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The Regress and Ground of Being: In Defence of Metaphysical Infinitism
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- Author / Creator
- Oberle, Thomas
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There is a common intuition among many philosophers that chains of ground cannot go on forever. Metaphysical foundationalists believe that there cannot be infinite chains of ground, where one thing depends upon another for its existence without end. For example, if the existence of my desk depends upon the existence of its parts, and those parts depend upon further parts, etc., foundationalists think this regress must terminate in something fundamental. A prominent argument for why foundationalists think there cannot be infinite chains of ground says we must posit something fundamental to explain why there exist any non-fundamental or dependent things at all. The main idea is that if everything were dependent, then there would be no explanation for why any dependent things exist in the first place.
In this dissertation, I develop an argument for an opposing view to foundationalism called metaphysical infinitism. On this view, there is no end to chains of ground. For example, insofar as the existence of my desk depends upon the existence of its parts, and those parts depend for their existence upon further parts, this regress carries on indefinitely. According to metaphysical infinitism, nothing is fundamental. Everything is dependent upon something else.
I argue in favour of this thesis by defending a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). Broadly speaking, the PSR says that everything has a reason or explanation. My defense of the PSR is situated within the theoretical framework of grounding. According to the ground-theoretic version of the PSR that I defend, every fact has a ground or metaphysical explanation. I argue that the PSR entails metaphysical infinitism because if everything has a ground, then nothing is ungrounded or unexplained. As a result, nothing is fundamental, contrary to what the foundationalist believes. Since metaphysical foundationalism has arguably been the received view in analytic metaphysics, my dissertation seeks to challenge this consensus by providing a novel argument for an alternative position.
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- Graduation date
- Fall 2024
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- Type of Item
- Thesis
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- Degree
- Doctor of Philosophy
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- License
- This thesis is made available by the University of Alberta Library with permission of the copyright owner solely for non-commercial purposes. This thesis, or any portion thereof, may not otherwise be copied or reproduced without the written consent of the copyright owner, except to the extent permitted by Canadian copyright law.