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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

WALTER "HOMO" FABER:  
PROTOTYPE OF MAX FRISCH'S  
TECHNOLOGICAL MAN

BY

LINDA S. ASCHENBRENNER

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND  
RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN GERMAN LITERATURE

DEPARTMENT OF GERMANIC LANGUAGES

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

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
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
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
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

IN GERMAN LITERATURE



DR. RALEIGH WHITINGER



DR. MARIANNE HENN



PROF. DONALD BRUCE

Date: 25 April 1990

for my Nana and my Grandpa,

i love you both

## ABSTRACT

This thesis reviews technological-human evolution in the novel Homo faber. It also includes a comparative review of Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän and refers to two other prose works by Max Frisch, Montauk and Blaubart. The goal is to ascertain that there is a consistency in Frisch's prose portrayal of the man-technology relationship that is epitomized by the Homo faber protagonist.

Walter Faber is the central characterization of modern technological man in this thesis and the first three chapters analyze this characterization. Chapter I outlines the actions and attitudes of Walter Faber the protagonist. Both the "Bericht" genre and time are evoked to a special effect in Homo faber and as a result the narrator has a character presence wholly his own. Hence Chapter II analyzes these attitudes as evidenced in Faber's narration. There is a third character presence that is integral to this thesis as well--that of science and technology. These along with objectivity and external perspectives in the novel are reviewed in Chapter III. Chapter IV analyzes the similar characterization of Herr Geiser in Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän. The men of sciences in the novels Blaubart and Montauk comprise the subject of Chapter V.

These characters and novels, along with related works (in particular, Tagebuch 1946-1949 and Der Laie und die Architektur), are then used to reconstruct Frisch's own perception of the relationship between man and technology in the conclusion. This

conceptualization of the scientist by Frisch along with Faber's scientific characterization are then related to the tradition of scientists in German literature.



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## INTRODUCTION

Only since the late 1950s in a career dating back to before the Second World War has Max Frisch's fame spread beyond the Franco-germanic border. It is a recognition particularly overdue here in North America. A result of this and other factors, such as Frisch's continuing prolificacy, is the noncomprehensiveness of reviews and analyses of his work, in North America especially.<sup>3</sup> Frisch's literary consistency, maturation and longevity all invite analysis of those themes recurrent in his works.

There have been numerous comparative analyses of Frisch's works. These, however, are usually limited in scope to the problem of identity. In particular, critics have concentrated upon Frisch's treatment of the biblical "graven-image" (Pygmalion Effect) theme, and also his techniques, and portrayal of women and intellectuals.<sup>4</sup> Another theme recurrent in Frisch's writings but

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<sup>1</sup> James Rosenberg, "Biography of Max Frisch, The Chinese Wall, by Max Frisch, trans. J. Rosenberg, Spotlight Dramabook SD3 (NY: Hill and Wang, 1961): 5.

<sup>2</sup> See for example: Günther Bicknese, "Zur Rolle Amerikas in Max Frischs Homo Faber," German Quarterly 42 (1969): 52-64; Peter Gontrum, "America in the Writings of Max Frisch," Pacific Coast Philology 4 (1969): 30-36; Jean-Paul Mauranges, "L'Image de l'Amérique chez Max Frisch," Recherches Germaniques 7 (1977): 173-196.

<sup>3</sup> A recent computer search of the MLA International Bibliography (1967-1985 inclusive) on Frisch and his works generated 423 items. Of these 43 (10%) were of a holistic approach: of those 14 dealt with individuality in Frisch's works and the remainder, with few exceptions, with Frisch's structural techniques (i.e. diarist style, time, language). Of the 423 only ten (2%) focussed upon specific titles; only three of those included Homo faber and only one was in English.

<sup>4</sup> pg. 2n.

not in those of his reviewers is that of man's relationship to technology (and here it is important to note that the inherent gender-universality of "Man" does not extend to females as well).<sup>5</sup>

This thesis will differ from other essays in three ways. First, the technician Walter Faber has frequently been compared to Frisch's character "Don Juan" or to the identity-seekers Stiller and Gantenbein,<sup>6</sup> but this thesis places Homo faber in a unique prose context and considers the works Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän, Montauk and Blaubart. The prose genre permits a two-tiered message--that of the protagonist (content) and that of the narrator (structural, stylistic), both of which are used most effectively by Frisch. Second, while critics have concentrated more on Frisch's intellectuals, this thesis will concentrate on his technologically-indoctrinated characters. Finally, and most importantly, this thesis will diverge from the popular

---

<sup>5</sup> Frisch writes of his own philosophical distinctions between men and women in his Tagebuch 1946 - 1949 (221, 321; also in Franz, Intellectuelle 558). This combined with his conviction that experience cannot transcend gender boundaries (Tagebuch 147) and his dichotomous portrayal of women and technological men indicates a fundamental schism between genders in his concepts which has been noted and analyzed by critics. See also: Doris F. Merrifield, "Das Bild der Frau bei Max Frisch" (Freiburg: Beckmann, 1971); Zoran Konstantinovic, "Die Schuld an der Frau: Ein Beitrag zur Thematologie der Werke von Max Frisch" Frisch: Kritik-Thesen-Analysen. Beiträge zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Manfred Jurgensen (Bern: Francke, 1977): 145-155.

<sup>6</sup> Of the aforementioned bibliographic titles, 3 (.7%) specifically mention Homo faber and other titles: of those two concentrate on the major prose works Homo faber, Stiller and Mein Name sei Gantenbein and one compares Homo faber and Don Juan.

interpretation that Frisch is anti-technology<sup>7</sup> and show that it is man's use of technology (misuse then abuse) that Frisch is critical of, as only a few authors have recognized (notably Pütz 139-140; Blair 148; Geulen, Studien 16).

Frisch's technological men constitute a unique group among his "intellectuals": they are the intellectually directed and therefore more limited of these characters. These technologists often overemphasize the technical, the concrete, the objective "reality," frequently using it to justify or avoid something and sometimes using it to escape altogether from the natural realm into a sterilized, predictable life. The fact that Frisch uses Hanna's nickname for Faber as the novel's title, Homo faber, implies that he means Walter Faber to be representative of such a breed of humankind. For this reason and because Faber is a currently employed professional "technologist" and because of the novel's status as Frisch's major work about technological man, this character is an ideal archetype to which Frisch's other technologically-oriented protagonists can be compared. Walter Faber more than any other of Frisch's characters identifies himself as a technologist. As will be shown, Faber approaches life as though man's physical sciences govern rather than describe nature and even life itself. Because of this reliance upon technology as a methodology superceding all other social and natural orders, Walter Faber could be called a technocrat acting as an individual

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<sup>7</sup> For example, see Barlow 52; Latta 53; Pütz 139; Schmitz, Entstehung 226.

allegory for a technocratic society.<sup>8</sup> Homo faber: Ein Bericht is Faber's attempt to resolve this belief in a technocratic approach with the events of his own life, and is Frisch's attempt to reveal to his readers the possible deficiencies of just such an approach. It will also be shown that these deficiencies are inherent not to technocracy, but to Faber's selfishly-motivated application of the tools of technocracy. Frisch uses Walter Faber as an individual who governs his own life with these principles as an allegory for a technocratic society. This permits Frisch to work with a society on a personalized, individual scale. If Walter Faber the technocrat cannot successfully apply the technocratic approach to his own personal life, how could others or more importantly society as a whole be governed with the same principles?

The concurrence of Frisch's works with the philosophies of Heidegger's existentialism is recognized by critics.<sup>9</sup> Heidegger believed that "There can be no talk of Dasein apart from its Being-in-the-World, and no sense to talk about 'the World' apart from

---

<sup>8</sup> Technocracy is an Americanism defined as "government by technicians; spec., the theory or doctrine of a proposed system of government in which all economic resources, and hence the entire social system, would be controlled by scientists and engineers" ("Technocracy," Webster's New World Dictionary 1460).

<sup>9</sup> See, for example: W. Gordon Cunliffe, "Die Kunst ohne Geschichte abzuschwimmen: Existentialistisches Strukturprinzip in 'Stiller,' 'Homo faber,' und 'Mein Name sei Gantenbein'," Max Frisch: Aspekte des Prosawerks, Gerhard P. Knapp ed. (Bern: Lang, 1972); Doris Josephine Kiernan, "Existenziale Themen bei Max Frisch: Die Existentialphilosophie Martin Heideggers in den Romanen 'Stiller,' 'Homo faber,' und 'Mein Name sei Gantenbein'," diss. U of Michigan, 1977.

Dasein."<sup>10</sup> Conception of the world in Heidegger's phenomenology (as in Gestalt theory) is achieved as conception of a set, not as a composite of conceptions of subsets and elements.<sup>11</sup> He further believed that only through the recognition of death could a person fulfill his/her life ("become authentic").<sup>12</sup> One earmark of Faber's allegorical technocracy is that he uses it, counter to Heidegger's requirements for an existence, to compartmentalize various aspects of life. Critics refer to this compartmentalization as Faber's "dualities." There are a few major dualities that Faber unsuccessfully uses his methodology (and modern, technological civilization) in an attempt to segregate. These are: man and nature, life and death. "As we cannot stress enough, Dasein and the world are logically inseparable, and it is the 'unitary structure' of Being-in-the-World which has the world ... as one of its essential structures. For Heidegger, the 'phenomenological standpoint' and 'the natural standpoint' cannot be distinguished."<sup>13</sup> As Faber discovers, and in keeping with Heidegger's phenomenological existentialism, none of these four elements can be isolated from any other, hence these four elements

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<sup>10</sup> Robert Soloman, "Martin Heidegger: Being and Being Human," From Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their Nineteenth Century Backgrounds (NY: Harper and Row, 1972); 203.

<sup>11</sup> Soloman, Heidegger 202.

<sup>12</sup> Soloman, Heidegger 208, 226.

<sup>13</sup> Soloman 202.

will hereafter be referred to as "the unity." Faber must learn that:

Dasein cannot be distinguished, even in logic, from its existence in the world. Therefore, it makes no sense to suppose that we know ourselves better than we know the world, and it makes no sense to say that we know about ourselves in a different way than we know about the world. (...) We know ourselves and the world identically, for ourselves (as Dasein) and the world constitute a single phenomena.... (Soloman 200)

Frisch uses both the prose genre and a fictive narrator to portray the faults of Faber's allegorical technocracy contextually and by default respectively. The fictive narrator relates journeys that have led him ever further beyond the confines of his methodology and Western civilization. As he relates these travels he is simultaneously compelled to transcend the confines of his "report" and confront issues not compatible with his philosophies. Thus the novel is a record of two Fabers: the travelling protagonist of the recent past and the narrator exploring the many issues engendered by these travels and his allegorical technocracy.

The critically recognized union of travel and personal development invites analysis of the character in the context of his travels. Indeed, this clarifies a complicated interdevelopment of chronology and psychology. For this reason, the first chapter will analyze the protagonist Faber within a partial chronological restoration of his travels. The narrator's time disruption is merely a structural device of Frisch's to further accentuate Faber's inconsistent and false methodology. Faber's journeys proceed as follows:



NYC  
 Houston, TX  
 Tamaulipas, Mexico  
 Campeche, Mexico  
 Palenque, Mexico  
 Guatemala  
 Caracas, Venezuela  
 NYC  
 Atlantic cruise  
 Paris  
 Italy  
 Greece  
 NYC  
 Merida  
 Campeche  
 Palenque  
 Guatemala  
 Caracas.....writes First Station  
 Cuba  
 Düsseldorf  
 Zürich  
 Athens.....writes Second Station

This amended chronology will further facilitate both the contrasting of his personal changes and also the understanding of his cyclic life pattern. Verifying Faber's personal changes means that science and technology need not be an epithet, the conclusion that critics often draw from this novel.

The First Station's representation of the travelling Faber is a relatively cohesive one from the technocratic perspective. The protagonist adamantly adheres to his technocratic precepts and the narrator tries to justify this. Hence the chapter will ascertain that technocratic character-type. There are also indications of a nascent comprehension developing. Chapter I will also examine this awakening readiness for change.

It is during and after Faber's trip to Cuba that his most dramatic personal changes take place. These changes are enabled in

part by the private reflections of the narrator writing his report. The essence of these ruminations is in turn reflected in the text. The narrator has a character presence wholly his own that becomes ever stronger as the novel progresses. It is this Faber, the most recent character, who can substantiate whether there has been any personal maturation. Hence the second chapter will analyze the personal (attitudinal) progression of the narrator.

The third chapter deals with "the" truth of these events. The interrelated roles of perspective, technocracy and objectivity are clarified. It discusses Frisch's methods of conveying external truth through Faber's report. It also examines Faber's relationship to technology and his reliance on a technocracy. And finally, it considers the validity of such a technocracy and why Faber's failed.

Homo faber is used in this thesis as a comparator, and Walter Faber will be shown to be the essence of Frisch's technological man in the extreme. This thesis will furthermore show that Frisch's ideas about man and technology are compatible throughout his prose works and the cumulative, mature philosophies epitomized in Homo faber. Thus Homo faber will be a central theme and comparator in this thesis and so the major and initial portion of this thesis is concerned with Faber's character.

Following these Homo faber chapters will be an analysis of Herr Geiser of Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän. A final chapter will briefly describe other technologically oriented protagonists of Frisch's prose and how they assimilate into this pattern. This

section will include Montauk (1975) and Blaubart (1982). This final chapter will be relatively brief because these protagonists are not singularly scientifically dependent in their professional and private lives.

Other of Frisch's texts will also be discussed as appropriate in the conclusion. Frisch frequently writes about his philosophies and other works in his autobiographical writings. His "fictional" works are also based largely upon his personal experiences. The literary approach most suited for such an analysis is the Geneva School's "phenomenological criticism."

The roots of phenomenology can be traced as far back as Herder who, in 1778, wrote: "The 'living reading,' this divination of the soul of the author is the sole mode of reading and the most profound means of self-development."<sup>14</sup> According to Abrams, "Geneva critics read a work of literature as the verbalized embodiment of the unique mode of consciousness of its author ... as the revelation of the personality of its author" (Abrams 134). They believe that a literary text depicts the author's consciousness as a photograph depicts his physical appearance. Although critics may emphasize different aspects of the literary reading, the goal of a phenomenological analysis is to reproduce the author's consciousness and philosophies by reading the work. They believe this consciousness is manifested in content, motif,

---

<sup>14</sup> M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 4th ed. (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981): 134.

figuration, linguistic style and themes.<sup>15</sup> It is also customary for phenomenologists to investigate the author's "consciousness" through more than a single work.<sup>16</sup> In sum:

In order to penetrate this (consciousness), the reader must develop a systematically empathetic approach in which he tries to re-create the experience embodied in the text. He must subordinate his own subjective personality to a new subjective identity which is gradually created and revealed in the course of the book.<sup>17</sup>

This is precisely the error of most critics of Homo faber: they do not suspend their own preconceptions and too quickly dismiss Faber as another example of the 'science-is-bad' tradition of literature. The unique position of both Frisch and Faber within German literary tradition is responsible in part for these misguided analyses. This work's relationship to a tradition of scientists and builders in German literature that was established during the "Goethezeit" will be considered in the conclusion. In contrast to these critics then, this thesis is written from an author-text-based (phenomenological) perspective and augmented by related social sciences. As Lawall points out:

The place of the (Geneva School) criticism (eg. interpretation) of consciousness in an ideally comprehensive view is assured by its discovery of literature as tracery of human perceptions, present in the creating mind, latent in the work, and given a new and final genesis by the act of reading. (274)

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<sup>15</sup> Abrams, 135; Sarah N. Lawall, Critics of Consciousness: The Existential Structures of Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1968): 267.

<sup>16</sup> Abrams 135.

<sup>17</sup> Lawall 6-7.

For these reasons, the distinction between diary, autobiography and fictional prose is sometimes blurred in this thesis as the author's consciousness and characterizations merge. By approaching the novel in this way, I hope to contribute to the understanding of Frisch's concept of the man-science relationship and of how each of these texts considered here exemplifies and contributes to this concept as developed in Homo faber.

## CHAPTER I

The First Station characterization of Faber is unique in that it is the truest technocratic perspective in the novel.<sup>18</sup> The narrator is bedridden because of ill-health in Caracas. He went to Caracas (for the second time) in order to finish a job installing turbines, but was (twice) unable to finish the job. At this point in the novel both he and the protagonist have reason to be defensive about and overly reliant on their technological methodology. This technocratic characterization is a thorough and multifaceted one, and one that is integral to understanding Max Frisch's technological man. Hence this chapter will analyze that characterization.

There is information enough in the novel about Faber's formative years to determine the interdevelopment of his allegorically technocratic approach and his 'Lebensangst.' Faber had a macabre affair with his teacher's tubercular wife shortly before her death and consequently felt guilty and was interestingly also afraid of being called on first in class (99). However, whether his 'Lebensangst' preceded his technological methodology or vice versa is not important to the novel which seeks merely to warn against an uncomplemented reliance upon any one approach to life.

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<sup>18</sup> This thesis will show that Frisch's position is, in fact, that there can be no such idealistically "pure" perspective.

#### A. FROM CIVILIZATION TO NATURE ... NEW YORK CITY TO GUATEMALA

During this first travel leg Faber becomes increasingly isolated from Western technological society. Frisch defines Faber's character precisely and extensively both in his native, technologically-progressive, Western society and during his first exposure to the natural domain in the Tamaulipas desert. This and later immersions in the natural realm are a challenge to Faber's technocracy and his reactions to this confrontation are integral to understanding his relationship with his technocracy. The readers' recognition and understanding of this initial characterization is integral in turn to an appreciation of Faber's inappropriate relationships with life and technology.

#### Breakdowns: New York to Tamaulipas

Already in the very first paragraph of the novel man's sciences are shown to be unreliable. Faber's flight is delayed by more than three hours due to a snowstorm. Sciences can neither predict precisely nor control such natural phenomena. To help pass the time the stewardess hands out newspapers with the headline "First Pictures of the World's Greatest Aircrash"<sup>19</sup>--a stronger example of technology's frailties. Faber's implicit trust in human technology, however, disallows any worry regarding the safety of his flight (7). He feels securely cocooned within this machine, and shuts out the storm, the headline disaster, the strange

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<sup>19</sup> Max Frisch, Homo faber: Ein Bericht (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957): 7.

vibration in the engines (7) and his ailing stomach, all of which are later deemed noteworthy by the narrating Faber. He also takes comfort in his ever-ready statistics, "... ein Flug wie hundert andere zuvor, die Motoren liefen in Ordnung" (9).

It is instead the person sitting next to Faber on the plane who makes him nervous (7) and to whom he cannot even be pleasant (8, 10, 11). Faber's difficulty is not merely lack of gregariousness, in his own words he finds that "Menschen sind anstrengend" (8, 28, 69, 92).<sup>20</sup> He more than once remarks that his neighbor gets on his nerves, at one point merely because he is eating breakfast as Faber awakens from a nap (8). Yet Faber's perception of his neighbor is dependant upon how his stomach feels.<sup>21</sup> Evidently, Faber is not making objective, unbiased observations, and Faber's technocracy is then a subjective one.

After Faber has napped and had his own breakfast, he takes his electric shaver from his briefcase and shaves, "so daß ich mich freier fühlte, sicherer - ich vertrage es nicht unrasiert zu sein" (10). This is symptomatic of his discomfort with anything biological or natural. Jurgensen notes: "Mit dem elektrischen

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<sup>20</sup> Faber's rather odd relationship with Ivy is also introduced in the first few pages of the novel: she fussed over him for three hours during the delay (7), he will not marry her (7), and he is annoyed because she robbed him of his sleep (15). In fact, Faber's uneasiness around people will recur throughout the beginning of the novel.

<sup>21</sup> After seven pages of grumbling about his neighbor, "da ich keine Magenbeschwerden mehr hatte, fand ich ihn jetzt etwas sympathischer" (14). By the time they reach their flight's destination Herbert will have progressed from "der Deutsche neben mir" (7) to "mein Nachbar" (8), "der Düsseldorfer" (18), Herhert (29) and finally to the familiar "du" (32).



Rasierapparat glaubt Faber eine technische Bereinigung ... (erreichen) zu können. Mit seiner Hilfe vermag er die Spuren natürlichen Wachstums zu beseitigen".<sup>22</sup> His shaving is at times obsessive as is his repulsion to sweat or even sex. The technocrat of allegory, Faber, has no place for life's biological facts. "Ich spürte den Magen ... nicht schlimm, nicht schmerzhaft, ich spürte nur, daß man einen Magen hat, ein blödes Gefühl" (10).

During the stopover Faber is unable to disregard his own fainting breakdown (11), but he still denies any biological weaknesses. "Ich bin in meinem Leben nie krank gewesen, ausgenommen Masern" (38, 98)--though he later concedes having had food poisoning (17) and later still appendicitis (99) in addition to these fainting spells. As becomes evident by the novel's end (which corresponds with Faber's own cancer-ridden end), Faber should heed these ample feelings and facts, both biological and technological, as warning signs.

Already at this early point in the novel a number of recurrent motifs have been presented. These include Faber's propensity for precise accounting of time (7, 11), his revulsion at things natural-biological and his corresponding faith in technology, his uneasiness with people, his unfinished UNESCO work (8), the blindness metaphor (7),<sup>23</sup> his predilection for denying or ignoring

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<sup>22</sup> Manfred Jurgensen, Max Frisch: Die Romane, Interpretationen (Bern: Francke, 1972): 113.

<sup>23</sup> This is one of Frisch's favorite motifs, cf. Mein Name sei Gantenbein, Graf Öderland, Don Juan.

potential warning signs, and complimentary propensity to feel reassured by statistics.

Faber's forced stay in the Tamaulipas desert, a natural domain,<sup>24</sup> is replete with further technocracy-challenges that function as examples of man's and his technology's subservience to nature. These include the susceptibility of the Super Constellation's motors to the sand (26), similarly of Faber's typewriter and its subsequent need to be cleaned (32) although the sand will never be totally effaced (29). Prepared food and drink are scarce--they run out of the latter (27, 29). The extreme climate causes headaches and other discomforts (27, 28, 29). The endurance of the plane's battery is limited and there is no alternate source of electricity (26, 27, 31). The inaccessibility of the area contributes to the 85 hour long rescue deferral (22). As a natural domain, the Tamaulipas desert is at once irrelevant to the allegorical technocrat Faber ("Zu filmen gab es überhaupt nichts,"<sup>27</sup>) as well as both threatening in and frightening to the mechanistic encultured Faber: "... als ich zum (Flugzeug-) Fensterchen hinausschaute und den Sand sah, die Nähe des Sandes (der Natur), erschrak ich eine Sekunde lang, unnötigerweise" (26). He attempts to orient himself by reliable quantitative devices derived from technology.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> For the purposes of this thesis "natural" will mean native and without human interference.

<sup>25</sup> He discusses and recalls the scale of Herbert's map (15) and uses it to calculate that the nearest road is about sixty miles (25). He also chronicles time, noting that the time is 11:05 (21) Describing the technicalities of his camera to the Düsseldorfer is

Faber has constantly sought to disassociate himself from oppressive nature and ally himself with technology. The technocratic-type protagonist Faber thus disallows himself to accept nature and his own place in it, and so instead must feel apathetic, threatened, defensive, or fearful when, as here in the desert, it becomes apparent that man and his technologies are ultimately subordinate to nature. Kaiser relates Faber's estrangement from nature to his relationship to life: "Solange Fabers Abdichtung gegen diese (natürliche) Sphäre funktioniert, bleibt er distanziert und unbeteiligt,"<sup>26</sup> which facilitates understanding Faber's stymied ability to undergo an 'Erlebnis' (see Chapter II). This pressure of being immersed in a natural domain disorients the protagonist Faber and even causes him to act irrationally. In exemplarum, he attempts to use his electric shaver<sup>27</sup> without an electrical source--noting, "das war es ja, was mich nervös machte: daß es in der Wüste keinen Strom gibt, kein Telephon, keinen Stecker, nichts" (27). This inescapability of the natural domain coerces him to recognize incorporation with it: "Ich habe dann das Gefühl, ich werde etwas wie eine Pflanze, wenn ... transpiert bin ..." (27). Faber's journey to Tamaulipas is a series of unheeded breakdowns: mechanical, technocratic, and human. "Das ist die, was ich in der Wüste von Tamaulipas tat" (23).

<sup>26</sup> Gerhard Kaiser, "Max Frischs Homo faber" Über Max Frisch II, ed. Walter Schmitz, Edition Suhrkamp 852, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976): 270.

<sup>27</sup> In 1957 rechargeable power packs were not commonly available.

biological.<sup>28</sup> His stay in this desert is also a premonitory prelude to his Campeche-Palenque-Guatemala excursion during which he becomes increasingly enmeshed in the natural world.

It is during Faber's travels in South America that his objective, technological methodology proves deleterious. Each of Faber's stop-overs is a vivid portrayal of the discord between his technocracy and the natural realm. Each stop-over is also more removed from Faber's security-blanket technological society than that preceding. Together these stop-overs form an anecdotal, snapshot collection of Faber's insufficient technocracy and nature's dominance that becomes repetitive and also intensifies. In this way Frisch familiarizes his readers with a characterization of the technocrat that is often interpreted as an enduring one.

#### "Immerhin eine Stadt": Campeche

Faber's first descriptions of Campeche instigate a literary awareness of the omnipresent unity of man, nature, life and death which will evolve as Faber's journey to Guatemala progresses. This presence is often expressed via 'Katachrese' and oxymoronic synesthesia. In Campeche the sun is slimy, the odor is of sludge decaying in the sun and one's sweat smells of fish (33-34).<sup>29</sup> The fixedness of this unity and Faber's repulsion to and repeated

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<sup>28</sup> The breakdown of Faber's technocracy occurs not just in his flagrant subjectivity, but also in his bastardized use of statistics regarding the flight's safety, Herbert's possible relation to Joachim, etc.

<sup>29</sup> Kaiser alluded to this unity in that he paralleled the ability to experience life and nature (270).

denial of it is evident in the allegory of encroaching primordial life represented by beetles. Faber rinses them down the shower drain and, when they crawl zombie-like back out from the plumbing, then crushes them with his heel, "um mich endlich duschen zu können" (34).<sup>30</sup> Life and death unite again in a foreshadowing metaphor when "man's best friend" is sacrificed to nature via the vultures: "schwarzvioletten Vögeln mit blutigen Därmen in ihren Schnäbeln ..." (34). Faber remains aloof from this unity. His refusal to become a part of nature's life-death cycle is evidenced when he writes of Joachim's burial:

Erde ist Schlamm ..., Verwesung voller Keime, ...  
 Tümpel im Morgenrot wie Tümpel von schmutzigem Blut,  
 Monatsblut, Tümpel voller Molche, nichts als schwarze  
 Köpfe mit zuckenden Schwänzchen wie ein Gewimmel von  
 Spermatozoen, genau so - grauenhaft.  
 (Ich möchte kremiert werden!) (68)

His determination in this matter allowed him to overcome the inherent repugnance of crushing beetles with his bare heels. In Campeche Faber is able to maintain his allegorically technocratic convictions without much effort since he is still able to shower and shave, there is a telephone and electricity, even an airport (34, 35) and when he leaves it is in a train with a diesel engine and air conditioning--all in all "besser als erwartet" (35). Faber records Campeche as a dichotomous, mutually exclusive coexistence of technology and nature: "Campeche ist immerhin eine Stadt, eine Siedlung mit elektrischem Strom" (34).

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<sup>30</sup> Showering is a symbolic cleansing ritual for Faber. He rids himself of any vestiges of a natural or biological nature (sweat, dirt and dust respectively).

"Ende der Zivilisation": Palenque

Although technology and nature reputedly coexist in Campeche, man's automatizations are now an insignificant intrusion into nature's domain called Palenque. Herbert and Faber must verify three times over whether the whistle stop they debark at is indeed Palenque. "Wir standen mit unserem Gepäck ... am Ende der Zivilisation ..." (34). This metaphorical limit of civilization is symbolically apparent as well. The jeep which is to escort them degenerates into a donkey. The pulse of modern civilization, time, is unheeded. Their escort is over one half hour late. Once in Palenque, rather than actively seek a means of further transport or return, they "hang around" in hammocks for five days until by fluke that even the logician Faber concedes as "das Wunder" (44) they gain access to a jeep (37). Furthermore, electricity is available only until 9 p.m. (39). The availability of prepared food and drink are limited as they were in the desert: they run out of beer (41) and eat the same fried Mexican-style Huevos every day-- "vermutlich gesund" (40) despite the availability of pumpkins, corn and bananas (37). Faber's dreaded sweating is inescapable "als wäre Schwitzen unser Lebenszweck" (37).

Faber's reaction to these primitive affronts is to exuviate any clues of them. "Ich duschte mich von morgens bis abends, ich hasse Schweiß ..." (37). He compulsively showers and shaves, "solange es noch elektrischen Strom gab" (41), seeking to purge himself of these vestiges of his biological nature. When Herbert

questions Faber about his ideologies--"was ich denn glaube" and "Was man denn machen solle"--the reply is simply "Duschen-" (39).<sup>31</sup>

Faber still relies on his personal, automatized technocracy to orient and comfort himself, he is emotionally and logistically immobilized without it. Hence when the Indian-and-donkey escort arrived he did not surrender his briefcase, but clung to it as a frightened child to his teddy bear. He and Herbert laze about for days waiting for a jeep yet they never consider enlisting the help of the horses or mules that are so common in Palenque (34, 39, 53).

Roisch offers an intriguing alternative interpretation for their inactivity. She interprets the South American sojourn as illustrative of man's acquiescence to nature. "Natur, die keine Spuren menschlichen Gestaltungswillens trägt, verharret im Zustand der Bewußtlosigkeit, ohne Verantwortung dem Gezeugten gegenüber; denn sittlich verhalten kann sich nur das denkende Wesen."<sup>32</sup> Nature is oppressive in its own domain and indeed will not be wholly denied. It can tolerate man as it did the Mayans or even be repressed by man as represented in the novel by America. For man and nature not only coexist, they are inseparable from one another. Man cannot escape his biological nature just as nature cannot escape man's influence.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> pg. 16n.

<sup>32</sup> Ursula Roisch, "Max Frischs Auffassung vom Einfluß der Technik auf den Menschen - nachgewiesen am Roman 'Homo faber'," Über Max Frisch, ed. Thomas Beckermann, Edition Suhrkamp 404 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971): 100.

<sup>33</sup> This particular idea is more developed in Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän.

### Civilization Reclaimed: The Mayan Ruins

Even this minor excursion to the ruins assimilates into Frisch's pattern of uniting distended travel and immersion into the natural world. These ruins are more remote from technology than Palenque, but less so than Guatemala will be. Faber notes this distance from civilization, he listens for airplanes but hears only birds (43). In fact, there is no sound of machinery at all (44). In Palenque Faber is awakened every morning by the "halb Industrie, halb Musik" sounds of machinery (40), but at the ruins he hears only the cacophony created by nature (42). Even the roads end at the ruins, overcome by nature, "... (die Straße) verliert sich einfach in Moos und Farnkraut-" (49).

### "Los in dem Dschungel": Guatemala

Now, even the roads are gone and the technologist can adapt and objectively orient himself at first only by counting the miles they have covered (49), noting their 18° latitude (50) and the 1:500,000 scale of Herbert's map (51), and recognizing the few natural landmarks which punctuate the jungle such as the Rio Usumacinta (51). Faber also observes that Marcel talks too much (38, 44, 50). He is at once condescending towards Marcel's ideas (42, 44, 50) and reluctantly intrigued in spite of himself: "das (über Cortez und Montezuma) ging noch, weil historische Tatsache" (50), "und wenn man zuhörte, sogar ganz interessant" (39). And listen Faber does, for it is Marcel who introduces Faber to the



plasticity concept of "The American Way of Life" which will later become a pet philosophy.

Faber is still agitated by nature's proximity despite his denials and half-admissions:

Ohne Rum ... wären wir umgekehrt ... nicht aus Angst (50)  
 Ich hätte keine Angst (wovor denn!) (51)  
 Ich war froh, nicht allein zu sein, obgleich eigentlich  
 keinerlei Gefahr, sachlich betrachtet (69)

Nature and the unity are inescapable and Faber's descriptions convey this multi-saturation of presence, metaphor, unity (53).

For example:

Was mir auf die Nerven ging: die Molche in jedem Tümpel,  
 in jeder Eintagspfütze ein Gewimmel von Molchen - über-  
 haupt diese Fortpflanzerei überall, es stinkt nach  
 Fruchtbarkeit, nach blühender Verwesung. Wo man hin-  
 spuckt, keimt es! (51)

The unity even denies Faber a cleansing bath since it pervades the river. His compulsion to shower prompts him to bathe in the life-infested river, despite the fact that the river smells and he suspects there are snakes in it (51, 52). Faber decides that his only recourse to escape nature's sovereignty is to convince Marcel and Herbert to turn back. Twice after being inundated by the natural realm he states "Ich war für umkehren" (52).

Faber still mistrusts nature and draws comfort from technology. He is able neither to understand nor to utilize nature. Upon reaching Joachim's plantation he will criticize the fact that the latter's Nash was "... nur mit einem Blätterdach geschützt ..." (55). He is still unable to sleep and is even disquieted by nighttime. "Die Hoffnung, noch vor Einbruch der Nacht hinzukommen, machte uns nervöser als je, dazu die Hitze wie

noch nie, ringsum Tabak ... Menschenwerk ... aber nirgends ein Mensch" (53). Once they do reach the plantation's main hut Faber considers the method and materials both of the hut's construction and Joachim's suicide (55), and the condition of the Nash 55 (55-56). Faber is also intrigued by the sound and electrical source of the radio although he admits "... das war jetzt nicht das Wichtigste - Wir fotografierten und bestatteten ihn" (55).

Now that Faber has reached his waylaid destination death is dramatically and unarguably placed within the unity. The goal of Faber's quest has led him through overly productive nature to death and Joachim's suicide. Death is the one element of the unity that Faber most stubbornly resists and it is his inability to accept death that most hinders his own progress. Bradley elucidates Faber's position: "By denying death, the technologist deprives himself of the zest for living; for it seems that only (sic.) the awareness of death imparts meaning to life" (290). Bradley is seconded by Blair, "Life can only be defined in relation to death ..." (Motif 147). The unity is alluded to by the theological concept of dust returning to dust and is indirectly expounded by Roisch: "Sein Freitod führt das :étour à la nature ad absurdum. Die bewußtlos produzierende Natur ist ebenso menschenfeindlich wie die Alleinherrschaft des männlichen Prinzips der Nur-Zivilisation" (Roisch, Über 99).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Note again that nature need not be 'menschenfeindlich,' but as seen in Campeche and Palenque technological man must adapt in certain ways to nature just as nature must acquiesce in some respects to technological society.

Ernst Schürer compares Faber's and Marcel's subsequent recrossing of the plant and rot-infested Rio Usumacinta to Jungian rebirth.<sup>35</sup> Even the final "a" in the river's name is indicative of feminine gender. Both the maturation and the rebirth interpretations are bolstered (to differing degrees) by Faber's ensuing description of his and Marcel's reemergence from the jungle: a night spent in wet, rain-soaked dark until the hot red morning light brings a halt to the rain leaving them "naß von Schweiß und Regen und Öl, schmierig wie Neugeborene" ( 68-69). It is with such overtones of a new beginning that Faber reenters technological society.

#### B. NEW YORK

Upon returning, Faber discovers that he cannot run away from nature, not even in New York--symbol of modern, technological, Western civilization. He and his girlfriend, Ivy, engage in a constant battle for control ... over the relationship, each other and in Faber's case over himself. These interactions with Ivy expose Faber's character because they personify his personal struggles. Even his decision to go to Europe via ship is an impotent reaction to her domination (59-60) and not, as Hasters

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<sup>35</sup> Ernst Schürer, "Zur Interpretation von Max Frischs 'Homo faber'," Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht 59.4 (1967): 335.

believes, because a cruise was more exotic than travelling by plane.<sup>36</sup>

Ivy usually wins these allegorical battles for supremacy.<sup>37</sup> Faber, for all his struggles, necessarily remains an unwilling and inadmissible captive of Ivy and his own nature. One of Ivy's triumphs over Faber's schismed lifestyle is that he is unsuccessful in his persistent attempts to end the relationship before she is ready. His attempts are often so indirect as to be indiscernible. Regarding his desire to separate he says "das hatte ich oft genug gesagt, zumindest durchblicken lassen" (31). He frequently "tries" to break off the relationship (30, 31, 59-60, 64). Yet each time he returns, she is a waiting reminder that he cannot escape himself.

Contrary to Faber's claims that he doesn't want to hurt Ivy by leaving her (30, 60), it is himself he is protecting. Faber does not spare Ivy by consistently choosing malapropos, awkward moments and locations to spurn her, rather he spares himself: it is easier for him to break the news and escape (LaGuardia) or even not be present when she learns the news (the letter from Tamaulipas) or to wait until she leaves of her own accord (twice in NYC) than accost such an emotionally messy situation in which no technocracy can advise.

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<sup>36</sup> Heima Hasters, "Das Kamera-Auge des Homo Faber: Ein Beitrag auch zur Medienpädagogik," Diskussion Deutsch 42 (1978): 385.

<sup>37</sup> These include sexuality, in the matter of the automobile (30-31), and with regard to her desire to maintain the appearance of togetherness right until Faber's ship departs.

Faber also tries to escape temporarily (58, 66). He schedules a chess game in order to leave Ivy (58). A less calculated avoidance ruse is his compulsion to fix his broken electric shaver (despite having another in the bathroom) before they leave for dinner (63). He also busies himself with arranging and labelling his films while he waits for Ivy (59), bungling that, too, as he will discover in Düsseldorf (187). Here again he perverts technology and order and uses them as an excuse and a diversion. This is also the same spirit in which he blamed the neon lighting in Houston for his wan complexion. Jurgensen noted that Faber similarly used his watch having stopped as an excuse for not reboarding the plane. "Wieder wird die Technik als Ausrede benutzt, als Erklärung und Entschuldigung für persönliches Versagen" (Romane 105). His quickness to use mechanical and technological failures, real or purported, as an excuse for his own behavior--for events caused by his irrational reactions to chance--is further evidence of his personal inconsistency.

None of Faber's analytical diversions, avoidance or stalling can rid him of Ivy. Ivy's power over Faber is exercised through insight and sexuality. Faber, as Ivy realizes, is susceptible to 'Vernunft' and ordinary sexual drives. Each time they have sex it is Ivy's will and Faber's nature prevailing over the latter's technocratic-dictated will. In the first instance Faber even believed he had "won" that bout with his factual (technocratic) approach (61-62): "Ich rechnete, bis Ivy mir glaubte .... Sie bat mich um Verzeihung" (61). The second time Faber and Ivy have sex

could be construed that Ivy methodically seduces Faber with cool, unaffected 'Vernunft' (65-66). Faber, however, calls it rape (64-65, 66) lamenting that "Ich weiß nicht wie es wieder kam-" (66). Faber can neither comprehend nor correlate the biological impetus for his own behavior.

Faber considers flesh a curse (171) and his reaction to his indomitable sexuality--which could be considered a man-nature-life fusion--is spite, fear, anger, even hate which he vents on Ivy who uses this control (62):

... ich haßte sie.  
 Ich haßte mich selbst. (...) es ekelte mich ihre Zärtlichkeit, ihre Hand auf meinem Knie ihre Hand auf meiner Hand, ihr Arm auf meiner Schulter, ihre Schulter an meiner Brust, ihr Kuß ... es war unerträglich - ich sagte rundheraus, daß ich sie hasse. (62)

It is because he cannot accept nor deal with his own sexual needs that he perceives Ivy as a seductress, even rapist; "... vielleicht ist sie lesbisch, vielleicht frigid, es war ihr ein Bedürfnis mich zu verführen, weil sie fand, ich sei ein Egoist, ein Unmensch" (64-65). He is also compelled to attribute sadistic motives to Ivy's sensuality. "Ich glaube, Ivy wollte, daß ich mich haßte, und verführte mich bloß, damit ich mich haßte, und das war ihre Freude dabei, mich zu demütigen, die einzige Freude, die ich ihr geben konnte. Manchmal fürchtete ich sie" (66). His fear, of course, is of the inevitability of his own sexual urges. As Friedrich comments in an article about Hanna's role, "Keines seiner (Fabers) Liebesverhältnisse hebt ihn über sich hinaus, jedes führt

ihn auf immer peinlichere Weise zu sich selbst zurück."<sup>38</sup> Faber finds that whenever he spends time with a woman, which forces him to acknowledge or confront himself, "... nach drei Wochen (spätestens) sehne ich mich nach Turbinen ..." (91). He admits that Ivy is "... dabei ein herzensguter Kerl, wenn sie nicht geschlechtlich wurde ..." (65). He describes her conciliatorily and most frequently as simply "ein herzensguter" or "lieber Kerl" (64-65, see also 3, 30, 65, 68, 94).

Even Ivy's name is symbolic of Faber's struggle. It implies that she is of the natural domain and nearly impossible to rid one's self of. Ivy's function in the novel could then be described as an allegory of ideas for the technocrat's constant dominance-submission battle with his own sexuality and mortality. Faber has one other American friend who plays an instructive but minimal role. This is Dick. Faber says very little of Dick, but he uses him and his parties in order to hide from himself and/or Ivy (66). Indeed, even Faber comments, "Joachim war mein einziger wirklicher Freund ... (und Dick ist) einer von denen, die uns das Leben retten können, ohne daß man deswegen je intimer wird" (59). This lack of intimacy is also present in Faber's relationship with Ivy in which he shuns emotional as well as physical intimacy. He is, after all, her lover and does not know whether she is a lesbian, frigid (66) or in love with him (58). Thus the common element in Faber's American friendships is a lack of intimacy.

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<sup>38</sup> Gerhard Friedrich, "Die Rolle der Hanna Piper: Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation von Max Frischs Roman 'Homo faber'," Studia Neophilologica 49.1 (1977): 113.

Cock supports a different interpretation of Faber's American friendships, namely: that they are integral and influential to his philosophical development. "Faber's residence in America and acceptance of the fully mechanized society is also an important contributing factor in his make-up and eventual crisis, for America, while not the cause of his dry, factual approach to life, certainly encourages him in it."<sup>39</sup> Yet there is no textual foundation for the assertion that America encourages his technocratic approach: indeed he maintains his impulsivity, his razor and the Nevada aircraft (products of technology) still malfunction, and he is still reminded of his biological reality (poor health and sexuality), hence his allegorical technocracy is still challenged even in America.<sup>40</sup> Certainly his sexual-scrimmage relationship with Ivy affords no refuge. What can be concluded from the text is that "The American Way of Life" permits this lack of intimacy and reality, but neither compels nor encourages it. It is the technocrat Faber who seeks the distance and escape from emotion and sexuality that he finds to some extent in his American residency and relationships and who extracts this meaning from "The American Way of Life."

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<sup>39</sup> Mary E. Cock, "Countries of the Mind: Max Frisch's Narrative Technique," Modern Language Review 65 (1970): 828.

<sup>40</sup> All four of the protagonists dealt with in this thesis are Swiss. Two of the works, Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän and Blaubart take place in a singular location--Switzerland. Montauk takes place in the United States and Homo faber on three continents, in Cuba and the Atlantic. The best generalization that can be considered valid is that these technologically assimilated protagonists are products of modern, industrial, Western civilization.



### Transition: Readiness for Change and One New Experience

The journey which has brought Faber to the New York harbor exposes his allegorical technocracy as incomplete and insufficiently reliable and so exposes him to reason for change. One change is his behavioral "readiness"<sup>41</sup> for new experiences, hence his choice of transportation (64). The beacon and role model for such changes is Sabeth. "Although Faber has had to put up with exceptions to the pattern he imposes upon the world all along it is (now) with the appearance of Sabeth ... that the 'countermovement' begins in earnest."<sup>42</sup> For the first time, he finds that his allegorical technocracy is undesirably limiting within even a technological environment. While the first journey into the natural realm revealed Faber's allegorical technocratic character, this lengthy journey shows his overwhelmingly erratic behavior. The circumscribed nature of the ship coerces Faber's methodological limitations. At the same time his long-suppressed emotions and impulses begin to assert themselves. On the temporal and Cartesian confines of the ship and when voluntarily juxtaposed with Sabeth, Faber's initially disjointed technocracy becomes a perverse and unstable retrogression unable to cope with these pressures.

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<sup>41</sup> In 1954 Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget proposed that children are able to learn only when they are mentally "ready" for the new cognitive structure. Readiness is promoted by a combination of environmental and individual factors. This theory has been popularly espoused since that time (Woolfolk 50-71).

<sup>42</sup> Alan D. Latta, "Walter Faber and the Allegorization of Life: A Reading of Max Frisch's novel 'Homo faber'," Germanic Review 54.4 (1979): 154.

## C. EN ROUTE

Faber's allegorical technocracy is culpably ignorant of nuance, supposition and intuition. Still, during the time Faber comes to know Sabeth, he adheres "Without question (to) the validity of (his) statistics, ... (even though) the events clearly show the validity of the human mind when personal factors are involved" (Bradley 283).<sup>43</sup> His severest guilt during this time is in not allowing himself to suppose Sabeth is his and Hanna's daughter, which is statistically conceivable. Without technocratically recognizable indications that Sabeth was his and Hanna's daughter, Faber declares "-ich weiß nicht, wie ich mich verhalten hätte (hätte ich gewußt), jedenfalls anders, das ist selbstverständlich, ich bin ja nicht krankhaft, ich hätte meine Tochter als meine Tochter behandelt, ich bin ja nicht pervers!" (81). Indeed, he does often unwittingly treat her in a paternal manner just as they are unwittingly taken for and treated as father-daughter.<sup>44</sup> Although Faber had more reason than others to imagine Sabeth might be his daughter, he never permits such considerations.

Faber furthermore has concrete reason to suspect that Sabeth may be Hanna's daughter. Such reason, however, is not recognized

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<sup>43</sup> It is important with regard to this quote to note again that it is Faber's interpretation of events and his biased observations that cause failure, not statistical theory (cf. pgs. 83-88).

<sup>44</sup> This is assumed by the ship's steward (78), the workmen in the ship's engine room (86), the Italian hotel clerk (122) and even Professor O. (194).

by his allegorical technocracy and so initially goes unheeded. And for this same reason he is later unable to correlate--he resists the knowledge as though avoiding it will abrogate it. He expends the same "effort" to discover who Mama is as he did to marry Hanna and leave Ivy.<sup>45</sup> When he does finally learn that his Hanna is indeed Sabeth's mother he accepts Sabeth as Hanna's child, but not as his own (118).<sup>46</sup> Even then he is reluctant to believe she is Hanna's child, demanding additional confirmations and details (117).

The preponderance of unheeded evidence of a Sabeth-Hanna relation damns Faber and his technocracy. Several facts stand out: Hanna and Sabeth share an enthusiasm for art history; they speak the same High German dialect (spoken by a whole 'Völkerstamm' which Faber claims lessens statistic likelihood of a connection, 79); and they have mannerisms and gestures in common (80). He also had less sure albeit more tangible factual chronological evidence: although he (probably out of cowardice) never asks Sabeth her birthday, she is twenty years old (83) and he last saw Hanna twenty or twentyone years earlier (80) at which time she was pregnant by him (47) and directly after which she married Joachim (28) and had a child (36)--all of which implies his paternity. Another

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<sup>45</sup> He asks Sabeth her Mama's family name only after he has already unwittingly learned it (28, 36, 78, 80, 112, 113, 117), and he unsuccessfully interrupts Sabeth's presentation from a tourism booklet to do so. He then changes this question in order to avoid it (116-117). As in this instance, Frisch repeatedly avoids anagnorisis throughout the novel. This results in a more effective alienating portrayal.

<sup>46</sup> This further contradicts his preceding quote which began by his indicating that had he known Sabeth was Hanna's daughter he would have assumed she was also his own (80-81).

definitive fact is the communism link (35, 78, 80, 82, 112). Hence he still adulterates his ostensibly exacting technical approach by biasing his data (observations, chronology, analyses, sampling). His behavior is prompted by a psyche repressed since adolescence.

It is not solely libido which attracts Faber to Sabeth, but also a compelling fascination for Sabeth's Hanna-similarity<sup>47</sup>, which Faber tries to disregard from the onset. He is repeatedly and inordinately struck by Sabeth's face (72), and her dialect and youth remind Faber of Hanna (79). During the farewell festivities on the ship Faber remarks to himself "Ihr Hanna-Mädchen-Gesicht!" and promptly asks her to marry him (94-95).

Faber's compulsion for the "graven image" of Hanna as enacted by an incestuous affair with Sabeth is perverse. In fact, father-daughter incest is the most despised form of one of the very few taboos believed to be "a universal norm found in every human society."<sup>48</sup> Franzen points out, "Wer die strengen Gesetze der (sic) Eros mißachtet, wird eine Beute der unteren Mächte" (76). Friedrich, too, notes the taboo nature of Faber's desires as having both quantitative and qualitative factors: "Fünfzig Jahre sind nicht nur das mathematische zweieinhalbfache von zwanzig Jahren, sind nicht nur quantitativ (Addition!) verschieden, sondern

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<sup>47</sup> Erich Franzen, "Über Max Frisch," Über Max Frisch, ed. Thomas Beckermann, Edition Suhrkamp 404 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971): 76.

<sup>48</sup> Eugene N. Cohen and Edwin Eames, Cultural Anthropology (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982): 66.

qualitativ. Diesen Unterschied aufheben, ihn überspringen zu wollen, ist widernatürlich" (Friedrich 110).

Even Faber notices this insidious side of the relation. Despite his claim of how natural this relationship is and despite his repression of feelings, even he feels and admits to something so potently impossible (72, 73), particularly when he kisses Sabeth for the first time "... wobei ich erschrak. Sie war mir fremder als je ein Mädchen. (...) es war unmöglich ... zu sagen gab es nichts, es war unmöglich" (95).

Faber's pattern of disharmony with his biological and emotional reality continues through the cruise (70, 71, 88, 90, 91, 106). He is still annoyed when people tell him what to feel and experience.<sup>49</sup> Yet he admits that he is lonely and attributes his desire to be with people to fatigue "wie beim Stahl" (92) and his sentimentality to wine (89)--yet alcohol is only the convenient, socially acceptable excuse to disinhibit one's real desires. So he is still attempting to escape or excuse his own biological and emotional impulses, to deny the unity of nature-man-life. Yet the very admission of such feelings indicates a new openness, a growing Piagetian readiness to accept them.

Countering these occasional sentimental and social impulses is Faber's admission of continued discomfort around other people.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> He resented the same in the Tamaulipas context and will also begrudge this of Sabeth later in Greece (111). This topic is dealt with in detail in Chapter II.

<sup>50</sup> He still finds people a strain, even men (8, 69, 92), and describes his happiest times as those when he shuts the door on people (92). He is generally uncommunicative (71), but still uses

He has come to connote emotion, sensuality, nature, death, even mysticism with womanhood because it refuses him an escape from the unified realm. He constantly wishes for a "Männertisch, gleichviel welcher Sprache" (64, 69, 70). Hence avoiding "the feminine" is imperative and ability to communicate with others is non sequitur.

While most people relax, facilely amuse and enjoy themselves while on a cruise, Faber is not used to his time being unoccupied by external diversions and he is bored (71, 74). He characteristically and unsuccessfully attempts to stave off boredom and anxiety with technological distractions.<sup>51</sup> He derives relief from merely discussing technology (78). He even approaches Sabeth through technology, explaining the mechanisms of his camera (as he did for Herbert, 23) and the principles of navigation, radar, the earth's curvature, electricity, entropy, Maxwell's demons, cybernetics, robotics, and his theories of man and robots (73, 74, 75).

Sabeth's approach often conflicts with Faber's. It is a new experience for Faber to desire something or someone so antagonistic to his technocracy. Still, he will consistently choose to endure these quandaries in order to be in Sabeth's company. On their

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chess as a means of interaction with anonymous opponents (83). He considers romantics irresponsible and the cause of unhappiness (106).

<sup>51</sup> He counts the days' voyage remaining as centimeters on a map (88), he prefers planning to time with a woman (91) and, when necessary, uses technology to bridge his communication gap with other people. He speaks of turbines to Sabeth's boyfriend (82), robots and the social responsibilities of the technician to his breakfast companions (77) and diesel motors and electricity to Mister Lewin (78).

episodically allegorical tour of the engine room, which normally is a safe retreat for him, Sabeth unnerves him with her daydreams of the sharks outside the portholes (87). In order to grab her attention in the industrial cacophony, he grabs her hand and places it on the seventy millimeter rivets to clarify himself because "Ich habe ihr etwas bieten wollen," namely the gear construction, torsion, coefficients of friction, vibrational stress and fatigue of steel, et cetera (86-87). The more Sabeth's imagination is elsewhere the more fevered and detailed his discussion becomes. Eventually their perspectives are so polarized that communication breaks down completely despite Faber's panicked yelling and hands-on illustration. "Hier! rief ich und nahm ihre Hand, legte sie auf die Siebzigmillimeter-Niete, damit sie verstand, was ich erklarte. Haifische? Ich verstand kein anderes Wort. Wieso Haifische? Ich schrie zuruck: Wei ich nicht! und zeigte auf die Konstruktion, ihre Augen starrten" (87). This communication gap, borne of unrelated frames of reference, will continue with Sabeth and Faber even to Rome (108, 110, 112). Thus it is not shared interests and commonalities which draw the technocrat to Sabeth. Yet once exposed to so seductive an alternative to his technocratic lifestyle Faber is able to choose whether to retreat into his technocratic safehouse or pursue this new realm. He makes this cognizant decision during his next round of travel.

#### D. A JOURNEY OF PERSONALITIES

The repetition and incest themes in Homo faber invite comparison of the young Faber to the aging technologist--of Hanna's "Homo faber" to Sabeth's Walter. Faber's use of technology as an aegis from aspects of life which he found difficult to accept started in his adolescence and continued into his adulthood. By this time, his self-serving reliance on technology has developed into a nefarious personal technocracy. It will be during his interaction with Sabeth that any newfound independence from this technocracy and any potential maturation should become apparent. Faber's sexual interest in Sabeth gives way to feelings of rejuvenation, paternalism and emulation as they travel together.

#### "Wie ein Jüngling": Paris

Faber's intention of finding Sabeth in the Louvre is irrational considering the size of the building and crowds. Nonetheless Faber perseveres and Sabeth sees him two days running before they meet on the third (100). She believes it is coincidence that they meet again--from which Faber should learn that coincidence can be more than it appears. Yet he still prefers to mislead himself to avoid complication, subsequently convincing himself that he stays with Sabeth (after waiting in Paris for her for a week) only because she was broke (100, 101).

Sabeth fulfills the obligatory May-November role without any such hesitation by impelling new vigor and rejuvenation in Faber. He finds himself happy "wie noch nie in diesem Paris" (104-105),



and it is not just Paris. Faber muses, "ich konnte nie glücklicher sein als jetzt" (105). He parades about in the snow without a hat "wie ein Jüngling" (101). He even enjoys anticipation (105) and feels a new giddy-type 'Geistesgegenwart' (102), not only does he attend the opera, but he arrives early! (104). This fledgling joie de vivre bodes a lessening dedication to his work. Although early to the opera he is late to the conferences which brought him to Paris (102) and they leave him uninspired (103). This reprioritization and vivacity that began only after Sabeth's influence will become permanent changes for Faber.

Despite these new feelings, Faber is characteristically uncomprehending of all nonscientific foreshadowing, particularly that forecasting death such as boded by Professor O.'s impending death. Faber's first thoughts of Professor O. are fond memories of a respected and influential role model (15, 103). During Faber's premonitory dreams Professor O. is "vollkommen sentimental," crying even (15). Faber finds this embarrassing and most out of character for a professor of electrodynamics and mathematics (15, 16). It is in Paris that Faber first reencounters Professor O. whom he had heard had passed away (102). The impression Professor O. makes on him is one of macabre disharmony. Faber did not recognize Professor O. whom he describes as "gräßlich, ... ein Schädel mit Haut drüber, sogar mit Muskeln, die eine Mimik machen" (102). Like Faber will be, Professor O. is guilty of denying the obvious, the physical symptoms and doctors' diagnoses of terminal stomach cancer (102-104). Faber recognizes the negligence of his former teacher,

"... und (ich) weiß, was jedermann weiß; aber er, scheint es, weiß es nicht. (...) ich weiß genau, daß dieser Mann eigentlich schon gestorben ist..." (103). Yet he is unable to extrapolate and realize that he is guilty of the same negligence. Faber is again hailed by Professor O. in Zurich. Again he does not recognize him (194) and is impressed by the same unmistakable macabre presence of death (194-195). Professor O. dies one week after this meeting and just under one month before Faber's own death similarly due to stomach cancer (170, 193, 203). Stomach cancer becomes the metaphor for a soul consumed by an unhealthy reliance upon technology. Yet Faber cannot relate these similarities to himself. Bradley relates this transfer-inability to Faber's allegorically technocratic dictums: "(Professor O.) is not only a prefiguration of Faber's personal fate but also exemplifies in a more general way the failure of the scientist who attempts to conquer death" (287). Yet this unmoderated failure-interpretation of Faber is too harsh, for although Faber will be unable to remediate his health by the time he reaches Athens, he nonetheless and quite out of character ponders that personal circumstances may prevent his return to work (161, 163), later worrying that he might not be equal to the task. This shows a marked maturation from his initial health-related denials and defensiveness.

#### "Ich ließ mich belehren" Italy

In Italy, too, Faber continues to discover life through Sabeth's example. Sabeth is happy about everything around her (eg.

109-112, *passim*). That is part of her attraction for Faber (109, 113) and that will sustain the *joie de vivre* he developed in Paris. For Faber, Sabeth is life. By his own description, she stands metaphorically full of life, color, vibrancy while he lies motionless on the ground below; it can be surmised that in his perception Sabeth is life and he is aged (115; see also 171, 189).<sup>52</sup> She is youthful, energetic, keen and aware, she appreciates art which is mankind's critique and celebration of life, and as Faber's lover she is also Faber's tangible link to humanity. He no longer ignores the unity. He gladly internalizes the man-life portion under Sabeth's tutelage. Just as his appreciation of art, love and life grows during his journeys, so does his awareness of nature and death. Sabeth forces him to confront death (his and hers) and nature as she motivates him to embrace life. Even before Faber's artistic awakening Sabeth is making him feel his mortality. More than once in Italy his narrative and emotions portray him as though he were an elderly grandparent (109, 110, 116) and Sabeth unwittingly reinforces this feeling with her constant expectation of his 'Begeisterung' (110).

As he travels through Europe and matures his pattern of escaping into an allegorical technocracy continues, but it is less prevalent than during his South American travels. He still values facts (118) despite trying to escape the fact of Sabeth's parentage (i.e. he interrupts her when she is giving concrete facts about her family, 112, 113). His mind shrinks back to the comforting

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<sup>52</sup> This is discussed in further detail in Chapter II.

confines of airplanes, construction techniques, technological analogies, mortality rates of snake bites whenever confronted with reality or the unity. He also allows himself to avoid the full truth by wrongly justifying Joachim as Sabeth's biological father (121-122). Just as the unity's ubiquity in the Americas forced Faber's technocracy, so too, his growing awareness of his guilt entails this reliance upon technocratic methodology until he can no longer deny the obvious.

The first fact which Faber permits himself is that Sabeth is Hanna's daughter. His blind faith in the improbability of this has left him without any coping techniques. His reaction is confusion, he doesn't know what to do and when he does act it is with the inappropriate and irrelevant question whether he was her first lover or not (120).

Although Faber's own coping strategy is undirected and inappropriate, he afterwards treats Sabeth paternalistically (119) and with compassion and generosity. He begins to distance himself somewhat emotionally and this hurts Sabeth contrary to his expectation. Faber meets Sabeth's pain with unselfish giving (121). He also placates her "It's okay ... it's okay" (121) aware himself that it is not "okay."<sup>53</sup> He protects Sabeth, but not himself.

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<sup>53</sup> Frisch uses this soothing phrase when the speaker knows that all is not well, but wishes to maintain the pretense that it is. \* This is the case when Faber comforts Sabeth over their relationship; when Williams placates Faber regarding the latter's reports (96, 97); and when Faber comments ostensibly concerning the wine, but what he was really considering was his own health (98).

Faber does exhibit increasingly frequent signs that he might be maturing after Sabeth's example.<sup>54</sup> Part of his willingness to accept other approaches could be due to his seemingly innate repulsion to the sterilized technological life symbolized by America (40, 73-74, 79, 114). For example, when he is surrounded and confronted by the superficiality of this symbolic America he rants:

In eurer Gesellschaft könnte man sterben ... man könnte sterben, ohne daß ihr es merkt, von Freundschaft keine Spur, sterben könnte man in eurer Gesellschaft! schrie ich, und wozu wir überhaupt miteinander reden, schrie ich, wozu denn (ich hörte mich selber schreien), wozu diese ganze Gesellschaft, wenn einer sterben könnte, ohne daß ihr es merkt-. (67)

Evidently Faber fears the isolation of this lifestyle. If he fears that which he seeks, then perhaps he is ready to augment his technocratic methodology.

Fear of his personal status quo is not the only indicator of potential maturation. The incident in the Museo Nazionale, for example, serves as an episodic allegory for continuing personal development in the novel. Faber's change as per an artistic awakening is initially deliberate. Forced as this change is it does not evolve forthwith. He plagiarizes the tour guide-priest's analysis of the relief Geburt der Venus just as earlier he had parroted Mrs. Williams' critique of the opera (102). The reason

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<sup>54</sup> Some of this conscious attempt to understand can be noted as far back as the return trip from Guatemala. When Marcel asserts "que la terre est femme" Faber understands, but not so with "que la mort est femme." Faber also enjoys Marcel's company at that time (69). He is accepting and partially understanding of companionship and Marcel's perception of the unity respectively. Thus Marcel performed this additional task in functioning as a precursor to Sabeth.

for these borrowed analyses is Faber's own deficient analytic-empathetic abilities as well as his insufficient exposure and unfamiliarity with such basic descriptions and concepts as "Hellenistic" and "cubism" (112). Sabeth unwittingly admonishes his comments as incorrect which foments his characteristic defensiveness about being told what to experience (111). Aware of his vocational deficit (107, 112), Faber and also Sabeth monitor his interpretations: Fra Angelico is kitsch, "Ich verbesserte mich dann: Naiv" (107). Still, his feelings are stilted, limited and forced. At the next piece of sculpture, Kopf einer schlafenden Erinnye, he imitates Sabeth's approach to art and, though he may be less eloquent, still he is endeavoring. When Sabeth herself later describes this statue to him he writes, "Ich ließ mich belehren" (116). It is without forcing and without warning that Faber's appreciation of art suddenly confirms itself via Kopf einer schlafenden Erinnye. Hence Faber's appreciation of art is a mere externality of his relationship with Sabeth which is in turn a result of his desire for and attraction to life that she represents in abundance.

Faber's cognitive perspective also matures when inspired by Sabeth. These changes are subtle and minimal at first. He recognizes ping pong not as a game of vector and impulse analysis, but as a game of "Selbstvertrauen" (73). He acknowledges subconscious associations, and more importantly, accepts them (i.e. the radio reminds him of Joachim, 84). He exhibits other changes in his cognitive schema as well (95), many of them pertaining to

his mortality (89). He bemoans stagnation and aging as it has insinuated itself in his life (76) and he recognizes man's feeble attempts to "annul" death (77). He allegorically writes of his dislike for sweet-nothings in the morning, "Zärtlichkeiten am Abend, ja, aber Zärtlichkeiten am Morgen sind mir unerträglich" (91), just as now in the "twilight of his life" he is susceptible to companionship and sentimentality.

Not all of Faber's progress is as subtle or ego-centrally motivated. He becomes increasingly accepting and even appreciative of the unity of man and life, which includes art. He becomes melancholy over the prospect of losing the "friends" he has come to know on the ship (88, 89). He learns to appreciate modern dancing (89), conversation without technical jargon (90), and 'Stimmung' (90, 122).

Faber displays the selfless traits of sensitivity and genuine caring as well. He seems to have long been stuck in the stage that psychologists call adolescent egocentrism, during which a person is preoccupied with analyzing his or her own attitudes and assumes that these are equally important to all others.<sup>55</sup> Faber particularly exhibited this behavior at the time of Hanna's pregnancy and their aborted marriage plans.<sup>56</sup> With Sabeth, however, Faber becomes caring and quite paternalistic. He loses his adolescent-type egocentrism, and tries to understand Sabeth

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<sup>55</sup> Anita E. Woolfolk, Educational Psychology, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987): 64.

<sup>56</sup> 45-48, 57-58, 105-107.

(116). His protective paternalism is also free of any self-advancing motivation such as when he comforts her as she sleeps--he lies awake all night as she puts a tie about his neck, but he dare not move lest he wake her (122-123). He also calls her "mein liebes Kind" despite his own disbelief (117, 119), forbids her to be a stewardess or hitchhike to Rome (83, 90, 92), and warns her "Du rauchst zu viel! (...) Als ich in deinem Alter war-" (115). Geulen notes that Faber is happy when Sabeth is so, that he "mirrors himself" in her joy (Studien 69). This indeed is the earmark of a parental love--virtuous, selfless, noble even. Sabeth, too, noticing his unintentional fatherliness, chided "Du tust wie ein Papa!" (115). Unfortunately, Faber has not learned the lesson that Sabeth instinctively and Hanna cognizantly know: the life cycle does not repeat itself in an individual's life (107, 138-139, 170).

Faber also becomes ever more critically introspective as he spends time with Sabeth. He becomes increasingly paternalistic as well as less oriented toward marriage/relationship as the evidence becomes more damning that she is his daughter. He tries to "soften the blow" for Sabeth while still unable to confront the truth himself, but is struck dumb by some inkling. He cools toward her and warns her "Einmal müssen wir uns doch trennen mein liebes Kind, so oder so-" (119). Having accrued no finesse in such matters, however, Faber inadvertently confuses and hurts Sabeth (122-123). Although the truth of their real relationship is too horrendous for him to admit, he is at least by his narrative admissions and by his



increasingly paternal, decreasingly sexual actions covertly attempting to rectify an irremedial situation.

**New Understanding: Hanna**

Sabeth's death is the vehicle for Faber and Hanna's reunion. This reunion in some ways resembles a tentative ritual dance: both partners approaching and backing away. Faber cowers before the truth of his paternity which he by now unadmittedly suspects,<sup>57</sup> although eventually he will reverse his early errors of "ihr Kind" and Sabeth will become "unsere"<sup>58</sup> and even "meine Tochter" (180). He feels some current intimacy for Hanna and he spares her the grim details of Joachim's death, telling her instead that he died of angina pectoralis (146)--another inaccuracy by the scientist Faber.<sup>59</sup>

The minor compassion and initiative that Faber now shows Hanna and earlier showed Sabeth were more than he attempted in his earlier relationship with Hanna when his responsibility was obvious. Critics also recognize Hanna's contribution to Sabeth's

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<sup>57</sup> Otherwise he would not be so adept at not believing (or at avoiding the subject by redirecting the conversation (146) away from the truth (138, 147)

<sup>58</sup> 179, 182, 185, 191, 199, 203.

<sup>59</sup> This actually is not possible. Angina pectoralis is heart pain caused by lack of oxygen in the heart due to obstructed blood flow. Angina pectoralis is a symptom of heart disease, but not a cause of death. It is presumptuous to assume that Faber uses angina pectoralis figuratively (died of a broken heart), so the scientist Faber has erred again.

fate. Yet the parents' failure of their child and of one another is interrelated as Friedrich points out:

Sie (Hanna und Faber) verfehlen sich, weil sie einander verfehlen. Sie trennen sich, um sich, jeder für sich, auf den gleichen Weg zu begehen, nämlich den der eigensüchtigen, eigenmächtigen und ich-bezogenen Weltbewältigung (116).<sup>60</sup>

Hanna, although hospitable as necessary when she sees Faber, is less compassionate toward Faber's feelings than he is toward hers. She corrects his makeshift calculations (132).<sup>61</sup> When she does confirm Faber's fatherhood she does so brusquely and at the same beach where the accident happened, a painful "furchtbar" place for Faber (156). Hanna's initial mood is one of nervousness, defeat, defiance, pain, perfunctory politeness, but neither compassion nor warmth.

The Faber-Hanna interactions are instructive; for while Faber learns to enjoy life through Sabeth's example, it is through Hanna that he begins to understand himself and her. Hanna recognizes Faber's guilt as well as her own. She attempts to explain to him (despite his disclaimer "Ich verstand Hanna nicht immer," 139),

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<sup>60</sup> for example: Ernst Schürer, "Zur Interpretation von Max Frischs 'Homo faber'," Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht, 59 (1967): 340; Blair, 146; Friedrich, 112; Kaiser, 277.

<sup>61</sup> Even these miscalculations of Faber's are inept. He knows and records that Sabeth is twenty years old (83). When he wants to avoid the fact of his paternity he says he saw Hanna only twenty years earlier which Hanna corrects to twentyone. His choice of falsification is unreasonable: had he seen Hanna only twenty years previously then she must have either already had Sabeth or been nearing the end of her pregnancy (20 yrs. + 9 mos.). Thus he should have increased the elapsed time since he had last seen Hanna to 22 years in order to permit Hanna and Joachim time for a twenty year old daughter. Faber once again selfishly misuses objectivity.

remarking "... wir können das Leben nicht in unseren Armen behalten, Walter, auch du nicht. (...) Das Leben geht mit den Kindern ... wir können uns nicht mit unseren Kindern nochmals verheiraten" (138-139).<sup>62</sup> Faber transgresses these observations. He is understandably afraid of what he senses awaiting him and attempts to circumvent it. Hanna is also guilty since she "held" Sabeth to herself, ergo initially recognizing and declaring Faber's guilt while denying his paternity.

Hanna also tries to persuade Faber of the falseness of his methodology. She criticizes the use of "Technik ... als Kniff, die Welt so einzurichten, daß wir sie nicht erleben müssen" (169). She recognizes that Faber's outlook was "kein zufälliger Irrtum," but rather, "...ein Irrtum, der zu mir gehört wie mein Beruf. wie mein ganzes Leben sonst. Mein Irrtum: daß wir Techniker versuchen, ohne den Tod zu leben" (169-170). Walter, the First Station narrator, counters Hanna's devaluation, "Was Hanna damit meint, weiß ich nicht" (169).

The reverse sensitivity is true as well, an unusually inspired and insightful Faber analyzes Hanna's shortcomings. "Ich verstand ohne weiteres, daß Hanna an ihrem Kind hängt ... daß es für eine Mutter nicht leicht ist, wenn das Kind zum ersten Mal in die Welt hinausreist" (138). His dim understanding that Hanna's behavior deserves the labels "idiot" and "hen" moves her to critique and find the fault in her own actions (202). She even suspects his

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<sup>62</sup> She later describes "(Walters) Irrtum mit Sabeth: Repetition ... als gebe es kein Alter..." (170).

understanding may have included a much more profound level than even he realizes. When she realizes this she asks him whether he initially declared 'your' child "Ob als Vorwurf oder nur aus Feigheit?" (202).

#### E. SUMMARY

The First Station portrayal of Faber is Frisch's method of exposing Faber. Through allegory, symbolism, metaphor and confessional "reports" we see a man who uses his technocratic methodology as a rationalization. He subjectively abuses objectivity and objectively abuses subjectivity. Such bias invalidates probabilism, the foundation of his allegorical technocracy.

Faber misuses technological approaches in order to compartmentalize the unity. He seeks to segregate man, nature, life, death and distance himself from all but the formermost. He is unable to do so, however, and is repeatedly exposed to these and the insufficiency of his adulterated technocracy to do the same throughout the course of his travels. Once he meets Sabeth, however, he is forced to confront the unity. The time that Faber, the protagonist, shares with Sabeth and Hanna at the end of the First Station contrasts to the earlier portrayal. Faber is changing. He begins to seek out and experience the man-nature-life elements of the unity by the end of the First Station narration, but still remains rigidly unaccepting of any intimation of death.

## CHAPTER II

It is with the close of the First Station, the beginning of the Second Station, and the presence of Hanna that the elements of the novel begin to converge: time, action, fate and most notably, the dualist presence of Faber the narrator and Faber the protagonist. These two roles entail distinct identities, particularly during the First Station, and comparison of the two, their similarities and individual changes through the course of the report, offers insight into Faber's character as a totality.

Faber writes the First Station in lieu of letters to Hanna while laid up in the Caracas Hotel (170). This portion of the novel begins with a singular portrayal of both protagonist and narrator as adamant allegories of technocrats. The portrayal of the protagonist was examined in Chapter I. The concurring philosophical orientation of the narrator is evidenced in part by his bibliographic references to technical writings (22), his choice of 'Bericht' genre,<sup>63</sup> and cohesive portrayal of the technocratic protagonist. Thus the novel begins as an engineer's report.

Very revealing, however, is the inability of this narrator to deal with the impulsivity and irrationality of his earlier behavior. As Henze notes, "Mit dem Ingenieur Faber hat der Autor einen Erzähler gewählt, der eigentlich für diese Aufgabe wenig geeignet zu sein scheint; die Diskrepanz zwischen Erzähler und

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<sup>63</sup> This is manifested through trivial lists of details: train schedules, map scales, times and durations, etc. See, for example, pgs. 15-17.

Stoff ist das wichtigste und auffallendste Merkmal dieser Erzählweise."<sup>64</sup>

A. "ICH KANN NUR BERICHTEN, WAS ICH WEISS": THE FIRST STATION  
NARRATOR

This tension is apparent throughout the novel's First Station. One of the earliest, and most intriguing, examples of this is Faber's reaction to the Tamaulipas interlude. How the travelling engineer Faber reacted was discussed in Chapter I. What Faber did not do in the desert is undergo a conscious, existential crisis or learning experience: "total 85 Stunden, worüber es wenig zu berichten gibt - ein grandioses Erlebnis (wie jedermann zu erwarten scheint...) war es nicht" (23). The protagonist's first reaction was to accept this 'grandiose experience' only to discover that it was out of reach, " (ich) nahm sofort meine Kamera; aber von Sensation nicht die Spur" (23).<sup>65</sup> In his 'Bericht' the narrator's first reaction is to remark at other people's reaction to the situation: not only do other people expect the ordeal to have been an "Experience" as he indicated above, but his fellow castaways also found it such (24). Faber wonders at this. "Ich habe mich schon oft gefragt, was die Leute eigentlich meinen, wenn sie von Erlebnis reden. Ich bin Techniker und gewohnt, die Dinge zu sehen,

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<sup>64</sup> Walter Henze, "Die Erzählhaltung in Max Frischs Roman 'Homo Faber'," Wirkendes Wort 11.5 (1961): 279.

<sup>65</sup> The appearance of his camera in such potentially existential situations is a common and important partnership and is discussed in Chapter III.

wie sie sind. Ich sehe alles, wovon sie reden, sehr genau; ich bin ja nicht blind," further, "ich finde es nicht fantastisch, sondern erklärlich" (24).

As their confinement in the desert endures, Faber's narrative becomes progressively more hostile and condescending with regard to 'Erlebnisse.' Perhaps it is his frustration at not knowing the "Sensation" or perhaps it is the expectations of others who wanted Faber to acknowledge and/or recount an "Experience" that promotes the narrator's increasing defensiveness. "Warum soll ich erleben, was gar nicht ist?" (25). Whatever the impetus, Faber's concluding discussion on the matter is excessive, similar to other such of his defensive (narrative) posturing (eg. concerning marrying Hanna, abortion, recognizing Sabeth). He divests a two-page tirade on accepting matters at face value rather than attributing the fantastic or the mystical to what is reality and deduces, "Ein Flugzeug ist für mich ein Flugzeug, ich sehe keine ausgestorbenen Vögel dabei, sondern eine Super-Constellation mit Motor-Defekt, nichts weiter..." (25).<sup>66</sup>

The narrating Faber's excessiveness and hostility are borne of aggressive defensiveness and are commonly interpreted as arising out of fear. Weisstein believes it is the "died in the wool technologist's" fear of his own humanness.<sup>67</sup> Jurgensen attributes

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<sup>66</sup> Note the recurring present tense throughout this section indicating this attitude is maintained at the time of writing.

<sup>67</sup> Ulrich Weisstein, Max Frisch, TWAS 21 (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1967): 66.

this fear to Faber's unwarranted 'Lebensangst'.<sup>68</sup> A very similar interpretation (and one that accounts for his initial acceptance) is that Faber is merely frustrated by his inability to garner sensual experiences--"von Sensation, nicht die Spur" (22). Indeed, these two interpretations complement one another. The manner of presentation of the 'Erlebnisse' in the novel is often to relate tangible occurrences to the natural and supernatural worlds. Although "Lebensangst" may not be the most precise term, Faber does consistently deny the metaphysical realm and try to segregate himself from the natural-biological aspects of life.

A possible alternative interpretation of Faber's attitude toward 'Erlebnisse' is that Faber's technological methodology simply disallows these existential experiences and so their apparently universal existence is a challenge to it. Faber's dual narrative and 'recit' frustration arises not only from the evident deviation of his allegorical technocracy from the norm, it would also originate from condescending impatience toward anyone with another "less rational" methodology, "wie es der Laie gerne haben möchte" (22). His belief in a technological approach relies on rational observation in lieu of intuitive or inspired experiences. Repeatedly faced with these, however, the narrator turns to an empirical coping method: he (repeatedly) asks the same type of question, discusses it and reaches an eventual conclusion. He asks, "Es gibt keine urweltlichen Tiere mehr. Wozu soll ich sie mir einbilden?" (24). Faber tautologically poses facsimiles of

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<sup>68</sup> Jurgensen, Romane 103, 112.



this same question to himself, for example: "Warum soll ich erleben was gar nicht ist?" (25). His conclusion: "Ich kann mir keinen Unsinn einbilden, bloß um etwas zu erleben" (25).

Hence the preceding Angst analyses are not wrong, but they are simplistic. There is no evidence of any unusual and sustained fear on Faber's part while in the desert.<sup>69</sup> The fact, however, that the narrator who had always sought to suppress or control nature with technology is finally coming to grips with the fact that he is lying in bed dying of untreatable cancer certainly explains why a fear of death--which Faber equates with uncontrolled life<sup>70</sup>--is reflected in these passages alongside a vehement support of what he has always found reassuring--technology. These are also the motivations behind his energetic repudiation of the irrational and inexplicably commonplace 'Erlebnisse.'

Both narrator and protagonist remain very defensive throughout the majority of the First Station whenever this personal, technocratic-type style is contradicted. Sometimes, as in Tamaulipas, these contradictions have external causes. At other times they are a personal conflict of behavior and philosophy. Faber's decision to continue to Guatemala with Herbert is one such example.<sup>71</sup> Another example is when Sabeth contends that he is lonely. Both the narrator and protagonist respond by reciting five pages-worth

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<sup>69</sup> His only mention of fear is one of startlement (26), and this in comparison to the bulk of the events is insignificant.

<sup>70</sup> Faber's cancer, an accelerated and uncontrollable growth, is an interesting and ironic example of this.

<sup>71</sup> cf. pgs. 57-59.

of reasons that it is better to be alone than with a woman--and then the protagonist proposes to Sabeth! (90-96).

Initially, technology serves as the ideal (conscious) goal and role model as well as a comfort and leisure activity for both technocrats--protagonist and narrator. In addition to ridding himself of his emotional and physical nature he seeks to become mechanistically methodical. For Faber, machines are superior to men; they have superior speed, memory, reflexes and calculating abilities and are not subject to feelings and experiences (74, 75). Faber actually designs himself after the machines, claiming that "Ich bin nur ... durchaus sachlich" (91). Weisstein believes that "Faber's obsession with machines is pathological, in so far as his only criterion of judgement is functionalism" (65). Despite imprecise usage of the words "pathological" and "functionalism", Weisstein recognizes Faber's unmoderated perspective. The narrator's contingent plea that all of mankind should be above emotional and physical restraints (eg. dehumanized) is his most eloquently and passionately expressed premise in all his report. He mentions such emotion-laden topics as abortion, tuberculosis, care of premature babies, religion, the population explosion, standard of living, birth control, war and annihilation and morality, demanding of his readers to concede that "Menschen sind keine Kaninchen," and that "wie (das Leben) der Natur gefällt, das ist primitiver, aber nicht ethischer" (105).

Yet with this outburst the narrating Faber is avoiding the issue. The matter at hand (his paternity and incest) has been

concluded, it is not now appropriate for him to question whether abortion is ethical and/or necessary. He should be questioning why he did as he did and how he might have done it differently. Very few would argue Faber's ideals: a higher standard of living, family planning, developing the third world, slowing or even reversing the population explosion, some of these were principles ahead of their time. It is, once again, Faber's method and reasoning that are objectionable:

Schluß mit Romantik  
 Kein Anlaß zu Gewissensbissen  
 Es sind immer die Moralisten, die das meiste Unheil  
 anrichten  
 Unfug der staatlichen Geburtenförderung  
 Nicht zu vergessen die Automation: wir brauchen gar  
 nicht mehr so viele Leute  
 die Unmenge katastrophaler Ehen, die aus bloßer Angst vor  
 Schwangerschaftsunterbrechung geschlossen werden heute  
 noch  
 In jedem Fall ist es ein menschlicher Wille, kein Kind zu  
 haben. Wieviele Kinder sind wirklich gewollt? (106)

The narrator uses his personal technocracy to justify desirable and popular objectives, which become offensive then by this inhumane, lopsided rhetoric. Thus it is that Faber's allegorical technocracy is again inappropriately applied.

Faber's strenuous endorsements are prompted by any matter which threatens his personal technocracy. His treatise on abortion et al. was thus prompted by his desire that Hanna would have had an abortion, hindsight that she did not, and his admission that Sabeth is his daughter. He tries to defend himself, but his approach once again avoids the issues. That abortions were a necessary fact of life in 1957 is extraneous. The fact is that Sabeth was his and

Hanna's daughter and he had ample evidence to surmise this and avoid the subsequent consequences.

Frisch's narrator introduces himself with an exclusively alienating portrait which now becomes less harsh. This dual portrayal is particularly evident in this abortion soliloquy which functions as an episodic allegory. His methodology is offensive and alienating, but his objectives themselves are desirable and admirable. His recollections, while unapologetic and unbelieving, are still condemningly honest and even self-critical.

#### "Das ist flott von dir": Narrative Omissions

The narrator is rattled subsequent to this diatribe on abortion, and for that reason somersaults his narrative from arriving for the Paris Opera to travelling in Italy (105, 107). The reporter is unable to adhere to any form of objectivity or methodicism and his factual report deteriorates at an ever increasing rate. In addition to these insecure, inappropriate rationalizations interrupting his report, his chronology breaks down throughout the text. These narrative omissions become increasingly flagrant and less obviously motivated (32-33). Indeed, the shift from the memory of Sabeth spurning him occurs within a single paragraph and is demarcated only by an ellipsis (86). The impetus and repercussions of these undirected narrative meanderings should be considered, they are of particular import in the 'Bericht' context.

In the case of Faber's decision to go to Guatemala the sudden and obtrusive nondocumentation underscores the flippancy of the protagonist's decision itself. Faber desires that people approximate the rational and algorithmic (74-75). He defends robots against fear and resentment and the "abgedroschenes Argument: der Mensch sei keine Maschine" (74). Despite his refutation of that argument, Bradley recognizes his underlying belief that:

The precision of the computer is a constant challenge for man to imitate the mechanical brain in order to surmount the limitations of the human mind. His endeavor is basically similar to those undertakings which the ancients called rivalries with the Gods. (...) The hopeless competition with the machine deprives the technologist of an intuitive form of apprehension, which ordinarily compensates man for his intellectual insufficiency. As a result, the totality of his comprehension decreases. (283)

Faber wants mankind to become more like automatons.

Yet this decision to go to Guatemala was impulsive and rash, not rational. As an allegory of an uninspired technocrat the narrator Faber is unable to report what prompted the protagonist Faber's decision. In fact, he can't even find a word to define or categorize it: "'Du,' sagte (Herbert), 'das ist flott von dir!' Ich weiß nicht, was es wirklich war" (33). Faber's catapulting of the narrative to Campeche effectively prevents the reader from understanding his motives. Hence Faber forces the reader to parallel his own lack of understanding, which he later confirms. "Ich verstand mich selbst nicht" (42). Faber's omission of narration, of the facts necessary for a report, allows him to ignore scenarios which cannot conveniently conjoin with his use of

technocratic methodology; e.g. how, why, and with what attitude he is en route to Campeche in lieu of his scheduled work itinerary.

Faber phlegmatically offers a few possible rationalizations for this rerouting decision. He first suggests that he strays "bloß um einen alten Jugendfreund zu sehen ..." (33). However, he dismisses this reasoning at the same time he introduces it. The protagonist's attitude also contradicts a deep-seated and sincere desire to ascertain Joachim's situation and renew their friendship.<sup>72</sup> This explanation, too, is implausible in that Faber, as he has thus far revealed himself to the reader, is not a person motivated by sentiment.<sup>73</sup> Furthermore, what Faber calls a "friendship" may have been no more than a casual chess-playing acquaintanceship.<sup>74</sup> Were Faber really seeking out an old 'Jugendfreund' it is more likely that this sought-after friend would have been Hanna.

In Palenque Faber extrapolates his 'Jugendfreund' explanation, linking it to and defining Joachim in relation to Hanna: "...statt (weiterzuzfliegen) hockte man hier - um einen alten Jugendfreund, der meine Jugendfreundin geheiratet hat, Gutentag zu sagen" (43).

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<sup>72</sup> In Campeche a simple dream about beetles determines him to abandon the trek, "Kameradschaft hin oder her" (34). He still wants to turn back even after travelling so far as Palenque (41, 42).

<sup>73</sup> Faber's nonhumanism is also evident in his reasons for working for UNESCO; it is neither to fulfill need nor help people, but for "Nutzbarmachung unterentwickelter Gebiete"--which means street building (14, 15).

<sup>74</sup> Faber is unsure whether this friend of his will even remember him (35). When daydreaming one day Faber remembers Joachim and wonders "Aber was eigentlich (zu denken)?" (39).

In general, his questions to Herbert are more concerned with Hanna than Joachim<sup>75</sup> and these are also the answers that have an impact on both the protagonist and the narrating Faber (28-31, 33). His questions pertaining to Hanna become increasingly frequent as well as specific (e.g. on the train-ride from Campeche to Palenque, 35-36). Evidently, Faber does not detour to renew his friendship with Joachim.

Faber's second rationalization is the petulant "Nun warten die Turbinen einmal auf mich ... ich habe auch schon auf Turbinen gewartet - nun warten sie einmal auf mich!" (33). Faber quotes himself as having said this at the time he misses his plane to Caracas, but then in the present tense he subsequently concedes, "Natürlich ist das kein Standpunkt" (33). It is important to recognize these differing attitudes of Faber the protagonist and Faber the narrator.

The final narrative leap is particularly noteworthy, that subsequent to Sabeth's rejection of Faber.<sup>76</sup> It is more flagrant than the others in that it entails no such motivational ponderings. Faber merely signals by the ellipsis that he is off to seek solace in the engine room, "... immer Freude macht (es), Maschinen in Betrieb zu sehen" (86). Yet from the pattern in the events preceding and following each of these omissions it is evident that

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<sup>75</sup> 26, 28, 31-32, 35-36.

<sup>76</sup> There is one other similar, but temporary omission. Initially Faber skips over the description of his and Marcel's rebirth-like emergence from the jungle. In this case though he later includes this description (out of any chronological context) in his report.

they are a result of the fact that the narrating Faber still persists, alongside the protagonist, in technocratic dogmatism and flights.

These narrative circumventions underscore the fact that the novel is actually a subjective diary, not a true report. This limited format is unable to accommodate the changes taking place in and questions being faced by both the protagonist and the narrator. These pressures combine to disrupt both the work and travels of the protagonist and the factual report of the narrator.

"Homo faber: Ein Bericht"?

Many critics interpret Faber's lack of discrimination between objective and subjective forms as the result of an underlying desire to justify his actions.<sup>77</sup> However, Frisch says that the purpose of Faber's writings is to reconsider and reevaluate these past events now that he is threatened with death<sup>78</sup> and so the choice of a report is logical for him. Faber is also adept at manipulating facts in order to achieve a predetermined conclusion. Were his mind closed to reinterpreting these events he could well have avoided admitting the truth, he could have avoided admitting his errors and avoided assuming his final guilt, but he does not. Various aspects of his narrative consistently indicate these

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<sup>77</sup> For example: Cock 826; Geulen, Anordnung 120; Jurgensen, Romane 102-103; Latta 152. Kaiser says that the subject of false justification is technology (267).

<sup>78</sup> Rolf Kieser. "An Interview with Max Frisch," Contemporary Literature 13.1 (1972): 6.



faults. Stromsik elaborates upon Faber's loss of a fixed perspective:

Die 'Wahrheit' des Textes erscheint sodann nicht als eine statische, von außen her in ihn implantierte, sondern als eine dynamische, als Oszillation zwischen der Wahrheit des vom Schreiber verfaßten Textes und derjenigen, die durch diesen durchschimmert.<sup>79</sup>

Another impetus for the diary genre according to Steinmetz is Frisch's ability to use the diary "and the techniques of an alienating portrayal."<sup>80</sup>

Jurgensen makes a noteworthy observation: the technologist Faber's use of language in his "Bericht" is inconsistent and illogical. His use of tense, coordinating conjunctions and specific words such as "beziehungsweise"<sup>81</sup> are frequently inappropriate. Faber's tense usage is particularly flagrant and a few examples have been noted in this chapter. In another example, he writes while incarcerated in Caracas: "Ich weiß nicht wieso ich mich verstecke. Ich schämte mich; es ist sonst nicht meine Art, der letzte zu sein" (13). He writes this in the present tense for past events, and in the following sentence reverts back to the past tense. In another instance Faber comments prophetically upon

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<sup>79</sup> J. Stromsik, "Das Verhältnis von Weltanschauung und Erzählmethode bei Max Frisch," Über Max Frisch II, ed. Walter Schmitz, Edition Suhrkamp 852, 2. Auflage (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976): 147.

<sup>80</sup> Horst Steinmetz, "Frisch as a Diarist," Perspectives on Max Frisch, eds. G. F. Probst and J. F. Bodine (Lexington, KY: UP Kentucky, 1982): 57.

<sup>81</sup> Jurgensen, Romane 112-113.

Sabeth instructing him as to the procedure of obtaining a deck chair that "Ich wußte das alles noch nicht ..." (71).

As Faber narrates he initially attempts to use his technological methodology and report to rationalize his erratic behavior. Still, the narrator is somehow compelled to include much nonscientific memorabilia in his report: his inclusion and lengthy description of his dreams are one example; that of Professor O., Ivy and Herbert on the airplane (cf. pgs. 90-91). There are other examples as well, all as significant for their insistent presence as for their individual meaning--for example, his careful documentation of Marcel's "Künstlerquatsch." These subconscious shifts in tense, references to events and ideas not compatible with technocracy and admissions of guilt indicate that there is a nascent comprehension developing in the narrator.

Faber's choice of which events to exclude and which to use to relate his story is also informative. In general, whatever events are significant to the novel find their way into the narrative. Yet a case could be brought forth that Faber's very omission of the events of World War II implies their significance. In particular, it would be conceivable to interpret Faber's noncommitment to Hanna and ensuing position in Baghdad (Iraq being an independent country at the time) as an allegory for Switzerland's role during the war. A number of Frisch's works, dramas in particular (eg. Biedermann und die Brandstifter, Andorra, Die chinesische Mauer), are likewise allegories of the unique role of Switzerland during the war. Homo faber was written during a time when Frisch concerned himself more

with another of his favorite themes: the individual's need for unrestricted self-definition. The works Tagebuch 1946-1949, Graf Öderland, Don Juan oder die Liebe zur Geometrie, Stiller as well as Homo faber were all published with this same theme at this same time. Still, this allegory of Switzerland's role is a significant if not a central theme in the novel. Thus those faults that are so prominent in Faber's personal situations also anticipate a similar manner of escaping responsibility in the societal realm.

This allegory is particularly interesting in that whenever Faber seems to be in a position of social or historical responsibility, his reactions are evasion or withdrawal. In the case of Hanna's pregnancy and supposed abortion he was in Baghdad. He stayed in Baghdad for the duration of World War II. And during the time when European physicists were recanting the application of their science for military and other destructive uses at the Universität Göttingen conferences, Faber was in South America. Within a single sentence he mentions the conventions and his discussions of the same time period: "ich rede nicht von persönlichen Dingen" (166).

Faber's amazed and defensive inclusion of improbable events is one thematic cornerstone that Faber does write about, wittingly or not (and shall be considered in Chapter III). Geulen offers another, he believes that it is in fact Faber's relationships with people whom he encounters during his travels that cause his past to

resurface and that constitute the "Gelenkstellen der Handlung"<sup>82</sup> of the novel including (in the First Station) his meetings with Herbert, Sabeth and Hanna.<sup>83</sup> Yet these chance meetings result in geographic travel as well: he accompanies Herbert to Guatemala. Because of Ivy he boards a cruise ship. He hooks up with Sabeth on her travels through Europe, and eventually he ends up in Athens in order to be with Hanna.

Faber is compelled to confront his past as he travels. Thus as the protagonist makes geographic excursions, the narrator makes excursions into his personal history. Schmitz contends that this journey into (and eventual return to) his past is Faber's inevitable fate since wherever his destination may be "... das alte Wahre erwartet ihn immer am Ziel."<sup>84</sup> Blair similarly notes, "It is clear to any reader of Homo faber that physical travel is subordinate to psychological and emotional journey ...."<sup>85</sup> Whether due to fate or more likely chance,<sup>86</sup> Faber's past is integral to his present and actions:

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<sup>82</sup> Hans Geulen, "Max Frischs 'Homo faber': Anordnung der Geschichte im Erzählgang," Frischs Homo faber, ed. Walter Schmitz, St. 2028 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983): 114.

<sup>83</sup> The lack of intimacy in his American relationships and suspension of travel in New York is an interesting twist to this observation.

<sup>84</sup> Walter Schmitz, "Die Entstehung von 'Homo faber: Ein Bericht'," Frischs Homo faber, ed. Walter Schmitz, St. 2028 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983): 218.

<sup>85</sup> Rhonda L. Blair, "Homo faber, Homo ludens and the Demeter-Kore Motif," Germanic Review 56.4 (Fall 1981): 141.

<sup>86</sup> cf. pgs. 69-70, 106-108.

Sie (die Faber-Handlung) ist zudem, weit vor ihrem zeitlich und räumlich genau fixierten Einsatz zu Beginn der Erzählung, in der Vergangenheit verankert. Es besteht ein erst allmählich sichtbar werdender Zusammenhang zwischen der Person Fabers und Geschehnissen, die zwei Jahrzehnte zurückliegen.<sup>87</sup>

The most valid proposal is that Homo faber synthesizes interpersonal and personal history and travel, and instigates self-awareness along with possible character maturation. Blair calls Homo faber a novel of "self-discovery" (Imagery 104). The external conditions for maturation are present.<sup>88</sup> Hence Schürer's baptismal-rebirth interpretation of Faber's exit from the jungle. How much and even whether Faber matures elicits disparate opinions from scholars. However, there is an important distinction to be made which is not found in the secondary sources and reviews. Faber's first leg of travel, that to Guatemala, immersed him in the natural domain and confronted him with the man-nature-life-death unity. It may be that Faber's allegorical Rio Usumacinta "baptism" does indeed symbolize the Christian meaning that the baptised "child" is ready to enter a new life free of guilt and to learn to be an estimable person modelled after an ideal (Christian or not). However, up until the point at which Faber leaves on the cruise neither the protagonist nor the narrator has matured nor changed

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<sup>87</sup> Hans Geulen, "Max Frischs 'Homo faber' Studien und Interpretationen," Quellen und Forschungen zur Sprach- und Kulturgeschichte der germanischen Völker, Nr. 17 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965): 33.

<sup>88</sup> "Maturation" meaning the development of any new perspective, insight or self-awareness whether acted upon or not. Maturation includes physical development as well as cognitive progress, although the question of Faber's physical development is trivial.

his fundamental attitudes since the start of his journey or 'Bericht.' Latta acknowledges: "The Walter Faber who boards the ship to Europe is anything but a free man. He is a prisoner of his dualities, categories which (because they are selective and reductive) distort and reduce the reality of his world and which foment divisiveness and strife" (154).<sup>89</sup> This misleading reduction of reality is achieved by misapplication of objectivity and allegorical technocracy.

As Faber reviews personal history via the writing of his 'Bericht,' his narration changes simultaneously as Sabeth's parentage ceases to be supposition or a statistically unlikely event and becomes fact apparent. He is still reluctant to take responsibility for an incestuous relationship afterwards as well as before and because of this new pressure his 'Bericht' changes. Up to this point Faber's narration has been unapologetic and self-righteous,<sup>90</sup> now it becomes strained and increasingly removed from his alleged, objective report-style.

During the cruise Faber merely denies that Sabeth could possibly be Hanna's, never mind his own, daughter in the face of easily dismissed and ever increasing nonscientific evidence. He claims in the present tense "Ich kann nur berichten, was ich weiß"

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<sup>89</sup> Latta specifies two basic dualities, those of technology-nature and man-woman, but he also discusses those of technology-art and age-youth (153, 155).

<sup>90</sup> His first recollections of his relationship with Hanna are one example (56-57).

(56). Weisstein believes it is the present tense, post-experiential journal which allows this denial:

The subliminal suspicion, once conceived, grows rapidly, in spite of desperate attempts to lull it. (...) Yet his conscious mind, suppressing the steadily mounting subconscious fear, remains in control of the situation, at least in the subsequent rationalization of the events.... (76)

Faber develops a technocracy-based defense, but one in which his desired hypothesis changes (i.e. whether or not Joachim is Sabeth's father, 85). He claims that had he had reason to suspect Sabeth were his daughter he would surely have asked (80-81).

The narrating Faber incorporates rationalization and other excuses while writing his 'Bericht' in order to avoid responsibility for their relationship and its consequences. He insists that he associated with many people besides Sabeth in order to reduce the intensity of his guilt (73). He emphasizes, "Ich flirtete (mit Sabeth) in keiner Weise" (74). When they disembark the ship Faber sees Sabeth for what he believes is the last time at the customs station. "Unser Kind! Aber ich konnte das damals nicht wissen" (96). He ultimately maintains that he had no reason to suspect he was a father because neither he nor Hanna wanted the child and they had planned on an abortion (48, 105) and because he was never told of the child's subsequent birth. Faber seems angry because of this withheld information, but is still unapologetic for his own actions as he narrates the events of the cruise, though his words could equally be read as a despondent and disillusioned acknowledgment of guilt. "Was ändert es, daß ich meine Ahnungslosigkeit beweise, mein Nichtwissenkönnen! Ich habe das

Leben meines Kindes vernichtet und ich kann es nicht wiedergutmachen. Wozu noch ein Bericht?" (72). Bradley answers that question. She believes that the length and depth of the description of the cruise mean that "Faber is apparently trying to prove that the circumstances alone are responsible for his contact with Sabeth" (287).

Certainly the content of Faber's 'Bericht,' his fascination with and inability to deal with the constancy of coincidences support this interpretation. He even tries to place the coincidental responsibility literally on a thread:

Es war wieder ein purer Zufall, was die Zukunft entschied, nichts weiter, ein Nylon-Faden in dem kleinen Apparat - jedenfalls ein Zufall (...) Hätte ich das Apparätchen nicht zerlegt ... wäre meine Schifffreise nicht zustande gekommen, jedenfalls nicht mit dem Schiff, das Sabeth benutzte, und wir wären einander nie auf der Welt begegnet, meine Tochter und ich. (63-64)

He finds coincidence the culprit again because he cannot but notice Sabeth when he stands behind her in line to the dinner-room. "Das Mädchen bemerkte ich bloß, weil ihr Roßschwanz vor meinem Gesicht baumelte, mindestens eine halbe Stunde lang. (...) Ich versuchte, das Gesicht zu erraten. Zum Zeitvertreib (...) Ich war einfach durch diese Warterei gezwungen, sie zu betrachten" (70).<sup>91</sup> Kaiser asserts it is by trying to ignore reality in this way and so escape his life that Faber recalls his past incarnate which assumes his fate and destroys him (268, 276). Faber, however, does not believe

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<sup>91</sup> Readers familiar with Frisch's work will recognize this 'Gesicht-erraten Zeitvertreib' as a warning sign in itself: particularly with regard to the "Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen" precept in Mein Name sei Gantenbein albeit Faber is guilty of a slightly different perversion of the rule than is Gantenbein.



in fate, "Wieso Fügung?" (72), hence the narrator's invectives against coincidental circumstances. What Faber, narrator in particular, fails to recognize up to the end of his narration about the cruise is how his own actions not only aggravate these circumstances, but determine his "fate".

As this evidence mounts the narrating Faber's mind is protesting the information that he is writing and over which the protagonist Faber's mind is subconsciously panicking. Even he admits in his narration that by the time he and Sabeth reached the Via Appia and he learned she was Hanna's daughter he should have known the truth (118-119). It is likely that at that point the protagonist did "know", but couldn't yet believe the unbelievable for which he was so unprepared (hence his difficulty accepting the fact that Sabeth was Hanna's daughter). Van Ingen considers Faber's disbelief to be intentional, "-Weil Faber kein Unwissender ist, sondern einer, der die Wahrheit nicht haben will."<sup>92</sup> In a lucid post-experiential confession the narrator admits, "Vielleicht bin ich ein Feigling, ich wagte nicht, mehr zu sagen Joachim betreffend, oder zu fragen. Ich rechnete im stillen (während ich redete, mehr als sonst, glaube ich)..." (121).

It is significant that Frisch has so openly and early in the novel (before the cruise, 64, 72-73) admitted to Faber being Sabeth's father (56, 64, 72, 73, 81). This epic anticipation along

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<sup>92</sup> Ferdinand van Ingen, "Max Frischs 'Homo faber' zwischen Technik und Mythologie" Amsterdamer Beiträge zur neueren Germanistik, Hrsg. Gerd Labrousse, Bd. 2 (Amsterdam: Rodopi NV, 1973): 74.

with Frisch's avoidance of any anagnorisis invites the readers to concentrate not on what happens so much as how it happens and why. As pointed out, Faber has had to pervert his allegorical technocracy in order to relieve these misgivings about Sabeth, acting just as impetuously and subjectively and observing (particularly of his own actions) just as selectively as he has throughout.

The narrating Faber is especially industrious during the European leg of the narrative Faber's travels. He frequently delves into his past experiences. At the beginning of the novel the narrating Faber added very little commentary, and then only factual references. Now he has become an intrusive narrator, no longer bothering even to offset his personal commentary with double spacing.<sup>93</sup> The narrator has also completely forsaken his 'Bericht' genre. The chronology in his report of his travels with Sabeth after leaving Paris is especially fragmented. This probably reflects the narrator's continuing difficulty dealing with these events. The result is that this section of the novel is a record of Faber's personality; that of his remote past, and of the concurrently developing protagonist (recent past) and narrating Faber.

It is during these travels that Sabeth's influence on narrator and protagonist becomes apparent. They learn new approaches: artistic, experiential, paternal, psychological, metaphoric, empathetic. The narrator develops an additional new perspective, a self-critical one that he also uses increasingly

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<sup>93</sup> See, for example, pg. 118.

frequently. As the narrating Faber reawakens to various realities, he tentatively continues to celebrate life. He does this by writing that he became "immer wacher" (123). He also recounts anecdotes which were a celebration. These include a description of the eclipse and his first night with Sabeth (123-125). The eclipse is in many legends (including the bible) a mechanism of the unity, relating man to life, death and nature. In Faber's narration it also incites a degree of philosophy from Faber. He uses it, intentionally or not, as a symbol and foreshadowing, "wir, die Erde, ebenso im Finsternis schweben" (123-124), and follows with a treatise on life and death (124). His stymied methodology gives way to a new perspective. His recollections are borne of a new, emotive empathy similar to that he shows Hanna. They are also deeper (see, for example 150-151). His recollections are more self-damning. He recalls Sabeth waiting for him after being bitten. As he approaches, she retreats from his naked, aged and cancer-ravaged body--even he must shut his eyes in order to avoid seeing it (136).

#### B. "KANN ICH WIEDERGUTMACHEN?": THE SECOND STATION NARRATOR

As mentioned, the novel's elements begin to converge in the Second Station. The tension between the narrator and his past behavior and the contents of his narration dissipates. The narrator and protagonist converge with a new ease. Frisch's use of the two "Stations" is also a method of insinuating Faber's change.

This structure implies an advance from one state to another. The protagonist's European rejuvenation was discussed in Chapter I. After leaving Europe Faber retraces his earlier travels. The narrator and/or the protagonist can use this travel rerun either to escape reality by returning to an individual application of technocracy or he can use it to highlight and reinforce new attitudes, personal changes and maturation.

Critics disagree as to whether or not Faber has matured or changed permanently (Friedrich 116).<sup>94</sup> Most seem to agree that during the Cuba portion of Faber's repeat journey at least even the literary Faber has accepted and enjoys life as never before.<sup>95</sup> This change is most commonly attributed to an existential crisis, be it either Sabeth's death<sup>96</sup> or Faber's knowledge that he is her father.<sup>97</sup> Change, however, is a dynamic process over time and from the moment Faber returns to New York, it is apparent what his choice must be.

Faber attempted to impose a man-and-nature schism upon his world, but his travels proved that the two cannot be completely distinguished. Once aware of the falseness of this exclusion Faber

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<sup>94</sup> Many critics tend to disregard the permanence of Faber's situation and often conclude irrelevantly, 'Were Faber to survive...' (pg. 146n.).

<sup>95</sup> Blair 148; Bradley 289; Haberkamm 737.

<sup>96</sup> Bradley 289; Hasters 377; Schürer 332.

<sup>97</sup> Hertha Franz, "Der Intellektuelle in Max Frischs 'Don Juan' und 'Homo faber'," Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 90.4 (Dec. 1971): 561; also in Über Max Frisch II, ed. Walter Schmitz, Edition Suhrkamp 852 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976): 241.

has no recourse to his earlier ignorance, to his technocratic and schismed dogma. This new ostracism is particularly evident in the Second Station.

It is during the time intervening between the writing of the two stations that Faber's personal changes are confirmed. While in Caracas he is forced by his confinement to both acknowledge his worsening health and to reflect via his 'Bericht.' After this he "christens" his new relationship to life with his trip to Cuba. He then, in long-delayed acknowledgement of his health condition, returns to the Athens hospital. Here he begins writing his Second Station.

Faber's new attitude is evidenced from the beginning of the Second Station. This time the narrator analyzes and interprets events and his own feelings; he does not merely report and defend. These feelings, too, show a marked change. Faber now detests the New York parties with Williams in which he once sought comfort and refuge from himself. He must now be given a role by Williams in order even to coexist in that society (161-162). Even this temporary comic role is symbolic of Faber's newfound displacement: he has lost the key to "his" apartment (162). In addition, "his" phone number either yields no answer or a new, unfamiliar voice (163-164). In New York, cradle of "The American Way of Life," Walter Faber now exists as a name on an apartment door (162) and in the phone book (163), but as a homeless name only. Yet despite Faber's attempt to go back, it was his own choice to leave; he was

determined to give up the New York apartment and left the arrangements to Ivy (63, 68).

Faber recounts his flight to Campeche, and that he was forced by stomach problems to lay-over in Merida (165). This delay elicits none of the narrator's defensiveness about his health that his earlier stop-overs did, it is simply reported as an accepted fact.<sup>98</sup> It is clear upon Faber's eventual return to Caracas that his life is both finite and nonessential, even his technologist role (178). The turbines are now operative without his assistance. The machinery, in fact, functions better than Faber (170). His second arrival in Palenque is a stark contrast to the first. Previously he (both narrator and traveller) was disoriented, confronted and fixated by the ubiquity of death and nature while being isolated from technologically sterilized civilization.<sup>99</sup> Much of his change from visit to visit is enabled by the travelling Faber's new attitude,<sup>100</sup> but is expressed by the narrating Faber through the redirection of his observations and reports. During this trip he notes the parrot, children, the ruins, candy (165), a

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<sup>98</sup> Once recommenced, Faber's trip again follows a general degeneration of transport: airplane, bus, train, Landrover (165).

<sup>99</sup> Faber still exhibits a few technocratic eccentricities. He continues all this difficult distance to Guatemala because "man hat nicht so viele Freunde" (166), only to be greeted by Herbert's suspicious demands as to his intentions (166) and a "friendship" in which neither person understands the other (167). He shaves as before and, unlike Herbert, is determined to fix the Nash, convinced that "Ohne Nash (und fünf Kanister Benzin) war Herbert verloren" (167, 169).

<sup>100</sup> The travelling Faber's greater tolerance of nature's role in his life is symbolized by his partaking of Herbert's roast iguana and coconut milk meal (167).

horse, the static lifestyle, a Tom turkey, the deer, the moon, a sow (166), fruitful soon-to-be and nursing mothers (167). Faber's observational shift also encompasses his analogical observations. A new sensitivity to the cycles of nature is also evident. He chronicles the unchanging status of jungle life in Guatemala (165, 166). Faber's development manifests itself in more ways than varied observations. This time what the narrator omits is also important. His agitation and frustration over the natural realm are absent.

#### Rorschach Similes: Figuration

Numerous examples of the technocratic narrator's allegories, metaphors and symbols were discussed in Chapter I. A Second Station change in Faber's similes is yet another visual extension and narrative figuration of his personal changes. Initially the novel's metaphors are a method of relating the natural and supernatural worlds (plane as dead bird, geological formations as angels and demons, 24-25) and it is just these two worlds which Faber sought either to dissociate himself from or to control. This was reflected in his own analogies which were artificial and mechanical associations (i.e. rotting foliage to petroleum jelly, 68; Sabeth's hips to a steering wheel, 87; a donkey's whinny to ungreased brakes, 151). Bänziger notes:

In order to avoid feelings, Faber ... tries to keep any sensitivity at arm's length with hurriedly fabricated comparisons. The sea is like tinfoil; the Mediterranean

air, like cellophane with nothing behind it; the surf, like beer foam; the black cypress trees like exclamation points.<sup>101</sup>

Faber and Sabeth consummated their union sexually in Avignon. Later, in Acrocorinth they fused cognitively as well. Both saw the moonlit stony trail of Acrocorinth as yogurt. This new perspective accompanies Faber through his remaining travels (175, 176, 181), sometimes as a painful reminder such as on his final flight to Athens: "Unser Flugzeugschatten: wie eine Fledermaus! so würde Sabeth sagen, ich finde nichts und verliere einen Punkt..." (195-196). Faber's new perspective (cf. Latta 153) and the fact that it is maintained is one of Frisch's techniques of showing Faber's maturation to be a profound one. These metaphors act as Rorschach tests of subconscious associations.

There is one other cogent example of the narrator's figuration: his Jungian-like description of his and Marcel's reemergence from the jungle (cf. pgs. 22, 64). Faber's initial omission of this event, deliberate effort to later record it, choice of (re-) birth metaphor ("wie Neugeborene," 69) and subsequent acknowledgement of Marcel's ascertainment "that earth is woman" all indicate that this metaphoric rebirth passage was intentionally constructed as such. This is a valuable albeit subtle insight into the narrator's attitudes toward these events. He considers himself newly borne of Mother Earth and proceeds to relate anecdotes of new experiences, desires and attitudes.

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<sup>101</sup> Hans Bänzinger, "Frisch as a Narrator," Perspectives on Max Frisch, eds. G. F. Probst and J. F. Bodine (Lexington, KY: UP of Kentucky, 1982): 44.



**"Mein Entschluß, anders zu leben": New Perspectives**

The repeated and lengthening reminders of Faber's mortality are likely motivations for some of his ongoing changes. It is after his Caracas internment that the most dramatic changes take place for both narrator and protagonist. Faber now refuses even to fly over New York, his one-time home (172).<sup>102</sup> The narrator delves into acerbic, vehement tirades against "The American Way of Life" (175, 176, 177), the U.S. "ready for use ... amerikanisiertes Vakuum ... alles wird Highway ... Plakatwand zu beiden Seiten ... Illumination, am anderen Morgen sieht man die leeren Gerüste, Klimbim, infantil..." (177), and Americans:

... diese Bleichlinge, die nicht wissen, was Wein ist, diese Vitamin-Fresser, die kalten Tee trinken und Watte kauen und nicht wissen, was Brot ist, dieses Coca-Cola-Volk, das ich nicht mehr ausstehen kann- (175)

His anger is particularly directed toward Americans' relation to youth and death (67, 175-177). This is an indirect criticism of his own American-like technocracy which has likewise failed. "Mein Zorn auf Amerika! (...) Mein Zorn auf mich selbst!" (175, 176).

The evolution in both past (protagonist) and present (narrator) and these inklings of a pending death intensify once Faber reaches his four-day stop-over in Lisbon. His stomach problem still haunts him (178, 179, 181), "Mein Hirngespent: Magenkrebs" (178). He has premonitions of death which he fears and resents. He feels himself as dead among the living (178)--similar

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<sup>102</sup> He is also angered at the frequent assertion by the Cubans that he is American, especially after he has already corrected them (172, 179).

to the unwitting Professor O., worn out (173), with no time left even for sleep (180). He is bitter about what technology and "The American Way of Life" have to offer him as death draws near (177), and he laments that this is his legacy. His laments progress from determined to resigned, from his incessantly reiterated "Mein Entschluß, anders zu leben" (173, 175) to the wistful "Meine Lust, jetzt und hier zu sein" (174) and finally to the tired, resigned, pensive "Wenn man anders leben könnte" (176). Finally he settles for the only solace left him (again note tense usage): "Ich preise das Leben!" (181), and the only philosophy left him: "Ich wußte, daß ich alles, was ich sehe, verlassen werde, aber nicht vergessen-" (180). In another foreshadowing quote Faber evokes Wisch's blindness motif. Lightening, dramatic and powerful, strikes and "nachher ist man wie blind, einen Augenblick lang hat man gesehen" (175). At times his Lisbon vitality, too, seems to wear and fade leaving him disoriented: "... ein komischer Tag, ich kannte mich selbst nicht ... ich bewundere (diese Leute) wie fremde Tiere" (177).

Faber's newly developed and recurrent lust for life in Cuba is expressed by the narrator in many ways.<sup>103</sup> The preceding bitter invectives result from his desire for this newly fulfilling life that he cannot have. His diversion to Cuba is the first time he travels for himself.<sup>104</sup> His narration switches into present tense

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<sup>103</sup> The protagonist's changes are obvious and even include clumsy attempts at spiritualism (eg. pgs. 175, 177, 179).

<sup>104</sup> His previous travels were for work or Professor O.'s 'Hochzeitsreise.'

which carries a greater nuance of "aliveness" than the present perfect. The same vitality is also evidenced throughout his descriptions based upon his still reoriented observations.<sup>105</sup> He makes enthusiastic plans for his future even though he knows he will not be able to execute them (180).

"Ich brauchte keinen Techniker. (...) Ich wurde ihn nicht los."

Still some comforting and habitual vestiges of his technological life remain. These include his peculiarities about his health, shaving, showering and sex (although he is not in so combative a quandary over his sexuality as before).<sup>106</sup> He does, as before, pacify his worries by discrediting his state of health (171, 172, 179). Some of Faber's newly acquired values are inconsistently victimized by his allegorically technocratic methodicism as well. His philosophical letters to Dick and Marcel terminate in pieces scattered over the water "weil unsachlich" (177). Faber, too, feels a bit adrift and sometimes is unsure what to do now that his work (which he never completed) is finished (179).

Because much of his previous personality is left intact the Faber of old has been deemed incorrigible by the critics. They generally view him as reverted to his technological and mechanistic

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<sup>105</sup> These include birds, people, atmosphere (172), a new father's celebration, the weather, colors, market wares, the sunset and much much more (173-179, 181, 195).

<sup>106</sup> 134, 148, 149, 173, 178.

mentality at the moment of death.<sup>107</sup> Much in Homo faber seems to support this theory that Faber's maturation is ineffectual: Faber's blinding lightening anecdote, persistent old ways and attitudes. This opinion that he is unchanging also fits in with themes put forth in other of Frisch's work, eg. Stiller and Biographie: Ein Spiel.

Yet to state that Faber does not change is to contradict much of the novel's Second Station with little textual support. Much of the text and Frisch's themes in fact support the idea of irreversible change. New York denies Faber its previous refuge. Herbert, Caracas and Campeche no longer offer the comradeship nor the sense of belonging that they earlier did. His body continues to age despite himself (177). Symbolically, cameras, chess, razors and showering are all fading motifs rarely encountered later in the novel. He feels uncomfortable and nervous when with other 'Techniker' despite their interest in the mechanics of his photography (185), he further<sup>A</sup> claims not to need them (186). His personal relationships show much progress (with Hanna, Sabeth and Hanna, respectively). His attitudes seem changed, too: even in Düsseldorf he critically recognizes the difference between an objective but nonsubstantial record and experiencing something (182, 187, 188-191). He still sings (192), and his metaphors reveal subconscious level changes. Hanna warns Faber that

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<sup>107</sup> For example: Bradley 290; Franz, Über 241, also Zeitschrift 561; Jurgensen, Romane 110; Schmitz, Interpretation 214. Blair is one of the few critics who optimistically affirms a definitive change in Faber (48).

repetition is not possible in life (138-139). Even Faber ultimately realizes that nothing can be repeated nor even held static, "und es vergeht ja doch alles" (182). Faber himself asserts that despite his pending doom he will not forget (180). Faber, like Stiller, is aware of the capacity for change within himself. Ironically, this majority of critics who doubt Faber's maturation may be guilty of the same Stillerian-Andorrian version of halo effect. These critics expect a certain behavior from Faber (just as Stiller's acquaintances and Andri's fellow villagers did of them) that their very expectations eventually elicit. In fact, Faber moves steadily and evermore knowledgeably and realistically toward his acknowledged destiny and will even manage a degree of serenity (197). This is a much matured man compared to the fearful, desperate Faber of the first station.

Faber's life presumably ends in the Athens hospital. The Second Station of his report alternates between typewritten accounts of the past and handwritten, current-time details and ponderings forced by the confiscation of his typewriter during the hospital's quiet hours (161). His inappropriate and inconsistent (and presumably unintentional) use of the present tense within his report of past events continues. Earlier in the novel he had interjected such comments as that about his methodology, "Vielleicht bin ich ein Feigling" (121) and others, more condemning, that were mentioned earlier. These present tense interjections have progressed as Faber matured, from cowardly

defensiveness (13, 15, 22, 24-25, 45) to a quarrelsome resignation<sup>108</sup> and finally to inclusion of the unity.<sup>109</sup> This change in attitude reflected in the narration reaffirms the personality changes enacted in the narrated time and confirms that Faber continues to mature until the novel's end. That end is symbolic and significant. For when the separate texts of the past, represented by the typed text and protagonist Faber, and the present, represented by manuscript and Sabeth, meet the result is death. The novel's First Station ends with the union of Faber and Sabeth and so Sabeth's death; the Second Station culminates in the union of machine and hand-written text and Faber's death.

Despite his oblique understanding of death's approach, Faber remains positive. There is a sense of triumph in his planning (171) and his loving descriptions of Hanna. His musings interfuse meaningful, interrelational insights and descriptions past and present (eg. contrast of Armin, the figuratively all-seeing blind man, and Faber, the blind sighted man, 184). All of this indicates a profound change in Faber the narrator and Faber the protagonist, present to the novel's end.

### C. SUMMARY

Two distinct Fabers are apparent in this novel: Faber the protagonist and Faber the narrator. The latter begins his First

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<sup>108</sup> 33, 56, 72, 91, 105, 121, 177.

<sup>109</sup> 181-203 'passim.'

Station report as a technocratically-based defense in the face of recent, confusing events. His philosophical outlook concurs with that of the protagonist (as analyzed in Chapter I). Yet by the very nature of these events he is forced to shift from the report he had hoped to redeem himself and his allegorical technocracy with to something more revealing. He experiences the same pressure via his narration that the protagonist did because of his travels. These past events and Faber's current bedridden state have readied the narrator for personal changes. These changes begin to find subtle expression in the First Station narration.

Faber suspends his writing during his trip to Cuba. It is during this time that the protagonist (who post-dates the First Station narrator and those subtle changes) unarguably matures and these changes are maintained right up to the moment of death. This is evidenced by the narrator who is writing his Second Station while in the Athens hospital. There no longer exists any tension between the human actions and the narrator's chronicle of them. The 'Bericht' form is all but forsaken in favor of romantic and nostalgic remembrances and wishes. Even death, the one element of the unity most characteristically denied and feared by Faber is accepted with a measure of equanimity. Thus there is a distinct and irreversible change of attitude, from technocratic to emotive celebration, as proven by Faber's narration.

### CHAPTER III

Thus far two of the novel's characters have been analyzed: Faber the protagonist and Faber the narrator. There is a third presence in the novel whose interpretation is integral to the understanding of Max Frisch's technological man--that of science and technology themselves. These include order and objectivity. Faber's relationship with science begins similar to those with the unity. He tries to isolate certain aspects, in the case of science those that he finds comforting, and apply them out of context. Faber's misuse of arithmetic and statistics has already been noted. This chapter will investigate how he similarly abuses other aspects of science and technology as well, and how he attempts to force his world and himself to adhere to his (mis-) interpretations of science and technology.

#### A. "KEINERLEI MYSTIK; MATHEMATIK GENÜGT MIR": MISAPPLICATIONS

##### Unstatistics

Early in the novel the reader is presented with Faber's behavioral pattern of reassurance in statistics. Faber dismissed his ill-fated flight as merely "ein Flug wie hundert andere zuvor" (9). His first reactions to the emergency landing are predictable. He justifies the precepts of probabilism (as was quoted on page 15). To his own justification he then adds bibliographical references (22). He thus bolsters his faith in his



allegorical technocracy. Not only is Faber comfortable when embedded in the safe median of life, he is also uncomfortable when forced out of this mainstream of society. In Houston he prepares to reboard the plane until his name specifically is announced over the P.A. system (11-12). He then deliberately attempts to let his plane depart without him by hiding for over ten minutes (13). This incident indicates his consistent desire not to be differentiated from the mass, he wants to be lost as an insignificant one-among-many statistic.<sup>110</sup> Faber does not want to be an extreme, called an "outlier" in statistics. He does not want to deviate from the standard by being the last to board the plane. "Ich weiß nicht wieso ich mich eigentlich verstecke. Ich schämte mich; es ist sonst nicht meine Art, der letzte zu sein" (13). To be the last is furthermore to be culpable for interfering with the pace of technology, "ich ging wie einer, der vom Gefängnis ins Gericht geführt wird" (14).<sup>111</sup> Faber initially forces himself to conform to his warped perception of mathematical security.

Statistical method relies on accurate and sizable sampling, yet Faber's observations are consistently inaccurate. He writes, for example, how he held Sabeth's head like a vase yet she said he was hurting her (120). He feels his stomach, but not pain (42, 88). He insists when surrounded by mirrors that he looks great,

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<sup>110</sup> Faber's desire is not to be distinguished from the mainstream which, according to Heidegger's existentialism, has as its goal to be average (Soloman 218). By confining himself to this average mainstream, Faber is unable to become "authentic."

<sup>111</sup> Compare this to the attitude he developed after having sex with his geometry teacher's wife (see pg. 12).

well-rested, even if he is older and balder, has dark circles under his eyes (98). He feels great, but is not able to enjoy the excellent food (98). And he ignores both the concerns of others about his health (including Sabeth's, 110) as well as symbolic portents (i.e. Williams' concern ending in a dead connection, 96). He fervently expounds how he, a real man, lives in his work, yet he still ignores his UNESCO work throughout the novel. His personal technocratic double standard becomes even more pronounced. He doesn't believe in coincidences (61-63)--nor fate--y. he further flaunts his favored statistics when he looks about for someone he might know on board ship (70) eventually even looking for Hanna. He lackadaisically notes that Bach had thirteen children "oder so etwas" and seven or nine of Dick's friends were over to his place (66, 105). Thus his observations are imprecise as well as inaccurate.

Faber's biased observations result in abberant statistical analyses. These in turn, elicit insoluble conflicts and inconsistencies, many of which are apparent in his actions and unrealistic expectations throughout the duration of the cruise. They are noticeable in many individual incidents, but particularly in those concerned with emotion and/or other people. For example, when he drinks wine on his birthday he is unrealistically determined not to become sentimental, but he does (89). He claims that he "hates this mania" (17) of grabbing a person by the arm, sleeve or elbow, yet he does the same--even when he is determined not to (17, 18, 87). The baptist, like Faber, catches hold of

Sabeth's arm (77). Sabeth shuns this hand, laying it back on the table "wie eine Serviette" (78) according to Faber who marks the action with catty laughter, conversation and feelings of vindication. There will be no such relief for Faber in discovering Sabeth's "identity". This is premonished from the moment he first sees her face. Faber played a favorite game of Frisch's character Gantenbein by imagining Sabeth's face from behind and when he does see her face he is surprised (71-72). Faber similarly presumes Hanna's abortion without facts or even any real assignation on Hanna's behalf (57). Again he is disappointed when his fiftieth birthday is different from what he had imagined (88). Were Faber a true technocrat in methodology, a purist with respect to observation, analysis and also expectation, he should easily have assimilated and accepted Sabeth's appearance and these other situations. Faber has employed quite nontechnocratic, false, and invalid methods and perceptions to arrive at an unsubstantiated expectation which he refuses to relinquish literally in the "face" of truth. It is his habitual repetition of this mistake which elicits his self-destructive 'Lebenslauf.'

#### Miscalculations

Faber applies his calculations in the same subjective and inexact manner and with equally contradictory results. He consistently misapplies or fails to apply universal and objective reasoning to his personal situations. Much as Faber loves statistics and predictions, he himself hates being predicted (62).

The ship's library is useless to Faber as it is filled only with novels and so he mulls over various vibrations and calculations to pass the time (71, 79). These calculations include the ages of almost every woman on board ship other than Sabeth (79), he considers Hanna's age (80) and whether or not she might yet have white hair (79). He continues to avoid the inevitable, eventually fabricating calculations to prove to himself that Sabeth could not possibly be his daughter:

Ich wagte nichts mehr zu sagen, Joachim betreffend, oder zu fragen. Ich rechnete im stillen (während ich redete, mehr als sonst glaube ich) pausenlos, bis die Rechnung aufging, wie ich sie wollte: Sie konnte nur das Kind von Joachim sein! Wie ich's rechnete, weiß ich nicht; ich legte mir die Daten zurecht bis die Rechnung wirklich stimmte, die Rechnung als solche. (121)

He then verbally makes this truth universal by telling Sabeth on the way to Porta San Sebastiano that he knew her father Joachim (121). He universalizes this truth in writing also en route to Rome:

... (dann) genoß ich es, die Rechnung auch schriftlich zu überprüfen. Sie stimmte; ich hatte ja die Daten (die Mitteilung von Hanna, daß sie ein Kind erwartet, und meine Reise nach Bagdad) so gewählt, daß die Rechnung stimmte; fix blieb nur der Geburtstag von Sabeth, der Rest ging nach Adam Riese, bis mir ein Stein vom Herzen fiel. (122)

This is not the first time he has perverted analysis to justify falsehood. Faber is not afraid of flying (61), but he wants Ivy to believe that he is so "Ich rechnete, bis Ivy mir glaubte, sie setzte sich sogar und gestand, daß sie solche Rechnungen nie angestellt hätte" (61). Faber's apparently intentional miscalculations and self-serving, even false analyses are thus not uncommon.

More optimistic than most critics, Latta asserts that Faber's miscalculations are not intentional (154). However, in view of Faber's own admission to computing "bis Ivy mir glaubte" and "bis die Rechnung aufging, wie ich sie wollte," it is more likely that, as other critics suggest, the errors were deliberate. Geulen believes that it is Faber's prejudiced perspective (Studien 66) that causes him to choose to miscalculate and be in error in lieu of acknowledging Sabeth as his and Hanna's daughter (Studien 71). The technocracy-implicating interpretation of Faber's purposeful aberration is pronounced by Hillen: "Die Berechnung, die über allen Zweifel erhabene Methode des Ingenieurs, erweist sich als manipulierbar,"<sup>112</sup> seconded by Jurgensen. All these interpretations underscore Faber's complicity in the "fateful" events to come.

#### Subjective Objectivity: Inherent or Intentional?

Some critics believe it is Faber's methodology with these inherent flaws which is alone to blame for his fate. Roisch says, for example: "Das technisch-pragmatische Denken hat seine Erlebnisfähigkeit so reduziert, daß keine innere Regung ihm mehr sagen kann: Das junge Mädchen, mit dem du ein Verhältnis eingehen wirst, ist deine eigene Tochter."<sup>113</sup> Bänziger concurs:

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<sup>112</sup> Gerd Hillen, "Reisemotive in den Romanen von Max Frisch," Wirkendes Wort 19.2 (1969): 131. See also Manfred Jurgensen, "The Diary in Contemporary German Literature," Universitas 20.4 (1978): 257. And also Romane 103.

<sup>113</sup> Roisch, Über 93.

(Faber's is) the life of an intellectual bungler. Naturally Faber's bungling is not in the area of his specialization but rather in his entire life-style .... (And so) Faber's pride in standing solidly on the ground, of seeing precisely the things that people talk about, leads him into error. The conviction that his sense of reality certainly does not make him blind leads him directly into darkness and into death. (... In that) His presumptuous miscalculations lead to incest. (44)

They lay the blame then on technological thinking. Yet it is not the allegorical technocracy itself which is flawed, but rather Faber's deployment of it. He uses technology as a mask (Roisch, Beiträge 963), he uses it to deny and rationalize.<sup>114</sup> Schmitz classifies Faber's calculations as parodistic,<sup>115</sup> and so they are. It is not the use of objectivity and reason that ensnares Faber, but this disparateness between the ultimate reality and his parody of it.

Die Rechnung als solche ersetzt also die Gewißheit, die Faber in der menschlichen Begegnung fehlt, wie ihm überhaupt die Begegnung gar nicht eigentlich gelingt, denn allen elementaren Ereignissen und Bindungen gegenüber bleibt sein Verhalten unaktiv und objekthaft. So entsteht im ganzen ein fast komisches Mißverhältnis zwischen den Leitbildern von Fabers Leben und der Praxis seines Verhaltens: statt als Organisator zu leben, gleitet er von einer Konstellation in die andere ohne eigenes Handeln. Statt (...) Lösungen zu finden, verursacht er unlösbare Konflikte.<sup>116</sup>

Faber's thus unjustified reliance on a personalized technocracy he makes false is additionally complicated by his inability to deal with the human, subjective, realm. He further

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<sup>114</sup> Walter Schmitz, "Max Frischs Roman Homo faber, Eine Interpretation," Frischs Homo faber, ed. Walter Schmitz, St. 2028 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983): 76.

<sup>115</sup> Schmitz, Interpretation 219.

<sup>116</sup> Kaiser 272-273.

intentionally perverts his alleged technocracy in order to rationalize rejecting this realm in his life. This dismissal is not only unjustified, it is also illogical even by technocratic standards:

$$\text{given } A, B \mid (A \cap B = \emptyset) \not\rightarrow (A \leftrightarrow \neg B)$$

i.e. to assert "A," or technocracy, and "B," or subjective humanism, as a complement of "A," does not entail that "A" and "B" are mutually exclusive. Again: technocracy and subjectivity are a continuum, they cannot be wholly removed from one another. Yet Faber consistently tries to dehumanize and technologize himself. He does this by removing himself from and removing from himself all that he perceives as subjective and (illogically) replacing it with the (false) converse of his allegorical mechanical technocracy.

### III. "ICH MACHE MIR NICHTS AUS ..."

#### The Scientific Method

Faber's flagrant probabilism is consistent with his failure to employ the general scientific method correctly. Sabeth's demise, for example, is a bizarre combination of errors on Faber's part. The scientific method was first developed during the Enlightenment (Garbarino 13-14) and is based upon three processes: observation, analysis and experimentation. He fails in these elementary steps. The allegorical technocrat observes three marks on Sabeth, then hastily and wrongly says "ich begriff sofort" (127). He sees, but

does not observe, that Sabeth was conscious until she fell over a six foot escarpment (127, 157, 158). He also failed to report Sabeth's observed symptoms to the hospital staff despite Dr. Eleutheropulos' questioning doubts (126).

Despite Faber's failed observation he or the doctor should have been able to surmise Sabeth's diagnosis from the progression of her symptoms. They all indicate a head injury, concussion or bleeding and Faber failed to analyze (diagnose), to observe or to report these.<sup>117</sup>

Compounding his failure to approach the situation scientifically, Faber's immediate reactions to Sabeth's predicament are nonsensical. He ineffectually runs in the water (157), he screams for help on a deserted beach (127). He does not trust that a "primitive" with a donkey and cart could aid him, condemning this "Hilfe mit Kräutern oder Aberglauben oder was weiß ich" (128). Ironically, it is just such old wives' cures (in the opinion of the Athens doctor, 130) to which Faber resorts (127, 128). In the end neither Faber's home-remedies nor the doctor's uninformed technologies are able to save Sabeth's life.

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<sup>117</sup> Sabeth's loss of consciousness and drowsiness, vomiting, unfocussed eyes and sweating (128, 129) are all classic symptoms of a head injury or concussion; paleness, thirst and sweating (128, 131) are symptomatic of bleeding (a ruptured medial meningeal artery in Sabeth's case, 160). When a person is in shock the signs are thirst and vomiting (128) and eventually a blue-white paleness (as of marble), slow and shallow breathing, and a slow pulse (129, 131) as the body's systems shut down. Thus Sabeth's earlier symptoms were indicative of a head injury and/or bleeding.



### Objectified Subjectivity

Faber is not only overly reliant upon technology, he is also initially unable to complement his technocratic approach--to experiment. He remarks (again in the obtrusive present tense), "Ich mache mir nichts aus Romanen - sowenig wie aus Träumen" (15). Later in Palenque he will similarly note, "Ich mache mir nichts aus Folklore" (45) and in Italy it will be museums (108). Faber is unable to use anything which cannot be reconciled with his statistical dictates, although the narrating Faber finds such dreams and intuitions important enough to recall and report.<sup>118</sup> Any subconsciously or intuitively inspired precepts are discounted. In exemplum, Faber had earlier noted his neighbor's similarity to Joachim despite identifiable differences in appearance (10). Since this observation was not grounded on reason or quantitative evidence he discarded the possibility.

Faber would do well not to disregard his dreams and intuition so readily. While his neighbor reads, he sleeps and experiences (or perhaps the problem is that he does not experience) potentially foreshadowing dreams (15-16). Blair interprets the dreams (as well as the novel) from the perspective of Jungian personality development.<sup>119</sup> In his dream, Faber hears his name called again and again over the loudspeaker. Blair interprets this as a search for identity--a popular interpretation for any of Frisch's works

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<sup>118</sup> This again indicates a later change in attitude.

<sup>119</sup> Rhonda L. Blair, "Archetypal Imagery in Max Frisch's 'Homo faber': the Wise Old Man and the Shadow," Germanic Review 59.3 (1984): 104-108.

that safely coalesces all of them. "Symbolically, this (hearing his name called) is ... an inner calling to free himself from the crowd and from his own well-worn paths of habit and false security in technology" (Imagery 105).

Some of Faber's dream is readily interpreted. He feels confined with Ivy in the chaotic, American glitz (15). His seat neighbor's role is easily explained by his connection in Faber's mind, not quite as forgotten as believed, with Joachim. He becomes a surrogate for Joachim, becoming Faber's friend and personifying the past to which Faber is bound. The presence of Professor O. in the dream is of greater import. Blair reasonably asserts that his "weeping suggests some disaster" and that since he is a respected authority figure for Faber the dream should not be so readily dismissed (Imagery 105). On a more superficial level, Faber's mechanistic approach is again evidenced when he says of Professor O., "vollkommen sentimental, er weinte immerfort, obschon er Mathematiker ist" (15). Emotion seems to have no place in Faber's technocracy. Weisstein's description of Faber's personality relates to and expands upon this, explaining Faber's nonacceptance of his dream. "Since Faber regards feeling as a flaw, he does not care to understand them even where they touch him ...."<sup>120</sup>

Faber is awakened from his dream by the stewardess who instructs him to don a life-preserver (16). One of the Super Constellation's four engines has malfunctioned. This is one of an

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<sup>120</sup> Ulrich Weisstein, Max Frisch, TWAS 21 (NY: Twayne Publishers, 1967): 70.

inordinate number of coincidences occurring in the novel. As Kaiser notes, "Ganz deutlich ist die Ereignisfolge des 'Homo faber' in ihren entscheidenden Wendepunkten auf 'Zufällen' aufgebaut."<sup>121</sup> Faber's frustration with the insistence of these unpredictable events is noted by Pütz. He observes that Faber's use of the nonanticipatory 'plötzlich' "... signalisiert den Einbruch des Unüblichen."<sup>122</sup> The fact that Faber chose to start his narrative at the beginning of this long sequence of improbabilities is further evidence of his difficulty with accepting them and his ensuing extraordinary fate.<sup>123</sup> He himself declares, "Ich glaube nicht an Fügung und Schicksal, als Techniker bin ich gewohnt mit den Formeln der Wahrscheinlichkeit zu rechnen" (22). Had he, however, been able to account consistently for these unusual occurrences in his statistical-technocratic approach and so prepare for, accept and deal with them as they occurred, he would not need to look back to resolve his life in his "Bericht." Instead, Faber biases his data by subjectively choosing which observations to accept.

Faber, however, counter to a true technocratic method chooses to lend greater credence to (and derives greater comfort from)

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<sup>121</sup> Gerhard Kaiser, "Max Frischs Homo faber" Über Max Frisch II, ed. Walter Schmitz, Edition Suhrkamp 852, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976): 267.

<sup>122</sup> Peter Pütz, "Das Übliche und das Plötzliche. Über Technik und Zufall im Homo faber" Frischs Homo faber, ed. Walter Schmitz, St. 2028 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983): 135.

<sup>123</sup> Faber's frustration with these coincidences and belief that they are responsible for his "fate" was discussed in Chapter II.

trivial or extraneous details. This is what critics often overlook when interpreting Homo faber. It is not a problem inherent to technocracy that dooms Faber, it is Faber's own flawed scientific method. Faber's methodological error here is that, rather than acknowledging these coincidences as indicative of the transcendent reality, he refutes them. He thus biases the "data" upon which he must base a conclusion by editing his observations. He generalizes the unreliability of familial similarity from the case of his adoptive brother and himself (80) to Sabeth and Hanna despite the Herbert-Joachim example. "Ich sagte mir, daß mich wahrscheinlich jedes junge Mädchen irgendwie an Hanna erinnern würde. (...) Was heißt schon Ähnlichkeit? Hanna war schwarz, Sabeth blond beziehungsweise rötlich und ich fand es an den Haaren herbeigezogen, die beiden zu vergleichen" (78).<sup>124</sup> He makes an ironic, double-entendre mockery of this idiom by emphasizing such dissimilarities as the fact that Hanna never wore a ponytail like Sabeth (80)--an obviously ludicrous method of determining familial lines. As Haberkamm remarks, "Walter verfährt ähnlich" (736). Nonetheless, the last night of the cruise he is struck by Sabeth's "Hanna-Mädchen-Gesicht!" (94). So inexorably adverse is he to allowing Sabeth's similarity to Hanna that when he eventually encounters Hanna he remarks, "Sie glich ihrer Tochter schon sehr!" (131).

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<sup>124</sup> Faber's one other young female in the novel, Ivy, never reminds him of Hanna. Nor, he remarks, was Hanna as young as his girlfriends (8).

A formidable percentage of these coincidences are doubly-damning mechanical breakdowns; neither do Faber's statistics fail to prepare and guide him, nor can he depend upon technology itself. This was the first of many times Faber felt onus to become an intrusive narrator; he rationalized all these coincidences back into the realm of his statistical approach:

Es ist aber, wenn einmal das Unwahrscheinliche eintritt, nichts Höheres dabei, keinerlei Wunder oder derartiges... Indem wir vom Wahrscheinlichen sprechen, ist ja das Unwahrscheinliche immer schon inbegriffen und zwar als Grenzfall des Möglichen, und wenn es eintritt, das Unwahrscheinliche, so besteht für unsereinen keinerlei Grund zur Verwunderung, zur Erschütterung, zur Mystifikation. (22)

This justification of his parody of probabilistic technocracy is valid, but selfishly motivated. His inappropriate reactions to unpredictable events further skew the resultant aberrations. Technology's subservience to man's frivolities is also evidenced by the inability of the awaiting American helicopters to rescue the stranded Super Constellation passengers (32).

### C. PERSPECTIVE AND CONSENSUS

Faber discovers in other ways, also, that sometimes a statistical sampling is not so comforting. Up to this point this thesis has been essentially limited to Faber's (technocratic) perspective. Frisch employs a number of methods of communicating "the" external reality to the reader. One of these, the narrator's style, was discussed in Chapter II. Some of the numerous (probably unintentional) allegories in Faber's narrative were noted in

Chapter I, and these function as a mode of perspective as well. Frisch also incorporates some of his personal favorite motifs to add perspective and consensus. Consensus of perspective is called "coherence" in Heidegger's existentialism; and it is precisely this coherence wherein lies "truth" (Soloman 236).

### Mirrors

One of Frisch's methods is the mirror motif. Faber's first stop after disembarking the cruise ship is Paris. When he first arrives he is as incognizant as ever. He is still paranoid (over Williams, the waiter, 96-97), distracted, preoccupied, disturbed, and unjustifiably and inappropriately irritated (96-99). He is especially disturbed by Williams' comment about his health, unable either to admit or to confront it entirely. He transfers this health-paranoia by becoming angered and critical of the waiter and, in keeping with his earlier patterns, by denying the matter, claiming "Ich bin nun einmal ... ein Mann in den besten Jahren..." (98). Yet this statement is invalidated by his reflection in the restaurant's mirrors.

Mirrors are a recurring motif in Frisch's works. They enable a person to perceive and interpret an image of the real totality, yet no two perspectives of a mirrored image are ever the same: eyes cannot be concurrent in space, minds are never equivalent. Hence the damning aspect of mirrors in Homo faber is the concensus of perception. Faber is sick, and this he must see through the perspectives of others even if he denies it to himself. The negro

woman (12) and Williams (96-98) recognize his illness, and he cannot deny the wan reflected image that is his in mirrors in Houston, in the Parisian restaurant and in the Athens hospital (11, 98, 170-171). In Paris Faber ascertains his virility only "Ohne Spiegel" (98). This external consensus eventually distills into the irreversible reality of Faber's mortality.

### People

Perspective in Homo faber is gained through human mediums in other matters as well. Professor O. infers the father-daughter relationship (194) as do numerous strangers (78, 86, 122). An integral consequence of consensus of perspective, of reality, in Homo faber is judgement. Hanna's perspective finds herself (202) as well as Walter guilty of injustice. Upon Hanna's learning the truth Faber writes "Ihr Blick- ... so blickte sie mich an ... ein Ungetüm ... ein Monstrum, was Tee trinkt" (141). He is unable to look Hanna in the eyes and face this judgement of guilt (141). Hanna's perspective, however, along with these others, is a truth that becomes apparent during these reunions and one that he is no longer able to avoid.

### Photography

Düsseldorf proves a painful synopsis for Faber, one that also accentuates his changes. At the Henke-Bosch Company Faber is confronted with his slipshod organization when his supposedly labelled rolls of film result unexpectedly in home movies. While

viewing these slides Faber encounters the same now insubstantial, guilt-invoking inspiration: "Sabeth nochmals ... sie steht jetzt, unsere tote Tochter, und singt ... und singt, aber unhörbar-" (191). He then once again leaves a job (his report to the 'Techniker') unfinished. He excuses himself with false pretenses, but this time it is not technology which is his 'Ausrede,' rather his stomach.

Faber's camera is an important motif in the novel. Cameras are a type of Frischian mirror, a mechanical vehicle for perception and interpretation.<sup>125</sup> Faber's relationship to his camera is a synopsis of his travel-maturation. From the very beginning of the novel Faber indicates the importance of his camera "die mich schon um die halbe Welt begleitet hat" (11) as well as its hinderative powers (10). The camera is a literal hindrance to Faber typically causing problems with customs officers. It is a figurative hindrance to Faber's perception. Instead of living 'am Gipfel der Zeit' Faber occupies himself with his camera during potentially unique 'Erlebnisszenen': Tamaulipas (23), farewells (68, 95-96), finding Joachim's body (55), new adventures (72), emotions (85).

The camera's figurative hindrance is twofold. Firstly, it permits Faber, as an objective photographer, to detach himself from the scenes before the camera (Hasters 379). Like the chessboard, Faber uses his camera as a means to approach and/or avoid people (intimacy, 23) and sensations (himself, 23, 27, 40). Secondly, the

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<sup>125</sup> The importance of mirrors in Frisch's work is particularly evident in Mein Name sei Gantenbein.



photographs themselves are a similarly distanced and inexact record of these experiences. Faber's photos are adulterated records, they are out of focus (186), underexposed (186), defective (191), and blurred from camera movement during the exposure (191). Yet the photos of Sabeth are improved (190)--a symbolically significant point since it was at this time when, unfettered by his allegorical technocracy, he began to perceive life more clearly and focus on new priorities. Photography as a method of record also has the inherent reduction of frame of reference and dimension. Bradley counts lack of dynamics among the camera's insufficiencies: "The camera-like vision turns the objects into static images which enable the mind to supply them with fixed definitions" (284). Faber acknowledges another of the camera's intrinsic insufficiencies at the Henke-Bosch building. Cameras cannot capture the essence of an experience which is often non-visual, sensual in nature (187, 188-191). Weisstein recalls the camera-distance idea saying that photographs are "... records of, and thus appropriate substitutes for the real thing. Instead of reproducing the experience ... it merely records the surface of the sensory stimuli and impressions" (66).

It is another tribute to Faber's maturation then that he eventually overcomes his dependence on his camera. It plays ever less significant a role (155) until sometime between his first and second visits to Athens when he disposes of it so nonchalantly that it goes unnoted and he is able then to pass through customs unfettered (155, 197). His Cuban conclusion: "-ich filme nichts

mehr. Wozu! Hanna hat recht: nachher muß man es sich als Film ansehen, wenn es nicht mehr da ist, und es vergeht ja doch alles" (182, 197).

### The Mayan Perspective

During his first visit to South America, Faber was incredulous that a civilization as mathematically advanced as the Mayans could live so harmoniously with nature. He berates the human energy they expended in building their temples as idiotic. He finds the ruins themselves primitive and is unable to comprehend the Mayan emigrations from their cities, concluding that it was their lack of technology that doomed them (44).

Brigitte Bradley also interprets Faber's dualistic attitude toward the Mayans as a result of his technological methodology.

Faber acknowledges the Mayans' accomplishments in mathematics, but deplors the fact that they did not use their theoretical knowledge for practical purposes. In other words, unlike the present age, they did not develop technology, that is, the mechanistic approach to life. The ancients made a distinction between an objective and a subjective form of reality, whereas the technologist allows objective reality only.<sup>126</sup>

Bradley's idea of distinctly objective and subjective realities deserves consideration. It could be construed that the Mayans found some ideal balance of technology and nature or, as Bradley terms it, "objective" and "subjective" realities respectively. Superficially, Bradley's interpretation is not plausible because the only examples of man wholly immersed in nature ('not developing

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<sup>126</sup> Brigitte L. Bradley, "Max Frisch's 'Homo faber': Theme and Structural Devices," Germanic Review 41.4 (Nov. 1966): 283.

technology') are Joachim and the Mayans, neither of whom survived. Also contrary to Bradley's position, however, is the fact that objectivity and subjectivity, just as nature and technology, are not nor can they be distinct. They are a continuum. Technology, or objectivity, cannot be limited to calendars and mathematics nor can subjectivity be controlled, even by the ancients. Indeed, this is Faber's error. He subjectively abuses objectivity, as when he miscalculates Sabeth's birth relative to the date of his leaving Hanna. Conversely, he objectively misuses subjectivity, as when he spurns intuitions. His methodology relies on unalloyed objectivity and that exists only as concept, for even a computer carries its programmer's bias. This presumption is increasingly challenged both by Faber's circumstances and by his own behavior. This explains his dualistic beliefs, denials, insecurities and so forth.

#### **"Die sogenannten Maxwell'schen Dämons": Chaos versus Order**

Professor O. was on the faculty of the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule where Faber was working on his dissertation at the time Hanna became pregnant (15, 33, 47). The topic of his unfinished dissertation "Über die Bedeutung des sogenannten Maxwell'schen Dämons" (33). A more farcical topic he could not have chosen. J. C. Maxwell was a mathematician who researched electromagnetic phenomena; hence he can be assumed to be professionally influential for Professor O. "Maxwell's demon" is the 1930's name given the then undiscovered-but-prophesied mechanism of ideal entropy reversal. The humorous name was given

to then not only unknown but also scientifically inconceivable forces of entropy during the interim between the inconsistencies discovered in state of the art atomic theory and the proposal of the concept of entropy necessitated by these inconsistencies. It was a demon, Maxwell declared, who sat on a stopgap connecting two closed containers and purposefully selected and separated molecules of unlike energies, eg. reversing entropy. Hence the meaning of Faber's dissertation is not the haunting "strenger, mythischer Dämon der Technologie" (Schmitz, Interpretation 228-229) that some critics romantically contend, but rather another of Frisch's very wry, ironic, if not original 'Witze' in Homo faber.

The serious aspects of Faber's thesis are first of all that the demon was a frivolous token proposal to deal with state-of-the-art science's non-knowledge and secondly that entropy is the law of (universal) disorder founded on the principles of probability calculus. Had Faber finished his dissertation, how might or might not this knowledge of randomness have affected his allegorical technocracy? How would Faber have reacted to the coming, scientific knowledge, the law of entropy, which states that observable phenomena (and so probability, statistics) are dependant upon the random chaos and uniqueness of isolated instances? Entropy is furthermore a metaphorical vehicle for Faber himself in that entropy is equivalently a measure of the energy unavailable for work in a closed system undergoing change.

Faber's analysis of chance and change as embedded in the principles of entropy is obviously incomplete, but this is not

necessarily true of the personal maturation realm. It is a great issue of contention amongst critics whether there is any temporary or permanent change in Faber. Ultimately the more urgent question from the broader perspective, however, is whether or not the potential for change exists within Faber.

**"Wieso Fügung?": Fatalism or Progression?**

Many critics like to make the distinction between statistical probability and fate or mysticism, and base their interpretations of the novel thereupon. Latta, for example, writes: "This is Faber's basic duality - probability vs. fate - and he makes no secret of where he stands."<sup>127</sup> Geulen also interprets the novel as one of mathematics vs. deterministic fate.<sup>128</sup> Schmitz also supports a fatalism interpretation, but he believes that Faber's inability to comply with the precepts of mysticism determines his demise, hence "... jede Panne drängt ihn von seinem vorgeplanten Weg ab."<sup>129</sup>

Schmitz' interpretation is partially correct since Faber is forced by each breakdown although not, as Schmitz maintains, to his

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<sup>127</sup> Alan D. Latta, "Walter Faber and the Allegorization of Life: A Reading of Max Frisch's novel 'Homo faber'," Germanic Review 54.4 (1979): 152.

<sup>128</sup> Hans Geulen, "Max Frischs 'Homo faber' Studien und Interpretationen," Quellen und Forschungen zur Sprach- und Kulturgeschichte der germanischen Völker, Nr. 17 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965): 96.

<sup>129</sup> Walter Schmitz, "Die Entstehung von 'Homo faber: Ein Bericht'," Frisch's Homo faber, ed. Walter Schmitz, St. 2028 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983): 208.

fate. Rather, Faber is confronted time and again with the flaws of his approach and the chance to amend it. This allegorical technocratic approach is not wrong per se, it is merely insufficient. Faber's actions after any number of these coincidences could have averted (or at least eased) the pending outcome had Faber not rigidly adhered to his purportedly statistical mechanistic doctrine. Faber's preceding quote (pg. 94) is correct; it was neither statistics nor technology which failed to prepare him, but it was his method of applying those statistics, his personal technocracy.

Jurgensen believes Faber responded to this pressure on his "ethics" by accounting for coincidence (Romane 113). "Der 'Zufall' gewinnt in Fabers Bericht die Bedeutung eines unwahrscheinlichen Schicksals, das es mathematisch zu überwinden gilt."<sup>130</sup> Weisstein echoes Jurgensen's ideas, "... it is no longer the impossible but merely the improbable--the limit value of the possible--which has to be taken into account. People like Faber like to persuade themselves that the difference between chance and necessity (or fate) is quantitative rather than qualitative."<sup>131</sup>

Critics base these "technology-vs.-fate" interpretations in part upon Faber's admission of his pending incest and subsequent summary:

Ich bestreite nicht: Es war mehr als ein Zufall, daß alles so gekommen ist, es war eine ganze Kette von Zufällen. Aber wieso Fügung? Ich brauche, um das

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<sup>130</sup> Jurgensen, Romane 110.

<sup>131</sup> Weisstein 70-71.

Unwahrscheinliche als Erfahrungstatsache gelten zu lassen, keinerlei Mystik; Mathematik genügt mir. (22)

Frisch's own intention was one of irony in incorporating the concept of fate; he considers it the "Witz" of the novel "... daß ein Mensch, der in seinem Denken die Zufälligkeit postuliert, eine Schicksalsgeschichte erlebt."<sup>132</sup> Ultimately, Frisch is neither condemning technology nor promoting mysticism, fatalism, religion or any other possible approach; what can be concluded from Faber's experiences is that flexibility, moderation and a complement are necessary in any approach to life. Faber's technocratic approach incorporated none of these. His selfishly motivated use of science and technology, compounded by inconsistent, inappropriately emotional reactions to coincidences, is what proved fateful.

#### D. SUMMARY

Faber's version of a technocracy is twice bastardized. Firstly, he subjectively abuses objectivity. He misapplies the basic principles and processes of sampling, observation, analysis, probability and arithmetic. Secondly, he dismisses subjective knowledge in the name of objectivity. He is unable to accept intuitions, dreams, foreshadowing, and so on. His failure to accept these is especially crass considering the disturbing consensus of these and other external perspectives (mirrors,

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<sup>132</sup> Klaus Haberkamm, "Einfall-Vorfall-Zufall: Max Frischs Homo faber als 'Geschichte von außen (sic)'" Modern Language Notes 97 (1982): 738.

people, even current state-of-the-art science). Yet it is not those basic scientific principles and processes that are to blame for the events of the novel. Rather it is Faber's misuse and isolation of them. In fact, were he to study and properly apply these same principles he uses as a basis for his perverted allegorical technocracy he would have had to recognize it as such. Thus the figuration of science and technology in Homo faber is that of an abused and misunderstood mistress, but not of a "femme fatale."



## CHAPTER IV

### A. DER MENSCH ERSCHEINT IM HOLOZÄN

Herr Geiser of Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän is Frisch's second and only other professional technologist of his prose works. Since Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän (1979) was written twenty-two years after Homo faber (1957) it is reasonable to expect developments in Frisch's treatment of these themes and motifs. Although Herr Geiser is not so devout a technocrat as Walter Faber he does derive comfort from scientific knowledge and he is of the Homo faber species. Both Frisch and Geiser, who is in his seventies (42, 91, 95, 99-100, 110),<sup>133</sup> have grown beyond Walter Faber's allegorical technocracy. Geiser does not adulterate technology like Faber did. Most of Frisch's characters use technology as a method of avoidance, but Geiser uses it as an acknowledged albeit unreliable source of comfort. He is mentally more mature than Faber as well. He correlates and synthesizes information and is relatively at peace with the nature of his existence. Faber's inability to do that forced his aberrative methodology and so compounded his existential crisis. Hence the conclusion of Faber's 'Bericht' has none of the peaceful serenity found at the close of Geiser's notes. Still, there is much commonality in Faber's and Geiser's relationships to technology. Geiser is also guilty of biasing observation by destroying context

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<sup>133</sup> Max Frisch, Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979): 42, 91, 95, 99-100, 110.

(see following pgs. 109-110). Both fail as academic technologists: Geiser, although a graduate of a technical school (76) laments his sporadic scientific knowledge and a schooling (80, 112) that proved unsatisfactory even for his own industry (124).

The novel's content is of the Faber genus as well. Herr Geiser is an aging man confronted with his own fears. Schmitz even believes that "Todesbewußtsein" is the theme of the novel.<sup>134</sup> He attempts to recapture youth and relive his past. The result is an existential crisis, followed by a brief lucidity before a health relapse, followed by collapse. Bauer-Pickar mentions the role travel plays along with other similarities between the novels:

... the trip which is of such pivotal significance in Holozän recalls ... those which played crucial and central roles in Stiller and Homo faber (1957). In addition, Geiser's predilection for facts, tables and categories, for the printed word recapitulating and capturing history or scientific investigation, as well as his disavowal of fiction, tales and myths, speaks to his kinship with the protagonist of Homo faber. Geiser, in his attempt to negate his anxiety and to gain control over himself and his environment by categorizing elements and by accumulating facts and figures, resembles Walter Faber. That earlier figure sought to control ... and to deny the unpredictable and the illogical by withdrawing into a calculable, and statistically verifiable world. Neither figure succeeds, and both are near death as the works conclude.<sup>135</sup>

The two novels also share other minor motifs. Geiser uses photographs as a method of perception (15). Mirrors, too, provide

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<sup>134</sup> Walter Schmitz, "Erdgeschichte und Humanität: 'Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän'," Max Frisch: Das Spätwerk (1962-1982) Eine Einführung Uni-Taschenbücher 1351 (Tübingen: Francke, 1985): 143.

<sup>135</sup> Gertrud Bauer Pickar, "'Es wird nie eine Pagode': Frisch's 'Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän'," Seminar 19.1 (1983): 33.

an objective, external perspective, and as Bauer-Pickar observed it is reminiscent of Faber that Geiser detaches himself from this reality by recounting facts (120, 124). Like Faber, Geiser remains undecided about and distanced from religion and mythology throughout the novel (17, 18, 25, 102-103). Maps assume a proportionally gargantuan importance, but like Faber's photographs, these renderings of reality are eventually deemed to be not worthwhile (93-94, 98, 99, 100, 102, 108-109). Geiser, again like Faber, "married" his temperamental nemesis. Elsbeth Geiser shares with Hanna's Elsbeth not only a name, but also a penchant for novels (17) and languages (38). Like Sabeth, she was her "husband's" temperamental guide (22) and even societal conscience (50-51).

Faber's and Geiser's narrated characters are also similar even though the narrations are very different. Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän is recorded by an omniscient narrator.<sup>136</sup> This effects a more alienating portrayal of a senile old man than would his own record. The omniscient narrator fulfills the function that mirrors, cameras and other external perspective did in Homo faber. Like Walter Faber, Herr Geiser is at times pathetic in his dogged pursuit of some objective solution--namely, "die Spuren menschlichen Daseins in Exzerpten menschlichen Wissens zu sichern"

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<sup>136</sup> The text conforms to the definition since it is entirely descriptive, conveys spoken or unspoken material, the reader is always within the consciousness of the character and the text is written in third person (Humphrey 35).

according to Schmitz.<sup>137</sup> Also similar is the eventual softening of this portrayal. In Faber's case this was achieved through personal and attitudinal maturation. In Geiser's case this shift is the result of his sympathy-engendering mental and physical breakdown.

The narrative characters share many attitudes, including a dislike for novels because they are not factual and conversely a preference for technological journals (16, 17, 111). They misapply technological jargon (110). They detest sweat--Geiser, too, feels impelled to bathe (80) or change clothes (97). Both keep detailed accounts of time (76, 77, 86, 88, 103, 106) which nonetheless does not help to reduce the confusing progression of events in the narratives. Geiser not only randomly mixes tense (past and present), but the form and perspective of Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän is also seemingly mixed. It is sometimes written as an exterior description and sometimes in interior monologue. This underscores Geiser's personal confusion. Both Faber and Geiser wish to be unobtrusive; Faber by being one of the crowd and Geiser by being neither observed (87, 89) nor quantified (109, 111, 112, 120). Like Faber Geiser listens for the comforting sounds of technology--the mail truck (20, 120) or helicopters (21, 62). Both shun human contact (121, 122, 123, 126) while conversely deriving comfort from it. Herr Geiser's ability to effect reassurance from other people is more highly developed than Faber's. He, too, finds comfort when surrounded by people (20, 25, 39) as a part of the anonymous mainstream. He also derives comfort from others'

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<sup>137</sup> Schmitz, Erdgeschichte 145.

routines (38, 42, 65, 120) and attitudes (32, 33, 44, 46, 126) while (like Faber) simultaneously denying that such is the case (43). Both organize the world into technologists and laymen (25, 73; cf. Homo faber 74, 90, 107). Very importantly, both, as technologists, find comfort in factual knowledge.

Like Faber's statistics, Geiser's potpourri of facts is an ever more desperate attempt to deny the imminent loss of vitality and, in Geiser's case, mental faculties. He literally builds a walled fortress of his clippings which eventually and symbolically usurp even Elsbeth's place, banishing her portrait from over the mantel to the hall then to behind the wardrobe (53, 86). Geiser's personal progression is mirrored by that of his clippings. Initially he tacks up biblical tidbits (17, 25). He quickly converts to geometric or technological information (21, 35, 39, 53, 59, 67) eventually returning to the biblical ... but this time as per eschatology (113, 139). Anthropology coupled with health and reptilian-dinosaur history and particularly earth sciences (climatology, natural history, geology) are interspersed throughout.<sup>138</sup> Geiser is compelled, as was Faber, to write his memorabilia by hand. Yet Geiser's clippings share other symbolically condemning properties with Faber's statistics. They are ineffectual, Geiser still forgets (82-83), which is his great Angst (28, 48). Faber's statistics permitted him to avoid context:

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<sup>138</sup> These clipping references can be found on the following pages of the text: anthropology 19-20, 71-72, 140; health 114, 141; paleontology 81-85, 113-119; earth sciences 18, 19, 22, 26-29, 34, 44, 48-50, 54, 58, 89, 110, 115, 118, 139, 140.

he could statistically rationalize the unlikelihood of Sabeth being Hanna's or his daughter and so ignore the evidence to the contrary. Geiser's snippets destroy their context, knowledge as a cohesive totality rather than individual trivial facts.

Geiser's collection is, indeed, a grabbag of facts made trivial by their isolation: the year the Vikings landed in Iceland (52), the commutative property (102), the fact that ants live in colonies (103), et cetera (passim). He is particularly concerned with quantifying lightening (11,-13, 35-36). Geiser feels the need to reduce lightening in this way because he is respectful of it, he notes down its speed and strength (74). Lightening is indeed powerful; delivered as unpredictable bursts of uncontrolled electricity and so functioning as representative of Faber's omnipotent natural realm. Lightening is also scientifically understood, "wogegen über Donner wenig zu erfahren ist" (11). Despite lightening's potential for destruction and thunder's innocuous nature it is the thunder that catalyzes Geiser's histrionics because he is not able to quantify it. Bauer-Pickar also recognizes Geiser's attempts to quantify the weather, specifically the rain:

He tries similarly to cope with what he perceives as unprecedented rainfall, not only recording its 'schedule,' the time it begins and when it ceases, but also noting the various forms it takes. He registers the rain visually by shape ... in terms of light and dark ... audially ... and by feel.(41)

Like Faber, Geiser is trying to quantify and rationalize the unpredictable by recording and analyzing it.

Weather is a central motif in Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän. Like the jungle and desert in Homo faber, it represents uncontrollable natural forces, and Herr Geiser studiously chronicles it (especially 26-27, 32, 54-56, passim). Unlike the strictly deductive Faber, Geiser correlates and synthesizes, intentionally or not. One of his favorite expressions is "Che tempo?" (33, 40, 73) which is an equivalent query after weather or time.

Geiser's preoccupation with nature has a distinct time component. Aside from the time-weather connection, he is acutely intrigued by progressions and successions, particularly of various animal and dinosaur species (82-84, 54-56, 113-119) as well as humankind (103). Hence the title of the novel. Bauer-Pickar's article analyzes this theme in the context of Geiser's building a sort of house of cards using crispbread. "Yet even in this one, limited success (passing the time with this diversion) lies an indication of the ultimate futility of man's endeavor in the face of nature and the irresistible, inevitable passage of time: 'Es ist keine Pagode geworden, aber Mitternacht' (10)" (Bauer-Pickar, 38). Geiser's unavoidable mortality prompts this fascination with species progression. He further personalizes this sense by comparing himself to a batrachian, confronted, like all these life forms, with extinction (125, 127).<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Bauer-Pickar elaborates this idea. "The long since extinct dinosaurs come to represent Geiser's perception of himself as a vestige of a bygone era, without function or relevance for the day at hand" (54).

Geiser's natural progression, though not as graphically described, is a more imposing unity than Faber's man-nature-life-death unity because with the added dimension of time it is incontrovertible.<sup>140</sup> Although Faber was forced to accept that life could not be repeated, he never confronted the diminutive nature of man's existence on earth. This diminutiveness theme includes man's intellect, upon which Geiser is so dependant, and develops "Concurrent with (Geiser's) gradual decline ... his growing awareness that the value of information, of knowledge itself, is unique to man, that it is totally irrelevant to the universe itself, and thus without merit or interest in the larger context of the macrocosm" (Bauer-Pickar, 54).

Despite Geiser's historic orientation, Faber's more limited unity is still present in this novel. A young couple hiking reveals the man-nature-death link (98) while numerous cankerous trees further unify nature and death (62, 67, 140, 142). Other aspects of Faber's unity are also present: salamanders (77-80, 111, 124) and ants (97) as nature-life for example.

As in Homo faber the supremacy of this unity is illustrated in technology's ultimate subservience to nature. Many of these examples have exact counterparts in Homo faber. Availability even of electricity cannot be assumed (11, 13, 30, 31, 32). Transportation and accessibility are limited in the natural realm: helicopters cannot fly in fog (10), trucks cannot navigate the

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<sup>140</sup> It could be that Frisch's own advancing age effects Geiser's characterization.



roads (43). There is an ongoing tension between man and nature encroaching upon one another:<sup>141</sup> the roads become overgrown if untended (60), certain wildlife has relinquished the valley (60-61), even Geiser's lunch seat is teeming with ants (97)!

Geiser's reactions to prolific nature are similar to Faber's. Both are afraid of that which cannot be quantified. Impressed by his own biological weaknesses and by the unsubjectable nature of the valley he wonders "Worüber soll man Gedanken machen?" His answer is the meaningless, but objective result of the golden ratio:  $EB:AE = AE:AB$  (102). Although Geiser is less excitable than the jungle-bound Faber he, too, deems that "es sehe wüst aus" when man's technology is overrun by nature as is the case with the sawmill, the bridge to Isorno and the road buried by the landslide (72, 73). These are not the only examples of the temporary nature of man's technology. Many personal items break down as well: the T.V. (29-30, 37), a nail, shears, thermometer, the stair landing, screws (80), clocks (32, 43), a watch (86), the grocery's doorbell (43), Geiser's reading glasses (84), the boiler (30-31) and freezer (32).

Hence both protagonists similarly take note of nature's dominance over a finite, limited technology. The sardonicism linking the novels is that the intensely vital and powerful life-from-death cycle of nature in Homo faber is portrayed more weakly in Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän. This, in fact, serves to

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<sup>141</sup> This mutual tension is recognized to a greater extent in Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän.

strengthen the man-nature unity. Nature is now, like man, diseased, both artificially and naturally induced (62, 63, 64-65, 103).

Disease, age and death are some of Geiser's great fears. Like Faber, Geiser is in the process of confronting his fears. Like Faber, Geiser's fears are misdirected, usually to the natural realm (weather, biology, time). Like Faber, he then seeks to quantify these recognized fears in order to calm his histrionic anxiety. And again like Faber, Geiser's demons cannot be rationalized away, they only become intensified.

Geiser's subconscious fear of mortality and avowed fear of nature turn him panic stricken. He begins to believe it is the end of the world (32). When his lettuce is buried by mud he begins to fear a major landslide (10, 21-22, 33, 41, 45-47, 103). He expectantly searches his property with binoculars for the tell-tale crack believing first to have found it when he sees the cat's tracks (46) and later a string (123). Yet like Faber he misuses such objective tools. Because such observation does not yield the results his subjective paranoia expects, he concludes that even the binoculars can deceive (46). He even fears a biblical-type Armageddon flood up in the mountains (25-27, 30, 34, 44). These fears are more evident early in the novel, after his hike his fears are more restrained and confined to his house where he expects a housefire (112) or a crack in the foundation (123).

Geiser's doubts about his own sanity are limited to early in the novel. His appalling memory will unnerve him throughout the

novel, however. He epitomizes the stereotypical elderly man. He repeats himself (i.e. about the sun shining in London, 30) and he is losing his memory (for example, 14-15, 128). At the same time his lucidity is failing (34, 38-39, 73-74, 121, 125-126, 126-127). At times his lack of lucidity is a half comical, half pathetic portrait: he drinks raw eggs to enhance his virility (31); he crosses the stream on stepping stones while holding an umbrella over his head (121); he pastes notes on his walls all through the night while wearing his hat (119). At other instances Frisch's portraiture is a sombre example of what in medical psychiatry falls into the category called dementia.<sup>142</sup> Geiser prepares and cooks his own pet, Kitty, then (unable to eat her) buries her in the garden by the roses (125-126). Geiser displays other symptoms of age, too. He rests (91), naps (103) and falls asleep while reading (119), is bored (39, 85-86), and carries medicine for his weak heart (24, 94).

Geiser's attack on aging is a dual assault: mental and physical. He has convinced himself that as long as he retains certain queer, objective facts he is not yet decrepit (52), ergo his manic 'Zettel' collection, child's geometry, and such.<sup>143</sup> All of this is a Walter Faber-style bandaid cure--a temporarily placating placebo that has no substance. As just discussed, Geiser's aging is apparent despite these faith healings. So while

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<sup>142</sup> David A. Tomb, Psychiatry for the House Officer, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins, 1984): 57-64.

<sup>143</sup> Bauer-Pickar asserts that by reviewing these facts Geiser also continually reviews and reassesses his condition (39).

Faber is keen to experience an emotional artistic awakening, Geiser, his mental discipline turned traitor, is compelled to test his physical health. The hike then is a personal matter and Geiser prefers it be his secret (89, 110). He is aware of what he is doing (89) and of the possible consequences (94, 98, 109), yet still maintains that it is feasible (99), and doggedly persists in his task (109). Like Faber then, his goal is to parody and even improve upon the past, the feelings of potential, conquest and omnipotence of his Matterhorn climb. Unlike Faber he plans this trip, accounting also for his advanced age and physical infirmities (94, 95).

The hike itself is quite successful for a man with a heart condition who is nearing seventy-four. Yet Geiser's hike is in another sense self-defeating since it accentuates his physical degeneration. He falls frequently (94, 101, 107, 109), experiences the "pins and needles" sensation (101, 102), palpitations (89, 91, 100, 109) and his strength and endurance fail (see especially 99-100). As a consequence, he suffers cramps in his calves and thighs (101, 104, 105), myalgia (110), is out of breath (92), and his knees hurt and buckle (99, 101, 109).

In addition to these physical failings and despite Geiser's precautions his planning was deficient. The expected five or six hours (99-100) dilates to eighteen or so (98, 100). This could be partially caused by the predictably impeding weather conditions (89). The maps he brings are insufficient leaving him to use barns to landmark and orient himself (108-109). Perhaps it is his own

misuse of the maps that leaves him going in circles in a thicket (99). He eventually ignores his maps altogether (109).

These intrinsic annoyances may distract Geiser, but they neither deter nor defeat him. When he returns home he even appears to be somewhat rejuvenated. His thoughts and actions appear reasonable and ordered in a logical progression (110). He is also no longer interested in the weather and consequently seems to have lost his paranoia over it and other matters (110).

This seeming rejuvenation is only temporary, however. Geiser's deterioration is quick and extreme, caused this time not only by age, but also by an impending hematoma. He notices the physical symptoms: left eyelid paralysis (121, 124, 134, 138), then pressure over his temple (125), and finally partial paralysis of his mouth (138). Geiser demurely acknowledges that the hat on his head won't help (121), age and failing physique will not be denied.

At the story's conclusion Herr Geiser is reduced. His daughter treats him as though he were an incapable child (136-138). As Bauer-Pickar points out, the name of this daughter who coerces Geiser into the role of a helpless elder, Corinne, "evokes the Greek setting of *Homo faber's* climactic scenes" (35). Rather than resist he slips back into memory and meditation, comfortable and unthreatening places. He accepts that he will never leave the valley (111), but at least he has one last time proven to himself that he can overcome it.

## B. SUMMARY

Herr Geiser is Faber's cousin. Both are socialized into the technological world. For Geiser this indoctrination appears minimal and harmless. Although Geiser relies on technology during his existential crisis, his life was not one of such indoctrination exclusively. Science plays ever greater a role in Herr Geiser's life when he begins to use it as a support when faced with mortality. His ego-motivated reliance on objectivity negates the validity of objectivity. He believes his miscellaneous facts, made meaningless by their isolation, will stave off senility. He, too, biases his observations. Once he succeeds in the physical challenge of his hike and experiences the subsequent brief lucidity, however, he is content to sink back into integrated, comforting reminiscences.

Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän reiterates much of the content of Homo faber. The greatest contrast is the relatively sympathetic portrayal of Herr Geiser. This has three likely causes. Firstly, it is much easier for the reader to sympathize with a senile old man than with Faber's alienating desperation. Secondly, this old man is described for us by an omniscient narrator, and although he appears comical at times and pathetic at others, there is none of the alienating fevered excuses or immature tension as found in a first person account such as Faber's. Finally, Frisch probably feels himself more akin to the aging Geiser and this identification is reflected in the text.

Frisch also added new perspective to his portrayal of the technology-nature relationship. In Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän technology still succumbs to nature, but now nature, too, is subject to man's effects. Geiser's concerns about his health also express themselves as fascination over the extinction of genuses (and the occasional histrionic fit). The effect of this is that , unlike in Homo faber, nature is not omnipotent. Nonetheless, this latter novel and character add no new major themes, motifs nor structures to the man-technology relationship of Homo faber despite the time elapsed between the novels. Thus Frisch created in Homo faber a very artistically and philosophically mature characterization that is substantiated by Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän.

## CHAPTER V

### A. ADDITIONAL PROSE WORKS

Two other of Frisch's prose works are applicable to the man-technology theme: Montauk, published in 1975, and Blaubart: Eine Erzählung, published in 1982.<sup>144</sup> Montauk is pertinent because like the narrating Faber, the writer alleges that it is an objective report, and he is similarly concerned over the schismed life inherent in technocratic methodology.<sup>145</sup> In Blaubart: Eine Erzählung the pro-tagonist, Herr Schaad, uses technology as an escape.

One other of Frisch's works is also pertinent: Don Juan oder Die Liebe zur Geometrie. This drama encompasses two of Frisch's recurrent themes: the protagonist is torn between the dualism of the analytical-male and the emotive-female realms, and his identity is rigidly presumed by an impersonal society.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> Max Frisch, "Zeittafel," Stiller, by Max Frisch, St. 105 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975): 440-441.

<sup>145</sup> Bauer-Pickar further relates Montauk to Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän since both are "autumnal work(s), in which the concerns of an old man determine tone, as well as content, and the concepts of lateness, of ending, of finality, intrude as thematic concerns" (37).

<sup>146</sup> There is a relative abundance of secondary material regarding the man-technology relationship in Don Juan. See for example: Franz, Zeitschrift 555-563; E. Kuby, "Don Juans Liebe zur Geometrie ist klein," Frankfurter Hefte 6 (1953); P. Ruppert, "Max Frisch's Don Juan: The Seductions of Geometry," Monatshefte 67 (1975): 237-248.



Montauk

The first impression of Montauk is that it is extraneous to this investigation of man's relationship to technology. Montauk is a personal crusade of Frisch's, a collection of impressions and experiences meant to record the events of one weekend without fictionalizing (27-29, 43, 82, 137-138, 155).

This is one way that Montauk augments this thesis' subject. It is a purportedly objective novel of self-expression through which Frisch is compelled, like Faber, to resolve and perhaps evolve. "...Ich möchte nichts erfinden; ich möchte wissen, was ich wahrnehme und denke..." (137). Hence Homo faber and Montauk share the form of objective report, though the weekend narrator Frisch admits more readily in his report that he still fictionalizes his reality (139). This work of all those considered in this thesis most conforms to Frisch's lauded "diary" genre (autobiographical, in this case). It is arranged not by dates, but by subject (i.e. "Supermarkt," 169), theme (i.e. "It is Pointless," 72-73) or observation/association (i.e. "You Have an Open Face," 89; "Amangesett," 155). This is the same structure he used in his Tagebuch 1946-1949 and Tagebuch 1966-1971.

'Montauk' setzt sich gemeinsam mit Erinnerungspassagen und Zitatmontagen aus einer Vielfalt von Tagebuch-Szenen zusammen, die der Erzählung ihren charakteristischen Reiz aus Unmittelbarkeit und Reflexion, aus Ich-Intimität und Selbstverfremdung, ausvordergründigen Handlungsgeschehen und subtiler Gedankenverwirklichung verleiht. Maximen und Reflexionen im Tagebuch-Stil einerseits, privates Bekenntnisbuch ... andererseits.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Manfred Jurgensen "Montauk" Max Frisch: die Romane, Interpretationen 2nd ed. (Bern: Francke, 1976): 264-265.

A more important consideration for this thesis is the self-image that Frisch reveals in Montauk. As a former professional architect Frisch (like his character Faber) considers himself a part of the technological realm and separate from the laity (131-137).<sup>148</sup> He approaches problems, this narration for example, rationally as a modern man trained in the sciences. Unlike Faber, who naively perverts his objectivity, Frisch is always aware of the necessity, desirable or not, of transcending the purely objective approach technology and integrating love, art, life, death. This tension between technologist and poet is expressed throughout the work just as it is in the preceding quote in which Frisch laments the challenging desire to discover himself through his poeticization. For these reasons, Montauk pertains to the discussion of Frisch's portrayal of the objective technologist. Moreover, since Frisch expresses his personal perspective (sans pen persona) in this work, it should be possible to confirm (or confound) ideals that do not conform to those previously observed in Homo faber and Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän.

In addition to report form of Montauk, other structural techniques from Homo faber are also repeated. Although there are not tense shifts, the initial report-like third person narration quickly "degenerates" into a first person narration and, in some sections (i.e. pg. 14) a direct interior monologue. Like Faber, Frisch's reporting initially sacrifices substance for objectivity.

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<sup>148</sup> Frisch especially emphasizes the distinction between laymen and architects in his essay Der Laie und die Architektur.

This desire to write without fictionalizing is borne of Frisch's rational technologist's nature, yet his factual observations quickly become romanticized fantasies (19-22 passim), with occasional reversions to his sterile, dry reporting (152). Whereas Faber needed to purge his objectivity of personal bias in order to perceive reality, Frisch is consciously personalizing his record of reality (28-29). He writes:

Die Wahrheit, die ich auszudrücken versuche, die ich in diesem Augenblick erkenne, ist selten ein Freispruch für mich. (...) Kein Zurück in die Vernunft; die Vernünftigkeit verletzt mich, sie erniedrigt mich, sie entfesselt auch noch den Zorn. Dabei habe ich so gelassen begonnen: was ich gemeint habe, ist kein Vorwurf, es ist wichtiger: WAHRHEIT, meine. (27)

As a trained scientist, the author Frisch is apparently frustrated by his obligation to universalize his reality for readers by fictionalizing it (28, 82, 138, 155). He feels that he has betrayed himself in so doing:

ICH PROBIERE DIE GESCHICHTEN AN WIE KLEIDER

Es erschreckt mich nur die Entdeckung: Ich habe mir mein Leben verschwiegen.  
Es stimmt nicht einmal, daß ich immer nur mich selbst beschrieben habe. Ich habe mich selbst nie beschrieben.  
Ich habe mich nur verraten. (156)

The Geneva School of phenomenological critics similarly insists that an author's consciousness is not identical to his biographt (Abrams 134).<sup>149</sup>

The need for objective (written) self-definition was compounded by the author's need to write for writing's sake as

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<sup>149</sup> It is also interesting to note that this group of critics was living and publishing in the same community as was Frisch (Lawall 41).

impetus for the work (137-138, 155-156). "Diese Obsession, Sätze zu tippen-" (21) as Frisch describes it is also apparent in the role typewriters play in his novels, his protagonists' narrations and his real life. This author of sufficient, but not exorbitant means (172-182), who is meticulous enough to recall and record his August and September 1943 budgets in 1975 (173-174) incurred only one debt in his lifetime--for a Remington Portable Typewriter (172). His typewriter will be one of the few material goods he transports with him from home to home (194). This is a characteristic of his artistic writer's nature.

Frisch's self-concept of having a technological nature is also evidenced in these memorabilia. He derives a masculine self-awareness from his architectural work. Of his architectural work he says: "Ich zeichne exakter, als ich vordem geschrieben habe. Als Zeichner von Werkplänen komme ich mir übrigens männlicher vor" (131). Addressing his former intimate, Marianne, he writes, "Du siehst meine kindliche Freude am Bauen, meine männliche Freude" (192).

Frisch's personal identification with the technological realm manifests itself in other familiar behavioral idiosyncracies. He keeps a running account of clean shirts and sweat (122). He battles for territory with the "jungle" encroaching upon his home (196). When agitated he immerses himself in reassuring factual trivialities and methodology. For example, he is overwrought when he remembers that he did not try Lynn's door to ascertain whether

it was locked (188-189) and he distracts himself by counting a ship's horn blasts and studying "den technischen Vorgang" (189).

Frisch portrays himself as an artistic illiterate. It was his childhood friend "W" who assumed the role of his aesthetic benefactor. It was W's conviction, reminiscent of Hanna in Homo faber, that "kein Mensch sei völlig unmusikalisch" (30-31, 35). W also taught Frisch what to see in pictures (31). Yet Frisch remains unmotivated to appreciate art intrinsically and shuns art museums despite this knowledge (15). He remains isolated from visual arts.

Photography combines visual artistry with objective record-keeping. Frisch adheres to the latter end of this continuum for his personal photos, although he also recognizes the camera's limitations. "Man hat schon großartigere Landschaften gesehen, trotzdem versucht er's mit der Kamera, Microflex 200" (51). Cameras are less important to Frisch than typewriters since he would never consider a camera he could not afford (172).

It is indicative of Frisch's tendency to seek comfort within a technological context that there are other familiar analytic motifs in Montauk. Billiards, ships and machines, numbers, the sound of helicopters, construction of streets, construction methods, sizes and makes, et cetera are all mentioned.<sup>150</sup> Frisch exhibits kindred orientation to both Geiser and Faber. Like Geiser, he records the weather<sup>151</sup> and genus' progression (16).

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<sup>150</sup> 14, 126, 172, 173-174, 184-185, 193, 205.

<sup>151</sup> see for example: 12, 95, 96, 126, 205.

Like Faber, he records distances (9, 95) and dates (9). He particularly diligently records times (55-58, 97), dates (7, 121, 126, passim) and durations (99, 130, 165, passim). He uses time as an adjective (103, 126) and a frame of reference (9, 110, 118, 121). His attitude toward another motif, maps, is less consistent. He relies on them to navigate (91, 92) and even for impersonal advice about what to tour (10, 80) yet he still comes to the same conclusion as Geiser, that maps are useless (8). Chess accounts for Frisch's leisure time--but not as a social participant. He either watches (18-19, 194) or plays against himself (164). One final frequent motif is actually a personal hobby of Frisch's (203)--ping pong (93, 122, 126, 186). The presence of ping pong in Frisch's works indicates again that he writes about that which plays a role in his own life.

Frisch does have a ping pong opponent, Lynn; a girlfriend who is the same age as his daughter (51, 54). Lynn is ironically similar to the fictional Sabeth. She smokes (12), wears a red ponytail (10) and jeans with a comb in the back pocket (9-10). She bodes an impossible relationship (9-10, 72) which he pursues anyway, and she inspires him to reconsider his past, particularly other relationships (8-9).

These and other memories disturb Frisch (9), and they are likely another reason for his regressions. Despite the fact that his greatest fear is repetition (18) his memories command such a presence that they are nearly indistinguishable from the present (110, 114). One past experience that Frisch recalls is his

relationship with Käte, the historical basis for the Faber-Hanna story. Frisch and Faber both hesitate to marry their Jewish-German girlfriends. They were frightened by the idea of a family at a time when their professional lives were not yet certain.<sup>152</sup> Yet both felt obligated to marry in order to offer their girlfriends sanctuary from the Nazi regime. Käte, like Hanna, recognized at the City Hall just before the marriage that "das ist nicht die Liebe, die Kinder will" (168) and declined (166-168).

Frisch portrays his May-November relationships as a manifestation of his personal battle to accept his age (71, 72). He writes that he is sixty (126) going on 63 (140), a thought that disturbs him so that he begins to recount the time and weather (140)--"CHE TEMPO?" (Paradoxically, he is also relieved when time passes, 170.) He is at an age, he believes, when one must speak of death (202) and he does so (21). He considers his health good for his age although he has been experiencing angina pectoris for twenty years (202). He was once quite ill and at that time cultivated an irrational fear of losing his reason (143). This is similar to Herr Geiser: both are also incurable metacognitives (8). As his age increases he too relies increasingly on his work to uphold his sense of self-worth: "Je älter ich werde, um so weniger halte ich mich aus, wenn ich nicht arbeite" (163).

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<sup>152</sup> Frisch finished his architecture degree in 1936. He served in the military from 1939 to 1945 and supplemented that with a position as an architect starting in 1942 which he eventually gave up in order to write in 1954 (Frisch, Zeittafel 440).

Frisch eventually found his technological work unfulfilling, however, and he began writing in order to gain experiences (12). Yet like Faber, he must confront the fact that his work, comforting though it often is, is ultimately insignificant. He recognizes this and admits that some of his works were ego-motivated (21, 28, 29) and also expresses frustration that his work stymies his life. He describes this with a tongue-in-cheek anecdote:

HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT RENOWN?

Manchmal ist es vorteilhaft: ein deutscher Zöllner, nachdem er meinen Paß gesehen hat, möchte gar nicht in meine Koffer schauen, sondern behilflich sein; er kennt nicht bloß den Namen, sondern erinnert sich wohl an ein Stück, das ihm gefallen habe: BESUCH DER ALTEN DAME.(60)

#### Blaubart: Eine Erzählung

Doctor Felix Schaad is another of Frisch's technologically indoctrinated modern men. The science-orientation of Schaad's socialization process was instigated by his father who was an earth sciences teacher (137-140). These early lessons are the beginning of the externally stoic, precise man of sciences.<sup>153</sup> Even when Herr Schaad talks a stranger out of committing suicide, the person describes him as "ganz sachlich. Ohne Moral. Einfach so technisch" (89).

Schaad relies on a methodology that is similarly stoic and factual in appearance, but that leads him into an existential crisis. He is accused of murdering one of his many ex-wives. The

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<sup>153</sup> Schaad's science is an external one because it is not comprehensive; it does not encompass astronomy, Einstein nor mathematics (100-101). See also: 40, 68, 79, 153.



objective nature of the trial is noted repeatedly by such phrases as "Die gerichtswissenschaftliche Expertise" (8), "Aufgrund unsrer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung" (44) and the traditional "Wahrheit und nichts als die Wahrheit" (22, 41, passim). The prosecutor calls in damning expert witnesses (44, 97, 99) and compelling evidence. The tie that the victim was strangled with belonged to Schaad (8). He was seen entering her apartment shortly before the murder (24-25) and his alibi proves false (18).

Yet this superficially convincing evidence leads to the wrong conclusions. Schaad did not kill Rosalinde (74, 172), but once the facts seem conclusive it is the chief prosecutor who effects hasty judgement and its consequences. This reiterates another of Frisch's themes (Andorra, Don Juan): "(daß) der 'Spieler' Felix Schaad die Regeln, deren Objekt er ist, nicht zu 'verändern' vermag; sie werden von der richtenden Öffentlichkeit diktiert."<sup>154</sup> it is just these social roles that are defined by the public and not the individual that forces a person into a restrictive, inauthentic life according to Heidegger's existentialism (Soloman 216, 218). Although the chief prosecutor's subsidiary role is not the main theme of the novel it does reaffirm the concepts in Homo faber. His case is factual and seemingly objective, but it is not comprehensive, truly objective, nor efficient. He and Faber are different men, and they have differing allegories of "technocracy." Yet their wanton objectivity yields the same result--falseness.

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<sup>154</sup> Walter Schmitz, "Unschuld und Geschichtsverlust: 'Blaubart'," Max Frisch: Das Spätwerk (1962-1982) Eine Einführung Uni Taschenbücher 1351 (Tübingen: Francke, 1985): 154.

Were these men of science similarly prodigious and diligent in their methodologies, the victimization of innocents would have been circumvented.

From start to finish the chief prosecutor defies thorough investigative procedure and seeks to prove a false conclusion. Instead of questioning the witnesses he seeks evidence to support his preconceived judgement. The consistency with which the witnesses' testimony differs from the prosecutor's expectations is farcical.<sup>155</sup> He twists their testimony to serve his own perspective (28-29) and is warned by the judge about his leading questions (63) and harassment of the witnesses (27). Even a witness who is a scientist calls the proceedings a "comedy" (131). The condemning clues prove inconclusive when scrutinized (44, 99, 164). For example, although Rosalinde was strangled with Schaad's tie that same tie had been in her apartment for some time (82) and he was seen wearing another tie soon after the murder (106).

One matter that is never definitively settled is that of Schaad's alibi. It is likely that he was feeding swans. This, however, is unacceptable to the prosecutor because of the inclement weather, although, as Schaad points out, "Das macht den Schwänen nichts aus" (16). The proceedings disallow any nonstandard behavior by Schaad, and his guilt seems to be retroactively implied in any nonrational behavior. Although his nonconformist behavior

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<sup>155</sup> Herr and Frau Bickel, the first witnesses introduced in the book, counter the prosecution's proposals (14, 22). Even the defendant's ex-wives (57, 61, 111, 115) and the victim's family (69, 86-87) confound his preconceptions along with numerous others who testify (20, 32, 33-34, 63, 72, 81, 85, 100-101).

is extraneous evidence it is the worst the prosecutor is able to convict him of. This includes Schaad's lack of alibi, his absence at Rosalinde's burial (10, 128-129) and delayed first visit to her grave (125-127), the death of his childhood pet rabbit (52, 137, 141), his irrational emotionalism (97) and even his own dreams (67, 94-96, 162).

Technology's greatest role in Blaubart, however, is as a diversion for Schaad. The ergometer is his only consistent distraction (56) because it requires uninterrupted counting, measuring and analyzing. He uses other analytic diversions to distract himself and discovers that "Was hilft, ist Billiard." Schaad subsequently submerses himself in caroms in order to escape his anxieties and unpleasant experiences. These caroms can be reduced into straight-forward and soluble analyses (58 passim). They also incorporate probability (12). Yet even billiards are not the perfect diversion (9, 11, 27, 60, 85). His other methods of distraction are not as analytic and prove even less effective. These include movies, mundane daily activities such as washing and drying his hair, sailing, the sauna, observing numbers and geometries, travel, alcohol, and hiking.<sup>156</sup> In earlier times Schaad found refuge in writing a journal. His journal was theraputic and, just as Faber's journal, allowed him to come to terms with events he found discomfoting (113). Thirteen weeks

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<sup>156</sup> These references can be found on the following pages of the text: movies 85; daily activities 21, 110-114, 122; sailing 152-153; the sauna 43, 49; observing numbers and geometries 80, 85, 91; travel 96, 98; alcohol 41, 73, 140; and hiking 36, 85, 137, 149, 162, 166.

after his acquittal Schaad claims that by focussing on caroms he has dispelled the recurring memory of the prosecutor (85-86), "-er hat zu warten, bis ich meine Kugel gestoßen habe, und wenn es ein Treffer geworden ist, hat er zu warten, bis ich ..." (86).

Schaad's billiards though are like Faber's technological distractions--they might delay, but they do not transmute reality. The text is Schaad's stream-of-consciousness record of this reality using the technique of direct internal monologue.<sup>157</sup> The use of direct internal monologue means that, unlike Homo faber and Montauk, the narrator has no presence in the narrative at all; the reader is aware of him only because of the use of third person descriptions. The narrative continuously shifts between post-trial experiences and memories of the trial. Schmitz blames these shifts of Schaad's for his pending crisis: "(die) wechselnden Frage-Instanzen drücken letztlich die diffusen Schuldgefühle des Angeklagten aus und verstärkt sie."<sup>158</sup> Months later Schaad is still haunted by the reality of the trial (80). It disturbs him during his idle moments such as between turns in a billiard game (9, 11, 27, 60) and whenever he by chance sees any of the sixty-one witnesses called to testify (81, 82).

The disturbing reality is that he is punished even though he was acquitted of the charges and received remuneration (30, 134-135). The prosecutor will never be resigned to his exoneration

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<sup>157</sup> Direct internal monologue is characterized by first person narration and the lack of a "middle man" narrator--hence the events are "directly" experienced (Humphrey 24-25, 27).

<sup>158</sup> Schmitz, Unschuld 150.

(30). His reputation and practice are ruined (18-20, 78-79) and he must subsequently sell the business (80). Like Faber, Schaad has no appropriate coping strategies to deal with his crisis.<sup>159</sup> He cultivates a belief that he was acquitted for lack of proof (8, 135), even that such evidence exists and punishes himself. Schmitz compares this reality of Schaad's to Faber's:

Sobald Felix Schaad meint, seine Schuld zu begreifen und sein "Kreuz" tragen zu können, indem er den Mord an Rosalinde Zoog, den er sich nur metaphorisch vorwirft, tatsächlich auf sich nimmt, setzt er ein schriftliches "Geständnis" auf; seine Intention ist also, anders als ... in Fabers nachträglichem "Bericht," nicht die Leugnung, sondern die Forcierung des Verdachts zur Wahrheit.<sup>160</sup>

Six years later these 'Hirngespinnster' drive him literally to self-destructive behavior: he drives into a tree while travelling to retract his testimony and confess to the murder he did not commit (144-145, 151-152, 167), only to reawaken in a hospital to thoughts of his trial (172).

Blaubart deals with the destructive potential of incomplete information and analysis. Superficially, the evidence indicates Schaad's guilt. He is furthermore not allowed any nonstandard behavior in rational society, since that, too, is condemning. "Mein Freispruch ist bekannt, aber man weiß zu viel über meine Person" (19). Like many of Frisch's protagonists, Schaad must live

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<sup>159</sup> This makes an interesting contrast to Heidegger's existentialism. According to Heidegger, it is necessary for Schaad to break such restrictive, "inauthentic" ties with the public, "to pry him loose from the social framework and allow him to find his ... 'authentic self'" (Soloman 216, 218).

<sup>160</sup> Schmitz, Unschuld 153.

with the label that an uninformed society has chosen for him (94, 119), learning to accept (121) and even assume this externally-imposed identity.<sup>161</sup> It augments his own doubts ("Ich bin nicht unschuldig," 8, 73, 135) and increases his need for consensus (32), eventually leading to self-destructive actions. Schaad has inappropriately used analytic diversions to avoid a reality which neither will nor should be repressed.

#### B. SUMMARY

Montauk and Blaubart are both applicable to the man-technology topic. The protagonists in each of these narrations is a man trained in some science discipline. Montauk is especially informative since its narrator is Frisch and the purpose of the work is to express his personal perspective. Blaubart, too, is pertinent since it reiterates the theme of the modern technological man who tries to escape into analytic thought. It augments this theme (as executed by the protagonist) with the chief prosecutor's role. He brings forth the familiar theme of logical analysis perverted by weakly imposed assumptions that lead to a false conclusion. While the relative brevity of these narrations makes them inappropriate as individually representative of Frisch's work, the perspectives put forth in them validate that the man-technology relationship in Frisch's prose works is consistent and coalesces into a mature theme.

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<sup>161</sup> This is remarkably similar to the storyline in Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum.

## CONCLUSION

The Age of Faith gave way to the philosophies of the Enlightenment in 18th century Europe. The major tenets of this movement were: 1) that "discoverable" laws governed both the physical world and human behavior, and 2) that man is a part of the natural world.<sup>162</sup> One of the period's great social-philosophers was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who challenged Hobbes' (1588-1679)<sup>163</sup> hundred-year-old doctrine that man was at heart evil and needed a strong social order and political system to civilize him. The tradition in German literature is rooted in the ideologies of European Romanticism. It concentrates not so much on the man of science versus the man of nature, as on the man of society versus the man of nature, as did Rousseau. Romanticism was a strong reaction to the French Revolution: in particular this included the belief that things were better off before the Revolution, during the Middle Ages (called "degeneration theory"). The empiricism of the Enlightenment was given up at this time.<sup>164</sup> The Romantic contention, much borrowed from Rousseau, was that of man as the "noble savage,"--evil only when his virtuous nature was corrupted by a contrived, artificial society. This theme saw its fullest literary development in German literature beginning with the "Sturm und Drang" movement (ca. 1770-1785). Nonetheless, the emphasis on

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<sup>162</sup> Merwyn S. Garbarino, Sociocultural Theory in Anthropology: A Short History, Basic Anthropology Units (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977): 13.

<sup>163</sup> Cohen and Eames 203.

<sup>164</sup> Garbarino 17.

rational thought and learning espoused by the Enlightenment continued to be influential in industrial and technological Western society.

These two traditions then, one Romantic and the other Enlightenment-oriented, have influenced the direction of German literature in general and the characterization of men of science in particular. Since Romanticism and the "Goethezeit" there have been examples of the driven man of sciences: Goethe's Faust (1808-1832) and Storm's Der Schimmelreiter (1888) are two examples that span the nineteenth century. The twentieth century continues this with the engineers and mathematicians in Musil's works or the problematic characters of science in dramas by Brecht (Leben des Galilei, 1938-1939), Dürrenmatt (Die Physiker, 1962), Zuckmayer (Das kalte Licht, 1955) and Kipphardt (In der Sache J. Robert Oppenheimer, 1964). These, however, are men who are torn between responsibility to science and responsibility to a society that is not yet mature enough for this science. The solution for these scientists is to make this technology unachievable. With Homo faber Frisch marked his place in this lineage with an as yet unique characterization. Walter Faber is not in danger of using technology to destroy, he is in danger of causing destruction by misusing a bias that he mislabels as "objective" or "scientific." Faber's solution must be to purge his science and then to better use its purified form--but not to conceal it. Faber's allegorical technocracy need not be destructive, yet critics too often include him in this trend in German literature. The technological man



characterized by Frisch is a newborn in world literature. He, too, can be the product only of a post-war, post-Industrial Revolution society. Max Frisch, the architect, is a product of such a technologically reliant society. Max Frisch, the author, often addresses his concerns about this reliance in his works. He unites two German literary traditions: the Romantic man of nature and the Enlightenment emphasis on rationality and science. In so doing Frisch is pioneering a new generation of literature.

Frisch believes in scrutinizing the attitudes and demeanor of the public by personifying these in a single character (Tagebuch 66). The origin of such a character is often Frisch's own experiences. Jurgensen explains, "Literatur bedeutet Frisch eine zitathafte Auswahl und Nutzbarmachung der eigenen Lebensgeschichte."<sup>165</sup> Hence such characters should constitute a fairly consistent philosophy. The function of each of these characters, according to Frisch, is to present the facts and confront preconceptions.<sup>166</sup> Walter Faber is the definitive technologically-reliant Frisch character; he is an allegory of the technocratic prototype, he relies on these principles of rational objectivity and technological progress to direct his life.

Frisch does not believe in giving his readers a single, terminal answer to dilemmas. He believes his greatest task as an author is to present all the possibilities and then allow each reader to decide the best recourse for him/herself (Latta, 157).

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<sup>165</sup> Jurgensen, Montauk 267.

<sup>166</sup> See Weisstein, 74.

This reflects his preoccupation with truthfulness and his position that "there are truths but no truth."<sup>167</sup> He further defines authorial success as presenting these possibilities to an audience in such a way that they are compelled to decisiveness even though they try to avoid the issue (Tagebuch 140, 141, 401).

This interplay of confrontation and avoidance was actually enacted by the characters in Frisch's radio dramatization Der Laie und die Architektur: Ein Funkgespräch (1954). In this short piece the architect persona is confronted (via the laity) with the contradictory nature of his beliefs. This piece is pertinent to this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, the role entitled architecture is a major comment on Frisch's attitudes toward technological protagonists, particularly in view of his own experiences as an architect. Secondly, the architect is unable to avoid his hypocritical dogmatism and attains a new awareness.

Federico summarizes a number of these points in an article about Frisch's dramatic characters:

Thus Frisch's preoccupation with the 'Bildnis' idea reflects his own conviction, 'daß jedes Ich, das sich ausspricht, eine Rolle ist.' Most of his heroes are actors in a script dictated by society or their own shortcomings, the plays depicting individuals in various stages of the search for the 'true' self. None of Frisch's heroes, however, is entirely successful. (...) Indeed Frisch's own outlook tends to become increasingly fatalistic.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> As quoted in Kieser, Diary 112; the same idea is found in Blaubart, "Es gibt kein gemeinsames Gedächtnis" (117).

<sup>168</sup> Joseph A. Federico, "The Hero as a Playwright in Dramas by Frisch, Dürrenmatt, and Handke," German Life and Letters 32 (1979): 166.

Other critics perceive the trend in Frisch's works as increasingly positive (i.e. Barlow, 60). Homo faber is a relatively early work in Frisch's career and ascertaining whether its conclusion warrants hopefulness or decrees fatalism will have a major impact on what Frisch's prognosis of a technologically reliant society might be.

As mentioned, critics contest whether or not Faber shows any definitive maturation or personal development. Blair is one of the few critics who believes there is a fundamental change in Faber (Motif 148). Most critics disagree. Since it is unreasonable, considering Faber's Parisian rejuvenation and Cuban *joie de vivre*, to maintain that Faber does not change at all, these critics then assert that he reverts irrevocably to his schismed self at the point of death.<sup>169</sup>

Faber's deathbed reversion is difficult to prove; he does not panic, placate his worries nor distract himself with technological diversions. He has proven amply by his actions, observations and attitudes that he has accepted the unity of man-nature-life. He also displays a new equanimity when confronted with death--including his own. He understands that Professor O.'s mortality is already final--a contrast to his reaction to the much less personal instance of the dead donkey and vultures in Guatemala. He acts upon, even if he does not confess, his own pending death. He bids many farewells, he finally enters a hospital voluntarily, and he

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<sup>169</sup> Bradley, 290; Schmitz, Interpretation 214; Franz believes the same, but at Sabeth's point of death (Über 241).

concedes his mortality in a progressive change of attitude (173-182, 195).

Faber's changes are manifested in other aspects of his life as well. His interactions with the characters Sabeth-Marcel, Hanna, Joachim-Herbert and Dick progress, as does his reaction to people in general. At first he finds people 'anstrengend,' but later he will embrace the moments he spends with his Cuban "friends." He relies less and less on technology as a methodology and diversion or escape. That his subconscious thoughts are redirected is evident in his likewise redirected similes, observation and attitudes. His attitudes toward art and technologically-reliant America both change, as do his feelings about being first or last, the importance of his work, and his own sexuality. These changes are invoked by Faber's desire for Sabeth, a desire whose origins change as the relationship grows. Frisch cogently expresses his belief in the (self-)liberating nature of love in the context of one of his favorite themes:

'Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen'  
 Es ist bemerkenswert, daß wir gerade von dem Menschen,  
 den wir lieben, am mindesten aussagen können, wie er sei.  
 Wir lieben ihn einfach. Eben darin besteht die Liebe.  
 (...) Vieles sieht er (der geliebt ist) wie zum ersten  
 Male. Die Liebe befreit es aus jeglichem Bildnis."  
 (Tagebuch 1946-1949 31)

Thus Faber's feelings for Sabeth explain both his attitude toward her as well as his ability to free himself from his parody of a technocratic 'Bildnis' of the world and himself.

The consistency in attitudes from the protagonist to the narrator must be addressed before it can be decided whether or not

Faber has changed. The protagonist appears to have matured by the end of the First Station, yet when a few days later the narrator recalls the past events (eg. Tamaulipas) his 'Bericht' indicates that he still retains the fear and defensiveness symptomatic of his schismed, technocratic methodology. Although the narrator's attitude was shown to progress through the work, this apparent relapse should be explained. In fact, there are many reasons for this seeming contradiction.

One reason is Faber's continuing struggle with fear and anger regarding his imminent death. He has admitted his mortality to himself, but he is not yet willing to cede his newfound hopes for the future. In this respect Homo faber concurs with the philosophies of a crisis-engendered existentialism.<sup>170</sup> Heidegger believed that only through the threat of death and experience of Angst could a "Dasein" achieve an "authentic" existence. Faber's "Bericht," his need to contemplate his life and death is an example of what Heidegger calls "an existential structure of Dasein," and the means to "winning oneself" (eg. becoming authentic).<sup>171</sup> Faber's new hopes and desires cannot be quashed. Ruppert explains this in the context of Kierkegaard's "despair of possibility" existentialism. He quotes Kierkegaard: "Possibility then appears to the self ever greater and greater, more and more things become

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<sup>170</sup> Doris Kiernan, Existentielle Themen bei Max Frisch: Die Existentialphilosophie Martin Heideggers in den Romanen 'Stiller', 'Homo faber' und 'Mein Name sei Gantenbein' (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1978).

<sup>171</sup> Soloman 208, 209.

possible, because nothing becomes actual. At last it is as if everything is possible - but this is precisely when the abyss has swallowed up the self."<sup>172</sup> Never was Faber's potential greater, never his ability to enactuate it so limited. One last time he tries to find solace in his allegorical technocracy. At this painful juncture in his life the narrating Faber is wistful; machines do indeed have an advantage over humanity: "Vor allem aber: die Maschine erlebt nichts, sie hat keine Angst und keine Hoffnung, die nur stören...."<sup>173</sup> Yet just as in New York, Faber's allegorical technocracy proves a superficial refuge without substantial comfort. His "enlightenment" is indeed one of no-return, and so the narrator, too, must progress past the allegory of a technocracy.

Another reason for the narrator's reluctant progress is the increased difficulty of his changes. Kaiser, concentrating only on the protagonist, called Faber "ursprünglich ein Mann der Aktion, nicht der Reflexion" (267). Whereas the protagonist can develop through actions, it is the task of the narrator to accept, understand and internalize these actions in addition to the changing motivations behind such acts. Faber comments that despite his changed actions, "nichts hatte ich gewußt" (120). Frisch himself had difficulty with the mechanics of the narrator's technocratic-type style and, in fact, radically altered the novel

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<sup>172</sup> Peter Ruppert, "Max Frisch's Don Juan: The Seduction of Geometry," Monatshefte 67 (1975): 243.

<sup>173</sup> 75; Hanna recognizes this anesthetizing distance of Faber's allegorical technocracy, too, 169-170.

for this reason even after the first manuscript had been submitted to his publisher (Schmitz, Entstehung 63). The final character, however, successfully fulfills Frisch's assignment for a representative character who must confront and grow beyond his inconsistencies. He explains this:

Wogegen wir in Begriffen leben, die wir meistens nicht überprüfen können ... oder wenn ich sie einmal da sehe, kann ich sie nicht mehr sehen, weil ich ja schon eine Überzeugung habe, das heißt: eine Anschauung, ohne geschaut zu haben. Die meisten unserer Begriffe, wenn sie konkret werden, können wir gar nicht ertragen; wir leben über unsere Kraft. Unser Denken muß konkret werden! Man müßte sehen, was man denkt, und es dann ertragen oder seine Gedanken ändern, damit man sie denken darf. (Tagebuch 1946-1949 193-194)

Frisch also offers a third reason for the narrator's hesitation to develop: Faber is afraid of appearing foolish, or out of control (Tagebuch 187). Like Herr Biedermann he wants to avoid a guilty conscience (Tagebuch 246, 247). Whereas Biedermann contorts objectivity in the name of humanitarianism (Tagebuch 247), Faber does so in the name of statistics and technological methodology in order to avoid guilt. "Du willst auch nicht dein Unrecht ändern, denn das hätte zu viele Folgen. Du willst Ruhe und Frieden und damit basta!" (Tagebuch 243). Like Biedermann, Faber discovered that perverting methodology to avoid the objectively obvious reality only intensified the destructive potential of the situation. So again, the narrator is forced to progress beyond these results.

It must also be recalled that change is a continuing process over time. It is not static, and it does not act as a step function. There is no prescribed goal to change and, in Homo

faber, no successful ideal for change to model itself after--only additional potential and possibilities. In this context Faber's maturation is undeniable.

Of the four novels that address the man-technology relationship, Homo faber concludes with the most confidence of a positive resolution. The kindred spirit, mannerisms and attitudes of Herr Geiser, Felix Schaad, Walter Faber and Frisch as he portrays himself in Montauk have already been outlined. The fact that these three later characterizations advocate Faber's idiosyncracies without contradicting them indicates how mature and valid a character Frisch created in Faber. None of these three, however, is as staunch an allegory of technocracy as is Faber.

Geiser, like the narrating Faber, turns to technological and factual support when confronted with his mortality. Initially he panics over the changes that result from his aging. Science and knowledge prove as insubstantial an emotional crutch for Geiser as for Walter Faber, but Geiser does not resist this fact as did Faber. Instead he is compelled to prove himself, mentally and physically, one last time--his hike is his swan song. Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän does contribute one major element to the man-technology relationship as it was described in Homo faber: that of temporariness. Death in Homo faber seems to be the unnecessary result of negligence (Professor O.'s, Sabeth's, Faber's), but it is the natural course for the elderly Geiser and the dinosaurs. This new dimension is also noticeable in the changed portrayal of nature. In Homo faber nature was omnipotent, unsubjectable; now it



is diseased and harassed by mankind. This is due to Frisch's own increasing age, but not to a newly-developed, cynical fatalism as Schmitz recognizes:

In seiner späten Erzählung (Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän) korrigiert Max Frisch erneut das Pathos seiner frühen Werke und des Literatursystems, dem sie angehören, aus der Sicht historischer Alterserfahrung. Nachdem sich der Autor selbst "historisch geworden" ist, gibt er nicht die früheren Ideale wohl aber den literarischen Schwung des Idealismus vollends auf.<sup>174</sup>

Both the Montauk and the Blaubart protagonists reiterate the futility of the scientifically indoctrinated man who uses technology as an escape. The destructive perversion of objectivity is again enacted through the chief prosecutor's role in Blaubart. Like Faber, the chief prosecutor never started with a null hypothesis. This destroys the validity of objectivity and probabilism and therefore of the prosecutor's conclusions just as Faber's allegorical technocracy. Faber further adulterated his personal technocracy by applying statistics as though they would predict individual cases instead of describing the universal case. The chief prosecutor adulterated his obligatory objectivity by "proving" an "Überzeugung" as Frisch calls it. Frisch mentions this type of "reversal" in his diary, too: "Die Faszination, die Brecht immer wieder hat, schreibe ich vor allem dem Umstand zu, daß hier ein Leben wirklich vom Denken aus gelebt wird. (Während unser Denken meistens nur eine nachträgliche Rechtfertigung ist; nicht das Lenkende, sondern das Geschleppte.)" (Tagebuch 286). Both

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<sup>174</sup> Schmitz, Erdgeschichte 147.

characters further distort objectivity by continuing misuse (or disuse) of the basic scientific method: observe, record, analyze.

It can be inferred from these characterizations of technological man that in Frisch's opinion it is not technology that fails--even Faber's frenetic statistical rationalizations are true--but the man. Geiser fails mentally and physically because of age. Faber, the chief prosecutor and Schaad fail because they are overly reliant on scientific objectivity or technology without considering their more profound needs or preconceptions. Montauk fails to separate the subjective and objective methods of self-portrayal.

This interpretation is confirmed elsewhere in Frisch's work. Speaking to high school students about Walter Faber, Frisch said:

Dieser Mann lebt an sich vorbei, weil er einen allgemeinen angebotenen Image nachläuft, das von "Technik." Im Grunde ist der "Homo faber," dieser Mann, nicht ein Techniker, sondern er ist ein verhinderter Mensch, der von sich selbst ein Bildnis hat machen lassen, das ihn verhindert, zu sich selber zu kommen.<sup>175</sup>

Frisch again condemns "Überzeugung" in his diary. "Wer eine Überzeugung hat, wird mit allem fertig" (Tagebuch 308). He expands this idea that any perspective, technological included, has limits (Tagebuch 193-194, 229). In Der Laie und die Architektur the architect's character is forced by the laity to concede a restricted world-concept:

Architekt: "Ich bin Architekt, ja."  
 Laie: "Was nicht ausschließt, daß einer denkt."  
 Architekt: "Wozu soll ich viel darüber denken! Ich muß ja bauen. Ich will ja bauen."  
 (...)

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<sup>175</sup> As quoted in Haberkamm 737-738.

Architekt: "Ich denke, aber ich denke nur noch innerhalb gewisser Grenzen, die ich aus meiner täglichen Erfahrung kenne...." (263, 264)

Ironically, Frisch's work is similarly much determined by his experiences, including his technological, architectural training. At some time all those trained in a science or technology share two things with Frisch and Faber. Firstly, they are trained to find answers. As Faber explains, "...ich bin gewohnt, Lösungen zu suchen, bis sie gefunden sind..." (159). Frisch always indicates the tendency of his scientifically oriented character to this approach. Second, if those solutions are not readily forthcoming as desired they are tempted to "fudge" the data. There is a lot of destructive "data-fudging" in these novels.

Montauk elucidates the man-technology relationship in a bit more detail. This time the lack of unalloyed objectivity, the fictionalization of the personal realm is also deleterious. Faber recognizes the insignificant nature of technological careers. This idea is also found in Montauk. The concept of transience is apparent in these two later novels, too: in Schaad's ruined reputation and practice, in Frisch's relationships and aging.

This is the evolution of Frisch's man-technology relationship: the added dimension of age and transience. It is likely for this reason that there is no intimation of a new beginning in Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän and Blaubart, and Montauk, as there is in Homo faber. This is not intended as a condemnation of scientific and objective methodology. However, Frisch's work, even Homo faber, is often interpreted this way. His goal was not to present a

decisive, one-sided portrayal, but rather to force the reader to confront paradoxes such as he enacted in Der Laie und die Architektur. This work along with Homo faber, his definitive consideration of the man-technology relationship, proffers hope and opportunity. It is with Frisch's own irreversible aging that a new acknowledgement of temporariness is incorporated into his works and this is easily confused with bleak resignation or fatalism.

In conclusion, Frisch writes in order to present a contradiction with many possible solutions. It is the reader's task to decide which solution is best. Science and technology have played an extensive role in Frisch's life, and this is reflected in his works, some of which consider the man-technology relationship. Most critics interpret Frisch's work fatalistically, as if technology inherently distorts an objective perception. Yet Frisch's opinion is that any perception, even a purportedly objective one, biases scientific objectivity. He engenders a reliance on the scientific approach in his allegorical technocrat, Walter Faber. Faber's characterization proves to be consistent with Frisch's other scientifically indoctrinated characters from the novels Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän, Montauk and Blaubart (and finds further support still from other of Frisch's texts). These novels, however, were published 22, 25 and 18 years after Homo faber respectively. In this time Frisch's views had time to develop. It is frequently asserted that his works become increasingly fatalistic and condemning of technology as the cause of this destructive force, but this is not necessarily true. The

evolution in Frisch's portrayal of the man-technology relationship as the element of transience. In that time, Frisch has had to confront his own aging and this new consideration is thus incorporated into his novels. The fact that mankind is mortal does not invalidate the well-developed man-technology philosophies in these works. Man and technology can and must coexist, but society must also learn to accept the limitations of each.

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