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by

© David Henri Prud'homme

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated
to my wife, *Linda Marie*,
and
to my mother, *Anita*.

ABSTRACT

The objective of this work is the examination of the Russian prepositionless Instrumental case, in particular from the point of view of *case grammar*. In an overview of the Instrumental case in English, we ascertained that this case can be primarily characterized by five specific features -- namely, *cause*, *autonomy*, *definiteness*, *intent*, and, most important, *control*. An in-depth study of several classificatory works on the Russian Instrumental and an examination of the applicability of the five characteristic features of the Instrumental to these lead us to two conclusions.

First, the number of distinct Instrumental meanings in Russian is not as great as has been proposed by many scholars, but rather, the majority of these meanings, or functions, can be understood as examples of either the *Instrumental of implement* or the *predicative Instrumental*, both of which have wide-ranging transformational possibilities.

Second, the concepts of *case grammar*, while seemingly compatible with a case language like Russian, proved to be less viable than had been anticipated.

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I. Introduction

The aim of this study is to clarify the functions of one surface case in what is termed a *case language*, and compare these functions with some of the proposals which have been presented within the theories collectively referred to as *case grammar*.

For this purpose, we will examine a surface case from the Russian language. There are several factors underlying this decision, some of which follow. First, as will become more evident in Chapters II & III, which deal with the theories of *case grammar*, a large number of the studies of case have been concerned with the languages of the Indo-European linguistic family. Even more specifically, much of this work has dealt with *case* not only in the Western branch of the Indo-European family, but specifically with English data in mind. By concentrating our efforts on a language still within the Indo-European family, it is reasonable for us to expect many of the general mental concepts of the speakers of the languages within this family on the whole to be similar. Thus, it will not be necessary for us to relate various psychological perceptions to our theory, but rather we will make an initial assumption that, among the speakers of the many languages and dialects of this family, there will not be a sufficient degree of variance with the conceptualization of the world situation, as it is expressed linguistically, to have a greatly significant effect on our results.

Secondly, it is generally accepted that within the East Slavic branch, morphological manifestations of case for substantives are realized to a far greater degree than within the Western branch.

Russian *per se* also holds a unique position within the Slavic languages. Through a typological classification of the Slavic languages, it has been shown that "none of them has as many cases as Russian or as few as Bulgarian, and none of them has a richer verbal system than Bulgarian or a poorer one than Russian" (Isačenko 1940: 198). With the most cases of any Slavic language[1], Russian seems to be a natural choice if one wishes to study the meaning of case, for, it would seem, with more cases to express various nuances, one could expect each case to be in some sense proto-typical for a certain function, either semantic or syntactic.

The next question that had to be decided was on which surface case to concentrate. Again, one could choose almost any of the eight cases in Contemporary Standard Russian (later, also referred to by the abbreviation CSR), but we have chosen the Instrumental (henceforth also Inst) for several reasons. First, without a formal discussion on the topic, it may be accepted that the Nominative, while nonetheless a *case*, can be said to represent a neutral form of the substantive. Since its surface realizations are limited, i.e. to nominal sentences, subject of the verb, and object of the preposition *za* in the one question,

---

[1] Morphologically Russian can be said to have the following eight cases: Nominative, Accusative, Genitive, Genitive II (Partitive Genitive), Dative, Instrumental, Prepositional, and Prepositional II (strict Locative). For the most part, however, six is the number usually agreed upon; the Genitive II and Prepostional II are not normally considered to be full cases.

(1) *čto èto za ... ?*
What kind of ... is this?

we did not choose it.

Similarly, we will not discuss the Accusative or Genitive. The Accusative is the most widely used *oblique* case in Russian with verbs, while the Genitive is the most common with nouns[2], and both of these uses can be simplistically summarized by labelling them the *(direct) object of the verb*, and *an adnominal modifier*, respectively.

We excluded the Prepositional by virtue of the fact that it is invariably used with prepositions, which can add significant independent semantic information to the case phrase. Vinogradov (1972: 140) has explained this particular aspect of Russian grammar in the following manner[3]:

"S razvitiem analitičeskix otnošenij, rasširjajuščix funkcii predlogov i usložnjajuščix značenija padežej, gruz grammatičeskogo vyraženija perekladyvaetsja s padežnoj formy na predlog."

---

[2] Averaging the unweighted figures given in Nikonov (1961: 28) for case usage in works by Pushkin and Lenin, the Accusative's usage with verbs accounts for 18.3% of all case forms in these works, while the use of the Genitive with nouns represents 19.3%.

[3] Another viewpoint with respect to prepositions is expounded by Van Schooneveld, whose claim is that *case* refers to phenomena "as directly seen by the eyes of the *speaker and addressee* in the *speech situation*," while "prepositional modification gives merely a new substantivic setting against which the modified [substantive] is projected" (1978: 204).

Finally, since the Dative is widely understood as the *indirect object* of the verb, and further, since much has also been written about it both from the point of view of *impersonal sentences*[4], and of *stative verbs*[5], we have narrowed this study down to the one remaining case -- that known as the *Instrumental*.

The Inst is not a statistically insignificant case form, since it accounts for slightly less than 10% of all case forms in Russian. Nikonov's data, mentioned in a previous footnote, indicate that in publicistic works (here, those of Lenin), the Inst represents 7.0% of all substantive forms, while in literary works (specifically Pushkin) it comprises 10.4%. These figures correlate well with the data of Lekov[6], whose frequencies for the Instrumental are as follows: in scientific and publicistic works, 7.7%; in literary works, 9.6%; and in dramatic works, which are a close approximation of the spoken language, 6.6% (1971: 327-28).

The Inst case itself is used primarily in constructions with verbs. Lekov does not break case usage down into its specific manifestations, but Nikonov's data indicate that the Inst is used in verbal constructions about 76% of the time, compared with about 17% with nouns, and only about 7% in other constructions. Moreover, in most instances of its usage with a nominal[7], the nominal is derived from a verb, thereby retaining the governing properties of the latter. Although the Inst in Russian can be used without a preposition, or with any of the prepositions *s*, *za*, *meždu*, *pered*, etc., approximately half of its total occurrences are in its prepositionless form, while its usage with the one preposition *s* seems to account for about 33% of its total usage[8]. None of these scholars, however, gives statistics for individual usages in particular environments. Because of the additional semantic information provided by prepositions, as mentioned above, we will thus focus our discussion on the Russian *prepositionless Inst* -- a case form occurring primarily in constructions with verbs. The theoretical discussion will, therefore, concern itself principally with a functional interpretation of this surface case and its interplay with verbs.

---

[4] See, for example, Comrie (1974), "Impersonal Subjects in Russian."

[5] See, for example, Tixonov (1960), *Kategorija sostojanija v sovremennom russkom jazyke*; and Miller (1970), "Stative Verbs in Russian."

[6] Lekov (1971), *Vŭnšna struktura na dumata v slavjanskite ezici*.

Methodology

As will be seen in the historical review of case studies presented in the next two chapters, cases have been studied both in isolation and within context.

---

[7] Bernštejn (1958: 364) has noted that the use of the Inst with nouns is chiefly a characteristic of specific styles of writing, namely scientific and journalistic. Moreover, this usage does not exist at all in the dialects.

[8] While we do not have exact figures for this statement, our work with this case leads us to conclude that the data given in Freeman (1973: 70) for Old Russian fairly reflect the present state of affairs also.

The slavist, Isačenko, already mentioned above, writes (1965: 94):

> "... nel'zja priznat' pravil'nym utverždenie, čto padežnaja forma sama po sebe "ničego ne značit". Padežnaja forma, vyrvannaja iz konteksta, lišena smysla, ibo ona vyražaet *otnošenie*, a dlja osuščestvlenija kakogo-libo otnošenija neobxodimo naličie dvux členov."

It seems prudent to agree with Isačenko that cases express relations, and that they must, therefore, be considered within context. Our study, as already mentioned, will concentrate on the relationship between verbs and their arguments.

The next chapter, Chapter II, will present a summary of the historical development of case studies from their ancient Western origin up to the beginning of the era of Transformational Generative Grammar. Chapter III will then present an outline of the study of case within the Generative framework, where we will review the origin of *case grammar*, and its subsequent developments. This will include the major approaches to case taken by scholars such as Chomsky (the Standard Theory), Fillmore (Case-Grammar), and Anderson (Localist Theory). Various criticisms and counter-proposals will be mentioned, as well as other linguistic factors which might affect the interpretation of *cases* or *case-phrases*.

In Chapter IV the various meanings, functions, and definitions of the Inst case that have been proposed will be examined in greater detail. Since the majority of these are not drawn from Slavic data, specific manifestations of the Russian (and Slavic) Inst will be provided in the following chapter. This section will concentrate on the specific interpretations of both the deep case Inst and the surface manifestations called Inst. Needless to say, this will require some examination of the syntactic overlapping that occurs at the surface level among various semantic notions.

Chapter V will present a fairly detailed overview of the classifications and functions of the Inst in Russian, as identified by various scholars. Some data from other Slavic languages, and from the predecessors of modern Russian, will also be given. Such information may assist us in determining which uses of the Inst are general to the Slavic languages, and which may be specific only to modern Russian. This chapter will, therefore, serve as the description of our basic corpus of data.

Chapter VI will examine the interrelationships which exist between the usages and classifications of the Inst in Russian and the diverse theoretical approaches which have been taken for case in language in general. It will be impossible to examine every use of the Inst in modern Russian, so the study will concentrate on examining the data with the hope of extracting features and conditions on the use of the Inst which will be applicable to a wide cross-section of our data. We will examine syntax, semantics, and even pragmatics for this purpose. We will endeavour to extract just those features which may allow us to provide some linguistically significant generalizations about the case in question.

Our conclusions and generalizations from our discussions will be reiterated in the last chapter, Chapter VII.

II. Pre-Transformational Theories of Case

One of the basic problems facing the researcher in the field of case-grammar is the fact that the category of case does not have a direct parallel in the philosophical sciences -- epistemology, logic, metaphysics -- on which to base a disciplined theory.

The formal study of case has followed a rocky, and at times, very muddy road. At the surface level of language, where the study of case had its beginnings, it is a morphological phenomenon. However, case is much more than simply an aspect of morphology or morphophonology. Grammarians and linguists have been striving for centuries to understand the mechanisms whereby morphological case is assigned, or not assigned.

Case has been studied, primarily, within two not altogether distinct schools of thought -- the *syntactic* and the *semantic*. In this chapter we will examine representative periods of the evolution of these approaches from the earliest Western studies of case up to the early years of Transformational-Generative Grammar.

A. Ancient History

It is the Greeks and Romans who may be duly credited with advancing the first theories of case. Their contribution has exerted a significant influence on the direction in which later scholars were to go in their studies. The Greeks instituted a bipartition of the surface cases into the *upright* (which we may also call the Nominative) and the remaining cases, which they labelled as *falling* or *deviant* on the basis of the morphologically differing forms which were manifested in surface structure. One assumption which the Greeks made in this connection was that the *upright* case, in its widely used syntactic application as the subject of the sentence, was sufficiently understood so as to warrant no further study. The essence of the matter for the Greeks lay in the semantics of the remaining cases -- the *deviant* ones -- for which the Greeks used the word *ptosis*, a translation borrowing of which appeared in Latin as *casus*, and in Russian, by way of Church Slavonic, as *padež*. Therefore, in the very earliest studies of case, we have the Nominative treated as a syntactic manifestation, while a semantic explanation was attempted for the remaining cases.

In the ensuing centuries case studies maintained the bipartition introduced by the Greeks. Thus, the syntactically-based Nominative received virtually no detailed analysis; while the *deviant* cases were the subject of extensive endeavours to explain their various and diverse functions. A great number of these earlier studies concentrated on Greek and Latin, and from these came terms such as the *Dative of possession*, the *Genitive of possession*, etc. Thus, for example, some later semantically-based descriptions of surface morphological forms present up to thirty different case-definitions for the Latin Genitive alone'.

A different approach, which also dates from the scholars of Antiquity, is that which has been labelled as the *localist* or *localistic* theory of case (Anderson 1971: 6). The first exponent of this theory was the Byzantine grammarian Maximus Planudes. The basic premise on which this theory is predicated is the belief that humans perceive the world around them with respect to the physical location of its various entities, and the movement of these from one place to another. These entities may be of a concrete nature -- as in the sentence,

(2) *Kreml' v Moskve*
the Kremlin (is) in Moscow;

or may be of an abstract nature, e.g.,

(3) *on okazal mne pomošč'*
he helped me
Lit: he gave (displayed) to-me help,

in which the situation may be described as the transfer of the abstract entity *pomošč'* from its source -- the subject of the sentence -- to its destination, namely, me (*mne*).

Such entities may be viewed in two ways. One may consider *abstract* and *concrete* instances of location to be of equal importance, or one may postulate that the *concrete* instances have more validity than the *abstract* ones, under which interpretation it is believed that *concrete* location has a certain ontological priority over *abstract* location.

'See, for example, W. A. de Groot (1956), "Classification of the Uses of a Case illustrated on the Genitive in Latin."

Anderson, whose work is largely within such a general framework, prefers to call the latter interpretation the *localist* theory, and the former, *localistic* (Anderson 1971: 12).

From the time of the Greek and Latin studies until the last century, little new was added to supplement these early approaches[10]. It was only with the inception of the XIX century that studies returned to a more detailed theoretical examination of case.

B. Early XIX C. Case Studies

The scholars of the early 1800's worked, for the most part, within the localist theory. They continued to study case from a syntactic-semantic viewpoint, and were therefore concerned with the meanings of those cases having such a spatial meaning in contradistinction to those which carried an immediate syntactic function, such as *subject* and *direct object*. We thus have the following description of the theory of one of the XIX c. localist scholars:

> "La théorie enseignée par [Franz] Bopp[11] consiste à voir dans les cas des expressions primitives d'ordre

---

[10] This is not to say that no work was done on case; rather, the researchers of case through the medieval ages fell "between the two extremes, *i.e.* of reproducing in their own semantic terms the ideas of their predecessors or of trying to produce something new." Generally speaking, their terms of reference were "partly functional, partly semantic" (Bursill-Hall 1971: 170).

[11] For the early form of this theory, see Bopp (1826), "Vergleichende Zergliederung des Sanskrit und der mit ihm verwandten Sprachen. Dritte Abhandlung: Ueber das Demonstrativum und den Ursprung der Casuszeichen."

> spatial, aptes à se conformer aussi aux besoins d'une pensée plus développée qui opère dans la sphère du temps et de la causalité" (Hjelmslev 1935: 36).

It was F. Wüllner, however -- a student of Bopp -- who, in a work published the following year[12], further refined this point of view. Wüllner was perhaps the first to search for a unified semantic function of each surface case. Of the principles he set down towards this goal, his second was, as quoted by Hjelmslev (1935: 37):

> "La conception ou l'idée qu'il s'agit de chercher dans une forme linguistique doit être une idée une, une seule signification fondamentale (*Grund-bedeutung*) d'un degré d'abstraction assez grand pour permettre d'en déduire tous les emplois concrets de la forme."

About two decades later, in the mid-1800's, an opposing view to this -- one that Hjelmslev calls the *Anti-Localist* theory -- was developed. One of the early proponents of this theory was Theodor Rumpel, who expounded it primarily with regard to Greek[13]. His work is mainly a study of the surface syntax of language. Rumpel claimed that the Nominative is the case of the subject; the Accusative, the case of the direct object; the Dative, the case of the indirect object;

---

[12] Hjelmslev identifies this work as, Wüllner (1827), *Die Bedeutung der sprachlichen Casus und Modi*, Münster.
[13] Rumpel (1845), *Casuslehre in besonderer Beziehung auf die griechische Sprache*.

and that the Genitive is an adnominal modifier of the subject or object. Moreover, Rumpel wrote that the Nominative and the Accusative indicated a relationship between a noun and a verb; the Genitive, between two nouns; and that the Dative indicated a relationship to the entire phrase (*op. cit.*: 48). This form of argumentation is rather circular, for syntactic functions and surface case forms are defined in terms of each other. In other words, it would have no effect on Rumpel's theory were we to say, for example, that the direct object is the noun found in the Accusative, for all we really have here ~~is~~ a proposed description through labels.

Over 30 years after Rumpel's work was published, yet another variation appeared: the so-called *Demi-Localist* theory. This theory is primarily a synthesis of the rather semantically-based Localist school of thought and the more syntactically-based Anti-Localist view. As expounded by F. Holzweissig[14], among others, it accepts the syntactic description of some cases, as described above, but also provides a semantic, i.e. non-syntactic, function for certain other *oblique* cases such as the Ablative and the Instrumental. Under this proposition, the point of view is taken that there exist, in fact, two types of surface cases, namely, *grammatical* cases, which are purely syntactic in function; and *local* cases, which are of a semantic nature.

---

[14] See especially his work, *Wahrheit und Irrtum der localistischen Casustheorie*, which was published in 1877.

These two types of cases later became known as *concrete* and *abstract* with regard to their respective functions (Lyons 1968: 304).

C. Case Grammar in the First Half of the XX C.

It was with this background that research into case entered the twentieth century. British and North American studies of case in the English language can trace their origin to the early European studies of, especially, Latin. Despite the fact that case endings *per se* -- i.e. morphological markings on nominals, etc. -- were all but extinct in the English language, scholars such as Sonnenschein, even in the 1920's, propagated the imposed dogma of Latin grammar by supporting the study of the "cases" in the English language. This trend was not, however, sacrosanct to the study of case. Many later scholars refuted this viewpoint and shifted the focus of their studies to a more semantic interpretation of surface structure.

Jespersen

Otto Jespersen was one of the more notable scholars of the early part of this century. Among his contributions to linguistic studies was his opposition to what he considered to be the fallacious viewpoint of Sonnenschein, namely that

> "the pupil who has mastered the uses of English cases, as set forth in [Sonnenschein's] book, will have little to learn when he comes to Latin, except that Latin has an extra case -- the ablative" (Jespersen 1924: 180).

In some respects, Jespersen returned to the views of the Anti-Localists, claiming, ostensibly, a purely syntactic function for case (Jespersen 1924: 185). He saw no advantage in examining the forms and functions of pronouns in English, since he believed that they "present a great many peculiarities of their own and keep up distinctions found nowhere else" (1924: 183). Moreover, despite the claim of a purely syntactic function for case, Jespersen still admitted to the Demi-Localist bipartition of case functions into a concrete class and an abstract class -- admission of which is, *ipso facto*, contradictory to a purely syntactic viewpoint.

Nonetheless, Jespersen's work proved significant for the modern researcher of case by directing him out of the labyrinth created by an adherence to the study of case on the Latin model. It warns us that case "notions, however, are ill-defined and pass imperceptibly into one another." His final admonition is that "cases form one of the most irrational part [*sic*] of language in general" (*op. cit.*: 186).

Hjelmslev

It was not until the 1930's that one of the first truly semantically-based grammars of case appeared, namely, Louis Hjelmslev's *La Catégorie des Cas*. Perhaps Hjelmslev's major contribution to the study of case is his inclusion of the long-neglected Nominative within the scope of his semantic framework: "Il s'ensuit que *la distinction principale entre rectus et obliqui doit être abandonnée comme étant sans importance essentielle*"'' (1935: 95-96).

Hjelmslev's theory was formalized by various principles, among which was that

> "les termes possibles d'une dimension grammaticale ne sont pas épuisés par l'établissement du terme positif et du terme négatif; à ces termes extrêmes s'ajoutent des termes intermédiaires et complexes."

To this he adds,

> "il semble être tout indiqué que chacun des cas rentrant dans une seule et même dimension peut être défini d'une façon mathématique ou logique en utilisant les symbols + - 0 ± $_{(\pm)}$ $^{(\pm)}$ '• et en désignant chacun des cas comme étant positif, négatif, neutre, complexe, complexe-positif ou complexe-négatif respectivement" (*op. cit.*: 98).

''The italics are Hjelmslev's.

'•In actuality, Hjelmslev used the symbol "÷", where we have used "-". However, in keeping with the more familiar terminology of plus- and minus-marking, we have taken the liberty of making this change with regard to Hjelmslev's work.

It follows, then, for Hjelmslev to specify later,

> "que *l'opposition qui a lieu à l'intérieur d'une dimension grammaticale n'est pas une opposition entre une idée positive et une idée négative, mais une opposition entre une idée simple et une idée complexe*''" (*op. cit.*: 100).

The principle opposition which Hjelmslev proposes, continuing the localist tradition founded in antiquity, is that of *direction*. He specifies the positive, neutral, and negative points of this dimension as *rapprochement*, *repos*, and *éloignement* respectively, and displays these diagramatically as three contiguous "cells." From these cells, one term is chosen as a base for the system, and is designated *intensive*, while the remaining terms are *extensive*. He explains this decision in the following manner:

> "La case qui est choisie comme intensive a une tendance à *concentrer* la signification, alors que les cases choisies comme extensives ont une tendance à *répandre* la signification sur les autres cases de façon à envahir l'ensemble du domaine sémantique occupé par la zone" (1935: 112-113).

The second dimension which Hjelmslev proposes is that of *cohérence : incohérence*. The positive pole is defined in the following manner: "Par *cohérence* nous comprenons le fait général d'être lié par une connexion relativement intime à

''Here, again, the italics are Hjelmslev's.

un autre objet" (*op. cit.*: 129).

As an explanation of the interaction of the above two dimensions (*direction* with *cohérence : incohérence*), let us survey some of Hjelmslev's examples (1935: 130) for their various combinations. For *rapprochement* and *cohérence*, we have German *in* + acc., and Latin *in* + acc. For *rapprochement* and *incohérence*, there is Latin *ad* and German *an*, both with acc. *Éloignement* with *incohérence* accounts for Latin *ab* and German *von*, while the neutral degree of direction, *repos*, and no difference between *cohérence* and *incohérence* yields English *between* and the German equivalent *zwischen*. Finally, *cohérence* without a difference in *direction* gives German *in* + dat., and *éloignement* without a difference between *cohérence* and *incohérence* produces English *through*. While these examples do not exhaust the total nine possible principle combinations given by Hjelmslev, they do serve to indicate the general character of his system.

Hjelmslev's third and final dimension is based on the *physical relationship of the speaker and the object spoken about*. The main terms of this dimension are the two spatial pairs *au-dessus : au-dessous* and *devant : derrière*. Hjelmslev writes, "Reste à voir en quoi consiste la différence entre le couple *au-dessus - au-dessous* et le couple *devant-derrière*. C'est selon nous une différence d'*objectivité* et de *subjectivité*" (1935: 131-132). Thus, in the sentence *il est sous l'arbre*, there is "une relation d'ordre objectif" (*op. cit.*: 132); while, "en disant *l'oiseau est derr[illegible]re l'arbre* ou *l'oiseau est devant l'arbre* j'indique d'[illegible]ire la situation relative de l'oiseau et de l'arbre par rapport à moi-même comme spectateur" (*op. cit.*: 133).

The essence of Hjelmslev's theory is in the assignment to the various cases of the terms of any of these semantic features, or combinations of such terms. However, Hjelmslev's theory is somewhat constrained by the assignment of a strong hierarchical relationship to these three dimensions, corresponding to the order in which they are presented above. Hjelmslev claims that all cases may or may not be specified by any or each of the three dimensions, but adds that any case specified by a feature of a lower dimension, must also be specified for each of the dimensions above it.

Under such a definition, all cases must therefore be marked for the dimension of *direction*. John M. Anderson imposes a self-interested interpretation on Hjelmslev's theory, by claiming that,

> accordingly it seems just to regard only Hjelmslev's first dimension as articulating [case relations] proper; this is certainly more in line with current understanding of the scope of the notion [case relation], and thus makes comparison with non-localist case grammars like Fillmore's possible. In comparison with these, Hjelmslev's theory, divested of the notions of 'cohérence' and 'subjectivité', makes a strong claim concerning the number of [case relations] available to a language, viz. a maximum of six. And he provides an intrinsic definition of the category of case: its content is directionality; and the range of [case relations] depends upon the set of oppositions which can be

associated with this dimension (1977: 113-114).

This interpretation is, however, at best a self-interested one by Anderson, for Hjelmslev, in formulating his theory, writes,

> "Il a été reconnu, plus ou moins explicitement, depuis l'antiquité ... que les significations des cas constituent un système de plus d'une seule dimension" (Hjelmslev: 95).

Thus, Hjelmslev gives a new direction to the study of case by providing a semantic feature analysis of its usage. Equally important, however, is the inclusion of the long-neglected Nominative case within Hjelmslev's theoretical framework.

Jakobson

Although there are some other XX C. descriptive works on Russian grammar which include the uses of the various cases''•, it is Roman Jakobson who gave us the first important theoretical discussion of the case-system of Russian. Like Hjelmslev, whom he quotes extensively, Jakobson attempts a semantic classification of the cases. His principal proposal was published under the title "Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasuslehre: Gesamtbedeutungen der russischen Kasus" in 1936''; however this was subsequently modified in his 1958 work, "Morfologičeskie nabljudenija nad

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''•See, for example, A. M. Peškovskij (1938), *Russkij sintaksis v naučnom osveščenii*.
''This article was reprinted in 1966 in Eric P. Hamp et al, eds., *Readings in Linguistics* II. It is to this version that my page references refer.

slavjanskim skloneniem (sostav russkix padežnyx form)[20]."

Jakobson includes in his discussion of the cases, besides the traditional six Russian cases (Nom, Gen, Acc, Dat, Inst, and Prep), the so-called second Genitive (the *partitive genitive*) and the second Prepositional, or Locative *sensu stricto*. Moreover, in the manner of Hjelmslev, he establishes a set of semantic dimensions, or oppositions (in German, *Korrelationen*), which he suggests can be binarily marked to indicate the semantic content of each case in Russian.

Before discussing the nature of these oppositions, it is essential to understand Jakobson's theoretical basis for them. By way of explanation, let us quote Jakobson himself:

> Indem der Forscher zwei einander entgegengesetzte morphologische Kategorien betrachtet, geht er oft von der Voraussetzung aus, diese beiden Kategorien seien gleichberechtigt, und jede besitze ihre eigene positive Bedeutung: die Kategorie I. bezeichne α, die Kategorie II. bezeichne β, oder mindestens: I. bezeichne α, II. bezeichne das Nichtvorhandensein, die Negation von α. In Wirklichkeit verteilen sich die allgemeinen Bedeutungen der korrelativen Kategorien anders: falls die Kategorie I. das Vorhandensein von α ankündigt, so kündigt die Kategorie II. das Vorhandensein von α nicht an, d. h. sie besagt nicht, ob α anwesend ist oder nicht. Die allgemeine Bedeutung der Kategorie II. im Vergleich zu der Kategorie I. beschränkt sich auf den Mangel der "α-Signalisierung" (Jakobson 1936: 56[21]).

Expressed simply, this means that a *positive* specification

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[20] In *American Contributions to the Fourth International Congress of Slavists*.

[21] This is, in actuality, a direct quote by Jakobson from one of his own earlier works, *viz*. "Zur Struktur des russischen Verbums," 1932.

can indicate the presence of that feature with the particular case, while a *negative* specification does *not* mean its *absence*.

In his 1936 work, Jakobson identifies four oppositions which he considers necessary to provide an adequate description of the above-mentioned eight cases: *Bezugskorrelation* (directionality[22]), *Umfangskorrelation* (scope or extent), *Stellungskorrelation* (position), and *Gestaltungskorrelation* (formation). Since the meanings of these oppositions are not clear from their labels alone, Jakobson's motivation for each will now be briefly presented.

With reference to the sentence,

(4) *syn nakazan otcom*
the son is punished by his father,

Jakobson writes,

> erweist sich der Nominativgehalt als ein Objekt der Handlung. Der tatsächliche Gegensatz des A-s und N-s besteht bloss darin, dass der A ankündigt, auf den Gegenstand sei eine Handlung gerichtet, wogegen der N an sich weder das Vorhandensein noch das Nichtvorhandensein eines Bezugs zu einer Handlung angibt. Die Angabe des Vorhandenseins eines Bezugs ist also das Merkmal des A im Gegensatz zum N; es ist mithin angebracht, den A als das merkmalhaltige, bzw. den N als das merkmallose Glied einer Bezugskorrelation zu betrachten (1936: 58).

Similarily, for the examples,

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[22] While the German word *Bezug* may be translated as *reference*, *Bezugskorrelation* was later interpreted by scholars as *directionality*, and this is the understanding of the term which we, too, accept.

(5) *strana upravljaetsja ministrami*
the country is governed by the ministers,

(6) *ministry upravljajut stranoj*
the ministers govern the country,

Jakobson compares the uses of the Inst with those of the Nom and Acc, incidentally dealing with the Dat, writing,

> "Wie der A so auch der D fungieren folglich als die merkmalhaltigen Kasus der Bezugskorrelation (die Bezugskasus) im Gegensatz zu den merkmallosen N und I" (*op. cit.*: 68).

Thus, Jakobson's first correlation (*Bezugskorrelation*), which he maintains in his 1958 article under the Russian name *napravlennost'*, specifies the Acc and Dat as positively marked (*directional*) in opposition to the Nom and Inst. Schematically this information is presented in *Fig. 1*[23].



Fig. 1: **Bezugskorrelation (napravlennost').**

Jakobson's *Umfangskorrelation* (scope), which is presented in the later work under the label *ob"emnost'*, indicates the extent to which the case-phrase *participates in the speech situation*. Thus, Jakobson explains the positively-marked Gen as follows:

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[23] In *Fig. 1* through *Fig. 4*, the *positively* specified cases are presented on the *left* side of the schematics.

> "Der G an sich besagt nur, dass der Umfang der Teilnahme des Gegenstandes am Sachverhalte der Aussage geringer als sein gesamter Umfang ist. In welchem Masse der Umfang des Gegenstandes beschränkt wird, das bestimmt der sprachliche oder der aussersprachliche Kontext" (1936: 63).

Later, he includes the Prep (or Loc) as the other positively-marked member of this correlation, stating that "Der L ist also gegenüber dem N, I, A und D als Umfangskasus und gegenüber dem N, A und G als Randkasus merkmalhaltig" (*op. cit.*: 79). Note that the Loc is opposed to the Nom and Acc under *both* specifications. However, this opposition is made more precise in the 1958 article, in which Jakobson writes, "Priznak ob"emnosti v [Gen][14] protivopostavlen otsutstviju takovogo v [Nom] i [Acc], i tot že priznak v [Prep] protivopostavlen ego otsutstviju v [Inst] i [Dat]; nazovem [Gen] i [Prep] ob"emnymi padežami v otličie ot pročix, neob"emnyx padežej -- [Nom], [Acc], [Inst] i [Dat]" (1958: 131).

Fig. 2 presents a schematic representation of the later claim.

The third major opposition of Jakobson is that of *Stellungskorrelation* (position), which he calls *periferijnost'* in "Morfologičeskie nabljudenija," and which he explains simply in the following manner:

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[14] For the convenience of the reader we have replaced here, and throughout this paper, the Russian case abbreviations with the English equivalents in square brackets.



Fig. 2: **Umfangskorrelation (ob"emnost').**

> Worin liegt denn der Unterschied des I und D vom N und A? Zwei Termini von Pongs[28] paraphrasierend (245), bezeichne ich den I und D als Randkasus und den N und A als Vollkasus, und für den Gegensatz der beiden Gattungen verwende ich im folgenden die Benennung Stellungskorrelation. Der Randkasus gibt an, dass das bezügliche Nomen im gesamten Bedeutungsgehalte der Aussage eine periphere Stellung einnimmt, wogegen ein Vollkasus nicht angibt, um welche Stellung es sich handelt (Jakobson 1936: 68).

In the cited passage, Jakobson does not explicitly specify the marking of this feature for either Prep or Gen, however in the later article the implicit relationship between these two cases was made explicit: "Po priznaku periferijnosti [Inst], [Dat] i [Prep] proti[illegible]ostavleny lišennym ètogo priznaka [Nom], [Acc] i [Gen]" (Jakobson 1958: 131). *Fig. 3* shows this information schematically.



Fig. 3: **Stellungskorrelation (periferijnost').**

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[28] The only reference Jakobson gives to this is, simply, Pongs (1927), *Das Bild in der Dichtung*.

In the 1958 article Jakobson eliminated the final feature, *Gestaltungskorrelation* (formation), which is discussed in the next paragraph. His motivation for this decision will also be presented shortly, and the reader is advised to decide for himself from the following discussion whether this decision was a prudent one.

After posing the rhetorical question, "Welche ist also die Gesamtbedeutung der sichtlich gleichlaufenden Gegensätze G I -- G II und L I -- L II?" Jakobson answers as follows:

> Die Nomina, welche den G II bzw. den L II besitzen, besitzen notwendigerweise auch den G I bzw. den L I. Der G II und der L II sind im Verhältnisse zu G I und zu L I merkmalhaltige Kategorien. Sie besagen im Gegensatze zu den merkmallosen G I und L I, das der bezeichnete Gegenstand nicht als Gestalt, sondern als etwas Gestaltendes oder zu Gestaltendes im Sachverhalte der Aussage fungiert. Man kann dementsprechend den G II und den L II als Gestaltungskasus und ihr verhältnis zum G I und L I als Gestaltungskorrelation bezeichnen (1936: 81).

While on the one hand, in "Morfologičeskie nabljudenija," Jakobson claims to have eliminated the need for the *Gestaltungskorrelation*, he has, in actual fact, only provided a surrogate for it through a variation in his notation. In this article, inasmuch as he admits of the fact that there are eight cases in Russian, he considers for purposes of his exposition that the second Gen and second Prep are not *primary* cases, but rather *additional* cases within the system, an idea taken from Peškovskij (Jakobson 1958: 131). He thus writes the following about these two "additional" cases:

> Otnošenie [Gen I] k [Gen II] i [Prep I] k [Prep II] sleduet sopostavit' s otnošeniem [Dat] k [Inst], t.e. s protivopostavleniem signalizovannoj napravlennosti dejstvija na predmet otsutstviju podobnoj signalizacii. Sobstvenno, každyj iz četyrex padežej [Gen I], [Prep I], [Acc] i [Dat], v otličie ot [Gen II], [Prep II], [Nom] i [Inst], nadeljaet predmet svojstvom ili sostojaniem, vytekajuščim iz napravlennogo na predmet dejstvija, i sootvetstvenno možet byt' nazvan padežom nadelitel'nym (1958: 148-49),

the ultimate word of which the English summary translates as *ascriptive* (*op. cit.*: 156).

From this discussion, there now seems to arise a variation of *Fig. 1*. While that figure contained only two pairs of cases in opposition to each other, Jakobson now provides for an opposition between two sets of four cases, as indicated below in *Fig. 4*.



Fig. 4: Gen I and Prep I *vs* Gen II and Prep II.

With the above correlations -- at least the three primary ones given in "Morfologičeskie nabljudenija" -- Jakobson proposes a three-dimensional representation (*Fig.* 5) -- his famous cube -- of the case system in Russian (1958: 149). By its very nature, this cube seems to be intuitively satisfying as an explanation of the oppositions of the various cases. By the specification of exactly three correlations, Jakobson has used the minimum number of features by which eight cases can be uniquely expressed.



Fig. 5

Jakobson: A Summary

On the basis of the schematic representations for Jakobson's various features and the accompanying discussion, it seems that Jakobson removed some of the specificity of the 1936 article in the later version. Let us re-examine some of Jakobson's oppositions in an effort to clarify his system.

In his initial formulation of the three features -- of the original four -- which comprise the cube, Jakobson had not included the Gen II or the Prep II. The feature *Gestaltungskorrelation* (formation) was used in the 1936 article to describe the function of these two cases as opposed to Gen I and Gen II. By way of analogy, however, they are included in the 1958 version under the feature *napravlennost'*, which had been used to show the opposition of the Acc and Dat to the Nom and Inst. As mentioned on page 28, however, the name of this feature was modified to *ascriptive*. This "new" feature was intended to account for the differences in the cases originally under the term *napravlennost'*, and for those of Gen I and Prep I in relation to Gen II and Prep II. Therefore, since *napravlennost'* and this latter set of oppositions seems to form two distinct subsets of cases under the term *ascriptive*, it does not seem correct to represent the system as a cube. It would be more reflective of the situation if presented as a three-dimensional I-beam shaped structure[14], as shown in *Fig. 6*, below.



Fig. 6

Jakobson's theory, like its predecessor, is founded on the belief that individual features can be used to account for the different surface forms of nominals. Although his

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[14] This approach is also, however, rather simplistic. Logically, a *fourth* dimension should be present.

1936 work listed four such features (*directionality, scope, position*, and *formation*), the later variant (1958) dismisses the latter feature as unnecessary. The oppositions involved in that feature were shown to be similar to those under the *scope/extent* label, and hence Jakobson combines these under a single new label, *ascriptive*.

While the reduction of the number of features to *three* does bring a high degree of efficiency to Jakobson's theory, it obscures some the relations and oppositions which do exist in the Russian case system. This was shown above by a modified version of Jakobson's cube.

D. Post-Jakobson Studies

Many scholars have discussed Jakobson's feature system, and we will now look at the work of some of these simply to indicate the nature of this influence on later case studies.

In the period around which Hjelmslev's and Jakobson's works were published, a number of scholars took up the semantic-syntactic banner, and propagated the view that cases serve either a *concrete* (*syntactic*) or an *abstract* (*semantic*) function. Perhaps the most notable of these are

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[17] There is a lesser known scholar, H. Chr. Sørensen (1949, 1957), who attempted a synthesis of the frameworks of Hjelmslev and Jakobson in a description of Russian case. He correlates three of the oppositions of Jakobson (1936) with Hjelmslev's feature of *direction*, and equates Jakobson's *Stellungskorrelation* (position) with Hjelmslev's *spacial* feature. Sørensen's approach, however, is not important to the present theoretical framework.

J. Kuryłowicz (1949) and A. W. de Groot (1956)[27]. Ebeling[28], however, while considering the works of Jakobson (1936) and Hjelmslev at some length, attempts to remedy what he perceives as a shortcoming in their works by explaining case functions as contextually-conditioned phenomena (1955: 212).

Ebeling

Basing much of his article on an analogy with phonology, Ebeling claims that the "meaning of [a case-]suffix may differ, according to what position it takes in the arrangement of the semantic elements out of which the meaning of the sentence is constructed" (1955: 212). Thus, in considering the case suffix *-u*, which results in the Acc singular form of nouns ending in *-a*, Ebeling claims Acc government for *nedelju* in

(7) *čerez nedelju*
after a week,

where "it conveys the meaning 'singular,' but no other meaning." However, in

(8) *rabotat' nedelju*
to work a week,

this suffix is now said to reveal 'singular' plus '*indication of time*.' From this, he concludes that the syntactic rules of a language are *not worthy of study with respect to the meanings cases could represent*, since

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[28] Ebe[illegible]g (1955), "On the Meaning of the Russian Cases."

> "It is impossible to elicit information from [them], unless we would interpret the syntactic function as a meaning."

He continues, then, with the statement, that "In our opinion the N[om], functioning as the subject of a transitive verb, has no meaning whatsoever" (1955: 213).

In another section of the article, rather than examining the conditions under which any given case is used, Ebeling (1955: 216), citing Hjelmslev for support, attempts to show that the appropriateness of an expression will not be limited if a marked case, such as Gen II, e.g.,

(9) *vy xotite čaju*
do you want *some* tea,

is replaced by an unmarked correlate, i.e. Gen I, e.g.,

(10) *vy xotite čaja*
do you want some tea.

This approach, however, seems more applicable to the study of case-syncretism and interchangeability of cases, than to case meanings. It seems that it would have been more fruitful to examine the conditions under which a case such as Gen II is used in order to ascertain the semantic and/or syntactic features which determine this usage.

Ebeling goes on to state, however, that with the use of case valences, ~~by~~ which he means government of a case, "the Russian cases offer ... six meanings," which he loosely defines as *mediated*, *concerned*, *circumscribed*, *capacity*, *quantity*, and *contained* (*op. cit.*: 217-18). With only these six meanings he endeavours to describe the functions of each case in Russian, and of each *group of cases which results from syncretisms*[2], which he feels are independent of single cases. His results are not particularly profound, and in several instances he claims that a case or group of cases has no meaning! This is later explained, in his summarizing paragraph, with the statement, "We regard the Russian case system as a system in decay: the Russian cases have mostly lost their meanings in exchange for syntactic functions" (*op. cit.*: 222).

In the final analysis, one cannot consider Ebeling's article to be much more than a taxonomic study of case with respect to syncretism and complementary distribution of cases in certain syntactic environments.

The theoretical import of Ebeling's and other similar articles is not major, and their contribution may have been over-stated by de Groot, who concludes (1955: 194):

> "The consistent application of these distinctions and methods of investigation enables us to give a description of the meanings and uses of the cases in Latin that is satisfactory from a structural point of view."

Let us now examine two works, with differing objectives, but which embrace the Jakobsonian framework outlined above. Both John Lotz (1967) and Michael Shapiro (1969a,b) have endeavoured to further the study of the Russian cases through the use of the Jakobsonian features.

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[2] Ebeling treats such groups as if they were individual cases, and thereby ignores the similarities of the syncretized cases with the original single cases.

Lotz

John Lotz[30] is concerned with the uses of prepositions in Russian and the applicability of Jakobson's features to them[31]. He ignores the restricted use of *za* with the Nom, perhaps justifiably, and uses only the first three primary correlations of Jakobson, leaving out the *formation* correlation. He also omits the *ascriptive* difference between the primary Gen and Loc and the second Gen and Loc, at least as regards the use of prepositions with these cases.

Lotz, with the restrictions we have pointed out above, then writes (1967: 1207),

> "In Russian there are three kinds of cases with regard to their combinability with prepositions: (a) the nominative (N) EXCLUDES prepositions; (b) the locative (L) REQUIRES a preposition; and (c) the other cases dative (D), accusative (A), genitive (G), and instrumental (I) PERMIT prepositions."

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[30] Lotz (1967), "Jakobson's case theory and the Russian preposition."

[31] Van Schooneveld (1978) also uses Jakobson's two articles as the basis for a detailed discussion of Russian prepositions, and extends Jakobson's *Nabljudenija* set of three features to five for his prepositional hierarchy, as he refers to his theoretical structure. Van Schooneveld's features are the three which also occur in the case system, *per se* -- *extension* (= directionality), *restrictedness* (= marginality), and *objectiveness* (= quantification) -- and two which are only distinctive features for prepositions -- *dimensionality* and *duplication*.

He proceeds to give a tabulation of the Russian prepositions, and their case government, but this, however, is not important to the present discussion.

Although not having any theoretical importance in itself, Lotz's article does make a very strong statement on Jakobson's features, even if not explicitly. While pointing out the general truths of case usage -- those given above -- which every student of Russian is taught quite early, and while including several diagrams of Jakobson's system, Lotz fails to capture a significant generalization which is evident from his presentation, and, in particular the single quote above.

An examination of the Jakobsonian features and the cited quote of Lotz reveals that the nominative, which excludes the use of prepositions, is *un*marked for all these features, while the Loc, or perhaps more descriptively, the *prepositional*, which *always* requires a preposition, is *positively* marked for *all three features*. Thus, the presence or absence of a preposition with a case phrase seems to be a function of the marking of Jakobson's features.

This fact tends to lend strong support to Jakobson's feature system, through the direct correlation of a separate set of data. It should be noted, however, that the impact of this generalization is severely reduced if *ascriptive* is included in place of *napravlennost'*, since the former feature distinguishes two such sub-groups of the prepositional case.

Shapiro

Michael Shapiro[12], on the other hand, bases his analysis on the case system as a whole, and not solely on the use of prepositions. In place of Jakobson's cube, Shapiro chooses to present the same information in the form of a tree diagram. Like Lotz, however, Shapiro disregards the use of the term *ascriptive*, but unlike Lotz includes the Gen. II and Loc. II as being negatively marked with respect to the feature *napravlennost'*, which he calls *directionality*. The remaining two features Shapiro calls *limitational* and *peripheral*. He then marks all eight cases according to their plus- and minus- values, and presents this information in a matrix, which can be reconstructed from the semantic-feature tree given in *Fig. 7*, below (1969a: 15).

Shapiro justifies this semantic-feature tree, with the given hierarchical order, by writing,

> "In going from the completely unmarked case Nom to the maximally marked case Loc₁, one travels along a line of diminishing centrality (participation in the message) and increasing marginality. In a progression of this nature, *directional* is more central than *limitational*; and the latter is more central than *peripheral*. Hence this is the only possible order of feature questions" (Shapiro 1969a: 15).

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[12] Shapiro (1969a), *Aspects of Russian Morphology: A Semiotic Investigation*; and (1969b), "Observations on the Russian Case System."



Fig. 7: **Shapiro's feature tree.**

While this may at first glance seem to provide at least some justification for imposing hierarchical order on Jakobson's features, it finds little diachronic support. With ordered features one would normally expect syncretism to occur first among the lowest nodes of any such feature tree. This, however, has not occurred. The most common incidences of syncretism in modern Russian are between Prep I and Prep II, and also between Gen I and Gen II. However, under Shapiro's interpretation, both of these syncretisms would occur not across the lowest nodes of the tree, but across the uppermost node!

Although the results of syncretism do not support Shapiro's position, the attempted explanation of morphology through semantics may indeed be worthy of further study. Comrie, who is interested in the causes and effects of syncretism, points out, that while Jakobson's classification is semantic,

> "the various semantic classes are subsequently shown to correlate with morphological classification, in that those cases that share a greater number of semantic features tend also to share a greater number of formal features, up to formal identity in some paradigms" (1978: 177).

E. Pre-Transformational Case: A Summary

The early history of the study of case was not unified, as one might well expect. Case grammarians have examined the syntax, semantics, and combinations of these in their endeavours to explain how cases are used.

After failed attempts to explain case solely by semantics or by syntax, many scholars adopted the Demi-Localist position, whereby case was treated as a manifestation of *both syntax and semantics*. Those cases which carried primarily a syntactic function were labelled as *concrete*, while those displaying primarily a semantic function were called *abstract*.

Most of the early case grammarians did not include the Nominative within their study of case, until Hjelmslev gave it a more deserving treatment. Hjelmslev also showed that there can be multiple values assigned to any case, but further, that certain case features will be considered *intensive*, meaning that the feature is *concentrated* in the given case. Hjelmslev's dimension of *space*, whereby the location of the speaker in the real world can play a role in his choice of case and syntax, was actually an embryonic predecessor of more modern theories of pragmatics, which are discussed later in this work.

Jakobson presented a set of four correlations (later reduced to three) -- *directionality*, *scope*, *position*, and *formation* -- through the binary marking of which all eight Russian cases (including Loc II and Gen II) can be *uniquely specified*. The later modification of his features to three showed that optimal efficiency of a system can result in the obfuscation of semantic and syntactic oppositions.

Although other scholars followed this outline for a feature theory of case, none of these was able to achieve any linguistically significant generalizations.

Thus, up to the end of the period preceding Transformational Generative Grammar, which is the topic of the next chapter, scholars were unable to provide either a semantically or syntactically adequate description for the uses of the surface cases of language. Most scholars, therefore, resorted to a combination of both kinds of information, while one, Hjelmslev, even addressed the question of speaker-specific information in the determination of syntactic structures.

III. Transformational Theories of Case

Until the middle of this century, modern linguistic theory in general had been strongly influenced first by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure[33], and later by the American Leonard Bloomfield[34]. Case studies within that time period were the topic of the preceding chapter, and here an examination of the study of case within the framework established by contemporary linguistic theory will be presented.

The year 1957 marks the birth of the new era of linguistics -- that of Transformational-Generative Grammar (henceforth, TGG). Although some of the concepts of TGG can be found in earlier works by other scholars, the publication of Noam Chomsky's *Syntactic Structures* can be considered as the break between structural and transformational linguistics. A primary work of TGG is, of course, Chomsky's 1965 *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.*

Chomsky's theoretical approach was a radical departure from the "taxonomic" theories that preceded it. Let us now review what Chomsky and other linguists have to say about case within the transformational model.

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[33] De Saussure (1906-07, 1908-09, 1910-11; Trans. 1966), *Cours de Linguistique Générale.*
[34] Bloomfield (1933), *Language.*

A. Chomsky

The early version of TGG presented in *Syntactic Structures* takes no cognizance of case as we understand that term. An oblique noun phrase is given the same structural description as a non-oblique phrase. Chomsky's phrase-structure rules, as presented in the earlier work, provide, among others, the following (1957: 26):

Sentence -> NP + VP,

VP -> Verb + NP,

where, of course, NP stands for "Noun-Phrase" and VP for "Verb-Phrase." Presumably case is predicatable from the linear ordering, but this is not made explicit.

Aspects of the Theory of Syntax at least recognizes the concept of case. Since Chomsky's work deals mainly with English, oblique noun phrases (those other than *Subject of* and *Object of*) were considered to fall under the label "Prepositional-Phrase" (PP). Chomsky then observed that

> "it is well known that in Verb^Prepositional-Phrase constructions one can distinguish various degrees of "cohesion" between the Verb and the accompanying Prepostitional-Phrase" (1965: 101).

By way of explanation he introduces the following example:

(11) he decided on the boat on the train,

which he glosses as "he chose the boat while on the train." His conclusion from this type of example is:

> "Clearly, Time and Place Adverbials can occur quite freely with various types of Verb Phrase, on the one hand, whereas many types of Prepositional-Phrase appear in much closer construction to Verbs" (*loc. cit.*).

This required some modification to the phrase-structure rules and constituent analysis which he had introduced earlier, including those rules from *Syntactic Structures* mentioned above. It should be noted, therefore, that by the nature of the expansion rule for Sentence in both *Syntactic Structures* and *Aspects*, Chomsky gives some ontological priority to the concept of *Subject of*. Under his constituent analysis, *Subject of* is defined as the NP which is immediately dominated by the S[entence]-node (1965: 70-71). Thus, despite the modifications in *Aspects*, *Subject of* (of an *active verb*) is always provided by the first NP-introducing expansion of S, and is thereby preserved with the same status as in *Syntactic Structures*. The first expansion of the new set of rules is

S -> NP^Predicate-Phrase.

The Predicate-Phrase is in turn expanded as follows:

Predicate-Phrase -> Aux^VP (Place) (Time).

The VP can then manifest any of five possibilities, the one of primary concern to us being,

VP -> V (NP) (Prep-Phrase) (Prep-Phrase) (Manner).

The syntactic category of Prep-Phrase is replaced by essentially *semantic* markers, i.e. "Direction, Duration, Place, Frequency, etc." Finally, it is only after the numerous expansions have produced any number of NP's and PP's, that the Verb is replaced by the "Complex Symbol" (CS) which contains its syntactic features.

> "It will follow, then, that Verbs are subcategorized *with respect to the Prepositional-Phrases introduced by [the VP expansion rule above] but not with respect to those introduced by [the Predicate-Phrase expansion rule]*[15] -- namely, the Place and Time Adverbials that are associated with the full Predicate-Phrase, and that might, in fact, be in part more closely associated with the Auxiliary" (1965: 102).

Chomsky seems to give more importance to those noun phrases which are generated from the Predicate-Phrase, than to the one generated by the expansion of S. Since the rule for the rewriting of the S produces the NP which later can be identified as the *Subject of* the (active) sentence, Chomsky seems to imply here that this NP, the *Subject of* the verb, does not play a role in the subcategorization of the verb. This is made explicit by Chomsky (1965: 96):

> "*every frame in which V appears, in the VP,* is relevant to the strict subcategorization of V, and ... *no frame which is not part of the VP* is relevant

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[15] The italics are mine.

to the strict subcategorization of V."[14]

These conditions result in various types of Verb-Phrase structures, which have, naturally, diverse semantic readings. Here, then, is a partial list of such structures and some suggested semantic interpretations (*loc. cit.*):

V	(*elapse*)
V NP	(*bring the book*)
V Prep-Phrase	(*decide on a new course of action*)
V NP Prep-Phrase	(*save the book for John*)

As is evident from the preceding discussion, case *sensu stricto* is not introduced. *Subject of* and *Direct Object of* are both defined in terms of NP and V, with no reference to case.

In fairness to Chomsky, however, the minor references to case that are made must be noted. In one footnote Chomsky writes,

> "Notice, for example, that Case is usually determined by the position of the Noun in surface structure rather than in deep structure, although the surface structures given by stylistic inversions do not affect Case" (1965: 221-222).

The reader will, of course, realize that this statement is made by Chomsky with reference to English, a language which has a strict surface word-order, and cannot apply as it stands to a language which manifests relatively free word-order, as is the situation in Russian.

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[14] The italics are Chomsky's.

Case is also discussed in a sub-section of *Aspects* entitled *Inflectional processes*, but in a very limited way. Rather than using binary marking for inflectional categories, Chomsky proposes that categories such as *gender*, *number*, *case*, and *declensional type* be marked by "integers conventionally associated with the traditional designations." The Gen, for example, may have the feature [2 Case] associated with it.

The question that arises from this is where such categories are to come from. Chomsky's claim is that gender and declensional class are *inherent* in the lexical items (i.e. are in its CS). Number "is introduced by a context-free rule of the base applying to Nouns," whereas case "is introduced by a rule that does not belong to the base subcomponent of the syntax at all but rather to its transformational part" (1965: 170-72). Unless Chomsky constrains these rules to assign case to particular configurations of elements -- which would imply case to be a syntactic manifestation only -- such transformations can only be understood as meaning changing!

Although not directly related to case *per se*, Chomsky's semantic interpretation rules should be mentioned. According to the *Aspects* thoery,

> "the semantic interpretation of a sentence depends only on its lexical items and the grammatical functions and relations represented in the

> underlying structures in which they appear" (*op. cit.*: 136).

What this means is that all interpretation of any given structure occurs in the *base-component* of the grammar, and that the relations established by the phrase-structure rules are in some way *primary* to the language.

What exactly, then, is the status of case in Chomsky? First, Chomsky denies it a place in the base component, saying that case is assigned later dependent on the position of the various lexical items in surface structure. He does not, however, provide any means of determining which case should be assigned for any given structural description. Moreover, the vague label "Prepositional-Phrase" is applied to those phrases which are understood as being more closely linked to the verb than phrases such as those designating *Time*, *Place* and *Manner*. These latter three adverbial notions, while not considered to be cases by Chomsky, are nonetheless given categorial status. Finally, all PP's are replaced with semantic structures. It is only then that the node V[erb] is replaced by a CS which contains its collocational restrictions. Therefore, under the TGG proposals of Chomsky, the verb is selected in terms of the nominal phrases present in the same deep structure, regardless of what case these may manifest later in surface structure.

B. Fillmore

Inasmuch as 1957 can be considered to be the birth of the modern era of TGG, 1968 may be considered to mark the beginning of a new era in the study of case. It was in that year that Charles Fillmore's landmark work, "The Case for Case," was published[37].

Fillmore's case theory is also a transformational model, which itself has rewrite rules. The first rule, very similar indeed to Chomsky's, is the following expansion of "Sentence":

Sentence -> Modality + Proposition,

in which the Modality component is the parallel of Chomsky's *Aux*. The Proposition, like *Predicate-Phrase*, is then further expanded. It is in this procedure that the most marked contrast between these two scholars' theories is manifest, for Fillmore's rewrite rule is

P -> V + C_1 + ... + Cn[38].

Each C of this proposition is to be understood as a case, and in the interests of clarity for the reader, we will quote Fillmore's explanation for these cases, and his description of this preliminary set of cases (Fillmore 1968a: 24-25):

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[37] Case-grammar had been discussed before 1968, but Fillmore's "The Case for Case" in this field can be considered to have the same importance as Chomsky's *Syntactic Structures* had for TGG.

[38] We have corrected the misprint in the original article, whereby the arrow had inadvertently been printed as another "+".

The case notions comprise a set of universal, presumably innate, concepts which identify certain types of judgments human beings are capable of making about the events that are going on around them, judgments about such matters as who did it, who it happened to, and what got changed. The cases that appear to be needed include:

Agentive (A), the case of the typically animate[11] perceived instigator of the action identified by the verb.

Instrumental (I), the case of the inanimate force or object causally involved in the action or state identified by the verb.

Dative (D), the case of the animate being affected by the state or action identified by the verb.

Factitive (F), the case of the object or being resulting from the action or state identified by the verb, or understood as part of the meaning of the verb.

Locative (L), the case which identifies the location or spatial orientation of the state or action identified by the verb.

Objective (O), the semantically most neutral case, the case of anything representable by a noun whose role in the action or state identified by the verb is identified by the semantic interpretation of the verb itself; conceivably the concept should be limited to things which are affected by the action or state identified by the verb. The term is not to be confused with the notion of direct object, nor with the name of the surface case synonymous with accusative.

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[11] Fillmore notes in his own footnote to this definition that "typically" is included as an escape qualification to account for inanimate words such as *robot* and human institution nouns like *nation*.

Fillmore does not claim that this set of case-notions is exhaustive, and notes that "additional cases will surely be needed.". There is, moreover, one further important aspect concerning the case notions of this theory, namely that,

> "although there can be compound instances of a single case (through noun phrase conjunction), each case relationship occurs only once in a simple sentence" (Fillmore 1968a: 21).

From the above rules, and case-definitions, Fillmore's Proposition is thus representable by the members of a set of possible expansions of P according to the rewrite rule for P, i.e. V + A, V + O + A, V + D, V + O + I + A, etc. Regardless of the surface manifestations of these expansions after the application of the transformational component of the grammar, the case-relations identified in each will remain constant. Consider the following examples taken from Fillmore:

(12) John opened the door,
(13) The door was opened by John,
(14) The key opened the door,
(15) John opened the door with the key,
(16) John used the key to open the door,
(17) Chicago is windy,
(18) It is windy in Chicago.

In (12), (13), (15) and (16) *John* ~~is~~ always the A, in the same manner that *key* is always the I in each of (14) - (16). Likewise, despite the two surface structure manifestations of *Chicago* in (17) and (18), it is, in both cases, the L (*op. cit.*: 25).

This aspect of Fillmore's case grammar is a reflection of a point of view taken in the *Aspects* theory. As noted above, Chomsky gives some primacy to the relations generated in the base component of his grammar, and Fillmore likewise states that the case relations generated in the deepest level of his theory do not change, even through transformations, and thus remain the same in the surface structure, regardless of the form they may manifest at that level.

From the procedures described above, Fillmore classifies, or defines, verbs in terms of their *case frames*. He writes, that "the insertion of verbs ... depends on the particular array of cases, the 'case frame', provided by the sentence" (*op. cit.*: 27). One difficulty in this respect is that "many verbs are capable of occurring in more than one distinct case environment" (*loc. cit.*). By way of example, Fillmore presents the following case frames, for the verb *open*: [____O], [____O + A], [____O + I], [____O + I + A], which correspond to the next four examples respectively:

(19) The door opened,

(20) John opened the door,

(21) The wind opened the door,

(22) John opened the door with a chisel.

One notational shortcut for this set is the suggested usage of parentheses for optional elements, whereby the set of case frames for *open* given above could be represented by the single feature frame, +[____O (I) (A)]. One difficulty Fillmore encountered with this proposal is in the small set of verbs such as *kill*, which always require a D, but must have one of *either* an I or A. As a solution to this problem, he suggested linked parentheses to indicate that at least one of the indicated cases *must* be chosen. Thus, the frame feature for *kill* is given as +[____D (I|A)]**.

Not only are verbs subcategorized by their case frames, but nouns are also categorized with respect to the Cases for which they may be selected. Thus, one

> "rule might associate with every noun under L the feature [+locative], for example. Since abstract nouns such as *idea* cannot serve as heads of L expressions, they will be marked [-locative]" (*op. cit.*: 27).

Fillmore also provides rules for the insertion of the appropriate preposition with each case which is realized in surface structure. This same method will work for the assignment of *case* in such languages as Russian. Each case (C) which is generated is later replaced by *K* (for *Kasus*) and NP. The *K* represents either the preposition, case, or both, which is normally realized in surface structure for the given case relation.

**While not of concern to the main topic of this thesis, it should be noted that +[____S] is considered as a frame feature for such words as *true*, and *interesting*, with which a S[entence] is required.

Fillmore writes that the rules for prepositions in English

> "may look something like this: the A preposition is *by*; the I preposition is *by* if there is no A, otherwise it is *with*; the O and F prepositions are typically *zero*;" etc. (1968a: 32).

Finally Fillmore provides a general rule for the selection of the subject of any given sentence. For the 'unmarked' choice of subject (i.e. not passive), the rule is

> "If there is an A, it becomes the subject; otherwise, if there is an I, it becomes the subject; otherwise, the subject is the O" (1968a: 33).

This rule is very general, indeed. It does not account for, among many others, verbs which take the frame feature +[____D]. Nonetheless, the reader is given some idea of how Fillmore expects such operations as subject selection to function.

The above represents the essence of Fillmore's "The Case for Case." Unlike Chomsky, Fillmore's expansion (re-write) rules produce all NP's at the same level. While Chomsky *reads* the relations of *Subject of* and *Direct Object of* from the deep case configuration, Fillmore "produces" these later. His deep cases are assigned a certain hierarchy, from which specified cases can become *Subject of*, etc.

Fillmore thus assigns case at the deepest level of language, in the expansion of the Proposition. Each Case-node that is present consists of an NP and a case-marker (*Kasus*), which contains the relevant information for both morphological case and preposition. Such specifications, however, can be modified through later transformations. Regardless of the transformational history of any given nominal, though, the basic *case relationship* remains unchanged.

In a fashion similar to Chomsky's, verbs are inserted into the *case frame* of the sentence according to the cases which are present therein, and their compatibility with the cases in the verb's *frame feature*. The collocational restrictions in Fillmore's theory relate to both the *cases* which are specified, and the *lexical items* themselves. Fillmore is not, moreover, concerned with function of the deep-case configuration in the specification of the surface categories (Subject, Object, etc.) of nouns, and hence includes *all* cases in the selection process of the verb.

C. The Theoretical Cases

In this section we will examine some of the relevant criticisms and changes that have been proposed both in the TGG and Case-Grammar models.

Semantics and Case

James D. McCawley has discussed the standard TGG theory and proposed some modifications. In the same year that "The Case for Case" was published, some significant works of McCawley also saw the light of day. In these works, e.g., "Lexical Insertion in a Transformational Grammar without Deep Structure," McCawley argues against the concept of 'deep structure' as "a linguistically significant level 'between' semantic representation and surface syntactic representation" (1968a: 71). The stimulus for his position, expressed appropriately enough in an article in the same volume as "The Case for Case," is

> "that it is high time for linguists to grant to semantics the status as an integral part of linguistics which has hitherto been denied it by most" (McCawley 1968b: 161).

Like Fillmore, McCawley does not accept the premises of the standard theory with respect to the value of the phrase-structure and lexical insertion rules. Without the accompanying details, here are two of the conclusions from his works which, along with other literature of the period, have exerted a significant influence on the later direction of theoretical linguistic studies:

> "1. Syntactic and semantic representations are of the same formal nature, namely labeled trees.
>
> 2. There is a single system of rules (... 'transformations') which relates semantic

> representation to surface structure through intermediate stages" (McCawley 1968a: 71).

The concepts underlying this theory are now generally referred to as *Generative Semantics*. In some ways this theoretical approach may be understood as the standard (syntactic) theory with a semantic face. As opposed to *Interpretive Semantics* -- as the theory incorporating Chomskian projection rules is labeled -- it places semantic information at the deepest level of a grammar.

As a reply to Fillmore's "The Case for Case," and somewhat less as a reply to the scholars promoting "Generative Semantics," Chomsky[•'] reversed a stand he had taken in his earlier works:

> "Thus deep structures are not mapped into semantic representations in the same sense as the standard theory; rather the converse is true" (1970: 59).

The semantic representations which Chomsky proposes are introduced as a

> "new set of structures C (for "case systems") which represent semantically significant relations among phrases such as the relation of agent-action ... and of instrument-action" (1970: 60).

Under the standard theory, both

[•'] Chomsky (1970), "Deep Structure, Surface Structure, and Semantic Interpretation."

(12) John opened the door,

(14) The key opened the door,

would have been considered identical at the deep-structure level, with the exception of their lexical entries. Chomsky notes that the relations mentioned above are in no way differentiated by the phrase-structure rules. Therefore, to capture this difference at the phrase-structure level, he proposes constructing some "structures C_1 and C_2 of C as follows:

C_1: ([V, *open*], [Agent, *John*], [Object, *the door*])

C_2: ([V, *open*], [Instrument, *the key*], [Object, *the door*])"

In a paraphrase of Fillmore 1968, Chomsky continues: "Suppose that the grammar contains a component that generates such structures as C_1 and C_2 and rules that map these onto phrase-markers; for example, the main rule might say that the item specified as Agent takes the position of subject (in the sense of the standard theory), and if there is no Agent, this position is occupied by the Instrument, etc." (*loc. cit.*).

The difference between Chomsky's view and that of Fillmore lies in what both do with such information. Unlike Fillmore, Chomsky questions the need for such information in the deep structure, or whether

> "the rules mapping C_1 and C_2 onto the deep structures of (12) and (14), respectively, can be interpreted as rules of semantic interpretation for these deep structures" (1970: 61).

What the net result of Chomsky's discussion amounts to is that he now claims that case relations, as opposed to *Subject of* and *Object of* in *Aspects*, are "readable" from the deep constituent structure. In the earlier formulation, the raw categories were sufficient for the interpretations he required. Now, however, other semantic information must be available in order to read "case relations" at this level. Chomsky states that

> "one rule (probably universal) will stipulate that for verbs of action, the animate subject may be interpreted as the agent; etc." (*loc. cit.*).

Thus, the syntactic relation of *Subject of* must already have been interpreted. This means that, unlike the projection rules of the standard theory which applied only to the base component, projection rules are no longer limited to this single component. To account for various surface phenomena such as *focus*, Chomsky now permits projection rules to apply at any point from the base component right up to the surface structure.

Chomsky still maintains implicitly that verbs are not central in the phrase-structure rules and the transformational derivation of a sentence, but rather that the verb is selected on the basis of information present in deep structure, which is also, of course, the basic position of Fillmore.

Already by the early seventies, however, scholars were beginning to question whether deep case syntactic structure was sufficient to account for both surface structure and surface interpretation of language. Fillmore and McCawley both exerted some influence on the studies of case relations, with the result that other scholars, even Chomsky, modified the then current linguistic theory to include at least some semantic information. It was no longer felt that semantics had no place in deep structure.

One of the more popular methods of expressing semantic information at the deep level of language has been through cases, as introduced by Fillmore. Almost all supporters and critics of *case-grammar* have, therefore, addressed the one question of which cases are necessary, and how many cases are required for a complete semantic description of language.

What follows is by no means a complete listing of all the proposals that have been advanced in this regard, but it will nonetheless provide an idea of the difficulties such a task encompasses, and the many types of cases scholars have envisioned in deep structure.

Two approaches have been taken in this endeavour. Most scholars have followed the pattern established by Fillmore, describing their case choices in prose, and thereby have maintained Fillmore's belief that cases should represent "types of judgments human beings are capable of making." Some, on the other hand, have attempted to describe these cases in terms which they feel would have more direct applicability to a transformational theory of grammar; that is, they have incorporated *features* as an integral aspect of case descriptions. This latter type of case may be referred to as a *feature case*.

Let us first examine Fillmore's own modifications. We will then look at other case proposals based on this model, and finally at feature cases.

Fillmore's Cases

Fillmore claims (see above) that he is not convinced that his case selection is the best possible, and makes several changes to his original set in later works.

In "Some Problems for Case Grammar" (1971), Fillmore proposes the renaming of *Dative* to *Experiencer* in order to reflect the actual function of this case. Accordingly, he has "reanalyzed the old Dative by spreading it around among the other cases" (1971: 42). Similarly, *Factitive* is replaced by another case which has an even wider understanding, namely *Goal*. Moreover, two new cases, *Source* and *Time*, are added (*loc. cit.*). The positing of the special case, *Force*, seems unnecessary to Fillmore[42], "since this putative Force case never occurs in contrast with either

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[42] Huddleson (1970: 505), among others, has advocated this case.

Agent or Instrument" (1971: 44). Furthermore, Fillmore earlier discussed the possible necessity of the case *Benefactive*. Due, however, to the occurrence of *Benefactive* only in sentences with Agents, it appears to be redundant in the theory (*op. cit.*: 52).

Another article, "Types of Lexical Information" (1972), is not so much a paper on case grammar, as on the information contained in the lexicon. This, of course, includes cases, especially as they assist in the subclassification of verbs. Of interest here is another new case, *Counter-Agent*, which Fillmore defines as "the force or resistance against which the action is carried out," but for which he fails to give a concrete example. Moreover, the former Factitative, which had been considered a sort of Goal, is now manifest as *Result* (*op. cit.*: 376).

In a more recent article on case grammar, "The Case for Case Reopened" (1977), Fillmore does not discuss the problem of case configurations, but rather discusses case from the point of view of discourse analysis, or, perhaps more accurately, *focus*, to which we will return later.

According to this article, there are 10 deep cases, eight of which are used to subclassify the majority of verbs. Those eight are *Agent*, *Counter-Agent*, *Object*, *Result*, *Instrument*, *Source*, *Goal*, and *Experiencer*; while the two which do not play a role in verb subclassification are *Time* and *Locative*, although even the latter are used for a very small group of verbs.

Fillmorian Cases

There have been several proposals made with respect to cases by scholars other than Fillmore, of course, and an examination of the salient aspects of these follows, given in an approximate chronological order.

Shroyer

One of the largest number of distinct cases has been proposed by Thomas Shroyer''. His *sixteen*'' cases are divided into groups, giving the following individual cases and sets of cases (1969: 30-32):

[(Agent)]

[(Locative)]

[(Controlled Instrument) (Uncontrolled Instrument) (Agency)]

[(Comitative Spatial) (Comitative Temporal)]

[(Inalienable Possessor) (Alienable Possessor) (Inalienably Possessed) (Alienably Possessed)]

[(Contactive Object) (Reactive Object) (Responsive Object) (Resultative Object) (Affective Object)]

The alienable-inalienable set of cases is obviously a response to Fillmore's rather lengthy discussion of this

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''Schroyer (1969), *An Investigation of the Semantics of English* ... , unpublished Ph. D. dissertation.

''Anderson (1971) has proposed the fewest cases, namely three, but his theory is not as simple as this might indicate. The details of this theory are discussed later in this chapter.

topic (Fillmore 1968a: 61-81). Notice, however, that these cases are not as simple as Fillmore's, and might have some difficulty qualifying as "judgments humans can make." This particular approach and these case suggestions indicate the difficulty of determining exactly which cases a *minimal* set should contain.

Robinson

With respect to individual cases, a different proposal is made by Jane Robinson[41]. She proposes a special case, characterized primarily by the feature [+Abstract], to account for such surface phenomena in English as *it* and *the fact* in sentences like,

(23) it shocked me that he left,

(24) the fact that he left shocked me.

This choice of case seems to be ill-advised, and indicates but one of the problems of attempting to correlate every aspect of the surface level of any language with the concepts of case grammar. Deep cases were never intended to be language-specific, and scholars must be aware of such pitfalls.

Grimes

Another aspect of this problem, which is common in many linguistic theories, is that of notational variants. Grimes‘‘ proposes a total of thirteen cases, but other than Agent, Instrument, Force, and Benefactive -- with the normally understood meanings thereof -- he suggests five cases specifically for use with verbs of movement, which he calls *Orientation Roles*. Another four cases are called *Process Roles*. Other than *Vehicle*, however, the remaining four Orientation cases are directly reflected in the Process cases. The *Object* role of Orientation ("the thing whose position or motion is being described") is paralleled in the Process Role *Patient* ("the thing changed by a process or the thing whose state is being described"). Grimes does not fail to see this relationship, and suggests, for each such pair, the possibility of a *Combined* meaning. Thus, for the cases just mentioned, this is *Patient*. The remaining three pairs, presented in the order *Orientation Role, Process Role, Combined Role* are: *Source, Material -> Former; Goal, Result -> Latter;* and *Range, Referent -> Range*. The final set of these could also conceivably be called *Path*, or, under Fillmore's proposals, *Locative*. Other than the case *Vehicle*, which it would not be unreasonable to classify as an *Instrument of Motion*, Grimes really presents nothing more than a notational variant of Fillmore's 1971 cases.

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[41] Robinson (1969), "Case, Category, and Configuration."

Moreover, although Grimes has supposedly introduced *thirteen* cases, this does not appear to be actually ~~true~~. Once possible redundancies of these cases are eliminated,

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‘‘Grimes (1972), *The Thread of Discourse*.

the actual number of cases can be reduced to *eight*.

Starosta

Another type of notational variant is introduced by Starosta[47]. What Starosta wishes to do is provide the Standard Theory with a case-grammar overlay. Unlike Chomsky, who does not specify relational information in his deep structure, Starosta does.

In the lexicon, a verb, for example, is specified for each of the *cases* with which it can co-occur. In the manner of Chomsky, particular features which are obligatory or blocked for each of those case arguments are also included. Each noun is similarly marked for its possible case relations and specific features. Thereby, the case and inherent features which are present in the various lexical items of the deep structure must not disagree. Otherwise, an anomalous sentence results.

For example, two of the features for the verb *explode* are +[+O], and -[+O,-explosive]. *Dynamite* is specified as *+O*, and *+explosive*. Since these features are compatible, the following sentence can be produced:

(25) The dynamite exploded.

Starosta's ostensible purpose for this approach is that "case features will be retained ... , and case nodes will be dispensed with" (1976: 28). However, this approach is not successful. Admittedly, the very basic deep structure is represented by the V's and NP's of Chomsky's Standard Theory, but the presence of case labels with each lexical item automatically labels the nodes with case relations anyway. Thus, one can consider this approach to be nothing more than a notational variant of Chomsky's revised theory, with Fillmorian cases present, but introduced directly from the lexicon, rather than through a feature and configurational analysis.

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[47] Starosta (1976), "A Place for Case."

Moreover, Starosta's marking of case information on nominals in the lexicon is also a suspect procedure. It seems that almost any inanimate noun can be conceived of as filling any case role other than those which are specifically animate, i.e. Agent and Experiencer. Starosta, however, chooses his examples carefully so as to avoid this kind of problem, e.g.,

(26) the villain exploded the dynamite
with the detonator.

In this example, the *detonator* is, of course, the Inst. On the other hand, is not *dynamite*, which is specified only as +[+O], the Inst in the following?

(27) The villain blew up the bridge with dynamite.

Although brief, the preceding serves to show that it would be very difficult to constrain the possible relationships which any given noun could manifest.

Other authors, of course, include possible cases in the lexicon with the verbal semantics, but not for the same purpose as Starosta. Thus, *Lexi-Case*, as this variant is called, cannot be supported by the basic facts of language, nor by its own ostensible *raison d'être*.

Stockwell et al.

The so-called UCLA grammar[48], like those immediately above, does not differ substantially from Fillmore's model. However, there is one point which is worth noting with respect to deep structure semantics. In the frame features for verbs, obligatory cases, along with those which are blocked for any given verb, are essential for the subcategorization of the verbs. Optional cases are simply omitted. One example of a case frame is the following, in which *Neutral* is roughly the equivalent of the case earlier referred to as *Objective*:

(28) *reside*: [____ -NEUT -DAT +LOC -INS +AGT]

Stalker

Perhaps one of the more significant variations from the norm set by Fillmore is the *causal : non-causal* bipartition of the cases by Stalker[4]. The former, the *causal* set, contains six cases: *Cause*, *Instrument*, *Method*, *Remote Agent*, *Agent*, and *Actor*. It seems worth our while to examine these by way of the following short definitions, and a few of Stalker's examples (1975: 47-51):

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[48] Stockwell, Schachter, and Partee (1973), *The Major Syntactic Structures of English*.

Cause "is the case of that which effects something by its existence or its nature, but not by its action or voluntarily," e.g.,

(29) *Nixon* frightened me.

(30) *Ambition* has brought you to this pass.

Method "is the case of that which is effective both by its existence and by its action," e.g.,

(31) *The plan* provided for that contingency.

Remote Agent is "the animate case of that which is causal by volition, not through carrying out the action described," e.g.,

(32) *Governor Smith* built that expressway.

Actor "is the animate case of that which effects the action or situation described by the verb by mental or physical action, but not voluntarily," e.g.,

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[4] Stalker (1975), *A Syntactically-Based Deep Case Grammar*, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation.

(33) *Horace* fumbled the ball.

(34) *Alice* disapproved of Mary.

All of these six cases are subject to co-occurrence restrictions, of course. Stalker's claim, however, is that only one animate (i.e. one of *Remote Agent*, *Agent*, or *Actor*) and only one inanimate cause (i.e. one of *Cause*, *Instrument*, or *Method*) may occur in the same proposition (1975: 51).

The four *non-causal* cases are *Dative*, *Objective*, *Positive*, and *End*, defined as follows:

Dative is "the animate case of the experiencer, neither willing nor causing the situation or action represented by the verb, nor serving as its object," e.g.,

(35) I commanded *John* to rescue Charles.

(36) Mary forced *him* to reconsider his views.

Objective has the expected definition of a "neutral case, the case of that whose role is identified by the semantic interpretation of the verb itself." Moreover, the noun represented by this case is *presupposed to already exist*, e.g.,

(37) I ate *the turnips*.

(38) Karl learned *that you were doing an excellent job.*

Positive is "the case of that which the action or situation represented by the verbs tends to affirm, deny, query, or qualify, either absolutely or with reference to that which occupies the role [*Objective*]," e.g.,

(39) Charles is *a Russian.*

(40) I cannot believe *that Alice will be defeated.*

End is "the case of that which represents the actual or projected, desired or abhorred, outcome relating to a non-stative verb, or represents the situation or thing to which the situation indicated by a stative verb tends, relates, or approximates," e.g.,

(41) Harry marched them *into the forest.*

(42) I shouted *at Charles.*

These cases are similar to what has been proposed before, but with further refinements, especially to the cases of the *causal* group. One question which arises is whether ~~all~~ six cases from this group are justifiable, especially since several of them are mutually exclusive, implying that they may be in complementary distribution with each other.

Bhat

Finally, there is one aspect of case theory involving the Inst which has received a significant amount of attention, namely, the question of which deep cases are represented in each of the following sentences:

(43) The garden was swarming with bees,

(44) Bees were swarming in the garden,

(45) John loaded the wagon with hay,

(46) John loaded hay onto the wagon.

Fillmore (1968a: 48; 1977: 69), Stalker (1975: 99-109), and many others have considered this to be a very thorny problem, but all of these scholars have concerned themselves primarily with *English* data.

Fillmore, for example, explains this as a question of *promotion*, whereby one or the other case is moved to the *Direct Object* position and loses its preposition and case marking.

Givón[**] has proposed that for these sentences there is extrasentential information specified (1975: 164). Thereby, in (47), he claims, *all* the paint was used,

(47) John sprayed the paint on the wall,

while in (48), the *whole* of the wall was involved,

[**] Givón (1975), *On Understanding Grammar*.

(48) John sprayed the wall with paint.

Bhat[11], on the basis of English and Kannada (a Dravidian language), has proposed yet another solution. He introduces what he calls *multiple case roles*, e.g., *Agent-Experiencer*, *Object-Location*, etc. His explanation for this is that

> the speaker of the language would have the option of assigning to the element any one of the constituents of this multiple case role in a given context, not by a transformational rule, but by an option *in the deep structure representation itself*, with the restriction that he would not assign one and the same case role to two different elements. The characterizing semantic feature of the case role so assigned would then get attached to the element (1977: 367).

Although this explanation is sufficient for the data Bhat is dealing with, it runs counter to basic case-grammar theory. It is, moreover, not universal since many languages do not have verbs with problems equivalent to those of English verbs like *swarm*, *load*, *smear*, etc.[12]

The above discussion has shown that there is very little agreement among scholars on the set of cases which are *necessary and sufficient* for a semantic explanation of surface syntactic forms.

Perhaps it is the formally unconstrained nature of these cases that is the greatest problem. One approach to formalizing case is to specify features for each case in place of the prose description. We will presently examine this proposal. There is, however, a parallel problem with the approach of feature cases. As will soon become clear, there is not a high degree of agreement among scholars as to which features are necessary to describe each case, and whether such features should be *inherent* or *relational*.

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[11] D. N. S. Bhat (1977), "Multiple Case Roles."

[12] Although an explanation for the prepositionless indirect object of

(49) I gave *Mary* the book

seems obvious to scholars, the very similar situation of alternate case assignments in other examples seems to present insurmountable problems.

Feature Cases

One version of feature-case grammar is that used by McCoy, with particular reference to the classification of Spanish verbs[11]. In actuality, McCoy has proposed 20 cases, spread over three relational groups: *Causal Arguments*, *Affected Arguments*, and *Circumstantial Arguments*. The Causal Arguments are represented by *Agentive*, *Instrumental*, *Matter*, *Contents*, *Causative*, and *Purpose*. The Affected Arguments are *Experiencer*, *Dative*, *Objective* and *Factitive*. The remaining 10 cases belong to the Circumstantial group -- five cases each for *Time* and for *Locative* relations.

These cases are defined in terms of the binary marking of 13 features, of which 8 serve specifically the Causal and Affected Groups: *Cause*, *Instigator*, *Performer*, *Intent*, *Effect*, *Active*, *Control*, and *Affected*. Two more features -- *Source* and *Goal* -- serve for these cases along with the Circumstantial cases. The remaining three features -- *Place*, *Transition* and *Extent* -- are used only with the

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[11] McCoy(1969), *A Case Grammar Classification of Spanish Verbs*, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation.

Circumstantial group.

The reader may have already noticed that under such a system, the exact nature of each of these features is not really any more clear, if even as clear, as the meanings of the cases they are intended to define. What, one may ask, is the meaning of the two features *Intent* and *Control*, which are marked negatively for every case except Agentive, for which case they are marked "±" and "+" respectively? Moreover, it is obvious that this particular system is not very efficient, for it employs *thirteen features* to specify only *twenty cases*.

Combinative Features

On the other extreme of this is the approach of Matthew Marino[34]. While still maintaining the basic premise of deep cases, which also serve to subcategorize verbs, Marino has limited the number of cases to only four. These four cases, however, are defined in terms of exactly *two* binary features. The two features which he feels are necessary and sufficient for the determination of the essential deep cases of a language are *±animate* (inherent) and *±affective* (relational). The four unique combinations of these features specify Agent, Instrument, Dative, and Object. Agent and Dative are both specified positively for *animacy*, while Agent and Instrument are positively specified for *affective* (1972: 573).

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[34] Marino (1972), "A Strong Deep Case Hypothesis."

Marino's proposal does, of course, specify co-occurrence restrictions, which he introduces via his phrase structure rules. The expansion of Proposition is as follows (1972: 585):

$$\text{Prop} \rightarrow \text{V} + \left\{ \begin{matrix} (\text{A}|\text{I}) & + & (\text{D}|\text{O}) \\ (\left\{ \begin{matrix} \text{D} \\ \text{O} \end{matrix} \right\}) & + & \text{O} \end{matrix} \right\}$$

It will strike the reader as rather unusual that one possible expansion of the Proposition yields *V + O + O*. This seems to contravene the convention of only one deep case per proposition. Marino's intention in allowing such a case configuration, however, was to provide, through the deep structure of the language, a means of dealing with the problem of inalienable possession. Thus, one *O* represents some inalienably possessed part of the other *O*.

Nilsen

An intermediate set of case features is proposed by D. F. L. Nilsen, who has published three major works concerned with semantic-feature marking of deep case (Nilsen 1972, 1973; and Nilsen & Nilsen 1975).

Nilsen's major *cases* are *Agent*, *Instrument*, *Causative*, *Patient*, *Source* and *Goal*. He postulates a relationship between these six cases and three *pairs of semantic features: Controller* vs. *Controlled; Cause* vs. *Effect;* and ***Source*** **vs.** ***Goal***, to which he assigns a hierarchical order. Pairing the cases in the respective order given, one case (at least) from each pair is marked positively for at least one of the features *Source* or *Goal*. Similarly, at least one case from each of the first two pairs is marked positively for at least one of *Cause* or *Goal*. *Agent* alone is marked positively for *Controller*, while only *Instrument* is positively marked for *Controlled* (1972: 35-37). This approach of marking all cases for *Source* or *Goal* is not unlike that of Hjelmslev, discussed earlier, whereby every case is marked at least for the dimension of *directionality*.

The three pairs of features are ranked in the order given, and "this hierarchy plays a major role in language" (1972: 48). From each pair, the first is considered to be the *Active* feature; and the second, the *Receptive*. If these cases were linearly ranked from highly active to highly receptive, the result would be as follows:

(1) Controller (e.g., Agent)
(2) Cause (e.g., Causative)
(3) Controlled (e.g., Instrument)
(4) Effect (e.g., Patient)
(5) and (6) Source-Goal (e.g., Location)

The function of this scale is to properly assign topicalization, that is,

> the ranking of cases according to amount of activity is crucial since it provides a clear and simple explanation for topicalization. Primary topicalization, which in some languages is equivalent to subject marking, is predictable from this hierarchy since the most active cases are the most likely to receive it, while the least active (and most receptive) cases are least likely to receive topicalization (*op. cit.*: 49).

Moreover, Nilsen claims to account for the obligatoriness and/or omissibility of certain arguments in any sentence by this same process of topicalization:

> Neutral topicalization ... applies to those cases which are neither actors ... nor receivers ... . The result of Neutral topicalization is that the Arguments thus marked have freedom of movement within the sentence and may be deleted from the surface structure of the sentence without affecting grammaticality (*loc. cit.*).

One further question which has been asked of deep cases is whether they are linguistically justifiable. Nilsen & Nilsen address this question in their discussion of the case features mentioned above. If *Agent* is nothing more than *Animate Cause*, they ask, do we really need the case label? Their answer is that such "gross" cases may indeed be of value for the human mind (as opposed to computer programs). One relevant fact "is that deep cases represent a relationship between inherent features, like animate, and relational features, like cause" (1975: 97).

Consider the relational feature pair of *Cause* and *Effect* discussed above, and the inherent features *Animate* and *Inanimate*. The four highest ranking cases (see above) can be described in terms of the combinations of these two feature dichotomies (*op. cit.*: 98), which is exactly the viewpoint taken by Marino.

Nilsen & Nilsen, in discussing the roles of these four cases, give further support to the linguistic usefulness of such deep cases. They write,

> Since the features animate and cause are basically active features, while the features inanimate and effect are basically passive features, we can now explain that the Agent is the most eligible to become the subject of a sentence because it consists entirely of active features and the subject position in English, and many other languages, is normally the position for the most active case. This is why the Object with its all-passive features is most eligible to become a direct object while an Agent with its all-active features is least eligible for this position. On the other hand, Instruments and Experiencers are equally comfortable as subjects or direct objects because they are partly active and partly passive in nature (*loc. cit.*).

The material cited above has shed some light on the complexities of case descriptions. Many different cases have been proposed, but there is no firm agreement on which of these cases should comprise the minimal set for a grammar. Most scholars agree that *Agent*, *Instrument*, *Dative* (or its equivalent, *Experiencer*), and *Objective* should be part of this set, but the exact description of these cases is still not resolved. A description of these and other cases by means of *features* has been somewhat successful in solving this problem. Many features, both *inherent* and *relational* have been introduced in an attempt to formally constrain any description of case, but there is still some disagreement on which features should be employed, and, moreover, what the exact nature of these features is. With reference to the one case, Inst, this topic will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Localist Theories of Case

In the preceding chapter we examined some of the theories which can be included under the rubric *Localist Theory*. While this theoretical approach had lost some support early in this century, many scholars have attempted to revive its concepts within both the TGG and case-grammar frameworks. Kuryłowicz, for one, does not consider this to be a fruitful approach:

> "The so-called 'localist' theory of cases may be justified from the *diachronic* point of view. From the *synchronic* one the expression of spatial relation generally represents *one* only of the possible functions of a given case-form" (1964: 202).

John Anderson[11], however, presents an attempt at the incorporation of *locational* concepts within a transformational theory. Many of his rules are extremely complex, and in the interest of space we will only present the essence of this theory, without many specific details.

Anderson's theory is predicated on *subcategorization* and *dependency* rules. He begins all derivations with V[erb], from which he generates features and cases. The first dependency rule generates a *nom*inative case for every verb. This case "is the notionally most neutral case." This rule, given as

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[11] Anderson (1971), *The Grammar of Case*; and (1977), *On Case Grammar*.

(50) V -> nom//____V,

generates a nominal for each and every (English) verb. Verbs may be ±*stative*, and those that are +*stative* must undergo another dependency rule, ordered *after* that given above, namely,

(51) +stat -> cop//____V.

This rule produces the copula (once again language-specifically for English and similar languages).

A second case, related to nom as a non-local case, is *erg*ative, which is "typically rather than necessarily animate," and which "introduces the N which is regarded as the initiator of the 'action' associated with the V in such clauses" (1971: 40).

These fragments of Anderson's theory are sufficient to show the reader that this theory is, like other concepts rejected earlier, too tied to the surface structure of language, nor are his features easily interpreted.

For example, the feature +*stat* does not necessarily imply semantic "stativeness." When an *erg* is introduced with a *cop*, the presence of the *erg* over-rules the +*stat*. "Only when erg is absent is a clause containing cop semantically 'stative'" (1971: 48). This is the situation represented by the following example:

(52) The lights were dimmed (by John).

It can thus be seen that Anderson's features and cases are not necessarily reflective of reality, although the use of a feature such as *stative* would imply that they were meant to be so. The real semantic interpretation of the feature *stative*, as used up until now, could be read as *the feature which will generate a copula in the surface structure of an English sentence.*

However, the presence of *erg* and *nom* in deep structure, without the feature *stative*, can be interpreted as a transitive verb, as in,

(53) John dimmed the lights,

(54) Egbert moved the couch.

Anderson points out that intransitives may behave like transitives, which he uses as justification for the introduction of the feature *±reflexive*. This feature choice is conditioned by +erg, but moreover, in the presence of *+erg* and *+reflexive*, the obligatory *nom* and the *erg* may combine into a single case node, *nom/erg*. This would be the case of the noun in a sentences like,

(55) Egbert moved.

Thus, Anderson proposes only two non-local cases: the *nom*, which is obligatory, and the *erg*.

The two local cases which Anderson introduces are *loc*, which may be understood in the meaning of *place* or *place to which*; and *ablative*, which has the meaning of *source* or *place from which*. These cases are again introduced by subcategorization rules followed by dependency rules. A verb may be marked *+locative*, after which a dependency rule inserts a *loc* case to the right of the verb.

In the manner presented above, Anderson allows other combinations of cases besides *nom/erg*. To account for the sentence,

(56) John is cold,

Anderson proposes the case combination *nom/loc*, whereby the obligatory nom is now understood as the reflexive location of the *cold*. Similarly, the case *loc/erg* can be postulated for the first noun in,

(57) his regiment contained the attack.

The presence of the agentive-like *erg* unit is justified since such a sentence can be found in the imperative mood, e.g.,

(58) Contain the attack at all costs!

The unit *abl* is introduced in the presence of the feature *+dynamic*. However, it is also *blocked* by the presence of *-dynamic*. The feature *dynamic* does not universally imply any kind of motion, however. A verb which is *+stative* can actually combine with a case that would seem to be in complementary distribution with it, i.e. *+dyn*. Anderson's claim is that this combination of features accounts for the verbal semantics of

(59) this road goes from London to Brighton.

The preceding material shows only the concrete interpretation of the local cases of Anderson, but an abstract interpretation is available for *nom*, *erg*, and motion. An abstract *loc* is represented in

(60) many people know part of the truth.

in which *people* is understood to be the location of *part of the truth*.

The abstract interpretation of *abl* and motion (+*dyn*) can be seen in the subject and verb of

(61) John sold the book,

in which *John* is considered to be the source of the book, and whereby the book is interpreted as moving in some abstract manner from *John* to the buyer. *John* is more than just the *abl* here, he is also *erg*.

Anderson then attempts to show the universality of his theory by explaining the simple procedure which will differentiate the two verbs *teach* and *learn*. Both verbs have the obligatory *loc*, who receives the material, and an *abl* who dispenses it. The only difference here is whether the unit *erg* gets added to *abl* for *teach*, or to *loc* for *learn* (1971: 138).

One may also have a reflexive locational nominal, which is accounted for by the addition of *abl* to *loc*. Such a case would be represented by the notions "across, through."

Due to the parallel nature of case configurations of *nom* with *erg*, and *loc* with *abl*, Anderson questions whether the distinction between these two sets is perhaps simply that of non-locative "transitivity" and locational "direction." Without presenting his supportive argumentation here, Anderson does feel that indeed this is the case. He therefore reduces the number of basic cases to two: *loc* and *abl***; while maintaining *nom* and *erg* as *features* (1971: 217-18):

> Nom and erg are reduced to the status of features accounting for the 'grammaticalization' (subjectivalization and objectivalization) of the basic cases loc and abl (and perhaps of the unmarked case I have designated 'nom', if it is not identified with loc), which underlie both the non-'local' cases (and, of course, 'abstract' uses of the 'local').

Anderson's claim for his theory is that there are basically four types of deep case, which is also the number reached in general in non-Localist theories. These sets are not parallel however. While *erg* and *nom* are similar to *Agent* and *Objective*, respectively, *loc* and *abl* are more similar to secondary cases in the other theories, such as *Locative* and *Source*. These cases, however, can combine with each other to produce yet other case meanings. Moreover, by specifying verbal features such as *dynamic* and *stative* along with the cases, Anderson reduces the number of cases to essentially two.

***Nom* is actually maintained as a secondary case, resulting in three cases in the deep structure of this theory.

From this brief presentation of Anderson's views, it can be seen that this version of localist theory seems to "stretch" semantic reality, and especially the basic concept that cases should represent judgments humans can make. While interesting, especially in its reduction of the number of cases to two, the theory does not support case-grammar, nor is it a strong counter-proposal to it.

Kilby

David Kilby'', with some minor modifications, maintains the basic theory of Anderson (1971), and applies this to Russian data. Kilby's proposals are as abstract as Anderson's, and he tentatively establishes

> four elements (i.e. dyn, erg, loc & nom) which, linking together more concrete elements, may be capable of representing a large part of the categorial semantic structure of Russian. The structures which are possible will not embody every possible configuration of these elements; the element *dyn*, for instance, cannot be directly dominated by *loc*, while an *erg* governing a *loc* predication must have an intercalcated *dyn*. The exemplificatory sentence ... 'X put Y on Z' can now be given the structure (1977a: 29):



This basic structure serves for many different situations, both concrete and abstract. If X is replaced by *Ivan*, and

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''Kilby (1977a), *Deep and Superficial Cases in Russian*.

Y by *Boris*, then the Z may be replaced by *komnata* (room) or *razdraženie* (annoyance), for example, resulting in any of the following, where it is the combination of features and lexical items which predicts the shape of the verb (1977a: 32):

(62) *Ivan vve[illegible] Borisa v komnatu*
Ivan brought Boris into the room,

(63) *Ivan privel Borisa v razdraženie*
Ivan brought Boris into annoyance,

(64) *Ivan razdrazil Borisa*
Ivan annoyed Boris.

It can be seen in the preceding diagram that there is no node V[erb]. As the schematic indicates, Kilby's theory uses the relational information in such structures, from which verbs are generated. There are, however, no hard and fast rules to predict the phonological or exact semantic shape of these items. Thus, the ultimate prediction for surface cases is given in the appendix as a combination of node government and position in surface structure''. Kilby writes, for example, that "any noun governed by an element on its right will be in the instrumental," and that, "any noun governed by a loc will be in the locative" (1977a: 177-78).

These theories, based on earlier Localist concepts,

''Position, the reader will recall, is also used by Chomsky in *Aspects* as a predictor of case.

seem to fail in two ways. First, the basic concepts seem to be *ad hoc* in nature, and rather unclear even to linguists. Second, while Kilby predicts case from an ordered base, and Anderson introduces surface lexical items from semantic features, both theories rely on surface structure positional information, without convincing support for such a view.

While perhaps interesting as linguistic curiosities, these theories do not seem to further our understanding of case grammar.

D. Influences on Case

Let us now examine some other aspects of grammar which may assist us in answering at least some of the myriad problematic areas of surface structure.

Topicalization

Although a satisfactory definition of *topicalization* has not been proposed, Chomsky writes that

> "It might be suggested that Topic-Comment is the basic grammatical relation of surface structure corresponding (roughly) to the fundamental Subject-Predicate relation of deep structure" (1965: 221).

This viewpoint has been adopted by many scholars. Fillmore has proposed that the process of *subjectivalization* is the same as *primary topicalization* (1968a: 57). Miller'' agrees, writing,

> "The nominative'', I believe (along with Fillmore), is the one case ending which has only a Satzfunktion, since its role is to indicate which noun in the sentence is the topic" (1974: 247).

There are, however, scholars who disagree with this suggestion. Among these are Channon'', who discusses Russian, a language which doesn't always have a Nom in surface structure. According to him,

> "Subject formation is a process which takes place during the derivation of a given sentence, but at a stage before any kind of topicalization can apply" (1971: 158).

The data of Nilsen (presented above) seem to confirm such an hypothesis. Those data show that the subject slot of an active sentence is usually filled by the nominal in the sentence having the greatest number of *active* features. The implication of this is that subject-selection has nothing whatsoever to do with marking any given nominal member as special, but is rather a direct process of the language.

Fillmore took this basic process further by rejecting any kind of term for *topicalization*. Rather he feels that

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''Miller (1974), "A Localist Account of the Dative Case in Russian."

''The Nom can be considered to be the subject of a Russian sentence, especially if it is the only Nom in that sentence.

''Channon (1971), "On Subject Noun-Phrase Fronting, Topicalization and Argument Promotion in Russian."

the slogan, "MEANINGS ARE RELATIVIZED TO SCENES," is more reflective of the true situation in natural language (1977: 59). As an example of this, Fillmore discusses the verbs which may describe a "commercial event," e.g., *buy*, *pay (for)*, etc. He gives the following examples:

(65) I bought a dozen roses.

(66) I paid Harry five dollars.

(67) I bought a dozen roses from Harry
for five dollars.

(68) I paid Harry five dollars for a dozen roses.

He explains the notions of scenes as follows:

> Whenever a speaker uses ANY of the verbs related to the commercial event, for example, the entire scene of the commercial event is brought into play -- is "activated" -- but the particular word chosen imposes on this scene a particular perspective. Thus, anyone who hears and understands either of the sentences [given above] has in mind a scene involving all of the necessary aspects of the commercial event, but in which only certain parts of the event have been identified and included in perspective.
>
> It may not be necessary to believe that everything that is included in our understanding of a sentence is necessarily a part of the underlying grammatical structure of that sentence; it seems preferable to say that a word like *buy* or *pay* activates the scene of the commercial event; that everybody who understands the word knows what are the various components and aspects of such an event; and that a speaker's linguistic knowledge of the verb includes that knowledge of the grammatical ways in which the various parts of the event can be realised in the form of the utterance (1977: 73).

This point of view is also supported by Schaarschmidt, who proposes three universal constraints on grammatical derivations. The first, and most important one for the present discussion is the *Semantic Completeness Constraint*,

> "which says that all terminal semantic representations are free of linear order relations. The only relations that hold between constituents of terminal semantic representations are thus relations of grouping" (1978: 119).

Schaarschmidt continues, writing that

> "the only conditioning factor for the linearization of elements in a sentence is the topic-comment grouping of constituents" (*op. cit.*: 121).

Simon Dik[12] identifies what he calls *functional relations* at three levels of the grammar (1978: 13):

i. Semantic Functions:
    Agent, Goal, Recipient, etc.
ii. Syntactic Functions:
    Subject and Object
iii. Pragmatic Functions:
    Theme and Tail, Topic and Focus.

According to Dik's proposal, semantic functions are understood to exist in the deep structure of the language. Like the proposals immediately above, syntactic functions are assigned to deep structure cases, e.g.,

---

[12] Dik (1978), *Functional Grammar*.

(69) John (AgSubj) gave the book (GoObj)
to Bill (Rec),

(70) John (AgSubj) gave Bill (RecObj)
the book (Go).

(71) The book (GoSubj) was given to Bill (Rec)
by John (Ag).

These examples, of course, show this information as it is used in surface structure, but they nonetheless serve to explain Dik's general procedure.

Dik identifies two types of pragmatic functions, which he calls *external* and *internal*. The external pragmatic functions he describes as follows (1978: 19):

> The Theme specifies the universe of discourse with respect to which the subsequent predication is presented as relevant.
>
> The Tail presents, as an 'afterthought' to the predication, information meant to clarify or modify it.

These functions, therefore, are not concerned with the *isolated sentence* as we would understand that term, but with the actual speech situation. The *internal pragmatic functions*, which relate to the simple proposition *per se* are described thus (*loc. cit.*):

> The Topic presents the entity 'about' which the predication predicates something in the given setting.
>
> The Focus presents what is relatively the most important or salient information in the given setting.

These latter two functions are added to a deep proposition, such that all items, being marked for syntactic and/or semantic functions, can further be specified with internal pragmatic information. Thus, (69) above would be the normal expression of the deep structure in which *John* was marked *AgSubjTop*, and *Bill* as *RecFoc*.

The major contribution of Dik to the present theory of case is his specification of *pragmatic information* below the surface structure of language. Although the effect of this approach may not be great in a language with strict word order, it could play a greater role in languages with a less strict order.

Topicalization, focus, or scenes -- whichever term the reader may wish to use in reference to the content of the preceding pages -- does not play a central role in case-grammar as we have been discussing it. It does seem to account, in a limited way, however, for the choice of *actually occurring elements* (specific lexical items and phrases) in the surface structure of language.

Verbs or Cases

The primary concern of the preceding section was the exact nature of deep cases. Here we will examine a viewpoint which is held, at least implicitly, by most of the scholars discussed.

It was shown earlier that both Fillmore and Dik adhered to the position that the rules of deep structure produce a configuration of deep cases or nominal phrases. With due concern for the nature of these cases or nominals, a verb is selected which would not violate its co-occurrence restrictions. That is, the verb of a sentence was selected on the basis of the nominals present in deep structure.

Fillmore, although he does not admit of it, is in his more recent work equating the deep case configuration of a verb with the scene that verb elicits. As quoted above, he now claims that the choice of the verb activates the scene, which is tantamount to claiming that verbs *are the central elements of a linguistic situation*. This, while reversing the stand taken in the earlier works, seems justifiable, and, indeed, has been adopted by other scholars as well.

Fillmore is not the first scholar to propose the centrality of the verb. This stance has also been taken by Nilsen & Nilsen (1975: 87) who write that

> "Rather than the noun being the important part of a sentence, it is usually the verb which is basic and which holds the sentence together both syntactically and semantically."

Further, they add that the

> clustering of nondeletable items around the verb seems to be a fact not only in English but in Indo-European languages in general, as well as in many other unrelated languages. It may even be a universal tendency that the verb, as the most significant part of the predication, serves as a magnet drawing close to itself the nondeletable elements (1975: 97).

An even stronger statement is made by Xrakovskij[43]: "*informacija, soderžaščajasja v predloženii, ravna informacii, soderžaščejsja v leksikografičeskom tolkovanii glagola, kotoryj javljaetsja veršinoj ètogo predloženija*[44]" (1974: 5).

Although the features of the verb were used in Anderson for case prediction, his cases were not easily interpreted, nor could they be readily equated with the cases as understood under Fillmorian case-grammar. We will now examine one work which uses verbal features in the prediction of Fillmorian cases.

Wallace Chafe[45] was one of the earliest scholars to combine the verb-central hypothesis with the concepts of case-grammar. He identified in English the following six types of verbs, with representative example sentences (1970: 95-104):

states:

(72) the elephant is dead,

processes (changes of state):

(73) the elephant died,

actions (activities):

(74) the tiger pounced,

process-actions (activities which change the state of something else):

---

[43] Xrakovskij (1974), "Passivnye konstrukcii."
[44] The italics are Xrakovskij's.
[45] Chafe (1970), *Meaning and the Structure of Language*.

(75) the tiger killed the elephant,

ambient states (all-encompassing states):

(76) it's hot,

ambient actions (all-encompassing activities):

(77) it's raining.

The term *ambient* is proposed to account for those sentences which do not really have a noun -- which seem "to involve nothing but a predication." The superficial subject *it* "reflects nothing in the semantic structure." Such verbs do not have nominal arguments in deep structure, but rather the verb represents a complete predication.

Chafe's description of verbs is generative, but in some ways the features he uses here could equally well be interpreted as descriptive semantic features. Let us now examine these.

His claim is that a verb can be marked optionally as *stative*. However, any verb which is marked *-stative* must obligatorily be marked as *process*, *action*, or *both*. A verb which is marked (positively) for both features is understood to be an *action* which in some manner causes a *process* to occur concomitantly. Finally, as indicated above, *ambient* can be marked for any verb which is either a state or an action, but *not* a *process*.

For the various types of verbs, Chafe introduces two rules which will generate two of the major cases associated with verbs, namely *agent* and *patient*:


V
state
process
-ambient
->
V
state
process
pat
N


V
action
-ambient
->
V
action
agt
N

The qualification *-ambient* is necessary in both rules. *Ambient*, of course, would block the generation of a case for this type of verb. On the other hand, any verb which is a *process* or a *state* must logically have a noun (*patient*) which undergoes the process, or is in the state named. An *action*, under Chafe's system, must have a performer of that action, and hence must generate an *agent*. It follows that a verb which is both an *action* and a *process* must have both cases present. The application of both rules results in the following structure:


V
process
action
pat
N
agt
N

Chafe does not by any means imply that only those two cases are sufficient for all types of verbs. Later in his work he discusses several of the remaining cases and the types of verbs with which they co-occur. The features and case-notions presented do, however, describe the most basic types of verbs and their corresponding case arrays.

The case *Experiencer*, for example, occurs with verbs which are marked *-action* and *+experiential*. The [illegible]rivation for this latter feature, is via an optional rule which can mark any *-action* verb as *experiential*.

The feature *benefactive*, which in turn evokes the case *Benefactive*, is also introduced by an optional rule. Any *-ambient* verb which is either *state* and/or *process* may be marked as *benefactive*. Note, however, that

> "in addition to [this rule], therefore, which obligatorily adds a beneficiary noun to a verb which is intrinsically benefactive, we can also state a rule which will optionally add a Beneficiary to any action verb" (1970: 151).

In a similar manner to the rule above, the case *Instrument* can be optionally added to a verb that is both *process* and *action*. There are other less clear situations in which the case *Instrument* may appear. A verb may specify an [illegible]on which is *relative* in its application, e.g., the English verb *widen*. When used in its unmarked sense, and there seems to be only one such meaning for relative verbs, the unit *successful* cannot be added to the verb, e.g.,

(78) the men widened the road with a bulldozer.

Thus, any configuration of a *-relative* verb with an Inst can be optionally rewritten as a *successful* verb with an Inst. Thus, the verb *cut*, which is both *process* and *action* can be further marked as *successful*. Consider, however, Chafe's further examples:

(79) the rope cut with a knife,

(80) the door opened with a key.

While these sentences are not representative of action-process verbs, they carry a *marked* meaning, inasmuch as both can be paraphrased by adding the words *was successfully* before each verb. What seems to occur here is that a verb which is an action-process and which is further specified as *successful*, may be optionally converted into a simple process verb, i.e. the unit *action* is deleted, and with it the concomitant *Agent*.

Many state verbs, and *non*-process action verbs can take a case similar to Fillmore's Factitative. *To sing*, for example, implies a *song*. Verbs which can be characterized in this manner Chafe calls *completable*, and the corresponding noun is the *Complement*. Chafe explains the meaning of such nouns as follows:

> "A complement noun does not specify something that is in a state or that changes its state. It completes or specifies more narrowly the meaning of

the verb" (1970: 156).

While the verb *read* has the broadest possible implicit complement *reading matter*, the *completable* variation of it is represented in

(81) Tom read *War and Peace*.

Examples of state verbs taking a *complement* include

(82) the book weighs a pound,

(83) the candy costs ten cents.

Thus, the basic rule, which would apply optionally, is that any verb which is *-process* can be specified *completable*. However, a verb which is *completable* does not always take an obligatory *complement*. State verbs of the type given in the last two examples seem to require the complement, while not all action verbs do; that is, *sing* does not, while *make* does.

The final relation which Chafe discusses in this section is that of *Location*. Chafe here proposes that state verbs may be optionally specified as *locative*, to account for examples like,

(84) the knife is in the box.

However, his treatment of such examples departs from the traditionally accepted interpretation. Any verb which becomes locative must obligatorily be marked by a lexical item such as *in*, *on*, *under*, etc. This provides

> "for the introduction of locative verb roots, essentially the list of what are usually thought of as locative 'prepositions'" (1970: 159).

Finally, along with the obligatory verb root, a *locative* noun is also generated, obligatorily.

As for the remaining verbs, Chafe writes that it "seems possible ... that there are no nonstative verb roots which are intrinsically locative" (*loc. cit.*). Although the verb *sit* may be conceptualized as a locative verb, it need not be, e.g.,

(85) Tom is sitting (on the chair).

Thus, Chafe proposes a means whereby a *non*locative verb can be specified as locative. The *root* of any verb which is *-locative* may optionally become *root* + *locativizer* with a concomitant change of the feature *-locative* to *+locative*. Thereby the *non*locative verb root *crawl* can become *+locative* and be replaced by *crawl* + *under*, for example.

The above proposals of Chafe, whereby cases are generated by the features of the verbs, seem more intuitively satisfying than some of the earlier proposals we examined. This approach will be applied later to a more extensive corpus of data.

X. Case and TGG: A Summary

This chapter has examined the phenomenon of case within the framework established by TGG. The position of case within the early form of Chomsky's Standard Theory was reviewed, showing that the notion of case was considered to be relatively trivial in that theory.

The birth of case grammar was examined, along with its motivation. Case grammar was shown to generate all NP's on the same level, which was a departure from Chomsky's theory. Moreover, each NP was marked with *semantic information* in the form of *a case*, which identified the role such an NP played in relation to the action of the verb. In the identification of these cases, Fillmore emphasized that they should represent judgments humans are capable of making. Moreover, no case notion could appear twice in the same simple proposition.

This theory was discussed and modified by many scholars. The importance of semantic information in deep structure was claimed by many to be necessary, and as a result even Chomsky reversed his earlier belief and included semantics at that level.

The nature of the cases has always been a problem. Many proposals have been made for the minimal set of these, but there is little unity as to which cases are necessary, and how they should be defined. Scholars have tried both prose and feature descriptions of case. Feature cases are more promising inasmuch as they can be more highly constrained through formal marking than prose cases can.

Although the full minimal set is far from agreed on, there is a fair degree of agreement on a basic set of what may be called *central* or *nuclear* cases: *Agent*, *Instrument*, *Objective*, *Experiencer*, which can, under a feature analysis, be uniquely described in terms of only two features, *±animate* and *±cause*. The latter of these can also be described as the opposition of *Cause* and *Effect*.

The three-case proposal of Localist theory was examined, but in general this theory is unacceptable because of its very confusing feature system. Although only two actual cases and one neutral case were proposed, these can combine in several ways to account for more than three case relations. Thus, although these units are referred to as *cases*, they function more like *case features*, and could easily be understood as a notational variant of feature case in the general case-grammar theory.

After having examined the various proposals which were directly connected with the basic understanding of *case-grammar*, we turned our attention to other related aspects of this theory.

Several scholars, including Fillmore, have addressed the question of *topic and comment* in linguistics. Fillmore claims that for speech situations whole *scenes* are "activated," which means that all relevant arguments are comprehended. Not all of these, of course, are realized in surface structure. Those which are not, however, are still presupposed by the understanding of the scene. Dik contributed to this proposal with the introduction of an attempted formalization of the concept of deep structure *pragmatic functions*.

The tendency of modern studies of language seems to be to include such extra-sentential information in the description of surface structure. Both pragmatics and presupposition serve in the explanation of various aspects of surface structure realizations.

The final major topic of this chapter was the proposal that, contrary to Fillmore's and Chomsky's earlier theories, the *verb* of a sentence may predict the arguments of the proposition, and not *vice versa*. This can be seen as an implicit aspect of Fillmore's later *scenes*, and is actually well developed by some scholars. We examined in some detail the work of Chafe, which exemplified how this concept could be intimately related with case definitions as outlined above.

Case grammar can be seen to be a theory which is still not fully developed. Many of the basic concepts have yet to receive universal agreement even by proponents of the theory. Moreover, case grammar has been unable to account for many manifestations of the surface structure of language, and as a result, non-case information such as *presupposition* and other kinds of *pragmatic knowledge* have been suggested as at least a partial solution to this problem.

IV. The Instrumental Case

Having already examined in some detail various theories which have been proposed to account for deep cases and the corresponding surface phenomenon of case-marking, let us now, in this chapter, consider some of the specific semantic interpretations which have been put forth for the one case, Inst.

Most of the material which follows is based on the Inst in the English language, although other linguistic data have occasionally been introduced to support some of the arguments. We have deliberately omitted any discussion of the Inst in Russian, as we will take an in-depth look at this case in the following chapter, and at that time will mention some of the manifestations of the Inst in other Slavic languages as well. Various proposals for a definition of the Inst were mentioned under *case grammar*, and here we will examine some of the ramifications of these.

While linguistics attempts to specify and delimit the meanings of the Inst in language, it is of critical importance to know how closely these linguistically established divisions correspond to the average speaker's/hearer's cognitive or conceptual structures. The experiment described in the following section seeks to address these two problems: the meaning of the surface instrumental and its correlation with some deeper level of cognition.

Schlesinger

In 1978 I. M. Schlesinger** attempted to ascertain whether there is any reasonably specific boundary between the *comitative* and the *instrumental* functions in English, both of which may be expressed by means of a *with*-phrase. In the written instructions, the subjects of this experiment were told the following:

> "In English, *with* has at least two meanings:
>
> (a) together -- as in: He went to the movie with his friend.
>
> (b) by means of -- as in: He cut the meat with a knife."

The subjects were to rank ten sentences, each containing a *with*-phrase, "according to whether *with* is closer in meaning to (a) or to (b) -- from the sentence in which *with* is most clearly *together*, as number 1, and until the sentence in which *with* is most clearly *by means of*, as number 10."

The ten sentences, and the resultant mean rank order, given in parentheses preceding each sentence, are as follows:

(1.67) The pantomimist gave a show with the clown.

(2.90) The engineer built the machine with an assistant.

(3.67) The general captured the hill with a squad of paratroopers.

**I. M. Schlesinger (1978), "Cognitive structures and semantic deep structures: the case of the instrumental."

(3.87) The acrobat performed an act with an elephant.

(4.67) The blind man crossed the street with his dog.

(6.17) The officer caught the smuggler with a police dog.

(6.27) The prisoner won the appeal with a highly paid lawyer.

(7.40) The Nobel Prize winner found the solution with a computer.

(9.00) The sportsman hunted deer with a rifle.

(9.40) The hoodlum broke the window with a stone.

> These results suggest that although there may be two discrete linguistic categories, instrumental and comitative, this does not mean that we view the world in terms of such discrete categories. In our cognitive structures there are apparently no such neatly delimited classes. Rather, there is a continuum, and language, because of its necessarily limited means of expression, imposes a classification on this continuum‘’ (Schlesinger 1978: 309-310).

‘’It should be noted, however, that Schlesinger may not be justified in drawing this conclusion. While the average difference between the mean results must equal 1.00, there are two gaps which are significantly greater than this. One, the 1.60 value between 7.40 and 9.00, demarcates *animates* and the *computer* (a somewhat autonomous device capable of operating without constant direct control) from *absolute inimates*. The other gap, of 1.50, may be more important, since it spans the test mean value of 5.50, and seems to actually differentiate between *instrumental* and *comitative*, despite Schlesinger's interpretation.

The next step Schlesinger too[illegible]as to have bilingual speakers translate these sentences into their native languages. A similar set of results was obtained from this exercise, which left him his

> "contention that the instrumental and comitative are poles on a conceptual continuum. Such a continuum may be characteristic of cognitive structures in general. As for linguistic deep structure, we have so far no reason to abandon the common approach which views the instrumental and comitative as two separate cases" (1978: 315-16).

A similar study, also reported in the same article, compared *manner* with *instrumental*. This study also resulted in a continuum of these two cases in a cognitive structure, with the more specific observation that "*with*, accordingly, denotes the instrument, not the manner, of doing. Through semantic assimilation, however, manner is treated linguistically in the fashion of an instrument" (1978: 319).

Schlesinger then points out that "it appears ... that in *with*-phrases both the notion of instrument and that of accompaniment are salient" (*loc. cit.*). On this basis he suggests that, at least for English, *with*-phrases are the surface representation of a special case, which he calls *INSTRUMENTAL-COMITATIVE*. This proposal is not at all unreasonable, for bearing in mind the stricture of case grammar that in any simple proposition each case may appear only once, the following sentence would be blocked (although

Schlesinger did not utilize this concept to support his hypothesis):

(86) *John robbed the bank with an accomplice
with a gun

at least for the reading that "John used a gun" and "John had an accomplice." An acceptable reading of that sentence obtains only when the phrase *with a gun* is considered to be an adnominal modifier of *accomplice*.

Schlesinger concludes that "a distinction has to be made between cognitive structures and semantic deep structures**. Cognitive structures consist of continua, sections of which (often overlapping ones) are categorized into deep structure cases or relations" (1978: 320). For example, Schlesinger proposes as the cognitive structure for the above data the following continuum:

agent...............*instrument*..............*manner*

of which the left (approximately) one fifth might represent the deep structure notion *Agent*; the middle three quarters, the notion of *Instrumental-Comitative*; and the right one fifth, the notion of *Manner*. Put another way, the *agent*ˆ*instrument*ˆ*manner* continuum can be conceived of as a scale ranging from 1.0 for Agent to 0 for Manner. Thus, the approximate ranges that result from the previous verbal description could be interpreted as follows: from 1.0 to .90

**These structures may be, of necessity, distinct. It seems to us that *cognitive structures* are universal, while *semantic deep structures*, like *surface structures*, are language-specific.

will be considered Agent by almost all speakers, from .89 to .70 will be thought of as Agent by some speakers, and Inst by others; from .69 to about .21 will be Inst; from .20 to .11 will be Inst to some and Manner to others; while anything less than that will be seen as Manner by most speakers. Naturally the proportion of speakers conceiving of any given phrase as representing one or another case will vary in relation to that phrase's position on the continuum.

The overlapping sections will thus represent those instances of language usage which certain speakers will perceive as one deep notion, and other speakers as the other. First, this does not really reflect on the various speakers' linguistic competence, but rather is one indication of the widely accepted psychological concept that each person has a unique perception of the world around him. Moreover, it would seem that much of this overlap is a direct result of ambiguity arising from the lack of context. This overlap should be negligible if the sentences were given a contextual background.

In the discussion which follows, the reader should therefore be aware of the fact that, although many linguists do consider the deep *cases* (*Agent*, *Inst*, etc.) to be relatively clearly defined and understood, we should not expect any given deep case to be realized in surface structure in one and only one form. Similarly, although certain surface structures may be associated with a *typical* deep case interpretation, we cannot expect a perfect one-to-one correspondence.

Semantic Influences

The continuum given by Schlesinger is really no more than a schematic of some of the possible meanings of *with*-phrases. *With*, however, is not the only possible means of expressing these concepts. The word *by* can combine with nouns to express each of these concepts, e.g., *by John*, *by poison* and *by night*. The actual usage of such phrases is conditioned by other factors.

Fillmore[**] explains the distinction between *with* and *by* phrases as follows:

> When the Instrument is mentioned, the choice of preposition depends on whether the notion of Agent is conceptually present or not. If the event involves only an Instrument and a Place, the Instrument noun is marked with the preposition BY: if the event involves an Agent, however, even when the noun that would identify the Agent is not syntactically present, the Instrument noun is marked with the preposition WITH (1968b: 385).

His two examples, with and without the involvement of an Agent, are, respectively,

(87) The window was hit with a branch,

(88) The window was hit by a branch.

Dougherty, in a review of Fillmore, suggested some further data on this, not all of which is acceptable to be my idiolect of English. Two such examples, which Dougherty introduces (1970: 514), are

---

[**] Fillmore (1968b), "Lexical Entries for Verbs."

(89) A 200 inch telescope sees the craters on Mars.

(90) The canals on the moon were first seen by the telescope at IBM.

The second sentence is rather unfelicitous, while the first is perhaps only unusual. If one reads an extended meaning into it, then it may be acceptable if paraphrased as

(91) *By using* a 200 inch telescope *one can see* the craters on Mars.

This could serve as a counter-example if the "canals" were detected by a computer, in which extension the computer and telescope could "see" things.

Having explained this use of *by*, Dougherty disagrees with Fillmore in claiming that "*by* must only optionally be inserted since the preposition *with* can occur even if there is no A" (*op. cit.*: 520). The examples he provides for this are,

(92) John was killed by the poison,

(93) John was killed with the poison.

While these sentences may indeed be counter-examples to Fillmore, Dougherty's later explanation becomes rather *ad hoc*:

> "The Instrumental preposition is *with*, but under certain conditions, i.e. if there is no Agent, if the verb is [+passive], and if *be* is present in the

M node'[9], then the preposition can be *by*" (1970: 521).

Fletcher'[1] introduces a different example with specific reference to *with*,

(94) John filled the tub with the bucket,

in which he interprets *with the bucket* as an Inst. This example reveals a unique problem. If this phrase is the Inst, then what is the case of the phrase *with water* in the next example?

(95) John filled the tub with water.

Fletcher suggests that *the tub* is not an Object case, but rather a Locative. *Water* thus serves as the Object of the verb *to fill*, and *the bucket* is indeed the Inst.

The question which comes to mind here is whether the following example would be acceptable to most speakers:

(96) John filled the tub
with water with a bucket.

This particular sentence is rather unusual, and it could be that perhaps both of the *with*-phrases carry some nuance of Inst. Perhaps *water* is a facilitating substance (implement) of the verb *fill*, while the mention of *bucket* presupposes that this substance associated with the verb is a liquid. Therefore, there are two Inst phrases, each of a different

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'[9] It should be noted that under both Chomsky's and Fillmore's theories the element *be* is added to the modal only *when* +[passive] is specified.

'[1] Fletcher (1971), "CASE GRAMMAR: Its Viability As An Alternative Grammatical Model."

character.

Consider now the unfelicitousness of examples like,

(97) John filled the tub
with water with a sieve.

This particular example seems to shed some light on the meaning of the Inst. It seems that the Inst slot can be felicitously filled by a substantive which is semantically compatible not only with the verb, but with the *verb^object* phrase. This would account for the grammaticality of the first two of the following examples, and the questionable nature of the other:

(98) John broke the window with a rock,

(99) John broke his eardrum with a Q-tip,

(100) ?John broke the window with a Q-tip.

In all of these cases, however, we are again resorting to explanations based on encyclopedic knowledge of the universe to account for the *unfelicitousness* of the given sentences, not their *ungrammaticality*. An attempt will be made in subsequent discussion to maintain this distinction, although it will be found difficult to preserve in many instances.

Incorporation

We will now examine some types of Inst phrases. There is a productive process in English whereby verbs are formed from nouns which were once some form of object (instrument).

Leifrink[12] explains this process as that of the formation of a *synthetic* verb from an *analytic* verb phrase by the combination of a *prime* verb with a *sentence constituent*. Thus, the same real referential situation could be described by using a *prime* verb or a *synthetic* one, as exemplified respectively by the following (1973: 48):

(101) Mary was giving the baby food with a bottle,

(102) Mary was bottlefeeding the baby.

Moreover, Liefrink c[illegible] that many such situations can be further described by means of a *periphrastic* sentence, in which there is a *prime* verb and a noun which is derived from a synthetics *verbal sentence constituent* (*loc. cit.*), e.g.,

(103) Mary was giving the baby a bottlefeed.

Thus, there is a sufficient degree of cohesion between the verb and instrument to allow a combinatory transformation to obtain.

Nilsen & Nilsen also provide other examples (1975: 117), including ***asphalt*, *butter*, *grease*, *sugar***, etc., all as verbs. They point out that

> "although the Objects for such verbs are not incorporated, they very well could be, since each of these words occurs with an extremely limited range of Objects."

For the four verbs cited above, the expected objects are, respectively, *road/parking lot; bread/cracker; machine;* and *food* (e.g., *cereal*).

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[12] Leifrink (1973), *Semantico-Syntax*.

While in the cases mentioned the instrument is phonologically manifest in the shape of the verb, there is another series of verbs which have an "opaquely incorporated Instrument" (*op. cit.*: 118-119). Examples for these are *shave : razor; whittle : knife; chop : ax;* and *slice : knife*. Not only are the instruments incorporated, but with many such verbs so is the direct object. Note the following Verb^Instrument^Object relations:

sweep^broom^floor,

(un)lock^key^lock.

According to Nilsen & Nilsen, semantic factors play an important role in the determination of both the Instruments and Objects of at least some verbs. These authors have classified verbs according to eight main verbal types (e.g., one-place predicates, verbs of motion, symmetrical predicates, etc.). It is interesting to note that not one of the major verbal classifications requires an obligatory Inst in its case frame. Some of the sub-groups do have an optional Inst specified, and a sub-group of Location verbs (i.e. verbs of *attachment*) is considered to have an obligatory Inst. The authors *do not mean*, however, that this Inst is a separate lexical item which can appear in the surface structure:

> in all of [these] verbs the Instrument is incorporated into the verb, so that *to button* means *to attach with a button*, *to clamp* means *to attach with a clamp*, etc. There are some verbs like this where the Instrument is not transparent. For example, *to sew* doesn't overtly tell that it is thread that is used, nor does *to stick* tell that it is glue which is used (1975: 116-117).

What is evident from this quote is that the authors seem to confuse the semantics of individual lexical items with case-grammar notions. Cases are, of course, intended to indicate which arguments co-occur with which verbs, prepositions, etc. Nilsen & Nilsen, however, are using cases to specify the internal semantics of lexical verbs. In other words, since *button* is used as an implement, they consider Inst to be in its case specification.

The above has not provided us any means of dividing the semantics of verbs from their surface syntax. Felicitousness seems to be a function of surface syntax and internal semantics. Thus, redundancy arises in surface structure if the incorporated Inst with the types of verbs under discussion is given in its *generic* or semantically *predicatable* form (Green 1974: 222), e.g.

(104) *She painted the woodwork with paint.

If, however, it is necessary to "describe some noteworthy aspect of the instrument, means, manner, material, etc. ... [it is] not felt to be so redundant," e.g.,

(105) She painted the woodw[illegible]h
red/latex/Dutch/o[illegible] paint.

Feature Specifications

The preceding section reveals the difficulty of not only applying deep case concepts to grammar, but even of fully describing these deep cases.

Perhaps what is needed is not such a general exposition of the uses of the Inst with specific lexical items, but rather an examination of the underlying *features* which motivate this case.

Fillmore (1968a), in his case description of the Inst noted that this is "the case of the inanimate force or object" involved in the action. This feature, *-animate,* is one aspect of case-grammar that most scholars agree on[13]. Thus, in its basic meaning it seems valid to say that the Inst usually is characterized by *inanimacy*.

In the same definition of the Inst, Fillmore also writes that this case is "*causally*[14] involved in the action or state identified by the verb." Here, too, there is a high degree of concord among scholars that *cause* is a semantic marker of the case Inst. Indeed, the semantic item <X causes> has become an established marker in Katzian[15] semantics.

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[13] This does not, however, preclude *animate*, e.g.,
(106) he swept the floor with his dog.
The *animacy* of the substantive is not relevant to[illegible] felicitousness of the utterance; rather, an *animate* noun [illegible] used as *-animate*.

[14] The italics are mine.

[15] See, for example, Katz (1972), *Semantic Theory*.

The feature *cause*, however, is not applicable solely to the case Inst. It is also further a feature of the Agentive case. Several scholars (e.g., Mellema 1974: 46) have used the feature *cause*[14] in combination with *±animate* for the differentiation (and specification) of these two cases.

Although the Inst is characterized by the feature *+cause*, it nonetheless "is not independent, but something which is acted on as well as itself having an influence of some sort" (Kilby, undated: 79). This observation leads to yet another feature which may be ascribed to the case Inst: *±controlled*. Thus, an Inst must be something (presumably concrete) which can be manipulated, e.g.,

(107) John sculpted the figure with a chisel and hammer,

(108) Seymour sliced the salami with a knife,

(109) I cut my finger with a knife[15].

This feature implies some further information, namely that there is a *controller*. This also is made specific by many scholars (e.g., Nilsen 1972: 33ff, Dik 1978: 40). The controller^controlled relationship is, of course, that of Agent^Inst.

Although the Inst carries the sense of a controlled entity, the implication is not that it is actually

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[14] The reader is reminded that the semantic *cause* used here is, of course, the Katzian interpretation thereof, and not the lexical item "cause" as used in

i. His inattention caused the accident.

[15] These examples are, respectively, a variation from Chomsky (1970), and borrowings from Lakoff (1968).

controlled. Example (109) shows that Inst expressions, at least for English, can manifest ambiguity. If the knife had actually been *controlled*, I may not have cut my finger. However, the same sentence can also be interpreted as an intentional action in part. Thus, the term *controlled* may be better understood not as that which *is controlled*, but that which *is normally understood to be controllable*.

Whether or not a sentence such as (109) describes an intentional action on the part of the subject does not really affect the instrumental import of the *with a knife* phrase. Still, *intent* on the part of the manipulator can be reflected in the syntax of language. Nilsen (1972: 11) has claimed that "although both *use* and *with* expressions entail [*Cause*], *use* entails an additional feature [*Intent*] that *with* does not entail." This is reflective of Lakoff's argumentation (1968: 8-9) whereby several factors are listed which prevent a phrase from being interpreted as *accidental*.

Among these conditioning factors is the use of the word *use*. Thus,

(110) I used a knife to cut my finger,

can only be interpreted as meaning that the action was intentional. Other factors include the substitution of *without* for *with*, e.g.,

(111) I cut my finger without a knife;

and the presence of adverbs like *carefully*, *easily*, and *successfully*, e.g.,

(112) I carefully cut my finger with a knife.

There are still other situations in which the interpretation cannot be accidental, but they are not important to the present study.

This leads to a further manifestation of the Inst. Chomsky (1970: 65, ftn 16) points out that a question that can be asked of the situation described in (107) is,

(113) Did John use the chisel to sculpt the figure?

but not,

(114) Did John sculpt the figure with the chisel?

The first question brings into focus the use, or non-use, of one item, the *chisel*. The second question focusses on the complete action of the figure having been sculpted, and in the form given should require a negative answer. While this is not formalized by Chomsky, it seems that the Inst in its true sense must be capable of being used to *succeed* in the action specified by the verb. Thus, in (107), the conjoined phrase *a chisel and hammer* forms the singular unit, *Inst*.

While not intended to explain this particular problem, Nilsen has proposed another feature which may be of use here. That is the feature *Effect* (1972: 37). Accordingly, the total nature of the Inst phrase must be capable of *effecting* the action described by the verb. In some ways, this is a parallel of Chafe's proposal that process-actions can be *successful*''.

Notice that the next example does not have any kind of *successful* or *completive* interpretation, despite the presence of the word *use*, while the following example does:

(115) John used the hammer,

(116) John used the hammer to break the window.

The conclusion that may be drawn from this is that the verb *use* does not necessarily require what we have been referring to as an Inst, and therefore there are two different semantic relations expressed by *the hammer* in these examples. This is further supported by

(117) John used the hammer to try to break the window,

in which it is difficult to unequivocably accept *the hammer* as a true Inst, since it did nothing we know about. The previous discussion has led us to understand Inst to be at least *causative*, but there is nothing that is known to have been caused in the situation as described.

It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to at least tentatively reject the argument that in English a paraphrase of a *with*-phrase into the object of the verb *use* is one means of identifying *Instrumentals*.

The preceding discussion leads to one final point within the present framework. English usually allows the subjectivalization of an Inst, e.g., Fillmore's sentence

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''Lakoff (1970:13f) indicates that the verb in such situations as these must be +ACTIVITY.

from the previous chapter,

(118) The key opened the door,

and a very similar,

(119) The rock broke the window.

Schlesinger argues that not all instrumental phrases can undergo subjectivalization. In a sentence like (119), the role of an Agent is rather fuzzy. It is possible that someone threw the rock through a window, or perhaps a rock was flipped into the air and through the window by a passing vehicle. In either case, the above sentence is grammatically and semantically acceptable. When, however,

> "the action to be performed is one that requires much deliberation, know-how, or creativity, the 'subjectivalization' of the instrumental is blocked" (1978: 318).

Thus, with reference to a variation of Chomsky's example, (107), namely, *John carved the statue with a chisel*, one cannot say,

(120) *The chisel carved the statue.

Thus, while *with*-phrases in English can specify the Inst of a sentence, that is not the only means of doing so. In some instances a *by*-phrase may serve this function, or a nominal in subject position. To unambiguously interpret any noun phrase in English as a true Inst, we must know the values of several different features. *Cause*, *controllability*, and possibly *effect* must all be specified or ascertainable from the surrounding context. Moreover we must also know whether there was deliberation, or *intent* on the part of the subject of an active verb. Finally the nature of the verb could itself also add some clarification, especially to our expectation of an Inst-type.

Passives

Let us now look at another surface manifestation of language -- the passive, which also can express the Inst in either a *with*-phrase or a *by*-phrase, much as sketched above. The agent, if expressed, is normally found in a *by*-phrase. However, the mention of the Agent causes the passive to be interpreted as marked.

Haiman'' claims that "the original *raison d'ètre* of the passive is to avoid mentioning an agent as the superficial subject of a sentence" (1976: 50). Schaarschmidt'' believes this may be a universal linguistic feature:

> "In all Slavic languages, perhaps in all languages, passive constructions without an overt agent are far more frequent than those in which the agent is formally expressed" (1978: 131).

This observation is borne out in English, by at least one limited study. Givón'' found that in the texts he studied, a full 87% of all passives were *agentless* (1979:

''Haiman (1976), "Agentless Sentences."

''Schaarschmidt (1978), "On the Typological Variability of Argument Regrouping in the Slavic Languages."

''Givón (1979), *On Understanding Grammar*.

60). Thus, in only 13% of the cases was the agent mentioned in the passive[43].

Many scholars have concerned themselves with passives, and many different explanations have been given for the usual lack of overt agent in surface structure. Jespersen dealt with this problem within "connected text," and his conclusions were that there are three main reasons for this phenomenon (1924: 167), i.e. the omission of the agent in passive structures:

1. "The active subject is unknown or cannot easily be stated:"

(121) He *was killed* in the Boer war.

2. "The active subject is self-evident from the context:"

(122) No reason *had been assigned*.

3. "There may be a special reason (tact or delicacy of sentiment) for not mentioning the active subject; thus the mention of the first person is often avoided, in writing more frequently than in speaking":

(123) Enough *has been said* here of a subject
which will *be treated* more fully
in a subsequent chapter.

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[43] Extrapolating from his other data (1979: 59) concerning usage of actives and passives in general, it can be determined that in non-fiction the agented passive is used only 2.3% of the time, while in fiction this figure is only 1.2%! Prideaux & Hunter (1980), however, found an even lower incidence of passives, in general, which would reduce each of these values to less than 0.9%.

Martinet[illegible], however, sees the situation of passives differently. Although he does not comment on Jespersen, it is evident from his discussion that he disagrees with the approach of the latter:

> Even a relatively simple three-cornered statement like *a man killed a bear* may prove awkward in practice because the mention of an agent may detract from the pungency of the message. In many instances, it had better be left out even if it is known that it actually was a man who killed the bear. The use of the passive *a bear was killed* or of an indefinite pronoun (Fr. *on a tué un ours*) should not be viewed as an incomplete transform of *a man killed a bear*, with *by a man* omitted, but as the only normal and efficient linguistic rendering of a certain type of experience (1970: 449-450).

There are, nonetheless, situations where a passive is more natural than an active sentence. This is especially true when the discourse is concerned with weather phenomena. Niéger[illegible] discusses case theory as it relates to French, and points out that the behaviour of the Inst varies in relation to its degree of *autonomy* in the action (1973: 47). Thus,

(124) *la moisson a été détruite par l'orage*
the harvest was destroyed by the storm,

is acceptable, since the *storm* is very independent of any kind of control. However, note the only possible renderings in the following:

[illegible] Martinet (1970), "Verbs as Function Markers."
[illegible] Niéger (1973), "La notion du cas dans la théorie de Fillmore."

(125) *le coffre-fort a été ouvert*
avec une/à l'aide d'une/au moyen d'une
pince-monseigneur
the safe was opened
with/with the aid of/by means of a jimmy.

She concludes this discussion by writing, "La préposition *par* ne précède le cas instrument que s'il n'y a pas d'agent exprimé ou sous-entendu" (*loc. cit.*). This lends further support to the preceding discussion of *by* and *with*.

It has been shown above that passives can result from various conditions, not all independent of each other. The basic unifying feature of passives is that there is an almost universal tendency to render them without the logical subject (Agent).

Both Jespersen and Martinet have considered the contextual environment of the passive, and the intended message. Niéger has mentioned the autonomous value of the Inst noun and the semantic presence or absence of an agent. What all of these views point to is the fact that the rendering of any statement in the passive is not a purely syntactic matter. Semantics (both contextual and inherent) seem to play a major role.

This matter was also addressed by Givón. His results indicate that semantically passives are not really *agentless* at all. Of the supposedly *agentless* passives he studies, 31% of the agents were "*recoverable from the immediate discourse* *context*[45], " i.e. *the "agent-argument is known to the reader-hearer.*" This renders those unexpressed "agents 'somewhat' *definite* or *presupposed*" (1979: 63).

Of the total corpus of agentless passives, another "46% of agents [are] recoverable from general pragmatic knowledge. It is reasonable to assume that most of them are *nonreferential,*" and that they make up the "*presuppositional background* to the utterance" (*loc. cit.*).

These two observations show that in actuality, such passive structures are not *agentless*, but rather that "close to 80% of them *involve a presupposed agent*" (*loc. cit.*).

It is worth noting, with respect to the 13% of the passives that do express agents, that "the full, agented passive is used mostly when *the agent is (at least part of the) new information*" of the sentence (*op. cit.*: 64).

A Summary of the Instrumental

The discussion in this chapter has shown several of the possible means of understanding the term *Instrumental* as it is used in linguistic theory.

Most users of the language will not always agree on whether any given *with*-phrase is Instrumental or Comitative, when used with an animate noun. With inanimate nouns, the same holds true for the non-delimitation of Instrumental from Manner. It was shown that there seems to exist a cognitive structure (continuum) along which the three case concepts *Agent^Instrument^Manner* run. In isolated sentences, given in a test, subjects could not uniformly agree on which concepts were represented by various structures. This would indicate that surface syntax is more ambiguous in its reference than has been sometimes thought.

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[45] The italics are Givón's.

The surface manifestations of Inst and Agent phrases were also examined, with particular regard to the use of the prepositions *by* or *with* with the Inst. The data indicated that the use of *by* assumes that an Agent is neither present nor understood. The same conclusion was drawn in French for the prepositions *avec* and *par*, the latter of which is used if the Inst has a fairly high degree of *autonomy*.

It was then shown that many verbs in the language incorporate, either directly or opaquely, an Inst. In most instances the Inst is not expressed, unless, however, something about its characteristics is necessary in the speech situation. Thus, the *generic* instrument is seldom expressed, while a *specific* one often is.

Many of the Inst-incorporation verbs also have incorporated objects, or a very limited semantic choice thereof. Verbs with an incorporated Inst usually take an object, since it is through the Inst that their action is realized, i.e. such verbs are most often *transitive*. Verbs combined with specific objects, however, quite often allow only a limited range of Instrumentals.

Features of the Inst were discussed, and the sole feature that is inherent (primitive) to Inst nouns seems to be *-animate*. Inst was also shown to be marked by the relational feature *cause*, and many scholars point out that it is the inherent animacy of *cause* nouns that differentiates *Agent* and *Inst*. Two other relational features of the Inst are *controlled*, implying some outside manipulation, and *intent*, or deliberation, which permits or limits certain transformations, e.g., the subjectivalization of the Inst. The features *effect* and *completive* depend on the specific relation between the verb and the object.

It became apparent in the work of Givón that the presence or absence of an overt agent in passive structures is largely a function of the over-all information that is available from the context. In the majority of instances in which the agent is not expressed, it can be determined through either contextual information** or presuppositional background (pragmatics). In the 13% of passives which do contain an overt agent, this agent provides almost exclusively *new* information to the speech situation.

Although syntactic information, along with inherent and relational features, all play a role in the determination of the expression of the Inst in English, it has been clearly shown that more than that is needed in order to account for all of the manifestations of the Inst case.

**One can only wonder ho[illegible] different the results of Schlesinger's study wou[illegible] have been if his sample sentences had had some sort of co[illegible]xtual background.

V. Classifications of the Russian Instrumental

In Chapters II and III we examined the various theories which may collectively be grouped under the general label *Case-grammar*. In Chapter IV some of the specific proposals for a definition of the Inst were discussed. The majority of the more recent contributions concerns the Inst in English, rather than Russian, which can be readily explained by the fact that Soviet scholars do not in general accept the premise of case-grammar as a valid linguistic theory[87].

Let us now examine in some detail the multifarious manifestations of the surface *instrumental* in Contemporary Standard Russian. We will concentrate on the various classifications which have been proposed for the Instrumental case in Russian, and where applicable, its historical predecessors -- Old Church Slavonic and Old Russian -- as well as other Slavic data which may have some bearing on such a classification. Similarities or differences between CSR and the other Slavic languages may serve to explain particular usages of the former.

First, let us set some further limits on our material. In Russian, the Inst case may be the result of direct government by a preposition:

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[87] The paucity of articles on case-grammar in general in the Soviet Union, and on Fillmore specifically, is one indication of this; however, this has also been confirmed by Soviet scholars in personal communications with the author. Nonetheless, Fillmore's concepts have been at least given lip service, even if not systemically applied to Russian data (cf. Arutjunova (1973) and Apresjan (1974a: 25ff)).

(126) *za dver'ju*
behind the door,

a verb:

(127) *ovladet' texnikoj*
to master the technique,

an adjective:

(128) *dovolen svoimi uspexami*
satisfied with his success,

or a noun:

(129) *otkrytie Ameriki Kolumbom*
the discovery of America by Columbus.

It may appear as a "free" or "floating" form:

(130) *vesnoj*
it was spring,

or its presence may be conditioned by the voice of the verb, i.e., *impersonal*, *reflexive*, or *passive*:

(131) *dom stroitsja pionerami*
the house is being build by the Pioneers.

It would, of course, be a mistake to examine only one of these manifestations of the Inst to the exclusion of the others. However, *the focus of the following classification will be on the prepositionless Inst governed or conditioned by the presence of a verb*. This will exclude, for the most part, the use of the Inst with prepositions, adjectives, and nouns; but some commentary on these usages will indeed be included. Moreover, with the classification of the Russian

Inst which follows, we will also present the primary corpus of data on which this dissertation is founded.

A. The 1954 Academy Grammar

While it is certainly true that the first classification of the various components of the grammar of the Russian language•• was not presented in *Grammatika russkogo jazyka*, by the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1954••, this two-volume work does provide a fairly comprehensive structured description of the Instrumental in Russian, along with many other grammatical categories. Similar data can, of course, be found, even if not in such an organized manner, in the works of, in particular, A. M. Peškovskij'• and A. A. Šaxmatov''.

In Vol. I of the 1954 Academy Grammar, *Fonetika i morfologija*, the prepositionless Inst, as used with verbs,

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••It must be noted, of course, that linguistic studies of the Russian language did not begin only in the Soviet period. Rather, formal studies of Russian have a rich history (see, for example, Vinogradov 1958), with such luminaries as M. V. Lomonosov, F. I. Buslaev, and A. A. Potebnja. Their works, however, followed a course similar to that of the West (as discussed in Chapter II of this dissertation), and it is to avoid unnecessary repetition that we do not embark on the details of their achievements, but rather begin with a fairly recent state of case studies in the Soviet Union.

''Although this version of the USSR Academy of Sciences Grammar (edited by V. V. Vinogradov) was first issued in 1952-54, all references throughout this paper are from the revised reprint of 1960, hereafter called, simply, the 1954 Academy Grammar, but which we will abbreviate as "AG 1960," with either I to indicate Volume I, or II to indicate Volume II, Part i (Part ii of Volume II is not cited in this dissertation)."

''Peškovskij (1938), *Russkij sintaksis v naučnom osveščenii*.

•'Šaxmatov (1941), *Sintaksis russkogo jazyka*.

is listed as having seven basic functions (AG 1960 I: 124-126):

i. The most typical function of the Inst carries the meaning of the *instrument (tvor[itel'nyj] orudija)*, in the normal sense of this word, as the *implement*; or the *means (tvor. sredstva)* with the help of which the action described by the verb is performed, e.g.,

(132) *rezat' nožom*
to cut with a knife,

(133) *vlijat' svoim avtoritetom*
to exert influence through one's authority.

ii. Similar to the meaning in i. is the Inst which functions as the *means* whereby an action, expressed by a verb in the *impersonal mood*, is carried out, e.g.,

(134) *tečeniem uneslo lodku*
the boat was carried away by the current.

iii. The Inst serves to indicate the *producer of an action (proizvoditel' dejstvija)* in passive constructions, e.g.,

(135) *pis'mo bylo napisano Ivanom* (or *karandašom*)
the letter was written by Ivan (*or* with pencil).

iv. With some verbs the *Inst of Content, (viz. tvor. soderžanija)* defines more precisely the meaning conveyed by the verb, by specifying *the object or sphere of influence* indicated by that verb, e.g.,

(136) *rukovodit' zanjatijami*
to direct studies,

(137) *on interesuetsja sportom*
he is interested in sports,

(138) *on zanimaetsja sportom*
he participates in sports,

(139) *paxnet senom*
(it) smells of hay.

v. With verbs the Inst case is widely used with various *adverbial meanings*, including:

a) time (*tvor. vremeni*):

(140) *uexat' rannej vesnoj*
to leave in the early spring,

(141) *zanimat'sja celymi dnjami*
to work all day long;

b) path and space (*tvor. puti i prostranstva*):

(142) *idti lesom*
to walk via the forest,

(143) *exat' beregom*
to drive along the shore (i.e. take the shore route);

c) mode and manner (*tvor. sposoba i obraza dejstvija*):

(144) *govorit' gromkim golosom*
to speak in a loud voice,

(145) *povernut'sja bokom*
to turn sideways.

vi. The *predicative Inst* (*tvor. predikativnyj*) serves for the expression of the nominal predicate with copulas (which are link-verbs) -- *byt'* (to be), *stat'* (to become), *kazat'sja* (to seem), and others -- and in more complex expressions using such verbs, e.g.,

(146) *on byl komendantom kreposti*
he was the commandant of the fortress,

(147) *ona namerena stat' vračom*
she intends to become a doctor.

vii. Similar in meaning to the predicative Inst is the *Inst of qualification* (*tvor. priznaka*, also known in Russian as *tvor. funkcional'nyj*), which indicates the designation (job, position, state, or property) of another person or object, which usually stands in the Acc case, e.g.,

(148) *ego sčitajut lučšim udarnikom*
they consider him the best shock worker.

The preceding is, therefore, what may be considered the most basic classification of the function of the Inst in Russian. Its purpose in the first volume of the 1954 Academy Grammar was to serve as a general summary of the uses of this case, and it had no pretention of serving any greater linguistic goals.

In Vol. II, however, which is sub-titled *Sintaksis*, the various functions of the Inst are given a more detailed treatment. The larger section here is concerned with "slovosočetanija, soderžaščie v kačestve glavnogo slova glagoly." Thus, five major classes of the prepositionless Inst are presented, namely, *objective*, *temporal*, *spatial*, *determinative-circumstantial*, and *causal*, each of which will be further elucidated in the following pages (AG 1960 II: 130-138).

Objective Relations

Objective Relations are defined as those which carry the meaning of the implement by means of which an action is accomplished. Naturally, such expressions which have a concrete meaning exemplify this best, e.g.,

(149) *rubit' toporom*
to chop with an axe,

(150) *lečit' poroškami*
to treat with powders,

and (132): *rezat' nožom*.

The editors of the 1954 Academy Grammar also include within this concrete group verbs which have the meaning of allotment, equipment, and supply accompanied by an Inst, which phrase denotes the object with which someone is endowed, or which is given to someone or something. Some examples are the following:

(151) *nagradit' ordenom*
to award an order,

(152) *snabdit' den'gami*
to provide with money,

(153) *nadelit' talantom*
to endow with talent,

(154) *odelit' gostincami*
to bestow presents.

Finally, still within this concrete group are included expressions made up of a verb, as a rule intransitive, which describes movement, and a -- normally inalienable -- part of the person or thing producing such movement, e.g.,

(155) *maxat' rukami*
to wave one's hands,

(156) *skrežetat' zubami*
to gnash one's teeth,

(157) *kačat' vetvjami*
to have the branches sway (of a tree).

In more abstract syntagmas, the meaning of "implement" of the dependent word is somewhat weakened, and is replaced by the wider understanding of an oblique object, e.g.,

(158) *poražat' krasotoj*
to strike with one's beauty,

(159) *ugrožat' vojnoj*
to threaten with war,

(160) *umorit' golodom*
to starve.

The authors of the 1954 Academy Grammar point out that such expressions often have another NP either in the Acc to indicate a Direct Object, or in the Dat to indicate an Indirect Object[13].

Further, with verbs indicating *filling* or *satiation*, the noun in the Inst case indicates the object with which another is filled. Such Inst phrases can be used with reflexive or non-reflexive verbs, and with either a concrete or figurative meaning, e.g.,

(161) *nagruzit'/nagruzit'sja knigami*
to load/be laden with books,

(162) *napitat'/napitat'sja moroženym*
to sate/be satiated with icecream,

(163) *ispolnit'sja nenavist'ju*
to be filled with hatred.

A separate group of Objective Relations are those expressions which include verbs with the meaning of possession, internal capacity, constant activity, and in which the Inst phrase may further indicate the source of the feeling expressed in the verb. Some examples are

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[13] Notice here that while the authors are describing the function of the Inst in more or less semantic terms, accompanying cases -- and the Inst itself at times -- are referred to in surface syntactic terminology such as Direct Object and Indirect Object.

(164) *vladet' francuzskim jazykom*
to have command of the French language,

(165) *pol'zovat'sja žurnalami*
to use magazines,

(166) *naslaždat'sja muzykoj*
be delighted with music,

and, as given above, expressions like (137): *on interesuetsja sportom.*

The Inst also serves as the object, over which the activity named by the verb is spread, e.g., (136): *rukovodit' zanjatijami*, and the following:

(167) *komandovat' batal'onom*
to command a battalion,

(168) *upravljat' narodom*
to govern the people.

The final group within the set of Objective Relations is that set of phrases which serve as either the person or object which is considered the producer of the action, either in the passive voice or with passive participles. This group corresponds to the first three groups given above for Vol. I of the 1954 Academy Grammar, and the same examples need not be repeated here.

As can be seen from the preceding discussion, there was no attempt at a purely semantic classification for Objective Relations, but rather the various uses of the Inst which may be construed as having some sort of *object-of-the-verb* function are simply collected under this label. Although not stated explicitly, these various uses seem to depend *on the semantics of the verb.*

Temporal Relations

The group of Temporal Relations is much smaller than the one above, and is divided into two sub-groups based on syntactic criteria. The first of these is almost always characterized by an adjective or some sort of modifying phrase with the (singular or plural) substantive in the surface structure, while in the second, the phrase always appears in the plural.

The first sub-group is exemplified by, among others, (140): *uexat' rannej vesnoj*, and

(169) *umer večerom togo že dnja*
(he) died the evening of that day.

However, with regard to non-modified Inst nominals such as

(170) *zimoj; letom; utrom; dnem*
in the winter; summer; morning; during the day,

the authors claim in a note, without any further explication, that these are not really nouns in the Inst, but are rather lexicalized adverbs.

There is, though, a similar set of Inst words which serves the same function as the preceding group. This set consists of words relating to periods of one's life, or tenure in one or another state or position, e.g.,

(171) *uexal rebenkom, junošej, starikom*
(he) left as a child, youth, old man,

(172) *vstretilis' studentami*
(they) met as students.

The second sub-group comprises words denoting time, appearing in the Inst plural. These structures refer to an action which is repeated periodically, and which continues through the course of the time frame named by the noun, e.g.,

(173) *oni čitajut večerami*
they read in the evenings,

and, with a modifier, compare (141): *zanimat'sja celymi dnjami*.

Spatial Relations

Like Temporal Relations, Spatial Relations comprise a very small group. The basic function of the Inst serving this purpose is to indicate, with verbs of motion, the place or territory over which the action is conducted. For example, consider (142): *idti lesom*, and (143): *exat' beregom*.

However, the authors indicate in a note that with verbs which express an action other than one of motion, a spatial Inst phrase acquires a nuance of time, e.g.,

(174) *dorogoju stali bit'*
on the way (they) started to beat (him).

Determinative-Circumstantial Relations

In expressions with such a meaning the Inst phrase signifies the mode of completing the action named by the verb, e.g.,

(175) *pet' fal'cetom*
to sing falsetto,

(176) *goreli golubym plamenem*
(they) burned with a blue flame.

The mode of completion may also be expressed by means of a comparison, with the object of the comparison appearing in the Inst, e.g.,

(177) *letet' streloj*
to fly like an arrow,

but it should be noted that such expressions have a direct paraphrase with the conjunction *kak* (and *slovno*, *točno*) -- which can be translated by *like* -- producing, for example, *letet', kak strela*.

Such a mode of completion may also refer to the quantitative manner of performing the action of the verb, as in the following example:

(178) *letjat stadami pticy*
birds fly in flocks.

Finally, it is pointed out that within the group of Determinative-Circumstantial Relations, a further small sub-group may be noted in which the dependent noun is very close, by its semantic composition, to the governing word. In these cases the noun must always be accompanied either by an adjective, or a personal possessive pronoun, e.g.,

(179) *ona nevol'no dumala ix mysljami i čuvstvovala ix čuvstvami*
she involuntarily thought their thoughts and felt their feelings.

Causal Relations

Under Causal Relations, the Inst noun phrase indicates, simply, the phenomenon or state, which, by itself, has conditioned the action named by the verb, e.g.,

(180) *ošibkoju dobro o kom-nibud' skazali?*
was it by error that you said something good about someone?

As can be seen from the above, the Academy Grammar has primarily provided labels for Inst phrases occurring with verbs, and added some special notes where necessary. The thrust of the discussion seems to be to provide a deeper categorization based on a *functional relation* with verbs. There is, therefore, only a partial correlation between the seven groups suggested in Vol. I of this Grammar, and the five major groups of Vol. I

B. Worth's "Transform Analysis"

Dean Stoddard Worth's 1958 article, "Transform Analysis of Russian Instrumental Constructions[13]," examines this case ostensibly from a purely morphological viewpoint. Although he talks about the Inst in its morphological manifestations, the real emphasis of the article is on the Inst from a structural point of view.

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[13] *Word*, 14: 247-290.

For this purpose, Worth reduces "all actually occurring phrases ... to the structural essentials necessary for further analysis" (1958: 254). This reduction is of two types. "First, all modifiers are eliminated from endocentric constructions, excepting only those very units which we are interested in classifying" (*loc. cit.*). As an example of this process, Worth presents the following sentence and its subsequent reduction:

(181) *bol'šaja gostinnaja komnata v dome Ivanovyx uže napolnjalas' tolpoj zenščin i detej*
the big living room in the Ivanovs' house was already being filled by a crowd of women and children,

(182) *komnata napolnjalas' tolpoj*
the room was being filled by the crowd.

The "second step of reduction consists of eliminating from the description all those grammatical categories which can be shown to be irrelevant to the transformations to be effected" (*loc. cit.*). Under this principle, for example, the categories of tense and number are shown to play no role in the active-passive transformation, i.e., both the plural present tense sentence

(183) *pionery strojat dom*
the pioneers are building the house,

and the singular past perfective

(184) *stoljar postroil škaf*
the carpenter built a wardrobe,

can be *passivized* into (131): *dom stroitsja pionerami*, and

(185) *škaf byl postroen stoljarom*
the wardrobe was built by the carpenter,

respectively.

Under his analysis, then, Worth derives, "with insignificant exceptions ... six morphologically [*sic*] distinct types of phrase in which instrumental substantives modify verbs" (1958: 262). For convenience we will simply present these six types below, with examples or parallels from Worth's work (*op. cit.*: 262-63)[14]:

1) S'n Vs S'i (reflexive verbs with a subject in the Nom and another noun in the Inst): this phrase type includes example (182): *komnata napolnjalas' tolpoj*; verbs combined with the forms of (170): *zimoj*, *utrom*, etc., and the following:

(186) *luga zalilis' vodoj*
the meadows were flooded with water,

(187) *sčet sostavljaetsja buxgalterom*
the account is drawn up by the bookkeeper,

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[14] Due to the technical limitations of the text-formatting system being used, we have indicated in bold type the case-designations and verb-classifiers (s for *-sja*-verbs, and ø for impersonal forms), which Worth presents as sub-scripted characters.

(188) *student udarilsja nožom*
the student wounded (injured) himself
with a knife.

(189) *Ivan vernulsja starikom* .
Ivan returned an old man,

(190) *barži tjanulis' rjadami*
the barges moved along in rows.

2) S'n V S'i (non-reflexive active verbs with the same cases as above): this includes a Nom subject combined with examples like (136): *rukovodit' zanjatijami*; (142): *idti lesom*; (155): *maxat' rukami*; (156): *skrežetat' zubami*; (167): *komandovat' batal'onom*; (175): *pet' fal'cetom*; (177): *letet' streloj*; and the following parallels, but without the *-sja*, of (189) and (190) above:

(191) *Ivan priexal starikom*
Ivan arrived an old man,

(192) *oni šli verenicej*
the went in a row.

3) S'n V AiS'i (as above, but with an obligatory adjective accompanying the noun in the Inst): this structure includes Inst phrases which incorporate an adjective for semantic completeness, e.g., (144): *govorit' gromkim golosom*, and

(193) *on smotrel ostorožnymi glazami*
he looked with cautious eyes.

4) S'n V S'a S'i (an active verb with substantives in each of the Nom, Acc, and Inst): this group parallels the second last one above, but includes a third nominal phrase, in the Acc, as exemplified by (132): *(on) režet (xleb) nožom*; the subjectless examples (148): *ego sčitajut lučšim udarnikom*; (172): *vstretilis' studentami*; and the following:

(194) *oni vybrali ego prezidentom*
they elected him president,

(195) *on udivil nas otvetom*
he astonished us by the answer,

(196) *rabočie pokryli ulicu asfal'tom*
the workers covered the street with asphalt,

(197) *tetja nadelila menja nasledstvom*
my aunt left me an inheritance.

5) V0 Si (an impersonal verb and an Inst substantive): being similar to the Inst of Content, mentioned in an earlier classification, this group includes (139): *paxnet senom*, and examples such as

(198) *zateklo krov'ju*
blood began to flow.

6) S^1a Vø S^2i (an impersonal verb, and substantives in the Acc and Inst): this group consists of the impersonal sentences of the type (134): *tečeniem uneslo lodku*, and

(199) *otca pereexalo avtomobilem*
father was run over by a car.

As can be seen by this brief survey of the classifications provided by Worth, a purely structural approach tot the classification of the Russian Inst is not, for our purposes, enlightening by itself. Simplistically, Worth has identified six syntactic environments in which an Inst can be found: with reflexive verbs having a subject in the Nom; with active verbs having a Nom subject, in which instance the Inst may or may not have an obligatory adjectival complement; with active verbs having both a Nom subject and an Acc object; and with impersonal verbs, either with or without an Acc phrase. It is possible, however, that the analysis Worth applies to these structures could shed some light on the study of the various *meanings* of the Inst.

C. Aleksandr V. Isačenko

A. V. Isačenko, in *Grammatičeskij stroj russkogo jazyka*, discusses case, as mentioned in the introduction, from the point of view that cases represent relations *in surface structure*, rather than any kind of independent meaning. They therefore can be considered to be contextually conditioned. Under this interpretation of case, Isačenko identifies two primary groups of such relations: sentential and syntagmatic. Sentential relations are chiefly those which we have come to accept by the terms of subject and object of the verb. Syntagmatic relations exist in connection with verbs, nominals, adjectives, and in a separate set which Isačenko identifies as the Gen of *relative comparison* (1965: 98-99) , e.g.,

(200) *starše svoego brata*
older than his brother.

Inst phrases denoting time, and including an adjective, such as (140): *uexat' rannej vesnoj*, are independent of other words, and can be considered as an "adverbial usage of the case form" (*op. cit.*: 100). Further, Isačenko claims, as did the authors of the 1954 Academy Grammar'', that expressions of the type (170): *zimoj*, *dnem*, etc., have lost their connection with the nominal paradigm and should be considered as independent adverbs (*loc. cit.*).

His actual classification of the Inst does not differ substantially from its predecessors and is based on the claim that the primary functions of the Inst are *adverbial*. To this class of adverbials belong the Inst of time -- formed only from words with a determinate (quantificational) meaning -- along with the Inst of manner, and comparison, which is limited to a small circle of idiomatic combinations. The Inst of instrument, and all prepositional

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''See page 140.

uses of the Inst, are also considered here, but the first, e.g., (132): *rezat' nožom*, we have already mentioned above, and the second is outside the scope of our study. Finally, Isačenko lists two syntactic functions for the Inst -- the Inst of agency in passive constructions, and the predicative Inst (1965: 104).

Isačenko classifies the Inst on the basis of both syntactic and semantic information. With a few minor differences, his classification of the Inst coincides fairly directly with that given in the 1954 Academy Grammar.

D. Rød, Černov, and the Predicative Instrumental

As a syntactic manifestation, the predicative Inst has not had much written about it, especially from a classificatory point of view. Two articles on this topic are in the 1966 study of Ragnar Røed, *Zwei Studien über den prädikativen Instrumental im Russischen*.

Røed points out the well-known fact that with the verb *byt'*, in the past or future tense, the predicative nominal appears in either the Nom or Inst in modern Russian. Thus, either of the following variations is possible:

(201) *on byl/budet pevec*
he was/will be a singer,

(202) *on byl/budet pevcom*
idem.

It should be emphasized, however, that the actual appearance of either the Nom or Inst is not by chance, nor is it a manifestation of free variation, but rather it is conditioned by other circumstantial factors, including consideration of the status of the substantive in subject position at the time the statement is made. If, for example, the subject of the preceding examples is at the present time a singer, then the predicative nominal would most likely appear in the form of the Nom. More formally it may be said that the Inst "is used ... for contingent states of quality or condition ... whereas the 'nominative' is used for more permanent, or necessary, states" (Lyons 1968: 301). The specific conditions involved in this problem, though, are too numerous and complex to deal with here.

The predicative forms with the verb *byt'* do not represent a true *deep* Inst in the semantic sense[14]. Our main concern is the function of the Inst with verbs,and hence it should be noted that several scholars[15] consider *byt'* to be nothing more than a copula, thereby depriving it of the status of a *full* verb. As a result, little more attention will be given to it here.

There are, however, a class of verbs which are neither full verbs nor copulas, but rather which function as a combination of both. The Russian term for these is

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[14] For an analysis of the occurrences of both cases in Russian, from the time of Fonvizin onwards, including relative percentages of usage, see, for example, Ragnar Røed, "Der prädicative Instrumental beim Verbum *byt'*," one of the two studies in Røed 1966: 7-71.

[15] See as one example V. I. Černov 1971, "O klassifikacii svjazočnyx glagolov sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo jazyka."

poluznamenatel'nye glagoly ("semi-meaning," i.e. demonstrative verbs), and this group includes, e.g., *stat'*, *kazat'sja*, etc., which have already been mentioned on page 135. These verbs invariably take the Inst for the predicative substantive, e.g.,

(203) *on stal geroem*
he became a hero.

Of such examples it can be said that the Inst phrase represents the (completive) predicate of the verb, and that the two substantives are coreferential.

Although the preceding represents what is generally construed to be the *predicative Inst*, some scholars include a wider range of material under this label than that given above. Černov, mentioned in a previous footnote, lists two predicative verb groups, excluding the verb *byt'*. These are the *poluznamenatel'nye glagoly*, as above, and the *veščestvennye svjazki*, or *material copulas*, which include the verbs *stojat'* (to stand), *ležat'* (to lie), *vernut'sja* (to return), etc. (1971: 83).

Røed further sub-classifies this latter group, the material copulas, into the following (1966: 76):

i.) verbs denoting an *activity*: *služit'* (to serve), and

(204) *on rabotaet voditelem*
he works as a driver,

ii.) verbs denoting a *state of repose*: *sidet'* (to sit), *viset'* (to hang), and

(205) *žit' det'mi*
to live like (as) children,

iii.) verbs of *motion: xodit'* (to go, walk), and

(206) *vernut'sja starikom*
to return an old man.

While not providing classifications of the Inst *per se,* these and other scholars do consider the predicative function of the Inst to be worthy of more attention than it has thus far received. What other researchers have considered to be, for example, some instances of the Inst of *mode of completion* -- (177): *letet' streloj* -- or the Inst of *time* -- (171): *uexal rebenkom, starikom* -- Reed and Černov interpret as examples of the predicative usage of the Inst. Thus, the *starikom* of the previous example is equated with that in

(207) *on byl starikom*
he was an old man.

These scholars have thus extended the range of material encompassed by the label *predicative Inst* to include uses which have elsewhere (cf. the 1954 Academy Grammar and Isačenko) been considered adverbial or objective in nature.

E. The 1970 Academy Grammar

During the approximately one and a half decades since the publication of the 1954 Academy Grammar, the Soviet school of thought on case function has not really changed from its more or less semantic orientation'*, however, more syntactic material (e.g., transformational possibilities) has been added. In the 1970 Academy Grammar, edited by N. Ju. Švedova, we find a transformational-type approach to case government, based on what Soviet scholars call *strong* and *weak government (sil'noe i slaboe upravlenie)*.

Strong government is defined as government in which there are established either objective or completive -- i.e. syntactically *necessary* (obligatory) -- relations between the verb and the governed form(s) (AG 1970'': 491). *Weak government*, on the other hand, is defined as that under which the governed form is not determined by the categorial properties of the governing word. With *weak government* objective or subjective relations are complicated by other relations such as those characterizing adverbs (AG 1970: 507). This will become clearer to the reader with the examples which are presented throughout the following discussion.

Although the primary classification of Inst usage is based on syntactic criteria -- possible transformations -- under each such syntactic heading there are numerous sub-groupings which, while this is not explicitly stated, are of a semantic nature. An examination of some of this data and classificatory information is found below.

'*See pages 132 to 143 for the 1954 Academy Grammar description.

''As we have done with the older Academy Grammar, this 1970 version will be designated by the abbreviation "AG 1970."

The major classificatory elements of the 1970 Academy Grammar are: *strong* vs *weak government; singular* (governing only one oblique case) vs *dual* (governing two oblique cases) vs *multiple government; invariant* vs *variant* (having a possible alternative case phrase); and *prepositional* vs *non-prepositional* case phrases. Under the various combinations of these elements, examples of each of the five oblique cases are presented, often with information of a quasi-transformational nature (AG 1970: 491-495).

Strong Singular Invariant Government

Strong singular invariant government is used to label three types of conjunctions of words (i.e. parataxis):

a) a conjunction in which the governed form occupies the syntactic position of the independent Nom in the sentence, but which, because of its systemic relationship to the verb, represents the direct object,

b) a conjunction in which the dependent word occupies the position of the direct object, but cannot be transformed into an independent Nom, and

c) a conjunction in which the dependent word does not occupy the position of direct object, but rather which completes an informational deficiency of the governing word.

Verbs such as *interesovat'sja* (to interest) comprise the first sub-classification of type a). Included are forms such as (137): *on interesuetsja sportom,* which can be transformed into a sentence in which *sport* appears as the independent Nom, viz.,

(208) *sport ego interesuet*
sport interests him.

However, the following example, (138) *on zanimaetsja sportom*, which was classified under the same heading as the preceding example in the 1954 Academy Grammar, cannot undergo such a transformation and thus appears in the 1970 Academy Grammar as type b), discussed on the next page.

This group seems to consist of verbs which describe psychological events, for other verbs found here are *vosxiščat'sja* (to admire), *uvlekat'sja* (to be fascinated), *naslaždat'sja* (to take delight), and the like.

The second sub-classification of type a) contains verbs which describe some property characterizing another substantive. To this group belong verbs of the type *otličat'sja* (to be differentiated), and *sijat'* (to glow), e.g.,

(209) *ee glaza svetilis' radost'ju/*
v ee glazax svetilas' radost'
her eyes shone with happiness/
happiness shone in her eyes.

The third sub-classification is composed of verbs of *filling* or *satiation*, e.g., *otjagotit'sja* (to be weighted down with), *pitat'sja* (eat, be fed on), and

(210) *auditorija napolnilas' studentami/*
studenty napolnili auditoriju
the auditorium was filled with students/
students filled the auditorium.

Next follow verbs denoting movement, activity, or the production of some sort of sound, all of which require 'some nominal -- usually an inalienable part of the body -- for the fulfillment of this action. This includes the examples (155): *maxat' rukami*, (156): *skrežetat' zubami*, and

(211) *dvigat' ušami/uši dvigajut'sja*
to wiggle one's ears/the ears wiggle.

The last of these sub-classifications consists of verbs of the *control* or *government* type. With this type of verb, the Inst nominal can be transformed into a Nom only if the new structure incorporates a passive participle. The verbs of this group are exemplified by (136): *rukovodit'.zanjatijami*, and

(212) *upravljat' tankom/tank upravljaem*
to control the tank/the tank is controllable.

The *strong singular invariant government*'s second type, b), consists of those verbs which govern an Inst, but from which an independent Nom *cannot* be created. There are ten further sub-classifications, based on meanings, which are represented, in part, by the following verbs (AG 1970: 492): *pravit'* (to manage), *vladet'* (cf. (164): *vladet' francuzskim jazykom*), *zanimat'sja* (to take part in), *gordit'sja* (to be proud of), *žertvovat'* (to sacrifice), *gnušat'sja* (to distain, despise), *obrasti* (to become overgrown), *ograničit'sja* (to be restricted), *torgovat'* (to deal in, trade), and

(213) *razrazit'sja smexom*
to break out in laughter.

The third and final type of *strong singular invariant government* verbs, type c), is also further broken down into five sub-classifications. The unifying feature of the whole group is the function of the Inst as a unit which completes an informational, and therefore semantic, deficiency of the verb. The first sub-classification contains the verb *byt'* (see example (202)), along with *javljat'sja* (to seem, be), *nazvat'sja* (to name, call), and the use of *xodit'* in such examples as

(214) *on xodit geroem*
he goes (as) a hero.

The second sub-classification consists of verbs of the nature of *vejat'* (to smell of) (cf. (139): *paxnet senom*) and *'nesti* (to carry, in the same sense of (139)). The third encompasses a small group of fixed lexical phrases, similar to (213): *razrazit'sja smexom*, including

(215) *zakatit'sja plačem*
to break out in tears.

The final two sub-classifications are represented by the following examples, respectively:

(216) *stradat' golovnymi boljami*
to suffer from headaches,

(217) *vzjat' umom*
to succeed by one's wits
Lit.: to take by one's mind.

Strong Singular Variant Government

Variant government means that the verb can govern two or more different case forms with one and the same meaning. Such forms are therefore considered by the authors to be synonymously interchangeable.

Under this heading there are three major sub-divisions, of which only two are of concern to us. The three divisions are variations based on prepositionless and/or prepositional phrases having such an interchangeable status with each other, while still supposedly conveying the same semantic information'••. Unfortunately the authors of the 1970 Academy Grammar have confused the criteria on which they have classified their material to such a degree that some verbs are listed under two different headings, which, by their nature, should be mutually exclusive, as shown in the following paragraphs.

The first type of variant given is that whereby a *prepositionless* phrase in one case may be interchanged with a *prepositionless* phrase in another case (AG 1970: 496), e.g., the verb *preispolnit'sja* (to be filled/fraught with), which, according to this Grammar may take a Gen or Inst phrase. Also listed here, as a *variant*-type verb -- with the same phrase alternation -- is *gnušat'sja*, which was given above as an *invariant*-type.

'••We do not agree that such variations are as free as the authors of the 1970 Academy Grammar imply, but rather feel that there is a concomitant semantic shift with most alternations. More will be said on this later.

The second alternation is that between a *prepositionless* phrase and a *prepositional* phrase of the same or a different case (AG 1970: 496-97). Here again we have a verb, *gordit'sja*, , listed above as *invariant*, but which can take, along with the prepositionless Inst, the prepositional phrase, *za* + Acc. Other prepositional Acc phrases which can vary with the prepositionless Inst are exemplified by *izumit'sja* (to be astonished by), which can take *na* + Acc; and *pročit'* (to intend (for)), which can manifest the prepositional phrase *v* + Acc, but only in the plural, e.g.,

(218) *ego pročili v svjaščeniki*
he was intended for the church
Lit.: (they) intended (for) him
(to be) in(to) the priests.

Variations with a Gen prepositional phrase include *naznačat'sja* (to designate) which also combines with *v kačestve* + Gen (in the capacity of); and *načinat'* (to begin as), which can take *s* + Gen, but, as in the preceding example, only in the plural, e.g.,

(219) *on načinal učenikom/s učenikov*
he began as a student/from the students.

As an example of the Prep case varying with the Inst prepositionless, we have the following:

(220) *razojtis' mnenijami/v mnenijax*
to differ in opinion,

(221) *ego čisljat načal'nikom/v načal'nikax*
he is considered a leader/among the leaders.

Note, again, that the prepositional phrase is in the plural.

Finally, also included within this variable group are prepositionless Inst phrases alternating with prepositional Inst phrases. In these instances, the preposition is *nad* (over). Once again we meet a variant form which was given above (e.g., (167)) as *invariant*, namely *komandovat'*.

Multiple variations also are possible. Thus, according to the 1970 Academy Grammar, examples of the type (214): *on xodit geroem* and (221): *ego čisljat načal'nikom* can take a prepositionless Inst phrase (as indicated above), *za* + Acc, or *v* + Prep plural.

Strong Dual Invariant Government

This large group is further broken down into sub-groups, each sub-divided into various semantic types (AG 1970: 498-501). Under *dual government* there are two possible relations between two case phrases and the verb:

1) objective for both forms, e.g.,

(222) *povedaju tajnu drugu*
I reveal a secret to a friend,

2) objective (for the first form) and completive (for the second), e.g.,

(223) *nadelil detej gostincami*
treated the children to sweets.

With transitive verbs, as exemplified above, one case is usually the Acc/Gen, while the other can be either Dat or Inst -- the latter normally appearing with prefixed verbs.

The authors of the 1970 Academy Grammar consider the *phrase in the Inst* to represent the *direct object*, because, they explain, it can be transformed into an independent Nom. For example, with the prefixed transitive verb *napitat'*, we have

(224) *napital*[101] *počvu vlagoj*
the soil was saturated with moisture,

which can be transformed into

(225) *vlaga napitala počvu*
the moisture saturated the soil.

Other types of prefixed verbs falling into this classification include those in the following examples:

(226) *dorogu zaneslo snegom*
the road is snow-bound
Lit.: the road (*Acc*)
(something) bound with snow,

(227) *okružili les vojskami*
(they) surrounded the forest with soldiers,

(228) *peresypat' reč' šutkami*
to strew a speech with jokes,

and (134): *tečeniem uneslo lodku*.

A second group of transitive verbs with which the Inst can undergo the transformation into an independent Nom consists of, according to the authors, "verbs from specific semantic groups." Of these seven sub-groups there are: verbs of *supply* (cf. (151) - (153): *nagradit' ordenom, snabdit' den'gami*, and *nadelit' talantom*); verbs of *deservedness*, e.g.,

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[101] This verb is given in the masculine singular by the authors.

(229) *zaslužil nagradu userdiem*
(he) earned the award through diligence;

verbs of *blame or burden*, e.g.,

(230) *obremenil druga poručeniem*
(he) burdened his friend with the assignment;

verbs of *psychological events* (for example (158): *poražat' krasotoj*);

verbs of *augmentation*, such as *utverdit'* (to strengthen), and

(231) *otkryli sezon prem'eroj*
(they) opened the season with a premiere;

verbs of *depletion*, e.g.,

(232) *morit' ljudej golodom*
to exhaust people with hunger;

and finally, verbs as semantically diverse as the following examples indicate, but which, nonetheless, are classified together in the last of these sub-groups:

(233) *voobrazil ego sportsmenom*
imagined him an athlete,

(234) *postavit' učebu cel'ju*
to organize the studies towards a goal,

(235) *zakončil p'esu tragismom*
(he) finished the play with tragedy,

and *naznačit'* (cf. (146), above).

The third and final group here consists of intransitive verbs, governing both the Inst and Dat, but which are nonetheless characterized, as above, by the possibility of the transformation of the Inst into an independent Nom, with other concomitant morphological changes to the verb in some instances. The first of the four sub-groups here seems to consist of verbs describing the *elicitation of some response* from a person or animal, e.g., *ostočertet'* (to be fed up with), *nadoest'* (to tire of, become bored with), and

(236) *naskučil sosedu boltovnej/*
boltovnja naskucila sosedu
(he) bored (his) neighbour with (his) chatter/
(his) chatter bored (his) neighbour.

The second sub-set is characterized by verbs denoting *threat or menace*, e.g.,

(237) *ugrožajut miru vojnoj/*
vojna ugrožaet miru
(they) threaten the world with war/
war threatens the world.

The third set, for which we cannot detect a general unifying characteristic, includes the verbs *ugodit'* (to oblige), *oplatit'* (to recompense, pay back), and

(238) *žertvuet drugu sostojaniem/*
sostojanie žertvuetsja drugu
(he) is sacrificing a fortune to his friend/
a fortune is being sacrificed to his friend.

The last set of *strong dual invariant* verbs, also with no obvious unifying feature, is exemplified by *zapomnit'sja* (to remain in one's memory), and *predstavit'sja* (to feign, pretend).

Strong Dual Variant Government

The 1970 Academy Grammar explains that with verbs manifesting this so-called dual government (directly governing two case phrases), it is possible either for only one form or for both forms to be selected from alternative case forms. It is important to point out, however, that the Grammar does not list any verb taking a prepositionless Inst in which *both* cases can vary. Moreover, in none of the examples of dual variation given above, nor in those discussed below, does the case accompanying the Inst vary! The two possible variations which are of interest to us are those in which a *prepositionless* Inst form alternates either with another *prepositionless* case, or with a *preposition-governed* case.

The only type of prepositionless variation is exemplified by the verb *udostoit'* (to confer on, favour with), which always takes an Acc animate substantive as the other case form. With this verb the prepositionless Inst form can supposedly be replaced by a prepositionless Gen, e.g.,

(239) *udostoil studentku ulybkoj*
favoured the student with a smile (Inst),

(240) *udostoili Brežneva leninskoj premii*
awarded Brezhnev the Lenin Prize (Gen),

but here, as mentioned earlier, the choice of case is not free. Note the anomalous example:

(241) **udostoil studentku pravitel'stvennoj nagradoj*
favoured the student with
a State award (Inst).

There are three manifestations of a prepositionless Inst alternating with a preposition-governed phrase, and these are exemplified by: *isčisljat'* (to calculate, estimate) which can also take *v* + Acc; *sčitat'* (to consider, reckon) which also takes *za* + Acc; and *otličat'sja* (to differ) which may take *v* + Prep.

Finally, the authors of the 1970 Academy Grammar mention that there is such a thing as triple variation, whereby a prepositionless Inst may alternate with either of *two* other case phrases. Verbs manifesting this phenomenon are, among others, *izbrat'* (to elect), *stavit'* (to appoint), and *nanjat'* (to engage, hire). For this type of verb, the phrase representing the *post*, *job*, or *position* for which a person is chosen may be the prepositionless Inst, *v kačestve* + Gen, or *v* + Acc, as exemplified by

(242) *nanjali ego dvornikom/v dvorniki/*
v kačestve dvornika
(they) hired him as a yard-keeper.

As was pointed out earlier, it should again be noted that with *v* + Acc, the substantive appears in the plural form.

The above discussion gives the essence of the classification of the uses of the prepositionless Inst with verbs as presented in the 1970 Academy Grammar. The main criteria used are the syntactic (morphological) manifestations of case phrases with verbs. Such case phrases result from either *strong government*, in which case they are *obligatorily* expressed in surface structure, or *weak government*, in which case they are *optional*. *Variant government* means that a case phrase, whether strongly or weakly governed, may appear in one of two or more forms. *Dual* and *multiple government* means that a verb governs, respectively, two or more case phrases.

Under the various combinations of these government types, verbs are divided into sub-groups, *not* on further syntactic criteria, but rather on the *semantic* nature of the verbs.

F. Veyrenc: Syntactic Analysis

In his short article, "Sintaksičeskij analiz tvoritel'nogo padeža[102]," J. Veyrenc ostensibly approaches the study of the Inst in Russian from a syntactic point of view. Like

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[102] This article was translated from the French, although my references will be to the Russian translation, published in 1971.

Worth, discussed above[103], Veyrenc postulates structural types of sentences which include the Inst. There are nine major types, and a total of thirty sub-types.

Before embarking on the details of Veyrenc's article, however, it should be noted that the factors involved in the differentiation of these sentence-types are somewhat more semantic than the title of the article implies, although Veyrenc does try to show that there is an underlying syntactic basis.

Veyrenc's *type I* structures are those "osnovannye na inversii diatezy" (1971: 130). Diathesis is, however, a poorly defined and understood term in linguistics. Pei and Gaynor's *Dictionary of Linguistics* defines it thus:

> "The relationship of the subject to the verb, according as the subject is the agent or the target of the action. (In old grammars, *diathesis* was used in the meaning of *voice*.)"

This still leaves some question as to its exact applicational *meaning*. The parenthetical comment, however, is correct -- "in fact, the term *zalog* 'voice' is itself a loan translation from Greek *diathesis* ('disposition')" (Schaarschmidt 1968: 7). Finally, perhaps somewhat more practical than the dictionary definition above, is the decision of Xrakovskij "nazyvat' *diatezoj* sootvetstvie členov predloženija participantam situacii" (Xrakovskij 1974: 13), which for him means the relationship between the

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[103] See pages 143 - 148.

Subject : Agent and the (grammatical) Object : Objective Case. Diathesis, in the sense of Veyrenc, seems to correspond to that of Xrakovskij, i.e. that the *agent* of a sentence usually appears as the *subject*, and the *objective* as a *direct object*. "Inverse of diathesis" thus means no more than "passive," "pseudo-passive," or "reflexive."

The first sub-group of this type is thus introduced by the comment, "konstrukcii, zaključajuščie tak nazyvaemyj a *T[vor] agensa*''', predstavljajut soboj passivnuju transformaciju aktivnogo oborota" (1971: 130). The other structures of *type I* are, respectively, impersonal constructions, and impersonal constructions specifically with prefixed verbs (of the type (226): *dorogu zaneslo snegom*).

Type II includes those uses of the Inst which may be classified as *instrumental*, or as the *object of a complex verb*. The syntactic basis for this grouping is the fact that these phrases are, according to the author, the result of the overlapping of simpler expressions, or of embedding. Thus, examples of the form

(243) *oni zasejali pole pšenicej*
they sowed the field with wheat,

result from the overlapping of more simple sentences, i.e.

(244) *zasejali pole + zasejali pšenicu*
sowed the field + sowed wheat,

in both of which the objects are in the Acc. A similar

'''The italics are mine.

procedure derives examples like

(245) *stvol obros moxom*
the trunk is over-grown with moss,

which is formed from embedding, e.g.,

(246) *stvol ob-(...) + mox ros*
the trunk is over-(...) + moss grew.

The surface Inst is found initially, however, as an underlying Nom, and not an Acc as in the preceding example.

Type III, "sočetanija, osnovannye na kondensacii dvux bazisnyx vyskazyvanij," while similar to *type II*, has, at least for the first sub-group, partial identity between the two objects. The sentential derivation has two different functions: first the deletion of identical words, and then the change of either a Nom or Acc into an Inst. Thus,

(247) *oni radovalis' vsej sem'ej*
the whole family is happy,

is derived from *oni radovalis' + vsja sem'ja radovalas'*, by which procedure the following example can also be explained:

(248) *oni gubili ljudej millionami*
they murdered people by the millions.

The second sub-group, the Inst with adjectives, is not of concern to us here, and the third, similar in function to other type III expressions, produces from *on rubit* and *topor rubit* a conjugated form of (149), namely,

(249) *on rubit (sosnu) toporom*
he chops (the pine) with an axe.

Examples such as (145): *povernut'sja bokom*, or

(250) *on sidit spinoj k stene*
he's sitting with his back to the wall,

are classed as the first sub-group of *type IV* -- "sočetanija tvoritel'nogo, osnovannye na skreplenii dvux bazisnyx vyskazyvanij." They are derived, for example, from structures such as *on sidit* + *spina k stene*. The second sub-group, also an adnominal usage of the Inst, is formed in a like manner, and is exemplified by

(251) *u menja kniga stoimost'ju v sto rublej*
I have a book worth a hundred rubles.

Type V are "sočetanija, dopuskajuščie sokraščenie pri sektoral'nyx transformacijax." The *Inst of means, place* and *time* are treated together, meaning that examples (143): *exat' beregom* and (140): *uexat' rannej vesnoj*, are considered together with

(252) *exat' poezdom*
to go by train.

For these examples Veyrenc claims that the verb *exat'* forms a closed semantic field, and that these Inst phrases are deeper structures within this field. In (252) the Inst *poezdom* is considered as a *limitational sememe* representing the *supplemental means of conveyance*, and derives from the deeper expression *poezd idet* (the train goes). *Beregom* of (143): *exat' beregom* is likewise considered to be present in the semantic field of *exat'* as the "space covered."

Rannej vesnoj, however, is not part of the semantic field of *exat'*, but rather represents a general sememe characteristic of *any verbal function* which may be considered to be a *process*. Under this scheme, Veyrenc considers *beregom* and *poezdom* to be *limitational*, while *rannej vesnoj* is *non-limitational*.

Adnominal expressions of *comparison* are formed from the combination of a quantificational and a qualitative sememe, resulting in Inst phrases such as

(253) *ètažom vyše*
a storey taller.

"Sočetanija, stavšie na put' zastyvanija" comprise the contents of *type VI*. Thus, (144): *govorit' gromkim golosom*, is derived from two expressions. The latter of these, the Inst phrase, is taken from the same semantic field as the verb. Since one must use one's voice to speak, (144) represents the combination of the verb with the expression *golos gromkij* (his voice is loud).

Sentences with the reflexive particle, *sebja*, e.g.,

(254) *ona xoroša soboj*
she, herself, is beautiful,

are formed from the combination of two identical deep structures -- in this example, each being *ona xoroša*. Veyrenc does not, however, explain the necessity of having the two identical deep structures in the first place. Another sub-group includes those Inst expressions which imply an increase or decrease of the internal characteristic of the accompanying substantive. This is a use of the Inst with a substantive, which expressions are not of concern to the present study. They are, however, represented by the following two examples:

(255) *pjat'ju vosem'*
five times eight,

(256) *durak durakom*
a real fool
Lit.: a fool by a fool.

The final sub-group of *type VI* represents expressions which have become completely and categorically set, e.g.,

(257) *begom bežat'*
to run
Lit.: to run at a run.

Types VII and *VIII* are expressions "s fiksirovannym upravleniem." The first group consists of non-reflexive verbs, while the second set comprises reflexive verbs. Included are verbs of control, e.g., (167): *komandovat' batal'onom*; and verbs of supply, e.g., (151): *nagradit' ordenom*. Some verbs, which govern two cases -- the Acc and Inst -- are opposed by diathesis. "External diathesis," whereby the noun having the *objective relation* to the verb appears in the expected case, here the Acc, is exemplified by

(258) *on brosaet kamni*
he is throwing stones,

(259) *on dvigaet stakan*
he moves the glass.

"Internal diathesis," whereby the objective substantive seems more intimately associated with the subject, supposedly accounts for examples similar to these, namely,

(260) *on brosaet kamnjami*
he is throwing stones,

(261) *on dvigaet pal'cem*
he moves his finger.

The example, (155): *maxat' rukami*, which also manifests "internal diathesis," is included in the subsequent sub-group.

Verbs which allow either the *presence* of an Inst object, or the *absence* of one, comprise the next sub-group. The verbs here, e.g., (216): *stradat' golovnymi boljami*, as a rule select their Inst objects from the semantic field of the verb itself.

Overlapping, according to Veyrenc, also accounts for structures like

(262) *les gudel golasami*
the forest rang with voices,

which derives from *les gudel* combined with *golosa gudeli*.

Type VIII, the reflexive counterpart of *VII*, has four sub-groups. The first consists of verbs which characterize a property which is manifest in the subject of the sentence, and is conditioned by the substantive appearing in the Inst with the verb, e.g., (166): *naslaždat'sja muzykoj*. The second, a variant of the type exemplified by (245): *stvol obros moxom*, consists of prefixed verbs, giving, e.g.,

(263) *on ob"elsja pirožkami*
he over-ate tarts,

or, as the prefixed reflexive correlate of (260), above,

(264) *oni perekidyvalis' snežkami*
they were pelting each other with snowballs.

The third sub-group consists of those verbs, discussed on page 156, from which the Inst oblique object may become the subject of the non-reflexive form of the verb, e.g., *vosxiščat'sja*. The final sub-group is represented by verbs which take an Inst object with the reflexive form, but an Acc with the active correlates, e.g.,

(265) *menjajutsja mestami/menjajut mesta*
they are changing places.

Veyrenc's final main type represents forms of the predicative Inst which have already been mentioned at some length earlier.

Veyrenc's classification is both syntactic and semantic. Syntactically, like Worth, he identifies Inst environments, e.g., with passives, with nouns, as strongly governed forms with both reflexive and non-reflexive verbs, and in the predicative function. He also discusses Inst forms that appear in another case (either Nom or Acc) in a simpler statement, but which become Inst through embedding or contraction in/with another simple sentence.

On the other hand, his fifth group is determined by the semantic field of the governing verb, or the nature of such a verb. Thus, a *conveyance* or *space* Inst may accompany a verb of motion such as *exat'*, while a *time* Inst may accompany any *process* verb.

G. Dešerieva: Structure of Semantic Fields

T. I. Dešerieva[183] makes an attempt at a logical analysis of cases and their semantics. Her principal aim is, as the title of her book suggests, a comparative analysis of the Russian and Chechen[184] cases. For this purpose she proposes the designation of each case by the first letter of the Russian name for the case (thus *T* (*tvor.*) for Inst), a super-scripted *č* (for Chechen) or *r* for Russian, and a sub-scripted numeral for each semantic function of that case. This is followed by the functional structure "(*x*)". However, since the language-designating letter is unnecessary, as we are only interested in the Russian data, we will present Dešerieva's cases by the case letter and numerical indices.

In total, Dešerieva defines twenty-three *logical predicates* for the *semantic field* of the Inst in Russian, where "semantičeskim polem padeža nazyvaetsja sovokupnost' predikatov, opredeljajuščix ego značenie" (1974: 5). The first ten of these are of primary interest to us, as they represent the usage of the Inst with verbs (1974: 174-75). Although some of the following material may seem repetitious, we include it for later reference, since, for the purposes of the classification of the Inst in Contemporary Russian, this is the final work which we will discuss in any detail, and it is also very typical of the modern Soviet studies of case.

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[183] Dešerieva (1974). *Struktura semantičeskix polej čečenskix i russkix padežej.*

[184] A member of the Eastern branch of the North Caucasian family of languages, Chechen includes the Ingush and T'ush (Bats) dialects.

$T_1(x)$: "*x* forma priglagol'nogo kosvennogo dopolnenija, oboznačajuščego *orudie ili sredstvo, pri pomošči kotorogo proizvoditsja dejstvie*[illegible]." Along with such concrete examples as (149): *rubit' toporom*, Dešerieva includes structures with a more abstract means, such as

(266) *unižat' oskorblenijami*
to humiliate with insults

She goes on here to indicate that "ètot predikat peredaet ... osnovnoe značenie tvor. padeža v sovremennom russkom literaturnom jazyke" and then adds that specialists in the field of Slavic linguistics "utverždajut, čto èto značenie tvor. padež imel uže v praslavjanskom jazyke."

$T_2(x)$: "*x* forma priglagol'nogo kosvennogo dopolnenija, utočnjajuščego *predmet ili oblast', na kotoruju rasprostranjaetsja dejstvie skazuemogo*." This meaning includes examples (136): *rukovodit' zanjatijami*, (137): *on*

[illegible] The italics in this and the following definitions are mine.

interesuetsja sportom, (138): *zanimat'sja sportom*, (167): *komandovat' batal'onom*, and

(267) *gordit'sja det'mi*
to be proud of one's children.

The Inst case with this meaning is used primarily with *intransitive* verbs.

T$_3$(*x*): "*x* forma *logičeskogo sub"jecta* dejstvija v stradatel'nyx oborotax," e.g., (135): *pis'mo bylo napisano Ivanom* (or *karandašom*). Dešerieva adds that in the contemporary language this is the singular means of expressing the logical subject of passive constructions, but that this is not historically so. In manuscripts of the XVIII C., for example, the parallel form, expressing the *logical subject*, was *čerez* + Acc.

T$_4$(*x*): "*x* forma *predikativnogo člena* imennogo skazuemogo," or, simply, the predicative Inst, e.g.,

(268) *on stal kommunistom*
he became a communist.

T$_5$(*x*): "*x* forma priglagol'nogo *obstojatel'stva pričiny*," e.g.,

(269) *on smelost'ju svoej geroem stal*
he became a hero because of his bravery,

in which we have the *cause*, represented by the Inst phrase *smelost'ju svoej*, combined with a "sentence" which already contains an Inst, namely (203): *on stal geroem*. This juxtaposition of two prepositionless Inst phrases within the same proposition is very unusual in the literary language. Moreover, the Inst of *cause*, Dešerieva writes, is rarely used in the contemporary Slavic languages. In place of this meaning of the Inst in Russian, the following constructions are often found: *iz-za* + Gen; *s* + Gen; *ot* + Gen; and *po* + Dat.

$T_6(x)$: "*x* forma priglagol'nogo *obstojatel'stva mesta,* otvečajuščego na voprosy: *po kakomu puti, čerez kakoe prostranstvo proisxodit dviženie?*" (143): *exat' beregom* and the like are examples. Along with the Inst in this meaning, *čerez* + Acc is also found, e.g.,

(270) *krov' xlynula gorlom/čerez gorlo*
blood gushed through (his) throat.

$T_7(x)$: "*x* forma priglagol'nogo *obstojatel'stva vremeni,*" which we have already seen as (140): *uexat' rannej vesnoj* and as the adverbial forms of (170), e.g., *letom, dnem,* etc.

$T_8(x)$: "*x* forma priglagol'nogo *obstojatel'stva mery, količestva,*" as in (178): *letjat stadami pticy,* and

(271) *pit' vino stakanami*
to drink wine by the glass.

The Inst with this meaning is normally used with verbs of motion (cf. also (190): *barži tjanulis' rjadami*), but it is not excluded with verbs with different semantics, as in the example above and the further example Dešerieva gives, namely,

(272) *pet' duètom*
to sing (as) a duet.

$T_9(x)$: "*x* forma priglagol'nogo *obstojatel'stva obraza ili sposoba* dejstvija so značeniem *predmeta sravnenija ili prevraščenija*," e.g., (177): *letet' streloj*, and

(273) *obernut'sja dobrym molodcem*
to turn into a fine young man.

This particular function -- especially as in (177) -- is found primarily in folktales (*byliny*, *skazki*, and lamentations), and is very rare in contemporary literary or scientific works. It is usually used with those verbs signifying the sounds or movements of animals and the singing of birds.

$T_{10}(x)$: "*x* forma priglagol'nogo *obstojatel'stva obraza ili sposoba* dejstvija, xarakterizujuščego dejstvie glagol'nogo skazuemogo *bez sravnenija ego s čem-libo ili s kem-libo*." This group includes (175): *pet' fal'cetom*; (252): *exat' poezdom*; and

(274) *idti šagom*
to walk (go on foot).

With the sole exception of $T_4(x)$ -- the *predicative Inst* -- these ten groups also have direct correlates with deverbal nominals, carrying the exact meanings as given above. This set of nine functions comprises Dešerieva's $T_1(x)$ to $T_{10}(x)$

respectively.

The prepositionless Inst is also used with adjectives -- in expressions like (256): *durak durakom* -- as the form of the adverb of measure with the comparative degree of adjectives or adverbs, and as "forma nesoglasovannogo opredelenija pri suščestvitel'nom, sootnosimom s prilagatel'nym," e.g.,

(275) *bogatyr' teloslozeniem*
a Hercules by body-build.

Dešerieva identifies both syntactic environments and semantic meanings in her analysis. As regards the prepositionless Inst with verbs, her analysis has ten *logical predicates*. Two of these are syntactic -- the Inst with passives, and the predicative Inst. Two more are strongly related to the semantics of the verb, specifying the *implement* used in the action, or the *field (sphere)* of the action. The remaining six predicates are all adverbial, indicating *cause, place, time, measure, mode (by comparison with something else)*, and *mode (without comparison)*.

H. The Contemporary Instrumental: A Summary

If we set aside for the moment the transformational classifications of the Russian Inst, we find that the majority of the classificatory literature on this subject shows a low degree of correlation. Most such works list, with quasisemantic or syntactic labels, general functions of the Inst. This gives only a limited insight into the specific factors that may condition the usage of the Inst in any given phrase or sentence.

Of the purported semantic classifications, for example, Dešerieva, discussed immediately above, with her alpha-numeric rather than verbal labels, is typical. The implication of her system is that the 23 Inst types given are sufficient to identify every use of that case in Russian. Ten such predicates are considered sufficient for uses with verbs. The Academy Grammar of 1954, on the other hand, identifies only seven of the latter Inst types in Volume I, and even fewer, five, in Volume II.

The reader might well ask for an explanation of this low correlation within such a limited field of data. This explanation is fairly straightforward. Certain functions, such as that of the *producer of the action* in passive constructions, are easily identified and classified. Many of the other "labels" given for the functions of the Inst are rather imprecise, however, which leads to the lack of agreement manifest on the part of most scholars as to the exact placement of certain examples of Inst usage. Thus, example (269): *on* smelost'ju svoej *geroem stal*, does not seem to have an exact place in the classification of Volume I of the Academy Grammar. Similarly, that volume's *Inst of qualification*, as characterized by (148): *ego sčitajut lučšim udarnikom*, does not seem to have any direct correlation with Dešerieva's classification.

Bearing in mind that scholars do not fully agree on the meanings and functions of the Inst, let us nonetheless review the classifications which have been proposed on a structural or transformational basis.

The two main structural works here are those of Worth and Veyrenc, but the transformational material presented in the 1970 Academy Grammar should also be mentioned. Worth, as discussed earlier (pages 143 - 148), actually does not categorize the Inst case *per se* as much as its syntactic environments. Thus, one separate grouping, ostensibly for the Inst, is its usages in sentences with reflexive verbs and a second substantive in the Nom. Two groupings are relevant to verbs in the impersonal form -- one with just an Inst, and the other with an Inst and an Acc. *Active verbs*, as opposed to reflexives and impersonals, manifest three combinations with the Inst. In each such combination there is a noun in the Nom -- serving as the active subject of the verb -- and an Inst phrase. In the first type the Inst is unmodified; in the second, it has an obligatory adjective; and in the third, there is an additional substantive in the Acc. The question which arises from this is whether this really represents a classification of the Inst or of sentence types in the Russian language.

Svedova, in the 1970 Academy Grammar, has included some semantic information with her transformationally-based classification of the Inst. The main thrust of this approach is the determination of the possibile transformations of the nominal from the Inst phrase into an independent Nom. While this could have some bearing on the interpretation of the semantics of such a phrase, the information is not fully useful, since in some instances this Nom can become the subject of an active verb, in which event the transformation can be considered rather powerful semantically, e.g., from (132): *on režet xleb nožom,* it is possible, with qualifications, to have a similar structure, i.e.

(276) *nož režet xleb*
the knife cuts bread,

while in others it can only become a Nom with a passive participle, as in (212): *tank upravlaem.* In such an event one could argue that the Nom, while indeed independent, is not of the same status as a Nom which is the subject of an active verb.

A second form of supposed transformational variance which Švedova lists is that between various types of case phrases. This approach, however, is flawed in two ways. First, Švedova occasionally assigns one verb to two mutually exclusive syntactic types, e.g., variant and *invariant.* Second, she has indirectly shown that semantics must play a role in such case assignments. (241): *_udostoil studentku pravitel'stvennoj' nagradoj_ is but one example of a semantically anomalous output from Švedova's theoretical discussion. Nonetheless valuable information on the meaning of the Inst can be gleaned from some of the variable surface manifestations.

Veyrenc has used a more balanced approach to the Inst, classifying the data according to semantics, the syntax of the environment, and sentence embedding and reduction. This latter aspect of his theory will prove to be applicable to the discussion which follows.

As can be seen, even works ostensibly applying syntactic criteria for the classification of the Inst in Russian do not show any high degree of correlation, although, of course, there are similarities.

While we do not claim to have presented an exhaustive study of the various classifications -- semantic and syntactic -- of the Inst case in contemporary Russian, we have attempted to present the reader with an overview of some of the multifarious functions and typical classifications which have been given by several scholars, including the similarities and differences among these. During the discussion of the Inst which follows later, more data will, of course, be given, and the present data expanded.

I. An Historical Digression

In the preceding sections of this chapter we examined the various functions of the Inst in Russian within a synchronic framework. The works were presented more or less in the chronological order in which they were published. Studies whose primary focus was the Inst from a diachronic point of view, or which dealt with this topic in the Slavic languages in general, were not included. Let us now examine some of the material included in these investigations into the historical manifestations of the Inst, and some developments in other languages of this family which differ from those in Russian. We will not dwell on those uses of the Inst which are still extant in contemporary Russian, but will include specific developments which may have some explanatory impact on the question of the contemporary use of the prepositionless Inst.

First, let us preface this discussion with a general remark on cases in Old Church Slavonic. As our interest lies with the *prepositionless* Inst, it is worth noting that "Bespredložnye padeži v podavljajuščem bol'šinstve slučaev oboznačajut čisto sintaksičeskie različija, tak kak èti padeži, buduči formami ob"ektov, zanimajut raznye pozicii po otnošeniju k glagolu ... i [oni] svjazany otnošeniem ... kotoroe predstavljaet soboj ne oppoziciju, a kontrast" (Xodova 1971: 90). Considering this, it is not in the least surprising that Xaburgaev, in a standard text on OCS, should point out that the prepositionless Inst was used almost exclusively with verbs, although its use with nominals and adjectives *derived from verbs* was also possible (Xaburgaev 1974: 378).

The general meaning for all uses of the prepositionless Inst in OCS was "*obstojatel'stvennoe značenie sredstva soveršenija dejstvija*," including *direction* and *time* expressions which serve as a means of realizing a given action (Xaburgaev: 378). However, the *means* of completing the action can be interpreted in a very broad sense, and can include "specializirovannoe orudie, sredstvo peredviženija, odežda, ljuboj neoduševlennyj predmet, čast' tela, abstraktnoe ponjatie, životnoe, i daže lico (vse v konktetnom [*sic*] i perenosnom značenii)" (Baurova 1963: 291).

Interestingly, Bernštejn has considered the Inst of *instrument* in earlier varieties of Slavic to be tripartite in nature, having specifically the nuances of *implement*, of *means*, and of *assisting material or content* (1958: 77). The behaviour of each of these three aspects is not fully parallel, however.

The Inst of *implement* can function with several types of verbs, including absolute transitives, e.g., (135): *pisat' (pis'mo) karandašom*; verbs which take the same case configuration whether used as transitive or intransitive (with certain objects, such as body parts), e.g.,

(277) *trjasti golovoj*[108]
to shake one's head;

verbs which, with a change in the case configuration, can be either transitive or intransitive, e.g.,

(278) *ščelknut' bičom*
to crack the whip,

(279) *ščelknut' ego po nosu*
to give him a flick on the nose;

and, finally, verbs which are always intransitive, and for which the Inst serves as the object through which the action or state of the verb is realized, e.g., (155): *maxat' rukami* (Bernštejn 1958: 92-93).

There is, however, an exception to the use of the prepositionless Inst with the meaning of *Implement*, and that is the following (Mrazek 1964: 30):

(280) *lovit' rybu s brednem*
to catch fish with a drag-net

The use of the preposition *s* here, whether by accident or not[109], is nonetheless not surprising, for that particular preposition is by far the most common preposition with the Inst in historical (and modern) texts, comprising, for example, two-thirds of the prepositional occurrences of the Inst, and a full one-third of *all* Inst occurences in the *Lavrent'evskaja letopis'* (Freeman 1973: 70). Moreover, it has also been shown for OCS that "s bespredložnym tver. čereduetsja počti tol'ko tvor. s predlogom *Sъ*" (Bauèrova 1963: 288). The influence of the preposition *s* in other Slavic languages is more pervasive than in Russian. In both Czech and Slovak, for example, the Inst of *Implement* is being realized more and more through the use of this preposition (Isačenko: 97).

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[108] The examples here are given in contemporary Russian for ready comparison with other examples already given. They refer, however, to reconstructed forms.

[109] We could assume that its use here represents a comitative function.

The Inst of *means* can be replaced by a whole series of prepositional phrases, quite unlike the Inst of *Implement*. Even in OCS, when the meaning was *mode of transportation* prepositional phrases in *v* and *na* + Prep were already replacing the prepositionless Inst in this function (Xaburgaev 1974: 378), and in all the Slavic languages this process is still active, most commonly with the preposition *na*, and less so with *v* (Bernštejn: 97). Moreover, in Russian this process is complete when the means of transport is animal or non-mechanized device, such as *telega* (cart), *lodka* (boat), and *koljaska* (carriage) (*op. cit.*: 98), e.g.,

(281) *exat' na koljaske/*koljaskoj*
to go by carriage.

Functionally, it may be said that the *Inst of means* is gradually being replaced by the *Inst of mode of action*, which is not classified by Bernštejn as a form of the *Inst of Instrument*.

The Inst of *assisting material or content* is normally used only with transitive or reflexive verbs, and not with intransitives (Bernštejn: 353). However, there is a series of Verb Inst constructions which are closely connected with this function, but which contain intransitive verbs. This includes the verbs *dyšat'* (to breath), *kipet'* (to boil), *sijat'* (to shine), etc., with which the Inst serves to indicate the substance with which the action is realized. In this function, the Inst may be considered to be some sort of *object* [illegible] the verb (Bauerova 1963: 293), as it may be in CSR also.

Instrumental constructions used with impersonal verbs are very rare in the Old Slavic texts (Freeman 1973: 137-38), and thus the corpus of data is too small to gain any real insights. As a result, we will ignore the few examples that are extant, but it is worth noting that in Contemporary East Slavic languages, the use of the prepositionless Inst with impersonal constructions is a productive process. The prepositionless Inst is found in West Slavic, but this is no longer a productive phenomonon.

Another important aspect of this discussion, however, is the function of the Inst to indicate the *logical subject* (agent) of the action in the passive mood. Unlike most other functions of the Inst, the agent has realized many different manifestations both diachronically and synchronically.

As was mentioned in the discussion of Dešerieva, *čerez* + Acc was used in Russian documents of the XVIII C. to express this concept, but that was a later development, for in OCS the form that appeared almost exclusively was that of *OTЪ* + Gen., but this applied only to animate logical subjects, e.g.,

(282) *KRЪSTAAXQ SĘ ... OTЪ NEGO*
(he was) baptized ... by Him,

(283) *POSЪLANЪ OTЪ BOGA*
sent by God.

Thus, there was a true dichotomy in the passive, whereby there could be little question as to which form represented the logical subject of the verb, or the facilitating instrument, e.g.,

(284) *OUDARITI NOZEMЬ*
to cut with a knife,

however, an Inst of person might seem to be possible, e.g.,

(285) *DA VIDIMI BQDQTЪ CLOVEKЫ*
that they will be seen by men.

This example, however, is not a counter-example, since experiencer verbs of the type *see*, *hear*, etc., do not take *agents*.

This state of affairs is still represented in many of the Slavic languages. While literary Russian only allows the prepositionless Inst as the *logical subject* of passives, the North Russian dialects use *u* + Gen to express the animate agent of a passive verb''': Slovene, historically, followed this pattern, but now both people and things are expressed in this function by *ot* + Gen. *Ot* is also used in several languages for the animate subject in Ukrainian and

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'''For a full discussion of this phenomenon, see Timberlake, 1976.

Belorussian; in Upper and Lower Sorbian as *wot*; and in Bulgarian with an undeclined NP, but many use expressions with the Acc also, similar to the XVIII C usage of *čerez* in Russian. Polish and Czech use *przez* and *skrze* + Acc respectively in this function. Along with the use of *wot* + Gen in both Sorbians, Upper Sorbian has (archaically, at least) *přez* + Acc for true *instrumentals*'''. The general significance of the above data is that while most of the Slavic languages use prepositional phrases to express an animate logical subject of a passive expression, Russian uses the prepositionless Inst alone.

The Inst of *place* in Slavic has three possible meanings, i.e. *traversed space; path* and *opening through,* of which only the first two are productive in Russian. All these forms have alternatives with prepositional phrases. *Traversed space* in CSR can be expressed by *čerez* + Acc, as it can with equivalent parallels in the other Slavic languages. With the meaning of *path*, Russian may also use *po* + Dat, while in Serbo-Croatian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and all the West Slavic languages use *po* + Loc. The meaning of *opening* is only found in modern Russian in such rare examples as (270): *krov' xlynula gorlom,* which has the paraphrase *čerez gorlo* (Bernštejn: 246ff). This function of *opening* was represented in OCS. It was restricted even at that time, however, occurring only with prefixed verbs. The

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'''Schaarschmidt (1978) is the source of some of the data in this preceding paragraph.

paraphrase of this structure in OCS was a phrase with *SKVOZE*, but this was more rare than the prepositionless Inst (Xaburgaev 1974: 381).

The Inst of *time* historically displayed two meanings: *the time span* during which the action occurred, and the time *at the moment of the action*. The first of these, however, is losing ground, being replaced in general by the Acc, either with or without a preposition (Bernštejn: 244).

It was mentioned earlier that some scholars considered the forms *dnem*, *utrom*, etc. to be lexical adverbs, rather than morphological Inst forms[112]. Such an hypothesis is not unreasonable, since in the Slavic languages in general the exact function of such Inst forms is very confused. For example, in the meaning of *moment of time*, Serbo-Croatian and Czech can use the form *subbotoj* (on Saturday), while Russian cannot. Russian, however, has the above forms, e.g., *dnem*, which are not used in Czech with this meaning, while Serbo-Croatian uses the old form of the Inst *i*-stems (*op. cit.*: 229-234). We can shed some light on the latter usage in Serbo-Croatian, and on the hypothesis of such forms being independent lexical entries, by examining the OCS treatment of this material.

In OCS there was a distinction between the adverbial forms of some of these words, and the Inst form *per se*. In OCS, for example, the paradigmatic Inst form of DЬNЬ is

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[112] This was first mentioned here with reference to the 1954 Academy Grammar on page 140.

DЬNЬMЬ. However, the adverbial form of this word, corresponding to an answer to the question, "when?" is DЬNЬJQ. In fact, there was no confusion between these two forms. The paradigmatic Inst form "v st.-sl. tekstax s dannym ottenkom vremennogo značenija ne vstrečaetsja" (Bauèrova 1963: 290).

The final aspect of the Inst which we will mention here is the so-called Inst of *cause*. Bernštejn points out that this form of the Inst was used most often with intransitive verbs, indicating the state or action evoking or blocking the action of the verb, e.g., (160): *umirat' golodom*. In most Slavic languages, however, this structure has been replaced by some form of prepositional phrase, e.g.,

(286) *načali umirat' ot goloda*.
(they) started to starve (die from hunger).

Remnants of the historical Inst of *cause* are rarely found in the literary languages now, but do exist in several dialects (*op. cit.*: 159). The re-interpretation of this case may be one reason for this change, for in example (160) the Inst phrase is now considered to be an abstract *Implement*. In OCS, a parallel construction would have been construed as the Inst of *cause*, cf.

(287) *AZЪ ZE GLADOMЬ GYBLJQ*
I am dying from hunger/starving

(Žaburgaev 1974: 380).

This chapter has given the reader a broad picture of the semantic and syntactic complexities of the Russian Inst, a case which, as pointed out in the introduction, comprises less than 10% of the case forms in the literary language. Nonetheless, despite its limited usage, in statistical terms, it is capable of expressing numerous semantic relations and nuances, along with serving specific syntactic functions in both active and with passive constructions. It can be seen that there are few immediately obvious correspondences between these functions and the case categories proposed under the various theories of case grammar, and that there are several areas of significant divergence between the functions of the Russian Inst and those of English, which were discussed in the preceding chapter.

VI. Theoretical Discussion of the Russian Instrumental

We have, so far, examined early case theory, TGG theories of case-grammar, the various theoretical explanations that have been proposed for both the deep and surface Inst in (primarily) English, and the numerous classifications that scholars have given for the Russian prepositionless Inst.

Our task, for the remainder of this work, will be to synthesize the conditions and factors underlying the actual usage of this prepositionless case in Russian with the theories which have been proposed for case in language in general. In this way we shall attempt to provide an indication of some of the features which must be included in an attempt to provide an explanatorily satisfactory theory of the Russian Inst.

It has been mentioned in several places earlier that the basic meaning of the surface case Inst in Russian, as in English, is that of the *instrument* or the *implement* used for the *realization of the action* described in the lexical verb. Such verbs usually have an *affective* relationship towards the objective substantive. One concise summary of this meaning, which has been suggested, is the following:

> "Konkretnoe real'noe značenie orudija dejstvija imeet forma tvoritel'nogo padeža ot nazvanij konkretnyx predmetov pri glagolax, oboznačajuščix *mexaničeskoe vozdejstvie, sozidanie, razrušenie,*

fizičeskoe preobrazovanie'''" (Popova 1970: 94).

It is with this working definition that we will begin our in-depth examination of the various surface manifestations of the Inst, and of the factors conditioning such uses. We will begin with this narrow meaning of the Inst, and include other relevant material as we proceed.

A. The Instrumental of Implement

First, we should like to stress that we prefer to use the term *implement* rather than *instrument*, to avoid confusion between the general case, or case concept, *Inst*, and one of that case's primary meanings, namely the *implement* as the "*instrument*" which is used to carry out the action of the verb.

In the chapter on Instrumentals in English, we introduced a typical example for this meaning of the Inst, i.e.,

(288) Seymour cut the salami with the knife.

There is, as cited in the previous chapter, an approximate Russian parallel to this with respect to the basic meanings of the arguments, i.e.

(289) *on režet xleb nožom*
he cuts bread with a knife.

One transformational test, which is intended to show the implemental meaning more clearly, is suggested by Lakoff

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'''The italics are mine.

for the English example. It results in

(290) Seymour used a knife to cut the salami.

This sentence, unfortunately, does not have an equivalent (with the exact meaning) in Russian. A direct parallel translation might be

(291) *on vospol'zovalsja nožom, čtoby porezat' xleb*
he used a knife (in order) to cut the bread,

but this example does not have the same semantic reading as the simple infinitive structure of the English version. Rather, the Russian equivalents of English "use" in this sense are reflexive, take an Inst, and translate roughly as "to assist oneself (with).". Moreover, the Russian sentence uses a conditional subordinate clause, and not an infinitive phrase. Thus, a parallel structure, bearing a similar surface syntactic form to Lakoff's, must be considered semantically different in Russian. This shows that transformational tests from one language, designed to reveal functional information about certain aspects of that language, cannot always be used inter-linguistically. Nonetheless, we will examine other such material, but will maintain a degree of caution.

Another transformation of Inst phrases in English is that whereby the Inst of an active sentence can become the subject of the verb of that sentence. A previously introduced example,

(14) the key opened the door,

is usually considered to be a partial transform of a sentence like,

(15) John opened the door with a key.

The Russian equivalents, in reverse order, are

(292) *Ivan otkryl dver' ključom,*

(293) **ključ otkryl dver'.*

Notice that only the first of these is acceptable, while the second is not. Grammatically, (293) represents a correct sentence, but semantically it is unfelicitous[114] (unless some sort of self-motivation is implied).

It is interesting, however, that while the present tense equivalent is acceptable in English, it is somewhat less so in Russian:

(295) The key opens the door,

(296) *?Ključ otkryvaet dver'.*

The most acceptable variant of (296) seems to be

(297) *ètim ključom otkryvaetsja dver'*
with this key the door opens,

in which the implemental *key* is manifest in the Inst. The previous example, representing the subjectivalization of the Inst, does not provide a suitable paraphrase for the active sentence.

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[114] Note the felicitousness of
(294) *kluč otkryval dver',*
but not, however, as a paraphrase of the perfective sentence with *Ivan* as subject. We will not deal with aspect at any length, but as is evident from this example, aspect may, indeed, be a contributing factor to the felicitousness of such sentences.

Let us examine some further data. Similar to the two basic examples above are the following:

(298) *nož režet xleb.*
the knife cuts bread,

(299) *nož rezal xleb*
the knife cut the bread.

Although here too there is subjectivalization of the Inst, both the present tense and the past tense versions are acceptable, unlike (293) and (296). What explains this phenomenon, whereby parallel Russian sentences are given different readings for felicitousness?

Let us first mention a limitation on the English sentences (14) and (295), which seem grammatically correct. We can modify (15) by adding a time adverbial:

(300) John opened the door with a key
(every morning) at 8 o'clock.

The parallel variant of (14) is, however, very unusual, even though comprehensible, i.e.

(301) The key opened the door
every morning at 8 o'clock.

This latter example can be read as normal within a hypothetical context in which there may be some sort of timed, automatic lock which changes the pattern of its tumblers at set intervals, such that we may now speak of the *particular key* identified by (301). The felicitousness of this example seems to depend on the fact that the subjectivalized Inst is *specific*, and not *generic*.

The definiteness of the Inst in subject position is also reflected in French. Dugas (1975: 53) points out that the French equivalent of this kind of sentence is only possible with the definite article, e.g.,

(302) *la clé a ouvert la porte*
the key opened the door,

(303) **une clé a ouvert la porte*
a key opened the door.

Russian, however, does not use its overt marker for definiteness as freely as English, and this may be one reason that such sentences are blocked in that language.

A different explanation for this phenomenon is given by Apresjan[113] (1974b: 26-27). The type of sentence exemplified by (296): *?ključ otkryvaet dver'* and (298): *nož režet xleb* is considered to be both *nuclear* and *noncausative*[114]. Noncausative nuclear sentences can be transformed (productively) into sentences carrying a *causative meaning* "on condition that the 'subject' of the former is converted into the 'means' or the 'instrument' of the latter."

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[113] Apresjan (1974b); "Regular Polysemy."

[114] Apresjan (1967: 119ff) does not have a nuclear equivalent for a transitive verb with an *Implemental Inst* in his 84 types of such nuclear structures. Thus, Apresjan has implicitly maintained his position that such *Implemental* Inst phrases are transformationally derived.

Apresjan, therefore, takes the position that implemental nominals are normal as subjects of such sentences, at least in their nuclear form. In this meaning, however, they are not understood to *cause* anything to happen, as much as to *perform*. Moreover, his claim can be understood to imply that such sentences are not only normal, but *basic* in the language. Still, this viewpoint does not account for the unacceptability of (293): **ključ otkryl dver'*, at the same time that (299): *nož rezal xleb* is acceptable.

There is a present tense paraphrase which might cast some light on the apparent ambiguity of this situation. It may be that such sentences do not express *actions*, but rather represent expressions of the type *X can (is capable of) do(ing) something to Y*. Thus, along with the variation of (293) given above, there is yet another, perhaps more accurate, rendering of the information conveyed by the present tense sentence, i.e.

(304) *èto -- ključ ot dveri*
this is the key to the door.

Notice, however, that (299) does not have such a paraphrase. On this basis one can assume that these sentences are representive of different types of deep structure information. There are, in fact, at least two major differences.

First, there is an intimate relationship between *key* and *door* in these sentences. Any given key, in general, will open only one door, or set of doors as would be the case of a master key. For a particular given key, one cannot say

(305) This key opens doors (in general),

just in the case in which it opens one door. There is, though, the *encyclopedic information* about keys, whereby one can say,

(306) a key opens a door,

but in this case the *indefinite* phrase is only a substitute for a *definite* expression, e.g.

(307) a key is the implement which opens a door''.

Example (298): *nož režet xleb* cannot be said to be expressing such *encyclopedic information* due to the presence of a specific object. The basic information about a knife might be represented by

(308) *nož režet*
a knifes cuts,

in which no object needs to be specified. Moreover, emphasizing the quality of the knife permits an adverbial modifier, e.g.,

(309) *ostryj nož (xorošo) režet*
a sharp knife cuts (well).

Second, in example (298), with an object specified, some broader meaning is implicit. Such a sentence implies

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''In actuality, though, this is inaccurate, since a key only opens *a lock*. The substitution of *door* for *lock* is, however, representative of a common form of metonymy in language.

that *an actual action occurs*'''. The difference between these two implemental nouns seems to lie not in the sentential syntax, but rather in the internal semantics of the implements themselves. The *key* could not have opened the door by itself, but it is possible for *a knife*, especially a large, automated knife as one might find in a bakery, to actually cut bread on its own, with minimal external manipulation. If the *noż* of this example is meant to denote a small knife, like a table knife, then the sentence must be considered as unacceptable'''.

This discussion shows that the internal semantics (or specific *referent*) of a word plays an important role in the determination of that word's possible syntactic manifestations. More than the lexical semantics, however, the inter-relationship among the various nominals in sentences also affects possible manifestations.

In Chapter IV it was shown that along with the feature *cause* the feature *controlled* is commonly associated with the *implemental* meaning. In both of the basic examples cited above, the implement, when it appeared in the subject position of the sentence, was not actually *being controlled*. For one variation of the sentences -- the present tense -- the *causal* nature of the substantive is absent. In the past tense, whereby an action can be understood to have actually

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'''Consider Chafe's discussion of this, whereby an *action* or *process* can answer a question like *What happened?* (1970: 99).

'''My thanks to Dr. Felix Drejzin for the nature of such sentences.

occurred, the substantive is not only *not controlled* directly (i.e. not *manipulated*), but it has a certain degree of *autonomy*. Although means of conveyance will be considered at length later, consider the unacceptable nature of

(310) **avtobus privez ego*
the bus brought him.

The unfelicitousness of this sentence derives from the fact that a *bus* is not *autonomous* in the manner of an automated knife. Rather it is constantly being manipulated by its driver. An acceptable variant is

(311) *ego privezli avtobusom*
(they) brought him by bus.

The implication of these arguments is first that not all syntatic and semantic tests from one language can be applied to another language. This is due to the fact that the semantic information that can be read in one language from its syntax is often more clearly manifest in another. Thus, example (290): *Seymour used a knife to cut the salami* was shown to not have the same semantic value as the Russian parallel. The *conditional* rendering of the Russian can be read into the English version as well, e.g.,

(312) Seymour used a knife (to try) to cut the salami,
but the knife was dull and he couldn't,

but it is not as directly expressed. Therefore, tests for semantic compatibility of various transforms cannot be considered universal in any sense, although inter-language parallels may indeed prove useful for the understanding of *potential* meanings.

Another aspect of this discussion shows that the actual nature of the implemental substantives plays a key role in the determination of surface syntax and felicitousness. Implemental nouns can become subjects of the same verbs with which they can be found in the Inst if and only if they are definite, rather than generic. Generic substantives can be subjectivalized, but the nature of such sentences does not describe an actual situation as much as a potential one. Thus, the sentence,

(313) *nož režet kožu*
a/the knife cuts leather,

is ambiguous with respect to definiteness and potential of the implemental noun. In general it can be said that *a knife can cut leather*, which is the *potential* reading of this sentence; or it may be known that a *particular* knife actually *cuts leather*, which is the definite reading. The potential reading conveys *encyclopedic information*, while the definite reading claims an actual action can occur. Only the latter of these can be rendered in the past tense.

In Russian, unlike English, the actual internal semantics of a substantive conditions its use in such sentences. A noun which appears in the Inst in Russian can be understood to *cause* the action identified by the verb. Moreover, it is also understood to be *controlled*, or at least *manipulated* in the case in which an action may not be intentional. Plewes' claim is that

> "the size of the object plays a part in determining whether it will appear in the instrumental; if the object is small and can be brandished or manipulated like a weapon, instrumental is more likely to be chosen" (1977: 251-52).

This discussion has therefore shown that an implemental noun appears in the Inst form with only minimal regard to its internal semantics. However, the value that is assigned to the relational feature *cause* can have a direct bearing on whether such a noun is subjectivalized or made Inst. Similarly, the *autonomy* of a noun determines whether that noun could become the subject of a verb in the past tense, where, of course, the verb is compatible with such a transformation, as indicated above.

Incorporated Instrument

Having examined some of the semantics and syntactic transformations of the Inst of implement and its collocational possibilities, let us now examine another facet of implements, i.e. verbs which incorporate an implement within their semantic, and often their lexical, make-up.

As in English, Russian has many verbs which imply a specific *implement* which is actually incorporated within the lexical verb. Most often such implements are *opaquely* incorporated, e.g.,

(314) *bodat' (rogami)*
to butt (with horns),

(315) *brykat'/ljagat' (nogami)*
to kick (with feet),

(316) *kusat'/gryzt'/glodat' (zubami)*
to bite, gnaw, gnaw (with teeth).

In each of these examples, however, it will be noted that the opaque implement is an inalienable body part, which is seldom expressed in surface structure. This type of structure will be considered again later, but serves for now to identify one type of implemental structure.

In many cases the incorporated Inst is *transparent*, which means that the Inst is morphologically reflected in the shape of the verb. With verbs of this type, too, the Inst is rarely found in surface structure. If the incorporated Inst is specified in its generic form, the sentence will usually be unacceptably redundant. Consider, for example, the following:

(317) *brit' britvoj*
to shave with a razor,

(318) *boronit' boronoj*
to harrow with a harrow,

(319) *kosit' kosoj/kosilkoj*
to scythe with a scythe/a mower

and compare the inalienable possession examples in the preceding paragraph,

(320) *klevat' kljuvom*
to peck with a beak.

Lesnik has pointed out that,

> "tvoritel'nyj orudijnyj pri glagolax, nazyvajuščix podobnye dejstvija, sovsem neobjazatelen; bol'še togo, nazvanie orudija v ètix slučajax, kak pravilo, opuskaetsja, v leksičeskoe značenie glagola vxodit oboznačenie kak samogo dejstvija, tak i orudija" (1966: 89).

There are other verbs, however, which do not incorporate a singular generic implement in the manner of those listed above. Rather the semantics of the verb entails the specifications for a certain *type* of implement. Representative verbs from this set include, together with their typical implements, the following:

pisat' (to write), which implies a writing implement, e.g., *melom, perom, karandašom* (with chalk, pen, pencil);

bit' (to beat), which entails some sort of object which can be wielded manually, e.g., *palkoj, plet'ju, kulakami* (with a stick, a whip, clenched fists); and

proteret' (to wipe), which involves something soft, e.g., *trjapkoj, platkom, polotencem,* (with a rag, a kerchief, a towel).

Although the actual implement with such verbs may be omitted, its general semantics can be read from the verb itself.

There is, therefore, a class of Russian verbs, implemental in nature, which have a *transparently* incorporated Inst (e.g., *brit'*), or an *opaquely* incorporated implement (e.g., *ljagat'*). The specification of the transparently incorporated implement in its generic form usually results in redundancy. On the other hand, *opaquely* incorporated implements, at least *alienable* ones, *may* be specified without resulting in redundancy. It might be noted, however, that with verbs entailing an incorporated implement, the implement is often *not* specified.

Non-incorporated Implements

Many verbs represent *mechanical action*, *creation*, *destruction*, or *physical transformation* -- which are the basic characteristics of verbs taking an *Inst of implement*. The majority of these do not, however, have either an incorporated implement of any kind, nor strict specifications on the types of implements with which they normally co-occur. Nonetheless, they do carry the semantic import of action performed on or towards another object, i.e. of *transitivity*. The Inst phrase usually is non-obligatory.

Švedova (AG 1970: 504) indicates that the weakly governed Inst case has a certain *adverbial character* when used in the implemental sense, as above. To propose an adverbial character for *incorporated* implemental expressions may be unreasonable, inasmuch as there is always an implement semantically present. With other verbs, however, this point of view is open to question.

When used *without* an overt object, only the second of the Inst phrases with *pisat'* in the next example has an adverbial nuance:

(321) *pisat' ručkoj/karakuljami*
to write with a pen/with a scrawl.

Since something is always *created* by *writing*, the implementa~~l~~ *ručkoj* is still an implement. *Karakuljami*, however, describes some aspect of the writing itself, as does the adverb *krasivo* in

(322) *on pišet krasivo*
he writes beautifully,

and can therefore be classified as an adverbial. Transformationally, then, *ručkoj* and *karakuljami* would differ, since their underlying structures may be derived from a purely adverbial function in the first instance, and from an adjectival function in the second.

Popova (1970: 95) indicates, however, that the Russian language permits the insertion, in the Inst of implement slot, of words which contradict the grammatical meaning of the case form, or digress from it. This usually occurs when an *abstract* substantive is used in the place of an expected concrete implement, e.g.,

(323) *kormit' obeščanijami*
to feed with promises,

(324) *zaščiščat' oružiem, slovom*
to defend with a weapon, with words
(i.e. verbally).

Such examples as these are, of course, fully comprehensible. One explanation for this is given by Weinreich[129] (1972: 100f). He theorizes that all lexical items have both *inherent* and *transfer* features. Moreover, each language has *transfer paths* enumerated in its description. A Transfer Rule then copies such transfer features onto the other elements indicated by the transfer path. These paths are identified in terms of phrase-structure trees such that the feature <+moveable on land>, for example, which is present with *drive*, would pass from the V, to the VP, to the NP, and finally to the N. Therefore, whatever form this latter noun takes, it is still understood as something <+moveable on land>.

While this description is somewhat simplified, of course, it indicates how an implemental verb of the type we have been discussing would have a transfer feature of the nature *implemental*, which would then be transferred onto the substantive in the *implemental* slot, whatever its semantics.

Implements and Presupposition

In the preceding chapter we discussed the Soviet interpretation of strong and weak government in its basic form. Lesnik has identified two sub-types of weak government

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[129] Weinreich (1972), *Explorations in Semantic Theory*.

(1966: 89):

a) that whereby the lexical meaning of the verb requires a necessary element to indicate a more precise definition of the semantic content of the verb, but which allows variation in the governed form, e.g.,

(325) *tait'sja vo t'me/pod kryšej*
to hide in the dark/under the roof;

b) that whereby there is a potential in the verb for the realization of the government of a particular oblique case, but which case may not be manifest, unlike strong government.

It is this second type of weak government that determines the *Inst of Implement* in most of the previous examples. In each case, the absence of the Inst element leaves behind a syntactically and semantically acceptable utterance:

(326) *parikmaxer breet klienta*
the barber shaves the client,

(327) *on pišet pis'mo*
he is writing a letter,

(328) *ona proterla dosku*
she wiped the blackboard,

(329) *on b'et svoju ženu*
he beats his wife.

Each of these sentences has an understood Inst of implement.

Most scholars of Russian grammar would agree on the fact that there is an *Inst* [illegible] *Implement*, which is a weakly governed form, and th[illegible]re *optional*.

Lesnik, however, further sub-divides the *Inst of Implement* into two "series." Verbs of the type indicated earlier, which incorporate their usual implements transparently, and those which include opaque, specific implements, Lesnik labels as verbs of the *narrow implemental series*. Verbs which have a range of instruments, or which can take abstract as well as concrete implements, are considered to be verbs of the *wide range of implements* (1966: 90).

While this is not made explicit in any of the literature, it does seem that the nature of the verb is closely related to not only a range of the implements, but also to the extension of its own meaning in a figurative sense. Verbs with the narrowest range of implements should, by this interpretation, have the greatest number of transfer features. The possible contradictions between transfer features and the inherent features of nouns would limit the number of possible manifestations of this verb with figurative meanings. Thus, the verb *brit'* (to shave) has little latitude with respect to its possible figurative meanings. *Bit'*, on the other hand, takes a slightly wider range of possible implements, resulting in the perfect acceptability of

(330) *ego bili každym slovom*
(they) beat him with every word.

Further, there are verbs like *zaščiščat'* (to defend) which, as shown in a previous example, (324), can take yet an even wider range of implements and figurative meanings.

Before leaving the topic of felicitous implemental expressions, let us consider again the question of implementals and Verb-Object structures. It has been explicity stated (Apresjan 1964: 34) that a weakly governed Inst of implement can be subordinated not only to a verb, but also to a phrase or sentence. Weinreich has further rules, beyond the Transfer Rule discussed above, which can apply to the present situation. First, there is a *Linking-and-Nesting Rule* whereby similar features are nested. This means that lexemes containing similar features are linked into larger units. Under this theory, the intimate relation that seems to exist between a verb -- especially a *causal* verb, which has an effect on something -- and its object -- which is affected -- would combine into a more intimate unit. Although not expressly stated, it would seem that those units of a proposition which are subject to *strong government* would be combined first. Only after that do other rules apply, namely the *Conflation Rule*, "which eliminates tautologies," and the *Construal Rule*, "which eliminates contradiction." It is this latter rule which, if unable to make a direct interpretation from all the units present, will find a reading whereby "the contradictory inherent feature can be accommodated" (1972: 101ff). It is this sort of rule which allows us to make some sense of most grammatical sentences, regardless of the number of collocational restrictions which may be violated. As long as the syntax is acceptable, then almost any sentence of any language can be expressed, and "interpreted," including the classic (Chomsky 1965: 149),

(331) Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.

Thus, all possibilities may be exhausted until the interpretation becomes at least somewhat acceptable. The verb *podderžat'* (to support) usually takes a concrete noun, however (332) has an acceptable abstract noun, e.g.,

(332) *on podderžal ženščinu sovetom*
he supported the woman with advice,

On the other hand, (333) has a strange (irregular) implement,

(333) *on podderžal ženščinu ciferblatom*
he supported the woman with a watch-face.

Nonetheless, some interpretation would be reached, even if it were a comical situation whereby a woman were pictured being propped up against some rather large watch-face!

Such situations, though, make the study of grammar awkward, since in theory any sentence which is grammatically correct could be considered to be a sentence of the language. Our aim, however, is to describe those sentences which actually do occur, or are *potential* in the language. Thus, we shall continue our study by concentrating on what may be considered the linguistic *norms* for Russian, and we will not overly concern ourselves with unfelicitous sentences.

Passives and Reflexives

Passives in English ~~were~~ treated at some length earlier, but some clarification of the Russian situation is nonetheless in order. First, let us examine some more basic linguistic data.

Xrakovskij believes, as do the proponents of Valency Grammar[3], that verbs can be classified by the number of dependent "actants," as he calls the verbal arguments. He lists four such types, ranging from zero-valency for verbs like *smerkat'sja* (to become dark), to tri-valency for verbs like *davat'* (to give) (1974: 5). These "actants" are, however, the basic (central) cases for each type of verb, and yet in none of the classifications is the *Inst* or *Implement* used. This should not be surprising, since, as mentioned above, this meaning of the Inst is, as a rule, optional. What is interesting, though, is that in most passives in Russian, as in English, the Inst of implement is one of the surface cases!

There are, of course, limitations on the passive Inst in Russian in its contemporary form. It was mentioned previously that the logical subject of the verb in a passive structure was not always expressed by way of the prepositionless Inst, but rather, in earlier stages of the language, by a non-Inst prepositional phrase (*OTЪ* + Gen in OCS; *čerez* + Acc in Old Russian). Modern Russian, however, does not formally differentiate agent from implement with passives. Thus, the passive transformation in Russian places the deep structure logical subject in the surface form of the oblique Inst, if and only if there is a necessity of expressing it. As earlier shown for the English data, the agented passive is very rare. This same state of affairs was also shown to exist in CSR.

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[3] See, for example, Helbig (1971), *Beiträge zur Valenztheorie*.

Since the form of both the agent and implement, if expressed in a surface passive would be in the same case, there is what seems to be a surface filter which blocks such sentences as,

(334) **pis'mo bylo napisano perom učitelem*
the letter was written by pen by the teacher.

Karolak[133] points out that when an agent has been removed from its normal position to that of the surface Inst, it is then in a *dependent* relationship to the verb -- the exact relationship of the implement. Thus, he claims, the expression of different types of nouns sharing the same relation to the verb is not permitted (1966: 45). If, indeed, the agent assumes the same relationship to the verb that the implement has, then such a surface realization would be blocked even by case grammar theory, which allows only one instance of any case per simple proposition.

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[133] Karolak (1966), *Zagadnienia rekcji przyimkowej czasownika w języku rosyjskim.*

While Karolak feels that the relationship of the displaced logical subject to the verb is the same as that of the deep Inst, not all scholars would agree. Johnson[123] (1977: 155), in his work on Relational Grammar, claims that, by *The Relational Annihilation Principle*, a NP which is displaced from any given grammatical relation (here, *subject of the verb*) by another NP (the former *object of the verb*) becomes in *chômage*. Basically, as the French would translate, it is *unemployed*, bearing *no* relationship to the verb.

Although both points of view have support within their respective theories, we shall opt here for the theory of Karolak. It seems more logical to accept the fact that (334) and (335) are anomalous due to the presence of two nominals bearing the same relationship to the verb, than for any other reason:

(335) ?The window was broken by John with a rock.

With passives in Russian, however, the exact nature (*agentive* or *implemental*) of the Inst phrase can be determined by the inherent semantics of the substantive (i.e. *±animate*), however the *expected* relationship is that of *implement*. Thus, syntactically and semantically Russian and English passives have much in common.

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[123] Johnson (1977), "On Relational Constraints on Grammars."

Similar to passives are the *middle voice*, or *reflexive* verbs of Russian. "Tvoritel'nyj orudija dejstvija vystupaet i pri vozvratnyx glagolax, oboznačajuščix konkretnoe fizičeskoe dejstvie, napravlennoe proizvoditelem dejstvija na samogo sebja," (Popova 1970: 94), e.g.,

(336) *pričesyvajus' grebeškom*
I comb with a comb,

While it is not necessary to discuss the origin of reflexive verbs, it should be mentioned that historically an agentive Inst with such verbs is usually blocked[114]. There are transformational and semantic restrictions on these verbs, of course, but they do not differ substantively from the material given above. The principal point to be made here is that with passives and reflexives, the *Inst of agent* is *not a governed form*. Rather it is a result of a transformation (AG 1970: 636). This prevents infini[illegible] structures like,

(337) **stroit'sja kem*
to be built by whom,

since there is no basic structure such as (338) from which to derive it:

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[114] For various points of view on the nature and behaviour of reflexives, the reader is directed to, among other works, Babby (1975), Bořkovec (19[illegible]6), and Schaarschmidt (1968, 1971).

(338) **kto^čto^stroit'*
*who^what^to build.

A similar phenomenon to the passive voice structures discussed above is the set of impersonal expressions in Russian. These, of course, do not express a grammatical subject, e.g.,

(339) *dorogu zaneslo snegom*
the road (Acc) was blocked with snow.

Veyrenc (1971: 131) further divides these structures into those with *prefixed verbs*, as above, and those *without prefixes*, e.g.,

(340) *čeloveka ranilo pulej*
the man was wounded with a bullet.

Support for some kind of intrinsic difference between these structures is provided by the next example, which is ungrammatical even though it, too, is unprefixed:

(341) **dorogu neslo snegom*
*the road was being blocked with snow.

Impersonal sentences, nonetheless, are quite common in Russian, and there is, in the language, a large layer of impersonal sentences which express the action of an unknown, unknowable force, realized by means of an implement. This group of sentences is formed from personal verbs, which are used impersonally in a phrase with the Inst case, which designates the instrument by which some unknown force acts (Galkina-Fedoruk 1957: 288). A slightly different view to this is taken by Jurčenko (1976: 93). He perceives of impersonals of the type under discussion as describing "dejstvie, skryto vyzvannoe predmetom, predstavlennym odnovremenno kak ego orudie."

It seems that the viewpoint taken by Galkina-Fedoruk may best describe the origin, if not the present state, of such impersonals. Ivić writes that "the origin of this sentence structure was linked to a primitive 'Weltanschauung' according to which natural forces were viewed as mere tools of an unknown, mighty agent" (1965: 317). Further she points out that all of the Slavic languages have some sort of impersonal sentence type for describing natural events,

> however, the instrumental form has been firmly established within such pattern [*sic*] only in dialects belonging to the Eastern Slavic linguistic group, that is, precisely in those dialects which *did preserve, in contradistinction to all other Slavic languages, the instrumental of agent within the passive sentence pattern*[125] (*op. cit.*: 318).

Thus, the Eastern dialects of the Slavic world are unique in their use of the Inst of agent with impersonal sentences. This does not, however, shed any light on the problem of the Inst in Russian, other than to list yet another of its surface uses.

Ivić does add, however, an interesting comment which will serve as a summary to this digression, i.e. that "the passive and the impersonal sentence denoting natural events share a particular semantic feature: it is the performance of the action which is placed in the focus of attention, not the performer" (*op. cit.*: 320).

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[125] The italics are Ivić's.

Although with passives and impersonals the agent is not (usually) manifest (even when known), the substantive in the **Inst form -- denoting an implement -- still maintains the** semantic character of a *controlled* element. If one does not care to accept the presence of an "unknown, mighty force," then it is still reasonable to assume that the implements of such constructions are controlled by the laws of nature.

Inalienable Implements

We have already mentioned inalienable body parts earlier in this chapter, and now will examine these and other *inalienable* implements. While this particular section may not be precisely defined by the term *inalienable implements*, it will be seen by the following discussion that, like the verbs of the *narrow implemental series*, these verbs also are, in most cases, inseparable from their implemental complements.

Consider, first, the following examples. Unlike the true implements above, these occur not with transitive verbs, but with intransitive ones:

(342) *kol'co brjaknulo -> brjaknut' kol'com*
the ring clattered -> to clatter with the ring,

(343) *špory stučat -> stučat' šporami*
the spurs make noise ->
to make noise with spurs,

(344) *glaz morgaet -> morgnut' (levym) glazom*
the eye is blinking ->
to blink the (left) eye.

Very similar to these, but not behaving in the exact syntactic manner, is

(345) *on skripnul zubami -> u nego skripnuli zuby*
he grated his teeth -> his teeth grated.

In each of the examples, the use of the implement reveals the feature *cause*. It is the function of the implemental noun which *realizes* the action described by the verb. However, the possessor of the implement can also *cause*, voluntarily, the action to occur. In this case, the Inst rendering would be the expected situation.

In Apresjan (1974b: 27), example (344) is rendered in English *blink*. It would be better, perhaps, to describe these situations by *to blink* and *to wink*, respectively. English, of course, reveals this difference in the lexical items themselves. *Wink* and *blink* respectively reflect the *voluntary (causative)* and *involuntary* action of the eyes. The semantic division between these two interpretations, though, is not by any means complete. The involuntary English verb can be used in the imperative, "Blink!" In Russian, the causative form, with the past gerund, is used in a particular colloquial expression implying complete control over the involuntary action, i.e.

(346) *ne morgnuv glazom*
"without much thought"
Lit: not having blinked (once).

Thus, although the difference between *voluntary* and *involuntary* performance of this action can be shown with an animate (human) subject, as in

(347) *on morgnul/on morgnul (levym) glazom*
he blinked/he winked with his (left) eye,

these actions are not considered mutually exclusive. Even without the Inst specification, but with the presence of a Dat object, as in,

(348) *on morgnul mne*
he blinked at me,

there is ambiguity as to whether this action was intentional, or spontaneous.

The nature of the four examples which introduced this section also permit an ambiguous reading with respect to intended *cause*, at least for the first three. For the last of the four, (345), with the personal pronou specified, it seems to imply intentional control; however the Gen structure seems neutral in this respect.

While there may be ambiguity with respect to implements which are *not* body parts, Popova (1970: 94) makes the claim that there is not with parts of the body:

> Pri glagolax, oboznačajuščix dviženija i funkcii častej i organov tela, forma tvoritel'nogo padeža ot suščestvitel'nyx, nazyvajuščix časti i organy tela, imeet inoe konkretnoe real'noe značenie -- značenie vyjavitelja, ispolnitelja dejstvija, soveršaemogo *po*

vole[124] proizvoditelja dejstvija.

Other verbs which share the characteristic of allowing a body part to appear in the Inst include,

(349) *maxat' rukami*
to wave one's hands,

(350) *govorit' gromkim golosom*
to speak with a loud voice.

Both of these examples imply a greater degree of conscious control than those given above. To wave (*maxat'*) would seem to the native English speaker to require an Acc, since unlike the other examples, the body part is used for the performance of the action, but is not such an integral part of it as *eye* is of *wink*. However, in order to wave, one uses the inalienable hand, and Russian obligatorily requires the Inst. This verb does not take an Acc object, and is limited to three similar semantic environments: that cited above,

(351) *maxat' kryljami*
to flap one's wings,

(352) *maxat' xvost'ju*
to wag one's tail,

Alienable objects, however, with a body part, can be used, e.g.,

(353) *maxat' platkom*
to wave with a kerchief.

Expressions of the type immediately above can be considered to form *closed semantic fields*. The choice of the surface Inst is inseparable (in the normal situation) from the semantics of the subject noun. One would not expect, for example,

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[124] The italics are mine.

(354) **sobaka maxal ušami*
*the dog wagged/flapped its ears.

In another example cited, (338), in order *to speak*, other than in sign language or something similar, one must use one's voice. Unlike the examples of *winking* and *blinking*, however, there is a paraphrase of this expression which does not overtly specify the Inst, i.e.

(355) *on gromko govoril*
he spoke loudly.

There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, the Inst phrase seems to indicate a certain degree of conscious action on the part of the speaker. Since the word *golosom* is actually manifest, and being that it inalienably belongs to the speaker, it may be construed that the speaker *intends* to speak loudly. The adverbial modifier, however, while describing the same physical event, is ambiguous with respect to conscious effort.

Which, one might ask, is the "normal" manifestation? There is no simple answer. It seems that presupposition may play a role, and we will briefly examine this possibility now.

Focus has been shown to play a role in the word order of Russian[12], whereby the *rheme* (new information) is given at the end of the utterance. Thereby, the choice of one or the other of these structures would presuppose some other information. If the *manner of speaking* was new, then one would tend to employ the Inst construction; whereas if the fact of the *speaking, per se*, was new, then one might expect the lexical adverb construction.

It might be the case, however, that the Inst really does not play a significant role at all, particularly in its unmodified form. While I have at my disposal only limited statistics for Verb^Inst usage, there are some data that would tend to support a hypothesis that the Inst of body parts is far from obligatory in CSR with many such verbs.

Plewes (1977: 249) points out that one such verb, *kivat'* (to nod), "is used almost exclusively with *golovoj* [head], and the connection is felt so strongly that often the latter word is omitted altogether."

Apresjan, who studied the probability of occurence of different cases with various verbs, verifies this (1964: 47), giving the probability of government (of the Inst case) for this verb as less than 0.45 but greater than or equal to 0.3. Without any extensive knowledge of statistical theory, the reader will realize that this probability is not great.

It has, however, also been written about the verb *maxat'* that it is "used almost exclusively with *ruka* 'hand,' which is *often omitted*[128] elliptically with no change in the basic meaning" (Plewes: 249). This is not supported by Apresjan's data (*loc. cit.*), which give this verb a probability of government of 0.95 to 1.0 for the Inst case. These limited data might seem to indicate that the degree of participation of an inalienable body part in the actual semantics of the verb is somewhat inversely correlated with the probability of that part being realized in surface structure[129], however, this is beyond the scope of the present paper.

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[12] By way of a simplified explanation, see, for example, Krylova & Xavronina (1976), *Porjadok slov v russkom jazyke*.

Let us now consider the other expressions which were included at the beginning of this section, e.g., (343): *Špory stučat -> stučat' šporami.*

While such implements are by no means inalienable in the sense that physical parts of the body are, such sentences as use these expressions seem in some way to treat the implement as an extension of the body. Thus, in (343), if the spurs were clunking against the base of the seat of a carriage, for instance, then the first expression might well be employed. If, however, there is some conscious control on the part of the person by whom such spurs are being worn, then we expect an Inst manifestation.

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[128] The italics are mine.

[129] In one study (Greenberg 1974), an attempt was made to determine a correlation of case form with the semantics of the substantive. The results of this limited study indicate that while *common nouns* occur in the Inst 8.6% of the the time, there is one group of nouns which occurs significantly more frequently than this -- *body parts*. This group takes the Inst case in 20.3% of its occurrences.

Consider a similar verb to *stučat'*, namely *prixlopyvat'* (to slam (down)), which usually takes an Acc. The verbal root of this prefixed form is the simple verb *xlopat'* (to slam), which does not take an Acc, but rather the Inst. The meaning of this verb, as usually used in Russian, seems more to mean the creation of a loud dull noise, than simply the physical act of moving something forcefully against something else. There are two examples which emphasize the former interpretation: first, with the "*Implement*" in subject position,

(356) *xlopajut vystreli/granaty*
shots/grenades "clap,"

and, second, with the *Implement* in the Inst, as in the sign,

(357) *"Ne xlopat' dver'ju"*
Don't slam the door!

The imperative form, of course, implies *control* on the part of the reader of the sign, in the same way that *eyes* are a *controlled* entity, even though they may blink *involuntarily*. Here, the door, perhaps thought of as an extension of the person using it, will cause this noise if it is *not* consciously controlled, since, of course, its nature was such that it always closed quickly and loudly if allowed to. *Prixlopyvat'* behaves similarly, but the prefix seems to imply a conscious effort in all instances of its use. Thus, in the meaning of *controlled noise*, we have Tolstoj's description of a prince dancing:

(358) *stanovjas' na odno koleno i*
prixlopyvaja šporami kak-to osobenno
kneeling on one knee and
"clicking" his spurs in a particular way.

Unlike the simple verb, there does not seem to be an *involuntary* reading for this verb.

The above discussion therefore shows that *voluntary* or *involuntary* participation on the part of the person creating some movement or noise, with an object of which he is in at least some control, does not necessarily indicate the form which the *implement* can take. It can, and often does, however.

With *autonomous* "noise-makers" such as grenades and shots, one can have the sentence structure of (356), but not,

(359) **on xlopyvaet granatami*
he is making noise with grenades.

However, one can say about the door mentioned above,

(360) *dver' vsegda xlopyvaet*
the door always slams.

Thus, *external control* of an implement, such that the control (manipulation) of the item is the action identified by the verb, will usually result in the implement appearing in the Inst. The Nom, however, is not blocked. Nonetheless, when such an implement is used as the subject of the verb, the feature *control* is somewhat weakened. Finally, nouns which are *autonomous* in the production of a movement or noise are blocked from appearing in the Inst position. This same situation is manifest with inalienable parts of the body, as the following examples indicate:

(361) *ego serdce bilos'*
his heart was beating,

(362) **on bil serdcem*
*he beat with his heart,

Modified Instrumentals

There is one aspect of incorporated implements which until now has been deliberately avoided, and that is the use of adjectives with any of the above types of verbs.

It was indicated that with verbs of the narrow implemental series, the incorporated instrument is rarely manifest in surface structure. This is especially true, as noted, if the implement is given in its generic form. There are, however, many instances in Russian in which such forms are manifest *with* an adjectival modifier on the implement. Thus, we have a previous example, (344): *morgnut' levym glazom* (to wink with the left eye), and,

(363) *parikmaxer breet klienta èlektrobritvoj*
the barber shaves the client
with an *electric* razor.

Such examples are perfectly acceptable, and non-redundant.

With verbs having a readily identifiable implement, this implement is considered redundant only if mentioned in its generic form, but it is completely acceptable if the implement is in some way modified, i.e. made *definite*.

Since, as discussed above, many verbs describing movements of parts of the body are self-explanatory with respect to that body part, it seems unnecessary to include it, unless one wishes to say something about it. This is tantamount to adding *new* information, and thus brings us full circle back to an earlier example from this chapter, (350): *govorit' gromkim golosom*.

As the discussion concerning (350) indicated, many verbs have a *presupposed implement* understood. Thus, with respect to the question of topic, focus, and presupposition, such information is considered as *old*. The specification of some feature of that old information may be the *rheme* of the sentence, and would thus appear in the final position. In many such instances, however, there is no way to specify a lexical adverb, as that term is commonly understood, in sentence-final position, without altering the intonational pattern, and still have a grammatically correct sentence, e.g.,

(364) **nož režet xorošo*
cf.: *the knife well cuts.

The specification in such sentences as those given above with inalienable body parts could then be considered not to be *implemental* phrases, but rather true *adverbials*. The body part, although manifest in the Inst form, becomes nothing more than a *vehicle* for a displaced adverbial (or adjective)[139].

If we accept the notion of such Inst expressions as being representative of adverbial notions, it would remove some of the seeming inconsistencies in the language. Although the verb *videt'* (to see) is not an implemental verb in the same sense as those given above, its semantics is predicated on the fact that the *eye* is an essential component for *seeing*. Thus, one usage of this verb is the following,

(365) *on vidit Saturn nevooružennym glazom*
he sees Saturn with his naked eye.

Such an example seems to parallel the types of verb given above, whereby the assisting body part can appear in the form of a modified Inst. There is, however, evidence to conclude that this is a false assumption. With the verb *videt'*, if an actual assisting implement is specified, it is in the form of a prepositional phrase, namely, *v* + Acc, e.g.,

(366) *on vidit Saturn v teleskop*
he sees Saturn with a telescope,

which is true for all such optical devices. Thus, it seems the telescope does not aid in seeing, but only affects the image.

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[139] Dr. Drejzin claims that expressions such as
i. *videt' levym glazom*
to see with the left eye,
really are the only possible grammatical representations for expressions like
ii. **levo videt'*
*to see "leftedly."

However, this interpretation with inalienable parts of the body is not applicable in every case. Although it could be interpreted for the example above that *nevooružennym glazom* means something like "*unarmedly*," the same type of interpretation cannot be given to

(367) *bodali ostrymi rogami*
butted with sharp horns.

It is much more difficult to interpret *sharply* as an adverb of *butt*, than *unarmedly* as an adverb of *see*.

There is an exception of sorts to this general characteristic of inalienable body parts. If a verb which has an incorporated implement is used metaphorically or figuratively, then the specification of the implement in its generic form is completely blocked. It may only be specified if it is in some way modified, in which event it too takes on a figurative meaning (Lesnik 1966: 91):

(368) *voda gryzla nogi xolodnymi zubami*
the water gnawed (someone's) legs
with cold teeth,

which example Lesnik took from Šiškov.

The material presented above is sufficient to show that incorporated implements, especially those of the so-called *narrow implemental series*, seem to have a meaning somewhat wider than that of *Inst of Implement*.

It was shown that inalienable parts of the body need not always be specified with verbs indicating an action or function of them. The statistical probability of their occurrence in unmodified form seems to be inversely correlated to the strength of the relationship between the body part and the action describing it. Since, for example, *kivat'* is used almost exclusively with *golovoj*, this latter nominal is rarely specified. *Maxat'*, on the other hand, has at least four possible nominals with which it can be associated, and an extended meaning with others would not be unreasonable. Its most common *implement*, *rukoj*, is, therefore, often realized at the surface level.

Verbs taking a transparent implement, however, never specify this implement in its generic form without risking redundancy. The addition of some specific information or quality to such a transparent implement is completely acceptable under the norms of the language. With adjectives, then, these *Inst of Implement* structures impart not general details of *which implement* was used, but rather *previously unknown aspects of the implement*. Pragmatically, this means the introduction of *new information*.

With parts of the body, however, where the choice of *specific implements* is severely limited -- there are, for example, only two hands with which one can wave -- it seems to be the case that the information is not necessarily meant to be only a modification of the implement used, but simultaneously a modification on the verb. That is, such a modification seems to be *adverbial* in nature. This latter type of expression gains a degree of support from the fact that an *adjectival part-of-the-body* construction is found in the Inst with experiencer (sense) verbs, but an *implement* in the meaning we have been using this term takes *v* + Acc.

Transportation

There is another class of verbs which also can be said to belong to verbs of the narrow implemental series. These are the *verbs of motion*.

Verbs of motion include another form of *implement*, that of *the vehicle* or *means of transport*. An interesting aspect of verbs of motion in Russian, as opposed to those of English, is that the semantics of the verb indicates whether the mode of transport is vehicular or by foot.

The verbs (determinative and non-determinative, respectively) for motion not involving any kind of conveyance, i.e. neutral (or walking), are *idti* and *xodit'*. Verbs involving a vehicle of some kind are *exat'* and *ezdit'* for surface conveyances, and *letet'* and *letat'* for aircraft. Normally the neutral verbs do not specify any kind of implement. It is possible, however, to *emphasize* the fact that the motion was carried out on foot, e.g.,

(369) *idti peškom*
to walk (go) by foot.

The absence of either specification, however, does not diminish the semantic import of the verb with regard to the means of travel. Similarly, neither of the vehicular pairs is weakened in this respect by the absence of an overt means of conveyance. With the two examples cited immediately above, the presence of the Inst phrase imparts to the utterance a marked nature. With the other verbs of motion, however, the conveyance is very often specified. There is, of course, a degree of redundancy in utterances which specify the *expected* means of conveyance, e.g.,

(370) *my leteli tuda samoletom*
we flew there by plane.

Other complements that might replace *samoletom* in this utterance are *vertoletom* (by helicopter) and *raketoj* (by rocket), at least in the not too distant future, the use of which would not be at all redundant. Each of these complements, though, can be replaced by a prepositional expression, *na* + Prep.

Surface transport manifests the same type of relationships, but not in all instances. As mentioned previously, nouns such as *telega* (cart) cannot be used in the Inst with verbs of motion, but rather must use the prepositional phrase. Similarly, nouns such as *velosiped* (bicycle), *motociklet* (motorcycle) and the like take *na* + Prep.

Other forms of transportation, e.g., *paroxod* (boat), *mašina* (car), *poezd* (train), etc. all can appear in either the prepositionless Inst or with a preposition *na* (usually) and the Prep.

What, if any, are the conditioning factors whereby a speaker may use one or the other of these expressions? Mrazek (1964: 38) writes that the Inst form is *not* used for nouns denoting animals or *nonmechanized* means of transport. Nouns for *mechanized* and/or *self-motive* vehicles, however, can take either form[11].

Veyrenc claims that expressions of the type (371) are the result of the combination of the basic expression of *travel* contained in the verb *exat'*, and of the expression of the *assisting transporter*, represented by *paroxod šel* (the boat went) (1971: 134):

(371) *exali paroxodom*
went by boat,

which is understood to be self-motive. Under this interpretation, the *paroxod* is not considered to be an *implement*, but rather the *object of means (dopolnenie sredstva)*. Veyrenc, however, does not address the question of how the relationship of the Inst in (371) and the prepositional phrase of (372) may differ:

(372) *exali na paroxode*
went by (on the) boat.

Let us look, for a moment, at two *means of transport* which are always used in a Prep phrase. *Metro* (subway) and *taksi* (taxi) only use the Prep form with *na*. Mrazek claims this is due to the indeclinable nature (morphology) of these two nouns (1964: 38). Perhaps due to the alternation of only some forms of conveyance in this meaning there seems to be a tendency in the contemporary language for the prepositional form to prevail. The strength of examples such as *na taksi* and *na metro*, which are both popular forms of transport, may provide some of the impetus for this tendency.

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[11] *Motociklet* seems to be an exception, but it cannot travel autonomously for more than a few feet, i.e. it needs a greater degree of direct control than the other nouns in the category at hand.

Moreover, there seems to be a further semantic influence at work here[132] and that is that more and more *private* means of transport are used in the Prep form, while *public* transport appears in the Inst. The basis for this tendency may also come from the fact that the substantives identified by Mrazek as *animal* or *nonmechanized*, are, more often than not, *privately owned* in contemporary Soviet society[133].

There is a third, less common variant, which may also be used, but mainly with adjectival Inst phrases (*loc. cit.*), i.e.

(373) *vyletet' s pervym samoletom*
to fly out with the first plane

Examples such as this could, however, carry a *comitative* nuance, although there seem to be insufficient data on this type to make any strong claims.

There are, furthermore, a few verbs of motion which cannot necessarily carry a weakened semantic value with regard to the mode of conveyance. One typical example is the verb *pribyt'* (to arrive). Bernštejn (1958: 94) has shown that with such verbs it is possible to transform the Inst means into the subject of the *same* verb, i.e.

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[132] This information was also provided by Dr. Drejzin.
[133] Stylistics may also play a role, but we have no statistics at our disposal to verify this possibility.

(374) *pribyt' poezdom -> poezd pribyl*
to arrive by train -> the train arrived.

Even with prefixed variants of the basic verbs above, this transformation is also possible:

(375) *priletet' samoletom -> samolet priletel*
to arrive (flying) by plane ->
the plane arrived (flew in).

In both of these examples there seems to be a marked quality about the statement; that is, there are limitations on its usage. The meaning of *arrive* in both instances strikes us as implying that the subjects were *expected*, as in the extended variant of (375), namely,

(376) *samolet priletel vovremja*
the plane arrived on schedule.

Along with this fact, there are also other data in the language which would support a hypothesis that not only *public* transit appears as a rule in the Inst, but *scheduled* transport in particular. This is especially true if certain adverbial modifiers are added to the means of transport.

Both variations of the following expression are acceptable, and seem equally likely to be used in CSR:

(377) *priexat' avtobusom/na avtobuse*
to come by bus/on the bus.

The addition of adjectives complicates the picture, however. Consider the next examples:

(378) *priexat' na polunočnom avtobuse/*
polunočnym avtobusom
to arrive on the midnight bus/
by the midnight bus,

(379) *exat' na pjatom avtobuse/*
pjatym avtobusom
to go on the No. 5 bus/
by the No. 5 bus,

(380) *exat' na sinem avtobuse/*
**sinim avtobusom*
to go on the blue bus/
by the blue bus.

Although these examples are all very similar, both the prepositional and prepositionless Inst forms are possible *only* with expressions representing *scheduled* transport. Thus, beyond the basic lexical data, it must be known to the speaker whether an adjective such as *pjatyj* (fifth, or "No. 5" in this context) implies scheduled transport or not. To use such phrases correctly, then, the speaker of the language must call upon *cultural information*.

Instruments of transport can thus be seen to have many restrictions on their surface manifestations. The case form of these nouns is determined by syntax (the Inst of *Implement*), semantics (the nature of the noun itself), the morphology of the substantive (e.g., *metro*), and pragmatic information (cultural knowledge).

Inst vs Acc

In Chapter III we mentioned the problem of English sentences with verbs such as *smear*, *swarm*, etc., in which there seems to be a choice of object for the morphologically unmarked (prepostionless) position of direct object. It was mentioned at that time that Russian did not have this type of problem.

This same question has been addressed in Russian, despite the fact that Russian does not really parallel English. Kilby, in an article entitled "A Semantic Approach to the Accusative Case in Russian," gives the following two pairs of examples (Kilby 1975: 58), which appear to represent the same situation discussed in English:

(381) *On bryzgal vodu na proxožix*
he splashed water on the passers-by,

(382) *On bryzgal proxožix vodoj*[134]
he splashed the passers-by with water,

(383) *Nabili sneg v pogreb*
they packed snow into the cellar,

(384) *Nabili pogreb snegom*
they packed the cellar with snow.

These examples, while seemingly parallels of the English, are not. The second pair, (383) and (384), may be considered as the basic examples. The verb *nabit'* does not simply mean *to pack*, but rather can be translated differently depending on its case array. The latter example, (384), reveals the meaning of *to stuff* (full), while the first means *to pack*. These verbs display a difference of meaning, and we will repeat here a point that was made in the previous chapter. There we rejected an argument concerning *variant government* -- e.g., example (241) -- given in the 1970 Academy Grammar. There, as here, surface realizations can be seen to often reflect *differences of meaning* for one and the same lexical item. We should, and henceforth will, consider such *homophonous* forms to be different lexical items on the basis of their variant government of surface forms.

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[134] The verb is incorrectly cited by Kilby, and should be *obryzgival*.

Bryzgat', however, translates as *to spray, sprinkle, splash, spatter*, whether used simply with an Acc, or with *na* + Acc. Nonetheless, Kilby agrees with the general assertion of Givón, mentioned earlier, that the sentences are not fully synonymous. Kilby's explanation is the following:

> Sentence-pairs like [381] and [382] are not synonymous; the version with a locative preposition merely states that he splashed some indeterminate quantity of water on the passers-by, while the other version conveys the additional information that enough water was splashed to have some effect on the passers-by (*loc. cit.*).

As much as this interpretation may be acceptable for the equivalent English examples, it is not valid for the Russian.

Let us consider here two other examples from the previous chapter, namely, (260): *on brosaet kamnjami*, and (258): *on brosaet kamni*. Veyrenc had claimed that these sentences were examples of what he called *internal* and *external diathesis*. By the former term, he implied that the *objective substantive* (here, *kamnjami*) is more closely associated with the subject of the verb, as in sentences of the type (155): *maxat' rukami*.

An examination of these sentences leads to some doubt as to the validity of Veyrenc's claim. How, one must ask, are *stones* closely associated with *man*? The answer comes implicitly from the discussion above concerning incorporated implements. In those instances in which the action itself is specified by the verb, and the necessity of some kind of complement is weakened, we understand that the action is the most important part of the utterance. The substantive in the Inst, to use the term of Dik from Chapter III, is the *tail* of the utterance, i.e. it adds a kind of semantically unnecessary 'afterthought.' This also seems to be the case with the examples above. Thus, in (382) we can understand that the subject was, perhaps aimlessly, "*splashing with water*," and this action caused some water to land on the passers-by. (381) can be read differently. Here it can be understood that there was some water, and the subject, perhaps intentionally, *splashed water*, which landed on the passers-by. But, again Kilby has erred in his examples, however in a way which helps clarify the general situation.

Although the interpretation is tenuous as it has been presented, there is further support for this argument. Because of the Acc form in (382), it can be seen to be a *Direct Object* of a *transitive* verb. The Inst form can be read as an *Implemental* form, from a *narrow implemental* *series*, since *to splash* entails something liquid. Kilby has used the Acc form *vodu* in (381), however, this form is erroneous. As indicated immediately above, *bryzgat'* can take an Acc form, but only of *that which was made wet*. *Voda* can be read in an Objective relation only with the *intransitive* counter-part of this verb, which takes just the Inst, e.g.,

(385) *on bryzgal vodoj*
he splashed (with water).

This example parallels (260), and can shed some light on its interpretation also. The verbs of sentences like these can be interpreted as *intransitive* forms. While an object of some sort is expected in both of the cited instances, it is realized not in the Acc, but the Inst. Thereby, the action of the verb is emphasized, and not the Verb^Object relationship. The Inst thus fills a syntactic necessity for the verb form. We could, then, give a paraphrase of (260) as something like: *he was tossing things, and the things happened to be stones.*

This type of example harks back to a feature which was mentioned in Chapter IV, namely *intention*. The *intransitive* reading of these verbs can easily be seen as *unintentional*. Consider these variations with the adverbial *tščatel'no* (carefully) added:

(386) *on tščatel'no brosaet kamni*
he is carefully throwing stones

(387) **on tščatel'no brosaet kamnjami*
he is carefully throwing (with stones).

This material has once again supported the hypothesis that a change in case government at the surface level is often indicative of a change in meaning of a lexical item.

Very similar to this type of sentence is the sentence given earlier, but repeated for convenience, i.e.

(388) *oni zasejali pole pšenicej*
they sowed the field with wheat.

It will be recalled that Veyrenc had interpreted this sentence as the result of the over-lapping of two simple sentences, namely,

(389) *zasejali pole + zasejali pšenicu*
sowed the field + sowed the wheat.

This interpretation is also invalid, since the verb *zasejat'* cannot be used with an Acc of the grain sown. This error, however, is not serious. The unprefixed verb *could* be used, given for the second component the form *sejali pšenicu*. Although the perfective form of this verb is *posejat'*, it is conceivable for it to combine with the cognate form *zasejat'*. Still, this interpretation becomes somewhat *ad hoc*, and must be rejected.

In the case of both types of sentence expressed above, we would suggest that the Inst form in the surface represents some sort of incorporated implement, but not in the same manner as indicated in the first part of this chapter.

The other evidence which leads me to this conclusion is as follows. With regard only to surface case government, the imperfective verb *sejat'* takes the Acc of the grain used (or, figuratively, the emotion evoked, e.g., *strax* (fear)), and the Inst of the *actual implement*, e.g., *sejalkoj* (seeder). The perfective form of the example, *zasejat'*, takes the Acc only of the plot of land involved, and the Inst only for the seed used. It would seem from these data that more than the basic meaning of "sow" is involved. The prefix *za-* in Russian usually imparts a certain *completive*, or *successful* nuance to the basic verb. Under Chafe's terms, the latter of these would be used. However, Chafe would claim that the *action-process* involved in sowing would allow for an Inst, but this is not possible here, e.g.,

(390) **oni zasejali pole sejalkoj*
they sowed completely the field with a seeder.

The answer to this problem comes from a suggestion made by Nilsen & Nilsen, and another concept of Chafe's. As discussed in Chapter IV, there are not only verbs which incorporate an implement, but verbs which seem to imply a specific *object*. Nilsen & Nilsen, of course, took this in the very narrow meaning with the expected objects of verbs like *asphalt*, *butter*, *grease*, etc. Consider here both of the verbs mentioned, and the perfective of *sejat'*, *posejat'*.

The verb *sejat'*, as it is used in both English and Russian, *generally* refers to either the seed or crop, but not the land. In some senses this would seem to qualify as a *completable* verb under Chafe's proposals, which means it would have a *complement*. This complement would be the grain or seed, since in its normal use this verb is an *action* verb only, and not a process. If, on the other hand, a *completive* meaning was implied, to state that say all of the grain was used, then the *perfective* verb, *posejat'*, would appear. In either the perfective or imperfesctive, however, the Inst of implement, namely, *sejalkoj*, could be specified. This, however, is contrary to Chafe's theory, whereby only a process-action verb, or a successful process, can be marked with an Instrumental.

Zasejat', which has only the imperfective forms *zasevat'* and *zaseivat'*, always takes an area or parcel of land as its direct object, but not a type of seed. Moreover, it seems ungrammatical to say,

(391) *?oni zasejali pole sejalkoj*
they sowed the field with a seeder.

The unfelicitousness of this sentence, rather than ungrammaticality, may be accounted for in terms of the arguments. Thus, the interpretation (or "scene" in Fillmore's terms) of *zasejat'* is *the transformation of a piece of land (totally) by changing the composition of it*. The questionable nature of (391) results from the fact that a seeder by itself cannot produce *the change identified in the verb*.

Thus, returning to Veyrenc's explanation, we see that this approach is incorrect. In actuality, *pšenicej* is an

Inst of implement, since it is the *intermediary* which brings about the change specified in the verb. Chafe would therefore identify *zasejat'* as a true process-action verb. We can see, then, see that the action verb *sejat'* is really included semantically in the verb *zasejat'*, as one might expect. We can, therefore, redefine the scene above as *the transformation of a parcel of land ... through the action of sowing*.

This is the same state of affairs that exists with other verbs. Consider the verb *teč'* which can only take a liquid as the subject in direct usage, e.g.,

(392) *slezy tekli v glaza*
tears flowed in the eyes.

With the prefixed verbs, however, "the object affected by the action and upon which the action is manifested" can become the subject (Schupbach 1979: 26-27), e.g.,

(393) *glaza zatekli slezami*
the eyes flowed with tears.

Contrary to Chafe's suggestion earlier, or rather in a reinterpretation of his views, we can see that what can be called an *action* verb can indeed have some sort of *Instrument*. Considering the data discussed earlier in this chapter, one could propose, for Chafe's earlier example with the verb *to read*, the inalienable instrument of sight, *the eyes*.

At this point we should also like to question Veyrenc's other example, namely (again repeated):

(245) *stvol obros moxom*
the trunk is over-grown with moss,

which Veyrenc produces from,

(246) *stvol ob-(...) + mox ros*
the trunk is over-(...) + moss grew.

The prefix *ob-* imparts a nuance of *around*, *over*, or *about* not to the action of the verb *per se*, but as above, to the object of that action. Thus, a better source for the given sentence is

(394) *ob-(...) stvol*$_{\omega}$ + *mox ros*
over-(...) the trunk + moss grew.

Support for this point of view comes from the colloquial expression for putting on weight, namely

(395) *obrasti žirom*
to get fat
Lit.: to surround oneself with fat.

This same relation between the verb and nominal is shown in another pair of examples (Schupbach 1978: 627ff),

(396) *sypat' oves na molodyx*
to scatter oats on the bride and groom,

(397) *osypat' molodyx ovsom*
to shower the bride and groom with oats.

Schupbach claims, like Givón for English, that in the first example

> "the oats are displaced with respect to the static newlyweds. The oats are entirely embraced by the action (cf., *sypat' ovsa* [scatter *some* oats]) and are viewed as the object affected by it" (1978: 627).

For the second example, however, Schupbach refers to Jakobson's terminology, explaining,

> "the displaced oats have been reinterpreted as peripheral to the action and they are appear [*sic*] in a *peripheral* case" (*loc. cit.*).

It is evident from the above discussion that many scholars of case choose to ignore other information in the structures they are dealing with. The prefixed verb forms (*zasejat'*, *obrasti*, *osypat'*) do not take the same case arrays as the unprefixed forms. The presence of a prefix in these examples *signals the fact that the action of the verb is more intimately involved with a particular type of argument*, i.e. there is a re-grouping of the arguments with respect to the intensity of their relationship with the verb.

This brings us back to the discussion of Chapter IV, where we dealt with Verb^Object structures. The preceding material seems to indicate, as mentioned, that the relationship of the Inst to the utterance is not simply one of *performing the action described in the verb*, but rather that of *realizing the process described in the Verb^Object expression*. However one wishes to translate the verbs *sypat'* and *osypat'*, the general characteristic of the action is the *spreading of something light, and non-liquid*. In English we comprehend this as an action which can be carried out by some device, or by hand. In Russian, however, through verbal prefixation, the scope of the action (or the *scene*) can be limited by *focussing attention* on the verbal action towards one of its possible arguments. This Verb^Object (Argument) unit now functions with respect to other elements in the sentence, both realized and potential, as a new *verb*, so to speak.

Russian has many other such examples of this, including verbal prefixes which occur concomitantly with specific prepositions. This is particularly transparent with the prefix *s-* which occurs with the preposition *s* very frequently, e.g.,

(398) *vjazat' veniki*
to tie (bind) besoms,

(399) *svjazat' koncy/odin konec s drugim*
to tie the ends/one end to the other.

The prefixed form can be interpreted, of course, as the perfective form of the verb *vjazat'*, but it is also understood as *to tie something to something else*. In this meaning, with which the preposition *s* is often used, it is understood as the perfective form of *svjazyvat'*. The derivation for this form is understood as originating with the *perfective*, and not *vice versa*. Russian, therefore, is a much more powerful language than English with respect to the

Verb^Nominal relationships that can be formally marked in surface structure by the verb.

With specific reference to the English verbs discussed earlier, it can be seen that English does not have the same means at its disposal (i.e. prefixation and aspect) to express the various shades of meaning which Russian can. Thus, one reason English verbs are so problematic is that a single lexical item can express a number of nuances which Russian might accomplish in several different ways. The English verbs must remain ambiguous with respect to their exact, intended application as there are no formal means of disambiguating them. The only fruitful path to a solution of that problem would seem to be through pragmatics, whereby one might better be able to ascertain the exact status of the various nominals in the cited examples.

B. Instrumentals and Control

Much of the above discussion has shown that the Inst of implement is the intermediary between the actual performer of the action and the object which is affected by that action (for transitive verbs). Moreover, for both intransitive and transitive verbs the Inst of implement is not always conscious or intentional, but *could* be controlled. There is, of course, as least one kind of exception to this, and that is exemplified by

(400) *kačat' vetvjami*
to have one's branches sway (of a tree),

which was introduced in the last chapter. This, however, can be considered to be a figurative meaning, extended from examples like (155): *maxat' rukoj*, etc. This type of expression is, moreover, relatively restricted in its use. More often, one can expect something like,

(401) *vetvi kačalis'*
the branches swayed,

or, when the whole tree is involved,

(402) *rjabina kačaetsja*
the mountain ash is swaying.

Returning, however, to the salient aspect of this section, it is evident that in many instances the substantive in the Inst is a controlled element, even if not a physical *implement* as this word is normally used. In many of the examples above, e.g., *bryzgat' vodoj*, *zasejat' pšenicej*, the *water*, *oats* are not at all such "implements." They are, however, the potentially controlled substantive which aids in the performing of the action. Whether expressed or not, their lexical features in general are ascertainable in the same manner as those of *incorporated implementals*. Moreover, like the incorporated implements, these substantives are understood *to be controlled, manipulated*,

Many verbs which could be interpreted in this manner have been included elsewhere under other headings. The 1954

Academy Grammar, for example, included all of the above expressions which do not fall (obviously) into the *Implement* category as *Objective Relations*. The 1970 Academy Grammar includes these forms under the label *Strong singular invariant government*, which seems to be true. Several sub-sections were specified there, however, with unnecessary complications in many places. Numerous verbs which show similar characteristics were separated on the basis of the very specific semantics of the verbs, e.g., verbs of *filling* or *satiation* (*snabdit' den'gami*, (to provide with money)), verbs describing movement, such as (155), and words with a weakened "implemental" meaning which could be understood as an oblique object (*umorit' golodom* (to starve)). In each of these instances, it can be seen that the Inst form is *part of the action of the verb*. The term *objective relation* is confusing, inasmuch as it has a nuance of *Direct Object*. These verbs, however, do not take the substantive which appears in the Inst as an object in this sense. Either there cannot be a direct object, in which case the Inst plays a role in the action described; or there can be a separate direct object, which is acted upon by the activity described in the verb, and with some part of this action performed or caused by the Inst. In both instances, however, the Inst represents a *controlled* or *potentially controlled* element of the utterance.

There is another large set of verbs which take only an

Inst, and cannot take an Acc objective. These are represented by the verbs *rukovodit'* (to manage, run); *komandovat'* (to command); and *upravljat'* (to govern). These verbs have been usually identified as having an Inst which represents the object, or sphere, over which the action of the verb is spread (AG 1954, Dešerieva). However, for every verb of this type, there is not only an element of the totality of the action on the Inst substantive, but also one of *control* over that item, without having any real effect on the item itself.

It has been pointed out, however, that in the 19th and early 20th centuries verbs such as *rukovodit'* and *dirižirovat'* (to direct) governed like transitives, i.e. they took an Acc direct object (Butorin 1966: 125-26). In CSR, these verbs now govern the Inst.

The explanation we propose for this change in government is that the nuance of *control* that is associated with the basic usage of the Inst (that of *Implement*) was greatly strengthened in the late part of the last century, resulting in this shift. Thus, more than signifying a simple *Implement*, the Inst came to be associated with a broader range of substantives which in some sense are *controlled entities*.

This is further supported by Veyrenc's analysis of Inst constructions. He claims that Verb^Inst structures of the type under discussion indicate "skoree *vnutrennij motiv* *kompetencii, čem vnešnee opredelenie*[123]" (1971: 136). Thus, unlike Acc government which seems to imply an effect on something, Inst government indicates control without effect of the item controlled.

There is independent support for the hypothesis that the Inst in the surface structure of Russian, in the types of expressions we have been examining, does convey a sense of *controlled entity*, or at least of *potential control*. Immediately above we mentioned verbs such as *rukovodit'* which changed their government to reflect the semantics of the action thereby described namely the *controlled nature* of the old Acc object. There is, in dialectal Russian, some evidence that this kind of process with other verbs is productive.

The reflexive verb *interesovat'sja* (to be interested in) implies a certain degree of conscious effort on the part of the subject; cf.

(403) *ja interesujus' znamenitym poètom*
I am interested/"take an interest"
in the famous poet,

(404) *znamentiyj poèt menja interesuet*
the famous poet interests me.

Although the lexical items convey much the same information, the nuances differ. The first example means more than just *I have an interest*. The implication of this example seems to be that, not only am I interested in something (the famous poet), but I make an effort to learn more about that something; I consciously exert an effort to control the knowledge I have about it. The second example does not have this implication. Rather it means that by its nature, something is interesting to me, but I don't really control what I know about it. Hence, in Russian one could say,

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[123] The italics are mine.

(405) *astrofizika menja interesuet*
astrophysics interests me,

whether or not I do anything to further my knowledge of this field. If, however, I happen to study this topic, or be a scientist working for NASA, then I can say,

(406) *ja interesujus' astrofizikoj*
I am interested in astrophysics.

The controlled element in these examples is my participation in the topic. If I control the topic, in that I can exert some influence over the aspects of it that are of interest to me, then topic can be expressed in the Inst with the reflexive verb.

Dialectally, the deliberative meaning of this verb is expressed differently. The reflexive form can be used when the speaker takes an active interest in something. If what he has an interest in, however, cannot be controlled by him, except with regard to whether or not he finds something out, then this may receive a different surface manifestation. *Results* of something may be interesting, but the most one can find out about them is the exact scores (say, of a test) but nothing more. Such a situation implies conscious effort, but no real control. Popova[134] studied dialectal deviations from the literary norm in letters to newspapers, and her data indicated a unique expression for such a situation, namely,

(407) *zdes' každyj den' interesujutsja*
o rezul'tatax stroitel'stva
every day here they are interested
in the results of the construction.

Thus, in CSR the verb *interesovat'* implies interest *without intent*; while *interesovat'sja* implies both *intent* and *some degree of control*. When there is *intent*, but *no real control*, then some speakers of the language do not use the Inst structure, but rather circumvent it with a different phrase. In Popova's terms, this new expression represents the *deliberative object*.

There is a rather large group of verbs similar to *interesovat'sja*, including *uvlekat'sja* (to be fascinated by) and *vosxiščat'sja* (to admire). Like *interesovat'sja*, there and many other such verbs can appear without the *-sja* affix, with the substantive which appeared in the Inst with the *-sja* form now as the subject of the verb. These verbs also seem to evoke a certain response in the animate object (or subject). This response may be completely spontaneous, or it may be conscious. The surface manifestation can depend on the degree of conscious control exerted by the animate member of the sentence.

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[134] Popova (1974), "Prostorečnoe upotreblenie padežnyx form i literaturnaja norma."

There are a few verbs, however, with which the Inst and subject phrases are set, i.e. there cannot be the same variation as above. These include both the verbs *zanimat'sja* (to be occupied with, take part in) and *gordit'sja* (to be proud of). The first of these, of course, is readily understood as a verb of *control*, since the subject takes an active, conscious role in doing something. The second however is not as obvious.

Plewes suggests that *gordit'sja* be translated not as "*to be proud of,*" but rather as "*pride oneself on*" (1977: 261). This interpretation implies that pride is not something that is evoked in the same manner as admiration, but rather is within the realm of the conscious control of man. Thus, since an object cannot instill pride in the same way that some awesome scene might evoke admiration, these verbs must appear only in the *-sja* form. The Inst with such verbs is blocked from becoming the subject of the non-reflexive verb.

There is, moreover, a direct parallel with this latter verb and other reflexive verbs for which there exist no corresponding non-reflexive verbs, e.g., *bojat'sja* (to be afraid) and *opasat'sja* (to fear) (Schaarschmidt 1971: 156), both of which normally take the Gen. What is important with all of these verbs is that they are often used without any object, e.g.,

(408) *ja bojus'/goržus'*
I am afraid/proud.

Thus, verbs which are reflexive and normally take an Inst object can be understood as representing some sort of emotional state, in which the experiencer takes an active role. Thus, since pride is a direct result of one's conscious state of mind, the object of that pride appears in the Inst. Fear, however, is at times irrational, and hardly subject to the control of the experiencer. With this verb, the object of the fear, if expressed, is in the Gen.

C. Predicative Structures

The predicative usage in its strict sense was dealt with in a section of the last chapter. While much of the data that has been presented with respect to the predicative Inst is at least somewhat understood, we should like to add more to these data.

It was mentioned that Røed included a broader range of data under that rubric than is usually considered within the full scope of predicative function.

Although Røed classified, without much discussion, examples like

(409) *on rabotaet voditelem*
he works as a driver,

(410) *vernut'sja starikom*
to return an old man,

as predicative forms, more support can be produced for such an approach.

It seems that both of these structures are actually what Veyrenc calls the over-lapping of two basic sentences. Thus, (409) might well be represented in deep structure as

(411) *on rabotaet + on -- voditel'*
he works + he is a driver.

The obvious question is why the profession would then appear in the Inst rather than the Nom. There are two reasons for this. Unless conjoined, two Noms rarely appear in the same sentence, other than in tautologies. Second, *working as a driver* implies a different state than normal, or perhaps, a *change of state*. It was shown earlier that the Inst in the past and future with the verb *byt'* was usually an indication that the state mentioned, in the Inst was not a permanent state.

Mrazek, however, who also supports this interpretation, does not use separate simple sentences, as we have proposed, but rather uses a participial (therefore *partially derived*) structure, namely, for his example (1964: 67),

(412) *on rabotaet, buduči traktoristom*
he works, being a tractor driver.

Our more basic interpretation is, however, more viable than both Mrazek's and that proposed by Veyrenc for other examples:

(413) *oni radovalis' vsej sem'ej*
the whole family is happy,

is derived, according to Veyrenc, from

(414) *oni radovalis' + vsja sem'ja radovalas'*
they are happy + the whole family is happy.

It seems more to be the case that the derivation of this type of structure is,

(415) *oni radovalis' + oni -- vsja sem'ja*
they were happy + they are a whole family,

The same procedure, though, does not apply to an Inst attached to a substantive, e.g.,

(416) *oni gubili ljudej millionami*
they killed people by the millions.

This seems more to be an adnominal function, indicating a quantificational value of the substantive, and can not be derived by this transformational procedure. Our predicative interpretation has two benefits. First the Inst can be accounted for in terms which already exist elsewhere in the grammar, and moreover, the Inst phrase is no longer associated with the verb of the sentence, but rather with the nominal. Thereby, no collocational restrictions are violated, nor is it necessary to postulate what would otherwise be unfelicitous sentences in the deep structure.

Comparison

Briefly, we will now look at what is called the *Inst of Comparison*. There is some confusion as to whether or not this Inst structure is productive or not in CSR, the "standard" example being,

(177) *letet' streloj*
to fly like an arrow.

Panfilov (1967) and Isačenko (1965) claim that this is not a productive process, but rather is limited to a small, fixed number of idiomatic expressions. Panfilov (1967: 164-65) writes that the Inst of comparison cannot appear with generally-used words, colloquial words, and in particular with verbs which are of a bookish style. Moreover (*op. cit.*: 166), nouns denoting humans and their professions, etc. are blocked from appearing in such structures.

Other scholars, however, e.g., Mrazek (1964: 67) believe that this is a productive process. Many speakers of the language feel that there are no limits on the types of verbs involved, nor on the nouns, including "human" ones.

One explanation for this phenomen is that such expressions represent a structure like (Mrazek: 67):

(417) *letet' + ego polet napominaet polet strely*
to fly + its flight resembles the flight of an arrow.

It seems prudent to accept this as the *interpretation* of such structures, but it does not account for the Inst form.

It is commonly accepted that such expressions have a metaphorical nuance to them. We should therefore like to extend this figurative aspect one step further, and equate these structures with the type discussed immediately above. If something *flies like an arrow*, then, in the metaphorical extension of that expression, that something *is an arrow*, as *it flies*. Thus, as above, the deep representation for this structure is

(418) *on letit + on -- strela*
it flies + it is an arrow,

which, via a transformation, becomes,

(419) *on letaet, buduči streloj*
he flies, being an arrow.

This structure still conveys the same semantic information as Mrazek's, and directly accounts for the Inst structure.

Under this interpretation, there is no reason to consider this process as unproductive. Rather, any such structure in which the Inst nominal is capable (usually) of performing the action identified in the verb can be understood as such an *Inst of comparison*, and can be derived in the same manner.

Perhaps certain expressions with human nouns would be blocked, for example (Panfilov: 165),

(420) **pečatat' mašinistkoj*
to type like a typist,

if only because *to type like a typist* entails *being a typist*. This structure should not, however, be blocked according to the above interpretation. Let us, therefore, examine further the underlying semantic reading of the earlier examples. This type of example means "as if he were," which entails the notion that "he is not." Thus, the above example is not blocked because it contains a human noun in the Inst, but rather because it violates the relationship of reality to the semantic reading. Thereby,

(421) *pet' protod'jakonom*
to sing like an archdeacon,

is not blocked, because to sing as if one were an archdeacon does not entail being one.

The full paraphrase of the given semantic reading would also account for the presence of the Inst in, for example,

(422) *on letaet budto by on byl streloj*
he flies as though he were an arrow,

in which the Inst is not a special Inst of comparison, but, simply, the predicative Inst.

A similar explanation is applicable for structures containing an Inst of qualification, through the use of the gerund *buduči* (being), e.g.,

(214) *on xodit geroem*
he goes a hero

can be derived directly from

(423) *on xodit, buduči geroem*
he goes, being a hero.

Such structures can now be seen not as oddities, which somehow acquired an Inst form, but rather as regular manifestations of the predicative Inst in Russian.

Time and Space

We have not discussed Time and Place Inst expressions, but we would like to make a tentative proposal in this respect.

First, we would agree with the proposal that expressions of the type, *dnem, vesnoj* are indeed adverbials. Not only is this the situation that obtained in OCS, but in modern Russian it is limited to *eight* nominals representing the four times of the day, and the four seasons.

With regard to Time expressions with adjectives, e.g.,

(424) *čitat' celymi dnjami*
to read for days on end,

and Place Inst expressions, e.g.,

(425) *exat' lesom*
to drive via the forest,

we propose that in these instances the Inst nature of the expressions also imparts a nuance of control. Activities carried out over 'whole days' are limited not by the days, but by the action of the subject who *controls the time frames in which he performs.* The same obtains for Place Inst, whereby it can be understood that the route taken was under the control of the subject of the verb, or some other Agent (as is the case with the Inst of public transportation).

D. Summary

This chapter has examined the main use of the surface prepositionless Inst in Contemporary Standard Russian, i.e. that of the *implement used to realize the action described by the verb.*

Various scholars at different times have classified many of the types of examples we have examined under a broad range of headings. Our data have indicated that this may not have been at all necessary.

In a general comparison with English (especially that from Chapter IV), it was shown that *autonomy* and *definiteness* both play a role in the determination of the possible surface manifestations of what might be called an *implemental noun*. This discussion revealed that English has fewer restrictions than Russian with respect (especially) to the subjectivalization of nouns.

We next looked at the various types of implements which could be used with different verbs. We determined that in Russian in particular, it was necessary for the nominal in the Inst to be either *controlled* (*manipulated*), or at least to be *potentially* so. The one feature which seems to be present in a large majority of Inst structures in Russian, therefore, is that of *control*. It was possible for us to extend this feature to account for many diverse functions of the Inst in the surface structure of CSR. Moreover, the verbal semantics often indicates which implement, or *basic type of implement* is the *expected implement*.

This led us to conclude that with respect to implemental structures there is a great deal of *presupposition* entailed in the verbal semantics. While *grammatical* sentences are possible with little or no regard to the semantics of the individual words, *felicitous* sentences are primarily possible if *the information presupposed by the verb of a sentence is present and not contradicted by the semantics of the other elements of that sentence*. If, however, a contradiction does occur, *transfer features* from the verb are imposed on the noun, and from this new *semantic framework* a felicitous, or satisfactory reading is made. Many verbs, including those which take at the surface level the Inst of a part of the body, express an action (movement, or creation of sound) which is totally dependent on that part of the body for its full representation. Deletion of such parts of the body is only possible in those cases where there is little choice as to which item was used for the action, or where this information is readable from the context. There are also a few verbs which behave similarly to this, but do not take a part of the body. This small group includes onomatopoeic verbs like *xlopyvat'sja*.

When an Inst appears with an adjective, it was shown that often the Inst was already understood from the context, or from the verb itself. Such structures are not considered redundant, but rather could be seen as a grammatical vehicle for the expression of some *new information* about the expected implement (*old information*). Moreover, with verbs of motion and implements of transportation, more than the semantics of the transport had to be known to correctly produce and properly interpret surface structures containing these. More than simply being *new information*, this information could be seen as *culturally based*.

Unlike English, Russian has a powerful device at its disposal in the form of prefixation. Fillmore had proposed *scenes* as a method of understanding all the elements which could potentially participate in any given speech situation. Russian verb prefixation takes this process further. Not only does a verb evoke the scene in Fillmore's sense, but a prefix *focusses* one of the arguments of that scene.

The main conclusion we can draw from the discussion of this chapter is that the Inst in surface structure in the modern Russian language is not the result of a simple deep-structure process. Although the primary use of the Inst is to represent the *Implement of the action*, this is not the only conditioning factor. The interplay of the semantics of the verb with its deep-structure arguments can have an effect on the form of the surface structure, but even more than this it seems to be *pragmatics* which contribute much to the production and interpretation of a sentence.

We also examined some other structures in Russian which were not of an *Implemental* nature. These are what could be called *predicative Inst* manifestations. Although Røed had broadened the scope of the material which could be encompassed by the label *predicative* with its implications, Mrazek also implicitly included other material here. Some further tentative proposals seem to support a point of view that many prepositionless Inst phrases in Russian can be explained by the embedding of a tautological (*be*-sentence) in another basic structure. With an extended meaning, this includes even the so-called Inst of comparison.

The primary conclusion we must draw from this work is that the surface prepositionless Inst is a case which is characterized by a feature of either *actual control*, or of *potential control*.

VII. Conclusions

The present work takes a very broad over-view of case grammar and its specific application to a single case in Russian, the prepositionless Inst.

We reviewed the early theories of case to determine what the historical background was to the modern theories of case-grammar and the Transformational Generative approach to case. The earliest studies simply identified the meanings associated with each of the surface cases. This was applied especially to Latin and Greek.

In the first half of the present century, scholars such as Hjelmslev and Jakobson attempted to ascertain *features* by which the surface cases of language could be determined. Hjelmslev's study was concerned with both the case marking of and the prepositions used with case phrases. Although much of his data at least reflected the actual usage of prepositions and cases, it did little to explain it. As a descriptive tool, his theory is interesting, if not useful.

Jakobson was the most notable of the scholars to apply this approach to Russian. Jakobson was less concerned with prepositions than the cases *per se*, and he proposed four correlations (features) which he marked binarily. These correlations did little more than establish sets of cases which were opposed to each by these features. A later revision to his basic theory saw the combination of two of the features into a single correlation, which resulted in a maximally efficient system for the marking of the eight cases of Russian. While nonetheless interesting, this theory also contributed little to the explication of the use and meaning of the surface cases of language. For the Inst, which is our main concern, the only feature which was marked positively indicated that this case was a *semantic* rather than a *grammatical* case under the former bipartition of cases into these groups.

The era of Transformational Generative Grammar gave linguistics a new approach to grammar. Case was most intensely studied under the theory proposed by Charles Fillmore, which has become known simply as *case-grammar*. This proposal, which was not embraced by Soviet scholars, entailed the inclusion of semantic information, in the form of case nodes, in the deep structure of language. Unlike surface syntax, which has an established domain of data, semantics has always been a problem for linguists. It has proven to be most difficult to ascertain exactly what semantic features are, and how they should be applied. Nonetheless, the need for this kind of information in deep structure was shown, and case-grammar was at least one of the means of formally expressing it.

Among the problems which case-grammar came up against were the question of which cases were necessary (and sufficient) for the full explication of the surface manifestations of case, and what the exact content of such cases should be. Early case-grammarians proposed cases which described the meaning of the case, as it related to the semantics of the verb. The array of such cases in deep structure determined which verb could be inserted (compatibly) into a proposition.

Various other approaches were taken to case-grammar. Some were based on the fundamental Fillmorian theory, others simply recognized that theory, and yet others rejected the theory in favour of another framework.

Features provided a constrained means of formalizing the description of cases. Both inherent features (e.g., *animacy*) and relational features (e.g., *cause*, *control*) were introduced. Although some scholars feel that inherent features should not play a role in this matter, others have shown that animacy is one means of differentiating Inst and Agent in the surface level of language. Since such features are a necessary part of the grammar elsewhere, e.g., in the determination of felicitous subjects, etc., inherent features can be supported. Relational features such as *cause* (and its result, *effect*) indicate the transitive effect of one noun on some other noun in the sentence. *Control* indicates that one member of the sentence exerts some influence on another element, which is by its nature *potentially controllable*.

An examination of more recent theories indicates that such information by itself may not be sufficient to generate and interpret the surface output of a language. Fillmore, Dik, and others indicate that contextual information (encyclopedic knowledge, discourse situation, and even cultural background) all play a role in both the generation and interpretation of surface sentences.

We examined the Inst in English (and French) and found that the main features which are of concern for this case are *control*, *cause*, *autonomy*, *definiteness*, and *intent*. The first of these, *control*, seems to be the feature which is most important for this case. A substantive must be *controlled*, *manipulated* or at least *potentially controllable* for it to appear in the surface Inst. *Cause* is a general characteristic of the case, but this feature is also shared with the Agentive case. The remaining three features do not have any kind of direct role in the formation of an Inst from a substantive so marked, but do determine certain transformational possibilities for a noun which could appear as the Inst of implement.

In Chapter V we presented our primary data. This was accomplished through the presentation of the many different classificatory studies that have been done on the prepositionless Inst in Russian. It became evident in that chapter that many scholars do not fully agree on what such a classification should entail with respect to "classifiers," but there is a great deal of agreement in general. Certain works (e.g., AG 1970) differentiate small variations of meaning, which complicate the material unnecessarily, and even lead to avoidable errors.

Our task was, therefore, to examine the theoretical approaches to case in general, and the Inst in particular, and relate this material to a language which has a productive surface case system, namely, Russian.

In our detailed discussion of the Inst, it became evident that the single feature *control* is often an integral part of the surface Inst. In most instances, another nominal was present in the sentence which was in some way affected by the Inst, but this alone does not account for much of the data. The Inst itself was shown to be, of necessity, compatible with the Verb^Object relation with transitive verbs, and to be an integral part of the action described by intransitive verbs. With transitive structures, the *controlled* relationship is more evident than with intransitive structures. The latter often use instrumental constructions even though the substantive is not *controlled* as we understand that term normally. In some instances, it is the *non-control* of the implement which results in the action described by the verb.

There are implements which do not fit the normal reading of this term, but which nonetheless function as the Inst of implement in Russian. This includes the implement of *grain* with *the sowing of a field*.

Our discussion indicated that prefixation with many verbs *focusses* one argument, usually the *objective*. Although the implement with such verbs may appear in the Acc with the unprefixed verb, and have an objective relation to that verb, it becomes implemental at a higher level with derived verb forms. This seems to be a process similar to Liefrink's creation of synthetic verbs from analytic verbs with complements. Nonetheless, even in the role of such an implemental, these nouns are still characterized by the feature of *control*.

A noun in deep structure which is marked as *controlled*, however, does not necessarily become the surface Inst of a sentence, as there is a complex interplay of both other features and pragmatic information.

Many verbs, especially transitive and reflexive, entail either an exact implement, or the primary features which would characterize this implement. This is also true for the characterization of the normal object of transitive verbs, but that is not of major concern to this work. If the implement is specific to the action, as *razor* is to *shave*, then the surface manifestation of this element is normally blocked. Such *generic* implements are not usually expressed, except perhaps for emphasis or stylistics. If the implement is in any way modified, or if some characteristic of it is expressed, then it will appear in the surface, usually in the Inst. Such additional information can be seen to be "new" to the situation evoked by the verb itself.

This discussion of the conditions on the appearance of an implement indicates that the new direction taken in case-grammar, namely explanation through *pragmatics*, may indeed be the correct path. In the same way that Agents are rarely specified with passive structures due to their "recoverability," implements are specified only if they are specific, if something new is said about an expected implement, or if they are added for emphasis. Otherwise the semantics of the verb (encyclopedic information) will implicitly provide the speaker/hearer with a general understanding of what the *expected implement* would be. Therefore, the non-specification of an implement in surface structure means one of two things. Either the implement is the *expected one* or is recoverable from context; or, the implement is not at all important to the speech situation and is simply omitted. The first of these conditions obtains especially with verbs of what was called the narrow implemental series, whereby the semantics of the implement is either fully available (as with *brit' britvoj*), or are at least fairly limited (as with *bit'* and *pisat'*). There seems to be a hierarchy with respect to the implemental involvement with such verbs, whereby the upper levels are occupied by verbs with transparently incorporated implements, the next level with opaquely incorporated implements, and on down to verbs which do not necessarily entail an implement at all (e.g., *nakazat'*). These latter verbs are considered to be verbs of the wide implemental series.

This interpretation of the Inst of implement strongly supports the inclusion, in any linguistic theory, of pragmatics, an area which has hitherto received minimal attention. Closely related to this are a variety of problems which have recently been plaguing grammarians of various theoretical persuasions. We spoke of *felicitous* versus *grammatical* sentences, where the former involved more readily interpretable grammatical sentences, while the latter could be less interpretable. But this evaluation hinges critically on the possibility of the speaker/hearer envisioning the appropriate *scenes* to make such judgments. This is the same problem as that mentioned in the previous paragraph where a determination had to be made from context (linguistic or extra-linguistic) concerning the *expected* implement. As such scenes become progressively less plausible to the speaker/hearer/linguist, he must either reject them as *unfelicitous*, *ungrammatical*, or begin to employ such terms as *metaphorical* and invoke the notion of transfer features mentioned earlier. It is the lines of demarcation between such concepts which require further elucidation in linguistic theory. What is clear, however, is that syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and encyclopedic knowledge all play substantial roles in the surface expression and interpretation of the instrumental case in Russian, and, most likely, other languages of the world.

Our discussion of the Russian Inst case has not taken much from case-grammar. Although it had seemed to us that a case-grammar approach to Russian should be fruitful, this has proved not to be the case.

Our data do, however, give strong support to a verb-central hypothesis. Under this theoretical approach, the verb contains various semantic features, which, along with pragmatic information, determine which cases will be manifest with it in the surface structure. The actually manifest cases, and the potential (understood) cases bear the features generated for them by the verb. In those instances in which abstract or figurative nouns are present, the verbal features are transferred to those nouns, whereby the latter can be felicitously understood.

The Russian Prepositionless Instrumental

From the various data we examined, and the numerous theories of the grammar of case that exist, it is our conclusion that the prepositionless Inst in Russian is less characterized by a deep-case concept ("Instrumental") than by a single relational feature, *control*. The application of this analysis to the broad corpus of data from Russian shows that much of the classificatory detail that is provided elsewhere may be quite unnecessary. Although the term *Instrumental of Implement* is usually applied to a very limited portion of the data, we propose that much more can be included under this label than has been until now.

We also propose that much of the other data in Russian on the Inst is classifiable under the label *Predicative Instrumental*. We have shown that simple embedding transformations provide a predicative interpretation for another large portion of the data which also has been considered under various other headings.

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