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Full Name of Author — Nom complet de l'auteur

SUSAN CHARLOTTE HALEY

Date of Birth — Date de naissance	Country of Birth — Lieu de naissance
MARCH 3, 1949	CANADA

Permanent Address — Résidence fixe

BOX 262
WOLFVILLE, NOVA SCOTIA

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THE CORRESPONDENCE ASSUMPTION AND THE REFUTATION OF MONISM IN PLATO'S SOPHIST

by

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Correspondence Assumption and the Refutation of Monism in Plato's Sophist" submitted by Susan Charlotte Haley in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Supervisor

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DEDICATION

To Marten Hartwell

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents an interpretation of Plato's Sophist. It is maintained that the theory of naming of Plato's Cratylus is preserved and extended in the Sophist. It is argued that Plato holds that language corresponds mimetically to the world. It is denied that the Sophist presents an account of predication and in so doing marks a radical departure from Plato's earlier view of speaking.

A detailed examination of the paradoxes of Not-Being of the first part of the dialogue is undertaken. Three aporiae arise out of the view of language described. It is maintained that these paradoxes are not rejected at any point in the dialogue as misleading statements of a problem, as some commentators, notably Moravcsik, hold. It is also argued that these paradoxes must be seen as arising out of the view of language described; they are not radical reformulations of old Platonic problems set up in light of a new theory of language as Owen would maintain. For each paradox a solution is found later in the text.

The view of the paradoxes presented, it is argued, makes it clear that Plato's central problem in the Sophist is accounting for Existence and Non-Existence. The passage 255B - D where many commentators, e.g., Frede, Moravcsik, see Plato as shifting the problem from Existence to predication is examined critically. It is maintained with regard both to this passage and the passages which follow it in which Plato gives an account of negation, that Plato's dominant concern is to fit Existence and Non-Existence into the same mold as other positive and

and negative genera.

Some commentators beginning with Ryle have held that in the Sophist Plato begins to develop the notion of an incomplete concept different in type from generic concepts. These commentators hold that this development is crucial to understanding Plato's treatment of Being and Non-Being. The evidence for this view is examined and the view is rejected on the grounds that the text does not support it.

Finally, it is argued that, on the interpretation presented, Plato tries, but fails, to refute monism. The central notion of combination or mingling cannot be given any content with the theory of language Plato has.

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INTRODUCTION

The Sophist is the subject of the most interpretational disagreement of all of Plato's dialogues.

A sketch of the structure of the dialogue shows some good reason for this. The dialogue begins with an explication of the method of division by means of an example (the division of the angler). The method is then applied to the proposed subject of the dialogue, the sophist. It is demonstrated that the dividing out of the sophist cannot be completed without a preliminary inquiry into false speaking.

Aporia are presented, each of which represents false speaking as impossible. All of the aporia depend upon the identification of false speaking as saying τὸ μὴ ὄν .

A discussion is undertaken of the metaphysical views of Parmenides and some other Pre-Socratics not clearly identified. It is maintained that the ontology of these positions is such as to make not only saying τὸ μὴ ὄν but speech in general impossible. The section concludes with a methodological point: that it is not possible to eliminate the problem of τὸ μὴ ὄν before certain perplexities are cleared away about τὸ ὄν .

The next stretch of the dialogue is concerned with whether τὸ ὄν is to be identified either with Rest or with Motion. The conclusion is that it cannot be identified with either, although both must be.

In the next stage of the dialogue, a discussion is undertaken

of genera. The question put forward is: do none of the genera combine at all, do some of them combine, or do all of them combine? Five genera are discussed in this connection -- Rest and Motion, τὸ ὄν, Difference and Sameness. A long discussion follows in which it is established that all are independent genera although all mingle with all or some of the others.

A crucial and much disputed passage is part of this discussion in which τὸ ὄν and Difference are established as distinct genera. Another controversial passage in this section concerns an analogy between the combination of genera and the letters of the alphabet. It is asserted that some of the genera combine with all the other genera as vowels combine with all the letters; others, like the consonants, do not have such combinatorial natures.

The dialogue turns again to the possibility of saying τὸ μὴ ὄν. It is argued that to say τὸ μὴ ὄν is to speak of something and that τὸ μὴ ὄν is itself a genus, a part of the genus difference, the independence of which has already been established.

The next section is concerned with a discussion of the nature of logos. A logos is asserted to be a combination of nouns and verbs. It is then asked whether τὸ μὴ ὄν combines with logos. The answer is yes and the section concludes with an account of truth and falsity.

Finally, the division of the sophist which was broken off at the beginning of the dialogue for lack of an account of saying τὸ μὴ ὄν is completed.

The superstructure of the dialogue is clear: the division of the sophist's art is undertaken, broken off because of problems that appear, these problems are solved, and the division is completed at the

end. What is unclear is how all the various stretches of discussion I have discussed above are brought to bear; how they either serve to set up or serve to solve the central problem of the dialogue, namely the analysis of falsehood.

In this thesis I am attempting to refute a mainstream of interpretation which depicts the central theme of the dialogue in a certain way. This mainstream may be represented as standing by three interpretational tenets.

The first tenet was suggested by Ryle in "Plato's Parmenides". The Sophist, it is maintained, marks a modification in the theory of Forms, the need for which was first noted in the Parmenides. The Forms are distinguished as to type: some, such as Chair, Wood, etc., corresponding to complete concepts; others, such as One, Being, Difference, Sameness, corresponding to incomplete concepts.

Alongside this development, there is a radical change in Plato's philosophy of language. In the Cratylus, words were thought of as names, sentences as strings of names. With the introduction of the notion of combination in the Sophist, and of incomplete concepts or genera effecting combination, a logos comes to be thought of as a complex whole, the truth or falsity of which is not secured by the naming relation. Sentence meaning may be distinguished from sentence truth. Meaning is held in place by syntactic rules (a sentence is a combination of a noun and a verb); truth is secured when a word standing for a Form-function is combined with a word standing for the right argument.

Thirdly, it is held that this important change in Plato's thinking both with regard to metaphysics and the philosophy of language finds a special application in the Sophist to Being and Not-Being.

When it is recognized that both are incomplete concepts corresponding to the copula and its negation rather than the complete concepts of Existence and Non-Existence, then the way is cleared for an analysis of negative predication. This analysis is the heart of the dialogue, it is maintained.

The problem of false speaking, depicted initially as saying τὸ μὴ ὄν is cleared away through the analysis of negative predication. The falsehood of "Theaetetus is flying" can be given an account when "Theaetetus is not flying" has been explicated. Two points are accepted by interpreters in this tradition as to how this is accomplished. First, the negation of the copula is central to the account. Second, the Form Different underwrites the negation of the copula, but "different" is not univocal in its use in the dialogue. When the concept of difference is used to account for negative predication it cannot be the same concept which was used earlier in the dialogue in the numerical differentiation of Forms.

In this thesis I shall be attempting to refute every one of these interpretational tenets. I do not think that Plato distinguishes Forms as to logical type. I disagree that his philosophy of language undergoes a corresponding change. I believe that Plato's central concern in the dialogue is with Existence and Non-Existence. I do not think that the solution to the problem of falsehood is through an analysis of negative predication. I deny that Plato introduces two senses of "different" corresponding to either two senses or two uses of "is".

I shall be arguing these points, for the most part, against two interpretational variants of the mainstream view depicted above. The first is the position of G.E.L. Owen who holds, with Michael Frede,

that Existence and Non-Existence are never part of Plato's concern in the Sophist. The other is the position of Julius Moravcsik who holds that the problems Plato sets himself early in the dialogue are based upon a confusion of an existential with a predicative sense of "is". When the confusion is eliminated, Moravcsik holds, Plato can go on to give an analysis of falsehood by means of an account of negative predication.

The picture I shall be presenting may seem reactionary when set against these views. I take the problem of the dialogue - false speaking - to be set for Plato by Parmenidean monism. I do not think that he brings to bear any new logical tools. What he does bring to bear are the resources of pluralism as embodied in the theory of Forms together with the notion of correspondence between word and object, sentence and fact.

The problem set is to find a place in the ontology for images in general and, as a species of these, false logoi, represented as τὰ μὴ ὄντα. If these things are to have a place in the ontology it must be shown that they exist. The existence puzzles at the beginning of the dialogue do not misrepresent the problem as a problem about the existence of these things. The problem is about the existence of these things. What needs to be shown to eliminate the puzzles is that τὰ μὴ ὄντα are existents.

If we are to take the puzzles seriously as the real source of the problem, it becomes clear that the Sophist does not arrive at an account of false logoi by means of an account of negative predication. In the Sophist, Plato does introduce negative Forms which may be seen as underwriting negative predicates. The introduction of these Forms, I

shall argue, functions as an analogy for the explication of the negative Form Plato is primarily concerned with, namely, τὸ μὴ ὄν .

In Chapter 1 I shall examine two assumptions which I argue are held by Plato: the assumption of the Cratylus that every word is a name, and what I shall call the correspondence assumption which I take to be basic to Plato's account of language in the Sophist. I shall examine Plato's positive theory about falsehood in the light of these two assumptions. Finally I shall discuss the connection between the assumptions and the method of division which forms the superstructure of the dialogue.

In Chapter 2 I take up the aporia and try to show that they are fundamentally dependent upon an existential interpretation of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν . For each of the aporia I shall try to locate a solution later in the text. I shall argue that due to the existential nature of the aporia and due to their structure the solutions that Plato offers to the problem of false speaking cannot be derived from an account of negative predication.

In Chapter 3 I shall take up the crucial passage in which according to Moravcsik's variant of the mainstream view the confusion of senses of τὸ ὄν is eliminated by means of a distinction drawn between τὸ ὄν and Difference. I shall argue that this passage is misinterpreted both by Moravcsik's variant and also by Frede.

I go on in this chapter to show that Plato's explication of τὸ μὴ ὄν proceeds by analogy with other negative expressions and that an existential sense is preserved throughout. I conclude the chapter by giving an account of the role the Form Difference plays in the account of τὸ μὴ ὄν . I argue that the word "different" is

not used by Plato with more than one sense.

In Chapter 4 I shall try to refute Ryle's claim that Plato distinguishes Forms as to type. I shall give a positive account of the combination of the Forms and criticize it.

My project in this thesis is to dispute a very broad line of interpretation. I do this by selecting as my interpretational opponents some commentators who represent this mainstream view very fully in their work. The details of their accounts are still very much in dispute with other interpreters who belong in the same mainstream. But it is not the details which I shall be concerned with in my refutation so much as with the basic tenets of the whole line of interpretation. Against this I shall be trying to set up an alternative positive account of my own.

CHAPTER 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I shall be discussing two assumptions, which, I shall contend, are basic to Plato's philosophizing, the correspondence assumption and the naming assumption. Both are assumptions about language, although both have deeper metaphysical roots in the thoery of imitation which pervades all of Platonic metaphysics and epistomology.

I want to begin by discussing in general what the relation between the two assumptions is, before I go on to trace their manifestations in some of Plato's works. There are several different assumptions which may go under the rubric of correspondence assumptions, but their most basic feature is that they posit some similarity between language and the world, between statements and the facts. That there is some similarity, no matter in what it should consist, opens up the possibility of comparison. The connection between a correspondence assumption and a correspondence theory of truth is clear: it must first be posited that comparison is possible between statements and the facts before a correspondence theory of truth can be developed. For the correspondence theory of truth would have it that it is upon the basis of a comparison between any statement and the facts that we are able to determine whether that statement is true or false.

Since this assumption has been basic to much of western philosophizing from Plato onwards, it may at first be hard to see that there is anything difficult or startling about it. To assume, however,

that statements are different from or similar to the facts is to presuppose certain things about 'similarity' and 'difference' that need careful spelling out. In what respect is "Theaetetus sits" similar to Theaetetus sitting? But, further, it must be asked: what assumptions about the nature and ontological status of language must be made if we are to see ourselves in a position to make a comparison? What assumptions must be made about the nature of facts and our epistemic position in regard to them? If we are to be able to make a comparison, we must be able to pick out, in some sense, the fact 'Theaetetus sitting' and the linguistic entity "Theaetetus sits", and we must be able to pick them out independent of one another. Further, the relevant features of the fact and the linguistic entity, whereby we compare them must be of the same logical order, if we are not to make nonsense of the notion of comparison.

One sort of correspondence assumption proposes that a statement is similar to a fact when the elements that can be picked out as constitutive of the statement can be matched to elements constitutive of the fact. The assumption then embodies two deeper pre-suppositions: that the elements of both statement and fact can be picked out in some non-arbitrary way, and that the elements of the statement can be matched or compared to the elements of the fact in some non-arbitrary way.

Another sort of correspondence assumption, which is not really more than a sophistication of the first, proposes that not only must the elements of statement and fact be matchable or comparable, but that their order must be the same. That is to say a statement containing elements a, b, c, in that order is the same as a fact containing elements a, b, c, but not the same as a fact containing elements c, a, b,

because of their difference in order.

A train which has a different car order than another is different from it in that respect or to use another example, the kind of matching that is required is like the matching done in ticking off an alphabetically ordered pile of examination papers. The assumption that it is relevant to pinpoint here is the assumption that facts (and correspondingly, statements) have a non-arbitrary order by their very natures, i.e., not an order which is imposed by our epistemic position in regard to them. This ordering, however, is not expressed by the statement, but shown.[1] It remains for the form of correspondence assumption discussed below to produce the beginnings of an account of logical relations or structure, as a distinct part of facts, and an account of how these relations are expressed correspondingly.

Another assumption, which is a sophistication of the second, proposes that a fact is a "complex unity" composed of elements in relation to one another.[2] The fact has a structure. A statement, too, is complex and has a structure, being composed of elements in relation to one another. This third sort of assumption is a sophistication of the first two, insofar as it proposes that not all of what a statement contains corresponds to elements of the fact. For the statement, as well, expresses relations between the elements of the fact. What this comes to, then, in terms of correspondence, is that a statement expresses relations which correspond to relations within the fact, as well as elements which correspond to elements of the fact.

I shall be arguing, particularly in Chater 4, that Plato holds the second assumption but not the third.

What is required for comparison between statement and fact to

be drawn? We earlier elicited two conditions: 1) that the elements of both statement and fact can be picked out: and 2) that they can be matched. In the Cratylus Plato builds a theory, which as I shall argue, accounts for the matching of the elements of statements with the elements of facts. This theory is built upon the assumption that every word is a name. The criteria for naming or being the name of something are then criteria which specify the matching of elements of a statement to elements of a fact. In the Cratylus we find that what makes something a name is its similarity to a thing, let us say, an element of the world.

But what of our first condition? We may allow that it is a non-arbitrary answer to the first part of that condition to specify that the elements of statements are words. But does a fact fall apart before our eyes as neatly sectioned as an orange? We find that if a fact does not submit itself to division into elements then the second condition cannot be met either. For if the fact cannot be sectioned, then the possibility of matching is not open.[3] Finally, if things did not, as it were, make their appearance naked to the eye, then Plato's theory of naming would be impossible. For if to be a name is to be like a thing, then the thing must show itself, before we can know its name.

I shall begin this chapter by discussing the theory of naming of the Cratylus, which I argue, is antecedent to and required by Plato's theory of language and of truth. I shall go on to give an interpretation of Plato's theory of truth as it appears in the Sophist. I shall conclude the chapter with a discussion of the dialectical process of division with which the Sophist opens, since, as I shall argue, it sheds light upon the requirement that things must show themselves before we

can know their names.

1.2 The Naming Assumption

In the Cratylus, Socrates simply assumes that words are the names of things. This, I think, justifies us in speaking of the naming assumption, rather than the naming theory. The theoretical entreprise that he is engaged in is establishing just what it is to be a name.

The first question, then, that is addressed in the Cratylus is just what giving names is, or what kind of an activity it is. Socrates argues that all activities have a nature or an essence, which dictates what is the appropriate way to perform the activity. To try to cut something with a flatiron is inappropriate, or incorrect - it is not up to us what instrument we choose to use; the instrument is dictated by the nature of the action. Socrates argues that naming is an activity, that we can regard names as the instruments we wield in naming. But it will be possible to try to perform the activity in an inappropriate way, and what this comes to, as in trying to cut with a flatiron, is using the wrong instrument. But how are we to know that the instrument is wrong? Because we cannot accomplish the purpose towards which the activity is directed. Towards what purpose is the activity of naming directed?

> Socrates:
> Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name?
> Hermogenes:
> I cannot say.
> Socrates:
> Do we not give information to an another, and distinguish things according to their natures?[4]

At this point another assumption is brought to bear. This is the assumption that things have natures or essences. They are already distin-

guished just in themselves, in virtue of what they are. Our task in speaking is to capture the distinctions apparent among real things. Just as the proper instrument for cutting will depend upon the nature of the material to be cut, so the proper name to be applied to a thing can be found only by reference to the nature of the thing to be named.

This assumption is simply vital to the intelligibility of the naming assumption. If the determination of the proper instrument (i.e., the name) depends upon knowing what the material to be acted upon is (i.e., what the thing to be named is), then the knowledge of what it is must precede the application of the name. That is to say, the essence of the thing is something given to us by nature. It is not enough that things just have natures prior to our coming by a language. It is that it is in our power to grasp their nature, to come to know what they are, prior to our possession of a language. In fact, it is precisely on account of the fact that the nature of things is apparent to us that we are able to undertake the project of naming them - that is to say, that we are able to come into possession of a language in the first place. It is the "whatness" of the thing that we capture in assigning the name and this "whatness" must have been apparent to us even in our primordial state. This is the relevance in the Cratylus of the periodic reference to Heraclitus; if the very natures of things are continuously subject to change, we can never fix upon the "whatness" of a thing for a long enough time to assign a name; nor will the standards of correctness for the application of names be possible to uphold.

In this discussion, I do not want to prejudice the issue of the dating of the Cratylus. Whether the Cratylus is earlier or later than the Republic, when we are trying to put together an interpretation

of Plato's theory of language, the issue will arise as to how many imitative removes names are away from the Forms. In what follows, I shall try to propose a dilemma for Plato on naming, which does not pre-judge the issue of whether the Cratylus invokes the full-blown theory of Forms or merely some notion of essence.

It is worth noting that Plato's whole ontology is based upon the similarity of things to Forms. That is to say, things are what they are in virtue of a mimetic relation that they bear to immutable real things. In the Republic, Plato discusses two levels of imitation. At the first level there is the imitation of Forms by things. At the second level there is the imitation of things by objects of art. The production of objects of art is forbidden in the Republic on moral grounds.[5] They are misleading; the artist would have us believe that they represent things as they are, for what they are. But this they cannot do without being imitations of the Forms, that is, without being at the same imitative level as things themselves. This is what is meant in the Republic when it is said that the objects of art are at a third remove from reality. Why is it that language is not banned in the Cratylus on the same grounds? Names, too, are "at a third remove from reality". Why are we not, like the neophyte guardians of the Republic, misled by names, mistaking them for the things of which they are only imitations? I think that Plato has a reply to this in the Cratylus, but a highly unsatisfactory one. Names are the imitations of the essences of things, not of their accidental features, colours, shapes, etc., the features imitated by the objects of art. The reply is unsatisfactory because it is unclear what the essence of a thing is. If the essence of a thing is that which informs it, or makes it what it is,

then names are the imitations of forms, and do not differ in ontological status from things. If on the other hand, names are the imitations of the individual essences of individual things, the τὶ ἦν εἶναι of things, then the view of words as names is undercut. The word "horse", if it is a name, will be the name of only one horse, this horse. That horse must have a different name; in fact, we will not be in a position to speak of this or that horse. In short, if names are the imitations of individual essences, and all words are names, we will have no control over count nouns.

Plato, thus, seems to have placed himself in a dilemma. If words are the names of forms, then we will have no resources in our language to speak of this or that (since "this" and "that" are not names of forms.) If words are the names of the individual essences of individual things, then we will have no words for kinds; all words will be proper names.

The whole plausibility of the naming assumption, as Plato presents it, depends upon his not making a distinction between naming individual things and naming kinds of things. This is shown in the use he makes of a tempting analogy; the analogy is as between the activity of the name-giver who coins the words of a language and the activity of a person naming an animal or a place or another person. The claim is that in both cases there is a standard of correctness, namely, the similarity of the name to the thing.

I may name my cat "Scamp" or "Rover" on account of certain peculiarities of its own; it seems inappropriate to name a pure black cat "Spot" (although perhaps not incorrect.) Primitive tribes and the Greeks themselves, assigned names to individuals on the basis of their

heritage, their own habits, the time at which they were born. To call a child "Tuesday" which was born on Friday might be thought a mistake by people with the custom of naming people according to the day upon which they were born. Plato gives the example from Homer of Astyanax son of Hector who was also called "Scamandrius", and supports the view that the more correct name for the boy was "Astyanax" given that he was the son of the saviour of the city.[6]

The difficulty with these kinds of examples is that they don't really make plausible the thesis of the correctness of the assigning of kind-names. The correctness of my naming my cat "Scamp" depends upon my already knowing what "Scamp" means. The correctness of naming a child born on Tuesday, "Tuesday" depends on a body of customs so well integrated into social structure, that they seem, as social structure itself often does seem, a part of the order of nature. And again a linguistic basis is assumed already; it cannot be appropriate to name a child "Tuesday", because it was born on Tuesday, before the designation of days of the week. So similarly with Plato's examples: we cannot allow him to rely on the etymology of proper names to establish a basic thesis about language. We may agree that "Astyanax" (which means 'king of the city') is a very good name for the son of Hector; we might even allow given a certain set of customs for naming that it is more correct to call him "Astyanax" than "Scamandrius"; what we cannot allow is that "Astyanax" is more properly his name than "Scamandrius" because of a simple imitative relation that "Astyanax" bears to nature. Its appropriateness is based rather upon a set of customs established in the social world for naming, and an already developed language. Although this is a tempting model, especially tempting to Plato, given the

evidence of the Cratylus, it simply will not do to carry the burden it is meant to carry, namely being the paradigm of the establishment of a language.

But we might well ask why this analogy was introduced. At the beginning of this discussion I said that it had a certain plausibility. It furthers Plato's assumption that the virtue of a name is to reveal the "whatness" of the thing named. "This is Astyanax" serves not only to introduce Astyanax, but to say what he is. We are no longer in a position, then, to ask a further what-question; yet our language does give us this resource. We are in a position, it would seem, to ask what Astyanax is, whether a man or a horse or a cat; but this position is denied us by Plato: Saying "Astyanax" we have already revealed the essence of Astyanax; to go on to say "is a horse" is only to go on to reveal the essences of yet another thing, to reveal Horse.

The view that every word is a name, as I have said, implies that there is a one to one correspondence between the elements of speech, and already individuated things in the world. But so far we are not in a good position to understand the activity of speaking. The initial naming situation cannot fulfill the requirements of an account of speaking. Something more needs to be posited to explain how a list of names can be transformed into a speech act. The Cratylus, of course, is not designed to answer that question; for the answer we must wait up for the Sophist, where the metaphysical relations obtaining between kinds, underlying the activity of speaking, is proposed to take on this burden.

But I think we must ask: how long can we wait up for the explanation of what it is to speak to be given? Can we postpone the discussion as long as Plato would have us do? For naming, as Plato

characterizes it, already puts us in a quite sophisticated speech situation, namely that position from which it is possible to answer the question "what is this?" The revelatory power of names makes it possible for us at this early stage to tell or say what this is. And what telling or saying what this is comes to is imitating it. Our earlier arguments were designed to show that Plato's etymological theories are irrelevant to establishing the thesis of the correctness of names. What remains to lend plausibility to Plato's theory of naming is the view that the sounds in the utterance of the name imitate, and thus reveal, the thing named.

At 431C, Socrates compares the imitative nature of words to pictures representing things: what the picture accomplishes by shapes and colours, the word accomplishes by means of sound combinations.[7] Just as I can tell that the picture represents a person, by examining its lines and colours, so I can tell that the word represents water, on account of its rho-sounds.

What is proposed to make representation go, as it were, in the case of both words and pictures, is that both are imitative - the picture imitates by means of lines and colours, the word by means of sounds. But this is a curious construal of what it is to imitate. The only case of imitation mentioned by Plato that I think we can agree to be imitation in any ordinary sense of the word is the imitation of animals and other people. But this is explicitly denied to be analogous to the way in which words are said to imitate things. Imitating the crowing of a cock, Plato says, is not like coining the word "cock".[8] And, indeed, it is true that it is not. But in that case, how is coining a word a case of imitation at all?

Let us say that when we imitate animals and other people, there are two things necessary. We must do what they do; we must also do it the way they do it. For instance I cannot imitate someones walk merely by walking myself; I must walk with a strut or a swagger or a limp, in the same way that he walks. In doing my celebrated barnyard imitations, I must not only say what the calls of the animals are, but, as for instance in the case of the cock, I must myself crow. Again, imitations of people involves these two ingredients: imitating the Queen, I must say what the Queen says (although I may exaggerate for comic effect) and I must also imitate her intonation, her accent and the pitch of her voice.

The point of these examples is that the notion of imitation will not serve to underwrite the possibility of saying what, since that is itself one of the ingredients of imitation. I do not imitate the Queen unless I say what she says. Saying what she says is not yet to imitate her.

To return to the issue of onomatapoeia I think we can allow the point that the word "bang" may have been coined on the basis of a resemblance in sound between the utterance of the word and banging. To allow this is to allow nothing sufficient to get a theory of linguistic imitation off the ground, however. For, to say: "The gun went bang" is not to imitate the gun, but to say what sound it made. Imitation requires both that, and saying or rather shouting "Bang!" with a certain intonation and pitch.

Perhaps all Plato needs to underwrite linguistic representation is resemblance. Some words are said to be onomatapoeic, that is, in Platonic terminology, they sound like what they name. Thus, we say

cats lap their milk, rivers have lapping waters. People bang on doors. The tea in my cup sloshes. It is true that there is a certain likeness of sound between the utterance of the word and the lapping of the cat, the sloshing of the tea. But is this resemblance all that is needed to underwrite saying what sound the cat makes when drinking, what the tea does in the cup? That is to say, I can make the sound made by the cat or the tea, but at that stage I haven't said what sound it is. I can go "lap, lap" after the cat, or "slosh" after the tea. But it seems to me that in these cases I have made a noise, and not necessarily spoken a word. The coiner of the words "slosh" and "lap" was doing something distinct from making sounds.

I think Plato wants to rest his whole case on this sort of example, however. Rho is expressive of motion, he says, because it is a sound made by whirring the tongue. But why does this make rho expressive of motion, rather than simply the sound produced by a moving object? That is, it is a case of a sound produced by a certain kind of motion, but its utterance is no more expressive of motion than the sound produced by a turning wheel.

I said before in my discussion of imitation, that to say what is not to imitate. Again, it may be that in saying what, we make a sound which does resemble the sound of which we are speaking, saying what sound it is. But the resemblance of sound to sound will not underwrite saying what sound it was of which we are speaking. If it were enough, speaking would be nothing other than the production of sounds, and cats and tea and rivers would speak.

Suppose that I can compare the sounds and the thing of which the collocation of sounds is the name, as I can compare the picture and

a person's face. Do the sounds or the picture yet reveal something more to me - namely what is this? Imagine two people gazing at a horse in a meadow. One asks: "what is that?" The other holds up a picture of a horse. Has he thereby done something to answer the question? Perhaps Plato supposes that the question: "what is that?" never comes up in the presence of objects. Looking at the thing itself would be sufficient to learn what it is - indeed a picture could hardly do a better job.

> Socrates:
>
> Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn things through the medium of names and suppose also that you can learn them from the things themselves, which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way - to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly executed?
>
> Cratylus:
>
> I would say that we must learn of the truth.
>
> Socrates:
>
> How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be derived from names.9

This passage goes to confirm what was suggested above. The name has no power in the presence of the thing. The name, in fact, gives us nothing that we could not better learn from the thing itself. If we do not trust the name-giver to have revealed in the name what the thing is, our immediate recourse is to discover that in the thing itself. But even if we do trust the name-giver, the name, being only an image, is not a source of knowledge - like the representations of art spoken of in the Republic, it is at the third remove from reality. None of this is new, of course. It must all be presupposed for the name-giver's activity to get off the ground. But the point I'm trying to make here, is that even after the name-giver has completed his task we do not yet have any-

thing recognizable as a linguistic activity. We have buried the answer to the question: "what is that?" at the pre-linguistic level by subordinating it to showing, indicating and pointing out. While I should think that these activities have a place in connection with speaking insofar as they help to make clear of which thing I am speaking, there always remains the possibility of going on to say what that thing is. But I think Plato has made it clear that for hjm there is no going on which is not redundant. For at the point where I have managed to show what thing I am speaking of, I have also, just in doing that, completed the task of conveying what it is.

I shall go on to discuss the issue of how things make their appearance naked to the understanding in the fourth section of this chapter. My immediate task is to show how Plato builds a theory about speaking upon the foundation of his two assumptions, the naming assumption, and the correspondence assumption.

1.3 The Correspondence Assumption

1.3.1 A. Speaking is Combining Names

We found in our examination of the naming assumption of the Cratylus, that a more complex speech act, namely, saying what, had already been introduced, albeit illicitly, in the imposition of a name. The name is given two tasks as we noted, that of picking out a thing and that of saying what it is. It is in this latter function that the illicit introduction of the more complex speech act takes place. But speaking, as Plato acknowledges in both the Cratylus and in the Sophist, does not consist simply in giving names. He characterizes it as putting nouns and verbs together so as to accomplish something.[10] Speaking is

a more complex communicative act than naming, inasmuch as every act of speaking is composed of acts of naming. However, Plato implies more than this when he says that speaking is not only giving names. He suggests that another act is embodied in speaking as well, namely, combining. In Chapter IV I shall try to give some substance to this notion of combination or mingling. But I hold as well that Plato takes it to be a requisite for speaking every that word spoken be a name, and this implies that he holds to the correspondence between the words said and the elements of a fact.

At 261D ff, the Stranger speaks of the two kinds of things which reveal essence or being by means of sound, namely ὀνόματα and ῥήματα. Although he reserves the word ὄνομα - name - for only one of these kinds of words, his subsequent definitions assure us that he takes both kinds to be names in the spirit of the Cratylus.[11] For both sorts are δηλώματα περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, revealers of essence, that are not distinguished in their function - which is the function of a name in the Cratylus - but by what they name or reveal. It is the kind of being or essence which they reveal which forms their definitions: respectively, actions (ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν), those who act (ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκεῖνα πράττουσι). It follows that discourse is never composed solely of nouns or solely or verbs spoken in succession.

This conclusion puzzles Theaetetus, as well it might. But, in fact, it is a consequence of what has already been enunciated in the Cratylus, that what we should characterize as already a speech act, saying what, is something prior to speaking, something in the relation of the name to the thing.

The Stranger goes on to clarify speaking or discourse to

Theaetetus:

> When one says "(a) man learns",[12] you would say that this is the least and first of sentences, would you not? For when he says that, he makes a revelation what is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not name only but accomplishes something by combining nouns and verbs. That is why we said that he discourses, and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.[13]

Saying "(a) man learns" one names two things: the actor and the action. But one does not name only, one accomplishes something. What does one accomplish? One reveals what happens or is happening. And in what way is this revelation different from the revelation of a thing by a name, in this case, of two things by two names? Because the latter revelation is timeless, the former one in time. One reveals things, as they are, at a time.

1.3.2 B. A Discussion of Tense

It is the "as" of this formulation which is most significant. For it is this which suggests the likeness of the statement to the fact. That is, it suggests correspondence. It should be remembered however, that there is already an "as" involved in naming. For naming already opened up the possibility of comparison. And names were already characterized as true, more or less true, and false depending upon their likeness to a thing. We see correspondence, in a sense, already embodied in naming, as the name-giver, in spelling out the syllables, got the thing more or less right.

But naming is not micro-cosmic speaking, nevertheless the specific accomplishment of speaking is to make a revelation concerning what is, or is becoming, or has become, or is to be. Speaking then relates to an event in time, naming to a timeless thing or nature. The

omnipresence of change through time, which was rejected as incoherent in the Cratylus, as part of the foundation of naming, must here be taken into account, as part of the foundation of speaking. Speaking, then, is a special accomplishment, insofar as it embodies temporal reference.

I want to ask a question about the temporality of logos. Plato allows two elements of the logos ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει, the ὄνομα revealing the πρᾶγμα, the ῥῆμα revealing the πρᾶξις, μανθάνει. The special accomplishment of this logos is to reveal that this is happening (or does happen). But, now, at what level does temporal reference take place? Is there a concealed reference to time in the tense of the verb, as a third element of the logos - and hence of the fact? Or is the tense of the verb something which reveals the time of combination of the elements of the fact? Or, as a third possibility, is the tense of the verb something that reveals the correspondence of the logos to the fact at a time, that is, that reveals that this is going on at the same time as the utterance of the logos, or is earlier than or later than the utterance of the logos?

In the former case, our judgment as to the truth of the logos would depend upon our finding in both fact and logos a concealed temporality as a third element, and our finding that they are alike. But the comparison involved in this last step depends upon our taking the tense of the verb to be the name of a time, something which it patently is not. For the tense of the verb is unlike "two o'clock", which might, I suggest, with the methodology of the Cratylus, be taken to be the name of a time. For to say "two o'clock" may be to say when something will or did happen, but to say that it will or did happen is not to say when. The tense of the verb is also unlike "now", or "then".

I have already criticized the Cratylus for failing to give any satisfactory account of "this" and "that", "here" and "there", and by analogy "now" and "then". These cannot be names, since they cannot be construed as revealing things or places or times; they depend for their meaning upon their contrastive function. Nevertheless, in a context, to say "now" may be to say when, just as to say "this" may be to say what, to say "there" may be to say where. Once again, this function may be contrasted with the function of the tense of a verb. Saying: "a man is learning" is not to say when.

I conclude that the tense of the verb cannot be another element of the logos, alongside the elements: noun - man, verb - learn. But if this is so, then, it must be the case that the tense of the verb either reveals the time of combination of the elements of the fact, or the simultaneity or lack of it of the correspondence of the logos with the fact. For reasons already given in excluding the first option, we must exclude the second as well. The tense of the verb cannot reveal the time of combination of the elements of the fact since the tense of the verb does not answer to the question, "at what time?"

It follows that the tense of the verb answers only to the third option, namely, specifying whether the utterance of the logos is simultaneous with the fact or earlier or later, that is, specifying whether there is correspondence in the present, or will be in the future, or was in the past, between the elements of the logos and the elements of the fact. But this makes the tense of the verb something, as it were, exterior to the logos since it is not a part of the logos which corresponds.

I think that there is no reason to believe that Plato was

sensitive to this issue, however. The discussion of tense, above, has a part to play in the criticism of his theory of language. For the conclusion of the discussion constitutes a rejection, at a critical juncture, of the view that combining names is all that there is to speaking. Yet there is no appreciation in the text which we have been speaking of that the combination of names could fail to bring about the special accomplishment of revealing things as they are at a time. Nor is there any discussion at any point in the Sophist or the Cratylus about the function of tense. I conclude that just what Plato thinks the function of tense to be is a question that must be left to "definite perplexity". I have simply argued here, that tense must be construed as exterior to logos, i.e., not as one of the elements in combination, nor as indicating time of combination, but rather as expressing something about the correspondence of logos of an event, whether the utterance of the logos is simultaneous, or earlier, or later than the event.

1.3.3 C. Plato on Truth and Falsity

If it is allowed that the account given above of tense is correct, then it should be noticed that the way a logos works is subtly transformed. The logos makes as if there is present, past, or future correspondence to a fact. The logos, then, does two things: it reveals the elements of the fact by means of the ὄνομα and the ῥῆμα, but it also tells us something about itself, namely that it bears a correspondence to some fact temporally situated in relation to its pronouncement.

This sort of making as if is not present in the case of names, inasmuch as the name, as it were, pretends to nothing. What makes a name a name is its organic similarity to the nature of a thing; names

are false not insofar as they pretend to anything, but insofar as they lack a sufficient degree of similarity. We should note that it is this making as if feature of logos which permits Plato to give an account of the falsity of logos which is not reducible to his account of the falsity of names. This is an extremely important point. For a logos to be a logos it must contain names, and these names must truly represent natures. This much is demanded by the correspondence assumption, that we must be able to undertake matching the elements of logos with the elements of fact. If this condition is not met, then the logos does not get off the ground. The paradoxes discussed in Chapter II illustrate the difficulties encountered when the falsehood of logos is taken to depend upon the falsehood of a name, that is, its failure to reveal an essence.

Let us turn to the place further on in the section we have been discussing (262D ff.), where Plato treats of truth and falsehood. Sentences have a quality; they are either true or false. An example of a true one is: "Theaetetus sits", an example of a false one: "Theaetetus flies". The noun is the name of Theaetetus, and the sentence is thus allowed to be about Theaetetus. What is it, then, to say that the former is true, the latter false?

> The true one of them states things which are as they are about you.[14]

That is, the true one makes as if Theaetetus is sitting, and, by simple comparison, we note that Theaetetus is sitting.

We should note that the comparison took place in two stages. We read, or heard "Theaetetus..." and we checked out who this was about. Does it pick out somebody? The further question is not asked, but the

checking out is so elaborate as to make it implicit - does it pick him out correctly or truly, i.e., is it his name?

Then the logos continues "...sits". Now the question is: does this say what is as it is about Theaetetus? The sentence makes as if sitting is about Theaetetus, and to explicate "about" we must turn to the metaphor of combination. That is, then, the sentence combines Theaetetus with sitting.

But at this time we run afoul of a dilemma. Is the appropriate question: does sitting combine with Theaetetus? (or does Theaetetus participate in sitting?) or is the appropriate question: does "sitting" pick out something which is there correctly (as we have already asked of "Theaetetus", does it correctly pick out something which is there?) It might seem as though this dilemma is not presented by the text because of the stress upon "about you" in the definition we are given of the true logos. That is to say, it might seem as though what is being asked must be the former question, which is a question about the combination in the fact of Theaetetus and sitting, rather than a question about the existence of sitting.

The question I am asking is the following. What is it that a logos states: does it state that there is a relation of combination between two (or more) things? or does it state that there are two things in combination? In the first case what we should seek in order to verify the logos is the real relation of combination between the two things. I mean, what we should ask is: are they combined? In the second case we focus on the things in combination, and ask, are they correctly represented by the ὄνομα and the ῥῆμα .

Now if the question is the former one, we must re-address our-

selves to Plato's definition of true logos. For that was: the true one states things which are as they are about you. The way this formulation is phrased it does not seem to bear upon the question: is sitting combined with Theaetetus? The formulation which would seem to capture that question is: the true one states that things are about you which are about you, that is to say, it says to be combined what is combined. Whereas the formulation given in the text invites us to compare the ῥῆμα combined with the ὄνομα, "Theaetetus", with the πρᾶξις which is in fact combined with the πρᾶγμα, Theaetetus; it suggests the question, that is, does this ῥῆμα correctly represent the πρᾶξις -

This refinement of the issue gives us an answer to the question at hand. Questions about the truth of a logos are questions about whether the logos picks out, or represents, elements in combination, not questions about whether it correctly ascribes combination to those elements.

The point becomes sharper when we consider how Plato defines the falsity of a logos at 263B:

1) The false one states things other than the things which are.

2) That is, it speaks of things which are not as being (as if they were).

3) It states other things than things which are about you.

These three formulations get at the most difficult issue of all. If a logos is a combination of names which (if they are to be names at all) pick something out, and if a true logos is a combination of names which correctly represent the things in combination, then how are we to account for false logos? In the case of the false logos "Theaetetus flies", the

ῥῆμα fails to pick out something which is, as it were, there, in combination. This failure needs to be given some special account. For it is not a failure to name something. I mean, there is something named by the ῥῆμα "flies". Were this not so, there would be no logos, since it is demanded: 1) that a logos be the combination of an ὄνομα with a ῥῆμα and 2) a ῥῆμα is the name of a πρᾶξις. Yet this is the puzzle of formulation 2, quoted above: It speaks of things which are not as being (as if they were). This is why other formulations are required, as interpretations of the puzzle encountered with formulation 2.

It is just how formulation 2 is resolved which, as I said above, serves to sharpen our understanding of where Plato stands with reference to our dilemma. I asked, then, is the issue the correct representation of combination, or is the issue correct representation of things combined? If the former, then the deepest question is: are the things which are mentioned in the logos combined, and the formulation 2 is a misleading way of stating the issue, which ought to be dismissed by the other formulations. If the latter, then the deepest question is: are the things there which are mentioned by the logos, in particular, is the thing there which is mentioned by the ῥῆμα and the formulation in 2 captures (although without the necessary refinements) the existential nature of the query.

Let us then examine the other two formulations.

1) The false one states things other than the things which are. This formulation, it seems to me, quite clearly retains the existential nature of 2. What it serves to satisfy is our worry that there is no ῥῆμα and hence no logos. The ῥῆμα mentions another πρᾶξις than

the one that is, that is to say, than the one that is there, in combination with Theaetetus. Formulation 3 goes on to make this clear.

3) It states other things than things which are about you.

This formulation is still intended to clarify the referent of the That is to say, rather than constituting a dismissal of the puzzle in 2, it is an attempt to work it out.

Plato goes on in such a way as to make clear the analysis I am attributing to him. "Theaetetus flies" is analysed in two steps.

Step 1:

1) A sentence without a subject is impossible
2) This is about something, namely you.
3) It therefore is not impossible for it to be a sentence.

Step 2:

1) A false sentence says about something things other as (if they were) the same, things which are not as if they were.
2) This sentence says about you something other as (if it were) the same, i.e., it says about you, "flies", but this is not the same, but other, than what is about you.
2a) This sentence says about you something which is not as if it were, i.e., it says about you, "flies", but flying is not about you.
3) This sentence therefore is false.

The steps are compressed. Step 1 merely establishes that a necessary condition for being a sentence a fulfilled. Step 2, thus, presumes that another necessary condition has been fulfilled parallel to the condition established by step 1, namely, that the ῥῆμα has also picked out something, or, to put it in the manner of the Cratylus, that the ῥῆμα correctly represents something. The question, then, raised in step 2 is: does the ῥῆμα correctly represent the same thing as the thing which is about Theaetetus? or does ῥῆμα represent something other?

The whole project is built up on the basis of one to one matching or comparing. If we re-formulate the steps noted this becomes even more apparent.

Question 1: Is it a sentence?
Step 1: Does it have an ὄνομα?
Step 2: Does it have a ῥῆμα?

These questions can only be answered by reference to the naming assumption:

Step 1: Yes, since a πρᾶγμα is picked out or represented.
Step 2: Yes, since a πρᾶξις is picked out or represented.
Question 2: Is it true or false?
Step 1: What πρᾶγμα is picked out by the ὄνομα?
Step 2: Is the ῥῆμα in combination with this ὄνομα one which picks out or represents the πρᾶξις in combination with this πρᾶγμα, or does it represent some other πρᾶξις?

In each step we are asked to match a thing with a name. If there is a failure in the steps in connection with question 1, we fail to have a logos. If there is a failure in the second step of question 1, we fail to have a true logos. It should be noted that we cannot fail at the stage of step 1 of question 2, since an answer has already been guaranteed by step 1 of question 1. As Plato depicts it, falsehood depends entirely upon the representation of the ῥῆμα.

Plato's correspondence theory of truth, then, comes to this: A sentence is true if its proper elements (i.e., an ὄνομα and a ῥῆμα) correspond to the elements of a fact (i.e., a combination of πρᾶγμα and πρᾶξις). This analysis of truth is only possible if we assume a correspondence between language and the world, an assumption which may be stated as: something is a sentence when its elements (i.e., an ὄνομα and a ῥῆμα) are the names of two things (i.e., a πρᾶγμα and a πρᾶξις).

Thus the correspondence theory of truth ultimately depends upon the basis for correspondence which is spelled out by the naming assumption.

1.3.4 D. How Is To Be Translated at 263B?

In this last section I have given an interpretation of Plato's discussion of truth and falsehood which accords with the second correspondence assumption I outlined in the introduction to this chapter. I have taken Plato to hold the view that the words in combination in a true statement reach out and grasp the things that are combined in a fact. The difficulty Plato encounters with falsehood, as I have interpreted his position, consists in explaining how the false statement can express anything, since there is a failure of the predicate expression (e.g., "flies" in "Theaetetus flies") to grasp anything which is in combination in the fact. The solution to this difficulty, I have attributed to the use of the word ὡς in Plato's formulation of falsehood. Plato says:

Τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄ[redacted] λέγει.

and this I have translated:

It (the false statement) says what is not as if it were.

The job that is done by the word ὡς here is to suggest that the statement purports to do something that it does not do; that is, it purports to represent things in combination, where one of the things is not, in fact, present. What Plato does, I propose, is to make our understanding of false statements crucially depend upon our expectations about the job of statements in general - that is, to represent things which are in fact present in combination. Thus his approach to falsehood is just the approach that we should expect from a correspondence theorist.

However, some modern interpreters have strongly disagreed that there is a correspondence assumption embodied in Plato's discussion of truth and falsity. One of these is David Keyt in an article entitled "Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B".[15] Keyt argues that the use of ὡς in the formulation for truth:

λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ.

must be translated as the conjunction "that" introducing a substantial clause. He would translate this formulation, thus:

> The true one states about you that the things that are, are.

Keyt correctly recognizes the other possible translation of this formulation:

> The true one states about you things that are as they are.

to be a version of the correspondence theory of truth. His translation and the arguments he uses in support of it constitute a rejection of the view that Plato has here stated a correspondence position.

Before I consider Keyt's defense of his translation of the truth formulation I wish to point out a curious anomaly in his interpretation. Keyt translates the falsity formulation:

τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.

so that it carries the same sense as my translation, above. Keyt translates it:

> So it states the things-that-are-not as things-that-are.

About his translation he says:

> In this use, the ὡς phrase indicates how the things to which the participle is linked are viewed by the subject of the leading verb with-

out implying that this view is correct.

This analysis is, I believe, substantially the same as my analysis of this formulation in terms of purporting, or making as if. What is anomalous, then, about Keyt's translation of this formulation is that in recognizing the force of ὡς as "as", he allows that it at least tacitly invokes the correspondence theory of truth for an explanation of false statement. Keyt does not recognize this; indeed, he takes his translation to be proof that no correspondence theory is involved. This may be because he asserts (without support, as far as I can see) that "the phrase ὡς ὄντα is, in effect, the sign of affirmation". But this is suggested neither by his own translation, nor by his analysis as quoted above. For both of these lend to ὡς the force of inviting a comparison or suggesting a correspondence, when, as indicated by the disagreement of τὰ μὴ ὄντα and ὄντα, the things spoken of, and the things there, in the fact, do not correspond.

Keyt rightly points out that the fact that this construction in the falsity formulation, i.e., of ὡς with the participle, invites the translation of ὡς as "as", says nothing to indicate that the ὡς of the truth formulation must be so translated. For the construction, ὡς ἔστιν, in the truth formulation need not be understood as parallel to ὡς ὄντα in the falsity formulation. Thus, although I hope to have said enough about the force of "as" in the falsity formulation to establish that it opens up the possibility of comparison as between what was said and what exists in the fact, this will not yet be enough to establish that the force of ὡς in the truth formulation is such as to indicate correspondence. Thus, I must independently defend my view that the correct translation of the truth formulation is:

1) The true one states about you the things that are as they are.

as against Keyt's translation:

2) The true one states about you that the things-that-are are.

Keyt analyses 1) thus:

> Plato is saying that the true statement "Theaetetus sits" (i) states that sitting belongs to Theaetetus, and (ii) is right in so stating.

He goes on to analyse 2) thus:

> He is saying that the statement asserts that sitting, an actual attribute of Theaetetus, belongs to him.

As in the case of the interpretation Keyt gives to the falsity formuation, I believe that he is mistaken about the force of the verb after ὡς. For, I take ὡς ἔστιν, like ὡς ὄντα to express not affirmation but to make clear that there are things in the fact corresponding to what was said. As Keyt analyses 1) it appears that Plato is doing nothing other than asserting that what was said is indeed the case. That is to say, as Keyt would have it, nothing is revealed by 1) about what the truth of "Theaetetus sits" consists in. But this is curious, indeed, as Plato, in speaking of "Theaetetus sits" as ὁ μὲν ἀληθής has already allowed that the statement was a true one. He then goes on to say what is said, i.e., τὰ ὄντα. But having said this much, we should expect Plato now to do more than what he has already allowed, namely that what the statement said is the case. We should expect him to tell us why he makes the allowance that it is true, not to state redundantly that it is the case.

Keyt supports his view that his analysis of 1) does not yield

Plato's position on truth with the following argument.

> ...If truth is assigned to "Theaetetus sits" by ὡς ἔστιν , falsity should be assigned to "Theaetetus flies" by ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. Under 1) a false, affirmative statement should state τὰ ὄντα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. "Theaetetus flies" should (i) state that flying belongs to Theaetetus and (ii) be wrong in so stating.

Keyt points out, however, that Plato's formulation for the false statement does not read this way, since what follows the ὡς is, in fact, affirmative. However, what Keyt does not take into account here is that even on his own analysis of the falsity formulation, what is expressed by the ὡς clause is the point of view of the false statement itself. That is, the false statement makes as if it were about something which exists. And this making as if as I have already pointed out, is an expression of the correspondence assumption. In any case, reading the truth formulation as I have suggested that it should be read, above, does not awaken the expectation that the falsity formulation should, by parity, contain a negative ὡς clause. For if the ὡς expresses a correspondence in the case of truth, it is that very correspondence which does not hold in the case of falsity. Thus, falsity does not consist in saying something (τὰ ὄντα)corresponding to what is not (ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν) but rather, in saying something which does not correspond to what is. Keyt's expectation of parity arises from the fact that he does not take the force of ὡς to be an expression of correspondence, although, surprisingly, he does identify formulation (1) as an expression of the correspondence theory of truth.

The translation that Keyt supports, translating ὡς as "that" in the truth formulation appears curious on close inspection. For his analysis of it suggests that what Plato takes "true one of them" to do is to assert that sitting, which belongs to Theaetetus, belongs to

Theaetetus. Now there appears to be a puzzle about how this analysis is to be understood. At first sight it appears that Keyt must be attributing to Plato the position that the true statement "Theaetetus sits" is tautologous. For we read the ὡς as governing not only ἔστιν, but τὰ ὄντα as the subject of ἔστιν, yielding the translation: "that the things-that-are are". If this is taken to be what the true statement says, then it is tautologous. But, in fact, it is not tautologous, nor would it be anything other than patently wrong to suggest that it is. The only other way in which the analysis may be understood, however, is equally a blind alley. We might take Keyt to be reading τὰ ὄντα not as part of what was said by "Theaetetus sits", but as a judgment by Plato to the effect that "Theaetetus sits" is indeed about a real attribute of Theaetetus. But at this rate, the syntax is both confused and confusing. For the formulation purports to begin to tell us what "Theaetetus sits" said. But after saying: "it says that..." Keyt would have us understand Plato to go on not to say what was said, but to break off and make a judgment to the effect that what was spoken of was really <u>there</u>. The sentence then ends lamely with a subjectless ἔστιν, since clearly on this reading, τὰ ὄντα, being a judgment about the actual existence of sitting in regard to Theaetetus, cannot at the same time be a part of the content of what was said. In any case, this translation and its analysis, suffers from the tremendous defect that it fails to tell us anything about what the truth of "Theaetetus sits" consists in. For on my first interpretation of Keyt's translation, it would appear that the true sentence is a tautology, but this, just aside from being patently false, tells us nothing about why the statement is true. On my second interpretation of Keyt's translation, if we can

leave aside the lack of continuity in what is said, once again no claim about the nature of truth emerges that is nontrivial.

I shall argue in Chapter II that a formulation used to define falsity in the paradox at 240D involves the same sort of dilemma as I have outlined above for Keyt's translation. The formulation goes: False opinion thinks εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα : that what in no way is, is. The paradox springing from this formulation results from reading the formulation as contradictory. Its plausibility as a formulation for falsity, on the other hand, depends upon its appearing trivially right. I believe that the origins of this paradox give us grounds to believe that Plato could be sensitive to the dilemma I have outlined for Keyt's translation above. The use of ὡς in the truth and falsity formulations at 263B acquires significance for us, when we recognize that by using it, Plato is clearing up the confusion at 240D. But on Keyt's translation, the use of the ὡς would compound the difficulty, rather than remove it.

I conclude that insofar as Keyt's arguments against the translation of ὡς as "as" in the truth formulation do not work if ὡς is taken, as I have taken it, to have the force of correspondence they are only relevant to Keyt's own analysis of the first way of translating the truth formulation, which is such as to make it redundant, rather than a clear expression of a correspondence theory. I have indicated that there are good reasons for not translating ὡς as Keyt would wish to translate it since this way yields a trivial truth formulation, which does not resolve, and may reinstate, a paradox encountered earlier in the dialogue at 240D. I shall have more to say about how my own interpretation of this difficult passage serves to resolve that paradox in

Chapter II.

There remains an issue which is really at the heart of all of Plato's philosophizing about language. How do we locate the fact which is compared to the logos, the elements of the fact which are compared to the elements of the logos? As we have been analysing Plato's correspondence assumption, it is clear that these things, i.e., the fact and its elements, must be apparent to us prior to our speaking about them. The world must present us with individuated things and facts; more than that, it must present us with their natures.

I have already emphasized this in connection with the naming assumption. In order for Plato to give to names the rationale that he does, as being names in virtue of their revelation of essence, he must take it that the essences are already apparent, long before we name them.

The point now becomes crucial in connection with facts. Facts are combinations of things having natures. They too must present themselves, as combined, if we are to be able to make the requisite comparison with statements. And our ability to make that comparison depends upon the way the fact, as well as the statement which reveals it, displays its parts. As I suggested at the beginning of this discussion, the fact must be partitioned as naturally as an orange is divided into sections.

The point is of both epistemological and metaphysical importance. Our knowledge is founded in the natures of things themselves - this is the epistemological point. The power of individuating themselves, of combining - this too resides in the nature of things. This is the metaphysical point.

1.4 Division

In this section I want to discuss one of the metaphysical points raised at the end of the last chapter - that Plato holds that things are individuated in nature, or as I have put it elsewhere in this chapter that there are real divisions in nature. I shall examine how the dialectical process of division reflects on this view. I shall be dealing specifically with the division at the beginning of the Sophist, where, as I shall try to show, Plato connects his division of the angler and the sophist in an interesting way with the naming assumption.

There is another issue of importance which I shall be discussing in this section. This is the connection of the process of division with the Form Different. It is my view that the division at the beginning of the Sophist sets the stage for the important role that Different will be found to play in the discussions of negation and falsehood later in the dialogue.

At 217 Socrates puts the opening question of the dialogue to the Eleatic Stranger. The question is:

> Socrates:
> What I am asking is whether they customarily recognized all these (the sophist, the statesmen, the philosopher) as one, or two, or just as there are three names, did they divide them into three, attaching to each a kind answering to one name?[16]

The question is a complex one. Perhaps one should expect it to go: "Are the sophist, the statesman and the philosopher really three different kinds of men, or are there in fact only two kinds or even one?" That is to say, one should expect Socrates to be asking a question about how many kinds there are. Indeed, he begins this way, asking: "is there only one kind or are there two?" However, in continuing - "or

just as there are three names" he enters upon a new question - namely, he suggests that the existence of the names provides a reason to believe that there are three things. In the end he asks a different question than the one with which he began; he asks whether there are divisions answering to the names. Thus, the question becomes not simply a question about how many things there are, nor a question about what they are, but both of these, as well as a question about whether we are justified in using three names. We should expect to find that the method adopted by the Stranger to find the sophist will serve to answer all these questions: not only that the sophist is one person "distinct from other things, with a nature of his own" but also what his nature is, and that we are justified, thus, in speaking of him.

The method of division is not described in the Sophist, but merely illustrated to begin with, by the dry-run division of the angler. The purpose of pursuing the method is given at 218C. It is "to search out and make plain by argument what (the sophist) is" and again, it serves us "come to agreement about the thing itself by argument, rather than about the mere name". The search for definition, then, is not carried out in an arbitrary spirit. We cannot choose to designate just whatever we wish or agree to by the name "sophist". Our real search is for a definition of "the thing itself" to which the name serves as a significant clue.[17]

Our first assumption, then, is that there are divisions in nature which we can divine. We infer that this divination must be systematic, and that we must be able to argue for each cut (literally, from τμήγω -cut) we apprehend, that it is really there. A principle ennuciated in the Statesman at 262B - 263C is that one must cut only

when there is a "real cleavage between specific forms", a cleavage which, it is claimed, most often exists down the middle of an εἶδος. However, the Stranger refuses to go on to enlighten young Socrates in the Statesman as to the certain marks of a true cleavage. He does suggest that there is an explanation to be given of the "principle" that "a portion and a subdivision of a class are not identical". Could it be, however, that basically the method rests upon the sensitivity of the one who divides? Given the assumption that things in themselves already reveal on essence, even before we can speak of them, then our ability to find out what they are depends upon our sensitivity to their revelation.[18]

All of this should very much go to suggest that the method of division is an art of discovering, of finding out, of as it were, lifting off the wraps and [illegible]. Of course, this is not a completely passive occupation; we do have to learn how to look. What is, at first, puzzling, however, is the language which Plato uses to describe what the stranger is doing when he is making the divisions. He uses the very actives metaphors of cutting (τμήγω), separating (διαλείπω), dividing (διαιρέω), turning out (ἐκτρέπω).[19] At 266C the Stranger speaks of discrimination as the essence of the notion of division. And again, we should think that discrimination is very like finding out or discovering e.g., whether this is the same as that or whether this is better than that. But, in fact, the menial arts which serve as examples of discrimination are: sifting, straining, winnowing, separating, carding, combing, and beating the web. Again, the metaphors are active, as though, in discriminating, we, ourselves, were acting upon something in such a way as to change it. I should emphasize that it is our

activity here which is puzzling. Sifting bran from flour is not like discovering bran to be a different kind of thing from flour. Discovering, recognizing, etc., are not acts but achievements of mind, and are not, as it were, practiced upon something.

I believe that the very same puzzle comes up again, in connection with the notion of combination later in the dialogue, where weaving is the metaphor. The puzzle is, to restate it: does the philosopher himself divide and combine, or does he discover division and combination in nature. The problem becomes more crucial when one considers what is said to be divided. Plato uses the two words εἶδος and γένος, the first of which, in particular, already has a special technical usage in his philosophizing as a thing, one, simple, and changeless. How is it, then, that we cut up an εἶδος?

One possibility I should like to set aside is the thesis that Plato is talking of conceptual analysis. The method of division, it is true, is a special philosophic tool, and it is tempting to think of it in this way. Two things forbid this, though. 1) A form is not just a concept. That is to say, it is an entity of metaphysical as well as epistemological import. It is surely wrong not to take Plato's realism seriously. 2) The analysis of concepts preceeds from an examination of the way we speak (and perhaps, of what we do.) Plato, as I say, takes it seriously that speaking is a clue to the way things are. However, he is looking for the rationale behind our use of words, and in that case what we must look to find is the things themselves of which words are the names.[20]

I wish to enter upon my solution to the puzzle. We must think of ourselves as tool-users - we operate the spindle, the flail,

and the scissors. We operate these instruments upon the materials to which they are suited. We cannot cut with a flatiron or thresh with the scissors. The nature of the material thus determines what we can do to it. Similarly with the shuttle in the Cratylus at 389C:

> And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thick or thin, of flaxen, woolen, or other materials, ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle, and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case?

Similarly we are to regard names as instruments which we wield in speaking about the material of the world.

> Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name? Do we not give information to one another and distinguish things according to their names? Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing threads of the web.[21]

Let us try to carry out this metaphor as far as possible. The intelligible world is a web of fabric, the various threads crisscrossed and interwoven, but each nonetheless distinct and having a nature of its own. As speakers, we use the shuttle, we recreate the pattern laid out for us in the intelligible world, but we re-create it as speakers in the realm of discourse. We do not ourselves enter and re-form the intelligible world in our use of the tools of the world of discourse. Nonetheless we rely on the pattern, and what we produce may be seen as a copy. We could not accomplish this task without the possibility of distinguishing the warp and woof lines in each section. This is required in order for us, in producing our copy, to pick up the proper shuttle, that is to say, the shuttle that carries the appropriate thread, the shuttle adopted to the purpose.

What is the method of division in relation to all this? The philosopher of the Sophist and the Statesman take up the task which was attributed to the legislator in the Cratylus. The legislator, looking to the nature of things themselves, designed the shuttles, that is, the words, whereby we, in speaking, pick things out. This was a metaphorical account of the origins of language; there is no evidence that Plato supposes that the legislation took place as a historical event. Translating the metaphor, we find the task of the philosopher. The philosopher has a keener insight than the ordinary man into the tangled web of things, in virtue of the education which, in the Republic, leads him to a knowledge of the forms. He is then in a position to find the γένη upon which the possibility of discourse is founded. His task then is to ask in every case, whether there is a real γένος to which a word refers, and whether the word is the appropriate tool for capturing that γένος.

The philosopher's task, then, is to provide a rationale for the divisions and combinations we make in speaking (in the sense that in using words to communicate we separate out, or refer to distinct objects; we also "combine nouns and verbs to accomplish something," 262D). The rationale takes the word to be a tool and asks whether the tool is adapted to the purpose or not. The purpose that the tool serves is to identify a kind (or a γένος) which is really there. To find out whether the tool does serve its purpose is then to find out the nature of a kind.

If this analysis is correct it has three interesting ramifications for an interpretation of the Sophist. First, it shows that for Plato a metaphysical inquiry and a linguistic inquiry are of necessity

linked in virtue of the very special relationship that language bears to reality, namely, imitation. Second, it connects the method of division and the complementary method, collection, with the theory of language advanced later in the Sophist, where speaking is represented as "combining verbs and nouns". Third, it shows a continuity between the linguistic theses of the Cratylus and those of the Sophist.

A.E. Taylor has put forward a view as to the significance of the division at the beginning of the Sophist.[21] This view is not dissimilar to the one presented above. Taylor sees a connection between the notion of division and the problem of negation, which is the central concern of the dialogue. As he sees it, the division at the beginning sets the stage for an investigation of negation, not simply because it reveals the sophist as an illusionist and a charlatan, but because the method itself necessarily involved "an act of exclusion. In saying what the definiendum is, I am, in the same breath saying what it is not". Division cannot be carried out without the employment of the notion of difference. But, of course, as it turns out, the Form Different provides the underlying real thing to which, according to Plato, we refer, when we use the word "not".

I think that this view is highly enlightening. The presumption at the beginning of the dialogue, where the philosopher's task is represented as ferreting out the real divisions in nature which entitle us to speak as we do, is that there is in fact a multiplicity of things, each with a nature of its own. But the very assumption that underwrites the possibility of ferreting out that multiplicity, namely, the assumption that every word corresponds to some real thing, commits us at the same time to the view that we can find that thing in nature, which, as

it were, holds that multiplicity in place as a multiplicity. When we speak of something's being different from something else, or something's not being something else, the philosopher is just as much committed to finding the reality underlying the words "different" and "not", as he is to finding the nature of that thing which we speak of using the word "sophist". As A.E. Taylor puts it: "there is a real 'moment of negativ-ith' in that reality, not made by our thinking, to which all significant thinking refers."

The Stranger takes Theaetetus through six divisions to begin with, in each of which the sophist makes an appearance under a different guise (231D). He is found to be 1) "a hired hunter of rich young men"; 2) "sort of merchant of learning as nourishment for the soul"; 3) "a retail merchant in the same wares"; 4) one who "sells the products of his own manufacture"; 5) "an athlete in debate, appropriating that subdivision of contention which consists in the art of eristic"; 6) "a purifier of the soul from conceits that block the way to understanding." The Stranger then proposes to go to the root of the matter and "look for that feature of (the sophist's art) in which all these forms of skill converge". This feature is derived from the results of all the previous divisions. It is that the sophist is a controversialist. He is a controversialist in science, in rhetoric and politics, in the crafts, such as wrestling, and in fact he turns out to be able to dispute in any area whatsoever. It is agreed however, that no man can know every-thing. So a man who can convincingly dispute concerning such a variety of subjects must have hypnotic powers, if he is to produce the belief that he knows all these things in his audience.

This part of the account is continuous with the Socratic theme

first introduced in the Apology, where Socrates interviewed the politicians, the poets, and the craftsmen, looking for a man with an account of the knowledge he purported to possess. In the Republic the same argument is used in Book X, where Socrates' polemic against the poets is

> that all poetry, from Homer onwards, consists in representing a semblance of its subject, whatever it may be, including any kind of human excellence, with no grasp of the reality ... the poet, knowing nothing more than how to represent appearances, can paint in words his picture of any craftsman so as to impress an audience which is equally ignorant and judges only by the form of expression...[22]

At this point in the Sophist, as in the Republic, an analogy is drawn between the man who gives an appearance of knowledge by means of words, and the graphic artist, who gives an imitation of reality by means of pictorial representation. Again, the crime is a moral one. The charge is "deceiving the innocent minds of children" by making them think the picture is the real thing.

It is agreed, then, that the sophist is an image-maker. But, at this point, the sophist becomes himself recognized as an antagonist in the dialogue, since he will seek to elude discovery by every trick of his art. The philosopher must expose the illusionist without being taken in at any stage by the very illusions he produces.

The Stranger adopts at this point the metaphor of a search party out looking for a criminal by quartering the ground upon which he is known to hide. What is especially interesting about this metaphor and the succeeding passage in which the search is carried out, is the occurrence of verbs of vision making out the divisions. Initiating the division the Stranger says: "It seems to me, that I now see two forms

of mimesis." (... ἔγωγέ μοι καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι δύο καθορᾶν εἴδη τῆς μιμητικῆς.)"...I see the likeness-making as one art." (Μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν .) (235D - E) He also speaks of "discovering" (ζητέω) at 235D2. This fits with the claim made above that we divide only in speaking; we discover or discern the divisions in nature.

The division proceeds as follows: out of the art of image making is divided the art on the one hand which seeks to produce a perfect copy, and the art on the other which produces what only seems to be a likeness, but which in fact is distorted in such a way as to deceive the viewer into thinking it the real thing. This is the art of the sophist. The sophist says things in the course of his teaching, which are in fact untrue, and are calculated to deceive the minds of his audience. Furthermore, he himself purports to be a wise man, but in fact this is only an appearance, calculatedly produced.

The Stranger says: "This 'appearing' or 'seeming', but not 'being', and saying things, but not true things, all this is always very perplexing..." The problem arises in describing the art of the sophist. We say that he speaks falsely. We also say that he produces an appearance. Saying these things we assert the existence of falsehood and the existence of appearances.

At this point the division is broken off. For the sophist begins to show his mettle as an antagonist and produces the first of the paradoxes which the latter half of the dialogue is designed to unravel. The Stranger pretends to dismay at the liveliness of the sophist as he eludes his captors. But the dismay, as well as the puzzlement brought on by the paradoxes is an ironic device, for, as I

have hoped to show, the first of the metaphysical doctrines with which the sophist will ultimately be trapped, the elusiveness of his nature banished, has already been introduced. This is the doctrine that there is a multiplicity of things which are different from one another, each with a nature of its own.

FOOTNOTES

1. cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961: (4.121) "Propositions show (zeigt) the logical form of reality".

2. cf. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1968, Chapter XII.

3. This might seem to be false if we consider the possibility that facts are atomic or simple. A correspondence assumption about language, on this view, would have it that statements are correspondingly simple. However it is clearly a condition of being able to hold apart naming and correspondence assumptions that both statements and facts are complex. If both were simple, a statement would be nothing other than the name of a fact. Since my analysis of the correspondence assumption for purposes of an analysis of Plato's work presupposes a distinction between the correspondence and the naming assumptions, I shall not be considering this possibility.

4. Plato, Cratylus, translated by Jowett, in Hamilton and Cairns, Plato, Bollingen Series, Pantheon Books, 1963, 388B5.

5. Plato, Republic, translated by Cornford, Oxford University Press, 1941, Book X, 595-601.

6. Op. cit., Plato, Cratylus, 392 D, translated by Jowett.

7. cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: (2.1511) "That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it."

8. Op. cit., Plato, Cratylus, 423C, translated by Jowett.

9. Ibid., Plato, Cratylus, 439A, translated by Jowett.

10. Plato, Sophist, translated by Fowler, Loeb edition, 1968, 262D; Op. cit., Cratylus, 431B, translated by Jowett.

11. Since the use of ὄνομα in the Sophist to mean "noun", together with its use in the Cratylus to mean "name", is a potential source of confusion for readers of my discussion below, I have reserved the translation "noun" for the technical usage of ὄνομα in which it contrasts with ῥῆμα (verb), and have spoken throughout of both ὀνόματα (nouns) and ῥήματα (verbs) as names. The point is that both nouns and verbs are names, but of different kinds of things.

12. The Greek ὁ ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει does not make clear whether Plato's example makes reference to one man, or is about men in general.

13. Op. cit., Plato, Sophist, 262C - D, translated by Fowler.

14. Op. cit., Plato, Sophist, 263B, translated by Fowler.

15. David Keyt, "Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B", Phronesis Supp. Vol. II.

16. This question has been translated without due attention to its significance. Cornford translates:

> Socrates:
> Did they think of all these as a single type or as two, or did they distinguish three types and attach one of the three corresponding names to each?

Taylor translates:

> Socrates:
> Did they take all three to be one and the same, or to be two, or did they distinguish three types, as well as three names, and give each of them its several names?

The point I wish to make about the latter two translations is that they do not do justice to an important assumption made by the speaker. The assumption is suggested by the coordinate use of ὥσπερ and ὡς, which I have translated respectively: "just as", and "answering to". Using ὥσπερ, Socrates suggests that a reason for thinking there to be three kinds is that there are three names; using ὡς, he suggests a correspondence (to use Cornford's word) between the names and the kinds. The assumption, then, which the question's phrasing virtually forces, is that words or names correspond to natural divisions (γένη).

17. This passage is reminiscent of Cratylus 439B: "...the knowledge of things is not to be derived from names. No, they must be studied and investigated in themselves." (translated by Jowett)

18. The notion of sensitivity, here, is analogous to perceptiveness as at Republic, VI, 508.

19. The other metaphors are self-explanatory, but in the case of ἐκτρέπω, I take it that Plato is exploiting the notion of cutting something free from a mold, as when one turns a cake or a piece of cake out of the pan.

20. We find evidence of this throughout the division of the Sophist: e.g., 223A - "And that sort which professes to form acquaintances only for the sake of virtue, and demands a reward in the shape of money, may be fairly called by another name. ...I believe that we have discovered the sophist - which is, as I conceive the proper name for the class described." 224B "Of this merchandise of the soul, may not our part be fairly termed the art of display? And there is another part which is certainly not less ridiculous, but

being a trade in learning must be called by some name germane to the matter." etc.

21. Op. cit., Plato Cratylus, 288B, translated by Jowett.

22. A.E. Taylor, The Sophist and the Statesman, Dawson's, 1971, Introduction, p. 13.

23. Op. cit., Plato, Republic, Book X, 6-0, translated by Cornford.

CHAPTER 2

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I shall discuss the paradoxes of not-being which the Stranger lays out between 236 - 242. I shall argue that these paradoxes come up in connection with the view of language which is discussed in Chapter 1. "Not-being" is thought to be a name in accordance with the naming assumption and yet, on account of considerations made clear in these paradoxes cannot be a name.

The way in which these paradoxes are understood places constraints upon the interpretation of the whole dialogue. First of all I shall be arguing that the paradoxes are not straw men which can either be overlooked or disposed of quickly. From the point of view of Plato's own theory of language it is essential that he establish for τὸ μὴ ὄν the status of a name. Secondly, I shall argue that the puzzles are existence puzzles; they come up when the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν is taken to mean either "non-existence" or "that which does not exist". I shall show how what G.E.L. Owen calls the Parity Assumption can be brought to bear on this; if the puzzles concern Non-Existence or the non-existent then the dialogue as a whole must be concerned with questions of existence and non-existence. Thirdly, I shall attempt to show how each paradox finds resolution in later parts of the dialogue.

The first set of paradoxes set a problem with the status of τὸ μὴ ὄν as a name. They may be seen as resolved when τὸ μὴ ὄν is found to be the name of something (258B). The second paradox sets a

problem for the status of discourse as a whole when it is defined as image-making. It finds resolution when discourse is declared to exist (260A). The third paradox arises when an inadequate formulation for false opinion is offered. The problem is resolved with an alternative formulation at 263B. I argue that in each case the setting of the problem and its resolution can only be understood when both are interpreted within the context of the theory of language outlined in Chapter 1 and when both are seen to be existential.

This form of approach to the Sophist is unusual. Throughout this thesis I shall be for the most part considering three commentators whom I take to be putting forward variants of a modern "received view" of the dialogue. Of these, Frede considers the paradoxes not at all, but starts his interpretation of the text at a much later point (255C-D). Moravcsik (in "Being and Meaning in the Sophist") takes the paradoxes into account, but believes them to misleadingly characterize a problem which can only properly be stated when existential difficulties with τὸ μὴ ὄν have been set aside. Owen also gives some consideration to the paradoxes, but his approach is opposite to mine. Since he interprets Plato later in the dialogue to be giving an account of the incomplete sense of "is" and since he also recognizes the importance of the Parity Assumption of 250E, he argues that the paradoxes are not existential problems at all. Thus, all three interpreters start their analysis of the dialogue with the interpretation of Plato's positive doctrine and, insofar as they consider the initial setting of the problem, either rule it irrelevant or tailor it to fit the supposed solution. Although my approach is an unusual one considered against the starting point of these interpreters, it seems to be a more natural one.

I consider the paradoxes in order, dividing them up as follows: the paradoxes of 236E - 239D, the paradox of 239D - 240C, the paradox of 240C - 241B.

2.2 236E - 239D

2.2.1 Introduction

In this stretch of the dialogue there are four puzzles which may be separated out. The first comes up between 236E and 237A: saying that falsehood comes into existence involves the assumption that τὸ μὴ ὄν exists and this is a contradiction. The second puzzle is stated at 237C - 238: to say something false is to say τὸ μὴ ὄν, to say τὸ μὴ ὄν is not to say something, not to say something is to say nothing, so we cannot characterize someone who says something false as having said anything. The third puzzle between 238A and 238D is a problem about using grammatical number in an expression which fails to refer either to anything or any things. The fourth paradox at 238D and 239D consists in pointing out that the argument in the previous puzzle is unintelligible, since in uttering it we violate its own conclusion: that the expression, τὸ μὴ ὄν whether in the singular or the plural has no intelligible use.

I shall begin by discussing the views of commentators on these puzzles and how they find resolution in the Sophist. I shall then go on to give my own interpretation, dividing the text for convenience into two sections: 236E - 238 and 238A - 239D. I shall conclude by giving my own view of how these puzzles may be seen to be resolved in later parts of the Sophist.

2.2.2 Cornford's Interpretation

Cornford takes Plato's enterprise in these paradoxes to be to set aside as beyond investigation the totally unreal. He says:[1]

> The very words "the non-existent" (absolute non-entity) cannot be uttered without self-contradiction. This point is not urged against Parmenides and could not be urged without descending to captiousness. In all this section on 'the totally non-existent' Plato is rather confirming Parmenides and accepting his warning 'Hold back thy thought from this way of inquiry'. Plato does not go back upon the results here reached.

According to Cornford, if τὸ μὴ ὄν is understood to have the sense of τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν it must be "ruled out of the discussion". Later in the dialogue, Plato does not make use of this sense of the term.

Cornford takes the sense of τὸ μὴ ὄν which will be used in giving a positive account of falsehood to be isolated at 258E, where the Stranger says: (Cornford's translation)

> So let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent (i.e., the simply non-existent) that we mean when we make bold to say that 'what is not' exists. So far as any contrary of the existent is concerned, we have long ago said good-bye to the question whether there is such a thing or not, and whether any account can be given of it or none whatsoever.

As Cornford understands them, these paradoxes are not really paradoxes at all. They present part of Plato's positive thesis about τὸ μὴ ὄν.

There is a difficulty with this interpretation. As Michael Frede points out in connection with an interpretation of the famous passage 255C - D[3], it would appear that for Plato the sense of a word is captured by its reference to a Form; if a word has more than one sense

it refers to more than one Form. But in these paradoxes it seems that the expressions τὸ μὴ ὄν and τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν fail altogether of reference. The conclusion that τὸ μὴ ὄν is unthinkable, inexpressible, etc. (238C8) cannot be interpreted as meaning that one sense of τὸ μὴ ὄν is to be set aside. It is to conclude that τὸ μὴ ὄν does not have a sense.

2.2.3 Owen's Interpretation

Owen picks out three levels of argument in the text between 236E and 239D.

> (i) "what is not" stands for nothing, hence speaking of what is not = speaking of nothing = not speaking at all...
>
> (ii) 238A1 - C11 tries for conclusions that have what is not as their express subject. Since what is not cannot have any actual attributes, it cannot have any number...so it eludes our references and cannot be spoken or thought of...
>
> (iii) 238D1 - 239C8 points out that according to (ii) the argument and conclusion of (ii) cannot be consistently formulated.[3]

Owen's dominant interpretive thesis is that Plato is not concerned in the Sophist with the existential sense of the verb "to be". It is his position that these paradoxes, while they deceptively resemble earlier paradoxes in Plato's works (Theaetetus 188E2 - 189A14; Republic 477A3 - 4, 478D7) are actually dissimilar. He argues that this is shown by the fact that the problem is not fully stated with (i), as it was in earlier occurrences. (i) traditionally delineates the impossibility of speaking of non-existent subjects. But (ii) and (iii) go on to raise questions about the use of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν. (ii) and (iii), Owen maintains, open up what becomes the central issue

of the dialogue: how to understand correctly the negation of the verb "to be". Even in (i) in the Sophist version Owen argues[4] the identification of "what is not" with "nothing" proceeds by way of identifying "what is not" with "not something". So the point is not that "what is not" gets identified with "nothing" because of an interpretation of "what is not" as "what does not exist"; the problem arises not with an incorrect treatment of the verb "to be", but with an incorrect understanding of the scope of the negation sign.

This interpretation is part of a very radical view of the Sophist, one which coheres with the equally revolutionary interpretation of Michael Frede, which will be discussed later. According to both Owen and Frede, Plato is only ever concerned with one sense of the verb "to be" in the Sophist; the resolution of earlier difficulties with the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν cannot be seen as stemming from a distinction of senses of εἶναι, ὄν, or ἔστιν.

Owen elicits a very powerful piece of evidence for this larger view. He argues from the Stranger's pronouncement at 250E5 - 251A1 (Owen's translation):

> -Now that both being and not being have turned out equally puzzling, this in itself (ἤδη) offers the hope that if one of them can be made out to a greater or lesser degree of clarity the other can be made out to the same degree.[5]

Owen calls this assumption the Parity Assumption.

It is clear that the Parity Assumption may be turned against the interpretation of Cornford already presented. If τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν are only to be illuminated, if they can be illuminated at all (251A1 - 3), both at once, then there can be no setting aside or ruling out of a sense of τὸ μὴ ὄν which is not a ruling out of a sense of τὸ ὄν.

The Parity Assumption can be used to support Owen's interpretation of the first three paradoxes of the Sophist. Since Owen thinks it clear that in the solution to the problem of falsehood Plato uses only the incomplete sense of "is", it would be in violation of the Parity Assumption if he were to set the problem in terms of a complete or existential sense.

I think that the Parity Assumption is an extraordinarily valuable tool in the interpretation of the Sophist. Before discussing its implications further, or the uses I wish to put it to for purposes of my own interpretation, I shall turn to a third interpreter of the three paradoxes. The view which the Parity Assumption is used against by Owen is perhaps most fully represented by Julius Moravcsik in "Being and Meaning in the Sophist".

2.4.2 Moravcsik's Interpretation

Moravcsik interprets the paradoxes in the following way:[6]

> The first of these (237B7 - E7) shows that "non-existent" must be meaningless. It is argued that this phrase cannot be applied to any existent, and thus it cannot apply to anything. It applies to nothing. This is taken to mean not only that it has no reference, but also that it has no meaning...
> The second argument (238A5 - C11) demonstrates that non-existence is inconceivable. It is stated that nothing can characterize a non-existent, not even plurality or singularity...
> In the third argument (238D4 - 239B3) we are told that if "non-existence" is meaningless and non-existence inconceivable, then nothing can be said of non-existence. The preceding arguments and even the statement that nothing can be said of non-existence are all meaningless...

Moravcsik, like Cornford, maintains that what these passages show is that Plato cannot deal satisfactorily with the concept of non-existence. Thus, he takes the conclusion of these paradoxes to stand in

The Sophist: Non-existence is a concept that we cannot get clear about. However, this does not prevent our becoming clear about Existence; in fact, it yields valuable clues as to how this might be accomplished. For instance, Existence cannot be a sortal concept for Plato. This is ruled out by the corresponding equations: existent = anything; non-existent = nothing in the first paradox.[7]

It is easy to see that Owen's Parity Assumption fundamentally challenges this interpretation of the force of the paradoxes, just as it challenges Cornford's view. Once again, it cannot be, if the Parity Assumption is taken at face value, that the paradoxes rule out a sense of the negation of τὸ ὄν as inexpressible, inconceivable, etc.; unless they simultaneously rule out its positive counterpart. Since Moravcsik holds that Plato has a full-blown theory about Existence, his view violates the Parity Assumption.

Moravcsik takes Plato to have introduced a distinction between meaning and reference in the Sophist. In the paradoxes he takes Plato to be setting up the views of some (unnamed) opponents for whom saying something meaningful is to express part of reality.[8] On this view, saying something true and saying something meaningful are identical; for nothing said is either true or meaningful unless it expresses part of reality.

According to Moravcsik, this feature of the paradoxes is challenged by Plato. The heart of enterprise of the Sophist will be to give a more adequate account of speaking which separates the truth of what is said from its being meaningful.

Thus for Moravcsik these paradoxes find resolution when Plato has set out two new theses:

(1) When he has distinguished the existential sense of the verb to be from the incomplete predicative sense at 255C - D, thus vitiating the equation τὸ μὴ ὄν = nothing; and

(2) when he has formulated the view that a sentence is a combination of nouns and verbs at 261E ff, whereby sentence meaning becomes associated with well-formedness.

With this second step, the resolution of the paradoxes is complete: the old formula λέγειν ψευδῆ = λέγειν τὸ μὴ ὄν is transformed. The expression τὸ μὴ ὄν no longer stands in for the unitary thing said, but for the negation of the connective expression "is" which combines sentence elements. Thus τὸ μὴ ὄν becomes a kind of shorthand for negative predication.

2.2.5 An Interpretation of the Paradoxes 236E - 238A

I have attempted to set out the views of three interpreters. I now proceed to give my own interpretation of the paradoxes. I shall first discuss the paradoxes themselves; then the conflict between my position and the views of the other interpreters. Then I shall try to outline how the paradoxes must be resolved.

The paradoxes are introduced at the end of the Stranger's division of the Sophist. It is announced that any attempt to understand falsehood gives rise to contradiction. Saying or thinking that falsehood really exists is contradictory (236E). This is to suppose that τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι (237A3 - 4). This is what is forbidden by Parmenides, when he says:

οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε τοῦτο δαιμῇ, φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆδ' ἀφ ὁδοῦ διζήμενος εἶργε νόημα.

It is important to notice at what level the problem arises. It arises not when someone says something which is false, but when we try to understand that what he said was false. The sophist says: "Theaetetus is flying". We say: "What the sophist said was false." But the sophist now points out: "What you have just said involves a contradiction."

The contradiction lies in the allowance we make that there is falsehood, i.e., that τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι . Since we cannot hold that, the sophist is at liberty to say anything he likes.

At this point there can be little doubt that the problem is an existential one. Two lines in particular serve to establish this:

236E1 τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας . . .

237A3 . . . ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν.

In the first, the problem of understanding how it is possible to say things but not true ones is set side by side with the problem of understanding seeming and appearing but not being. In the second quotation, falsehood is said to come to be only if τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι. Both the phrase τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι and ἐγίγνετο· ὄν must be understood as existential: τὸ μὴ ὄν exists and falsehood comes into existence.

If the problem is set up in existential terms, i.e., if

a problem with the existence of τὸ μὴ ὄν , then the purported contradiction must also be seen in existential terms. The phrase τὸ μὴ ὄν must be read "what does not exist" if the claim that τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι is to be a contradiction.

It follows that Plato understands Parmenides' injunction as a prohibition against thinking that what does not exist exists. There are two ways of reading this: thinking of what does not exist that it exists, or thinking "what does not exist exists." Since Plato labels the thought a contradiction he must interpret Parmenides as inveighing against the latter.

It is to be noticed that this distinction again makes it clear at what level the problem arises. Speaking falsely is saying that something exists when it does not. This involves no contradiction. Judging that someone spoke falsely is thinking that something which does not exist does exist. The contradiction arises at the level of judgment.

It can be seen that the problem really stems from characterizing speaking falsely as λέγειν τὸ μὴ ὄν . This characterization seems to have been very attractive to Plato since it comes up not only in the Sophist, but in the Theaetetus (188D), Republic (477 - 8), Cratylus (385B), Euthydemus (284B) etc. Indeed, the characterization is never undermined, and recurs even in the crucial passage of the Sophist, 263B, where the falsehood of "Theaetetus flies" is analysed:

τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.

Although the first of the paradoxes treats the account of falsehood as involving a contradiction, the next paradox suggests that the problem is worse yet. The paradox is expressed in these lines:

237B8 - 9: καὶ μοι λέγε· τὸ μηδαμῶς ὂν τολμῶμεν που φθέγγεσθαι;

237C7 - 8: ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ τι τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ οἰστέον.

237C10 - 11: οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὸ τί φέρων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις φέροι.

237D1 - 4: καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ τί τοῦτο ῥῆμα ἐπ' ὄντι λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε· μονον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων, ἀδύνατον·

237D6 - 7: ἆρα τῇδε σκοπῶν ξύμφῃς ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν τι λέγοντα ἕν γέ τι λέγειν;

237D9 - 10: ἑνὸς γὰρ δὴ τὸ γε τὶ φήσεις σημεῖον εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τινὰ δυοῖν, τὰ δὲ τινὲς πολλῶν.

237E1 - 2: τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τί λέγοντα ἀναγκαιότατον, ὡς ἔοικε, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν.

237E4 - 5: ἆρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγειν μέν, λέγειν μεντοι μηδέν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὅς γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ μὴ ὂν φθέγγεσθαι;

The paradox begins with the only mention of the term τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν. This is again puzzling if one takes τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν to be the subject of these paradoxes as Cornford does. Since Plato passes on immediately to the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν, and uses it throughout the paradoxes, it seems reasonable to take it to be their subject; and to understand the initial use of τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν as for intensifying effect.

The force of ἐπιφέρειν in the next two points is taken by all interpreters to be referential. Thus, one cannot make reference to

one of the things that are with τὸ μὴ ὄν ; if one cannot make reference to τὸ ὄν, one cannot make reference to something.

This step involves a use of the naming assumption. Reference to a thing which is cannot be accomplished by means of a name which belies its nature. τὸ μὴ ὄν cannot be the name of τὸ ὄν. There can be no doubt at this stage that the expressions τὸ μὴ ὄν and τὸ ὄν are existential, since otherwise no impossibility would arise. There is, for instance, no impossibility in speaking of what is a horse as what is not a cow.

It is important to notice that this step precedes the entailment τὸ μὴ ὄν → μὴ τί. In fact, it is part of the justification for that step as the next lines prove. The expression τί is always used of beings (ἐπ' ὄντι). If something does not exist, then it is not something, Plato argues. This point is in direct contradiction to Owen's contention that not to be for Plato, even in this argument, is just not to be something. It looks rather, from the order of the argument, as though Plato thinks that if something does not exist then it cannot be something. There is an entailment here.

The next two speeches seem to belong properly to the second paradox. The issue of number is not followed up here.

With the first of these lines (237D6 - 7) however, an obscurity is introduced which is picked up at the next stage (237E1 - 2). If someone says something he says some one thing. He who says not something must say nothing. The obscurity is in the use of λέγειν together with the absence of some expression indicating quotation marks (like τοῦτο ῥῆμα above). So on the one hand the lines may be read:

1) If someone says "something" he says what is equivalent to "some one

thing:; if he says "not something" he says "nothing".

On the other hand, they may be read:

2) If someone says something (i.e., if something was said) then he says some one thing (i.e., some one thing was said); if he says not something (i.e., if it is not the case that something was said) then he says nothing (nothing was said).

If these two readings are deliberately confused, then the puzzle is simply specious.

There is, however, a third reading which makes the transition:

3) If someone says "something" he speaks of something; if he says "not something" he speaks of nothing.

This third possibility derives its plausibility again from the naming assumption. "Something" is properly the name of some one thing, "not something" is the name of nothing. This permits Plato to derive his conclusion non-speciously. He who speaks of nothing does not speak, for if τὸ μὴ ὄν and μὴ τί are the names of nothing they are not names at all. In the last two lines this is driven home by the distinction of φθέγγεσθαι, uttering, from λέγειν, speaking. All that is accomplished with the expressions τὸ μὴ ὄν and μὴ τί is utterance; since they cannot be used to speak of anything, nothing is said.

This puzzle does resemble the problem at Theaetetus 188 - 189. Speaking and opining are there compared to seeing, touching and hearing. Saying or believing something false is compared to failing to touch, see, or hear anything.

Two things mark off this puzzle from the Theaetetus ἀπορία. First, in the Theaetetus Plato does not show himself sensitive to the use of words as the medium of speech or opinion. The analogy shows that

speaking and thinking are simply taken to have direct objects; neither the correspondence assumption nor the naming assumption need be invoked when the analogy is adopted. But, secondly, the Theaetetus passage differs from the 237C - E puzzle insofar as they are on different levels. In the Theaetetus paradox false speech and false opinion are impossible, just as nothing is accomplished when nothing is seen, heard or touched. Whereas in the Sophist passage the problem is not one for the person who says something false; it is for us who wish to characterize what he did. This is made clear in the Stranger's conclusion (237E5):

ἆρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον τὸ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγειν μέν, λέγειν μέντοι μηδέν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὅς γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ μὴ ὂν φθέγγεσθαι.

It is we who are in difficulties; the sophist may say what he pleases, while the accusation that it was false eludes us.

I shall conclude my examination of this passage by summarizing what is at variance with the views of the commentators discussed earlier. First, against Owen, I conclude that the two puzzles discussed are really existence puzzles. The first is clearly so, since no paradox arises unless τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι is interpreted existentially. In the second, the argumentation would seem to proceed from an existential interpretation of τὸ μὴ ὄν to the entailment μή τι rather than the other way around. But for Owen's claim that the paradoxes are not existential to go through τὸ μὴ ὄν may never be interpreted existentially. Thus, his view requires that the problem all along must be with μή τι. This does not seem to be so.

Neither Owen nor Moravcsik seem able to come to terms with the use of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν as a characterization of falsehood.

For both interpretations the problem is settled at another level: for Owen the problem is solved when Plato gives an adequate account of sentence negation, for Moravcsik it is settled when another sense of the verb "to be" is marked off. But the real problem in these paradoxes is not with sentence negation, or the negation of the verb "to be" in sentences but with the characterization of false sentences as saying τὸ μὴ ὄν. If the problem is recognized to be at the level of characterization, whereby τὸ μὴ ὄν is not shorthand for what the false speaker said, but what we would say about what he said, then it is hard to see how the reductive machinery which will turn it to a problem about negation can be set in operation.

Finally, Cornford's position seems unsatisfactory for the reasons already adduced.

It is noteworthy that Owen's powerful interpretative tool, the Parity Assumption, may be turned now not only against Cornford's position and Moravcsik's position, but even against his own. For if the paradoxes can be shown to be existential, there can be no setting aside of one sense of "is" or "being". The Parity Assumption would dictate that existence and non-existence now require equal investigation.

2.2.6 An Interpretation of the Paradox at 238A - 239B

This puzzle, like the 236E - 239B paradox which immediately precedes it, is concerned with our predicament in trying to explain what the sophist says when he says something false. It centers around the attribution of number to τὸ μὴ ὄν when it is spoken of in the singular or plural with a singular or plural verb and when it is referred to as "it".

The principle which generates the puzzle is contained in these lines (238A6 - 7, 9 - 10):

τῷ μὲν ὄντι ποῦ προσγένοιτ' ἄν τι τῶν ὄντων ἕτερον;
μὴ ὄντι δὲ τι τῶν ὄντων ἆρα προσγίγνεσθαι φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἶναι;

It is possible to attribute (προσγίγνεσθαι) something which is to something which is; it is not possible to attribute something which is to something which is not.

The way the principle is stated makes it clear that there is no alternative to taking ὄν and εἶναι to be existential. Being is a precondition of attribution; the non-existence of a subject rules out attribution. This is once again to deny Owen's claim that the paradoxes are only "apparently existential".

The Stranger prepares to apply the principle with the addition of the premise: number is a thing which is. Again, there seems no other way of taking this than existentially: number exists. This is reinforced by Theaetetus' next line:

εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὡς ὄν.

The argument continues:

μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν; ἆρα οὐ πλῆθος ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι; μὴ ὂν δέ, ἆρα οὐ τὸ ἓν οὕτω;

The notion of attribution employed in these lines and in the principle which generates the paradox is not straightforward. I am translating the four words προσγίγνεσθαι (from 238A6 and 9), προσφέρειν (238B4), προστιθέναι (238C1) and προσαρμόττειν (238C6) as "attribute". Cornford uses "attach" for προσγίγνεσθαι,

προσφέρειν, and προσαρμόττειν, and "attribute" for προστιθέναι. The difficulty is that neither attachment not attribution seem to be involved in saying τὸ μὴ ὄν in the singular or τὰ μὴ ὄντα in the plural. For while it is true that the concept of number is employed in using singular and plural forms, it is at a different level from the level of assertion. Saying τὸ μὴ ὄν in the singular ought not to be analysed in the same way as saying that τὸ μὴ ὄν is one is analysed. This perception is not one that I am suggesting Plato has, however. Its importance lies in the fact that Plato cannot be aware of it because of the framework of his theory of language as laid out in Chapter One. Every element of language is potentially false. Even names contain descriptions of the thing names. Plato does not really have a distinction between the naming relation and description or attribution, since the naming relation turns out to be dependent on describing. The expression τὸ μὴ ὄν is not a sentence so we might be inclined to think that it makes or contains no attribution. But on Plato's account referential or putatively referential expressions like τὸ μὴ ὄν must attribute to be referential at all.

This part of the argument concludes: in attributing number to not-being we violate the principle that a being (τί, τῶν ὄντων at 238A9; ὄν at 238C6) should not be attributed to not-being. So not-being is inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational.

> συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον; (238C8 - 11)

The line fragment δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτε ... διά-

νοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό presents a difficulty for interpretation. Cornford translates it as "that which just simply is not" and finds in it therefore an echo of τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν. His interpretation is the same for τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό as it was for τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν -- with these expressions Plato is marking off an illegitimate notion of not-being.[9] I have already pointed out the problem with this view, that it violates the Parity Assumption.

But why does Plato speak of τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό? I think it serves to emphasize the nature of the predicament: even the grammatical form of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν reveals an attribute, which is just what τὸ μὴ ὄν cannot have. There can be no form of expression nor any thought[10] which corresponds to τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό without doing this, so we can neither speak nor think of it.

At this point the first stage of the problem has been fully enunciated: we have been given a principle which is violated whenever the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν is uttered. This part of the argument appears to rely on the results of the previous paradox. What makes the principle intuitive is the equation of τὸ μὴ ὄν with nothing (237E). It is obviously inappropriate to try to describe nothing - this is the intuitiveness of Plato's principle. The application of the principle takes us further: saying "nothing" in some sense describes nothing since singularity is thereby attributed to nothing. So "nothing" should not be said.

The second stage of the argument of this passage is where genuine paradox is introduced. The statement of the principle and its

application at stage one involved saying τὸ μὴ ὄν . But it was precisely that which was forbidden by the argument.

> οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκόπειν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὑποθέμενος οὔτε ἑνὸς οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μὴ ὄν δεῖν μετέχειν, ἅρτι τε καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἐν αὐτὸ εἴρηκα, τὸ μὴ ὄν γὰρ φημί.

Saying "you cannot talk about nothing" is talking about nothing. So this will be something that you cannot forbid. The passage ends:

> μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανοῦργος εἰς ἄπορον ὁ σοφιστὴς τόπον κατεδέδυκεν.

(239C6 - 7)

The sophist is again seen as the opponent. He reduces those who would seek to classify him to inarticulateness; the argument is his, and what it shows is the impossibility of correctly describing false speaking.

What is the connection of this paradox with false speaking? For this paradox as for the last one, the connection is in the lines at 236E4 - 237A4:

> ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρὴ ψευδῆ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ συνέχεσθαι, πάντάπασιν, ὦ θεαίτητε, χαλεπόν. τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι.

The problem is again not one for the ordinary speaker or, for that matter, for the sophist, but for the philosopher who attempts to classify what is said as true or false. It is the incoherence of the terms of classification which is here being proven.

Thus, I maintain that neither this paradox nor the last one

are about the falsity of sentences which have non-existent subjects as in Owen's example: "The elves interrupt my typing."[11] They arise because Plato is taking on the characterization of falsehood as saying τὸ μὴ ὄν. In the first paradox what is driven home is the equation of this characterization with saying nothing. In the first stage of the second paradox it is argued that the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν belies itself since it attributes unity to nothing. In the second stage it is argued that the argument given in the first stage is incoherent since the proof it offers makes use of the very expression the use of which it forbids.

I would like to examine the connection which Plato sees between being and being one, or being and being some one thing. It is important to do so because a whole cluster of interpretive claims rest upon taking this connection in a certain way. The most immediately relevant of these interpretive claims is Owen's view that the paradoxes discussed in this chapter depend upon a special misunderstanding of the negation of the (incomplete sense of) the verb "to be" whereby τὸ μὴ ὄν becomes equated with not being anything or not being (even) one thing. The problem of the paradoxes, it is suggested, does not rest upon difficulties with negating the verb in its existential sense. This claim, in turn, rests upon a deeper thesis, that for Plato, to be is to be something. Plato's problems with τὸ μὴ ὄν arise within a logic without existential qualification, it is maintained.[12] In the 238A paradox the special candidate for "being something" was "being one" - and this had been mentioned before at 237D6 - 7. This position has already been disputed.

I think that there is an interesting view revealed in these

paradoxes about oneness or unity, one which conflicts with another set of claims which have been made about Plato's progress in the Sophist. These claims are those of Ryle in "Plato's Parmenides".[13] The view is that in the Sophist the conclusion of a reductio ad absurdum argument in the second part of the Parmenides is embedded in a theory. The reductio argument goes to show that the concept one and its opposite many are incomplete. In the Sophist it is held, Plato builds a theory to account for incomplete concepts and their linguistic analogue, incomplete predication. So the view that "one" is complete is given up. I also wish to dispute this position.

As I have said, I think that this passage (238A - 239D) reveals an interesting insight into Plato's view of "one". But the view revealed here is not the one attributed to him by Ryle. "One" is taken to be the name of an entity, a being, that is, of a number. That is what permits in this puzzle the assumption that saying "x is one" is a case of attributing something which is to something else. Numbers are attributes, part of the character of a thing or group of things.

As I have already said, this view is a corollary of the naming assumption. The word "one" is the name of a number. When it is said that x is one, in turn, the correspondence assumption demands that this sentence find a correlate in nature: a thing x and its attribute oneness.

Ryle has suggested that in the Sophist Plato came to see the flaw in this view. The problem is that such activities as counting do not receive sufficient metaphysical underpinning if "one" is thought to be a complete concept. For example, if asked to count the number of things on my desk, mere knowledge of the number sequence will not be

sufficient for me to undertake the task. Whereas, if I am asked to count the number of books on my desk, knowing not only the number sequence, but also what I am to count makes it possible for me to succeed. What Ryle maintains that Plato came to see is that we must have such concepts as "book" before we can count. Further, it is "book" not "one" which individuates a set of things on my desk.

What makes the 238A paradox puzzling is precisely a violation of the revised view of "oneness" which Ryle attributes to Plato in the Sophist. The assumption is that a thing which exists will be one. A thing which does not exist will not be one, but in speaking of it as "a thing which does not exist" we already attribute oneness to it. Just in speaking of it in the singular we have made this attribution. There is no way in which we can speak of τὸ μὴ ὄν without speaking of it as one thing. Even our conclusion that it is irrational, inexpressible, and unspeakable cannot be drawn without making a mistake, i.e., identifying it as one thing.

If Ryle were right about Plato's revised view of "one" in the Sophist then this paradox is set up in misleading terms. For the paradox to be dissolved it would be necessary for Plato to make his new views about "one" explicit somewhere in the dialogue. But this is never done.

This point is an important one for several reasons. First, it establishes something about any resolution of the paradox: it will not be enough to make use of a different sense of "is" to resolve it, for the paradox relies crucially on a view about "one". To resolve the paradox it will be necessary either (1) to revise the assumption about "one" which makes the paradox work, or (2) establish that τὸ μὴ ὄν is

one thing. This mitigates against the views of Moravcsik, Owen, and Cornford. Second, if it is found that the view about "one" is not revised, but the second form of resolution is taken, then this is the foundation of an argument that Plato does not in the Sophist form the notion of an incomplete concept. But if he does not do this then the interpretations of Owen and Moravcsik, which rely crucially on this claim, must be incorrect.

In the section which follows I shall discuss what I take to be Plato's resolution to the paradoxes of 236E - 239D. I return explicitly to the argument against Ryle's claim in Chapter 4.

2.2.7 The Resolution of the Paradoxes

It is a matter of general agreement among the interpreters discussed that the paradoxes 236E - 239D find final resolution at 263Aff. It is thought that there the original terms of the puzzles have been given up with the recognition that speaking is not just uttering names but uttering combination of nouns and verbs (262D). The problem of falsehood does not center around failure of reference, but around incorrect attribution or combination. At the same time, the problem of falsehood is no longer tied up with existence or non-existence. Just as speaking gets reformulated not as uttering names but making attributions, so τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν are recognized to be connective expressions. The expression τὸ μὴ ὄν is not a characterization of the sentence "Theaetetus flies" as false but is part of a denial that Theaetetus flies.

On this view, the puzzles are entirely misleading. Speaking is mischaracterized by the puzzles as the utterance of names. The prob-

lem of false attribution is mischaracterized as a problem involving the failure of reference of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν . Finally, the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν is misunderstood as the negation of existence when it is really a negative connector.

This view of the true problem abolishes the old one entirely. The problem of characterizing a false statement is given up in favour of providing an analysis of wherein it is false. Thus, the problem at 263, it is maintained, is not to understand the person who characterizes the false sentence "Theaetetus flies" as τὸ μὴ ὄν , but to understand the person who denies that Theaetetus is flying.

I disagree with this interpretation of 263A ff. In any case, I also disagree that the puzzle at 237 is solved there. I have two reasons for thinking this:

1) Too little is done between 237 and 263 for a re-statement of the puzzle to be presupposed;
2) There is another place, 257B - C, where the puzzle may be seen to get resolution in the terms in which it was originally stated.

With reference to the second point: as the puzzle is stated, the problem is to see that he who characterizes what the sophist said has 1) succeeded in saying anything himself, and 2) allowed that something was said by the sophist. The problem thus centers around whether the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν has a referent.

At 257B10 ff. the Stranger says:

οὐκ ἄρ', ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τὶ μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων

ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἃττ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.

This passage breaks up the fatal set of equivalences: τὸ μὴ ὄν = μή τι = μηδέν . It is claimed that μή does not have the force of signifying (σημαίνειν) the opposite, but indicates (μηνύει) something different. So even if μὴ ὄν = μή τι this still does not yield τὸ μὴ ὄν = μηδέν since μή τι is not equivalent to μηδέν . (It may even be the case that Plato has restored usage to μηδέν as a word signifying not nothing but τι τῶν ἄλλων).

It is unnecessary to say that interpreters who find the puzzle of 237 essentially misleading as a statement of the problem of falsehood, do not interpret this passage in this way. Again, I must leave a detailed examination of the passage to the next chapter. All I wish to establish here is that this passage may be interpreted in this way, and when it is so interpreted, it solves the puzzle and at the same time retains its terms. If the problem is to find a referent for τὸ μὴ ὄν , it is here suggested how this may be done. τὸ μὴ ὄν does not signify the opposite of τὸ ὄν , but something different.

With reference to the first criticism made above of the received opinion about the resolution of the puzzles: I said that not enough is done between 237 and 263 for us to see that the old puzzles have been abolished in favour of a new problem. The old puzzles were concerned with characterizing false statements as saying τὸ μὴ ὄν. The new problem is with negative predication: denying that Theaetetus flies. One would, therefore, expect Plato to give up on his concern for

the reference of τὸ μὴ ὄν in favour of the analysis of negative sentences. Yet the problem of reference is recurrent; it comes up not only in the passage at 257B but at 258B, 258C, 258E, 259A, 260B, 260D, etc. Indeed, the characterization: saying something flase is saying τὸ μὴ ὄν recurs in the very passage which is supposed to solve the radically re-formulated problem. At 263B9 the line:

τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.

may be translated as repeating the formulation:

> It (the false sentence) says τὰ μὴ ὄντα as being.

At the same time, no analysis of sample negative sentences of the type "Theaetetus is not flying" is ever offered.

At this point, competing interpretations of the resolution of the paradoxes cannot be finally adjudicated. I have offered an alternative to the received view here. My alternative is that the paradoxes are resolved in the same terms in which they are set up -- as problems of the reference of the characterizing expression τὸ μὴ ὄν. I leave showing that this is the only alternative available, that the terms in which the puzzles are set are not shifted to a problem about negative predication, to more detailed analysis in Chapter 3, where I take up the passages 257B ff.

2.3 239D - 240C

2.3.1 Introduction

Only one puzzle is brought out in this part of the dialogue. It seems to have a different subject from the puzzles already discussed. Here the problem seems to be with a characterization of image-making in general, the sophist having been identified as an image-maker in the

conclusion of the divisions. In the previous paradoxes the problem was with a specific characterization of speaking falsely: λέγειν τὸ μὴ ὄν . The question is: what are these images which the sophist produces: At 239D ff. Theaetetus gives the commonsensical reply that images occur in nature as well as being the products of art. For instance, images appear in water and mirrors, as well as painting and sculpture. The sophist, acting again as the adversary, is unwilling to allow any commonsense assurance that there are such things as images. He demands an account of what they are. The account which Theaetetus gives leads on to the difficulty.

I take it that this problem has greater generality than the previous puzzles, since what is challenged is an account not only of false speaking but of speaking altogether, as well as other forms of image-making. I conclude this from the r[redacted] Theaetetus' examples. It coheres with the account of speaking given in the Cratylus, where the picture analogy with speaking occurs side by side with the tool analogy. It also coheres with Plato's discussion of the poet's art in Book X and elsewhere of the Republic, where the poet is accused not only of leading the minds of potential guardians away from luminous reality by the production of third-hand images.

I shall begin with a discussion of the puzzle. Then I shall set my interpretation against the interpretation of Owen. Finally, I shall again set up what I think is Plato's resolution of the problem.

2.3.2. The Paradox 239D - 240C

Theaetetus answers the sophist's challenge at 240A9:

τί δῆτα, ὦ ξένε, εἴδωλον ἂν φαῖμεν

εἶναι, πλήν γε τὸ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον;

He defines an image as another thing of the same sort copies from the real thing. The argument proceeds:

ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶπες; οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' ἐοικὸς μέν.

1) "of the same sort" signifies not another real thing, but a likeness.

ἆρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὂν λέγων;

2) One means by "real" what really is.

τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἆρ' ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς;

3) The not real is the opposite of the real i.e., really is not.

οὐκ ὄντως ὂν ἄρα λέγεις τὸ ἐοικός, εἴπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρεῖς.

4) It follows that a likeness or an image really is not.

ἀλλ' ἔστι γε μήν πως.
οὐκοῦν ἀληθοῦς γε, φήις.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν· πλήν γ' εἰκὼν ὄντως.
οὐκ ὂν ἄρα ὄντως ἔστιν ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

But 5) it is in some sense since it really is a likeness. The sophist has forced us to contradict ourselves, admitting on the one hand that an image is not real, and on the other hand asserting that it is real, insofar as it is a real likeness. We have come into con-

flict against Parmenides' prohibition against the third way again admitting that what really is not, really is.

I would like to begin my analysis of this argument by locating what I see as a fatal mistake. I would not like to attribute to Plato a recognition of this as a mistake. On the contrary, I think that in bringing the paradox to resolution, Plato continues to make the mistake.

Conflict is supposed to arise when we recognize that an image of e.g., a pot is not a real pot, although it is a real image. But I think that we must just fail to see that there is conflict here unless a mistaken assumption is brought to bear. This assumption is made explicit as a premise of the argument: 2) one means by "real", what really is. We appear to have a choice in the interpretation of this premise, and it is this ambiguity which, I contend, lends it its plausibility. On the one hand we may interpret it as meaning: by "a real pot" one means the same as what one means by "what really is a pot". On the other hand one may interpret it as meaning: by "a real pot" one means the same as what one means by "a pot which really is". If we take the first option, however, and follow through with the argument, we still fail to see conflict. For, prima facie, there is no more conflict between: this really is not a pot, but nevertheless really is an image of a pot, than there is between: this is not a real pot, but is, nevertheless, a real image of a pot. On the other hand the second option does yield conflict. The conflict is between the contention, on the one hand, that this (image) really is, and on the other, that this (image) really is not.

My view, then, is that the source of conflict in the paradox is a mistaken handling of the word "real". I think that Plato takes it to be the case that having said that something is real, we have said something about it; we have said what its ontological status is. In fact, there is evidence, for example, in the Republic[14] that Plato does think this. In this argument, however, we are led to believe this, rather by a fallacious move, than by the presentation of positive doctrine. What the fallacious move is, I have already mentioned above: the Stranger leads Theaetetus on from the formulation "a real x" to the formulation "an x which really is."

The proper criticism of this argument is clear. We should reject the underlying assumption that "real" is a word that can stand on its own, on a par with "pot". We should urge with Austin[15] that "real" is a trouser word that gets its meaning from the context in which it is used. Thus we understand what a real pot is in contrast to a mirror-image of a pot, a picture of a pot, or an artificial pot. Similarly, we understand what a real man is in contrast to a weakling, a fictional character, a robot, or a picture. The point is that we do not understand what a real thing is, in isolation from a context which provides a range of alternatives.

However, if we allow the mistaken supposition that to say something is real is to say something about its ontological status, then to say that something is not real will come to seem very peculiar indeed, given the equivalence asserted by Plato in 2), that to say that something is real is to say that it really is. If, as well, we take on 3), the not real is the opposite of the real, then we find that anything which is not real really is not. This our old friend τὸ μηδαμῶς

οὐ . But again we find that of the image which we have shown is an unreal thing, a thing which really is not and in no way is, we nevertheless want to say that it is real, and hence that it really is.

Let me attempt to discuss this puzzle in terms that make it seem more plausible than the result of a bad argument. The best way to begin is, I think, to contrast the roots of this puzzle with the roots of the puzzle at 237D. At 237D the picture we get of speaking was of an accomplishment, the ingredients of which were an action (the uttering of words) and something spoken of. What is demanded is that in virtue of the peculiar nature of the action, something be picked out. If the nature of the action is not suited to the nature of the thing to be picked out, nothing is accomplished. The correspondence assumption which I take to be basic to this puzzle, fills out what the suitability of the action to the thing consists in. This picture of speaking is expressed fully in the Cratylus, where speaking is characterized as an action like other actions which can only be carried out with the use of proper instruments.[16]

In the puzzle at 240, however, our attention shifts from correspondence pictured in this way, to correspondence pictured as the likeness between a thing and the image of a thing. Speaking is here thought of as an action having an intermediate end, namely the production of an image. This shift of focus in the picture of speaking brings about a different sort of puzzle from the puzzle at 237D. There is no longer any question as to whether something was said at all, in the sense of "thing said" which is like "thing grasped", or "thing pointed at". Rather, the question becomes: what sort of thing is this image, or thing said (where what was said is taken to be the image)?. For it is

not a real thing. But, on the other hand it was something, namely a word or sentence. So it must be real.

It should be noted that the terms in which the puzzle is expressed make the bond between speaking and image-making explicit. Theaetetus defines εἴδωλον (image) as: τὰ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀφοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον - "another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the real one." The word which we have been translating as "real" throughout the discussion, ἀληθινόν, is derived from ἀλήθης. Liddell and Scott give roughly the same definitions for both words:

> -... of persons, true, sincere; truthful, frank, honest: of things, real, actual...
>
> -... of persons, truthful, honest: of things, real, actual, genuine...[17]

We could just as well have phrased the puzzle in terms of truth rather than reality. The same Austinian criticism would have been appropriate. For "true" used in the translation above has the same sense as "real" and just as "real" contrasts with "artificial", "fictional", etc., so these would contrast as well with "true". However "true" as well allows of the contrast "false", and this is exploited by the paradox in the same steps (substituting "true" for "real"): (240B)

> Str.: And by the true one you mean that which really is (ὄντως ὄν)?
>
> Th." Exactly..
>
> Str.: And the not true is the opposite of true?
>
> Th.: Of course.
>
> Str.: That which is like, then, you say does not really exist if you say it is not true (οὐκ ὄντως ὄν).

We have already noted that Plato in the two preceding paradoxes used the formula: saying τὸ μὴ ὄν, for saying what is false. The terms of this puzzle simply provide a further rationale for the formula. If we allow the equation of "true" and "real" with "being" and the opposition of "true" and "real" with "untrue" and "unreal", then the false, just as much as the artificial, the fictional, etc., becomes subsumed under "not-being".

It is still hard to find this puzzling. We must find a metaphysical background which makes it seem anomalous. However, we do not have far to look to find that background in the Sophist. The upshot of the discovery of this puzzle is that the Stranger is led to discuss a number of theories about the number and nature of reality. The movement of the argument from this puzzle to these theories is as follows:

1) The puzzle results in the difficulty that if we are to assert the reality of speaking and speaking falsely we must assert the forbidden third way of Parmenides (241B).
2) The Stranger then makes it clear that the only way that he can see out of this position is to undertake a refutation of the thesis of Parmenides that this is a forbidden way (241D - E).
3) This undertaking involves us in a discussion of not only the theory of reality (how many things there are and what they are like) advanced by Parmenides, but also other theories which are similar in approach (242C).
4) A casual examination of these theories shows us that they assume that we understand certain notions such as separation and combination and "the unreal" without theoretical explanation, but when we take a close look at these notions as they are embedded in the

theories, we find ourselves perplexed (243B).

5) Analogously we are perplexed when we ask ourselves whether we understand what reality is. For these theories assume our understanding of the word "being" without examination. But our present perplexity about not-being leads us to think that perhaps we understand what is meant by "being" no better.

The Stranger then looks at one sort of theory, the sort that proposes that all the things that really exist, are two (243D - E). Again, he makes use of the equivalence, which is here blatant, of "really exist" and "are real", to ask whether when these people say that they believe that each of these things is real they mean that 1) "reality" is the name of some third thing, or 2) "reality" is the name of one of the things, or 3) "reality" is the name of both of the things. In the first case, it follows as a consequence that the theory really must show that there are three things, not just two, in the second and third case, it appears that there is only one. The consequence of an application of the correspondence assumption is that "reality" is a name. It must then be the name of something, either of some third thing or redundantly of one or both of the two. But if it is the name of both, then in fact the two are one, since if reality is a name there will be only one thing that it names or that corresponds to it.

A point is here being made about the position of such a cosmological theory when we allow that language has revelatory power. The theory disallows all the usual ways of speaking about things, so that when we talk about tables and chairs, and water and so on, the theory would disallow that we are revealing the natures of things in so talking. However, the theory is itself expressed, and indeed is a theory only

insofar as it can be expressed. And one of the things that the theory does put forward is that only two things are real. The point is that we do have a right to ask what this means, and the theory does not provide us with any tools whereby we could find out. But now, if we press the theorists, and make the assumption that when they say that only these two things are real, the word "real" has some significance, we find, by the application of a Platonic assumption, the correspondence assumption, that the theory is unintelligible. What this is an attempt to show, going back to our puzzle, is that there is something very much awry with any theory which is put forward by people who do not take any account of the fact that in so doing they are using words, and that this activity must be accounted for by the theory itself.

This point is made even more forcibly and explicitly in the next refutation (244A ff.), which is the refutation of monism. The monist asserts that only one thing is real. Again he is held accountable for his use of the word "real". (The correspondence assumption forbids that he hold that the words "one" and "real" both name the same thing.) Yet on his own theory, they cannot be names of different things, since there is only one. But further, he is in a dilemma about names altogether. For if he assumes that there is even one name then he assumes that it is different from the thing which it names. But in that case there are two things, which is in contravention of his own thesis. On the other hand, if he supposes that the name is identical with the only thing that exists, then there still will have to be something which it names, since it is a name, which is different from it. But this cannot be another real thing, since the name is all that there is. At this point a corruption of the text makes it hard to see what the conclusion

of the argument is. I propose that it must be that the dilemma of the monist is either to disallow names altogether, and thus to have a non-theory, or hold that the only real thing is a name, which leads to difficulties as to what it is the name of.[18]

I want to go back to the puzzle from this discussion of what follows it in the text. One thing that this shows is the metaphysical background of the puzzle. The puzzle is put forward on behalf of people, who, in Plato's view, have a fundamental misapprehension of the importance of language. The puzzle is identified as a Parmenidean puzzle, but, as the Stranger makes clear, it does not only come up in connection with monism, but with any theory which proposes that the whole of reality consists of some number of distinct things. (I shall call this kind of thesis monadism, for the sake of ready identification.) The point is that none of these theories can give any account of the existence of thought and speech. But this makes these theories self-stultifying. About this conclusion, I think a question can be asked: does Plato really refute these theories on their own ground, or doesn't his refutation base itself rather upon his own assumption of correspondence, and hence, the assumption that thought and speech are real? Further examination of this question remains.

In the next section, I take up the interpretation of Owen.

2.3.3. Owen's Interpretation

What of the Parity Assumption? It was supposed that we could not find existence-puzzles in the Sophist, which really are existence puzzles and not predication-puzzles, because of the Parity Assumption. But interpreting "being" in this puzzle as "existence", we find that we

are stuck with "non-being" as "non-existence", and this in turn, given the Parity Assumption, sticks us with the problem of shedding light on that which cannot be illuminated.

The answer of Owen's thesis to all this is clear. He says that the puzzle here consists in the assertion "that it is paradoxical that what really is not (or is not real) should really be (or be a real) anything at all."[19] He suggests that the way the puzzle is set up seems tailored to a solution: namely, that just as the incomplete "is" and the incomplete "is not" may be said of a subject in respect of different predicates, so we may take it that there is no conflict between being a real semblance and not being a real pot. He adds, however, that Plato, in the end, simply reduces the problem of unreality to falsehood.

I think I have said enough in my analysis of the puzzle to forestall easy acceptance of this way out. The discussion of theories of reality that follows on the heels of the puzzle seems to contravene any such easy way out; as I have pointed out, in the refutation of monadism, Plato, on his own behalf, makes use of the move from "is real" to "really exists".

But Owen's second claim to solution demands more argument. I propose that Plato does not reduce the unreality of images to falsehood. At 260A we see the conclusion of the long struggle to give an account of discourse. Theaetetus fails to see the importance of the conclusion that discourse is one of the classes of being. But, if we accept my preceding line of argument with reference to the puzzle, then it allows us at least to place the sophist as an image-maker. At this point, however, the sophist adopts a second-string argument. He admits the existence of speech and opinion, but holds that they can have no participation

in non-being and so falsehood can never arise in them. That is to say, the sophist allows that there is speaking, but denies that there is false speaking. In so doing, he relocates the art of the image-maker as the art of deceit strictly, and not as the art of a speaker in general. (However, this is put right in the final division, where two kinds of μίμησις are defined as species of the art of image-making, opinion-imitation, and scientific-imitation.) The point I wish to make about this is that it does not reduce the problem of unreality to that of falsehood. Rahter, it seems that just as the argument had reached that point where the existence of the image-maker's art could be found, the sophist shifted his ground and redefined image-making. I conclude that Owen's analysis of the solution to the puzzle is unsatisfying.

2.3.4 The Resolution of the Puzzle

What the examination of the metaphysical background of this puzzle shows is that the puzzle is about the reality and existence of discourse itself. It does not, as Owen allows "give the appearance of an existence puzzle." Rather, it is an existence puzzle.

A conclusion I would like to draw from this is that, although one is perhaps tempted, in examining the mid-part of the dialogue, to think that Plato is replacing an inadequate theory of language with another one, one in which a plausible and even rather modern theory of predication is put forward, this temptation must be resisted. For the theories of Plato's predecessors, from which he derives his opposition, are theories which fail to account for language altogether, and which resist being supplemented with an account. Thus Plato's most significant achievement at the deepest level is not to give an account of negative

predication and falsehood, but to give an account of discourse, within which, of course, these are vital ingredients.[20]

Again, as in the case of the puzzle at 237D, I want to tentatively propose a solution which does justify to the Parity Assumption. In that case I suggested that Plato's solution to forestall the reductive move from "is not something" to "is nothing", would be to find a referent for "not something". I denied that Plato was reinterpreting the verb "to be" in such a way that "being" and "not being" conveyed a relation of "about-ness" and "other-than-aboutness". Rather, I suggested that the seeming opposition of "is" and "is not" could be dissolved if one could locate the real thing identified in saying "not being". The obvious virtue of this interpretation is that it rescues the third way of Parmenides, and that, as Plato tells us, is what he is trying to do.

Taking up the present puzzle, I want to apply the same sort of balm. Again, we are up against the third way of Parmenides; again it would seem that the apparent opposition of reality and unreality is the stumbling block to resolution. What I propose that Plato has established at the point where he concludes (260A ff); discourse exists, is that the unreal occupies a place among those things which really are.

2.4 The Paradox 240C - 241B

2.4.1 Introduction

I am now going to return to the fourth paradox which intervenes at 240D ff between the paradox of εἴδωλα and the discussion of reality in connection with monism and monadism. We found ourselves stymied by the sophist's argument about images. We were stymied because

he was able to show that an image as defined by Theaetetus at 240D could not be described without contradiction. An image appears to be both real and unreal. At this point, then, we try to define the sophist's art in a different way, as the art of deception. I think the paradox now introduced is the second-string argument of the sophist I mentioned at 260E. At that point as I analysed it, the sophist allowed that the image-making involved in discourse had been shown to exist or to be real, but took refuge in a re-definition of the art of image-making as the art of deceit, i.e., as speaking falsely with conscious intent to deceive. This shift of ground is an easy one to make, since all that is needed is to shift from the sense of ἀληθινόν which means "real" or "true" in the sense of "genuine" to the sense of ἀληθινόν in which what is meant is "true" in the sense in which it contrasts with false. The focus of the last puzzle was image-making in general--that is, speaking in general. The focus of this puzzle is on the production of falsehoods. And the question raised by the sophist at 260E, which relies on this puzzle, is whether there can be any such art as the production of falsehood.

The paradox at 240D begins by tacitly allowing that there is such a thing as an image or a semblance, the very image or semblance we have been speaking of:

ὅταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτοὶ ἅπαντᾶν φῶμεν.

but then asks a further question about it. Even supposing that there is such a thing, what would it be for it to be used in deceit? Here, as at 260E, the argument shifts from the existence of an image to the question whether it can produce false belief. The paradox depends upon an argu-

ment to show that it does not make sense to talk of false belief. We should then expect the solution to the paradox to be given following 260E (where the existence of discourse is admitted) in the section where Plato gives an explanation of whether falsehood mingles with speech and opinion (261C).

2.4.2 Interpretation of 240C - 241B

The Stranger begins (240D6):

ψευδὴς δ' ἂν δόξα ἔσται τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς;

1) False opinion thinks the opposite to the things that are. I want to interpret τοῖς οὖσι existentially as "things which exist". This is defensible on the grounds that what we have here is a characterization of a false opinion. That is, τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι is not a specification of what the opiner (falsely) thinks, but rather is a characterization of what it is to think falsely. That this is so is made clear in what follows:

λέγεις ἆρα τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

2) It follows that a false opinion thinks things that are not. Here is the explicit identification of τὰ μὴ ὄντα or τὸ μὴ ὄν with τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι which is eventually denied at 257B. The real source of this puzzle is contained in the next lines:

πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα, δοξάζουσαν, ἢ πως εἶναι τὰ μὴ παμπῶς ὄντα.

3) Does false opinion think A) that things which are not are not? or

B) that things which are not at all (τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα) are, in some sense? These alternatives are bogus. The first alternative cannot be a characterization of false opinion at all, the second makes false opinion out to be contradictory. The bogusness stems from packing both the characterization of the false opinion and the conditions under which it is false into the formulation.

In the Theaetetus at 189C - 190C the same type of paradox is introduced when Socrates attempts to define false opinion as "a kind of interchanged opinion". The example is given by Theaetetus: "When a man in forming an opinion puts ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, he does truly hold a false opinion". This may be interpreted: a man thinks of a beautiful thing that it is ugly or vice versa. However, Theaetetus is confused, for he admits that a man must think of two things in this case, of an ugly thing and of a beautiful thing. Thus he thinks that the beautiful thing is the ugly thing or vice versa. From this move, it is an easy step to characterize the opinion as an opinion "that one thing is another". The upshot is Theaetetus' recognition that since no one ever holds such an opinion, no one every holds a false opinion.

The Sophist paradox is similar, but at another level once more. In the Theaetetus paradox, the actual opinion that something is beautiful is packed together with the actual fact that it is ugly in once clause following δοξάζειν. The opinion itself is thus contradictory. In the Sophist paradox the content of the opinion is characterized as either in A) that things are not, or in B) that things are; but also packed into these characterizations of the opinion with the phrase τὸ μὴ ὄν is the specification that the things thought really are not.

Again the paradox plays upon a misinterpretation of the clause following δοξάζειν. Theaetetus in the Theaetetus was led to accept the original premise that a man in thinking falsely may think e.g., the ugly the beautiful because he understood the formulation to mean: thinks of the ugly that it is beautiful. Here Theaetetus is led on in exactly the same way. The false opiner may be correctly characterized as thinking of what is not that it is. This is alternative B) on one understanding. Alternative A) on the same understanding turns out to be a characterization of a true opinion: thinking of what is not that it is not.

That Theaetetus is again tricked by this understanding of the formulations is made clear by his next remark:

εἶναί πως τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἴπερ ψεύδεταί ποτέ τις τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ.

That is, with this understanding, Theaetetus rejects A) since it characterizes a true opinion and selects B) which characterizes a false one.

B) has another variant which the Stranger offers at the next stage:

Τὶ δ'; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα δοξάζεται.

Again, the variant may be understood in two ways, either as: the false opinion thinks of things which certainly are that they are not at all, or the false opinion thinks that things which certainly are are not at all.

Again, Theaetetus is misled, for he agrees that this second variant characterizes falsehood, as indeed it does on one understanding: thinking of things which certainly are that they are not at all. The

other understanding, on the contrary, is not an adequate characterization of falsehood since, again, it involves a contradiction. But it is clearly this understanding of the characterization that the Stranger is working with, and the conclusion of the paradox is to point this out:

. . . ψευδῆ τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους· τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὂν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι . . . (241A)

On the understanding of the characterizations which Theaetetus was misled to have no problem arises; on the other understanding we have a case of προσάπτειν τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν which was agreed at 238A to be illegitimate.

It is to be noted that this paradox does not just generate a mischaracterization of false opinion, but of true opinion as well. False opinion is unintelligible because it is uncharacterizable without involving oneself in contradiction; the characterization of true opinion is tautological. Characterization A) does not yield a notion of true opinion at all. If Theaetetus had noticed this, he would have been well on the way to dissolving the paradox, since with reference to A) only the understanding: false opinion thinks <u>of</u> things that are not <u>that</u> they are is viable. There will be a corresponding variant of A): false opinion thinks <u>of</u> things <u>that</u> are that they are. With this recognition of how A) must be understood, the opacity of B) may similarly be dispelled.

The theoretical background of this puzzle must be to draw to our attention how essential it is to adopt the correspondence assumption if we are to understand communication. The move which generated the puzzle was an understanding of B) which incorporated a characteri-

zation of the opinion and the conditions of its falsity both into the same formulation following δοξάζειν. What is needed to block the move is a formulation of the alternatives which is not susceptible to this understanding, i.e., which establishes correspondence between what is said and what is the case.

2.4.3 The Resolution of the Puzzle

I propose that Plato does give a reformulation of false opinion at 263B which satisfies the correspondence assumption. This formulation is:

λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστι περὶ σοῦ.
ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων.
τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.

I have already discussed this formulation in Chapter One. I criticized the translation of Keyt on the grounds that it simply generates the paradox of 240C - 241B all over again. I argued that the word ὡς must be translated "as", and that it is used to establish correspondence between what is thought or said and what is the case. It has the function of making it clear in what the truth or falsity of the opinion or statement consists. It breaks up the opacity of the phrase following λέγειν or δοξάζειν specifying that there is correspondence between what is said and what it is said about.

The commentators whose views I have discussed would not agree that this opacity is the source of the puzzle. They would not agree, as well, that the solution to the puzzle is breaking up the opacity of the formulation. Owen dismisses this paradox as simply a further display of contradiction.[21] Moravcsik also gives it no consideration. From this

we may understand that they take it to be dealt with in the same way that the other paradoxes are dissolved. Owen is committed to taking the paradox to be only apparently existential; Moravcsik believes that all the puzzles are dissolved by the purported distinction of two senses of "being" at 255C - D. These positions have already been shown to be insufficient for dealing with the other paradoxes. They are also at war with one another, insofar as Moravcsik takes the puzzles to have an existential basis, while Owen, making use of the Parity Assumption, disputes both the existential basis of the puzzles and any solution which distinguishes senses of "is".

I maintain that neither of these commentators can explain how the puzzle arises or is dissolved. If, as Owen must allow, the puzzle centers around a falsity formulation in which the existential "is" is not operative, then there is no contradiction in the formulation. For there is no contradiction as between thinking that something which is not e.g., green is blue, or thinking that something which is green is not blue. With no specification of how the purported incomplete "is" is to be filled out, a contradiction does not arise.

But in any case, to suppose that this is the correct level to assign the problem to is a mistake. The paradox is, as I have said, like the Theaetetus puzzle, but at another level. The problem does not arise for the speaker or opiner here, as it did in the Theaetetus, but for he who tries to characterize the accomplishment of the speaker. That is, the falsity formulation in the Sophist does not specify what the speaker or opiner said or opined: that the beautiful is ugly or the ugly beautiful, but rather characterizes what he accomplished: he said or thought that what is the case is not or vice versa. And this should

not be construed as a problem for the speaker but for the characterizer.

Moravcsik's dissolution of the puzzles runs up against the same criticism, insofar as the puzzle is not dislodged by a correct understanding of the "is" used by the speaker. It would have to be dissolved by a correct understanding of the "is" used by the characterizer. But again, it would seem that the characterizer is not mistaken in thinking that the "is" he is using is the existential one.

This point has very far-reaching consequences for both positions. First, for Owen, it shows that the Parity Assumption may be simply turned against him. If the puzzles are existential then the problem of the dialogue is existential and so must its solutions be. But second, for Moravcsik, it shows not that Plato must rid himself of the correspondence assumption of language by means of the adoption of the notion of incomplete predication, but rather that if he is to come to terms with the problem he himself set up he must adequately characterize correspondence. The source here is not one which can be dispelled by the adoption of a new sense of "is"; it may be dispelled when the notion of correspondence is employed by the falsity formulation, as I maintain it is at 263B.

2.5 Conclusion

I have tried to establish a parallel structure in the Sophist between the paradoxes and Plato's positive doctrine which provides their solutions. It is noteworthy that the ordering of the paradoxes is exactly mirrored by the ordering of their solutions: the first set 263E - 239D are resolved at 257B - C, the second 239D - 240C is resolved at 260A, the third at 263B.

At the same time I have argued that the paradoxes all depend upon taking τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν existentially. If their solutions are indeed as I have delineated them, then Plato's positive doctrine concerns existence and non-existence, not "is" and "is not".

One of these solutions, the one at 263B, I have already analysed in Chapter One, showing it to retain the existential sense of τὸ μὴ ὄν. In Chapter Three I go on to a more detailed examination of the remaining solutions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1964, p. 208.

2. Frede, Praedikation und Existenzaussage, Hypomnemata, Andeuhuek and Ruprocht, Gottingen, 1967, p. 30 ff.

3. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being"; in Plato I, Gregory Vlastos, Doubleday Anchor, 1970, p. 241.

4. Ibid., p. 241.

5. Campbell gives the translation: "Suppose, on the other hand, we can get sight of neither; then we shall, at any rate, push the argument through, as creditably as we may, between both of them at once." The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, Lewis Campbell, Arno Press, 1973.

6. Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist", Acta Philosophica Fennica 14, 1962, p. 26.

7. Ibid., p. 26 ff.

8. Ibid., p. 25.

9. Op. cit., Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 208.

10. Thought is silent speech for Plato: cf. 264A9 ff.

11. Op. cit., Owen, "Plato on Not-Being", p. 227.

12. Ibid., Owen, "Plato on Not-Being".

13. Gilbert Ryle, "Plato's Parmenides", Collected Papers, Barnes & Noble, 1971.

14. Republic, Book X as well as elsewhere throughout.

15. J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford, 1972.

16. Cratylus, 388B5.

17. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, 1971.

18. Benjamin Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, Oxford, 1953. Jowett translates this as: "And the one can refer to only one thing — that is to say, to a name." Fowler translates this as: "And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name." Cornford omits this speech. In stating what I believe the conclusion of the argument must be, I have followed Jowett's translation. I can make no sense of the Fowler translation, nor his footnoted explanation.

19. Op. cit., Owen, "Plato on Not-Being".

20. I do not mean to suggest that this is strictly an ancient problem, brought about by the relative poverty of philosophizing prior to Plato. For it seems to me that a modern monist like F.H. Bradley proposes the same kind of puzzle as is found at 240, namely, that the activities of speaking and thinking are illusory and hence unreal.

21. Op. cit., Owen, "Plato on Not-Being", p. 242.

CHAPTER 3

3.1 255C - E

In the previous Chapter, I argued that the aporiae of the Sophist depend upon an existential interpretation of τὸ μὴ ὄν. I also indicated my belief that the places which I identified later in the text where Plato comes to grips with the solutions to these aporiae would also bear an existential interpretation. This chapter as a whole will be devoted to a defence of this view.

In this first section of the chapter I shall undertake a preliminary investigation of the passage at 255C - E. This passage has traditionally borne a heavy weight of interpretation, from commentators who have seen it as fitting into the neo-Platonic tradition,[1] to those modern interpreters whom we have been criticizing. These interpreters, in particular, Moravcsik and Frede, have seen in this passage the key to the whole dialogue, the place where Plato comes to grips with the "senses" (for Moravcsik) or "uses" (for Frede) of "is".

Although the interpretation I wish to present does not depend on this short passage, because of the weight which these commentators place upon it, it is necessary for me to attempt to refute their claims. I shall argue that this passage involves a distinction between Difference and the Form τὸ ὄν interpreted existentially. I shall be arguing against other commentators that this passage does not provide the key to the dialogue, for I do not see in it a solution to the earlier aporiae. I go on to discuss solutions to the puzzles in the second section of

this chapter.

3.1.1 The translation of the passage 255C - E

Τί δέ; τὸ θάτερον ἆρα ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον; ἢ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὂν ὡς δύ' ὄντα ὀνόματα ἐφ' ἑνὶ γένει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ;

Ἀλλ' οἶμαι δὲ συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι.

Τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον· ἢ γάρ;

Οὐκ ἂν εἴ γε τὸ ὂν, καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην. ἀλλ εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἂν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν, ὅτιπερ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.

Πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα.

Here is Cornford's translation of this passage:

> Stranger:
> And are we to call Difference a fifth? Or must we think of Difference and Existence as two names for a single kind.
>
> .....
>
> But I suppose you admit that, among things that exist, some are always spoken of as being what they are just in themselves, others as being what they are with reference to other things.

.....

> And what is different is always called so with reference to another thing, isn't it?

.....

> It would not be so if Existence and Difference were not very different things. If Difference partook of both characters as Existence does, there would sometimes be, within the class of different things, something that was different not with reference to another thing. But in fact we undoubtedly find that whatever is different, as a necessary consequence, is what it is with reference to another.

.....

> Then we must call the nature of Difference a fifth among the Forms we are singling out.

The most obvious difficulty in translation throughout the passage is with τὸ ὄν . Cornford's translation throughout of as "Existence" begs the modern interpreters' questions about lines D4 - 6. A more neutral translation of τὸ ὄν than "Existence" is "Being" which leaves open the question whether Plato's distinction is between senses or uses of ἐστιν .

Another obvious difficulty of translation is the distinction made in lines C12 - 13. αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά has some history in Plato's philosophizing as a technical term whose counterpart in the (also technical) term πρὸς τι . It is tempting to think that the contrast between αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά - πρὸς ἄλλα is just the contrast between absolute and relative, or relational and non-relational. This is the interpretation of Moravcsik, and as a consequence he sees this passage as explicitly distinguishing between a sense of "is" meaning "exists", the absolute sense, and a sense of "is" meaning "is F", the relational sense.

Cornford's interpretation is consistent with Moravcsik's in

seeing the distinction, drawn here as between absolute and relative (although he avoids the term "absolute" because of its misleading associations), but, of course, because of his translation of τὸ ὄν throughout as Existence, he does not draw the same conclusion as Moravcsik.

An interpreter who does not wish to identify πρὸς ἄλλα with the technical term πρός τι is Michael Frede. Frede takes the ἄλλα in πρὸς ἄλλα very seriously. He argues that πρὸς ἄλλα cannot be identical with πρός τι since the category of πρός τι includes all relatives, identity among them, whereas πρὸς ἄλλα taken literally could not delimit a class of relations which included identity.

Another difficulty of translation is the shift in the passage from the expression πρὸς ἄλλα at line C13 to the expression πρὸς ἕτερον at line D6. This shift raises certain difficulties for the interpreters who take πρὸς ἄλλα to be a technical term, for if it were one, why would such a sudden change in terminology be made? Since, however, ἕτερον and ἄλλο are synonymous in Greek, not too much can be made of this. Frede's position gains some strength from it, however, since it would seem that whatever the meaning of the term, whether technical or not, emphasis is being placed on numerical distinctness.

It is also difficult to discover what is being spoken of, whether the expressions τὸ ὄν and θάτερον, the Forms Being and Difference, or the things that partake in these Forms. This, of course, is constantly a difficulty with τὸ ὄν and ἕτερον in the Sophist.

We must try to settle this with reference to the overriding theme of the argument, which appears to be that Being and Difference are distinct genera. Thus in line C9 it would appear that the expres-

sions τοῦτο (τὸ ἕτερον) and τὸ ὄν stand for Forms, as also with τὴν θατέρου φύσιν in line D10. Lines C12 and D1 are more difficult.

Cornford translates:

> "Among things that exist some are always spoken of as....."

If this translation is correct, the πρὸς ἄλλα - αὐτὰ καθ'αὑτά distinction would be essentially a metaphysical rather than a linguistic one. That is, the force of the distinction would be to divide up the things that are (or have being, or non-neutrally, exist) into two classes -- those which are always said to be πρὸς ἄλλα, and those that are always said to be αὐτὰ καθ'αὑτά. This is the force of Cornford's translation.

Line D1 presents further difficulties; the contrast suggested by δέ is not easy to understand, for with τὸ ἕτερον, the subject of the sentence, we revert to a singular form. Is τὸ ἕτερον to be understood as the expression τὸ ἕτερον, the form Different, or generally, what is different, i.e., what participates in the Form?

At D3 we appear to get a reminder of what I have called the dominant theme of the argument. The line must be read (as Cornford translates):

> It would not be so, if Existence (sic) and Difference were not very different things.

Similarly, in the clause at D4 - 5:

Forms Different and Being participate. There is already a problem of interpretation in connection with this, since it would seem that qua Form, Different must be αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά just as much as Being if indeed, the Forms are self-subsistent entities. This, in turn, raises questions about what Plato means with τὴν θατέρου φύσιν at line D10. Does Plato tacitly make a distinction between what is said of Forms qua Forms, and what is said of Forms qua their natures? In any case, what is the nature of a Form? Can we take Plato quite literally as asserting of the Form Difference that it always is what it is, or is to be said, in regard to something different? Or if we take it that πρὸς ἄλλα is a technical term, will it be the case that while Difference qua Form is αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά. Difference in its own nature is πρὸς ἕτερον, whatever that contrast may mean?

A further problem is introduced when we note that the terms πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά are first introduced at lines C12-13 in connection with ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι. We have discussed above a dilemma about these lines, whether the distinction made in them is linguistic or metaphysical. If the distinction is metaphysical, the lines may mean (as Cornford translated):

> "Among things that exist, some are always spoken of as being what they are just in themselves, others as being what they are in reference to other things."

This metaphysical distinction sits relatively well with a metaphysical distinction in the natures of Forms, whatever that distinction may come to. If however, the distinction at C12-13 is a linguistic one then the sense of πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά must there be different from what it is at D4-5. That is, it will have been asserted at C12-13

that "being" is διττῶς λεγόμενον, viz., πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, whereas at 01-4 πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά reappear, not as linguistic categories, but as metaphysical ones, in fact as forms in which Being and Difference participate.

These seem to be the main interpretive difficulties with this passage. Let us look at two strains of interpretation which provide answers to these problems. Both of these interpreters, as I have said, to a large extent base the over-all interpretation of the dialogue on their analysis of this passage.

3.1.2 Moravcsik's Interpretation of 255C - E

Moravcsik takes the passage to involve a linguistic distinction between two senses of "is", the existential and the "relational".[2] Thus the dominant theme of the argument, i.e., the numerical distinction of the Forms Being and Difference is taken to depend crucially upon the fact that while "is" has two senses, "different" always has only one, a relational sense.

As I have outlined in the two preceding chapters, Moravcsik takes the paradoxes at the beginning of the dialogue to have existential import. His claim is that what gives these problems their aporetic nature - what makes them paradoxes - is a confusion of senses of "is". Thus, for Moravcsik's interpretation, this passage at 255C - E represents the turning point of the whole dialogue, since here, at last, the confusion of senses of "is" is untangled and the paradoxes thereby dissolved.

A problem we have already discussed in connection with Moravcsik's interpretation is that it does not accord with the Parity

Assumption drawn out by Owen. The Parity Assumption places Being and Non-Being on the same footing. If this passage does, as Moravcsik claims, distinguish two senses of "is", the relational and the existential, the latter of these two senses will, on Moravcsik's account, find no counterpart in Non-Being. That is, there is, according to Moravcsik, no sense of "is not" which is on a par with the sense of "is" which means "exists". This is one price that would have to be paid by the view that a distinction of senses of "is" is the key move of the dialogue. Such an interpretation makes Plato violate the terms of his own discussion - it does not merely, as Moravcsik would have it, make him attribute a confusion to his predecessors.

An even more pressing objection to this interpretation is raised by Michael Frede.[3] If the distinction here is one of "sense" of "is" then how has Plato succeeded in bringing about his end in the argument, namely, distinguishing the Forms Being and Different? For one sense of "is" is πρὸς ἄλλα and "different" is always πρὸς ἕτερον. Thus this sense of "is" has not been given a criterion of distinction from the sense assigned to "different". In only one of its senses has "is" been distinguished from "different", namely in the sense of "exists". Further, if there are two senses of "is" then there cannot be a single Form of Being. There must instead be two Forms, one of Existence: τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό and one of Relational Being: τὸ ὂν πρὸς ἄλλο. This must be so if we are to continue to make the central Platonic assumption that the meaning or "sense" of a word is a Form. Thus, only one of the Forms of Being will have been distinguished from Difference, namely the Form of Existence.

Moravcsik is susceptible to this argument since he evidently

does retain the view that the meaning or sense of a word is a Form. Thus he speaks throughout the latter part of "Being and Meaning in the Sophist" of a Form of "Relational Being".[4]

There is, however, no license given by the text to speak of the Form Relational Being. What the text says is that there is a single Form Being which participates in the two Forms μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν πρὸς ἄλλο and αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό. And, in any case, as the argument above shows, the interpretation that there are two senses of "is" and two Forms of Being underlying them vitiates the force of the argument at 255C-E.

Frede's conclusion is that if the force of this argument is not to be vitiated, the assumption that there are two senses of "is" distinguished in this passage must be given up.

Moravcsik takes the terms πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά to be technical.[5] Thus he translates πρὸς ἄλλα throughout as "relational". However, as I understand his use of this term, he takes the distinction made by it to be primarily a linguistic one. Thus, when it is said that "is" is relational, this means that "is" has a predicate complement. "Relational Being" is then, for Moravcsik, that Form which underwrites the use of speech and writing of the predicative "is".

This understanding of πρὸς ἄλλα is not one that has traditional foundation. Cornford, for instance, assimilates the sense of πρὸς ἄλλα to πρός τι. However, Cornford recognizes, and argues from the position that πρός τι is a metaphysical category. In any case, insofar as the category of πρός τι dictates linguistic usage, it has nothing to do with predicate complementation. Paradigm cases of πρός τι terms for Plato and Aristotle alike are "sweet", "sour", "thirst", "drink".[6]

Neither of these cases seems allied to "is F".

The analogy which does seem to license the view that πρὸς ἄλλα provides a linguistic distinction having to do with predicate complementation is the analogy of "is F" with "different from F". Plato says:

(255D1)- Τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον
(255D4-6)- ἀλλ' εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥστερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον.

If we take the πρὸς in πρὸς ἕτερον to cover in both these cases the sense of "from" as in "different from" then we might take Plato here to be saying that "different" is an incomplete predicate. Then by analogy, we understand "is" in one of its senses to be incomplete as well.

This interpretation does not, then, as I have said, assimilate πρὸς ἄλλα as a technical term to πρὸς τί. Rather, it relies on the sense of πρὸς in πρὸς ἕτερον and πρὸς ἄλλα to yield the notion of relationality. Once again, Michael Frede raises a crucial objection to this position. If the notion of incompleteness were all that were carried by πρὸς ἕτερον and πρὸς ἄλλα, then why, he asks, does Plato say ἕτερον or ἄλλα at all?

ἄλλα and ἕτερον are both terms which in Greek indicate numerical distinction. They correspond to the common English usage of "other" or "another". The Moravcsik interpretation does not explain Plato's emphasis on these terms; it brings out only the sense in which πρὸς is to be taken, i.e., as indicating the incompleteness of ἕτερον and "is" in one of its senses. However, as Frede points out, the literal translation of πρὸς ἕτερον and πρὸς ἄλλα is "in relation to (or regard to) something (numerically) different (or another thing)".[7] This

translation brings more with it than is contained within the incompleteness theory, since an additional demand is made: that the predicate complement denote something numerically different - another thing, from the subject.

This point is basic to Frede's whole interpretation, which I shall now go on to discuss.

3.1.3 Frede's Interpretation of 255C - E

As has already been suggested by our discussion of Frede's criticisms of the "incompleteness" interpretation of Moravcsik, Frede finds the interpretation of 255C - E which takes no account of Plato's emphasis on ἄλλα and ἕτερον in πρὸς ἄλλα and πρὸς ἕτερον unsatisfactory. On his interpretation, the disjunction at 255C 12-13 must be taken as a disjunction of "things which are said to be in regard to themselves and things which are said to be in regard to something (numerically) different".

This reading yields what we shall call the two uses of "is" thesis. Frede's reading of these lines yields a single incomplete "sense" of "is" which is used in two ways: either in the definition a thing, where the predicate and subject terms denote the same thing, or in attribution, where the subject and predicate terms denote something (numerically) different. The first use of "is" is restricted to Forms, as the only things subject to definition, the second use of "is" applies to both Forms and individuals.

The virtue of the distinction for Plato is, as Frede sees it, that (1) it resolves the apparently paradoxical nature of such statements as are continually made throughout the section of the dialogue in which

this passage occurs and in the Parmenides:

1. Motion is ταὐτόν.
   Motion is not ταὐτόν.
2. Motion is ἑτέρου.
   Motion is not ἑτερόν.
3. Motion is ὄν.
   Motion is not ὄν.

and (2) it is an (undeveloped) beginning towards finding a way of avoiding the regress of the Parmenides, thereby making sense of the incidence of self-predication in the Sophist at 258C 1-3.[8] The distinction of uses of "is" in the Sophist may thus be seen as a reply to the difficulties raised by the Parmenides.

How does Frede arrive at the position that Plato is distinguishing "uses" of "is" at all? That is, a problem I raised above with 255C 12-13, and indeed, with the whole passage was that it is difficult to see whether the distinction Plato is making is a linguistic or metaphysical one. Frede's interpretation makes the αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτο – πρὸς ἄλλο distinction essentially a linguistic distinction, and indeed a very sophisticated linguistic distinction.

Frede discusses this in some detail. The literal reading of the lines 255C 12-13 and 255 D1 that he gives is:

> 255C 12-13:
> "Von dem Seienden wird das eine mit Bezug auf sich selbst, das andere mit Bezug auf etwas anderes seiend genannt."

He accepts Cornford's version of D1:

> "And what is different is always so called with reference to another thing, isn't it?"

However, he goes on to say:

> Nach unserer Übersetzung von 255C12-13 zu urteilen, werden hier Gegenstände in zwei Klassen aufgeteilt. Das gleiche gilt auch, wenn man 'Gegenstände' im weitesten Sinn nimmt, für die Aristotelesstelle. Das aber, was an der Aristotelesstelle wie die Beschreibung einer Zweiteilung von Gegenständen A aussieht, ist in Wirklichkeit wie ....
>
> ..." zeigt, als die Beschreibung der Zweiteilung von Verwendungen des entsprechenden Prädikates "A" auf Grund der Zweiteilung der Gegenstände A gedacht.[9]

Frede is suggesting that although the distinction here is explicitly one of things (Gegenstände) it really, implicitly, turns out to be a distinction of predicates. The Aristotle passage referred to as a justification of this interpretation is from the περὶ ἐναντί :

εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἐναντία, φησί, διττῶς ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἐναντίον· ἢ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὰ τὰ ἐναντία ῥηθήσεται, οἷον ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία, κίνησις καὶ στάσις, ἢ τῷ μετέχειν ἐναντίων, οἷον τὸ κινούμενον τῷ ἑστηκότι . . .

Frede constructs from this a sentence running parallel to 255C 12-13:

διττῶς ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἐναντίον. τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ ῥηθήσεται, οἷον . . . , τὰ δὲ τῷ μετέχειν ἐναντίων, οἷον . . .

This has the status of very flimsy evidence indeed. For the original Aristotle passage differs from 255C 12-13 in two crucial ways: it does not contain a partitive construction and with the words διττῶς ῥηθήσεται, Aristotle makes perfectly clear that he is talking about usage. This perfect clarity cannot be transferred to Plato's usage of λέγεσθαι.

This is the textual backing that Frede gives to his claim that an apparent distinction of things is really a distinction of predicates. The other evidence discussed in part above, is circumstantial. That is, Frede shows that such a distinction, if Plato did make it, would address itself to concerns that Plato had in the Parmenides and in the Sophist.

Let us have a look at the ontological distinction which Frede allows is the one explicitly made by this passage. He says that the distinction which Plato has in mind is one of the Forms and individuals. Only Forms are said to be in regard to themselves i.e., only Forms have definitions. On the other hand, as Frede recognizes, it is not the case that only individuals are said to be in regard to other things; for Forms also may be said to be in regard to other things. The parallelism of the distinction becomes lost at this point. We only get a complete disjunction between Forms and individuals if we read the second disjunct as: individuals are only said to be in regard to other things. Thus the first disjunct delimits a class of things, namely, Forms, saying that they are said to be αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά; the second, however, takes a class delimited by other means, namely, individuals, and says of them that they are only ever said to be πρὸς ἄλλα.

It seems to me too strong a claim for this the status of

"eine vollständige Einteilung von Gegenständen in Formen einerseits und Einzeldinge andererseits."[10]

On this interpretation there is clearly a difficulty with the positioning of ἀεὶ at 255C 12. ἀεὶ appears to go only with τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα. However, its position with λέγεσθαι at the end of the sentence suggests that it goes with both disjuncts as in Cornford's translation. However, it cannot go with both disjuncts on Frede's inter-

pretation, for the disjuncts are unsymmetrical and it only naturally fits with the second: "some things (namely, individuals) are always said in regard to other things".

Frede recognizes this as a problem and discusses it. However he is willing to settle for this:

> "Auf Grund unserer Interpretation könnte man dagegen meiner, dass sich ἀεὶ zwar auf τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα " bezieht, aber die Funktion hat, eben die vollständige Disjunktion von Gegenständen im oben beschriebenen Sinn zu erreichen . . . ."[11]

Both interpretations of this passage discussed above - Moravcsik's interpretation and Frede's interpretation - share a serious flaw arising in connection with the circumstantial evidence surrounding the case. That is, they both made too much out of this passage. For both interpretations, the passage is the turning point of the dialogue. Here a distinction is made which will clear the way to an account of negation and falsehood which will not be subject to the confusions of Plato's predecessors. One would, therefore, expect that the passage would be concluded with a certain amount of fanfare. Yet it ends, in fact on rather a flat note, reminding us once again, that whatever this distinction was between πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά it was only part of the argument that Being and Difference are distinct Forms:

255D10:

Πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὖσαν. . .

In what follows, I shall try to construct an interpretation of my own of this passage - one which I hope to show fits the circumstantial evidence better, and one not subject to the textual flaws discussed with reference to Moravcsik and Frede. I shall begin this enterprise by

having a further look at what Cornford has to say about πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά.

3.1.4 Cornford's Interpretation of 255C - E

Cornford's translation of 255C 12 - 13 makes it clear that as he interprets the distinction made therein, it is a metaphysical one. This is particularly clear from his translation of ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι, as "always spoken of". (This is paralleled by Frede, who translates as "genannt". As we have seen, however, Frede takes the distinction to be implicitly a linguistic one.)

The other tenet of Cornford's interpretation which I wish to examine seriously is his translation of τὸ ὄν as "Existence" throughout. Thus in the interpretation C12 - 13, Cornford takes Plato to be making a distinction between "things that exist". What this suggests, and this is, I think, borne out by Cornford's discussion of his interpretation, is that Cornford does not take Plato to be here making, even implicitly, a linguistic distinction, either of senses or of uses of "is".

Cornford assimilates the terms πρὸς ἄλλα and πρὸς ἕτερον to the term πρός τι. He thus takes Plato to be using essentially the same terminology as Aristotle uses in Chapter 7 of the Categories. He says:

> "Obviously the Author of the Categories did not conceive of relations as subsisting between two things. . . He thinks of 'relative things' or 'relative names'; some are substantives, some adjectives, all are predicates'.[12]

Thus, for Cornford, when Plato says at 255C 12 - 13:

> ". . .among things that exist, some are always spoken of as being what they are just in themselves, others as being what they are with reference to other things".

a division is being made among things: some are relative to others,

others are in no way relative to others. Thus, to use some examples from Aristotle's mixed bag: "'The greater is what is (greater) than another thing (ἑτέρου)'. 'A habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something'. . ."[13]

One must ask this question, however: does Cornford mean that the existence of these things is relative, or does he mean that what they are, the character that they have (e.g., being greater, being a habit, etc.) is relative? If he means the latter; then how does this point in any way reflect on the nature of Existence? (That the distinction must reflect on the nature of Existence is clear, since if it did not, it would not serve to establish the dominant theme of the argument - to distinguish the Form τὸ ὄν from the Form θάτερον.)

It must be the case that Cornford does mean that some things are relative insofar as they are what they are. This is clear both from his translation and a footnote used to justify it:

> "The addition of the words 'being what they are' is justified by the statement below (D7) that what is different is what it is (τουθ' ὅπερ ἔστιν) with reference to another thing. . ."[14]

It is, in any case, possible that something needs to be inserted in the clauses:

> "Some (are) . . . αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά; some (are). . . πρὸς ἄλλα".

otherwise we find ourselves, as Frede says, in the unpleasant position where we must take αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and πρὸς ἄλλα as themselves ordinary predicates. We should then be in the difficulty that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, where it would appear that Plato takes αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and πρὸς ἄλλα to be Forms on exactly the same footing as the other Forms, e.g., on the same footing as Big and Red.[15] As it would

be wrong just to assume straight off that he does this, some tinkering with 255C 12-13 is justifiable.

To return to the point at issue, is Cornford's addition of "being what they are" plausible? As I said, the real point on which this turns, is whether the distinction of things into relative and non-relative will assist in the argument that Existence is a distinct Form from Difference.

If there is an argument to show this, it needs to be expressed more clearly than Cornford does it. In fact it is not clear that Cornford sees the difficulty here at all.

As we have noted, the distinction Cornford makes for C12-13 is a purely metaphysical one. In both this sentence and in the one which follows at D1, he takes Plato to be speaking of "things which exist" and "things which are different". He does not take Plato to be speaking of the expressions "exists" and "different". The argument is thus seen to progress from a distinction among things, participants in the Form Existence and Difference, to a distinction between those Forms themselves.

The argument then has three stages:

1. (255 C12-13) The whole class of existent things may be divided into those things which, in virtue of their natures, (being what they are), are relative, and those things which, in virtue of their natures, (being what they are) are not relative.

2. (255 D1) What is different, is, in virtue of its nature (being what it is) relative.

3. (255 D3-8) Therefore, Difference and τὸ ὄν must be distinct. For all different things are relative, whereas only some of the whole class of existent things is relative.

Plato, on this account, could be seen as arguing that the class of different things is only a subclass of the whole class of existent things. That whole class, the class of existent things includes subclasses of things which are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά as well as πρὸς τί. The class of different things however, includes no things that are not πρὸς τί. Therefore Existence differs as a genus from Difference.

It might be argued that more needs to be said to justify Plato's assertion that τὸ ὂν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν. For still, all that has been said is that e.g., wood qua wood is αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, while the big qua big is πρὸς τί. Nothing has been said to show that wood qua existence is αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, the big qua existence is πρὸς τί. Hence it has not been shown that Existence μετεῖχε τὸ πρὸς τί καὶ τὸ αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά.

Furthermore, to use an argument of Frede's against this interpretation, considered purely as classes, the class of things that participates in the Form Difference is co-extensive with the class of things that participates in the Form Being (or Existence). Just as some of the things that are (or exist) are what they are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and other are what they are πρὸς τί, so with the things that participate in Difference; some are what they are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, others are what they are πρὸς τί. Thus no argument can be constructed which will differentiate Being and Difference which is based on the natures of their participants. For they have the same participants.

This objection of Frede's against Cornford's interpretation is only avoided by his own interpretation at great cost. Thus Frede was forced, as we have seen, to tinker with the apparently exclusive disjunction at 255C 12-13, and eventually made it non-exclusive. Thus

the disjunction as he would have it goes: of the things which are only some are αὐτὰ καθ'αὑτά, while some are all πρὸς ἄλλα. Cornford's translation of the disjunction is, however, surely correct: of the things which are, some are (always) spoken of as . . . αὐτὰ καθ'αὑτά, some are (always) spoken of as . . . πρὸς ἄλλα. Had Frede not revised the disjunction he would have been faced with a similar problem to Cornford's, namely that the disjunction apparently forbids that the class of things which participate in being and the class of things which participate in ἕτερον should be co-extensive. It was only by reducing the scope of ἀεὶ to the second clause, that Frede was able to preserve for the Forms their status as things that may be said to be πρὸς ἄλλα. But, when one examines the motivation for this chess move in his translation, one sees that it serves only to protect his interpretation, and has no legitimacy conferred on it by the text.

Frede's argument as to the fundamental importance of the terms ἕτερον and ἄλλα can also be used against Cornford's Interpretation. At most, the class of πρὸς ἕτερον things can only be a sub-class of the class of πρὸς τί things since the Form of Identity is πρὸς τί, but, presumably, not πρὸς ἕτερον. This is a point that Cornford recognizes, when he says:

> "The class of relative things is introduced in connection with Difference, not Sameness; but Plato seems to regard Sameness as a relative thing."16

Thus, as Frede has pointed out, Cornford's interpretation cannot be right. On the other hand, it is not apparent to me that it is entirely wrong, even though the objections against it made above are strong.

3.1.5 An Interpretation of 255C - E

The chief difficulty that we found with Cornford's interpretation stemmed from his interpolation of "as being what they are" twice into his translation of the lines at 255C 12-13. On his account, what Plato is doing in these lines is dividing things that exist into two classes, those that are what they are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and those that are what they are πρὸς τί. This then, according to him, yields a traditional distinction of e.g., wood, which is non-relational, from e.g., great, which is relational. The difficulty with this understanding of the distinction was that it could not be used to derive the desired distinction between Being and Difference, since as the distinction is set up it does not reflect back upon the character or nature of the Form Existence: That is to say, the fact that e.g., wood and the great are respectively αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and πρὸς τί does not obviously show that Existence, in which both participate, has both characters. If it is thought that it does, then a worse difficulty arises, namely, that Difference in which both wood and the great also participate will, by the same reasoning, also have both characters, and will thus fail to be distinct from Existence on the criterion proposed.

As I say, the problem here seems to stem from the interpolated words "as being what they are". Cornford avoids accepting the terms αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and πρὸς τί as straightforwardly predicative.

I think we must ask: why should it be thought that there must be an interpolation here? Frede suggests that it is because we wish to avoid making πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά predicative; i.e., suggesting that they are somehow qualities of things.[17] But in fact, there is nothing in the text to support the assumption that Plato wants to avoid

this. Indeed, the statement at 255D 4-5 that τὸ ὂν μετεῖχε τοῦν εἰδοῦν goes far towards suggesting that Plato does think of πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτα on exactly this model. Indeed, this statement raises difficulties for Frede's own view which he does not discuss, for on his interpretation there would be no reason to speak of πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά as εἴδη - in fact, on his view, they cannot be εἴδη.

I conclude, on the evidence of 255D 2-3 that as πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά evidently are meant to denote Forms, they may be taken to be intended by Plato as straightforwardly predicative.

Let us then translate 255C 12-13 as:

> "Of the things which exist, some are always said to be αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, others to be πρὸς ἄλλα."

Continuing with the thread of the argument, at 255D1, Plato places τὸ ἕτερον in the class of things which are said to be πρὸς ἕτερον. It is not entirely possible on linguistic grounds to tell whether ἕτερον here denotes Difference or things which participate in Difference. However, the singular form, taken together with the article would seem to suggest that Plato is here speaking of the Form. This is supported further by the way in which the argument continues. Plato argues at 255D 4-8 that if τὸ ἕτερον were not πρὸς ἕτερον then some of its participants would not be, but as this is plainly false, τὸ ἕτερον must be πρὸς ἕτερον. This argument follows naturally from the assertion at 255D1 that τὸ ἕτερον is always πρὸς ἕτερον where τὸ ἕτερον denotes the Form. If τὸ ἕτερον at 255D1 were taken to denote participants in the Form the statement at 255D1 would be strangely out of place; 255D1 could not be seen as being defended below at 255D 4-8, but merely re-stated. So I think it is natural to take τὸ ἕτερον at 255D1 as

denoting the Form.

As we have analysed it, then, the argument that Difference is πρὸς ἕτερον is a transcendental one. (By "transcendental argument" I have in mind an argument such as Kant uses: Something is posited as that which makes some state of affairs possible.) It has the form: Difference must be πρὸς ἕτερον because it is its nature which is responsible for the natures of its participants, and their natures are plainly such as to be πρὸς ἕτερον.

That this is indeed the form of this part of the argument seems to be a matter of common agreement among interpreters. However, it is to be noted that this argument is distinctly not a linguistic one.

Plato appears to be arguing from the natures of things which have the character of being different to the nature of the Form. He does not appear to be arguing from the fact of language that "different" demands a complement.

Why is this an important point? It would seem that once we recognize the non-linguistic nature of the argument that it is simply incorrect. For if the participants in Difference are taken in all their infinite variety - men, the Form Motion, etc. it would not appear that any argument can be generated from the natures of these participants to what must be the nature of the Form Difference. This is, of course, simply an application of Frede's point, discussed above, to this segment of the argument. However, what should be noted now about this point is that it would appear to cut against all interpretations of this part of the argument. If the argument is taken to be a transcendental one from participants to the nature of a Form, then it is plainly, as it stands, fallacious. For there is nothing about white things, qua white, men and

Motion, qua men and qua motion, which will go to show that Difference is πρὸς ἕτερον.

We must, then, reconsider what participating in Difference, or being different amounts to for Plato. What makes the argument, as we have analysed it, fallacious, is that we have been considering the participants in Difference qua being what they are, e.g., men, etc., and qua different things. What has tempted us to do this is the recognition that "different" is a predicate of quite a different order from, e.g., "man". That is, we have taken it that "different" is not on the same logical footing with "man". In fact, we have been assuming, on Plato's behalf, something like a Aristotelian distinction of substance from other categories.

The argument can be re-constructed as non-fallacious if we rid ourselves of the distinction between being different and e.g., being a man. If we allow that "different" has for Plato the same status as a classificatory predicate such as "man", such that in saying that something is different one is saying what it is, the argument regains its plausibility. For then, when Plato speaks of τῶν ἑτέρων at line 255D6 he will be speaking of those things the nature of which is to be different, and his statement about what is true of them -namely, that they are πρὸς ἕτερον - will reflect back on the Form Difference.

The point is an important one precisely because Plato's argument is a metaphysical one. It must be that there is something in the nature of participants in Difference which reflect back on the Form. But this in turn could not be so if Difference itself (and, indeed, every Form) were not somehow responsible for their natures. But this in turn could not be so if Plato made a substance-accident distinction.

This can be shown in more detail by means of an example. Man is a participant in Difference. But Man is αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό. There is nothing about Man, considered as accidentally participant in Difference, which shows that Difference itself is πρὸς ἕτερον. On the other hand, if we consider the whole class of different things (that is, everything, presumably) as different things - not as men, or horses but qua different - then we do find out something about Difference itself. For these things are by nature πρὸς ἕτερον and thus, so must what is responsible for their being different be, Difference itself.

If this is the way the argument must be understood and I am arguing that it is the only way, if it is not to be simply a non sequitur - then it is revealing of certain things in the surrounding text of this part of the dialogue. Why does Plato select the γένη τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἕτερον, Same, Motion, and Rest and call them μέγιστα? In fact, why does he call them genera at all? For to the eyes of one accustomed to the Aristotelian logic of substance and accident, they do not appear to be either genera, or "most important". Yet if we take Plato at his word, it appears that he believes that they collect and inform classes of things. And taking him further at his word, it would appear that they are μέγιστα just in the sense that each of them collects and informs everything, or at least every particular (for how Motion and Rest will apply to the Forms is a perplexing problem in the Sophist.)

If, then to say that something is different is to say what it is, or to be different is to have a certain nature, then what about Being? Surely it will be the case as well that the class of things which are will have a certain nature, in virtue of their participation in Being and will be spoken of as being what they are when it is said

that they are.

I think that it can be argued that this is the correct understanding of the way the argument is set up, oddly enough, on precisely the same grounds that lead Cornford to suppose that it is not set up in this way. Cornford argues for his interpretation of "being what they are" in lines C12-13 on the evidence of the words τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἔστιν at line D7 - what is different is what it is with reference to another thing. There are two ways in which τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἔστιν can be understood in this context: either, (1) what is different is what it is, e.g., wood, a man, etc., . . . or (2) what is different is what it is, i.e., different, . . . Interestingly enough, I think Cornford believes (and I think, rightly) that the latter is the correct interpretation. If he did not then there would be no point to the claim that he makes in the discussion following his translation[18] that "'Different' is a relative name that things have towards other things." So Cornford must hold that to say that something is different is for Plato, to say what it is. But then, the parallelism of the argument would seem to force the assumption that to say that something is is for Plato to say what it is. This point, then, works against Cornford's interpolation at C12-13 of "as being what they are" rather than for it, as Cornford supposes. For the interpolation was made on the assumption, which emerges from Cornford's discussion that to say that something is is not to say what it is. As it turns out, the phrase τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἔστιν at D7 provides good evidence that this is precisely the contrary of what Plato believes.

We now must return to what it is that the nature of Being lends to its participants, i.e., things that are considered as a class.

If the argument about Being is to be analogous to the argument about Difference, then we must consider 255C 12-13 as supplying the transcendental proof. What the lines wouls suggest is that Being lends it to its participants, i.e., the things that have being as their character or nature, that they may be either πρὸς ἄλλα or αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά. But now, what does this mean? And further why is it so obvious?

I want to speculate upon what sort of theory is implied by this in the next section. But before I do that I must show how this interpretation can come to terms with Frede's objections.

The objection we considered against Cornford that the fact that there are πρὸς ἄλλα participants and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά participants does not reflect back on the character of Being and Difference has already been forestalled. The argument proceeds from the natures of things which are considered as different or as existent to the natures of Difference and Being. It does not proceed from the natures of things considered as wood or tall. We saw from our analysis of the argument from the natures of participants in Difference, that if we do not take Difference as informing its participants with the character different which can then be considered as reflecting back on the Form Difference, the argument would be fallacious.

Frede's other objection is harder to meet. It is that since the class of things that participate in Being is co-extensive with the class of things participating in Difference, no argument can be generated which will not attribute to those participants conflicting characters. All the things there are participate both in Difference and in Being; therefore some existing things which in virtue of their participation in Being are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά will be also, in virtue of their participation in

Difference πρὸς ἄλλα.

It seems to me that this objection, in fact, does not take into consideration the transcendental nature of Plato's argument, either. Plato argues from the character of things to the natures of the Forms that give them that character. Thus 255C12 - 13 does not divide up the world of bare particulars into either the class of πρὸς ἄλλα things or the class of αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά things. Rather 255C 12 - 13 is part of a transcendental argument which goes from the natures of things which have the character of being to the Form Being which gives them that character. This line should not be taken, then to forbid the possibility that particulars, or for that matter Forms, may be both πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά when they are considered under different characters. All that 255C12 - 13 says is that considered as having the character of being, participants in Being must be one or the other.

My reply to Frede's objection finds significant support from the text surrounding this passage. At 256A10 ff. Plato appears to be making exactly this kind of point:

> Τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταὐτόν τε καὶ μὴ ταὐτὸν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἴπωμεν αὐτὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ μὴ ταὐτόν, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ὁπόταν μὲν ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν ταὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτήν, οὕτω λέγωμεν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὖ θατέρου, δι' ἣν ἀποχωριζομένη ταὐτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ' ἕτερον . . .

A point analogous to the point that I am trying to make with reference to 255C - D is made in this passage by means of the repetition of διά at lines 13 and 15. In virtue of its participation in Same and Different

respectively a thing may be the same and not the same. When we speak this way, we may appear to be saying something contradictory, but this is only a manner of speech. For it is in virtue of participation in different Forms that a thing is the same and not the same.

Similarly, as a thing which is, something may be καθ' αὑτό, while the same thing, considered as a different thing will be πρὸς ἄλλο. But this is not puzzling, for it is in virtue of its participation in different Forms that it has these different characters.

Another point made in this passage and again and again throughout this part of the dialogue (256A ff.) is that things are, are different, and are the same in virtue of (διά) their participation in Being, Difference, and Sameness. This point is consistently neglected by commentators. It has importance for my analysis of 255C - D as well as for any analysis of relationality in the Sophist. Its importance for my analysis of 255C - D is that Plato in saying this appears to be asserting quite openly what interpreters like Owen and Frede deny on his behalf - that being is a character of things, and as well that difference and identity are also characters of things. My analysis of 255C 12-13 depends upon its being possible to consider a thing merely as being in virtue of its participation in Being. According to both Owen and Frede, to be, for Plato, is to be something and it is not possible to consider something as being, simpliciter, in virtue of participation in τὸ ὄν. Yet this position is simply belied by what Plato says at 256A1 and by the kind of point made in the passage considered above at 256A10. I shall take this point up in greater detail in the next section.

If my interpretation of this passage is correct, then Existence

and Difference are the Forms distinguished at 255C - D. If the Form τὸ ὄν gives a character to its participants it cannot be, as Moravcsik and Frede would have it, what underwrites the connective expression "is". From now on, therefore, in relation to this passage I shall translate τὸ ὄν as Existence.

What of the πρὸς ἕτερον nature of Difference, the mixed nature of Existence? We have not yet come to terms with what it is for something to be πρὸς ἄλλα or πρὸς ἕτερον or αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά.

3.1.6 Existence

The text of the passage 255C - D provides very little support for giving a full-blown account of what Plato has in mind when he introduces the two "Forms" αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and πρὸς ἄλλα. The terms αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and πρὸς ἄλλα are introduced here at 255C 12-13 as though their meaning must be perfectly clear to any philosopher and there is no recurrence of their usage elsewhere in the dialogue. This fact has its own significance for the over-all interpretation of the Sophist, as I have said said before, since it is most implausible that this distinction - between αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά Being and πρὸς ἄλλα Being - could be the turning point of Plato's struggle with Parmenides, when it is never mentioned again.

There are two ways of understanding the casual introduction of the terms. One is that they are technical terms with a rich history in parts of Plato's work which are lost to us - discussions in the Academy itself, perhaps. The other is that they are to be understood perfectly literally. Cornford and Moravcsik apparently adhere to the former view,

believing these terms to be the antecedents of Aristotle's category of πρὸς τί, while Frede argues that the terms are non-technical, the force of αὐτὰ καθ'αὑτά being to stress self-identify and that of πρὸς ἕτερον and πρὸς ἄλλα to stress numerical difference.

There are difficulties with both views. A problem with the view that πρὸς ἄλλα and πρὸς ἕτερον are to be somehow identified with πρὸς τί has already been touched upon: ταὐτόν, while neither πρὸς ἄλλα nor πρὸς ἕτερον is surely relational. A difficulty with the other view, besides the problems discussed with Frede's interpretation in which it is imbedded, is that the term αὐτὰ καθ'αὑτά or καθ'αὑτά does have a history in writings attributed to Plato, where its contrary term is πρὸς τί.[19]

I do not believe that the text of the passage warrants anything more than speculation as to the truth of either of these views. However, I do think that the passage is rich enough to provide an account of what it means to say that Existence is πρὸς ἄλλο which is neutral as to whether the term is technical or not. I propose to do this.

All interpreters are in agreement about what it means to say that Difference is πρὸς ἕτερον. In this case, absolute neutrality is preserved as to whether πρὸς ἕτερον is a technical term or not. The Form Difference is of such a kind that it makes it possible that the things that are informed by it are always related to different things. Different things come in complementary classes; nothing is different without being different from something else.

It is interesting to note that Plato puts this point in lines 7-8 without using the term πρὸς ἕτερον at all:

. . . ὅτι περ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.

Cornford translates this:

> But, in fact, we undoubtedly find that whatever is different, as a necessary consequence, is what it is with reference to another.

Plato evidently is not arguing for the relativity of other things to other things on the basis of grammatical consideration. Commentators[20] are inclined to take the πρὸς of πρὸς ἄλλα and πρὸς ἕτερον to be the sign of predicate complementation, i.e., to stand in for the "than" of "other than", or the "from" of "different from". But the lines at D7-8 do not indicate that Plato has in mind what we <u>say</u>, at all, or do the lines preceding these at 4-6, where the term πρὸς ἕτερον is used. Indeed, if the argument <u>were</u> from linguistic considerations, then we should hardly expect the word πρὸς to give an indication of what those considerations are. The lines 7-8 where the term πρὸς ἕτερον does not occur, being replaced by a genitive construction, reflect much more accurately the common usage of ἕτερον in Greek. And if the term πρὸς ἕτερον is supposed to give a semantic analysis of the genitive construction usage, one would not expect Plato to conclude this argument by reverting to that usage.

What of τὸ ὂν πρὸς ἄλλο, however? In the lines C12-13 the word λέγεσθαι is used. Yet here as well, it seems dubious to me that Plato is arguing from linguistic considerations. In any case it is clear on any interpretation of τὸ ὄν - whether as the copula or as Existence - the argument once again will not be from usage. For πρὸς does not stand in, in this case even more clearly than in the case of ἕτερον, for some relational expression or construction. We do not say that x is

to F; "existence", if it is a predicate at all, is a complete one. Nor will πρὸς seem to do duty as part of a semantic analysis of what is involved in predication. For the copula just is the relation - it is not related to some other.

Once considerations of usage are discarded it becomes difficult to see what Plato is saying about the ontology of τὸ ὄν. We cannot say that he is specifying what underlies the copula, since that is to put linguistic considerations first, once again.

On the other hand, if the argument is about Existence then it can be reconstructed in a precisely parallel way to the argument about Difference. It goes like this: Existence is πρὸς ἄλλο because in the case of some existents we find that they are what they are, i.e., existents, with reference to another. Another what though? We found that something was different when it is different from something different - πρὸς ἕτερον. If there is no slippage in the parallelism here then it must be that what exists in some cases exists with reference to another existent. We were able to conclude about Difference that it dominates complementary classes of different things. Here we may conclude about Existence that it dominates complementary classes of existents.

What is the significance of this interpretation? We may rephrase the position in terms of dependence. For there to be different things, there must be things from which they are different. In the case of some existents, similarly, for them to be just qua existents, must be other existents. Or to put the point even more plainly, some existents, and all different things, depend on others.

Cornford's interpretative use of Aristotle's categories is of

little use in this connection. If this is the correst interpretation, then Plato's position is far more radical than Aristotle's. For Plato is not initiating an inquiry which will lead him to wonder: are "head" or "hand" relative terms? The issue is not as to whether certain terms are relative, or even as to whether certain kinds of things are relative. The issue seems to rather concern existents just qua existents, whether they are dependent on others.

What would lead Plato to posit such a position? Obviously this question has implications which affect the interpretation of The Way of Truth. On one plausible interpretation[21] it is argued that Parmendies holds Existence to be an essence. If I am right in suggesting that Plato believes that things can be discussed simply qua existents, then so does Plato. That is, I have argued in the last section that there is good reason to take Plato's claim that τὸ ὄν is a genus seriously. For Parmenides, the notion that Existence is an essence closes down the possibility that there might be a plurality of things. Plato, here, with a bold stroke, re-opens that possibility. For the mere positing of τὸ ὄν as a genus does not seem to close down on pluralism. Difference, for example, is a genus, but one which in all cases demands a plurality of related participants. Similarly, Existence is a genus, which in at least some cases, demands a plurality of related participants.

It should be pointed out how different this interpretation is from the mainstream of interpretation as represented by Moravcsik, Owen, and Frede. These interpreters hold that monism is based on a logical mistake; the mistaken belief that "is" is always complete. Plato's answer to this challenge is to expose the mistake. However, it seems to

me clear that this line of approach would not answer to the challenge of monism when it is taken seriously as a metaphysical theory. For the monist is clearly prepared to rule out non-existential uses of "is" as simply ill-formed. What still has to be shown to answer monism is that there is something about the nature of Existence itself considered as a Form-essence which admits plurality.

The other approach to the challenge is the one that Frede and Owen adopt on Plato's behalf - namely, denying to τὸ ὄν the status of a Form-essence. Both Frede and Owen take the final lesson of Plato's treatment of Being in the Sophist to be that "to be is to be something". For Owen, the principle of Parity is simply applied inversely by Plato: since there can be no viable sense attached to τὸ μὴ ὄν in its existential sense, there can be no sense attached to τὸ ὄν in its existential sense. He says: "For such a study [as Plato undertakes in the Sophist] of the subject-predicate structure an account of existence is neither a pre-supposition nor a part; but it might well be a further outcome, much as a logic without existential pre-suppositions can be made to yield a formula for individual existence."[22]

This version of Plato's enterprise in the Sophist presents considerable difficulties for the interpretation of large stretches of the text. In Chapter 2 I discussed the existential nature of the paradoxes at the beginning of the dialogue; neither Owen nor Frede devote serious attention to these paradoxes, despite the fact that they appear to set the problem which Plato intends to solve. Neither attach significance to Plato's repeated assertion that to be is to participate in Being, (e.g., at 256A1, 256D 7-8, 256E4), which we have emphasized in the latter part of this chapter. Frede, in interpreting 256C - E so

that it yields a univocal but non-existential sense of "is" was forced to change the literal sense of the line 256C 12-13 so as to make it a non-exclusive disjunction, a reading belied both by the use of τὰ μὲν... τὰ δὲ, and the reinforcement of the exclusivity by the word ἀεὶ. Owen simply neglects to interpret this passage at all.

Thus, I do not think that there is strong enough evidence to think that Plato rejects the belief that τὸ ὄν is a Form-essence; in fact I think that there is a significant weight of evidence against this view.

In line with the interpretation I have given of 256C - E, let us suppose that Plato retains Being as a Form-essence. 256C - E might be seen as introducing, at least for the first time in Plato's published writing, an innovative concept of Being. For one of the "kinds" of Being, Being πρὸς ἄλλα would answer to the challenge of monism. That is, it would embrace that plurality which the monist denies to the nature of Being.

This remains purely a speculation upon the use and importance of the concept of Existence πρὸς ἄλλα, for Plato does not develop this concept in the Sophist at all, beyond what is said at 255C - E. This is consistent with the obscurity of the passage, and the lack of reference to it later in the dialogue. The concept that Plato does develop is the concept of Difference, and I shall contend in what follows that he uses it explicitly towards the defeat of Parmenidean monism.

3.2 255E - 263B

The issue I shall address myself to in the second half of this

chapter is the role that Plato attributes to the Form Difference in the account he gives of negation and falsehood. I shall first give an interpretation of the passage 255E - 257B. Then I shall take up 257B - 258D where Plato gives an account of negation and non-being in terms of participation in Difference. Then I shall turn to the difficult issue of how Difference is used in the account of falsity, an issue to which we have already devoted some discussion in Chapter I in connection with 263B. Finally, I shall ask whether the enterprise Plato has undertaken of explicating non-being in general by means of the Form Difference has been successful.

3.2.1 256E - 257B

The passage lies intermediate between the passage discussed earlier in the chapter and Plato's account of negation, 257B ff. It is thought, e.g., by Moravcsik[23] that this passage winds up a complex dialectical exercise in the use of the concepts of identity and difference. Moravcsik also believes that earlier parts of this exercise reveal Plato making use of yet a third sense of "is", whereby it has the sense of "is the same as". Frede, although disputing with Moravcsik that there are "senses" of "is" distinguished by Plato, concurs, insofar as he believes that with such contrasting pairs of statements as:

Motion is the same.
Motion is not the same.
Motion is different.
Mostion is not different.

Plato is revealing the logic of an identitative use of "is".[24]

If I am right in my thesis that the term τὸ ὄν is used univocally throughout the Sophist to indicate either the Form Existence or one of its participants, then it would seem that this passage is not

to be interpreted as Moravcsik and Frede do. In what follows I shall try to show that this passage is to be interpreted as shedding light on Existence and non-Existence and leading up to the account given at 257B of negation and Non-Existence.

At 255E the Stranger beings to recapitulate the findings of his dialectic. Taking one of the great Forms, Motion, as an example, he runs through what it is and what it is not.

255E: Motion is other than Rest.
Motion is not Rest.

256A: Motion is other than the Same.
Motion is not the Same.

256C: Motion is other than Difference.
Motion is not Difference.

256D: Motion is other than τὸ ὄν.
Motion ὄντως οὐκ ὂν ἔστι.
Motion ὂν ἔστι.

In the case of each of the pairs of statements that can be made about Motion a participational model is invoked as an explanation. The object of the exercise appears to be to show how this model will serve to explain away the apparently paradoxical pairs of claims that can be made about Motion in regard to each of the great Forms (other than Rest, in which Motion has no share).

It should be asked why the claims appear paradoxical? Is the problem, as Moravcsik believes, with the interpretation of:

Motion is the same.
Motion is other.
Motion is τὸ ὄν.

Such that we are tempted to take "is" here as identitative and find contradiction in the counterpart claims:

Motion is not the same.

Motion is not other.
Motion is not τὸ ὄν.

If this is the problem, then of course, it would be appropriate to see Plato as making a distinction with reference to the sense of "is". However, he nowhere explicitly does this. Rather than emphasizing the participational model to be employed in explaining the positive cases, Plato seems most anxious to demonstrate how it works in the negative cases. Thus in the case of each negative claim:

Motion is not the same.
Motion is not other.
Motion is not τὸ ὄν.

Plato explicates the participational model:

Motion is other than the Same.
Motion is other than Difference.
Motion is other than τὸ ὄν.

Thus, it looks as though the difficulty all along was with the negative claims, and not with an identitative interpretation of the positive ones. And what was this problem with the negative claims? We can presume from the subject of the entire dialogue that it had to do with the use of the word "not". The use of the word is explicated fully by Plato in the passage immediately following the one we are discussing. We shall take it up in the next section. The point to be stressed here is that there is every reason to believe that the dialectic of 255E - 257P is of a piece with that problem, rather than stemming from an elusive identitative sense of "is". The problem, then, is to provide a participational model for negative claims.

It should be pointed out as well that there is as yet no reason to see Plato as explicating either "is" or "is not" by reference to the Form τὸ ὄν, or by reference to τὸ μὴ ὄν. Thus the claim, e.g.:

Motion is the Same.

is explicated by saying that Motion participates in Same. Similarly, the claim:

Motion is not the Same.

is explicated by saying that Motion participates in Difference with regard to Same. In neither case is any use made of the Form τὸ ὄν - the whole weight of explication is placed upon the notion of participation. This also tends to confirm our contention that this passage invokes neither a new sense nor a new use of "is".

The part of the passage that bears examination at this point, then, is the part which does invoke τὸ ὄν, namely

256D: Motion is τὸ ὄν.
Motion is other than τὸ ὄν.
Motion is not τὸ ὄν.

This set of claims appears at the very end of the list, and there is no indication that it is explicatory of the others - rather it seems to be placed on the Same footing with them. That is, it does not appear that τὸ ὄν can be taken here to denote an incomplete concept of being which has been invoked by interpreters in the case of each of the other positive claims. Rather it would appear that:

Motion is τὸ ὄν.

is a claim to be explicated exactly as

Motion is other.
Motion is the same.

This, once more, tends to confirm our assertion that Plato is not concerned with a predicative or incomplete sense of "is", but rather with an existential one.

Plato goes on to draw out the point about Motion, extending

it to all genera: each of them is, insofar as it participates in Being, each is not, insofar as it participates in Difference with respect to Being. This conclusion is then applied to Being itself: Being is in relation to many classes, but it also is not (i.e., participates in difference with regard to) however many of them there are (256E - 257A). This passage once again confirms the view that Plato is not explicating "is" in such claims as:

Motion is the Same, etc.

The progress of the argument is analogical. Being is like Motion insofar as it both is and is not many things. The Form Being is not invoked in the explication of "is" and "is not"; rather, like Motion, its being F and at the same time not being F without contradiction is explained by means of a participational model.

Moravcsik has been tempted to identify the participational model which we have been speaking of with the concept of relational being.[25] This position is unsatisfactory, however. For participation in Being is explicitly used throughout this passage by Plato to explicate what it is to be. If participation in Relational Being were simply identical with the participational model then given what Plato says, a regress would be generated. For we would need to invoke participation in Being to explain participation in Being. Thus, for instance:

Motion is τὸ ὄν.

would require invocation of the Form Being twice, and with the analysis.

Motion participates in Being with regard to Being

we should still have to invoke it again, only to get:

Motion participates in Being with regard to

Being with regard to Being.

and so on. This cannot be right. What my argument shows, rather, is that neither Moravcsik or other commentators are correct in their assumption that the Form Being is invoked with e.g.:

Motion ἔστι ταὐτόν.

All that is invoked in this case, just as in the case of:

Motion ἔστι τὸ ὄν.

is a participational model. I conclude then, that this passage cannot be interpreted as an exposition of a predicative "is" in terms of participation in the Form Being. If it were, then what Plato has to say about the Form Being at the end of the passage, on analogy with Motion and πάντα τὰ γένη would be utterly incomprehensible.

3.2.2 256B1 - 256C3

The argument with which this section of the dialogue begins is translated by Cornford as follows:

> Now let us mark this.
>
> When we speak of 'that which is not', it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists but only something that is different.
>
> In the same way that when, for example, we speak of something as "not tall" we may just as well mean by that phrase 'what is equal' as 'what is short', mayn't we?
>
> So when it is asserted that a negative signifies a contrary, we shall not agree, but admit no more than this: that the prefix 'not' indicates something different from the words that follow - or rather from the things designated by the words pronounced after the negative.[26]

This passage may be seen in the context of what immediately precedes it as explicitly making the point that negation is to be

identified not with contrariety,[27] but with participation in Difference. Taking the passage in context, however, introduces difficulties about the concept of difference being employed - in this passage it is not clear that 'different' is to be understood in the same way as it was in 255E ff. where it clearly meant 'numerically distinct'. This is a difficulty which we shall postpone for future discussion.

A more immediate problem with the interpretation of this passage is this: What point is being made about τὸ μὴ ὄν? It is reasonably clear in general what point is being made about the negative particle in its use in connection with predicates like "tall". When something which is not tall is spoken of we do not mean to imply that we are speaking of something short any more than something equal. Thus μὴ μέγα does not mean the contrary of μέγα.

Plato generalizes this point when he says that: "the prefix 'not' indicates something different . . . from the things designated by the words pronounced after the negative."

Moravcsik takes the force of the passage to be that all negative predicates do not signify their contraries. The lines at 257B 3-4 he understands as a general statement of this thesis, what follows for the case of "tall" is then just a working out of the thesis through an example. Thus, according to Moravcsik, what is under analysis is the formula "is not F" where "is" has an incomplete predicative sense.[28]

However, as I think Owen correctly points out,[29] this interpretation cannot be right. For what Plato says is that the negative does not signify the contrary of the things denoted by the words that follow it. But in the case of τὸ μὴ ὄν, the word following μὴ is ὄν, just as in the case of τὸ μὴ μέγα the word following μὴ is

μέγα. Thus, if Plato's point is to be taken seriously as applied to τὸ μὴ ὄν, he must be understood as saying that μὴ ὄν does not signify the contrary of ὄν. Thus the case of the analysis of μὴ ὄν must be taken to be analogical to the case of μὴ μέγα rather than an exemplification of a general thesis stated about μὴ F, where the term μὴ ὄν is simply a place-holder.

Owen's argument seems to me to be conclusive. Whether or not ὄν is to be taken as incomplete, it remains clear that Plato by his own words in this passage had made himself responsible for giving an explanation of the negation of ὄν and not merely of the predicates which may complete it. Thus the example of τὸ μὴ μέγα must be taken as analysed analogically to τὸ μὴ ὄν.

The point is further supported by Plato's worry early in the dialogue about τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν. If μὴ ὄν does signify a contrary, it signifies τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν. But that is something which by its very nature cannot be referred to, i.e., it is, as Owen puts it, quoting Webster's dictionary, "something that does not exist."[30] So τὸ μὴ ὄν would be inexplicable, and μὴ ὄν merely an empty sound, if it referred to a contrary. Thus, we can see Plato dealing with an earlier problem and solving it. The referent of τὸ μὴ ὄν is "something different from Being". What this means we shall discuss below.

Before going on to discuss it, there is a problem, further to the issue just discussed, which is raised by James Kostman, in an article entitled "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist".[31] Kostman argues that the form of the argument at 257B ff cannot be analogical, for the reason apparently offered for the claim that μὴ μέγα does not signify the contrary of μέγα will not be appropriate in the

case of μὴ ὄν . μὴ μέγα is said not to signify the contrary of μέγα on the grounds that the phrase may just as well indicate τὸ ἴσον or τὸ σμικρόν.[32] However, as Kostman points out, this reasoning will not apply to μὴ ὄν. That is, it could not be said of τὸ μὴ ὄν that it does not signify something which is contrary to being any more than something qualified by some other predicate, for there is nothing which could be intelligibly qualified by a predicate signifying what is contrary to being. Thus, according to Kostman, the argument cannot be analogical, as the reasoning with reference to τὸ μὴ ὄν cannot be the same as that with reference to τὸ μὴ μέγα. Kostman concludes that the reasoning about τὸ μὴ μέγα must be taken as an example of that about τὸ μὴ ὄν.

However, we have just seen that this conclusion cannot be so. For if we take Plato seriously when he states his position on μὴ at 257B 3-4, then this analysis must be applicable to τὸ μὴ ὄν, that is, μὴ will not signify the contrary of the word immediately following, which in this case is ὄν . This, however, simply undercuts Kostman's argument. Kostman must hold that Plato can attach no sense whatsoever to the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν but only to expressions like τὸ μὴ μέγα, τὸ μὴ σμικρόν etc. But in this case, they can hardly <u>exemplify</u> τὸ μὴ ὄν.

If Kostman's conclusion that this passage is not analogical is incorrect, nevertheless he makes a striking point in the course of arguing for it. For if we take Plato to be offering a range of affirmative expressions which stand in a special relation to τὸ μὴ μέγα when he speaks of τὸ σμικρόν and τὸ ἴσον at 257B 6-8 it is true that there is no clear analogy to this in the case of τὸ μὴ ὄν.

In any case, it is clear that by τὸ μὴ ὄν we could not mean something contrary to being for that has been ruled out.

We may find new light shed on this matter by taking a fresh look at what is being accomplished by this passage. All the commentators we have been discussing in these chapters, including Kostman, make the assumption that in this passage Plato is coming to grips with negative predication. However, it is by no means clear that this is the case. Several things mitigate against this, in fact.

First, the subject of this passage seems to be the significance of τὸ μὴ ὄν , and as we have argued, now, at length, this cannot simply be a place-holder for "not-F", "not G", etc.

It would seem that in drawing the analogy between "not being" and "not tall" Plato must be taking these as predicates upon the same footing. If this is so, then the focus of the passage must be upon explicating "not being" as a legitimate negative predicate, just as "not tall" may be explicated as a legitimate negative predicate.[33] Thus, we must suppose that for Plato, negative predication is not itself in question. It can be handled by reference to the same participational model that has been used throughout Plato's writing on the theory of Forms, together with the introduction of the Form Difference. What is in question, then, is whether τὸ μὴ ὄν is a legitimate predication, that is, whether it can be explained by the same model as other negative predications.

What Kostman's point hangs on then, is that "not being" really cannot be explicated like other negative predicates. One may think that this point does indeed find purchase in the text of the passage. Kostman finds that Plato is here suggesting that the denial that a thing

is tall hangs together with a special group of positive assertions that one may make: namely, that the thing is short, or that it is equal. Now what Kostman has pointed out is there are no counterpart positive assertions that hang together with τὸ μὴ ὄν, for τὸ ὄν unlike τὸ μέγα cannot have a contrary. Kostman points out that Plato's examples are carefully chosen -- the positive predicates that he chooses are predicates of size. Had he meant only as much as: "when we say that something is not-large, we don't thereby deny that it may be something else, say red",[34] he would not have used such examples.

I think, however, that the way in which Kostman puts his point mistakes the significance of the text. For, what the text actually says at lines 257B6 - 8 is not that there are positive assertions associated with the denial that something is tall, nor does the text say that there are positive predicates which hang together with "not tall" (although this is how Cornford erroneously translates it).[35] What the text actually says is that we do not refer to, or indicate (δηλοῦν) τὸ σμικρὸν any more than τὸ ἴσον when we use the expression τὸ μὴ μέγα. Thus, it would seem that Plato has no strong theory in the background here either to the effect that a negative predicate somehow hangs together with some positive ones, or that a denial must be backed by some assertions. His point need not be interpreted as a logical one at all.

We may reconstruct the point being made in this way, as a referential one: when we say that something is not tall, we do not thereby pick out what is small, any more than what is equal. Interpreted this way, the disanalogy that Kostman points out becomes relatively harmless. The counterpart claim about not being would then

go like this: when we say that something is not, we do not thereby pick out something that does not exist in the sense of being contrary to what exists, for there is no such thing to be picked out. The fact that we cannot pick out something that is qualified as contrary-to-existing does not disrupt the argument if we take the analogy to depend solely on lack of reference to a contrary. The disanalogy only becomes disruptive if we take the argument Plato offers, not at its face value, but as concealing a theory about the relationship between assertion and denial, or between positive and negative predicates.[36]

I shall argue that Plato, later in fact, cannot have the former kind of theory, and not the latter either, as I shall be claiming that he makes denial into a variety of assertion, and negative predicates into something like positive predicates. This comes up with the interpretation of 257C5 - 258D to which we now turn. If this conclusion is in fact correct, then I think it will have been shown that Kostman's point about 257B6 - 8 is in fact a criticism of Plato's position, and not a criticism of the analogy ascribed to him by Owen.

3.2.3 257C5 - 258D

In this passage, the Form Difference is used to explain how we may legitimately speak of τὸ μὴ ὄν. I think I should emphasize before I enter upon my interpretation of this passage that here, as in the last passage, there is a continuing puzzle about the Form Difference. Between 255E and 257B Difference together with a participational model was used to account for the numerical differentiation of Forms, including the distinction of all of them from τὸ ὄν. Between 257B - C5 it was invoked to account for the reference of τι μὴ μέγα and, as we

argued, by analogy, τὸ μὴ ὄν. In the passage we shall be examining, it is used apparently in the construction of negative counterparts to all of the Forms. Each of the latter two passages is introduced rather casually, as though the continuity of these passages was perfectly clear (at 257B1 ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε ; at 257C5 τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν). We have, in our account, identified one of the strands that preserves continuity: Plato is accounting for the legitimate use of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν by showing that it has a referent, namely, the Form τὸ μὴ ὄν.

However, the role played in these passages by the Form Different has seemed mysteriously various to interpreters who have identified the object of Plato's quest for an explanation of τὸ μὴ ὄν to be an account of negative predication. Both Kostman and Moravcsik, for example, ask whether the concept of difference for Plato can be interpreted as incompatibility (as Kostman concludes)[37] or contrast (as Moravcsik concludes).[38] For these interpreters, then, the concept cannot preserve the sense that it had in the passage 255E - 257B where we were able to positively identify it as numerical differentiation.

In what follows, I shall be arguing that it does preserve this sense. To state my position as plainly as possible at this point, I shall be arguing that the focal points of Plato's discussion throughout these three passages are non-existence and numerical distinction not negative predication. I believe that if this were not so, the continuity of these three passages would be inexplicable. The proof of the point, however, comes up in connection with the passage I shall be discussing in this section.

The passage opens with the same kind of casual remark that

the Stranger used in introducing the last - τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν. A comparison is then drawn between the nature of Difference and ἐπιστήμη. Both are κεκερματίσθαι - cut up. Knowledge is one, but divided by subject, and each division has its own name. The same thing is true of the nature of Difference: Difference is one but has many parts, each of which has a name proper to it.

Why should Plato choose such an analogy? The stating of the analogy between Difference and Knowledge echoes the language of the divisions at the beginning of the Sophist. Thus, the metaphor for division was there cutting, and this is echoed at 257C8 - 9; similarly, in the division at the beginning, Plato was insistent, as we saw, upon the appropriateness of a name to the parts of each genus divided, and this comes up again at 257C11 - D1. Thus I think that Plato believes that Difference, just as much as knowledge, is truly a proper subject for division -- that is, it is a genus. This is partly driven home by the analogy, but it is argued for in the case of each of the proposed parts. Thus, the next step is this:

> ἔστι τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιθέμενον; τοῦτ' οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τιν' ἔχον ἐπωνυμίαν;
> ἔχον· ὃ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἑκάστοτε φθεγγόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φυσέως.

The methodology being used here is precisely like the methodology involved in locating the angler at the beginning of the dialogue. A genus is found and divided, and where the divisions have been properly made, there will be an appropriate name for the thing divided. Here we have succeeded in finding the thing to which the name τὸ μὴ καλόν is

appropriate. Plato goes on later in the passage to argue that the not Tall, the not Just, and so on, can all be found by the same method.

So much, therefore, seems to be involved in making the analogy: that both Knowledge and Difference are alike and that both are generic insofar as they are subject to division. The analogy, however, is being used to make a point and I believe that there is considerable disagreement in the interpretations we have been discussing about what that point is. The difficulty comes up in the lines 258B 1-6.

It is first said at 257E1 - 6:

Ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρὸς τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὕτω ξυμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καλόν; Ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὄν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικ', εἶναι τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν.

Then the same reasoning is applied at 258B1 - 6 to Being:

Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος . . . ; οὐδέν ἧττον . . . αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσίᾳ ἐστίν . . .

Cornford translates 257E1 - 6:

> May we not say that the existence of the not-Beautiful is constituted by its being marked off from a single definite kind among existing things and again set in contrast with something that exists? . . . So it appears that the not-Beautiful is an instance of something that exists being set in contrast to something that exists.

He translates 258B106:

> So it seems, when a part of the nature of the Different and a part of the nature of the Existent (Existence) are set in contrast to one another, the contrast is, if it be permissible to say so, as much a reality as Existence itself; it does not mean what is contrary to . . .

'existent' but only what is different from that Existent.

Cornford's interpretation of these passages would lead us to believe once again, as in the case of his translation of 256B1 ff.[38] that the point being made is a logical one. Thus he translates at 258B4 - 5:

οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα,

as:

> ". . . it does not mean what is contrary to 'existent . . ."

Further, in his commentary on this passage, he maintains that Plato is not relating the not Just, the not Beautiful, etc. to Difference as species to genus, but rather, in saying that they are "parts of θάτερον" that Plato is merely intending to point out that they are real. He says:

> "The 'not-Beautiful' is not a Form but a group of Forms, negatively described, which is a part of the Real . . . when it is said to be 'a part of the Different' or 'of the nature of the Different', the Different must mean 'that which is different'. Since every part of the field of Forms is different from every other part, the whole field can be called 'the Different'."[40]

I think, as I have already indicated, that there is clear textual evidence that Cornford is wrong on this point. The assumptions of the Cratylus about the relationship of language to the world which we argued in the first two chapters were employed in early parts of the Sophist -- in the division at the beginning, and in the construction of the paradoxes -- are still at work in this passage late in the dialogue. The Stranger asks at 257D10 - 11 whether the part of the Different which is opposed to the Beautiful is nameless or has a name--

and as I have already pointed out, this is exactly the kind of question which was appropriate to the division of the angler at the beginning of the dialogue. Furthermore, at 258B12 - C1, the Stranger concludes that τὸ μὴ ὄν has a nature of its own. These two parts of the text of the passage are totally inconsistent with Cornford's claim that e.g., the not-Beautiful is "not a Form but a group of Forms negatively described". Finally, I think it is once again incorrect to take Plato here to be talking about the meaning of terms--just as I argued that this was incorrect in the previous passage at 257B 8. When Plato says:

οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα . . .

the point is not a logical one but a metaphysical one. The problem with negation as we emphasized in the last section, does not appear to be one of the meaning of negative terms, but rather of providing a metaphysical model which will give the terms reference. So it is very significant that Plato takes 'the not-Beautiful', 'the not-Just' and so on to be names revealing natures. Thus, I wish to ally my position on this passage to that of Maravcsik insofar as he holds that Plato has argued here for the existence of negative forms. (However, I think that Moravcsik's position is otherwise not correct.)

I believe that Cornford's translation of τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν throughout the passage as "Existence" and "Non-Existence" is correct. This is the first point of my disagreement with Moravcsik. Once again, as in the 257B1 ff. passage, the point turns upon whether Plato is drawing an analogy between the not-Just, the not-Beautiful and τὸ μὴ ὄν, or whether he takes these to be examples of the antithesis of Being, where 'Being' is understood to be an incomplete concept. The

controversy can be seen to center around the correct interpretation of the lines 257E6 - 7

ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὂν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικ,
εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν.

I believe that this is correctly translated by Cornford as:

> So it appears that the not-Beautiful is an instance of something that exists set in contrast to something that does not exist.

It is my opinion that this line sets the stage for an analogy which is drawn with τὸ μὴ ὄν at lines 258B1 - 6. The point of the analogy is to show that τὸ μὴ ὄν can be said to exist and have a nature, and its analysis is no different from that of τὸ μὴ καλόν. To put the matter in the terms which I suggested in Chapter 2, Plato solves the problem he set himself with the paradoxes by here showing that τὸ μὴ ὄν is the name of some real thing.

The analogy which I believe is being drawn here is structurally similar to the one which I have argued occurs at 257B1 ff. First it is shown that τὸ μὴ καλόν, τὸ μὴ δικαίον, etc. are names of real things which have natures of their own; then it is argued that the same is true of τὸ μὴ ὄν, that it is an existent thing with a nature of its own.

This, however, is not the interpretation that Moravcsik and Owen give to this argument; nor can they attach this significance to the lines 257E6 - 7. Owen, in particular, holds that Plato is never in the Sophist speaking of anything but the incomplete concept of 'Being'. Moravcsik says this about the passage:

> The not-Beautiful has as its extension the class of entities which lack Beauty. Obviously we cannot

> construe not-Being as the Form which has as its extension everything which lacks Being. We should, however, construe 'Being' in this passage as referring mostly to Relational Being. We can speak of the positive predicates, which are the completions of Relational Being, as "parts" of Being. In the same way, the negative predicates are "parts" of not-Being, and thus not-Being is to be understood as the form indicating negative predication.41

I have already argued against one point of this position. It does not make sense to say that there is a Form "indicating negative predication" if one accepts that Plato explains predication -- what it is to say that "X is F" -- on a participational model, as it appears he does throughout all three of the passages we have been discussing. There are much greater difficulties with this passage than this, however. Plato does not say anything about the "extension" of the not-Beautiful, nor is it clear that the term "extension" is appropriate when used in connection with Platonic Forms. Moravcsik is very unspecific when he says that "we can construe 'Being' in this passage as referring mostly to Relational Being." I believe that the cautious word "mostly" occurs in this sentence because of a difficulty with lines 257E6 - 7 which I have quoted above, and this is a speculation I shall return to shortly.

Another thing, however, which is clearly wrong in what Moravcsik says is his remark that the negative predicates are "parts" of not-Being. This is just not in the text; what Plato says is that the not-Beautiful, the not-Just and τὸ μὴ ὄν are all parts of Difference and this is in fact inconsistent with the claim that the not-Just and the not-Beautiful are parts of τὸ μὴ ὄν unless either τὸ μὴ ὄν is identified with Difference, or is supposed to be a higher order part

than the not-Just and the not-Beautiful of the Different. Neither of these possibilities is in any way borne out by the text.

This statement, that the negative predicates are "parts" of not-Being is, however, the only reason that Moravcsik gives for going on to the claim that not-Being is to be understood as the Form indicating negative predication.

Moravcsik thinks that Plato accounts for negative predication in the following way: he hypothesizes that τὸ ἕτερον is the relation which stands between e.g., Beauty and its negative counterpart. τὸ ἕτερον, he believes, has here some unspecified contrastive sense; it does not function as it did in the passage at 256E ff. with the sense of numerical difference. In a negative predicative sentence such as "x is not beautiful" the analysis is this: that x partakes of the not-Beautiful. The not-Beautiful is then, according to the passage criticized above, a part of not-Being. We understand what this means in virtue of our understanding a contrastive relation holding between the Beautiful and the not-Beautiful, spelled out by the statement that the not-Beautiful is different from the Beautiful.

But, now what of Being and not-Being? They are, according to Moravcsik, the wholes of which the positive and negative forms are parts. If this is so, in what sense do they express relations? If they are relations, in what sense are the negative and positive forms "parts" of them?

This problem becomes acute for Moravcsik's interpretation if we contrast what he says about negative predication with positive predications of the form "a is F". Moravcsik holds that the analysis of this yields a particular, referred to by "a", the Form referred to by

"F", and the relational Form Being, which effects the participational bond, and which is referred to by "is".[42] But if we look [redacted] negative predications of the form "a is not F", we find no counterpart to relational Being in relational not-Being. In fact, by parity with the analysis of "a is not F", which Moravcsik gives as: "a participates in not-F, where not-F is a part of not-Being", we must wonder about Moravcsik's analysis of "a is F". That is, Being appears to contain the predicate F rather than indicate a relation. No matter how we juggle the pieces, we do not find 'relational not-Being' even though, according to Moravcsik, Plato does have such a concept. But this makes us suspicious of Moravcsik's construal of Plato's position on rleaitonal Being.

Once again, in arguing this way, we have relied on the Parity Assumption, the importance of which was pointed out by Owen. However, Owen's position, too, is susceptible to this sort of criticism. For although Owen thinks that Plato demands parity between Being and not-Being, such that he cannot demote the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν to a mere place-holder for negative predicates like τὸ μὴ καλόν, τὸ μὴ δικαίον, etc., on his view as well, it is not, and cannot be explained in what sense the incomplete concept non-Being is a "part" of Difference. Further, as in our criticism of Owen's position on the passage 257B1 ff. in the last section, if, indeed, it is the focus of Plato's explanation of negative predication to explicate τὸ μὴ ὄν i.e., "is not", then Plato's parallel and analogous explication of the negative predicates τὸ μὴ καλόν, τὸ μὴ δικαίον is perplexing.

To conclude, it seems to be that we cannot, as Moravcsik does, take Plato's explanation of τὸ μὴ ὄν to be an explanation of

τὸ μὴ καλόν, τὸ μὴ δίκαιον etc., for that does not accord either with the text of the passage, or with the Parity Assumption. On the other hand, we cannot accept Owen's position, that τὸ μὴ ὄν <u>like</u> τὸ μὴ καλόν, τὸ μὴ δίκαιον etc. is accounted for by reference to Difference, for it is puzzling why the analogy of τὸ μὴ ὄν to other negative predicates should be made at all. On the Parity Assumption, as Owen takes it, the explication of τὸ μὴ ὄν should be the explication of all negative predications, just as the explication of τὸ ὄν is the explication of positive predication. As well, for Owen, just as for Moravcsik, there is no sense to be made of what Plato means by saying that τὸ μὴ ὄν is a "part" of Difference.

Let us return to an examination of the passage itself. It is my view that the focus of the whole passage is the proof which Plato offers that not-Being is a real thing with a nature of its own. At 257E2 - 4, 257E6 - 7 this point is made with reference to the not-Beautiful. At 258A1 - 2, it is made with reference to .

At 258A4 - 6, the point is made quantitatively with reference to the not-Just. Cornford translates this:

> And we must also put the not-Just on the same footing as the Just with respect to the fact that the one exists no less than the other.

The quantitative point, in fact, recurs throughout the passage; at 257E10 with reference to the not-Beautiful, it is said that the Beautiful exists no <u>more</u> than the not-Beautiful; the point is made as above with reference to the not-Just; it is made as well in the Stranger's summing up at 258A8 - 11:

καὶ τἆλλα δὴ ταύτῃ λέξομεν, ἐπείπερ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὖσα, ἐκείνης

δὲ οὐσίας ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἧττον ὄντα τιθέναι.

Finally, when the analogy of the not-Beautiful, the not-Just, etc. is carried through to its application to not-Being, at 258B1 - 4, we get:

Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσέως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλλη-λα ἀντικειμένον ἀντίθεσις οὐδεν ἧττον . . . αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἔστιν . . .

There is no sense to be made of this point unless we take Plato to be making comparisons as to the reality or existence of the positive forms with the negative forms, or parts of Difference. For Owen's view, as well as for Frede's, these comparisons as to the amount of Being which things possess will simply make no sense at all, since there surely will be no variation as to degree of the incomplete concept of Being. Although Moravcsik may allow that Plato may be speaking here of degrees of existence (this will depend on how one understands "mostly" in the passage quoted above from his article) his interpretation of the force of the argument in this passage makes no sense of Plato's motivation for so speaking. For on his interpretation, just as on that of Owen and Frede, the force of the passage ought to be to show that an incomplete "is not" has legitimate usage; not to show, as we contend, that τὸ μὴ ὄν has an existent referent.

If we look over the argument, taking the steps back from the conclusion, it looks like this:

258B8 - 9	we have found not-Being
258B1 - 5	not-Being exists no less than existence, for it is a part of Difference
257E	In this, it is like the not-Beautiful which exists no less than the Beautiful. The not-Beautiful is an existent set in contrast to

another existent, the Beautiful.
257D6 - 7 We say this because of the status of the not-Beautiful as a part of Difference.
257C11-12 We have already proven that Difference is one, but
D1 - 2 We allow that like knowledge, it has parts

The conclusion with regard to not-Being is clearly set out at 258B12 ff.

δεῖ . . . λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον, ὥσπερ τὸ μὴ μέγα μὴ μέγα . . . οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, ἑνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἕν . . .

Not-Being is one Form, which has a nature of its own, just as (ὥσπερ) τὸ μὴ μέγα is one Form having its own nature. Hence, by direct means, Plato has come to a denial of Parmenides' injunction:

258D2
οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα

It has been argued, then, that Plato has established the existence of Non-existence. What does this mean, however, and why should he wish to do such a thing? In order to find out, two preliminary investigations must be undertaken. We must examine what Plato has in mind when he uses the word ἀντίθεσις in this passage, and we must find out what sense he attaches to "difference", the long postponed inquiry mentioned at the beginning of this section.

Plato has maintained throughout this passage and the one examined in the last section that negation is not to be identified with contrariety. In this passage he appears to identify it with what he calls ἀντίθεσις which we may translate as "contrast". Now the question is: precisely what role does the notion of antithesis, or

contrast play, in the explication of negation?

Moravcsik simply identifies ἀντίθεσις with Difference.[43] He takes the sense of the word "different" in this passage to be "antithetical too". This, of course, fits with the view that 'difference' is an incomplete concept. It does not, however, sit well with the idea, which Plato explicitly subscribes to, that "Difference" is the name of a Form. I shall devote further discussion to this point in the next chapter. The other problem with Moravcsik's view, as well as the view of Kostman, that "difference" has the sense here of "incompatible with", is that it belies the apparent continuity of the three passages we have been discussing. For "different" at 256E ff. is allowed by all commentators to have its literal Greek meaning of "numerically different" or "other".

I suggest that there is another possibility for interpretation which has not been considered. It is that ἀντίθεσις is not to be seen as a relation whose sense is captured by the word "different", but, rather, is to be considered, like contrariety, as being a feature of the things contrasted. Thus, at 257B6 - 8, we argued against Kostman that Plato's point was a purely referential one, not a point about the meaning of terms. The point was that τὸ μὴ μέγα does not signify (δηλοῦν) something which is contrary to τὸ μέγα; we argued that it was misleading to take the point to be that τὸ μὴ μέγα does not mean "what is contrary to μέγα". Thus, we were forced to see contrariety as being something, as it were, <u>in</u> the pair Tall-Short, but not <u>in</u> τὸ μέγα - τὸ μὴ μέγα. So we might put the point in this way: Tall and Short are contraries, τὸ μέγα and τὸ μὴ μέγα are antitheticals.

We find, when we look at the lines 258B1 - 5 that their literal rendering accords well with this. Cornford translates this:

> So it seems, when a part of the nature of the Different and a part of the nature of the Existent (Existence) are set in contrast to one another the contrast is, if it be permitted to say so, as much a reality as Existence itself . . . . (my italics).

This does not mean that Difference exists just as much as Existence itself, which is what it would have to mean on any interpretation which identifies contrast as the sense of "different"; rather it must mean that the antithetical, τὸ μὴ ὄν , exists just as much as τὸ ὄν.

What is the point of constructing all negative things in this passage: τὸ μὴ μέγα , τὸ μὴ καλόν, τὸ μὴ δικαίον, τὸ μὴ ὄν . . . as parts of the Different, if not at least to imply that Difference is itself nothing other than the antithesis between them and their positive counterparts? If we look to the passage itself, we see, as I have already emphasized, that the role of Difference appears to be to establish the full-fledged existence of these negatives. The parts of Difference cannot fail to have the same degree of existence as it itself has; therefore, insofar as the negatives are parts of Difference, they exist just as much as the positive things which are antithetical to them.

Thus, Difference may be seen as having quite a different role in this passage than that ascribed to it by Moravcsik, just as we have already seen that it must have a different role at 257B ff. from that ascribed to it by Kostman. There is no reason to believe that in these passages Plato is talking about the meaning of "different" or of "not"; rather it would appear that he is speaking of the natures of the things

denoted by the form of expression τὸ μὴ F.

But still, it may be argued that the antithetical natures of the things which are the parts of Difference must reflect back somehow upon Difference itself. If we are not to say that Difference is the relation of antithesis lying between these things, we nevertheless must see that, in some sense, their being antitheticals must be derived from their being parts of the Different. This, however, does not harm the point made above.

What I am arguing, in effect, is that Difference, while relational, is not an incomplete concept.

In his article "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist", Edward Lee puts forward a view about 257C - 258E which is in some respects similar to mine.[44] His interpretations of 257E2 - 7 is that the not-Beautiful is a being whose nature consists in antithesis to another being, viz., Beauty. In general, the parts of Other are just those things whose nature consists in this determinate antithesis, determinate in the sense that the antithesis is focussed on some other determinate x. I have also argued for this interpretation of the passage.

Lee makes the point that this passage 257C - 258E marks a change in what he calls the "role" of other. In earlier passages (251D - 257A) where other had the role of a Form differentiator, it had a supervenient role, where, as on my account, a participational model was used to analyse the distinctions of, e.g., Motion and Rest: Motion participates in other with regard to Being. In the 257C - 258E passage, Lee suggests, it plays a constitutive role whereby its parts constitute the negative Forms: their being what they are consists

precisely in their being antithetical to determine natures.

Lee's position differs from mine on what I have been maintaining is the crucial point, however. He accepts the Owen-Frede view that for Plato, to be is to be something. He thus takes 'Not-being' to be the covering concept for the parts of Other. (He does not, like Moravcsik, identify Not-Being with Other itself. I have criticized this view above.) If my argument, that 257C - 257A are all passages in which an analogy is drawn between the analysis of other negatives and Not-Being, then Lee cannot be right about this.

The Lee account has the virtue that it does away with the necessity of arguing, as, e.g., Kostman and Moravcsik do, that "other" changes its sense. This is a virtue that I wish to preserve for my own account. The problem that Moravcsik's interpretation puts to us is: how can Difference, if it is a unified concept, be used to explain both the numerical non-identity of Forms and the negative Forms? If Lee is right, this can be explained by means of reference to a change of "role".

Our analysis of each of the passages so far discussed in this chapter shows each to contain an argument identical in structure. In the passage at 255E ff. it is shown that Motion is not each of three of the four other greatest Forms. Then the same point is made with regard to Existence, that just as Motion is not same or Difference or Rest, so it also is not Existence. A participational model is provided to give substance to the claims that Motion is not Difference or Sameness; Motion participates in Difference with regard to these Forms. The same model is then supplied to explain how it is that Motion is not Existence.

In the next passage at 257B1 ff., the argument is this: the

thing spoken of when we use the expression τὸ μὴ μέγα is not something which is contrary to τὸ μέγα, but rather something which is different from τὸ μέγα. Similarly, the thing spoken of when we use the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν is not the contrary of the thing spoken of when we say τὸ ὄν, but rather something which is different from τὸ ὄν.

Finally, we have applied the same analogical interpretations to the last passage examined. There it is found that there exists a set of negative Forms which are antithetical to their positive counterparts. Their existence and their antithetical (rather than contrary) natures can be traced to their being parts of the genus Difference. By analogy with the Forms the not-Just, the not-Beautiful, etc., we conclude that there is a Form τὸ μὴ ὄν, which also has existence and a nature of its own as a part of the genus Difference.

Thus we may see the passages as held together in this way: in each case there is an analogy drawn between the analysis of ordinary negative expressions with the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν. In each case the negative expressions are found to have reference because of the existence of the Form Difference, and reference is by analogy attributed to the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν.

Now, what commentators have found difficult to analyze in the continuity of these passages is the role of Difference, or rather the role of the expression "different". The problem stems, I suspect, from an assumption basic to all of them: that the focus of the last two passages is on explicating negative predication. Thus, in the last two passages, they are inclined to see Difference as underwriting the use of the negative operators μὴ and οὐκ in predicative expressions. This

then creates a hiatus between what is going on with reference to Difference in the last two passages as opposed to the first, where Difference was apparently invoked to explicate numerical differentiation.

However, the assumption that the focus of the last two passages is on negative predication is, I believe, a mistaken one. The only reason to take that to be the focus of the last two passages is what I have been arguing is incorrect, the identification of the expression τὸ ὄν with the copula, the identification of τὸ μὴ ὄν with the negation of the copula.

If we rather interpret all three passages as focusing on finding a referent for the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν where this is not identified with the copula, but rather with non-existence, then the hiatus between the passages disappears. For the conclusion of each of the passages is the same -- τὸ μὴ ὄν does have a referent <u>just</u> like other negative terms.

If we take the focus of Plato's discussion in these passages to be the reference of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν then we need not ascribe to him any distinction between predicative contexts and identitative ones, or at least no distinction which drives a wedge between one sense of μὴ where it refers to a numerical differentiation and another sense of μὴ where it refers to a predicate negator. The point seems rather to be that whereever, i.e., in whatever context, the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν arises, it refers to the same Form, namely non-Existence, the existence and nature of which can be analyzed by reference to the Form Difference.

When Moravcsik found in the <u>Sophist</u> three senses of "is" -- existential, copulative, and identitative, he was also forced to find in

the Sophist at least two senses of "is not" (the existential "is not" dropping out altogether). But we have found in the Sophist only one sense of τὸ ὄν being given analysis -- the existential one -- and this leaves us with only one sense of τὸ μὴ ὄν as well.

I have now given my argument that there is no reason to disrupt the continuity of the three passages. This is at the same time an argument that Plato does not have more than one concept of Difference. I have also already stated my belief that the concept of Difference that he does have is what in post-Aristotelian terminology we call numerical distinction.

Someone may now argue: even if the focus of the three passages is on the reference of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν, since that expression occurs in two radically different contexts, there is every reason to believe that there is at least some slippage between concepts of Difference. Kostman,[45] for example, argues that Plato cannot be using "Difference" in the sense of numerical distinction to explicate τὸ μὴ ὄν where it occurs as a negative predicate. Nor, he argues, can Plato use that concept to explicate falsehood. Thus Kostman, as it were, argues back from the results -- if the assumption of the concept "difference" is to be useful in the explication of τὸ μὴ ὄν in predicate contexts and with reference to falsehood, it must not be identified with numerical distinction, he maintains.

The only way to counter this argument is to see whether Plato can make use of the concept of difference as numerical distinction in the explication of τὸ μὴ ὄν in its use with reference to falsehood. I shall take this up in the next section.

3.2.4 Plato on Falsehood Again

In Chapter 1 I devoted a section to the famous and difficult passage at 263B ff. where Plato explains the false sentence "Theaetetus flies". What I concentrated on was the influence of the Correspondence Assumption on Plato's analysis. Thus, I focussed on the importance of the word ὡς at 263B4 - 5, 263B9, and 263D2. I left giving a precise account of how Difference is supposed to function till now -- although I did claim there that its function, in accordance with the correspondence assumption, would be to give reference to characterizations of false sentences as saying τὸ μὴ ὄν.

On Kostman's interpretation there are two possible accounts of "'x is F' is false" given what Plato says at 263B:

a) For any G, if G is an ὂν περὶ x then F is non-identical with G.

b) There is some G such that G is an ὂν περὶ x and G is incompatible with F.[46]

There is a third alternative noted by Frede:

c) x is non-identical with F.

This third possibility is rejected by all commentators on the grounds that it reduces all negative predication to denial of identity. To attribute this interpretation of falsehood to Plato would be simultaneously to attribute to him a real lack of understanding of predication-the very concept about which, according to the line of interpretation being criticized here, Plato gets clear in the Sophist. It is worth noting that in the face of the improbability of C for this line of interpretation commentators are forced to fall back upon A and B. But for all Plato says at 263B C might be correct. It is only by interpreting the phrases

ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων (263B7) and
ὄντων δέ γε ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ

as being about relations between predicates (ὄντων denoting the predicates and ἕτερα the relation) that one is in a position to reject C. I have already disputed this interpretation of the lines in Chapter 1.

If one does interpret τῶν ὄντων here as denoting predicates A and B are the alternatives remaining. A is rejected on grounds that the non-identity of F and G is too weak for an account of falsehood. If Theaetetus is laughing, and 'sitting' and 'laughing' are non-identical, this will not yet secure the falsity of "Theaetetus is sitting". For Theaetetus might very well be both sitting and laughing. Something stronger than mere numerical differentiation is needed to secure falsehood. So with the rejection of A and C, the possibility of interpreting ἕτερα simply as otherness or numerical difference. B is then the remaining possibility.

I want to argue that B is too strong to give an account of falsehood, at least within the restrictions laid down by Plato earlier in the dialogue. At 257B as I have maintained, Plato appears to be speaking not of the meaning of μὴ or οὐ but of the reference of compound expressions like τι μὴ μέγα . I take it that Plato is asserting that these compound expressions containing μὴ and οὐ do not pick out things contrary to the things denoted by the name after the negation sign. Thus τὸ μὴ μέγα picks out neither τὸ σμίκρον nor τὸ ἴσον. In this way negation is marked off and distinguished from contrariety.

Later on Plato secures the same point by identifying the

relation between positive and negative Forms as ἀντίθεσις. At 258B he stresses that the relation of Not-Being to Being is ἀντίθεσις, not contrariety. The role of the Form Difference is to secure an object of reference for negatives -- the not large is what is different-from-large, not being is what is different-from-being.

Two things, I think, emerge from reviewing these two passages for the interpretation of 263B. 1) If any one of A, B, or C fits with these passages, it is C and 2) these passages rule out B. I shall address the second point first.

B is ruled out because it makes contrariety underwrite negation. The falsehood of "Theaetetus sits" depends upon its being the case that Theaetetus does not sit. For Plato the reference of "not sitting" is to what is different-from-sitting. Interpreters who debate the merits of B over A point out that mere difference from sitting will not be sufficient to explain the falsehood of Theaetetus sits since each of the properties that are in fact true of Theaetetus will be different from each other. So it is asserted that all that will provide a sufficiency here for the falsehood of "Theaetetus sits" are those properties of Theaetetus which are the incompatibles of 'sitting' -- like 'standing' and 'lying'. But this approach makes contrariety underwrite negation and falsehood. And this was forbidden by Plato at 257B when he denied that finding the reference of τὸ μὴ μέγα involved looking to τὸ σμικρὸν and τὸ ἴσον. At 258B the reference of the two contentious phrases, ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων and ὄντων δέ γε ἕτερα πρὸς σοῦ are given a precise interpretation. The reference of the phrases is to a part of Difference, and a relation is specified between ὄντα and ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων which is

distinct from contrariety, viz., ἀντίθεσις .

It might be argued that although Plato does specify a relation and an object of reference for negatives the question may still be raised -- what incompatible properties does Theaetetus have which are integrally connected to his not sitting (unlike 'laughing'). For even if Difference does secure reference for negation, mere reference will not be enough to account for falsity. That is, allowing that "not sitting" in "Theaetetus is not sitting" has a referent, namely, 'different-from-sitting', does not yet give us an account of the falsity of "Theaetetus sits". To account for falsity, it might be argued, we still need incompatibility.

This is a position that no one holds. Kostman actually substitutes the word "incompatible" for the word "different" in B.

But if someone were to adopt it there is a reply which I believe is definitive. The case taken up in the passage at 258B is, as I have argued above, what all the analogies of other negatives lead up to -- the case of Not-Being. If it is once allowed that this really is a legitimate case of negation then there can be no resort to incompatibles to explain its role in accounting for falsehood. Whether, as I have been arguing, τὸ μὴ ὄν and τὰ μὴ ὄντα are understood existentially or whether they are understood as incomplete predicates, the fact remains that it is ὄν and ὄντα which are negated, and there can be no resort to incompatibles or contraries to explain their role in falsehood, since Being has no incompatibles. So on this view, Plato would be continually making hash of his own position when he states it in connection with τὸ μὴ ὄν and τὰ μὴ ὄντα as he consistently does.

I want now to turn a point of Kostman's back on itself. He argues: since Being has no incompatibles, Plato cannot be talking about Being and it will have no role to play in the analysis of falsehood. My point is: since Plato is constantly talking about Being and Being has no incompatibles, insofar as Being is used to account for falsehood, there can be no resort to the incompatible predicates account.

It is worth noting that although at 263 Plato has before him the examples of true and false statements: "Theaetetus is sitting" and "Theaetetus is flying" and although the discussion appears to be specifically about these examples, Plato puts his case with regard to falsity without reference to either 'sitting' or 'flying', but only with reference to 'being'. If B or the proposed modification of B were correct, Plato would be making nonsense of his position here.

So it looks as though A, B, and C must all the rejected for the reasons offered above. The conclusion to be drawn from this, I suggest, is that the link between negation and falsehood is not made by way of negative predication. The account of falsehood is made out by way of the clarification of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν ; the problem all along was with 'non-existence' and not with negative predication.

In Chapter 1, I interpreted Plato's account of false sentences as: false sentences make as if some thing exists (e.g., Theaetetus flying) when they do not. As it can be seen the problem is at a different level from a worry about the referent of "flying". "Flying" itself clearly has a referent -- namely, Flying. Nor as I argued in Chapter 1 will the problem turn out to be one of the combination of "Theaetetus" and "flying" in speech when they are not in reality combined, a problem which might be seen as connected with finding a

referent for "is". The problem seems rather to be to find a reference for what is said in the account of wherein the falsity lies: i.e., finding a reference for τὰ μὴ ὄντα in:

τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.[47]

If I am right about the point of Plato's analysis of negation, it will have been to get clear about what this means -- not what "not flying" means, as on Kostman's account.

Now, if, as I have been arguing, Plato has given us an account of the reference of "does not exist", then here is where that analysis ought to be brought to bear.

It should be noticed once again how seriously Plato takes the aporia of the early part of the dialogue. If my interpretation is correct, the project of the second half of the Sophist has been to give a sense to the precise terms in which the paradoxes are stated which will resolve them; not to show that the paradoxes are mis-statements of the problem. Thus, at 263B9, we find an echo of the formulation of the paradox at 237D: to speak falsely is to say τὸ μὴ ὄν. Only at this point "saying τὸ μὴ ὄν" does not reduce to saying nothing.

What does it reduce to, then? It reduces to saying something which is not the opposite of what exists, but its antithesis. Falsehood, thus, turns out to be speaking of what does not exist as though it did. And the possibility of so speaking is preserved by the existence of the Form τὸ μὴ ὄν.

Thus, "Theaetetus flies" receives the following account: "Theaetetus flies" asserts the existence of Theaetetus flying. But Theaetetus flying does not exist. "Theaetetus flies", however, makes as if it did (263B9). So something was said. What was said was other

than what is (263B7).

This solution is very much the product of the terms in which the problem is set. At 260D5 ff., Plato makes the Stranger take up the question whether speech, opinion and fancy participate in not-Being. At 261C6 ff., he asks whether not-Being touches them. The conclusions of the discussion of falsehood at 263D ff appears to sum up the position: there is "really and truly" (ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς) false discourse -- that is, discourse which, while it exists, can only be explained by reference to non-Existence.

This talk of the participation of false discourse in non-Existence is not metaphorical. (It must be interpreted as a metaphor, however, and a highly confusing, if not downright misleading one, by those who take Plato to mean Relational Being, by τὸ μὴ ὄν). The difficulty all along has been to come to understand the ontology of a false sentence. If what is said does not exist, then how can anything have been said? It would now appear that even though what was said is not, since not to be is only to be other than what is, the conclusion may not be drawn that nothing was said.

Thus the point of the analysis given above does not lie in a difficulty about the fact that Theaetetus does not have some attribute. Rather, the point seems to be that what was said about Theaetetus, while not the case, nevertheless exists.

Perhaps it is difficult to see that anyone could be puzzled about this in just this way. The commentators discussed have all located the problem at the level of giving an analysis of the actual content of what was said and then relating this to what is the case about Theaetetus. But I am suggesting that the problem does not lie

with the content of what was said -- with "flying", for example, as it relates to what may truly be said about Theaetetus, e.g., "sitting". The problem lies in seeing how "Theaetetus flies" can be anything at all, once it is recognized that it is a representation that does not represent anything which really is the case. "Theaetetus flies" is different from everything that is (or for that matter, was or will be -- the curious nature of Plato's example may stem from an attempt to make the difficulty seem as dire as possible). Plato's solution comes from this very formulation, for insofar as we can say that it is different, at least it must be.

What this all depends upon is the possibility of making sense of, i.e., finding a reference for, denials of existence. What is involved in this?

3.2.5 Denying Existence

Plato's enterprise must now be seen as a very precarious one, indeed. Contrary to what other interpreters impute to Plato, I have been arguing that he does not diverge very far from an essentially Parmenidean framework. I do not think, for instance, that Plato locates in Parmenides' writing some serious logical mistake for confusion about τὸ ἐστιν. The divergence appears to be rather Plato's taking seriously the importance of providing an ontology which includes language. (The criticism of Parmenides at 244B ff. bears witness to this concern.) Thus, if the solutions I attribute to him seem unsatisfactory, that is because I interpret his way of setting up the problems to be solved as conservative.

Plato's way of dealing with denials of existence is surely

unsatisfactory, if I am right. Kostman attributes to Plato what is fundamentally a modern solution. For Kostman, Plato makes denial related to or dependent on assertion.[48] Thus, for Kostman, the denial "X is not large" brings with it some assertion as to the size of X. Since "X does not exist" does not bring with it some such assertion, the possibility that Plato could contemplate denying existence is excluded.

I have already argued that this cannot be the focus of Plato's project. The issue surrounding the term τὸ μὴ ὄν is one of reference, and not the denial of some size. By the same token, the issue of the falsehood of "Theaetetus flies" does not center around how "flying" does not cohere with some other attribute of Theaetetus, but what we are to understand ourselves as saying when we say that it is false. We must ensure that what we say was said finds a referent.

Thus, to focus on denial is not to capture the essence of Plato's project. Plato's worry is not what the relation is between denial and assertion, but whether any account can be given of what we have said or spoken of just in denying. That is to say, his worry is whether a denial itself touches on reality.

This is, I think, the proper rationale for the controversial claim at 259E:

ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν.

If falsehood and denial are to find roots in reality, it must be in virtue of the interweaving of Forms. The importance of the point made immediately before this may be overlooked, however. The contrast is:

τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων.

Thus, both assertion and denial, truth and falsehood, depend on the interweaving of the Forms. The point, then, is that whatever is said, it must be underwritten by interweaving.

What of denial then? Since, in general, discourse depends on interweaving, denial must be reflective of interweaving. That is to say, denial must be just another kind of assertion.

Applying this moral to τὸ μὴ ὄν, we find that to deny existence to something is in fact to attribute to it participation in something -- just as to deny μέγα was to attribute participation in μὴ μέγα.

The major technical difficulty with the account seems to be that Difference has too great a role to play. For while I have argued that "different" retains a univocal sense throughout the passages discussed, the Form appears to have two roles. One of these is as the genus of the negative Forms; the other is as that Form which guarantees the separateness of all the Forms. Thus, each of the Forms is other than all the others because of its participation in Difference; Difference is also A.E. Taylor's "moment of negativity".[49] Why should it be assigned so great a role?

The problem with giving to Difference these functions is that at the level of speaking denial becomes assertion: to say that X is not large is just to say that X participates in the other-than-large. This analysis of negation essentially eliminates denying as a speech act which opens up further paths of speech. Although there is conflict between the claims that something is large and that the same thing is not large because of the underlying ἀντίθεσις of Large and Not-Large, the latter claim leads on to no positive claims as to the size of the

thing. When the Not-Large is accorded the same ontological status as the Large, the speech act of denying is accorded the same status as that of asserting, namely, saying what something is. So when one says that something is not large just as when one says that something is large, there is no need to go on: one has already succeeded in saying what something is.

Applying the analogy of Large and Not-Large to Existence and Non-Existence, we see that Plato has an analysis which will fit the paradoxes he introduces at the beginning. The problem was to see what the characterizer of falsehood accomplished when he denied existence to what the sophist said, when he characterized the sophist as saying τὸ μὴ ὄν. It was thought that the characterization could not be accomplished -- this was what the first set of paradoxes was designed to show. But with an analysis of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν on which the characterizer has succeeded in saying what by making reference to the negative Form Non-Existence, Plato has restored the accomplishment of the characterizer of falsehood.

Given a certain set of philosophical expectations this may seem a hollow victory. First, perhaps the problem seems trivial, and second, as I have pointed out, the solution seems inadequate. But, of course, against a philosophical background where it was incomprehensible how τὸ μὴ ὄν could be said at all a significant step has been taken. Against Parmenides, Plato has restored the third way, and with it has restored usage to an important expression, τὸ μὴ ὄν the use of which he thinks vital to explaining "how falsehood can come into existence" (237A).

FOOTNOTES

1. Op. cit., Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 282, n.1.
2. Op. cit., Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist".
3. Michael Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage.
4. Op. cit., Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist".
5. Ibid., Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist".
6. Plato, Republic 438, Aristotle, Categories.
7. Op. cit., Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage.
8. Ibid., Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage, p. 30.
9. Ibid., Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage, p. 28-29.
10. Ibid., Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage, p. 35.
11. Ibid., Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage", p. 36.
12. Op. cit., Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 238.
13. Aristotle, Categories, quoted by Cornford in Plato's Theory of Knowledge.
14. Op. cit., Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 281, n.1.
15. It might be thought that the use of εἶδος as opposed to γένος, is significant here. But Plato appears to use εἶδος interchangeably with γένος ; cf. 258C5, 258D5, 259E6 and elsewhere.
16. Ibid., Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 285.
17. Op. cit., Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage, p. 24.
18. Op. cit., Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 284.
19. cf. G.E.L. Owen, "A Proof in the Peri Ideon", Journal of Hellenic Studies 77, 1957.
20. In "Being and Meaning in the Sophist, Moravcsik clearly relies on this. So, I think, does Frede.
21. Richard Bosley, "Monistic Argumentation", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol. 1976. Bosley takes the key word ἔδος in The Way of Truth to be a quasi-technical term used by Parmenides like οὐσία or essentia when Parmenides says that only one way may be taken he is saying that there is only one essence, namely, Being..

22. Op. cit., Owen, "Not-Being in the Sophist", p. 266.

23. Op. cit., Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist, p. 42 ff.

24. Op. cit., Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage, p. 30.

25. Op. cit., Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist", p. 53 ff.

26. Op. cit., Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge.

27. I am translating ἐναντίον as "contrary" although some interpreters prefer "opposite" or "polar contrary". My interpretation of 257B gives me no reason to prefer either of these.

28. Op. cit., Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist", p. 69-70.

29. Op. cit., Owen, "Plato on Not-Being", p. 232.

30. Ibid., Owen, p. 225.

31. James Kostman, "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist", Patterns in Plato's Thought, ed. J.M.E. Moravcsik, Reidel, 1973.

32. Ibid., Kostman, "False Logos & Not-Being in Plato's Sophist".

33. Sophist 257B6: the use of οἷον suggests comparison rather than exemplification here.

34. Op. cit., Kostman, "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist", p. 202.

35. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 290. Cornford translates: "When we speak of 'that which is not', it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists but only something that is different. . . In the same way that when, for example, we speak of something as 'not tall' we may just as well mean by that phrase 'what is equal' as 'what is short', mayn't we?" Cornford is translating δηλοῦν as "mean" whereas it seems only to suggest reference.

36. There is no reason to believe that Plato has any view about meaning in this passage if δηλοῦν and σημαίνειν are translated as "indicate", and "signify".

37. Op. cit., Kostman, "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist".

38. Op. cit., Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist", p. 69.

39. See note 35.

40. Op. cit., Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 293.

41. Op. cit., Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist, p. 69.

42. Ibid., Moravcsik, p. 53.

43. Ibid., Moravcsik, p. 69.

44. Edward Lee, "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist", The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXXI, No. 3.

45. Op. cit., Kostman, "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist.

46. Ibid., Kostman.

47. Sophist 263B10.

48. Ibid., Kostman.

49. Op. cit., A.E. Taylor, The Sophist and Statesman, Introduction, p. 13.

CHAPTER 4

4.1 251A - 257A

4.1.1 Introduction

The question which remains to be answered is: what is the doctrine of the mingling of the Forms? The view that the Forms mingle with one another is the central concern of the section of the dialogue which runs from 251D to 257A. The section 254C - 257A is introduced as an exemplification of how the Forms mingle, "selecting some of the Forms only, from those that are considered most important". It would seem that this section is the one we should begin examining, if we are to come to understand the doctrine.

4.1.2 251A - 251D

At 251A the Stranger introduces the subject of mingling by bringing up an old problem: how do we come to be constantly calling the same thing by many names? The problem is an old one, but put in a new way. The problem, at heart, is a metaphysical one: how is it that one thing is at the same time many?

The problem is here put in a new way. It is characterized as a problem that we have in speaking of a thing. Just in speaking of it as "it", we allow that it is one; in going on to attribute various characters to it such as "colours, forms, size, vices and virtues" we seem to allow that it is many. The correspondence assumption permits us to see straight off, however, that the problem is really the metaphysical

one. We could not possibly be troubled by this way of speaking, had we not already "grasp(ed) the notion that the one cannot possibly be many, nor the many one".

Plato goes on to make fun of people who are seriously worried by the problem.

> I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.[1]

As to how Plato himself deals with the difficulty we get no clue in this passage. He goes on to discuss the matter of attribution, but does not return, at any stage in the dialogue to the one-many problem itself.

What Plato undertakes to attack is the thesis that the attribution of various characters cannot be made to a thing, that is, that we are restricted to naming only. The passage is sometimes interpreted to mean[2] that we are restricted (according to some poverty-striken mentalities) to identical predication, i.e., to saying that man is man, and good is good. The point is however, that if a thing, in being a thing, is necessarily one, then our only speech activity in connection with that thing can be to reveal the unitary character that it has. Predication and identity do not get off the ground. Looking to Plato's formulation of what the poverty-striken intellects allow us to say: ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος, and ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, we note that we may take this two ways. Either he means they are allowed to speak these words, or he means they are allowed to say ἄνθρωπος of an ἄνθρωπος, i.e., to call an ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος. But in either case, we have done no

more than uttered a name, in the first case, twice. For to utter the word "same" in connection with ἄνθρωπος is to attempt to do what is forbidden, that is, it is an attempt to attribute something, namely sameness, to the ἄνθρωπος spoken of.

4.1.3 251D - 253

Plato now puts the questions he is driving at:

> Are we not to attach existence to motion and rest nor anything to anything else, but rather to treat them in our discourse as incapable of any blending or participation in one another? Or are we to lump them all together as capable of association with one another? Or shall we say that this is true of some and not others? 3

The translation quoted does not do enough to show how much is being asked. To begin with, two sorts of questions are being asked. This is made clear by the construction ὡς-οὕτως (as-so) which makes its appearance in the first question and is picked up by a ὡς in the second. Being faithful to this construction we should translate the first question:

> Do we neither attribute Being to Motion and Rest, nor anything at all to any other, but as things which are unmixed and incapable of participation, so do we posit them in our discourse?

This question then can be seen to embody two sorts of question:

1) Does Being not mix with Motion and Rest?
2) Are we not entitled to attribute "being" to "motion" and "rest", that is, are we able to say that they are?

Similarly, the second question can be split in two:

1) Is everything capable of combining with everything?
2) Are we entitled to attribute everything to everything else?

Similarly, the third:

> 1) Do some things mingle only with some things? Can we attribute some things only to some things?

The phrasing of the questions very well exhibits the correspondence assumption. The occurrence of ὡς here, used in this way, gives additional support to our view, expressed in Chapter 2 and 2 that its translation as "as" is vital to Plato's theory of truth.

What becomes obvious, when we separate the questions as we have, is that the first in each pair is the vital one. The justification for the attributions we make or are entitled to make, comes, as the Greek construction suggests, entirely from the way things are.

The questions may be characterized as pointing up the twin nightmares against which Plato's own theory is set. The issue raised by question one is: is the universe a monadism? The nightmare is that of absolute separation. The issue raised by question two is: is the universe a monism? The nightmare is that of absolute conglutination. It is clear from the kind of context the dialogue provides, as we have examined it so far, that this latter nightmare is to be associated with Parmenidean monism. This inference is supported by the words of the text: πάντα εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυνάγωμεν. which suggests that the possibility of universal attribution corresponds to a world in which everything is the same, in which no difference is possible.

We must examine this inference closely, however. For it is by no means clear that the Parmenidean world admits of anything like attribution to correspond to it. The very notion of mingling, and its correspondent on the linguistic level, attribution, suggests that differentiation is possible. We must notice that Plato has built into his

question the very grounds upon which Parmenidean monism is to be denied: for in assuming that there is combination at all, he is assuming that things are differentiated. Thus, the question is not really a fair one: the monist would not, any more than would the monadist, allow that there is mingling at all.

On the other hand, we note in the question something which is consistently part of Plato's approach to monism. That is, that he holds monism responsible for an explanation of our linguistic activities. We do make attributions. How shall the monist explain this? The monist is already trapped if he allows that combination underlies attribution, and he does not escape the trap if he adds that all things mingle together, or are mingled εἰς ταὐτόν.

The moral of our examination of the second question is that the notion of combination or mingling does not contrast with differentiation, but pre-supposes it. This reflects in an interesting way on the metaphysical view discussed at the end of Chapter 3, and the linguistic views discussed in Chapter 1. The role of the Form Different does not facilitate discombination. Rather, the role it plays is precisely what makes combination possible. The function of the word "not", then, is not to signify discombination, but rather to indicate the thing combined, namely Different, or rather one of its parts.

This is not to say, however, that discombination is impossible. For in allowing the third alternative to be the right one, Plato admits that some entities do not combine. What this means awaits further investigation. What I have tried to establish so far, is simply that the Form Different does not cover for discombination.

Theaetetus and the Stranger go on to refute alternatives one

and two. Alternative one is dismissed first of all on the grounds that it can play no part in cosmological theories, since any cosmological theory attributes being, whether it is argued that it is motion or rest which really exists. Further, the position makes nonsense of any cosmology that takes account of change. Finally, the very position itself, that there is not attribution, is self-refuting since in stating it, its proponents are forced to make attributions: they are forced to say that the monads which they posit exist, are apart from one another, are by themselves, etc..

It is interesting that Plato considers all these expressions, χωρίς, τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' αὑτό, and, of course, εἶναι to be attributions.[4] That is to say, he considers saying: "this is καθ' αὑτό" to be every bit as much an attribution as to say: "this is at rest". These expressions, it follows, indicate things in combination, and do not indicate discombination. Nor is εἶναι taken to signify combination, but rather to indicate an attribute in combination. We must take Plato to mean this, or else the argument would not go through. For if εἶναι were admitted to signify combination, then by parity of reasoning, its fellow expressions χωρίς, etc., could be taken to signify discombination. But if this were the case, then the position of the monadist would not be self-refuting, since in saying: "everything is χωρίς," he would not have made any attribution whatsoever. For the position to be self-refuting, all the expressions listed must signify things in combination. We find in this passage additional evidence to that given in Chapter 3, that Plato does not take εἶναι to have the function of a copula.

The Stranger then takes up the second option, which, with some

reservations, we have ascribed to the monist, that all things have the power of combining.[5] The argument goes:

1) All things combine.
2) Motion is at rest, Rest in motion.
3) This is impossible.

There appears to be a puzzle here. Why is it impossible for motion to be at rest? The Forms are immutable. If Motion is a Form then it necessarily is at rest. The only puzzle then is with Rest, said to be in motion. For if Rest is a Form, then this is impossible.

The method we found useful in dealing with this sort of problem in Chapter 3 was to determine what characters can be ascribed to Forms by looking to a lower level of imitation. We found there, that we determine what the character of the Form Different is by appealing to what it is for a thing to be other, and to the logic of "other". For we seem to come to know the nature of the Form by means of an examination of those things which participate in it. Yet the Form is prior to those things: it is responsible for their being what they are.[6]

Accordingly, let us assume that this is Plato's methodology here. An examination of things at rest suggests that they do not admit of being in motion; of things in motion, that they do not admit of being at rest. On this basis we identify Rest - Motion as a contrary pair.

What of the argument that Motion, insofar as it is a Form, must be at rest? I do not think we know what Plato's solution to the apparent conflict is: the conflict between the allowance that Motion insofar as it is the contrary, by its nature, of Rest, cannot admit of rest, and the allowance that Motion insofar as it is a Form, and had the formal characteristics of a Form, must be at rest. One possibility is that he allows a meta-language for the discussion of Forms qua Forms.

That is, he might allow that the adjective "immutable" applies to Forms always in the meta-language. This would permit us to speak separately of the character or nature of a Form without conflict. However, I think that there is no reason to think that he can allow for a meta-language. For the role of Other is a differentiator of Forms, and yet it is not accorded the status of a meta-linguistic entity or term, but is said to be a Form like the others, itself differentiable from them.

It might be proposed that a Form is the extension of a term. If that were so, however, the explanatory power of Forms would have been lost. For a Form could hardly be just a class of things having a certain character, and at the same time be the thing metaphysically responsible for things having that character. The Forms must be prior or they cease to have the metaphysical power which Plato ascribes to them.

This is another problem to the solution of which Plato does not address himself here. We merely note it here as perplexing; however, its solution is not crucial to the argument at hand.

4.1.4 Combination and Contrariety

The point of the argument, as we have analysed it, is that what seems to account for the inability of Rest and Motion to combine is the contrariety of their natures. The hypothesis we argued for above -- that Different was not a Form signifying discombination -- is here confirmed. We must be careful, however. For someone might want to distinguish 'cannot combine' from 'does not combine' and further to this, to argue that while the passage under discussion does imply that two Forms do not combine because of their natures, it does not imply

that some Forms cannot combine because of their natures. There is a difficulty with the distinction, however. Insofar as our argument applies to the Forms Rest and Motion the distinction is inapplicable. Since the Forms are immutable, there must be a coincidence of what can be and what is. If the sense of "can" is possibility, it makes no sense to suggest that the Forms are not doing some of the things that it is possible for them to do, since there is no time change in which they could ever actualize what is possible. If the sense of "can" is, as I strongly suspect, the power sense (since whatever the Forms can do springs from their natures) the same sort of argument applies; there is no time but, as it were, the eternal present, at which the Forms could come to exert their powers. It would seem to make no sense to suggest that they have powers which they never do exert.

The combination of the Forms is reflected by the lower world - the mutable world. There it might seem that we should speak of combination and discombination as activities or occurrences. The colours, shapes and sizes of things change, after all. That is, things pass in and out of combination, and this takes place in time. This seems to break up the symmetry of the reflection of the mutable world of its ideal model. But, in fact, I do not think that it does. For the model of combination should not be invoked to explain change. Change is precisely that about the lower world that makes it lower; it contains unintelligible elements, and change is the foremost of these. If it were not for this, the lower world would not be an imitation of the ideal one, but another of the same sort. Combination and discombination in the lower world, insofar as what is meant is change, are like the wavy lines in a bad mirror. The model reflected is not held to account

for these by reference to its own features; the flaw is in the mirror itself. The combination of the Forms can only be held to account, similarly, for the intelligible combinations in the world: Socrates' being tall and Socrates' being short. It cannot be held to account for Socrates' becoming tall, or Socrates' becoming short. Insofar as it is a reflection of the model, and thereby intelligible, the world is just as static as the world of Forms. This is precisely one of Aristotle's complaints: Plato has no interest in any but one sort of cause.

At the end of Chapter 2, I argued that Plato could not have discombination to explain negation any more than he could have lack of correspondence to explain falsehood. We found in both cases that the Form Different intervened to give correspondence to false statements, and combination to negation. I argued, at that point, that Plato found this necessary, both to save the account of speaking analysed in Chapter 1, and as well to save himself from the metaphysical abyss of the void. Among the Forms, however, we do seem to have found discombination already, in the argument that Rest and Motion do not and cannot combine. As I have said, here we seem to have no resort to Otherness to explain this away, since Otherness is presupposed just in asserting that Rest is one Form, Motion another, i.e., just in the distinction of the Forms; a distinction, moreover, which is pre-supposed both by combination and discombination. But at this point, don't we find Plato trembling on the edge of the abyss again?

The difficulty is to be found in trying to give an account of the inability of Rest and Motion to combine. Our examination of the Rest - Motion argument at 252D showed that discombination must consist in contrariety. We have found no Form, however, which corresponds to

our use of the term "contrary" which we use in giving the account of the discombination of Rest and Motion, saying: "Rest is the contrary of Motion, Motion the contrary of Rest". How, then, are we to compensate for the expectations raised in us by the use of the correspondence assumption throughout the argument of the dialogue? I mean, how are we to find the notion of contrariety as rooted in nature if we cannot find an underlying Form?

Plato does give us a clue in the passage at 254C where, it being allowed that some of the Forms mingle, and other not, he opens the investigation into "first what kind of thing each of them is, second, what their power of mingling with one another is". What the order of investigation suggests is that the power to mingle or combine derives from the natures of the Forms themselves, and similarly, that the inability to mingle is traceable to the same source.[7] Put in terms of power or ability, as I earlier suggested it must be, the position seems very plausible indeed. The square peg cannot fit the round hole. If we think of Forms on a sort of tinker-toy model, their ability or inability to connect, mingle, or combine can be explained on this analogy. If we are willing to allow that things have natures, just in and of themselves, then it is but a small step to allow that contrariety resides in them.

I suggest, nevertheless, that there is still something amiss with this thesis, on grounds provided by Plato himself. The problem stems, as I suggested above, from the correspondence assumption. Plato derided the opsimaths, who, in stating their thesis that all things are separate and can thus only be named or mentioned, violated their position simply in stating it, being unable to account for what they meant

by "apart" (χωρίς). In the view traced above, however, we see Plato laying himself open to his own criticism of the opsimaths, since by placing contrariety in the natures of things themselves, he cannot account for the use of the term "contrary". For if contrariety to Motion is in the nature of Rest, then, by the naming assumption, it is revealed by the word "rest" and no thing at all is independently revealed by the word "contrary". Thus no rationale can be given for why Rest and Motion will not combine, other than mentioning Rest and Motion. The correspondence assumption compells Plato to remain silent.

The difficulty, discussed in Chapter 3, with the notions of πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά as characteristics of Forms becomes clearer. We saw that in the passage at 255D Plato referred to πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά as forms (εἴδη) and yet we experienced a difficulty in explaining how he could hold this, and at the same time in the passage at 252D deny that the Form Motion is at rest. If it is allowed that the Forms acquire their formal characteristics (like being immutable, being καθ' αὑτό, etc.) by participation in other Forms, then there should be no trouble about Motion being at rest. If, on the other hand, their formal characteristics reside in their very natures, and are not acquired by participation in other Forms, then Plato's own theory will provide no account of how we can speak of these characteristics. This dilemma adds conviction to the view that the problem that we have been discussing in connection with contrariety is not one that Plato does resolve. It remains to ask: could he resolve it? Is the theory of speaking outlined in Chapter 1 rich enough to accommodate a solution?

The solution I proposed, a few pages back, was the recognition of a meta-language in which the formal characteristics of the Form

could be accounted for. But, in fact, I do think that neither Plato's linguistic theory nor his metaphysics can accommodate a meta-language. The metaphysical theory we have located in the Sophist is closely connected with the account given in the Timaeus at 34C ff.[8] of the generation of a pluralistic world. The spirit of the whole enterprise is in showing that the world is pluralistic in virtue of the natures of its generating Forms, Same, Being, and Other. The present difficulty reaches so far back, that were it recognized, the project would even at this stage have been scotched. For, if we were to say, using the proposed meta-language that the Form Different generates the others (in the world) in virtue of having the formal characteristic πρὸς ἄλλο we should not have explained how it is that this generation comes about. For we should have refused to Plato's pluralism the metaphysical basis that he demands of it. We should not have located "the moment of negativity" in nature, but rather, in the meta-language. If we propose to found the meta-language, as Plato's linguistic theory, in fact, demands, upon the nature of things, then we would either refuse to it the virtue of a meta-language, or be forced to posit regressive levels of Forms as underlying regressive levels of meta-language. For, if we posit the meta-language as corresponding to a new level of Forms, a new meta-language would be required to account for the formal characteristics of those Forms, and so on. I conclude, therefore, that the position is hopeless. The result of the argument is really the conclusion that the attempt to found language entirely in nature is a futile one. The notion of contrariety is one that arises within a conceptual system; it is not something in natura rerum.

This conclusion about Plato's failure to adequately deal with

contrariety brings together with it more serious doubts as to the success of the solution to the particular problem to which the Sophist addresses itself, namely, the status of Not-Being. In the previous chapter, we noted that although Not-Being was assured existence in virtue of its status as a part of the Form Different, its special relation to Being was expressed by saying that it was that part of the Other the nature of which is in opposition to the nature of Being. We noted, there, that to account for Not-Being and all the other negative Forms Plato was forced to invoke not just the Form Other, but as well, the notion of opposition or ἀντίθεσις. Just how unsatisfactory this way of dealing with negation is becomes clear when we notice that the notion of ἀντίθεσις fails of an account, just as we have seen contrariety to fail of an account, and just as the even more basic notions of πρὸς ἄλλα and αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά have failed of an account. The Form Other was invoked to allow an account of negation to be given, but it did not yet go deep enough to yield an explication of the special relation of Being to Not-Being. The notion of ἀντίθεσις was invoked to give this account, but corresponding to this notion, no Form is to be found. Plato's own theory, like those he criticized fails to account for its own stating.

The problem we seem to have located is a problem with discombination. The problem is that Plato's metaphysical and linguistic theories prevent us from being able to give an account of contrariety. But what of combination? Are we in a better case in regard to it? If we take discombination (i.e., the inability to combine) to be located in the natures of things themselves then, by parity, we should think of combination (i.e., the ability to combine) as similarly situated. If, on the other hand, we think of discombination as resulting from the

participation of things in some Form, such as Contrariety, then we should think, by parity that combination comes about similarly through participation in a Form.

We have given some arguments to show that Plato places discombination in the natures of things. We have argued as well that his metaphysical and linguistic theories are not broad enough for any further account to be given of discombination than to make reference to the natures of things. We seem able to go no further than to say: Rest and Motion do not combine because of what they are, namely Rest and Motion. To invoke contrariety is to invoke something for which the theory of Forms can give no account. What this suggests, then, with reference to the option given above, is that combination should be similarly situated in the natures of things, and similarly unaccountable.

The same tradition of Platonic interpretation that we disputed in Chapter 3 we must now turn to dispute with again. The view of that tradition with regard to combination is of a piece with its view with regard to Being (which was our concern in Chapter 3). The view is that combination is effected by certain Forms: Forms distinguished from the other Forms by a difference in type. The special case of this position, which we have already disputed, is the view that Being has the function of a copula, an incomplete predicate, effecting a bond on the metaphysical level, between other Forms.

In Chapter 3, I argued that Plato does not attribute to Being the status of an incomplete predicate. In this section of this chapter, I have argued that Plato takes and must take discombination to stem from the nature of a Form. It remains for the next section of this chapter to examine the evidence for the view that combination is effected by

Forms.

4.2 The Formal-Material Concept Distinction

4.2.1 Ryle's View

I shall begin by laying out the interpretive position that I dispute, as carefully as I can. The best statement of it is to be found in Ryle's article "Plato's Parmenides".[9]

Ryle's thesis is that Plato is to be construed in the Parmenides, Theaetetus and Sophist as groping towards a theory of types. He makes a distinction between what he calls Formal and Non-Formal concepts. In the former class he places τὸ ὄν, 'same', and 'different'. Ryle argues that Plato retains the assumption that words are names in connection with non-Formal, or Material Concepts (such as 'motion' and 'rest') but terms such as "same" and "being", he argues, are held by Plato in the Sophist to denote the "mode of combination of elements" but are not themselves the names of elements subject to combination.

Ryle says: "To pick up the two analogues which Plato uses in the Theaetetus and the Sophist, formal concepts differ from generic and specific concepts not as one letter of the alphabet differs from another nor as one bunch of letters differs from another bunch of letters, but as the mode in which the letters are arranged into a syllable or word differs from the letters which are so arranged."

The thesis has two sides to it. The metaphysical side is this: Some Forms are not elements in combination, but effect the combination of elements. The linguistic side of the thesis is: Some words do not name the elements in combination, but indicate the way in which the elements are combined.

Evidence is offered for the thesis from the Sophist. Ryle makes reference to the Sophist passage at 253A. An analogy is drawn out between the commingling of the Forms and the commingling of letters of the alphabet. The basis of the analogy is that some letters will fit or harmonize with some letters but not others. It is found that the vowels are different from other letters in that they "run through all like a bond, so that without some one of them it would be impossible for one of the other letters to harmonize with another". The role of the vowel is as a bond holding the syllable together. The vowel has this function since it is fitting or harmonious with all the other letters by its nature. (Plato does not speak here of the vowels as having natures; rather he speaks of them as having this power or capacity. However, since he speaks of the natures of Forms throughout the Sophist it is not unjustifiable to draw out his analogy using this terminology). It is concluded that the knowledge of letter combination is embodied in the art of grammar. Similarly, of musical notes, some will combine or harmonize while others will not. There is an art which embodies this knowledge as well, the art of the musician.

It is specifically these analogies which tempt Ryle to attribute to Plato a distinction among Forms as to type. However, I think it must be pointed out that he mistakes what Plato says here. The analogy will not do to make out the difference between the elements combined and the mode of combination. For the vowels are, after all, letters, differing from the other letters only insofar as they have the power of combining with all. Similarly, in the case of musical notes: all are notes -- wherein they differ is their power of combination. If we apply the analogy to the Forms, we see that it merely points out that

the Forms Same, Being, and Other have the power of combining with all other Forms and differ from other Froms in just this way.

On the other hand, there does seem to be a bit more going on in analogy than this. For Plato says that the vowels "run through the letters like a bond." What Ryle is after is, I think, contained in these words. For, applying the analogy again, we find that it suggests that Same, Being, and Other differ from the other Forms in being bonds, rather than elements bonded.

But once again, Ryle is mistaken in what he draws out of the analogy. For he suggests that the vowel, in being a bond, cannot, at the same time, be an element. Yet the syllable "cat" does contain three elements: c, a, t. Whatever Plato means when he says that the vowel is a bond is not such as to preclude its being named as an element.

A passage in the Timaeus confirms this as well:

> The fairest bond is that which makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines; a proportion is best adapted to effect such a union.[10]

The point has special application to the analogy of musical notes, since Plato is here talking about harmony. Harmony is constituted by the proportion of string lengths. The middle term of mathematical ratios fulfills the function of a bond in the ratio as the vowel fulfills the function of a bond in the syllable.

What we must notice about what Plato says about bonds is that once again, it will not do to make Ryle's distinction in type. Let us use another analogy to make this clear: a parcel tied up with string. The elements of the parcel are the box, the wrapping paper and the

string. The string is an element of the parcel. Being tied up is not an element of the parcel. One might say that the string is the bond. But one would not thereby be denying that it is a part of the parcel. One would simply be saying something more about it: what its function in the parcel is.

What I was complaining about in the first section of this chapter was that Plato can find no place in his antology for 'being tied up' or 'being untied.' The best he can do to accommodate these is to trace them to the ability or nature of the string. But this, as I suggested, is not good enough.

I conclude, then, that this analogy will not be a good enough basis from which to interpret Plato as making a distinction in type among Forms. Further, there is nothing in this passage which belies the naming assumption. "String" is the name of an element of the package, "a" is the name of a letter in the syllable, and so "Being" is the name of a Form.

What we have shown gains new interest from our discussion of Chapter 3. Plato gives every indication in what he says about Different (and what we were able to extrapolate from that to his view of Being) that he thinks of Other and Being as very high up generic concepts. For we saw that he took Different to be the whole of which the negative Forms are parts. Ryle is surely correct in saying that a formal concept differs from a generic concept as the mode of combination of letters differs from the letters combined. What we have shown is just that the Form Different is not a mode of combination.

4.2.2 253B - 254

The next passage in the Sophist on from the letter analogy is intended to establish its force. The Stranger and Theaetetus conclude that there is a science which corresponds to the sciences of music and grammar. He who possesses the science is able to show

> "which of the genera harmonize with which and which reject one another and also (to show that) there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again when they separate, that there are causes of separation, making them others."[11]

The science is identified as the science of dialectic, and he who possesses it is the philosopher.

The science of dialecic is traditionally connected with the art of division -- the art which we discussed in the last section of Chapter 1. It is not disputed that division is based on proto-generic-specific model. Some commentators, following Ryle, however, do dispute whether what Plato means by dialectic here is what he does at the beginning of the dialogue, when he divides the art of the angler. Moravcsik suggests that what Plato does in the middle part of the dialogue when he distinguishes the five important kinds is quite different from generic division, and recognized as such by Plato.[12] He suggests, in fact, that the generic division traditionally associated with dialectic, is far less central to the notion of dialectic as Plato later came to see it, than what is going on in the mid-part of the dialogue, which, as he sees it, is an exercise in the employment of the concepts of identity and difference. But, as I have been arguing, Plato treats Different, at least, as a generic concept. This is something that Moravcsik himself admits, when he notes (erroneously) that the negative

Forms seem to be contained by Not-Being (what Plato says, in fact, is that they are parts of Other).[13] If I am right about this, it would follow that what Plato conceives of himself as doing in the distinction of the five Forms is not essentially different from division.

I believe that the next passage goes to confirm my hypothesis, but not the hypothesis of Moravcsik.

The Stranger says:

> Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one Form or Idea extending entirely through many, each of which lies apart, and of many many Forms differing from one another, but included in one greater Form; and again of one Form evolved by union of many wholes, and of many Forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes (κατὰ γένος) how things can or cannot mingle with one another.[14]

We can identify Forms which exemplify what Plato is talking about, from what has already been said. The Form Different satisfies the first description, for it is a Form extending entirely through many each of which is apart. All of the five great Forms satisfy the description, differing from one another, but included in one greater Form, and candidates for the greater Form are Being and Different. The Forms entirely apart and separate could be Rest and Motion. The description thus satisfies us as an account of the interaction of the five great Forms. But as well, it satisfies us as an account of generic division. For what is the one Form evolved by the union of many wholes but a genus, such as art or knowledge, which is the product of a collection of many arts and kinds of knowledge? The notion of inclusion (περιεχόμενον) satisfies both the relation of knowledge and art to their parts, as well as the relation of Being and Other to their parts. It

must be remembered that this passage follows directly on the heels of the letter analogy, and is clearly intended to draw it out. So when Plato here talks about part-whole relationships, great Forms, and inclusion, he must intend to be telling us about the function of the bond-Forms. But there is nothing in the passage quoted to indicate that the bond-Forms differ from the generic Forms in type. Where they appear to differ is in their generality -- they extent through all the other Forms. But the passage goes on to cash out the metaphor of 'extending through', into the metaphor of 'inclusion', the metaphor whereby we understand the relation of genera to species.

4.2.3 Theaetetus 202 - 207

Ryle does not draw his evidence for the thesis that Plato makes a Material-Formal concept distinction solely from this passage in the Sophist. In G.E.L. Owen's article "Notes on Ryle's Parmenides",[15] Owen argues that Plato in the Theaetetus moves beyond the conflicting premisses of an argument in the Parmenides, by making the distinction. The premisses of the Parmenides take the form of a disjunction: "a whole contains and so limits its parts" and "if X has parts, X is the aggregate of those parts". It is Owen's claim that Plato "moves beyond the disjunction" of these premisses ultimately in the Sophist, but by means of an argument in the Theaetetus, where Plato recognizes a whole to be more than the sum of its parts, as a Gestalt.

The passage in the Theaetetus is the famous Socrates' dream argument at 202-207. I shall argue that this passage does not provide evidence for the Ryle - Owen view; even more, it is my opinion that it provides evidence to the contrary.

Theaetetus suggests that knowledge is true opinion with a λογος. At this point Socrates relates his famous dream. The primary elements admit only of being named; to add or attribute any character to them would be to add something distinct from them. But that would then not be to disclose the essence of the element itself, but to mention something else. Indeed, the only thing that is proper to an element is a name.

Here the naming assumption comes out in full force. At this point we are still in the position of the monadists of the Sophist, for whom not only is every word a name, but the only activity allowable in speaking is to utter a single word at a time. However, Plato admits the possibility of combination, and Socrates' next step is to allow that just as the elements combine, so do we in speaking combine their names.

> But when we come to things composed of these elements, then, just as these things are complex, so the names are combined to make a λόγος a λόγος being precisely a combination of names.

I take this to be precisely the case that Plato makes out at 251D for the third possibility, that some of the genera combine with others. It is interesting to note that the ὡς-οὕτως construction which we there pointed out as bringing out the correspondence assumption, is here echoed by a similar construction of parallel classes introduced by ὥσπερ and ὅπως.

The next step in the argument is what I take to be the subject of controversy. The claim is that the elements are objects of perception only, while the complexes into which they are formed are knowable and explicable. The useful analogy of letters and syllables is drawn out to establish this. It is agreed that an account can be given of the

syllable, by stating the elements of which it is composed, while no such account can be given of the letter. Ex hypothesi, the syllable is an object of knowledge, but the letter is not. A puzzle arises, however, as to the nature of the syllable itself. Is it nothing other than the letters it contains, or is it "a single entity that comes into existence from the moment (the letters) are put together"? If the former, knowing the syllable would come to knowing all the letters which make it up. But in that case, it would be absurd to maintain that each of the letters cannot be known. So this option must be wrong, because of the initial hypothesis that the letters cannot be known. If the second option is taken, the syllable cannot be a whole. For a whole is nothing more or less knowable than any of its parts. But if the syllable is not divisible into its letters, but is incomposite, then the status of the syllable would not be different than the status of the letters themselves, since being incomposite, it would be simple, and ex hypothesi, not knowable. If this were the case, we should be in no better position to know the syllable than the letter. Thus, Socrates' dream fails to give a correct account of knowledge, since a complex will not be more susceptible of a logos than a simple, given either interpretation of what it is to be a complex, and hence, will not provide a more fitting object of knowledge than a simple.

Socrates places Theaetetus on the horns of a dilemma: either a complex is a whole of parts or it is not different from a simple. If it is a whole of parts, it is no more than its parts, and hence, knowable only to the extent that its parts are knowable. If it is not a whole, then there is no way of distinguishing it from a simple, and no reason to think it any more knowable than a simple.

Ryle would have us conclude from this that Plato has the notion of a Gestalt: that a whole is not the sum of its parts, but parts in a certain mode of combination. If he were right than there is no reason why Socrates' dream should fail in giving an account of knowledge. For the dilemma could not be formulated: a whole would be more or at least, different than the sum of its parts. But, in fact, Plato explicitly argues against this, when Socrates forces Theaetetus to admit that a whole is no different from a sum, the number of feet in an acre no different from the acre, the number of soldiers in any army, no different from an army, etc. So we must conclude that Ryle is wrong in interpreting this passage as showing Plato distinguishing the elements of a whole as different in type from their mode of combination. Not even is the distinction not explicitly drawn in the passage; it is directly contradicted that there is such a distinction. For the conclusion of the argument rests upon the denial that a whole is or has a Gestalt.

Our examination of this passage makes it easy to see how Ryle's Material-Formal concept distinction is supposed to undercut the correspondence assumption. Let us turn this talk of letters and syllables and wholes and parts to talk of facts and elements. Ryle's point is that a λόγος inasmuch as it is about a fact, will be more than the names of all the elements in the fact. But this is not the point that Plato seems to be making. He gives us the option; either a fact will be a sum, composed of elements, in which case a logos about the fact will be a sum, composed of the names of those elements; or a fact will be a simple and a logos will be no more than a name. If we respect Plato's dilemma as genuine, then we see him, in the Sophist at 262D,

where he says that a logos is a combination of verbs and nouns, taking up the first of the two options. He says there that a logos is not just a name, but a combination of names. (I have tried to establish in Chapter 1, where I discussed this passage, that both verbs and nouns are names).

G.E.L. Owen, in summing up Ryle's thesis[14] misconstrues the collective conclusion to be drawn from the Theaetetus passage just discussed and the Sophist passage where what is established in the Theaetetus is utilized. He says: "Speaking (as characterized in the Sophist) is not stringing nouns together, and learning to speak is not, as in the Cratylus, a piecemeal business of correlating atoms of the world with atoms of language." Owen is quite right to say that speaking is not represented as stringing nouns together: Plato says that nouns are combined with verbs. But this gets us no closer to the gestalt of a logos, for all the evidence, both in the Cratylus and the Sophist, points to the conclusion that Plato considers both verbs and nouns to be names, albeit names of different sorts of things. This point is then, simply a red herring. The point that Owen needs to make to drive home his conclusion, is that the concept of combination itself is recognized to be a vital ingredient of the logos, and not an ingredient on the same logical footing as a name.

4.2.4 Conclusion

The difficulty with the interpretive position of Owen and Moravcsik is this: they take Plato to make a distinction between relations and things related. What they cannot get away from is that Plato continues to treat the relations, which they hold he distinguishes,

exactly like their relata. He says that the other Forms combine with these supposed relations, that things participate in them; he calls them Forms, and attributes to them natures; and he takes them to be revealed by names. What they attribute to Plato is a contradictory position. For if their interpretation were correct, it would have to be the case that Plato confuses the bond with the bonding. In our analogy of the parcel, the string is not identical with the tying up of the parcel, although it is that by which the parcel is tied. If they were right Plato would have identified the Forms Same, Being, and Other with combination or mingling, rather than allowing that it is by virtue of the greater combinational power of these that certain combinations are effected.

The consequence of attributing this position to Plato is to make him subject to the Bradleian paradoxes of relation. If a relation is said to stand between its relata, then we still want to know how it is related to each of them. But if the two relations thus posited are also said to stand between the original relation and its relata, then the same question arises for them: how are they related?[17]

If Plato had really made the Rylean distinction between things combined and the mode of combination, the Bradleian paradoxes would not be a difficulty (although we should still want to know what a 'mode of combination' is). But our examination of Ryle's own evidence shows that no such distinction is made. What is in fact said in the famous letter analogy is that the vowels (and by analogy some Forms) are best fitted to be bonds. Owen and Moravcsik, in turn, misconstrue, on Plato's behalf, what it is to be a bond, for they take a bond to be a relation. But this is not what Plato says. All that he

attributes to the vowels (and hence to the bond Forms) is a greater power of combination. Exhibiting the Forms Same, Being, and Other as bonds will not provide an analysis of combination. Indeed, before we can understand their natures as bonds, we must have an independent analysis of what combination is; just as before we can understand how string can be used to tie up a parcel we must understand what tying up is.

It will not do, then, to analyse participation and combination as just the Forms Same, Being, and Other. For the analysis of participation and combination we must look elsewhere.

This brings us back to our difficulty in the first section of this chapter with discombination. We found evidence to the effect that discombination consists in contrariety. The difficulty was that we could not seem to find any account that could be given of contrariety given Plato's ontology. Plato himself seems to locate it in the natures of the Forms themselves. But that is an evasion of what we have been coming to see as the issue. The point is that combination and discombination themselves need explication before we can come to see what the capabilities of the Forms are for being combined. Using our parcel analogy once again, we have to know what it is to tie up a parcel before we can tell whether a particular piece of string will or will not do the trick. But this is precisely the point at which Plato's analogy shows itself to be deficient. For it is, essentially, an ontology of <u>things</u>. I conclude that insofar as combination and participation are introduced into the ontology, they are introduced illicitly. They are not Forms, for were they Forms they should fail to serve the purpose for which they were introduced. Nor are they part of a meta-

linguistic account of the Forms, for that meta-language would itself, on Plato's linguistic assumptions, need explication in terms of Forms.

I have indicated throughout this thesis that Plato's most significant mistake comes about with the stating of the most fundamental assumptions of his theory. He attempts to ground the dynamic, speaking, in the inert, nature. Combination in speaking is simply the mirror of things combined in nature. We have seen that combination in nature is inexplicable. If we ask: what is combination? It is not even clear that we know what the question means. We do, of course, recognize things as combined, e.g., H2O, a cake batter, a complex on the scrabble board. But combination, itself, escapes us if we attempt to look for it _in_ those things. The dilemma of the dream of Socrates in the _Theaetetus_ makes this abundantly clear. H2O is nothing other than two parts of hydrogen to one of oxygen. Similarly, the cake batter is nothing more than its ingredients. What Plato neglects in the _Theaetetus_ is that the cake batter is put together out of its ingredients: two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen have to come together in order to make water. What Plato comes to speak of combination in the _Sophist_ he still overlooks this. For the analogy is still the same -- the world is a world of things, essentially static things, and we somehow have to locate combination _in_ them. But this is precisely where we shall not find it. Similarly, when Plato says that speaking is combining, he does not look to the dynamics of speaking, itself, to locate combination, but to the static world which he believes, lends to speaking its intelligibility. We can no more find combination in the mirror we hold up to the world than in the things it reflects.

It is interesting that almost every metaphor that Plato uses for combination suggests what I am getting at. He speaks of interweaving, adding, mingling and in the case of discrimination of threshing, sifting, straining. But as we noted in our discussion of the Cratylus he regards an account of these activities as dominated by a description of what objects they are directed towards. The intelligibility of the use of the shuttle was to be found in the description of the thread and the loom. So, the intelligibility of use of the name was to be found in the thing. In the Sophist the intelligibility of combining nouns and verbs is to be found in the πράγμα and the πράξις which, in nature, are combined.

Plato, then, thinks that combination is prior to combining. He does not see us as active in the universe, collecting things, mixing things, weaving things together. This is perhaps, the false delusion of people still underground.

FOOTNOTES

1. Sophist, 251C, translated by Fowler.

2. My interpretation of this is in accord with that of both Moravcsik and Frede; cf. Frede, p. 62.

3. Sophist, 251D, translated by Cornford.

4. Sophist, 252C.

5. Sophist, 252D.

6. Sophist, 255E4, 256A1, 256A7, etc.

7. Frede denies that Plato can be using the term "the nature of a Form" in such a way as to imply that Forms have natures. I have advanced a good many considerations against this view, e.g., my analysis of division in Chapter 1.

8. Timaeus, 34C: "he made [the soul] out of the following elements and on this wise. From the being which is indivisible and unchangeable, and from that kind of being which is distributed among bodies, he compounded a third and intermediate kind of being. He did likewise with the same and the different. . .", translated by Jowett.

9. Op. cit., Ryle, "Plato's Parmenides".

10. Timaeus, 32, translated by Jowett.

11. Sophist, 253B9 - C4, translated by Cornford.

12. Op. cit., Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist", p. 48.

13. Ibid., p. 69.

14. Sophist, 253D5 ff., translated by Fowler.

15. G.E.L. Owen, "Notes on Ryle's Parmenides", in Ryle, Doubleday Anchor, 1970.

16. Ibid., p. 365.

17. F.H. Bradley, "Relations", Appearance and Reality, Oxford, 1897. In "Being and Meaning in the Sophist" p. 49, Moravcsik denies that these paradoxes arise, just as Russell had argued against Bradley: no regress of a vicious kind arises when relations are recognized to be of a different type than their relata. This is to attribute to Plato a theory of types. I dispute that there exists even any evidence that Plato was "groping" for a theory of types.

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