say, the two dimensional line inscribing the area of the circle. The limit part of the limits

in effects is caused by creatures completely, and there is no worry that creatures do not require God for this aspect of their causal contribution, since God is incapable of causing imperfection; the significance of this last point will become clearer in sections six and seven. In this way, both God and the creature contribute something to the effects within the natural order, but since both contribute different *kinds* of properties to these effects, and since the *kind* of property the creature contributes does not depend on God, we needn't worry about the above dilemma.

Leibniz's model of concurrentism might, nevertheless, lapse into occasionalism, unless there is a way of spelling out the production of limits in a way that seems sufficiently causal. For now, I want to leave open whether or not Leibniz's model of concurrentism leaves room for causally efficacious creatures, and, consequently, whether it does, in the end, lapse into occasionalism. I will take up this issue in detail, however, in section seven. To hint at some of the content of these sections, I will mention here that Leibniz distinguishes between two senses of reality, one that includes only perfections and one that also includes privations; it is in the latter sense that creatures are genuine causes of effects within the natural order, not by contributing perfection to effects, but by contributing limitation to them:

> God is the one principle cause of pure and absolute realities, or of perfections…But when one comprises limitations and privations under the term realities one may say that second causes cooperate in the production of that which is limited; otherwise God would be the cause of sin, and even the sole cause. (T 392: H 359; also, see, H 389-92)

3.2 Problems with the alternatives: Occasionalism and Conservationism

Not only does Leibniz explicitly accept concurrentism, he also explicitly rejects its alternatives – conservationism and occasionalism, although he says little about the shortcomings of the former. It is likely that Leibniz dismisses conservationism with little hesitation because he does not want to beat the

dead horse of the "greater number of Scholastic theologians" (T 27: H 139). Scholastic philosophers, for the most part, object to conservationism for theological or purely scriptural reasons.[xxviii]

Perhaps the most relevant of the scholastic objections against conservationism for understanding why Leibniz rejects the view is stated in Suarez's *Metaphysical Disputations*. According to Suárez, religious piety should incline theologians to a view of divine causation that permits the greatest amount of divine activity in the natural order compatible with secondary causal powers. If a consistent account of concurrentism is available – one that does not lapse into conservationism or occasionalism – then there is no convincing theological reason for preferring conservationism to concurrentism (*Disputations*, 22, 1, 13; Freddoso, 1991, 578). If Leibniz, like Suárez, believes that his concurrentism is consistent, he has no reason to worry about conservationism.

Unlike his treatment of conservationism, Leibniz spends a great deal of effort, throughout his philosophical career[xxix], attempting to show the shortcomings of occasionalism. Leibniz's greater concern with occasionalism most likely stems from the widespread popularity of the view among continental philosophers and theologians during his lifetime, and from the relevant similarities between his own account of causation and occasionalism. Leibniz, in a number of places in his oeuvre, presents the following two objections against occasionalism.

First, Leibniz claims that occasionalism is theologically deficient because it makes God the author of sin, instead of making creatures the authors of sin. Since creatures lack causal powers, according to the occasionalist, they are incapable of causing sin; so, if sin is caused, then God causes it – a heretical conclusion, no doubt (T 399-400: H 362-3; also, see, H 389). Occasionalists, such as Malebranche, are aware that their theory risks implicating God in creaturely sins – the risk is to be expected. However, there are a limited number of viable responses that allow occasionalists to absolve God for creaturely sins, and each one seems to make an unacceptable concession. On the one hand, the

occasionalist might argue that sin is non-existent, and thus not caused, a strategy that Malebranche favored (ST 547-558), but in this case the occasionalist must tell a story, perhaps a story that's not hard to tell, but a story nonetheless, about how punishment for sin is still warranted. On the other hand, the occasionalist might argue that at least some creatures – humans, in the very least – have some causal powers, namely, those required for free action, but in this case concurrentism seems to follow, at least in a limited sense. As Leibniz is quick to point out, neither of these concessions is necessary with his model of concurrentism.

Leibniz, through his model of concurrentism, absolves God as the author of sin by stipulating that God causes only perfection in creaturely states, while creatures cause what there is of imperfection in their states, sin being a type of imperfection, one that human creatures cause through their free actions (T 273-275, 288; H 294-5, 302, respectively). If nothing else, Leibniz's perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism, thus, seems to offer a theodical advantage over occasionalism.

Leibniz's second objection against occasionalism aims to show that it requires a 'perpetual miracle' in order to explain ordinary natural phenomena. The objection is featured prominently in an exchange between Leibniz and Pierre Bayle:

> Let us see, however, whether the system of occasional causes really doesn't involve a perpetual miracle. Here [Bayle says] it does not, because the system holds that God acts only according to general laws. I agree that he does, but in my view that isn't enough to remove miracles. Even if God produced them all the time, they would still be miracles, if the word is understood not in the popular sense, as a rare and marvelous thing, but philosophically, as something which exceeds the power of created things. It isn't sufficient to say that God has made a general law, for in addition to the decree there has

> also to be a natural way of carrying it out. It is necessary, that is, that what happens should be explicable in terms of the God-given nature of things. (WF 205)

According to Bayle, occasionalism does not involve a perpetual miracle, because God acts according to general laws when God acts *ordinarily* within the natural order, rather than violating general laws, such as he does when he acts miraculously (WF 196-7). According to Leibniz, however, a miraculous action is simply one that exceeds the power of a created thing. Since all action exceeds the power of created things, for the occasionalist, the consequence that occasionalism involves perpetual miracles follows.

Although Bayle is the first to exit the debate with Leibniz over whether or not occasionalism involves a perpetual miracle, he does not leave convinced with Leibniz's argument in favor of the motion (WF 196-7), and nor should he, and nor should we, for that matter. Like Bayle, we ought to be suspicious of Leibniz's 'perpetual miracle' objection, since he seemingly stacks the deck in his favor by *specifying* that miraculous activity is activity that exceeds the power of created things, rather than activity that violates general laws. After all, who are we to say that the 'parting of the Red Sea' (*King James Version*, Exodus 14. 21-2) is miraculous because it exceeds the natural power of the Red Sea, and not because it is a "rare and marvelous thing" (WF 205). If occasionalism is true – if things lack causal powers, that is – then the only distinction between miraculous and non-miraculous phenomena is that the former occur less frequently than the latter. In order to avoid begging the question against occasionalism, Leibniz better have an argument against the occasionalist account of miracles.

Although Leibniz's argument against the occasionalist account of miracles is enthymemetic, at best, I'm going to take the opportunity here to rationally reconstruct it. As I take it, the argument I am here supplying on Leibniz's behalf is echoed in the *Correspondence with Arnauld*:

> I admit that the authors of occasional causes might give another definition of the term [miracle], but, according to common usage, it seems that a miracle differs *internally* and

> *substantively* from the performance of an ordinary action, and not by the external accident of frequent repetition…(AG 83; emphasis my own).

Overlooking the force of the *appeal* to the common usage of "miracle" in this passage, the crucial element is the emphasis on the tie between an 'internal and substantive' distinction, or, put differently, a *real* distinction, between miraculous and non-miraculous action. Leibniz rejects the occasionalist account of miracles because it is unable to distinguish between the epistemology of miracles, or how we come to know whether or not some event *p* is a miracle, and the metaphysics (or, more specifically, the ontology) of miracles. As for the epistemology of miracles, Leibniz gives much the same account as the occasionalist one above: we come to know miracles because they *appear* to violate "natural laws" (AG 48-9; also, see, AG 71). But how we come to know whether or not some event is or is not miraculous does not tell us about the nature of miracles. Since Leibniz has recourse to causal powers within creatures, he is able to explain miraculous activity as anything that exceeds the powers of created substances: miracles come directly from God, ordinary phenomena from creatures.[xxx] But the occasionalist must lump both ordinary phenomena and miracles together, since God, on his own, causes both. The occasionalist, therefore, fails to provide a *real* distinction between ordinary phenomena and miracles.[xxxi] Leibniz, then, has a perfectly good argument against the occasionalist account of miracles, even if he only implicitly makes it himself.

-- §4 Tensions at the Intersection of Metaphysics and Theology --

We are now in a position to start addressing whether or not Leibniz's perfection- imperfection model of concurrentism is compatible with *real* secondary causation. In section two, we saw that Leibniz seems to be committed to a type of secondary productive causation, but in section three we saw that the model of concurrentism Leibniz seems to endorse, a perfection-imperfection model, is incompatible with secondary productive causation. The present section focuses on a unique challenge, in this respect, one that does not aim to show that Leibniz's model of concurrentism is incompatible with *real* secondary causation, per se, but rather that Leibniz's model of concurrentism is incompatible with his account of secondary *active* causation.

According to Robert Adams (1994), Leibniz's metaphysical account of *active* creaturely causation states that creatures are only active insofar as they are *productive* causes, a statement that, when taken in relation to Leibniz's perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism, reduces creatures to merely *passive* causes. It is important to note that this is not an objection that Leibniz's model of concurrentism lapses into occasionalism, *per se*, since *passive* causal powers are still a type of *real* causal power: a patient that delimits the range of effects that an agent can produce in it still contributes to the causal nexus with the agent. The worry is, rather, that Leibniz's concurrentism goes against his central thesis that creatures, especially rational creatures, have an intrinsic principle of action, or active force.

Adams takes the following passages from section fifteen of the *Discourse on Metaphysics* (hereafter, DM 15) and section forty-nine of the *Monadology* (hereafter, M 49) to illustrate Leibniz's account of active causation:

> [DM 15] the substance which immediately passes to a greater degree of perfection or to a more perfect expression exercises its power and *acts*, and the substance which passes to a lesser degree shows its weakness and *is acted upon* [*pâtit*]. (AG 48; emphasis original)

> [M 49] The creature is said to act externally insofar as it is perfect, and *to be acted upon* [*patir*] by another, insofar as it is imperfect. Thus we attribute *action* to a monad insofar as it has distinct perceptions, and *passions*, insofar as it has confused perceptions. (AG 219; emphasis original)

Since these passages, at least on their surface, indicate that active creaturely causation is a type of productive causation, for Leibniz, they seem compatible with a dual-productive causal model of concurrentism, which, if what I said in the last section is correct, Leibniz rejects, and incompatible with a perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism. If a creature is only active insofar as it passes to a greater degree of perfection or distinctness of perception, and if God is the sole source of perfection or distinctness of perception in creaturely states, it stands to argue that creatures, when analyzed with full metaphysical rigor, lack active causal powers, or, as Adams puts it, creatures lack active force:

> Identifying substantial form with primitive active force, and primary matter with primitive passive force, [Leibniz] therefore treats the former as a tendency to perfection, or distinct perception, and the latter as a tendency to imperfection or limitation, or confused perception. But if God's conserving activity produces directly all the perfection in the states of creatures, in such a way that creatures produce only the imperfection of their states, the conclusion is close at hand that God's is the only *active* and that creatures only have *passive* force. (Adams 96)

Adams does not dispute that Leibniz holds a perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism, nor does he dispute that Leibniz holds the metaphysical account of active causation provided in DM 15 and M 49. Being unable to find a way to render Leibniz's model of concurrentism wholly consistent with his account of active causation, Adams concludes, somewhat apologetically, that in "allocating perfection

and imperfection to the action of God and of creatures, respectively, Leibniz had the problems of theodicy more on his mind than those of metaphysics" (Adams 97).

There is no doubt that Leibniz's model of concurrentism helps him solve, at least some, theodical problems; as we saw previously, it helps him avoid implicating God in creaturely sin. However, it is certainly not clear that theodical concerns motivate Leibniz's concurrentism to a greater extent than either theological or metaphysical concerns do. In addition, when we situate DM 15 and M 49 in their appropriate context, the impression of inconsistency between Leibniz's concurrentism and his account of active causation dissolves, although we are still left with the question of what active causation amounts to for Leibniz.

Bertrand Russell, in his book on Leibniz (1900), reveals an important distinction between the two senses of action in Leibniz's work. According to one sense, action is the essential activity of the creature; this is the metaphysically strict sense of action. In the other sense, action is opposed to passion, such that the former signals an agent or cause and the latter a patient or effect; this is the phenomenal sense of action. Russell rightly notes that the "activity which is opposed to passivity is quite distinct from the activity which is essential to substance" (Russell 142). Leibniz only discusses activity as it is *opposed* to passivity in the context of inter-substantial causation.

When we look closely at DM 15 and M 49, we see that they deal exclusively with inter-substantial active and passive causation; more specifically, these two texts deal exclusively with the reduction of inter-substantial causation at the phenomenal level to the inner workings of creaturely states at the metaphysical level:

> *The Action of One Finite Substance on Another Consists Only in the Increase of Degree of its Expression Together With the Diminution of the Expression in the Other, Insofar as*

God Requires Them to Accommodate Themselves to One Another. (AG 48; italics in original)

As we saw in section two, Leibniz denies *real* inter-substantial causation between finite creatures – creatures do not transfer perfection, either substances or modes – to one another. In DM 15, M 49, and similar passages, Leibniz explains creaturely interaction, in the terms of his system, as intra-substantial changes in creaturely states: a creature *x* is said to act *phenomenally* on a creature *y* when the *real* state or perception of *x* is more perfect or distinct than *y*'s state or perception; *x* is passive otherwise[xxxii].

Nothing in DM 15 or M 49 indicates that the *phenomenally* active creature causes perfection in its own states; nothing in these two passages, that is, implies that creaturely actions are *productive*. The closest Leibniz comes to treating creaturely actions as *productive* is in DM 15, where he says, "the substance which immediately passes to a greater degree of perfection or to a more perfect expression *exercises its power and acts*" (AG 48; emphasis my own). However, on careful examination, since nothing in this remark from DM 15 shows that the perfection in the state of the creature is a *product* of its 'active power', it is consistent both with the view that the creature does not cause any perfection in its states and with the complementary view that the creature only causes what is limited or imperfect in its states, doing so by changing the *degree* of perfection in, but not by contributing perfection to, its states.[xxxiii] The tension Adams's sees between Leibniz's concurrentism and his metaphysical account of active causation is, therefore, unfounded. There is no doubt that active force, for Leibniz, is a "tendency to perfection" (Adams 96), but this needn't imply that creatures *contribute* perfection to their states by exercising their active force.

Nevertheless, we can assume that Adams would request an explanation of what active creaturely causation is for Leibniz, if it is not the most obvious candidate – productive causation. One response

available is that active causation is final causation, and final causation alone, for Leibniz. This response echoes Sukjae Lee's interpretation of Leibniz's account of secondary causation.

-- §5 Lee's Interpretation: Secondary Causation as Formal and Final Causation --

In this section, I examine Sukjae Lee's (2004) novel interpretation of Leibniz's account of secondary causation. Lee's interpretation treats final and formal causation as the only types of secondary causation for Leibniz. According to Lee, the "nature of a creature cooperates in the production of the [modifications of its states] by setting bounds to God's production in the sense that it provides *reasons* that determine and demand which modification God is to produce among infinite possibilities" (Lee, 2004, 221; emphasis original). On the one hand, the creature is a formal cause insofar as its present states specify fully its future states, which God brings about through God's productive causal influence. On the other hand, the creature is a final cause insofar as its present states "*demand* or *urge*" God to bring about its particular future states, rather than any other possible future states (Lee, 2004, 222-223). The fusion of formal and final causation, what Lee calls "rational determination," constitutes Leibniz's full account of secondary causation.

Treating formal and final causation as the only types of secondary causation for Leibniz has a number of interpretative advantages. In section three, we saw that Leibniz rejects a dual productive causal model of concurrentism, claiming instead that God produces *all* there is of perfection in creaturely states, which is perfectly consistent with Lee's view that secondary causes are only formal and final for Leibniz. Moreover, because Lee's interpretation also treats God as the *only* productive cause, while creatures are merely formal and final causes, Lee's interpretation avoids carving up the effects that God and creatures contribute to in the natural order in such a way that leads to the dilemma faced by the dual productive model, where conservationism looms on the one side and occasionalism on the other.

Nevertheless, Lee's interpretation does conflict with the passages that we saw in section two that suggest that Leibniz accepts some form of productive causation at the creaturely level. These passages should not be used as the principal reason for rejecting Lee's interpretation, however, since the passages

do not come up in places where Leibniz discuses concurrentism specifically. It could merely be the case that when Leibniz discusses secondary causation on its own, he veers closer to mere conservationism than to concurrentism. But an account of secondary causation that is consistent with both the passages from section two and Leibniz's account of concurrentism seems preferable to one that is just consistent with the latter, like Lee's. In section seven, I attempt to offer such an account, one that makes sense of the content from sections two and three.

My present task, however, will be to show that there are reasons for rejecting Lee's claim that creatures are only formal and final causes for Leibniz. As I will argue, an interpretation that limits secondary causation, for Leibniz, to formal and final causation must be rejected, for both textual reasons and because it risks making God the author of sin.

5.1 Formal Causation as a Type of Secondary Causation

Although Leibniz explicitly endorses secondary final causation, he does not explicitly endorse formal causation; what's more, he does not explicitly mention formal causation as it pertains to secondary causation in any of his texts. Why, then, does Lee treat formal causation as one of the principal forms of secondary causation for Leibniz? Certainly, there are areas in Leibniz's texts where conceptual associations, or at the very least the terminological ones, implicitly refer to formal causation, of some type; for example, Leibniz identifies active force as the substantial *form* of the substance. But Lee does not base his argument that creatures are formal causes on *mere* conceptual or terminological associations. Rather, he argues that formal causation is integral to Leibniz's notion of a complete individual concept (CIC, for short), or, more accurately, to his notion of the 'concrete correlate' of a CIC.

According to Leibniz, each individual creature, possible or actual, maps on to an individual concept in God's understanding, a concept so complete that it contains every predicate that could ever or will ever apply to the creature (DM 14: AG 46-7). Concepts in their own right, however, are not causal.

There are many un-actualized concepts in God's understanding, each of which corresponds to a creature[xxxiv], and none of which have causal powers: the un-actualized forty-fourth president of the United States has no more causal power than the 'present King of France'. If CICs possessed causal properties at all, they would not be properties of secondary causation, but rather properties of divine causation, since CIC's exist only in God's understanding. And as Lee puts it, if "God's idea of the creature were bringing about the relevant states in the creature, then Leibniz's account of creaturely action would ultimately be more occasionalist than concurrentist, a clearly unacceptable consequence" (Lee, 2006, 5). I'll return to a worry that is relevant to this last point below.

Although Lee does not identify CICs as the formal causal aspect of secondary causes, he does identify the formal causal aspect of secondary causes with what C.D. Broad calls the "ontological correlate" (OC, for short) of the CIC, something concrete in each individual creature that corresponds to the CIC.[xxxv] The textual evidence most often cited in favor of the existence of *concrete* correlates, OCs, corresponding to CICs comes from a notoriously difficult passage from DM 14:

> What happens to each [creature] is solely a consequence of its complete idea or notion alone, since this idea already contains all its predicates or events and expresses the whole universe. In fact, nothing can happen to us except thoughts and perceptions, and all our future thoughts and perceptions are merely consequences, though contingent, of our preceding thoughts and perceptions (DM 14; AG 47).

Leibniz scholars interpret this passage in different ways, but many, including Lee, hold that it indicates a type of causal relationship between something like an OC and a CIC, such that the OC *expresses* concretely the CIC, which exists in God's understanding. This interpretation is plausible, given that Leibniz explicitly refers to the notion of the CIC at the beginning of the passage, and then relates this notion to perceptual change, and, as I mentioned in section two, perceptual change is causal, for Leibniz.

There is further evidence that there is a concrete expression of CICs. In Leibniz's mature philosophy, he often talks of perceptions following a "law of the series." For Leibniz, each creature contains within it from the moment of creation every perception it will ever have, similar to how each CIC contains every predicate that will ever apply to it.[xxxvi] Moreover, just as each CIC provides an exact blueprint for the predicates that will ever apply to it, the law of the series provides a detailed map, or, more accurately, a set of tracks, for perceptual change within each creature. And as Lee indicates, Leibniz, at least in some of his mature works, associates the law of the series with the substantial form of the creature: "the principle of actions, or primitive force of acting, from which a series of various states follows, is the form of the substance" (MP 84).

OCs act as formal causes, according to Lee, because they specify the precise perceptual *shape* of the creature; OCs, that is to say, specify which perceptions God is to *produce* in the creature. While OCs might play the formal causal role Lee assigns to them, at least at some level of explanation within Leibniz's system, OCs, with their formal causal role, do not explain creaturely *actions*. Let me explain why.

If OCs are just concrete expressions of CICs, and CICs are concepts in God's understanding that reveal a creature's complete nature prior to its existence, OCs seem to fix perceptual states in a deterministic way. To understand why, start by assuming two principles that we might reasonably extract from Lee's explanation of formal causation: (1) *creatures are not responsible for their CICs*, since CICs are ideas in God's understanding prior to a creature's existence, and (2) *OCs are merely concrete expression of CICs*–there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of predicates that apply to

a concept and the set of perceptions that a creature will have over the course of its existence. If (2) implies, on the basis of (1), that creatures are not responsible for their OCs, then OCs, along with

God's causal contribution, specify fully each future state of the creature, without the creature's active causal contribution.

There is reason to think that (1) is false, however, and that creatures are, in a sense, responsible for their CICs, and consequently also responsible for their OCs:

> …the soul finds in itself, *and in its ideal nature anterior to existence*, the reasons for its determinations…That way it was *determined from all eternity in its state of mere possibility to act freely, as it does, when it attains to existence*. (T 323: H 321; emphasis my own)

This passage is linked to Leibniz's solution to the problem of necessitarianism, a problem briefly mentioned in section two. Opponents of Leibniz's notion of a CIC often criticize that CIC's do not allow room for free creaturely actions, since God is only capable of filling a world with the concepts in God's understanding, and each concept in God's understanding is *necessarily* fixed by its full set of predicates. Leibniz's solution to this problem is simple and elegant. Instead of the concepts of creatures determining their actions, the actions of creatures determine their concepts (partially[xxxvii]): if a true proposition in God's understanding describes, for example, that Adam eats a shiny red apple, it is Adam's eating the shiny red apple that makes the proposition true, but it is not the true proposition that makes Adam eat the shiny red apple, since Adam's eating the shiny red apple is anterior to the true proposition, 'Adam eats a shiny red apple (at such and such a time, etc.)'. This solution preserves the contingency of creaturely acts, without requiring a limitation on God's omniscience.

Now, since OCs are just correlates of CICs, it cannot be that OCs, with their formal causal roles, are responsible in any substantial way for creaturely actions, since these actions are already "freely" determined in the CIC, prior to the existence of the OC. Hence, it must be some other type of causation that specifies a creature's perceptions, and really the only candidates are final and efficient causation.

This is not to deny that OCs have a formal causal role: a creature is responsible for its actions prior to its existence, and in virtue of this responsible for its actions while it exists, but existing creatures do not deviate from their conceptual natures – their concrete correlates, or OCs are fixed; so, at one level of explanation, OCs are formal causes, and responsible for specifying a creature's perceptual states. Nevertheless, this level of explanation is derivative, since formal causation is posterior to whatever form of causation is responsible for OCs in the first place.

5.2 An Unfortunate Similarity Between Final and Sine Qua Non Causation

Despite disagreeing with Lee over the role that formal causation plays at the secondary level, I agree with him completely that creatures are final causes, and that final causation is a type of active causation. But while Lee holds that final causation is sufficient[xxxviii] to dissociate Leibniz's concurrentism from occasionalism, I hold that some further causal component is necessary to do so. I hold this position for two reasons.

I raise the first reason only briefly, since it relies mostly on my own intuitions about Leibniz. As I see it, if Leibniz were to maintain that final causation is the only form of causation necessary to prevent his version of concurrentism from lapsing into occasionalism, he would say as much, especially since Leibniz rarely misses an opportunity to point out how his rehabilitation of final causation helps him overcome the problems faced by those that rely solely on efficient causation. Leibniz, however, never once appeals to final causation when explaining his version of concurrentism. Perhaps the omission of an explicit mention of final causation in discussions pertaining to concurrentism would be less significant if concurrentism were an issue that Leibniz rarely addresses; however, Leibniz addresses many issues pertaining to concurrentism throughout his writings, from his earliest to his latest[xxxix].

While Lee's failure to locate, what I would deem, sufficient textual evidence in favor of the model of concurrentism he attributes to Leibniz is in no way a reason for rejecting Lee's interpretation

outright, there is a much more philosophically significant problem with Lee's interpretation. This problem derives from the insufficiency of final causation alone to distinguish Leibniz's concurrentism from occasionalism in an important respect: final causation, isolated from efficient causation, is not sufficiently different from *occasional* (or *sine qua non*) causation to avoid making God the author of sin.

In section three, I mentioned that occasionailists reject secondary causation, but left un-explained the occasionalist's notion of secondary *occasional* (or *sine qua non*) causation. Here's a brief summary Freddoso cites of Molina's interpretation of Gabriel Biel's occasionalism and his notion of an occasional cause:

> He is of the opinion that secondary causes bring about nothing at all, but that God by Himself alone produces all the effects in them and in their presence, so that fire does not produce heat and the sun does not give light, but instead it is God who produces these effects in them and in their presence. Hence... he claims that secondary causes are not *properly* causes in the sense of having an influence on the effect; for it is only the First Cause which he affirms to be a cause in this sense, whereas secondary causes, he claims, should be called causes *sine qua non*, insofar as God has decided not to produce the effect except when they are present… (Freddoso, 1988, 84)

Leaving aside the subtle nuances that might make one account of occasional causation slightly different from another, we can describe occasional causation as a type of counterfactual *dependence* between an occasional cause *x* and an effect *y*, such that were the occasional cause *x* to fail to obtain, the effect *y* would as well, though *y*'s failure to obtain is in no way due to the exercise, or lack thereof, of any productive causal power in *x*; this is precisely the account we find Molina attributing to Biel. The nature of the occasional cause, *x*, is such that it operates as a 'reason' for an effect, *y*. With respect to creatures that are not free – fire, for example – a reason just takes the form of a natural disposition – God produces

heatings and burnings through fire because fire is the type of thing that heats and burns; however, with respect to free creatures, a reason takes the form of a demand or desire for an effect – God produces the event, 'Adams eating the apple', not because God wants man to fall, but because Adam desires or demands to eat the apple.

As we saw in section three, Leibniz rejects that an occasional cause is sufficient to absolve God as the author of sin. Although the occasionalist claims that sinful acts require occasional causes – the occasionalist claims that God does not cause sin without a creature directing her causal power towards a sinful act – the occasionalist is committed to saying that either God is the *causal source* of sin, or that sin is not *real*. But if Lee is correct, and creatures are merely final (and formal) causes for Leibniz, then Leibniz's concurrentism would seem to make God the author of sin as well. A Leibnizian final cause, according to Lee, is one that 'directs' God's productive causal power towards the creation of a new state, but an occasional cause is just one that directs God's productive causal power towards a new state as well; so, final causes make God the causal source of sin just as much as occasional causes do.

Nevertheless, Lee responds to this objection, and in a way that he assumes discredits a variant of the model of concurrentism I attribute to Leibniz in section seven. According to Lee, Leibniz takes the Malebranchian way out of the above objection, by denying that sin is *real*. Leibniz's mature position on sin, according to Lee, is a Neo-Platonic one. But as I will argue in the next section, Lee's response trivializes Leibniz's account of evil. The project of *Theodicy* is to vindicate God's benevolent nature in the light of evil in general, and sin more specifically. And the account of evil that Leibniz provides in *Theodicy*, as well as in many of his other theodical and theological works, is manifold – it divides evil up into different ontological categories, as we shall now see.

-- §6 The Ways in which an Imperfection Counts as a Non-Existent --

According to Lee, a Neo-Platonic account of imperfection is incompatible with a perfection-imperfection model of concurrence, since the former assumes that imperfections are uncaused privations and the latter assumes that creatures cause imperfections. In Lee's words:

> Imperfections [according to Neoplatonism] do not arise from a *distinct source* and they are not "positive evils" inherent in created things, but rather are limitations in the sense of privations, since the perfections of creatures are lacking and limited when compared to the absolute perfections of God. (Lee, 2004, 210; emphasis my own)

As Lee rightly points out, in the *Dialogue on Freedom and Human Evil*, in an exchange between A, representing Baron Dobrzensky, and B, representing Leibniz, Leibniz defends a Neoplatonic account of imperfection:

> A. – ... [h]ow did sin come into the world, since God, the creator of the world, is infinitely good and infinitely powerful? To account for sin there must be another infinite cause capable of counterbalancing the influence of divine goodness.
>
> B. – I can name you such a thing.
>
> A. – You would therefore be a Manichean, since you admit two principles, one of good and the other of evil.
>
> B. – You yourself will acquit me of this charge of Manichaeism when I name this other principle.
>
> A. – Then please name it now, sir. B. – It is nothingness [*le Néant*]. ...
>
> A. – You are joking, no doubt. [This is] almost like a wise man whose book about Nothing I remember having seen. (Passentius, *de Nihilo*)

> B. – No, I am not joking. The Platonists and Saint Augustine himself have already shown us that the cause of good is positive, but that evil is a defect, that is, a privation or negation, and consequently, it arises from nothingness or nonbeing.
>
> A. – I do not see how nothingness, which is nothing, can enter into the composition of things.
>
> B. – But, ... you would admit that all created things are limited, and that their limits, or their *non plus ultra* if you wish, constitute something negative. For example, a circle is limited on account of the fact that the separation of the compass used to inscribe that circle was not larger. Thus the boundaries or the *non plus ultra* of this separation determine the circle. It is the same for all other things, for they are bounded or imperfect by virtue of the principle of negation or of the nothingness they contain, by virtue of the lack of any infinity of perfections in them, and which are only a nothingness with respect to them. (AG, p. 113-114; quoted in Lee, 2004, 209-10[xl])

In this exchange, Leibniz explicitly rejects Manichean dualism, which posits two distinct forces of good and evil, offering instead an account of evil supported by the "Platonists and Saint Augustine[xli]," in which evil is an *imperfection or mere privation – nothingness*.

Leibniz's Neoplatonic account of imperfection, however, does not contradict a perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism. Lee is right that imperfections do not arise from a distinct source for Leibniz, just as for the Neoplatonists, but only if by "distinct source" what is meant is a source opposing God – for example, the Devil, as the Manicheans believe. Imperfections, as we will see, also do not arise from God. Imperfections do, nevertheless, arise from creatures–creatures *cause* imperfections, according to Leibniz. Lee's reason for rejecting this last claim relies on a simplification of Leibniz's account of evil, one that I will now analyze.

6.1 Imperfect Creatures and Creatures that Sin

In order to absolve God of any blame for the existence of evil, Leibniz finds it necessary to distinguish between three types of evil for which God might be blamed: moral evil, which "consists in sin," physical evil, which "consists in suffering," and metaphysical evil, which "consists in mere imperfection," (T 21: H 136). Leibniz does not assume that all types of evil are privative, as the exchange with Dobrzensky might lead one to believe. Leibniz claims that God "wills" at least one[xlii] type of physical evil, namely, punishment and its extreme – damnation, and since God's will never fails to produce its full effect and certainly only ever creates what is positive, physical evil is positive. Metaphysical evil and moral evil, however, are privative, although metaphysical evil results from an "original imperfection" in creatures, whereas moral evil results from creaturely action.

Although it might not appear obvious from the specific passage cited above, in his exchange with the Baron, Leibniz explains where sin originates in its first instance–an explanation of its metaphysical origin. The Baron, just prior to the discussion quoted above, pushes Leibniz to explain how evil enters the world prior to Adam's original sin (AG 113): in order for man to fall, so the argument goes, God must cause original sin. But in the exchange with the Baron, just as in *Theodicy*, Leibniz explains evil in its first instance through an "*original imperfection*" in creatures, one *all* creatures have in virtue of being "limited in essence" (T 20: H 135; emphasis original). God does not cause the original imperfections in creatures, since they are mere privations, and result from creatures lacking some degree of the total share of perfections–perfections creatures have no claim to, such as omniscience. And sin, according to Leibniz, only enters the world in its first instance because creatures lack certain perfections, not because God makes creatures imperfect (AG 113-115; T 20: H 135): if Adam were omniscient, he would know the consequences of eating the apple, and would avoid doing so, but since finite creatures have no claim to a property such as omniscience, God is not culpable for failing to endow Adam with the property.

There is a distinction, however, between a creature's natural propensity to sin and a creature's sinful actions. Although sinful actions are only possible because of an original limitation in the creature, the original limitation does not *necessitate* that a creature sin. Since no creature, no matter how perfect, contains every perfection God himself possesses, metaphysical evil is necessary (T 20: H 135).[xliii] It is possible for God to create a world devoid of rational creatures, and consequently one without sin and punishment; however, it is not possible for God to create a world devoid of any imperfection whatsoever, since no created world can possess all of God's perfections. But even sin and punishment do not enter worlds as a *necessary* consequence of the type of metaphysical evil that accompanies rational creatures: Adam's limited nature makes it possible for him to stray from God's grace, but in order for sin to enter our actual world, Adam has to freely choose to eat the apple; he is not metaphysically compelled to eat the apple (T 273-7: H 294-6). Lee does not address this point, but it discredits his claim that creatures do not cause their imperfections. Let me explain.

Lee assumes that all imperfection, for Leibniz, enters into the world because of the "original limitation" in creatures – what Leibniz calls metaphysical evil. More specifically, Lee attributes to Leibniz the view that *all* imperfection in creatures results from imperfect-perfections that emanate from God (2004, 211): "[i]n acting, things depend on God, since God concurs in the actions of things, insofar as there is something of perfection in their actions, which, at least, must emanate from God" (G 6:440; quoted in Lee, 2004, 212). A creature *qua* creature, Lee argues, is only able to receive limited perfections, despite the fact that its perfections emanate from God (2004, 212).

Lee's interpretation, however, overlooks that creaturely free will is a cause of imperfection, for Leibniz:

> …free will is the *proximate cause* of the evil of guilt, and consequently of the evil of punishment; although it is true that the original imperfection of creatures, which is

> already present in the eternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause" (T 288: H 302; emphasis my own).

Contrary to Lee's interpretation, the original imperfection in creatures generates the conditions for the possibility of sin – the original imperfection being the "first and most remote cause [of sin]," but original imperfection does not sufficiently explain sin in creatures by itself, since a complete explanation of creaturely sin must also refer to free will – the "proximate cause [of sin]." God does not cause sin, and since, as we saw in section three, God is the sole productive cause, sin must be an imperfection. Moreover, since free will is the proximate cause of sin, and the original limitation in the creature only the first or remote cause of sin, there must be a distinction between the imperfections creatures cause, at least with respect to sin, and those that constitute the original limitations of its essence.

Leibniz is clear about the distinction between the original imperfections found in creaturely essences and those that creatures cause in "Summary of the Controversy Reduced to Formal Arguments" – a set of objections and replies that accompanies *Theodicy*. In the first part of his response to the fifth objection of the "Summary" – the objection that God must be the cause of sin, since God is the cause of all that is real, and consequently all that is real in sin – Leibniz distinguishes between two senses of reality, one including limitations and one excluding limitations, and then claims that God is not the cause of sin if reality is taken in the former sense, but that God is the cause of sin if reality is taken in the latter sense, a response that echoes Leibniz's response to the Baron in the *Dialogue on Freedom and Human Evil*.

Leibniz's distinction between original imperfection and those that are caused is not novel, not even among early modern philosophers and theologians; indeed, Descartes's meditator makes a similar distinction with respect to error in the *Meditations on First Philosophy*. The meditator claims that error, in its first instance, is "not something real that depends on God, but merely a defect"– a lack of "perfection"

or “nothingness” (CSM 2:38); more specifically, the mediator finds that error is only possible because of an uneven relationship between the will and intellect, the former being more perfect when taken in relation to the latter (CSM 2:40). However, since creatures are capable of restricting their will to the scope of their intellect, creatures are responsible for errors of judgment with respect to the truth or falsity of propositions. Much the same as Leibniz, then, Descartes’s meditator locates error, a type of evil, in privation in its first instance and creaturely freedom in its second instance.

Naturally, one might worry about the response I have provided to Lee’s objection, given that it seemingly only explains how *free* creatures cause imperfections, not how creatures in general cause imperfections. Free creatures cause sin, and sin is an imperfection; however, according to Leibniz, there are many creatures that have causal powers but do not sin. Because Leibniz’s model of concurrentism applies to *all* creatures, I owe an explanation for how creatures that are not free cause imperfection.

As I take it, the explanation of how free creatures cause sin illustrates how creatures cause imperfections more generally. Although lower creatures might not sin, *per se*, their actions must terminate in imperfect states, states that limit the perfection that God’s causal input is able to produce in them. In the next section, I will explain how the notion of causing imperfections, privations, or limitations counts as type of *real* secondary causation.

-- §7 Tying up Loose Ends: Sleigh's Unfinished Interpretation --

On the basis of some of the passages I cited in section three, passages indicating a perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism, Sleigh states that his view on Leibniz's mature position of concurrentism is that "God produces what there is of perfection in the states of creatures; creatures produce whatever there is of limitation in their own states" (Sleigh 185). Sleigh does not argue for his view, however, nor does he explain what it means for creatures to "produce whatever there is of limitations in their own states," which is understandable, since the topic of concurrentism lies outside the scope of the work in which he discusses the issue, *Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence*. Sleigh, moreover, makes it transparently clear in that work that he only attributes a perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism to Leibniz because of intuitions he has about the texts where Leibniz states his received view of concurrence. In this section, I want to make a case for Sleigh's intuitions.

To start, let me draw your attention to the passage I ended section 3.1 with; the passage contains one of the clearest statements of the perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism that I've been attributing to Leibniz:

> God is the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or of perfections…But when one comprises limitations and privations under the term realities one may say that second causes cooperate in the production of that which is limited; otherwise God would be the cause of sin, and even the sole cause. (T 392: H 359; also, see, H 389-92)

In this passage, just like many of the others in which Leibniz discusses concurrentism, he attributes the production of perfection within the natural order to God, exclusively. However, we also see Leibniz making an interesting ontological distinction here, one between 'reality' in the traditional sense, the sense that includes only perfection or being, and 'reality' in a wider ontological sense, the sense that also includes 'limitations'. We know that if one agent produces *all* of the perfection in an effect, that agent is

responsible for the 'being' of the effect – all of the *positive* realities it contains, that is. What could Leibniz mean by productive causation in this latter sense?

Before I answer this question, I want to address a minor worry that might come up when reading the above passage, a worry related to its apparent hypothetical form. One might worry that Leibniz allows some flexibility with respect to the scope of our ontology – we might treat 'being' in either the narrow sense, by including only positive realities, or in the wider sense; if the former, then we are not compelled to consider anything other than the orthodox notion of productive causation. The hypothetical form of the above passage, however, is illusory. Leibniz must treat 'being' in the wide sense, otherwise "God would be the cause of sin, and even the sole cause" (ibid.), a consequence Leibniz would not accept. Thus, limits must be comprised under what Leibniz considers "realities," and it must be the case that creatures cause "limits."

In order to explain what it means for a creature to *cause* a limit, for Leibniz, it will be necessary to first clarify what Leibniz means by the concept, 'limit'. To start, a limit, for Leibniz, is just a 'mode'– limits modify realities or perfections; this is how Leibniz describes limits in general. As Garber points out, when discussing line segments and points, for example, Leibniz describes that points are "limits" (*termini)* or "modifications" (*modificationes*) of line segments – line segments are *real* geometrical objects (L 597-8; quoted in Garber, 1985, 49); put differently, points merely "mark the boundaries" of line segments (Garber, 1985, 49). Leibniz's discussion of line segments and points also reveals an interesting ontological property of limits. According to Leibniz, while each line segment includes an infinite number of points, line segments are not composed by points – an infinite number of points, that is, will not get you a single line segment; however, the converse does hold – from one line segment we can get an infinite number of points (Garber, ibid.). Taking what Leibniz says about points as indicative of the properties of limits in general, a limit, then, (1) is not a reality *per se* – a reality in itself, but a reality *per*

accidens – a reality in relation to a reality *per se*, (2), because of (1), depends on an underlying reality for its existence, and (3) 'marks the boundaries' of a reality *per se*.

In section two, I explained that perceptions and appetites are merely modes of substances. Since modes are limits, perceptions and appetites are also limits. In section two, I also briefly mentioned that creatures do not *produce* perceptions, at least not if productive causation is taken to mean the communication of perfection from an agent to a patient, or, what turns out to be the same thing, if it is taken in the 'narrow sense' described above. But, as Leibniz indicates in the following passage, it is inaccurate to describe the production of modes as production in the 'narrow sense':

> As for the so-called creation of accidents, who does not see that one needs no creative power in order to change place or shape, to form a square or a column, or some other parade-ground figure, by the movement of the soldiers who are drilling; or again to fashion a statue by removing a few pieces from a block of marble; or to make some figure in relief, by changing, decreasing or increasing a piece of wax? The production of modifications has never been called *creation*, and it is an abuse of terms to scare the world thus. God produces substances from nothing, and the *substances produce accidents by the changes of their limits*. (T 395: H 360; emphasis my own)

As this passage indicates, creatures are capable of producing modes, for Leibniz, because the production of modes requires no efficient-productive effort – it does not require the communication of perfection, that is; rather, to "produce" a mode is just to alter perfection – to set bounds to it. When a creature produces a new perceptual state, then, this is not to say that the creature *efficiently produces* the perception, but rather that the creature, in a manner of speaking, 'deficiently' produces it, by setting bounds to or limiting what is real in the perception – the perfection that God communicates to it. It is this notion of productive causation, I take it, that operates in passages such as the following:

> In my system every simple substance (that is, every true substance) must be the true immediate cause of all its actions and inward passions; and, speaking strictly in a metaphysical sense, it has none other than those which it *produces*. (T 400: H 362; emphasis my own)

But if deficient causation is not a communication of perfection, why should we treat deficient causation as genuinely causal; how is producing limitation a type of *real* causation? The answer to this question, as I see it, requires us to again observe the above distinction between production in the narrow sense and production in the wide sense. If we hold that the only types of real causation are those that contribute causally to the perfection of things, then, of course, deficient causation is not a type of real causation; this would also mean that occasionalism follows from Leibniz's account of secondary causation.

It seems, however, too ontologically restrictive to limit real causation to just the communication of perfection, since the perfection of states must have some determination, and it is deficient causation that accounts for part of this determination. While God is the productive cause of creaturely states, insofar as God gives perfection-in-general and perfection-in-specific to creaturely states, without creatures' deficient causal input, God would also be responsible for limiting the perfection in creaturely states, but this seems contrary to God's nature. A creaturely state, that is, is not limited because God cannot give it more perfection than God does give it, but because the creature limits the perfection that God is able to produce in that state. Let me explain this last point with an analogy. Imagine you are at a function where you can drink as much (of your favorite beverage) as you can fit in your glass, but you must bring your own glass. If I am dispersing the drink, I am causally responsible for the contents of your glass – *all* of the drink that goes into it. I am not, however, responsible for not giving you more or less drink than your

glass can hold, since you were responsible for bringing with you your own glass. A creature, in a similar way, is responsible for the perceptions that it chooses to bring to God to be filled with perfection.

The full account of secondary causation that I am attributing to Leibniz, then, has two (main[xliv]) causal components – final and deficient causation. It is through final causation that a creature singles out one among a number of possible perceptions that it would have God produce in it. It is through deficient causation that the appetitive aspect of the creature, in conjunction with God's productive contribution, *acts* to bring about its perceptions. Therefore, the creature, on the interpretation I am here offering, does not merely set bounds to God's productive effort in virtue of its limited nature, or in virtue of the states it demands or desires, but, rather, *actively* sets bounds to God's productive effort.

-- §8 Concluding Remarks --

Admittedly, the case that I am providing here in favor of attributing secondary deficient causation to Leibniz is not conclusive, and will fail to convince some Leibniz scholars. There are, nevertheless, many interpretative desiderata that this account meets, of which I only list a few.

First, and perhaps most importantly, an interpretation of Leibniz's model of secondary causation ought to make sense of the passages in which Leibniz seems to attribute a type of efficient-productive causation to creatures, while also making sense of the passages where Leibniz claims that God is the sole productive cause. The interpretation I have provided here accomplishes this task by allowing for a type of deficient-productive causation – one that captures what it means for creatures to produce modes – while also maintaining that God is the sole productive cause, when productive causation is taken in the traditional sense – the sense in which an agent communicates perfection to a patient.

Second, since Leibniz maintains that creatures are essentially active, an interpretation of his account of secondary causation ought to leave room for secondary active causation. The interpretation that I have provided does so by emphasizing the active causal role of secondary final causation, in the spirit of Lee (2004), while also emphasizing the deficient causal role that creatures play in limiting their states.

Lastly, since one of the main tasks of Leibniz's major theodical works, *Theodicy*, is to show that creatures are solely responsible for their sins, even though God concurs with each and every one of their actions, it would seem that an interpretation that is consonant with Leibniz accomplishing this task is preferable to one that is not. As mentioned briefly in section three and in section seven, a perfection-imperfection model of concurrentism avoids making God the author of sin. Since creatures cause all that there is of imperfection in their states, and sin is a type of imperfection, God is absolved of any guilt for creaturely sins.

Therefore, if we take the interpretative position that Leibniz accepts a form of deficient causation, we are able to dissolve many of the apparent inconsistencies between Leibniz's metaphysical and theological accounts of causation. And this seems to warrant taking this interpretative position, especially given that Leibniz does not merely constrain his metaphysical account of causation with his theological account, and vice versa, but also sees the two as forming a unified whole.

[i] Throughout this work, I use "creature" in place of Leibniz's early terminology, (created) substance, or late terminology, (created) monad. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "creature" applies to *all* types of substances or monads – from rational minds to bare-bodies.

[ii] Productive causation is explained in detail in section 2.

[iii] For Leibniz's early and late views regarding occasionalism, see, e.g., Daniel Garber's Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, pp. 189-194.

[iv] There is a lively controversy among Leibniz scholars over the status of matter (or body) in the Leibnizian universe, one that was escalated, if not started, by Daniel Garber (1985; and, more recently, 2010). According to Garber, Leibniz maintains a *hylomorphic* account of substance up until and during his middle years, prior to and as late as the time of the *Correspondence with Arnauld* (1686-90) and the *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686). According to this account, substances are genuinely, not just conceptually, composed of form and matter. Substantial unities or form-matter composites are the most fundamental level of reality, and ground beings by aggregation–merely phenomenal assemblages of substantial unities. Although Garber's view has garnered many supporters over the past few decades, it is still met by great opposition (e.g., Christia Mercer (2001)). But even Garber agrees that the nature of the substance changes sometime shortly after the middle period, roughly around the time that Leibniz's universe becomes populated with monads (from the mid to late 1690s onward). At this point, monads, mind-like substances that express both mind-like and body-like properties, become the simple substances of the middle years: monads do not contain two distinct ontological components of form and matter, but can still be distinguished conceptually into these two elements, insofar as they contain both a primitive active force and a primitive passive force. In the present work, I am only concerned with Leibniz's mature metaphysics – the metaphysics monads. The *Discourse on Metaphysics* is the earliest text from Leibniz's corpus that I cite here, and the passages I cite from the *Discourse* do not really bear on the said controversy. In addition, I am sure to point out any place where the controversy filters into the discussion even in the slightest.

[v] The notion of productive causation is discussed at length in 2.3 of the present section.

[vi] Although there are a few notable exceptions (Radner, 1985; O'Neill, 1993), scholars have failed to examine in detail Leibniz's reasons for rejecting 'real influx' between substances, even though the topic permeates his dynamics and metaphysics. Most address the issue only insofar as it allows them to pass onto well-trodden areas of Leibniz's philosophical system; regretfully, I must do the same here.

[vii] This suggestion has been offered, for example, by Marc Bobro (2009).

[viii] Sleigh's description of spontaneity is in no way controversial. Indeed, Sleigh merely rephrases what Leibniz says in a number of his mature works: see, e.g., AG 143, and DM 14: AG 47.

[ix] Leibniz's notion of primitive active force, *conatus*, might seem foreign, especially in relation to the more familiar notion of *conatus* put forward by Spinoza, but close examination reveals that the two notions share a similarity at their cores. While it is true that Spinoza describes *conatus* in the way that Leibniz describes *inertia*, as a "striving to preserve in being" (E 3 P6), 'preservation in being', or conatus, for Spinoza, is a type of action, or increase of perfection, just as it is for Leibniz.

[x] According to Woolhouse and Francks (WF 217, fn), Leibniz first uses the term "monad" in *Nature Itself; or, The Inherent Force and Activity of Created Things– Confirming and Illustrating the Authors Dynamics* (1698).

[xi] See, also, AG 119, and T 87: H 170.

[xii] A word of caution: the notion of perfection – esse or being, is tied to the concept of existence, since all beings that exist have perfection, but whereas perfection come in degrees – humans are more perfect in *essence* than rocks – existence does not – rocks exist just as much as humans do.

[xiii] Leibniz discusses at length in *Theodicy* the threat of various types of determinism, with necessitarianism–the thesis that there are no metaphysical contingencies, being the most extreme form of determinism, and a type of weak moral determinism, where creatures are compelled to act on the basis of what seems best to them, being the least extreme. Leibniz concedes a type of weak moral determination, but rules out both physical determination, because of his pre-established harmony, and strict necessitarianism, for reasons that I will not be able to get into here.

[xiv] The point I am making here is in the spirit of one that Laurence Carlin makes (2006). According to Carlin, final causation is just a species of productive causation for Leibniz. I disagree with Carlin's account, however. Even though I think productive and final causation are intimately tied for Leibniz, I don't think Carlin provides an adequate textual basis for his claim that the one is just a species of the other. I leave aside further discussion of this issue here.

[xv] One of Aristotle's discussions of final causation can be found in *Physics* bk. II, ch. 3.

[xvi] All of the divine theories of causation we will look at imply a type of conservationism – that God conserves creatures and creaturely causal powers; however, the *mere* conservationist maintains that this is the full extent of God's causal contribution within the natural order.

[xvii] For an in depth discussion of conservationism, see, Alfred Freddoso's "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is Not Enough," and his "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects."

[xviii] "Conservation" will be used strictly to refer to God's causal role in preserving creatures and creaturely causal powers, whereas "cooperation" will be used to refer to God's causal role in producing effects. Leibniz often equivocates between the two, though context usually makes his intended use apparent.

[xix] Nothing in the notion of immediate causation prohibits two agents from immediately causing an effect, though, as we will see below, there are problems associated with dual productive causation.

[xx] The 'no intermediary' condition is quite straightforward: if x gives perfection to w, and w gives perfection to y, x is not an immediate cause of y, even though x is a mediate productive cause of y.

[xxi] This account of immediate causation is a slight modification of the one provided in Freddoso, 1991, 558.

[xxii] Of course, at the most fundamental level, God gives creatures their natures, for the conservationist, which then dictates what effects it can produce. Whether or not conservationism is self-defeating is not an issue I will address here; but, see, e.g., Alfred Freddoso's "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservationism is Not Enough."

[xxiii] There is a controversy here that will come up in section five: occasionalists maintain that creatures act as *sine qua non* causes, which, on some interpretations, is a type of specifying causal activity. I leave aside issues pertaining to *sine qua non* causation until section five.

[xxiv] Since I am primarily concerned with Leibniz's version of concurrentism, I will not discuss competing views, unless they relate directly to Leibniz's own. But for a survey of some of the more notable versions of concurrentism, see Alfred Freddoso's "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects." Also, see, Vialti, "Leibniz on Divine Concurrence with Secondary Causes," especially, pp. 219-222.

[xxv] There is some controversy over whether or not the passage in question comes from Leibniz himself or from Nicholas Steno (or from someone else altogether), since it is pulled from a text in which there is no explicit indication of which arguments belong to Steno and which belong to Leibniz. Robert Sleigh attributes the passage to Leibniz, because there is no refutation of the argument offered in the text, unlike many of the other passages that almost certainly come from Steno, and because, "bluntly," "it is too clever for Steno" (Sleigh 184). But Ezio Vialti questions Sleigh's reasons for attributing the view to Leibniz, since Luis de Molina (in *Concordia* XVI, III, XXVI), whose theory of concurrence Leibniz often criticizes, makes a similar argument; so, the argument "need not be Steno's own invention"– Steno could merely be reporting Molina's argument (Vialti 223-4). Moreover, Molina was not the only medieval philosopher to try out the argument; Durandus used it as well (see, Freddoso, 1994, 151-155). While it is possible that the argument comes from Steno, or even that Leibniz himself included it in the text with the intention of later refuting it, both of these options seem unlikely. Leibniz's mature view of concurrentism, which I explain further below, leaves God as the only *productive* cause; creatures only cause limitations, on Leibniz's mature view. So even if the argument were Steno's, Leibniz would have no reason to refute it, since it supports his own view indirectly.

[xxvi] It does seem as though we can think of cases where one agent gives perfection-in- general and another gives perfection-in-specific and both agents act immediately on the effect. Although the following analogy is not perfect, perhaps it illustrates that two agents can immediately act on an effect, while only one acts specifically: we might take, for example, two sculptors, one of whom provides the clay for the other; it seems there is a sense in which we can say the two acted immediately, since one was directly responsible for the material constitution of the statue and the other its form. Freddoso states a similar concern in relation to this objection on behalf of the conservationist against concurrentism (Freddoso, 1994, 143-151).

[xxvii] See, e.g., T 27: H 138-9.

[xxviii] In "God's Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is Not Enough," Alfred Freddoso presents and addresses the various philosophical, theological, and purely scriptural arguments against conservationism, most of which derive from either Suárez or Molina; see, especially, pp. 566-578.

[xxix] Cf. fn. 3.

[xxx] I am here assuming that God's ordinary cooperation with the creature does not count as miraculous.

[xxxi] Perhaps the occasionalist could distinguish between miraculous and non-miraculous causes on the basis of the cardinality of the set of miracles and the cardinality of the set of non-miracles, the latter, of course, being greater than the former. But with no qualitative distinction between the members of the two sets–since God causes both–it seems arbitrary that we would throw members into one rather than the other. Yet another retort on behalf of the occasionalist might be that God's general law and God's natural laws constitute two genuinely distinct metaphysical classes. God's actions always follow his general law, whether ordinary or not; however, it is only when God violates a natural law that his action is miraculous, so we only need to look at God's natural laws to determine whether or not an action is miraculous. Although this line is promising, it is not one that a theistic philosopher or theologian can take without teetering dangerously close to Deism, since natural laws themselves, on this view, either have to be genuinely distinct from general laws and incontrovertible by God, if they are not just a species of general law;

hence, Deism would follow–the natural laws could subsist without God. If the natural laws, however, were just a proper subset of God's general law and fully *reducible* to it, then there would, again, be no substantial difference between miraculous and non- miraculous action. In fact, we find this latter view–that there is no substantial difference between God's general law and natural laws–in the epitome of occasionalism, Malebranche (ST 667-8), suggesting that even if a suitable response to the above argument is available, it was not produced or used by Leibniz's own interlocutors.

[xxxii] Although I have spent a fair amount of time searching, I have been unable to locate a place where Leibniz talks about the metaphysical reduction of elastic collisions between bodies with equal mass and velocity. I assume both substances underlying the bodies are equally active and passive with respect to each other. This is an interesting issue, both for Leibniz's physics and metaphysics and for the connections between them, but it is one that is beyond the scope of this paper.

[xxxiii] The claim that creatures cause what there is of limitation in their states by changing the degree of perfection in their states forms the basis of my interpretation of creaturely causation in Leibniz's model of concurrentism; I wait until section seven to expand on this claim.

[xxxiv] This claim is false if we allow 'concept' to range over *abstracta*, since *abstracta* are not even possible creatures. The only concepts under consideration here are ones corresponding to creatures and possible creatures.

[xxxv] For an in depth discussion of the notion of an OC, see, e.g., Broad, pp. 24-5. For a more recent discussion, see, e.g., Adams, 79-80.

[xxxvi] The thesis is actually more radical than this, since each creature, for Leibniz, contains every perception that every other creature will ever have, as well, though this component of thesis – sometimes called "universal expression" – is not relevant for our purposes.

[xxxvii] Of course, creatures possess properties that are not related to their actions, like eye color.

[xxxviii] As I interpret Lee, formal causation does little work to prevent occasionalism, given that Lee does not once raise the issue of creaturely formal causal powers when arguing that his account of Leibnizian concurrentism does not lapse into occasionalism. See, e.g., Lee, 2004, 231-40.

[xxxix] For chronological details pertaining to Leibniz's work on concurrentism, cf., fn. 3.

[xl] For additional instances of Leibniz's support for a Neoplatonic account of evil not cited by Lee, see, also, T 135-6, 302-3, 384.

[xli] For Augustine's account of evil, see, e.g., *Confessions*, Bk. 7, Chp. 12-13, p. 130.

[xlii] Suffering is also a type of physical evil, which God merely permits in order to keep from committing greater evils (T 22-6: H 136-8).

[xliii] For Leibniz, a proposition (p) is "absolutely" necessary if and only if the contrary of p implies a contradiction (AG 45, 217); p is possible if and only if p does not imply a contradiction (AG 26).

[xliv] As I noted in section five, I do not deny that formal causation operates at some level of explanation for Leibniz.

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