Calibrating Intuition: A Defense of Standard Philosophical Analysis

• Author / Creator

  Jalea, Justin

• Intuition has fallen from grace. Its authority to act as a source of evidence in philosophical discourse has recently been called into question by philosophers and cognitive psychologists alike, who claim that because of the many difficulties that plague intuition, it should not hold the evidential role it does presently. This is exceedingly troubling, since appeals to intuition are pervasive throughout, and infiltrate every level of, philosophical discourse. This paper explores the extent of intuition’s infiltration in philosophy and whether intuition is warranted in those positions. I argue that by focusing on virtues exhibited by philosophical methodology, many of the arguments made against them are defused. In spite of this, we can largely carry on utilizing the methodology which houses intuitions – Standard Philosophical Analysis – while continually attempting to revise and refine that methodology.

• Subjects / Keywords

  • Methodology
  • Intuition
  • Calibration

• Graduation date

  Fall 2009

• Type of Item

  Thesis

• Degree

  Master of Arts

• DOI

  https://doi.org/10.7939/R3X143

• License

  This thesis is made available by the University of Alberta Libraries with permission of the copyright owner solely for non-commercial purposes. This thesis, or any portion thereof, may not otherwise be copied or reproduced without the written consent of the copyright owner, except to the extent permitted by Canadian copyright law.