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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

SPARTA AND THE SEA:

A History of Spartan Sea-power, c.706 - c.373 B.C.

BY

CAROLINE FALKNER



A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY.

IN ANCIENT HISTORY

DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1992



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
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
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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

Sparta is traditionally viewed as a land power, noted only for the efficiency of its army. Spartan maritime actions suggest that this picture is not entirely true.

Archaic Sparta had foreign cultural and diplomatic maritime contacts. Some degree of co-operation between the elements of Spartan society is suggested in the ownership and manning of its ships, which were used for state service on an ad hoc basis.

In 480 Sparta was chosen as supreme commander of the Greek naval and land forces against Persia. Sparta contributed competent commanders and successful organisation. It maintained its maritime interests briefly after the war, but may have had to give them up because of problems of domestic security.

Sparta's naval weakness became evident in its mid-century war with Athens. By the time of a second war Sparta attempted to gather a sizable allied fleet under its own leadership. Its naval actions do not demonstrate that this fleet and command were incompetent, as suggested by the war's historian, Thucydides. On the contrary, Sparta's main naval problem was its complete reliance on allies whose interests were as divided as its own.

After the Athenian defeat in Sicily, Sparta renewed the naval war in the Aegean. It showed some flexibility in its attempt to build a small fleet of its own fleet and to re-organise its command structure to face the new situation. Lack of secure financial resources and resistance by Athens still prevented immediate success. Only the certainty of secure funding by Persia ensured eventual victory.

Through its naval victory Sparta gained a naval empire and considerable wealth. It was, however, unable to unite the Greeks in any common purpose and seems to have been interested in power alone. Spartan leaders made no attempt to maintain the fleet's efficiency and its defeat foreshadowed Sparta's own.

Sparta was consistently reluctant to spend money on a fleet of its own. The acquisition of a larger fleet might have resulted in considerable social change, as had occurred at Athens. There is no evidence that any level of Spartan society wanted such a change at any time.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the advice and encouragement of my supervisor, Dr. R. J. Buck. He always received my opinions and arguments with the consideration which might be given to a valued colleague and his sense of humour relieved what sometimes seemed to be an interminable project.

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INTRODUCTION

It is a commonplace assessment of Sparta that its interests were restricted wholly to its land army and that, when it came to maritime power, the Spartans were veritable landlubbers. As, perhaps, with many accepted ideas about Sparta the truth may be more complex.

The problems with any research into Spartan history are the scarcity of sources and the 'mirage spartiate' that Sparta was always a rigidly conservative, aristocratic and militaristic society, devoted to the preservation of its Lysurgan constitution and its military supremacy in the Peloponnese. Sparta's successful preservation of its reputation for military prowess is indicated by the widespread shock experienced by the Greeks when Sparta made peace with Athens in 421 to ensure the return of a small number of Spartan soldiers who had been blockaded at Pylos, and later in 371, when the Spartan army was defeated by the Thebans at Leuctra.

An aristocratic society such as Sparta's would have had a natural aversion to expanding its naval arm. Athenian democratic development had shown that the navy was a vital feature of its democracy. Aristocratic bias against the 'naval rabble' is detectable even among Athenian authors. By the fourth century sea-power could be criticised by an Athenian orator for being imperialistic, unlike a more moderate land-based power [Isoc.8.102].

The geographical location of Sparta and the topography of the coastline controlled by the Spartan state may be supposed not to have naturally encouraged strong maritime interests. The Peloponnesian coastline of the south is, for the most part, steep and rocky with few bays or inlets. Sparta itself is situated approximately forty-five kilometres from the sea in fertile countryside. It also had interests in the rich lands of Messenia to the west. With such rich areas under their control the Spartans were self-sufficient.

For a state with, apparently, no interest in maritime affairs, it is odd that Sparta is frequently found involved in maritime activity. From the sixth century onwards the Spartan alliance contained several important maritime states. Before this period Sparta itself appears to have benefitted from maritime commercial activity. During the Persian War it was Sparta that led the allied Greek naval resistance to Persia. Sparta, too, provided the commanding officers and a small naval force for the allied Peloponnesian fleet during the Peloponnesian War. There is little evidence for allied dissatisfaction with Spartan naval leadership or involvement in the war. Greater opposition might have been expected had the Spartans been inept as naval leaders. After

its victory over Athens Spartan maritime power extended from Asia Minor to Sicily for nearly twenty-five years. There is, then, some reason to suppose that the traditional picture of the landlubberly Spartans was not entirely true.

From antiquity, however, the Spartans appear to have acquired a reputation for lack of maritime interests and for general lack of ability at sea. Perhaps the picture has been distorted by the greater amount of information available on the Athenian navy, and by the appeal of the simple contrast between Sparta, the state with a first-class hoplite army and Athens, the greatest naval state of fifth-century Greece. For Herodotus it was Athens that was responsible for the Greek naval victories of the Persian War [8.2]: for Thucydides the Spartan fleet was inexperienced and inept [2.87]. The philolaconian Xenophon, however, while acknowledging Athenian supremacy at sea and Spartan supremacy on land, nowhere states that Sparta was incapable of leading a fleet. Later authors, such as Diodorus and Plutarch, repeated earlier attitudes; Diodorus says that the Spartans were unfitted by nature to fighting at sea [11.41], while Plutarch claims that the Spartans at first forbade their people to be sailors, although they later made themselves masters of the sea [*Inst.Lac.*239e].

Modern scholars have followed this interpretation and have seen Sparta as a failure at sea,¹ although with the occasional word of warning that Spartan society was not monolithic.² In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries scholarship on Sparta's maritime interests centred around the problems of the Spartan navarchy and the possibility that an agreed list of navarchs would provide a sound chronological basis for Spartan history.³ The Italian scholar Luigi Pareti researched into Spartan maritime history in 1917, but he, too, was largely concerned with the Spartan navarchy and its dates.⁴ After Pareti little new work was done on the navarchy until R.Sealey suggested a more flexible interpretation of the development of the office.⁵ His suggestion has been generally accepted by researchers into Spartan history, such as A.Andrewes,

¹ P.Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300-362 B.C.* (London, 1979) 143.

² W.Forrest, *A History of Sparta 950-192 B.C.* (London, 1971) 102.

³ K.J.Beloeh, "Die spartanische Nauarchie" *Rhein.Mus.* 34 (1879) 117f; E.Curtius, *Griechische Geschichte* 2 (4) 838 (1870); W.Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (repr. Hildesheim, 1987) 109.

⁴ L.Pareti, "Ricerche sulla potenza marittima degli Spartani e sulla cronologia dei navarchi", *Storia di Sparta arcaica* (Florence, 1917).

⁵ R.Sealey, "Die spartanische Nauarchie" *Klio* 58 (1976) 335-358.

D.Kagan and P.Cartledge.⁶ Most recently a different line of approach has been put forward; N.G.L.Hammond, in an essay on Greece and the Persian War, remarked on the organisation necessary for Greek land and sea resistance to Persia. This, he believes, must have been the responsibility of the Greek hegemon, Sparta.⁷ Other scholars have concentrated on Sparta's naval abilities in a particular period, especially that of the Archidamian War.⁸ There has, however, been no attempt to write a general history of Spartan sea-power since the time of Pareti.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the extent of Spartan involvement in maritime affairs from the time of the foundation of Sparta's colony at Tarentum in Italy, c.706 B.C., to its actions at Corcyra 373/2, which mark the end of Spartan sea-power in the fourth century. Some attempt will also be made to assess Spartan naval organisation during this period. The traditional term 'Spartan' is used to include Spartiate and Lacedaemonian forces or policy decisions emanating from Sparta. It is also used of the fleet led by Sparta in the Ionian War. 'Spartiate' is used when it is necessary to distinguish this group.

It is not part of this investigation to examine in detail the controversies over the tactics of sea-battles in which Sparta was involved, especially those of the Ionian War, for which the sources often disagree. The importance of these actions will be discussed in relation to their contribution to overall Spartan strategy and to their effect on Spartan sea-power. Reference will be made in the footnotes to the important scholarship on the basic points of disagreement.

Research into Spartan sea-power relies for the most part on the available literary evidence, especially that of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, the Oxyrhynchus Historian, Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch. Other sources, such as Polyaeus and fourth century Athenian orators, are also employed with due caution when the major sources fail. Archaeological sources have also been employed where available. They are, however, more plentiful for Spartan history in the archaic period than for the later fifth and fourth centuries.

The thesis will be divided into five chapters with an appendix. The first chapter will

⁶ A.Andrewes in A.W.Gomme, K.J.Dover and A.Andrewes, *An Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 5 vols.(Oxford, 1945-1981) 454; D.Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca and London, 1987) 200f; P.Cartledge, *Agisilaos and the crisis of Sparta* (London, 1987) 79.

⁷ N.G.L.Hammond in *The Cambridge Ancient History* vol.4 (Cambridge, 1988) 5f.

⁸ For example, P.Brunet, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War" *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 255-80 and T.Kelly, "Thucydides and Spartan Strategy and Foreign Policy in the Archidamian War" *AHR* 87 (1982) 25f.

review the literary and archaeological evidence for Spartan maritime interests in the archaic period. Chapter Two will investigate the role of Sparta in the naval actions of the Persian War. Chapter Three will deal with the evidence of Spartan naval activity in the Pentecontaetia. Chapter Four will be in two parts: the first will assess Spartan naval actions and organisation between the peace with Athens and the outbreak of the Ionian War, the second, those of the Ionian War. Chapter Five will discuss the period of Spartan naval domination and subsequent weakness in the Aegean and the west. The Appendix will contain a discussion of the scholarship on the Spartan navy.

CHAPTER 1

THE ARCHAIC PERIOD TO THE DEATH OF CLEOMENES

Introduction

Sparta was involved in maritime activity throughout the Archaic period. Its early ventures included colonial expeditions and the coastal settlements of foreign exiles. Later in the sixth century Sparta sent military expeditions and diplomatic missions overseas.¹ At the same time the literary and archaeological evidence suggests that Sparta was active in the artistic life of the time and that much of this contact was made by sea.

The history of Sparta in this period, however, is obscure and controversial while the sources are 'normally scrappy, discontinuous and variously slanted.'² The general picture as stated by Herodotus is, however, clear that by the end of the sixth century Spartan power had expanded to include much of the Peloponnese [Hdt.1.66]. As a result Sparta controlled a long stretch of coastline that faced south, east and west and included the island of Cythera that itself was important for access to the Aegean. Sparta was, thus, well placed to develop as a naval

¹ Colonies at Thera and Tarentum, Herodotus 4.147-152; Pausanias 3.1.7; 15.5; Strabo 6.3. 2-3; the attempted colonisation in North Africa and Sicily under Dorieus, Herodotus 5.42-9; Pausanias 3. 12. 5, 16.4. Coastal settlements at Corone and Methone, Paus. 4.14.3, 35.1. Military expeditions to Lydia, Hdt.1.69; Samos, Hdt.3.4; Naxos, Plutarch *de Mulig. Her.* 21 (859D), Schol. Aeschin. 2.77. Diplomacy on Naxos, Plutarch *Apophth. Lac.* 236D; Salamis, Plutarch *Solon* 10.6. The following abbreviations are used throughout this chapter; Cartledge: P.Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History, 1300-362 B.C.* (London, 1979). Denham: H.Denham, *The Ionian Islands to the Anatolian Coast: A Sea Guide* (London, 1982). Forrest: W.G.Forrest, *A History of Sparta, 950-192 B.C.* (London, 1968). Jeffery, AG: L.H.Jeffery, *Archaic Greece: The City-States c.700-500 B.C.* (London, 1976). Jeffery, LSAG: L.H.Jeffery, *Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford, 1961). Huxley: G.L.Huxley, *Early Sparta* (London, 1962). Craik: E.M.Craik, *The Dorian Aegean* (London, 1980). Casson: L.Casson, *Ships and SeamanSHIP in the Ancient World* (Princeton, 1971). Burn, Lyric: A.R.Burn, *The Lyric Age of Greece* (London, 1960). Burn, Persia: A.R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (Stanford, 1984). Boardman: J.Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas* (Harmondsworth, 1973). Klein: *Cleomenes: A Study in Early Spartan Imperialism* (Diss.Kansas, 1973). Fitzhardinge: L.Fitzhardinge, *The Spartans* (London, 1980). Griffin: A Griffin, *Sikyon* (Oxford, 1982). Kelly: T.Kelly, *A History of Argos* (Minneapolis, 1976). Shipley: G.Shipley, *A History of Samos* (Oxford, 1987). Salmon: J.B.Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford, 1984). How and Wells: W.W.How and J.Wells, *Commentary on Herodotus, I and II* (Oxford, 1968). Macan: G.Macan, *Herodotus IV-VI* 2 (New York, 1973). Beloch: K.J.Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* (Stuttgart, 1922). Busolt: G.Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* (Hildesheim, 1967). Jones: A.H.M.Jones, *Sparta* (Oxford, 1967). Dawkins: R.Dawkins, *The Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta* (London, 1927). Chrimes: K.M.T.Chrimes, *Ancient Sparta. A Re-examination of the Evidence* (Manchester, 1949). Hooker: J.T.Hooker, *The Ancient Spartans* (London, 1980). Pelagatti: P.Pelagatti, "La ceramica laconica del Museo di Taranto" *ASAA* 17-18 (1955-6) 7-44. Morrison and Williams: J.S.Morrison and R.T.Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* (Cambridge, 1968). Humphreys: S.C.Humphreys, *Anthropology and the Greeks* (London, 1978). Will: E.Will, *Korinthiaka: recherches sur l'histoire et la civilisation de Corinthe des origines aux guerres médiques* (Paris, 1955). Haas: J.Haas, "Athenian Naval Power before Themistocles," *Historia* 34 (1985). de Ste. Croix: G.M.de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972). Trade: P.Garnsey, Hopkins and Whitaker edd., *Trade and the Ancient Economy* (London, 1983).

² P.Cartledge, "Trade and Politics revisited", *Trade* 14.

power in the eastern Mediterranean. Sites on the southern Peloponnesian coasts could control traffic both east and west as they were to do in the later period of Venetian sea-power.³ There is, however, no evidence that Sparta saw itself in such a global role at this time. The maritime activity in which it was involved appears to have been motivated by the prospect of immediate profit through commerce or booty: such activity may also have had some aristocratic connections. It has been pointed out about ancient trade that "Little but an ideological hairline divided the noble who voyaged in order to come home loaded with valuable gifts... or to exchange iron for copper.... from the commander of sailors out for gain...., always thinking about his cargo."⁴

The historical and archaeological evidence for Spartan maritime interests will be considered in the first two sections of this chapter. In the third section details of the harbours, types of ship, their uses and the problem of their ownership will be discussed. Some conclusions will also be drawn about the nature of Spartan maritime actions down to the period of the battle of Marathon, c.490 B.C.

A. The early period: c.800 to 580 B.C.

Spartan maritime interests in the archaic period can only be said to have begun when Sparta gained access to or control of some coastal territory. There is no record of the process or the time by which this may have been achieved. Sparta is thought to have expanded its power down the valley of the Eurotas towards the sea at Helos by the middle of the eighth century at the latest.⁵ With the mountain ranges of Taygetos to the west and Parnon to the east expansion southwards was the natural path for Sparta to follow. Shortly after the conquest of Helos, Sparta was at war with Messenia. It would hardly have attacked there if it could have been outflanked from the south. Strabo, who based his account on that of Ephorus, says that Helos was enslaved by Sparta under Agis I after a rebellion [8.5.4-5, C365]. This suggests that there may have been earlier control of Helos by Sparta; Helos may have been perioecic. Strabo adds that the Spartans went on to conquer some of the coastal territory of Messenia. It seems that, by the time of the

³ Denham 73f.

⁴ Humphreys, 167.

⁵ Forrest 21f.

First Messenian War, Sparta had access to the sea on the coast of Laconia and, possibly, from part of the Messenian coast as well.⁶

Sparta has been described as 'isolated' by the end of the first quarter of the eighth century.⁷ Geographically, Laconia is somewhat cut off from Aegean-centred maritime activity, chiefly because of the difficulties of the Cape Malea sea-passage and the barrier of the Parnon range to the east. Yet Sparta is said to have sent out a colonising expedition to Melos in the Cyclades by the eighth century [Thuc.5.84,89,112], to Cnidus [Hdt.1.174.2] and, perhaps, had some contact with Crete and Cyprus.⁸ In order to be aware of such possibilities abroad, Sparta must somehow have come into contact with states or individuals with knowledge of potential sites. One such contact may have been through the island of Cythera off the south-east coast of Laconia.⁹ Once in control of a part of the gulf of Laconia, Sparta was open to influence from the commercial activity of the island. Herodotus refers to the presence of Phoenicians on Cythera and the island was well-known for its purple dye production [1.103].¹⁰ Contact with Cythera may have led to some Spartan interest in the Aegean as the island controls the access to the Aegean through channels north and south of the island. Perhaps writing and knowledge of metal-working also reached Sparta by this route.¹¹ Contacts by land, however, were no less important. Laconian pottery of the period before the sixth century is said to show some affinities with Argive and Corinthian styles.¹² Although interaction between Sparta and the Aegean was

⁶ The dates for the First and Second Messenian Wars are controversial. Those used here are the dates followed by Jeffery, *AG* 115-118. The First Messenian War is dated to c.735-715 and the Second to the second quarter of the seventh century.

⁷ Cartledge 103.

⁸ Craik 22f, Cartledge 109.

⁹ Cythera is said to have been a colony of Sparta [Thuc.7.57], but the date of its foundation is unknown, see Cartledge 108, 122. There is little archaeological evidence from Cythera for the archaic period.

¹⁰ For the dye industry, see Coldstream J.N. and Huxley, G.L., *Kythera* (London, 1972) c.1, and for the earlier period "Bronze Age Purple Dye Production in the Mediterranean Basin, *B.S.A.* 82, 1987, ed. H.Waterhouse, *The British School at Athens: the first One Hundred Years* (London, 1986) 105,7, and Cartledge 122f, who dates this activity to between the eleventh and eighth centuries. Thucydides 4.53 mentions that Cythera was a well-known port on the routes from Egypt and the East.

¹¹ Jeffery, *LSAG* 183f. suggests Olympia and Delphi were the contacts.

¹² Cartledge 109f.

probably on a small and sporadic scale, it appears to have been sufficient to introduce Spartans to the possibilities of the Aegean world.

The story of the colonising expedition to Thera, c.800-750, is related by Herodotus and Pausanias [Hdt.4.143-8; Paus.3.1.7].¹³ Herodotus' account contains a great deal that seems mythical and impossible to substantiate but traces of a settlement of about the right period have been discovered on the island.¹⁴ According to Herodotus Minyans from Lesbos sailed to Lacedaemon and were adopted into the Spartan state. Trouble arose some generations later when they tried to acquire a greater share of power, including royal power, by claiming heroic descent. When they were unsuccessful, they seceded to Taygetos. Theras, a Spartan aristocrat, who also had royal pretensions and was frustrated in his claim, decided to lead a colonising expedition to Thera where he already had some Phoenician contacts. Other Spartans, chosen from all the tribes, went with him. Theras offered in addition to take any of the Minyans, and some accompanied him. Herodotus consulted both Theraean and Spartan sources and says that they agree to this point. Perhaps the colony was the result of political unrest at Sparta, hence the connection with claims to royal power. Economic pressure and land shortage may also have contributed as this expedition preceded the Spartan take-over of Messenia.

The colonists sailed in three triaconters, a statement that assumes the availability of ships, somewhere to launch them, some maritime knowledge and previous contact between Spartans and Thera. It also shows that the expedition was not large. The triaconter was a thirty-oared galley that is well attested for this period.¹⁵ Clearly such a galley, like the later penteconter, was not used only for war. The story also suggests that the ships were Spartan, as they were prepared by the aristocrat Theras, and the expedition was led by him. The expedition is, then, associated with aristocratic enterprise. Neither source has any problem with the idea that Spartans were capable of mounting an expedition of this kind or with the implication that it required some previous contact with the outside world to be feasible. Later contact between the metropolis and

¹³ Huxley 23, Cartledge 103.

¹⁴ Craik 22f.

¹⁵ Casson 44.

daughter colony is mentioned by Herodotus in his account of Dorieus' attempt at establishing a settlement in North Africa [5.43, 7.158].¹⁶ The guides used on that occasion were Theran.

During the late eighth century Sparta became involved in a protracted war in Messenia. Sparta's original interest in Messenia may have been economic - control of the fertile plain of Stenyclaros to satisfy an expanding population. During this time Sparta is said to have been involved in resettling the dispossessed inhabitants of Asine on the coast of the Argolid at New Asine (thought to be modern Koroni) on the Gulf of Messenia [Paus.2.36.4, 4.34; Strabo 8.4.4, C360]. Sparta's role in helping in the foundation of New Asine may have been prompted by concern to have a friendly town in conquered territory to guard newly conquered areas of Messenia and to help patrol the coastline. Sparta may also have wanted to have a harbour conveniently situated on a route to the west - a route that was opening up to more colonisation in the latter half of the century.¹⁷ Although still heavily involved in Messenia, Sparta appears to have shown some interest in maritime security and the possibility of maritime expansion.

Sparta founded the colony of Tarentum on the south-eastern coast of Italy, c.706 B.C.¹⁸ This settlement took place not many years after the colonial foundations by Euboea and Corinth in Magna Graecia. From the tradition of its foundation it seems possible that land hunger was once again the reason for the colonising expedition. The Partheniae, who founded Tarentum, were illegitimate Spartans with no land allotments, although their leader and oecist, Phalanthius, is called a Spartan. Perhaps they were a group dissatisfied with land settlements after the First Messenian War. It has also been suggested that Tarentum may not have been an official state enterprise originally but one undertaken by a small group whose success gained them later recognition by the metropolis.¹⁹ Whatever the reason for the colony, the Spartan venture was sufficiently organised under an oecist to obtain the usual approval from Delphi, although the oracle apparently suggested at first a site near Corinth. Sparta, then, was not cut off in the Peloponnese by the end of the century, but was aware of western expansion and was ready to tap into it for social or economic reasons, or both.

¹⁶ See also Paus.3.16.4, 10.4.1.

¹⁷ Burn, *Lyric* 76.

¹⁸ Strabo 6.3.2-3; Athenaeus 6.101; Aristotle *Politics* 5.7.1306b; Pausanias 10.10.6-8; Diodorus 8.21; Justin 3.4; Burn, *Lyric* 151, Boardman 179; Jeffery, *AG* c.4.

¹⁹ Cartledge 123-4.

As with the foundation of the colony on Thera, this enterprise was probably not large. Its struggle for survival may have been similar to that of the African colony of Cyrene, founded by Thera, which had close links to Sparta. That Sparta maintained necessarily sea-borne communications with Tarentum is shown by later epigraphical, cultic, ceramic and literary evidence.²⁰ Once again, such colonising activity implies the knowledge and possession of ships by a group with aristocratic connections and with knowledge of opportunities overseas.

The ships used may have been triaconters as at Thera or, perhaps, the larger fifty-oared penteconter, as used by the Therans en route to Cyrene, c.630, as the penteconter is known to have been used by this time.²¹

There is no literary evidence for further overseas expeditions by Spartans in the seventh century. This would seem to suggest that the foundation of Tarentum was not symptomatic of a deeper problem, but the solution to a particular situation. Sparta's attention may have been concentrated during the seventh century on the struggle with Argos and Messenia and on the problem of the control of the large subject population that it gained as a result of its success. The poetry of Tyrtæus reflects the seriousness with which the Spartans regarded the struggle in Messenia.²²

The Second Messenian War is traditionally explained as a revolt by Messenian helots encouraged by Sparta's defeat at the hands of Argos at Hysiae c.669 B.C.²³ Sparta may have been attempting to expand eastward through deliberate aggression or to define its borders in the Thyreatis region. That Sparta's contacts with the world overseas did not cease during this period is shown by the fact that Cretan archers as well as some Samians and Corinthians are said to have

²⁰ For the foundation of Tarentum see J.Carter, *The Sculpture of Taras* (Philadelphia, 1975) 7-14, and for the links between colony and mother city, Jeffery, *LSAG* 279-84, *AG* ch 4; Boardman 179, 189, G.Pugliese Carratelli, "Per la storia dei culti di Taranto", *Atti del 10 Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Graecia* (Taranto 1970) 133-46, and Pelagatti 7-44.

²¹ Casson 44f.

²² Tyrtæus F2,5,19 ed. West; *FGH* 580F5; Strabo 8.4.10, C362; Paus.4.4-24; Diodorus 15.66.3-4; Cartledge 127.

²³ Paus.2.24.7, 3.7.5. The view that Sparta was involved in the Thyreatis at this time has been challenged by Kelly 73f., on the grounds that Spartan/Argive hostility has been seriously distorted. Cartledge 126, quotes a fragment of Tyrtæus (P.Oxy. 3316) that mentions Sparta's problems with Argos in the mid-seventh century.

helped Sparta against Messenia.²⁴ Such aid does not necessarily prove official relations between one state and another but perhaps reflects contacts between individuals or small groups. These may have been prompted to join in by the prospect of action and profit. Once in possession of Messenia Sparta would have gained access to Messenian harbours through which some Messenians had been able to escape to the west [Paus.4.3.10].

By the end of the seventh century another town of resettled refugees was established by Sparta at Mothone on the west coast of the Messenian Gulf [Paus.4.35.2].²⁵ The settlers were from Nauplia, a coastal site that had been destroyed by Argos. Once again, Sparta may have taken the opportunity to have a friendly settlement to guard the coast of Messenia as well as to establish another port of call on the route to the west, and perhaps, to annoy Argos. The establishment of Mothone may have been the reason why Sparta never seems to have considered establishing a settlement at Coryphasium, fifteen kilometres to the north, an omission which was to lead to the loss of the Peloponnesian fleet there to Athens in the Archidamian War. The site at Coryphasium was not deserted, but may have remained just as a sheltered anchorage for vessels caught by the strong prevailing westerly winds on that coast.²⁶

B. The sixth century to the accession of Cleomenes, c.520

Herodotus provides more information on the relations between Sparta and other states in the sixth century. Unfortunately, his account is not without its problems, especially those of chronology. He indicates, however, that during the first half of the century Sparta extended its power considerably in the Peloponnese and became an internationally known state [Hdt.1.66]. This position brought with it further overseas contacts and obligations. Pausanias records that there was a war between Sparta and Cnossos which may have been fought about this time

²⁴ Cretan archers - Paus. 4.8.3, 4.10; Samians - Hdt. 3.45. They may have been hired as mercenaries, but aristocratic links of *xenia* may also account for mutual assistance, see P.Cartledge, "Sparta and Samos. A Special relationship?" *CQ* n.s.32 (1982) 243-265.

²⁵ Huxley 59, Burn *Lyric* 76. Its use as a port by the Messenians is mentioned by Pausanias 4.3.10.

²⁶ Thuc. 4.3.2. states that the area was uninhabited. There must have been some local settlements from which the Spartans later obtained help for the men on Sphacteria, see J.Wilson, *Pylas* - 425 B.C. (Warminster, 1979) c.1 and Denham 75f.

[2.21.3].²⁷ This war is not historically certain but, if it took place, it would obviously have involved the use of ships by Sparta.

Within the Peloponnese Sparta was at first unsuccessful against Tegea, which lay north-east of Sparta in Arcadia, but later 'successful in all her other wars' [Hdt.1.66]. By mid-century Sparta controlled 'most of the Peloponnese.' Spartan attention may have been concentrated on consolidation of its frontiers because of a growing concern for security over the problem of controlling a large subject population of Messenian helots. From the importance Herodotus or his sources must have attached to it to give it such prominence, the Tegean episode is often seen as the beginning of a new Spartan policy, one that employed diplomacy instead of force. According to Tegeate sources the Spartans intended to reduce Tegea to helot status but, after some unsuccessful fighting, an agreement was reached between the protagonists. Later sources claim that a treaty was made and that its provisions included the warning that Tegea should give no help to the Messenians.²⁸ Spartan action against Tegea is often explained as an example of Spartan aggressive expansion, but it is equally possible that some Arcadian towns had helped Messenians or provided a base for them in Arcadia.

A Spartan alliance with Elis on the coast to the north of Messenia is also dated to about this time, c.570.²⁹ Spartans had, perhaps, helped Elis against a Pisatan claim to control of Olympia. Elis may thus have been Sparta's first coastal ally in the Peloponnese, though it is doubtful whether Elis could provide many ships. In the classical period only two Elean ports, Cyllene and Pheia, are mentioned. The long coastline of Elis is open to adverse winds from the west in the sailing season.³⁰

²⁷ Huxley 67.

²⁸ Aristotle, fr.592 ed.Rose, Huxley 136, Jeffery, *AG* 121. The agreement with Tegea is seen by many as the beginning of the Spartan Alliance. The first proponent of this view was G.Dickens, "The Growth of Spartan Policy", *JHS* 32 (1912) 1-45, and the latest A.Holladay, "Spartan austerity" *CQ* 27 (1977) 111-26, who links Tegea with a change in the Spartan outlook. Cartledge 139, says it was the start of a series of alliances that led to Spartan hegemony of the Peloponnese. Forrest 76, explains it as the policy of the ephor, Chilon, while Klein 49, sees it as Anaxandridas' policy.

²⁹ Strabo 8.3.30,C355; Jeffery, *AG* 120, Cartledge 138. Elis won control of Olympia from the Pisatans c.576 - Pindar *Ol*.51.

³⁰ Pheia - Thuc. 2.25, 7.31; Cyllene - 1.30, 2.84, 3.69, 6.88. Jeffery, *AG* 166, Denham 73f., mention the frequently adverse winds off the south-western Peloponnese.

The terms of the Spartan alliance with Elis are not known but in the light of the later 'Spartan Alliance' it is frequently assumed that such treaties as those with Tegea and Elis were the start of the series of 'unequal alliances' through which Sparta extended its power over its allies. That Sparta was hegemon over a number of allies by the end of the archaic period seems likely, but there is some difficulty in assuming that this control extended back into the first quarter of the sixth century as part of a deliberate and consistent Spartan policy of overlordship of the Peloponnese. Herodotus says nothing about it. If Sparta had over-extended itself in attacking Tegea (it was, after all, unsuccessful at first), then it was hardly strong enough to exercise much control over Tegeate policy so early.

Elis, too, appears to have exercised some independence in foreign policy. The Eleans concluded a treaty, c.500, with the Arcadian state of Heraea - an offensive/defensive alliance that was to be in force for ever and which involved some religious sanctions.³¹ There is nothing to indicate that either Elis or Tegea was bound to Sparta under the same conditions that were imposed on Athens after its defeat in the Peloponnesian War, according to which Athens was to follow Spartan leadership by land and sea.³²

The area of the Thyreatis may have been taken by Sparta in the second quarter of this century, as a result of which Sparta controlled the eastern coast of the Peloponnese to the Gulf of Nauplia and also the island of Cythera.³³ Access overland to this coast is difficult, even in modern times, because of the Parnon range. There are, however, some good harbours on the east coast. Laconian influence has been suspected in the area, but there is little archaeological evidence to prove Spartan occupation of eastern coastal sites such as Epidaurus Limera; Prasiae, a member of the Calaurian Amphictiony, may have been replaced by Sparta at this time, an event that suggests increasing Spartan influence in the area.³⁴ Artifacts from this coast suggest that there was some influence here from the eastern Aegean.³⁵

³¹ M.N.Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions, I* (Oxford, 1933) no. 5. This treaty has been dated to the mid-sixth century or to c.500 on the basis of Strabo 8.3.2.

³² Xenophon, *Hell.* 2.2.15

³³ Cartledge 141-2, Huxley 70, Kelly 73f.

³⁴ Epidaurus Limera and Prasiae - Burn, *Lyric* 27, Cartledge 141.

³⁵ Fitzhardinge 18f., Cartledge 141.

Excavations on Cythera have revealed little about any Argive or Spartan occupation in the Archaic period: little is known of the island's history at any period. Literary references to it are from the mid to late fifth century when it was attacked and later taken by Athens.³⁶ Herodotus refers to Cythera's position as a concern to Chilon, the sixth-century Spartan ephor, but the statement is put in the mouth of Demaratus during the time of the Persian War and may reflect later fifth-century strategic concerns over the island [7.234]. Herodotus' Demaratus later gives advice to Xerxes to send his fleet south and take Cythera, in order to threaten Sparta. Whatever the period of the island's acquisition, Sparta would have had to use ships in order to reach Cythera.

The state of Sicyon is thought to have made an alliance with Sparta at about the same time, after Sparta had helped to depose its tyrant, Aeschines.³⁷ The terms of this alliance are not known. Like Elis, Sicyon was a coastal state, but no Sicyonian ships are mentioned at this time. Perhaps the alliance was a move aimed at Argos against whom Sparta had fought over the Thyreatis.

By mid-century Sparta had consolidated its position in the Peloponnese and was in alliance with many of its states. At the same time, it possessed a coastline that faced in three directions, - east to the Aegean, south to Crete and Egypt and west to the Ionian Sea, Italy and Sicily. Thus, Sparta was ideally placed to participate in any activity along these routes. Not all this coast was well-populated or useful for shipping, e.g., the area around Pylos, called deserted by Thucydides, eastern Cape Taenarum and Cape Malea, both of which are notorious for sudden storms.³⁸ Access to the east coast from Sparta is difficult, but possession of so much coastline gave Sparta the opportunity to look outwards more than ever before. That some at Sparta responded to this challenge is shown by Spartan actions overseas in the next quarter-century.

³⁶ Thucydides 1.108.5; Diodorus 11.84; Paus. 1.27.5; Plutarch *Perikles* 19.2; Schol. to Aeschines 2.75. The date of the acquisition of Cythera is unclear. Huxley 70, thinks it fell before the Battle of the Champions in the mid-sixth century.

³⁷ Plutarch *de Mal Herod.* 859; *FGrH* 105F1, Huxley 75, Cartledge 140, Griffin, 58f. The sources are late and, thus, have been doubted.

³⁸ Denham 86f.

Sparta and Lydia to c.547/6

Early Spartan/Lyidian contacts are suggested in the poetry of Alcman, fl.c.600.³⁹ In the *Partheneion* he mentions the wealth and fashions of Lydia that were known at Sparta. It is thought that Alcman himself may even have been Lydian. Alcman also uses nautical similes in his work, a fact that suggests that these images may not have been lost on his audience.⁴⁰ Even the influence of Ionian cosmological speculation has been detected in Alcman's work, which, if true, would add further weight to the idea of Spartan contact with the eastern Aegean by the end of the seventh century.

The monarchs of Lydia had attempted to establish their influence in mainland Greece by rich dedications at Greek shrines such as Delphi. Croesus of Lydia appears to have continued this policy at Delphi, Thebes and in East Greece at Ephesus [Hdt.1.69f; Paus.3.10.8, 4.5.3; Diod.9.33].⁴¹ Sometime before 547/6 he concluded an alliance and a pact of friendship with Sparta. According to Herodotus he also made alliances with Babylon and Egypt. The reason for this diplomatic activity was the growing threat of Persian power to his kingdom. Sparta was singled out by the king as the greatest power in Greece and was presented with gold for a statue of Apollo, for which the Spartans had been prepared to pay.⁴² Croesus may have been attempting to win them over by this gift. The Spartans, in turn, presented Croesus with a bronze bowl.⁴³ Herodotus may have called the agreement between Sparta and Lydia an alliance because he is attempting to show the power and position of Sparta prior to the Persian War.⁴⁴ That the contact was at aristocratic level is also suggested by the Spartan desire for gold. Only richer Spartans could have afforded to buy it.

³⁹ For the dating of Alcman to the late seventh century from P.Oxy.2390, see M.E.West "Alcmanica I. The date of Alcman", *CQ* 15 (1965) 188-202 and F.D.Harvey, "Oxyr. Pap. 2390 and early Spartan history", *JHS* 24 87, 1967, 62-83. The reorganisation of the Menelaion is mentioned by Alcman in Fr.14b, ed. Page. See also W.G.Cavanagh and R.R.Laxton, "Lead figurines from the Menelaion and seriation", *BSA* 79 (1984) 23ff.

⁴⁰ D.Page, *The Partheneion* (Oxford, 1951) ll.25-6.

⁴¹ The date for the fall of Sardis is generally accepted as c.547/6 but D.M.Lewis has recently doubted the account of Herodotus that Sardis fell as the result of an unexpected winter campaign by Cyrus, see Burn, *Persia* 587f.

⁴² Paus.3.10.8.

⁴³ The Spartans were specialists in bronze vessels, Cartledge 138.

⁴⁴ Cartledge, *CQ* n.s. 32 (1982) 249 draws attention to the special, i.e. personal and hereditary, relationships that Sparta had with other states. He does not include Lydia in this category. There would seem to be no reason why Sparta should not have had aristocratic links with this state, even if they were based on trade in luxuries.

In his war with Persia Croesus called on his allies for help and gave Sparta four months to prepare its forces for a campaign abroad. A second urgent appeal for immediate help was sent to Sparta when Cyrus of Persia is said to have surprised Croesus by a sudden winter campaign against his kingdom. The Lydian capital, Sardis, fell before the Spartans responded. A single penteconter was then sent by Sparta to Asia Minor, perhaps to find out what was happening before Sparta committed any force so far away. Herodotus uses this incident to have the Spartans deliver their famous warning to Cyrus to leave the Greeks alone - clearly, a dramatic foreshadowing of the coming clash between the two in which Sparta played a leading role and which was the subject of Herodotus' history.⁴⁵

The authenticity of this alliance and the Spartan response has been doubted.⁴⁶ If it was not true, what was the purpose of Herodotus or his source in inventing it? Perhaps it was to associate Sparta from the start with opposition to Persia, but Sparta never sent help to Croesus and does not gain much credit from the story. It may, alternatively, be background preparation to explain the penteconter story, but this could stand alone as a reconnaissance voyage. There seems no reason to reject the version in Herodotus that some arrangement was made between Sparta and Lydia, especially in the light of earlier contacts between them. The detail of the amount of time allowed for Spartan preparation also seems authentic, since Sparta would need to muster the necessary force and prepare ships. Herodotus specifically mentions a force of Spartan ships, not allied vessels. His sources for this event are obviously Spartan, so that Sparta's role could be magnified. It is not unlikely that Croesus would look to Sparta for some help if, as Herodotus says elsewhere, Sparta was really the strongest power in Greece. Diodorus adds that Croesus needed mercenaries from the Peloponnese, a fact that would be a good reason to ally with Sparta who might permit the raising of such a force [9.32.1].⁴⁷

⁴⁵ How and Wells 125, doubt the authenticity of the penteconter incident.

⁴⁶ It is doubted by Beloch 1.1.371, H.Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge* (Berlin, 1962) 2.12, Will 631 n2. and V.Ehrenberg in Pauly-Wissowa IIIa 2 col.1384. R.Sealey, *A History of the Greek City-States, 700-338 B.C.* (Berkeley, 1976) does not believe in tales of unfulfilled intentions. The treaty is regarded as historical by G. Busolt 2.391.n2, who claims that Sparta was influenced by Lydian wealth. See also, Huxley 73.

⁴⁷ The reliability of Diodorus for this period and for the fifth century is questionable. He seems to have used Ephorus, a fourth century historian, as his main source. Ephorus' work was influenced by rhetoric and provided a less pragmatic than moral explanation of history. He also arranged his work according to subjects, a system that seems to have confused Diodorus when he tried to relate it to other systems, such as that of Thucydides, which relied on an annual arrangement. For the shortcomings of Ephorus and Diodorus, see G.Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge, 1935) 49f.

It is interesting that no leader is associated with this expedition. Either Herodotus omitted to ask or his informants omitted to tell him. It is also possible that there was no record of such a leader, in which case none might have been appointed. This in turn suggests that either the preparations never reached that stage or that the expedition was not state-sponsored but a private response by some Spartans. A mercenary force might also be considered an independent one and not an official response by Sparta, but one organised under Spartan auspices.

Sparta's willingness to conclude an alliance with Lydia and to fulfil its terms is not explained. It has been claimed that the planned expedition was the beginning of a Spartan anti-Persian policy, but it seems unlikely that Sparta would have felt threatened by Persia so early.⁴⁸ Nor is there evidence to suggest that Persia was a threat to mainland Greece at the time. Sparta did not follow up the proposed expedition with another after sending a penteconter to reconnoitre. Therefore, the expedition can hardly be considered evidence of long-term Spartan imperial designs in the Aegean. Sparta is said to have been involved in hostilities with Argos at the time and this might have affected its strategic views [Hdt.1.82].

Perhaps, as the emerging power in Greece, Sparta was establishing a sense of its own identity and importance and associated itself with Lydia for the prestige of a link with so wealthy and famous a state. Sparta's claim to Achaean heritage in the story of the bones of Orestes may be another such attempt for position and prestige by association [Hdt.1.66f]. It is possible that Sparta may have felt the alliance to be just that, if it were concluded at a time before the threat from Persia was recognised at Lydia. The date of the agreement is unknown. The desire for prestige and the promise of profit to be made from such an expedition to wealthy Lydia may have been sufficient motive for the Spartan action.⁴⁹ Lydian wealth was proverbial and is frequently mentioned by Herodotus [1.13,25,30,51; 6.123].

The incident also shows that Sparta was considered capable of mounting an overseas expedition and of reaching Lydia. There is no mention in any of the sources about the use of allied ships.

⁴⁸ Klein 13.

⁴⁹ Klein 71. For the Spartan desire for greater standing but with imperial motives, Huxley 73.

Sparta and Samos

No further Spartan activity in the Aegean is recorded for another twenty years, something that hardly indicates a consistent anti-Persian or naval policy in the area. It may even suggest that there was a reaction at Sparta against foreign involvement after the Lydian alliance.⁵⁰ By c.525 Sparta became involved once more in Eastern Aegean affairs, this time at Samos [Hdt.3.39-45, 54-55].⁵¹

Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, controlled the area around Samos through his fleet of one hundred penteconters. His may be the closest example in the archaic period of a thalassocracy, although Polycrates seems to have been more a pirate king than a tyrant with imperial ambitions.⁵² He was finally forced to recognise the power of Persia and, in fulfilment of an alliance with Amasis of Egypt, sent forty triremes, manned by dissident aristocrats, to help his ally against the Persians. In this way he hoped, according to Herodotus, to rid himself of his obligation to Egypt and some Samian troublemakers at the same time. The aristocratic Samians fought the Persians but, instead of returning home, went to Sparta and asked for help in removing Polycrates. They appealed on the basis of Samian help to Sparta during the Second Messenian War. Spartan sources denied this and claimed to be avenging the theft by Samians of the bronze bowl sent to Croesus some generations before and of some bronze armour sent to Egypt. The Spartans were readily joined in the expedition by the Corinthians, who also wanted revenge on Samos for piracy and theft. The combined force besieged Samos for forty days without result, although the landing had been successful, and returned home. It was later rumoured that they had been bribed. The Samian exiles went on to raid Siphnos, then settled at Cydonia in Crete, where they were later attacked by the Aeginetans for their activities in Troezen and Hydraea. The ships used by the mainland Greeks seem to have been for purposes of transport only. There is no record of their meeting the supposedly large fleet of Polycrates. It might legitimately be asked where this fleet was.

⁵⁰ Klein 71.

⁵¹ Busolt 1.451, 2 392 and Huxley 62-4 claim that Polycrates' actions had affected Spartan trade but there is no evidence for this.

⁵² Shipley 94f.

Herodotus says that revenge was the motive for both Corinthian and Spartan involvement. No further details are given about the relationship between the two that would explain a joint expedition. Herodotus' explanation of events has been generally disbelieved and various alternatives have been suggested.⁵³ As Corinth was a known trader of the archaic period and was by the end of the sixth century at the latest an ally of Sparta, it has been assumed that the expedition's ships were Corinthian, on the ground that Sparta had no ships of its own.⁵⁴ If, however, it possessed no ships of its own, Sparta could have used the Samian ships that had arrived in Laconia, thus making the use of Corinthian ships unnecessary. The existence of some kind of alliance would be the only basis on which Corinth might provide ships, unless Sparta were to buy them,⁵⁵ but there is no evidence to show that Sparta could make such demands on its allies this early. Besides, the Corinthians are said to have joined eagerly, a statement that hardly indicates Spartan pressure.

An alternative suggestion has been made that Corinth and the Samian exiles were the driving force behind the appeal to Sparta in an attempt to isolate their trade rival Aegina.⁵⁶ Corinth then persuaded a reluctant Sparta to join. There is no evidence to suggest that any Samian appeal was made to Corinth, and the persuasion of Sparta is too reminiscent of the situation of the 430s, when Corinthian pressure was apparently put on Sparta to force it into war with Athens.⁵⁷

A third theory is that Aeginetan pressure forced Sparta to attack Samos, its commercial rival.⁵⁸ Despite the ingenuity and plausibility of such explanations, the motives of Corinth are not clear, except for Herodotus' claim of revenge. No Sicyonian ships are mentioned either. If Sparta had needed extra ships, Sicyon could also have provided them.

⁵³ Busolt 1.451 thinks that the Samian incident is indicative of Spartan interest in the Aegean and the effect of pro-Persian Samos on trade. Huxley 74 claims it was part of an anti-Persian policy at Sparta.

⁵⁴ Jeffery, *AG*, 122, Salmon 240f, Will 626-7.

⁵⁵ As Athens is said to have done in its war with Aegina, *Hdt.* 6.87.

⁵⁶ Busolt 446-8 and Salmon 225.

⁵⁷ *Thuc.* 1.118-24.

⁵⁸ Burn, *Lyric* 173.

The Samian expedition has been thought another example of Spartan imperialism in extending its power across the Aegean. The story of revenge is, then, pure propaganda to disguise Sparta's real motive. No explanation of how Sparta could have maintained such a position of dominance, unless it possessed ships, is provided in this theory, except under the terms of an alliance with other states that contributed ships, an alliance that has been suggested to be unlikely for this period. Polycrates is another of the Greek tyrants whom Sparta was supposed to have put down in the Archaic Period, along with Aeschines of Sicyon, Lygdamis of Naxos and Hippias of Athens. Sparta's role as disinterested tyrant slayer has been questioned, and there is no evidence to show that it attacked Polycrates as part of this policy, nor does Herodotus say so.⁵⁹

Spartan participation in the action is no proof of an anti-Persian policy. According to this argument Sparta was able to tolerate an independent Polycrates but could not allow him to admit the Persians into the Aegean. In any case Persia, if it were interested in expansion into the Aegean, was already in possession of an Aegean coastline after the fall of Lydia.

A more recent interpretation has emphasised the revenge motive given by Herodotus as more typical of the archaic period.⁶⁰ The motives of individual Spartans and Samians are argued to be more important than any interpretation of the foreign policy of the state, and a case has been made for a special relationship between the two states.

Some aristocratic Spartans may have had links of *xenia* with their Samian counterparts that went back to the time of the Messenian War and formed the basis of their appeal to Sparta. The presence of such Spartans on Samos at about this time is suggested by the discovery of Laconian hoplite figurines and a bronze cauldron handle at the Samian Heraeum. The bronze is inscribed with the name of its Spartan dedicator.⁶¹ Herodotus, too, attests the presence of such Spartans. One of his sources in Sparta was the grandson of a Spartan killed on Samos and buried with honour by the Samians [Hdt.3.57]. It is possible that Sparta and Samos had such a relationship as their names are linked quite frequently in this period.

⁵⁹ How and Wells 346-7.

⁶⁰ Cartledge, *CQ* n.s.32 (1982) 243-65.

⁶¹ Jeffery, *AG*, pl.14a, b.

As with the Lydian expedition, no leader's name is recorded in the sources for the action in Samos. It has been suggested that a Spartan king would be expected to lead this state-organised force, but that there may have been a religious taboo against Spartan kings going to sea.⁶² The Spartans certainly were meticulous in their religious observations, but there is no evidence for such a restriction. If there had been, they had found a way around it by Cleomenes' time; he led a sea-borne invasion of Argos c.494 [Hdt.6.92]. The suggestion of action by a group of individuals also fits the situation here and again might account for the fact that Herodotus records no name for its leader. He could surely have discovered it from his informant, Archias.

Aristocratic connections and past service would account for the Samian appeal to Sparta. Both Spartan and Corinthian participants may have claimed revenge as their motive, but their response was also influenced, not so much by anti-Persian feeling or imperialism, as by the prospect of action, repayment and possible booty. The profit/plunder motive is a strong one in Greek history and should not be ignored. It is frequently stressed in Herodotus' account of the appeals of Eastern Greeks to the mainland in the reign of Cleomenes.

At about the same time as the Samian expedition, some Spartans are said to have been appointed to settle the claims of Athens and Megara to the island of Salamis in the Saronic Gulf.⁶³ They would probably have used a Spartan ship on such a mission. During the same period the philosopher Anaximander of Miletus is said to have visited Sparta, to have set up a sundial and to have predicted an earthquake in the region.⁶⁴ Sparta was clearly playing an important and active part in the archaic world.

Sparta and Naxos

Sparta is supposed to have deposed Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos, in the last quarter of the sixth century. This action is thought to have been another example of Sparta's stand against tyranny and it is dated to the same period, c.525, because Sparta is not known to have crossed the Aegean at any other time. The move against Lygdamis might then have been a strategic one, to secure the island for Sparta before advancing further east. The story is not recorded by

⁶² D.Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977) 45.

⁶³ Plut. *Solon* 10.6, Huxley 76.

⁶⁴ Diog.Laert.2.1; Huxley 76.

Herodotus, but comes from later sources.⁶⁵ If it was part of the overall strategy of the Samian expedition, then it would indicate a greater degree of control by Sparta over its ally, Corinth, who would have had to have been involved as a member of the expedition, than is suggested by ancient sources which say nothing about the role of Corinth at Naxos. It would also indicate either that the success of the expedition would depend on initial success at Naxos, since Sparta would hardly leave a hostile state behind it, or that Sparta took Naxos on the return voyage as some kind of recompense for the failure of the Samian venture. An alternative date of 515 has also been suggested. In this version of events Sparta removed Lygdamis as part of an anti-Persian policy in the defence of Greece.⁶⁶

Sources on Lygdamis also indicate that some earlier diplomatic activity may have taken place between Sparta and Naxos. This expedition would then be Sparta's final solution when diplomacy failed. Whatever the basis or truth of the story, an expedition against Naxos would have involved the use of ships by Sparta in a context in which no other ally is actually mentioned. The same is true of any diplomatic activity. Sparta seems to have been active overseas, though not consistently so, to the time of Cleomenes. In each expedition ships are used as troop transports only and there is no record of any naval battle. There is no evidence that imperial motives played a part, although it is possible that some Spartans with interests abroad realised the change that the arrival of Persia on the shores of the Aegean had brought about. The expeditions to Lydia and Samos were so far apart, however, that they can hardly be thought evidence of anti-Persian or imperialist aims. In addition, there is no indication that Sparta was deliberately building up a fleet or that it had control of any other fleet by 525. Spartan actions in the Aegean were probably prompted more by the aristocratic desire for prestige, action and profit, and they were not strictly state activities.

⁶⁵ Plut. *Apophth. Lac.* 236D and D.M. Leahy, "The Spartan Embassy to Lygdamis", *JHS* 77 (1957), 272-5. For the reference to Sparta's deposition of tyrants, Plut. *de Mal. Herod.* 21 (859D) and Schol. Aeschines 2.77. It is associated with the Samian expedition by Beloch, 1.1.394, who is followed by Jones 46, Huxley 74-5, Leahy and Cartledge 145. Klein 123 thinks that Naxos may have been considered as a possible naval base for Sparta.

⁶⁶ The date 515 for the deposition of Lygdamis is suggested by the appearance of Naxos on the thalassocracy list of Eusebius, see Jeffery *AG* 252.

C. The reign of Cleomenes, c.520 - c.490.

Herodotus appears to have considered Cleomenes more interesting and important than any other earlier Spartan, regal or otherwise, since he chose to relate so much about him [5.37-52,75,87, 6.74-85]. That his information comes from sources hostile to the king, perhaps within his family, is obvious - Herodotus' Cleomenes is in many respects nothing more than a stock mad figure of folk-tale,⁶⁷ but this hostility also serves to demonstrate the existence of opposition to Cleomenes' policies in Sparta. Apart from his fellow-king, Demaratus, no other opponents are identified, though there has been a great deal of speculation about the role of the ephors during his reign.⁶⁸ Cleomenes could have made many enemies by his high-handed attempts to gain greater power for himself. Among them may have been those who favoured a more active and profitable policy for Sparta, a policy that Cleomenes by his action in refusing overseas appeals for help seems firmly to have discouraged. At the same time he does not appear to have prevented private action abroad by Dorieus, his half-brother, though this may have been a special case, nor did he discourage the use of ships in maintaining his policies. In fact, he made some use of them for campaigns against Greek states of the mainland.

The embassy of Maeandrius

Maeandrius became the ruler of Samos after the fall of Polycrates [Hdt.3.54-5]. After the Persians chose to support his rival, Syloson, Maeandrius sailed to Sparta and asked for help, c.518/7. His appeal was based on earlier Spartan/Samian contacts as well as on Sparta's position as hegemon of mainland Greece. Cleomenes, who, as king, received foreign embassies and delegations, at first refused to see Maeandrius, but later agreed. Maeandrius then tried to persuade the king to help by demonstrating the extent of his personal wealth. Cleomenes was not bribed and had Maeandrius removed from Sparta with the help of the ephors, before Maeandrius could corrupt anyone else. Maeandrius' offer may have been a personal bribe for Cleomenes; it may also have been an attempt to show Cleomenes how much profit Sparta stood to make by helping him. Cleomenes had Maeandrius expelled because he was only too well aware that some Spartans could easily be persuaded by such means. Herodotus, thus, tacitly

⁶⁷ See "Was Cleomenes Mad?" *Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success* ed. P. Cartledge and A. Spawforth (London and New York) 1989.

⁶⁸ Beloch 36 and Dickens, *JHS* 32 (1912) 26, Huxley 70.

acknowledges the existence of such a group at Sparta, whose interests perhaps clashed with those of the king.

Cleomenes' refusal to become involved in the eastern Aegean at this point has been thought an early example of his reluctance to face Persia. Interference on Samos would have meant direct confrontation for which Cleomenes was not yet ready or which he was not willing to accept.⁶⁹ It is also seen as evidence of his Peloponnese-first policy. Either of these explanations is possible, but Cleomenes may, too, have had reason to suspect that Maeandrius' wealth might be a temptation to some at Sparta. Perhaps this group would have included those involved in the earlier expedition to Samos. Maeandrius' use of the promise of profit shows that he thought it might work at Sparta.

Sparta was also Maeandrius' first stop in Greece; Maeandrius clearly expected the Spartans to be able to help, even if he underestimated the king's opposition. If, as the story suggests, Cleomenes was responsible for restricting the audience for Maeandrius' appeal, he also prevented action by those interested in extra-Peloponnesian adventure.

The thalassocracy list

This list, recorded by Eusebius in two separate works is a late record of those states that are supposed to have exercised sea-power hegemony before Athens in the fifth century.⁷⁰ There does not appear to have been any real attempt by any Greek state to employ such power for imperial ends in the archaic period - even the ships of Polycrates seem to have been used more as a pirate fleet and to have controlled only a local area without any desire to spread further. The concept of such imperial naval power seems anachronistic for this time. It does not occur in literary sources until Thucydides analysed it in the fifth century.

Sparta's name occurs on the list between those of Samos and Naxos, i.e. c.520 - c.515. Its period of thalassocracy was short and its name may have been inserted later to fill the perceived vacuum between the fall of Polycrates and the rise of Naxos, which became important because of the interest shown towards it by the Persians. The career of Dorieus and, perhaps, the account of the Scythian embassy and its proposals, provided further indication of Spartan

⁶⁹ Klein 116f.

⁷⁰ Eusebius, *Chronographia* 1.225.ed.Schoene. It is defined by Eusebius as a list of thalassocrats who ruled the seas. The accuracy of the list is disbelieved by Jeffery, *AG App.III*, 252 and Klein 121. It is dated to the fifth century by J.Myres "On the List of the Thalassocracies in Eusebius", *JHS* 26 (1906) 86-88, but believed by Burn, *Lyric* 318.

willingness to be involved in maritime activity at the time and may have been a factor in the choice of Sparta for this period.⁷¹ Sparta, therefore, is on the list as the only likely candidate. It had already been involved in Lydian and Samian affairs and had demonstrated some maritime ability.

Dorieus

Dorieus, the half-brother of Cleomenes, was, according to Herodotus' sources, the better man and should have succeeded to throne, despite the fact that he was the younger candidate [5.42-49; Paus.3.16; Diod.10.18.6]. Apparently, Dorieus believed it too. He left Sparta in what seems to have been a fit of pique and tried to found a colony on the coast of North Africa, c.515.⁷² Sparta had previously founded a colony on Thera which, in turn, had sent a daughter colony to Cyrene, c.630. Later Spartan contacts with Cyrene are suggested by literary, ceramic and archaeological sources so that Sparta had some interest in and knowledge of North Africa.⁷³ Herodotus himself may not have believed the praise of Dorieus supplied to him, as he gives enough information to show that some of Dorieus' actions were rash. Perhaps some of this was supplied by other sources in Magna Graecia, especially at Croton. Dorieus did not consult the Delphic oracle, the standard procedure for the would-be colonist, but relied on an oracle he already possessed, and left with a group of Spartan aristocrats and some Thera guides, presumably pilots. Samians had performed the same function at the foundation of Cyrene. The colonists tried to establish themselves on the coast near the river Cinyps in Libya, but were soon driven out by local inhabitants and Carthaginians. Their choice of site for the colony was obviously a poor one from the strength of the opposition to it, and they underestimated the resistance of the earlier settlers.

Dorieus' expedition may be evidence of some political unrest at Sparta. He had been frustrated in his royal ambition, according to Herodotus' story, and he was accompanied by other

⁷¹ Cartledge 145.

⁷² The date is assigned from the date of the end of Sybaris in 510 in which Dorieus was involved, Diod. 9.90.3, Klein 123, but How and Wells 18 are sceptical of Dorieus' involvement at Sybaris. It is accepted by Huxley 79.

⁷³ For Sparta's ties with Cyrene, Hdt. 4.156; Paus.3.14.3. Dorieus knew of the area around the river Cinyps in Libya, as well as the possibilities for colonisation in the west, Hdt 5.42. At the time of the Persian Wars the Spartans were included in Gelon's reference to those who had derived profit from the Emporia on the North African coast, Hdt.7.156. See also, M. Nafissi "Battiadi ed Aigeidai: per la storia dei Rapporti tra Cirene e Sparta in eta Arcaica" 375-387, and G.Schaus, "The Evidence for Laconians in Cyrenaica in the Archaic Period" 395-402, *Cyrenaica in Antiquity*, edd. G.Barker, J.Lloyd and J.Reynolds, (Oxford, 1985).

Spartans, presumably those sympathetic to him. Herodotus gives no hint of this, but stresses the personal rivalry between Dorieus and Cleomenes. No opposition is recorded to their departure from Sparta, and no barrier mentioned against their return when the venture failed. After his return Dorieus became interested in attempting the foundation of another colony, this time in Sicily. Delphi was now consulted, a fact that makes the expedition seem more official, or it may be that Dorieus had no convenient oracle to hand. Some members of the band of settlers are named by Herodotus. They included a number of those from the failed African settlement and an aristocratic exile from Croton, who provided and paid for his own ship, a trireme. He had arrived at Sparta from Cyrene; it is clear that the news of the new expedition had spread. Herodotus adds that Dorieus first helped Sybaris in its war against Croton, help that Croton later denied. The Spartan colonists were subsequently killed fighting against the Carthaginians and Eggestaeans while trying to establish themselves at Heraclea in western Sicily. A Spartan survivor took over Minoa but was killed when he tried to hold Selinus.

This colonising attempt appears to have had little sense of purpose and direction, if Dorieus did join in the war at Sybaris, and it seems to have underestimated Punic and local resistance once again. There is a suggestion that this second action was also the result of political unrest, this time on the part of the perioeci, unrest that Dorieus exploited in support of his claim to the throne. The claim is not supported by any ancient source, but relies on an emendation of Pausanias' text [3.16.4].⁷⁴ As before, Dorieus was accompanied by other Spartans, a fact that suggests that this was a predominantly aristocratic enterprise. It is also linked with a wealthy Crotoniate aristocrat with his own ship. The prime movers, then, were aristocrats rich enough to organise the enterprise. Their action over Sybaris and at Selinus indicates that they acted more as soldiers of fortune than as needy settlers, and they joined in the war for what they could get out of it. If it had been a state-supported venture, there is no record of any further Spartan interest or involvement, so that a policy of expansion in the west by Sparta was a short-lived one, if it existed at all.⁷⁵ Gelon specifically states that Sparta did not come to help him when he later

⁷⁴ Busolt 2.756 believes that some groups from the Peloponnese went with Dorieus to Sicily. These included men from Anthana, a perioecic settlement in territory disputed by Argos [Thuc.5.41]. Dorieus, then, may have been trying to exploit some perioecic unrest in Laconia. The emendation of Pausanias text was proposed by E.Lobel and quoted by Cartledge 145, who accepts it.

⁷⁵ Huxley 78 for Carthaginian resistance to Greek intrusion in the west.

claimed to be avenging Dorieus against the Carthaginians [Hdt.7.156].⁷⁶ Although Gelon's speech is made before the ambassadors of the Greek allies on the eve of war with Persia, a Spartan was the leader of the embassy and Gelon must have had Spartans as much as other Greeks in mind when he mentioned the profit that had been made by them at the Emporia on the coast of Africa. Gelon's statement provides another link between Sparta and North Africa.

Cleomenes does not appear to have been opposed in any way to these expeditions. He may have been happy to get rid of this element of Spartan society, an element whose ideas conflicted with his own, or he may not have felt strong enough to oppose the wishes of another member of a royal family. Both incidents show that at the end of the sixth century some Spartans at least were ready to leave for an enterprise overseas, had contacts abroad and the means to get there.

The Scythian embassy

After Darius' invasion of Scythia a Scythian embassy was supposedly sent to Sparta to propose a joint expedition against Persia, c.510 [Hdt.4.89, 6.85].⁷⁷ Sparta's role would be to cross to Ephesus and invade by way of the river Phasis. Both the date and likelihood of such an embassy have been doubted on the grounds that Scythian society was not sufficiently organised to send such a mission in the late sixth century, and that an expedition so far inland by a mainland Greek state is 'unlikely' at the time.⁷⁸ Herodotus himself may indicate that he did not put much faith in the story. It is introduced as an aside to another scurrilous tale about Cleomenes, and does not form part of the main narrative. It does, however, suggest that Sparta was thought to be internationally known and active at the time. There is also no indication that Sparta refused this proposal through any maritime weakness.

The first Spartan invasion of Attica, c.511

The reasons for Cleomenes' attempts against Athens have been much disputed. Whatever the underlying causes, Sparta made its first attempt in a seaborne invasion of Attica at Phalerum

⁷⁶ Gelon mentions particularly how profitable the area of the Emporia in North Africa had been to Sparta. See also Polybius 3.22 for mention of the Emporia in a treaty between Carthage and Rome of about the same date as Dorieus' western adventure.

⁷⁷ Beloch 2.2, How and Wells 429, Macan 90.

⁷⁸ Beloch 2.2 and How and Wells 429 disbelieve the story.

[Hdt.5.64-5; Aristotle *Ath.Pol.*29.4; Paus.8.3.4].⁷⁹ The force under the Spartan Anchimolius landed safely and set up camp on the plain. It was defeated by the Athenians with the help of Thessalian cavalry. Anchimolius was killed and buried in Attica, and the survivors were driven back to their ships. Cleomenes afterwards led another expedition by land, defeated the Thessalians and marched to Athens.

Herodotus separates the two invasions by a customarily vague reference to the interval between them - he uses *meta*. It has been thought that this could mean a couple of years or very little time at all.⁸⁰ In the latter case, the suggestion is that Anchimolius' force was a diversionary tactic and part of a combined attack on Attica.⁸¹ Cleomenes led the land forces that defeated the Thessalians, who were reported to be still in the area after their victory over Anchimolius. This saves any difficulty in explaining why the Thessalians helped Athens on two separate occasions, or why Cleomenes did nothing for some time after Anchimolius' failure. As king, Cleomenes led the larger force, so that there is no need to infer that there was a religious taboo against a king travelling by sea. Cleomenes may have used a similar sort of combined operation in his later attack on Argos. If the invasion by land occurred much later, then the first force may have been too small and ill-equipped to deal with cavalry in open country. Cleomenes corrected this mistake in his second invasion.

There is no mention of allies or of allied ships in the attack. The forces involved are called Spartan except for the anti-Hippias faction with Cleomenes. Nevertheless it has been argued that the ships used by Anchimolius must have been Corinthian or Aeginetan.⁸² It is not necessary to suppose this, as Sparta clearly was able to provide some ships of its own, and there is no indication of involvement by members of the alliance. This expedition under Anchimolius is the first recorded use of ships by Sparta against another mainland Greek state. In addition, it shows that there had been some change in naval organisation by the time of Cleomenes; ships are still being employed as troop transports, but they are now clearly under state control, i.e. the king's, as an arm of the state force.

⁷⁹ Forrest 81 thinks this may have been a move to discourage medism. For the chronology, N.G.L.Hammond, "Studies in Greek Chronology of the Sixth and Fifth Centuries," *Historia* 4 (1955) 371-411.

⁸⁰ Cartledge 146, suggests about two years, but does not explain why.

⁸¹ Klein 135.

⁸² G.G.Busolt and H.Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde II* (Munich, 1926) 1321.

As the first named Spartan in charge of an expedition by sea, Anchimolius has been called the first Spartan navarch.⁸³ Herodotus does not give his rank, though he does refer to his status as Spartiate. Had he been navarch, one might have expected Herodotus or his source to mention it. Ships were used in this expedition for transport only, and there is no mention of any naval organisation at this time. It seems unlikely, therefore, that a formal and annual office of navarch was created this early, especially if previous sea-borne expeditions were privately organised. If the title existed in the late sixth century, the office would have had little of the prestige or importance associated with it in the late fifth and early fourth centuries; presumably it referred merely to an officer in charge of forces transported by sea.

Aristagoras of Miletus

Aristagoras of Miletus appealed to Sparta to help the Ionians in their revolt against Persia, c.499. His appeal as recorded by Herodotus was based on the promise of wealth from a campaign against a supposedly weak Persia [Hdt.5.38,49]. The embassy was received by Cleomenes who was persuaded to refuse it by his daughter, Gorgo. The reason Cleomenes gave to Aristagoras was that Sparta would be taken too far from the sea. Once again, Cleomenes refused to commit Spartans to East Greece. Perhaps this incident was played up in Athenian sources as a joke about Spartan caution, or it may be an example of Herodotean humour at the parochial view of Greeks who thought a three months' journey into Asia Minor too far. In reality the extent of the Persian empire was greater than that, as Herodotus well knew.⁸⁴ But would any Greek state have been willing to march so far inland at this time?⁸⁵

There is no hint in Herodotus' account of any consistent anti-Persian policy by Cleomenes in the early part of his reign. The appeal of Aristagoras is a mercenary one.⁸⁶ No mention is made of a possible threat to Sparta or to Greece from the Persians. Aristagoras was heard and refused by the king in person, as in the case of the appeal of Maeandrius. Cleomenes may have felt that Sparta's position in Greece was not secure enough to enable it to campaign so far, or that

⁸³ Jones 50. Beloch 2.2.271 thinks that Eurybiades was the first to hold the office. Klein 131, suggests that Herodotus recorded Anchimolios' name because he saw his tomb in Attica.

⁸⁴ Klein 282.

⁸⁵ As pointed out by A.Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (New York, 1962) 120.

⁸⁶ Burn, *Lyric* 198, refers to the visual nature of the appeal as described by Herodotus.

Sparta was not yet strong enough [Hdt.5.49];⁸⁷ or he simply did not wish to provoke Persia abroad. His answer is at least consistent with his earlier reply to Maeandrius, and it is not necessarily due to any weakness after the débâcle over the allies' refusal to join in another attack on Athens. Official Spartan policy under Cleomenes was clearly to be one of non-involvement in the eastern Aegean. Aristagoras made a subsequent appeal to the Athenians, who sent a small force that achieved little. Sparta, as the object of Aristagoras' first appeal, was clearly considered capable of providing significant help.

Cleomenes' invasion of Argos c.494

Argos is thought to have been a long-time rival of Sparta for hegemony in the Peloponnese. In addition to any traditional rivalry between the two states, Cleomenes may well have recognised the need to act against possible medisers in Greece by this time and to have campaigned against Argos, c.494, for that reason [Hdt.6.76f; Paus.3.4.1].⁸⁸ The explanation given by Herodotus is that Cleomenes was warned by an oracle to attack Argos, and this could have been Cleomenes' public excuse. Whatever his motive, Cleomenes was successful in weakening Argos for some time to come.

Cleomenes led a Spartan army to the border with Argos, but he apparently changed his mind after the omens, usually taken by the king on leaving Spartan territory, proved unfavourable. He then approached Argos by way of the Thyreatis region and crossed to Nauplia, using requisitioned Sicyonian and Aeginetan ships, perhaps to achieve an element of surprise. The crossing may have been made from the bay of Astros, the closest convenient anchorage in the vicinity.⁸⁹ Cleomenes defeated an Argive force by a ruse, but did not destroy Argos as he might have done. Instead he returned to Sparta, where it was said that he had been bribed by the Argives.

Later, Argos imposed fines on Sicyon and Aegina for joining the Spartan expedition. Perhaps there was some kind of agreement between them that involved a fine on religious

⁸⁷ Cartledge 152, takes this reference and the evidence of Arcadian coinage to mean that Sparta had problems in Arcadia at the time, as is possible.

⁸⁸ Cartledge 149, Huxley 83, Kelly 77.

⁸⁹ Suggested by Cartledge 149.

grounds if the agreement was broken.⁹⁰ The Sicyonians acknowledged their guilt and negotiated a settlement of the fine, but the Aeginetans refused. The text of Herodotus may suggest why. The Sicyonians are said to have joined the expedition - *sunapobainesthai* - but the Aeginetans were forced to comply - *ananke lambanesthai*. The presence of a large Spartan force would have been sufficient persuasion.

If this sea-borne invasion was the result of a change of plan, Cleomenes would have needed rowers as well as ships. It has been suggested that the rowers and some of the ships were perioecic, as Astros was in perioecic territory.⁹¹ The force was a large one and only some Sicyonian and Aeginetan vessels were involved. Cleomenes would have been forced to commandeer whatever ships were available in the area. No alterations or refitting would have been necessary if they were only to be used as troop transports. It has also been suggested that the ships were there by pre-arranged plan.⁹² If so, this would suggest that Sicyon and Aegina were party to the plan and prepared to ignore possible religious sanctions. According to this theory, Cleomenes' initial march by land was meant to deceive the Argives, and the attempt by sea was envisaged by him all along. Alternatively, perhaps the amphibious landing was planned by Cleomenes as part of a two-pronged attack, which he later had to alter. Some extra ships would then have been needed to accommodate the land force. This explanation would allow for Herodotus' implication that they were there by chance and coerced into service.

A further suggestion is that Sparta used the ships of both states to prevent them helping Argos.⁹³ If they were both members of the Spartan alliance at the time, Sparta thought them capable of independent action with Argos - an interesting aspect if Sparta were, as some believe, able to exercise great power over its allies by this time. Such influence as Sparta exercised may have been restricted to its smaller allies.

The incident, whether the result of Spartan planning or not, shows that Cleomenes was ready to use ships when he thought it necessary, that he had the expertise to complete the crossing and that, once again, ships were employed as transports on a state campaign.

⁹⁰ Griffin 61 n4.

⁹¹ Cartledge 149, suggests that the ships were perioecic.

⁹² How and Wells 94, Burn, *Persia* 229, Huxley 81.

⁹³ Burn, *Lyric* 231.

Cleomenes and Aegina

Athens and Aegina had been hostile for some time.⁹⁴ When Aegina medised, Athens immediately appealed to Sparta for help, despite past differences [Hdt.6.47,74]. Cleomenes crossed to the island to arrest the medisers, but was opposed in this by his fellow-king, Demaratus. Cleomenes had him deposed with the connivance of the Delphic oracle and replaced him with Leotychidas. Both kings then crossed to Aegina and took hostages who were sent to Athens.

Cleomenes' initial action against Aegina in his own right was clearly high-handed and caused opposition at Sparta as well as on Aegina. His determination to get his own way is shown by his engineering the deposition of his opponent by manipulating the Delphic oracle. His quick response to the Athenian appeal indicates that he may by this time have appreciated the problem a pro-Persian Aegina would present to Greece both from immediate and long-term strategy.⁹⁵ Aegina had a fleet of seventy ships which would be a useful addition to the small number of Greek ships available for a war with Persia.

It has been thought that Corinth may have been involved through its interest in controlling a trade rival, but Herodotus does not mention this, although he records that Corinth later sold twenty ships to Athens for use against Aegina. No allied ships are mentioned in Cleomenes' visits to Aegina. On each occasion the number of ships sent was probably small, as Cleomenes' visit was not an invasion. Sparta had sufficient ships of its own for the purpose.

Herodotus' account of the reign of Cleomenes reveals inconsistencies and many problems of motive and chronology. The amount and variety of information he has recorded shows his interest in the king and how important he considered him to have been. The period of Cleomenes' reign certainly appears to have been crucial for the position and power of Sparta in the Peloponnese before the Persian invasion of 490. Cleomenes had built up Spartan power in the Peloponnese and refused to allow it to become involved in actions abroad. By his action over Demaratus, however, Cleomenes precipitated a political crisis and his own exile. His later recall

⁹⁴ Spartan/Argive hostility over the Thyreatis is recorded by Herodotus, 1.82, when Croesus sent a request for help. The enmity was supposed to extend back to at least c.669, when the Argives defeated Sparta at the Battle of Hysiae, Paus.2.24.7, P. Oxyrh. 3316.

⁹⁵ Klein 236.

and possible murder, c.490, reveal the turmoil in Sparta's domestic affairs that may partly explain its slowness to help Athens at Marathon.

A new attitude to Spartan allies can also be seen in this period. While up to c.525 there is no evidence that Sparta's allies could be coerced into action or that Sparta was hegemon of a formal alliance, Cleomenes appears to have summoned some allies, including Corinth, for an expedition against Athens without fully informing them about the object of the campaign. Corinth was instrumental in opposing this expedition and, perhaps, in forcing Sparta to come to some kind of formal agreement with its allies that stipulated their rights and obligations. The first meeting of such an alliance may have taken place c.504.⁹⁶ This action by Sparta in summoning allies against Athens and in commandeering ships against Argos reveal that Sparta's attitude to them was one of control rather than co-operation by this time. This may well have been due to the personality and aims of the king. Corinth's refusal to go along with these demands did not stop Cleomenes coercing weaker Spartan allies against Argos.

His actions against Athens, Argos and Aegina also show that Cleomenes appreciated the usefulness of a maritime force in transporting troops, or in diplomatic situations, even if these were confined to relatively local waters. His action against Aegina may even suggest that he understood the need for Sparta to have as many ships as possible under its control for a possible clash with Persia, although there is no indication that he built up the Spartan naval force with such an intention.⁹⁷ Spartan ships had been used as transports for campaigns and expeditions abroad both before and during his reign. The change that Cleomenes brought about was that ships were now used for state purposes under his control and not just for individual enterprises. By refusing to allow interested Spartans to become involved in Samian and Ionian adventures, he had tried to end such expeditions and to establish a more centralised control over Spartan actions abroad. He may not have opposed Dorieus in order to rid Sparta of some of these more adventurous spirits. That his policies were not wholly supported at Sparta is shown by the opposition of Demaratus, the circumstances of Cleomenes' recall and death and the bias of the sources used by Herodotus. Some of this opposition may have included those profit-seeking aristocrats who had advocated foreign adventure and involvement.

⁹⁶ Jones 51, Huxley 81, de Ste Croix 339, J.A.O.Larsen, "Sparta and the Ionian Revolt: a study of Spartan Foreign Policy and the Genesis of the Peloponnesian League", *CP* 27 (1932) 136-50.

⁹⁷ Klein 182, who thinks he did, but there is no evidence for this.

Archaeological and artistic evidence.

The Sparta described by the sources of the fourth century and later was a strictly ordered, militaristic, 'barrack' society with no interest in art and culture. The great change that caused Sparta to be so different from other states was said to be the result of the reforms of Lycurgus, a shadowy and perhaps mythical figure who is usually dated to the eighth century. Earlier sources for the archaic period, such as Herodotus, mention Lycurgus but give few details about the changes associated with him.⁹⁸ The archaeological discoveries of the British excavations at Sparta in the early part of the century and more recently appear to have complicated the picture. As a result of the kinds of artefacts found it has been suggested that Sparta was an importer of luxury articles, e.g. ivory, gold, glass and amber, from c.700 and a producer of some fine pottery and bronzes.⁹⁹ Most of these artefacts have been dated to the sixth century with the bronzes continuing down into the fifth.

Much has since been written to try to reconcile this Sparta with the ultra-conservative, militaristic Sparta sprung fully-armed from the eighth-century reforms of Lycurgus. Artefacts discovered at the site of the temple of Artemis Orthia and at the Menelaion indicate that Spartans of the period were both open to outside influences from Central Greece, the Aegean and East Greece, and that they were able to produce artistic styles and innovations of their own. Later excavations at the Menelaion, at Amyclae and at Sparta itself have not changed this assessment. Many modern scholars agree that the changes that occurred in Spartan society to make it the closed and disciplined state of the later sources must have occurred more gradually and over a much longer period than was assumed.¹⁰⁰

The evidence indicates that construction of the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta began c.700, perhaps as a result of surplus wealth from success in the war with Messenia and the need to record and display this success for posterity.¹⁰¹ Among the artefacts excavated was

⁹⁸ For the power of the Spartan mirage and Spartan austerity in later literature, see F.Ollier, *Le Mirage Spartiate* (Paris, 1933) and E.N.Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity* (Stockholm, 1965).

⁹⁹ Dawkins 1-50. The dating has since been corrected by J.Boardman, "Artemis Orthia and chronology", *BSA* 58 (1963) 1-7. For the discoveries at the Menelaion, see H.W.Catling, "Excavations at the Menelaion, Sparta, 1973-6", *AR* (1977) 24-42 and W.G.Cavanagh and R.R.Laxton, *BSA* 79 (1984) 23ff.

¹⁰⁰ Cartledge 120, 154-5, Fitzhardinge 155f., Huxley 61f., Jeffery, *AG* 122.

¹⁰¹ For success in war as a stimulus to temple building, see W.K.Pritchett, *The Greek State at War, II* (Berkeley, 1974) 100.

a series of ivory plaques depicting a variety of subjects and revealing oriental influences. These date from the mid-seventh to the early sixth centuries and confirm the suggestions of contact with the Eastern Aegean in the historical sources. The supply of ivory is thought to come from the Near East, perhaps through Tyre, and to have dried up when Tyre fell c.573. Ivory carving was replaced by bone carving and by the greater use of local limestone for plaques. The ivory plaques were worked at Sparta, perhaps for use at the sanctuary. Clearly, there were some artists skilled in the medium at Sparta.¹⁰²

One of the plaques from later in the series shows the departure of a warship.¹⁰³ The shape of the piece is unusual and it is suggested that it may have been part of a piece of furniture. The segment may have been a slice of ivory tusk, which would account for its semi-circular shape. The edge of the ivory has a series of holes which may have been set with beads of amber. It is dated to c.600. The ship is depicted in some detail. It has a pointed ram, raised rear deck, rails, steering equipment, sails and sheets. Some crew members are shown lowering the sail and one is fishing at the stern. The fact that this is a warship is shown by five shields. The heads of the rowers or perhaps the warriors are shown above the shields. The captain of the ship is greeting a woman on shore as he disembarks. The woman may be a representation of the goddess Orthia and the piece part of a dedication for the safe completion of a voyage, perhaps after some raid. Orthia has been linked with the Cretan goddess and supposedly associated with the sea.¹⁰⁴ The name Orthia is inscribed retrograde on the ship.¹⁰⁵ This has been thought to be the name of the vessel but there is no evidence for the naming of ships until the fourth century. Earlier ships were identified by a plaque that carried a representation of the tutelary deity of their city of origin.¹⁰⁶ The general style of the scene is similar to that on Cretan rings and to that of Theseus and Ariadne on the Francois vase and may have been a well-known

¹⁰² Fitzhardinge 57-70.

¹⁰³ Dawkins 370, pls 119-20, Jeffery, *LSAG*, 188, Morrison and Williams 83 pl.10d.

¹⁰⁴ Chrimes 248f., based on *IG* 2.2.1623

¹⁰⁵ *IG* 5.252b.

¹⁰⁶ Casson 344f. Morrison and Williams 83, suggest it could be the name of the ship as well.

type,¹⁰⁷ but the detailed representation of the activity of the crew indicates some knowledge of ships and the sea. Perhaps it was dedicated by a returning Spartan of the early sixth century.

One of a series of limestone blocks from the rebuilding of the sanctuary, c.580, also depicts a ship but the work is more crude.¹⁰⁸ A square-rigged ship is clearly identifiable, as is the inscription, Praxinos, probably the name of the dedicator. This scene is probably also a thank-offering for a safe voyage, and perhaps was dedicated by one of the sculptors brought in by Sparta to work on the temple, which was rebuilt at about this time.¹⁰⁹

A number of foreign artists are said to have visited Sparta and been commissioned for various works in the sixth century. Theodoros of Samos, c.570, designed the Skias, Bathycles of Magnesia built the throne of Apollo Amyclaeus c.550, and Clearchus of Rhegium sculpted a bronze Zeus for the sanctuary of Athena Chalcidicus c.520. Spartan artists also worked abroad: Theocles in cedar, Dorycleidas in gold and ivory, his brother, Dontas, in cedar and gold at Olympia, and Telestas at Olympia.¹¹⁰ Spartan artists, working particularly in wood, were known outside Sparta and their work prized. Artistic skills also appear to have been associated with families. Perhaps these skills were also hereditary [Hdt.6.58]. Spartan patrons in turn were aware of the best artists outside their own city and were able to commission them. Much of this artistic activity must have come into Sparta from the sea.

The period from c.580 has also been called the 'high point' of Laconian black figure. This is especially true of the black-figure cups.¹¹¹ Many of those discovered come from Tarentum and reveal an interest in maritime decoration. Though such decoration naturally reflects the taste of the buyer, they also show knowledge of the topic by the artist and contact between the producer and the buyer. One of the most famous is the inscribed Arcesilaus cup. This depicts Arcesilaus, king of Cyrene, overseeing the weighing of wool or silphium either on a ship or at a warehouse. The scene is similar to those of Egyptian paintings and may reflect

¹⁰⁷ Chrimes 256.

¹⁰⁸ Fitzhardinge 75.

¹⁰⁹ Cavanagh and Laxton, *BSA* 79 (1984) 23ff.

¹¹⁰ Paus. 3.2.10, 17.6, 18.9, 19.3; M.N.Tod and A.J.B.Wace, *A Catalogue of the Sparta Museum* (Oxford, 1906) 99, Burn, *Lyric Age* 180.

¹¹¹ Cartledge 155, Hooker 85, Boardman 122f., 159f., 210.

some North African influence.¹¹² Contacts between Sparta and Cyrene are also suggested in the literary sources. A Spartan athlete is said to have taken part in the foundation of Cyrene [Paus.3.14.3]. It also suggests that some Spartan artists had either accurate knowledge of such activity or had seen it in person. Again this implies maritime activity connected with Sparta and Laconia. A school of painters, whose activity extended to the last quarter of the sixth century, has been identified from these cups. Clearly, there was a small group of highly talented and literate artists at work in the period.¹¹³

Laconian ceramics have also been found at other sites, in Italy (Etruria), Sicily, North Africa, Egypt and Samos and so were widely distributed.¹¹⁴ The links with Italy, Sicily, North Africa and Samos are also attested from literary sources.

Ceramic production was not confined to perioecic Laconia, but has also been traced to Sparta itself. A site that contained graves and a kiln was excavated in the Mesoa district of Sparta.¹¹⁵ The grave site, dated c.600, is thought to be that of a perioecus because of the kiln and the association with manual labour, which the Spartans themselves are said to have despised. It has been suggested, however, that some Spartans may have been artisans.¹¹⁶ The discovery of this site has left the question open. The graves contained amphorae with moulded decoration that showed some similarities to Spartan bronzework.

Spartan bronzes, particularly in the form of cauldrons and tripods, were also widely distributed and continued to be produced well into the fifth century [Hdt.1.70; Paus.3 17.2,18.7].¹¹⁷ Sparta and Samos are again associated here, as Sparta was said to have learned the art of metalworking from the Samians. Such large bronzes are also referred to in the literary sources. It has been suggested that some of them were specially commissioned; the sections were

¹¹² Pelagatti, *ASAA* 17-18 (1955-6) 7-44. See also note 73.

¹¹³ B.B.Shefton, "Three Laconian Vase-painters", *BSA* 49 (1954) 299-310.

¹¹⁴ Cartledge 136, Hooker 85, Jeffery *AG*, 129, Huxley 64, Fitzhardinge, 24f.

¹¹⁵ C.Christou, "Archaic Graves in Sparta and a Laconian funeral figured relief", *AD* 19A, (1964) 123-63, Fitzhardinge, *Spartans* 45-57.

¹¹⁶ Huxley 63 but see Hdt.2.167.2, for Spartans as cooks, heralds and flute-players. These occupations, however, are all connected with military organization and may thus have been special cases.

¹¹⁷ Jeffery, *AG* 24 114, 128, *LSAG* 191, Boardman 213, Hooker 89, Fitzhardinge, 90-119.

made at home and assembled in their final form at their destination.¹¹⁸ The artist, then, would have accompanied his work. Evidence of such bronzework, identified as Laconian, has been found at Vix, in southern France, Switzerland, Italy and Yugoslavia. Spartan bronzesmiths may well have travelled widely.

By the end of the century Spartan ceramic art appears to have been in decline. In ceramics this was mainly due to the increase in the export and popularity of Attic pottery in the Greek market.¹¹⁹ The series of Laconian cups ends c.520 but Laconian red-figure mugs were popular among aristocratic Athenians in the fifth century.¹²⁰ Artistic bronzework continued down into the first half of the fifth century.

For much of the sixth century there was an active market for Spartan goods and freedom of movement in and out of Sparta for artists. Poets such as Stesichoros of Himera and Theognis are said to have visited Sparta in this period.¹²¹ Most of the expensive raw materials and finished goods, as well as the foreign artists commissioned by Sparta, probably entered Laconia through Gytheum, Las or Taenarum.

The economic picture should not be exaggerated. Sparta's production of ceramics and metalwork was not a decisive part of the Spartan economy - the majority of the lead and bronze figurines, for example, seem to have been produced for temple dedication, and crafts may have been confined to a small number of families. Laconia remained self-supporting. The ceramics and bronzes that have been identified outside Sparta suggest the establishment and organisation of permanent trading ties and the regular exchange of goods, but the scale of such operations is not clear. What their distribution and the movement of artists to and from Sparta does indicate is that it was open to and benefitting from outside influence, and that it was able to produce its own innovative and valued work.

¹¹⁸ A.M.Snodgrass, "Heavy Freight in Archaic Greece", in *Trade* 16-27.

¹¹⁹ Cartledge 155, Huxley 73, Fitzhardinge 24ff, Salmon 109.

¹²⁰ I.McPhee, "Laconian red-figure from the British Excavations in Sparta," *BSA* 81 (1986) 153ff.

¹²¹ Huxley 64, 71, 76 and the sources there cited.

Spartan ports, ships and owners

Ports

There is no evidence for Spartan harbours in the sources for the period.¹²² Available harbours on the Laconian Gulf, e.g., at Taenarum, Las, Helus and Boiae, are identified mostly from later sources, such as Thucydides [4.45.53,56]. Thucydides, however, does not mention Gytheum. The west coast of the Peloponnese is a considerable distance from Sparta and appears to have been of little interest. Thucydides describes the area around Pylos as uninhabited [4.3]; there may have been some small settlements there. The two known harbours on the Messenian Gulf were both settled by Sparta with outsiders: Mothone, where the Spartans were said to have settled Nauplians during the Second Messenian War, and Asine, another deliberate settlement by Sparta of refugees from Asine during the First Messenian War [Paus.2.36.4, 4.34; Strabo 8.4.4. C360]. A later reference to this site indicates that it was an important port for the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War as a timber depot [Thuc.4.13].

Harbours mentioned in the Gulf of Laconia include Taenarum on the Mani peninsula. Arion is said to have come ashore here after he was thrown overboard by some Corinthians, c.600 [Hdt.1.24]. Neither Las¹²³ nor Gytheum is mentioned in the Archaic period, although Las was in use in the fifth century; there is no contemporary reference to Gytheum in the sixth or fifth centuries. Gytheum apparently had no natural harbour and its anchorage had to be man-made.¹²⁴ Recent survey work by underwater archaeologists has revealed nothing about the facilities at Gytheum before the Roman period, when the harbour was enlarged.¹²⁵ Harbours did not have to be large, particularly in archaic times, as ships were frequently pulled up and loaded or unloaded on any suitable small beach.¹²⁶

¹²² Ports at Las and Helos are mentioned in Homeric epic (*Iliad* 2.581-90) but this is no indication of their use in the archaic age.

¹²³ Strabo 8.5.4, C364.

¹²⁴ Strabo 8.5.2, C363. Diod.11.84 identifies Gytheum as one of the places attacked by Tolmides of Athens in his *periplous* of the Peloponnese, c.456.

¹²⁵ N.C.Scoufopolos and J.G.McKernan. "Underwater survey of ancient Gytheion, 1972," *JNA* 4 (1975) 103-16.

¹²⁶ Homer, *Odyssey* 6.263; Hdt. 7.59, 188, 9.96, 98 Casson 361, Morrison and Williams 65.

The east coast is divided from Laconia by the Parnon range which made rapid access to it difficult. Its southern coastline is rocky and the ports further north have revealed little archaeological evidence of Spartan influence.

Ships

The numbers of ships at Sparta at any time during the archaic period is not known. The only number identified is from the time of the Persian War, 480/79. Sparta provided ten ships at Artemisium and sixteen for the battle at Salamis.¹²⁷

It is also difficult to identify the types of ship used in a particular action. Herodotus often uses the term *stoloi* to indicate sea-borne expeditions and *ploia* for the ships involved.¹²⁸ Specific types of vessel are, however, occasionally associated with Sparta. The Spartan colonists reached Thera in triaconters. Herodotus probably considered the triaconter to have been in use for some time as the colony was established early in the Archaic period. The triaconter was a thirty-oared vessel, often described as a galley, but it could also be used for other purposes, as here.

For the voyage to Lydia the Spartans are said to have used a penteconter, the larger, fifty-oared version of the triaconter [Hdt.1.163.1].¹²⁹ Again, this is thought to have been a galley that could be single or double-banked and was commonly used as troop transport. Presumably the ships being prepared at Sparta for the Lydian campaign were also penteconters. It seems doubtful that ships were built for a single purpose at this period, a purpose for which they might not always be needed and would therefore spend long periods out of service. Herodotus clearly states that the Phocaeans used penteconters, not specialised merchant vessels, for their trade.¹³⁰ These were the ships they later used to transport themselves and their belongings to the west. They may even have been used in their battle with the Etruscans at Alalia [Hdt.1.166]. A later source attributes to Samos the invention of a larger penteconter designed

¹²⁷ Hdt.8.1.(Artemision), 42 (Salamis).

¹²⁸ Herodotus uses *stolos* for the forces prepared for Samos, 3.54.1 and Athens under Anchemolios, 5.64.1. *Stolos* may thus mean an expedition by sea, Liddell, Scott, Jones, *s.v.h.* *Ploia* is used for the ships against Argos, 6.76 but at 6.92 they are called *neon*. It seems useless to consider Herodotus' vocabulary an accurate indication of the types of ship used.

¹²⁹ The penteconter was known from the Homeric period, Morrison and Williams, 47, Casson 44f.

¹³⁰ Morrison and Williams 68. Many of Polycrates' penteconters may have been employed in trade.

to take bigger cargoes.¹³¹ Although oared ships are depicted in the main on vase-paintings and on plaques of the period, they are not all found in representations of battle.¹³² The penteconter, then, was a vessel with a variety of applications and adaptations. Penteconters at Sparta would have been used in the same way. Although Herodotus mentions only Spartan military expeditions abroad, as he is trying to account for Spartan military prestige before the Persian War, Sparta could also have used the same ships for diplomatic and some commercial voyages.

Further specialisation in ship types took place later in the period when the trireme was developed. The question of the date and place of its introduction is still disputed but it was clearly a purposely-built warship and not a merchant vessel.¹³³

It is possible that Sparta knew about the trireme by c.525 when dissident Samian aristocrats are said to have sailed from Samos to Egypt and thence to Sparta in forty triremes [Hdt.3.44,39]. Previously, Herodotus had stated that the Samian fleet consisted of penteconters. Thucydides adds that fleets of the archaic period consisted mostly of penteconters with few triremes.¹³⁴ Perhaps Herodotus was mistaken as it seems unlikely that Polycrates would have entrusted so many expensive ships to aristocrats whom he was supposed to have suspected, or Polycrates may have diversified his fleet to meet a possible threat from a Persian-led Phoenician fleet. By the time of Dorieus, however, Sparta knew of the trireme. Philippus of Croton is said to have brought his own trireme, equipped at his own expense, to join the expedition to the west [Hdt.5.48]. This story reveals how unusual it was for an individual to own such a ship unless he was wealthy. The trireme was expensive to build and maintain. It was light, fairly fragile, unable to remain at sea for long periods, and then only in good weather.

Other small boats are not attested for the period, but may be assumed to have been used off the Laconian or Messenian coasts. They would be necessary for the dye trade for which Laconia was famous and which the Spartans used for dyeing their military cloaks [Paus.3.21.6]. Small boats used by helots of the southern coast of the Peloponnese are attested by Thucydides in the later fifth century [4.26].

¹³¹ Plutarch *Per.* 26, 3-4.

¹³² A.Snodgrass, "Heavy freight" *Trade* 17, Morrison and Williams pls. 13-18, Casson pl. 91.

¹³³ Casson 65.

¹³⁴ Thuc.1.13, perhaps correcting Herodotus.

The timber needed for ship building was available from Spartan territory. It has been suggested that Sparta was so rich in timber that it may have been used as one of its main exports in return for the luxuries imported in this period.¹³⁵ Wood was also needed in smelting and metalworking. The timber needed for ship-building was oak, pine, poplar and fir. These were readily available from the slopes of Taygetus. There were also extensive oak forests near Asine.¹³⁶

Ownership

The question of the ownership of vessels in the archaic period has been frequently debated. It is no less problematical in the case of Sparta. It has been said that as all harbours were in perioecic territory ships must have been owned by perioeci and, presumably, commandeered by Sparta as necessary.¹³⁷ This is quite possible, especially since Herodotus states that the Spartans themselves avoided manual work, so that ship building and maintenance must have become the province of perioeci. As these ships were expensive to own and to operate, the perioecic owners must have been wealthy. In the case of triremes perioecic ownership is more questionable, if it is assumed that the perioeci owned such war vessels and kept them seaworthy for any Spartan demand. This would have been an expensive and wasteful operation as the trireme is so specialised a vessel with such a restricted period of use. If, however, the adaptable penteconter were used it makes the idea of perioecic ownership more likely. The ships might then be used for trade as well as for military actions. The financial risk would have been even greater for trading vessels when experienced crew, vessel and cargo could be lost. The sailing season was short and the Aegean subject to local variations in wind strength. Greek aristocrats in general show an aversion to trade.¹³⁸ If Laconian perioeci were wealthy enough to own ships, use them for commerce and put them at the service of Spartans in this

¹³⁵ Holladay, *CQ* 27 (1977) 111-26.

¹³⁶ Paus. 3.10.6; 19.3; 20.4; Jeffery, *AG*, 121ff., R. Meiggs, *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Oxford, 1982) 116ff.

¹³⁷ Cartledge 149.

¹³⁸ Homer, *Odyssey* 8.158-64; Hdt. 2.167.2; Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1367a28-33; Plutarch *Agessilaos* 26.5. Cartledge, *Sparta and Laconia* 183, suggests that the hostility shown by the aristocratic class towards manual labour was sharpened by the rise of democracy. W. Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece* (Kansas, 1980) 35ff. says that this change was generally expressed in Greek society by the middle of the sixth century, but that some aristocrats had become wealthy through trade. The whole question of aristocratic involvement in trade is a still a much debated one. For a summary of current views, see *Trade*.

period, one might have expected some demand for a share in power from a group whose wealth was growing and who made such a contribution to the Spartan state. Yet there is no record of any perioecic unrest until the fifth century and little even then.¹³⁹ Perhaps the level of co-operation and identity of interest between Spartans and perioeci was in some cases closer and longer-lasting than is often supposed.

The extent and possible organisation of trade in the ancient economy is also a controversial topic. Most scholars now agree that its extent has been exaggerated and the existence of a commercial class is doubted for the period.¹⁴⁰ Instead there is renewed interest in the aristocracy of Greek states as the only class with sufficient capital to risk at sea.¹⁴¹ Aristocratic wealth would still have been based in land and agriculture, but some may also have owned ships and speculated in trade as well. This activity, however, was not usually considered to bring any glory from the Homeric period onward so that interested aristocrats may have operated through a third party, the agent. In Sparta the agent may well have been perioecic. There is, however, no conclusive evidence for any such maritime loans in this period.¹⁴²

The scale of commerce was small and mostly in luxury objects of interest to the wealthy. Some trading in person in surplus goods by aristocratic Greeks is recorded in the archaic period. Solon of Athens and Charaxos of Lesbos are said to have sailed with their own produce for sale. Solon is also said to have used the opportunity to finance his travels. The Athenian aristocrat Miltiades, whose family had close relations with Sparta, had ships to sail to the Chersonnese. Miltiades is also linked to profitable raiding for the state in his expedition to Paros, after which he was exiled by an angry Athenian public defrauded of its expected gain.¹⁴³

¹³⁹ Thuc. 1.101 says that some perioeci from Thuria in south-east Messenia and Aethaea joined the helot revolt of c.465 at Ithome, although in his account the revolt is a mainly helot one. Isocrates *Panath.* 177 refers to factions among the Spartans at an early period and the reduction of some perioeci. Xenophon, *Hell.* 3.3.5 describes the conspiracy of Cinadon in the fourth century which may have involved some of the perioeci.

¹⁴⁰ P. Cartledge, "Trade and Politics revisited," *Trade* 1-16.

¹⁴¹ A. Snodgrass, "Heavy freight," *Trade* 17, Salmon 150, B. Bravo, "Remarques sur les assises sociales, les formes d'organisation et la terminologie du commerce maritime grec à l'époque archaïque", *DHA* 3 (1974) 1-59, Humphreys 166-8.

¹⁴² P. Calligas, "An Inscribed Lead Plaque from Korkyra," *BSA* 66 (1971) 79-94 suggests that there is some evidence for an archaic maritime loan on the island. This is not convincing, but Corcyra with its maritime history would seem a likely place for such evidence to be found.

¹⁴³ Hdt. 2.135, 6.41, 133, Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 11.1, Strabo 808; Salmon 150.

At Sparta, it was wealthy aristocrats who could afford to commission and bring in foreign artists. It was they who stimulated artistic activity and foreign contact, such as the possible *xenia* with Samos and the gift exchange with Lydia. They, too, were the ones closely involved in any military and colonising actions overseas. Theirs were the interests involved in the organisation of the expeditions to Lydia, Samos, North Africa and Sicily. Their motive was profit and adventure.¹⁴⁴ It seems at least possible that a few of them could have speculated in trade. It was the ambitions of these aristocrats that Cleomenes may have had in mind when he tried to prevent Spartan military adventures overseas. The picture of a number of Spartans ready to undertake such adventures does not agree with the traditional interpretation that Sparta by this time had transformed itself into a closed and austere society.¹⁴⁵

It was probably aristocrats at Sparta who owned the larger ships necessary for diplomatic and military activity. It may be significant in this respect that one of the archaic Spartan regiments is said to have been called Ploas.¹⁴⁶ The fact that no innovations in naval methods or architecture can be associated with Sparta shows that maritime activity was not vital in any economic sense, as Laconia was self-supporting. Ships were important in order to acquire extra wealth and the prestige of foreign contacts. One such aristocratic family may have been that of Archias the younger, Herodotus' host at Sparta, who must have given Herodotus the Spartan version of the Samian expedition. The grandfather of Archias the younger, another Archias, was killed on this expedition and buried by Samians, presumably by a group sympathetic to the Spartans. His son, Samius, was surely named for some Samian connection. It has been suggested that the family held the Samian proxeny at Sparta. The son of Archias the younger, another Samius, was Spartan navarch in Asia Minor in 402/1.¹⁴⁷ The family clearly had some maritime tradition.

¹⁴⁴ Herodotus mentions the story of the Spartan, Glaucus, who held money in trust for some Milesians - 6.85.

¹⁴⁵ *contra* Cartledge 156, who follows the idea of a 'sixth-century revolution' at Sparta, proposed by M. Finley, *The Use and Abuse of History* (London, 1975) c.10.

¹⁴⁶ Burn, *Lyric* 275.

¹⁴⁷ P. Poralla ed. A. S. Bradford, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians* (Chicago, 1985) n.150 p31. Thucydides 8.61, mentions a Spartan, Leon, who owned his own ship.

Ship crews would probably also have been perioeci and have come from the coastal settlements, where they were likely to have had maritime knowledge and experience. There is no record of helot rowers until the fourth century, when Spartiate manpower declined.¹⁴⁸

Conclusion

Spartan maritime activity in the archaic period is usually assessed by its failure or success in promoting the imperial interests of Sparta in the Aegean. Thus Beloch called Spartan naval policy in the Aegean *kurzsichtige* because Sparta did not take the Persian threat more seriously, despite the fact that it was supposed to have control of the two best fleets of the time.¹⁴⁹ The Italian scholar Pareti concluded that there was a small Spartan fleet in the period, but that for geographical, economic and social reasons it was of little significance until the formation of the Peloponnesian League. Sparta was then able to requisition ships as needed from league members, Corinth in particular, for imperial ends.¹⁵⁰ This has remained a popular and tenable theory. Sparta is seen to have been unable to recognise its moment of opportunity as a sea-power with the result that its contribution to the Greek fleet at the time of the Persian War in 480-79 has been referred to as 'paltry'.¹⁵¹ There have been few dissenting voices and even these, while admitting the existence of Spartan maritime interests, have tended to interpret them as imperial.¹⁵² The result has been that it is generally agreed that Sparta 'failed to become the dominant naval power before Athens'.¹⁵³ Such an interpretation together with the concept of Sparta as a conservative power, interested only in Peloponnesian affairs, has produced the paradox expressed but not recognised by one scholar, who stated that "Sparta herself had no

¹⁴⁸ K-W. Welwei, *Unfreie im antiken und mittleren griechischen Staaten und die hellenistischen Reiche* (Wiesbaden, 1974) 158ff for helot rowers in 369 B.C.

¹⁴⁹ Beloch 2.9 n1, How and Wells 351, and Will 661.

¹⁵⁰ L. Pareti, "Ricerche sulla potenza marittima degli Spartani e sulla cronologia dei nauarchi", *mat* 59, *Storia di Sparta arcaica*, (Florence, 1917) 71-159.

¹⁵¹ P. Cartledge, "Trade and Politics revisited", *Trade* 1-16.

¹⁵² Huxley 61-77.

¹⁵³ Cartledge 143.

particular reason to take an interest in affairs outside the Peloponnese (except of course when she was aspiring to an extra-Peloponnesian hegemony)."¹⁵⁴

There is no conclusive evidence for a consistent naval policy at Sparta in the archaic period. Even Athens, the greatest naval power of Greece in the fifth century, seems to have had few maritime resources, ambitions and skills at this time.¹⁵⁵ Thucydides states that Aegina, Athens and other mainland Greek states had few vessels [1.12]. In fact, the view that maritime capability must have been used for long-term imperial ends seems anachronistic for Greece in this period. It is, perhaps, influenced by the enormous and quite extraordinary imperial naval power exercised by Athens in the fifth century as a result of the naval programme of Themistocles. The Archaic period is characterised rather by the interests of states in agriculture, warfare (particularly booty), colonisation and religious cult.¹⁵⁶ Its concerns were largely local, and there appears to have been no concept of sea-power as such until the time of Thucydides [1.3-20]. To view the maritime activities of archaic states in such fifth-century terms may well be misleading.

From the beginning of its expansion south into Laconia and west to Messenia in the eighth century Sparta showed some appreciation of the need for coastal security in the planting of settlements. Although not an extensive coloniser, Sparta also participated in the expanding world of the seventh century and Laconian art demonstrates the result of its influence. Contacts abroad, especially with Lydia, Samos, North Africa and Italy, were maintained in the sixth century and Sparta's power and prestige grew in the Peloponnese. All this involved the use of ships. These were relatively few in number and owned by the Spartans or perioeci whose interests they served. Small fleets were typical of the period - Athens could only provide twenty ships during the Ionian revolt. Fleets that are referred to as large numbered about seventy vessels. Polycrates' fleet of one hundred was quite exceptional. There is no evidence that the Spartan state consistently or deliberately enlarged its fleet and naval facilities, or that it was thought of as an instrument to maintain or increase Spartan power. Even Cleomenes, who showed some appreciation of the tactical use of sea-borne raids, still only used ships as troop

¹⁵⁴ de Ste. Croix 100.

¹⁵⁵ Haas 29-46.

¹⁵⁶ A.M.Snodgrass, quoted by Cartledge, *Trade* 12.

transports but, by employing Spartan and allied ships under a centralised Spartan command created the closest example of the archaic period to the fifth century Peloponnesian navy.

With a small number of ships and with no evidence that, down to the end of the sixth century, Sparta was able to commandeer large numbers of allied ships, especially those of its largest maritime ally, Corinth, Sparta cannot be thought to have had imperial intentions in the Aegean, such as Athens was to show in the fifth century. Nor can it have seriously attempted to challenge Persia overseas, although some at Sparta may have been aware from mid-century of the growth of Persian power in Asia Minor. There is no indication in the sources that any Greek state realised the potential of sea-power as such before the end of the sixth century.¹⁵⁷ Even Polycrates appears to have used his fleet for local pirate-style raids, and Athens in 490 made no attempt to meet the Persians at sea. It is, therefore, wrong to say that Spartan policy was short-sighted or that Sparta, in particular, failed to grasp an opportunity to become a sea-power. No such opportunity would have been recognised at the time. The modern understanding of the use and function of a navy or a fleet may also have contributed to this view. Present-day navies are usually considered as ships owned and operated by the state and used for state purposes, often imperial.¹⁵⁸ In the medieval period, however, state navies often consisted of privately owned ships chartered by the state.¹⁵⁹ Similarly, vessels of the archaic period appear not to have been state funded. They were owned probably by aristocrats, as they were expensive to build, maintain and risk. Sea-power in archaic terms was the ownership of some ships which could be used for trade contacts and raids abroad. The line between them was often blurred - Spartan action in Samos was prompted as much by the prospect of plunder as by the appeal of *xenia* from the Samians. The same prospect was held out by Maeandrius and Aristagoras. In commerce, too, there was little difference seen between pirate and trader. The Corinthians, well-known traders of the time, who offered passage to Arion, were ready to throw him overboard for his money when out at sea [Hdt.1.24].

The concept of sea-power seems to have been first expressed in Greek literary sources by Thucydides in the fifth century. Recognition of its possibilities may well have been forced on the Greeks, particularly the Athenians, by the enormous naval force that the Persians were

¹⁵⁷ O.Picard, *Les Grecs devant la menace perse* (Paris, 1980) 107.

¹⁵⁸ Haas 29-46.

¹⁵⁹ Casson 301 n.5.

able to command by the end of the period.

CHAPTER 2

FROM NAVAL HEGEMONY TO NAVAL IMPOTENCE

A. The Persian War

More is known of Sparta's foreign than of its domestic policy before the Persian Wars. This is because of the interest of Herodotus both in Sparta's position as a leading state in Greece and in the character of the Spartan king, Cleomenes, who pursued a policy of Spartan dominance of mainland Greece [Hdt.1.57; 6.58-64]. Herodotus, however, claims that the Persian War was won largely through the efforts of Athens [Hdt.8.3]. In this chapter it will be argued that the Persian War of 480/79 was for Sparta both the culmination of its position as hegemon in Greece and a maritime challenge to which Sparta rose capably.

Before the Persian invasion and especially under Cleomenes, Sparta had requisitioned naval contributions from its allies as and when necessary [Hdt.6.94]. This policy was to be the basis of Sparta's maritime actions during the Persian Wars. With hindsight it is clear that the hope that the *status quo ante bellum* would be maintained after 479 was short-sighted but understandable. No one in 480/79, Sparta included, could have predicted the wartime success and post-war ambition of Athens.

In the final years of his reign Cleomenes continued to strengthen his own and Sparta's position and power.¹ He had rejected any involvement in Asia Minor's problems with Persia, but the Spartans had not withdrawn completely into isolation within the Peloponnese. Some

¹ The following abbreviations are used throughout this chapter; Cartledge: P.Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia, A Regional History* (London, 1979). Podlecki: A.J.Podlecki, *The Life of Themistocles* (Montreal, 1975). Hignett: C.Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford, 1963). Burn: A.R.Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (Stanford, 1984). Green: P.Green, *The Year of Salamis* (London, 1970). Grundy, G.B.Grundy, *The Great Persian War* (London, 1901). Lewis: D.Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977). Morrison and Coates, J.S.Morrison and J.F.Coates, *The Athenian Trireme* (Cambridge, 1986). Salmon, J.B.Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford, 1984). Gomme: A.W.Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* v.1 (Oxford, 1959). Macan: R.W.Macan, *Herodotus* v.2 (New York, 1973). Forrest: W. Forrest, *A History of Sparta* (London, 1980). Deane: P.Deane, *Thucydides' Dates* (Don Mills, 1972). ATL: B.Meritt, H.T.Wade-Gery, M.F.McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* v.3 (Princeton, 1950). Hammond, *Studies*: N.G.L.Hammond, *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford, 1973). de Ste.Croix, G.M.de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972). CAH: *Cambridge Ancient History* v.4 (Cambridge, 1988). Michell, H.Michell, *Sparta* (Cambridge, 1964). Meiggs: R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972). Kagan: D.Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1969). Holladay: J.Holladay, "Sparta's role in the First Peloponnesian War" *JHS* 97 (1977) 54-63. Pritchett: W.K.Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practices* (Berkeley, 1975). Brunt: P. Brunt, "The Hellenic League Against Persia" *Historia* 2 (1953-54) 135-163.

showed interest in the west, through the exploits of Dorieus, and in the emporia of the North African coast - perhaps in response to the rise of Persia in the east [Hdt.5.42-3; 7.158].²

Sparta possessed a small number of penteconters that were in regular use for Cleomenes' campaigns or for contacts abroad, but it had had no incentive to build a large fleet - an action that would have involved a large financial outlay. Sparta could not have undertaken such a step without changing its political system and way of life. There is no evidence that Sparta had the will to make such a change; nor was there the need. Sparta was the centre of a network of alliances around the Peloponnese and was economically self-sufficient.³

Sparta and Persia 492-90

By 490 Persia had control of the major Mediterranean fleets of Phoenicia and Egypt, and it could afford the triremes necessary for a war fleet.⁴ Persia had also already attempted to expand its influence across the Aegean to Naxos [Hdt.5.28]. Persian power over the northern coast had been strengthened and the combined expedition under Mardonius in 492 that followed the Ionian Revolt had given warning of its intent to expand further to the west. After the withdrawal of Mardonius' forces, Darius ordered more ships to be built on the coast of Asia Minor. The policy of imperial expansion was clearly to continue [Hdt.6.46].

In addition, the Persians were active in the western Mediterranean. Darius sent a reconnaissance expedition there, although Italy seems to have been the western limit of Persian power, as some Persian representatives were not well treated on their arrival [Hdt.3.132-6]. Sparta, from its contacts abroad and from the appeals it received from the east, was well aware of the rise of Persian power and Persia's continued expansion in the 490s.

² Athens may have reacted similarly when its interests were also threatened. Themistocles appears to have had some western connections, Podlecki 21.

³ The Actolian Erxadeis treaty (*SEG* 35 (1985) 326) has been dated to the first quarter of the fifth century by F. Gschnitzer, *Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag* (Meisenheim/Glan, 1978). A offensive/defensive land and sea alliance in Actolia seems too early here for Sparta. Its use of allied ships before the war was spasmodic and its own vessels often sufficed. It has also been thought that Sparta could have given some naval help to the Ionians in 499 by encouraging its naval allies to send a force, Hignett 86. There is no evidence for any basis on which Sparta could have done this.

⁴ It has been suggested that Persia had a naval policy for control of the Aegean through fleets provided by Persia and manned by subject allies but controlled by the Persian marines on board. Such fleets might not always be loyal and might use their triremes against Persia itself, H.T. Wallinga "The Ionian Revolt", *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984) Fasc. 3-4 401-37.

Heralds were dispatched to Greece by Darius in 491 to demand submission, and most states acceded to the Persian request [Hdt.6.48.9]. Before this time there is no sign of concerted aggressive counter-measures by the Greeks or of the recognition of a possible naval threat. Individual states, such as Sparta or Athens, did not have the means to do anything about it.⁵

Sparta is said to have the heralds sent to it by Persia murdered.⁶ Such an act, if true, was sacrilegious as well as provocative, and appears to have weighed on the Spartan conscience to the point that they sent two volunteers to Persia, perhaps to expiate the crime [Hdt.7.130].⁷ It seems strange that Sparta had the Persian heralds killed. It had no quarrel with Persia at the time. There are, however, signs that opinion over the response to the Persian demand for submission was divided in some states, for example, at Athens.⁸ Spartan opinion may have been similarly divided.

One of the states that medized in 491 was Aegina. Its position was difficult since it traded with the east and probably needed to reach some accommodation with Persia. Athens then appealed for Spartan help against Aegina, since it could see the threat that a Persian-supported Aegina would be to its interests [Hdt.6.47].

Cleomenes' response was quick and effective, but it involved him in collusion with Delphi over the deposition of his fellow king, Demaratus, who opposed Cleomenes' involvement in Aegina [Hdt.6.52]. His actions against Demaratus led to Cleomenes' own downfall. The stakes must have been high to have caused him to risk so much. Cleomenes may have seen the threat of Persian interference as too close for comfort for his and Sparta's hegemony in Greece,⁹ although he had shown little interest in resistance before. Demaratus, who later defected to Persia, was, perhaps, already in contact with the Persians or, at least, sympathetic to medism.

⁵ Athens had even had to buy ships from Corinth for its campaigns against Aegina (Hdt. 6.89). Themistocles' much debated archonship of 492 may have been the first signs of Athenian awareness of the need for naval power but Athenian moves would probably have been directed against Aegina rather than against Persia this early, Podlecki 196.

⁶ The murder of Persian heralds by Sparta has been debated. It has been doubted by Macan 188f., but accepted by other scholars - e.g. Burn 223 and Green 39.

⁷ The sanctity of heralds is discussed by D.J. Mosely, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (Wiesbaden, 1973) 81-92.

⁸ See M. Ostwald, *CAH* 255f.

⁹ Burn 267-71.

He may even have aimed for accommodation with Persia to dispose of Cleomenes and rule with Persian support.¹⁰ He did not leave Sparta immediately after his deposition but held an elected office there [Hdt.6.68]. This suggests that he was not without support.¹¹ Yet a third group at Sparta may have preferred isolationism to avoid involvement altogether.¹²

The murder of the heralds may have been Cleomenes' response to the isolationists and to Persian sympathizers at Sparta, as well as an answer to Persia itself.¹³ Cleomenes had previously shown that he had scant regard for religious considerations when they interfered with his plans.¹⁴

By the end of the decade pro-Persian sympathy in Greece was understandable. With Macedon already in the Persian camp any northern defence was very weak [Hdt.6.43].¹⁵ There is no indication that the Greeks were considering resistance at sea c.490, or that they were aware that land resistance might not be effective if the coasts were open.

Sparta and the Greek preparations for war

Darius attacked Eretria and Athens with the use of a sea-borne expedition in 490 [Hdt.6.100]. No Greek power was strong enough to stop or even to challenge this, and so the response was defensive. Nor was there any general unity of defence among the Greeks, except that Athens ordered its cleruchs in Euboea to help Eretria, and Sparta was presumably kept informed, as its help was expected [Hdt.6.100, 123].¹⁶ It may have been the expectation of these reinforcements from Sparta that forced the Persians to move against Athens at Marathon

¹⁰ Burn 393. When Cleomenes was in Aegina, Demaratus was apparently working against him through Polycritus of Aegina [Hdt.6.52]. There may have been a direct connection between pro-Persians on Aegina and Demaratus.

¹¹ His subsequent move to Elis has also been linked to the democratic movement there [Hdt.6.69], Cartledge 199f. He might still have been involved with this movement to weaken Sparta's position in the Peloponnese and thus against Persia.

¹² Hdt. 8.142.2 may indicate the existence of a belief at Sparta that Athens, because of its involvement in the Ionian Revolt, was responsible for bringing on the war with Persia.

¹³ It has also been suggested that Sparta murdered the heralds to impress others, such as Argos, Hignett 97.

¹⁴ Hdt. 6.79 where Cleomenes had the sacred grove of Argos burned; 6.63ff where he conspired with Delphi over the deposition of Demaratus.

¹⁵ For the suggestion that Cleomenes was in Thessaly trying to shore up Greek resistance, see Burn 268.

¹⁶ The only state to help Athens at Marathon was Plataea - Hdt. 6.107.

earlier than they may have wished.¹⁷ but in the event Spartan help did not come.¹⁸ Nonetheless, the assumption that Sparta was to help suggests that co-operation between some Greek states against the invader was envisaged.

The Athenian victory at Marathon altered the Athenians' view of themselves¹⁹ and probably reinforced the predominance of land warfare in Greek thought. The Greeks, including both Sparta and Athens, saw that they could beat the Persians on land, as the Ionians had not been able to do, and they may even have thought for a time that Persia had been repelled permanently.

By 489 Cleomenes was dead and his fellow-king and associate in the Aeginetan affair, Leotychidas, was in disgrace.²⁰ Next to nothing is known of what happened at Sparta immediately after Marathon.²¹ During the same period Athens increased its naval capabilities considerably as a result of a financial windfall [Hdt.7.142]. The Athenians built a large number of triremes, probably for their continuing war with Aegina [Hdt.5.82f.], although, as time went on, the news of Persian preparations may have altered Athenian aims.

Persia in the meantime was occupied with the succession of Xerxes and the revolt in Egypt, c.486. Many Greeks may have been lulled into feelings of even greater security since Persia had made no new hostile move.

By 483, when it began the canal at Athos and ships were being prepared in Asia Minor, it was clear that Persia had resumed its western aims and that Marathon had been only a check to its momentum [Hdt.7.23]. That the next Persian thrust was to be over land was indicated by

¹⁷ Burn 253.

¹⁸ The chronology of events in these years is very uncertain. Little is known of internal events at Sparta at the time. The Spartans claimed that they were unable to come to Marathon because of a religious festival (Hdt. 6.106.3; this excuse is doubted by Forrest 91. They moved quickly enough once it was over, Green 34f., Burn 246, 253, Cartledge 153. Other reasons such as a helot revolt and problems in Arcadia have also been suggested to explain Sparta's lack of response, Cartledge 153f.

¹⁹ Grundy 145-194, Burn 255, Green 39.

²⁰ Following Burn's chronology, 267. For Leotychidas' disgrace, Lewis 45.

²¹ For a list of possible explanations, see Cartledge 153f., Burn 258.

the time taken for the Persian preparations - a naval campaign alone could have been despatched far more quickly.²²

Herodotus says that Sparta was the first to know of Xerxes' plans because of a message from Demaratus at Susa [Hdt.7.238]. Clearly there was still contact between him and Sparta despite his voluntary exile. This contact presumably occurred by 481, when Xerxes left Susa, but the Greeks would have been aware of the Persian preparations along the Asia Minor and northern coasts long before. The immediate response at Sparta to this message is not known, but there would have been at least some discussion among Greek states threatened by the Persian advance before any formal allied meeting took place on the plans for combined resistance. Spartan involvement would have been important if it was receiving information from Demaratus. The role of a naval force in such resistance must also have been discussed, since the Greeks realised well in advance that they had insufficient ships [Hdt.7.139; 8.2].

The numbers of helot and perioecic fighters at the later battles of Thermopylae and Plataea have been thought to indicate that Sparta had been training its land forces earlier in preparation for this war.²³ If this is so, Sparta may well also have been training the crews of some recently acquired triremes.²⁴

Some at Sparta may have been aware by this time of the need for such ships. For the first naval campaign of the war Sparta was able to supply ten. Previously all it was known to have used were penteconters.²⁵ The building of triremes by Sparta, the total number of which is unknown, may indicate that some Spartans recognised the need for such ships in the face of the threat from the east, and did what they could to equip themselves with and man the latest specialised fighting vessels. This preparation would be even more likely if Sparta was expected

²² N.G.L.Hammond, *CAH* 518. That Persian naval tactics were influenced by land fighting is shown by their use of boarding rather than ramming techniques. The Chians had proved at Lade how effective Greek ramming tactics could be against heavier Persian vessels with a large number of marines on board [Hdt.6. 11-15] - Morrison and Coates 43-4.

²³ N.G.L. Hammond, *CAH* 518f.

²⁴ Herodotus appears to contrast the term *naus* with penteconters in his list of ship contributions at 8.1. If *naus* here refers to triremes, the the Spartans were able to provide ten triremes at Artemisium. Unfortunately, Herodotus' vocabulary about ships cannot be pressed too closely, although it is possible that a few Spartans had equipped themselves with the latest fighting craft, despite the expense of their operation and their restricted usage. It is also possible that the Spartan state may have ordered such ships built, although there is no evidence for this.

²⁵ Penteconters before the Persian War, Thucydides 1.14. For Spartan triremes at Artemisium, Hdt. 8.1.

to take a leading role in any combined Greek resistance. Spartans may also have wanted to acquire such ships for their prestige value. That Sparta was unable to contribute more was due to the expense of building and manning triremes, and to the priority given by the majority at Sparta, as elsewhere, to land warfare.

Sparta's naval command

Greek preparations against Persia are all placed by Herodotus at the First Congress, held probably in the autumn of 481 [Hdt.7.143ff].²⁶ When the Spartans were informed of Xerxes' move, they told the other Greeks. This incident, if true, has to have taken place some time before the First Congress, and it may indicate the start of the general Greek preparations that led to that Congress. If Pausanias is correct in his explanation of the Helleneum at Sparta as the place where the allied Greeks met, then Herodotus' story may also suggest that Sparta took the initiative in calling the Congress [3.12.6].²⁷ It would not be surprising for it to have done so as the leading power in Greece.

It has been suggested that the question of the supreme command on land and sea was discussed and settled at this First Congress.²⁸ Herodotus gives no hint of this. He says that the Greeks exchanged views and pledges, settled their quarrels, sent embassies to other possible allies and spy missions to Asia Minor.²⁹ He may have telescoped events and attributed to this Congress some actions that must have taken longer to discuss and prepare, such as the Congress agenda and the co-ordination and collection of intelligence. Herodotus adds in his description of the Artemisium campaign that there had been talk, even before the embassy to Sicily in the autumn of 481, of giving the Athenians the naval command, but that the other allies had preferred a Spartan commander. They are supposed to have said that they would break up the expedition to Artemisium rather than serve under an Athenian. The Athenians then gave up their claim for the good of Greece - an explanation heartily endorsed by Herodotus [8.2].

²⁶ Following the timing suggested by Burn 307 and Brunt 135-63.

²⁷ As suggested by Salmon 253.

²⁸ Brunt 145-50.

²⁹ Diodorus [10.33, 11.1] says that the Congress was held at Corinth, but Diodorus refers to only one Congress in the war. Most, if not all, of the Greek states would have been due to observe a truce in 480 because of the Olympic Games.

Only the Athenians appear to have lodged any objections to a Spartan naval command. Had the majority of Greek allies not supported the decision, some dispute would surely have been reflected in the sources. The objection of an important maritime ally such as Corinth would have been decisive - as Corinth's refusal to join the Spartan expedition under Cleomenes against Attica had been [Hdt.5.75, 92].³⁰ With only ten Spartan ships ready at Artemisium a change of naval hegemon there would not have been impossible.

It seems unlikely, however, that the question of the naval command would be discussed separately from that of the land campaign at this time - resistance at sea was regarded as of secondary importance. Herodotus' statements about the First Congress appear to stress unity of the Greeks rather than division over hegemonical claims. He describes the allies of the time as 'Greeks who united for the benefit of Greece' and 'Greeks who had taken an oath to resist Persia' [Hdt.7.148].³¹ Spartan leadership is not emphasised, perhaps because of pro-Athenian bias in Herodotus' sources, but clearly such leadership was not heavy-handed. Sparta may have genuinely aimed at a collective decision-making process, while it and the other allies recognised the necessity for a supreme command.

Perhaps Herodotus is quoting from Athenian sources on what was being said at Athens then or later about the question of command. Current rivalries between states were certainly a topic of discussion at the First Congress, and it would be likely for such feelings to have influenced the choice of a Greek hegemon [Hdt.7.143]. The Athenians are said to have claimed the naval leadership alone on the basis of their greater contribution in ships [Hdt.8.2]. They could not have based their claim on superior seamanship at this time, since their record was not outstanding.³² Athens apparently laid no claim to leadership of the land forces. If this was so, then the Athenians do not seem to have appreciated the necessity of a single supreme commander of operations on land and sea - a type of command that the majority of the Greeks favoured.³³

³⁰ This incident is regarded as decisive in the development of the Peloponnesian alliance - Cartledge 147.

³¹ This alliance from the First Congress lasted until the 460s, when it was broken by Athens. Thuc.1.102. Brunt 150f.

³² As pointed out by J. Haas, "Athenian Naval Power before Themistocles", *Historia* 34 1985 29-46.

³³ Argos is said to have put forward a claim to the leadership of the Greek forces on land, a claim it modified to joint leadership with Sparta [Hdt.7.148/9]. Sparta, however, refused, perhaps because of its long-standing rivalry with Argos in the Peloponnese as well as its realisation of the need for a single overall command.

It is also possible that, if Sparta had taken the initiative in summoning the Congress, the question of the supreme command may not have arisen as the subject of a formal decision at that Congress. It may well have been agreed or assumed beforehand. Sparta was clearly the leading power in Greece and the centre of an alliance that included some experienced maritime states, such as Corinth and Sicyon. It was thus in the best position to co-ordinate the Greek collective response in both areas. There is no indication that Sparta exploited its position in order to win the command, but it is a logical assumption that a state of Sparta's prestige and power would lead the resistance.

Plutarch's version of events has the Athenians complaining about Spartan naval command just before the naval battle at Artemisium [Plut. *Them.* 9]. Herodotus, too, may hint at Athenian dissatisfaction at Artemisium in his placement of the question of naval command as a digression to his description of Artemisium, and in his strong support at the same point for the high-mindedness of Athens' submission to the general allied feelings [Hdt.8.2]. If the command had been assigned to Sparta by the time of Artemisium by an official decision of the Congress, the Athenian action looks like a last-minute mutiny. If, however, the decision was not a formal one, then the dispute may reflect the opinions of Athenians at Artemisium, when they realised that the Greek embassies abroad had achieved little, since even the Corcyrean ships they had expected were not coming [Hdt.7.168].³⁴ This left Athens as the single biggest contributor to the allied fleet by a wide margin. Critical Athenian comments on such a situation would not be surprising.

It is also possible that the whole question of the naval command was blown out of proportion by Athenians who were used to later Athenian maritime supremacy and could not believe in a time when other Greeks might have had little confidence in an untried Athenian fleet.³⁵ The Aeginetans had shown how ineffective the Athenian fleet had been to 483,³⁶ and there is no evidence that Athenian skill had improved. Sparta, then, assumed command by virtue of its position in Greece as a land power, when the main action was expected to be on land. A more informal assumption of command by Sparta would also explain the ease with which naval

³⁴ Diodorus [11.15.1] puts this division of opinion before Salamis.

³⁵ J.A.S. Evans, "Notes on Thermopylae and Artemisium", *Historia* 18 (1969) 389-406.

³⁶ Hdt.6. 86-94. J.Haas, *Historia* 34 (1985) 29-46.

command was transferred to Athens, c.478-6.³⁷ There were no formal agreements concerning it to be disputed or broken.

The Spartan naval contribution at Tempe, Artemisium and Salamis

A second session of the Congress of allies was held in the following spring to receive the reports of the embassies and missions sent by the First Congress and to decide on strategy [Hdt.7.172],³⁸ although plans had certainly been discussed before this [Hdt.7.139]. This Congress met at the Isthmus - a convenient and safe location for mustering the allied forces as the loyalty of northern Greece was not certain.

Apparently, while in session, the Congress received an appeal for help from some Thessalian delegates who summed up the position of the northern Greeks very clearly - either the southern states would have to help them or they would be forced to medize. The response of the Congress was to send an expedition to Tempe. This was done before Xerxes crossed into Europe, around the beginning of May, 480 [Hdt.7.174; Diodorus 11.2; Plut. *Them.* 7].

A force of ten thousand men was sent by sea from the Isthmus to Halos in the Gulf of Pagasae by way of the Euripus channel, thence overland to Tempe. Once at Tempe the Greeks discovered that the pass could be turned and that Thessalian loyalty could not be depended upon. They then returned by sea to the Isthmus by late June.

The Spartan contingent of the force was led by a polemarch [Synetis - Diod.11.2.5-6], and the Athenian by Themistocles, a general. The choice of a polemarch for the expedition has been explained in various ways - as a sign that the Spartan king, Leotychidas, was in disgrace,³⁹ that the Spartans were less committed to this action, or that Themistocles was pursuing his long-held policy of defence as far forward in Greece as possible.⁴⁰ Herodotus and Diodorus agree on the number of Greeks in the force and on the fact that it was a hoplite one [Hdt.7.173; Diod.11.2.5]. If the ships sent to Tempe were triremes, such a force requires a

³⁷ ATL 95-105.

³⁸ Brunt 145-63, Burn 349.

³⁹ Lewis 45. Polemarchs commanded units of the Spartan army. They are mentioned by Herodotus [7.173] and Thucydides [5.66]. See also, J.F.Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster, 1985) 41f.

⁴⁰ Burn 341.

minimum of fifty ships at two hundred men per ship, if it is assumed that the hoplites also do the rowing.⁴¹

There is no mention in the sources of who was in supreme command at Tempe and no indication of any disagreement over command decisions. It must be assumed that the Spartans, as allied hegemon, had the overall command. Herodotus describes the actions and decisions of the force at Tempe as Greek, rather than as Peloponnesian or Athenian, thus suggesting that there was no disagreement at the time among the allies. None of the participants in the expedition had any problem with a sea-borne campaign or this one in particular. In fact they supported it, since they were prepared to land further south at Halos and march by a longer route to reach Tempe [Hdt.7.173]. The allies' decision to go to Tempe by sea may well have been for speed - a quick response might save Thessaly from medising. The Greeks at the Congress were evidently prepared to try any plan that looked promising. The Tempe venture might even have been seen as a chance for the ships' crews involved to gain some valuable rowing practice en route.⁴²

The preparation of ships in a short time appears to have presented no difficulty. This fact may indicate that an allied fleet was already in being in the sense that, if the ships used for Tempe were all Athenian, some at least would have had to carry non-Athenian, i.e. Spartan and Boeotian, crews or marines. An allied fleet would also be indicated if any Peloponnesian ships were used on the expedition. The ships are usually assumed to have been Athenian as Athens was the nearest state on the route to north, and it had the largest number of vessels available. Athens also had ties with Pharsalus.⁴³

The existence of an allied fleet by this time is also suggested by the fact that the ships for Tempe sailed from and returned to the Isthmus. These ships would not all have been carrying marines or crews that needed to be taken back there, unless there was an allied fleet already gathered at the Isthmus in the spring of 480.

⁴¹ Isocrates, 12.49, refers to a force of sixty ships at Artemisium. Burn 354, suggests that he may have meant Tempe. If the ten thousand refers to hoplite marines alone, this would require nearly one thousand Greek ships, at ten to fourteen marines per ship - clearly a ridiculously large number. Perhaps there were light-armed soldiers among the rowers, as is suggested at by Burn 547 for the battle at Mycale.

⁴² R.J. Buck, *A History of Boeotia* (Edmonton, 1979) 130.

⁴³ Burn 341.

It has been supposed that the organisation of men and ships for this expedition would have taken time and that the strategy of fighting forward was decided upon at the First Congress in 481.⁴⁴ Herodotus indicates that the Greeks did not decide upon their next line of defence until after the return from Tempe [Hdt.7.175]. This does not mean that they cannot have been already discussing future strategy. They might even have been waiting for further information to be reported by the Tempe force - especially on naval defensive positions. It is difficult to believe that no discussion of strategy was taking place both before and during the action at Tempe, which seems more like a response to an unlooked-for opportunity, i.e. the Thessalian appeal, than part of any "grand strategy". The presence of a Spartan polemarch as commander does not indicate lack of commitment by Sparta, but shows that this was probably a small Spartan detachment with, perhaps, a larger Athenian contingent to account for the numbers of oarsmen needed. The Spartan king, Leonidas, was preparing the land force which was to be sent to Thermopylae.

Tempe has been described as an 'achievement' for Greek unity since the Greek states of the south went so far from home to fight.⁴⁵ The same would be true of their naval defence. Sparta, as hegemon, appears to have been committed to both. Yet the Spartan response to action north of the Isthmus has been called 'reluctant' and Sparta is thought to have been already suspicious of Athenian maritime ambition.⁴⁶ The Tempe expedition showed that all the allies, including Sparta, at the Congress were prepared to try a northern defence line with a fast response on land and at sea, and that they had the nucleus of an allied fleet ready. The speedy preparation and dispatch of the expedition is also an example of Sparta's organizational abilities. Each contingent of allies for the war was commanded by a *strategos* responsible to the Spartan supreme commander,⁴⁷ as the Greek alliance had probably adopted the military organisation of its hegemon. The scale of these operations, however, was something new and a test for Spartan organisational abilities.

⁴⁴ Macan 247f.

⁴⁵ Burn 341.

⁴⁶ Spartan reluctance, Forrest 97, Burn 362, because of the upcoming Carneia - but Sparta sent a force to Thermopylae and Artemisium closer to the time of the festival. Religious scruples should not be dismissed - many Greek states were reluctant to send a large force because of the Olympic truce - the refusal to alter their way of life even at this critical point is instructive for the Greek outlook; for Spartan suspicion of Athens, Burn 406.

⁴⁷ N.G.L.Hammond, "Strategia and Hegemonia in Fifth-Century Athens" *CQ* ns 19 (1969) 134-9

After the return of the force from Tempe the Greeks decided on the Thermopylae/Artemisium line of defence, while Xerxes was still in Macedonia [Hdt.7.175]. It has been argued on no sound basis that the composition of the fleet at Artemisium shows that ships must have been quickly summoned as vessels from further away could not have arrived there in time, and that the agreement of the Spartans, as supreme commanders, must have been obtained at the last minute.⁴⁸

The fleet sailed to Artemisium in late July/early August and probably was in position slightly before the land forces at Thermopylae. This supposition allows one month at the most, after the decision to hold Thermopylae and Artemisium, to appoint the commanders and navarch, to organise the contingents, to assign and to train the crews and to arrive at Artemisium. If, as suggested above, there was already discussion of other defensive positions before Tempe and the nucleus of an allied fleet was stationed at the Isthmus, the timetable is less crowded. It also allows more time for training and manoeuvres at the Isthmus. Naval contingents from states with no maritime skill, such as those from Plataea, would have needed as much practice as possible because of their complete inexperience [Hdt.8.1]. This fleet, together with the ships that had gone to Tempe and that may have continued their training en route, was the one that was later sent to Artemisium.⁴⁹ A reserve fleet made up of the remainder with some late-comers was left at Pogon [Hdt.842].

The choice of Artemisium for the Greek defence by sea was a good one as it commanded the route from the north and the approach to Euboea.⁵⁰ The presence of a reserve fleet in the Saronic Gulf also serves to show that the Greeks were taking precautions against a possible attack by sea on the south-east coast. Spartan awareness of Greek vulnerability here may be indicated by Herodotus' account of the advice given to Xerxes' to divide his fleet and attack the

⁴⁸ Burn 347f., although there is no evidence for this.

⁴⁹ N.G.L.Hammond, *Phoenix* 40 (1986) 143-8 suggests that trained crews might have been divided up among the vessels of the Athenian fleet, according to the Troizen decree. A similar division of experienced crews might have been made among the ships of the allied fleet at Artemisium, but this would still have left many, such as the Plataeans, without any training in the combined allied fleet.

⁵⁰ Hammond, *CAH* 518f.

Peloponnese. It is the exiled Spartan king, Demaratus, to whom Herodotus attributes this plan [Hdt.7.235].⁵¹

That the allied fleet must have received some combined training is shown by their tactics and discipline in battle at Artemisium.⁵² They were careful to engage the Persian ships for short periods only, perhaps to test their tactics and to gain battle practice [Hdt.7.123ff; 8.9-15]. When attacked by Persian vessels attempting a *periplous*, they had a well-planned and well-executed response. The commanders at Artemisium cannot have known that Xerxes would delay his advance from Macedonia as long as he did, and so they must have recognised the need for such training and have provided it earlier in the season.⁵³ The extra time allowed them by the Persian delay was a bonus. The Spartans as hegemon and the Spartan naval commander-in-chief, Eurybiades, would have been involved with any combined training of the Greek allied contingents, especially if they were organised according to Spartan military practice.⁵⁴

The Greeks cannot, however, have expected to win any naval engagement against the vastly greater number of Persian ships. They had no battle experience, and at Artemisium they do not seem to have acted as though they aimed to destroy the Persian fleet. Their tactics were defensive and suggest that their orders were to hold the line at sea, while the force at Thermopylae held the pass.⁵⁵

Both Herodotus and Diodorus refer to a general Greek, not Peloponnesian or Spartan, desire to retreat during the action at Artemisium [Hdt.7.184, 8.3; Diod.11.12.4 - 13.5]. The anti-Peloponnesian argument appears only after the return of the fleet from Artemisium, perhaps

⁵¹ Cartledge 206.

⁵² Morrison and Coates 49-54.

⁵³ Hdt.7.123ff., 8.9-15..

⁵⁴ Herodotus introduces Eurybiades as a *strategos ton to megiston kratos echonta* [8.1], which suggests supreme command. He is later referred to as *navarchos* [8.42], who seems to have his own ship [8.58]. There is, however, nothing in Herodotus' description to suggest that the navarchy was a formal office at this time. It may have been created to meet the emergency and to fulfil the need for a commanding officer over allies. For the training of the Spartan army, see J.Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster, 1985) 24f.

⁵⁵ *contra* Hignett 153f.

because it was then that the Athenians realised that Attica definitely had to be abandoned.⁵⁶ According to Plutarch [*Them.* 7.4] the Peloponnesians and the Spartan commander at Artemisium were subject to attacks of panic, and wanted to return to the Isthmus. If this had been the case, it is surprising that they still stayed there and participated so well in the actions.⁵⁷ The discipline and training shown by all the Greek crews in battle does not suggest a panic-stricken or poorly-led force. Thermopylae was not expected to fall as early as it did, and the fleet understood that reinforcements were to be sent to the army at Thermopylae [*Hdt.* 7.203].⁵⁸ Any fear, then, at Artemisium was general throughout the fleet.

Sparta's individual contribution to the action in terms of ships was small. It provided ten triremes, one of which was the admiral's vessel [*Hdt.* 8.1, 58; *Diod.* 11.27]. This number of ships, if triremes, would require two thousand men as rowers and crew. Most of these were probably perioecic or helot, as Sparta would have used forces from many coastal perioecic settlements in Laconia and Messenia. There would also have been one hundred to one hundred and forty Spartan marines on board. During the engagements the Spartan contingent would have fought on the Greek right wing, the position of honour reserved for the leader.⁵⁹ The damage the Spartan squadron may have sustained or its losses in battle are not recorded. If the Peloponnesian contributions are considered together, Sparta and its alliance initially provided about half the original fleet for Artemisium,⁶⁰ while the Athenians supplied most of the rest [*Hdt.* 8.1]. These numbers suggest that there may have been an agreement among the allies to match the Athenian contribution as far as possible. There is no indication of the basis on which

⁵⁶ The date of the evacuation of Athens has been disputed and depends largely on a belief in the authenticity of the Troizen Decree, the debate on which continues, see *SEG* 36 (1986) no. 352. Herodotus suggests that the Athenians abandoned the city after the fall of Thermopylae, but this does not allow much time. Much of the evacuation must have taken place beforehand. Burn 364-77, Morrison and Coates 108f.

⁵⁷ The story of withdrawal from Artemisium in panic is contradicted in Nepos' account, *Themistocles*. 3.2-3. He says that it was a precaution against another flanking attack around Euboea. The appeal to the Greeks by the Euboeans may also have been properly ignored by Eurybiades not through fear but because of tactical considerations.

⁵⁸ Green 111.

⁵⁹ Macan 491a.

⁶⁰ Burn 385. Diodorus says that it was exactly half 11.12.4.

the number of allied ships was decided. They may have sent what they could or what they wanted to commit.⁶¹

After the fall of Thermopylae the Greek fleet withdrew from Artemisium and put in at Salamis [Hdt.8.40]. The tactical decision for the time for retreat was clearly left to the supreme commander, Eurybiades, but, according to Herodotus, he was persuaded to go to Salamis by the Athenians under Themistocles. It may have been reasonable to do so as the Athenians needed extra ships to help complete the evacuation of their city. Herodotus does not, however, indicate where the Greek fleet may have been headed, if it was not aiming for Salamis. Perhaps the attribution of the plan to Themistocles to make a last-minute change of direction for Salamis is an Athenian reconstruction of events.⁶² After Artemisium Eurybiades and the Greek commanders would have realised the need to fight in a place where the size, speed and numbers of vessels involved was of less account. The strategy of the Greeks in tempting the Persians to fight at Salamis was, however, a risky one. The Persians might wait for the Greeks to withdraw again as they had from Artemisium⁶³ but, given the lateness of the season, it was not an unlikely hope that Xerxes would give battle at sea to try to finish the campaign before the winter.

The general feeling of the Peloponnesians is said to have been that the Isthmus was the better position since the Greeks could be bottled up in the straits between Salamis and the mainland and unable to support the Isthmus land force. As the majority of the non-Athenian naval allies in the fleet were Peloponnesian [Hdt.8.1], this accusation may again reflect an Athenian interpretation of events. It is also legitimate to ask how Herodotus' informants had such a detailed account of the discussions that took place among the allied generals. He cannot have interviewed the generals who had been in charge of the naval campaign but the survivors (mostly Athenian) who had served in the fleet. His account, then, may reflect all their misunderstanding of what was really going on, as well any inaccuracies and distortions that arose as a result of subsequent events.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Burn 378, Salmon 253/4. This was an Olympic year. Some states may not have appreciated the danger of not resisting as strongly as possible, or they may have temporised.

⁶² Grundy 352 and Hignett 20 think it was a hasty plan to meet the circumstances.

⁶³ Hignett 208 points out that Xerxes had to deal with the Greek fleet before he could proceed with a land attack.

⁶⁴ Burn 441-2.

The news of the invasion of Attica and the fall of the Acropolis interrupted the allied discussions. According to Herodotus some Peloponnesians panicked yet again, and set sail for the Isthmus immediately, while others stayed and voted to retire to the Isthmus and fight a naval action there [Hdt.8.56]. Herodotus does not say how many vessels were involved. This division of opinion has led to the suggestion that the action at Salamis was subsequently taken without the agreement of the high command at the Isthmus, though this does not seem likely in the case of a commander such as Eurybiades, who had maintained communications with Thermopylae and the Isthmus during the Artemisium operation.⁶⁵

Herodotus' account vividly conveys the feelings of despair among all the Greeks before the battle, especially that of the ordinary Peloponnesians, who were torn between staying and facing defeat or siege, while the Isthmus was attacked [Hdt.8.73], and who blamed their commander, Eurybiades, for their dilemma.⁶⁶ Nor is it surprising that the larger Saronic Gulf states, Aegina, Athens and Megara, were in favour of fighting at Salamis. Whether some Greeks deserted, as Herodotus claims [Hdt.8.56], is debatable, but that Eurybiades was aware of the importance of morale in the fleet is suggested by the story that both he and Themistocles spoke to the crews before the battle [Diod.11.16.1].

Herodotus provides the total numbers for the Greek fleet at Salamis, which he puts at 378. Later, on the arrival of a Tenean ship and a Lemnian vessel that had joined them at Artemisium, the Greeks are said to have had 380 ships [Hdt.8.47].⁶⁷ This total does not allow for any ships that had apparently deserted to the Isthmus. If Herodotus' informants for the action at Salamis were sailors from the fleet, they may have put their own interpretation on the ship movements they observed but did not understand. Perhaps a few of these ships moving between the Isthmus and Salamis were used for communications, while others may have been on watch for enemy movements. Eurybiades had already shown at Artemisium that he knew the importance of scout ships and of regular communications with the land defences and with Greek headquarters [Hdt.7.177, 183.1, 8.9, 21, 56]. If Herodotus' totals for the Salamis fleet are correct, no Greek ships can have deserted at the last minute.

⁶⁵ Green 159. Diodorus may also suggest that there was some communication, 11.16.2-3.

⁶⁶ Hammond, *CAH* 518f.

⁶⁷ See Burn 442 for the problems with Herodotus' account of the numbers of ships at Salamis.

On the eve of the battle the Persians may have sent squadrons around Salamis to cut off any possibility of escape. The Greeks were told of this move by a newly-arrived Athenian, Aristides [Hdt.8.9, 79; Diod.11.17; Cornelius Nepos 4.2-3].⁶⁸ Once again, it seems unlikely that the Spartan command that had had an organised intelligence-gathering system at Artemisium would not have taken similar precautions to watch for Persian naval movements at Salamis, where the Greeks were risking their whole fleet. This would be especially true of the possibility of a flanking move around Salamis to cut off the Megara channel. The Persians appear to have attempted a similar move against the Greeks at Artemisium by sending a detachment to sail around Euboea.

The few details of the battle have been variously interpreted, but most scholars have agreed that Salamis was an action well-planned and executed by the Greeks, in which tactics and training were more important than numbers.⁶⁹ The Spartan supreme command should at least share some of the credit for this. Herodotus, however, continually downplays the Spartan and Peloponnesian contribution to the Greek victory. It is the Athenians and Themistocles who are seen as the architects of victory, while the Peloponnesians panic and the Corinthians under Adeimantus tend to challenge Themistocles' advice [Hdt.8.40, 58].

For the action at Salamis the Spartans supplied sixteen triremes [Hdt.8.42]. The extra Spartan vessels had formed part of the reserve fleet at Pogon. It is not recorded whether any of the ten Spartan ships at Artemisium were damaged in the fighting there and so the extra ships may have been in addition to these ten or to replace some of them. Herodotus says that the whole Greek fleet at Artemisium was heavily damaged, but does not say whether they were replaced or repaired in time for Salamis [Hdt.8.15,42.]. The presence of Spartan ships with the reserve indicates that this fleet was also under Spartan command. Sixteen ships, if triremes, would mean a total Spartan commitment of over three thousand men as crew and one hundred and sixty to two hundred and twenty-four hoplite marines. This may have been the total number of trained crews available from all the coastal towns of Messenia and Laconia.

⁶⁸ Diodorus says it was a Samian who brought the news. For a discussion of the possible Persian flanking movements around Euboea and at Salamis see Burn 347-450.

⁶⁹ Hignett 185; Burn 450f.; Green 192; Morrison and Coates 59; N.G.L. Hammond, "The Battle of Salamis", *Studies* 251-310.

The Spartan squadron was again stationed on the Greek right wing, the position of honour, as at Artemisium, and it faced the Ionians, perhaps the contingent from Halicarnassus [Hdt.8.85]. Pausanias [3.11.3] in his description of the Colonnade at Sparta, built to commemorate Spartan victories in the Persian War, mentioned that one of the caryatid figures represented there was Artemisia of Halicarnassus. The Spartans may have had cause to remember her if they had fought against her ships at Salamis.⁷⁰

Little is heard of the Spartan or Peloponnesian contribution in the battle, but it must have been among the earliest groups to engage the Persians [Hdt.8.84ff; Aeschylus, *Persae* 386-407]. Athens and Aegina were singled out as making greatest state and individual contributions. If any of the Peloponnesians had not fought well it would surely have been remembered and mentioned - as Herodotus did over Adeimantus of Corinth, although he expressed some reservations over the account given him [Hdt.8.92].

The record of the Greek fleet at Salamis as at Artemisium in discipline and co-ordination does not suggest total panic and despair among the crews or their commanders, or an action into which nearly half the contingents involved had been blackmailed.⁷¹ After the battle, when the Greeks had not yet realised that they had won, they proceeded to clear the area of damaged ships and prepared for further action [Hdt.8.96] - the order and discipline of the whole fleet is again obvious. The order that followed to pursue the Persian fleet would surely have been issued by the Spartan commander-in-chief. There is no hint that the pursuit by the various contingents was a rushed and disordered one. Eurybiades opposed the idea of going further than the Cyclades, although, apparently, Themistocles wished to advance as far as the Hellespont [Hdt.8.107ff].⁷² Whatever the truth of this claim, there were sound reasons for not going further. The season was getting late,⁷³ and the Persian army was still in Attica as far as the fleet was aware. The loyalty

⁷⁰ Macan 1.2.491a. Diodorus 11.18 says they were on the left- a less likely position for the hegemon, unless he referred to the left part of the right wing, see Burn 459. Mardonius, the Persian commander at Plataea, the site remembered as another Spartan victory, was also represented among the caryatid figures in this Colonnade [Vitruvius 1.1.6].

⁷¹ Burn 444f.

⁷² Plut. *Them.*16 says the discussion took place between Themistocles and Aristides.

⁷³ Hignett 243, Macan 1.2.531a. Burn 468 points out that Spartans did not pursue a beaten enemy, although whether this would have been the main reason at this moment is doubtful. The Persian army was still in Attica and may even have attacked the Isthmus fortification (Hammond, *CAH* 518f.). The fleet could not go too far away.

of the Cyclades also had to be ensured, if possible, and some reparations collected for their medism to fund further operations.

The financial organisation of the Greek fleet

The financial organisation of the naval campaigns at Tempe, Artemisium and Salamis is not clearly known but Herodotus supplies some information. It has recently been suggested that there must have been some attention to finances as Tempe had to be paid for somehow.⁷⁴ If, as seems likely, none of the Greek states had reserves to pay for their expeditions, they would have relied for the most part on the booty gained from a successful action to cover their costs. For a force at the front line and at some distance from its home base, such as that at Tempe and Artemisium, local supplies would also be necessary. Perhaps one of the reasons for the fiasco at Tempe was that neither money nor food was forthcoming from the Thessalians. Tempe, then, may have been a financial loss for the Greeks. It may also have provided another reason for Athenian discontent with Peloponnesian leadership at Artemisium, especially if the Athenians had provided the majority of the force as unpaid crew members.

At Artemisium the Euboeans supplied both money and food to the Greek forces [Hdt.8.3 - money, 15 - sheep]. Themistocles received some money and turned a sixth part of it over to Eurybiades - an incident that suggests that the Spartan command also included financial responsibility, although Herodotus relates it as a story of a successful bribery attempt by Themistocles. There may have been an agreed portion, the sixth part, payable to a central fund under Spartan control. The charges and counter-charges of bribery against the commanders of the fleet indicate that they were handling sums of money.⁷⁵ One of the Athenian commanders at Artemisium is said not to have had enough money to pay his crew, while another was able to pay his own crew [Hdt.8.13]. Clearly the majority of states did not have large amounts of money available and relied on all possible contributions. Perhaps each state initially provided supplies for its own force. These would have lasted only for a short time since little could be carried on

⁷⁴ Plut. *Them.* 7.5. Hammond, *CAH* 518f. supposes there was some organisation and that the supplies for Tempe were dropped ahead of time by the Greeks, as the Persians had done through northern Greece before their advance. This supposition would mean that the Greek resistance was organised in even greater detail and much earlier to allow time for such planning.

⁷⁵ See Pritchett ccs.1-4 for methods of supplying troops in this period. Some rations were probably provided, while the rest was made up by supplies from local inhabitants and by foraging.

triremes. The length of time of a particular campaign could not be predicted and local supplies would then be needed [Plut. *Them.* 7.5]

By the time of Salamis the financial situation must have been difficult for the Greeks. There had been no booty from either previous action, Attica was now occupied by the Persians, and the fleet faced its third action of the summer. The offer of a bounty for the capture of Artemisia of Halicarnassus [Hdt.8.91] may indicate that some Greek captains needed an incentive to remain in the campaign. This is also suggested in Mnesiphilos' speech to Themistocles about the possibility of the dissolution of the allied fleet [Hdt.8.57]. After Salamis some booty was gained from the Persian dead at Psyttaleia and from Persian wrecks. The Persian camp, where most could be found, could not be attacked at this time.⁷⁶ The Athenians again had the most serious problem in this respect as they had the largest contingent to pay. This may be why Themistocles, in particular, gained a reputation for greed when he exacted reparations in the Cyclades [Hdt.8.11]. He and the rest of the Greek fleet badly needed the money. Thus, some organisation of fleet finances is apparent and must have been the responsibility of the supreme command.⁷⁷

Eurybiades, the Spartan naval commander

Most scholars who have written on the Persian Wars have followed the canonical lines laid down by Herodotus [8.3] and later by Thucydides [1.89-90, 136-8]. The credit for the naval successes is given to the Athenians, and especially to Themistocles. The strength of the tradition about the Athenian role argues for some validity. Their contribution had been of crucial importance in an area of warfare that had been generally undervalued by the Greeks. In the same way scholars frequently accept the explanation that the Peloponnesians were motivated by panic and isolationism. Perhaps some of them were, but there is no real proof from Peloponnesian actions that this was true of the majority.

Little credit has been given to Eurybiades' considerable diplomatic skills in keeping the allies together.⁷⁸ Even less has been said of his hardly glamorous but still vital contribution in

⁷⁶ The Greeks were able to recoup all their losses from the tremendous amount of booty taken from the Persians at Plataea in the following year [Hdt.9.79].

⁷⁷ Green 208.

⁷⁸ E.Bradsford, *The Year of Thermopylae* (London, 1980) 14, compares Eurybiades role with that of General Eisenhower in the Second World War.

the organisation and control of the naval campaigns, and nothing at all about his responsibility for the discipline and training the fleet must have received, though the evidence of that training has been readily recognised.

The reputation of Eurybiades has suffered because of the legends that grew around his Athenian counterpart, Themistocles. As supreme commander of the allied forces Sparta was also responsible for the allied naval campaign. It is difficult to believe that so military a state would have appointed an inexperienced and incapable commander to the fleet at this critical juncture, even if the main defence was expected to be on land.⁷⁹

None of Eurybiades' actions suggest that he was incompetent. Any assessment of him is made more difficult by the problem of understanding the tactics involved, and by the role assigned in the pro-Athenian sources to Themistocles. Diodorus states that, while Eurybiades was still commander-in-chief, it was Themistocles who was in charge of fleet affairs - surely an intolerable and impossible situation [Diod.11.12.4]. Eurybiades' task was difficult enough in the first place. He had to keep together a force of allies whose tactical preferences and whose depth of commitment to the cause of resistance may have varied considerably. Their morale certainly was not high [Hdt.7.183].

When the Greeks captured some Persian ships and crews off Artemisium, it would probably have been Eurybiades who had them interrogated and sent back to the Greek headquarters at the Isthmus [Hdt.7.196]. It was presumably he who also ensured that communication was established with the land army at Thermopylae, had scout-ships from various states positioned - who else but their supreme commander could have organised this? - and had look-outs and signal beacons put in place and provisions ensured [Hdt.7.183, 189-96, 8.3-20].⁸⁰ The Greeks had never undertaken such a large-scale naval operation before, so that Eurybiades' contribution here in overseeing the creation of such organisation was invaluable. His was the authority to summon and to preside over the war-council [Hdt.8.58]. He was also responsible for the organised withdrawal in good order of the badly battered Greek fleet [Hdt.8.21]. The

⁷⁹ *contra* Cartledge 206.

⁸⁰ Hammond, *CAH* 518f. suggests that provisions were placed in advance for the Artemisium fleet, as the Persians had done for their advance across Thrace. If this were the case, it demonstrates even greater attention to the organisational details by the leader of such an expedition. The Spartan army organisation, its use of heralds to pass orders down from the king, its organisation of set meals and the king's responsibility for prisoners are suggested by Hdt. 6.78.

stealthy retreat by night of the Greek fleet may also have been a Spartan suggestion [Hdt.8.9]. Spartans were well-known for secretive night manoeuvres. Navigation at night was difficult because of the crews' lack of ability to communicate.⁸¹

Such tactics as the Greeks are thought to have employed at Artemisium: fighting late in the day to give the crews battle practice against a numerically superior and faster enemy; training so as to be able to complete the necessary manoeuvres; and taking up the position at Artemisium in the hope that the Persians might be exposed to the meltemi winds off Magnesia, all these must have received the approval of Eurybiades. Eurybiades, then, helped create the organisation and maintain the discipline and good relations among the contingents of the fleet at Artemisium.⁸²

Trickery, not skill in naval strategy, is the aspect of Themistocles at Artemisium stressed by Herodotus [Hdt.8.3].⁸³ Where Themistocles is not considered responsible the decisions are said to be "Greek", presumably agreed to by the admiral, Eurybiades. The contribution of the Spartans, either in command or in execution of the battles and manoeuvres is not mentioned. Anti-Corinthian bias has been suggested for the passages concerning the role of Adeimantus, as it reflects the situation between Athens and Corinth after c.460 [Hdt.8.3, 61].⁸⁴ Herodotus' sources may have been as biased about the Spartan role. Spartan-Athenian relations were hardly cordial at about the same time [Thucydides 1.101-3].

Accounts of the preparations for and victory of the Greek fleet at Salamis are even more heavily influenced by later Athenian interpretation of the role played by Themistocles. The Spartans and their commander played an important part here, too. Eurybiades was still in command of the allied fleet which put in at Salamis, while the Athenians completed the evacuation of their city [Hdt.8.40; Diod.11.13.4]. The reserve fleet at Pogon was then ordered to sail to Salamis - presumably by its commander-in-chief, although Herodotus' account makes it seem as though the reserve fleet sailed by its own decision [Hdt.8.42]. Once again, Herodotus' informants may have downplayed the Spartan role. If Eurybiades and the Peloponnesians in the

⁸¹ Thuc.5.68, 4.80; Cartledge 133, 246-7; Gomme 19-20.

⁸² Diodorus 11.12.4, suggests that the relationship between Eurybiades and Themistocles was a friendly one.

⁸³ The tricks are called unhistorical by Hammond, *CAH* 518f. Themistocles' decisions are strategic. C. Fornara, *Herodotus: An Interpretive Essay* (Oxford, 1971), c.2, calls attention to the Odysseus-like portrait of Themistocles in Herodotus' account.

⁸⁴ Burn 441,444.

fleet were in favour of a withdrawal to the Isthmus, where the allied troops were gathering [Hdt.8.72],⁸⁵ why was the reserve fleet summoned to Salamis in the first place, and why did the whole non-Athenian contingent of the main fleet stay there, while the Athenians returned to their own harbour [Hdt.8.41; Plut. *Them.* 9.3-4; Diod.11.15.3]? Herodotus explains the subsequent meeting of the allied commanders at Salamis by saying that a council of war was summoned by Eurybiades to discuss the best location for a battle. Salamis and the Isthmus are clearly points of argument for the Greeks but Eurybiades, in having the fleet put in at Salamis and stay there,⁸⁶ in summoning the reserve fleet to the island and in holding an allied conference there, may already have appreciated the advantages of the island's position.

Eurybiades has been called the first Spartan navarch,⁸⁷ but in a wartime crisis special measures may have been taken to create the office of commander of an allied fleet. That it was not envisaged as a permanent position is suggested by the fact that there is no record of any other Spartan navarch or other major Spartan naval action from the end of the Persian War down to the time of the Peloponnesian War. The naval command may have been a royal office initially, since Spartan forces were led by their kings [Hdt.6.52], but this could be changed, as it was in the case of Eurybiades and Anchimolius [Hdt.5.61].⁸⁸ King Leonidas led the force at Thermopylae, but the whereabouts of King Leotychidas are not known in this year. If he were in disgrace, he had redeemed himself by the following campaigning season when he commanded the allied fleet. The fact that subsequent naval campaigns were led by Spartan kings reflects a growing Spartan appreciation of the importance of the fleet in Greek strategy.

The Spartans clearly thought Eurybiades was worth honouring after the naval campaign. That they continued to feel this way is indicated by the fact that his tomb was a public memorial

⁸⁵ The states represented at the Isthmus included Sparta, Arcadia, Elis, Corinth, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Phlius, Troizen and Hermione. Sparta, Corinth, Sicyon, Troizen, Epidaurus and Hermione also provided naval contingents for Salamis [Hdt.8.42]. The rest of the Peloponnese could not be relied upon [Hdt.8.73], despite the fact that the festivals were now over.

⁸⁶ It is also possible that Eurybiades may have believed the threat reportedly made by Themistocles that the Athenians would leave Attica and sail west - Hdt.8.62. Such suggestions seem to have been frequently made but less frequently carried out and the difficulties of carrying out such an operation would have been daunting e.g. Bias of Priene suggested the Ionians move to Sardinia [Hdt.1.170]. Could Themistocles have had the authority to make any such move?

⁸⁷ P. Poralla, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians* (Chicago, 1985) no. 317 and the sources cited there.

⁸⁸ Michell 101-18; R.Sealey, "Die spartanische Nauarchie", *Klio* 58 (1976) 335-40.

at Sparta [Hdt.8.124; Plut. *Them.* 17.2; Paus.3.16.6]. His tomb was near the sanctuary of Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver. Eurybiades had shown himself to be a competent leader with some understanding and appreciation of strategic and tactical niceties, even if, according to tradition, he did not initiate them. Sparta, then, had provided an able naval commander, who realised the need for good communications and morale, proper religious observation, logistics, training, discipline, finance and intelligence [Hdt.8.64; Diod.11.16.1]. Eurybiades was able to maintain his leadership throughout the campaign, and he defined the position of allied naval commander-in-chief. It was under his leadership that Greek command of the Aegean was established and the Persian advance halted.⁸⁹

The Spartans also appreciated the contribution of Themistocles and awarded him unprecedented public honours at Sparta at the same time.⁹⁰ Honour awarded an outsider by a state usually supposed to shun foreigners suggests that contemporary Sparta was both more open than has been supposed, and that it supported the idea of joint resistance to Persia, albeit under its leadership.⁹¹ Its successful leadership of the allied naval forces was compensation for the loss at Thermopylae and would have appeared to justify its position as hegemon. The questions that Sparta and the allies had to consider for the new campaigning season were not those of the naval leadership but whether there would be another Persian attack by sea and when and where to deal with Mardonius.

B. Sparta from hegemony to retirement - 479 to c.476

The allied Greeks had no way of being certain that they had won virtual control of the Aegean by their victory at Salamis. The remainder of the winter and much of the season of 479 appears to have been spent in increasingly bitter recriminations between Athens and the Greek hegemon, Sparta, over Sparta's reluctance to move north of the Isthmus, while Athens was once

⁸⁹ Morrison and Coates 59; Burn 313f. gives credit to the careful Persian preparations for their expedition but fails to mention the organisation necessary behind the Greek campaigns.

⁹⁰ This has been thought [after Diod 11.27.2-3] a devious move by Sparta to split the Athenians (Green 213) But why would Sparta try to do this in 480/79 when Athenian support was vital to the allied war effort and the Persians still had not been defeated on land?

⁹¹ Chilcus of Tegea was also held in esteem in Sparta at the time - Hdt. 9.9.

more threatened by a Persian land force [Hdt.8.129, 9.12].⁹² It was not bitter enough to cause a split in the Greek alliance as a whole.

Xerxes, however, had changed his strategy and attempted to win control by a decisive land battle. Through Mardonius, he also pursued the successful policy of earlier years of dividing Greek resistance. Mardonius sent offers of accommodation to Athens during the winter that must have found some favour, but it was not until he invaded Athens in the following spring that Athenian resistance appears to have hardened against the Persians [Hdt.9.3]. It is interesting that Mardonius is not said to have sent similar offers to Sparta.

The Peloponnesians of the Greek alliance were by no means safe behind their Isthmus defence. The Isthmus wall had been attacked by the Persians previously and needed to be urgently repaired and completed [Hdt.8.70].⁹³ Mardonius had been in contact with all the oracles accessible to him - perhaps these visits were the origin of the prophecy that Persia and Athens would drive the Dorians from the Peloponnese. In addition, there may have been some pro-Persian feeling in Elis and Mantinea. Not all the Peloponnese was a solid bloc of resistance.⁹⁴ Sparta was also aware that the Peloponnese could be turned by a naval attack, which, in the winter of 480/79, must still have seemed possible. Nonetheless, Sparta's strategy has been described as 'selfish, but militarily defensible'.⁹⁵ In the winter of 480 and spring of 479, with Mardonius in Greece how else was Sparta to think and act but in military defence of the Peloponnese?

The allied fleet was to be smaller than in the previous year, because of the expected land battle, and might have to face, once again, a numerically superior opponent. That Sparta had not given up and adopted an isolationist policy is indicated by its embassy to Xerxes to demand reparations for the death of the Spartan king, Leonidas, and by the possible involvement of the allies in the revolt of Chalcidice against Mardonius [Hdt.8.126].⁹⁶

⁹² Burn 494.

⁹³ Hammond, *CAH* 518f. with reference to O.Bronceer, *Isthmia* 1 (New Jersey, 1971) 3f.

⁹⁴ Mardonius' envoy to the oracles - Hdt.8.133; Elis and Mantinea at Plataia - Hdt. 9.77. A. Andrewes, in Gomme, Dover and Andrewes, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* v.4 (Oxford, 1970) 60f, Cartledge 205; the 'neutral' states of the Peloponnese - Hdt.8.73.

⁹⁵ Forrest 97.

⁹⁶ Hdt. 8.126; Burn 496.

In the spring of 479 the first Greek move against Persia was made at sea.⁹⁷ Sparta, still the allied hegemon, sent Leotychidas, the king, as commander to oversee the mustering of the allied fleet at Aegina. There is no mention that this was agreed at another meeting of the Congress, but some allied discussion must have taken place during the winter over where and when the fleet should gather and what was to be its objective. The appointment of the naval commander would probably have occurred before such a meeting in the spring and before the start of the sailing season to co-ordinate the collection of the fleet.⁹⁸ That the objective of the naval campaign was to guard against a possible further Persian naval assault is indicated by the choice of Aegina as its base, which was well-placed for patrols in the central Aegean.

The appointment of a king to lead the force, while the other Spartan king was to lead the army, shows that Sparta was by now fully aware of the importance of the naval arm in the defence of Greece against further attack. The Greeks would not have known whether the Persians would attack by land or in a renewed offensive by sea. The appointment is said to have made Leotychidas the first Spartan king to lead a fleet, although Cleomenes had already done so against Argos.⁹⁹ As navarch Leotychidas was also responsible for maintaining the agreed overall defence strategy, although tactics would be his own decision - the Chians appealed to Sparta but were sent to Leotychidas at Aegina for his decision [Hdt.8.133].

The allied fleet consisted of one hundred and ten ships - a number similar to that of the Aeginetan and Peloponnesian contingents at Salamis [Hdt.8.43]. It has been suggested that the paucity of ships and the reluctance for some time of the Peloponnesians to make an attack either by land or by sea indicate that the Athenians were holding their fleet back in order to force the

⁹⁷ Lewis 47 says that the command was shared between Leotychidas and Xanthippus on the basis of Hdt. 8.133 2-3. Herodotus actually says that Leotychidas was navarch and Xanthippus led the Athenians. It is Diodorus [11.34.1] who indicates that the command was shared.

⁹⁸ Hammond, *Studies* 322. Although this does not prove that Eurybiades was appointed navarch in the spring of 480, it provides some support for the suggestion. Evidence for the navyrchy in this period is confined only to wartime when it may have been an extraordinary office over an allied fleet. If there was a Spartan navyrchy in peacetime it may have been similar to that of Spartan polemarch - a commander of the naval division of the Spartan forces.

⁹⁹ Michell 277 thinks the navyrchy was a royal office during the Persian Wars. That this was not written in stone is shown by the appointment of Eurybiades as navarch in 480. The reason is not given - Leotychidas may have been needed at Sparta to officiate at the religious festivals. Herodotus says that after Cleomenes' interference in Athens, both kings were not allowed to go on the same campaign [Hdt.5.75]. Perhaps the Thermopylae/Artemisium defence line was considered as one campaign to which one king was assigned.

Peloponnesians to agree to move against Mardonius.¹⁰⁰ The small numbers may be equally well explained by the fact that the Greek commanders knew they would soon have to face Mardonius in a land battle. There is no indication in the sources that the Athenians held back their fleet.¹⁰¹ Would they not have felt the same way as the other allies about the danger of another attack by sea? Or were there divisions of opinion at Athens about Mardonius' offer, disguised by later propaganda that it was Sparta that was the problem? Perhaps the Spartans, in line with Mardonius' aim, had begun to suspect Athenian loyalty to the allied cause. In that case, the Spartan offer to take Athenian refugees was a clever response to the Athenian attempt to force the Spartans' hand - it would have provided the Spartans with hostages for Athenian good conduct, if indeed they suspected Athenian loyalty - a procedure that Sparta had successfully used over Aiginetan medism in the time of Cleomenes [Hdt.6.47-52].

It may have been the occupation of Athens by Mardonius that finally persuaded Sparta to move. In the event the Spartans made their decision without the knowledge of the Athenian ambassadors and sent a force to Boeotia. Could the Spartans have fought as they did at Plataea if, as was once again suggested, they had been blackmailed into it by Athenian threats?¹⁰²

The timing of and reasons for the move of the allied fleet from Aegina to Delos are not clear. Herodotus makes it subsequent to the Chian appeal for help which was refused by Leotychidas - perhaps because Leotychidas had insufficient information to make such a decision, or because he was waiting to see what the Persians would do. Delos was, however, a good forward defensive position from which to watch for Persian moves.¹⁰³ Any news of such a move could also be signalled to the mainland through a beacon system.¹⁰⁴

While the fleet was at Delos an appeal was received from a group of Samians [Hdt.9.89]. This time Leotychidas responded, perhaps because of previous long-standing Spartan/Samian

¹⁰⁰ J. Munro, "Observations on the Persian Wars", *JHS* 24 (1904) 145-7 first stated this view. It is shared by Green 221-7. The view is based on an attempt to reconcile the ship numbers in Herodotus with those of Diodorus. Both Hignett 250 and Burn 500 argue against it.

¹⁰¹ In fact, Herodotus seems to suggest that the Athenian fleet mustered at Aegina, since he includes Xanthippus among the commanders there [8.129].

¹⁰² As supposed by Forrest 97 and Cartledge 207.

¹⁰³ Hignett 251.

¹⁰⁴ Such as the Greeks had organised from Sciathos [Hdt.7.183].

contacts, or because the Samians offered a better chance of success. The Persians had still made no move from Asia Minor and the Greeks may now have heard more of the dubious loyalty of the Ionian Greeks in the Persian fleet [Hdt.9.32.96; Diod.11.19.4] and the conditions of Xerxes' retreat [Hdt.8.129].¹⁰⁵ Herodotus attributed the Greek reluctance to move to plain fright over going so far, which is ridiculous if previous contacts with Asia Minor are remembered [Hdt.8.132]. Perhaps he meant that their uncertainty over the situation in Ionia and the strength of any Persian naval response made them nervous about committing their forces there.

Leotychidas' decision not to move until the situation was clearer was sound. By the time they fought the Persians at Mycale, many of the Greeks in the Persian force were ready to come over. Their defection might not have been the case earlier in the season. Leotychidas' appeal to these Greeks before the battle shows that he must have believed that this encouragement was enough. He might also have been informed about morale in the enemy fleet. The Persians still appear to have been thinking of a combined operation, since they withdrew from Samos to the mainland where there was a land force close by, while the Greek advance to the coast of Asia Minor under Spartan leadership was the beginning of a more aggressive naval strategy for them [Hdt.94-105].

Once the decision for battle was reached Leotychidas appears to have acted with confidence, although the actual engagement turned out not to be a naval one at all [Hdt.9.89; Diod.11.34-7]. Perhaps his rowers were also marines, or he had a large number of marines on board each ship to enable him to fight on land.¹⁰⁶ Herodotean rhetoric and hindsight turned this battle into one for control of the Hellespont and the Aegean islands. It can hardly have seemed so to Sparta at the time, and it was not considered important enough by Thucydides to be mentioned in his brief account of the war.¹⁰⁷

The later Spartan attitude to the problem of the protection of Ionia does not indicate that they went into battle with the liberation of Ionia as their aim. They are more likely to have been thinking of ending the threat of Persian naval intervention in the Aegean.

¹⁰⁵ There are problems with the chronology of events involving the Ionians' defection - Burn 501.

¹⁰⁶ Hignett 255; Burn 547. The same might well be true of the numbers in the force at Tempe.

¹⁰⁷ Thuc. 1.23.1. Thucydides' account may be biased because of his thesis that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest Greek war to date. The battle at Mycale was not one in which the Athenians gained credit for their naval expertise.

Herodotus also mentioned that this battle took place on the same day as that at Plataea [Hdt.9.89].¹⁰⁸ It is possible that some message may have reached the fleet by beacon - Herodotus says that Plataea was fought in the morning and Mycale that same evening - if so, then again the Spartan command showed its awareness of the need for swift communications between forces.¹⁰⁹

The size of the Spartan contingent at Mycale is not known, but it must have included some Spartan ships for the king and his entourage.¹¹⁰ Other members of the Peloponnesian alliance, Corinth, Sicyon, Troizen and Aegina also contributed ships but there is no record of their respective numbers [Hdt.9.103].¹¹¹

The Greeks returned to Samos to distribute the spoils of Mycale and to discuss what to do about Ionia [Hdt.9.104/5]. For Sparta this was not a decision to which it appears to have given much previous thought. The object of the oath taken by the Greeks at their Congress had been to resist Persia. This had been successfully done at sea and, if they had received the news of Plataea, on land as well. All that remained was to ensure that the Hellespont could not be crossed again by destroying Xerxes' bridges. They could then deal with the medizers in Greece [Hdt.9.114].

The Spartan suggestion that the Ionians should be resettled in Greece in the towns of the medizers was for them a reasonable one [Hdt.9.105].¹¹² It was Athens that appears to have turned the whole question into a wider one of Greek responsibility for Asia Minor and to have introduced the ethnic argument that Dorians could not decide the fate of Ionians. The prospect

¹⁰⁸ Diodorus 11.35.3. denies the possibility.

¹⁰⁹ Mardonios had a beacon system established through the islands [Hdt.9.3.] - a fact that indicates that Greek control was not well-established in the Aegean at the time. This may also explain why Leotychidas did not move against the Persians earlier.

¹¹⁰ According to Herodotus [6.52.], the king, when on military service, was accompanied by a bodyguard of one hundred picked men.

¹¹¹ Burn 549 says that the forces involved on both sides were small. Diodorus [11.36.6], following Ephorus, who would naturally wish to emphasise the importance of an engagement that involved Ionians, has enormous numbers involved on both sides.

¹¹² Diodorus 11.37.1. may reflect a different tradition. He says that both Athens and Sparta agreed to this suggestion but that Athens later changed its mind and offered support to the Ionians to stay in Asia Minor. Burn 552 thinks it an impracticable suggestion, while Green 285 points out its eventual effect on Athenian trade. They can hardly have been thinking of future trading patterns at such a time.

of the administration of Ionia was not one that Sparta could have envisaged - it had only a small fleet with which to do it, and it would have needed the strong support of its most powerful maritime allies, such as Aegina and Corinth. What the allies thought of the whole question is not recorded, but they must have agreed with Spartan policy, since the Peloponnesian contingent maintained its support of the Greek hegemon.

At this point there was a basic disparity of purpose between the leading states of the alliance. Sparta had failed to appreciate the growing ambition and independence of Athens, which had been stimulated by its successful contribution in the war.¹¹³ A compromise was reached about the admission of the eastern islanders to the Greek alliance [Hdt.9.105].¹¹⁴ The season was late and the Greek plans successfully completed. The Persians had been driven from Greece and from the coast of Ionia.¹¹⁵ Leotychidas may, however, have needed further consultation with Sparta over the new developments that had not formed part of his mandate in the spring. The Peloponnesian force apparently returned home after its mission to destroy the bridges at the Hellespont, while the Athenians and some eastern allies independently besieged Sestos.

The fact that new members were admitted to the Greek alliance shows that for both Athens and Sparta the war against Persia was not yet over, and that the alliance was still considered intact.

During the winter of 479/8 the Athenians began to rebuild their walls which had been damaged during the Persian occupation. The incident is interpreted as a sign of open hostility between Sparta and Athens,¹¹⁶ but Sparta's counter-claim that it feared the use of a walled base

¹¹³ Hdt.9.102. if true, suggests this rivalry existed by the time of Mycale. Undoubtedly, there would have been some rivalry between allied contingents, but fear of Athens' ambition seems anachronistic for Sparta at this time.

¹¹⁴ Hammond, "The Organization of the Athenian Alliance against Persia", *Studies* 317, says that it was Athens who failed to get the mainlanders admitted to alliance with the Greeks in 479. This was converted by Athenian bias to a Spartan failure to admit them.

¹¹⁵ See J.M.Balcer, "The Persian Wars against Greece" *Historia* 38 (1989) 127-43 for the suggestion that the Persian effort was hampered by recent revolts in Babylon and Egypt, and by their need to defeat the Greeks quickly.

¹¹⁶ Thucydides 1.90-92. says that the Spartans were secretly annoyed at the Athenians because they had not taken their advice about the walls, but he also adds that Sparta was particularly friendly to Athens at the time. Thucydides' thesis that Sparta was motivated by secret fear of Athens' increasing power may have influenced his view of these earlier events. Most scholars have followed him and seen the Spartan demand as a thinly veiled threat to Athens, although they have had to point out that, following this incident, Sparta made no hostile move against Athens for nearly seventeen years.

by a future Persian force has some validity.¹¹⁷ The fact that Sparta was prepared to carry on the campaign against Persia into the next year may not have been merely to secure its continued hegemony of the allies. The prospect of a Persian response - at least a naval one - must still have seemed real. Persia still had naval bases in Phoenicia and Egypt.¹¹⁸ That Athens, too, was similarly apprehensive about a further Persian naval attack is suggested by Thucydides [Thuc.1.93].¹¹⁹ The allied campaigns for 478/7 show that the major areas of Greek concern against Persia were in the south-east against the Phoenician fleet, and in the north-east at Byzantium.

The complaint was made at the prompting of Aegina [Plut.*Them.*19.2], who would naturally be apprehensive about the successful Athenian fleet and the completion of the fortifications of Piraeus. Sparta also proposed that all walls outside the Peloponnese be pulled down. Sparta itself had no walls. For Thucydides, their request to Athens was principally because of their allies' unease, i.e. Aegina and perhaps Megara [Salmon 258 n.4], although Thucydides adds that Sparta disliked walls in other cities [Thuc. 1.90]. With the Athenian success at Salamis, their contribution at Mycale and their independence over the Sestos campaign, Sparta may have been nervous about Athens' abilities. Thucydides' account makes the speed of the building of the city walls the main problem, but Athens had possessed city walls long before the Persian invasion [Hdt. 9.13.2; Thuc.1.89; E. Vanderpool, "The Date of the pre-Persian city walls of Athens", *Phoros; A Tribute to B.D.Meritt*, ed. D.Bradeen and M.Macgregor (New York, 1974) 156-60, and Sparta does not appear to have had any problem with them.

It seems more likely that Sparta and its allies' real objection was to the completion of the more solid and impressive harbour walls [Thuc.1.93] - an innovation in Greek fortifications [Gomme 262 n.1]. Aegina had shown how weak Athens' naval defences were before the war. Themistocles himself is said to have thought them very important [Thuc.1.93]. If, as suggested by Gomme 261, the landward walls of the Piraeus fortification were now being completed, this might well have caused concern. Athens would not merely have some protection for her fleet from an attack by sea - still of great concern to the allies in 479 - but would be immune from a land attack [suggested as Themistocles' justification [Thuc.1.93] - the Athenians would be able to retire safely to Piraeus]. The Spartans had little expertise at sieges [Thuc.1.102]. Diodorus may indicate the relative importance of the harbour walls. He separates the issues of city and harbour fortifications and has the Spartans object to both. Aristides and Xanthippos are party to the building of the Piraeus walls, which is kept secret from the Athenian Assembly so that the Spartans should not find out. The Spartans are further deceived by Themistocles claim that the walls were an advantage to the Greek fleet [Diod. 11.41 ff.] The Spartan claim that a walled base would be useful to Persia may have been valid; the Persian fleet was not yet out of the picture and Ionia was still in Persian hands.

Whatever the truth behind the story, the Spartans clearly preferred to maintain good relations with Athens than to make any further objections. The Greek alliance still had to deal with Persia.

The general feeling of Greek goodwill towards Athens is suggested by the text of a bronze tablet at Olympia, c.479 - SEG 31 (1981) 358. It details the decision in favour of Athens and Thespieae against Thessaly and Boeotia who had broken the Olympic truce of 480 by fighting on the side of Persia.

¹¹⁷ *contra* Hignett 239, 264; Forrest 100; Gomme 269; Burn 556 attributes it to fear of Athens; G.M. de Ste Croix 167f. sees it as confirmation of Spartan intention to invade Attica.

¹¹⁸ The fear of another Persian attack by sea must also have been felt at Athens. The city had been twice occupied and twice damaged by the Persians. This must have played some part in their single-minded rebuilding of the walls to the point where they were ready to argue with Sparta about it.

¹¹⁹ Later, the Persians did try to put together another naval force. It was defeated by Cimon at the Eurymedon, c.469 (ATL), c.468/7 to 467/6 (Gomme 408), or 465 (Deane 9-12); Thuc.1.100.

The Spartan regent and king exchanged commands for 478 and the regent Pausanias led the allied Greek fleet [Thuc.1.94]. Once again, some allied discussion and agreement about their aims for the coming season must have taken place by the spring. Whatever the disagreements over the later implementation of allied policies, the continued dispatch of joint forces shows that the allies were still in general agreement at the beginning of the season.

Pausanias led a force of twenty Peloponnesian and thirty Athenian ships together with a number of vessels from the island allies [Thuc.1.94].¹²⁰ No Spartan ships are specifically mentioned, but there must have been a few at least for the regent and his Spartan associates.¹²¹ The numbers from individual Peloponnesian states are not known, but the Peloponnesian and Athenian contributions are roughly similar. There is also no suggestion that the Peloponnesians were reluctant to provide their share or to serve under Sparta again. Nor were the Spartans reluctant to lead another campaign.

The campaign against Cyprus to remove the threat of a Phoenician naval response was successful, and there were apparently no complaints made about Pausanias' generalship or behaviour. The true picture of what happened afterwards at Byzantium is impossible to recover on the present state of our evidence,¹²² but Pausanias lost the support of the non-Peloponnesian group, and was recalled to Sparta to face charges that included medism [Hdt.5.32; Thuc.1.128-30]. Sparta was clearly disconcerted by this event and took time to investigate the case and to find a replacement for Pausanias. The loss of time was crucial, for by the time the replacement, Dorcis, arrived, either late in 478 or early 477,¹²³ the Athenians had the support of the majority

¹²⁰ Diodorus 11.44.2.says there were fifty Peloponnesian ships.

¹²¹ Thucydides refers to Pausanias as a *strategos*.

¹²² The problems of chronology and motive in the story of Pausanias are notorious [de Ste Croix 172]. Thucydides believed that Pausanias medized and intended to set himself up in the Hellespont with Persian support. This has been questioned by P.J. Rhodes. "Thucydides on Pausanias and Themistocles" *Historia* 19 (1970) 287-323; M.Lang, "Scapegoat Pausanias" *CJ* 63 (1967) 74-85. The Spartans themselves appeared to be in two minds about his guilt and needed a great deal of proof and investigation against him before they acted. Perhaps Pausanias' problem was because of his early and great success. He was only a regent and never likely to be king at Sparta and may not have been able to come to terms with the personal obscurity in the Spartan system that would follow the war [A.Powell, *Athens and Sparta* (London, 1988) 103-6]. A position with Persian support might have seemed his only choice. Pausanias may have hoped for a career in the east similar to that of the Athenian Miltiades; if so, he chose the wrong time to do so.

¹²³ *ATL* 95-106. N.G.L.Hammond, "The Organisation of the Athenian Alliance against Persia" *Studies* 311-345, points out that major problem over the date is that it gives little time for Pausanias to become so great a problem that he has to be recalled.

of the eastern allies for their hegemony of the naval campaign in the east. They had had some practice at leading the allied forces during the Sestus campaign in the winter of 479/8. Presumably they would have used the same command structure as set up under Sparta. It would be ironic if the military organisation that developed into the Athenian empire was one modelled on the Spartan system.

Pausanias' precise aims are unknown but, on his return to the Hellespont after his trial, he is said to have taken a trireme from Hermione on his own authority. His second journey was an unofficial one according to Thucydides. Pausanias went to Hermione where, because of the distance from Sparta, he still had some influence [Thuc.1.128.3].

If Pausanias' command in Cyprus and Byzantium was contemporary with that of Leotychidas in the north, then the allies must have agreed to two separate campaigns for 478/7 - each of which involved a Greek naval contingent. The chronology of events in the next few years is far from clear.¹²⁴ Plutarch refers to a proposal by Themistocles to burn the Greek fleet wintering at Pagasae - presumably to ensure Athenian supremacy [Plut. *Them.* 20.1].¹²⁵ Command of this fleet is associated with Leotychidas' operations in Thessaly in 478.¹²⁶ It was, perhaps, undertaken to punish the medising states and to exact war reparations.¹²⁷ Elsewhere Plutarch says that Leotychidas deposed the tyrant of Thasos [Plut. *de Mal. Her.* 21] - another action that would have required ships to reach Thasos. The date of Leotychidas' operations on the island is unknown. They may well have occurred during his Thessalian command. The only other time that Leotychidas was said to have been in the northern Aegean was in 479, when he

¹²⁴ See the comments of J. Johnston, "A Chronological Note on the Expedition of Leotychidas to Thessaly" *Hermathena* 46 (1931) 106-112

¹²⁵ Cartledge 212 assigns this proposal to 480/79 but does not say why. Plutarch, *Them.* 20.1, on whom the story is based, claims the incident took place after the departure of Xerxes (in 480, or does Plutarch mean the departure of the Persians in 479?). He goes on to describe the attempted Spartan take-over of the Amphictyonic League, which is usually dated to Leotychidas' period of command in the north. Plutarch adds that the Greek fleet was wintering at Pagasae - why would it have done so in 480/79? It had sailed south after Artemisium and there is no evidence that it went north again in that year, when the threat of a Persian naval response was very real. There is the further problem that Themistocles was hardly likely to have wanted to destroy about half the Greek fleet until the threat of a further Persian attack at sea had been eliminated. Cic. *Off.* 3.11.49 claims that the fleet was at Gytheum; there is no evidence that Gytheum was used as a winter base for the allied fleet in the Persian War. In 479/8 the fleet was operating at Mycale, then at the Hellespont, after which the Spartans and their allies returned home, while the Athenian besieged Sestus and Abydos. The earliest opportunity for an allied fleet to have been wintering in Thessaly would have been in 478/7.

¹²⁶ Forrest 100, dates Leotychidas' command to sometime between 478 and 476, when he was exiled.

¹²⁷ Booty raids on a former medising state were to be expected after the Persian War, see Pritchett ccs 3-5.

was at the Hellespont. According to Herodotus, however, he took the remainder of the fleet home after the Athenians decided to continue operations against Sestus [Hdt.9.114]. As these operations continued until autumn, it was still summer when Leotychidas left the Hellespont; he may have visited Thasos on his way back, but neither Herodotus [9.114] nor Thucydides [1.89] mentions it.

The fleet was said to be wintering at Pagasae and so Leotychidas' command of it may have been extended. Thus for 478, and into 477, the allied fleet may have been divided, and Sparta sent a king to lead one division and a regent the other. This decision may have been taken to emphasise Spartan authority that had been challenged by the Athenian decision to campaign alone against Sestus the previous winter. If a northern campaign under Leotychidas was undertaken later than 478, Sparta must still have had a recognised claim to lead an allied force that included a naval contingent after the supposed loss of naval hegemony to Athens.

Thucydides' claim that the Spartans were no longer interested in the hegemony may thus have been true for the Hellespont command only:¹²⁸ the Spartans had clearly shown their lack of interest in pursuing the fight in the Hellespont at the time of the Sestus campaign and the admission of Ionian mainlanders to the Greek league. Herodotus and Diodorus may reflect different explanations of events. Herodotus suggests that the Athenians took the opportunity provided by Pausanias' behaviour to challenge Spartan command [Hdt.8.3]. After praising the moderation of Aristides in taking over after Pausanias, Diodorus refers to the loss of the naval hegemony by Sparta as unreasonable [Diod.11.46.5].¹²⁹ The Spartans are said to have held a debate, c.475, on the loss of naval command, in which the younger element favoured war with Athens to get it back. Some Spartans, then, resented the loss of prestige and the possible wealth this loss involved. The majority, however, were not so supportive of the naval hegemony that they were prepared to go to war over it. The date suggested by Diodorus puts this debate after the accusations of bribery against Leotychidas. The disgrace of two members of royal households in a short space of time might well have resulted in a reaction at Sparta against further naval involvement abroad.

¹²⁸ Thuc.1.95., where the majority of Spartans are said to have thought the Athenians friendly to them.

¹²⁹ At 50.8 Diodorus says that Athens expected war over the question and was building extra ships. As Sicilian events are related between the two chapters, Diodorus may have changed sources and have been taking the account of the Spartan debate from a source less favourable to Athens, perhaps Ephorus.

There is no indication that Sparta intended to build up its fleet to challenge Athens - the debate was over the issue of hegemony. The real loss of Spartan naval hegemony may have been a more gradual process that occurred first in the east and then in the west. The eastern command was seen as the more significant later because it formed the basis of Athens' Delian League and, subsequently, its empire. It is also possible that Thucydides' explanation represents an Athenian argument that justified Athens' take-over of power at a time when its empire was far less popular [Thuc. 1.130; Hdt. 7.139].

It has been said that Sparta tried three separate policies in the final years of the war: maintenance of its naval hegemony under Pausanias, followed by extension of its land power under Leotychidas (the old Cleomenean policy) and, finally, concentration on the Peloponnese.¹³⁰ It is possible that the first two were aspects of the same policy - an interest in maintaining the naval leadership as long as possible. Leotychidas was not necessarily a slavish follower of Cleomenes. He still controlled a Greek fleet, not just a Spartan force, and was probably operating off the mainland at Thasos. He may not have been altruistically pursuing panhellenic aims by this time, but instead have been strengthening Sparta's position to counter-balance that of Athens in the east.¹³¹ His subsequent conviction for bribery together with Pausanias' disgrace in Byzantium brought the whole naval involvement of Sparta into question.¹³²

The Persian War had been a watershed for Sparta. It had played a major role at Plataea and its leadership and organisation of the Greek forces had made an important contribution at Artemisium and Salamis. Thermopylae, although a military failure, was eventually to be regarded as an example of Spartan discipline and obedience.¹³³ Herodotus, too, praised Spartan

¹³⁰ Forrest 99; Cartledge 212.

¹³¹ That he was trying to strengthen Sparta's position in the north is indicated by the account of the Spartan attempt at control of the Amphictyonic League - Plut. *Them.* 20; Ael. Arist. xlv.

¹³² Thuc. 1.95 in a brief review says that it was Pausanias' recall alone that caused the Spartans to give up the hegemony, through fear of the corruption of their commanders. He does not mention Leotychidas. Charges against two members of royal families would better explain the debate at Sparta and the more conservative decision of the majority.

¹³³ J. Barron, *CAH* vol. 8 592ff. C. Starr, "Why did the Greeks defeat the Persians?" *P.P.* 86 (1962) 321-3.

abilities, though it was Athens which eventually won the propaganda war until its contribution to the Greek naval victory became a commonplace.¹³⁴

Sparta had entered the war to resist the Persian invasion and had, perhaps, initiated allied resistance as well. It had organised and led the Greeks without forcefully stressing its position as hegemon - a position that was difficult since it relied on good-will among all the allies in order to work. Sparta had not, however, thought further than simple, organised resistance, punishment of anti-medism and maintenance of its own current position. The Spartans had clearly not appreciated the effect Athenian success had on Athens, nor do they appear to have had any long-term post-war plans, apart from punishment of the medising states. They may even have expected the pre-war *status quo* to be preserved.

Although Sparta's domestic policies in the period are unknown, it had not emerged unscathed from the war. Apart from their known dead, especially at Thermopylae and Plataea, they had also effectively lost four members of their royal families in the space of a few years; Cleombrotos, the regent for Pleistarchus, and Leonidas had died, while Pausanias and Leotychidas were in disgrace. There may also have been security problems in the Peloponnese [Hdt.9.77]. These events and Sparta's own lack of vision left an opportunity for the ambitious challenge of Athens.

C. Sparta to the revolt of Samos, c.476-439

The details of events and their chronology in the period of the Pentecontaetia form a notorious crux in Greek history.¹³⁵ Our major source, Thucydides, gives only a brief outline of them and even this may be vitiated by his objective which was to show how Athens' actions caused Sparta to fear its growing power and resulted in a war that Thucydides thought the greatest to his time [Thuc.1.1, 89-117].

The internal history of Sparta in the period is equally obscure. It may have been involved in several wars in the Peloponnese [Hdt.7.37,9.35.2].¹³⁶ Discontent in the alliance may have

¹³⁴ Hdt. 7.102, 104, 135, 209, 9.71, *contra* Cartledge 203,207.

¹³⁵ Thucydides 1. 89-117; Diodorus 11. 41ff, 12. 1-30; *ATL* 158-83, Gomme, 222-4, 361-413 for a summary of the major problems; see also Deane and E. Badian, "Towards a chronology of the Pentecontaetia down to the renewal of the Peace of Callias" *Classical Views* n.s.7 (1988) 289-320.

¹³⁶ Forrest 101-5; Cartledge 214.

influenced Sparta to give up further involvement in the later part of the Persian war. Any such threats to its leadership in the Peloponnesian alliance would probably have tended to accentuate conservative response to operations abroad. The ascendancy of pro-Laconian Cimon at Athens helped preserve friendly post-war relations between the two states.¹³⁷ His idea of a dual hegemony - Sparta on land and Athens at sea against Persia - seems to have been preserved on both sides for some years.¹³⁸

No further Spartan actions are recorded for some years after the exile of Leotychidas, despite the probable anti-Spartan activities of the ostracised Themistocles [Thuc.1.135].¹³⁹ In fact, there is no real evidence of any hostility between Sparta and Athens for nearly seventeen years.¹⁴⁰ Such inactivity suggests that Sparta accepted the necessity of the situation of shared hegemony provided that Athens pursued the war against Persia and made no claim to leadership in Greece. There is no evidence for any further Spartan maritime activity to c.465.¹⁴¹

Thasos

According to Thucydides, Sparta, c.465/4, secretly agreed to help the island of Thasos [Thuc.1.100-101].¹⁴² The Spartans promised to distract Athens by a land invasion of Attica, but were prevented from doing so by a major earthquake and the helot revolt that followed. Thucydides does not say why Sparta was ready to help Thasos, but the action was clearly its

¹³⁷ Plutarch, *Kimon*, de Ste Croix, 169-80. A. Blamire, *Plutarch: Life of Kimon* (London, 1989) 166.

¹³⁸ Ion *FGrH* 392 F14 ap. Plut., *Kimon* 16.10.

¹³⁹ de Ste Croix 171; Forrest 100; Cartledge 215.

¹⁴⁰ de Ste Croix 168 says there was 'no overt hostility', although there were still some Spartans who would prefer to see Sparta as sole Greek hegemon. There is no real evidence for this statement which appears to be based on Thucydides' assumption that Sparta was secretly jealous of Athens' new-found prestige from the start. If such a group existed, it must have been small and have kept quiet for a considerable time.

¹⁴¹ This assumption, of course, depends on the dating of Pausanias' recall and the activities of Leotychidas in the north. These have been assigned to as late as the late 470s. For Pausanias' dates see M.E. White, *JHS* 84 (1964) 140ff, Cartledge 213; for Leotychidas, Forrest 100, who assigns Leotychidas' exile to 476 but Powell, *Athens and Sparta* (London, 1988) 102, suggests the late 470s. The uncertainty here is typical of the problems of this whole period between the major wars.

¹⁴² The Thasian incident has been doubted but is accepted by most scholars, see *ATL* 163, Gomme 295-300, 408f.; Meiggs 83; de Ste Croix 178ff.; Deane 12-20.; Forrest 102 and Cartledge 220, do not seem entirely sure because Sparta had only recently re-established its hegemony in the Peloponnese and might not be strong enough to make any promises. Cartledge also states on the basis of Thuc.1.101.2 that the Spartans 'voted' to help Thasos - this is not what Thucydides says.

own, as no involvement by members of the Peloponnesian alliance is mentioned. If its hegemony in the Peloponnese was by now restored, Sparta may have been looking to challenge Athenian expansion. That Sparta was unable or unwilling to help by a naval action is indicated by the fact that it was intending to respond by a land invasion of Attica. If the story is true, earlier contacts between Sparta and Thasos are indicated, otherwise why and how would the Thasians appeal to Sparta in the first place? The Spartan king, Leotychidas, was said to have helped depose the tyrant of Thasos [Plut. *de Mal. Her.* 21]. That Sparta was not ready to help anyone at all who revolted from Athens is suggested by the fact that the Spartans do not appear to have objected to the suppression of the revolt of Naxos or to the forced enrolment of Carystus in the Athenian League [Thuc. 1.98].¹⁴³

Perhaps Sparta had maintained some interest in the north-west Aegean, even after the failure of Leotychidas to gain control of the Amphictyonic League.¹⁴⁴ There may have been ties between the Thasian regime and some Spartans,¹⁴⁵ perhaps of *xenia* - these ties would have involved further contact by sea. The incident also indicates that there were Spartans who were prepared to run the risk of war when Athenian interests appeared to expand outside their anti-Persian mandate.¹⁴⁶

Sparta subsequently appealed to Athens for help against the helots, c.465.¹⁴⁷ Although Thucydides concentrates on the crisis between Athens and Sparta that resulted from Athens' dismissal from Ithome, other states, Plataea, Mantinea and Aegina, sent help. Aeginetan aid would presumably have come by sea.¹⁴⁸ After the revolt was over and because of the hostility

¹⁴³ Meiggs 69-71.

¹⁴⁴ Plut. *Them* 20.3; Forrest 100; Cartledge 212.

¹⁴⁵ Later contacts in the period of the Peloponnesian War are mentioned by Meiggs, *Empire* 218/9.

¹⁴⁶ de Ste Croix *OPW* 178ff sees this incident as a further indication that Spartan 'hawks' resented the hegemony of Athens from the start, and that their influence at Sparta grew as pro-Spartan Cimon's declined at Athens. Presumably these 'hawks' maintained a low profile for years until a suitable opportunity arose for action. Such long-term patience does not seem likely nor does it explain why Sparta should choose to interfere at Thasos. At the same time it is true that the whole incident 'needs more explanation than we are given in our sources' [Meiggs, *Empire* 83].

¹⁴⁷ Thucydides 1.101-3; Gomme 298-302; Deane 15-28.

¹⁴⁸ The Athenian reaction of outrage against their dismissal is usually supported by scholars - de Ste Croix 178 - they may have found out about the Spartan promise to Thasos or perhaps it was because of Athenian democratic sympathies with the helots. Gomme 301 stresses that it was an unusual reaction for a Greek state. But what had happened to cause it and why did Athens react so immediately and spectacularly? Was Athens looking for an excuse

Athens then felt towards Sparta that had resulted from Ithome, the Athenians settled the surviving Messenians at Naupactus, which Athens had acquired.¹⁴⁹ It was to be a provocative move, but its full import cannot have been felt in the Peloponnese until Megara seceded from the Peloponnesian alliance and allied with Athens.¹⁵⁰ How far Athens was involved in this move by Megara is impossible to say.

The First Peloponnesian War

The circumstances of the start of this war are as obscure and controversial as the amount and date of Spartan involvement.¹⁵¹

There is no clear evidence that Sparta took part in the war until the battle of Tanagra.¹⁵² Thucydides refers to those involved as Peloponnesian - a term that may include the Spartans, as he uses it when he refers to the parties concluding the truce and the later peace, after Sparta had fought Athens at Tanagra [Thuc.1.112, 115]. He also adds that Athens was later at war with Aegina [1.105]. Diodorus [11.78.1] suggests that it was Corinth and Epidaurus who were fighting Athens. Sparta must have been at least an interested observer from the first in events that so closely involved its major naval allies, Aegina and Corinth. The resulting loss of the Aeginetan navy was to increase the power and position of Corinth as a naval force within the Peloponnesian alliance.

Sparta was cut off from land access to central Greece when Megara allied with Athens [Thuc.1.103]. Athens then gradually isolated Sparta from its allies by sea. It is difficult to

to break with Cimonian pro-Spartan policies? Thucydides says Athens made alliances with Thessaly and Argos immediately afterwards, [1.102] but this would require some time for negotiation. The consequences of the Spartan action at Ithome, however, were significant.

¹⁴⁹ Thucydides 1.103. Salmon 261 thinks Naupactus was not taken before the Ithome incident as Athens had no reason to be unfriendly to Corinth. Athens could do little to harm Sparta directly after Ithome, so it tried to act against Sparta's allies.

¹⁵⁰ Thucydides 1.103. The effect of this alliance on access to the Saronic and Corinthian Gulfs was important for Athens. Gomme 305 has pointed out the difficulties of sailing around the Peloponnese to get to the Gulf of Corinth.

¹⁵¹ de Ste Croix 180; Cartledge 224ff; Deane 31-45; Forrest 106 has called it a "series of adventures not a war", while Gomme 304 believes it was a war from the time of Megara's secession from the Peloponnesian alliance. J. T. Hooker, *The Ancient Spartans* (London, 1980) 174 feels that Athens, Sparta and Corinth were all responsible. de Ste Croix 180 has pointed out that Thucydides gives little detail because there was little direct conflict between Athens and Sparta. Holladay 54-63 doubts that Sparta was at war until the battle of Tanagra. Salmon 261f. disagrees with this.

¹⁵² Cartledge 226 and Holladay 54-63.

believe that the Spartans were unaware of this. Their lack of response was probably due to their inability to retaliate by land or sea to the Athenian actions because of Athenian control of Megara and because of Athenian operations in the Saronic Gulf.¹⁵³ Sparta had insufficient ships to act alone against Athens. The use of allied ships in the Persian War and Sparta's misinterpretation of Athenian policy had caused Sparta to neglect strengthening its own naval arm.

The first actions in the dispute were naval and confined to the Saronic Gulf area, a fact that indicates its importance in this war; the Athenians sailed to Halieis but were defeated by a land force from Corinth and Epidaurus.¹⁵⁴ Athens may have been trying to link up with its ally, Argos, and gain control of a useful harbour between Argos and the Saronic Gulf.¹⁵⁵ The attempt may have failed because of an earlier Spartan move, perhaps aimed at linking up with the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: a Spartan, Aneristus, had sailed to Halieis in a merchant ship (from Prasiae or from the Laconian Gulf) with an armed crew and taken the town [Hdt.7.136]. The date of the incident is not known but it is usually assigned to this period in the war. It is not clear either whether Aneristus was acting on his own initiative, or whether the attack was a Spartan decision in response to the Athenian move against Halieis.¹⁵⁶ Whatever the explanation, such a Spartan plan implies access to a ship and the recognition of the need for surprise. Sparta was aware of the importance of access to the Saronic Gulf and to Aegina.

A naval battle between a Peloponnesian fleet and Athens off Cecryphalaea in the Saronic Gulf followed the action at Halieis [Thuc.1.105; Diod.11.78.1]. The number and origin of the Peloponnesian ships involved is unknown. As the Athenians afterwards besieged Aegina, it is reasonable to assume that some were Aeginetan. Corinth and Sicyon would probably also have

¹⁵³ It has been suggested by Deane 12f. that the helot revolt was not yet over and that this was the reason for the lack of Spartan response in the early part of the war.

¹⁵⁴ Thuc. 1.105. Diodorus 11.78. says that the war was Corinth and Epidaurus against Athens but he puts it before the alliance of Megara with Athens. Kagan 84. The date and occurrence of the subsequent battle of Oenoe has been the subject of much debate. If it occurred early in the war, it may have been after the Athenian alliance with Argos - Meiggs 469-72. Its importance is that it was the first battle between Athens and Sparta and was, apparently, recorded by a painting in the Stoa Poikile at Athens. If Oenoe was the first action, then technically Sparta was the aggressor in the war, since Argos was allied with Athens. A later date has been suggested for Oenoe - L.H. Jeffery, "The Battle of Oenoe in the Stoa Poikile: a Problem in Greek Art and History" *BSA* 60 (1965) 41-57. She suggests that it took place after Oenophyta. This would make Athens the aggressor at Halieis - Salmon 262, 265 n.39.

¹⁵⁵ Meiggs 97.

¹⁵⁶ Hdt.7.136. The date of this incident is not clear. It must have been after 477 and while Argos was hostile to Sparta, i.e. before the thirty-year alliance of 451 - Meiggs 97. Diodorus 11.78.2 has Athens winning at Halieis. Holladay 54-63 questions whether it was an individual action.

been involved, as their interests were threatened by Athenian access to the Saronic and the Corinthian Gulfs.¹⁵⁷ A large number of unspecified Peloponnesian ships took part in a subsequent battle between Aegina and Athens.¹⁵⁸ This is suggested by the fact that the Peloponnesians are said to have lost seventy ships [Thuc.1.105]. In the Persian war the Peloponnesians could put to sea well over a hundred ships. To lose seventy would have been a major disaster. More Aeginetan ships probably were lost, as the battle was fought in Aeginetan waters. No Spartan vessels or commander are mentioned, so the action may not have been performed under Spartan leadership.¹⁵⁹

The first concrete evidence of Spartan involvement in this war is in the expedition to Doris, c.458, [Thuc.1.108].¹⁶⁰ This force went by sea across the Gulf - a bold move not anticipated by the Athenians. Whose ships were used to transport the force is not known - perhaps they were Corinthian and Sicyonian. Athens took precautions to cut off the Peloponnesians' return by a similar route across the Corinthian Gulf [Diod.11.80.1]. Sparta probably needed to make such an expedition to restore its prestige after the Peloponnesian naval failures and its general lack of action. The battle of Tanagra that followed settled nothing.¹⁶¹ By c.457 Athens held Aegina, Troizen and Hermione, and Sparta was unable to respond.

The weakness of the Spartan policy of relying on allies for naval protection was clearly demonstrated when the allies themselves were in difficulties. Athens emphasised this for even

¹⁵⁷ Diod. 11.80 mentions ships at Pagae on the Corinthian Gulf. Pericles uses it later as a naval base for an attack on Sicyon.

¹⁵⁸ Thuc.1.105; Diodorus 11.78.4 adds that Aegina had a large number of ships including new triremes, and experienced sailors. The loss of its fleet to the Peloponnesian alliance must have been significant.

¹⁵⁹ Salmon 264 believes the Spartans were not involved because they were inefficient, and that the fleet was commanded by the Corinthians.

¹⁶⁰ The reasons for Spartan action are usually thought to be that it needed the prestige - Gomme 314; Cartledge 227; Salmon 264; de Ste Croix 190-5, and not because it intended to attack Athens. Diodorus suggests it was to help. Holladay 59-60 states that Sparta was not hostile to Athens and that the war was the result of the Athenian attack at Tanagra. Spartan good faith is shown by the fact that it did not proceed to invade Attica after the victory. Kagan 104/5 points out the disputes between Athens and Aegina over Salamis as a source of hostility. For Kagan the Peace was a recognition of realities of power and a promise of future stability although there were still some extremists on each side.

¹⁶¹ de Ste Croix 187f. for the strategic importance of Athens' control of the Megarid.

the most anti-naval Spartans in the *periplous* of the Peloponnese by Tolmides, c.456.¹⁶² The number of places attacked or captured by the Athenians on their successful rampage around the Peloponnesian coast is unclear. Thucydides limits the damage to the burning of the Spartan harbour in the south [Thuc.1.108] and successful operations on the north coast at Chalcis and Sicyon. Diodorus and Pausanias expand the list to include Boiae, Gytheum, Cythera and Methone [Diod.11.84.6; Paus.1.27.5].¹⁶³ Diodorus places the attack on Methone before that on Gytheum, which is geographically unlikely. Whatever the true details were, it was now clear that Athens could sail around the Peloponnese with impunity, or cut off Sparta from its naval allies through its use of Megarian ports. Sicyon was again attacked and defeated by an Athenian naval force operating out of Pagae and an alliance was made between Athens and Achaea.¹⁶⁴ No further naval actions are recorded in the war. They were not necessary as Athens had complete naval supremacy. When Persia sent money to Sparta to tempt the Spartans to invade Attica in order to draw the Athenians away from Egypt, the Spartans were unable to move, even had they wished to do so [Thuc.1.109].¹⁶⁵

Problems in the Aegean after the Egyptian disaster may have forced Athens to negotiate a truce and later alliance with Sparta [Thuc.1.115].¹⁶⁶ By the terms of the peace with Sparta

¹⁶² Thuc.1.108 says that Tolmides attacked Gytheum and Chalcis (west of Naupactus) and defeated Sicyon. Diodorus 11.84 says that he did it for the prestige value and sailed with 50 triremes and four thousand hoplites, took Methone and Gytheum, won over Zacynthus, Cephallenia, and settled the Messenians at Naupactus. Pausanias 1.27.5 and Schol. Aeschin.2.75 add that Tolmides held Boiae and Cythera briefly. Cartledge 229 feels that Tolmides anticipated the idea of *epiteichismos*. R.K.Unz, "The Chronology of the Pentekontaetia" *CQ* ns 36 (1986) 68-86 suggests that Diodorus has put together into one several raids made by the Athenians in the 450s. This is quite possible as Diodorus is not noted for his accuracy. His reference to Gytheum, however, is the first mention of this harbour as the Spartan naval base in the fifth century. From Spartan activity to this point it is unlikely that Sparta had anything so formal as a naval base in the mid-fifth century.

¹⁶³ Thucydides does not name Gytheum as the Spartan dockyard but it is usually assumed to have been Sparta's harbour at this time. There is, however, no direct evidence for this assumption. Gytheum is not mentioned at all by Thucydides. He refers to ships at Las [8.91] which may have been the Spartan port at the time. It had a large bay suitable for triremes, whereas the harbour at Gytheum was man-made [Strabo 8.5.2, C363]. An underwater archaeological survey of the harbour at Gytheum revealed some remains of Roman harbour walls [N.C.Scoufopoulos, J.G.McKernan, "Underwater survey of ancient Gytheum, 1972" *JNA* 4 (1975) 103-16]. Gytheum was damaged by seismic activity and rebuilt and expanded in the Roman period. No remains of the Classical period have been identified. The earliest reference to Gytheum as Sparta's port in the fifth century comes from Cicero, *Off.*3.11.49. It is possible that it was assumed from its later importance always to have been Sparta's naval headquarters.

¹⁶⁴ Troizen and Achaea were taken at some time in the war as they were returned to Sparta by the terms of the peace - Thuc.1.125; de Ste Croix 196-200; Gomme 74; Cartledge 230.

¹⁶⁵ Lewis 50.

¹⁶⁶ *ATL* 168f.; Salmon 226; Meiggs 109-24.

Athens gave up Nisaea, Pagae, Troizen and Achaea but not Naupactus. The rest of Megara had already revolted to the Peloponnesians [Thuc.1.114/5].¹⁶⁷ Sparta did not recover Aegina and so lost a major contributor to its fleet - an important one for any Spartan interests in the Aegean Sea.¹⁶⁸ There was also division over policy at Sparta.¹⁶⁹ The bribery charge brought against Pleistoanax suggests that there was opposition to his action and that some favoured a more aggressive response to Athens than Pleistoanax' possible accommodation with Pericles implied. The terms of the peace may have forced Sparta to acknowledge publicly Athenian control of the Aegean, but Spartan action later in the same decade was to show that it did not always subscribe to this view.

Samos and Mytilene

The revolt of Samos in 440/39 was a serious threat to Athens [Thuc.1.115].¹⁷⁰ Sparta was sufficiently interested in the situation to call a meeting of the allies to discuss a Samian appeal for help. The timing of events, or whether the help was to be at sea or on land by invading Attica, is not clear. The Spartan discussions may have preceded the revolt, if Samos had been disaffected for some time.¹⁷¹ Corinth and some other unidentified Peloponnesian allies, however, opposed the suggestion of intervention, and nothing came of it. Their reasons are not known - the reference to their rejection occurs in the Corinthians' speech to the Athenians in which they are concerned to show how their actions, in particular, have benefited Athens [Thuc.1.40.5]. Corinth's importance in this situation would have been for its port on the Saronic Gulf and for the ships it would have to supply, if the Spartans intended to send aid to Samos. After the loss of Aegina, Corinth was the single largest contributor of ships to the Peloponnesian

¹⁶⁷ Interpretations of the terms of the peace differ widely: the peace was made on the Athenian initiative [Andoc. *Pax*.6] and Athens yielded more - J.T.Hooker, *The Ancient Spartans* (London, 1980) 181/2; Athens made peace on favourable terms - Meiggs 182, Holladay 54-63; Sparta's weakness was shown by this peace - Cartledge 230, Forrest 107.

¹⁶⁸ *ATL* 303 for the unsatisfactory post-war status of Aegina.

¹⁶⁹ Meiggs 178.

¹⁷⁰ Thuc. describes it as a serious threat - 8.76.4, 73.4, 86.4, 98.4. The Samians were treated savagely after the naval battle with Athens - Plut. *Per.* 28; Meiggs 191. Peloponnesian involvement may be referred to in a Samian inscription *IG*(2) 50. Samian exiles helped Sparta in 427 and in the Ionian War from their base at Anaca - Thuc.4.53, 8.19,61.

¹⁷¹ G.Shipley, *A History of Samos* (Oxford, 1987) 113-9 suggests dissatisfaction with Athens at Samos in the early 440s. The discussion about Peloponnesian assistance may not have taken place until after Samos revolted. Sparta/Samian *xenia* may have been invoked to justify the proposal - Cartledge 231.

alliance, and its agreement was crucial for any naval action. Corinth's interests in general may have been directed more towards the west.¹⁷² Sparta's only other naval ally with an Aegean port was Megara, but the actual size of Megara's fleet at this time is unknown. Megara, too, may have been more interested in the west.¹⁷³

It is possible that the first appeal from Mytilene was received at Sparta around the same time [Thuc.3.13].¹⁷⁴ The Spartans refused to become involved, but the Mytileneans must have thought some Spartans would favour it, in order to approach Sparta in the first place. Why Sparta refused to help is not clear. The Spartans may have thought the whole situation on Lesbos too fluid, or, if the request came after the Samian debate, that Corinth might oppose it. The appeals from both islands also suggest diplomatic activity by sea in both cases. They also reveal the dependence of Sparta on Corinth, in particular, for naval expeditions in the period leading up to the Second Peloponnesian War. The Spartan and other allied naval contributions were too small to be effective, even collectively, against the Athenian fleet.¹⁷⁵

For the period of the Pentecontaetia Sparta relied on allied ships for any proposed naval campaigns. Its position as allied naval hegemon in the Persian war had probably consolidated this practice. The personalities of its later naval commanders and some possible security problems with its allies in the Peloponnese, as well as a helot revolt, had caused Sparta to take a less direct interest in maritime matters following the campaigns against Persia in the north, but potential naval allies, such as Mytilene and Samos, still directed their requests for assistance to Sparta. Its traditional position as allied hegemon was still strong. Such ships as Sparta itself possessed would have been kept for diplomacy and its own security.¹⁷⁶

By the end of the first war with Athens in 446, Sparta had been frustrated by its allies' naval failures and weakness, which had exposed its own. Its naval plans for the Archidamian

¹⁷² R.Legon, "The Megarian Decree and the Balance of Greek Naval Power" *CP* 68 *CP* 68 (1973) 164-5.

¹⁷³ Megara certainly supported Corinth in both naval actions of the Ionian crisis, c.435-32 [Thuc.1.27, 46-50]. For the suggestion that Megara maintained its trade links in the northern and north-eastern Aegean and played an important role as a trader in timber for the Corinthian fleet in its massive building programme, see R.Legon, *Megara: the Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 B.C.* (Ithaca and London, 1981) 219ff.

¹⁷⁴ Kagan 172-3.

¹⁷⁵ The numbers of ships supplied by Sparta and its allies, apart from Corinth, in the Persian wars indicates that they had few ships compared with the extraordinary size of the Athenian fleet - Hdt.8.1, 42-45.

¹⁷⁶ Thucydides at 4.53.3 notes the presence of pirates around the Peloponnesian coast.

War were to show that Spartan was aware of its vulnerability in this respect. The Spartans did nothing immediately to improve the situation, as a large amount of money would be needed to build and man a fleet of sufficient size to challenge Athens at sea. They received no financial payment in peace time from their allies such as the Athenians did from their empire [Thuc.1.121, 142]. The Spartans themselves could have funded a small fleet of their own from their own resources without allied contributions, but they were clearly unwilling to do so and preferred to rely on allied contributions. After their allies' refusal to be involved against Athens in the Samian revolt, Sparta would clearly have to have under its control larger and more reliable naval forces if it was to challenge Athens at sea in the future.

CHAPTER 3

SPARTAN SEAPOWER IN THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

It has been frequently supposed that the Peloponnesian fleet under Spartan command should not be considered a serious part of the Spartan war effort, since it lacked numbers, commitment, discipline and skill.¹ This assessment stems from that of Thucydides, who was not impressed by Peloponnesian or Spartan naval achievements.² According to modern interpretation of Thucydides' theory, the Spartans can have had few, if any, realistic pretensions to a naval policy during the Archidamian War, and their main actions had to be by land.

It is clear that Spartan society was regarded as different; it interested Herodotus sufficiently to describe some of its peculiarities - something that he did not do for other Greek states [6.52f]. Sparta seems to have been an essentially conservative, oligarchical state, although its constitution was a blend of aristocratic, monarchic and popular elements. Its object was the preservation of the *status-quo*, in which Spartiates were the ruling class, the *homoioi*, and its full citizens. Only they could hold political office at Sparta. These offices included membership of the *gerousia*,³ which acted as a deliberative and administrative body and a criminal court. The *gerousia*, however, had to be called into session by the ephors. These officials were five magistrates, elected for one year, who summoned and presided over the Spartiate assembly. The assembly consisted of the rest of the *homoioi*, who voted on fundamental issues such as elections, war and treaties.

¹ P.A.Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War", *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 255-280, henceforth Brunt.

All text references are to Thucydides unless stated otherwise.

The following abbreviations are used throughout this chapter; Cartledge: P.Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: a regional history 1300-362 B.C.* (1979) 242f. de Ste Croix: G.M.de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972). Salmon: J.B.Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford, 1984). Kagan OPW: D.Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1969). Kagan AW: D.Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca, 1974). Shipley: G.Shipley, *A History of Samos* (Oxford, 1989). Legon: R.Legon, *Megara: the Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 B.C.* (Ithaca and London, 1981). ATL: B.Meritt, H.T.Wade-Gery, M.F.McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* v.3 (Princeton, 1950). Gomme 1 and 2: A.W.Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* vols 1 and 2 (Oxford, 1959). Kelly: "Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War" *AHR* 87 (1982) 25f. Westlake, *Individuals*: H.D.Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Manchester, 1968).

² Thucydides frequently refers to their old-fashioned fighting methods, lack of experience and their tendency to panic - 1.49; 2.83-84, 88-91, 93-94; 3.26-33, 79-81.

³ It is thought by some that the *gerousia* was the real source of power in Sparta, see Isocrates 4.154; Diod.2.14 and A.Andrewes, "The Government of Classical Sparta" *ASAI* (1966) 1-20.

Sparta also possessed a dual monarchy. By the fifth century the civil and executive power of the kings in Sparta was curtailed, although they were supreme commanders in military actions. Their conduct was, however, subject to reviews by the ephors, who could charge them with treason. Because they were permanent and controlled the army in the field, the kings could become the focal point of differences of policy in the state. They do not appear to have been interested in controlling the navy, which by this time was left to Spartiate command.

The view that Spartan policy-making related only to land warfare has been modified by the interpretation, most recently espoused by Cawkwell, that the Spartans had two policies in the Archidamian War, the one conservative and concerned with action in Sparta's traditional sphere, land warfare, the other adventurous and concerned with naval policy.⁴ Spartan action, then, depended on which policy was in favour at a particular time. This idea does not explain how Sparta was able to follow both policies at the same time as it clearly did over Mytilene, when it commanded both land and sea expeditions in the same year.⁵

A more recent view has stressed the naval expectations of Sparta and has suggested that Spartan naval strategy before the war began may have been more complex than has been generally assumed.⁶ According to this view, however, the Spartan-led Peloponnesian fleet still suffered from terminal incompetence after the outbreak of war, as Thucydides claimed. It is not necessary to suppose that an annual change of ephors at Sparta meant an annual change of strategy, any more than the succession of generals at Athens entailed annual, radical changes in Athenian war policy. Each side was capable of formulating and maintaining large-scale plans and of altering their scope when the opportunity arose or when circumstances changed. In addition, in the case of Sparta it was difficult to find out what was going on because of the secretive nature of Spartan society [Thuc.5.68.2], a secretiveness that the threat of war would only have increased.

Spartan policy should only be interpreted from Spartan action. Where Thucydides, the contemporary historian of the Peloponnesian War, states his own opinion or inference it is legitimate to see whether this agrees with the actions and events he records.

⁴ G.Cawkwell, "Thucydides' Judgement of Periclean Strategy", *YCS* 34 (1976) 32-60.

⁵ This point is made by Kelly 25f.

⁶ Kelly 53-4.

Sparta had not shown itself to be a naval leader in any way during the Pentecontaetia. It took part in none of the naval actions of the First Athenian War and appears to have possessed no naval force of any size. Spartan and Peloponnesian naval weakness was apparent from the complete victory of the Athenians at sea, from the loss to the Spartan alliance of the strategically important island of Aegina and from the unchallenged *periplous* of the Peloponnese by the Athenian navy under Tolmides [1.105-108; Diod.11.84.6]. Nonetheless, there are indications of some maritime interest by both Sparta and individual Spartans in this period: good relations were maintained between the Peloponnese and Corcyra, and Spartans supported the Corcyrean appeal for compromise at Corinth [3.70]; contact was probably maintained with Aegina after its loss to Athens [1.67]; Cleandridas, the father of Gylippus, went west to Thurii after he was exiled for bribery [6.93,104; Plut.*Per.* 2], and Sparta had continued contact with the Dorian settlements of the west [3.86]. Some Spartans, at least, had already realised the importance of continued overseas relations. The majority of Spartans, however, appear to have expected naval requirements to be met by their allies, as had been the case in the Persian War, not by themselves at their own expense.

The refusal of the Spartan alliance to interfere in the revolt of Samos as Sparta wanted is evidence that in naval expeditions Sparta was at the mercy of the decisions of its naval allies [1.41.2; Diod.12.27].⁷ By the time of the Archidamian War Sparta had restricted access to the Aegean Sea; its allies, Corinth and Megara, had ports, Cenchreae and Nisaea, on the Saronic Gulf.⁸ Sparta also had some contact with Aegina, Melos and, perhaps, the Samian exiles at Anaea.⁹

For Sparta to succeed at sea it had to rely on its allies. Their support, however, was not automatic. The Spartan alliance was basically a military one in which the common factor was Sparta, its hegemon by tradition and through fear of its military might.¹⁰ The synod of the

⁷ A.H.M.Jones, "Two Synods of the Delian and the Peloponnesian Leagues" *PCPhS* clxxxii (1952/3) 43-4; de Ste Croix 200-3; Salmon 268, 281; Kagan *OPW* 174; Shipley 113-124.

⁸ Legon 228-56.

⁹ Aegina Thuc.1.67; Melos 5.84; Anaea 3.19,32.

¹⁰ The relationship of Sparta to the members of its alliance is the subject of much debate. The majority view is that the alliance probably began with a deliberate change of Spartan policy from conquest to hegemony at the time of Sparta's treaty with Tegea, G.Dickens, "The Growth of Spartan Policy" *JHS* 32 (1912) 1-42. The alliance came to be a recognised body with its own synod and organisation by about 505 [Hdt.5.75, J.Larsen, "The Constitution of the

alliance appears to have met infrequently and to have discussed mainly local matters [1.141].¹¹ When some of the allies disagreed with Sparta they could act independently of their hegemon and even make war on each other. Sparta's expectations of its allies appear to have been that they should help when requested and should provide forces in predetermined numbers. These allied forces were provided at the allies' own expense, as Sparta exacted no tribute. To a large extent, Sparta's position within this alliance relied on the tradition of its supremacy before and during the Persian Wars, since it did little to demonstrate it during the Pentecontaetia. This kind of alliance could work on a short-term basis when Spartan and allied interests might coincide, but its weakness was clearly revealed when Spartan interests differed from those of the allies. That this problem was true of naval as well as military interests is evident from the actions of the Spartan alliance during the course of the Archidamian War.

Epidamnus

Little is known of public opinion at Sparta during the Ionian crisis of 435-432 and the revolt of Potidaea, incidents that Thucydides describes as the immediate causes of the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War in 431 [1.24-55; Diod.12.30.2-5, 31.2-3.33.].¹² Thucydides suggests that the Corinthians were responsible for the start of the war, by singling them out as supporters of war in the speeches and in his narrative.¹³ The Spartans, by contrast, are presented by Thucydides and by the Corinthians as slow to act [1.118.2, 69/70]. Such Spartan action as is known shows that they were not always so slow.¹⁴

Peloponnesian League 1" *CP* (1933) 256-75 and 2 *CP* (1934) 1-19. Interpretations of the form of the league constitution have varied considerably, see de Ste Croix 101ff, who saw it as an organisation similar to that of the former Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Larsen *op.cit.*, who suggested a formal constitution similar to that of the League of nations, and V.Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (Oxford, 1960) 112 who saw the alliance as an example of federalism.

¹¹ This passage occurs in Pericles' speech to the Athenians on the resources available to each side at the start of the war. It may, therefore, contain some bias in its assessment of the Spartan alliance.

¹² Gomme 1.158 describes the strategic location of Epidamnus and its importance to Corcyra and Corinth. See also R.Beaumont, "Corinth, Ambracia and Apollonia" *JHS* 72-4 (1952-4) 62-73 and Salmon 272.

¹³ Corinth and Corcyra, Thuc.1.25.3, the Corinthian speech at Athens 1.37-43, Potidaea 1.56.2, Corinthian initiative with allies 1.66-7, Corinthian speech at Sparta making the case for war 1.68-71, and at the synod of the allies, 1.120-124.

¹⁴ Brunt, *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 258.

At the time of the Epidamnian affair the major maritime powers of Greece were Athens, Corcyra and Corinth [1.33,44]. The events at Epidamnus were the result of a Corinthian quarrel with Corcyra, in which Athens initially had no part. Other coastal and non-coastal Peloponnesian states supported Corinth with contributions of ships, crews or money. The combined Peloponnesian fleet of seventy-five ships that fought at Epidamnus was under the command of Corinth. This is suggested by Thucydides' use of the term 'the Corinthians and their allies' for this naval force [1.29]. The support of Corinth's policy by other coastal Peloponnesians shows that they were in full agreement and that they probably also had interests to protect in the area.¹⁵

Sparta was not directly involved in this affair, but the Spartans and Sicyonians were active diplomatically in an apparent attempt to defuse the crisis [1.28].¹⁶ Spartan ambassadors were present at Corinth in support of the Corcyrean protest over Corinthian action [1.28]. Sparta, then, was fully aware of the potential threat of a change in the balance of naval power, especially for the west, should the Corcyreans follow through with their statement that they would look for an alliance elsewhere [1.28.3]. The Spartan preference for diplomacy rather than direct action may have been one of the reasons why Corinth later accused Sparta of being slow to act and to help its allies. Spartan support of Corcyrean diplomacy suggests that it was opposed to Corinthian escalation of the crisis and that at the time it was supporting the search for a compromise. Corinth ignored Spartan and any other allied opposition and declared war on Corcyra [1.29.1]. Sparta's position at the time within the Spartan alliance is clearly revealed by this incident. It was unable to stop Corinth even if it wished to do so.¹⁷

The Epidamnian affair was followed by a remarkable build-up of Corinthian naval forces over the next two years [1.31]. What Sparta did during this period is not explained by Thucydides. His description of the situation emphasises only the coming confrontation between Corinthians, Corcyreans and Athenians in the west [1.31]. Perhaps Spartan diplomatic attempts had ended when Athens accepted an alliance with Corcyra [1.44.2]. Athens showed by this provocative move that it was prepared to act in western waters, however much the Athenians

¹⁵ For the interests of Corinth and Elis in Epirus see Hammond *Epirus* 477f. and for Spartan interests at Dodona, Demosthenes, *de Hal.* 32.

¹⁶ Gomme 1.167.

¹⁷ Brunt, *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 258, Kagan *OPW* 174.

might represent the move as a defensive one.¹⁸ The increase in the Corinthian naval forces must have caused Athens considerable concern. Thucydides may be right when he states that the reason for the Athenian/Corcyrean alliance was that Athens had no wish to see the Corcyrean navy under the control of Corinth [1.44] - a distinct possibility given the current size of the new Corinthian fleet. The Athenians were sufficiently concerned at the prospect of a Corinthian victory over Corcyra to send extra ships there [1.45.1]. Corinth already had an Aegean port and might, should it choose, present a challenge to Athenian supremacy in the Aegean. For Sparta, now that the Athenians had made their position clear, an increase in Peloponnesian naval power might have seemed welcome, especially if, as Thucydides states, war between Athens and the Peloponnesians was by that time considered inevitable [Thuc.1.44]¹⁹.

The Corinthian fleet dispatched against Corcyra was twice as large as the force that had been sent to Epidamnus. Corinth had increased its contribution in ships from thirty to ninety and must have spent a great deal of money on the vessels themselves as well as on the hiring of Peloponnesian and Aegean shipwrights and crews [1.31.1, 46.1; Diod.12.32.1-2]. These ships were provided and presumably funded solely by Corinth.²⁰ To some Spartans the naval reliance of Sparta on Corinth may have seemed justified by the tremendous efforts made by Corinth to increase its fleet. Corinth was supported by its western allies with thirty-eight ships and by Elis with ten. Megara, alone of the Saronic Gulf allies, sent a contingent, one of twelve vessels [1.46.2]. These allies may have increased their ship-building programme at the same time as Corinth and with Corinthian encouragement.²¹ The other smaller allies from the Saronic Gulf may have been deterred by Athenian participation, as they made no contribution.²² The use of the combined fleet of the Peloponnesian naval allies in an expedition that was apparently not one

¹⁸ Gomme 1.171. Athens may have been active in the western Greece at an earlier date when Phormio was in Acarnania, see Gomme 1.199, N.G.L.Hammond, *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford, 1973) 471 ff, Beaumont, *JHS* 72 (1952) 62-73. The date of Phormio's north west operations is unclear, see Salmon 286.

¹⁹ Gomme 1.170 thinks that this statement may be Thucydides' own and not a reflection of current opinion.

²⁰ The construction of this number of ships by one city is considered feasible by J.Coates and S.Grahl, *The Athenian Trireme of the 5th century B.C.* (Greenwich, 1985) 33. The source of timber used by Corinth for this fleet is open to question. Hammond, *Epirus* 425f., believes it to have been the timber-rich areas of Epirus, but Legon 219 suggests that access to the north west was difficult for Corinth after its defeat by Corcyra in 435. The supply of timber must then have come from the northern Aegean and have been carried by Megara, which was not yet affected by Athens' decree against it.

²¹ Legon 208.

²² Gomme 1.178.

agreed to by the Peloponnesian alliance as a whole, and not led by its hegemon, Sparta, may have served to encourage the independence of Sparta's naval allies in their choice of action.

The battle at Sybota that ensued is best remembered for Thucydides' comment on the tactics that both sides employed.²³ He says it was an old-fashioned engagement between the hoplites on board the ships on both sides, as opposed to the newer Athenian tactics that relied on attacks by lighter, faster and more manoeuvrable ships. He also criticised the lack of skill of both sides [1.49.1]. It is interesting to note that each side expected to fight this kind of battle and prepared for it. Thucydides himself had earlier stated that the Corinthians did all they could to improve their fleet. Clearly, the second and third largest Greek naval powers of the time either had not heard of, or were not convinced by, the new tactics. Such tactics relied on great precision and constant training to be successful.²⁴ In addition, they could only be successful in open water. In more constricted areas the older tactic was still preferable [2.89.8]. Opportunities for training in new manoeuvres would present great difficulty for a fleet made up of numbers of widely separated allies. It is also noteworthy that Thucydides admits that the Corinthians were expected to win by the Athenians [1.51.5]. Perhaps this was because theirs were the newer ships; Corcyra had had to refit older ships for Leucimne [1.29]. They may also have expected a Corinthian victory because the Corcyrean fleet relied on slave rowers [1.55.1].²⁵ The Corinthian fleet evidently possessed some naval skill.

In the event, Athenian naval participation at Sybota was not particularly effective in military terms. Sybota was a partial success for Corinth as a large part of the Corcyrean fleet had been damaged in the battle. Corinth withdrew from a second engagement involving more Athenian vessels so as not to become further involved with Athens without greater Peloponnesian support, and for repairs to its ships [1.52.2]. Corinth then became active in undermining Athenian interests where it could and in justifying itself to the Peloponnesian alliance in order to promote war, particularly, perhaps, to the inland states who had taken little interest so far [1.120.2]. These states may have felt the dispute concerned only the coastal allies of Corinth.

²³ Gomme 1.184, following Beloch.2.2.227, suggests that Thucydides' source for this battle was Athenian, possibly Lacedaemonius, son of Cimon.

²⁴ For Athenian naval training, see Plutarch, *Pericles* c.11, and Morrison and Coates 8,9.

²⁵ For new ships in Corinth's fleet and for slave rowers in the Corcyrean fleet, see Hammond, *Studies* 460 and J.Wilson, *Athens and Corcyra* (Bristol, 1987).

It is hard to believe that Sparta could have been completely uninterested in the outcome of the battle, especially after the Corcyrean attack on Cyllene, the Elean dockyard and an important harbour for Peloponnesian contact with the west; but Thucydides does not mention the Spartans at all in this context.

Potidaea

The revolt of Potidaea is treated by Thucydides as another step in the escalation of the enmity between Corinth and Athens [1.56-65; Diod.12.34-37].²⁶ Problems for Athens in Chalcidice may have arisen over a long period and were further complicated by the activity of Perdicas of Macedon, who was attempting to foment war between the Peloponnese and Athens for his eventual benefit [1.57.5].²⁷ The Potidaeans negotiated with both Athens and, with Corinthian help, Sparta, and obtained a promise of Spartan help in the event of an Athenian attack [1.58.1]. This help was to be in the form of a land invasion of Attica by Peloponnesian forces under Sparta. Clearly, there were some Spartans who anticipated war with Athens and were acting with Corinth to promote it.²⁸ The Spartan promise of aid to Potidaea does not suggest reluctance to go to war.

A force of Corinthian volunteers and mercenaries, led by Aristeus, son of the Corinthian admiral Adeimantus, was sent to Potidaea after the city rebelled. This was not an official action by the Peloponnesian alliance but a Corinthian-inspired move [1.60.1, Diod.12.34.4]. There is no hint in Thucydides' account that the Spartans tried to discourage it. This force reached Potidaea in forty days but it is not clear how it got there. If it travelled over land it apparently had few problems getting through Thessaly.²⁹ If it went by sea, considerable difficulty might be expected in sailing through the Aegean, supposedly controlled by Athens at this time. Corinth, however, possessed sufficient ships to transport such a force. The ships, which were probably at its Gulf port, could have been hauled over the *diolkos* to Cenchreae, and thence sailed

²⁶ Gomme 1.199ff and A.Andrewes 4.26.

²⁷ *SEG* 5.22 and *ATL* 19f., for Athens' problems in Chalcidice and Gomme 1.223/4 for the dates. Gomme 1.201-3 also describes the problems of Macedonian history in this period.

²⁸ de Ste Croix 204, Gomme 1.210.

²⁹ Gomme 1.215,221,226 thinks the force went over land as Brasidas was to do later [4.78]. J.A.Alexander, *Potidaea* (Athens, Georgia, 1963) 40ff, asserts that the force went by sea in Corinthian ships. If, as Diodorus suggests [12.34.4], there were two thousand hoplites in this force, a large number of ships would have been required to transport them. After Sybota, Corinth would have had sufficient vessels.

for Chalcidice. Presumably, the Athenians were not thought to be on watch for this fleet. Once at Potidaea they could have been used in the evacuation of the city. The use of Corinthian ships at Potidaea would serve to confirm Corinthian opinion of their position as the naval power among the Peloponnesian states. Thucydides, however, at no point in his narrative of the Potidaean affair refers to Corinthian ships in the north, and so their presence must remain speculative.

Spartan naval plans on the outbreak of war

Thucydides states that it was primarily the Corinthians who were active in persuading the Peloponnesian allies to attend discussions at Sparta, but he also mentions the role of the naval states, Aegina and Megara, and of Sparta itself in inviting allies and any other Greek states with a grievance against Athens [1.67].³⁰ Sparta does not appear to have been reluctant to have action against the Athenians discussed, even in the presence of an Athenian embassy. The war debate in the Spartan assembly may have been a mere formality by this time. Thucydides appears to use the occasion as an opportunity to reflect on the different opinions of the participants and of the Peloponnesians generally. Spartan and Peloponnesian opinion must have reflected several different viewpoints on the necessity for war.³¹

The subsequent discussions among the Spartans themselves throw some light on Spartan naval thinking. The majority opinion is for immediate war [1.79], but King Archidamus points out Sparta's obvious need for time to build and train an effective fleet [1.80-5]. He warns the Spartans not to be carried away by their allies' wishes. Perhaps he saw their role as a possible weakness in the Spartan alliance. Sparta had already suspected Corinth of acting in its own, Corinth's, interest [1.68].

Archidamus refers to the possibility of raising a Spartan fleet. At no time does he specifically mention allied ships, which is surprising in view of the recent increase in Peloponnesian naval strength as a result of the Corinthian construction programme. That Sparta already had a fleet of sorts is implicit, since Archidamus says that their present one is inferior

³⁰ *ATL* 32ff for Aegina and 321 for Megara and the Megarian Decree. See also Legon 183f., for a discussion of the problems of the date and effects of this measure.

³¹ Gomme 1.419; Brunt, *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 268. The problem of the accuracy of Thucydides' speeches is a well-known one. They often form an antilogy, as here, where the second speaker appears to answer the statements of the first which was given to a restricted audience. It seems best to accept what Thucydides himself claims was his method [1.22.2]: that the speeches contain what the situation seems to Thucydides to call for. Thus, they may reflect opinions and ideas which were probably current but not necessarily expressed by the particular speaker.

to the Athenian, and Sparta has no public funds to increase it and private sources are difficult to tap [1.80.4]. For Archidamus, Sparta needed greater naval and financial resources, as well as more members in its alliance, before taking on the Athenians. Despite the success of the supporters of war, some Spartans, as exemplified by Archidamus, may have been giving serious thought to the lessons of the earlier war against Athens. Sparta, they may have felt, needed its own trained fleet to establish itself within its own alliance, as well as against Athens. Anything less would lead to division of policy and interest, as well as to allied domination of an important area of policy.

The concerns expressed by Archidamus were answered by the Corinthians' speech [1.120-4] and by Pericles [1.140-44]. Both speeches seem to reflect the opinions and expectations of both sides current on the outbreak of war. The Corinthians, at the synod of the Peloponnesian alliance, acknowledge the strength of Athenian naval resources, but claim that the Peloponnesians can match it from their existing alliance and from money borrowed from Delphi and Olympia. They provide no basis for their belief in such funding from the sanctuaries. They hope to use mercenary crews as they had done in their battles against Corcyra [1.31.1]. They are confident that mercenaries in the Athenian fleet will desert to the Peloponnesians for better pay and because of Peloponnesian superiority. It will only take one sea-battle to demonstrate this fact: any delay in fighting at sea will be to the Peloponnesians' advantage, because they will have more time to train their crews. If the Corinthians attached as much importance to greater Athenian naval skill and training, as Thucydides implies here and continues to imply elsewhere³², it seems strange that they had not thought of this before and prepared for it by fitting out and training their new fleet against Corcyra with such tactics in mind. If these tactics were as good and as superior as Thucydides implies, they would have enabled the Corinthians to have overwhelmed the Corcyreans far more easily. The Corinthians seem criminally negligent as a naval state in not attending to the developments in naval tactics. If this was the case, Archidamus was right to advocate caution and distrust of Sparta's allies. Perhaps the Corinthians and Corcyreans were not convinced of the effectiveness of these different tactics.³³ With hindsight, much of the

³² Thuc.2.84,89,91.94.

³³ They continued to use similar tactics and were successful with them against the Athenians in the Great Harbour at Syracuse [7.70]. Each type of tactic had its advantages and weaknesses. The Peloponnesians were better at fighting in constricted areas and in hoplite battles on board, The Athenians carried fewer hoplites and so relied on their lighter, faster ships to disable an opponent in open water [2.89]

Corinthian argument can be seen for the wishful thinking it was, but at the time it seems to have convinced the majority of Peloponnesian allies who voted for war.³⁴ The beliefs and expectations of each side at the outbreak of war are important in understanding their actions as war progresses.

In his speech Pericles countered these arguments and pointed out, in agreement with Archidamus, that the Peloponnesian resources were small and their organisation unsuitable for a prolonged war. They had no strong central decision-making authority. Their navy was too small, too unskilled and the Peloponnese too easily blockaded. Athens had more crews available and the power to prevent the hiring of Aegean crews by the Peloponnesians.

Perhaps the possibility of access by the Peloponnesians to Aegean crews was a genuine fear at Athens. The rebellion and siege of Potidaea were hardly calculated to make Athens confident in the loyalty of its allies. Perhaps, too, there were good reasons for the Peloponnesians to suppose that they would obtain financial assistance from the sanctuaries. In addition, a strong Peloponnesian navy may have been a genuine Athenian concern. Corinth, Sparta's major naval ally, had already shown that it could build and equip a sizeable and effective fleet. This fact alone may have increased Peloponnesian naval confidence. Many of the Peloponnesian naval allies had also had recent battle experience at Sybota. Thucydides may have emphasised Peloponnesian pretensions in this area precisely because they had been cause for some concern at Athens. In addition, the encouragement given to the Peloponnesian cause by other Greek states should not be forgotten [2.8]. Athenian fear and Spartan trust in continued Greek support in more concrete terms, once the war had started, may well have been genuine.

Thucydides places the details of the war preparations after the first hostile act, the Theban attack on Plataea in the early spring of 431 [2.2], but some of their preparations may have been begun well before this. Both sides attempted to win Persian support, presumably political or financial, and to bring over as many allies as possible [2.7]. Sparta also issued some interesting naval orders to increase the size of the Peloponnesian fleet. The western states of Italy and Sicily, who were friendly to Sparta, were asked for money and for ships in proportion to the size of each city to a total of five hundred vessels. These were the Dorian cities that made alliances with Sparta at the start of the war [3.86], and were thus subject to such orders. The passage is a well-known *crux*, as Diodorus states that two hundred ships were ordered from the west

³⁴ Salmon 307.

[Diod.12.41.1].³⁵ Despite the problem of ship numbers, it is clear that the Spartans were envisaging an allied fleet of some size under their control. Spartan prestige would demand no less. Thus, ambitious naval planning formed part of their war strategy. In the meantime, the western cities were to exercise strict neutrality and not to allow the Athenian fleet to use their harbours. Given the financial difficulty of building a large number of its own ships in sufficient time, this may have seemed the best alternative for Sparta. In addition, a number of western ships, based presumably in the Peloponnese and under Spartan direction - Sparta, after all, had ordered them - would be a useful counter to Corinthian or other allied influence in naval policy and strategy. At the same time, Athens tried to strengthen its position in the west off the coast of the Peloponnese as part of its policy of blockade and, perhaps, to meet any perceived threat from a strong Peloponnesian navy.

It would not be surprising, then, if Peloponnesian naval activities were restricted to the west, where the interests of the major contributors were at stake. Some Spartans, however, may have had a wider naval strategy in mind: the Corinthians, in their speech to the allied synod, mentioned the aim of fostering rebellion among the Athenian allies. Most of these allies were in the Aegean basin, and so the Peloponnesians would need access to the Aegean. Although the Aegean is frequently considered to have been an Athenian lake, it was not completely cut off from contact with the Peloponnese. Athenian measures for the security of the area indicate that there were some vulnerable points. Early in the first year of the war Aegina was resettled by Athenians, and its original inhabitants were given a home in the Thyreatis by Sparta [2.27; Diod.12.44]. Aegina had, apparently, been secretly encouraging Sparta to war [1.67]. The resettlement of Aegina with Athenians may also indicate that Athens was nervous about the use of Aegina as a Peloponnesian base in the Saronic Gulf.³⁶ Peloponnesian ships from Locris [Thucydides calls them pirates] attacked Athenian interests in Euboea so effectively that they provoked a response from Athens: Atalante, off Locris, was fortified and a small Athenian detachment kept there until 421 [2.32, 5.18; Diod.12.44.1]. Peloponnesian ships were active in small numbers against Athenian trading vessels off the coast of Asia Minor.³⁷ The Athenians

³⁵ Gomme 2.27.

³⁶ Kelly 33.

³⁷ See *ATL* 11 for the importance to Athens of trade with Asia Minor. It is not clear whether the raids on Athenian shipping encouraged by Sparta were conducted by pirates. Thucydides states that they were, but his is an Athenian viewpoint. The raids might have been conducted by pro-Spartans. If they

sent a force of six ships to stop these attacks, but the force was later destroyed in Asia Minor [2.69]. Where these Peloponnesian ships originated is not stated. They may have been Megarian vessels from Nisaea; Thucydides mentions that in 427 the Athenians fortified Minoa to prevent the Peloponnesians using it as a base for raids [3.51]. The Athenian position at Budorum, established at the beginning of the war, was not a success in preventing such actions. Melos and Thera, though tributary members of the Athenian alliance, may have been sympathetic to Sparta - they both had Dorian links.³⁸ Spartan ships also attacked and took Athenian traders off the coast of the Peloponnese itself [2.67]. The Spartans killed all prisoners taken in such raids at the beginning of the war - an action that so annoyed the Athenians that in 430 they killed a captured Peloponnesian embassy in retaliation [2.67].

The Peloponnesian naval policy in the Aegean appears to have been to exploit any opportunity for revolt against Athens - a prospect that may have seemed good in 431 when Greek public opinion was with Sparta - and to harry Athenian shipping and trade wherever and whenever possible. Athenian fear of Peloponnesian naval action is indicated by the security measures they took and by the fact that Athens set aside an amount of money and a number of ships to be used in case of an enemy attack on Piraeus [2.24].³⁹ Evidently this was considered to be a possibility in 431.

The defence of the Peloponnese was also of some concern to Sparta. Its vulnerability here had been clearly demonstrated by the *periplous* of the Athenian, Tolmides, during the first war with Athens. That Sparta may have expected attacks on her coastal settlements is implied by the presence near Methone of a mobile force under Brasidas, one that was able to fight off an Athenian attack [2.25; Diod.12.42.2]. A later attack on Pheia was left to the Eleans to defeat; evidently, the Peloponnesian allies provided their own defence against such raids. Methone was an important landfall on the coast of the Peloponnese and perhaps independent of direct Spartan control; it had been settled in the eighth century by exiles from Nauplia [Paus.4 35.2]. Its destruction would have been damaging, as its importance is shown by Thucydides' record of the

were pirate raids, then Sparta would presumably have had to spend money to encourage them. The raids around the southern Peloponnese surely would not have been conducted by pirates encouraged by Sparta. Sparta could not have trusted such allies close to its own shore.

³⁸ Gomme 2.11; *ATL* 336. Melian connections with Sparta are attested by a Spartan inscription of 7427, IG 5 (1) 1.

³⁹ Gomme 2.42.

award given to Brasidas for saving it. To maintain a fleet on permanent watch around the Peloponnese would have been expensive and pointless. Events later in the war show that it was too easy for fleets to miss each other completely [4.8.].

The Spartan war strategy was twofold and not exclusively concentrated on land actions. Repeated invasions of Attica were still Sparta's best prospect for a quick end to the war, an end that most expected to come within a few years [2.18]. Spartan expectation of the success of its land strategy is indicated by the fact that in the first invasion Archidamus halted in several places in Attica to tempt the Athenians to fight a battle they could not win.⁴⁰ This was a strategy that could be employed immediately, one that did not require waiting for distant allies. Sparta's immediate aim was to make Athens come to terms as soon as possible, not to destroy it completely - even after over twenty years of war the Spartans did not wish to do that [Xen. *Hell.*2.2.16] - and to ensure that Spartan superiority could be seen and acknowledged.

That the winning of a decisive land battle was not the sole aim of Spartan strategy is indicated by the record of their naval actions, preparations and expectations both in the short and longer term. From the first, small numbers of ships were to be used in the Aegean and around the Peloponnese to attack Athenian shipping, while western allies were ordered to build more ships for eventual use in the Peloponnesian fleet. Sparta appears to have been well aware of the importance of a sizable fleet in the struggle with Athens.

Zacynthus

There is no record of any activity by a Peloponnesian allied fleet in the first year of the war, which is surprising in view of the Peloponnesian naval preparations. The Spartans may have hoped for greater initial success from their land strategy, or it may have been becoming clear that the west would not supply any significant naval help, and that Sparta would have to adopt a different naval strategy to take this fact into account. After the Athenians withdrew from the north-west in 431, the Corinthians re-settled matters there more to their liking in a winter campaign, and tried without success to arrange support for the Peloponnesians in Cephallenia [2.33]. No Spartans are associated with this campaign but it is likely that, as supreme commanders of the Spartan alliance, they knew about it.

⁴⁰ Thuc.2.19 and E.F.Bloedow, "Archidamus, the 'Intelligent' Spartan" *Klio* 65 (1983) 27-49.

By 430, and especially after Athenian action in the western Peloponnese and in north-west Greece, a naval move was required from the Peloponnesians if they were to have a credible naval policy, although they still maintained their hopes for an effective land strategy by invading Attica a second time on an even larger scale [2.57].⁴¹ Some time during the campaigning season of 430 a fleet of one hundred Peloponnesian ships sailed for Zacynthus under the command of the Spartan navarch, Cnemus.⁴² Thucydides describes the expedition briefly; he may not have had much information about it, or there may have been little information to obtain. He places it immediately before his account of other Spartan activities towards the end of the season. This may indicate that the Zacynthus campaign was later than the previous actions he describes, but the planning and organisation of such a campaign may have taken place much earlier.

It was important for Peloponnesian strategy in the west that some attempt be made to counter Athenian influence and to make a demonstration of Peloponnesian naval power.⁴³ Thucydides gives no details on the composition of the fleet which was to be the largest put to sea by the Peloponnesians during the Archidamian War [2.66]. It may have assembled at Cyllene, the closest Peloponnesian port to Zacynthus, and one used later in western campaigns, but Thucydides does not say so. Sparta was well represented in this force as it provided a thousand hoplites.

The reason for the expedition is also unclear from Thucydides' account. He says that the Peloponnesians landed on Zacynthus, destroyed most of the area, but sailed away when the Zacynthians would not come to terms. Clearly, the acquisition of Zacynthus would have been of great strategic value to the Peloponnesian cause, and its loss would have deprived Athens of an important base. Equally clearly, the Peloponnesians could not hold a hostile Zacynthus on a long term basis; the support of a force there for any length of time would have been expensive, as the Athenians were later to find when they maintained a force at Pylos [4.26,27]. Zacynthus had to come over voluntarily. When it did not, the Peloponnesians were able to recoup some of their expenses by ravaging the countryside. How effective this was may be suggested by the fact

⁴¹ Kelly 37f.

⁴² The campaign may have been undertaken at the Corinthians' request, Kagan, *AW* 93-4; Salmon 308, but as supreme commanders of the allied fleet, the Spartans, who provided 1000 hoplites, would have had to approve the plan.

⁴³ Gomme 2.214 for the importance of western bases.

that Zacynthus is not recorded to have taken any part in further Athenian military activities until 426. The Peloponnesian expedition may also have been useful as a training exercise for the combined allied fleet, but this could hardly have been its sole purpose.⁴⁴ The Peloponnesians, as far as is known, could have been training in the previous season. Despite their failure to win over Zacynthus, the Peloponnesian allies had demonstrated that they could put to sea a large fleet and sail at will in the west.

In the same season the Athenians manned a fleet which restricted its activities to the eastern coast of the Peloponnese at Epidaurus, Troezen, Haliae, Hermione and Prasiae [2.56]. Here they did a great deal of damage and appear to have been unopposed. The reason for their concentration on this area is not given by Thucydides.⁴⁵ It may have been that they feared some kind of attack by the Peloponnesians from the eastern coast of the Saronic Gulf, if the Athenian expedition pre-dated the Peloponnesian attack on Zacynthus. If the Peloponnesian expedition came first, the Athenians attack in the east may have been in response and from reluctance to challenge the Peloponnesians in such large numbers.

The Athenians subsequently sued for peace on terms unacceptable to Sparta [2.59]. Sparta may have been waiting for the Athenians to be weakened still further by the plague. By the end of 430 the Spartan had cause for confidence, despite the non-arrival of naval forces and money from the west. Their fleet was operating freely in western waters, they were active against Athenian interests in the Aegean [2.69], and Athens, weakened by plague, had tried to sue for peace. By the winter the failure of peace negotiations⁴⁶ and the activity of the Peloponnesian fleet had caused the Athenians to take the unprecedented step of posting a squadron at Naupactus [2.69]. They may have expected further trouble from the Peloponnesian fleet after the Zacynthus expedition.⁴⁷ Their orders to blockade the Gulf would not exclude this possibility; to counter it they might try to prevent Corinthian ships joining the Peloponnesian fleet, as in fact they were able to do in 429.

⁴⁴ *contra* Kelly 40.

⁴⁵ Gomme 2.163 suggests that these attacks were important for Athenian confidence. He is followed by Cartledge 238. Bloedow, *Klio* 65 (1983) 27-49, adds that they may have been necessary to keep as many serving Athenians as possible away from the plague in the city.

⁴⁶ This embassy included Aristeus, son of the Corinthian naval hero, Adcimantus, and the Spartan Aneristus, who had led a sea-borne raid on Halicis [Hdt. 7.135].

⁴⁷ Kelly 41.

The Acarnanian Campaign - 429

Spartan strategy seems to have changed dramatically for the following year's campaigns. Instead of invading Attica they besieged Plataea [2.71ff]. Perhaps the Peloponnesians were already thinking of a future peace agreement, in which they would not have to return Plataea to Athens if it came over to them voluntarily [3.52 for this idea in 427]. Perhaps, also, this move was part of a new Peloponnesian plan to attack Athens' allies,⁴⁸ to isolate Athens from contact with the north and to create a band of pro-Peloponnesian states across northern Greece. In this same year a force from Macedon was expected to join a Spartan-led expedition in Acarnania in accordance with a secret agreement with Perdiccas, who was in alliance with Athens at the time [2.80]. In the light of their northern adventures, Spartan strategy for 429 may have been wider and more ambitious than is often supposed. They may have felt that this was the year in which they could finally bring Athens to acceptable terms. Their confidence may be reflected in the Corinthians' attitude to the Athenian squadron under Phormio in the Gulf. They apparently thought it was too small to be of any consequence [2.83].

The Spartan campaign in Acarnania is presented by Thucydides as a last-minute response to an appeal for help against Acarnania by Epirote tribes [2.80]. Clearly, the Spartans are considered by Thucydides to have needed the Epirote tribes and the Gulf states to point out the possibilities to them [2.80]. Thucydides places the campaign subsequent to developments at Plataea and the failure of an Athenian force in Chalcidice. He states that the purpose of the conquest of Acarnania was to gain a foothold in the west before taking Cephallenia and Zacynthus, to prevent an Athenian *periplous* of the Peloponnese, and, eventually, to capture Naupactus.

The Spartans subsequently dispatched a thousand allied hoplites by sea to Leucas, where the Peloponnesian fleet was to gather. Once again, the Spartans decided the mustering point for the fleet. Thucydides does not say where they embarked - perhaps it was at Cyllene, the most convenient Peloponnesian port for access to the north-west. They returned there after their defeat at Stratus [2.84.5]. Some of the ships were probably Spartan, so as to accommodate the navarch and other Spartan officers. This force was unchallenged by the Athenians at Naupactus. It may have slipped across unseen. Native and allied land troops from a wide area were also to meet

⁴⁸ Bloedow, *Klio* 65 (1983) 27-49.

under the Spartan navarch, Cnemus.⁴⁹ His expedition to Zacynthus in the previous year was evidently not considered a disaster by Sparta, as he was still navarch.⁵⁰ After Zacynthus he may have been considered the Spartan most experienced in western affairs.

The importance of the campaign to the Spartans is suggested by the involvement of a large Peloponnesian contingent and an even larger number of allied and native troops, which were taken from practically the whole of Epirus, as well as the expected Macedonian contingent. To requisition and muster such a far-flung force must have taken time and considerable organisation – clearly Spartan, as they commanded the expedition. There was also a fleet to be summoned and assembled and which was to act in concert with the land army, to prevent help reaching the interior of Acarnania from the coastal states. It is likely that the planning on such a scale took place during the winter after the Ambraciot attack on Amphilochoia. The Spartan grand plan was, perhaps, nothing less than to establish a strong Peloponnesian control of the north-west and to link up across northern Greece with Macedon and, perhaps, Thrace, if the embassy of the previous winter to Thrace and Persia had been successful.⁵¹ They might also have hoped to cut Athens off from the timber resources of the north and west and to sever its links with Corcyra. That the Athenian general, Phormio, was aware of some of the developments is shown by the message sent to him by the Acarnanians about the build-up of forces against them [2.81].

The failure of the land campaign seems to have been due to the independence of the Epirote tribes, some of whom had no king or were not used to a central command [2.80]. Thucydides reports that Cnemus marched without waiting for the rest of the allied fleet from the Gulf. Perhaps he had to act quickly because his allies refused to wait, or because the support fleet from the Gulf was late in arriving. Cnemus' haste may reflect the bias of the sources used by Thucydides. If they were Corinthian, as is possible, since Thucydides knows details of the Corinthian naval command, they may have been concerned to cover their own failure in the Gulf by blaming the navarch for hasty action.

Thucydides may also have had Corinthian reports on the action in the Gulf, since he is able to give their feelings and expectations about Phormio's squadron [2.83]. The Gulf force was

⁴⁹ The problems of the Spartan navarchy will be considered in the Appendix.

⁵⁰ *contra* R.Sealey, "Die spartanische nauarchie" *Klio* 58 (1976) 335-58.

⁵¹ Kagan *AW* 107 thinks it a good plan.

ancillary to the overall plan, despite Thucydides' concentration on its naval battle, and was sailing under allied, not Spartan, command. The Spartan navarch was with the main force where he should have been as supreme commander. The support squadron was to report to the rest of the allied fleet at Leucas.

Each of the allied contingents in the Gulf squadron had its own commander, and there does not appear to have been any overall commander. This was reasonable since the squadron did not expect to fight, as Thucydides says. It was equipped as a transport force, not for a sea-battle, although some precautions had been taken against a possible attack; the Peloponnesians had some triremes on convoy duty and were ready to use the defensive manoeuvre of the *kuklos* [2.83.3, 5].⁵² From previous experience they may even have thought that the Athenians would not attack.⁵³ The presence of the squadron at Naupactus had not prevented the Peloponnesians planning this campaign, nor is there any evidence that Corinth had been suffering economically as a result of a successful blockade by the Athenians. The Corinthians may have been justified in their confidence at this point.

When the forty-seven Peloponnesian ships became aware that the Athenians were shadowing them, they attempted a quick night crossing [2.83]. Phormio, the Athenian general, had little choice in his tactics. Against ships with so many hoplites on board he could not afford to engage except in open water, where the Athenian strength lay in their skill and speed of manoeuvre. At this point in the narrative, Thucydides becomes much more personal and details Phormio's expectations about the battle [2.84].⁵⁴ Phormio himself may have been Thucydides' informant here, in which case his account may well contain some bias. He certainly appears to have expected exactly what followed.

The Peloponnesians were caught by the early morning breeze for which Phormio was supposedly waiting. Thucydides adds that the wind did not always blow at dawn. Gulf sailors would surely have known the local conditions at least as well as the Athenians. Perhaps the Peloponnesians hoped to hold station until dawn when they could break out, when the Athenians would be tired from rowing around them. Thucydides says that Phormio had given orders not

⁵² Gomme 2.218 considers this a sensible response to the Athenian threat, but the Peloponnesians should have taken the initiative. How would this have been possible in heavy transport vessels and with few triremes?

⁵³ Salmon 308.

⁵⁴ Westlake 36-47.

to attack until he gave the signal. This in itself is not remarkable since it surely was how a disciplined fleet usually operated. Perhaps Phormio was not sure of what to do until the wind solved it for him. He clearly needed something more than rowing around the Peloponnesians to give him victory. Thucydides also accuses the Peloponnesians of lack of experience. This may be so, especially if there was no sole command and each contingent was operating separately. The Peloponnesians were, however, sufficiently in agreement on tactics to have performed their defensive action in time and to have ensured the presence of some triremes for the protection of their convoy. In addition, the presence of so many heavily-armed hoplites on board their ships would inevitably make them extremely difficult to handle, especially in rough water.⁵⁵ These hoplites may have had little experience on board ship, and the resulting panic could have been theirs rather than that of the crews. For the same reason, the rowers' inability to clear the water with their oars may have been due to the ships' listing because of distribution of weight on board.⁵⁶ The Peloponnesian captains, steersmen and boatswains evidently did what they could to rescue the situation [2.84.3].

The battle at Naupactus

The Peloponnesian failure to get its naval support force through to Cnemus may have been due not so much to Phormio's planning as to luck. In the event, the Peloponnesians lost nearly a quarter of their troopships, and were forced to make for the Elean dockyard at Cyllene, because of its position as a naval headquarters and for its repair facilities [2.84.5].

The Spartan reaction to this failure, according to Thucydides, was one of incomprehension and anger [2.85.1].⁵⁷ Their emotions are easier to understand if they were the result of the failure of their whole strategy for this year and not, as is usually understood from Thucydides account, anger at the naval loss alone. It was, after all, a victory against transport vessels, not fighting ships.⁵⁸ The immediate importance of the Athenian victory may have been

⁵⁵ Morrison and Coates 49, discuss the problem of weight distribution in the trireme and the difficulty of hearing commands.

⁵⁶ There may have been fewer oarsmen than on a regular trireme because of the extra hoplites on board. This would have increased the difficulty of rowing in heavy seas.

⁵⁷ Gomme 2.220.

⁵⁸ D.Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca, 1986) 102, mentions the ineffectiveness of Athenian troopships in battle at Chios 8.61.2-3.

exaggerated by Thucydides in the light of subsequent events in the Gulf. The Spartans assumed that they had failed on both land and sea because of their allies, and to an extent this was true. Spartan commissioners, including Brasidas, were sent to help Cnemus organise a second Peloponnesian fleet at Cyllene.⁵⁹ Spartan anger seems to have been directed more against their allies than the commanding officer, since Cnemus was retained in command.

The Spartans were also demanding a second naval muster in the same season. Thucydides shows later how reluctant the Peloponnesians were in 427 to undertake more than one campaign in a season [3.15]. The commissioners, then, may have been appointed to assist Cnemus in overseeing the muster of allied ships. Seventy-seven Peloponnesian ships were collected and a land army gathered in support, although it was close to the end of the season for a major action.⁶⁰ There is no hint of allied disagreement over another naval battle. Some time must have been taken in these preparations, as the Athenians had enough time to send for reinforcements. Both sides took up positions where they practised for a week [2.86.5].

Thucydides attached great importance to this battle, as for him it exemplified the difference between Athenian skill and discipline and Peloponnesian naval inexperience and ineptitude.⁶¹ The picture may be too one-sided, although it is clear that the Peloponnesians heavily outnumbered the Athenian ships. From the speeches of the commanders on each side, each fleet appears aware of its own weaknesses and nervous of its opponent - the Peloponnesians in open water and the Athenians in numbers and in fighting in a constricted area. Phormio has been thought tactically an Athenian Nelson,⁶² though in his speech he gives no details of his

⁵⁹ The status of these commissioners has been much discussed. Gomme 2.222-7 considers them subordinate to the navarch. Others, such as Sealey, *Klio* 58 (1976) 341, have suggested that they were there to prolong the navarch's command and oversee his conduct. See also Roisman 419f. for a summary of the role of Spartan commissioners in Thucydides.

⁶⁰ Gomme 2.193 discusses the impressive number of ships gathered by the Peloponnesians for this battle. They are actually no more than would be expected from the numbers provided by the allies for Sybota. The Gulf states had thirty five ships left from the original forty-seven in the first battle. The north-western states had sent thirty-eight to Sybota [1.46]- their losses there are not known. Elis may not have contributed to the first Gulf fleet, but instead have sent its ships (perhaps about ten, as at Sybota) to Leucas. This would easily account for the seventy-seven ships at Naupactus without supposing a requisition of more ships from the allies, as Thucydides implies [2.85]. Alternatively, it is possible, and more in line with later numbers in the Peloponnesian fleet, that the number of ships was fifty-seven. One ms.[C] has this number, as do the scholiasts to Aristophanes, *Knights* 562 and Aelius Aristides 1.159.1. A fleet of this size, while still outnumbering the Athenians, makes more sense in terms of the events of the subsequent battle.

⁶¹ The action is important for Thucydides, as it is highlighted by speeches by the commanding officers on both sides, Gomme 2.228. Gomme also provides details of the initial Spartan tactics.

⁶² Morrison and Coates 9.

battle plans. From the start Athens was clearly nervous of Peloponnesian naval potential, despite their use of 'old-fashioned' tactics. Athenian tactics, however, could only be successful against small groups of ships or groups in some confusion in open water.⁶³ The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, were fully aware of the dangers of Athenian expertise and sought to counter it by seizing the advantage of position.

Thucydides' account of the second battle in the Gulf raises some questions. The Peloponnesians were at first successful in bringing the Athenians to battle in an area of their own choosing. For this the navarch, Cnemus, must receive some of the credit, if only for approving such a plan. Order, discipline and good tactics are evident in the Peloponnesian battle plan.⁶⁴ The Peloponnesian line was divided into four, but the number of ships in each division is unknown, except for the right wing of twenty fast vessels. Four Spartan commanders (the navarch and his three advisers), one of whom, Timocrates, is said to have led the faster right wing on a Leucadian vessel [2.92], may have commanded each group; perhaps this was why the Spartans despatched three commissioners to Cnemus.

They sailed at dawn from the east, so that the sun was behind them.⁶⁵ Their best ships were stationed on the right to cut off any Athenian move for Naupactus. Phormio was clearly outmanoeuvred at this point.⁶⁶ He had deserted his station at Naupactus and was forced to make a dash back to save it from possible Peloponnesian attack. So far the Peloponnesians had proved they had some ability in tactics and manoeuvre.

Thucydides then follows the progress of the eleven Athenian ships that out-rowed the attacking Peloponnesian right wing and made for Naupactus, still on the defensive. The rest of the Athenian squadron was caught by the Peloponnesians close to the shore. A sudden *periplous*

⁶³ Gomme 2.229-30 draws attention to the fact that the Athenians could only be successful against ships in confusion or in small groups.

⁶⁴ The contribution of Brasidas is suggested here by Gomme 2.229, but there is no evidence for this as Thucydides does not mention him here. Thucydides' picture of Brasidas has been responsible for many suggestions about his part in successful or innovative actions.

⁶⁵ If the Peloponnesian right wing was leading and they were sailing inside the Gulf on the south side, they must have been approaching Naupactus from the west. The four lines then turned to attack Phormio with the sun behind them. Corinth used the angle of the sun to block the enemy's view at Sybota [1.51].

⁶⁶ Busolt 3.979 says Phormio should have attacked when the Peloponnesians were coming from Cyllene but Gomme rightly disagrees 2.229. How could Phormio have attacked vessels so close to shore?

by an escaping Athenian ship dramatically changed the situation on the right wing.⁶⁷ The Peloponnesians in pursuit were now rowing into the sun and were caught at a disadvantage and in disorder by the sudden move. Some even ran aground while others stopped to regroup and were attacked by the Athenians. The slowness of even the fastest Peloponnesian vessels in comparison with Athenian ships can be appreciated from the time that elapsed between the Athenian and Peloponnesian arrival at the harbour at Naupactus. The Athenians had, however, conceded position to the pursuing Peloponnesian ships because they had already drawn up on shore. The later events in this part of the battle may not have been seen until it was too late by the majority of the rest of the Peloponnesian fleet because of the angle of the sun.

Thucydides' report of the action does not include what happened to the other ships engaging the nine Athenian vessels further west. Diodorus [12.48.2] says that Phormio rashly attacked the Peloponnesians and that victory was in doubt. Perhaps Diodorus is using a different tradition of which there is no evidence in Thucydides.⁶⁸ He may be referring to the second half of the battle. Thucydides shifts his account from the one action to the other, suggesting that his informant may have been involved with the events nearer Naupactus. Neither Phormio nor Cnemus is mentioned and the impression is left that they played no outstanding role. As Gomme has remarked, Thucydides' omission of the name of the Athenian captain responsible for the *periplous* is most surprising in view of the fact that he makes this the turning-point of the battle.⁶⁹ Perhaps Thucydides was stressing the unexpectedness of the move to both sides by omitting names here. He may have been interested only in this part of the action because it illustrated Athenian skill and because of his conviction about Peloponnesian naval incapability. The pursuing Peloponnesians evidently thought they had won as they were already singing a victory paean. The Peloponnesian right wing, then, was caught off guard, but what was happening elsewhere is unclear.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ I.N. Whitehead, "The Periplous" *Greece and Rome* 34 (1987) 178-85 argues that this manoeuvre was the classic periplous which was performed by a single ship and not a squadron. A. Holladay, "Further thought on trireme tactics," *Greece and Rome* 35 (1988) 149-51 agrees.

⁶⁸ Westlake, *Individuals* 142 and Gomme 2.234 review the evidence for possible charges against Phormio as a result of the Gulf actions in 429.

⁶⁹ Gomme 2.232.

⁷⁰ They may have had difficulty in communication with the main fleet, see Hammond, "Naval Operations off Coreyra" *Studies* 463.

The remainder of Peloponnesian fleet subsequently appeared to make little resistance, but fled in panic to Panormus. In the pursuit they abandoned nine captured Athenian vessels and lost six of their own - from the right wing, or, perhaps, they included the ships that ran aground. A fight in the open sea was clearly what the Peloponnesians wished to avoid, especially if some of them had been attempting to tow disabled Athenian ships.⁷¹ They appear to have been well aware of the Athenians' skill in this kind of situation, as can be seen from their earlier tactic to attack the Athenians close inshore. They may have made for Panormus in panic, as Thucydides suggests, or they may have tried to tempt the Athenians to follow. After all, this was where the Peloponnesian land army was waiting in support, and the Peloponnesians' preferred tactic was close fighting on board ships in a constricted area. The army might be expected to give as much help in any fighting close to shore as the Messenians had to the Athenians on the opposite coast [2.90]. In the event, the Athenians did not pursue them. Half their ships were too heavily damaged and needed towing off.

At the time the Athenians do not seem to have been aware of the strategic gain they had made for the future, and their victory had been by no means decisive.⁷² They recalled Phormio at the beginning of the spring and did not replace him until after the revolt of Mytilene [2.103,3.7]. Nor do the Peloponnesians appear to have considered their case hopeless. Only six Peloponnesian ships had been lost.

Thucydides adds that the Peloponnesians were afraid of the approaching Athenian reinforcements. This was why they had to fight quickly and why they subsequently retreated into the Gulf. They had not, however, gone far into the Gulf and may have contemplated further action. The Athenians, though later reinforced by an extra squadron [2.92], were not so strong or so confident that they attempted to take the battle to the Peloponnesians. Their subsequent action under Phormio in the north-west was not effective either [2.90].

If Athenian reinforcements were the Peloponnesians' main fear, they appear to have had enough time to arrange an armistice, to exchange their dead and to set up a trophy and a

⁷¹ Towing disabled ships was a slow process, Hammond, "Naval Operations off Corcyra" *Studies* 464 n.1.

⁷² The engagement has been called one of the most significant battles of the Archidamian War - Kelly 42; Kagan *Archidamian War* 115; Gomme 2.232, as it demonstrated Athenian skill and inventiveness in their first naval action against the Peloponnesians. All this is true, but it is also the effect of hindsight from the later history of the war. The initial Peloponnesian tactics in the Gulf showed that they already were aware of Athenian superiority in open water and that they tried to avoid such a situation. In this they were relatively successful.

dedication of the ship they had taken. The Leucadian contingent was dismissed and appears to have gone unchallenged by the Athenians at Naupactus. The Peloponnesian command may have been already planning their next strike in the rear of any reinforcements and in the knowledge that the Athenians were fully stretched in putting another squadron of twenty vessels to sea.

The first part of the engagement had been a Peloponnesian victory, and had demonstrated that the Athenians could be beaten. The second half is difficult to follow, but clearly showed that the Peloponnesians could not afford to underestimate Athenian skill. It does not prove complete Peloponnesian ineptitude or mass panic. The suicide of the Spartan adviser, Timocrates, suggests, perhaps, how much importance the Spartans had attached to this battle, or that he realised his own responsibility through overconfidence for the situation that developed on the right wing. Perhaps he had exceeded his orders in extending the pursuit before the rest could catch up.

The raid on Piraeus

After this engagement the Peloponnesians went on to perform one of their boldest naval actions of the Archidamian War, a raid on the Athenian home port of Piraeus [2.93-4, Diod.12.49.1]. The original plan was to man the forty ships that were drawn up at Nisaea and to attack Piraeus, which was unguarded. Thucydides gives no reasons for the raid, except to say that it was done on Megarian advice. From its position in Thucydides' narrative, the raid appears to have been decided on after the action against Phormio and before the dispersal of the Peloponnesian fleet at the beginning of the winter.⁷³ If the Spartans expected to win when planning the second Gulf campaign, this attack on Piraeus might have been considered the crowning achievement of the season, a challenge to Athens in its own home port. It would also have signified the end of the war. If it were decided on after the battle, it may have been as a face-saver for Cnemus and the Peloponnesian fleet. In any case, its effect on Athenian morale would have been considerable, as Thucydides appears to indicate in his description of the reaction at Athens. It would also have had a positive effect on Peloponnesian morale, and have provided some booty to pay for the campaign. Gomme seems to suggest it was pointless, since he has asked what would be the practical aim of a raid aimed at Piraeus alone - it would achieve only

⁷³ Kelly 42-3.

the burning of an arsenal.⁷⁴ The propaganda value of the raid, however, would surely have been immense under any circumstances. The burning of Athenian ships in the reserve fleet would also have been a major loss to Athens. The Athenian reaction to the presence of a Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean in 427 shows how confident Athens was in its naval superiority in the east.

Whatever the immediate reasons behind the raid, Thucydides' method of description seems to do it less than justice. The treatment of the episode provides an interesting example of how Thucydides can build a particular impression in the mind of his reader; in this case his judgement of the Peloponnesian fleet as ignorant and inept.

Many scholars have followed Thucydides' inferences, especially after what is considered the ignominious Peloponnesian failure in the Gulf.⁷⁵ If the Peloponnesians had considered it so great a failure and the Athenians so dangerous an opponent at sea, would they have embarked on the scheme? Gomme sees the hand of Brasidas in the action, but there is no evidence for this. Thucydides attributes the plan to the Megarians and its performance to Cnemus, Brasidas and other Peloponnesian commanders. It was, then, approved by a majority of the commanders, and they are all involved in his assessment of incompetence. On the face of it, it would seem just the sort of action that would appeal to Thucydides: a bold, unexpected stroke carried out by night,⁷⁶ and not at all the sort of thing to be associated with Thucydides' unimaginative Spartans [8.96]. Thucydides' comments in the narrative and his presentation of events underline that, for him, 'the conception of the plan did not match its execution'.⁷⁷

Some preparation and discussion about the raid must have taken place beforehand. The Megarians would hardly have waited to the last minute to suggest it. They would surely have brought the matter up earlier, at least after the first action in the Gulf and as compensation for the loss of twelve Peloponnesian ships in the first battle. Perhaps they may have been looking to have their ships freed from Nisaea for Peloponnesian use. Gomme suggests they might have gone from Cenchreae, but there were no ships there. Cenchreae was surely less convenient for this kind of raid, as it was further away and the risk of being detected was consequently greater.

⁷⁴ Gomme, HCT 2.233.

⁷⁵ Gomme 2.233; Kelly 42-3; Legon 233.

⁷⁶ D.Latciner, "The speech of Teutiaplus (Thuc.3.30)" *GRBS* 16 (1975) 175-84.

⁷⁷ Legon 233.

There is no indication of any reluctance on the part of the Peloponnesian participants. Thucydides must have obtained some of his detail from a Peloponnesian source since he gives details of the night march and the Peloponnesian plans, but his presentation and interpretation of events are open to challenge. The action itself does not seem to fit the facts as he gives them.

The Peloponnesian rowers marched by night from Corinth to Nisaea taking with them their individual equipment, including their oars [2.93.2]. Clearly, the Peloponnesians knew beforehand that such equipment would not be available to them at Nisaea, or they wanted to save valuable time by not having to distribute these items at Nisaea. In the case of the rowlock thongs, it would have been advisable for each to take his own, as they stretched according to their users' strength.⁷⁸ If they knew this much, they might also have known that the Megarian ships had not been in the water for some time. Thucydides indicates that plans were changed at Nisaea, either because of the weather or because the Peloponnesians panicked at the thought of going to Piraeus. Thucydides clearly states that panic was the reason, since no wind would have stopped them had they been a little more resolute. This is surely an exaggeration. Triremes were fragile vessels not to be risked in bad weather. From Thucydides' description it is evident that the Peloponnesians knew the ships had been drawn up out of the water for some time, since this detail is included in his summary of the Peloponnesian plan [2.93.2]. They must, therefore, have been ready to risk the raid as far as Salamis, despite the bad weather. Thucydides adds, either as his own observation or as part of the Peloponnesian knowledge, that Piraeus was unguarded and no-one considered the possibility of an unexpected attack [2.93.3]. There is a problem here with the reading of the text: Gomme reads the term 'unexpected' [*aprosdoketois*] as an adjective to indicate that the plan was adopted without sufficient preparation by the Peloponnesians: Hude prefers the adverbial form [*aprosdoketos*] to suggest that the attack was unexpected by its victims.⁷⁹ This is the version followed here.

The objective of the raid was now to be Salamis. The Athenian fort at Budorum on Salamis was attacked and taken by surprise, and its three ships captured.⁸⁰ This garrison does

⁷⁸ Morrison and Coates 38. It is possible that the vessels at Nisaea had no *hypozomata* (the cables that ran around the hull of the ship). These were removed from ships when they were out of the water. Their absence could also have caused the Peloponnesian change of plan since these cables helped to prevent the ship leaking.

⁷⁹ Gomme 2.238-9.

⁸⁰ Gomme 2.240 discusses the garrison at Budorum, and Legon 229 comments on its poor position for guarding Nisaea.

not appear to have been particularly successful in preventing action from Nisaea, as is clear from elsewhere in Thucydides' narrative [3.51]. The Peloponnesians then successfully raided Salamis. Thucydides shifts the scene to Athens, and describes the dramatic reaction there when warning beacons were lit on Salamis; the Athenians could not tell what was happening and thought that Salamis was taken and that Piraeus was already under attack. The panic, he states, was as great as any in the course of the war [2.94.1]. Presumably this passage was written before the fall of Euboea in 411, since he makes a similar observation about that event [8.96]. Perhaps Thucydides' comments on the inability of the Spartans to capitalise on this opportunity is the result of the evident panic he saw in the city and the port; if the Spartans had reached Piraeus, they might have been able to do considerable damage.

The Athenians were aware that they had no defences and may have been overconfident in not providing any, although there had been no Peloponnesian naval activity recorded anywhere near the Saronic Gulf. They manned a fleet at dawn and made for Salamis. The scene changes once more to Salamis where the Peloponnesians, who had overrun most of the island by that time, are described as hurriedly making for Nisaea with their booty of prisoners, ships and plunder. They obviously had sufficient time to escape and had probably posted look-outs. It is only at this point that Thucydides introduces the detail that the Megarian ships were letting in water because they had been out of use for some time [2.94.3]. The Peloponnesian crews would surely have noticed that they were launching dried-out ships at the start of the raid, but by placing it here, Thucydides is suggesting that they were inexperienced enough not to have realised it before.⁸¹ As noted above, the ships' condition may even have been the reason why Salamis was substituted for Piraeus. Such ships would have been useless for any length of time at sea, and several hours' rowing were needed for a run from Nisaea to Piraeus and back. The substitute plan was a deliberately chosen risk, as the crossing to Salamis was short and the condition of the ships less important. The Peloponnesians' decision to reassess their plan shows that their original boldness had not entirely deserted their commanders.

⁸¹ J.Coates and S.McGrail, *The Athenian Trireme of the 5th century* 85, show the importance for triremes of regular drying out. The application of pitch to the hull before a new sailing seems to have been regular procedure, Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 189-90. The Peloponnesian sailors would have noticed the omission of this procedure on launching the vessels.

The Athenian response was to guard Piraeus [Diod.12.49.5], and in 427 to establish a stronger garrison position at Minoa [3.51]. They were not able to do this earlier because of the crisis on Lesbos [3.51]. In the meantime, the Peloponnesians were still able to use Nisaea.

Although in the long term and with hindsight, the Peloponnesian failure to remove the Athenians from Naupactus was to be crucial for both the naval and northern land wars, the Peloponnesians, like the Athenians, would not yet have seen this. Athens continued to be weak because of the plague. The Peloponnesians had been partially successful against Phormio, and had rattled the Athenians considerably by making a successful raid in the eastern waters of the Saronic Gulf. At the end of 429 the Peloponnesians had some cause for confidence in the progress of the naval war, despite the fact that they were primarily relying on allied ships from the Peloponnese and north-west Greece.

The crisis in Lesbos - 428

In 428 Sparta returned to its previous policy of invading Attica [3.1], but it was also negotiating to widen the war in the Aegean.⁸² Previously its actions in this area had been restricted to raids on Athenian shipping whenever possible. The Spartan attack in the Saronic Gulf in the winter of 429 may have been intended to demonstrate that Peloponnesian naval activity was not to be restricted only to the west. During this same winter and even before, the Spartans and Thebans had been discussing the possibility of aid to Lesbos to encourage revolt against Athens [3.2]. Lesbos was one of the few remaining independent ship contributors to the Athenian fleet - its ships and its position in the eastern Aegean would be a useful addition to the Peloponnesian fleet in numbers and in skill [3.11,13]. The island could also be an important focus for the encouragement of further rebellion against Athens. Chios, another free island ally of Athens, may also have been contemplating similar action at about this time [4.51]. The Athenians were still weak and could only put together forty ships for a *periplous* of the Peloponnese - some of these forty may even have included ships returned from duty at Naupactus.

Thucydides makes it clear that the Lesbian revolt had to occur earlier than planned because someone informed the Athenians about it. The Spartans and Thebans were not to know that Athens would be slow to respond [3.3], although, in the event, the timing of the Lesbian

⁸² Gomme, *HCT* 2.237,252, 270-78; Kagan, *AW* 139-41, Kelly, *AHR* 87 (1982), Bloedow, *Klio* 65 (1983) 46.

revolt was to cause grave problems for Sparta and its eastern policy. The incident is highlighted by speeches in Thucydides. That of the Mytileneans at Olympia perhaps indicates that Thucydides considered this moment of importance for the war. The Mytileneans appealed for Spartan military aid when an Athenian fleet arrived to settle the situation [3.4,5]. Sparta was still determined to hold on to the possibility of action in eastern waters, action that the Athenians tried to discourage by the dispatch of thirty ships around the Peloponnese [3.7]. Twelve of these vessels later remained at Naupactus, not to blockade Corinth but to attack Oeniadae and Leucas, which they did without success. The Athenians may have been trying to follow up the Spartan failure of 429 in the north-west and to keep the Peloponnesian fleet occupied here for as much of the season as they could.

The Spartans brought the Mytilenean ambassadors to Olympia during the Games so that an allied meeting might be held to enable Mytilene to join the Peloponnesian alliance and to receive aid [3.10]. Clearly, the decision to help Mytilene up to this point was a Spartan one that needed allied ratification. This had not been given before the beginning of the season, when allied strategy for the coming campaign would presumably have been discussed. The fact that Sparta had to submit the proposal for allied agreement reveals the weakness of the Spartan position within the alliance, as well as its naval reliance on its allies. Sparta was unable to take such a decision unilaterally and have it obeyed by the allies, and the Spartans needed their ships in order to get help to Lesbos. The Mytileneans' speech to the Peloponnesians shows their belief that Athens was weak and had no reserves [3.13], that action was needed quickly and that an eastern ally was of value to the Peloponnesian cause [3.13]. The Spartan strategy is also revealed - an immediate combined land/sea attack on Attica [3.13]. The speech may also indicate some of the arguments of the allies against such involvement: the distance of Lesbos from the Peloponnese [3.13]; and whether the Peloponnesians could trust a state that had rebelled against its hegemon [3.11,12].

Once the decision was made to accept Lesbos into the alliance, it was the Spartans who ordered the mustering of naval and hoplite forces [3.15]. They were also the most enthusiastic in carrying it out. The fact that they were instrumental in preparing the *diolkos* for use perhaps indicates that the Corinthians were somewhat reluctant to participate. Corinth may have had little reason to be concerned with developments in the east. It had promoted this war to strengthen its position in the west, now threatened by the Athenian force out of Naupactus. Corinth may also have been waiting for results of its activities in Corcyra, where it had returned the Corcyrean

prisoners taken at Sybota [3.70]. Other allies were also reluctant to serve in a second campaign. Thucydides' observation on Peloponnesian reluctance may refer mainly to the hoplite force rather than naval crews. The hoplites had served already that year [3.15.16]. Time was again wasted in waiting for the allies to gather, and this delay enabled the Athenians to send a large naval force to attack the Isthmus area. The Spartans were compelled to give up their plans and to return to Sparta.

The failure of the Peloponnesians to follow through with their decision to help Mytilene with swift, decisive action once again shows the weakness of the Spartan position within the alliance and a difference of opinion on strategy among the Peloponnesians. Sparta, evidently, strongly supported the plan of a second invasion of Attica with naval and land forces, but its allies were not as enthusiastic. The Spartans may have retreated from the Isthmus not so much because of their realisation that Athens was not as weak as they had supposed, but on account of the lack of allied support. Thucydides makes it clear that the fleet the Athenians put together was not manned with the usual highly-trained crews. It may not have been able to meet a Peloponnesian fleet with any success. There was no reason for the Spartans to suppose that Athens could keep on putting fleets of this size to sea indefinitely.

The new Spartan plan was to send a fleet to Lesbos in the following year [3.16]. Had they been able to carry out their plans for an attack on Attica, the war might have been considerably shortened.

Alcidas in Ionia and Corcyra

Before the start of the fighting in 427 the Spartans sent a representative to Mytilene to take charge and to encourage them with news of the Spartan intentions [3.26-33; Diod.12.55]. Thucydides states that Salaethus went from Sparta to Mytilene in a trireme for this purpose. The Aegean was always open to such voyages since it was impossible to close it off completely. It is clear that larger fleets could miss each other completely and have to rely on local sightings to come to grips with the enemy.⁸³

⁸³ Alcidas' presence is known to the Athenians from local reports but they could do nothing until his whereabouts could be precisely located [3.33].

The allies were prepared to undertake a land invasion, though a longer one than usual, and a fleet was to operate at Lesbos at the same time in another land/sea action.⁸⁴ A combined attack on Attica would not have achieved the surprise hoped for in the previous season, whereas naval activity by the Peloponnesians in the Aegean would be completely unexpected [3.32,36].

The number of ships in the Peloponnesian fleet appears low compared with what the Peloponnesians had put to sea previously. Only forty⁸⁵ were to be sent, under the Spartan admiral Alcidas.⁸⁶ Perhaps the use of the rebel fleet was envisaged, or, perhaps, some of the allies were again reluctant to serve. Perhaps, too, there was a shortage of available rowers, or the naval force may have been underfinanced. Previous naval actions had produced little booty and the naval states may have been operating at a loss, especially if, as seems likely, they had to provide ships at their own cost [1.125].

Thucydides' account of the actions of the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean reveals his beliefs about Peloponnesian naval intentions. The fleet is accused of wasting time while the Mytileneans are forced to surrender because of its non-appearance. Mytilene, however, may have fallen too early, as it had rebelled too early; Thucydides indicates, too, that Salaethus had problems restraining the Mytileneans from giving in to the Athenians because of the famine [3.28].

The Peloponnesian fleet was trying to avoid detection by the Athenians and had reached Myconos via Delos by the time Mytilene fell. They may have sailed via Melos [5.84],⁸⁷ which possessed the best harbour in the Cyclades. This route would have best chance of avoiding detection. Perhaps the Athenian decision to attack Melos in the following year was in response to Spartan use of it in 427 [3.91].

Alcidas, the navarch, chose not to return to Sparta at this juncture, as he might have done had his orders merely been to relieve Mytilene, but he sailed to Embatum to find out further

⁸⁴ Kelly 44.

⁸⁵ Gomme 2.288. Thucydides records the number as forty at 3.17, forty-two at 3.26 and forty at 3.29. Diodorus [12.55] says there were forty-five.

⁸⁶ The observations on Alcidas in this section owe much to the comments of Roisman 385-421.

⁸⁷ *IG* 5 (1) 1; R.Meiggs and D.M.Lewis, *A selection of Greek historical inscriptions* (Oxford, 1969) no.67. This inscription appears to belong to the 427. See the appendix by D.M.Lewis to L.H.Jeffery, "The development of Lakonian lettering; a reconsideration" *BSA* 83 (1988) 179ff.

details of the situation. He must have realised that the Athenians would now be free to hunt him down once they knew of his presence. Thucydides, however, underlines Spartan hesitation and fear by a speech, given by the Elean, Teutiaplus, in which he advocates a quick night attack on Mytilene. This bold move is rejected by Alcidas.⁸⁸ The presence of this Elean is the only identification of any Peloponnesian ally in this fleet, but a Spartan vessel can also be assumed for the navarch.

The Ionians and Lesbians, perhaps picked up by the Peloponnesian fleet when they reached Embatum, suggested that the fleet should seize a base in Ionia and use it to encourage further revolts among the Athenians allies and to negotiate Persian assistance. According to Thucydides, Alcidas had only one idea in mind - to return to the Peloponnese as quickly as possible. But he could have done this from Myconos at considerably less risk. Any attack on Mytilene would have been foolhardy, as there appears to have been no contact between the fleet and the pro-Spartans in Mytilene. Alcidas could not be sure of their support in the event of an attack. As it happens, Thucydides himself has already indicated that the pro-Spartan group was under severe pressure in Mytilene [3.28] and would not have been able to help. The possibility of the seizure of some Ionian city as a Peloponnesian base would have been as great an example of Spartan disregard for Greek liberation as the Samians thought the later execution of some of the Ionian prisoners taken on his voyage by Alcidas [3.32]. If Alcidas was aware of the complications of Ionian politics, he would have realised that the situation in cities such as Notium would hardly have ensured a secure base for any Peloponnesian fleet [3.34]. As for his behaviour in executing prisoners, Alcidas may have done this for security or for political reasons. Alcidas, then, very sensibly rejected all proposals, but chose to sail along the Ionian coast.

His decision to stay in Ionia is strange behaviour for one whose main idea was said to be a return to the Peloponnese.⁸⁹ Also, Alcidas is clearly in charge of decisions here. The allies and Ionians can only put forward suggestions. The Spartans had given their navarch power to decide on the immediate tactical position. Perhaps he was assessing the extent of support for Sparta in Ionia. How long he remained is not clear but it was evidently important that he keep

⁸⁸ Salmon 315 and Roisman 400 both consider Alcidas' refusal to attack to be wise.

⁸⁹ Gomme 2.294 thinks that Alcidas may have been forced to stay at Ephesus from necessity. Roisman 401 suggests he may have delayed in the hope of getting some profit from local raids. He may even have taken some of his prisoners from such raids.

his presence secret. Alcidas returned to the Peloponnese after being sighted by some Athenian ships - he had remained unseen for some time though reports of his presence had reached the Athenians.

Alcidas' main objective had been to help Mytilene. In this he had failed. As a result of the remarks of Thucydides about Alcidas' failure and his wish to return to the Peloponnese as quickly as he could, his activity has been criticised.⁹⁰ Thucydides gives the impression that Alcidas was timid, unenterprising and cruel, charges that he frequently brings against Spartans. None of this explains why Alcidas delayed in Ionia, especially when the earlier Spartan enthusiasm for aiding Mytilene is considered. By his treatment of this episode, highlighted by a speech, and his comments on the character of the Spartan navarch, Thucydides has left the impression that for him it revealed an important point in this war. Sparta had had a chance to create trouble for Athens in the Aegean and had failed to do so because of its usual timidity and caution.⁹¹ Alcidas had, however, sailed across the Aegean without losing any ships and in constant danger of meeting Athenian vessels. He had also shown that Sparta was serious in its promise of help to rebel Athenian allies [3.13.7].⁹² That Athens had not expected this move is indicated by their indignation at the presence of a Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean [3.36.2].

Thucydides appears to use the incident as an example of a missed opportunity for Sparta, since they were not to be in Ionia again for many years. This may not have been the fault of Spartan tactics but a sensible appreciation of the situation. Alcidas may have been recalled to the Peloponnese to help with developments in Corcyra. This possibility is suggested by the fact that all the Peloponnesian ships sailed to Cyllene, although they had been scattered by rough weather [3.69]. Had Alcidas not known of developments at Corcyra, which were subsequent to his departure, he would not necessarily have made for Cyllene, which is situated on the north-west coast of the Peloponnese, nor would the Spartans have been able to plan to reinforce their fleet in time to act at Corcyra before the Athenians arrived. Perhaps Alcidas' supposed flight across the Aegean was a planned dash to take advantage of the situation in the west. The appointment

⁹⁰ E.g., Gomme 2.294; Kagan, *Archidamian War* 151; Cartledge 262; Hornblower 400.

⁹¹ Westlake, *Individuals* 142-7; Kelly 46, Lateiner, *GRBS* 16 (1985) 182.

⁹² J.B.Wilson, "Strategy and Tactics in the Mytilene Campaign" *Historia* 38 (1981) 144-63.

of an adviser to Alcidas has been seen as a warning to the navarch against further failure,⁹³ but Brasidas could have been at Cyllene to supervise the collection of ships before Alcidas' arrival.⁹⁴ No reluctance on the part of the Peloponnesians to serve on a second naval campaign is mentioned, and so this campaign may have been agreed on before Alcidas sailed to Ionia. The number of ships sent west was larger than that of the eastern fleet. Perhaps this signifies greater support among the Peloponnesian allies from Leucas and Ambracia for action in the west [3.69].

The Corinthians had been carefully watching the Corcyrean situation since the return of the Corcyrean prisoners from Sybota [3.70; Diod.12.57],⁹⁵ and they were present at the Corcyrean debate on the future political alignment of the island. Corcyra continued to be of great strategic interest to the Peloponnesians, especially after the failure of the Acarnanian campaign. In this situation the Corcyreans attempted a course of neutrality but, after violent action by pro-Peloponnesian oligarchs with possible Peloponnesian support - they may have helped organise the mercenary force from the mainland [3.73] - Sparta became more directly involved and sent an embassy to Corcyra. The arrival of this embassy was a sign for a further oligarchic attack on the democrats. Athens was also fully aware of developments [3.71,81]. On the defeat of the oligarchs the Peloponnesians left - perhaps warned of the imminent arrival of the Athenian squadron from Naupactus [3.75.1].

Within a week the Peloponnesian fleet of fifty-three ships under Alcidas arrived at Sybota. The Spartan plan, as described by Thucydides, was to arrive at Corcyra before any Athenian reinforcements [3.69]. They knew these were coming, since they had posted look-outs [3.80].

⁹³ Sealey, *Klio* 58 (1976) 341, 343. Perhaps Thucydides used this and the Cnemus incident to stress the role of Brasidas. No loss of power by the navarch followed, Roisman 404. Each of these incidents is concerned with increasing the size of the fleet by mustering more allied ships. The advisers may have been sent to help with this process and as commanders of allied squadrons, cf. Timocrates.

⁹⁴ Roisman 419-21 gives a cautious assessment of the role of Brasidas in Thucydides and on the possibility that he was Thucydides' source for Alcidas' actions. See also E. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Antiquity* (London, 1965) 128 and H. Westlake, "Thucydides, Brasidas and Clearchus", *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History* (Bristol, 1989) 78-84 and *Individuals* 148f.

⁹⁵ Gomme 2.359-60.

It is not clear what the Peloponnesians hoped to achieve at Corcyra.⁹⁶ The fleet did not wait on events, but challenged the Corcyreans and the Athenian contingent from Naupactus immediately [3.76]. The confusion of the Corcyreans suggests that the Peloponnesian fleet may have arrived unexpectedly.⁹⁷ The ensuing battle took place in relatively open water where Athenian skill could be used to good effect. The Athenians, however, are said to have been afraid of the superior numbers of the enemy and the consequent danger of a *perikuklosis* [3.78], although they had apparently advised the Corcyreans to let them sail out first. They may have expected the Peloponnesians to retire on seeing them. The Peloponnesians, however, appear to have waited to see where the Athenians would attack and then to have responded effectively. Sixty Corcyrean ships went out against the Peloponnesians with the Athenians in support [3.77], but the Corcyreans were soon in difficulty. The few Athenians ships attacked the Peloponnesian wing, and so they showed some confidence.

The Peloponnesians seem to have had plenty of time to perform their tactics. They detached twenty ships to fight the disorganised Corcyrean fleet, while the rest met the Athenians. These Peloponnesians formed a defensive circle while the Athenians rowed around them. This time there was no rough water or transport ships to give the Athenians the advantage. The detachment of twenty Peloponnesian vessels then came up in support and the whole fleet advanced to attack. They successfully divided the Athenians from the Corcyreans and involved them in the laborious manoeuvre of encirclement. Thucydides emphasises the discipline of the Athenian retreat, a fact that is mentioned by Gomme.⁹⁸ The same manoeuvre performed in battle by the Corinthian fleet at Sybota before the war won no such praise from the historian [1.51.2]

Whatever the explanation of the tactics employed in the battle, it was a victory for the Peloponnesians [3.79], their first in this war and with the loss of only one ship. Nonetheless, Thucydides claims that they did not have the courage to follow up their success by attacking the town. He attributes this suggestion to Brasidas and its rejection to Alcidas. His account leaves questions unanswered. Could the Peloponnesians have made immediately for Corcyra? They had

⁹⁶ Gomme 2.365-7 attempts to reconstruct a timetable for the movements of the fleets, but Thucydides leaves many questions unanswered in this episode.

⁹⁷ Roisman 407.

⁹⁸ Gomme 2.380

thirteen ships in tow, and the democrats were in power in the city.⁹⁹ How would they hold a hostile city when the arrival of Athenian reinforcements was imminent? Thucydides may be reporting Corcyrean fears rather than Peloponnesian intentions here.

The reasons why the Peloponnesians fought at all is unclear.¹⁰⁰ They may have wanted revenge on the democrats for destroying a promising situation [3.72-4], or to neutralise the Corcyrean fleet and make it useless to Athens. The Corcyreans could only man thirty ships for the expected second battle [3.80]. Perhaps the Peloponnesians fought to show that Athens was not in control of western waters, and that the Corcyrean oligarchs might rely on Peloponnesian naval help. They may not have known before they arrived at Corcyra that the democrats' position had become more secure. In the event, they refused to fight a second time when the Athenian reinforcement of sixty ships arrived, but retired via Leucas - a prudent move since the Peloponnesians would have been greatly outnumbered. The Peloponnesian fleet was still not ready to take on a large number of Athenian ships.

This year has been considered the best for the Peloponnesian fleet from the scope of its operations,¹⁰¹ but little had been achieved in concrete terms by their fleets, while the Athenians had been given valuable time to recover their strength. There is no evidence that any time had been spent by the Peloponnesians in training to meet the Athenian fleet, as the Corinthians had suggested was the plan when war broke out [1.121.4], although the fleet had probably gained rowing practice and improved its efficiency, perhaps a contributing factor to their success at Corcyra. They had also achieved minor financial reward in the Cyclades, Ionia and Corcyra from local contributions, the ransom of prisoners and from raiding, but this could hardly have repaid the expense of maintaining a fleet of forty to sixty ships for the whole campaigning season of 427.

⁹⁹ Gomme 2.367 adds that Alcidas could not have attacked the city immediately since his fleet was tired after a battle that had lasted all day.

¹⁰⁰ Salmon 314 suggests that Corinth was planning to gain control of Corcyra without Sparta's knowledge but he does not explain how they could do this. Gomme 2. 363 has asked why the Peloponnesians did not attempt to take Naupactus while the Athenians were at Corcyra. Did the Peloponnesian fleet know that the Athenian squadron was at Corcyra? Was Naupactus not considered a great threat?

¹⁰¹ Kelly 44.

Heraclea and north Greece

For 426 the Spartans appear to have planned no specific naval actions [3.92-3; Diod.12.59.3-5]. Although they had won a naval victory at Corcyra, they had been unable to capitalise on it because they were still unable to challenge the whole Athenian fleet. Nonetheless, the Peloponnesians maintained contact with some Corcyrean exiles, but did not give them immediate and active support [3.85]. The failure of the Peloponnesians to deliver a decisive blow at sea from 429 onwards allowed the Athenians to regain some of their position and strength.

Spartan energies in this season were concentrated more on a new approach and a possible long-term solution to the problem of action in the Aegean and in northern Greece in a partial resurrection of their former design for northern and western Greece. Sparta had taken advantage of an appeal from the Trachinians and Dorians to establish and fortify a colony at Heraclea in Trachis [3.92]. Sparta was careful about security in new foundation - only Peloponnesian sympathisers were to apply. The establishment of this proposed colony was a popular plan and confidence was shown in Spartan organisation, despite their relative lack of experience in such foundations.

One of the oecists was Alcidas, who had been the navarch of the previous year. Perhaps he was considered something of a naval expert by this time.¹⁰² Another was Leon, perhaps the father of Pedaritus and Antalcidas, the latter of whom was later ambassador to Athens during the peace negotiations in 420.¹⁰³ Both these men may have been active supporters of an Aegean policy for Sparta. Thucydides records that the site of Heraclea was well-placed for the war against Athens. It lay on the route to Thrace and it was planned as a naval base with dockyards [3.92.4] for raids against Euboea. The earlier raids may have been less effective after the establishment of the Athenian garrison at Atalante, which had been damaged in an earthquake that spring [3.89.1]. Timber supplies were also available locally [Livy 36.22]. The use of Heraclea as a naval base is not recorded, but its position relative to Euboea caused considerable panic at Athens [3.93]. Thucydides mitigates the effect of this reaction by relating briefly the

¹⁰² *contra* Gomme 3.395 and Westlake, *Individuals* 147, who think his appointment a sinecure. A.Andrewes, "Spartan Imperialism" *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, ed. P.D.A.Garnsey and C.R.Whittaker (Cambridge, 1978) 95-99, and Kagan, *AW* 196 point out the importance of Heraclea to Sparta's land operations but Kelly 46 and Cawkwell, *YCS* 24 (1975) 56 n.1 emphasise the wide-ranging Spartan plans for the area.

¹⁰³ P.Poralla, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians* 2nd.ed.(Chicago, 1985) no.42.

unsuccessful history of the colony, but at the time it was evidently thought a grave threat [3.93.1].

Some of the intentions of the Spartans in founding the colony were shown in the same season when troops from Heraclea took part in the Aetolian campaign aimed at Naupactus [3.100-102,105; Diod.12.60.2-6].¹⁰⁴ Clearly, the Peloponnesians were not willing to attempt to take Naupactus from the sea, although some may have been ready to make raids on Athenian ships. The Athenian share of the spoils after the Spartan defeat in Amphilochia was captured during the return of the fleet to Athens [3.114.1].

The naval disaster at Pylos and its consequences - 425

The story of the action at Pylos has been a continuing source of controversy, as Thucydides' account leaves many gaps in detail [4.1-41; Diod.12.61].¹⁰⁵ The results of the incident are, however, clear; the Athenians, by a combination of luck and good judgement, were able to occupy a position on the Peloponnesian coast, to defeat the Peloponnesian fleet at Pylos, to score a diplomatic and strategic coup by demanding and getting custody of that fleet and to drive a wedge between the interests of Sparta and its allies over the fate of the Spartans cut off on Sphacteria.

The differences in naval aims and interests between the Peloponnesians that had been partly suggested by the diminishing numbers of ships sent on naval campaigns, and the importance of their lack of significant success in financial and military terms were now to be seen openly. Sparta was intent only on getting back its Spartiate soldiers, whatever the cost, while its allies were compelled to give up their ships in a purely Spartan cause. It is strange that this incident is not referred to again as a source of friction in the alliance.

¹⁰⁴ The long-term Spartan plan may also have included control of Corcyra, since the Athenian occupation of Naupactus had been instrumental in preventing Peloponnesian success in the west, Kelly 50. The need for a wider-ranging strategy by Sparta is recognised by Gomme 2.394-9 and Kagan, *AW* 195-7. Gomme 2.395 and Cartledge 239, also see the hand of Brasidas in the plan to found Heraclea. There is no evidence for this supposition.

¹⁰⁵ See J.Wilson, *Pylos* (Warminster, 1979) for an account of the problems relating to the topography and battle plans at Pylos.

The Spartans began their campaigning year with another invasion of Attica [4.2] early in the spring [4.6].¹⁰⁶ At the same time they had dispatched a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty ships to take advantage of the situation at Corcyra. There was a serious famine on the island, due in large part to the activity of the Corcyrean rebels at Istome [4.2]. Clearly, the Peloponnesians had withdrawn from Corcyra only on a temporary basis and were waiting for the right opportunity to return. Sparta was again involved in this campaign. The fleet was sent to Corcyra under a Spartan navarch, Thrasymelidas [4.11.2].

The news of the seizure of Pylos by a small Athenian force at first appears to have caused no great reaction at Sparta. The Spartans may have considered it a temporary affair, much like previous attacks on their coastline [4.5]. On the return of Agis from Attica either because of the weather or because of the news from Pylos, the Spartans sent a force to Pylos, called up more troops and summoned the fleet from Corcyra [4.8]. These ships used the *diolkos* at Leucas and were able to avoid the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus. The *diolkos* played an important part in this war in enabling the Peloponnesian fleet to escape detection or to retreat quickly. The Spartans took the threat posed by the Athenian presence at Pylos seriously, though Thucydides says they expected to take Pylos easily once they arrived there [4.8].

Their plan seems to have been to deny any Athenian ships a landing-place and to besiege the Athenian land forces [4.8]. The Athenians at Pylos still had communications by sea, since Messenian ships supplied them with arms and men [4.9]. The Athenians had, apparently, not expected such a response, especially naval, from Sparta [4.9.3]. They may not have been aware of the size of the Spartan fleet at Corcyra.

The importance of the ensuing battle for a landing point is highlighted in Thucydides' account by the speech of Demosthenes [4.10]. The Spartan fleet made its assault [4.11] with forty-three ships under Thrasymelidas. Where the remaining seventeen Peloponnesian vessels were is not clear. The ensuing struggle is not related in great detail by Thucydides except for the role of Brasidas. The navarch, Thrasymelidas, is not mentioned, but he was surely involved in any discussion on tactics. Much of the detail about Brasidas may have come from a Brasidean

¹⁰⁶ The timing of this invasion early in the season has led to the suggestion that it was a diversionary strike. The Peloponnesians' real objective was the occupation of Corcyra where they had dispatched a large fleet, before it could be reinforced by Athens, Busolt *G.G.* 1096, Kelly 51 n.89 quoting Grote, *History of Greece*, 6 (New York, 1899) 313.

source, since the Peloponnesians are elsewhere said to have attacked bravely despite the difficulty of the coastline [4.11.2].¹⁰⁷

Spartan attempts to force a landing continued for two days. On the third they dispatched some ships to Asine to collect timber for siege-engines [4.13]. The Spartans, then, had stocks of large timbers on the coast. These may have been available for shipbuilding as well as for other purposes.

The arrival of the Athenian fleet in the harbour appears to have caught the Peloponnesians relatively unprepared, though some ships were manned in time to meet the Athenians [4.13].¹⁰⁸

They may have thought that the Athenians had sailed off unable to attack, when they had in reality only gone to Prote. The description of the battle that followed in the bay is confusing, as are many of Thucydides' accounts of naval battles. The Peloponnesians put up some resistance, mainly in the fight on the shore around the ships, but lost access to Sphacteria. The Athenians do not appear to have had a specific battle plan, since Thucydides says that their intention was to fight in the harbour or out in open water [4.13.3]. The tactics, however, are of less importance here than the result: a band of Spartiates was caught on Sphacteria, Athenian ships patrolled the island and the Spartans could not prevent them [4.14]. The Spartans were then forced into a truce in order to rescue their men. Thucydides does not mention any Spartan attempts to rescue the force on Sphacteria. They still had some ships available, since Thucydides later mentions boats used by helots, and ships in Laconia and elsewhere [4.26]. Moreover, Peloponnesian attacks by sea were evidently a concern to the Athenians, since the terms of the truce contained specific provision against them [4.16], but the Peloponnesians may well have been reluctant to meet the Athenians again.

The Spartans agreed to hand over all the ships in the harbour and in Laconia to Athens as one of the terms of the truce. About sixty ships in all were handed over, presumably without their crews [4.16]. Perhaps this was why Thucydides put the Peloponnesian numbers at Corcyra at sixty, although the number taking part in the battle for a landing-place was forty-three. There

¹⁰⁷ For Thucydides and Brasidas see Gomme 1.233ff, Westlake, *Individuals* 148ff, and *GRBS* 21 (1980) 331-40, also the summary by Roisman 413-419.

¹⁰⁸ The problems in Thucydides' account of this naval battle are discussed by H. Westlake, "The Naval Battle at Pylos and its consequences" *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History* (Bristol, 1989) 60-78.

is no record of what happened to these vessels. The damaged ships may have been burned and the rest towed back to Piraeus, although this was a long and tedious process.¹⁰⁹

The Spartans' speech to the Athenian assembly about the possibility of peace demonstrates that they had nothing new to offer Athens, but were prepared to sacrifice their allies' interests to get back the Spartans on Sphacteria. That they were well aware of the effect of this revelation on their allies is indicated by their suggestion that further negotiations be held in secret [4.22].

When the talks were broken off, Athens refused to hand back the Peloponnesian ships on what Thucydides seems to consider a weak pretext [4.23.1]. The Spartans appear to have been somewhat naive in handing over their whole fleet during the negotiations. There were, after all, no guarantees that the ships would be returned and no mention is made of any oaths taken at the time of the conclusion of the truce. They may have been confident that the Athenians would accept their pragmatic proposal of a return to a dual hegemony. If so, they badly misread the situation. As a result they were cleverly outmanoeuvred by a possibly calculated Athenian demand. Demosthenes, Eurymedon and Sophocles, in making such truce arrangements with the Spartans, may have known that Athenian rejection of the Spartan proposals was likely, and that the Peloponnesian fleet might thus be eliminated as a threat to Athenian interests in the west.

The subsequent surrender of the Spartiate force on Sphacteria had serious consequences for Spartan prestige [4.40] and the Spartan 'mirage'.¹¹⁰ The Spartan war effort was now hamstrung, since Athens had hostages to prevent further Spartan action on land [4.41] and a permanent position on the Peloponnesian coast from which they could launch damaging raids. The Peloponnesians had also been deprived of their fleet and could not conduct naval operations or respond to Athenian sea-borne attacks. These were not long in coming.

Few ships may have been left at Corinth, as Athens was able to attack Corinth from sea at Solygia without any Corinthian naval resistance [4.42]. The Peloponnesian coastal towns of Epidaurus and Methana were also sacked [4.45], and the Athenians took the strategically important island of Cythera [4.53]. The Corcyrean rebels were also vulnerable as there was no possibility of help for them from the Peloponnese [4.46].

¹⁰⁹ As happened to some of the Peloponnesian ships captured by the Athenians at Cynossema [8.106].

¹¹⁰ Kagan, *AW* 148; Brunt 273, Kelly 52.

The Spartans had not given up all hope of continuing the war, as they sent an embassy to Persia. Their demands, however, were not at all clear to the Persians and the negotiations appear to have come to nothing [4.50]. Perhaps the Spartans did not know themselves what to offer.¹¹¹ There is no evidence for any large-scale construction of ships by the Peloponnesians in the years leading up to the peace of Nicias, although some crews were still available, since only one had been captured at Pylos [4.14].

The terms of the armistice of 423 show that the Peloponnesians still had some warships available, but these may not have been sufficient for active service [4.118.5]. Perhaps it was a matter of morale; Thucydides says that the effect of the Spartan surrender on the Greeks was considerable [4.40]. Sparta and the Peloponnesians were entirely on the defensive at this point. It may also have been a matter of money. The construction by Corinth of the ninety ships for Sybota had been a tremendous effort. After six years of war and little or no financial profit from victory, neither they nor any other Peloponnesians may have had sufficient money to rebuild their fleet or to pay their crews.

Sparta, however, was not completely finished. In 424 Brasidas had taken a small army north to Thrace. Sparta had remained in contact with Perdikkas [4.70,74,78,79,83] and with Chalcidice. Brasidas' campaign must have been planned and organised with the help of the Spartan state which armed his force [4.80], since Sparta needed something more with which to negotiate with Athens [4.81]. The Athenian defeat at Delium and Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis changed the situation [4.96,102]. Brasidas himself was aware of the importance of ships for his campaign, not surprisingly in view of his previous association with the Peloponnesian fleet. He ordered triremes built during the winter [4.108], and used them in his attack on Scione [4.120].

It is difficult to suppose that in the two years after Pylos the Peloponnesians had not been trying to replace their naval losses, but there is no evidence to support it. The terms of the truce of 423 and the peace of Nicias in 421 included land and sea security clauses. These clauses may have been aimed at preventing a future build-up of Peloponnesian naval forces [5.18].¹¹²

¹¹¹ Gomme 3.499 suggests that they were as yet not ready to give up Greek claims to Asia Minor as the Persian King would demand as the price of his help. Kagan, *AW* 257-58 blames factional politics at Sparta for the indecision.

¹¹² They may alternatively have been formulaic; the Erxadeis treaty between Sparta and the Erxadeis of Aetolia apparently contained similar provisions, see P.Carlledge, "A New Fifth-Century Spartan Treaty" *LCM* 1 (1976) 87-92.

Spartan naval policy, finances and organisation

By 431 the Spartans had evidently recognised that, in order to defeat Athens, they would have to have a sizable fleet. It was to this end that they requisitioned ships and money from their alliance and from the western states in Italy and Sicily. Some at Sparta had learned the lessons of the first war with Athens. Sparta, as the leading power of the Spartan alliance, was to be in supreme command and to provide the officers and a few ships for the fleet.

Given the fact of their reliance on allied sea-power, it may seem strange that the Spartans did not consider the possibility of building and maintaining a fleet of their own, but until the Archidamian War there had been no need to do so. Spartan and allied naval interests had remained the same during the Pentecontaetia. In fact, it would probably be true to say that the Spartans had shown little interest in maritime matters during this period and had accepted Athenian naval domination of the Aegean, although they had kept their contacts with Aegina. The Peloponnesian maritime states had concentrated their interests mainly in the west; Sparta had allied with Dorian states in Sicily and Italy and had maintained good relations with Corcyra. By the time of the outbreak of war, Corinth had increased the size of its fleet to the point that there was no need for Sparta to consider a building programme of its own, especially if the western states were to contribute their expected share of ships and money.

The majority of the Spartans themselves probably had not considered building a permanent fleet. They did not see themselves as a potential sea-power, nor did they look to a future development in this area. They merely wished to resume their former hegemony of the Greeks by destroying that of the Athenians. Carried away by their role as liberators and by the support of the rest of the Greeks, the Spartans looked no further than Athens' defeat. If they had considered funding their own naval force, it would have had incalculable effects on the traditional oligarchic Spartan system. The status of the craftsmen and crews needed to build, to maintain and to man such a fleet would have been elevated. In addition, wealthy Spartan citizens were hardly likely to agree to take on the burden of funding a fleet; Thucydides' Archidamus specifically says that this idea was not one that would be readily approved at Sparta, and that there were no public funds to cover such expenses [1.80.4]. The Spartan state was clearly not ready for such a fundamental change. This kind of change had occurred at Athens, according to Athenian tradition, because of the foresight of one man, Themistocles, and, initially, because of a large and chance infusion of cash from the silver mines at Laureum.

For Sparta the use of allied ships and crews, provided at allied expense was more acceptable. This is not to say that individual Spartans did not contribute to a Spartan war fund. Epigraphical evidence suggests that at least one Spartan donated a talent of silver.¹¹³ On the same document groups of contributors are also recorded; these are not members of the Spartan Alliance in the Peloponnese, and so this public inscription may commemorate a special donation. Among them is one who handed over what appears to be a trireme's pay, evidently a recognised sum. Others seem to have provided produce for the use of Spartan forces. Sparta, then, organised some kind of ration for its forces. It is unlikely that crews were paid money, unless by their individual states. They probably relied on any booty gained from battle, as in the period of the Persian War.

Money, produce, ships and men for a fleet were raised according to a pre-arranged system based on each state's resources [2.7], probably at a rate agreed at the time a treaty was signed between Sparta and its future ally.¹¹⁴ These were not permanent payments on an annual basis, but were raised by Sparta for a particular military emergency. Thucydides states that the Spartans did not impose a tribute on their allies [1.19]. These assessments may be what Thucydides refers to by *ta prosphora* [1.125], organised by the allies in the winter before the war began. Sparta was presumably also responsible for their distribution. The Spartan system, then, was unlike that of Athens, in which funding of the Athenian fleet depended in large part on the annual tribute paid by Athens' allies in the Aegean. Wealthy Athenian citizens were also taxed in the form of trierarchies and occasional wartime *eisphorae* [3.19].

For land operations Sparta could call on up to two-thirds of a state's total force [2.10]. The precise naval assessment is unknown. Thucydides records the numbers of new ships ordered to be built by allied states in 412 [8.3], but there is no indication of what percentage this may have been of their resources, or how many vessels they already had in service. That these were

¹¹³ *IG* 5 (1) 1, dated to 427 B.C.

¹¹⁴ The Spartan treaty with the Aetolian Eraxadeis may be an example of such an agreement signed in wartime, Cartledge, *LCM* 1 (1976) 87-92, *contra* F. Gschnitzer, *Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag* (Mannheim, Glan, 1978), who thinks it from the early 5th century. The treaty appears to be a purely military one in which the Aetolians agree to follow Spartan direction by land and sea. The phrase *katto dunaton* [line 23] may be a reference to a Spartan assessment or it may be formulaic.

formal assessments and requests is indicated by his use of *epitasso* and *protaxis* respectively.¹¹⁵ Costs might be recovered from booty taken as a result of victory.¹¹⁶

Why the Spartans thought that the western Greeks, who had not taken an important part in the Persian War, would be ready to help them in 431 is not stated. Perhaps they assumed that fear of Athenian ambition in the west would be sufficient motive. Some western Dorian states had shown support of the Peloponnesian cause by making alliances with Sparta at the beginning of the war [3.86]. Clearly, their interpretation of what was expected from the terms of their treaties differed from that of Sparta, since they sent no help. Brunt's statement that there was no prospect that Spartan 'orders' to the west would be obeyed, or that western ships would have made little difference to the balance of power is not satisfactory.¹¹⁷ Thucydides has surely recorded what was believed at Sparta at the time the treaties were made, on or shortly before the outbreak of war. Nor is there evidence to show that western help would have made little difference to the Peloponnesian naval effort. What evidence there is seems to point the other way: the Athenians were clearly nervous of a naval build-up by the Peloponnesian states at the time of the crisis at Corcyra [1.44]. Their alliance with Corcyra was an attempt to weaken the Peloponnesians navally and to have a base on the route to the west. There is no evidence that they were thinking of this base in purely commercial terms.

Had Sparta attempted to alter this system in favour of one that involved allied payments for a permanent fleet, it would have had considerable trouble with the members of its alliance. Sparta's whole objective in undertaking the war was ostensibly to liberate the Greeks from the tyranny of Athens. The Spartans could not afford to treat their allies as the Athenians did theirs. Should Sparta demand greater contributions from the allies, they might in turn request a greater share in the command as compensation. While Sparta controlled military numbers and policy, it would not be ready to grant such a request. Sparta, then, opted for an *ad hoc* system of financing, employed on a case by case basis. The political effect of a permanent allied army or navy on the alliance would have been the loss of Spartan hegemony. The supreme command

¹¹⁵ Liddell, Scott, Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford, 1961) s.v.h. When Corinth asks for allied naval help in 435 against Corcyra [1.27.2], the verb used by Thucydides is *deomai*. This suggests more of a request in need than an order.

¹¹⁶ W.Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practices I* (Berkeley, 1971) 53-93.

¹¹⁷ Brunt 262.

would also have been divided among allies with different interests and would have become unwieldy and inefficient; the Greeks had avoided the problems of shared command in the Persian War by appointing Sparta as supreme leader [Hdt.7.148]. Sparta, then, had every reason to prefer a system that ensured its continued hegemony.

In retrospect, lack of funding was crucial for the Spartan naval effort, as it was to be eventually for Athens, because of the length of time the war lasted. At the time of its outbreak, however, it was not considered a problem by Sparta. According to Thucydides, no-one in Greece expected the war to last more than a few years [5.14].

Perhaps the major problem experienced by the Peloponnesian navy was a financial one, as Pericles forecast [1.142]. Fleets were expensive to fit out and to maintain; there appears to have been a tendency on both sides not to risk their ships unless they were confident of victory through numerical superiority. Sparta's need for money is indicated by its requests for money and ships to allies outside the Spartan alliance, by the acknowledgement that more allies were needed (perhaps to expand the financial base of the alliance, as well as to increase its manpower) [1.82], and by the early Spartan embassies to Persia [2.7].¹¹⁸ One of the major problems for the Peloponnesian fleet in the Archidamian War was that it had no victories of any significance from which it might recoup its losses and expenses. It is understandable, therefore, that Sparta's allies may have become increasingly reluctant to take part in naval actions unless their interests were directly involved. Spartan interest in the military use of the fleet, however, continued, as it was planning naval campaigns down to the time of the loss at Pylos in 425. Sparta had less to lose in terms of ships and men in comparison with larger naval allies such as Corinth, Ambracia or Elis.

Ship totals and naval installations

A considerable number of Peloponnesian ships appears to have been available at the start of the war.¹¹⁹ Thucydides lists the naval allies of the Spartan as Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Pellene in Achaea, Elis, Ambracia and Leucas [2.9], but does not give details of the numbers from each state. He does not mention Locris in this list, but it evidently had a part in naval

¹¹⁸ D.Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977) 50-82, reviews relations between Sparta and the Persians during the Archidamian War.

¹¹⁹ Gomme 2.7; Kelly 31. Kagan, *Archidamian War* 21 puts the number of available Peloponnesian ships at 100, N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece* (Oxford, 1967) 311-12 claims that 300 could have been provided.

activity in the Aegean [2.32]. These Peloponnesian allies had supplied a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships at Sybota [1.46]. Corinth had provided ninety ships for this fleet. The Peloponnesian losses at Sybota totalled thirty, but how many of these were Corinthian is not known [1.54]. Megara sent twelve ships to Sybota, many of which had been destroyed along with their crews [1.48.4,49.5]. Megara had subsequently suffered the effects of Athens' decree against it, although the full effect of this decree and its provisions are not known.¹²⁰ Forty ships are later mentioned at Nisaea, though whether they were all Megarian is unclear [2.93]. They may have been triremes [3.65]. These vessels do not appear to have been used after the raid on Piraeus in 429. Ambracia had increased its contribution from eight ships at Leucimne to twenty-seven at Sybota, while the Leucadian squadron remained at ten [1.46].

Apart from Megara and Corinth, all the Peloponnesian naval allies faced the west. Even Corinth and Megara had western ports.¹²¹ Elis had produced some empty hulls and money for the action at Leucimne and ten vessels for Sybota after its dockyard at Cyllene had been burned by the Corcyreans [1.30]. It is odd that there is no reference during the whole of the Archidamian War to any further attack on Cyllene, a major repair facility, and none to any move against Gytheum. Cyllene seems to have been the major Peloponnesian port for action in western waters; the fleet withdrew there to refit and regroup after in 429 [2.84.5], and mustered there for action against Corcyra in 427 [3.69]. Perhaps it was too well fortified after the Corcyrean raid.

These figures may not reflect the total naval strength of each state, but they are probably the minimum that could be comfortably produced. If the losses at Sybota were replaced, the addition of ships from the west would bring the Peloponnesian fleet up to around 350 [Diod.12.41.1-2] or 650 [2.7], surely too large a number to be likely, at the start of the war.

The potential number of ships available to the Spartan alliance must have given them confidence that they could meet Athens wherever necessary, and have influenced their naval hopes at the time, as well as their hopes for the war as a whole. Yet this was the fleet whose supposed inexperience Thucydides, the major source for this period, frequently criticised [2.84,85,87,89,91,94]. After the action at Sybota, however, Thucydides gives no more detail of ship totals from each Peloponnesian state. Perhaps such information was not available to him,

¹²⁰ Thuc. 1.139; Diod.12.39.4; Plut.*Per.*29; Gomme 1.230 and Legon 219 for the problems of the date, purpose and effect of the Megarian Decree.

¹²¹ Legon, *CP* 68 (1973) 164-5.

or he may not have thought it important enough to record. What is clear is that the numbers of ships put to sea by the Peloponnesians generally declined during the Archidamian War. They furnished one hundred vessels at Zacynthus [2.66], seventy-seven at Naupactus [2.86.4], around forty for Mytilene [3.26.1, 29.1], fifty-three for Corcyra [3.76] and about sixty for Corcyra in 425 [4.2.3]. Their reliance on crews from outside the Peloponnese and the elimination of this source may have been part of the problem [1.143.1]. The rest may have been the problem of paying for a fleet, otherwise it seems strange that the Peloponnesian states do not seem to have trained more crews of their own to meet their needs. Not all Peloponnesians can have been interested only in agriculture.

The Spartan contribution to the fleet is not known, although it was probably not large, as Archidamus acknowledged [1.80.4]. In 429 a Spartan force of one thousand hoplites under Cnemus was sent from Sparta on a few ships [2.80.2]. If these vessels were warships each taking about forty men, twenty five would be required.¹²² They may, however, have included troop transports which would hold more men. There is no indication whether this number was all the Spartans could produce.

Perioeci and helots in the fleet

The role played by *perioeci* in Spartan naval affairs is unclear. *Perioeci* were free men who, according to Herodotus, lived in towns in Lacedaemon [Hdt.7.234]. Their major interest was probably in agriculture. They provided military contingents for the Spartan army. All harbours on the Laconian Gulf used by Sparta were perioecic;¹²³ two of those on the Messenian Gulf belonged to refugees from Asine and Nauplia, settled there by Sparta in the archaic period.

There is little agreement among scholars about the organisation and the relationship of the *perioeci* and the inhabitants of Asine and Methone to the Spartans.¹²⁴ The Spartans were

¹²² IG 1(3) 199 ; Morrison and Coates 3, 60.

¹²³ These were at Thyrea, Tyros, Prasiae, Cyphanta, Epidaurus Limera, Gytheum, Las, Helos, Boiae, Asine, Methone and Pylos. This last, despite its position, was not developed for overseas trade. The west coast of the Peloponnese is not particularly hospitable. Fishing and trade, especially in murex, probably took place in the towns of the Laconian Gulf. Asine was also a timber depot [4.13].

¹²⁴ J.Larsen, "Perioikoi" *RE* 19 (1938) 816-33 thought that the status of *perioeci*, 'the dwellers around', lay somewhere between helots and the free allies of Sparta. P.Oliva, *Sparta and her social problems* (Amsterdam and Prague 1971) 62 supposed they had between citizen and foreigner status. Cartledge 178f., suggested that their status was similar to that of the allies of Sparta before the formation of the Spartan Alliance. Thus, unlike the allies, they had no way of disagreeing with Spartan commands. In addition, he claims that, as subjects of the Spartiates, *perioeci*

concerned with the defence of Methone in 431, since they had a mobile detachment under Brasidas ready to defend the strategically important site, and they presented him with an award for doing so successfully [2.25]. Prasiae was also fortified in the Archidamian War [Aristophanes, *Peace* 242]. There is no evidence, however, that perioecic towns were regularly garrisoned, or that they were under the care of harmosts.¹²⁵ Methone was, apparently, fortified, but this may have been because of its strategic position.

There were other perioecic towns on the coast of the Peloponnese whose interests must have been, at least partly, maritime, and who suffered economic damage from Athenian attacks. Those mentioned by Thucydides, or those that he says were attacked at some time during the war, are Methone (see above), Asine [4.13, 54] and Cythera [4.53ff]. Cythera was garrisoned, but the only evidence for this comes from a period of war; Cythera was of commercial as well as strategic importance [Hdt. 7.234; Thuc. 4.53]. From their base at Cythera after 425/4 the Athenians were able to raid perioecic towns such as Asine, Helos, Cotyrta, Aphrodisia [4.56], Epidaurus Limera and the Thyreatis, where Sparta had settled the Aeginetans in 431 and had stationed a garrison at some time in the war [4.56]. For a historian with interest in sea-power [1.1-15], it is strange that Thucydides never mentions Gytheum by name; it was, supposedly, the naval base of the Spartans, Athens' opponent, in the fifth century. Perhaps Gytheum had not yet achieved that status. Sparta may have used it or any nearby harbour, such as Las, as necessary.

had no citizen rights at Sparta. These scholars appear to subscribe to the view that Spartan society was already rigidly stratified into *homoioi* [equals], *perioeci* and helots. This is by no means certain in the case of the helots, see C.D. Hamilton, "Social Tensions in Classical Sparta" *Ktima* 12 (1987) 31-43. Similarly, there is little reason to suppose that the *perioeci* were treated as subjects.

Most of their settlements were inland, although there were important perioecic harbours, e.g., Las, on the coast of the Laconian Gulf. *Perioeci* also provided some help to the Spartan force at Pylos in Messenia - the Athenian fortified position was said to be in their *chora* and Brasidas appealed to them to wreck their ships, if necessary in order to preserve their land [Thuc. 4.11]. The earliest literary evidence for *perioeci* comes from 480/79 [Hdt. 7.234] - they lived in towns in Lacedaemon and are described by Demaratus to Xerxes as good soldiers. There is no firm evidence for their individual towns in the literary sources. Wealthy *perioeci*, perhaps volunteers, were brigaded with Spartans in the hoplite phalanx by c.425. Such *perioeci* probably also possessed slaves [IG 5 (1) 1228-32, Polybius 4.34.9]. Relations between Spartiates and *perioeci* do not appear to have been hostile and there is little evidence of perioecic discontent. Their lack of citizen status at Sparta is of little importance if they were citizens of their own towns. There is no evidence for the claim [Cartledge 180] that they acted as watchdogs for Sparta against the helots. It is generally supposed that many *perioeci* formed a major element in commerce, especially in the production of weapons and armour for Spartiates, but the names of some Spartans, such as Technarchus (P. Poralla, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians*, ed. Bradford (Chicago, 1985) s.v.h.), suggests that commerce may not have been confined to the *perioeci* at all times. A.J. Holladay, "Spartan Austerity" *CQ* 27 (1977) 123 has suggested that as a class they reflected Spartan values and that their life was not far different from that at Sparta. It is difficult to reach any firm conclusion about this because of the lack of evidence.

¹²⁵ See H.W. Parke, "The evidence for harmosts in Laconia" *Hermathena* 46 (1931) 31-8.

Perioecic and helot service in the fleet at this time is not attested, although the presence of *perioeci* may be suggested by Thucydides: Brasidas, a Spartiate, was in command of a trireme, and perhaps of a naval squadron, at Pylos [4.11.4]. The other captains mentioned may have been Spartiate or *perioeci*, since Brasidas is said to have encouraged them to force a landing despite the damage to their ships, in order to save their *chora*. Their fear of damaging their ships may also indicate that they were responsible for them in some way. The steersmen mentioned by Thucydides at Pylos will probably have been *perioeci*. The Spartiates would not have considered service as crew in the fleet as suitable for them.

In 428 the Spartans sent a Laconian, Meleas, to Mytilene in a trireme to persuade the rebel Mytileneans that Sparta was going to help [3.5.2]. As a Laconian, Meleas would also have been a *perioecus*. Thus, some *perioeci* enjoyed sufficient status to be used on delicate diplomatic missions.

The only helots mentioned in connection with the sea are those at Pylos who were promised their freedom by the Spartans if they ran the Athenian blockade [4.26]. It is interesting that they volunteered for such service and that they had their own boats. Had helots been kept in complete subjection and had they been the focus of Spartan fears, as Thucydides seems to imply [4.80], it would not have been necessary to offer them their freedom for such a task. Helots such as these may have served as rowers on Spartan ships. Brasidas may also have envisaged using his helot hoplites for this purpose when he had ships built on the Strymon after an abortive attack on Eion [4.108].

Summary

Sparta had entered the Archidamian War out of concern for its traditional prestige. Athens' power had increased considerably during the Pentecontaetia and was a challenge to the Spartan view of itself as the pre-eminent Greek state. This perception can only have grown in Spartan memory, though it had achieved nothing in the same period to reinforce its claim. Spartan hostility as a result of Athens' growth in power is shown during the last decade before the war by its attempts to interfere with Athens' control of its ally, Samos. When Athens appeared to be fulfilling the predictions of those in the Spartan alliance, represented for Thucydides by Corinth, who warned of Athenian ambition in the west, the majority of Spartans regarded war as inevitable. In this they were supported by most Greeks, whose attitude may only

have encouraged the Spartans to see the challenge as one to its role as champion of Greek freedom from the time of the Persian Wars.

Sparta, as hegemon, led the allied fleet, but did not commit as much manpower or ships to it as the rest of the allies. This situation in itself would not necessarily have called its abilities into question. Indeed, some of the Spartan navarchs were quite successful and innovative, but over a long period it may have become a source of annoyance to the allies on whom the brunt of naval losses and expenses fell. Perhaps the most telling episode in the first years of the war was the refusal of Sparta's allies to mount a second campaign during the crisis at Mytilene. That Sparta was thoroughly committed to this course is seen from its actions at the Isthmus, but it had completely misunderstood its allies' motives. Similarly, Sparta's allies were capable of refusing to turn out for a second campaign in the same season; perhaps the greatest weakness of the Alliance was that it was easily factionalised, whereas the Athenian empire was used to control from the centre.

The Aegean policy of the Peloponnesian alliance seems to have been Sparta's alone. Sparta appears to have initiated the plans for Mytilene in 428 and 427, plans which then received allied approval. Sparta, too, seems to have been solely responsible for the foundation of the colony at Heraclea. Its western strategy, on the other hand, may have been influenced by Corinthian interests or have coincided with them, but the final decisions in war were Sparta's. Sparta may have wished to cut Athens off from the west which it considered, perhaps, a Dorian preserve. Sparta seems to have considered it such at the time of the summons to the western states to provide money and ships for the war.

Had Sparta been able to win a decisive naval engagement in 429 or even later, financial success and prestige would have encouraged the allies to continue their support of the fleet more strongly, by building more ships and supplying more crews. As it was they continued to provide them but in smaller numbers. The Peloponnesian fleet under Spartan leadership was unable to deliver the knock-out blow to Athens or to improve its abilities. Perhaps such expectations as the Greeks had of Sparta at the start of this war were unreal and could not have been completely fulfilled. Sparta itself may have been aware of this weakness when its ambassadors attempted to have peace discussions with Athens held *in camera*.

Sparta and the Peloponnesians had begun the war with great optimism in their abilities and their military and naval resources. Despite Thucydides' charges of inexperience and panic

against the allied fleet, its actions did not demonstrate that it was inept or incompetent. Had the western states sent the required naval forces and money, the progress of the war might have been different. The realisation that support was not forthcoming from the west forced Sparta to change its policy and to rely wholly on its mainland allies for naval campaigns with a fleet that was less skilled in actions in open water than the Athenian and, except for the period of the outbreaks of the plague at Athens, consistently smaller than the Athenian. The Peloponnesians were aware of their deficiencies and preferred not to meet the Athenians directly, if they could, unless they had the advantage of overwhelming numbers and of position. This policy was a cautious and defensive one, hardly calculated to win them a naval war. In fact, it was similar to the land policy of the Athenians, who preferred not to meet the Spartan army. With better financing and greater attention to training more crews, the Peloponnesian fleet might have presented a greater challenge to the Athenians in this war than it did.

CHAPTER 4

SPARTAN NAVAL POWER FROM 421 TO 404

A. Naval Actions from 421 to 413

The peace negotiated in 421 between Sparta and Athens was a recognition that both protagonists had reached a stalemate in the war: Athens had lost Amphipolis to Sparta, had been defeated at Delium and was increasingly suspicious of the loyalty of its allies: the Spartan war effort had been hamstrung since the débâcle at Pylos, the subsequent loss of Spartan prisoners to Athens and the presence of Athenian bases on the Peloponnesian coast at Pylos and Cythera: furthermore, Sparta and its alliance had no fleet with which to retaliate.¹ Neither side could claim outright victory and neither had been fatally weakened to the point of acknowledging defeat. With hindsight it is clear that this peace was no solution to the underlying question of the hegemony of Greece that had caused the war, but in 421 the proponents of peace on both sides were the more influential groups.

¹ Spartan selfishness in concentrating only on the return of its soldiers taken at Pylos reveals how the justification for war by the Peloponnesians in 432/1 had changed in the intervening period. The Spartans began the war with the aim of liberating Greece from the tyrant-city of Athens [1.124.3], and in the belief that such a war would not last long [4.85.2]. Nonetheless, they appear to have flirted with the possibility of Persian aid, but did not pursue it very seriously between 431 and 421; Thucydides' Archidamus made a vague reference to the possibility of acquiring ships and money from barbarian sources [1.82.1], and the Spartan alliance attempted to send at least one embassy to Persia in the early years of the war [2.67.1], but Alcidas in 427 refused to attempt to win the assistance of the satrap, Pissothnes, against Athenian interests in Ionia [3.31], although it was recognised that such an action would cause the Athenians the expense of maintaining a fleet against them. Spartan policy may well have been split in the early years over the wisdom of becoming involved with a power with which they were technically still at war, and against whom at Thermopylae they had achieved their greatest glory [see, D.Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977) 62ff.]. Besides, Sparta had little to offer Persia, except the promise of action against Athens, and, perhaps, the future assurance that it would not attempt to replace Athens in the east. Artaxerxes was intrigued enough to send Artaphernes to Sparta in 425/4 to clarify Spartan policy. The capture of this embassy [4.41.4] and events in Persia over the succession to the throne following the death of Artaxerxes prevented any further developments. Sparta, in any case, became more concerned with ending the war and ensuring the return of Spartan prisoners from Pylos.

The following abbreviations are used throughout this chapter; Dover: K.J.Dover in Gomme, *An Historical Commentary on Thucydides* v.4 (Oxford, 1970). Lewis: D.Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977). Meiggs: R.Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972). ML: R.Meiggs and D.Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century* (Oxford, 1969). Bloedow: E.F.Bloedow, *Alcibiades Re-examined* (Wiesbaden, 1973). Cartledge: P.Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300-365 B.C.* (London, 1979). Andrewes: A.Andrewes, *An Historical Commentary on Thucydides* v.5 (Oxford, 1981). Hatzfeld: J.Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade: Etude sur l'histoire d'Athènes à la fin du Ve siècle* (Paris, 1951). Kagan: D.Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca and London, 1987). Busolt: G.Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* (Gotha, 1893-1904). Beloch, K.J.Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 2nd.ed. (Strassburg, 1912-27). Poralla: P.Poralla, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians*, ed.A.S.Bradford (Chicago, 1985). Grote: G.Grote, *A History of Greece* (New York, 1855). Bommelaer: J.-F.Bommelaer, *Lysandre de Sparte* (Athens and Paris, 1981). Hamilton: C.D.Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca and London, 1979). Lotze: D.Lotze, *Lysander Und Der Peloponnesische Krieg* (Berlin, 1964). Rahe: P.A.Rahe, *Lysander and the Spartan Settlement* (Diss.Yale, 1977).

The peace was not easy for Sparta to negotiate. Some of its more powerful allies, Boeotia, Corinth, Megara and Elis, disagreed with its terms [5.17], but Sparta was supported by a sufficient number of its other allies to give it the ability to conclude peace on their behalf in the spring of 421.² It may be significant that the Spartan allies who abstained from signing the peace, with the exception of Boeotia, which concluded a renewable agreement with Athens, were all major contributors to the Peloponnesian fleet; they had all lost a substantial number of vessels when Sparta had handed over the Peloponnesian fleet to Athens.

Thucydides attributes Corinth's dissatisfaction to the loss of Sollium and Anactorium [5.30], that of Megara to the Athenian occupation of Nisaea, and the hostility of Elis to a quarrel with Sparta over Lepreum [5.31]. Sollium and Anactorium lay either side of the isthmus at Leucas, which had been invaluable to the Peloponnesian fleet in the Archidamian War: Nisaea was Megara's only port on the Saronic Gulf, and its occupation denied Megara access to the Aegean: the dispute with Elis was not over a coastal area, but it concerned the revenues due to Elis from Lepreum. Elis' deteriorating relations with Sparta even before this event may be appreciated from the Elean belief that arbitration of the dispute over Lepreum by Sparta would not produce a verdict favourable to the Eleans [5.31]. Elis also appealed to an agreement, presumably concluded between the members of the Spartan alliance, that ensured that, when hostilities ended, any ally would keep everything it possessed at the beginning of the war. If such an agreement was in force, Corinth, Megara and Elis had just cause to complain about Sparta's conduct of the peace negotiations with Athens.³

The loss of their ships at Pylos and Sparta's lack of activity on their behalf since then can only have increased allied discontent with their *hegemon*. That they were able to act with such independence reveals how much Spartan prestige and power had suffered after Pylos [5.56]. For Sparta, even if the hulls of the Peloponnesian fleet had been returned by the Athenians by this time, and there is no evidence that they had, the hostility of its maritime allies meant that a united Peloponnesian fleet could not be a factor in assessing Sparta's strength against that of Athens.

² See Dover 22 for date of the peace.

³ Thucydides calls this agreement a *suntheke* [5.31], which seems to suggest that it had some kind of formal status. It is not clear whether the allies had agreed to such a condition at the start of the war in order as a condition of their participation, or whether it was to be one of the points to be negotiated on their behalf by Sparta in the peace talks with Athens [5.17.2]. For a discussion of this point and the different interpretations that have been made, see Dover 28.

Sparta's treaty with Athens in 421 tacitly acknowledged Athenian maritime supremacy, just as Sparta had done at the end of the First Peloponnesian War.

For Corinth, Elis and Megara it may have seemed that Sparta had also conceded what these states had entered the war to assert - their supremacy in western waters. After Pylos Athens was now free to do as it pleased in the west [4.62]. All three states had fought against Corcyra before the war and had maintained their interest in the west between 431 and 421. The importance of the Corcyrean fleet, which had threatened to be a factor before the start of the war, had come to nothing. After 431 the island never made the sizable and effective contribution that had been expected when it seemed vital to both sides to control its fleet.⁴ Both sides, however, remained interested in the alignment of Corcyra because of its strategic position and both interfered in its internal politics whenever possible.

At the start of the Archidamian War Corinth alone possessed a fleet of about ninety ships, but the numbers in the Peloponnesian fleet had steadily diminished during the conflict, probably due to the shortage of crews, of money, and, perhaps, a lack of skilled labour for the ships' maintenance. Many vessels may have deteriorated badly in the intervening period. This would have been especially so in the case of their removable equipment. Aristophanes refers to Athenian naval equipment as black-market goods by the end of the Archidamian War, with the result that Athens had to tighten security over their distribution.⁵

The terms of the peace eventually concluded between Sparta and Athens included a clause guaranteeing security by land and sea for fifty years for both sides [5.18]. The clause may well have been formulaic, but it was also a *de facto* recognition by each of the other's particular sphere of power: Athens acknowledged Spartan supremacy on land as Sparta acknowledged Athenian supremacy at sea: Sparta, lacking the use of the Peloponnesian fleet and with no naval allies of any significance, aimed to avoid the threat of further attacks on its coastline.⁶ At best

⁴ See the arguments of J. Wilson, *Athens and Corcyra* (Bristol, 1987) c.1.

⁵ The hull cables, *hupozomata*, are referred to as such items in Aristophanes' *Knights* 278/9 (c.424 B.C.). If the Athenians had returned the Peloponnesian hulls after Pylos, they would probably have stripped them of such movable equipment.

⁶ Dover 675 sees this only as Spartan recognition of Athenian maritime supremacy.

the treaty was a pragmatic agreement in which each side made concessions at the expense of a third party.⁷

The peace treaty was followed by a defensive alliance between the two signatories [5.23; Diod.12.75]. Sparta needed this extra security, since its treaty with Argos had expired, or was about to expire. Argos was already making demands over the disputed territory of Cynuria [5.14] and had refused to renew an agreement with Sparta. Athens may have agreed to a defensive alliance with Sparta through fear of Boeotia and Corinth, the former Spartan allies, who had not signed the peace.⁸

The Argive alliance against Sparta and naval power in the Saronic Gulf

For its part Argos began a series of negotiations that led to an alliance excluding Sparta and Athens [5.27,30; Diod.12.75]. Elis, Corinth and the Thracians of Chalcidice joined Argos [5.31], but Boeotia and Megara remained uninvolved because of their lack of sympathy with democratic Argos [5.32].⁹ The aim of the Argive alliance was to weaken Sparta even further by detaching its strategically situated ally, Tegea, from the Spartan alliance. When this scheme failed, Corinthian enthusiasm for the project began to wane. The loss of Corinth to the Argive alliance meant the loss of a potential maritime ally, if it is assumed that Corinth had replaced at least some of its lost warships by this time. That this was an important factor in Argive policy is indicated by Argos' interest in the Athenian fleet soon after. Corinth was, of course, also extremely important for its strategic position at the Isthmus. A subsequent alliance between Boeotia and Sparta, which contravened the terms of Sparta's peace with Athens [5.39], caused Athens to retaliate by courting the Argive alliance.¹⁰ This alliance now needed some powerful

⁷ Dover 669.

⁸ Dover 692.

⁹ Secret negotiations are said to have begun a little later between two of the Spartan ephors and a group of Boeotians: firstly, to effect an agreement between Boeotia and the Argive alliance; and secondly, to engineer another alliance between Argos and Sparta [5.38]. When the first part of the plan failed, Argos feared isolation and offered to make a treaty with Sparta. Sparta made a separate treaty with Boeotia, although it contravened the terms of the peace with Athens [5.39].

¹⁰ Sparta's policy has been called changeable and capricious at this point [Dover 38, 43], but it can be explained by fluctuations of support at Sparta for the continuation of peace under the terms agreed with Athens, just as the Athenian attitude varied. The rise of Alcibiades at Athens is instructive for the differences in its support for peace, while Thucydides expressly states that two at least of the Spartan ephors of 421/20 were hostile to the peace. The lack of progress over the fulfilment of the peace terms also indicates that the peace did not satisfy all elements on both sides [5.36].

support and was especially interested in the protection of the Athenian fleet; it was expressly mentioned in the terms of its agreement with Athens [5.47; Diod.12.79]. Argos was in an advantageous position for an attack on the coast of the Peloponnese, and Athens was interested in gaining a naval base for quick access to Spartan territory. Corinth, however, refused to join the new alignment [5.43], although it maintained a defensive alliance with Argos. Perhaps Argos' need of naval protection was against the possibility of a reconciliation between Sparta and its former naval ally, Corinth [5.48], and, possibly, Sicyon [5.52], and the consequent threat to the Argive coast.

Argos and Athens had made an agreement with a view to weakening the Spartan alliance in the Peloponnese. An Athenian force under Alcibiades invaded the Peloponnese in 419 and reached Patrae. Dover has suggested that this force went by sea to Argos.¹¹ If so, the use of the sea link from Athens to Argos demonstrates its strategic importance against the rest of the Peloponnese. The aim of Alcibiades' expedition was to cut off Corinthian interests in the Gulf by fortifying Rhium. Corinth and Sicyon prevented this by bringing up their own forces in opposition [5.52]. Argos also attacked Corinthian interests by declaring war on Epidaurus, a member of the Spartan alliance, and Epidaurus appealed for aid to its allies. The Argives were interested in Epidaurus because of its strategic position against Corinth and as a base for the Athenian fleet in transporting troops to the Argolid. The Athenians were evidently in full support of the Argive attack, since they established a naval blockade of Epidaurus [5.53].

The Spartans were now threatened by hostile moves in the north-west and the north-east Peloponnese. Their response was to move forces to the frontier in western Arcadia,¹² but they were unable or unwilling to proceed further because of unfavourable omens. They subsequently prepared for a second march [5.54]. At a conference to discuss the situation Corinth took an active role [5.55] in attempting to solve the current problem, although the discussions were unsuccessful. The Spartans, perhaps now appealed to by Corinth as well as Epidaurus, prepared to move towards Caryae to threaten the Argolid. Once again they found the omens unfavourable and returned home. The Spartans may have hoped that the mere threat of retaliation would be enough to stop Argos.

¹¹ Dover 64.

¹² They may have been attempting a show of support for the pro-Spartans in Tegae [5.75]

By the winter of 419 Sparta decided on more effective support for its ally by sending a small force by sea to Epidaurus. A garrison of three hundred men under a Spartan leader, Agesippidas, was despatched [5.56]. It successfully eluded the Athenian blockade and reached the city. Clearly, the Spartans recognised the need to shore up Epidaurian resistance to attack, and they appreciated the effectiveness of a small force in holding out against a siege for a considerable time. Dover called this move one of 'unaccustomed daring', perhaps in contrast to Sparta's seeming hesitation to commit itself to fight on land.¹³ It may be significant that Sparta's first recorded expedition by sea since Pylos came at a time when Corinth was more or less back in the Spartan camp. Perhaps Corinthian ships or ports were necessary for Spartan activity in the Saronic Gulf, especially at this time of the year; ships despatched from Laconia or further west would have had to round Cape Malea. Alternatively, the Spartans might have sailed from Prasiae or Epidaurus Limera via Hermione or Troezen. In any event, the operation was to have important results both for Sparta and the Argive/Athenian alliance.

The Argives were, apparently, furious that a Spartan force had evaded the Athenians at sea, since they had obviously considered the Saronic Gulf an Athenian preserve. They complained to the Athenians that they had broken their treaty by not stopping the Spartans. The Athenian response was to encourage the helots of Cranii in Cephallenia to raid the area around Pylos. They also publicly castigated the Spartans in an inscription, set up by Alcibiades [5.56].¹⁴ Otherwise they made no move, probably because they were unwilling to challenge Sparta directly. The Argives made a third attack on Epidaurus, which was frustrated because of the presence of the Spartan garrison [5.56]. Such setbacks when the Argives had evidently expected success because of Athenian aid, may have contributed to the unsettled state of Argive politics that ensued. When Sparta and its allies took the initiative in 418 and marched against Argos, the Argives offered a truce. This, however, was badly received at home by hostile groups in each city [5.60]. Some at Argos felt that they could have beaten the Spartan force, while a number at Sparta believed that Sparta needed victory to restore its prestige in the Peloponnese. Further disputes followed at Argos over the role of the Athenians in the war [5.61], but eventually the anti-Spartan coalition marched on Orchomenus. Even here they were unable to agree on their future objectives, and the Elean contingent returned home. Sparta then

¹³ Dover 57.

¹⁴ For Alcibiades' role in Athenian post-war policy see Meiggs 338-347.

called up its allies for a campaign against Tegea, which appeared to be ready to go over to Argos, and the force assembled at Mantinea [5.64]. The Argive alliance was subsequently defeated in battle near Mantinea.

With the defeat of the Argive coalition the Spartans were once again supreme in the Peloponnese. Their agreement to share command in common expeditions with Argos is, perhaps, surprising, but they probably now had little to fear from Argos, where oligarchs were in power [5.76].¹⁵ When democratic elements at Argos began a revolution and built walls from the city to the sea to ensure any Athenian aid could reach them, the Spartans attacked and captured the walls. They also concluded an alliance with Macedon, and agreed to drive out the Athenians from the Peloponnese. Sicyon and Achaëa were again brought back into the Spartan fold [5.81].

The Athenians, however, were not prepared to allow Sparta to gain the upper hand in Argos or in Macedon. They retaliated against Perdiccas with a blockade in the winter of 417 [5.83], and took three hundred hostages from Argos whom they imprisoned on the islands [5.83]. In addition, in 416 Athens renewed its interest in the Aegean and reduced Melos, a Spartan colony.¹⁶

Sparta's lack of concern over Melos has been much discussed because it appears to reveal a callous disregard for its allies. A major problem with Thucydides' account of the dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians is that it contains more argument about the generalisations on inter-state relations than it does details of what those precise relationships were in a political or military sense. The Melians claim an alliance but, as Gomme pointed out, this might have been with Sparta, with its alliance, or it may refer to the expectation of such an alliance given the Athenians' action.¹⁷ Certainly, Melos was strategically placed for any Spartan venture into the Aegean: in fact, Melos may have been one of the places where the Peloponnesian fleet called in during Alcidas' expedition to Asia Minor in 427, when the impossibility of total control of the Aegean was demonstrated to the Athenians, much to their chagrin [3.36].¹⁸ In the event, Sparta

¹⁵ Dover 142.

¹⁶ *IG* 1(2) 302; *ML* 77, and Meiggs 344.

¹⁷ A.W.Gomme quoted in Dover 182f.

¹⁸ *IG* 5 (1) 1, *ML* 67 indicates that the Melians made a contribution to the Spartan war fund, probably in 427.

sent Melos no direct help, even when a damaging raid was made on Spartan territory from Pylos with Athenian encouragement, but incited its allies to attack Athenian interests [5.115].

Sparta, too, appears to have tried to avoid direct confrontation with Athens; both sides had been content since 421/20 to damage each other through attacks on each other's allies. Part of the Spartans' difficulty in responding directly may have been that they did not wish to be the first to declare war, as they had done in 431, but they would also have been conscious of the need for a large fleet in order to defeat Athens. Neither side could defeat the other decisively in Greece: the Athenian army could not face that of Sparta, and the Peloponnesian navy was next to non-existent at this time.¹⁹ Until Sparta controlled a fleet of sufficient skill and size, it would be unable to face the Athenian navy. There is no evidence that the Spartans were ready to commit themselves at this time to a policy of rebuilding a fleet without considerable help from outside, and their maritime allies may have been in no position to help: the Gulf allies, Corinth and Sicyon, had only recently returned to the alliance and appear to have been unable or unwilling to build on the same scale as before the outbreak of war, and Elis was hostile.

Sparta and Elis

The enmity between Elis and Sparta appears to have begun about the time of the Spartan peace negotiations with Athens, and the Spartan decision over Lepreum [5.31]. Elis took part with the Athenians in an action against Epidaurus in 418.²⁰ Elis, therefore, would not have been hostile to Alcibiades' moves against Patrae and Rhium in 419. Perhaps Elis had remained neutral in the realignment of states after Mantinea, as there is no evidence that it had become more friendly towards Sparta, and its evident hostility up to the time of Mantinea suggests that the Eleans would not have returned willingly to the Spartan alliance at this point. The arrival of Alcibiades at the Elean port of Cyllene in 416 en route to Sparta attests perhaps to the personal popularity of Alcibiades in Elis, or to no more than continued trade taking place between Thurii and Cyllene.²¹ It may be a further significant indication of Elean sympathies that the Eleans were not mentioned on the list of Spartan naval allies required to provide ships for the Peloponnesian fleet in 412 [8.3.2].

¹⁹ See R.J.Buck, "The Sicilian Expedition" *AHB* 2.4 (1988) 74, who discusses this strategic problem from the Athenian point of view. There is no reason to suppose that Sparta was not equally aware of the position.

²⁰ The treaty between the Eleans and the Athenians is preserved on an inscription, *ML* 72; Paus.5.12.8.

²¹ See Dover 360.

As a result of Elean hostility, Cyllene, an important Elean harbour with repair facilities [2.84], which had played a major role as a base for Peloponnesian naval activities in the west during the Archidamian War, was now denied to the Peloponnesians [2.84, 3.69]. Cyllene was necessary to a resumption of the naval war in the west, and there was no equivalent harbour available to the Peloponnesians.

Sparta and the Athenians in the west 416/5-413

It is most unlikely that Sparta remained unaware for long of Athenian ambitions for Sicily, after the Athenians had decided to send a large expedition to the island [6.9-14]. Yet there was nothing that Sparta or Corinth, the metropolis of Sicilian Syracuse, could do about it. Certainly, Athens seems to have expected no serious opposition from mainland Greece to its western plans, although it was aware of the potential risk to its security [6.24].²² A move to control western waters and to cut the Peloponnesians off from possible supplies of men and timber, while securing them for itself, could be decisive for the resumption of war. Hermocrates' request for help from Corinth and Sparta against the Athenian invasion [6.34] may not have come as a surprise to either the Corinthians or the Spartans. After the debate of the Sicilian states at Camarina in the winter of 415/4, representatives were sent to obtain help and to urge Sparta to outright war in Greece with the support of Corinth [6.73; Diod.13.7.1].

Evidently there was much discussion over these developments at Sparta before the arrival of Alcibiades in Laconia [6.88; Diod.13.5.3]. The role of the Athenian renegade, Alcibiades, in strengthening Spartan resolve to help Syracuse and to fortify Decelea has been much debated, but it is clear from Thucydides' own narrative that the Spartans were discussing their options in the west and at Decelea before he came to Sparta.²³ Evidently, there were differences of opinion over the type of involvement, whether diplomatic or military, that Sparta should undertake [6.88].

When they finally decided on limited military support, the Spartans chose Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to co-ordinate Syracusan resistance to Athens and to work with the Corinthians [6.93; Diod.13.7.2]. This was a considered choice since Cleandridas had lived at Thurii and had

²² Inscriptional evidence [*ML* 78] attests to the fact that Athenian naval forces were present in the Thermaic Gulf and on the coast of Ionia while the majority of the fleet was in Sicily.

²³ See Bloedow 25.

fought on its behalf.²⁴ His son may have had some knowledge of the area; through his father he probably had local contacts. Exactly what office, if any, Gylippus had is not clear: Thucydides calls him an *archon* for the Syracusans [6.93].²⁵

A naval force was to be sent in the spring of 414, while Gylippus prepared to leave ahead of them with two Spartan and two Corinthian ships, manned by hoplite rowers, a suggestion attributed to Alcibiades [6.91]. Whether it originated with him or not, it appears that Sparta had a force of rowers, who could also act as hoplites in such operations. They may have formed a major portion of the garrison sent to Epidaurus in 419/8 [5.56]. Perhaps they were trained in both disciplines for small naval operations, like that at Epidaurus, after the loss of the Peloponnesian fleet at Pylos in 425. The rowers may have been helots or neodamodes,²⁶ since both classes are known to have served as hoplites by the end of the Archidamian War [4.80; 5.34]. The two Spartan and two Corinthian ships assigned to this expedition must have been warships as the crew, used later as infantry, including the *epibatai*, numbered at least seven hundred [7.1.5]. The Corinthians were to provide ten more ships later.

Gylippus summoned the two Corinthian ships under their commander, Pythen, to Asine to meet him. This is one of the few references to Asine in ancient literature: it was situated on the Gulf of Messenia and was suitable for voyages to the west, though it was not a convenient mustering point for the Peloponnesians. Thucydides referred to its use as a timber depot at the time of the crisis at Pylos. Perhaps its use now was because Cyllene, the more usual harbour for Corinthian ships to rendezvous with the Spartans for a journey west, was barred to Spartan ships because of the hostility of Elis.

²⁴ Antiochus F11: Polyaeus 2.10. Cleandridas was banished from Sparta after being associated with the bribery of Pleistoanax by Pericles. His son is said to have been a *mothax*, Aelian 12.43.

²⁵ Dover 381 observed that Gylippus' role at Syracuse *vis-a-vis* the Syracusans changed as time went on and the Syracusans became more effective.

²⁶ For Thucydides the slave class of the helots was a permanent threat to Spartan security, and the fear of helot revolt controlled Spartan policy [4.80]. Thucydides' view has been followed by most scholars, such as W.G. Forrest, *A History of Sparta 950-192 B.C.* (London, 1968) 31, Cartledge 245, H. Michell, *Sparta* (Cambridge, 1964) 82ff. The prevailing orthodoxy has been recently questioned by R. Talbert, "The Role of the Helots in the Class Struggle at Sparta" *Historia* 38 (1989) 23-40. Xenophon makes the first direct reference to helots serving on Spartan ships in describing the actions of 369 [Hell. 7.1.12]. See also K-W. Welwei, *Unfreie im Antiken Kriegsdienst I* (Wiesbaden, 1974) 158.

Neodamodes were a class of manumitted helots. They may have appeared only after 424 after the success of Brasidas' helot force in Thrace, see Cartledge 251.

Gylippus was at Leucas in the spring of 414 to await news of what was happening at Syracuse. Here he was told that the Syracusans were in some difficulty [6.103]. He then crossed the straits with his four ships to Tarentum for more news on the situation. He renewed his family's rights of citizenship at Thurii, probably a deliberate move to identify him with western interests, but he failed to get concrete help from the city. His ships were caught in a storm and driven back to Tarentum where they were refitted. Presumably Gylippus had money with him or some western friends to provide it. The Athenians, who were aware of his arrival, supposed the small fleet to be on some kind of piratical expedition [6.104]. Such an assumption may mean that other Peloponnesian ships, perhaps Corinthian, had been raiding in western waters recently. If this was the Athenian belief, their mistake was to be costly [7.2].

After receiving more reliable news from Locri, Gylippus finally arrived at Syracuse overland [7.1; Diod.13.7.7]. The rest of his force avoided the Athenian guard ships and reached Syracuse safely. The effect of their arrival was a turning-point in the Sicilian effort against Athens: although Gylippus' main role was to encourage Sicilian and Siceliote help for Syracuse, he also was responsible for encouraging the Syracusans to build a large fleet and to resist the Athenians at sea [7.7]. His crews also helped the Syracusans build defensive walls [7.7]. The remaining twelve ships that had been fitted out by the Corinthians, Ambraciots and Leucadians arrived from Leucas [7.7], and the rest of the summer was spent in building up the Syracusan forces, especially their fleet [7.7]. A delegation was sent to Corinth and to Sparta to ask for more troops to be despatched by whatever means possible against further Athenian reinforcements.

Corinth had been active in the Peloponnesian programme for Syracuse. Not only had it provided the majority of the ships for the first expedition, but Corinthians and Spartans were already raising more troops from their allies in support of the expeditionary force, apparently even before the Syracusan delegates came from Sicily [7.17]. These troops included contingents from Boeotia and Sicyon, as well as Arcadian mercenaries, paid for by Corinth, and Corinthian citizens [7.19]. Corinth also manned a fleet of twenty-five triremes to prevent the Athenians' twenty ships at Naupactus from attacking their convoy to Sicily and to test the new device of a reinforced ram that they had fitted to their ships. The new ram was designed to damage the lighter bows of the Athenian triremes.

The Athenians had already attacked at Pylos and were operating from Argos with a small fleet on the east coast of Laconia [7.18]. With so much of Athens' navy committed to Sicily, the Spartans decided to make their move at Decelea in the spring of 413 [7.18; Diod.13.8.8] to wear Athens down by making it fight on two fronts [7.18,28]. The success of this policy is seen from the fact that Athens was forced to raise taxes to pay for both its Sicilian venture and for the damage done from Decelea.²⁷

In 413 the majority of the Peloponnesian reinforcements were sent to Sicily in merchant ships from various points in the Peloponnese: the Spartan contingent, made up of 600 helots and neodamodes, left with a Boeotian force of three hundred hoplites from Taenarum in Laconia [7.19]. The Corinthian and Sicyonian contingents left through the Gulf of Corinth. Again the difficulty of not having Cyllene available as a mustering point for the Peloponnesians is apparent. Evidently, too, the Peloponnesians had few warships available for such service. The use of merchant ships was less preferable; they were slower and, because of their reliance on sail power, liable to be driven off course. In fact, some of them were carried by bad weather to the coast of Libya, where the Cyreneans gave them an escort of two ships and pilots. They then helped in a local dispute before resuming their journey to Sicily [7.50]. The merchant ship discovered by Demosthenes at Pheia in Elis was intended to be used by a mercenary force raised by Corinth [7.31]. It was not one of the ships sent from Laconia, as no Corinthians were part of this group. Perhaps it had to seek shelter there from bad weather: the west coast of Elis is exposed to strong westerly winds in the summer months and has few sheltered harbours. Pheia (modern Katakolon) was one of them.²⁸ The Athenian response to all these preparations was to send a fleet of thirty ships to attack the coast of Laconia [7.20,26].

At Syracuse Gylippus encouraged the Syracusans to fight at sea [7.21], while he led a successful land attack on the Athenian supply depot at Plemmyrium. Obviously he was aware of the importance of logistical supplies to the Athenians. His aim seems to have been to cut off supplies to the Athenian force wherever possible: Syracusan ships were also sent to burn the timber supply in Caulonia. Although the Syracusans were defeated at sea, they gained some

²⁷ See Meiggs 349. Athens did not, however, discontinue its association with the Persian, Pisouthnes.

²⁸ L.H.Jeffery, *Archaic Greece. The City-States c.700-500 B.C.* (London, 1976) 166, and H.M.Denham, *The Ionian Islands to the Anatolian Coast. A Sea-Guide* (London, 1982) 76.

valuable fighting experience. Their other successes were reported around the island to encourage Sicilian resistance [7.25].

The Corinthian squadron, stationed against the Athenians at Naupactus, fully intended to bring the Athenian squadron to battle when the Peloponnesian convoys had safely cleared the Gulf [7.19]. Their object was to test their innovative reinforced ram, and then, if it was successful, employ the device in Sicily.²⁹ There is every indication that the Corinthians made careful preparations for this engagement, a fact that suggests it had a serious purpose. They positioned their land force in support on the headlands around their anchorage and waited for the Athenians to approach. Their ships were then stationed at the entrance to the bay and blocked it. The Corinthians waited for the signal to attack when the Athenian ships were close enough and put seven ships out of action by ramming, although they lost three of their own. The wrecks were blown out to sea and taken by the Athenians, as the Corinthians made no move to do so. The action was then broken off. Thucydides' comments on this battle draw attention to the fact that the Athenians took the disabled ships and did not consider this action to be worth claiming as a victory. The Corinthians are said to have refused to pursue the retiring Athenian ships, to be ready to escape quickly and to be eager to claim victory because they had not actually been defeated [7.34]. It is clear, however, that the Corinthians deliberately waited for the opportunity to fight, drew the Athenians into a position favourable to their tactics, used their reinforced rams to great effect and showed no interest in taking prisoners. In addition, the Athenians did erect a trophy but only after the Corinthians had left. This action hardly indicates acknowledged Athenian superiority in battle. The reason given by Thucydides, that they did not consider it a victory if they did not win outright, sounds hollow in the light of their later action. It may have been the excuse they used at Athens for their poor showing. The Corinthians had evidently been testing their new weapon in this engagement.

The adoption of the same technique by the Syracusans soon after suggests that the Corinthians had employed it at Naupactus with a view to its use against the Athenians in Sicily. The initiative at sea had now passed to the Peloponnesians and Syracusans [7.39; Diod.13.10.2-3]. They also invented a method of resisting the Athenian grappling irons, which were used for fighting at close quarters [7.65, 67]. Such innovations, the deliberate weakening

²⁹ Gomme, quoted by Dover 411, states that the Athenian crews at Naupactus were inferior while the Peloponnesians were improving with every year of training and experience. This is possible, but the same was surely true of the Peloponnesian fleet in the first years of the Archidamian War.

of the Athenian fleet by attacks on its supplies and the strategy of making the Athenian fleet fight in narrow waters where they were weakest, demonstrate the value of Corinthian and Spartan assistance at Syracuse.³⁰ Syracusan independence, however, had grown with success and, after the Athenians were defeated, Gylippus was not able to secure the release of the captured Athenian generals, Nicias and Demosthenes [7.81].³¹

Conclusion

For the greater part of the period of peace between the Archidamian and Ionian Wars the Peloponnesians acknowledged Athenian maritime supremacy in the Aegean. This situation was largely due to the loss of the Peloponnesian fleet at Pylos in 425 and to the inability of the allies to repair this loss. By the terms of the peace in 421 it was clear to the allies that Sparta was concerned only with its own situation, not theirs. The dissension in the Spartan alliance that followed further prevented any concerted effort at rebuilding a Peloponnesian naval arm.

By 419 Corinth had realised that, whatever its differences with Sparta, an alliance with its former hegemon was preferable to one with the democratic states of Argos and Athens. From this time the Peloponnesians began to undertake naval actions once again, albeit in a small way, a fact that argues for strong Corinthian influence in the naval policy of the Spartan alliance, most probably because of its ports in the Corinthian and Saronic Gulfs. Sparta had not remained idle, however, but had a few ships and some trained rower/hoplites available for service.

It is not clear how many ships the Corinthians had in seaworthy condition by this time. The ships that Corinth had built immediately before the war, many of which may have remained unused, even if they were still available, would have needed extensive refitting and preparation, for which Corinth may not have had the resources after so long a war. Inevitably, the initial naval actions undertaken by the Peloponnesians during the peace were on a small scale, such as the introduction by sea of a small garrison at Epidaurus. The continuing absence of Elis in the alliance was also an important factor in the strength and strategic position of the Peloponnesians in the west.

³⁰ Interestingly, Nicias refuses to call the battle in the harbour at Syracuse, a sea-battle [7.62.2].

³¹ Diodorus' picture of Gylippus is somewhat different: he speaks against leniency towards the Athenians [13.23ff], but perhaps this refers to the Athenians in general not their leaders. Gylippus probably wanted to bring them back to Sparta for his own prestige.

When, however, the Athenians turned their attention to building up their maritime power in the west, the Spartans and Corinthians reacted quickly. Until this time the Corinthians had been the major power in western waters. Besides, the Peloponnesians may well have feared that the acquisition of Sicily by the Athenians would give Athens an overwhelming advantage because of the island's resources in men and timber [6.90]. Unable to put together a large fleet to challenge the Athenian presence in Sicily, they turned their attention to developing new weapons to counter Athenian naval speed and skill. This was achieved despite the continuing difficulty of a convenient western port for assembling their naval forces. Sparta also contributed a number of rower/hoplites to the Peloponnesian forces in Sicily. Whether such crews had been a feature of Spartan naval organisation during the Archidamian War, or whether they were trained as a specialised force after the loss of the Peloponnesian fleet is unclear. Alcibiades apparently knew of them in 415/4 [6.91].

The enormous Athenian losses in ships and crews in the Great Harbour at Syracuse meant to the Spartan alliance that Athenian sea-power was sufficiently weakened to allow the Peloponnesians to consider resuming a naval war as well as the land campaign. They had not anticipated such a great victory, since they had clearly made no significant naval preparations in Greece. Following the Sicilian disaster they requisitioned a fleet of one hundred ships from their allies, a number they appear to have thought was sufficient to ensure success.

B. Sparta and the Ionian War 413-404

(i) Sparta's naval preparations

The news of the defeat of the Athenian expedition in Sicily produced a mood of confident expectation at Sparta [8.2]. With the threat of Athenian sea-power considerably lessened, they could now hope to prosecute the war more widely. In the event, Athens was able to resist far longer than its opponents anticipated. Thucydides' account of events shows how Spartan plans were modified as the situation changed in the early part of the war. Presumably, the Spartans' hopes of eventual victory over Athens had been pinned on initial success in the west; that they were aware of the need for a fleet to operate in the Aegean and that they made plans to meet it is suggested by their first actions. The Spartans, however, do not appear at first to have had any immediate plans to extend operations as far as the coast of Asia Minor.

Sparta made its preparations with a view to action in the following spring. As in 432/31, a significant contingent of ships was expected from the west, although no numbers are mentioned. Sparta had to wait for the Syracusans' decision rather than requisition ships and money, as it had in 431. This time, however, Spartan expectations may have had a firmer base, since Hermocrates was urging his Sicilian compatriots to participate in the war against Athens in Greece [8.26]. These ships could not have been counted on immediately, however, because of the lateness of the season. In fact, any immediate naval action by the Spartans in the autumn of 413 was unlikely; even if they wished to attack Athens by combined operations, they would have to summon reinforcements from their allies. Given the time of year, such a plan would have been difficult to pursue since their allies would have been reluctant to provide more men than were already at Decelea for a possibly lengthy campaign. If their attack resulted in a long siege of Athens, as was likely because of Athens' fortifications and its access to the sea, there was no guarantee that they would eventually prevail. In order to make such a siege effective, Sparta needed a fleet. A fleet was also necessary if Sparta was to try to detach members of Athens' maritime empire.

The Spartans did not expect that this fleet would come entirely from the west: in the winter of 413/12, Agis was raising money expressly for a fleet, partly by contribution, partly by force, from Sparta's northern allies on the Greek mainland [8.3].³² This money may have been for Agis' own naval plans, as he is later said to have had ten ships, but the Spartan government appears to have been no less eager for a stronger naval arm: a fleet of one hundred vessels in total was requisitioned from the Spartan alliance. It is not clear how many new ships there would have been in this fleet. If they were all new, this factor would extend the time required to provide them. In that case, Sparta cannot have expected them all to be ready by the following spring, as Thucydides suggests. The vessels were to be supplied by Sparta itself (25 ships), Boeotia (25 ships), Corinth (15 ships), Arcadia, Pellene and Sicyon (10 ships), Phocis and Locris (15 ships), and Troezen, Megara, Hermione and Epidaurus (10 ships). Sparta, then, had collected sufficient resources to build one quarter of the projected Peloponnesian fleet. These may have come from Sparta's share in the booty after the battle at Syracuse [Diod.13.34.4]. The money raised by Agis in northern Greece was also meant for this purpose [Thuc.8.3]. Where

³² For the suggestion that Agis may have had a more complex plan of northern conquest and one that involved Alcibiades, see H.D. Westlake, "Alcibiades, Agis and Spartan policy", *JHS* 58 (1938) 31-40.

Sparta had the facility to build these vessels is unclear. Perhaps the task could be divided among nearby harbours at Gytheum, Las and Helus.

It is surprising that Megara was asked for so small a contribution. Perhaps this is to be explained by the economic damage Megara had suffered in the Archidamian War, and from which it may not have yet fully recovered. The small contribution levied on Corinth may also seem surprising, but Corinth already possessed twenty-five triremes, and ten of the Peloponnesian squadron sent to Sicily were Corinthian. The Corinthians, then, could provide a fleet of approximately fifty ships.³³ The omission of Elis from the list is also interesting in the light of its naval contribution to the Spartan alliance in the Archidamian War. Evidently, Elean relations with Sparta were still strained. With the focus of the war now shifting away from the west towards Greece and the Aegean, Sparta may not have been too concerned over Elis: it was not, however, to forget Elis' defection.³⁴

Perhaps the most striking point is the relatively large number of ships to be provided by Boeotia, not usually thought of as having maritime interests, and by Sparta. Thebes had been able to increase its resources as a result of its participation in the raiding of Attica from Decelea [*Hell.Oxyr.*12.4]. Thucydides does not reveal how many of these ships were eventually put into service, but some of the states mentioned were later represented at Chios and Cynossema [8.33,106.3]. Nor does he explain their purpose, which may have been to assist in a blockade of Athens or to help dismember the Athenian empire in the Aegean. Their maintenance would have been expensive. Perhaps a fleet of one hundred was the maximum that could be provided under such circumstances. It might be expected to increase as Sparta won over more of Athens' former maritime allies, and as it won more booty to pay for a larger fleet.

In all these plans, there is no hint in Thucydides' account that Sparta was attempting to involve Persia.³⁵ Sparta may have hoped for eventual Persian assistance, but cannot yet have

³³ *contra* Lewis 88.

³⁴ The Spartans under Agis invaded Elis c.400 [*Xen.Hell.*3.2.21-31]

³⁵ Sparta had been sending embassies to the Persian king as early as 430 [2.67.1], see note 1. By the time of the Deceleian War the next king, Darius, was demanding the arrears of tribute owed him by his western satrapies [8.5.5.]. This time it seems that the Persians were the first to make a move. They may have been prompted to discuss aid with Sparta after they heard of the Athenian defeat in Sicily, which appeared to alter the balance of naval power in the Aegean and to present Persia with the opportunity to regain her influence. It is not clear whether the subsequent embassies to Sparta came with the king's approval or whether they were the result of the western satraps' own policies: their satrapies were geographically separate from one another and so each may have been acting alone. Although little

counted on it: in the meantime the Spartans were making their own naval arrangements. Thucydides indicates that these were in preparation before the appeals came from Euboea and from Ionia [8.5.1].

The Euboeans were the first of the Athenian allies to discuss with Sparta the possibility of revolt [8.5]. They appealed to Agis at Decelea, as the nearest Spartan representative. Euboea was of great strategic and economic value to Athens: its eventual fall to Sparta was to cause consternation [8.96]. Agis prepared a force, with Sparta's help, presumably to be conveyed in Euboean ships. There is no reason why Agis would have had his own ships at this point. He merely needed to transport a small force of three hundred men across the channel, not to fight a naval battle. When approached for help by a deputation from Lesbos, supported by the Boeotians, he changed his plan in favour of an expedition to Lesbos. Agis also promised to provide ten Spartan ships to match the ten promised by the Boeotians. These vessels were later ordered to join the main Peloponnesian fleet at the Isthmus. Agis' ships are clearly under Sparta's orders, not the king's.³⁶

What altered the whole prospect of war in the east for Sparta were the appeals for help that came from Lesbos, Chios and the Hellespont [8.5]. The Chian request was supported by the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, who promised financial aid for the Peloponnesian forces. At about the same time, an embassy was sent from Pharnabazus, satrap in north Asia Minor, to ask the Spartans to provide a fleet against Athenian interests in the north. Pharnabazus' ambassadors had brought twenty-five talents as a contribution towards the preparation of this fleet. It is not clear whether the Persian king was behind these appeals, but both satraps might have thought an arrangement with Sparta in the light of current Athenian naval weakness would be approved by him.

time elapsed between the defeat in Syracuse and the embassies to Sparta from Ionia and the Hellespont, it is likely that such important news as the defeat of the Athenians reached the king quickly [Dover, 449 and Lewis 87 n.25]]. He would also have been interested in the situation in his western empire, where Amorges, the son of Pissouthnes, who had rebelled against Darius, was in revolt, see Lewis 85f., and ML 77. For the dispute over whether Athens decided to help Amorges before the Persian negotiations with Sparta [Andocides 3.29], or after them, see H.D. Westlake, "Athens and Amorges", *Phoenix* 31 (1977) 319-29.

³⁶ It is possible that the independence enjoyed by Agis at Decelea has been exaggerated: Thucydides says that his decision to help Euboea was made with the full knowledge of the Spartan government [8.5.2]. The powers possessed by Agis are not any greater than those of any Spartan king on campaign [Hdt. 6.52ff]. His subsequent decision to direct the force for Euboea to Lesbos is understandable in this context.

Sparta was now faced with two separate appeals from two Persian satraps and an appeal from Lesbos, backed by its ally, Boeotia, and supported by Agis at Decelea. Spartan response was divided: the majority, including Agis, who had once more changed his mind, favoured the idea of supporting Chios and Ionia and concluding an alliance with the Persians [8.6.12]. This policy was also supported by the ephor, Endius, and by Alcibiades.³⁷ Sparta made an alliance with Chios and prepared to send ten ships under the Spartan navarch, Melanchridas;³⁸ thirty more vessels were to follow later, according to this arrangement [8.6].

The original Spartan plan was altered when an earthquake occurred, and Chalcideus was appointed to command five ships from Laconia.³⁹ Sparta, then, was to cut its contribution by half. The Spartan reaction to the omen of an earthquake suggests that many were still not sure of the wisdom of significant involvement so far away for an unspecified time. In a sense, they downgraded their contribution by reducing their force and by appointing an *archon* in place of a navarch, but the majority must still have been in favour of continuing the expedition in some form, as the Spartans proceeded with the plan.⁴⁰

Despite their approval of assistance for Chios and Ionia, the Spartans moved cautiously and carefully. Phrynīs, a *perioecus*, was sent to Chios during the winter to find out whether the Chians had as many ships and resources as was claimed. The despatch of a *perioecus* on so important a mission indicates that *perioeci* were considered valuable in diplomatic activity to the Spartan state. The use of a *perioecus* also shows that Sparta was doing as much as possible to maintain the secrecy of the operation - a Laconian *perioecus* could have been at Chios to trade, whereas the presence of a Spartan might have caused suspicion. The Spartans had also made

³⁷ For the role of Endius and Alcibiades, see Plut. *Alc.* 12.1., 23.7, Andocides *Against Alcibiades* 30, *Xen.Hell.* 3.3.1, Andrewes 26; Hatzfeld 220; Lewis 88f.

³⁸ This decision suggests that this navarch at least was appointed by the spring. The length and tenure of the Spartan navarchy is much debated. For a discussion on the Spartan navarchy, see the appendix.

³⁹ Andrewes 19-20 believes the earthquake was the reason Sparta changed its plans; Kagan 35 does not. He dates Spartan activity at Corinth to April/May 412.

⁴⁰ It is not clear exactly what an *archon* was at Sparta. The term may be used by Thucydides to signify a commander whose rank the historian did not know. Spartan superstition about earthquakes is well documented, see Andrewes 19/20. It is not impossible that such fear could be used to political advantage. Chalcideus' actual status is unclear. Thucydides calls him *archon*, which may imply that he had similar powers to a harmost. From the fact of his negotiations with Tissaphernes he had diplomatic powers as well.

arrangements with Tissaphernes' representatives for the financial support of any fleet they might send [8.26.1].

The attraction of the Chian proposal over those of Lesbos and the Hellespont was that it afforded Sparta an immediate fleet of sixty ships, according to the Chian claim [8.6], and a local base for later operations in Lesbos and the Hellespont.⁴¹ Sparta was evidently attracted by the possibility of a quick victory in the east, while Athens was still weak as a result of its immense naval losses in Sicily. Such a victory, the Spartans might have hoped, would be obtained with the minimum of Spartan effort and expense. The Spartans were clearly not anticipating sustained overseas operations when they considered aid to Chios. In addition, to wait for all the vessels that they had requisitioned from their mainland allies would have meant a greater delay and a greater chance that their plans would be discovered by the Athenians and by the Chian government then in power. Sparta, however, was still cautious over the prospect of an Athenian naval response before it linked up with Chios. According to Thucydides' account, the Athenian fleet had been destroyed at Syracuse, and Athens was in a bad way [8.1]. For him, the caution exhibited by the Spartans at this point was typical of their normal behaviour, but they may have been right to proceed in secret: although Athens had lost the greater part of its navy and some of its best crews in Sicily, it still had about seventy ships available, and was rebuilding a fleet during the winter of 413/12.⁴²

The exact timing of all the appeals to Sparta is not clear: Thucydides says that they all came during the winter of 413/12, but the Spartans needed time to discuss the implications and the changes in strategy that would follow each new request from the east. The whole situation was fluid, but the Spartans responded to the Chians, at least, by the end of Thucydides' winter (perhaps March) by promising aid. They then had to summon their allies for consultation, since they would be providing the majority of the Peloponnesian ships for the east. Nothing, however, is mentioned by Thucydides about the allies' reaction to any possible arrangement with Persia. The prospect of such an arrangement may have remained a private matter between Endius and

⁴¹ Meiggs 359; S. Van de Maele, "Livre VIII de Thucydide et la politique de Sparte en Asie Mineure (412-411 av.J.C.)" *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 32-50 noted that the Chian fleet of sixty and the Peloponnesian promise of forty ships make the same total of one hundred vessels ordered earlier from the allies. This fleet, then, was to replace that originally ordered. The promise of ships from Chios appears to have taken some of the pressure off the allies.

⁴² There were thirty-three ships at Naupactus under Conon in 413 [7.31] and thirty under Charicles around the Peloponnese [7.26]. Kagan 37 is critical of Spartan caution here and states that the Spartans were 'always nervous and poorly led at sea.'

Alcibiades [8.12], but it seems unlikely that the subject of financing operations in the east was not discussed by the allied synod. It must be concluded that they had no objection to Persian involvement at this stage, and that they did not accuse Sparta of betraying its previous anti-Persian stance. The delay of the Corinthians in sending forces to Chios from the Isthmus is not linked by Thucydides with any Corinthian opposition to Persia.

At the allied congress at Corinth in the late spring⁴³ Sparta's allies voted to explore all the possibilities offered them from Ionia. The allies may have exercised some degree of control over policy, because they did not merely ratify the Spartan proposal to aid Chios:⁴⁴ their final decision was a compromise, designed to explore all possibilities and to take advantage of all the appeals by despatching forces under designated commanders, each of them an *archon* [8.8], to all three places in turn. This was the initial Peloponnesian grand strategy for war in the east; Thucydides may have over-emphasised the Spartan interest in Chios in the light of what happened soon after. At the same time, Sparta sent three Spartans to Corinth to supervise the moving of ships across the *diolkos* to be ready to sail to Chios. Twenty-one ships from the Gulf states were brought over out of the thirty-nine ships then available [8.7]. Thucydides concluded that they decided to send the fleet in two squadrons to divide Athenian response. The earthquake in Laconia may have been the reason that the numbers for Ionia, too, were cut by half.⁴⁵ The Spartans had done the same thing over their promised contribution when they reduced it from ten to five ships. The decision to send Chalcideus from Laconia, not from the Isthmus, may have been to ensure that at least one Spartan officer reached the island to co-ordinate the rebellion. The presence of a Spartan officer was obviously considered vital to success as well as to Sparta's claim to continued leadership in the war against Athens.

⁴³ Andrewes 20, 23 suggests the conference took place before late June or early July, as it was connected with the Isthmian Games. Some delay in the Spartan response to Chios is indicated by Athens' despatch of Aristocrates and his return before the expedition sailed [8.9].

⁴⁴ Kagan 36 suggests that their decision showed lack of trust because of its different orders and commanders. It seems more likely that the final decision represents strong differences of opinion about the value of each proposal. It may have seemed at the time to the Spartans and Peloponnesians that the Athenian empire was beginning to break up.

⁴⁵ Although it is possible that the occurrence of an earthquake may have been a Spartan excuse for delay, the Greeks regarded such signs seriously. In 426 the Spartans withdrew early from their proposed invasion of Attica because of earthquakes [Thuc.3.89].

Corinth, however, was reluctant to move because of the Isthmian festival and truce.⁴⁶ Agis offered to take over the responsibility for the expedition, but the Corinthians did not allow this. Corinth, then, must have been in charge of the naval preparations at the Isthmus, or contributing a significant number of ships. The Corinthians' excuse about the Isthmian festival may well have been a diplomatic excuse, especially if they thought that the Athenians were still too weak to react after Sicily.

The Peloponnesian ships under their commander, Alcamenes,⁴⁷ designated for the command at Lesbos, finally left the Isthmus in July. The fleet at the Isthmus and the government at Sparta were evidently in close communication, as a message was despatched to Sparta on the departure of the fleet, and the Spartans were quickly informed of the subsequent events in the Saronic Gulf. The Peloponnesian squadron was challenged by an Athenian fleet of at first twenty-one and later thirty-seven ships [8.10]. The Peloponnesians refused to fight in the open sea and turned back. These crews had had little battle experience and may have been aware that there were insufficient ships to replace or reinforce them quickly. Furthermore, their object was to get to Chios, not to fight the Athenians. They made for Spiraem in the Corinthian Gulf where they could expect some reinforcement by land.⁴⁸ Here they were blockaded by the Athenian squadron. In a subsequent engagement on land most of their ships were disabled, and their leader, Alcamenes, was killed. The Peloponnesians were evidently able to get the news to Corinth, as they were provided with reinforcements the next day. Agis also supplied them with another Spartan commanding officer, should they escape and resume their journey to Chios.

Thucydides says that the Spartans became completely discouraged at the failure of this first move towards Ionia. They wanted to prevent Chalcideus from sailing from Laconia and to recall any of their ships that had set out already. He gives no information about how many may already have gone or where they were. Perhaps they were a few of the ships that were intended to join Chalcideus' expedition. Given the approval of the majority and the enthusiasm for an Ionian policy in general because of its promise of a quick victory, a sudden and complete Spartan

⁴⁶ Andrewes 24. Corinth may have been reluctant to send ships so far east but this was not apparent at the congress. The excuse of a religious festival and truce seems likely.

⁴⁷ Kagan 39 calls him admiral but no admiral was appointed immediately after Melanchridas. Thucydides calls Alcamenes an *archon*.

⁴⁸ For the location of Spiraem, see Andrewes 24.

change of heart seems most unlikely. Some disappointment was natural, especially if, as Thucydides indicated, most of Greece had believed Athens to be finished [8.2]. Perhaps Thucydides was referring to political disagreement at Sparta over the Chian proposal and how to save it, particularly after the omen of an earthquake that had caused a change in size of the Spartan contingent. Some Spartans, such as Agis, had originally wanted to help Lesbos: the naval setback in the Saronic Gulf might have been seen as a chance to win greater support for a Boeotian/Lesbian policy, not an opportunity to abandon the east altogether.⁴⁹

In the event, Chalcideus and Alcibiades sailed to Chios with five ships and the approval of the current ephors [8.12].⁵⁰ As their force was now so small, their intention was to use the ships' crews as hoplites, and so the crews of the five Spartan vessels may have been helot and neodamode soldiers with experience of rowing [8.11]. If the Spartan rower/hoplites had not returned from Sicily in time to join this squadron, as Thucydides indicates they had not [8.13], Sparta must have had up to one thousand more men or mercenaries trained in both fighting and rowing.

Later in the same summer the twenty Peloponnesian ships at Spiraëum broke away from the Athenian blockade. Some of the Athenian vessels had been withdrawn for service in the east as revolt spread in Ionia. The Peloponnesian ships returned to Cenchreae and prepared to sail later to Ionia as part of the main Peloponnesian fleet [8.17]. By late summer the fleet at Cenchreae numbered at least fifty-five ships, although twenty-two of them were from Sicily. Thus, the Peloponnesian states contributed only thirty-three ships to this fleet, a number far short of that requisitioned by Sparta in the previous winter. Spartan and Peloponnesian hopes were now pinned on a fleet to be largely made up of Ionian, not Peloponnesian, ships.

(ii) Early Spartan naval activity in Ionia - 412-411

The small Spartan force destined for Ionia recognised that its position in the Aegean was precarious. Chalcideus arrested anyone they met to preserve the secrecy of the mission [8.14.1].

⁴⁹ Kagan 41 agrees that Alcibiades was responsible for the Spartan resumption of the Chian plan. For Alcibiades' influence in Ionia, see Andrewes 26; Hatzfeld 217-8, and Westlake, *JHS* 58 (1938) 33-5.

⁵⁰ The Chians were already nervous over the lateness of their arrival [8.7]. For the political situation on Chios, see T.J. Quinn, "Political Groups at Chios: 412" *Historia* 18 (1969) 22-30 and *Athens, Samos, Lesbos and Chios* (Manchester, 1981). The Chians were still sending ships for the Athenian fleet at this time [5.84.1, 7.20.2, 8.10].

The detainees were quickly released at Corycus, where Chalcideus negotiated with the pro-Spartan party from Chios. The Peloponnesians were careful not to antagonise future Ionian allies by treating their prisoners badly, a lesson they may have remembered from 427, when Alcidas had killed Ionian prisoners: he had to be reminded that Ionian goodwill towards Sparta would be affected by such conduct [3.32]. Chalcideus, then, was very much at the mercy of the situation in Ionia and had to respond to whatever developed. His instructions from Sparta had probably been no more specific than to encourage revolt in Ionia as quickly as possible. This was exactly what he did.

The Chians were then brought into revolt, and they enthusiastically promoted further rebellion in Ionia. The cities of the Erythraean promontory on the mainland opposite followed [8.14], some through a prudent assessment of the relative strength of the Spartan and Athenian forces in the area.⁵¹ Chalcideus then moved to the mainland with a fleet of twenty-three vessels, mostly Chian, and a land army in support; a small Athenian squadron fled from them near Teos, and Chalcideus pursued them [8.16]. For Chalcideus speed was essential for success: he had to make the revolt as widespread as possible, before the Athenians could respond in greater force. He also needed to gain control over at least one of the major cities of the Aegean coast, such as Ephesus on the river Cayster or Miletus on the Meander, each of which stood at the head of a communications route inland to Persia, in order to secure a base for Sparta on the mainland. Many of the natural harbours of the Aegean coastline of modern Turkey are still only useful as temporary refuges because they are isolated from the interior. Provided the Spartans could hold at least one of the major cities and realise the financial support promised by Tissaphernes, they would not have to fight at sea until they chose to do so. Although Thucydides emphasises the role of Alcibiades in these early moves, it must have been Chalcideus, the Spartan commander, who had the final power of decision. Perhaps it was Alcibiades' promise of assistance in bringing over the Ionians of the mainland to the Spartan cause that had obtained him passage to Ionia in the first place. The Spartan government would surely not have given an Athenian

⁵¹ For the attitude of many of the cities of Ionia to both the Spartans and the Athenians, see H.D. Westlake, "Ionians in the Ionian War" *CQ* n.s. 19 (1979) 9-44.

renegade official status on such an expedition. Alcibiades still had to prove his worth to Sparta by using his influence to their advantage in Ionia.⁵²

At Teos Chalcideus was joined by a small force under a Persian officer, responsible to Tissaphernes [8.16]. He may have been there to establish contact with the Spartan commander and to demonstrate Persia's interest in the area. Tissaphernes completed the Persian arrangements for Teos after his meeting with Chalcideus at Miletus [8.20].

Chalcideus returned to Chios and prepared to move south to Miletus, where Alcibiades claimed to have influence [8.17; Plut.*Alc.*22]. Chalcideus may also have been persuaded to go to Miletus by information given him by the Persians at Teos. Before leaving Chios, however, he provided for the protection of the island and for continued Spartan commitment to their earlier agreement with the Chians;⁵³ the crews of the Spartan ships were left as a garrison and were replaced with Chian rowers in Chalcideus' fleet. Chalcideus may have had the internal security of Chios in mind: the original Chian appeal to Sparta had not been an official embassy by the Chian government, and there may still have been some dissidents on the island.

The Spartan move south to make Miletus their base was, in retrospect, a strategic error: by concentrating on Miletus, Chalcideus allowed the Athenians at Samos to cut him off from his northern base at Chios and to split the Spartan offensive into two. Much time was subsequently wasted in fighting in both theatres.⁵⁴ At the time, however, Chalcideus' orders must have been to ensure that the revolt spread as far and as fast as possible. He had only five ships under his direct command, and, as *archon* of the force, cannot have been expected to undertake a major naval engagement for possession of the Ionian coast, although he showed himself ready to engage a small Athenian squadron [8.16]. Thucydides explains Spartan interest in Miletus as the result of Alcibiades' desire to gain prestige for himself and for Endius for bringing over the city before the main Peloponnesian fleet arrived [8.17]. This may well have played a part, but the strong

⁵² The role of Alcibiades in all this is not clear. He had many contacts in Ionia and was useful to the Spartans in that respect. For the possible over-emphasis by Thucydides on the importance of Alcibiades, see P.A.Brunn, "Thucydides and Alcibiades" *REG* 65 (1952) 59-96 and H.Westlake, "The Influence of Alcibiades on Thucydides, Book 8", *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History* (Bristol, 1989) 154-166.

⁵³ Kagan 74.

⁵⁴ Busolt 3(2) 1426 suggests that the Spartans should have challenged the Athenians at this time, while they had the tactical advantage and numerical superiority. There is no evidence that they had such superiority. To bring the Athenians to battle cannot have been part of Chalcideus' mandate.

prospect of winning over as their mainland base the famous city of Miletus must have been irresistible to Chalcideus.⁵⁵ Miletus was an important port in Asia Minor, strategically situated to spread the revolt to the south, and closer to a good supply of timber than was Ephesus.⁵⁶ It was also in Tissaphernes' territory, and the Spartans had to make some contact and official arrangements with the man who had agreed to finance their forces. In addition, the loss of Miletus would be a major blow to Athens and would endanger the position of Amorges, in revolt from Persia at Iasus.⁵⁷ Besides, it is not at all clear whether Ephesus was ready to revolt at this time.⁵⁸ Had it been, it makes Chalcideus' decision to make for Miletus the more short-sighted, since Ephesus was also strategically situated for access to the interior and far better placed for continued contact with Chios. If, however, Chalcideus had to react to a quickly developing situation, then he may have taken the decision to proceed to Miletus because it offered the better prospect of an immediate revolt and a strong mainland base with secure supplies for the Spartan fleet. Had Ephesus come over to the Peloponnesians by this time, it is odd that Thucydides does not mention so important a strategic gain.

At Miletus Chalcideus concluded an agreement with Tissaphernes [8.18]. This first 'alliance' was probably an *ad hoc* arrangement, needed by Sparta to establish official contact and general lines of co-operation in the war against Athens.⁵⁹ It contained no specific reference to the financial arrangements between Sparta and Persia, although these may already have been in place by an agreement reached at Sparta before Chalcideus left for Ionia [8.29]. In fact, its terms

⁵⁵ Hdt. 6.23.

⁵⁶ J.C. Dewdney, *Turkey: An Introductory Geography* (New York and Washington, 1971) fig. 35.

⁵⁷ See Andrewes 40.

⁵⁸ From the fact that, shortly after Chalcideus' arrival at Miletus, a Chian ship took refuge at Ephesus from the Athenians, Beloch 2 (1) 378 has concluded that the city had gone over to the Spartans. He is followed by Lewis 90 n.30 and Kagan 47. Thucydides, however, says nothing more about Ephesus until Tissaphernes visits it on his way to negotiate with the Spartans at the Hellespont in 411. It was certainly pro-Spartan in 409 [Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6].

⁵⁹ The terms of this first agreement have been much debated; Grote, 7.376, Busolt 3 1426-7 and Kagan 48 think it a one-sided document that was kept secret by Sparta because of its giveaways. Chalcideus agreed to it because he was inexperienced - Hatzfeld 222, or it was just a draft proposal, De Sanctis, *Studi di storia della storiografia greca* (Florence, 1951) 86-7. Lewis 90-1 thinks Chalcideus simple-minded, and Bury suggests that it was Sparta's hatred for Athens that motivated the sell-out, *A History of Greece*, rev. R. Meiggs (New York, 1975) 307. The role of Alcibiades, if any, in the negotiations is also questioned: Meiggs 354; Kagan 49 says Alcibiades probably supported the need for a quick agreement because he needed some credit. Van der Maelle, *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 32-50 suggests that Alcibiades was behind Chalcideus' general failure to act against Athens in Ionia.

were very broad.⁶⁰ Quite possibly, Chalcideus had no idea of the full implications of what he had agreed to, since he had achieved his current military objective: he may well have acted quickly to obtain an agreement so that he could proceed with encouraging further revolt. For his part Tissaphernes was able to gain Spartan help against Amorges, and the Spartans fulfilled this condition within a short space of time.

While Chalcideus was at Miletus, his squadron of twenty-five ships was blockaded by nineteen Athenian vessels stationed at Lade. Chalcideus apparently made no attempt to break out of Miletus by sea, as he might have done, especially if he had some Milesian vessels to support him. Perhaps he intended to hold on until the main Peloponnesian fleet arrived. Clearly, from their later arrival in the southern theatre, the home fleet was aware of what was happening at Miletus, and it was intended to support the Spartan position there. The acquisition of Miletus for the Spartan cause must have been regarded as an important coup in mainland Greece. Perhaps, too, according to the terms of his agreement with Tissaphernes, Chalcideus delayed because he was preparing to meet Amorges, who, as he reported to some of the Chians, who came to investigate the southern situation, was bringing up his army. Before the end of the summer, however, Chalcideus was killed by the Athenians in a skirmish near Miletus [8.24].

Ten Chian ships had arrived at Anaea to find out the situation at Miletus.⁶¹ The Chians appear to have recognised the need for action in order to maintain the impetus of the revolt. They may also have wanted, as Thucydides suggests [8.22], to establish the importance of their role in the revolt before the arrival of the main Peloponnesian fleet. Left to their own devices while Chalcideus was still in Miletus, the Chians manned thirteen ships and sailed to Lesbos to carry out the rest of the Peloponnesians' instructions that had been decided at the congress in Corinth. It is also possible that the Chians sailed to Miletus to consult Chalcideus about their next move, since he was still the Spartan officer in charge of the Ionian theatre of operations.

⁶⁰ There has been much debate over whether this treaty was secret because its provisions were considered a sell-out of Ionia by the Spartans. E. Will, *Le monde grec et l'orient I* (Paris, 1972) 364 and Hatzfeld 224 n.4 believe that it was a secret deal of which the Spartans had reason to be ashamed. Busolt 3 (2) 1427 n.1 believes its conditions were publicly known because Thucydides indicates that the Peloponnesians were aware of it [8.36.2]. If it was secret, how did Thucydides find out about it and its provisions? It seems more likely that it was acceptable to Chalcideus at the time as it covered the major areas of military co-operation between himself and Tissaphernes. It was only at Sparta that the full implication of its sweeping generalisations were realised. Had there been major objections to its terms by the Ionians, it is strange that they are not mentioned, and that they continued to support Sparta.

⁶¹ Andrewes 42 has explained that the report given by Chalcideus about Amorges was not relevant to the Chian position at Anaea. It was probably Chalcideus' answer to their question about the state of affairs at Miletus.

Chalcideus may have instructed them to go north to draw the Athenians away from Miletus. Evidently these ships left Chios before they were aware that a Spartan navarch was soon to arrive on the island.

In command of the Chian vessels that sailed to Lesbos was the *perioecus*, Diniadas. Such a command for a *perioecus* seems unusual, but Diniadas was not in charge of Spartan, only allied ships, perhaps with some neodamode, helot or Chian slave crewmembers.⁶² He may have gained this appointment because he was the most experienced Laconian in the fleet. Perhaps, too, Lesbos was expected to come over to Sparta very quickly, so that the presence of a Spartiate was not considered necessary. In any case, the Spartan navarch was expected to arrive soon to take over [8.23.1]. The land force that formed part of this expedition and that was intended for later service in the Hellespont, was led by a Spartan, Eualas [8.23].⁶³ The Spartan strategy for the east still included bringing over Lesbos.

Chalcideus has been much criticised for his activities in Ionia.⁶⁴ He was, however, faced with a difficult task: not the Spartans' original choice for the mission to Chios, he was sent as commander of a secret but downsized expedition and was accompanied by the disloyal Alcibiades, on whom he would have to depend for his introduction to the Ionian political and strategic situation: he had to negotiate some kind of working agreement with the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, to create a base for future Spartan activities and to encourage the spread of the revolt as quickly as he could. His orders from Sparta may not have included all this, but it must have been clear to him, soon after his arrival in Ionia, that he would have to attempt them all. The Spartans may not have known, nor may Chalcideus and Alcibiades have realised until they arrived, the readiness of many of the coastal cities to rebel. Chalcideus' decision to help them and to make Miletus a base for spreading revolt was made on an assessment of the situation as he saw it. His decision to take Miletus was clearly approved at Sparta, with which he must have been in contact, since two officers were later sent out with the main fleet to take charge of Chios

⁶² Andrewes 50 comments on the unusual nature of this command.

⁶³ For the difficulties of the text at this point, see Andrewes 53.

⁶⁴ Kagan 55 calls him 'timid and incompetent.' See also note 59 for comments on Chalcideus' competence as a negotiator.

and Miletus [8.28].⁶⁵ Chalcideus was caught in a dilemma caused by Sparta's lack of knowledge of the true position in Ionia, by the speed of the revolt and by the necessity to make arrangements with the Persian satrap. Once he was blockaded at Miletus, it was difficult for him to leave, since such a move would have left the city open to the Athenians, as Teos had been. Furthermore, it is not clear how long his negotiations with Tissaphernes took. With hindsight it is clear that his mistake was to take a small fleet too far, too quickly, and to put Samos, the Athenian base in the Aegean, between himself and his base at Chios. He thus created two theatres of war, a situation to which the Athenians were quick to respond. Given the situation he faced, it is difficult to see what else he could have done: to spread revolt was his only choice, since the Peloponnesians were aware of the Athenian power to respond, and the capture of Miletus was an attractive prospect. It would also cause the Athenians to divide their forces, which, Chalcideus might have hoped, would be made less effective. The spread of revolt in the south would also threaten the supply route to Athens from the east and from Egypt; the Peloponnesians had appreciated this possibility early in the Archidamian War [2.69]. The delay in the Spartans' success, caused by the blockade of Chalcideus at Miletus, could have been the fault of the Spartan home government, because it did not send the main fleet from the Isthmus quickly enough. They may have been anticipating greater support from both Persia and Ionia than actually arrived, or they may not have known of the blockade until it was too late.

The navarchy of Astyochus, 412-411

Astyochus was appointed navarch some time before the beginning of winter 412 at the latest to take over command from Chalcideus [8.20]. The appointment of a navarch for the eastern campaign suggests that it was by now being regarded at Sparta as more extensive than was at first envisaged. At Cenchreae Astyochus took charge of the ships that had escaped the Athenian blockade at Piraeus and that were to form part of the main Peloponnesian fleet for Ionia.

When Astyochus set out for Chios, Chalcideus was already blockaded at Miletus and Chios and Lesbos were threatened by the Athenians. The support of Chios was evidently still considered important by the Spartans; they may have discovered the Athenian preparations at Piraeus and their destination, and have despatched the navarch promptly with a small squadron

⁶⁵ For the probable identification of these Spartan archons as harmosts, see H.W.Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire (405-371 B.C.)" *JHS* 50 (1930) 37-79.

of four ships with hoplites to shore up Chian and Lesbian resistance. Six more ships were prepared for Chios.

The Athenians arrived at Lesbos within a few days of Astyochus' arrival on Chios [8.23]. Astyochus responded immediately and sailed to Lesbos, hoping to reach Mytilene before them. The Athenians, however, had already taken the city. Operating from Eresus, which had revolted to him, Astyochus tried to shore up the Methymnaeans by sending a hoplite force to help them, while he brought up the ships. Thucydides gives no further detail about his movements, except to say that Astyochus was forced to return to Chios when he was unable to counter the Athenian success on Lesbos.

Six more Peloponnesian ships arrived, and the Peloponnesian contingent under Astyochus now included five Corinthian, one Megarian, one Hermionian and three Spartan vessels [8.33]. There were already five Spartan ships with Chalcideus at Miletus, whose crews had been left as a garrison on Chios.

The Athenian counter-offensive at Lesbos had prevented the Spartans extending their operations further north. Astyochus responded with Persian help [8.31] by attacking Athenian forts on the mainland around Erythrae to maintain the Spartan hold on the Ionian coast, but he was brought back to Chios by the news of a possible pro-Athenian revolt on the island. It may have seemed to the Chians that they had done most of the work up to this time, while Sparta had committed little despite the earlier promises of Chalcideus and Alcibiades [8.14]. Twenty of their ships were still at Miletus, and Chios itself was threatened as a result of Athenian success on Lesbos.⁶⁶

The main Peloponnesian fleet was dispatched to Miletus under Therimenes, initially to relieve Chalcideus' fleet and to be handed over to its navarch, Astyochus. Slightly under half this fleet consisted of ships from Sicily.⁶⁷ The Spartans, Pedaritus and Philippus, accompanied

⁶⁶ It has been thought that Chios was a somewhat less than enthusiastic partner in the rebellion, since only forty-seven Chian ships are known to have been at sea from the sixty promised, Kagan 59 n.33. Sixty may not have been the actual number of ships they were able to put to sea, as Thucydides indicates: Phrynus relied on reports of their numbers from Chian informants who wanted Spartan support [8.6]. Besides, Chios had sent twenty-five vessels to Syracuse [6.31] and seven more had been impounded by the Athenians [8.10]. There is no evidence to show that they had not supported the revolt wholeheartedly. It was natural for them to react when their own island was threatened, despite their earlier successes.

⁶⁷ The Sicilians sent twenty-two ships according to Thucydides [8.26.1], but thirty-five in Diodorus' account [13.34.4].

this force to take over commands, perhaps as harmosts, at Chios and Miletus [8.28].⁶⁸ The Spartan government was committing its fleet to the southern theatre and was attempting to regulate the situation there by appointing commanders for its two bases; the navarch, however, was probably supposed to exercise supreme command over all naval decisions in the east. That there could be a conflict between areas of command was clearly not envisaged, nor do the Spartans appear to have envisaged any conflict with Tissaphernes over the authority of a Spartan officer in mainland states, such as Miletus.

When the fleet was informed that Miletus was under siege by a large Athenian force, it made for the isolated coastline of the Gulf of Iasus, where Alcibiades was waiting and where it would be protected. There must have been some contact between Alcibiades and the fleet command to effect such a meeting: presumably this was arranged when the fleet arrived at Leros [8.26]. The Peloponnesians had no option but to attack to save their southern base, although the decision to do so is represented by Thucydides as the result of Alcibiades' persuasion.

At Miletus the Athenians had a total of forty-eight ships, many of them transports.⁶⁹ The Peloponnesian fleet consisted of fifty-five warships.⁷⁰ Under these circumstances, the Athenian commander, Phrynichus, refused to risk battle, perhaps because he had insufficient skilled rowers and crews, or because of problems with the Argive contingent, or because this was a force equipped to take Miletus by a land assault, not to fight in open water. The Athenians had clearly not anticipated the arrival so soon of so large a Peloponnesian fleet, just as the Peloponnesian fleet command had not anticipated finding the Athenians at Miletus in such force. They may have thought that the fleet being prepared at Piraeus was intended to reinforce the Athenian presence at Lesbos.

The Peloponnesians, however, were ready to fight and had left their removable equipment at Teichiussa [8.28], but the Athenians refused battle and withdrew to Samos.⁷¹ Had the

⁶⁸ Spartan harmosts, 'fixers', apparently were appointed more frequently in the latter stages of the Peloponnesian War and after it. They seem to have been appointed to take charge of allied cities. See G.Bokisch "Harmostai" *Klio* 43-5 (1965) 129-239 and J.Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster, 1985) 21f.

⁶⁹ This fleet had been sent to Miletus around October, Busolt 3(2) 1432, Andrewes 58.

⁷⁰ For the difficulty of reconciling the numbers of ships in the Peloponnesian fleet see Andrewes 61, who concludes, rightly, that a rough approximation is all that we can expect.

⁷¹ For a discussion of the wisdom of this decision attributed to Phrynichus, see Kagan 62-68 and the sources cited there.

Spartans been able to force a battle at Miletus, they might well have won it: they had a slight superiority in numbers, greater if the twenty-five ships with Chalcideus were used, and they had warships against a fleet containing troopships. Had they been defeated, their prospects of further success in Ionia would have been poor, since they would have lost an important base at Miletus. Their loss of prestige would have been enormous. In the event they were left in control of Miletus without a fight.

With Miletus finally secure Tissaphernes asked the Spartans to help him attack Amorges, presumably in accordance with the agreement made between them. Their successful joint campaign produced a great deal of booty which helped to pay some of the fleet's expenses [8.36.1]. Evidently, Tissaphernes had not yet provided in sufficient quantity the financial support promised by his agents at Sparta in the spring [8.29.1]. He later fulfilled these terms by providing a month's pay for the fleet.⁷² The Persians garrisoned Iasus, but it was under Spartan control by 409 [Xen.*Hell.*1.1.32]. Tissaphernes and the Spartans appear to have been co-operating well at this time, and the presence of Persians at Iasus may have caused the Spartans no alarm. Tissaphernes also helped bring over Cnidus [8.35], which was traditionally a Spartan colony.⁷³ His use of the Spartans at Iasus solved two immediate problems for the satrap, that of Amorges and that of paying for a large fleet. When he had promised through his agents to pay a drachma a day to each man in the Peloponnesian fleet, he may not have envisaged paying for as many as fifty-five ships, in addition to the twenty-five at Miletus. He may also have balked at paying for Ionian vessels in the fleet [8.45]. His promise to pay only three obols until he had consulted the king is not necessarily a sign of oriental cunning and far-sighted planning, but an acknowledgement that he needed more money. He may have expected the booty from Iasus to help supplement Spartan finances until he knew whether he was to obtain further funds from the king. This arrangement was evidently acceptable to the majority of the fleet: it was only the independent Syracusans who objected and negotiated a small increase. As Tissaphernes agreed, he must still have wanted the fleet to stay at Miletus.

The capture of Iasus is usually discussed from the point of view of Tissaphernes; it was he who persuaded the Spartans to take the city and who later helped in the revolt of Cnidus. As well as the need to stop Amorges Tissaphernes would have been eager to gain access to cities that

⁷² In November, Busolt 3 2 1436; Andrewes 70-2.

⁷³ See Lewis 97 and n.68.

were geographically cut off from the interior by highland, and whose interests lay in the Aegean.⁷⁴ The Spartans, however, may have had their own reasons for helping Tissaphernes, apart from the prospect of booty; the capture of Iasus gave them access to the Dorian cities (the Hexapolis) of the Bodrum peninsula and the islands facing it. These cities included Cnidus, Halicarnassus, Cos, Lindus, Ialysus and Camirus [Hdt.1.142]. In addition, Sparta is soon found negotiating with Cnidus and with Rhodes. By the time of the arrival of the Spartan commission in December, Caunus was also pro-Spartan [8.39]. Thus, the attack on Iasus helped extend Spartan influence to the south.

The relationship between the Spartans and Tissaphernes was, however, immensely complicated by the role of Alcibiades. He appears to have played no part in support of Sparta after the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus, and Thucydides implies that it was at about this time that his sympathies began to be questioned by the fleet, perhaps because of his role in the dispute over pay [8.45]. The Spartan government is said to have sent a letter to Astyochus demanding that Alcibiades be put to death.⁷⁵ What is clear, however, is that by the time the Peloponnesian fleet moved to Rhodes in the new year Alcibiades was no longer helping them, but had gone over to Tissaphernes [8.45].

A squadron of twelve ships, eleven from the west with the Rhodian Dorieus, and one from Sparta, sailed from the Peloponnese to Cnidus [8.35]. The presence of a Spartan commander in a Spartan ship indicates that this fleet had an official mission, one that had been approved at Sparta. Thus, the policy of supporting revolt in the south had received official Spartan backing. Their arrival was reported to Miletus as the centre of Spartan operations for the area, and they were instructed, presumably by Therimenes in the absence of the navarch, to protect Cnidus and to attack Athenian merchant ships coming from Egypt [8.35]. It is not clear what merchant ships would have been sailing so late in the year. Perhaps these orders were not as specific as Thucydides implies; they probably applied to the Spartans' general policy for attempting control of the shipping around the Bodrum peninsula. The importance of this area to Athens is shown by the fact that this Spartan action provoked a strong response from the

⁷⁴ See *Turkey*, vol 1, Geographical Handbook Series B.R.507, British Naval Intelligence Division, 1942 87.

⁷⁵ For the controversy surrounding Alcibiades' role at this time, see Busolt 3(2) 1437; M.F.McGregor, "The Genius of Alcibiades" *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 27-46; Hatzfeld 225f., Bloedow 22-40, Meiggs 354.

Athenian fleet at Samos, which captured the Peloponnesian ships on watch and launched an unsuccessful attack on Cnidus.

The Peloponnesian fleet then remained inactive at Miletus for about three months. This delay is thought to have lost them the initiative in the war, since the Athenians were given more time to organise their strategy [8.30].⁷⁶ Perhaps the financial discussions and differences, the increasing tension over Alcibiades and the absence of the navarch in the north had much to do with its lack of action. There may even by this time have been rumours of the possibility of help from the Persian fleet in the spring [8.46]. With a secure base and future prospects of overwhelming naval superiority, there was no need for the Peloponnesians to risk their fleet in battle. In addition, the fleet may have received news of the intended despatch of a commission from Sparta to review the whole Ionian situation [8.39].

When Astyochus heard that the Athenians had withdrawn from Miletus, he adopted more aggressive tactics against the pro-Athenian cities on the mainland with the help of a Persian force. He then received a delegation from Lesbos that offered the chance of another revolt on the island [8.34], an opportunity to fulfil part of the earlier Spartan strategy for the east. This proposal caused division among the commanders of the small fleet of ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian ships [8.32]. It was they, including a Corinthian contingent, who were responsible for the dismissal of the plan, despite Astyochus' appeal. On their return from the mainland to Chios, they found that Pedaritus had arrived from the fleet at Miletus with a mercenary force and had taken charge on the island. Astyochus unsuccessfully tried to persuade him to support the Lesbians' plan. Pedaritus refused to allow the Chian fleet to become involved [8.32], and Astyochus prepared to leave for Miletus.

The disagreement between Pedaritus and Astyochus indicates that there was a problem over the jurisdiction of Spartan officers abroad: Pedaritus clearly felt he had the authority to refuse the navarch the use of Chian ships,⁷⁷ and Astyochus could do nothing about it. Sparta's allies also had sufficient independence to refuse to follow the navarch's advice, but Astyochus

⁷⁶ Kagan 58.

⁷⁷ Plut. *Apoth.Lac.* 10 mentions Pedaritus' high status at Sparta. Pedaritus is also mentioned in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* PSI 1304 and by Diodorus 13.65. See also I.A.F. Bruce, "Chios and PSI 1304", *Phoenix* 18 1964 272-82. For Pedaritus' influence at Sparta, see Kagan 79 n.42 and Andrewes 69. His dispute with Astyochus has also been thought to have political undertones. According to this theory, Astyochus is to be connected with Endius' faction. See Busolt 3(2) 1469 and Lewis 96.

may not have pressed the matter too hard with them, if he thought he had control of the ships at Chios. His threat not to help the Chians in the future shows that he supposed that he had the power of decision in all military matters relating to the security of states under Spartan protection. Much of the difficulty may also have been due to a personality difference between the two officers. It is also possible that the whole issue may have been exaggerated, especially if Thucydides used Chian sources for this story, for, despite his threat, Astyochus went to Erythrae to discuss with Pedaritus a later security problem at Erythrae.

Astyochus arrived at Miletus where, according to Thucydides, morale was still good, pay satisfactory and the Milesians strongly pro-Spartan [8.36.1]. The Spartans, however, were unhappy with the agreement made by Chalcideus, because it favoured Tissaphernes' interests, and they had concluded a second treaty with Tissaphernes, while Therimenes was still with the fleet.⁷⁸ These Spartans may have been either the Spartan naval commanders, the Spartan home government or both. If Astyochus was supposed to negotiate a new agreement with Tissaphernes on behalf of the Spartan government, he had taken a long time in arriving at Miletus. There is no suggestion in Thucydides' account that Astyochus was unhappy with the terms of the new arrangement. Interestingly, the new treaty guarded against the possibility that Sparta and its allies might replace Athens in Ionia.⁷⁹ Perhaps both it and the previous agreement were made at the instigation of Tissaphernes, who had more reason to be wary of inviting into Ionia another Greek state than the Spartans had in accepting his new proposals. By this time also Tissaphernes was paying a far larger fleet than he may have anticipated, and he needed to ensure that it would not take tribute from or attack cities under his jurisdiction, if it became short of money. The treaty provided for the possibility of future negotiations between the two parties and, thus, gives no evidence of major dissatisfaction on either side.

While Astyochus was at Miletus the Athenian general, Phrynichus, presumably thinking that Alcibiades was still with the Peloponnesian fleet, informed him by letter that Alcibiades was trying to obtain Tissaphernes' help for Athens. Such information, if disclosed to Tissaphernes, might have had the effect of bringing the Spartans and the satrap closer in mutual distrust of Alcibiades, but Phrynichus' motive was clearly personal and aimed at Alcibiades alone. The

⁷⁸ See Lewis 93f. for this treaty as terminating the former hostility between Sparta and Persia.

⁷⁹ See Lewis 93 and Andrewes 81, who argues that the cities of Asia Minor may have had separate arrangements with the king about the situation after Athens' defeat.

whole episode has been the subject of much discussion, most of it discrediting the role played by the navarch, who, apparently, confronted Alcibiades in Tissaphernes' presence.⁸⁰ Clearly, Phrynichus was taking a chance, as Astyochus could have ignored the letter. The motives of Astyochus in revealing the correspondence to Tissaphernes and to Alcibiades are not stated by Thucydides. It is often assumed that he did what was expected of him and that he was merely a pawn in the game. Astyochus' motives, however, are crucial; had he not gone to Tissaphernes, Alcibiades' loss of influence with the satrap might not have followed so quickly. Undoubtedly, Astyochus' main aim was to discredit Alcibiades with Tissaphernes. If Astyochus was being bribed by Tissaphernes, as popular rumour in the fleet supposed, the commission that later investigated him could have dismissed him from office. Evidently, Astyochus was able to clear himself from suspicion on this charge. To discredit Alcibiades, who had only recently promised to help the Spartans, was a tempting prospect, especially since he had not been able to arrest and kill Alcibiades, as the Spartans are said to have ordered him to do [8.45].

The episode was followed by the decline of Alcibiades' influence. It would be overstating the case to assign this success to the farsightedness of the navarch in seizing the chance to reduce Alcibiades' influence offered him by Phrynichus' letter,⁸¹ but his desire to discredit Alcibiades with Tissaphernes is credible for personal and for political motives. He would also have gained valuable insight into the state of affairs in the Athenian fleet.⁸²

During this period, Pedaritus again requested help from Astyochus against the Athenian attacks on Chios and against pro-Athenian elements on the island. Astyochus refused the request and Pedaritus complained to Sparta. Evidently, messages could still get through to the Peloponnese from Chios, and time must have been spent in doing so. Pedaritus may already have reported his earlier difficulty with the navarch, and, perhaps, the allies' disagreement with him over his plans for Lesbos. Astyochus may not have felt that he could help at this point since, in order to do so, he would have to pass the Athenian fleet at Samos, which he clearly was not prepared to do, as he did not have the necessary numerical superiority. Nor could he have taken

⁸⁰ Hatzfeld 235-6 has rejected the whole story. This was refuted by Westlake, *JHS* 76 1956 99-100, and *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968) 305. Van de Maelle, *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 32-50, Grote 7.401, Hatzfeld 324 believe the charge of bribery by Tissaphernes levelled against Astyochus. This is rejected by Westlake, *op.cit.* 304-7 and Andrewes 118. Kagan 84 believes in Astyochus' lack of ability.

⁸¹ As suggested by Kagan 128.

⁸² For this suggestion, see Westlake, *JHS* 76 (1956) 99-100.

all his ships to Chios; some would have to be left to protect Miletus. Strategically, the Athenians possessed the advantage, since their base lay between Chios and Miletus. Nonetheless, it seems that Astyochus decided to make some move, whether at his allies' insistence or on his own decision [8.40]. The final decision on such a move was evidently the navarch's responsibility.

The Spartan Commission in Ionia

The need for a first-hand review of the situation in Ionia to review their eastern strategy, to renegotiate the terms of the second treaty agreed by Therimenes with the Persians, and to solve the problem of jurisdiction of power between Spartan officers led to the despatch from Sparta of an investigative commission of eleven advisers [*symboloi* - 8.39] in December 412.⁸³ Thucydides states that these advisers were all Spartiate with the power to order affairs in the east and to replace the navarch, if necessary; Astyochus' possible substitute, in fact, commanded their group of ships. Twenty-seven vessels, the ones fitted out at Pharnabazus' expense for the Hellespont, were diverted to transport the commission to Ionia. From the point of view of the home government, the offensive in Asia Minor had become bogged down by the end of the year, and its future was in jeopardy: Chios, the first Ionian state to defect, was on the point of being lost, their navarch at Miletus apparently refused to help in the north, and the Spartans had been asked to ratify an unsatisfactory treaty that appeared to assert Persian territorial claims as far as Greece: the news of the defection of Alcibiades can only have exacerbated Sparta's frustration at the situation. Consequently, Spartiate advisers were sent with wide powers over the strategic and diplomatic crisis; they included Lichas, a senior experienced diplomat.⁸⁴ Clearly this was a high-level commission. If Tissaphernes refused to discuss a change of terms, the commissioners had the power to order as much of the fleet as they wished to the Hellespont, where Pharnabazus might be more accommodating.⁸⁵ If Astyochus was guilty of the charges laid by Pedaritus, they had a replacement available for him.

Thucydides suggests the wide-ranging nature of the commission's mandate: they were to settle the eastern situation as they saw fit [8.39.2.]. The significance of their powers is not

⁸³ For the date see Andrewes 84. The use of advisers by Sparta, usually after apparently unsatisfactory military ventures, was not unprecedented. See Sealey, *Klio* 18 (1976) 335-58, Andrewes 85, and J. Roisman, "Alkidas in Thucydides" *Historia* 36 (1987) 419-21.

⁸⁴ For Lichas' achievements and diplomatic experience, see Poralla *s.v.l.*

⁸⁵ As suggested by Kagan 86; Busolt 3(2) 1448 sees this as a renewal of Agis' policy.

usually discussed by scholars, who are more concerned with the legal niceties of the relationship between Sparta, Persia and the Ionian cities. The despatch of a large number of advisers with plenipotentiary powers shows that the Spartans were seriously concerned not only with the state of their relationship with the Persians, but also with the strategic situation and their lack of quick success in the east. These advisers clearly out-ranked the navarch in their power of decision.

The commission approached Ionia in secret, a fact that is usually explained as an acknowledgment of Athenian maritime supremacy. This may be so, but the commissioners could hardly allow the Athenians to find out the nature of their task. To acknowledge that their agreement with Tissaphernes was to be renegotiated, or that their offensive was in any way threatened, would be an admission of weakness and failure. The commissioners, then, approached from Laconia via Melos, Crete and Caunus. Once at Caunus they summoned a convoy from Miletus to meet them at Cnidus [8.42].

Astyochus abandoned his plans for assisting Chios when the commissioners arrived in Asia. It was, after all, his duty to protect the commission whatever his personal motives. The size of the fleet he took to Cnidus, where he was to meet the commission, is unknown; it cannot have been the whole allied fleet, as he had to leave sufficient ships to protect Miletus in his absence.⁸⁶ On his way south to Cnidus he sacked Cos; it was an easy target because of the damage done by a recent earthquake. He may have done this for prestige in front of the advisers, who were to investigate him,⁸⁷ or because the fleet needed more money by this time. The sack of an island community off southern Ionia did not contravene the terms agreed with Tissaphernes.

Astyochus arrived at Cnidus by night. According to Thucydides, he was in a hurry and wished to avoid the Athenians, who were on watch for the commission's ships [8.41-2].⁸⁸ Thucydides' report suggests that he left Cnidus as soon as he was informed of the Athenians' presence in the area and that he was compelled by the Cnidians to meet the Athenian squadron. If this was the case, it seems odd that he had arrived at Cnidus by night in bad weather, unless he already knew of the possibility of meeting Athenian ships. All he may have learned from the Cnidians was that the Athenians were closer than he supposed. Astyochus then decided to sail

⁸⁶ Twelve were left at Miletus when the Peloponnesians went to Rhodes [8.61].

⁸⁷ As suggested by Kagan 88.

⁸⁸ Kagan 88 believes Astyochus was afraid of the Athenians. The Athenian attitude had changed, since they were no longer afraid of attack at Samos and had detached some ships for the Syme watch.

against them immediately, as he was well aware that he had to neutralise the threat of this Athenian squadron to ensure the safe arrival of the Spartan advisers. The Peloponnesians stayed at sea all night, and part of their fleet is said to have lost contact with the main body due to the bad weather. It is equally possible that Astyochus knew that the Athenians were at the island of Syme, off Cnidus, and tempted them out by sending only part of his fleet ahead, while the rest maintained position around the island. The Athenians attacked what they thought was a small detachment of Peloponnesians, the rest of whose fleet, from the Athenian point of view, then came up unexpectedly.⁸⁹ Astyochus put in again at Cnidus, where he was joined by the commission and by Tissaphernes [8.43]. The main Athenian fleet came out from Samos, but neither side appears to have wished to fight again [8.43.1].⁹⁰

At Cnidus the commissioners opened talks with Tissaphernes, who was still prepared to negotiate. Thucydides hints, in his account of Alcibiades' influence with the satrap, that Tissaphernes broke off the talks either on the advice of Alcibiades or, perhaps, because of his own assessment of the relative power of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians [8.46]. Thucydides' earlier description of the meeting between Tissaphernes and the commission suggests a slightly different explanation [8.43]: the commission had come out on a Spartan initiative, and Tissaphernes was ready to meet them and to re-negotiate any terms that were to his and the Spartans' advantage. He, perhaps, had assumed that the discussions were to be about financial arrangements and strategy. When he discovered that the Spartans intended to deny the validity of both treaties that he and the fleet had found satisfactory to that point, Tissaphernes was furious. The manner of the Spartan demand, if Thucydides has described it accurately, can hardly have helped the situation.⁹¹ To put Tissaphernes in such a position, the Spartan commissioners must have felt they had time on their side and a better card to play: they may have been counting on the defection of Rhodes, the situation in the Athenian fleet after Phrynichus'

⁸⁹ For the date of this battle, see Aristophanes, *Thesmoph.* 804 and A.H.Sommerstein, "Aristophanes and the events of 411" *JHS* (1977) 112-126.

⁹⁰ Kagan 89 claims they sought an encounter, but Thucydides expressly states they did not. Perhaps the Athenians came out to ensure safe escort for the remainder of their squadron that had taken refuge at Halicarnassus [8.42].

⁹¹ Andrewes 122 suggests that there may have been disagreement between members of the commission and those in the fleet who had negotiated the treaty. There is no hint of this in Thucydides' account, although it is a possibility, given our ignorance of the state of affairs in the Peloponnesian fleet at this time.

refusal to fight, and the threat of a possible change of theatre in favour of the Hellespont.⁹² They still favoured the Ionian policy above all, however, as is shown by their readiness to wait in Ionia to see what Tissaphernes would do.

To this point, the Spartan government had shown little appreciation or understanding of diplomatic niceties and strategic necessities in Ionia. From their point of view both agreements with Persia were too vague and could be interpreted to mean that Sparta had conceded a large tract of Greece as well as the Greeks of Ionia to the Persians. The Spartan role as liberator of the Greeks from Athens was thus threatened at a time when Athens had begun to fight back with some success in the Aegean. The Spartan commanders in Ionia, who had concluded the agreements, had done so from a purely military point of view. The general ignorance of the Spartan government about Ionian politics and topography is not surprising. They had shown little interest in the area during the Archidamian War, apart from Alcidas' presence there in 427. Their present concern was merely the result of decisions taken too quickly and on the basis of too little reconnaissance in the winter of 413/12.

When Tissaphernes did not return to Miletus, the Spartan fleet moved to Rhodes, but left a small naval presence at Miletus [8.61]. They did not intend to abandon completely their base at Miletus. The start of their negotiations with Rhodes is not made clear by Thucydides until the breakdown of talks between the Spartan commission and Tissaphernes [8.44]; they may have received offers from the Rhodians some time before this confrontation with the satrap.⁹³ Rhodes was an attractive alternative base in the south, as it was a strategically important island that could provide both ships and money for the Peloponnesian fleet. Accordingly, the fleet of ninety four ships sailed to Camirus, and the Rhodians revolted. The Athenian response to this move came too late to be effective, but they kept a squadron on watch at Chalce. The initiative in the south was still with the Peloponnesians, but their fleet was to stay inactive on the island for some eighty days, while they again waited to see what Tissaphernes would do.⁹⁴

⁹² *contra* Lewis 104. Kagan 91 suggests that Lichas' terms made Tissaphernes believe Alcibiades' claim that the Spartans could not be trusted.

⁹³ The move to Rhodes was made about mid-January, 411 according to Andrewes, 371. For the presence of Rhodian rowers in the Athenian fleet even after this see *JG* 2(2) 1951 251-2.

⁹⁴ The figure of eighty days is disputed, see Andrewes 146.

Pedaritus once more appealed to the Peloponnesian fleet, which, apparently, decided to help him [8.55]. Soon after, however, Pedaritus was killed in battle and the Athenians blockaded Chios even more effectively. The Spartans still considered Chios important, as they later sent Leon from Rhodes as a replacement for Pedaritus.⁹⁵ He brought to Chios the twelve ships left at Miletus when the Peloponnesian fleet went to Rhodes.

In the meantime Tissaphernes had been negotiating with the Athenians under Pisander about a possible arrangement between Athens and the Persians.⁹⁶ The talks, however, came to nothing when the Athenians made it clear that they would not agree to access to the Aegean for the Phoenician fleet [8.56]. Tissaphernes now decided to come to terms with the Spartans; he may have realised that he was in danger of losing the Peloponnesian fleet completely before the king's fleet arrived. Perhaps, too, he was under pressure from the king to carry on the war more effectively. Thucydides adds that he was afraid of what the Peloponnesian fleet might do next [8.57]: it must have gone through the money provided by the Rhodians and whatever else it had realised by this time. The Spartans for their part were also ready to negotiate. Further delay with no financial support would only cause a reduction in the number of their crews, or force the Peloponnesians to fight under the wrong circumstances.

They returned to Miletus, and a formal agreement was signed with Persia.⁹⁷ The king's territory and his rights within it were clearly defined, and Tissaphernes agreed to provide money until the arrival of the king's ships. Provision was made for the Peloponnesians to borrow money thereafter, if they needed it. Evidently both sides were looking to the end of their association and to the possibility that Tissaphernes would not need to use the Spartan fleet once he had his own. Most of this treaty was not to be fully effective until the arrival of the Phoenician ships.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ For the family of Leon, see Poralla *s.v./t.* Leon was a popular name so it is difficult to identify him with any certainty.

⁹⁶ According to Thucydides, the Athenians were ready to barter the Ionian Greeks and the islands for an agreement that would bring Tissaphernes over to their side and deny Sparta financial support [8.56]. How this arrangement would affect the terms of the so-called 'Peace of Callias' between Persia and Athens is not stated. For a discussion of this point, see Andrewes 135.

⁹⁷ The treaty itself was signed near the Meander, probably at Magnesia [8.58], in a later formal ceremony.

⁹⁸ Andrewes 146 discusses the role of the king in this treaty. Lewis, *Sparta* 103-4 argues that it was the promise of the Phoenician fleet that caused Sparta to agree to such terms. D.Lateiner, "Tissaphernes and the Phoenician Fleet", *TAPA* 106 1976 281-8, points out the generally poor record of Phoenician ships against the Greeks. This does not seem to have concerned the Spartans.

By the terms of the third treaty the Spartans are assumed to have conceded Asia to Persia. Effectively, they had done so, if the wording that the king was claiming the *chora* of Asia Minor meant the whole territory of Asia Minor including the cities of the coast. Athens, too, had apparently been ready to do the same thing to gain Tissaphernes' support. The question of the status of the east Greek cities in 411 is a difficult one that may be further complicated by fourth-century views of the later Spartan empire and its peace agreement with Persia, which was seen as a sell-out of the eastern Greeks [Isocr.*Panath.*103] There appears to be no current criticism to the effect that this was what the Spartans had done. In 411 the Spartans do not appear to have been thinking of this area as part of a potential empire, or as their responsibility as pan-hellenic leaders. They were interested in one thing alone - the defeat of Athens followed by the reinstatement of Sparta as hegemon of mainland Greece. This was a short-sighted view; Tissaphernes had already made clear his interpretation of what Persian control of the Ionian cities meant when he installed a Persian garrison at Miletus, and the Milesians complained to the Spartan commissioners. If the Spartans were short-sighted in this respect, so were the Ionians themselves: they do not appear to have defected *en masse* from Sparta because they had been betrayed in this treaty by their supposed liberator.⁹⁹ They followed Sparta because they preferred what Sparta appeared to offer to their present association with Athens. Many of them, too, were more concerned with their own political interests and looked to outside help, whether Persian or Greek, to obtain these ends. Others, like Teos, may have accommodated with whatever side was in their area in large force [8.16].

An appeal for help from Eretria was received by the fleet at Rhodes before the end of the same winter. At the time the Peloponnesians were preparing to sail for Chios, and they were unable to spare a detachment for the west [8.60]. The Spartans were concentrating their naval effort solely in the east. Perhaps, too, the Eretrians wanted to keep their negotiations with the Spartans a secret from Athens until they had a definite promise of help. The Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets sighted each other and both refused battle. Perhaps the Peloponnesians did so because they could afford to wait for the king's ships before seeking a confrontation. This factor may also explain their reluctance to fight at all during the winter. With a safe base at either Miletus or Rhodes, the support of many coastal cities and the prospect of the assistance of

⁹⁹ As pointed out by Andrewes 81. For a less severe judgement on Spartan policy in this war see also Lewis 108f.

the Persian fleet, the Spartans had no need to risk their ships. Provided their financial needs were met they could wait the Athenians out.

Although the Spartans had made a treaty with Tissaphernes, under the terms of which their fleet was to stay in the south, they had not given up their plans to assist Pharnabazus in the Hellespont. Perhaps part of the commission's mandate had been to emphasise this point to their navarch.

At the beginning of spring, 411, Dercyllidas was sent out with a small land force to bring over Abydos, together with the surrounding coast, an important strategic point at the entrance to the Hellespont [8.61]. With Pharnabazus he also captured Lampsacus, which was then retaken by the Athenians. This Peloponnesian action was clearly aimed at disrupting the economy of Athens that depended on exports of grain through the Hellespont. The expedition may also have been intended to distract the Athenians from Chios.¹⁰⁰ Dercyllidas' march overland has been thought proof of Athens' control of the sea, as land journeys were more difficult and longer than those by sea.¹⁰¹ It is also possible that the Spartans wanted to maintain surprise for this operation by proceeding overland.

On Chios the situation had improved for the Spartans by the end of May, and Leon recorded some success at sea against the Athenians. Astyochus moved against Samos with his fleet, but the Athenians there refused to fight, probably because of the internal political situation in their fleet. Astyochus may well have been aware of this, but he may have wished to give his crews something to do and some exercises on which to train. They were apparently complaining of the lack of activity [8.78],¹⁰² although the general feeling in the Aegean was that Sparta would soon win [8.64].¹⁰³ What the fleet saw as a refusal to fight at Samos was taken as further proof of collusion between Astyochus and Tissaphernes [Diod.13.36].

After a meeting with the allies Astyochus apparently decided on another attempt to bring the Athenians to battle. He took his whole fleet of one hundred and twelve ships and a Milesian

¹⁰⁰ Kagan 101, but he is wrong in calling Dercyllidas' force considerable - Thuc says it was 'not large'.

¹⁰¹ See, M.Amit, "The Disintegration of the Athenian Empire in Asia Minor (412-405 B.C.E.) *SCI* II (1975) 38-71.

¹⁰² See Andrewes 271 for the imbalance of Thucydides' picture of a Peloponnesian fleet with high morale and readiness to mutiny.

¹⁰³ See *Hell. Oxyrh.* 7.4 for the situation at Thasos. Future references to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* are to the notation by I.A.F.Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge, 1967).

land force to Mycale, where eighty-two Athenian ships were stationed. The Athenians promptly retired to Samos, because they were numerically inferior, and they sent for reinforcements from the north. The Peloponnesian fleet prepared to follow to force the issue. On the arrival of twenty-six extra Athenian ships from the Hellespont, Astyochus retired to Miletus. The Athenian fleet then challenged them at Miletus, but battle was refused by the Peloponnesians. Evidently, the number of ships was decisive in offering and refusing battle. With a difference of thirty ships Astyochus was ready to do battle, even without the Persian fleet. With numbers approximately equal, he could afford to retire, whereas the Athenians had to take a chance. The confidence of the Athenians in offering battle at Miletus may be complicated by the fact that they were receiving information on the Peloponnesians' plans from inside the city.¹⁰⁴ They may have hoped for further help should they show themselves before Miletus.

This second refusal to fight led to further problems of discipline and morale in the Peloponnesian fleet, particularly among its western crews, although Thucydides' picture of a fleet at the peak of its preparedness up to this point may be an exaggeration.¹⁰⁵ The western crews, in particular, may have been frustrated, as they had already defeated the Athenians once in Sicily. They may also have been more vocal on the subject as many of them were free men. Perhaps a significant number of the rowers in the Peloponnesian fleet were also free, but mercenaries. Rumours spread that Astyochus and Tissaphernes did not want them to fight. The navarch was physically threatened by the western contingent in the Peloponnesian fleet. Further trouble followed when the Milesians captured a fort built by Tissaphernes and were advised by Lichas not to annoy the satrap while the war was in progress. Most of the Spartan allies, especially the Syracusans, supported the Milesian action. Tissaphernes' garrison at Cnidus was also driven out [8.109]. If Lichas and the commissioners were still in office in Ionia, as seems likely from the fact that Tissaphernes invited Lichas to accompany him to Aspendus, it may have been they who restricted the navarch's actions. Otherwise it seems odd that Astyochus offered battle a short while previously and then completely changed his mind. Perhaps the first offer was made at a time when the Athenian fleet was expected to refuse because of political revolution. The Spartan move was, then, merely a piece of bravado, carried out with the agreement of the commission

¹⁰⁴ Andrewes 272 points out the relative ease with which each side appears to have known the other's plans in advance in this war.

¹⁰⁵ For this incident as a doublet of the first refusal, see Andrewes 227.

as it involved no possible loss. It was also made in the hope of satisfying the fleet and, perhaps, the Ionians by some action.

Late in July¹⁰⁶ the Peloponnesians sent forty ships with Clearchus to the Hellespont, as had been intended in 412. Pharnabazus had offered to pay for them, perhaps because he was forced to match Tissaphernes' offer in the south. This squadron was to help in the revolt of Byzantium which had been in contact with the Spartan command. It went by a circuitous route to avoid being seen by the Athenians, but was scattered by a storm. So ready was Byzantium to rebel that it did so on the arrival of ten ships led by the Megarian, Melixus; Byzantium was a Megarian colony. The rest of the fleet returned to Delos, and Clearchus proceeded overland to Byzantium. The navarch, Astyochus, was shortly afterwards replaced by his successor, Mindarus.¹⁰⁷

Astyochus returned to Sparta with a representative from Tissaphernes, who wanted to defend himself against the complaints that the Milesians intended to make about him at Sparta. Hermocrates, the Syracusan commander, also accompanied a party of Milesians to Sparta to criticise the roles of Alcibiades and Tissaphernes in the war in the east.¹⁰⁸ It is not clear whether the commissioners also returned at this time, but evidently, there was to be some kind of accounting and discussion at Sparta over the development of the war in Ionia and the possible recommendations of the commission. It is interesting that Astyochus is not included in these complaints, and that nothing was made of his supposed delaying tactics in Ionia and his bribery by Tissaphernes. In the event, Astyochus testified on behalf of Hermocrates against Tissaphernes, a fact that makes the supposed ill-feeling between the Syracusan and the navarch over conditions in the fleet unlikely [Xen.*Hell.*1.1.30].

Astyochus' initial actions around Chios and Erythrae showed that, as navarch, he could be both aggressive and determined: he arrived ahead of his main fleet to attempt to save the situation in the north, and it was his determination to assert his authority that led to complaints against him at Sparta. After the arrival of the commission his control over Spartan strategy was

¹⁰⁶ Kagan 175 n.65.

¹⁰⁷ The date of Astyochus' return and Mindarus' appointment, like all matters connected with the Spartan navy, remains controversial. Busolt 3(2) 1496 suggested that Astyochus' term expired in August, Andrewes 38 prefers a date some time in September.

¹⁰⁸ For the problem of the date of Hermocrates' recall to Syracuse and the irreconcilability of the account of Thucydides and Xenophon, see Andrewes 283f.

eclipsed by that of the high-ranking advisers, who had the power to replace him. It was at this time that rumours began in the fleet that Astyochus was being bribed not to fight by Tissaphernes. Astyochus was, perhaps, being identified with the Spartan policy of waiting to see what Tissaphernes could provide. Accusations of bribery might easily have arisen among members of the fleet who did not know what their commander's orders were. Yet he seized the opportunity of Phrynichus' letters to discredit Alcibiades with Tissaphernes and to help the Spartan cause and his own. The role of the commission after its negotiations with Tissaphernes is unclear, but it is likely that its members retained control of affairs in the east. Astyochus would have had to submit to this. His subsequent actions perhaps should be seen with this restriction in mind. The problems of his navarchy were considerable, and, as a result, his term was full of contradictions and accusations: he tried to rescue the northern situation and to deal with Pedaritus, in the south he contended with the defection of Alcibiades to Tissaphernes and with the arrival of the commission of investigation. His conduct must have been at least satisfactory to the commissioners, as he was retained in command. Astyochus asserted the supreme authority of the navarch in the war zone and over the allies, yet he also consulted them over strategy [8.32, 40.3]. The attempt to identify him with a pro-Ionian group at Sparta and his recall with the failure of that policy overestimates his powers against those of the commission. It seems unlikely that Astyochus would have forced such a policy on senior government members, who had only recently investigated him. It is more probable that he carried out new instructions from them to prepare to change Spartan strategy: it was, after all, during his tenure that Dercylidas and Clearchus were sent to the north. He was unable to take the northern command himself because his term of office was near expiry or because Sparta recognised the need for consistency of command for a campaign in a new area. If Astyochus had retained command and had led the fleet in the Hellespont, his term would have been extended for an unspecified time.

Because of the distances and time involved in communication, the Spartan home government had no direct control over what was happening in Ionia. For their initial foray into Ionia and the Hellespont they had planned to send three separate squadrons under three *archontes*, after the omen of an earthquake caused a change of command. The appointment of Astyochus had been a new departure for them. Previous navarchs had served in home waters, and perhaps

had had their terms extended under special circumstances.¹⁰⁹ For the first time, Sparta had appointed an officer with unrestricted powers of decision to a distant command. His role needed clarification. There was no fixed objective of a battle or control of specific area at which he should aim, as was the case with previous naval campaigns. He had to make decisions as the current local conditions demanded. In addition, the personality of the navarch was to be important in the development of the office. The situation between Astyochus and Pedaritus would have been further exacerbated at Sparta, if Pedaritus' family had been influential. Perhaps the problems involved with the creation of such an unrestricted command were confirmed at Sparta at the end of Astyochus' tenure, when Hermocrates and representatives from both Tissaphernes and the Ionians came to Sparta to complain about the situation in Ionia. The commission may have recommended changes that clarified the navarch's period of tenure and control of all decisions, together with the proviso that the office, with its potential for abuse of power, should not be held more than once by the same individual. In this respect it may be significant that two *epistoleis*, perhaps originally secretaries, may have been first appointed during the navarchy of Astyochus' successor, Mindarus [8.99]. The navarch needed officers, answerable to him, to report on situations where he was unable to be present.

(iii) Sparta and the Hellespont - 411-410

The navarchy of Mindarus - 411/10

Tissaphernes left for Aspendus to fetch the Persian ships at a time when he was most under suspicion from the Peloponnesian fleet [8.87]. It is not clear how long he was away. Thucydides says that in this summer one hundred and forty-seven Phoenician ships came to Aspendus, but he does not know why they never arrived in the Aegean [8.99]. He suggests that Tissaphernes may have been trying to wear down the Peloponnesian forces, to obtain money from Phoenician crews, who would pay for their discharge, or to appear to be fulfilling his side of the agreement with Sparta as long as possible. It is also possible that the king may have needed the ships for service elsewhere, although Thucydides does not say this.¹¹⁰ The Spartans, Philippus

¹⁰⁹ See Sealey, *Klio* 18 (1976) 335-58.

¹¹⁰ Meiggs 355, Lewis, *Historia* 7 (1958) 392-7 and Andrewes 290. The question why the Phoenician fleet did not arrive at Miletus remains unresolved. If, as Lewis claims, the fleet arrived at Aspendus by June, it would not have waited there for long in the summer months. In the past, malaria was endemic on the southern coast of Turkey, especially around the Gulf of Antalya, where both harbours were situated. Lewis 113 considers that the third treaty

and Hippocrates, were sent to Aspendus and to Phaselis, respectively, to watch for this fleet [8.99]. They reported to Mindarus that it was on its way back east [Diod.13.84]. On this news Mindarus decided to move his forces north. Presumably, he had been given the orders from Sparta to do so should it be necessary. The loss of the support of the Persian fleet had destroyed Spartan hopes of winning the war in the south.

By about September 411¹¹¹ the Spartans had mustered a fleet of forty-two vessels, including a number of western ships, under the command of Agesandridas at Las in Laconia.¹¹² Evidently, Las had facilities for beaching triremes and was being used as a Spartan base. There is no mention of Gytheum as the Spartan base; perhaps it was too small to hold this number of vessels. Spartan interest in Euboea may now have been renewed with the change of strategy in the east, and they may have intended to threaten the island at about the same time as Mindarus' move to the Hellespont. Euboea was an important landfall for the grain ships coming to Athens from the Hellespont.

This force sailed from the Laconian to the Saronic Gulf and, using Epidaurus as a base, attacked Aegina. It is next heard of coming from Megara around the island of Salamis. It is not clear whether the fleet was there by design or on the off chance that it might be able to intervene at Athens [8.94-5]. The ships sailed around Sunium and put in on the coast, presumably for news of the situation at Athens. They then anchored at Oropus. Agesandridas expected an Athenian response to this threat to Euboea, perhaps from the information he had received while off Attica, and he planned to trick the Athenian fleet with the help of the Eretrians. Twenty-two Athenian ships and crews were lost in the subsequent battle off Eretria, and Euboea fell to Sparta.

Thucydides says that at this point the Peloponnesians could have taken Piraeus, as the Athenians expected them to do, and that they were too cautious in not attempting it. Perhaps their caution was justified: the appearance of a Peloponnesian fleet at Piraeus could have caused the Athenians to patch up their current political differences in the face of the common enemy. Besides, the Athenian fleet at Samos could have returned to protect the port.¹¹³ Perhaps, too,

was nullified by the non-arrival of the Phoenician fleet.

¹¹¹ See Andrewes 341 for the date.

¹¹² Las - Paus 3.24.6; Ephorus FGH 70 F117; Scylax 46.

¹¹³ Andrewes 322.

with a threat to each end of Athens' economic lifeline, the Spartans may have hoped for a peace initiative from the Athenians. They had already received an offer of peace from Athenian oligarchs.¹¹⁴

Mindarus had to complete the transfer of forces to the north before the winter set in and before the Athenians could find out his objective and station ships to prevent him. He was able to maintain secrecy and surprise by the speed of his move. This successful Spartan dash to the Hellespont is made all the more surprising by the fact that each side appears to have had ample notice of the other's moves during this war. There must have been many informers in both camps, so that such surprise was difficult to achieve. Mindarus was detained at Icarus by bad weather, but made for Chios quickly. He had no wish to meet Athenians, but wanted to get to the Hellespont with his fleet intact. On Chios he raised money for his Chian contingent and provisions for the rest of the fleet.¹¹⁵ Tissaphernes and Tamos had not paid the fleet regularly and the Chians, perhaps, not at all. Thucydides records that Alcibiades was instrumental in having a Chian appeal for money rejected by Tissaphernes, because the Chians were rich enough to pay their own expenses [8.45.4]. Tissaphernes may have applied such logic to the Chian contingent in the Peloponnesian fleet.

In two days the fleet moved from Chios to the Hellespont, a tribute to its skill and speed. It had covered one hundred and ten miles in twenty hours with seventy-three ships, and had successfully slipped past the Athenians on watch at Lesbos.¹¹⁶ The Athenians may have supposed that the Spartan fleet was to winter on the island, its former base in the north. Thirteen vessels from the Peloponnesian fleet had been left at Rhodes under Dorieus, a Rhodian. Thucydides does not mention this, but Xenophon and Diodorus report the return of Dorieus to the fleet at Abydos [Xen.*Hell.*1.1.2; Diod.13.38.5]. Perhaps Dorieus had been detached to look after Rhodes because the Peloponnesians were aware of Alcibiades' presence there, or because they wanted to reassure the Rhodians that they had not abandoned the south completely, but wished to maintain good relations with this important base.

¹¹⁴ See Kagan 200.

¹¹⁵ Andrewes 347.

¹¹⁶ For the figures, see Kagan 215.

Mindarus' arrival at the Hellespont achieved complete surprise and caught an Athenian squadron of eighteen ships off Sestus. The new Peloponnesian base was now at Abydos on the Asia Minor coast of the Hellespont, where they had eighty-six ships. The Athenians moved immediately to Eleaus, as the threat to the Hellespont was too great to ignore. Tissaphernes hurried back to Ionia, thence to the Hellespont, to try to negotiate with the Spartans [8.109]. Mindarus' move had stolen the initiative away from Tissaphernes and from the Athenians: the Peloponnesians at Abydos now had both numerical and strategic superiority. The Athenians would soon have to challenge them to maintain control of the straits.¹¹⁷

The Spartan actions in the Hellespont and at Euboea signalled a more aggressive phase for them in the war. They had also sent a small force to Amphipolis and Thasos under the Corinthian, Timolaus, who defeated an Athenian general in a sea-battle [8.64; *Hell. Oxyr.* 2.4]. The battle at Cynossema that followed, however, was initiated by the Athenians, although the Spartans were ready to respond [8.104]. According to Diodorus the latter had the better marines while the Athenians had the better steersmen. The accounts of the battle by both Thucydides and Diodorus are not consistent, and the possibility of Alcibiades' involvement is not clear.¹¹⁸ Thucydides describes the overall battle along broad lines without much detail on developments within it, while Diodorus seems to describe it from a participant's point of view. The Peloponnesians had numerical superiority, but not by a significant amount.¹¹⁹ Their tactics appear to have been to try to outflank the Athenians to a point where the Athenian centre became too weak to withstand an attack. It is not clear how the Athenians avoided this manoeuvre, but the result of the battle was a victory for them with the loss of fifteen ships to the Peloponnesians' twenty-two. Peloponnesian losses included eight Chian, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and one each from Leucas, Sparta, Syracuse and Pellene. The Peloponnesian naval allies of Sparta were still represented in the fleet, although it is not known whether they also provided the crews for these ships.

¹¹⁷ Andrewes 350.

¹¹⁸ See Grote 8.110; Busolt 3 (2) 1517-19; Andrewes 35-51. For a good summary of the problems, see Kagan 218-24.

¹¹⁹ Contra Kagan 220. It is true to say of the Spartans in this period at least that they did not fight unless they had around thirty vessels more than the enemy.

Thucydides stresses the psychological effect of this victory on Athens.¹²⁰ Certainly it made the Athenians more confident in their abilities after a year of political revolution, little naval success and increasing financial difficulty. It had, however, not solved the strategic situation. The presence of a Spartan fleet was still a threat to the Hellespont, although the Athenians had survived to fight again. Mindarus recovered some of his captured ships from Eleus and sent Hippocrates, his *epistoleus*, with Epicles to fetch the fleet at Euboea to reinforce his own [Diod.13.41.2-3]. Evidently he was aware that there was a naval squadron there, a fact that supports the idea that Spartan policy was now concentrated on the Euboea/Hellespont link. Most of Agesandridas' ships coming up in support were lost in a storm off Athos, but the survivors reached the Hellespont. They may have fought an engagement with the Athenians on the way [Xen.*Hell.*1.1.1.]. The loss of most of a fleet of fifty-four ships from Euboea made a significant difference to the Spartan naval force at Abydos. Mindarus also expected the arrival of Dorieus from the south. In the meantime, some hoplites with the land force at Abydos helped the Antandrians drive out Tissaphernes' garrison there.¹²¹ By this move the Spartans showed that they had no desire for any reconciliation with Tissaphernes, and that they were interested in establishing some contact with a city important for its timber resources. With a large fleet to maintain, an assured supply of timber in the north was a necessity.¹²²

Mindarus was again ready to risk all his available ships on another battle, as he realised the importance of winning control of the Hellespont [Diod.13.45]. Dorieus, returning from the south with fourteen ships, was caught by the Athenians, and Mindarus' fleet sailed up to support him.¹²³ Once again the accounts of this battle are confusing and reflect different traditions. Diodorus emphasises the skill of the pilots on both sides and the bravery of the *epibates*. The battle was, apparently, hard fought until the arrival of Alcibiades with eighteen ships

¹²⁰ He is followed by many scholars, Grote 8.112; Busolt 3(2) 1519; Beloch 2 1 393. Kagan 224 claims more significance for this victory as defeat here could have lost the war for Athens. It had no more ships and money and Sparta would be in control of its food supply line.

¹²¹ Andrewes 356 suggests that these hoplites may have been local Abydene soldiers.

¹²² At this point Thucydides' history ends and the problem begins of reconciling the sources of Diodorus and Xenophon who rely on different traditions. The account of Diodorus is sometimes supported by that of the more reliable Oxyrhynchus historian. See I.A.F.Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge, 1967).

¹²³ The battle took place in November, 411 according to Busolt 3(2) 1522-3.

[Diod.13.46].¹²⁴ He had moved north once Dorieus had escaped his squadron. Unsuccessful land fighting followed, and the Peloponnesians fled with the help of Pharnabazus' cavalry. This second battle again did not produce a final decision for control of the straits. The Peloponnesians could command strong land forces with the help of Pharnabazus and they still held their base at Abydus with a fleet of sixty ships [Xen.*Hell.*1.1.11]. The Athenians moved to Cardia to wait and see what the Spartans would do. In the meantime Mindarus repaired his fleet at Abydus, presumably at Pharnabazus' cost, sent for reinforcements from the Peloponnese to join him in the spring and retired into the Bosphorus, where he was joined by Pharnabazus [Diod.13.47].

Mindarus and Pharnabazus besieged Cyzicus in spring, 410, although Mindarus kept in touch with Abydus for information on the movements of the Athenian fleet [Diod.13.49ff; Xen.*Hell.*1.111-23]. The Athenians appear to have known this, because they were careful to approach Proconnesus, near Cyzicus, from Sestus by night voyages so as not to alert the watch at Abydus.

Once again the differences between the sources make it difficult to know the tactics employed in the battle that followed at Cyzicus. Xenophon emphasises the chance of a storm and the role of Alcibiades; Diodorus says nothing about the weather, while Cornelius Nepos stresses the skilful execution of the Athenian plan [Nepos, *Alc.*3].¹²⁵ Clearly, the Athenian fleet took the initiative in moving to Proconnesus and in seeking battle. Mindarus appears to have been tempted into battle by a small squadron of Athenians, while the rest of the Athenian fleet lay in wait. Once again the battle turned into an engagement on land. When this battle was lost, the Peloponnesians had also lost their whole fleet, which they had drawn up on shore: their navarch, Mindarus, was killed in the fighting. The Athenians then followed up their victory by strengthening their position in the Bosphorus and the Hellespont and by securing their food supply [Xen.1.1.19ff].

The Peloponnesian defeat at Cyzicus was a tremendous blow to Spartan morale after their significant success in Euboea. It also demonstrated that the naval war had moved into a phase where only total destruction of a fleet signalled victory. Because Athens had no financial

¹²⁴ There has been much discussion over whether his arrival was pure luck as Diodorus suggests or whether its timing was luck, though the signal was pre-arranged, see Bloedow 43 n.265.

¹²⁵ See Hatzfeld 269-73; Bloedow 46-55; R.J.Litman, "The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus" *TAPA* 99 (1968) 265-72. For a good comparison of the sources and a credible account of the battle, see Andrewes, "Notion and Cyzicus: The Sources Compared" *JHS* 102 (1982) 15-25.

resources to follow up its success at sea with a vigorous campaign on land, its victory at Cyzicus eventually brought no real gain, only more time. It did, however, bring an offer of peace from the Spartans, who acknowledged that their Hellespont campaign had completely failed.¹²⁶ The Athenians refused the offer. Had they accepted a peace on the basis of the *status-quo* in Asia, as the Spartans offered, they would have left Sparta with some bases in the north and in Ionia and with every possibility of continuing its association with Pharnabazus. Sparta still had support at Rhodes, Miletus, Ephesus, Chios, Thasos and Euboea. Under these conditions, the Spartans could conceivably rebuild their fleet and renew the war with Persian help. The speech made by Endius to the Athenians, as related by Diodorus, may not be authentic, but it reflects what could have been the Athenian fears that made them reject peace [Diod.13.52ff]. For Endius the role of Persia was crucial. With Persian aid Sparta did not need to worry about losing ships or citizen crews, because it had Persian money to pay for a new fleet and mercenary forces.

(iv) Sparta's period of naval reconstruction - 410-408

Following the battle at Cyzicus Pharnabazus provided rations and employment for the survivors from the Peloponnesian fleet. Undoubtedly, his action was motivated by the desire to give them something to do, since he did not want bands of mercenaries looting his territory. Pharnabazus also promised the Spartans a new fleet to be built at Antandrus.¹²⁷ For the moment the Spartan offensive that had risked everything on a move to the Hellespont had been checked. Perhaps their peace offer was also motivated by the need to get back the prisoners taken by the Athenians. How many of these were Spartan is unclear, but the capture of only one hundred and twenty Spartiates at Pylos had hampered the Spartan war effort in 425. By 410 the Spartans may also have been concerned to get back Spartan officers and experienced crew members from their fleet. Elsewhere Sparta's successful run was halted: the Athenians resisted an attack by Agis [Xen.*Hell.*1.1.33],¹²⁸ there were anti-Spartan movements at Chios [Diod.13.65.3-4] and Spartan colonists at Heraclea were defeated [Xen.1.2.18].

¹²⁶ Diod 13.52, Nepos, *Alc.* 5, Justin 5.4. Philoch. *FGH* 3 328 Fr 139,40.

¹²⁷ For the role of the Syracusans at Antandrus see Xen.*Hell.*1.1.26, their return to the west [Diod.13.61.1] and the exile and replacement of Hermocrates Xen.*Hell.*1.1.27, Thuc.8.85 and Andrewes 281-85.

¹²⁸ The date of this attack is disputed, see Busolt 3(2) 1528-9.

The Spartans, however, were again active on the mainland of Greece during the year following the failure of the peace talks. In addition, they had eleven ships in Laconia, five from Sicily and five of their own. These, with a land force in support, took Pylos, which had been in Athenian hands since 425 [Diod.13.64.5]. The Megarians also retook Nisaea with some Spartan help [13.65; *Hell.Oxyr.*PSI 1304].

It is not clear whether Sparta appointed a navarch for 410/9.¹²⁹ Technically, there was no fleet for him to control, only the promise of one at Antandrus and whatever allied ships he could muster. A Spartan naval commander, Pasippidas, who evidently had some authority, collected a number of ships from the allies, presumably the Ionians. This fleet was probably stationed at Antandrus. Pasippidas was later exiled for supposed intrigues with Tissaphernes at Iasus,¹³⁰ where Eteonicus, the Spartan harmost, was driven out by an anti-Spartan group [Xen.*Hell.*1.1.32]. There is no explanation for this incident, but perhaps Pasippidas was attempting to negotiate with Tissaphernes for aid to Sparta, and Tissaphernes may well have wanted to regain influence among the cities of the Hexapolis.¹³¹ Sparta, then, was still maintaining a presence in key cities of Ionia, wherever possible. The Athenians, on the other hand, were unable to follow up their victory by attacking pro-Spartan centres of support because they lacked the money to do so.

In 409 Thrasyllus, the Athenian general, operated against Persian/Spartan interests in Ionia with little success.¹³² A Persian, Stages, was said to be in the area around Miletus [Xen.*Hell.*1.2.5], and Tissaphernes and some Spartans were involved in the defence of Ephesus against an Athenian attack [Diod.13.64; Xen.*Hell.*1.2.7-9; *Hell.Oxyr.P.Cair.*1]. Thus, some accommodation between Tissaphernes and the Spartans must have been reached by 409. Syracusans and Selinuntines were also present at Ephesus with twenty-five ships, perhaps from the fleet at Antandrus [Xen.*Hell.*1.2.12]. Four of their ships were cut off by the Athenians when

¹²⁹ For the suggestion that Sparta re-organised the navarchy into an annual office after Cyzicus, see Sealey, *Klio* 18 (1976) 335-58 and the Appendix.

¹³⁰ Xenophon's text at 1.1.32. reads Thasos. It is generally accepted that this is a corruption of Iasus, where the Spartans had previously helped Tissaphernes against Amorges. It is unlikely that Tissaphernes would have been involved in political intrigues on Thasos.

¹³¹ See Poralla s.v.h. and Kagan 274.

¹³² Following the chronology of Busolt 3(2) 1522ff and Meiggs 351-74.

they tried to go north, perhaps back to their base [Xen.*Hell.*1.2.12]. Harmosts were in charge of those key positions in the Hellespont still in Spartan hands: Hippocrates was harmost at Chalcedon [13.66.2] and Clearchus at Byzantium. He had arrived there from Sparta with a force of *perieoci* and neodamodes, as well as some Megarians and Boeotians, who had come from the Peloponnese in troopships. Spartan ships were also on patrol in the Hellespont, although their commander is not named.

The new navarch for 409/8, Cratesippidas, with a fleet of twenty-five ships and allied troops, restored Spartan influence on Chios [Diod.13.65.3]. Little else is known of his navarchy, but clearly the Spartans were slowly rebuilding their position in Asia Minor and maintained some kind of naval presence to justify the appointment of a navarch. Cratesippidas' successful tenure may have been forgotten in comparison with that of his successor, Lysander. The twenty-five ships with Cratesippidas are said by Diodorus to have been Spartan ships with allied crews; perhaps the Spartans did not have enough of their own trained rowers for this number of ships. If the ships were Spartan, Sparta may have revived its plans of 413/12 to build a small fleet of twenty-five vessels of its own. If this was the period in which the navarchy may have been reorganised better to suit foreign long-term campaigns, it may also have been the time when Sparta undertook the improvement of its facilities at Gytheum. In 411 forty-two allied ships had anchored off Las; Gytheum may have had too small a harbour for this number. In 407, however, Alcibiades saw a Spartan fleet being fitted out at Gytheum [Xen.*Hell.*1.4.11]. Sparta's naval reorganisation after Cyzicus may have been more extensive than has been supposed. There is no indication how such operations would have been funded.

Spartan ships, perhaps from Antandrus, operated in Thrace under Agesandridas in this year [Xen.*Hell.*1.3.17], but the Athenians had won back the Thracian cities before Alcibiades returned to Athens in 407 [Xen.*Hell.*1.4.9]. The Spartans still held Abydos in 408 [Xen.*Hell.*1.2.16], although by this time the Athenians had been successful everywhere else in the Hellespont. Selymbria, Chalcedon and Byzantium fell while the harmost, Clearchus, was attempting to put together a plan that involved the use of Spartan ships and money from Pharnabazus.¹³³ It is not clear whether the navarch was involved in this plan. The subsequent arrangement over Byzantium between the Athenian generals and the satrap apparently included

¹³³ For the Athenian negotiations with Pharnabazus over these cities, see M.Amit, "Le traité de Chalcedoine entre Pharnabaze et les stratèges athéniens" *LAC* 42 (1973) 453.

the provision that he would conduct Athenian ambassadors to the king [Xen.*Hell.*1.3.8-9]. The former navarch, Pasippidas, and the Syracusan exile, Hermocrates, also joined this embassy, although their role is obscure. The Athenians may also have been negotiating with Tissaphernes between 411 and 407.¹³⁴

Sometime during the same winter, 409/8, the Spartans had sent an embassy to the king to request more substantial and direct assistance. It is not clear whether this was the first such representation since Cyzicus, or whether the Spartans had been urging greater involvement by the Persian monarch in his western empire only recently [Diod.13.52]. A possible peace embassy to Athens, in which, as in 411, the Spartans had requested a exchange of prisoners, had been rejected. Sparta may have been increasingly concerned about them as it was between 425 and 421.¹³⁵ Perhaps also, like Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus had been unable to fulfil his promise of a new fleet on the scale envisaged by the Spartans. Certainly, there do not seem to have been many Peloponnesian or Ionian ships at sea during the period after Cyzicus. If Pharnabazus was supporting the Spartans adequately, then it is odd to find the Spartans sending an embassy to the king, and to find Pharnabazus promising Athenian generals an escort to Darius. Perhaps Pharnabazus had changed his mind about helping the Spartan cause and now favoured the Athenian side, especially after the Athenian successes near his territory in the Hellespont and the Bosphorus. The Athenians, too, may have been prepared to make concessions to Persia, as they had previously to Tissaphernes.¹³⁶

The Spartan embassy returned from Susa by the spring of 408 and announced that the Spartans had obtained all they wanted from Darius [Xen.1.4.1]. The king had finally agreed to become more directly involved in Asia Minor and was to send his son, Cyrus, with a special command to take charge.¹³⁷ The Persians may have been more concerned with security problems in Media than in the west before this to respond to appeals in any strength [Xen.1.2.19]. When Alcibiades returned to Athens in May he made a detour to the Spartan port of Gytheum. He may have done so because he wanted to find out what his reception at Athens

¹³⁴ See IG 1 (3) 113 and Lewis 129. Tissaphernes also acted for the Athenians in their representations to Cyrus in 407 [Xen.*Hell.*1.5.8-9].

¹³⁵ Androtion *FHG* 324 F 44 and Lewis 126.

¹³⁶ M.Amit, *L'antiquité classique* 42 (1973) 436-57.

¹³⁷ See Lewis 119 for the theory that this Spartan embassy represented a further treaty between Sparta and Persia.

would be like, but Gytheum seems an unlikely place for him to visit, especially if the Spartan death warrant against him was still in force. It is more probable, as Xenophon suggests, that he had heard of the new agreement between Sparta and the Persian king and wished to see for himself whether evidence of preparations at Sparta could confirm it [Xen.*Hell.*1.4.11].¹³⁸ At Gytheum he found a fleet of thirty triremes was being fitted out by the Spartans. This reference to Gytheum by Xenophon is the first contemporary mention of its dockyard by a Greek historian.

Alcibiades did not remain long in Athens, but collected a force of hoplites and ships to deal with the coming crisis in Ionia. On his way east he blockaded Andros, where some Laconians are said to have been helping the Andrians [Diod.13.69.4]. Andros is only a short distance from Euboea and the channel between them was used by Athenian grain ships on their way from the Hellespont. The Spartans may have been trying to establish their influence on the island to attempt to block the grain route once again.¹³⁹ Alcibiades then proceeded to Cos and Rhodes where he forced contributions for his fleet and perhaps attempted to neutralise the southern cities for the immediate future.

(v) The final phase of the naval war - 408-404

The navarchy of Lysander - 408/7

The date of Lysander's appointment in 408 is debated, as the sources are imprecise.¹⁴⁰ According to Diodorus [13.70], Lysander took a force of mercenaries and ships from the Peloponnese and sailed to Rhodes, where he collected their naval contribution. Then he arrived at Ephesus with a force of seventy ships, having called in at Cos and Miletus. If he took with him the thirty ships that Alcibiades had seen at Sparta, and received contributions from Rhodes, Cos, Miletus and Chios/Antandrus, the newly built fleet from Antandrus cannot have supplied many ships. Sparta perhaps had good reason to be annoyed with Pharnabazus' performance to date. From this point Pharnabazus drops out of the picture completely, perhaps a sign that his

¹³⁸ contra Kagan 289.

¹³⁹ Bloedow 73 calls this a strategic blunder. It is hard to see why. If Euboea was still pro-Spartan, Athens needed to ensure the security of the Cyclades before going to Ionia. The grain ships may well have been due by this time.

¹⁴⁰ Beloch 3 (3) 273-4 suggests spring and Kagan 297 autumn 408, as with Astyochus and Mindarus. If Lysander was navarch from the spring, the date of tenure for the navarchy had been changed at some point.

association had been unsatisfactory for the Spartans, and that they had approached the Persian king on their own behalf without his knowledge.

With the appointment of Lysander¹⁴¹ and the arrival of Cyrus in Ionia, the situation in the east changed dramatically for the Peloponnesians. Persian financial help became more regular and more reliable, and the Spartan fleet established a new, strongly defensible base at Ephesus in the south with closer access to its Persian support. Antandrus, where the fleet was being rebuilt between 410 and 407, and Chios were too close to Athenian-held Lesbos. Ephesus, the new base, was within reach of Chios and further north than Samos,¹⁴² so that the fleet would no longer be split by the presence of the Athenian main base at Samos. Ephesus was also at the end of the royal road with excellent communications into the Persian interior. In addition, the navarch was to extend the diplomatic power of his office by interfering in local politics to further his own ambition: Lysander made many of the cities of Ionia more dependent on his goodwill by promoting the interests of small oligarchic groups within them [Xen.*Hell.* 1.6.4].

At Sardis Lysander settled the problem of payment for the fleet and established a good relationship with Cyrus, one that was to be invaluable for the Spartan cause.¹⁴³ Clearly, if Lysander was a *mothax*, as is suggested by a late source,¹⁴⁴ the Spartans were ready to promote talent to the navarchy by this time. It is legitimate to ask, however, where and in what manner Lysander had demonstrated such ability that the Spartans appointed him navarch at so critical a juncture, especially if he was a *mothax*. Was it a sign that the Spartans did not appreciate the importance of their agreement with the king at the time? They may not have been convinced that it would turn out any more successfully than their previous associations with his satraps. The appointment of a less than full Spartiate perhaps showed lack of confidence in the new arrangement. On the other hand, they cannot surely have appointed Lysander only because he was a past master at behaving subserviently, an aspect of his character that supposedly ensured

¹⁴¹ Sources on Lysander: Xenophon 1.4.1f.; Plutarch, *Lysander*; Cornelius Nepos, *Lysander*; Diodorus 14.13f.; Phylarchus, *FGH* 81 Fr 43; Aelian 12.43.

¹⁴² Bommelaer 88, suggests that Lysander was the first navarch to appreciate the necessity of securing supplies from the interior.

¹⁴³ For Lysander's ambition and talent, see Diod. 14.13, Plut. *Lys.* 24-6, Nepos *Lys.* 3, Ar. *Pol.* 1306b 31-3, Hamilton 92f., and P.Oliva, *Sparta and her social problems* (Amsterdam and Prague, 1971) 185.

¹⁴⁴ Aelian 12.43. For the status of *mothakes* at Sparta, see Cartledge, *Sparta* 312ff and D.Lotze, "Mothakes" *Historia* 11 (1962) 427-35.

his good relations with Persia.¹⁴⁵ He must also have shown some ability in leadership and organisation, as well as having powerful political friends.

Lysander also persuaded Cyrus to increase the rate of pay in the Peloponnesian fleet to attract more allies and to encourage desertions among the rowers in Athenian service, since they were being paid less [Xen.*Hell.*1.5.8ff]. In addition, he totally reorganized and refitted the Spartan fleet. Cyrus had given him five hundred talents, which would last a fleet of seventy ships about eleven months.¹⁴⁶ To increase the fleet he would need more money; Lysander collected contributions from local supporters [Diod.13.70.4] to help with the fleet's expenses. Immediately before the battle of Notium, Xenophon puts the total number of Peloponnesian ships at ninety. The extra ships may be evidence that Lysander's policy of encouraging desertions from the Athenian fleet was working. Lysander, however, needed considerable time to outfit his base, to train his fleet and to allow his desertion policy to work. He was, thus, in no hurry to fight, although Alcibiades offered battle [Diod.13.71.1].

The Athenian fleet was stationed at Notium from November to watch for the movement of the Peloponnesians at Ephesus.¹⁴⁷ It is agreed by the sources that Alcibiades, for whatever reason, left his fleet under the command of his pilot, Antiochus, who risked a battle against Lysander's ships. Lysander recognised his opportunity for forcing a quick battle while the Athenians' experienced general was away. As a result the Athenians lost between fifteen and twenty-two ships [Diod.13.70; Xen.1.5.14].¹⁴⁸

The Spartan victory at Notium was a boost to Spartan morale, because they finally had a victory to show for their years in Ionia. It was not, however, a decisive victory. About the same time the Spartans had also attempted a further move on Andros: the Athenians captured Doreus and two ships with him near the island [Xen.*Hell.*1.5.19]. In this year the Athenians were successful in consolidating their hold on the north Aegean [Diod.13 72]. Conon, who

¹⁴⁵ For Lysander's supposed ability to appear subservient because he was a *mothax*, see Hamilton 36f.

¹⁴⁶ See Kagan 306.

¹⁴⁷ For the problems of reconstruction of this battle see Andrewes, *JHS* 102 (1982) 15-25 and I.A.F.Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge, 1967) 35-9. Hatzfeld 312 n.1, Bommelaer 70-72, and Lotze, 19-20.

¹⁴⁸ *Hell.Oxyrh.* PSI 1304 gives some part as do Diod. 13 70, Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1-10 and Plut. *Lys.* 3.1-4.5. Again there is a difference in the traditions used by Xenophon and by Diodorus. For a review of the traditions, see Andrewes, *JHS* 102 (1982) 15-25.

replaced Alcibiades in command, also plundered pro-Spartan cities in Ionia to pay for his fleet. Lysander's victory, then, had not altered the strategic situation, but it had shown that the Spartans could defeat the Athenians in a naval battle.

Lysander's tenure of the navarchy had been a remarkable success: he had established good relations with his Persian contact, but he had not achieved an overwhelming victory: he had necessarily spent much of his time in training and organising the new fleet. When it had fought, it had done so with order and discipline.¹⁴⁹ The Athenians, however, still maintained a strong hold on vital areas of the Aegean and could still threaten Sparta's allies.

The navarchy of Callicratidas - 407/6

The navarchies of Lysander and his successor Callicratidas form so vivid a contrast that they may reflect a complete change of policy at Sparta. It is possible that this was caused both by Lysander's success and by the personal ambition he had shown through his influence-building in the east.¹⁵⁰ If the story of Lysander's behaviour on the arrival of his successor is true and not merely anti-Lysander propaganda, then the Spartans may have been justified in their suspicions of him. On the other hand, the Spartans had won one battle and now had the opportunity to crush the Athenian fleet for good. Lysander's term of office, however, had expired, and they might have wanted to select someone with greater promise as a tactician or strategist or with less concern for good relations with Persia.

The new navarch, Callicratidas, was a much younger man than Lysander. He appears to have possessed a more traditional Spartan outlook: Xenophon presents him as resentful of Sparta's dependence on foreign aid and determined to gain glory for Sparta, even if it meant his own death [1.6.11,32]; Diodorus and Plutarch praise his nobility, justice and patriotism [13.76,98; *Lys.*6]. When he was faced with lack of co-operation from Cyrus, Callicratidas is said to have threatened to do his best to reconcile Sparta and Athens. As a result, his navarchy has been seen as an attempt at a different approach by Sparta, and representative of the more traditional Spartan outlook of independence from foreign aid, perhaps even evidence of a peace move at Sparta. This last seems unlikely: Callicratidas' actions show that he was prepared to fight as soon as possible to decide the war. Furthermore, Callicratidas promised freedom for

¹⁴⁹ See Kagan 328.

¹⁵⁰ For the opposition to Lysander see, Hamilton 50ff.

Greeks from any enslavement, presumably to Athens or to Persia [*Xen.Hell.*1.6.11-12; *Diod.*13.76.4-5].¹⁵¹

From the start of his term Callicratidas was to use a completely different approach from that of Lysander and even to challenge Lysander's claim of success.¹⁵² According to Xenophon, he went to Miletus and asked for the fleet to be sent to him there. Callicratidas apparently also experienced problems when he met Cyrus and tried to obtain more money from him: he was, according to Xenophon, furious at being told to wait, but Cyrus may have had to send for more money. He was certainly ready to finance Callicratidas a little later [*Xen.Hell.*1.6.6, 18]. After this, Callicratidas preferred to raise money from Sparta's allies at Miletus and Chios rather than be dependent on a Persian source.

Callicratidas' act of moving his base, which signified both a challenge to Lysander's influence at Ephesus and to the role of the Persians, may have prompted Lysander's next actions: he sent back to Cyrus the surplus money from the prince's original grant,¹⁵³ and he encouraged his supporters there and in other cities to question the replacement of himself with an inexperienced successor. Lysander's friends at Ephesus may also have been prompted by the very real economic difference a change of naval base would make for them. Callicratidas called their bluff by threatening to report the situation to his home government, a move he would not have made if he had not been sure of support from Sparta.

For Diodorus, Callicratidas still possessed the same noble character that Xenophon attributed to him, but Diodorus makes no mention of any problems between the navarchs: Callicratidas took over the fleet from Lysander at Ephesus and raised more ships from the allies [*Diod.*13.76.3]. Some of Xenophon's detail may be the result of political propaganda between parties at Sparta, who were divided over the status of Lysander in Ionia and over whether the war should continue on its present footing. To move Sparta's naval base from Ephesus to Miletus would have required considerable organisation and preparation at Miletus, which had not been a major base since 411.

¹⁵¹ Grote 8.161-66 sees Callicratidas as the champion of Panhellenism.

¹⁵² In April, 406. See Beloch 2.275 and Kagan 329.

¹⁵³ Kagan 329 calls this 'a shocking act'. See also, Rahe 28-9.

During the spring Callicratidas raised a fleet of one hundred and forty ships and issued a challenge to the Athenian general, Conon [Xen.*Hell.*1.6.15]. This and his successful attacks on and later mild treatment of Methymna, Delphinium and Teos, were excellent propaganda for the Spartan cause. Sparta the liberator declared its readiness and ability to finish the war immediately. Conon responded to a Spartan attack on Lesbos, and, when his force was blockaded by Callicratidas at Mytilene, he appealed to Athens for reinforcements [Diod.13 77]. About mid-July¹⁵⁴ Athens sent to Samos a relief fleet of one hundred and fifty ships, manned by inferior crews and all available rowers [Xen.*Hell.*1.6.25].

Callicratidas left fifty ships of his fleet with Eteonicus to continue the blockade at Mytilene and moved to meet the Athenian fleet at Arginusae [Diod.13.78.4; Xen.*Hell.*1.6.16,26]. Callicratidas took the initiative. He may have been determined to fight and gain the victory while still navarch, the more so if his orders had been to finish the war quickly; perhaps Lysander had been campaigning against him at Sparta.

The sources give different accounts of the battle and its tactics: Xenophon's account is clearer than that of Diodorus, which is full of dramatic detail, but he does not mention the importance of the islands in the Athenian battle plan.¹⁵⁵ Callicratidas' aggression may have been the cause of his failure in this battle; his fleet was outnumbered, and, though better trained, was, apparently, out-positioned. Seventy-seven Peloponnesian ships were lost and Callicratidas killed [Diod.13.100.4; Xen.*Hell.*1.6.34], although forty-three vessels escaped. The Spartans lost nine of their ten ships. Eteonicus escaped from Mytilene with his fifty ships and retired to the pro-Spartan island of Chios, where he was joined by the survivors from the battle.

According to Aristotle [*Pol.*34.1], the Spartans once more offered peace on the basis of the *status-quo*. This offer has been doubted, as it is not mentioned by either of the major sources for the period. With a large number of ships and bases still in Asia, together with the prospect of continued Persian support, there was no need for the Spartans to make such an offer, unless they were playing for time to reorganise their war effort. If peace was offered, the Athenians might have refused it for much the same reasons as they refused the Spartan offer after Cyzicus. Sparta still had too many bases in Asia Minor, at Abydus, Chios, Ephesus, Miletus, Phocaea and

¹⁵⁴ Busolt 3(2) 1590 n2.

¹⁵⁵ See Grote 8.171; Busolt 3(2) 1593-96; L.Herbst, *Die Schacht bei den Arginusen* (Hamburg, 1855); Bommelaer 72-3; Rahe 28-9 and Kagan 339-53 for the importance of the islands in the battle.

Cyme, and, from the Athenian viewpoint, were still too friendly with Persia. The Spartan presence in Asia, especially at Abydos, was still too much of a threat to Athens.

The Spartans, with the better trained and better equipped fleet, had not expected to lose this battle, and the situation presented an opportunity for Lysander to work towards his return to the east as navarch. Requests for his re-appointment began to come to Sparta from the fleet, from Cyrus and from Sparta's allies at Chios [Xen.*Hell.*2.1.6].¹⁵⁶ The Spartans, however, were not yet ready to take such a decision, which contravened their own regulation about repeated navarchies. Clearly, Lysander's ambition and success had caused some opposition, and respect for Spartan law was strong.

After the death of Callicratidas, Eteonicus took charge of the forces on Chios.¹⁵⁷ The Spartans could still command a fleet of ninety-three ships in Ionia, although they had the problem of provisioning the fleet and keeping it together. Xenophon describes how the sailors of the remainder of the Spartan fleet on Chios supported themselves as casual labourers on the island and bought the local produce [2.1.1]. When winter arrived, because they were short of food and clothing, they planned to raid Chios. Their plan was foiled by the quick action of Eteonicus. The Chians were compelled by the situation to pay the sailors' expenses for a month [2.1.5]. It was after this incident that the Ionian allies sent a report of the situation in the fleet to Sparta and requested the return of Lysander. It was, perhaps, the threat that the fleet would attack a hitherto loyal ally that was the final event that made the Spartans decide that they should find a way to re-appoint Lysander. At best, they stood to lose Chios if it suffered such treatment from their fleet, and at worst they might lose the fleet altogether, if it could not be paid when its money was exhausted. After the Spartan defeat at Arginusae, there was evidently no further money paid by Cyrus. He later claimed to Lysander that he had already used up what the king had given him and more [2.1.11]. One of Lysander's earliest actions on arriving in the east was to request more money and to pay the fleet what it was due [Xen.*Hell.*2.1.12]. The Chians could not go on supplying the fleet indefinitely. Lysander then proceeded to wrap up Ionia and to attack the Athenians in the Hellespont, although Cyrus had advised him to fight only if he had great

¹⁵⁶ See Kagan 379; Busolt 3(2) 1610-2; Bommelaer 96-8.

¹⁵⁷ U.Kahrstedt, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden funften und des vierten Jahrhunderts* (Gottingen, 1910) 178/9 claims that Eteonicus was navarch. There is no evidence for this, but Eteonicus evidently had some official capacity and was able to maintain control of the fleet.

numerical superiority. Lysander may also, like Callicratidas, have had orders to finish the war quickly. The Spartans did not want to be in Persia's debt longer than was necessary.

Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus says in what capacity Eteonicus acted, when he collected the scattered Spartan fleet and arranged with the Chians to provide supplies for his force. He certainly acted with some authority and saved the situation on Chios and for the future, nor was his authority questioned by the troops. This indicates that he probably had some official status. Eteonicus was also aware that Sparta had to maintain the goodwill of the Ionians by not allowing their territory to be plundered [Xen.2.1.]. Perhaps he was also involved in the meeting of the allies at Ephesus where it was decided to ask Sparta to re-appoint Lysander. He must, at least, have known about it. Previously, Eteonicus had been left in charge of the blockade at Mytilene, while Callicratidas took the main fleet to challenge the Athenians. Perhaps he was *epistoleus* to Callicratidas and took charge of the remainder of the fleet in that capacity. There would then be no need for Sparta to appoint him navarch.

The second 'navarchy' of Lysander - 405/4

Sparta's response to the appeals from its eastern allies was to send Aracus as navarch, but to appoint Lysander as his *epistoleus*. Lysander, however, was to have effective charge of the fleet [Diod.13.100.78; Xen.*Hell*.2.1.7; Plut.*Lys*.7]. Aracus had been ephor at Sparta in 409/8 [Xen.*Hell*.2.3.10]; he may have been one of those responsible for the first appointment of Lysander to the navarchy and, perhaps, was ready to support Lysander's second appointment. This decision broke the spirit of the law at Sparta that stated that the navarchy could not be held twice by the same individual, but, clearly, the majority of Spartans were by now prepared to overlook this in order to achieve victory.¹⁵⁸ The defeat of Callicratidas at Arginusae may have helped the pro-Lysander group at Sparta re-assert itself and get Lysander returned to the east. The message that this appointment gave Lysander was that the navarchy, hitherto an office to be held only once, could be the basis for obtaining individual, personal power that could rival the position previously enjoyed only by a Spartan king.

¹⁵⁸ The date of the introduction of such a law is not known, see Sealey, *Klio* 18 (1976) 335-58 for the suggestion that it was introduced after Cyzicus. Xenophon says that the Spartan law stated that the same man could not be navarch twice [*navarchein*]; Diodorus' version is that the law was that the same individual could not head a campaign twice [*pempein*]. If Xenophon is right the Spartans must have introduced such a law when the office of navarch was seen to be a possible threat as a basis of power. This cannot have been before the Ionian war, when the danger of an individual with great power operating out of reach of the Spartan government began to be appreciated. If Diodorus is correct, then the law was a more general one, perhaps aimed at preventing any challenge to the royal prerogative of leading successive campaigns abroad. For further discussion on the navarchy, see the Appendix.

Lysander arrived at Ephesus with thirty-five ships from the Peloponnese and from Sparta's allies in spring, 405 [Xen.*Hell.*2.1.31; Diod.13.104.3]. Eteonicus was ordered to bring his fleet to Ephesus from Chios [Xen.*Hell.*2.1.10.]. Lysander then organised the refitting of older ships and the building of new ones at Antandrus. He was able to pay for all this because he had been put in charge of the resources of Cyrus' satrapy, while Cyrus visited the ailing Darius [Xen.*Hell.*2.1.14].¹⁵⁹ Lysander spent some time in the south, consolidating the Spartan hold there. He also ensured by his harsh treatment of such cities as Iasus and Cedraea, that had gone over to Athens, and his political interference at Miletus, that there would be no further trouble [Xen.*Hell.*2.1.14; Diod.13.104; Plut.*Lys.*8; Polyaeus 1.45.1]. Lysander may have needed to assert his authority at Miletus, which was, apparently, democratic and had also been Callicratidas' base. There seems to have been little reaction to his severity among the Spartan allies in Ionia: they do not appear to have seen his actions as any kind of future threat to themselves should Sparta win the war. They were probably motivated more by immediate, local rivalries and by their hatred of anything Athenian [Xen.2.1.31-2]. Lysander may also have visited Agis in Attica, perhaps to distract Athenian attention from his true objective, the Hellespont.¹⁶⁰

With the south pacified and the Athenians reduced to ineffective attacks on Chios and Ephesus [Xen.*Hell.*2.1.10], Lysander moved north to the Spartan base at Abydos. He was well aware that control of this area was the key to Athens' defeat. His forces took Lampsacus, but Lysander was less harsh in his treatment of this city than he had been in the south. He may have needed to display more moderation to bring over more cities to Sparta. At Aegospotami he defeated an Athenian fleet of one hundred and eighty ships by the use of a similar trick to that used by Agesandridas against the Athenians at Euboea [Xen.*Hell.*2.1.22-25; Diod.13.105-6].¹⁶¹ Perhaps Lysander had studied naval tactics, or had been present at that battle. The Athenians in their desire to force a decision over control of the Hellespont beached their ships in an inferior

¹⁵⁹ For the situation in Persia and the hostility between Tissaphernes and Cyrus, see Lewis 120f., and A.Andrewes, "Two notes on Lysander" *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 208-9.

¹⁶⁰ For this suggestion, see Kagan 401f. The story is rejected by both Beloch (2) 2:2 1423-4 and Busolt 3(2) 1617. Lysander's visit to Agis is found only in Diodorus 13.104.8 and Plutarch, *Lys.*9.2.

¹⁶¹ The sources for Aegospotami are Xen.2.1.22-30; Diod.13.105-6; Plut.*Lys.*10-11, *Alc.*36-7; Polyaeus 1.45.2; Paus.9.32.9; Nepos *Alc.*8. For the tactics at Aegospotami, see Lotze 32-37; Bommelaer 101-115; C.Ehrhart, "Xénophon and Diodorus on Aegospotami" *Phoenix* 24 (1970) 225-8; B.Strauss, "Aegospotami Re-examined" *AJP* 104 (1983) 24-35; F.Bourriot, "Xenophon et la bataille d'Aegospotamos" *Sacris Erudiri* 31 (1989-90) 49-64.

position, twelve miles from their nearest supplies at Sestus. From here they sailed out daily to challenge the Spartan fleet to battle. Lysander, however, chose to wait until a time when the major part of the Athenian fleet was ashore and seized the opportunity to attack the Athenian camp, destroying or capturing their fleet. Unlike the Spartans, they had no financial resources with which to rebuild it. The Spartan victory appears to have been won on land rather than at sea, where Lysander's ships met only a small squadron of thirty Athenian ships before reaching Aegospotami. Both Lysander's victories seem to have been won by his taking advantage of a sudden opportunity presented by Athenian carelessness, rather than by planning and executing a set naval battle.

As a result of this victory Lysander was able to intercept the grain ships that came through the Hellespont in late summer, bound for Athens [Demosthenes L.4-6]. Lysander's strategy in first settling the south, then proceeding north in the latter half of the year had been wise. He followed up his victory by moving along the Ionian coast with his fleet and army and by returning any Athenians to Athens to exacerbate the food shortage the city was experiencing [Xen.*Hell*.2.1.17].

Lysander was clearly in no hurry to return to Sparta in person with news of his victory. He still had to settle the Aegean to his own satisfaction [Xen.*Hell*.2.2.1]. Instead of reporting his victory by regular correspondence, he preferred to create a visual impression of its magnitude and importance by sending a Milesian captain, Theopompus, and the Spartan, Gylippus, in triremes decorated with the spoils of victory and containing large amounts of money [Diod.13.106.7-8].

His later arrival at Athens with one hundred and fifty to two hundred ships was just as impressive [Diod.13.107; Xen.*Hell*.2.2.21], as was his generosity towards the inhabitants of Aegina and Melos. Lysander's return to Sparta with ships, captured prows, the rest of Cyrus' tribute, and the crowns given him as personal gifts, all of which he handed over to the Spartan authorities, was nicely calculated for its effect. He may have formally handed over the spoils of victory to the state, but there was no doubt about who had won them. His dedications at Sparta and Delphi following Aegospotami demonstrate a similar acknowledgement of Lysander's apparent subservience to the Spartan state and his need to have his achievement recognised throughout Greece: Pausanias says that at Sparta there was a statue of Lysander's seer, Agias, descendant of Tisamenus, a famous Spartan seer in the period during and after the Persian War

[3.11.5]; on the Spartan acropolis was a colonnade with eagles and victories to celebrate the victories of Notium and Aegospotami [3.17.4]. At Delphi, however, as well as the gold and ivory replica of a trireme presented to him by Cyrus, Lysander had erected, near the entrance of the precinct, a large group of statues of gods and mortals, to the front and centre of which was Poseidon crowning Lysander himself, flanked by the figures of Agias, the seer, and Hermon, Lysander's Megarian pilot. Behind this group stood statues of the Spartans and their Ionian and Peloponnesian allies, who had contributed to Lysander's victories; they included Aracus, the navarch, Eteonicus and representatives from Boeotia, Chios, Rhodes, Cnidus, Ephesus, Miletus, Myndus, Samos, Euboea, Carystus, Eretria, Corinth, Troezen, Epidaurus, Pellene, Hermione, Phocis, Megara, Sicyon, Leucas and Ambracia [10.9.7-11; *Plut.de Pyth.Orac.2*].¹⁶² It is not clear whether they are named in accordance with the size of their naval contributions. These last names show that Sparta's mainland allies had continued contributing to the fleet to the end of the war.

Changes in Spartan naval organisation in the Ionian War

Spartan interest in naval operations changed radically during the Ionian War, which was conducted on a vast scale in terms of the numbers of ships and the money involved. For Sparta the war also meant the search for a secure source of funding. It involved, too, a change in the importance of its naval arm which was no longer ancillary to the land forces, but became the focus of attention. The supreme naval office, that of navarch, changed with the fleet's changing status and importance.

At the start of the war, Sparta had to define the jurisdiction of the navarch and the command of a harmost. Clearly, such a situation had not arisen before, and the Spartans employed the extraordinary measure of sending an investigative commission with enormous powers to deal with the problem.

The necessity of a single supreme commander in the naval war caused the role of the navarch to increase in importance and complexity. At the same time, the potential abuse of such a position was avoided by allowing the office to be held only once by the same individual. The personality of the navarch, the political situation at Sparta and the length of time that the war

¹⁶² For the possibility of a perioecic admiral at Aegospotami, see Cartledge 263 and *ML* 95 (k), although the evidence is far from conclusive. No explanation is given about the basis on which any perioecus is thought to have been an admiral in this period.

lasted also affected the status of the office. The increasing importance of the navarchy and the Spartans' inevitable lack of control over their navarch in the field left an opportunity for an ambitious individual, such as Lysander. As well as re-organising the fleet during his first navarchy, he increased his personal influence in the east, perhaps with a view to his return in some other capacity. He could not at this time have foreseen that Callicratidas, his successor, would lose the fleet. When he did, Lysander obtained a second term of office from which, after his victory over Athens, he was to attempt to build a powerful position for himself in the Spartan state.

When he reorganised the fleet in 408, Lysander may have begun to appreciate the value of such long-service officers as Eteonicus as a basis for control of the eastern Aegean. It was partly through the presence of these men as harmosts in key cities, as well as partly through their own financial problems, that the Athenians had been unable to dislodge the Spartans from the Ionian mainland between 410 and 408. Several Spartans who spent long periods in Asia Minor in various capacities both naval and military during the Ionian War were: Eteonicus, who had arrived in Ionia with Astyochus in 411, had been harmost at Iasus in 410, served under Callicratidas in 406, held the fleet together in 406/5 and served under Lysander in 405. After the Spartan victory at Aegospotami, he was sent by Lysander to settle Thrace. Lysander publicly acknowledged Eteonicus' contribution to Sparta's success when he was commemorated in the monument erected by Lysander at Delphi [Paus.10.9.10].

Agesandridas served in Euboea in 411, where he defeated an Athenian squadron, and then at the Hellespont under Mindarus. He also commanded a small fleet that operated off the coast of Thrace in 409/8.

Hippocrates came out from Sparta to Miletus with the main Peloponnesian force in 411: he was *epistoleus* to Mindarus for the following season, 411/10, and was sent to Phaselis to report on the movements of the Persian fleet. After the battle of Cyzicus in 410 he was appointed harmost at Calchedon, where he was killed in action in 409.

Clearchus, whose family held the Byzantine *proxenia* at Sparta, was first appointed in 412 to lead a Peloponnesian force to the Hellespont. He was sent there from Miletus in 411, but failed to reach Byzantium by sea. He later arrived at Byzantium by an overland route. He was present at the battle of Cyzicus, and then served as harmost at Byzantium, which he lost to the

Athenians in 409/8. Callicratidas is said to have named him his successor in the battle of Arginusae [Diod.13.98.1].

Such Spartan officers as these must have been an invaluable source of experience and local knowledge for a new navarch and for the home government. They could also play an important role in the fleet, when the navarch was absent or had been killed in action, as Eteonicus did after the death of Callicratidas and Hippocrates after the death of Mindarus. The Spartans created a useful pool of knowledgeable senior officers in the east, a fact that probably helped maintain the Spartan presence and local support in Ionia after two potentially disastrous naval defeats.

During this war the Spartans came to rely less on their own forces, whether Spartan or Peloponnesian, and made greater use of mercenaries. Manning the Peloponnesian fleet depended in large part on the use of mercenaries, as did the Athenian fleet.¹⁶³ Before the beginning of the Archidamian War the Corinthians had needed mercenary rowers for their ninety ships at Sybota [1.31]. When war broke out, they expected to be able to hire any extra rowers as before [1.121]. As the war progressed, it became more difficult for the Peloponnesians to hire rowers [1.143]. By this time it was also too late for the Peloponnesians to make a radical change of policy, build a large fleet and train more rowers. Their difficulties were increased because their fleet was supplied by a number of states, many of which were distant from one another.

In the Ionian War, too, the ships of the Spartan fleet were not necessarily manned by rowers from the home state, or even from the Peloponnese. Chian slaves rowed the Spartan ships to Miletus, while their Spartan crews served as hoplites on Chios.

Mercenary rowers came from many different states: a Samian is recorded as serving with the Spartan fleet, although Samos was the main Athenian naval base in the east. Hermon, a Megarian, was the pilot for both Callicratidas and Lysander on board the navarch's vessel [Paus.10.9.7; Xen.*Hell.*1.6.32]. Lysander sent a Milesian freebooter from his fleet as well as the Spartan, Gylippus, to Sparta to announce his victory [Xen.*Hell.*2.1.30]. Peloponnesian rowers, then, may not necessarily have been supplied as well as ships for the Spartan fleet by their home state, although Peloponnesian states of the Spartan alliance may have provided empty hulls. This was not an unusual procedure; the Eleans had done so at Epidamnus [1.27].

¹⁶³ M.Amit, *Athens and the Sea* (Brussels, 1965) 30-49. In 428 Athens was threatened by Spartan preparations at the Isthmus and had no time to summon mercenary help, but relied on citizen crews [3.16].

A drawback in the employment of mercenaries was that they could be tempted to serve with an opponent's fleet. This fact may indicate that there was a finite number of experienced men available to either side. The Spartan fleet under Callicratidas at Arginusae numbered one hundred and forty ships. Under Lysander in the previous year it had numbered about ninety. Many of them may have been tempted away from Athens' fleet by the offer of better pay. Athens as a result was forced to use slave rowers at Arginusae [Xen.*Hell.*1.6.24].

Some rowers in the Spartan fleet may have been helots or neodamodes. Their use may reflect a change in the social situation at Sparta by this time.¹⁶⁴ In the fleet neodamodes and helots were employed as rowers and hoplites from at least the time of the Spartan involvement in Sicily [6.91]. Neodamodes and helots also served on land and sea both in the west and later in Asia.

The members of the Spartan fleet who had come from the west were mostly free men [8.84]. This factor was important in the trouble in the fleet at Miletus: it was these men who questioned the Spartan command and its decisions. The western crews had, after all, defeated the Athenians before and had also shown themselves quite independent of Spartan control. They had probably also come east at their own expense.

By the time of the period between the Archidamian and Ionian Wars Spartan naval commanders were no longer necessarily full Spartiates; both Gylippus and Lysander are said to have been *mothakes*, yet they were both given important naval roles. Perhaps the fleet, which did not have the long tradition associated with the king's right of command of the land forces, was more open to change.

Conclusion

The Spartans had begun the war in the east by planning a grand strategy that included helping, in turn, all three eastern states that appealed to them. They may have hoped for a quick and inexpensive revolt and, thus, a speedy and relatively effortless victory over Athens. The small force that they finally sent indicates how fluid both the situation and Spartan strategy was at the time, and how little reconnaissance was undertaken before embarking on so distant and

¹⁶⁴ See Cartledge 307-18. For the problem of the supposed hatred of helots for their Spartan masters despite their use in important roles in the Spartan military system, see R. Talbert, "The Role of the Helots in the Class Struggle at Sparta" *Historia* 38 (1989) 23-40.

important a project; the despatch of a *perioecus* to Chios, whose report depended largely on what the Chians told him, was hardly thorough intelligence work. Clearly, as Thucydides says, the majority of Spartans were eager to take up the eastern offers [8.6], and Chios offered them the chance of an instant fleet and base. Otherwise, they would have had to wait for their mainland allies to provide sufficient ships. Their effort to divide any Athenian response to their action also indicates that they still considered the Athenians a force to be feared in the Aegean.

With such small regard for knowledge of the true situation in Ionia, it is hardly surprising that, with the speed of the spread of the revolt and the difficulties of communication with the home authorities because of the distance and time involved, the Spartans seemed slow to take advantage of their early success in spreading revolt. Chalcideus allowed himself to be blockaded at Miletus by the Athenians. The Spartans were not prepared this early in the Ionian campaign to challenge the Athenian fleet directly, since they did not have great numerical superiority. With more eastern allies and more naval support from the west, they might have intended to do so at a later date. This Spartan strategy, however, allowed the Athenians time to increase the size of their fleet in response.

The Spartans then adopted the plan of holding on to strategic positions on the Ionian coast and waiting the Athenians out. With financial support from the Persians and with the later promise of the arrival of the Phoenician fleet they could afford to do so. They were still not ready to meet Athenian ships in open water under conditions that favoured Athenian tactics. Thus, the Athenians maintained their domination of these waters. The Spartan home government was evidently unhappy about the situation when it sent a commission of investigation to the east with powers to change whatever it saw fit. Interestingly, the commission appears to have changed little in Spartan strategy once it arrived. The preferred policy of those on the spot in Ionia was still to wait on Tissaphernes' decision before pursuing a northern strategy. Perhaps Tissaphernes' offer of the assistance of the Phoenician fleet was too tempting to resist: with the addition of one hundred and fifty ships to their fleet, the Spartans could confidently expect a speedy victory against Athens. How the post-war arrangements over Persian and Spartan sea-power in the Aegean would be made as a result of this joint naval action is never stated. Perhaps the Spartans never even considered this factor, or perhaps they were just not interested in sea-power in the eastern Aegean at this time.

The Spartans' early strategy for Ionia collapsed when the Persian fleet did not arrive, and the Spartans turned to Pharnabazus to finance their operations in the north. Here their plan of cutting off the Athenian grain route could have had dramatic effect. Their mere arrival in the Hellespont caused the Athenians serious concern. The narrow waters of the Hellespont were also more suited to the traditional Peloponnesian naval tactic of fighting in hand to hand combat on board close to shore with land troops in support. The series of Peloponnesian naval defeats that followed was to show that the Spartans could not claim naval superiority in these waters either. As a result they sued for peace. The peace offer, however, was not made with a long-term settlement in mind: Sparta still held much of the Ionian coast, had Pharnabazus' support, and could renew its war policy at a future date. Peace was to be on the basis of the current strategic situation.

When the Athenians rejected their peace proposal, the Spartans faced both continuing Athenian attacks and the need to rebuild their fleet. Why Pharnabazus continued to assist the Spartans is unclear: perhaps he was under orders from the king to do so. Pharnabazus supplied them with funds for the next two years while the fleet was being rebuilt at Antandrus, but perhaps its expenses and the Athenian successes in the north were greater than he had anticipated. The satrap may have agreed to accompany Athenian ambassadors to the Persian king in order to try to change the Persian policy of helping Sparta in favour of support for Athens.

The Spartans seem to have recognised in time that only direct negotiations between them and the king would bring them consistent funding. Both satraps, on whom they had previously relied, had been unable, either for their own reasons or because they had not been given sufficient resources, to provide what the Spartans needed. The Spartans' agreement with the king was crucial for eventual naval success, as was the despatch of Lysander to Asia. The combination of a steady supply of money and the friendship between the Persian prince, Cyrus, and Lysander ensured a solid base from which to achieve the re-organisation and re-training of a Spartan fleet. With such backing it became only a matter of time until the Spartans were victorious against an Athenian fleet that was suffering from consistent shortages of trained men, money and equipment.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ Aristophanes, *Frogs* 364 refers to the extra security in the Athenian dockyards over items of removable naval equipment, such as pitch, leather fittings and sailcloth. They had become black-market goods by this time, c.405.

The navarchy of Callicratidas marked a change in policy for Sparta, caused, perhaps, by fear of Lysander's personal ambition as well as the possibility of further quick victory after their success at Notium. When Callicratidas was defeated at Arginusae, much of the fleet lost and the rest in danger of disappearing for lack of money, the Spartans must have felt that they had no option but to send back the man who, through friendship with the Persians, had brought them their only naval victory over the Athenians. Lysander, too, had to change his tactics: he could no longer afford to wait for the Athenians to collapse through desertions and financial weakness. There was, perhaps, opposition to him at Sparta and he needed another naval victory to silence it. His careful campaign of securing Ionia before proceeding north to meet the Athenians in the Hellespont shows that he was taking no chances.

The Persians, however, were keeping careful account of the sums expended on their aid to Sparta. They may have intended to call in the debt after the war [8.58]. Their declared aim, as stated in the terms of the third treaty, was control of the coast of Asia Minor, which they had won in the reign of Darius and which had been lost in the interim to Athens. What is not directly stated, but what had been an important part of Persian power in coastal Asia Minor immediately before the Persian Wars, was Persian control of the fleets in the area; in the Persian fleet at Salamis had been ships from Caria, Ionia and the islands, Aeolis and the Hellespont, with Persian marines on board each, presumably to ensure their loyalty [Hdt.7.89]. It is not unlikely that, when he made his agreement with the Spartans, Darius was contemplating the restoration of this situation as well. The majority of the ships in Lysander's fleet at Aegospotami were from Asia Minor and, presumably, returned to their home cities at the end of the war. Persian funding for the Spartan fleet may have included the expectation that the ships they had paid for would revert to Persian control when the war ended. Tissaphernes' demands to the Athenians that they allow the king's ships to sail in the eastern Aegean at will as the price of Persian assistance to Athens may be an indication of such Persian aims in the Aegean. Thus, Tissaphernes was carrying out royal policy. He may also have been acting on the king's behalf when he was involved in affairs at Iasus in 410. Iasus was one of the important coastal sites of southern Asia Minor, whose interests were concentrated in the Aegean. With the eventual defeat of Athens and with the agreement of Sparta not to attempt to replace the Athenians in the east, Persia hoped to restore its former position and power on both land and sea in Asia Minor.

What the Spartans wanted from their association with Persia is also evident - an assured supply of cash and ships to defeat the Athenian fleet and renew their hegemony of Greece. Only by defeating Athens where it was strong could Sparta hope to win the war. It was no great sacrifice to the Spartans to give Persia control of the coast of Asia Minor; even the Athenians had been ready to do this for the right price. Panhellenism was not yet a factor in these decisions and negotiations. In view of what happened later over the Persian role in Greek affairs, it was short-sighted of the Spartans to grant the Persians so much, but, given their desire to crush Athens and to regain the hegemony of Greece, they must have felt that they had at the time no option but to rely on outside financial aid. That the price demanded was not seen as too high by the Spartans indicates their lack of interest at the time in Asia as potential imperial territory and their desire to win at all costs, even to the extent of breaking the intent of Spartan law.

By the end of the war when Lysander returned to Sparta, the Spartan fleet and the Spartan navy had become extremely important areas of the Spartan military command. How to deal with the threat of personal power the navy now represented and with the changes that the war had brought to them and to Greece were questions that the Spartans were forced to meet in the immediate post-war period.

CHAPTER 5

SPARTA'S NAVAL EMPIRE - AEGOSPOTAMI TO CORCYRA, 404-c.373/2

The sources

The period between the battle of Aegospotami in 405 and the action at Corcyra, c.373/2, is one in which Sparta for the first time played a continuously leading role in geopolitics. It is also a period in which more can be seen of the workings of Spartan policy than at any previous time. Even so, this information is still extremely limited. Xenophon, the major source for the period was, unfortunately for the modern historian, not so much concerned with Spartan history as with writing memoirs. His omissions, such as the foundation of the Second Athenian League and the rise of Epaminondas, and his unsatisfactory accounts of such important events as the peace negotiations of 392/1 and the battle of Cnidus, are notorious. His philolaconian stance and his obvious partisanship for Agesilaus have also to be taken into account when using his works as a source for Spartan history in this period.¹

The discovery of fragments of a fourth-century work by an unknown author, the Oxyrhynchus historian, has provided some new information, especially on the importance of the naval war of 397 to 394, and on Boeotian politics. It has also improved the status of the work of Diodorus Siculus, who was considered much inferior to Xenophon as a source for early fourth-century history. It would now appear that Diodorus used the Oxyrhynchus historian, or a source closely dependent on him, for his own epitome, especially in Book XIV. Nonetheless, only a relatively small number of incidents can be confirmed by the Oxyrhynchus papyri.²

Apart from these major sources, the researcher into this period has to depend on the speeches of Athenian orators, such as Isocrates, Lysias, Demosthenes and Isaeus, whose work is influenced by rhetorical *topoi*. The works of later writers, such as the travelogue of Pausanias,

¹ All future references from Xenophon are to the *Hellenica*, unless otherwise stated. The following abbreviations are used throughout this chapter; Hamilton: C.D.Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, 1979). Lotze: D.Lotze, *Lysander Und Der Peloponesische Krieg* (Berlin, 1964). Rahe: P.A.Rahe, *Lysander and the Spartan settlement, 407-403* (Diss.Yale, 1977). David: E.David, *Sparta between Empire and Revolution (404-283 B.C.)* (New York, 1981). Cartledge: P.Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300-362 B.C.* (London, 1979). Cartledge, *Agesilaos*: P.Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (London, 1987). Poralla: P.Poralla, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians* ed. A.S.Bradford (Chicago, 1985). Bruce: I.A.F.Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge, 1967).

² For the reliability of Diodorus and his probable dependence on Ephorus, who, in turn, may have used the Oxyrhynchus historian as a source, see G.Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (London, 1935).

Polyaenus' handbook on military tactics and, occasionally, archaeological sources, provide extra details to flesh out the bare bones of fourth-century Greek history.

Lysander and Spartan naval policy from 405-403

With the defeat of Athens at Aegospotami and the capture there of nearly the whole of the Athenian fleet, Sparta became the most powerful and important state in Greece. Potentially Sparta's interests extended through its friendship with Cyrus to Susa and through its association with Dionysius to Syracuse in the west. The architect of Sparta's two naval victories over Athens and the man who was to shape its immediate post-war foreign policy was the former navarch, Lysander, now *epistoleus*, but navarch in all but name [Xen.*Hell* 2.1.7ff; Diod.13.106].³

Lysander had been responsible for the re-organisation and refitting of the Spartan fleet after Arginusae and for Sparta's good relations with Persia through his friendship with Cyrus, the son of Darius. Any hopes that some Spartans may have had of achieving victory over Athens with as little debt to Persia as possible had vanished with the defeat of Callicratidas at Arginusae [see previous chapter]. In his second term of office in the east following this battle, Lysander had not only settled the southern cities of Asia Minor to his own satisfaction before proceeding to the Hellespont, but he had also been given total charge over the revenues of Cyrus' satrapy during the prince's absence at Susa. He thus had the means and opportunity to bring Sparta's war with Athens to a successful conclusion. With his victory at Aegospotami Lysander became supreme in the Aegean. He sent Eteonicus to Thrace to settle the northern Aegean and retained control of the Aegean states through a system of installing harmosts and decarchies. Many of these owed their loyalty to Lysander himself [Xen.2.1.32; Plut.*Lys*.13.3-5]. The only hold-out was Samos, which he besieged, and where he had his supporter, Thorax, appointed harmost.

Lysander then sent notice to Sparta of his intention to return to Greece with about two hundred ships [Xen.2.2.5-6; Diod.13.107]. He proceeded to Athens which he blockaded by sea. How he had settled the cities of Asia Minor, if at all, is unclear. As Cyrus' nominee in his

³ The Spartan *epistoleus* appears to have been a second-in-command to the navarch by the time of Lysander - perhaps it was specially altered to fit the circumstances of Lysander's appointment. It was probably originally devised to deal with communications and correspondence. If this was the case, it is unlikely to have been an office until the Ionian War, when the need for regular communications over a long period of time between the navarch and the home government was first felt. Thucydides uses the term *epestalkei* [8.99.1] of Hippocrates and Philippus, who served under the navarch Mindarus. They were to report to him on the arrival of the Phoenician fleet. Thus, more than one *epistoleus* may have been appointed by this time. The creation of the office of *epistoleus* may have been the result of the recommendations of the Spartan commissioners after their visit to Ionia in winter 412/11 [Thuc.8.39].

satrapy, it would not be surprising if Lysander encouraged, as he had previously done during his navarchy [Xen.1.6.4], the establishment of decarchies or friendly oligarchies here as well.⁴ It is possible that some of those whom Lysander helped to powerful positions in their own cities in Asia Minor may have been commemorated on his monument at Delphi, where individuals from the Ionian allies are conspicuous.⁵

At Athens Lysander played an important role in the surrender and settlement of the city [Xen.2.2.1-24; Diod.14.3]]. It was to Lysander that the Athenian, Theramenes, went to discuss the terms of settlement that Sparta demanded. He was referred by him to the home government at Sparta, which decided to spare the city much against the wishes of Sparta's allies, Corinth and Thebes. Undoubtedly, all Lysander's actions to date must have had the support of the ephorate and the Spartan assembly, but he enjoyed unprecedented *de facto* power and prestige. In the immediate post-war euphoria that Sparta would have experienced, there would seem to be no reason not to trust Lysander's decisions.⁶

On his return to Samos after the surrender of Athens and the capitulation of the island in 404, Lysander received divine honours, a unique achievement to that time.⁷ Under him Spartan naval power was undisputed in the Aegean, the Hellespont and along the coast of Asia Minor. With the appointment of his brother, Libys, as navarch for 404/3 [Xen.2.4.28], Lysander's power may have appeared secure. This was not apparently the case.

Wealth and social change at Sparta

When Lysander announced his naval victory in 405, he had done so by sending some of the spoils to Sparta. He followed this by despatching Gylippus with somewhere between fifteen hundred and two thousand talents [Diod.13.106; Plut.*Nicias* 28.3]], some of which Gylippus is said to have stolen [Lysias 17.1]. Lysander himself returned with gold crowns, his personal gifts

⁴ The question of the status and settlement of Asia Minor after the war remains undecided. See A. Andrewes, "Two Notes On Lysander" *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 206-26 for a fuller discussion of the position.

⁵ The suggestion of E.Cavaignac, "Les Dekarchies de Lysandre" *REH* 25 (1924) 292-3.

⁶ For the role of Lysander after the war, see C.D.Hamilton, "Spartan politics and policy 405-401" *CQ* n.s.26 (1976) 299; Hamilton 40-125; Lotze 62f., Rahe 10f.and David) 5f.

⁷ Brasidas had received such honours at Amphipolis, but only after his death [Thuc.5.11]. Lysander was apparently the first Hellene to receive such honours in his lifetime, Plut.*Lys*.18. For the archaeological evidence for this, see J.K.Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece* (Hassocks, Sussex, 1978) 182.

from various cities, and four hundred and seventy talents of tribute money that remained from Cyrus' satrapy.⁸ The influx of such wealth is frequently seen as the beginning of opposition at Sparta to the imperial policies of Lysander, a view based largely on the observations of Plutarch [Lys.21]. Evidently there was much discussion about the effects of such large amounts of cash on a city that was said to have hitherto avoided the use of money and to have preferred to observe the laws of Lycurgus. A compromise solution was finally adopted in which money could be used by the state, but not kept by individuals, a law that Plutarch rightly criticised as useless. The disregard for such a law and the gap between rich and poor Spartans that the possession of wealth created are said to have led to social unrest at Sparta, as revealed by the conspiracy of Cinadon, c.399 [Xen.3.3.5-11]. This may be true, but it is clear that Sparta had been experiencing some social changes prior to the influx of money into the state.⁹ At Pylos helots were offered their freedom if they successfully ran the Athenian blockade [Thuc.4.26]: between 424 and 421 a class of freed helots was created, the *neodamodeis* [Thuc.5.34]. Helots and neodamode rower/hoplites were used in the Spartan fleet at least by 413 in Sicily [Thuc.6.19,7.1]. *Mothakes*, sons of impoverished Spartans, were appointed, perhaps on merit, to responsible positions; Lysander, Callicratidas and Gylippus were said to be *mothakes* [Aelian V.H.12.43].¹⁰ *Perioeci*, too, served in the Spartan forces, at least from the time of the Peloponnesian War, and enjoyed diplomatic and naval office, e.g. Phrynis at Chios [Thuc.8.6], Diniadas on Lesbos [Thuc.8.22] and Neon of Asine, who served with Cyrus' army [Xen.*Anab.*5.3.4]. It is also possible that the commander, Eteonicus, who had a distinguished career in the east, was a *perioecus*.¹¹ A class of *desposionautae* [Athen.Deip.F1], helots who received freedom in return for naval service, may have arisen in this period.

Such changes in a system that was apparently devoted to the maintenance of Spartiate supremacy are surprising and may be due, although to what extent and when are not clear, to the

⁸ For a discussion of the sums of money introduced to Sparta after the Peloponnesian War, see David 5ff, also n.1 and 3. Such honour and wealth in the hands of a *mothax* appears to have been unique to date in Spartan history.

⁹ For the gradual changes in Spartan society, especially military changes, see G.Cawkwell, *The Decline of Sparta CQ* 33 (1983) 385-400, with whose conclusions I agree.

¹⁰ See D.Lotze, "Mothakes" *Historia* 11 (1962) 427-35.

¹¹ Eteonicus is not given any patronymic in the sources and is never described as a Spartan except by the later author Pausanias [10.9.9]. Thucydides [8.23] makes no comment on his status and Xenophon refers to him as Laconian [1.1.32]. See also the comments of G.Cawkwell, *CQ* 33 (1983) 393 n.32. The question remains open.

oliganthropia experienced by the Spartans during the fifth and fourth centuries [Aristotle *Pol.*1270a33].¹² Sparta may well have been forced to open hitherto exclusive positions to perioeci and helots in order to maintain its military supremacy. This process would have taken time. The whole question of the status of the perioeci and their contribution to Sparta is debatable. Money, too, was not unknown among the Spartans before the time of Lysander. Kings such as Agis could be threatened with a fine [Thuc.5.63], and Sparta would have had to pay any mercenaries in cash [Thuc.4.80] - they would hardly have accepted iron spits as currency. The influx of money from 405, then, may have brought to a head, rather than have created, disagreement between those who supported such social change and those who resisted it in favour of the more conservative 'Lycurgan' society. Whatever the period at which such changes began to occur, they would probably not have been motivated by a desire on the part of the ruling Spartiates for social equality in Sparta and Laconia. Their impetus was military and their effect was to change Spartan society and to create groups that demanded their share of power and privilege. In this respect it is significant that Cinadon, apparent author of a planned revolution at Sparta, did not aim to redistribute Spartiate wealth and status; he only wished a share in it for himself [Xen.3.3.5].¹³

The more traditionally minded Spartans, who deplored the changes that were being made at Sparta, may well have pointed to Spartan overseas interests, and therefore its possession of a fleet and maritime power, as a major contributing factor in this 'decline'. The Athenian orator, Isocrates, voiced this point of view when he asserted that Sparta's problems began when it began to be a sea-power: land-power, according to Isocrates, encourages order and discipline in a people, whereas sea-power relies on mercenary forces [8.102, 12.115].

The 'fall' of Lysander

Undoubtedly questions would also have arisen in time at Sparta about the nature of its empire, Lysander's part in it and his current power and prestige. The attack on his supporter, Thorax, may be evidence of feelings against Lysander and of envy of his success: there had been

¹² Scholars have suggested several reasons for this Spartiate oliganthropia: it may have been economic in origin as the result of growing disparity of wealth between the Spartiates themselves or have been, at least partly, the effect on population numbers of the earthquake of c.465 at Sparta and the subsequent revolt of the helots [Thuc.1.101.2; Diod.11.63.1]. See Cartledge 157 and 221f.

¹³ See Cawkwell, *CQ* 33 (1983) 385-400 and S.Hodkinson, "Inheritance, Marriage and Demography: Perspectives upon the Success and Decline of Classical Sparta" in *Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success* ed. A Powell (London, 1989) 79-121.

similar envy felt by some Spartans over Brasidas' success in Thrace [Diod.14.3; Plut.*Lys.*19; Thuc.4.108]. A reference in Diodorus suggests that some Spartans may have been becoming conscious of the poor reputation Sparta was getting as a result of Lysander's settlements [Diod.14.33]. As king Pausanias is identified with this feeling, the claim may be the result of jealousy of Lysander's success. It is too schematic a solution to suggest that such feelings can be separated to prove the existence of three distinct factions at Sparta.¹⁴ Spartans had never been in a position of quite so much power and wealth before, and it would be natural for Spartan reactions to be mixed and their opinions to fluctuate, while the expectations that the rest of Greece may have had of them went unfulfilled and were even, perhaps, impossible to realise. It cannot be said from post-war Spartan decisions and actions that there was ever a great majority at Sparta that disliked what empire had brought the state; their disagreements seem to have been based more on how their power should be administered than on whether they should enjoy such power at all. Nonetheless, it seems that by 403 a majority at Sparta was becoming disenchanted with Lysander's particular brand of imperialism, and he may have suffered something of an eclipse in popularity and power.¹⁵ He cannot have lost all his influence, however, as he was instrumental in the accession of Agesilaus, c.400 [Xen.3.3.3].¹⁶

The clearest evidence of the new state of affairs is in the actions of Pausanias at Athens in 403. Lysander was relieved of his command for Athens, and Pausanias, with the support of three of the five Spartan ephors, settled the situation with more regard for what most Athenians wanted than had been the case in Lysander's settlement [Xen.2.4.29ff].¹⁷ The Athenians marked

¹⁴ *contra* Hamilton 40-120 and David 5ff.

¹⁵ For the date see Andrewes, *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 3ff.

¹⁶ Lysander is said to have planned a radical change at Sparta whereby kings should be chosen by merit or because of Heraclid birth [Diod.14.13, Plut.*Lys* 24-6]. Xenophon says nothing about this. The additional details that Lysander himself attempted between 403 and 401 to suborn the oracles at Delphi, Dodona and Cyrene to support this aim, are usually accepted by scholars. These details are apparently supported by a further story that a letter indicating his monarchical aims was discovered among Lysander's personal effects after his death. This letter was never made public, although, clearly, its contents were known. Lysander's plans, then, are only known as a result of a supposedly suppressed document. Perhaps the story was concocted by his opponents to discredit Lysander after his death. On the other hand, perhaps it was true: there is insufficient evidence to decide on the matter. It is noteworthy, however, that the incident indicates the possibility of change in the Spartan system around the same time as the conspiracy of Cinadon. King Pausanias, too, when in exile after 395, is said to have written a pamphlet defending the Spartan constitution [For Pausanias see David c.1].

¹⁷ P. Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the crisis of Sparta* (London, 1987) 86ff. regards Pausanias as a statesman for his just settlement of Athens, a decision which paid due regard to Greek public opinion and kept Athens friendly to Sparta as a counterweight to Thebes.

their gratitude by burying the Spartans who died during the unrest in the city in the Ceramaecus [Xen.2.4.33].¹⁸ Pausanias faced an enquiry on his return to Sparta but was acquitted; evidently there was some domestic disagreement over his actions and settlement.

The sources give different reasons for the Spartan reaction against Lysander: Plutarch asserts that the kings, Pausanias and Agis, were envious of Lysander's prestige [Lys.23]. This may well have been the case, since Lysander's power may have seemed to rival that of a king on campaign [Hdt.6.52-7; Thuc.83]. Diodorus suggests that Sparta was becoming aware of its poor reputation in Greece [14.33] because of Lysander's actions, and Xenophon adds that both Thebes and Corinth suspected Sparta of planning to take over Attica [Hell.2.4.30]; they were already hostile because Sparta had refused them a share of the booty from the war.¹⁹ The Spartans had presumably decided that, as the Ionian War had been primarily a naval one, in which these allies had not played a large role, they therefore should not be given a share of the naval spoils.²⁰ Thebes and Corinth may also have felt defrauded of what would accrue to them from the destruction of Athens, which they had advocated, although Thebes appears to have done well out of the raiding from Decelea [Hell. Oxyr.12.4].

¹⁸ See F.Willemsen, "Zu den Lakedaemoniergräbern im Kerameikos" *AM* 92 (1977) 117-57.

¹⁹ Booty was usually distributed on the spot after a battle, see W.K.Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practices I* (Berkeley, 1971) 53ff.

²⁰ In the early years of the Ionian war Sparta's allies in Italy and Sicily, as well as those in the east, such as Chios, had provided a significant portion of the ships for the Spartan fleet; nearly half of the fleet sent to Miletus in 411 consisted of vessels from the west [Thuc.8.26]. Corinth, however, still participated; Corinth was expected to build fifteen ships in 412 [Thuc.8.3], its port at Cenchræe and the *diolkos* were used by the allied fleet, Corinthian allies refused to join in the plans of Astyochus for Lesbos [Thuc.8.32] and Corinthian ships fought in the Hellespont, as did ships from Boeotia, Ambracia, Leucas and Pellene, as well as those from Sparta [Thuc.8.106; Xen.2.1.31]. No Elean ships seem to have taken part in this war: Elis was, apparently, still hostile to Sparta [Thuc.5.50]. Among the allies commemorated on Lysander's monument at Delphi were representatives from Boeotia, Corinth, Troezen, Epidaurus, Pellene, Hermione, Phocis, Megara, Sicyon, Leucas and Ambracia [Paus.10.9.7-11]. Sparta's naval allies still included most of those that had begun the Peloponnesian War as its allies [Thuc.2.9]. The size of their respective contingents is unknown, but they cannot have provided a significant number of the crews needed for the large fleets used at the end of the war. At the end of the war, however, Corinth and Boeotia had serious differences with Sparta over the fate of Athens. Corinth may also have opposed involvement against Athens in the east in 412; it may have used the celebration of the Isthmian Games as an excuse to delay sailing to the east [Thuc.8.9]. The Corinthians may have supposed that the defeat of Athens in Sicily would leave them a free hand in the west and that there would be no need to fight Athens in the Aegean. Perhaps it was the reduction in the numbers of Corinthian crews/ships in proportion to the size of the fleet, as well as the consolidation of Spartan leadership with Persian funding of this fleet that caused a corresponding reduction in the naval importance of Corinth to Sparta. For the question of Corinth's policy after the war, see J.B.Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, (Oxford, 1984) 324f.

Spartan reaction against Lysander's policies probably also led to the abolition at this time of his machinery of settlement, the harmosts and decarchies that were so disliked.²¹ If this withdrawal also took place in the cities of Asia Minor, it may have given Tissaphernes the opportunity to win these cities back for himself while Cyrus was still away [Xen.*Anab.*1.1.6]. The date of Tissaphernes' return, Cyrus' whereabouts and his official position, if any, on his return c.403 to the west coast of the Persian empire are, however, by no means clear.²² Perhaps the news of return of Cyrus and the prospect of continued personal co-operation and friendship between him and Lysander further contributed to the Spartan reaction against Lysander in 403.

Spartan naval power in the Aegean 405-403

Spartan naval power in this period was immense as a result of Lysander's success. Sparta controlled the Aegean and the Hellespont, and probably had at least some influence among the cities of Asia Minor. After Aegospotami Lysander brought to Athens up to two hundred triremes, but most of these must have returned with him to continue the blockade of Samos. After Samos surrendered, Lysander disbanded his fleet and returned to Sparta with the Laconian ships and the prows of the captured Athenian triremes; the ships themselves may have been sunk, if they were no longer needed [Xen.2.3.7-9]. He also collected whatever Athenian ships there were at Piraeus, apart from the twelve the Athenians were allowed by the terms of their treaty with Sparta.

What was done with the vessels brought back to Sparta is not stated in the sources, but Sparta must have used at least some of them for administering its empire and policing it, especially for the collection of the tribute that was imposed [Diod.14.10]. Athens had used some of its fleet in 425/4 in a similar capacity [Thuc.4.50].²³ Such Spartan ships may have been manned by helot rowers, perhaps the class of *desposionautae* [Athen.*Deip.*F1], who received

²¹ For this period as the likely date for their abolition, see Andrewes, *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 3ff. The absence of a harmost at Byzantium in 403/2, when one had been there in 405 [Hell.2.2.2], may indicate that harmosts had been withdrawn, at least in some areas.

²² For the whole question of the return of Tissaphernes and Cyrus and the vagueness of the ancient sources, who were more interested in the problems of mainland Greece, especially Athens, see Andrewes, *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 3ff.

²³ The question of tribute in the Spartan empire is a debated one: the sources record little more than its imposition and that it was hated - Aristotle *Ath. Pol.*39.2; Isoc.12.67-9; Polyb.6.49.8. See also Lotze 63-4; Hamilton 61, suggests that *perioeci* may have been used to collect it, although there is no evidence for this.

their freedom in return for naval service. These ships and crews may have formed a standing Spartan fleet in peace time. The annual appointment of a navarch after Libys in 404/3 certainly suggests that the Spartans anticipated the continuing use of a fleet. An on-going Spartan interest in maritime affairs in the late fifth and early fourth centuries may also be indicated by such names as Naucleidas, the ephor of 404/3, and Naubates, who served in Asia Minor in 398. Both were Spartiate.²⁴ Their names suggest some naval tradition in their families.

Spartan naval finance

Although Spartan public finance is thought to have been rudimentary at this time, which it probably was if compared to the public administration of the Athenian empire, some attention had been paid to it [Arist.*Pol.*1272b]:²⁵ finance was the province of the ephors as a probable extension of their power in the military sphere [Plut.*Lys.*19; Thuc.5.63]. Before and during the Peloponnesian War contributions were levied on Sparta's allies for the duration of hostilities according to previously agreed terms. The introduction to Sparta of large amounts of money at the end of the war is not said to have caused an administrative problem for the Spartans, and so they must have been able to absorb the influx. It was probably from this financial base that subsequent Spartan naval expeditions and mercenaries were financed, as well as public loans to other states.²⁶ In terms of ship numbers and financial reserves, and in prestige Sparta was the supreme naval power in Greece and the East.

Sparta and the revolt of Cyrus - 401

Externally both in the east and west, and internally in the Peloponnese Sparta continued to strengthen its hegemony. Assistance was offered to Dionysius in Sicily in 404/3 [Diod.14.10] by the despatch of the Spartan Aristus; a harmost was sent to Byzantium at the Byzantines' request [Diod.14.12]; and, by 401, the Spartan ephors had agreed to help Sparta's former benefactor, Cyrus, in his revolt against his brother, Artaxerxes, the Persian king [Diod.14.9,19,21; Xen.3.1.1-2, *An.*1-4]. If Lysander was no longer in a position to dictate

²⁴ See Poralla *s.v.h.*

²⁵ The inscription recorded by R.Meiggs and D.Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1969) no.67, and *IG* 3 (1) 1, shows that Sparta accepted assistance in cash and in kind c.427.

²⁶ The Spartans lent money to the Thirty at Athens [Xen.2.4.28]; see also H.Michell, *Sparta* (Cambridge, 1964) 126f. and Cartledge, *Agesilaos* 47f.

Spartan foreign policy, those who were do not appear to have been any less interested in maintaining Sparta's imperial position.

Cyrus had probably returned to Asia Minor by the end of 403, where most of the cities went over to him in preference to Tissaphernes [Xen.*Anab.*1.1.6]. Sometime before the spring of 401 Cyrus had begun recruiting mercenaries in Greece and had asked for Sparta's help in his planned revolt against Artaxerxes. As these plans were to be kept secret from Tissaphernes and the king, Cyrus publicly claimed that he was to campaign against Cilicia and Pisidia in south-east Asia Minor. Evidently there was some problem in these areas, since both Cyrus' recruits and Tissaphernes appear at first to have accepted the reasons asserted.

Official Spartan assistance was granted to Cyrus by the Spartan ephors, who agreed to send seven hundred hoplites to Asia Minor. It is not certain whether this support was prompted by Lysander, as the sources say nothing about him at this time. His possible eclipse, however, does not seem to have deterred Cyrus in his approach to Sparta. He may have laid the groundwork for his appeal when he allowed the Spartans to retain the surplus revenue that Lysander had brought back from his satrapy in 404. There is reason to suppose that Spartan aid to Cyrus was not just a *quid pro quo* for his help against Athens in the war, but was genuine support for a campaign in the outcome of which Sparta had a serious interest. Had Cyrus been successful, Sparta stood to gain not only prestige as the only state that had sent official support to him, and an enormous amount of booty, but the Spartans also might have hoped to reach an accommodation over the status of the cities of Asia Minor through their detente with the new king. They could have supposed that, once at Susa, Cyrus would become less interested in his western empire and more inclined to leave its interests to his Spartan friends; at the least Sparta might have hoped that Cyrus' success would have meant the end of Tissaphernes in Asia Minor.

The ephors ordered the current navarch, Samius/Samus²⁷ [Xen.*Hell.*] or Pythagoras [Xen.*Anab.*], to take his fleet of twenty-five [Diod.14.19], or thirty-five [Xen.*Anab.*1.4.2-3], ships, together with the promised hoplite force, and to join Cyrus' Persian fleet of fifty vessels [Diodorus], or twenty-five [Xenophon], under its Egyptian commander, Tamos, at Ephesus. The

²⁷ For Samius, see Poralla *s. v. h.* He appears to have belonged to a family with some naval tradition. He may have been the grandson of Samius, Herodotus' host at Sparta, whose father, Archias, had been with the Spartan expedition of 525 to Samos [Hdt.3.55]

joint fleets were to sail immediately to Cilicia and report to Cyrus at Issus. He intended to use them to transport his land forces around the Cilician Gates before turning inland.

Several interesting points emerge from this plan: it is stated by Diodorus that Samius/Samus received his orders when he was already in command of the fleet [Diod.14.19.5]. Perhaps Sparta had been preparing its naval force during the previous winter ready for Cyrus' orders in the spring; there may have been a good deal of covert planning going on at Sparta long before the Spartan fleet sailed. The order to sail to Ephesus and then to Issus indicates that Cyrus needed the use of Spartan ships in Cilicia, as well as the promised hoplites: he could not know until he reached the Gates whether the garrison usually stationed there would be loyal to the king, but he had to prepare for the eventuality. Cyrus, then, had been making careful plans for some time, and Sparta was fully aware of them.

The Persian fleet waiting at Ephesus was the one Cyrus had used until recently to blockade Miletus [Xen.*Anab.*1.1.7]. The presence of Persian ships in Aegean ports, though under Cyrus' command, needs explanation. The ships might have been local vessels from coastal states friendly to Cyrus. After Cyrus' defeat, Tamos took these ships to Egypt to put them at the service of the Egyptian king, Psammetichus [Diod.14.35.4].²⁸ If they were local Ionian vessels, there would have been some objection to such a move. Alternatively, the ships might have been those paid for by Cyrus during the latter part of the Ionian War, or part of the Persian royal fleet, officially called into service for the blockade of Miletus. Diodorus refers to Tamos' fleet as a '*barbarikos stolos*', which may mean that it was the Persian royal fleet. Cyrus could not summon more such ships to Ephesus without incurring Tissaphernes' suspicions, but the movement of Spartan ships apparently caused little surprise. Spartan ships could have been in the Aegean for security or for tribute collection. If the ships under Tamos were not part of the royal fleet, it is strange that the royal fleet is not mentioned, especially when the rebel vessels sailed into the home waters of the Persian fleet. Cyrus' secret preparations were evidently successful.

It is also clear that Cyrus was able to sail ships to the Aegean ports of Miletus and Ephesus. In fact, Ephesus seems to have been the designated Persian base; Cyrus sent his fleet back there to await news of his campaign. Had Cyrus obtained special Spartan permission as he

²⁸ It is strange that Tamos did not consider refuge at Sparta, but his previous relations with the Spartans in 411 may not have endeared him to them [Thuc.8.87].

may also have done in order to proceed with the naval blockade of Miletus, or had the two parties come to an agreement, similar to that offered the Athenians by Tissaphernes, that ships under Persian command could sail in the eastern Aegean? Perhaps naval control of the coast of Asia Minor had reverted to Persia after the war, although Tissaphernes does not appear to have used a fleet there while Cyrus was at Susa. In addition, the peculiar situation of a Spartan navarch and his fleet under the command of a Persian officer, Tamos, and later under the control of Cyrus, indicate an especially friendly co-operation between Cyrus and Sparta, as do the claims of *eunoia* for past benefits, emphasised by the sources as the Spartan motive for helping Cyrus [Diod.14.19]. Such friendship may have promised well for their future plans for Asia Minor in Spartan eyes. The Spartans also were clearly backing Cyrus because they did not expect him to lose.

Control of the cities of Asia Minor evidently concerned Sparta, whether Pausanias, Agis or Lysander guided Spartan foreign policy at the time. Secrecy was vital to the expedition's preparations and first moves, and so Sparta's secret support for Cyrus does not necessarily mean that Sparta aimed only at self-protection and denial should the expedition fail. In fact, the Spartans are said to have made a public declaration at Issus of their support for Cyrus [Diod.14.19]. The presence of Spartan ships in Persian waters in support of a rebel force might have been considered by Artaxerxes as much a provocation as the provision of seven hundred hoplites for Cyrus' army or the later presence of a Spartan expeditionary force on the mainland of Asia Minor in 400/399. Cyrus' failure meant that Sparta's approach to its claim to influence in Asia Minor had to be re-considered. The fact of the claim itself, however, seems not to have been in doubt.²⁹

Sparta and Elis c.401/400

Spartan policy in this period had been opposed by Thebes, Corinth and Elis, which refused to supply military contingents for Spartan actions.³⁰ Two of Sparta's former naval

²⁹ In the period of the peace negotiations of the fourth century such collaboration between a Greek state and Persia came to be regarded as treachery, Isoc 12.104.

³⁰ Corinth and Boeotia had not provided contingents for Sparta at Athens [Xen.2.4.30] or against Elis [3.2.25].

allies, Corinth and Elis, were among these recalcitrant Peloponnesian states. At about the same time as the *anabasis* of Cyrus Sparta declared war on Elis.³¹

The immediate cause of hostilities was a quarrel over border territory, but, clearly, there were other underlying reasons for hostility, such as the withdrawal of Elis from the Spartan alliance after the Archidamian War and the humiliating treatment of a distinguished Spartan at the Olympic Games [Thuc.5.31, 49-50, 62; Xen.3.2.21-31]. Perhaps yet another reason was the Spartan naval aspirations in the west; they could not use the Elean ports, Cyllene and Pheia. It may be significant that the Eleans offered to dismantle the fortifications of both these ports and hand over their fleet as part of the terms of peace. They must have felt these conditions to be of interest to Sparta [Xen.3.2.21-31]. Cyllene may have been fortified from the time of the Epidamnian War, when it was attacked and burned by Corcyra [Thuc.1.30]. Perhaps these fortifications are the reason why Athens never appears to have launched any attack on Cyllene in the Archidamian War. Cyllene and Pheia might have been further strengthened in the post-war period because of continuing Elean hostility to Sparta. The loss of western harbour facilities had not particularly mattered to Sparta during the time it was involved in Sicily and could use the ports of Corinth and its allies [Thuc.6.104],³² or in the latter part of the Ionian War, when action had been concentrated in the Aegean, but when Sparta renewed its interest in Sicily through its friendship with Dionysius, and perhaps in the west generally as a source of mercenary power and materiel, access to a friendly port on the west coast of the Peloponnese became necessary; Cyllene lay on a known trade route to the west while any warships making for Sicily needed a safe anchorage along the east coast of the Peloponnese, while Corinth was no longer a reliable ally.

At the end of the Elean War, the peace terms included the handing over to Sparta of the Elean fleet [Diod.14.17]. Sparta cannot have been in need of these ships so soon after the Ionian war. The Spartans were establishing control over Elean foreign policy, as they had done at Athens by their naval restrictions there. Sparta's war with Elis, then, was not necessarily

³¹ Xenophon synchronises this war with the campaigns of Dercylidas in Asia [3.2.21], but later with the death of Agis [3.3.1], who was succeeded by Agésilas about 400 B.C. For the question of the date of the Elean War see the summary of the problems by M.Cook, *Boeotia in the Corinthian War* (Diss.Washington, 1981) 530f., and the arguments in support of Xenophon by R.K. Unz, "The Chronology of the Elean War" *GRBS* 27 (1986) 29-42.

³² Perhaps the Spartans used Asine on the Gulf of Messenia in place of Cyllene [Thuc.6.93] as their port for voyages north and west. The ship caught by Demosthenes at Pheia [Thuc.7.31] was Corinthian, although it carried Peloponnesian reinforcements. Elis had no quarrel with Corinth and may have allowed this ship into harbour.

evidence of a 'Little Sparta' policy pursued by Pausanias or Agis.³³ He may have been as interested in the maintenance of Spartan imperial and naval power as Lysander and his supporters. It was, perhaps, the means by which this power was to be maintained that was the source of friction between them: Pausanias did not interfere internally with Elis as a result of the war, as Lysander had done when he settled Athens.

Sparta and the Hellespont 401/00

When the Ten Thousand reached the coast of the Black Sea in 400, the Spartan navarch, Anaxibius, was in command there with a small naval force [Xen.*Anab.*5.1.4].³⁴ He was accompanied by Eteonicus, an officer who seems to have had much experience in Asia. It is not clear why the Spartan navarch was in the north, how many ships he controlled and whether they were Peloponnesian or local. At least a few must have been Spartan to transport Anaxibius and his successor, Polos, to and from Sparta. Perhaps Sparta was concerned about the security of this area after the defeat of Cyrus in 401 and the revelation of its part in his revolt. The Hellespont was an important strategic site and a source of revenue. Sparta's continued interest in the area is evident: a Spartan harmost had been quickly despatched to Byzantium between 403 and 401 at the request of the Byzantines [Diod.14.12]. Sparta also had support at Byzantium, Chalcedon, Sestus, Abydus and parts of Lesbos until 391, when Thrasybulus won them back for Athens [Xen.4.8.26-28], and Xenophon mentions twelve Spartan harmosts who fought with Anaxibius in the Hellespont in 389 [4.8.39]. The Spartans might also have been responding to appeals from the area against the actions of the Thracians, as they were to do in 398/7 [Xen.3.2.8]. Sparta, then, continued to maintain a strong presence in the Hellespont and reacted quickly to any threat to its security.

Chirisophus, the Spartan commander with the Ten Thousand, was apparently a personal friend of Anaxibius, and, on his arrival in the Black Sea, he unsuccessfully tried to have the navarch arrange for ships to transport the army. The response of both the Spartans and Pharnabazus to the arrival of the mercenary force was embarrassment and fear. Anaxibius appears to have co-operated with Pharnabazus to remove the mercenaries from Asia to Europe

³³ Diodorus mentions Pausanias in this campaign [14.17], Xenophon refers only to Agis [3.2.23]. For Pausanias as a supporter of a traditional Spartan policy of confining its interests to the Peloponnese, see Hamiltons 80f., and David 10f., and Cartledge, Agesilaos 285.

³⁴ For the actions of Anaxibius in the Hellespont, see J.Roisman, "Anaxibios and Xenophon's *Anabasis*" *AHB* 2.4 (1988) 80f.

as quickly as possible. Perhaps the full story of Sparta's involvement with Cyrus had not reached this part of the Persian empire. The mercenaries later joined the Spartan commander, Thibron, for his campaign in Asia.

Anaxibius was replaced in the Hellespont by Polos, navarch for 400/399. Navarchs, apparently, did not officially leave office until they were replaced by a successor. They had no official authority once they had been replaced: thus, Pharnabazus was able to ignore Anaxibius' advice once the navarch was out of office [Xen.*An.*7.1.1].

Whatever the Spartans' concerns in the north, their attention soon turned back to events in the coastal cities of Asia Minor, where Tissaphernes threatened to attack the Greek cities of the coast. Sparta, too, may have been concerned about the control of Ionian waters after the defeat of Cyrus, whose fleet had fled from Ephesus to Egypt for safety [Diod.14.35]. The Spartans would not have wanted Tissaphernes to have the same kind of access to coastal waters as Cyrus had possessed.

The expeditions of Thibron and Dercylidas - c.400-397

After the defeat of Cyrus at Cunaxa Tissaphernes began to assert his authority over Asia Minor [Xen.3.1.3; Diod.14.35-6]. Those of the Greek cities that had supported Cyrus naturally felt some apprehension on Tissaphernes' return to the west. They appealed to Sparta as Greek hegemon, and perhaps as hegemon of Asia Minor after the fall of Cyrus, for assistance. Sparta responded with a diplomatic request to Tissaphernes to refrain from attacking the Greek cities. His answer was to attack Cyme. The Spartans then quickly sent out an expeditionary force under Thibron to Asia Minor [Xen.3.1.4-7; Diod.14.37].³⁵ There does not appear to have been any determined opposition to this action at Sparta, nor did the Spartans show any of their former 'reluctance' to undertake a campaign abroad. Perhaps they were trying to redeem their reputation for 'selling out' the Asian Greeks in 411, although their actions in helping Cyrus do not suggest that they were motivated by guilt so much as a chance to assert their claim to the area. Perhaps some Spartans genuinely wished to protect the Greeks against Tissaphernes, whom they had disliked since the time of the Ionian War [Thuc.8.46ff]. In the light of their support for Cyrus' bid for the throne, it is also possible that this Spartan move was a re-affirmation of the policy of

³⁵ For a detailed assessment of this campaign and that of Dercylidas, see H.D. Westlake, "Spartan Intervention in Asia, 400-397 B.C." *Historia* 35 (1986) 405-416.

402/1.³⁶ Then, the Spartans had agreed to help Cyrus in return for his continued friendship and some amicable arrangement over the cities of the coast. The diplomatic overture to Tissaphernes was meant to find out whether any negotiation was possible with the satrap. When it failed, Sparta acted quickly to maintain its claim to the area. Spartan foreign policy still aimed to maintain Spartan power and Spartan prestige over Greece, the Aegean and Asia Minor; such power could only be maintained with a fleet. It is not clear which individuals at Sparta promoted this policy: Lysander may have been in a position of some influence as a result of his part in the recent accession of Agesilaus, but such interest in Asia Minor must have been supported by a majority at Sparta.

The permanent conquest of Asia Minor was not the object of this expedition. Such an action was unlikely to succeed and the topography of the Aegean coast of Asia Minor makes it difficult. Besides, it would have needed the use of a strong fleet and large land forces, neither of which were sent. The only ships used by Thibron were those that transported his troops from Euboea to Ephesus [Diod.14.36]; the Spartans sailed from Euboea because they had lost access to Corinthian ports. Euboea was a convenient departure point for Ephesus. Thibron's force may have sailed from Gerastus, the port used by Agesilaus in 396 [Xen.3.4.4]. Spartan influence in Euboea was still considerable; it also maintained good relations with Histiaeus [Xen.2.2.3, 5.4.56].

For this expedition the fleet appears to have been used in a purely ancillary capacity to transport troops, as it had for Cyrus' expedition. Even if the Spartan expeditionary force had been successful, control of Asia Minor would have been difficult and expensive, since the Spartans would have had to maintain permanent garrisons there against hostile incursions by Persia. The purpose of the expedition must therefore have been more limited: the Spartans, perhaps, hoped that their determination, as shown by the prompt despatch of the expedition, their support of the coastal cities and their constant attacks on Persian territory, would bring the Persians to agree to some accommodation, perhaps along the lines of that agreed between Persia and Athens according to the 'Peace of Callias'.³⁷ Their hopes may have been further influenced

³⁶ *contra* G.Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta: *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 62-84, who says that the expedition of Thibron was the start of a new period for Spartan policy in Asia.

³⁷ The existence of this peace is one of the major *crucis* of classical Greek history. It seems likely, however, whether there was a formally ratified peace or not, that by the middle of the fifth-century Athens and Persia had come to an acceptable working arrangement over the cities of the Asia Minor coast.

by the apparent weakness of the Persian control of the interior of Asia Minor, a possibility that the survival of the expedition of the Ten Thousand had indicated. Areas of Asia Minor were apparently not under the full control of the Persians; Cyrus could reasonably claim that he was sending an expedition against Cilicia and Pisidia, and Pharnabazus had problems with the Mysians [Xen.3.1.12]. If the Spartans were acting on this assumption, they miscalculated both the effectiveness of their own action and the Persian response.

Thibron's lack of immediate success and his plundering of allied territory caused him to be recalled by the ephors; Sparta needed continued support from the cities of Asia, not their alienation. Thibron was replaced by Dercylidas, who had some military experience in Asia Minor [Xen.3.1.8-28, 2.1-20; Diod.14.38]. Once again, the situation developed contrary to the plans made at Sparta, and a commission was sent to review the problem.³⁸ The Spartans may have been concerned about the possible commitment of further manpower in the east, especially if the Elean War was still in progress. Dercylidas was, however, retained in command for another year. The Spartan presence in Asia had at least been successful in safeguarding the principal Greek cities against Tissaphernes.

A second embassy was sent to Sparta from the Ionians in 398/7 to complain about the lack of a permanent solution to their situation [Xen.3.2.12]. They do not appear to have feared an attempt at complete Spartan conquest of their country; their concern was with Spartan tactics. They advocated an attack on Caria and on Tissaphernes who, they claimed, ought to leave them autonomous. Sparta responded by despatching a fleet of one hundred and twenty ships under the navarch, Pharax, to act in concert with Dercylidas in an attack on Caria, the home territory of Tissaphernes [Xen.3.2.12; *Hell.Oxyr.*4.2].³⁹ The number of ships in this Spartan fleet indicates that the Spartans were planning a major action in the southern theatre, perhaps in the hope of a speedy end to the campaign. The ephors had advocated an attack on Caria from the time of Thibron's expedition [Xen.3.1.7; Diod.14.36]. Although Xenophon concentrates his attention on the actions on land, the co-operation of a fleet was essential to Spartan success on this coast.

The terms of the third treaty agreed by Sparta and Tissaphernes in 411 may have been considered worthless by Sparta after Tissaphernes' inability or unwillingness to produce the Persian fleet as he had promised [Thuc.8.58,99].

³⁸ The commission consisted of Aracus, the former navarch, Naubates and Antisthenes [Xen.3.2.6], who were to review the situation in the east - two of them, at least, with experience.

³⁹ Most of the ships in this fleet may already have been stationed at Rhodes. Pharax' predecessor in the navy of 399/8 is not known.

It could be used to help supply the land forces and to bring over the cities of the Hexapolis, who could be brought out of Tissaphernes' direct control because of their geographical location: they were separated from the hinterland by highland. This fact had brought these cities together and encouraged them to focus their attention on the Aegean.

The Spartans had not, however, anticipated the successful co-operation between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, a move that threatened Ephesus. The Carian plan was abandoned when Dercylidas was forced to march to protect Ephesus. Both sides then agreed to a truce and referred their proposals for peace to their respective home governments: these included the removal of Spartan land forces and their harmosts, installed under Thibron and Dercylidas. The Spartan demand was for independence for the Greek cities. Nothing further is heard of these proposals, which were quickly superseded by a different policy adopted by Artaxerxes.

The expeditions of Thibron and Dercylidas have been rightly criticised for their lack of success and general ineptitude, but it is wrong to assume that the Spartans had no policy at all in this campaign.⁴⁰ The Spartan home government wanted faster results than their commanders in the field could provide.

Sparta had consistently shown its interest in Asia Minor from the time of the revolt of Cyrus. The expeditions of Thibron and Dercylidas were a continuation of the same policy - to bring the Persians to negotiate a settlement favourable to Sparta's interests in Asia Minor through continual attacks on Persian territory that were intended to destabilise Persian control there.⁴¹

The naval war in the south-east Aegean c.397-4

Instead of being brought to negotiate an arrangement, as the Spartans had hoped, Artaxerxes had decided to support a naval campaign against Sparta in the Aegean [Xen.4.2.1; Diod.14.39; Ctesias 63], perhaps from hatred of the Spartans [Plut.*Art.*21], or because of fear of what the Spartans might eventually achieve in Asia, especially with the possible co-operation of Egypt [see below].⁴² The existence and whereabouts of the Persian fleet are unclear at this time, although eighty ships were sent by the ruler of Sidon to help Conon in 396 [Diod.14.79].

⁴⁰ *contra* Westlake, *Historia* 35 (1986) 404ff.

⁴¹ See K.Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 3(1) (Strasbourg, 1912-27) 2.48

⁴² The later report to Sparta of the presence of the Persian fleet at Cyprus and the question of its destination may suggest that it was intended for Egypt. The King of Egypt had acquired twenty-five to fifty triremes as a result of Tamos' defection after the death of Cyrus [Xen.3.4.1]. See D.Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977) 141 ff and n.43.

The royal fleet was not a standing one, and, perhaps, considerable time was needed to prepare for Persian naval action. Conon, the Athenian general who had escaped to Cyprus after Aegospotami [Xen.2.1.29], and Evagoras, ruler of Salamis, had advocated such a naval policy for Persia.⁴³

In 397⁴⁴ a squadron of forty ships was operating under Conon at Caunus, the forward base of the Persian fleet, while Pharnabazus led the Persian land forces. The fleet was blockaded by the navarch Pharax with a Spartan fleet of one hundred and twenty ships [Diod.14.79; *Hell.Oxyr.*4.2]. The presence of so large a fleet from 398 in the south-east Aegean, freely sailing in waters that the Persians probably considered their own,⁴⁵ and the possibility of a link between this fleet and Egypt [see below] may have prompted the raising of the Persian naval force. Pharax' base for operations was at Rhodes, which had been in alliance with Sparta since 411 [Thuc.8.44]. The use of Rhodes was crucial to all Spartan naval actions in south-east Asia Minor in this period.

Conon had arrived at Caunus, perhaps to raise more ships from the area around the Cnidian peninsula and to contact the democrats at Rhodes in the hope of effecting a revolt on the island. Conon may have hoped that winning over Sparta's important base at Rhodes would make the Persian king back Conon's naval plans more seriously. Conon may well have been involved in negotiations with Rhodian democrats for some time; Rhodes admitted the Persian fleet very quickly after the removal of the oligarchic government.

The Persian land forces that came up in large numbers to support Conon at Caunus must have been close by in support of his fleet. Perhaps they were there to compel the local cities to comply with Conon's request for ships. Because of the arrival of this army Pharax was forced to lift the blockade and to retire to Rhodes, presumably because he did not have sufficient hoplites on board to consider a land battle against Conon and Pharnabazus at Caunus. Diodorus suggests that Pharax went deliberately to Caunus from Rhodes via Sasandra in Caria. Thus, the Spartan fleet may have initiated hostilities at Caunus in order to protect both its base at Rhodes and its communications with Egypt from any Persian threat from the Cnidian Chersonese.

⁴³ For the career of Evagoras of Cyprus and his relations with Persia, see E.Costa, "Evagoras of Cyprus" *Historia* 23 (1974) 40-56 and D.Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977) 129-135.

⁴⁴ Bruce 74/5. All references to the Oxynrhynchus historian are to the notation in this edition.

⁴⁵ The Persian fleet had used Caunus and Antandrus as forward bases in 411, [Thuc.8.57,87,91].

Pharax, however, was unable to achieve anything. This fact gave the Persians more time to assemble a fleet in Cyprus.

Perhaps the presence of Conon's fleet in Cnidian waters was part of a Persian counter-move in the south to divide the Spartan fleet and army and prevent the possibility of a combined Spartan attack on Caria or Ionia. This was certainly the result of the movements of the Persian forces: Pharax was drawn to Caunus and delayed there, while Dercylidas met the Persian threat to Ephesus. The result was a stalemate, so that a truce and peace discussions between the satraps and Dercylidas were the inevitable outcome. Either Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had not yet been informed of the king's decision to enlarge his fleet and to drive the Spartans from the Aegean, or the king had not made a final decision. The Spartan government, too, was not yet aware that the king was considering a naval campaign against them [Diod.14.79; Paus.6.7.6].

Athens, too, appears to have become actively involved in hostilities towards Sparta by 397. Pharax intercepted the members of an Athenian embassy on their way to the king and executed them. As well as the embassy, the Athenians had sent arms and men to Conon [*Hell.Oxyr.*1.3, 2.1]. There was to be continued disagreement at Athens about the level of hostility to be shown to Sparta: in 396 the Athenian, Demaenetus, sailed in one of Athens' twelve triremes to join Conon. His action was reported by Thrasybulus to Milon, the Spartan harmost at Aegina, who unsuccessfully tried to overtake him [*Hell.Oxyr.*1.1]. Aegina may have had a Spartan harmost since the end of the Ionian War to protect it from Athenian interference [Xen.2.2.3]. What the political repercussions were in Greece of the Spartan discovery of Athenian dealings with the Persians and of the subsequent execution by Pharax of the Athenian ambassadors, the sources do not say.

It may have been during the following winter, in the navarchy of Archelaidas [397/6], that the Spartans proposed an alliance to Nephereus, the king of Egypt. This offer is associated by Diodorus with the preparations for the expedition of Agesilaus [14.79]. If so, it indicates the extent of Sparta's intended response to Persian naval re-armament. The Spartans were aware by this time of the Persian preparations at Cyprus [Xen.3.4.2], which had been reported to them by Herodas, a Syracusan merchant. The reaction at Sparta appears to have been one of complete surprise and shock. It is interesting that Herodas claimed not to know the destination of this fleet. It may have seemed likely to him that it was to be used against Egypt. Perhaps the king had not yet sent down its final orders, in the same way as he does not appear to have appointed

its commander until 396, when Pharnabazus was put in charge [Diod.14.81]. Diodorus also claims that Conon chose Pharnabazus, but this is most unlikely: Conon must have been obeying Persian orders in this and the following years. In 392/1 he had to return to Sardis to face charges that he was using the Persian fleet to further his own ambition.

Nephereus offered the Spartans grain and naval equipment for one hundred triremes. These were important items for supplying a large fleet. The burden of supplying the Spartan fleet to date must have fallen largely on Rhodes. Such requisitions may have contributed to the discontent that flared up on the island in 396. The convoy carrying these supplies was sent from Egypt to Rhodes, perhaps in late summer 396. It arrived shortly after the island had been taken over by the democrats, had driven out its Spartan fleet and gone over to Conon. Conon was thus able to capture a valuable Egyptian convoy for his own fleet and to cut off further communication between the Spartan fleet and Egypt.

Early in 396 Agesilaus sailed to Ephesus from Euboea with a large land force of eight thousand men and supplies for six months [Xen.3.4.3-4].⁴⁶ Once again, there is no indication of any disagreement at Sparta over an expedition to the east.⁴⁷ The Spartan fleet was probably involved in the transport and escort of Agesilaus' army. It would then have proceeded to Rhodes. Sparta, this time at the prompting of Agesilaus and Lysander, was once more attempting to bring the Persians to acknowledge Spartan claims in Asia Minor. Like the expeditions of Thibron and Dercylidas, the subsequent actions of Agesilaus in Asia hardly seem intended to bring about its permanent conquest, let alone the conquest of the Persian empire, despite the claims of Xenophon [4.2.4]. Had he envisaged such grandiose plans before he reached Asia Minor, it would not have been long before their impossibility became clear to him, as it became to Dercylidas before him.

The Fall of Rhodes and the outbreak of the Corinthian War

The Spartans may originally have planned that this expedition to Asia Minor would be a combined land and sea invasion with the help of the fleet stationed at Rhodes. The subsequent

⁴⁶ For the role of Lysander at this time, see J.-F. Bommelaer, *Lysandre de Sparta* (Paris and Athens, 1981) 173-82 and Hamilton 100f.

⁴⁷ Cawkwell, *CQ* n.s.26 (1976) 67 suggests that the provision of only six months' supplies by Sparta may indicate some opposition to the expedition. These provisions were a great deal more than those of previous expeditions and, in any case, the force was expected to fend for itself once established. The fleet would have been instrumental in raiding cities for such provisions.

loss of its southern naval base at Rhodes must have significantly affected such Spartan plans. In the late summer of 396 Rhodes revolted from its Spartan alliance and admitted the Persian fleet.⁴⁸ The immediate Spartan response to the situation is not known, although a Spartan fleet is later found operating around Cnidus [Xen.4.3.11; Diod.14.83], which may have become its temporary base. Alternatively, the fleet may have moved to Ephesus. The loss of the strategically situated island of Rhodes was a major blow to the Spartan naval effort in the Aegean [Isoc.4.142] and it probably caused Agesilaus to change his campaign tactics; perhaps this accounts for some of the time he spent at Ephesus and his need for a truce with Tissaphernes [Xen.3.4.5-7]. Agesilaus' advance inland into Phrygia in 396 is said to have been prevented by unfavourable omens [Xen.3.4.15]; the king may have returned to the coast because he could not proceed too far inland without control of the coast and without the unhindered support of his fleet. Communications by sea between Sparta, its naval force in Asia and its potential ally in Egypt were impeded by the presence of the Persian fleet at Rhodes, now, perhaps, up to one hundred and seventy strong [Diod.14.79.7]. Conon, then, had won an important strategic advantage without a battle.

Agesilaus' expedition was significant both for continuing Spartan ambitions in Asia Minor and for showing the depth of feeling experienced against Sparta in Greece; the Spartan king tried to raise his exploit to the level of a second Trojan adventure by attempting to sacrifice at Aulis before his departure [Xen.3.4.4]: he was trying to raise support for his anti-Persian campaign by reviving old anti-Persian feelings in Greece. The attempt failed ignominiously because of the hostility of the Thebans. It is noteworthy, too, that Agesilaus went to Aulis by sea; presumably he could not reach it by land through the Corinthiad, Attica and Boeotia because of the hostility of these states. Agesilaus' troops subsequently sailed from Gerastus in Euboea to Ephesus, which clearly still supported Sparta [Diod.14.80; *Hell.Oxyr.*6.2-3]. Cenchreae was unavailable to the Spartans because of Corinthian hostility.

⁴⁸ See I.A.F.Bruce, "The democratic revolution at Rhodes" *CQ* n.s. 11 (1961) 166-70.

Nothing further is known of naval events during Archelaidas' tenure.⁴⁹ In addition, nothing is recorded of his successor, Pollis, the navarch of 396/5 [*Hell.Oxyr.*4.2].⁵⁰ It is unfortunate that so little is known of Sparta's naval policy immediately following the loss of Rhodes. Perhaps there was none after so severe a blow to Spartan naval power in the southern Aegean. It may have taken time for the full implication of the situation to set in at Sparta and for a new policy to be developed. The absence of a clear Spartan policy may be indicated by the lack of confidence shown by the Ionians in the Spartan fleet at Cnidus.

Sparta did not, however, abandon its claims to Asia Minor. The Spartans continued to appoint navarchs and their ships continued to harass the Persian fleet [*Isoc.*5.100, 9.64, 4.140];⁵¹ if the Spartans also knew of the discontent in the Persian fleet at Rhodes [*Hell.Oxyr.*10.1], they may have hoped to recapture the island. The democratic revolution there in 395 ended that possibility. The threat of secret negotiations between Rhodian oligarchs and the Spartan fleet may account for some of the violence that took place in this revolution.

In the west in 396/5 the former navarch, Pharax, led Dionysius' allied naval contingent of twenty ships from the Peloponnese and Italy against Carthage [*Diod.*14.63,70]. He also declared Sparta's support for Dionysius. Pharax, one of the better-known Spartan naval commanders of the period,⁵² is thus associated with Spartan maritime actions in east and west. The Spartans were still operating as though they believed their naval power to extend from Asia Minor to Sicily.

⁴⁹ See Poralla s.v.h. and Bruce 66-69. There may be references to him at *Hell.Oxyrh.*5. p.76 and 9.1 p. 95/6, although it is not certain.

⁵⁰ The dating problems for the navarchies of Archelaidas and Pollis are clearly laid out by Bruce 66-69, 73. Pollis was navarch in 396/5 [*Theopompus Hell.*4.2,14.1] and *epistoleus* to Podanemus in 393/92 [*Xen.*4.8.11]. He was also associated with Sparta's western policy as ambassador to Syracuse in 388 [*Plut. Dion* 5]. He may have held the navarchy twice, as a Pollis is recorded in 377/6 as navarch at Naxos [*Xen.*5.4.60/61; *Polyaenus* 3.11.11], although it could be a different Pollis.

⁵¹ The Spartan fleet is said to have been a constant problem for the Persians in this period, see W.E.Thompson, "Isocrates on the Peace Treaties" *CQ* 33 (1983) 75-70.

⁵² The career of Pharax, perhaps the son of the Spartan commander at Pylos [*Thuc.*4.38], spanned the sphere of Spartan military and naval activity from Asia Minor to Sicily. He was an adviser to Agis at Mantinea in 418 [*Diod* 12.79.] and fought at Aegospotami in 405 [*Paus* 6.3.15]. He was in Asia Minor as navarch in 397/6 [*Xen.*3.2.12;*Diod* 14.79 *Theop Hell* 2.1] and served at Rhodes [*Diod.*14.79]. Later he represented Sparta with Dionysius against Carthage in 396/5 [*Diod* 14.63,70]. He accompanied Agcsilaus at the Isthmus in 390 [4.5.6].

Sparta's actions at sea around Asia Minor were an important contribution to the outbreak in 395 of the Corinthian War in mainland Greece.⁵³ The presence of a large Spartan fleet in the south-east Aegean from 398 and the Spartan negotiations with Egypt must have confirmed Artaxerxes' fears that the Spartans intended to attack Asia Minor in greater force, and thus have contributed to his agreement to fund a fleet to respond to the threat.⁵⁴

The naval war was also a link between the Corinthian allies and Persia: Pharnabazus and Conon sailed to Corinth in 393 to bring financial support to the allies there [Xen.4.8.8].⁵⁵ The fall of Rhodes in 396 signified the start of a more aggressive phase of the naval war by Persia: Pharnabazus was appointed supreme commander of the fleet, which was increased by the addition of ninety ships while it was stationed at Rhodes [Diod.14.79].

In mainland Greece Sparta had already become hated by various states for its policies towards them and, perhaps, for its ambitious plans for the Aegean and Asia Minor. Sparta may also have been criticised for its favourable attitude to Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse [Diod.14.10; Isoc.8.95]. When the Persians despatched Timocrates to foment war in Greece and to effect the recall of Agesilaus by bribing the leaders of the Greek states, Thebes, Corinth, Argos and Athens, he found the situation there favourable:⁵⁶ the Greeks may have feared that Sparta was

⁵³ The causes of the Corinthian War have been variously interpreted as the fault of Thebes, Spartan land imperialism, Spartan naval imperialism or economic in origin, see K.J.Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* (Strassburg, 1912-27) 3 1 (2) 61-8, G.Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta" *CQ* 70 (1976) 62-84, D.Kagan, "The Economic Origins of the Corinthian War" *PP* 80 (1961) 321-41, I.A.F.Bruce, "Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War" *Emerita* 28 (1960) 75-86, Cartledge, *Agesilaos* 287-9, Andrewes, *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 3ff., Hamilton 158-61, M.L.Cook, *Boeotia in the Corinthian War: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (Diss.Washington, 1981) 167-82, S.Perlman "The Causes and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War" *CQ* 58 (1964) 64-81 and J.E.Lendon, "The Oxyrhynchus Historian and the origins of the Corinthian War" *Historia* 38 (1989) 300-313. The view followed here stresses the importance of the naval war in the Aegean to the outbreak of the Corinthian War, though, undoubtedly, it was not the only contributing factor. It is a common view that the naval war was not as important as the expedition of Agesilaus in Asia [Bruce 68/9]. This is due to the bias of Xenophon's account and to the fragmentary nature of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. The Oxyrhynchus historian seems to give some prominence to the progress of the war in the Aegean.

⁵⁴ See S.Hornblower, *The Greek World 479-323 B.C.* (London, 1983) 181-96, who emphasises the effect on Greece of Sparta's dealings with Egypt and Syracuse. It is equally possible that these events affected the decisions of the Persian king.

⁵⁵ See Perlman, *CQ* 58 (1964) 64-81.

⁵⁶ The circumstances and date of Timocrates' mission to Greece are debatable. See Bruce 58f. and *Hell.Oxyrh.* 7.2., who says that Pharnabazus sent Timocrates. Xenophon says it was Tithraustes. Tithraustes may have arrived too late to do so, as he was appointed late in summer of 395 [Paus. 3.9.9]. Xenophon does not mention Athens taking any Persian money, whereas the Oxyrhynchus historian [7.2]. does. Polyaeus [1.48.3] claims that it was Conon who sent the money from the Persians.

returning to the imperial policies of Lysander, while the fall of Rhodes to the Persian fleet might have made them hope that Spartan aims in the east could be defeated. In particular, the Athenians, if the hopes ascribed to Conon are typical of the majority of Athenian opinion [Diod.14.39], thought of regaining their lost maritime power.⁵⁷

War in Greece broke out during the summer of 395 and began badly for Sparta with loss of its control in central Greece and southern Thessaly, the death of Lysander at Haliartus and the exile of Pausanias [Xen.3.5.6,17-25]. As a result of fighting a war on two fronts and through the increased difficulty of communications with its forces in the east, Sparta gave Agesilaus total command of the naval and land forces in Asia. Agesilaus promptly ordered one hundred and twenty triremes to be built by local cities and individuals favourable to the Spartan cause, i.e. at their own, not Spartan, expense [Xen.3.4.27-9]. Clearly, he appreciated the need for a strong Spartan-led fleet in the east. It is not clear whether these ships were in addition to Spartan ships already in the Aegean. This may have been the case, if the Spartans believed they had to counter the figure of three hundred vessels for Conon's fleet, as reported by Herodas.⁵⁸ In any case, the allies could not have provided anything like the one hundred and twenty ordered: at Cnidus in 394 the Spartan naval effort in the Aegean was crippled by the loss of fifty ships out of a fleet of eighty-five [Diod.14.83].

Agesilaus then appointed his brother-in-law, Peisander, as navarch of the eastern fleet.⁵⁹ Despite his approval of Agesilaus, Xenophon was forced to confess that Peisander was less than suitable for the position, as he had little experience in the large-scale organisation needed for the task [3.4.29].

It is not clear what Agesilaus' orders to Peisander were; given the fact that Peisander was operating around Cnidus in the following year, he may have been expected to attempt to regain control of the southern waters around Rhodes once his fleet was up to strength. The organisation and fitting out of this fleet must have taken until the spring of 394. These Spartan naval

⁵⁷ See R.Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396-386 B.C." *JHS* 87 (1967) 95-116 and G.Cawkwell, "The Imperialism of Thrasybulus" *CQ* 26 (1976) 270-277.

⁵⁸ The naval figures differ in the accounts of Diodorus, who gives a total of one hundred and seventy ships and *Hell. Oxyrh.* 4.2, who claims that it was nearer one hundred.

⁵⁹ Cartledge, *Agesilaos* 26 emphasises Agesilaus' tendency to appoint family and friends to positions of power.

preparations in the south may have prompted Tissaphernes to suppose that Agesilaus' next attack would be on Caria [Xen.3.4.12]].

The battle of Cnidus - 394

Because of the interest of Xenophon in Agesilaus' land campaigns, the fragmentary nature of the Oxyrhynchus history and the summary character of the account of Diodorus, little is known of the immediate events leading up to the battle of Cnidus in 394. Peisander may have had to change his plans for the southern Aegean when Agesilaus was recalled to Greece [Xen.3.5.17-25; Diod.14.82,3], and the Spartan fleet and army was thus divided. Again, the Persian strategy of attempting to divide the Greek land and sea forces was successful. Agesilaus returned via the invasion route of Xerxes in 480 [4.2.8]; perhaps he was once more attempting to elevate what was in reality an ignominious recall: Sparta could not allow his army to be cut off by further Spartan losses in central Greece, nor could the fleet be recalled or used, as it would have to pass the Athenians at Rhodes. Besides, to recall the fleet would have meant the complete abandonment of Sparta's position in Asia Minor. Agesilaus had apparently given every indication that he intended to return: Sparta was not yet ready to give up its claims in the east [Xen.4.2.4].

Although Sparta was successful at the battles of Nemea and Coronea in mainland Greece [Xen.4.2.15-23,3.17-23; Diod.14.83,84], its fleet was soundly defeated off Cnidus by Conon and the Persians. Little is known of the battle: Xenophon preferred to deal with it as briefly as possible [4.3.10-12,8.1]. Diodorus, who provides a little more detail [14.83], says that Conon and Pharnabazus had over ninety ships. When they heard of the presence of an enemy fleet at Cnidus they prepared for battle. Peisander had eighty five ships and was sailing in the direction of Phycus and Caunus. He may have intended to bring the Persian fleet to battle by such a move into Persian-held waters. His ships, however, were still under sail when the leading vessels on both sides engaged. Evidently the Spartan fleet was not ready to confront so large a Persian force, and the allied vessels fled to shore; a prudent move if they saw that the position was hopeless, since they would afterwards have to come to some accommodation with a victorious Persian fleet. The position of the Asian Greeks was precarious after the recall of Agesilaus.

Although the number of ships on both sides was approximately equal, Conon decided to fight while the Spartan fleet was still under sail and thus at a disadvantage in manoeuvring. He was given an extra advantage when the Spartans' allies deserted.

The aftermath of Cnidus 394-391

Diodorus concluded his account of the naval war in the Aegean by saying that from this time the Spartans lost their maritime empire [14.84.4; also Isoc.12.56]; he may have been following the assessment of Theopompus, whose history concluded with this battle [14.84.7]. For the moment, the Spartans had lost a great deal, but they retained a sufficient presence in the Aegean to cause problems later for Athens in its attempt to regain naval supremacy there. The Hellespont was not yet settled, the northern coast of the Aegean remained under Spartan control and there were Spartan harmosts at Lesbos [Xen.4.8.25-39], at Aegina and possibly at Euboea. Sparta, then, could still threaten the Athenian line of supply.

Sparta, however, was unable to capitalise on its position because of its lack of ships and because of the speed of the subsequent Persian actions; Pharnabazus and Conon, in following up their success at Cnidus, robbed Sparta of possible tribute and bases in Asia and the offshore islands; in addition, there was no way to replace quickly the ships lost at Cnidus. Spartan harmosts on the Asian mainland abandoned their posts after the battle and fled to the nearest Spartan possessions in the Hellespont, Abydos and Sestus [Xen.4.8.3]. Here Dercylidas, harmost at Abydos, organised resistance to the approaching Persian fleet. This fleet had already brought over Cos, Nisyros and Teos through promising them autonomy without a garrison [Xen.4.8.1; Diod.14.84]: the garrisons had, perhaps, been a source of complaint against Sparta. Many of the cities, however, may have had little choice but to comply with the demands of the Persians, especially if they had actively supported Agesilaus. Chios, Mytilene, Ephesus and Erythrae also joined the Persian cause.

The Persian fleet wintered in the Hellespont and blockaded Abydos and Sestus [Xen.4.8.6]. Conon was still acting under Persian orders at this time; his expedition to Abydos was made because Pharnabazus wished to expel Spartan influence on the northern coast of his satrapy. The blockade was lifted in the following spring when Pharnabazus planned to take the naval war across the Aegean to the Peloponnese [Xen.4.8.6,7; Diod.14.84].

Persian strategy was clearly to heighten pressure on Sparta by attacking the coast of the Peloponnese and by sailing to Corinth to link up with and to finance the Greek alliance fighting the Corinthian War [Xen.4.8.8]. Sparta would thus be threatened from land and sea. The Persian fleet sailed via the Cyclades, where it occupied Melos on its way to the Peloponnese [Xen.4.8.6; Diod.14.84; Lysias 2.59; Isoc.4.119]. A garrison under an Athenian commander

was left at Cythera, the strategic position of which was well known to the Greeks [Xen.4.8.8; Diod.14.81].⁶⁰ Presumably the garrison was to guard the channel between Cythera and Anti-Cythera, the easiest route to the Aegean from the Laconian Gulf.⁶¹ Nothing is known of actions by this garrison, but its presence must have been why no Spartan fleet was heard of in the Aegean for some time; Sparta was cut off from its remaining bases in the Aegean and from any source of money and ships there. The Spartans, however, may have been making some provision for the security of the Peloponnese against such an occupation since the fall of Rhodes. The presence of late fifth/early fourth century walls on Anti-Cythera may indicate as much; Cythera was also fortified by this time [Xen.4.8.8.].⁶²

With the removal of the Spartan fleet as an effective force in the Aegean, Athens pursued a policy of renewed imperialism there.⁶³ Athens began a series of alliances that eventually formed the basis of the Second Athenian Confederacy [Tod, *GHI* 123]. The dedication at Athens of a statue of Conon minimised the Persian contribution to the battle of Cnidus [Dem.20.69], while Conon's plans to continue the rebuilding of Athens' fortifications and to win influence along the coast of Greece [4.8.12] had imperialist overtones. Athens also explored the possibility of an association with Dionysius [*JG* 2.2.18,20; Lysias,19.20]. These independent actions also demonstrate the naval weakness of Sparta, which was unable to respond to them. Athens' plans, however, were still dependent on Persian support; Conon was recalled to Persia because of the accusations made by Tiribazus that he was using Persian resources for his own ends. There was no sizable fleet in the Aegean other than the Persian at this time [Lysias 2.56-60; Xen.4.8.4].

Because of the continuing war around Corinth, a small Spartan fleet was maintained in the Corinthian Gulf in 393 under the navarch, Podanemus. Ships under Spartan command were also used in 394 to transport Agesilaus' troops to the Peloponnese after Coronea; the land route was closed to Sparta because of the hostility of Corinth and Argos. Megara may have remained

⁶⁰ Demaratus pointed out the advantages of holding Cythera to the Persian king in 480 [Hdt.7.234]. Thucydides also mentions the point [4.53]. The Athenians had occupied Cythera in the Archidamian War and raided the Laconian coast from the island [Thuc.4.53-6].

⁶¹ See H.M.Denham, *The Ionian Islands to the Anatolian Coast. A Sea-Guide* (London, 1982) 95-7.

⁶² C.Foss, "Greek sling bullets in Oxford" *AR* (1975) 40-44 supposes the walls to be Athenian, built by Conon at the same time as his occupation of Cythera. They could just as easily have been part of Spartan defences.

⁶³ See Scager, *JHS* 87 (1967) 95-116 and Cawkwell, *CQ* 26 (1976) 270-77.

neutral.⁶⁴ The Corinthian fleet, funded by Pharnabazus, was also active in this area in 393 [Xen.4.8.11]. Sparta's neglect of its fleet, especially in the light of its imperialist ambitions, is quite extraordinary. It was only just over ten years since Lysander had controlled a fleet of two hundred vessels.

Podanemus, the Spartan navarch, was killed in a naval battle in the Gulf of Corinth and his *epistoleus*, Pollis, wounded; a third Sparta officer, Herippidas, took command [Xen.4.8.11]. The command structure in the Spartan fleet was apparently similar to that of their army [Thuc.3.100], where Spartan officers were designated to take command should anything happen to the original commanding officer.

The Persian plan may have been to wait for Sparta to come to terms or for the Corinthian allies to finish the war. Conon had persuaded Pharnabazus to leave a fleet at Athens because a strong Athens, supported by contributions from the Aegean islands, would keep Sparta confined to the Peloponnese and out of the Aegean [Xen.4.8.9]. Although their efforts were now restricted to the Gulf of Corinth in the west, the Spartans recorded some naval success: they retook Rhium, which had been held by Corinth, and regained control of the Gulf [Xen.4.8.11].

The peace negotiations of 392/1

Spartan fears of a resurgence of Athenian power in the Aegean are said to have prompted the despatch of Antalcidas on a peace mission to Tiribazus, perhaps in winter 392/1 [Xen.4.8.12].⁶⁵ It is more likely that the disaster to Sparta's maritime power at Cnidus caused this change in Spartan policy in the Aegean. The Corinthian allies sent their own embassy in protest. The Spartan terms contained a bilateral offer of peace with Persia on the basis of the withdrawal of the Spartan claim to Asia Minor, while the states of the Aegean and the mainland were to be autonomous. The negotiations were followed by a second meeting at Sparta [Andoc.3.1; Xen.3.4.1; Philochorus F.149]. Clearly, Sparta needed some kind of agreement to prevent further Persian involvement in Greece to Sparta's detriment: the proposal to give up their claims to Asia Minor reveals how weak Spartan naval power had become after Cnidus to abandon

⁶⁴ Megara is not mentioned in Xenophon's list of anti-Spartan allies at Nemea in 394 [4.2.17].

⁶⁵ How far Agesilaus was involved with this peace move is difficult to say. Teleutias, his brother, is made to criticise Spartan dependence on foreign power [Xen.5.1.4ff]. Such an opinion would accord with the actions of Agesilaus in leading a Spartan force against the Persians in Asia. There is no evidence for great opposition to peace among the Spartans, but support for Agesilaus may have been weakened after the naval disaster at Cnidus in 394.

a policy it had consistently followed since the time of Cyrus' revolt. Agesilaus, who seems to have supported actions against Persia, may have lost influence at Sparta after Cnidus; he is not mentioned in the sources between Nemea and the attack on Argos in 391.⁶⁶ Perhaps Agesipolis, the son of Pausanias, was instrumental in sending Antalcidas to instigate these peace talks with Persia. Such proposals are a significant admission of Sparta's weakness after Cnidus. Perhaps their advantage for Spartan maritime policy was that, if they could no longer lay claim to Asia Minor, then peace with Persia on these terms would mean that Athens would also be prevented from doing so. In addition, independence for the Aegean states did not necessarily mean that Sparta or Athens intended to keep out of the Aegean altogether: there were still Spartan harmosts at Lesbos and Aegina and the Hellespontine cities of Abydos and Sestus were under Spartan control [Xen.4.8.32]. In any case, the peace negotiations failed; none of the Greek states were ready to give up their hegemonical aspirations.⁶⁷

Renewal of the naval war in the Aegean, 391-386

The king, too, had no reason to trust the Spartan offer. Despite the support that Tiribazus, the satrap, is said to have given Antalcidas and despite the recall of Conon to Sardis, Artaxerxes sent Struthas to replace Tiribazus on the coast of Asia Minor [Xen.4.8.17]. Struthas' anti-Spartan actions are said to have caused the Spartans to despatch Thibron in 391 to attack Persian interests from his base at Ephesus [Xen.4.8.17; Diod.14.99]. How Thibron managed to reach Ephesus, and why the city admitted him are not stated.⁶⁸ It appears that his army was a mercenary force, raised in Asia, probably with money brought from Sparta. Spartan financial resources were apparently not entirely exhausted, although the Spartans do not seem to have been ready to spend much on a fleet. It is possible that the expenses of a fleet were becoming too great for any single state to provide without significant contributions from subject states. A locally-raised mercenary army may have been less expensive. In addition, the presence of the garrison at Cythera may have successfully prevented both the entry into Laconia of supplies for new vessels and the departure of Spartan ships from Gytheum in any force. It was not able to do so, however, after 391.

⁶⁶ See R.E.Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaus' Foreign Policy" *Historia* 2 (1953/4) 274-288.

⁶⁷ See Seager, *JHS* 87 (1967) 95-116 and Cawkwell *CQ* 26 1976 271 on this conference]. Cartledge claims that Athens rejected peace terms because of its imperial aspirations and panhellenist sympathies, *Agesilaos* 293/4.

⁶⁸ Ephesus had admitted Pharnabazus' fleet after Cnidus [Xen.4.8.3].

The failure of the peace talks led to renewed land and naval warfare in Greece and in the south-east Aegean in 391. In the Corinthian Gulf Teleutias with twelve ships successfully supported his brother Agesilaus' attack on Argos and Corinth by capturing the ships and dockyards at Lechaeum [4.4.19; Diod.14.86].

The expedition of Thibron was not the only evidence of renewed Spartan claims in the Aegean basin. The presence of a group of exiled Rhodian oligarchs is attested by Xenophon at Sparta about 391 [4.8.20]. It may not have been the first such appeal from them. Evidently, Sparta had not permanently lost interest in regaining its maritime influence in the Aegean to counter the growing power of Athens.

Ecdicus was sent east with eight ships [4.8.18-21]. Another Spartan, Diphridas, accompanied this force to collect Thibron's army, to raise another and to carry on the war against the Persian, Struthas, on the mainland [Xen.4.8.17]. These ships made for the area around Cnidus, where the survivors of Thibron's army were holding out against Struthas [Diod.14.99]. Cnidus was to be Ecdicus' base while he discovered the true situation at Rhodes and reported it back to Sparta [Xen.4.8.22]. Ecdicus may also have established good relations with Samos on his way to Cnidus, since Samos soon provided ships for his successor, Teleutias [Xen.4.8.23].

The Spartans' eastern policy of attacks on land and the attempted restoration of their power on Rhodes may have caused the Persians to lose confidence in the Athenians' promise to keep Sparta weak. Besides, Athens was also assisting Evagoras of Salamis, who was currently in revolt against the king.⁶⁹

As the Spartan naval force at Cnidus was not large enough to counter democratic support on the island, Ecdicus requested reinforcements. The renewed Spartan naval initiative was clearly important and the situation in the Gulf sufficiently settled, because they removed Teleutias and his squadron from Lechaeum and sent him to Cnidus to replace Ecdicus.⁷⁰ Teleutias collected twenty-seven ships on his way east, including some from Samos and an Athenian force of ten vessels on its way to Cyprus [Xen.4.8.24]. Xenophon draws attention to the paradox that Spartans, fighting against the king's forces, captured an Athenian squadron also on its way to

⁶⁹ See Costa, *Historia* 23 (1974) 40-56 and D.Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977) 141-8.

⁷⁰ There is a problem over the identity of the navarch of this year, 390/89: no navarch is specifically mentioned in the sources. Cawkwell, *CQ* 26 (1976) 272 n.14, suggests Chilon, who fought a battle against Demaenetus [Aesch. 2.78]. He was identified with Milon, harmost at Aegina, by Meyer [Theopompus. *Hell.* 42].

fight the king. Teleutias took command at Cnidus and then sailed to Rhodes, as he now had more ships than his opponents. Rhodes returned to oligarchic control by about 389 [Diod.14.97].⁷¹ The presence of Teleutias, his brother, as navarch may indicate a renewal of Agesilaus' influence over Sparta's foreign policy. Agesilaus may still have intended to resume his eastern plans which had been interrupted in 394.

The Athenian response to these Spartan moves, or the action that precipitated them through Athenian fear of increased Spartan interest in the Aegean [Xen.4.8.25], was the preparation of a fleet of forty ships at Athens. They were commanded by Thrasybulus, whose orders apparently were to make for Rhodes [Xen.4.8.25ff; Diod.14.94].⁷² Although Thrasybulus first sailed towards Ionia, he proceeded north to the Hellespont, where he successfully replaced the Spartan interests at Thasos, Byzantium, Calchedon and Lesbos, and collected revenues for his own fleet. His change of plan may have been due to the news that Teleutias had recovered Rhodes or to the need for money.

The Spartans, concerned about their control of Abydus, the Athenian hold on Byzantium and the possibility that other cities might go over to Athens (they had about twelve other cities in the area under the control of Spartan harmosts [Xen.4.8.38]), sent Anaxibius to replace Dercylidas as harmost at Abydus [Xen.4.8.31-32]. Xenophon's explanation that no blame was to be attached to Dercylidas and that Anaxibius obtained his command through political influence may suggest that questions may have been asked at Sparta about why the base at Abydus had done nothing to oppose the Athenian actions in the Hellespont. Xenophon is clearly concerned to exonerate Dercylidas from any charges. Anaxibius sailed for the north with three ships and with money for a mercenary force. With these vessels and three more from Abydus he was able to interrupt commercial shipping through the straits [Xen.4.8.33], a tactic Sparta had previously used against Athens with great success. Anaxibius also organised the support of local Spartan harmosts. He was later killed in a land ambush by the Athenian commander Iphicrates and his force of peltasts [Xen.4.8.34-39], who had been sent in response to Sparta's successful economic blockade of the straits. At the same time Eteonicus, with the support of the ephors, was actively encouraging raids against Attica from Aegina to increase economic hardship at Athens [Xen.5.1.1].

⁷¹ See E.David, "The Oligarchic revolution at Rhodes, 391-89 B.C." *CP* 79 (1984) 271-84.

⁷² See Scager, *JHS* 87 (1967) 95-116 for the date of Thrasybulus' departure from Athens.

Thrasybulus had gone south from the Hellespont to collect more money at Lesbos and Aspendus, where he was killed because his troops had plundered the property of the inhabitants [Xen.4.8.30]. It seems strange that Thrasybulus went as far east as Aspendus in Persian territory. Perhaps Pisidia was still not under full Persian control and was open to raids like this. The size of Thrasybulus' fleet also meant that he was safe from attack by the Spartan ships at Rhodes. Clearly, from the presence of these ships, Sparta had regained some of its influence in the south-east Aegean at Samos, Rhodes and Cnidus, even if its response to Thrasybulus' successes in the Hellespont had been cut short by Anaxibius' death.

While stationed at Rhodes Teleutias, too, needed money for his fleet. He is said to have collected it from the islands (presumably the Cyclades) [5.1.2]. Evidently the Athenians were unable to prevent such actions; Sparta may have considered the Cyclades, too, part of its sphere of influence in the early 380s. Teleutias was evidently close enough to assist the Spartan garrison at Aegina against an Athenian blockade. Teleutias had been in command on Rhodes for a considerable time. His successful tenure is recorded by Xenophon [5.1.3ff], but the details are obscure. Xenophon's praise of Teleutias may also be vitiated by his obvious admiration for Teleutias' step-brother, Agesilaus.

What Xenophon does not say, but what is clear from later Spartan action, is that after Teleutias' command Spartan strategy in the Aegean changed, and that Rhodes was no longer a major Spartan base. Teleutias and the navarchs who immediately succeeded him all took over their commands at Aegina, probably now the Spartan forward base in the Aegean. The Spartans may have withdrawn their ships from eastern waters in preparation for a new initiative being discussed during the navarchy of Hierax in 389/8. Alternatively, they may have been withdrawn under the terms of the later peace of 386. By 378/7 Rhodes was an ally of Athens [*IG* 2(2) 43]. Some of the mercenaries from Teleutias' fleet probably remained on Aegina: these were the men who greeted the appointment of Teleutias to the command at Aegina with such approval [Xen.5.1.14].

Teleutias is nowhere referred to as navarch during his command at Rhodes, although Xenophon suggests as much in his description of the transfer of command from Herippidas to Teleutias in the Corinthian Gulf in 392 [4.8.11]. Teleutias may have been appointed navarch as a result of the influence of his brother, who had been given the navarchy or the power to appoint a navarch in 395. There is no evidence that Agesilaus gave up this privilege, granted him in the

crisis of the outbreak of the Corinthian War. When Agesilaus returned to Sparta after Coronea, Podanemus and Pollis may already have been elected for 394/3. Their replacement by Herippidas perhaps signals Agesilaus' renewed influence at Sparta: Herippidas had served with Agesilaus in Asia [Xen.4.1.11]. In the light of Agesilaus' power, the appointment of Teleutias to the office of navarch in the Gulf and his long tour of duty on Rhodes are not surprising.⁷³

In 389/88 Teleutias was replaced as navarch on Aegina by Hierax. Hierax left twelve ships on the island with his epistoleus, Gorgopas, to continue raiding Attica [Xen.5.1.4]. Nothing further is known of Hierax' navarchy. The Spartans were clearly keeping up economic pressure on Athens, perhaps while preparing a new policy for the Aegean. They were evidently negotiating with Syracuse for a squadron of ships, which was to arrive in the Hellespont to assist Antalcidas in 387 [Xen.5.1.26]. They were also active in the west in 389; in response to an appeal from the Achaeans, Agesilaus campaigned against Acarnania, an ally of Athens and Boeotia [Xen.4.6.1-4]. Achaea was a member of the Spartan Alliance. Agesilaus' force went by sea from the Peloponnese to Calydon, perhaps using Achaean and Elean ships; Achaea provided contingents for the Spartan fleet [Xen.6.2.3]. His return journey was via Aetolia to Rhium, since the Athenians were guarding his previous route from Oeniadae [Xen.4.6.14].

Antalcidas, Persia and the Hellespont 388-386

Antalcidas, who had been ambassador for Sparta during the abortive peace negotiations of 392/1, succeeded Hierax as navarch in 388/7. The appointment of Antalcidas looks like a deliberate move by Sparta towards new peace negotiations with Persia. It may also signify the abandonment by Agesilaus of any interest in the Aegean, in order to direct his attention towards the growing power of Thebes on the mainland.⁷⁴ Antalcidas took office at Aegina and used the ships there as escort to Ephesus for his fleet of twenty-five ships [Xen.5.1.6], whence he left to consult with Tiribazus [Xen.5.1.25]. He would surely not have needed such an escort had a

⁷³ The outbreak of the Corinthian War in 395 had created two theatres of war for Sparta. It would have been impossible for a single navarch to oversee both, so that Agesilaus' command in Asia was increased to include both naval and military forces. In the meantime, Sparta appointed a navarch, Podanemus, for the western area. It is not clear whether Agesilaus used his power as king to appoint Peisander or whether he merely delegated his authority as navarch to his brother-in-law, while retaining the office himself. On his return to Sparta after Coronea, Agesilaus appears to have continued to have some say in appointments to the navarchy, especially that of his brother Teleutias.

⁷⁴ Plutarch *Ages.*23 suggested that Agesilaus and Antalcidas were antagonists. This is supported by D.G.Rice, *Agesilaus, Agesipolis and Spartan Politics, 386-79 B.C.* *Historia* 23 (1974) 165 and questioned by Smith, *Historia* 2 (1953) 274f.

Spartan fleet still been at Rhodes and had the south Aegean been secure. Evidently, the use of an escort implies that this was a crucial mission and that Sparta was not prepared to run the risk of losing any ships in a naval battle.

Antalcidas' *epistoleus*, Nicolochus, was sent on to Abydus in the Hellespont, where an Athenian fleet was threatening the area from Thasos and Samothrace [Xen.5.1.6]. This fleet blockaded Nicolochus at Abydus.

Antalcidas' precaution of taking an escort to Ephesus proved correct: on his return to Aegina, where he had been in command of a naval squadron when *epistoleus* to Hierax [Xen.5.1.5-6]. Gorgopas met an Athenian squadron, perhaps on its way from Cyprus. He followed these ships and attacked them by night off Cape Zoster in Attica [5.1.9]. The Athenians in turn tried to dislodge the Spartans from Aegina. Gorgopas was killed in an ensuing Spartan defeat on land, and the blockade against Athens from Aegina was temporarily lifted. The remainder of the Spartan mercenary force on the island under its commander, Eteonicus, refused to row until it received its pay. Control of the Saronic Gulf from Aegina was evidently an important part of Spartan strategy, since Teleutias was sent to take command there.⁷⁵ Teleutias persuaded the rowers to obey him and he conducted a successful raid on Piraeus, gaining enough booty to pay his fleet for a month [5.1.18-24]. Sparta was concentrating its attack on Athens at both ends of the Athenian line of supply from the Hellespont. With the Athenian fleet in the north, it was difficult for the Athenians to deal with such raids from Aegina.

Antalcidas had returned to Ephesus with peace proposals from the king. Artaxerxes may by this time have wanted to turn his attention to Cyprus, especially as the Spartans were ready to acknowledge his claim over Asia Minor. Antalcidas sailed north to assist Nicolochus with the full support of the Persians, who summoned ships from Tiribazus' and Ariobarzanes' satrapies to assist him [Xen.1.28]. He was able to slip into Abydus by deceiving the Athenians into supposing that he was making for Calchedon - an important source of revenue for Athens. He

⁷⁵ Xenophon's text is corrupt at this point; he appears to indicate that Teleutias was appointed *navarch* at Aegina. This is unlikely as Antalcidas was still in office. Is it possible that Agesilaus opposed the appointment of Antalcidas and used the opportunity to re-appoint his popular brother? If so, there may well have been considerable disagreement at Sparta between Antalcidas and Agesilaus over the policy of accommodation with Persia. For such disagreement, see Cawkwell, *CQ* n.s.26 (1976)68ff, *contra* Cartledge, *Agesilaos* 195. The adoption of Aegina as a base instead of Rhodes may have been Agesilaus' policy. Teleutias' speech to his men at Aegina may reflect such sentiments [Xen.5.1.17]. He asserted that it was preferable for a naval force to be able to supply its own needs by piracy and plunder than to rely on foreign favour.

captured an Athenian relief force and raised a fleet of eighty ships with which he was able to blockade the Hellespont, divert the grain ships and force Athens to negotiate [Xen.5.1.28; Diod.14.110]. Corinth and Argos, whose friendship with Athens had severely restricted Spartan activity against Attica by land, were also ready to come to terms after so long and exhausting a war.⁷⁶

By the terms of the peace agreement of 386 Athens was given control of Lemnos, Imbrus and Scyros, while the rest of the Aegean states remained autonomous. The relief of the Spartan majority at end of the war in Greece and with Persia is indicated by the fact that they inscribed the terms of the peace on their temples [Isoc.12.105].

Spartan naval policy c.386-378

As a result of the peace settlement of 386 Sparta became the guarantor of the peace in mainland Greece [Xen.5.1.36].⁷⁷ Thus, Sparta was able to impose its will on any unwilling state, as Agesilaus did at Thebes and Corinth [Xen.5.1.33-4], despite the presence of a clause guaranteeing autonomy for the Greek states.⁷⁸ In the years following the peace Sparta chose to concentrate on its hegemony on land at Mantinea, Phlius, Thebes and Orchomenus [Xen.5.2.1-11].⁷⁹ Between 385 and 380 both Agesipolis and Agesilaus were linked with this policy; Agesipolis led Spartan forces against Mantinea and Olynthus where he died in 380, while Agesilaus settled Phlius and continued his hostility towards Thebes [Xen.5.2,11-43]. Spartan authority also extended to the north and west, where Sparta was instrumental in preventing pillaging in Epirus by Dionysius in 385 [15.13].

Sparta tolerated Athens because of Athens' naval interests, which did not threaten Sparta's current land policy. Athens in these years appears to have been reluctant to undertake any military activity against Sparta, although its alliances with Aegean states such as Chios and Byzantium contain references to freedom and autonomy [IG 2(2) 34, 41]. Presumably Athens

⁷⁶ See Rice, *Historia* 23 (1974) 164-182.

⁷⁷ For Sparta's later exploitation of its position, see R.Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece, 386-362" *Athenaeum* 52 (1974) 36-63 and for differences of policy at Sparta over its treatment of its allies in this period, see Polybius 4.27.6-7 and Cawkwell, *CQ* n.s.23 (1973) 47-60.

⁷⁸ See H.W.Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire" *JHS* 50 (1930) 37-79, who calls the Spartan alliance of this period an *arche* rather than a *symmachie*.

⁷⁹ See Rice, *Historia* 23 (1974) 164ff.

felt free to conclude such terms which did not contravene the terms of the Peace of 386 nor did they antagonise Sparta. In addition, no Spartan navarchs are recorded between 387/6 and 377/6. Sparta, then, appears to have lost interest in Aegean sea-power after it had finally conceded control of Asia Minor to Persia.

There is, however, some indication that this was not the whole picture: Diodorus [15.30] speaks of Spartan control of Peparethus and Sciathus and some other unspecified islands.⁸⁰ In addition, Sparta maintained contact with Histaea Oreus in Euboea to 377. Sparta may have retained an interest in this area as a result of its interference in Chalcidice and in order to watch Jason of Pherae. Isocrates, too, speaks of quarrels between Sparta and Athens over the Cyclades [Pan.132,136]. Complete historical accuracy can hardly be expected from a reference in such a rhetorical work, but the situation suggests that Sparta felt it had the right to take part in disputes over the Aegean. Spartan imperialism immediately after the peace of 386 was not wholly confined to the mainland of Greece. It is true that to maintain a definite naval policy in the area would have required a strong Spartan fleet for which there is no evidence in the sources. In fact it appears that piracy and plundering were rife in the Aegean, because no fleet controlled its security [Isoc.4.115]. To provide a fleet Sparta would have needed, as before, considerable assistance from its allies [see below]. There is no evidence to indicate that Sparta itself could provide a fleet of significant size. Fleets were expensive for Sparta to maintain without Persian financial assistance. As Agesilaus was influential in Spartan foreign policy in this period, Sparta's policy reflected his interest in mainland Greece, especially against Thebes. For Agesilaus there was no reason for naval aggression by Sparta after the peace. In addition, fleets and armies were supposed to have been disbanded as one of the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas [Xen.5.1.35], although this statement may refer to the usual demobilisation that took place when a war was concluded.⁸¹

During the same period the Spartans tightened their control over their mainland allies [Xen.4.4.17]. Now their allies were consulted less often over expeditions, and any new allies were forced to provide contributions for Spartan actions [Xen.6.3.7; 5.3.26]. Allies were also

⁸⁰ Diodorus also refers to Chios and Byzantium under some kind of Spartan control at the time of the liberation of the Theban Cadmea in 379 [15.28]. This is certainly not true in the case of Chios which was allied with Athens [IG 2(2) 34 from c.384/3].

⁸¹ See R.K.Sinclair, "The King's Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval Forces 387-378" *Chiron* 8 (1978) 29-54.

used for long periods of garrison duty [Diod 15.25.3; Xen.5.4.15]. By about 382 conditions of military service had changed and, because of the increasing use of mercenaries, the allies were allowed to remit money instead of manpower [Xen.5.2.21]. The money was necessary to pay the mercenary forces, who would refuse to fight without regular pay, as Eteonicus' sailors had done at Aegina [Xen.5.1.13]; the same crews readily fought for Teleutias because of his promise of pay and booty [6.2.16].

These frequent financial requisitions must have been a considerable burden on some states and have contributed to the general rise of feeling against Spartan domination in this period. The Spartan empire after 386 existed solely for the benefit of Sparta, and it may have seemed to many Greeks that, because of their co-operation with Persia, the Spartans could bring the Persian king into Greek affairs whenever they wished. Hatred of Persia became a rhetorical *topos* among Athenian orators of the time; their speeches reveal a tendency to distance Athens from its close association with Persia in time of Conon. In Lysias' account of Conon's career Cnidus is not even mentioned [19.34], and Diodorus makes a special distinction between the Athenian naval success at Naxos and that at Cnidus: the latter was won with Persian assistance and was not a true Athenian victory [15.35]. Spartan co-operation with the Persians in the peace settlement of 386 was frequently criticised.

Such anti-Persian feelings had a long history in classical Greece. They reached a peak in the fifth century as a result of the Persian War. During the Ionian War, however, both sides had attempted to gain Persian support for their immediate objective - the defeat of the other. The attitude of the Greek states to Persia in the later fifth and fourth centuries is ambivalent to say the least. Agesilaus had tapped into this feeling as early as 396, when he attempted to win Greek support for his expedition to Asia Minor. He made a similar attempt to recall the past on his return across the Hellespont in 384. In addition to dislike of Sparta's association with Persia, the Spartan seizure of the Theban Cadmea in 382 had only increased hatred of Sparta in Greece. This Spartan action was a flagrant violation of Theban autonomy, and it caused a general outcry in Greece [Xen.5.2.32; Plut.Ages.24; Diod.15.20].

In the same period internal quarrels at Sparta contributed to fluctuations in Spartan foreign policy. Both Xenophon and Diodorus refer to differences between Agesilaus and Agesipolis [Xen.5.4.25; Diod.15.19]. Once again the problem was not whether Sparta should remain an imperial power, but how it should do so. In 380 Agesipolis was succeeded by his

brother Cleombrotus, who appears to have opposed strongly Agesilaus' policy towards Thebes. Xenophon also mentions support for and hostility against Cleombrotus at the time of Leuctra [6.4.4-5]. It was said that Cleombrotus would be able to demonstrate finally whether he was a friend or an enemy of Thebes. After the accession of Cleombrotus Spartan foreign policy continued to be characterised by fluctuations, but now with a renewed interest in Spartan maritime power.

In the east Glos, the Persian naval commander in the war against Evagoras [15.9],⁸² revolted from Persia and sent ambassadors to Acoris, the king of Egypt, Evagoras' ally, to effect an alliance. He also wrote to Sparta, apparently to rouse the Spartans against the king, promising them a great deal of money and other benefits, including assistance in regaining their supremacy, presumably their naval supremacy. The Spartans concluded an alliance with Glos. They did not have to honour this agreement because, soon afterwards, Glos was killed. Also, according to Theopompus [F 103], Evagoras had asked for such an alliance with Sparta.

The facts of the story, not recorded by any other extant source, raise questions over Sparta's foreign policy around 379, shortly after the accession of Cleombrotus. It has been suggested that Sparta may have been ready to reassert its claims in Asia Minor after its successes in Greece against Phlius and Olynthus.⁸³ Sparta had until Cnidus followed a consistent policy of aggression in the east to bring the Persians to terms over Asia Minor, but in 379 it does not appear to have had the naval resources to adopt such a policy with any expectation of success. The motives ascribed to Sparta by Diodorus suggest that the alliance with Glos was undertaken to strengthen the Spartan position in Greece and to make Sparta part of the ground-swell of opinion against Persia. This is a possible motive, but it supposes a very swift change of direction, even for Spartan foreign policy, between 379, the date of the alliance with Glos, and 378, when Sphodrias attempted a raid on the Athenian port of Piraeus, thus embroiling Sparta in war with Athens [Xen.5.4.20-24; Diod.15.29; Plut.Ages.26].⁸⁴ Perhaps the alliance with Glos marks the influence at Sparta of Cleombrotus, whose policy was to differ from that of

⁸² For a discussion of this incident, its date and its implications for Spartan policy in Greece, see T.T.B.Ryder, "Spartan Relations with Persia after the King's Peace: a strange story in Diodorus 15.9" *CQ* 14 (1964)105-109.

⁸³ See K.J.Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* (Strassburg, 1912-27) 3(1) 99.

⁸⁴ *contra* Ryder, *CQ* 14 (1964) 104ff, who attributes the change to Sparta's anger following the liberation of Thebes.

Agessilaus. The promises of money and ships from Glos and the possible support of Egypt could have been a tempting prospect to renew Spartan maritime power in the Aegean to challenge what may have seemed the growing power of Athens.⁸⁵ The Persian king's apparent lack of response to Sparta's alliance with Glos may have been because he did not know of it, or because he chose to ignore the growth of Athenian naval power in order to counter any threat from Sparta.⁸⁶

The Spartan alliance with Glos was soon followed by the raid of Sphodrias [Xen.5.4.20-1; Diod.15.29.5]. The date and implications of this raid have caused considerable controversy. The accounts in the sources do not make it unequivocally clear whether the raid was the result of the formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy or its cause. In addition, the role of Thebes is both obscure and suspicious.⁸⁷

It would appear that Sphodrias, the harmost at Thespieae, decided to invade Attica and seize Piraeus. His force was caught in the Thriasian plain where it did some damage and then returned across the border. It seems unlikely that Sphodrias could have reached Piraeus overnight in time for an attack, but the Athenians appear to have believed that he intended to do so. Their anger could only have increased when Sphodrias was brought to trial at Sparta for his action and acquitted. Sparta had certainly pursued an aggressive policy in Greece since the Peace of Antalcidas and, if the alliance with Glos was true, also retained an interest in the Aegean. This Spartan behaviour followed by Athens' interpretation of the intent of Sphodrias' raid could have resulted in the formation by Athens of a confederacy to oppose Sparta. The preamble of the inscription that commemorates the foundation of the league appears to emphasise this aim.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Athenian maritime power was reduced by Sparta in 405 to the possession of twelve ships. In the following years Athens continued weak, passing only honorific decrees after 404 [see Tod, *GHI* 98]. After Cnidus in 394 Athenian policy became bolder and grants of citizenship are found, e.g. Clazomenae [Tod *op.cit.* 114]. After 387/6 Athens made alliances with Chios and other Aegean states.

⁸⁶ See Ryder, *CQ* 14 (1964) 104ff.

⁸⁷ The traditional view, following Xenophon [5.4.20-34] and Plutarch [*Pel.* 14, *Agess.* 24-26] in preference to Diodorus [15.28-29], is that Athens carefully avoided any anti-Spartan action until this time. See G. Grote, *A History of Greece* vol.10 (London, 1888) 81-102, K.J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* (Strassburg, 1912-27) 3 (1) 140-51; T.T.B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* 53-5; D.G. Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus and the year 379/8 B.C." *YCS* 24 (1975) 112; R. Sinclair, "The King's Peace and the Employment of Military and naval Forces 387-78" *Chiron* 8 (1978) 40-52; J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League* (Berkeley, 1981) 59 and Cartledge, *Agessilaos* 297f. Grote, *op.cit.* 10.99; Rice 102-5; Smith, *Historia* 2 (1953) 281 and A. MacDonald "A Note on the raid of Sphodrias" *Historia* 21 (1972) 38-44 do not accept the involvement of Thebes. Both G. Cawkwell, "The foundation of the second Athenian confederacy" *CQ* n.s.23 (1973) 47-60 and R.M. Kallet-Marx, "Athens, Thebes and the Foundation of the Second Athenian League" *Class.Ant.* 4.n.2 (1985) 127-51, suggest that Athens had begun to form the confederacy before Sphodrias' raid.

⁸⁸ *IG* 2(2) 43; Tod, *GHI* 123.

It was the cumulation of a number of incidents in which Sparta had violated the spirit of the Peace of 386.

Spartan reaction after the raid was to try to pacify the Greeks. The level of suspicion, fear and distrust of Sparta created by its earlier policies towards Greece made the attempt futile. By alienating both Thebes and Athens by its actions, Sparta had driven them together and faced war against them both.

Sparta, Athens and Thebes - the war at sea between 377/6 and 372/1

Spartan strategy for the war was to be economic. Such a strategy had worked before against Athens in 405 and 388/7. This time, however, Sparta did not have bases in the Hellespont, but had to rely on garrisons in Euboea and in the Cyclades. Its land strategy was to make annual invasions of Boeotia to destroy the Boeotians' crops. Sparta probably also had the use of the Corinthian port of Cenchreae for its actions in the Aegean: Corinth had remained loyal to Sparta after the peace of 386.

The threat to Euboea and the grain route was countered by the Athenians, who sent Chabrias there in 377 [Diod.15.30]. He brought several of the Euboean cities and the offshore islands into the Athenian Confederacy.⁸⁹ There was a Spartan harmost and garrison at Histaea Oreus in 377 [Xen.5.4.56], and perhaps a Spartan base at Gerastus. After two years of destructive invasion the Thebans sent two triremes to Pagasae to acquire supplies. Their ships were taken by the Spartan harmost at Oreus [Xen.5.4.56], who controlled a small squadron of three triremes. Spartan control of this strategic site in northern Euboea was not to last long; the inhabitants of Oreus were only too ready to plot with the Theban prisoners taken by the Spartans to overthrow Spartan control. The Spartan blockade from Oreus was subsequently lifted [Xen.5.4.57]. Sparta, however, continued to use Aegina as a base for raids on Attica in conjunction with its bases on Euboea [Xen.6.2.1].

Such economic blockades were not capable of effecting immediate victory for Sparta, and its allies became reluctant to provide the required military forces for Sparta's land campaigns. At a congress of the Spartans and their allies Spartan conduct of the war to date was criticised [Xen.5.4.60/1; Diod 15.34]. The allies are said to have put forward a proposal that Sparta

⁸⁹ Their enrolment and that of the islanders of the Sporades was recorded on the front face of the Stele of Aristoteles, *GHI* 2 (2) 43. See also Cargill 328f.

needed a fleet in order to carry on a successful war against Athens. The fleet could also be used to transport troops across the Corinthian Gulf against Thebes. Given Sparta's strong control over its allies it is not likely that this proposal was made without full Spartan knowledge and backing. To raise a fleet Sparta needed the support and contribution of its allies. The plan may even have originated with Cleombrotus.⁹⁰ The proposal was designed to win over those Spartans who may have supported Agesilaus' plans for Thebes by promising them the use of the fleet to transport troops across the Corinthian Gulf. Cleombrotus' plan may have succeeded because Agesilaus was ill at the time and remained in Sparta. The allies supported the plan because the use of a fleet meant less hardship for them in supplying hoplites for Sparta's land forces. A fleet would require a smaller allied contingent and might be manned mostly by slaves or mercenaries.

Sparta was able to collect a fleet of sixty ships from its allies, under the navarch, Pollis. This number has been said to indicate Sparta's neglect of its naval power after 386.⁹¹ If this was the case, then Athens had also neglected its naval power. Despite Diodorus' claim that the Athenians planned a fleet of two hundred triremes in 378 [15.29], Athens was able to man only eighty-three ships to face the Spartans at Naxos.⁹²

The Spartan fleet patrolled the waters between Aegina, Ceos and Andros. Its base may have been at Naxos.⁹³ As a result of the presence of the Spartan fleet and the garrison at Aegina, Athenian grain ships were no longer able to go further south than Gerastus [Xen.5.4.61]. The Spartan plan was clearly to force a response from Athens, but according to Diodorus the grain convoys were able to avoid the Spartan fleet by using a different, longer route [15.34].

The battles of Naxos and Alyzia, 376-375

After the safe passage of the convoy Chabrias brought the Spartans to battle by attacking Naxos. Xenophon gives the battle only a brief mention [5.4.61], but Diodorus provides a fuller account [15.34-5]. Chabrias commanded an Athenian fleet of about eighty ships and besieged Naxos. Pollis attempted to relieve the island, an important strategic position for Sparta in the

⁹⁰ See Rice, *Historia* 23 (1974) 171, Cartledge *Agesilaos* 304.

⁹¹ Sinclair, *Chiron* 8 (1978) 45.

⁹² The Athenian naval list for 376 shows only around one hundred ships [IG. 2 (2) 1604].

⁹³ *contra* Cartledge, *Agesilaos* 304, Ceos and Andros were not members of the Second Athenian Confederacy until after the battle of Naxos, see Cargill 344f.

Cyclades, with his sixty ships. The Spartans were defeated by Chabrias' use of a reserve squadron, brought out at a point in the battle when the Spartan crews were tired [Diod.15.34; Polyaeus 3.10.6,16]. The Spartan losses at Naxos are disputed: according to Diodorus twenty-four ships were taken, eight with their crews to Athens' loss of eighteen ships: Demosthenes records that forty-nine Spartan ships were captured [Dem.20.77; IG 2(2) 1606 where the ships and gear are mentioned]. If the Athenians, mindful of Arginusae, stopped to pick up their own crews, it is strange that the Spartan losses were as high as Demosthenes claimed. The victory may have been exaggerated by the Athenians: Diodorus makes a special point of the fact that it was the first naval victory for Athens without the assistance of the Persians. The money realised by Chabrias from this battle was also said to be enormous.⁹⁴ Whatever the true figures, the financial loss to the Spartans must have been significant, since they would have had to replace the ships, men and equipment lost, if they wished to fight again.

The battle of Naxos was a complete disaster for Spartan pretensions to naval power in the Aegean. With the loss of the large part of its fleet, it could no longer threaten Athens in the east. Athens attempted to take advantage of this perceived naval weakness of Sparta and, in the following year, the Athenian general, Timotheus, sailed around the Peloponnese with a fleet of sixty ships and made arrangements to bring Corcyra, Acarnania and Cephallonia into the new Athenian Confederacy.⁹⁵

This new threat to Sparta's interests in the west caused the Spartans to put together another fleet of fifty-five ships under Nicolochus [Xen.5.4.65; Diod.15.36]. The Spartans evidently still had naval allies in the west; Ambracia was to send six ships. The Spartan fleet, however, was defeated by Timotheus at Alyzia, and more ships were lost. The Spartans did not consider this a decisive victory for Athens because they offered battle a second time, when the Ambraciot reinforcements arrived. They set up a trophy when the Athenians refused the engagement [Polyaeus 3.10.4,12,13,16,17]. The importance for Athens of the booty taken is shown by Timotheus' concern not to fight a second time when challenged, but to protect the captured ships and prisoners [Polyaeus 3.13,17]. Once again, the financial loss to Sparta must have been serious. An Athenian naval record of the equipment taken at this battle shows that

⁹⁴ G.Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* (Gotha, 1893-1904) 757-60 suggested that Chabrias' booty included spoils from the siege of Naxos.

⁹⁵ IG 2(2) 96, Tod, *GHI* 126 records the recommendation that these states join the alliance.

some of the captured ships had no *hupozomata* [IG 2 (2) 1606], cables normally fitted to a vessel before it sailed. This second Spartan fleet had obviously contained vessels that were not in first-class condition; although their naval resources were being seriously strained, the Spartans were determined to protect their interests in the west. The events following the battle at Alyzia indicates that both sides were financially strapped, and that the question of control of western waters had not yet been decided, although they now began to discuss peace.

The peace of 375/4

The peace agreement of 375/4 concluded between Sparta and its allies and the Athenian Confederacy are described very differently by Xenophon and Diodorus. According to Diodorus the Persian King was once again involved in the negotiations [15.38].⁹⁶ Xenophon suggests that peace was the result of an Athenian initiative because of the expense of naval warfare and the lack of Theban financial assistance [6.2.1]. Sparta was clearly also ready to make peace. Athenian negotiations with Corcyra and other western states were a threat to its power in the west. The Spartans had been ready to send a less than adequate fleet to defend these interests at Alyzia.

What was concluded at Sparta in 375 was probably a truce between the two sides: both agreed to withdraw from sensitive areas, Athens from western waters and Sparta from areas belonging to Athens' allies. Mutual suspicion remained, however, and was to lead to further conflict. By the agreement Athens was granted a share in the hegemony of Greece, and so the Spartans finally, though tacitly, acknowledged Athenian maritime supremacy [Nepos Tim.2.2; Philochorus *FGH* 328 F151; *SEG* 29.88].

It would seem, however, that what the Spartans acknowledged and what the Athenians understood about their respective geographical areas of maritime interest were two different things. The battle at Alyzia had not ended Spartan naval claims or Athenian interests in the west. The west was where Sparta's main naval allies were, and possession of the western bases as well as control of the Aegean would mean the end of Spartan links to Sicily and Italy, as well as any Spartan pretensions to sea-power.

⁹⁶ As a result of Diodorus' statement, it has been suggested that Sparta sent to Persia for help after Naxos, see Cawkwell, *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 63. Diodorus' account is quite possibly an anticipation of what actually happened in 371. Diodorus, especially when he follows Ephorus, is quite capable of doubling incidents.

Some time after the truce Timotheus, the Athenian general, was active at Cephallonia and Zacynthus, where he helped Zacynthian exiles to attack and damage Zacynthian property. His presence there annoyed Sparta [Diod.15.45]. Zacynthus, however, was not a *casus belli*, and the island remained loyal to Sparta: it provided ships for Mnasippus' fleet in 373 [Xen.6.2.3-6].

Clearly, however, neither side was ready to give up its maritime interests in the west. In 375/4 the Spartan navarch, Aristocrates, patrolled the waters around Zacynthus [Diod.15.45]. In the meantime, Athens may still have been discussing membership of the confederacy with Corcyra. Corcyra was probably not yet a member of the Athens' new organisation.⁹⁷ This interpretation of the evidence has serious implications for the subsequent actions undertaken by Athens.

Continued Athenian interest in Corcyra drove Sparta in 374/3 to send the navarch Alcidas with twenty three ships to Corcyra, perhaps through fear of a democratic take-over of the island [Diod.15.46]. The pretext for the despatch of this force was that it was going to Sicily. Its arrival at Corcyra may well have made the pro-Athenian Corcyreans nervous enough to negotiate with Athens for help. Athens then prepared to send a fleet to Corcyra. This Athenian decision was tantamount to a renewal of war. The formation of a Second Confederacy and success under Athenian leadership at Naxos had rekindled Athens' naval ambitions.

In 373 in response to the escalating crisis over Corcyra, Sparta put together a fleet of sixty ships to transport a force of fifteen hundred mercenary soldiers to the island.⁹⁸ The Spartan fleet was led by Mnasippus and included contingents from all Sparta's western naval allies, such as Corinth, Leucas, Ambracia, Elis, Zacynthus, Achaea, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione and Halieis. Perhaps these states, too, were once again nervous of Athenian ambitions in the west. Sparta also negotiated with Dionysius at Syracuse for assistance [Xen.6.2.4; Diod.15.46,47]. The Spartan argument to Dionysius emphasised the strategic position of Corcyra, as did the Corcyrean appeal to Athens [Xen.6.2.9]. Neither side claimed that Corcyra was allied to Athens at this time. Thus, this Spartan move against Corcyra was not a declaration

⁹⁷ Corcyra was thought until 1967 to have been mentioned on the stele of Aristoteles. D.Bradeen and J.Coleman, "Thera on I.G.11 (2) 43" *Hesperia* 36 (1967) 102-4 showed that this was impossible and suggested that the entry actually referred to Thera. Corcyra, then, may not yet have been enrolled in the Athenian alliance.

⁹⁸ For the timing of these events, see G.Cawkwell, "Notes on the Peace of 375/4" *Historia* 12 (1963) 84-95.

of war on Athens.⁹⁹ It was, however, an act of aggression against Corcyra, and quite in line with Sparta's imperial attitude to other Greek states.

Interestingly, this Spartan fleet did not fight a naval engagement: it may not have been intended to do so, as many of its ships were transports [Xen.6.2.25]. Its occupation of Corcyra was perhaps intended to forestall Corcyra's enrolment in Athens' league. Mnasippus would hardly have discharged some of his troops had he been expecting an immediate attack by the Athenians [Xen.6.2.16]. The troops seized the island and blockaded the city of Corcyra. Mnasippus' forces, however, became lax over the siege, and the Corcyreans were able to lift his blockade before the arrival of help from Athens. The navarch himself was killed and his *epistoleus*, Hypermenes, took over command. The Spartan force left Corcyra in considerable haste with as much booty as it could take; it had no intention of meeting the Athenians.¹⁰⁰

The Athenians' naval actions were restricted to the capture of a small squadron from Sicily on its way to Corcyra [Diod.15.47], although Iphicrates' manoeuvres on his voyage to Corcyra show that he expected to fight a naval battle [Xen.6.2.27-32]. After Corcyra Athens continued its aggression against Sparta's western allies and against the Peloponnese itself [Xen.6.2.38]. The Spartans, however, had abandoned any claims to sea-power by their withdrawal from Corcyra.

By the end of 372 when another peace was negotiated with Persian involvement, the Peloponnese was ringed with supporters of the Athenian Confederacy, and Sparta was unable to respond with yet another fleet [Xen.6.2.9, 38]. Some of its western naval allies had been enrolled in the Athenian Confederacy and its territory in the Peloponnese had been attacked. The destruction of Spartan sea-power between 376 and 372 was a foretaste of what was soon to happen to its pretensions to military hegemony in the Peloponnese.

⁹⁹ See Cargill 37f. Cawkwell, *Historia* 12 (1963) 85 argues from Isocrates Plat. 1,5 and Paus. 9.1.8 that peace between Sparta and Athens lasted at least until 373, when Athens celebrated a new cult of Eirene [Philoch. *FGH* 325 F 151].

¹⁰⁰ Xenophon [6.2.12] refers to the Peloponnesian fleet as well-equipped and experienced at this time. This can hardly have been the case: Sparta had to provide three fleets between 375 and 372. The cost of this must have been enormous. The state of some of the Spartan ships at Alyzia showed that putting a fleet to sea had become a considerable hardship.

Conclusion

The period between Aegospotami and Alyzia was an extraordinary one in which Sparta went from complete naval domination to humiliating naval weakness. The fault was Sparta's own.

After the victory of Aegospotami in 405, Sparta was supreme in the Greek world. Although its war with Athens had been almost continual from 431, the Spartans had no 'New World Order' in mind for the immediate post-war period. They had entered the war ostensibly to liberate the Greeks from the imperial power of Athens. When the war ended Sparta's only object appears to have been to consolidate its position and to maintain its hegemony over what had been won. Yet any control of Greece was inextricably linked to control of the Aegean and western waters. Such control could only be maintained by a fleet. Initially, this was no problem for the Spartans because they had captured a large number of ships as a result of their victory, and they had the financial resources to build and man more vessels should they wish to do so.

After the 'fall' of Lysander there is some indication that a few leading Spartans might have been prepared to be less rigid in their attitude to the rest of Greece: Pausanias' changes to Lysander's settlement of Athens may indicate as much. There is, however, no sign that the majority of Spartans, despite the complaints of those who deplored the effects of the introduction of wealth into the Spartan state, at any time wished to give up Sparta's hegemony. The possession of an empire was not a moral or ethical question for Sparta. For the majority of Spartans war and empire brought power, prestige, wealth and a chance for some to improve their status. It was no longer possible for Sparta, even had the Spartans thought about it, to return to a pre-war state of affairs. Sparta now played too large a role.

Spartan actions in the Aegean, Asia Minor and Elis indicate that Sparta recognised sea-power as the basis of its empire. There was, effectively, no challenger. Athens had been deliberately weakened and Persia was, apparently, not contemplating a change in the naval balance of power in the Aegean. Spartan control was maintained in the south through Sparta's alliance with Rhodes, established in 411, and in the north by its continuing interest in the strategic area of the Hellespont. Some accommodation with Cyrus over Persian access to the Aegean had been reached. The only annoyance to Sparta would have been the continuing defiance of Corinth, a former leading naval ally in the Spartan Alliance. Corinth's independence meant that Sparta was denied access to Corinthian ports for its naval expeditions in the Aegean.

It was Sparta's interest in Asia Minor that was to embroil the Spartans in a naval war with Persia. After the defeat of Cyrus Sparta continued to lay claim to Asia Minor through the expeditions of Thibron, Dercylidas and Agesilaus. Sparta also negotiated aid from Egypt. The Persian response was to challenge Spartan control of the Aegean by summoning its own large fleet. The presence of an Athenian admiral in this fleet also encouraged Athenian aspirations towards renewed naval power in the Aegean.

The fall of Rhodes and the Spartan naval disaster at Cnidus effectively spelled the end for Spartan hopes of controlling the southern Aegean, but control of the Hellespont was to give Sparta the edge it needed to bring Athens to agree to peace in 386. After the peace the Aegean and the Hellespont belonged to the Persian fleet, and the Spartans appear to have been largely content with this situation, provided the Athenians did not renew their naval aspirations. Sparta, however, did not neglect the Aegean entirely, but maintained some small areas of strategic interest in the Cyclades, Euboea and the Sporades.

Sparta's imperialist land policy dominated the succeeding decade from 386 to 376. Spartan behaviour in Greece alienated both Athens and Thebes and Athens was quick to respond to the shock of Sphodrias' raid by forming its own confederacy against Sparta. In 376 the Spartans attempted to end the war with Athens and Thebes by raising a fleet and employing its old, previously successful strategy of starving Athens into surrender. Sparta had already employed a similar strategy against Thebes through annual land invasions and a small but vital naval blockade from Euboea. The plan against Athens did not work, and the Spartans were driven from the Aegean after their defeat at Naxos, while Athens began to entertain ambitions of enrolling western Greek states in its new confederacy.

The peace of 375 was more a brief cessation of hostilities than a lasting agreement, largely due to Athenian interest in the west. Sparta tried to maintain its claim there as long as possible, but was reluctant to challenge the Athenian fleet. Sparta's naval power in the west declined so rapidly that by 372/1 the Spartans were ready to make peace and concede western waters to Athens.

The problem with Sparta's attempt at a naval hegemony after Aegospotami was that it had no underlying purpose with which its members might agree. Moreover it was imposed on the Greeks by the use of harmosts and garrisons in strategic areas, garrisons that may not have appeared necessary as Spartan/Persian relations were friendly in the immediate post-war period.

Unlike the Athenian empire, it did not begin from a league of allies acting with a common purpose, the expulsion of Persia from the Aegean. Sparta's Pentecontaetia of empire began with Sparta in a position of enormous wealth and power. No benefit was derived by its members from this empire's existence, and it served only to maintain Spartan hegemony. Sparta could have chosen to become the hegemon of a new kind of order with itself in the role of arbitrator of the rest of Greece. This plan at least would have had the merit of giving Sparta's hegemony some kind of purpose apart from the continuance of its domination. There is little evidence of any such vision at Sparta after the Peloponnesian War. Perhaps it should not be expected; warfare appears to have been an almost continual state of affairs in Greece, and it would not have been long before Sparta would have been involved in the disputes of others.

Sparta's attitude to the need for a fleet in this period is typical of its general outlook and expectations between 404 and 371. Sparta was ready to accept naval hegemony, money and ships as the result of war, but not ready to plan how to use or maintain them in the long term. Sparta still expected that any fleet it needed would be provided either by Persian assistance or by its allies. When a fleet was not needed, as in the period between 386 and 376, Sparta appears to have taken little thought for the future. Thus, when forced to put together fleets against Athens between 376 and 373, Sparta had to rely once more on allied ships. To judge from the condition of some of the vessels at Alyzia, the Spartans had to take what they could get when it came to such ships.

Not only had the Spartans failed to appreciate the need for a permanent fleet, but they do not seem to have paid enough attention to developments in naval tactics and strategy: none of the innovative techniques and plans used in the naval battles of this period originated with Spartan commanders; only Teleutias' raid on Piraeus showed any imagination. The Spartans relied too much on their past victories, current prestige and tired tactics. When faced with innovations they were unable to counter them. Sparta's defeat at Leuctra, shortly after its concession of naval hegemony to Athens, showed that they had not appreciated military innovations either.

CONCLUSION

For most of the archaic period Sparta probably possessed a small number of ships, some of which were, perhaps, owned by wealthy Spartiate aristocrats or by *perioeci*. Their crews and rowers may have been *perioecic* and/or helot. Spartan adventures overseas continued down to the time of Cleomenes, who seems to have been the first to use Spartan ships on expeditions that can be identified as state sponsored. Even so these vessels were only transports and not used for sea-battles. Sparta does not appear to have possessed a navy in the sense that a navy is a fleet owned and operated by the state. Sparta may not have had a navy in this sense to the time of the Ionian War. Such ships as were used were probably the property of individuals and commandeered or offered for state service as necessary. The existence of Spartans interested in adventures overseas in the late sixth century, and the evidence for flourishing ceramic art to the mid-sixth century and bronzes to the fifth century call into question the idea that Spartan society had reached a rigid 'Lycurgan' form by this time [Plut.*Lyc.*8, 28].¹ The restriction of Spartan interests to the Peloponnese in the reign of Cleomenes may be due as much to the king's personality and politics, sufficiently memorable to have interested Herodotus, as to any fundamental change in Spartan society.

The period of the Persian Wars underlined Sparta's leading position in Greece and introduced it to opportunities for hegemony abroad. Sparta was a successful wartime leader and organiser, although Athens had provided most of the ships for the allied naval effort. Sparta chose to reject distant involvement in Ionia, but did not abandon completely the exercise of some naval power in Greek waters, e.g. in Thessaly and Thasos. This interest probably died through lack of real success and through post-war conservative reaction at Sparta. There is little evidence to suggest that Sparta was hostile to Athens before the end of the war with Persia, but more to suggest that belief in the possibility of 'dual hegemony' of Athens in the Aegean and Ionia and Sparta in Greece was an important factor in Spartan policy for some years. Such an arrangement, however, could not last in the agonistic atmosphere of Greek politics, especially with the growth of Athenian naval power and the development of its democracy. The aftermath of a helot revolt that followed a serious earthquake at Sparta, perhaps c.464, which eventually was to involve

¹ *contra* P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300-363 B.C* (London, 1979) 156, who quotes the argument of M. Finley, *The Use and Abuse of History* (London, 1975) c.10.

Athens, shows how ready the two states were to misunderstand each other by this time. Mutual division and suspicion grew in the ensuing years and led to the First Peloponnesian War.

It is difficult to know what was happening at Sparta itself. Undoubtedly, the helot revolt had been a time of major disruption, but whether it alone encouraged the development of an even more conservative outlook at Sparta than before or whether Sparta's apparent interest in other problems in the Peloponnese also contributed is difficult to say as the sources are meagre: Sparta does not appear to have played a major military role outside the Peloponnese in the mid-fifth century. Sparta, however, did not wholly turn in on itself as a land power: it maintained some interest in commercial maritime activity: Thucydides' reference to the commercial importance of Cythera belongs to the late fifth century [4.53]. Trade to and from Cythera can hardly have proceeded unnoticed by Sparta. In addition, the number of *perioecic* coastal sites in Laconia and Messenia appears to have increased considerably between the archaic and classical periods.² There may have been an accompanying rise in economic activity, some at least of which would have been maritime. Many of Sparta's *perioeci*, then, had some knowledge of the sea. The same was true of at least some Messenian helots in this period [Thuc.4.26]. Sparta also maintained contact with the west; it had ties with Corcyra as well as with states in Italy and Sicily [Thuc.2.7, 3.73].

Thucydides' picture of Spartan society in the fifth century has been very influential. He implies that Sparta was both dependent on and fearful of its helots and that Spartan society was secretive and cruel [4.80]. His inferences have led to a popular theory that compares Sparta to the Soviet Union of the Cold War period.³ According to this interpretation Sparta was rigidly divided into three groups: Spartiates, *perioeci* and helots. The Spartiates exercised control over the other two groups.

The evidence for the organisation of Spartan society is very scanty, and too little is known to make such an assessment. Thucydides himself appears to contradict the picture at different points in his history.⁴ It may be that Spartan society was a great deal more complex

² P.Cartledge, *op.cit.* 132, 200 and sources cited.

³ G.E.M. de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972) 244.

⁴ Thucydides implies that Sparta depended on and was fearful of its helots, and that its society was secretive and cruel [4.80]. This view, perhaps an Athenian interpretation, has influenced subsequent discussions of the structure of Spartan society, which explain Sparta as a clearly stratified organisation of Spartiates controlling both *perioeci* and helots, both of whom served in the Spartan fleet. Yet helots are able to own some property [4.26] and volunteer for

than is usually supposed. It certainly was not static: by the time of the Ionian War other groups existed at Sparta, the *mothakes* and the *hypomeiones*, perhaps as a result of imbalance of wealth and privilege among the *homoioi*. Their presence suggests some kind of social tension and change. *Perioeci* and helots served in the Spartan forces in the Persian War and again in the Peloponnesian War, some of them in positions of trust. Had they been kept down by the Spartans or their loyalty as a class suspected it is difficult to believe that they would have been so used. In the case of *perioeci* and helot service in the fleet, the co-operation necessary between the various members of a ship's crew might suggest a better relationship between them than is usually supposed.

Nonetheless, the wealth of Spartan society was never, it seems, used to build up a permanent fleet. Thucydides' Archidamus even suggests that the Spartiates would have objected strongly to such a plan [1.80]. Sparta never had any economic or strategic need to drive it to such a decision and, when it needed ships, could use allied naval contributions. Perhaps the example of democratic, naval Athens also influenced their preservation of their aristocratic and oligarchic system. The consequent naval weakness of Sparta was emphasised by Athenian actions during the First Peloponnesian War.

Sparta learned the lessons of that war and attempted to increase its naval forces in 431 on the outbreak of the second conflict. It did not, however, choose to build its own fleet, but still relied on allied ships and crews for the bulk of the Peloponnesian fleet. Contrary to most interpretations of its actions in the Archidamian War the Spartan-led Peloponnesian fleet did not fail through lack of skill either of its men or its commanders.⁵ It failed because of its lack of

service with Sparta; *perioeci* have their own chora and a vested interest in removing the Athenians from Pylos [4.11]. *Perioeci* lived in towns [Hdt.7.234], although their social organisation is unknown. It may have resembled that of Sparta. They attended the funerals of Spartan kings in large numbers [Hdt.6.58]. They also served in the Spartan army at least by the time of the Peloponnesian War. Spartan war losses alone cannot have accounted for the use of *perioeci*; they may well have formed units in the forces before this war. The reason is unclear, but it may have been because of the diminishing numbers of Spartiates. *Perioeci* were also used on undercover missions during the Peloponnesian War [Thuc.3.5,8.6]. Had they been suspected by the Spartiates in any way, they would hardly have been used in such service. There is no evidence for harmosts or garrisons being used in *perioecic* towns except during wartime and possibly only in strategic locations. Other elements in Spartan society include the resettled people of the coastal towns of Asine and Methone, whose actual status is unknown - Methone was fortified [Thuc.2.25]. There is little evidence of helot unrest except after the disruption of the earthquake at Sparta, and even less of *perioecic* rebellion. Had they both been kept in subjection, more evidence of unrest might be expected. Even when Athens occupied fortified positions in the Peloponnese, few helots or *perioeci* went over to them.

⁵ *contra* P.Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War" *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 255-80 and T.Kelly, "Thucydides and Spartan strategy and foreign policy in the Archidamian War" *AHR* 87 (1982) 25f.

financial resources and the divisions in its alliance that resulted. No success meant no booty and no money to show for naval effort. Sparta itself was to show the same lack of concern for the maintenance of naval strength when it handed over its fleet to Athens at Pylos.

Sparta still did not recognise the need for a fleet of its own until the disaster to the Athenian fleet in Sicily gave it a better chance of naval success. At this point Sparta even contemplated building some ships, still as only part of an allied fleet. In the event the offer of other ships and of Persian money became Sparta's preferred policy as it involved less expense. Sparta's early naval efforts in Ionia were hampered by its ignorance of the area and its officers faced a difficult situation. Some effort was made by Sparta to improve this situation both in its command structure and, after naval defeat, in its ship-building. The effort was still small, however, and Sparta still looked to Persia for funding. The large fleets used in this war only drew Sparta further into dependence on Persian subsidies, although it continued to use allied contributions as well as mercenaries. Sparta never produced enough of its own sailors for the fleet.

Naval success in the Ionian War brought great changes and social tensions to Sparta - probably as great as any resulting from a deliberate build-up of a Spartan fleet. Spartan policy was divided between the imperialism of ambitious individuals, such as the *mothax*, Lysander, and the conservative forces that clung to the Lycurgan ideal of Spartan society and protested against the inevitable changes that victory brought [Plut.*Lys.*21].

Lysander's victory at Aegospotami in 405 had provided Sparta with a large fleet, enormous wealth and unlimited power. Both the ships and the money could have been used as the basis of a permanent Spartan fleet, which might have helped maintain a peaceful post-war Spartan hegemony over Greece. In some ways Sparta's position after Aegospotami is similar to the current position of the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After a long period of Cold War between the two superpowers, the U.S. has been left as the largest military power in the world. Its promise of a 'New World Order' after the war in Iraq depends for its success both on its own actions and the trust that other powers have in its intentions.

There is no sign that the Spartans made any such long-term beneficial plans for the administration of Greece after the war, although their victory had won them great popularity. Any trust that the Greeks had in Spartan hegemony was to be destroyed by Sparta's imperial behaviour, which helped bring on the Corinthian War. Even if Sparta had behaved in exemplary

fashion, it is unlikely that its hegemony would have lasted long before Spartan involvement in Greek rivalries would have ended it.

Sparta's only concern, however, appears to have been that it should continue to enjoy power over the rest of the Greeks and to amass even greater wealth. What happened to the large sums of money that flowed into Sparta after the war is not clear, but it seems likely that they ended up in the hands of individuals. The social changes that must have begun to occur in the Spartan state by the end of the Peloponnesian War at the latest, did not ultimately cause a fundamental change in its outlook: those who wanted revolution, like Cinadon [Xen.*Hell.*3.3.4f], seem only to have wished to join the privileged, not to replace the Spartan social structure with a better one, or to improve Sparta's standing in the Greek world. What was left of the fleet the Spartans had acquired from the war was probably used to police the empire from which the Spartans collected tribute and the rest were, perhaps, destroyed, since they were not immediately needed.

The size of the Spartan fleets employed in the years after Aegospotami are nothing like the numbers supposedly brought back to Greece by Lysander. Evidently, Sparta maintained some naval presence as it continued to appoint navarchs, but it expected no real naval opposition and planned for none. Its only possible rival, Athens, had been left with twelve ships.

Sparta's post-war policy lacked consistency and its only aim appears to have been the maintenance of Spartan power. In 386 it was the Persians, who with their ships helped Sparta defeat the imperial aspiration of Athens and impose a peace on Greece. Afterwards, Sparta may have adhered to the conditions of peace in the Aegean immediately after 386 and have disbanded its fleet, although it maintained contact with Egypt and Cyprus. There is no record of any Spartan navarchs between this time and 377/6. Perhaps this was due to the influence of Agesilaus over Spartan foreign policy. His understanding of the importance of naval power appears little short of disastrous; it was due to his appointment of his relative Peisander as navarch and his use of a largely Ionian fleet that Sparta lost the battle of Cnidus and, ultimately, its naval hegemony in the Aegean.

Spartan behaviour towards the rest of Greece eventually resulted in war against a new Athenian naval alliance, a situation for which the Spartans were ill-prepared. After Sparta's final loss of any pretensions to naval power in the Aegean following the battle of Naxos, the Spartan naval war effort also lacked good leadership, strategy and ships. It was only a matter of time

before Sparta lost any claims to naval power at all by its inadequate naval responses to Athenian aggression in the west. Despite the fact that after Aegospotami Sparta had the opportunity to become a major naval power, it did not do so; it was not lack of ability or organisation, nor this time lack of resources, that stopped it, but the lack of any wish to employ its wealth for any purpose other than to maintain its own prestige and power. Had Sparta paid more attention to its fleet, it might have maintained its hegemony of Greece far longer than it did; sea-power was essential to the control of Greece.

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APPENDIX

The Spartan Navarchy

The navarchy may originally have been a royal office because it involved foreign expeditions, the conduct of which was the prerogative of a Spartan king. The first recorded Spartan naval commander, Anchimolius, however, was not royal. His expedition appears to have been subordinate to that of the king, Cleomenes, and he may have gained his appointment for that reason. There is no evidence for the proposition that Spartan kings could not lead expeditions at sea because of a religious ban.¹

During the Persian War, another Spartiate, Eurybiades, was appointed navarch for Artemisium. This situation may have been due to the extraordinary circumstances of war; the Spartan kings were involved with the defence of Thermopylae and the Isthmus, and again Spartan strategy was, perhaps, more concerned with land than sea defences at this time. Each of the navarchs appointed in this war may have served for a particular campaign or for a year. There is no clear evidence either way. It is clear, however, that if navarchs were not royal, then they were Spartiate. The allies, who were contributing so much to the Spartan fleet in the Persian War, would probably have settled for nothing less.

According to Aristotle [*Pol.*2.1271a], the navarchy was like another monarchy, opposed to the authority of the regular kings, but his view may reflect the power and prestige gained as a result of the success of the later navarch, Lysander.² In Lysander's case, in particular, his power was opposed by at least one king, Pausanias. A later king, Agesilaus, also had considerable power over the navarchy.

It is not known who planned Spartan naval strategy, called up the fleet and arranged for the choice of the navarch. In the period before the Persian War it may have been the kings who appointed the commander of any naval force, as perhaps Cleomenes appointed Anchimolius. The nature of the Greek alliance against Persia and the request by the allies for a Spartan naval commander does not make it clear how Eurybiades was chosen to command [*Hdt.*8.2]. His immediate successors in office were royal, perhaps because of the importance of the war at sea.

¹ W.Forrest, *A History of Sparta, 950-192 B.C.*(London, 1971) 62.

² W.Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (repr.Hildesheim, 1987) 109.

Dorcis, the last Spartan navarch of this period, who was sent out by the Spartans after the recall of Pausanias [Thuc.1.95], may have been chosen simply because he was not royal; the regent and previous navarch, Pausanias, had alienated the allies by his behaviour.

No Spartan navarchs are recorded during the Pentecontaetia. This may be because there were none, as Sparta appears to have undertaken no naval campaigns in that period.

Thucydides gives no information about the navarchy at the outbreak of the Archidamian War. Yet the Spartans had a definite naval policy in 431 [see chapter three], and their subsequent naval actions seem to suggest a consistent appraisal of the naval situation. By this time it was probably the ephors who appointed the navarch and called up any fleet. They were already responsible for calling up the Spartan land forces.³ Thucydides, however, appears only to have recorded those Spartan navarchs who took part in naval battles against the Athenian fleet. There may have been others, whose term of office was less spectacular or memorable, e.g. someone, although, perhaps, a lesser officer, must have overseen the organisation of the naval force necessary to transport the army sent by Sparta to Aetolia in 426. This force of two thousand, five hundred hoplites assembled at Delphi, a fact that suggests it must have crossed the Gulf near Itea. In addition, one of the founders of the colony at Heraclea in Trachis, a colony meant to provide some access to the Aegean and to the north for Spartan forces, was Alcidas, the navarch of 427. Clearly, those who appointed him as oecist had some appreciation of the need for naval experience and expertise in the foundation of this strategically placed colony.

Whatever its duration the navarch appears to have had to render an account of his term in office: Astyochochus was clearly facing an enquiry when he returned to Sparta in 411, and Pasippidas was exiled after his term, c.410/9 [Xen.Hell.1.1.32]. Such requirements were a way of controlling a navarch's power and, perhaps, his opportunities for acquiring wealth.⁴

³ W.G.Forrest, op.cit. 76f, H.Michell, *Sparta* (Cambridge, 1964) 118f, P.Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300-362 B.C.* (London, 1979) 206f.

⁴ The question of bribery in the Spartan naval high command is an interesting one. From the time of the Persian Wars, Spartan navarchs are associated with charges of bribery, usually expressed in the sources as 'corrupted by money'. In an article on bribery of Athenian ambassadors, S.Perlman pointed out that from Athenian comedy and oratory bribery would seem to have been endemic in Greece, and that Greek attitudes towards it were different from ours; S.Perlman, "On Bribing Athenian Ambassadors" GRBS 17 (1976) 223-33. He also noted that these charges were levelled in particular against those who had dealings with foreign powers, such as Macedon and Persia. They may, thus, have arisen partly as a result of the gift-giving that accompanied such dealings. Undoubtedly, too, bribery was considered a possibility in Greek society and a charge worth bringing against a political opponent.

During the Persian War the navarch, Eurybiades, and the Corinthian commander, were said to have been bribed by Themistocles [Hdt.8.3] with money he, himself had received as a bribe from the Euboeans. Such stories may

The Spartan navarchy was a much discussed topic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, since it presented problems of chronology and tenure. Scholars hoped that a list of Spartan navarchs, each of whom served for an agreed period that began at an agreed time of year would provide a firm chronological framework for Spartan history. It was believed that such a framework of Spartan navarchs could be derived from Xenophon, Diodorus and Theopompus. The groundwork for this list was done mainly by Beloch, Curtius and Pareti.⁵

The theory assumed that the navarchy was from its inception an annual office, because of the strict organisation of Spartan society and the annual nature of other Spartan offices, such as the ephorate. This supposition seems to have relied on statements in Xenophon [*Hell.* 1.5.1, 6.1], and especially on the claim that the navarchy could be held once only by the same individual [*Xen.Hell.* 2.1.7]. It was further assumed that the office began with the Spartan civil year, i.e. between the middle and end of summer. Thus, Beloch drew up a list of Spartan navarchs, beginning with Eurybiades in the Persian War and ending with Mnasippus in 373/2, whose terms ran from autumn to autumn. This interpretation, with a few variations, was the prevailing orthodoxy for a considerable time. The anomalies, especially for the Ionian War,

well have arisen from a misunderstanding of the reasons for sums of money brought to the commander and which he used to acquire rations for his forces. Alternatively, they may be the result of post-war hostility between Sparta and Athens, when the character of Themistocles as a clever and unscrupulous leader was developed. That bribery may have been used at Sparta as a way of 'fixing' a particular situation is suggested by the story of Pausanias, who thought he could avoid the charges being considered against him by using bribery [*Thuc.* 1.131]; the story comes from an Athenian source and may be questioned. Misinterpretation of the commander's action may explain the accusation of bribery against Astyochus in 411. It is not surprising, given the picture that Thucydides describes of divided counsel between the navarch and the independent western commanders of the Peloponnesian fleet, that such a charge was rumoured, especially as Astyochus had dealings with the Persian satrap, the fleet's paymaster. Persian wealth and the opportunities for corruption as a result may well have seemed limitless to the Greeks, see A.D.H. Bivar, *Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge, 1985) 619 for the special issue of coins by Tissaphernes to pay the fleet, and A.R. Burn, *op.cit.* 292-392 for Persian wealth and its effect on the Greeks.

Other charges may have been brought as the result of political differences at Sparta. Leotychidas was accused of bribery after his campaign in Thessaly but, as the campaign was hardly a great success, such a charge may have been laid by opponents of his campaign. He would have had charge of some money as a result of his punitive operations in the north. Similar charges brought against Cleandridas, supposedly bribed by Pericles [*Plut.Per.* 22], appear to have resulted in his exile. Once again, the incident may suggest that there was opposition at Sparta to his policy of accommodation with Pericles and Athens. The exile does not appear to have included Cleandridas' family; his son, Gylippus, was at Sparta in 413 [*Thuc.* 6.93]. Gylippus' own problems with similar charges in 405/4 [*Diod.* 13.106] may have been true or because of his association with the navarch, Lysander, whose success caused envy at Sparta. It is surprising that Gylippus was not more careful in view of his family's history. Lysander's carefulness in sending others with the money and treasure he had won and his clear handing over of all of it to the Spartan state may have been done precisely to avoid the charges of bribery he knew were quite likely to be made against him.

⁵ K. Beloch, "Die Nauarchie in Sparta" *Rhein. Mus.* 34 (1879) 117f., E. Curtius, *Griechische Geschichte* 2 (4) 838, 879, L. Pareti, "Ricerche sulla potenza marittima degli Spartani e sulla cronologia dei nauarchi" *Studi Minori di Storia Antica* v.2 (Florence, 1917) 1-131 and A. Solari, La navarchia a Sparta e la lista dei navarchi, *Annali della Scuola normale di Pisa* (1899).

produced by the assumption of an annual navarchy from the autumn were explained as possible extraordinary extensions of office due to a particular situation. This explanation became so well accepted that it was used to date apparently irregular navarchies, e.g., Gomme⁶ assumed that Cnemus' expedition to Zacynthus took place in the autumn of 430 because autumn was when navarchs were appointed.

In 1976 Raphael Sealey suggested a new approach to the question of chronology and tenure of the Spartan navarchy. As he pointed out, the evidence for the period before the Peloponnesian War was too little on which to base an assumption of annual tenure, while the navarchies of the Archidamian War did not appear to have been regular annual offices:⁷ Cnemus, who led an expedition against Zacynthus at an unspecified time in 430, was still navarch at the beginning of winter 429 [Thuc.2.66,93.1]. In addition, there is no complete list of navarchs for this war. Two of Sparta's navarchs, Cnemus and Alcidas, may have had their office extended, while the navarchy of Thrasymelidas appears to have begun not in the autumn, but in the spring of 425, since Thucydides says that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra before the corn was ripe [4.2.1-3]. Sealey therefore concluded that in this war a navarch was appointed for the duration of a particular expedition only. His term might be extended should the need arise, but it was intended to end when his fleet was disbanded.

Sealey further suggested that major changes occurred in the Spartan navarchy during the Ionian War. To explain this he supposed a law, passed c.409, which made the navarchy an annual office from spring to spring and restricted its tenure [*Hell.*1.6.1, 2.1.10].⁸ Sealey assumed that only a major crisis, such as the Spartan defeat at Cyzicus, could have prompted such a change. There is no clear evidence on the point, however, which must remain speculative. Certainly the naval war in Ionia became a major Spartan pre-occupation from 412 and available evidence suggests that navarchs were in office in the spring after this time, but it did not necessarily require a crushing naval defeat to make the Spartans refine their naval system. The Spartan government was made aware from early on in the war of the difficulties of adapting to

⁶ A.W.Gomme, *An Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2 (Oxford, 1956) 199

⁷ R.Sealey, "Die spartanische nauarchie" *Klio* 58 (1976) 335-58.

⁸ Polos, the navarch of 400/399, appears to have replaced Anaxibius in the autumn [*Xen.Anab.* 7.2.5.7]. Beloch thinks this proof of an autumn adoption of command in the navarchy. Sealey, *Klio* 58 (1976) 350 argues that Anaxibius was recalled at the same time as Clearchus, as Sparta was not happy with either.

naval action so far from home, especially when they were faced with appeals from three different geographical areas in the east. At first, after the offer of a considerable number of Chian ships, Melanchridas was appointed navarch of the allied fleet [8.6]. It is not clear whether the appointment of the navarch preceded the mustering of the fleet, which might have been the province of the ephors as it was for land forces. When the omen of an earthquake caused the Spartans to rethink their approach, they envisaged the appointment of three separate *archontes* to investigate the possibilities of each situation in the east.

Problems over jurisdiction of authority soon arose between Pedaritus, the Spartan archon at Chios, and the navarch, Astyochus. The commission sent to investigate the Ionian situation had the power to replace the navarch with a another commander [*archon*], who would have completed Astyochus' term of office, and to change the direction of the Spartan strategy in the east. Although Astyochus was retained in command by the commissioners and, thus, cleared of the charges brought by Pedaritus, there is no suggestion that the Spartans contemplated extending his term of office to include a future campaign in the Hellespont or re-appointing him for such a reason. Yet his navarchy had not been a failure [see chapter Four]. In fact, many of its problems may have been due to Sparta's adaptation to a new type of war situation, as well as to the Spartan association with Tissaphernes. Sparta may have been seriously troubled by operations conducted so far from home and not under its direct control. The restrictions to annual tenure and a single term may well have applied to the navarchy as a result of the recommendations of the commission of 411, which had a first-hand opportunity to see the problems of command over so wide an area. To ensure naval success it was necessary to consolidate control in the hands of a single officer, the navarch, possibly with assistance from one or two other officers, the *epistoleis*. The Spartans might well have been nervous of what such powers might encourage in an ambitious individual: they had already had a similar problem with the talented and ambitious regent, Pausanias, for whom Spartan society had no place once the Persian war ended.

The Spartans must have recognised that they could not conduct a war with constant complaints and appeals being referred back to the home government. They therefore would have needed to give their navarch considerable decision-making authority. Perhaps Pedaritus' difficulty was in recognising that the navarchy was now necessarily a more powerful position that it had previously been. There is further indication that the problem of the navarch's authority may have been resolved by the time of Mindarus. He had the power to move naval operations to the Hellespont and did so without any apparent opposition from individuals or from groups of

allies. He also was given two subordinate officers, the *epistoleis*, Hippocrates and Philippus. The *epistoleus* was a junior officer responsible to the navarch; there is no evidence for this office before the Ionian War. The title of the office suggests its original purpose was secretarial: an *epistoleus* may have been needed to keep the home government better and more regularly informed of developments in the east. These officers also possessed some military responsibilities. They could replace the navarch, if necessary, to ensure continuity of command, as Hippocrates did after the death of Mindarus at Cyzicus [Xen.*Hell.* 1.1.23]. Such on-the-spot replacements were necessary when the fleet was operating at a considerable distance from home, since it took time to send out another commanding officer. A similar practice was employed in the Spartan army [Thuc.3.100]. Later, it appears to have been possible for former *epistoleis* to be promoted to the navarchy; Nicolochus was *epistoleus* in 388/7 and navarch in 376/5.

There was a further important development in the virtual second navarchy of Lysander. The rule on second navarchies was not disobeyed, but its intent was nullified when Lysander was given a navarch's power, though his office was that of *epistoleus* [Xen.*Hell.* 2.1.7]. This was done with the full co-operation of the Spartan state, since the Spartans intended to defeat Athens whatever the cost. Lysander's powerful position after his victory at Aegospotami was a direct result of this Spartan decision.

Information on developments in the navarchy from the time of the Peloponnesian War to the Corinthian War in 395 is sparse. The navarchy, however, had achieved greater importance than ever before, because of the success and ambition of Lysander. Because Sparta had acquired an empire in the Aegean, it now seems to have appointed navarchs on a more regular basis; thus, more navarchs' names are recorded for this period. Sparta kept control of the Aegean and possessed bases in the Hellespont and at Rhodes.

The growing importance in foreign policy of individual kings at Sparta appears to have led to a further change in the development of the navarchy. Agesilaus, the dominant figure in the foreign policy of Sparta in the early part of the fourth century, was granted supreme military and naval command for his campaign in Asia in 395/4. The navarchy once again returned to the

royal sphere of power. Agesilaus appointed his brother-in-law, Peisander, as navarch in 394, perhaps in conjunction with the navarch already appointed by Sparta.⁹

The subsequent defeat of Peisander at Cnidus was a severe blow to Spartan naval power in the Aegean and one from which it never really recovered. At the same time Agesilaus may not have given up his privilege of appointing navarchs from his family; his brother Teleutias was appointed to the office in 392/1 and again in 387/6.

By the time of Antalcidas, 388/7, the navarchy was an office of considerable diplomatic as well as military importance, perhaps as a result of Agesilaus' appointments. Antalcidas conducted a successful naval campaign against the Athenians in the Hellespont; he also had powers to negotiate peace terms with the Persians, although he still had to refer them back to Sparta.

No navarchs are recorded in the period between 386/5 and 376/5. Once again, perhaps none were appointed. The fleets of the signatories of the Peace of Antalcidas were supposed to have been disbanded as one of the conditions of the peace [*Xen.Hell.5.1.35*]. By this time Sparta may well have abandoned any ideas of a naval empire under the control of its own fleet. Xenophon's silence on the navarchy at this point cannot, however, be taken as decisive. He is notorious for his omissions of important matters in the fourth century: for example, he says practically nothing of the Second Athenian Confederacy or of Epaminondas of Thebes.

It seems most likely that when Sparta had a fleet it appointed a navarch. This fleet, which was not wholly Spartan but provided for the most part by Sparta's allies, was regarded as an instrument of war and empire. When Sparta was not at war and had no naval empire, no navarchs were appointed.

⁹ See Chapter Five, note 68. For the succession of navarchs in 395/4, see the comments of I.A.F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge, 1967) 74-5. Pareti, *Storia di Sparta arcaica*, 135-7 thinks that Peisander was not navarch but had some subordinate command under Agesilaus. Xenophon, however, calls Peisander navarch [*Hell.3.4.29*]. He should, perhaps, be given the benefit of the doubt. For Agesilaus and his family and the navarchy in general, see P. Cartledge, *Agesilaus and the crisis of Sparta* (London, 1987) 79f.

A tentative list of Spartan navarchs and *epistoleis*¹⁰

<u>Source</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>
Hdt.8.2-5,49,57-64; Diod.11.12.15-19; Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 8.	480	Eurybiades
Hdt.8.131-2, 9.96-105 Diod.11.34-6.	479	Leotychidas
Hdt.5.32;Diod.11.44 Thuc.1.94-5, 128, 130. Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 23, <i>Kimón</i> 6.	478?	Pausanias
Thuc.1.95;Diod.11.44; Hdt.8.131.42.	477?	Dorcis
Thuc.2.66.80-2; Diod.12.47.4-5.	430/29	Cnemus
Thuc.3.16.26,29-33,69 76-81;Diod.12.55,6.	427	Alcidas
Thuc.4.11; Diod.12.61.	425	Thrasymelidas
Thuc.8.6.	413	Melanchridas
Thuc.8.20,23,31-45, 61-3,78-84	412/11	Astyochus
Thuc.8.85,99-105; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.1.2-7,11-18 Diod.13.45-6;Polyaen.1.40. Plut <i>Alcib.</i> 27. Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.1.23.	411/0	Mindarus Hippocrates (Epistoleus) Philippus (Epistoleus)

¹⁰ Based on K.Beloch, "Die Nauarchie in Sparta" *Rhein. Mus.* 34 (1879) 117ff. and L.Pareti, "Ricerche sulla potenza marittima degli Spartani" *Memoire della R. Accademia delle scienze di Torino* (1909).

<u>Source</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.1.32;	410?	Pasippidas?
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.1.32,5,1.	409/8?	Cratesippidas
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.5.1-15, 6.1-10;Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 3-6; Diod 13.70.	408/7	Lysander
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1 6.1-33; Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 6-7; Diod.13.76-9, 97-9. Aelian <i>VH</i> 12.43.	407/6	Callicratidas Eteoniceus (Epistoleus) Clearchus (Epistoleus)
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 2.1.7; Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 7	405/4	Aracus Lysander (Epistoleus)
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 2.4.28-9.	404/3	Libys
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.1.2; Diod.14.19;	402/1	Samius/ Samus/Pythagoras
Xen. <i>An.</i> 5.1.4, 6.1.16, 7.1.10-20, 2.4-8; Diod.14.30	401/0	Anaxibius
Xen. <i>An.</i> 7.2.5	400/399	Polus
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.2.12; Diod.12.79,14.63,70,79; Paus.6.3.15 Theop. <i>Hell.</i> 2.1 <i>Hell. Oxyrh.</i> 4.2	398/7	Pharax
Theop. <i>Hell.</i> 4.2; <i>Hell. Oxyrh.</i> 9.1	397/6	Archelaidas
Theop. <i>Hell.</i> 4.2; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.8.11 Plut. <i>Dion.</i> 5	396/5	Pollis

<u>Source</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>
Theop. <i>Hell.</i> 14.1 Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 3.4.29, 4.3.10-13;Diod.14.83. Plut. <i>Ages.</i> 17. <i>Hell.Oxyrh.</i> 4.2	395/4	Chiricrates Agesilaus/ Peisander
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.8.11.	394/3	Podanemus Pollis (Epistoleus) Herippidas (Epistoleus)
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.8.11.	393/2	Herippidas
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.8.11.	392/1	Teleutias
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.8.20-3; Diod.14.97; Aesch.2.78.	391/0	Ecdicus or Chilon?
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.8.23-5.	390/89	Teleutias
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.1.3-6.	389/88	Hierax
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.1.6; Diod.14.110.	388/7	Antalcidas Nicolochus (Epistoleus)
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.1.13-24	387/6	Teleutias
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.4.60-1. Polyaen.3.11.11.	377/6	Pollis
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.1.6-7. Polyaen.3.10.4	376/5	Nicolochus
Diod.15.45.	375/4	Aristocrates
Diod.15.46.	374/3	Alcidas
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 6.2.4-9; Diod.15.47.	373/2	Mnasippus Hypermenes (Epistoleus)