CANADIAN THESES

THÈSES CANADIENNES

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

PARTY AND PROFESSION: SOVIET POLITICS AND THE OFFICER CORPS

BY

BRENT LAWRENSON BENNETT

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

IN

EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF SLAVIC AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1987

IBBN 0-315-37606-4

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: Brent Lawrenson Bennett

TITLE OF THESIS: Party and Profession: Soviet Politics and the Officer Corps.

DEGREE: Master of Arts

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1987

Permission is hereby given to THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific purposes only.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

Brent Bennett

(Student's signature)

302-17108-64 AVE

(Student's permanent address)

EDMONTON, AB. T5T-2C8

Date: 22 APRIL, 1987

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and reccommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled PARTY AND PROFESSION: SOVIET POLITICS AND THE OFFICER CORPS, submitted by BRENT LAWRENSON BENNETT in partial fulfilment for the degree MASTER OF ARTS in EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET STUDIES.

Mark E. Mote
Supervisor

Tova Yedlin

Date: 21 April 1987

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my wife Susan, my parents Lyle and Doreen, and my family.

Abstract

This thesis is an analysis of the relationship between the Soviet military officers and the political leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There are three major parts in this work. After the introduction, the second chapter reviews the general discussion as to the nature of the Soviet political system. The third chapter, the keystone section in this thesis, covers the history of the officer corps, the Soviet defense structure, and Soviet military thought. There is also a discussion of the various theories regarding civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. The fourth chapter consists of an analysis of three cases of potential or actual Soviet military intervention: Czechoslovakia, 1968, Afghanistan 1979, and Poland 1980-81. There is also a brief summary in which several important issues are outlined and certain conclusions made as to the best method to use in approaching the subject of the Soviet military and its role in the political system.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Prof. M. Mote for his support and guidance in both my studies and the work on this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. T. Yedlin for her help and encouragement during the course of my studies. In addition, this paper could not have been possible without the generous support of Dr. R.L. Busch or the Department of Slavic and East European Studies, and I am grateful for their efforts on my behalf. Finally, I wish to extend my thanks and appreciation to the departmental secretaries - Janet Rebalkin, Doreen Hawryshko, and Jean Williams - who tolerated my many questions and my haunting presence at the department computers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the decision-making process involved in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, and more specifically the role played by the Soviet military establishment. It is important for western scholars to study the Soviet political system in hopes of understanding and responding properly to Soviet foreign policies because the USSR is one of the superpowers capable of creating a nuclear holocaust, a primary reason to accurately assess Soviet policy and its implications. Objectively, beyond just the nuclear consideration, there are other facts that make the Soviet Union a priority for study in the international sphere. The landmass of the USSR covers one-sixth of that on the globe, with the nation physically a part of several regions: Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The Soviets have a wealth of national resources and a population numbering approximately 270 million people and the largest standing military establishment in the world, so a study of Soviet foreign policy is necessary not only because of its nuclear arsenal but also

for its strategic power and position.

The idea of studying all, or even most, aspects of Soviet foreign policy with any depth is beyond the scope of this thesis. The alternative is to offer several theories regarding Soviet foreign policy, and then identify an element within the decision-making process as the key subject of study. The Soviet military establishment was selected as the topic of study for several reasons. It consists of a large number of uniformed members, which represent the largest such institution in the world, an establishment that affects many sectors of Soviet society from the social fabric to the economic system. The fact that they are uniformed and occupy a key role in society, the officer corps is easier to identify as a separate area of study within the Soviet system. The professional nature of their mission is the protection of the Soviet Motherland and the furthering of national interests abroad, both of which are the highest priorities of the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Thus, it can be assumed that the military establishment is important to the making of Soviet foreign policy when questions of national

security are involved. It is relatively easy to assess Soviet combat capabilities as opposed to determining the domestic influence of the Soviet military because there is a more objective data base for a study of the armed forces *per se* : numbers of tanks and ships, divisions, missile silos, Soviet articles on tactics and doctrine and so on. But this thesis will attempt to gauge the extent to which the top Soviet officers influence decision-making in foreign policy, and in so doing shed some light on the policy process as a whole.

There are several facts that make any study of the Soviet Union difficult. The nature of the foreign policy process is a complex field of study when applied to the the structure of any government, but a study of the Soviet political system is comparably more difficult because of the information system in the USSR. Basically, the nature of the domestic political structure ensures that no official source of information is permitted to exist independent and outside of the state. This is applied to all types of information flows, including the media, academic institutions, tourism, radio and television stations, and publishing houses. The state apparatus, in turn, is supervised by

the CPSU organization the form of official censors and party members in the information sectors, backed by the potential intervention of agencies such as the KGB. Although the nature and efficiency of party controls over information flows is still debated in the west, it must be said that all legal sources of information emanating from the USSR have been subjected to official censorship.

The government and CPSU members themselves exhibit a traditional Russian preoccupation with secrecy and a deep mistrust of foreigners seeking information about the USSR. The most elemental facts pertaining to the political process are often witheld from foreign observers and most Soviet citizens, such as the existence of certain CPSU or state institutions, the names of individuals responsible for committees and institutions, or the policies and responsibilities of the political agencies in question. The CPSU does not publish minutes of their meetings, and neither the state nor the party hold hearings that are open to the Soviet public. One western journalist, Hedrick Smith, has written about the "White TASS" system in which the Soviet state publishes different sets of information on

the same subject, with the information made available for the general public being falsified to suit the party, while the most accurate publications are reserved for top state and party officials.[1] There is a strictly stratified information system that limits hard facts to the ruling elite and leaves western observers and most Soviet citizens with a questionable base of information.

One must also recognize the cultural differences that exist between the Russians and the peoples of the west. Policy and politics are not drawn out of a vacuum but are rather the product of society. Morton Schwartz sounded a warning which is worth repeating here as a general caution for any field of study that involves an analysis of a foreign country.

> Though each nation shares some features of its outlook with others, the particular "mix" which constitutes its political personality or character is distinctive. This is quite natural since the forces which shape it . . . are varied and complex . . .Many people tend to view other nations as but quaint foreign versions of themselves. We tend to believe, unconsciously, that the assumptions and values of our own society are both natural and universal; other peoples and their leaders are seen to be much like our own . . . Other political systems are assumed to share

the same norms as we do.[2]

A Canadian wishing to study the Soviet system has to acknowledge that there are cultural problems inherent to such a study and avoid the pitfalls of judging the system according to our values or assuming certain Canadian political characteristics and processes as being applicable to Soviet society.

With these cautionary notes in mind, the objective of the first chapter is to examine the wide variety of opinion regarding the nature of the Soviet domestic political system. For the sake of cohesion and organization, the various models discussed in this chapter will be placed in three very broad categories of Soviet domestic political theory: Soviet official views, the totalitarian model, and interest group theory. The strengths and weaknesses of each theory will be examined to narrow down the definitions and ascertain the major points of contention between the three major models.

End Notes

[1] Hedrick Smith; The Russians (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976), pp. 459-504.

[2] Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, Ca. : Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 71-72.

II. SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

> . . . the thing that is so extraordinary about the [post-Stalin] Soviet system is the fact that the individual segments of the power elite, which include the economic bureaucracy, the army officer corps, the police, and the political-administrative bureaucracy, and all are united in a single organization - the Communist party. Consequently, each group surrenders some of its independence to the party, but they gain a share in the absolute monopoly power of the party. This constitutes the basis of the systemic strength of the party . . . The conflict between various groups in this system amounts to a conflict for influence <u>within</u> the party, but not a conflict <u>with</u> the party.
>
> Zdenek Mlynar,
> a former member of the
> Czech Politburo, as quoted in
> Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F.
> Laird, eds., <u>The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era</u> (New York:
> Aldine Publishing Co., 1984),
> p. 107.

Official Soviet View

Soviet writers have traced the roots of modern Soviet society back to the October Revolution of 1917, which witnessed the

ascension to power of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin and his Bolshevik Party in Petrograd. It is the specific contention of Soviet scholars that the history of Russia before 1917 has no real bearing on the current makeup of Soviet society or the political process of the state. The advent of communist rule in Russia, according to the popularized official theory, eradicated the entire structure of tsarist absolutism and eliminated all traces of the Old Russian legacy. The revolution paved the way for the creation of a unique and radically different social structure in which there was no class conflict and an absence of a small, propertied class exploiting the masses.[1] The elimination of privately owned property meant that for the first time in history the resources and wealth of the state were publicly owned and operated for the benefit of all the people in society.

The Soviet view of their history and the nature of their political system are both ideologically based. Within the USSR, it is also the duty and the scientific right of the CPSU to lead society and determine the correct policies. The CPSU comprises the professional

political party that represents the interests of the masses, including both social classes of Soviet society (workers and the peasants). The party is the elected agency representing all Soviet citizens because all class conflict in the USSR has been eliminated. The abolition of private ownership of the means of production and the elimination of capitalism have left the wealth and resources of the land in the hands of the masses (who in turn are represented by the party). The party is charged with interpreting the Marxist-Leninist ideology and is entrusted with the task of furthering the construction of socialism in the USSR and in the international arena. This reasoning is used to legitimize the fact that the CPSU is the only political party in the USSR, since the ideology precludes any other political theory or party from truly representing the people. The Soviet Union can therefore be described in Soviet literature as being a democratic nation despite the fact that there exists only a single political party in the system .

The CPSU is seen by official Soviet writers and theorists as a party based upon the ideals of "democratic centralism", whereby the

leadership of the party is responsive and responsible to the party rank-and-file while at the same time the membership is duty bound to obey the leadership when party policy is formalised. A Soviet source described the leadership of the CPSU and its relation to the party as a whole.

> The main principle of the party's work is the Leninist principle of collective leadership [original emphasis], conclusively confirmed by the Party Programme and Rules. This principle stems from the very essence of the Party, which is not an administrative organization but a voluntary union of fellow-thinkers united by a common aim, association, and responsibility. Only relying on the principle of collective leadership can one properly direct and develop the constantly growing creative energy and activity of the people.[2]

The party is viewed as being both democratic in nature and hierarchical in structure, which is a contradiction in terms but nevertheless is said to exist because the CPSU members understand the scientific laws of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and hence the membership can retain a cohesive unity. The conclusion is that the party combines the advantages of complete unity and democracy.

In the Marxist vision of the ideal communist system, there is

no official role of a political party nor a state apparatus in society because Marx envisioned a spontaneous revolution on the part of the masses followed by the complete withering away of the oppressive state services. Lenin himself justified the role of a professional political party of revolutionaries to spark the revolution and lead the people because Lenin was pessimistic about the revolutionary consciousness of the masses and their ability to defeat the oppressive ruling class. The Bolshevik leaders believed that the success of the revolution in Russia would lead to the establishment of socialism on a global scale, creating a world in which national states would no longer exist. This mentality is perfectly summed up in Trotsky's famous statement that as head of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs he would simply " . . . issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the people of the world and then shut up shop."[3] The failure of the communist revolution to spread to any other nation in the twenties forced the party to retain and even strengthen the powers of the state apparatus to survive the rigours of the Russian

Civil War and reconcile themselves to the continued existence of capitalist societies, an occurrence not accounted for in the Marxist-Leninist scheme.

It was left to Joseph Stalin as general secretary of the CPSU in the twenties to offer the theory of "socialism in one country," the idea that socialism could exist in a single nation and serve as an interim solution while awaiting the collapse of capitalism in the world. This meant that true communism, with the withering away of the state, would only occur after the hostile capitalist societies had become socialist, and until such time the party was forced to retain the state apparatus to protect the "gains of October" and defend the socialist motherland. The state apparatus was a temporary necessity to prevent its elimination or subversion by capitalist powers surrounding the USSR. The party retains full power over the existing state apparatus to provide the proper guidance in the development of socialism and as protectors of the nation and the interests of the masses.

> The Communist Party works out a single political line to be pursued in every sphere of the country's life and conducts the organizational, ideological work for its realization in practice. The Party effects its leadership through the system of government and public organizations. It unites their efforts, co-ordinates their activities towards a definite end. It is precisely through the state bodies and numerous public organizations that the Party is connected with millions of working people. It both teaches the masses and learns from them, generalising their rich, versatile experience. Together with the people and the state the Party tackles most important problems involved in the guidance of society and the construction of communism.[4]

The CPSU is maintained to play an active and instrumental role in Soviet society, and by its nature the CPSU exercises this role in a benevolent and responsible fashion as representatives of all Soviet citizens. Its decrees are not legally binding but are morally binding because of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, hence party members must 'persuade' their fellow citizens (in the state and public realms) as to the merits of the party decrees. They must be quite persuasive, as no party recommendation has ever been rejected by any state organ, so that while the theoretic aspects of the relationship have been

debated, the *de facto* results are quite apparent.[5]

As mentioned above, the official Soviet view stresses the unique ability of the party to follow a policy of "democratic centralism" within its structure. It is important to detail the party structure at this point and determine the process of decision making within the CPSU, according to the Soviet sources. The basic unit of the party structure are the Primary Party Organizations (PPO), which are formed in any organization (state or party) consisting of at least three party members. The members of the PPO approve the appointment of their own party secretary for the PPO in question and who will hold office at the next highest party level in the CPSU hierarchy (the *raikom* or *gorkom* party organization). This process is repeated at each tier of the structure, hence members of the Party Congresses are sent every five years to Moscow by party organizations at the provincial (*oblast'*) level, and those party members attending the congress elect the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Central Committee is the most prestigious body in Soviet

political literature and is made up of approximately 500 party officials, but it only meets formally twice a year; and a smaller group of members are elected to serve as the Politburo of the Central Committee (an election that is also held during the Party Congress).

The Politburo has usually consisted of ten to twenty of the top party officials who are entrusted with handling the day to day affairs of the party and meet on a weekly basis. The Soviets as a rule have not given details regarding the nature of Politburo proceedings, and are also reluctant to comment on the role played by the CPSU Secretariat. The Secretariat is another small group of party members (comparable in numbers to the Politburo) headed by the General Secretary, some members of which serve in the Politburo (the General Secretary is always a member of both party organs). The Secretariat members are responsible for the supervision of the Central Committee departments, known as the *apparat*, departments which cover a wide range of party and state concerns from ideology to the economy and foreign policy. The Soviets emphasize the role of the

Central Committee in the process, but for the purposes of this thesis it can be assumed that there are three crucial party organs in the decision-making process under the heading of Central Party Organs; the Politburo, the Secretariat and the departments of the Central Committee. The official Soviet literature clearly indicates that power flows from the bottom to the top in the form of party elections at each tier of the structure, but simultaneously power also flows down the structure in the form of binding party decrees upon party and the state. Although centralist abuses have been noted by some Soviet writers, especially in regards to the Stalinist years, the concept of democratic centralism is still commonly viewed in the Soviet literature as the pillar of the Soviet political system.[6]

Totalitarian Model

In the west, there is currently a wide spectrum of opinion among experts regarding the nature of the Soviet political system and the role of the CPSU in society. The totalitarian model was the

earliest and most comprehensive model offered by scholars in the post-war era to describe the Soviet political system. The term 'totalitarian' was originally used by the Italian Fascist party of Benito Mussolini in the early 1920's, but was given greater emphasis and definition three decades later by writers such as Hannah Arendt, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski.[7] The major thrust of these early works on totalitarianism was a comparison of the single, mass party systems in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. Friedrich and Brzezinski used the study of these three systems to compile the six basic pillars or characteristics that make up a 'syndrome' identifying the essential features of totalitarian power:

> (1) An official ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere . . .
>
> (2) A single mass party led typically by one man, the "dictator", and consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total population (up to ten per cent) of men and women . . . such a party being hierarchically organized and typically superior to or completely intertwined with bureaucratic government.

> (3) A system of terroristic police controls, supporting but also supervising the party for its leaders . . .
>
> (4) A technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control in the hands of the party and its subservient cadres, of all means of effective mass communication such as the press, radio, motion pictures;
>
> (5) A similarly technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control (in the same hands) of all means of effective armed combat;
>
> (6) A central control and direction of the entire economy . . .

Totalitarianism was identified as a political phenomenom unique to the twentieth-century because of the impact made on society by the fusion of official state ideologies and modern technological systems available to the governors. Repressive, autocratic regimes of other eras do have one or more of the six elements of totalitarianism, but none can match all six as described above.[8] The greatest differentiation was identified in technological terms, and it was noted that the effectiveness of four elements of the totalitarian model are conditioned by technology (system of terroristic police

control, monopoly of control of mass communication, monopoly of control of weapons, monopoly of control of the economy).[9]

Historically, many scholars emphasizing the continuity between Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. The October Revolution is not viewed as a break from the past as it is depicted in the Soviet literature. The emphasis on the tsarist legacy not confined solely to proponents of the totalitarian model, nor is it intrinsic to that political theory. Nevertheless, many scholars have linked aspects of the historical legacy of Tsarist Russia to elements in the totalitarian rule of the CPSU. Brzezinski stated that "(s)oviet politics cannot be separated from Russian history."[10]

There are many aspects to the complex and elusive debate as to the degree of influence Russian history has had on the Soviet political system, but suffice it to say that the basic element linking the two regimes is autocracy. The numerous invasions of the Russian heartland by foreigners since the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century has necessitated a strong, central authority capable of

retaining a large standing army and having the power to mobilize all the resources of the state to repel foreign intrusions. The tradition of a powerful single ruler in the expanding state of Muscovy was entrenched by Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible), Peter I (Peter the Great) and Nicholas I (Nicholas the Cudgel). Most of the inspiration or impetus for change in Russia came from the top, and one of the most significant events in this pattern was Peter the Great's attempt to modernize Russia, which led to the creation of a vast state bureaucracy in which the wealth and privileges of the ruling class were dependent not upon personal holdings or heritage but upon appointment to state positions by the tsar; in essence, a service nobility. The central authority was progressively strengthened to the point where one author felt that the power exercised by later tsars bordered on totalitarianism.

> In the early years of the twentieth century, the imperial government carried out experimentally certain policies which overstepped the boundaries of the police regime and moved into the even more sinister realm of totalitarianism . . . . Yet when all is said and done, it would be difficult to maintain that

> imperial Russia was a full-blown police state; it was rather a forerunner, a rough prototype of such a regime, which fell far short of its full potential. [11]

The implication is that the Russian penchant for an autocratic ruler, a strong, centralized state apparatus and stringent policy control did not end in 1917, but rather these traditions were carried on by leaders of the CPSU, who strengthened these lines of development with the aid of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and modern technology. Brzezinski felt that social conditions which existed in 1917 further accentuated this process.

> The adaptation of Marxism to Russia accordingly took place in a context that was bound to emphasize the authoritarian and dogmatic aspects of Marxism. That it took place at a time of accelerating change in Russia, of the first pangs of the industrial revolution, and of increased political suppression, which came in the wake of unsuccessful populist terrorism, further tended to prompt more Manichaean, simplistic, and autocratic expressions among those who dedicated themselves to destroy the old for the sake of the new.[12]

This line of argument is further extended by scholars who state that totalitarianism is not just the product of an autocratic dictator such as Stalin, but is intrinsic to the Marxist ideology and/or the

nature of the Communist Party as founded by Lenin. Kolakowski noted that Marxism " . . . was repeatedly attacked in the nineteenth century, expecially by anarchist writers, as a program for unabashed state tyranny. Historical developments perfectly bore out this assessment."[13] While historically other despotic regimes did not attempt to control all aspects of society, Marxism as an ideology postulated that the state must attempt to control society to guide it to perfection. The conclusion is that " . . . modern totalitarianism is inseparably linked with the history of socialist ideas and movements."[14]

The emphasis given to Russian history in many totalitarian models has a definite impact on the most crucial aspect of our discussion, mainly the nature of the CPSU and its relationship to the rest of Soviet society. The party, as indicated given above in the definition of a totalitarian state, is seen as a centralized and hierarchically organized structure, within which power flows from the apex (the central party organs, headed by the General Secretary)

down to the PPO's. The party is not a democratic institution. All officials "elected" or recommended to key party positions at any level are actually appointed by higher CPSU departments. A key element in the General Secretary's maintenance of personal power is this ability to determine party appointments and staffing of important positions by placing a reliable client as the head of departments in the Secretariat.

A further extension of this principle is evident in the *nomenklatura* system.

> . . . *all* [original emphasis] important positions in the Soviet Union - whether in the party, the government, the military, the trade unions, the press, agriculture, science, education, or the world of the arts - are subject to the so-called *nomenklatura* system. The term *nomenklatura* refers to a list of key positions, the appointments to which are directly or indirectly controlled by the secretariats of the CPSU at the various levels of the political and territorial-administrative structure of the Soviet system . . . Through its exclusive or joint control over the personnel appointed to all key positions in Soviet society via the basic and the registration and control *nomenklatura* , the CPSU has gained a preponderant institutional advantage.[15]

The General Secretary, as a member of the Politburo and the Secretariat, ultimately has the power to supervise the CPSU departments and hence the cadre constituency as well. While the system is no longer the terroristic dictatorship of Stalin, the Soviet system remains totalitarian because " . . . no [original emphasis] truly important decision is made without the knowledge, let alone against the wish, of the leader. It is equally important to realize that while not all decisions are made by the supreme leader, all could [original emphasis] have been made by him."[16]

The conclusions as to the nature of the system also indicates the role of the elite in relation to the rest of society. The Politburo and the Secretariat, headed by the general secretary , with control of the *nomenklatura* system, can shape the nature of the elite in the party and the state and perpetuate its rule. This had led some scholars to the conclusion that a new ruling class or elite has arisen, separate from the mainstream of Soviet society.

> As defined by Roman law, property constitutes the use, enjoyment and disposition of material goods. The

> Communist political bureaucracy uses, enjoys, and disposes of national property. If we assume that membership in this bureaucracy or new owning class is predicated on the use of privileges inherent in ownership - in this instance nationalized material goods - then membership in the new party class, or political bureaucracy, is reflected in a larger income in material goods and privileges than society should normally grant for such functions. In practice, the ownership privilege of the new class manifests itself as an exclusive right, as a party monopoly, for the political bureaucracy to distribute the national income, to set wages, to direct economic development, and dispose of nationalized and other property . . . Now that the party has consolidate its power, party membership means that one belongs to a privileged class. And at the core of the party are the all powerful exploiters and masters . . . [17]

This passage represents an important aspect of the totalitarian model, with the leadership forming a classic ruling class along the lines originally used by Marx to define the bourgeoisie.

The state apparatus itself is supervised by the party, partially staffed by party members, and is subject to the party Secretariat for promotions and appointments. In short, the state is but an arm of the party, and the *apparatchiki* owe their loyalties to the party above any professional responsibilities. The state in turn encompasses all

public activity in the country through ownership of communication, the economy and the coercive capabilities of the security organizations and the extensive system of informants.

The totalitarian model usually denies the existence of any real political power outside the central party organs of the CPSU. The homogenity of the party membership as the elite of society and the social benefits of their status allows the party to eventually present a unified line on any policy in the USSR and hence to leave no political alternative in Soviet society. In fact, party unity is the crux of a totalitarian system and " . . . in modern conditions social and political control of the masses has become much easier - provided always that there is no split in the ruling stratum. This is the one mortal danger facing the system."[18]

The totalitarian model confirms the strength of the party and the leadership, and allots it a dominant role in setting policy. Any policy discussions take place only within the party, and this discussion often centers not as much on general objectives but rather

on the tactics and timing that will bring the best results. The discussions are conducted to obtain a consensus and are carefully screened from the remainder of Soviet society. The power in this system originates almost solely in the party leadership and flows down the structure from top to bottom. Policy is determined by the General Secretary and his Politburo collegues and carried out by the state and party apparatus.

Alternative Models

Ironically, as the original totalitarian theory of Soviet politics was being given scholarly definition, an event occurred that gave impetus to alternative theories. The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, followed by Khrushchev's stunning denunciation of Stalin as a tyrant and murderer three years later in the famous "secret speech", led some observers to question the continued utility of the totalitarian model in the post-Stalin version of Soviet society. The various alternative models often represented a combination of criticisms of

the totalitarian model as put forward in the fifties and early sixties, the new style of leadership exhibited by Khrushchev, and a growing movement towards comparing political systems and arriving at common (if salient) characteristics of all policy making processes. Several approaches were adopted to challenge the totalitarian model and identify the changes in post-Stalinist society, but for the purposes of this paper we shall examine the most prominent of the alternative theories as advanced by authors such as H. Gordon Skilling, Franklyn Griffiths, Jerry Hough and Stephen Cohen.

One of the earliest and most comprehensive alternative arguments was put forward by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths in the early seventies.[19] Their studies of the Soviet Union following the "secret speech" in 1956 led them to believe that a fundamental change had indeed occurred in the pattern and substance of Soviet politics. The totalitarian model was rejected in favour of the interest group theory of Soviet society. Power was not seen to be concentrated solely at the apex of the CPSU, but was diffused down

through several layers of the system. The decisions produced by the leadership in the USSR were partially shaped by competition between various groups representing widely disparate interests in society, a process in which the party performed as an arbitrator of internal disputes.

The interest group theory as an approach to political analysis was derived from the writings of the American political scientist Arthur Bentley, who worked early in the twentieth century, and who embarked on the creation of a domestic political model that would more accurately reflect the American political process as distinct from the rigidly class oriented politics of Europe.[20] The model postulated that groups of interdependent men with similar outlooks and interests organized with the intention of influencing the political process to suit their aims. The government structure served primarily as an arena which defined the means by which interest groups could compete and interact. Once the interaction had produced a policy, that policy would be implemented by the responsible

government agencies. The interest groups represented active domestic political actors, while the government served as a passive framework for their activities.

The theory of interest group politics was revived and modified in the fifties by David B. Truman.[21] Truman defined an interest group as a set of individuals with one or more sets of shared attitudes attempting to modify or set government policy and that " . . . the existence of a political interest group is said to require a minimum frequency of interaction amongst its members."[22] Truman's model was an attempt to assess and define the process of American domestic politics, but scholars such as Skilling and Griffiths thought that such a study could be applied to the post-Stalinist structure of Soviet politics. Skilling divided the interest group model into two broad categories of groups: " occupational groups" (such as intellectual groups - writers, economists, lawyers, natural scientists - or official and/or bureaucratic groups - *apparatchiki*, KGB, or military) and "opinion groups" (persons within a single given

occupation who have a distinguishable viewpoint of their own, i.e., liberal, centrist, or conservative).[23] Skilling added that these classifications were not mutually exclusive and that it was likely that there existed a complex web of subgroups and overlap between these above-mentioned categories.[24] In the Soviet case, Skilling altered Truman's definition of an interest group and narrowed the basis of a group by maintaining that such a group could only be recognized if it expressed its attitudes and articulated its claims on the government structure and called for a certain action or policy (i.e. a "demand" group). The emphasis was shifted from Truman's concept of shared characteristics in an interest group towards the "common attitudes" and "claims" of a politically active group.[25] Skilling defined this by stating that " . . . (I)t is only when a common attitude, associated with, but not identical to, a common characteristic, leads to an expressed common claim that a 'political interest group' may be said to exist."[26]

The political groups were said to play a distinctly secondary

role in the Soviet political process because the USSR remained dominated by a highly centralized party which controlled the key elements of power in the state. Moreover, the status and influence of these political groups is not necessarily comparable, as those with greater access to the ruling Politburo (i.e., the military or the KGB) have a better opportunity to present their case directly. Nonetheless, the political groups ensure that the " . . . Soviet decision-making process is thus to some degree pluralistic . . . ," with " . . . several points of access or channels of possible influence in the various departments of government and sections of the party *apparat* ."[27] The military groups will attempt to influence the Minister of Defense, the judges and lawyers will deal with the Minister of Justice, and so forth. These groups will also attempt to present their views through newspapers and journals with editors sympathetic to their cause, as well as prevailing upon supporters in the state bureaucracies and party organs such as the Central Committee to advance policy preferences and eventually influence the leadership to a degree,

either through forcing the agenda or gaining their policy preference. Skilling stated that the system remained authoritarian, with political groups as defined above able to express policy preferences and have an impact on policy making.

> Policy-making, accordingly, more and more takes place within a context of sharp group conflict. Political groups may interpose their own viewpoints, presenting alternative policies for consideration, and endorsing, criticizing, or sometimes resisting, the carrying out of policies already resolved upon. Although interest groups seldom possess constitutional or even practical sanctions to enforce their views on the topmost leaders, they may on occasion succeed in influencing the ultimate decision or in blocking its implementation. [28]

The major focus is not on social groups in Soviet society but on the intermediate political actors in the state, party and professional ranks. The interest groups that could affect the upper levels of leadership are not class-oriented in the traditional sense.

An offshoot of the interest group theory was the study of individual Soviet leaders and their personal ties to different aspects of the state bureaucracy, an approach that emphasized the presence

of 'pyramids' or 'family circles' as the hallmark of the political system. The members of the Soviet elite are said to have many patron-client relationships, a single patron having a group of associates drawn from personal contacts when the patron held offices at lower levels of the party and state machinery. As the patron rises through the structure, he brings along these trusted associates, often gaining a wider circle of clients as he moves up to higher office. In turn, these clients develop their own 'pyramids'. The study of these personal groups is a complex matter in its own right, and while no doubt the clash of personalities and factions plays a role in the political process, it is almost impossible to accurately follow the course of factional infighting among the Soviet elite. To give this model a primary place in the study of Soviet politics would give " . . . the appearance of Oriental court politics, the power implications for one's faction determining the policy position one took and the relative strength of the factions determining the outcome."[29] This aspect of Soviet politics is better

discussed in conjunction with or within the framework of specific cases.

The course of Soviet politics in the seventies failed to confirm the interest group theories developed a decade earlier. It was clear that the "intellectual" groups described by Skilling had little impact on the policy making process. Brezhnev embarked upon a policy of detente with the United States in the field of foreign policy, but simultaneously enhanced the powers of the KGB (headed by Iurii Andropov) and mounted a widespread domestic crackdown on intellectual dissent in the Soviet Union. The KGB did not have to resort to a Stalinist "terror purge" in its campaign against the intelligentsia and yet it succeeded in shattering the movement and any ideas of instituting reforms of the domestic political system.

The events served to highlight the other remaining aspect of the interest group theory: the 'bureaucratic' groups. The bureaucratic theory has proven to have a greater attraction. The general theory is that to function properly, an industrially advanced

and modernizing society requires a bureaucratic structure to supervise and co-ordinate activities in the state by representing or identifying the various aspects and interests clamouring for attention and priority. In turn, these bureaucratic departments became an integral part of the political process and would become domestic political actors in their own right. As a large industrial superpower with a vast bureaucracy, the Soviet Union, was theorized to be a subject of bureaucratic political theory developed for other non-totalitarian systems. In a sense, the bureaucratic theory is a major element in the comparative politics school, as the bureaucratic oriented study is seen as being the best common approach to link characteristics of the Soviet political system with other systems. The course and basis of comparative politics in general cannot be adequately discussed here, but the model currently represents the primary alternative to the totalitarian theories of Soviet politics.

This model retained the idea of the party as a power broker

whose function is to mediate the clash of powerful interest groups with vested interests, but narrows the scope to a few at the apex of the government and party pyramids. As alluded to before, these vested interests were confined to entrenched groups within the bureaucracy (party and state), usually at the level of the Central Committee (or the ministries) and above. Jerry Hough offered the notion that a rough comparison could be made between the procedures in the Central Committee and in the various parliaments of western democracies. The executive has no formal restiction on policy setting, there is no written constitution to frame the actions of the cabinet or Politburo, but there exists and 'unwritten' constitution which has evolved over the years from precedents set by previous governments and rulers. While there is only one political party in the USSR, Hough inferred that there may be an unwritten code of conduct regarding procedures, responsibilities and restraints amongst the Soviet elite. [30] No official factions exist in the Central Committee, since the formation of such groupings was outlawed in

1921, but there is a spectrum of varying interests within the Central Committee formed around issue "whirlpools". The idea was drawn from Franklyn Griffiths' theory of tendency articulation, whereby bureaucratic individuals from several differenct departments will develop a common or shared attitude over an issue facing the state, and work together to try and gain the support of key members in the central party organs (the issue becomes a "whirlpool" that will attract interested elements in the bureaucracy). For example, an issue in the field of legalizing small entrepeneurial operations among the population at large would perhaps draw in like-minded officials from areas such as the light industry departments or ministries, GOSPLAN, the trade unions, legal services, the lawyers and the judiciary. Competition would then develop between this "whirlpool" and others (i.e. a "whirlpool" with security minded officials calling for a crackdown on black-market activities) for the attention and political support of the party members in the Central Party Organs.[31]

Griffiths was more expansive than Hough in this interpretation, stating that issues could involve different intermediate and elite levels, such as defense and light industry representatives vying for support and thus giving the debate wider scope. The operative indicator would be the nature of the issue at hand rather than competing priorities between established bureaucratic groups.[32] But ultimately there was a kind of consensus amongst the bureaucratic or comparative political scientists was summed up by Alexander Dallin.

> All this [discussion] underscores the need to recognize the existence of multiple sources of cleavage and alignment in Soviet politics and society . . .[33]

But there were recognized limits to this statement.

> It is clear that there are such elements of initiative and individual choice in the Soviet system. They appear to be growing. On the other hand, it seems that such practices are not yet widespread and there is no information about their effect, if any.[34]

Most recent writers devote little attention to the impact of Russian history or the Marxist ideology on the formation of the Soviet

political system, but in general little weight is placed on the inherited Russian political culture or the usefulness of the ideology as a key to Soviet foreign policy. Dallin noted that there were certain characteristics reminiscent of the Tsarist regime, but pointed out that for each trend inherited from Russian history there also existed counter-trends. In conclusion, placed little faith in a historical or ideological foundation for the current Soviet system, a point rejected by other scholars such as Karen Dawisha.[35]

Stephen Cohen, in his book Rethinking the Soviet Experience, approached the historical argument from a completely different angle. Cohen's basic premise is that there are friends and foes of change in the CPSU and that the schism can be traced back to the critical debates of the twenties. Cohen personalized the split in the form of Stalin and Bukharin, with Stalin forcing massive industrial growth on the nation (over the protests of Bukharin and other Old Bolsheviks) and creating the new class of managers and professionals drawn from the peasantry, who were determined to preserve the economic and

social system that grew out of the initial five-year plans. Others, following the Bukharin philosophy of balanced allocation of resources to both the industrial and agricultural sectors, are currently seen as attempting to alter and modernize the system to achieve a balanced economy. Cohen postulated that the debates between the two groups was stifled during the terror of Stalin's rule; but it re-emerged during the Khrushchev thaw and, barring a return to a blood purge, the debate will continue.[36] This is a historical argument that supports the 'left versus the right' dichotomy within the Communist spectrum of policy. Alexander Dallin claimed that signs of this dichotomy have been apparent since 1917 and that individuals within the elite have tended to favour one approach over the other. The factions are not permanent but form upon specific issues, with the left being the reformers and modernizers while the right is represented by party officials concerned with stability and consensus-building.[37] The major conclusion is that there are two general traditions of political thought within the Soviet elite which are capable of transcending

party discipline.

Conclusion

This coverage of the debates on the nature of the Soviet political system illustrates some aspects of the arguments put forth for the last four decades. When dealing with a subject as complex as political theory and power, definitive conclusions remain elusive, even in the western world where there are more data and information soureces available.

It would perhaps be easier to summarize a platform upon which most western scholars would agree and then proceed to areas of contention. The Soviet Union is at the very least an authoritarian system within which a small ruling elite in Moscow (no lower than the Central Committee / Ministry level) have a dominant position in ruling Soviet society. The CPSU, as an organization, has the most political power in the system, which is noteworthy for its capacity to operate behind a screen of censorship (state-, and self-imposed), an

army of secret police and beyond the scrutiny of its own citizens. No official alternatives to the CPSU are allowed to exist, and official groups or factions are not permitted within the party. The government system is perhaps the most centralized ever known to man and a remarkable achievement for such a geographically massive nation. The rulers represent the most conservative of domestic politician as a group, and with a rigorous party discipline one of the most cohesive organizations to be found in the world.

Any variations from the party line would be farther to the right relative to many other countries, as Jerry Hough noted in his studies.

> One suspects that the best - and most usual - strategy for a political hopeful, especially one at the middle levels of the Soviet system, would be to refrain from policy controversy or even a policy stance and try to acquire the stance of a sound and progressive moderate as those terms would be defined by the Soviet establishment.[38]

The link between the elite and the masses is one where the population is generally acknowleged as playing at best a secondary role in policy decisions, and often described as having only passive influence.

Alexander Dallin, while noting the divisions in the elite, also gave this appreciation of the capabilities of the Soviet rulers.

> . . . of all political systems, the Soviet seems most likely to and most able to override, ignore, or distort what might otherwise or elsewhere be identified as natural of secular trends.[39]

The above information is merely a reference framework. It seems fair to conclude that domestic political friction does exist within the Soviet system be it superficial or fundamental; its scope and intensity can be debated but not its presence (hence this study can be considered a rejection of orthodox Soviet political theories as put forward earlier in this chapter). The example of Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 is irrefutable evidence that even the most powerful position has some political limitations in the exercise of power However, it could be stated that Khrushchev's ouster was a unique occurrence, much as the resignation of President Nixon a decade later could be considered an extraordinary event not indicative of the usual American political process, but the result was the same in that both leaders had incurred powerful domestic opposition by overstepping

their powers. In any event, most theories do not suggest that any society that is completely totalitarian and free of opposition or conflict.

This leads us to another important point. The Soviet reality cannot be ascribed to an extreme interpretation of any of the above models. The totalitarian model does not posit the complete power of the General Secretary, and has been criticized by the caveat that " . . . it is impossible for one man, even the most efficient and hardworking leader, to control every aspect of life in a big country."[40] But the criticism led to a more realistic interpretation of the totalitarian theory, noted above by scholars such as Walter Lacqueur, who went on to say that " (t)here is no justification for calling society pluralistic simply because some of the leaders may disagree."[4]

The original criticism of the totalitarian model still remains valid to this day and pertains to the controversy over the nature of the elite and the Soviet policy process: the original totalitarian model was not a useful guide to the policy process, and this point was

identified by authors such as Roman Kolkowicz:

> It is as if some immaculate conception had occurred after the October Revolution, and a wondrous, conflict-free harmonious system of institutions and bureaucracies had materialized in the Soviet Union . . . the boundary between state, society, and the individual is rather ambigious in a country where the ruling elite subscribe to a modern Hobbesian concept of *kto-kogo* [who-whom], and suspicion and terror are institutionalized.[42]

As for interest group theories, there remains the ever-present danger of transferring western values or political assumptions to a completely different culture such as the one that exists in the USSR. Franklyn Griffiths himself noted the major weakness in an interest group theory:

> . . . since most of the interaction is not visible to the foreign observer, it is virtually impossible to demonstrate that it in fact occurs. Thus, the use of analytic group concepts would have to take largely for granted that which is most vital to the enterprise: the existence of the "group" under investigation.[43]

This warning can and should be extended to any group theory, bureaucratic theory, or any other proto-pluralistic approach to Soviet politics. If an observer goes on faith that there are groups in the

USSR, then an investigation based on this premise already assumes the most controversial point in the argument and makes the rest of any such study a predetermined exercise. If some form of pluralism does exist in the Soviet elite, the odds are that it would be in a form far different from the western experience of political pluralism.

The models should not be viewed as ends in themselves, but rather as a means to an end, that end being a greater understanding of the Soviet system and the crucial questions involved in the policy process. The original work of Friedrich and Brzezinski was valuable not as a dogma or a definitive model of Soviet politics, but because it focused attention on the unique qualities of the Soviet system that had not existed in the usual authoritarian regimes in history. It was also, along with the works of Hannah Arendt, a pioneer work in attempting to analyse and define the workings of the political system. The work of Skilling and Griffiths was valuable in that it exposed some problems with the original totalitarian theory and spurred debate and clarification in the area of the policy process

itself, the model challenging one to further define the scope and intensity of disagreement in domestic politics. As the debate goes on and time passes, there is a greater volume of data and a broader base of scholarly work to be drawn upon for study of the system. The models presented above were essentially pioneering efforts, and now the challenge is to draw out the strongest lines of argument from each and perhaps mesh them to produce a more accurate picture.

The best theories of Soviet policy and policy formulation will be those that are not dogmatic and deterministic, but those which attempt to amalgamate and synthesize earlier theories. One example of this is George Breslauer's Khrushchev and Brezhnev: Building Authority in Soviet Politics. There are other scholars such as Holloway, Colton, and Odom who refine and combine earlier hypotheses along with new information on historical events, to arrive at more sophisticated theories regarding policy formulation. Breslauer noted that " . . . Western characterizations and evaluations of Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's orientations have often been

misleading, for they have tended to overstate the differences, and to view these leaders as choosing between, rather than synthesizing, egalitarian and elitist values."[44] Breslauer's research is more flexible in that he did not simply attempt to characterize the role of the General Secretary, or just the personalities of Khrushchev or Brezhnev in isolation. Breslauer found that despite the remarkable differences in leadership style between the two men, their careers as General Secretary seemed to have followed a similar three-part pattern. Such an approach must be commended for its ability to encompass a broader spectrum of information and a careful study of the careers involved. It should be noted that scholars now have three post-Stalinist leaders that can be compared and studied.

William Odom has also produced a different point of view. Odom agreed that the important question was not " . . . <u>whether</u> [original emphasis] power was diffused but <u>how</u> [original emphasis] it is diffusing."[45] Odom shifted the focus from the horizontal conflict between departments in the central party and state *apparat* (as

would be found in the west) to postulate vertical conflict between the central party organs who decide policy and the various party and state officials in the intermediate levels of the system charged with actually attaining Politburo policy goals.

> Conflict is less severe between institutions and incipient groups than it is between higher and lower strata in the hierarchical Soviet system . . . the central focus for Soviet domestic policy has to be the party cadre problem, 'that is, the lack of cadre responsiveness to the party center.[46]

The question becomes one of how the party elite can enforce its policies on a passive and stubborn bureaucracy without resorting to terror or giving up the privileges of central power, as opposed to the question of a divided 'eadership utilizing the bureaucracy for its own factional infighting. In any case, this is a new approach and a much more sophisticated argument.

The overriding issue that will be addressed in the next chapters will be the strength of the CPSU in the policy process, focusing primarily on the central party organs in Moscow. Hough set out a

pattern of questions regarding the policy process, and these questions will be applied to this study. There are two primary aspects to Soviet politics and the formulation of policy: (1) Methods by which the elite control the party and state apparatus and (2) Methods and the process by which decisions are reached. Under the second point, there are further questions to be considered. Where do policy initiatives originate? How does the initiative merit becoming part of the Politburo agenda? Is the initiative motivated by personal belief, personal and/or bureaucratic politics, or societal pressure?[47] At the core of these considerations is the question of what happens when the elite in the party disagree.

These questions are impossible to answer definitively, but in the next two chapters we shall attempt to measure the members of the Soviet military and analyse their political relationship to the CPSU so as to obtain clues as to some answers for these questions. The members of the Soviet Armed Forces (which will often be referred to as the Soviet military) are easily identified in the

political structure. They are uniformed specialists and are important because they physically make up an organization capable of destroying nations and continents. Most of the weapons in the nation are physically manned by members of the military and a huge part of the national economy is structured to supporting the military and geared to serving its needs. If any professional subset could be proven to have the power to act as an interest group, the army would have the most impressive credentials (even the KGB could hardly be ranked as its equal in coercive capability and budgetary allocations). The only drawback to the study is that in a secretive government such as that of the USSR, national defense issues naturally become much more difficult to analyse because of their security classification. With this in mind, the second chapter shall now deal with an analysis of the Soviet military and its role in the policy process.

End Notes

[1] Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, Ca. : Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1975), p. 29.

[2] V.G. Afanasev, The Scientific Management of Society (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1971), p. 128.

[3] As quoted in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War Two: Imperial and Global (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1981), p. 1.

[4] Afanasev, The Scientific Management of Society, p. 125.

[5] Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, The Soviet Communist Party (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 107.

[6] Ibid., pp. 70-72.

[7] Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956) and: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York : Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1951).

[8] Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship, p. 11.

[9] Ibid., p. 11.

[10] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past," in Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, eds., The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984), p. 69.

[11] Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 312-313.

[12] Brzezinski, "Soviet Politics," p. 70.

[13] Leszek Kolakowski, "Totalitarianism and the Lie," Commentary 75 (May 1983), p. 34.

[14] Ibid., p. 33.

[15] Rolf H.W. Theen, "Party and Bureaucracy," in Hoffmann and Laird, eds., The Soviet Polity, p. 153.

[16] As quoted in Walter Lacqueur, "Is There Now, or Has There Ever Been, Such a Thing as Totalitarianism," Commentary 80 (October 1985), p. 31.

[17] Milovan Djilas, "The New Class,"in Samuel Hendel, ed., The Soviet Crucible: The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, 5th ed. (Boston: Duxbury Press, 1980), p. 283.

[18] Lacqueur, "Is There Now," p. 33.

[19] H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[20] See Jerry Hough, "The Party *Apparatchiki* ," in Skilling and Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, p 48.

[21] See David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Publishers, 1951).

[22] Franklyn Griffiths, "Tendency Analysis of Policy Making," in Skilling and Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, pp. 338-339.

[23] H. Gordon Skilling, "Groups in Soviet Politics," in Skilling and Griffiths, eds., Interst Groups in Soviet Politics, pp. 24-26.

[24] Ibid., pp. 25-26.

[25] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[26] Ibid., p. 29.

[27] Ibid., p. 40.

[28] Ibid., p. 45.

[29] Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 524.

[30] Ibid., p. 555.

[31] Ibid., pp. 525-526.

[32] Franklyn Griffiths, "Tendency Analysis," p. 376.

[33] Alexander Dallin, "The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, Inc., 1981), p. 365.

[34] Ibid., p. 371.

[35] Ibid., pp. 356-357. See also: Karen Dawisha, "The Limits of Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations on the Soviet Case," Studies in Comparative Communism 80 (Winter 1980), p. 316.

[36] See Stephen Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[37] Dallin, "Domestic Sources," p. 344.

[38] Hough and Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, p. 543.

[39] Dallin, "Domestic Sources," p. 343.

[40] Lacqueur, "Is There Now," p. 33.

[41] Ibid., p. 33.

[42] Roman Kolkowicz, "The Political Role of the Soviet Military," in Joseph L. Nogee, ed., Soviet Politics: Russian After Brezhnev (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 68.

[43] Griffiths, "Tendency Analysis," p. 346.

[44] George Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 269.

[45] William Odom, "Choice and Change," p. 926.

[46] Ibid., p. 937.

[47] Hough and Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, pp.

528-530.

III. POLICY PROCESS: THE PARTY AND THE MILITARY

> One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons . . . Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist system of economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said on the eve of the October Revolution: "Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries."
>
> - J.V. Stalin

Introduction

The relationship between the civil authority of the state and its military establishment is one of the most important and central themes in the study of politics. The natural tension that usually exists between the two institutions has been a feature of politics for

centuries. This tension stems from the unique character of the military as a potential political actor because by definition the army is equipped with weapons to defend the state from foreign enemies, but in the domestic context this means the army is the one institution with the physical means to enforce its will on the civilian government. The centralized and hierarchical command structure allows for organized and coordinated action, giving the army the advantages of power, speed, and unity. As the army is usually organized on a national basis, any such action would represent conflict on the largest scale possible and would be extremely difficult to localize (given the assumption that the officer corps is, to a great extent, united). Since no other single institution or political organization in the state has a greater potential for imposing its will on civilian government, many civilian leaders remain keenly aware of this fact and are sensitized to the status of the officer corps in the state.

There are several measures that a civilian government may

adopt to control its military establishment. The military can have its powers carefully delineated by the provisions of civilian law (such as the constitution of a state) which serves to restrict and regulate its participation in the political decision-making process. A branch of the national security force or police may be directed to maintain a constant surveillance of the military, so as to alert the civilian leadership as to any signs of a conspiracy or a revolt. A rival organization loyal to the government may be created and equipped with weapons equal to those of the regular army, and could number only a small bodyguard unit in the capital or could constitute army-sized formations (i.e., the Waffen-SS in Nazi Germany). The leadership may directly intervene to ensure that the army high command is made up of men they deem to be politically reliable, and the unity of the army can be tempered or undermined by playing different factions in the officer corps off against each other. The civilian authorities could also introduce rigid political education and indoctrination programs into the officer corps. Finally, the civilian

government could coopt the army by giving the officer corps high social status and generous budget allotments in an effort to cultivate the idea that the army has a definite material stake in preserving the status quo of civilian authority.

Many of these measures designed to control the army can be implemented or combined, but such policies can be counter-productive if it saddles a nation with an army incapable of properly defending the state and its interests from foreign aggression. If the officer corps is split, the army high command could be staffed by politically reliable but professionally incompetent generals. As well, the resources of the nation may be divided between the regular army and a rival political force, which would also divide the command and intelligence structures. The restriction of army input into national policy may have produced an economy ill-prepared for war or a civilian government ignorant of the problems and potential of a given strategic situation. Large budget allotments to purchase military allegiance could result in a military-industrial complex resistant to

civilian control. Clearly, these consequences are not desirable for a government, especially one facing the prospects of, or actually engaged in, a shooting war. Herein lies the dilemma confronting politicians; how to effectively control the military without destroying its value as an armed force.

History

These considerations were paramount in the minds of Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders when they toppled the Provisional Government in 1917 because their coup in Petrograd that fall triggered a civil war that swept the length of the Russian empire. Lenin and Trotsky (along with other prominent bolsheviks) looked to the French Revolution as a historical model of a popular revolution, and were determined to prevent the rise of a Russian Bonaparte out of the turmoil and chaos of Civil War. The Marxist-Leninist ideology had identified the officer corps of capitalist nations as powerful centers of reactionary forces, and the theory of world wide Marxist revolution precluded their

necessity in a truly socialist society, but the reality of Russia in 1917 required a Red Army capable of defeating the White armies and their foreign allies in a world very much resistant to the spread of socialism. Loathing the very necessity, Trotsky became Commissar of War in early 1918 and, desparate for experienced officers, the Bolsheviks managed to enlist 22,000 officers from the Old Imperial Army to give the Red Army a capable officer corps.[1]

Trotsky displayed brilliant feats of organization and strategy, and his leadership was a factor in the ultimate Bolshevik victory in the Civil War. But it had required the aid of politically suspect ex-tsarist officers, and during the war the system of appointing political officers as deputies to military commanders was implemented. These military commissars (the forerunners of the officers of the MPA- Main Political Administration) were to spread the Marxist-Leninist ideology amongst the troops and serve as a check on any potentially disloyal military officers. This was the first element in the system to restrain the military in Soviet Russia.

The Civil War also produced other legacies for the Soviet leadership. The forerunner of the modern Council of Defense was established to provide the Soviets with centralized leadership, a measure which was also an important factor in their subsequent victory (see discussion of Defense Council below).

The crucial debate over the nature and the role of the Red Army, however, came after the successful end of the Civil War and the defeat of the immediate military threat facing the Soviet leaders. Trotsky, supported by some of the ex-tsarist officers which had led the army in the war, argued for a small regular army whose primary mission would be the protection of the regime against a counter-revolution or spontaneous peasant revolts.[2] Other prominent officers, such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky and M.V. Frunze, argued that a large standing regular army, supplemented by a militia system, was necessary for quick reaction to outside threats and the professional competence to use that force in future mobile wars. (Trotsky was deposed and exiled in a succession struggle which followed Lenin's

death in 1924, and in 1940 was assassinated on the orders of the victor, Joseph Stalin). The military issue was only one of many in the crucial debates and political struggles of the twenties, with Stalin in most cases leading the opposition to Trotsky, as Stalin sided with Frunze and Tukhachevsky to give the military a larger establishment and a professional officer corps. One of the most damaging political issues that hampered Trotsky's position in the twenties was his impressive civil war record, which made him a potential Bonaparte in the eyes of his nervous party collegues. For the sake of the revolution, Trotsky never attempted to capitalize on his standing in the Red Army to advance his political career, and he was aware of the danger greater than that of Bonapartism.

> However, even during the NEP Trotsky was showing fears that military considerations might dominate Soviet society rather than the reverse. Trotsky later warned that if the skewed economic priorities, wherein military claims predominated, were to continue, both the economy and society would become militarized. Such, to him, was the essence of "Bonapartism", a concept much more dangerous than the conventional notion of a mere soldier on a white

horse.[3]

Trotsky may have recognized the danger, but the reality of the Civil War quickly superimposed its own logic over ideological tenets. Trotsky himself called for extreme measures to mobilize the entire nation for war, advocating policies that led one author to note that "Trotsky's state was implicitly monolithic," and he " . . . extolled the collective solidarity of the ruling group in the face of a hostile or apathetic nation."[4]

The subject of the militarization of Soviet society will be discussed later in this paper, but suffice it to say that a large standing army staffed by a professional officer corps was created in the twenties and fully established by the thirties, ostensibly as an arm of the people, since there was no longer a capitalist ruling class. Stalin's major platform in the debates of the twenties was 'socialism in one country', the idea that the Soviet Union could exist as a socialist state in what the Soviets perceived to be an implacably hostile international system dominated by capitalist states and

bereft of socialist allies. Stalin tied the interests of global revolution to its only existing patron-state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and thus the measurement of the power and progress of the socialist movement depended upon the state interests of the USSR. To exist in this hostile international environment, the USSR would require a large defense establishment backed by a massive industrial base capable of surviving and sustaining a protracted war effort. Since 1928, military interests and heavy industry considerations have dominated the Soviet economy and foreign policy, and by extension, Soviet society. Every five year plan since 1928 has witnessed the primacy of the military-industrial complex in the system over the consumer and agricultural sectors, producing the skewed economy forseen by Trotsky. As was noted in the first chapter, six decades of communist rule have created the largest military establishment in the world backed by a massive base in heavy industry.

Given the statements above, one could assume that the

professional and political standing of the Soviet officer corps has grown in step with the size and power of the army, but the record does not bear out this assumption. Stalin kept a tight rein on the generals, and when the general secretary viewed the officers as becoming a threat to his position, Stalin used the NKVD (later to become known as the KGB) to institute a massive purge of the officer corps starting in 1937. Between one-quarter and one-half of the officer corps lost their lives, and many others were arrested on the outlandish charges of treason with the flimsiest of evidence and sent to the gulags (labour camps). The 'Great Purge' had struck the officer corps, just as it had the party cadre and as it would the KGB itself, with arrests and executions going on into the early years of the Second World War. The decimation of the officer corps was reflected in the defeats suffered by the Red Army in the Winter War with Finland (1940) and the colossal losses in the German invasion of 1941. The invasion placed a severe strain on the Soviet armed forces, and many officers languishing in the gulag were hastily given

commands and were thrown into battle against the veteran legions of the German *Wehrmacht* . The war served to remind Stalin and other party officials of the penalties of crushing the military leadership for perceived domestic political gain.

The Soviet armed forces suffered massive losses, but in the end halted the Germans at Stalingrad in 1942 and by 1945 the Soviets had fought their way into Berlin. During the war, Stalin had gradually granted talented commanders such as G. Zhukov, K. Rokossovsky and I. Konev great prestige and some operational flexibility, privileges Stalin immediately revoked at the end of the Great Patriotic War. In July, 1946, the most influential and respected Soviet officer, Marshal Grigory Zhukov, Hero of the Soviet Union and the victor at Moscow in 1941 and Stalingrad in 1942 , was packed off to command the minor Odessa, and later Ural, Military Districts. Rokossovski was dispatched to Warsaw to take command of the Polish armed forces. Stalin had served notice that with the victory over Germany the armed forces was to again be relegated to stricter control by the

leadership.

The death of Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent succession struggle seemed to augur well for the military, with Zhukov returning to Moscow to become First Deputy Minister of Defense that same year. During a Central Committee plenum in June, 1957, a faction in the party attempted to have Khrushchev ousted, but Zhukov made military aircraft available to Khrushchev to fly in loyal party cadres to secure Khrushchev's position as party leader.[5] Khrushchev prevailed over his political opponents and Zhukov became the first career officer to obtain membership in the ruling Politburo. Four months later Zhukov himself was ousted and once more banished into obscurity. Three years later, in February, 1960, five hundred generals from the Soviet armed forces followed Zhukov into forced retirement as Khrushchev had decided to reduce the size of the Soviet Ground Forces in favour of the new Strategic Rocket Forces.[6] This action was a sharp reminder of the power of the First Secretary. Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, however, seemed to benefit the military when the new

leadership headed by Leonid Brezhnev instituted a substantial military buildup to attain strategic parity with the United States. In addition, Brezhnev's rule witnessed the ascension of both Marshal Grechko (1973-76) and Marshal Dimitriy Ustinov (1976-1985) to Politburo membership. The officer corps as a whole seemed to benefit from a more secure standing in society and ample budgetary allotments for the military establishment.

The political and professional power of the officer corps since 1928 has not consistently increased to match the material growth in the military-industrial sector of the economy. On the contrary, the officer corps has had a checkered history marked by great achievements such as the military victory in the Second World War and the political rise of Zhukov, along with great disaster in the Great Purge of Stalin and wholesale dismissal by Khrushchev. As one former Soviet officer observed, the result is that the officer corps has been sensitized to party interests in the military and political spheres.

> No Soviet general, and for that matter no Soviet officer or soldier - no single member of this enormous organization - has any guarantee that he will be allowed to retain his privileges, his rank or even his life. They [the party] may drive him out, like an old dog, at any moment: they may stand him against a wall and shoot him.[7]

This may be an extreme view, but it does point out that the history of the officer corps and the purges still has an impact on the opinion of Soviet officers today.

The Structure of Soviet Defense Politics

The structure of Soviet defense politics has developed into a remarkably stable form since the expansion of the armed forces in the thirties. There are three major agencies in the Soviet High Command: (1) the **Council of Defense** of the USSR (*Sovet oborony*); (2) the **Main Military Council** of the *kollegiia* of the Ministry of Defense (*Glavnyi voyennyi sovet - kollegiia ministerstva oborony*) and; (3) the **General Staff** (*General'nyi shtab*). Another important agency is the

Figure 1. Military-Technical System



-Based on William T. Lee and Richard F. Starr, Soviet Military Policy Since World War II (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 6-9.

Main Political Administration (MPA), which consists of the career political officers in the armed forces. Other state and party agencies which play a large role in defense politics are GOSPLAN (the State Planning Agency - economic), the Defense Industries Department of the Central Committee, the various state ministries involved in defense industry, the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) and, of course, the Politburo. All of the aforementioned agencies have existed in one form or another since the thirties and represent a highly centralized and consistent defense structure.

The highest decision making body in the Soviet defense and foreign policy structure is the Council of Defense. The direct forerunner of this organ was established in 1938 and the 'Main Military Council', but was renamed the State Committee of Defense (GKO) and chaired by Stalin himself after the German invasion of 1941. The GKO became the top governing body in the land and its decrees during the war years were considered law and binding on both the state and party structure. The GKO consisted of approximately

nine men, a small subset of the ruling elite with representation from some members of the Politburo, the military, the secret police, the diplomatic corps, state economic planning and defense industry managers. The GKO was officially disbanded after the war (September 4, 1945) but may have continued to exist. Only recently was Brezhnev directly referred to as Chairman of the Council of Defense (in a decree of the Supreme Soviet, May 7, 1976).[8] Since 1976, the General Secretary of the CPSU has chaired the Defense Council, and its existence in peacetime further served to highlight defense concerns within the Soviet elite. Most scholars have gone on the assumption that the powers and representation on the Defense Council are similar to that of the old GKO.

> The Council of Defense of the USSR, as the successor to the STO [a legacy of Lenin's conduct of the civil war] and GKO, oversees the preparation of the country, the economy and the people for war. It ensures that there are standby plans for mobilizing industry, transport, and manpower to meet the requirements for possible war at various levels of intensity. it has the power to form new staffs, create new military districts, or change the entire structure of the Soviet

> Armed Forces. The council examines proposals, makes its judgements, and issues decrees.[9]

While the 1977 Constitution mentions the Defense Council, the membership of the modern defense Council beyond the General Secretary has never officially been specified by the Soviets and is currently the object of much speculation. Most sources agree that it is chaired by the General Secretary, and that the Minister of Defense (usually a military officer) is a full member.[10] Other positions commonly suggested are the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Chairman of the KGB, Chairman of the VPK (the Military-Industrial Commission that oversees defense production), Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief of the General Staff and the Chairman of GOSPLAN.[11] Not all members of the Defense Council are Politburo members (although some are members of both, most notably the General Secretary), but rather each member of the council represents the apex of a specialized field in the Soviet Union. As such, the council would represent the greatest centralization of economic, political and military power in the USSR.

The second component in the Soviet High Command is the Main Military Council, which is chaired by the Minister of Defense and responsible for the implementation of Defense Council decisions regarding manpower procurement and personnel issues affecting the armed forces, often acting in an advisory capacity. It is commonly suggested that this council includes the General Secretary, the three first deputy defense ministers (Chief of the General Staff, Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces, and General Affairs), and eleven first deputy ministers from within the defense ministry (heads of the five major services; Ground Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Navy, Frontal Aviation, Troops of Air Defense, as well as the Inspector General, civil defense, billeting and construction, rear services, cadres and armaments).[12] Finally, the Chief of the MPA is also a member of this body. In wartime, the *kollegiia* would revert to its designation given in the Second World War, STAVKA, and carry out strategic operations ordered by the Defense Council, with representatives from STAVKA being dispatched to military fronts to

supervise implementation of the plans and provide overall co-ordination for the various fronts involved in the plan. The Main Military Council would become the link between the fronts and the Defense Council.

The third element in the structure of the High Command is the General Staff, which is of course headed by the Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff was modelled on the German General Staff and the staff tradition of the tsarist officer corps, but the Soviets have published very little information regarding the General Staff and are yet to publish an organization chart. The five military services are directed by the Ministry of Defense through the General Staff, which handles basic planning for the armed forces. The Staff itself has eleven directorates, the three most important being those of operations, intelligence and organization-mobilization, and it is primarily entrusted with formulating and implementing Soviet military strategy and the military-technical aspects of military doctrine (for the discussion of military doctrine, see below).[13] For

the purposes of this study, the General Staff *per se* is not central to the thesis but the Chief of the General Staff does hold a prestigious and important position in Soviet defense politics.

The party influence in the military is represented in several different ways, a hallmark of the Soviet system whereby the state structure is paralleled by a dual party structure supervising policy implementation. The Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee is responsible for screening all military (as well as judiciary, KGB, and MVD- Ministry of the Interior) personnel for key appointments, while nearly all officers including and above the rank of colonel must be members of the CPSU. It has been noted that the Minister of Defense is now quite often a military officer and has full or candidate status as a member of the party Politburo. Most of the officers serving in the Main Military Council are also members of the CPSU Central Committee, and the military forms the second largest single professional contingent in the Central Committee (second only to regional party first secretaries).[14] Finally, all military posts in

the Soviet High Command (with a few exceptions in the lower echelons of the General Staff) are assumed to be *nomenklatura* posts subject to direct review by the Politburo/Secretariat departments, and the MPA.[15]

So far, there have been several references in this paper regarding the MPA going back to its original role as the "political commissars" in the Russian Civil War. The MPA today is the network of career political officers within the overall military structure whose mission is to reinforce and upgrade the ideological awareness of the officers and soldiers in the armed forces, as well as to educate the Soviet people and youth in military history and the benfits of martial values. The MPA parallels the military structure from the Chief of the MPA and the Minister of Defense in the Main Military Council right down to the company level (a unit of one hundred men).[16] The MPA functions as the publisher and censor of all military journals and publications, and screens military appointments while operating with the full authority of a department of the Central

Committee.[17] The MPA is viewed by some as the principal arm of the party in military affairs, and it should be noted that the Chief of the MPA is ranked fourth in the hierarchy of Soviet military protocol (after the Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces). There are MPA officers serving with their military counterparts on military councils, and party members within the armed forces are also responsible to the MPA for instruction. It is fair to say that the MPA is a major factor in attempting to determine that nature of party-military relations in the USSR and the debate over the nature of this organization will be taken up later.

There should also be some mention of the KGB and its role in the Soviet military. The KGB is the "sword and shield" of the party and is responsible for maintaining vigilance and loyalty amongst the population, a mission the party and KGB view as also extending to those Soviet citizens who also happen to be members of the armed forces. The secret police force is commonly known to have its own

informants amongst the officers and rank-and-file members of the services, providing the KGB with information regarding the activities of the servicemen.[18] This is only one of the sources of tension between the two agencies, as both are powerful organizations within the Soviet state. In addition, the military has its own intelligence branch - the GRU - which is a bitter rival of the KGB in the field of foreign (and even domestic) intelligence gathering. However, this area of party-military relations is obscured from view in the west, but the fact that the KGB does maintain a network of informants in the ranks should be remembered as another potential constraint on the military.

Soviet Strategic Thought

The basic framework of Soviet strategic thought can be traced back to Lenin and his acceptance of Clausewitz as a valid guide to political and military struggle, particularly as struggle was considered the primary mechanism of social change in the

Figure 2.

Military Doctrine and Military Science



Marxist-Leninist ideology. Lenin emphasized the idea that war was an extension of politics and that the party must control all elements of the struggle. While there was not a uniform adoption of Clausewitzean theory in its entirety, the Soviets have accepted many tenets outlined by Clausewitz and these are reflected in Soviet military thought. There is a hierarchical division of strategic policy prerogatives which are designed to follow and ensure the principle of political control over the military. In this paper, only the top two levels of strategic thought shall be discussed in detail; **military doctrine** (*Voyennaia doktrina*) and the subordinate area of **military science** (*Voyennaia nauka*).

Military doctrine has the greatest scope for determining the strategic policies of the Soviet Union. Doctrine is expected to answer five basic questions facing the leadership of the nation and shape the strategic framework within which the state operates.

(1) What is the possibility of war in the future? If a war is to occur , what country or countries should be considered the potential enemy or enemies?

(2) If a war is to occur, what sort of war should the nation and the military expect to fight?

(3) If such a war is to occur, what objectives and tasks should be assigned to the military? In order to achieve such objectives, what level of military power should the nation maintain?

(4) In order to prepare the nation and the military for war, what military organizations should the state create?

(5) If a war is to occur, what fighting methods should be used?[19]

The final definition of military doctrine is the sole responsibility of the party leadership as represented in the Politburo and the Council of Defense. Soviet military writers in the past have consistently defined doctrine as an **objective** assessment of current military, economic and political realities (the idea of the 'correlation of forces' in the world) produced by the leadership based upon indisputable Marxist-Leninist principles. The ability to set military doctrine is a crucial theme of this paper and as John Dziak

commented, doctrinal power is not to be underestimated:

> Military doctine, then, is the party's guide to the strategic structure and future of the military. It is the intellectual and policy framework which informs war planning and guides force acquisition. Once pronounced by the Party, it provides the authority for more specific planning and establishes the armament norms and weapons acquisition policies for the armed forces. Since doctrine issues from the highest council of the land, it is very stable, though it can be changed in response to new military-scientific developments. Once pronounced, however, doctrine is no longer debatable unless so ordained by higher Party authority, in specific terms undoubtedly the Defense Council . . . This being the case, who controls docrine controls the lot . . . [20]

The next major term subordinate to that of military doctrine is military science. Science as a definition is more limited in scope compared to the all-encompassing nature of "doctrine." Military science itself is made up of several elements (including military strategy, operational art and tactics). The Soviet military writers have defined military science as:

> . . . .a system of knowledge concerning the nature, essence and content of armed conflict, and concerning the manpower, facilities and methods of conducting combat

> operations by means of armed forces and their comprehensive support.[21]

The definition of military science describes responsibilities that fall primarily under the jurisdiction of the General Staff, with the element of military strategy being essentially determined by the guidelines set by military doctrine. Unlike doctrine, military science is seen to be subjective in nature and hence some aspects are open to debate within professional military circles, usually within the official journal of the General Staff (*Voyennaia mysl'* - Military Thought, a publication closed to the west after 1973). The difference between doctrine and science is emphasized in Soviet literature along the following lines.

> The difference between military science and doctrine consists in the fact that doctrine, elaborated and adopted by the state, is a unified system of views and a guide to action, free of any kind of personal subjective opinions and evaluations. Science, on the other hand, is characterized by controversy. In a system of theories known as military science, there may be several different points of view, diverse scientific concepts, original hypotheses which are not selected as doctrine for practical application and thus do not acquire the character of official state

views on military questions.[23]

This suggests that in the narrower realm of military preparations for war, the General Staff has the ability to debate aspects of military science but that it is more limited in its ability to discuss doctrine.

Given the above material, it is clear that the definition given to the term military doctrine has a great impact on defense policy with important ramifications in both domestic and foreign affairs. Thus, the subject of military doctrine is worth examining in greater detail as it is such a major consideration in the question of party-military relations and is the highest political arena where political and strategic viewpoints intersect. Military doctrine is made up of two elements; sociopolitical and military-technical. We shall now turn to these topics in an attempt to assess their relation to one another and the possible influence of the military in one or both of these elements.

Most sources agree that the Soviet military plays a crucial role in the military-technical field, as many of the decisions fall under

the mandate of military science, an area we have seen to been covered by the General Staff. The diagram used to convey the military-technical policy process shows how the various party, state and military agencies interact. Ideas and systems developed in the military service branches are screened and collected at the level of the General Staff and reviewed by the Main Military Council. The information is sent to the party apparatus, namely the Central Committee Defense Industries Department and the Defense Council. The program is then sent to GOSPLAN and to the state ministries (including the Ministry of Defense), after which it is possibly placed on the Politburo agenda for consideration. Upon approval, the program is sent to the Military-Industrial Commission where it is transformed into a set of specific economic guidelines as part of the five-year economic plan. The military is directly represented in all of the agencies in the military-technical process with the exception of GOSPLAN. It is also worth noting that the General Secretary of the CPSU, who holds the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed

Forces, is a member of the Defense Council, Politburo, the Secretariat (which includes the Defense Industries Department), and the Main Military Council, giving the General Secretary access to many levels of the process.[24]

The extent of the military participation in this area is necessary to staff and run a modern, professional army capable of effectively deploying its forces in wartime to fulfill political requirements for victory. The military jealously guard their privileged access to information in this area. Considering that the military have direct access to military production and theories from the drawing board up to the Defense Council and departments of the Central Committee, the officers are in a position to deny access to other agencies in the area of foreign or defense affairs (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the civilian Academy of Sciences Institutes, namely the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada).

It is one thing to say that the military have considerable input concerning the technical concerns of its own profession and

institution, but could this or has this been translated into actual policy power? In order to support such a position, one would have to determine the relationship between the sociopolitical considerations and military-technical input that determine military doctrine. To do this, the first step would be to examine the officer corps and its role in the elite. Can and do these officers in key positions act in concert to form a domestic political actor advancing their own causes and agenda? Professionals in the USSR are said to wear two hats, one for the party and one for the state (their profession). Which role is played by the military officers involved in the shaping of Soviet military doctrine?

Nature of the Soviet Military Elite

As was the case in the analysis of theories regarding the Soviet political system, many viewpoints have been advanced on this topic. In one book, Dale Herspring divided the range of opinion into three basic schools of thought.[25] The first theme is that of the

military as an interest group and the emphasis is on the element of friction in party-military relations. The military is depicted as constantly trying to escape and circumvent party restrictions which hamper the attainment of professional military objectives. The second model, the participatory model of party-military relations, notes that the military has some minor grievances and bureaucratic troubles with the party but postulates that the officer corps has no reason to intervene in leadership politics even though it has that capability. The military has benefitted from a generdus party policy regarding the officer corps and its military establishment and thus the military has no motive to take a direct role in ruling the USSR. Finally, there is the party cadre model, which notes that party-military relations are marked not only by a harmony of common interests and values, but that the organizational relationship between the CPSU and the military (especially in the elite) is almost symbiotic in nature. These three positions shall serve as the parameters for this discussion, with the various opinions of other

writers being linked or compared to one of these three theories.

The interest group theory of party-military relations is generally an extension of the interest group model of Soviet politics discussed in the first chapter. The death of Stalin in 1953 was followed by the ouster of one General Secretary, and then followed by a massive military buildup during the Brezhnev era. Some writers have made a positive connection between the growth of the armed forces and an increased domestic political power on the part of the Soviet military. One of the most influential spokesmen for this view of Soviet politics has been Roman Kolkowicz, who gave the following appreciation of the Brezhnev era:

> Essentially, the military has become the benefactor of the Party's decline within the system and its expansionary, ambitious, imperial and superpower policies abroad. The military has benefitted from the Party's erosion of legitimacy, decline of authority and failure of performance.[26]

Kolkowicz pointed to the political succession struggles for the position of General Secretary as the opportunity for the military as

an interest group to intervene in party politics and secure policies favourable to the military such as budgetary allocations, a continuing mission rationale (the external threat posed by the USA), and a major influence in foreign policy concerning Eastern Europe, the United States and China.[27] The checkered history of the officer corps is indicative of the differences between the military professionals and party careerists for control over policy. A major assumption in this theory is " . . . that the political leaders, the basic political values, and the ideology are inherently anti-military, i.e., there is a profound distrust of the professional military men who possess the weapons and technology of war . . . "[28] Kolkowicz has noted party intolerance of policies articulated outside the CPSU, and wrote that the " . . . party and the military have become mutual captives; they need one another and cannot let go for there are no viable alternatives."[29]

This viewpoint has been echoed by other writers such as Andrew Cockburn, who stated that " . . . . political power in the Soviet Union stems from the support in the bureaucracy."[30] The dynamic

source of army influence in the policy-making system are once more identified as political succession struggles and the fact that party leaders " . . . played for and secured the support of the military industrial complex while consolidating power and edging out formidable political rivals."[31] Cockburn's argument follows along the lines that bureaucratic politics rule the USSR and that the military is one of the most powerful elements in the bureaucracy.

Edward Warner adopted a slightly different approach to the theory of the military as a powerful interest group. In an age of rapid technological change, particularly in the field of military theory and technology, the military exercises its expertise in defense issues to secure favourable domestic policies.

> We have also seen that the efforts of the military to advance their parochial interests are enhanced by the virtual monopolies of defense policy information and expertise they enjoy and the policy-making arrangements that permit them to play leading roles in the formation and implementation of Soviet military policy.[32]

To extend this statement, the Soviet officers determine the

military-technical policy and would thereby have an influential role in the shaping of military doctrine.

> Soviet military doctrine that provides the authoritative assignment of roles and missions within the military establishment and guidelines for the employment of military power is importantly related to the size, composition, and armament of the Soviet Armed Forces. However, this relationship appears to be as much a shaping of doctrine to accommodate and rationalize particular weapons systems as a result of the lobbying efforts of the various services, branches, and weapons designers, as it does the programmatic shaping of the services and weapons procurements in accordance with a singular doctrinal design.[33]

One author has gone further than this and declared that " . . . (t)his is not the case of having a well-constructed doctrinal edifice and then adapting military forces to it" because the doctrine is " . . . improvised to fit the circumstances which oblige it to accept a particular pattern of forces at a given time."[34] The general conclusion is that the military has had a major role in setting military-technical policy, which has at times outweighed the sociopolitical considerations of the party when determining doctrine.

The other conclusion is that the party membership for professional military officers is in a sense just a permit for them to participate in the policy debates of the elite, and only binds top officers to maintaining an outward facade of party unity while simultaneously pursuing professional autonomy and benefits for the military as an institution.

Timothy Colton disagreed with this portrayal of party-military relations based on his extensive study of the Main Political Administration.[35] Contrary to the perception of the political officers as the Trojan horse of the party in the military camp, Colton presented an image of a political officer network that shares many of the concerns and interests of their military counterparts. This is not a trend that developed in recent years. During the Great Purge the commissars often suffered the same fate as the military professionals with whom they served (if the NKVD arrested a general for high treason, this had definite implications for the commissar nominally responsible for the general's loyalty to the party).[36] Many

sources acknowledge the diminished role of political officers as the party watchdog, a duty which has been enthusiastically embraced by the 'special departments' in the KGB Third Directorate. The MPA officers are more responsible now for military training and discipline in their units and thus have acquired a definite stake in the standing of the unit and the status of the commanding officer.

> The common goals that unite the commander and his political officer are not dissimilar from those that link the enterprise director with the enterprise party secretary. In both cases the relationship between the two officials, which has often been viewed by Western observers as an adversarial relationship, is more one of partnership. Just as the Soviet enterprise director and enterprise party secretary must work cooperatively to achieve common goals and fulfill the enterprise's plan indicators, the military commander and his *zampolit* [political officer] have important professional incentives to maintain a fairly harmonious working relationship. These comments suggest that MPA activities within the armed forces are basically irrelevant to the issue of civil-military conflict. The relationship between the political officer and the commander cannot be used as a barometer of party-military relations.[37]

If one accepts, as this literature suggests, that the political officer

corps has become almost a regular branch of the armed forces, it undermines the idea of severe party-military tension but also removes what heretofore has been viewed as a key element in party control over the military.[38] There is still the coercive constraint in the form of the KGB, but Colton viewed this as a secondary consideration. Instead, Colton stated that the military has been successfully co-opted into political quiescence because the CPSU has consistently satisfied the officer corps with regards to the four key military interests: (1) ideological; (2) military; (3) status and (4) professional.

Ideologically, the party has provided the military with a guide to action in the form of protecting the first socialist state, and the party has also been " . . . disposed to nationalism in foreign policy and firm centralism in domestic affairs . . . "[39] The material benefits bestowed upon the military have been mentioned earlier, but the officers also benefit in a more personal manner. For example, pensions reach 75% of salary after thirty-four years of service and

since 1953 local Soviets are bound by law to allot 10% of all new housing for reserve and retired officers in a state plagued by a perpetual housing shortage.[40] Amongst professional occupations, the career of military officers has great prestige within the Soviet Union, their accomplishments and strength symbolizing for many citizens the great achievements of the nation. While the pay and living conditions, especially for junior officers, are not particularly admired, there are fringe benefits (as shown above) and perhaps greater potential for upward social mobility (usually for ethnic Russians). There is also the cynical side, as a Soviet military defector noted when he compared the USSR to a prison and pragmatically chose to become an officer as th? " . . . guards are better fed and have a pleasanter and more varied life than those [civilians] in the cells . . . "[41] Finally, in terms of professional interests, the military has considerable latitude to discuss intra-institutional affairs and plays a major role in the military-technical process. There is the mission rationale provided

in the form of the great external enemy, the United States, and the party is in full agreement with the need for a strong military to protect the socialist Motherland. The military does have some disagreements with aspects of their position in society and party policy, but their four key interests have largely been met.

Colton concluded that the military has been politically quiescent because historically (tsarist years included) the army has never shown the propensity for direct intervention in ruling the land and presently the party has given the military no reason or motivation to challenge or test party rule. David Holloway, in his study of Soviet nuclear weapons policy, basically reached the same conclusions.

> . . . the party, by stressing the importance of conflict between states and the need for cohesion and solidarity at home, has provided an ideology that gives clear purpose to the Armed Forces' existence. Party policy has given the officer corps a good standard of living and high status, and has furthered their professional interests by allocating generous resources to defense. Finally, the party has provided capable and cautious leadership (with some glaring exceptions) in foreign policy, avoiding risky adventures that might provoke war.[42]

Colton stated that beyond these points, the Soviet officer corps does have the capability to intervene in Soviet politics, and depending upon the timing and circumstances, could conceivably institute a coup d'etat.[43] The officer corps have developed a professional identity which is most effective in the bureaucratic and administrative realm of Soviet politics and the development of military-technical policy, but the military has accepted the party leadership and and the party military doctrine. Holloway placed more weight on the party's power to control the military and stated that the armed forces and the defense industries could resist party policy but could not necessarily modify or halt party policy.

> Such resistance might have considerable political significance if the Party leaders were divided on the issue. But priorities have been changed since Stalin's death (for example, in the greater investment in agriculture), and this suggests while old structures may make it difficult to adopt new priorities, they do not make it impossible.[44]

Holloway agreed that the armed forces had been coopted for party

reasons, but made it clear that the party still retains policy power.

The interest group model was based on the concept of friction between two powerful and dichotomous institutions, while the participatory model consisted of a largely harmonious relationship between two institutions that shared the same societal concerns and objectives. The third model, the party cadre model, is based on the idea that the harmony between the party and the military is so extensive that the army should be viewed as an " . . . administrative arm of the Party, not something separate from and competing with it."[45] The officers of the Soviet armed forces should be seen primarily as officials of the CPSU, a party whose political philosophy is based largely upon the military ethos and exists in a society permanently semi-mobilized for war. Under these conditions, the military is a party and state instrument with greater responsibilities than those who serve in the light industry or agricultural fields. Since the party is a political entity organized along military lines, the military themselves easily fit in as a subordinate branch in the

party chain of command. Coit Blacker pointed out that the thought of the military as an institution acting outside party auspices is quite remote.

> The crucial point to bear in mind, however, is that the competition takes place among party members within limits set by the party, which defines the rules, monitors compliance, adjudicates differences, and enforces outcomes. No evidence indicates that the military has ever taken a position opposed to that of the Party on any critical issue.[46]

William Odom is a leading proponent of this model, and stressed the importance of viewing the military as an integral part of the *nomenklatura* system and very much an element of the CPSU cadre. It is the emphasis on the notion of the military as party members first that sets it apart from the interest group or participatory models.

> Perhaps it is instructive in comprehending the differences I have with Colton and Kolkowicz to ask "What if the marshals did intervene?" "How would Soviet policy differ?""Would they dismember the Party?" Hardly; if they did they would fall into civil war, and in the course of that war they would reinvent the party or one very similar. The absence of

sharp Party-military conflict, which Colton discovered, is rooted in the historical development in the Russian military state and the heritage of the multinational empire it bequeathed the Bolsheviks . . . Lenin faced up to the politics of ruling a state that embraces very powerful centrifugal forces. As long as those forces persist, the military imperatives for Soviet rule shall remain dominant for the CPSU. the CPSU is not beholden unto corporate military interest; rather, it understands military-bureaucratic requisites for ruling the Soviet Union. It is not paying off the military corporate interests to get the marshals to behave; rather, it is emphasizing military power to cope with political realities. The marshals cannot afford the luxury of corporate military interest; they are in the same political boat with the CPSU.

It is important to keep in mind that large defense budgets and a vigorous set of military programs are probably much less the result of pressures from military leaders (military corporate interests?) than the response by the leadership (including marshals) to a clear perception of domestic political fragmentation, of danger of dissolution of the Warsaw Pact alliance system in the absence of Soviet military power, and of fears of Soviet foreign policy that have been manifested by many states outside the Soviet alliance system. The more fully this is understood, the easier it is to understand why Brezhnev is a marshal and why the military-bureaucratic ethos is so widely adapted to social and economic organization in the Soviet Union. Finally, if I reject Colton's reading of an

> "institutional congruence model" into my analysis, I would accept the idea of a congruence in organizational ethos between the military and the Party. That is, social choices, as defined by key central leaders, take precedence over individual and subgroup values. The military ethos is not expressed in the wearing of uniforms. It is expressed in the priority of institutional values over individuals' values.[47]

This passage has been quoted at length because it succintly summarizes Odom's viewpoint and also highlights its differences from other models. Odom does not deny the " . . . existence of the military boundary as an administrative and bureaucratic reality . . . " but goes on to " . . . assert that too much is made of that boundary in explaining Soviet military politics in general."[48]

Ellen Jones has also noted the shared sociopolitical outlook of the party and the military. Jones has worked on the concept of the armed forces as a tool for socialization of the Soviet citizenry in the military ethos of service to the state. There are a host of para-military activities and organizations that supplement the two-year term of service for draftees in the Soviet military (three

years for naval personnel), such as the Pioneer and Komsomol party organizations for Soviet youths. The DOSAAF (Voluntary Organization for the Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and Fleet) is a mandatory pre-draft program for Soviet students to provide for specialist training in future military service. The subject of military socialization of society cannot be given justice here, but Jones argued that the major impact of programs such as this was to break down social barriers between the armed forces and Soviet society.

> . . . the interdependence of military and civilian institutions is based on more than shared values. Use of conscription maximizes the connections between civilian and military environments . . . The discipline and regimentation of the military environment - strict by Western standards - are acceptable in the Soviet military because such an environment is but a more rigid version of the USSR's regimented civilian lifestyle.[49]

Many civilians have tended to adopt the vocabulary and outlook of the military and retain a greater understanding of the armed forces and its role in Soviet society.[50]

This model does not imply that the military has no place in

defense policy. The military-technical questions of doctrine are still very much the concern of the armed forces. The monopoly of professional information and expertise in military affairs makes this possible. But the military elite conduct their business as party officials through party channels, and the sociopolitical element of military doctrine, as defined by the General Secretary and the Politburo, is the binding framework within which the military-technical questions of strategy are decided.

> The Party apparatus, the military elite, and even the KGB are entitled and even obliged to give their opinions and provide expert analyses for the Party leadership. But they influence political and economic decisions only on account of their expert knowledge or because they favour goals and interests closely coinciding with those of the Party leader and Politburo anyhow [original emphasis].[51]

The marshals are party officials trained to handle military affairs rather than military professionals forced to accept party policy and doctrine. Experts capable of influencing policy are not automatically

policy-makers.

> The position of Soviet specialists, in the end, remains entirely dependent upon the goodwill and needs of political authorities; their participation is governed by the authorities' pleasure; their advice given is largely secret; the portion of it that is subject to public debate is for the most part a weak echo of what is really being discussed behind the scenes, and there is no appeal - none, that is, that the leaders are obliged to take account of. The Soviet expert, at least in the areas we hve discussed here, is clearly on tap, not on top, however much he many be useful or necessary.[52]

The above passage was not a direct reference to the military, but it is definitely in tune with the the party cadre model whereby the party uses its control of communications to monopolize debate, hoard vital information and then summon technical experts. In this manner, the party, including top military officials, restrict real policy debate to the upper levels of the elite.

Zhukov and Ogarkov

So far in this chapter, we have taken into account the debates

as to the history, structure and nature of the armed forces and party-military relations in the USSR. In an attempt to gain further insight into these arguments, we shall now examine two specific cases in party-military relations; the ouster of Marshal Zhukov from the Politburo (then called the Presidium) and; the demotion of Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov from his position as Chief of the General Staff in September, 1984 to the post of commander of the Western TVD (Theater of Military Operations - still a prestigious post).

The ouster of Marshal Zhukov in October, 1957, was initially seen as a prominent manifestation of party-military conflict the the USSR. Kolkowicz stated that Zhukov had obtained a remarkable freedom of action from 1955 to 1957 as a result of the internal party tension between the old Stalinist proteges and Khrushchev, a dispute which intensified after the secret speech in 1956 and Khrushchev's startling condemnation of Stalin as a tyrant and murderer.[53] Zhukov exploited this opportunity to weaken the party controls over the military by attacking the prerogatives of party membership on

military councils (which oversee military districts) and the powers of the MPA. Kolkowicz reaffirmed that " (t)he MPA, the Party's crucial instrument of control, has always been a bone in the throat of the military."[54] According to Kolkowicz, the attempt by a wartime hero to reduce party controls over military affairs raised the spectre of a Bonaparte on the ruling Politburo. Zhukov paradoxically may have triggered political opposition by helping Khrushchev to defeat the attempted coup by dissatisfied party members in June, 1957, an event that left Khrushchev indebted to the marshal.[55] The ease of Zhukov's removal is explained by Zhukov's character as " . . . the heroic but politically naive Marshal . . ." outmaneuvered by the wily political chiefs.[56] Kolkowicz's conclusions were very much indicative of how he viewed the role of Zhukov in the affair.

> With the ouster of Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet military had lost a charismatic leader, a fearless spokesman, and, even more important, an officer who embodied the military virtues cherished by the officer corps and whose primary loyalties lay with the military establishment . . . Upon his departure, the military again had to submit to the dreary catechisms of

> Marxism-Leninism and the schizoid performances of men who were both military officers and Party zealots [emphasis added].[57]

Not surprisingly, Colton has arrived at a different interpretation of Zhukov's fall from power. Colton noted that " . . . scholars have been unanimous in seeing the Zhukov affair in institutional terms as a head on political collision between the army under Zhukov and the party . . . " and that " (t)his interpretation of Zhukov's fall is in drastic need of revision."[58] The Western assessment is almost exclusively based on the five official Soviet charges against Zhukov published after his ouster, a dangerous single source upon which to rely so heavily. The charge of Bonapartism and plans to replace party control is suspect because such an action would require several officers in key positions, yet there was no discernable purge of other top military commanders. The military as an institution did not close ranks behind Zhukov, the most prestigious representative ever to lead the officer corps, and there was little evidence of unrest resulting from Zhukov's dismissal. As for Zhukov's

supposed policy adventurism, Colton found that there was no remarkable military policy shift after October, 1957. As well, the charges of creating a personality cult and displaying personal crudeness can be linked to Zhukov's autocratic and imperious nature in addition to the jealousy and resentment engendered by Zhukov's wartime standing and record (as a travelling representative of STAVKA, the high command, during the war Zhukov earned the enmity of many frontline commanders).

The fifth charge, weighted heavily by Western observers, was that Zhukov had led an attack on the military party organs. Colton stressed that there is no evidence of an anti-political attitude on Zhukov's part during his active military career, and that in light of MPA and party policies during the fifties as a whole, Zhukov's speeches followed the general party notion that political officers must become more aware of military theory and concentrate on improving discipline and political education in the context of combat training.[59] Even more surprising is the fact that after Zhukov's fall,

the MPA was struck by a series of firings and dismissals, engendering a turnover rate of fifty percent in top MPA posts during the years 1957 and 1958, two and a half times the normal mean.[60] It seems that Zhukov's attack on the MPA was trivial compared to the wrath of the party (reasons for the purge of the MPA at this time are vague, but one theory is that the party was made aware of serious problems in the MPA organization by the Zhukov affair).[61] Colton's conclusions concentrate on a different aspect of Zhukov's position in 1957.

> This reassessment sheds some light on the enduring problem of analysing elite-level politics in the Soviet Union. It reinforces T.H. Rigby's admonition to distinguish with care between conflict among leaders and conflict among institutions . . . It was, after all, only a combination of contingencies - such as Zhukov's personality, his status as a national hero, and his arrival in the Presidium as part of a precarious leadership coalition - that produced the outcome in 1957.[62]

The Zhukov affair is more reflective of the personal rivalries in the Politburo, with the inspiration for Zhukov's ouster based on the fact that his standing in the Politburo, the top party institution, had begun

to rival that of the First Secretary and necessitated his removal from the party elite (during the Khrushchev era, the leader of the CPSU was officially known as the First Secretary).

A more recent but lesser known case of a prominent military officer being relieved of his position is that of Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov. Ogarkov was the military representative on the Soviet delegation to the SALT talks, leading to his promotion to Chief of the General Staff in January, 1977. Ogarkov became known for his professional ability and the relatively outspoken proponent of increases in the military budget. The Chief of the General Staff also gained a measure of domestic and international recognition when he conducted televised sessions with the Soviet and western press following the destruction of Korean Air Lines flight 007 in September, 1983. Approximately one year later, it was announced that Ogarkov had been dismissed from his post and was made commander of the Western TVD. Ogarkov's dismissal was unanticipated, considering that he was a potential candidate as the

next Minister of Defense. Though this happened only recently, there has been some speculation as to the motive for Ogarkov's removal from the second spot in the military hierarchy. Many observers have cited the doctrinal disagreement between Ogarkov and Minister of Defense Dmitry Ustinov, a debate that is said to go back to Brezhnev's years as General Secretary.

Tsuyushi Hasegawa has indicated that Brezhnev, at the 26th Party Congress in 1981, launched a doctrinal shift that had been gradually formulated since Ustinov, a defense industry expert, had been appointed Minister of Defense (April, 1976).[63] In fact, Hasegawa stated that Ogarkov was brought in to relieve Marshal Viktor Kulikov in 1977 so as to pave the way for acceptance of the new doctrine in the officer corps.[64] The new doctrine was based on the idea that it was national suicide for a nation to become engaged in a nuclear war , with Hasegawa convinced that " . . . by October, 1981, at the latest, Brezhnev and his supporters had come to fully accept MAD [Mutual Assured Destruction] as the basis of Soviet

military doctrine."[65]

From Ogarkov's various public pronouncements, articles, and books, Hasegawa and other observers have deduced that Ogarkov opposed the doctrinal shift that accepted the principle of MAD. Ogarkov persisted with the interpretation that a conventional war would quickly lead to a nuclear conflict in which the USSR would emerge victorious because of the superiority of the Soviet armed forces and the socialist system.[66] In this doctrine, the Soviet Union must plan for a nuclear was strategy capable of obtaining some level of victory, especially after a massive retalitatory strike by the USSR.

The carefully worded debate went on for another three years as Ustinov backed Brezhnev and later Brezhnev's successors as party leader (Andropov and Chernenko). Ogarkov never specifically renounced the principle of victory in nuclear war, and in his book History Teaches Vigilance, published after his removal as Chief of the General Staff, Ogarkov again discussed a successful nuclear war fighting strategy.[67] Hasegawa concluded that the Ustinov-Ogarkov

debate was evidence that the sociopolitical guidelines of the party and the military-technical requirements of the officer can be in conflict when deciding Soviet military doctrine. There was also another example of the party's ability to remove dissenting officers and rewrite doctrine, as the CPSU did at the 27th Party Congress in 1986. But the military is has been said to be reluctant to adopt the MAD principle in the operational and force posture levels, while the dissenter Ogarkov still retains an important military command and membership in the Central Committee.

Dale Herspring accepted the doctrinal debate as one possible cause of Ogarkov's ouster, and also cited Ogarkov's standing as a known and respected military figure (especially after the Korean Air Lines incident). There was also the possibility that Ogarkov pushed too hard for increased military spending.[68] But Herspring stated that the major reason was the Soviet political situation in the fall of 1984.

Chernenko was ill, and it was well known that his

> days were numbered. Defense Minister Ustinov was also ill, and the Politburo must have known how serious his illness was by the summer of 1984 . . . Given the situation at the time, Ogarkov would have been in a good position to succeed Ustinov if he had not been removed. Ogarkov's assertive personality, the possibility that he could become a kingmaker in the succession, the likelihood he would have continued to push for additional military allocations, and the problems the leadership might have faced in trying to stop him once the top job came open - all argued for his removal.[69]

The above passage is striking when compared to Colton's conclusions as to Zhukov's ouster. In both cases, we have strong willed and highly regarded military professionals in the upper ranks of the party elite at a time of flux within the CPSU. Each case resulted in the dismissal of the officer concerned and a subsequent failure of their military colleagues to come to the defense of their senior spokesman. Colton and Herspring point to the officers' potential political power within the CPSU Politburo as the cause of dismissal, but Kolkowicz and Hasegawa cited the professional military argument as the deciding factor. The study of these cases illustrates the debate covered earlier as to the nature of the officer corps and party-military

relations. There are a myriad of considerations to be addressed such as party membership, professional responsibility, Kremlin politics and the foreign and domestic conditions, all of which tend to blur the line between a straightforward reading of civilian-military relations.

Conclusion

We were left with two central aspects of Soviet politics at the end of the first chapter; methods by which the elite control the party and state apparatus, and methods or the process by which decisions are reached (see Chapter One, conclusion). The arguments in the present chapter have dealt with the first consideration, that of party control in party-military relations. Kolkowicz said that the party actively exercises control over the military as part of a rivalry between two dichotomous institutions, while Colton countered that the military was not controlled but coopted by the party and thus had never exercised a political capability. Odom denied that the military existed as an interest group separate from the party, and felt that the

military identity should be subordinated to the party identity and the officers properly seen as an integral part of the party cadre system. The cases of Zhukov and Ogarkov have been seen in two ways; a party-military clash and as an internal matter of party politics in the Politburo. The interpretation of these cases therefore can be used to support any of the three major theories, but have served as an example of the difficulty of interpreting Soviet politics and reaching definitive conclusions.

The strength of the interest group theory is that it has identified the Soviet military as an administrative entity within the system and has heightened awareness of the military identity in the officer corps. The military is a unique institution in any country, and the military in Russian society has been a special profession in a nation historically obsessed with defense. Ogarkov and Zhukov no doubt had professional concerns for the Soviet military and its doctrine. They may have been removed as potential party rivals, but the stature they held was based on the bureaucratic strength in the

military, serving to add an element of potential political power and thereby playing on party sensitivities. There is no doubt that the military officers have had professional concerns regarding military-technical issues and its monopoly of expertise had secured it a role in the highest decision making process in the state. The structure of the military-technical process and the presence of officers in the Politburo and Defense Council ensures military input into top policy questions.

But as was noted in the first chapter, the interest group theory rests on the presumption of a minimum frequency of interaction among the members of the group, and evidence that the group has made demands on the government authority. Proponents of this theory have yet to sufficiently deal with either ot these prerequisites. The evidence is that information flows and official military organizations are carefully monitored by the KGB. The presence of KGB career officers down to the regimental level and the network of hidden informants within the rank-and-file have all served to limit the flow

of information amongst the officer corps, preventing an interest group from coalescing.

In the military-technical process, the KGB serves to restrict lateral information flows between research institutes and branches of the armed forces. As guarantors of state secrets, the KGB is involved in clearing information for security purposed. On top of this, the Russian and military tradition of secrecy also plays a large role in dividing the bureaucracy and the military:

> The General Staff is extremely 'compartmentalized' and subject to rigourous security . . . No one can doubt its high standard of professionalism, but, in many ways, the most important point is the isolation in which it works - partly for traditional Russian and partly for security reasons - even from other elements in the Armed Forces and the Ministry. As far as we can tell, General Staff requirements and assessments are often sent upwards through the Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of Defense and the Defense Council, without, appartently, full consultation with all the relevant Staffs and Councils of the Armed Forces. But the General Staff is also under close Party supervision through its Political Directorate, through which the Party monitors and supervises the work of even this very closed section of the Armed Forces.[70]

To reinforce this view of a compartmentalized military structure, there is the Soviet tradition of loading up military councils with political representatives and making sure that political councils have greater party membership than military. This is evident in the elite structure.

> The available evidence suggests that as long as this structure is adhered to, the Party will continue to be the dominating authority in Army-Party relations on foreign and defense policies. While the Minister of Defense is a member of the Defense Council and the Politburo, he has only one officer, the Chief of the General Staff, to support him - if he is putting forward military views or recommendations - in the Defense Council.[71]

In this manner, the party can set military doctrine by calling on fragmented elements of the military-technical bureaucracy to give their opinions as separate entities, thus allowing only Politburo members the luxury of knowing the full information and range of options regarding an issue.

We will now review the three basic models. The interest group theory also has no evidence that the military has forced the party to

adopt a policy that the Politburo had opposed. The military buildup of the sixties and seventies does not necessarily indicate that the military dominated policy. Caution must be exercised in analysing the Soviet political process with Western modes of management and communication. David Holloway issued a warning that places the interest group theory in perspective.

> Can one speak of a military-industrial complex? The Soviet Union certainly possesses a large defense industry and powerful Armed Forces, and the ties between them are close and numerous. But the mere existence of such institutions does not mean that they can dictate a government's policy.[72]

Colton's argument that the military has been well provided for and has a part in supporting the status quo is valid. The work done in regards to the MPA and its military professionalization is also impressive and convincing. One should add, however, Checinski's caveat that while the MPA is politically indifferent, its existence does render by definition any political activity outside its realm as illegal. Colton also serves to remind us that a nominal military

structure exists, even though it does not clash with the party leadership and does not necessarily function as a political entity. For example, the Soviet Constitution of 1977 guarantees each of the Soviet Republics a separate governmental structure in a federal system, and has provisions for republics to voluntarily withdraw from the Soviet Union. A centralized government bent on containing the centripetal forces of nationalism in a huge, multinational state, has ignored those rights guaranteed under the constitution (in addition to countless others). But there is always the latent threat that one day, in the midst of a severe crisis, this procedure might be initiated by the existing republic authority. Likewise, the military is still a latent threat, and that in a severe crisis it might coalesce as a political actor. The subtle lesson of the military in society and its role compared to the party and the KGB was noted by Suvorov:

> The Army is potentially the most powerful of the three [Party, KGB, and Army] and therefore it has the fewest rights. The Party and the KGB know very well that, if Communism should collapse, they will be shot by their own countrymen, but that this will not

happen to the Army.[74]

While Colton would not agree that the military has the fewest rights, there are some powers of the military structure that may not necessarily exist in mainstream elite politics, but could come to the fore in a systemic crisis, at which time a salient professional identity might come to the surface of Soviet politics. The major omission in Colton's works is the failure to analyse the KGB network in the military, admittedly a difficult task, and fails to go beyond stating that it should be scrutinized more carefully.[75]

The party cadre model is useful because it offers a unique approach to civil-military relations. It highlights the role of the officer as a responsible member of the party and maintains that the political training of the officer corps is not just an ideological facade but a real element in combining military and party concerns. The senior Soviet military officers have consistently maintained that the party sets doctrine in the USSR. Marshal Grechko continued this interpretation:

> Only the party, armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, is capable of comprehending every political, economic, social, and military phenomenon and event, of profoundly analysing all of our social and political life, and of setting the proper course for resolving the complex problems of building Communism, defending its just cause, and consolidating world peace.[76]

The militarization of Soviet civilian institutions and the adoption of a military ethos by the ruling party has limited civilian-military conflict as understood in the west. Yosef Avidar offered his conclusion of the implications of the symbiotic relationship between party and army in the Soviet Union:

> Under normal conditions in relations between the Party and the Army, when the political leadership and the bureaucratic machines are functioning well . . . it is inconceivable that any junta should form in the Soviet Armed Forces. No commander, however senior he might be and however great his influence in the Army, could conceivably raise the standard of revolt in the Party, overthrow the leadership and seize power, in the State in its stead. It is inconceivable that an officer corps, educated in the way customary in the Soviet Union, fundamentally loyal in its own way to the Party, seeing it as the flesh of its flesh and the bone of its bone, should put its hand to a revolt of this kind.
>
> Even if a special situation should arise of a

> breakdown of the political leadership within the Party, while the Army remained united, it seems to me that the influence of the military force could only be brought to bear through the Party and in the name of the Party. It would be a take-over all the same, but not a military *coup* in the usual sense . . . To the outside world, the new ruler or rulers would certainly remain the monolithic Party of Lenin, clarifying its principles anew but continuing to set the "only correct" general line, infallible as ever.[77]

The party cadre model should not be taken so far as to totally rule out the salient professional identity discussed above. It would be a disservice to the field if the party fear of Bonapartism or the special place of the military in Soviet society were not recognized as important. Avidar himself noted these qualifications of a complete harmony model of party-military relations:

> If this is so, if the senior command and the officer corps are part and parcel of the Party and see it as flesh of their flesh and bone of their bone, if instances of friction are internal affairs which are resolved solely within the Party - then the leaders should calmly rely on the Army's absolute loyalty to the Party and to themselves as representing the Party monolith. Yet the reality throughout has been otherwise. The leaders are not light-headed and they do not rely on the blind loyalty of the Army. We see the leadership's apprehensions awakened by every

> sign of the Army command's entrenching itself in defense of its direct professional needs, when these are opposed to the needs of the Party. Hence the constant insistence on the priority of Party needs. We have seen the investment of great and sustained efforts to establish and keep going special Party-political supervision over the officers - supervision without parallel in other professional groups in the state.[78]

The nature of party-military relations has a double element reflected in this passage. One is the identification of the military with the party and its interests, while another is the set of various political agencies supervising the military. All three schools of thought identify these elements and the structure of Soviet defense politics bears out the interwoven membership of party and military officials. But the three schools of thought stress one element over the other, and differ as to the methods and nature in which the party exercises control. All three generally agree that the party has retained the political power and has the major say in setting military doctrine. the real implications of the debate are whether there is potential for dominant military influence and a separate military identity in the

USSR.

The third chapter dealt primarily with the first half of the mandate outlined in the first chapter; methods of party control over the military. The fourth chapter shall now deal with the other topic; the military role in Soviet decision-making. To tackle this difficult area of inquiry, three prominent crises in Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev era have been chosen for study, crises that involved the Soviet Armed Forces: Czechoslovakia 1968, Afghanistan 1979, and Poland 1980-81.

End Notes

[1] Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR 3d ed. (Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1984), pp. 4-7.

[2] William Koenig and Peter Scofield, Soviet Military Power (Greenwich, Ct. : Bison Books Corp., 1983), p. 62.

[3] John J. Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1981), p.7.

[4] Isaac Deutscher, "Defeat in Victory," in Samuel Hendel, ed., The Soviet Crucible: The Soviet System in Theory and Practice (Belmont, Ca. : Wadsworth, Inc., 1981), p. 95.

[5] Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). p. 435.

[6] Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (London: Grafton Books, 1984), p. 435.

[7] Ibid., p. 435.

[8] Hannes Adomeit and Mikhail Agursky, The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex and its Internal Mechanism (Kingston: Queen's University Center for International Relations, 1978), p. 8.

[9] Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, p. 107.

[10] Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 6-7.

[11] Dziak, Soviet Perceptions, p.46 and: Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, pp. 105-108 and: Adomeit and Agursky, The Soviet Military Industrial Complex, pp. 8-9 and: Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army, pp. 61-63.

[12] Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, p. 108.

[13] Dziak, Soviet Perceptions, p. 70.

[14] Jones, Red Army and Society, p. 4.

[15] Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, p. 117 and: Jones, Red Army and Society, p. 23.

[16] Colton, Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority, p. 15.

[17] Dziak, Soviet Perceptions, pp. 56-57.

[18] Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army, p. 403.

[19] N.V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness to Defend the Fatherland) (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 53 as quoted in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Soviets on Nuclear-War-Fighting," Problems of Communism 35 (July-August 1986), p. 69.

[20] Dziak, Soviet Perceptions, p.23.

[21] Dictionary of Basic Military Terms (A Soviet View) (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965) translated by the United States Air Force

(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 37, as quoted in Dziak, Soviet Perceptions, p. 29.

[22] Hasegawa, "Soviets on Nuclear-War-Fighting," pp. 68-70.

[23] Dziak, Soviet Perceptions, p. 34.

[24] Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, p. 37 and: Hasegawa, "Soviets on Nuclear-War-Fighting," p. 69.

[25] Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1978).

[26] Roman Kolkowicz, "The Political Role of the Soviet Military," in Joseph L. Nogee, ed., Soviet Politics: Russia After Brezhnev (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 68.

[27] Ibid., p. 79.

[28] Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," in Herspring and Volgyes, eds., Civil-Military Relations, p. 10.

[29] Kolkowicz, "The Political Role of the Soviet Military," pp. 82-83.

[30] Andrew Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York: Random House, Inc., 1984), p. 115.

[31] Ibid., p. 117.

[32] Edward L. Warner, III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 268.

[33] Ibid., p. 118.

[34] Ibid., p. 118.

[35] See Colton, Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority.

[36] Ibid., p. 148.

[37] Jones, Red Army and Society, p. 142.

[38] Michael Checinski, *Die Militaerelite im sowjetischen Entscheidungsprozess* (The Military Elite in Soviet Political Decisionmaking) (Cologne: Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien) No. 3, 1981, pp. 39-40.

[39] Colton, Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority, p. 259.

[40] Ibid., p. 265.

[41] Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army, p. 407.

[42] David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 158.

[43] Colton, Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority, p. 257.

[44] Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp. 159-160.

[45] William Odom, "The Party Connection: A Critique," in Herspring and Volgyes, eds., Civil-Military Relations, p. 41.

[46] Coit Blacker, "Military Forces," in Robert F. Byrnes, ed., After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s (Washington, D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 1983), p. 148.

[47] Odom, "The Party Connection," pp. 48-49.

[48] Ibid., p. 48.

[49] Jones, Red Army and Society, p. 220.

[50] Ibid., p. 219.

[51] Checinski, The Military Elite, p. 40.

[52] Thane Gustafson, "Lessons of the Brezhnev Policies on Land and Water and the Future of Reform," in Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, eds., The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984), p. 521.

[53] Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 121.

[54] Ibid., p. 123.

[55] Ibid., p. 131.

[56] Ibid., p. 134.

[57] Ibid., p. 135.

[58] See Colton, Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority, pp. 175-195.

[59] Ibid., p. 189.

[60] Ibid., p. 192.

[61] Ibid., p. 193.

[62] Ibid., p. 195.

[63] See Hasegawa, "Soviets on Nuclear-War-Fighting."

[64] Ibid., p. 72.

[65] Ibid., p. 72.

[66] Ibid., p. 73.

[67] Ibid., p. 78.

[68] Dale Herspring, "Soviet Military in the Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress," Orbis 30 (Summer 1986), p. 298.

[69] Ibid., pp. 298-299.

[70] Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Military Role in Soviet Decision-Making," in Curtis Keeble, ed., The Soviet State: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy (England: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985), p. 180.

[71] Ibid., p. 181.

[72] Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 159.

[73] Checinski, The Military Elite, p. 39.

[74] Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army, pp. 45-46.

[75] Timothy Colton, "The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Herspring and Volgyes, eds., Civil-Military Relations, p. 71.

[76] As quoted in Colton, Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority, p. 249.

[77] Josef Avidar, The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1985), pp. 323-324.

[78] Ibid., pp. 320-321.

IV. SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION

In reality, what was the Russian Empire based on? Not just primarily, but exclusively on its army. Who created the Russian Empire, transforming the Semi-Asiatic tsardom into the most influential, and dominant European power? It was accomplished strictly by the army's bayonets.

It was not before our culture, bureaucratised church, or wealth and prosperity that the world bowed. It bowed before our power. And when - with a significant degree of exaggeration - it appeared we were not as strong as everybody thought, and that Russia was the colossus on clay legs - the picture immediately changed. All our enemies - both internal and foreign - raised their heads and the neutrals began to pay no attention to us.

-Sergei Witte,
Prime Minister of Russia
for Tsar Nicholas II

Introduction

In the realm of foreign policy formulation, the decision to use military force in the pursuit of political goals is the most serious of

all the options available to a government. Such a decision runs many risks that cannot be easily controlled (or controlled at all) and can result in the shift of policy power from the civilian authorities towards the military officers (witness Imperial Germany during the First World War). The greatest risk is that of failure or of ultimate defeat. A sharp reverse or a lost war has served as a catalyst which shakes or topples powerful regimes or systems, governments that appear to have been quite secure. Russian history in particular bears witness to the costs of losing a war and the resulting impact on the domestic scene. The defeat in the Crimean War (1854-56) contributed to the turmoil of the following decade and was one of the motivations for the domestic reforms introduced by Tsar Alexander II during the 1860's. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 triggered the revolution of 1905, a revolution that resulted in the formation of a Russian parliament (the Duma) as a challenge to the power of the tsar. The war also has been cited as a crucial factor in the loss of popular support for the Russian monarch in the years

following the conflict. Finally, the severe hardships and military defeats of the First World War led to a domestic crisis that toppled Tsar Nicholas II and ultimately led to a situation in which a small group of communists, with heretofore little power or support, seized and eventually held political power in Russia in October, 1917. These three examples alone, all drawn from Russian history, are testimony to the risks of military failure.

The Soviet leaders, no doubt, are quite cognizant of the domestic risks of military adventures, accentuated by the fact that they are conducting foreign policy in an age where total war would probably result in the decimation, if not total annihilation, of any society involved in a nuclear exchange. When given the traditional and historical Russian preoccupation with defense of the homeland and the risks of military failure cited above, it can be appreciated that any Soviet decision to intervene militarily would involve the input of the most authoritative agencies in the foreign policy process. The high visibility of any crisis which could lead to the use of force

would be more likely to provide clues as to policy formulation and to the locus of power behind Soviet foreign policy, as opposed to long-term and routine foreign policy decisions which evolve more slowly with much less visibility. The analysis of each of the following cases will attempt to cover three basic elements in the crises; the basic outline of what occurred, a description of the Soviet policy process in dealing with the crisis, and the role played by the military in the decision-making process.

Czechoslovakia 1968

The roots of the Czechoslovak crisis go back well before 1968, but it can be said that one immediate catalyst for the 'Prague Spring' was the replacement of Antonin Novotny as leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) by Alexander Dubcek in December, 1967. The matter appeared to be relatively routine and seems to have been sanctioned in Moscow. But Dubcek went on to initiate a series of liberal domestic reforms which took Brezhnev and his East European

collegues by surprise. The reforms included purging the CPCz of hard-line Stalinists, the curbing of the terroristic practices of the secret police and its connections to the Soviet KGB, acknowledging the shortcomings of one-party rule in the nation, and calls for an end to censorship. In March, 1968, Brezhnev and other Eastern Bloc leaders met at Dresden amidst mounting concern over the Dubcek reforms while one month later, the Soviet CPSU Central Committee held an extraordinary plenum while the first calls for intervention were heard amonst communist officials. In early May, 1968, a Czechoslovak delegation led by Dubcek arrived in Moscow to discuss the situation, but after the talks Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces began summer maneuvers in and around Czechoslovakia while the Soviet and East European newspapers mounted a massive campaign to denounce and discredit the domestic reforms in Czechoslovakia. The tensions increased, and late in July the Czechoslovak and Soviet Politburo members met face to face at Cierna-on-Tisa to defuse the crisis and reach an agreement. They arrived at a *modus vivendi* that

seemed to accept Dubcek's continued leadership of the CPCz. Later, on August 3, the other leaders of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), with the exception of Romania, met at Bratislava and agreed to the withdrawl of WTO units from Czechoslovakia, but not those units in the districts surrounding the country. Whatever the provisions of this agreement, it lasted only seventeen days. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army and other WTO forces (again excluding Romania) began on August 20, 1968.

The invasion is remarkable for several reasons. It represents the largest military commitment by the Soviet Union since the Second World War, an attack against a nation governed by a fraternal communist party which had given repeated assurances of loyalty to Moscow and which was maintained order in the land. The move came as a great surprise to many outside observers because it had occurred on the heels of the apparent agreement at Bratislava. The invasion was also a precedent in setting policy, and was justified under the new Brezhnev Doctrine; the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in

the affairs of another communist nation if the leading role of the party there is threatened by the forces of reaction.

To deal with this case in depth, two of the most prominent and recent studies of the Crisis will be used as the basis for our examination here in this thesis. One of the most impressive analyses regarding the Soviet decision to intervene was written by Jiri Valenta.[1] Valenta maintained that the formulation of policy in the USSR is restricted to three major bodies in descending order of power; the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee. The general secretary, Brezhnev, is not seen as the omnipotent dictator but, to use Valenta's description, Brezhnev is the 'leader among equals' (*primus inter pares*) in the Politburo.[2] The Politburo is portrayed as an example of collective leadership (*kollektivnoe rukovodstvo*), an arrangement that evolved following the death of Stalin. The Politburo is a ruling oligarchy, and all debate is limited to the members of the aforementioned three party organs. The more crucial and controversial the issue, the more likely that professionals

and ideologues of the Central Committee will have some impact on policymaking. Valenta believed that within the narrow CPSU elite, party officials do tend, to some extent, to represent their current field of expertise within the bureaucracy.[3] This is not to say that there are "hawks" and "doves" in the Politburo, and Valenta stated that such a view is misleading because all Soviet party leaders do strongly share the communist *weltanschauung* (world view).[4]

In the international field, there are several basic tenets that the leadership subscribes to as foreign policy pillars, and these serve to unite the opinions of the party and the leadership; these are the avoidance of nuclear war with the United States, the desire to weaken the US commitment to its NATO allies and Japan, the prevention of any resurgence of an equal or superior power in Europe (i.e. a united Germany), the maintenance of the East European states within Moscow's socialist commonwealth, limiting Chinese influence in the ideological and international spheres, and that support for Third World states presents opportunities for the USSR.[5] These serve as

standard pillars of Soviet external behavior and Valenta asserted that adherence to these goals prevents factionalism within the Politburo along lines of belief such as "progressive vs. conservative" in the western sense of the meaning.

But there remains scope for competition amongst bureaucracies with vested interests. Should domestic considerations take precedence over the foreign policy tenets? If an issue creates conflict between two or more foreign policy objectives, which course should be adopted and which objective should be subordinated? Valenta thought that the answer to these questions depends on the Politburo member's current constituency in the bureaucracy, with the general secretary carefully presiding over the debate and noting the formation of coalitions over the issue.[6]

In the case of Czechoslovakia, there were conflicting domestic and foreign policy considerations as well as conflict amongst the set of foreign policy objectives mentioned earlier. In 1968, Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev were working to create a world

communist conference in hopes of isolating the Chinese and reducing their influence in the global communist community. Together they represented the "internationalist" viewpoint as members of the Politburo. Suslov was responsible for supervising Soviet foreign policy, particularly the relations with the international communist movements, while Ponomarev headed the International Department of the Central Committee, which dealt with non-ruling communist parties and revolutionary movements.

Also at this time, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Alexei Kosygin, seems to have been working on two major issues at this time. Internationally, he had met with President Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro in 1967 to discuss the possibility of initiating talks aimed at reducing strategic nuclear arms (the first step in the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty - SALT). Domestically, Kosygin was working on possible economic reforms in hopes of rejuvenating the system and increasing both productivity and quality in the Soviet economy. Suslov, Ponomarev, and Kosygin were seen by Valenta as

members of the Politburo primarily responsible for international affairs, and in this capacity they appear to have taken a moderate or conciliatory line regarding the events in Czechoslovakia. A military invasion would undermine efforts to isolate the Chinese internationally, divide the opinion of the Soviet Union amongst other communist states and movements, damage relations with western governments, delay the move towards arms control and stifle the prospects for economic reform in the Soviet Union.

Those Politburo members charged with domestic concerns tended to support intervention in Czechoslovakia. First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Pyotr Shelest, spoke of the danger that the liberalism of the Prague reforms might "infect" and destabilize party rule in Byelorussia and the Ukraine. By allowing Dubcek to shape a Czechoslovak system of 'socialism with a human face,' it was thought that the restive Ukrainian or White Russian population would also campaign for more regional autonomy. There were prominent individuals outside the Politburo who were also

pushing for a military resolution to the changes in the Czechoslovak socialist system. The leaders of the German Democratic Republic, Ulbricht, and Gomulka of Poland, also feared that the Czechoslovak example would undermine their regimes in Eastern Europe.

Confronted by varying concerns in the Politburo, Brezhnev was initially cautious and careful to avoid pursuing a single policy line regarding the Dubcek reforms. According to Valenta, the role of the general secretary is that of an arbitrator who supervises the debate. Once it seems that a particular faction has gained a large base of support in the Central Committee, a general secretary will abandon the role of neutrality and adopt the cause of the winning faction as his own. Thus, the general secretary always sides with the winning faction and reinforces his authority and retains power in the Politburo. In February, 1968, Brezhnev's public pronouncements were cautious in regards to the reforms initiated by the Czechoslovak leader. After the conference of bloc leaders in Dresden in March, and the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in April, 1968, Brezhnev's

attitude seems to have become more critical of the Prague reforms and Valenta hypothesized that there was enough support for intervention in the Central Committee for Brezhnev to begin advocating a program to limit or halt the Prague reforms (Valenta also noted that Brezhnev's rivalry with Kosygin, a member of the triumvirate that replaced Khrushchev in 1964, may have served to prompt Brezhnev to support the interventionists).[7] This account emphasized the links between foreign policy decisions and the bureaucratic responsibilities of the Politburo members, and how their mission and personal rivalries affect their foreign policy stands.

In regards to the Central Committee, Valenta stated that this organization is rarely brought into policy formulation, as the Politburo usually strives to achieve and obtain a consensus without attempting to mobilize support in the Central Committee. In cases where the issue defies Politburo attempts at consensus, the CC becomes more influential as Politburo members engage in mobilizing support and by obtaining professional and technical expertise from

their bureaucracies. In examining the existing records from the Central Committee session of April, 1968, Valenta noted that Shelest seemed to have a large role in the interventionist coalition, and that several speakers responsible for ideological supervision and domestic security were called upon during the session to give speeches. Party members from large urban *oblasts* such as V.V. Grishin of Moscow, had dealt with the problem of dissent among members of the Soviet intelligentsia during the sixties and viewed the liberal Czechoslovak reforms as a possible rallying point for Soviet dissenters who wanted to liberalize the political system. It is difficult to discern what role the CC played at this point, but Valenta felt that it served as a forum where the party was attempting to legitimize a course of action (in this case, to lay the groundwork for intervention in Czechoslovak affairs should it become necessary). However, there is no sign of any party sympathy for the Prague reforms in Moscow, and no split over whether the liberal policies adopted by Dubcek were justified or not. The members of the Politburo and the party elite all viewed the

events in Czechoslovakia with antipathy, and all agreed that the situation had to be stabilized. The question was finding the optimum strategy to stabilize the situation.

Valenta's model definitely portrays a system where loose, temporary, heterogeneous, issue-oriented coalitions seeking personal and/or bureaucratic payoffs attempt to influence the course of Soviet foreign policy over Czechoslovakia.[10] Valenta indicated that the Soviet Armed Forces did not act as a united, professionally based interest group during the decision-making process. The head of the MPA, General Epishev, was the first Soviet official reported as calling for military intervention in April, 1968.[11] Other members of the armed forces, including the commander of the Warsaw Pact forces (Commander-in-Chief Marshal Iakubovskii) and the commander of the Ground Forces (Commander-in-Chief Pavlovskii), were worried about the possible security problems in the Eastern bloc and the strategic implications of a weak or neutralized Czechoslovakia bordering on the Soviet Union.[12] Soviet military intelligence (GRU) is stated to have

favoured intervention, and served as a primary source of information for the Politburo in Czechoslovakia during the crisis. But Valenta also indicated that other military officials did not actively advocate intervention, such as the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshal Krylov.[13] Krylov may have viewed the intervention as an opportunity for the rival Ground Forces command, and thus did not support the case of active military intervention.[14] The Air Defense Command (General Batitskii) and the Navy (Admiral Gorshkov) are described by Valenta as having been 'disinterested' during the crisis.[15]

There were other conflicting signs noted by Valenta amongst the military officials. Even though Marshal Iakubovskii favoured intervention by the military, his chief of staff in the Warsaw Pact command, General Kazakov, was abruptly replaced in June, 1968, because Kazakov doubted the wisdom of such a policy. Marshal Grechko, as Minister of Defense and the top military professional in the Soviet Union, does not appear to have played an active role in the

political deliberations but rather remained aloof from whatever debate occurred and served as an arbitrator over any disagreements within the armed forces. On the whole, the military seemed disposed to intervention because of the strategic implications for Soviet security if Czechoslovakia were neutral or hostile. As well, there was also the effect of the prolonged summer maneuvers on the economic system of the Soviet Union and the logistical problems of maintaining unit readiness among the divisions earmarked for the Czechoslovak operation (considerations which may have forced the military to request a decision regarding Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, on professional grounds).

According to Valenta, the armed forces did not act as a professional interest group during the crisis, but rather as a set of conflicting branches, who used their status as party members of the Central Committee rather than channel their arguments through the Ministry of Defense as state professionals.[17] The debate was solely restricted to the arena of the CPSU elite in the form of the Politburo

and the Central Committee, the point of note being that the military men accepted this political arena as the legitimate forum for their views to be put forward. The views of the officers did not necessarily coincide, and it was possible that the military members of the Central Committee joined different coalitions during the discussion of the crisis.

A second major study finished recently was that of Karen Dawisha. Dawisha agreed with Valenta on many aspects of Soviet decision-making at this time.[18] She supported the theory that there was a lack of consensus within the Politburo as to how the situation in Prague should be handled. The usual Politburo confirmation of the results of an international conference was not recorded in the major party newspaper, *Pravda* , in the aftermath of the Dresden conference in March, suggesting a lack of unified opinion.[19] The calling of a CPSU Central Committee plenum in April, hard on the heels of the Dresden conference, also reinforced this impression and suggested the need to sound out the party elites in the Central Committee.

Dawisha also viewed the CPSU April plenum as the occasion where the interventionists built a consensus by calling hardline speakers from the republics experiencing nationality probelms and the party elite from the cities dealing with dissidents.

The dissent problem facing the Soviet leadership is given greater emphasis in the decision-making process. The trial of Alexander Ginzburg in January, 1968, and the censoring of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, served to make dissent in the intelligentsia a major party concern, a problem equal in stature to the Prague reforms. The two key resolutions of the April plenum should be seen in this light. The first indicated that in dealing with domestic dissent, the CPSU retained the right to combat outside bourgeois influences, a resolution clearly aimed at justifying whatever measures the CPSU deemed necessary to deal with Dubcek. The second resolution stated that dissent and bloc disunity were caused by imperialist attempts at subversion from within the bloc system, thereby labelling any dissent as imperialist treason.[20] Taken together, the plenum served as a

platform for party consensus and a warning to dissident elements in the USSR and to Dubcek in Prague.

Dawisha, like Valenta, also mentioned the effect on policy of the bureaucratic responsibilities of the Politburo members; Kosygin and Suslov pursuing a non-interventionist line; Shelest, Podgorny and the eastern bloc leaders (except for Kadar of Hungary) as favouring intervention, and Brezhnev as undecided. As well, Dawisha wrote that the Czechoslovak crisis was partly elevated to the Politburo level by Ulbricht and Gomulka in March, 1968, at a time when the Politburo remained preoccupied by the Ginzburg trial and the riots in Poland (the forced resignation of the pro-Moscow president of Czechoslovakia, Novotny, at this time, also served to heighten suspicions in the USSR and other bloc countries).[21] In the main, the Dawisha view paralleled the earlier work by Valenta.

> Neither the Central Committee nor the East European leaders could be classified as part of the decisional forum in the pre-crisis period [January to April, 1968], but their functions nevertheless extended beyond mere passive consultation. From the beginning

> they acted as policy advocates, constituted pressure groups, and served as allies in the slow process of consensus building that began in the pre-crisis period, but really only gained momentum later on. Neither the Central Committee *apparat* nor the East European leaders represented a unified group; there were crosscurrents of opinion in both groups.[22]

At this point it should be noted that Dawisha had identified two of the three major groups involved as consultative agencies during the crisis: the East European leaders and the Central Committee *apparat*. The third agency is the military, which shall be covered in greater detail later.[23]

There are, however, differences between the two accounts of Soviet decision-making. Dawisha placed much more emphasis on the failure of the Soviet and Czechoslovak delegations to reach an accommodation at a conference in Moscow on May 4,1968. After these talks, the military preparations began in earnest, and, unlike Valenta, Dawisha stated that the consultative role of the Central Committee and the bloc leaders declined during the crisis period (May-August, 1968), while concurrently the role of the Politburo and the military in

policy-making increased. This led to the conclusion that the party leadership headed by Brezhnev had secured their workable consensus by the end of April, 1968. The most important point was that for the duration of the entire crisis "(a)uthority for strategic or policy decisions rested with the Politburo" and Dawisha asserted that the Politburo was the key policy-making body.[25]

> The overwhelming impression of research findings is that the Politburo remained the institutional focus for all the formal and major decisions made on Czechoslovakia . . . (h)ad a majority of the Politburo wished to resist pressures to convene a plenum, then almost certainly the [April] plenum would not have been called. The absence of a Central Committee meeting to approve the results of the Cierna and Bratislava negotiations can be interpreted in this light . . .[26]

Conversely, however, Dawisha gave the military a greater profile during the months from May to August. When the KGB network in the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior (and other CPCz or government departments) was disrupted by the firing of its operatives by the Dubcek liberals in March, the traditional Soviet

sources of information from abroad were all but removed. The intelligence gap was filled by the GRU supplemented by a series fo tours to Czechoslovakia by Soviet generals during the summer of 1968 in connection with ostensibly routine Warsaw Pact exercises. This situation was unique, as it forced Brezhnev and his Politburo associates to deal more directly with their Czechoslovak counterparts and hence there is more information available as to the actions of the Politburo, more that would have existed has the KGB network remained intact. It also gave the military greater scope regarding input into the decision-making process as a main source of intelligence. When this fact is added to the professional expertise required to prepare and execute the invasion, it appears that the military had a substantial part in the Politburo decision to invade:

> Although the Politburo remained the formal institutional focus of decision-making, the indications are that Grechko was involved in key Politburo deliberations involving military security...[27]

While Dawisha noted that Grechko never seemed to be an active proponent of intervention (as noted by Valenta), there is also no evidence that he opposed intervention, and given the opinion that Czechoslovakia could develop into a strategic risk, Grechko would logically have supported the invasion.[28] The military men that toured Czechoslovakia during 1968, such as Marshal Konev and General Epishev, were early proponents of a military solution and Dawisha stated that " . . . so serious was the breakdown of bilateral relations on the military front [of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations] . . . that it is doubtful if any of the key military counseled against invasion."[29] Grechko is thus viewed as having agreed with the consensus to intervene with the Warsaw Pact military forces.

The swift and decisive invasion by the military on August 20,1968, in contrast to the political confusion that followed it, may have given the military a greater standing in the CPSU elite and allowed Grechko to play a greater role in the foreign policy process (such as his trip to Egypt in 1970 to discuss military matters with

President Nasser).[30] Dawisha offered this possibility in the aftermath of the invasion, but also sounded a note of caution by observing that at the key negotiations between the Soviet and Czechoslovak politburo members at Cierna and Bratislava in late July, Grechko was absent and it was quite clear that the party element dominated the Soviet handling of this crucial meeting.[31]

On the whole, Dawisha's conclusions give a greater impression of a military consensus than is found in the Valenta material. She also went on to downplay the internal Politburo conflict:

> In the final anaysis, one must be skeptical about the effect of political infighting on the decision to invade because of the almost complete absence of negative political repercussions for the opponents of the invasion. The membership of the Politburo in the Soviet Union and party leadership in Eastern Europe were very stable in the years following the invasion; and when demotions were finally announced, at the top of the list were those who had been the most vociferous advocates of invasion: Shelest in the Ukraine, Gomulka in Poland, and Ulbricht in East Germany.[32]

Dawisha agreed that the Politburo was indecisive or cautious from

January to March, and did call for limited debate on the issue in which the Central Committee (or elements thereof) and the bloc leaders played a consultative role and acted as a sounding board for the Politburo. In addition to this, the talks with these elements also granted more legitimacy for any later course of action, including military intervention. But, as noted already, Dawisha observed a shift in policy with the dissolution of the Central Committee plenum and the failure of the Czechoslovak-Soviet talks of May 4. After this, she stated that the Politburo basically adopted a two-track policy in which they decided to provide for a potential military solution while simultaneously attempting to subvert the new reforms in Prague. The Politburo wanted to use pro-Moscow members of the CPCz to halt the liberalization process and possibly replace Dubcek, but called in military officials just in case this course failed. After April, the Politburo again became the sole locus of decision-making and it was here that the discussion over the Prague Spring went on. The invasion probably resulted from the perception in the Politburo that the crisis

could not be resolved by meddling in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs and that the military solution was called for in the strategic interests of the Soviet Union.

A final point worth mentioning in the Dawisha account is that she not only considered the Politburo as the locus of decision-making, but that often a small group of members within the Politburo itself seemed to be the most important in regards to party policy during the crisis.

> Certainly there was an inner core within the Politburo that acted both formally in the name of the Politburo in negotiations on Czechoslovakia and informally as a subgroup with apparently self-appointed responsibility for the management of the crisis. The membership . . . included Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov and Shelest . . . [33]

It is interesting that Dawisha refrained from offering the possibility that this subgroup represents the membership of the Soviet Defense Council in 1968. Both the naming of the members and the postulated existence of the Defense Council in 1968 are highly speculative assertions, but nevertheless Dawisha's observation should be noted.

Soviet behavior during the crisis does tend to support the subgroup theory of Politburo decision-making.

Both Valenta and Dawisha caution that their finding in the Czechoslovak example require further study of Soviet behavior in other situations in order to reach definite conclusions regarding the crisis of 1968. Valenta noted that the bureaucratic politics paradigm is best utilized in cases where domestic security interests are as important as defense and international considerations, and less useful in cases where non-socialist countries are involved.[34] Dawisha also observed the bureaucratic interplay of the Soviet elite in the crisis, but insisted that this conflict can only be properly judged if one first views the existing consensus within the Soviet elite. Both of these points should be kept in mind during the analysis of the next two Soviet foreign policy cases.

Afghanistan 1979

Afghanistan is a case study that involves a country governed by

socialists when the Soviet invasion took place in December, 1979, but the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had only taken power from the government of Mohammed Daoud in April, 1978. Unfortunately, from the Soviet point of view, the PDPA under the leadership of Nur Mohammed Taraki proved to be incapable of running the country. The party policies were brutal and implemented by an administrative apparatus that was both inefficient and corrupt, two facts that worked in tandem to alienate the bulk of the population and produce a resistance movement that the PDPA was incapable of suppressing.

As early as May, 1978, Soviet officials were dispatched to the Afghan capital of Kabul to advise their socialist allies on how to stabilize the country, but Taraki was both unable and unwilling to adopt the Soviet programs. The party itself was split along tribal lines, with Taraki heading the Parcham faction of the PDPA and Hafizullah Amin representing the Khalq contingent. There was deep seated distrust between the two groups based on a historical rivalry

and ideological differences, and the existence of this split prevented any coordinated policy to deal with the problems facing the new regime.

In July, 1979, the Soviets began to study alternatives to Taraki as leader of the PDPA, and possible methods of suppressing the guerrilla movement and securing a measure of stability and support in the country, the most significant step being the transfer of an elite 400-man strike unit from the Soviet 105th Guards Airborne Division to Bagram airbase outside Kabul.[35] Two months later, Taraki was ousted by Amin and reportedly killed shortly after his fall from power, and it is still not clear as to whether this was inspired by the Soviets or an independent plot engineered by Amin. It does seem apparent now that at this time the Soviet leadership began to press Amin to issue a call for Soviet aid, thereby restoring order and allowing the Soviets to deal with the guerrillas. Moscow seemed to be reaching the conclusion that the Afghan army was disintegrating as a military force. Instead, Amin sought to improve relations with

Pakistan and the United States while simultaneously attempting to limit or reduce Soviet influence in Afghan internal affairs, which was no mean feat considering that by this time there were approximately 1500 Soviet officials in the civilian ministries of Afghanistan and 3500 to 4000 Soviet officers aiding the Afghan army.[36] Amin's refusal to call for direct Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is cited as a major factor in the invasion in late December, 1979, an invasion that was accompanied by the assassination of Hafizullah Amin and his replacement by Babrak Karmal as leader of the PDPA.

Some parallels between Afghanistan in 1979 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 have been noted by several other authors and will only be summarized briefly here. Both countries were governed by socialist parties and in each case the Soviet Politburo came to view the native communist party as unable or unwilling to control domestic dissent that threatened the leading role of the party in that country. They also represented security risks, since both nations bordered on the Soviet Union, and in this light it was intolerable for

either to become neutral or pro-western. There were also the ideological and international considerations involved in "losing" countries that were once members of the socialist commonwealth, leading to concerns regarding Soviet prestige and its ability to protect its friends abroad. Finally, there was the threat that domestic turmoil in a bordering socialist state could carry over into the Soviet Union itself and threaten to weaken the power of the CPSU; in the case of Czechoslovakia, there was the threat of dissent amongst the nationalities and intelligentsia, while in 1979 the concern centered primarily on potential problems that Islamic fundamentalism could raise amongst the Moslem sects in the Soviet Union (particularly with the fundamentalist regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini in the bordering state of Iran).

There were other considerations beyond those mentioned above, but these were the crucial considerations involved in the Afghan situation. The major distinction between the two cases compared above is that Afghanistan was a Third World nation, ostensibly a

non-aligned member of the international community with no formal ties to the Soviet Union, such as membership in the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet invasion represented the first occasion where the USSR had conducted a military invasion of a Third World country since their occupation of northern Iran in 1946. The outcome of the invasion, of course, has been far different from Czechoslovakia in 1968. Both were initially successful in seizing key centers of power and both attained a large measure of surprise that facilitated military operations during the opening days. But the war in Afghanistan has degenerated into a bloody and inconclusive struggle to suppress the rebels in the countryside, while the PDPA remains weak and the regular Afghan army units a liability. The party in Czechoslovakia had made it known that in the event of military confrontation, the Czech armed forces would not resist, but the Moslem rebels called for a *jihad* or holy war against the Soviets. The upshot is a situation that still requires Soviet attention and resources, and also created ongoing complications in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

In trying to piece together the Soviet decision-making process, it must be remembered that such information is difficult to come by, given that the invasion occurred a relatively short time ago and that in many ways the Czechoslovak crisis was a unique opportunity to study Soviet policy formulation. In regards to Afghanistan, Bradsher noted the problems that existed in 1983 and still exist today in analysing the Soviet decision-making process.

> No inside, adequately informed account of that thinking [Politburo deliberations] had become available to the outside world more than two years later . . .[37]

Nevertheless, we will use the information available in an attempt to gain some further insight into the decision-making process.

The two key elements, the lack of faith in the ruling socialist party and the strategic location of the country, have been identified. The latter concern would involve the military in the policy process in some manner. The evidence seems to indicate that Amin adamantly refused to issue an official invitation to the Red Army to enter

Afghanistan, and that Soviet advisors already there were quite pessimistic about the ability of the Afghan army to defeat the guerrillas despite large amounts of military aid shipped to the embattled regime.[38] As in 1968, Soviet military missions made several visits to Afghanistan during the course of 1979, and the makeup of the personnel dispached from Moscow seems to indicate that the Soviets themselves recognised the parallels to Czechoslovakia. Many familiar figures were being sent to Afghanistan: Deputy Minister of Defense Ivan Pavlovskii, commander-in-chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, conducted an extended visit to Kabul from August to October, 1979 (Pavlovskii held the same post in 1968 and commanded the invasion of Czechoslovakia after touring the country beforehand).[39] Before him, the head of the MPA, General Alexei Epishev, had been part of a military mission to Afghanistan in April, 1979 and should be remembered as the earliest military officer to advocate the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.[40] The dispatch of two top level military officers, both of

whom occupied the same posts during the Czechoslovak crisis, in the same year, indicated that the Politburo had in all likelihood concluded that events in Afghanistan were becoming serious and that the military might be required to ensure stability in the country. It also signalled to the Afghans the same message that it had to Dubcek eleven years earlier; there was the distinct possibility that the Red Army would be called to settle the matter.

The April trip by General Epishev might be considered the initial stage in which the military was consulted, while the immediate preparations for invasion by the military were set in motion during the Pavlovskii visit to Kabul in August. The decision-making process probably stretched for a number of months during which the military was sent as a political message, and to lay the groundwork for the actual invasion of December 27, 1979. The question again is this; how much influence did these military professionals have during the course of policy deliberations?[42]

There were strategic differences from Czechoslovakia that

probably served to strengthen the military inclination to invade Afghanistan. The Czechoslovak case represented a strictly negative strategic operation: to prevent the loss and/or neutrality of Czechoslovakia as part of the Soviet defensive buffer in Eastern Europe. But Afghanistan offered heretofore unavailable bases for further operations in Iran, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, a significant factor if one considers the volatility of the region and the international sensitivity to events here. The prospect of an invasion offered positive strategic gains that would perhaps strengthen the Soviet position in the Middle East and serve to further Soviet efforts in gain access in some manner to a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean. There was also the potential gain in combat experience for Soviet forces in Afghanistan against what was probably considered to be relatively simple opposition, whereas in Czechoslovakia there had been no organized and armed resistance to the invasion. The Soviet military had envied the experience gained in Vietnam by their American counterparts and possibly saw Afghanistan as an advanced

testing grounds to measure and temper the combat capabilities of Soviet units and equipment.[43] There is no doubt that strong military and strategic incentives which could win favourable opinions amongst members of the Soviet military establishment and the Politburo. But there is precious little evidence as to whether the military commanders formed a cohesive pressure group, organized an interest group coalition in the elite or simply fulfilled the orders of the Politburo.

The key to the Czech case was that in the initial stages the Politburo did not come down with a specific policy line and thus a wider range of expertise within the Central Committee seems to have been consulted. But in late 1979, there were few domestic or foreign policy issues that would or could have produced the same hesitiation within the Soviet elite. The domestic argument of potential subversion of the Soviet system by Islamic fundamentalismplayed a major role, with the argument that losing Afghanistan would deal a great blow to the international standing of the Soviet Union. But

these seemed to lack the same immediacy and intensity when compared to the parallel concerns of 1968. The international conditions that may have promoted disunity or indecision in 1968, however, had very much diminished by 1979. The SALT process, a keystone of Soviet-American relations in the seventies, had played itself out as both sides came to conclude that the results of the talks had been disappointing. During the course of 1979, it appeared that President Carter would be unable to have the SALT II Treaty ratified by the Senate, and in the Politburo it was probably increasingly evident that the Americans wanted to link several international issues to the treaty, a concept that had been completely rejected by the Soviets. The Carter Administration may not have been viewed as likely to take any active measures over the anticipated invasion. One commentator noted that in the wake of American inaction of Soviet involvement in Angola, Ethiopia and the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the American warnings against direct Soviet action in Afghanistan " . . . looked good on the

bureaucratic record. They showed that the administration had not been unaware of the situation. But that was about all they were - a bureaucratic record."[44] There are grounds to support the view that Moscow had decided that the American reaction would be limited to general comdemnation of the USSR on a diplomatic level and that in the event of a stronger reaction there was no problem because SALT II was the major consideration involved and it appeared to be lost no matter what policy was pursued by the Soviet leadership.

Other international considerations that had served to restrain the Politburo in 1968 had diminished in intensity by 1979. The Sino-Soviet split was now an accepted reality in the international arena and the drive to isolate the Chinese ideological heresy was no longer the priority consideration it had been at the height of the split in the sixties. The question of the impact on the non-ruling communist movements, particularly in Europe, doesn't seem to have figured prominently in Politburo deliberations, while the role of other leaders in the Warsaw Pact countries was quite limited because

Afghanistan was not a member of that organization. The only restraining factor in the Soviet decision-making process may have been the diplomatic problems connected with the invasion of a Muslim and a Third World nation, which would represent a sharp break from the Soviet party line of the USSR as a defender of Third World interests against the forces of imperialism. But here, again, there is little evidence in current literature as to the debate or its existence as a consideration in Politburo planning.

The general conclusion is that an observer, at his point, cannot analyse which model of Soviet behavior applies in this case because the Politburo appears to have been united in regards to the decision to invade Afghanistan and prop up the PDPA as the governing party. The international and domestic trade-offs appear at this time to have overwhelming supported the idea of direct military intervention. From the bureaucratic point of view, the decision-making process does not appear to have been marked by a high level debate, perhaps because most of the domestic restraints of 1968 were absent or

lessened by 1979. The rational-actor or unity model would assume that the members agreed that action would have to be taken and that the only question was really one of tactics.

Henry S. Bradsher has made a rare attempt to analyse the mechanics of Soviet decision-making in relation to the invasion of Afghanistan.[45] Again, as Dawisha related in her account of the Czechoslovakia, Bradsher mentioned that there was probably a small "inner Politburo" of six key party leaders (Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Kosygin, Suslov, Ustinov and perhaps Ponomarev) responsible for decisions taken regarding Afghanistan, but refrained from identifying this small subgroup as the Defense Council.[46] Furthermore, Bradsher thought that the Politburo as a whole probably decided to intervene in Afghanistan at the meeting on November 26, 1979, the day before the Central Committee meeting that Bradsher referred to as " . . . a sounding board for the Politburo."[47] (Three days later, Lieutnant-General Viktor Paputin of the Soviet internal police and first deputy minister of the interior, plus an unidentified KGB

general, arrived in Kabul in what some have described as an attempt to have Amin assassinated before the invasion).[48] Although Brezhnev announced after the invasion that action had been taken by the Central Committee and the state organs, he did not discuss who made the decision but simply acknowledged that it had been a complex issue to resolve.[49]

This last reference has been interpreted to mean that there was some Politburo debate on the issue, but Bradsher noted that there is as yet no real evidence of this, and quoted former Politburo member Dimitriy Polyanskii as having said that "(d)ecisions are made collectively, and in no case is a decision made individually. Questions are carefully discussed, but final decisions are made with complete unanimity. The decision on the dispatch of Soviet troops to Afghanistan was made in accordance with this practice . . . the debate on this question was not easy. But the final decision was adopted with unanimous approval."[50] Bradsher did not rule out possible bureaucratic interests being voiced in the Politburo by five or six key

members, but his conclusions preclude an interpretation of any policy making role on the part of the Central Committee.[51]

The Afghan case, from the standpoint of the Soviet military and policy formulation, raises some interesting questions rather than giving objective conclusions. The military appears to have occupied a special role in the decision-making process in 1968 and 1979, with the same top generals of the armed forces being entrusted to personally attend the scene of developing crisis and make an assessment of the situation. Both cases resulted in a military invasion within the targeted country with some sources alluding to the idea that the military, because of their professional expertise, had a decisive role in the decisions to invade.[52] Reinforcing this conclusion is the argument that by August, 1968, and December, 1979, military preparations were complete and the Soviet military was able to use this accomplished fact to sway the political leadership, and that it was psychologically difficult to reverse the momentum of a military buildup once it had been completed[53] (not to mention the

possible disruption of the Soviet economy caused by large-scale military mobilization, as occurred in 1968).[54] There is strong, although generally circumstantial evidence, that the military or sections of the military exerted influence through their role as experts. The Afghan case does not really go further as yet in addressing this particular consideration. But the study of the invasion of Afghanistan does indicate that the various domestic and international factors can have a major impact on the decision whether or not to commit the military, and these factors may well serve as the framework within which one should judge possible military influence.

Poland 1980-81

The purpose of introducing the Solidarity crisis in Poland is to provide a contrast to the previous examinations of the crises in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. In Poland, there were many key Soviet defense priorities which were being threatened by the growth

of the independent Solidarity trade union movement. First, the rise of this movement threatened the traditional leading role of a ruling East European communist party, a party which was already split and in disarray for a variety of reasons. From a Soviet perspective, it could be interpreted as an intraparty problem worse than that in the CPCz in 1968. When dealing with Dubcek, the Politburo could be reasonably confident that the rank-and-file of the CPCz would obey the directives of their party leader (a fact that prevented the Soviets from being able to form an alternate and legitimate Politburo in the aftermath of the 1968 invasion). But the PUPW (Polish United Workers Party), which traditionally could be argued as the least legitimate ruling communist bloc government in the eyes of its people, was for all intents and purposes paralysed in 1980 and incapable of dealing effectively with the rise of the Solidarity trade union movement. The crisis was brought on by the incompetence and corruption of the PUPW leadership headed by Edward Gierek, whose ouster in September, 1980, only served to highlight the differences of

opinion within the party and initiate a high rate of turnover in top party positions. There were many reformist elements within the PUPW calling for a more "horizontal" party structure whereby the central leadership would consult with lower party groups rather than the "vertical" structure which emphasized obedience to dictates from the center.[55] Furthermore, one-third of the three million PUPW members in 1980 were also members of the Solidarity movement and this added a definite political undercurrent to the initial economic debate.[56]

The political bankruptcy of the PUPW was confirmed when Gierek's successor, Stanislaw Kania, was in turn replaced a few short months later by a uniformed officer of the Polish Army, General Wojciech Jaruzelski (October 17,1981). Jaruzelski was a party member, but his succession nonetheless represented a sharp break from the official Leninist principle of a professional political leadership, and could be interpreted as a tacit admission both on the part of the PUPW and the Soviet leadership that communist rule in

Poland rested more on the armed might of the Polish army and security forces, rather than on any ideological convictions. The major point to be drawn from this is that when the Politburo dealt with their counterparts from Poland, the Soviets could not be certain that agreements or decisions could and would be enforced by the PUPW on its membership. Even if Moscow could find an alternative leadership or faction in the Polish Politburo, there was no guarantee that the new leadership would fare any better at stabilizing the situation. As in Afghanistan, the Soviets were faced with a crisis in which they could not depend on the effectiveness of the ruling communist party.

The second defense issue that must have concerned the Soviets was the geographical location of Poland. The strategic importance of Poland was greater than that of either Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan because the Group of Soviet forces in Germany (GSFG), comprising the largest and finest Soviet military force outside the USSR, is supplied through Poland. The disruption of communist control in Poland, or a loss of power in that country, would serve to practically isolate the

the GSFG and even threaten to undermine Soviet rule in East Germany. So the primary conditions for Soviet military intervention did exist in the Solidarity crisis: the communist party was perceived as weak and having lost control of events in the host nation, a nation that was both a member of the WTO and bordered directly on the USSR.

There is evidence that the Soviet approach to the Polish question was similar to the approach taken in 1968 and 1979, which was essentially a two-track policy of mediation and intimidation. There were efforts made to stabilize the situation by using domestic political forces (aided by Soviet political and intelligence networks) and via a series of bilateral meetings between members of the Soviet Politburo and the PUPW. While conducting these talks in the fall of 1980, elements of the Red Army (numbering approximately thirty divisions) were gathered in four major groups around Poland, in addition there was a limited mobilization of reserves in the western Soviet military districts.[57] By December 7, 1980, one White House source stated that the USSR had completed military preparations for

intervention in Poland[58], a concentration of forces which remained in place until February, 1981, when the force was gradually dispersed.[59] There were further large scale military maneuvers (codename *Soyuz -81*) conducted in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and western Russia as well as limited maneuvers in Poland itself. These coincided with further labour unrest in Poland in March and April, 1981, and the Soviet Politburo seems to have prepared for both political and military solutions to the Solidarity crisis.

The domestic considerations that had marked the Czechoslovak crisis were also evident in 1980-81. East German and Czechoslovak communist party leaders (Erich Honecker and Gustav Husak, respectively) and their party organizations severly condemned the August, 1980, compromise that gave legal recognition to the Solidarity movement in Gdansk, which they characterized as being both anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary.[60] There were press campaigns in Eastern bloc news services, describing the situation in Poland as being a case of "counter-revolutionary subversion", a charge

which could later be used as a pretext for intervention under the tenets of the Brezhnev doctrine. But when the first calls were heard in the fall of 1981 for free elctions in Poland, there is no doubt that the issue could pose a grave domestic threat to all of the other bloc nations. This development on the part of radical elements of Solidarity is felt to have been instrumental in the imposition of martial law by General Jaruzelski on December 13, 1981.[61]

The domestic implications of the Solidarity crisis for other members of the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union, were more far-ranging and potentially dangerous than the Dubcek reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But despite these pressing concerns regarding the situation in Poland, concerns similar to those that had previously led the Politburo to sanction military intervention by Soviet troops, the Red Army did not invade Poland. The reasons given by many observers centered around three reasons. The first is that the appointment of Jaruzelski as leader of the PUPW and his declaration of martial law had stabilized the crisis. Second, it is

widely thought that the Politburo was aware of very severe repercussions on east-west relations between the CPSU and other communist parties in western Europe. Both the Carter, and later the Reagan Administrations, publicly warned the USSR that an invasion would seriously damage relations with the United States and other western powers and threatened to invoke sanctions. This warning came in the wake of the international reaction to the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an invasion of Poland would accentuate a negative world image of the Soviet Union already developed from Afghanistan. Third, there is the assertion that domestic Soviet political factors worked against any decision to effect a military solution.

A discussion of the first two points is outside the major aim of this paper, but the suggestion that Soviet domestic political elements played a role in deciding against intervention is very much a related issue. One author stated that the Soviet Politburo itself was paralysed on the Polish question by the illness of Brezhnev and

Suslov, which had led to a nascent succession struggle in which no Soviet contender wished to make a decision concerning Poland for fear of backing a failed foreign policy decision.[62] Another theory is that having recently become embroiled in a guerrilla war in Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership was less sanguine when faced with the prospect of another military venture and reluctant to further tie down Soviet forces or accept the promises of the military establishment.[63]

As stated above, it was important to establish that by historical precedent there were grounds for Soviet military intervention and offer proof that the Soviet armed forces were mobilized and ready to act in December, 1980, and again in March, 1981. Even though the military mobilization was called and the buildup for an invasion completed, the political leadership was not pressured into giving the green light simply because everything was ready and the units in place. In fact, the Soviet forces were put on hold for three months, at which time further military exercises were

conducted as a tool of political pressure on the Poles to solve the problem of Solidarity. The military played the same role that it had in previous crises, with Marshal V.G. Kulikov (commander of the Warsaw Pact forces) personally visiting Poland five times during the course of 1981 to observe the situation in the country. As Pavlovskii had found in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, Kulikov insisted that there were problems in the training and combat readiness among units of the host country due to the domestic crisis.[64] Kulikov had also denounced Polish counter-revolutionary forces and had accused certain elements in the country of conspiring to remove the socialist government.[65] The tone of other reports issued by Marshal Kulikov can only be guessed at, but they were in all likelihood similar to Pavlovskii's reports in 1968 and 1979.

In contrast to the success of the initial invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the military was not called upon in the Polish crisis and it seems that the military was actually rebuked over its conduct during this period of time. Andrew Cockburn

declared that the mobilization in the western military districts (Baltic, Carpathia, Byelorussia) was a disaster, with reports of the reservists failing to show up or be located as well as rumours of desertions and poorly-coordinated unit movements.[66] Several top Soviet officers were removed from their posts at this time, including General Ivan Pavlovskii (commander in chief of the Ground Forces), General S.P. Vasyagin (chief of the MPA in the Ground Forces), General Ye. F. Ivanovskii (commander of the GSFG) and General D.T. Yazov (commander of the CGSF - Central Group of Soviet Forces - based in Czechoslovakia), as well as the commanders of the Baltic and Byelorussian military districts.[67] These demotions all occurred from December 1-5, 1980, when military preparations for intervention were being completed.

A quick glance will suffice to show that these six officers comprise almost the entire command of Soviet forces surrounding Poland in December, 1980 (only General V.A. Belikov, commander of the Carpathian Military District, retained his post). The timing and

the scope of this 'mini-purge' can be interpreted in many ways, and was seen by Cockburn as Brezhnev taking the opportunity of a lacklustre military operation to remove political enemies within the Soviet armed forces.[68] It is also possible that the officers were indeed punished for problems in mobilizing Soviet forces. There is also the explanation that senior members of the officers responsible for the operation protested the decision not to intervene in Poland upon the completion of military preparations. Whatever the cause, it was severe enough to have most of the senior officers concerned sacked and replaced at a critical juncture in the crisis.

Conclusion

These three cases examined above represent the three largest mobilizations of Soviet forces during the Brezhnev era.[69] In each case, the military was consulted and allowed to monitor the situation, but the greatest link in these cases force had to be used to restore the situation to Moscow's version of stability. In the first

two cases discussed, the Soviet Army assumed that role while in the last case the Polish Army (and other Polish security forces) solved the Solidarity problem. These considerations indicate the level of seriousness in which the various crises were viewed by the Soviet leadership.

In spite of the high visibility of the political issues we must be satisfied with negative conclusions at the end of this chapter, for the subject matter was the most difficult. The aim was to gauge the strength and nature of Soviet military influence in the decision-making process. There is no doubt that the armed forces was consulted in all three cases and its expertise drawn upon in the decisions rendered. But in searching for signs of active policy advocacy by the military as a group, there are serious problems which remain to be addressed and large gaps in the exisiting base of information. In particular, the lack of memoirs on the part of Politburo members or minutes of their meetings.

The Czechoslovak crisis, with perhaps the best existing base of

information, there is little to indicate that the senior officers moved out of the realm of military considerations and into discussions of political and socio-economic policy. We do not see Marshal Grechko at the table in Cierna and Bratislava where Brezhnev and the Politburo made their final attempt to assess Dubcek and the Prague Spring. Only the Politburo conducted meetings in Eastern Europe and Moscow and while many military officers called for intervention, their calls were not directly endorsed or echoed by members of the Politburo during the crisis leading up to the invasion.

Actually, the situation in 1968 was probably the most favourable of any for military influence in the decision-making process. The two-track policy adopted by the Politburo still reflected an undecided approach, and the Soviet leadership appeared to be unusually indecisive. The GRU had replaced the KGB as the prime intelligence network in Czechoslovakia, and the Politburo seemed more susceptible than usual in reacting to press reports and rumours, an information gap that may well have fostered the atmosphere of

indecision. The GRU and the Soviet officers in Czechoslovakia may have been relied on to a greater extent than usual. But as yet, there is no indication that the military could have or did take advantage of this situation to induce the Politburo to invade Czechoslovakia.

The other two cases serve to give some perspective on the decisions made in 1968. The timing of the crisis in that year found many Soviet foreign and domestic policies at a critical juncture: the economy, domestic dissent, arms talks with the United States, and the split with Beijing. Many of these issues were just developing and often proved to be mutually incompatible, with the Politburo as yet to set the party line on many of these programs. But in 1979, the domestic and foreign policy factors that had foiled party consensus during the Czechoslovak crisis had substantially changed. For our purposes, the topic of military influence must be judged within the framework of these considerations. Each invasion took place against a differing backdrop, and the effect of this should be determined before analysing the role played by elements in the government (i.e.

the military).

Poland is the contrast to the two earlier cases. The situation in some respects was more threatening than that of Czechoslovakia, yet there was no invasion. The curious element in this crisis was the dismissal of several senior officers involved in operational and administrative duties in the military commands around Poland. It was a startling reminder of what can happen to generals, admirals and marshals in the Soviet armed forces, a move made at a time when there were suggestions that Brezhnev's illness and the nascent succession struggle was paralysing the policy power of the party leadership.[70] There is the implication that even during the course of a succession struggle or the apparent indecision of the leadership, the party is still quite capable of dealing with the military.

Finally, this author looked forward to analysing the role played by the top four military individuals in each case; the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, the head of the Warsaw Pact forces and the Chief of the MPA. In these case studies, we

encountered wide ranging calls for military intervention on the part of service commanders (often the commander of the Ground Forces). The Chief of the MPA and the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces often toured the target countries and railed against what they viewed as the forces of reaction. But the top two officers, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, consistently kept a low profile in each crisis. Dawisha and Valenta noted that Grechko was not active in the Czechoslovak case and went on to say that Grechko mediated between the military services or must have tacitly accepted the idea of intervention. There is also the approach that perhaps these men, who deal directly with the Politburo at the apex of the defense structure, do not have the luxury of offering public opinions on such sensitive matters. Membership in the rarefied circles of the party elite and the uniform may well indicate an understanding that the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff do not publicly state a position until the Politburo has arrived at a consensus. It may well have been this understanding that

Zhukov and Ogarkov neglected at the peril of their positions.

End Notes

[1] Jiri Valenta, Soviet Foreign Policy Decisionmaking and Bureaucratic Politics: Czechoslovak Crisis 1968, 2 vols. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

[2] Ibid., p. 153.

[3] Ibid., p. 37.

[4] Ibid., pp. 21-23.

[5] Based on Valenta's list, ibid., pp. 21-22.

[6] Ibid., p. 24.

[7] Ibid., pp. 154-155.

[8] Ibid., pp. 148-150.

[9] Ibid., p. 221.

[10] Ibid., pp. 273-275.

[11] Ibid., p. 281.

[12] Ibid., p. 283.

[13] Ibid., p. 293.

[14] Ibid., p. 591.

15 Ibid., p. 592.

16 Ibid., p. 603.

17 Ibid., pp. 602-603.

18 Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

19 Ibid., p. 61.

20 Ibid., pp. 59-60.

21 Ibid., pp. 23-33.

22 Ibid., pp. 88-89.

23 Ibid., p. 357.

24 Ibid., pp. 358-359.

25 Ibid., p. 89.

26 Ibid., p. 361.

27 Ibid., p. 344.

28 Ibid., pp. 305-306.

29 Ibid., p. 358.

30 Ibid., p. 358.

[31] Ibid., p. 362.

[32] Ibid., p. 366.

[33] Ibid., p. 361.

[34] Valenta, Czechoslovak Crisis, pp. 737-738.

[35] Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 1983), p. 107.

[36] Ibid., p. 123.

[37] Ibid., p. 154.

[38] Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 23.

[39] Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences (Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1984), p. 97.

[40] Ibid., p. 142.

[41] Ibid., p. 98.

[42] Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 152.

[43] See Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 158 and: Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, 143.

[44] Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 152.

[45] Ibid., pp. 163-168.

[46] Ibid., p. 163.

[47] Ibid., pp. 163-164.

[48] Ibid., p. 175.

[49] Ibid., p. 165.

[50] Ibid., p. 166.

[51] Ibid., p. 167.

[52] Ibid., p. 158. See also: Valenta, Czechoslovak Crisis, p. 604 and: Dawisha, Prague Spring, p. 305.

[53] See Valenta, Czechoslovak Crisis, p. 599 and: Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, p. 143 and: Dawisha, Prague Spring, p. 282.

[54] Dawisha, Prague Spring, p. 275.

[55] Adam Bromke, Poland: The Protracted Crisis (Oakville, Ont. : Mosaic Press, 1983), pp. 186-187.

[56] Arthur R. Rachwald, Poland Between the Superpowers: Security versus Economic Recovery (Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1983), p. 113.

[57] Jeffrey Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control (Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1985), p. 166.

[58] Peter Raina, Poland 1981: Towards Socialist Renewal (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 26.

[59] Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces, p. 177.

[60] Raina, Poland 1981, p. 9.

[61] Rachwald, Poland Between the Superpowers, pp. 120-122.

[62] Charles Gati, "Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well," Problems of Communism 34 (March-April 1985), p. 85.

[63] Ibid., p. 85. See also: Raina, Poland 1981, pp. 26-27.

[64] Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces, p. 177.

[65] Ibid., p. 173.

[66] Andrew Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York: Random House, Inc., 1983), pp. 178-179.

[67] Ibid., pp. 112-113. See also: Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces, p. 166.

[68] Cockburn, The Threat, p. 179.

[69] Ibid., p. 174.

[70] Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Pergammon Press Inc., 1984), p. 316.

V. SUMMARY

> Ancient theories of Russian administration were thereby illustrated: centralisation brought inefficiency, de-centralisation brought anarchy.
>
> -Norman Stone,
> The Eastern Front 1914-17
> (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975), p. 95.

One of the inspirations for the writing of this paper came from a debate in a history class covering the First World War. The issue in this particular class dealt with Lord Kitchener and his role as England's Secretary of State for War in 1914. The main theme was the question of whether ministers of defense should be civilians or military officers. When this writer offered his opinion that the minister responsible for defense should be a civilian, the discussion became heated and several arguments for and against came out. The debate centered on the dichotomy of the military ethos and civilian structure of government, and in the end it became a question of

whether war was too important to be left to the generals or if defense could only be handled properly by a uniformed professional.

The concept of civil-military relations was intriguing, and the original aim of this paper was to examine this aspect of politics in the Soviet Union and how the CPSU dealt with the matter. On the surface, the Minister of Defense in the Council of Ministers is traditionally a uniformed military officer. But there were other factors in the situation that sharply differentiated this study in the USSR from that of Western nations. Officers were also members of the CPSU, and the military establishment was integrated into the political and legislative structure of the Soviet state, a marked departure from the western practice of keeping the military separate from the governing agencies. During the course of preparing this thesis, it gradually became apparent that the traditional approach to civil-military relations would not translate well into the Soviet milieu.

This is the major problem with the interest group approach.

The model was designed by Bentley and Truman to describe American politics as separate from those of Europe. The model is still being discussed in regards to North American and West European political systems, and there are unresolved problems with the model in this context. Can such a model be transferred to the study of the Soviet Union?

In the case of the military, the value of interest group study was found to be minimal. There was little support in the general literature or case studies analysed here to suggest that the Soviet officer corps ever made demands on the party and on the Soviet political system. The question of communication necessary for the creation of effective interest groups has not been answered. Soviet information flows are much more strictly regulated and are subject to party interference and supervision in the form of the KGB. Military publications are subject to party censorship, while key promotions and personnel moves require MPA and secretariat approval. It is difficult to imagine that in the regular flow of Soviet politics the

circumstances under which a powerful faction of the armed forces could organize a group capable of making demands on the party. The circumspect role of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff during crises indicated the caution exercised by the party in regards to the military and politics.

Another suspect element of the interest group theory is the assumption that military values are antithetical to those of the party. In the Soviet Union, this is an extremely dubious proposition upon which to base a theory of political behavior. Lenin was an enthusiastic student of Clausewitz and practiced politics as a form of warfare. The Soviet state was born in wartime, with the party forced to centralize all the powers of the state to fight and win a bitter civil war. The centralised structure that had been the hallmark of the tsars was adopted to defeat the opponents of the party and then used to survive as the lone socialist state in a hostile world. The elements of the high command today - the Defense Council, Main Military Council, General Staff, the large and pervasive

military-industrial complex - all have their roots in the War Communism of 1918-20 and the Stalinist five year plans of the thirties. The CPSU leadership commands a highly centralised, stratified political organization that demands strict party discipline and sacrifice on the part of its members. Such sociopolitical values are not anithetical to military officers.

One is also hardpressed for signs of professional solidarity during the years since 1917. there was no united reaction on the part of the armed forces to the Great Purge, the dismissal of Zhukov in 1957, the sacking of five hundred officers in 1960, the removal of six important officers during the Polish crisis of 1980 or the demotion of Ogarkov in 1983. There is little precedent in Russian or Soviet history of collective action on the part of the military to set policy for the civilian authority, be that authority tsar or general secretary.

The bureaucratic model has more promise in the analysis of Soviet politics and the Soviet military. The military does have a monopoly on defense data and an expert voice in military-technical

policy through its definition of military science. The shaping of military doctrine by the party leadership includes sociopolitical and military-technical considerations, and hence the military may have a form of influence in this regard. Unfortunately, this is probably the most difficult area of politics to analyse because of it is the heart of the Soviet defense system and the subject of extreme secrecy. The military may not make demands on the leadership, but it could very well be equipped to resist them. The military in the bureaucracy is still the agency that carries out the policy dictated by the doctrine, and there is scope to perhaps distort or delay those aspects of military doctrine that the officer corps does not favour. This power is negative in content, rather than the positive political power hypothesized by the interest group theory. It is also an area of Soviet politics that the original totalitarian model did not address very well. The bureaucratic interplay at the intermediate and lower levels has been obscured because in the main, the domestic and foreign policies of the CPSU (including military doctrine) are materially quite

beneficial to the military establishment and had been ever since the first five-year plan and the decision to establish socialism in one nation. Such policies do not promote civil-military conflict, and the lack of conflict gives such problems a low profile and makes them difficult to study.

The above discussion has been conducted on the assumption of a regular flow of Soviet politics, but political systems are of course human and not material structures. The party has usually exhibited a remarkably high degree of consensus on foreign and domestic issues, and in cases where there is broad consensus (such as defense), the totalitarian model seems more applicable to the study of the political system. But circumstances which deny this consensus could usher in conditions where tenets of the bureaucratic model could be used to analyse the policy process, the Czechoslovak crisis in the spring of 1968 being a case in point. The approach to policy formulation must first assess the relative complexity of the issue facing the leadership and the impact of the issue on the cohesion of the party

and the consensus of opinion within the leadership. Within this framework, one can look to the military acting as the armed element of the party if the leadership is basically united, but in a situation where there is a lack of consensus, the military may have the scope to pursue bureaucratic politics at a higher level than is usual. In this vein, succession struggles within the party can be divisive and prolonged, and in this situation the officer corps may have a greater impact on policy. Before moving on, however, there is the warning in the Polish case, where the party was led by an ailing Brezhnev and the heirs were jockeying for position, and yet the leadership was quite able to fire six top generals.

The bureaucratic model also raised the profile of the Central Committee in Soviet politics as playing a role in policy formulation. There is some evidence to indicate that the Central Committee has served as the final breakwater beyond which interparty discussion must not pass, an arena that can play an important role in a crisis or during prolonged periods of indecision over policy. The attempt to

remove Khrushchev in 1957 was fought in the Central Committee, and the Czechoslovak crisis also seems to have been debated in this party forum. While these examples are by no means indicative of the system, further investigation of the role of the Central Committee may reveal new aspects of the political process and perhaps a party organ that is more that just an instrument of party control over the system. As the largest professional bloc in the Central Committee, the military may be an important political factor whenever policy discussion is opened up at this level. Again, the key is the consensus within the Politburo, and only if there is a lack of solidarity on the part of the leaders can these opportunities arise.

The fact remains, however, that during the course of seven decades of Soviet rule there is no evidence that the military has intervened directly in party rule to secure permanent policy power as a profession. The party leadership has created a military-industrial complex, but nothing in this study indicates that the rapid growth in the defense sector has been the result of a decline of party power

relative to the officer corps. The party has designed a series of controls that are multidimensional and include many of the methods cited at the beginning of Chapter Three. The military members are uniformed professionals with a parallel political branch in the service - the MPA. They are watched by a rival organization with hidden sources of information within the military structure. The officers also receive generous material and sociopolitical benefits from party rule, and its officers are thoroughly indoctrinated in a party system that is based on the military ethos. The party pursues foreign and domestic policies that almost coincide with the interests of the military establishment. The controversy lies in which area of civil-military relations to emphasize, and at the expense of which of the other factors in the argument.

Hypothetically, if the party leadership embarked on a large-scale cutback in the size and funding of the armed forces and the defense sector, and simultaneously revised military doctrine to de-emphasize the likelihood of war and competition with the west,

we might get a better idea as to the nature of Soviet officer corps and its relation to the state by analysing its reaction to these events. We may then be able to test which element of civil-military relations is more durable; coercion or cooption. But in lieu of such an occurrence and in acknowledgement of its remote nature at this point in Soviet history, this paper can offer no objective conclusions as to the party and professional roles of the officer corps and which identity is the stronger of the two.

What this paper does offer is the assertion that civil-military relations in the Soviet Union cannot be properly assessed using a western framework for reference. It is a mistake to begin an assessment of Soviet politics on the assumption that political and military values are incompatible for other cultures just becuase it is true of western cultures. The distinct division between civilian and military life common in the west does not exist in the USSR, and the very term 'civil-military' relations is a western term imputing the idea of a substantial boundry between the two. One can accept that

power is diffused in the Soviet system, but that does not necessarily mean that one must assume that it is a diffusion of power along western lines.

To conclude this paper, attention should be drawn to what is perhaps the most important and least-noted element of the Solidarity crisis in Poland. General Jaruzelski became the head of the PUPW and imposed martial law on Poland. But the system still functions much as it did before Jaruzelski, except that a general who is a party member now runs the party. When the PUPW was disintegrating and communist rule was threatened, the Soviet leadership called upon the most reliable source of party cadres in Poland: the armed forces. And the military answered the call, Jaruzelski took the leadership of a socialist party and stabilized the party and the situation for the time being.

In the final analysis, if domestic trouble were ever to grip the USSR and party rule were threatened in the Soviet Union or parts thereof, there is the distinct possibility that the Soviet Armed Forces

could turn out to be the 'strongest bastion of reaction', the final stronghold of the communist system of government. And perhaps the Politburo would have to summon the military party cadres as the last resort to uphold the gains of October, and in the process the Minister of Defense might become the General Secretary of the CPSU. But as Avidar and Odom hypothesized, and the case of Jaruzelski showed, the nature of Soviet or party rule and policies may well undergo only marginal changes. This is not a statement that could be made if a uniformed officer of the Canadian Armed Forces were to become the Prime Minister of Canada. Herein lies the danger of looking at Soviet military in Soviet politics in a western framework. In the end, the study of Russian history and political culture, along with the study of Lenin, Stalin and the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, would grant greater insights and benefits than attempts to graft western systems and experiences onto the Soviet political structure.

Bibliography

Adomeit, Hannes and Agursky, Mikhail. The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex and Its Internal Mechanism. Kingston: Queen's Center for International Relations, 1978.

Afanasev, V.G. The Scientific Management of Society. Moscow: Progress Publishers, Inc., 1971.

Arnold, Anthony. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

Ascherson, Neal. The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution. New York: The Viking Press, 1982.

Avidar, Josef. The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983.

Bialer, Seweryn. The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, Inc., 1981.

Blacker, Coit. "Military Forces." In After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s, pp. 125-185. Edited by Robert F. Byrnes. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983.

Bradsher, Henry S. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983.

Breslauer, George W. Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1982.

Bromke, Adam. Poland: The Protracted Crisis. Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1983.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past."

In The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era, pp. 69-85. Edited by Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984.

Byrnes, Robert F., ed. After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s. Washington, D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 1983.

Checinski, Michael. *Die Militaerelite im sowjetischen Entscheidungsprozess* [The Military Elite in Soviet Political Decisionmaking]. Cologne: Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 3, 1981.

Cockburn, Andrew. The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. New York: Random House, Inc., 1983.

Cohen, Stephen F. Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

Colton, Timothy. Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Dallin, Alexander. "The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy." In The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 335-408. Edited by Seweryn Bialer. Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1981.

Dawisha, Karen. The Kremlin and the Prague Spring. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

_____. " The Limits of Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations on the Soviet Case," Studies in Comparative Communism 80 (Winter 1980) : 300-346.

Deutscher, Isaac. "Defeat in Victory." In The Soviet Crucible: The

Soviet System in Theory and Practice 5th ed., pp. 89-100. Edited by Samuel Hendel. Boston: Duxbury Press, 1980.

Djilas, Milovan. "The New Class." In The Soviet Crucible: The Soviet System in Theory and Practice 5th ed., pp. 282-285. Edited by Samuel Hendel. Boston: Duxbury Press, 1980.

Dziak, John J. Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1981.

Friedrich, Carl J. and Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.

Gati, Charles. "Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well," Problems of Communism 34 (March-April 1985) : 73-86.

Girardet, Edward. Afghanistan: The Soviet War. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1985.

Griffiths, Franklyn. "Tendency Analysis in Policy Making." In Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, pp. 335-378. Edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Gustafson, Thane. "Lessons of the Brezhnev Policies on Land and Water and the Future of Reform." In The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era, pp. 511-528. Edited by Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984.

Hammond, Thomas T. Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences. Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1984.

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. "Soviets on Nuclear-War-Fighting," Problems of Communism 35 (July-August 1986) : 68-79.

Hendel, Samuel, ed. The Soviet Crucible: The Soviet System in Theory and Practice 5th ed. Boston: Duxbury Press, 1980.

Herspring, Dale R. "The Soviet Military in the Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress," Orbis 30 (Summer 1986) : 297-315.

_____, Dale R., and Laird, Robbin F. The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms. Boulder and London: Westview Press, Inc., 1984.

_____, and Volgyes, Ivan, eds. Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1978.

Hill, Ronald J. and Frank, Peter. The Soviet Communist Party. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981.

Hoffmann, Erik P., and Fleron, Frederic J., ed. The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1980.

_____, and Laird, Robbin F. The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984.

Holloway, David. The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983.

Hough, Jerry F. and Fainsod, Merle. How the Soviet Union is Governed. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1979.

_____. "The Party *Apparatchiki* ." In Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, pp. 49-72. Edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Jones, Ellen. Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet

Military. Boston: Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1985.

Kaplan, Stephen S., ed. Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Washington, D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1981.

Keeble, Curits, ed. The Soviet State: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy. London: Gower Publishing Company, Ltd., for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985.

Koenig, William, and Scofield, Peter. Soviet Military Power. Greenwich, CT: Bison Books, Inc., 1983.

Kolkowicz, Roman. The Soviet Military and the Communist Party. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

_____. "The Political Role of the Soviet Military." In Soviet Politics After Brezhnev, pp. 47-69. Edited by Joseph L. Nogee. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985.

_____. "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military." In Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, pp. 9-26. Edited by Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes. Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1978.

Kolakowski, Leszek. "Totalitarianism and the Lie," Commentary 75 (May 1983) : 33-38.

Lacqueur, Walter. "Is There Now, or Has There Ever Been, Such a Thing as Totalitarianism," Commentary 80 (October 1985) : 29-35.

Lee, William T., and Starr, Richard F. Soviet Military Policy Since World War II. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

Mackintosh, Malcolm. "The Military Role in Soviet Decision-Making." In The Soviet State: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 169-191. Edited by Curtis Keeble. London: Royal

Institute of International Affairs, 1985.

Nogee, Joseph L., Donaldson, Robert H. Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II 2d ed. New York: Pergammon Press, 1984.

Nogee, Joseph L., ed. Soviet Politics: Russia After Brezhnev. New York: Praeger Publishers, New York, 1985.

Odom, William. "Choice and Change in Soviet Politics," Problems of Communism 32 (May-June 1983) : 1-21.

Odom, William. "The Party Connection: A Critique." In Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, pp. 27-52. Edited by Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes. Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, Inc., 1978.

Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Old Regime. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.

Rachwald, Arthur R. Poland Between the Two Superpowers: Security versus Economic Recovery. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1983.

Raina, Peter. Poland 1981. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1985.

Reshetar, John S., Jr. The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the USSR 2d ed. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1978.

Rigby, T.H., and Harasymiw, Bohdan. Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relationships in the USSR and Yugoslavia. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983.

Rush, Myron. How Communist States Change Their Rulers. London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974.

Schapiro, Leonard, ed. Political Opposition in One-Party States. London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1972.

Scwartz, Morton. The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors. Encino: Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1975.

Scott, Harriet F., and Scott, William F. The Armed Forces of the USSR 3d ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1984.

Shevchenko, Arkady. Breaking With Moscow. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985.

Simon, Jeffrey. Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1985.

Skilling, H. Gordon, and Griffiths, Franklyn, eds. Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Smith, Hedrick. The Russians. New York: Ballantine Books, 1977.

Suvorov, Viktor. Inside the Soviet Army. London: Grafton Books, Ltd., 1984.

Théen, Rolf H. W. "Party and Bureaucracy." In The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era, pp. 131-166. Edited by Erik P. Hoffman and Robbin F. Laird. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984.

Valenta, Jiri. Soviet Foreign Policy Decision-Making and Bureaucratic Politics: Czechoslovak Crisis 1968 2 vols. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.

_____., and Potter, William, eds. Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security. Los Angeles: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.

Voslensky, Michael. Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1984.

Warner, Edward L. III. The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977.