The False Only Problem For Dialetheism

  • Author / Creator
    Pona, Nika
  • Paraconsistent logics reject the validity of the principle that says that from a contradiction one can derive any proposition. A dialetheist is a paraconsistent logician who claims that this principle is invalid, because there are statements that are both true and false. The paradigmatic example of such contradiction is the Liar Paradox - informally, a sentence that says of itself: "I am not true". The paraconsistent solution to this paradox is to change the classical logic to a paraconsistent logic and accept that the Liar is both true and false. In this thesis I will discuss an objection to the claim that one would be better off if she switched to the dialetheic paraconsistent logic. The problem is that the dialetheist can't express the familiar notions of truth and falsity simpliciter. That is, she can't describe the consistent domains, neither can she reason about them.

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  • Graduation date
  • Type of Item
  • Degree
    Master of Arts
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  • License
    This thesis is made available by the University of Alberta Libraries with permission of the copyright owner solely for non-commercial purposes. This thesis, or any portion thereof, may not otherwise be copied or reproduced without the written consent of the copyright owner, except to the extent permitted by Canadian copyright law.
  • Language
  • Institution
    University of Alberta
  • Degree level
  • Department
  • Supervisor / co-supervisor and their department(s)
  • Examining committee members and their departments
    • Linsky, Bernard (Philosophy)
    • Bulitko, Vadim (Computing Science)
    • Hazen, Allen (Philosophy)