China’s energy relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia: Discursive politics of energy

by

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Abstract

Since the early 20th century, we live in “the world of oil.” With the rapid development of
the natural gas industry, electricity, biofuels, and other non-traditional energy sources over the
past decades, oil has been losing ground. It also has been pushed to the political defensive
position in many parts of the world by environmental activism and international politics of
climate change mitigation. However, we still largely depend on oil and in the near future it will
stay entrenched in literally all systems of our societies.

From economic, geological, and technological perspectives, oil is a concrete and “real”
thing, yet it animates such abstract ideas, as freedom, mobility, and independence. When we
think about oil, we think not only about pumpjacks, pipelines, tankers, price charts, and long
supply chains but also about capitalism, security, development, environment, democracy, and
modernity. Importantly, both material and imagined constructions of oil are socially and
culturally specific. In other words, while we all live in the world of oil, we all think about oil and
imagine it differently.

These ideas have led me to the question: How do different states understand oil and how
do these understandings influence relations between them? Consequently, at the heart of my
research is an interest in the interplay between politics and sociocultural contexts in international
energy politics. I explore this interplay by examining the development of bilateral energy
relations between China and three oil-rich countries – Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

I put China at the center of my research because China’s case is unique. Just over the past
three decades, China experienced an extreme transformation from energy self-sufficient to
energy dependent development. From the standpoint of enlightened self-interest, mutual
vulnerabilities within the global energy system should be a sufficient pragmatic reason for studying the way China understands oil and constructs its relations with the major energy exporters. Examining China’s relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia, I explain what narratives about oil modern China constructs in international energy relations and how these narratives influence China’s energy choices. I also demonstrate how Kazakhstan’s, Russia’s, and Canada’s interactions with China transform the way these three countries view their own energy wealth.

Building my analysis on constructivist and poststructuralist insights, I seek to offer a nuanced perspective of energy politics that captures such variables as social context, intersubjective meanings, and identities. My research is divided into two parts. The first area that I examine is discursive politics of energy. It includes identities and historical narratives about energy resources that are constructed by states to represent themselves and each other in energy relations. The second area of research involves developing a better understanding of how these identities and historical narratives about energy resources are reproduced in energy paradigms. Energy paradigms are my constructivist roadmaps to energy relations: they represent relatively stable systems of norms, meanings, and ideas that shape the way states act in the field of energy relations. In this light, my central research question can be put as follows: How are China’s identities and historical narratives about energy resources constructed, manifested, and enacted in its bilateral energy relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia?

To answer this question, I use a discourse analysis methodology. Discourse analysis is preoccupied with what people know about diverse material and social realities and how they articulate this knowledge because its aim is to uncover the ways in which these realities are constructed, negotiated, and interpreted through the processes of social interaction. A structured
and systematic intertextual discourse analysis of a heterogeneous collection of texts allows me to achieve two major analytical goals:

- to reveal the discourses that dominate China’s energy relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia;
- to examine how these dominant discourses support and sustain specific interpretations of China’s energy relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia while excluding or rendering marginal others.

My analysis demonstrates that China’s energy relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia are simultaneously enabled and constrained by the discursive politics of energy. China’s external energy strategy is crucially dependent on its domestic discursive politics of energy. Hence, to build collaborative and constructive energy relations with China, its partners in Canada, Kazakhstan, Russia, and elsewhere must consider not only material realities of China’s energy industry (e.g. the amount of energy resources available in China, its mining, refining, and storage capacity, and the existing and planned transportation routes) and institutional settings of China’s energy policy (e.g. China’s legal frameworks and the structure of China’s energy government) but also multiple symbolic meanings that energy resources acquire in China. Overall, by examining China’s relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia, my research not only provides a nuanced understanding of energy relations between these individual states but also raises and brings to the fore questions about the social logic of international energy politics in general, offering an important addition to the literature critical of mainstream approaches to international relations and helping to further promote discourse analysis within the discipline.
Preface

This thesis is an original work by Anna Kuteleva. The research project, of which this thesis is a part, received research ethics approval from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board, Project Name “China’s Energy Relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia: The Social Construction of Energy”, No. Pro00064652, 29 May 2016.

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To my grandparents, Antonina Filippova and Vadim Filippov,

and to my mother, Olga Kuteleva

С любовью и благодарностью – моей бабушке, дедушке и маме
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Introduction

Why did I want to write this dissertation and why do you might want to read it?

Oil.

What do you imagine when you think about oil?

What is the first thing that comes to your mind?

Do you imagine highways full of fast cars? Do you think about climate change and imagine pipeline protests in Canada’s British Columbia? Do you think about a small toy factory in China’s Guangdong? Maybe, you think about the 2003 invasion of Iraq? I was born and raised in post-Soviet Russia and, when I think about oil, the first thing that comes to my mind is corruption. When I think about oil, I imagine Vladimir Putin being the President of my country for yet another decade.

Since the early 20th century, we live in “the world of oil” (e.g., Yeomans, 2004; Heinberg, 2005; Shiva, 2008; Yergin, 2011a; Bridge and Le Billon, 2017). With the rapid development of the natural gas industry, electricity, biofuels, and non-traditional energy sources over the past decades, oil has been losing ground. In the past decades, oil also has been pushed politically to defensive positions in many parts of the world by environmental activists and international politics of climate change mitigation. However, we still largely depend on oil and in the near future it will stay entrenched in literally all systems of our societies.

Crude oil is a form of bitumen composed principally of hydrocarbons. Crude oil is extracted from natural reservoirs and transported through pipelines to a refinery or to a port
where it is loaded into a tanker and continues its journey to a refinery by water. More than half of all the crude oil used in the world crosses an international border, which makes oil one of the most internationally traded commodities in the world (Yergin 2011a).

Oil powers over 90 percent of the world’s transportation that underpins modern economies and lifestyles. Our industrial food supply systems also consume a lot of oil. Petrochemicals from oil are used to make everything from clothes to mobile phones to perfumes to vitamins. Nothing moves without oil in the modern world. This makes oil a globally sought-after commodity (Wenar 2016, Yergin 2011a). Nonetheless, oil is concentrated only in a few geographic areas, and concerns about its scarcity are widespread and strong. The temporal aspect and declining availability of oil that reflect technological and geological constraints of oil extraction add another dimension to its scarcity.

From economic, geological, and technological perspectives, oil is a concrete and real thing, yet it animates such abstract ideas as freedom, mobility, and independence. When we think about oil, we think not only about pumpjacks, pipelines, tankers, price charts, and long supply chains but also about capitalism, security, development, environment, democracy, and modernity. Importantly, both material and imagined constructions of oil are socially and culturally specific. In other words, while we all live in the world of oil, we all think about oil and imagine it differently.

These ideas have led me to the question: How do different states understand oil and how do these understandings influence relations between them? Consequently, at the heart of my research is a general interest in the nexus between politics and sociocultural contexts in international energy politics. My research project explores this nexus by drawing on the analysis of the development of bilateral energy relations between China and three oil-rich countries – Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia.
Examining China’s relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia, I explain what narratives about oil China constructs in international energy relations and how these narratives influence China’s energy choices. I also demonstrate how Kazakhstan’s, Russia’s, and Canada’s interactions with China transform the way these three countries view their own energy wealth. The first question (Chapter 2) that my research seeks to answer is: How does modern China define and communicate its identity in international energy relations and how does China make its energy choices? The second question is: What impact does China’s emergence as a major energy consumer have on international energy politics and on the other actors involved in international energy relations? I approach it by focusing on China’s bilateral energy relations with Russia (Chapter 3), Kazakhstan (Chapter 4), and Canada (Chapter 5).

I put China at the center of my research because China’s case is unique. In the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, economically dilapidated and politically unstable, China posed a potential threat to some states and served as a space for geopolitical invasion for others. Despite that, by the beginning of the 21st century, China has successfully lifted a record number of people out of poverty and achieved a rapid increase in living standards, and reached a sustained level of economic growth, gaining stature and influence in world affairs. To quote Giovanni Arrighi (2007), at the end of the 20th century China pioneered “the social and economic empowerment of the peoples of the global South” (p. 95). Given China’s size and scale, it is obvious that its rapid and powerful rise is bringing about a new age in economic and political history (Arrighi, 2007; Jacque, 2009; Halper, 2010; Harvey, 2005; Ramo, 2004). China’s extreme transformation from energy self-sufficient to energy dependent development over the past three decades is one of the driving factors of these changes.
Since the 1990s, China has emerged as “the world’s factory floor.” Around half of all energy consumed in China is absorbed by the industrial sector and can be attributed to international trade (Du and Lin, 2015). The increased output of China’s industrial sector drives the high demand for electricity, refined petroleum products, and materials that are energy intensive to produce, such as chemicals, steel, and aluminum (Ma, Oxley, and Gibson, 2009; Fu, Ma, and Polenske, 2014; Du and Lin, 2015). The industry has also contributed to the total energy demand by boosting energy demand in the transport sector (Leung, 2010; Meidan, Sen, and Campbell 2015). Socioeconomic changes, such as the marketization of the economy, rapid urbanization, and rising incomes have added additional pressure to China’s demand for energy. The dynamic consumer culture emerging in China promotes a lifestyle that is fundamentally dependent on ecologically destructive and non-renewable sources of energy. High fossil-fuel use and carbon-intensive behavior are now the major consumer patterns of China’s households (Liu et al., 2009; Feng, Zou, and Wei, 2011; Dai et al., 2012).

As a result of these deep and rapid changes, in the first decade of the 21st century, the fluctuations in Chinese energy consumption deviated considerably from global trends. While primary energy consumption has only risen by 13 percent in OECD countries, and by 30 percent for the whole world, China increased its primary energy consumption by 70 percent. Rising demand for energy has turned China from a net energy exporter to a net energy importer. China’s energy production was 11.6 percent more than consumption in the mid-1980s; since 2005 consumption has surpassed production by approximately 10 percent. China became a coal importer in 2002 and a natural gas importer in 2007. However, the switch is particularly marked for petroleum products: in the 1980s China’s oil production was 35 percent more than its consumption but since 2003 over one-half of total oil
consumption has been imported. Importantly, there is strong evidence to suggest that the expansion in demand for energy will continue for about another two decades, inasmuch as China’s economy is still in the process of “take-off” in industrialization and socio-economic transformation (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2015).

Over the past decade, the productivity of China’s oil fields has worsened, and the quality of domestic production has declined steadily because of resource depletion. While in the 1960s the development of domestic energy capacity was the major solution to China’s energy security challenges, in the future substantial new fossil fuel reserves will not likely be discovered. In other words, almost all radical options for the development of domestic energy capacity have already been exhausted; in the near to medium-term, China will be unable to overcome its foreign energy dependence on fossil fuels. Currently, Chinese state-owned enterprises are prospecting for and extracting crude oil in 42 states (EIA, 2015, p. 9). Three-fourths of China’s crude oil imports come from the Middle East (52 percent) and Africa (23 percent)\(^1\) (EIA, 2015, p. 10). Even so, there is ample evidence to suggest that China aims to broaden the geographical scope of its foreign energy quest.

It is important to recognize and analyze China’s emergence as a new influential actor in international energy politics. From the standpoint of enlightened self-interest, mutual vulnerabilities within the global energy system should be a sufficient pragmatic reason for studying the way China understands energy and constructs its relations with energy exporters in the different parts of the world. It is also important to inquire what, on a

\(^1\) China’s oil imports come from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Oman, Angola, and Russia. In 2015, Russia four times temporarily overtook Saudi Arabia as the biggest crude exporter to China. While fluctuations in import numbers over 2015 indicate that Russia is gaining momentum in China’s market, it is too early to draw conclusions. As for 2018, Saudi Arabia is still China’s major supplier.
relative basis, makes China an attractive partner for different energy exporters and how their interactions with China transform the way they view their own energy wealth.

My initial intent was to focus solely on China’s relations with Kazakhstan. My scholarly interest in energy relations between China and Kazakhstan was inspired by a spirit of contradiction: while Kazakhstan is a significant oil producer and has become an increasingly important supplier to China over the past twenty years, almost no one studies relations between China and Kazakhstan. Only a modest number of studies examine China’s expansion into Central Asia and its economic, political, and social consequences (e.g., Clarke, 2014; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2012; Swanström, 2005, 2011; Pron, 2014). Most of those works approach Central Asia as a homogenized unitary entity, whereas the studies that focus on bilateral relations between China and Kazakhstan are rather limited.

Examining relations between China and Central Asia (Kuteleva and Ma, 2013; Kuteleva, 2012a, 2012b), I have noticed an elephant in the room. Russia’s presence in the region, and specifically in the energy sector, as the primary political mediator and economic partner is huge. Thus, neither Kazakhstan’s domestic energy politics nor its

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2 Similarly, literature in Russian and Chinese languages on Kazakhstan’s energy politics and its relations with China is not extensive and well-developed. The only significant difference is that Russian and Chinese scholars pay considerably more attention to the regional political and economic integration in Central Asia and such organizations, as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, and the Eurasian Customs Union.

3 Importantly, besides a few notable and encouraging exceptions, the Anglophone academic literature on Kazakhstan in general is limited and scattered. The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program is known for a cutting-edge research on Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan (e.g., Cohen, 2008; Ismailov and Papava, 2010; Swanström, 2011). Wojciech Ostrowski’s research examines energy security and political economy of resources with a regional focus on Central Asia (2011), and specifically Kazakhstan (2009, 2010). Saulesh Yessenova (e.g., 2005, , 2010, 2012) examines relations between nation-building and exploration of oil in Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bhavna Dave (2007) and Oliver Roy (2000, 2002) study identity, ethnic, and language policies in Kazakhstan through the prism of post-colonial analysis. Martha Brill Olcott is considered to be the leading expert on Kazakhstan in the US. She studies how Kazakhstan’s democratic transition has failed in the mid-2000s (2010). Finally, a number of studies focus on the relations between Islam and the state in Kazakhstan (e.g., Khalid, 2008; Yemelianova, 2014).
relations with China can be understood without considering Russia’s social, cultural, economic, and political influence. Hence, by bringing energy relations between China and Russia as an independent case study into my research and examining intersections between Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s energy paradigms, I can explore how various identities and narratives that are constructed around energy resources travel across different nations, diverse cultures and societies, and contexts.

Unfortunately, with Russia, a new elephant came into the room. Both Kazakhstan and Russia are economically weak, and importantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they both have failed repeatedly and soundly to embrace a neoliberal path of democratization. The literature on Kazakhstan and Russia most often focuses on the political implications of resource-based economic development. While there is a diversity of opinions on the impacts of energy wealth on economic growth and political regime, frequently Kazakhstan and Russia are portrayed as victims of the “resource curse” and are labeled as “rentier states” or “Petrostates.”

I do not deny that the discussion of Kazakhstan’s and Russia’s energy paradigms cannot be divorced from the various domestic challenges emerging around the concerns about social justice, authoritarian drift, and various structural economic problems. On the contrary, I acknowledge that these challenges in a meaningful way shape the trajectory of my analysis. Above all, the existing predilections away from political freedom in Kazakhstan and Russia restrict the discursive competition on energy issues and thus influence the way identities and narratives about

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energy are being constructed. Nevertheless, I want to go beyond the idea of political “resource curse” in my analysis.5

To loosen some of the limitations of political “resource curse” in my research, I decided to include a case that promises to be different in relation to Kazakhstan and Russia. Canada manages to escape the political “resource curse” and is, according to some political activists (e.g., Levant, 2010), one of the few countries in the world that produces “ethical” and “democratic” oil. Importantly, Canada has a different cultural, social, and political context when compared to Kazakhstan and Russia. Whatever analytical and conceptual frameworks one would apply – developing/developed, South/North, East/West, non-settler/settler states, unitary states/federations, or authoritarian/democratic – Canada will always appear on the opposite side of the spectrum from Kazakhstan and Russia. Nevertheless, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia possess some of the world’s largest oil deposits and are net oil exporters, and therefore there is an identity that the three of them share: the identity of an oil-rich country and oil exporter.

By examining China’s relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia, my research not only provides a nuanced understanding of energy relations between these individual states but also raises and brings to the fore questions about the social logic of international

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5 Stefan Hedlund (2014) accurately sums up the three major claims of the literature on resource curse: “the first holds that resource wealth will impact negatively on economic growth, the second that it will be the cause of civil war, and the third that it will impair the quality of institutions and erode the prospects for democracy” (p. 33). These claims have a number of shortcomings and were refuted by several scholars. For example, Michael Alexeev and Robert Conrad (2009) demonstrate that resource curse is “elusive,” using ample econometric data. Their analysis reveals that energy resources have enhanced rather than hampered long-term growth and have a neutral effect on institutions. Along similar lines, Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal (2010) claim that “oil is not a curse.” They show that the literature on resource curse generalizes the trends of a particular historical period between the 1970s and 1990s. According to them, it overlooks a critical intermediate factor – the nature of resource ownership. Drawing on experiences of five post-Soviet states blessed with hydrocarbons – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – Jones Luong and Weinthal examine different ownership models and conclude that when energy resources are controlled by private enterprises, governments are likely to have stronger fiscal institutions.
energy politics in general. Specifically, it demonstrates that the material and discursive structures of energy politics are complexly interwoven and interdependent through diverse social, cultural, economic, and political encounters with energy, and thus, energy relations are determined not only by material realities but also by discursive politics of energy. In this sense, the analytical focus of my research is not on why a particular outcome was obtained in China-Canada, China-Kazakhstan, and China-Russia energy relations but rather on how and with what effect diverse discursive structures of energy politics are socially constructed in the course of these relations.
Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

In the realm of political science, energy resources belong to everyone and to no one in particular. A meaningful and constructive discussion of oil in political science, in my opinion, should involve strong quantitative comparativists with an interest in energy governance (e.g., Luong and Weinthal, 2010), a couple of international relations (IR) scholars fighting each other over the prospect of “resource wars” (e.g., Campion, 2016; Klare, 2008), a group of critical political geographers (e.g., Huber, 2011; Labban, 2008), a political theorist (e.g., Mitchel, 2011), a number of public policy analysts, and a crowd of area specialists. Those political scientists should also invite to join their discussion an anthropologist (e.g., Rogers, 2015), a critical cultural studies scholar (e.g., Szeman, 2013; Wilson, 2017), and at least one angry environmental sociologist (e.g., Hannigan, 2014). And, of course, this little gathering will not be complete without someone who hates fossil fuels as much as Leif Wenar (2016) and someone who is able to make a convincing moral case for fossil fuels, like Alex Epstein (2014). Finally, the gurus, such as Daniel Yergin (2011a, 2011b) and Michael Ross (2012), should be invited as special guests to represent the hegemonic discourses on oil and American political science in general.

As much as I would love to join such a discussion myself, I limit my current project to international politics of oil and fit it into the framework of IR. In this chapter, I explain where my research is located within the major theoretical debates that provide the basis for the study of energy politics in the realm of IR, identify and outline the key concepts, and elaborate the methodology of my project.
1.1. International Relations theories and energy relations

This section starts with a broad and diverse but not overly detailed review of the existing mainstream realist and liberal scholarship that is heavily preoccupied with the dichotomy of conflict and cooperation and explains international energy relations through the prism of energy security. Further, I discuss critical Marxian-inspired scholarship that overcomes some major shortcomings of the mainstream theorizing of international energy politics by “rematerializing” it.

My analysis of the existing realist, liberal, and Marxian-inspired scholarship demonstrates that this diverse scholarship is united by a heavy focus on the material realities of energy relations and hence pays insignificant attention to the role of discursive structures in international energy politics. I present constructivism as an alternative that can lead to valuable insights. I outline briefly what I mean by constructivism, a perspective that deviates in small yet noteworthy ways from the conventional definition of constructivism in the field of IR and overlaps considerably with the poststructuralist approach. In the last part of this section, I develop a constructivist methodology of the study of international energy relations and define major concepts.

Realism VS Liberalism: The dichotomy of conflict and cooperation in the study of international energy politics

The major divisions within the scholarship on international energy relations are built on different approaches to international order and the nature of the state in providing and regulating this order. The literature on energy politics that seeks to incorporate IR theoretical perspectives most often refers to realist and liberal IR theories as “major,” “dominant,” or “traditional” schools of IR (the issue highlighted by Hancock and Vivoda,
Despite some notable exceptions (Bouzarovski and Bassin, 2011; Mitchel, 2011; DeBardeleben, 2012; Casier, 2011, 2013; Kratochvíl and Tichý, 2013; Campion, 2016), the role of other IR traditions in the research on international energy relations is limited to the extent to which theorizing is reduced to the dialogue between realism and liberalism.

Realism assumes that the international system is characterized by anarchy, inasmuch as no authority is capable of regulating interactions of “sovereign” states within it. This means that instead of following the prescriptions of a higher authority, states have to build relations with each other on their own. States are viewed as rational agents that always pursue their own interests in the system of self-help, and thus the key goal of a state is to ensure its own survival. In the quest for security, states try to accumulate resources, and the relative levels of military and economic power of states determine the relations between them. The majority of mainstream realists use a fixed and narrow concept of power offered by Kenneth Waltz (1979), according to which the power of a state in international relations is measured in terms of the “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” (p. 131). This materialistic approach to power is one of the major appeals of mainstream realism because it allows its advocates to “justify both accommodation and the building up of armaments in the name of a balance of power” (Hollis and Smith, 1990, p. 28). It also offers those advocates “the ingredients needed to explain the resilience of the modern international system of states” (Little, 2007, p. 3).

When it comes to energy, proponents of the realist approach hold that energy relations, like any other field of international relations, are strictly determined by the national interests of states in which concerns of survival and power are highly prioritized.
Following the realist tradition, scholars focus on categories such as resource competition (e.g., Klare, 2008; Zweig and Bi, 2005; Zweig and Hao, 2016), energy dependence (e.g., Bilgin, 2011; Bosse and Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011; Orttung and Overland, 2011; Yafimava, 2011), and resource nationalism (e.g., Cutler, 2010; Nurmakov, 2010; Stegen, 2011; Stulberg, 2008). From this perspective, China is a “hungry dragon” that needs to fight for energy to power its rapidly developing economy (e.g., Klare 2008, Zweig and Bi 2005, Zweig and Hao 2016); Russia has an “energy weapon” and is trying to use it to build a new “energy imperialism” (e.g., Baev, 2008; Goldman, 2008; Kropatcheva, 2014; Mankoff, 2009; Orban, 2008); Canada is destined to help the US to preserve the balance of power (e.g., Clarkson and Mildenberger, 2011; Zweig and Hao, 2016); and Kazakhstan matters only as a space of geopolitical expansion for various great powers (e.g., Ahmad and Rubab, 2015; Weitz, 2006).

In sum, proponents of the realist approach to international energy relations examine a world of states that faces an ongoing battle over resources. They emphasize geostrategic aspects of energy relations and most often rather narrowly focus on the balance of power between energy exporters and import-dependent states, portraying energy relations as a zero-sum game. This, as advocates of the liberal tradition point out, leads realist analysis to a number of shortcomings inasmuch as it disregards important institutional determinants of energy relations.

In the popular imagination and wide foreign policy discourse, liberalism is portrayed as being peace-orientated and more ethical when compared to realism. Discussion of energy relations is not an exception (e.g., Currier and Dorraj, 2011; Stokes and Raphael, 2010). On the contrary, however, the principal concern of liberal scholarship is not the attainment of peace or peaceful relations among individuals and states. In fact,
similar to realist scholars, the majority of contemporary proponents of liberalism in IR offer pronounced utilitarian and rationalistic theories. At the same time, they all are still based on the belief in “a slow but inexorable journey away from the anarchic world the realists envision, as trade and finance forge ties between nations, and democratic norms spread” (Snyder, 2004, p. 56). Even when liberal theorizing is detached from its historical ideological inclinations – such as the celebration of progress and modernity, the balance of plurality and unity, the equality of opportunities, and the promotion of well-being – it is still logically cognate with a teleological definition of international relations as unfolding in the pursuit of mutually advantageous cooperation (e.g., Moravcsik, 1997).

Liberal theorizing claims that if it is possible to identify instigators of a conflict, then it should be possible to form a coalition of law-abiding states that will jointly stand against aggressors (e.g., Claude, 1964; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995). A global system of international organizations ought to fulfill legislative, executive, and, importantly, judicial functions and responsibilities, ensuring at the same time that each state would be able to retain its sovereignty, freedom, and independence (e.g., Smith, 1992; Kingsbury and Robert, 1993). Importantly, liberalism presupposes that it is governments that make wars, not the people. Hence, according to the logic of reason, the best hope for peace is a democracy because it represents the will of the people who reject conflict in favor of cooperation (e.g., Owen, 1994; Doyle, 1997; Oneal and Russett 1997; Richardson, 1997, 2001).

Consequently, various version of liberalism, regardless of their theoretical orientations, manifest the intent and restraint that announces the possibility of peace among the states that are bound by rational liberal norms. Liberal scholarship on energy relations perfectly illustrates this point.
The basic assumption that guides the liberal approach to international energy politics is that energy relations are governed by diverse institutions, organizations, and regimes, and thus involve both state and non-state agents. Liberal scholarship on energy relations focuses mainly on complex institutional arrangements that provide frameworks for cooperation between energy exporters and energy importers (Goldthau and Witte, 2013). While liberal scholarship on international energy politics is diverse, all liberal contributions to the study of international energy politics are united by the “faith in the functioning of markets and the potential for institutional international cooperation to achieve mutually beneficial solutions between both economic actors and states” (Stoddard, 2013, p. 445).

Advocates of the liberal approach are interested in strategies that transform energy relations into a positive-sum game, ensuring greater economic efficiency of cooperation between energy exporters and energy importers. Examining energy relations as a positive-sum game, scholars turn to environmental aspects of energy cooperation and emphasize issues of long-term depletion of fossil-fuel reserves, efficient energy use, environmental protection, as well as the development of renewable energy sources. These themes are articulated particularly strongly in the literature on global energy governance that asks the questions: Who should govern global energy relations and how should those relations be governed? (Florini and Sovacool, 2009; Victor and Yueh, 2010; Ghosh 2011) and What should be governed in energy? (Cherp, Jewell, and Goldthau, 2011; Araújo, 2014; Bazilian, Nakhhooda, and Van de Graaf, 2014). Some scholars focus on the potential of existing organizations, such as the G8, G20, or the International Energy Agency (e.g., Kirton and Kokotsis, 2015; Downie, 2015; Keohane, 1978; Van de Graaf, 2012) to govern global energy relations while others propose to establish new organizations (Victor and Yueh, 2010). As regards the areas of energy governance, the vast majority of liberal scholars
agree that emphasis needs to be on the security of energy supply, environmental sustainability, and energy poverty – in each case, to offset presumed causes of international conflict.

Whether energy relations are perceived as a zero-sum game (realism) or as a positive-sum game (liberalism), their logic is explained through incentives provided by energy security. As Lynne Chester (2010) points out, the very term “energy security” evidently promises that there is “a concept (an abstract idea) with some form of strategic intent” behind it (2010, p. 891). At the same time, the concept of energy security is vague: it covers a range of threats that vary in nature, time, and magnitude and includes “the multiplicity of meanings that can be attributed to it establishes that there can be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution” (p. 893). The only idea that unites diverse interpretations of energy security is an emphasis on avoiding sudden changes in the availability of energy relative to demand. In other words, energy security is always about the deficit of energy and this deficit is to be addressed mainly by increasing supply.

Both realist and liberal analyses of energy relations disregard their social logic which creates a few blind spots. Particularly, the concept of energy security and its diverse properties explain nothing and have to be explained themselves. Issues related to the extraction, production, consumption of energy, and the redistribution of energy rents become matters of security only when a powerful agent frames and responds to them as such. Hence, the very notion of “security” in energy relations should be problematized and conceptualized in ways that allow for an understanding of how various energy issues become matters of security.
Marxian-inspired attempts to “re-materialize” energy relations

The focus on energy security in the study of energy politics is challenged by Marxian-inspired IR scholarship. Following the principle of historical materialism, this scholarship is focused on the material context of international relations, perceiving it to be composed of the tension between means and relations of production. It also bears, in a special and complex way, the imprint of the emancipatory project associated with classical Marxism. It draws attention to the inequality and oppression that are reproduced by the modern capitalist system in the realm of energy international relations.

Proponents of the Marxian-inspired approach to international energy politics argue that the deficit of energy is not an objective reality but a by-product of the development of the modern capitalist system. Production of energy resources is restricted to stabilize prices and secure the inflow of revenues through various institutional arrangements built by the state and global capital (e.g., Labban, 2008, 2010a; Mitchel, 2011; Nitzan and Bichler, 2002). This not only erodes market practices in the realm of energy relations but also limits “the democratizing potential of petroleum” and becomes the driving force of petro-imperialism (Mitchel 2011, p. 42). Accordingly, the concept of energy security and institutional arrangements related to it should be understood as a part of the system of scarcity.

Advocates of Marxian-inspired approaches move beyond the strict materialism of classical Marxism and offer important insights into how historical contexts and social

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6 As many scholars indicate, Karl Marx was never an IR theorist and did not focus on the theoretical analysis of international relations per se. Nevertheless, as John M. Hobson (2000) points out, Marx’s general theory is a “theory of everything” (p. 116), and thus his ideas are relevant to understanding modern international relations. The scholarship that seeks to reposition Marx’s concepts in the realm of IR is diverse and cannot be subsumed under the umbrella of “Marxist IR theory.” Many IR scholars employ Marx’s ideas without being Marxists, which is why I have chosen to refer to this branch of IR scholarship as “Marxian” rather than “Marxist.”
relations construct energy resources as a “seemingly powerful thing-in-itself” (Huber 2011, p. 36). This idea is important because it implies a refocusing of the emphasis done in much of the realist and liberal analysis from energy security to energy resources extraction as a human-environment process that unfolds in a particular historical context (e.g., Harvey, 1974, 2003; Huber, 2010, 2011, 2012; Labban, 2010a, 2010b; Zalik, 2009, 2010).

At the same time, however, the Marxian-inspired scholarship is still largely focused on the power of material realities in determining political outcomes. Even though it problematizes the idea of the deficit of energy and the use of energy security as a rationale for energy politics, the broad explanatory framework of Marxian-inspired scholarship still stands close to realist and liberal accounts of international energy politics because it treats discursive structures as incidental to material realities.

Similar to proponents of realism and liberalism, Marxian-inspired analysis of international energy politics draws on the assumption that in choosing a particular strategy in energy relations agents foresee the overall cost-benefit orientation and follow the logic of consequence. While realist and liberal theorizing link the logic of consequence in international energy relations with the incentives of energy security, Marxian-inspired scholarship perceives international energy relations as a hierarchic system, placing special emphasis on mechanisms and structures that perpetuate inequality. In this sense, Marxian-inspired scholarship sets a practical research agenda wherein issues of domination and exploitation are the central content areas and emancipation is the goal. If we leave the emancipatory project associated with classical Marxism aside, what will be the nature of the discussion of the historical context and social relations that construct energy resources?

Moving beyond the analysis of global capitalism and social relations of production on which it is founded, we could focus on the social logic of international energy politics
and denaturalize the conventional understanding of energy relations as driven by the logic of consequence. This will allow us to ask new questions about international energy relations. What are the different ideas that the notion of security embodies in energy politics? How do particular responses to the challenges of extraction, production, consumption, and distribution of energy emerge as appropriate and rational? How do multiple and diverse understandings of energy shape the identities of states in international relations? How are diverse national narratives about energy resources connected at the international level?

Relevant theoretical and conceptual frameworks could be found in the works associated with the English school. Martin Wight (1977, 1986 [1978]) and Hedley Bull (2002 [1977]) – the two scholars that are commonly identified as the founding fathers of the English School – recognize the social construction of international society by states and, importantly, acknowledge the constitutive role of language in international relations (see Epp 1998, pp. 52-56). Constructivism and poststructuralism also offer clues on how these questions might be answered. While the English school emerged at the edges of the realism versus idealism dispute and evolved as an independent scholarship and developed an independent analytical and theoretical system, constructivism (e.g. Onuf 1998, Wendt 1995, Hopf 1998) and poststructuralism (e.g. Der Derian 1989; Hansen 2006) crafted a space for themselves within the discipline of IR. Constructivism and poststructuralist theorizing have spread throughout a wide spectrum of topics in international relations, its

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7 As Ole Wæver (2000) puts it, “[t]he relations between American mainstream IR (“the discipline”) and the English school is a curious story of sporadic contacts and periods of near isolation” (p. 80). Some scholars argue that the key insights of the English school overlap with mainstream theorizing (e.g. Dunne 1995, Wæver 1998, Buzan 2004), whereas others link the English school tradition to poststructural approaches (e.g. Der Derian, 2009). Despite the existing overlaps and links, however, the English school is an independent and “living tradition” in IR (Epp 1998). In this study, I do not engage with the English school and focus on constructivist and poststructural approaches to the study of international relations because I want to stay closer to a “centered” picture of IR (Nayak and Selbin 2013).
interventions in the discussion of international energy politics are still limited and scattered. However, a few notable and encouraging exceptions (specifically, Campion, 2016; Bouzarovski and Bassin, 2011; Kratochvil and Tichý, 2013) demonstrate the ultimate utility of these approaches for the analysis international energy politics.

**An alternative: Critical constructivism**

One of the core insights of constructivism was formulated by Nicholas Onuf (1989): the subject of IR theory is a “world of our making.” At the heart of such an understanding of international relations is the assumption that social relations make or construct people – *ourselves* – into the kind of beings that we are. Conversely, we *make* the world what it is, from the raw materials that nature provides by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other. Indeed, saying is doing: talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we go about making the world what it is. (Onuf, 1998, p. 59)

Social realities are then, following Onuf’s argument, as influential as material realities in determining states’ actions in the international arena. In the words of Alexander Wendt (1995), “social structures include material resources like gold and tanks” because “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (p. 73). From this perspective, primary units of analysis are diverse social constructs that are “real and objective, not ‘just talk’… [but] this objectivity depends on shared knowledge” (Wendt, 1995, p. 74). Importantly, social constructs exist “not in actors’ heads nor in material capabilities, but in practices” (Wendt, 1995, p. 74). This means that social constructs emerge through the processes of social interaction between agents and the existence of social constructs is reinforced by their daily

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8 Shared knowledge is understood as comprehensive knowledge embodied in culture and specific knowledge expressed and communicated in norms and rules (Burch 2002, p. 63-64).
use. As Brigit Locher and Elizabeth Prügl (2001) argue, “diverse constructivisms” embrace the “ontology of becoming” inasmuch as all of them “are describing the world not as one that is, but as one that is in the process of becoming” (p. 114). Particularly, the ontology of becoming allows constructivists to examine “the constitution of international agents” and reveal historically contingent sets of agreed knowledge in order to explain transformations of strategies and develop a comprehensive understanding of social change (Locher and Prügl, 2001, pp. 114-115).

The two overarching constructivist approaches are labeled as “conventional” (or “thin”) and “critical” (or “thick”) (e.g., Adler, 1997; Price and Reus-Smith, 1998; Zehfuss, 2001). Both approaches assume that the material and social realities of international relations are complexly interwoven and interdependent; yet conventional constructivism puts at the center of analysis material factors, whereas critical constructivism prioritizes discursive structures. Striving to bridge epistemological relativism and epistemological rationalism, conventional constructivists perceive the international system “as an objective social fact” (Wendt, 1999, p.75). In contrast, critical constructivists focus on “how the world is ‘talked into existence’” (Adler, 2013, p. 122). For them, social facts emerge through the structures of language, which presupposes that “consciousness can be studied only as mediated by language” (Adler, 2002, p. 97). Consequently, critical constructivist scholars take relations between symbolization, language, and power more seriously than conventional constructivists, which brings them close to poststructuralism.

James Der Derian (2009 [1990]) defines poststructuralism as “a semio-critical activity ever searching for and seeking to dismantle the empirico-rational positions where power fixes meaning” (p. 296). He offers a four-dimensional research agenda of poststructuralist theorizing:
to interrogate present knowledge of international relations through past practices, to
search out the margins of political theory, to listen for the critical voices drowned
out by official discourses, and to conduct an inquiry into the encounter of the given
text with reacting text. (1989, p. 6)

Subsequently, as Onuf (1989) accurately points out, poststructuralism takes major
ontological and epistemological assumptions of constructivist theorizing “as a dialectical
necessity” and extends them to “a radical degree” (p. 45-46).

Poststructuralist theorizing explicitly questions the very existence of independent
and objective knowledge and explores “how the discursive distribution of power
normalizes particular subject positions, regulates space and time, and surveils to ensure
conformity” (McKenna, 2004, p. 22). Following this logic, poststructuralist scholars see
causal epistemology as “a particular discourse of knowledge, which cannot sustain its
privilege outside of its own historical and political location” (Hansen 2006, p. 9).

Critical constructivists borrow freely and apply conceptual apparatus and
methodological tools developed by poststructuralist IR scholars. Nonetheless, even when
critical constructivists pose constitutive questions – “how is it possible?” (see Doty, 1993)
– they do not diverge from the position of mild positivism and are not willing to abandon
completely causal epistemology (e.g., Price and Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 282 and Jackson, 2016,
p. 105-108). Operating within constitutive and intersubjective frameworks of social facts,
they deliberately use existing meta-structures of international relations (e.g., state,
sovereignty) to define and limit their theorizing. Importantly, as Imanuel Adler (1997)
points out, critical constructivists are “interested neither in emancipation per se, nor
exclusively in uncovering the power structures that affect the marginalized in history but in
providing better explanations of social reality” (Adler, 1997, pp. 333-334). In this regard,
critical constructivism is still a “rebel son” of mainstream IR traditions, realism, and liberalism (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004, p. 28-29).

In sum, constructivism remains a diverse scholarship that is best described as a “heterogamous” research program (Hopf, 1998, p. 196) or a “meta-theory” (Wæver, 1997, p. 25). Hence, its engagement with and learning from poststructuralism is natural and appropriate. Building my research on constructivist and poststructuralist insights, I seek to demonstrate that identities of agents matter in international energy politics and examine these identities systematically through the adoption of a discourse analysis approach. In doing so, I move beyond the concept of energy security and focus on a set of research questions that emphasize the constitutive significance of representations of identity in formulating and debating diverse strategies in the realm of international energy politics. While my study is inspired by both constructivist and poststructuralist scholarship, it still firmly fits into an overarching constructivist research agenda because it is focused on “what is” rather than “what ought to be” or “what could possibly be.”

Beyond energy security

Although the theory of securitization and desecuritization/politicization integrates classical realist understandings of international relations, it is grounded in constructivist ontological and epistemological assumptions. In this case, as Stefano Guzzini (2011) puts it, “the constructivist horse has been put before the geopolitical cart” (p. 331). The quintessence of the concept of securitization is that “it is by labeling something a security

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9 While I argue that attempts to wall off constructivism from poststructuralism are counterproductive (e.g., Hansen, 2006, p. 2-4 and Campion 2016, p. 12-13), I doubt whether it is possible and, for that matter, necessary or desirable to reconcile constructivist and poststructuralist approaches to the study of IR. Overall, even when constructivist and poststructuralist epistemologies and ontologies overlap, the differences between the research agenda of these two approaches set them far apart from each other.
issue that it becomes one” (Wæver, 2004, p. 13). This means that security is a social construct, and thus it does not have any pre-existent meaning but can be anything a securitizing agent claims it is. As Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) elaborate it:

[T]he task is not to assess some objective threats that “really” endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. (p. 26)

Consequently, the concept of securitization represents the essence of what Buzan (2010) elsewhere refers to as the “social side” of security analysis. Securitization is defined as a successful speech act “through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p. 491). Full securitization of a valued referent object requires gaining legitimacy through accepting the “need to go beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations” (Taureck, 2006, p. 55). The reverse process – desecuritization/ politicization – is understood as “the shifting of issues out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 4).

When applied to the study of energy relations, the theory of securitization and desecuritization/ politicization offers insights into how an energy deficit becomes

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10 The concept of securitization was first articulated by Ole Wæver in a working paper Security the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word (1989) and further developed in Securitization and Desecuritization (1995).

11 Intersubjective understanding represents reflections of agents’ assumptions of the material reality. For instance, examining energy security as an intersubjective understanding, we acknowledge that essentially energy security is an empty concept and can be endowed with any meaning, depending on how an agent of energy relations understands material realities. Following this logic, we can address such questions as: What are the different ideas that energy security embodies? How in the process of social interactions do agents agree on a particular set of meanings or a definition of energy security? How does a particular understanding of energy security inform agents’ actions?
represented as either an existential threat to national sovereignty and international stability or a political matter. Importantly, by identifying energy issues as security or political matters, agents simultaneously determine the need for respective strategies. Consequently, the theory of securitization and desecuritization/politicization helps to explain the conceptual foundations of the dichotomy between conflict and cooperation that is at the center of the radical rift between realist and liberal views of energy relations. It also adds an extra layer to the Marxian-inspired research on international energy politics by explaining how discourses about security contribute to the social construction of energy through the prism of its deficit.

Having said that, problematizing the idea of security in energy relations is not enough. The second step is to ask how particular responses to the challenges of extraction, production, consumption, and distribution of energy emerge as appropriate and rational. To raise and bring to the fore questions about the social logic of energy relations, a constructivist analysis should move beyond the concept of energy security and focus on the role of identity in international energy politics.

*Identity and the logic of appropriateness*

Identity is a complicated concept: it “tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p. 1). In the theoretical framework offered by constructivist scholars, identity is perceived as a “relatively stable system of meanings with a well-consolidated context in which to act” (Tsygankov, 2010, p. 16) and is located “at the core of national and transnational interests” (Adler, 2012, p. 102). This does not imply, however, that each agent of international relations holds only
one identity or that agents have a pre-social essence\textsuperscript{12}. On the contrary, identity is continually transforming in the process of social interaction. As Ted Hopf (1998) points out, an agent “understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practices” (p. 175). The main conceptual premise behind this assumption is three-fold. First, agents’ identities are shaped by the social structures of the environments in which they operate (Hansen 2006; Tannenwald, 2007; Jackson, 2016). Second, identities are constructed through the process of differentiation and linking (Wæver, 2002; Hansen, 2006). Third, identities are negotiated in a discursive competition between different social groups that represent agents (Tsygankov, 2010).

In the constructivist conceptual framework that captures various identities constructed by agents to represent themselves and each other in international energy politics, energy relations appear as a product of complex, dynamic, and interdependent social processes. In this framework, identity has characteristics of a causal variable because it gives rise to and explains the logic of appropriateness\textsuperscript{13} in energy relations. In this light, the broad constructivist question about international energy politics can be put as follows: how does the way agents identify/label themselves and others shape the strategic choices they make?

\textit{Discursive politics of energy}

\textsuperscript{12} Here my version of constructivism deviates significantly from the conventional constructivist theorizing associated with works of Wendt (1999). Among the most significant and influential critical discussions of Wendt’s conceptualizing of identity are contributions of Zehfuss (2001), Rumellili (2004), and Hansen (2006).

\textsuperscript{13} The logic of appropriateness is a structure of meaning that justifies actions that is accepted by an agent (March and Olsen, 1989, 2006, 2009). Agents are evaluating courses of action according to the logic of appropriateness that corresponds best with their identities. This means that an action always implies “evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation” (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 951).
As the preceding analysis shows, realist scholars securitize the deficits of energy resources and perceive energy resources as a strategic commodity, control over which determines the power and influence of a state. Liberal scholars, on the other hand, politicize the deficits of energy resources, seeing them as a normal economic commodity that should be allocated by markets and regulated by international institutions. Marxist-inspired scholars, in contrast, seek to “re-materialize” international energy politics and focus on how the material realities of energy production and consumption determine political outcomes, particularly in the relations of domination. These three approaches present three idiosyncratic narratives about energy resources yet ignore the process through which these narratives are socially constructed. Energy, as E. F. Schumacher (1982 [1964]) highlights, “is not just another commodity, but the precondition of all commodities, a basic factor equal with air, water, and earth” (p. 1-2). Diverse social, cultural, economic, and political encounters with energy resources give them multiple symbolic meanings.

In the framework that I propose, the realities of energy production and consumption (e.g., volume and destinations of oil exports, domestic oil demand) are treated as material referents of identities that are constructed by states in international energy politics. However, narratives about energy resources define the meaning of these material referents. For example, when Russian political leaders identify Russia as an “energy superpower,” they refer to oil, natural gas, coal, and other energy resources that are located within Russia’s borders and often use the volume of Russia’s energy imports as a material referent. In this case, the narrative about energy resources portrays them as a source of extraordinary national power. Nevertheless, the material realities of energy acquire their meanings and significance only in the process of narrative-making and
discursive symbolization. The very same material realities of energy production and imports are successfully used as a referent by those who claim that Russia’s energy wealth is the source of tremendous national vulnerability and identify Russia as an “energy appendage of the developed world.”

Consequently, a material referent qualifies as a part of the “reality” of international energy politics not because it exists but because it is treated as important by agents. The reality, in general, is thought of as a quality that agents attribute to phenomena in the process of narrative-making by noticing them, talking about them with others, and acting as if these phenomena are important. Following this logic, if we want to understand how an agent constructs its identity and identities of its counterparts in international energy politics, we need to know what meaning this agent attributes to energy resources.

The logic of appropriateness: Energy paradigms

Diverse contestations of identity and narratives about energy resources are promoted by various actors in both public and private spaces. These contestations could be especially intense until one of the available visions of identity and a specific narrative about energy resources acquires a dominant status. More specifically, the persuasion part of the process is complete when the state appropriates an identity vision and a narrative about energy resources as a foundation of its energy paradigm.

I use the term “paradigm” in Thomas Kuhn’s broad sense as standing for “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on, shared by the members of a given community” (2012 [1970], p. 175). Energy paradigms are discursively constructed precisely in a way to appear to be objective representations of the reality and provide a
consolidated institutional context in which states operate in the realm of international energy politics. Energy paradigms represent the logic of appropriateness in international energy relations and, like any other expression of the logic of appropriateness, they are rooted in “structures of resources that make action possible” and “structures of meaning that explain and justify behavior” (March and Olsen, 2006, p. 691). Energy paradigms are my constructivist roadmaps to energy relations: they represent relatively stable systems of norms, meanings, and ideas that shape the way states act in the field of energy relations.

**Agency in international energy relations**

As it was acknowledged above, constructivist theorizing suggests that identities are ambivalent, and each agent holds multiple identities. As a result, two interconnected questions come up. First, who are the agents in international energy politics? And second, whose narratives and visions of identities about energy resources matter in international energy politics?

While various state actors and non-state national and transnational actors participate in international energy politics, the quality of that agency varies across types of actors. Agency is a social condition, which means, according to Onuf, that actors are only agents when their position and status in the social relations “make sense, and use, of our physical circumstances” (2013 [2002], p. 23) and when they “make choices in pursuit of their interests” (1998, p. 65). Elsewhere, Onuf also specifies three categories of acts that qualify actors as agents: participation in everyday social practices, representations that involve acting/speaking on behalf of somebody, and recognition (and the refusal to recognize) (2013 [2005], p. 188).
I argue that states remain the major agents in modern international energy politics. Recognizing the importance and agency of various actors within the state, as well as the importance and agency of diverse transnational actors, does not obviate the significance of the authority of state’s agency in international energy politics. In addition to conventional arguments that leverage the central role of states in the modern system of international relations (e.g., Hobson, 2000; Lake, 2007) the way in which energy resources are understood in the modern world leads to a state-centric analysis of international energy politics.

Energy resources are “embedded – literally – in the territorial framework of states” and “physically, legally, and culturally” are perceived as part of “the ‘body’ of the nation” (Bridge and Le Billon, 2012, pp. 22-23). States have permanent and absolute sovereignty over energy resources in their territory. States regulate extraction, production, consumption, and distribution of energy on the domestic level and control energy exports. Even though in many parts of the world they rely on private capital – not state-owned enterprises – to do this work, states still are the major decision-makers in energy policy and energy politics. They decide whether to enter into international agreements (e.g., climate change mitigation agreements) and whether to abide by their provisions. In sum, states exercise exclusive and unique jurisdiction when it comes to energy resources. Most often states actually permit other national and transnational actors to exist and act as agents in international energy politics, rather than being challenged by them. Hence, I examine international energy relations as a government-to-government engagement and as the use of foreign policy to promote cooperation in the energy sector.
1.2. Discourse analysis and texts

The chapter has thus far aimed to develop a critical constructivist research design for the study of international energy politics. In this section, I further elaborate the methodology of this project by focusing on the methods of collecting, generating, and analyzing the data. I briefly outline the logic of discourse analysis in IR and then focus on the specific framework of discourse analysis that I utilize. I also outline how the data was collected and generated and discuss some specific patterns in the data collection.

“From poststructuralist islands to even the faraway shores of constructivism”

Michel Foucault (1972) defines discourse as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (p. 50). Following Foucault’s logic, “discourse analysts do not try to check the truth of any version or claim but try to understand how it is constructed” and “by showing that it is a construction, they, therefore, open an apparently authoritative and ‘truthful’ claim to contestation” (Taylor, 2013, p. 35). Linking texts to social contexts, discourse analysis examines how texts contribute to the constitution of reality by creating meanings (Fairclough, 2007; Fairclough and Wodak, 2013). In other words, discourse analysis explains “how language constructs phenomena, not how it reflects and reveals it” (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 6).

Discourse as a concept and discourse analysis as a methodology in the realm of IR had initially belonged to poststructuralist scholarship that entered the field in the late 1980s and the early 1990s as a critical attitude and new approach to intellectual inquiry focused mainly on ontological and epistemological shortcomings of conventional IR theorizing (e.g., Der Derian, 2009; Walker, 1993). However, as Anna Holzscheiter (2014) rightly points out,

14My references to texts imply largely written and spoken language materials. However, anything constitutive of discourse (e.g. visual representations, symbols) can be an object of discourse analysis (Campbell, 2007).
over the past two decades the study of discourse “has gradually traveled from poststructuralist islands to even the faraway shores of constructivism that works hard to reconcile constructivist ontology and positivist epistemology” (p. 43).

A unified and standardized approach to the study of discourses in IR does not exist. Nevertheless, as Jennifer Milliken’s (1999) comprehensive methodological review demonstrates, diverse and competing versions of discourse analysis in IR share three overarching “theoretical commitments” that “implicitly restrict appropriate contexts of justification/discovery” (p. 228). First, discourses constitute systems of signification and representation. Second, a particular “regime of truth”15 is operationalized through the construction of legitimate speakers and authorized practices. Finally, discourses become dominant or hegemonic through constant production and reproduction through practice. Holzscheiter (2014) adds to Milliken’s summary that the major objective of discourse analysis in IR is to explain “what is achieved by using particular discursive repertoires and strategies and which dimensions of reality and options for political action are included and excluded by specific representations of reality” (p. 144).

**Intertextual discourse analysis**

My study borrows heavily from the poststructuralist discourse analysis methodology offered by Lene Hansen (2006). Hansen draws on Julia Kristeva’s (1986) theory of intertextual generation of meaning that implies that texts are “constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (p. 37). Hence, her intertextual discourse analysis examines texts as “simultaneously unique and united,”

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15 “Truth” is understood as “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements” that produces and is reproduced in “systems of power,” inducing and extending it (Foucault, 1980, p. 133).
meaning that each text “makes its own particular construction of identity, weaves a series of differentiations and juxtapositions, and couples them to a spatially, temporally, and ethically situated foreign policy” (Hansen 2006, p. 55). She develops a set of four “intertextual research models,” each of which has its own analytical focus, an object of analysis, and a goal of analysis (p. 57). Using Hansen’s intertextual research models, I organize all my texts into larger groups to structure and systematize my analysis (Table 1).

Mainly, I focus on official discourses (Model 1) and wider political discourses (Model 2). Model 1 is “directly based in official foreign policy discourse and centers on political leaders with official authority to sanction the foreign policies pursued as well as those with central roles in executing these policies” and “identifies the texts produced by these actors, […] as well as the texts which have had an intertextual influence on their discourse” (Hansen, 2006, p. 53). Model 2 “facilitates analysis of the discursive and political hegemony a governmental position enjoys and thereby of its room for maneuver” and “provides a good indication of how official discourse might change, either through a discursive adjustment made by the present government or were there a change in the government itself” (Hansen 2006, p. 53-54). Accordingly, Model 2 includes texts that influence in meaningful and persistent ways construction of official discourses by supporting or criticizing them.

Model 3A focuses on cultural representations and introduces to the analysis of diverse cultural artifacts (e.g., works of fiction, poetry and drama, paintings, photographs, and films). This helps to demonstrate how and with what effect official discourses emerge and disseminate themselves beyond the realm of foreign policy. Finally, the analysis of marginal discourses (Model 3B) and cultural representation (Model 3A) is specifically important in cases where official discourses achieve a hegemonic status (the discursive
power of texts in Model 1 is very strong) and the space for a wider political discussion is limited (the discursive power of texts in Model 2 is very weak). For example, the existing predilections away from political freedom in China, Kazakhstan, and Russia restrict the number of actors that participate in discursive politics of international energy relations within these states, which marginalizes the role of Model 2 and increases the value of Model 3A and Model 3B for the analysis.

In preparing my analysis, I formulated an overarching analytical question: *What identities and historical narratives about energy resources do China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada construct to represent itself and others in energy relations?* This question was further divided into four simple and clear questions:

- Definition of the subject: What is energy? What is oil?
- Definition of actors (Self): Who are “we” in relation to energy/ oil?
- Definition of actors (Other): Who are “they” in relation to energy/ oil?
- Definition of action: What are “we” going to do with energy/ oil?

I used these questions to “interrogate” each text in the dataset when I read (and reread) and coded texts to identify recurring patterns, themes, concepts, and relations between them.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Model 1</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Analytical research questions</strong></td>
<td>1. Discursive politics of energy: What identities and historical narratives about energy resources do China, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia construct to represent themselves and each other in energy relations? - What is energy? What is oil? - Who are “we” in relations to energy/oil? - Who are “they” in relations to energy/oil? 2. Energy paradigms: How are identities and historical narratives about energy resources constructed, manifested, and enacted in bilateral energy relations between China and Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia? - What are “we” going to do with energy? - What are “they” going to do with energy?</td>
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The data collection: Texts and Contexts

The overall data collection includes 1523 texts. All textual documents in Chinese, English, French, and Russian were collected from the official websites of individual institutions and through archival research. The data collection also includes visual materials, semi-structured interviews, and fieldwork observations conducted between May 2016 and August 2017. I used Atlas.ti, a qualitative analysis software package, to manage the data collection, organize coding, tabulate coded texts, do a word search, and retrieve important quotes from the texts.

Any discourse analysis is based on a close reading of and immersion in the texts. That is why all texts were analyzed in their original language (Chinese, French, or Russian) to avoid losing contextual or culturally specific meanings and expressions, and only the excerpts used for illustration were translated into English.

Primary and secondary sources

I treat all texts included in Model 1 and Model 2 as primary sources, whereas Model 3A and Model 3B contain both primary and secondary sources. In the framework of

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16 Overall, my research is trilingual, with the sources in Chinese, English, and Russian being at the core of the analysis. I examined a total of 17 texts in French for the case of China-Canada relations. The most important set of data, however, for this case comes in English. Kazakh language is the state language of Kazakhstan (Constitution, Article 7). It is defined by the Law “On Language” of 1997 (Article 4) as “the language of government administration, legislation, legal proceedings, and paperwork operating in all spheres of public relations in all over the territory of the state.” However, Russian language holds a strong position in Kazakhstan and is recognized as an “official” language by the state (Constitution, Article 7). The prominence of Russian language in both public and private domains allowed me to use only texts in Russian language for my analysis of Kazakhstan’s discursive politics of energy and the development of China-Kazakhstan energy relations.

17 Some official websites were accessed through the digital archive Wayback Machine. For example, the Ministry of Energy of Russian Federation was established as the lead agency for energy development only in 2008, while the preceding ministry – the Ministry of Industry and Energy – was reorganized. The official website of the Ministry of Industry and Energy for 2006, 2007, and 2008 was assessed through the Wayback Machine.

18 National Library of China (Beijing), Russian State Library (Moscow), and National Academic Library of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Astana)
intertextual discourse analysis, texts that are conventionally considered secondary sources (Halperin and Heath, 2012, pp. 180-181 and pp. 255-256) might be treated as a primary source. For example, if scholarly an article from Model 3B is repeatedly quoted in official discourse or wider public debate, it could be treated as a primary source in some cases and as a secondary source in others. In this case, as Hansen (2006) points out, “the use of secondary sources does not prevent one from subjecting them to discourse analysis at a later stage of the research process” (p. 75)\(^\text{19}\).

**Interviews**

From May 2016 to May 2017, I undertook eleven semi-structured interviews in Kazakhstan and Russia with leading experts and academics. Respondents were chosen based on their practical or academic experience with international energy cooperation and foreign affairs. All the interviews were transcribed in the original language. All interviewees reviewed the transcripts and agreed to be named.

The interviews conducted in Kazakhstan and Russia served three functions: data collection being their primary purpose and gaining access to primary sources and establishing new contacts through a snow-balling effect being their secondary purposes. However, I did not rely on interviews as a major source of my research insights. The quality and reliability of the final data for the analysis of China’s and Canada’s discursive energy politics were ensured without supplementary interviews.

Canada has a vibrant and dynamic discursive politics of energy that includes diverse powerful actors, such as political parties, local governments, NGOs, social movements, and

\(^{19}\text{This being said, I will follow Ariande Vromen’s (2010) guide to qualitative methods to assess the reliability of secondary sources. All secondary sources will be assessed according to four criteria: authenticity, credibility/accuracy, representativeness whether a document offered a “typical” interpretation of an event), and meaning (clarity and comprehensiveness) (Vromen 2010, pp. 262-263).}
research networks. The production of critical foreign policy discourses (Model 2) is as institutionalized and powerful as the production of official discourses (Model 1). In the case of Canada, I have collected 653 textual sources in English and French, which accounts for more than 50 percent of the total dataset. Given the variety and quality of sources, I had enough data for the analysis of Canada’s discursive energy politics and did not need to conduct interviews.

In the case of China, six pilot interviews with China’s experts and academics conducted in Beijing in November 2016 did not add any additional information or new dimensions to the data that I have already had. My data collection for Model 3B (marginal political discourses) already included academic articles and books and reports produced by national NGOs that together make up a set of 75 textual documents, and thus supplementary interviews with China’s academics and experts were not necessary.

China’s policymakers, policy consultants, and experts of the think-tanks affiliated with China’s government, and representatives of China’s corporate institutions all declined my requests for interviews. Thus, I was not able to expand the data collection for Model 2 (wider political discourses). In China, as elsewhere in the world, people who officially represent the state are not willing to share their professional and personal opinions, while some of them are even forbidden to do so (Mikecz, 2012). In addition to this, recently energy politics has become an increasingly sensitive topic in China in reaction to the corruption scandals in the energy industry that occurred between 2013 and 2015.20

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20 In December 2012, Liu Tienan, the head of the National Energy Administration (NEA) and the deputy director of National Development and Reform Commission, became one of the first senior officials to be investigated in the anti-corruption campaign initiated by Xi Jinping. Liu Tienan was arrested in January 2013 and convicted on bribery charges in September 2014. Between 2012 and 2016, at least eleven senior official who worked in energy industry, including Zhou Yongkang, were dismissed from their positions and accused in corruption (Quah, 2015, pp. 49-52, see also Anderlini, 2017 and Hornby, 2014).
controversies added extra pressure to the challenges related to my “outsider status,” as all actors of China’s energy politics kept a low public profile during the time of my study. For me as a discourse analysis scholar, the “silence” of China’s energy sector was as annoying and frustrating as it was revealing. I could not access potentially useful sources of information. However, there was a silver lining in this situation. The “silence” indicated that in the period between 2013 and 2016 the discursive power in the realm of energy politics was concentrated in the Politburo and its Standing Committee, which only increases the value of texts of Model 1 (official discourses) for my analysis.

Fieldwork observations: Oil cities and oil museums

In the course my fieldwork in China in November 2016, I visited the city of Daqing, Heilongjiang. This trip made me interested in the oil cities and in national museums dedicated to the oil industry. Subsequently, I conducted fieldwork in Astana (Kazakhstan), as well as in Edmonton and Fort McMurray (Canada). Astana, Edmonton, and Fort McMurray are the oil cities, inasmuch as they symbolize and epitomize the development of national oil industries and play a significant role in the national discursive politics of energy. Due to the time constraints, the goal of my fieldwork in the oil cities was simple and precise: to discover the major cultural representations related to discursive politics of energy (e.g., public monuments and other significant landmarks) and to visit the local

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21 China’s senior officials avoided interactions with media and skipped some major international energy events in 2015 and 2016. As a case in point, Nur Bekri, who assumed the post of the head of the NEA in December 2014, did not give any comments and interviews even to China’s official media in the period between 2015 and 2016, which is an obvious shift given that all his predecessors were very active. My conclusions about the link between corruptions scandals and the “silence” in China’s energy industry were later confirmed by Sergey Goncharov (personal communication, Nov. 2016, Beijing), the current director of the Representative Office of UC Rusal in China and the former director of the Representative Office of Rosneft in China (2006-2013).
museums dedicated to the oil industry. These fieldwork observations are analyzed as a part of Model 3A.

1.3. Summary: Research Question

Building my analysis on constructivist and poststructuralist insights, I seek to offer a nuanced perspective of energy politics that captures such variables as social context, intersubjective meanings, and identities. My research is divided into two parts. The first area that will be examined is discursive politics of energy that includes identities and historical narratives about energy resources that are constructed by states to represent themselves and each other in energy relations. The second area of research involves developing a better understanding of how these identities and historical narratives about energy resources are reproduced in energy paradigms. In this light, my central question can be put as follows: How are China’s identities and historical narratives about energy resources constructed, manifested, and enacted in bilateral energy its relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia?

To answer this question, I use a discourse analysis methodology. Discourse analysis is preoccupied with what people know about diverse material and social realities and how they articulate this knowledge because its aim is to uncover the ways in which these realities are constructed, negotiated, and interpreted through the processes of social interaction. A structured and systematic intertextual discourse analysis of a heterogeneous collection of texts allows me to achieve two major analytical goals:

- to reveal the discourses that dominate China’s energy relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia;
• to examine how these dominant discourses support and sustain specific interpretations of China’s energy relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia while excluding or rendering marginal others.

As a result, I demonstrate that China’s energy relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia are simultaneously enabled and constrained by the discursive politics of energy. I am also able to demonstrate that a critical constructivist approach to the examination of China’s energy politics provides an original contribution to the understanding of the development of China’s energy relations with major oil-exporters. In this sense, my dissertation offers a valuable addition to the literature critical of mainstream IR approaches and helps to further promote discourse analysis within the discipline.
Chapter 2

China’s Discursive Politics of Energy

In the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, economically dilapidated, politically divided, and unstable China served as a space for geopolitical invasion and imperial domination for Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Japan, and other nations. In October 1949, the People’s Republic of China emerged from the crucible of the “century of humiliation” (百年国耻, bǎinián guóchǐ). China’s new leaders, led by Mao Zedong, introduced a centrally planned command economy patterned on that of the Soviet Union and set out an ambitious goal to develop a massive industrial complex by the end of the next decade. The period between 1953 and 1957, corresponding to the First Five-Year Plan, was largely successful (Usov, 2006a). However, the Great Leap Forward campaign launched in 1958 resulted in an economic disaster that caused the most devastating famine in China’s modern history (Chen and Zhou, 2007; Zhou, 2013; Dikötter, 2010). The concurrent withdrawal of Soviet aid seriously affected the progress of the Third Five-Year Plan and further aggravated China’s socioeconomic development (Adelman and Sunding, 1987; Usov, 2006b). Moreover, economic experiments of the Great Leap Forward were followed by social and political experiments of the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that led to a profound systemic crisis (MacFarquhar and Fairbank, 1991).

The so-called “second generation of leaders,” headed by Deng Xiaoping, came to power soon after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 and made a sharp and decisive turn from “permanent revolution” (不断革命, bùduàn gémìng) to “socialism with Chinese

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22 Between 1959 and 1961, China lost, by some estimates, 52 million people in the Great Famine (Mao, 2014)
characteristics” (中国特色社会主义, zhōngguó tèsè shèhuì zhǔyì). In the four decades after China’s government officially initiated the “reform and opening up” policies in 1978, China has successfully lifted a record number of people out of poverty, achieved a rapid increase in living standards, reached a sustained level of economic growth, and emerged as an active participant in the global trade, gaining stature and influence in world affairs and becoming a player of consequence on the international stage. Martin Jacques (2009) enthusiastically summarizes China’s developmental experience in the 21st century:

The emergent Chinese model bears witness to a new kind of capitalism where the state is hyperactive and omnipresent in a range of different ways and forms: in providing assistance to private firms, in a galaxy of state-owned enterprises, in managing the process by which the renminbi slowly evolves towards fully convertible status and, above all, in being the architect of an economic strategy which has driven China’s economic transformation. China’s success suggests that the Chinese model of the state is destined to exercise a powerful global influence, especially in the developing world, and thereby transform the terms of future economic debate. (p. 185)

Despite such positive assessments, there are plenty of far less favorable aspects of China’s extraordinary transformation. China’s development so far has been extremely resource-intensive, and its current success cannot be divorced from the various domestic challenges related to the environmental and resource sustainability of its growth trajectory.

China’s energy problems are vast, complex, and increase exponentially as China continues its development. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, energy resources have been perceived in China as a matter of national security and a source of chronic vulnerability. After struggling to achieve energy self-sufficiency throughout the 1950s, China enjoyed it for more almost three decades. Energy exports were the major source of foreign exchange and played a vital role in China’s modernization in the late 1970s and the mid-1980s. In the early 1990s, China began transitioning rapidly
from self-sufficient to import-dependent development. China became a coal importer in 2002 and a natural gas importer in 2007. However, the shift is specifically noticeable for oil: in the 1980s China’s oil production was 35 percent more than its consumption but since 2003 over one-half of oil consumed in China has been imported (BP Energy Charting Tool 2016).

Between the 2000s and the 2010s, China’s industrial sector accounted for 70 percent of final energy consumption. Contrary to popular assumptions, the rapid and extensive development of industry is not directly correlated to the accelerated growth of oil demand (Liu et al., 2016, see Figure 1). Oil demand increased by 567 percent in industry, but in other sectors it has been growing faster (Liu et al., 2016, p. 58). In fact, the industrial sector’s share of total oil consumption even decreased from 59 percent in 1990 to 41 percent in 2014. Industry has been contributing to the total oil consumption by driving oil demand in the transport sector that went up by 2097 percent between 1980 and 2012 (Liu et al., 2016, p. 58). While the share of oil in the total industrial energy fuel mix did not change since the early 1990s, fluctuating around 15–16 percent, the share of oil in the transportation sector fuel mix jumped to 90 percent in the mid-2000s (Leung, 2010, p. 937). Specifically, the accelerated use of diesel for road transportation closely correlates to the development of heavy industries that boomed throughout the 1990s and 2000s, such as construction, coal, shipbuilding, steel, and cement (Meidan et al., 2015, p. 4). For more than a decade after 2000 the demand for diesel grew with 8 percent annual average rates. Even though it started slowing down in 2011 and declined in 2013 for the first time in the past four decades, domestic consumption and further development of the transport sector will likely continue to precipitate a modest growth of diesel consumption in the future.
Socioeconomic changes of the 2000s have also added additional pressure to oil consumption. China’s urban population grew from 35.4 percent in 2000 to 57.35 percent in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics of China [NBSC], 2017). At the same time, the disposable income per capita of urban residents skyrocketed, showing a 10 percent increase annually (NBSC, 2017). China’s new dynamic consumer culture promotes a lifestyle that is ecologically destructive and fundamentally dependent on non-renewable sources of energy. High fossil fuel use and carbon-intensive behavior are now the major consumer patterns of China’s households (Dai et al., 2012; Feng et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2009). The spread of “car culture” that goes hand in hand with urbanization and expansion of the urban middle class is one of the most vivid examples of the relationships between socio-economic changes and oil consumption.

Figure 1. Oil consumption by sector in China (Mtoe) in 2014

![Pie chart showing oil consumption by sector in China in 2014]

China's total oil consumption reached 527,96 Mtoe in 2014.

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23 Source: China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, 2016) and BP Energy Charting Tool, 2016.
In the 2000s, Chinese cities became less pedestrian and cyclist friendly, the daily travel distance of urban residents significantly increased, and the use of public transport escalated considerably at the expense of non-motorised transport modes (Pan, Shen, and Zhang, 2009; Wang, Chai, and Li, 2011). At the same time, owning a car became an important badge of middle-class social status for the urban Chinese (Gerth, 2010; Marks, 2012). The overall number of civilian vehicles on the roads increased from 15.45 million in 2006 to 108.7 million in 2016, while the number of private passenger cars grew from 11.49 million to 101.5 million (NBSC, 2017). Gasoline is the second-largest consumed oil product in China with an estimated 23 percent share and, due to the growth in the number of vehicles, its consumption rose to 17812 Mtoe in 2015 (IWEP ACSS, 2016, p. 132). In addition, the huge boom in car ownership and rapid development of the transport sector, in general, spurred energy-hungry domestic auto production. China surpassed the US, Japan, Germany, and South Korea and became the largest auto manufacturer in 2012 (Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles [OICA], 2017). In 2016, China’s production of passenger cars reached 24.420 million units (OICA, 2017) and continues to grow. To put China’s car culture in global perspective, the share of car owners in China is only 17 percent, whereas 88 percent of Americans have a car, Japan and South Korea trail closely behind the US with 81 percent and 83 percent of car owners respectively, and the median national share of car owners in the European Union is 79 percent (Pew Research Center, 2015). In fact, China’s share of car owners is significantly below the international average of 35 percent and is less than the share of car owners in countries such as El Salvador (19 percent), Nigeria (18 percent), and South Africa (31 percent) (Pew Research Center, 2015). Given that China’s low numbers, it is reasonable to expect that the expansion of car culture in China will push consumption of oil for quite some time.
Why does all this matter? Many interdependences between China and the world are economic – most notable examples include trade relations and financial flows – while other, no less important, forms of mutual interdependency concern global environmental degradation and natural resource shortage. Consequently, inasmuch as China now occupies an important place in an increasingly interdependent world, the sustainability of China’s development is not “their” but “our” problem. Both inside and outside China, the general consensus is that the resource-intensive model of development is unsustainable in the short and long terms. But how will China address resource shortage? If China’s modern history is a guide, China will transform swiftly and deliberately, solving the problems that it currently faces and will move on to the next set of problems that it will create in the interim. That is why it is particularly important to understand how China itself defines its development in the context of energy deficit, as well as how China imagines the future and prepares for it.

How does modern China define and communicate its identity in international energy relations and how does China make its energy choices? This is the central question that I address in this chapter. I start with China’s quest for “self-reliance” in the 1950s and the story of the Daqing oilfield. Further, I discuss the legacy of “self-reliance” and transition to the “going global” energy strategy in the era of “reform and opening-up” in the 1990s and the early 2000s. In the second part of this chapter, I focus on China’s discursive politics of energy in the mid-2000s and the early 2010s. Using intertextual discourse analysis, I was able to identify the dominant discursive constructions in China’s energy politics and trace how they shifted and changed over the past ten years. When this part of the analysis was completed, I was able to determine how these discursive constructions support and sustain specific interpretations of China’s energy strategy, while excluding
others or rendering them marginal. This helped me to define norms, meanings, and ideas that constitute *China’s energy paradigm*.

Overall, the final dataset contains 349 texts. Its core contains 309 textual documents in Chinese, including 234 documents for Model 1 (official discourses, see *Table 2*), 21 documents for Model 2 (wider political discourses), and 74 documents for Model 3B (marginal political discourses). All textual documents were collected from the official websites of governmental institutions and through archival research at the National Library of China (Beijing, China). Fieldwork observations, conducted in the city of Daqing in November 2016, and visual materials contribute an additional 24 texts to Model 3A (cultural representations). In sum, the final dataset encompasses a rich and diverse body of information that is well suited to examining China’s discursive energy politics.
Table 2. Model 1: China’s official discourses, 2005-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hu Jintao, President of China, 2003-2012</th>
<th>Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister of China, 2003-2012</th>
<th>Xi Jinping, President of China, since 2012</th>
<th>Li Keqiang, Prime Minister of China, since 2012</th>
<th>Li Zhaoxing, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2003-2007</th>
<th>Yang Jiechi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2007-2012</th>
<th>Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, since 2012</th>
<th>National Energy Administration, established in 2008</th>
<th>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including public statements of ambassadors and senior diplomats</th>
<th>State Council</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.1. Evolution of China’s energy strategy from the 1950s to the 2000s: “Self-reliance,” “going out,” and “scientific development”

This section discusses the evolution of China’s energy strategy from the mid-1950s to the early 2000s. It also tells the story of China’s oil that starts with the discovery of oil in Daqing in 1959 and goes all the way to China’s commitment to “peaceful rise” and “world harmony” in the early 2000s.

Daqing: The “big celebration” in the history of China’s oil

Right after the People’s Republic of China was established, China joined the “battle for oil” (石油大会战, Shíyóu dàhuì zhàn). During the first decade of this battle, Soviet technical advisers and specialists controlled the development of China’s petroleum industry. China also was dependent on the Soviet Union for approximately 80 percent of drilling equipment and machinery and imported Soviet crude oil and refined oil products (Cheng, 1976, p. 128). As a result, the Sino-Soviet split of the mid-1950s created an acute shortage of oil that forced China’s government to accelerate efforts to increase domestic extraction and production capacity. Soon Daqing, located in the northeastern part of the country in Heilongjiang province, became the frontline of China’s “battle for oil” and the axial symbol of China’s economic and political independence.

Daqing is the largest oil field in China. Official narratives link its discovery directly to the core of China’s nation-building project by connecting it to the 10th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC. Daqing’s history formally started four days before National Day celebrations on September 26, 1959, when, according to official Chinese sources, oil flowed from Songji No. 3 well in Songliao Basin. In 1960, Daqing’s proved oil reserves were estimated to be 400 million tonnes (Feng et al., 2012, p. 6). Production grew rapidly
and, already by the end of 1963, 46.3 percent of all oil produced in China came from Daqing (Lim, 2010, p. 19).

The very name “Daqing” emphasizes its symbolic importance and ideological underpinning as it is derived from a combination of two words: “big” (大, dà) and “celebration” (庆, qìng). All spheres of the production process and daily life in Daqing were ideologized and from the outset framed as a never-ending struggle. Daqing was frequently referred to as a “battleground” (战区, zhànqū) or a “great battle” (大清会战, dà qīng huìzhàn)24. The Political Department of Daqing Oilfield established a political supervisory structure similar to the one of the People’s Liberation Army of China (Hama, 1980, pp. 190-191) and published weekly ideological updates in a newsletter entitled Battle report of Daqing (大庆战报, Dàqìng zhànbào)25. As Chu-yuan Cheng (1976) points out, Daqing was deliberately designed “so as not to replicate the typical oil-boom city of the West” (p. 11).

Yu Qiuli26, who was responsible for the early development of China’s oil industry, instituted in Daqing a policy of self-sufficiency and frugality for oilfield workers and their dependents that subsequently has evolved into a cult of self-imposed asceticism and ideological vigor.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Daqing played a distinct role in the Maoist ideology, when China’s authorities turned oil workers into the national “labor

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24 The use of the term “great battle” (大会战, dàhuì zhàn) is specifically noteworthy because this term was also used to describe the guerilla warfare during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).

25 Battle Report of Daqing matured into a local daily newspaper. In 1982, it was renamed as Daqing Daily.

26 Yu Qiuli (余秋里) belongs to the so-called “first generation” leaders of the Communist Party of China. He joined the party in 1931 and took part in the Long March of 1934 as a soldier of the PLA. After 1949, he became the head of the Military Academy of China and thereafter held various posts in the central military command. In 1958, Yu Qiuli was appointed as Minister of Petroleum Industry by Mao Zedong. He occupied this post until 1964, when he became a deputy chief of the State Planning Commission. From 1977 until his retirement in 1987, he was a member the Central Politburo of the CPC.
model’ (模式 or 典型, móshì or diànxíng) in the industrial sector. Wang Jinxī, a head of a drilling crew, became the focus of the “Industry Learn from Daqing” (工业学大庆, Gōngyè Xué Dàqìng) national ideological campaign and gradually earned the status of a national hero. He was renowned for what later came to be known as the “iron man spirit” (铁人精神, tiěrén jīngshén) or “Daqing spirit” (大庆精神, Dàqìng jīngshén): selflessness, unconditional loyalty to the party-state, and exceptional courage to work in hostile and harsh conditions for the sake of national prosperity. Featured on numerous propaganda posters and in newspaper articles, Wang Jinxī literally became the face of China’s industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Figure 2a and Figure 2b). After Wang Jinxī’s death in 1970, China’s authorities carefully preserved his legacy. Between 1971 and 1978, the People’s Daily mentioned Wang Jingxi in 361 editorials (Renmin Ribao Tuwen Shujuku, 2017). Wang Jinxī also became a character of many children’s books and in 1973 his biography was published in 150 thousand copies. To commemorate Wang Jinxī’s contribution to the development of national oil industry, China’s authorities erected elaborate monuments all around China, including a massive Iron Man Memorial in Daqing (opened in 1971, subsequently expanded).

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27 For a brief period between 1966 and 1970 at the peak of the Culture Revolution, Daqing several times came under attack from the leaders of the Gang of Four; however, its celebrity status of the “model” was quickly restored (see Lim 2010, pp. 79-106).

28 Wang Jinxī is the most famous of “five red flags” (五面红旗, wǔ miàn hóngqí), the group of model celebrity oil-workers that also included Duan Xingzhi, Ma Deren, Xue Guobao, and Zhu Hongcha.
Figure 2a. Model worker poster
Wang Dawei (1974) The spirit of Iron Man Wang will be handed down generation after generation (铁人精神代代相传)

Figure 2b. Model worker poster
Ha Qiongwen (1965) Study the spirit of Daqing (苏俄大庆精神)

On a broader scale, Daqing and the oil industry epitomized success and leadership of the Communist Party of China. In the words of Zhou Enlai, Daqing symbolized “the red flag that was erected by Chairman Mao himself” (Renmin Ribao, 1967a). According to the official narratives, the “red flag of Daqing” (大庆红旗, Dàqìng hóngqí) made “American imperialists” and “Soviet revisionists” shiver in fear and admiration (Renmin Ribao Tuwen Shujuku, 2017).

At the end of 1963, Zhou Enlai attested that “China does not need to import oil anymore and can be primarily self-sufficient” (Renmin Ribao, 1963). Soon after, the idea
of self-reliance\textsuperscript{29} became a guiding principle for the energy industry development, striking deep roots into the official energy discourses and a broader discourse of national development.

In the Chinese context, the idea of self-reliance is related to the locus of control over the trajectory of national development. First and foremost, it implies an orientation on the maximum possible independence and autonomy in decision-making. Following this logic, energy self-sufficiency becomes an ultimate programmatic and policy goal and is a corollary of self-reliance. Starting from the late 1950s, the idea of self-reliance, both economically and politically, was taken to its extreme as complete non-involvement in international relations and isolation. During this time, self-reliance in the development of the energy sector was framed not as a rational and deliberate developmental choice but as a matter of survival.

**Getting used to the new energy security imperatives**

Between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s, China’s enthusiasm and great optimism about the future of Daqing and the development of the oil industry, in general, were taken up by the West. Western imagination of China’s success ran wild as a result of statements made by China’s authorities (Bartke, 1977, p. 21; Yeh, 1962, p. 1-2) and was further ignited by reports of journalists, such as Anna Louise Strong (e.g., 1963) and Wilfred Burchett (e.g., 1974). However, as Lim Tai Wei (2010) indicates, the exact location and size of Daqing were unknown outside China for almost a decade and up till the mid-1970s most of the available information about Daqing in the West came from a report provided by an anonymous mainland China immigrant to Taiwan (pp. 10-11).

\textsuperscript{29} The concept of self-reliance is represented in the official discourse by two terms: “one one’s own strength (自力更生, zìlìgēngshēng) and “self-reliance” (自给, zìgěi).
In 1974, the chairman of the Japan-China Oil Import Council, Ryutaro Hasegawa, visited Daqing and announced on his return to Japan that soon China will become Japan’s major oil supplier (Smil, 2004, p. 8). As Vaclav Smil (2004) accurately puts it, Japanese “wishful thinking was mistaken for a genuine critical forecasting” by many international experts (p. 9). A number of renowned Asia experts in the United States concluded that by the 1980s China’s oil production would have a huge impact on the international energy market. Selig S. Harrison (1975), for example, branded China as “the next oil giant,” claiming that “the net effect of expanded Chinese oil exports would be to reduce global dependence on the Middle East and the Persian Gulf” (p. 4). In a similar vein, Park Choon-ho and Jerome Alan Cohen (1975) certified that “the oil-poor China of the past” would soon “emerge as an oil power of the future” (p. 28) and warned that “enormous quantities of [China’s oil] may be a mixed blessing” for the United States (p. 49). Arthur Jay Klinghoffer (1976) believed that oil from Daqing transformed China “into a regional oil power in East Asia” and “a successful rival of the Soviet Union in the game of Asian oil politics” (p. 540). For their part, Soviet experts did not recognize China as a potential competitor, yet still were worried that China was becoming increasingly independent and assertive (e.g., Kulpin, 1975; Kapitsa, 1979). Nonetheless, while China’s oil production had indeed skyrocketed from 11.31 Mtoe in 1965 to 106.15 Mtoe in 1979 (BP Energy charting tool, 2017), China was not destined to become a new Kuwait or a new Saudi Arabia.

In the 1980s, China became the world’s fourth-largest oil producer outside the Middle East and started to sell its oil on the international market, signing contracts with Japan, Thailand, Philippines, Romania, and Hong Kong (Zha, 2005a, p. 16). However, China’s career as an oil exporter was soon to end. After the introduction of the “reforms and opening-up” policies and the turn from Mao Zedong’s “permanent revolution” to Deng
Xiaoping’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in 1978, China emerged as “the world’s factory floor” and rapid economic development accelerated domestic demand for oil. As early as in 1993, China turned from a net oil exporter into a net oil importer. Meanwhile, the productivity of China’s oilfields worsened, and the quality of domestic production declined steadily because of resource depletion. By the mid-1990s, all radical options for the development of domestic energy capacity had already been exhausted and it became clear that in the near to medium-term China would be unable to overcome its foreign energy dependence on fossil fuels (Zha 2005b, p. 28).

China’s first oil-boom town Yumen, located in the northwest of Gansu province, had turned into a “ghost town” by the mid-2000s when the deposits of the Laojunmiao oilfield were exhausted. Daqing has also experienced an economic downturn, yet it avoided the fate of Yumen because of its celebrity status. The central and provincial governments closely monitored the post-industrial transition and economic development of Daqing in the 2000s (Wang, Chen, Zhang, Tong, and Ma, 2014). When I visited Daqing in November 2016, the city was bearing all the typical signs of the decay under a command economy. A high-speed train from Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang province, brought me to a newly-built modern railway station that was obviously too big for a city the size of Daqing. Thousands of pumpjacks scattered around the city were nodding rhythmically near closed shopping malls and new residential areas unclaimed by tenants. Newly-renovated roads were empty.

While Daqing’s population is aging and declining, the central and provincial authorities are pouring investments not only into Daqing’s infrastructure but also into its heroic heritage. Iron Man Memorial (Figure 3) opened in 1971 was subsequently expanded in 1991 and 2004. In 2006, the new memorial complex was built to celebrate the 47th
anniversary of the discovery of Daqing oilfield. It occupies 21 square kilometers and includes a park with a 30-meter-tall granite statue of Wang Jinxi and a museum with about 2000 exhibits.

Figure 3. Daqing Iron Man Wang Jinxi Memorial  

In addition to the Iron Man Memorial, Daqing, like any other major oil city in the world, has a museum that tells the story of its oil. The main exhibition at the Museum of Daqing Oilfield is divided into three parts: The Surprising Discovery of Daqing; A Difficult Start of the Great History; and The People of Daqing Oilfield Are Its Backbone. A large part of the exhibition consists of lifelike specimens and practical artifacts, including personal items of Daqing’s oil-workers and management (e.g., Figure 4). It also features diverse works of art dedicated to oil-workers of Daqing (e.g., Figure 5a and Figure 5b).
Consequently, the Museum of Daqing Oilfield is not an industrial museum but a heritage center: it is devoted almost entirely to the stories of the people who built China’s oil industry rather than to the history of the industry itself. At the same time, these stories are carefully bound to the official narrative of China’s development since the establishment of the PRC. In this sense, the Museum of Daqing Oilfield is a museum of China’s political history and – more than anything else – showcases the ideological role that the oil industry has been playing in China since the 1950s.

In 2003, to avoid the depletion of the oilfield and to cut capital spending, CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) decided to strategically bring the production down to 803.289 kbd. Daqing became a “centurial oilfield”, meaning that it is will operate for a century and is supposed to be China’s major domestic oil production base until 2060 (CNPC, 2017)\textsuperscript{30}. According to Xi Jingping (2009), the goal of Daqing in the coming decades is two-fold: “to maintain for as long as possible high and stable production in order to ease the tension of domestic oil demand and to protect the national energy security,” and “to promote economic development of Heilongjiang province and revitalization of the old industrial bases of the northeastern region in general in order to support steady growth of national economy.” Consequently, even though Daqing is not an active center of thriving industrial development anymore, it is still a symbol of this development. Importantly, it still plays a vital role in China’s quest for the maximum possible self-reliance.

\textsuperscript{30} In the 2000s, China not only took care of Daqing oilfield but also started to build a system of strategic petroleum reserves. Current capacity of China’s strategic petroleum reserves is 36.9 Mtoe (Xie et al, 2017, p. 333), which is equivalent to approximately 30 days of oil imports in 2016.
Figure 4. The Museum of Daqing Oilfield, November 2016
An oil worker studies the “two theories” of Chairman Mao after a shift.

Figure 5a. The Museum of Daqing Oilfield, November 2016

Figure 5b. The Museum of Daqing Oilfield, November 2016
Zheng Zhenhe (1977) *The iron man Wang Jinxi studies the “two theories” of Chairman Mao.*
The “Going global” strategy and China’s NOCs in the 2000s and the 2010s

In the 1980s, China’s oil consumption increased annually by an average of 5.4 percent. In 1993, China’s oil consumption surpassed its oil production, and as a result, China became a net importer of oil. In 2002, while still holding the title of the world’s fourth-largest oil producer outside the Middle East, China became the world’s second-largest oil consumer. Between 1993 and 2015, its net oil import dependency\(^{31}\) climbed from 8 percent to 59 percent (see Table 3) and, so far, oil is the only source of energy for which China meets the demand by such massive net imports.

In 1997, a policy paper authored by Prime Minister Li Peng acknowledged that domestic oil production “cannot keep up with the needs of economic development” and stated that, while China is still determined to expand and diversify domestic oil production, it will also have to “go on the global level” and “invest into the development of multifaceted cooperation with foreign countries” (China Internet Information Center [CIIC], 2012)\(^{32}\). This paper signified the official shift from “self-reliance” to “going global” (走出去) in China’s energy strategy. The three large state-owned companies – China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China Petrochemical Group Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Petroleum Group Corporation (CNPC) – became instruments in the implementation of this strategy.

\(^{31}\) Net import dependency stands for the percentage of the amount of net oil imports over the amount of total oil consumption.

### Table 3. China’s oil production, consumption, and trade: 1993-2016

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production Mtoe</th>
<th>Consumption Mtoe</th>
<th>Imports Mtoe</th>
<th>Exports Mtoe</th>
<th>Net imports Mtoe</th>
<th>Net import dependency (%)</th>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>105.95</td>
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<td>-18.06</td>
<td>-9.79</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>124.90</td>
<td>89.75</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>-36.30</td>
<td>-27.30</td>
<td>-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>138.31</td>
<td>112.86</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>-31.10</td>
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<td>-21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>144.03</td>
<td>145.79</td>
<td>36.20</td>
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<td>149.02</td>
<td>160.20</td>
<td>36.73</td>
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</tr>
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<td>45.40</td>
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<td>18.40</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>160.13</td>
<td>192.15</td>
<td>67.90</td>
<td>-28.20</td>
<td>39.70</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>64.80</td>
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<td>23%</td>
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<td>-21.72</td>
<td>75.76</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>164.83</td>
<td>229.09</td>
<td>91.20</td>
<td>-20.50</td>
<td>70.70</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>166.87</td>
<td>248.10</td>
<td>102.70</td>
<td>-21.40</td>
<td>81.30</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>169.59</td>
<td>276.94</td>
<td>131.90</td>
<td>-25.40</td>
<td>106.50</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>174.05</td>
<td>323.41</td>
<td>172.90</td>
<td>-22.40</td>
<td>150.50</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>181.35</td>
<td>328.93</td>
<td>171.16</td>
<td>-28.88</td>
<td>142.28</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>184.77</td>
<td>353.15</td>
<td>194.50</td>
<td>-26.30</td>
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<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>186.32</td>
<td>370.66</td>
<td>211.40</td>
<td>-26.60</td>
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<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>190.44</td>
<td>378.06</td>
<td>230.16</td>
<td>-29.40</td>
<td>200.76</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>189.49</td>
<td>392.81</td>
<td>256.42</td>
<td>-3.92</td>
<td>252.51</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>203.01</td>
<td>448.49</td>
<td>294.37</td>
<td>-4.08</td>
<td>290.29</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>202.88</td>
<td>465.11</td>
<td>315.94</td>
<td>-4.12</td>
<td>311.82</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>207.48</td>
<td>487.07</td>
<td>330.89</td>
<td>-3.88</td>
<td>327.00</td>
<td>67%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>209.96</td>
<td>508.14</td>
<td>281.74</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
<td>280.13</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>211.43</td>
<td>527.96</td>
<td>361.80</td>
<td>-4.21</td>
<td>357.58</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>214.56</td>
<td>561.84</td>
<td>335.48</td>
<td>-2.87</td>
<td>332.62</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>199.69</td>
<td>587.66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

In the process of reorganization of ministries responsible for the energy sector, these three national oil companies (NOCs) were created in the 1980s. The ministries were repeatedly reshuffled, and eventually, ministerial authority was forwarded to three state-owned enterprises (Yang, Duan, Huan et al. 1994, p. 7). CNOOC was created in 1982 from

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33 Source: BP Energy Charting Tool (2016) and CSY, various issues.
the offshore assets of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry and is currently responsible for the overall offshore work in cooperation with foreign enterprises. In 1983, Sinopec was created from the downstream assets of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry and the Ministry of Chemical Industry. Sinopec received full control over downstream production and took the responsibilities for all oil refining, marketing, and petrochemical manufacturing. Finally, in 1988, the CNPC was established to take control over the remaining onshore upstream oil and gas production activities. China’s authorities stimulated the development and growth of CNOOC, Sinopec, and CNPC though price liberalization and the introduction of management incentives and internal market competition (Houser, 2008). At the end of the 1990s, China’s NOCs were ready and had a market incentive to “go global” even in the absence of a mandate by China’s authorities (Downs, 2006, 2007; Zhang, 2012c). In fact, the NOCs started to invest in developing new oil resources outside China years before the government included “going global” into the national energy strategy (Zhang, 2015, p. 280).

However, China’s NOCs became visible on the international energy market and the level of their overseas investment started growing rapidly only after they were granted the official approval of the government. In the 1990s, NOCs directed their investments at fields with proven reserves and focused on bringing their overseas production home (Alon et al., 2015, p. 298). However, by the mid-2000s, China’s domestic refinery capacity expanded, and the NOCs could diversify their investment portfolio by engaging in the production and exploration of different types of crude oil (Zha, 2005b, p. 28). At the same time, the NOCs became more ambitious by targeting exploration areas with unproven reserves and expanding the geographic scope of their business activities. Most often, the NOCs advanced their trading operations to maximize profits regardless of the oil’s final
destination. Between 2005 and 2006, when overseas mergers and acquisitions of China’s NOCs peaked, 93 percent of their foreign production was sold on local markets, whereas equity oil\textsuperscript{34} made up only 15 percent of China’s oil imports (Chen, 2011, p. 607, see also Houser, 2008, p. 155). Consequently, through overseas equity investments China’s NOCs were trying to secure control over the upstream to increase their profits, rather than to advance China’s national energy security. China’s goals became even more obvious in the period after 2008, when China’s NOCs expanded their overseas activities in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Alon, Leung, and Simpson, 2015).

China experts report that, even though China’s government does not dictate to the NOCs where, how, and when to invest, all overseas projects initiated by the NOCs have to be authorized by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)\textsuperscript{35} and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before being implemented (Downs 2006, 2008; Andrews-Speed 2012; Zhang, 2015). In other words, China’s party-state monitors and supports but does not run overseas activities of the NOCs. The dynamics of China’s domestic political and economic development in the 2000s led to a high degree of convergence between the interests of the state and of the NOCs. While it is unclear whether China’s NOCs actually consider national interests and security in their business activities abroad, they comply with and actively support the official energy security discourse (Zhang, 2015, p. 280-281).

China’s “going global” energy strategy is not limited to the support of the outward investment of NOCs. It also includes merging energy security objectives with foreign policy and diplomatic efforts. As Chen Shaofeng (2008), a political scientist from the

\textsuperscript{34} Equity oil is that proportion of production that a concession owner has the legal and contractual right to retain.

\textsuperscript{35} NDRC is a successor to the State Development Planning Commission.
Peking University, points out, “securing energy resources abroad and diversifying import sources have de facto been incorporated into China’s foreign strategy” (p. 93). In the 2000s, China advanced its bilateral relationships with oil-rich countries, such as Iran, Sudan, Libya, Myanmar, Russia, and Kazakhstan. This makes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an important and powerful stakeholder in China’s energy strategy development.

As a political economist of Peking University, Zha Daojiong (2005b), notes, between the 1950s and the 1970s, China had “20 years of self-reliance in a tense international environment,” but, up until the early 1990s, it did not have to worry about its energy security (p. 28). The legacy of self-reliance and its influence on China’s energy security is still strong, even though it was clear in the early 2000s that “the era of energy self-sufficiency has passed” and now China has “no alternative but to learn how to survive in the interdependent world” (Zha, 2005b, p. 29). At the dawn of the “going out” strategy, China was still focused on maintaining its freedom from outside control and minimizing outside influence. In this sense, the “going out” strategy should be seen not as a substitute for China’s energy self-reliance strategy but as its extension and evolution.

**New variables in China’s energy development: Sustainability and environment**

Energy resources, and oil specifically, from the outset, were ideologized and securitized issues in China. As a result, up until the mid-2000s, China’s energy security was limited to the supply side. China’s state did not pay significant attention to control over domestic energy consumption and advancement of a domestic clean energy agenda. China’s energy security strategy focused on keeping high economic growth, and energy resources, in this framework, were viewed as strategic commodities rather than normal economic commodities to be allocated by the free market. The initial panic over China’s
energy dependency started to subside gradually both inside and outside China in the mid-2000s. China’s state reconciled with the fact that substantial oil imports were China’s new normal and acknowledged that growing dependency on imported energy was not China’s only energy problem.

China’s high fossil fuel use and carbon-intensive development also aggravated environmental degradation. By the mid-2000s, thick smog covered Beijing, Chongqing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Harbin, Ürümqi, and many other major Chinese cities, cutting visibility and causing chief disruptions in transportation and daily activities. The carbon dioxide (CO₂) footprint of China’s energy consumption was far greater than that of any other single country. Coal is largely to blame for the degradation of air quality and the increase of CO₂ emissions: it contributes about 70 percent of China’s total dust, nitrogen oxide emissions and CO₂ emissions and up to 90 percent of China’s total sulfur dioxide (SO₂). However, the growing consumption of oil by the road transport and industrial sectors adds their fair share to China’s environmental degradation (He, Huo, Zhang et al. 2005; Alam and Paramati, 2015). Environmental destruction started to threaten China’s economic growth, whereas rising incomes and rapid urbanization increased the demand for environmental amenities and thus political pressure for environmental protection.

In the mid-2000s, China’s state shifted the focus from economic development measured in the growth of its GDP to improving the national environmental landscape and social sustainability. The “fourth generation of leaders” headed by Hu Jintao promised to evaluate China’s developmental success based on “the satisfaction of the people” (Central Committee of the CPC, 2003). China’s new aspiration was “harmony” (和谐, héxié), a concept with Confucian overtones (e.g., Ge, 2006, pp. 30-42). On the domestic level,
“harmony” was defined as “the development of the entire society in a sustainable and balanced manner” and “putting people first.” It was operationalized as five overarching and interdependent developmental targets (known as the “five harmonies”): (1) harmony in the development of urban and rural areas (emphasizing rural development); (2) harmony in regional development (emphasizing the gap between the coastal provinces and the rest of the country); (3) harmony in the balance between economic and social development (with the emphasis on creating more jobs and providing better social services); (4) harmony in relations between people and nature (stressing resource conservation and environmental protection); (5) harmony in the balance between domestic development and openness to the international markets (Central Committee of the CPC, 2003).

“Harmony” became the central theme of the 17th National Congress of the CPC held in 2007, and China’s domestic development officially became encapsulated in the concept of a “harmonious society” (和谐社会, héxié shèhuì). After the Congress, “harmony” spilled all over China: university students were urged to “make the campus life harmonious,” passengers of taxis were encouraged to build “harmonious relations with the driver,” and even local farmers markets started to promote “harmonious trade.” After 2007, the aspiration for harmony was omnipresent: one could find it everywhere from the “harmonious” high-speed trains (和谐号, Héxié Hào) to the “harmonious family” sales promotion (和谐家庭 Héxié Jiātíng) of the American fast-food chain KFC.

“Harmony” also became the new mode and the ultimate goal of China’s interactions with the international community. In 2007, Hu Jintao highlighted that China maintains “that the people of all countries should join hands and strive to build the harmonious world

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36 The author made those observations in December 2007 and March-July 2008 in Beijing and Xian.”
of lasting peace and common prosperity” (和谐世界, héxié shijìè). Hu (2007) also made a commitment to contribute to the building of this “harmonious world” by ensuring that China’s rise would be peaceful (和平发展, hépíng fāzhǎn), calling the aspiration for the peace a “strategic choice that the government and people of China have made in light of the development trend of the times and their own fundamental interests” (see also Hu, 2005).

Another major contribution of the “fourth generation” to China’s ideology was the concept of a “scientific outlook on development” (科学发展观, kēxué fāzhǎn guān) that corresponded with the quest for harmony on the domestic and international levels. “Scientific outlook” is not about science per se but about the quality of development, as it promotes a conception of balanced and inclusive growth. On the international level, China’s leaders were linking “scientific outlook” to the international “sustainability” discourse (可持续, kě chíxù with a focus on climate change), whereas on the domestic level the emphasis was on the use of innovations, technology, and expertise in solving China’s social and ecological problems.

Overall, the two concepts – “harmonious society/world” and “scientific outlook on development” – defined a new developmental objective for China. In 2005, energy conservation and environmental protection were included in China’s overall economic development framework as a part of the 11th Five-Year Plan. The overarching goal was to

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37 The term “scientific development” was introduced right after Hu Jintao took office as the Chairman of CPC in the late 2002; however, it was fully developed into a coherent concept only by the 17th Congress of the CPC.

38 In 2005, the name of China’s national developmental program was changed from “plan” (计划) to “guideline” or “blueprint” (规划). According to the official statements, the difference is not only linguistic but also conceptual. While old “five-year plans” were setting mandatory growth targets for output, the new “five-year blueprints” issues guiding developmental targets.
reduce energy use per unit of GDP by 20 percent and cut national SO₂ emissions by 10 percent in the period between 2006 and 2010.

2.2. China’s discursive politics of energy: 2005-2016

The new slogan determines the new political direction.

– Ai Qing³⁹, Mao Zedong, 1941

In this section, I focus on China’s discursive energy politics between 2005 and 2016. First, I examine the evolution and diversification of China’s approach to energy resources. I define and explain the change in China’s framing of energy security and its political notion of oil. Further, I turn to contextualized actualizations of collective identities: Who are “we” and who are “they” in China’s energy politics? I explain how and with what effect China defines itself as well as its allies and adversaries in international energy politics. Finally, I map China’s energy paradigm by defining discursive constructions that are institutionalized as China’s energy strategy.

What does oil mean for China?

Energy security as a global political issue

As the first part of this chapter demonstrated, the availability of oil from the outset was ideologized and framed as a security issue in modern China. From the early 1950s to the early 2000s, China’s understanding of energy security was limited to the supply side and was focused on oil. With the rapid growth of China’s oil imports and even more so with the new focus on sustainable development in the mid-2000s, energy deficit has ceased to be an internal issue for China, and the concept of energy security has started to internationalize and expand.

³⁹ Ai Qing (1910-1996) is a famous Chinese writer who acted like a court poet during the early Mao era and is renowned for his contribution to the development of “modern poetry” in the mainland China.
Between 2006 and 2016, energy was often placed on an extensive list of new non-traditional security threats and the most current global developmental challenges, including terrorism, transnational cyber crimes, food insecurity, infection disease, natural disasters, and climate change (e.g., Yang, 2011; Hu, 2012b; Xi 2015b, 2016a). China’s official energy discourse also emphasized the complex interconnections within the international system that make balanced and equal energy development of all states within it a common value (e.g., State Council of the PRC, 2012; Li, 2012; Yang, 2012b).

In parallel with internationalization, the concept of energy security also started to incorporate new dimensions of energy development. In the 21st century, according to China’s authorities (State Council of the PRC, 2012), China’s energy resources ought to be stable and secure, as well as economically efficient and clean, because “China’s energy development not only guarantees domestic economic and social development but also makes significant contributions to global energy security.”

Energy security now goes beyond the supply security of fossil fuels. Over the past decade, China has emerged as both the world’s largest producer and consumer of renewable energy technologies. The Renewable Energy Law of 2005 and the Energy Conservation Law of 2007 are official benchmarks for China’s “green” and “sustainable” energy development (绿色发展 and 可持续发展, lǜsè fāzhǎn and kě chìxù fāzhǎn). The Renewable Energy Law (2005, amended in 2009) specifies measures and goals relating to mandatory grid connection, price management regulation, special funds, and tax reliefs (State Council of the PRC, 2009). Importantly, this law sets the goal to increase the share of renewable resources in China’s total energy mix up to 15 percent by 2020. The Energy Conservation Law (State Council of the PRC, 2007) intends to strengthen energy conservation on the national level, specifically, for key energy-using entities. It also promotes efficient use of
energy, adoption of energy conservation technologies, and application of renewable energy in various areas. Between 2009 and 2010, renewable energy resources and technological development moved to the very center of China’s discursive politics of energy. As Zhang Guobao (2009) summarizes, China’s government realized that “if China neglects the renewable energy industry now, in the next ten years it will suddenly find itself falling behind other countries once again” (p. 43). As a result of this shift in thinking, “science and technology” became a new mantra of China’s energy development (e.g., Jiang, 2008; Hu, 2012c; Li, 2012; Liu, 2012c; Wu, 2014a).

The shift to a broader concept of energy security is closely associated with and follows the logic of “harmonious society/world” and “China’s peaceful rise.” For instance, reframing the notion of “harmonious society/world,” the authors of the 2007 China’s Energy Development Report focus on “development” and “peace.” In the manifesto-like introduction, they describe the availability of energy resources as a precondition of “development” and a potential obstacle to “peace,” emphasizing that the global quest for energy resources leads to a fierce competition between different groups of states, aggravates mistrust, and increases possible conflict between great powers. The authors of the report strongly argue in favor of “peaceful international cooperation” in the realm of energy development. In their opinion, shifting the focus from geopolitics to integrated, sustainable, and efficient development is the only solution for the global energy challenges in the 21st century. They also suggest that changing the approach to energy security on the international level will bring a noticeable change. By switching to a more inclusive and cooperative mode of international energy relations the countries of the Global North will understand that their energy security is not affected by the surge in energy demand in China, India, and other developing countries.
The scarcity of energy resources is constructed as producing international inequality and reinforcing the backlog in the development of the Global South in the 21st century. China’s officials see the availability of energy resources as a developmental right of all nations. In this sense, they put human development above environmental concerns. They do not deny negative impacts of climate change and its connection to the rising production and consumption of fossil fuels. At the same time, the attempts to impose universal consumption limits under the umbrella of climate change are labeled as actions that hinder economic growth and poverty reduction in the Global South (e.g., Wen, 2007b; Zhang, 2008c; Li, 2012).

Given their emphasis on globalization and interdependence, China’s officials find the solution to the contradictory energy problems in the realm of international politics. First of all, the countries of the Global North must recognize their “historical responsibilities” towards the Global South and act accordingly, generating the political will to ensure a fairer and more equitable global energy development (State Council of the PRC, 2005; Wen, 2007b). It is the Global South’s turn to realize its full potential and it must have an opportunity to allocate as many energy resources as it needs for its economic growth. However, China now treats economic growth as a means rather than an end. Following the logic of a “harmonious society/world,” China urges the countries of the Global South to not only prioritize their own economic success but also to generate the political will for a fundamental change in the mode of energy consumption because the one chosen by the Global North in the 19th and 20th century is unhealthy and unsustainable for the shared future of both the North and the South (Li, 2012).
Energy security and oil

Despite a general acknowledgment of environmental consequences of rising energy consumption of fossil fuels and the rapid expansion of solar, geothermal, wind, biofuels, and other non-traditional energy sources in the late 2000s and the 2010s, oil has kept its status as the key energy resource for China. The leading role of oil in Chinese thinking about energy resources results in frequent terminology substitution between “energy” and “oil” in scholarly research on energy security. Many Chinese academics either explicitly or implicitly define energy security as the security of oil supply (e.g., Zhao, 2006; Wu, 2009; Lin, 2014; Zhang and Zhang, 2015). Similarly, energy self-sufficiency is often understood as an ability to meet oil consumption needs from domestic supplies (e.g., Wei and Liu, 2006; Wu, 2013; Zha, 2012; Yan, 2016). The overwhelming majority of academic articles published in Chinese peer-review journals between 2005 and 2016 examine China’s energy development through the prism of the definitions of energy security offered by American scholars that emphasize relative gains concerns, prioritize short- and medium-term security challenges, and mainly focus on the acquisition of oil. In particular, the most frequently cited unresolved issue of China’s energy strategy is the reliability of the Malacca Strait as a route for China’s oil imports from the Middle East and Angola, the so-called “China’s Malacca dilemma” (马六甲困境, Mǎliùjiǎ kùnjìng).

The scholarly approach mirrors the official energy discourse that univocally describes the scarcity of oil as a security threat and a fundamental predicament for China’s national development. Moreover, the official energy discourse also often defines energy security as the reliability and availability of oil supplies. China’s latest white paper on energy policy (State Council of the PRC, 2012) highlights “resource restraints,” “low
energy efficiency,” and “increasing environmental pressure” as “tough challenges” of energy development, while defining “grave challenges” to national energy security in connection to oil as follows:

The country’s dependence on foreign energy sources has been increasing in recent years. In particular, the percentage of imported petroleum in total petroleum consumption has risen from 32 percent at the beginning of the 21st century to the present 57 percent. Marine transportation of petroleum and cross-border pipeline transmission of oil and gas face ever-greater security risks. Price fluctuations in the international energy market make it more difficult to guarantee the domestic energy supply. It will not be easy for China to maintain its energy security since its energy reserves are small and its emergency response capability is weak.

The central role of oil in the definition of energy security presupposes securitization of energy development in general, implying that governance and management of energy resources is a strategic task for a state. Consequently, while energy development, in general, is framed as a global/international challenge that should be approached as a matter of international politics rather than as a purely economic matter or a security threat, China’s approach to oil is drastically different.

*China’s oil: Reproducing Daqing spirit under the “socialist market economy”*

Daqing continues to epitomize China’s aspirations for oil and inspires China’s oil politics on both domestic and international levels, as it did six decades ago. Xi Jinping (2009) affirms that the Daqing spirit is still an important part of Chinese culture and Daqing, as a “modern oil city,” plays a key role in the implementation of the strategy of clean development and scientific development. The cover articles authored by Liu Tienan and Zhang Guobao, published by the *People’s Daily* in 2012, offer particularly clear-cut examples of the role of Daqing in China’s contemporary oil discourse. Liu’s article (2012a) argues that over the past ten years China “has been carefully studying the global situation, engaging in energy diplomacy, and actively implementing the ‘going global’ strategy.”
According to him, as a result, China was able to “build an overseas Daqing” (建成了 “海外大庆”, jiàncéng le “hǎiwài Dàqìng”) by securing the four strategic transportation channels for its oil imports (North-West, North-East, South-West, and maritime routes). In a similar vein, Zhang (2012b) gives a positive assessment of the development of China’s oil industry and, highlighting the success of China’s offshore oil production, concludes that in the early 2000s China “has recreated a Daqing on the sea” (再造了一个海上大庆, zàizàole yīgè hǎishàng dàqìng).

China’s authorities make sure that the population will be able to read those metaphors correctly. As was already mentioned in this chapter, the central and provincial governments support the fading economy of Daqing city and invest in its museum infrastructure, making Daqing city an attractive destination for domestic tourists. Social scientists and business management researchers study the evolution of the Daqing spirit (e.g., Li, 2012; Ma, 2009; Song and Wang, 2013; Wang, 2009). North-East Petroleum University (Daqing, Heilongjiang) and Northeast Normal University (Changchun, Jilin) both have Research Centers for the Daqing Spirit that focus on building the narrative of Daqing into the curriculums of provincial and sub-provincial Party schools. Moreover, with the support of the government, Daqing spirit, rebranded as “patriotism, entrepreneurship, realism, and dedication,” is visualized in films, documentaries, and TV-shows.

An excellent example is the film Iron Men (铁人, Tiěrén) that was released amidst the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2009 (see Figure 6). The leading actor, Wu Gang, “felt blessed to have the opportunity to represent the heroism that touched the whole country” (Renmin Ribao, 2009). However, the major goal of the film is not to remind the new generation of Chinese about the glory of industrialization and
fearlessness of China’s oil workers of the 1960s but to help the new generation form a link between the heritage of Maoist China and the present China that is building a “socialist market economy.”

![Posters for Iron Men (2009)](image)

**Figure 6. Posters for Iron Men (2009)**

The plot of *Iron Men* alternates between the story of a group of Daqing oil workers led by Wang Jinxi and a present-day story focused on a fictional character, Liu Sicheng, the son of one of Wang Jinxi’s comrades-in-arms. Liu Sicheng continues the work of his father: he is the head of a drilling crew that struggles to find oil in the middle of an unknown desert in the early 2000s. He collects items related to Wang Jinxi and is fascinated by the early history of Daqing. The audience learns about the Daqing spirit through Liu Sicheng’s recollections of the conversations he had with his father. In the course of a spiritual and professional struggle, the young man ends up embracing Daqing spirit and finds a balance
between his deep feeling of patriotism and seeking commercial success for the company that he represents.

This 50-million-yuan (approximately 7.5 million US dollar in 2009)\textsuperscript{40} film was funded by the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television, an executive branch under the State Council. The \textit{People’s Daily} reviewed \textit{Iron Men} as a “big piece of barnstorming widescreen entertainment” (Ren, 2009), yet the film still did not top the charts and did not achieve success in terms of the box office results. Daqing’s iron men and their spiritual descendants had to compete for the hearts of the audience with Tony Stark, the famous American Iron Man\textsuperscript{41}, and obviously lost the battle. What makes \textit{Iron Men} and other similar films (e.g., \textit{The Founding of a Republic}, 2009 and \textit{Aftershock}, 2010) interesting, however, is not their commercial or artistic value but their political background and agenda. \textit{Iron Men} is a part of the effort of China’s authorities to keep Daqing’s brand and ideological heritage alive. Like the exposition at the Museum of Daqing Oilfield, \textit{Iron Men} is yet another medium that communicates a whole set of official discourses, including the oil discourse.

The discourse that showcases Daqing as the model for China’s oil industry is reinforced not only by the government but also through the narratives produced by China’s NOCs. For example, the official website of CNPC has a page dedicated to the “Daqing spirit,” summarized as “dynamic, loyal, honest, and committed.” Linking its corporate history to the “miracle of China’s industry,” CNPC features the stories of “representative

\textsuperscript{40} For comparison, historical drama \textit{The Founding of a Republic} (2009) that marked the 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the PRC cost US$8.4 million. It was also commissioned by China’s film regulator and made by the state-owned film studio. Action movie \textit{Mulan: Rise of a Warrior} (2009) was produced without direct governmental grants and cost US$7.4 million.

\textsuperscript{41} Tony Stark, the Iron Man, is a fictional superhero portrayed by Robert Downey Jr. in the action film trilogy \textit{Iron Man} (2008, 2010, 2013) based on comic books published by Marvel Comics. For another comparison, the first film of the trilogy (2008) costed 140 million US dollars.
pioneers”: Wang Jinxi, the old oil industry hero, and Wang Qimin, the new oil industry hero (see Figure 7). Wang Qimin “consciously followed the example of old Iron Man Wang Jinxi” since he started to work for the Exploration and Development Research Institute of Daqing Petroleum Administration. This helped Wang Qimin to develop a set of methods for oilfield development that helped “Daqing oilfield to accomplish the goal of maintaining a high and stable annual output of 50 million tons for 27 consecutive years.” CNPC honors Wang Qimin as the “Iron Man of the New Era” for contributing to the “scientific research spirit of constant innovation and improvement.” By emphasizing the continuity of generations of oil workers, the narrative told by the CNPC also reinforces the idea of the continuity in the development of the industry.

In sum, in the 21st century, China’s oil and China’s ideology are as closely interconnected as they were in the early 1950s. The ability of the party-state leadership to ensure adequate and reliable supplies of oil remains one of the symbols of the enduring success of the Communist Party of China. A rebranded Daqing spirit helps to legitimate the party’s ongoing rule through historical continuity. Even though China’s major strategic goals in energy development have changed, when it comes to oil, China’s aim is still self-reliance and maximum possible self-sufficiency.
Figure 7. Representative pioneers.
Print screen of the English version of the official website of CNPC, 20 March 2018.
“We” and “They” in China’s discursive politics of energy

China as a developing country in international energy relations

Between 2005 and 2016, China was consistently identifying itself as a developing country that is facing a “complicated” and “grim” situation in the realm of energy security (e.g., Wen, 2006; Hu, 2008; Liu, 2012a; Xi, 2013a; Wu, 2014d). To support China’s status as a developing country in the realm of international energy relations, China’s officials often refer to BRICS, highlighting commonalities, shared interests, and challenges (Hu, 2012b; Xi, 2013b). The overarching idea is that development of China and other BRICS states on the trajectory from a pre-industrialized state to a modern affluent industrialized state is unfinished and China’s economic success is relative, on the one hand, to the context in which it occurs and to the living standards in the developed Western countries.

This idea is vividly articulated in the keynote address of Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying (2010) at the Dinner of the Third World Policy Conference. Fu Ying strongly defines China as a developing country, facing the challenges that go beyond mere economic growth:

China is not just a symbol or a GDP figure. It is a country that provides for 1.3 billion people, with 140 million students in schools and universities, over 20 million new job-seekers every year, including 6 million university graduates. […] China is quickly urbanizing, and yet a half of its population is still rural.

Further, Fu Ying rearticulates China’s definition of energy development as a developmental right:

Measures to mitigate the effects of climate change have a human dimension. People living in poor regions need to secure their right to proper indoor-heating. Grandmas in urban communities are debating about a fairer way to pay electricity bills. The migrant laborers demand a better pay and better working conditions. Workers are laid-off when factories close due to poor energy efficiency and need to be re-employed. For China, all these rank high on the government’s agenda to address human right concerns.
Consequently, contrasting China to the developed Western countries, China’s officials highlight that China’s consumption per capita is still low and many Chinese still experience energy poverty. In this sense, China’s official discourse on energy contraposes China to developed Western countries that must “face their own historical responsibilities” (Wen, 2007b, p. 999) and make a coordinated effort to “to achieve universal, coordinated, and balanced development” (State Council of the PRC, 2005). In this sense, China’s energy identity is firmly contextualized around its ongoing developmental project: “as the largest developing country in the world, China is faced with the daunting tasks of developing its economy, improving its people’s livelihood, and building a moderately prosperous society” (State Council of the PRC, 2012).

The quantity of China’s energy consumption is as important as the quality of China’s energy development for the discursive construction of China’s energy identity. Zhang Guobao (2012b) argues that “China will not follow the development path of the Western countries” because it places greater emphasis on “scientific development, economic restructuring, and modernization of its energy structure” and “vigorously promotes energy conservation and emission reduction, as well as the development of renewable energy such as wind power, hydropower, and solar energy.” Elsewhere, Zhang Guobao (2008a) points out that, at the peak of their modernization, developed Western countries accounted for only 15 percent of the total world population yet were consuming more than 60 percent of the world’s energy resources. In contrast, China, according to him, “has supported the rapid development of its national economy with a relatively low rate of energy growth,” and China’s energy development is “healthy” when compared to energy development of its Western counterparts (Zhang, 2008a, p. 15). Wu Xingxiong (2014a) made similar declarations, promising that, even though China’s economic growth will
continue in the future, “China will not repeat the traditional path of developed countries who produced uncontrolled emission of greenhouse gases during their industrialization” (p. 5).

At the same time, China strongly identifies itself with the Global East, as a part of “globalized Asia” (Xi, 2014b) and a “member of Asia-Pacific family” (Hu, 2006a). This identity reinforces China’s divergence from Western developed countries. It simultaneously allies China not only with developing but also with developed Asian countries. Confidently situating itself in the East (understood as East Asia and Asia-Pacific) or the Global South and distancing itself from the West or the Global North, China is making a conscious identity choice that allows it to claim the status of an exceptional developing country, a powerful independent player, and a prospective leader of the developing world. As a case in point, Yang Jiechi (2012a) affirmed that in the 2010s China is uniquely equipped to represent the Global South and promote its interests on the international stage and is also capable to “initiate an international reform” (促改革, Cù gǎigé) of global governance, with fair energy development as one of the major targets. This intersects with another dimension of China’s official energy discourse that addresses representations of China as both consumer and producer.

*China as a consumer and as a producer: The guarantor of global energy security*

Pointing out that China not only tops the world’s charts of the largest energy consumers but also leads the world in the production of all sorts of energy resources, Zhang Guobao (2008a and 2012b) identifies China as an “energy great power” (世界能源大国, Shìjiè néngyuán dàguó). Zhang constructs China as a guarantor of global energy security, pointing out that China’s national energy security is (and always has been) a principal issue
for global energy development rather than just a source of China’s domestic concerns. For example, he argues that, acting “as a responsible great power,” China “for a long time has been trying its best to ensure global energy security by solving its own energy security problems through maintaining self-sufficiency” and now it is the time for the international community to recognize China’s heroic efforts (Zhang, 2008a, p. 17). Importantly, these efforts, according to Zhang Guobao (2008a), should earn China not just international recognition but also the right to take part in international energy governance. The idea of China being a guarantor of global energy security corresponds well with the international ramifications of the concept of Chinese Dream (中国梦, Zhōngguó mèng), actively promoted by Xi Jinping after 2013.42

At the core of the notion of Chinese Dream is a negotiation of collective identity and individual aspirations. All diverse goals of the individual Chinese people are represented in Chinese Dream as shaped by a shared history and collective will to make China “a rich and powerful country,” “revitalize the nation,” and “enhance the well-being of the people” (Xi, 2014a). An important part of Chinese Dream is the confidence over China’s developmental achievements during the past decade and the superiority of China’s development, compared with both the developed world and other countries in the developing world. This growing confidence has been transferred into international relations.

Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was risk-averse and largely focused his attention on “harmony,” initiating a transition to sustainability and maintaining economic growth. While Hu was practicing a strategy of “hide capabilities and keep a low profile”

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42 Xi Jinping did not invent the idea is “Chinese Dream.” It was articulated first in 2006 by Li Junru, then the head of the Central Party School, and further had a life of its own, gradually achieving a wider currency in Chinese society.
(韬光养晦, tāoguāngyǎnghuì) in foreign affairs, Xi quickly reframed China’s foreign policy as “striving for achievement” (奋发有为, fènfā yǒu wéi) (Qian, 2013). In the work report presented at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Xi Jinping highlighted that China had entered a “new era” (新时代, Xīn Shídài). The concept also featured in the long-winded title of Xi’s report: *Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era*. He specified that “it will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage” and held out China as a model for other developing nations, emphasizing that China had developed its economy without imitating Western values. According to Xi, “the path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics” provides “a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization” and offers “a new option” for those developing nations “who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” Overall, Xi demonstrated extreme confidence in China’s growing national power and confirmed international trends working in favor of the developmental model chosen by China. By the middle of the 21st century, Xi asserted, China will have become “a global leader in terms of comprehensive national power and international influence.”

Among the other things, Xi Jinping (2017) made two commitments related to China’s energy future. First, he promised that China will actively take part in the international policy response to climate change: “taking a driving seat in international...”

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43 Chinese officials and scholars also use other Chinese proverbs to highlight the turn to a more proactive foreign policy strategy: “take initiative” (主动进取, zhǔ dòng jìn qǔ, e.g., Xi, 2013d), “actively going in” (积极进取, jī jí jìn qǔ, e.g., MFA of the PRC, 2014b), and “actively accomplish” (积极作为, jī jí zuò wéi, e.g., Xi, 2015d).

44 This text was included into the dataset because of its importance, even though it is dated as 24 October 2017.
cooperation to respond to climate change, China has become an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization.” Further, Xi Jinping promised that China “will promote a revolution in energy production and consumption, and build an energy sector that is clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient.”

Consequently, in the “new era” announced by Xi, China is not only a guarantor of international energy security but also a potential model for energy development. As China is optimistically “dreaming” about a better world in which it will be rightfully acknowledged as a frontrunner, Xi is getting ready to take a lead in balancing common goals of the world community and its individual national interests.

*China’s allies and adversaries in international energy politics*

Since 2013, China has focused on the “correct view of morality and benefits” (正确义利观, zhèngquè yì lì guān), trying to improve relations with its neighbors and developing countries at large (MFA of the PRC, 2014a). This diplomatic strategy is closely associated with Xi Jinping’s leadership, as it is supposed to become “a solid foundation for the smooth start of China’s diplomacy in the new era” (Wang, 2013). China portrays its relations with the developing world as close and constructive: a “friendly cooperation” with the ASEAN countries, a “mutually beneficial partnership” with Central Asia, “people’s friendship” with Latin America, and the Caribbean, and a “brotherhood” with Africa.

According to Wang Yi (2013), “African leaders and people from all walks of life speak highly of China’s Africa policy and appreciated China for its selflessness in helping to Africa for a long time and solemnly refute the fallacy of China’s so-called ‘neocolonialism’ in Africa.” Wang Yi (2013) confirmed Xi Jinping’s promise to “offer the aid to Africa without any political conditions attached,” helping African countries to
“transform their resource advantages” into “diversified, independent, and sustainable development.”

Similarly, Wang Yi’s predecessor, Yang Jiechi (2010) argued that the cooperation with China helps the people of Africa to convert their countries’ energy resources into “the real developmental advantages.” Responding to the question about Western disapproval and vocal concerns about China’s investment in African oil, Yang Jiechi (2010) replied that he has noticed that “some people in the world do not want to see the development of China-African relations and often use China-African energy cooperation to ‘make speculations’.” He pointed out that “the US and Europe” export more oil from Africa than China. In his opinion, inasmuch as China fully supports the efforts of other countries to develop cooperation with Africa in the energy field, they also have no reason to oppose China’s attempts to build a partnership with Africa. Finally, Yang Jiechi also highlighted that “Africa belongs to the African people and the African people are the owners of Africa, whereas the rest are just guests,” and thus Western countries “should respect the host’s right to chose partners and friends.”

Along the same lines, China articulates its political and economic ambitions in Central Asia. China’s officials highlight that “Shanghai spirit” (上海精神, Shànghǎi jīngshén) is an essential attribute of the SCO that makes an organization of “a new type”: peace-oriented, cooperative, open, and striving towards harmony (e.g., Yang, 2008; Xi, 2013e). China endorses its status of the founder of SCO, as well as its major inspirer and ideologist, and offers Central Asia a partnership based on foreign policy pluralism, cosmopolitanism, mutual benefits, common developmental goals, and equality. Energy resources are listed as one of many options for “pragmatic cooperation,” along with socio-
cultural exchanges and a joint struggle against the “three evils forces” (三股势力, sāngǔ shìlì) that are drug-trafficking, transnational crimes, and cyber-crimes (Xi, 2014c, 2015a).

In sum, China promotes itself as a senior, yet still an equal partner in Central Asia and stresses that it will offer a “no strings attached” relations.

Consequently, China is mostly surrounded by “friends,” “brothers,” and “friendly neighbors” in the Global South. In the 2000s and the 2010s, “win-win” (合作共赢, hézuò gòng yíng) is the most frequently repeated epithet of “cooperation” in China’s discourse on South-South energy relations (e.g., Wen, 2007a; Zhang, 2008b; Yang, 2012a, Xi, 2015c). According to China’s officials, all China wants in the Global South is “to reduce the global imbalance, so that people of all countries share the fruits of world economic growth” (Xi, 2016a). In contrast, when it comes to the discursive politics of energy, China’s relations with the Global North appear to be way more complicated.

China’s officials describe the European Union (EU) as neither a “brother” nor a “friend” but as an “important role in the international political arena” (Li, 2015), yet they still offer the EU member-states the opportunity to become China’s “comprehensive strategic partners” (e.g., Song, 2012) and invite them “to intensify coordination and cooperation” with China (e.g., Xi, 2014b). On the narrower level of China’s energy discourse, however, the EU is homogenized and treated as a single hostile entity. It becomes one of “those countries” that see China as a threat, labeling its cooperation with other developing countries as neocolonialism and questioning the possibility of its peaceful rise (e.g., Yang, 2010; Ying, 2010). As one of “those countries,” the EU also is trying to restrict China’s access to energy resources and thus prevent China from bridging the North-South gap and strengthening South-South cooperation.
Together with the homogenized EU, “those countries” also include the US. Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying (2010), in the speech that was already cited in this section, urges the representatives of the developing world to “take China as [their] partner.” Making a reference to an unspecified publication in the *New York Times*, Fu Ying encourages them to disregard the opinion of “those countries,” which treat China as “the scapegoat for all problems on earth.” She highlights that China is “a very convenient scapegoat” because “despite the sacred principle of freedom of speech, there is little interest among the media in those countries in informing their public the views from within China” (Fu, 2010).

**Building a new Daqing overseas**

At his retirement, Jiang Zemin (2008) proposed the “new approach to energy development with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色的新型能源发展道路, *Zhōngguó tèsè de xīnxíng néngyuán fāzhǎn dàolù*) based on six pillars: conservation of energy, energy efficiency, diversified energy development, environmental protection, technological progress, and international cooperation. He warned his successors that “the next few decades will be the crucial period for China’s comprehensive socioeconomic development and will mark the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and, [in this regard.] the task of energy development is very significant” (Jiang 2008, p. 351). While the term did not take root, the energy strategy formulated under Hu Jintao and further developed with the arrival of Xi Jinping fits into the framework developed by Jiang Zemin. This indicates that there is a general agreement among the three latest generations of China’s leaders as to how China’s energy strategy should look.

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45 Later Jiang Zemin’s article was expanded into Research on Energy Issues in China
Since the mid-2000s, the overall aim of China’s energy development has been sustainable economic growth and social stability. China consistently chooses an “all-of-the-above” energy strategy: it plans to secure a stable supply of fossil fuels and simultaneously initiates a transition to “greener” fuels and launches a comprehensive resource conservation program.

At the symposium on China’s Peaceful Development (2011), Yang Jiechi linked growing energy consumption to environmental degradation and identified these two issues as the primary “bottlenecks” of China’s development. He further attested that

Self-reliance is the foothold for development. In the final analysis, a country must rely on its own strength to ensure its development. Common prosperity is the goal of development. A country can truly achieve sustainable development only when it integrates its own development with the common development of the whole world.

Consequently, Yang Jiechi explicitly connects China’s energy strategy to the notions of “harmonious society/world” and “China’s peaceful rise” and confirms that China firmly believes in the possibility of mutually beneficial energy cooperation and is going to focus on avoiding competition in the realm of energy development. Along the similar lines, Liu Tienan (2012b) argues that, by conducting “all-around international cooperation” and actively implementing its “going global” strategy, China is acting as a responsible participant in international energy relations and its actions will balance rather than destabilize global energy markets (p. 24). The white paper of energy policy (State Council of the PRC, 2012) converts this idea into the strategic aim of China’s energy development, defining it as “a modern energy industry” that will “provide a solid guarantee for building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and make greater contributions to the world’s economic development.”
China quickly transitioned from the promise to “modernize” and “reform” its energy system (e.g., Hu, 2006b, 2008; Wen, 2007a) to a “revolution in energy production and consumption” (能源生产和消费改革, nèngyuán shēngchǎn hé xiāofèi gǎigé) (e.g., Zhang, 2012b; Wu, 2014c). According to the white paper on energy policy (State Council of the PRC, 2012), China “is exploring and practicing a new way in the history of energy development to ensure its sustainable energy development.” In 2014, Xi Jinping summarized China’s energy strategy as “four revolutions and one cooperation” (四个革命、一个合作, sì gè gémìng, yīgè hézuò): (1) the “revolution in energy consumption” that focuses on restraining unreasonable energy use; (2) the “energy supply revolution” that implies developing a diversified supply system; (3) the “technological revolution” that will promote modernization of energy industry; (4) the “energy system revolution” that will open a fast lane for energy development (see Xi, 2015b). In addition to these four “revolutions” in China’s domestic energy development, Xi also highlighted the need to strengthen international cooperation and make energy security a part of China’s overall “opening-up” strategy. As Wu Xingxiong (2014c, 2014b) explains Xi Jinping’s plans, this final dimension of energy strategy is “an extension” of China’s new foreign policy strategy and, specifically, the Belt and Road project (see also Huangpu and Wang, 2015).

As of 2016, CNOOC, Sinopec, and CNPC contributed to a combined 92 percent of the total oil industry revenue in China (IWEP ACS, 2016). They operate in over than 30 countries and have equity production in at least 20 of these countries. China maintained the principle of “China first” and “focus on domestic resources by strengthening domestic energy supply capacities and continuously improving its ability to control the dependence on external sources of oil” (Wu, 2014c, p. 4). Consequently, supporting NOCs and
expanding the scope of energy diplomacy, China’s government remains largely concerned with the availability of oil and does not plan to revolutionize its approach to supply security. Following the logic of self-reliance, China is “building an overseas Daqing” (Liu, 2012a). In this sense, while the dream of bringing China into a leadership position in the world affairs begins to loom over the concerns about maintaining its economic growth and making it more sustainable, in China’s energy politics in general, and specifically when it comes to oil, self-reliance still plays a bigger role in structuring policies and developing relations with resource-rich countries.

2.3. Summary: China’s energy paradigm

On the international level, China’s official energy discourse stresses the fundamental and persistent inequality of the current world order and, using it as a starting point, calls for reducing the gap between the Global North and the Global South. The two major dimensions of China’s energy paradigm are the following:

- Availability of energy resources, and specifically fossil fuels, is a prerequisite for development;
- Global distribution of energy resources is neither a purely economic issue nor a security issue but first and foremost a matter of international politics, because energy development is a right of every nation.

Coherently, in this paradigm the focus of energy security is development, and thus the definition of energy security corresponds with the concept of development that in the mid-2000s was encapsulated in the aspiration for “harmonious society/world” and “China’s peaceful rise.” Following the new development strategy, China’s energy paradigm
broadened and now includes sustainable and environmentally conscious development as a part of the concept of energy security. In addition to it, the notion of energy security started to internationalize and, as a result, energy deficit became more politicized. Politicization of energy deficit presupposes that distribution of energy resources should be regulated by binding international rules and regulations. It also implies that international energy relations can and should be a positive-sum game.

On the domestic/national level, however, energy deficit is largely associated with the reliability of oil supply and remains securitized. As was the case sixty years ago, China treats the deficit of oil as an existential threat to its national development and a source of dangerous security vulnerabilities. As a result, China’s oil strategy on the domestic level is defined as the quest for a new Daqing.

In sum, there is a bifurcation in China’s energy paradigm: while on the global/international level the energy deficit is now politicized, on the domestic/national level it remains largely securitized. China actively promotes a cooperative mode of energy development on the international level and does not call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with energy deficit, yet, when it comes to oil, China still does not rush to trade its self-reliance for interdependency.

An important part of China’s energy paradigm is China’s energy identities. On the one hand, branding itself as a developing country, China defends its right to obtain energy resources for its growth. China also allies itself with resource-rich developing countries, framing its global quest for energy resources in terms of “win-win” South-South cooperation. Here, China presents itself as an in-group member, proposing equal partnership and “no strings attached” relations that are constructed as advantageously different than relations with the Global North. According to China’s official energy
discourse, the people of the Global South readily embrace the opportunities for the “win-win” cooperation with China, whereas “those countries” in the Global North are still suspicious and distrustful of China’s peaceful rise. On the other hand, China defines itself as a special case among developing countries. With the arrival of Xi Jinping, this discursive trend has intensified.

The identity of energy producer builds on the narrative of heroic oil exploration and production in Daqing in the 1950s. While on the domestic level this narrative is perceptible, on the international level China’s identity of energy producer is supported mainly by the references to its strong and consistent record of energy self-sufficiency. As for the identity of a consumer, China describes its energy consumption as responsible and modest relative to the Global North and showcases its recent achievements in “green” and “clean” energy development. China’s official energy discourse translates the past records and current accomplishments into the future promises. When China’s identity of the largest consumer and producer of energy merges with the identity of a developing country, China becomes not only the first-choice partner for the resource-rich developing countries but also is able to legitimize its attempts to represent the interests of the Global South in the international energy politic. In addition, by bringing these two identities together, China undermines the legitimacy of the Global North’s leadership in international energy politics and, particularly, the right of the Global North to criticize China’s energy choice, be that regulations of domestic energy consumptions or its energy cooperation with developing countries. The overarching idea is that China is a guarantor of global energy security and the success of its energy development offers benefits to other participants of energy relations in both the Global South and the Global North.
China’s official energy discourse details and carefully revises the story of China’s “green” and “clean” energy future. It explicitly confirms that the ultimate goal of China’s energy development is self-reliance and asserts that its new proactive role in the global energy politics bring benefits to all other actors. Notably, Chinese representatives promise resource-rich countries to “transform their resource advantages into development advantages” and stimulate their “diversified, independent, and sustainable development” (Wang, 2013). The state’s financing and diplomatic backing have opened many doors for China’s NOCs and helped them to bring many barrels of overseas produced oil home. Nevertheless, China’s experiences in the different countries of Global North and Global South have varied widely. It is fair to say that China’s emergence in the international energy politics has not been warmly welcomed by all other actors.

The subsequent chapters examine China’s relations with three large oil-producers – Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada. As I point out in the introduction, these three states are different from each other. Two autocracies and a liberal democracy, a colonial empire that got stuck in between North and South, a post-colonial developing country of the Global North, and a settler-colonial developed country of the Global North… Nevertheless, they possess some of the world’s largest oil deposits and are net oil exporters, and thus the three of them share the identity of an oil-rich country and oil exporter. Looking at the bilateral energy relations between China and Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada, I focus on two interconnected goals. First, I continue to define and deconstruct China’s energy paradigm, focusing on how it manifested and is enacted in bilateral energy relations with Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Secondly, I address my second research question by examining how China’s emergence as a major energy consumer influences the energy paradigms of its oil-rich counterparts, as well as how their perceptions of China have evolved over time.
Chapter 3
China-Russia energy relations

The year 2019 marks the 70th anniversary of Sino-Russian diplomatic relations. The relations between these two close neighbors have been nothing short of turbulent and were marked by the waves of friendship and confrontation (Garver, 1998; Usov, 2006a, 2006b; Datsyshen, 2014). Since the early 2000s, China and Russia yet again opt for a close partnership.\(^{46}\) Chinese and Russian representatives in one voice proclaim that the relations between the two states are more developed than at any time in their history. At the same time, China-Russia partnership essentially is “an axis of convenience, driven by a pragmatic appreciation of the benefits of cooperation rather than a deeper like-mindedness” (Lo, 2014, p. 3). Russian experts are anxious about the increasing asymmetries of the bilateral relations and the extent to which Russia depends on China both economically and politically (e.g., Voskresenski, 2015; Trenin, 2012). They also worry about China’s growing assertiveness in East Asia and Central Asia (e.g., Tsomaya, 2014; Savvidi and Voloshin, 2016) and the emergence of a bipolar economic world order in which Russia would have a subordinate role in vis-à-vis China and the United States (e.g., Voskresenski, 2012; Dynkin and Pantin, 2012; Portyakov, 2013). In addition to it, several experts claim that China’s rise threatens Russia’s national security and sovereignty (e.g., Khramchikhin, 2013). For their part, the majority of Chinese experts note that Putin’s regime develops an explicitly aggressive approach towards the West and argue that China should not be a part of this new geopolitical rivalry (e.g., Zheng, 2008; Tian, 2007; Li, 2012; Li, 2014).

\(^{46}\) Formally, the establishment of “partnership of strategic coordination based on equality and benefit” was declared in 1996 by Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin. Nevertheless, only once Vladimir Putin come to power in Russia, these friendship statements have been transformed into practical cooperation agenda.
Recognizing the strong constraints that hinder the creation of a stronger alliance between the two states, virtually all experts, nevertheless, agree that in terms of forging the energy cooperation China and Russia is a perfect match (Lukin, 2009; Portyakov, 2013; Luzyanin and Semenova, 2016; Voskresenski, 2015; Lang and Wang, 2007; Trenin, 2012; Li, 2013; Wang and Wan, 2015 to name just a few most prominent studies).

As was noted in the Second Chapter, the Soviet Union provided China with the technology, equipment, and expertise required to develop a modern oil industry. This assistance was abruptly withdrawn in 1958 as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated. Over the following three decades the two countries developed their energy sectors independently from each other. In the 1990s, Russia was recovering after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its economic, commercial, diplomatic, and political priorities have changed, whereas China was becoming a net importer of oil. As a result, the governments and NOCs of both Russia and China started to develop an interest in each other. The Treaty of Friendship signed in 2001 specifically identified energy as the key sphere of cooperation. However, real energy cooperation between Russia and China started to emerge only in 2005 and, despite the undeniable logic for the construction of a direct oil pipeline from Russia to China, the pipeline was not completed until 2011. Against the background of sharply deteriorating relations between Russia and the West in the mid-2010s, the China-Russian energy relations have picked up momentum. By 2016, Russia became China’s second-largest supplier of oil, whereas China surpassed Germany as the top importer of Russian oil. The contracts signed by Russia’s and China’s NOCs over the past five years anticipate a further increase in exports of oil over the next decade.

The first section of this Chapter is devoted to the discussion of Russia’s discursive politics of energy that includes identities and historical narratives about energy resources
that are constructed by Russia to represent itself and other actors in international relations. In the second part of this Chapter, I explain how and with what effect China’s and Russia’s energy paradigms are manifested and enacted in their bilateral energy relations. The closing section summarizes the findings.

3.1. Russia’s discursive politics of energy

Russia is the world’s largest producer of conventional oil and the second-largest producer of natural gas\textsuperscript{47}. Russia also produces significant amounts of coal. Russia’s economic development after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been highly dependent on its hydrocarbons. Notably, in 2016 oil and natural gas revenues accounted for 36 percent of the federal budget revenues (Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 2018).

Russia’s energy policy has long been a subject of intense interest and contentious debates in International Relations (IR). However, despite some notable and encouraging exceptions (e.g. Casier, 2011, 2013; DeBardeleben, 2012; Kratochvíl and Tichý, 2013), the discussion of Russia’s energy politics reflects the realist-liberal split in IR theory. Anita Orban (2008) argues that Russia has an “energy weapon” and is trying to use it to build a new “energy imperialism” (see also, Baran, 2007; Kropatcheva, 2014; Mankoff, 2009). Along the similar lines, Pavel Baev (2008, 2012a) and Marshall I. Goldman (2008) conclude that Russia’s leadership is preoccupied with geopolitics and uses Russia’s energy exports as an instrument of power. In contrast, for proponents of the liberal approach to energy relations, the key question is how relations between Russia and its counterparts could be transformed into a positive-sum game that will ensure greater economic efficiency.

\textsuperscript{47} In the mid-2000s, Russia’s authorities declared most of the oil and gas data a state secret and thus there is no reliable information on Russia’s oil reserves.
and less political tension. This logic underpins Tatiana Romanova’s analysis of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (2008, 2014) and other EU-Russia energy institutions (e.g. 2016a, 2016b). Christophe-Alexandre Paillard (2010) and Andreas Goldthau (2008a, 2008b) follow the liberal IR tradition by focusing on complex structural and institutional interdependencies in EU-Russia energy relations.

Whether Russia’s external energy affairs are conceptualized as a zero-sum game (realism) or as a positive-sum game (liberalism), the analysis is heavily focused on the material realities of Russia’s energy politics and energy relations, and hence disregards important social dimensions. As Petr Kratochvíl and Lukáš Tichý (2013) point out, the analysis of Russia’s relations with energy importing-countries simply does not “make sense,” if we do not take into account

the ideational framework(s) through which both [energy-importers] and Russia attach meaning to their mutual ties, interpret their mutual dependence as beneficial/threatening and, in the end, decide about the concrete political steps that can either boost the energy ties or, alternatively, try to reduce the dependence to a minimum. (p. 393)

This section takes the constructivist analysis of Russia’s external energy affairs even further by focusing on Russia’s discursive politics of energy and offering a new perspective on how Russia represent itself and others in international energy relations. I focus on official discourses (Model 1). Overall, Model 1 contains 165 texts published between 2005 and 2016 (summarized in Table 4). I also examine cultural representations (Model 2A) and marginal political discourses that are produced by NGOs, academics, and public intellectuals (Model 2B). In total, Model 2A and Model 2B include 121 texts and fieldwork observations conducted in May 2015 and between June and September 2016.
### Table 4. Model 1: Russia’s official discourses, 2005-2016

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Putin’s discursive politics of energy: Russia as the energy superpower

Since Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999, Russia has been explicitly asserting itself as a great power and “geopolitical subject” (Putin, 2012) and behaving accordingly. “Greatpowerness” (великодержавность, velikoderzhavnost’) is perceived as an inherited property that belongs to Russia by the virtue of its enormous size, resources, culture, and history (Laruelle, 2007; Urnov, 2014). Constructed as a property, this “greatpowerness” becomes Russia’s concomitant characteristic and fundamental quality, rather than a position or a condition that is subject to change. In other words, in this framework, Russia’s great power status is a matter of fact. However, notwithstanding a broad agreement among political elites that Russia’s “greatpowerness” must be reaffirmed on the international level, the question of how this goal might be achieved was answered only when Putin updated the underlying foundations of Russia’s claim for the status of great power with a new focus on control over energy resources during the oil price surge of the mid-2000s.48

In December 2005, at a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Putin proclaimed that Russia will become one of the leaders and “trendsetters” of the global energy sector. According to him, in the 21st century energy resource wealth is Russia’s “natural competitive advantage” that will not only be a “locomotive” that pulls Russia’s economy forward but also will help Russia to improve its position in the international arena (Putin, 2005a). Vladislav Surkov (2006), the deputy chief of Putin’s administration at that time, was even more direct about Russia’s future: “If you have strong legs, you should be doing the long jump rather than playing chess.” While Putin himself emphatically avoided using the term “superpower” (e.g., Putin, 2006c), Surkov (2006) explained that while

48 See Bouzarovski and Bassin (2011) and Rutland (2015) for a general discussion of the role of energy resources in debates over Russian national identity.
“adherents of the liberal obscurantism” see market liberalization as the major driving force of Russia’s economic development, Putin offers a “realistic model” which is “the concept of Russia as the energy superpower.” In July 2006, during the G8 summit in Saint-Petersburg, Putin presented the concept of Russia’s energy leadership to the international public through the discussion of global energy security (Putin, 2006b). By the end of his second term as president (2004 -2008), Putin successfully regained full state control over the national energy complex and “discovered the value of ‘securitizing’ the energy business,” actively and explicitly using energy resources as a tool or lever to promote Russia’s foreign policies (Baev, 2012b, p. 178). As a result, in the mid-2000s for Russia to be a great power (сверхдержава or держава sverkhderzhava or derzhava) meant to be the energy superpower (энергетическая сверхдержава, energeticheskaya sverkhderzhava).

Over the following decade, Russia’s domestic politics was full of internal contradictions, yet ad hoc opportunism is an endogenous variable rather than an invariable feature of Russian politics (Orttung, 2009; Orttung and Overland, 2011). As Robert W. Orttung (2009) explains, Russia’s political development in the mid-2000s was not driven by growing energy rents but reflected Putin’s perception of the 1990s and endeavored to “correct what he considered to be some of the mistakes of that era” (p. 54). In this sense, while the new Russian authoritarianism and Putin’s project of restoring Russia’s imperial prerogative that was lost over the 1990s benefited significantly from the dramatic rise of

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49 As Thane Gustafson (2012) puts it, in the energy sector “the market reforms went irrevocably wrong” (p. 101). Market liberalization of oil industry was a child of the 1990s, a period that is commonly referred to in Russia as “the reckless and evil 1990s” (лихие девяностые) or “the time of confusion” (смутное время). On privatization of Russia’s oil industry in the 1990s see Freeland (2000), Dixon (2008), Gustafson (2012), and Sakwa (2014).

50 Imperial prerogative is a concept developed by Partha Chatterjee (2005, 2011, 2012). It is understood as a self-claimed right of an empire to declare the colonial exception within its spheres of influence, such as proclaiming other political entities as in need of intervention because they are unable to manage their own affairs.
oil rents, they were not caused by it. Importantly, as Anne Applebaum (2012) demonstrates, the ideas that are associated with Putin’s political leadership constitute “a carefully worked out system, with carefully designed institutions,” and thus should be approached as an ideology (p. 4). Applebaum also (2012) points out that this system “comes complete with an interpretation of the past and predictions for the future” (p. 4). Constructing Russia as an energy superpower is one of the central themes of Putin’s ideology.

In the mid-2000s, introducing the discourse of energy superpower into the narrative of Russia’s “greatpowerness,” Putin’s regime was making a conscious identity choice. Even though, as Peter Rutland (2015) points out, after 2011 Putin’s government shifted the gravity of identity-building project onto “religion, patriotic values, military achievements, and defending the rights of ethnic Russians” (p. 84), the discourse of energy superpower continues to influence the development of the hierarchy of domestic and foreign policy objectives.

One illustrative example of the ideological value of the discourse of energy superpower in the mid-2010s is the attempt to merge it with the narrative of Russia’s victory in World War II. As a case in point, during the 2015 annual celebration of the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War (Victory Day), the square in front of the Gorky Central Park of Culture and Leisure in Moscow was decorated with a massive multimedia art-installation entitled Energy of the Great Victory. The installation featured symbols of gas, electrical, and oil energy: a gas drilling rig, a transmission tower, and an oil horse (see Figure 8a and Figure 8b). According to the press release issued by the administration of the park, the installation was commemorating “the role of the energy sector in the development of the national economy in the wartime and heroic deeds of the Soviet power engineers, who together with [all other Soviet people]
were victorious over fascism” (Muzeon.ru, 2015). A documentary with the same title that was broadcasted by the state-owned television channel Russia-1 (Terner and Yevsyukov, 2015) also presents ample energy supplies of the Soviet Union as one of the major causes of its victory over fascism. The central idea of the documentary is that the Soviet energy sector not only helped to save the country from fascism but also kick-started its economic development after the hardship years of the war and eventually made it one of the world’s two superpowers.

Figure 8a. Multimedia art-installation *Energy of the Great Victory*. May 7, 2015. Gorky Central Park of Culture and Leisure, Moscow, Russia.
In the realm of international relations, Russia’s authorities construct energy wealth as one of Russia’s key competitive advantages. Dominant official discourses define energy cooperation between Russia and the major energy consumers as a “dialogue.” Specifically, Russia’s representatives use the concept “energy-dialogue” (энергодиалог, energodialog) to describe Russia’s relations with the European Union and China. They highlight mutual vulnerabilities to portray these relations as being based on a set of symmetrical interdependencies (e.g., Medvedev 2010a, Lavrov 2007b) and describe them as “cooperative” (Putin, 2005b), “pragmatic” and “mutually beneficial” (Medvedev, 2010b), “dynamic” (Shmatko, 2010), “partnership-based” (Novak, 2014b), “stable” (Novak, 2015a), and “positive” (Denisov, 2016).

At the same time, however, Putin and other senior representatives of Russian government also consciously and deliberately deploy and perpetuate more aggressive expressions of the discourse of energy superpower that distinguish Russia as a unique actor in the international energy politics. A vivid illustration of this is the statement made by Putin (2010) at an investors’ forum in Germany:
How are you [Germans] going to heat your houses? You do not want our gas; you do not develop nuclear energy. So, what are you going to do then? Are you going to get your heat from firewood? Even for firewood, you will have to go to Siberia, [because] you do not even have firewood.

These aggressive expressions of the discourse of energy superpower come into play when Russia’s counterparts try to reduce cooperation with Russia. Notably, Russian officials present “stable, reliable, predictable, and based on mutual trust” relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia as an “essential condition” for European energy security (Shmatko, 2010). According to Russia’s representatives, the EU “simply does not have another partner” that could guarantee it secure exports in the same degree as Russia (Lavrov, 2013). Accordingly, the EU’s endeavors to reduce its dependence on Russian energy exports are labeled as “politicization” of its strategy towards Russia and as a threat to economic interests of individual EU member-states. For example, Putin (2006d) argues that

The permanent discussion about excessive dependence on Russia certainly forces us to find other commodity markets. And, of course, in this case, we shall find these markets. And if we go there, then Europe will not receive the natural irreplaceable resources that it could have received.

In sum, official discourses frame Russia as an indispensable and irreplaceable energy exporter and emphasize Russia’s exceptional role in regional and global energy security, implying that energy importers need Russia as much, if not more than, Russia needs them. Introducing the discourse of energy superpower into the narrative of Russia’s “greatpowness,” Putin’s regime made a conscious identity choice. The discourse of energy superpower has outlived the oil price boom of the mid-2000s and occupies a prominent place in Putin’s ideology in the 2010s.
A raw-materials appendage and a victim of resource curse

The broad discourse of “greatpowerlessness” is accepted by the Russian public and resonates with popular perceptions of Russia. As the most recent surveys of Levada Center51 (2016) show, 64% of Russians believe that Russia is a “great power” (p. 34) and 76% think that it must maintain this role in the future (p. 31). Moreover, 43% expressed nostalgia for the Soviet Union because of “the lost sense of belonging to a great power” (Levada Center, 2016, p. 257). However, only 17% of Russians think that possessing vast natural resources qualifies a country as a great power (Levada Center, 2016, p. 35) and only 18% think that Russia’s international respect is based on its resource wealth (p. 36). Consequently, Russians clearly want Russia to be a great power, yet they do not associate the “greatpowerlessness” with natural resources and do not see a great power as an energy superpower.

The survey conducted as a part of the NEORUS project (2013)52 adds another layer to the findings of Levada Center. This survey reveals that 64% of respondents agree that Russia is an energy superpower. At the same time, however, the survey also shows that the Russian public not only approves of the discourse of energy superpower but also is markedly influenced by a conflicting discourse that identifies Russia as a “raw-materials appendage” (сырьевой придаток, syr’yevoy pridatok). Specifically, the survey found that 63% of respondents think that “Russia should not be a raw-material appendage” (NEORUS 2013).

51 Levada Center is a Russian independent non-governmental polling and sociological research organization.
52 The survey was conducted by the firm Russian Public Opinion and Market Research (ROMIR) as a part of the NEORUS (Nation-building and nationalism in today’s Russia) project of the Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages at the University of Oslo.
The metaphor of “appendage” and the discourse that goes with it have a long history in Russian politics, going back to the early years of the Soviet Union. In 1925, Joseph Stalin (1952) encouraged the building of the Soviet economy “in such a way as to prevent our country from becoming an appendage of the world capitalist system” and “not as a subsidiary enterprise of world capitalism, but as an independent economic unit” (p. 297). Later Soviet authorities used the metaphor of “appendage” to describe the position of the decolonized countries of the Third World in the global capitalist system. In the early 1990s, opponents of economic and political liberalization claimed that Michael Gorbachev’s reforms were transforming Russia into a “raw-material appendage of the West” (сырьевой придаток Запада, syr’yeyvoy pridatok Zapada) (e.g., Andreyeva, 1990; Kol'ev, 1995).

Since then, the discourse of raw-material appendage has become more complex and developed three interrelated expressions. In the 2000s, at the core of it is the idea that extraction and export of resources are primitive and unsustainable economic activities, appropriate only for an underdeveloped and weak country.

Following the updated of the raw-material appendage discourse, dependence on resource exports constrains Russia’s economic development and inevitably consigns it to a low place in the international hierarchy. Finally, only a corrupted and traitorous government can condemn Russia to such a humiliating and miserable position. In its original version, the discourse of raw-material appendage focused on the West as Russia’s negative Other, yet over the past decade it has expanded to include China as the second negative Other (e.g., Buyarov, 2011; Grek, 2015; Pestsov, 2015).

In sum, the discourse of raw-material appendage presents Russia’s vast energy resources not as a foundation of extraordinary national power but as a source of tremendous national vulnerability. In this sense, the popularity of this discourse indicates that an energy
superpower in the popular imagination has a definition by contradiction: being an energy superpower means not being a raw-material appendage.

The power of the discourse of raw-material appendage is particularly evident in the experts’ debates on the role of energy resources in Russia’s development. Only a few Russian experts speak with enthusiasm of using energy resources as the foundation of Russia’s economic growth and rise in the international arena (e.g., Simonov, 2006, 2007; Inozemtsev, 2015). In a widely discussed book with a revealing title *Energy Superpower* (2006), Konstantin Simonov argues that “creating a sovereign system for extracting and selling energy resources, which will allow Russia to determine independently the directions of its export flows, is not a matter of imperial ambitions but of the country’s survival” (p. 7). However, despite his passionate support of the concept of energy superpower, Simonov is not satisfied with how energy wealth has been used by Putin.

Other experts openly call Putin’s attempts to turn Russia into an energy superpower a strategic failure (e.g., Denisov and Grivach, 2008; Evstafiev, 2014; Trenin, 2016). In this critique, the discourse of raw-material appendage coincides with the broader discourse of resource curse that holds that resource wealth might impact negatively economic growth and cause so-called Dutch Disease (e.g., Roland, 2005; Tabata, 2009; Gaddy and Ickes, 2010, 2013). Fyodor Lukyanov (2016), for example, claims that in the mid-2000s the discourse of energy superpower was perceived by Russia’s political elites as a strategy of “smart downshifting”: the initial goal was not to rest on the laurels of an energy superpower but to use energy resources as a tool to encourage Russia’s economic development and strengthen its international political ties. However, in Lukyanov’s opinion, in the 2010s this strategy has proven itself unsuccessful and even harmful because it slowed down the evolution of post-Soviet economic and political systems. For their part, Vladimir Mau (e.g.,
2008), Aleksey Kudrin (e.g., 2015), German Greff (e.g., 2016), and other Russian liberal economists compare Russia’s dependence on energy exports with a heavy drug addiction and frequently use the metaphor of “sitting on the oil needle” (сидеть на игле, sidet’ na igle) to describe Russia’s economic development.

The overlaps between the broader discourse of resource curse and the discourse of raw-material appendage, however, are limited to the economic rationalities. The concept of political resource curse that suggests that resource wealth weakens the quality of institutions and erodes democracy, and is often applied to Russia by Western political scientists (e.g., Fish, 2005; Ross, 2001, 2012), is dismissed by most Russian scholars. They claim that this concept is ideologically biased (e.g., Popova, 2015) or consider it only a “partly justified opinion” (Mezhuyev, 2010, p. 19, see also Kuyan, 2016). Overall, Russian academics and think-tank experts not only rarely explicitly link Russia’s authoritarianism with resource revenues but also generally avoid an open discussion of corruption and political bribery in the state-run oil and gas companies. This gap is filled with journalistic investigations (e.g., Konstantinov, 2006; Mukhin, 2006; Ostal’ski, 2007; Panyushkin and Zygar’, 2008) and reports of oppositional NGOs, such Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (e.g., Kulachenkov, 2015).

**Putin’s energy superpower in paintings, music, and literature**

The critique of Russia’s oil-driven development is produced and reproduced in contemporary art. Andrei Molodkin (2008) literally fills democracy with crude oil (Figure 9). His installation consists of nine separate three-dimensional letters arranged to form the word “DEMOCRACY” that are filled with crude oil through a system of interconnected pipes. According to Molodkin, he wanted to show that democracy is “not an idea” anymore.
but “just a souvenir,” and thus it is only useful as “an empty canister” to carry oil (Moscow House of Photography, 2008). Vasya Lozhkin, a renowned artist of the newly emerging in Russia “punk trash” art, turns oil into vodka and life-giving water on his paintings. On his stylized icons (2012), a grim Mother-oil (матушка-нефть, matushka neft’) is nursing a man dressed in the grey suit, a uniform of an official in Russia (Figure 10a). Lozhkin’s other painting – The Black Vodka (2012) – presents a group of identical men feasting on oil that is coming from a pipeline (Figure 10b).

Figure 10a. Vasya Lozhkin (2012) *The pagan deities* [Acryl on paper]. © Vasya Lozhkin. Courtesy of the Artist. Inscriptions on the painting: “Father-Gas” (left) and “Mother-Oil” (right).

A popular song *I love oil* (ELLO, 2013) focuses on another aspect of Russia’s oil-driven modernity, ridiculing the prosperity generated by oil revenues. A spouse of an oilman sings: “If there is oil in Russia, I am in Milan.” The music video presents the major symbols the so-called “well-fed 2000s” (сытые нулевые, sytyye nulevyye): lavish parties, luxury shopping, expensive cars, and skyscrapers of Moscow’s business district. The video also features women in folk costumes dancing against the backdrop of oil rigs. Eventually, the main character’s love for oil and gas transforms into love for Russia. Brought together, the lyrics and images construct oil as a part of Russia’s national identity and link oil to the timely and timeless Russianess.

A more striking and straightforward example of the critique of Russia’s dependency on oil revenues in popular culture is Semyon Slepakov’s *Song about Oil* that appeared on the social media in 2015, amidst a new upsurge of the economic crisis. The comedian Slepakov speaks on behalf of “a simple worker of a tractor factory” Volodya Sinitsin, who grumbles that he recently started to notice that he “does not have enough money to live his bad life.” In an ironic and satirical monologue, the “simple worker” comments on the TV-news reports that explain the current economic downfall by blaming the United States and promise that “soon the prices on the mother-oil will go up again.” Complaining that he might not survive while waiting for the oil prices to go up, he reproaches the authorities:

Dear all who are at the helm of
Our immense oil ship,
I don’t get it. How did it all go like this?
You said, it’s going to be all right!

You have been pumping the oil all these years,
You did know limits, grief, and sorrows.
You worked day and night, serving your fatherland.
And you earned enough money for ten thousand lives.

But how am I supposed to live [through this], guys?
I’m a simple worker. My only savings are my kidney stones [and] Very little flesh on the surface of my bones. I might not live to see the oil prices going up!

In a similar humorous fashion, Yury Shevchuk (30Avesta, 2008 [2007]), a renowned rock musician, poet, and ardent critic of Putin’s regime, links oil and political power in a tender but grim romance. Speaking directly to Russia, Shevchuk promises her that “when oil runs out, our president will die” and “the world will be a bit freer.” The last verses of his song go:

We will learn once again to love and to be wise, There will be no handouts and eternal arguments, All mermaids and fairies will pray for us, Once we will drink all the oil, once we will smoke all the gas.

Even though Shevchuk’s song was censored on TV (Vinogradov, 2009) and has never been played on the radio since its release in 2007, it instantly became popular and regained its popularity again during the political protests of 2012 and 2013.

No less striking and vivid actualizations of the discourse of raw-material appendage emerge in Russian fiction writing. In the 2000s and the 2010s, an entire corpus of Russian “petro-fiction” has evolved, including travelogues (e.g., Golovanov, 2014), detective novels (e.g., Yudenich, 2007), and dystopias (e.g., Sorokin, 2006, 2008, 2013; Pelevin, 2003, 2006; Bykov, 2006; Khazin, 2017). Summarizing the major trends in this literature, Ilya Kalinin (2015) argues that oil is “transformed into a systematic motif of contemporary Russian literature (and of culture as a whole)” and “acts as one of the central symbolic figures through which the post-Soviet unconscious finds a language” (p. 143). Authors utilize this language to criticize oil-driven capitalism of post-Soviet Russia, as well as the nationalistic ideology and new consumer culture that arise around it. In addition to it, they construct the
moral, intellectual, cultural, and social progress as a function of Russia’s oil-dependent
development. This idea is exemplified in Victor Pelevin’s writing (2003):

Our whole culture is just a mold on the pipe that exists only because the oil in the
pipe is heated. And the oil is heated not to blossom the mold but because it is just
faster to pump. (p. 124)

Consequently, the discursive politics of energy spills into and onto all areas of life
in Russia. The official constructions of energy resources as Russia’s major competitive
advantage are confronted by critical discourses in the realms of popular culture, literature,
and contemporary art. These critical discourses are political inasmuch as they evolve
around the struggles over values, relationships and interests, and over who is in control
over the key national assets.

“**We**” and “**They**” in Russia’s discursive politics of energy

The analysis of Russia’s discursive politics of energy makes apparent two
overarching constructions of Russia: the energy superpower and a raw-material appendage.
It also uncovers one prominent discursive silence. Being obsessed with its energy wealth,
Russia does not identify itself as a petrostate (for a detailed analysis see Rutland, 2015).
Both official and critical discourses avoid comparisons of Russia with other energy-rich
states. Russia’s economic successes and failures are never measured against the experience
of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan Venezuela, Nigeria, Norway, and other
prominent petrostates.

The discourse of energy superpower constructs Russia as a one-of-a-kind actor of
the international energy politics. It frames Russia as an indispensable and irreplaceable
energy exporter and emphasizes Russia’s exceptional role in global energy security,
implying that energy importers need Russia as much as, if not more than, Russia needs
Defending, reinforcing, and justifying the claim for Russia’s special status in international energy relations, Putin’s regime responds to the raw-material appendage discourse that portrays Russia as addicted to the revenues generated by energy exports and thus weak and vulnerable. While being the mirror opposite of each other, the two discourses construct the West (mainly, the European Union) and the East (mainly, China) as Russia’s major Others.

While Russia belongs to a larger European intellectual and cultural history, it never identified itself and was never identified by others as a Western country without a stipulation for some uniquely Russian qualities. This complex and contradictory identity creates a gap of alterity between post-Soviet Russia and the countries that are traditionally designated as the West. The Western version of modernity is simultaneously perceived as “a developmental or civilizational model to emulate” and “as a degenerate and dehumanized foil for what Russia should never become” (Clunan, 2009, p. 79; see also Malinova, 2012).

The discourse of raw-material appendage identifies Russia as a potential or actual victim of Western expansionism. In this discursive framework, Russia’s energy cooperation, as well as general economic and political rapprochement with the West, is perceived as a threat. In contrast, the discourse of energy superpower presents Russia as an equal among equals in relations with the West. In this regard, the discourse of energy superpower forces Russia’s representatives to seek from the West the recognition of Russia’s unique status in international energy relations. More specifically, Russia’s role in European energy security becomes a cornerstone of Russia’s claim for energy superpower status.

At the same time, however, the concept of “the West versus the Rest” (Huntington, 1997 [1996]) assists Putin’s regime in promoting the idea of Russian cultural aversion to
the “Western” notion of democracy and categories related to it. As an energy superpower, Russia has a political system based on supposedly unique Russian cultural values (e.g., “sovereign democracy,” суверенная демократия, suverennaya demokratiya) and thus can reject the international criticism. Ekaterina Shulman (2010) describes this as a “reverse cargo cult”\(^53\): even though de jure Russia is building a Western-type liberal democracy, Russian elites refuse to adopt the Western norms and follow recommendations of international organizations because the West allegedly deviates from its proclaimed principles or does not fully follow its own recommendations. A case in point is Russia’s energy relations with the EU.

Identifying itself as an energy superpower, Russia claims the “right for an independent viewpoint” (Shmatko, 2008) and rejects asymmetrical definitions of energy relations, which recognizes the “normative power” (Manners, 2002) of the EU, as well as its general political superiority. This is particularly evident in the evolution of Russia’s major strategic energy policy document, Energy strategy. While the first Energy strategy (2003) contains references to “European norms” and expresses a commitment to adopt “European regulations,” its newest additions (2009 and 2015) appeal to “international norms” and “international regulations.”

By reaffirming Russia’s political autonomy and normative independence from the EU and the West more generally, Russia politicians elevate Russia’s role in the

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\(^53\) Initially, the term “cargo cult” chiefly, but not solely, referred to diverse Melanesian religious practices characterized by the belief that material wealth could be obtained through ritual worship. Later, the term was used metaphorically to describe attempts to achieve successful outcomes by replicating a set of conditions associated with those outcomes, although those conditions are either not related to the causes of the outcomes or not sufficient enough to reproduce them by themselves (e.g., “cargo cult science” or “cargo cult programming”). According to Shulman (2010), in Russia’s case “all forms of social organization and public administration are almost entirely borrowed and implanted with more or less violence, in the course of repetitive […] waves of westernization,” yet “many of these forms have a purely decorative character of window dressing” because there is a belief that this state of affairs is the same in the West but “they are just better than we are at pretending.”

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international energy security and construct Russia as a sovereign and powerful actor of international energy politics. In addition to this, Russia’s rejection of European norms in the realm of energy politics is an expression of the “cargo cult.” For example, in the mid-2000s, Russian representatives started to accuse their European counterparts of establishing a double standard approach in relations with Russia:

Certainly, we can give access to our partners [to our resource extraction and transportation infrastructure]. However, we have a question: will they give us access to anything? [....] We do not mind working on the principles of [the European Energy Charter]. But we need to understand what we will receive in exchange. (Putin, 2006b)

Following this logic, the major regulations of the EU’s Third Energy Package were labeled by Russian politicians as “unwise” (Lavrov, 2012), “indiscreet” (Lavrov, 2013), “short-sighted” (Novak, 2014b and Putin, 2013b), “ineffective” (Novak, 2015b), and “unfair” (Putin, 2013b). In Putin’s Munich speech of 2007, this criticism is particularly tangible, when Putin makes a claim that the European Energy Charter “is not so acceptable” for Russia because neither Russia nor the EU member-states wants to follow it (Putin 2007).

By and large, in the mid-2000s Russia adopted a defensive position in relations to the West. Notably, Russia’s representatives wanted the EU member-states to respect Russia’s interests in international energy politics and accept Russian claims for the status of an energy superpower. Instead, Russia’s European counterparts allegedly “follow the old habit, treating Russia as the Soviet Union” (Khristenko 2006a) and have “complexes” that do not allow them to “reconcile themselves to their dependence on external sources of energy” (Lavrov, 2007b). Following the logic of Russia’s defensive discursive strategy, Russia can be a reliable partner for the EU member-states, but only if it will be treated as an energy superpower.
Similar trends are apparent in Russia’s construction of the East. In the context of Russian energy politics, the East is understood as Asia. Russia’s representatives describe Asia as “promising,” “dynamic,” and “energetic” yet paint it with a wide brush. For example, discussing the new trends in the international development, Lavrov (2006) notes that the globalization has “an Asian face” but does not specify to whom this face belongs. Most often, Russia’s representatives designate Japan, South Korea, China, and India as Asia. According to Lavrov (2006), these countries are “interested in a prosperous Russia” because without Russia’s energy resources they will not be able to achieve “the goals of economic growth.” In the similar vein, other Russia’s representatives claim that Russia is recognized in Asia as a “natural partner” (Khristenko, 2006b) and an “infallible guarantor of energy security” (Shmatko, 2009).

While Asia is increasingly more important in Russia’s energy politics, the historical, cultural, and political gulf separating Russia from the East is considerably deeper than that separating it from the West. Russia is in Asia but not of Asia. Importantly, Russia’s dominant discourses over the centuries constructed non-Western societies, including those of East Asia and Southeast Asia, as premodern or even anti-modern and thus inferior relatively to Russia (Bassin, 1991, Clunan, 2009). At the same time, in a quantitative sense post-Soviet Russia is currently a “normal developing country” (Schleifer and Treisman, 2004): in terms of income inequalities, macroeconomic instability, corruption, crime, and other typical problems of the developing world Russia is far from the worst (better than Nigeria) but still not in the top (worse than China). The obvious rise of East Asian and Southeast Asian nations at the end of the 20th century and their newly found economic clout contradicts traditional perceptions of the East as lower in status and subordinate in relation to Russia. Specifically, it is increasingly difficult for Putin’s regime to construct Russia as
an energy superpower vis-à-vis rising China and, as a result, its rapprochement with China triggers the raw-material appendage discourse (e.g., Buyarov, 2011; Grek, 2015; Pestsov, 2015).

In sum, the discourse of energy superpower presents Russia as an equal among equals in relations with the West and as superior in relations with the non-Western powers. At the same time, however, the discourse of raw-material appendage identifies Russia as a potential or actual victim of Western and Chinese expansionism. In this discursive framework, Russia’s energy cooperation, as well as general economic and political rapprochement with the West and China, is perceived as a threat. The discourse of energy superpower forces Russia’s representatives to seek from the West and China the recognition of Russia’s unique status in international energy relations. More specifically, Russia’s role in Eurasian energy security becomes a cornerstone of Russia’s claim for energy superpower status. This discursive framework sustains the construction of Russia as located in the midst of an infinite dialogue between the East and the West. Consequently, Putin’s regime carved for Russia a distinctive and prominent yet lonely position in the international energy politics. Inasmuch as Russia’s “We” is with neither the West nor the East, Putin’s regime is doomed to protect its energy sector – in Putin’s own words (2006c), “the holy of holies of Russia’s economy” – from everyone.

**Russia’s energy paradigm: A discursive bipolar disorder**

In the mid-2000s, control over energy resources became the ends and means of political power at the domestic level and a center of gravity in Putin’s project of restoring Russia’s international status that was lost during the 1990s. As oil prices rose, multifaceted and contradictory ambitions of Russia’s political elites for the national future in the
international arena became encapsulated in the discourse of energy superpower. In this
discursive framework, the possession of abundant energy resources and control over energy
streams automatically make Russia a player of consequence on the international stage.
Accordingly, energy resources are socially instrumentalized as one of the major sources of
national economic growth, pride, power, and independence, as well as a sustainable
foundation for mutually beneficial relations with other countries.

Introducing the discourse of energy superpower into the narrative of Russia’s
“greatpowness,” Putin’s regime made a conscious identity choice. The discourse of
energy superpower has outlived the oil price boom of the mid-2000s and occupies a
prominent place in Putin’s ideology in the 2010s. The discourse of energy superpower,
being one of the integral parts of Putin’s ideology, is produced and reproduced by Russia’s
authorities. This discourse was reproduced even under the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev
(2008-2012) who was promoting political and economic modernization, urging Russia
away from “humiliating dependence on raw-materials” (Medvedev, 2009c).

The production and reproduction of the discourse of energy superpower are
reinforced by the presence and strong influence of the critical discourse of raw-material
appendage, within which energy wealth is recognized as a function of multiple
vulnerabilities. The discourse of raw-materials appendage is a critical discourse that
challenges Putin’s ideology, as well as the legitimacy and credibility of Putin’s government.
In this sense, the discourses of energy superpower and raw-material appendage are
mutually constitutive, meaning that the two discourses simultaneously exclude and
reinforce the reproduction of one another. The discourse of raw-material appendage forces
Putin’s government to sustain the discourse of energy superpower by reproducing it on both
domestic and international levels. In other words, Putin’s regime must present Russia as an
energy superpower and frame its interactions with other international actors accordingly because rejecting the discourse of energy superpower will entail accepting its antithesis, the discourse of raw-material appendage. As a result, Russia’s energy diplomacy becomes a hostage of the conflict between the discourse of energy superpower and the discourse of raw-material appendage.

3.2. China-Russia energy relations

This section starts with an overview of the development of China-Russia energy relations with a focus on oil-related deals between 2005 and 2016. Further, I demonstrate how Russia’s and China’s energy paradigms are enacted in China-Russia energy relations.

Loans-for-oil and new pipelines

Since Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999, one of his major goals has been to reestablish full state control over the energy sector. The culmination of Putin’s efforts was the nationalization of the rebellious Yukos. In 2003, one of the most valuable assets of Yukos – Yuganskneftegaz – was sold by a controversial closed-room auction (Sixsmith, 2010) and was eventually acquired by Rosneft for $9.3 billion. Rosneft was not able to raise the full amount of cash from domestic sources. Western banks refused to offer it a loan because of the controversies that surrounded the Yukos affair. CNPC, on the contrary, agreed to lend Rosneft $6 billion as an advance payment for 5-year deliveries of oil, passing the credit through China’s Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank). Even though Russia’s exports to China increased, Russian authorities again suspended plans to build a direct pipeline from Eastern Siberia to Northern China.

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For a detailed analysis of the Yukos affair see Sixsmith, 2010.
In 2006, against the background of sharply deteriorating relations between Russia and European consumers of its energy, Putin announced that in the nearest decade Russia would increase its oil exports to Asia tenfold, from 3 percent to 30 percent. Transneft, the state-owned operator of the oil pipeline networks, initiated the construction of a new pipeline system to transport oil from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific coast at Nakhodka. However, the new project did not include a direct branch to China. Between 2006 and 2008, more than 60 percent of Russian oil was delivered to China by the East Siberian railway, whereas the rest was delivered through Kazakhstan via the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline and by tankers from Sakhalin (Eder, Andrews-Speed, and Korzhubaev, 2009, p. 229-231). The breakthrough in pipeline negotiations happened only after the 2008 global economic crises hit the Russian economy hard.

As oil prices were collapsing from the July 2008 high of $147 to the December 2008 low of $32, Russia’s NOCs were eager to sign new deals with the Chinese. In February 2009, Chinese and Russian officials announced the China Development Bank (CDB) would lend Rosneft and Transneft $15 billion and $10 billion, respectively, with the interest rate of 5.69 percent. China had already used loan-for-oil and loan-for-gas deals to secure long-term supplies before and amidst the economic crises in 2009 it offered generous loans to many energy-rich states but not at this scale and in such quantity. Chinese and Russian governments played an active role in facilitating these deals. Russian government and Rosneft initiated the negotiations by approaching China’s government in 2008 (Goncharov, personal communication, November 2016, Beijing). As a result, Russia’s

55 In 2009, China signed similar deals with Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Turkmenistan, but none of these loans exceed $10 billion. By the end of 2010 the total value of loans extended by China to energy-rich countries is estimated to be about US$77 billion (Jiang and Sinton, 2011); however, not all these loans were directly backed by energy supply contracts (e.g., the $10 loan to Kazakhstan in 2009 and $13 billion loan to Ghana in 2010)
NOCs covered the holes in their budget, whereas CNPC was supposed to get 15 Mtoe of crude oil yearly at market price over the next 20 years. The loans were also contingent upon the construction of a spur from Russia’s newly launched ESPO pipeline to China. In 2011, the 1030-kilometer-long pipeline linked the ESPO to the Daqing refinery complex via Skovorodino. Transneft built the 65-kilometer-long section of this pipeline on Russian territory using CDB’s loan, whereas the 965 kilometers located inside China were completed by the CNPC.

In 2010, Russia became one of the top five oil suppliers to China and its exports to China have grown steadily since then. Even though a significant price dispute quickly arose between Rosneft and CNPC, in 2013 Russia’s and China’s NOCs signed new multiple energy deals. Notably, Rosneft signed a 25-year oil deal worth $270 billion with CNPC and another ten-year oil deal worth $85 billion with Sinopec. As a result, Rosneft’s export deals with China jumped to over 25 Mtoe per year. In addition, CNPC and Rosneft signed a memorandum of understanding to form a joint venture to develop Russkoye and Yurubchenskoye-Tokhomskoye oilfields in Eastern Siberia that will supply local demand, as well as Chinese and other Asian markets.

At the end of 2014, Transneft added three more oil pumping stations to the ESPO system, increasing the oil pumping capacity of the stations built in 2011. A year later, the initial pipeline was joined by a parallel one. Once the capacity of China’s spur of the ESPO was expanded, China received more than 50 Mtoe from Russia, which constituted 14 percent of total China’s imports and 18 percent of Russia’s total exports. In 2016, this allowed Russia to compete with Saudi Arabia for the status of China’s second-largest...

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56 In 2012, following the disagreement over the terms of the contract related to pipeline fees, CNPC reduced its payments for Russian oil. The dispute settled with a compromise.
supplier of oil, whereas China surpassed Germany as the top buyer of Russian oil. The existing China-Russia contracts anticipate a further increase in exports of oil over the remainder of the 2010s and well into the 2020s.

**Discursive politics of energy in Russia’s China policy**

Framing the relations with China as an “energy dialogue,” Russia’s representatives claim that this dialogue is motivated and sustained by market incentives rather than a desire to form a new political coalition against the West. They describe it as “pragmatic” (Denisov, 2014a) and “clearly defined” along the lines of economic development (Lavrov, 2012). The frame of market rationalism highlights Russia’s special and enduring capacity to satisfy China’s growing energy demand. It also connotes that Russia is interested in China as a market and desires to strengthen its relations with it. Importantly, by using this frame, Russia’s officials discursively instrumentalize Russia’s ample resource wealth as a major competitive advantage, rather than a curse or a source of vulnerabilities. Russia’s energy exports to China become not a consequence of an unhealthy addiction to resource revenues and a necessity to diversify energy exports in the face of deteriorating relations with the West but a rational economic choice stipulated by the development of the global energy market.

Another part of the official discourse on China-Russia energy relations is the frame of regionalism. It foregrounds geographic proximity as a foundation for China-Russia mutually beneficial energy cooperation. This frame, however, has limitations. As the discussion of Russia’s constructions of “we” and “they” in the previous section points out, Russia does not perceive itself as a part of Asia. As Russia’s current Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov (2014a) puts it, China and Russia “are neighbors, but [they] are different.”
Hence, the frame of regionalism is not supported by the references to shared past and cultural affinity with China. Moreover, whereas in the case of Russia’s relations with the EU, official discourses temporally harken back to the past (e.g., World War II, Cold War), the discursive construction of China-Russia energy relations is framed in terms of the future (e.g., expected future economic growth).

For example, framing Russia’s relations with the EU, Victor Khristenko (2006a) argues that “Russia had never cut off supplies to Europe – neither during the Cold War nor during the financial crises of 1998 – because [Russia] historically sees itself as a part of Europe” (also Lavrov, 2012; Novak, 2014b). In contrast, discussing Russia’s energy cooperation with Asia, Khristenko (2006b) focuses on geoeconomic rather than geopolitical or geocultural links:

We view the eastern direction as a strategic one, since here – on the outer contour – Russia has such countries as Japan and Korea, the leaders of the world economy, China and India, with their huge markets and industrialization potentials, and dynamic and ambitious Southeast Asian states. The internal contour is East Siberia and the Far East. […] There is a situation when there is a real opportunity to realize Mikhail Lomonosov’s famous prediction that “the power of Russia shall be increased by Siberia.” (Khristenko, 2006b)

Consequently, the frame of regionalism does not create another dimension within the construction of China-Russia energy cooperation but reinforces its reading as a rational choice based purely on the matching economic interests of the two countries.

Alexander Gabuev, a China expert and a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that, despite the recent progress in China-Russia energy relations, China is still not “a priority partner for Russia” (personal communication, Oct. 2016, Moscow). According to Gabuev, the Russian elite identifies itself as “Europeans” and sees its future “in Europe”:
Russian business and high-ranking officials – everyone – want to return to business with the West. No one ever wanted any serious partnership with Asia. [The Russians] are a little culturally limited, racists, often not well informed [about Asia], and not pragmatic, and thus a partnership with China is still a cultural choice. If you sell more oil to the West, then you are a European country, you are striving for capitalism, a market democracy, and high Western standards of consumption. If you sell more oil to China, then you become a more authoritarian country, in which human rights are violated, and so on. (Personal communication, Oct. 2016, Moscow).

Indeed, discussing diversification of the energy exports towards the East, Russian representatives stress that China is not going to replace Europe in Russia’s energy diplomacy. For example, Putin (2006d) declares confidently that even though Russia wants to have “access to the developing Asian markets,” its European partners “need not fear” that their energy supplies will be reduced. Similarly, in all his public statements, especially those aimed at the Western audience, Alexandr Novak insistently rejects the notion that enhanced cooperation between Russia and the countries of Asia-Pacific region marks a turn to “the East” in Russia’s energy politics (e.g. Novak, 2015a, 2015c). In addition, Novak, on multiple occasions, emphasizes that Russia will not favor interests of its new partners over those of current ones. Consequently, Russia’s rapprochement with China and other Asian nations is constructed not as a redirection of Russia’s energy politics but as its globalization. As the First Deputy Minister of Energy Alexey Texler (2015) puts it, in the 2010s Russia like a “double-headed eagle looks in both directions.”

Nevertheless, in the mid-2000s and even more so after Putin’s regime officially announced the “pivot to the East” (разворот на Восток, razvorot na Vostok) in 2014, China started to represent the major (if not only) counterbalance to the West in Russia’s energy diplomacy. On the discursive level, Putin’s regime uses energy relations with China to maintain Russia’s status as the unique provider of the continental energy security and
reinforce the discourse of energy superpower. In this context, the frame of strategic partnership becomes critical for the construction of China-Russia energy relations.

This third frame based on the notion of the national interests (e.g., Denisov, 2014a, 2016; Putin, 2012, 2013). Denisov (2014b) describes Russia-China energy cooperation as “a product of political will of the leaders of the two countries.” Similarly, Lavrov (2012) argues that “the main secret” of a steady development of the China-Russia relations is “a systemic approach” that includes yearly meetings at the highest level and “sets the necessary political tone for practical projects.” In addition, China-Russia energy cooperation is elevated to the global level and its development is presented not only as a part of the bilateral relations but also as an important factor in the development of the international energy politics. For example, in an article for People’s Daily (2012), Putin argues that

The energy-sector dialogue between our two countries has a strategic dimension. Our joint projects have a big impact in shaping the global energy market’s entire configuration. They offer China more reliable and diversified energy supplies for its domestic needs and offer Russia the chance to open up new export routes to the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region.

While Putin (2014) recognizes that “[Russia’s] Chinese friends drive a hard bargain as negotiators,” the more aggressive expressions of the discourse of energy superpower are absent in Russia’s official discourse about China-Russia energy relations. There is evidence, however, to suggest that the assertiveness of the energy superpower marks Russia’s relations with China on an unofficial level. Sergey Goncharov, the former director of the Representative Office of Rosneft in China (2006-2013), characterizes Russia’s senior officials responsible for negotiations with China as “mobsters” with “the mentality of drug dealers” (personal communication, November 2016, Beijing). According to him, in internal communications they formulated the goal of China-Russia negotiations over oil exports in
the late 2000s as “to put on the needle” (посадить на иглу, posadit’ na iglu), comparing Russia’s oil to a heavy drug. A current employee of Rosneft in China also confirmed that his supervisors believed that the ESPO pipeline will “fasten the Chinese to Russia” and, subsequently, China will accept the oil-linked gas pricing mechanism offered by Russia (personal communication, November 2016, Beijing). The fact that statements like these were never made by Russia’s representatives in public indicates that the energy superpower discourse has a vindictive and protective nature. In the realm of energy diplomacy, Russia’s representatives evoke its aggressive expressions only when they consider that their foreign counterparts threaten Russia without a due respect and question its unique status in international energy relations.

**The discourse of raw-material appendage and China-Russia relations**

Generally, Russians like China but are hesitant about the Chinese. In 2016, 36 percent of Russians believed that China is Russia’s friend (Levada Center, 2017, p. 194 and p. 205). A decade ago, only 12 percent of Russian thought so. While public opinion about China is steadily improving, many Russians still believe that there is a danger of “Chinese expansion,” which will be caused by China’s overpopulation and, accordingly, will lead to the loss of Russian eastern territories (for a detailed analysis of Russian fears about “Chinese expansion” see Larin, 2009 and Yankov, 2010). According to the surveys, 46 percent in 2005 and 24 percent in 2016 agreed that the authorities need to limit the residence of the Chinese on the territory of Russia (Levada Center, 2017, p. 174).

As it was already pointed out through this Chapter, the discourse of raw-material appendage originally focused on the West as Russia’s negative Other and has expanded to include China as the second negative Other only relatively recently (e.g., Buyarov, 2011;
Khramchikhin, 2013; Yanitskiy, 2010). However, the contradictory attitudes towards China and the Chinese do not transform into a coherent China threat discourse in the realm of energy politics.

Alexander Gabuev notes that Russia is often portrayed as China’s raw-material appendage because of the unbalanced trade turnover between the two countries and frames this opinion as a “widespread liberal discourse” (personal communication, Oct. 2016, Moscow). According to him, the formula “our raw materials in exchange for your cars and consumer goods” is a product of Russia’s economic structure rather than a result of China’s attempts to conquer Russia. This opinion is widely shared by most of Russia’s China experts. Ksenia Kushkina, a project specialist at the Energy Systems Center of the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology points out that China is often perceived as an “Oriental mystery” and a “‘black box’ in which something enters but what comes out of is not clear” (personal communication, Oct. 2016). According to her, the Chinese are “quite pragmatic and truthful” because “they always honestly define their long-term goals, albeit in vague phrases.” Like Gabuev, she describes the critique of China-Russia energy cooperation and the perceptions of China as a threat as an opinion of the “radical liberals” and attributes it to the ignorance about China and its intentions. Importantly, Russia’s China experts believe that as a buyer of energy resources China is the ultimate choice for Russia. As Raisa Epikhina of Moscow State University puts it, “China has no equals” because “China is a huge market, and, from this point of view, China will always be attractive for everyone” (personal communication, Oct. 2016).

The opinion described by China experts as “liberal” indeed is often held by adherent critics of Putin’s regime that stand up for liberal economic reforms and comprehensive political reforms. For example, Yulia Latinina, a well-known journalist, public intellectual,
and to a certain extent a symbol of Russian liberalism, criticizes China-Russia energy deals as unprofitable for Russia (e.g., 2014a, 2014b). However, her criticism targets the corruption in Russia’s energy sector rather than perpetuate the perceptions of China as a threat. Similar representations of China-Russia relations appear in fiction writing (e.g., Sorokin, 2006).

In sum, the raw-material appendage discourse labels as a threat not China but Russia’s unhealthy addiction to the energy rent in general. In this sense, Sinophobia that exists in Russian society is not a challenge for the development of China-Russia energy relations because it exists in another discursive space. The discourse of raw-material appendage, however, forces Putin’s regime to reproduce the discursive logic of energy superpower in its constructions of China-Russia energy relations. Consequently, the expressions of the energy superpower discourse in Russia’s discursive politics of China-Russia energy cooperation can be attributed to two factors. First, it is a part of the discursive structure that legitimizes Putin’s regime. Second, it sustains the discursive construction of Russia as an influential actor of international energy politics.

**China’s construction of Russia as a partner in energy relations**

China’s leaders and senior officials at the end of the 2000s and the early 2010s described China-Russia relations as a “healthy” and “dynamic” (Hu, 2012a), praising Russia as a trusted partner and a good neighbor (Liu, 2005; Li, 2016a). Energy cooperation was always a priority for the Chinese side. At the dawn of China-Russia energy relations, Liu Guchang (2005), China’s Ambassador to Russia at that time (2003-2009), bluntly formulated Chinese approach to the energy dialogue with Russia: “China needs oil and gas, Russia needs a market, and the Chinese market is the most convenient and stable.” He also
noted that successful energy cooperation would elevate China-Russia relations to a new level.

The 2007 China’s Energy Development Report argues that in the mid-2000s “the highly politicized nature” of international energy relations exposes Russia to “enormous pressure.” According to it, the decision of Russia’s authorities to increase oil exports to Asia in 2006 is a logical step in creating a “multipolar” energy strategy. Importantly, the authors of the report unite Russia and China by portraying them both as victims of unfounded criticism of the West:

Since the beginning of 2006, Russia has switched to a diversified strategy of energy exports. This strategy turned the international public opinion against Russia: some argued that Russia ‘uses energy resources as a foreign policy tool,’ ‘manages geopolitics through energy exports,’ and ‘tries to manipulate the West with energy resources.’ On the other hand, the energy needs of some major energy consumers were also criticized. For example, China’s and India’s rapid economic development caused a rapid increase of energy demand. The countries were labeled as ‘the world’s energy black holes,’ ‘energy-hungry dragons,’ and even as the chief culprits of the oil prices rise. As a result, China’s and India’s contribution to the global economic development was diluted, whereas their energy demand was placed under the spotlight and examined with a magnifying glass. In this framework, the United States and Western European countries emerged as ‘threatened’ because their energy security is jeopardized by Russia’s intentions to explore Asian markets and their energy supply is affected by the surge in demand in China, India, and other developing countries.

In this discursive framework, Russia is explicitly constructed as an antipode to the West and thus as China’s potential ally, even though it does not appear as a part of China’s “we” (because the “we” is India and “other developing countries”). Other experts of state-affiliated think tanks and research institutions sketch a similar portrait of Russia. Li Zhonghai (2009) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences defines Russia as an “independent energy producer” (p. 5) and claims that “China’s government, business, and people have always had high hopes to meet China’s growing energy demand through the development of China-Russia relations” (p. 6). Along the similar lines, Zhang Hongxia
(2007), also a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, claims that the energy wealth became “the ‘golden key’ to Russia’s economic development and the ‘tool’ for the rise of Russia as a great power” in the 2000s (p. 38). Even though some Chinese scholars point out that Russia’s economic overdependence on the energy sector is not sustainable in the long run (e.g., Zhang, 2007; Wu, 2006), overall the rich body of literature on Russia’s energy strategy and energy diplomacy that emerged in China between 2006 and 2009 presents Russia as a promising energy supplier and provides a positive outlook for the development of China-Russia cooperation (e.g., Wang, 2006; Li, 2009).

China’s officials, on the contrary, between 2006 and 2009 bypassed the topic of China-Russia energy cooperation in silence. Against the background of the 2005 loan-for-oil, China’s representative had high hopes for the pipeline project (Liu, 2005; MFA of the PRC, 2005). When Russian authorities suspended the plans to build a direct pipeline from Eastern Siberia to Northern China, the development of energy cooperation with Russia was removed from China’s agenda. The language of the public statements made by China’s officials during this period is vague, and it seems that they struggle to find practical examples to illustrate the “strategic” nature of China-Russia relations. For instance, calling 2006 and 2007 “extraordinary years in the history of China-Russia relations,” Liu Guchang (2007) describes the strategic component of these relations as follows:

China and Russia exchange their opinions in a timely manner and maintain close cooperation on the major global and regional issues, which contributes to strengthening the influence and effectiveness of the two countries in the international arena and contributes to the peaceful development of the planet.

China’s officials start to talk about strengthening energy relations with Russia again only after 2009. Their construction of it is structurally similar to the Russian one, but the emphasis falls differently.
Like their Russian counterparts, China’s representatives define China-Russia energy relations as a “dialogue” based on “the principle of mutual benefit and complementing each other with advantages” (MFA of the PRC, 2010). The frame of market rationalism occupies a central place; however, while the idea of interdependence plays the key role in Russian discourse, China’s representatives put the accent on the absence of geopolitics and link China-Russia relations with the idea of “peaceful rise” and “harmonious world.” They frame China-Russia energy cooperation in terms of the desire of the two countries to use their development potential and ensure dynamic economic growth rather than to form an anti-Western coalition. Reinforcing the logic of the “peaceful rise,” Hu Jintao (2012b) argued that “the whole world” will benefit from a closer interaction between China and Russia. China’s representatives often describe China-Russia energy relations as “business cooperation” (e.g., Hu, 2012a; Li, 2012b).

The frame of regionalism is also present in China’s construction of China-Russia energy relations. A common metaphor for China-Russia relations evoked by both China’s officials and foreign policy experts is a proverb “a close neighbor is better than a distant relative” (远亲不如近邻, yuǎn qīn bù rú jìn lín) (e.g., Liu, 2008; Ma, 2008; Wang, 2009). Unlike their Russian partners, China’s representatives present China-Russia energy cooperation not as a novelty but as an opportunity to revitalize the historical economic, social, and cultural networks connecting the two countries. As a case in point, Xi Jinping (2013a) compared oil and natural gas pipelines to the Thousands-miles Tea Route (万里茶道, wàn lǐ chá dào). According to him, the new pipelines will become “arteries” that connect China and Russia in the 21st century, like the route over which traders exchanged

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57 This historic route connected European Russia to China through Siberia in the 18th and the 19th centuries. It is better known as the Siberian Route (Сибирский тракт, Sibirsky trakt).
Chinese tea for Russian furs two centuries ago. Reinforcing the narrative of “win-win” cooperation, Xi Jinping argued that in the case of China and Russia “one plus one is more than two” because of their complementary interests.

Finally, China’s official discourse of China-Russia relations also frames energy cooperation between the two countries as a part of the strategic partnership. However, China’s officials emphasize the “comprehensiveness” of China-Russia strategic rapprochement and broaden the content of energy cooperation. Whereas for the Russian side energy cooperation means first and foremost exports of fossil fuels and the construction of the transportation infrastructure to facilitate these exports, Chinese representatives focus on expanding the portfolio of China-Russia energy relations and moving beyond “traditional oil and gas” (e.g., MFA of the PRC, 2010; Li, 2012a, 2012b).

The construction of the energy cooperation as a part of China-Russia “comprehensive strategic partnership” did not change once Xi Jinping replaced Hu Jintao. Starting from 2014, however, Xi and other China’s senior officials highlight that energy relations are based on “practical cooperation” (e.g., MFA of the PRC 2014c, Xi, 2015d; Li, 2016a, 2016b). By 2017, “practical” (务实, wùshí hézuò) became the key epithet for China-Russia relations in China’s official discourse and, accordingly, energy is featured in recent public statements of China’s representatives not as a main strategic priority but just as another item in the long list of items on the cooperation agenda (e.g., Xi, 2017d; Li, 2017). Notably, the discussion of the further expansion of energy infrastructure was incorporated into the discourse of the Belt and Road project and framed as one of the “connectivity” issues (e.g., Xi, 2015a; Huangpu and Wang, 2015). This means that the Chinese side wants to include the negotiations on future pipelines in the broader theme of regional integration,
as well as potentially linking up the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road project\textsuperscript{58}. In this framework, the pipelines are not a matter of bilateral relations but a part of the integration package.

3.3. Summary: Xi’s Chinese Dream and Putin’s energy superpower

Despite the undeniable logic for the rapprochement between Russia and China, their “energy dialogue” has been complicated. Despite the steadily rising growth of demand for and of imports of oil on China’s part, Russia hesitated to enter long-term agreements with China until the end of the 2000s. In the late 2000s, some scholars argued that a convergence of outlook between Russia and China in regards of their preference for the state controlling the key sectors of the economy will create a stronger foundation for the cooperation (e.g., Ferdinand, 2007; Williams, 2009). However, the direct pipeline to China was not completed until 2011 and stable energy cooperation between Russian and China started to emerge only in 2013.

The pattern of China-Russia energy relations between 2005 and 2016 indicates that Russia turns to the East only when it faces challenges in the West: the need to find cash to finance the controversial nationalization of Yukos’ assets in 2005, the decline in Western demand for Russian oil following the global financial crises of the 2008, and, finally, the recent alienation between the West and Russia following the Ukrainian crises in the mid-2010s. Russia’s energy identities and discursive politics of energy appear to be driving it away from China. Putin’s regime must present Russia as an energy superpower and frame its interactions with China accordingly because rejecting the discourse of energy superpower will entail accepting its antithesis, the discourse of raw-material appendage. As

\textsuperscript{58}The energy cooperation, nevertheless, was not mentioned in the Joint Declaration on the Connection of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union signed in 2015 by Putin and Xi (Joint Declaration, 2015).
a result, Russia’s energy diplomacy towards China becomes a hostage of the conflict between the discourse of energy superpower and the discourse of raw-material appendage. In addition, while Russia separates itself from the West, the historical, cultural, and political gulf separating it from China is substantially deeper.

The Soviet Union was China’s “big brother” (老大哥, Lǎo dàgē). Modern Russia is not a member of China’s family but merely a business partner. In the 2010s, China can buy as much Russian oil as its economic development requires and recognizes that Russia needs China’s money much as China needs Russia’s energy resources. For the Chinese side, the partnership with Russia is a matter of convenience and a rational choice determined by its current economic interests. Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream does not include a geopolitical coalition with Putin’s energy superpower. Russia is losing (or already has lost) its competitive advantages in relations with China because in the 2010s oil supplies can buy China’s friendship but cannot turn it into a geopolitical alliance.
Chapter 4

China-Kazakhstan energy relations

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China received new opportunities to intensify its geopolitical presence and influence in Central Asia (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2010). China recognized the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – in December 1991 and as early as January 1992 they began diplomatic exchanges. Developing relations with Central Asian states, China purposefully and even assertively pursues its national interests. One of China’s core interests in the region is securing energy supplies: maximizing access to Central Asia’s energy resources and expanding the overland energy supply lines.\(^{59}\)

Kazakhstan is one of China’s key energy partners in Central Asia.\(^{60}\) The record time in which China constructed the Kazakhstan-China pipeline illustrates well the high priority China attaches to its energy resources. The landmark project – the Atasu-Alashankou section of the first direct oil import pipeline between China and Central Asia -- was completed in just ten months. It began to pump oil in December 2005 and its current capacity is at 14 Mtoe of crude oil per year (Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP [KCP LLP], 2018). Kazakhstan is the largest recipient of Chinese investment in Central Asia. According to the Eurasian Development Bank (2017), between 2009 and 2016 Chinese investment in

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59 The other two core axes of China’s engagement with Central Asia are opening new transportation routes and depriving anti-Chinese political movements of Uyghurs in Xinjiang of external support (Kuteleva, 2012b).

60 Turkmenistan’s economy is also dominated by China. In 2007, CNPC received its first license to explore and extract onshore gas in Turkmenistan and built a new 3,666-kilometer-long pipeline to bring Turkmen gas home. By the end of the 2000s, Turkmenistan became fully dependent on China for its gas sales. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan also supply gas to China through the upgraded between 2007 and 2009 pipeline network. In Kyrgyzstan, China built two refineries, near the cities of Kara-Balta and Tomok. The refineries, financed by CNPC and supplied by CNPC-run oil fields in Kazakhstan, together produce 1.2 million tons of refined product annually (Azattyq, 2012).
Kazakhstan increased from $9.5 billion to $21.5 billion (p. 6); 89 percent of this investment was in oil and gas (p. 46).

In the mid-2010s, Xi Jinping designated Central Asia as China’s “inland gateway” to Europe and the Middle East in the framework of the Belt and Road project 61 and clearly signaled that China offers Kazakhstan one of the central roles in it. China recognizes Kazakhstan as its key ally and Central Asia’s potential sub-hegemon. This elevates the status of Kazakhstan in China’s international strategy, including both China’s ongoing quest for energy resources and its attempts to reframe international energy relations as a positive-sum game.

Kazakhstan is the trend-setter in Central Asia, especially now when its major rival for the regional leadership – Uzbekistan – is temporarily inward-looking62. Hence, the discussion of Kazakhstan’s interactions with China is important for understanding China’s potential in Central Asia. From another point of view, an analysis of China’s engagement

61 According to Xi’s plan, the Silk Road Economic Belt will begin in the city of Xi’an in central China and stretch all the way through northwestern China to cross the border with Kazakhstan. It then will head southwest through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to Iran, Iraq, and Syria. It will reach Turkey and cross the Bosphorus. Further, it will traverse Central Europe, make a detour to Russia, and pass through Ukraine, Poland, and Germany. Eventually, the Silk Road Economic Belt will come to Venice where it will converge with the Maritime Silk Road. As a result, Central Asia becomes China’s gateway to Europe and the Middle East.

62 Uzbekistan, the most populous of the five Central Asian states, is often regarded as Kazakhstan’s key rival for leadership of the region. However, recently Uzbekistan has been inward-focused. Uzbekistan faced a critical moment in its history when Islam Karimov, who ruled the country for 25 years, died in September 2016. The rumors about Karimov’s poor health and corruption scandals in his family in early 2013 and late 2014 led many observers to predict that the first leadership change in Uzbekistan since its independence would be chaotic and painful. Even though the transition of power in 2016 was smooth and without political turmoil, Uzbekistan is still largely preoccupied with its domestic affairs. Karimov’s political skill and clever geopolitical maneuvering gave Uzbekistan stability and independence. At the same time, his rule left behind a bitter legacy that includes a fragile economy, ethnic conflict, and backlash from his regime’s repressive stance towards Islam. It is not clear how the new president, Shavkat Mirzioyev, will address these complex issues. Similarly, it is not clear how the new leader of Uzbekistan will deal with China’s increasing interest in asserting its influence in Central Asia. So far Mirzioyev has made only general statements regarding Uzbekistan’s participation in the Belt and Road project.
with Kazakhstan provides novel insights into the latest changes in China’s energy paradigm and its energy relations with the countries of the Global South.

The first part of this chapter focuses on Kazakhstan and its discursive politics of energy. I examine the dominant discursive constructions that shape Kazakhstan’s energy paradigm and how Kazakhstan constructs China as its Other. From there, the focus shifts back to China. First, I examine how China constructs Kazakhstan as its Other in international energy politics. Further, I explain how and with what effect China’s and Kazakhstan’s energy paradigms are manifested and enacted in their bilateral energy relations. The closing section summarizes the findings.

4.1. Kazakhstan’s discursive politics of oil

Kazakhstan’s oil industry counts its history from 1899 when the first oil gusher fountained in Karashungul (Cherdiev, 2012, p. 12). In the mid-1910s, British investors started to produce oil in the northeast of the Caspian Sea (now Atyrau Region of Kazakhstan), receiving concessions from the Russian Empire. After West Turkestan63 became a part of the Soviet Union in the early 1920s, the oil industry was nationalized. The Soviet state offered the people of West Turkestan a paternalistic social welfare system, mass education, a robust public health system, socialist justice, and security. It also invested heavily in the industrialization of the region and especially in the development of resource sectors. In exchange, the region was assigned a role of a commodity supplier. For

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63 West Turkestan, also known as Russian Turkestan, is a region colonized by the Russian Empire. It comprised the vast territory to the south of the Kazakh Steppe. In the Soviet era, the region was known as the Middle Asia (Средняя Азия) and was divided between Kazakhstan in the north, Uzbekistan across the center, Kyrgyzstan in the east, Tajikistan in the southeast and Turkmenistan in the southwest.
70 years its economy was subordinated to the needs of the European part of the Soviet Union (Loring, 2014).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan became an independent state and found itself holding 3.2 percent of the world’s total proven oil reserves. Nursultan Nazarbayev – the first and, so far, the only president of Kazakhstan – turned the extraction of energy resources into the foundation of Kazakhstan’s national prosperity. In 1997, Kazakhstan became the proud leader among the post-Soviet states in per capita foreign direct investment, and, in 1999, it registered the first budget surplus. Throughout the 2000s, Kazakhstan’s growth performance averaged almost 8 percent annually in real terms (World Bank, 2018). Since 2006, riding largely on high oil prices, Kazakhstan has transitioned from lower-middle-income to upper-middle income status. To the credit of Nazarbayev and his allies, Kazakhstan’s government invested generously and consistently not only in poverty eradication but also in the new middle class and, as a result, Kazakhstan became one of the most socially and politically stable post-Soviet states (Kalyuzhnova and Patterson, 2016; Azam and Ahmed, 2015).

Nazarbayev’s regime also has ambitious plans to diversify the economy away from natural resource extraction, but little progress was made in this direction in the 2000s and the 2010s. In 2017, the manufacturing sector accounted for 11 percent of GDP, while the agricultural sector constituted only 5 percent. Both sectors are inefficient and fail to compete successfully with foreign producers (World Bank, 2018). In contrast, rents derived directly and indirectly from the sale of energy resources constitute about 25 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP (World Bank, 2018). Consequently, after the independence, Kazakhstan became a classic rentier state (Ostrowski, 2011; Franke et al., 2009), and its fragile economy is extremely vulnerable to downward global oil demand and price shocks.
This section starts with the discussion of Nazarbayev’s discursive hegemony and outlines the dynamics of Kazakhstan’s discursive politics of energy. Further, I discuss the key energy discourses and the ways they are produced and reproduced by Nazarbayev’s regime. Finally, I examine Kazakhstan’s constructions of “we” and “they” in energy politics. Summarizing the findings, I formulate Kazakhstan’s energy paradigm.

Nazarbayev’s discursive hegemony

In 1991, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the former first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, became the first president of Kazakhstan Republic and has since steadily centralized the power in his own hands. In 2010, the parliament of Kazakhstan awarded Nazarbayev an honorary title of the Leader of Nation (Елбасы, Elbasi), which uniquely empowered Nazarbayev to secure a lifetime role in domestic and foreign policy decision-making. Darkhan Kaletayev, the first deputy chairman of the ruling pro-presidential party Nur Otan (2008-2009), provides the most precise summary of the dominant vision of Nazarbayev’s leadership:

Nazarbayev is not just the president of Kazakhstan but is the leader of the nation, like Atatürk for the Turks, Mahathir for the Malayans, Lee Kuan Yew for the Singaporeans, and Roosevelt for the Americans. He is a kind of personality that comes precisely in the period of the demand and need for serious progress in the development and growth of the nation. Supporters and opponents of Nazarbayev are united in one thing: without him, there would be no present-day Republic of Kazakhstan in the modern state system (Suleev, 2009).

An increasing amount of scholarship is dedicated to understanding the discursive mechanisms employed by Nazarbayev’s regime to legitimize and strengthen its power in Kazakhstan. Marlene Laruelle (2014) argues that “Nazarbayevism” is closely bound to the

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64 The 1995 referendum extended Nazarbayev’s term in office to 2000. However, in the aftermath of the 1998 Ruble crises, Nazarbayev called for elections ahead of the schedule and was reelected president in 1999. In 2005, he got 91.2% of the vote and won another seven-year term. In 2007, a constitutional amendment exempted Nazarbayev personally from the two-term limit on the presidency.
civic nationalism (Kazakhtanness) and ethnic nationalism (Kazakhness) and intimately connected to transnationalism, that is the idea of Kazakhstan as a modern nation-state integrated into the world community and benefiting from economic globalization. Rico Isaacs (2011) demonstrates that discourses that construct Nazarbayev as “the father of independence” and the single person capable of resolving the challenges of post-Soviet nation-building are not only “projected from above at the elite level” but also shared and accepted by most of the citizens (p. 448). Similarly, Mariya Y. Omelicheva (2016), exploring the legitimacy discourses produced by Nazarbayev’s regime and evaluating the effectiveness of these discourses, based on data from the 2011 World Values Survey, concludes that the Nazarbayev’s discursive politics echo the beliefs about socioeconomic and political development widely held in Kazakhstani society. Elsewhere, Omelicheva (2013) argues that the concept of a presidential democracy became popular among the Kazakhstani because it resonates well with the widely-shared idea of a strong visionary leader responsible for the national success (pp. 84-85). Other scholars (e.g., Kudaibergenova, 2015; Alff, 2015; Sullivan, 2017) point out that discourses of development are monopolized by Nazarbayev’s regime and also legitimize the everlasting rule of Nazarbayev.

In sum, Nazarbayev is an authoritarian ruler and an authoritarian discourse-maker that enjoys broad popular support. Even though the discursive politics of Nazarbayev’s regime is contested in some realms (e.g., Kudaibergenova, 2016), overall its discursive

65 Russian and Kazakh languages distinguish “Kazakh as nationality/ethnicity” from “Kazakh as citizenship/territorial affiliation.” The term “Kazakh” (казах, kazakh) is only used for the nationality and for ethnicity. “Kazakhstani” (казахстанец, kazakhstanets) is designated for the state and territorial belonging and thus includes many other ethnicities and nationalities (e.g., Russian Kazakhstani, Uzbek Kazakhstani, Korean Kazakhstani). The later term – Kazakhstani – was introduced in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
dominance has remained unchallenged for the past three decades. Nazarbayev has successfully monopolized all formal discursive domains, including public communication of Kazakhstani officials, academic discussions, and media. His speeches and articles are compiled into edited volumes, including four collections of quotations. In addition, Nazarbayev is a prolific writer, authoring 22 books between 1985 and 2017 on the political and socioeconomic development and history of Kazakhstan.

Given the strong political and discursive hegemony established by Nazarbayev personally and his regime, my analysis of Kazakhstan’s discursive politics of energy is largely focused on the texts produced by Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan’s official discourses (Model 1) are represented by a set of 77 texts, including key policy and programmatic documents and public statements of Kazakhstani officials; 33 out of 77 texts are authored by Nazarbayev (summarized in Table 5).

In Kazakhstan’s case, cultural representations (Model 3A) and marginal political discourses that are produced by NGOs, academics, and public intellectuals (Model 3B) replicate, entrench, and even intensify the official discourses. Notably, my survey of Kazakhstani academic literature on energy politics revealed that an overwhelming majority of scholarly works contain at least one quotation from Nazarbayev’s treatises.

Nazarbayev’s discursive dominance is reinforced through the creation of numerous symbolic references that construct him as a protector and encourager of the development of science and education in Kazakhstan. Almost all major initiatives of the last decade related

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66 I retrieved 68 academic works published in Russian between 2006 and 2016 from the social science databases of the National Academic Library of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Astana) on 12 February 2017. The search was based on the keywords: “нефть” (oil), “ресурсы” (resources), “развитие” (development), and “Казахстан” (Kazakhstan). The results included academic articles published in the national peer-reviewed journals (43), graduate dissertations (17), and monographs (8). In 52 out of 68 works, the authors quoted Nazarbayev as an authority on diverse topics (e.g., economic development, foreign policy, energy security, environmental policies, to name just few), with 19 works using his quotes as an epigraph.
to enhancing Kazakhstan’s intellectual and research potential – new schools, universities, research centers, museums, libraries, scholarships, and special bursaries – have been named after Nazarbayev. Nazarbayev dominates even the physical discursive spaces. In Astana and Almaty, Nazarbayev’s quotations can be found everywhere: facades and entrances of public buildings, billboards, freeway overpasses, benches, and public art objects (e.g., Figure 11a and Figure 11b). Consequently, the position of the highly centralized and personified regime of Nazarbayev enjoys a full political and discursive hegemony in Kazakhstan. With only sporadic and isolated exceptions, wider political debates in Kazakhstan are shrunk to the point of being barely significant for the analysis of Kazakhstan’s dominant energy paradigm and China-Kazakhstan relations.

In total, the data collection on Kazakhstan contains 114, including visual materials, six semi-structured interviews with the China experts and academics, and fieldwork observations collected between January and February 2017 in Astana.
Table 5. Model 1: Kazakhstan’s official discourses, 2005-2016

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Figure 11a. A street banner in the center of Astana.
The banner promotes a new developmental program, Bright Path (Нұрлы жол, Nurli Jol): “The core of the new economic policy will be the infrastructure development plan.” February, 2017.

Figure 11b. The National Museum of the Republic of Kazakhstan
The quote of Nursultal Nazarbayev featured on the wall at the entrance hall of the National Museum of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Astana: “Kazakhstan is a country with a strong foundation, rich history, and extensive territory.” February, 2017.
Kazakhstan’s Oil: A blessing and a threat

Control over national oil resources occupies a distinct place in Kazakhstan’s official narrative of national independence and sovereignty. Narrating the modern history of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev (2006) emphasizes that, being a part of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan never felt as a “real master” of “the great treasures hidden in its bowels” (p. 107). Only as a sovereign state, Kazakhstan was able to use oil as the “foundation of [its] economic independence” (p. 108). Nazarbayev starts the story of Kazakhstan’s sovereignty by calling oil the “blood of the Kazakhstani economy” and the “black gold of Kazakhstani lands” that helped the government to kick-start economic growth in the early 1990s (p. 99). Developing this story further, he argues that the vast resource wealth is “an object of envy and claims [of other states] because of which [Kazakhstan] could indeed lose [its] independence” (p. 100). In the very same paragraph, oil transforms from Kazakhstan’s “blood” and “black gold” into a “beast” that Nazarbayev and his team “managed to tame,” while “always remembering that for a minute we cannot relax and deceive ourselves by the fact that we control it” (p. 100). Consequently, there are two competing narratives about oil in the official energy discourse: oil as a blessing and oil as a threat.

Like Russia, Kazakhstan struggles with the identity of the victim of resource curse and seeks to reposition itself. However, while Putin’s Russia reframes itself as an energy superpower, Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan consistently and emphatically declares the principle of “economy first.” In addition, Nazarbayev’s regime has developed a complex construction that rationalizes and reframes Kazakhstan’s dependence on energy revenues as a transitional phase in its development, neutralizing the negative connotations of the resource curse discourses.
Portraying Kazakhstan as a sovereign owner of its energy resources and as a modern state that is aspiring to join the “international energy resources club” (p. 130), Nazarbayev (2006) claims that the focus on the oil sector and the quest for foreign investments was the only rational developmental choice for Kazakhstan after it became independent:

Each country enters the process of [international economic] integration with luggage. This luggage is different for each country: intellect and labor, industrial and technological, cultural, and resource potentials or a combination of these potentials. And, given the capabilities of a country, the world market dictates it the conditions of integration. Each country must pay a kind of “membership fee,” offering the world market whatever it is able to contribute to the integrated economy at the moment. (p. 128)

Kazakhstan, according to Nazarbayev, paid its “membership fee” in the late 1990s by giving access to its natural resources to large international companies. Foreign investments in the oil sector must “smoothen the difficulties of the transition period” during the first decades of independence and help Kazakhstan to become a part of the global economy; however, this developmental choice does not determine Kazakhstan’s long-term future and its “fate” in international politics (pp. 128-129). Consequently, Nazarbayev constructs Kazakhstan’s dependence on oil revenues as its conscious choice and an inevitable side effect of its successful integration into the global economy. As a Kazakhstani expert summarized it, “the president explained to us that we need to sell our oil, if want to become Kuwait” (personal communication, 5 February 2017).

Nazarbayev also highlights that by bringing home foreign investment and inviting international companies to develop oil reserves, Kazakhstan did not surrender its newfound independence but, on the contrary, was able to strengthen its sovereignty by revitalizing the economy (Nazarbayev, 2006, 2009, 2010a). In addition, according to the official discourse, Kazakhstan will eventually outgrow its petrostate status and obtain the recognition of the international community in the realm of technological innovations, particularly by
developing “green” sectors. When addressing Kazakhstani citizens between 2005 and 2016, Nazarbayev yearly repeated like a mantra that the government is determined to develop the non-primary sectors of the economy and will use oil revenues to create the “new economy of the future” (новая экономика будущего, novaya ekonomika budushchego).

Consequently, while Russia’s energy discourses construct the dependency on oil revenues as a humiliating “downshifting,” Nazarbayev’s regime presents Kazakhstan as a proud petrostate that perceives oil as a purely economic commodity and does not take its oil-based prosperity for granted. A good case in point is Nazarbayev’s (2017) framing of the oil-boost of the mid-2000s as a unique “respite” that gave the government an opportunity to “take a comprehensive look at the emerging model of the national economy” (p. 221). He also stresses that even in the early 1990s he “clearly realized” that Kazakhstan needed “a model of balanced, sustainable development” (p. 221) and was determined to diversify Kazakhstan’s economy away from oil.

Kazakhstani experts and scholars reproduce Nazarbayev's official discourse, solidifying its legitimacy. They diagnose Kazakhstan with certain symptoms of the Dutch Disease and address the risks related to its dependence on volatile commodity markets (e.g., Nurmaganbyetov, 2011; Karyenov, 2014; Ondash, 2012, 2013; Yelyubayev, 2016). With only rare exceptions (Temirkhanov, 2014a, 2014b, 2015), the experts agree that the state is the only actor that can protect Kazakhstan from the resource curse and present Nazarbayev’s developmental programs as effective preventive measures for mitigating it. The metaphor of raw-material appendage appears in the popular discourse but is absent in experts’ vocabulary. Overall, the general attitude of the expert community towards the economic consequences of Kazakhstan’s dependence on oil income is most vividly summarized by Murat Temirkhanov (2014a), the Head of Research at the investment bank
Halyk Finance: “The resource curse is the evil, but it makes happy both the ordinary Kazakhstanis and the officials.”

Like their Russian colleagues, Kazakhstani experts rarely discuss the political side of the resource curse and avoid references to the studies that focus on possible antidemocratic effects of resource wealth. Quite notably, none of Kazakhstani experts cite quasi-canonical works of Michael Ross (e.g., 2001, 2012) or mention the popular “no taxation, no representation” axiom that inspired many studies of the resource curse. On the contrary, some of them reframe political implications of resource curse as an external sovereignty threat, echoing Nazarbayev’s concerns about Kazakhstan’s oil causing the envy of other nations. For instance, Jumageldi Yelyubayev of the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (2016) argues that one of the major expressions of resource curse is “the increasing pressure on the national governments from transnational energy corporations and countries where [these corporations] are registered” that “undermines the basis of the state sovereignty” (p. 83). This brings us to the broader energy discourse that constructs oil as a heavily sought-after resource and follows Nazarbayev’s alarming narrative of energy and environmental crises.

When writing about sustainable development and the future of the human civilizations, Nazarbayev is rather pessimistic about the role of oil in the social, political, and economic progress. In *Radical Renewal of Global Society and Partnership of Civilizations* (2010b), Nazarbayev identifies the energy and environmental crisis as one of the three “most urgent and topical problems for all mankind,” along with food shortages and income inequality (p. 6). He characterizes these as a contradiction between energy security and environmental protection. According to him, the crises are provoked by the depletion of world oil reserves and is further deteriorated with the expansive growth of
China, India, and other developing countries. As the prices for oil and costs of its transportation are growing, oil becomes a “geopolitical factor”:

Whether we like it or not, oil becomes a geopolitical factor and an effective lever of political pressure. We are now forced to talk about energy blackmail, energy threat, and energy terrorism. Sources and supply routes of energy resources became a potential and very vulnerable target for attacks by international terrorists. It seems that we have crossed the line from the civilization that was able to control oil. Now oil controls us! We are ready to pay for it more and more literally and figuratively. (p. 43, emphasis added)

Consequently, according to Nazarbayev, oil is the energy resource of the 21st century. His concept of energy security is focused on the availability of oil supplies. At its core is the idea of oil scarcity and global oil dependence. In this context, oil becomes extremely securitized and appears on the “panic politics” agenda. To complete the picture, Nazarbayev presents the environmental side of the crisis as an unfolding “ecological catastrophe” (p. 44). Without going into details, he argues that it is a result of “ecological violence” and “irrational use of hydrocarbons as an energy carrier” (p. 43).

Following Nazarbayev’s logic, Kazakhstan’s vast oil reserves expose it to potential (but unspecified) geopolitical threats in the present, whereas the inevitable depletion of these reserves in the future is constructed as a structural problem for its long-term development. Nazarbayev (2010b) concludes that “one thing is clear”:

We need to take urgent measures to implement the global energy imperative and ecological imperative, which commands us to actively – that is daily – engage in innovative development of existing energy technologies: 1) optimization of consumption; 2) conservation of natural resources; 3) energy saving; 4) renewable energy; 5) alternative energy. (p. 49)

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67 The idea of energy and environmental crises is further developed in Global Energy and Ecological Strategy of Sustainable Development in the 21st Century (2011). According to the library abstract, this book summarizes Nazarbayev’s “theoretical and methodological research on the problems of building a global energy security and environmentally sustainable development of the world and the Eurasian Economic Community.” The book is also described as Nazarbayev’s “message” to the developing world and its publication was timed with the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.
In sum, the dominant energy discourses construct the vast oil reserves simultaneously as a blessing and as a source of multiple vulnerabilities. Oil is the foundation of Kazakhstan’s independence and the greatest threat to its sovereignty after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan’s dependence on oil incomes is framed as a temporary phase in its economic development. Accordingly, Kazakhstan portrayed as a modern and dynamic petrostate that will not lie on its oars but will use its oil money to transition to a new modernity and elevate itself onto a new development level. In this framework, Nazarbayev’s regime secures for itself the role of the only guarantor of the post-oil bright future.

**Constructing Kazakhstan as a petrostate: Oil rent and Nazarbayevism**

In the early 2000s, Kazakhstan reshaped the relationship between the political authorities and the economy, building a structure similar to Putin’s “power vertical” in Russia. As Wojciech Ostrowski’s research (2010) reveals, the security of Nazarbayev regime’s control over the oil sector is founded on managing and rotating cadres according to various considerations, the foremost of which is the loyalty to Nazarbayev. Successfully securing control over the rent from the country’s oil resources, Nazarbayev gained the access to enough political and economic resources to impose and maintain the regime that Ostrowski defines as “quasi-corporatist” (p. 139). One of the major features of Nazarbayev’s domestic energy politics in the early 2000s was “Kazakhization” of the oil industry and its sub-contractors: a company is “only granted access to the oil industry because it is at least partly owned by the regime’s client, who is also an ethnic Kazakh” (Ostrowski, 2009, p. 36). In addition, Nazarbayev’s regime staffed KazMunayGas with ethnic Kazakhs, creating barriers for other non-Kazakh specialists to join it (p. 36). This
policy elevated the status of ethnic Kazakh oil men and, as a result, they “not only owe their patron Nazarbayev the high positions they are handed but are also indebted to him for their special, privileged positions in post-Soviet Kazakhstan that go beyond measurable benefits” (p. 36). Consequently, the Kazakhization of the oil sector allowed Nazarbayev to build complex, modern, and mediated patron-client ties that determine relationships of loyalty over ethnicity or clan affiliation.

On the discursive level, however, oil is instrumentalized by Nazarbayev’s regime not as a source of political power of ethnic Kazakhs but as a source of collective prosperity of all people of Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev’s government encourages among the population a sense of national pride in valuing oil as a national asset and, as a result, the rising national consciousness of the population is tightly bound to Kazakhstan’s resource wealth. In other words, the sovereign control over the national natural resources and, specifically oil, became one of the corner-stones of the self-determination of the multi-ethnic Kazakhstani nation.

It is important to highlight one significant contradiction here. While the official nation-building discourses are concentrated around the idea of the Kazakhstani as the symbolic owners of their own house, the people of Kazakhstan were never designated as the holders of natural resources. All official texts, starting with the 1995 Constitution (Article 3, Section 6), emphasize that the state owns natural resources. The 2010 Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use68 explicates this constitutional norm further, defining state

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68 The Law “On Subsoil and Subsoil Use” of 2010 institutionalized Nazarbayev’s strategy of resource nationalism. As a case in point, the law confirms that “on the initiative of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan” a contract might be ultimately terminated, if the actions of the subsoil user “lead to changes in the economic interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan which jeopardize national security” (Article 72, Section 5). In the end of 2017, Kazakhstan’s government adopted a new Code “On Subsoil and Subsoil Use,” which replaced the previous statute regulating oil and gas and mining activities, including the Law “On Subsoil and Subsoil Use” of 2010.
ownership of natural resources as “one of the constituent basic elements of state sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (Chapter 10, Article 1). While Nazarbayev can be fairly called the most secular president in the post-Soviet space, he (2006) turns to religion, rationalizing the state ownership on natural resources enshrined in the Constitution and other laws of the country:

The subsoil, water, flora, and fauna remained exclusively in the state ownership. Not everyone who participated in drafting the [1995] Constitution supported this view. The enthusiastic proponents of the private property offered to allow the possibility of private ownership for everything. At the same time, most of the members of the working group considered it unsubstantiated to allow private ownership for what was not created by human labor. The wealth of our land was given to us by the Most High and was preserved by our ancestors, this is what existed before us, and will exist after, and therefore belongs not only to us but also to our future generations. (p. 80, emphasis added)

In this discursive framework, the state is presented as the sole, authentic, and the only legitimate owner of natural resources. Inasmuch as the regime and the state in Kazakhstan are purposefully conflated, Nazarbayev, acting as the “guarantor of the inviolability of Kazakhstan’s special path of development” (Suleev, 2009), takes personal responsibility for governing the natural resources and redistributing resource revenues.

This discursive construction is reinforced further by references to the ability of Nazarbayev’s regime to satisfy citizens’ socio-economic needs. Namely, Nazarbayev on multiple occasions praised himself for spending the oil money wisely during the period of high commodity prices by redirecting substantial portions of it into the main sovereign wealth fund, the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK). In 2006, Nazarbayev warned his nation that if Kazakhstan boosted social welfare and incomes of its citizens with the “easy oil money,” it will only “get hocked up” to oil revenue (p. 139). Instead, he proposed to save this money “for a rainy day” (p. 139) or to direct it to “supporting and developing the priority things for the country” (p. 261). While “the priority
things” remain hidden in the black box of Nazarbayev’s regime, the “rainy day” came with a broad-based economic slowdown twice, in 2008 and in 2014. In the 2014 address to the nation, Nazarbayev pointed out that because he did not let the Kazakhstani people “spend the oil money on their daily needs” when oil prices were on the rise but “saved and multiplied it,” now Kazakhstan has the reserves that will help its people to “overcome grim times and to stimulate the growth of the national economy.”

Another discursive construction that legitimizes Nazarbayev regime’s new strategy of resource nationalism and its model of state capitalism is the narrative that problematizes the privatization of the early 1990s. In the mid-2000s, Nazarbayev (2006) called privatization “the most controversial page in the history of Kazakhstan” (p. 183). He further described it as being vital to economic progress yet also a chaotic and disorderly process, which nourished a class of business elite with nothing but contempt for national interests. Later, he also frequently emphasized the stark contrast between the Kazakhstan of the early 1990s and the Kazakhstan of the mid-2000s (e.g., Nazarbayev, 2011a). In this framework, reestablishing state control over the strategic oil sector becomes another nation-building exercise, whereas Nazarbayev’s regime becomes the only power that can ensure the fairness and rightfulness of this process.

Many discourses produced by Nazarbayev’s regime are materialized in the literal sense in Astana, the new capital of Kazakhstan. As many studies point out, Astana’s new cityscape is designed to stimulate feelings of national pride and to support a particular

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69 Nazarbayev used here the expression “проесть деньги” (proyest’ den’gi), which literally means “eat the money.”

70 Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tselinograd (also known as Aqmola) was a remote industrial town in the middle of the Kazakh steppe. In the early years of independence, Nazarbayev decided to transform this small town into the capital of his newly sovereign state, giving it a new name, Astana (means “capital” in Kazakh). The capital was formally moved to Astana in 1997.
construction of national identity (e.g., Anacker, 2004; Dave, 2007; Schatz, 2010; Koch, 2010). The city became a focal point of the omnipresent nationalist propaganda and plays an important role in the nation-building project of Nazarbayev’s regime. In this sense, it is symbolic that even Astana’s urban geography reflects the intimate relationship between oil and the state in Kazakhstan: in the bureaucratic district (known as the Left Bank) the grandiose headquarters of KazMunaiGas (KMG) neighbors the Ak Orda Presidential Palace, the Supreme Court, and various state ministries.

The headquarters of KMG is a part of Astana’s Round Square, a 70,000-square-meter architectural composition. The building that holds KMG’s headquarters is a massive construction serving as the main entrance of the Round Square. The building reflects multiple inspirations in its architectural structure. With an arch located between two high towers and slightly lower rectangular buildings, the KMG’s headquarters is reminiscent of a triumphal arch. The 18-storey building is almost entirely made from golden-pink glass windows separated by white and grey concrete ribs that emphasize the vertical lines on the facade imitating Greek columns. With its multiple references to world architecture, the KMG’s headquarters reflects both the traditional (e.g., triumphal arches) and the modern (glass and concrete). To access the Round Square, a pedestrian walks on the esplanade that passes under the arch of KMG’s headquarters. This pathway forms one of the main axes of Astana because it connects the building with three other key landmarks: the Khan Shatyr Entertainment Center, the Bayterek Tower, and the Ak Orda Presidential Palace (Figure 12).
Figure 12. Map of Astana
One of the main urban axes of Astana: the Khan Shatyr Entertainment Center (1), the KMG’s headquarters and the Round Square (2), the Bayterek Tower (3), and the Ak Orda Presidential Palace (4). Source: The image adopted from Redbus.kz.

Climbing the stairs to enter the Round Square from the north, one can observe the shape of the Bayterek Tower located outside it (see Figures 14a and Figure 14b). The tower is a popular observatory and a symbol of Kazakhstan (e.g., the 10,000 Kazakhstani tenge note features the image of the Bayterek tower). Like the KMG’s headquarters (Figure 13), the Bayterek Tower merges linear and circular shapes. It is constituted of the main steel base that slowly opens in see-through metal points like flower petals. At the center of these steel petals are located a massive golden ball. The Baiterek Tower is meant to embody a Kazakh folktale about a mythical tree of life and a magic bird of happiness. In this sense, the tower links the new Kazakhstani modernity to the Kazakh traditions. The observation deck is 97 meters above ground level, corresponding to the year 1997 when Astana became the capital of Kazakhstan. Inside the top level of the observatory, one can
find a gilded handprint of the right hand of Nazarbayev mounted in an ornate pedestal. A plaque invites the visitors to place a hand in the imprint and make a wish. From the Bayterek Tower’s observatory, one can see the Ak Orda Presidential Palace where the KMG’s headquarters’ pathway also leads.

The Ak Orda Presidential Palace (see Figure 14c) is the official workplace of President Nazarbayev. Like the other buildings I described earlier, the Palace is of mixed inspiration. Its facade has a semi-circular portico supported by massive pillars that were inspired by the White House, the official residence and workplace of the President of the United States. The palace general structure is rectangular and supports a sky-blue and gold dome (national colors of Kazakhstan) that is topped with a gold spire with a golden sphere at its apex. The Palace remains connected to the other two buildings – the KMG’s headquarters and the Bayterek Tower – by the pedestrian esplanade that leads from one building to another.

Finally, the same esplanade also leads to the Khan Shatyr (Royal Marquee) Entertainment Center. Climbing the stairs to the south to exit the Round Square through the KMG’s headquarters’ arche, one can see the shape of the Khan Shatyr slowly emerging in the space of the arch (see Figure 14d and Figure 14e). Built in 2006 by British techno-architect Norman Foster, the Khan Shatyr is a neo-futurist building and one of the key architecture landmarks of Astana. It is a metallic see-trough leaning structure shaped like a pointed tent on an elliptical base. From the bird-eye view, the building looks like the traditional Kazakh dwelling, the yurt. The Khan Shatyr is one of the elite buildings in Astana and is consistently framed in the official discourses as a symbol of the new Kazakh modernity and prosperity (for more on the Khan Shatyr’s role in the nation- and city-building see Koch, 2013).
Overall, the four landmarks described above constitute an urban composition that purposefully links symbols of the personified state power (the Ak Orda Presidential Palace), the independence and nation-building narratives (the Bayterek Tower), oil incomes (the headquarters of KMG), and the new Kazakh modernity (the entertainment center Khan Shatyr). They all play with shapes and materials to mix the idea of traditions and innovations into a single authoritative ideological message of power.

Overall, the whole city is a large-scale commemoration of Kazakhstan’s oil-driven modernity. According to its citizens, Astana is nourished by the oil companies that generously and supposedly voluntarily donate funds for various infrastructure projects (personal communication, Jan. 2017). Eward Schatz (2004) also highlights this popular narrative, adding that “foreign states whose extractive industries sought a foothold in the lucrative Kazakhstani market found themselves ‘donating’ to the construction of the capital city, in a clear bid for preferential allocation of contracts” (p. 126). In this framework, oil becomes an ultimate blessing for Kazakhstan and a source of national pride, whereas Nazarbayev yet again is portrayed as the only guarantor of the fair redistribution of oil incomes in the best interests of the people of Kazakhstan.
Figure 13. The headquarters of KMG in Astana, February, 2017

Figure 14a. The headquarters of KMG, the view on the Baiterek Tower from the Round Square (North), February, 2017
Figure 14b. The Baiterek Tower and the Ak Orda Presidential Palace, February, 2017

Figure 14c. The Ak Orda Presidential Palace, the view from the Baiterek Tower. February, 2017
Figure 14d. The headquarters of KMG, the view on the entertainment center Khan Shatyr from the Round Square (South) (February, 2017).

Figure 14e. The entertainment center Khan Shatyr, February, 2017.
Petro-multiculturalism and internationalism

In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan’s deep political, economic, and social crisis coupled with the ideological and ideational vacuum produced by the collapse of the Soviet ideology. The Kazakhstani people had to reinvent not only their statehood but also themselves. After independence, many Muslims in Kazakhstan felt great reverence for the religion of their forefathers (Jessa, 2006; Khalid, 2014; Yemelianova, 2014). However, Nazarbayev’s regime has failed to translate Islam into a source of political legitimacy and thus has started to frame Islam as a threat to national unity and political stability.

According to the official nation-building discourses of Nazarbayev’s regime, the major political project for Kazakhstan is to create the Kazakhstani nation, perceived not as an ethnic category but as one of civil collective solidarity (Omelicheva, 2011; Rico, 2010; Laruelle, 2014). In this framework, Islam becomes one of many symbols of the local culture, whereas Nazarbayev’s petrostate wants very strongly to remain secular. As Galina M. Yemelianova (2014) argues, Kazakhstan’s political elites remain “extraordinarily ignorant about Islam in any form” and, as a result, view Islam as fanatical and anti-progressive (p. 9-10). Since the mid-1990s, Nazarbayev’s regime has imposed an authoritarian and repressive secularism from the top down. It is vigilant in its determination to keep “Islamic fanaticism” and “Islamic extremism” from taking root in the country and initiates all-out campaigns against any Muslim political activities. Public manifestations of religiosity became securitized.\footnote{The most recent example includes girls being banned from school wearing head scarfs. On September 1, 2018, in the village of Firdaus in Turkestan province 32 teenage girl attempted to enter the school building but were stopped by the administration. In the public statement, the minister of education and science Yerlan Sagadiyev promised to make sure that “no pupil in a head scarf will enter the school building” (Zakon.kz, 2018). Another official emphasized that because “the President [Nazarbayev] says that we are civilized secular state, we must raise [the children] as secular people” (Informburo.kz, 2018).}
According to the official discourses, Kazakhstan’s internal unity and openness to Western modernity are supposed to strengthen its international prestige and, therefore, secure a steady inflow of foreign investment. This logic allows Nazarbayev’s regime to put secularism at the service of protecting its interests in the energy sector, constructing the consolidation of Islamic sentiment not only as a threat to political stability but also as an imminent threat to the country’s oil incomes. The same discourses are enacted on the international level. As Bahva Dave (2007) puts it, Nazarbayev’s regime has “skillfully learnt to cultivate and exploit” an image of “a Muslim-dominated oil-rich state, which is politically stable, devoid of ethnic or religious conflict or a threat of ‘terrorism’, under a strong leadership with a pro-Western outlook” in order to attract Western and Asian investors (p. 136).

On both domestic and international levels, Nazarbayev actively publicizes the idea of national unity based on Kazakhstan’s distinctive brand of secular multiculturalism that is presented as the utmost value and a prerequisite for sustainable economic development. Nazarbayev’s *The Way of Kazakhstan* (2006) opens with the following claim:

If we talk about the Kazakhstan way, of course, this way is not limited only to the choice of an economic model. This is also a political model, which includes not only general constitutional provisions but also the political regime and inter-confessional relations. This is the richest array, and in this regard, Kazakhstan emerged as a model state in the modern world. This realm [of Kazakhstan’s development] received a high international and domestic recognition. The preservation of the ethnic and religious consensus in such a fragile region of the planet for a decade and a half largely determines the Kazakhstan way. (p. 5)

Along the same line, in his latest book about Kazakhstan’s history *The Era of Independence* (2017), Nazarbayev concludes that Kazakhstan “found the optimal golden mean in the relationship between the state and religion, which allowed the state and religious denominations to fruitfully work together to strengthen the national accord” (p. 155).
Securitizing cultural and religious differences, *Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy* released in 2012 defines “the clash of civilizations” as one of the ten key challenges for Kazakhstan in the 21st century and outlines the following as a response to it:

We must learn to live in co-existence of cultures and religions. We must be committed to dialogue between cultures and civilizations. Only in dialogue with other nations our country will be able to succeed and gain influence in the future. In the 21st century, Kazakhstan must strengthen its position of a regional leader and become the bridge for dialogue and interaction between East and West (Nazarbayev, 2012).

The secular multiculturalism discourse intersects and overlaps with Nazarbayev’s aspirations to make Kazakhstan a part of the international community as an equal and contributing member. In this context, both Kazakhstan’s multiculturalism and secularism are celebrated not in the name of liberal tolerance and universal humanity, beyond cultural, national, and religious differences, but as a sign of Kazakhstan’s openness to globalization and readiness to cooperate with whoever is willing to invest in its economy.

Finally, the second pillar of Nazarbayev’s construction of Kazakhstan as a modern petrostate is internationalism that becomes the foundation of a pronouncedly non-confrontational and multi-vector foreign policy. Locating Kazakhstan “at the heart of Eurasia,” Nazarbayev (e.g., 2005, 2006, 2017) presents it as an indispensable and natural ally of Russia, China, the European Union, Turkey, Iran, India, Japan, South Korea, and so on. In every presidential address, Nazarbayev reminds the Kazakhstani people about the importance of international economic integration. He wants them to “think globally” (2011b) and be ready to “take part in the global decision-making,” contributing to “the formation of a new architecture of international relations” (2010c). At the same time, Nazarbayev (2010) highlights that Kazakhstan needs to accept the logic of globalization and learn to act according to it:
The global economic system is a well-built and well-functioning mechanism that operates according to its own rules. And we must work by these rules. We are not expected at the world markets, but we need to make ourselves in demand there and gain a foothold.

This idea of internationalism is firmly tied to the discourses of multiculturalism and secularism. Following Nazarbayev’s logic, only multicultural and secular Kazakhstan will be accepted by the international community and only multicultural and secular Kazakhstan can attract foreign investors.

In sum, the secular multiculturalism and internationalism discourses have two functions. First, on the domestic level, they develop as dovetailing parts of the discursive system that protects and legitimizes Nazarbayev’s rule in Kazakhstan and, subsequently, his control over national oil resources. Secondly, these discourses are at the core of the self-representation of Kazakhstan on the international level. In this sense, they are a part of Kazakhstan’s international branding. Nazarbayev’s discursive construction of Kazakhstan is supposed not only to distinguish it from other petrostates but also to open-up for it as many cooperation opportunities as possible.

One way to think about interconnections between Kazakhstan’s state-led secular multiculturalism and pronounced internationalism on one side and its energy politics on the other side is the concept of petro-Islam. Petro-Islam is defined by Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi (2010) as a specific type of Islam, the first and foremost objective of which is “to protect oil wealth, or, more appropriately, the type of social relations underlying those tribal societies that possess the lion’s share of this wealth” (p. 145). Nazih N. Ayubi (1996) notes that in Saudi Arabia and in most of the smaller countries of the Persian Gulf “domestically ‘petro-Islam’ emphasizes an interpretation of religion that is excessively ritualistic in style and conservative in socio-economic content” (p. 233). Consequently, in
the case of the Persian Gulf states, a conservative top-down version of Islam served as a legitimacy structure for state control over the oil sector and redistribution of oil revenues. As Richard U. Moench (1988) sharply summarizes the essence of petro-Islam as an ideology, it “may be theologically vague, but it is sociologically clear” (p. 188). While the readings of Islam by Nazarbayev’s regime are the exact opposite, the discursive mechanisms that link oil and religion are the same. Essentializing and mythologizing religion and promoting a top-down repressive secularism, Nazarbayev’s regime instrumentalizes Islam as a threat to Kazakhstan’s oil-driven prosperity. Nazarbayev’s regime uses religion policy and multiculturalism as tools in constructing Kazakhstan as a petrostate, and thus its approach to Islam and multiculturalism can be functionally defined as petro-secularism or petro-multiculturalism.

“*We*” and “*They*” in Kazakhstan’s discursive politics of energy

Nazarbayev repeatedly emphasizes that Russia has never been the Soviet Union itself (2006, 2010, 2017). Even though Nazarbayev admits that being a part of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was constrained by the decision power of the “center,” he constructs Kazakhstan as an equal agent of Soviet modernity rather than a powerless colonial subject of Russia (e.g., 2006). In this framework, the “center” is responsible for the fiasco of the Soviet Union and, as the successor of the Soviet Union, Russia represents the failure to provide a viable alternative to the neoliberal development model and the failure to reform the socialist system in the late 1980s. Importantly, such framing of the Soviet past allows Nazarbayev to detach Kazakhstan from the collapse of the hegemonic socialist project. He also does not include Russia into the category of developing countries. Labeling Kazakhstan as a developing country and excluding Russia from this group, Nazarbayev
differentiates Kazakhstan’s and Russia’s experience after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet Union is “we,” but Russia is “they.”

Nazarbayev (2017) stresses that, unlike many other former member republics of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan “made the right choice” in the early 1990s and continues to follow “the right path” in the 2010s:

In just a quarter of a century, a former Soviet republic that in the USSR was unjustly ranked among the laggards turned into a modern country with a national statehood, an effective market economy, a democratic social system, and a high international authority. All this is a complex and dynamic process of modernization of Kazakhstan – breaking the old and obsolete, carrying out bold reforms and innovations, and creating the new and modern. (p. 17)

Consequently, the process of development turns into a competition. Nazarbayev constructs Kazakhstan as an exceptional post-Soviet state, accentuating that in many realms Kazakhstan became “the only” or “the first” post-Soviet state. He contrasts Kazakhstan to other post-Soviet states that, according to him, failed to embrace modernization and globalization. Unlike them, Kazakhstan is opened to the world and actively learns from the developed countries. The recurring example is the decision to establish the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK) in 2000 that, as stressed in the official energy discourses, was inspired by Norwegian experience (e.g., Nazarbayev, 2017, p. 218).

While official discourses emphasize the advantages of close relations with Russia and other former Soviet states, they construct Kazakhstan as a part of the broader international community rather than the so-called “post-Soviet space” (постсоветское пространство, postsovetskoye prostranstvo). Within the international stratification system, Kazakhstan places itself among the developing countries. In this category, however, Kazakhstan is set off against developing countries of Africa and Latin America.

Specifically, such petrostates as Nigeria, Venezuela, and Argentina are presented as failures
and often serve as examples for what Kazakhstan should never become. In contrast, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and China are commonly pointed out as suitable role models for Kazakhstan (e.g., Nazarbayev 2006, 2017; Suleev, 2009). At the same time, Nazarbayev’s regime does not present Kazakhstan as an Asian country. Instead, Nazarbayev (2006, 2010, 2017) introduced and developed his own vision of Eurasianism that he has been propagating on a consistent basis over the past two decades.

Nazarbayev (2010) locates Kazakhstan both symbolically and geographically “at the heart of Eurasia.” In Nazarbayev’s conception, being Eurasian means being different from both Asia (East) and Europe (West). Asia is associated with a set of negative stereotypes, including underdevelopment, illiteracy, radicalism, fundamentalism, and violence, whereas Europe designates a modern and superior yet culturally and socially foreign model of development. In addition, the European past represents colonial oppression and imperialism. Following the logic of the East-West dichotomy, being a Eurasian country, Kazakhstan is more civilized and modern than its neighbors in the East but still is not an entirely Western country and thus is entitled to its own unique path of development that deviates considerably from the hegemonic neoliberal model.

The logic of Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism intersects with Kazakhstan’s own brand of post-colonialism that distinguishes it from the former Third World. Official postcolonial discourses focus on further delinking Kazakhstan from its Soviet past and strengthening the construction of Kazakhstan as an independent actor of international relations vis-à-vis Russia. Kazakhstan considers itself only semi-colonized and does not identify itself as a victim of imperialism (Beissinger and Young, 2002). Discussing her conversations with Kazakhstani academics in the early 1990s, Bahvna Dave (2007) describes their understanding of colonialism as “quite perfunctory” because they did not disapprove of
Colonial domination per se but expressed “a feeling of disappointment by the failure of the Soviet state to fully deliver its promised goals” (p. 2). Diana T. Kudaibergenova (2016) accentuates similar trends in Kazakhstan’s post-colonial discourse in the 2000s and the 2010s. She points out that Kazakhstan’s post-colonial discourse is “as fragile and insecure as the local process of nation-building” (p. 924). She highlights that her respondents in Kazakhstan were “ambiguous in pointing fingers to [sic] the active actors of the past colonization” and avoided “radical anti-colonial and, thus, anti-Russian messages” (p. 924). Colonialism, in general, is associated with humiliation and shame, while a post-colonial status signifies its inferiority. Avoiding associations with this status, dominant discourses separate Kazakhstan from the victims of colonialism, represented by a generalized and homogenized Third World.

In sum, Kazakhstan’s “we” still belongs to the Soviet Union, whereas the developing countries are “they.” Constructing itself as a part of the former Second World, Kazakhstan also delinks itself from the political legacies of the Third World. Finally, Kazakhstan is presenting itself as a carrier of the unique Eurasian identity. These complex and contradictory identity constructions transform into an even more complex and more contradictory energy identity.

According to the dominant discourses, while Kazakhstan aspires to become “the Kuwait of Central Asia” in the near future, it is not going to be a petrostate forever. Nazarbayev (2006) promises that Kazakhstan will have its own distinctive and original path of development and, despite all odds, will not repeat the experience of Nigeria, Norway, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and other petrostates that allowed themselves to “drown in petrodollars” (p. 45, p. 110, p. 137, p. 138). In this context, Kazakhstan’s construction of Russia as an “other” is particularly revealing.
Some Kazakhstani scholars compare Russia and Kazakhstan as countries that face similar economic challenges related to the dependence on resource rents (e.g., Yelubayev, 2016). Others, on the contrary, avoid such parallels and distinguish Kazakhstan from Russia, using the metaphor of the raw-material appendage to describe Russia’s development after the collapse of the Soviet Union (e.g. Bisenbayev, 2011). The discursive construction of Russia as a raw-material appendage is particularly interesting. For example, Murat Abdirov of the Gumilyov Eurasian National University (2017 [2011]) argues that in the 2000s Russia “turned into a raw-material appendage of the developed countries, such as Europe, and China” and thus it will eventually lose both “its vast territory and splendid natural resources” (p. 704-705). Abdirov predicts that by 2030 “not only China but also the international community” will try to gain control over Russian “immense and unpopulated lands full of natural resources” (p. 706). Particularly, according to him, Russian authorities risk losing Siberia and the Far East: these two regions will turn into “Siberian Africa” where China extracts resources to support its aspirations for global hegemony (p. 622). In the picture so vividly presented by Abdilov, Russia’s overreliance on energy resources not only subscribes it to a low status in the international power hierarchy but also jeopardizes its sovereignty and territorial integrity. He warns that, if Kazakhstan follows Russia’s steps, it too can “unwittingly become China’s resource colony” (p. 754).

In the essence, Kazakhstan’s dominant energy discourses purposefully and consistently construct other petrostates as “they.” Since the 1990s, Kazakhstan has not found a place for itself in the developed First world or in the developing Third world. Staying in-between the two worlds as a petrostate, Kazakhstan is exposed to geopolitical threats and risks. Hence, the key goal for Kazakhstan becomes transitioning into the
category of the developed countries and a gradual abandonment of its dependence on resource incomes.

**Kazakhstan’s energy paradigm: Nazarbayev’s petrostate**

The dominant energy discourses identify oil wealth as the foundation of Kazakhstan’s independence and prosperity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, official discourses construct Kazakhstan in the opposition to other petrostates. It is widely recognized in Kazakhstan that the dependence on resource exports constrains Kazakhstan’s economic development and inevitably consigns it to a low place in the international hierarchy. At the center of Kazakhstan’s energy paradigm is the reading of its oil-driven economic prosperity as a temporary phase in the national development. In the discursive framework developed by Nazarbayev’s regime, Kazakhstan is a petrostate by destiny but will become a modern innovation-driven economy by choice.

Another important part of Kazakhstan’s energy paradigm is securitization of oil as a globally sought-after commodity. Kazakhstan’s official discourses construct its oil wealth as a tasty morsel for the avid great powers. Following this logic, oil becomes a source of various threats to Kazakhstan’s independence and sovereignty.

Kazakhstan’s discursive politics of oil is intimately connected to the discourses that legitimize and support Nazarbayev regime, and hence Nazarbayevism plays an instrumental role in Kazakhstan’s construction of oil. Nazarbayev is portrayed as the single guarantor of the fair redistribution of oil incomes in the best interests of the Kazakhstani people. Nazarbayev’s regime also promises to ensure that Kazakhstan will smoothly transition to the post-oil future. Defining Kazakhstan in relation to oil, Nazarbayev’s regime produces and reproduces two broad discursive constructions: internationalism and petro-
multiculturalism. Nazarbayev’s regime uses religion policy and multiculturalism as tools in constructing of Kazakhstan as an exceptional petrostate. According to the official discourses, Kazakhstan’s internal unity and openness to Western modernity strengthen its international prestige and, therefore, secure a steady inflow of foreign investment.

In sum, oil is constructed in Kazakhstan as a source of development and a source of multiple vulnerabilities, whereas Nazarbayev’s regime represents itself as the only power that is able to turn oil into a blessing for Kazakhstan. In this sense, Kazakhstan’s energy paradigm is subordinated to the discursive politics that sustains and legitimizes Nazarbayev’s authoritarian rule.

4.2. China-Kazakhstan energy dialogue

This section focuses on the development of China-Kazakhstan energy relations between 2005 and 2016. First, I discuss investments of China’s NOCs in upstream and downstream assets in Kazakhstan. Second, I discuss how China’s expansion in Kazakhstan’s oil sector triggers Sinophobia and increasing neo-colonial concerns in Kazakhstani society. Further, the discussion focuses on the changes in China’s Kazakhstan policy.

China’s NOCs in Kazakhstan: The reality and perceptions

China’s NOCs first purchased equity oil stakes in Kazakhstan in the late 1990s, yet until the mid-2000s China was not a visible actor in the oil sector. In 2005, China-Kazakhstan energy relations made news when CNPC announced that it had struck an agreement to buy PetroKazakhstan, a Canada-based company, for $4.2 billion. The news about this deal came three weeks after CNOOC had to drop its bid for Unocal amid
opposition from US politicians. Kazakhstani analysts (personal communication, 5 February 2017) argue that Canadian investors “slammed the door” in the mid-2000s because they did not want “to share” by investing in infrastructure and social projects in Kazakhstan.

China’s NOCs, on the contrary, took a “more cooperative stance” and thus were warmly welcomed by Nazarbayev’s regime. Later the same year, CNOOC signed a memorandum of understanding with KMG to jointly explore the Darkhan field on the shelf of the Caspian Sea that has been estimated to hold about 11 billion barrels of oil.

In February 2006, Kazakhstani media reported that Canada’s Nations Energy Company was interested in selling to China’s CITIC Group 96.4 percent of shares in KarazhanbasMunai, which held 20-year exploitation rights for the oil fields north of Aktau in Mangystau region. Representatives of Nations Energy Company at first denied that they were negotiating with Chinese investors; however, in November 2006, the company announced that it reached an agreement with CITIC Group to sell its share in KarazhanbasMunai for $1.91 billion.

After the deal was announced, all key Kazakhstani press agencies, newspapers, and news websites reprinted quotations from the statements made by Valery Kotovich, Victor Egorov, and Alikhan Baimenov, members of the Mazhilis (the lower house of the Parliament), who expressed concerns with “Chinese expansion” (e.g., KazakhstanToday, 2006). Kotovich described the actions of China’s NOCs as “persistent and even straightforward.” According to him, the acquisition of KarazhanbasMunai would have allowed China to control more than 40 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil production. Egorov and Baimenov warned that China’s assertive expansion might threaten national interests of

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72 Renamed as CITIC Canada Petroleum Limited in 2007.
Kazakhstan. The anxiety voiced by the tree Mazhilis members provoked a heated public
discussion about the nature and consequences of China’s growing presence in Kazakhstan’s
energy sector. Various commentators shared the belief that Kazakhstan was a “tasty morsel”
for energy-hungry China and agreed that Nazarbayev’s regime needed to be more cautious
in relations with it (e.g., Adilov, 2006; Amerkulov, 2006; Morzabayeva, 2006).

Two years later, Kotovich explained that he “read on the Internet about China’s
expansion in Kazakhstan” and “became alerted” by this information (Zakon.kz, 2008). In
the retrospect, he calls the public statements that he made in November 2006 “a certain
message to the government so that it pondered and developed an approach to minimize
threats for the national security.” Konstantin Syroezhkin (2010, p. 287-288) and some other
Kazakhstani China experts (personal communication, 5 February 2017), however, speculate
that concerns of Kotovich and his colleagues are linked to the interests of unspecified
Western and Russian energy companies. Whatever the motivation of the members of the
Mazhilis, their concerns resonated with the public. The government took their “message”
and public debates provoked by it seriously. After a review, it approved the deal with the
condition that CITIC Group will resell 50 percent of its shares in KarazhanbasMunai to
KMG. In addition, in October 2007, the Parliament approved the amendments to the 1996
Law of Subsoil and Subsoil Use that enabled the government to alter or cancel contracts
with foreign companies if their actions pose a threat to the national security by substantial
impairment of the economic interests (Law 2-IV, 24 Oct. 2007).

While this legislative change continued the process of institutionalization of
resource nationalism initiated after the dispute over Tengiz in 200273, Kazakhstan’s

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73 A dispute arose in November 2002 when the Western companies that controlled Tengizchevroil sought to
finance a $3.5 billion expansion of the Tengiz oil field using oil revenues. Kazakhstan’s government protested,
authorities presented it as a direct response to the public concerns about China’s newest acquisitions. Official discourse emphasized that Kazakhstan needs Chinese money as much as China needs Kazakhstani oil and thus toughening control over the IOCs operating in Kazakhstan would not scare off Chinese investors (Nazarbayev, 2006, 2017). Importantly, Nazarbayev’s regime was able to discursively reinforce its position of the only guarantor of Kazakhstan’s sovereignty over natural resources.

Despite deteriorating phobias and prejudices against China and the Chinese in Kazakhstan, China’s NOCs continued their expansion in Kazakhstan’s energy sector. During the oil price surge of the end of the 2000s, Nazarbayev’s regime welcomed Chinese investment and effectively used Chinese money to renationalize the oil sector. The case in point is the takeover of MangistauMunaiGas by KMG and CNPC in 2009.

Central Asia Petroleum Ltd of Indonesia had controlled MangistauMunaiGas since 1997 and by 2007 its stake in the company had risen to 99 percent. Various sources, however, connect MangistauMunaiGas to a member of Nazarbayev’s family, Rakhar Aliyev. While being married to the president’s older daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva, Aliyev made a successful career in Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee and invested in various assets, including the oil sector (Peyrouse, 2012). In 2007, Aliyev fell from grace after he divorced Nazarbayev’s daughter. Experts connect the decision of Central Asia Petroleum Ltd to sell its stake in MangistauMunaiGas to Aliyev’s downfall (Silk Road Intelligencer, 2007; personal communication, 5 February 2017).

Nazarbayev’s regime was determined to regain control over MangistauMunaiGas, but because of the ongoing economic downfall KMG did not have enough money to close as the plan would erode its tax receipts. In 2004, the amendments to the 1996 Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use granted the government to claim priority purchase rights in all energy projects (Law 2-III, 1 Dec. 2004). In 2005, the government toughened its contract terms (Law 79-III, 14 Oct. 2005).
the deal with Central Asia Petroleum Ltd. In 2009, Nazarbayev visited China and after a meeting with Hu Jintao secured for Kazakhstan a generous $10 billion loan. While the media often describe the deal as a “loan-for-oil,” the two lines of credit extended to Kazakhstan were not backed by a supply contract. China’s Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank) lent the state-owned Development Bank of Kazakhstan $5 billion, whereas CNPC extended a $5 billion loan to its Kazakhstani peer KMG. The two NOCs also signed a separate deal agreeing for a joint purchase of the majority stake in MangistauMunaiGas. The MangistauMunaiGas takeover was finalized at the end of 2009 when Central Asia Petroleum Ltd divided its assets between KMG (51 percent) and CNPC (49 percent) for $2.6 billion, less than the $3.3 billion originally announced in 2007.

Since 2010, controversial reports that China will soon control most of Kazakhstan’s oil sector appear regularly in the national media. As a case in point, in August 2013, the key Kazakhstani news websites reported that “China’s share in Kazakhstani oil is greater than that of Kazakhstan itself and greater than that of anyone else in the country,” citing an “analyst wishing to remain anonymous” (e.g., TengriNews.kz, 2013; Forbes.kz, 2013). Even though such information was usually followed by refutations and questions about its credibility, many of Kazakhstan’s China experts perpetuate it as a fact, arguing that after the 2009 MangistauMunaiGas takeover China’s NOCs control around 40 percent of Kazakhstani oil (e.g., Syroezhkin, 2010, p. 292; Sadovskaya, 2015, p. 22).

On the contrary, China’s NOCs did not have assets in Kazakhstan’s offshore projects that produce “big oil” for a long time. Only in 2013, CNPC was able to buy a share in the Kashgan oil field in the Caspian Sea waters. This acquisition cost CNPC $8 billion:

74 Kashagan is the largest super giant oilfield discovered in the past three decades. Even though Kashagan has suffered from eight-year delays and cost increase since 2005, many experts still consider it an oil market
$5 billion for ConocoPhillips’ 8.33 percent share in the North Caspian Operating Company and $3 billion to finance the second phase of the Kashgan oil project. As in the case of the 2009 MangistauMunaiGas takeover, the two governments were involved in settling the deal. CNPC and the North Caspian Operating Company signed the final agreement after Xi Jinping’s visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013. In Xi’s words (2013), Nazarbayev and he both “hailed and supported” CNPC participation in the Kashagan project.

In parallel with the practice of obtaining equity oil stakes, China was also actively investing in the development of the unfractured pipeline in Kazakhstan. The construction of the 2,798-kilometer-long Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline was financed by KMG and CNPC and is operated as a joint venture. The Atasu-Alashankou section of the pipeline (987 kilometers) was completed in just ten months and in July 2006 the pipeline began to pump oil from the fields located near Atasu in northern Kazakhstan to the Dushanzi refinery located in Xinjiang. The current capacity of the pipeline is 14 million tons of crude oil per year, whereas its nominal capacity is 20 million tons (KCP LLP, 2018).

The Kazakhstan-China pipeline is not overly significant in addressing China’s rapidly growing energy needs (EIA, 2017). Likewise, even though the pipeline offers to Kazakhstan a direct connection to the rapidly growing Chinese market, the amount of crude oil that comes to China through the pipeline is small in comparison to that shipped to Russia (EIA, 2017). However, because it is China’s first transnational pipeline and Kazakhstan’s first post-Soviet transnational pipeline and, importantly, Kazakhstan’s first pipeline that bypasses Russia, many experts consider its construction an important sign of
game-changer in the making. The Kashagan oil project is operated by North Caspian Operating Company owned by Eni, KazMunaiGas, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, ExxonMobil, CNPC and INPEX. Production started in September 2013, some eight years after the original schedule, but was halted in just a few weeks because of gas leaks in its pipelines. Production was restarted in October 2016 and the field reached actual production levels of over 200,000 barrels per day by mid-2017.
geopolitical changes (e.g. Huo et al., 2013; Yang, 2014; Zhao, 2015; Yue and Yang, 2016). In this framework, the Kazakhstan-China pipeline becomes a symbol of the new era in which Russia’s domination in Central Asia is declining, whereas China’s influence is rising.

While China’s achievements in Kazakhstan are indeed impressive, China’s NOCs still do not participate in the development of the Tengiz and Karachaganak fields where around 55 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil is produced (see Table 6). By investing in the smaller projects, China obtained access to a total of around 24 percent of the oil produced in Kazakhstan. However, China’s NOCs do not ship their equity oil back home via the newly built pipeline, as it was predicted by many observers. Between 2005 and 2017, Kazakhstan’s oil exports to China have not exceeded 6 percent of its total oil exports (Ministry of National Economy of the RK [MNE of the RK], 2017). According to the customs statistics (MNE of the RK, 2017), Kazakhstan exports its crude oil to 35 countries. The key consumers of Kazakhstan’s oil are in the West. The EU members receive more than 75 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil, with most of the exports going to Italy (32 percent), Netherlands (15 percent), Switzerland (11 percent), and France (11 percent).
Table 6.
Kazakhstan’s largest oil producing companies (with more than 1,000 employees, April 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Company</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ozenmunaygaz</td>
<td>Mangystau Region</td>
<td>KMG (Kazakhstan), 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MangistauMunaiGas</td>
<td>Mangystau Region</td>
<td>KMG (Kazakhstan), 51% CNPC (China), 49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KarazhanbasMunai</td>
<td>Mangystau Region</td>
<td>KMG (Kazakhstan), 50% CNPC (China), 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PetroKazakhstan Kumkol Resources</td>
<td>Kyzylorda Region</td>
<td>KMG (Kazakhstan), 33% CNPC (China), 67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. Kazakhstan</td>
<td>West Kazakhstan Region</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell (UK, Netherlands), 29,25 % Eni (Italy), 29,25 % Chevron (США), 18 % Lukoil (Russia), 13,5 % KMG (Kazakhstan), 10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nostrum Oil and Gas (former Zhaikmunai)</td>
<td>West Kazakhstan Region</td>
<td>Netherlands, 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tengizchevroil</td>
<td>Atyrau Region</td>
<td>Chevron (США), 50 % KMG (Kazakhstan), 20 % ExxonMobi (USA), 25 % LukArco (Russia, France), 5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (NCOC)</td>
<td>Atyrau Region</td>
<td>KMG (Kazakhstan), 16.8% Eni (Italy), 16.8% Total (France), 16.8% ExxonMobil (USA), 16.8% Royal Dutch Shell (UK, Netherlands),16.8% CNPC (China), 8.3% INPEX (Japan) 7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EmbaMunaiGas</td>
<td>Atyrau Region</td>
<td>KMG (Kazakhstan), 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPC AktobeMunaiGas</td>
<td>Aktobe Region</td>
<td>CNPC (China), 94.5% KMG (Kazakhstan), 5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sinophobia and oil

Sinophobia is becoming an increasingly prominent phenomenon in Central Asia, and China is perceived as yet another great power that threatens the political and economic sovereignty of Central Asian states. While Central Asian states’ political leaders all praise China in unison for its reliable and trustworthy partnership, Central Asian societies are divided over China’s rise (Peyrouse, 2016; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2012). Kazakhstan is not an exception.

The majority of Kazakhstani experts see China as a necessary counterweight to both Russia and the United States not only for Kazakhstan but for the whole Central Asia (e.g., Basenov and Khafizova, 2007; Abdrakhmanov and Kaukenov, 2007; Tokayev, 2008; Syroezhkin, 2010; Bisenbayev, 2011). Kazakhstan’s China experts believe that cultural and educational exchanges between China and Kazakhstan improve the way that young people see Chinese development. For example, the director of the Chinese Studies Center in Almaty Adil Kaukenov (personal communication, 11 February 2017) maintains that university students already see China as an opportunity rather than a threat. Another prominent Kazakhstani China expert, Ruslan Izimov, argues that in the 2010s China started to invest more in its “soft power” and it had a positive effect on the image of China in Kazakhstan (Omarova, 2017). In spite of that, the experts agree that Sinophobia is a problem. As Kaukenov (personal communication, 11 February 2017) emphasizes, Sinophobia is “undulant” and its “outbreaks” are related to the exacerbation of problems or discontent in Kazakhstani society. In these cases, China and the Chinese become the scapegoat. In the regards of China-Kazakhstan energy relations, the 2010 and 2011 labor protests in the oil-rich Mangistau region provide a vivid example that even gossip can trigger Sinophobic sentiments.
In 2010, in the city of Zhanaozen six thousand employees of OzenMunaiGas owned by KMG went on strike to demand unpaid danger money, higher wages, and better working conditions. After two weeks of negotiations, the oil-workers ended the strike as the company agreed to satisfy almost all their demands. In May 2011, a similar labor conflict between the management and employees of KarazhanbasMunai led to a mass strike. Activists called for a general strike across the Mangistau region and soon protests broke out in Kuryk and Aktau (Salmon, 2011). The three companies involved in the disputes with oil-workers – KarazhanbasMunai, Ersai Caspian Contractor, and OzenMunaiGas – refused to negotiate with the independent labor unions and eventually dismissed the employees who actively participated in the strikes. Local authorities took the side of oil companies in the conflict, which only aggravated the tension, turning the labor dispute into a grand battle between the workforce on one side, and the oil companies and authorities on the other. The movement also acquired a political dimension, when many strikers in Zhanaozen collectively resigned from Kazakhstan’s ruling political party Nur-Otan.

On 16 December 2011, the day when Kazakhstan celebrated its 20 years of independence, oil-workers laid off by OzenMunaiGas disrupted festivities in Zhanaozen. Protests of oil-workers quickly transformed into mass riots. Rioters burned down several administrative buildings, including the mayor’s office and the offices of OzenMunaiGaz, as well as private houses of the top-managers of the company. Police responded by shooting at the rioters, killing 14 and injuring over 90 of them (General Prosecutor’s Office of RK, 2012, see also Salmon, 2012).

The day following the clash between police and protestors, Nazarbayev delivered a speech at a meeting of the Security Council, identifying the events as “criminal actions of a group of individuals” that “resulted in mass disorders” (Akorda, 2011). He emphasized that
“labor disputes of oil-workers should not be associated with the deeds of hooligans who wanted to use the situation for their criminal intentions” and ambiguously warned the masterminds of the riots that the authorities would soon identify them. While official discourses attributed the violence to the actions of unspecified evil Others, blogosphere, social media, and opposition news websites produced information and opinions critical of Nazarbayev’s regime, creating several contradictory versions of the events in Zhanaozen. Along with Islamic fundamentalists, Oralmans\textsuperscript{75}, the West, and the Russians, commentators also blamed Chinese NOCs for the oil-workers’ strikes and riots.

Chinese investors only participated in the negotiations with oil-workers of KarazhanbasMunai in Aktau, whereas OzenMunaiGas is wholly owned by KMG and Ersai Caspian Contractor is a Kazakhstani-Italian venture. Nevertheless, some commentators speculated that it was the unfair labor policies and practices introduced by China’s NOCs that contributed to social discontent and pushed Kazakhstani oil-workers to go on strike (e.g., Kurmanov, 2011; Rumer, 2011; Torguzbayev, 2013). Even the sources that did not focus on the role of Chinese investors in the conflict, emphasized that it was a Chinese manager who filed a suit on behalf of KarazhanbasMunai against the lawyer of the striking oil-workers Natalia Sokolova\textsuperscript{76} (e.g., Torguzbayev, 2011).

The oil-workers strikes and Zhanaozen tragedy undermined Nazarbayev’s long-standing efforts to present Kazakhstan as a democratic and politically stable state, causing

\textsuperscript{75} Oralmans are Kazakh repatriates. Most of them have immigrated to Kazakhstan from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia, and China.

\textsuperscript{76} Natalia Sokolova acted as the official presentative of the independent trade union of oil workers of KarazhanbasMunai in the conflict. In August 2011, the court found Sokolova guilty of violating two articles of the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan, by inciting social, national, tribal, and racial irreligious enmity (article 164) and violating the regulations of organizing and holding meetings, rallies, pickets, marches and demonstrations (article 334). The labor lawyer was sentenced to six years of imprisonment. In March 2012, Sokolova pleaded guilty on all charges and her penalty was reduced to three years of probation.
serious damage to its international image. On the level of domestic discursive politics, these events caused a “discursive dislocation” (Torfing, 1999, p. 301) because official constructions that portray Nazarbayev’s regime as a source of economic prosperity and security were not able to domesticate and explain the events in Zhanaozen (for a detailed analysis see Lewis, 2016). In this sense, it is quite indicative that not only Nazarbayev’s regime but also its critics attributed the escalation of the conflict to the actions of ambiguous evil Others. The discursive politics around the oil-workers’ strikes and Zhanaozen tragedy also reveals how easily Kazakhstani latent Sinophobia turns China into one of the Others.

**China’s Kazakhstan policy in the mid-2000s and China’s construction of Kazakhstan**

In an attempt to build a foundation for a mutual discovery and create new socioeconomic and political links, since the mid-1990s China has promoted itself in Central Asia under the brand of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). According to China’s officials, an essential and novel attribute of the SCO is the “Shanghai spirit” (上海精神, Shànghǎi jīngshén), a set of shared values, such as peace, cooperation, openness, and striving towards harmony (e.g., Yang, 2008; Xi, 2013c). China also emphasizes its status as the SCO founder, as well as its major inspirer and ideologist, and offers Central Asia a partnership based on foreign policy pluralism, cosmopolitism, mutual benefits, common developmental goals, and equality. Energy resources are listed as one of many possible areas for “pragmatic cooperation,” along with socio-cultural exchanges and a joint struggle against the “three evils forces” (三股势力, sāngǔ shìlì) that are drug-trafficking, transnational crimes, and cyber-crimes (Xi, 2014c, 2015a). In sum, China promotes itself as
a senior, yet still an equal partner in Central Asia and stresses that it will offer a “no strings attached” relations.

In the mid-2000s, China’s representatives framed China’s bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan and the four other Central Asian states as a logical extension of multilateral dialogue with the SCO. However, despite the lofty rhetoric and China’s repeated attempts to improve the SCO’s competency, the organization failed to become an effective platform for multilateral cooperation and is often accused in “talking too much and doing too little” (e.g. Lukin, 2007; Germanovich, 2008; Kaukenov, 2013). In other words, the SCO became a gateway for China to Central Asia but was largely ineffective in institutionalizing political and economic ties between China and the Central Asian states. Importantly, China approached Central Asia as a single country.

For example, China’s representatives often highlight that “Central Asia is rich with hydrocarbon resources,” whereas only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan could be considered oil and gas rich. A similar trend is evident in the academic literature on China’s relations with Central Asian states, where all five states are portrayed as having identical populations, cultures, development potential, challenges, and sociopolitical systems (e.g. Wei and Liu, 2006; Wang, 2008; Yue and Yang, 206). Some Chinese scholars end up with a discussion of “China’s oil cooperation with Central Asia” that is “mainly concentrated in Kazakhstan”

77 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are members of SCO, with Turkmenistan attending most of the summit meetings in a status of a special guest.

78 Uzbekistan is often described as resource rich; however, it does not belong on the same plane as Turkmenistan with gas and Kazakhstan with oil. Uzbekistan’s oil production has seen steady decline over the past decade. The situation with natural gas is slightly better. In 2015, Uzbekistan was the third largest natural gas producer in Eurasia, following Russia and Turkmenistan. However, existing gas fields are depleting faster than new discoveries are coming online, spurring the need for further investment and modernization of the gas sector. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan do not have substantial deposits of oil and gas. Both countries have potential for hydroelectricity and wind energy production but fail to make the most of their endowments, using only about 5% of the available reserves.
Kazakhstan becomes “the treasure-house of Central Asia” (Huo, Yang, and Xu, 2013, p. 15) and, as a result, it is presented not as an independent and sovereign entity but as a part of the region. In this framework, Kazakhstan’s energy cooperation with China become a part of China’s relations with Central Asia.

**China-Kazakhstan energy relations and the new Silk Road**

In the mid-2010s, Xi Jinping designated the region as China’s “inland gateway” to Europe and the Middle East in the framework of the Belt and Road project. The Silk Road Economic Belt initiative was first officially announced in September 2013, at Nazarbayev University, during Xi Jinping's official state visit to Kazakhstan (Xi, 2013c). That this initiative was first officially presented in Kazakhstan underlines Central Asia’s significant symbolic status in the Belt and Road project. It also signals that China offers Kazakhstan one of the central roles in the Belt and Road project, responding to Nazarbayev’s ambitions for regional leadership.

Introducing the Silk Road Economic Belt, Xi Jinping (2013c) remarked that he “could almost hear the camel bells echoing in the mountains and see the wisp of smoke rising from the desert” and that these images “have brought [him] closer” to Central Asia. Eventually, camels became one of the major symbols of the Belt and Road project. Camels traversing the desert in caravans regularly appear not only on official websites and newspaper articles but also in the speeches of China’s officials. For example, Li Zhaoxing (2015) argued that camels “have epitomized the trade and cultural exchanges across the Eurasia continent and beyond into the vast oceans.” China’s officials also frequently refer to the legacy of Zhang Qian, a Chinese explorer of the Han Dynasty who is credited with “discovering” Central Asia for China (e.g., Xi, 2013c, 2016a, 2017b, 2017c).
Mythologizing and romanticizing the history of the ancient Silk Road, China’s official discourses link the Belt and Road project to the past that Central Asia shares with China. In doing so, they present the Belt and Road project not as a novelty but as an opportunity to revitalize the historical economic, social, and cultural networks connecting China and Central Asia. Under this framework, the Chinese and Central Asian community of destiny becomes timeless and timely, while the narrative of the mutually beneficial relationship between China and its immediate neighbors moves to the center of the discourse of the Belt and Road.

Defining Central Asia in the context of the Belt and Road project, China’s representatives often use such words as “bridge,” “crossroad,” “corridor,” “hub,” and “strategic location.” Under the brand of the Silk Road Economic Belt, China offers Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states an “all-of-the-above” cooperation strategy. As a People’s Daily editorial summarized, the Silk Road Economic Belt is a strategy that will improve the development of China’s relationship with Central Asian states: “By strengthening policy communication, road connectivity, trade links, currency circulation, and connections among their peoples, the countries involved can tighten their economic links, deepen cooperation among them, and expand the space for development” (Zhong Sheng, 2014). Importantly, Xi Jinping promised multiple times to respect Central Asian states’ political independence and, specifically, to preserve the status quo vis-à-vis Russia:

> China is committed to the path of peaceful development and the independent foreign policy of peace. We respect the development paths and domestic and foreign policies chosen independently by the people of every country. We will in no circumstances interfere in the internal affairs of Central Asian countries. We do not seek to dominate regional affairs or establish any sphere of influence. We stand ready to enhance communication and coordination with Russia and all Central Asian countries to strive to build a region of harmony (Xi, 2013c; see also Xi, 2016b).
In this discursive framework, all five Central Asian states have space for their own discursive models of cooperation with China and can frame their participation in the Belt and Road project as stemming from their independent choice. Importantly, Central Asian states are not forced to respond to China’s initiative as an integrated unit but are able to join it as autonomous entities. In this sense, under the brand of the Belt and Road, China consolidates the existing bilateral ties rather than build a new multilateral network in Central Asia.

Nazarbayev’s ambitions for Kazakhstan to not only be Central Asia’s regional leader but also play a greater role in international politics shape his regime’s approach to the Belt and Road project. First and foremost, Nazarbayev seeks to use China’s interest in Central Asia to his sovereign advantage, kick-starting the development of non-resource sectors and reinforcing his political control at home and in the region. At the end of 2014, Nazarbayev’s government announced a new development program called Bright Path (Нұрлы жол, Nurly Zhol). This program is designed as an anti-crisis plan and an extension of Kazakhstan-2050, the long-term development strategy presented in 2012 (Akorda, 2015); however, it is best described as a smaller customized version of the Belt and Road project.

At the end of 2015, China’s Silk Road Economic Belt and Kazakhstan’s Bright Path were merged together by the leaders of the two states. The joint plan focuses on three priorities: transportation infrastructure, trade, and manufacturing industries. This strategic and highly ideologically charged merger allows Nazarbayev to position Kazakhstan as an actor with independent decision-making power in the framework of the Belt and Road project. Simultaneously, the merger supports the official Chinese discourses that present the Belt and Road project as a collaborative effort and a basis for win-win cooperation.

According to the official glossary of China.org (2017), Kazakhstan’s Bright Path program
and the Belt and Road project are “complementary and mutually reinforcing.” Consequently, China created a discursive framework where Nazarbayev’s regime is able to construct Kazakhstan’s participation in the Belt and Road project as its independent and active choices. In this framework, Kazakhstan is a willful international agent rather than a loyal powerless subject of China’s new geopolitical ambitions. Supporting Kazakhstan’s discursive politics of the Silk Road Economic Belt, China reinforces the reading of the Belt and Road as a cooperative and collective endeavor.

On the discursive level, security and energy cooperation ceased to be the key priorities in China-Kazakhstan relations, giving way to the “multi-vector cooperation” that includes five areas: (1) strengthening policy communication and coordination, (2) development of transport infrastructure, (3) creation of new trade routes and improvement of the business environment, (4) enhancement of currency circulation and creation of new financial networks, (5) and the “people-to-people bond [sic]” that will ensure the public support for the Belt and Road project (State Council of the PRC, 2015). Consequently, in the discursive framework of the Belt and Road project energy relations between China and Kazakhstan are fading into the background. This new logic of cooperation corresponds well with the discursive politics of Nazarbayev’s regime that tends to obscure the role of energy resources in Kazakhstan’s development and foreign affairs. On the other hand, it helps China to rebrand itself in Kazakhstan.

In addition to rebranding relations with Kazakhstan along the lines of the Belt and Road project, China’s representatives started to openly address the issue of Sinophobia in Kazakhstan, rebutting the popular myths about China’s expansion and resource grabbing. Zhou Li (2012), China’s ambassador to Kazakhstan (2010-2013), for example, complained about the lack of confidence in China’s peaceful rise around the world:
The US worries that China can claim world leadership. India and the countries of South-East Asia are afraid that China will use its growing military power to resolve territorial disputes. Tokyo is concerned about the threat to its security and the reduction of its influence in the region in connection to the rise of Beijing. In Russia, some Central Asian countries, and even in far-away Africa one can hear about the “threat of Chinese migration” or “China’s resource grabbing.”

According to Zhou, those fears are groundless. He claimed that China does not pose a threat to Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia because “China is not the Soviet Union” and China’s rise is not going to unleash a new Cold War. He also highlights that China needs Kazakhstan’s “understanding and support” as a fellow developing country. His successor Le Yucheng (2013a) used the idiom “a close near neighbor is better than a far-off relative” (远亲不如近邻, yuǎnqīn bù rú jìnlín) to describe China-Kazakhstan relations, implying that both countries are equally attracted to each other and thus need to “invest in the mutual trust.” Elsewhere (2013b), Le argues that the Chinese Dream is compatible with Kazakhstan’s development aspirations and thus China’s ongoing transformation into “powerful and prosperous state” brings Kazakhstan (as well as all other countries in the world) only benefits (see also Le, 2013c and Le, 2014).

China’s reaction to Kazakhstani discourses that portray it as a threat gradually became more forceful. In August 2013, China’s response to Sinophobia in Kazakhstan hit the headlines of the major national newspapers, when Zhang Hanhui, at that time the director-general of the MFA’s Department of European and Central Asian Affairs, abruptly criticized pronouncedly anti-Chinese remarks by Murat Auezov, the first Ambassador of Kazakhstan to China (1992-1995) and renowned Kazakhstani sinologist (Burdin, 2013). In an interview to a popular Kazakhstani weekly newspaper, Auezov

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79 In 2014, Zhang Hanhui became the new China’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan. In 2018, Zhang left Kazakhstan to become the Assistant Foreign Minister.
argued that “today China needs Kazakhstani oil and gas,” whereas in the nearest future China will occupy its territory to “solve its problem of overpopulation” (Batsiyev and Omelchenko, 2013). Auezov also told the journalists that he repeatedly raised the issue of China’s expansion and possible aggression with Kazakhstan’s leadership but never received a proper response. Zhang responded to the retired diplomat, accusing him of spreading “false information” about China and calling him a “lunatic” (Burdin, 2013). Zhang blamed the Kazakhstani media for not covering the “American threat,” despite the fact that “NATO gained a foothold on the territory of Kazakhstan” and conducted military exercises near the Chinese border. He also boldly pointed out that the Kazakhstani are more interested in China than the Chinese are interested in Kazakhstan:

Some [Kazakhstani] media report that a million illegal Chinese immigrants freely live in Kazakhstan. Others claim that there are special settlements – three million people – in Xinjiang on the border with Kazakhstan that could be turned into an army in a wink and occupy Kazakhstan in three days. Can you imagine this! But the Kazakhstani people believe that China can attack them. However, I am telling you that [in 2012] only 180 thousand Chinese citizens visited Kazakhstan. This is the exact statistics. In contrast, half a million Kazakhstani went to China, and this number is growing. So, who will occupy who? (Burdin, 2013)

Zhang’s unambiguously assertive and straightforward response to Auezov and other opponents of Kazakhstan rapprochement with China only highlights the new trend in China’s Kazakhstan policy. Framing China-Kazakhstan relations as mutually beneficial and synergetic, China’s representatives present Sinophobia as a common problem. Accordingly, Kazakhstan should be interested in a decrease of Sinophobia no less than China because Kazakhstan needs China. Consequently, it is clear that China wants to be recognized and respected as a valued partner not only by Kazakhstan’s authorities but also by Kazakhstan’s

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80 Zhang Hanhui is a fluent Russian-speaker and the interview was conducted in Russia without a translator. Criticizing Auezov, Zhang used a colloquial Russian expression “fall from the Moon” (как с луны свалился, kak s luny svalilsya). This expression is quite strong and implies that Auezov’s comments are inappropriate and reveal his ignorance about the subject.
society. At the same time, China recognizes its image of a “resource grabber” in Kazakhstan as a problem and seeks to reframe China-Kazakhstan relations, creating a new discursive construction within which its interest in Kazakhstani oil and other resources is less obvious.

4.3. Summary: Kazakhstan-China energy dialogue as an example of South-South cooperation

In the mid-2000s and the 2010s, with the strong financial and political backing of the state, China’s NOCs were able to make good deals with Kazakhstan’s KMG. Even though China’s NOCs were able to invest only in “leftover” assets, by 2017 they gained control over a total of around 24 percent of the oil produced in Kazakhstan. Their investments brought the financial resources much-needed by Nazarbayev’s regime in the wake of the global financial crisis but did not transform Kazakhstan into China’s “resource colony” as many Kazakhstani observers predicted. Despite the increase in equity production volume and the rapid development of the pipeline infrastructure, China’s NOCs do not send substantial amounts of Kazakhstan’s oil back home, and hence the dynamics of regional energy supply patterns did not change. In this sense, China’s NOCs successfully built an “overseas Daqing” in Kazakhstan but did not solve China’s “Malacca dilemma.”

At the same time, even though energy relations between China and Kazakhstan have so far been mutually beneficial and corresponded to the interests of both states, China’s expansion in Kazakhstan’s oil sector promotes a Sinophobic backlash and increasing neo-colonial concerns in the Kazakhstani society. Kazakhstan’s energy paradigm securitizes oil
as a global sought-after commodity and, as a result, China’s interest in Kazakhstani oil is constructed as a potential threat to Kazakhstan’s independence and sovereignty.

The securitization of oil is a result of Kazakhstan’s energy paradigm being subordinated to the discourses that legitimize and support Nazarbayev’s regime. Kazakhstani public, critiques of Nazarbayev’s regime, and many experts see China’s growing presence in Kazakhstan’s oil sector as a sign of the weakness of the state and its inability to protect Kazakhstan’s national interests. In this sense, Sinophobia not only creates risks for China’s NOCs but also poses a legitimacy challenge for Nazarbayev’s regime. As a result, Nazarbayev’s regime is trying to reposition Kazakhstan as an actor with independent decision-making power in relations with China and reframe China-Kazakhstan relations in accord with the broader construction of Kazakhstan’s development, according to which the country is moving away from its dependence on resource incomes.

China’s representatives consistently frame China-Kazakhstan energy relations as win-win cooperation. In the mid-2010s, “Shanghai spirit” gave a way to the new narrative that fits China’s relations with Kazakhstan into the framework of the Silk Road and the Belt and Road project. China still positions itself as a peer of Kazakhstan. The frame of shared regional history is bridged with the frame of market rationalism through the emphasis on China’s reputation as a reliable partner that has been built over decades of cooperation. At the same time, in the 2010s, China became more assertive and sensitive to the allegations of neocolonialism. China’s representatives aggressively denied that China might use the investment of NOCs in Kazakhstan as geopolitical leverage and rejected the allegations of neocolonialism.
Chapter 5
China-Canada energy relations

In 1970, China and Canada published a joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations, opening a new chapter in the history of relations between the two countries. Canada became one of the first Western countries to recognize China. Since then both Liberal and Conservative governments were successful in maintaining what was identified as “special friendship” in the 1980s, “comprehensive partnership” in the 1990s, and “strategic partnership” in the 2000s. After the Conservative Party under Stephen Harper defeated the Liberal government of Paul Martin in the January 2006 elections, the new Conservative government came to office with a manifestly different attitude towards China. Between 2006 and 2016, China-Canada relations were full of uncertainties and went through multiple ups and downs. Notably, China’s investment in the Canadian energy sector evoked intense interest and contention in Canada and attracted public attention abroad. Energy resources are cited as one of the major strategic areas of cooperation between Canada and China by all of Canada’s leading China experts (e.g. Evans, 2014; Jiang 2009, 2012; Nossal and Sarson, 2014; Paltiel, 2009). In contrast, images and interpretations of China’s rise as one of the world’s largest energy consumers and China’s global quest for energy resources that emerge in Canadian Parliament are multifaceted, complex, and sometimes contradictory, ranging from favorable and enthusiastic to strongly adverse and critical.

The first section of this Chapter focuses on the oil discourses that dominate Canadian energy politics and constitute Canada’s energy paradigm. The next section demonstrates how these discourses are enacted in Canada’s China policy. Further, I
examine the Chinese side of China-Canada energy relations. The last section of this Chapter summarizes major findings, articulating the role of discourses in China-Canada energy relations.

5.1. Canada’s discursive politics of oil

Canada is a significant net energy exporter, and energy sector contributes substantially to the strength of the Canadian economy, accounting directly for 6.7 percent of GDP (Natural Resources Canada [NRC], 2017a). There are two major oil producing areas in Canada: the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin, which includes Alberta, Saskatchewan, and parts of British Columbia and Manitoba, and the offshore fields in the Atlantic Ocean. Most of Canada’s oil wealth, however, is concentrated in the oil sands deposits of northern Alberta (NRC, 2017b). As of 2014, oil sands constitute as much as 97 percent of Canada’s proven oil reserves (166.3 billion barrels); up to 56 percent of all oil produced in Canada comes from oil sands (NRC, 2017b).

Canada’s oil sands consist of viscous bitumen embedded in sand and clay. The bitumen is solid and does not flow like conventional light oil, which makes its commercial extraction challenging and expensive. As Daniel Yergin (2011b) notes, over several decades oil sands “had seemed, at best, almost beyond the fringe of practicality and were generally dismissed as of little importance” (p. 46). Between 2003 and 2016, however, Canada’s oil sands industry rapidly expanded from two to seven oil sands mining projects81.

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81 Mining projects in Alberta: Syncrude Mining Project, Suncor Base Mine, CNRL Horizon Mine, Athabasca Oil Sands Project – Muskeg River and Jackpine Mine, and Imperial’s Kearl Mine.
26 commercial *in-situ* projects\(^{82}\) approved, along with approximately 130 primary recovery projects, and 12 experimental schemes (NRC, 2017b).

Canada frames itself as a multiethnic and multicultural liberal democracy which is proud of its generous natural resources and increasing conflicted about how to extract them responsibly in the best interest of the Canadians. Political scientists, cultural geographers, and other social scientists have long noted the central role of wilderness, landscape, and climate in Canadian national identity (e.g., Sandilands, 1999; Baldwin, 2009, Haluza-DeLay, Kowalsky, and Parkins, 2009; Ekers and Franan, 2010), whereas the role of oil in Canada’s nation-building narratives has received significantly less attention. There are a lot of insightful and important studies on oil as a subject of Canadian economic policy and a driving force of Canadian political development and sociocultural transformations (Adkin, 2016, 2017; Arès, 2014; Davine, Lawhon, and Pierce, 2017; Laxer, 2015; Le Billon and Carter, 2012; Shrivastava and Stefanick, 2015; Taft, 2017; Urquhart, 2018; Way, 2011; Wilson, Carlson, and Szeman, 2017, to name just a few most recent studies). However, these studies only intermediately and often superficially discuss how Canada recognizes itself as a petrostate and negotiates its identities in relations to oil. This section seeks to fill the gap and open the discussion on Canadian discursive politics of oil and its role in Canada’s self-representations in international relations.

My analysis of Canada’s discursive politics of energy focuses on official discourses (Model 1); however, examining Canada’s discursive constructions of oil and Canada’s side of China-Canada energy dialogue, I also pay significant attention to the wider foreign

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\(^{82}\) About 80% of Alberta’s bitumen reserves are too deep (deeper than 75 meters) to be mined and must be extracted *in situ* (or “in place”) using steam. The bitumen is heated and pumped out of the ground, leaving most of the solids behind. As for 2014, *in situ* projects are bringing 53% of Alberta’s oil production. The largest *in situ* projects in Alberta are Cold Lake, operated by Imperial Oil, and Firebag, operated by Suncor.
policy discourses (Model 2). Unlike China, Russia, and Kazakhstan, Canada has a vibrant and dynamic discursive politics that includes diverse powerful actors, such as political parties, provincial governments, the media, NGOs, social movements, and research networks. Hence, not only the wider foreign policy discourses (Model 2) but also cultural representations (Model 3A) and marginal political discourses (Model 3B) play a bigger role in Canada’s discursive politics of energy. A systematic intertextual discourse analysis of an extensive collection of texts produced by these diverse actors allows me to achieve two major analytical goals: to reveal the discourses about energy resources that dominate in Canada’s foreign policy towards China and to differentiate them from the discourses that are marginalized or even suppressed.

The core of the overall Canadian data collection includes 774 textual documents in English and French. All textual documents were collected from the official websites of individual institutions and through archival research. The data collection also includes visual materials and fieldwork observations conducted between May 2017 and August 2017 in Edmonton and Fort McMurray (Alberta, Canada).

Canada as an energy superpower

Janice Paskey, Gillian Steward, and Lori Williams of Mont Royal University conducted a detailed study on the development of discourses on Alberta’s oil sands (2013), examining texts produced by the Canadian government, NGOs, industry, academics, and the press between 1970 and 2013. Their analysis reveals that over the past four decades oil sands have been presented as “a tool to build a strong economy not only in Alberta but for the entire country” (p. 13) and more generally as “a way to build the nation” (p. 79). Particularly, they point out that in official discourse of the 2000s the new pipeline projects and the overall development of the oil industry are linked to the important Canadian
symbols of nation-building from the past. My analysis is consistent with the major findings of Paskey et al. (2013). One of the most illustrative examples in my sample is the 2012 report of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources that argues:

Legacy infrastructure projects in Canada like the railway system, the Trans-Canada Highway and the Saint Lawrence Seaway have greatly facilitated the movement of people and goods, strengthened the national economy and knitted together the country’s regions. Today, Canada has the opportunity to further advance the building of the nation through modernizing and expanding our [...] oil and gas pipelines (Senate of Canada, 2012, p. 28).

Another notable example is the 2012 redesign of the Canadian passport that features oil pumpjacks together with a string of train cars and a rye field as “images that are unique to Canada” (Government of Canada, 2017) on the 16 watermarked pages (Figure 15). As announced by Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird, these 16 “iconic” images are supposed to “showcase Canada’s history and the building of our great nation” (Government of Canada, 2012). Consequently, oil became a part of Canada’s landscape literally and figuratively.

Figure 15. Canadian passport, 2012
The image titled Canada’s Prairies is located on pages 14 and 15 of Canadian passport.
In this framework, oil is presented as a symbol of Canadian, and more specifically Albertan, pioneerism, ingenuity, and entrepreneurial spirit. This idea is vividly expressed in the statement of Conservative Party Member of Parliament Blaine Calkins (2006):

We have always been innovators in central Alberta and we have not looked back since the discovery of oil in 1947. The petrochemical industry has added a new and exciting dimension to life in Alberta. Thanks to black gold, new industries are locating throughout [the province].

In sum, Canadian oil is more than just a source of revenues and energy. It is defined and socially instrumentalized as a vital source of Canadian liveliness and national development.

The discourse promoted by Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government in the mid-2000s subsumed these ideas by implying that successful exploration of oil sands energized an inevitable change in Canada’s status on the international arena and transformed Canada into “an emerging energy superpower” (Harper, 2006a, 2006b, 2007). Describing Alberta as “an ocean of oil-soaked sand,” Harper (2006a) compared the oil production with some of the major symbols of nation-building in human history. According to him, “digging the bitumen out of the ground, squeezing out the oil and converting it into synthetic crude” represents “an enterprise of epic proportions, akin to the building of the pyramids or China’s Great Wall, only bigger” (Harper 2006a).

Advertising Canada as an oil supplier on the international level, Harper’s government defined energy superpower as a “reliable producer in a volatile unpredictable world” (Harper, 2006a) – one that can offer its oil-thirsty partners “a transparent regulatory system and a commitment to open markets” (Harper, 2007a). Harper (2007b) describes Canada as “a safe place to invest, a sound place to do business, and a positive force in a troubled world.” These definitions of energy superpower are rooted in the neoliberal posture of Harper’s government. Harper’s promise that the Canadian energy superpower
will eventually become “clean” and “green” (e.g., 2007b, 2008, 2009) even more heavily established that his concept of energy superpower is deeply embedded in neoliberal political rationalities, including technopolitical provisions of environmental protection and the faith in the logic of the market. Importantly, the concept of energy superpower promoted by Harper is closely correlated with the Canadian dominant reading of energy security.

The dominant reading of energy security in Canada emphasizes relative gains concerns, prioritizes short- and medium-term security challenges, and mainly focuses on the acquisition of non-renewable energy resources with a strong emphasis on oil. Following this logic, Canada becomes, using Harper’s words, a “major contributor to global energy security” (2007a) and “a bastion of world energy security” (2007b). At the same time, as Ian Urquhart (2018) and Gordon Laxer (2015) demonstrate, since the 1950s Canada has been largely preoccupied with “continental energy security,” where it takes the role of the guarantor of the United States’ oil supply. In this role, Canada becomes an energy superpower that wins the competition by offering the United States what in the early 2010s was branded by the Conservative politicians and their supporters as “ethical” and “democratic” oil.

**Ethical and democratic oil**

One of the most active contributors to the discourse of ethical oil is Ezra Levant, a Canadian conservative political activist, writer, and media personality. Published in 2010, Levant’s book *Ethical Oil: The Case for Canada’s Oil Sands* became a non-fiction bestseller in Canada and won the National Business Book Award for 2011. Levant’s central claim is that those who criticize Canada’s oil-driven development and emphasize the negative environmental impacts of oil sands extraction do not do justice to the benefits of
Canada’s “more peaceful, more democratic and more fair [sic]” oil (p. 7). In late 2010, Levant, in collaboration with a conservative political communications adviser Alykhan Velshi, established the Ethical Oil Institute, which identifies itself as a “100 percent Canadian” non-profit organization, aiming to “empower people to become grassroots community activists on the frontlines of the campaign for Ethical Oil” (EthicalOil.org, 2018). In 2011, the Ethical Oil Institute started a public campaign that included billboards and television commercials (also made available online on YouTube, e.g., EthicalOil.org, 2011).

As a part of the campaign, the Institute also published dozens of messages through Twitter and Facebook, contrasting Canada’s “ethical oil” with “conflict oil” from Middle Eastern countries and reframing oil imports as an ethical and political choice based on the human rights record of the producer-country. For this campaign, the Institute used a two-panel layout to juxtapose “ethical” and “conflict” oil (see examples Figure 16a and Figure 16b). The left panel of each image depicts symbols of “conflict” oil, such as flags of Iran and Saudi Arabia, a woman being stoned in Iran in the late 1970s, a burning oil field in the Niger Delta, and allegedly gay teenagers in Iran being hanged in 2005. In contrast, the right panel of each image showcases symbols of Canada’s “ethical” oil, including the Canadian flag, a former mayor of Wood Buffalo, Melissa Blake, a reclaimed and reforested Syncrude site in Alberta, and an image of Toronto’s annual Pride parade.

Despite the controversies surrounding Levant’s book and the criticism of the campaign operated by Velshi under the brand of the Ethical Oil Institute, the discourse of ethical oil took roots in Canadian politics. As a case in point, an Alberta-based pro-oil sands group, Canada Oil Sands Community (currently known as Oil Sands Strong), used the discourse of ethical oil and mirrored the discursive structure used by the Ethical Oil
Institute in its public relations campaign in 2016. The two images (Figure 17) released during the campaign attracted widespread criticism (e.g., Kornik, 2016; Nerman, 2016). The first image urges the audience to “choose Canadian oil” and subscribe to the Facebook page of Canada Oil Sands Community by contrasting Canada, where “lesbians are considered hot,” to Saudi Arabia, where “if you are lesbian YOU DIE [sic].” The second image focuses on the rights of gay men. While the target of the campaign is Saudi Arabia, the image depicts two Iranian teenagers – Mahmoud Asgari and Ayaz Marhoni – who were publicly hanged in 2005 for what was identified by Iranian official sources as a violent crime involving homosexual intercourse. This case attracted international attention when a British LGBTQ rights organization alleged that teenagers were executed for a consensual homosexual act and not a rape (Rastegar, 2013). The Ethical Oil Institute used the same image in their campaign in 2011 (see the right image in Figure 16b).

The discursive structure of these two campaigns lays open the edifice of the ethical oil discourse itself. First, the audience is expected to accept the claims of human right violations in the targeted countries based on the condensed and simplistic evidence. This discursive structure makes use of the North American audience’s lack of familiarity with the sociocultural and political context of these countries, as well as ingrained prejudices against Muslim majority countries in general. Secondly, Canadian oil can be framed as ethical, democratic, and fair, only if there is unethical, undemocratic, and unfair oil. The parallelism – ethical oil versus conflict oil, civilized versus uncivilized, “we” versus “them” – pairs Canada’s self-proclaimed moral authority with the ethics of Canadian oil to justify the development of oil sands. Finally, as Sheena Wilson (2014) puts it, this discursive structure “links what are apparently disparate issues in ways that rely on the preexisting sociocultural fetishization of oil as a thing, with powers that make it capable of changing
the nation” (p. 250). In sum, the discourse of ethical oil legitimates oil sands and constructs Canada as an exceptional oil producer, reinforcing the dichotomy of “we” versus “them,” within which oil appears as politicized and, subsequently, is gendered and racialized.

Figure 16a. The social media campaign of Ethical Oil Institute, 2011
All images were released through the official website of Ethical Oil Institute and related accounts on social media between July and August 2011.

Figure 16b. The social media campaign of Ethical Oil Institute, 2011
All images were released through the official website of Ethical Oil Institute and related accounts on social media between July and August 2011.
Six months after *Ethical Oil* was published, Harper merged the discourse of ethical oil formulated by Levant with the discourse of energy superpower. Promoting oil sands on the international stage, he emphasized that Canada is “a very ethical society and a safe source for the United States in comparison to other sources of energy” (cited in Chase, 2011a). Other Conservative politicians echoed Levant’s argument in their public speeches. For example, according to Harper’s Environment Minister Peter Kent,

[Alberta’s oil] is a regulated product in an *energy-superpower-democracy*. The profits from this oil are not used in undemocratic or unethical ways. The proceeds are used to better society in the great Canadian democracy. The wealth generated is shared with Canadians, with investors. (as cited in Chase, 2011b, emphasis added).

Appealing to the concept of ethical oil, Harper and other proponents of the development of oil sands in Canadian government inevitably invoke the same discursive structure as is used in the campaigns of the populist pro-oil sands groups. Levant’s concept of ethical oil also rearticulates the notion of continental North American energy security in the energy superpower discourse, constructing Canada as a unique partner of the United
States when compared with the illiberal, barbaric, and dangerous oil-producers of the Middle East, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Following this discursive logic, Americans must buy Canadian oil not only because Canada is a reliable supplier but also because both Canada and the United States share a commitment to the same set of core liberal values.

The ethical oil discourse helped Harper’s government to reinforce the idea of Canada becoming a new energy superpower, yet did not convince the expert community. The consulting firm Deloitte Canada (e.g., 2010, 2011, 2012), for instance, was skeptical of Harper’s attempts to change the Canadian brand in international relations. Particularly, Deloitte’s 2011 report blandly points out that it will be “difficult” for Canada to turn itself into an energy superpower “when [it] can serve only two markets – [its] own Canadian and the United States” (p. 2).

In a similar vein, Harper’s new foreign policy rhetoric was criticized by Canada’s academic community. As a case in point, Annette Hester (2007) argues that to become an energy superpower a state needs to gain significant control over its energy resources (including oil), and then it should be able and willing to assert this power to achieve other political goals. Drawing on these criteria, Hester concludes that Canada is not an energy superpower and, importantly, not on the path to becoming one. Mathieu Arès (2014) points out that political difficulties associated with the expansion of the pipeline network and the ongoing energy revolution in the United States make the task of turning Canada into an energy superpower near impossible. Philippe Le Billon and Angela Carter (2012) call Harper’s attempts to present Canada as an energy superpower “doubtful” because of “the dearth of Canadian policy and the dominance of foreign companies” (p. 186).

While the majority of Canadian economists and political scientists considered the term “energy superpower” misleading, many representatives of the oil industry, on the
contrary, eagerly embraced the new shift in the official energy discourse. For instance, the authors of *A Canadian Energy Strategy Framework: A guide to building Canada’s future as a global leader* (2012), produced by the Energy Policy Institute of Canada, present Canada’s status of an energy superpower as a fact that does not require any lengthy discussion:

Canada is an energy superpower with the potential to achieve even more for the benefit of Canadians. Realizing our national potential will require aggressive and focused innovation, exceptional environmental performance and a broad-based capacity to serve domestic and international markets with energy products and expertise. (p. 6)

Similarly, the Canadian Academy of Engineering (CAE) uses the metaphor of energy superpower in the titles of its reports: *Canada’s Energy Progress. In Pursuit of the Energy Superpower Vision* (2010) and *Canada: Winning as a Sustainable Energy Superpower* (2012). In the preface of the 2012 report, the President of CAE, P. Kim Sturgess, defines energy superpower as “a country that uses energy wealth wisely to maximize its economic, environmental, and social prosperity and its global influence” (p. 4). She also adds that Canada is “one of the few nations that have the physical resources and the science and technology to become such a superpower” (p. 4). This last clarification added by Strugess to the definition of energy superpower is particularly meaningful because it introduces the third energy discourse, the scientific oil discourse.

**Scientific oil**

The scientific oil discourse has two distinguishable themes: an affirmation that there is no alternative for oil for now and unconditional faith in progress. The statement about the non-alternative nature of oil is built on the notion that oil is the only cheap, reliable, and plentiful source of energy that can support current economic growth (for a detailed
discussion see Epstein, 2014). This logic rationalizes the expansion of the oil industry and presents it as the only possible developmental choice in the foreseeable future. As Harper (2007b) summarized this idea, while “human ingenuity” is developing “alternative forms of energy as well as cleaner, greener ways to use carbon,” Canada will adhere to its status of a “global mining giant.” At the same time, the scientific oil discourse portrays oil sands as a massive knowledge-based project and fetishizes science behind the development of oil and specifically the science behind the expansion of oil sands. As a result, Canadian oil starts to represent a triumph of modern technology. A prominent example of articulations of this discourse is the Oil Sands Discovery Centre in Fort McMurray sponsored by Syncrude.

The Oil Sands Discovery Center presents the history of Alberta’s oil sands by focusing on the science and technology of oil production. The outdoor display area presents “retired” oil sands equipment used by Syncrude, such as the giant 850-tonne bucketwheel excavator “Cyrus,” massive parts of hydraulic shovels, and a 110-meter tall dragline. The main part of the exhibition immerses the visitors in the history of the technological development of oil sands reserves in Alberta and explains with in-depth details how bitumen becomes usable crude and fuel, showcasing Syncrude’s industrial advancements (see for examples Figure 18a and Figure 18b).
Figure 18a. Display Synthetic Crude: The Star of the Show
Oil Sands Discovery Center, May 2017.

Figure 18b. An overview of the central exhibition hall
Oil Sands Discovery Center, May 2017.
As a sharp contrast to the Museum of Daqing Oilfield, the visitors of the Oil Sands Discovery Center do not see the people who extract Canadian oil. Oil sands employees are presented only as cartoon characters on attributions for some of the exhibits. They are wearing a blue uniform and bright yellow hardhats. They are often armed with a pair of glasses or personal protective gear and hold a notepad, which causes them to resemble scientists or engineers rather than operators of the famous caterpillar tracks.

The space occupied by the main exhibition, *Dr. Karl A. Clark Exhibit Hall*, is named after a famous Alberta-based chemist, who developed the separation process for oil sands and is renowned as “the father of oil sands extraction” (Canadian Petroleum Hall of Fame, 2010). The visitors learn about Clark’s research and special role in the development of Canada’s oil industry from the 45-minute documentary *Pay Dirt: Alberta’s Oil Sand: Century of the Making* (Palmer, 2005). This documentary, however, attributes the breakthrough in the oil sands development not only to the work of Clark but also to the ingenuity and determination of Canadian entrepreneurs. While the documentary reproduces the general narrative that bridges the development of oil sands with nation-building, it does not tell the stories of oil workers or residents of the communities located around oil sands.

The Oil Sands Discovery Center presents oil sands projects as detached from the socioeconomic development of Canada, including the development of Alberta. The visitors learn everything about how Canadian oil is produced but nothing about the people who produce it and the people who live in close proximity to it. In a nutshell, the Oil Sands Discovery Center is first and foremost a science museum. In contrast to the Museum of Daqing Oilfield, it portrays oil as a product of technological, rather than human progress. In this framework, Canadians simply embrace the inevitable technological development and learn to benefit from it.
The scientific oil discourse presents the environmental consequences of oil sands extraction as one of the scientific challenges that will be successfully resolved in the course of the development of Canada’s oil industry. For example, Harper (2007a) argues that Canadians still have plenty of time to change the way they produce and use energy:

Just as the Stone Age did not end because the world ran out of stones, the Carbon Age will not end because the world runs out of fossil fuels. Instead, human ingenuity will develop alternative forms of energy as well as cleaner, greener ways to use carbon. And Canada will be at the forefront, as a green energy superpower.

In this context, Canada’s modernization and oil sands development stand in a one-to-one relationship with each other. The linear and inevitable evolution of oil production technologies not only serves Canada’s economic prosperity but also improves Canada’s environmental accountability. This framing of air emissions, land and forest reclamation, tailings management and other environmental problems as exclusively technological denies the importance of political and social responsibility. In other words, the scientific oil discourse contains a promise that current and future technological innovations will make Canada’s oil clean – and thus keep it ethical – without harming Canada’s economic growth. Consequently, Canada’s oil industry is portrayed not as the cause of environmental problems on the domestic and international level but as a part of the solution that emphasizes confidence in future technological and scientific breakthroughs.

Dirty oil and tar sands

As it was already noted throughout this section, the discourses of energy superpower, ethical oil, and scientific oil are challenged by strong environmental concerns associated with the rapid expansion of oil sands. According to Paskey et al. (2013), Canada’s broad discourse on oil sands “shifted from being primarily an economic issue to one that included significant discussion of environmental impacts” only around 2000 (p.
Their findings demonstrate that “as early as 1973 the Alberta and federal governments anticipated many of the environmental impacts of oil sands development and also recommended strategies to eliminate or minimize those impacts”; however, only three decades later – when “the environmental impacts that had been predicted started coming home to roost” – environmental concerns of oil sands development were officially recognized and addressed (p. 53). Those concerns are specifically related to air pollution, water contamination (tailings ponds), destroying the boreal landscape, and greenhouse gases emissions.

In the late 2000s and the early 2010s, critics described the oil sands project as “one of the world’s most fantastic concentrations of toxic waste” (Nikiforuk, 2008, p. 79), “Canada’s number one global warming machine” (Clarke 2008, p. 149), and the major cause of Canada’s “environmental Armageddon” (Marsden, 2010). The turning point for the mainstreaming of environmental concerns was April 2008, when photographs of ducks covered with oil in a Syncrude tailing pond (e.g., Figure 19) became a key news item across Canada. Paskey et al. (2013) point out that “newspaper headlines and images of oily ducks on television and the Internet brought more public attention to the tailings ponds than they had ever received in the past 40 years” (p. 41). In what Paskey et al. (2013) call the “the post-dead ducks period” (p. 41), oil sands became known as “toxic,” “poisonous,” and “dangerous.”


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83 Paskey et al.’s (2013) analysis of 653 documents retrieved for the search query “tailings” shows that words “toxic” or “toxicity” appear in 46 documents: beginning in the mid-1980s (6), continuing into the 1990s (6), and gaining increasing currency in the 2000s (34) (p. 44).
Subsequently, even the choice of terminology – “tar sands” or “oil sands” – became politicized. In 2008, the Glossary offered by Alberta Government explains that “oil sands” is “an accurate term because bitumen […] is mixed with the sand” and thus “it makes sense to describe the resource as oil sands because oil is what is finally derived from the bitumen” (Alberta Government, 2008). Despite this explanation, with the notable exception of the Pembina Institute, the critics of the way Alberta’s bitumen deposits are developed consciously choose to use the term “tar sands” to emphasize the downsides of the expansion of unconventional oil production. Paul Kellogg (2015) argues that the “tar” versus “oil” debate is a “somewhat silly linguistic polemic,” initiated by those, who “with a kind of neoliberal political correctness attempt to vilify the use of the tar word” (p. 159).

84 Interestingly, the term “tar sands” was used as a completely neutral by all stakeholders, including federal and provincial government, until Alberta Government adopted “oil sands” as a preferred term in the 1990s during a public relations campaign of Alberta government (e.g, Alberta Chamber of Resources, 1995).
On the other side of the spectrum, Paula Arab (2011), a columnist for the *Calgary Herald*, condemns using “tar” rather than “oil” as the adjective for Alberta’s bitumen production as a “rhetoric of extremists who are anti-oil and who want to shut down the industry.” She points out that “Canada has to engage the world in an informed discussion about the oil sands,” whereas the use of the term “tar” by environmentalists, oppositional politicians, and Indigenous peoples’ groups “aborts the debate before it gets started.”

**Canada’s dirty oil on Indigenous peoples’ land**

The political, social, economic, and environmental concerns of Indigenous peoples add an extra layer to the dirty oil discourse. Alberta is located on the lands covered by Treaty 6 (1876), Treaty 7 (1877), and Treaty 8 (1899) and has the third largest population of Indigenous peoples in Canada. The areas of oil sands exploration are located on the land traditionally and currently used by various groups of Indigenous peoples. An estimated 23,000 Indigenous people live in the areas of oil sands exploration, with 18 First Nations and six Métis settlements (Alberta Government, 2014). According to the data released by the Government of Alberta (2014), over 1,700 Indigenous people had permanent jobs in the oil sands industry in 2010. Fort McKay First Nation community, located approximately 60 km north of Fort McMurray at the heart of the Alberta oil sands, is often cited as a compelling example of mutually beneficial relations between Indigenous communities and Canada’s oil industry by experts (e.g., McIntosh, 2005; Urquhart, 2018) and the press (e.g., Kirkup, 2016; Cattaneo, 2013).

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85 Negative socio-economic impacts of oil sands development in rapidly urbanized communities of Alberta, such as lack of infrastructure, deficiency of social services, housing crises, adverse health effects, substance abuse, and increased crime, are also well documented by researchers (e.g., Branetson, 2015; Fraser et al. 2015; Keough, 2015; Williams et al., 2016) and discussed in the press. However, these themes do not contribute a substantial and influential part in Canada’s discursive politics of energy.
Almost the entire land base of Fort McKay’s traditional territory has been leased out for oil sands developers (Spink and Abel 2015, p. 232). The Fort McKay First Nation fully owns the Fort McKay Group of Companies and since the mid-1980s has been “aggressively [taking] advantage of its close proximity to the oil sands” (Fort McKay Group of Companies LP, 2015). Most of the members of Fort McKay First Nation benefited significantly from active engagement with the oil industry, as their income was almost 30 percent more than the provincial average by the end of the 2000s (Urquhart, 2018, pp. 155-156).

Nevertheless, members of other communities located in the proximity to oil sands – specifically, Chipewyan Prairie First Nation and Fort McMurray No. 468 First Nation – have not benefited as much as members of Fort McKay First Nation from their encounters with oil companies (Urquhart 2018, p. 157). Importantly, it is widely recognized that the adverse environmental impacts of oil sands expansion most strongly affect Indigenous communities located in Alberta and socio-economic benefits brought to some of these communities by oil sands developers came with great environmental losses that were poorly addressed by Canada’s government and the broader society (Spink and Abel, 2015; Parlee, 2016). In the 2000s and the 2010s, Canada’s energy discourse accentuated environmental problems impacting Indigenous communities related not only to the expansion of oil sands exploration in Alberta but also to installments of new pipelines in British Columbia (Stendie and Adkin, 2016). The discussions of these issues evolved into a new frame within Canada’s discursive politics of energy that links environmental concerns of Indigenous peoples to the protection of their treaty rights and human rights.

The core idea behind this frame is well captured in the widely cited public appeal of Roxanne Marcel, a former Chief of Mikisew Cree First Nation (2005-2011): “Our message
to both levels of government, to Albertans, to Canadians, and to the world who may depend on oil sands for their energy solutions, is that we can no longer be sacrificed” (as cited in Petersen 2007). Some Indigenous authors and activists refer to the concept of “genocide” to describe the way the development of oil industry changes their communities. For example, George Poitras, a former Chief of Mikisew Cree First Nation (1999-2002) and environmental activist stated:

If we don’t have land and we don’t have anywhere to carry out our traditional lifestyle, we lose who we are as a people. So, if there’s no land, then it’s equivalent in our estimation to genocide of a people. (As cited in Petersen, 2007)

In the mid-2000s, the Indigenous groups started to work in partnership with environmentalist groups in Europe and, specifically, in the UK, including Tar Sands in Focus, UK Tar Sands Network, and Friends of the Earth Europe, to internationalize their campaign and bring attention to the UK-based companies, such as BP, Shell, and the Royal Bank of Scotland, that are heavily involved in development of oil sands. They also are actively trying to reach out to the consumers of Canadian oil in the United States and Western Europe, internationalizing and disseminating the dirty oil discourse. For instance, the Mikisew Cree First Nation and the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, together with the Canadian-based environmental organization ForestEthics (currently known as Stand.earth), in February 2009 placed an anti-oil-sands advertisement in USA Today, the most widely circulated newspaper in the United States (Figure 20). The full-page ad is entitled Canada’s Tar Sands: the dirtiest oil on earth. It depicts a map of North America with black oil flooding Canada and dripping down on the United States. The ad was timed to coincide with the United States President Barack Obama’s visit to Canada and directly

86 For scholarly analysis of the concept of genocide in Canadian environmental politics see Huseman and Short, 2012 and Preston, 2013.
addressed Americans: “Your voice counts. Please let President Obama know that he should ask Canada to clean up the Tar Sands.” The ad also lists the major problems associated with Canada’s oil industry, presenting the quintessence of the dirty oil discourse of the late 2000s:

Producing oil from Canada’s Tar Sands releases massive greenhouse gas emissions, consumes huge amounts of energy, contaminates fresh water and fish, produces toxic waste and destroys vast forests along with their birds and wildlife. And now, downstream indigenous communities are suffering higher than normal rates of cancer.

While Poitras described that the ad as “the beginning of a process to educate the American people and the Obama administration on the issue of the tar sands and its impacts on [Indigenous peoples of Canada],” Alberta Premier Ed Stelmach described it as “misinformation” spread by “self-interest groups” (as cited at CBC News, 2009). The reaction of Alberta’s government to the initiatives of the Indigenous activists and environmentalists emphasizes that the dirty oil (tar sands) discourse challenged the legitimacy and foundations of the official discursive politics of energy. Dirty oil questions the discursive logic that focuses on economic, social, and political benefits of the exploitation of oil sands and links the development of the oil industry at large to Canada’s nation-building project.
Figure 20. The full-page anti-oil-sands add *Canada’s Tar Sands: the dirtiest oil on earth*, February 2009

The add was published by the Mikisew Cree First Nation, the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, and environmental organization ForestEthics in *USA Today* (February 17, 2009).
“We” and “They” in Canada’s discursive politics of energy

The energy superpower, ethical oil, and scientific oil discourses are closely interconnected. They support and complement each other, providing a solid foundation for the claims that endorse Canada’s oil-driven economic prosperity and legitimize the development of oil sands in Alberta. These discourses are deeply embedded in the neoliberal ideology and the distinct notion of the linear progress. As a result, they form multiple homogenized dichotomist variations of “the West versus the Rest,” where Canada always finds itself on the side of the West. As an energy superpower, Canada represents an alternative to the disobedient subjects that disrupt the neoliberal international order and destabilize international energy markets. Canada’s oil is ethical and democratic as opposed to the oil coming from the non-Western countries that fail to embrace the neoliberal version of modernity. The scientific oil discourse justifies Canada’s superiority claims by references to the constant scientific and technological progress that comes with the right version of modernity.

The dirty oil discourse, on the contrary, not only problematizes the development of oil sands but also questions the foundations of Canadian neoliberal modernity in general. The dirty oil discourse focuses on the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of the oil industry development and opens Canada’s domestic and international energy politics for the concerns of Indigenous peoples. At the same time, however, while challenging the legitimacy of Canada’s neoliberal modernity, the dirty oil discourse still represents Canada as a part of this modernity. This is evident in the attempts of the supporters of the dirty oil discourse to “peer-pressure” Canadian government by attracting the attention of other Western societies to the negative environmental and socioeconomic impacts of the oil
sands development. In other words, the dirty oil discourse still identifies Canada with the West. In this sense, the dirty oil discourse exists within the same structure as the other three discourses and cannot be separated from this structure.

**Canada’s energy paradigm: Discursive diversity**

The first pillar of Canada’s energy paradigm is the construction of oil as a source of Canada’s economic prosperity. Oil is simultaneously socially instrumentalized as a vital source of Canadian liveliness and national development. In this framework, Alberta’s oil sands epitomize the exceptional pioneerism and hard-work of the Canadians.

Canadian oil is securitized. The dominant reading of energy security in Canada emphasizes relative gains concerns, prioritizes short- and medium-term security challenges, and mainly focuses on the acquisition of non-renewable energy resources with a strong emphasis on oil. This is the second pillar of Canada’s energy paradigm. As a reliable and stable producer, Canada contributes to global energy security and becomes the key guarantor of the United States’ oil supply.

These positive constructions of Canada’s oil-driven development are reinforced by the ethical oil discourse that distinguishes Canada from other oil-producing countries. Defining Canada’s oil as ethical and democratic, this discourse constructs Canada as a unique oil producer that is not only capable to satisfy energy security needs of oil consumers but also solve moral dilemmas of global energy politics.

The scientific oil discourse contributes to Canada’s energy paradigm an affirmation that there is no alternative for oil for now and faith in the progress that will eventually make Canadian energy “green.” Oil is identified as the only cheap, reliable, and plentiful source of energy that can support the current global economic growth, and hence the development
of oil reserves becomes the only rational choice for Canada. At the same time, the scientific oil discourse upholds that Canada is able to enhance its oil production capacities in a responsible manner. According to the logic of the scientific oil discourse, Canada’s oil production becomes not the cause of environmental problems but a part of the solution that emphasizes the confidence in Canada’s ingenuity and creativity. It also reinforces the construction of Canada as an exceptional oil producer that is able to use its oil wealth wisely and in a responsible manner.

However, Canada’s energy paradigm is not monolithic. The dirty oil discourse breaches the solid structure of the triad comprised of energy superpower, ethical oil, and scientific oil discourses and undermines the legitimacy and credibility of the logic of appropriateness that they reproduce. As a result, Canada’s energy paradigm is prone to conflict and is easily disrupted by the discrepancy between the dominant energy discourses. In the realm of international relations, the most sensitive and controversial elements of Canada’s energy paradigm are magnified by the constructions of “We” and “They.”

5.2. Oil in Canada’s China policy

Exploring further the discursive intersections in Canada’s energy politics, this section focuses on Canada’s China policy and Canadian perspectives on China-Canada energy relations between 2006 and 2016. My goal in this section is to answer the second set of analytical research questions: What are “we” going to do with oil? and What are “they” going to do with oil?
Stephen Harper’s energy superpower and China: 2006-2012

In 2006, the foreign policy platform of the Conservative Party (CP) consisted only of 168 words and, as Kim R. Nossal and Leah Sarson (2014) point out, it was almost entirely devoted to the “coded criticism” of the previous Liberal government’s China policy (p. 148). Conservatives claimed that “Liberal foreign policy has compromised democratic principles to appease dictators, sometimes for the sake of narrow business interests” (Conservative Party of Canada, 2006, p. 44). Instead, they promised to “articulate Canada’s core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free markets, and free trade – and compassion for the less fortunate – on the international stage” (Conservative Party of Canada, 2006, p. 45).

Conservatives abandoned the narratives of “friendship” and “partnership” in relations with China and started to explicitly target its most sensitive political areas, including China’s human rights situation, persecution of Falun Gong followers, Taiwan and Tibet politics, and speculations about China’s economic espionage (for more details see Evans, 2008 and Burton, 2015). In November 2006, Harper unapologetically claimed that his government would not stop challenging China on human rights issues, even if this would jeopardize further the development of economic relations with it:

I think Canadians want us to promote our trade relations worldwide, and we do that, but I don’t think Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values. They don’t want us to sell that out to the almighty dollar. (CBC, 2006)

With only a few exceptions (e.g., Gilley, 2008), Canada’s leading China experts are highly critical of the changes in China policy that were introduced by the Conservatives in 2006. Paul Evans (2011, p. 22) and Charles Burton (2009, p. 1) openly call the Conservatives’ attempts to refocus Canada’s China policy a failure. Nossal and Sarson (2014) also consider the Conservatives’ initial approach to China a mistake and
characterize it as “simplistic and overly ideological” (p. 157). Wenran Jiang (2009) points out that “while the world is busy engaging China, for obvious reasons, Harper’s handling of Canada’s China policy has been, by design or default, exactly the opposite” (p. 905).

In a similar vein, the Conservatives were criticized by foreign policy experts and diplomats. Derek Burney (2009), a former Canadian ambassador to the United States (1989-1993) and the head of the Conservative Transition Team (2006-2007), claims that “symbolism” in the Conservatives’ China policy has overshadowed “calculations of how [Canada’s] interests are best served.” Canada’s former ambassadors to China (2009-2012) and Harper’s foreign policy advisor in 2006, David Mulroney (2015), summarizes the Conservatives’ China policy as “speaking loudly and caring a small stick.” For his part, David Emerson (2009), the Harper’s government’s first Minister of International Trade (2006-2008) and subsequently Minister of Foreign Affairs (2008), also emphasizes the importance of stronger ties with China for Canada: “It’s late in the game and we are overdue for a broad strategy of engagement.”

In sum, virtually all of Canada’s leading China and foreign policy experts agree that deeper engagement with China is not a choice but a necessity for Canada. Importantly, all cite energy resources as one of the major strategic areas of cooperation between Canada and China. Indeed, in 2006 when Harper branded Canada as an energy superpower, China was consuming 7431.53 mb/ d (BP Tools, 2017) and was interested in the oil that Harper was advertising. The overarching idea that unifies the diverse opinions on China-Canada relations is that Canada needs China more than China needs Canada, specifically if Canada aspires to become an energy superpower (e.g., Paltiel, 2009, Jiang, 2009, 2012; Evans, 2014; Nossal and Sarson, 2014). Thus, the remarkable reversal of the Conservatives’
approach to China in the late 2000s was recognized as the beginning of a positive, promising, and much-needed policy transformation.

As Paul Evans (2011) points out, the Conservatives’ approach to China started to change as early as fall 2007 and, by the time the Conservatives won a majority in 2011, their China policy “had returned very close to where Paul Martin had left it five years ago” (p. 24). In 2009, Harper visited China for the first time. A year later, during Hu Jintao’s visit to Canada, Harper (2010) restored the narrative of “strategic partnership.” He enthusiastically promised his Chinese counterparts that “shared aspirations for stronger Canada-China relations in a better world” and mutual respect between the two countries “grow with every encounter.”

Following the rapprochement between Canada and China, CNOOC, CNPC, and Sinopec all have made substantial investments in Canada’s energy sector. At the end of 2009, CNPC purchased 60 percent of Athabasca Oil Sands Corporation’s MacKay and Dover oil sands projects for $1.9 billion through its subsidiary PetroChina. In April 2010, Sinopec bought for $4.56 billion a 9 percent stake in Syncrude Canada Ltd., which owns the world’s largest oil sands operation. In July 2011, CNOOC bought the struggling oil-sands producer Opti Canada Inc., acquiring a 35 percent share in the joint Nexen-Opti oil sands project in Long Lake. All deals were approved by the Conservative government as being of net benefit to Canada.

In February 2012, Harper made his second trip to China. In the speech that he gave at the end of his visit in Guangzhou, Harper mentioned “energy” 13 times. He highlighted that “Canada has abundant natural resources” that are “critical things that China needs […]

87 In 2012, Athabasca Oil Sands Corporation sold the other 40% of the company to PetroChina.
and will continue to need, to power the kind of industrial growth that we are witnessing.”

Harper’s concluding remarks are worth quoting in length:

“Canada is not just a great trading nation; we are an emerging energy superpower. It has abundant supplies of virtually every form of energy, and you know, we want to sell our energy to people who want to buy our energy, it’s that simple. Currently, 99 per cent of Canada’s energy exports go to one country – the United States. And it is increasingly clear that Canada’s commercial interests are best served through diversification of our energy markets. To this end, our government is committed to ensuring that Canada has the infrastructure necessary to move our energy resources to those diversified markets. Yes, we will continue to develop these resources in an environmentally responsible manner, but so too will we uphold our responsibility to put the interests of Canadians ahead of foreign money and influence that seek to obstruct development in Canada in favour of energy imported from other, less stable parts of the world.

This section of the speech is a perfect composite of the arguments and the narrative strategies that Harper used to promote Canadian oil abroad:

- Canada as an advocate for free markets and fair competition;
- Canada as a rational and pragmatic actor in international energy politics;
- Canada as an environmentally conscious oil producer;
- Canada as a politically and socially stable oil producer.

In addition to this, Harper implicitly affirmed the discourse of “ethical” and “democratic” oil, by mentioning the “energy imported from other, less stable parts of the world.”

Importantly, he plainly invited China to invest in Canada’s energy sector and framed China as a potential rival to the United States. Nevertheless, as the future development of China-Canada relations demonstrates, the Conservatives’ adjustment of their China policy was largely rhetorical, whereas the expected fundamental shift did not actually take place (Burton, 2015; Mulroney, 2015).

Later in 2012, the bid by CNOOC to acquire a Canadian oil firm Nexen became the subject of considerable controversy. In the intense debates over this takeover, the
opposition from both the right and left wings of Canada’s political spectrum, the press, and eventually from Harper himself, employed all four dominant energy discourses – energy superpower, ethical oil, scientific oil, and dirty oil – to explain why Chinese NOCs are not welcome in Canada’s energy sector. In other words, Canada’s energy paradigm rejected a partnership with China.

Canada’s response to the Nexen-CNOOC takeover

In July 2012, CNOOC announced its intentions to purchase Nexen for a total bid of $15.1 billion. The deal was soon accepted by Nexen. This news immediately captured the attention of experts and the media, as it was the largest energy deal ever for China and Canada. In September 2012, Harper’s government announced that it would review the deal under the Investment Canada Act (2002). The review was prolonged until early December (see Figure 21 for the detailed timeline of the Nexen-CNOOC takeover).

Figure 21. The Nexen-CNOOC takeover timeline, 2012
The left-wing parties in the Canadian Parliament – the New Democratic Party (NDP) and Green Party – loudly criticized the deal itself and the way Harper’s government responded to it. The central theme of their critique was that CNOOC – as well as Sinopec and CNPC – are affiliated with China’s party-state. Green Party MP Elizabeth May (e.g., 2012a, 2012b) repeatedly emphasized that all of China’s NOCs are “owned” and “controlled” by the Communist Party. Another Green Party MP, Bruce Hyer (2012), described the Nexen-CNOOC takeover as a “reckless” deal and accused Harper’s government in allowing “Chinese communists to scoop [Canada’s] key natural resources.” Disparaging the deal, May and Hyer also argued that it would jeopardize Canadian democracy and Canadian commitment to the propagation of human rights. In a similar fashion, NDP MPs accentuated attention on the state-ownership of China’s NOCs, raising concerns about economic espionage and illicit transfer of Canadian technologies to Chinese other firms. For example, Jamie Nicholls (2012) stated:

After 40 years of investment in innovation in horizontal drilling technology, what protections do we have that CNOOC or Nexen will not export this technology and basically take that 40 years of investment away and use it at their own leisure around the world?

Hélène LeBlanc (2012a and 2012b) argued that the Nexen takeover by a state-owned Chinese company endangers Canada’s national security. Other NDP MPs also questioned CNOOC’s and more broadly China’s attitudes towards environmental protection. For example, Romeo Saganash presumed that “if Nexen is bought by a Chinese state-owned enterprise, we will never know if it is trying to eliminate an environmental measure” (see also LeBlanc, 2012c). Laurin Liu (2012) cited the controversy in Burma, where CNOOC was accused in violations of labor and environmental regulations, as a reason to block the deal.
Canadian media joined the debates. Supporting the concerns of NDP and Green Party MPs about China’s poor environmental record and economic espionage, many columnists and editorial writers also doubted the willingness of China’s NOCs to follow foreign laws and speculated about their involvement in tax evasion and bribery in other countries. Many Canadian journalists described China as a selfish and unreliable partner. For instance, the editor-in-chief of Montreal-based *Le Devoir*, Jean-Robert Sansfaçon (2012) argued that “at the slightest diplomatic chill, China’s government will not hesitate to blackmail its trade partners either by threatening to close facilities or by interfering in the markets to choose its suppliers and customers.” He described the hesitation of Harper’s government as being “stuck between its democratic ideals, resource protection, and economic spin-offs.”

Some critics used the ethical oil discourse to make a case against cooperation with China. Brian Lee Crowley (2012), the Managing Director of Macdonald-Laurier Institute, in an opinion piece in the *National Post* argued that we live in the world where “[oil] demand is rising, and supply is limited” and thus China needs Canada more than Canada needs China:

> Canada has a huge reputational and institutional leg-up on many other potential suppliers. Would you like to be reliant on dysfunctional Nigeria, thuggish Venezuela, unstable Iraq or nice polite Canada for your oil?

Following Crowley’s ethical-oil logic, the international competition for Canadian oil will only intensify in the future and Harper’s government should not rush to welcome untrustworthy China’s NOCs to Canadian energy sector.

In sum, the opponents of the Nexen-CNOOC takeover and the Conservatives’ economic rapprochement with China in the Canadian Parliament pointed out that China’s
involvement in Canada’s energy sector could potentially destroy everything that Harper wanted Canada to be. According to them, instead of transforming Canada into an energy superpower, Harper risked selling it out to companies that are owned by “exceedingly interventionist” China and thus represent a “communist dictatorship” and a “totalitarian regime” (Canada, 2012). In this framework, Canadian oil sands became securitized and instrumentalized as a source of Canada’s sovereignty. Importantly, the investments of China’s NOCs were presented as a threat not only to Canada’s security but Canada’s national identity. Following the logic of those who opposed Nexen-CNOOC takeover, by opening its strategic industry to China, Canada risked losing the ability to be itself (e.g., an international human rights advocate) and to intensify already existing domestic challenges (e.g., balancing oil production and environmental concerns).

Many representatives of the Liberal Party were deeply critical of Harper’s China policy, yet consistently supported the Nexen-CNOOC takeover. This position was vividly outlined in an opinion piece in the Edmonton Journal by Justin Trudeau (2012), a federal Liberal leadership candidate at that time. Trudeau’s key argument was that a constructive engagement with China is vital for Canada. However, Trudeau argues that Harper failed to “make the positive case for Asia” by pursuing the politics of “unhelpful saber-rattling” in relationships with China at the beginning of his first term. Because of the diplomatic mistakes made between 2006 and 2010, Harper’s government, according to Trudeau, was unable to obtain public support for “good opportunities” that came with Chinese investment in Canada’s energy sector in 2012. Finally, Trudeau reasoned that “Chinese ownership of 3 percent of oil sands leases hardly constitutes a national security issue,” and thus, if
Canadians “really believe in a Canada built on equality of opportunity, upward mobility, and expanded individual freedom and choice,” they should not oppose Chinese investment.

The 14th Premier of Alberta, Allison Redford, supported China’s investment in oil sands too. During her official visit to China in September 2012, Redford met with CNOOC’s officials and assured them that Albertans “have always believed foreign investment assisted [the province] with growing [its] economy” and that Alberta’s government welcomed Chinese companies (as cited in Wheeler, 2012). Other supporters of the Nexen-CNOOC takeover also cited market-based strategy as the major incentive to invite China to invest in Canada’s oil sands. For example, Terence Corcoran (2012), the columnist of National Post, shared his skepticism about the very idea of “energy-hungry China” going on a “global energy hunt” and Canada being among “the hunted.” In his opinion, China cannot undermine Canada’s free-market-orientated economy and does not pose a threat to Canada because China’s NOCs have already discovered that “there’s no strategy like a market-based strategy.”

Consequently, the supporters of the Nexen-CNOOC deal desecuritized both oil and China, placing China-Canada energy dialogue in the realm of rational choice and traditional neoliberal economic cost-benefit calculations. Accordingly, Canada’s oil is neither “ethical” nor “dirty” but a standard market commodity. When oil is not instrumentalized as a source of power, Canada does not have to adhere to the role of energy superpower that safeguards continental energy security. Simultaneously, the supporters of the deal also politicized China by framing it as an actor that makes rational decisions and follows a coherent market-based strategy, prioritizing economic growth and cooperation.
Harper’s government granted its approval to the Nexen-CNOOC takeover in December 2012. While China was celebrating the deal as an “important mutually beneficial step” in China-China relations, Harper made it clear that this deal was an exception rather than a beginning of a new trend. He stated that “when we say Canada is open for business, we do not mean that Canada is for sale to foreign governments” and further elaborated that “Canadians have not spent years reducing the ownership of sectors of the economy by our own governments, only to see them bought and controlled by foreign governments instead” (as cited in Payton, 2012).

**The fading energy dialogue between “green” Canada and “red” China: 2013-2016**

Between 2013 and 2015, the global oversupply pushed oil prices down. China’s interest in Canada’s oil sands ceased to be the major theme in Canada’s China policy. The focus shifted to the ratification of China-Canada Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. In the context of energy politics, China was only sporadically mentioned in the debates over new pipeline projects. For example, in the debates over the Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project, one of the major arguments of the CP MPs was the opportunity to expand Canadian exports to China. For example, CP MP Joan Crockatt (2013) argued that without new pipelines the Canadian government not only “runs the risk of missing the boat to China and losing out on billions in revenue that could be in the pockets of Canadians.” Crockatt also highlighted that “many [of Canada’s] competitors can develop their resources in a far less environmentally sound manner than Canada” and emphasizes Canada’s “unique position” to liberate China from its dependence on coal by supplying it “with clean fossil fuels like oil and liquefied natural gas.” This framing of China-Canada energy relations rearticulates the ethical oil and scientific oil discourses by
constructing Canada as an exceptional oil producer and China as a country in the need of oil.

The most interesting development of recent years has been the framing of China as Canada’s competitor in the realm of green development. For instance, Green Party MP Bruce Hyer (2014) warned his colleagues that “Communist China is eating [Canada’s] lunch on green technologies and green jobs.” According to him, “by refusing binding greenhouse gas targets, Red China has successfully trapped [Canada’s] Conservatives, all while Red China’s national bank is pouring capital into sustainable future energy technologies like solar and wind.” Hyer was not the only MP who compared Canada’s and China’s environmental policies and approach to the development of renewable energy resources. In fact, the Liberals were trying to swing the focus from China’s global quest for oil to China’s interest in clean energy and green technologies as early as in 2010 (e.g., Brison, 2010). These comparisons are connected to the dirty oil discourse and construct China as a wealthy and strong modern country yet still inferior in relation to Canada. Following the logic of these comparisons, Canada must rethink its relations with oil because even countries like China are getting ready for decarbonization of their economies.

While China’s experience with green technology serves merely a rhetorical function in the speeches of MPs, Canada’s leading China experts take the new developments in China’s approach to energy seriously. In 2016, Canada’s two major China-focused think-tanks, Asia Pacific Foundation (Vancouver, British Columbia) and China Institute (Edmonton, Alberta), published detailed surveys of China’s renewable energy and green technology market. Both reports give a high rating to the growth prospects of China’s clean energy sector and urge Canadian industry to engage with China. The analysis of the media
also indicates Canada’s growing interest in China’s new focus on decarbonization (e.g., Francis, 2015, Hussain, 2015; Morton, 2015).

In October 2015, Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party gained a victory in federal elections. As a former Canadian diplomat and Asia expert Philip Calvert (2018) puts it, “as a son of the man who established diplomatic relations with China, Trudeau brings a certain cachet, as well as a new level of enthusiasm and energy, to a relationship that is consistently difficult to manage” (p. 145). Back in 2013 Trudeau awkwardly expressed his admiration with China, stating that he respects China’s “basic dictatorship” for its ability to “turn [China’s] economy around on a dime” (CBC News, 2013). Once in power, Trudeau and the Liberal Party demonstrated that they wanted to revive and deepen China-Canada relations, correcting the diplomatic omissions of Harper’s government. However, as some observers have already noted (e.g., Calvert, 2018 and Mulroney, 2017), the Liberals’ fascination with a dynamic, innovative, growth-orientated, and competitive China has not been transformed yet into a clear and coherent strategy that could help them to reconcile political differences between China and Canada. As a result, China-Canada energy dialogue is gradually fading. While China’s investors slowly lost interest in Canada’s oil sands, China-Canada energy cooperation in the realm of clean and green energy did not increase.

5.3. The Chinese perspective on China-Canada energy dialogue

The legacy of Pierre Trudeau – the “old friend of Chinese people” (中国人民的老朋友) – still distinguishes Canada from the United States and the rest of the West, designated by China’s officials as “those countries” that see China as a threat. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs routinely praise Canada as a reliable and promising partner.
However, China does not seem to have a coherent Canada policy. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canada is in the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs that also includes Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the Pacific Islands. Overall, China’s Canada policy is associated with and in some cases subordinated to the logic of Sino-American relations. My dataset does not contain a single speech by China’s top officials where they provide a coherent definition of Canada or a comprehensible vision of China-Canada relations. Chinese and Canadian leaders exchange congratulatory notes, sign agreements, and joint declarations, yet in the past ten years, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping, and other China’s top officials have not delivered in Canada a speech that was labeled as “important” (重要讲话, zhòngyào jiǎnghuà). Consequently, relations with Canada are not essential for the Chinese. This is particularly evident in China’s discursive politics that surrounds China-Canada energy relations.

**China’s Canada policy and China’s construction of Canadian oil**

In the mid-2000s, Canada fell out of sight for the Chinese state. During the period of setbacks in the development of China-Canada bilateral relations associated with Harper’s hostile stance towards China, Canada was not present in China’s discursive politics of energy as a potential partner for energy cooperation. After the remarkable shift in Canada’s China policy in the late 2000s and the establishment of “strategic partnership” at China’s initiative in 2009 on the occasion of Hu Jintao’s visit to Canada (Paltie, 2009, p. 110), energy cooperation became one of the few highlights of China-Canada relations.

In the late 2000s and the early 2010s, paying homage to Canada’s resource wealth and praising Canada’s technological breakthroughs in the exploration of unconventional oil deposits, Chinese officials reproduced the discourses of energy superpower and scientific
oil (Liu, 2013; Zhang 2011, 2013; Wang, 2015). However, the discourse of ethical oil does not resonate well with Chinese discursive energy politics, where Middle Eastern oil is not stigmatized and liberal democracy is not seen as a key advantage of an oil supplier. For example, recognizing Canada as “the emerging energy superpower,” ambassador Zhang Junsai (2013a) concludes that North America has a “potential to become the new Middle East.” Following the logic of non-interference in the domestic affairs of their partners, Chinese officials never comment on Canada’s environmental challenges and Indigenous peoples’ concerns about the development of oil sands, and thus the dirty oil discourse also does not influence China’s construction of Canadian oil.

According to Chinese officials, China-Canada energy relations – as well as China’s energy relations with any other resource-rich country – are mutually beneficial and based on win-win cooperation. The key benefits to Canada, according to Chinese sources, are the opportunity to diversify its energy exports and attract new investment to oil sands, whereas China’s benefits are vaguely defined by referencing its growing energy consumption (Embassy of the PRC in Canada, 2006; Liu, 2012, Zhang, 2011, 2013; Wang, 2015). At the same time, if Chinese authorities indeed want NOCs to bring Canadian oil home, as many Canadians suspect, they never had officially admitted that. The Chinese never postulated sending Canadian oil across the Pacific to China as the goal of China-Canada energy dialogue and never identified oil supply security as a rationale for the cooperation. On the contrary, Chinese officials claim that Chinese investors “play by the rules of global competition” (Zhang, 2011) and their interest in Canada is driven by market incentives and the desire to learn from their Canadian counterparts (e.g., Liu, 2013; Zhang, 2011, 2013). In sum, in the framework of China’s discursive politics, China-Canada energy relations are
sustained by market rationales rather than security or geopolitical concerns and thus should
transcend political and ideological differences between the two countries. Importantly, in
China’s discourse of China-Canada relations the topic of energy cooperation is gradually
diminishing. In the mid-2010s, China’s representatives focus on trade rather than on the
further development of energy dialogue.

Research on China-Canada energy relations in China

The field of Canadian Studies in China is small. As of 2017, the Canadian Studies
Association of China has 94 members (International Council for Canadian Studies [ICCS],
2017), with a sizable number (87) of them also specializing in the field of American
Studies. Charles Burton (2009) argues that Chinese scholars who specialize on Canada
“tend to be weaker academic ‘second stringers’,” while “their stronger colleagues are more
inclined to go to the US on Fulbright Fellowships or to apply to become Nieman Fellows at
Harvard or comparable programs at ‘more important’ nations” (p. 16).

According to China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) Database, Chinese
academic journals published 26,653 articles on Canada between 2005 and 2016, in
comparison with 12,539 articles on Kazakhstan and 53,345 articles on Russia. The
analysis of Chinese publications on Canada’s politics and China-Canada relations (about 12
percent of all publications on Canada retrieved from CNKI Database) demonstrates a
strong correlation between the scholarly interest in Canada and the development of China-
Canada diplomacy. Firstly, Chinese scholarly interest in Canada peaked between 2006 and
2009, which correlates with the shifts in Canada’s China policy discussed in the previous

88 Retrieved on 24 May 2017, keywords “Canada” (加拿大), “Kazakhstan” (哈萨克斯坦), and “Russia” (俄罗斯).
section. Secondly, almost all publications explicitly focus on providing policy implications and suggestions for enhancing China-Canada relations. At the same time, however, Chinese research on Canadian politics is linked and often even subordinated to the discussion of the United States. Establishing the differences between Canada and the United States and highlighting that because of these differences Canada is more open to China than the United States, Chinese experts, nevertheless, identify Canada with the United States and approach Canada’s foreign policy as an extension of the United States’ foreign policy. Those trends are apparently expressed in Chinese scholarly discussion of Canada’s energy sector and China-Canada energy relations. The data also indicates that, when it comes to Canada, Chinese experts do not have a strong interest in energy because only less than 0.3 percent of publications focus on this topic (see Figure 22).

The way in which Chinese scholars framed Canadian oil between 2005 and 2016 echoes Canada’s energy superpower discourse. Chinese scholars described Canada as a reliable, predictable, and dependable partner for China’s NOCs. Even when the oil prices started to decline after 2008, decreasing the potential economic profitability of oil sands projects, Chinese experts were urging China’s NOCs to invest in the oil sands (e.g., Xue, 2009; Zhang, 2009; Cui, 2010). They wrote about the impressive potential of the oil sands as an energy source and predicted that Canada in future would be a player of consequence in international energy politics. Generally, they portray Canada not as one of “those countries” that see China as a threat but as an exceptional Western society that respects China’s developmental achievements. For example, some experts argue that Canada’s

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89 Retrieved on 24 May 2017, with keywords “Canada” (加拿大) and “energy cooperation” (能源合作). In comparison, 4% of publications on Russia (俄罗斯 and能源合作) and 2% of publications on Kazakhstan (哈萨克斯坦 and能源合作) focus on energy cooperation.
“spirit of multiculturalism” is reflected in its approach to international energy politics, and thus Canada will welcome China’s rise, seeing it as a contribution to a more diverse, balanced, and sustainable international energy system (e.g., Jin, 2008). In addition to this, many Chinese experts praise Canada’s consistent focus on pragmatic market-based international cooperation (e.g., Li and Gao, 2006; Xue, 2009; Wang, 2011; Lin, 2014). While portraying Canada as a Western country that is open for cooperation with China, they also point out that China’s NOCs face in Canada some “political constraints.” According to them, the major political constraint that hinders China-Canada energy dialogue is “the United States factor” (e.g., Hou, 2008; Jin, 2008; Xue, 2009; Cheng and Xie, 2012; Lin, 2014). Overall, these trends in the scholarly discussion of Canada and China-Canada energy cooperation highlight that the development of relations with Canada is not a priority to China and is located on the periphery of China’s international strategy.

**Figure 22. Chinese scholarship on “Energy Cooperation”: 2005-2016**
Chinese narrative of the Nexen-CNOOC takeover

In a sharp contrast to Canada, the Nexen-CNOOC deal was not a subject of public debates in China. The key Chinese media – *People’s Daily, China Daily*, and *Global Times* – covered the review of the deal initiated by Canadian government in short notes, providing only the most basic information about CNOOC’s struggles in Canada. At the end of 2012, *Xinhua News Agency* mentioned the deal in one short line in its annual top-ten list of international financial news (Zhang, 2012).

China’s industry experts portray the deal as one of the major achievements of China’s “going out” strategy. For example, Jin Huandong and Wu Mouyuan (2017), experts of the CNPC Economics and Technology Research Institute, describe the Nexen-CNOOC deal as a culmination of CNOOC’s overseas capital operations of the 2010s and a result of the “precious experience” gained by the company through the failed bid for the United States oil company Unocal in 2005 (p. 59). For Chinese officials, however, this episode in China-Canada relations seem to have a bitter aftertaste. Speaking at the Luncheon of *Alberta Oil* magazine a year after the Nexen-CNOOC deal was concluded, Ambassador Zhang Junsai (2013a)90 stressed that “people should have more objective and square perceptions of Chinese investments in Canada.” Zhang clarified the status of China’s NOCs, highlighting that

China is a market economy, and China’s state-owned enterprises, such as CNOOC, are independent market players, whose investments in Canada’s energy sector, just like in other countries, are sheer market-driven decisions. While investing here, they have made [a] due contribution to local employment, community development and fulfilled their social responsibilities.

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90 Zhang Junsai’s speech at the Luncheon of Alberta Oil Magazine in 2013 is a rare public expression of China’s official position on the Nexen-CNOOC deal. On all other occasions, China’s representatives refused to comment on Canada’s hesitation to authorize the deal (e.g., MFA of the PRC, 2012) or mentioned it casually (e.g., Liu, 2012, 2013).
He also pointed out that China-Canada energy dialogue is not possible without state-owned enterprises, “because almost all the big energy companies in China are SOEs, and those with clear strength in capital and technologies are also SOEs” and emphasized that this state of affairs is “determined by China’s system.” Further, Zhang addressed perceptions of China as a threat that came out during the discussion of Nexen-CNOOC deal:

Chinese investors did not come to Canada to grab this country’s wealth of resources. The major motive driving them here is to optimize the portfolio of their overseas investments and learn the best technology and management know-how, just like everyone else.

In conclusion, Zhang reinforced that “what China wants in its energy cooperation with Canada is nothing but a win-win scenario.”

5.4. Summary: China’s energy relations with the Global North

In the realm of energy relations, China becomes a negative Other for Canada, as Canada poses itself as an antagonistic opposite of China. The debates over the Nexen-CNOOC takeover in 2012 uncovered contradictions within Canada’s energy paradigm, accenting the dichotomies of “We” and “They” that punctuates Canadian discursive politics of energy. As a result, the outcome of the first noteworthy energy deal between China and Canada was securitization of China as a threat towards Canadian independence and sovereignty. Importantly, according to the dominant framing of China-Canada energy relations, by opening its strategic industry for China’s NOCs, Canada risks losing the ability to be itself (e.g., an international human rights advocate) and to intensify already existing domestic challenges that jeopardize its integrity (e.g., balancing oil production and environmental concerns). This supports securitization of oil in Canadian politics and,
subsequently, the reading of energy security through the prism of continental energy arrangements and zero-sum benefits.

The Chinese, for their part, do not see Canada as their key partner in the realm of energy. Canada is not included in China’s quest for the new Daqing. Notably, there is no evidence to suggest that the interest of China’s NOCs in Canada’s oil sector in the late 2000s and the early 2010s was motivated by the energy security concerns of China’s government. Particularly, the CNOOC’s takeover of Nexen in 2012 looks more as an attempt to demonstrate the desire and ability of NOCs and, more generally China, to engage with the West.

In the context of China-Canada relations, Canadian discursive politics of oil is almost exclusively focused on the control over the production of crude oil and the political power that comes with it. Supporters and critics of the development of China-Canada energy dialogue only sporadically mention the need of transportation infrastructure (e.g., pipelines or ports where oil tankers could stop and load crude oil) that would allow exporting Canadian oil to China. Similarly, only some Chinese observers consider potential difficulties in the transportation of Canadian oil. Importantly, both Canada’s and China’s energy discourses elide the fact that most of oil produced in Canada is heavy oil, heavier than shale oil or conventional crude. Refineries in the United States have spent billions of dollars configuring themselves to process the heavy oil coming from Alberta’s oil sands (Banerjee, 2012). It is not clear whether China’s NOCs will be willing to invest in refining Canadian heavy oil at home. Consequently, the whole discussion of China-Canada relations in the context of China’s energy security disregards some crucial material realities of energy production.
Overall, I argue that China-Canada energy relations in the early 2010s acted as a conduit through which perceptions of China as a threat found a voice in Canada. Several themes and adjectives relating to China recur in the debates: rising, expanding, powerful, unfair, untrustworthy, totalitarian, and communist. China has been positioned in opposition to Canada and actions of China’s NOCs were perceived to be aggressive. At the same time, Canada’s unpreparedness to develop energy relations with China exposed contradictions in its energy paradigm. Canada was not acting as an energy superpower that, as Stephen Harper (2012) was claiming, is “willing to sell its oil to people who want to buy its oil.” The perspective of China’s involvement in the development of oil sands challenged Canada’s identity of a unique oil producer. As a result, the idea of Canada emerging as a new energy superpower was overshadowed by the concerns that China’s NOCs will make Canadian oil dirtier than it has ever been and less ethical.

Official Chinese discourses portray China’s NOCs as determined to understand the global oil market and striving to acclimatize themselves to the accepted business practices. According to China’s official representatives and academics, China’s NOCs came to Canada to learn how to “go out” in the West and were willing to use the legitimate mechanisms of the international market. The evidence suggests that the main lesson that both China’s NOCs and China’s government learned in Canada is that they are not welcomed. In sum, while in Canada the Nexen-CNOOC takeover provoked an epic competition between diverse constructions of oil and punctuated Canada’s domestic discursive politics of energy, for the Chinese side it turned into a political issue rather than an energy issue.

Lu Shaye, the new Ambassador of China to Canada, is straightforward in demonstrating China’s frustration. As a case in point, answering the questions of Canadian journalists, Lu made it clear that Canada does not have much to offer Chinese investors
apart from Alberta’s oil sands and the controversies around the Nexen-CNOOC takeover have tainted the future of China-Canada energy dialogue:

Are [sic] there anything in Canada that can attract Chinese investors? Maybe oil sands, or some so-called advanced technologies. But several recent takeover cases seem to have gotten lots of criticism, which I think will make Chinese investors more prudent. With such a low international oil price, oil sands probably has [sic] no much attraction to Chinese investors. As for some still relatively advanced technologies and products, if encountered with too many obstacles, Chinese investors will also lose their interests, leaving those technologies less valuable in a few years. (MFA of the PRC, 2017)

Lu’s statements⁹¹ are markedly different in the tone and emphasis from his predecessors.

We are yet to see what China’s new assertiveness will bring into China-Canada relations.

As for now, it seems that China moved Canada to the very periphery of its energy strategy.

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⁹¹ As it is evident from Lu’s latest statements (e.g., Embassy of the PRC in Canada, 2018a, 2018b), China frustration with the challenges that Chinese investors face in Canada is growing. The latest source of China’s grievance is the construction sector. In May 2018, Canada’s government blocked on national security grounds a $1.2 billion deal in which China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) would have acquired a Canadian construction firm Aecon.
Conclusion

At the heart of my research is an interest in the nexus between politics and sociocultural contexts in international energy politics. My dissertation explored this nexus by drawing on the development of bilateral energy relations between China and three oil-rich countries – Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia. The goal of my research project was to challenge conventional assumptions about energy politics and, particularly, China’s global quest for oil by demonstrating how energy resources become ideas and how these ideas are mobilized in the realm of international relations. Firstly, I sought to offer a nuanced, dynamic, and diverse picture of international energy politics and China’s participation in it. Secondly, I wanted to show that mainstream IR theories are too limited in their analytical scope and thus not able to explain the complex nature of energy relations.

Key findings

At the core of China’s energy paradigm is the notion of development. The availability of energy resources, and specifically fossil fuels, is instrumentalized as a prerequisite for development. Importantly, China’s energy paradigm defines energy development as a right of every nation. Hence, the global distribution of energy resources is neither a purely economic issue nor a security issue but first and foremost a matter of international politics. China’s official energy discourses emphasize the fundamental and persistent inequality of the current world order and, using it as a starting point, calls for reducing the gap between the Global North and the Global South.

Accordingly, the focus of China’s concept of energy security is development, and thus its definition corresponds with the concept of development that in the mid-2000s was encapsulated in the aspiration for “harmonious society/world” and “China’s peaceful rise.”
Following the new development strategy, China’s energy paradigm broadened, and now the concept of energy security includes sustainable and environmentally conscious development. In addition to it, the concept of energy security began to internationalize and, as a result, energy deficit became more politicized. Politicization of energy deficit presupposes that distribution of energy resources should be regulated by binding international rules and regulations. It also implies that international energy relations can and should be a positive-sum game.

On the domestic level, however, China’s official discourses associate the deficit of energy with the reliability of oil supply, and thus oil remains securitized. As was the case sixty years ago, China treats the deficit of oil as an existential threat to its national development and a source of dangerous security vulnerabilities. Therefore, China’s oil strategy on the domestic level is defined as the quest for a new Daqing.

In sum, China’s energy paradigm is bifurcated: while on the global/ international level the energy deficit is now politicized, on the domestic/national level it remains largely securitized. China actively promotes a cooperative mode of energy development on the international level and does not call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with energy deficit, yet, when it comes to oil, China still does not rush to trade its self-reliance for interdependency.

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, “win-win” is the most frequently repeated epithet for “cooperation” in China’s energy discourse. China frames its relations with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada as mutually beneficial and based on common developmental goals. The balance of interdependence in the relations between China and these oil-rich countries is assumed to be created and sustained by market incentives that transcend political and
ideological differences. Building relations with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada, China aspires to become their strategic business partner and trusted friend. The three cases demonstrate that China is determined to desecuritize energy and separate its cooperation with oil-rich countries from geopolitics.

At the same time, China is becoming more assertive and sensitive to the allegations of neocolonialism and to the doubts about its peaceful intentions. When Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, he announced that China is dreaming about the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” By the middle of the 21st century, Xi (2017a) asserts, China will have become “a global leader in terms of comprehensive national power and international influence” (p. 9). Consequently, Xi offers China as a model for other developing nations, demonstrating extreme confidence in China’s achievements during the past two decades and in the superiority of China’s development, compared to both the Global North and the Global South. This growing confidence transfers into China’s energy policy-making on the international level. Under Xi’s leadership, we see China seeking not only to build an “overseas Daqing” but also striving to be recognized as a new trendsetter and a global player of consequence in international energy politics.

The analysis of China’s bilateral energy relations with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada also reveals a lot about the ways discursive politics of energy influence foreign policy and international strategies of petrostates. In these discourses, Russia is a former empire recovering after a collapse and seeking revenge. Kazakhstan is a young post-colonial state. While its geopolitical position in the international system is uncertain, Kazakhstan can be safely identified as a part of the Global South. In contrast, Canada is a
well-established part of the Global North. As much as these three states seem to be different from each other, they are significant net oil exporters and share the identity of an oil-rich country. As the analysis of their discursive politics of energy demonstrates, they all instrumentalize oil as a source of liveliness, national development, sovereignty, independence, and power. At the same time, notwithstanding their obsession with oil, they do not consider themselves petrostates. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada securitize the energy sector, and their energy diplomacy is heavily affected by the dominant dichotomies of “we” and “they.”

China is “they” for Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada. All three countries see China striving to control their energy sector and, subsequently, as a threat to their sovereignty in the realm of international energy politics, which is key to their sense of identity. As a result, all three states do not consider China as a priority partner. Overall, Russia’s, Kazakhstan’s, and Canada’s energy cooperation with China simultaneously exposes contradictions within their energy paradigms and acts as a conduit through which perceptions of China as a threat find a stronger voice.

In sum, my study shows that external energy strategies of China and its energy-rich counterparts are crucially dependent on their discursive politics of energy. Hence, the work of building collaborative and constructive energy relations with China, its partners in Canada, Kazakhstan, Russia, and elsewhere must consider not only material realities of China’s energy industry (e.g., the amount of energy resources available in China, its mining, refining, and storage capacity, and the existing and planned transportation routes) and institutional settings of China’s energy policy (e.g., China’s legal frameworks and the structure of China’s energy government), but also multiple symbolic meanings that energy
resources acquire in China. Likewise, my best advice to China’s representatives is to be conscious about the way China is perceived in other states and take the world of words and ideas as seriously as the world of pumpjacks, pipelines, tankers, price charts, and long supply chains.

**Theoretical implications**

My study reveals that the commonly used concept of energy security lacks explanatory power. The notions of security and insecurity in energy politics are contextual. Focusing on the social logic of energy relations, I move beyond the concept of energy security and the dichotomy of conflict and cooperation reproduced through the dialogue between realist and liberal IR approaches.

My analysis focuses on discourses and their constitutive role in the development of relations between states. I develop a constructivist conceptual framework and adopt the poststructuralist discourse analysis methodology designed by Lene Hansen (2006). As a result, I demonstrate how the material realities of energy acquire their meanings in the process of narrative-making and discursive symbolization. Social context, intersubjective meanings, and identities acquire characteristics of explanatory variables. The concept of energy paradigm links national discursive politics of energy to the practice of international relations and hence becomes a constructivist roadmap to relations between exporters and importers.

I use textual documents and diverse cultural artifacts (e.g., works of fiction, popular song lyrics, paintings, photographs, films, museum exhibits, and architecture), to map and elucidate the development of discursive politics of energy in four different countries. My research is trilingual, with textual documents in Chinese, English, and Russian being the
major sources of data. I take language seriously and explore its power to construct social reality. Moreover, I show that diverse competing discourses about extraction, production, and consumption of energy and redistribution of energy revenues emerge and disseminate themselves through different forms of visual art, popular entertainment, architecture and city planning, museums, cultural spaces, and other sociocultural structures and practices. This allows me not only to advance the nuanced understanding of official discourses of energy but also to unravel critical discourses about economic, environmental, social, and political impacts associated with the expansion of the energy industry and the increase of energy exports.

Overall, my study is a valuable theoretical and methodological addition to the study of energy politics in the realm of IR. It also makes a strong contribution to the literature critical of mainstream IR approaches and helps to further promote discourse analysis as a methodology for studies of international relations.

Limitations and directions for future research

Four directions for future research are most apparent. Firstly, my study concerns itself with the underexamined topic of oil, and thus it only superficially covered discourses related to decarbonization and energy transition. A study of discursive politics of energy with a focus on renewable resources (e.g., biomass, hydropower, geothermal, wind, and solar) would offer important and valuable insights into the current state of international energy politics and likely would also allow us a glimpse into its future. Moreover, the analytical scope of my study is defined by its emphasis on the states. Accordingly, the next logical step is to have a closer look at the energy discourses produced by various actors
within the state (from NOCs to the CEOs of private refineries) and diverse transnational actors.

Secondly, while China’s energy relations with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada are a fertile source for the analysis of China’s discursive politics of energy, these cases allow covering only one side of it. An examination of the recent examples of China’s engagement with international institutions on energy-related issues, therefore, would help to show how China’s energy discourses evolve to represent the latest shifts in China’s foreign policy strategy (e.g., China’s foreign policy-making on climate change) and power realignments in the international energy politics in general (e.g., the United States withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and Xi Jinping’s determination to “strive for achievement” in international affairs).

The third direction involves a study of complex issues related to political legitimacy and national branding. My analysis of Russia’s energy politics reveals the discursive constructions that are essential to the way Putin’s regime has been actively positioning Russia as an antagonist to the West on both domestic and international levels (this idea is further developed in Kuteleva 2018). The case of Kazakhstan demonstrates that Kazakhstan’s energy paradigm is subordinated to the discursive politics that sustains and legitimizes Nazarbayev’s authoritarian rule. In this sense, a critical examination of the evolution, transformation, and limits of Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s official discursive politics of energy would be fruitful for a more nuanced understanding of domestic practices and strategies of nation branding adopted by the ruling regimes. Importantly, the conflict between the discourse of energy superpower and the discourse of raw-material appendage exposes fractures in Putin’s and Nazarbayev’s ideologies, pointing out to new possibilities
for the emergence of strong counter-hegemonic discourses that will challenge the legitimacy of their regimes. As for Canada, a more detailed and nuanced study of Canada’s discursive politics of energy would offer valuable insights into interprovincial relations and open new perspectives on the relations between Canada and Indigenous peoples.

Finally, as a constructivist and somewhat critical student of international relations, I was struck by the fact that the discursive politics of energy reinscribes the wide varieties of masculinist hierarchies. In China, the official discussion of energy poverty and the quest for energy efficiency never considers gendered energy usage and pollution. In Russia, the aggressive expressions of the energy superpower discourse in Russia’s diplomacy are linked to Putin’s masculinity cult. Doing the fieldwork in Kazakhstan, I witnessed many examples of structural and institutionalized gender discrimination that left me wondering whether the disempowerment of Kazakhstani women is connected to or affected by the dominance of the energy sector in Kazakhstan’s economy. In Canada, female characters are stereotyped, objectified, and exploited by the supporters of the ethical oil discourse, which co-opts and undermines the political nature of women’s rights and feminist concepts. Lastly, in all four countries that I studied, women’s experiences were absent in the dominant narratives of the oil industry development. On illustrations to newspaper articles about oil, at the oil museums, and in the documentaries about oil I saw men digging, drilling, and squeezing out the oil, as well as men smiling and shaking hands over the signed international contracts. I hardly can find two dozen texts in my dataset that are produced by women. In other words, it seems that the world of oil belongs to men. While I am not sure how exactly we should study the women-oil nexus in the realm of international energy
relations, I am confident that this nexus deserves more attention from scholars in the fields of politics, International Relations, and political economy.

This research project was challenging and extremely rewarding. The experience and new knowledge that I gained affected my view of the aims and methods of the discipline of political science. As a way of concluding, I want to summarize the major lessons that I have learned as a political scientist throughout this research project. First, diversity is beautiful and exciting. The diversity of ideas about energy inspired me to pursue this study, and further this diversity became an essential source of creativity and established an exigency for critical thinking. We should celebrate differences rather than try to neutralize them. In the world suffering from multiple social breakdowns and divided by political polarity, an appreciation for diversity will challenge us to search for new paths towards compromise and cooperation. Second, traveling across different languages, cultures, and countries, I encountered a great variety of politics, practices, types, and modes of knowledge production. I believe that by creating, reproducing, preserving, sharing, and celebrating knowledge we can embrace diversity and help other people to do so as well. This is the only way how we can learn and teach others to accept and respect political and sociocultural norms distinct from our own. Finally, we indeed live in the “world of our making,” and this world, to a large extent, is talked into being. We must acknowledge that language is political and recognize its power to shape our lives and the lives of others. I hope my work will inspire both scholars and practitioners to take the constitutive power of language seriously and reflect on how the language they use influences the way they study and practice politics.
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