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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION:

Formation of the Second United Front Between the  
CCP and the GMD, 1931 - 1941

BY



Xianguang Dai

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

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
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
  
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## ABSTRACT

The period from 1931 to 1941 in Chinese history is important in that it witnessed the formation of an Anti-Japanese National United Front between the two major political parties, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD). The most important factor that made this possible was the impact of Japanese aggression on the Chinese people and the two parties. In response to public pressure and in seeking to protect their own interests, the two parties had to change their mutually hostile policies and join efforts to fight against a common enemy. A fierce civil war came to an end and after strenuous negotiations, a united front was established in 1937. A unique period thus began in which the CCP and the GMD were able to cooperate in many areas in order to prosecute the war. Unfortunately, this situation did not last long and fundamental differences soon led to serious confrontation. Even so, relations between the two parties never totally broke off.

It is evident that during this period of cooperation and confrontation, the CCP was quicker to respond to the changing circumstances and, as a result, increasingly strengthened its position and influence in the nation. The GMD, while also making commendable efforts to resist Japan, was unable to implement policies that could match those of the CCP and steadily lost its support among the population.

This dissertation presents a succinct, factual account and analysis of major developments in relations between the CCP and the GMD from 1931 to 1941. It examines the circumstances in which the two parties initiated a shift in their policy orientation, the process that led to the formation of the united front and once it was established, the impact it had on their mutual relations and on China.

Research is based mainly on material that have been made available in recent years in China. Results of personal investigations and interviews also contributed to the writing of this dissertation.

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I wish to express my gratitude to the University of Alberta for its support of my graduate studies. I specifically wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Brian Evans, who gave me constant encouragement and unfailing support from the very inception of my research until the completion of this dissertation. I am also most grateful to other members of my committee who spent so much time going over the dissertation and giving me valuable advice. I am, of course, solely responsible for the opinions and conclusion expressed in this dissertation.

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## INTRODUCTION

This dissertation deals with relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD) from 1931 to 1941. In modern Chinese history this short period is important in that it witnessed the formation of the Second United Front between the CCP and the GMD in joint efforts to resist Japanese aggression. Politics in China in the thirties was governed principally by the relations between the CCP and the GMD. It was in these inter-relations that other factors came into play. Several major events took place in this period and profoundly influenced the development of the two parties and the course of Chinese history. They include the September 18 Incident, the Xian Incident, the Lugouqiao Incident and the formation of the United Front. As a consequence of these events, the CCP rapidly grew in strength while the GMD steadily diminished in power.

After Jiang Jieshi's coup of 1927 and the extermination campaigns that followed, the CCP faced the threat of total destruction. Yet by the end of 1941, not only had the CCP

survived; it had grown remarkably in strength, became a major force in the resistance against Japan, and was a principal cause for concern of Jiang Jieshi and the GMD. This period from 1931 to 1941 also saw a rise and then steady decline of the GMD. In 1931 the GMD was already the dominating force in China and was in control of most of the nation. It had some success in bringing the regional powers into line, but it did not become the revolutionary party that was going to transform the nation. Instead, it became increasingly conservative and corrupt. Faced with Japanese aggression, it was unable to meet the challenges of the times and its problems only increased. The seeds of its downfall after the war were sown during this decade.

Many factors contributed to this development of the CCP and GMD in opposite directions. The most important was Japanese aggression and the response of the two parties to the new situation. When Japanese aggression began in 1931, the GMD and the CCP were still locked in a fierce civil war. The GMD was engaged in its extermination campaigns against the CCP. Its policy after the September 18 Incident remained "internal pacification before external resistance," and right up to the Xian Incident in 1936, it adhered to this policy. Between resistance and unity the GMD chose unity as its priority, and continued to be preoccupied with wiping out the CCP. During

the fifth extermination campaign, the GMD forced the CCP to take the Long March to Yan'an where the CCP established a revolutionary base. From Yan'an, the CCP endeavored to expand its bases and carry on its revolutionary struggles. The GMD failed to wipe out the CCP but it did not forsake its determination to do so.

Japanese aggression also presented the CCP with additional difficulties. Its policy had been straightforward. Since Jiang Jieshi's coup, the CCP was engaged in unrelenting, though largely unsuccessful, struggles to overthrow the GMD government. Even after the September 18 Incident, the CCP's objective did not change. It equated the GMD and Jiang Jieshi with Japanese imperialism and proclaimed that the overthrow of the GMD was a prerequisite for resistance against Japan. For the CCP, it was revolution before resistance. Both the GMD and the CCP put resistance against foreign aggression in a secondary position.

However, as Japan intensified its aggression, the situation in China underwent important changes. Both the GMD and the CCP increasingly recognized the threat that Japanese aggression posed to China's independence and sovereignty and to their future. Confronted by the national crisis and the pressure of public opinion for resistance, both parties, starting from their own interests, reached a similar conclusion

on their policy orientation.

Neither party could ignore the growing demand of the people for unity in resistance against Japan. For the CCP, there was the additional pressure of the instructions from the Comintern to end the civil war and to form an alliance with the GMD. The CCP shifted from a position of opposing the GMD and Jiang Jieshi to one of seeking means to end the civil war and form a united front to resist Japan. But the CCP was also unwilling to abandon its long-term revolutionary objectives. Inner-party struggles of the CCP reveal how difficult it was to reverse its previous position.

For the GMD it was just as difficult. To change its attitude towards its principal enemy required courage and determination. When it became clear that its policy of non-resistance against Japan was facing increasing opposition, even from its own party members, the GMD had to change its policy to move towards cooperation with the CCP and other parties. The initiatives taken to contact the Soviet Union, the Comintern and the CCP testify to this, but it was the developments at Xian that led to a major shift in GMD policy.

It was by no means an easy process for the two former enemies to reconcile their differences; the antagonism generated by years of civil war was hard to set aside. Nevertheless, domestic and international factors put pressure

on the two parties to reach some kind of understanding. After a series of long and difficult talks and negotiations, a second united front was formed following the outbreak of all-out war against Japan.<sup>1</sup> The CCP acknowledged Jiang Jieshi as the national leader and the GMD formally recognized the legitimate status of the CCP. Ten years of civil war finally came to an end.

The formation of the united front brought in a unique period of genuine cooperation on both the political and military fronts. For a time there appeared to be agreement on major issues between the two parties. CCP offices and agencies were established in GMD areas and GMD flags were raised in CCP border regions. CCP members participated in meetings of the National Defence Council to discuss war strategy. As part of the National Revolutionary Army, Red Army soldiers were issued GMD uniforms. In war, soldiers of the two armies fought side by side. However short this period of cooperation turned out to be, it was symbolic of the potential for cordial relations to develop between two enemies. This short period of history demonstrated the possibility that if there was a major common concern, the two parties could set aside their differences and come to terms. Had that cooperation continued throughout the war, the future of China might have been different.

The formation of the united front would have a profound

influence on developments in the war of resistance against Japan. During the initial stages of the war, both sides cooperated and made vigorous efforts with quite remarkable results. But deep-rooted differences soon resurfaced and led to open strife and conflict. Even so, the united front never formally broke up and throughout the war, there was continuous contact between the two sides to reach some understanding on the prosecution of the war and mutual relations. The maintenance of the united front was important in helping to keep up the resistance efforts. In the history of relations between the CCP and the GMD, this was a time of cooperation and confrontation.

The objective in writing this dissertation is to examine the relationship between the CCP and the GMD during the thirties. It is to analyze a situation in which the two most important parties of the time were able to cooperate in spite of fundamental differences. My principal interest lies in looking into the political, military and economic changes which occurred during this period. These changes gave rise to the shifts in policies of the two parties and brought about fundamental changes in the relations between them. The dissertation examines how and why such a development took place and the impact of such a development on the two parties and the nation.



The dissertation discusses the effect that Japanese invasion had on the respective positions of the two parties and their attitudes towards each other. It examines how and why the CCP raised the issue of the united front and why the GMD agreed to work together with the CCP but would soon find itself in confrontation. It also analyzes the nature and significance of the united front and the extent of external influence on the CCP and the GMD. Finally, it examines some of the factors that led to the success of the CCP and the failure of the GMD.

This dissertation demonstrates the degree and extent of cooperation that took place once a united front was formed, particularly in the political and military areas. Also important in this thesis is that it emphasizes that while the confrontation was frequent and evident, the relations between the two parties never totally broke off. Negotiations and talks continued whenever problems arose. These two aspects are important.

Considerable space is devoted to the many contacts that the two sides had to discuss their differences and attempts to resolve them. Detailed accounts of the numerous meetings are crucial to the dissertation. Only by going over the substantive issues discussed in the talks and the stand adopted by each party is it possible to see how the position of the two parties changed with the changing situation in China. In the

decade discussed in this dissertation, long and strenuous high-level negotiations were often held to improve relations. There were also frequent contacts at various levels between members of both parties.

However, as the GMD and the CCP were antagonistic towards each other, whatever understanding or agreement reached was sometimes kept secret or downplayed, or distorted. Many of the negotiations and discussions were not made public. In GMD material, meetings between the GMD and the CCP where the GMD criticized the CCP are fully discussed, but many others are omitted. Until recently, a similar kind of situation existed in CCP material. With the information now available, it is clear that there was far more contact between the GMD and CCP than either side had previously been willing to acknowledge. The agreements reached at Xian between the CCP and Jiang Jieshi were kept secret for half a century and were only made public by the CCP in the Selected Works of Zhou Enlai.

In this account of the GMD-CCP relations, there is considerable emphasis on the two party leaders, Jiang Jieshi and Mao Zedong. This is necessary as they both played a predominant role in the decision-making process once they had gained a leading position within their respective parties. The autocratic nature and organizational structure of both the GMD and CCP enabled the party leaders to enjoy a dictatorial role

within the party. It was the party leaders that gave direction to their respective parties. In the absence of a system of check and balances within either party, what the leaders decided became party policy.

Zhang Xueliang and the Xian Incident are also discussed in considerable detail. This is because in the establishment of the Second United Front, the Xian Incident was the most important factor that made it possible. It is justly referred to as a turning point in Chinese history. It is evident that negotiations to reach agreement between the GMD and the CCP had already been initiated before the Xian Incident. There were numerous contacts at different levels besides those established between the CCP and Zhang Xueliang. Evidence also points to the fact that the Soviet Union and the Comintern were adamant in their instructions to the CCP on uniting with Jiang Jieshi to oppose Japan. The CCP, as an affiliated party, was committed to obey the instructions whether it approved or not. There is therefore the contention that even without the Xian Incident there would have been cooperation between the two parties in the war against Japan.<sup>2</sup> The significance of the Incident and that of Zhang Xueliang then loses some of its weight. This dissertation will demonstrate that this was not the case. Without the Xian Incident and its peaceful resolution, developments in and after 1936 could have taken a

different direction. However, there is no attempt in this dissertation to present a comprehensive discussion on the Xian Incident or Zhang Xueliang.

This brief period of Chinese history deserves further study. It is fair to say that neither the CCP nor the GMD have presented a faithful account of their history. Much of what has been written by both the CCP and the GMD historians have been influenced too much by political considerations. Each side justifies its own action and negates the efforts of the other by claiming that the other side was intriguing with the enemy against the interests of China. Too often history was written to serve a political purpose and facts were sometimes misrepresented to support a particular position. CCP and GMD history present diametrically opposite views on the same historical events to glorify its leader and party.

In CCP history, until recently, the GMD and Jiang Jieshi represent all that is bad and evil in China. The CCP alleged that Jiang Jieshi was willing to collude with the Japanese and sell out China to the imperialists, while the CCP and Mao Zedong were the epitome of all that was righteous and noble. Mao was infallible. At every crucial stage of the revolution, he would make a correct analysis of the situation and propose correct solutions and policies. A History of the Chinese Revolution (1983) written by Hu Hua, an authority on CCP

history, is a typical CCP version of Chinese history.

There is no doubt that the CCP and Mao did make some significant achievements, but equally obvious was that a number of serious mistakes were also committed. No one is infallible and no party is without its mistakes. The achievements did not belong to one man, nor can all the mistakes be attributed to "left" and "right" elements.

On the GMD side, similar problems exist in presenting its history. An often quoted work written in Taiwan, Hu Puyu's A Brief History of the Sino-Japanese War (1974) is an example of politicization of history. He believed that the GMD was the only genuine resistance group and that the CCP was sabotaging war efforts and working for a Soviet communist conspiracy for world domination. Some noted Taiwan historians like Wu Xiangxiang (A History of the Second Sino-Japanese War) and Wang Yuting, who have written both on the Sino-Japanese war and the relations between the GMD and the CCP, are so steeped in their original views that it is difficult for them to offer new interpretations. They still harp on the same theme. The allegation that Mao Zedong was only willing to spend ten per cent of the CCP's efforts on resistance continues to be the basis for their analysis of the CCP during the Sino-Japanese war.<sup>3</sup>

In writing this dissertation, I have taken into

consideration the general opinion on this issue both in mainland China and Taiwan. Considering the fact that there has been and is so much misrepresentation of historical facts, this thesis presents, as a starting point, a succinct account of the course of developments and reasons for these developments. In the main, this dissertation is a re-interpretation of some major developments that relate to the the CCP and GMD. The interpretation and analysis are based on the facts presented. I feel this approach is necessary when one sees all the analyses or inferences made on incorrect assumptions.

My understanding of this particular period of Chinese history began with the courses that I took as a History student in the mid-fifties. Over the years, both willingly and unwillingly, my impressions of the period have been reinforced through studies of various kinds. In China, no matter what profession one is in, everyone has to study politics on a regular basis. This study usually centred on the history of the Communist Party and its policies. Discussing Party history for a time became part of the daily routine. Of particular relevance to this thesis was the considerable time and effort that I spent during the Cultural Revolution investigating and studying many of the issues related to what I have written.

For quite some time and like many others, I was involved with investigating both people and events in modern China. It

is not too difficult to see that many revolutionary leaders who were labeled "capitalist roaders" began their political career in the thirties. People belonging to the other camp, the "counter revolutionaries", began their active career during the same period. The tumultuous and dramatic events of those times greatly affected their thinking and the course they decided to take in their life. Any investigation into personal history cannot be undertaken without looking into the historical circumstances in which the individuals lived and worked.

It is not difficult to find people who are interested in and understand this period of history and the relations between the two parties. Many ordinary Chinese who lived through those years can make penetrating observations of the situation at the time. With the serious review of history and historiography in recent years, more people are willing to express views on the past that are different from the orthodox interpretations. Many feel that history should not be judged by abstract philosophical concepts or traditional theories of historical interpretation.

Much of the dissertation was based on the impressions which I have formed over the years through studies and discussions on such issues as the Xian Incident and the attitude of the people and the CCP towards the Anti-Japanese War. Some of the conversations were confidential. Changes in

the academic and political atmosphere have also brought about an increase in works on modern Chinese history. These publications that often include new information, particularly with regard to the CCP, were very useful in writing this dissertation.

I also wish to make clear that some of my conversations were with friends who are sympathetic to the GMD cause and are staunch opponents of the CCP. Their views conform with the traditional position of the GMD. There does not appear to be so much new historical interpretation in Taiwan as in mainland China. GMD material was still important for reference and influenced my thinking on the subject matter. Materials from Taiwan were made available through libraries and friends in north America and Europe.

Obviously, interviews or discussions are insufficient for writing a thesis. Since I decided to write on this subject, I have returned to China twice, and travelled to U.S. and Europe a number of times. Wherever I went, I tried to make use of the time to collect information and material. The material from China was not all from the libraries or archives. Anyone who has worked in China will understand that the system there is quite different from the West. Much important material is not available to the public, and what is available is not always well documented and catalogued. However, it is possible



through certain channels to gain access to useful material including important personal reminiscence:

It is also necessary to note that some accounts of important participants in the events of the period unfortunately do not always present a faithful picture of history. Such works as those by Mao Zedong, Jiang Jieshi can only be used as reference. These works were strongly influenced by personal attitudes and politics. Jiang Jieshi's Diaries are regarded as an authentic account of the Xian Incident, but can they be said to be faithful to the facts when he himself did not write that account and when some crucial information about his exchanges with Zhang Xueliang and the CCP was deliberately omitted? The diary leaves out some important developments as the true facts of what exactly took place in Xian could cause embarrassment for him and the GMD. Selected Works of Mao Zedong are selected according to whether the articles conformed with the current policies of the CCP. Some important articles were omitted.

In writing this thesis, I have tried to use as much Chinese material as possible and consciously cited as many Chinese sources as necessary. The reason for doing so is to use fully the information now available from China. It is in no way meant to belittle the significance or importance of Western historians. Indeed, they have made important

contributions to the understanding of China. There are certainly many commendable works that provide valuable insight into the relations between the two parties. Chalmers Johnson's work Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, The Emergence of Revolutionary China (1962) was an important contribution in offering his interpretation of the growth of the CCP. Lyman Van Slyke's Enemies and Friends convincingly emphasizes the importance of the United Front in the rise of the CCP and discusses the theoretical basis and practical implementation of the front from the 1920s to the 1950s.<sup>4</sup>

However, there are some Western works that are so strongly biased against one or the other of the two parties that they become seriously flawed. A case in point is Tetsuya Kataoka's Resistance and Revolution in China. Although Kataoka's work is an important reference book on the united front, his point of departure for analysis was an strong anti-Communist bias; the basic assumption is that the CCP was a tool of the Soviet Comintern and Stalin and from that he made many inferences. Some of his conclusions such as on the relations between the Comintern and the establishment of the united front may be correct, but they were not based on substantial evidence. His inference that the CCP may have been involved in instigating the July 7 Incident to create trouble is difficult to accept.<sup>5</sup>

I have consciously left out some material which has been

quoted extensively by others. One example is Li An's Hongse wutai. It is quoted by Benjamin Schwartz and even more often by writers from Taiwan in analyzing the early history of the CCP. My reason for not using it is that I do not believe it is a faithful account of history. Some basic facts are misrepresented. Similarly, the two volume work of Zhang Guotao (The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party) is not used. Reading his work, it is easy to detect where the facts are wrong. His description of Mao is also biased. In general, the material written by party defectors or other personal reminiscences has to be treated with discretion.

In contrast, there is Zhou Enlai Zhuan (1989) which I have used quite extensively. That is a major work written by the (CCP) Party Documents Study Group and the volume available is the first part of a two volume work and the result of seven years of going over Party documents and numerous interviews.

The bibliography listed in this thesis is far from comprehensive, and only provides the sources of the basic information and some views expressed in the dissertation. Most Western sources and some Chinese material were obtained through the inter-library loans and the library of the University of Alberta.

Another source of information for this period of history is the Beijing Military Museum. Over the years, that has

often been the place which is the first to reflect the changes that have taken place in interpretation of Chinese history. I spent some time there trying to form an opinion of the war situation and the contribution of the two parties. The information and material recently put out are both revealing and interesting in that there appears to be a more balanced view of the contribution of both parties to the war efforts.

Putting together an account of this period of history has been a challenge. In some ways, it is like putting together a jigsaw puzzle without knowing exactly what the total picture would be like. Finding and selecting the pieces was the first difficulty. Without first hand knowledge one has to rely on what others relate and the credibility of that material can sometimes be questionable. Because of the complexity of the situation and the divergence of views on the same issues, a major difficulty is to decide which are factual and reliable. Wherever possible facts have been compared and verified. Sometimes it has been necessary to make a subjective analysis and deduction of what is more likely to be the truth; but because it is subjective, it naturally can be mistaken.

I have attempted to present the history of this period in as coherent a way as I can. I have tried to highlight the most important events so as to make clear how relations between the the GMD and the CCP developed. In trying to do so, certain

important facts may have been left out and facts selected may turn out to be false. For all these reasons, there are certain to be errors and mistakes in this dissertation for which I am solely responsible. Even so, I feel content in that in writing this dissertation I have broadened my knowledge of a country that has had such a tragic and tumultuous past but one that is certain to play a significant role in the future. Much will depend on how the differences between the GMD and CCP are resolved. As yet, it is difficult to speculate how relations between the two parties will develop. Will they be "friends in adversity", as Jiang Jieshi sometimes liked to say? Or, to use Mao Zedong's expression, will "unity and struggle" continue to govern their relations?

## I. THE SEPTEMBER 18 INCIDENT AND ITS IMPACT ON CCP-GMD RELATIONS

### A. CCP-GMD Relations Prior to September 18, 1931.

The September 18 Incident marked the beginning of Japanese invasion of Northeast China. It did not bring about any significant change in relations between the GMD and the CCP; indeed, the tense struggle that had begun after 1927 with the April 12 Coup<sup>1</sup> continued and intensified after 1931. However, September 18 did bring about important changes to the situation in China; it gave birth to new factors that would alter the political scene and bring about changes in the policies of both parties and the attitude of foreign powers that had an influence on both the CCP and the GMD. It also greatly strengthened the patriotic and nationalistic sentiments of the people. These factors would contribute to the formation of the Second United Front. The September 18 Incident was a catalyst for bringing together a divided Chinese nation in a common struggle against Japanese aggression.

#### 1. The GMD Before 1931

When China entered the thirties, it was in a truly depressing situation. Although Jiang Jieshi had by 1928 managed to establish a central government, he was still in a weak position and could not control much of the country. His coup brought to an end the first united front between the CCP and the GMD and led to a ten year period of civil war.<sup>2</sup> During this period, he considered the Red Army led by the CCP as the greatest obstacle to his efforts at gaining control over the country. Jiang regarded "Bandit suppression as the single most important task of the GMD."<sup>3</sup> In order to accomplish his mission of exterminating the CCP, he first had to consolidate his own camp which was far from united. Within his camp, he had the task of uniting the different factions within the GMD. More important, he had to contend with the warlords many of whom had sworn allegiance to him in name only and were only interested in preserving their own power and spheres of influence. In the years before the September 18 Incident, Jiang Jieshi had to fight a series of wars with warlords.

Warlords continued to be an important feature on the Chinese political scene. Over the years their influence and alignment changed but they continued to dominate a large part of China, each exerting his own influence to best suit his own interests. Several regional warlord armies joined the

National Revolutionary Army formed in 1925 and gave their cooperation, but they still remained independent. These warlords maintained control over their troops, and kept a close watch over any incursion into their real power. And wherever possible, they would try to extend their power.

In February 1929, the National Revolutionary Army held an important conference in Nanjing on the reorganization of the army. A plan was put forward to cut the army to 800,000, but it failed to get the approval of the various warlords. The warlords had, in fact, more men than the central army under Jiang, and none was willing to make any serious cuts.<sup>4</sup>

At this time, the area under the control of the central government was restricted to the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangxi in the Changjiang Valley. Nanjing and the financial centre of Shanghai were under its administration.

South of the Great Wall, the Guangxi warlords controlled the largest area of China. Among them, Li Jishen as Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Army and Chairman of the Guangzhou Section of the Political Council was in control of Guangdong and Guangxi. Li Zongren as Chairman of the Wuhan Political Council controlled Hunan and Hubei. Bai Chongxi in his capacity as Front Line General Commander had his forces stationed in Eastern Hebei.



Feng Yuxiang's sphere consisted of Gansu, Henan, Shaanxi, Shandong, and the outskirts of Beijing. His control over Shandong was weak as during the Northern Expedition, the Japanese had moved into the province to protect their special interests there and they prevented Feng from exercising full control.

Yan Xishan had control of the province of Shanxi, where he had been dominant since 1912. He was also preeminent in Suiyuan and Hebei and exercised control over the outskirts of Tianjin.

Zhang Xueliang dominated the three provinces of the Northeast, although at the end of 1928 he decided to support Jiang Jieshi and let the Nanjing government take control of the foreign affairs of the area. Zhang still retained overall control of Northeast China. One of his principal concerns was to take revenge on the Japanese who had murdered his father in 1928.<sup>5</sup> That was why in spite of many efforts on the part of the Japanese to win him over, he still decided to pledge allegiance to the GMD government.

Then there were the independent provinces such as Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Chahar, Ningxia, Xikang, Qinghai and Xinjiang. In these provinces the influence of the central government was nominal.

In the years immediately following the Northern

Expedition, several armed conflicts broke out between the regional warlords and the central government. The first crisis erupted in March, 1929, when the Guangxi warlords tried to expand their base by acquiring dominance in Hunan. When they decided to replace the Nanjing appointed governor of the province, the central government decided to take action. After a short campaign, the Guangxi troops under Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were defeated.<sup>6</sup>

Li and Bai then contacted the Wang Jingwei faction and the Guangdong army of Zhang Fagui and together launched three successive wars against the Nanjing GMD government in June, September and October. These battles were all fought in Guangdong and Guilin provinces and again ended with the defeat of the Guangxi warlords. At about the same time, in May and later in October, Feng Yuxiang started a civil war in Henan province. He too failed, but the fact that these warlords had all risen against the GMD central government was a cause of serious concern for Jiang Jieshi and the GMD.<sup>7</sup>

Of the Northern warlords, Yan Xishan played an unique role in that his attitude and policies brought about changes to the overall situation. Within the GMD warlord factions, he continuously utilized contradictions and created new ones. When he felt it opportune, he would change sides and faces. His relations with Feng Yuxiang was a case in point. During a

confrontation between Jiang Jieshi and Feng Yuxiang over the control of Shandong province, Yan initially supported Jiang, but decided to remain neutral when the fighting broke out as he believed that Feng could deal a blow to Jiang. He decided to watch and wait. But just as the shooting was about to begin, Jiang bribed two of Feng's commanders to defect with some of 50,000 of Feng's best troops.<sup>8</sup> Yan Xishan knew that if Feng were eliminated he alone would face Jiang in north China and his own position in Shanxi would become precarious. He therefore offered Feng a safe haven in Shanxi, and the two warlords became allies. In July, at a meeting with Jiang, Yan offered to persuade Feng to go abroad and to leave politics. Meanwhile, he encouraged some of Feng's subordinates to rebel against Jiang. When they did rebel, he did not support them as promised. For that Jiang offered him the position of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That did not win Yan over. He remained a source of trouble for Jiang.

For Jiang, it was important to try to win over as many of the warlords as possible, for in spite of some of the successes that he had in fighting them he was still in a relatively weak position. He had to strengthen his political authority. Within the GMD, party veterans Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei had both at one point or another opposed him. At the

time of the Second Party Congress in January 1926, the GMD was still pursuing a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and accommodation with the CCP. At that time Jiang Jieshi leaned more to the left and was supported by the Russian advisor Michael Borodin<sup>9</sup> and Wang Jingwei.

His position aroused the dissatisfaction of the Western Hills faction<sup>10</sup> and that of Hu Hanmin. But this situation changed when he organized the April 12 coup in Shanghai to get rid of the CCP; he won the understanding of the Western Hills and Hu Hanmin factions.

In March of 1929, the Jiang faction convened the Third Party Congress and the Central Committee that came into existence included Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang, but Wang Jingwei, the Reorganizationists,<sup>11</sup> and the Western Hills faction were excluded. Jiang's policy at the time was to try to win over Hu and to ostracize Wang Jingwei. In the midst of the conflict between the different factions, Jiang's position was further strengthened as his central role became more prominent. His maneuvers had enabled him to gain a commanding control of the GMD.

Conflict between the various factions centred on the contradictions between Wang Jingwei, the Western Hills group and Jiang. The left-wing GMD Reorganizationists opposed Jiang's autocratic rule and hoped to force his resignation

so as to return Wang Jingwei to leadership in the party and government. The right-wing Western Hills group was also opposed to Jiang's leading position in the GMD. In their opposition to Jiang, they formed an alliance with the northern warlords, Yan and Feng.

Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang were also seeking to overthrow Jiang; their purpose was to strengthen their regional independence. The different objectives of these two groups in policies had kept them apart, but not having had much success in their endeavors, they now joined in a common effort to challenge Jiang.

During the October war with Feng Yuxiang, Jiang had tried to win the cooperation of Yan Xishan to control Feng. However, Yan was concerned about the possible consequences and gradually, he moved towards an alliance with Feng to oppose Jiang. Nominally the differences were over the Third Party Congress and party rule, which was why the Wang Jingwei group supported Yan. Numerous exchanges took place between Yan and Jiang but it soon became evident that both sides were mobilizing their forces for a showdown along the Longhai Railway in southern Shandong and northern Henan.

On March 14, 1931 a joint telegram drafted by Yan was sent out. In it, he listed Jiang's major crimes: personally appointing representatives to the Third Party Congress and

assuming a dictatorial control of the party; revising the unequal treaties to deceive the people, when his real purpose was to get loans for his own interests; political corruption in the name of reorganizing the army to expand his own forces, and so on.<sup>12</sup> Most of the disputes centred on two issues: the Third Party Congress and the Military Reorganization Conference. On April 1, Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Li Zongren of Guangxi appointed themselves the Commanders-in-Chief of the Chinese Armed forces. Four days later, on April 5, 1931 the Central GMD government issued the order to suppress Yan, Feng and Li. Thus began the Zhongyuan Campaign near the Longhai Railway.

During the months of May and June the battle went well for Yan, Feng and Li. Jiang decided to send a telegram to Wang Jingwei, proposing the convening of a special National Congress of the GMD to resolve some of the problems left from the Second and Third Party Congresses. At the same time he sent emissaries to Shenyang to try to get Zhang Xueliang to arbitrate the dispute and if possible to get his military support. Jiang also offered Zhang the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, a position he had previously given to Yan Xishan. In June, Zhang did agree to help to bring about a truce. At the time, Yan Xishan felt that he was in a favorable position and could force Nanjing

to make some concessions. He demanded that Jiang resign and let others take over political affairs. Wang Jingwei, the Reorganizationists and the Western Hills group, however, were actively advocating the establishment of a separate government and fighting it out with the Nanjing government to the end.

By July the military situation underwent a significant change. The Central Army started to counter attack and took Jinan in August, by which time, Zhang agreed to use his forces to help Jiang. That decision of Zhang decided the outcome of the Zhongyuan Campaign.

When the Central Army was beginning to gain the upper hand, Yan, Feng, Li and their representatives and the Reorganizationists and Western Hills group convened a enlarged meeting of the Central Party Committee of the GMD and decided to establish a rebel government in Beiping with Yan Xishan as head of state. Feng Yuxiang and Wang Jingwei became members of the State Council. This development took place as the military situation for Yan and Feng continued to deteriorate. Feng's forces were unable to get any supplies and weapons promised by Yan and the contradictions between the two forces began to grow. Along most fronts, the Central Army began to get the upper hand.

On September 18, 1930, one year before the September 18

Incident, Zhang issued his famous " Qiao Dian", just nine days after Yan became chairman of the national government in Beiping. In this telegram Zhang expressed his views on why the war must be ended and his determination to bring it to a peaceful conclusion.<sup>13</sup> This telegram decided the fate of Yan. When he received it, he decided to return to Shanxi; he had held office for exactly ten days.

In the Zhongyuan Campaign the forces of Feng Yuxiang suffered the heaviest casualties. When Yan saw that things were not going well, he ordered his troops to begin withdrawing which meant that Feng's forces would bear the brunt of the attack by the Central Army. Through military pressure and bribery, Jiang was able to completely rout Feng's army and the Northwest Army with some 400,000 men collapsed within two months.<sup>14</sup>

That battle in central China turned out to be one of the bloodiest battles fought during the thirties. It is estimated that Jiang's forces suffered 30,000 killed and twice that number wounded, and Yan Xishan's casualties numbered 150,000.<sup>15</sup> Property damage was equally enormous, bringing untold hardships to the population. But that major battle managed to settle temporarily the warlord issue. There was a period of truce between the Nanjing government and the warlords who gave nominal obedience to the central



government. Jiang decided that the best policy for him was to focus on the few provinces under his control and to try to gradually expand his influence to the other regions of China. It was not an easy task; there seemed to be no end to his problems.

In February, 1931, the President of the Legislative Assembly, Hu Hanmin reached an impasse with Jiang Jieshi over the convocation of a National Assembly and the formulation of a provisional constitution. Hu was generally dissatisfied with Jiang's dictatorial imperiousness; Jiang had become a member of the Central Committee without going through the proper formalities. Besides, Hu was also greatly angered by Jiang's decision to name Zhang Xueliang the deputy commander of the Chinese armed forces. He considered this to be an act of patronage to win support and draw people to his side. He did not like the idea of giving this and other posts to people from the Northeast. Relations between Jiang and Hu became very strained.<sup>16</sup>

On February 28, 1931 their conflict came to a head. Jiang decided to put Hu under house arrest in Tangshan, on the outskirts of Nanjing. In protest Hu resigned from all his posts and went on a hunger strike. A week later, Guangdong members of the central committee did manage to get him back to his own residence but he still did not have

freedom of movement.

On March 2, 1931 the standing members of the central committee passed Jiang's resolution on the formulation of a provisional constitution during the period of tutelage<sup>17</sup> and proposed that a committee be set up to draft the constitution. At the same meeting Lin Sen was elected President of the Legislative Assembly and Shao Yuanzhong, the Vice President.

The majority of the Guangdong faction within the GMD was unhappy and uneasy about the detention of Hu Hanmin and soon Gu Yinfeng of the Hu faction left Nanjing. The newly elected President of the Legislative Assembly Lin Sen later followed together with other leaders of the GMD such as Deng Zeru, Xiao Fucheng and gathered in Guangzhou.

On April 30, Deng Zeru, Lin Sen, Xiao Fucheng, as members of the supervisory committee issued a circular telegram demanding the impeachment of Jiang Jieshi for allowing excessive spending, bribery, corruption, usurping military power, murdering revolutionary comrades and illegally abducting Hu Hanmin.<sup>18</sup> This telegram signalled the final split with the central government at Nanjing.

The Guangdong GMD division was the first to respond to this telegram, followed by the commander Chen Jitang of the Guangdong 8th Route Army. Then Wang Jingwei, Chen Gongbo,

Tang Shengzhi, Chen Youren (Eugene), Li Zongren all responded. On the 27 of May, 1931, these members of the central committee and members of the Supervisory Committees from three previous congresses organized a Special Central Supervisory Committee of the GMD Central Committee and on the next day a military government was established with Li Zongren as the Commander-in-Chief of the First Group Army, and Chen Jitang the C-in-C of the Second Group Army. A separatist government came into existence in Guangzhou, in contention with the Nanjing government. That government continued to exist until after the September 18 Incident.

Even though Jiang faced a rebel government in the south, he at least had managed to achieve a truce with the most important warlords. This made it possible for him to once again turn his attention to the CCP, as to him suppressing the CCP was the most pressing issue. To him, the CCP was still a serious challenge. The military and political contradictions and conflicts within the GMD created advantageous conditions for the CCP to develop. By 1930 there was quite substantial growth of the CCP particularly in south China. When war broke out between Jiang and the warlords, the CCP used the opportunity to occupy new territories and recruit new troops for its army.

## 2. The CCP Before 1931

The fact that the CCP managed to survive the coup and see some expansion of its influence did not mean that it did not have serious difficulties of its own. Just as the GMD under Jiang Jieshi in the years before the September 18 Incident faced many problems, the CCP likewise faced serious difficulties. After the April 12 coup in 1927 the CCP was in a precarious situation. Many of its organizations had been crushed and members either arrested or executed. The party as a whole nearly faced extinction. Its primary concern was how it was to survive in those difficult circumstances. From 1927 to 1931 the CCP underwent several changes in leadership and policies. These changes did not fundamentally alter the position of the party as policies were still being made by the Comintern in Moscow. Arbitrary instructions continued to dominate the CCP and it continued to suffer one setback after another.

It was Moscow that provided the CCP with the analysis of the revolutionary situation in China, and told the Chinese when a favorable revolutionary situation in China existed. It was Moscow that often formulated CCP policies and gave instructions on how they were to be carried out, and often against the wishes of the Chinese Communists. To a large extent, it was because the CCP leaders carried out these policies, often incorrect, that it suffered so many defeats

in the early years. Even with these serious setbacks for the CCP, Moscow refused to acknowledge that the situation in China was very unfavorable for the CCP and continued to give instructions to prepare for uprisings.<sup>19</sup> It was in such circumstances that the Guangzhou Uprising was held. When that uprising failed, Moscow could no longer speak of a continuing rising wave of the Chinese revolution. On February 25, 1928, the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern adopted a resolution "On the China Question" stating that China was now "in a trough between two waves". It pointed out that the first high wave of the revolution had passed and that before the emergence of a new revolutionary situation, the duty of the CCP was to prepare for armed insurrection.<sup>20</sup> At the end of April, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a circular approving the Comintern resolution.

Half a year later, in August 1928, the Sixth National Congress of the CCP was held in Moscow. During the "white terror" under the GMD, it was unsafe for the CCP to meet in China. The other consideration was that the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern was being held in Moscow during the same period and it would be easier for the Comintern to give guidance to the CCP Congress. Altogether 170 delegates attended the congress among whom were Zhang Guotao, Zhou

Enlai, Qu Qiubai, Xiang Zhongfa, Xu Teli, Li Lisan, Li Weihan, Liu Bocheng, Wang Jiaxiang and Ye Jianying. The main purpose of the meeting was to draw lessons from the failures of the revolution and decide on new policies in the new situation. Under the direction of the Comintern, the Congress condemned the policy of Chen Duxiu as rightist opportunistic and that of Qu Qiubai as putschist. Nikolai Bukharin, present at the congress as representative of the Comintern, made a report "On the Chinese Revolution and the Task of the CCP" and criticized both Qu Qiubai and Zhou Enlai.<sup>21</sup>

The Congress adopted resolutions on the political question, the peasant movement, the land question, the labour movement, the women's movement, the Communist Youth movement, propaganda and the organizational question in the Soviet regime. It drew up a ten-point programme<sup>22</sup> which included a call to overthrow imperialism, the warlord GMD regime and to unite with the proletariat of the world and the Soviet Union. The Comintern resolution concerning China declared:

In China the future growth of the revolution will place before the Party (CCP) as an immediate and practical task the preparation for the carrying through of armed insurrection as the sole path to the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and to the overthrow of the imperialists, landlords, and national bourgeoisie -- the GMD<sup>23</sup>

A revised constitution of the CCP was also adopted by the Congress in which it was provided that the CCP was a branch of the Comintern and must obey the Comintern's decisions.<sup>24</sup>

At the conclusion of the Congress in September, it elected Xiang Zhongfa as secretary general. Zhou Enlai was elected head of the Organizational Bureau while Li Lisan became the head of the Propaganda Bureau. Liu Shaoqi was put in charge of the Labour Bureau and Peng Bai headed the Peasant Bureau. Qu Qiubai and Zhang Guotao were to remain in Moscow. The newly elected leaders returned to China to carry out the programme and the instructions of the Comintern. Although Xiang Zhongfa was the secretary general, actual leadership was in the hands of Li Lisan who was an intellectual and a more competent person. The Sixth Congress thus marked the beginning of the Li Lisan line in the history of the CCP, later to be known as the Li Lisan left-opportunist line, a line that brought the greatest damage to the CCP and one that still influenced the CCP when the September 18 Incident broke out.

The Central Committee of the CCP held its Second Plenum at Shanghai in June, 1929 and resolved to carry out the decisions of the 6th Congress i.e. to conquer the enemy and win over the masses and to strengthen the revolutionary rising tide. In September various opposition groups led by

Chen Duxiu met in Shanghai to discuss how to win power from Li Lisan. Two months later they were expelled from the party as Trotskyists.<sup>25</sup>

In 1929 the Comintern sent four directives to the CCP of which the letter sent in October was the most important. It gave instructions on what the CCP policy should be: at a time when China had entered a period of national crisis, the CCP should mobilize the masses to overthrow the landlord-capitalist government and establish a Soviet worker-peasant dictatorship.<sup>26</sup>

A conference of delegates from various Soviet areas met in Shanghai in May and passed a political resolution stating that there already existed a revolutionary situation in China.<sup>27</sup> Their basis for reaching such a conclusion was that at the time the large scale war between the government troops of the GMD and Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang was being fought out in Central China and would thus provide the CCP with an excellent opportunity to expand. The resolution stated that armed uprisings should begin and also proposed that a Central Soviet Government be established. The Politburo met at about the same time to discuss the political situation. Li Lisan believed that a national civil war could lead to a direct revolution and the CCP should organize revolts in one or more provinces, the most important being Hubei. In line with his



thinking, the politburo adopted two resolutions which laid out the policy objectives for the CCP and plans for the reorganization of the Red Army. On the political situation, the Politburo resolution stated that China was developing rapidly and evenly toward a revolutionary high tide. It pointed out that workers' struggle in large cities would be decisive in bringing about the high tide. However, without Red Army attacks on cities, local uprisings and mutinies within GMD and warlord armies, the revolution could not succeed.<sup>28</sup>

The resolution on the reorganization of the Red Army also included an attack plan. The Wuhan area was designated as the centre of a general uprising. The CCP forces in the area were to attack the two cities, and the Red Army in other provinces were to be drafted to Wuhan to help carry out the plan. The attack on Wuhan was to be coordinated with workers and peasants uprisings.

In July, the plan of action was carried out. Red Armies marched on Nanchang and Changsha but had little success. Only Changsha was occupied for a few days and the uprising ended in a total failure. In the labour movement, the CCP also suffered severe setbacks. Many of the communists exposed themselves in the political strike and were arrested and executed. Several CCP local organizations were crushed

and the number of party members dropped sharply. During the Third Plenum of the Central Committee in August, Qu Qiubai, who had now been sent back from Moscow attacked Li Lisan for his blind leftist action, and later Li was forced to resign from the politburo.<sup>29</sup> Plans to prepare for a national revolt were abandoned.

In May, 1930 Comintern agent Pavel Mif, director of Sun Yatsen University at Moscow, arrived in China as its representative and with him twenty-eight students of the University, including Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu (Qing Bangxian), Shen Zemin and Wang Jiaxiang. This group of students had studied Marxism and Leninism and came to be known as the "Returned Students Clique" or the "Twenty-eight Bolsheviks." It was mainly due to the patronage of Mif that this group, without any practical experience in leading the revolution, won high positions within the party. At the Fourth Plenum which was dominated by Mif, Wang Ming became a member of the Politburo. During the half year that he was in China, Mif made all the important decisions for the CCP and drafted the resolution of the CCP's Fourth Plenum.

In January 1931, the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, held secretly in Shanghai, formally abandoned the Li Lisan line. Li publicly admitted his mistakes and was sent to Moscow "to study." Zhou Enlai was also criticized.

Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu and Shen Zeming were elected members of the Politburo to replace Li Lisan, Li Weihan and He Chang.

In June Wang Ming was elected acting secretary-general as by this time Xiang Zhongfa had been arrested and executed in Shanghai. Thereafter the party power was firmly in the hands of the Returned Students Clique. However, their political line did not change fundamentally; it was a continuation of Li Lisan's leftist line.

While the leading organ of the CCP was in Shanghai under Wang Ming, the actual strength of the CCP lay in other areas, particularly in Jiangxi. It was in Jiangxi that Mao Zedong had his power base. Mao was the political commissar of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants Red Army with a strength of 10,000 men. Zhu De was the commander of this army. They had joined forces when Zhu retreated to Jinggangshan after an uprising in southern Hunan in early 1928.<sup>30</sup> In July, Peng Dehuai led a military uprising in Pingjiang, Hunan, and organized the Fifth Red Army. He managed to take several districts in the border region of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi before being defeated by the GMD and retreating to Jinggangshan.

At about the same time other Communists were also organizing new CCP bases or armies. Xu Xiangqian organized

2,000 peasants into the First Red Army. He Long was active near the Hunan, Hubei border where he formed the Second Red Army. Other Red armies were founded in Guangxi, Guangdong and northern Shaanxi. These forces were weaker than those at Jiangxi.

The CCP forces in Jiangxi steadily increased in size and influence. To a large extent this was due to the policies of the CCP to win the support of the peasants. The growth of this communist base became a growing threat to the rule of the GMD, and therefore Jiang and the GMD decided to use all their efforts to wipe out that CCP base. Mao in Jiangxi had to face continued attacks by the GMD forces.

### 3. GMD-CCP Relations - Extermination Campaigns

With the conclusion of the Zhongyuan Campaign, Jiang Jieshi was able to concentrate his forces in launching further attacks against the CCP. In December 1930, General Lu Diping, Provincial Governor of Jiangxi, was ordered to suppress the Red Armies and 30,000 troops were sent into the Soviet Area.<sup>31</sup> At that time Mao and Zhu had about 40,000 men under their command and there they adopted the tactics for carrying out guerrilla warfare, principles that were used throughout the Anti-Japanese War. These principles which are now well known included the following:

When the enemy advances, we retreat. We attack when the enemy seeks to avoid a battle. When the enemy halts we

harass them, and when the enemy retreats, we pursue.<sup>32</sup>

These tactics proved to be very effective and the GMD troops that attacked were almost all annihilated.

In February 1931, the GMD government launched a second campaign against the CCP with 100,000 troops under the command of General He Yingqin, Minister of War. They advanced slowly according to a strategy of "Be careful of every step and push forward together" and attempted to encircle the Red forces. However, the GMD forces were unable to coordinate their efforts and as a result were defeated unit by unit. By early 1931 Mao's undisputed role and authority in the Red Army was established. His strategy was to "lure the enemy troops deep and annihilate them one by one." After three months of the campaign the CCP succeeded in occupying half a dozen districts, including Ruijin, and capturing over 10,000 rifles. The second campaign ended in another failure for the GMD.<sup>33</sup>

Jiang Jieshi then assumed the responsibility of suppressing the CCP forces. He went to Nanchang in June 1931 and established his headquarters there. Over 200,000 troops were concentrated in Jiangxi and a third campaign began in July 1931. The government forces advanced along three routes and soon penetrated deeply into the Soviet area. The CCP forces decided to withdraw and avoided battles. District

after district was taken by the government forces without fighting. By the middle of September all the districts except Juijin in the Soviet area were taken by the GMD and the Red Army was being encircled in an ever tightening pocket. To the GMD, it looked as if the successful end of the campaign was in sight when the September 18 Incident took place in Northeast China. The focus of attention of the government and people turned to the disturbing developments in Northeast China and the third encirclement campaign had to be terminated.

B. Japanese Interests in Northeast China and the September 18 Incident.

1. Japanese Interests in Manchuria

Disunity and internal strife in China, lack of a strong central government and international apathy towards China created opportunities for Japan to expand its interests in Northeast China. The world economic crisis of 1929 and its repercussions in Japan made China all the more important in Japan's policy considerations. Domestic and external factors pushed Japan towards adopting an aggressive policy towards China to protect its vested interests.

Japanese interests in Northeast China date back to the victory by Japan in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 and its

victory over Russia during the war in 1905. In 1915 an agreement that included a 99 year lease on the Liaodong Peninsula was imposed on China. By this agreement, Japanese entrepreneurs enjoyed special rights and privileges and were permitted to operate freely in the Northeast.

By 1931 Japan had leased 1,400 square miles of land in the Northeast and had invested 1.2 million yen. It was operating 690 miles of railways. The Japanese owned South Manchurian Railway was a primary instrument of infiltration. It was more than a railway company; it administered schools, the police, and public utilities. It also owned ironworks, coal mines, and controlled the city of Dalian.<sup>34</sup> Faced with economic difficulties during the economic depression, it was inevitable that Japan would look to Northeast China for its supply of vital raw materials.

As Japan's economic interests and influence in the Northeast grew so did Japanese emigration to China. The world economic crisis of 1929 created serious unemployment problems for Japan and emigration to China was one way of easing the pressure. One source gives a figure of four million moving into the two populous areas, the Northeast and Shandong in a single year.<sup>35</sup> Altogether about a quarter of a million Japanese subjects, many of whom were Koreans settled in the Northeast. These Japanese subjects and immigrants all

enjoyed special privileges.

The Japanese had far more than just economic interests in Northeast China. To the Japanese Guandong Army stationed in Manchuria, it was important in that the Northeast could serve as a strategic base against Russia and the United States. With its control of China's Manchuria, it could also push for domestic reforms in Japan.

In spite of growing Japanese presence and influence in the Northeast, the area was politically and economically far closer to the rest of China. The Northeast was still under the direct control of Zhang Xueliang who did not entertain friendly feelings for the Japanese. Almost 28 million of the 30 million inhabitants were Chinese. At about the same time as the Japanese emigrated to China, Chinese from south of the Great Wall also moved to the Northeast in quite large numbers.<sup>36</sup>

Conflicts of interest between the Japanese and the Chinese in Manchuria would inevitably lead to difficulties and disturbances in that area. There were constant boycotts of Japanese goods which seriously hurt the Japanese economy as at that time about forty per cent of Japanese trade was conducted with China. Tensions between China and Japan continued to grow but the situation did not get out of hand until 1931.



Development in the area was affected by several factors. One was the influence of Japanese diplomatic policy. In July 1929, Shidehara Kijuro became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new government and directed relations with China until December, 1931. Although he was opposed to the policy of force of Tanaka Giichi, he still actively pursued the expansion of Japanese interests and was unwilling to relinquish any Japanese vested interests. As a career diplomat, he was more interested in achieving his aims through diplomatic means than in applying military pressure. As a result, he was in conflict with the Army Department over China policy. Within the Foreign Ministry, there were factions that supported the army and those that supported him which sometimes resulted in conflicting directives.

It was during this period when Shidehara was foreign minister of Japan that there was an easing of tension between the two countries. Prior to September 18, 1931, some progress had been made in the tariff negotiations and although Japan was unwilling to negotiate some basic rights relating to extra-territoriality, it did still express willingness to cooperate with the Nanjing government in settling some of the outstanding issues. These efforts did not get very far.

From the Chinese side, there was the pressure of

nationalism. There was a continuing call for the abolition of unequal treaties, a slogan put forward by the Nanjing GMD Central Committee as part of its "Revolutionary Diplomacy". During the Northern Expedition, it was a resounding call for the whole nation. The GMD did make some efforts to resolve the questions of unequal treaties, but at a time when there was civil war among the warlords, there was little that it could do. That slogan lost its practical value and was used by the GMD as a means of coping with the warlords. However, it was still deep in the hearts of the Chinese people, particularly in the Northeast, and did have the effect of putting a damper on attempts for further compromise.

There was pressure from the junior officers of the Japanese Guandong Army in opposing the government in Tokyo and from the growth of militarism in support of the War Department in adopting an independent policy. In April of 1928 Itagaki Seishiro was appointed senior staff officer of the Guandong Army and in October Ishihara Kanji became the director of the staff officers of the Guandong Army. These two officers were considered to be the instigators of the September 18 Incident.<sup>37</sup> They were for resolving Japan's differences with China through the use of force. Soon after their arrival they began to make plans for the occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia. In particular, Kanji, soon after

arriving in the Northeast, started working on a plan to attack Shenyang as part of a scheme to set up a puppet regime in Manchuria. He also contemplated the idea of a future war with the United States and the Soviet Union. The occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia was a precondition for the future war with the West. On the basis of study tours that he took with Guandong Army staff, he formulated his plan for the occupation of the Northeastern provinces and the organization of a new government under the military and political protection of the Japanese. During the third study tour Itagaki's Liutiaohu Plan<sup>38</sup> for the occupation of Shenyang was worked out.

Kanji's thinking was popular with the Japanese militarists and became an important philosophical basis for the adventurism of the Japanese military. He had thought out for the Guandong Army a plan for the future occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia, and he was determined not to let the government interfere with the ambitions of the Japanese army.

Meanwhile in Japan a movement was started to attack the Japanese foreign minister Shidehara Kijuro for implementing a weak policy as seen in his efforts to work out agreements with the Chinese government. Extreme right wing organizations mobilized people to attack Shidehara and to call for the forceful occupation of China. This situation in

1931 paved the way for the militarists of the Guandong Army to carry out their premeditated plans.

Events that developed in the Northeast in that year gave the Guandong Army pretexts for taking the situation into its own hands. In July 1931, Chinese farmers in Wanbaoshan village of Changchun County, Jilin Province, complained that Koreans were digging an irrigation channel that would divert water away from their land. They claimed that the ditch cut across some Chinese owned territory. Although some Chinese troops were sent to the area, no action was taken. On July 2, 1931, two hundred Korean residents came into conflict with the Chinese peasants and fighting broke out. When the news spread to the cities south of the Great Wall, a new anti-Japanese boycott began. At the same time Japanese militarist propaganda stirred up the Koreans who started riots in Seoul and reached other places including Pyongyang. As a result of the Wanbaoshan Incident and clashes elsewhere, 91 Chinese were killed and 102 wounded, and the Chinese quarter of Seoul was destroyed.<sup>39</sup> In this incident reason was on the side of the Chinese but the Chinese government, for fear of a confrontation with the Japanese, did not take any action and only wanted the Japanese government to pay compensation and to apologize. The Japanese were only willing to pay some money for those killed but did not accept any political

responsibility. The GMD government wanted to minimize the incident and instructed the local authorities to seek a solution and ordered the nation not to take any action that would harm the Japanese.<sup>40</sup> It also called on the Shanghai authorities to promote national products as a way of preventing the boycotting of Japanese goods. The primary purpose was to calm down the anti-Japanese feelings that were growing throughout the nation.

However, just two weeks after the Wanbaoshan incident, another incident occurred on July 17 when a Japanese captain was killed by the Chinese Northeastern Army. On June 9, 1931, a Captain Nakamura and four aides, posing as agricultural experts, went on a reconnaissance mission to the Taosu district of Heilongjiang province. At Taonan they were arrested by the commander of the Third Regiment of the Reclamation Army. During their detention, they tried to escape and were shot by Chinese soldiers. News of the incident was not made known until mid July.

At this time the Japanese were also plotting to instigate a rebellion by Shi Youshan in North China. They believed that an attack on Tianjin would tie down the Northeastern Army of Zhang Xueliang and prevent it from interfering with the situation beyond the Great Wall. The Japanese would then have a free hand to attack Shenyang and

solve the issues of Manchuria and Mongolia. The Nakamura Incident provided the Japanese militarists with a pretext to use force on China.

Early in August the Guandong Army repeatedly asked for permission to use force, but the request was rejected by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. An order from the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Army Department was revised by the Minister of War Minami Jiro who on August 20 openly stated that when necessary Japan would use force to make China accept Japan's demands. Four days later the Army Department informed the Foreign Ministry that the army already had a programme and was prepared to use force to occupy Taonan.<sup>41</sup>

At a meeting of army commanders held on August 3, the commanders criticized the Foreign Ministry and an understanding was reached between the Guandong Army and the forces stationed in Korea that an attack on Manchuria and Mongolia would be launched at an appropriate time.

At the time the total number of Chinese forces in the Northeast was 250,000 while there were only a little over 10,000 Japanese troops, so it had to be a case of attacking a larger number of troops with a smaller force. But by 1931 the situation had changed considerably. Most of the best of the Northeastern troops had been moved south of the Great Wall, as a result of the Zhongyuan Campaign and the war

between Shi Youshan and Zhang Xueliang. This left a vacuum in the defence of the Northeast. Only five or six brigades were left in Liaoning; and in Jilin and Heilongjiang, five brigades. All were poorly equipped and unprepared for war. The Japanese believed, and probably knew, that after the initial attack there would not be much organized resistance.

## 2. The September 18 Incident

The Liutiaohu Plan to occupy Shenyang was carried out on September 18, 1931. By this plan the engineering corps of the Japanese army was secretly to destroy that section of the South Manchurian Railway near Liutiaohu and cite this as an incident of sabotage by the Northeastern Army. This incident could then be used as a pretext for mobilizing the Guandong Army in Shenyang, Liaoyang and Fuxun to launch a lightning attack to take Shenyang.

At 10 p.m. on September 18, a special column of 105 Japanese soldiers was sent to the railway tracks at Liutiaohu to prepare for the dynamiting. The designated time for the explosion was 10:30 p.m., it being intended to derail the train from Changchun. However the blast did not damage the train and it arrived at Shenyang on schedule. This was a surprise to the Japanese and the news was reported to Itagaki and Shimamoto. Nevertheless, the plot was executed as planned. Itagaki ordered the 2nd Independent Corps to attack

the North Barracks, and the 29th Infantry Regiment to attack the city of Shenyang. That was the beginning of the September 18 Incident.

Like other incidents in history different sides offer different interpretations of the event. The Japanese could not admit that they had planned the September 18 Incident. In a statement, Honjo Shigeru, Commander-in-Chief of the Guandong Army, stated that a unit of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army of the Republic of China had dynamited part of the South Manchurian Railway and had attacked the Japanese Railway Guards near the North Barracks northwest of Shenyang.<sup>42</sup> From the Chinese side, perhaps the account of Wang Tiehan, a regiment commander of the Independent 7th Brigade is worth quoting. Wang's regiment was one of the few remaining Chinese military units in the Northeast that engaged the Japanese.

At 10:15 p.m. on the 18 of September I suddenly heard the sound of explosions in the direction of the South Manchurian Railway. At that time I was at the regiment headquarters, and thought that they were mines that had been exploded, an occurrence that was quite regular and did not cause much concern, but after five minutes, outside the west wall of the North Barracks, there was the sound of hand-grenades and rifle fire, followed by the sound of gunfire. It was only then that I realized that something abnormal was happening, and immediately called the battalion headquarters. No one answered the call and the same thing happened when I tried to get in touch with the two other regiments that made up the brigade. I found out that both regiments had withdrawn. I myself waited and received an order "not<sup>43</sup> to resist and await negotiations" and then lost touch.



There were at that time more than 10,000 men in the North Barracks, but they had orders from Zhang Xueliang, Commander of the Northeastern Army, not to resist. This order was confirmed by Brigade Commander Wang Yizhe at the time of the Japanese attack. As a result there was only a small skirmish between the Japanese and that regiment of the Chinese army under Wang Tiehan.

By September 20, the Japanese had control of Shenyang and its outskirts, not having met any resistance from the Chinese. At the same time, the troops stationed in Changchun also occupied that city. Troops from Korea crossed the border and occupied Andong and the Eastern Section of Jilin Province.

Before September 22, the cabinet of Prime Minister Wakatsuki and the Army Department were in disagreement over the behavior of the Guandong Army. The Foreign Minister was critical of the Guandong Army in creating war, and the debate centred over the question of "right of command".<sup>44</sup> But Japanese opinion supported the militarists. In addition, responsible members of the government did not dare take on any responsibility. The Emperor knew that the military had gone too far but there was nothing he could do and the situation became irreversible. On September 22, Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro consented to the use of force and

approved requests for military expenditure. From that time on, the aggressive acts of the Japanese were in fact condoned by the government. The Japanese government did not openly stand for military expansion but this did not make any difference to the military in Northeast China; they could simply ignore the government orders.

### C. Repercussions of the September 18 Incident

#### 1. The Government

In fact, about one week before the Incident, Zhang Xueliang had received information gathered by his staff indicating that there were irregular Japanese troop movements and had asked Jiang Jieshi for instructions. The reply came in a telegram of September 16, the famous "Xian Dian" telegram of non-resistance. It read: "No matter how the Japanese army creates trouble in the Northeast, we should not resist or create any conflict. Do not be carried away by one moment's burst of anger and disregard the national and state interests."<sup>45</sup> Zhang Xueliang's later action and that of other officials in the Northeast were all guided by the "Xian Dian" of Jiang Jieshi.

The theoretical basis for Jiang's policy of non-resistance lay in his belief that China's national defence was too weak and any resistance would only bring self-destruction. Four months after the Incident, and after he

had temporarily retired from office, Jiang Jieshi went back to his home town of Fenghua and made a speech there outlining his views on the issue:

Because of the weakness of China's defence, the Japanese aggressors were able to occupy the two provinces of Jilin and Liaoning in twenty-four hours. If we should break off diplomatic relations and declare war on Japan, then because of the weakness of our forces, the coastal areas and the Changjiang River area will be taken by the Japanese within three days and the political, military, transportation, and financial systems would all be disrupted. Although we do not wish to yield, we nevertheless cannot but yield. Sun Yat-sen once said that if China breaks with Japan, it would be wiped out in ten days. This remains true today. I, as premier, do not want to create<sup>46</sup> deliberately this distressing and alarming analysis.

It is for this reason that after the September 18 Incident, the central government at Nanjing and other political, military and party organizations in giving instructions and commands adopted a policy of non-resistance.

Non-resistance was not an expedient policy to cope with the situation. Before the Incident Zhang Xueliang had made clear his position. In response to the growing anti-Japanese movement in the Northeast as a result of Japanese aggressive activities, Zhang sent the following telegram on July 8, 1931 to the foreign affairs and political affairs commission of the Northeast: "Once a war is started, the Northeast is certain to lose. And after the victory of the Japanese, there is bound to be compensation. Therefore, no matter what the attitude of the Japanese is, we must strive

to use reason in our struggle with Japan."<sup>47</sup> On September 6, in a telegram to his Chief of Staff of the Frontier Defence Army and the Political Affairs Commission of the Northeastern Provinces, Zhang Xueliang stated:

At present, in view of the mounting tension in our foreign relations with the Japanese, we have to be especially careful in our dealings with them. No matter how provocative they are, it is imperative that we be extremely patient and tolerant. We must neither resist nor cause an incident. Please immediately instruct your subordinates to strictly observe this order.<sup>48</sup>

This order of Zhang Xueliang is often quoted in GMD sources to show that he was unwilling to resist Japan. But it should again be noted that this order was based on instructions that Jiang had sent to Zhang Xueliang from Nanjing. On July 11 Jiang sent the following telegram to Zhang Xueliang: "The Japanese are sinister and crafty, but now is not the time to resist Japan.... Be sure to warn the masses against any transgressions."<sup>49</sup> Other government officials also expressed the view that the most important task at the time was to resolve the internal chaos caused by the warlords and to warn the people in the Northeast against taking any action against Japan without seriously considering the consequences.

Zhang Xueliang had reasons of his own for not resisting Japanese aggression at that time but what should not be neglected is that his orders were basically formulated

according to instructions from Jiang. As a military officer that was his duty. Still, the fact that he was branded the "Non-resistance General" certainly affected Zhang's later thinking and action.

This series of orders and instruction from Nanjing, Beiping and Shenyang formed the basis for the policy of "self restraint and non-resistance against Japan." The GMD government, however, could not just ignore the aggressive acts of the Japanese. When the news of the September 18 Incident reached the Nanjing government, Jiang Jieshi had left for Jiujiang two days earlier to direct military operations against the Communists in Jiangxi.

An emergency meeting of the Standing Committee of the GMD Central Executive Committee was convened at which it was decided to send a telegram to Jiang urging him to return to Nanjing immediately. At the same time a telegram was sent to the government in Guangzhou to persuade the dissident leaders to put aside their differences and to join Nanjing in facing the national crisis. It also decided to lodge a strong protest with Japan and to submit a complaint to the League of Nations.<sup>50</sup>

After Jiang returned a conference was held at his residence on September 21. It was decided at this meeting that a Special Foreign Affairs Committee was to be set up

for dealing with Japan. Armed forces were to be dispatched to the north to assist in the defence, and plans for a campaign in Guangdong were abandoned so as to try to bring about a settlement with the regime there. On the same day the government also issued appeals to the people and to the armed forces urging them to maintain unity, to keep calm, and to be ready to defend the nation, as well as to have faith in an expected settlement by the League of Nations. In the meantime orders were sent to the Chinese forces to avoid any conflict with the Japanese army.<sup>51</sup> The government was still hoping for a possible peaceful solution to the issue. On the day after the Incident Song Ziwen met secretly with the Japanese Minister Shigemitsu in Shanghai. Song suggested forming a joint committee which would go to Shenyang to prevent an aggravation of the incident and to seek a method of resolving the Manchurian-Mongolian question there on the spot. Shigemitsu twice telegraphed Shidehara recommending that the proposals be accepted. Approval was received in a telegram dated September 20. It was because public reaction in China against Japan was so strong that the GMD government decided to terminate the negotiations for fear that diplomatic compromise might cause serious demonstrations.

On September 22, Jiang spoke at the Nanjing Municipal Headquarters of the GMD again urging patience pending justice

and settlement by the League. In that speech he advised the people temporarily to "resign themselves to adversity." The government policy towards the Incident was "faith in the League of Nations" and "preparation for resistance."<sup>52</sup> These were the two most important elements to the GMD policy after the September 18 Incident.

Jiang hoped that the United States and Great Britain would intervene on China's behalf. But these western nations were in the midst of a serious economic crisis and had no particular wish or will to pay special attention to Asia, as they were more concerned with solving their own domestic difficulties. More important, as shown in history, they would not stand up for the interests of a "poor friend" and risk the possibility of a war with Japan. As to the League of Nations, the investigative commission set up could only eventually put on a superficial act of condemning the Japanese, an act that led to the withdrawal of Japan from the League. If at the beginning of the Incident Japan had any apprehension about launching a war for fear of the reaction of the United States and Great Britain, then these fears were quickly dispelled by the weak and helpless attitude demonstrated by the Western powers. That attitude only served to give a further boost to the Japanese war machine.

Obviously Jiang failed to see, or did not wish to see that the League was not able to help settle China's conflict with Japan. But the fact that he had appealed to the League of Nations at least put his mind at ease so that he could concentrate on his more pressing issue of attaining internal pacification. To Jiang, internal pacification was a necessary precondition to the preparation for resistance.

As part of that process, Jiang sent Chen Minsu and Cai Yuanpei to Guangzhou to urge the government there to dissolve itself and unite with Nanjing. Talks were held on collaboration between Nanjing and Guangzhou. The Guangzhou faction insisted on the retirement of Jiang as a first condition for reconciliation. It would only agree to send a delegation to Nanjing when it had information that Hu Hanmin had arrived in Shanghai from Nanjing where he had previously been detained.

After Hu Hanmin arrived in Shanghai, he was joined by the five delegates from Guangzhou, Wang Jingwei, Sun Ke, Wu Zhaosu, Li Wenfan and Eugene Chen. The Shanghai unification conference convened on October 27 and ended on November 4, 1931. At this conference Wang, Hu and Jiang reached a compromise agreement. Jiang was to accept the supremacy of civilian rule and to relinquish his power in the party. The Central Political Council was to be reorganized to include



three permanent members: Wang, Hu and Jiang with equal authority and veto power in important matters. The government was to be restructured so as to entrust real power to the Executive Yuan or the Cabinet. A constitution was to be drafted but before the constitutional government was established a provisional constitution should be instituted at the provincial level. It was agreed that the Central party headquarters of Nanjing and at Guangzhou would convene their own Fourth Congress; each side was to elect twenty four members of the central committee who would be mutually recognized. The Central Committee thus elected was to meet in Nanjing to hold their first plenary meeting and to carry out political reforms.

The Fourth National Congress of the GMD was formally inaugurated on November 4, 1931. About three hundred and fifty formerly expelled members of the GMD were reinstated. The Reorganizationists of Wang Jingwei were restored, and war criminals of the Zhongyuan Campaign, Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi were taken off the wanted list. A warlord coalition that had broken up was patched together again.<sup>53</sup> The Guangzhou faction with Hu Hanmin as the spokesman of the most important faction became the spokesman for all those factions opposed to Jiang Jieshi. Hu and the Guangzhou GMD leaders issued a demand that Jiang

resign immediately as Commander-in-Chief, in the interest of national unity. Jiang complied and retired from politics on December 15, 1931. The Guangzhou government then dissolved itself.

After Jiang resigned, the Guangzhou faction entered Nanjing and became the centre of the GMD Government there. By a strange turn of events, the Guangzhou faction was propelled to the top of the GMD leadership. Lin Sen became the President of the National government. Sun Ke became the President of the Executive Yuan and Eugene Chen, the Foreign Minister.

The Guangzhou faction thus became the guiding force in resistance against Japan. It was unlikely such a government could be firm in dealing with the Japanese. Its foreign minister, Eugene Chen, had gone to Japan at the time of the Wanbaoshan and Captain Nakamura Incident, and suggested to the Japanese foreign minister, Shiderhara Kijuro, that they should cooperate to oppose Jiang Jieshi.<sup>54</sup> In exchange for weapons, the Japanese would get rights and benefits in Manchuria and Mongolia. Chen did not know that he had approached the wrong person as Shiderhara was at that time precisely opposed to the activities of the Japanese military.

It was not surprising that the Sun Ke Cabinet with Eugene Chen as foreign minister failed to inspire public

confidence. But they did claim that if necessary, the government would make a stand and there were limits to what the government would tolerate. The position of the GMD government was stated in a report of the Special Foreign Affairs Committee.

In our foreign policy, first; under no circumstances must China, in her relations with Japan, be the first to declare war; second: we must do everything to maintain the goodwill of other nations; third: although it is necessary to have every regard for practical interests, whenever necessary we must make military sacrifices to maintain national unity. Thus, if Japan should attack Jinzhou, we must resist in order to maintain public confidence in the government so<sup>55</sup> that China shall not perish through disintegration.

This was to show that "if Jinzhou is attacked, everything would be done to defend it".<sup>56</sup> Events showed that would not be the case.

In the three months from September 18 to December 18, the Japanese after occupying Shenyang, Changchun also took Jilin, Yinkou, Andong, Fenghuang, Harbin and Qiqihar. During the same period disturbances were created in Tianjin and the last Qing Emperor Pu Yi was abducted to the Northeast. Very soon the pressure on Jinzhou began when the Japanese started making bombing attacks on it.

On December 25, 1931 the GMD government sent its order, the first of its kind, to Zhang Xueliang to hold onto Jinzhou to the last, but it could not be carried out, partly because Zhang was suspicious of the motives of Eugene Chen with his

strong connections with Japan. Also, the government in Nanjing was not able to give any financial or military support to the Northeastern Army. No food, arms or ammunition were issued to the army and only orders arrived. It looked very much like a scheme to destroy the Northeastern Army. Before the order was given, the Chief of Staff of the Government, Zhu Peide had testified before the Special Foreign Affairs Committee that it would only be possible to hold Jinzhou for one week at most. There were therefore only two ways out; either hold on without any regard for the consequences; there would not be any support troops from south of the Great Wall, or to seek truce with the Japanese. The order of the Nanjing government to defend Jinzhou was obviously an irresponsible act.<sup>57</sup>

Three days after this order came, another arrived. But the finance minister was still unable to give any money to Zhang's army. Zhang decided to disobey. There were claims that Zhang was afraid that Yan Xishan and Han Fuchu might attack his rear, and it was important for him to defend his position in North China. On January 3, 1932 Jinzhou fell after the defending troops put up a brief resistance on the outskirts of the city. The Japanese were able to take the city of Jinzhou without having to fight a battle.

There was nothing that the Nanjing government could do.

The Executive Yuan under Sun Ke resigned on January 20, after being in office for less than a month. China faced a national crisis without an effective central government.

A few days previously Wang Jingwei initiated a personal meeting with Jiang Jieshi in Hangzhou where they decided that Wang would take charge of civilian matters in the Executive Yuan while Jiang would lead the Army. On January 28, 1932, Jiang Jieshi reemerged and this time he had Wang Jingwei with him to organize the so-called Jiang-Wang coalition administration, with Wang Jingwei as the President of the Executive Yuan, and Jiang Jieshi as the Chairman of the Military Commission, responsible for the campaign against the Communists in Jiangxi province.

## 2. The CCP

At the time of the September 18 Incident, the CCP faced many internal problems that prevented it from reacting in a forceful way. Until early 1930 the Soviet areas were small, active mostly in the south, and therefore far way from events in the Northeast. Furthermore, no strategic connections had yet been established between the various bases. Also, relations between the Soviet area in Jiangxi and Central Committee in Shanghai were strained. Mao Zedong had trouble with those who controlled the CCP. He was dissatisfied with the party leadership under Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan and then Wang

Ming. Likewise, these leaders of the CCP were unhappy with what Mao was doing in Jiangxi. Mao was carrying out a line that differed from their position. As Mao grew in influence, the struggle between them intensified. But since Mao controlled an army and also contributed funds to the party while the Central Committee could only engage in underground work in Shanghai, the party leaders could not disregard him.

At about the same time as the GMD's Fourth National Congress, in November 1931, the First All-China Congress of the Soviets was convened in Ruijin. Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai and other important communists all went from Shanghai to attend the congress. This congress with 290 delegates adopted a Constitution of the "Chinese Soviet Republic," and elected 61 members to the Central Executive Committee with Mao as Chairman. A "Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic" was also set up with Mao as Chairman and Zhang Guotao and Xiang Yin were elected vice-chairmen. Zhu De was elected Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. Ruijin was named the capital of the Republic.

After Wang Ming returned to Shanghai, Mao urged the the Central Committee to transfer its headquarters to Ruijin on the ground that there was "white terror" in Shanghai and it was difficult for the CCP to continue to operate there.<sup>58</sup> Important CCP leaders, including Xiang Zhongfa and Gu

Shunzhang, who was in charge of security in the CCP, had been arrested and turned evidence against the CCP. In November the Central Committee decided to move from Shanghai to Ruijin. Wang Ming was soon sent to Moscow as a delegate to the Comintern and Bo Gu succeeded him as secretary-general. A Provisional Central Political Bureau remained in Shanghai until January 1933 when it also moved to Ruijin.

In response to the situation after the September 18 Incident, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic declared war on Japan in February, 1932. The views of the CCP on the Manchurian Incident as expressed in a "Resolution on the Occupation of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialism" on September 22, 1931, characterized the Incident as a "product of the Japanese imperialists' colonial policy, an unabashed expression of the Japanese plan to seize all of Manchuria and eastern Mongolia by colonizing the Northeast to turn it into a military base for an attack on the Soviet Union."<sup>59</sup>

The CCP saw the September 18 Incident as the "beginning of the carving up of China by various imperialists for colonies, the prelude to the anti-Soviet war, and the first step in a new imperialist robbers' war." The party should therefore arm itself to oppose the imperialists robbers' war. It called on the people to strengthen the anti-imperialist

movement by organizing movements to oppose Japanese imperialism and to prevent it from interfering in the revolutionary war in China.<sup>60</sup>

The GMD discredited the CCP resolution, claiming that the CCP was only taking advantage of Japanese aggression to expand, and instead of fighting the Japanese, the CCP was doubling its efforts to overthrow the GMD government and were thus helping the Japanese. The CCP, however, believed that in fighting the GMD, it was in fact strengthening the struggle against Japan.

In considering the reaction of the CCP to the September 18 Incident, it is important to see the tense and bitter struggle between the two parties at that time. After three extermination campaigns, the CCP could not possibly consider the idea of working together with the GMD to resist Japan. In fact the CCP saw the GMD as actually participating in Japanese aggression in not trying to prevent it in any way. As stated in the same resolution:

Unhindered execution of policy by Japan cannot but be attributed to the shameless surrender of the GMD to imperialism and its sale of the national interest. The GMD government has... ordered its troops to surrender unconditionally to the enemy, permitting millions of working masses to suffer trampling, massacre, rape by Japanese imperialists. After the Incident, they lodged empty protests, carried out 'calm' diplomacy, begged for the robbers' agency (the League of Nations), hoped that the United States would uphold equality .... But in practice they tightened their cruel suppression of the masses' national awareness and anti-imperialists



struggles. The GMD government's surrender to imperialism and the shameless sale of national interest has opened the way for the Japanese imperialists' colonial policy and armed occupation.<sup>61</sup>

The Central Committee also ordered the party to intensify its activities among the GMD soldiers. It declared that the soldiers had been long subjected to the deceitful propaganda of their officers and it predicted that once they recognized the servility and shamelessness of the GMD, they were bound to be rebellious and angry.

Although the Jiangxi government declared war on Japan and issued several declarations, the more urgent issue was still to try to fend off the attacks of the GMD forces, for the fate of the CCP depended on whether the Jiangxi base could continue to exist. The CCP believed that the life-and-death struggle between the revolution and counter-revolution was the basic feature of the political situation in China. Under Bo Gu, the CCP was more radical than under the "left line" of Li Lisan. It continued to put forward adventurist proposals for seizure of cities, for the arming of workers and peasants everywhere and for the holding of strikes in all enterprises.<sup>62</sup>

The position of the CCP after the September 18 Incident was that the struggle against Japanese imperialism was one aspect of the general struggle against imperialism. The GMD was a puppet of imperialism and the overthrow of the GMD was

a precondition for anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist struggle. In the national revolutionary war the Chinese Soviet Government and the Red Army were the fundamental leading force and only workers and farmers constituted the revolutionary core. The national bourgeoisie was an enemy of the revolution.

This radical position of the CCP failed to gain much popular support among the people. Like the GMD, the CCP leadership underestimated the growth of nationalism in face of Japanese aggression, and as a result did not manage to broaden its base of support in the nation as a whole.

Mao Zedong summed up the CCP situation when he stated:

Meanwhile, with the invasion of Japanese imperialists, begun on September 18, 1931, the movement for democracy and national independence throughout the country reached a new climax. The new Central Committee from the very beginning made a completely mistaken appraisal of the new situation arising out of these events. It exaggerated the crisis of the GMD's rule and the growth of the revolutionary forces, and, neglecting the sharpening of national contradictions between China and Japan and the demand of the intermediate classes since September 18, 1931, for resistance and democracy, stressed that Japan and other imperialist powers would unanimously attack the Soviet Union and that the imperialist powers and reactionary cliques and even the intermediate groups in China would unanimously attack the Chinese revolutionary forces, and asserted that the intermediate groups were the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese revolution.<sup>63</sup>

In China, south of the Great Wall, neither the GMD nor the CCP changed its basic policy after the September 18 Incident. Both were still preoccupied with attaining their

primary objectives. Both parties at this time considered resolving domestic problems were still more important to their fate than resisting Japan and their attention was mostly devoted to trying to strengthen their own base. After all, the Japanese were still in Manchuria, still some distance away from Nanjing or the CCP base in Jiangxi.

In the Northeast, however, the situation was different. For the people there the most important fact of life was the occupation of the Japanese, and national contradictions were the overriding concern. There, at the local level, both the GMD and the CCP did play an active role in resisting Japan, though it is generally acknowledged that the CCP was more active in organizing guerrilla warfare.<sup>64</sup> The resistance against Japan by Ma Zhanshan became well known and received warm praise in the nation.

In October, 1931 Ma was appointed commander of the Chinese forces in Heilongjiang Province and acting governor. Because of his popularity in the area, the Japanese made every effort to win his support and even later offered him the post of Defence Minister in the Manzhouguo cabinet. Ma would feign collaboration to obtain badly needed food, weapons and ammunition for his troops.<sup>65</sup> Ma Zhanshan was best known for his defence of the Nenjiang Bridge in Qiqihar in November of 1931. That battle was the first fierce combat

with the Japanese after the September 18 Incident and was carried out in defiance of the government's order for "non resistance". Ma was unable to sustain his defence against the Japanese because he could not get any supplies from the government. By the end of 1932 most of the provincial troops were defeated by the Japanese and Ma and others had to escape by way of the Soviet Union.

The Northeastern Army of Zhang Xueliang retreated south of the Great Wall, but there were still many soldiers who stayed behind and, together with peasants and city residents, they formed various kinds of spontaneous voluntary armies. Most failed but there were some that came under the influence of the CCP to form part of the Northeast United Army of Resistance Against Japan which was basically a combination of various guerrilla forces in the Northeast. Many CCP members such as Yang Jingyu and Zhou Baozhong were sent to the Northeast after the September 18 incident to work in the United Army. At the height of its development, there were almost 45,000 men in that army.<sup>66</sup> Operating behind enemy lines, these forces came to be a formidable source of resistance that the Japanese had to reckon with.

### 3. General Reaction of the Chinese People

Immediately following the September 18 Incident, people throughout the country called for resistance against Japan.

This was a natural reaction to this new act of aggression. China's sovereignty and territory has repeatedly been violated, but seldom had any nation tried to enslave such a large part of the country. Most people felt that for China not to resist was a disgrace that could not be tolerated. They were dissatisfied with the passive policy of the GMD government and demanded action.

Particularly active in the movement to oppose Japanese aggression were the student organizations throughout the country. At the end of September, students from Nanjing and Shanghai demonstrated in front of government offices in Nanjing in protest against appeasement towards Japan and the policy of non-resistance. They marched on the Foreign Ministry, destroyed buildings and attacked Wang Zhenqiang, the Foreign Minister. In October nearly six thousand students from Shanghai went again to Nanjing to protest GMD policy. Later in December over two hundred students from Beiping arrived in Nanjing. On the 17th of December two days after the Beiping students arrived, thirty thousand students from several cities around the country marched on the Party Headquarters of the GMD and clashed with the military police. Thirty were killed, over a hundred were wounded, and many more were arrested.<sup>67</sup>

There were excesses in some of the student

demonstrations, but the government tended to see them as CCP inspired schemes to destroy the government. While it is true that the CCP was active in the student movements, the students were not all following Communist instructions. What made these movements so popular was the patriotism that was displayed. That patriotism was not restricted to students associated with the CCP. In negating some of the student demonstrations, the government failed to see the patriotic enthusiasm of the students who would continue to combat any appeasement on the part of the government.

Also important at this time was the reaction of other intellectuals. It was in response to the domestic and international situation that a League of Left-Wing Writers was formed in the Shanghai in 1930. It was not just the left that was opposed to Japanese aggression. Intellectuals of other political colouring were also moved by the same spirit of patriotism. Together, these intellectuals had an important impact on public opinion.

In fact, people from all circles joined in the movement for national salvation and resistance against Japan. Workers, merchants, industrialists called for boycott of Japanese goods, cutting all economic ties with Japan, and organizing volunteer armies. The movement not only involved people from various circles; it encompassed a large part of

China.

#### D. Conclusion

In the years before the September 18 Incident, the GMD government did make some commendable efforts to restore national sovereignty in initiating talks to abolish unequal treaties and extraterritoriality. Efforts were also made to restore and to develop the national economy with some success. However, by 1931 the national government was still beset with monumental difficulties of all kinds. In 1931 China was hit by one of the worst natural disasters in history with drought in the north and floods in the south. In the same year a separate GMD government was set up in Guangzhou in opposition to Nanjing. At the same time the CCP was determined to strengthen its revolution against the GMD. In the midst of all these difficulties came Japanese aggression. The September 18 Incident exacerbated the national contradictions between China and Japan. But Jiang believed that China as a nation could not react effectively to the Japanese aggression when it was in total disorder. He placed his hopes on foreign intervention and went ahead with trying to attain his primary objective: to achieve internal pacification before all else. Theoretically, it was sound but what should be done to achieve that pacification was very

important. With the GMD regime in Guangzhou, Jiang was willing to adopt a conciliatory attitude as he knew there was no fundamental conflict of interests involved. His attitude towards the CCP was different; he was unwilling to adopt the same conciliatory position he had taken with other factions of the GMD or with other warlords. While the September 18 Incident temporarily suspended the anti-CCP campaigns, it did not change Jiang's thinking nor his determination to eliminate the CCP.

Faced with this situation the CCP could only try its best to ward off the GMD attacks and to strengthen its already weak position. Continued misdirection on the part of Stalin and the Comintern did not bring about any significant change in the position of the CCP. It continued its efforts at overthrowing the GMD; and its call for resistance against Japan was more a slogan than a practical policy.

The reaction of the general public towards this Incident was very forceful. People throughout the country were unwilling to put up with the policies of the GMD government and started organizing their own forces of resistance. In the Northeast, the people continued their armed resistance through guerrilla warfare. South of the Great Wall, people from all walks of life made known their demand for an end to the civil war and all out resistance against Japan. In time,



public opinion would exert an increasing pressure on both parties to change their policies.

Japan understood perfectly the Chinese situation. It saw that China was unable to put up any significant resistance and the Western powers were not going to do anything of consequence for the Chinese. By this time the Japanese military had attained a dominant position in the nation and Japan step by step carried out its premeditated plan and continued its further intrusion into China.

## II. EMERGENCE OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

### A. Further Japanese Incursions in China.

#### 1. North China.

Failure of the GMD government to defend Jinzhou led to further losses in north China. After occupying the three provinces in Northeast China, Japan began to look with increasing interest to Rehe Province. Rehe lay between the Northeast and Hebei and Chahar provinces; it was of strategic importance in that it was a shield for defending Japan's westward move toward Chahar, Suiyuan and Hebei. Beginning in the first half of 1933, the Guandong Army launched a massive attack on that province and soon reached military outposts along the Great Wall, closing in on Eastern Hebei and surrounding Beiping and Tianjin. This was a major Japanese military move following the September 18 Incident. It was another important step in Japan's plan of occupying China. During the battle of the Great Wall the Chinese troops put up a brave struggle against the Japanese and won warm acclaim in the nation.

As pressure on Rehe increased, the governor of the

province Tang Yulin made a joint pledge with Zhang Xueliang to defend the province against Japanese attack. The Acting President of the Executive Yuan, Song Ziwen believed that if the Chinese army made a show of its determination to resist Japanese aggression, both the League of Nations and the United States might show more sympathy towards China and offer assistance. On his arrival in Beiping, he stated that as Rehe was an inseparable part of China, the forces of the nation would be mobilized should the Japanese attack it.<sup>1</sup>

On February 27, 1933 the Japanese army, after attacking Shanhaiguan, advanced along three routes towards Rehe. Without putting up any resistance, the governor of the province Tang Yulin left the provincial capital, Chengde, on March 3 with his family, in spite of orders from Nanjing to the contrary and his pledge to defend the province. The Japanese army occupied Chengde without having to fight any battle. The rest of the province was occupied by the Japanese without meeting heavy Chinese resistance. The loss of Rehe led to a public outrage at the government for not resisting Japan. Zhang Xueliang was made the scapegoat of these developments, and on the 9th, in a meeting with Jiang Jieshi, he handed in his resignation and decided to go abroad.

When Zhang left for Shanghai the Japanese army was

attacking the outposts of the Great Wall and the Northeastern Army and forces under Song Zheyuan were fighting fiercely with the Japanese. The battle of the Great Wall is a story of the heroic struggle put up by the Northeastern Army but very little was made known to the public. The battle began on March 7 and 8 after the loss of Chengde. The first campaign started at Xifengkou, defended by the Northeastern Army under Wan Fuling. The second began on the 8th at Gubeikou defended by the Wang Yizhe brigade which had retreated from Shenyang. At both these points the Northeastern Army put up a brave struggle and suffered extremely heavy losses. When the Central Army under Song Zeyuan arrived to support them, they were already in very bad shape. Song put up a brave fight and much was reported in the newspapers. All the successes that the Chinese army had were accredited to the Central Army and Song; the Northeastern Army was not even mentioned.<sup>2</sup> This neglect of the Northeastern Army would have an impact on the thinking and psychology of its officers and soldiers. It is not surprising that that army would later feel so unhappy with the policies of the central government. On April 4 Lingkou was lost and on the 15th of April the 29th Army under Song Zeyuan had to withdraw from Xifengkou after sustaining heavy losses. The 117th Division that was sent to support the 29th

Army was also made up of many people from the northeast. They too were unable to repulse the Japanese and by May the central army had lost Gubeikou.

Besides not getting sufficient support from other Chinese forces, one of the reasons for these heavy losses was that the Chinese Armies fighting at the Great Wall lacked planning and coordination and as a result did not attack or defend strategic points when they should have done so. The situation in the Chinese forces was chaotic.

On May 26 the GMD government announced that it would be willing to negotiate a truce with the Japanese. Two days later, Jiang Jieshi held a meeting at Lushan in Jiangxi province and on May 28 he authorized He Yingqin to sign the infamous Tanggu Truce Agreement. The agreement designated the area from the Great Wall to Beiping as a demilitarized zone which meant the loss of Chinese sovereignty over the area. The agreement stipulated that all anti-Japanese activities were to be thoroughly prohibited.<sup>3</sup>

This agreement was a sell out of the four provinces of North China including Rehe to the Japanese; and in the buffer zones of Eastern Hebei and Beiping area most of China's sovereign rights were lost. The agreement superficially maintained the ancient capital and the door to North China, Tianjin, in Chinese hands. It was a complete betrayal of

all the volunteer forces behind the enemy lines. All the heroic exploits of the volunteers were drowned under "non-resistance" and written off by the Tanggu Agreement. The agreement marked the end of the resistance of the Chinese army at the Great Wall and made Eastern Hebei and Beiping into a special area, creating favourable conditions for further Japanese aggression against China. After the Agreement was signed Luo Wengan resigned as foreign minister and Wang Jingwei assumed this post. Jiang was satisfied with the agreement for it enabled him to position his forces in North China, something he had been unable to do since the Zhongyuan Campaign.

The signing of the Tanggu Truce was bitterly denounced in the nation. One of the first to react was Feng Yuxiang who together with his generals organized the "The People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army" and denounced the Agreement as soon as it was signed. His 21st Army under the command of CCP member Ji Hongchang soon began operations in Inner-Mongolia. The Guangxi generals and their allies on the Southwest Political Council immediately responded to Feng's call for war against Japan. One of the first things the Nanjing government did after the truce was to resolve the problems with Feng Yuxiang. In Chahar, Feng had organized forces to fight the Japanese but he was not able to get much

support; his own forces lacked unity and split as a result. Surrounded by the Nanjing army and the Japanese, Feng was forced to return to Taishan in Shandong. Most of Feng's forces were reorganized by Song Zeyuan but Ji Hongchang and Fang Zhengwu persisted in fighting the Japanese. Had the GMD government seriously considered resisting Japan, it could have united with these forces. It did not; instead, it used various means to put down this demand for resistance. Many people were seriously concerned with the situation and openly expressed their opinions or gave their advice:

Professor Ding Wenjiang writing in Independent Review, said in his article "If I were Zhang Xueliang": "If I were Zhang Xueliang, I would actively prepare for resistance against Japan." He then outlined his plan for the defence of the Rehe, Eastern Hebei and Great Wall. He wrote this four months before the loss of Shanhaiguan.<sup>4</sup> Then in an article in January 1933 entitled "If I were Jiang Jieshi": he wrote, "If I were Jiang Jieshi, I would: 1. immediately try to achieve unity within the GMD, 2. immediately work for cooperation among the military leaders and 3. immediately discuss with the CCP a truce agreement, the sole condition being that during the period of resistance against Japan, the two parties should not attack each other."<sup>5</sup> Wang Zaoshi's article "War Policy" further proposed that the CCP should

surrender the Red Army to be reorganized by the Nanjing government and sent to the front; it should also end its policy on class struggle. In return the Nanjing government should accommodate the CCP and permit it and other parties to participate in political affairs.<sup>6</sup> These viewpoints generally reflected public opinion in China. Of course none of the advice could at that time be accepted by either of the two parties. But public pressure continued to bear on both the GMD and the CCP.

## 2. The Shanghai Incident.

After the September 18 Incident, while the Japanese continued to make advances in Manchuria and North China, they also launched an attack on Shanghai as part of their effort to divert the attention of the world from developments in Manchuria. On the day the Jiang-Wang coalition was formed on January 28, 1932, the Japanese started their operations against Shanghai. The reason for doing so was explained by the former military attache of the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, Tanaka Ryukichi, who at the time was in Shanghai. He said it was to divert the attention of the foreign powers away from the Northeast:

The Japanese wanted Manchuria and Mongolia to be independent. But foreign reaction was troublesome. The senior staff officer of the Guandong Army, Itagaki Seishiro sent a telegram: 'Foreign attention is very annoying; do something in Shanghai!' And about 20,000 yen was sent over. The purpose in starting disturbances



in Shanghai was to make it easier to set up independent regimes in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Tanaka created an incident between Japanese monks and Chinese workers on the 18th of January, 1932. On that day five Japanese monks were hurt by Chinese workers in a dispute and on the 20th, Japanese youths set fire to the place where the incident took place. In the afternoon over one thousand Japanese demonstrated, demanding that the Japanese Army and Naval forces take action to suppress the anti-Japanese activities in Shanghai. In the demonstration the Japanese smashed shop windows and also demanded the closing down of a major newspaper Minguo Ribao that carried anti-Japanese stories.

Meanwhile the Japanese army made military preparations. After the September 18 Incident, the Japanese increased their naval force in Shanghai. On January 21 they sent an additional cruiser and fifteen destroyers, and on the 24th an aircraft carrier arrived. In the course of the negotiations that took place between the Japanese Consul General Murai Kuramatsu and the mayor of Shanghai, Wu Tiechen, the Japanese issued an ultimatum on January 26 demanding China's acceptance of four demands of the Japanese that included the abolition of anti-Japanese activities and organizations, compensation for the monks, apology to the Japanese consul by

the mayor, and arrest of the instigators. If these were not accepted then Japan would take appropriate measure to protect "the rights and interests of the Japanese Empire." Two hours after these conditions were accepted by the mayor of Shanghai, the Japanese started their attack on the 19th Route Army "to protect the Japanese citizens."<sup>8</sup>

The commanders of the 19th Route Army including the General Officer Jiang Guangnai and Army Commander Cai Tingkai, and Songhu Garrison Commander Dai Ji were determined to resist and made preparations for the defense of the city. For a month there was heavy fighting in the Shanghai area and, in spite of considerable reinforcement, the Japanese could not defeat the 19th Route Army. In the course of the fighting, Jiang Jieshi's 5th Army under the command of Zhang Zhizong joined in the defence, and the bravery displayed by the Chinese soldiers was an inspiration to the Chinese people. However, the Chinese army could not win a battle by bravery alone. It needed the support of the government and continued supplies of weapons and ammunition. These they did not get. The GMD government was still adhering to its policy of non-resistance. Shortly after the fighting broke out, Army Minister He Yingqin send a telegram to Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai and Wu Tiechen asking them to accept the mediation of the various consulates and ordered the 19th

Route Army to "strictly maintain discipline and order, and without orders from higher command, it was not to open fire. The forces at the front must strictly observe this order." <sup>9</sup> The 19th Route Army did not obey the order.

In fighting the Japanese, the 19th Route Army did not get the support of the air force or navy, which were under strict orders from Nanjing not to counter attack, even when the Japanese navy opened fire on the Wusong area on the 3rd of February. The 19th Route Army did not get any extra supply of arms and ammunition, and even their salaries were cut off during the fighting.

The government did not believe the 19th Route Army could defeat the Japanese. He Yingqin's telegram to the 19th Route Army on February 23 stated: " ... in any attack on Japan we cannot win, no matter what sacrifices we make; we have therefore sent Deputy Foreign Minister Chen to contact the Japanese to work on a cease fire as a first step to discussing how to withdraw the armed forces..<sup>10</sup> Wang Jingwei was also anxious to work out a peaceful settlement and in the process tried again to get the assistance of the League of Nations.

Popular reaction to the Shanghai Incident was very strong, with students and workers holding demonstrations, strikes and boycotts. Many formed volunteer groups to join

the 19th Route Army in the fighting. The Shanghai General Trade Union called for a general strike on the second day of the incident and about sixty to seventy thousand workers in Japanese-owned factories stopped work. When people heard about the truce with Japan they demonstrated in front of Ge Taiqi's residence. Ge was the chief Chinese representative in the negotiations; and when he read out the content of the truce agreement, he was hurt by flying bottles thrown by the demonstrators. He had to be sent to hospital and signed the agreement there.<sup>11</sup>

Much of the popular response to the Shanghai Incident was spontaneous. The Nanjing government did not support the resistance. The CCP as a party was not supportive of the 19th Route Army either, although some of its organizations were active in the demonstrations. An article in the Hongqi Weekly said that Cai Tingkai was just as sly as Jiang Jieshi and none of the senior officers in the army were any good. Instead of fully supporting the efforts of the 19th Route Army, the CCP was still calling on the rank and file soldiers to rebel against their commanding officers.<sup>12</sup>

The Nanjing government was anxious to seek a solution to hostilities in Shanghai and again appealed for help from the League of Nations. Several foreign powers were also concerned about Japan's intentions and it was through their

mediation that the Shanghai Truce Agreement was signed. By this agreement, fighting was to end on May 5. If problems were to occur, the four western powers (Italy, the U.S., Great Britain and France) were to investigate. The Shanghai truce agreement also stipulated areas where the Chinese were not to station troops. Apart from the agreement itself, there was also an understanding reached on the redeployment of the 19th Route Army and on prohibiting anti-Japanese activities by the Chinese government.<sup>13</sup> Obviously, the truce was a major concession on the part of the Chinese government.

If one aim of the Japanese was to suppress the anti-Japanese movement, it failed. Japanese aggression further stirred up the patriotic sentiments of the people and the movement for resistance against Japan and national salvation did not abate; it was further strengthened. However, the Japanese did manage to divert international attention for a time from developments in the Northeast. On March 9, 1932 after the 19th Route Army withdrew, the puppet regime of Manzhouguo was established with Pu Yi as the nominal head of state.

The Chinese 19th Route Army and the 5th Army were not able to win a significant victory in Shanghai, but they did deal a blow to the Japanese which gave a morale boost to the Chinese people who had been so disappointed with

developments after the September 18 Incident. The battle in Shanghai also greatly encouraged the fighting spirit of the 19th Route Army which, when later sent to Fujian, rebelled against the policies of the Nanjing government.

B: The Fujian Rebellion and the CCP.

During and after the battle in Shanghai, Jiang Jieshi was concerned with the disobedience shown by the 19th Route Army. He felt that this army that had become heroes in the hearts of the people could be a threat to his rule. To remove that threat, he decided to transfer the army to Fujian to engage in the encirclement campaigns against the CCP. One month after the truce was signed on May 5th, 1932, the 19th Route Army was again assigned to fight the CCP in Fujian Province. It is often stated that in doing so, Jiang hoped that the 19th Route Army and the CCP would destroy each other.<sup>14</sup>

The 19th Route Army started to arrive in Fujian in July of 1932. Its task was to fight the CCP in Western Fujian and Jiangxi, an assignment that it had been engaged in prior to the Shanghai war. The army did take part in some campaigns but its interest was not in fighting the CCP. It was more concerned with fighting the Nanjing government and the Japanese. Most of the men in the 19th Army were tired of fighting a civil war and demanded resistance against Japan.

### 1. The Rebellion.

In the winter of 1933, at the time of the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, Cai Tingkai, Cheng Mingshu, Jiang Guangnai led the Army in a rebellion in Fujian Province and established the "People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China" on November 22 with Li Jishen as chairman. This Fujian government was formed from several anti-Jiang groups, and left-wing politicians, particularly those of the Third Party who had become active after the first CCP-GMD united front. The general programme and policies focussed on two issues: opposition to Jiang's GMD and resistance against Japan. What had happened in Shanghai was an obvious factor in their decision to rebel. The commanders of the Army felt bitter that the GMD government had not supported them during the battle. Their view as reflected in a declaration was: "Now Jiang Jieshi has adopted a totally pro-Japanese policy. If this policy is not stopped, the whole of China will fall before Japan's system of aggression ...."<sup>15</sup>

It was therefore important to struggle against Jiang Jieshi. They opposed the Nanjing government not just for its foreign policy of appeasing the Japanese, but also for its domestic policy in general, accusing it of provoking civil wars and of corruption and inefficiency. They claimed that the Nanjing government did little to improve the livelihood

of the people.

To realize its stated objective, the Fujian government hoped to win the support of other factions of the GMD and other provinces, particularly the southern provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi. Much to its disappointment, it did not get that support. Only Feng Yuxiang in the north expressed firm support but he was too weak to offer any substantial assistance to Fujian after his own failure in Chahar. In seeking support, the 19th Route Army had also taken the initiative in trying to improve relations with the CCP.

## 2. Fujian and the CCP.

Before the Fujian government was established, an "Initial Agreement" had already been signed between the Fujian authorities and the CCP. Since the basic objectives of the two forces were the same, it was natural that an alliance should be formed. In August 1933 Jiang Guangding and Cai Tingkai sent their representative Wu Ming to secretly contact the Red Army at Yanping. Wu returned with a letter from Peng Dehuai that welcomed cooperation with the 19th Army and from that time on, a cease fire was put into effect. The areas that the 19th Army controlled bordered on the Red Army territory. An alliance would remove the threat to the CCP from the east and allow the Red Army to focus on the Jiang



forces on the north. Formal negotiations between the CCP with Pan Hannian<sup>16</sup> as representative and the Fujian authorities were begun, and on October 26, 1933 the Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic signed with the People's Government of Fujian an "Initial Agreement on Resisting Japan and Opposing Jiang Jieshi."

Earlier in the year the CCP had declared its willingness to accept a cease-fire with any hostile force on condition that that force grant civil liberties and permit the formation of a people's militia. This offer was repeated in April to Jiang Jieshi, and again in May to the military authorities of both Fujian and Guangdong. Working out an agreement with the Fujian authorities was an opportunity to put into practice what the CCP had been offering to do.

The Initial Agreement provided for the cessation of all hostile military operations and the resumption of trade between the Soviet areas and Fujian. It also stipulated that Fujian was to release all political prisoners, permit the existence of all forms of revolutionary organizations and guarantee civil rights to the people. There was also a provision for military cooperation once the Fujian government had begun preparations for an anti-Japanese and anti-Jiang campaign.<sup>17</sup>

The agreement benefitted both sides. The Fujian

authorities secured the support they needed for their attack on Nanjing and the CCP managed to drive a wedge in the GMD blockade set up since the beginning of the Fifth Extermination Campaign. Some supplies that the CCP needed were brought into the Soviet area. In fact, if the CCP had really managed to make full use of the opportunity, it could have formed a close military alliance that would enable it to get the support of the 19th Route Army. That would certainly relieve considerable pressure from the Soviet area.

According to Edgar Snow, most of the leaders of the Soviet Government as well as the Red Army were very sympathetic to the Fujian government and were prepared to move their main forces into Fujian and give the 19th Route Army full military and political support.<sup>18</sup> The proclaimed programme of the Fujian government contained elements that were similar to what the CCP stood for. The government promised to abolish all exploitive taxes so as to improve the livelihood of the people. A more radical programme was the land reform policy. According to this programme, all land was to be nationalized and would in turn be distributed equitably for the use of all the peasants. The only way that this differed from the CCP land program was that in Fujian the peasants were not divided into different classes according to their economic status. Twenty percent of the

harvest from the land would be given to the government. The Fujian government also proposed to nationalize forests, mines, waterways and commercial enterprises.<sup>19</sup>

However, the government had difficulty in carrying out all these programs; it lacked the necessary revenue. Fujian had always been one of the poorer provinces of the country. Arable land was limited, as the province was mostly mountainous and within the province there was very little industry to speak of. The people were extremely poor. The government had considerable difficulty in raising money for the programmes that it wanted to carry out. As a result, in some cases extra burden was put on the shoulders of the people. Some programmes could not be implemented. Not being able to do very much, the new government began to lose popular support.

The CCP was very sceptical of the Fujian government from the beginning and became increasingly critical.<sup>20</sup> The official position of the CCP was expressed in a statement of the Central Committee on 5 December. It said that after the establishment of the People's Government, the Fujian authorities had done nothing that was either for the people or revolutionary in nature. All that had come out of Fuzhou were revolutionary phrases and fine-sounding statements. Unless the People's Government took specific measures to

restore civil rights, improve the people's livelihood, and prepare for war against Japan and Jiang, it would be no different from the counter-revolutionary regime it had rebelled against.<sup>21</sup>

The CCP also criticized a third path policy, declaring that there were only two paths: the colonial path of the GMD or the national liberation path of opposition to imperialism and the GMD. Third paths were doomed to failure and those who tried would become tools of the counter-revolution.<sup>22</sup>

On December 20, the Soviet government and the Red Army jointly urged the leaders of the Fujian People's Revolutionary Government to mobilize its forces to immediately begin a decisive battle against Jiang. It also demanded the granting of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and other civil rights.

These statements of the CCP show that it had grave doubts about the Fujian government. As the Fujian government had not brought about any significant change in the situation, the CCP started to make scathing attacks on the government. Cai Tingkai and his government were called running dogs of the imperialists; their slogans for opposing imperialism, warlords, landlords, and corrupt bureaucrats were merely a deception "not to overthrow imperialism and the

landlord-capitalist classes, but to maintain their own rule in order to prevent the masses from becoming revolutionary and from advancing on the Soviet path." They were therefore the most dangerous enemy and they did no more than "shout revolutionary slogans." It declared that "We do not believe that verbal proclamations make a real revolution."<sup>23</sup> The following statement by the CCP reflects the antagonistic attitude of the CCP:

We should grasp the People's Revolutionary Government's every deceit, wavering, superficiality, betrayal, and sell out, and prove to the masses that the government cheats them.... We should increase class divisions and class struggle within the united front. We should lead the masses to resolutely oppose the People's Revolutionary Government and all counter-revolutionary factional revolts so that they come under our leadership.<sup>24</sup>

There were probably a number of reasons why the CCP became so unfriendly. Besides suspicions about the intentions of the Fujian government, opposition by the Comintern was probably another important factor. Edgar Snow's explanation was that at the time Moscow had just recognized the Nanjing Government and still hoped to unite the CCP and the GMD in a common stand against Japan.<sup>25</sup> Whether it was the Comintern that totally changed the views of the Soviet government in Jiangxi is not clear. But it is natural that the CCP should have some misgivings; the 19th Route Army before going to Shanghai had been fighting the CCP, and there were doubts about the

sincerity of this change in its position.

Faced with the criticism of the CCP, the Fujian government did not respond to the CCP demands. In fact it never carried out any serious political reforms or its promise to release political prisoners. It even decided to take measures to restrict communist activities. That it had worked out an initial agreement was more out of necessity than a sincere wish to cooperate with the CCP. From the very beginning the Fujian government openly tried very hard to disclaim its relations with the CCP. On December 22, Li Jishen and Eugene Chen strongly denied Shanghai newspaper allegations that the 19th Route Army had entered any alliance with the CCP in Jiangxi.<sup>26</sup>

### 3. Failure of the Rebellion.

The Fujian government was isolated and its base of support in the province was very narrow. It did not get assistance from the CCP or the southern GMD factions, and it was under heavy military pressure from Jiang Jieshi who decided that there would be no compromise with the Fujian government. After the setting up of the government in Fuzhou, Jiang started sending troops to the area and by December there were between 150,000 and 200,000 troops against the 40,000 of the 19th Route Army. In this situation the CCP did not make a serious effort to assist the Fujian

government. One source said that the CCP did send some troops to help in early January 1934 but it was far too late.<sup>27</sup> With the occupation by the Nanjing forces of Xiamen and Fuzhou on January 10 and January 15, the Fujian government was brought to an end and many of its leaders fled to Hong Kong.

The statement made by the CCP after the failure of the rebellion showed that the CCP did not change its views.<sup>28</sup> When Jiang started the mass attack on Fujian, the CCP ridiculed Cai Tingkai and others for "running away at the sound of a gun and thoroughly losing heart." However, two years after the rebellion, Mao Zedong asserted that the failure to provide full military and political support to Fujian had been a serious error of the Wang Ming leftist line.<sup>29</sup> Mao's later analysis of the Rebellion was correct in that with the support of the CCP, the Fujian government could have lasted longer and thereby pose a serious challenge to the Nanjing government.

It should also be noted, however, that at the time of the rebellion, there was no substantial difference of opinion among the leaders of the CCP. Mao Zedong himself was equally critical of the Fujian government when it was in existence. In a speech at the 2nd Soviet Congress, Mao said that the rebellion was foredoomed to failure because the masses could

see that the rebel leaders were no different from the GMD. He reiterated his analysis of the insincere motives of the rebel leadership and its reactionary attempt to deceive the masses by taking a "third path." His conclusion was that the Fujian government had no revolutionary significance at all.<sup>30</sup>

Clearly Mao's views did not differ from the line taken by the Central Committee.

Evidently Mao Zedong's thinking underwent some significant change after the incident. His change of attitude may have been due to his differences with Bo Gu who defended the policy adopted by the CCP towards the Fujian Rebellion. The mistakes were attributed to the left line of Wang Ming and Bo Gu. If this was so it would be difficult to explain Wang Ming's description of the rebellion as having presented a "most favourable situation" for the Soviet Government and Red Army. The fact that the CCP lost the opportune moment, "was due to mistakes committed both by us and on the part of the 19th Army."<sup>31</sup> Perhaps, he too had learned a lesson.

For whatever reasons, the CCP obviously did miss an unique opportunity to put into practice some of the policies it advocated. The third parties that it criticized were those that it later tried to win over in its effort at establishing the anti-Japanese united Front. Mao Zedong's



later criticism of the CCP policy towards Fujian may also have been prompted by the need to emphasize the importance of forming a united front with all factions that opposed Jiang, including other leaders of the GMD. Failure of the CCP to cooperate with the Fujian government also prevented it from effectively breaking the fifth extermination campaign. This was one of the CCP's historical lessons that is often referred to when the party's political line of this period is analyzed.<sup>32</sup>

#### C. Escape from Encirclement and On the Long March

##### 1. The Fourth and Fifth Encirclement Campaigns

In spite of continued Japanese intrusion into China, Jiang Jieshi was still insisting that internal pacification must be the first priority. On January 1, 1933 Jiang was able to mass a considerable force of 150,000 men to attack the CCP base. Even so he was unable to get very far in his campaign. In part it was because some troops were transferred to the north because the Japanese had taken Rehe and penetrated as far as the Great Wall. In April of 1933 the CCP was able to launch an offensive and the GMD troops were routed. The fourth campaign ended in a complete failure. The GMD suffered heavier losses than in any of the other previous campaigns. One of Jiang Jieshi's crack divisions,

the GMD 11th Division, was eliminated in battle. Jiang considered the fourth campaign to be the "greatest humiliation" in his life.<sup>33</sup> The CCP attributed this victory to Mao's correct line as it claimed at that time the erroneous line of the Central leadership under Bo Gu had not yet managed to get control of the Red Army.

Not long after the fourth extermination campaign began the CCP issued a declaration in the name of the Chinese Soviet Provisional Central Government and Revolutionary Military Commission of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on January 17, stating that in order to oppose Japanese aggression in North China, it was willing to cooperate with all national forces under three conditions. These conditions were that the GMD cease their attacks on the Soviet base areas and the Red Army, grant civil rights to the people and arm the people so as to form volunteer forces.<sup>34</sup> This declaration did mark some change from the previous statements about the national revolutionary war in that it proposed uniting with all other armies in the country for joint resistance.

However, it should be pointed out that these "three conditions" were only raised as a tactical slogan, and its purpose in doing so was to refute Jiang Jieshi's claim that the CCP was "creating trouble in the rear." It was quite

obvious that the GMD could not possibly accept the three conditions or agree to fight together with the CCP against Japan when it was engaged in the fourth extermination campaign.

Just as the CCP did not trust the Fujian government's sincerity in its opposition to Jiang Jieshi and the Japanese, it likewise was sceptical of Feng Yuxiang and others who professed to oppose Japanese aggression. The CCP doubted the sincerity of Feng Yuxiang in organizing a United Anti-Japanese Army in Chahar and in expressing willingness to cooperate with the CCP. In its attitude towards Feng, the CCP shared some of the views of Jiang Jieshi and the GMD. An article in the Hongse Zhonghua said that Feng Yuxiang's purpose in organizing the United Army was "to raise high the banner of resisting Japan and opposing Jiang Jieshi to deceive the soldiers and masses so as to cover up his collusion with the Japanese who were invading Chahar and Suiyuan. What Feng did would only help the imperialist powers in provoking a war against the Soviet Union."<sup>35</sup> It was indeed sad that the CCP failed to see that Feng Yuxiang was sincere in his intentions. Ji Hongchang, one of Feng's generals who later joined the CCP, was particularly active in resisting Japan and even sold his property so as to help finance an armed force. Yet at the time the CCP said that Ji

was an enemy who had more foresight than others, that he was in fact an agent sent by Feng Yuxiang and had ulterior motives in seeking cooperation with the CCP. That attitude of the CCP showed that it was not yet prepared to unite with the other forces for joint resistance.

At the time when the patriotic generals Feng Yuxiang, Fang Zhewu, Ji Hongchang, Wang Yize were leading their forces in the battle of the Great Wall, Jiang Jieshi was at the same time preparing for the Fifth Extermination Campaign. After the Tanggu Truce in May, 1933, there was a temporary peace in northern China which made it possible for Jiang to launch the Fifth Extermination Campaign. It began in October, 1933 and this time he was guided by his German advisers who adopted a strategy of relying on encirclement and progressive economic strangulation. Jiang's troops constructed fortresses and pillboxes as they advanced, tightening the blockade ever more until all outside supplies to the Red Areas were cut off. This campaign progressed slowly and steadily but was temporarily interrupted by the Fujian Rebellion. After suppressing the Rebellion, the GMD resumed its attacks on the CCP.

For Jiang Jieshi the Fifth Campaign was a great success. His new strategy in the campaign was effective. On the CCP side Comintern agent Li De (Otto Braun) had control of the

military activities of the Red Army. He rejected guerrilla tactics and decided to use positional warfare which meant relying solely on main forces and required "attack on all fronts" and "strike with two fists." He was opposed to the tactics of luring the enemy in deep and regarded the shifting of troops as flightism. According to Lin Biao, the reason for the CCP's failure to break the GMD was that "the methods of Comrade Li De resulted in scattering our forces and maintaining a continuous contact with the enemy, which was highly disadvantageous to us with inferior equipment and resources. We were deprived of opportunities to maneuver and to make the best use of our forces by massing them for quick attacks and quick dispersal".<sup>36</sup>

Other CCP leaders also blamed Li De for the CCP blunders in the 5th Exterminations Campaign. Li De had graduated from a Moscow Military Academy when he was sent to China in 1932. After a short stay in Shanghai, he soon arrived in the Soviet Jiangxi area as a military adviser to the CCP. His experience in warfare was limited and he had only arrived in the Soviet area not long before the campaign. He had no knowledge of the Chinese language and yet he assumed supreme command of the Red Army. The fact that the CCP let a Comintern agent take control of its military forces and become a member of CCP leading group reflects the hold

the Comintern and the Soviet Union had on the Chinese communists at that time.

The CCP suffered heavy losses and by the middle of 1934, it was nearly crushed. It was in such circumstances that the CCP decided to break through the encirclement and undertake the Long March. Its stated purpose was to go north to resist Japanese aggression. On April 20, while the CCP was still coping with the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, it issued an important document in the name of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese Armed Self Defence Council entitled "The Chinese People's Basic Programme for Fighting Japan." In it, it put forward six major programmes for resisting Japan. It was signed by 1,779 people including Song Qingling, He Xiangning and Li Du.<sup>37</sup>

This basic programme called on workers, peasants, merchants, soldiers, students and armies to unite. Although it denounced the reactionary nature of the GMD, it no longer insisted on overthrowing the GMD government as a prerequisite for carrying out the national revolutionary war. It also dropped the slogan of opposing all imperialists, and stood for uniting with all enemies of Japan, and with all countries and nationalities that sympathized and aided China or maintained true neutrality. It also proposed the establishment of a Chinese National Self Defense Council to

act as the leading organ in the war of resistance. This was the forerunner of the later slogans for a "National Defence Government" and a "United Army of Resistance Against Japan."

This programme, compared with the ideas behind the "national revolutionary war" and the three conditions set forth in January, 1933 marked a big step forward. But when the programme was put forward, the CCP and GMD were still engaged in a fierce struggle. This document was not published until September 21, 1934 in the Hongse Zhonghua, and in October of that year, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army left the Central Soviet Region and started on the Long March. There was therefore no opportunity for the CCP to implement its programme.

The CCP was not able to do very much to resist Japan and its efforts to support the anti-Japanese forces were limited. This was because it, like the GMD, failed to understand the tremendous changes that had taken place as a result of the September 18 Incident. Its principal objective was to carry further the struggle against the bourgeoisie and the completion of the domestic revolution. It advocated a policy of opposition to the bourgeoisie and even the petty bourgeoisie, and labelled the intermediate groups such as those in Fujian which had conflicts of interests with the GMD Nanjing government and were advocating cooperation to oppose

it as "the most dangerous enemy."

With the left line dominant in the CCP, it was difficult to bring about a truly united front. If the call for a united front had any practical meaning, it would be that the CCP was hoping for a united front from below such as getting soldiers to unite to oppose their officers. Even that would be difficult in view of the CCP's position on class relations. At that time there were few classes that the CCP was willing to unite with. The CCP made many statements on resisting Japan but because of the influence of the radical thinking in the Party and the difficult circumstances it was in, none of them were put into practice.

These new statements, like previous ones, were still put forward more for propaganda purposes. In that, it did make an impact. At a time when the people wanted resistance against Japan more than anything else, the CCP proclamations gained broader support. Although the CCP was unable to practise its united front policy, the various declarations on this issue show that there was a development in its thinking on the united front. There was considerable Comintern influence in the formulation of these policies but the fact that the CCP made them public showed that it began to see the significance of the issue. On the basis of these statements it would later adopt practical measures to establish a united



front. Probably the most significant and important change in the CCP policy took place during the Long March.

## 2. The Long March and the Zunyi Conference

The Long March began on October 15, 1934 with 85,000 soldiers, and 15,000 government and party officials. Some of those that held different views from the 28 Bolsheviks such as Su Yu, Chen Yi and Qu Qiubai were left behind according to a decision of the leading group of three composed of Bo Gu, Li De and Zhou Enlai.<sup>38</sup>

Much has been told about the exploits of the CCP during the Long March. Some statistics would be sufficient to illustrate some of the changes that took place as a result of the Long March. Altogether the Red Army covered 12,500 kilometres. It is generally accepted that the Long March took one year which was the time it took the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to reach northern Shaanxi from Jiangxi. It took about two years for all the three main forces of the Red Army to reach their destination. By then the First Army under Mao had been reduced to about 7,000 survivors. The total number of men from the three forces amounted to about 30,000.<sup>39</sup> The important fact was that the CCP and the Red Army managed, as a result of the Long March, to keep intact a force that in the new revolutionary base was able to expand and develop.

More important was the fact that the CCP underwent important changes in the leadership structure and made important policy decisions that would have a tremendous impact on the future course that the CCP was to take.

When the Long March began the leadership of the CCP was under Bo Gu, Li De and Zhou Enlai; the three made up the leading group which was to direct all operations before and during the Long March. All plans for the withdrawal from the Jiangxi base were made by this group.<sup>40</sup> The political line that dominated the party was still that of Wang Ming and Bo Gu. Following the serious setbacks during the Fifth Campaign, and particularly the heavy losses in the early part of the Long March, the CCP and the Red Army felt greatly disillusioned and disheartened. Dissatisfaction with the leadership and the line of the party led to the demand for an Enlarged Politiburo Meeting that was held at Zunyi in Guizhou Province from January 15 to January 17, 1935. After a very intense debate between the Central Committee and the advocates of a new line that included Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, Peng Dehuai and Liu Bochong, the conference strongly criticized the "leftist deviationist" leadership and its position. The strategy and tactics used in the struggle against the Fifth Campaign was criticized; the organization of the Long March was also

criticized for not having been planned as a "strategic retreat".<sup>41</sup>

Such sharp criticism called for a change of leadership. The result was that the control of Bo Gu, Li De and the 28 Bolsheviks over the party was brought to an end through the reorganization of the Politburo. After three days of discussion, the enlarged meeting of the politburo made the following decisions: 1. Elect Mao Zedong as standing member of the politburo; 2. Appoint Zhang Wentian to draft a resolution for consideration by the politburo and then transmitted for discussion in the Party branches; 3. Redivide work within the standing committee; and 4. Abolish the three-man group and assign Zhu De and Zhou Enlai to take command of the Red Army.<sup>42</sup>

During the meeting, Mao made a long speech in which he criticized the "left" military line and apparently argued for the "utilization of every conflict inside the reactionary camp by taking active steps to widen the cleavage."<sup>43</sup> It would seem that it was time to work for a united front with any group that was opposed to the Japanese imperialists and the GMD of Jiang Jieshi. The past CCP interpretation of the conference was that only Mao had a correct understanding on the importance of establishing a united front to fight Japanese aggression; many other members of the Central

Committee did not fully comprehend the significance of a united front at that time. Actually, the conditions and circumstances made it very difficult for the CCP to formulate a practical united front policy. In that year, the Red Army was under constant military pressure from the GMD. It was fighting every day and exhausted in the effort; and after Zunyi, it crossed China's hinterland, far away from sources of information. The CCP's radio link with the Comintern was disrupted after the Long March began and was not reestablished until after the Red Army reached Shaanxi province. Many of the important changes that were taking place in China and abroad were not known to the CCP and it was impossible for the CCP to formulate any policy until the Red Army had reached Shaanxi. Although the Zunyi Conference did not immediately establish Mao Zedong as the absolute leader of the CCP, it did strengthen his position and with the support of Zhou Enlai and others he was able to begin a process that would bring change to the policies of the CCP.

After the Zunyi Conference, the Red Army continued on its March. The objective was to reach the Soviet base set up in the Northwest in Shaanxi so as to be safer from the GMD attack and closer to the areas threatened by Japan. From Shaanxi they would be in a better position to carry out

resistance against Japan. Not all the leaders agreed with this strategy. In July when the main body of the Red Army, the First Front Army, joined forces in Sichuan with the Fourth Front Army of Zhang Guotao which had come from the E-yu-wan Soviet in western Hubei, conflicts soon arose between Mao and Zhang. Mao and others of the First Army did not want to entrench themselves in Sichuan, far from the anti-Japanese front. Zhang Guotao, a veteran of the workers' movement of the 1920s, however, wanted to compromise with Jiang Jieshi and integrate the CCP troops into the GMD army. The conference held by the CCP at Maoergai on the Sichuan-Gansu border did not resolve these differences. It was decided that the Red Army would push north along two routes. One section of the army continued its march to the North. The other, with Zhang Guotao, remained in Sichuan for a time. Zhang later broke completely with the CCP. His forces came under the leadership of Zhu De who continued the Long March to Shaanxi.

In October 1935, the different units of the Red Army began to regroup at Shaanxi, in the Soviet base held since 1930 by the local Communist leader Liu Zidan. Mao's troops were first joined by those of He Long's Second Army. The Fourth Army, now under Zhu De, which had remained in Sichuan because of the indecisive results of the Maoergai Conference

arrived in 1936.

#### D. August 1 Manifesto and the Comintern

The CCP and the Red Army had to overcome tremendous human and natural obstacles during their Long March. In the process they brought about important changes to the leadership structure at the Zunyi Conference. Also important during the Long March was the August 1 Declaration, probably the most important document issued during the Long March. That declaration marked the beginning of a substantive change in the policy of the CCP on the united front. The circumstances surrounding that Declaration had been obscure in the past. It had been assumed that in the course of the Long March and in line with its stated purpose of moving north to resist Japanese aggression, the CCP, now under the new leadership of Mao Zedong, issued this famous statement. Only recently have the origins of the document and the circumstances under which it came to be issued become clearer. The August 1 Declaration was not the work of Mao Zedong; it was a declaration drafted by Wang Ming under the influence of the 7th Comintern Congress. It is said that it was under the influence of and with the help of the Preparatory Committee of the Seventh Comintern Congress that Wang changed his views and supported the new line.<sup>44</sup> The new united front policy advocated in the August 1st Declaration

was a direct reflection of the general united front policy of the Comintern put forward at its 7th Congress.

1. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern.

The rise of fascism in the world posed a threat to the Soviet Union and to peace and democracy. In order to cope with this situation the Comintern convened the Seventh Congress in Moscow from July to August, 1935. The congress was under the leadership of Stalin and presided over by Georgi Dimitrov, secretary general of Comintern. Chinese representatives at the Congress included Wang Ming, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Zhang Hao, Wu Yuzhang, Zhao Yimin, Kong Yuan, Liang Pu, Ouyang Sheng, and Zhou Heshen.

The most important speech at the Congress was made by Dimitrov, entitled: "The Attacks of Fascists and the Task of the Comintern in Struggling for the Anti-Fascist United Front of the Workers." This report analyzed the international situation and the nature and origins of fascism and decided on the establishment of an anti-Fascist people's front and the strategies of the democratic classes in the struggle. He also reported on the anti-imperialist front of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. With regard to China, he stated that all organized forces that stood for a genuine struggle to safeguard the nation and the people should be united to establish a very broad united front to oppose the

imperialists and their agents. The report analyzed and criticized the close doorism in the international communist movement and called on the parties to wage a struggle against the trend.<sup>45</sup>

The policy adopted by the 7th Comintern Congress was a major departure from its previous one. This policy was formulated mainly out of consideration for the needs of Soviet foreign policy, but it also had a major impact on the international communist movement. At the Congress, Wang Ming made the report "On the Revolutionary Movement of the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries and the Strategies of the Communist Party." He analyzed questions concerning the national united front, the leadership of the proletariat in the united front and close-doorism and other organizational issues. Together with other members of the CCP Comintern delegation, he drafted the August 1 Declaration. He also wrote an article entitled "New Situation and New Strategy for the Bolsheviki and the Comintern" in which he analyzed the basis for forming a united front against Japan and various policies regarding land, industry, commerce, labour, administration and foreign affairs.

## 2. The August 1 Declaration: Its Origin and Significance.

The August 1 declaration was first published on October



1, 1935 in Paris by CCP representatives to the Comintern in a newly set up newspaper, National Salvation. The paper was soon forced to close down as a result of French Government intervention. CCP Comintern representative Wu Yuzhang was sent to Paris where he changed the name of the paper to Salvation Times and from December 9 resumed its publication. Its circulation reached over 20,000 of which half were sent to the overseas Chinese and the other half to China -- Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou Chongqing and even Xikang and Xinjiang.<sup>46</sup>

At the time that the Salvation Times was published the Comintern sent Zhang Hao, Yan Hongran, Liu Zhansheng back to China. At the end of November, 1935 they reached northern Shaanxi bringing with them the August 1 Declaration and other documents of the 7th Comintern. They also brought the secret radio codes which made it possible for the CCP to restore contact with the Comintern and Moscow. One source says that the CCP in Shanghai first received the August 1 Declaration in a telegram which was later relayed to the Central Committee of the CCP. The CCP at that time was still on the Long March.<sup>47</sup>

The general orientation of the Declaration can be judged from the following paragraph:

At this moment when our nation and people are threatened by imminent destruction, the Communist Party once again

appeals to all fellow countrymen: Whatever the past or present differences in political opinions and interests among various political parties, whatever the difference in views and interests among the various circles of our countrymen, and whatever the hostile actions once taken or now being taken by the various armies, all should truly waken and realize that 'brothers quarrelling at home will join forces against attacks from outside' -- first and foremost all should endeavor to stop the civil war so that the forces of the nation (man-power, material and financial resources, and armed forces) can be concentrated in the sacred cause of armed resistance and national salvation. Once again the Communist Party solemnly declares: Provided that the GMD troops cease their attacks on the Red Army, or that any armed forces carries out resistance to Japan, then regardless of old feuds or present conflicts between them and the Red Army, of differences between them and the Red Army on domestic problems, the Red Army will not only immediately cease its hostile actions against them, but will warmly join <sup>48</sup> hands and work together with them to save the country.

The main ideas included in the Declaration are:

1. Chinese affairs should be solved by the Chinese.

However criminal and treacherous the GMD and the Blue-shirts<sup>49</sup> have been, Japan has absolutely no right to meddle with them.

2. All parties and groups and people from all walks of life should put aside their different political views and interests, end the civil war, and unite in the struggle against Japan and for the salvation of the nation.

3. An anti-Japanese allied army should be organized.

4. A national defence government composed of all parties, groups, and professions should be established to carry out the responsibility of resisting Japan and saving

the country by implementing the following measures:

- a) Resist Japan and save the country by the recovery of lost territory.
- b) Relieve famine, prevent floods in order to stabilize people's livelihood.
- c) Confiscate all the properties of the Japanese in China for use in financing the war against Japan.
- d) Confiscate all the properties, grain and land of the Chinese traitors to be handed over to the poor and the anti-Japanese fighters for their use.
- e) Abolish onerous taxes and fees, regulate currency and finance, and develop industry, agriculture, and commerce.
- f) Increase salaries and wages and improve the life of workers, peasants, soldiers and officers, and students and teachers.
- g) Practice democracy and liberty, and free all political prisoners.
- h) Promote free education and provide jobs for unemployed youth.
- i) Carry out the policy of equality for all nationalities in China and protect the freedom of life, property, residence, and the business of overseas Chinese in China and in foreign countries.
- j) Unite with all labouring people that are anti-imperialist and with all nations who are sympathetic to the Chinese liberation movement, and establish friendship with all those nations which maintain goodwill and neutrality.<sup>50</sup>

The Declaration was issued in the name of the Central Committee of the CCP and the Central Government of the Soviet government and in the form of an "Appeal to Compatriots on Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation." It was a

comprehensive document and in several aspects differed from the previous statements made by the CCP. The declaration was not restricted to the united front "from below"; apart from calling on the unity of the workers, peasants, soldiers, students and merchants, it was broadened to include the various parties and factions and people from various sectors and circles and from all nationalities. It put forward the slogan "Those who have money give money; those who have guns give guns; those who have food give food; those who have labour power give labour power; and they who have special skills contribute their special skills." This slogan would include in the united front landlords, capitalists and all armies.

The Declaration stood for establishing a "National Defence Government, an "Anti-Japanese Allied Army and a General Headquarters for that army. Jiang Jieshi was not included in the united front, but all parties were called to forget their prejudices and together fight against Japanese aggression.

The Ten Point Programme put forward in the declaration was no longer issued for a tactical purposes. The situation in North China became increasingly dangerous after the signing of the He-Umetsu agreement.(See D.4. below) It was a sincere call on people from all circles to engage in

consultations and negotiations to discuss practical work to save the nation. It made clear that the CCP was willing to be the initiator in these endeavors.

The August 1 declaration marked the formation of a basic strategy for establishing a National United Front. Because of its appeal to the general population on an issue that was deep in the hearts of the people, it won warm support. From that time on, the united front line work of the CCP entered a new stage. Later declarations of the CCP on the United Front were based on this declaration.

Some people in the CCP had in the past criticized the Declaration saying that it did not mention the dictatorship of the proletariat and that it lacked class analysis. In fact, to have written about the dictatorship of the proletariat would have been totally inappropriate. It would also have been incorrect to stress class analysis and divide people into left, middle and right or progressive and reactionary elements; it would have had little appeal.

The August 1 Declaration did not include Jiang Jieshi in the united front, but very soon Wang Ming began urging the inclusion of Jiang and the GMD. On 15 August he issued another statement in the name of the CCP Central Committee declaring that the CCP did not want to see the death of Jiang Jieshi and that rumours to the contrary were enemy

propaganda. Earlier he stated that the CCP was willing to form a united front with any party if only that party's armies ceased attacking the Red Army and opposed Japanese aggression.<sup>51</sup>

Wang Ming's change of attitude had to do with the overall orientation of the Comintern's 7th Congress. It was also influenced by his analysis of the situation in China following the losses by the CCP during the exterminations campaigns and the Long March. He realized that the Red Army was too weak to defeat Japan and that the GMD was still a very strong and influential party. He believed that a united front with Jiang Jieshi was possible and that, in order to promote this, it was necessary for the CCP to modify some of its policies. Moreover, there was at that time contact between the GMD government and the Soviet government to discuss the possibility of cooperation between the two countries against Japan. Wang proposed that, instead of overthrowing Jiang, the CCP should unite with him and view his army as the main force in the anti-Japanese struggle. He suggested replacing the former slogan of "oppose Jiang and resist Japan" with a new one: "unite with Jiang to resist Japan." The Jiuguo Bao (Salvation Daily), edited by CCP Comintern members, also indicated that under certain circumstances, Jiang and the GMD might be included in the

united front.<sup>52</sup> These views were very different from those that Wang Ming formerly stood for. They were probably too far to the right for the CCP in China to accept, particularly with regard to the inclusion of Jiang Jieshi.

In previous analyses of CCP history, much was oversimplified. There were many serious errors and mistakes during this particular period of history and they were attributed to the left line of Wang Ming. There were also some achievements; these were all made part of the contributions of Mao Zedong. In connection with the United Front, the CCP statement of January 17, 1933 on the three conditions for cooperation of all the national forces to resist Japan and the August 1 Declaration were all attributed to the correct line of Mao Zedong. In fact the above documents were not put forward by Mao but by Wang Ming and CCP representatives to the Comintern and under the direction of the Comintern. From the time of the September 18 Incident to August, 1935, Mao Zedong did not write a single article or make any speeches that dealt with the national united front.

When compared with the previous thinking of Wang Ming and the 28 Bolsheviks, it is true that Mao's position was not as radical, as is reflected in his writings. In Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist? (October, 1928) he wrote that the national bourgeoisie did not benefit either

politically or economically from the GMD government and in the The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains (November, 1928) he did not agree to pressing too hard on the middle classes. This goes to show that Mao's policies regarding the handling of classes was more moderate. Even so, his thinking was still some distance from regarding the national bourgeoisie and other middle classes as a motive force in the revolution or as friends in the struggle against Japanese imperialism and with whom to be united. That, in part, explains Mao's attitude towards the 19th Route Army and the Fujian Rebellion.

Previous CCP interpretation of the struggle within the party was extremely dogmatic. It appeared to be so clear cut; there was a correct line represented by Mao Zedong and there was always the other incorrect line of the opportunists. The facts show that very often this was not the case. If Wang Ming represented the leftist line or the adventurist line, then his August 1 Manifesto or his later statements certainly were not radical when compared with other pronouncements of the CCP. Of course, the August 1 Declaration may not have been a reflection of his own personal views but rather the views of the Comintern and Stalin. Nevertheless, it does seem that after the August 1 Declaration was issued, his views were consistent. They were



by then even more moderate than Mao's views and were a significant contribution to the formulation of the CCP united front policy. It is clear from what happened during this short period that not all of Mao's statements were correct, but his views should be understood within the context of the specific conditions in China.

It was naturally easier for the Comintern and the CCP representatives in Moscow to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the GMD and other parties. This was because they were far away from the facts of life in China, far from the cruel massacre of revolutionaries by the GMD in which many senior CCP leaders had lost their lives. At a time of white terror, it was not easy to unite with those who had turned against the revolution in order to fight against a common enemy. It was only after the lessons were drawn from the setbacks and failures in the revolution that the CCP began to understand how class relations after the September 18 Incident had changed and that the CCP policy should change correspondingly. This could only be possible after the completion of the Long March when the CCP was in a more secure situation. It would still take time for the CCP to be able to devote serious effort to the work of the united front policy.

The August 1 Declaration did have the effect of shaking

the close doorism of the past and made possible the creation of a new strategy. It marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of the united front; previous CCP calls for the united front had been for one "from below", with work done among the lower strata of the society such as the peasants, workers and soldiers of the GMD armies. After the August 1 Declaration, attention was paid to trying to form a united front at the upper level, "from above."

Another change was that the focus was no longer just on "opposing imperialism to safeguard the socialist motherland-- the Soviet Union." The CCP had regarded the destruction of the GMD as a necessary step in the resistance against Japan which in turn would help to protect the Soviet Union. The August 1 Declaration, though it still calls for opposition to the GMD government and Jiang Jieshi, stressed that the Japanese attack was directed against the whole of China and not just against the Soviet Union; it called on other sections of the population including the members of the GMD and the Blue Shirts to join in the fight against Japan.

This declaration became widely known by the end of the year and, needless to say, had an important influence on the patriotic movements in Shanghai and elsewhere. The prestige of the CCP was greatly raised. People on the left moved closer to the CCP and the middle of the roaders, including

people like the president of the lawyers's association, Shen Junru, and Wang Zhaoshi, Zhang Naiqi and others leaned more to the left. To most people, there was less concern about what the long term objectives of the CCP were. The immediate issue was how to resist Japan.

### 3. Impact of CCP United Front Policy on Zhang Xueliang.

The CCP calls for a united front against Japan affected the thinking of many people in the GMD. In Northwest China, it influenced the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies of Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. At the time of the Fujian Rebellion, Jiang had sent a telegram to Zhang Xueliang urging him to return from his trip abroad and assist him in his efforts. On February 7, the Nanjing government appointed Zhang the deputy commander of the Henan-Hubei-Anhui bandit suppression campaign and acting commanding general for Jiang Jieshi in Wuhan. As a result of this appointment, the Northeastern Army was deployed west. Zhang was not enthusiastic about his appointment and did not put his heart in the anti-CCP campaigns; he was becoming more interested in resisting Japan, and in removing his label of a "non-resistance general."<sup>53</sup>

An incident that took place in Wuhan University would leave a deep impression on him. One day when he went to visit the university after assuming his new senior post, the

President of the University and other university officials all waited to receive him but not one student showed up. Zhang was quite perplexed. Then at one point, all the windows of the student dormitories suddenly opened and students popped out their heads and shouted in unison: "Oppose the policy of non-resistance!", "Oppose the non-resistance general!" and then all windows closed. Although the president apologized profusely, Zhang was thoroughly disturbed and could only put on an uneasy smile. He said the students were all patriotic and no action should be taken against them.<sup>54</sup> Obviously Zhang was very unhappy in spite of his high position and was disappointed with the policy of the GMD.

#### 4. GMD's Policy Toward Japan and the He-Umetsu Agreement.

Here it necessary to make clear the GMD policy towards Japan since the Tanggu Agreement. At the end of the Fifth Extermination Campaign, and the departure of the CCP for the Northwest on the Long March, Jiang was highly optimistic about the future. He was jubilant, greatly encouraged and, according to Zhou Enlai, was at the zenith of his power.<sup>55</sup> Jiang Jieshi believed that his policy of internal pacification was proving to be a success. He wanted to establish a united, stable China under his leadership and,

for the time being, he was convinced that he should avoid confrontation with the Japanese. His thinking is clearly reflected in his speech in July, 1934 at Lushan Military Officers Training Corps on "External Resistance and National Revival" and his article "Friends or Enemies?" published in October of the same year in Foreign Affairs Review.

In his speech at Lushan, he analyzed the military preparedness of the Japanese and their intention of breaking the hegemony over East Asia by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. China as a nation was backward in everything and totally unprepared to resist Japan at a time when it was faced with countless crises. Therefore, the military cadets should strengthen their united will, pool their resources, overcome material difficulties through spiritual control, and in so doing, make preparations for resistance against the foreign enemy. The fundamental policy was to first seek domestic peace, stability, unity and centralism. He put forward the eight character slogan: "Faith in the party and nation, internal pacification before external resistance." 56

In his article he called on the Japanese to seek a peaceful and rational solution to the problems between the two countries so as to avoid a war. He stated that everyone in China knew that Japan was not China's enemy and there was

a need for the two countries to join hands. If the differences between Japan and China could be resolved, then it would help to improve the world situation and prevent a war between Russia, the U.S. and Japan. He warned that if the Japanese military did not repent, and end its aggression against China then the war between China and Japan would destroy both countries. He stressed that if the GMD should fall, then the Japanese should be aware of what kind of regime would likely follow and the effect it would have on the situation in East Asia. He was in fact pointing to the threat of the CCP and the Comintern under the direction of Moscow.<sup>57</sup>

On January 22, 1933 the Japanese Foreign Minister in a speech at the Diet stated that the government should adopt an attitude of non-aggression and non-interference. This speech appeared to be in harmony with Jiang Jieshi's statement and for a time there was an atmosphere of friendliness in relations between the two countries. This was followed by the meeting in Nanjing between Jiang, Wang Jingwei and the Japanese ambassador and the commander of the Japanese forces in China. Wang Zhonghui of the Foreign Ministry was sent to Tokyo to meet the Japanese Foreign Minister and exchanged an informal statement of three principles. Both sides would agree to seeking a peaceful solution of differences between

the two nations through friendly negotiations and on an equal footing.<sup>58</sup>

In this atmosphere, both Nanjing and Tokyo gave the impression that they were seeking to improve relations. Although the Japanese refused to negotiate the return of the three provinces of Northeast China, they did publicly state they had no territorial designs on China. Still, the Chinese were asked to prohibit anti-Japanese activities so as to promote friendship between the two countries.

On February 20, 1935 the GMD government ordered all newspapers in the nation to prohibit publishing anything that was anti-Japanese in nature or speeches and articles that discriminated against the Japanese. Efforts were also made to get the GMD party organizations at various levels to abide by the regulations of the government.

Meanwhile, the GMD government did appear as if it were also making some preparations for resistance in announcing new military appointments and reorganizing the military structure. But that was all it did. Nothing else was done, partly because the CCP had not yet been wiped out and partly because relations had improved with the Japanese to the extent that Jiang began to have some second thoughts about what should be done and whether it was the time for military preparation. The improvement in relations with Japan led to

the raising of diplomatic representation from consular to ambassadorial level.

In Japan there was still opposition to this improvement of relations. Some believed that the GMD policy of seeking to improve relations with Japan was an expedient measure to resolve its economic problems and it was difficult to see what the true intentions of the GMD were. They were opposed to a conciliatory attitude and expressed their independent stand by putting pressure on the Beijing Military Commission to demand the withdrawal of GMD forces from North China and removal of the chairman of Hebei province -- Yu Xuezhong. These demands were put to the Chinese on May 27, 1935, just two years after the Tanggu Agreement. They were presented to the Chinese in a form of an ultimatum, stating that "there was no room for discussion."<sup>59</sup> The Japanese were just informing the Chinese of the decision of the Japanese army.

The Nanjing government immediately instructed its ambassador to Japan to meet the Japanese Foreign Minister so as to get it to bring some pressure on the army. Nanjing also expressed willingness to withdraw the seat of the Hebei government to Baoding so as to avoid a conflict. The Japanese government did not intervene and the Nanjing government authorized He Yinqin to exchange a memorandum later to be known as the He-Umetzu Agreement on June 10, 1935



with the Japanese commander. The GMD government bowed to all the demands of the Japanese army. For fear of public reaction, the Nanjing government censored all news about this agreement and not one word about it was mentioned in the press. At the same time it issued an order prohibiting all activities directed against Japan or that discriminated against Japan.

There was immense dissatisfaction with the policy adopted by the GMD. Even some staunch supporters of the government such as Hu Shi, writing in the Duli Pinglun <Independent Review>, expressed concern with the censorship of the government. He complained that information about what was happening in north China and the severe conditions put to the Chinese were all coming from foreign sources.<sup>60</sup>

At the end of June, the Japanese army again created trouble in Chahar, and again the GMD government compromised. The commander of the 29th Army, Qin Dechun and Doihara Kenji signed an agreement and the chairman of the province Song Zeyuan was replaced.

Jiang Jieshi still hoped he could work out a long-term settlement with Japan. In the summer of 1935, he approved a peace plan proposed by Chinese ambassador to Japan, Zhang Zuobin. This plan provided for Japan's cancellation of all unequal treaties with China and the establishment of economic

co-operation, in exchange for Chinese acknowledgment of Japan's domination of Manchuria. The most important part of the plan was the provision for a Sino-Japanese military agreement.

E. Contact Between the GMD and the CCP.

1. GMD Contact with the Soviet Union.

Within the context of trying to work out a settlement with Japan, Jiang also believed that opening channels to the Soviet Union might be useful. This would make Tokyo more apprehensive about pushing China closer to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, if Japan's demands proved unacceptable, better ties with Moscow would be of some assistance in efforts to resist Japan.

There was a further reason why Jiang adopted this unusual policy towards the Soviet Union. That was because in spite of the repeated appeals he had made to the Western powers, he did not get much support from them. In fact, the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1935 prohibited the sale of weapons to China. This attitude of the United States encouraged the GMD government to turn to the Soviet Union for possible financial and military assistance.

On the Soviet side, Stalin was concerned about the German-Japanese discussions on a possible anti-Soviet

alliance. A high-level Japanese mission had arrived in Berlin in the spring of 1935 to begin talks on anti-communist cooperation. Regarding China, Stalin thought that a united front under Jiang Jieshi would make Japan's Guandong Army less likely to strike north against the Soviet Union. He may also have believed that CCP revolution against the GMD might drive the GMD closer to Germany which was already the major supplier of military supplies and expertise to the GMD and had been actively involved in suppressing the Communist bases in Jiangxi.<sup>61</sup>

In the spring of 1935 Jiang asked Deng Wenyi, the military attache at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow to contact the Soviet government.<sup>62</sup> On October 18, 1935 Jiang met with the Soviet Ambassador to China, Dimitri Bogomolov, and hinted at the wish of signing a military agreement with the Soviet Union. At the end of the year, because of the support shown by the Soviet Union for resistance against Japan, Jiang then sent Chen Lifu and Zhang Chong to Moscow in order to hold consultations with Soviet Union on the possibility of an anti-Japanese alliance. Early in the spring of 1938, Chen Lifu arrived in Moscow very much in secret and held talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov.<sup>63</sup> As a tactical measure, Jiang asked his representative in Moscow to indicate to the Russians that the GMD wanted a political

settlement of the problems with the CCP and that his representative would meet the CCP representative in Moscow. Jiang reportedly stated to the Russian Ambassador that so long as the CCP was willing to recognize his authority and the Nanjing central government, the GMD would open negotiations with the CCP. It was shortly after that direct contact between the two parties was established.<sup>64</sup>

## 2. Contact Between the GMD and the CCP

It was indeed a major policy change of Jiang Jieshi in deciding to initiate secret talks with the CCP after engaging in ten years of civil war. The direct cause for this change was the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relationship after the North China incident. The North China autonomous movement convinced more and more people in the GMD that China could and should resist Japan. Jiang himself felt that war with Japan was inevitable and attempted to resolve some of the differences with the CCP.<sup>65</sup>

Contact between the two parties was established through two channels. Chen Xiaolin on behalf of Chen Lifu contacted the Northern Bureau of the CCP through Professor Lu Zhenyu of Beijing Zhongguo University. The other channel was to get into touch with the CCP organization in Shanghai through Madame Song Qingling. The Northern Bureau and the Shanghai Committee sent Lu Zhenyu and Zhang Zihua to hold initial

talks with the representative of Chen Lifu, Zeng Yangfu. Zeng Yangfu was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the GMD, head of the CC clique and former mayor of Guangzhou and had been asked by Chen Lifu to initiate talks with the CCP.<sup>66</sup> He participated in most of the negotiations with the CCP from the end of 1935 to 1936. In initiating direct talks, Jiang Jieshi was hoping to improve his relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, improving relations with the CCP could be an asset in his negotiations with Japan. He was also hoping it might be possible to entice the CCP to surrender to him.

In the preliminary discussions the GMD was represented by Zeng Yangfu, Chen Xiaolin, Zhang Chong and Chen Lifu who was the chief representative, but not present at the meetings. On the CCP side there were Jian Baizhan, Lu Zhenyu and Chen Lei; later the central committee decided to send Zhou Xiaozhou, and then Pang Hannian who was also a representative of the Comintern and the CCP negotiator with the 19th Route Army during the Fujian Rebellion. At these meetings the CCP made clear that it wanted to end the civil war and unite to fight the Japanese. The GMD stated it was willing to fight the Japanese and discussed with the CCP specific issues such as the ending of military confrontations, establishing a national defence government

and a united army for resisting Japan, reorganization of the Red Army and the guerrillas in the south, allowing freedom of expression, release of political prisoners, and ending the land reforms.

The GMD demands as stated by Jiang Jieshi were:

1. Belief in the three people's principles; 2. Obedience to the command of Jiang Jieshi; 3. Abolition of the Red Army which would be reorganized as a part of the national army; and 4. Abolition of the Soviets to be reorganized as local governments.<sup>67</sup> These conditions were unacceptable to the CCP and the negotiations that took place in Nanjing and Shanghai did not make much headway. Each side was probably wary of the true intentions of the other.

The GMD hoped that it could negotiate directly with CCP leadership. The desire was relayed to the CCP through Madame Song Qinglin. She gave Dong Jian, a priest and former CCP member, a letter to be delivered to Mao and Zhou. Shanghai CCP member Zhang Zihua was to accompany him. To reach the north Shaanxi, surrounded by troops of the Northeastern Army, it was necessary to get the approval of Zhang Xueliang. Hence, Zhang became aware of the intentions of the GMD government.

The CCP readily accepted offers to hold talks with the GMD because it had by this time begun to attach greater

importance to the work of the united front. Leaders of the CCP were quite active in seeking some form of cooperation with the GMD. In the autumn 1935, Zhou Enlai met with Zeng Yangfu, and expressed through him to the Nanjing government the hope that the GMD would send representatives to consult with the CCP. The sole purpose would be to speedily end the civil war and together fight the Japanese. There were no other conditions. On September 1, 1935, Zhou Enlai wrote to Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu expressing his appreciation for the position taken by them on unity with the Soviet Union. He restated the sincerity and hope of the CCP in calling for cooperation between the two parties, and hoped that they would convince Jiang Jieshi to end the military action and to implement a policy of unity with the Soviet Union and the CCP to fight together against Japan. Zhou made clear the CCP's willingness to engage in concrete negotiations with the GMD, and hoped that he could be able to meet the two Chens personally.<sup>68</sup>

The Nanjing government decided to send Zhang Chong, a member of the GMD Central Committee, to visit the CCP areas to evaluate the actual state of affairs. He took a military plane from Xian to the CCP base and then to the CCP battle fronts. At that time northern Shaanxi was under the area controlled by the 67th Army under Wang Yizhe. As Wang

saw these developments between the GMD and CCP take place, he became more determined to adopt a more independent attitude. From that time on, he permitted free contact and communication between the Red Army and the Northeastern Army. These activities later also led to contact at a higher level between the two armies.

Another aspect of the CCP 's work at this time was to send people to try to win over those with influence and power including Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng and Yan Xishan. In the Southwest, there were Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Li Jishen. In Yunnan, Liu Xiang, Liu Wenhui, Long Yun and in North China, Feng Yuxiang, Fu Zuoyi, Song Zheyuan. From many of the reminiscences now available, it is evident the CCP sent quite a number of CCP members or sympathizers to work among them and to try to get their support.<sup>69</sup> Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi also wrote letters, made speeches supporting the position of these people on resisting Japan and offered to work together with them. It was clear that the CCP was taking concrete measures to bring about a united front. This initiative of the CCP did bring about some changes to the situation.

### 3. Contact Between the CCP and Zhang Xueliang.

Contact and talks between the CCP and GMD greatly affected Zhang Xueliang who was supposed to be engaged in



commanding the GMD forces in suppressing the CCP. His feelings generally reflected the sentiments of the Chinese people:

After the September 18 Incident, we mistakenly believed in the League of Nations and other peace organizations and that reason would prevail; that right could control might and made one concession after another, always hoping for external assistance. Now it is time to wake up from this dream. Our only way out is to rely on ourselves and seek life in death. The government should mobilize the masses and struggle against Japanese aggressor to the end.

Zhang Xueliang became more and more disillusioned with the campaigns to suppress the CCP. He was far more concerned with external resistance and made clear his reluctance to fight the CCP, saying that "Sacrificing oneself in the suppression of the CCP is not nearly so worthy as dying in the fight against Japan."<sup>71</sup> As Zhang Xueliang became more preoccupied with resisting Japan, he got more involved with people and events that related to the resistance movement.

Li Du, commander of the Jilin Self Defence Army and active in fighting Japan, expressed to Zhang Xueliang his desire to return to northern Manchuria and organize the people there to resist Japan. To return to Manchuria, however, it was necessary to travel through the Soviet Union and Li said he would have to get in touch with the CCP to do so. Zhang Xueliang, in the midst of his enthusiasm for resisting Japan, agreed to Li's request and financed his

trip.<sup>72</sup> The trip did not get through but it sowed the first seed for contact with the CCP. Zhang Xueliang would use that contact in his later dealings with the CCP.

Zhang Xueliang's change of attitude had partly to do with his setbacks in the battles against the Red Army. The many losses in September of 1935 brought added concerns and worries. His 67th Army under Wang Yize had been dispatched to northern Shaanxi in July. In September it encountered the CCP's 15th Army Regiment under Xu Haidong and Cheng Zihua and was badly defeated. The 110th division of that army was totally lost and its commander He Lizhong was killed. He Lizong had been a heroic commander who had fought well in the battles after the September 18 incident and his loss made Zhang Xueliang feel all the more keenly the senselessness of fighting a civil war when China was facing Japanese aggression.

One month after He Lizhong's death, Zhang Xueliang was sent to the Northwest and on October 3, 1935 the Northwest Bandit Suppression Headquarters was set up at Xian with Jiang Jieshi as the Commander-in-Chief and Zhang Xueliang the deputy commander and Acting C-in-C. Within Zhang's Northeastern Army, Gao Fuyuan's 127th Division stayed on in Baoding, Yu Xuezhong's 51st Army was sent to Gansu and Wang Yize's 67th Army remained in north Shaanxi. The 57th Army

and the 105th, 106th and 111th divisions were directly under Zhang Xueliang.

Very soon the Fifth National Congress of the GMD was held in Nanjing. By this time the Japanese Foreign Minister's attitude underwent some change under pressure from the military, and the following principles were declared, known as "Hirota's Three Principles": 1. China's suppression of all anti-Japanese movements; 2. Sino-Japanese-Manzhouguo economic cooperation; and 3. Sino-Japanese joint defence against Communism.<sup>73</sup> In the North, the Guandong Army fanned up the independence movement and arrested Chinese officials that did not support them. Even in this situation Jiang's position, as expressed during the GMD's Fifth Congress, was still against active resistance. Hirota is said to have told the Diet on January 21, 1936 that the Chinese government "has accepted the three principles proposed by the Empire."<sup>74</sup>

While attending the Fifth Congress, Zhang Xueliang returned to Shanghai and met his neighbour and friend Madame Song Qingling. Song Qingling had always been opposed to the policy of the Nanjing government and encouraged Zhang to be more active in resisting Japan, and suggested that only in this way, could he rid himself of the label "non-resistance general."

In Shanghai, Zhang also had numerous other friends such as Shen Junru and Wang Zaoshi who were all leaning towards ending the civil war and resisting Japan. In his conversations with them, Zhang made known his opposition to continuing the civil war and his support for resisting Japan. These conversations all greatly strengthened his resolve to fight Japan. However, after the Congress, his instructions from Jiang were to fight the CCP. It was with mixed feelings that he returned to Xian. He offered to resign from the Northeastern Army but his subordinates were very critical of him for the idea:

We Northeasterners left our homeland and followed you down south of the Great Wall but in our hearts there was the hope that one day we would be able to return home and now you want to leave us. Do you not have any feelings at all?

Have you forgotten the death of your father? Have you forgotten the just cause of fighting the Japanese? You are just seeking further promotion and blindly follow the leader. Don't you feel for the sacrifices of the Northeastern Army? Aren't you driving the Northeasterners against the wall?<sup>75</sup>

Such statements helped to bring about a radical change in Zhang Xueliang's attitude and policy. Furthermore, on his return to Xian, he was influenced by the feelings of his subordinates, particularly those that had been captured by the CCP in the campaigns. Regiment Commanders of the 107th Division Gao Fuyuan and Wan Yi of the 110th Division returned to Xian after a period of training in Northern

Shaanxi with the CCP. When they met Zhang Xueliang, they made clear to him that the CCP only wanted to unite and fight the Japanese and stressed that the Chinese should not fight each other. These former prisoners of the CCP were assigned to their former regiments and resumed their command. This naturally had an impact on the soldiers of the Northeastern Army. Another fact that influenced the situation in Xian was that members of the Northeast Anti-Japanese National Salvation Society such as Wang Zhuoran, Gao Chongmin, Wang Huayi and Lu Guangji were all gathered in Xian. They all encouraged Zhang to resist Japan.

Then there was Yang Hucheng of the Northwestern Army. He was reluctant to fight the CCP; he complained that compared with the Northeastern Army and the Central Army, his forces were very small, ill equipped, and in financial difficulties. In such circumstances, Zhang had had to provide some financial support to Yang's army in the campaigns against the CCP. However, when Zhang Xueliang's own 109th Division was defeated by the CCP, he totally lost interest in fighting the CCP.

At this time, Zhang Xueliang's friend from the Northeast, Gao Chongmin wrote a pamphlet Huolu (Way Out) arguing for unity between the people of the Northeast and Northwest and unity to fight Japan as the only way out of all

the difficulties. Zhang felt ever more strongly that if the Northeastern army should end the fighting with the CCP, he would not be alone and he would at least have the support of the Northwestern Army.<sup>76</sup>

Since Zhang intended to end hostilities with the CCP, he thought of the contact that Li Du had made with the CCP and got in touch with him. Li then introduced him to Liu Ding. At Xian, Liu Ding explained that he had been a former member of the CCP, had been captured and then released. Although he could not represent the CCP, he could put Zhang in touch with the CCP in Shanghai. He later received a report from the CCP that they would be willing to meet but not in Xian. At about the time of the GMD's Fifth Congress, Zhang Xueliang met Pan Hannian, the representative of the CCP, in a Western restaurant in the western suburbs of Shanghai. Zhang was uncertain of Pan's status within the CCP and was reluctant to engage in in-depth discussions. Although nothing came out of the talks, it was clear that Pan Hannian relayed to the CCP leadership that Zhang would be willing to consider working with the CCP.

#### 4. The December 9 Movement and Its Significance.

In spite of the many political negotiations being carried on at various levels, between the GMD and Japan, the Soviet Union and the CCP, and between the CCP and Zhang

Xueliang, nothing of any significance came out of them and the situation in North China continued to deteriorate. On the 24 of November 1935 the "East Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council" was established with Yin Rugeng as chairman. It became the first Japanese puppet regime south of the Great Wall, and brought additional pressure on the government. The aggressive policy of Japan in North China aroused a new upsurge of patriotism. It was amidst this crisis in North China that Jiang made his famous statement on policy towards Japan: "We would never abandon our efforts for peace until the hope for peace is completely gone; nor would we lightly talk about sacrifice until sacrifice becomes our last resort."<sup>77</sup>

Japanese aggression and the passive policy adopted by the GMD government led to mass protests around the nation. First and foremost among them were the student demonstrations. Of particular importance was the December 9 Movement in 1935. On that day the students of Beiping held mass demonstrations to oppose the autonomy movements of the five North China provinces and to demand mobilization of the nation to resist the enemy and granting of freedom of speech, assembly and other civil rights.<sup>78</sup> Students planned to present a petition to He Yinqing. As Acting chairman for the Beiping Sub-Council of the Military Affairs Council, He was

the highest GMD authority in north China. Ever since he signed the He-Umetsu Agreement, he had been labelled pro-Japanese and had been the target of students demonstrations. On that day He Yingqing refused to meet the students. Later in the afternoon, students marched towards the Japanese legation and were blocked by the Chinese police who turned water hoses on them, driving the students away. The police also beat the students with clubs and arrested those who failed to escape.

Despite these suppressive measures the students were not intimidated; the next day most of the students in universities and high schools throughout the city were on strike, demanding the release of those who had been arrested. On December 16, students from nearly all high schools and universities in Beiping succeeded in evading the police and the 29th Army and reached Tianqiao at the south end of the city, shouting slogans along the way. The crowd soon grew to 30,000 and a rally was held, followed by a demonstration parade. The planned procession was to pass through the foreign legation area but was blocked by the troops of the 29th Army. In the evening at 9 o'clock students were attacked and dispersed by the troops. Not too many were hurt as many of the soldiers were in sympathy with the students' cause.<sup>79</sup>

As a result of the December 16 demonstrations the



inauguration of the Hebei-Chahar Political Council was postponed. Its significance lay in that it gave further impetus to the students movement. The fact that the students clashed with the police and that the movement spread to most of other cities in the country gave it prominence in the nation.

The December 9 Movement was a mass struggle waged under the leadership of the CCP and from the very beginning it received warm support and response from the whole nation. Public media, various organizations and famous patriotic people from all over the country issued statements supporting the just struggle of the students. Not only that, people from other circles also held demonstrations, strikes, boycotts in big and small cities to condemn Japan and the policy of the GMD government.

It is clear that many of the leaders in that movement were CCP members or members of the Chinese National Vanguard, an organization close to the CCP. The reason that this was possible was that by the end of 1935 the CCP had restored and developed its activities in the GMD controlled area. A Northern Bureau was established in Tianjin and some of the leaders of that Bureau included Gao Wenhua, Ke Qingshi, Li Dazhang. Leaders in the Beijing, Tianjin underground organizations included Peng Tao, Huang Jin, Wang

Xueming, Yao Yilin, Zhou Xiaozhou, Ling Feng, and Huang Hua, Jiang Nanxiang and Song Li and others were among the student leaders.<sup>80</sup>

With the outbreak of the December 9 movement, the national salvation movement reached a new high tide. Mass popular support for resistance against Japan was an important factor that helped the CCP to adopt a new approach to the question of the united front. After the conclusion of the Long March, the CCP had by now established a new base in northern Shaanxi. Many of its grass root organizations were again functioning. Its August 1 Declaration had been made public and there was increasing demand for unity and resistance. These factors and the December 9 Student movement laid down the foundations for carrying forward the movement to establish a united front. It was for this purpose that the CCP decided on December 20, 1935 to hold a meeting of the enlarged political bureau of the Central Committee in Wayaobao, Shaanxi.

##### 5. The Wayaobao Conference. (1935.12.17 - 1935. 12.25)

The meeting was attended by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu, Wang Jiaxiang, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Fa, Li Weihan, Ge Hongtao. The Zunyi Conference had resolved some of the military problems but the political line of the CCP still needed to be clarified as the domestic political situation

had undergone immense changes.

A puppet regime had been set up in Eastern Hebei and Japanese aggression reached deeper into China. In Shaanxi, the Red Army faced the Northeastern Army of Zhang Xueliang. What policy should the CCP adopt toward this army was a practical issue that had to be resolved. The most important task of the meeting was to determine the tactical lines to be adopted in the new period of the revolution. At this meeting, Bo Gu still had doubts about broadening the united front and whether it was wise to let the national bourgeoisie enter the front. He did not feel that the middle forces could be relied on as they seemed to him to be the most dangerous, nor did he believe that it was possible to split the bourgeoisie class. After considerable debate and the expression of sharply different opinions, the political bureau passed the "Resolution on the Present Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party" on December 25. It analyzed the situation and set the party's line: to mobilize, to unite, and to organize all forces in China to oppose the main enemy -- Japanese imperialism and the chief traitor Jiang Jieshi. The resolution stood for establishing a National Defence Government and a United Army of Resistance Against Japan as measures for carrying out a Ten Point Programme. The Resolution of the Conference changed the name of the

government from the Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Republic to the Soviet People's Republic to broaden the appeal of the CCP and also made adjustments to some of the Party's policies.<sup>81</sup>

This resolution in many ways was just as important as the August 1 Declaration, as it reflected further development in the strategy of the CCP on the question of the united front. The united front enunciated in this December resolution was to be formed "from below" and "from above," with the emphasis on "from above" as all those who were opposed to the Japanese imperialism, including the national bourgeoisie, were to be included regardless of individual origin, parties, groups, and classes. However, it singled out Jiang Jieshi as an enemy along with the Japanese imperialists to be opposed: "Our Party's tactical line will emerge victorious in the mobilization, incorporation, and organization of all revolutionary masses in the struggle against the arch enemy in the present stage, Japanese imperialism, and against the chief traitor of the people, Jiang Jieshi...."<sup>82</sup> Mao Zedong did not believe that it was possible or necessary to include Jiang in the united front. According to Li De, the Comintern censured the Wayaobao resolution's call for the overthrow of Jiang.<sup>83</sup>

The rural policy of the resolution showed a change from the past radical policy of the "poor peasant line" practised

in the Jiangxi Soviet period. Under the new rural policy, rich peasants in the Soviet areas would enjoy the same rights as the poor peasants in the distribution of land. Landlords were included in the united front and were given political rights, but their right to own land was not mentioned. Still, the resolution repeatedly stressed the importance of the solution of the land problem as well as the fundamental principle of linking the agrarian revolution and the national revolution.

On December 27, Mao made a report "On Tactics Against Imperialism", in which he analyzed the characteristics of the national bourgeoisie and the possibility of their participating in the united front and of a split within the landlord and compradore class. He cited the Fujian Rebellion as an example to emphasize the importance of utilizing that split to strengthen the united front.<sup>84</sup>

The resolution of Wayaobao and the report of Mao Zedong were the most comprehensive statements of the Party on the national front for resistance against Japan. The conference ended the leftist close-doorism line which was regarded as the main danger within the Party and established within the CCP the strategy of establishing a broad united front. It was after this conference that the movement was developed in earnest.

After the Wayaobao conference, in the work of formulating the United Front, the focus of attention was on trying to win over the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies of Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng and to make that a central link to the strategy of forcing the GMD to resist Japan. Once a united front in the Northwest was established, the CCP would then promote an united front in the whole country. These were the important strategic considerations of the CCP. The Wayaobao meeting was very important in leading to a transition from the civil war period to the war of resistance.

### III THE TURNING POINT -- THE XIAN INCIDENT

#### A. Major Developments in 1936

##### 1. The CCP 's Eastern Expedition and the Revolt of Guangdong and Guangxi ("Liang Guang").

Nineteen thirty-six was an important and eventful year that culminated in the Xian Incident in December. For the CCP, the year began with efforts to consolidate and to expand its base in Shaanxi and at the same time strengthen its attempts at forming a united front for resistance against Japan. These were the two principal concerns of the CCP after it had set up a new base. To demonstrate its sincerity in resisting Japan, it needed to put into practice the many declarations that it had made. At the beginning of the Long March it had stated that its purpose in moving north was to fight the Japanese aggressors. Having now completed the March and passed the important Wayaobao resolution, it was time to take concrete action. The CCP was deeply concerned about Japanese aggression in the Hebei and Suiyuan area of north China and strongly felt the threat of Japanese aggression to China's sovereignty and survival which would naturally affect its own future. One possible strategy was

to send the Red Army east into Shanxi province where it would be nearer to the front and could support Chinese resistance in North China. The CCP would also be able to propagate its united front policy and, in the process, win more followers and consolidate and expand its territory.

Possibly a more important consideration for an Eastern Expedition was that the CCP felt in the richer province of Shanxi it could get hold of much needed supplies and relieve some of its economic difficulties. The CCP base in Shaanxi suffered from a serious shortage of grain and supplies.

In an interview with Edgar Snow, Zhou Enlai explained the difficult economic situation in Shaanxi compared to that of Jiangxi which was far from a rich province. The population of the Jiangxi Soviet numbered three million, whereas in Shaanxi it was at most 600,000. In Jiangxi and Fujian people could bring bundles with them when they joined the Red Army; in Shaanxi, they did not even bring chopsticks; they were utterly destitute. The peasants were extremely poor and their land very unproductive. The Red arsenal in Jiangxi could turn out 500,000 shells per month; but in Shaanxi very few were made.<sup>1</sup> A pressing issue for the CCP was to find some solution to this difficult economic situation. In the richer Shanxi province the Red Army could replenish itself and bring back supplies.



There was a difference of opinion within the CCP and considerable debate over whether this expedition should be undertaken. Some members expressed concern that the Red Army might be destroyed in the process. At the end of the Long March, the Army was reduced to a force of no more than twenty thousand men. A small poorly-equipped Red Army would not make much impact on the military situation in north China. Besides, the CCP could ill afford to sacrifice all that it had managed to preserve during the Long March in fighting against the Japanese without first consolidating its own base area. However, Mao Zedong insisted that the CCP could strengthen itself both politically and economically in moving into Shanxi province and it was decided that an Eastern Expedition would be launched.

The Red Army crossed the Yellow River in western Shaanxi on February 20, 1936 and advanced into Shanxi Province. On March 1, Peng Dehuai, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, issued a formal declaration of the objectives of the "Eastern Expedition". In it Peng stated that the Red Army was marching east to confront the Japanese aggressors. He denounced both Jiang Jieshi and Yan Xishan for their traitorous activities which had put the country in danger, and called on all nationals, regardless of their party affiliations and origins, to unite with the Red Army for the

common task of resisting Japanese imperialism.<sup>2</sup>

In connection with this Eastern Expedition, the CCP also issued a circular telegram on March 10 entitled "Convocation of a National Congress for War of Resistance Against Japan and National Salvation." It called for immediate convocation of the national congress, formally establishing a national defence government and joining all forces against Japan. It also urged the government to declare war on Japan, abrogate all unequal treaties between China and Japan, mobilize the armed forces to fight Japan, organize the people of the nation to participate in the battle and formally establish a national defence government and an united army of resistance against Japan.<sup>3</sup>

The Red Army initially did not meet much resistance and took over forty counties of Shanxi. Wherever it went, it propagated the united front and won new recruits. At the same time, it also searched for food and supplies. Li De reported that the CCP was able to seize half a million silver dollars, ample stores of food, textiles, and weapons and ammunition.<sup>4</sup> The Red Army was quite successful in its expedition until eight divisions of the GMD Army arrived to stop them. Altogether Jiang Jieshi and Yan Xishan sent thirty divisions to block the Red Army. As fighting erupted, it appeared as though another civil war was about to break

out. In such circumstances, and in order to avoid confrontation with Yan Xishan and the GMD forces, the Red Army decided to make a withdrawal to the west of the Yellow River, taking with it the provisions it had captured.

Upon its return to northern Shaanxi the CCP issued a circular telegram on May 5, 1936 under the title "Armistice and Negotiations for Joint Resistance Against Japan". This declaration was addressed to the Nanjing government, all parties, groups, and armed forces of the whole nation. The telegram stated that, in withdrawing to the west bank of the Yellow River, the CCP wanted to demonstrate its good faith to the whole nation in arranging a cease fire and holding discussions on peace so as to end the civil war and to unite to resist Japan.

The May 5 circular telegram pointed out no matter which side emerged victorious, it would be a loss for China's national defence and would only benefit Japan. That was why the CCP decided to pull back its forces. It stated that the Red Army would within one month implement a truce with all armies attacking it.

It is important to note that the May 5 declaration revealed a change in CCP strategy. Whereas in the December 25, 1935 Wayaobao resolution, Jiang Jieshi was considered the enemy of the Chinese people and equated with the Japanese

imperialists, the tone of the May 5, 1936 declaration was different as shown in the following passage:

The Revolutionary Military Commission of the Red Army hereby solemnly advises the gentlemen of the Nanjing government at this critical juncture, when our country and people are threatened with imminent destruction, to make a determined effort to atone for past misdeeds and end the civil war in the whole country, to join forces against attacks from without in the spirit of brothers quarrelling at home, and first of all end the civil war in Shaanxi, Gansu and Shanxi, whereupon both sides should appoint delegates to discuss specific measures for resisting Japan and saving the nation. However, if you obstinately refuse to listen to reason and prefer to be traitors and collaborators, your rule will surely collapse in the end....

Although the CCP had to withdraw to northern Shaanxi, it did benefit from the expedition. Politically, the CCP gained broader support through its call for a united front. More and more people joined its ranks and as a result it managed to get 6,000 to 8,000 new recruits for the Red Army. Economically, it put to good use badly needed supplies that it brought back to Shaanxi. The CCP asked such contacts as Liu Ding to convert some of the money the Red Army seized from provincial banks into Central Bank currency so that it could be used to buy supplies in other parts of the country.<sup>6</sup> The CCP did suffer some setbacks in fighting during the campaign; it lost its important commander Liu Zidan but all in all it was stronger after the expedition than before. And its influence had spread. Almost as if in response to the May 5 call of the CCP for united efforts against Japan, the

Liang Guang rebelled against the Nanjing government.

On June 1, 1936, Chen Jitang of Guangdong and Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi of Guangxi openly rebelled against the Nanjing government. They decided to change the name of their armies to the "National Salvation Armies Against Japan" and announced they were going north to fight Japan. They demanded that they be allowed to fight the Japanese and began to move their forces into Jiangxi and Hunan. Like the Red Army, the Liang Guang leaders also issued a declaration of war on Japan and jointly called on Jiang Jieshi to do the same. Jiang was against this move of Liang Guang and his forces prevented the rebel armies from getting very far north. Within the forces of Liang Guang, there were differences and disputes and the Nanjing government was able to use bribery and threat of force to suppress the revolt. When the Guangdong Air Force defected to Jiang Jieshi in October, the revolt was brought to an end.

Although the revolt was resolved without bloodshed and only lasted a short time, the effect it had on China's political climate was very great. Because of their strategic position and their long standing opposition to the Nanjing government, the leaders of the revolt not only damaged the prestige of the Nanjing government, especially in the eyes of provincial leaders like Zhang Xueliang and Yan Xishan, but

they also reflected the very strong feeling and attitude towards Japanese aggression.<sup>7</sup>

The general demand for resistance throughout the nation put pressure on both the CCP and the GMD to continue their talks that had begun in 1935. While the Red Army was engaged in the Eastern Expedition, and government troops and those of Yan Xishan were advancing to meet it in battle, the CCP and the GMD representatives nevertheless continued meeting to discuss issues relating to the two parties.

## 2. Talks Between the CCP and GMD.

On February 27, 1936 as representative of the Nanjing government, Zhou Jiwu arrived in Wayaobao together with Zhang Zihua who was a representative of the CCP Changjiang Bureau. At the time Mao Zedong was still in Shanxi and Bo Gu met them at Wayaobao and listened to the reports of the two concerning the expressed desire of the GMD to negotiate with the CCP. They informed the CCP that within the GMD, Sun Ke, Feng Yuxiang, Chen Lifu were among those that leaned towards uniting with the Soviet Union and the CCP to fight the Japanese. They also stated that Jiang Jieshi himself intended to seek a compromise with the CCP for the same purpose. This development was reported to Mao who was directing the Eastern expedition in Shanxi. The CCP Central Committee agreed to talks and suggested negotiations should

be based on the following principles: 1. Terminate civil war and unite all national forces to fight against Japan. 2. Permit all the main Red Army forces in the nation to speedily concentrate in Hebei so as to block further advances of the Japanese. 3. Organize a national defence government and a united army of resistance against Japan. 4. Free all political prisoners and grant political freedom to the people. 5. Implement necessary economic and political reforms.<sup>8</sup> The CCP expressed its appreciation to the Nanjing government for seeking a political solution to the problems between the two parties and expressed the hope that concrete negotiations could proceed according to the above conditions.

On March 5, Zhou Jiwu left Wayaobao with the views of the CCP and reported back to Nanjing. On April 16, Zhang Zha also reported to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and then left with Feng Xuefeng for Nanjing. At the same time the Central Committee issued declarations calling on the GMD to end the civil war and form a people's front against Japan to resolve the national crisis together.<sup>9</sup> The proclamation issued on April 25, 1936, while the Red Army was still in Shanxi, for the first time included the GMD in the United Front.

At about this time, on 22 July, the secretariat of the Comintern in Moscow held a meeting to discuss the strategy

and principles of the united front of the CCP. The meeting stood for carrying on national war and domestic war at the same time and proposed setting up a united national democratic republic to replace the former slogan of establishing a Soviet People's Republic. This was because at that time the Soviet areas were small and did not enjoy the support of the majority of the Chinese people. On the next day, July 23, Dimitrov stated that the CCP should not equate the GMD and Jiang Jieshi with the Japanese aggressors. He further stated that "Jiang was unwilling to set up a united front and was afraid of it, but a situation should be created whereby a movement is started within the GMD and the GMD Army to make Jiang accept the united front. The organizer of this movement could only be the CCP."<sup>10</sup>

At the beginning of August the CCP Political Bureau, according to the directives of the Comintern, discussed the united front issue and decided that united front efforts should be mainly directed at the Nanjing government. On August 12, 1936, the Central Committee in a document "On Future Strategic Principles" made clear that the Nanjing government was the main objective of the united front work. It recognized that the GMD had control over most of the country and to resist Japan, it was necessary to unite with the GMD and its Army, and proposed "inviting Jiang



Jieshi to resist Japan." The document stipulated that "If he does not attack us, we will not fight him. Even if he attacks, the CCP will still work for peace, and adopt a policy of 'courtesy before force' if he should engage in provocations."<sup>11</sup>

On 25 August, the CCP in a letter to the Second Plenum of the Fifth GMD Congress confirmed a policy of "making Jiang resist Japan." In the spirit of this decision, it issued a series of documents and directives which, while criticizing the GMD for its policy of appeasement and compromise, demanded that Jiang end his "totally incorrect" policy of internal resistance before external resistance. The CCP expressed its willingness to meet with representatives of the GMD at any time or place to speedily reach a concrete agreement on resistance against Japan and on national salvation. It was willing to set up a united democratic republic and supported the convening of a National Congress with elected representatives. It was also prepared to make the Soviets a part of the democratic republic, and the Red Army would accept the united command of the national defence government and the United Anti-Japanese Army. If certain conditions were accepted, the CCP was ready to form "a solid revolutionary united front like that of the great revolutionary period of 1924-27 against imperialist and

feudal oppression, for this is the only correct way today to save the nation from subjugation and ensure its survival."<sup>12</sup> And from that time on the CCP dropped the slogan of opposing Jiang and started the new policy of "forcing Jiang to resist Japan."

Meanwhile secret contact with the GMD increased. On August 27, Zhang Zihua brought a letter from Zeng Yangfu inviting Zhou to negotiate with the GMD. At the same time he brought secret codes for communication with the GMD. The CCP on the 29th expressed to the GMD its hope that people in responsible positions in the GMD government could go to Shaanxi province for talks. The GMD was afraid that going to Shaanxi for talks with the CCP would attract too much attention and instead invited Zhou Enlai to come south. The CCP agreed and urged the GMD to end its attack on the Red Army. The CCP would likewise stop attacking the forces of the GMD. On September 1, the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee issued an inner-party directive concerning the problem of forcing Jiang Jieshi to resist Japan. It declared that Japanese imperialism was the main enemy of the Chinese people and it was incorrect to equate Jiang Jieshi with Japanese imperialism.<sup>13</sup> The slogan of "Resist Japan and Oppose Jiang was inappropriate and the general policy of the CCP should be to force Jiang to resist Japan. The new

slogan should be "end civil war and all resist Japan together". When a Democratic Republic of China is established, the Soviet areas would be part of that republic and its representatives would participate in the National Congress. The Red Army would then come under a unified command.<sup>14</sup>

This directive marked an important change in the policy of the CCP toward the GMD. It formally completed the process of a change in policy from "oppose Jiang and resist Japan" to "forcing Jiang to resist Japan." It was this new policy that guided the decision of the CCP to seek a peaceful solution of the Nan Incident.

On October 14, Zhang Zihua brought back the GMD conditions for negotiations. 1. The Soviets could continue to exist. 2. The Red Army name would be abolished and become part of a united army. 3. CCP representative could openly participate in the National Congress.<sup>15</sup> The CCP agreed to talks on these conditions.

Just as the situation appeared to be favourable to resolving the differences, a new turn of events developed. This was the suppression of the Liang Guang Revolt. Prior to this Jiang was active in seeking negotiations with the CCP, but with the solution of Liang Guang, he could spare forces to be used in the suppression of the CCP in Northwest China.

At the time the GMD conditions were put to the CCP, Jiang Jieshi went to Xian to make plans for "exterminating the CCP." In such circumstances, the CCP decided not to let Zhou Enlai go to Nanjing, but instructed Pan Hannian to conduct talks with the government instead. The issues that were discussed remained the same. Negotiations on them continued right up to the formation of the united front in 1937.

On October 15, the Soviet Central Government and the Revolutionary Committee of the Red Army unilaterally issued a cease fire order. They decided that all Red Army forces would end attacks against the forces of the GMD and only adopt a defensive stand when attacked. A week later, Commanders of the Red Army, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai and forty six others wrote a letter to the senior officers of the GMD in the Northwest, stating that the Red Army would "pledge to cooperate with you to the end". The Red Army also committed itself to taking a certain responsibility on a front in the war and guaranteed it would accomplish its task. On the question of command, the Red Army would obey a national united command, and would not, under any circumstances, enter the lines of defence of the "friendly armies resisting Japan" without their consent. The GMD troops were for the first time referred to as "friendly

armies." On December 1, nineteen generals of the Red Army in concert wrote to Jiang Jieshi and again proposed that he should "turn enemies into friends and join in a common effort to resist Japan."<sup>16</sup>

While these calls were put out to the GMD, the CCP adjusted its policies in order to win broader support. It placed more emphasis on resistance than on the revolution and class struggle. The CCP land policies stipulated that the land of the rich peasants and that of landlords and officers that are active in resisting Japan would not be confiscated. Industry and commerce would be protected. The CCP also called on all those unemployed officers, soldiers, functionaries and experts to go to the Soviet areas where they would be given appropriate work. This series of documents and declarations illustrate the serious efforts the CCP made in trying to form a united front. Unfortunately the GMD did not display the same desire and determination for conciliation with the CCP.

Jiang Jieshi and the Nanjing government obviously felt the threat of Japanese aggression to its rule and the need to resist Japan. However, it hoped to achieve internal unity first before undertaking resistance; its principal goal was still to destroy the CCP. But as a tactical measure it was willing to explore the possibility of compromise with the

CCP. Judging by developments during the talks, its determination to compromise was far from firm. The GMD did not take the proposals of the CCP very seriously; it believed that the situation in 1936 both at home and abroad was conducive to its efforts at achieving internal pacification by force.

In Japan's military coup of February 26 failed, but the influence of the military authorities on government was very much greater; it led to an increase in military spending and preparations for further aggression. As Japan's military power grew, the Japanese government simultaneously decided to exert more diplomatic and economic pressure on China. Economic missions were dispatched to strengthen Japan's economic interests in China. The GMD government felt there was a possible solution to the Sino-Japanese conflict and strengthened its resolve to solve the problem of internal pacification. In July, Jiang stated that the diplomatic situation with Japan had not yet reached a hopeless state and that, while there was still a ray of hope, the government must exercise care and not neglect the work of internal pacification.<sup>17</sup>

While Japan appeared to be adopting a more conciliatory position towards China, the United States and Great Britain began to take a firmer attitude towards Japan. Jiang Jieshi

was further encouraged by the fact that these two major Western nations had decided to provide the Nanjing government with more economic aid after his monetary reforms had achieved some success. With less pressure from the Japanese and more support from the West, the GMD government believed that it had a very good chance of eliminating the CCP, particularly after the speedy resolution of the Liang Guang revolt in southwest China. Jiang Jieshi by then had most of the country under his firm control. As Jiang's confidence in solving the question of the CCP and Red Army became stronger, his conditions during negotiations with the CCP became more demanding.

In a statement sent to the CCP through Zeng Yangfu, the GMD government, while expressing appreciation to the CCP for being willing to take part in the struggle against Japan, demanded that the CCP end its revolutionary activities and that the Red Army all cross the Yellow River for Chahar, Suiyuan and Outer Mongolia. The intent was to force the Red Army into the border regions or, better still, out of China.

On 10 November, CCP representative Pan Hannian arrived in Shanghai to meet with Chen Lifu for further talks. He delivered Zhou Enlai's letter to Chen Lifu and his brother, Chen Guofu. Pan also presented for discussion a CCP draft "Agreement Between the CCP and GMD on Resistance Against

Japan and National Salvation". The agreement would be that:

1. Representatives of both sides meet to reach agreement on resistance and salvation.
2. Joint efforts for armed resistance against Japan, to safeguard and to restore China's territorial integrity and sovereign rights, to establish a united salvation front of all parties, all circles and all armies, and according to a democratic programme establish a Democratic Republic of China.
3. The essential measures would be:
  - a. Take necessary steps to bring about an immediate end of hostilities.
  - b. Establish an area for the Red Army to operate where they would receive financial and military support from the Nanjing government. The Red Army would not change the CCP organizational and leadership structure in the Army.
  - c. Change the current political system, free political prisoners, cease the disrupting of CCP organizations and the arrest of CCP members; the CCP will, in return, end using military means for overthrowing the government.
  - d. Convene a congress for resistance and national salvation.
  - e. Set up a united national military command with representatives from the Red Army.
  - f. Sign an agreement of cooperation with the Soviet Union.
4. Set up a committee of the two parties to meet regularly to discuss issues.
5. Both sides maintain political and organizational independence.<sup>18</sup>

These proposals of the CCP were rejected by Chen Lifu.



He put forward counter-proposals that the CCP abolish its political administration and that the Red Army should be restricted to between 3,000 and 10,000 men at most. Division commanders and above should go abroad for half a year after which they would be reassigned duties. Some CCP members would be allowed to work for government institutions. These conditions were turned down by Pan Hannian stating that they were contrary to the previous positions stated by Deng Wenyi in Moscow or Zeng Yangfu in previous talks with the CCP. Two later meetings with Chen Lifu did not yield any results. The GMD was unwilling to alter its position. As these talks were getting bogged down, Jiang concentrated 300,000 troops to attack the Red Army and hoped to wipe it out in Gansu east of the Yellow River. He hoped that by applying military pressure he might help Chen Lifu in his talks with the CCP.<sup>19</sup> As large numbers of GMD troops attacked the Soviet areas and fierce fighting broke out east of the Yellow River in Gansu Province, CCP-GMD relations faced another serious crisis and challenge.

In this year it was the CCP that took the initiative in adjusting its policies in order to promote cooperation with the GMD. However, the GMD was unwilling to demonstrate a similar political will. There was little chance of success in these talks; but the fact that these initial contacts had

continued showed that there did exist some opportunity or potential for cooperation.

To the CCP, it was increasingly clear that Jiang Jieshi was in firm control of the GMD and of the government. It was equally clear that most of the armies of the GMD stood for resistance. Of utmost importance was to get the Nanjing government to change its policy and to form a united front against Japan. This would also be the only way for the CCP to extricate itself from its difficulties and eventually to grow sufficiently to win a victory against the GMD. The GMD also explored various options to deal with both the Japanese and the CCP threats. When the situation permitted, it agreed to hold talks with the CCP while not forsaking military preparations against both the CCP and the Japanese. The CCP and the GMD were each using double-sided tactics.

In spite of the repeated efforts and appeals, the CCP was unable to make the GMD and Jiang Jieshi change their policy. However, its work among other GMD groups and within the Northeastern Army and Northwestern Armies of Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng did make some progress. This was because the CCP's call for resistance coincided with their aspirations.

In the Northwest the CCP continued its efforts at reaching an understanding with the Northeastern Army and

Zhang Xueliang. On February 25 and March 4, 1936, Li Kenong went to Luochuan to meet with generals of the 67th Army and Zhang Xueliang. In the latter half of March, Liu Ding was sent by the Shanghai CCP underground committee to Xian and was appointed the CCP representative in the Northeastern Army.

After Li Kenong reported to the CCP central Committee, it decided to send Zhou Enlai as representative to meet Zhang Xueliang. At the invitation of Zhang Xueliang, Zhou Enlai met him in a church in Yan'an for three hours on the evening

9. They discussed questions relating to ending the war, organizing a national defence government and formation of an united army to resist Japan. They also discussed trade between the two areas, unity with the Soviet Union, and the exchange of representatives. On these issues, an initial agreement was reached.<sup>20</sup>

Zhang Xueliang himself described the conversations that took place. There were arguments about several issues mostly centering on Jiang's attitude towards Japan. Zhou Enlai asked about Jiang's attitude towards the Three Principles of Hirota. Zhang assured him Jiang would not accept them. Zhou then asked if the Nanjing government was determined to resist Japan, and why it should want to eliminate the CCP which was hated most by Japan and was most determined to resist Japan.

Zhou Enlai said that under a programme for resistance against Japan, the CCP would be willing to restore former relations with the GMD. Zhang tried to convince Zhou Enlai that it was necessary to support Jiang otherwise resistance against Japan would be impossible. Of all the senior GMD officials, Zhang said he admired Jiang most for his ability to lead the nation and his spirit of nationalism. It was because Jiang was surrounded by pro-Japanese elements that made it difficult for Jiang to make up his mind to resist Japan. However, he sincerely believed that it was possible for Jiang to resist Japan. In the course of the talks Zhou put forward ten conditions for supporting Jiang in resisting Japan:

1. CCP armed forces will accept reorganization and training in preparation for resistance against Japan.
2. Ensure that the Red Army will not be deceived or disarmed.
3. The CCP forces in Jiangxi, Hainan and Dabeishan will also accept reorganization.
4. The CCP will abolish the name of the Red Army and accept the same treatment as the national army.
5. The CCP will no longer operate in the army
6. The CCP will no longer wage struggles.
7. Free all CCP members and grant them freedom to engage in activities that do not attack the government and the leader.
8. After the victory of the war, the CCP would become a legal party like in other democratic countries.
9. After the victory of the war, the Red Army will like the National Army demobilize and disband.
10. Permit non military party members to stay in northern Shaanxi.

Zhang Xueliang promised to try to relay these proposals to the Nanjing government and to attempt to persuade it to

accept them. He did not have any success in convincing Jiang Jieshi but he did win the support of Yang Hucheng. In his talks with Yang on these conditions, Yang Hucheng even suggested that they could possibly try to use military persuasion, bingjian.

In the summer of 1936, the CCP assisted Zhang Xueliang in establishing the Wangqu Officers Training Corps with Zhang Xueliang as the commander and Yang Hucheng the deputy commander. Ye Jianying and Deng Fa from the CCP were instructors in the Corps. This corps played an important role in spreading the united front policy and in winning over the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies.

On June 20, 1936, the Central Committee issued the "Guiding Principles for Work in the Northeastern Army." They stated that winning over the Northeastern Army was a fundamental policy of the CCP, but the objective was not to break it up or to turn it into a Red Army, but to make it a friend of the Red Army. The methods to be used were persuasion and explanation; there were to be no schemes or intrigues. This policy did not preclude the possibility of the Red Army counter-attacking when attacked by those in the Northeastern Army that had been deceived and insisted on fighting the Red Army. However, the purpose was not to destroy them but to win them over. The directive also stated

that united front work among the senior officers of the army was very important. It was not long before fighting ceased between the two armies.<sup>22</sup> The Red Army soon signed a partial cease fire with the 6th cavalry division of the Northeastern Army. From that time on, the soldiers of the two armies were no longer enemies and often had parties together, watched plays together, gave each other gifts and supported each other. Former combat lines became lines of friendship for common resistance against Japan.

The CCP's work with Yang Hucheng and the Northwestern (17th Route) Army was equally successful. In many ways it was easier for the CCP to win over Yang Hucheng. Yang was born in a poor family, and had joined the revolution very early. He was influenced by revolutionary thinking and the CCP had considerable impact in his Army. The work to win over Yang Hucheng and his 17th Army was carried out through several channels.

The CCP Northern Bureau sent party members under the direction of Nan Hanchen to work in the Northwestern Army as General Yang Hucheng's secretary. The Central Committee from northern Shaanxi also sent people directly to the Northwestern Army. Wang Feng, for one, was sent to Xian in the winter of 1935 and took with him a personal letter from Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai to Yang Hucheng. The Comintern

was also involved. In April 1936, the CCP representative to the Comintern Wang Bingnan returned to China and was assigned to work with Yang Hucheng who was also his close relative. In late August of 1935 a preliminary agreement on cooperation was reached with Yang Hucheng. By the end of 1936, both Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng were working closely with the CCP to promote a united front.

In handling relations between the two armies, the CCP was careful to promote unity and understanding and to help to remove any suspicions between them. In this respect Nan Hanchen, Wang Bingnan, Wang Shiyang, Wang Feng, Gao Chongmin and Sheng Pachun all played important roles. The existence of this unity in the Northwest testifies to the appeal of the CCP's united front policy. This situation in the Northwest was also influenced by developments in other parts of the country.

### 3. Popular pressure for Resistance

A constant factor that affected the CCP and the GMD government and the Northeastern and Northwestern armies was the pressure from the general public for resistance and an end to the civil war. Patriotic organizations of various kinds sprang up all over the country. On June 1, 1936, at the same time as the Liang Guang Revolt, the Association of All Circles for National Salvation was established. It was

made up of the various student associations and those of the cultural circles. Leading members of the Association included Song Qingling, Shen Junru, Wang Zaoshi, Sa Qianli, Shi Liang. This organization included many left wing GMD members and others that were opposed to Jiang. Its objective was to promote unity among the various parties so as to end the civil war and resist Japan. The manifesto of this association was banned in Nanjing and other areas controlled by the central government, but in Xian it was distributed.

Secretly, Zhang Xueliang transformed Xian into a base of the national salvation movement. Publications banned by the Nanjing government in other parts of the country were available in Xian. The city of Xian had by this time become a centre of activity for those who demanded resistance. Student and other organizations made use of all occasions to hold demonstrations and parades. The slogans were always the same: "End the Civil War" and "Unite to Resist Japan". As time went on these demonstrations grew in size and in fervor.

These developments in Northwest China worried Jiang Jieshi. He felt that he must curb the growing influence of the CCP. In October, with the end of the Liang Guang Revolt, Jiang's plan to eliminate the CCP in Northern Shaanxi was very much alive. He very soon moved thirty divisions of his best troops north. At this time the main forces of the Red



Army were concentrated in Gansu-Shaanxi area where Jiang hoped he would be able to wipe them out.<sup>23</sup>

On 22 October, Jiang flew to Xian, his first visit there as Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Bandit Suppression Headquarters. At a meeting with Zhang and Yang, he made known his plan for eliminating the R Army within three months and asked them to make all necessary preparations. Zhang and Yang told him that the Northeastern and 17th Route Army would find it difficult to accomplish the task as they all demanded an end to the civil war. During the week there, Jiang Jieshi listened to the appeals of the officers of the Northeastern Army for resistance against Japan. Jiang was furious. He criticized them for being weak-willed and insisted that there must be internal pacification before external resistance. At a meeting of the Wangqu Officers Training Corps he said that the arch enemy at the time was the CCP and that they should use all their efforts to wipe it out. As to the Japanese, they were enemies that were thousands of miles away and he would fight them in the future. If they did not fight the principal enemy and clamored for struggle against the distant enemies, it would mean opposition to his policy of "pacification before resistance" To oppose this policy was counter-revolutionary and he would wipe out all counter-revolutionaries. Jiang

stressed that as military officers, their duty was to obey the leader; to them the leader was the father.<sup>24</sup> Jiang's attitude was a great disappointment for Zhang, Yang and their fellow officers.

On October 30, Yan Xishan arrived in Xian from Taiyuan and in talks with Zhang decided to go to Luoyang, where Jiang was to celebrate his 50th birthday, and where they would together try to convince Jiang to end the civil war. The meeting that took place after the party turned out to be a disaster. Jiang strongly reprimanded them and reminded them who was in command. He again stressed internal pacification before external resistance and that it would not take long to completely wipe out the CCP.<sup>25</sup> On his return to Xian, Zhang Xueliang informed the CCP that he was unable to get Jiang's understanding but promised to try again. In the meantime the local truce would be maintained between the two armies. He requested that the CCP force withdraw further to the north so as to separate the two armies.

Meanwhile, the Nanjing government became more repressive towards the anti-Japanese movements. Fourteen magazines were censored, and this was followed by the arrest of seven leaders ("Seven Gentlemen") of the National Salvation Movement in Shanghai on November 11. They were arrested for staging a demonstration in support of striking workers in a

Japanese cotton mill in Qingdao.

The bans and arrests further infuriated the people . To many the suppression of the anti-Japanese movement was a sign that the Nanjing government was leaning towards compromise with Japan. This fear was strengthened by the signing of the anti-Comintern Agreement between Tokyo and Berlin on November 25, 1936. Jiang still employed a group of German advisors headed by General Alexander von Falkenshusen, whose chief mission was to exterminate the CCP. The agreement between Japan and Germany would force the Nanjing government to move closer to Japan.

Zhang Xueliang was disturbed by this new development and on November 27, issued a "Request to Fight the Japanese." He urged Jiang Jiashi to dispatch his forces to the north and fight the Japanese. He openly protested Jiang's order to fight the CCP. When Jiang arrived in Luoyang on December 3 to make new plans for the suppression of the CCP, Zhang flew in from Xian and again tried to persuade Jiang to change his mind. He presented Jiang with three requests. 1. Reiterate ending of bandit suppression and unity to resist Japan. 2. Dispatch the Northeastern Army to Suiyuan to participate in the battle against Japan and 3. Release the seven leaders of the National Salvation Association.<sup>26</sup> All were rejected by Jiang again.

On December 4 Jiang flew to Xian and stayed at Huaqingchi, Lingtong. He decided to hold a military conference and presented Zhang and Yang two options. Either the Northeastern Army and the 17th Army all leave for the front against the CCP with the Central Army as support, or if they did not want to fight the civil war the Northeastern Army would be sent to Fujian and the 17th Army to Anhui. Their task in the Northwest would be taken over by the Central Army.

None of these options could be accepted by Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng and this military meeting drove them to the wall. Zhang decided to make another try. On December 7, in tears he again pleaded with Jiang. Three hours of argument failed to move Jiang. Jiang is said to have declared that even if Zhang shot him, he would not change his plan to suppress the CCP.<sup>27</sup>

On the first anniversary of the December 9 Movement about 20,000 students from universities, high schools and primary schools in Xian participated in a demonstration demanding that the GMD end the civil war against the CCP in order to resist Japan. In the course of the demonstration a student was wounded by the police. The demonstrators were outraged. They decided to petition Jiang Jieshi directly, and marched towards Lingtong. Zhang was informed of this

development and immediately tried to stop them. He promised the demonstrators that he would tell Jiang of their demands, fearing that there would be more clashes if they went ahead with their march. He told them he was on their side and that they would be able to see results within a week. That evening, Zhang was still unable to make any headway with Jiang Jieshi. Zhang felt desperate, even with the promises he had made to the CCP and the students, and his wish to fight the Japanese, he seemed to have reached a dead end.<sup>28</sup>

Jiang was determined to go ahead with his plan to wipe out the CCP. In terms of numbers the GMD forces in the Northwest were far superior; they had almost 200 regiments as opposed to about 100 of the Red Army. They were also far better equipped. But only about half of the GMD troops were serious about fighting the CCP. The forces of the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies had already worked out a cease-fire agreement with the CCP.

Many leading members of other GMD factions such as Chen Mingshu, Cai Tingkai of the 19th Route Army, Li Zongren of Guangxi, Yan Xishan of Shanxi, Liu Xiang of Sichuan were also opposed to civil war. These important people were all in touch with the CCP or had reached a secret understanding with it. The CCP also maintained secret contact with Feng Yuxiang, Sun Ke, Ma Zhanshan, Song Zheyuan and others.<sup>29</sup>

It was not that Jiang did not see this situation. Nevertheless, he felt that the CCP was cornered in the Northwest and if he could make more effort to alter the situation there he could accomplish his mission once and for all. But in this new effort to do so he came into sharp conflict with Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng.

When Jiang Jieshi decided to hold a meeting on December 9 without Zhang and Yang, they both knew that the situation had become hopeless. They decided to take action. It was in these circumstances that the Xian Incident took place, an incident that shocked the whole nation.

#### B. The Xian Incident.

Around the 10 of December senior officers of the Central Army arrived in Xian to participate in the Northwest military conference, including the commander of the 18th Army, Chen Cheng, in charge of the Shanxi and Suiyuan command and Wei Lihuang, newly appointed commander of the anti-bandit campaign in the four northern provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia and Shanxi. Also there was the Commander of the Northwest Bandit Suppression Command, Jiang Dingwen, Commander of the 25th Army, Wan Yaohuang and the commander of the 6th Route Army, Zhu Shaoliang. There were also important government officials including the Interior

Minister, Jiang Zuobin and members of the Central Committee of the GMD. Generals of the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies including Yu Xuezhong of the 51st Army , Miao Zhenliu of the 57th Army and Wang Yizhe of the 67th Army were also in Xian at the time.

Zhang Xueliang, as a last resort, decided to use military persuasion, bingjian. He did not make any careful arrangements beforehand and he did not give prior indication of his move to either the CCP or to his subordinates. On the 11 of December Zhang made one further try through one of his officers but was strongly rebuked by Jiang. Jiang criticized Zhang for not fully supporting him as the national leader. Late in the afternoon of the eleventh, Zhang Xueliang sent for his military commanders and on the morning of the 12th explained to them his decision: In spite of repeated efforts he had failed to persuade Jiang to change his mind . Jiang Jieshi was more concerned about internal pacification, a policy that could only lead the nation, the Northeastern Army and himself to disaster. There was no other way out and the situation was becoming increasingly dangerous. Jiang was determined to pursue his civil war policy and Central Army forces were already beginning to move in. Very soon, Jiang Jieshi would be leaving Shaanxi and it was necessary to act immediately. At the meeting Zhang made it clear that his

sole purpose was to get Jiang to resist Japan and that after the "persuasion", he would still support Jiang in leading the nation against Japan.<sup>30</sup> There was some discussion on whether to inform the CCP of their plan. They had initially worked out a telegram but later cancelled the idea when they feared that the telegram might be intercepted by the government, and realized that, in any case, by the time the telegram arrived the event would already have taken place. Moreover, there was not much that the CCP could do in that short space of time.<sup>31</sup> Although this shows that the CCP did not have prior knowledge of what was going to take place in Xian, it is clear that the CCP was certainly very much on the mind of Zhang Xueliang.

What took place in Xian during the fortnight between the 12th and 25th of December has been recorded by Jiang Jieshi in his "Extracts from a Diary." And Madame Jiang (Song Meiling) has written "Sian: A Coup D'Etat." Most of what was written may be quite a faithful account of what transpired but for political reasons, they were unable to write the complete story; much of consequence and substance was left out. There were also obvious exaggerations to give the impression that Jiang Jieshi was a loving father of the people. The story that many soldiers committed suicide when they thought that Jiang had been assassinated is probably one



such case, particularly when one considers how wretchedly the rank and file soldiers in the GMD Army were treated.<sup>32</sup> It therefore would be necessary to recount the main events during these fourteen eventful days, and fill in some of the information that was expurgated.

December 12.

By 5:30 in the morning Zhang Xueliang's men were sent to Huaqingchi where Jiang was staying. After some skirmishes with Jiang's guards, Zhang's men finally managed to capture Jiang who had in the confusion tried to escape but fell into a cave as he was trying to climb up a mountain at the back of the house. Jiang was detained and put under house arrest. Meanwhile the 17th Army under Yang Hucheng soon had control of Xian City and about 300 officials and officers were also taken into custody and made prisoners. In this process some were hurt or shot. There was also looting and chaos reported in the city that worried Zhang but he still went ahead with his plan.<sup>33</sup>

On that day Zhang set up the Headquarters of the United Army of Resistance Against Japan. He was the Commander-in-Chief and Yang the Deputy C-in-C. A Provisional Northwest Military Council of the Anti-Japanese United Army was also established that included members of the CCP such as Wang Bingnan, Gao Chongmin and Nan Hanchen. The Council issued an

open telegram to the GMD and the nation, signed also by other Nanjing government officials who were in Xian, calling for the reorganization of the government to accommodate the various parties and factions to jointly end all civil wars and to save the nation. The telegram began with listing the humiliating agreements with Japan since the September 18 Incident and warned of an international conspiracy underway, designed to sacrifice the Chinese people. It praised the brave Chinese soldiers fighting in Suiyuan. It criticized the appeasement policy of the Central Government and its suppression of the patriotic movement, particularly in the shooting of the students in Xian. It stated that the signers had taken action in order to stimulate Jiang's awakening so that he could change his policy. The revolt was a last remonstrance to Jiang, but guaranteed his personal safety. In conclusion, it listed eight demands:

1. Reorganize the Nanjing Government, and allow all parties to share the joint responsibility of saving the nation.
2. Terminate all civil wars.
3. Immediately release the patriotic leaders arrested in Shanghai.
4. Release all political prisoners throughout the country.
5. Emancipate the patriotic movement of the people.
6. Safeguard the political freedom of the people to organize and call meetings.
7. Implement the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in practice.
8. Immediately call a National Salvation Conference.<sup>34</sup>

The whole nation and the world soon got to know of these

eight demands. However, Jiang did not hear of them immediately because he refused to see Zhang and went on a hunger strike.

The Political Council and the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the GMD held a joint meeting in the evening and views were divided as to how the incident should be handled. There were two different opinions. One group headed by Dai Jitao, President of the Examination Council, and He Yingqin believed that Zhang and Yang's background was very complicated, with connections with both the CCP and Li Jishen and Song Zheyuan. In making a hostage of Jiang, Zhang and Yang hoped to achieve their political demands. The Central Government should not yield to force; doing so would hurt the image of the country. They were convinced that the Government must remain firm by a show of force to Xian. Any delay on the part of the Nanjing government in launching an expedition would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. They believed that even if Jiang were alive, he probably would not be able to return. Maintaining state discipline should be the first priority.

The other group were of the opinion that as Zhang had guaranteed the safety of Jiang, it was necessary to first get a clear understanding of the situation before deciding on an overall policy. Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng were only

raising the issue of resisting Japan and therefore there existed ground for consultations and persuasion. This group was against a military expedition.<sup>35</sup>

At that time Madame Jiang and Kong Xiangxi, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan, were not in Nanjing and no consensus could be reached. However, it was decided that Zhang Xueliang would be stripped of all his official positions and arrested for trial by the Military Council. Although there was no direct order for a punitive expedition, there were troop movements towards Xian. He Yingqin sent a telegram to Wang Jingwei requesting him to return to China. Wang had been hurt in an assassination attempt during the GMD Fifth Congress and was recuperating in Europe. It appeared as if there was a scheme to unite with Japan to suppress the rebels in Xian and the Communists.

Zhang Xueliang sent a telegram to the CCP in Baoan asking for its views. Late in the day, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai sent a reply informing Zhang that Zhou Enlai would go to see him and consult him on the issue. Meanwhile, the Central Committee of the CCP held an emergency meeting and decided to instruct Shanghai, Tianjin and Xian party organizations to expose Jiang Jieshi's capitulationist external policy and persistence in civil war, to call on the Nanjing government to expel Jiang and immediately convene a

Resistance and National Salvation Conference. The meeting also decided to send Zhou Enlai to Xian.<sup>36</sup>

December 13

Zhang Xueliang met Jiang Jieshi four times this day but he was unable to get any expression of understanding from Jiang who was still livid with anger. At headquarters, Zhang explained to his staff why he decided to use bingjian. He was unhappy about having to fight the CCP and not being allowed to turn his guns against foreign aggressors. He also explained his political differences with Jiang. He was also troubled by the arrest of the seven patriotic leaders, and the handling of the December 9 Xian student demonstration when Jiang ordered the shooting of students. Zhang told them that Jiang was dissatisfied with the Northeastern Army. In spite of repeated pleas, he had been unable to make Jiang change his attitude. Nevertheless, he could not just give up and resign, and the only way out was to use bingjian. Once Jiang changed his mind, he would support Jiang in leading the nation and he was willing to accept any kind of punishment for what he had done. He reiterated that Jiang was safe and sound.<sup>37</sup>

Zhang Xueliang hoped to get support from the CCP and he sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai inviting him to Xian for consultations but Zhou was unable to leave right away. The

delay may have been caused by the reported inability of the plane Zhang Xueliang sent to Baoan for Zhou to land. In any case, it was not until the 17th that Zhou arrived in Xian.

In Baoan a mass meeting of activists was held in the afternoon at the Red Army University. At this meeting Mao Zedong listed the crimes Jiang had committed since April 12, 1927 and stated it was time to settle accounts. He called for bringing Jiang Jieshi to Baoan to be tried by the people of the whole country and to be punished accordingly for the ten years of blood debt he owed. His speech won the support of all those present.<sup>38</sup> At a meeting of the Politburo, Mao fully supported Zhang Xueliang saying it was a revolutionary act and that Zhang's programme was positive and should be supported. Politically, the CCP decided not to take a determined stand against the Nanjing government. The policy of the CCP would be to try to expand the regional united front into a national front.<sup>39</sup> The CCP sent a second telegram to Zhang Xueliang requesting him to send a plane for Zhou Enlai to go to Xian.

Meanwhile, in Nanjing, Song Meiling and Kong Xiangxi who had both arrived from Shanghai received telegrams from Zhang Xueliang. In his reply Kong did not show any sign of strongly reprimanding Zhang; it was more to state the differences could be settled through consultations and that

it was important to guarantee the safety of Jiang. He stated that care must be taken not to let the incident get out of hand and affect the future of the country.<sup>40</sup>

One of the first things that Song Meiling did was to get Jiang Jieshi's personal advisor, William H. Donald<sup>41</sup> to go to Xian to see Jiang and clarify the situation. She was unhappy with the attitude taken by the Nanjing officers who within a few hours decided how to punish Zhang and were mobilizing troops for a punitive expedition on Xian.

In Xian, Zhang Xueliang received some support from Han Fuqu of Shandong, Liu Xiang of Sichuan, and Bai Chongxi of Guangxi. He was particularly concerned about the attitude of Yan Xishan as Shanxi was a neighbouring province. He had, together with Yan in Luoyang, tried to convince Jiang to resist Japan and was hoping that this time the forces of Shanxi and Shaanxi could unite to handle the crisis. Much to his disappointment, Yan Xishan was not non-committal about his position. Yan was skeptical and showed concern that the rebellion might lead to greater domestic disorder.

December 14

On this day Zhang Xueliang read some of Jiang's diaries and according to Jiang felt remorse for what he had done.

In the entry for December 14, Jiang wrote:

Chang (Zhang) came to see me again in the morning, standing behind the door, with tears in his eyes, as if

he regretted very much what he had done.... By noon Chang came again and said, "We have read your diary and other important documents and from them have learned the greatness of your personality.... If I had known one-tenth of what is recorded in your diary, I would certainly not have done this rash act. Now I know very clearly that my former views were wrong".<sup>42</sup>

In his own recollections Zhang Xueliang also mentioned this fact. Zhang is said to have been greatly moved by the "Military programme" in the diary. But in fact, there were only names of the commanding officers of the seven military districts. Yang and others thought that the programme lacked substance. They did not believe that the material sufficiently proved that Jiang was determined to resist Japan. On the contrary they found documents that dealt with the many talks that Zhang Qun had with the Japanese and the advice he gave the government on policy towards Japan.

Zhang Xueliang was concerned about Jiang Jieshi's personal safety and suggested that Jiang move to his residence so that he could be more comfortable and better protected. Jiang refused. In the afternoon Donald arrived. With Donald's arrival Jiang felt more secure and eventually agreed to move to another residence where he stayed together with Donald. It was there that Zhang made known to Jiang his eight demands. There was an argument during which Zhang criticized Jiang for being too "despotic" and for his "old thinking" but at the same time commended Jiang as being a man



of high character.<sup>43</sup> Yang Hucheng met Jiang for the first time since the revolt and only then did Jiang find out that Yang was in the conspiracy together with Zhang. This was very much of a surprise to Jiang as he had not suspected Yang would cooperate with Zhang. Jiang had actually hoped that Yang would keep an eye on Zhang for him in the Northwest.

In Moscow, Izvestiia issued an editorial highly critical of the Xian Incident. It said that Zhang's demands for declaration of war on Japan and uniting with the CCP was a smokescreen to attack the Chinese people's front and to disrupt China's efforts at external resistance. Zhang's reactionary action would destroy the unity of the anti-Japanese forces and constitute a serious threat to the whole of China. The anti-Japanese slogans only served and benefitted Japanese imperialism.<sup>44</sup> A telegram later sent by the Comintern expressed the same views.

December 15

In a telegram sent to the Nanjing government, Mao Zedong and other Red Army generals called for the end of the civil war and removal of Jiang Jieshi from office.<sup>45</sup> On this day, Zhou Enlai, Luo Ruiqing and sixteen others left for Yan'an which was under the control of the Northeastern Army.

In an interview with an American correspondent, W.H. Donald said that Jiang Jieshi was safe and sound and that

Zhang's motive in detaining Jiang was to convince him it was essential to resist foreign aggression. Donald also reported directly to Song Meiling in Nanjing on Jiang's situation and hinted that Zhang would be willing to send Jiang back to Nanjing. Zhang also said to Jiang that day that he hoped Song Meiling and Kong Xiangxi could come to Xian to break the impasse. The people in Nanjing that stood for a punitive expedition believed that this was a ploy to get Song Meiling and Kong Xiangxi to go to Shaanxi and thus give the rebels more hostages. Their views differed sharply with that of Song Meiling. She had more faith in Zhang Xueliang when she was informed that it was Yang Hucheng who had long ago wanted to use bingjian and that it was only when Jiang reprimanded Zhang Xueliang so harshly that Zhang decided to detain Jiang. She was told that Zhang was full of regrets. This information was a relief for Song Meiling and she decided that she would have to go to Xian.

December 16

The Comintern sent a telegram which urged the CCP to seek a peaceful settlement to the Xian incident. There is some difficulty verifying details relating to this telegram. According to recent Chinese writing on the subject, it

appears that the telegram was sent to Baoan on December 16 but because of incorrect telegraphic codes, it was impossible to decipher and the Central Committee requested that it be sent again. The second telegram from the Comintern arrived on December 20. If in fact the CCP did not receive the telegram until that day, then it would show that the decision for a peaceful settlement was not made in Moscow but by the CCP itself, as by then the CCP had already made clear it wanted a peaceful settlement of the incident.

According to Edgar Snow, Song Qingling forwarded the telegram to the CCP in Baoan.<sup>46</sup> This telegram from the Comintern stated that:

unless the Chinese Communists used their influence to release Chiang (Jiang), they would be denounced by Moscow as "bandits" and repudiated before the world.<sup>47</sup>

Song Qingling reportedly said that "Mao Tsetung flew into a rage when the order came from Moscow to release Chiang. Mao swore and stamped his feet. Until then they had planned to give Jiang a public trial and to organize a Northwest anti-Japanese defence government." There is also a different interpretation for Mao's reaction which was that he was not angry at the order to release Jiang but at Moscow's attitude towards Zhang Xueliang. The CCP had until then given Zhang the impression that the Soviet Union would support him. Within the CCP there was a difference of

attitude with regard to the directive from Moscow. Zhang Wentian and Bo Gu were for accepting the directive while Mao's opinion was that while implementing the directive the CCP would also give Zhang and Yang military support.

Donald returned to Xian and brought the news that Song Ziwen and Gu Zhutong might arrive in Xian. Zhang told Jiang Jieshi that he intended to send Jiang back to Nanjing in four to seven days. One reason for this delay might have been that he was still waiting for Zhou Enlai to arrive and to discuss with him under what conditions Jiang should be released. The CCP was very active in Xian at this time. Peng Dehuai was in Xian to discuss with Yang Hucheng how the Red Army could cooperate with him. Ye Jianying, Li Kenong, Luo Ruiqing were all working within the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies. But these people were not in a position to make a decision on how to release Jiang or on what should be done after the release. They had to wait for Zhou Enlai's arrival. Perhaps that was why Zhang said it was necessary to wait for four to seven days.

At this time the government air force bombed some of Zhang's forces and one regiment suffered serious losses, causing great indignation among officers of the Northeastern Army and also naturally affected Zhang feelings.

On this day the Nanjing government decided to launch a

punitive expedition with He Yingqin as the commander-in-chief of this force. It was encouraged by reports from its ambassadors in Moscow and Tokyo. From Moscow, it was clear that Stalin did not support Zhang and from Tokyo, it appeared that Japan was going to keep a close watch on developments and not take any action that might distract the Nanjing government.

The decision of the Nanjing government to launch the expedition aroused great resentment in Xian. At a mass meeting Zhang Xueliang strongly criticized Jiang Jieshi's policy, saying that Jiang refused to turn the guns against the enemy but reserved them for use against his own people.<sup>48</sup> This statement contradicts Jiang's assertion that Zhang Xueliang had changed his mind and was full of remorse after he had read Jiang's diaries.

December 17

Jiang Jieshi ordered the Air Force to suspend bombing for three days, a fact that showed Jiang was still able to exert some influence on developments. While Zhang was finding the situation more and more difficult, Zhou Enlai finally arrived. Zhou met Zhang in the evening and explained the peace policy of the CCP. They agreed on the following conditions for the peaceful settlement of the incident: 1. End the civil war and withdraw the Central Army forces from

Tongguan. 2. Order the whole nation to support the resistance in Suiyuan. 3. Establish a transitional Nanjing government under Song Ziwen and remove all pro-Japanese factions. 4. Form a united army of resistance against Japan. 5. Free political prisoners and convene a meeting in Xian to prepare for a National Salvation Conference.<sup>49</sup> It appeared that releasing Jiang was no longer an issue. The question was how and under what conditions.

The decision of the CCP to work to free Jiang was a major turnabout and was a relief for Zhang but it caused some difficulties with those in the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies, as not long before that they had been advocating the overthrow of Jiang. This was not only true for the CCP members in these armies but also for the young officers in them.

Zhou Enlai participated in the Northwest Military Council and a Three-in-One Council (the Northeastern, the Northwestern and the Red Armies) that had been formed. It was decided that they would insist on the eight conditions and try to bring about an early solution.

December 18

Li Jishen issued a circular telegram from Guangxi supporting Zhang and Yang. In his telegram he stated that at a time of national crisis, the nation should unite for

resistance, and the armed forces should be used for external resistance and not for any personal revenge. He fully supported the eight demands of Zhang and Yang, and stated that they had the sympathy of the people of the nation. He was against the punitive expedition of the Nanjing government. This was an encouragement for Zhang, but this support was too far away to be of practical value.

Meanwhile, Prince De of Mongolia who was collaborating with Japan sent a telegram supporting He Yingqin's punitive expedition against Xian. As an expression of goodwill, he offered to suspend his military attacks against Fu Zhuoyi, commander of the Central Army forces in Suiyuan, so as to relieve some of the pressure from the north. This brought additional pressure to bear on Zhang Xueliang.

At a meeting of the Central Committee, the CCP decided on the basis of a report it received from Zhou Enlai and the fact that He Yingqin was already in actual control of the Nanjing government, that it would not press for the removal of Jiang Jieshi and instead focus on trying to get him and the Nanjing government to change their erroneous policy.<sup>50</sup>

In Xian, Zhou Enlai met Yang Hucheng. Yang was somewhat surprised at the CCP policy and expressed concern about his own safety and future.<sup>51</sup>

December 19

Zhang Xueliang again saw Jiang about the eight demands. Jiang refused to negotiate on any of them if he were not allowed to return to Nanjing. On this day the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet and the Central Committee of the CCP issued a circular telegram on the peaceful solution of the Xian Incident. The telegram praised Zhang and Yang stating that "the Xian leaders acted from patriotic sincerity and zeal, wishing to formulate quickly a national policy of immediate resistance to Japan," and that they must be ranked among the great patriots of the nation. "By contrast, the Nanjing leaders lagged behind; however, with the exception of a few pro-Japanese leaders, they are not unwilling to fight against Japan."<sup>52</sup> As a solution to the Incident, the CCP proposed a truce between the Nanjing government and Xian leaders and called for a national peace conference to be held in Nanjing under the auspices of the government. The conference would discuss the problem of reviewing Jiang Jieshi's position on the basis of "national unity, cessation of civil war and resistance to Japan." In conclusion, it urged the Nanjing leaders to decide on the national policy without delay so that the Japanese invaders would not take advantage of the current situation in China.<sup>53</sup>

This was an important telegram stating CCP policy on the Xian Incident and its solution. Clearly the views of the CCP



on the Xian Incident differed from those of the Soviet Union; the CCP praised Zhang and Yang for what they had done and cooperated with them to settle the incident. Secondly, it did not state explicitly that Jiang should be released immediately as Stalin had wanted. The telegram only stated that the "disposition" of Jiang should be discussed. This fact showed that the CCP had become less dependent on the Soviet Union.

It would have been very difficult for the CCP to call for the immediate release of Jiang Jieshi or to acknowledge him as the national leader. This was due to the strong anti-Jiang feeling in both the CCP and the Northeastern and Northwestern armies. The CCP could not have called openly for submission to Jiang which would have been seen as a reversal of its former position and a betrayal of Zhang Xueliang.

Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng must have read this telegram with mixed feelings. They must have been pleased that the CCP formally supported their position on the solution of the Incident. However, it would seem that if the GMD agreed to the proposals, Zhang and Yang would not have any significant say in future decisions. The GMD and CCP would be the main players. Convening the peace conference in Nanjing would only put them further out of the scene.

On this day, Song Ziwen decided to go to Xian to meet

Zhang and Yang. The Nanjing government was against Song's decision to meet the rebels, stating that he was going there on a personal visit and not on behalf of the government.

December 20

Song Ziwen, accompanied by W. Donald, arrived in Xian together with Guo Zengkai who was close to Song, having worked for him in the National Economic Commission. Guo was also a friend of Yang Hucheng as in the half year or so before the Xian Incident he had also worked under Yang. Guo Zengkai participated in many of the important meetings in Xian and he was one of the few people who was able to give a personal account of what happened there.

Song Ziwen soon met Jiang and delivered Madam Jiang's letter which said that if Jiang did not return to Nanjing within three days she herself would go to Xian. Song discussed with Jiang the eight demands, all of which Jiang said he rejected. However, Guo Zengkai testified that Jiang did express his intention of dropping his policy of internal pacification before external resistance. Jiang worried whether Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng were sincere in their pledge to send him back to Nanjing. He privately proposed to Song that armed forces should be sent against Xian. He believed that Xian could be taken in five days without much danger to himself. Even if there was danger he was not

afraid.<sup>54</sup>

When Zhang Xueliang met Song Ziwen, he informed him that the Northeastern Army, the 17th Army and the Red Army had agreed on a policy to resolve the incident peacefully. If Jiang accepted the eight demands, all three armies agreed to release him. Zhang then took Song to see Jiang jieshi. At a meeting with Guo Zengkai, Zhou Enlai told him that "So long as Jiang resists Japan, the CCP would give him full support and call on the nation to support the GMD government and form a united front." These views were also relayed to Song Ziwen.<sup>55</sup>

The telegram from the Comintern finally arrived and as reported by Mao Zedong in his telegram to Zhou Enlai set forth the following conditions for a peaceful solution of the Xian Incident: Reorganization of the government, guarantee of people's democratic rights, end of policy of extermination of the Red Army and establishment of cooperative relations with countries that sympathized with the Chinese people's opposition to Japanese aggression.<sup>56</sup>

December 21

By this time Jiang Jieshi fully understood that Zhang and Yang were only seeking the acceptance of their political demands. Jiang verbally agreed that the political demands could in principle be considered, but he was unwilling to

make any commitments. Zhang hoped that there could be some kind of guarantee from the government or at least there would be some guarantors of high standing. He personally believed in the verbal commitments of Jiang but he feared that once Jiang returned to Nanjing and was surrounded by another group of people, he might again revert to his old theme of civil war. That was why he wanted Song Ziwen to explain this situation to the Central Government at Nanjing and hoped that Song Meiling and Kong Xiangxi could go to Xian. Song Ziwen was a close friend of Zhang Xueliang and sympathized with him. Song decided that he would try to convince Jiang to compromise and get him out of the danger and thus help Zhang to end the affair.

Song Ziwen returned to Nanjing after his meeting with Jiang, Zhang and Yang. He was able to clarify some of the questions he had in mind. Zhang and Yang's demands, as they had stated in the circular telegram, were purely of a political nature and there were no personal conditions attached. On this point it appeared as if Song Ziwen was convinced by Zhang and Yang's sincerity. It was also clear to Song that whether Jiang would be able to get out of Xian safely depended entirely on Zhang.

On this day Donald also returned to Nanjing. He reported that if the Central Army was to proceed with its

attack on Xian, Zhang would take Jiang away by plane to another place, implying that Jiang's future safety lay in the hands of Zhang. Song Meiling decided that it was time for her to go to Xian, She wrote:

"The situation at Sian (Xian) was, I reflected, that Mr. Donald had laid the foundations, T.V. (Song Ziwen) had built the walls, and it would be I who would have to put on the roof."<sup>57</sup>

There were certain risks in her going at that time as the three day truce from bombing that Jiang ordered had ended and the military were actively preparing for an attack. But in her special position and with the government in chaos without a leader, she and her brother Song Ziwen, and brother-in-law Kong Xiangxi decided to take matters into their own hands.

December 22

Song Meiling arrived in Xian. Her main purpose was to use whatever means possible to get Jiang out of the danger. She decided that she would take full responsibility for Jiang and would negotiate on his behalf. She said to Zhang Xueliang that she would meet anybody that Jiang was unwilling to see which would include meeting Zhou Enlai of the CCP.

The CCP secretariat instructed Zhou Enlai to attempt to hold talks with Jiang Jieshi, Chen Cheng and seek to arrive at a peaceful solution on the following conditions: 1. Preliminary reorganization of the Nanjing government by

increasing those that supported resistance and removing the pro-Japanese elements, 2. Remove He Yingqin from command and end the military expedition against Xian. 3. Guarantee democratic rights. 4. End suppression of the CCP and unite to resist Japan.<sup>58</sup> In talks with the Songs, Jiang agreed to reorganize the government. He agreed to unite with the Soviet Union and CCP, and convene a Salvation Conference within three months. There were two conditions: 1. he does not participate in the talks which should be undertaken by the Songs and 2. he would make guarantees but he would not sign any written agreement.<sup>59</sup>

December 23

Negotiations took place between Zhou Enlai and Song Ziwen, Song Meiling, W. Donald, Jiang Dingwen in the morning. At the meeting Zhou put forward the CCP six conditions for a peaceful solution: 1. End fighting and withdraw the GMD troops to east of Tongguan. 2. Reorganize the Nanjing government, expel the pro-Japanese faction and bring in people who are for resistance to Japan. 3. Release political prisoners and guarantee basic democratic rights. 4. End suppression of the CCP and unite with the Red Army to resist Japanese aggression and permit the CCP to operate openly. (The Red Army was to retain its independent organization and command. Pending the convocation of a

democratic national assembly, the Soviet areas should continue to function as usual, but the words "anti-Japanese" or "National Salvation" might be added to their names.) 5. Convene a National Salvation Conference representing all parties, groups, sections of the population and armies. 6. Cooperate with all nations that sympathize with China's resistance to Japan.<sup>60</sup> Zhou also promised that the CCP and the Red Army would support Jiang Jieshi in unifying China to fight Japan.

The most important concern of the Song family was to save Jiang and although there was some bargaining, they basically accepted these conditions. Song Ziwen agreed to relay them to Jiang Jieshi. He also suggested forming a transitional government to be followed by the establishment of a Resistance Government in three months time. He Yingqin, Zhang Qun and some other pro-Japanese elements would be removed. Song's nominations for the proposed transitional government were approved by Zhou, Zhang and Yang.

These issues were brought up in the discussions with Jiang Jieshi. With Madame Jiang, Song Ziwen, Donald and Guo Zengkai present, Jiang expressed his readiness to accept the first demand of Zhang on reorganization of the government and allowing all parties and all factions to participate in the salvation of the nation. Concrete discussions took place

on this issue. As to specific appointments, Zhang and Yang first of all made clear that they had no intention of waging a power struggle. The Xian side would not recommend anyone from its side to take any ministerial posts. Zhang and Yang expressed the hope that members of the CC clique and the Huangpu clique<sup>61</sup> would become members of the government as they believed that these cliques stood for resistance. They also proposed that someone who stood for resistance should be the president of the reorganized Executive Yuan and specifically had Song Ziwen in mind. However, Song was reluctant to take the position.

At the same time, Zhang and Yang raised the issue of ending the suppression of the CCP. In the spirit of accommodating the various parties and factions in national salvation, they suggested that outstanding people in the CCP could be recruited to work for the government. It was agreed with the Xian leaders, through Song Meiling and Song Ziwen, that after Jiang returned to Nanjing, he would immediately invite Zhou to Nanjing to discuss the details.<sup>62</sup>

On this day the first clashes between the Northeastern Army and the Central Army occurred. The forces of the Central Army were repulsed and the Northeastern Army wanted to completely wipe out the Central Army unit attacking it. They were prevented from doing so by Zhang Xueliang who, because



Jiang had agreed to the first and most important of his eight demands, felt that some important progress had been made. He prohibited any counter attack by the Northeastern Army.

December 24

Bo Gu arrived in Xian, bringing with him instructions from Paoan. The new directives from the CCP Central Committee were to convince the Northeastern Army that the best policy was to release Jiang.<sup>63</sup> These were conveyed to Zhou Enlai.

At 10.00 p.m. Zhou Enlai went to see Jiang for the first time. Before then Jiang had refused to see him. He was persuaded to do so chiefly by Madame Jiang, Donald and Zhang Xueliang. There is no mention of the meeting with Zhou Enlai in Jiang's diary, but in Madam Jiang's account, there is quite a detailed description of her meeting with Zhou Enlai. Zhou is not mentioned by name; he is referred to as a "man with influence". The meeting lasted for two hours. Madam Jiang wrote: "It interested me to hear him reiterate again and again that apart from the Generalissimo, there was no one capable of being the leader of the country at this period of its existence. When he referred to the grievance concerning the defence of the country he said, 'We do not say that the Generalissimo does not resist aggression, but we say he does not resist definitely enough or sufficiently fast.'"<sup>64</sup> Madam

Jiang and Song Ziwen made it clear that they supported ending the civil war and made specific commitments which were reported in Zhou Enlai's telegram to the CCP on December 25.<sup>65</sup>

On meeting Zhou Enlai in the evening, Jiang Jieshi's first words were, "We must not have any more civil wars." The CCP's most important demand was that he make such a promise. After that Jiang made the remarks, "All the time we've been fighting I often thought of you. I remembered even during war that you had worked well for me. I hope we can work together again."<sup>66</sup> Jiang further said, "Enlai, you are my subordinate and you should listen to me." To which Zhou replied, "If Mr. Jiang will change the policy of 'internal pacification before external resistance', then not only would I listen to you but the Red Army would obey your command."<sup>67</sup>

To remove any doubts or misgivings that Jiang may have had, Zhou explained that the CCP at that time had no intention of carrying out a proletarian revolution in China and that its political objective was to resist Japan and domestically, to work for a democratic system. It wanted to form a united front of all parties and all armies. The Red Army would be willing to accept the unified leadership of the Nanjing government.

Jiang agreed to end suppression of the Communists and stated at the end that "From now on I will never engage in the suppression of Communists."<sup>68</sup> He agreed with Zhou's statement that continued civil war would only lead to self destruction and the only way to survive was resistance against aggression. Jiang invited Zhou to go to Nanjing for direct negotiations.

At the same time activists in the Northwest Military Council held a meeting to discuss the peace line of the CCP. Although the general policy of the CCP had been made clear, there were still different views on how the matter should be settled. Some queried whether it would be giving up too much just to get the cooperation of the GMD. Most of those present thought that if the Central Army attacked Xian, they should counter-attack. It was in this kind of atmosphere that Bo Gu further explained CCP policy. He emphasized that because China was weak, it was necessary to avoid civil war when faced with foreign aggression. Civil war would only lead to the destruction of the nation. As a result, the Nanjing government would be turned into a Japanese puppet regime controlled by pro-Japanese Wang Jingwei and He Yingqin. In the GMD the C.C. and the Huangpu factions could play a positive and active role in resisting Japan and efforts should be made to win them over. His conclusion was

that releasing Jiang would benefit the united front against Japan and the salvation of the Chinese nation. Not all present at the meeting were convinced and a further meeting was scheduled for the next day.

Late in the evening the Central Committee of the CCP sent instructions that Jiang should be released after he issued a declaration stating his commitment to end suppression of the CCP and acknowledging the legal status of the Red Army. As Jiang had only made verbal promises, this would prevent him from going back on his word. The CCP had no idea that Zhang Xueliang would release Jiang the very next day.

The attitude of Yang Hucheng on the question of releasing Jiang differed from that of Zhang Xueliang. There were also some differences between the Northeastern Army and Yang's 17th Route Army. It was relatively easy for Song Meiling and Song Ziwen to reach an understanding with Zhang. However, Yang was different. Jiang's diary said that Zhang reported to Song Meiling:

Yang and his men are not willing to release the Generalissimo. They say that since T.V. and madame are friendly toward me, my head would be safe, but what about theirs? They now blame me for getting them into this affair, and say that since none of our conditions are granted they would be in a worse <sup>69</sup>fix than ever if they now released the Generalissimo.

From the conversations that took place within the 17th

Army, it was clear that there were differences of opinion. There were those that wanted to eliminate Jiang. Yang Hucheng did not support this view. He was also for releasing Jiang but only when certain conditions had been met. Because of this, his views clashed with those of Zhang Xueliang. In resolving the differences between the Zhang and Yang, Zhou Enlai played an important role as a mediator, helping Zhang to get Yang to agree to release Jiang. Indeed, in settling the whole dispute in Xian, Zhou Enlai was to play a significant role.

December 25

This morning Zhou Enlai met Jiang and Song Meiling for a second time during which Jiang reiterated his hope of ending the civil war. Song Meiling wrote: "When I saw him the following day (25th), I urged him to use his influence to convince various parties of the futility of opposing the government, reminding him that nothing had been gained by any armed anti-government forces during the past ten years.... As we were all Chinese, we should not fight each other. Internal problems should be solved by political means and not by military force...."<sup>70</sup> This statement indirectly testifies to what happened during the meetings. There already existed a verbal understanding between Jiang, Zhang, Yang and Zhou Enlai on ending the civil war and establishing unity to

resist Japan.

In the morning meeting of the Northwest Military Council opinion was still divided on what to do. The majority insisted that Jiang should make known his plans for reorganization of the government and sign the conditions that he had accepted. Without some guarantee, Jiang should not leave Xian. Yang Hucheng still did not agree to the immediate release of Jiang. Zhang's view was that they should have faith in what Jiang said. He said that according to reports from Nanjing, the pro-Japanese factions were making schemes and it was necessary to let Jiang return to Nanjing quickly so as to prevent the situation from getting out of hand.

Some time in the afternoon, Zhou Enlai managed to convince Yang Hucheng to free Jiang but no specific time was decided. Yang did not know that Zhang Xueliang would decide to free Jiang Jieshi that very day and accompany him to Nanjing. Zhang Xueliang did tell Wang Yizhe and two other senior officers the day before that he had decided to set Jiang free. He said he would take full responsibility for all that had happened and that he was prepared to explain to Nanjing and the whole nation that this rebellion had no intention of harming Jiang and that he was not seeking any personal interests. All three officers were against his

decision.<sup>71</sup>

Around two o'clock, Zhang wrote an order for Yu Xuezhong, making Yang Hucheng the acting director of the affairs of the Northwest. He gave this to his close friend Miss Zhao Si<sup>72</sup> to give to Yu Xuezhong after he had left Xian. At three o'clock he personally drove Jiang Jieshi, Song Meiling, Song Ziwen and Donald to the airport. Yang was informed by Zhang Xueliang by phone at the last moment and rushed to the airport where Jiang is reported to have said hurriedly: "You both made a rash decision in this incident; fortunately you both soon saw your own mistakes. Now that all the views and positions have been accepted after due consideration, what is past is past and need not again be mentioned. You should both focus on training your forces." Moreover, Jiang reiterated, "If there ever should be another civil war, I personally will be responsible. From now on I will never engage in the suppression of Communists. I admit my past mistakes, but you must also admit yours."<sup>73</sup> Soon after the group arrived at the airport, their plane took off, arriving safely in Luoyang at about 5:00 p.m.

At Xian airport Jiang had tried to persuade Zhang not to go with him as the Northeastern Army would have no leader and it would be inconvenient for him in Nanjing. However, Zhang insisted on going. He probably felt that to do so would help

to clear his name and show the nation that his purpose in detaining Jiang Jieshi was for a noble cause. Zhang was not mentally prepared for what was in store for him. That fateful decision was to cost him his life's freedom.

When Zhou Enlai arrived at the airport, he was too late. Jiang and his group together with Zhang Xueliang had already left. Zhang had made the decision to release Jiang entirely on his own and without prior consultation with the CCP.

### C. Domestic and International Reaction

#### 1. Domestic reaction

Initial domestic reaction to the Xian Incident was mostly unfavorable to Zhang Xueliang. There was student support for Xian but most people in the nation did not know what Zhang's true intentions were. They had known him as a "non-resistance" general and did not understand why Zhang wanted to detain the national leader, Jiang Jieshi. The negative reaction was due in part to the fact there was not enough information reaching other parts of the country about what was happening or what the Xian leaders wanted. It was soon discovered that a communication division chief in Xian, Jiang Bing, for three days withheld Zhang and Yang's telegrams. Jiang Bing was arrested and later executed.<sup>74</sup> Most of the telegrams that arrived in Xian were critical of



Zhang and Yang. Although Zhang and Yang undoubtedly had the firm support of their officers and men in the Northeastern and Northwestern armies, there were some in both armies that were against the revolt and defected to the Nanjing government side. Some of the negative reaction may also have influenced Zhang's final decision. He was afraid that further delay in resolving the incident might mean more trouble and decided on an early release of Jiang.

In the CCP areas and in Xian, the reaction was different. With Jiang under arrest, the people there were naturally pleased and resolutely stood for punishing him. After news of the incident reached Baoan, there were meetings and demonstrations, and the demand for Jiang's death was very high. From December 12 to 16, telegrams of the Central Committee to the Northern Bureau of the CCP and to the Nanjing government, and public opinion expressed in the Hongse Zhonghua all believed that Jiang Jieshi should be removed and handed over to the people to be tried. This view seemingly contradicts some of the public statements that the CCP made in connection with the united front, but when those statements were made the CCP could not possibly have predicted there might be a chance of Jiang being taken into custody. Considering the bitter struggles of the past and the many losses that the CCP had suffered, it was not

surprising that the CCP and its leadership should want to settle accounts with Jiang Jieshi. Fortunately, the CCP eventually made a correct analysis of the causes of the Incident and decided on a peaceful solution to the issue.

## 2. The attitude of the foreign powers.

Japan hoped the incident would turn into a civil war, in the course of which it would benefit from the weakening of the GMD, the Northwestern forces and the CCP. There can be no doubt that Japan sympathized with the Nanjing government under He Yingqin and Chang Qun both of whom were pro-Japanese. As an expression of goodwill the Japanese halted their military operation in northern Suiyuan. The Japanese Ambassador to Nanjing, Kawagoe, returned to Nanjing and the negotiations between the two countries were resumed. He Yingqin was resolutely for a punitive expedition to fight Zhang Xueliang and even claimed that the government would bomb Xian flat if necessary. Kawagoe met privately with He Yingqin to seek clarification on what the Nanjing government intended to do to cope with the Xian crisis. He was assured that the Central government was determined to proceed with its announced policy of carrying out a punitive expedition. It was a disappointment for Kawagoe that Jiang was released so soon.<sup>75</sup>

The United States and Great Britain did not want to

see Japan attain hegemony in China and were becoming increasingly concerned at Japanese expansion in China, threatening their interests in the area. Both nations hardened their stand towards Japan. The U.S. and U.K. realized that a major civil war would only benefit Japan. In a civil war, the Nanjing government would likely fall to the pro-Japanese factions. They therefore supported the efforts of Song Meiling, Song Ziwen and Kong Xiangxi who were representatives of the U.S., U.K. faction. Britain even suggested that provided Jiang maintained his rule, it might not be a bad thing for him to "form some sort of alliance with the Communist Party so as to deal a blow to the Japanese policy of aggression."<sup>76</sup> For the Song family, there were, of course, strong personal considerations. Song Meiling cooperated closely with W.H. Donald and actively sought a peaceful solution to the Incident. In the process she spent tireless efforts, meeting with officers of the Huangpu Academy and of the Air Force to express her strong opposition to an attack on Xian. Her efforts in Xian also helped to bring about a solution.

The Soviet Union was in the process of organizing an anti-fascist front to prevent an anti-Soviet war and was resolutely opposed to letting Japan use the Xian Incident for its own interests. In previous talks with the Nanjing

government the Soviet Union had agreed to support the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. It naturally made use of its influence with the CCP to carry out its wishes. The Comintern's telegram may not have determined the CCP's final decision, but it must have had its impact. Mao Zedong's unusually strong reaction shows that the CCP could not just ignore the directives from Moscow.

#### D. Conclusion.

##### 1. The Deciding Role of Zhang Xueliang.

In looking at the Xian Incident, there are still a number of questions and details which remain unclear, particularly with regard to the solution of the Incident. Was it the policy of Moscow that was the deciding factor that altered the policy of the CCP? And did the CCP then manage to convince Zhang Xueliang to adopt the CCP policy? What role did the GMD, Madame Jiang and Song Ziwen play in the Incident? What other factors were there that affected the course of developments? Each side involved in the incident has its own views. In many accounts, Zhang Xueliang appears to have been a passive actor manipulated by others, either by the CCP, as the GMD claim or, as the CCP say, was educated by the CCP, and by Zhou Enlai in particular. Neither claim was accurate.

It is clear that in the period before the Xian Incident the CCP was already moving towards cooperation with the GMD and Jiang Jieshi, in part because of the directives from Moscow, but also because it realized the people wanted an end to the civil war and wanted unity to resist Japan. The CCP became convinced that in this war effort the GMD and Jiang were indispensable. The attitude of the CCP in its direct talks with the GMD clearly showed that it was willing to make compromises in order to achieve its stated purpose of forming a united front against Japan.

Jiang Jieshi himself was also sincere in his opposition to Japanese aggression but believed he first had to achieve internal unity before he could resist Japan. When he came to see it was difficult to use force to destroy the CCP, he decided to try to seek a political solution. Changes in the position of the two parties towards each other have led some to down play the significance of the Xian Incident, believing that even without the Incident the two parties would eventually unite to fight Japan.

However, at the time of the Xian Incident, Jiang was not yet fully prepared to resolve his differences with the CCP peacefully and was still bent on a military solution. Nor was the CCP committed to accept the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. It would take the Xian Incident to change that

situation.

The Xian Incident was not the result of an outburst of excitement on the part of Zhang Xueliang or Yang Hucheng but an inevitable consequence of the development of the various contradictions in China. Briefly , the following factors brought about the Xian Incident:

1. Zhang Xueliang's military setbacks in the fighting against the CCP. In less than three months he lost nearly three divisions to the Red Army, which made him deeply feel the senselessness of losing men in civil war and he began to contemplate the possibility of resolving the contradictions with the CCP.
2. The unfair treatment that Zhang received from the Nanjing government. Not only did it not make up for his losses, but it abolished two of his divisions and cut its financing for the Northeastern Army. Contradictions between Zhang Xueliang and the Nanjing government became more intense.
3. The CCP, in releasing officers like Gao Fuyuan of the 619th regiment in the Northeastern Army, extended a hand of friendship to Zhang and hoped that the two forces could join to fight the common enemy. The work of the CCP within the Northwestern and Northeastern Army influenced many of Zhang and Yang's officers and men.
4. The strong desire of the people of the whole country for resistance strengthened Zhang's resolve to end the civil war.
5. The

officers and soldiers of the Northeastern Army were unhappy with having to fight a civil war when their homeland was occupied by the Japanese and they were left homeless. Their interest was in recovering their lost homes. In the Laoshan battle of October 1935, only a few hundred soldiers of 67th Army were lost but over a thousand laid down their arms because they did not want to fight the CCP.<sup>77</sup>

These were the circumstances that made the Xian Incident possible but it would take a determined man like Zhang Xueliang to make the fateful decision to actually start a revolt. It was also Zhang Xueliang who made possible the peaceful solution of the Incident.

At the centre of the Xian incident was Zhang Xueliang, who planned both the arrest and the release of Jiang Jieshi. From the very beginning he stood for a peaceful solution of the Incident and his views were consistent. He had always stood for a broad united front that would include all classes, parties, armed forces and Jiang Jieshi. He was specifically opposed to the CCP's "anti-Jiang, anti-Japan" policy. In the course of his conversations with Zhou Enlai in Yan'an and his talks with Li Kenong on March 3, 1936, he disagreed with the CCP policy of not including Jiang in the united front. He believed that it would be a great loss not to include Jiang Jieshi as Jiang also wanted to resist Japan.

He tried to convince the CCP that Jiang was sincere in his statements about resisting Japan and should be trusted. In his talks with Zhou Enlai in Yan'an, Zhang again stated that the united front should try to win over all possible forces and that as Jiang was the actual ruler of China it would very difficult to wage an anti-Japanese war without him.<sup>78</sup> Zhang repeatedly made clear to Zhou Enlai that the country needed Jiang to lead the nation, for without him the struggle against Japan would be more difficult and there would be chaos and civil war. It was Zhou who showed doubts about this policy as he thought that it would be practically impossible to win him over and unless Jiang's reactionary clique was smashed, it would be hard to wage serious struggles against Japan. It was later that the CCP, after taking into consideration the directives from Moscow and analyzing the political situation in the nation, modified its policy to one of compelling Jiang to resist Japan. It should be noted that the eight demands put forward by Zhang came about a week before the CCP sent its circular telegram for a peaceful solution.

From the very beginning Zhang Xueliang tried to enlist the support of other leaders in the nation. He sent his representatives to other parts of the country to ask for their assistance. On many occasions he pleaded with Jiang to



give up the policy of pacification before resistance. In June, in July, in November after the arrest of the "Seven Gentlemen", and twice in December he pleaded with Jiang and made it clear that he had no personal grudges against Jiang. All these efforts were made in vain and as a last resort he used military persuasion. Military persuasion was a continuation of passionate persuasion kujian. The purpose remained the same: to force Jiang to resist Japan. In retrospect, Zhang probably put too much faith in Jiang, but at that time his position was that if there was to be united front, it had to be one that included Jiang.

Rather than the CCP convincing Zhang Xueliang on the necessity of a peaceful solution of the Xian Incident, it was Zhang Xueliang who helped the CCP to modify its position on Jiang Jieshi. The peaceful solution of the Xian Incident was not the result of Zhou Enlai spending "tireless efforts to convince Zhang Xueliang of the necessity of releasing Jiang and seeking a peaceful solution." It was not a case of "Zhou Enlai explaining to the two generals (Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng)" that the "long term interests of the Chinese people had to be placed above personal feelings. And Jiang's removal would only play into the hands of the Japanese imperialists and further divide the Chinese nation."<sup>79</sup>

Zhang Xueliang was the central figure in deciding the

outcome of the Incident. He started the revolt and had the power of decision and execution. He had 130,000 troops in the Northeastern Army and was the deputy commander-in-chief of China's Army, Air and Naval forces. The peaceful solution of the Incident advocated by the CCP could not be implemented without the approval of Zhang. The GMD's efforts at freeing Jiang could not succeed without meeting some of Zhang's conditions. The central role of Zhang was partly illustrated in Jiang's diary:

The leaders in Sian (Xian) suddenly disagreed over what they had discussed with T.V. (Song Ziwen) yesterday. They indicated that they could not let me go until the Central Government troops had withdrawn to Tongkwan (Tongguan) .....Later the radical elements brought up seven terms and asked T.V. to present them to me.... T.V. flatly refused... Chang Hsueh-liang (Zhang Xueliang) then came out as a mediator and told them that no more 'politics' should be played; otherwise he would do as he saw fit. The terms were then withdrawn.

Quite evidently, Zhang could not have determined the course of developments all by himself; there were other factors at work and he was influenced by the other people and events. The role played by the CCP and especially by Zhou Enlai throughout this incident was most significant. Without the firm support of the CCP, Zhang would have found the situation far more difficult. It is unlikely that he could have gained any concessions from Jiang if he were acting alone. The cooperation between Zhang, Yang and Zhou Enlai was essential in settling the Incident. But it was still Zhang

that made it possible. No one understood this better than Zhou Enlai and it is not surprising that he called Zhang "a hero of all times."

GMD views on Zhang Xueliang were quite different from those of the CCP. Some emphasize that Zhang and Yang were seeking personal gains and trying to get their armies assigned to a richer part of the country. In staging the Xian Incident, they had been deceived by the CCP and had made a big blunder in antagonizing all the people of China. It was through War Minister He Yingqin, who made a show of force, and the work of Madam Jiang and Song Ziwen that made Zhang Xueliang see his mistake and agree to free Jiang. He therefore rightly deserved punishment for his breach of military discipline. But Jiang Jieshi, in the spirit of great magnanimity, pardoned him and let him off very lightly! More recent writing from Taiwan appears to see his action in a more positive light and point more to his desire to fight the Japanese as a motive for staging the Xian Incident.

Jiang Jieshi's account in "A Fortnight in Sian: Extracts from a Diary", Madame Jiang's story, "Sian: A Coup D'Etat" and the "Admonition to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hucheng prior to departure from Sian" are GMD official versions of what happened in Xian. When Zhang Xueliang wrote his own reminiscences, he knew of these accounts and he

did not record what exactly happened in those two weeks. He could not contradict the statements of Jiang Jieshi and Madam Jiang. It is clear that there are serious questions about the genuineness of Jiang's first hand account of the Xian Incident.

Jiang Jieshi's diary of the fortnight in Xian was written for him by his personal secretary, Chen Bulei, after Jiang returned to Nanjing. The text underwent eight revisions before it was published. The thrust of the diary seemingly was to propagate the greatness of character of Jiang Jieshi such as his determination to sacrifice his life if necessary for the country: "I was born for the revolution, I will gladly die for the same cause.... If anyone wrongly thinks that he can manipulate national affairs by capturing me and endangering my life, he is a perfect fool...".<sup>81</sup> And "Zhang should know that although he is able to make a captive of my body he could never break my will-power."<sup>82</sup>

The "Admonition" was also written by Chen Bulei. Jiang could not have made the long statement at the airport. There was a dual purpose in issuing that statement after the event. It was to show to the nation that he did not bend under threat of force, and therefore emphasized that he rejected all requests of Zhang and others and repeatedly refused to give any orders or sign anything under duress.

But it was also to indicate to those who were in the know that he would carry out the verbal commitments he had made to Zhang and Yang. That was why he used "Promises must be kept and action must be resolute" to introduce the statement "Whatever is beneficial to the country and the people, I will do without any regard for my personal interests. Everything that is beneficial to the nation and the people must be adopted or carried out."<sup>83</sup> Although the idea was ambiguous and vaguely expressed, the implication was clear.

There can be no doubt that while in Xian Jiang Jieshi verbally agreed to change his policy and accepted the principal demands put forward by Zhang Xueliang. Mao Zedong's "Statement on Chiang Kai-shek's Statement" issued on 28 December was based on a report of the CCP delegation in Xian and listed the terms that Jiang Jieshi accepted. Jiang's changes in policy after he returned to Nanjing testifies to what happened in Xian. Jiang Jieshi finally decided to discontinue the civil war and to try to cooperate with the CCP. Therein lies the significance of the Xian Incident. It is precisely this important consequence of the Incident that the GMD is unwilling to recognize.

Neither the CCP nor the GMD gave a faithful account of what actually happened at Xian and both parties claim credit for the peaceful solution of the crisis. The tragedy lay in

that the person who had brought about important changes to the situation in China and to the relations between the GMD and the CCP was not given due acknowledgment for what he did. The Nanjing government deprived him of an opportunity of fulfilling his greatest wish: to fight against Japanese aggression.

## 2. Aftermath and Significance

After returning to Nanjing, Jiang Jieshi repeatedly offered to resign as he felt he had to bear responsibility for what had happened. The government would not let him do so; but he was permitted to return to Fenghua to recuperate. Zhang Xueliang was stripped of his titles and tried by the Military Affairs Commission. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and five years' loss of civil rights. Jiang requested that a special pardon be issued, and from that time on Zhang was kept under the custody of Jiang Jieshi. Yang Hucheng was later sent abroad and when he returned was arrested and thrown into prison.

On January 6 the Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Xian was disbanded but the Central Forces under Gu Zhutong moved into the area, and anti-Communist sentiments continued to be expressed by the GMD government. In Xian there was a feeling of disappointment. Yu Xuezhong, who had been appointed commander of the Northeastern Army, could not

maintain the unity that had existed. It soon became clear that Zhang Xueliang would not be returning to Xian, in spite of earlier firm promises by Madam Jiang that Zhang would soon be sent back to Xian.<sup>84</sup> Meanwhile, the Northeastern and Northwestern armies were about to be transferred and dispersed. The young radical officers became convinced that some of the senior commanders were negotiating privately with the Nanjing government. They wanted to use force to free Zhang Xueliang but could not get the senior officers to agree. These officers were also upset with the CCP for not making enough effort to secure the release of Zhang. The CCP was more concerned with maintaining the unity of the country and trying to avoid a civil war. In desperation, they staged a revolt on February 2 and killed General Wang Yizhe and some other officers. The revolt of the young radicals was quickly brought to an end and eventually the Northeastern Army and Northwestern Army were either dispersed or came under the control of the Nanjing government. As army units, they lost their identity.

Obviously, the forces that made the Xian Incident possible were those that lost most. The end result of the incident was that one of the chief protagonists Yang Hucheng was cruelly murdered in Chongqing shortly before the CCP victory in 1949 and the other, Zhang Xueliang, was deprived

of his freedom for more than fifty years.

For the nation, the Xian Incident was of great significance. It was one of the most important events in the history of modern China. It changed the course of development for both the CCP and the GMD. As a result of the Incident, Jiang Jieshi could no longer continue his anti-Communist suppression campaigns and under pressure from the CCP and the various patriotic forces, Jiang could not but take the road of resistance to Japan. As Mao Zedong said, "The peaceful settlement of the Xian Incident became the turning point; under the new circumstances internal co-operation took shape and the nation-wide War of Resistance Against Japan began."<sup>85</sup>

The Xian Incident was certainly a turning point in the history of the CCP. It saved the CCP from almost total destruction in the extermination campaigns; it enabled the CCP to avoid being further attacked and possibly being wiped out by the GMD and instead enabled it to firmly establish itself as a significant force in Chinese politics. For the first time since the failure of the 1927 revolution, the CCP was able to enter the Chinese political stage outside the Soviet region, publicly and legitimately.

From that time, the CCP was able to develop and strengthen its position in China. The Xian Incident and its



peaceful solution prevented an almost inevitable major civil war against the CCP and brought about important changes to GMD-CCP relations.

The Xian Incident ended ten years of civil war and brought in a new period of cooperation between the CCP and the GMD which was the basis for national resistance against Japanese aggression. It became possible for all the material, financial and human resources of the nation to be mobilized for use in resisting Japan. As Jiang Jieshi said at the beginning of the war, the whole nation from north to south, old and young would be engaged in the war of resistance.<sup>86</sup>

The Xian incident that was to decide the future developments was peacefully resolved as a result of the efforts and Zhang, Yang, the CCP, the Song and others that stood for resistance. In the serious national crisis, all classes and strata and political forces that stood for resistance put the national interests first and strived to save the nation. In the process all sides made major concessions or sacrifices. Zhang Xueliang lost his freedom and Yang Hucheng eventually sacrificed his life; the CCP agreed to change the name of the Soviets and the Red Army and end its opposition to the GMD, while the GMD changed its policy of suppressing the CCP and after formal negotiations,

entered a second period of cooperation.

From the Xian Incident on there would be times of cooperation between the two parties and also times of confrontation. This situation would continue to be the main feature of the political scene in China. During this crucial and difficult historical period, the courage Jiang Jieshi displayed in facing reality and bringing about changes in the GMD policies should undoubtedly be fully acknowledged. Without his leadership, the heroic efforts made by the Chinese people when confronted by all-out Japanese aggression would have been impossible.

#### IV. OUTBREAK OF WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

(1937.7.7)

A. Continued GMD-CCP Talks and Negotiations Following the Xian Incident.

##### 1. GMD Third Plenum of the Fifth Congress

After Jiang Jieshi returned to Nanjing, the situation in the nation remained unclear for a time; the GMD government continued to condemn both the CCP and Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. It was yet uncertain whether any true changes had been brought about by the Xian Incident. Much depended on the attitude of Jiang. At this crucial stage the direction of the country was in the hands of Jiang Jieshi.

After the Xian Incident, Jiang was hailed as a national hero, but he realized that the tremendous popular demonstration of support was more a reflection of the strong demand of the people for unity in resistance against Japan. Jiang knew he could not continue his campaigns against the CCP, as any punitive action against the Northeastern and 17th armies and the CCP would immediately result in loss of his popularity. And in all conscience, Jiang could not ignore

the promises he had made in Xian. Moreover, Jiang was at the same time becoming increasingly concerned with continued Japanese expansion in north China. In such circumstances, and in spite of public utterances to the contrary, Jiang Jieshi decided to alter his priorities and to initiate a new orientation in his policies.

In his much strengthened position after the Xian Incident, Jiang was able to force through this change of policy, as exemplified during the proceedings of the GMD's Third Plenary Session of the GMD's Fifth Central Executive Committee held in February, 1937. Several important policy changes were made at this conference. On domestic issues, the government adopted a policy of peace and unity. Among other decisions, it promised to improve the election laws, expand democracy, free political prisoners, grant freedom of speech and guarantee basic human rights of the people.

On the question of resisting Japan, the GMD's attitude became more resolute. Resolutions were adopted on recovering east Hebei and northern Chahar, and abolishing the "autonomous" Hebei-Chahar Council.<sup>1</sup> In effect, the GMD declared that further Japanese military aggression would be met with armed resistance.

The CCP showed great interest in this GMD Plenum. While preparations for the Plenum were still underway, the Central

Committee of the CCP sent a telegram to the GMD on February 10 expressing the hope that relations between the two parties could be improved. It set forth five conditions for better relations:

1) End all civil wars and pool national resources and forces in a united effort against Japan.

2) Guarantee freedom of speech, assembly, association and release all political prisoners.

3) Convene a conference of representatives of all political parties and groups, people from all walks of life and all armies and pool the nation's manpower and resources in a common endeavor to save the country.

4) Speedily complete preparation for the war to resist Japan.

5) Improve the livelihood of the people.

The CCP stated that if the GMD would carry out the above conditions, it would make the following guarantees:

1) End armed insurrection to overthrow the GMD Government throughout the country.

2) Rename the Soviet Government as the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and redesignate the Red Army as part of the National Revolutionary Army under the command of the Central Government in Nanjing and its Military Council.

3) Establish a democratic system based on universal suffrage in the areas under the Government of the Special Region.

4) End confiscation of land and resolutely implement the common programme of the anti-Japanese national united front.<sup>2</sup>

These guarantees represent an important concession on the part of the CCP. Many of these ideas were not new and had been put forward during previous negotiations with the GMD, but they had never before been made public. The telegram made clear to the nation under what conditions the CCP would be willing to cooperate with the GMD and how far the CCP would go in order to achieve that cooperation.

The GMD Third Plenum responded to the telegram of the CCP on February 20, 1937 with the adoption of a resolution on the "Extermination of the Red Peril" which was directed at the four guarantees made by the CCP. It put forward four minimum conditions for the solution of the differences between the two parties:

1) Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the national army and termination of confrontation between the two armies ; 2) Dissolution of the "Soviet Republic"; 3) Termination of Communist propaganda that was diametrically opposed to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three People's Principles"; and

4) Abandonment of class struggle.<sup>3</sup>

The GMD resolution demanded that the CCP surrender and offered it a chance to "make a new start in life." In fact, however, the GMD was willing to accept the CCP proposals as a basis for reconciliation. Like some previous GMD statements, it is possible to read the resolution in different ways and it could have a double meaning. As Zhou Enlai said: "Once the name of the Red Army has been changed, it can be said that it had been abolished but the Red Army still existed, only in another form."<sup>4</sup> Likewise, the other demands could be interpreted in the same way. On the surface, Jiang was maintaining his firm stand on the CCP issue, but in essence the resolution reflected an important change in his policy.

The CCP decided to take up the GMD challenge. It was evident to the CCP that Jiang Jieshi still faced strong opposition within the GMD for any changes in its attitude towards the CCP and that there was a strong demand that Jiang should take revenge for what had happened at Xian. Within the GMD, there still existed a strong pro-Japanese faction and deep anti-Communist feelings. In such circumstances, it would have been difficult to have had the resolution worded differently.

At the same time, the CCP had to consider its relatively

weak position in the nation and could not be too demanding of the government. It also had to take into account the directives from the Comintern calling on it to establish a united front. The CCP thus ignored the negative aspects of the resolution and regarded the results of the Third Plenum as positive, especially with respect to the decisions adopted on peace and unity, and policy towards Japan. The CCP saw the meeting as marking a change in the GMD policy. It believed that an important step had been taken towards cooperation between the CCP and the GMD.

Both the GMD and the CCP felt that there was a need for some form of cooperation, but how should this cooperation be carried out? For example, how should the Red Army be reorganized? How should the system of the Soviet government be changed? What form should cooperation between the two parties take? How was a united front to be established? All these were important issues that had to be resolved through strenuous negotiations.

## 2. CCP-GMD Negotiations.

Altogether five rounds of serious and strenuous negotiations between the two parties began early in 1937 and lasted about seven months. The talks were held in Xian, Hangzhou, Lushan and Nanjing.<sup>5</sup> On the CCP side, the delegates included Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Ye Jianying, Zhu De,



and Lin Boqu. Representing the GMD were Gu Zhutong, He Chuhan, Zhang Chong, Jiang Jieshi, Chen Lifu, Song Ziwen, Gan Zhe and Shao Lizhi.

These negotiations focussed on the recognition of the Red Army and the border areas, legal status for all political parties, and the establishment of a united front. Contact between the two parties began at the beginning of January, 1937. Pan Hannian, as representative of the CCP, met Chen Lifu for negotiations and requested the GMD speedily implement the various measures agreed upon between Jiang Jieshi, Song Ziwen and Zhou Enlai. He stated explicitly the CCP was opposed to any schemes of pro-Japanese elements for inciting a civil war and to the detention of Zhang Xueliang. At the same time, according to the expressed wishes of Song Ziwen, Pan contacted Song secretly and asked him to help in putting into practice the various guarantees made.<sup>6</sup>

On January 8, Zhou Enlai met GMD representative Zhang Chong in Xian, and expressed the sincere desire of the CCP to cooperate with the GMD. Two days later Zhou wrote to Jiang Jieshi urging him to end the civil war and to reorganize the government. Zhou Enlai declared that the CCP would assist Jiang Jieshi in bringing about domestic peace and resisting external aggression.<sup>7</sup>

Jiang replied on the 20th, setting forth conditions for

cooperation, similar to the ones that were included in the resolution on the CCP passed during the Third Plenum. He also demanded that the Red Army withdraw to north Shaanxi. In a reply, the CCP agreed in principle to the requests of Jiang and asked that Jiang guarantee that he would not start a civil war once the issues were resolved peacefully. It demanded that the GMD end the policy of eliminating the CCP. Part of the Red Army should be stationed in south Shaanxi in order to solve the grave shortage of grain in north Shaanxi but later it could move to other areas. The CCP requested that concern should be shown for the Northeastern Army and the 17th Army and also for Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng.

At a meeting on the afternoon of February 12, Zhou Enlai met the GMD representative Gu Zhutong and the two sides agreed that:

- 1) The CCP would recognize the leadership of the GMD in the whole nation, end armed rebellion and the policy of confiscation of land. It would earnestly implement a united programme for resistance and salvation. The GMD guaranteed that imprisoned CCP members would be freed in batches. There would be no more arrests of CCP members or disruption of their organizations and the CCP would be allowed to operate openly at an appropriate time.

- 2) The system of Soviets would be abolished. The

existing Soviet government would be renamed Special Regional Government of the Republic of China and come under the direct leadership of the National government. General elections would be held. Administrative officials of the special region would be elected locally and ratified by the Central government.

3) The Red Army would be reorganized as the National Revolutionary Army and be placed under the direct united leadership and command of the Military Council of the Central government. With regard to specific personnel, organization, ordinance, pay and provisions, the Red Army would enjoy the same treatment as the Central Army. The commander would be nominated by the Central Government and the Military Council while the political personnel would be appointed by the CCP. The central government would send a limited number of personnel as liaison officers. Other Red Army units would be reorganized as local forces;

4) The CCP would send representatives to participate in the National Congress and the Army would send representatives to participate in the meetings of the Defence Council;

5) The GMD Third Plenum should further promote its stand on unity for resistance, grant freedom and democracy, and improve the people's livelihood.<sup>8</sup>

Jiang's instruction to Gu Zhutong was that he should

seek unity not in form but in essence; so long as the CCP agreed not to engage in communist propaganda but to implement the Three People's Principles, then other issues could all be subjects for discussion. But on the size of the Red Army, Jiang would only allow two divisions and eight regiments of 15,000 men. He insisted that the divisional chiefs-of-staff and deputy commanders should be appointed by the government. Clearly, Jiang still wanted to limit the Red Army as far as possible.<sup>9</sup>

While the GMD Third Plenum was still in session, the negotiations between the two parties were already making significant progress. By the beginning of March 1937, the talks between Zhou Enlai and Gu Zhutong moved towards agreement, including agreement on the number of men and officers in the reorganized Red Army. Based on the results of the talks, Zhou Enlai drafted an agreement on the 8th of March. However, two days later Gu Zhutong and He Zhonghan rescinded their stand and proposed major changes to the agreement. They raised such issues as limiting the Red Army to 10,000 men in each of the three divisions which in turn must obey all orders of the Nanjing Military Commission and Jiang Jieshi. They wanted the government to appoint political cadres to the Red Army. They also proposed dividing the Soviet areas and sending in deputy commanders of

units that must obey all orders of the government. A stipulation that the government forces would end their attack on the Red Army west of the Yellow River was deleted.<sup>10</sup> The purpose of these changes was to place the Red Army and the Soviet Areas under the total control of the Nanjing government. All these proposals were rejected by the CCP as they would seriously weaken their independent status. Nevertheless, Zhou Enlai stated that the fundamental principle of the CCP in supporting unity between the two parties to save the nation and support Jiang Jieshi would not change.

It was the CCP that was making major concessions, and the more that it did so, the more demanding the GMD became. This situation aroused the dissatisfaction of the CCP and Mao Zedong had to assert that it "was cooperation between the CCP and GMD and not surrender, and the basis for cooperation must be democratic reform of the GMD and a resolute policy of resistance against Japan."<sup>11</sup>

It was clear to the CCP that these important problems could not be settled by the GMD negotiators in Xian. The CCP felt that it was necessary to hold direct negotiations with Jiang Jieshi and decided to terminate the talks with Gu. So ended the month long talks in Xian, but these negotiations were not without consequence. Some agreements were reached

such as on the reorganization of the Red Army into three divisions and the setting up of a CCP liaison office in Xian. Beginning from March, the GMD government began to issue pay and provisions for the Red Army.

Late in March, Zhou Enlai arrived in Hangzhou and held direct talks with Jiang Jieshi. At the first meeting with Jiang, Zhou stated that it was for the interests of the nation that the CCP wanted to cooperate with the GMD government and Jiang. But it would not accept any form of surrender. He also stated that the CCP was opposed to any attempts to oppose Jiang and split the nation. Zhou reiterated the specific demands of the CCP:

- 1) The Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region should be kept intact.
- 2) The reorganized Red Army should reach 40,000 men with general headquarters for the three divisions.
- 3) The government was not to assign deputy commanders and political personnel;
- 4) The area to be garrisoned by the Red Army should be expanded.<sup>12</sup>

Jiang Jieshi said that the strength of the Red Army and the question of headquarters could be discussed. His attitude during this session of talks was singularly conciliatory. Jiang further stated that the CCP was a new force that demonstrated a national consciousness and revolutionary spirit. As a result of the split between the

CCP and GMD, the revolution had failed and led to separatist warlord regimes and the occupation of China by the imperialists. Jiang Jieshi's main thrust during the talks was that the CCP should cooperate with him. He stated that he would like to cooperate with the CCP on a long-term basis and proposed that the Central Committee of the CCP should consider ways for long-term cooperation.<sup>13</sup>

On other specific problems, Jiang stated that the CCP could participate in the National Congress and the National Defence Council; the CCP administrative district could remain intact, but on the border region questions, Jiang hoped that the CCP would recommend someone from Nanjing to be the head. The CCP could assume the deputy posts and he would not interfere with the CCP decisions. He also agreed to the establishment of a general headquarters for the CCP; he only wished to keep up a liaison with the Red Army. He would also try to settle the problems of food and provisions for the Red Army. Jiang agreed to Zhou Enlai's suggestion of working out a common programme for long term cooperation.

Zhou Enlai's impression was that Jiang was conciliatory in the talks mainly because he wanted to strengthen his role as the national leader. If the CCP was willing to recognize that, Jiang would be willing to compromise on other issues.<sup>14</sup>

Upon Zhou Enlai's return from Hangzhou, the Politburo of

the CCP immediately convened an enlarged meeting. The meeting expressed satisfaction with the talks held in Hangzhou and stated that the Third Plenum of the GMD marked the beginning of a basic change in its national policy. In this new stage of the revolution, the CCP should focus on the struggle for democratic rights as the civil war was over. National contradictions superseded domestic class contradictions. The CCP should therefore adopt new forms of struggle; instead of armed struggle and confrontation between the two political authorities, the CCP should engage in peaceful democratic struggles. The Party must persist in its united front policy and strive to gain leadership within the front.<sup>15</sup>

On April 5, the Central Committee of the CCP, based on the report of Zhou Enlai, drafted a programme for the national united front and suggested to the GMD the formation of a National Federation that would include the GMD, the CCP and all parties and organizations that supported this programme. The Central Committee also decided to launch a campaign for democratic rights.

The CCP policy of cooperating with the GMD was causing some misgivings among members of the CCP and the Red Army. Some were concerned about the wisdom of cooperation with the GMD when the government was still openly antagonistic towards



the CCP and wondered whether the GMD could be trusted.

The leaders of the CCP, however, understood that it had to be realistic on the matter of cooperation with the GMD. It understood that only when the CCP cooperated with the Nanjing government of Jiang Jieshi could there be a way out for the Chinese nation. The GMD had an armed force of two million and was in control of the national government, while the CCP only had control over a poor region of Northern Shaanxi, with only 50,000 Red Army troops.

The CCP was obviously the weaker party and it was compelled to make more concessions than the GMD. It had to accept the leading position of the GMD in the war of resistance. In view of the urgent desire of people throughout the nation for the two parties to reach an agreement, the Central Committee of the CCP decided it should maintain a sincere attitude towards the GMD. However, many of the doubts within the CCP had to be cleared away and a common understanding of the questions had to be reached. The united front with the GMD was the central issue discussed at a meeting of party delegates held in May 1937. The basic stand of the CCP on the united front was reiterated at this party meeting.

### 3. National Conference of the CCP (May, 1937).

From May 2nd to the 14th, the CCP convened a Conference

of Party Representatives from the Soviet Areas in Yan'an, attended by delegates from various regional party units. Altogether there were over 220 delegates. Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu, Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Boqu, Kai Feng, Lin Biao, Yang Shangkun, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Zhen, Cai Cang, and others participated in the conference. At the Conference, Mao Zedong made a political report "The Tasks of the CCP in the Period of Resistance to Japan" and a summary report "Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front."<sup>16</sup> In his political report, Mao analyzed the political situation in China after the end of the civil war, and made "consolidate peace, fight for democracy and carry out armed resistance" the three tasks of the CCP in this new period of history.

Mao criticized the rightist viewpoint that only wanted resistance and neglected democracy and class struggle, pointing out that resistance against Japan and democracy were mutually interdependent. To fight for democracy was to fight for the war against Japan. At a time when there was cooperation between the two parties there was the growing danger of right opportunism. Mao emphasized the importance of the leadership of the CCP in the Chinese revolution and the necessity to guard against a revival of Chen Duxiu's right opportunist line of the first united front period. He

said: "Without the political leadership of the proletariat and its party, it is impossible to establish an anti-Japanese national united front, to attain the objectives of peace, democracy and armed resistance ...."<sup>17</sup>

Mao reiterated the conclusion of the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo held in April that the contradiction between China and Japan had become the principal one while "China's internal contradictions have dropped to a secondary and subordinate place." Although the contradictions between classes still existed, the party had to make necessary adjustments in dealing with the internal and external contradictions so as to fit in with the general task of resisting Japan. This meant the party was to strive for peace and unity, democracy and improvement of the life of the people. It was "necessary as well as permissible" to make concessions to the GMD. Nevertheless, he stressed that the preservation of the CCP's independence and its leadership over the Special Region and Red Army, and the freedom to criticize were the "limits of the concessions beyond which it is impermissible to go."<sup>18</sup> The CCP would whole-heartedly support the Three People's Principles on the grounds that "they are completely in keeping with the historical requirements of the Chinese revolution", but the Communists "will never abandon their ideal of socialism and Communism".

However, at that particular period of history, the task of the CCP was to promote a united front between the two parties to fight foreign aggression.<sup>19</sup>

#### 4. End of Hostilities Between the CCP and GMD.

Erstwhile enemies were now moving closer towards each other and, with this change in political orientation of both parties, it was possible to bring to an end the hostilities that had existed for almost a decade. In late May, GMD-CCP hostilities had practically ceased when a semi-official GMD delegation visited Yan'an. At the reception, Mao Zedong expressed the CCP's sincere desire for co-operation with the GMD on a long-term basis. Relations between the two parties showed signs of improvement. The GMD economic blockade on the Communist Region was lifted and the government began to supply three-fifths of the monthly food allowance of the Red Army.<sup>20</sup> Trade relations were established between the CCP districts and other parts of the country. More important, communications between the different areas were restored. Postal and telegraph services were partly reopened. Needed technical materials of all kinds began to arrive in the CCP areas.

The peace that came into being after the Xian Incident brought immediate benefits for the CCP. The Red Army quickly expanded its base in the province of Shaanxi, occupying some

fifty counties, an area about sixty to seventy thousand square miles. The area was thinly populated, economically poor, and very limited in its possibilities for development. There were immense economic difficulties. However, the new peace provided the CCP with the freedom to implement its own policies, develop its base and expand its forces.

The CCP could also freely use the base to train cadres for the revolution and the resistance movement. Young people travelled to Yan'an from all parts of China, some walking over great distances. Many enrolled in the Anti-Japanese University. Intellectuals and people from other walks of life also began to go to Yan'an.

Conditions in the GMD areas for the CCP also improved. Oppression of the CCP was largely curtailed and political prisoners including Chen Duxiu were released from the prisons. In return for the concessions of the GMD, the CCP was ready to carry out its promise to end the confiscation of landlord lands, to cease its anti-GMD propaganda, and to guarantee equal rights to all citizens, regardless of their class status in society. The CCP made these necessary changes, but it retained the essential content of its doctrine and programme, and its independence. It was willing to honour the Three People's Principles but the CCP had its own interpretation of these three principles.

The CCP continued its efforts to fight for democracy and intensified its political activities. It launched a campaign for constitutional democracy and called for the reform of the National Congress and election regulations. The CCP increased its contact with other parties and provinces such as Sichuan, Guilin and Guangdong and urged them to join in the movement for constitutional democracy.<sup>21</sup>

The peace that came into being did not mean that the differences between the two parties had been resolved or that both sides were equally sincere in cooperating to resist aggression. There were still outstanding issues to be resolved and as the influence of the CCP grew, the government was anxious to seek a solution. Fortunately, both sides were willing to discuss their differences.

On June 4, 1937 Zhou Enlai arrived in Lushan, Jiangxi, and from the 8th to the 15th held a series of talks with Jiang Jieshi. Present were Song Meiling, Song Ziwen and Zhang Chong. At the meetings Zhou presented a draft programme for national salvation and unity that included fifty-two articles.

Jiang Jieshi reversed his previous attitude, perhaps because he was unhappy with the activities of the CCP in demanding democracy and reform of the GMD. He was no longer willing to abide by his position taken during the talks in

Hangzhou. He ignored the CCP programme and instead proposed the formation of a National Revolutionary League which would be set up with Jiang appointing a certain number of GMD cadres and the CCP recommending a similar number of cadres. Jiang would be the President of the League and have veto power over all decisions. All propaganda and external relations of the two parties should be discussed by the League and implemented by it. If the League operated well, it could be expanded to include members of both parties to form a party. Jiang suggested that it could even contact the Third Comintern and carry out a policy of uniting with the Soviet Union. The League could then replace the CCP in dealing with the Third Comintern. This was one way through which Jiang hoped he could integrate the CCP into the GMD and, in effect, eliminate it.

As to other pressing issues in relations between the two parties, Jiang Jieshi also changed his mind. He no longer agreed to setting up general headquarters for the three Red Army divisions and instead proposed establishing a political training section to take command. He even proposed that Mao Zedong and Zhu De go abroad. Jiang was no longer willing to discuss a specific time when he would allow the CCP to operate openly. He also stated that the CCP, in participating in the National Congress, should not do so as members of the

Communist party. Jiang advised the CCP to be realistic and not aim at the unattainable.<sup>22</sup>

Long debates and arguments took place and, in spite of repeated consultations with Song Ziwen, Song Meiling, and Zhang Chong, no solution could be reached. The negotiations reached an impasse and Zhou Enlai returned to Yan'an on June 18th.

The CCP, after studying Jiang's views, decided to make further major concessions. At the end of June, as the situation in north China became more tense between China and Japan, the CCP decided it would again try to make further efforts to secure cooperation with the GMD. It would: 1) Agree to the establishment of a National Revolutionary League and according to the League programme, Jiang would have veto power. 2) Recommend Zhang Ji, Song Ziwen, Yu Youren as candidates for the administrative head of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and Ling Boqu as the deputy head. Subordinates would be recommended by the CCP and formally approved by the Executive Yuan. 3) Insist on the setting up of a general headquarters, but if it was rejected, it would agree to a political training section with the authority to command. If all these attempts to reach an agreement failed, the CCP would then reorganize the Red Army on its own into three divisions of 45,000 men and a local force of 10,000.<sup>23</sup> The



CCP also drafted organizational principles for the proposed National Revolutionary League. These new views were relayed to Jiang Jieshi through Zhou Enlai.

The popular demand for unity and resistance, and the willingness of the CCP to make greater compromises prompted Jiang Jieshi to take some new initiatives. On June 26, he invited Zhou Enlai to go to Lushan a second time. Early in July, Zhou left Yan'an and took with him the draft declaration on cooperation between the CCP and GMD. He arrived in Shanghai on July 7, the very day that the Lugouqiao Incident broke out.

## B. Lugouqiao and Chinese Resistance

### 1. The Lugouqiao Incident

As Jiang Jieshi continued his negotiations with the CCP, he also strengthened his resolve to resist Japan. Even though Jiang still expressed a wish for improvement in relations between China and Japan, and talks between the two sides continued, he was feeling it was impossible to abate Japan's aggression and was deeply concerned with the consequences it would have in China. That was why he rejected Japanese Prime Minister Hirota's offer of an Anti-Communist Alliance with the Nanjing government. This decision was a definite indication that Nanjing's foreign policy had

undergone a fundamental change.

Japan was apprehensive of the growing unity within China, the improvement of relations between the CCP and the GMD and of Jiang's attitude and policy. The July 7 Lugouqiao (Marco Polo) Incident was one response of the Japanese to the new political situation in China.

During the night of July 7, 1937, a Japanese garrison was on maneuvers near the small town of Wangping at the end of Lugouqiao. When one of their soldiers was reported missing, the Japanese accused the Chinese garrison at Wangping of taking him prisoner and demanded to search the town. Just shortly after the Japanese presented their demand, the missing soldier returned. Nevertheless, the Japanese still demanded entry into the city for investigation. The Chinese commander refused, and fighting broke out when the Japanese troops attacked at dawn. That was the Lugouqiao Incident which marked the beginning of the Eight-Year War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-1945).

The purpose of the Japanese in launching the attack was to force the Chinese troops to withdraw from Wanping, just as they had done at Fengtai ten months earlier. In their first attempt they failed to take the city. Negotiations were begun at a local level between the Japanese and Song Zeyuan, the commander of the Chinese 29th Army and Chairman of the

Hebei-Chahar Political Council. In the afternoon of the 8th, the Japanese launched a heavier attack and the fighting lasted until the next day when a temporary cease-fire was arranged.

On the 10th of July, the Japanese cabinet decided to increase its forces in north China and issued a mobilization order. The next day, under the pretext of ensuring the safety of the many Japanese residents in North China, several large army units began to move from Korea, Japan and Manchuria towards the Beiping-Tianjin area, while three reserve divisions were mobilized in Japan. Within a month, the Japanese troops in North China, increased from 7000 to 160,000.<sup>24</sup>

The July 7 Incident did not happen by chance; it was an inevitable outcome of the developments in North China. Although according to the 1901 Peace treaty, the Japanese had the right to station troops in Beiping, Tianjin and the Beiping (Nanjing) railway, the amount of troops, equipment and weapons and the location of military maneuvers violated the stipulations in the treaty. Fengtai was not a location where Japan could station troops, but the Japanese forcibly occupied it. The Japanese army engaged in endless provocations, pushed for the autonomy of North China and set up a puppet regime in Mongolia. Its activities went far

beyond protecting the Japanese Embassy and communications and transportation. Japanese activities in the area only inflamed the hostile feelings of the Chinese and if that situation did not change there would inevitably be trouble in North China.

## 2. China's Response.

In provoking the incident, the Japanese were probably surprised at the firm response of the GMD government. The Chinese people and government were more united and determined than ever to resist further Japanese aggression. On July 12 Jiang Jieshi ordered Song Zeyuan to resist and dispatched four divisions to the Baoding area. His instructions on negotiations with the Japanese were that they were not to infringe upon China's territorial integrity and sovereign rights. In addition, only the central government could sanction any localized settlement.<sup>25</sup> Central and provincial troops were sent north of the Yellow River.

On July 17, at Lushan, Jiang Jieshi stated that any more concessions to the Japanese would only lead to total surrender and declared that China must be prepared to sacrifice and fight to the end. Unless Japan was willing to restore the status quo of July 7, 1937, Jiang intended to use force to resist all Japanese attempts to sever North China from the rest of the country. He reiterated what he had said

at the Second Plenum of the GMD's Fifth Congress about the limit of China's endurance:

.... We hope for peace, but we do not seek an easy path to peace; we prepare for war, but we do not want war. When we reach the point where the whole nation must take up arms, then we know we shall have to sacrifice to the very end without the slightest hope of avoiding suffering by some sudden turn of fortune. Once the battle is joined there can be no distinction between north and south, nor between old and young. Everyone everywhere will have to shoulder the responsibility for protecting the country and for resisting the foe.<sup>26</sup>

Jiang Jieshi then listed four points as minimum conditions for a settlement of the Lugouqiao Incident:

1. Any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of China.
2. The status of the Hebei-Chahar Political Council is determined by the Central government and there must not be any illegal alteration.
3. Central government appointees, such as Song Zeyuan, Chairman of the Hebei-Chahar Political Council, must not be removed by outside pressure.
4. There must be no restrictions on the stationing of the 29th Army.<sup>27</sup>

On the same day, Japan sent to the Nanjing government its last warning. It called on the Chinese government to end provocative activities and not to interfere with the execution of the terms of settlement by the local authorities. Two days later, the Nanjing government

responded, expressing its desire for a peaceful settlement of the incident as well as its intention not to aggravate the situation. The Japanese considered the Chinese attitude to be insincere and on July 20 they issued a statement blaming the Nanjing government for the deterioration of the situation. They decided to take "adequate self-defensive steps" to deal with the north China conflict. The military situation quickly deteriorated.<sup>28</sup>

On July 12 a new Japanese commander arrived in North China and on the 16th, the Japanese army decided on a tough policy towards China. More and more conflicts took place around Beiping from July 25 onwards. The Japanese attacked Langfang and Guangzhou on the 25th and 26th. On July 26 the Japanese called on the Chinese to withdraw to the west bank of the Yongding River. When on July 28 their ultimatum had been ignored, the Japanese destroyed an entire column of Chinese troops marching from Nanyuan airport to Beiping, and bombed the barracks around the capital. About 5,000 Chinese soldiers and university students were killed. General Tong Lingge, Deputy Commander of the 29th Army was among the casualties. He was the first GMD general to die in the anti-Japanese war.

On the night of July 28, General Song Zeyuan was forced to evacuate Beiping. After taking control of Beiping, the

Japanese attacked Tianjin on the 30th of July. In spite of fierce fighting, the city was lost the same day.

On July 29 Jiang reaffirmed the points he stated at Lushan on July 17 and stated : " Now we have reached the point when we can endure it no longer; we will give way no more. The whole nation must rise as one man and fight these Japanese bandits until we have destroyed them and our own life is secure. "29

On August 1, the Japanese Foreign Ministry declared that it would reject the arbitration of the League of Nations; the Japanese continued on the path of aggression in China. They were determined to carry out their occupation of China by force.

On the day after the Incident, the CCP issued a circular telegram to the nation calling on the people, the government and army to unite and form a united front so as to drive out the Japanese aggressors. On July 14, the CCP Central Committee expressed to the Nanjing government that it was willing to resist the enemy under the command of Jiang Jieshi and that it had ordered the Red Army to be prepared to set out to defend the Pingsui Area within ten days.<sup>30</sup>

On the same day Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu and Ling Boqu arrived in Lushan in secret where Jiang Jieshi was holding meetings with his advisors. Zhou Enlai handed Jiang Jieshi "The CCP

Declaration on Cooperation Between the CCP and the GMD" requesting him to issue it so that the Red Army could be reorganized immediately, and join in the resistance against Japan. Jiang was still reluctant to grant legal status to the CCP. There was dispute over the question of reorganization of the Red Army and the appointment of commanding officers for it. In fact Jiang had regressed from the position he had taken at the first Lushan meeting when Jiang had agreed to letting the CCP maintain control over their forces. Now he was particularly concerned about gaining command of the reorganized Red Army. Jiang would not allow the Red Army to establish its own general headquarters. He also insisted on sending chief-of-staff officers for the three reorganized Red Army divisions. This round of talks failed to achieve anything and the negotiations were broken off. In such circumstances, the Red Army decided that it would undertake reorganization of the Red Army on its own.<sup>31</sup>

On August 1, the same day that the Japanese Foreign Ministry issued its statement, Zhang Chong sent an urgent telegram on behalf of Jiang Jieshi inviting Mao, Zhou and Zhu to fly to Nanjing for consultations on national defence. The CCP did not respond to this invitation but instead agreed to send delegates to attend the National Defence Conference where the CCP was given de facto legal status. Zhou Enlai,



Zhu De and Yeh Jianying arrived in Nanjing on the 6th of August. Meanwhile, the government decided to issue military designations for the three CCP divisions and ordered the Red Army to set out within two weeks. In order to prevent the dispatch of all the Red Army to the front, thereby cutting its ties with the CCP and the Border Region and giving the GMD reason for not recognizing the legal status of the CCP, Zhou Enlai demanded that the government issue the CCP declaration and make clear the chain of command for the Red Army. He insisted that the GMD publicly acknowledge the legitimate status of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and the CCP, agree to the independent and mobile guerrilla tactics of the Red Army and the freedom of the CCP to use its forces as the situation warranted. These demands of the CCP were given favorable consideration. But on the declaration that Zhou had given to Jiang Jieshi, Jiang still wanted to make changes; he did not agree to the CCP definition of the three people's principles. He would not agree to the statement that the CCP had won the understanding of the GMD and were together coping with the national crisis.<sup>32</sup> This discussion took place on August 12, one day before the Battle for Shanghai.

Meanwhile, the GMD was busy making preparations for all out war against Japan. On August 8 Jiang Jieshi issued the

"Declaration to All Officers and Soldiers" making it clear that "Since all hope of peace is lost, there can only be resistance to the end. The nation must together, without fear of sacrifice, fight the Japanese aggressors to the end."<sup>33</sup> On August 12, 1937, the GMD held a meeting of the provisional standing committee of the Central Committee and decided to set up the Supreme National Defence Council, with Wang Jingwei as president and Zhang Qun as secretary general. The Council was to be made up of leading members of the Party, government, and military and was mainly responsible for the planning of the war of resistance. This was followed by a National Defence Conference at which Jiang Jieshi was made Generalissimo in command of the land, air and navy forces. The existing Military Council was expanded and six ministries were set up to meet the needs of resistance. On August 13, the battle of Shanghai broke out and all out Chinese resistance began.

### 3. Battle of Shanghai.

Although the July 7 Incident marked the beginning of the eight years of war, it was not until after the August 13 Shanghai battle that all out resistance against Japan began. In the time between the two incidents, there were both negotiations and fighting but the situation changed dramatically when the conflict in Shanghai erupted. What took

place at Shanghai fully showed Jiang Jieshi's new determination to fight the Japanese. He decided to throw in his best troops and in the end lost most of them.

There were several reasons why the Nanjing government decided to make a stand in Shanghai. The GMD had a paramount interest in preventing the city from falling into the hands of the Japanese. Shanghai was the political and economic base of Jiang Jieshi and the GMD government which they could not afford to lose. The government believed that it could prepare for a war there since it was the area in which the government had full control and where the best troops were stationed. It was probably the best defended part of China and, in contrast, the number of Japanese troops was modest.

Memories of the battle of Shanghai in 1932 were still fresh and the government did not want to be accused once more of weakness and lack of patriotism. Having been criticized for not resisting Japan then, its credibility would suffer if it did not take a firm stand against the new threat from Japan.

In preparation for war, the GMD government divided the whole nation into five war zones with Shanghai as part of the Third War Zone. That Zone included Wuxi, Jiangying and Changzhou, where Jiang had the 88th, 87th, and 36th divisions stationed. These divisions had all participated in the

January 28 battle of 1932 and been trained by German advisers. They were among the GMD's best troops and the 87th and 88th divisions were ordered to build defence facilities in preparation for a Japanese attack.

The Japanese had about 1,000 marines stationed in Hongkou of Shanghai and could at any time land from the Huangpu River or the Changjiang River. In such circumstances, the GMD had to make arrangements to secretly bring in regular troops disguised as security forces; several districts in Shanghai had been designated neutral zones by the 1932 Truce and there were restrictions on troop movements.<sup>34</sup>

The Japanese got word of these developments and when a Japanese soldier was killed by the Chinese at Hongqiao airport the situation became very tense. Jiang Jieshi sensed that fighting was inevitable and ordered Zhang Zizhong, the commander of this war zone, to blockade Jiangying. Unfortunately, the order was leaked to the Japanese who dispatched their ships and men to the Huangpu River near Hongkou where the Japanese had their marine headquarters.

Late in the evening of the 11th, Jiang Jieshi ordered the three divisions stationed in Suzhou, Changzhou and Wuxi to advance towards Shanghai. The GMD was to bomb the Japanese headquarters on the 14th, but the Japanese, in anticipation of this, launched their attack on the 13th of August. Japanese

marines were put ashore in Shanghai and fierce fighting broke out. Large numbers of Japanese troops were brought in from Wusong. The Japanese had altogether some 200,000 men, but they had the advantage of an air force and navy to support the army and marines. An efficient air force wiped out the weak Chinese air force in a matter of weeks. The Japanese also received reinforcements from Japan.

From the beginning, the Chinese command encountered serious setbacks and difficulties. Time and again, Jiang Jieshi had to order fresh troop reinforcements. The First Army was sent in from the Northwest, the 6th Division from Zhejiang, and three brigades were dispatched from Guangxi. In the course of the battle the main Chinese forces had to be reinforced four to five times. Altogether between thirty and forty divisions took part in the fighting.<sup>35</sup>

The battle of Shanghai lasted three months during which time bitter fighting broke out over almost every village and town. The Chinese troops fought with the utmost determination, but even these highly trained units could not match the far better trained and better equipped Japanese forces.

In early November, three Japanese divisions landed at Jingshan, near the border of Jiangsu and the weakly defended Zhejiang province. The Japanese were able to cut into the

rear of the Chinese forces. The Chinese troops were ordered to immediately withdraw, but the lines of retreat were limited and were often blocked by the large numbers of troops. The Chinese were constantly under attack by Japanese planes, tanks and troops, and there was tremendous chaos and heavy casualties among the Chinese troops.

Following the retreat of the Chinese forces, the Japanese occupied Shanghai on November 12, 1937. Unimpeded, the Japanese were able to advance straight through to Nanjing and occupied the Chinese capital on December 13, followed by massacre of tens of thousands of Chinese civilians. The GMD government retreated first to Hankou and then to the wartime capital of Chongqing.

Although both sides suffered heavy casualties in the battle of Shanghai, it was the Chinese that lost more men. Of the original Chinese forces, almost two-thirds of the soldiers and officers were killed and about half of the battalion and regiment commanders were killed.<sup>36</sup> For Jiang Jieshi, the battle of Shanghai was a major personal loss. Most of his best troops were wiped out in the fighting. After Shanghai it was difficult for him to mount major campaigns against the Japanese.

There have been debates about the wisdom of putting up the desperate struggle in Shanghai in a seemingly hopeless

situation. Jiang Jieshi and the government knew they were up against an enemy far stronger, but they believed they could not always be on the run. They believed that to put up a struggle would be better than retreating, as that would seriously hurt the morale of the people and the military in future war efforts. To mobilize the nation in a effort to resist was still the reasonable and positive strategy.

The fighting in Shanghai and the defeats presented Jiang Jieshi with enormous problems. He felt more than ever that his rule was seriously threatened. His hopes that the Western powers would come to his aid did not materialize. And his attempts to come to terms with the Japanese failed as Japan's conditions were too harsh. In view of the nation-wide upsurge of armed resistance, he dared not capitulate. Driven into a tight corner by the situation, Jiang Jieshi turned to the Soviet Union and hoped he could get its support. This in turn prompted him to speedily improve his relations with the CCP.

#### 4. Intensified GMD-CCP Talks and External Relations with the Soviet Union.

CCP negotiations with the GMD government took a dramatic turn once hostilities began in Shanghai. All-out war with Japan was inevitable and Jiang needed to get as much support as he could. His attitude towards the CCP became conciliatory and cooperative. Unresolved problems that had held up the

negotiations for months were settled in the shortest possible time.

Jiang Jieshi agreed to a comprehensive compromise with the CCP in the hope that the Red Army would agree to join in the battle against Japan as soon as possible. On August 18 Jiang Jieshi agreed to the reorganization of the Red Army, designating it as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army with Zhu De as commander and Peng Dehuai as deputy commander. The Eighth Route Army was assigned to the Second War Zone in northern Shaanxi under Yan Xishan's command. The order was made public on August 22.<sup>37</sup> The vital question of command and personnel that had held up the negotiations was finally resolved. Very soon two divisions of the 8th Route Army set out for the front in Shanxi. In the same month, the former CCP guerrilla forces in the areas north and south of the Changjiang River were designated as the New Fourth Army.

Jiang Jieshi's change of attitude towards the CCP was brought about mainly by the war situation in China and in Shanghai in particular; it was also influenced by his relations with the Soviet Union. Of the foreign powers, the Soviet Union was the nation that gave Jiang the most support initially. It was quick to react to the changed situation in China. On August 21, just one week after the fighting spread



to Shanghai, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression agreement with the GMD government. The Soviet Union promised a credit of 100 million yuan (US \$30 million) for the purchase of war materiel.<sup>38</sup> A second credit was arranged in July 1939 for \$150 million. China received thousands of tons of needed munitions. Meanwhile, Moscow dispatched Soviet planes and pilots to help in the Chinese defense. After the German military mission departed, the Soviet Union also assigned military advisers and technicians to the GMD government. At its peak the Soviet mission numbered 500 men. Soviet planes played an important role in later protecting Hankou, Chongqing and Chengdu against Japanese air raids.

All Soviet material support went directly to the GMD government, as Zhu De said during an interview with T.A. Bisson: "We received no material support from the Soviet Union, either in arms or other supplies."<sup>39</sup> Even so, the CCP did benefit from the improved relations between the Soviet Union and the GMD government: it was one day after the Sino-Soviet Agreement was signed that the Nanjing government formally announced the appointment of Zhu De and Peng Dehuai as the commander and deputy commander of the 8th Route Army.

##### 5. CCP Lochuan Conference (August 22-27, 1937).

Following the signing of the agreement between the

Soviet Union and the GMD government, the CCP convened an Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo from August 22 to 25 at Lochuan in Shaanxi province. It was the most important meeting of the CCP since the July 7 Incident. As a result of the new situation in China, the CCP was confronted with new problems. One outstanding issue was the strategy of the Red Army; it had some 30,000 troops in North China and it had to decide what role it was to play in the resistance. Another important question was the relations between the GMD and the CCP in the united front. What attitude should it adopt towards the government? And should it try to join in the government?

On the question of war strategy, there were differences of opinion within the CCP. At the conference, Mao Zedong asserted that the CCP forces dispatched to Shaanxi would make no impact if they employed the tactics of conventional warfare. Instead, the CCP should disperse its troops behind enemy lines, engage in independent guerrilla activities, and expand operations beyond the Second War Zone and establish new bases. Apparently, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and Zhou Enlai believed that there should be coordinated operations with Yan Xishan's forces and that guerrilla tactics should be combined with mobile warfare.<sup>40</sup> The decision arrived at was that the CCP should mainly wage independent guerrilla warfare in the

mountain areas and at the same time not neglect mobile warfare when a favourable situation existed. In fact, guerrilla warfare was not restricted to the mountain areas; very soon it spread to the plains.

At the meeting, agreement was reached on maintaining leadership of the CCP over the Red Army and maintaining the principle of independence and taking the initiative into its own hands. It was also decided that the party would mobilize, arm and organize the masses to take part in guerrilla warfare.

There was insufficient time to discuss the question of strategy thoroughly and Mao Zedong sent several telegrams to the commanders at the front reiterating his views on this. In the two weeks from mid September to the end of the month, 1937 Mao sent five telegrams to the army commanders stating the importance of a strategic turn from mobile to guerrilla warfare.<sup>41</sup> But it was evident that not all commanders listened to his instructions.

The meeting also decided to establish the Central Military Commission with Mao Zedong as Chairman and Zhou Enlai and Zhu De as vice-chairmen. The Commission designated the Red Army as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army with Zhu De as Commander-in-Chief.

On the united front, the conference debated a common programme for the united front and finally adopted the "Ten

Point Programme for Resistance and National Salvation Program", calling for active mobilization for resistance, improved living conditions for the people, and reforms in the political, administrative, military, fiscal and cultural spheres.<sup>42</sup> According to Li De, the ten-point programme itself was dispatched to the CCP by Wang Ming from Moscow before the conference.<sup>43</sup> On the question of cooperation with the GMD government, it was decided that while the GMD government remained an one-party dictatorship, and until the GMD accepted the Ten-Point Programme of the CCP and recognized the legal status of the CCP, CCP members would not participate in the work of the government. However, they could participate in some local governments and some representative bodies. Guided by these important resolutions of the conference, the CCP continued its negotiations with the GMD and finally reached an understanding with the GMD government.

### C. A United Front is Formed.

#### 1. Moving Towards the United Front.

There still existed problems to be resolved concerning the organization and personnel of the Red Army. The GMD Military Commission, in designating the Red Army as the 8th Route Army, appointed Zhu De Commander-in-Chief and Peng Dehuai deputy C-in-C. Ye Jianying was chief-of-staff, Zhu

Chuan, deputy chief and Ren Bishi was director of the political department and Deng Xiaoping was deputy director. Under the Eighth Route Army there were three divisions:

115th Division. Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen were the C-in-C and deputy commander. Zhou Kun was Chief-of-Staff and Luo Ronghuan the head of political training department.

120th Division. He Long and Xiao Ke were the C-in-C and deputy commander. Zhou Shidi was Chief-of-Staff and Guan Xiangying, head of political department.

129th Division. Liu Bocheng and Xu Xiangqian were the C-in-C and deputy commander. Nie Zhiliang was Chief-of-Staff and Zhang Hao, head of political department.

On August 29, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP decided to establish party committees in the army and military political committees in the various divisions. On September 12, the GMD Defence Council, according to the Battle Order for War of Resistance, changed the name of the 8th Route Army to the 18th Group Army of the National Revolutionary Army.

Although the reorganization of the Red Army had been completed, Jiang Jieshi still insisted on sending liaison and staff officers. The GMD, with approval from Jiang Jieshi, selected four "senior liaison staff officers" to be assigned to the headquarters of the CCP and the three divisions under

its control.

The CCP Central Committee was against having any GMD members in the Red Army forces. This was a matter that had been discussed and decided upon during the Lochuan Conference. On September 22 it instructed Bo Gu and Yeh Jianying to firmly reject this proposal. The CCP insisted on maintaining absolute control of the army.<sup>44</sup> For the CCP, this was a fundamental principle and a policy that would have a major impact on the future development of the Red Army.

In negotiations concerning the role of Red Army in the war, the CCP insisted that its forces be permitted to set up guerrilla bases and engage the Japanese in guerrilla warfare rather than in frontal warfare. Jiang Jieshi and He Yingqin agreed that the Eighth Route Army would only be responsible for guerrilla warfare and assisting the friendly armies to destroy the enemy.

Another unresolved question was the status of the border regions. On this, the CCP was willing to make concessions, hoping it would be possible to reach an understanding. It suggested either Zhang Ji, Song Ziwen, or Yu Youren of the GMD to be the head of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Government. The GMD did not agree and instead suggested Ding Weifen, a staunch opponent of the CCP, to head the government.<sup>45</sup> The CCP rejected the proposal and in September, 1937, it nominated

nine members to the border region government: Lin Boqu, Zhang Guotao, Bo Gu, Dong Biwu, Xu Teli, Xie Chuchai, Ge Hongtao, Ma Mingfang, Gao Gang. The CCP also made clear that it would be responsible for all the work of the border government. On the question of the border administration, no agreement was ever reached.

There was evidently still disagreement on several issues but on the fundamental question of resisting Japan, there was agreement. When the GMD Central Government established the National Defence Council as a consultative organ of the government, it invited the CCP, the China Youth Party, the National Social Party, and non party members to participate. Zhou Enlai was among the CCP members. This measure gave the impression that the GMD was ending its one-party rule and initiating a multi party system. It appeared as if it was just a question of time before a formal agreement on cooperation could be reached between the CCP and GMD.

## 2. CCP Declaration and GMD Statement.

There was considerable discussion on how to make public a declaration of cooperation between the two parties. The CCP wanted it to be signed by both parties and issued simultaneously. The GMD was still reluctant to acknowledge an equal status for the CCP and would not accept the CCP proposal. Instead, the GMD wanted the CCP, on the basis of

past declarations and statements, to issue a separate declaration on cooperation. The GMD would then issue an order for the reorganization of the Red Army, to be followed by a statement by Jiang Jieshi recognizing the legal status of the CCP.

The declaration drafted by the CCP was ready by the 4th of March, 1937, and handed over to the GMD for consideration in May of the same year. In the discussions, the GMD delegate Kang Ze raised many objections. In every way he tried to belittle the position of the CCP, changing phrases like "has reached an understanding with the GMD" to "gained the understanding of the Central Committee and the approval of the government." He also wanted to remove the CCP proposal concerning a common effort to deal with the national crisis, claiming that it was propaganda.<sup>46</sup> By the latter half of September 1937 the two sides still could not reach agreement on whether to use the word "government" or "GMD." Finally, through Jiang Jieshi's intervention, the CCP agreed to the use of "government" and the talks came to an end.

On September 22, 1937 the GMD Central Press issued the "Chinese Communist Party on the Declaration of Cooperation between the CCP and the GMD." At last, the GMD government made public the CCP's declaration. The four point pledge made by the CCP was identical with those points in the February 10



statement with respect to the status of the CCP, the Red Army and government.<sup>47</sup> But the CCP made additional concessions: it dropped its earlier demand for a "common programme" and pledged its support for Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles.

On the next day, September 23, Jiang Jieshi reciprocated with a speech "On the declaration of the CCP". The speech, drafted by his secretary, Chen Bulei, included some veiled criticism of the CCP for not comprehending the Three People's Principles and national crisis. Nevertheless, Jiang stated that the GMD would end the civil war and recognize the legal status of the CCP. He even commended the CCP for "surrendering its prejudices, " and for "sincerely working for the salvation of the nation." He stated that "the entire nation is awakened and solidly united" and that "At this critical juncture of life and death, we should all the more let bygones be bygones and together with the whole nation make a completely fresh start, and work strenuously for unity in order to preserve the very life and existence of our country."<sup>48</sup> With the CCP declaration of September 22 and the statement of Jiang Jieshi on September 23, the second united front, after years of negotiations and struggle, was at last established. Its formation would have an important impact on the long-term prosecution of the anti-Japanese war and on the

Chinese revolution in general.

### 3. Why the GMD Agreed to Cooperate with the CCP.

After several years of hesitation and procrastination, the GMD eventually agreed to a united front with the CCP. In the years following the September 18 Incident, the resistance movement had never been able to develop into a resistance war of the whole nation. This was principally because of Jiang Jieshi's policy of "internal pacification before external resistance." That policy determined that he would stand for "non resistance," and "appeal to international opinion" for a "peaceful solution." He was at best hesitant about the resistance movements, and in most cases, opposed them. His preoccupation was with the extermination of the CCP and other sources of opposition.

That Jiang Jieshi persisted in this policy was also a consequence of the policies of the CCP. Although the CCP did engage in some resistance activities in the Northeast, for some time it still did not change its basic policies to reflect the growing sentiment for resistance in the nation and continued to implement adventurist and "close-doorism" policies. It continued its revolutionary struggles and civil war continued hand in hand with further Japanese aggression. However, after the Wayaobao Conference of December 1935, the CCP shifted its attention to the anti-Japanese resistance

movement. It formulated a comprehensive set of policies on the united front. This in some ways eased the pressure on the Nanjing GMD government and made possible some change in its policy.

Whether it would eventually be possible for the long-time bitter enemies to work together to resist Japan depended on whether the GMD would give up its policy of internal peace before resistance. There were three pressures on Jiang and the GMD which together converged to make the GMD change its policy and agree to cooperate with the CCP

a) Continued Japanese aggression and expansion in China. Jiang Jieshi recognized from the beginning the aggressive aims of Japanese imperialism and the consequences it would have on his rule and on China. After the September 18 Incident, he made various statements expressing his intention of resisting Japan, but he was never able to put them into practice. It was only after the Japanese occupation of Jingzhou, the July 7 Incident and the August 13 attack on Shanghai that Jiang felt the seriousness of the direct threat to the Nanjing government. In 1932 he still felt that the CCP was the more serious threat and he made clear that the focus of his attention was on eliminating the CCP. That was why he agreed to a truce in Shanghai in 1932. By 1937 Japanese aggression threatened the survival of his government and he had to devote

far more attention to the struggle against the Japanese. The heroic fight put up by the GMD armies in the battle of the Great Wall reflected this change in attitude.

b) Failure of GMD's internal pacification campaigns. For a long time Jiang considered the CCP a disease of the heart and Japanese aggression a disease of the skin. If the disease of the heart is not cured, healing the disease of the skin would still not be of any use.<sup>49</sup> That was why Jiang personally assumed command of the anti-CCP extermination campaigns after the Shanghai Truce. In spite of the GMD's military superiority and the tremendous effort invested in these campaigns, Jiang did not wipe out the CCP. His further attempts to exterminate the CCP after the Long March failed to get support and could not be continued. In 1935 when Jiang Jieshi ordered Deng Wenyi, Song Ziwen, Chen Lifu and Zeng Yangfu to engage in direct talks with the CCP, he was in effect admitting the failure of his policy of exterminating the CCP. The purpose of these contacts was to seek a compromise with the CCP so as to cooperate in resisting Japan. It was a wise move on the part of the GMD.

The GMD was very demanding and unwilling to accept the CCP terms for cooperation; there was no ease in the tension between the two parties. In 1936, Jiang believed that if he made another concerted effort, he might be able to wipe out

the CCP. It took the Xian Incident to finally change that situation. The dismantling of the Northwest Bandit Suppression Headquarters on January 6, 1937 marked the complete failure of the GMD internal pacification campaign.

c) Domestic pressure for unity and resistance. There were people in the GMD and government who pushed for a peaceful solution of the civil war. Many prominent people who had been formerly opposed to the CCP changed their attitude after the September 18 Incident and demanded unity for resistance. The National Crisis Conference in 1932 was a case in point. The purpose of the Conference was to implement and propagate the "internal pacification before external resistance" policy, but of all the resolutions passed, most were on external resistance. These resolutions expressed the hope that all citizens without regard to party or class would unite, remove prejudice and together resist external aggression.

Influential leaders in the nation such as Han Fuchu in Shandong, Li Jishen in Guangxi, Song Zeyuan in Hebei, and Liu Xiang in Sichuan all voiced their support for resistance. In the formation of the second united front, two of the Song sisters (Song Qingling and Song Meiling), in their special status, played a significant role. Song Qingling was an important channel of communication between the two parties.

In January of 1936 she sent emissaries to Shaanxi to inform the Central Committee of the CCP of the GMD's desire for negotiations. And in the solution of the Xian crisis and the later negotiations that led to cooperation, it was her sister, Song Meiling that acted as a contact between Zhou Enlai and Jiang Jieshi and helped to improve relations between the two parties during the early years of the national crisis.

Public opinion and pressure also played an important role in changing the policy of the GMD. As the tension between Japan and China grew, there was strong public demand for an end to the civil war and opposition to making any further compromises to the Japanese. Numerous demonstrations by students and workers brought pressure to bear on the government. The GMD had to consider public reaction to any of the policies it adopted and what affect it would have on the government.

The pressure of all these factors together brought about a fundamental policy change in the GMD. For Jiang Jieshi, there was no other choice. Much as he disliked working with the CCP, he did not have many other options to choose from.

#### 4. Success of the CCP in Formation of United Front.

Circumstances in 1937 made it possible for the CCP to succeed in forming a united front with the GMD. The policies adopted by the CCP in the new situation helped to accelerate

the process. The CCP was willing to make important concessions that would have previously been inconceivable. This was because the CCP recognized that the prevention of Japanese conquest of China was of utmost importance to its future and the future of the nation. And the only hope of doing so was to work together with the GMD and other forces that stood for resistance. The CCP had to modify some of its revolutionary objectives.

Prior to 1931, the purpose of the CCP united front was to unite the various labouring classes in a common struggle to overthrow the GMD government. But as Japanese aggression against China intensified, it was important for the CCP to decide, like the GMD, what its priority should be in this new situation. It had to determine how to handle the relations between revolution and resistance. CCP understanding of this issue underwent a process of change. After the July 7 Incident, Mao Zedong stated unequivocally that the invasion of China by Japan meant that the "the interests of the class struggle must be subordinated to, and must not conflict with, the interests of the War of Resistance."<sup>50</sup> He wrote that "In a struggle that is national in character, the class struggle takes the form of national struggle, which demonstrates the identity between the two."<sup>51</sup>

On the basis of this understanding, the CCP implemented

policies to reflect this new emphasis on national resistance. In the new situation, it was necessary to make an appropriate adjustment in class relations. An anti-Japanese united front required the support of the people and the CCP policy was to endeavour to broaden that support as far as possible.

According to its perception of the attitude of the various classes towards the war of resistance, the CCP divided the Chinese society into three big classes and adopted corresponding policies.

a) The left wing was composed of the proletariat, the peasants (poor and middle peasants), and the urban petty bourgeoisie. The CCP policy was to expand and consolidate this section as it was the most revolutionary. This section would form the basis for pushing for the reform of the GMD, the government, and the army; for the creation of a democratic republic; and for the defeat of Japan.

b) The intermediate section was composed of the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, and in the countryside, the rich peasants, cooperative landlords and the "enlightened gentry". This section tended to vacillate but in time of war was moving towards the left, or toward reform. The task of the CCP was to help the intermediate section to move forward and change its stand to support resistance.



c) The right wing was made up of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, big hostile landlords and collaborators. These people tended towards capitulation because they feared both the destruction of their property in the war and the rise of the masses. Some had already gone over to the enemy; others would do so in future. This group was steadfastly anti-Communist, but might be used as long as it remained anti-Japanese. The task of the CCP was to resolutely combat national capitulationism.<sup>52</sup>

The CCP formed specific policies and directives precisely in terms of these categories. They had to determine how to strengthen the left and middle sections at the expense of the right. Mao Zedong made it clear that as the situation changed, the bourgeoisie could vacillate or defect because of its "economic and political flabbiness". Therefore, the composition of China's revolutionary united front could not remain constant at all times. At times the bourgeoisie may be included, at others it may not.<sup>53</sup>

The CCP was able to gain increasing support from the people and its base of support quickly broadened. This was not necessarily always because the people really understood communism or the CCP, but in the depressing economic and political situation, the theories offered by Marxism and the practical policies put forward by the CCP were an important

attraction. Moreover, the repeated calls of the CCP for resistance and, in contrast, the GMD's hesitancy and appeasement turned more and more people, particularly the intellectuals and the younger generation to the CCP cause.

In a broad united front maintaining independence and autonomy and striving to gain leadership of the front was also a question that was of primary concern to the CCP. Two fundamental conditions for cooperation that the CCP maintained throughout the numerous talks with the GMD were that the CCP must retain its organizational and political independence and that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army must remain under the leadership of the party.

The CCP did not have much faith in the GMD, nor in the ability of the GMD forces to resist aggression. The CCP felt that with its own army and political institution, it could contribute more effectively to the war of resistance. More important, without maintaining its independence, the CCP would not be able to continue to exist nor would it be able to carry out its own domestic political programme and further its long term revolutionary goals.

The CCP held that "the key to leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war to victory is to explain, apply, and uphold the principle of 'independence and initiative within the united front.'"<sup>54</sup> With the initiative in the hands

of the CCP, "Our chief purpose is to extend the ground already won and to realize the positive aim of 'winning the masses in their millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism.'"<sup>55</sup> Needless to say, after the victory in the anti-Japanese war, the CCP would work for the establishment of a "democratic republic".

The formation of the united front gave the CCP legal status which allowed it to operate openly. Various CCP offices were shortly established in various parts of the country. During the Xian talks, the GMD agreed to set up a CCP liaison office in Xian, and in Taiyuan, Yan Xishan agreed to opening a similar office there. After the July 7 Incident the government agreed to setting up CCP offices in Nanjing and Shanghai and later the CCP had offices in Hankou, Changsha, Lanzhou and other cities. There were also some 8th Route Army and New Fourth Army agencies. The position of the CCP was very much improved during this initial period of the war. Very soon after the war of resistance began, the CCP had in place an reorganized Red Army directly under its own control and political institutions in various parts of the country. It was able to spread its political influence in the government and throughout the nation. The CCP was ready to actively further promote the war of resistance and its own interests.

On September 25, the CCP Central Committee adopted a resolution affirming China's need for a united anti-Japanese government and expressing the CCP's willingness to participate in such a government. The resolution, like the decision made during the Lochnan Conference, stated that as long as the GMD government remained a one-party dictatorship, the CCP would not participate in it.<sup>56</sup> Later in December and then in February of 1938, Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong issued statements denying that the party was requesting participation in the national government. In fact, the CCP was interested in working in the government and CCP members did work in some government agencies, either covertly or overtly. For the CCP, this was important to expanding its influence and gaining leadership in the resistance. The GMD was fully aware of this situation, but during this time of national crisis, it was willing to cooperate with the CCP.

With the formation of the second united front, the contradictions between the CCP and the GMD were for the time being eased, but the military situation in China was still extremely serious and Japanese conquest of China was a very real threat indeed. Attempts to halt Japan's advance failed to change the situation and by the end of the 1937, China had lost a large amount of its territory.

#### D. Japanese Military Operations in 1937.

After taking Beiping and Tianjin in north China, three groups of Japanese troops advanced along three main railway lines : 1. The Ping-Sui (Beiping-Suiyuan) railway; 2. The Pinghan (Beiping-Hankou) railway; and 3. the Jinpu (Tianjin-Pukou) railway. On the Ping-Sui line the Japanese first of all had to fight a battle with the Chinese at the Nankou Pass, fifty kilometres north of Beiping and occupied it on August 15. On August 27 the city of Zhangjiakou fell to the Japanese. From there, the Japanese continued to move west and by October 16 they had reached Paotou after taking Suiyuan on the 14th. There, they were joined by another Japanese force from the Pinghan line and marched towards Shanxi, defended by Yan Xishan.

From the Zhangjiakou-Nankou area, the Japanese moved southwestwards once more. At the end of September a Japanese brigade was caught in a surprise attack by the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army and suffered considerable losses. The CCP claim that it was the first major setback for the Japanese since the beginning of the war. The victory was a moral encouragement to the Chinese people but it was an isolated engagement that did not affect the advance of the Japanese troops in Shanxi.

The Japanese managed to force their way through Niangzi

Pass, defended by three Chinese armies and the CCP's 129th Division, and directly threatened Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi. Taiyuan fell to the Japanese on November 9 and from there the Japanese headed towards the Yellow River.

A third Japanese force moved south from Tianjin along the Jinpu (Tianjin-Pukou) line. It took Changzhou on the 24th of September and entered Shandong to take Dezhou on the 3rd of October. Jinan and Qingdao were both lost on the same day, December 13, the same day that the Japanese took Nanjing.

By the end of 1937, the Japanese had reached their main objectives in North China. In Beiping, the Japanese managed to put together a provisional government headed by Wang Keming, a former member of the Hebei-Chahar Political Council. In Inner Mongolia, an autonomous government was set up in Zhangjiakou by the Japanese army.

In South China, the city of Guangzhou was lost on October 21 without much resistance from the Chinese. The loss of this city had serious consequences for the government as it meant the end of an important source of supplies from abroad.

The GMD government after retreating from Nanjing first moved to Hankou and then to the wartime capital of Chongqing where it remained entrenched until the end of the war. With all the defeats of its forces and the territorial losses, the GMD was in a very precarious situation.

In this very bleak military situation, not all was hopeless. For one, the united front managed to unite the people and in spite of the difficulties, the Chinese people did not give up. They continued the fight until final victory. During the first few years of the war, the united front between the CCP and GMD helped to promote the common war effort and there were some spectacular victories. There were many encouraging signs of cooperation, but, as could be expected, there were at least just as many instances of confrontation.

## V. Cooperation and Confrontation in War (1937-1941)

### A. Cooperation Between the CCP and GMD in the Prosecution of the War.

#### 1. General political situation from December 1937 to December 1938.

In spite of the early military setbacks, the general feeling in the nation was still one of hope for future victory. The cooperative war effort between the GMD, the CCP and all resistance groups in China imbued the people with a sense of confidence in the future. People throughout the country hailed Jiang Jieshi as the national leader and the symbol of the people's aspiration for unity and victory. The CCP, too, fully supported Jiang Jieshi and the GMD. After the seat of government was moved to Hankou in December of 1937, the relations between the GMD and CCP were better than ever. For a time the government worked in complete unity with the CCP. Frequent meetings were held to discuss national problems.

Early in December 1937, CCP representative to the Comintern, Wang Ming returned to Yan'an and together with Zhou



Enlai and Bo Gu went to Hankou to take part in negotiations with Jiang Jieshi. During the first meeting on January 21, the CCP raised such issues as setting up a committee on relations between the two parties, working out a common programme and expanding the National Defence Council. Jiang readily agreed with the views of the CCP and expressed the opinion that although the military situation was grave, as long as there was internal unity, victory would be assured. Agreement was reached on setting up the Committee on Party Relations and both sides nominated members to the Committee. Jiang Jieshi said that Chen Lifu, as chief GMD representative to the Committee, would be responsible for all future consultations with the CCP.<sup>1</sup> As a result of these talks, relations between the two parties in several areas markedly improved.

On January 9, the GMD finally authorized the publication of the Xinhua Ribao by the CCP. This had been agreed to during talks in Nanjing and Lushan but was not implemented until the government had retreated to Hankou. For the CCP, this was a very important event, for it allowed the party to voice its opinions in the GMD areas. Jiang Jieshi was reported to have subsequently recalled that this was his biggest mistake towards the CCP.<sup>2</sup>

In January of 1938 the Military Council was reorganized. One of the changes was that a new Political Department under

Chen Cheng was established. Jiang Jieshi twice asked Zhou Enlai to be the deputy director of this department. With the approval of the Central Committee of the CCP, Zhou accepted the position. Under him, Guo Moruo, a Communist writer, was placed in charge of its propaganda section. Other Communists working in the government under Zhou included Tian Han, Hu Yuzhi, Shen Yanbin, Yao Fengzhi and Hu Feng.<sup>3</sup> This development marked the beginning of the CCP members' participation in the work of the central government, though Zhou Enlai's position was the only responsible one in government held by the CCP throughout the war of resistance.

At the end of January 1938, the GMD government approved the establishment of the Jing-Cha-Ji Border Region which became the first guerrilla government to be established behind the Japanese lines in North China. Communists, GMD members and non-partisan officials joined in the work of this government. During the first few years of the war, the GMD government supported the CCP's resistance efforts, allocating a portion of its war materiel to the 8th Route Army, and providing pay for the three divisions. When the Supreme National Defense Council was established in February 1938, it functioned as the highest political and governmental organ for the duration of the war. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De were members of the Council. The GMD appointed Zhou Enlai as

one of the seventeen members of its presidium.

Indeed, reports of sincere Communist cooperation were quite common during this period, and foreign observers were impressed by the CCP's adherence to the united front policy.<sup>4</sup> In spite of these remarkable changes in relations between the two parties, the CCP was not able to get all it had demanded. The GMD still maintained a tight control over the army, the party, and government. Even so, the CCP showed strong support for Jiang Jieshi. It declared its support of the Three People's Principles and its determination to resist Japan hand in hand with the Central government. In a generally congenial atmosphere, Jiang Jieshi was careful not to poison the atmosphere of cooperation in any way. Early in the year, the CC Clique and the Fuxing Society<sup>5</sup> initiated a propaganda movement against the CCP by advocating "one leader, one ism and one partry," and attacked the border region and the Red Army for destroying China's political unity. They declared that the existence of any party outside the GMD would destroy China's political unity. For a time, this issue became the focus of attention and debate in Wuhan. In the circumstances, the CCP Changjiang Bureau held a meeting and passed a draft resolution that criticized any attempt to abolish other parties and freedom of belief. It also proposed setting up a National Revolutionary Alliance so as to strengthen the United

Front. When Jiang Jieshi met Zhou Enlai on February 10, 1938, he stated that he had no intention of restricting belief in any ism and that Sun Yatsen had already made it clear that there was no contradiction between Communism and the three people's principles. Jiang said that was a statement that no one could change or alter. He also stated he had no intention of abolishing other political parties and only hoped that they could unite as one. He further stated that the views expressed in the Saodang Bao ( February 10, 1938) attacking the CCP did not represent either his views or that of the GMD. Chen Lifu who was also present said Jiang had already criticized the paper and instructed other newspapers not to carry articles of that nature.<sup>6</sup> For a time, anti-CCP propaganda no longer appeared on GMD newspapers. It was evident that Jiang was careful not to let any unnecessary obstacles affect the unity that had only recently been achieved. CCP papers of this time all emphasized the importance of cooperation between the CCP and the GMD and that all revolutionary forces should be united in joint efforts.<sup>7</sup>

## 2. GMD Extraordinary National Congress at Wuchang.

On 29 March, 1938 the GMD government convened an Extraordinary National Congress at Wuchang. It took place after the fall of Nanjing and the purpose of the meeting was

to instil confidence in the final victory. The Congress ended on April 1 and elected Jiang Jieshi as the "Zhongcai" or "Supreme Executive" of the Party.

The resolutions adopted at the Congress marked a liberalization of the GMD policy. A "Programme for National Resistance and National Reconstruction" was passed, stating the GMD's policies and objectives during and after the war of resistance. The programme considerably extended civil liberties to the people. The Congress declared that "hereafter the people shall have absolute freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assemblage, and freedom in the formation of associations, provided such activities do not interfere with the war against Japan."<sup>8</sup>

This GMD programme was very similar to the CCP ten point programme and was endorsed by both the GMD and the CCP. A telegram of the CCP to the Changjiang Bureau on April 27 stated that the CCP should resolutely help the GMD to implement the programme. It advised the Bureau not to demand a better or more comprehensive programme; instead it should actively help the GMD to implement the programme and in the process develop and improve it.<sup>9</sup>

As a measure to broaden the base of the government and support from the people, the Extraordinary Congress also decided to establish the People's Political Council (PPC) to

take the place of the National Defence Advisory Council.

### 3. GMD's People's Political Council

The question of forming a PPC was first discussed by the GMD in 1932. In 1933, in response to public opinion that urged national unity and resistance to Japan, the GMD decided to establish a people's representative council known as the Guomin Canzhenghui (PPC). But the resolution was not implemented in that year. When the Fifth Party Congress of the GMD met in November 1935, it decided to call a National Assembly in 1936 to bring to an end the work of tutelage. The proposed National Assembly did not receive any support from other parties outside the GMD and never had a chance to meet. War broke out before the completion of the election process of its membership.

In order to promote national unity to resist Japan, Jiang Jieshi held a number of consultations at Lushan in June and July of 1937. It was agreed that the base of the national government should be broadened. After the formation of the united front, an Advisory Council under the Supreme National Defense Council was created in Nanjing in the spring of 1938 to advise the government on policy for furthering the cause of the war. The majority of its twenty-four members were leaders of other parties and prominent public figures. Many people, including members of the CCP, felt that the mandate and

membership of the Advisory Council was too limited and urged the government to expand or reorganize the council. The CCP proposed expanding the council so as to allow all parties, non-party members and those that were active in resisting Japan to participate in the work of the Council. It also proposed that all group armies could also send representatives. These proposals were accepted in principle by the GMD government.<sup>10</sup>

The government decided to broaden the area of competence of the council and increase its membership. This understanding was included in the agenda of the GMD's Extraordinary National Congress. In the war situation, the Congress decided to postpone indefinitely the convening of a National Assembly and transform the Advisory Council into the People's Political Council (PPC) as the permanent, highest, representative wartime body of the people.

The PPC was given the authority to approve the government's important policies submitted to it for consideration. It could make proposals to the government, hear government reports and question the government. Later, the PPC's mandate was further expanded to include the right to organize investigating committees when requested by the government. If all these powers were fully exercised, it indeed would have brought about some change in the GMD one-

party system. However, in practice, the authority of the PPC was severely limited and its role was left largely to the discretion of the GMD government. The PPC was not a legislative body and the approval of the PPC was regarded more as a recommendation with no binding force. The government was free to interpret what were "important policies" and what were not; it was not under any obligation to submit all its policy decisions for approval by the PPC. Moreover, the Chairman of the Supreme National Defense Council was given emergency powers to issue decrees which would have the same effect as the PPC-approved policy plans.

The PPC was supposed to meet four times a year, but from 1938 to 1941 it only met twice a year. The PPC never had sufficient time to deliberate all items on the agenda and most of the proposals were pushed through without adequate discussion. With all its limitations and shortcomings, the PPC did play a role in helping to maintain the united front. Although the PPC only had advisory powers, it was still warmly supported throughout the nation.<sup>11</sup> It provided a forum where people from different political backgrounds and parties could meet to discuss national affairs.

Seven members of the CCP were selected by the Central Committee of the GMD to be members of the PPC. They were Mao Zedong, Wang Ming, Bo Gu, Lin Boqu, Wu Yuzhang, Dong Biwu, and



Deng Yingchao. These seven councillors issued a statement on July 5, 1938, confirming their willingness to participate in the work of the PPC. They stated that the convening of the Council marked a step forward in the process of democratization, and demonstrated the unity between the various parties and factions in China. The PPC would further promote the establishment of a democratic system and unity in resisting Japan. They pledged cooperation with other councillors to strengthen the resistance efforts.<sup>12</sup>

The first meeting of the PPC was held in Wuhan at the height of the period of harmonious relations between the two parties. In his opening address, Jiang Jieshi stressed the importance of achieving unity and democracy in China for the resistance, and praised all delegates for their support of these objectives.<sup>13</sup>

The CCP gave enthusiastic support to the PPC. In the Council, Wang Ming proposed a motion that had the signature of sixty-seven delegates, expressing support for the GMD's "Programme of National Resistance and National Construction." He stated that the CCP supported the domestic and external policies of the GMD government and that the CCP would help the government to implement its programme for resistance and construction. Nevertheless, he also declared that the CCP would still retain its own programme for the ultimate

realization of Communism. Writing in the Jiefang , Lin Boqu expressed similarly enthusiastic views on the PPC, saying it laid the foundations for the establishment of a democratic republic.<sup>14</sup>

In 1939, the minor parties in China decided to merge and formed the United League for National Construction which was the predecessor of the Democratic League that became an important third voice in wartime China. Within the relations between the CCP and the GMD, the League often played the role of a mediator. Many members of the League were Councillors and the PPC became a forum for mediation. When disputes and differences occurred, the PPC was where the CCP could in an official capacity criticize the GMD and government and press for their demands. It was also where the Third Parties would try to help solve some of the disputes. In fact, all sides utilized the PPC for their own interests.

The CCP made full use of the favourable atmosphere in Wuhan to greatly expand its work of trying to win over members of the GMD government and army. In this, it was exceedingly successful. It was during the period in Wuhan that the CCP, and Zhou Enlai in particular, actively tried to strengthen its united front work among leading members of the GMD. Among those that were to a certain extent influenced politically by the CCP were Shao Lizi, Chen Cheng and Zhang Zhizhong. Zhou

Enlai met a number of times with Feng Yuxiang who had moved to Wuhan in November of 1937 and discussed the war situation and the differences between the GMD and CCP. The talks resulted in much closer relations between Feng and the CCP. After the reorganization of the Military Commission, Bai Chongxi was named the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. He was resolutely for resistance and often met Zhou Enlai. When the Japanese were advancing towards Xuzhou, the two of them discussed the strategy that could be used there. According to Cheng Shiyuan, Bai adopted some of the proposals put forward by Zhou when he went to Xuzhou to assist Li Zongren.<sup>15</sup> Zhang Aiping, as representative of the 8th Route Army, was sent by the CCP to see Li Zongren with a proposal that the GMD should fight a battle near the Taierzhuang-Zhangzhuang mountainous area.<sup>16</sup> After Li Zongren returned to Wuhan in July, he met Zhou Enlai and discussed how to strengthen unity and resistance. When a cultural commission was established in the Fifth War Zone under Li's command, CCP member Qian Junrui became its director. CCP members were also sent to work in the political department of the First War Zone. The CCP was even successful in recruiting GMD officers into the CCP such as the commander of the 114th Division of the Yunan Army. Commander of the 22nd Group Army Deng Xihou during this period established close ties with the CCP forces and continued to

supply the New Fourth Army with arms and ammunition. Zhang Chong, commander of the 184th Division, requested the CCP to send party member Xue Zizhen to be his secretary and later chief of staff. Zhang himself later secretly joined the CCP.<sup>17</sup> Deputy commander of the 77th Army He Jifeng secretly visited Yan'an in February 1938 and met Mao Zedong. Before leaving Yan'an, he handed in an application for CCP membership. In January of 1939 he was secretly admitted into the CCP.<sup>18</sup> These were some of those GMD officers and officials that were swayed by the CCP. The GMD probably would be amazed to see the number of secret CCP members or close supporters of the CCP among their ranks. This situation should not be underestimated as it would explain why so many armies of the GMD either rose in rebellion or surrendered very quickly during the CCP-GMD civil war after World War II.

The united front work of the CCP was not restricted only to government officials and officers. Very important and successful was its work among members of other parties such as Shen Junru, Shi Liang, Zhang Junli and Zuo Shunsheng and among such intellectuals as Zhou Taofen whose weekly publication Life was widely read by young people in the nation. The Chinese National Association of Art and Cultural Circles for Resistance was formed in March of 1938 and was supported by Shao Lizi, Propaganda Minister of the Central Committee of the

GMD. The CCP was most active in this Association which was also supported by many from other parties.

During the initial period of the war, the CCP made outstanding headway in expanding its influence in various circles. In order to discuss the united front and consolidate its achievements, the CCP held its Sixth Plenum to decide on its strategy and policy in the new war situation. The meeting was held shortly after the PPC was established.

4. The Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of CCP.

The Enlarged Sixth Plenum began on 29 September and did not conclude until 6 November 1938 by which time Hankou and Guangzhou had fallen and the capital was transferred to Chongqing. An important purpose of the meeting was to sum up the experiences during the fifteen months of the war, evaluate the war situation and discuss how to win final victory. It was an extremely significant meeting that clarified the Party's fundamental policies. In general terms, the CCP policy was to continue to support the war efforts of the GMD but at the same time act independently and promote its own interest.

Mao Zedong made a long speech "On the New Stage" that summed up the situation since the previous session. He said

that an important change had taken place in that a national united front had replaced confrontation between the various parties and various classes. He affirmed the correctness of the united front policy and stated the experience of the previous fifteen months had proved that China was capable of victory. This was because in spite of its military weaknesses, national unity had been achieved and its further development would guarantee China's final victory. Mao predicted that with the imminent collapse of Wuhan, China would enter a second stage of the anti-Japanese war: a stage of stalemate and preparations for the counter-offensive. He totally agreed with Jiang Jieshi's analysis that the war would be a long one and there could be no quick victory. Since the war was a protracted one, the united front with the GMD should also be a long-term policy.

In his report, he profusely praised the GMD and Jiang Jieshi. He said that the GMD, like other parties, had made significant progress and would have a glorious future. "It is unimaginable", he stated, "that the resistance could be launched and carried on without the GMD." The CCP "occupies a second place in the resistance", while the GMD is playing the leading role, "under the brilliant leadership of Generalissimo Jiang". He called on the party to fully support the united front, the GMD government and Jiang Jieshi. To strengthen

China's resistance, he advocated the elimination of inter-party conflicts, further democratization of the local administrative organs, improvements in the livelihood of the people, the promotion of the national economy, and alliance with the Soviet Union.<sup>19</sup>

Mao said that while the Party would strictly maintain its organizational, political ideological independence, that independence is "relative and not absolute" and should not "overshadow the spirit of unity but must be subordinated to it." Similarly, class struggle "must be subordinated to, and must not conflict with the interests of national resistance." The CCP would safeguard the political and material interests of the working masses without neglecting the interests of the upper classes in order to promote national solidarity against the external enemy.

This report was the basis for discussion and the resolutions passed at the conference conformed with the spirit of the report. It accurately reflected the attitude of the CCP towards the GMD at the time. However, the speech does not appear in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong. Probably, sections that praised Jiang and the GMD would show that there was not that much difference between Mao and the attitude of Wang Ming who was a target of criticism at this meeting.

Criticism was directed at the rightist tendency of Wang

Ming, particularly his view that "everything should be done through the united front". He was criticized for unduly believing in the ability of the GMD to win victory and neglecting the development of the CCP forces. Wang Ming defended his position, saying that he had only been relaying the views of the Comintern. While criticizing "right opportunism" for "unconditional cooperation", Mao Zedong was still anxious to work together with the GMD. Shortly after the meeting, he wrote a letter to Jiang Jieshi in which he greatly extolled Jiang Jieshi's leadership and the GMD and proposed long-term cooperation so as to win the protracted war.<sup>20</sup>

Mao's letter was personally delivered by Zhou Enlai to Jiang Jieshi in Wuhan. At the meeting with Jiang, Zhou Enlai discussed the possibility of the re-entry of the CCP members into the GMD. He proposed: 1) The two parties should end their conflict; 2) CCP members could join the GMD either as individuals or join the GMD collectively; 3) The CCP would abolish all youth organizations and join the Three People's Principles Youth League; and 4) The CCP members would still retain their membership in the CCP after joining these organizations. These proposals were rejected by Jiang who feared that it was another CCP attempt to infiltrate the GMD.<sup>21</sup> This round of talks between Jiang and Zhou did not



arrive at any specific agreement. They had to be suspended when Japanese troops were closing in on Hankou and GMD party, administrative and military institutions began to withdraw from Wuhan.

#### B. Military Situation After the Fall of Nanjing

The near total destruction of the GMD main forces early in the war convinced the government that it needed a comprehensive plan for the rehabilitation and training of the Chinese armies. One immediate step was the introduction of a conscription system to make up for the lost manpower. The GMD government also changed its military strategy; it adopted the policy of "trading space for time." The rationale was that China had enormous territory, abundant human and material resources, but lacked technology and efficient organization. In comparison, Japan was a small nation with scarce human and material resources, but it had advanced technology and superior organization. If China could succeed in withstanding the initial attacks, it could cause the Japanese army to get bogged down in China's huge space while China could gain time to modernize and organize its own resources and the victory in the long run would be China's.<sup>22</sup> Tactically, the Chinese army was to adopt mobile warfare and avoid fixed positional warfare. It was to rely on flanking actions to offset the

Japanese army's frontal attacks. The Chinese armies were instructed to harass the enemy in attritional warfare, and to conduct guerrilla warfare on all fronts. This new strategy of avoiding fixed positional warfare was implemented during the operations around Taierzhuang, Wuhan and Changsha.

During this initial period of the war, the CCP participated in many of the discussions of war strategy either within the Defence Council or with individual GMD generals and other government leaders.<sup>23</sup> It was during this period that the government and the CCP made common plans for the prosecution of the war. Some success in the fighting was achieved through joint efforts.

#### 1. Joint CCP-GMD Resistance Against Japan.

Cooperation and coordination between the CCP and the GMD in resistance was demonstrated in several ways. Not only did the forces of both parties join in specific battles, such as those in Shanxi province. More important was the cooperation demonstrated in the mutual interdependence of the frontal battlefield of the GMD forces and the rear guerrilla battlefield of the 8th Route Army, as the two separate battlefields came into existence. With the authorization of a second CCP Army, the New Fourth Army, on the lower Changjiang River behind the enemy lines, the CCP controlled forces grew considerably in number and played a growing role in the

resistance. Either directly or indirectly, they contributed to the efforts of the GMD forces. Joint resistance efforts helped the Chinese forces to win some limited victories, though none were significant enough to alter the overall military situation. Some of the early campaigns were good examples of coordination.

## 2. Pingxingguan.

On the morning of September 25, 1937 the CCP's 115th Division encircled and destroyed the 27th Brigade of the Japanese army. The CCP attack was carried out as the Japanese forces were passing along the difficult mountain pass from Yuxian, Chahar province, into Shanxi province. The CCP forces inflicted heavy casualties, killing and wounding about 1,000 Japanese and capturing large supplies of munitions.

Evidently, the CCP also suffered heavy casualties but the victory was psychologically very useful; the CCP was able to win a victory at a time that other forces were suffering defeats. However, in claiming this victory, the CCP failed to mention that GMD armies were also involved. Forces of the GMD's 15th and 53rd Armies covered the approaches to the pass and several GMD divisions were in the area. Before the battle, there was also discussion between Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and Yan Xishan, Commander of the Second War Zone, on the tactics that should be adopted in the battle.<sup>24</sup> Without

cooperation and coordination the victory at Pingxingguan probably would not have been possible.

Shanxi Province was of strategic importance to both the Japanese and the Chinese. To occupy north China, the Japanese would have to control Shanxi. It was a mountainous area and if it remained in the hands of the Chinese forces, they would be under the constant danger of Chinese attacks from the vantage point of the mountains and thus threaten their military bases in Beiping and Tianjin. This in turn would hinder the Japanese advance towards southern China. For the Chinese and especially the CCP, Shanxi was also important. The CCP had most of its forces in this province and the mountainous terrain provided them with the best environment for carrying out guerrilla warfare.<sup>25</sup> Japanese airplanes, tanks and armoured vehicles could not operate effectively in such terrain which made it easier for the Chinese to tackle the Japanese army.

It was in Shanxi province that the CCP and the GMD forces cooperated best during the war. The best example of cooperation was at the battle of Xinkou, which was the Japanese target after Pingxingguan. In mid October the Japanese used 50,000 to 60,000 troops in their attack on this city. For the Chinese, it was the last line of defence before Taiyuan, and Yan Xishan sent 80,000 troops under the commander

of the GMD's 14th Group Army, Wei Lihuan. The CCP took an active part in the preparation and execution of the battle plans. It participated in discussions to work out a coordinated plan on how the different armies were to be deployed. An unprecedented decision was made to place ten regiments of the GMD army under the command of Zhu De and Peng Dehuai who were responsible for operations in the right flank.<sup>26</sup> During the battle, all three CCP divisions were engaged in disrupting the Japanese lines of communication and transportation, and blowing up an airfield at Yangming while the GMD forces held on to the frontal positions.

Not being able to make much headway at Xinkou, the Japanese turned east and managed to take Shijiazhuang and force their way through to Niangziguan, defended by three Chinese armies and the CCP's 129th Division which did manage to win a partial victory. Nevertheless, by the end of October, the Japanese were able to take Niangziguan. This situation presented a serious threat to Xinkou; the Japanese were in a position to surround the Chinese forces from the rear, and in such circumstances, Yan Xishan gave the order to withdraw from Xinkou and to defend Taiyuan. The battle of Xinkou lasted about a month. Having lost Xinkou, the Chinese could not stop the Japanese army and Taiyuan was lost on November 9, which marked the end of three months of fighting

in Shanxi. The Japanese advanced towards the Yellow River.

After the loss of Taiyuan, frontal engagements with the Japanese ended in north China and there came into existence two battle fronts. The GMD forces still engaged in frontal warfare, while the CCP guerrilla forces started operating behind the Japanese lines. In this situation, there continued to be cooperation between the CCP and the GMD. In January of 1938, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai went to Luoyang where Jiang Jieshi was inspecting the northern front and discussed with him issues relating to war strategy.<sup>27</sup>

### 3. Taierzhuang

The GMD troops took the brunt of the Japanese attacks after the war of resistance began and suffered immense casualties and defeats. But they did put up a heroic struggle and managed to win an outstanding victory at Taierzhuang in the battle for Xuzhou. Xuzhou was the key to the defense of Hankou where the Chinese government had retreated and which was the next Japanese target. After the Japanese troops occupied Nanjing, they advanced towards Xuzhou where they planned to link up with the Japanese armies that were moving south from Jinan, Shandong province. At Xuzhou, they hoped to surround and destroy the twenty defending Chinese divisions belonging to seven armies, commanded by Li Zongren of the Fifth War Zone. To do so, it was first necessary to take Taierzhuang, northeast of Xuzhou, and use it

as a base for attacking Xuzhou. Twelve Japanese divisions with 200,000 troops were thrown into this battle that lasted three weeks.

Intense fighting took place in Tengxian and Linyi in which the GMD suffered heavy losses. When the Japanese reached Taierzhuang in April, 1938 the fighting was even more fierce. When most of the city was already lost and most of the GMD forces wiped out, the defending commander kept up the fight until reinforcements from other GMD armies arrived and turned the tide of battle. The Chinese destroyed two Japanese divisions. Altogether the Japanese lost over 40 tanks, 70 armoured cars and 16,000 men.<sup>28</sup> This was the first time that the Japanese suffered a major defeat in a frontal war with the Chinese.

The victory of the Chinese at Taierzhuang was a tremendous encouragement and boost of morale for the Chinese Army. This success, however, did not have a significant impact on the operations that followed. By mid-May, the Japanese were able to surround Xuzhou and occupied it on May 19. At the time of the battle of Xuzhou, the CCP 8th Route Army successfully destroyed some Japanese forces that were attacking the GMD in southeast Shanxi.<sup>29</sup> This was an example where there was a strategic coordination with the GMD forces.

As the Japanese forces continued their advance, the GMD

army broke the dikes of the Yellow River west of Kaifeng in early June and flooded parts of Henan, Jiangsu and Anhui provinces. The move was meant to block the north-south transportations routes so that the Japanese would not be able to take advantage of the summer dry season. This drastic measure only temporarily delayed the advance of the Japanese while it brought immeasurable suffering to the people of the area. Millions of hectares were flooded and millions of peasants died after the loss of their harvest. As a result of breaching the dikes, the Yellow River changed its course and reached the sea south of the Shandong Peninsula.

From Xuzhou, the Japanese moved west along the Longhai railway. They did not meet any resistance at Kaifeng and occupied it June 5. Then they advanced along the Changjiang River, taking Anqing, Hukou, Jiujiang and then Zhengzhou from where they turned south on the Beiping-Hankou railway to threaten Wuhan by late July.

#### 4. The Defence of Wuhan.

Wuhan was an important target of the Japanese; it was where the Chinese government had taken refuge. It was also an important political centre in China and the only remaining industrial base for the Chinese government. The GMD government called on the nation to defend Wuhan which was in the Ninth War Zone under the command of Chen Cheng. The



Chinese had 450,000 troops and were reinforced by another 340,000 from the Fifth War Zone under Bai Chongxi. It was the largest concentration of forces since the Shanghai campaign.<sup>30</sup>

The Japanese organized a force of 380,000 men. The battle began in June 1938 and lasted four months. In spite of a desperate attempt to stop the Japanese, the Chinese could not block them. When the GMD government saw that it was impossible to hold on to Wuhan, it decided to withdraw. In fact, it did not commit its main forces to the defense of the area and dispatched many divisions to Hunan and Sichuan provinces so as to maintain a stronghold there to continue the resistance.

On October 25, the Japanese took the three cities of Hankou, Wuchang and Hengyang and the GMD government moved to Changsha and then to Chongqing which became its third war-time capital. That move also marked the beginning of a new stage in the war.

The CCP participated in the defence of Wuhan. Important CCP leaders including Zhou Enlai, Wang Ming, Bo Gu and Deng Yingchao were all in Wuhan. Evidently the policy of the CCP on Wuhan underwent a significant reversal. Initially, it stood for the defence of Wuhan, urging the government to mobilize all human and material resources for the defence of the city. But by October, when the situation deteriorated,

the CCP opposed throwing everything into the defence of Wuhan as it believed that would not help the long term resistance efforts.<sup>31</sup> It supported a statement made by Jiang Jieshi to the nation explaining the decision to withdraw. Jiang stated that the purpose was to preserve the Chinese forces so as to carry out the all-out, protracted war of resistance to the end.

#### C. A New Stage of the War -- After Fall of Wuhan.

##### 1. Military Situation after Wuhan -- A Period of Stalemate.

The Japanese did not conduct any major military operations after Wuhan and focused their attention on consolidating the areas they had occupied. By the end of 1938 they had extended their control to most of northern China and the eastern coastal regions. To control this large region, the Japanese set up puppet governments and at the end of 1938, they even enticed Wang Jingwei, a leader of the GMD, to defect to the Japanese-held areas.

The Japanese also made attempts to reach a negotiated settlement with the GMD government through the mediation of the German ambassador, Doctor Trautmann. This effort failed; in December Jiang Jieshi rejected the Japanese conditions for truce. He was determined to carry on the war, but he was no

longer able to organize some of the major campaigns he had managed to do before retreating to Chongqing.

It was then necessary to review the military strategy and one month after the withdrawal from Wuhan the GMD convened the first Nanyue military conference. It was the first large scale conference of the war and over three hundred senior GMD officers participated. Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying of the CCP were among the participants. The conference approved a comprehensive plan for the reorganization and retraining of the armies.<sup>32</sup> One of the decisions made was that guerrilla warfare should be strengthened and a Guerrilla Training Corps be established to train cadres. The Corps was established early in 1939 at Nanyue under Tang Enbo. Ye Jianying was appointed deputy director, and a number of other CCP members were instructors in the school. The CCP regretted that it did not send more people because it provided an excellent opportunity to expand its influence with the GMD central army.<sup>33</sup>

A new emphasis on guerrilla warfare was an indication of the change in the military situation. With the shift in strategy of the Japanese and the withdrawal of the GMD government to the hinterland, the war entered a period of relative stability. There continued to be fighting in various parts of the country but the battles were generally on a

smaller scale. Both Jiang Jieshi and Mao Zedong were convinced that the war with Japan would be a long one and there would be no easy, quick victory. It was at this time that Mao Zedong published his article "On protracted War."

Mao predicted that there would be a three stage development of the war. The first was a stage of strategic defence in which the main form of combat would be mobile warfare in co-ordination with guerrilla and positional warfare. The second stage would be a stalemate in which the main form of combat would be guerrilla warfare in coordination with mobile warfare. The third stage was one of counter offensive in which the main form of combat would be mobile warfare in coordination with positional and guerrilla warfare.<sup>34</sup>

The tactic of the 8th Route Army should be based "on guerrilla warfare, but not giving up any chance of mobile warfare under favourable conditions." This meant that the CCP should avoid large-scale and decisive fighting and preserve its strength for expansion of the guerrilla bases. It was in the expansion of its guerrilla forces that the CCP would come into conflict with some of the GMD forces also operating behind the Japanese lines.

On the main battle front, the GMD continued to suffer defeats. Early in February, 1939, Hainan fell and in March

the Japanese occupied Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi province. There were military operations in west Henan at about the same time. The most important event of the year was the first battle of Changsha in September and October. The Japanese troops, numbering some 100,000 men, seized a large part of this province's rich harvest in spite of some Chinese victories. On November 24 the large town of Nanning was occupied.

## 2. The Hundred Regiment Campaign

Of some importance on the CCP side was the launching of the 100 regiment campaign in 1940. This operation was taken partly in response to the international and domestic situation. 1940 was a bleak year for the Allied powers and for China. In June, France surrendered to Germany, British forces were withdrawn from Dunkirk and the Axis powers continued their advance in Europe. In July, under pressure from the Japanese, the British decided to close the Burma road thereby cutting off Western supplies to the GMD and this led to a wave of pessimism in Chongqing. Seeing the difficulty the GMD government faced, Japan proposed negotiations to establish foundations for new relations between the two countries.

Even though these proposals were rejected by Jiang Jieshi, the CCP regarded the possibility of GMD

capitulation as very real. Meanwhile, confrontation between the CCP and the GMD had become more intense since the end of 1939. Within the CCP there was the fear that the GMD might seek a solution with the Japanese at the expense of the CCP. One way to prevent this was to launch a major offensive against the Japanese. The specific objective of the campaign was to attempt to link up the three CCP guerrilla bases in north China and to completely destroy the principal railway lines.<sup>35</sup>

The campaign was launched on August 20th, 1940 when 400,000 troops from 115 regiments of the Eighth Route Army simultaneously attacked Japanese forces in five provinces of north China. The battle continued for three months and was centered on important railway lines, Japanese strong points and blockhouses built within the guerrilla areas and the coal mine at Chingxing. The CCP attack took the Japanese by surprise and caused serious damage to the railway lines and communication facilities. The Chinese managed to recover some lost territory.<sup>36</sup>

Unfortunately, the achievements of the CCP in the campaign were short-lived. The areas that the CCP took were soon lost again and the railway lines that it had cut were quickly restored. In retaliation the Japanese adopted a "three-all" (kill all, burn all and destroy all) scorched-

earth policy, along with the extensive construction of fortifications. As a result, the CCP guerrilla bases entered their most difficult period of the war. Sharply increased attacks on the CCP bases caused immense losses. Communist controlled areas shrank and the number of Red Forces was also reduced. In 1940 the Red Army had expanded to 400,000 but by 1942 the Eighth Route Army was reduced to 300,000.<sup>37</sup> Japanese blockade of these areas made it necessary to launch a movement to promote agricultural production. Although the CCP claim that the One Hundred Regiment Campaign was an important victory, in fact it was at most a Pyrrhic victory.

Mao Zedong was not in favour of the campaign, fearing that it would only expose the true number of the CCP forces to the enemy. The strategy used in the campaign did not conform with his principle of guerrilla warfare during this stage of the war. Frontal attacks and attempts to hold on to recovered land proved to be futile. However, in spite of its losses, there was a positive aspect: the CCP gained increasing support from the peasants who because of the scorched earth policy moved closer to the CCP as they saw this as their only way to survival. It would not be long before the CCP and the Eighth Route Army again expanded and became more and more influential in the war. <sup>38</sup>

On the GMD battle front, 1940 was calm. The Chinese lost

Ichang in the Changjiang Valley in June 1940 but managed to recover Nanning on October 25. The military situation was still very depressing for the GMD. Several of China's leading generals defected to the Japanese with their armies and seriously hurt the morale of the Chinese people. The government still kept up the war, though with far less vigour. In March 1941 there was some fighting in the western sector of Nanchang, in the region of Anyi and Gaoan. Zhengzhou in Henan was temporarily lost in October. A second battle of Changsha broke out in September and October. Otherwise, there were no other important conflicts and the stagnation and stalemate lasted several more years.

#### D. Evaluation of Initial War Efforts of the GMD and CCP.

The GMD government was very active during the initial period of the war. The fact that in the first year of the war the GMD managed to organize several major campaigns that lasted three to four months each show its immense contribution to the war effort. The GMD was able to make these remarkable efforts because its determination to resist Japan had the full support of the people. At a time of serious national crisis, the mainstream of the Chinese people, including the leaders of the GMD government and several warlords such as Feng Yuxiang, stood for unity against the enemy. In fighting the war, the



GMD put up a heroic struggle and suffered devastating losses. Its best trained troops were lost soon after the war began.

Apart from individual victories, the important battles fought by the GMD troops mostly ended in defeat. There were many reasons for these failures. Incorrect strategies and tactics and the many problems within the GMD and its armies such as lack of trust and coordination were all causes for setbacks. Other factors such as the failure of the GMD to control inflation, to do away with corruption and to improve the livelihood of the people were also important; but an essential reason for the defeats was that the Chinese faced a much more powerful enemy, an enemy that in military, economical and organizational terms was far superior. It was extremely difficult to prevent the Japanese from occupying the major cities and lines of communication during the initial stages of the war.

Confronted by such a formidable enemy, the loss of life and land was not surprising. After suffering serious losses, the GMD adopted a strategy of trading space for time. The policy was sound but the GMD was unable and later unwilling to use the time to strengthen its war efforts against Japan. The situation remained bleak for the GMD for most of the war years, but it did not give in to repeated attempts by the Japanese to get the GMD government to capitulate. The GMD

persisted in the war until final victory.

In the early years, the GMD lost a great deal of territory and suffered major defeats, but the contribution it made must be fully acknowledged. Active participation in the war does not always lead to victory, and the GMD efforts should not be negated because of its defeats. The scope and duration of the battles organized by the GMD government were unprecedented in modern Chinese history. Never before had so many Chinese troops been engaged in such grand campaigns.

It is unjustified for the CCP to state that the GMD armies "retreated every time and in defeat scurried a thousand li"<sup>39</sup> Most of the retreats were made after putting up a fight such as at Shanghai, Taiyuan and Taierzhuang. There were exceptions: Han Fuqu of Shandong retreated without putting up a fight and for that Jiang Jieshi ordered his arrest and execution. Xuzhou and Wuhan were also evacuated only after the situation looked hopeless. During the withdrawals, the GMD suffered heavy casualties. With better command, the GMD forces may not have had to retreat in chaos as was the case after many battles. There were also examples of winning victories after retreats such as the Kunlun battle, and later in the war, the North Burma operation. To negate the efforts of the GMD and to claim all the credit for winning the anti-Japanese war, as CCP history has done, does not respect

some basic historical facts.

From the time of the Lugouqiao Incident to the battle of Shanghai and the loss of Taiyuan, there was strictly speaking only one battle front. The CCP's Eighth Route Army was attacking the enemy flanks and helped to slow down the enemy advance. It made coordinated efforts with GMD armies such as the victory in Pingxinguang. After the loss of Taiyuan, the Japanese occupied the major part of north China and, as the main battlefield slowly moved south, the Eighth Route Army infiltrated into areas behind the Japanese lines and two battle fronts came into existence.

The CCP and the GMD were basically fighting on two separate fronts; the CCP operating behind Japanese lines and the GMD engaging in frontal war. These two battle fronts were interdependent; they could not have existed in isolation. The existence of the two fronts were mutually supportive and helped to destroy the Japanese hope of an early solution to the war with China. Both played their role in bringing in a period of stalemate and in the eventual victory against Japan. The CCP guerrilla forces during the first few years of the war also fought hard and made major sacrifices.

The GMD gives very little credit to the operations of the CCP. It claims that CCP accounts of its victories were grossly exaggerated. It believes that the CCP was more

interested in furthering its own revolutionary interests and still often quotes a document by a CCP defector that cites Mao Zedong as saying 70 per cent of the CCP's efforts should be devoted to expansion of its own forces and bases; 20 per cent on efforts to compromise and coping with the GMD and 10 per cent on resistance against Japan.<sup>40</sup> The GMD claim that the CCP guerrilla forces only "roamed without striking" (youer buji).<sup>41</sup> The GMD charges that the CCP forces were mostly engaged in attacking the GMD and were thus helping the Japanese. The inference that the CCP was only sabotaging the anti-Japanese war is not very convincing. As to the growth of the CCP bases, the GMD does not say that much of the expansion of the CCP was carried out behind Japanese lines and often at the expense of the Japanese.

Neither the CCP nor the GMD have been faithful to facts in their accounts of the war efforts during this period. Both parties have never forgotten their fundamental political differences and the objective in presenting its version of history was invariably to improve its own image at the expense of the other. All this was a consequence of the deep distrust and antagonism between the two parties.

After the formation of the united front, the CCP and the GMD cooperated well politically and militarily. But that cooperation was forced upon them by the national crisis and

not achieved as a result of resolving their differences. In fact, the GMD did not abandon its basic policy of exterminating the CCP. Cooperation formed without a fundamental mutual understanding and trust between the two parties was shaky at best and liable to collapse when circumstances changed.

#### E. GMD-CCP Confrontation and Clashes

##### 1. Cause for friction and clashes.

Cooperation between the two parties did not last very long. The period of enthusiastic spirit of cooperation gradually came to an end after the fall of Hankou. Political differences were too fundamental for the two parties to reach any genuine reconciliation and developments during the war sharpened the contradictions. Particularly disconcerting for the GMD was the steady growth of CCP power, both military and political.

The CCP took advantage of the fact that the Japanese were only able to occupy major cities and lines of communication, and relying on an increasingly supportive population, quickly expanded the areas under its influence or control. Wherever they went, they set up their own guerilla bases and their own form of democratic united front government. This incursion of CCP power into areas formerly held by the GMD and the

establishment of CCP led administrations which defied the authority of the government seriously weakened GMD rule and was reason for deep resentment on the part of the government.

The GMD complained that it could not exercise effective command over the border regions or CCP armies. It stated that the Central government should exercise complete authority over all areas and all military forces. When large regions of the country were under the administration of an independent regime and an independent army, the government could not coordinate the war efforts.

The CCP was likewise unhappy with the GMD government. It complained that the Government had not carried out promised political and economic reforms. The livelihood of the people had not improved and, furthermore, the government refused to arm the people for the defense of the nation. Attempts by the CCP to form mass organizations of peasants, workers, and students all met with opposition from the GMD government.

Mutual accusations and denunciations led to a deterioration of relations and ultimately to clashes. At the end of July, 1938 relations were already beginning to show signs of strain. The government began to take measures to suppress CCP activities and in so doing took away the freedoms that were granted in the early days of the war. At the end of August some mass organizations were ordered to disband.

Together with this was the temporary closing down of the Xinhua Ribao and the enforcement of restrictions on the non-GMD press. Certain other basic people's rights were suppressed.

Restricting the activities of the CCP was an issue discussed at the GMD's Fifth Plenum which marked another important turning point in the policy of the GMD. With the war entering a period of stalemate, the government paid increasing attention to domestic issues and its relations with the CCP. Passive resistance against Japan and active opposition to the CCP became a policy that the GMD maintained to the end of the war.

On January 21, 1939 the GMD convened the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee in Chongqing. At the meeting, Jiang Jieshi publicly reaffirmed China's determination to carry on the resistance to the end. But at the same time the plenum secretly adopted a resolution known as "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties." It was designed to curb the CCP expansionist activities. A special committee was established specifically responsible for affairs related to the CCP, the Border Regions, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.<sup>42</sup>

Additional measures were taken after the session to restrict the CCP. CCP liaison offices in many parts of the

country were ordered to close down; only the Xian and Chongqing offices were allowed to operate. CCP organizations were prohibited in the GMD regions and if any underground organizations were discovered, they were to be destroyed. Arrests and killing of communists occurred in Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Shaanxi provinces. The government also severely censored the Xinhua Ribao.

Many new restrictions were placed on areas under CCP control. Beginning from the Summer of 1939, the GMD government began to enforce a military blockade of the CCP Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and stationed a large number of GMD troops in the Northwest. These policies and measures led to frequent clashes.<sup>43</sup>

## 2. Military clashes.

The first serious military clash between the two parties took place in 1939. In April, fighting broke out between rival CCP and GMD guerrilla forces in Shandong. This was followed by fighting in Hunan and Hebei in June. In November, GMD troops attacked the New Fourth Army office in Zhugou, Henan province, and killed over 200 people. At the end of the year, Yan Xishan's forces attacked the New Army that was under the influence of the CCP and caused considerable damage. This led to a split between the CCP and Yan Xishan.<sup>44</sup> This "First Anti-Communist Upsurge" as it was called by the CCP was



followed by negotiations between Jiang Jieshi and Zhou Enlai. The talks centred on the legal status of the CCP, recognition of the border areas, troops increases and the demarcation of war zones. An important point of contention was on where the New Fourth Army should operate. Jiang Jieshi wanted the New Fourth Army to move north of the Yellow River but the CCP would not agree and a "Second Anti-Communist Upsurge" began with the New Fourth Army Incident.

The most serious confrontation between the GMD and the CCP occurred in January of 1941. Units belonging to the New Fourth Army which was then operating in south Anhui near the south bank of the Changjiang River were attacked and disarmed by GMD forces. The government maintained that the New Fourth Army consistently violated orders concerning its areas of operation, and that, instead of fighting the Japanese, it had been consolidating its bases and spreading its influence. At first the New Fourth Army did not obey an order of the GMD to cross the Changjiang River and move north to the Yellow River. The order was reiterated; in the meantime GMD troops moved in to encircle the CCP forces.

On January 6, the GMD troops attacked the New Fourth Army as it was preparing to cross the Changjiang River on orders from the CCP and caused heavy casualties. The New Fourth Army's commander, General Ye Ting was taken prisoner and

deputy commander, Xiang Ying, was killed in the fighting. Over 1000 men were killed and several thousand wounded or taken prisoner. About one week after the incident, the GMD Military Affairs Commission issued an order disbanding the New Fourth Army.<sup>45</sup>

The attack on the New Fourth Army was on such a large scale that it attracted wide attention and brought an avalanche of protests against the Government. The CCP made a violent denunciation of the attack. It contended the New Fourth Army was the only effective anti-Japanese force in the area, and without it large areas would have been lost to the Japanese. In defiance of the decision of the Military Commission, the CCP decided to reorganize the New Fourth Army and retain its name.

When the PPC was convened in Chongqing on March 1, 1941 the seven CCP delegates refused to attend in protest. Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu, on behalf of the CCP, presented the government with twenty four demands which called for the immediate cessation of attacks on CCP forces, abolition of one-party dictatorship and the introduction of democracy, release of political prisoners, recognition of the border regions and governments, and punishment of the perpetrators of the New Fourth Army Incident.<sup>46</sup>

Jiang Jieshi was compelled to explain the government

action. Speaking at the PPC on March 6, 1941, he stressed the basic need to maintain the state's political and military authority in the face of the enemy. He condemned the New Fourth Army for disobedience and rejected the CCP demands. He did not, however, break the GMD's ties with the CCP.<sup>47</sup>

After the New Fourth Army Incident, there were no further internal clashes of the same scale; but the causes for conflict remained. Both sides still wished to maintain the relations and after each anti-CCP upsurge there invariably followed a round of talks between the two parties. The second round of talks took place in 1942. At the many negotiations that took place in the following years demands and counter-demands were repeated again and again but little substantial progress was made.

As the war of resistance continued, the two parties and two armies functioned more and more independently of each other, each operating in different regions of the country, and each side following different policies.

#### F. The CCP's Three-Thirds System and Development of CCP Areas.

When the GMD decided to form the PPC, it was done partly in consideration of public pressure. But it was also a conscious effort to strengthen and consolidate its rule. Similarly, to strengthen the CCP's control over the areas it

administered, the CCP decided to set up a three-thirds system of administration which became its form of a united front government.

#### 1. The CCP's Three-Thirds System.

The Three-Thirds system was an important measure adopted during the war to unite the people and strengthen the leadership of the CCP in the border regions. In March, 1940 the CCP, in an inner-party directive "On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Bases", stated that: The

political power we are establishing during the anti-Japanese war is of a united front character. It is the political power of all those who support both resistance and democracy; it is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries.<sup>48</sup>

According to this definition, a Three-Thirds system of administration was set up in which CCP members would occupy one third of the positions, non-CCP progressive elements of the left take up one third and the last third taken by middle of the roaders. In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia area preparations were made in 1941 for general elections to implement the Three-Thirds system. The CCP Bureau in this area promised that the number of CCP candidates would definitely not exceed one third of the total so as to ensure that other parties and groups could participate in the public administration and management of the border region.

When elections were held in the region over eighty per

cent of the population participated and elected councils at the village, county and regional levels from which government committees were elected. At the second Regional Council meeting, a political programme was passed that called for close cooperation between the CCP and non-party members. "Three-thirds" administrations were set up in the CCP controlled areas of East China and Central China and people from various classes participated in government.

The aim in allocating one-third of the places to the intermediate sections who were neither left nor right was to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Winning this group over would help to isolate the die-hards. This conformed with the CCP's general policy on the united front.

The institutions to which the Three-Thirds system was applied were similar to the PPC in that they were not policy-making bodies; they could only discuss and implement policies. It was still the CCP that made the policy decisions. Mao Zedong made it clear that within the political institutions the CCP must play the leading role. The CCP was to educate people outside the party so that they could accept party policies.<sup>49</sup> The composition of the Three-Thirds administrations ensured that the leading role of the CCP would not in any way be weakened. Non-party members who

participated in the Border Region governments were only those that sympathized with the policies laid down by the CCP. Non-CCP parties were permitted to exist only if they did not oppose the CCP.

There were limits to the liberties that the "democratic regimes" granted to people. CCP democracy did not give the people the freedom to freely criticize the party and its leaders. Democracy was kept under the strict control of the party. The CCP exercised this control over all the local governments in the border regions through the enforcement of the principle of "centralized democracy." More specifically, it meant that "It is necessary to place the (party) organization before the individual, the majority over the minority, upper party functionaries over the lower, and the Central Committee over the entire party."<sup>50</sup> Maintaining strict discipline within the party and ensuring its leadership in government was an important factor for the CCP's growth in the border regions.

In the effort to broaden public support, the CCP was far more successful than the GMD. It was even able to win the support of other classes. As Peng Zhen said in discussing the impact of the Three-Thirds system:

.... When we implemented the "three-thirds" system of political power and strictly guaranteed the political rights and property rights of all anti-Japanese people, the landlords finally felt like supporting the anti-

Japanese democratic regime and participating in it. The fears of the landlords and bourgeoisie were allayed and some actively cooperated with the CCP.<sup>51</sup>

The fact that the CCP decided to implement a Three-Thirds policy after 1940 when conflicts with the GMD had already broken out shows its commitment to the united front policy. In all areas of its endeavours, the CCP implemented policies that would help to strengthen the united front and gain the support of all people under its control. Most successful were the economic policies adopted after the formation of the united front.

## 2. CCP economic policies.

Development of the CCP controlled areas was made possible by its political programme and also by its economic policies. The two were inseparable; the economic policies were part and parcel of the united front policy. Many of the CCP's economic policies had already been implemented in the base areas but with the formation of the united front, they were reinstated or reinforced.

The most successful of its policies were with regard to land and taxes. The land policy was the foundation of the CCP's programme and an important reason for the growth of the CCP controlled areas during the war. It was moderate as the purpose was to attract support for the war effort from all rural classes, including the landlord class.

The practice of the CCP after occupying a new area had been to confiscate the land from the landlords and divide it among the poor and middle peasants by decision of the village people. After the divisions had been made, the peasants owned all their land as private property. Five per cent was made public land, tilled collectively by the peasants. Revenue from this land was used for schools, roads, bridges, and other village services.

After the Xian Incident, however, land was no longer divided but the landlords had to observe special regulations. Rent had to be reduced by 25 per cent and was to be collected after the harvest; in times of natural disasters or man-made disasters, payment was postponed or reduced. Rent in arrears for many years was to be exempted from payment. The rate of interest was fixed at 1.5 per cent per month; total interest may not exceed the capital. Land belonging to absent landowners or to those forced to be traitors would be temporarily managed by the government, if there was no one to look after it.<sup>52</sup>

With the policy of rent and interest reduction, the CCP gained the support of the peasants who were the mainstay in efforts to resist Japan and promote production. In 1936 all taxes and levies were remitted. In 1937 levying of new taxes was further postponed. These decisions further helped to



alleviate the burden of the peasants, improve their livelihood and promote their enthusiasm for resistance and production.<sup>53</sup>

When rent and interest reduction was carried out, payment of rent and interest was to be ensured so that the property and land rights of the landlords could be protected. An end to the confiscation of land and guaranteed payment of rent and interest were important measures for gaining the active support of the richer landowners. In places where landlords' land had already been divided, the landlords received small shares like the peasants so as to guarantee their basic needs. The rich peasants were also encouraged to increase production through protection of their means of production and helping to improve the working conditions of the peasants that they hired.

In the border regions, the CCP also introduced some farm aid measures, both on a short-term and long-term basis. Direct relief was given in some famine areas. Where it could, the CCP encouraged collective work and organized mutual aid groups and cooperatives. Some money was advanced to them for the purchase of farm implements, seeds, cattle and other items. These cooperatives functioned best during the peak periods of sowing and harvesting.<sup>54</sup>

Reduced revenue resulting from tax cuts and reforms did not substantially affect the administration as the revenue was

never very large. Measures were taken to cut expenditure such as cutting down administration and maintaining low salaries for the public officials. The army was encouraged to produce its own food, as well as its consumer goods. The GMD government was also able to provide the CCP forces with a limited amount of food and provisions.

Trade policy in the CCP areas was equally liberal; commercial taxes were reduced or even abolished, and the number of small businesses increased. The CCP also made a great effort to help artisans producing such goods as cotton fabrics, paper, and matches. Where war conditions permitted, trade was encouraged and developed. The growth of trade with other areas were important for the survival of the border regions.

In the border regions there was hardly any industry to speak of. However, industrial cooperatives, similar to the ones in the GMD areas, were created under the leadership of Rewi Alley.<sup>55</sup> The economy in the CCP areas as a whole was still backward and primitive.

### 3. Expansion of CCP forces and bases.

When the anti-Japanese war began the CCP forces were concentrated in central Shaanxi and fought mostly in Shanxi. By March 1938 the Japanese had occupied the railroad lines in Shanxi and Taiyuan was made the headquarters of the Japanese

First Army. But the Japanese army was unable to exterminate the Chinese forces fighting in Shanxi. A large number of the GMD troops scattered into the mountains and joined in the guerrilla operations organized by the CCP Eighth Route Army. Within a relatively short time, many CCP new guerrilla bases were established and the size of the Eighth Route Army grew considerably.

The CCP very quickly expanded beyond Shaanxi and Shanxi and spread to Hebei, Shandong and to the Huaihe River and Changjiang River valleys. After the formation of Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region in January 1938, the Eighth Route Army forces under He Long moved into southeastern Shanxi to the Taihangshan Mountain area, outside the region designated to them by the government. A similar situation existed in northeastern Shandong when the forces under Xu Xiangqian moved into areas around Jinan. Several CCP guerrilla bases were set up in Hebei and Henan provinces.

The growth of the Eighth Route Army was also a result of the united front work done within the GMD armies which were called the "friendly armies" after the war began. The CCP worked out specific measures to win over these armies. During the earlier part of the war when relations between the CCP and GMD were cordial, the CCP openly contacted officers of the GMD armies. When relations began to deteriorate, the CCP operated

secretly. In whatever circumstances their work was successful and well organized. The CCP adopted such policies as not attacking the GMD troops unless attacked and doing all it can to make friends with them. More important than these specific measures was the attraction of the CCP political programme and particularly its call to resist Japan. Men of the defeated GMD armies voluntarily joined the Eighth Route Army and became an important additional source of its manpower. Many of these former GMD soldiers, together with other peasants, joined the CCP. The number of CCP members rose from 40,000 in 1937 to 800,000 in 1940 and the population under CCP control increased many times within a few years.<sup>56</sup>

#### 4. "On New Democracy"

In these years of the war, the CCP greatly enriched its experiences in making the revolution and waging a national war. These experiences were summed up by Mao Zedong in some of his most important works of this period. They include "On Protracted War" (May 1938), "Problems of War and Strategy" (November 1938) and "On Policy" (December 1940) in which Mao laid out many of the basic policies on the war and the united front.

Of particular importance was his work "On New Democracy" published in January 1940. It was Mao's attempt to adapt Marxism-Leninism to concrete Chinese conditions. He held that

the Chinese revolution would be carried out in two stages: a period of the New Democracy followed by socialism. The New Democracy would for a long time continue to be the most appropriate political system for China. A new democratic republic was to be a union of the four anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes -- the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie; the proletariat was to assume leadership of this alliance.

The state would have control over the economy of this new democracy. It would take over the large industrial and commercial enterprises, but would not confiscate the rest as the backwardness of the Chinese economy justified the existence of private enterprises. Large estates would be confiscated and the land shared out to the peasants. Equal distribution of land would enable the first steps to be taken towards cooperative production.<sup>57</sup>

"On New Democracy" laid out a vision for the future, but in making it public in 1940 the work had its practical value. Although Mao emphasized the leadership of the proletariat and the importance of the peasants, he also made it clear that the period of the new democracy would last a long time during which there would be a coalition of four classes including the bourgeoisie. Under new democracy, the capitalist mode of production would continue to exist side by side with the

socialist ownership of the means of production. These views demonstrated that the CCP intended to keep the united front as a long term policy and that all classes would have a place in a future CCP republic. At a time when there had already been clashes between the two parties, reinstating this position was important as it served both to unify thinking within the CCP and to allay some of the fears of the other classes.<sup>58</sup>

These works of Mao Zedong provided the guidelines for specific policy measures. The largely successful implementation of these policies helped to satisfy some of the basic demands of the peasants and labouring people. With the support of the people, the CCP kept expanding its influence and became stronger than ever. As the CCP grew in strength, the GMD underwent a gradual process of decline during the same period.

#### G. GMD's Deterioration and Decline.

The GMD never managed to successfully institute any reforms nor carry out any policies that could match the popular appeal of the policies put forward by the CCP. The immense problems that the GMD faced before the war increased after 1937. The GMD government's focus on the military aspects of the war prevented it from devoting sufficient attention to economic, social and political reform.

The economic difficulties that the GMD encountered were monumental, particularly after the capital was moved to Chongqing. With the loss of a large part of its territory, the GMD government lost an important source of its revenue. It could no longer collect customs tax from the coastal cities, which was the most important source of revenue, or other taxes from the occupied territories, and had to count on collecting land tax in the areas remaining under its control. In 1941 the GMD government tried to take over land taxes formerly collected by the provinces and to centralize control over the tax collection. But when the local tax agents saw that they would be deprived of some benefits, they lost interest in collecting these taxes for the government. Without the support of the local authorities, the reform could not make much headway.

Even if the tax reform did work, the government could not have collected much tax anyway as at least half of the rural population in the country was constantly in debt.<sup>59</sup> In the GMD controlled areas, peasants were heavily burdened by the abuses of landlords, usurers, and tax and rent collectors. Taxes and rent and graft drove the peasants to extreme poverty. The attempts that the government made to put some control on rent were largely ignored.

The backward state of agriculture seriously affected

other sectors of the economy. There was little demand for industrial goods in the countryside. The modern industry that did exist was concentrated in the coastal areas which were soon occupied by the Japanese and the factories that were moved inland after the war began only had a limited production capacity. These industries located in West and Southwest China all faced a shortage of energy and raw materials.

With the economy in deep trouble, the GMD government could not generate enough revenue to finance the war. In order to keep the war going, the government took the easiest way out; it resorted to printing currency and borrowing which became the basic reason for inflation. As war expenditure rose, the government printed more money and an inflationary spiral began. Between 1937 and 1939, prices rose by 40 to 50 per cent a year.<sup>60</sup> Inflation caused widespread dissatisfaction among all classes of the people, particularly among the workers and intellectuals. This dissatisfaction and discontent was one reason the GMD lost more and more political support.

Attempts by the government to improve the political situation and strengthen its control over the nation met with little success. Apart from its difficulties with the CCP, the GMD government also faced the challenge of the regional powers that were always on guard against infringement of the central



government into their areas of influence. When the GMD attempted to gain some control over the local provincial governments, it came into conflict with the vested interests of the local political and military leaders who still retained a certain degree of independence. These leaders could decide whether or not to cooperate with the central government; in many cases they chose not to support the important reform measures of the GMD.

In 1939 the GMD made a major effort to reform the nation's political system with the implementation of a "New County System." Under this system, County Political Planning Commissions were established to control local political, financial and economic, educational affairs.<sup>61</sup> The County Commission was established as an autonomous unit under a chairman who must be a member of the GMD party. Under him there were various civilian administrative councillors. The county ("xian") was subdivided into several "xiang" which were then divided into ten "bao". "Bao"s were made up of "jia", each of which consisted of ten households. It was in effect a restoration of the feudal "baojia" system to control the rural population. The same system was used to organize the local militia forces.

The "xian" county re-organization policy was designed to organize and mobilize the people to carry on the war, to

accelerate the process towards local self-government and also to prevent the CCP from infiltrating into the GMD areas. These objective were never achieved. County governments failed to fulfill the many responsibilities that they held; they could not meet the quotas demanded of them on grain, conscription, labor service and so on. Control of the various institutions remained in the hands of the local gentry and landlords who were not anxious to bring any change to the existing state of affairs. Many of the government regulations and policies such as price and rent controls were not carried out.

In February of the same year, the GMD launched a "National Spiritual General Mobilization". The campaign was to ensure the strict obedience of the people through the teaching of traditional Chinese philosophy. The slogans raised were that the interests of the nation and victory should be placed above all else. To protect the interests of the nation, the people must forget prejudices and selfish interests. As Jiang Jieshi said: "... it is necessary to obey the State and to merge the strength of the individual into that of the State. We must place the interests of the nation above everything else."<sup>62</sup> In spite of the mobilization, it did not generate the ideological support the government had hoped for. It was unrealistic to demand ideological unity and

support when the government failed to show concern for the basic material well-being of the people.

The failure of these attempts at reform must also be attributed to Jiang Jieshi's failure to see the importance of political reform; he seemed to believe that so long as he controlled the military he could survive the war. Jiang maintained a tight hold over the military and exercised dictatorial powers. His authoritarian and obdurate view of society made him more and more removed from the ordinary people. His officials were also divorced from the people, regarding them as inferior and ignorant and expecting them to uncritically carry out the instructions of the government :

The attitude of the government towards the common people is fully demonstrated in the system of conscription adopted after the war began. Throughout the war, the GMD government carried out a rigid conscription system. It was basically a localized system; the central government in Chongqing assigned a quota to each province. Recruitment was controlled by the local gentry, which meant that the well-off families escaped conscription. The poorest of the population who could not afford to buy their way out were the ones drafted. Those who were drafted often had to cover long distances on foot to their training camps. Many died or deserted on the way.

In the army, the GMD soldiers were treated with utter

disregard for their health and their lives. They did not receive proper training and did not have adequate weapons. As these soldiers were recruited through forced conscription, low morale and desertion of draftees became major problems for the government. It was not surprising that many of the GMD soldiers went over to the CCP forces where they were treated more like human beings.

The GMD government had to cope with major challenges in the war but in areas that most affected the people's livelihood and the execution of the war such as tax collection and control, economic policies and the conscription system, it failed dismally. The result was widespread alienation and demoralization.

To many people it appeared as if the government was only concerned with maintaining its dictatorship. The repressive measures that it took against the CCP and other parties engendered unpopularity as people felt that it was suppressing the resistance efforts. All these problems and the widespread corruption in government and spiraling inflation alienated the majority of the people. Attempts by the GMD to strengthen its control during these years failed and as the government lost more and more territory, it lost more and more support from the people. The government in Chongqing continued to exist but its influence in the nation as a whole greatly diminished

as the war continued.

#### H. Conclusion

1941 was an important year for China and the world. Several important international events that took place influenced developments in China and relations between the CCP and GMD. On April 13, the Soviet Union concluded a Neutrality Pact with Japan whereby it pledged to respect the territorial integrity of the puppet state of Manchuguo. Later, Japan reciprocated by recognizing the Mongolian People's Republic. The GMD and the CCP took totally different positions on this pact. The GMD government protested at the violation of China's territorial integrity while the CCP defended the Soviet pact. When Hitler's army invaded the Soviet Union in June, the situation immediately changed. Hitler's attack brought the Soviet Union closer to Great Britain and France which would be beneficial to the war of resistance in China. The new situation prompted the CCP to strengthen its efforts to maintain the united front which was already under severe strain.

The entry of the United States into the war in December of the same year brought in new factors to the situation in China. The GMD government was greatly encouraged for it felt it had a powerful ally who would ensure the final defeat of Japan. The support of the Western powers and the Soviet Union

for China's war against Japan was important in affecting a shift in strategy. Jiang became convinced that eventually China and the allies would defeat Japan, but the situation within China was disturbing. If he did not take some measures to contain the CCP, his government might have difficulty staying in power after the victory. After 1941 the GMD increasingly turned its attention on conserving its military strength in order to strengthen its position against the CCP. To this end it became less and less willing to use its armies to fight the Japanese.

Nevertheless, as the war was still in progress, the GMD had to preserve, outwardly at least, the semblance of unity. After the serious confrontation during the New Fourth Army Incident, it even made efforts to ease the tensions. On March 14, 1941 Jiang Jieshi and Song Meiling invited Zhou Enlai to meet them and discuss questions of concern to both parties. At this meeting Zhou raised the issue of the New Fourth Army Incident and complained about the political persecution that was taking place. Jiang avoided discussing the Incident and said that local officials were responsible for the persecution and that they had misunderstood his intentions. He accepted some specific requests raised by Zhou and said that so long as the CCP obeyed orders, expansion of CCP forces and providing them with additional provisions would

not be a problem.<sup>63</sup> On March 25th Song Meiling invited Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao to dinner at which Jiang Jieshi, Zhang Chong and He Yaozhu were present. Ending military confrontation between the two parties and political persecution were some of the questions discussed. Zhou Enlai left with the impression that at least superficially relations would ease.<sup>64</sup> The fact that such meetings took place so soon after the New Fourth Army Incident and after the condemnation of the GMD is somewhat surprising but nevertheless significant in that it demonstrated the intention of both parties to maintain relations between them.

Shortly thereafter relations between the two parties entered a period of relative stability but these relations remained cool and no progress was achieved in the many rounds of talks that were held. In Chongqing, the CCP continued to operate its 18th Group Army Office (Eighth Route Army) and the Xinhua News Agency. Zhou Enlai stayed there much of the time and met with the GMD leaders quite regularly. However, political persecution continued and there were constant arrests of CCP members. The CCP found it more hazardous to operate openly. Consequently, the CCP sent out instructions in May of 1941 that the CCP should conserve its strength, go underground and make more use of the legal organizations.<sup>65</sup>

By the end of 1941, relations between the CCP and the GMD

had gone through the best of times and the worst of times. The cooperation that existed at the beginning of the war was never to be seen again and the worst confrontation in the clashes between the two parties during the period of the anti-Japanese war had occurred. Basically, the two parties abide by the understanding reached when the united front was established: when there was friction and conflict, the two sides would meet and try to resolve differences through negotiations. In varying degrees a pattern of cooperation and confrontation continued to be a feature of GMD-CCP relations during the war of resistance against Japan.



## CONCLUSION

On the Chinese political scene, the CCP and the GMD were the two commanding parties in modern Chinese history. They represent different class interests, different political ideologies and determined the fundamentally different political currents. Each party pursued its interests. The long term goal of the CCP was to establish a socialist state. It emphasized the struggle of oppressed nations against imperialism and the struggle of the masses against oppression and exploitation. The goal of the GMD government was to reconstruct the nation and eliminate all opposition of which the CCP was the most threatening. In pursuing their respective revolutionary objectives, the two parties came into conflict. Nevertheless, a unique phenomenon in the history of their relations emerged in the thirties when at times the two parties were irreconcilable enemies with intense hatred for each other while at other times they became allies working closely together for a common cause.

The political situation in modern China was determined by both class and national contradictions and with increasing

Japanese aggression, the national crisis took prominence and determined the former. Before the September 18 Incident both parties paid more attention to their respective class interests and neglected their policies towards imperialist aggression, but as the national crisis deepened and with increasing popular pressure for resistance, the two parties at the same time turned the focus of their attention to the national contradictions and sought new strategies. In the process, both parties adjusted their policies and arrived at a common understanding on how to face Japanese aggression.

The road to this understanding was long and tortuous as the two parties had been engaged in a civil war for ten years. During this decade, the CCP suffered immense losses, particularly after the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the Long March. The CCP survived the Long March but at a tremendous cost and it needed time to rebuild its base and strength. Thousands of revolutionaries had lost their lives and there was deep antipathy towards the GMD. Uppermost in the minds of the CCP was the overthrow of the GMD. Although it was opposed to Japanese imperialism, it equated Jiang Jieshi and the GMD with the Japanese aggressors and stated that to defeat Japanese imperialism, it was necessary to overthrow the Jiang Jieshi regime. The priority was still on defeating the GMD.

Confronted by threats to its rule from the CCP and Japanese aggression, the GMD opted for a policy of "internal pacification before external resistance." Jiang Jieshi insisted that before the Japanese could be effectively checked, China had to achieve greater unity and discipline under his leadership. Jiang decided that the suppression of the CCP was a prerequisite for effective resistance against Japan.

Even after the September 18 Incident, the GMD persisted in its policy of exterminating its arch enemy, the CCP. Although Jiang Jieshi came close to destroying the CCP, he in fact only managed to force the Communists to withdraw to a remote base in northwest China which was strategically more advantageous for them. From there the CCP developed even faster. In the end, the GMD defeated its own purpose.

The GMD's reluctance to stand up to Japanese pressure and aggression and its determination to pursue the suppression of the CCP and other opposing forces antagonized the majority of the people. The GMD policy of non-resistance led to the loss of Manchuria, which was an important factor that engendered the antagonism of Zhang Xueiliang and the Manchurian forces and eventually brought on the Xian Incident. A growing number of people in China felt that the GMD government was getting the priorities quite wrong when it used its forces to fight other

Chinese while at the same time retreating before the Japanese. They used various means to increase their pressure on the GMD to change its policy.

Japanese aggression strengthened nationalism throughout China. In the thirties, this was not restricted to any class and was a greater force than some would acknowledge. When a nation faces foreign aggression, the whole country unites in resistance. In China, people rallied to the political force that most actively called for resistance. That political force was the CCP. Many of the people who supported the CCP were not communists or even sympathizers of the CCP but they were patriots and wanted cooperation with the CCP. In the formation and the development of the united front, people from all strata of society played a significant role. The ordinary citizens were those that felt deepest the humiliation and pains of the nation being invaded by a foreign power. They were resolutely opposed to the policy of "internal pacification before external resistance" and waged various means of struggle to promote resistance against Japan. At the forefront of the national patriotic movements were the students who boycotted classes, held demonstrations, and organized delegations to petition the government and to protest against the policy of non-resistance. Students were organized to go to the streets and the countryside and to

propagate the policy of resistance and national salvation. In the December 9 Movement, the students of the nation broke through the restrictions of the government and, together with people throughout the nation, expressed their dissatisfaction with the policies of the government.

Besides the general population, other major political and military figures in the nation also played an important role. Zhang Xueliang's action at Xian and the Rebellion of Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi in Liang Guang demonstrated that they were just as concerned about resistance. Feng Yuxiang began to play an active role in the resistance efforts in 1933 and was active throughout the war. The continued existence of warlords in the nation during the war was a source of serious difficulties for the GMD government but not all the warlords were self-centred; some could also be patriotic and their positive efforts during the war of resistance should also be recognized.

Growth of nationalism throughout the nation and the ever increasing threat of Japanese aggression to the GMD's control of the country forced a fundamental change of policy upon the GMD, particularly after the battle of Shanghai when the GMD suffered a devastating loss of some of its best troops. Jiang Jieshi desperately needed support for his war efforts and reluctantly recognized the legitimate status of the CCP.

Faced with the unprecedented threat of Japanese aggression and the continued attacks from the GMD, the CCP was more than ready to adjust its policies and cooperate with the GMD. By comparison, the CCP was far quicker and more efficient in comprehending the changes brought to China by Japanese aggression. It made major concessions in order to reach an understanding with the GMD. Very quickly the CCP adapted its policies to the new situation and was able to win broad support for its policies. It was in such circumstances that a second united front was formed in September 1937.

The formation of the united front marked the beginning of a new period of cooperation. For the second time, the two parties set aside their differences to seek common ground on major issues. The existence of a united front enabled the two parties to cooperate in the war of resistance and prevented a break in relations when difficulties and disputes arose. Without doubt, the united front helped to unite the Chinese people in a common war effort. It helped to strengthen the resolve of the people and government and thus dashed the hopes of the Japanese for a quick victory in China. It made possible a protracted struggle that would eventually end in victory.

The most important feature of this second united front was that it was nationalistic in nature as its name "The

Anti-Japanese National United Front" implied. It was established to fight Japanese aggression and developed in the course of the struggle. The nature of the front ensured that it would win broad support and attract the broad masses of the people. People from all circles and different parties, irrespective of their different class interests, all joined to promote and to work for the united front. The front encompassed a broad strata of society that represented diverse interests and attitudes.

Within the united front, the GMD was the dominant force; it had control over the national government and the largest number of armed forces. It was the GMD that led the nation in the war of resistance. The CCP was far weaker but it was still the most influential party outside the GMD. How the united front developed depended to a large extent on the relations between these parties. The two parties joined in the war efforts but they each maintained their independence. The GMD and CCP had their own political and administrative organizations and their own armed forces.

The existence of independent armies and political administrations was another important feature of the second united front. At the time of the first united front the CCP did not have an army of its own and the GMD was still in control of an unstable government in Guangdong Province with

only a weak military force. By 1937 the situation had changed considerably, mostly as a consequence of the ten years of civil war. The CCP was in control of a Red Army that steadily increased in size and of revolutionary bases that also kept expanding. One of the lessons that the CCP learned from the civil war and the first united front was that to maintain its independence and carry on its struggles, it must have its own armed forces to protect itself. The CCP at all times was careful to defend and strengthen its Red Army and its border governments.

That the CCP maintained an independent army and political institution was a major cause for frustration and dissatisfaction for the GMD and Jiang Jieshi. In the repeated negotiations between the two parties, the GMD insisted on reorganizing or reducing the border administrations and the Red Army. It was never willing to recognize the border governments. From the GMD's standpoint, it did not want to see "a state within a state." To Jiang, the united front meant that cooperation between all Chinese must be on the basis of the integration of all military forces into the Central Army, and the subordination of all political parties to the GMD and the government. This was a principle that he followed in his negotiations with the CCP. When the Hankou government was reorganized at the height of cooperation



Between the two parties, the government made sure that all key positions were held by GMD members.

In fact, the existence of separate CCP armies and political organs was not detrimental to the war efforts. Considering the difficulties that the GMD faced and its sometime irresolute attitude, the Eighth Route army and New Fourth Army were a positive influence on the war and ensured that the united front could continue to exist. However, independent armies and different political interests were also a source of conflict. When the war entered a period of stalemate, they led to conflict and confrontation.

Fundamental differences between the GMD and the CCP made it impossible to form a solid united front. The two parties were never able to agree on a common political programme or a national mechanism to implement it. Numerous discussions were held to discuss a programme, but the GMD was unwilling to accept the proposals made by the CCP and unable to put forward acceptable programmes of its own.

With regard to setting up a mechanism or organization for the United Front, the CCP put forward various proposals such as forming a national federation or reforming the GMD to enable members of other parties to send representatives to join the GMD. Jiang turned down these proposals. He maintained that a prerequisite for joining the GMD was the

dissolution of the various parties. In principle, the GMD was never willing to recognize the CCP as an independent party or to grant it or any other party an equal status. It suggested integrating the CCP with the GMD in such a way that would, in effect, eliminate the CCP. These counter proposals of the GMD were likewise rejected by the CCP.

The PPC for a time and to a certain extent functioned as an organizational form of the united front but it was only a consultative institution and after the CCP members left the PPC following the New Fourth Army Incident, it became even less effective. At the provincial and county level, similar organizations only existed in form. The Three-Thirds System was a form of united front but it was not recognized by the GMD government and was only implemented in the CCP controlled areas when relations between the two parties were already very strained.

As there was no agreed mechanism for implementing any agreed programme for the united front, a special procedure of "consult when necessary" was agreed upon.<sup>1</sup> An united front without a common programme and a mechanism to implement it could only be a provisional arrangement. In spite of the structural weaknesses of the united front, the pressure of the people for unity kept the united front alive throughout the war.

The second united front was influenced considerably by developments in the international situation. An advantageous international environment pushed the two sides towards cooperation. After the September 18 Incident, the interests of several Western powers were seriously threatened. As a consequence, the contradictions between these nations and Japan intensified. Over the years, the position of the Western powers changed from one of tacit acknowledgment of Japanese aggression to one of support for China's war of resistance. They did not wish to see a civil war in China and supported the efforts at forming a united front.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union faced a growing threat from fascist Germany and needed international support. Its China policy as formulated by the Comintern was established within the context of its general policy on the formation of an anti-fascist united front. It urged the CCP to cooperate with the GMD and form a broad united front. Of importance to the history of the CCP was the extent of Moscow's influence on its policies. This has in the past either been overemphasized by the GMD or intentionally omitted by the CCP to avoid giving the impression that it was a tool of the Soviet Party. Although the CCP usually faithfully carried out instructions from Moscow, events that took place during the mid-thirties show that the CCP did not blindly follow orders from Moscow.

The statement issued by the CCP on the Xian Incident and its evaluation of the Incident differed considerably from Moscow's. It would be more accurate to state that CCP policy was decided by the specific political situation in China.

It should be noted that in material and moral terms, the Soviet Union supported the GMD government and actively supported China's war of resistance. This international environment was favorable for a united front. However, all the international support, be it from the Western nations or the Soviet Union was directed to the GMD and tended to neglect the CCP. This support for the GMD strengthened Jiang's position and influenced his domestic and external policies.

The characteristics of the Anti-Japanese National United Front determined it could only be a loose and fragile alliance. As the war entered a period of stalemate, contradictions within the broad and complex front sharpened and led to several incidents of conflict between the CCP and the GMD. During the eight years of the anti-Japanese war there were three major campaigns against the CCP and, in between, were three rounds of negotiations.

Throughout the period under study, the basic situation was that major differences and important areas of agreement between the GMD and CCP existed at the same time. These areas of agreement and differences would change in order of

significance as the political and military situation developed. In times of cooperation the two parties emphasized their common interests but this did not preclude the existence of serious differences and partial regional clashes; and in times when relations were strained, efforts at seeking some common ground never ceased and partial cooperation continued to exist in some areas.

The two parties hold diametrically opposite views on the world but even when the two parties split, it was not absolute. The two parties split because of class contradictions, but it did not result in one party destroying the other. However different their views were on mutual relations, there was one common concern: how best to cope with Japanese aggression. Both parties still considered the independence and sovereignty of China as of supreme importance. In spite of conflicts between the two parties, both still considered the anti-Japanese war to be primary importance. This common concern enabled the two parties to cooperate in a most significant manner. There was a sincere wish on both sides to work together to strengthen war efforts. Joint meetings were held to discuss strategy. Both sides tried to implement policies that had the common purpose of giving more voice to the population and, to the extent possible, bring them some material relief. This period did

not last long. However, this does not detract from the significance of the cooperation. Given political will on both sides, it was possible to maintain and improve friendly relations which could have significantly altered CCP-GMD relations.

The question arises that if the two parties had managed to arrive at a common understanding on the war of resistance, why was it that the two parties developed in different directions? How was it that the GMD, which by 1937 had achieved a dominant position in the nation, would gradually decline? Why did the CCP that had barely managed to survive at the end of the Long March, grow so remarkably fast within a few years?

With regard to the CCP, it is obvious that it benefitted from the war with Japan. It was not without reason that Mao Zedong said during an interview with Japanese visitors in 1965 that Japanese aggression in China had saved the CCP and helped it to grow. During the war, the CCP recovered from the losses it suffered in fighting the GMD and within a short time expanded its armed forces, its guerrilla bases and its influence throughout the nation. The war provided the CCP with an unique opportunity to promote national resistance and social reform. It seized that opportunity and initiated a series of economic and social reforms that were both profound

and successful. From its base in Yan'an, the CCP was able to strengthen its war efforts and in the process broadened its support, so much so as to become a formidable challenge for the GMD and a major force in Chinese politics. The war with Japan provided the CCP with the opportunity to make a new start after suffering major setbacks. Its strategies and policies made possible the rebirth of the CCP.

There were many factors that contributed to the success of the CCP. One important factor was the establishment of the united front and the corresponding political, economic, and social policies adopted to uphold the front. As Japanese aggression intensified, the CCP demonstrated that it was willing to subordinate its class struggle to the national resistance efforts. After 1935 there was a fundamental shift in the policies of the CCP: it was willing to forget past grievances and to unite with its enemy, the GMD, to resist Japan.

The CCP ably handled the relations between revolution and resistance. It put its priority on resistance but did not abandon its class struggles. However, these struggles were not of the radical kind carried out in the revolutionary bases of the pre-war period. The CCP learned, through the disasters brought about by its revolutionary tactics, that while its radical policies might win the support of the poor peasants,

the support of that class alone was not enough. It needed broader support to be able to compete with the GMD. The policies put forward by the CCP in the new circumstances were far more moderate than those it had adopted in the revolutionary bases and were meant to attract support from different classes. In many instances, the objective was to strengthen the united front. The specific economic policies that the CCP adopted were moderate and conciliatory. In allowing the landlords and the rich peasants to continue to exist and only restricting their exploitation, the CCP managed to promote its economic development and broaden its political base.

While it adopted these moderate policies towards the upper classes, it did not neglect the peasants who were the main source of the CCP support. First and foremost, it guaranteed and enhanced their interests through such policies as rent and interest reduction. These pragmatic measures helped to improve the conditions of the peasants and raise productivity. It was not surprising that the peasants showed such enthusiastic support for the CCP and helped it to grow so quickly. The CCP economic policies during this period helped to win support from the labouring masses but that was not the only reason. It would be incorrect to believe that during the Anti-Japanese war the ordinary people would support any force



that could bring material benefits to them irrespective of whether it was active in resistance. That would be ignoring the basic consciousness of the people. The CCP was successful in promoting its image as a party that not only adopted policies to help the masses but ,more importantly, as one that stood for resolute resistance.

The growth of the CCP influence was not limited to the rural areas; in the urban areas, its popular united front policies and call for resistance against aggression made an impact on all social strata. The CCP was able to infiltrate into all sectors of the society and to spread its influence from the working class to the industrialists. A considerable number of intellectuals, politicians and GMD military officers were at one time or another under the influence of the CCP. One cannot but be surprised at the incredible number of revelations about how the CCP carried out its united front work in the GMD government and armies. The fact that a daughter of Jiang Jieshi's secretary and advisor, Chen Bulei, would turn out to be an active member of the CCP illustrates the extent of the CCP infiltration. Some of the united front work was carried out by CCP members who operated covertly and some was done through intermediaries that sympathized with the CCP cause. The success of the united front in the urban areas should not be underestimated. Although the CCP power base lay

in the rural areas and that was where it rapidly developed, its influence in the urban areas was also substantial. The united front was directed at both the rural and urban areas and the CCP put in a great deal of effort into both. Although Mao Zedong called the anti-Japanese war a peasant war and Lin Biao described it as a case of encircling the cities from the countryside, it would be inappropriate to attribute the success of the CCP just to its work in the rural area. Neither can it be said that the CCP called for a united front in the cities while carrying out revolutionary policies in the rural areas to get the support of the peasants. The CCP worked out a correct relation between the urban and rural areas and between the revolution and resistance. The CCP's position on these inter-relations was demonstrated in the policies it adopted on the united front.

The very success of the united front convinced the CCP of the importance of upholding it throughout the war. As Mao said in "Introducing The Communist": "... the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the three fundamental questions for our party in the Chinese revolution."<sup>2</sup> Even when relations had deteriorated and armed conflict had broken out, the CCP still made conscious efforts to maintain the united front.

Mao Zedong contributed to the establishment and development of the united front. But he was not the only person to see its importance; others in the CCP also made their contributions. Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Pang Hannian, and many others, in theory and in practice, helped to establish the united front. Views were often divided within the CCP on the relations with the GMD and the united front. Wang Ming's over enthusiastic support for the united front as expressed in his view that "All should be done through the united front and all must conform with the united front" earned him severe criticism from Mao whose position was not always so different. Numerous meetings were held within the party to unify the party's thinking on policy. The objectives were achieved but, unfortunately, often at the expense of those who dared to criticize.

Compared with the CCP, the GMD was slower in adapting to the changes that took place in China after the September 18 Incident. Jiang Jieshi and most people in the GMD were genuinely concerned about Japanese aggression and yet it took several years before the GMD was able to decide on a policy of active resistance. Jiang frequently emphasized the weakness of China and its military forces. He maintained that without sufficient preparation, the Chinese armies would be unable to withstand the Japanese attacks and resistance would only lead

to the defeat of China. He did not realize that in the face of national humiliation, resistance was still preferable to compromise and that in the process of resistance, the nation could be further united and strengthened.

The only policy that the GMD carried out vigorously was its campaign against the CCP. For quite some time, Jiang considered that between Japan and the CCP, the CCP was the greater evil. It was difficult for him to accept the idea that the CCP could be an ally in resisting Japan. He took no heed of the fact that the Japanese and the CCP were bitter enemies and that the Japanese were just as eager as the GMD to eliminate the CCP and were willing to cooperate with the GMD to do so. If the GMD had been determined to resist Japan, the rational course of action would have been to unite with the CCP. Jiang did not think so and maintained his rigid position until circumstances changed his mind and it was only with reluctance that he eventually did agree to cooperate with the CCP. After the united front was established, Jiang still had grave misgivings about the CCP. He was particularly irritated at not being able to control the CCP armies and border governments.

The GMD not only had difficulty exerting influence on areas controlled by the CCP; its control over other parts of the country was also seriously jeopardized by the continued

existence of regional powers. The series of wars with the warlords before the war had only temporarily resolved the disputes and only won their nominal allegiance. These regional powers still exerted considerable influence over their spheres of influence; they still retained control over the people and production in large areas of the country.

The China that the GMD led into war was united more in form than in substance. It was still basically a loose military alliance of the various regional powers. The demarcation of the various war zones and the appointment of the commanding generals to some extent reflected the composition of this alliance. Within the alliance, some forces, such as those of Yan Xishan in Shanxi province, operated with almost total independence. Many of these warlords had at one time or another been in contention with the GMD of Jiang Jieshi. Although most supported the GMD's war efforts, their regional interest sometimes took precedence in their considerations.

Lack of effective control over the nation not only affected the military situation; it was also an obstacle in carrying out any meaningful social and economic reforms that the GMD had contemplated. When the GMD came into power, it was committed to national reunification and reconstruction and to extensive social and political change. However, it was

never able to put into practice its commitments. It never managed to accomplish any effective socio-economic reforms comparable to those of the CCP. The situation became more difficult for the GMD after the capital was moved to Chongqing. With the loss of its power base in the coastal areas, the GMD had to depend on the regional powers for its human and material resources. Regional and local authorities could choose whether or not to carry out the reforms or directives from the Central government. In fact, many of the instructions from the government were either simply ignored or deliberately flouted.

The failures of the GMD at reform cannot all be explained by emphasizing the unfavourable situation in which the government had to operate. As a party, the GMD failed to see the importance of political mobilization and socio-economic reforms to win the allegiance of the masses. It did not see that popular programmes of political and social reform could serve to strengthen its authority. As a national party, the GMD stood above the masses and never succeeded in setting up any effective grassroots level organizations like the CCP. To use the CCP terminology, it was unable to establish an united front from below with the the masses.

A fundamental weakness of the GMD was that it lost contact with the ordinary people. The GMD did not attach

sufficient importance to winning the support of the labouring masses. As it became more divorced from the people, the GMD and its government became more bureaucratic and corrupt and was plagued by inefficiency and patronage. Such a government failed to improve the livelihood of the people. The policies that it carried out were no better than those of the previous regimes. The rural population in the GMD controlled areas was hit hard by irrational land and grain policies, high taxes and cruel conscription, while in the cities, the urban intellectuals and working class suffered from inflation and general economic mismanagement. In the thirties, the GMD failed to initiate any new strategies or policies to remove some of the basic causes of dissatisfaction and resentment. More and more people became disillusioned with the GMD government and the confidence that the people had in it at the beginning of the war quickly eroded.

It is inevitable that most of China's woes in the thirties were attributed to the failures of the GMD. Without doubt the GMD did perform dismally in many important areas of its endeavors. The GMD under Jiang Jieshi failed to provide leadership to meet the serious national crisis. Preoccupied with consolidating and developing its political power, the GMD did not make any headway towards political, economic and social progress.

However, in all justice to the GMD, it is also important to recognize the immense difficulties that the GMD government faced in the thirties. Most of these years were spent in warfare and it had little time and energy to resolve the endless problems in a poor and disunited nation. Even so, the GMD did make some achievements; its efforts at financial and monetary reform and the development of transportation were largely successful. And when all-out war with Japan began, the GMD government organized several major campaigns which demonstrated the determination of the GMD to resist aggression. Within a short time, the GMD lost its best troops, its capital and its economic base in the coastal areas and encountered immense difficulties in fighting and financing the war. It did not receive much external assistance and had to fight against a far better organized and equipped enemy. In spite of the terrible hardships and defeats inflicted upon it in the first years of the war, and no matter how difficult the situation became, the GMD never gave up the struggle. It rejected repeated Japanese offers to negotiate and carried on the war through to the end.

Also of significance was the fact that the GMD did not restart a civil war with the CCP, however much it disliked the CCP. When there was confrontation, the GMD took some initiatives to ensure that there would not be a total break.



It was willing to sit down and hold talks with the CCP whenever problems arose. In spite of all its repressive measures, the GMD government was still willing to grant some basic rights and liberties. The continued existence of CCP media and other CCP institutions in the GMD controlled areas during the war showed that the GMD was willing to tolerate hostile propaganda more than the CCP was ever willing to do in the border regions.

In analysing the history of the GMD and CCP from 1931 to 1941, it is important to see both the strong points and weaknesses of the two parties. In the national crisis, both parties showed willingness to set aside their differences and work together for the interests of the nation. All Chinese, whether members of the CCP or the GMD, or any other patriotic people or organization, wished to fight foreign aggression. During the war of resistance, the whole nation fought bravely, suffered tremendous hardships and made enormous sacrifices. Both GMD and the CCP should take credit for some of the achievements and both bear some responsibility for the setbacks in the war. It is time for both sides to give due recognition to historical facts and acknowledge the contributions made by the other side.

In looking at this factual account of developments in the thirties, it is clear that the shifts in the policies of the

two parties were the result of two important factors. One was Japanese aggression in China and the other was the pressure of the people for unity in resistance. If there is one common lesson for both parties, it is that the will of the people decides the course of history. In the years discussed in this dissertation, the CCP did not grow because it had defeated so many GMD or Japanese armies or captured a large number of prisoners. Its position was strengthened because the policies it implemented attracted the support of the broad masses of the people. Likewise, the GMD did not lose its support because of military defeats at the hands of the CCP or the Japanese. It failed principally because it no longer could gain the understanding and support of the people. In the final analysis, whichever party could win and maintain the allegiance of the majority of the people was the one that would have a future. It is the will of the people that decides the general trend of social development. This should not be taken as a polemical or abstract statement. At the time of the Anti-Japanese War, the will of the people was translated into specific action that affected the policies of both the CCP and the GMD. Historical development is often slow and undergoes twists and turns but the aspirations of the people ultimately prevail.

## NOTES

## Notes to Introduction

1

In CCP history, there were several periods of the united front. The first lasted from 1924 to 1927. At its Third Congress, the CCP decided to form a united front with the GMD under Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It was formally established at the GMD's First National Congress in 1924. The objective of the first united front to unite the people in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism so as to achieve national independence and political freedom. It ended with the coup of Jiang Jieshi in 1927. The second period began in 1937 when Japanese aggression forced the CCP and GMD to join in an Anti-Japanese National United Front. When the war ended in 1945, the CCP continued its united front strategy in the civil war to overthrow the GMD. After the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, the CCP adhered to its united front policy when it carried out land reform and the socialist transformation of commerce and industry in the fifties.

2

See John W. Garver, "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party," The China Quarterly, 1989, Vol.113, p.31.

3

See Zhuanji wenxue <Biographical Literature>, Taipei, 1988, No.314, p.69. Hereafter cited as Zhuanji wenxue.

4

Van Slyke's Enemies and Friends covers three periods of the united front. With regard to the second period, it is now evident that the Comintern exerted considerable influence on the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Even so, Van Slyke's basic assumption that the CCP's united front policy was derived from practical needs rather than from theoretical considerations is still valid. He correctly saw the CCP leaders, and Mao in particular, as pragmatic politicians who were able to combine basic revolutionary ideals with practical policies. The united front policy thus became an integral part of Chinese Communist thought and practice. This dissertation provides instances of where the CCP maintained its

independent position in spite of instructions from Moscow to the contrary.

5

Tetsuya Kataoka, Resistance and Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 52-55.

#### Notes to Chapter I

1

On April 12, 1927 Jiang Jieshi staged a coup in Shanghai in which many workers and CCP members were killed. It marked the end of the first united front and the beginning of a ten-year civil war between the GMD and the CCP.

2

According to CCP history, this refers to the period from 1927 to 1937 and is called the Second Revolutionary Civil War Period.

3

From speech made on July 23, 1933 in Jiangzongtong ji <Collected Works of President Jiang>, (Taipei, 1964), Vol. I, p.650.

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Lei Xiaocen, Sanshinian dongluan Zhongguo <Thirty Years of Turmoil in China> (Hong Kong, 1955), p.182.

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Father of Zhang Xueliang and most powerful warlord in northern China. With Wu Peifu as ally, he occupied Beijing in 1926. In June 1928, while retreating to the Northeast by rail, he was killed by a bomb planted by the Japanese.

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Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics 1925-1937 (Cambridge University Press, 1974), p.139.

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For detailed analysis of Yan Xishan see Donald G. Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967)

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Sima Sangdun, Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan <Biography of Zhang Xueliang> (Hong Kong, 1986), p.110. Hereafter cited as Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan.

9

Borodin was the Soviet government emissary to the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government and political advisor to the GMD during the first period of GMD-CCP cooperation.

10

The group was made up of fifteen GMD members of the extreme right that met in the Western Hills of Beiping. It was formed during the First Revolutionary Civil War Period and opposed the Soviet Union, the CCP and was against cooperation between the CCP and GMD. After the Zhongyuan Campaign of 1930, the group collapsed.

11

Some left-wing members of the GMD formed a political faction called the Reorganizationists. They supported Wang Jingwei and wanted to force the resignation of Jiang Jieshi.

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Gao Yinzuo Zhonghua minguo dashiji <Chronicle of the Republic of China>(Taipei, 1957), p.339.

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Guowen zhoubao, Vol.7, September, 1930, p.1.

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Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.123.

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James Sheridan, China in Disintegration (New York, 1977), p.186.

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Lei Xiaocen, Sanshinian dongluan Zhongguo, p.183.

17

Sun Yat-sen divided the process of building the nation into three periods: a period of military government, a period of political tutelage and a period of constitutional government. The period of tutelage was to last six years

during which counties would prepare for self-government and train the people to exercise their rights and perform their duties.

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Lei Xiaocen, Sanshinian dongluan Zhongguo, p. 199.

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Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 115.

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Jin Chongji (ed.) Zhou Enlai zhuan <Biography of Zhou Enlai>(Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1989), p.165.

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Robert North, Moscow and Chinese Communism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 128.

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Tien-fong Cheng, A History of Sino-Russian Relations (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1957), p. 192.

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North, Moscow and Chinese Communism, p. 128.

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Cheng, A History of Sino-Russian Relations, p. 192.

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John Rue, Mao In Opposition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 168.

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Jean Chesneaux et.al., China from the 1911 Revolution to Liberation (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 226.

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Richard C. Thorton, The Comintern and the Chinese Communists (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), p.154.

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p.227.
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Agnes Smedley, The Great Road (New York: Monthly Review  
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Cheng, A History of Sino-Soviet Relations, p.196.
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Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Language  
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Justin Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise (London: Associated  
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Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise, p. 21.
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Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.152.
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Luo Jialun, Geming wenxian <Revolutionary Documents>  
(Taipei, 1965), Vol.33, p.609.
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Manmeng shiqing <Manchurain-Mongolian Affairs> August 25,  
1931.
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Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.156.

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Dagong bao, September 20, 1931.

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Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.166.

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Rong Zhai, Jinling jiumeng <Memories of Jinling>(Hong Kong, 1965), p.45.

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Luo Jialun, Geming wenxian, Vol.35, p.1293.

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Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.157.

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Chin-tung Liang, The Sinister Face of the Mukden Incident (New York: St. John's University Press, 1969), p.17.

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Liang, The Sinister Face of the Mukden Incident, p.74.

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## Notes to Chapter II

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"Duiwai xuanyan" in Renmin ribao, November 23, 1933.

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Pan Hannian was also one the chief CCP negotiators with the GMD government. Shortly after the Zunyi Conference he was sent to Moscow and returned to China after the August 1 Declaration with instructions to negotiate an end to the civil war and to seek cooperation with the GMD to fight Japan. He upheld CCP principles in the negotiations and worked strenuously to bring about the Second United Front. In 1955 he was branded an enemy agent by the CCP and thrown into prison. About one hundred others were implicated. It was not until 1982 that he was finally exonerated of all wrong doing, five years after he had died.

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Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.658.

39

Snow, Random Notes, p. 102. A recent work on the Long March is Benjamin Yang's From Revolution to Politics that complements the already substantial writings that include Harrison Salisbury' The Long March and Dick Wilson's The long March. Yang provides a detailed account of the March that draws on recent material. Unfortunately, the impact of Japanese aggression is not discussed in detail and what is said about CCP attitude towards Japanese aggression is difficult to accept. Like some GMD historians, he maintains that Mao was only willing to expend ten per cent of its efforts on resistance.

40

Chen Tiejian, Qu Qiubai zizhuan <Biography of Qu Qiubai>(Shanghai,1986), p.467.

41

Jean Chesneaux, China From the 1911 Revolution to Liberation (New York, 1977), p. 247.

42

Thomas Kampen, "The Zunyi Conference and Further Steps in Mao's Rise to Power" in China Quarterly, No.117, 1989, p.124. Also in Jin Chongji (ed.), Zhou Enlai zhuan <Biography of Zhou Enlai>, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1989), p.284. Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang formed a new three-man command group of the Red Army shortly after the Zunyi Meeting.

43

John Rue, Mao in Opposition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p.270.

44

Xiang Qing, "Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo gongchandang guanyu jianli kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian de celue" <The Communist International and the CCP regarding the tactic of establishing an anti-Japanese national united front> Dangshi tongxun (Beijing, 1983), No.11-12 (1983) p.16.

45

Xiang Qing, "Bayi xuanyan xingchen lishiguocheng" (The Historical process of the formulation of the August 1 Declaration) Dangshi ziliao congkan (Beijing, 1982) No.3, p.99.

46

"Kangri minzu tongyizhanxian", Vol.I, p.10.

47

James Thomson, Jr. "Communist Policy and the United Front in China" in Papers on China, XI (1957), pp. 105-112.

48

Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), Vol., p.276.

49

A GMD organization set up in 1932 with Jiang Jieshi as its head. Members wore blue shirts and yellow trousers and were thus known as blue shirts. They mostly belonged to the Huangpu military clique that strongly supported Jiang. It disbanded in 1938.

50

James Thomson, Jr. "The United Front in China" in Papers on China, XI, 1957, p.105.

51

Xiang Qing, "Bayi xuanyan xingchen lishiguocheng" <The Historical Process of the Formulation of the August 1 Declaration> Dangshi ziliao congkan (Beijing, 1982), No.3, p.106.

52

Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: 1967), p.57.

53

Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.201.

54

Rong Zhai, Jinlin jiumeng, p. 49.

55

Snow, "Interview with Zhou Enlai", Random Notes on Red China, p.58.

56

Jiang Zongtong ji <Collected Works of President Jiang> (Taipei, 1964) Vol.1. p.792-811.

57

Ibid., Vol.2. p.2103.

58

Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.210.

59

Ibid., p.212.

60

Hu Shi xuanji <Collected Works of Hu Shi> (Taipei: Zhenglun, 1966), p.151.

61

James W. Morley (ed.), Deterrent Diplomacy, Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935-1940 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p.23-25.

62

Yang Guisong, "Dierci guogong hezuo de xingcheng" <Formation of Second Period of Cooperation Between the GMD and CCP> Jindaishi Yanjiu (Beijing: 1985), No.3, p.62. Hereafter cited as "Guogong hezuo."

63

Chen Lifu, "Reminiscences on Preparation for the War of resistance", Zhuanji wenxue, Vol. 31 No.1.

64

"Guogong hezuo", p.62.

65

Jiang Zhongzheng, Sue zai Zhongguo <Soviet Russia in china>, Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe, 1956, p.69.

66

Wei Guolu, Renmin de hao zongli <Good Premier of the People>, Vol.1, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1977), p.200.

67

Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China: A Summing Up at Seventy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957) p.73.

68

Zhou Enlai tongyizhanxian wenxuan <United Front Writings of Zhou Enlai> (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1984), p.18.

69

There are many reminiscences in Wenshi jicui and Jindaishi yanjiu, Beijing.

70

Wang Zhuran, Zhang Xueliang daodi shige zenyangren <What kind of a person was Zhang Xueliang?> Beiping, 1937, p.16.

71

Ibid.

72

Zhang Xueliang, "Xian shibian qianhuilu zhaiyao" <Extracts from Reminiscences of Remorse on the Xian Incident> in Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.381.

73

T.A. Bisson, Japan in China (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938), p.124.

74

Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol.I, p.172.



75

Zhang Xueliang, "Xian shibian qianhuilu zhaiyao" in Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.383.

76

Ibid.

77

Tien-wei Wu, The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History (Ann Arbor, 1976), p.92. Also Jiangzongtong ji, Vol.1, p.921.

78

Yierjiu yundong <December 9 Movement> (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), p.146.

79

Ibid., p.147.

80

There have been debates about the role of the CCP in the December 9 Movement. Yierjiu yundong ziliao <Materials on the December 9 Movement> and Yierjiu yundong huiyilu <Recollections of the December 9 Movement> support the views expressed in this thesis. More attention should be paid to the National Vanguard, the "minxian", as it is clear from some of the investigations made during the cultural revolution that many in that organization could automatically become members of the CCP. The CCP undoubtedly played a significant role if one is to acknowledge that Jiang Nanxiang and Huang Hua of Qinghua and Yanjing universities were leaders in the movement.

81

"On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.1, p.165.

82

Otto Braun, A Comintern Agent in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 154.

83

Ibid., p.170.

84

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.I, pp.153-171.

## Notes to Chapter 111

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Zhonggong Zhongyang Beifangju, "Wei kangri jiuguo xuanyan" <Declaration on Resistance Against Japan and National Salvation>, in Muqian xingshi de fenxi, <Analysis of the Present Situation> (Lilun yu shijianshe, 1936), p.55-60.

4

Otto Braun, A Comintern Agent in China, 1932-1939, p.162.

5

Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.I, p.279.

6

Renmin Ribao, 14 November, 1987, p.2.

7

Tien-wei Wu, The Sian Incident (Ann Arbor, 1976), p. 37.

8

"Guogong hezuo", p.64.

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid., p.66.

11

"Kangri minzu tongyizhanxian" p.14.

12

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I. p.261.

13

Jing Chongji (ed.), Zhou Enlai zhuan <Biography of Zhou

Enlai> (Beijing: Remnin chubanshe, 1989), p.316. Hereafter cited as Zhou Enlai zhuan.

14

Liuda yilai: dangnei mimi wenjian <Since the Sixth Congress:Secrets Documents of the CCP> (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1980), p.778.

15

"Guogong hezuo", p.68.

16

"Kangri minzu tongyizhangxian", p.15.

17

See Shen bao, 1936, July 14 and July 15 for Jiang Jieshi's speech at the GMD Second Plenum.

18

"Guogong hezuo", p.69.

19

Ibid.

20

Zhou Enlai zhi Luo Fu, Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai de dianbao <Zhou Enlai's telegram to Luofu>, April 4, 1936.

21

Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p.239.

22

"Kangri minzu tongyizhanxian", p.16.

23

Zhuanji wenxue, No.317, 1988, p.25.

24

Li Jinzhou, "Xian shibian qinliji" in Zhuangji wenxue Vol.19, No.6, p.16.

25

Ibid.,p.17. See also: T.A. Bisson, Japan in China (New York, 1938),p.162-163.

26

Zhang Xueliang, Kanri jiuwang yanlunji, <Collection of

Speeches on Resistance Against Japan and National Salvation> (Xian, 1936), p.26.

27

Shen Bochun, "Ji Xian shibian" <On the Xian Incident> in Xinhua liaoyuan (Beijing, 1961), p.124.

28

Lu Bi, Lun Zhang Xueliang <On Zhang Xueliang>, (Hong Kong, 1948), p.30.

29

"Guogong hezuo" , p.71.

30

Zhang Xuejun, "Zhang Xueliang yu Xian shibian de heping jie jue"<Zhang Xueliang and the Peaceful Solution of the Xian Incident> in Jiaoxue yu yanjiu.(Beijing, 1985), no.1, p.128.

31

Wang Juren, "Ji Xian shibian qianhou jijian shi" <Some Events Before and After the Xian Incident>, in Xian shibian qinliji (Beijing: Wenshi chubanshe, 1986), p.146. Hereafter cited as Xian shibian qinliji.

32

Song Meiling, "Sian: A Coup D'Etat", China at the Crossroads (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1937, p.117.

33

Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York: Da Capo Press, 1975), p.142.

34

"China Weekly Review", LXXIX, 2 December, 1936, in Tien-wei Wu, The Sian Incident, (Ann Arbor, 1976), p.82.

35

Tien-wei Wu, The Sian Incident, p.90.

36

"Guogong hezuo", p.73.

37

Zhang Xueliang, Kangri jiuwang yanlunji, p.5.

38

Guo Hualun, Zhonggong shilun <On the History of the CCP>

(Taibei, 1969), Vol.3, p.170.

39

Mao Zedong's statement at the Politburo, December 13, 1936

40

Kong Xiangxi, "Xian shibian huiyilu" <Recollections of the Xian Incident> in Xian shibian zhenshi <Rare History of the Xian Incident> (Hong Kong, 1965), Vol. 1, p.98.

41

William H. Donald (1874-1946) was personal advisor to both Zhang Xueliang and Jiang Jieshi.

42

Chiang Kai-shek, China at the Crossroads, p.178.

43

Ibid., p.186.

44

Kong Xiangxi, "Xian shibian huiyilu", Vol.1, p.110.

45

"Hongjun jiangling guanyu Xian shibian zhi guomindang zhengfu" <Letter to the GMD Government on the Xian Incident from Generals of the Red Army> (December 15, 1936) in "Guogong hezuo", p.74.

46

Rewi Alley in an article in the Renmin ribao (November 14, 1987) shed some light on the Comintern communication system with the CCP Central Committee. It appears that in the Shanghai house where he lived there was a Comintern China group radio station. It was operated by the station chief who was British and two other German female operators. Song Qingling lived close by and was often in touch with Alley and other foreign friends. Perhaps that was why it was Song that relayed the Comintern directive to the CCP.

47

Snow, Random Notes on Red China, p.2

48

James Bertram, Crisis in China (New York:1937), p.130

49

Zhou Enlai's telegram to the Central Committee of the CCP (December 17, 1936) in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.331.

50

"Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Xian shibian zhi guomindang zhongyang dian <Telegram to the GMD Central Committee on the Xian Incident from the CCP Central Committee> (December 18, 1936) in "Guogong hezuo", p.74.

51

Shen Bochun. Xian shibian jishi <Record of events in the Xian Incident> (Renmin chubanshe, 1978), p.148.

52

Guo Hualun, Zhonggong shilun, Vol.3, p.201.

53

Specifically, the telegram proposed that:

1. Tongguan should be the demarcation between troops on both sides. While Nanjing troops should not invade Tongguan, the Anti-Japanese Army of Xian will remain in Shaanxi and Gansu, waiting for the outcome of the peace conference;
2. Nanjing should immediately call a national conference to include delegates of all parties, factions, professions, and armies, in addition to those appointed from Nanjing and Xian. The CCP will also send delegates;
3. Prior to the peace conference, a draft programme for national salvation will be drawn up by all parties, factions, and armies and the question of the disposition of Mr. Jiang Jieshi will also be discussed. The programme should deal with issues relating to the unity of the entire nation, opposition to all civil war, and concerted resistance against Japan;
4. The conference is tentatively proposed to be held in Nanjing. See Tien-wei Wu, The Xian Incident, p.109

54

Guo Zengkai "Yige lishi wenti de jiaodai" <An account of a historical question> in Xian shibian sanyi <Three Recollections of the Xian Incident> (Xiamen, 1962), p.125.

55

Xian shibian jianshi <Short History of the Xian Incident> (Beijing: Wenshi chubanshe, 1986), p.84.

56

Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.334.

57

Song Meiling, "Sian, a Coup D'Etat" in China at the Crossroads, p.112.

58

Zhonggong zhongyang zhi Zhou Enlai de diabao <Telegram from the Central Committee to Zhou Enlai>, December 21, 1936

59

Shen Bochun, Xian shibian jishi, p.154.

60

Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, (Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1981), p.86-87.

61

The CC clique refers to a power group headed by Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu. It was also known as the Organization clique as the Chen brothers dominated the Organization Department of the GMD. It was committed to the interests of Jiang Jieshi. Like the CC clique, the Huangpu clique firmly supported Jiang. It was formed of academy instructors and students and graduates of the Huangpu Military Academy where Jiang was commandant.

62

In the arrangements made in Xian, Song Ziwen and Madam Jiang were the guarantors, and the two witnesses were Zhou Enlai and Guo Zengkai. Of them all only Guo was the only person to leave a record. Another witness, the foreign consultant W.H. Donald had records but for fear that his book might cause his Chinese friends to lose face, these were not published. A biography of Donald by E.A. Selle does not give an accurate account of these discussions.

63

"Interview with Bo Gu", Snow, Random Notes on Red China, p.12.

64

Song Meiling, "Sian: A Coup E'Etat", p.129.

65

Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Vol.1, p.88.

66

Snow, Random Notes on Red China, p.12.

- 67  
Zhou Enlai shuxin xuanji <Collected Letters of Zhou Enlai>, (Beijing: Zhongyan wenxian chubanshe), 1988, p.123.
- 68  
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Vol.1, p.90.
- 69  
 Song Meiling, Sian: "A Coup E'Etat", p.125.
- 70  
Ibid., p.131.
- 71  
 He Guizhu, "Xian shibian qianhou de Zhang Xueliang" <Zhang Xueliang Before and After the Xian Incident> in Xian shibian qinliji, p.6.
- 72  
 Zhao Si (Zhao Yidi) was lifetime companion whom Zhang Xueliang married many years later after divorcing his wife. Writing in Shijie ribao (May 19, 1990), in honour of Zhang Xueliang's 90th Birthday, she emphasized Zhang Xueliang's spirit of patriotism in an article "What Kind of a Person is Zhang Xueliang?" It is unfortunate that Zhang Xueliang is still unwilling to tell the full story of the Incident. This in itself reflects the validity of some of the facts stated in this thesis.
- 73  
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Vol.1, p.90.
- 74  
 Gao Chongmin, "Xian shibian huiyi" <Reminiscences of the Xian Incident> in Xian shibian qinliji, p.72.
- 75  
 Wu Tien-wei, The Sian Incident, p.143.
- 76  
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.I, p. 282
- 77  
 Gao Zhuyao, "110 shi jiuqian qinliji" <Personal experience in the extermination of the 110 division> in Xian shibian qinliji, p.12.



78

Zhang Xuejun, "Zhang Xueliang yu Xian shibian de heping jiejie", p.127.

79

Kaiming Su, Modern China (Beijing, New World Press, 1986), p.164. See also Hu Hua, Zhongguo gemingshi jiangyi <Teaching Material on the History of the Chinese Revolution> (Beijing, 1983), p.477.

80

Chiang Kaishek, China at the Crossroads, p.208.

81

Ibid., p.188

82

Ibid., p.184

83

Guowen zhoubao (January 2, 1937) in Wu Tien-wei, The Sian Incident, p.150.

84

Yan Baohang, "Zhang Xueliang song Jiang Jieshi hui Nanjing yihou" <After Zhang Xueliang Escorted Jiang Jieshi Back to Nanjing> in Xian shibian qinliji, p.336.

85

"On Coalition Government" in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol.III, p.212.

86

The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. (New York: Kraus Reprint Co. 1969), p.25.

#### Notes to Chapter IV

1

In April, 1935, Japan planned to turn the five provinces in north China into special areas directly under its control. Under the He-Umezu Agreement, China lost its sovereignty over the provinces of Hebei and Chahar. Later in the year, the GMD appointed Song Zheyuan to organize the Political Council for Hebei and Chahar, which met the Japanese demand for a special

administration in north China.

2

Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, p.453. Also Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.I, p.281.

3

Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 427.

4

Zhou Enlai, "On the United Front" in Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Vol.1, p.217.

5

Ibid., p.218.

6

"Guogong hezuo" , p.77.

7

Ibid.

8

Zhou Enlai Zhuan, p.354. See also "Guogong hezuo", p.80.

9

Li Yunhan, "Guanyu Xian shibian jixiang yiwei de tantao" <An Inquiry into Some Contentious Issues of the Xian Incident> in Zhongyang ribao, 1984.6.17.

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Zhou Enlai's telegram to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP on March 10, 1937 in Zhou Enlai zhuang, p.355.

11

Jiuguo shibao, April 5, 1937.

12

Zhou Enlai, "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu yu Jiang Jieshi tanpan jinguo he wodang dui gefangmian chelue fangzhen xiang gongchanguoji de baogao" <Report to the Comintern on negotiations with Jiang Jieshi and the strategies of the CCP> April 5, 1937 in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.357.

13

Ibid., p.357.

14

Ibid.

15

"Zhongyang zhengzhiju kuodahuiyi taolunjinguo zhaiyao"  
 <Extracts from the Discussions of the Enlarged Politburo of the  
 CCP> April 7, 1937, in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.358.

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Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I. p.285.

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Ibid., p.273.

18

Ibid., p.270.

19

Shum Kui-Kwang, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power  
 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.99.

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Snow, Red Star Over China, p.432.

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"Guogong hezuo", p.85.

22

"Kangriminzu tongyizhanxian", p.26. Also Zhou Enlai "Lun  
 tongyizhanxian" <On the United Front> in Selected Works of Zhou  
 Enlai, p.194.

23

Zhou Enlai Zhuan, p.362.

24

Yang Zhenguang, Jinian qiqi shibian wushi zhounian wenji  
 <Collected Essays in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of  
 the July 7 Incident.> (Beijing,1987), p.32.

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James B Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy National  
 Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton, 1966),  
 p.345.

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The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang  
 Kai-shek.(New York: Kraus Reprint Co, 1969), p.25.

27

Ibid., pp.21-25.

28

Paul K.T. Sih (ed.), Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945, (New York, 1977), p.25.

29

The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang kai-shek, p.36.

30

"Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, He Long, Lin Biao zhi Ye Jiaying de dianbao" <Telegram of Mao, Zhu, etc. to Ye Jianying>, July 14, 1937, in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.364.

31

"Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai zhi Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian de dianbao <Telegram of Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Zhang Wentian>, etc. July 21, 1937, in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.365.

32

"Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying zhi Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian zhuan Bo Gu, Lin Boqu de dianbao <Telegram of Zhu, Zhou and Ye to Mao and Zhang>, August 12, 1937 in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.366.

33

The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, p.36.

34

Hsi-sheng Chi, Nationalist China at War, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982), p.41.

35

Shi Shuo, "8.13 Songhu zhanyu jilue" <Record of the 8.13 Songhu Campaign> Wenshi jicui (Beijing, 1985), p.45.

36

Ibid., p.51.

37

Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.367.

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Tetsuya Kataoka, Resistance and Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p.55.

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T.A. Bisson, Yenan in June 1937: Talks with the Communist Leaders (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p.41.  
See also Zhuanji Wenxue 1988, No.313. p.20.

40

Shum Kui-Kwong, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, p.107.

41

Jindaishi yanjiu, 1985, No.3, p.48.

42

Selected Works of Mao Zedong, volume II, p.25.

43

Otto Braun, A Comintern Agent , p.211.

44

"Kangriminzu tongyizhanxian", p.24.

45

Ding Weifen was director of the Party Affairs Department of the Beijing Executive Bureau of the GMD.

46

"Zhu De, Zhou Enlai zhi Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian de dianbao" <Telegram of Zhu and Zhou to Mao and Zhang>, August 12, 1937, in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.366.

47

Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Vol. 1, p.93.

48

The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, p.42. Also in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.II, p.43.

49

Gao Chongmin, "Xian shibian huiyi" <Recollections of the Xian Incident> Xian shibian qinliji , p.69.

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Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends (Stanford, 1968),

p.99.

51

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52

"The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan" in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol.II, p.69.

53

"Introducing The Communist" in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. II, p.289.

54

"After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan" in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. II, p.68.

55

Ibid.

56

See Zhunji wenxue, 1988, Vol.313, p.19.

#### Notes to Chapter V

1

"Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Bo Go, Ye Jianying zhi zhongyang zhengzhiju de dianbao" <Wang Ming, etc. telegram to the Politburo> December 21, 1937 in Zhou Enlai zhuan. p.394.

2

Geming huiyilu <Reminiscences of the Revolution> (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1982), No.4, p.144.

3

Zhuanji wenxue, 1988, No.313, p.19.

4

G. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, (New York: Institute for Public Relations Office, 1940), p.113.

5

The Fuxin Society was the name of the organization that the Blue-shirts belonged to. It had under it special secret

agent groups under Kang Ze and Dai Li.

6

Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Ye Jianying zhi Mao Zedong, Luo Fu dianbao <Wang Ming's telegram to Mao>, February 10, 1938

7

Xinhua ribao, March 12, 1938.

8

Lyman Van Slyke (ed), The Chinese Communist Movement (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p.63.

9

Yang Hansheng, Fengyu wushinian <Fifty Difficult Years> (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1979), p.193.

10

Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.396.

11

Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944 (Princeton, 1945), p.50.

12

Zhuanji wenxue , No.313. p.17.

13

Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, p.74.

14

Zhuanji wenxue, No. 313, p.17.

15

Cheng Siyuan, Zhengtan huiyi <Recollections of Political Events> (Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1983), p.116.

16

Reminiscences of Zhang Aiping, May, 1987.

17

Jin Cheng, Zhang Chong tongzhi rudang qianhou <Before and After Comrade Zhang Chong Joined the Party> (Beijing: Qingnian chubanshe, 1986), p.262.

18

He Jifeng was a brigade commander in the 29th Army and one of the well-known heroes during the Lugouqiao Incident. In 1948 he and another secret CCP member Zhang Kexia led the 59th and 77th Armies in revolt and were instrumental in bringing about the victory of the CCP forces during the first stage of the Huaihai Campaign. See Renmin ribao, January 8, 1983.

19

Zhuanji wenxue, No.313, p.20-21.

20

Photocopy of letter published in Zhuanji wenxue, No.313, p.24.

21

Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p.88.

22

Hsi-sheng Chi, Nationalist China at War, p.54.

23

Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.409-412.

24

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25

Ren Bishi, "Reminiscences of the War of Resistance in Shanxi" in Ren Bishi xuanji <Collected Works of Ren Bishi> (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987), p. 137.

26

Theodore White, Thunder Out of China (New York: 1946), p.253. Also See also "Mao Zedong zhi Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai de dianbao", April 29, 1937 in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.381.

27

Shum Kui-kwong, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, p.122.

28

Barbara Tuchman, Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970),



p.186. Also Frank Dorn, The Sino-Japanese War, p.185.

29

Junshi shilin <Historical Material on Military Affairs>  
(Beijing, 1987, March), p.5.

30

Chi Hsi-sheng, Nationalist China at War, p.50.

31

"Lunmuqian kangzhan xingshi" <On the Present situation in  
the War of Resistance> in Xinhua ribao, October 9, 1938.

32

Chi Hsi-sheng, Nationalist China at War, p.53.

33

Outline of speech at the Politburo of the CCP on August  
4, 1939 in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.433.

34

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II. p.136.

35

From confidential conversation

36

Chalmers A Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist  
Power (Stanford, 1961), p.57.

37

Jiang Jie, "Guanyu baituan dazhan wenti de tantao" <An  
Inquiry into the Hundred Regiment Campaign> in Jindaishi  
yanjiu, (Beijing, October, 1979), p.173.

38

Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution there has  
been considerable debate about the Hundred Regiment Campaign.  
Peng Dehuai, as Deputy Commander of the CCP forces, was  
criticized for launching the campaign. Mao, judging from the  
telegrams he sent to the CCP commanders, was skeptical about  
whether the campaign should be undertaken. Jurgen Domes' book  
Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image provides a more detailed  
account of this campaign.

- 39  
Junshi shilin, p.5.
- 40  
Zhuanji wenxue, No.214, p.69.
- 41  
Tetsuya Kataoka, Resistance and Revolution in China (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974), p.191.
- 42  
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Vol.I, p.222.
- 43  
Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, p.70.
- 44  
Ibid. See pp.130-142 for detailed account of CCP split with Yan Xishan.
- 45  
Jacques Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, (London: Methuen Ltd., 1968), p.352.
- 46  
Meng Guanghan, Guomin changzhenghui jishi <Record of Events at the PPC> (Chongqing, 1985) Vol. II, p.868.
- 47  
Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chaing Kai-shek, p.565.
- 48  
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume II, p.417.
- 49  
Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, p.151.
- 50  
"Role of the Chinese Communist Party" in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.II, p.204.
- 51  
Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, p.13-14.

52

"Interview with Chu Teh" in T.A. Bisson, Yenan in June 1937: Talks with the Communist Leaders, (Berkeley, 1973), p.30.

53

Zhongguo jindaishi <Modern Chinese History>(Beijing Normal University, 1983), p.169.

54

T.A. Bisson, Yenan in June 1937, p.32.

55

Industrial Cooperatives were organized by Rewi Alley, Edgar Snow and others. They planned to set up 30,000 such cooperatives in China and received support from both the CCP and the GMD. The headquarters of the Industrial Cooperatives was established in Hankou in August of 1938.

56

Jacques Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1949, p.361.

57

Ibid., p.363.

58

Benjamin Schwartz, Documentary History of the CCP: (Harvard, 1952), p.261.

59

James Sheridan, China in Disintegration (New York, 1975), p.225.

60

Ibid., p.259.

61

Zhongguo jindaishi <Modern Chinese History>, p.82.

62

The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, p.181.

63

"Zhou Enlai's Report to the Central Committee of the CCP on Talks with Jiang Jieshi" in Wannan shibian ziliao xuanji <Collection of Material on the Wannan Incident>, (Beijing:

Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1982), p.235.

64

Ibid. p.240.

65

Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.503.

#### Notes to Conclusion

1

See Zhou Enlai zhuan, p.396.

2

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.2, p.288.

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