[Review of the book Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change, by JaPorte]

  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
  • Introduction: Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change is a refreshingly direct book that challenges a range oforthodox views in the philosophy of science (especially biology), the philosophy of language, and metaphysics. Amongst these are the views that species are individuals rather than natural kinds; that scientists discover the essences of natural kinds; that the causal theory of reference has commonly-ascribed implications for realism and analyticity; that there is an unacceptable form of incommensurability entailed by descriptivism about reference; and that there are good grounds, familiar since Quine, for thinking that there is no distinction of significance to be drawn between changes in meaning and changes in theory. LaPorte argues against all of these claims, and if you are curious about just how he does it, then this is a book for you.

  • Date created
  • Subjects / Keywords
  • Type of Item
  • DOI
  • License
    Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
  • Language
  • Citation for previous publication
    • Wilson, R.A. (2004). [Review of the book Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change, by J. LaPorte]. Philosophy in Review, 24(6), 417-420.
  • Link to related item