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The Status of Aesthetics in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

by

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For my wife, Maryam

Abstract

Drawing upon Marie McGinn's non-metaphysical interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus,* this thesis attempts to make a connection between the book's opening and ending remarks. I argue that McGinn's non-metaphysical reading helps us, more than the metaphysical reading, to make a consistent connection between the opening remarks about the world and the ending remarks about the mystical and the status of aesthetics. The preliminary remarks, according to McGinn's interpretation, offer a description of the logical order or form of language rather than presenting a metaphysical theory about the features of a reality prior to language. Espousing McGinn's reading, I argue that what Wittgenstein passes over in silence in the ending remarks is what he does not discuss in the opening remarks. It is the world seen from a different—non-logical or aesthetic—viewpoint, which is essentially different from the logical form of language or the world, or the showable through language.

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It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

(*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.421)

Chapter One

Ontology or "Logical Order" of Language?

Opening Remarks in the *Tractatus*

Introduction: The opening and ending remarks in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* have probably been the most controversial remarks in the whole book for commentators and interpreters. Wittgenstein begins with metaphysical sounding statements about the world as a whole, such as the very first: "1. The World is all that is the case", and "[t]he world is the totality of facts, not of things" and "divides into facts" (See *TLP*, 1-1.2). The ending remarks start with 6.4 in which he announces that "[a]ll propositions are of equal value", going one with his claim about the oneness as well as inexpressibility of ethics and aesthetics (*TLP*, 6.421), what "the mystical" and seeing "the world as a whole" is (TLP, 6.44-6.45, 6.522), the best method in philosophy and the status of his own propositions in the *Tractatus* (*TLP*, 6.53-6.54) and concluding with 7: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence". The remarks occupy an important role in the book so that different treatments of these remarks have given rise to quite different interpretations of the whole Tractarian project. While the opening remarks contain Wittgenstein's exploration of his treatment of the world, objects, and substance (or form) of the world, i.e., what appears to many as metaphysical talk, the ending remarks address the status of the opening propositions. They also include what Wittgenstein thinks of the status of propositions in different fields of philosophy such as ethics and aesthetics. As

later explained in this chapter, the main readings of the book are based on different understandings of the status of the opening remarks as well as different interpretations of the ending remarks in which Wittgenstein seeks to demonstrate what he thinks is the best method in philosophy and reject any kind of metaphysical talk in philosophy.

In this chapter, while introducing the main extant readings of the opening remarks, I defend the reading I find more consistent with what can be seen as Wittgenstein's main task in his early philosophy, that is to reveal the essence of language. The interpretation is offered by McGinn in her book on the *Tractatus* (McGinn, 2006). While drawing upon previous interpretations, McGinn also judiciously criticizes them for their common problem, i.e., their metaphysical reading of the opening remarks.

In Chapter Two, I introduce different interpretations of the ending remarks, particularly of the remarks about ethics/aesthetics and existence of the world, as well as discussing the main ways of connecting them to similar remarks in other earlier writings of Wittgenstein. I attempt to show that almost all of the interpretations of the ending remarks have been influenced by the metaphysical reading of the opening remarks, which, I argue, is the reason why these readings have, in some way or other, linked Wittgenstein's talk of "the mystical", which is "not *how* things are in the world [. . .] but *that* it exists" (*TLP*, 6.44), to his remarks in the opening part of the book, Chapter Three, mostly drawing upon McGinn's reading of the *Tractatus*, will attempt to challenge the above mentioned dominant way of connecting the ending remarks to opening ones.

♦♦♦

This chapter pursues two main goals. First, it compares three important interpretations of Wittgenstein's early philosophy[1] and in particular the opening remarks of his *Tractatus*. Second, I attempt to provide a brief account of Wittgenstein's main lines of thought in the *Tractatus*, focusing on his treatment of reality and language, the world of facts, and his approach to "objects" and their ontological status. These two goals are pursued together as the second objective is to be achieved through the fulfilment of the first one. This interrelation of the opening remarks with the whole Tractarian project requires that I talk about many important issues in his early philosophy that may initially seem to be irrelevant to our topic here but will eventually prove as essential to the purpose of the thesis. These issues, which are the main topics in Wittgenstein's early philosophy, include his notion of facts, propositions, logic, the logical or pictorial form of the proposition and the mechanism by which he believes language works to picture the world. With this general picture of his early philosophy in mind, we will be able to better understand Wittgenstein's notion of object. Furthermore, the picture will contribute towards the requirements of the following chapters since I attempt to defend a way of connecting the opening and ending remarks in the *Tractatus*. As seen in the next chapters, understanding Wittgenstein's conception of the artistic object or seeing the world as a whole or what he deems as the

[1] Wittgenstein is known as a philosopher with two commonly recognized stages of thought: the early and the late. My thesis focuses on the early Wittgenstein, i.e., the writer of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Late Wittgenstein, the writer of *Philosophical Investigations*, took revolutionary steps in critiquing his early work as well as other similar philosophies of the time.

aesthetic/ethical, would be impossible without a good understanding of his whole early philosophical project.

After introducing three interpretations of the opening remarks of the *Tractatus*, I adopt one, and attempt to show why this particular understanding of the *Tractatus,* which I deem as *non-metaphysical*, can give us a more correct picture of what the book and in particular its preliminary apparently metaphysical remarks try to convey. The non-metaphysical reading of the *Tractatus*, as discussed in the final chapter, is more consistent with my understanding of the ending remarks of the *Tractatus* and similar ones in the *Notebooks* on the ethical and aesthetic and facilitates the understanding of those final remarks. These different interpretations of the opening remarks in the *Tractatus* are based on different readings of the whole book and they, in a sense, lead to radically different understandings of the meaning of some parts of the work.

Since the publication of the *Tractatus,* different parts of Wittgenstein's early philosophy have raised various controversies. One of the most controversial sections of the book is probably its opening remarks, including a debate over Wittgenstein's approach to the world and its components and the existence or non-existence of simples or objects. This issue is itself part of a bigger problem in the *Tractatus* on how to interpret the "apparently" metaphysical or ontological remarks, mostly appearing early in the book. The opening remarks start with a description of "the world" and what it divides into, i.e., facts, their structure and components:

1 The world is all that is the case.

1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.

1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.

1.2 The world divides into facts.

2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs. (TLP, 1-2.11).

It goes on with an analysis of objects, offering an argument for the persistence of objects and the necessity of the world's having a substance:

2.02 Objects are simple.

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.

2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.

2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false).

2.024 Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs. (*TLP*, 2.02-2.0272)

The controversy over how to interpret the remarks may be a result of a common belief among *Tractatus* commentators that "the initial of the book cannot be taken to be as straightforward as they may look at first sight" (Sluga, 2011: 25). Regardless of some subdivisions in each interpretation, the commentators can be divided into three main groups.

The first group are those who believe that there is a real metaphysics in the *Tractatus* by which the author justifies an ontological-metaphysical account of the world and its structure and supports the idea of the existence of simple objects in the world and seeks to base the picturing function of language upon his metaphysical view. According to this interpretation, which is suggested by several commentators (see, e.g., Anscombe, 1971; Hacker, 2005; Pears, 1987; Black, 1964; Hintikka, 2000; Sluga, 2011), Wittgenstein founds his picture theory or his view of how language represents reality on a metaphysical world that exists out there independent of its representational relation with language.

According to this reading of the *Tractatus*, the book not only offers a metaphysics in its opening remarks but also this metaphysics acts as the most essential condition for the existence of language or any system of representation. Pears believes that in the *Tractatus*, "the underlying structure of reality" is "a kind of grid of possible states of affairs with objects and the nodal points", and more importantly, the nature of these objects play an essential role in determining "the way in which the grid is put together" (Pears, 1987: 6). Pears explains the

differences between Wittgenstein's metaphysics and Schopenhauer's metaphysics by pointing out that unlike Schopenhauer "Wittgenstein is only concerned with the phenomenal world" and never speculates or says anything about "a world behind the phenomena" (Pears, 1987: 6); however, he understands Wittgenstein's world as one prior to language and believes that the world described in the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* has not passed through the filter of logic and language, and is the fundamental underlying condition required for language to work properly, i.e. to picture what it depicts.

In this reading of the *Tractatus*, what Wittgenstein calls the unsayable, i.e., what cannot be expressed in language, is the very metaphysics or any talk about the nature of reality, which Pears describes as "the fundamental condition of" language's existence (Pears, 1987: 7). The impossibility of saying anything about the conditions of meaningfulness of a language is a necessary impossibility, because otherwise we would require an infinite number of layers of conditions of meaningfulness for the usage an infinite number of metaphysical expressions in language. As Pears puts it,"[I]f factual language could contain an analysis of the conditions of its own application, the language in which it analysed them would itself depend on further conditions, which would itself remain to be analysed, and so on to infinity" (Pears, 1987: 7).

According to this reading of the *Tractatus*, language manages to depict the reality or the world easily, but what it cannot depict in any possible ways is the very thing that makes this depiction possible, i.e., the underlying structure of reality. Heeding this point is essentially important in reading the metaphysical

claim that what makes depiction possible is *outside* logic and language, although it appears to be a phenomenal world that exists prior to and underlies language or any representational system. Therefore, in its deepest layers, language "is founded on the intrinsic nature of objects" (Pears, 1987: 8). Putting the "intrinsic nature of things" or the metaphysical status of objects into words is impossible, and this impossibility is Wittgenstein's reason for inviting or commanding us to pass the issues over in "silence" (*TLP*, 7)[2]. Although the "metaphysical statements" of the *Tractatus*, as Pears says, lack "semantic success", they are treated with respect in the main body of the book. So, on one hand, they are a ladder we need to climb up to see the world aright, but on the other hand they do not gain any semantic success because the metaphysician, here Wittgenstein, has "failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions" (*TLP*, 6.53). As Sluga puts it, the picture of the world metaphysical statements "seek to describe is in conflict with the logic of our language" (Sluga, 2011: 43).

Although what must be passed over in silence, i.e., the metaphysical account of the world, cannot be expressed in language, it is *present* in all our linguistic expressions in a way that "in all our operations with language we are really running on fixed rails laid down in reality before we even appeared on the scene" (Pears, 1987: 10). According to this reading of the *Tractatus*, in his opening remarks Wittgenstein describes a reality prior to language or the intrinsic nature of objects, a reality that can "take over complete control and determine the correct use" of language, and therefore in any system of representation "the

[2] The references to the *Tractatus* (TLP) are based on the number of propositions not pages.

structure of the fundamental grid will inexorably dictate the general structure of the logical system" (Pears, 1987: 10).

Any talk of the structure of such a fundamental grid leads to nonsense because for Wittgenstein the only meaningful propositions are those of natural science (*TLP*, 6.53). However, we must acknowledge that committing nonsense, at least for once, is necessary before we can see the world aright and the world's fundamental structure as the essential condition of the sense of the language. Therefore, Wittgenstein's main reason and goal for having written the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* and his treatments of objects and the substance and the essence of the world is to *show* us this underlying structure that makes depiction possible. For Max Black, as a proponent of the standard reading, and as one who thinks there is a necessity of there being a particular ontology for language to work properly (i.e. to represent), this underlying structure, or the world's essence, is the "subject-matter of metaphysics" and "displays regularity, coherence, necessary connexion" and is contrasted with the realm of facts or the empirical "where all is plurality, separation, and what Wittgenstein calls 'accident'" (Black, 1964: 10). Later in this chapter we will discuss Wittgenstein's argument for substance to show how the metaphysical reading more or less fails to trace the main project of the *Tractatus*.

But what is the significance of this interpretation of the opening remarks for us? For these commentators——who read *Tractatus* as a metaphysical-logical analysis of language/reality——the analysis of the language must go deep down until the factual statements or ordinary propositions are analyzed into elementary

propositions in which simple objects are named (See Pears, 1987: 27). In other words, the level of complete analysis is pushed "downwards until there are no underlying facts left, but *only objects devoid of internal structure*" (Pears, 1987: 27, emphasis added). What makes possible this access to objects devoid of their internal structure is that in Wittgenstein's logical analysis, according to Pears, there is a level in which words "designate things devoid of internal structure" (Pears, 1987: 63). In a sense, the ultimate structure of the world is attained and accessible in this complete analysis. This structure constitutes of simple objects which are like "pivots on which all factual discourse turns" (Pears, 1987: 27). This, according to such commentators, is the connection of logic to the world for Wittgenstein: "logic reveals the structure imposed on all factual discourse by the ultimate structure of reality" (ibid).

We see that in this reading of the opening remarks, the underlying structure of the world, which is prior to language and "is a grid with simple objects at its nodal points" (Pears, 1987: 28), determines the essential structure of language. Even tautologies exist because of the ultimate structure of reality. Without this fundamental structure, language would even lack tautologies' "making the outline of its structure" (ibid). Hence, it is not the essence of the language in itself that gives us tautologies as necessary truths but it is the very ultimate structure of reality that "forces us to speak a language that generates tautologies" (Pears, 1987: 28). It must be noted that what occurs in the complete analysis is a movement from language towards the ultimate structure. For example Pears does not see Wittgenstein's logical atomism as a version of

empiricism. He believes that Wittgenstein's journey from meaningful factual sentences to the existence of "an underlying grid of elementary possibilities with simple objects at the nodal points" is a priori and does not involve in any empirical observation.

Ascribing an ontological status to the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* is not peculiar to the interpretation explained above. A second group of interpreters who think that the whole *Tractatus* endorses an anti-metaphysical view also reads the opening remarks as a metaphysical description of the world and its underlying structure. Unlike the first group of interpreters who thought the Tractarian metaphysics is shown by our using language and propositions but cannot be *said*, the second group argues that the purpose of the *Tractatus* is to *elucidate* that what cannot be said eventually is really nothing. So, the *Tractatus* must be eventually read as an anti-metaphysical text in such a way that it first sets up a traditionally ontological treatment of reality and then announces that all these ways of speaking are nonsense. This interpretation is offered and strongly supported by Cora Diamond and James Conant (Diamond, 1991 and Conant, 2002) who try to solve what they think is a problematic section in the *Tractatus*, i.e. its preliminary metaphysical remarks, which do not fit the whole work and the main thesis of the book, namely, its anti-metaphysical suggestion at the end of the book.

Pointing to the showing/saying distinction in the *Tractatus*, Diamond claims that there are two ways of encountering Wittgenstein's early philosophy: "chickening out" and "not chickening out" (Diamond, 1991: 181). To say that there is such a thing like *the logical form of reality* that is the essential feature of

reality but cannot be put into words and can only be shown is the reading that does not consider the situation after the ladder is thrown away (*TLP*, 6.54). Diamond's question is “How can *Tractatus* according to this reading save what it has gained at the end?” Or " What exactly is supposed to be left of that, after we have thrown away the ladder? Are we going to keep the idea that there is something or other in reality that we gesture at, however badly, when we speak of "the logical form of reality", so that it, what we were gesturing at, is there but cannot be expressed in words?" (Diamond, 1991: 181) Diamond thinks that the first group's answer to this question is yes, hence their "chickening out". But what is her own approach? According to her, "[w]hat counts as not chickening out is then this, roughly: to throw the ladder away is, among other things, to throw away in the end the attempt to take seriously the language of 'features of reality'." (ibid) In her view, talking of this "essential feature of reality" that is fundamental and makes possible the depiction of language is "plain nonsense". To announce this means not chickening out:

> To read Wittgenstein himself as not chickening out is to say that it is not, not really, his view that there are features of reality that cannot be put into words but show themselves. What is his view is that that way of talking may be useful or even for a time essential, but it is in the end to be let go of and honestly taken to be real nonsense, plain nonsense, which we are not in the end to think of as corresponding to an ineffable truth. (Diamond, 1991: 181)

A similar criticism of the metaphysical reading of the opening remarks can also be seen in James Conant's works. In "Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein" (Conant, 2000), for instance, he asserts that unlike Frege who suggests in his "On Concept and Object" that there are things of which we cannot speak but can be elucidated, Wittgenstein attempts to show us in his *Tractatus* that what he tries to elucidate at the beginning turns out to be nothing at the end—–that it has been indeed nothing from the very beginning.

For Conant, to grasp Wittgenstein's method in the *Tractatus*, one must understand the difference between "elucidation" and "nonsense", a difference that in Conant's view collapses before the book ends and the two concepts dissolve into, and become, one and the same (Conant, 2000: 176-7). But, what is "elucidation"? Conant wants us to learn the term in the way Wittgenstein teaches us. According to Conant, Wittgenstein opposes "elucidation" to "theorizing" in philosophy, and thinks that the philosophy as such "consists essentially of elucidations"; it is an activity not "a body of doctrine" (*TLP*, 4.112). Conant does not hesitate to link Wittgenstein's conception of good philosophy as elucidation in 4.112 to what comes later as an explanation of the term in 6.54. In the latter remark, Wittgenstein deems elucidatory propositions to be eventually nonsensical: "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)" (*TLP*, 6.54).

According to Conant, then, what is called unsayable and thus only showable through the use of language in the first interpretation of the *Tractatus* (what Conant calls the "ineffability reading") is nothing but an incomplete Wittgensteinian ladder climbing. To fulfil the task of philosophy, metaphorically described by Wittgenstein as climbing up the ladder, requires one to displace the substantial conception of nonsense with what he deems an austere conception of nonsense. Conant suggests that the substantial conception of nonsense tries to make a distinction between mere nonsense that "is simply unintelligible" because "it expresses no thought" and substantial nonsense which is logically incoherent but "is composed of intelligible ingredients" (Conant, 2000: 176). We will return to Conant's articulation of his criticisms of the ineffability interpretation later; before that, however, we need to learn more about Conant's argument for the sameness of apparently different kinds of nonsense.

According to Conant, although Wittgenstein apparently needs a substantial conception of nonsense to write the *Tractatus*, at the end of the book we see that Wittgenstein is trying to make us aware that the reader must find the whole book as nonsense, that differentiating between types of nonsense would be impossible. Therefore, what in the first interpretation of the *Tractatus* was accompanying the substantial conception of nonsense, i.e. elucidation as *showing* something which cannot be said, in Conant's new perspective "is to show that we are prone to an illusion of meaning something when we mean *nothing*" (Conant, 2000: 177. emphasis added). We, as it were, will notice that illuminating nonsense will make us see one important fact, namely that the elucidatory propositions are nonsensical

themselves. So, the main problem Conant sees in the metaphysical interpretation of the *Tractatus* is not with how it deals with reading the opening remarks; both interpretations think that these opening propositions are attempts to reveal the nature of reality. In particular, the metaphysical reading asserts that what can be described in language is the way things stand in the world, and that the structure of the world or various possibilities of the combination of objects in possible situations cannot be described or expressed in language, but are instead mirrored and manifested in possible ways in which names are combined in meaningful propositions. Conant and Diamond, however, think that the belief that language can "'hint' at what it cannot say" (Conant, 2000: 177) does not fit well with the philosophical assumptions of the *Tractatus*. He challenges the assumption that even though language does not possess the power to express a series of *thoughts*, it nonetheless can convey them in some way.

The distinction Wittgenstein draws between sign and symbol helps Conant to make his point on this issue more vigorously. A sign is a written or spoken thing perceivable by the senses. The printed lines on the pages of a book, for instance, are all signs. They could be meaningful if they symbolize something, that is, are symbols besides their being merely signs. For Wittgenstein, a symbol (or expression) is what "characterizes" the sense of a proposition (*TLP*, 3.31). So, if "[a]n expression presupposes the forms of all the propositions in which it can occur" (*TLP*, 3.311) and "is therefore presented by means of the general form of the propositions that it characterizes" (*TLP*, 3.312), and if "[t]o give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of

the world" (*TLP*, 5.4711), then what Wittgensteinian logical analysis deals with to reveal the essence of the world are symbols not signs.

As an example, the shape "is" is only a sign (a written or sound sign) that can be perceived by the senses and is what Conant calls a "sign design". Depending on which logical unit "is" refers to in different types of propositions, it may be used to signify different symbols. "Is" can symbolize such logical units as the copula, identity and co-extensionality. So, "is" as a copula-symbol is different from "is" as an identity-symbol or "is" as a symbol of co-extensionality. Different symbols affect the logical syntax of the propositions in different ways. This difference between sign and symbol helps Wittgenstein to show us that in the language of everyday life it is often the case that "the same word [or sign] signifies" in different ways (*TLP*, 3.323). Ordinary language must be analyzed until the symbols stand out so that no vagueness or even error remains. Nonsense occurs where the logical syntax of language is violated and as a result the statements and their signs fail to symbolize.

So, both of these readings of the *Tractatus*, i.e., that which Conant calls the standard reading as well as his own anti-metaphysical account of the *Tractatus*, regard the beginning remarks as containing metaphysical treatments of the world. The first reading takes the opening remarks as thoughts that cannot be expressed but can be only shown and hinted at in language. According to this view, the opening remarks are illuminating statements, not factual ones. However, the latter reading deems as illusory the attribution of any extra role to language.

Finally, there is a third interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy and the opening remarks of the *Tractatus*. This interpretation, similar to the second one, finds its roots in its criticisms of the metaphysical readings of the *Tractatus*. An older version of this interpretation, which I refer to as the non-metaphysical reading of the *Tractatus*, was initially introduced, among others, by Peter Winch, Brian McGuiness, Rush Rhees and Hide Ishiguro, as a response to the metaphysical reading. A more recent version of the third interpretation has been endorsed by Marie McGinn in her book *Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Logic and Language* (McGinn, 2006) as well as in some of her related articles in which she attempts to find an alternative to both the first and second readings.[3] Although she uses some of the insights of the second interpretation, the third interpretation radically differs from the other two in its central thesis. According to this last interpretation, the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* are not metaphysical at all. They, as McGinn puts it, are not about "the essential structure of a transcendent reality" but an "articulation of logic, that is, the essence of depiction" (McGinn, 2006: 137). According to this reading, Wittgenstein does not suggest any metaphysical claims to justify the existence of the world either to ground the essence of the language or to show later that such an attempt is worthless because it leads to nonsense. Rather, he attempts to articulate the logic governing the way language depicts reality, not the existence of the reality in itself. McGinn writes:

[3] To read more on the roots of this reading of early Wittgenstein prior to McGinn's book, see Ishiguro (1969), Block (1981), McGuinness (2002: pp. 82-94) and Rhees (1970).

> The idea that we are getting outside the symbolism and saying something about its relation to a transcendent realm with an intrinsic structure is indeed an illusion, but the illusion lies in our taking what belongs to the logic of the language in which we express propositions that can be tested for truth or falsity, for substantial doctrine. (McGinn, 2006: 137)

But what kind of analysis does |Wittgenstein use to introduce us to the "features" or "structure" of the world and what kind of world/reality is his world/reality of the opening remarks if it is not a metaphysical one? While defending the third reading of the *Tractatus* and drawing upon many insights from the other readings, I argue that the world of the opening remarks can be viewed in a very different way from that which is depicted in previous interpretations. I aim to show that the world of the opening remarks is not prior to language but is a world articulated based on language and in particular the propositional form or the essence of language. As I argue, Wittgenstein does not presuppose the existence of a metaphysical world for his theory of language to work but only concludes from the essence of the language that there must be, as it were, a certain type of structure in the depicted, i.e. the world, if it is to be depicted by language. Before presenting the reading of the opening remarks I espouse , I introduce another context in which how to read the opening remarks would have a very significant role in determining Wittgenstein's own propositions and their status. In 6.53 Wittgenstein calls the propositions of the *Tractatus* "nonsensical" in a peculiar

sense of the word. How to read the opening remarks would be of high importance in understanding what he meant by "nonsensical" in his ending remarks.

In an article on Wittgenstein's method in the *Tractatus* (Conant, 2002), James Conant questions another distinction the first interpretation of the *Tractatus* tries to make between two types of nonsensical statements. According to the first interpretation, we must differentiate between "misleading nonsense" and "elucidatory nonsense". The propositions of the *Tractatus* and in particular the opening remarks are of the latter kind, that is, although they do not refer to anything in the world and utter nothing factual, they reveal the essence of the reality. In other words, they show or elucidate what cannot be said. Therefore, the purpose of the propositions in the *Tractatus* is partly to elucidate what is not sayable through factual language.

Yet, Conant aims to show us that although the *Tractatus* begins with such claims about reality and its structure, we eventually encounter the fact that Wittgenstein rejects his own metaphysical doctrines and indeed any kind of philosophy that seeks to build "a body of doctrine". For Wittgenstein, philosophy concerns elucidation and elucidation is not a way for expressing unsayable things but is rather an activity by which the philosopher illuminates philosophical problems in a way that what first seemed to be a philosophical problem turns out to be nothing but a result of propositions that contain meaningless signs (*TLP*, 6.53). Thus, according to Conant, for Wittgenstein, philosophy as practiced by philosophers who seek to set up theories or bodies of doctrines (like metaphysics) will only add to the "fundamental confusions" which "the whole of philosophy is

full of them" (*TLP*, 3.324). This is why, Conant thinks, Wittgenstein asks us to throw the ladder away after the philosophical activity we have gone through. The world is now seen "aright" (*TLP*, 6.54), not through a new series of philosophical doctrines, but by our coming to see that philosophical problems were posed because "the logic of our language [was] misunderstood" (*TLP*, Preface, 3). In short, the reader of the *Tractatus* must, as Conant puts it, "resolutely" accept the final thesis of the book that any attempt to say something metaphysical, including Wittgenstein's own ontological propositions in the opening remarks of the *Tractatus*, would lead to nonsense. For Conant, this means that from the beginning there was nothing that language was trying to show, rather than say, to us. The goal of the whole journey was, therefore, solely to share with the reader this insight concerning language. Conant, having noted a connection on this point between the early and the late Wittgenstein, explains it as follows:

> The *Tractatus* aims to show that (as Wittgenstein later puts it) "I cannot use language to get outside language" (Wittgenstein, 1975, §6). It accomplishes this aim by first encouraging me to suppose that I can use language in such a way and then enabling me to work through the (apparent) consequences of this (pseudo)supposition, until I reach the point at which my impression of there being a determinate supposition (whose consequences I have throughout been exploring) dissolves on me. (Conant, 2002: 421-2)

I agree with the resolute reading that Wittgenstein's claim of the nonsensicality of metaphysical talk must be taken seriously; however, I also suggest that the world

Wittgenstein introduces and describes in the preliminary statements of the *Tractatus* is not a metaphysical one if by metaphysical world we mean a world prior to language or any representational system. I want to claim that Wittgenstein's opening remarks do not present a metaphysics or what Max Black regards as "prior notions about what 'reality' is really like" (Black, 1964: 7), but are an attempt to complete the linguistic analysis which starts from language and is fulfilled *in* language too without going beyond it. Wittgenstein seeks to reveal the depictional relationship of logical pictures (i.e. propositions) with reality and thereby to make clear the limits of thoughts and finally provide us a way to show that metaphysics—as well as ethics and aesthetics—are nonsensical and cannot be put into words. The consequences of these claims will be of importance for us as they will prove that Wittgenstein's remarks on the subsistence of the objects, or his claim that "there must be objects" or "there must be an unalterable form or substance for the world," are not metaphysical theses about the nature of reality and consequently about the ontology of objects, but requirements of language and propositions for their sense to be determinate and so about the logical or pictorial form of our language rather than the ultimate metaphysical structure of reality. So, the metaphysical and anti-metaphysical reading of the opening remarks both consider Wittgenstein's argument for substance as his proof for the subsistence of metaphysically final entities in the world; the difference in their approach is, however, that while the former sees this as a truth that is revealed through elucidatory talk, the latter regards it as a part of a bigger picture Wittgenstein

draws but claims to be nonsensical at the end. The non-metaphysical reading, on the contrary, does not see the argument as metaphysical at all.

But what are the main claims in the opening remarks? Here, I render a brief account of these remarks, but later in this chapter I will discuss them in further detail. "The world is all that is the case" (*TLP*, 1) and what is the case is a fact, so "the world is the totality of facts" (*TLP*, 1.1). It is composed of, and divided into, "facts and not [. . .] things" (*TLP*, 1 & 1.2). What are the components of the world, i.e., the facts? Facts are states of affairs that exist in logical space. In other words, logical space is where the facts come together to build the world (*TLP*, 1.13) and these facts are "all the facts" (*TLP*, 1.11). A state of affairs is a combination of objects (*TLP*, 2.01); objects are simple and make up the substance of the world. (*TLP*, 2.02 ff.) So, although the world is divided into facts, it has a substance which is the totality of things. (The totality of facts makes the world and the totality of things makes up the substance of the world.) While facts are changeable and can be the case or not, the things are unalterable and only combinations of them are changeable.

As McGinn acknowledges, we cannot deny that the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* seem to "present a fundamental ontology that is held to be the foundation of our ability to picture the world in propositions" (McGinn, 2006: 136). However, the reading I espouse here seeks to interpret these remarks in line with Wittgenstein's description of language and propositions. Such a reading tries to show that to understand the opening remarks, one must first understand the book's central view of language, how language depicts reality, and what depiction

involves or what the requirements of depiction are. In this reading, propositions and what they depict, i.e., states of affairs, "stand in an internal relation to one another" (McGinn, 2006: 136). Therefore, the opening remarks reveal the structure of the world as one side of this relation, that is, as what is depicted. In other words, Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis wants to show us the mechanism of this relationship by saying that for the picture or proposition to depict, the reality it depicts must possess the same structure as the picture does; the logical constituents of a state of affairs must, in a sense, correspond to the logical constituents of the proposition that represents it (See McGinn, 2006: 156). Wittgenstein wants to make perspicuous how a proposition is located in a "system of representation that exists in a projective relation to the world" (ibid).

Hence, we must begin with *Tractatus*' conception of proposition. A proposition is a logical picture and logical picture is a picture "whose pictorial form is logical form" (*TLP*, 2.181). Logical form is the logical common pattern that is shared by all pictures that depict a particular state of affairs. The pictorial form or the logical common pattern is "essential to the projection of a picturing fact onto reality" (McGinn, 99). This means that without the logical form no picture can depict what it does. The logic of our language is also essential to what language does, namely, representing states of affairs. Wittgenstein's central aim in the *Tractatus* is to make perspicuous this essential logical form that is shared by all propositions: "There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all" (*TLP*, 2.161).[4] The

[4] G. H. von Wright, in a biographical article on Wittgenstein, reports how Wittgenstein describes the source of his inspiration for considering significant language as picture. Wright says

identical thing in a picture and what it depicts is the picture's elements, that is the picture's structure. Wittgenstein calls the possibility of the structure "the pictorial form of the picture". This pictorial form is what makes depiction of the world possible; "*that* is how a picture is related to reality" (*TLP*, 2.1511). In 2.1513 he writes: "So a picture, conceived in this way, also includes the pictorial relationship, which makes it into a picture". To give this relationship or the pictorial form (2.17) of language or as Wittgenstein puts it "to give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world" (*TLP*, 5.4711). Reading *Tractatus* in this way means that Wittgenstein does not need to give us any metaphysical account of the world, but must only give us a complete analysis of propositions so that the pictorial form, the pictorial relationship, and in a sense, the essence of a proposition and the essence of all description will be given. This means that by going through the steps of linguistic analysis we will capture the essence of the world, too. In this sense, as we said above, the opening remarks can be seen as a description of one side of the pictorial relationship through a full analysis of the other side, that is, the picture. Wittgenstein's claim, that in order to depict, a picture must have in common

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Wittgenstein formed his picture theory of meaning after the outbreak of the war in 1914: "Wittgenstein told me how the idea of language as a picture of reality occurred to him. He was in a trench on the East front reading a magazine in which there was a schematic picture depicting the possible sequence of events in an automobile accident. The picture there served as a proposition; that is, as a description of a possible state of affairs. It had this function owing to a correspondence between the parts of the picture and things in reality. It now occurred to Wittgenstein that one might reverse the analogy and say that a *proposition* serves as a *picture*, by virtue of a similar correspondence between its parts and the world. The way in which the parts of the proposition are combined——the *structure* of the proposition——depicts a possible combination of elements in reality, a possible state of affairs" (Wright, 1955: 532-3) In a parenthetical remark in his *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein also points to the French modelling: "In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc.)" (*Notebooks*, 29.9.14)

something with what it depicts, is made prior to an analysis of the world. He has not analyzed the structure of reality to find an essence to see whether it fits the structure of language. The structure and the essence of the world are discovered in language, and since we know a priori that language as a picture must have something in common with what it pictures, we conclude that the world has exactly the same essence.

I think a comparison of what language is composed of, namely propositions, and what the world is divided into, namely facts and their constituents, can show us that the opening remarks contribute to a revelation of the pictorial relationship rather than being the properties of a reality which is independent of logic and any picture. The smallest meaningful units of language, namely elementary propositions, are the criteria according to which the world can be divided. Language can only have meaning and convey thoughts through propositions that are analyzed into elementary propositions. Beyond elementary propositions and downward to names one would encounter meaningless simple signs or signs that do not symbolize. Simple signs in themselves, i.e. outside the propositions, are a collection of signs without a logical or a propositional form. They are signs that have not been put together according to a certain logical pattern; hence, they can only be regarded as lists of words rather than as pictures or thoughts. They are not, as it were, language. Names have no meaning outside propositions and "in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names *in immediate combinations*" (*TLP*, 4.221, emphasis added. See also 3.3 ff.), not the names themselves separately. Thus, for

Wittgenstein language in its meaningful form is not composed of just "a set of names" or a "blend of words" in an accidental arrangement, but of propositions that can be analyzed into elementary propositions that stand for certain atomic facts (See *TLP*, 3.141-2). If a name has a meaning (or sense), it only does so in a logically possible combination with other words. As Wittgenstein puts it, "Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning" (*TLP*, 3.3). Analysis of the world must stop at the level of facts, too, because they are what the smallest units of language, i.e. elementary propositions, stand for. Since propositions picture the facts and say how the world is if they are true, the facts also have the same structure if propositions are to depict them. We cannot speak of objects outside facts. Objects in themselves do not make the world and are mere possibilities for making states of affairs, namely, what is the case or not. So, objects do not make up the actual world; they contain possibilities to combine with one another to make what the world is or what it is not.[5]

But, as mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein thinks that the world must have a substance. As a matter of fact, he says objects make the substance of the world and it is even necessary for the world to have substance. But why? Substance is needed because it is unalterable. It "subsists independently of what is the case" (*TLP*, 2.024). The argument Wittgenstein offers for the necessity of what the totality of objects makes, namely, the substance of the world, is based on the requirement that the sense of the propositions be determinate. For a language to

[5] This, I think, can be better explained using Leibniz's theory of possible worlds. In a sense, by their possible concatenations in possible states of affairs, objects make up an infinite (or finite, yet numerous) number of possible worlds of which one is 'what is the case'——the one which is made up of facts or existing states of affairs. The important point is that all these possible worlds as well as the one which is actual (what is the case) are in the logical space.

have sense and to be the picture of the world (True or False), each elementary proposition must depend merely on itself for its sense and not on any other propositions (*TLP*, 2.021 ff.) If an elementary proposition needs to stand on its own for its sense to be determinate, there must be final simple entities or objects which are unalterable and subsist independently of what changes, i.e. what is the case; they are what stand for the constituents of propositions. "The configuration of objects produces states of affairs" (*TLP*, 2.0272) and stands for propositions. "States of affairs are independent of one another" (*TLP*, 2.061) too, as propositions are independent of one another. But the independence of propositions of one another amounts to the view that they must have a final analysis, i.e., there must be a correspondence between their constituents and the constituents of states of affairs. The argument for this view is Wittgenstein's reason for an a priori necessity of an unalterable form or the subsistence of objects. The world needs to have an unalterable form, namely, substance. Substance is the totality of things and the unalterable form of the world. The reason why the totality of objects or an unalterable form is necessary is to avoid the infinite regress in finding the determinate sense of a proposition. As Black explains the argument,

> If a proposition had no final analysis, there would be an infinite (and vicious) regress. In order for *p* to have sense we should first have to determine by experience that some other proposition *q* was true (2.0211). But before doing so, we should have to know that *q* made

sense, i.e. we should have first to verify some *other* proposition *r*, etc. (Black, 1964: 62)[6]

Even the simplicity of objects is related to and explained in terms of their role in making up the world's unalterable form or substance. "Objects," for Wittgenstein "are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable" (*TLP*, 2.0271). They "make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite" (*TLP*, 2.021). In Black's view, "[i]t is a basic principle for Wittgenstein that every composition is contingent [. . .]. If objects were complex, their existence would be a contingent fact and hence they could not collectively constitute the substance of the world" (Black, 1964: 61). The possibility of being constituents of states of affairs is the form of an object. Since "objects contain possibility of" occurring in all states of affairs or situations, forms of all the objects make up all possibilities of the occurrence of objects in all possible situations and therefore make up the total possibilities of the world, that is, the form of the world. In other words, being "given all the objects [...] all *possible* states of affairs are also given" (*TLP*, 2.0124) and thus the form of the

[6] I agree with Ian Proops that there is a suppressed premise in the argument, the assumption that we *can* picture the world by propositions. As he states in "Wittgenstein on the Substance of the World" this argument is in the form of a "two-stage modus tollens, but for ease of exposition" he tries to "recast it in the form of a reductio" which can be helpful here:
"Suppose, for reductio, that:
[1] There is no substance (that is, nothing exists in every possible world).
Then
[2] Everything exists contingently.
But then
[3] Whether a proposition has sense depends on whether another proposition is true.
So
[4] We cannot draw up pictures of the world (true or false).
But
[5] We can draw up such pictures [the chief suppressed premise].
Contradiction.
So
[6] There is substance." (Proops, 2004: 114)

world is also given. But it should also be emphasized that even given all the objects, the world (what is the case) is not given; the possible configurations into which these things can come together are given; the possibility of the world (what is the case) is given. This is what Wittgenstein means when he claims that the totality of things or the substance of the world subsists independently of existing states of affairs, that is, independently of the world of facts (See *TLP*, 2.024). Revealing the pictorial form or the essence of the propositions will show us that what they depict, i.e. reality, has their essence. Wittgenstein's talk of substance is intended to show this relation between the essence of language and the world. So, the opening remarks can be read as a formulation of the structure of reality based on the structure of the propositions. The substance talk is, in a sense, an embodiment of Wittgenstein's attempt to realize his main vision in philosophy, i.e., his belief that any complete analysis of propositions will necessarily lead to a revelation of the structure of the world.

Wittgenstein has come to this picture of the world neither by looking at the world (or as Sluga says, by an "observation or empirical research" [Sluga, 2011: 23]) nor through a pre-linguistic metaphysical analysis of reality, but through an analysis of the structure of the language or propositions. In a sense, Wittgenstein's world in the opening remarks is a world that is limited to the conditions of language, and thus its essence is confined to the essence of propositions. In this respect, I agree with McGinn's view that the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* are Wittgenstein's attempt to find the essence of the language in order to draw a limit

to the expression of thoughts (True or False) rather than to offer a metaphysical body of doctrines on the structure and essence of a world prior to language.

Returning to the debate over the status of Wittgenstein's own propositions, particularly the remarks which open the *Tractatus*, we might say that they are nonsensical not because they are metaphysical but because they are a depiction of the depictional relationship or, we might say, a picture of the pictorial form, which is impossible for Wittgenstein. In 2.172, he writes: "A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it". So, a pictures says something that can only be shown. "A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form" (*TLP*, 2.174). The problem of Wittgenstein's propositions in the *Tractatus* is that these propositions have placed themselves outside their representational form.

In 6.53, Wittgenstein suggests two appropriate methods of doing philosophy: (1) "to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy" and (2) "whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions". The second task is, I think, what he does throughout the *Tractatus* by trying to delimit the borders between meaningful and senseless propositions and demonstrating to the metaphysician that she ignores these borders by violating the logical syntax of language, that is, by using signs that do not symbolize. This is an open and unfinished project. As long as there are philosophers who "say something

metaphysical", philosophy as defined by Wittgenstein means reminding them of their violation of the logical syntax of language.

But even if we accept that the latter task in philosophy, i.e., saying when one is producing fundamental confusions by formulating propositions that contain meaningless signs, is what *Tractatus* is doing and is the appropriate method of philosophy, this also leads to nonsensical propositions. So, to utter metaphysical statements is to commit nonsense even when saying that "metaphysics is nonsense". Unlike what Conant thinks, Wittgenstein has committed nonsense in the latter way: he has written a book on the logic of language or the essence of propositions "to draw a limit to thought" (*TLP*, Preface, p. 3) or to show the metaphysician what goes wrong if he utters anything metaphysical. In order to do this, Wittgenstein has produced propositions that have placed themselves outside their representational form. Although they do not say anything about the features of a reality prior to language, and thus are not metaphysical in this sense, they say many things about language or picture (about themselves) that can only be displayed in their meaningful employment.

In response to a letter from the translator of the *Tractatus*, and in response to his question about whether Wittgenstein had any supplementary notes to be added to the English translation to facilitate its understanding and diminish its unnecessary obscurity, Wittgenstein responds that he does have such notes but that cannot give them to Ogden because "they really contain no elucidation at all" (Quoted in Conant, 2002: 378-9). This letter can be regarded as evidence for the fact that to Wittgenstein, the *Tractatus*, far from being misleadingly nonsense,

was still composed of elucidatory propositions and that unlike the supplementary remarks, the *Tractatus* contained some sort of elucidation. This possibility marks my agreement with the standard reading as well as my disagreement with the anti-metaphysical reading of the opening and ending remarks.

On the other hand, I disagree with the standard reading which contends that Wittgenstein did regard metaphysical propositions as elucidatory nonsense. I think the anti-metaphysical reading is right in its claim that Wittgenstein's early framework of language does not allow any metaphysical proposition to be taken as containing *thoughts*.

Given Wittgenstein's aforementioned response to Ogden, the first translator of the *Tractatus*, it seems that unlike what is believed in the standard reading, misleading propositions are not only the statements that obviously violate the logical syntax of language (such as Wittgenstein's own example: "Socrates is identical" in 5.473-5.4732) but that they also include metaphysical propositions in which the speaker fails to "give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions" (*TLP*, 6.55). Wittgenstein sees his book as one to "draw a limit to [...] the expression of thoughts" (*TLP*, Preface, p. 3) and his attempt to draw the limit seems to be more similar to the activity he has confined philosophy to, namely to make the metaphysician aware of what she can or cannot say, rather than coming up with a new series of doctrines.

I think that Sluga's formulation of Wittgenstein's picture theory must be read the other way round. He thinks that "the sentence 'The cat is on the mat' can be taken to be a logical picture of the [same] fact [. . .] we envisage" in the world

(Sluga, 2011: 27). I think we cannot envisage any fact in the empirical world before we encounter the propositional form of the fact in language. The relation between the cat and the mat is first recognized in language through what McGinn calls the logical order of language as a system of representation. "The cat is on the mat" belongs to the world of facts and not the world of things, and is not a component of what Wittgenstein calls empirical reality and defines as what is "limited by the totality of objects" (*TLP*, 5.5561). That the cat is on the mat (if we suppose it is an atomic fact) has its *factuality*[7] because it already contains the logical relations of the language, and in a sense, is the world under logical conditions.

Wittgenstein's articulation of true and false propositions shows the point in a peculiar way. The articulation has been emphasized by McGinn and, as she points out in a footnote, had previously been recognized by Rush Rhees. In 4.25, Wittgenstein says "[i]f an elementary proposition is true, the state of affairs exists: if an elementary proposition is false, the state of affairs does not exist," and in 5.02: "the sense of '~p' *cannot* be understood unless the sense of 'p' has been understood already". I think as many commentators with even different approaches have mostly agreed, Wittgenstein's picture theory must be read as a theory of meaning, and not a theory of truth. The sense of a sentence is what it shows as a picture and not what it says. What a sentence *says* is either true or false, but what it *shows* is a certain concatenation of things which stand for the

[7] We will see that Eddy Zemach (Zemach, 1964) uses the term 'factuality' in his article to refer to *that* a fact is a fact and by that he means the existence of the fact. By 'factuality' I am referring to *that* a fact is a fact and by that I mean that a concatenation of objects is a fact and therefore I am emphasizing the role of logical or pictorial form here without which things cannot constitute facts and so cannot be put into language. (See TLP, 3.221)

proposition as its sense: "A proposition *shows* its sense. A proposition *shows* how things stand *if* it is true. And it *says that* they do so stand" (*TLP*, 4.022). As Anscombe puts it,

> we might say: 'Just this shows the difference between a proposition and a picture; for while a picture may be said to *show* how things are, *if* there is something it is a correct representation of, it certainly does not *say* that that is how things are; the most that one could grant would be that we could *use* the picture *in* saying how things are: we could hold the picture up and ourselves say: "This is how things are." ' (Anscombe, 1971: 65)
>
> The Picture-theory of the proposition is that the proposition in the positive sense says: 'This is how things are' and in the negative sense says: 'This is how things aren't'——the *'this'* in both cases being the same: the comparison is a comparison with a picture of the 'this' in question. It is because of the character of the 'this' that there is the *possibility* of saying 'it's how things are' or 'it's how things aren't'. (Anscombe, 1971: 67)

Hence in Wittgenstein's view, "the sense of '*~p*' *cannot* be understood unless the sense of 'p' has been understood already" (*TLP*, 5.02). Also, as McGinn points out, this shows us that in Wittgenstein what we call the case or a fact "is what can be represented by means of a true elementary proposition" (McGinn, 2006: 138). What makes possible Wittgenstein's way of articulating the truth and falsity of propositions, is the fact that for him the sense of the propositions can be determined independently of their truth or falsity. Rush Rhees reads 4.25 in a

similar way and emphasizes that "it is important not to confuse picturing reality with saying what is true" (Rhees, 1970: 5). This is based on Wittgenstein's remark on the possibility of understanding the sense of a proposition without comparing it to the reality: "What a picture represents is its sense" (*TLP*, 2.221) and a picture represents its sense "by means of its pictorial form" and "independently of its truth or falsity" (*TLP*, 2.22) and truth or falsity is "[t]he agreement or disagreement of [the proposition's] sense with reality" (*TLP*, 2.222). These all, for Wittgenstein, mean that if we know *what the case is if a proposition is true*, we already understand a proposition: "(One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true.) It is understood by anyone who understands its constituents". (*TLP*, 4.024). Rhees' explanation is useful here:

> When I say 'the iron is getting warmer', this may be true or false, but these are not two different ways of *saying* it. If it is false, it says just what it would if it were true. Otherwise I should never know *what* was true or false. [...] What gives sense to 'p' is also what gives sense to '~p'. But what makes 'p' true is not what makes '~p' true. And if 'p' is true——the truth is not a relation between the facts and what it says. I say the iron is getting warmer. If this is true, then what it says *is* a fact; not something else which corresponds to it. (Rhees, 1970: 10-11)

Wittgenstein is not, according to the non-metaphysical reading, trying to make a distinction between the empirical world and the world of facts; he is trying to draw our attention to his important view that a non-logical world cannot be thought at all because thinking is picturing and is made possible by the "logico-

pictorial form" of the language or its logical order. So, "we could not *say* what an 'illogical' world would look like" (*TLP*, 3.031). Seeing such relations in the world is only possible when we discover them through the linguistic analysis or through a search for the logical form of the propositions.

To sum up, for Wittgenstein, propositions can tell us what is happening in reality, and to do this they must have something in common with what they depict (or tell us about), namely a pictorial or logical form, but they cannot say anything about this shared thing. The shared thing cannot be pictured but is only displayed by the applications of the propositions. For Wittgenstein, to find this essence, i.e., what is shared by the picture and what it pictures, one does not need to analyze the structure of the pictured but should only perform a complete analysis of the picture. Any representational system, in order to represent, must possess such an essence in common with what it represents. Different representational systems can even work if they have this essence or a pictorial form in common or as Wittgenstein says "a common logical pattern": "A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world. They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern." (4.014). What is important to Wittgenstein for language to work, and more important, what he can show us by elucidation, is therefore not the existence of what is depicted but the existence of a depictional relationship between language and the world. In McGinn's words, "[w]hat Wittgenstein teaches us is that our ability to represent the world in propositions has nothing to do with metaphysics and everything to do

with the logical order of a system of representation, or with everything that is essential to the rules whereby language is projected onto reality" (McGinn, 2006: 159).

Chapter Two

The 'Standard Reading' of the Ending Remarks

The early writings of Wittgenstein (*Notebooks 1914-1916*, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and "A Lecture on Ethics") contain at least few remarks on what he thought was "the mystical"—which he defined as not *how* the world is but *that* the world exists. This line of thought can be seen in the final entries of his *Notebooks 1914-1916* which can be regarded as the preliminary thoughts which he developed into the *Tractatus* through some additions and eliminations. Also, the *Tractatus* itself, and a lecture he gave on ethics in 1929 after he came back to Cambridge to resume philosophy, include remarks on what the mystical is or the peculiar feeling of seeing the world as what *exists*. These three texts provide readers with a quite consistent train of thoughts on the nature of "the mystical", which has a firm connection with ethics and aesthetics in Wittgenstein's view. As he asserts in the final words of his lecture, although there "can be no science" of ethics and what ethics "says does not add to our knowledge in any sense" and hence it cannot be put into words, nonetheless, he felt a great respect for it. He writes: Ethics "is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it" (LE, 12). Although this important unsayable thing has been introduced under different terms in these texts, nonetheless they can be related to one another through a key inexpressible concept, i.e., the existence of the world or, in Tractarian language, "*that* it (the world) exists" (*TLP*, 6.44).

Wittgenstein names "*that* the world exists" as the mystical in the *Tractatus*, and thinks that a certain way of seeing the world is necessary for one to be able to see the world as the mystical. One must view it as a limited whole, and this requires one to see the world *sub specie aeternitatis* (under the aspect of eternity). In the *Notebooks*, we read that "the work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*" (*Notebooks*, 7.10.16) and in the "Lecture on Ethics," we see that the experience of absolute value is characterized as one possessed by someone who wonders at the existence of the World (LE, 8).[8]

This chapter reviews some interpretational attempts to read the final remarks of the *Tractatus* with the other early remarks on "the mystical" as well as aesthetics and ethics in the larger context of the whole book's views of language, the world and logical issues. It should be noted here that what I refer to as ending remarks in the *Tractatus* includes the statements in 6.4 and what comes after, in which Wittgenstein begins his thoughts on the issue by stating that all the propositions have the same value, and then goes on by talking about the value, God, ethics (he sees ethics and aesthetics as "one and the same"), the sense of the world, and in general what he names "the mystical". This chapter explores these issues in the *Tractatus* mostly in the view of those commentators who have speculated on the connection of these concepts to the rest of the *Tractatus* and especially to the beginning remarks. However, I particularly seek to show how the standard reading of the *Tractatus* and specially its metaphysical treatment of

[8] The references to the *Notebooks 1914-1916* (*Notebooks*) are based on the dates of the entries and the references to "A Lecture on Ethics" (LE) are based on the page numbers.

the opening remarks has affected and dominated the way most interpreters have read the final remarks of the book.

I think that except for some differences in methods and details the main stream of the interpretations of the ending remarks has been shaped by what following McGinn and Conant we called the *metaphysical* or the *standard* reading of the *Tractatus* and in particular the opening remarks. This dominant view draws a certain kind of connection between "the mystical" topics in the *Tractatus*—— which are, according to Wittgenstein, things that manifest themselves and cannot be put into words——and other unsayable things in the philosophy-of-language part of the book such as logic, the pictorial form of the propositions and the essence of language. Proponents of this reading of the ending remarks attempt to show that *what* we gain by analyzing the propositions, i.e. the essence of the propositions and hence the essence of language and the world, is the very mystical thing Wittgenstein refers to, in the final remarks, as what shows itself but cannot be said. We will see that this will amount to an identification of the essence of the world and the existence of the world in this interpretation and the thought that the mystical (or *that* the world exists) is in some way shown in language. To some commentators, it is shown in what language says meaningfully through factual propositions (this can be clearly seen in Eddy Zemach, 1964), and to some, through what language manifests by its senseless yet elucidatory propositions such as ethical or religious propositions (Sluga defends such an approach. See Sluga, 2011).

I think that these interpreters' view that language can show (although cannot say) the unsayable, including the mystical or "*that* the world exists," through its revelation of the essence of the propositions and thereby the essence of the world, is firmly related to their interpretational approach in reading the whole book and in particular the opening remarks. So, I believe that the fact that the standard reading sees the opening remarks as a description of a world prior to language and in a sense completely independent of logic, gives rise to see his remarks on "the mystical" or the existence of the world in a supplementary fashion; that the latter completes the former by offering an ontological foundation for language. Although this can be an extreme view and cannot be easily ascribed to all standard interpreters——and we do not intend to make such a claim——what we are going to argue is that the metaphysical reading of the *Tractatus* leads to a certain reading of the final remarks. In other words, I think that there are conceptual confusions in this way of interpreting the final remarks that have necessary connections with the metaphysical reading of the opening remarks. In short, I think there are two causes for confusion in most of the work written on the final remarks: (1) that all the unsayable things can be dissolved into one big realm called "the mystical" or, as Wittgenstein puts it, "*that* the world exists", and (2) that, consequently, they all can be shown in language but not said. I argue that the past interpreters have not, in some cases, paid exact heed to the difference I believe exists among Wittgenstein's unsayable things. In particular, they have not noticed the distinction between the logical form or the essence of the

language/world on one side, and the mystical or "*that* the world exists" on the other side.

Moreover, a question these interpreters must answer is whether these mystical things including aesthetics and ethics show themselves in language and, if their answer is positive, in what sense they manifest themselves. It seems that these commentators share the tendency to read the ending remarks under the influence of a metaphysical reading of the opening remarks; this tendency has mostly led to a final categorization of all kinds of unsayable things under 'the mystical,' and has motivated interpreters to try to show that all of things that cannot be said can be shown in language. Although some have not made such a claim as explicitly as others, it occurs to me that by "in language" many of them mean the application of language in its meaningful form, i.e. factual statements. This means that in their view meaningful propositions show their logical form and thereby the essence of the language and hence the world. Accordingly, they assert, the mystical—–which is according to some of them nothing but the very substance of the world—–will be uncovered through this manifestation. Thus, this chapter tracks the path of this dominant interpretation of the ending remarks and tries to show how the metaphysical reading of the opening remarks provides the background for such an understanding of the ending notes. I start by presenting the first signs of this interpretation in a couple of the early metaphysical readers of the *Tractatus*.

In the final chapter to her introductory book on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, a chapter devoted to the ending remarks in the *Tractatus*, Anscombe points to a

letter Wittgenstein wrote in response to Russell's understanding of the *Tractatus* in a previous letter. Indicating that Russell has not "really got hold of [his] main contention", Anscombe analyzes the distinction Wittgenstein makes between what can be said through language and what cannot be expressed but only shown by propositions: what for Wittgenstein was seen as "the cardinal problem of philosophy" (quoted in Anscombe, 1967: 161). According to Wittgenstein's picture theory of language, for a proposition to say something meaningful, it must be formulated in a way "the negative of which is also a possibility" and this is why "comparing the proposition with reality" is always a necessary criterion by which the truth or falsity of the propositions becomes determinate (Anscombe, 1967: 161). So, if there is an apparent proposition to which this rule is not applicable, i.e., the negative of which is *not* a possibility, it cannot be expressed and, thus, it is not a proposition at all. We know that the sense of a proposition is the very possibility of knowing the polar situations (positive or negative) of the proposition. In other words, I know the meaning of a proposition if I can imagine the situations in which the proposition is true or the ones in which it is false. This is why for Wittgenstein logical propositions, that is all tautologies, as well as all contradictions which are in all situations true and false respectively, "are devoid of 'sense' and 'say nothing'." (Anscombe, 1967: 162)

What Anscombe thinks is very important about this theory is that "an important part is played in the *Tractatus* by the things which, though they cannot be 'said', are yet 'shewn' or displayed. This is to say: it would be right to call them 'true' if, *per impossible*, they could be said; in fact they cannot be called true, since

they cannot be said, but 'can be shewn', or 'are exhibited', in the propositions saying the various things that can be said" (Anscombe, 1967: 161). But before Anscombe introduces the things which cannot be expressed but only shown, she talks of their difference and, more important to our purpose, of their connection with logical truths. She believes that logical truths are 'senseless' propositions and their negation would lead to contradiction. Any attempt to say something which is showable will end up in what Anscombe calls "nonsensical formations of words," which are "sentence-like formations whose constituents turn out not to have any meaning in those forms of sentences" (Anscombe, 1967: 163).

Here, in Anscombe's view, there is *something* that can be seen but "the attempt to express what one sees breaks down" (Anscombe, p. 163). Therefore, we might say that if we express the very logical propositions or tautologies, we have uttered something senseless, while if we make philosophical remarks about logic and, for example, if we talk about a formal concept like the very notion of 'concept' itself as if it were a proper concept, we have said something nonsensical. In the previous chapter, we saw that if we regard the *Tractatus* propositions as sentence-like formations *about* the logical form of language or about the pictorial form of pictures, i.e., if we see them as propositions by which the speaker tries to illuminate the essence of the propositions themselves (propositions talking about themselves), we can call them nonsensical in the following sense. There is something common in all propositions/pictures that gives them the possibility of being propositions/pictures, that is to say/portray something, but is itself impossible to be said/portrayed.

According to Anscombe "[t]he connection between the tautologies, or sense-less propositions of logic, and the unsayable things that are 'shown', is that the tautologies shew the 'logic' of the world" (Anscombe, 1967: 163). We know that for Wittgenstein, according to 5.143 in the *Tractatus* "tautology is the common feature of all propositions that have nothing in common with one another". A little further, where he talks about the general form of the propositions, Wittgenstein raises the issue again in a different way. He first asserts that logical propositions are tautologies and then says that the fact that this is the case "*shows* the formal—–logical—–properties of language and the world" (*TLP*, 6.2). Therefore, all propositions that have nothing in common in any other respects, have one thing in common and that is their feature of "tautology" which *shows* the form of language that is shared by the world and is equivalent to their essence. This is to say that in Anscombe's view, the connection between tautologies and unsayable things lies in the fact that the former show the latter through their presence in propositions. In other words, for Anscombe, there seems to be no difference between what propositions of logic can show, namely the formal properties of language/world, and the other unsayable 'things' in terms of their being manifested in language and through the employment of meaningful propositions.

Anscombe divides the unsayable things in the *Tractatus* into three: referring to the first one, she writes: "the most prominent [...] is this 'logic of the world' or 'of the facts'" (Anscombe, 1967: 163), and in reference to the second one, that "the most notorious" that Wittgenstein thinks can be shown but cannot

be expressed is "the truth of solipsism" (Anscombe, 1967: 166)[9]. The other thing about which we cannot say anything because it 'lies outside the world' is the sense of the world. I will explore how Wittgenstein sees the connection between the notion of "sense of the world" and "the ethical or absolute value" later in the chapter, but it should be noted here that for Wittgenstein, what causes the sense of the world to be outside the world is the fact that inside the world reside only facts and the happenings, and that to him "all that happens and is the case is accidental" (*TLP*, 6.41) and its negation is also a possibility. So, whatever is to be non-accidental must, in Wittgenstein's view, lies outside the world. In this sense, he claims that propositions are pictures of the things that are in the world and "can express nothing that is higher" (*TLP,* 6.42) and therefore there cannot be imagined anything as ethical or aesthetic propositions ("(ethics and aesthetics are one and the same)" (*TLP*, 6.421)).

Although Anscombe does not say explicitly where each of these unsayable things and particularly, the meaning of the world, show themselves, nonetheless in the last two paragraphs of the book an attempt is made to build a stronger (although not very clear) connection between these unsayable things and the whole logical purpose of the *Tractatus*, i.e., towards "seeing the world aright". Anscombe says with the help of logic the face of the world is unveiled but this "face can look at you with a sad or happy, grave or grim, good or evil expression, and with more or less expression" (Anscombe, 1967: p. 172). That is to say, she

[9] I do not discuss solipsism in Wittgenstein's view. I admit that this cannot be unproblematic, as I believe solipsism and its relation with the way the willing subject enters the world are crucial to understanding Wittgenstein's treatment of ethics. To make up for this missing debate, however, I provide brief relevant explanations whenever needed, especially in my final chapter.

sees the changes of the boundaries of the world in the addition of one particular expression to the world which has been already *unveiled* by logic. Not surprisingly, she sees "the world thought of, not as how things are, but as however they are——seen as a whole——" as the matter of logic (ibid, p. 172) and shows her interest in making an important and seemingly firm link between the following things: (1) the part logic plays in the *Tractatus* and the picture theory of language which is based on the logico-pictorial form of the propositions in determining the conditions of meaningfulness on one side and (2) the unsayable 'things' or "the mystical" which is characterized by Wittgenstein as "not *how* things are in the world [...] but *that* it exists" (*TLP*, 6.44).

Anscombe's description of the part logic plays in the *Tractatus* is very close to Wittgenstein's characterization of "the mystical" in another important aspect, too. Wittgenstein says in 6.45 that "feeling the world as a limited whole——it is this that is mystical." Conceiving the world in this way, i.e., distinct from understanding the world as the totality of facts and *how* they are but as a whole, is, in Anscombe's view, what Wittgenstein saw as a matter for logic. In my opinion, as I suggested earlier in this chapter, the treatment of the ending remarks and in particular the ones concerning "the mystical" and the particular relation some have made between the mystical and logic of language/world (5.6: "*The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world"), although implicit in Anscombe, have marked the dominant interpretation of some of the ending remarks in the *Tractatus*. This interpretation seeks to demonstrate that "the mystical" or *'that* the world exists" just like other unsayable things can be shown

in language but cannot be expressed *by* language. This reading of the ending remarks tries to interpret one of them by drawing our attention to the complementary notes in the *Notebooks* version of the same remark. Here, I bring both versions:

> If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. (*TLP*, 6.43)[10]
>
> If good or evil willing affects the world it can only affect the boundaries of the world, not the facts, what cannot be portrayed by language but can only be shewn in language. (*Notebooks*, 5.7.16)

To me it seems that the "*standard* reading" of the ending remarks (if we might call it by such a name following Conant's labelling of the metaphysical interpretation of the *Tractatus*), which is based on a standard (metaphysical) reading of the opening remarks and on the whole book, has linked two kinds of "being shown": (a) being shown in language as it applies to "the mystical" according to the *Notebooks* 5.7.16, and (b) being shown in language as it applies to the "logical (pictorial) form" according to the *Tractatus* 2.172. This kind of connection can also be seen more explicitly in Max Black's *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. To provide an explanation for his exegetical paraphrase of 6.43, Black refers us to the complementary sentence of the *Notebooks'* entry of the same thought to show that for Wittgenstein although the boundaries of the world cannot be expressed, they can be shown in language. (See Black, 1964:

[10] I have used Ogden's translation of the *Tractatus* here which is more consistent with Anscombe's translation of the related remark in the *Notebooks*.

372). To elaborate on the mystical, he points to the fact that in Wittgenstein's view "*that* the world exists" rather than *how* it is, is "the mystical" and refers us to Wittgenstein's "Lecture on Ethics" where he explains his understanding of the aesthetic/ethical (which are "the mystical" as, in Black's words, they have "authentic value" and are "transcendental") by comparing them to his experience of "wondering at the existence of the world". Black tries to link what Wittgenstein introduces in his "A Lecture on Ethics" as the mystical, namely, "wonder at the existence of the world", to one of the key opening concepts of the *Tractatus*, namely the substance of the world by claiming that "mysticism springs from wonderment at the *substance* of the world" (Black, 1964: 375). He does not explain how this connection is possible for him but it seems that he has taken the substance of the world, i.e. the unalterable form necessary for propositions to have sense, to be the same as existence of the world or what exists.[11]

So, what for Wittgenstein is the very unalterable form of the world and what makes it possible for the propositions to have sense and what makes it possible for language to picture what it depicts——which is uncovered through a full analysis——is taken by Black as the very existence of the world. For Black, then, the conclusion would probably be as follows: as we saw in the first chapter, for Wittgenstein factual statements can reveal the logical form of propositions, that is the essence of propositions and language, and thereby they unveil the essence of the world. Moreover, by going through the analysis of a factual statement, we can see that the world must have a substance, the unalterable form

[11] To use Black's words, what I will try to demonstrate in the next chapter is that "the mystical"——being independent from the logical order of language——is the existence of the world and aesthetics springs from the mystical feeling or the *wonderment* at the existence of the world.

made by the totality of things, or in Glock's exegetical entry in his *A Wittgensteinian Dictionary*, the "fixed order of possibilities, which is equivalent to logical space" and "is common to all possible worlds and the *Tractatus* calls it the 'form of the world'" (Glock, p. 215). So if the substance of the world is what Wittgenstein means by "the mystical" it can be unveiled by a complete analysis of propositions. We see that Black's interpretation of the final remarks and his approach to reading Wittgenstein's notion of the mystical show Black's agreement with the thought that what we had achieved as metaphysics in the opening remarks is essentially the same thing as the existence of the world or what in the ending remarks is regarded as "the mystical" and inexpressible in language.

Sluga, in a similar way, believes that ethical and aesthetic propositions, which are for Wittgenstein a way to express wonderment at the existence of the world, share an essential feature with Wittgenstein's own metaphysical and logical propositions in the *Tractatus*; they both have the tendency to run against the limits of language. So, for example Wittgenstein's reaction to Heidegger's *Being and Time* and his comment on the book in the presence of a couple of members of the Vienna Circle, appears to Sluga to be applicable to logical and metaphysical propositions as well as to the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* itself. Wittgenstein's comment here seems to be sympathetic with the tendency to run against the limits of language and shows how he thought of himself as being a philosopher with close concerns for Kierkegaard and his fight against the limits of language:

> Man has the drive to run against the limits of language. Think, for instance, of the wonder that anything exists. That wonder cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also no answer. Everything we might say can *a priori* be only nonsense .Nevertheless we run against the limits of language. This running-against has also been seen by Kierkegaard and he has even named it similarly (as a running against the paradox). This running against the limits of language is *ethics.*[12]

"The statements about metaphysics and logic that make up such large pages of [the *Tractatus*]", Sluga thinks, "must be understood to involve a similar running against the limits of language" (Sluga, 2011: 54). In his view, although these propositions, namely the metaphysical and logical ones, along with the mystical (which are according to Sluga, aesthetic and ethical *propositions*) "must fail, but that they fail is illuminating". For him, therefore, these nonsensical propositions pursue a goal and that goal is that "they are needed as elucidations of what can and cannot be said" (Sluga, 2011: 55). Sluga thinks the religious statements have the same status in Wittgenstein's view, that is, although they fail, they illuminate. According to Sluga, they must be seen as mere elucidations "rather than dogmatic truths" (ibid). This, he thinks, is important because we must not think that there are truths that these can show rather than express; there are not such truths at all in

[12] Quoted from Sluga's *Wittgenstein*. p. 54. I think what Sluga does not bring here is more important. Wittgenstein finishes his thoughts by saying:
"But the tendency to run up against shows something. The holy Augustine already knew this when he said: "What, you scoundrel, you would speak no nonsense? Go ahead and speak nonsense – it doesn't matter!"" Here Wittgenstein thinks the ethical 'tendency' and not the ethical propositions shows something. We talk more about this in the next (final) chapter.

his view. Sluga sees this as a difference between Wittgenstein and Neo-Kantians who tried to set up "a philosophical theory of value distinct from empirical science, that it made room for a philosophical science of value" (Sluga, 2011: 52).[13] For Wittgenstein, however, Sluga asserts, there are no truths outside the empirical truths and hence the solution of the meaning of life and the world must be found in "the vanishing of the problem" and not in giving a new solution based on some ethical, aesthetic or religious hidden unsayable truths.

Unlike Black and Anscombe, Sluga seems not to insist on the view that all the unsayable things (including logic, metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics) show themselves in language. Rather, he is interested in emphasizing that the very nonsensical propositions possess illuminating and elucidatory power, which helps us not see any certain truths but the world aright, that is, see the world in a way that the problems of life are not seen as problems any more but as misuse of logical syntax. Unfortunately, Sluga does not tell us how this realm of silence can help in seeing the world aright and how it connects to the logical syntax of language, but we may find answers for these questions in other interpretations which have tried to find a more rigorous link between the final remarks and the whole Tractarian project. Among those who see the final remarks and especially Wittgenstein's treatment of "the mystical" as an essential part of his early philosophy of language and logic are Eddy Zemach and James Atkinson (See

[13] It is worth mentioning here that there is a difference between Wittgenstein and the positivists on ethics in Sluga's view: "The separation of fact and value is, of course, not Wittgenstein's invention. Both neo-Kantian and positivist philosophers had asserted it before him. The former took values to be transcendental while the latter thought of them as merely subjective colorings of the objective facts. The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus appears closer to the neo-Kantians than to the positivists on this point. According to him, "the sense of the world must lie outside the world" (TLP, 6.41) and "ethics is transcendental" (TLP, 6.421)" (Sluga, 2011: 51-2).

Zemach, 1946 and Atkinson, 2009). In the rest of this chapter, thus, I will introduce their readings of "the mystical" in the *Tractatus*. I intend to show that the way Zemach and Atkinson's metaphysical reading of the opening remarks leads them to a connection between the opening and ending remarks of the *Tractatus* is highly analogous to——and in a sense the climax of——what previous commentators tried to say.[14]

We can probably see a complete embodiment of the identification of the mystical and the essence of the world/language in a famous article written by Eddy Zemach, "Wittgenstein's philosophy of the Mystical" (Zemach, 1964). In this article, he tries to show that what is introduced in the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* as the logical form of the propositions and language and hence the essence of the world, is nothing but "factuality of facts" or the very thing Wittgenstein refers to as "*that* the world exists" or, briefly, "the mystical". Zemach, therefore, considers Wittgenstein's philosophical clarification——which is to end in a better understanding of the essence of the world through an analysis of language and consequently used as a way to avoid meaningless propositions——to be the same as achieving good conscience which is the main goal of ethics. Surprisingly enough, Zemach claims that

> [n]othing can be done about the world; facts are facts. But "good conscience" can still be acquired by clearly seeing what the meaning of

[14] Atkinson can be considered different from other metaphysical readers of the Tractatus in his claim about the opening remarks. He does not think that the opening remarks are all metaphysical and ontological. Having drawn a distinction between ontology and metaphysics in the *Tractatus*, he thinks that what Wittgenstein says about world of facts is a matter of metaphysics but that anything beyond that, i.e., the world of things, belong to an unsayable ontology in the *Tractatus*. We will talk about this in more details later in this chapter.

> life (i.e., the meaning of the world) consists of; that is by "praying to God." Or, to put it in the language of 6.54, by climbing up the Tractarian ladder and then "seeing the world rightly." (Zemach, 1964: 54)

He begins by claiming that not only does Wittgenstein's assertions on "the mystical" in his ending remarks "depend heavily on what he says about facts, objects, logic and language" (ibid: 38), but that the other way is correct too. That is, what Wittgenstein says in the opening remarks on language, facts, and so on depends on what he writes at the end on "the mystical". As put by Zemach, "the earlier finds its natural and necessary completion in the later" (ibid). This view, I think, is a natural consequence of what I call the confusion of logical concepts with the ethical/aesthetic ones. We need to see how exactly Zemach makes his desired mutual connection between the opening and ending remarks of the *Tractatus*.

Zemach starts his discussion with telling us what Wittgenstein meant by the world and its constituents: "The world is the totality of facts" (*TLP*, 1.1). But, in order to make his point about the peculiar connection he builds between the opening and ending remarks, Zemach draws a distinction between "facts" and "factuality of facts" and regards the world of facts or what is the case as a matter of factual contingency in which no necessary condition can be found. In other words, he maintains, "facts are entirely independent of each other" (Zemach, 1964: 40). The factuality of facts is, however, completely different from the facts themselves; the former makes the latter possible. As Zemach says, "factuality is what makes the world a world" (ibid). But what is factuality? He thinks that the

factuality of facts is precisely the mystical which Wittgenstein believes is the existence of the world and that cannot be expressed in language. What Zemach learns from the final remarks[15] of the *Tractatus* on the mystical is

> 1) that the mystical is *that* there is a world (and not *how* it is), 2) that this "fact", i.e., that there is a world, is not itself *in* the world, and 3) that this "fact" cannot be *pictured* by facts, but it can be *shown* by them. (Zemach, 1964: 41)

He never tells us how he comes to the conclusion that by "*make themselves manifest*" (*TLP*, 6.522) Wittgenstein meant *make themselves manifest by or through facts*. Instead, Zemach comments on his own conclusion by pointing to the essence of language/world and saying that language can represent facts but that it cannot represent the "fact" that facts are facts, i.e., it cannot picture or represent the *factuality* of facts. In his view——and I think the non-metaphysical reading of the opening remarks I endorse would also agree with him on this point——the *factuality* of facts is not a fact itself but is a formal feature of a fact and since language is only able to represent facts, therefore it cannot picture that facts are facts; it, however, can show it.

What matters to us is the next step Zemach takes to demonstrate what he believes to be the identity of "*that* there is a world" and the "factuality of facts". In other words, in Zemach's reading, the formal feature of language and

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[15] The remarks are as follows:
6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical.
6.432 *How* things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself *in* the world.
6.44 It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but *that* it exists.

consequently the form of the world that cannot be pictured in language but only shown are nothing but "the mystical" or "*that* the world exists" that Wittgenstein introduces us to in the ending remarks. This is what I am inclined to disagree with based on the reading of the *Tractatus* I support in this thesis. The line of thought Zemach follows has serious consequences for our understanding of Wittgenstein's early philosophy. I believe that the kind of identification Zemach endorses allows him to enter a further step in which "the mystical" which lies outside the world is taken as the sense of the world, which must also "lie outside the world" (*TLP*, 6.41) and hence outside language. What this entails is that, since Wittgenstein names the sense of the world God[16], and since in Zemach's interpretation God is the very factuality of facts or the very formal feature of the world, it is absolutely evident for Zemach that God is what makes language meaningful or what makes language possible.[17] It would follow that God would be the formal logic of language or what language shares with the world in order to be able to picture it. Zemach has definitely accepted the other side of this equality: "God is exactly this essence of the facts, their factuality" (Zemach, 1964: 41). And we know that this factuality is not "something facts say, but rather something they show, [... it] is not effable, though it is exhibited by the facts" (ibid, p. 42).

We see that what in Black resulted in a view that the mystical and the substance of the world are the same and that Black implicitly makes the claim that

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[16] "The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God" (*Notebooks*, 11.6.16.).

[17] "The factuality of facts is not something facts say, but rather something they show. A fact cannot express its factuality, only exhibit it. Thus the factuality of the universe is not effable, though it is exhibited by the facts. It shows itself not by the specific way in which the fact *'sich verhält*,' but by the 'fact' *that* the fact is a fact. God, the inexpressible, the mystical, is a formal 'fact.' The formal 'fact' *that* the world is, namely, *that* there is the totality of facts, is God." (Zemach, 1964: 42)

a full linguistic analysis of ordinary meaningful propositions can end in showing "the mystical" or "*that* the world exists" through the manifestation of the logical form / essence and the form (or substance) of the world. Here, in Zemach, we see that this connection is more obvious. The above scheme in Zemach amounts to his announcement that God (the mystical=the sense of the world=*that* the world exists) is the very general form of the propositions which is nothing but the logical form of language or what he calls the factuality of facts: what makes a fact possible.

However, we know that these claims have more serious philosophical consequences for Wittgenstein. We saw in the previous chapter that for Wittgenstein any meaningful proposition contains what is shared by all propositions or, as it were, all description or language, namely, what language and the world must have in common so that the former could be a picture of the latter, the logical/depictional form. We saw that propositions *do* show this feature of theirs but do *not* say it. The general form of a proposition is the very logical form which is shared by language and the world; it is the world and language's shared possibility of structure and the very reason why language can picture the world. Although propositions cannot say or express this shared possibility of structure, they can *point at* it.

In conclusion, although propositions cannot say anything about the factuality of facts (i.e., formal feature of the world=sense of the world=God=the mystical) they can, however, show it. Simply, for Zemach, it seems to me that factual statements can manifest God through their ability to show logical form.

I think that this fits the metaphysical reading of the opening remarks and taking as one and the same what Wittgenstein says about the formal features of the world in his preliminary remarks and what he says on the mystical or "*that* the world exists" in the final remarks. The metaphysical reading has no choice other than to ignore the final remarks or to see a firm connection between them and what Wittgenstein says on the "substance" and the subsistence of the objects in the opening remarks. It has to do something about Wittgenstein's ontological claims at the beginning and at the end of the *Tractatus*. In Zemach, this identification of two (in my view) separate categories, i.e., the factuality of facts and the existence of the world or the meaning of the world, leads to the strange thought that for Wittgenstein thinking about logical form equals praying to God. Zemach comes to this conclusion based on his own interpretation of "the mystical" in the *Tractatus* and what Wittgenstein states in the 11.6.16 entry of *Notebooks*: "to pray is to think about the meaning of life".

A critical study of Zemach's interpretation has appeared in a chapter of James Atkinson's book devoted to the mystical in Wittgenstein's early philosophy. Atkinson thinks the main problem with Zemach's reading lies in a confusion between metaphysics and ontology in the *Tractatus*. Indeed, a distinction between features of reality and the existence of the world in Wittgenstein's early philosophy constitutes the main theme in Atkinson's critical reading of other interpretations and is at the centre of his own approach. He thinks the opening remarks include both a metaphysical and an ontological account of reality which

must be distinguished from one another. The problem with most interpretations in Atkinson's view, is their inability to make such a distinction.

According to Atkinson, Wittgenstein's early philosophy could be seen as having a similar treatment of the mystical as what makes language and the world possible, albeit in a different guise. Before we talk about Atkinson, we must mention that such readings (as that of Zemach) have no option besides seeing the very method of the *Tractatus* as a way of contemplating life through thinking about the essence of language and the world. So, the Tractarian method in finding the form/essence of language and the world is, as it were, nothing but to *pray*. For Zemach, the connection between the world and "the mystical" lies in the aesthetic way of seeing the world: the way in which "*that* there is a world' and not "*how* the world is" is contemplated. But the question Zemach must answer is whether in that case we do not have to consider the *Tractatus* as an aesthetic work, in a different sense from what Wittgenstein used to claim. Wittgenstein thought of his book's point as "an ethical one". In an undated letter to von Ficker he comments on the *Tractatus* as follows:

> I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have *not* written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY *rigorous* way of drawing

> those limits. In short, I believe that where *many* others today are just *gassing*, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the *preface* and the *conclusion*, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book. (Engelmann, 1967: 143-44)

What Zemach regards as the Tractarian method seems not to be drawing "limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside [...] by being silent about it" but pointing at "the mystical" through philosophical elucidation of the nature of language and the world. This, even though with some minor differences, could also be discerned in James Atkinson's interpretation of the final remarks and what he offers as his mystical reading of the *whole Tractatus*. Atkinson argues that the sense of the book is ethical in the sense that it seeks to show us "*that* the world exists" which is an *unsayable* thing by only saying *sayable* things. To show where exactly the line between the realms of the sayable and the unsayable rests, he starts from the ineffability of the objects in the *Tractatus*.

He believes that Wittgenstein's analysis of the structure of the world, i.e., the metaphysics of the *Tractatus*, does not go beyond facts since in Wittgenstein's view objects cannot be put into words. Atkinson uses the ineffability of reality at the level of objects to distinguish between *world of facts* and *world of things*. He states that Wittgenstein's metaphysics at the beginning of the book is only

applicable to the world of facts, not of things. This is to say that Atkinson also makes a distinction between the kind of analysis Wittgenstein employs to reach the world of facts and the kind of method he uses to argue for the world of things or for the subsistence of a totality of things. The former, Atkinson thinks, is similar to Russell's logical atomism, which is to analyze the world on its own (albeit with a logical method) and try to reach the final constituents of the world which are the very facts. The latter is a different method, or more exactly, approach by which the world of objects or things will be accessible not to thoughts but to a peculiar way of looking at the world. The latter philosophical method or treatment of the world is, according to Atkinson, the same as "the mystical" in Wittgenstein's early philosophy. In other words, he thinks a full understanding of the *Tractatus* requires a mystical reading of the text.

Atkinson argues that the existence of objects cannot be proved or rejected and for Wittgenstein the conditions of a meaningful language as picture do not allow one to talk of the existence of non-existence of objects:

> Propositions are pictures of reality (4.021) that show how things stand if they are true (4.022). Propositions restrict reality to either yes or no (4.023). In other words, language is restricted to propositions that restrict reality to yes or no. In the case of objects, they can be named in propositions that describe states of affairs. (Atkinson, 2009: 25)

However, the conclusion he comes to is not that, due to their ineffability, objects are not reality or do not make reality. He uses the distinction Henry Le Roy Finch has drawn between two German terms Wittgenstein has used in the *Tractatus* for

reality in order to show that objects make up a reality different from the reality made by collection of facts or states of affairs.

According to Finch, in order to refer to the reality that corresponds to propositions Wittgenstein uses the word *Wirklichkeit*; this is the reality whose logical form is shared by language (See Finch, 1971: 187). Language contains the form of what represents and not the content of its sense (*TLP*, 3.13). On the other hand, *Realität* is the reality that contains both the form and content of the world, and is what is limited in 5.5561 to the totality of objects. Atkinson sees this reality (*Realität*) as the mystical, or as what manifests itself but cannot be put into words. "The image of language that corresponds to *Wirklichkeit* is one in which propositions picture reality. They do this by showing the form of a situation, but not the content" (Atkinson, 2009: 38). Despite the distinction that Finch and Atkinson believe there is between these two realities, Atkinson sees them as one and the same in a peculiar sense. He, like the proponents of the previous interpretations, thinks that without the mystical sense of the reality ("*that* the world exists" (*Realität*)) one cannot think or talk of the other sense of reality, i.e. "*how* the world is" (*Wirklichkeit*). "[. . .] *Wirklichkeit* and *Realität* are not separate realities. It is not possible to talk about my world [(*Realität*)] without the world (*Wirklichkeit*). That is, the world provides the form and structure to the world that I alone understand (i.e. my world)." (Atkinson, 2009: 39)

Furthermore, Atkinson seeks a connection between what can be shown yet not said in language, namely the logical form on the one hand and what manifests itself, i.e., the mystical, on the other. He offers what he calls his "mystical

reading" of the whole *Tractatus* through which no difference could be seen between what Wittgenstein obviously thinks can be shown in propositions and what Wittgenstein in the final remarks introduces as the mystical as what manifest themselves (Wittgenstein does not say where). However, Atkinson does not state clearly how Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis and the way he reaches to what can be shown in language, i.e., logical form, can lead to the revelation of the mystical or *that* the world exists. For instance, he sees Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell on the theory of types[18] as related to Wittgenstein's mystical view of the world and his mystical way of solving philosophical problems. On this matter, Atkinson sees the advantage of Wittgenstein's approach as follows:

> In Wittgenstein's view there are things, such as logical form, which cannot be put into words but shows themselves. However, from Russell's point of view, all complexes and their constituents are self-subsistent, as in the case of teaspoons, the class of teaspoons and so on. The advantage of Wittgenstein's view (of distinguishing between what can be said from what cannot, but only shown) is that where Russell is limited to describing how the world is, Wittgenstein shows that the problems of philosophy are not to be solved by a description of the world. (Atkinson, 2009: 49)

Using Finch's distinction, in Atkinson's view Russell is limited to a description of *Wirklichkeit* , but the description fails because it lacks what any system of representation or any kind of language must have in order to represent what they

[18] Wittgenstein claims what Russell tries to say by this theory shows itself in the use of propositions and that we cannot make propositions that say something about themselves.

depict, namely logico-pictorial form. I think Atkinson's articulation of the difference between Wittgenstein and Russell can show how his interpretation of "the mystical" in Wittgenstein ties to the previous readings especially Zemach's. Atkinson thinks Wittgenstein's method succeeds because it is not limited to *Wirklichkeit* but presupposes another reality that cannot be expressed but makes any expression possible. So, Atkinson asserts that the difference between Wittgenstein and Russell here can be explained in terms of Wittgenstein's view of "the mystical" (*that* the world exists). For Atkinson, this is what Wittgenstein refers to as the cardinal problem of philosophy.[19] Atkinson explains the point as follows:

> Wittgenstein's feeling that Russell has failed to grasp the central point of the book is based on Russell's apparent inability to distinguish theories that can be expressed by language (i.e. what can be thought) from what can only be shown and not cannot be expressed by language but only shown. If we assume a mystical reading of the *Tractatus*, the passage at LRKM,[20] could be interpreted in the following way. At the end of the passage it is stated that what cannot be expressed by language shows itself. At 6.522 we find that there are things that cannot be put into words, which show themselves but cannot be put into words, which Wittgenstein calls the mystical. If we read this passage in light of 6.44,

[19] "Now I am afraid you haven't really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole business of logical props is the only corollary. The main point is the theory of what can be expressed [gesagt] by props—i.e., by language—(and which comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by props, but only shown [*gezeigt*] which I believe is the cardinal problem of philosophy" (quoted in Von Wright, 1974: 71).
[20] Von Wright,1974, *Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore*.

(that the mystical is not *how* the world is, but *that* it is), we can interpret "what shows itself" as "*that* the world exists". (Atkinson, 2009: 49-54)

So, Atkinson divides the opening remarks into two parts: metaphysical statements and ontological statements. He thinks the remarks on the structure of the world of facts and states of affairs reveal Wittgenstein's metaphysical account of the world, while the following remarks and especially those between 2.02 and 2.03 are about the structure of the world of things. The former, Atkinson believes, deal with how the world is, whereas the latter deals with *that* the world is. The latter remarks are about the substance of the world and we discussed them in the first chapter. His main criticism of the other readings is that they have not been able to see this distinction.

We see that what in the standard reading was implicitly taken to be the mystical in the *Tractatus* is announced by Atkinson more explicitly. He claims that the substance of the world is the *Realität* or *that* the world exists. This is not essentially different from what Black had claimed connecting the totality of objects or the substance of the world to *that* the world exists: "mysticism springs from wonderment at the *substance* of the world and might be expressed as the thought, 'How strange that there should be any objects!' " (Black, 1964: 375) We see that in both of these accounts the Wittgensteinian effort to find what is necessary to determine the sense of the propositions (the unalterable form or the substance of the world)---which belongs to the logical order of language as a picture is taken as his articulation of an ontological attitude about the world:

mystical feeling or *that* it exists. In the next chapter, I will attempt to read the mystical completely redeemed from the shadow of the opening remarks.

Chapter Three

Aesthetics: "A Condition of the World"

In this final chapter, I offer my reading of the final remarks of the *Tractatus* and in particular the remarks on the mystical and ethics/aesthetics, as well as their relations with the opening remarks. This reading, despite certain similarities it shares with the previously reviewed readings, focuses on a fundamentally different point: the independence of "the mystical" from logic and the essence of the language which is, as we saw in the first chapter, the main issue in Wittgenstein's investigation in the whole project of the *Tractatus* and in particular in the opening remarks. So, this chapter endorses and emphasizes a resolute acceptance of the logical consequences of the Wittgensteinian claims that (1) aesthetics and ethics are mystical phenomena——that they are a peculiar way of seeing the world in which "that the world exists," and not "how it is," is contemplated, and (2) this special way of seeing the world is a condition for the world exactly in the same way and at the same status as logic is; in other words, ethics/aesthetics can replace logic to put the world under new conditions. In this respect this chapter's thesis, can be seen as an attempt to read Wittgenstein's final remarks in the *Tractatus* in a way so that his claim in the *Notebooks* that "Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic" (*Notebooks*, 24.7.16) expresses the status of the ethical and thereby of the aesthetic in his early philosophy.

There are many remarks in Wittgenstein's *Notebooks 1914-1916* that are related to art and aesthetics, but it seems that Wittgenstein had changed his mind

about many of them when he was writing the *Tractatus*. I should note here that my use of *Notebooks 1914-1916* and "A Lecture on Ethics" will always be confined to the cases where I consider it plausible to prove their consistency with the related propositions in the *Tractatus*. In other words, I consider the *Tractatus* as a source of Wittgenstein's final views on his early thoughts. So, any claim in his other early writings that can be supported by the statements in the *Tractatus* can be useful to my purpose. In this respect, it should be noted that the roots of many misunderstandings of the status of mystical issues including aesthetics and ethics in the *Tractatus* lie in a careless use of Wittgenstein's other early writings. We pointed briefly to one of these careless uses in the previous chapter, and saw how some relations between the *Tractatus* remarks and the ones in the *Notebooks* have led some commentators to use the final parts of the *Notebooks* as a reliable source for reading and understanding the final remarks in the *Tractatus*. I think this can only be possible if we are able to argue for the certain understanding of certain remarks using the general attitude we have adopted towards the whole Tractarian project.[21] What I have pursued in this thesis is a holistic treatment of the status of the main issues in the *Tractatus* including the world and language, and now aesthetics and ethics (or "the mystical").

[21] As an example, Wittgenstein states in the Notebooks that " Art is a kind of expression. Good art is complete expression." (*Notebooks*, 19.9.16). In the *Tractatus*, 'expression' is a term Wittgenstein uses as a synonym for symbol and is described as "any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense" (TLP, 3.31). In the *Tractatus* aesthetics and ethics are regarded as inexpressible and it seems that Wittgenstein does not want to ascribe a power of expressiveness to art. Remarks suggesting 'art as an expression' might have been one of those supplementary remarks Ogden (the first translator of the Tractatus) asked for and Wittgenstein thought "they really contain no elucidation at all". (On this correspondence between Wittgenstein and Ogden see Conant 2002, 378-9)

I will start with a short account of the properties of the mystical feeling in the *Tractatus* and other early writings partly based on B.F. McGuiness' study of Wittgenstein's "mysticism" to see how they relate to and can characterize the aesthetic way of looking at the world.[22] McGuiness has introduced the characteristics of "the mystical" in Wittgenstein's early writings through a comparison with Russell's characterization of mysticism. This can be very useful in seeing where Wittgenstein's notion of "the mystical" diverges from the traditional notion of mysticism as a belief in a higher reality. I try to show that these concepts are all, for Wittgenstein, a way of describing the experience which is mystical, namely seeing the world as an existent. Then I look for the connections between the existential view of the world in light of the features of the mystical feelings and the artistic way of looking at the objects in the above-mentioned three texts to demonstrate the way in which art-objects can reveal the mystical. Finally, I attempt to show how the triangle of these three texts gives us a more complete and clearer picture of Wittgenstein's treatment of aesthetics in his early philosophy, helping me support my two main claims: (1) Contemplating the existence of the world which is not how the world is, but *that* it exists, is not a thought with a propositional form but a pre-linguistic act totally different from what Wittgenstein talks of in his opening remarks of the *Tractatus*; and (2) This kind of viewing the world or this feeling cannot be expressed in language since it has nothing to do with the aspect of the world that has been logically structured.

[22] Although I agree with Atkinson that we cannot consider Wittgenstein's treatment of 'the mystical' and his remarks on the issue as 'mysticism' since Wittgenstein does not present a set of theories and doctrines about mystical truth, McGuiness' search for the properties Wittgenstein ascribes to 'the mystical' is very useful.

This feeling is caused by a certain treatment of the world that puts the world under another condition. In other words, I try to show that a world prior to language——that is, a world we can see but cannot put into words——can be put under different conditions including logic and aesthetics; the world under the logical condition is the world we can express in language by saying how it is (how the facts constitute the world), but cannot describe as a pre-logical indivisible whole. I try to demonstrate the thesis that such a world, i.e. the world as a whole, cannot be said or thought but only can be seen *sub specie aeterni*, that is from a perspective prior to language and logic.

"It is not certain", as McGuiness points out, "that Wittgenstein had read Russell's essay, 'Mysticism and Logic', when he composed the *Tractatus*" (McGuiness, p. 305). But despite the historical evidence that shows he might not have read Russell's 1918 essay and the conceptual differences between their use of the term, he had, as McGuiness shows, what Russell had introduced as the main parts of mysticism and shared the "presuppositions and results" of Russell's essay (ibid). For Russell, the mystical is shown in inexpressible feelings and moods which indicate a sense of certainty and revelation. Although the particular beliefs which result from the mystical moods cannot be put into words, they have four characteristics that help us learn more about the phenomenology of these unsayable moments. According to McGuiness, these features of mysticism in Russell's article can be seen in Wittgenstein's treatment of "the mystical" in his early philosophy.

Russell starts his article by attempting to locate the motivation for mysticism. He writes:

> Metaphysics, or the attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of thought, has been developed, from the first, by the union and conflict of two very different human impulses, the one urging men towards mysticism, the other urging them towards science. Some men have achieved greatness through one of these impulses alone, others through the other alone. (Russell, 1918: 3)

Russell thinks that philosophers are different from mystics and scientists because philosophers have "felt the need both of science and of mysticism" (ibid). Russell gives us examples of philosophers and explores how their metaphysics is a combination of the mystical and scientific impulses. We also see in Wittgenstein that metaphysics and talk of what the reality prior to language is like is considered as the inexpressible and hence the mystical.

To Russell, the first feature of a mystical feeling is its providing a certain kind of insight into reality which is radically different from that of reason. Wittgenstein, similarly, thinks that the mystical is accompanied by a felt insight that you know the solution to the problem of life despite the fact that you cannot say it. The second property of the mystical feeling is, according to Russell's essay, the oneness and indivisibility of reality. Russell believes that this idea of oneness of things "has given rise to pantheism in religion and to monism in philosophy" (Russell, p. 16). Similarly, for Wittgenstein, the mystical constitutes viewing the world as a whole. Russell's third feature is the unreality of time or, in his own

words, "the denial of reality of time" (ibid, p. 10). Also, in Wittgenstein's words the mystical is to see *sub specie aeternitatis*, or to feel eternity or timelessness which is experienced by those who live in the present. The fourth and the last characteristic of "the mystical" is to regard good and evil as illusory or "mere appearance". According to McGuiness, for Wittgenstein, good and evil are not in the world, but are attitudes of the will; they are not real, not in the sense that facts are.[23] I agree with McGuiness that these features of the mystical are acknowledged by Wittgenstein in his early writings; however, I think these cannot be regarded as an exhaustive explanation of the nature of "the mystical" without attending to what Wittgenstein thinks *is* "the mystical"——"*that* the world exists" rather than "*how* the world is". The features of the mystical feelings recognized by McGuiness in Russell and Wittgenstein are features of a way of seeing objects and the world through which one views the existence of the world and objects.

It should be noted that Wittgenstein's philosophical system which deals with the status of language and aims at a revelation of the essence of language using logical analysis, is not a mystical philosophy.[24] This logical analysis is the

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[23] One can conclude that the mystical feeling and ethics, for one who has such feelings, must involve a full acceptance of the world. Indeed, this can be seen in a few of Wittgenstein's remarks on ethics in the *Notebooks*:

"Suppose that man could not exercise his will, but had to suffer all the misery of this world, then what could make him happy?

How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of this world?

Through the life of knowledge.

The good conscience is the happiness that the life of knowledge preserves.

The life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of the world.

The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of the world.

To it the amenities of the world are so many graces of fate." (Notebooks, 13.8.16.)

[24] Atkinson thinks that Wittgenstein's method in the Tractatus is a mystical one and the book must be read from a mystical point of view——a point of view that "emphasises the aim of the book" (Atkinson, 2009: 140). The role of 'what cannot be said' in the Tractatus in solving philosophical problems or making them vanish is supposed to remind us of the necessity of the mystical perspective to do philosophy. (See Atkinson, 2009 and in particular chapter 1, 3, and 6)

only legitimate way of talking in philosophy other than uttering factual statements. The kind of philosophy he does in the *Tractatus*, as discussed in the first chapter, does not say anything about metaphysics, the structure of the world prior to language, or *"that* the world exists". It only demarcates the boundaries of language and shows where the metaphysician commits meaningless utterances. The philosophers Russell introduces as examples of mystic philosophers are those who have used mysticism to establish their metaphysics. They have used a "faulty logic" to found their treatment of the world and reality on a mystical treatment of reality, time, good and evil. Wittgenstein's notion of "the mystical" does not have any constructive role in his philosophy. He places "the mystical" outside the whole realm of language and expressiblity (like logic) but refrains from acknowledging it as the condition of meaningfulness (unlike logic). He believes that it must be a condition for the world but not as logic is. It does not provide the world with conditions for a new language. Ethical propositions have no chance for having any meaning: "[...] it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics" (*TLP*, 6.42).

One very important similarity between Russell and Wittgenstein on "the mystical" is that both believe in its ineffability. Russell thinks that the logic that is used to defend mysticism or the unity of reality is "faulty as logic" (Russell, 1918: 27). Similarly, Wittgenstein suggests that "the mystical" cannot be put into words. However, we see that their notion of "the mystical" diverges when they talk about the content of this mode of feeling or belief. Russell emphasizes the classical notion of mysticism, i.e., a belief in a reality beyond what is known to the senses,

whereas for Wittgenstein the world we deal with in our everyday life can be seen in a mystical way. The senses feel the world in a different way than usual. There is no reality for Wittgenstein beyond the world of facts, but the very world of facts is able to be felt in an unusual way, namely, in an aesthetic way.[25]

Although Wittgenstein's articulation of "the mystical" has similarities with what Russell names as the characteristics of "mystical" emotions, we can see that they differ in some important manners vital to our discussion in this chapter. For Russell, the mystical beliefs result from the contemplation or "reflection upon inarticulate experience gained in the moment of insight" (Russell, 1918: 9). Furthermore, this insight or inner reflection reveals "reality behind the world of appearance and utterly different from it" (ibid). Russell's conception of mysticism—that can be called the classical conception of the mystical—involves a recognition of reality beyond and entirely different from what we see. On the contrary, for Wittgenstein, what the mystical feeling deals with is contemplation of the existence of the world one sees rather than another reality beyond what is seen. *That* the seen object "exists" is a matter of mysticism for Wittgenstein, and not a higher reality beyond the seen object. As we will see later, for Wittgenstein the higher or the ethical or absolute value is the very mystical attitude or *that* the world exists.

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[25] It seems that in his both early and late remarks on aesthetics, Wittgenstein has never limited the field to art and art-objects. In his early thoughts, artistic/aesthetic way of seeing the world can be extended to non-artistic objects as well as artworks. In his own example in the Notebooks, a stove can be contemplated and seen *sub specie aeterni*, that is in an aesthetic way (*Notebooks*, 8.10.16). Similarly, in his late remarks on aesthetics which appeared in a lecture he gave on aesthetics, he extends the realm of aesthetic judgments to most of preferential statements or behaviours in everyday life (See Wittgenstein, 1966, page 13 where he explores our "aesthetic reactions" to where one might think a door must be placed while designing it and page 5 where he discusses our reaction when we are "trying on a good suit at the tailor's").

It might be worthy to juxtapose those parts of the *Tractatus*, *Notebooks*, and "Lecture on Ethics" which can help us see where Wittgenstein determines the status of aesthetics and how he connects it with what he calls "the mystical" or "*that* the world exists". As we pointed out briefly in the previous chapter, the links between these three texts have led to the interpretation that art and aesthetics in Wittgenstein's view consist of contemplation of the existence of the objects. However, I think that we need a more precise account of these linking remarks in order to capture a more vivid picture of the connection we assume between the scattered remarks on "the mystical" in these three different texts.

Significantly, although the word "aesthetics" appears only one time and in a parenthetical remark in the *Tractatus*, the word is highly significant. Wittgenstein emphasizes the oneness of ethics and aesthetics to show that what he says about the status of ethics and ethical propositions could be applied to aesthetics, too. He writes, "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)" (*TLP*, 6.421). This is not the only statement on the status of ethics in the *Tractatus*. He expresses his views on ethics in other statements, too, which can be used to make perspicuous the relevance of aesthetics/ethics to the whole project of the *Tractatus*. I use *Notebooks* and "A Lecture on Ethics" to understand better the final remarks of the *Tractatus*. So, rather than trying to find an aesthetic theory in these remarks, I seek to see where aesthetics stands among the other parts of his early philosophy. In this respect, I try to offer and support an interpretation of the final remarks that is consistent with the opening remarks. We will see that this reading is most

consistent with the non-metaphysical reading of the *Tractatus* and its opening remarks offered by McGinn. Indeed, her treatment of the opening remarks and her central claim that they do not express truths about a world prior to language but describe the logical order governing language or any kind of representational system, will help us to better see the significance of Wittgenstein's reflections on ethics, aesthetics, and art-object in his early philosophy. In light of the non-metaphysical reading, we also explore what he had in mind by making a connection between aesthetic contemplation or artistic way of seeing the world and "the mystical" or feeling the world as a limited whole or "*that* it exists".

For the author of the *Tractatus*, aesthetics and ethics are one and the same. We will see that their oneness is explained in light of the peculiar way of seeing the world necessary for one to see things aesthetically or to regard the world ethically. This way of seeing the world is called by Wittgenstein *"sub specie aeterni"* and leads to the non-propositional feeling the world as a whole. Also, they are both inexpressible in language and hence transcendental (*TLP*, 6.421). The *Tractatus*, therefore, explains the connection between "the mystical" and the aesthetic by defining the former as "to view the world sub specie aeterni" or "feeling [it] as a limited whole" (*TLP*, 6.45). Wittgenstein characterizes this feeling or way of seeing the world as one by which one is able to consider not "*how* things are in the world" but "*that* it exists" (*TLP*, 6.44). In the lecture on ethics in 1929, we can see that the same theme of identification of ethics and aesthetics reoccurs in different ways. At the beginning Wittgenstein illuminates what he means by ethics by introducing it as "the most essential part of what is

generally called Aesthetics" (LE, p. 4). We see that Wittgenstein's treatment of ethics and aesthetics is different from what we normally see as moral philosophy or ethics and philosophy of art or aesthetics. He mostly deals with the status of ethics in his own philosophical system. He is highly concerned with finding the exact location of ethics and aesthetics, and in general the "absolute value," in his philosophy of language, and is strict in what he thinks is the ethical value. Ethical value is what cannot be deduced to factual statements. In his lecture on ethics, he introduces the topic as follows:

> [I]nstead of saying "Ethics is the enquiry into what is good" I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living. I believe if you look at all these phrases you will get a rough idea as to what it is that Ethics is concerned with. (LE, 5)

He says that what he means by ethics involves an absolute sense of value which cannot be put into words. In other words, it cannot be analyzed into relative values and then into pure facts; in this sense, it is not in the language and hence not in the world. He attempts to enlighten us about his notion of "absolute or ethical value" by stating that "I believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I have it *I wonder at the existence of the world*" (LE, p.8). He also claims in the lecture that the "experience of wondering at the existence of the world [...] is the experience of seeing the world as a miracle" (LE, p. 11). So, viewing the world as a limited whole, which is a mystical feeling, is to look at the world's

existence, and the ethical/aesthetic or absolute value is to wonder at the existence of the world or to see it as a miracle. Furthermore, he regards the existence of the world as a miracle in his *Notebooks*. He notes that "[a]esthetically, the miracle is that the world exists. That what exists does exist" (*Notebooks*, 20.10.16). So, the connection between the two former texts, i.e., the *Tractatus* and "A Lecture on Ethics," lies, I think, in the "feeling" of *wonder* at the existence of the world (in the Lecture) and the mystical "feeling" of the world as a limited whole or as what exists (in the *Tractatus*). The feeling, as we will see, is also characterized as different from the ordinary way of looking at the world and hence of standing outside the world and language. It is, as it were, inexpressible.

In the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein emphasizes the connection between ethics and aesthetics, characterizing the work of art and the good life respectively as the object and the world seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. He explains this peculiar way of seeing the object and the world by contrasting it with another way of viewing things as follows: "The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* from outside" (*Notebooks*, 7.10.16). We saw that in the *Tractatus* the view *sub specie aeternitatis* was the mystical which is to feel "the world as a limited whole", that is, to contemplate not how the world is but "*that* it exists". This is to say that for Wittgenstein viewing the world as a limited whole is not to see it as possible concatenations of objects; in other words it is not to see the world as we meaningfully and normally divide it into facts. The view *sub specie aeternitatis* sees the world from outside and this is the way in which it could be seen as an indivisible whole and not as

collections of possible facts. As we saw above, this way of seeing or attitude, that is common to ethics and aesthetics, is in contrast with the usual way of seeing the world. The usual way leads to meaningful description of the world, since it sees the world as what can be divided into facts which stand for elementary propositions. On the contrary, the view *sub specie aeterni* sees the world in a non-factual way, that is "from outside". Wittgenstein connects the view-from-outside (the aesthetic/ethical view) to seeing-the-world-as-a-limited-whole (the mystical feeling) by characterizing the former as a way of looking in which objects "have the whole world as background" (*Notebooks*, 7.10.16). We will see later that he goes further to announce that the object seen *sub specie aeterni* becomes my world.

An important statement in this regard is 6.43 in the *Tractatus* where Wittgenstein suggests what he thinks to be the relation between ethics and the world of facts described in the opening remarks: " If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language." (*TLP*, 6.43) We need to know first that what Wittgenstein means by "limit". Although I do not discuss Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism here and his argument for the inexpressible truth that solipsism means (see *TLP*, 5.62 ff.), we must take a look at his statements about the limits of the world. He thinks that the limit of the world is the "philosophical self". "The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world" (*TLP*, 5.632). The subject is not a part of the world. It is not "the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the

metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it" (*TLP*, 5.641). The will as the "bearer of good and evil" (*Notebooks*, 21.7.16.) and what is necessary for the world to have ethics (*Notebooks*, 5.8.16.) enters the world with the attitude of the "metaphysical subject" or in Tractarian language, with the alteration of the *limits* of the world rather than the facts of the world. In other words, it is not the case that with the ethical attitude entering the world that a new fact or a number of facts are added to the previous facts which made the world. The ethical attitude enters the world with a sense of absolute value. Value does not alter the limits of the facts, i.e., it cannot create new possibilities of concatenation of objects into new facts. This implies that value cannot add to the subject matter of propositions, either; it cannot add anything to what Wittgenstein knows as the full description of the world. "It can only alter the limits of the world." We know also "that the limits of *language* (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world" (*TLP*, 5.62). But again the limits of language and the subject are the same. Ethical or aesthetic ways of seeing the world can change the limits of language and that does not mean that new propositions are added since no facts have been added. They alter the subject and we might say that they show themselves in a poetic (nonsensical) language. So, any alteration in the limits of the world would go on outside language and the conditions of meaningfulness. The result would be an addition of an ethical/aesthetic attitude (good/bad, beautiful/ugly) to the subject which is not *in* the world/language.

It should be noted that for Wittgenstein ethical propositions cannot be reduced to propositions about the consequences of ethical actions, that is, in his own words, ethics cannot be related to "punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms" (*TLP*, 6.422). The fundamental chasm he sees here between ethics and the world is discussed in "A Lecture on Ethics" in a very similar way. There, he makes a distinction between "the trivial or relative" and "absolute" sense of the word *value* and sees the latter as impossible to be analyzed into propositions about the facts in the world:

> If for instance I say that this is a *good* chair this means that the chair serves a certain predetermined purpose and the word good here has only meaning so far as this purpose has been previously fixed upon. In fact the word good in the relative sense simply means coming up to a certain predetermined standard. Thus when we say that this man is a good pianist we mean that he can play pieces of a certain degree of difficulty with a certain degree of dexterity. And similarly if I say that it is *important* for me not to catch cold I mean that catching a cold produces certain describable disturbances in my life and if I say that this is the *right* road I mean that it's the right road relative to a certain goal.

He thinks that this is now how ethics uses the expressions. He continues:

> Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said "Well, you play pretty badly" and suppose I answered "I know, I'm playing pretty badly but I don't want to play any better," all the

> other man could say would be "Ah, then that's all right." But suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said, "You're behaving like a beast" and then I were to say "I know I behave badly, but then I don't want to behave any better," could he then say "Ah, then that's all right"? Certainly not; he would say "Well, you *ought* to want to behave better." Here you have an absolute judgment of value, whereas the first instance was one of relative judgment. The essence of this difference seems to be obviously this: Every judgment of relative value is a mere statement of facts and can therefore be put in such a form that it loses all the appearance of a judgment of value: Instead of saying "This is the right way to Granchester," I could equally well have said, "This is the right way you have to go if you want to get to Granchester in the shortest time"; "This man is a good runner" simply means that he runs a certain number of miles in a certain number of minutes, etc. Now what I wish to contend is that, although all judgments of relative value can be shown to be mere statement of facts, no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value. (LE, p. 5-6)

Since the limits of the world and language are the same and only facts can be put into language, ethics or the absolute value is the very thing which is irreducible to facts in the world. The irreducibility of absolute value has forced Wittgenstein to utter the claim that ethics is simply outside language and hence the world. The good or evil (in their absolute sense of the terms) will is also inexpressible in

language. In light of the above treatment of the statements 6.42-6.43 we might be able to come to a more coherent understanding of Wittgenstein's claim in his entry of late July of 1916 in the *Notebooks* that "[e]thics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic. Ethics and aesthetics are one" (*Notebooks*, 7.24.16).

To see better the above point, we should take a look at the whole Tractarian project from this new perspective. Wittgenstein introduces his *Tractatus* as a logical-philosophical study of language, his purpose being to reach the essence of propositions and so the essence of the whole of language and the world. For him, these all will finally determine the boundaries of meaningfulness or "draw a limit to thought" (*TLP*, p. 3). What seems to be absent in this study is an answer to the question of whether the very world exists and how an answer to such a question could be demonstrated. However, this does not mean that he has not contemplated the question. Although his book lacks any kind of ontology, Wittgenstein not only has pondered the existential question of whether the world itself exists or not, but has seen a peculiar form of this issue as the core of his book. As we saw in the last chapter, he claimed that his book revolves around an ethical problem; we also know that for him ethics means absolute value, and that might be explained in terms of *wonder at the existence of the world*. This, however, does not mean that he has said anything positive about the existence of the world or developed any ontological or metaphysical theory. On the contrary, he has concluded that such theories would result in nonsensical propositions. Ontological questions cannot be answered or even expressed in language; they

manifest themselves in a non-linguistic manner and are what he has called "the mystical" in the *Tractatus*. The *Tractatus* might be viewed as an attempt to determine the status of aesthetics by showing us where it *cannot* be placed. This is to say that it is not the case that the propositions of the book (such as the "elucidatory" remarks the *Tractatus* opens with, according to the standard reading) constitute the metaphysical or ontological section of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but that they do what Wittgenstein himself has mentioned in his comment on the book: they determine the boundaries of the ethical (the unsayable) from within by elucidating what language can do and what it cannot. This, i.e., the determination of the limits of ethics and aesthetics from within, is the only thing Wittgenstein can say about "the mystical" because as Rhees points out (Rush Rhees, p.19) what makes it possible for Wittgenstein to use the elucidatory language is that this very tool, namely meaningful language——the only thing we have to formulate our thoughts——has a logical (pictorial) form that is not expressible through propositions but can be *shown* through the *use* of meaningful propositions. The *Tractatus*, although it is composed of senseless propositions, is an attempt to use elucidatory propositions to "express" the very thing factual propositions show in their use: the essence of language and of the world. These all mean that there is nothing left for the ethical propositions to say; Wittgenstein can never make any meaningful propositions that possess some kind of ethical or aesthetic form. If he were able to make meaningful ethical/aesthetic propositions, he would be able to write another *Tractatus* to reveal by elucidatory propositions this ethical-aesthetic form! This is why he always has to keep an eye

on the logical form of factual language as the only thing which makes "speaking" possible; even when he is talking about the ethical/aesthetic he must have in mind that they are mystical and cannot be put into words. However, he states, they show themselves. What they manifest themselves through is ethical action or aesthetic objects, and the ethical/aesthetic or what manifest themselves show nothing but the absolute value which is for Wittgenstein best described as *"that* the world exists" or "the mystical". We have, thus, no way other than calling nonsensical what one tries to express by ethical propositions such as "You shouldn't tell lies". We must conclude that Rush Rhees's effort to compare ethics/aesthetics with representational systems does not go beyond a metaphorical articulation of the issue and does not say anything about the nature of ethical/aesthetic propositions. That ethics is transcendental refers to its place outside the world and language. Ethics and aesthetics transcend the world and language; this is very similar to logic as logic is also transcendental. However, they are essentially different for Wittgenstein; unlike logic that is a condition for language, which to be meaningful must have its logical form, ethics and aesthetics are not conditions for the world in the sense that they make another language possible. The only thing we might say is that they make a way of seeing the world that is possible prior to language.

One reason for the comparison between logic and ethics/aesthetics lies in what Michael Hymers describes as the "temptation" to go further and regard ethical propositions as tautologies (Hymers, 2010: 48-49). I think one can find enough textual evidence in the *Notebooks* to support this temptation, but as we

will see later, he is not using the term in the same sense as applies to logic. In the 7.2.15 entry of the *Notebooks* he states that "[m]usical themes are in a certain sense propositions. Knowledge of the nature of logic will for this reason lead to knowledge of the nature of music" and shortly after he claims that "A tune is a kind of tautology, it is complete in itself; it satisfies itself" (*Notebooks*, 4.3.15). Also, in a comment he wrote more than a year later, after he gives us his only absolute ethical rule ("Live Happily!"), he asserts: "And if I now *ask* myself: But why should I live *happily*, then this of itself seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to me to be tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it *is* the only right life" (*Notebooks*, 30.7.16).

Logical propositions are tautologies, but why is this so important in Wittgenstein's early philosophy? For Wittgenstein, tautologies are where the logical form of language can be seen. They show, in a sense, the essence of language.

> 6.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies.
>
> 6.11 Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing. (They are the analytic propositions.)
>
> 6.12 The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies *shows* the formal—logical properties of language and the world.
>
> The fact that a tautology is yielded by *this particular way* of connecting its constituents characterizes the logic of its constituents.

> If propositions are to yield a tautology when they are connected in a certain way, they must have certain structural properties. So their yielding a tautology when combined *in this way* shows that they possess these structural properties.

As we saw in the first chapter, the pictured must share its essence with the picture if the latter is to depict the former. That logical propositions are tautological reveals the very essence of the world and language; they show what makes picturing and language possible. They show the *logic of its constituents* by showing us how these constituents connect *in a particular way*. The question is: since we know that an ethical proposition such as "You shouldn't tell lie" is not a tautology in the logical sense of the word, what does Wittgenstein mean by his claim? I think it might help if we know what he is not saying here. I believe that by viewing ethical propositions as tautological Wittgenstein does not try to give a logical necessity to ethics/aesthetics endorsing the idea that the truth presented in ethical/aesthetical propositions is a necessary truth in the same way as logical propositions are true in all possible situations. Describing ethical propositions as tautological, he does not attempt to put them in a position symmetrical with the tautological propositions of logic. We know that the fact that logical propositions are tautological shows the formal (logical) properties of logical language, and of the logical world or the only world we can talk of. Wittgenstein does not simply replace logic with aesthetics/ethics and claim that *the fact that the propositions of ethics and aesthetics are tautologies shows—not the logico-pictorial form but—the aesthetic-ethical properties of aesthetic-ethical language, of an*

aesthetic/ethical world. Wittgenstein's talk of the limits of the world and that the boundaries of the world "must wax or wane" have to be read in a different way. The idea is not that the world seen aesthetically or ethically finds a new way of being expressed in a new language, since that would mean that new facts are being created or new possibilities are discovered; something that is impossible for Wittgenstein.

The world seen as a whole or the ethical/aesthetic world cannot be described; Wittgenstein writes: "It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic.—The truth is that we could not *say* what an 'illogical' world would look like" (*TLP*, 3.031). Good and evil (beautiful and ugly) or the fact that "will" enters into the world modifies logical space, but this does not mean that a new possibility of configuration is discovered or added. "If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. (Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot be discovered later" (*TLP*, 2.0123).[26]

For Wittgenstein, a new possibility cannot be found in logical space because logic is transcendental not accidental. "In logic nothing is accidental" (2.012) and "logic pervades the world" and this means that "the limits of the world are also its limits" (5.61). As mentioned above, Wittgenstein does not mean by limits "what is the case" but *possibilities* of what is the case or reality. These

[26] 1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
2.11 A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
2.202 A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.
2.203 A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.
3.42 The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space.

possibilities, as we saw in the first chapters, are fixed and concern the logic of the world and not what the world is like at a certain moment. That is to say that they deal with the totality of objects and the possibilities of these objects. They deal with the unalterable form of the world which is composed of the totality of the objects. It is worth mentioning that according to Wittgenstein the totality of things is the "empirical reality" that shows itself in the totality of elementary propositions (the whole language). These, as it were, explain why in Wittgenstein's view, "we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well" (*TLP*, 5.61).

This is impossible because it is thinking the unthinkable. Therefore, to *wax or wane* the structure of these possibilities is in a sense to *wax or wane* the substance of the world, what is necessary for the propositions to have sense. This is impossible in a logical sense; by saying it, Wittgenstein wants to draw our attention to the fact that an ethical/aesthetic world would be a totally different world.

We can trace the radical difference between the logically conditioned world and the aesthetically conditioned world in the way Wittgenstein treats the very notion of objects. Wittgenstein never gives us any examples of the objects or logical simples introduced at the beginning of the *Tractatus* but, interestingly, at

the end of the *Notebooks* where he talks about the ethical and the aesthetic, he simply talks of contemplation of objects like a stove or art-objects.

> As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one equally significant. If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all you know is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I had studied the stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was contemplating the stove it was my world, and everything else colourless by contrast with it. (*Notebooks*, 8.10.16)

These ending remarks of the *Notebooks* seem to be radically different from the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* in which Wittgenstein is more concerned with the logical order of language necessary for language and the world to *picture* and *be pictured* respectively. The necessity of logical simples was a result of a condition in which the limits of the world are the limits of logic, too. This is not to say that we might be able to say that logical simples do or do not exist, but to state that because the limits of language show the world's boundaries, any talk of the existence or non-existence of the world or objects outside logical space (or as Pears believed "*objects devoid of internal structure*" or objects in themselves) would be nonsensical. For Wittgenstein, that the world as a whole exists cannot be put into words. Saying the world as a whole (rather than this or that particular fact) exists lack the propositional form necessary for any statement (including existential statements) to possess meaning. On the contrary, in an aesthetic way of seeing the world one could view the world in a non-propositional way. This

means that even here one could not say anything about the existence of the world but could see and feel the world as an existent.

As discussed in chapter one, according to Pears, in a Wittgensteinian analysis of the world what we will have at the end of the day are objects devoid of their internal relations or the relations that are imposed by the logical form of the language. We might now say that to reach such simples is impossible in a logical analysis.[27] No simple objects could be possible in the thinkable world which are devoid of internal relations. This means that in order to imagine or feel the object in itself and devoid of its internal relations with other objects in logical space, we must leave the logical condition of the world. This is possible for Wittgenstein only by entering an aesthetic/ethical realm. This means leaving the territory of "sense" or limits of the world and language or simply going beyond the world to see the absolute value in the objects. Wittgenstein has compared this with imagining the thing *with* the whole logical space not *in* the logical space:

> In such a way that they have the whole world as background. Is this it perhaps——in this view the object is seen *together with* space and time instead of *in* space and time?
>
> Each thing modifies the whole logical world, the whole of logical space, so to speak. (*Notebooks*, 7.10.16)

[27] 2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.
2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)
A new possibility cannot be discovered later.
2.01231 If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties.

That is to say, in an aesthetic way of seeing the world, one could see the object not in a certain position in logical space and devoid of its specific position in logical space and hence without logical form. Hence, in an aesthetic way of seeing the world (*sub specie aeternitatis*) we might talk of art-object as a thing detached from any propositional form necessary for a thing to have meaning. We might say that an aesthetic object is not the logical simple whose subsistence is necessary for the sense of the propositions, but is a result of viewing the worlds and things in the world in a different non-propositional way.[28]

We might sum up the above by emphasizing the main point of the chapter which is logic and aesthetics are similar in their being transcendental albeit in different ways. Logic goes beyond the world and language because in order to be meaningful language needs to have a certain structure and the possibility of this structure is logical form. Ethics and aesthetics, on the other hand, are not transcendental in the way logic is. They do not go beyond the world to provide it with a new possibility of a structure or a new form. In other words, the transcendence of aesthetics/ethics does not mean we can talk of new facts with a new form; it only means that there is a sense in which world can be *seen* (not *thought* though) outside its logical condition and propositional form. As we said earlier in this chapter, this is a different way of seeing the world; it differs from the ordinary way of viewing the world. The usual way of seeing the world can lead to a full description of the world through a description of all the facts in it. Logic is in Wittgenstein's words the scaffolding of the world. What a logical

[28] An art object might be in some cases composed of numerous facts, complexes and logical simples. What specifies art-objects is the fact that they are seen *sub specie aeterni*.

configuration of the world can lead to has been clearly stated by Wittgenstein: "A proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding, so that one can actually see from the proposition how everything stands logically *if* it is true. One can *draw inferences* from a false proposition" (4.023). However, the artistic way of seeing the world or, in other words, the aesthetic world, cannot be put into words because it does not share its structure with the world introduced in the opening remarks; it is not the world "a proposition constructs [...] with the help of a logical scaffolding". It is a world prior to its being logically constructed by propositions. Hence language has nothing to do with such a world. This does not mean, however, that artistic way of seeing cannot be experienced.

(Wittgenstein says that the thing in itself when contemplated (the art-object) turns into the whole world with its logical space. I think the reason he states this is connected to what he calls *wonder at the existence of the world* in his "A Lecture on Ethics". In the lecture, he asserts that his wonderment is not directed at why the object of his wonder is like this and not like that (there is this rather than that fact) but why such an object *exists at all*. The very existence of the object is also the source of the wonder Wittgenstein talks of when describing his attitude towards ethical value.

Conceiving the world as a whole is necessary for this *"feeling the world as what exists"*. By "whole", I think, here Wittgenstein means the world which is not divided into facts; or the indivisible world which has not been structured logically. It is a necessary condition because the world of facts (what the case is) cannot have an absolute value; we can compare the world with what "it could be", that is,

the situations in which other states of affairs could exist instead of ones which have made the world here and now. So, *that* the world is composed of these certain facts and not other ones cannot be a source of the wonder at the existence of the world. Only a world as a whole can be the subject of such a wonder, because in this case it is not compared with another possibility but is compared in itself or in a sense is not compared at all. Art-objects have the same status. In a Schopenhauerian tone, Wittgenstein claims that object seen *sub specie aeternitatis* becomes my world. It becomes the whole world to be able to be considered in itself, and hence, a source of the wonder at its existence. No other fact could be imagined, if the object is going to be the whole world.

Conclusion

I agree with McGinn's reading of the opening remarks in the *Tractatus* that the apparently metaphysical propositions in the remarks reveal what she calls the "logical order of language" rather than features of a reality prior to language. We saw that the metaphysical account of the opening remarks has had a great affect on how the mainstream interpretations of the ending remarks reads the ending remarks. They——with some differences in details——try to show what Wittgenstein had claimed in the opening remarks about the world is what he later in the final remarks introduces as "the mystical". In this thesis, I tried to make a distinction between some of unsayable things in the *Tractatus* by differentiating between the essence of language (=essence of the world) and *"that* the world exists". Although both of them cannot be expressed, the articulation of the former

is what has made up the opening remarks, which are elucidations. The latter, however, cannot be put into elucidatory words and is the mystical. The mystical or *that* the world exists can be felt in a certain way of looking at the world which is characterized by Wittgenstein as viewing the world/things from outside, that is seeing them *sub specie aeternitatis*. This could also help us to talk more about the status of aesthetics in the *Tractatus* comparing to the status of logic in the book. Logic transcends language (and the world) since in order to be meaningful language must have a certain structure. The possibility of this structure is logical form. Aesthetics, on the other hand, is not transcendental or does not go beyond the world in this sense. It does not give the world a new possibility of a structure or a new form, that is aesthetic form. So, we cannot talk of new facts with aesthetic form. However, this means that there is a "sense" in which world can be *seen* (not *thought* though) outside its logical condition and propositional form. Although this way of seeing the world or things in the world cannot lead to meaningful propositions, it is required when one wants to see the world as not *"how it is"* but "*that it exists"*.

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Appendix I: Excerpts from *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

1 The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being *all* the facts.
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into facts.
2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).
2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.
2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing *can* occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.
2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)
A new possibility cannot be discovered later.
2.01231 If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties.
2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all *possible* states of affairs are also given.
2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all situations.
2.0141 The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.
2.02 Objects are simple.
2.0201 Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely.
2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.
2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.
2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false).
2.022 It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have *something*—a form—in common with it.
2.023 Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.
.....
2.024 Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.
2.026 There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form.
2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.
2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.
2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.
.....
2.032 The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs.
2.033 Form is the possibility of structure.

2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.
2.05 The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.
2.061 States of affairs are independent of one another.
2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or nonexistence of another.
2.063 The sum-total of reality is the world.
2.12 A picture is a model of reality.
2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.
2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects.
2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.
2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.

Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.
2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.
2.1511 *That* is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.
2.1512 It is laid against reality like a measure.
2.15121 Only the end-points of the graduating lines actually *touch* the object that is to be measured.
2.1513 So a picture, conceived in this way, also includes the pictorial relationship, which makes it into a picture.
2.1514 The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the picture's elements with things.
2.1515 These correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture's elements, with which the picture touches reality.
2.16 If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts.
2.161 There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all.
2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way it does, is its pictorial form.
2.172 A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it.
2.174 A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.
2.18 What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.
2.181 A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture.
2.19 Logical pictures can depict the world.
2.2 A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts.
2.201 A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
2.202 A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.
2.203 A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.

2.21 A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.
2.22 What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by means of its pictorial form.
2.221 What a picture represents is its sense.
2.222 The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.
2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224 It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori.
3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.
3.001 'A state of affairs is thinkable': what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves.
3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.
3.02 A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too.
.....
3.032 It is as impossible to represent in language anything that 'contradicts logic' as it is in geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist.
.....
3.13 A proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected.

Therefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility is.

A proposition, therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it.

('The content of a proposition' means the content of a proposition that has sense.)

A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.
3.141 A proposition is not a blend of words.—(Just as a theme in music is not a blend of notes.)

A proposition is articulate.
3.142 Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot.
[. . .]
3.221 Objects can only be *named.* Signs are their representatives. I can only speak *about* them: I cannot *put them into words.* Propositions can only say *how* things are, not *what* they
are.
3.23 The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate.
[. . .]
3.3 Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning.
3.31 I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (or a symbol).

(A proposition is itself an expression.)

Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common with one another is an expression.

An expression is the mark of a form and a content.

3.311 An expression presupposes the forms of all the propositions in which it can occur. It is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions.

[. . .]

3.32 A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol.

3.321 So one and the same sign (written or spoken, etc.) can be common to two different symbols—in which case they will signify in different ways.

[. . .]

3.323 In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification—and so belongs to different symbols—or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.

Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence; 'exist' figures as an intransitive verb like 'go', and 'identical' as an adjective; we speak of *something*, but also of *something's* happening.

(In the proposition, 'Green is green'—where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last an adjective—these words do not merely have different meanings: they are *different symbols*.)

3.324 In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them).

[. . .]

4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.

(They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful.)

And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact *not* problems at all.

4.0031 All philosophy is a 'critique of language' (though not in Mauthner's sense). It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one.

[. . .]

4.014 A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world.

They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern.

(Like the two youths in the fairy-tale, their two horses, and their lilies. They are all in a certain sense one.)

4.0141 There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the

score again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records.

4.015 The possibility of all imagery, of all our pictorial modes of expression, is contained in the logic of depiction.

4.016 In order to understand the essential nature of a proposition, we should consider hieroglyphic script, which depicts the facts that it describes.

And alphabetic script developed out of it without losing what was essential to depiction.

4.021 A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me.

4.022 A proposition *shows* its sense.

A proposition *shows* how things stand *if* it is true. And it *says that* they do so stand.

4.023 A proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no.

In order to do that, it must describe reality completely.

A proposition is a description of a state of affairs.

Just as a description of an object describes it by giving its external properties, so a proposition describes reality by its internal properties.

A proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding, so that one can actually see from the proposition how everything stands logically *if* it is true. One can *draw inferences* from a false proposition.

4.024 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.

(One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true.)

It is understood by anyone who understands its constituents.

[. . .]

4.0621 But it is important that the signs '*p*' and '*~p*' *can* say the same thing. For it shows that nothing in reality corresponds to the sign '~'.

The occurrence of negation in a proposition is not enough to characterize its sense (*~~p = p*).

The propositions '*p*' and '*~p*' have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality.

4.1 Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences).

4.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.

(The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.)

4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.

Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions.

Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.

4.12 Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form.

In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.

4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.

What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.

What expresses *itself* in language, we cannot express by means of language.

Propositions *show* the logical form of reality.

They display it.

4.1212 What *can* be shown, *cannot* be said.

4.2 The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

5.471 The general propositional form is the essence of a proposition.

5.4711 To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world.

5.473 Logic must look after itself.

If a sign is *possible*, then it is also capable of signifying. Whatever is possible in logic is also permitted. (The reason why 'Socrates is identical' means nothing is that there is no property called 'identical'. The proposition is nonsensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not because the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate.)

In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic.

5.4731 Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can become dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake.—What makes logic a priori is the *impossibility* of illogical thought.

5.4732 We cannot give a sign the wrong sense.

5.5561 Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions. [. . .]

5.6 *The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world.

5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.'

For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.

We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.

For what the solipsist *means* is quite correct; only it cannot be *said*, but makes itself manifest.

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of *language* (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.

5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'.

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.

6.12 The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies *shows* the formal—logical—properties of language and the world.

The fact that a tautology is yielded by *this particular way* of connecting its constituents characterizes the logic of its constituents.

If propositions are to yield a tautology when they are connected in a certain way, they must have certain structural properties. So their yielding a tautology when combined *in this way* shows that they possess these structural properties.

6.124 The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They have no 'subjectmatter'. They presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connexion with the world. It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols—whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character—are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. We have said that some things are arbitrary in the symbols that we use and that some things are not. In logic it is only the latter that express: but that means that logic is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself. If we know the logical syntax of any sign-language, then we have already been given all the propositions of logic.

6.125 It is possible—indeed possible even according to the old conception of logic—to give in advance a description of all 'true' logical propositions.

6.1251 Hence there can *never* be surprises in logic.

6.4 All propositions are of equal value.

6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: *in* it no value exists—and if it did exist, it
would have no value.

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie *within* the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.

It must lie outside the world.

6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.

Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.

Ethics is transcendental.

(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

6.422 When an ethical law of the form, 'Thou shalt . . .', is laid down, one's first thought is, 'And what if I do not do it?' It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. So our question about the *consequences* of an action must be unimportant.—At least those consequences should not be events. For there must be something right about the question we posed. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)
6.423 It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes.

And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.
6.43 If the good or bad exercise of the will [(willing)] does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.

In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.
6.432 *How* things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself *in* the world.
6.4321 The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution.
6.44 It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but *that* it exists.
6.45 To view the world *sub specie aeterni* is to view it as a whole—a limited whole.

Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.
6.5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words.

The *riddle* does not exist.

If a question can be framed at all, it is also *possible* to answer it.

6.52 We feel that even when all *possible* scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.
6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.

(Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that sense?)
6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical.
6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—*this* method would be the only strictly correct one.

6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

Appendix II: Excerpts from *Notebooks 1914-1916*

11.6.16

What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.
[...]
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.
That this meaning does not lie in it but outside it. [*Cf.*6.41.]
[...]
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world.
The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.

5.7.16

If good or evil willing affects the world it can only affect the boundaries of the world, not the facts, what cannot be portrayed by language but can only be shewn in language. [*Cf.* 6.43.]
In short, it must make the world a wholly different one. [*See* 6.43.]
The world must, so to speak, wax or wane as a whole. As if by accession or loss of meaning. [*Cf.* 6.43.]

6.7.16

The solution of the problem of life is to be seen in the disappearance of this problem. [*See* 6.521.]
But is it possible for one so to live that life stops being problematic? That one is *living* in eternity and not in time?

8.7.16

If by eternity is understood not infinite temporal duration but non-temporality, then it can be said that a man lives eternally if he lives in the present. [*See* 6.4311.]

In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that is what "being happy" *means*.

9.7.16

If the most general form of proposition could not be given, then there would have to come a moment where we suddenly had a new experience, so to speak a logical one.

That is, of course, impossible.

Do not forget that $(\exists x)fx$ does not mean: There is an x such that fx, but: There is a true proposition "fx".

The proposition fa speaks of particular objects, the general proposition of *all* objects.

24.7.16

Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.

Ethics and aesthetics are one. [*See* 6.421.]

30.7.16.

When a general ethical law of the form "Thou shalt..." is set up, the first thought is: Suppose I do not do it?

But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward. So this question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant. At least these consequences cannot be events. For there must be something right about that question after all. There must be a *kind* of ethical reward and of ethical punishment but these must be involved in the action itself.

And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant, the punishment something unpleasant. [6.422.]

I keep on coming back to this! simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad. And if I *now* ask myself: But why should I live *happily*, then this of itself seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it *is* the only right life.

But this is really in some sense deeply mysterious! *It is clear* that ethics *cannot* be expressed! [*Cf*. 6.421.]

2.8.16.

Good and evil only enter through the *subject*. And the subject is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world. [*Cf*. 5.632.]

19.9.16.

Art is a kind of expression.
Good art is complete expression.

7.10.16

The work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*; and the good life is the world seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. This is the connexion between art and ethics.

The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* from outside.

In such a way that they have the whole world as background.

Is this it perhaps——in this view the object is seen *together with* space and time instead of *in* space and time?

Each thing modifies the whole logical world, the whole of logical space, so to speak.

(The thought forces itself upon one): The thing seen *sub specie aeternitatis* is the thing seen together with the whole logical space.

8.10.16.

As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one equally significant.

If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all you know is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I had studied the stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was contemplating the stove *it* was my world, and everything else colourless by contrast with it.

(Something good about the whole, but bad in details.)

For it is equally possible to take the bare present image as the worthless momentary picture in the whole temporal world, and as the true world among shadows.

20.10.16

Aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists. That there is what there is.

Is it the essence of the artistic way of looking at things, that it looks at the world with a happy eye?

Life is grave, art is gay.

21.10.16.

For there is certainly something in the conception that the end of art is the beautiful.

And the beautiful *is* what makes happy.

4.11.16.

The will is an attitude of the subject to the world.
The subject is the willing subject.

21.11.16.

The fact that it is possible to erect the general form of proposition means nothing but: every possible form of proposition must be FORESEEABLE.

And *that* means: We can never come upon a form of proposition of which we could say: it could not have been foreseen that there was such a thing as this.

For that would mean that we had had a new experience, and that it took that to make this form of proposition possible.

Thus it must be possible to erect the general form of proposition, because the possible forms of proposition must be *a priori*. Because the possible forms of proposition are *a priori*, the general form of proposition exists.