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Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism Open Access


Other title
game theory
Type of item
Degree grantor
University of Alberta
Author or creator
Niu, Binglai
Supervisor and department
Dr. H. Vicky Zhao (Electrical and Computer Engineering)
Dr. Hai Jiang (Electrical and Computer Engineering)
Examining committee member and department
Dr. Yindi Jing (Electrical and Computer Engineering)
Dr. Ke-li Xu (Finance and Management Science)
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Date accepted
Graduation date
Master of Science
Degree level
Multicast is a bandwidth efficient mechanism to provide wireless services for a group of nodes. Providing reliable wireless multicast is challenging due to channel fading. This thesis investigates cooperation among receiving nodes to enhance the reliability of wireless multicast. A time division based cooperative multicast strategy is proposed, and the optimal scheduling scheme is found to maximize the system throughput. It is shown that the optimal relay number is bounded by a threshold, and the optimal time allocation can be found using an efficient algorithm. Numerical results show that the proposed strategy can enhance network performance when the average channel condition between receiving nodes is better than that of the direct link. To provide incentive for cooperation, this thesis further studies the interactions among selfish nodes using game theoretic approaches. The cooperative multicast process is modeled as a repeated game and the desired cooperation state which satisfies the absolute fairness and the Pareto optimality criteria is found. A Worst Behavior Tit-for-Tat incentive strategy is designed to enforce cooperation and its effectiveness is studied under both the perfect and the imperfect monitoring scenarios. To address the issue of imperfect monitoring, an interval based estimation method is proposed. Simulation results show that the proposed strategy can enforce cooperation efficiently even the monitoring is imperfect.
Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis and, except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatsoever without the author's prior written permission.
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