Hume's Epistemic Sentimentalism

by

Taro Okamura

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta

Abstract

Hume's epistemology in *A Treatise of Human Nature* has generated a great deal of research. In particular, in the section titled "Conclusion of this Book" at the end of Book One of the *Treatise*, it is ambiguous exactly what Hume's epistemological position is. While Hume arrives at a radical scepticism that gives no authority to reason at all, he remains committed to the use of reason in spite of that scepticism. The sceptical interpretations claim that Hume has given up on epistemic justification for the use of reason, while the naturalistic interpretations hold that Hume justifies certain kinds of reasoning by appealing to some natural psychological properties with reasoning.

I find the naturalistic interpretations persuasive in that they capture Hume's stable and continuous commitment to reason. However, some serious problems have been directed at the naturalistic interpretations: the problem of normativity (it is unclear why we should follow certain naturalistic standards) and the problem of truth-insensitivity (the psychological properties that the naturalistic interpretations focus on are truth-insensitive.). In this dissertation, I aim to develop Hume's naturalistic epistemology in such a way that it can respond to these problems. In particular, I would like to focus on Hume's theory of passions, which has not been mentioned much in the study of his epistemology. I argue that Hume's account of the "indirect passions" provide a response to the problem of normativity, and his account of the "calm passions" offers a reply to the problem of truth-insensitivity. In this way, my aim is to elaborate

Hume's naturalistic epistemology into what I call “epistemic sentimentalisim” that some *passions* play crucial roles in epistemic justification. I also argue that my interpretation and the "virtue theoretic interpretation" that has been so influential in recent years complement each other in significant ways.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Amy M. Schmitter. She always patiently discussed my crude ideas and encouraged me. It was a great pleasure to work on this project through numerous discussions with her. Without her precise criticism and warm encouragement, this dissertation would have been very different. I also thank Jennifer Welchman, Howard Nye, Karl Schafer, and Ingo Brigandt, members of the exam committee. Their valuable feedback has improved this dissertation and is essential in further developing it in the future. I also gratefully acknowledge Donald Ainslie, Chuck Goldhaber, Kensuke Ito, Takahiko Masuda, Hsueh Qu, Elizabeth Radcliffe, Todd Ryan, Kazunori Sawada, Ryo Tanaka, and Jacqueline Taylor for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts that now comprise this dissertation. I would also like to thank my former supervisors, Kunitake Ito, Yasuo Deguchi, Hiroshi Fujino, and Naoki Yajima, for their support and encouragement. Thanks also the philosophy community at the University of Alberta for being supportive and welcoming. Finally, I thank Aya, Taira, Miki, and my parents for allowing me to joyfully pursue philosophy.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Identifying the Problem[1]

1. Introduction

This dissertation is a study of David Hume's epistemology in the *Treatise of Human Nature*.[2] Particular focus will be given to the section 7, part 4, Book One of the *Treatise,* entitled "Conclusion of this Book" (hereafter referred to as the "Conclusion"). As we will see later, there Hume faces scepticism that all reasoning is unjustified. At one point, he even declares, "I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning" (T 1.4.7.8). Whether Hume accepts this conclusion or overcomes it, the core of his epistemology seems to lie in how he responds to such scepticism. However, in order to understand the issues in the "Conclusion", we need to familiarize ourselves with Hume's basic philosophical framework. In this chapter, I will first briefly review Hume's basic philosophy of mind, which is necessary for understanding the "Conclusion". I should

[1] For the purpose of references, *A Treatise of Human Nature* is abbreviated "T," and citations are by book, part, section, and paragraph number. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* is abbreviated "EHU," and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* is abbreviated "EPM." Citations of the two *Enquiries* are by part, section (if any), and paragraph number. *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary* is abbreviated "EMPL", and citations are by essay title and page number. *The Natural History of Religion* is abbreviated "NHR", and citations are by section and paragraph number. *A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh*, included in the Treatise is abbreviated "LG", and citations are by paragraph number. *Letters of David Hume is* is abbreviated "Letters", and citations are by volume and page number.

[2] The justification for why I focus on the *Treatise* in particular will be given in Chapter 2.

note that the following descriptions of the basic framework of Hume's philosophy remain sketchy, and are only intended to clarify the issues of the "Conclusion". Each of the topics in Hume's philosophy has given rise to a number of interpretive controversies, but I cannot go into each of them. However, I believe that this sketch will suffice to understand what problems Hume suffers in the "Conclusion". With the basic framework of Hume's philosophy in hand, then I review the "Conclusion".

2. Impressions, Ideas, and the Imagination

Hume begins Book One of the *Treatise* by classifying perceptions into two kinds: impressions and ideas (T 1.1.1.1). Impressions "include all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul" (T 1.1.1.1). Ideas are "the faint images of these [impressions] in thinking and reasoning" (T 1.1.1.1). The difference between them lies in the degrees of force and liveliness. Impressions are forceful and lively, and ideas are faint. Impressions and ideas correspond to what we call feelings (or experiences) and thoughts (T 1.1.1.1).

Hume also divides perceptions into simple and complex. A simple perception is a perception that cannot be further divided into smaller parts.[3] A complex perception is one that can be divided into simple perceptions (T 1.1.1.2).

[3] What counts as simple is determined by what Garrett calls the "Separability Principle" (Garrett 2015, 46), according to which "Whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination" (T 1.1.7.3). This principle, as well as the copy principle, is controversial in Hume studies, but I will not go into it here.

With these distinctions, Hume introduces what is commonly referred to as the "copy principle" (Garrett 2015, 43). The principle is that "all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent" (T 1.1.1.7). In order to have a simple idea of a color, we need to experience a simple impression of that color. In the case of a complex idea, its parts, the simple ideas, are derived from the corresponding simple impressions. An idea of a building is a complex idea, and the simple ideas that make up its parts, such as shape and color, are derived from the corresponding simple impressions.

Thus, we can think about an object, or have an idea of it, even when we are not directly experiencing it, using the material given to us by past impressions or experiences. According to Hume, it is through memory or imagination that we can have an idea. The difference between memory and imagination is that "the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination" (T 1.1.3.1). The idea of a dog that I remember is livelier than the idea of a unicorn that I have only imagined. Another difference is that "the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty'd down in that respect, without any power of variation" (T 1.1.3.2). I can't change the color or shape of the lion in my memory. But I can freely change the parts and circumstances of the imagined unicorn.

So it is through imagination that we can have an idea of an object that we do not currently experience or remember. The notion of imagination here is very broad. Imagination is said to be the faculty of having ideas that are fainter than memory:

“when I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas” (T 1.3.9.19, n22). As we will see soon, the imagination includes various kinds of cognitive activities, such as reasoning, prejudice, and so on. This contrasts with Descartes' sharp distinction between imagination and intellect, for example.

Although the imagination is taken very broadly as the faculty to have ideas, there are certain tendencies in the way imagination makes us have ideas. Hume maintains that imagination brings certain ideas to the mind, guided by the three relations of “RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place, and CAUSE and EFFECT” (T 1.1.4.1). Imagination tends to associate an idea with another idea that is similar to, contiguous to, or causally connected to it. But it is not the case that when these relations are present, imagination necesarily leads to the association of ideas. Nor does our having certain ideas always require the presence of these relations. Hume regards the associative relations as "a gentle force, which commonly prevails" (T 1.1.4.1). Appealing to these associative principles, in Book One of the *Treatise,* Hume sets out to elucidate how our imagination makes us have ideas of various subjects, such as abstract ideas, causality, external objects, and self.

3. Reason as a Kind of Imagination

Thus, it is only through the imagination that we can have any idea of an object we do not currently experience or remember. Now, according to Hume, reason, which

has traditionally been regarded as the absolute authority in our cognitive activities, is also a kind of imagination. Reasoning as an exercise of the faculty of reason is divided into demonstrative reasoning and causal reasoning. In the following, I describe each of them.

Demonstrative reasoning involves the discovery of relations of ideas (T 1.3.1.1-5, T 1.3.6.5). In order to reveal such a relation, demonstrative reasoning does not appeal to experience, but only compares ideas to find relations such that denying the existence of such a relation is inconceivable.[4] Algebraic reasoning is a typical example of demonstrative reasoning. Hume claims that demonstrative reasoning provides the highest degree of certainty. "In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible" (T 1.4.1.1). Only demonstrative reasoning produces "knowledge" in the sense of infallible cognitive states; causal reasoning can only produce probabilities in varying degrees (T 1.3.11.2),[5].[6]

Hume has a great deal more to say about causal reasoning than about demonstrative reasoning. Causal reasoning is reasoning from cause to effect or effect to cause. The perception of a union between cause and effect has two components: the experience of a constant conjunction between two types of objects, and the mind's

[4] "To form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it." (T 1.3.6.5)

[5] Intuition, which does not involve reasoning, is also a source of knowledge (T 1.3.1.2). What I mean here is that the only *reasoning* that gives rise to knowledge is demonstrative reasoning.

[6] Hume is not clear whether demonstrative reasoning produces beliefs, or lively Ideas. Since demonstrative reasoning does not involve impressions or memories, it does not seem to have a source that makes ideas lively. Perhaps demonstrative reasoning is supposed to identify ideas that are conceivable and logically consistent, rather than to distinguish between ideas and beliefs.

transition from one object to the other: “after we have observ’d the resemblance in a sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant, and to conceive it in a stronger light upon account of that relation.” (T 1.3.14.20) When we experience that a disease and its symptoms are constantly conjoined, we are made to think of the idea of that disease when we see the symptoms. However, we cannot further know *why* these objects are constantly conjoined.[7] When we observe a constant conjunction, we are led by custom to turn our imagination from one to the other. This is exactly what we mean by cause and effect, and we cannot explain it any better than that. “We cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjunction. We only observe the thing itself, and always find that from the constant conjunction the objects acquire an union in the imagination” (T 1.3.6.15). Hume's discussions of causation and induction particularly has generated a vast amount of research, but this brief overview is sufficient for my purpose of understanding the scepticism in the "Conclusion".[8]

Causal reasoning not only brings an idea to the mind, but it makes us *believe* or *assent to* it. According to Hume, belief is “A LIVELY IDEA” (T 1.3.7.5). According to Hume, the imagination not only moves between perceptions, but also transfers the liveliness from one perception to the other (T 1.3.8.2). Causal reasoning also conveys liveliness from impressions and memories to ideas, making them lively ideas or beliefs.

[7] This view is founded on Hume's famous argument about induction to the effect that the assumption of the uniformity of nature that the past resembles the future is produced by custom and is not open to rational justification (T 1.3.6).

[8] For an overview of the disputes, see Garrett (1997, ch.4).

For example, suppose we have an impression or observation of a certain symptom. This symptom brings to mind the idea of a disease, based on past experiences of constant conjunction between the symtom and the disease. This relation of causation conveys the liveliness of the symptom impression to the idea of the disease. This is how we come to believe that the disease exists in one's body. Thus, causal reasoning produces beliefs based on the perceptions of causal relations (constant conjunction and determination of the mind to pass from one to the other).[9]

These accounts of reason appear to be mere psychological descriptions of demonstrative and causal reasoning. But Hume is also committed to the normative significance of reason. The copy principle, which states that all simple ideas are derived from preceding impressions, is a product of inductive reasoning. Hume also appeals to "experience"(T 1.3.8.3) to establish the above account of belief. If Hume did not accept the legitimacy of causal reasoning, then these philosophical views would lack a basis. In fact, Hume seems to actively endorse the legitimacy of reason. He claims that "a just inference" (T 1.3.6.7) is founded on the relation of cause and effect. He lists "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects"(T 1.3.15) and considers these rules to be "all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning" (T 1.3.15.11). These show Hume's

[9] However, it is often the case that the cause cannot be identified due to lack of sufficient experience, or the unique cause cannot be singled out, due to the possibility of multiple, contrary causes. Hume provides a detailed discussion of what kind of reasoning counts as rational in such situations, and how we form beliefs based on probability calculations (T 1.3.12). See Falkenstein (1997) for a useful overview. Hume seems to regard reasoning based on such probability calculations as justified as well: "All these kinds of probability are receiv'd by philosophers, and allow'd to be reasonable foundations of belief and opinion" (T 1.3.13.1).

endorsement of causal reasoning. Demonstrative reasoning also seems to have a high epistemic status, since it is the only thing that can produce something worthy of the name "knowledge". Of course, what Hume means here does not have to be that all reasoning is immediately epistemically justified. Causal or demonstrative reasoning, when not supported by sufficient amount of experience or careful reflection, will be a source of error. In the case of causal reasoning, such erroneous reasoning would be ruled out by "rules by which to judge the causes and effects" (T 1.3.15) as failing to identify causal relations in the first place. I agree with Garrett that the epistemic standards Hume endorses at this point require that "the final decision of reason, as developed by experience, reason, and reason's own self-reflection, ought to be assented to" (Garrett 2015, 230).

Hume frequently seems to condemn various kinds of irrationality-inducing mental operations, which also shows his endorsement of the legitimacy of reason. Hume claims that "CREDULITY, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others" (T 1.3.9.12) stems from the unjustified assumption that what others say resemble or correspond to the facts, and people fall into credulity due to the "weakness of human nature" (T 1.3.9.12). Education in the sense of indoctrination is not based on the experience of constant conjunction, but just repetitions of ideas. Thus, "education [is] disclaim'd by philosophy, as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion" (T 1.3.10.1). We also tend to rashly form "general rules" by blindly following a habit, and have prejudices, such as that "An Irishman cannot have wit" (T 1.3.13.7). Under the influence of such hasty general rules, we mistake accidental conditions for the essential

characteristics of an object. Hume seems to dismiss this kind of tendency: "when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish'd principles of reasoning" (T 1.3.13.12).

However, while Hume endorses the legitimacy of reason, he does not say much about what the basis of that legitimacy is. Rather, he seems to *presuppose* its legitimacy. When he speaks of the legitimacy of reason, he just says that it is generally accepted in philosophy ("receiv'd by philosophers" (T 1.3.13.1)), or that irrational beliefs are not ("disclaim'd by philosophy" (T 1.3.10.1), "not receiv'd by philosophy as solid and legitimate" (T 1.3.13.1)), and he does not specify what his own reasons for that legitimacy are. As Owen puts it, at this point, Hume does not seem to consider "deeper questions of the warrant and authority of reason" (Owen 1999, 140),[10].[11] However, this uncritical commitment to the traditionally dominant idea of the legitimacy of reason leads to destructive scepticism in part 4 of the *Treatise*, especially in the "Conclusion. There, as we shall see next, Hume explicitly confronts the normative questions of what

[10] Garrett (1997, 80) also thinks that in the psychology of reasoning, as seen above, Hume does not face normative questions about its legitimacy, even though Hume appears to make use of legitimate reasoning.

[11] However, Loeb (2012) argues that in part 3, Book One of the *Treatise*, Hume has already addressed the normative question about the legitimacy of reason to some extent. Even if this is the case, my argument below holds. According to Loeb's interpretation, in the psychology of reason in part 3 of Book One, Hume provides discussions of the basis for the normativity of reason, but the sceptical discussions in part 4 makes the normative distinction established there collapse (Loeb 2012, 315). Thus Hume must redefine the normative distinction in his "Conclusion". Since my purpose is to clarify the normative distinction that is redefined in the "Conclusion", my argument does not depend on whether or not Hume is making a normative argument in part 3 of Book One.

kind of reasoning is legitimate, and what the basis for that legitimacy is. In my view, on the basis of these considerations, Hume redefines legitimate reasoning.

4. Overview of the "Conclusion"

In the "Conclusion," Hume shows that the basis for the authority of reason is less clear than traditionally thought. Further reflection on that basis leads to the very pessimistic view that no reasoning is justified. In spite of this consequence, Hume somehow continues his commitment to reasoning or philosophy. On what basis Hume can resume philosophy is a matter of interpretive dispute, which we will review in the next chapter. Here I will not go into a detailed interpretation of the "Conclusion," but describe it.

4.1 Sceptical Consequences of the Framework of Book One

Hume begins the "Conclusion" with a first-person description of various depressing passions that are produced by reflection on his epistemology or philosophy of mind in Book One of the *Treatise*. Such passions include "despair," "solitude," and "hatred" from others (T 1.4.7.1-2). He is made to feel that he is "some strange uncouth monster, who not being able to mingle and unite in society" (T 1.4.7.2). What puts Hume in such a miserable state are four concerns about the achievements made in Book One.

4.1.1 Vivacity of Ideas

Hume's first concern stems from his view that our causal reasoning consists in enlivening ideas. Hume summarizes his own view of causal reasoning as follows:

> After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that view, under which they appear to me. Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same advantages. Without this quality, by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond others…we cou'd never assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects, which are present to our senses. (T 1.4.7.3)

This view of causal reasoning is exactly what we saw earlier. Causal reasoning consists of the recognition of the constant conjunctions and the accompanying shift of the mind from one object to the other, and thereby vivifying an idea. We are not given any further reasons to agree with the conclusion of causal reasoning. The enlivening effect is not limited to causal reasoning. As we have seen in section 2, memory also enlivens an idea. And although I have not explained it so far, according to Hume, the belief that the objects we sense exist independently of the mind ("continu'd and distinct existence" in

Hume's own term) also stems from the enlivening effect of the imagination (T 1.4.3.56). Thus, "[t]he memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas." (T 1.4.7.3)

This view destabilizes Hume's trust in causal reasoning, senses, and memory. He claims that the vivacity of ideas is "so inconstant and fallacious"(T 1.4.7.4). The vivacity is "seemingly is so trivial, and so little founded on reason" (T 1.4.7.3). As already mentioned, the vivacious imagination found in prejudice or education produces errors. It becomes less clear, then, why we should accept causal reasoning, memory, and senses, since they, like other idiosyncratic forms of mental operations, are just what enlivens an idea.

4.1.2 The Operations of the Vivacious Imagination are Inconsistent

Hume's second concern is that the imagination based on the vivacity of ideas yields a kind of contradiction. This concern stems from Hume's critique of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities in modern philosophy, as represented by Locke (T 1.4.4). The qualities such as color, sound, taste, etc. change depending on the state of the perceiver. According to Hume, from this observation, some of modern philosophers have argued that these qualities are mind-dependent, secondary qualities that do not exist in objects, or do not resemble the qualities in objects. However, Hume argues that without the perception of secondary qualities, we cannot have a proper conception of

primary qualities, which is supposed to exist mind-independently.[12] Now, it is causal reasoning that leads to this conclusion. The conclusion conflicts with our sensory belief that a property, or object, exists independently of the mind. The conflict between causal reasoning and the senses is the conclusion of T 1.4.4:

> there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that perswade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an existence. (T 1.4.4.15)

This conclusion calls into question the reliability of the imagination, or the vivacity of ideas, because it sometimes produces the beliefs that are "directly contrary" (T 1.4.7.4). "'Tis this principle [the vivacity of ideas], which makes us reason from causes and effects; and 'tis the same principle, which convinces us of the continu'd existence of external objects" (T 1.4.7.4). Thus, the lively propensity of the imagination,

[12] Simply put, Hume's argument is the following (T 1.4.4.6-9). The perception of the primary qualities of motion and extension depends on the perception of the primary quality of solidity, but the perception of solidity requires the perceptions of colored objects.

responsible for causal reasoning and beliefs in external objects, leads to "a manifest contradiction" (T 1.4.7.4).

4.1.3 Causal Reasoning Does Not Reveal the Ultimate Principle

Hume's third concern rests on the fact that causal reasoning does not reveal the ultimate cause or the real connection between objects, which we are eager to know. "Nothing is more curiously enquir'd after by the mind of man, than the causes of every phænomenon; nor are we content with knowing the immediate causes, but push on our enquiries, till we arrive at the original and ultimate principle" (T 1.4.7.5). However, as mentioned in section 3, we cannot know the further cause of the constant conjunction between objects. All we are given is the psychological fact that the observation of one object determines us to think about the other object, that is, "this connexion, tie, or energy lies merely in ourselves" (T 1.4.7.5). Scientists and philosophers who want to figure out the ultimate cause of things will be disappointed by the nature of such causal reasoning. Why, then, should we regard such seemingly shallow causal reasoning as legitimate?

4.1.4 The "Very Dangerous Dilemma"

Then, the question to be asked is how much we should follow the lively propensity of the imagination, which is so trivial, incosistent, and shallow, or "how far

we ought to yield to these illusions" (T 1.4.7.6). This question leads to what Hume calls "a very dangerous dilemma" (T 1.4.7.6).

One horn of the dilemma is the following. One might decide to yield to all kinds of imagination on the grounds that causal reasoning and all other idiosyncratic imagination are on the same footing. But it's not a policy that can be applied consistently:

> For if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy; beside that these suggestions are often contrary to each other; they lead us into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become asham'd of our credulity. Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of the imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers. (T 1.4.7.6).

It cannot be correct to recommend a practice that leads to what we consider prejudice or credulity.

Here is the other horn. One might decide to exclude from reasoning the "trivial" property (the vivacity of ideas) that other kinds of idiosyncratic imagination have, and to follow more rational part of the imagination ("the general and more establish'd properties of the imagination" (T 1.4.7.7)). However, this policy leads to the extinction of all beliefs. The argument is based on his discussion in the section, "Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason" (T 1.4.1). Given the fallibility of our cognitive faculties (our

reasoning sometimes fails to produce a true judgment), we are required to check the reliability of our judgment by forming a second-order judgment evaluating it. But then, we have to confirm the reliability of the second-order judgment by forming a third-order judgment. Thus, "we are oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt", and this endless addition of doubt ends up with "a total extinction of belief and evidence" (T 1.4.1.6). This scepticism also applies to demonstrative reasoning, which so far has not been subject to scepticism in the "Conclusion". For even if the relations of ideas are unchangeable on their own, our faculty to compare ideas is fallible. We can avoid this scepticism and have a belief "only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy" (T 1.4.7.6). At some point, we need to naively have a belief. This brings us back to the credulity or the trivial property of the imagination. Thus, the dilemma is that we have "no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all" (T 1.4.7.6).

One perhaps could adopt a moderate maxim that we should not engage in "refin'd or elaborate reasoning" (T 1.4.7.7). Hume rejects this strategy for three reasons. First, the maxim "cut(s) off entirely all science and philosophy" (T 1.4.7.7): for science and philosophy essentially require refined reasoning. Second, the maxim "proceed(s) upon one singular quality of the imagination, and by a parity of reason must embrace all of them" (T 1.4.7.7): if we should follow a trivial propensity of enlivening imagination, it is not clear why we should not rely on other idiosyncratic propensities of imagination. Third, since the maxim itself is a conclusion of the "refin'd or elaborate reasoning", we violate the maxim just by proposing it (T 1.4.7.7).

4.2 From Melancholy to a Return to Philosophy

Following the "dangerous dilemma," Hume goes through three different states of mind. Each of these is described below.

The first is melancholy. Hume is faced with the "dangerous dilemma" and laments, "I know not what ought to be done in the present case" (T 1.4.7.7). Hume falls into the following extremely pessimistic state:

> The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv'd of the use of every member and faculty. (T 1.4.7.8)

Hume expresses this state as "philosophical melancholy and delirium" (T 1.4.7.9).

The second mood is indolence. The cure for this melancholy is not further reasoning, but “nature”. Hume gets out of this state by relaxing his mind and having lively sense impressions, such as by playing backgammon or having dinner. Here Hume returns to "indolent belief in the general maxims of the world" (T 1.4.7.10). However, Hume remains unwilling to resume his philosophical inquiry and engage in refined causal reasoning. “I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy” (T 1.4.7.10). Hume says, “Where I strive against my inclination, I shall have a good reason for my resistance” (T 1.4.7.10), but at this stage, Hume can't find a "good reason" to do philosophy.

However, in the third stage, Hume seems to have found a reason for philosophy and complex reasoning. Hume seems to have arrived at a confident claim about when reasoning should be assented to: “Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us” (T 1.4.7.11). Specifically, Hume is led to philosophy by the passions of curiosity and ambition:

> I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me. I am uneasy to think I approve of one object, and disapprove of another; call one thing beautiful, and another deform’d; decide concerning truth and falshood, reason and folly,

> without knowing upon what principles I proceed. I am concern'd for the condition of the learned world, which lies under such a deplorable ignorance in all these particulars. I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. These sentiments spring up naturally in my present disposition; and shou'd I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself to any other business or diversion, I feel I shou'd be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy. (T 1.4.7.12)

In addition to this "origin" of philosophy, Hume mentions another reason for doing philosophy. Religious superstition "opens a world of its own, and presents us with scenes, and beings, and objects, which are altogether new", while philosophy "contents itself with assigning new causes and principles to the phænomena, which appear in the visible world" (T 1.4.7.13). Thus, given its bold nature, superstition has dangerous consequences when it is wrong. Since philosophy is a modest enterprise that limits its inquiry to the world as we perceive it., it is safe even when it is wrong. Hume recommends philosophy over superstition because of its safety.

Thus, Hume returns to philosophy and moves on to philosophical investigations of passion and morality in Book Two and Book Three of the *Treatise*. But Hume's philosophical inquiry here is no longer a quest for the ultimate principle of things, but a more modest one:

> we might hope to establish a system or set of opinions, which if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hop'd for) might at least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical examination. (T 1.4.7.14)

To say that truth is "too much to be hop'd for" sounds like a significant concession. In any case, it is with this modest attitude that Hume continues his philosophy.

4.3 Epistemology for Philosophers

Various interpretations have been offered as to what the nature of this response to scepticism really is. We will see them in the next chapter. I would like to conclude this chapter by clarifying for whom the sceptical discussions and responses to them in the "Conclusion" primarily matter. As Ainslie (2015a, ch.7) points out, the primary question of the "Conclusion" seems to be what kind of reasoning is correct for a *philosopher*. The sceptical discussions have force only when one gives reason absolute authority. It is precisely because philosophers are committed to such authority of reason that they are bothered by the consequence that reason relies on "trivial" propensities and does not seem to have absolute authority. It is philosophers who have such a desire to know the ultimate principles and who are disappointed when it turns out that they are not able to make it (4.1.3). Also, non-philosophers do not use causal reasoning to recognize that some qualities are mind-dependent. Philosophers who are committed to

causal reasoning and who still believe in the mind-independence of the objects suffer from the "manifest contradiction" between the senses and causal reasoning (4.1.2). Indeed, Hume associates the sceptical problems with the title of "philosopher". Hume asks, "with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title [philosopher], when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction?" (T 1.4.7.4) Although it would be possible to extract from the "Conclusion" a universal scepticism that would make all people despair (indeed, the extreme credulity in the "dangerous dilemma" should be a problem for non-philosophers as well), scepticism in the "Conclusion" is primarily effective against philosophers who are committed to the norm of refined reasoning.

In Hume's response to scepticism, too, his focus seems to be how *philosophers* should respond to such scepticism, and what kind of reasoning *philosophers* should consider legitimate. Hume returns to the use of reasoning, guided by the tendency toward reasoning that he has as a philosopher. "if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner" (T 1.4.7.11). The passion of curiosity and ambition for philosophical reasoning would be something that only philosophers have. Indeed, Hume admits that Hume's own inclination toward philosophy is not something that all people are required to have. In a later part of the "Conclusion", He refers to "many honest gentlemen, who being always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing themselves in common recreations" and says, "of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers" (T 1.4.7.14). Hume's questions in the "Conclusion" seem to be what kind

of scepticism plagues philosophers, and how philosophers can overcome it. Again, one might draw from this a general epistemology that applies to all, but Hume's primary question is epistemology for someone like him, a philosopher.

Therefore, the specific question of this dissertation is: what kind of reasoning should philosophers pursue? Of course, the question of what kind of reasoning is legitimate for non-philosophers is very important. But in terms of my goal of interpreting Hume's response to scepticism in the "Conclusion," I will concentrate on epistemology for philosophers. However, in the final chapter I will mention the possibility that epistemology for philosophers can be extended to general epistemology for non-philosophers.

Chapter 2: Motivating This Project

1. Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 1, in the "Conclusion," Hume returns to philosophy and reasoning through his feeling or pleasure in them. Roughly, there are two major interpretations of this response to scepticism. One is what I call the "sceptical interpretations," which say that Hume gives up on identifying the criteria for correct reasoning, but Hume anyway returns to philosophy, even though doing so is not epistemically justified. The other is what I call the “naturalistic interpretations” to the effect that by appealing to some psychological items, Hume identifies the epistemological criteria for correct reasoning. In the following, I review each interpretation and its problems. I should note that the following literature review is not intended to be comprehensive. My purpose here is to motivate my own project by examining the advantages and disadvantages of the “naturalistic interpretations”, one of the most influential interpretations in Hume scholarship.[13]

[13] Qu (2019) provides a very useful and more comprehensive survey on the present topic.

2. Sceptical Interpretations

The sceptical interpretations propose that Hume is fully committed to the scepticism in the "Conclusion" that no reasoning is justified (e.g., Popkin 1951, Fogelin 1985, Waxman 1994, Cummins, 1999, Loeb 2002, Broughton 2004, Sassor 2017). The problem with such interpretations, as is often pointed out, is that they do not seem to answer well what Cummins (1999) calls the "integration problem". In Book Two and Book Three of the *Treatise*, Hume continues to rely on reasoning to explore the nature of passion and morality. But if Hume accepts that no reasoning is justified, on what ground can he make such an inquiry? The sceptical interpretations need to reconcile these two opposing images. Janet Broughton, for example, maintains that Hume makes use of causal reasoning in Books Two and Three "in a detached way" (Broughton 2004, 550), as Hume accepts the results of the radical scepticism in the “Conclusion”. However, Donald Ainslie aptly proposes that if this is correct, we would expect Hume to distance himself as much as possible from the early results of Book One, but that is not the case (Ainslie 2015a, 229-30). Rather Hume actively uses the framework of Book One to discuss passion (T 2.1.5.11, T 2.1.11.8), and in Book Two, he even reminds us of the sceptical discussion of external objects (T 2.2.6.2). Also, it appears unlikely that Hume distances himself from Book One in his ethics, when we see him saying, "our reasonings concerning morals will corroborate whatever has been said concerning the understanding and the passions"(T 3.1.1.1). There remains a tension

between a commitment to scepticism and Hume's own confident inquiry in Books Two and Three,[14].[15]

3. Naturalistic Interpretations

The naturalistic interpretations claim that in the "Conclusion", by appealing to specific psychological facts, which are somehow natural to us, Hume makes an epistemological response to scepticism, that is, he reaches some standard to justify certain kinds of reasoning. The interpretations provide a straightforward solution to the integration problem. Hume is able to use some kind of reasoning in Books Two and Three because it is somehow justified in a way that does not fall into radical scepticism.

One of the most influential interpretations of this line is that of Don Garrett. Recall that when nature rescues Hume from scepticism and he regains everyday beliefs, he was still unable to find a "good reason" (T 1.4.7.10) to philosophize again. In the next paragraph, however, Hume seems to have found such a reason:

> Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us (T 1.4.7.11)

[14] See Schafer (2014, 2) and Qu (2020, 132-33) for similar critiques of the sceptical interpretations.

[15] There are some interpretations that propose to give up on unifying Hume's perspective that dismisses causal inference and the one that endorses it, and suggest that Hume has more than one face (e.g., Hakkarainen 2012). However, a similar criticism to that of the sceptical interpretations has been offered, that this proposal does not fit well with Hume's stable attitude toward philosophical inquiry before and after the "Conclusion" (Schafer 2014, 3, Qu 2020, 135).

Garrett takes this as the “normative epistemic principle”, and names it the “Title Principle” (Garrett 1997, 234). Liveliness, as we have seen, is a certain feeling that the imagination transfers to an idea from a certain source. Garrett does not explicitly specify what the "propensity" refers to, but he thinks that passion is a typical example. Indeed, in the next paragraph, Hume mentions the passions of curiosity and ambition as accompanying his reasoning (T 1.4.7.12). According to the Title Principle, a lively reason, guided by passions such as curiosity and ambition, has epistemic authority. The Title Principle is supposed to save us from both horns of the "dangerous dilemma". Overly sceptical reasoning is neither sufficiently lively nor accompanied by motivating passions, while lively and active reasoning mingling with passions excludes mere fancy (that is, mere fancy would not arouse the curiosity and ambition of a philosopher.). Thus, the Title Principle would provide the basis for the standard of legitimate use of the imagination or reasoning. For Garrett, this is not a principle that Hume discovers through rational argument. The non-rational factors of some propensity and liveliness that mix with reasoning contribute to the justification for the reasoning. The view that the Title Principle, or the passage in which the principle is claimed to be found, constitutes Hume's epistemological response to scepticism has many advocates (e.g., Owen 1999, ch.9, Mounce 1999, Ridge 2003, Alison 2008, ch.12 Schafer 2014, Schmitt 2014, Qu 2020, ch.6).

However, one can take a naturalistic interpretation without committing to the Title Principle. For example, Kemp Smith thinks that, for Hume, the source of doxastic

normativity is "natural belief," something that our belief-forming processes inevitably incline us to have: “The beliefs which ought to be accepted are, [Hume] teaches, beliefs that Nature itself marks out for us. In their fundamental forms, as ‘natural’ beliefs, we have no choice but to accept them; they impose themselves on the mind” (Kemp Smith 1941, 388). Natural beliefs include beliefs about external objects and beliefs about causality. They have no rational basis, but are justified in that they are the product of our natural, irresistible imaginative tendencies.[16] Kemp Smith does not examine the "Conclusion" in detail, but there Hume certainly seems to have in mind the weak psychological force of radical scepticism: “[v]ery refin’d reflections have little or no influence upon us” (T 1.4.7.7). His interpretation would say that in the “Conclusion”, it is ultimately nature that provides the normative distinction between the operations of the imagination,[17],[18].[19]

[16] Kemp Smith does not deny that we fail to hold natural beliefs. He says that in particular cases we may err, that is, have beliefs that are not natural beliefs, but the general tendency of our imagination toward natural beliefs is irresistible, and we do not fail to have them (Kemp Smith 1941, 455).

[17] Avnur (2016) develops this line of interpretation in detail.

[18] Donald Ainslie distances himself from the "naturalistic interpretations" in order to emphasize that Hume somehow remains a sceptic. His point is that the radical scepticism in the “Conclusion” arises from a reflective attitude peculiar to philosophers, which seeks to provide rational justification for the fundamental tendencies of the imagination. Those who are aware of the hopelessness of such justification, and who recognize that philosophical activity is embedded in such imaginative tendencies, are the "true” sceptic (Ainslie 2015, ch.7). Here, as he admits (Ainslie 2015, 243), he shares with the naturalistic interpretations the view that for Hume, human beings have fundamental psychological tendencies that cannot be justified by reason. This suggests that his interpretation may be also vulnerable to the problems of the naturalistic interpretation we will see later. In particular, it is not very clear how Ainslie's interpretation can rule out superstition. For the imaginative tendency that leads to superstition is founded on human nature (NHR 5.9), and in Ainslie’s picture, philosophical reflection that condemns the kind of fundamental tendency seems to be unwarranted.

[19] Annette Baier proposes the interpretation that in the "Conclusion", Hume replaces the overtly intellectual conception of reason with "its more passionate and social successor"(Baier 1991, 21) by showing that the former has destructive consequences. Her interpretation could also be called a naturalistic interpretation in a broad sense, in that she understands Hume's response to scepticism by

4. Problems with the Naturalistic Interpretations

Although the naturalistic interpretations have the advantage of solving the integration problem, some scholars point out several problems with them. The common concern in these critiques is that the epistemological position presented by the naturalistic interpretations does not seem persuasive from our contemporary perspectives or even by Hume's own standards.[20] In the following, I discuss two common issues.

4.1 The Problem of Normativity

In the "Conclusion," Hume responds to scepticism by referring to various psychological items such as pleasure and passion. According to the naturalistic interpretations, certain aspects of these psychological facts provide the basis for correct reasoning. But how can a mere psychological fact give epistemic authority to reasoning? Michael Williams expresses the following concern about the naturalistic interpretations in general:

---

focusing on the psychological item of passions. And the focus on passions is very close to my own approach, as we will see later. However, the interpretation that Hume's concept of "reason" is ambiguous has been criticized for the lack of textual evidence (Garrett 2006, 155). In what follows, I will argue for the importance of passions in Hume's epistemology, while avoiding attributing two meanings of the concept of reason to Hume.

[20] Qu (2020) finds the Title Principle to be the correct interpretation of the “Conclusion”, and thinks that Hume's epistemology in the *Treatise* is flawed because it suffers from the following problems. In this project, I aim to reconstruct Hume's epistemology in *Treatise* as responsive to these problems.

> How do psychological differences in belief-formation underwrite normative distinctions? Hume seems to be arguing that, while all beliefs are groundless, some are more groundless than others. Of course, this could be a problem for Hume, rather than for the naturalistic reading. But we should not leap to this conclusion. So far, all we need conclude is that the naturalistic reading is incomplete unless it explains how Hume's psychology of belief acquires a normative edge. (Williams 2004, 269)

I take Williams' concern as that the naturalistic interpretations remain incomplete unless they give reasons for "why" we should follow the alleged naturalistic epistemic criteria. Just dividing psychological tendencies into two groups is not enough, we also need an explanation of why one group is good and the other is not. I call here the problem of the lack of reasons to follow certain naturalistic standards the *problem of normativity*.

The problem is not only that without explaining its ground, Hume's naturalistic epistemology is implausible in our contemporary eyes. As Qu points out (Qu 2020, 148-49), the lack of the ground for the epistemic norm must be also problematic from Hume's own perspective. As a possible response to the dangerous dilemma, Hume considers the view that “no refin'd or elaborate reasoning is ever to be receiv'd” (T 1.4.7.7) so that we do not fall into the extreme scepticism. However, this proposal appeals to the "trivial" part of the imagination in order to avoid scepticism. Then, Hume claims, the proponent of this view “by a parity of reason must embrace all of them

[conclusions of the fancy]" (T 1.4.7.7). Here Hume's point seems to be that there is no principled ground for choosing the prohibition of refined reasoning over assenting to the fancy. Then, if there is no reason to adopt the alleged naturalistic standards, this seems problematic even by Hume's own standards. To put it another way, without explaining how the psychological properties, to which the naturalistic interpretations appeal, are not "trivial properties," the naturalistic interpretation fails to show how Hume can resolve the "dangerous dilemma" in the first place.

Both the Title Principle and the natural beliefs have been criticized for failing to respond to this problem. Several scholars have pointed out that the Title Principle lacks justification (Durland 2011, 83, Ainslie 2015a, 233, Millican 2016, 105, n42, Qu 2020, 147).[21] As Qu puts it, Hume "helps himself to it [the title principle] without providing any good philosophical reasons for doing so" (Qu 2020, 147). It seems legitimate to require some ground for the norm, because its plausibility is by no means self-evident. Our psychological propensities can change from moment to moment. Just being in a good mood might enliven our reasoning. So it might seem to follow that the same reasoning could be justified at one time and not justified at another time, depending on one's psychological states, which is implausible (Durland 2011, 80, Ainslie 2015a, 233).[22]

[21] When Ainslie says, "Garrett's title principle gives us only what we do believe, not what we should believe" (Ainslie 2015a, 233), his worry also seems to be that no reason for accepting the principle is present.

[22] Allison interprets the Title Principle as "a second-order normative principle, the scope of which is limited to reasoning that passes the first-order normative test" (Alison 2008, 323), and does not

Donald Ainslie points out that Kemp Smith's natural beliefs do not explain why they should be endorsed (Ainslie 2015, 232). Kemp Smith's interpretation, which emphasizes the irresistibility of natural beliefs, suggests the view that an inference or belief has (or loses) authority when we have no choice but to agree with it (or dismiss it). Ainslie states, "That would be a case not of our finding out what we *should* believe, but of our finding out what we *do* believe" (Ainslie 2015, 232, emphasis in original).[23] Kemp Smith's interpretation only states that we cannot help following various imaginative tendencies in various situations, and does not seem to tell us "why" we should follow them.[24]

4.2 The Problem of Truth-Insensitivity

The second problem with naturalistic interpretations is that they seem to banish *truth* from Hume's epistemology. The naturalistic interpretations look to certain psychological features for justification of reasoning. Reasoning that results in radical scepticism is not supposed to be justified, and reasoning that is accompanied by such psychological features is supposed to be justified. These features clearly play a justificatory role. The problem is that these psychological features does not seem to be truth-sensitive. We can easily imagine that lively and passionate reasoning, which the

interpret the principle as an independent epistemic principle. Still, we can ask *why* such a second-order principle has authority.

[23] Morris expresses a similar concern about Kemp Smith's naturalistic interpretation (Morris 2000, 94).

[24] Qu (2017a, 2020, 133-35) argues that such a proposal seems to presuppose the principle of "Ought Implies Can," but such a principle does not fit with Hume's doxastic involuntarism.

Title Principle would recommend, leads to a false conclusion. My reasoning accompanied by anger toward my friend might lead to a false belief about her. The problem is not just that the title principle sometimes fails to deliver truth. As Qu puts it, the problem is that "epistemic justification is conferred on the basis of factors—that is, the passions—that seem unresponsive to truth" (Qu 2020, 160). The same would be true for natural beliefs. We could sometimes believe in falsehood in an irresistible way (e.g., when we have a strong desire for a falsehood to be true.). Committing a fallacy would be such an example. An epistemology that completely separates epistemic justification from considerations of truth seems implausible. I call this problem the *problem of truth-insensitivity*.

It is true that, on the one hand, Hume may seem to downplay the importance of truth in later parts of the "Conclusion": he notes that truth is "too much to be hop'd for"(T 1.4.7.14). On the other hand, however, he does not (and should not) dismiss it altogether. For in the *Treatise* and other writings, Hume often provides epistemic critiques of various doctrines, claiming that they are false, or there is no sufficient evidence that they are true. Most notably, as we will see in Chapter 5, Hume consistently provides epistemic critiques of religious *superstitions* such as miracles, the immortality of the soul, and the doctrine of the afterlife. However, if reasoning is justified independently of considerations of truth, then such superstitious reasoning is also justified insofar as it stems from lively, passionate or irresistible psychological

processes.[25] Given the importance of the critique of false religions to Hume's overall project, the failure of his epistemology to criticize superstition would be a fatal flaw. Thus, many scholars have pointed out that Hume's naturalistic epistemology fails to eliminate superstition (Dye 1986, 126, Ferreira 1999, 48, Winkler 1999, 211, n22, Williams 2004, 269, Durland 2011, 81, Qu 2020, 163). This problem seems to stem from the separation of truth from epistemic justification.[26] Unless Hume has at least *some* commitment to truth, how he can criticize superstition remains a puzzle.[27]

5. Focus on Book Two of the Treatise

Some scholars hold that the naturalistic interpretations are problematic not because their interpretive direction is misguided, but because they are incomplete. There are several attempts to find a more robust naturalistic epistemology in Hume by developing the naturalistic reading. However, to add any new element to Hume's epistemology for such a development would also create new interpretive and theoretical controversies. For example, Schmitt (2014) attributes a kind of reliabilist epistemology to Hume, and puts the Title Principle within such a framework (Schmitt

[25] In the *Natural History of Religion*, Hume shows that the psychology that leads to superstition is not idiosyncratic at all and it is founded on "human nature" (NHR 5.9).

[26] Qu initially treats the ineliminability of superstition of Hume's naturalistic epistemology and its truth-insensitivity as separate issues, but later suggests that the former problem stems from the latter (Qu 2020, 163).

[27] It might be said that there are cognitive values other than truth, such as understanding. My point is that the elements that make Hume's epistemic critique of superstition intelligible are lacking in the naturalistic interpretations, so if epistemic values other than truth make such a critique intelligible, then I do not need to stick to truth. However, it seems that for Hume, the most obvious epistemic value is truth.

2014, ch.12). However, Qu (2020, 136-7) points out that there is little textual evidence to support this interpretation, and there is a danger of anachronism in bringing in the contemporary epistemological framework in interpreting Hume. Or some scholars suggest that Hume ultimately attempts to justify some kinds of reasoning by appealing to the virtue-theoretic framework in Book Three of the *Treatise* (e.g., Owen 1999, ch.9, Ridge 2003, Kail 2005, McCormick 2005, Schafer 2014, Sasser 2017). However, Qu (2014) claims that this proposal risks collapsing the sharp distinction between epistemic normativity and moral normativity, a distinction that Hume seems to be committed to.[28] There may be ways to rescue these interpretations from these concerns, but in any case, one is required to develop the naturalistic interpretations with sufficient textual justification to make the developed view consistent with Hume's various theoretical commitments.

This dissertation is one of these attempts to develop the naturalistic interpretations, but in a different way from the ones mentioned above. I will specifically focus on Hume's account of passion in Book Two of the *Treatise*. I aim to show that Hume's response to scepticism in the "Conclusion" becomes more robust when understood in conjunction with Hume's passion theory, and that this interpretation has substantial textual evidence. It is not so difficult to motivate this interpretive direction. As Schmitter (2021) points out, in the "Conclusion," Hume refers to various passions (e.g., despair, hate, anger, curiosity, ambition, etc.), which are explained in more detail

[28] However, the virtue-theoretic interpretation has a great deal of similarity to my approach, and needs to be examined more carefully. I will discuss this interpretation in Chapter 6.

in Book Two. If, as the Title Principle suggests, Hume appeals to these passions to justify (or discredit) certain kinds of reasoning, then it is natural to think that his epistemology is more fully developed with Hume's theory of passions. Hume himself states, “The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves” (T Advertisement). This continuity between Book One and Book Two, which he himself declares, leads us to expect that Hume's response to the crucial question at the end of Book One will be more fully developed in Book Two. I call “epistemic sentimentalism” the view that some passion plays an essential role in the justification of reasoning, and I attribute it to Hume.

Scholars have not often interpreted the epistemology in Hume's "Conclusion" in relation to Hume's account of passions. Note that what follows is not a criticism, but a statement of how my approach differs from previous studies of Hume's theory of passion. First of all, Hume's theory of passions is more often read as the basis for Hume's sentimentalist ethics in Book III than in relation to epistemology (e.g., Árdal 1966, Cohon 2008). Hume thinks that we discern moral distinctions (virtue or vice) by means of distinctive affective states, and it is natural to think that the nature of these affections is developed in Hume’s account of passion. However, morality does not exhaust the significance of passions. In fact, some scholars point out interesting relationships between the frameworks in Book One and Book Two, for example, on issues such as personal identity (Rorty 1990, Ainslie 1999), mental representations (Schmitter 2009), Hume’s experimental method (Taylor 2015, ch.1) and motivational inertness of belief (Radcliffe 2018). These works are crucial to understanding Hume's

views on the relationship between understanding and passion, but they focus on particular topics and do not directly address scepticism in the "Conclusion".[29]

One important exception is curiosity; Schafer (2014) argues persuasively that the passion of curiosity, which Hume discusses at the end of Book Two (T 2.3.10), plays an important role in Hume's response to scepticism,[30].[31] However, Hume's discussion of curiosity occupies only one section among the many in Book Two. In this project, I propose that a larger part of Hume's passion theory has to do with Hume's epistemology. I should also note that Baier (1991) is an important study that portrays Hume's epistemology or scepticism and his whole theory of passion as unified. Still, her interpretation leaves much to be filled in and lacks concrete discussions of which passions contribute to Hume's response to scepticism or how they do so.[32] I will follow her interpretive direction, but develop specific accounts of how Hume's account of

[29] Radcliffe (2015) provides a comprehensive and very useful survey of the secondary literature on Hume's theory of passions, but in it, she does not make a section on the relationship between Hume's epistemology and his theory of passions. This also indicates that there is relatively little research on the relationship between Hume's theory of passion and epistemology.

[30] Schafer also attends to the passion of intellectual ambition. But since according to him, intellectual ambition is the desire to satisfy the curiosity of other members of a community (Schafer 2014, 11), for his interprertation, curiosity seems to be conceptually more fundamental than ambition.

[31] See also Wilson (1983) and Gelfert (2013) for the importance of curiosity in Hume's epistemology.

[32] There is also a criticism that Baier's interpretation of the "Conclusion" unjustifiably attributes the ambiguous senses of "reason" to Hume. See footnote 19.

passion contributes to responding to the problem of normativity and the problem of truth-insensitivity,[33].[34]

It is only in the *Treatise of Human Nature* that Hume describes intellect and passion as unified (or leaves room for such an interpretation). This gives a reason for this dissertation to focus on the *Treatise*. In recent years, several scholars have pointed out that there is a difference between the epistemology developed in the *Treatise* and in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, and sometimes claim that the latter is better than the former (e.g., Millican 2002, Qu 2020). However, in my opinion, the relationship between Hume's theory of passions and Hume's epistemology in the *Treatise* has not been sufficiently clarified, and we should compare the *Treatise* with the *Enquiry* only after presenting a unified epistemic sentimentalism in the *Treatise*. Moreover, even if it turns out that the resulting passion-involving epistemology is inferior to the *Enquiry*'s, generally speaking, it seems worthwhile to consider the place of passion in epistemology. Aside from Hume, many of early modern philosophers

[33] Baier's interpretive line has been developed by several scholars. Harris (2009) suggests that in "a compleat chain of reasoning" of Book One and Book Two, Hume describes the way in which we can govern passions without the absolute authority of reason. Jay Garfield takes Book Two as the "starting point" (Garfield 2019, 30) of his interpretation. Although I agree with their interpretive directions, these interpretations also do not make clear exactly how Hume's account of passion reinforces Hume's response to scepticism in such a way that Hume's epistemology can address the aforementioned worries.

[34] In fact, Kemp Smith give significant places to Hume's theory of passions and morality in his interpretation of Hume's epistemology based on "natural beliefs". However, as we have seen above, his interpretation is problematic in several ways. I hope to remove as much concern as possible from naturalistic interpretations such as Kemp Smith's, by analyzing Hume's account of passions in more detail.

give passions a special role in our cognitive practices. For Descartes (CSM I 350)[35] and Malebranche (*The Search After Truth*, 374), the passion of "wonder" plays an epistemically important role of motivating us to know the nature of things. For Hobbes, deliberation is the alteration of passions (*Leviathan* ch.6). Indeed, among scholars of the history of early moden philosophy, there seems to be a growing interest in the importance of passions in epistemology, rather than just in moral philosophy, (e.g., Shapiro and Pickavé 2012). In contemporary philosophy and psychology as well, there is a growing amount of research that points to the importance of emotions (the rough equivalent of "passions" in early modern philosophy) in our cognitive activities (e.g., de Sousa 1987, Damasio 1994, Goldie 2004, Brun, Doğuoğlu, & Kuenzle 2008; Morton 2010, Brady 2013). Character-based virtue epistemology, which has already established itself in contemporary epistemology, also emphasizes our affective nature (Zagzebski 1996). Given these great interests in the epistemic importance of passions or emotions, I believe that clarifying the relationship between Hume's epistemology and his theory of passions will be significant, even if it leads to an unsatisfactory view. For this reason, this dissertation will concentrate on the *Treatise*. However, passages from the *Enquiry* and other works will also be cited if they appear to be general claims that Hume would also make in the *Treatise*.

[35] For quotations from Descartes, *Philosophical Writings of Descartes* is abbreviated as "CSM" and quotations are by volume number and page number.

6. Overview of This Work

In Chapters 3 and 4, I will focus on what Hume calls the "indirect passions," and argue that they contribute to a response to the problem of normativity. In **Chapter 3: The Problem of Normativity (I): The Indirect Passions and Persons as Responsible Agents**, I examine the indirect passions themselves, independently of Hume's epistemology. Here I will argue that the connection between the indirect passions and the concept of responsibility is stronger than previously thought. Specifically, I will propose that the indirect passions of pride, humility, love, and hate are constitutive of the concept of responsibility.

In **Chapter 4: The Problem of Normativity (II): A Constitutivist Response to Scepticism**, I will argue, based on the results of Chapter 3, that we can find in Hume a constitutivist response to scepticism, along with its textual justification. Pride and humility are precisely what makes us a particular kind of person. In Hume's case, being a philosopher provides a constitutivist reason for pursuing pride-producing reasoning and avoiding humility-producing reasoning. It is in this framework that we find "why" we should follow the naturalistic criteria.

In **Chapter 5: The Problem of Truth-Insensitivity: The Calm Passions and Hume's Critique of Superstition**, I will argue that Hume's discussion of the "calm passions" offers a response to the problem of truth-insensitivity. What makes passions calm are the factors that contribute to the discovery of truth, such as certainty, custom, and abstractness. From this, I propose that reasoning that mixes with the calm passions in a certain way are truth-sensitive in the sense that they are sensitive to factors that

contribute to the discovery of truth. This is in contrast to superstition, which is accompanied by the violent passions because it contains factors that inhibit the discovery of truth. I will also argue that radical scepticism calms the passions, but since it also makes the passions *weak*, the excessive scepticism is not what Hume endorses.

In **Chapter 6: The Place of Virtue in Hume's Epistemology**, I will examine the "virtue-theoretic interpretations" that are influential in recent years, and share interpretive directions with my approach in many respects. I will argue that the virtue-theoretic interpretations and my passion-based, non-virtue-theoretic interpretation are compatible in meaningful ways. I suggest that a full account of virtue with respect to the use of reason requires a norm independent of virtue, and that my interpretation fills that norm. On the other hand, my interpretation is primarily directed at the question of what is legitimate reasoning for philosophers, and my interpretation does not, at least directly, provide epistemological criteria for non-philosophers. I propose that the introduction of virtue may play an important role in answering this crucial question.

Chapter 3: The Problem of Normativity (I): The Indirect Passions and Persons as Responsible Agents

1. Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 2, one of the problems with the naturalistic interpretations of Hume's epistemology in the "Conclusion" is the problem of normativity: even though in his response to scepticsm Hume appeals to liveliness and propensity accompanying reasoning (which constitutes the Title Principle), and the irresistibility of belief and reasoning, it is not clear why we should follow reasoning with these psychological features. As a result, it is not clear whether the alleged naturalistic epistemological criteria can resolve Hume's original scepticism, such as the dangerous dilemma.

I suggest that we can find an answer to the above concern in Hume's discussion of the *indirect passions*. My discussion of the indirect passions has two-steps. In this chapter, we will analyze what the indirect passions are. Independently of interpreting Hume's epistemology, Hume's account of the indirect passions is controversial and needs careful discussion. Specifically, I will propose that the indirect passions are constitutive of our conceptions of ourselves as *responsible* agents. In the next chapter,

I will propose that with this understanding of the indirect passions in hand, we can find a *constitutivist* justification for Hume's response to scepticism. Hume's return from scepticism is not just a report of his whimsical feelings, but relies on normative standards drawn from the nature of persons.

Hence, in this chapter, I focus on the indirect passions, without reference to their connections to Hume's epistemology. Hume distinguishes between two conceptions of person, that is, "personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves." (T 1.4.6.5) The focus of this chapter is the latter, the passion-based notion of person. Hume never clearly explains what the passion-based view is, but we can extrapolate it from his theory of the passions in Book Two of the Treatise. Hume divides the passions into direct passions (e.g., joy, hope, fear) and indirect passions (e.g., pride, humility, love, or hatred). The "indirect" passions involve the notion of person and therefore occupy a central place in Hume's discussion of the passion-based notion of person. Many scholars have claimed that the psychology of the indirect passions is meant to capture how we come to regard persons as what I will call "responsible agents" (e.g., McIntyre 1989; Rorty 1990; Russell 1995, ch. 4; Ainslie 1999; Pitson 2002, ch.7; Greco 2015; Welchman 2015; Qu 2017). Unlike mere inanimate objects, persons are subject to normative evaluation, that is, they are responsible for what they do. According to these interpretations, Hume's account of the indirect passions is meant to capture this aspect of personhood.

Although there is nothing original in my connecting the indirect passions with Hume's account of responsibility, commentators have not sufficiently clarified *how* the indirect passions contribute to our conception of responsible agents. Since the indirect passions are complex phenomena, there can be several different ways in which they contribute to the concept of responsibility. To answer the question of "how", I introduce the distinction between the *phenomenal* and *structural* aspects of the indirect passions.[36] As we will see in section 3, the indirect passions are by themselves simple feelings, but they are also described by their structural aspects such as their cause and effect. This distinction evokes the following questions about the way in which the indirect passions contribute to the concept of responsibility. For example, we may ask, are the indirect passions as feelings part of seeing a person as a responsible agent, or do the causes or effects of the indirect passions contain elements that make us conceive a person as a responsible being? Hence, without explaining how and which aspect of the indirect passions is relevant, it remains unclear where the important concept of responsibility ultimately comes from within Hume's empiricist framework. This chapter aims to answer the question of "how" by considering the two possible ways in which indirect passions contribute to the concept of responsibility. One takes the constitutive view that the indirect passions are constitutive of the very concept of responsibility. The other holds the non-constitutive view that the extrinsic circumstances of the indirect passions constitute the concept of responsibility. In the

[36] I owe this terminology to Radcliffe (2018, 99).

latter case, although the indirect passions are not a constitutive part of the concept of responsibility, perhaps they could play an important role in facilitating the practices surrounding responsible persons. As we will see in section 3, given these options, it seems that many interpretations have been inclined toward the non-constitutive view. I will argue that the extrinsic features of the indirect passions are insufficient for the perception of responsible agents, and thereby defend the constitutive view. Notice that since the purpose of my argument is to *clarify* the way in which the indirect passions contribute to the notion of responsibility, my claim does not necessarily contradict the previous interpretations, but it does contain something that previous interpretations have not said.

2. Responsibility as Attributability and the Indirect Passions

In this section, I would like to confirm that Hume connects the indirect passions with responsibility. How they are related will be considered in the following sections. But to do so, first of all, I would like to make it as clear as possible what kind of responsibility I attribute to Hume. Hume himself rarely uses the word "responsibility,"[37] but we can find some notion of it in his philosophy. Another note is that at first I focus on *moral* responsibility simply because Hume mostly talks about it, and most textual evidence will be drawn from Hume's reference to the moral one.

[37] In the *Treatise*, Hume uses the word "responsible" only once in T 2.3.2.6.

However, at the end of this section, I will point out that for Hume, responsibility associated with the indirect passions does not have to be limited to the moral domain.

To elaborate Hume's notion of responsibility, it is useful to look at Gary Watson's influential distinction between responsibility as attributability and responsibility as accountability (Watson 1996). To regard a person as morally *accountable* is to regard a person as being under certain moral demands. Those who violate these demands are subject to punishment and other sanctions. Complying with or exceeding the moral demands, one is praised and sometimes rewarded. Accountability often comes with the control condition: if people are accountable for their activities, then they have control over their activities. For usually we do not penalize people for something out of their control. In contrast, responsibility as *attributability* forms a broader category. It encompasses cases where moral qualities are attributed to a person without such strict moral demands. For example, one's cowardice is not necessarily something to be penalized, but it is still attributable to the person and it expresses her moral character. Here, the control condition becomes less prominent, because some moral items can express one's moral worth even though she has no control over them,[38].[39]

[38] This does not mean that responsibility as attributability refers to mere causal responsibility. Even if an infant is causally responsible for her immoral behavior, it would not be attributed to her. Attributability perhaps requires causal responsibility, but the latter is not suffcient for the former.

[39] Character traits are good examples. Thus, Watson characterizes the attributability-responsibility as "aretaic" (Watson 1996, 231).

With the two conceptions of responsibility, I agree with Vitz (2009, 216-17) that Hume is mainly concerned with responsibility as attributability. Hume writes:

> Philosophers, or rather divines under that disguise, treating all morals, as on a like footing with civil laws, guarded by the sanctions of reward and punishment, were necessarily led to render this circumstance, of voluntary or involuntary, the foundation of their whole theory. Every one may employ terms in what sense he pleases: But this, in the mean time, must be allowed, that sentiments are every day experienced of blame and praise, which have objects beyond the dominion of the will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as moralists, as speculative philosophers at least, to give some satisfactory theory and explication. (EPM App 4.21. Cf: T 3.3.4.3-4)

Here, rather than sanction-involving moral practices, Hume is interested in the fact that we have moral sentiments toward people even in matters that are not under their control or intention.[40] Intentional actions are just one of the traits to which moral sentiments respond. Thus, Hume's primary concern consists in responsibility as attributability. In what follows, by "responsibility," I mean it in the sense of attributability.

[40] Since control seems to require intention or choice, if Hume accepts responsibility for non-intentional activities, it would seem that he also accepts responsibility for things that are out of control. Although I should note that contemporary philosophy of responsibility sometimes makes a distinction between control and intention (e.g., McKenna 2012, 194-95), it seems difficult to find such a fine-grained distinction in Hume.

Then, what makes a person a morally responsible agent, that is, a being to whom morality can be attributed? To answer this question, Hume seems to appeal to the indirect passions. According to Hume, we are responsible for our actions only when the actions are closely connected to us in such a way that they cause the indirect passions. Hume writes, "Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never consider'd in morality." (T 3.3.1.4) "The action itself may be blameable; it may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion" (T 2.3.2.6), but when the action does not belong to us, or does not provoke the indirect passions, "the person is not responsible for it" (ibid.). For example, my unintentional stepping on my friend's foot would not make her angry (or if it does, her anger would be momentary), and thus I am not (at least fully) responsible for it.[41] In this way, Hume seems to accommodate the notion of responsibility with reference to the indirect passions.

We observe the same point in Hume's claim that the indirect passions provide the distinction between responsible and non-responsible agents. Hume takes it for granted that we regard inanimate objects as neither morally praiseworthy nor blameworthy. In Book Three, this assumption figures as a premise to argue that moral rationalism is untenable because it would entail that we could find morality in inanimate objects (T 3.1.1.15. n68, T 3.1.1.24). His own sentimentalist view that "virtue and vice be determined by pleasure and pain" might also seem open to the same

[41] I refer to intention here, but I do not mean to argue here that intention is essential to responsibility. As we shall see later, for Hume, intentions are insufficient for responsibility in themselves.

objection that "any object, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational, might become morally good or evil, provided it can excite a satisfaction or uneasiness" (T 3.1.2.4). Hume argues that the objection does not apply because we do not, in fact, have the same kind of response to inanimate objects, which he shows by considering the possible objects of the indirect passions (pride, humility, love or hate):

> They [virtue and vice] must necessarily be plac'd either in ourselves or others, and excite either pleasure or uneasiness; and therefore must give rise to one of these four passions; which clearly distinguishes them from the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate objects (T 3.1.2.5).

Inanimate objects can produce pleasure or pain for us, but they cannot be "morally good or evil" (T 3.1.2.4). This is because they cannot be the objects of the indirect passions. The account seems to claim that since inanimate objects never stir the indirect passions, no pleasure or pain is attributed to them,[42] that is, they are not responsible for it. Thus, Hume seems to appeal to the indirect passions to distinguish between responsible agents and non-responsible ones.

The exact same point is repeated in the moral *Enquiry*. "Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations which we observe in moral agents; though the former can never be the object of love or hatred" (EPM App. 1.17). "[A]n inanimate

[42] Of course, inanimate objects can be causally responsible for pleasure or pain, but causal responsibility is not the issue here. See footnote 38.

object may have good colour and proportions as well as a human figure. But can we ever be in love with the former?" (EPM 5.1.1. n1) Hume seems to think that being an object of the indirect passions is a mark of morally responsible entities.[43]

In contrast, when not referring to the indirect passions, Hume sees the person as continuous with inanimate objects. In his account of "personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination" (T 1.4.6.5), Hume proposes that person is a "collection of different perceptions" (T 1.4.6.4), but due to the associative relations (resemblance and causation) among the different perceptions, we attribute identity to the collection. Hume says that the way we attribute identity to a person is the same as the way we attribute identity to some complex inanimate objects. To explain personal identity as it regards our thought, Hume states:

> the same method of reasoning must be continu'd, which has so successfully explain'd the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all the compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature. The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a

[43] What separates the bearers of moral responsibility from those who are not was also an important question for Hume's predecessors. The most obvious example would be John Locke (For quotations from Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is abbreviated as "Essay" and quotations are by Book, chapter, and section number). He distinguishes between mere human beings, who are continuous with plants and animals, and the persons, which are the bearers of responsibility (person is a "forensick term" (Essay 2.27.26)), and proposes that "consciousness" is the constitutive feature of person (Essay 2.27.9). Shaftesbury claims that an entity can be a bearer of virtue when it has the ability to reflect on morality, or "when it can have the Notion of a publick Interest, and can attain the Speculation or Science of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong." (Shaftesbury 2001, 18) Hutcheson suggests that we do not morally admire inanimate beings because they 'have no Intention of Good to us' (Hutcheson 2008, 89).

> like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects. (T 1.4.6.15)

It is controversial whether Hume ascribes moral responsibility to non-human animals,[44] but as we have seen, he clearly takes it for granted that inanimate objects cannot be responsible for what they cause. Thus, in stressing the continuity between persons and inanimate objects, Hume seems to regard the thought-based notion of person as pertaining to non-responsible aspects of a person.[45] We attribute identity to a person just as we attribute it to a ship. This, in turn, suggests that Hume's passion-based account of person is concerned with the distinction between responsible agents and those that are not.[46]

So far, I have concentrated on moral responsibility. However, it is not only our moral traits that we are responsible for. Hume would agree. Hume thinks that we are evaluated not only on the basis of moral virtues, but also of intellectual virtues. For example, he mentions "good sense", "sound reasoning", "discernment" (EPM 8.7), "prudence", or "sagacity, which leads to the discovery of truth, and preserves us from

[44] For discussion of this point, see Boyle (2019). She convincingly argues that in Hume's philosophical system, non-human animals can be objects of moral evaluation by humans.

[45] McIntyre (1989, 549) also points out that agential aspects are less prominent than non-agential aspects in the thought-based notion of person.

[46] As Ainslie (1999, 481-82) points out, Hume's account of the self in Book One is supposed to explore the nature of the mind, as revealed by introspection. This lack of concern for the self as an active, social being also indicates that in the thought-based account of person, responsibility is not its central theme.

error and mistake" (EPM App 4.11). Since people can be evaluated on the basis of these traits, Hume would have no problem accepting doxastic responsibility. Indeed, the causes of the indirect passions include epistemic traits concerning "imagination, judgment, memory…wit, good-sense, learning" (T 2.1.2.5). In addition, Hume seems to have included in his scope of consideration responsibilities that are neither epistemic nor moral. Hume writes:

> A man may be proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mein, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture. But this is not all. The passions looking farther, comprehend whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility. (T 2.1.2.5)

This suggests that the indirect passions encompass things like professional or family responsibility. It may sound odd to say, for example, that we are "responsible" for our aesthetic qualities. We may have trouble with the idea that we are sanctioned for our appearance. However, recall that Hume is interested in responsibility as attributability rather than accountability, which is closely tied to legal sanctions. Perhaps we are responsible for our appearances in the sense that they express ourselves and provoke positive or negative affections in ourselves and other people. In this way, the indirect

passions are not limited to morality, but relate to responsibility for a variety of things.[47] Although I will mostly refer to moral responsibility in the following because of Hume's frequent references to it, note that the framework of the indirect passions are applicable to non-moral responsibility as well.

3. Two Possible Interpretations: Constitutive or Non-Constitutive

Now we need to ask *how* the passions and the concept of person as a responsible agent are related to each other, a question that has not been explicitly answered in Hume scholarship. I examine this question by distinguishing between the phenomenal and structural aspects of the indirect passions. As we will see in detail below, the indirect passions are, first of all, simple feelings. The structural aspects are the causal and extrinsic conditions for the indirect passions. According to the two aspects, there can be two ways in which the indirect passions contribute to the notion of responsibility. For one, the indirect passions themselves, or a certain kind of feeling, may be constitutive of the perception of responsibility. Alternatively, the structural features of the passions may constitute the perception of responsibility. Here, the indirect passions on their own are not constitutive of it. The indirect passions may be a response to what we *already* perceive as a responsible agent, even if they are indirectly involved in the perception of responsibility (e.g., in facilitating our beliefs or actions concerning

[47] This aligns with Ainslie's interpretation that the indirect passions are not exclusively concerned with moral commitments, but also with non-moral commitments such as one's nationality, profession or familty (Ainslie 1999, 479).

responsibility).[48] Which interpretation we take has important consequences for the question of whether our concept of responsibility is ultimately response-dependent.[49] In what follows, I will briefly describe each of the phenomenal and structural aspects, and then show that commentators have tended toward a non-constitutive interpretation, focusing primarily on the structural aspect.

Let us consider the phenomenal aspect of the passions. In themselves, they are simple impressions (T 2.1.2.1, T 2.2.1.1) and thus something we feel (T 1.1.1.1). The feeling can take a positive or negative valence, that is, be pleasurable or painful. The indirect passions of "pride and love are agreeable passions; hatred and humility uneasy" (T 2.2.2.3). Furthermore, Hume endorses a seemingly strong claim that the passions as simple feelings cannot be representational:

> A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. (T 2.3.3.5)

[48] As for morality itself, rather than moral responsibility, Hume clearly thinks that it is response-dependent (cf: T 3.1.2.2). However, the response-dependent view of responsibility does not immediately follow from Hume's response-dependent view of morality. As Ainslie (1999, 472-76) argues, moral sentiments and the indirect passions are conceptually distinct. Hume claims that moral sentiments cause the passions (T 2.1.7, T 3.1.2.5), which strongly supports distinguishing between them. Following Ainslie (1999, 491), I take moral sentiments to be a certain kind of pleasure or pain in response to character traits, and I take the indirect passions to enable us to evaluate persons in relation to these traits.

[49] This is the question discussed in the Strawsonian, emotion-based approach to the concept of responsibility. Some say, "The reactive attitudes are evidence about when to hold people responsible, but not something that constitutes them being responsible" (Brink and Nelkin 2013, 287) while others think that reactive attitudes are constitutive of it (cf: Shoemaker 2017).

Here Hume conceives the passions very narrowly as a specific kind of simple feeling that is incapable of "representing" an object.[50]

But Hume also conceives the indirect passions in a structural way. As simple feelings, no further description of the passions is possible. But we can describe extrinsic circumstances in which the feelings arise:

> The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them (T 2.1.2.1).

The same point applies to love and hate (T 2.2.1.1). Such "circumstances" include the *objects* and *causes* of the passions.

The *causes* of the indirect passions are hedonically qualified perceptions (pleasure in the case of pride or love, and pain in the case of humility or hatred). More precisely, causes of the indirect passions consist of an impression of pleasure or pain and an idea of the bearer of the hedonic quality (T 2.1.2.6, T 2.2.1.5). This does not

[50] Several scholars have found implausible Hume's denial of the intentionality of passions (Baier 1991, 160). But recently several scholars have argued that Hume's claim about the "original existence" is directed against the narrow sense of "representation," which is not to deny intentionality of the passions in a broader sense (Schmitter 2009, Qu 2012, Fisette 2017).

mean that any perception of pleasurable or painful things always causes an indirect passion. In order for such perceptions to cause indirect passions, they have to be associated with persons. A pleasurable or virtuous action alone does not cause me to feel pride. It has to be conceived as *my* action. Hume frequently stresses this point: "these subjects [in which hedonic qualities leading to pride inhere] are either parts of ourselves, or something nearly related to us" (T 2.1.5.2, my insertion).[51] Only perceptions of painful or pleasurable things that we perceive to have a close connection to a person become causes of the indirect passions.

The *objects* of the indirect passions are always persons (self or other). Although it is not clear what it is to be an "object" of the passions, Hume expresses it as at least involving the fixing of attention. "Pride and humility, being once rais'd, immediately turn our attention to ourself" (T 2.1.2.4; see also T 2.2.2.17).[52] The relation between the fixation of attention and the passions seems to be causal: Hume says that pride "never fails to produce" (T 2.1.5.6) an idea of the self.[53] This suggests that for persons to be objects of the passions is a matter of the passions' fixing attention on persons.

As feelings attended by circumstances involving causes and objects, the indirect passions have both phenomenal and structural aspects. The causes consist of an impression of pain or pleasure and an idea of the bearer of the hedonic qualities. These

[51] See also, among others, T 2.1.8.1, T 2.1.9.1, T 2.2.2.7-8, T 3.3.1.4.
[52] Schmitter (2009, 235) also takes "being an object" to mean that attention is fixed on the object.
[53] However, Qu (2012) argues that this relation between pride and self cannot be only causal and that the intentionality of the passions is intrinsic to their phenomenal character. Discussing this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but even if Qu is correct, Qu's interpretation is compatible with my feeling-dependent view of responsibility.

causes are associated with an idea of a person in such a way that when they lead to an impression or feeling of the indirect passions, our attention is directed toward the idea of the person (who then becomes the object of the passions). The idea of the bearer of the hedonic qualities and the idea of the person are connected via the principles of association of ideas, consisting of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. The impression of pain or pleasure and the impression of the indirect passions are connected via the principle of the association of impressions, that is, resemblance. In this way, the structural and phenomenal aspects of the passions jointly form what Hume calls the "double relation of ideas and impressions" (T 2.1.5.5).

To interpret Hume's view of responsible agents, commentators have often focused on the structural aspect. Amélie Rorty is an example. She explains the appeal to structural aspects by anticipating a possible objection to using Hume's theory of pride to account for agency:

> Second objection: how can pride, a simple and uniform impression incapable of definition, illuminate the construction of the fictional idea of the self as an agent? Although pride is, as Hume says, a given, an original and unanalysable impression, and although it is only contingently connected to its causes, consequences and objects, the circumstances of its production are law-like… Its characteristic feeling is necessary but not sufficient for the identification of pride: it is also identified by its causal role. (Rorty 1990, 257)

As this passage shows, she thinks that simple feelings could not capture the complex notion of agents, and accordingly argues that our perceptions of them are grounded in the causal roles of the indirect passions rather than in their feeling. Indeed, she holds that pride produces the idea of the self as a bearer of causes of the passion (Rorty 1990, 259-60).[54] For example, in taking pride in my beautiful house, I come to see myself as an owner-of-a-beautiful-house. According to Rorty, in characterizing myself again and again in terms of what I take pride in, I become aware of which of my traits I am "motivated to preserve or care for" (Rorty 1990, 262). I thereby see myself as a source of my actions, namely an agent. Then, Rorty continues, I come to take pride in virtues and internalize concerns for others (Rorty 1990, 266-269). Now I conceive myself as a moral agent, with a sense of justice. Here by "agent," Rorty seems to mean a being to whom some items such as actions or property are attributable (e.g., homeowners or morally evaluable persons), so she seems concerned with "responsibility" in my sense. According to this view, the emphasis is on the structural aspects of the passions: moral responsibility is grounded in the intimate relations between a person and her moral traits. Although Rorty herself does not pose the question of which of structural and phenomenal aspects constitutes the concept of responsibility, in pointing out the insufficiency of the phenomenal aspect and focusing on the structural aspect, her

[54] Rorty limits her considerations to pride, but I think the same story is applicable to the other indirect passions.

interpretation suggests a non-constitutive view that the indirect passions are by themselves not constitutive of the perception of the responsible agent.[55]

Other scholars also tend to focus on the structural aspects of the passions when discussing the features of agency. For example, Qu (2017b) notes Hume's remark that the indirect passions are only caused by *durable* traits (cf. T 3.3.1.4-5) and infers from it that to stir the indirect passions, a person in Book Two must be a bundle of durable dispositions rather than of transient perceptions. This durable notion of person grounds our normative worldview (Qu 2017b, 656). Since the durability is a property of the cause of the passions (only durable traits can be the cause of the passions), here Qu seems to locate a responsibility-making feature in the structural aspects of the indirect passions. Capaldi (1989, 172) and Piston (2002, 125) point out that a person in Book Two is described as having a body; they argue that this embodiment allows physical actions to be components of a person. Thus, they suggest, passion-based persons are not purely spiritual entities but entities publicly evaluable for their bodily actions. Again, Hume mentions bodily features of a person as *causes* of the indirect passions: our body "must still be allow'd to be near enough connected with us to form one of these double relations, which I have asserted to be necessary to the *causes* of pride and humility" (T 2.1.8.1, my emphasis). Again, these commentators do not ask whether the

[55] In stressing the motivational force of pride, Rorty might maintain that the phenomenal aspects of the passions play that motivational role. However, since Hume denies that the indirect passions have direct motivational force (T 2.2.6.3, T 2.2.6.5), the motivational force Rorty has in mind must come from something other than the feeling of the indirect passions—perhaps some pleasurable qualities in the *causes* of the passions.

phenomenal or the structural aspect is essential to the notion of responsibility. Still, their interpretations suggest the view that the structural, non-constitutive aspect of the indirect passions is essential for the perception of responsible agents.[56,57]

4. Insufficiency of the Structural Aspects of the Passions

I agree that structural features of the passions have importance for our conception of responsibility. That said, we should also notice that their structural features cannot account for some crucial aspects of our conception of agency. In particular, their structural aspects do not allow us to distinguish between agents and non-agents in any relevant sense. As we saw, Hume thinks that the indirect passions are marks of this distinction. Here are the passages cited earlier:

---

[56] Russell (1995, ch.4) seems to think that Hume grounds the notion of responsibility in feeling rather than in the structural aspects of the passions. However, he argues for this on the basis of Hume's moral sentimentalism. Specifically, his discussion equates moral sentiments with the indirect passions. Given the strong textual evidence for distinguishing between these two, I think that we need a different ground to support the response-dependent interpretation of responsibility. See footnote 48.

[57] Donald Ainslie, an influential writer on the current topic, seems to think that structural aspects alone fail to accommodate the passion-based notion of person when saying that causal reasoning is insufficient to reveal a person's distinctive character traits, or "person-defining markers" in his own words (Ainslie 1999, 480). His reason for the insufficiency is that causal reasoning is unable to distinguish person-defining features from incidental features of a person, such as being at such-and-such latitude (Ainslie 1999, 478, 480). But it is not very clear if causal reasoning is really unable to do so. Hume states:

> By them (the rules of causal reasoning) we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes; and when we find that an effect can be produc'd without the concurrence of any particular circumstance, we conclude that that circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious cause, however frequently conjoin'd with it. (T 1.3.13.11, my insertion)

This suggests that causal reasoning can exclude an incidental feature: causal reasoning would say that I would continue to be who I am, even if I were at a different latitude. Although I share with Ainslie the same conclusion, in what follows, I will provide a different justification from Ainslie's for the insufficiency of causal or structural aspects of the passions for our normative conception of person.

> Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations which we observe in moral agents; though the former can never be the object of love or hatred (EPM App. 1.17).
>
> …an inanimate object may have good colour and proportions as well as a human figure. But can we ever be in love with the former? (EPM 5.1.1. n1)

Note that Hume does not take this distinction to be a matter of degree. He says that inanimate objects "can *never* be the object of love or hatred" (EPM App. 1.17, my emphasis) and that when we say that inanimate objects are praiseworthy or blameworthy, "this is an effect of the caprice of language, which ought not to be regarded in reasoning" (EPM 5.1.1. n1). In what follows, I argue that the structural conception of the indirect passions cannot account for the substantive distinction between responsible agents and non-responsible ones.

4.1 Responsibility-making features in the causes of the indirect passions?

Let us begin by examining whether we can find what makes something a responsible agent in the causes of the indirect passions. Recall that causes of the indirect passions are perceptions of painful or pleasurable qualities in subjects that have close connections to perceptions of persons. Accordingly, the causes have three parts:

a) perceptions of painful or pleasurable things, *b*) perceptions of persons, and *c*) perceptions of close connections between painful or pleasurable things and persons. In this subsection, I propose that none of these three parts provides a substantive distinction between responsible agents and those that are not independently of the phenomenal aspects of the passions.

4.1.1 Perceptions of painful or pleasurable things

Mere perceptions of things with hedonic qualities cannot ground responsibility. "A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure" (T 3.1.2.4), but they are not responsible for it. Still, one might think that we can distinguish between attributable and non-attributable pleasures by appealing to their qualitative difference. Pleasure in wine and pleasure toward moral traits of responsible agents might be simply felt differently. Hume himself offers such a view:

> …an inanimate object, and the character or sentiments of any person may, both of them, give satisfaction; but as the satisfaction is different, this keeps our sentiments concerning them from being confounded, and makes us ascribe virtue to the one, and not to the other. (T 3.1.2.4)

Hume is claiming that there is an introspectively accessible difference between pleasure toward wine and pleasure directed at moral traits. This difference might reveal the difference between morally responsible and non-responsible entities.

Nevertheless, Hume seems to think that the phenomenological difference between the two kinds of pleasure comes largely from the presence of the indirect passions. He claims that pleasure directed at moral traits is distinguished from the pleasure we feel toward inanimate beings because only the former is "mixed with affection, esteem, approbation" (EPM 5.1.1.n1), resulting in a different felt quality. He says that the associations between moral pleasure and the indirect passions provide "a still more considerable difference" (T 3.1.2.5) between the different kinds of pleasure than their intrinsic feeling.[58] Hume does not explain in what sense the effects of the indirect passions are "more considerable." I take it that the intrinsic difference between different kinds of pleasure is not salient enough for the substantive distinction between responsible and non-responsible agents.[59] Hume notes that when we focus on their intrinsic feeling alone, different kinds of pleasure are "apt to be confounded" (T 3.1.2.4).[60] We might confuse pleasures toward an accurate computer and an astute

[58] In the moral *Enquiry*, too, Hume puts more emphasis on the effects of the indirect passions. The appeal to the intrinsic difference among different kinds of pleasure is less explicit or sometimes omitted. See EPM 5.1.1.n1 and App.1.17.

[59] Gill (2009, 584-586) criticizes Hume by saying that we cannot sufficiently distinguish between different kinds of pleasures, such as self-interested pleasure and unbiased pleasure, solely by looking at their intrinsic qualities.

[60] But note that Hume makes this claim regarding, not confusion between pleasures we feel toward human traits and pleasures we feel toward inanimate objects, but between self-interested pleasure and pleasure from an unbiased point of view.

person. Still, these pleasures can be easily distinguished because only the pleasure we feel toward the person is accompanied by love or respect. Perhaps the indirect passions are required for us to arrive at a more robust distinction between morally evaluable pleasure and other kinds of pleasure.[61] In any case, for Hume, the phenomenal aspects of the indirect passions seem to be a major source of the difference between pleasure we feel toward human traits and pleasure toward inanimate objects.

4.1.2 Perceptions of Persons

One might think that *persons* with whom pleasurable or painful things are associated might possess some trait distinctive enough to be responsibility-making. I think that Hume's deflationary notion of person makes this unlikely. In discussing the passions, Hume describes persons at whom the indirect passions are directed as non-substantial collections of perceptions. He uses expressions such as "self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (T 2.1.2.2), or "that connected succession of perceptions, which we call self" (T 2.1.2.3).[62] This is pretty much the notion of person "as it regards our thoughts" (T 1.4.6.5), namely the thought-based notion, developed in Book One of the *Treatise*.[63]

---

[61] Moreover, in practice, we rarely conceive moral pleasure independently of the indirect passions because moral traits which elicit pleasure immediately lead to one of the positive indirect passions, and practically they are "inseparable" (T 2.1.5.10. See also T 3.3.1.3).

[62] However, Ainslie (1999, 482, n27) and Greco (2015, 708) stress their difference by pointing to the presence of the modifier "intimate," which is not explicitly present in Hume's account in Book One. I think that even if this modifier makes a difference, we should explain it with reference to the phenomenal aspect of the passions.

[63] Because of the presence of such phrases in Book Two, I disagree with interpretations that take the

As we saw in section 2, Hume in Book One describes a person as "a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect" (T 1.4.6.19). Because of the intimate relation between perceptions, we ascribe an identity to such a collection of perceptions. In this notion of person, there seems to be no significant difference between persons and inanimate objects. In section 2, we already saw that Hume thinks that the way we conceive (the thought-based notion of) persons is not different from the way we conceive inanimate objects such as ships or houses (T 1.4.6.15). The ways we ascribe identity to persons and inanimate objects "must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects" (T 1.4.6.15). This view of personal identity makes it unlikely that the notion of person involves any responsibility-maker.

It might be said that the constituents of a person are psychological items, which inanimate objects cannot have. This presence of the mental, one might argue, is a crucial difference between them. However, for Hume, the psychological/non-psychological distinction does not seem to be what distinguishes responsible entities from those that are not. For example, Hume thinks that non-human animals are equipped with basic psychology consisting of reason and passion (T 1.3.16, T 2.1.12, T 2.2.12), but sometimes they are not responsible for morally bad actions, such as incest (T 3.1.1.25).[64] Here one might further maintain that a more complicated form of

passion-based notion of person as fundamentally discontinuous from the thought-based one (e.g., Lecaldano 2002). For critiques of this line of interpretation, see Carlson (2009) and Qu (2017).

[64] However, as Boyle (2019, 475) points out, it does not follow from this that non-human animals are not accountable for *any* trait.

cognition, which non-human animals presumably lack, provides a crucial distinction between us and non-human animals. But Hume claims that even human beings seldom act on the basis of highly abstract reasoning, which suggests that the attribution of responsibility in most cases does not require the attribution of complex cognitive capacities.[65] Thus, if responsibility consists in the presence of psychological constituents, it becomes unclear why non-human animals are sometimes not responsible for what they do, while people with the same psychology are fully responsible. Having psychology seems insufficient to be a responsible agent.

4.1.3 Perceptions of Close Connections Between Painful or Pleasurable Things and Persons

Now, one might nevertheless maintain that the relation between painful or pleasurable things and persons contains some element that can distinguish between responsible and non-responsible agents. A person may be related to a beautiful house or a virtuous action in a distinctive way that no inanimate object can be. An intentional or purposive relation would be a good candidate for such a distinctive relation. One might say that wine is not responsible for its taste because the wine does not intend it.

---

[65] Hume writes:

> Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. (EHU 9.5)

In contrast, I can be criticized for my action because I intended the action. Non-human animals might be said not to have intention in a full-fledged sense.[66] Thus, the presence of an intentional relation might mark the difference between agents and non-agents. Rorty (1990, 262-63) may have this in mind in saying that pride makes us aware of our own motivational structure and that the awareness constitutes the perception of ourselves as agents.[67] In section 2, I pointed out that Hume aims to account for responsibility practices that are not limited to those that involve intention and control, but all this means is that according to Hume, having an intention is not necessary for being responsible, and this does not prevent Hume from claiming that having an intention is sufficient for being responsible. For Hume, the intention-involving responsibility can still be an important subset of the broader category of responsibility as attributability (In this case, Hume would need a different explanation for why we are responsible for what we unintentionally do).

However, this strategy runs aground in the face of Hume's views that intentional relations are simply garden-variety causal relations. He explicates causal necessity by virtue of constant conjunction between objects and our inference from one object to another based on observations of the conjunction (T 2.3.1.4). When we say that heat causes boiling water, we mean that there has been constant conjunction between these types of things, and when we see water boiling, we infer the existence

[66] For example, Davidson (1982) suggests that a creature without language cannot relate to the world with the "propositional attitudes". The distinctive relation of propositional attitude (or the lack thereof) may explain why non-human animals do not have as much accountability as humans.
[67] Johnson (1992) also takes intention as central to Hume's view of moral responsibility.

of heat. Hume points out that intentional actions are causal relations in this sense. There is a constant conjunction between intentions and actions (T 2.3.1.8), and we infer from an action a motive or intention of the person who performs it (T 2.3.1.15). Hume expects an objection to the effect that human actions involve more uncertainty than material objects and thus cannot be explained in terms of causal necessity. His reply is that when we find someone's action and intention irregular, we think that the seeming irregularity comes from our ignorance (T 2.3.1.12). When someone acts unexpectedly, we look for a hidden intention behind the action: if someone suddenly pokes me, I ask him why he did that, and when it turns out that he intended to chase away a mosquito, I understand the situation. And if someone acts in a completely irregular way, we no longer call his actions intentional (T 2.3.1.13). Regularity is thus at the heart of our understanding of human actions.

Intentional actions, then, are instances of causal relations. Hume further argues that there are not two kinds of causal relations, one in material objects and one in human conduct.[68] Both of these two relations are constituted by constant conjunction and our inference, and therefore "are of the same nature, and deriv'd from the same principles" (T 2.3.1.17). Hume concludes:

> The same experienc'd union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volitions and actions; or figure and motion. We may change

[68] Hume criticizes the Aristotelian taxonomy of four causes, insisting that "all causes are of the same kind" (T 1.3.14.32).

> the names of things; but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change. (T 2.3.1.17)

To conceive wine as a cause of a pleasurable taste and to conceive intention or desire as a cause of a virtuous action are "of the same nature" (ibid.).[69] This makes it difficult to see why only intention's causal power, and not wine's, should be accompanied by responsibility. Hume's identification of intention with ordinary causation suggests that the intentional relation does not make people different from inanimate objects in an important sense.[70]

Focusing exclusively on intention also fails for another reason to fully capture Hume's view of moral responsibility. As I have pointed out in section 2, Hume recognizes responsibility even for unintentional traits such as natural abilities (cf: T 3.3.4). With regard to the indirect passions in particular, Hume claims that the causes of the indirect passions need not always possess intentionality in the sense of volition (T 2.2.3.6). Perhaps for Hume, voluntariness is just a subset of the intimate connections between us and our traits to which the indirect passions respond. The response-eliciting

[69] Hume's example of a prisoner nicely describes this point (T 2.3.1.17).

[70] One might think that the difference in a perspective makes a difference. From the third-person point of view, everything, whether it is an action or a motion, belongs in the web of causal necessity as Hume claims. But it might be thought that agency is something we can perceive only from the first-person perspective. Hume admits that "in performing the actions themselves we are sensible of something like it [a certain looseness]" (T 2.3.2.2). But Hume maintains that however loose we feel our actions are, there is always a motive discoverable by a spectator with sufficient knowledge (T 2.3.2.3), and in saying this, he seems to think that such a looseness does not play any positive role in the attribution of moral responsibility.

intimate connections between us and our non-voluntary traits are probably the associative relations, that is, resemblance, contiguity, and causation. These relations do not appear to make us and inanimate objects different in any significant way.

4.2 Responsibility-Making Features in the Objects of the Indirect Passions?

What about the effects or objects of the passions? The effect of the indirect passions is to turn our attention to some person. One might appeal to the mental act of fixing attention. Ideas of persons do not in themselves manifest any responsibility-making feature, but perhaps they might point the way to such features insofar as they gain a distinctive kind of attention. The way we attend to persons might be different in kind from the ways we attend to inanimate objects. However, I think the distinctiveness in the type of attention is best explained by the distinctive feeling of the indirect passions, which brings us back to phenomenal features. Hume sometimes claims that how our attention is fixed on an object depends on how vividly we conceive it (e.g., T 2.2.2.15). This suggests that types of attention derive their distinctiveness from distinctive feelings. In the present context, then, a natural explanation is that the phenomenal feeling of the passions makes the resulting attention distinctive. Thus, I think that this strategy amounts to the constitutive view.[71] Otherwise, the distinctive

[71] Schmitter thinks that the structural aspects of the passions and their feeling *holistically* contribute to this special mode of attention (Schmitter 2009, 236). I agree with this interpretive line insofar as the felt aspects of the passions are understood as indispensable parts of the holistically understood passions. The discussion so far suggests that it is the phenomenal aspect of the passions that makes the whole process of the passions and the resulting attention distinctive.

status of the relevant mode of attention would remain mysterious, since, as we have seen, there is nothing in the causes of the passions that distinguishes between responsible and non-responsible entities.

5. The Phenomenal Aspects of the Passions and the Responsible Agents

These considerations show that the structural features of the indirect passions, that is, their causes and effects, do not account for the distinction between responsible and non-responsible agents. Since the only alternative is the phenomenal aspect of the passions, we are now in a position to see why the phenomenal aspect of the passions makes the needed difference. To see a person as responsible is essentially to feel a distinctively pleasurable or painful passion toward her.[72] Hume stresses that the causes of passions produce "a separate pain or pleasure" (T 2.2.1.8), which is the indirect passions understood as feelings. A glass of good wine just produces pleasure, and there is no additional impression directed toward it. Although it is true that the pleasure from the wine could cause indirect passions when the wine is owned by someone, there is no additional impression directed toward the wine itself. On the other hand, in addition to the pleasure that we associate with the cause, another pleasurable feeling that is pride or love can arise. This additional feeling is missing in our perceptions of inanimate objects. That perceptions of persons are accompanied by this type of simple feeling

[72] In contemporary philosophy of responsibility, a similar position is defended by Shoemaker (2017).

seems to make the difference between agents and inanimate objects.[73] To have a certain type of unanalysable and simple feeling toward a person is a constitutive part of our conception of responsible agents.[74]

However, it is implausible to say that just feeling the indirect passions is sufficient for the attribution of responsibility. We sometimes have "wrong" feelings that would not justify that attribution. I might hate a person for the harmful action that she unintentionally performed. Or I might feel anger toward a newborn baby. These feelings are an illegitimate basis for the attribution of responsibility. The feeling-dependent view should be able to say that we justly attribute moral responsibility to a person just in case it is *appropriate* to feel the passions for her. I suggest that the structural aspects of the passions provide the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate feelings. To hate someone for what she did by accident is inappropriate in that accidental actions are not standard causes of hate. To feel anger at an infant is improper because anger is usually directed at "persons," entities with sufficient psychological capacities. Hume himself proposes structural constraints on the proper circumstances for feeling pride and humility when enumerating various "limitations of

[73] According to this picture, what explains the difference in responsibility between non-human animals and humans would be the fact that we do not "hate" or "love" non-human animals as much as we do humans, even though non-human animals produce pleasure or pain in us.

[74] This does not require us actually to feel the passions whenever we think of agents. Even if the concept of pain is grounded in pain experiences, it does not follow that we conceive pain only when we actually feel pain. Perhaps the feeling of passions stored in memory creates belief, and thereby we can conceptualize agency.

this system" at T 2.1.6.[75] However, this should not lead us to think that the various structural conditions are by themselves responsibility-making. These structural features are relevant for our perception of responsible agents because they are the type of things to which the feeling of indirect passions usually responds. If people were capable of perceiving the structural properties but lacked the sensibility to feel the indirect passions, they would only find a causal sequence of events in the world and would not find any relevant distinction between responsible and non-responsible agents. It is the phenomenal aspects of the passions that make the structural aspects significant for our perception of responsibility, not the other way around.[76]

Then, *why* do we feel love or hate for entities with structural features such as intentions and other psychological characteristics? Hume's answer would be that it is human nature that we have such sensibility, and he is not able to give any further reason for it[77]:

> the peculiar object of pride and humility is determin'd by an original and natural instinct, and that 'tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the

[75] According to the "limitations," these passions are appropriate only if their causes satisfy the following five conditions (T 2.1.6): (1) Their causes are intimately connected to a person. (2) They are peculiar to the bearers of the causes. (3) They are publicly approved or disapproved. (4) They are durable to some degree. (5) They conform to general rules.

[76] In interpreting Hume's view on morality, Cohon (2008, 138-143) suggests that Hume's appeal to certain cognitive conditions, such as "steady and general points of view" (T 3.3.1.15), does not necessarily contradict Hume's moral sentimentalism.

[77] Of course, the exploration of biological and social conditions may help us to understand why we have the indirect passions for certain objects. But that is not the task of Hume, who investigates perceptions insofar as they appear in the mind.

> mind, that these passions shou'd ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious… For this I pretend not to give any reason; but consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality. (T 2.1.5.3. See also T 2.1.3.3 and T 2.1.5.6)

The same explanation is given for the indirect passions toward others (e.g., T 2.2.1.2, T 2.2.11.6). These suggest that we feel the indirect passions for ourselves and other people, but not for inanimate objects, because of the "primary constitution of the mind," for which no further explanation can be given. Hume's explanation begins with the fact that we have such sensitivity.

Chapter 4: The Problem of Normativity (II): A Constitutivist Response to Scepticism

1. Introduction

In chapter 3, I argued that the relationship between the indirect passions and the concept of responsibility is much closer than previously thought: the indirect passions are constitutive of the concept of responsibility. In this chapter, I examine the relationship between this framework of the indirect passions and Hume's epistemology in the "Conclusion". In doing so, I will propose that we can find a response to the "problem of normativity" in Hume's epistemology. Specifically, in this chapter, I will argue that Hume's discussions of the indirect passions and personal identity provide a *constitutivist* (e.g., Korsgaard 2009) ground for the naturalistic epistemic standards in the "Conclusion". Being the object of the indirect passions constitutes our conception of ourselves as the bearers of responsibility, and they ultimately constitute who we are. Then, being the kind of person (philosopher in Hume's case) gives a reason to pursue certain kinds of reasoning, because doing so is part of who we are.

2. The Problem of Normativity with the Naturalistic Interpretations

Here I would like to recapitulate briefly the original scepticism in the "Conclusion", the naturalistic interpretations of Hume's response to it, and the problem with the interpretations. I focus in particular on the core of Hume's sceptical discussions, the "very dangerous dilemma" (T 1.4.7.6). There he is at a loss to determine the standard of correct reasoning. Hume says that "if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy", this would "lead us into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become asham'd of our credulity" (T 1.4.7.6). On the other hand, if we only follow stable operations of the mind, that is, "the general and more establish'd properties of the imagination" (T 1.4.7.6), this would result in "a total extinction of belief" (T 1.4.1.6), as was explained in the section, "Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason" (T 1.4.1). Given the fallibility of our cognitive faculties such that our reasoning sometimes errs, we are required to check the reliability of our judgment by forming a second-order judgment evaluating it. But then, we have to confirm the reliability of the second-order judgment by forming a third-order judgment. Thus, "we are oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt", and this endless addition of doubt ends up with "a total extinction of belief and evidence" (T 1.4.1.6). We can avoid this scepticism and have a belief "only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy" (T 1.4.7.6). This brings us back to the credulity. Thus, the dilemma is that we have "no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all" (T 1.4.7.6). This dilemma leads Hume to fall into "philosophical melancholy and delirium" (T 1.4.7.9).

However, this does not seem to be Hume's final position. Amusement (e.g., backgammon) cures Hume's melancholy, and he recollects himself and comes to have "indolent belief in the general maxims of the world" (T 1.4.7.10). But Hume is not satisfied with the indolence and returns to the use of reason. Here the naturalistic interpretation claims that Hume arrives at a stable epistemological position. Don Garrett proposes that Hume arrives at the following epistemological standards, which he calls "the Title Principle":

> Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us. (T 1.4.7.11)

For example, Hume seems to endorse reason accompanied by the passionate propensities of curiosity and ambition (T 1.4.7.12). With this epistemic norm, Garrett maintains, Hume overcomes the dangerous dilemma: overly sceptical reasoning is neither sufficiently lively nor accompanied by motivating passions, and lively and active reasoning mingling with passions rejects mere fancy.

Alternatively, Kemp Smith would say that Hume escapes from the dilemma, realizing that neither accepting total credulity nor accepting total annihilation of beliefs is psychologically feasible. Reason "gains a content and direction which reason qua reflective is incapable of supplying, and which can come only from a natural impulse" (Kemp Smith 2005, 131). In particular, beliefs that should be endorsed are those which

"we have no choice but to accept" (Kemp Smith 1941, 388). In spite of scepticism, nature makes us irresistibly hold fundamental beliefs.

The problem, however, is that it is unclear "why" we should endorse reasoning or belief that involves these psychological features (Williams 2004, 269, Durland 2011, 83, Ainslie 2015, 232-233, Qu 2020, 147). How can a mere psychological fact of some kind give us a principled reason to escape the dangerous dilemma? Unless we can show a principled difference between such a psychological fact and the "trivial suggestion of the fancy" (T 1.4.7.6), these kinds of naturalistic epistemology also seem to put us in the dangerous dilemma. The justification of the alleged naturalistic criteria seems to be missing in the interpretations. The absence of such a justification is problematic by Hume's own standards, since, as noted in Chapter 2, Hume believes that if we cannot find a principled reason for adopting a certain epistemic policy, it will not resolve skepticism (T 1.4.7.7).

One might respond to the worry by adding a restriction to the "propensity" Hume appeals to in the “Conclusion”. For example, Hume raises curiosity as a passion that motivates him to use reason (T 1.4.7.12). From this, one may propose that Hume specifically endorses reason that satisfies curiosity.[78] Curiosity, a distinctively epistemic passion, might play a privileged role in grounding the use of reason.[79]

[78] For example, Wilson (1983) particularly attends to curiosity. Schafer (2014) also focuses on curiosity, but he places it within the framework of Hume’s moral theory and finds a kind of virtue-epistemology in Hume.

[79] Schafer also attends to the passion of intellectual ambition. But since according to him, intellectual ambition is the desire to satisfy the curiosity of other members of a community (Schafer 2014, 11), curiosity seems to be conceptually more fundamental than ambition in his interpretation.

However, Hume's actual discussion of curiosity indicates that the passion is not rigid enough to resolve the dangerous dilemma. The object of curiosity is truth, but according to Hume, we do not pursue it as such. Rather, we pursue truth because of the pleasure that comes with the pursuit itself (T 2.3.10.3). Hume concedes that "(t)he truth we discover must also be of some importance" (T 2.3.10.4), but this is so "only because 'tis, in some measure, requisite to fix our attention" (T 2.3.10.6). As Gelfert notes, "(i)t is ultimately the pursuit that matters" (Gelfert 2013, 722). Thus, curiosity consists in the innocent pleasure of exercising one's reason. Although this discussion is interesting on its own, it is not clear how it can address the dangerous dilemma. For the pleasure-seeking passion appears to be quite "trivial" (T 1.4.7.6). What prevents Hume from concluding that if we should follow this pleasure, then "by a parity of reason" (T 1.4.7.7) we should also follow all trivial propensities? Hume's account of curiosity does not seem to answer this question.[80]

Another option for the naturalistic interpretation to respond to the concern about the ground is the kind of interpretation according to which in the "Conclusion", Hume provides a moral justification for the use of reason (Owen 1999, ch.9, Ridge 2003. Cf: Schafer 2014). Hume often characterizes virtue as a character trait that is agreeable to oneself or to others, or useful to oneself or to others. According to these criteria, the proponents of this view argue, the disposition to a certain kind of reasoning that Hume endorses in the "Conclusion" qualifies as virtuous. For example, Hume aims at

[80] But this does not mean that curiosity is insignificant in Hume's epistemology. The point here is only that curiosity is not suitable to answer the worry of groundlessness. See the concluding section.

reasoning that contributes to "the instruction of mankind" (T 1.4.7.12), that is, reasoning that is useful to society. Moreover, lively reasoning that satisfies the title principle is presumably agreeable to the reasoner. Thus, Hume's rich theory of morality might provide a solid basis for Hume's return to the use of reason. However, it has been pointed out that attributing moral justification for the use of reason to Hume comes with several interpretive costs. Here I describe two of them. First, Book Three of the *Treatise*, in which Hume develops his moral theory, was published separately from Book One and Book Two. This makes it unlikely that Hume appeals to morality at such a crucial moment of Book One (Garrett 2015, 232). In particular, it is not clear how Hume can move on to Book Two and use reason to explicate the passions, without having first justified reason. Second, the moral interpretation could collapse the distinction between epistemic normativity and moral normativity (Qu 2014), a distinction Hume seems committed to when saying, "Laudable or blameable…are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable" (T 3.1.1.10).[81] Even if these costs do not totally undermine the moral interpretation, it would be good if we could offer an interpretation without these costs. In the following, I will present such an interpretation. (However, the moral interpretation and mine overlap in many ways, and in Chapter 6, I argue that my interpretation and this kind of interpretation are compatible.)

[81] Schafer's virtue epistemological interpretation (Schafer 2014) may avoid this problem by making a distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. However, Qu (2014, 520-523) argues that the distinction between moral and epistemic normativity collapses as long as we model epistemic justification on moral justification in Hume's philisophical framework.

3. Why Indirect Passions?

Few scholars have attended to the indirect passions in the present context.[82] So, in this section, I will briefly motivate my turn to the indirect passions. As we saw above, the "Conclusion" has a negative phase that includes the "dangerous dilemma" and a positive phase where Hume appears to have overcome the scepticism and return to the use of reason. In both phases, the indirect passions occupy important places. In the negative phase, for example, his "desponding reflections" (T 1.4.7.1) resulting in the dangerous dilemma cause others' "enmity", "hatred", "anger, calumny and detraction" (T 1.4.7.2). They are the indirect passions or intimately connected to them.

The importance of the indirect passions in Hume's sceptical discussions is also suggested in *A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh*. In response to the charge of "Universal Scepticism" (LG 14) for Hume's discussion in T 1.4.7, Hume maintains that his purpose there is not to endorse the scepticism, but:

> to abate the *Pride* of mere human Reasoners, by showing them, that even with regard to Principles which seem the clearest, and which they are necessitated from the strongest Instincts of Nature to embrace, they are not able to attain a

[82] It should be noted that Annette Baier puts the indirect passions or personal identity in the context of Hume's scepticism (Baier 1991, ch.1 and ch.6). But her interpretation leaves a lot to be filled in. I follow her interpretive direction, and I will fill in the details of this line of interpretation. Livingston (1998, 11) takes Hume's self-knowledge as a philosopher as a central theme in the "Conclusion", but he does not associate this insight with Hume's actual theory of person or person-directed passions. Goldhaber (2021) approaches the emotional turmoil and Hume's existential concerns in the "Conclusion", focusing on the history of humoral theory. But he does not pay particular attention to the indirect passions.

> full Consistence and absolute Certainty. *Modesty* then, and *Humility*, with regard to the Operations of our natural Faculties, is the Result of Scepticism. (LG 21, emphasis mine)

The point of the sceptical discussion is to make dogmatic thinkers less proud and humiliated, by revealing that the reason they trust is more fragile than they think. In the positive phase, Hume cites the passion of "ambition" of "contributing to the instruction of mankind" and "of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries" (T 1.4.7.12). Ambition is classified as an indirect passion (T 2.1.1.4), and Hume describes it as a kind of pride that has authority or power as its cause (T 2.1.8.4, 2.2.8.14). And the ambition of "acquiring a name" in particular seems intimately connected to the "love of fame" (T 2.1.11), which is the pride caused by others' admiration.[83] Thus, the indirect passions are prominent in the "Conclusion".

Another feature of the "Conclusion" that has not often been mentioned is Hume's existential concerns, which, as I will argue later, seem best captured with reference to the indirect passions. Hume, who falls into the radical scepticism, appears to be:

[83] Of course, Hume also mentions non-indirect passions like curiosity, but this does not trouble my interpretation. My claim is not that Hume's response to scepticism is given solely by the indirect passions, but rather that indirect passions form *one* of his responses to scepticism. See chapter 5.

> some strange uncouth monster, who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been expell'd all human commerce, and left utterly abandon'd and disconsolate. Fain wou'd I run into the crowd for shelter and warmth; but cannot prevail with myself to mix with such deformity. I call upon others to join me, in order to make a company apart; but no one will hearken to me. Every one keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm, which beats upon me from every side. (T 1.4.7.2)

When the sceptical mood reaches its climax, Hume's existential concerns become obvious:

> Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv'd of the use of every member and faculty. (T 1.4.7.8)

In particular, he seems to be concerned about himself as a philosopher, when asking, "with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title [philosopher], when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction?" (T 1.4.7.4) Likewise, in the

positive phase, Hume's self-identification as a philosopher is prominent: "if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner" (T 1.4.7.11). As I will argue in the following sections, these existential concerns seem to be intimately connected to the indirect passions. Hume himself hints at such a connection: through the indirect passions, Hume seems to try to accommodate some aspects of personal identity, as he refers to "personal identity...as it regards our passions" (T 1.4.6.5).

Moreover, the structure of the *Treatise* gives us an additional reason to look to the indirect passions. As I emphasized in Chapter 2, Hume pronounces that Book One and Book Two are closely intertwined, by saying, "(t)he subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning" (T Adv.). If Book One and Book Two are continuous, then we expect a particularly close relationship between the "Conclusion" and Hume's account of the indirect passions. Book Two begins with Hume's discussion of the indirect passions, which means that it comes just after the "Conclusion". Also, of the three parts of Book Two, the first two parts are devoted to discussions of the indirect passions. Thus, Hume's self-proclaimed continuity of the *Treatise* and the centrality of the indirect passion in Book Two lead one to expect that there is some connection between the dramatic ending of Book One and Hume's account of the indirect passions.[84]

[84] Why Hume begins Book Two with the indirect passions has puzzled interpreters. Gelfert describes this order as "counterintuitive" (Gelfert 2013, 716, n6). If there is a close relationship between the indirect passions and scepticism, this would explain the order straightforwardly.

4. The Indirect Passions and Personal Identity

The following is a recapitulation of Hume's account of the indirect passions. Hume characterizes the indirect passions in terms of what he calls the "double relation of ideas and impressions" (T 2.1.5.5). The indirect passions are in themselves simple feelings, and take a positive or negative valence (T 2.1.2.1, T 2.2.1.1, T 2.2.2.3). But Hume describes the feelings in terms of their causes and objects. The causes consist of an impression of pain or pleasure, and an idea of the bearer of the hedonic quality (e.g., a perception of a beautiful house involves an impression of beauty and an idea of a house). The causes are associated with an idea of a person (the beautiful house has to be conceived as my house, to stir pride.). When they bring about the indirect passions, our attention is directed toward the objects of the passions, that is, self or other people (the owner of the beautiful house). The idea of the bearer of the hedonic qualities and the idea of the person are connected via principles of associations of ideas. The impression of pain or pleasure and the impression of the indirect passions are connected via the principle of the association of impressions, that is, resemblance. Thus, the process in which the indirect passions are produced can be described as the "double relation of ideas and impressions" (T 2.1.5.5).

So how do the indirect passions and personal identity relate to each other? As we saw in Chapter 3, many scholars have linked the indirect passions with the concept of responsibility (in the sense of attributability). And since Hume seems to consider the

framework of the indirect passions as part of the explanation of personality identity (the indirect passions are presumably supposed to accommodate "personal identity...as it regards our passions" (T 1.4.6.5)), these scholars think that the concept of responsibility contributes to an account of personal identity, or who we are. More specifically, many commentators have pointed out that the indirect passions lead us to form ideas of our identity as *bearers* of the causes of the passions, that is, bearers of the objects for which we are responsible (Rorty 1990, Ainslie 1999, 2005, Pitson 2002, Boeker 2015, Taylor 2015).[85] For instance, when I am proud of the music I have written and thus the music is attributable to me, the pride produces the idea of myself as a musician (a musician in the sense of being committed to music, not merely someone causally related to it). If a toddler happens to make a beautiful sound, we don't think she is responsible for that sound, so she would not be considered a musician. When I love my friend for her beautiful house and conceives her as responsible for it, the love makes me conceive her as a homeowner (homeowner in the sense of being commited to their home). This interpretation fits well with Hume's account of the indirect passions where the person in the "double relation" is always to be understood in relation to a specific cause. And the causes of the indirect passions seem to have a special relationship with the persons when Hume says that the cause of the passions is "consider'd as connected with our being and existence" (T 2.1.8.8). Hume also states

[85] The close relationship between responsibility and commitment and the attribution of personal identity has recently been revealed in empirical studies. For example, Knobe et al. (2013) conducted an empirical study suggesting that people hesitate to call someone an "artist" in some respect if she creates art but is not interested in it (e.g., if she thinks of artworks only as a way to make money).

that pride tells us "our own merit" (T 3.3.2.8) and "our rank and station in the world, whether it be fix'd by our birth, fortune, employments, talents or reputation" (T 3.3.2.11), which suggests that through pride we learn about our attributes. Thus, the interpretation that the indirect passions are meant to accommodate the person as the bearer of the causes of the passions is textually supported.

The consequence of my discussion in Chapter 3 is that feeling the indirect passions, rather than recognizing their extrinsic features, is constitutive of the very concept of responsibility and thus the concept of personal identity as described above. For example, if I intentionally create some music, the intentional relationship between me and the music is only one of garden variety causal relations, and that relation is not sufficient for me to be a musician responsible for my own music. It is only when my music triggers pride or humility, hatred or love for me, that I come to regard myself as a musician. This response-dependent view of personal identity does not seem to be so counterintuitive. To simplify the discussion, I will concentrate on the self-directed passions of pride and humility before turning to the other-directed ones. Let me consider the example of an identity as a musician. Intuitively, if one does not feel pride in her good music and is not humiliated by her bad music, we would not call her a musician. Instead, it seems that anyone who feels pride or humility about the quality of the music she makes is a musician. In short, it seems that those who are moved by the quality of one's music are musicians, and those who do not are not musicians. This claim should be distinguished from the claim that a person who is poor at making music is not a musician. An incompetent musician might still be a musician. For she might

still want to improve her music, that is, she feels humiliated by her bad music. The idea is that the commitment to the quality of one's music, rather than good or bad music itself, makes a person a musician. I suggest that the feelings of pride and humility are best interpreted as an expression of commitment. The same story would go for identity as a philosopher. The fact that I am humiliated by logical fallacies in my reasoning shows that I am a philosopher, a kind of person who engages in a certain kind of reasoning (assuming that avoiding logical fallacies is one of the norms in philosophy).[86] To feel proud of good reasoning and to feel humiliated by a bad one, namely to be committed to the quality of reasoning, is part of my identity as a philosopher. Again, the fallacies do not immediately undermine my identity. Rather, being humiliated by the fallacies shows that I am a philosopher although a bad one.[87] This response-dependent understanding of a person fits well with Hume's description of pride as literally being *part* of a person:

> A certain degree of generous pride or self-value is so requisite, that the absence of it in the mind displeases, after the same manner as the want of a nose, eye, or any of the most material feature of the face or member of the body. (EPM 7.10)

[86] Cognitive ability is a standard cause of pride and humility: "Every valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the causes of pride; and their opposites of humility." (T 2.1.2.5)
[87] Ainslie (1999) and Taylor (2015, 55) also point out that pride and humility reflect one's commitments, rather than one's descriptive traits.

If feeling proud of something is exactly what makes us who we are, then it is no wonder that pride is part of us.

The same account applies to the other-directed passions of love and hate. When people love or hate me for my music, the love or hate is a constitutive part of their perception of me as a musician, one who is committed to the quality of music. If people do not have the negative indirect passion toward me for my bad music, they do not see me as a musician. Now, the question is what the relationship is between the self-directed and the other-directed passions. Hume seems to think that the self-directed passions have priority over the other-directed ones in the formation of one's identity. For he claims that other's admiration of our traits does not move us if we ourselves do not value them. For example, a merchant does not feel pleasure even if others admire or love his learning, in which he does not take pride (T 2.1.11.13). This remark suggests that love and hate have force so long as they concur with pride and humility. However, this is not to say that love and hate are peripheral to one's identity. Rather, when concurring with pride or humility, love or hate has a great impact on us, and sometimes becomes the main source of our pride and humility. Hume writes:

> the possessor (of wealth) has also a secondary satisfaction in riches arising from the love and esteem he acquires by them, and this satisfaction is nothing but a second reflection of that original pleasure, which proceeded from himself. This secondary satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal recommendations

> of riches, and is the chief reason, why we either desire them for ourselves, or esteem them in others. (T 2.2.5.21)

Being rich is pleasant on its own, but the admiration from others which the wealth causes becomes the main reason for aspiring to be rich. This suggests that the most important source of pride or humility regarding wealth is love or hate from others. The significance of the indirect passions from others would apply not only to wealth, but to other attributes as well. Hume points out that we are heavily influenced by sympathy with others, and that therefore the praise or blame of others is a typical and indispensable cause of pride or humility (T 2.1.11). This entails that love and hate play a significant role in the formation of one's identity. Namely, feeling pride and humility make me who I am, but these passions often come from love and hate from others. This point seems plausible: taking pride in one's music makes one a musician, but since love is an indispensable cause of the pride, the significant part of the identity amounts to being loved by fellow musicians and audiences.

In sum, Hume's account of the indirect passions and personal identity based on them can be interpreted as follows. Being proud and humiliated about some kind of things, which often amount to being loved and hated for them, gives a person a specific identity. The indirect passions seem to be meant to capture this kind of identity based on one's commitment.[88]

[88] An important interpretive issue with Hume's account of the passion-involving person is whether it is distinct from the notion of person developed in Book One of the *Treatise* (for discussion, see Ainslie

5. A Constitutivist Ground for the Use of Reason

With Hume's views on personal identity and the passions in hand, I attempt to find in the "Conclusion" something similar to "constitutivism" about normativity (e.g., Korsgaard 2009, Velleman 2009, Katsafanas 2013, Schafer 2019). There are different types of constitutivism, but according to Katsafanas (2013, 38-41), constitutivists have the following lines of thought in common. They claim that agents (or actions or practical identities, depending on different authors) have a constitutive aim: seeking the aim is exactly what makes them agents.[89] Then, assuming that aims generate reasons for actions,[90] we as agents have reasons to do certain things by virtue of what we are. To see how this suggestion works, the example of a chess-player is useful. Chess-players have the constitutive aim of checkmate, and if they are just moving pieces around randomly without the aim, they are no longer chess-players. So, chess-players, by virtue of who they are, have a reason to do the actions that are conducive to checkmate. Of course, chess-players can also have a non-constitutive aim (e.g., to enjoy the game), and the aim can give them reasons for actions. The difference between

2005, Carlson 2009 and Qu 2017b). My interpretation here is independent of this issue. In other words, whether or not the kind of identity of which one's commitment is a part is reducible to the bundle view of identity developed in T 1.4.6 does not affect the following discussion.

[89] Note that not all constitutivists focus on the constitutive "aim" in particular. For example, Korsgaard attends to the constitutive "principles" (Korsgaard 2009, 119), and Schafer speaks of the constitutive "capacities" (Schafer 2019a). Katsafanas attempts to reconstruct differet types of constitutivism by focusing on "aim" in particular.

[90] This bridging assumption is what Kastafanas calls "success", according to which "(i)f X aims at G, then G is a standard of success for X." (Kastafanas 2013, 39)

non-constitutive aims and constitutive ones of chess-players is that the latter is completely non-optional for them: you can play chess without enjoying it, but you can't play chess without aiming at checkmate. In this respect, the constitutive aim provides an inevitable, normative binding force. In the same way, constitutivists believe that there is a constitutive aim that agents necessarily have, and given that we are inescapably agents, from the aim we get normative claims that apply to all of us. For example, Korsgaard thinks that conforming to the categorical imperatives is the constitutive feature of agency (Korsgaard 2009, 81). If so, being agents would give us a reason to follow certain norms, insofar as they are derived from the categorical imperatives. However, constitutivists disagree over what the constitutive aim of agency exactly is.

From the previous section, we can say that the indirect passions are constitutive of personal identity of a specific kind in that to be proud or loved (e.g., for good music) and to be humiliated or hated (e.g., for bad music) are the very things that make us who we are (e.g., a musician). Now, in this framework, to be a certain kind of person involves the aims of getting what produces pride (love) and avoiding what produces humility (hate). Pride in things of type X involves aiming to get the type X things: if you are not interested in getting them, then you are not proud of having them. Humility for things of type X involves aiming to avoid such things: if you do not care, then you are not humiliated by having them. Thus, from the indirect passions, we obtain the two aims of getting what produces pride and avoiding what produces humility. What is constitutive of a musician is to aim at making pride-producing music and to aim at

avoiding humility-producing music. What makes one a philosopher is to aim at pride-producing reasoning and to aim to avoid humility-producing reasoning. Of course, given that love and hate are often main sources of pride and humility, aiming at love-producing reasoning and aiming to avoid hate-producing reasoning are also important parts of being a philosopher. Abandoning these aims is not optional for philosophers.

However, one might think that while these aims are non-optional for philosophers, being a philosopher is optional. In other words, one could quit being a philosopher, and thereby ignore its constitutive aims. However, Hume seems to think that most of us rarely change what kind of things we feel pride or humility in. Hume writes:

> Almost every one has a predominant inclination, to which his other desires and affections submit, and which governs him, though, perhaps, with some intervals, through the whole course of his life. (EMPL The Sceptic, 160)

The “predominant inclination” to which one’s other desires submit can be construed as the indirect passions. For Hume describes the indirect passions as governing desires and other affections: they give “additional force to the direct passions, and encrease our desire and aversion to the object” (T 2.3.9.4). Also, Hume states that his own "ruling passion" (EMPL My Own Life, xl), which seems interchangeable with the “predominant inclination”, is "love of literary fame" (ibid.). Love of fame is an indirect passion, that is, pride caused by the admiration from others (T 2.1.11). These suggest

that, for Hume, pride and humility in certain kinds of objects are constant "through the whole course of his life".

However, it might seem to be an exaggeration to say that we can never change our indirect passions. But at least it follows from the nature of the indirect passions that we cannot easily escape the commitments embedded in the indirect passions. First, the indirect passions are feeling, that is, something “that depends not on the will” (T App, 2). This means that we cannot voluntarily stop feeling the indirect passions, and therefore cannot voluntarily cease to be philosophers. Second, the indirect passions involve durable commitment: “(a)ctions themselves, not proceeding from any *constant* principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility” (T 3.3.1.4, my emphasis). If we are proud of our philosophical thinking, we have to be philosophers, at least for a while, and we cannot casually change our constitutive aims.

This framework of the indirect passions gives a basis for Hume’s normative claims in the "Conclusion”. In the negative phase, Hume’s “desponding reflections” (T 1.4.7.1) lead to the dangerous dilemma. As seen in section 3, the dilemma makes other people feel the negative passions such as “hatred” or “anger” (T 1.4.7.2) toward Hume. I also noted that Hume has existential concerns: he asking himself "Where am I, or what?" (T 1.4.7.8), and "with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title [philosopher]"? (T 1.4.7.8). The above discussion shows that these existential concerns and the negative indirect passions are closely linked. Hume is a philosopher, that is, someone who aims at pride-producing reasoning and aims to avoid humility-producing reasoning. However, Hume's sceptical discussions requires either total

credulity or total extinction of belief. Both conclusions provoke the negative passions in others, and Hume himself feels shame about them. And he does not know how to escape the dilemma: “For my part, I know not what ought to be done in the present case” (T 1.4.7.7). If you have no idea how to avoid a certain thing, then it seems difficult for you to *aim* to avoid it. Then, since he cannot even *aim* to avoid humility-producing reasoning, he fails to meet the constitutive feature of a philosopher and appears to cease to be who he is. This understanding provides a constitutivist rationale for why Hume should not solely rely on mere fancy or destructive reason. Being a philosopher gives him a reason to avoid cognitive activities that only produce the negative passions such as hate or humility.

As I have already pointed out, in the positive phase, Hume also refers to the indirect passions such as ambition (T 1.4.7.12), and his identity as a philosopher (T 1.4.7.11). According to my interpretation, these two points are intertwined: aiming for reasoning that generates pride or satisfies ambition is exactly what makes Hume a philosopher. We can now find a constitutivist basis for Hume's naturalistic response to scepticism. Garrett’s title principle says, “(w)here reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to” (T 1.4.7.11). This passage comes with Hume’s self-identification as a philosopher: “if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner.” (T 1.4.7.11) Or as Schafer (2014) emphasizes, Hume refers to curiosity as what drives him to philosophical inquiry (T1.4.7.12). But he pairs it with the indirect passion of ambition (T 1.4.7.12). These suggest that lively reasoning

or curiosity-satisfying reasoning can be a cause of pride and person-constituting, and therefore being a philosopher provides a non-optional reason to pursue such reasoning. If my interpretation is correct, Hume's response to scepticism is not groundless in such a way that it exclusively relies on free-floating psychological propensities, but has a constitutivist basis.

Here I would like to answer a few possible worries with this account. One might think that this proposal ends up with something similar to Kemp Smith's interpretation that appeals to the irresistibility of beliefs and inferences. My interpretation also relies on the fact that someone like Hume irresistibly has to accept the identity of a philosopher. If so, then the criticism directed at Kemp Smith's natural beliefs, that they are explanations of what we do believe, not of what we ought to believe (Ainslie 2015, 232), may be directed at my interpretation as well. Following Katsafanas' response to a similar concern about constitutivism in general (Katsafanas 2018, 384-85), we can respond as follows. Kemp Smith seems to derive the normativity of belief from its irresistibility: "The beliefs which ought to be accepted are, [Hume] teaches, beliefs that Nature itself marks out for us. In their fundamental forms, as 'natural' beliefs, we have no choice but to accept them; they impose themselves on the mind" (Kemp Smith 1941, 388). However, what is irresistible in my interpretation is to *aim* at pride-producing reasoning and to *aim* to avoid humility-producing reasoning. My interpretation does not derive normativity from the irresistibility of beliefs or inferences, but from the irresistibility of *aiming* at a certain kind of reasoning. This picture seems to be an

account of what we "ought" to do, without ruling out the possibility that we fail to make good reasoning.

It might be said that radical scepticism, such as that which leads to the dangerous dilemma, is still something philosophers take pride in, insofar as it is valid. In fact, to the argument that strict adherence to reason would lead to the annihilation of all beliefs, Hume "can find no error" (T 1.4.1.8). Then isn't excessive scepticism still something philosophers admire? In my opinion, however, radical scepticism demands that philosophers accept conclusions so bizarre that they cannot be proud of them. It requires, for example, that philosophers have no beliefs whatsoever. If they accept this, then they would not be allowed to have beliefs about objects, causality, or even more mundane events, and would not be able to perform any action in the first place. This destructive conclusion does not seem to be something to be admired even in the philosophical community. In addition, philosophers in reality are compelled to believe and act despite their total scepticism. If that is the case, they fall into the contradiction of declaring that they follow reason completely, while partially ignoring it. Such inconsistency would be an embarrassment to philosophers. Indeed, Hume seems to think that such scepticism would ruin the pride of philosophers.

> All he means by these Scruples [scetical discussions] is to abate the *Pride* of mere human Reasoners, by showing them, that even with regard to Principles which seem the clearest, and which they are necessitated from the strongest Instincts of Nature to embrace, they are not able to attain a full Consistence and

> absolute Certainty. *Modesty* then, and *Humility*, with regard to the Operations of our natural Faculties, is the Result of Scepticism. (LG 21, emphasis mine)

Thus, in the"Conclusion," Hume seems to be pursuing a more moderate norm of reasoning, one that philosophers would be proud of, rather than excessively sceptical, humiliating reason.

The proposed framework implies that the normativity of reason is relative to one's identity. Hume seems happy to accept this consequence. In a later part of the "Conclusion", He refers to "many honest gentlemen, who being always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing themselves in common recreations" and says, "of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers" (T 1.4.7.14). This remark can be understood as saying that those who are not philosophers, that is, those who do not feel pride or humility in their philosophical reasoning, are not required to commit to such reasoning. How, then, can Hume accommodate the normativity of non-philosophers' reasoning? In the "Conclusion," Hume seems to concentrate on the question of what kind of reasoning *he* should pursue, and his answer to the question concerning non-philosophers is not clear.[91] Since the central question of this dissertation is how a philosopher like Hume would respond to the scepticism, the fact that I do not have answer to this question is not really a problem for this project. Still, the framework of

[91] Thus, Ainslie (2015a, 243) maintains that the "Conclusion" deals with the more specific question of whether we should *philosophize*, rather than the general question of what kind of reasoning we should follow. My interpretation, emphasizing Hume's identity as a philosopher, is perfectly compatible with the view that Hume is concerned mainly with the normativity of philosophical reasoning.

the indirect passions could be extended to the epistemic normativity for non-philosophers. Here are some possibilities. Assenting “to every trivial suggestion of the fancy” (T 1.4.7.6) seems to be shameful even for non-philosophers. In this respect, non-philosophers can also be minimal epistemic agents, even if not interested in highly abstract reasoning. Or we could say that the total credulity would undermine even "domestic affairs”. If one always has false beliefs about the means to satisfy her “ruling passion” about domestic matters, she will not be able to achieve her constitutive aims. Thus, constitutive aims of non-philosophers would also require some degree of epistemic competence.

6. Concluding Remarks on the Scope of My Interpretation

I would like to conclude this chapter by stating what this framework is *not* supposed to explain. The purpose of this chapter is to supplement the naturalistic interpretations, not to offer an alternative to it. Indeed, I remained neutral about exactly what kind of reasoning Hume thinks philosophers or more generally people are proud of. The naturalistic interpretations have offered such standards in different ways. The title principle in its pure form states that we should assent to reason that is vivacious and accompanied by some propensities. Alternatively, we might restrict the title principle to the particular passion of curiosity, and find in Hume the epistemic policy that we should reason in a way that satisfies curiosity (cf: Schafer 2014). In chapter 5, I will propose that for Hume, correct reasoning is the reasoning that tranquilizes the

mind or produces the calm passions. The present chapter, however, is not meant to determine which of these options best captures Hume's thoughts and constitutes Hume's identity as a philosopher. What can be said here is that all of the above options are compatible with the constitutivist framework of the indirect passions: all of the lively reason, curiosity-satisfying reason and tranquilizing reason can be admired by others, and therefore can be a cause of pride. Thus, the indirect passions can give normative force to these epistemic norms. In this sense, the constitutive framework is compatible with the naturalistic interpretation,[92].[93]

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the constutivist framework is not a device that automatically confers binding force on any naturalistic epistemic standards. Rather, it imposes significant constraints on such standards. Hume says that the causes of pride and humility satisfy the following conditions (T 2.1.6), many of which are already implied in my account so far. (1) The causes are intimately connected to a person: the correct/incorrect reasoning that we happen to make does not produce pride/humility. (2) They are peculiar to the bearers of the causes: reasoning that is too easy does not cause pride, and failure in reasoning that is too difficult is not humiliating. (3) They are publicly approved or disapproved: reasoning that is not accompanied by love/hate does not produce pride/humility. (4) They are durable to some degree:

[92] The view that bases epistemic normativity on moral normativity, mentioned in section 2, is also compatible with my interpretation. For virtues and vices are the typical causes of the indirect passions (T 2.1.7).

[93] In section 2, I mentioned the concern that moral interpretation may collapse the distinction between epistemic and moral norms. The constitutivist framework is neutral on this distinction in that both moral and intellectual traits can be the cause of the indirect passions.

making correct/incorrect reasoning only once is not enough to stir pride/humility. (5) They conform to general rules: if the standards of correct/incorrect reasoning are not shared in a community, pride/humility is not aroused. Reasoning that does not meet these conditions does not produce the indirect passions, and hence is not person-constituting. The indirect passions would exclude normatively insignificant reasoning (e.g., reasoning accompanied by momentary desire) from reasoning that appears to satisfy naturalistic epistemic criteria.

Importantly, it is not possible to present a complete interpretation of Hume's response to scepticism and the epistemology that results from it without specifying what kind of reasoning deserves the philosopher's pride. In particular, the indirect passions alone cannot fully exclude superstition, which is an important opponent for Hume. The indirect passions' framework may be able to eliminate superstition to some extent. For example, superstitious reasoning would be the object of the negative indirect passions in a community of rational agents. However, this effect is limited. In a community united by superstitious doctrine, superstitious reasoning would be an object of pride and admiration. What, then, is the difference between reasoning worthy of the pride of superstitious people and reasoning worthy of the pride of philosophers? In the next chapter, I will address this question.

In this chapter, however, I am content if I can show that Hume's response to scepticism comes with normative force, involving more than mere psychological description. To reiterate, the indirect passions provide a constitutivist ground for Hume's naturalistic response to the dangerous dilemma. Namely, Hume's identity as a

philosopher gives him reasons to seek pride/love-producing reasoning and to seek to avoid humility/hate-producing reasoning. This interpretation fits well with the text in that it accomodates the prominence of the indirect passions and Hume's existential concerns in the "Conclusion", and the close connection between Book I and Book II of the *Treatise* that Hume himself declares.

Chapter 5: The Problem of Truth-Insensitivity: The Calm Passions and Hume's Critique of Superstition

1. Introduction

As we have seen in Chapter 2, the naturalistic interpretations of Hume's epistemology in the *Treatise* according to which he appeals to some psychological feature in determining the criteria for correct reasoning have been highly influential in Hume scholarship (e.g., Garrett 1997, Kemp Smith 2005). At the same time, however, scholars have pointed out that Hume's naturalistic epistemology fails to have the critical role that it is supposed to have. In particular, it has been often pointed out that Hume's naturalistic epistemology is incapable of condemning *superstition*, which Hume clearly intends to criticize (Dye 1986, 126, Ferreira 1999, 48, Winkler 1999, 211, n22, Williams 2004, 269, Durland 2011, 81, Qu 2020, 163).[94] As we will see in section 2, Hume often blames superstition for its epistemic flaws. But if reasoning is justified by

[94] The critique of superstition occupies a central place in his overall project. Hume's criticism of (what Hume takes to be) false religions in the first *Enquiry* and *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* is well known. While the critique of religion is less explicit in the *Treatise*, Paul Russell has persuasively shown that behind the discussions in the *Treatise* of space, induction, necessity, object, soul, morality, freedom, etc., are specific religious or superstitious views that Hume intends to attack (Russell 2008). If Hume's philosophy were not capable of criticizing superstition, that would be a fatal flaw in his philosophy.

some natural psychological propensities, rather than epistemic factors involving truth or falsity, then even superstitious and false reasoning would be justified insofar as it originates in standard psychological processes. In this chapter, I argue that Hume's naturalistic epistemology is truth-sensitive in such a way that allows Hume to criticize superstition. Specifically, I argue that for Hume, correct reasoning is reasoning that specifically mixes with what Hume calls the *calm passions*. The calm passions are sensitive to truth, and for its epistemic defects, superstitious reasoning involves the violent passions. In this way, I suggest, Hume justifies certain reasoning by appealing to human psychology, without giving up the truth-sensitivity of such reasoning. I also add that certain calm passions prevent us from falling into excessive scepticism.

2. Hume's Epistemic Critique of Superstition

In this section, we describe what superstition is for Hume, and confirm that a significant part of Hume's critique of superstition is epistemological, exposing its falsehoods. What is superstition? In the *Natural History of Religion*, Hume claims that superstition arises from the fact that the causes of our happiness and unhappiness are often unknown to us:

> We hang in perpetual suspense between life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want; which are distributed among the human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft unexpected, and always unaccountable.

> These unknown causes, then, become the constant object of our hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers, on which we have so entire a dependence. (NHR 3.1. See also, EMPL Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, 73-74)

Then, Hume claims, people come to attribute psychology to these unknown causes, due to the "universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves" (NHR 3.2). People thus believe that they should please and should not offend the human-like entities to avoid their misfortune. This kind of belief is reinforced by allegory: for example, the god of war is described as furious, the god of poetry as polite, etc (NHR 5.3). Although this account is initially offered as an illustration of superstition in polytheism, the same explanation applies to superstition in vulgar forms of monotheism (NHR 6.1). Namely, people posit the existence of one supreme being as the cause of their unaccountable misfortune. This entity becomes the object of admiration and respect, and eventually comes to be regarded as a perfect being (NHR 6.5). Thus, for Hume, superstition, whether it's monotheism or polytheism, is a set of fictions that arise from the anxiety about the unknown. This fits well with Hume's statement that "(w)eakness, fear, melancholy, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the true sources of SUPERSTITION" (EMPL, Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, 74).[95]

[95] In talking about superstition, Hume mainly focuses on negative passions such as fear. This is probably because when we have good fortune, we don't care much about its cause, and therefore we do not

Ignorance of the causes that distribute fortune and misfortune to people, and the resulting fear of such causes lead to superstition.

Hume thinks that philosophy remedies superstition. For example, he states:

> I make bold to recommend philosophy, and shall not scruple to give it the preference to superstition of every kind or denomination. (T 1.4.7.13)

> As superstition is a considerable ingredient in almost all religions, even the most fanatical; there being nothing but philosophy able entirely to conquer these unaccountable terrors (EMPL, Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, 75)

> ONE considerable advantage, that arises from philosophy, consists in the sovereign antidote, which it affords to superstition and false religion. (EMPL, Of Suicide, 577)

Hume not only contrasts philosophy with superstition, but presents philosophy as a *cure* for superstition.

---

posit fictitious entities or the "unknown causes" to understand the fortune. "Prosperity is easily received as our due, and few questions are asked concerning its cause or author" (NHR 3.4). The false religions based on positive passions such as hope are distinguished from superstition as *enthusiasm*: "Hope, pride, presumption, a warm imagination, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the true sources of ENTHUSIASM" (EPML Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, 74). Interestingly, Hume is not as critical of enthusiasm as he is of superstition (See EMPL, Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, 75-79). Perhaps this is because enthusiasm is based on overconfidence and less dependent on the doctrines concerning the unknown causes.

So what is philosophy? Or what is *reason*, which is, for Hume, often interchangeable with philosophy?[96] Hume maintains that reasoning as an exercise of the faculty of reason "consist[s] in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other." (T 1.3.2.2) More specifically, Hume says, "[r]eason is the discovery of truth or falsehood." (T 3.1.1.9) This suggests that reason and philosophy cure superstition through the discovery of truth or falsehood.[97] Indeed, Hume states:

> Love or anger, ambition or avarice, have their root in the temper and affections, which the soundest reason is scarce ever able fully to correct. But superstition, being founded on false opinion, must immediately vanish, when true philosophy has inspired juster sentiments of superior powers. (EMPL, Of Suicide, 579)

A philosophical critique of superstition is possible because it has epistemic defects, in particular, it involves false beliefs. Then what are falsehood and truth for Hume? He describes truth and falsehood as correspondence and the lack thereof: "(t)ruth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact." (T 3.1.1.9). An empirical belief as a product of

[96] The interchangeability of philosophy and reason is prominent, for example, in T 1.4.7 and T 2.3.10.
[97] This is, of course, only a minimal understanding of Hume's concept of reason, necessary for the purposes of this paper. For a discussion of the uniqueness of Hume's concept of reason and its historical background, see Owen (1999).

causal reasoning is true when it corresponds to a fact. What about non-empirical beliefs produced by demonstrative reasoning, such as those found in mathematics? The "agreement to the real relations of ideas" is a bit difficult to understand. Perhaps there are "real" relations of ideas that are at least logically or mathematically consistent, and non-empirical beliefs are deemed true or false according to their agreement or disagreement with the real relations.[98] This suggests that philosophy can condemn superstition by showing that superstitious beliefs fail to agree to what they should agree to (e.g., by showing that they contain logical contradictions or they are contrary to empirical evidence). In contrast, Hume seems to think that since tempers or affections have no counterpart to which they should agree, reason or philosophy cannot correct them.[99]

Indeed, Hume often criticizes (what Hume takes to be) superstitious doctrines by pointing out that they are false or that there is only poor ground for their truth. Hume describes Homer as contradictory in that he "calls Oceanus and Tethys the original parents of all things" while he depicts Jupiter as "the father of gods and men" (NHR 6.11). Scholastic theism tends to fall into "absurdity and contradiction" (NHR 11.3). Also, he criticizes assertions of the immortality of the soul on the ground that the notion of substance on which the doctrine depends is confused, and thus whether the soul is

[98] The following seem to be an example of "agreement" in mathematical truths.: "We are possest of a precise standard, by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers; and according as they correspond or not to that standard, we determine their relations, without any possibility of error." (T 1.3.1.5)

[99] For the inability of reason to criticize passions, see T 2.3.3.5 and T 3.1.1.9.

immortal or not cannot be determined within such a conceptual framework (EMPL, Of the Immortality of the Soul, 591, T 1.4.5). Hume also criticizes the immortality of the soul because of the analogy between body and soul, suggesting that the soul is mortal like the body (EMPL, Of the Immortality of the Soul, 596-98). Whether or not there will be a reward or punishment in a future state, according to him, cannot be determined from the evidence people currently have (EHU 11. cf: T 1.3.9.13). As for miracles, simply put, Hume dismisses them for the lack of adequate evidence (EHU 10). All of these criticisms are epistemic ones, insisting that the doctrines involve contradictions or disagree with a matter of fact, or that there is no sufficient evidence that they are true.[100]

A reader might think that Hume sometimes justifies reason over superstition for non-epistemic reasons. Hume recommends philosophy by saying that philosophy is less harmful and fanatic religions are dangerous (T 1.4.7.13), which suggests a non-epistemic critique of superstition.[101] However, in addition to Hume's frequent epistemic criticisms of superstition we have seen above, texts suggest that Hume cannot prioritize reason exclusively on the basis of its safety. As Qu (2020, 138-39) points out,

[100] Whether or not the *Natural History of Religion* is meant to make epistemic critiques of superstition is debatable. Falkenstein (2003), for example, sees it as a psychological project, while Kail (2007) and Collier (2014) see it as epistemological. Marušić (2012) suggests something in between. I myself do not take any position on this matter, but in what follows, I suggest that the content of the NHR, even if it is purely psychological on its own, plays an essential role in understanding Hume's normative epistemology in the *Treatise*.

[101] For example, Ferreira (1999, 60-62) suggests that Hume ultimately justifies reason over superstition on moral grounds. More generally, some interpreters propose that, for Hume, reasoning is justified primarily by moral considerations (e.g., Ridge 2003). However, it has been argued that such an interpretation leaves Hume's epistemology with no room for distinctively epistemic justification (Qu 2014, Schafer 2014).

in his defense of causal determinism, Hume claims that a hypothesis should not be rejected on the basis of its dangerous outcome:

> There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than in philosophical debates to endeavour to refute any hypothesis by a pretext of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads us into absurdities, 'tis certainly false; but 'tis not certain an opinion is false, because 'tis of dangerous consequence. (T 2.3.2.3)

This suggests that Hume cannot reject superstition simply because it is dangerous. One way to make sense of Hume's reference to the danger is to think that justification for reasoning has an epistemic basis, and the epistemically justified reasoning tends to be safe. True beliefs often have good consequences in our life, but still they are not justified for the consequences, but for their epistemic correctness. This suggestion makes Hume's commitments to epistemic standards compatible with his seemingly non-epistemic preference of reason over superstition. Indeed, in what follows, I attribute to Hume an epistemic standard that is less dangerous than superstition.[102]

[102] Hume's non-epistemic, moral critique of superstition is also found, for example, in his critique of the "monkish virtues" (EPM 9.3). It suffices for my present purpose to show that a significant part of Hume's critique of superstition is epistemic.

3. The Problem of Truth-Insensitivity with the Naturalistic Interpretations

The problem, however, is that for Hume, the correctness of reasoning does not seem to be determined by epistemic success, such as the discovery of truth. This problem becomes visible when we look at the concluding part of Book One of the *Treatise*. As we have seen in Chapter 1, there Hume develops sceptical discussions that we cannot identify the criteria for correct reasoning. The climax of scepticism is what Hume calls "a very dangerous dilemma" (T 1.4.7.6). It is a dilemma between total credulity or total annihilation of belief. To refrain from the use of reason and just have beliefs as the imagination pleases cannot be a correct epistemic policy: “if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy”, this would “lead us into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become asham’d of our credulity” (T 1.4.7.6). However, aiming strictly at truth-tracking reasoning is also not a right policy, because it results in “a total extinction of belief and evidence” (T 1.4.1.6). We can avoid this scepticism and have a belief “only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy” (T 1.4.7.6). This brings us back to the credulity. Thus, the dilemma is that we have “no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all” (T 1.4.7.6).

According to the naturalistic interpretations, by appealing to some psychological fact, Hume discovers an epistemic policy that does not fall into the dilemma. Don Garrett proposes that, in escaping the dilemma and returning to the use of reason, Hume appeals to the following principle:

> Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us. (T 1.4.7.11)

This is what Garrett calls the "Title Principle" (Garrett 1997, 234). For example, Hume seems to endorse reason accompanied by the passionate propensities of curiosity and ambition (T 1.4.7.12). With this epistemic norm, Garrett maintains, Hume overcomes the dangerous dilemma: overly sceptical reasoning is neither sufficiently lively nor accompanied by motivating passions, and lively and active reasoning mingling with passions rejects mere fancy.[103] Kemp Smith likewise holds that the irresistible natural tendency of the imagination justifies belief. This suggests that radical scepticism and extreme credulity are to be dismissed in that they are not natural tendencies for us.

However, as commentators have pointed out (Dye 1986, 126, Ferreira 1999, 48, Winkler 1999, 211, n22, Williams 2004, 269, Durland 2011, 81, Qu 2020, 163), the problem is that the naturalistic norms of reason do not seem to allow Hume to criticize superstition. The title principle says that we ought to assent to reason if it is vivid and mixes with some propensity, and we ought not otherwise. The liveliness and propensities are crucial factors in the justification of reason. Both the excessive scepticism (unjustified) and the title principle (justified) involve the use of reason, and

[103] Kemp Smith has a similar view that reason "gains a content and direction which reason qua reflective is incapable of supplying, and which can come only from a natural impulse" (Kemp Smith 2005, 131).

the only difference between them is that the latter is mixed with propensities and liveliness. The problem is that these factors do not appear to be truth-sensitive in a way that enables Hume to criticize superstition.[104] We can easily imagine that lively and passionate reasoning leads to a false conclusion. My reasoning accompanied by anger toward my friend might lead to a false belief about her. A similar criticism could be made of Kemp Smith's natural beliefs. The tendency of our irresistible imagination does not seem to have any significant relation to truth, and we can imagine that it gives rise to false beliefs. As Qu puts it, the problem is that "epistemic justification is conferred on the basis of factors—that is, the passions—that seem unresponsive to truth" (Qu 2020, 160).[105]

Rather, these naturalistic criteria seem to even recommend superstition. The title principle seems to end up recommending superstition, because superstition involves the use of reason, and mixes with some propensities and liveliness (Qu 2020, 152-54). Superstition makes use of the "inference concerning invisible intelligent power" (NHR 2.5. See also EHU 12.32). Hume also states:

[104] Qu initially treats the ineliminability of superstition of Hume's naturalistic epistemology and its truth-insensitivity as separate issues, but later suggests that the former problem stems from the latter (Qu 2020, 163).

[105] Hume himself seems to admit that his epistemology is not fully truth-sensitive. After returning to the use of reason, he concedes that truth "is too much to be hop'd for" (T 1.4.7.14). Thus, attributing a truth-insensitive epistemology to Hume must be correct, at least partially. It remains a puzzle how, despite his alleged departure from truth, he can so confidently criticize superstition on epistemic grounds.

> where theism forms the fundamental principle of any popular religion, that tenet is so conformable to sound reason, that philosophy is apt to incorporate itself with such a system of theology. (NHR 11.3)

Thus, superstition tends to involve philosophy or reason. It also mixes with our psychological propensities. As described above, superstition comes with propensities such as fear or hope. Importantly, the propensities that lead to superstition are not idiosyncratic at all. Positing some human-like agents who produce fortune and misfortune in us is "founded in human nature, and little or nothing dependent on caprice and accident" (NHR 5.9). People "naturally" (NHR 5.9) ascribe superstitious attributes to the unknown causes. Superstitious reasoning mixes with natural and universal psychological propensities. This kind of reasoning accompanied by such passionate propensities seems lively.[106] If superstitious tendencies are so natural, then Kemp Smith's view that appeals to the natural tendencies of the imagination to accomodate epistemic normativity would also justify superstitious reasoning, even if it involves falsity or absurdity.

One might suggest that we can focus on the distinctively epistemic propensity of curiosity (e.g., Wilson 1983, Schafer 2014). In T 1.4.7, Hume mentions curiosity as one of the propensities that drive him toward the use of reason (T 1.4.7.11). From this we may derive an epistemic policy whereby superstitious and false doctrines are

[106] Hume maintains that passions make the imagination vivacious (T 1.3.10.4).

rejected on the grounds that they do not satisfy our curiosity. The problem, however, is that superstition is also accompanied by some kind of curiosity. Hume says that superstitious reasoning is not guided by purely scientific or philosophical curiosity (NHR 2.5). But curiosity refers not only to theoretical curiosity, but also to more ordinary kinds. According to Hume, sudden changes in objects make us uneasy, and in order to remove this uneasiness, people are motivated to know the causes of the changes (T 2.3.10.12). Superstition is guided by this "trembling curiosity" (NHR 2.5). As we saw in section 2, superstition arises from the fact that misfortune and fortune are distributed in unpredictable ways. This unpredictability produces uneasiness, and to remove it, people turn to superstitious doctrines. Thus, superstitious reasoning would satisfy curiosity in this sense. Curiosity on its own does not seem to provide a distinction between justified reasoning and superstition,[107].[108]

4. Reason and the Calm Passions

My proposal is that by examining in detail what kind of propensities particularly justify reasoning, we can find in Hume's naturalistic epistemology the epistemological distinction between justified and superstitious reasoning. In particular,

[107] Schafer attempts to exclude superstitious curiosity by suggesting that superstition does not satisfies curiosity in a stable way because it conflicts with a variety of everyday beliefs (Schafer 2014, 13-14). This suggestion is compatible with my interpretation, which focuses on the calmness or stability of the passions. However, in my view, curiosity is epistemically valuable only insofar as it is stable, so stability is explanatorily prior to curiosity.

[108] But I will later explain, based on my interpretation, why pure philosophical curiosity, rather than "trembling curiosity," occupies an important place in Hume's epistemology.

I will focus on Hume's discussions of the *calm* and *violent* passions in Book Two of the *Treatise*. In the following sections, I will argue that the calm passions enable Hume to make epistemic critiques of superstition. In this section, to reach the above conclusion, I describe what the calm/violent passions are for Hume, and I also motivate my interpretive direction by pointing out that Hume consistently associates each of the calm and violent passions to justified reason and superstition respectively.

What are the calm and violent passions?[109] The calm passions are characterized by their lack of psychological agitation: they "cause no disorder in the soul"(T 2.3.3.8) and “produce little emotion in the mind” (T 2.3.3.8). The violent passions, in contrast, “produce a sensible emotion” (T 2.3.3.9) or “disorder” (T 2.3.4.1). Hume also says that the violent passions are like "momentary gust[s]” (T 2.3.4.1). Thus I agree with Loeb (2002, 4) who characterizes the violent passions by their momentariness or volatility. These indicate that the calm passions are stable passions that do not involve sensible psychological agitation, while the violent passions are volatile passions with such agitation. For example, the calm passion of “kindness to children” (T 2.3.3.8) does not produce any disorder in us, while the violent passion of anger involves agitation, and triggers a series of contiguous passions such as vengeance.

[109] Hume inherits this terminology from Hutcheson. More precisely, however, Hutcheson makes a distinction between the calm desires and the violent passions, and, unlike Hume, uses the word "passion" exclusively for violent states (Hutcheson 2002, 19, 50).

Importantly, however, the calm/violent distinction does not reflect the motivational force of passions. Hume notes that calm passions are different from weak passions in that they can exercise a powerful motivational force:

> 'Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. As repeated custom and its own force have made every thing yield to it, it directs the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion, which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion. We must, therefore, distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one. (T 2.3.4.1)

The calm or stable passions still can be motivationally strong. Benevolence is a typical calm passion (T 2.3.3.8) and therefore produces little sensible impulse, but when it "has once become a settled principle of action", it certainly motivates us to help others. This does not mean that the violent passions are necessarily motivationally weak. Rather we are easily moved by them: "when we wou'd govern a man, and push him to any action, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions" (T 2.3.4.1). Violent passions also motivate, but in volatile ways. Here, it is important to recognize that the calm passions can be motivationally strong or weak.

Now, Hume frequently associates justified reasoning with the calm passions, and superstition with the violent passions. In T 1.4.7, he says, "Philosophy…, if just, can present us only with mild and moderate sentiments" (T 1.4.7.13). This suggests that for Hume, justified reasoning particularly mixes with some calm propensities. Aside from T 1.4.7, we easily find the association of reason with the calm passions. What we call reason is "a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection" (T 3.3.1.18) or the passions that "operate more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper" (T 2.3.9.13). Philosophy "takes off the edge from all disorderly passions, and tranquilizes the mind" (EMPL, The Sceptic, 179, n17). The reasoning associated with the calm passions seems to be legitimate, because in general, Hume approves as virtuous the calmness-involving traits such as "the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent" (T 2.3.3.10) or "philosophical tranquillity" (EPM 7.16).

In contrast, superstition violently disturbs our minds: it "seizes more strongly on the mind, and is often able to disturb us in the conduct of our lives and actions" (T 1.4.7.13). Hume describes superstitious people as agitated by passions and their minds as disordered:

> Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still

more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity. (NHR 2.5)

Hume consistently associates reason or philosophy with the calm passions, and superstition with the violent passions.

5. Truth-Sensitivity of the Calm Passions

However, Hume's epistemic critiques of superstition do not yet become intelligible merely by showing that justified reasoning tends to be accompanied by the calm passions and superstition tends to be accompanied by the violent passions.[110] In this section, I argue that the calm passions are truth-sensitive, and the violent passions are sensitive to particular epistemic defects, and thereby propose that Hume can criticize superstition on epistemic grounds. I specifically focus on the middle of part three of Book Two (T 2.3.4-2.3.8), where Hume investigates what makes passions calm or violent. My basic line of argument is as follows. As we will see, Hume claims that factors such as certainty, custom, and the generality of ideas render passions calm, and

[110] Loeb (2002) offeres an interpretation according to which Hume elucidates epistemic normativity by appealing to psychological calmness or stability. However, Loeb's interpretation does not capture well how such normativity can be truth-sensitive, as Loeb says, "the justificatory status of a belief depends upon nonepistemic facts" (Loeb 2002, 21). Indeed, the upshot of this interpretation, by his own admission, is that the beliefs of unreflective people, who do not hesitate to believe falsehoods, are justified insofar as they are stable (Loeb 2002, 97). As a result, under this interpretation, it is not clear how Hume can make the epistemic critiques of superstition, divorcing epistemic justification from truth. Immerwahr (1992, 295-96) assoiciates epistemic virtues such as wisdom with the calm passions. Watkins (2019, 228-233) proposes that especially in Hume's *Essays*, a certain kind of detachment is a distinguishing feature of philosophy. However, they also do not elaborate the truth-sensitivity of the calm passions.

the lack of these factors makes them violent (and as we will also see, this situation fits very well with Hume's description of superstition). For Hume, the fact that reasoning has these factors seems to be a reliable indicator that the conclusion of that reasoning is likely to be true (this should be distinguished from a strong claim that reasoning with these factors guarantees the discovery of truth.). Therefore, reasoning that has these factors contributes to the discovery of truth and produces the calm passions. On the other hand, superstitious reasoning that lacks these factors is unlikely to lead to truth and produces the violent passions.

To clarify, I do not intend to claim that all the calm passions are calm due to truth-related factors. Instinctive passions such as benevolence or kindness to children are calm (T 2.3.4.8), but their calmness does not seem to have a meaningful relationship to truth. My point is only that the presence of truth-related factors is sufficient to make passions calm, but not the opposite.

5.1 Certainty

Hume does not clearly explain what certainty is. But at least, the certainty Hume has in mind is not mere psychologically forceful conviction. Even those with irrational beliefs might have this sense of psychological certainty insofar as they forcefully embrace them. Rather, Hume seems to consider certainty to be an epistemic notion.[111]

[111] This does not mean that epistemic certainty is independent of any psychological property. Perhaps, for Hume, epistemic certainty is a subset of mere psychological certainty.

In order to “mark the several degrees of evidence” (T 1.3.11.2), he divides cognitive processes into three categories:

> By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments, which are deriv’d from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and *uncertainty*. By probability, that evidence, which is still attended with *uncertainty*. (T 1.3.11.2, my emphasis)

This passage says that the degree of evidence is proportional to the degree of certainty. Assuming that evidence is a good guide to truth, certainty also seems to be a good guide to the discovery of truth, if not identical to it. Hume's scepticism with regard to reason shows that as uncertainty increases, the probability that reason produces true judgments decreases (T 1.4.1). For Hume, the degree of certainty and the likelihood of truth seems to go hand in hand.

Hume thinks that the epistemic uncertainty renders passions violent, and the epistemic certainty makes them calm. Let me start with the relationship between uncertainty and the violent passions. In T 2.3.4, Hume deals with the phenomenon that when two different passions mingle with each other, one of the two becomes violent. For example, a “soldier advancing to the battle, is naturally inspir’d with courage and confidence” (T 2.3.4.3). The courage becomes more violent because of its co-occurrence with confidence. Hume’s explanation is as follows. The mixture of passions produces what Hume calls "emotion"(T 2.3.4.2), a certain kind of psychological

impulse or agitation. When confidence is added to courage, the mind becomes more agitated. According to Hume, this agitation or "emotion" is then incorporated into the predominant one of the present passions (courage in the example), and the passion becomes violent (T 2.3.4.2).

This phenomenon is especially prominent when *contrary* passions co-occur. The coexistence of passions with opposite directions and valences produces more impulse than the coexistence of passions with the same directions and valences. For example, the juxtaposition of a desire to break a rule with a sense of morality produces more agitation in the mind than that of courage and confidence. Thus, the resulting "emotion" makes the desire to break a rule violent. This is why breaking rules is violently pleasurable (T 2.3.4.5).

According to Hume, uncertainty has the same effect:

> Uncertainty has the same influence as opposition. The agitation of the thought; the quick turns it makes from one view to another; the variety of passions, which succeed each other, according to the different views: All these produce an agitation in the mind, and transfuse themselves into the predominant passion. (T 2.3.4.7)

Here, Hume says that not only the conflict of passions but also the movement of thoughts produces the "emotion" that intensifies passions. If we are uncertain whether a happy or sad event will occur, we are forced to think about both possibilities, and this

movement of thought agitates our passions. This situation also produces the conflict of passions such as hope and fear, and this conflict, too, agitates the mind. As a result, one of the passions, say fear, becomes violent. The lack of epistemic access to objects intensifies our passions: "nothing more powerfully animates any affection, than to conceal some part of its object by throwing it into a kind of shade" (T 2.3.4.9). The degree of violence of the passions is proportional to the degree of uncertainty: "when the chances are equal on both sides", "the passions are rather the strongest, as the mind has then the least foundation to rest upon" (T 2.3.9.19).

Hume adds that the obscurity of ideas, which often comes with uncertainty,[112] is also a cause of the violent passions. His explanation is that one has to use imagination to fill in the obscure parts of the objects, and this mental effort stimulates the mind and makes the passions violent (T 2.3.4.9). In this way, uncertainty and obscurity as its natural attendant make passions violent, by producing conflicting passions or agitation of thoughts.

This account of violence explains very well what happens in superstition. As we have already seen, superstition stems from positing the unknown causes that distribute fortune and misfortune. Where superstition occurs, it is uncertain whether good or bad things will happen. Then, people think about both possibilities, giving rise to the opposite passions of hope and fear (NHR 3.1). According to the above account, this agitation of thought and the opposition of passions would make fear, the dominant

[112] However, the obscurity of ideas may not always accompany uncertainty. Even if we are uncertain about the outcome of a dice, we can have clear and distinct ideas of all possibilities.

passion of superstitious people, violent.[113] The degree of superstition is proportional to the degree of uncertainty: "(i)n proportion as any man's course of life is governed by accident, we always find, that he encreases in superstition" (NHR 3.3).

In addition, since the unknown causes are unknown, the idea of the causes would be obscure: "(t)heir real idea of him [the Deity], notwithstanding their pompous language, is still as poor and frivolous as ever" (NHR 7.1).[114] As we have already seen, people try to make the unknown causes intelligible by projecting human psychology onto them (NHR 3.2). Such mental effort to fill in the obscurity will make the passions such as fear and melancholy violent.

In contrast, the removal of uncertainty renders passions calm. Hume claims that security and despair make the passions calm because they remove uncertainty (T 2.3.4.8). Both security and despair involve certainty: we feel security when we are certain that a passion or desire will be satisfied, and we feel despair when we are certain that it will not be satisfied.[115] It is easy to see why certainty calms down our passions, when reversing the above explanation. Since certainty eliminates the opposing possibilities, it causes neither the agitation of thoughts nor the conflict of passions. And once something is known to be certain, we do not have to fill in the gaps and therefore our passions are not agitated. For example, certainly identifying the cause of our illness

[113] Superstitious people are particularly guided by negative passions. See footnote 3.
[114] Our idea of a future state is also obscure: "we have so obscure an idea of the manner, in which we shall exist after the dissolution of the body" (T 1.3.9.13).
[115] Hume does not explain security and despair in detail, but when he says, "despair, tho' contrary to security, has a like influence"(T 2.3.4.8. See also Intro 9), he seems to understand them as described.

calms our fear by keeping our thoughts fixed and constant (if the cause is curable, we will feel security; if not, we will feel despair.).

In summary, since the calmness of the passions is proportional to the certainty of their objects, and certainty is a good guide to truth, the calmness is proportional to the likelihood of truth. Superstition contains uncertainty, and thus it is unlikely that it attains the truth. So, its passions tend to be violent.

5.2 Custom

Hume also maintains that custom makes passions calm, and the lack of custom makes passions violent. Hume explains the effects of the lack of custom by appealing to the aforementioned observation that the "emotion" makes the dominant passion violent. Novel things to which we are not accustomed produce agreeable passions such as wonder and surprise (T 2.3.5.2). At the same time, the mind finds it difficult to think of these novelties because it has never thought about them before. With this difficulty, the agreeable passions such as surprise or some other contiguous passions are agitated and made violent. Thus, "every thing, that is new, is most affecting" (T 2.3.5.2). Custom or repetition, on the other hand, eliminates the room for such surprises, and calms down passions by giving facility to the conception of objects. "When it [a novel object] often returns upon us, the novelty wears off; the passions subside; the hurry of the spirits is over; and we survey the objects with greater tranquillity." (T 2.3.5.2)

Now, for Hume, custom involved in reasoning is a reliable guide to truth, particularly truth in empirical or causal reasoning.[116] As we have seen in section 2, truth in causal reasoning "consists in an agreement…to real existence and matter of fact" (T 3.1.1.9). On the one hand, the realm that we directly experience or intimately remember is "what we are pleas'd to call a reality" (T 1.3.9.3). On the other hand, there is the realm of ideas and beliefs in which we do not immediately perceive the reality. The latter is found to correspond to the former (that is, to be true) when the latter is found to be "connected by custom" or "by the relation of cause or effect" (T 1.3.9.3) with the former. Hume also says, there is "a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas" and "[c]ustom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected" (EHU 5.21). These show that we approach empirical truth through acquiring the custom of inferring from one to the other (cf: T 1.3.14.31). Since custom calms the passions and it is also a guide to truth, the passions calmed by custom seems to be truth-sensitive.

Superstition contains novelty, which is at odds with custom. Superstition, Hume states, "opens a world of its own, and presents us with scenes, and beings, and objects, which are altogether new" (T 1.4.7.13). In superstition, "(a)mazement must of necessity be raised" (NHR 11.3). Moreover, miracles are an important ingredient of superstition. "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature" (EHU 10.12), and therefore

[116] Given that even in the case of truths about the relations of ideas, we need to establish by causal inference that our faculties are reliable (T 1.4.1.1), custom would be also necessary for the discovery of demonstrative truths.

it is obviously something we are not accustomed to. As we have seen, Hume maintains that novelty produces wonder and surprise (T 2.3.5.2), and according to him, miracles produce exactly the same passions of "surprize and wonder" (EHU 10.16). Miracles appear to be a typical case where novelties produce the violent passions. Thus, the superstitious reasoning about a matter of fact, appealing to novelty and lacking custom, is unlikely to yield truth. The violent passions that accompany superstition reflect this kind of epistemic defect.

Still, it is hard to imagine that superstition is devoid of any custom. Religious ceremonies and beliefs undeniably require the existence of some custom, and people will eventually get used to superstitious doctrines. However, Hume seems to think that custom involved in superstition is less stable that custom involved in legitimate reasoning. As we have already seen in section 2, the core of superstition is to posit the unknown causes, and to assume that they resemble human beings, with psychologies such as reason and passion.[117] Hume explicitly states that such fictional resemblances (and contiguity) are unstable:

> There is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling and contiguous objects; and if it feigns such, there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself to the same, without any difference or variation. And indeed such a fiction is founded on so little reason, that nothing but pure caprice can

[117] Bell also points out (Bell 1999, 164) that Hume associate superstition particularly with the relation of resemblance, rather than causation.

> determine the mind to form it; and that principle being fluctuating and uncertain, 'tis impossible it can ever operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy. (T 1.3.9.6)

The resemblance between humans and the unknown causes is arbitrary, and therefore in superstition, nothing fixes our thought on their particular resemblance. This suggests that even if we repeatedly bring to mind one resemblance, since another resemblance is equally possible, the resulting custom would be less stable. Such imperfect custom would still leave agitation that makes passions violent. In contrast, "[t]he relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages", that is, "the objects it presents are fixt and unalterable" (T 1.3.9.7). The custom based on the observations of constant conjunctions between objects fixes our thought on a particular relation and object, which would calm down our passions. Thus, custom involved in superstition seems imperfect and unstable because they are based on arbitrary resemblances, rather than the unalterable relation of cause and effect.

In sum, since custom is a good guide to empirical truth, the calm passions derived from custom are also a good guide to it. Superstitious reasoning produces the violent passions because it has the epistemic defects of novelty and imperfect custom.

5.3 Generality of Ideas

Hume also maintains "[w]herever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent" (T 2.3.6.1), which suggests in turn that the decrease in vivacity produces the calm passions. An example of a less vivacious idea is a general or abstract idea: "the more general and universal any of our ideas are, the less influence they have upon the imagination" (T 2.3.6.2). Such ideas are less vivacious, and therefore make the passions calm. Non-abstract, particular ideas are more vivacious and therefore intensify the passions.

The relationship between the generality of ideas and truth is less clear than in the cases of certainty and custom. For we can easily imagine abstract reasoning that is absurd or false. Still, the generality of ideas seems to be sensitive to truth in that reasoning that contributes to the discovery of truth comes with general ideas. That is, the abstractness of ideas is not sufficient, but necessary for truth-tracking reasoning. Demonstrative reasoning is concerned with abstract truth: it "regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects" (T 2.3.3.2). The discovery of mathematical truth depends on the possession of some general ideas. Sticking to particular ideas will obscure the abstract relations between concepts and hinder the discovery of mathematical truth. As Tanaka (2021, 210-11) points out, causal reasoning also involves general ideas. It requires the experiences of the constant conjunction of one *type* of object with another *type* of object in the past. Once a sufficient amount of conjunctions is observed, "we immediately extend our observation to every phenomenon of the same *kind*" (T 1.3.15.6, my emphasis). Thus, the truth-

tracking causal reasoning requires some general ideas. Without a general idea, we would not be able to derive properly general conclusions from experience. The reasoning that just focuses on particular ideas and overgeneralizes them is likely to produce falsehoods. These suggest that the discovery of truth (insofar as it appeals to reasoning and involves general conclusions) requires the generality of ideas. Since the calmness of the passions is proportional to the generality of ideas, if a piece of reasoning contributes to the discovery of truth, the generality of ideas involved in such reasoning would calm the passions. Determining the cause of disease demands a conceptual understanding of the human body. The generality of the idea or concept renders the fear of the disease calm.

Superstitious reasoning exemplifies such reasoning that sticks to particular ideas, fails to produce truth, and leads to the violent passions. People arrive at superstitious doctrines with very concrete ideas. Superstitious people do not believe in God through abstract reasoning such as the design argument. “[A]sk any of the vulgar, why he believes in an omnipotent creator of the world; he will never mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is wholly ignorant” (NHR 6.1). Rather, his faith is guided by particular ideas, such as those of "[t]he sudden and unexpected death of such a one", “[t]he excessive drought of this season” or “[t]he cold and rains of another” (NHR 6.1). And by projecting human characteristics onto the unknown causes, we try to conceive them concretely: “our anxious concern endeavours to attain a determinate idea of them [the unknown causes]” (NHR 5.9). The particularity of the ideas will prevent superstitious reasoning from drawing properly a general conclusion and reaching the

truth. Since particular ideas are more vivacious than abstract ideas, they make the passions of the superstitious violent. The violence of the passions in superstition partly stems from this kind of epistemic defect,[118].[119]

6. Scepticism and the Weak Passions

Thus, the calm passions involved in reasoning are truth-sensitive in that they are sensitive to certainty, custom, and the generality of ideas that contribute to the discovery of truth. Superstitious reasoning is distinguished from the calm and truth-tracking reasoning, because superstitious reasoning produces the violent passions for its epistemic defects. However, just aiming at truth-tracking and passion-calming reasoning as much as possible cannot be a correct epistemic policy.[120] As we have seen, scepticism with regard to reason (T 1.4.1) shows that the rigorous pursuit of truth has the consequence that, because of our fallible nature, we never reach any truth and all

[118] In addition to the issue of the abstractness/concreteness of ideas, Hume briefly adds that eloquence vivifies an idea and thereby produce the violent passions (T 2.3.6.7). Superstition involves eloquence: "no preachers are so popular, as those who excite the most dismal and gloomy passions" (T 1.3.9.15). Eloquence prevents us from perceiving truth: [e]loquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection" (EHU 10.19). These suggest that the passions in superstition are violent because the epistemic flaws of superstition come with eloquence.

[119] In T 2.3.7 and T 2.3.8, Hume discusses in detail the effects of spatial and temporal distance on passions. Here, the contrast between superstition and justified reason is less obvious than in the three points mentioned above. Therefore, I only mention the following possibilities. Hume's basic point is that objects that are spatially and temporally distant to us make our passions calm, while objects that are contiguous to us make them violent. According to this account, discovering truth might render passions calm, because it requires considering evidence that is remote in time and space. Hume himself says that what we call reason is "a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some *distant* view or reflection" (T 3.3.1.18, my emphasis). Superstition might intensify our passions because it has an epistemic defect that it only pays attention to what is familiar and close in time and space.

[120] If this were the correct epistemological criterion, then truth-conduciveness would be the criterion of correctness, and there would be no need to mention the calm passions.

beliefs are extinguished. To exclude such scepticism from a set of correct reasoning, this section will focus on Hume's view that the calm passions can be motivationally weak or strong. I suggest that the excessive pursuit of truth, or excessive scepticism, makes the passions calm and *weak*, and Hume does not endorse it.

In his discussions of the causes of the calm passions, Hume points out that such causes not only make the passions calm, but also sometimes make them weak. Hume thinks that security and despair, because of the certainty they involve, sometimes weaken the passions. When we have full certainty and lack any external stimulation, the mind "immediately languishes" (T 2.3.4.8). The search for certainty eliminates the agitation of the mind and at a certain point, makes the mind inactive. Custom calms the passions by facilitating the conception of the object, but sometimes the facilitation "is too great, and renders the actions of the mind so faint and languid, that they are no longer able to interest and support it" (T 2.3.5.4). Repeatedly conceiving the objects of the passions is sometimes boring, and weakens the passions, if it contributes to the discovery of truth. For the generality of ideas, Hume points out, referring to an episode in ancient Greece, that beliefs about one's own interests, when they are abstract or general, do not motivate people (T 2.3.6.3-4). This shows that the generality of ideas can sometimes make the passions weak.

The excessive scepticism that leads to the annihilation of beliefs seems to be an instance of reasoning that comes with the weak passions. Although the influence of custom is not clear, the generality of ideas and certainty seem to contribute to the weakness of the passions associated with sceptical reasoning. Excessive scepticism is

overly abstract: it involves, for example, the third-order judgment about the reliability of the second-order judgment about the reliability of the first-order judgment. Such reasoning, if valid, "ha[s] little or no influence upon us" (T 1.4.7.7), and thus does not accompany any motivating passions. Also, under such universal scepticism, which leads to the extinction of all beliefs, Hume's desire to establish the "science of human nature" (T intro. 9) cannot be satisfied. This situation leads Hume to despair: "the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair" and "I cannot forbear feeding my despair, with all those desponding reflections" (T 1.4.7.1) such as his consideration of the "dangerous dilemma". Despair, accompanied by the certainty that the desire will never be satisfied, deprives the desire of its motivational power.[121] Perhaps this despair makes Hume's reasoning inactive: he laments, "I cannot find in my heart to enter into them [sceptical discussions] any farther" (T 1.4.7.9). Hume seems to think that "cold" reasoning that is not accompanied by strong passions is unjustified: "[p]hilosophy…if false and extravagant, its opinions are merely the objects of a cold and general speculation" (T 1.4.7.13).

Thus, calming our passions in the pursuit of truth sometimes makes them weak. At the same time, however, the calm passions can sometimes be motivationally strong. A moderate degree of certainty or abstractness would make the passions calm, without

[121] I think that the excessive scepticism is not just concerned with the despair with regard to intellectual ambition. The scepticism seems to indicate that any desire can never be fulfilled. For example, such scepticism would lead to the despair that the desire to avoid disease cannot be satisfied because it would make it utterly impossible to determine the cause of disease. Consequently, the desire to avoid disease will be weakened.

making them completely inactive. Hume himself speaks of the possibility of the strong and calm passions, especially in connection with custom. According to Hume, the facility of the conception of the object brought about by custom is a "very powerful principle of the human mind...where the facility goes not beyond a certain degree" (T 2.3.5.3). This modest facility is “an infallible source of pleasure” (T 2.3.5.3). A custom-based, scientific exploration of disease, due to its facility, may not only moderate, but also reinforce the hope to cure it. Hume claims that custom also has another effect of creating an "inclination"(T 2.3.5.5) toward an action. For example, getting use to the search for human nature using causal and customary reasoning may give rise to an active "inclination" to the desire to explicate human nature. Thus, Hume believes that there are the calm passions that are not weak. This allows for the possibility of reasoning accompanied by the calm and strong passions.

7. Summarizing the Results

My suggestion is to attribute to Hume the following epistemic policy: a piece of reasoning is correct just in case it mixes with the *calm* and *strong* passions. What I mean by this "mix" relation is that reasoning renders some preexisting passions calm, and at the same time, the reasoning is still accompanied by these passions that retain their motivational strength. In addition, there must be a substantial causal relationship between reasoning and these aspects of the passions. My calm love for my friend might happen to mix with my reasoning about her, but this does not justify that reasoning.

"Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood." (T 3.1.1.9) Thus, this process of discovering truth or falsehood (or its failure) must be causally responsible for the calmness, violence, strength or weakness of the passions. Let's say there is a preexisting passion of curiosity about a disease. Identifying the cause of this disease by truth-conducive reasoning, through its truth-related factors, calms down the curiosity. Superstitious, epistemically flawed reasoning is incorrect because it makes the curiosity violent through its the epistemic flaws. However, at some point, this search for the cause also weakens the curiosity that accompanies the reasoning. As Hume's scepticism with regard to reason indicates, the unrestricted search for the cause of disease (e.g., the search for the infallible knoweldge of the cause, or for its "ultimate" cause) weakens our curiosity when it turns out to be certain that such a pursuit can never be satisfied. Such inactive, weakly curious reasoning, Hume would say, is not the kind of reasoning we should pursue.[122] On the other hand, as noted in the previous section, once we stop such unrestricted rational inquiry, establishing customary, truth-tracking reasoning can be a "very powerful principle of the human mind" (T 2.3.5.3). Therefore, a set of reasoning that calms the passions but retains their strong motivational force is not empty, and I suggest that Hume approves of this kind of

[122] However, there seems to be legitimate reasoning that renders the passions weak. Identifying the cause of an illness and thereby weakening or removing the fear of the illness (cf: T 2.3.3.6) seem to be an instance of good reasoning. But this is not an example of reasoning that mixes with the weak passions. Fear-weakening reasoning is still accompanied by the strong motive of fear, and thus correct. Hume would say that when the fear of illness is completely gone, and any passion concerning illness has completely disappeared, it would not be epistemically valuable to further explore the cause of illness.

reasoning. This epistemic policy allows Hume to avoid overcommitment to truth and yet not give up the search for truth altogether.[123]

The above framework explains why philosophical curiosity, rather than anxiety-driven everyday curiosity, occupies a privileged position in Hume. As Schafer (2014) persuasively shows, philosophical curiosity occupies an important place in Hume's response to scepticism in the "Conclusion" (T 1.4.7.12). Hume also frequently contrasts philosophical curiosity with superstitious, everyday curiosity. The passion that motivates our reasoning about the unknown causes are "[n]ot speculative curiosity surely, or the pure love of truth" because "[t]hat motive is too refined for such gross apprehensions" (NHR 2.5). The passion responsible for superstition is rather the "trembling curiosity" (NHR 2.5). Hume notes a similar point in the "Conclusion": "this [philosophical] curiosity…shou'd not transport me into speculations without the sphere of common life" (T 1.4.7.13). Hume also states in the first *Enquiry* that love of truth "never is, nor can be carried to too high a degree" (EHU 5.1). Why is philosophical curiosity unlikely to produce false, superstitious doctrines? One possible explanation is that since curiosity is the very pleasure that accompanies the pursuit of truth, our philosophical curiosity is weakened in subjects where the discovery of truth is unattainable. Philosophical curiosity consists "in the action of the mind, and the exercise of the genius and understanding in the discovery or comprehension of any

[123] As Immerwahr points out (Immerwahr 1992,297-300), the violent passions are detrimental to morality and to our political life by creating factions. If this is the case, then epistemically justified reasoning seems to be safer than superstitious reasoning. However, as I suggested at the end of section 2, this does not mean that reasoning is justified exclusively by their social and moral considerations.

truth" (T 2.3.10.6). Since (ideal) philosophers are certain that the inquiry into the ultimate, unknown causes of phenomena fails to satisfy curiosity in this sense (one cannot make truth-conducive empirical inferences about the kinds of things we have not experienced), this certainty of the impossibility to satisfy the curiosity makes the passion weak. Perhaps this is why philosophical curiosity "is too refined for such gross apprehensions" (NHR 2.5). And, since this passion is the desire specifically for the pleasure in exercising reasoning involving certainty, cusom, and abstract thinking, this passion would be calm. If so, it would seem that reasoning with strong philosophical curiosity about a subject in which we can hope to discover truth to some extent is, according to the above criteria, an example of correct reasoning, because the reasoning mixes with the calm and strong passion of curiosity. Thus, the importance of philosophical curiosity in Hume's epistemology can be understood within the framework based on the calmness and strength of passions.[124]

It seems that this kind of calm reasoning, accompanied by strong passions, is the kind of reasoning that is worthy of philosophers' pride. Hume says that he "recommend[s] philosophy" over superstition (T 1.4.7.13), and philosophy is "the sovereign antidote" (EMPL, Of Suicide, 577) to superstition. And technically, what gives rise to pride must be pleasurable in some way (T 2.1.5.5), but the calm reasoning suggested here can be considered pleasurable. The customary facility that constitutes

[124] Hence, the calmness has an explanatory priority over curiosity; Karl Schafer seems to think that the opposite explanatory order is true, namely that calm beliefs and reasoning are correct because they satisfy curiosity (Schafer 2014, 19, n74).

calmness is "an infallible source of pleasure" (T 2.3.5.3). Philosophical curiosity is obviously a source of pleasure (T 2.3.10). If so, this kind of pleasurable reasoning, which distinguishes philosophy from superstition, is peculiar to philosophers and something that generates pride in them. What makes a philosopher a philosopher, then, is to aim at pride-producing reasoning, reasoning that is truth-tracking and mixes with the calm and strong passions, such as philosophical curiosity.

Here, if the calm passions provide the criteria for correct reasoning, one might think that this framework alone would be sufficient to respond to the problem of normativity as well as the problem of truth-insensitivity, and that there would be no need to appeal to the indirect passions. I think the appeal to the calm passions alone is insufficient to address the problem of normativity. The calmness of the passions or philosophical curiosity is just one psychological feature, and it is not immediately obvious *why* we should follow it. Hume himself seems to think that the calm passions do not have normative force on their own. Hume is careful not to say that we should always aim at the calmness. He writes:

> What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; tho' we may easily observe, there is no man so constantly possess'd of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the sollicitations of passion and desire. (T 2.3.3.10)

He also claims that the “philosophical TRANQUILLITY”, when it is put to the extreme, is “too magnificent for human nature” (EPM 7.16. See also EMPL Of Sceptic, 179, n12). A similar point is found in the following:

> Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or others, that narrowness of soul, which makes them prefer the present to the remote. They cannot change their natures. (T 3.2.7.6)

Our preference for proximate objects is a cause of the violent passions (T 2.3.7), and Hume’s point here is that we cannot change this inclination toward the violent passions. If following the calm passions is not realistic for everyone, then it does not seem to be the case that we unconditionally ought to pursue the calm passions. These suggest that we are committed to the calm passions only under some conditions.

As the above quote suggests, the calm passions have normative force when it is our "nature" to follow them. Hume states that the authority of the calm passions is relative to the state of the subject: either the calm passions or the violent passions prevail, “according to the general character or present disposition of the person” (T 2.3.4.10). Also, philosophical calmness should be pursued only if it conforms to one's natural temper:

> By habit and study acquire that philosophical temper which both gives force to reflection, and by rendering a great part of your happiness independent, takes

> off the edge from all disorderly passions, and tranquillizes the mind. Despise not these helps; but confide not too much in them neither; unless nature has been favourable in the temper, with which she has endowed you. (EMPL The Sceptic, 179, n12)

We have reasons to pursue the calm passions only when they match our personal "nature", "general character", or "temper". My suggestion is that the indirect passions are an instance of such personal temper, and they give the calm passions normative force. Philosophers are proud of the calm reasoning that accompanies philosophical curiosity, and so such reasoning is of normative importance to them.

Then, do non-philosophers, who do not pride themselves on calm, truth-tracking reasoning, have no reason to pursue such reasoning? As mentioned in Chapter 1, in the "Conclusion" Hume concentrates on the question of how philosophers like him should respond to scepticism, and does not seem to be primarily interested in epistemic normativity for non-philosophers. Since the main purpose of this dissertation is to interpret the "Conclusion", it does not directly answer the question of what kind of reasoning a non-philosopher should pursue. But of course, this question is extremely important. Superstitious people would be those who do not take pride in calm reasoning. Then, even if it is possible to criticize superstition from the philosopher's side, the effectiveness of the philosopher's criticism of superstition is limited if, after all, the superstitious person has no reason to follow correct reasoning. I cannot give a complete

answer to this question, but at the end of the next chapter I will suggest that the concept of "virtue" may play a decisive role in this issue.

Chapter 6: The Place of Virtue in Hume's Epistemology

1. Introduction

So far I have proposed to interpret Hume's epistemology by focusing on Hume's philosophy of the passions in Book Two of the *Treatise*, especially his discussions of the indirect passions and the calm passions. But in recent years, there have been many attempts to interpret Hume's epistemology in relation to his account of "virtue"(e.g., Owen 1999, ch.9, Ridge 2003, Kail 2005, McCormick 2005, Vitz 2009, 2014, Boyle 2012, Hickerson 2013, Qu 2014, Schafer 2014, 2019b, Sasser 2017, Kelahan 2018), and my interpretation and this virtue-based interpretation share the aim to interpret Hume's epistemology in the context of his discussions of the affective and social nature of human beings. We can regard both kinds of interpretation as a development of the naturalistic interpretation of Hume's epistemology, since for Hume, virtue is based on the natural psychological operations of human beings, such as moral sense and sympathy. To what extent do my approach, which focuses on the passions, and the approach, which focuses on virtues, share the same views, and where do they differ? In this chapter, I would like to clarify the relationship between my interpretation and these virtue-based approaches.

There is no doubt that virtue has *some* importance in Hume's epistemology, as the above scholars made clear. Hume includes in his list of virtues many virtues that

seem to be involved in the use of reason. For example, he mentions "wisdom" (T 3.3.4.30), "good sense", "sound reasoning", "discernment" (EPM 8.7), "prudence", or "sagacity" (EPM App 4.11). The question to be asked is *how* or *to what extent* the notion of virtue is essential in Hume's epistemology.

Those who argue most radically for the relationship between Hume's epistemology and virtue propose, with a good amount of textual evidence, that the notion of virtue plays an essential role in Hume's response to scepticism in the "Conclusion", the core part of Hume's epistemology. I call this specific interpretation about the "Conclusion" the "virtue-theoretic interpretation" (e.g., Owen 1999, ch.9, Ridge 2003, Kail 2005, McCormick 2005, Qu 2014, Schafer 2014, Sasser 2017).[125] In this chapter, I argue that the virtue-theoretic interpretation and my interpretation so far are not in competition. Rather, I argue, a full account of virtue with respect to the use of reason requires a *non-virtue-theoretic* norm, and my interpretation provides such a norm. Thus, my interpretation and the virtue-theoretic interpretation are perfectly compatible in that my interpretation fills in a necessary part of the latter.

The next question, then, is whether a virtue-theoretic framework is not only compatible with my interpretation, but if my interpretation *requires* that framework in interpreting Hume's epistemology. What does the appeal to the concept of virtue add to my interpretation? I suggest the possibility that virtue can play an indispensable role

[125] Note, however, that Qu, while arguing that there is ample textual evidence to support the virtue-theoretic interpretation, points out that the view conflicts with Hume's other commitments. He is neutral on whether this inconsistency provides a reason to oppose the virtue-theoretic interpretation or Hume himself is inconsistent (Qu 2014, 523).

in thinking about the very important question of what constitutes good reasoning for *non-philosophers*, the question that I have not addressed in this dissertation so far. By referring to these possibilities, I would like to suggest an important place that the concept of "virtue" could occupy in Hume's epistemology. In this way, I would like to suggest that my interpretation and the virtue-theoretic interpretation can complement each other.

2. Hume's "Conclusion" and the Virtue-Theoretic Interpretation

The following is a recapitulation of Hume's scepticism in the "Conclusion". There Hume develops sceptical arguments that we cannot identify the criteria for justified reasoning. The climax of of these arguments in the "Conclusion" is what Hume calls "a very dangerous dilemma" (T 1.4.7.6). To reason simply to please the imagination cannot be correct: "if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy", this would "lead us into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become asham'd of our credulity" (T 1.4.7.6). However, aiming strictly at truth-producing reasoning is also not a workable policy, because it results in "a total extinction of belief and evidence" (T 1.4.1.6). We can avoid this scepticism and have a belief "only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy" (T 1.4.7.6). This brings us back to the credulity. Thus, the dilemma is that we have "no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all" (T 1.4.7.6).

However, as the narrative of the "Conclusion" progresses, Hume reaches a point where he is no longer bothered by this dilemma. According to the virtue-theoretic interpretation, it is the notion of virtue that saves Hume from this dilemma. Ridge (2003, 180-183) provides one of the most thorough textual justifications for this interpretation, and thus in what follows, I will review his considerations.[126]

For Hume, a virtue is a character trait or a motive that our moral sense approves for its agreeableness or usefulness to its possessor or to others, and this approval comes from sympathy we have for those who are affected by the trait (T 3.3.1.30). For example, a benevolent character is considered virtuous because it is agreeable and useful to others from the perspective of those around the person with that character. However, Hume notes that our sympathy is biased in that it works stronger for people who are close to us in time and space. In order to properly identify the circles that are affected by a character trait, we need to take "some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them" (T 3.3.1.30). Thus, traits that we take as agreeable and useful from the "common point of view" are properly regarded as virtuous.[127] According to the virtue-theoretic interpretation, in the "Conclusion", Hume endorses reasoning that satisfies the four virtue-constituting criteria (one or more of them): agreeable to the possessor of the trait or others, useful to the possessor of the trait or others.

[126] Qu (2014) also provides convincing textual justification in a similar, but somewhat different way to Ridge. This section basically follows Ridge's argument and refers to Qu (2014) as necessary.
[127] The virtue-theoretic interpretations such as Ridge (2003, 180) and Schafer (2014, 5-6) also recognize the need for a common point of view.

Let's start with the agreeableness to the possessor of the trait in question. Hume says, “Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to” (T 1.4.7.11). This lively and active reasoning seems agreeable to the reasoner.[128] In addition, Hume makes it clear that pleasure drives him to do reasoning or philosophy:

> these sentiments spring up naturally in my present disposition; and shou’d I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself to any other business or diversion, I feel I shou’d be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy. (T 1.4.7.12)

Hume specifically mentions curiosity as motivating him to engage in philosophy (T 1.4.7.12), understanding curiosity as the pleasure that accompanies the exercise of reason (T 2.3.10.3). Clearly, the disposition to reasoning he endorses is agreeable to himself.

Ridge points out that Hume also endorses reasoning or reasoning disposition that is agreeable to others. When Hume falls into scepticism, he laments, “no one will hearken to me. Every one keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm, which beats upon me from every side.” (T 1.4.7.2) This shows that the kind of reasoning that Hume wants

[128] Hume states that the vivacity of an idea produces pleasure (T 2.3.10.12).

to reject is disagreeable to others, which in turn suggests that the kind of reasoning that Hume endorses is agreeable to others.

Hume also seems to pursue reasoning that is useful to himself and others. Cognitive activity that leads to hopeless, suffering scepticism is "an abuse of time" (T 1.4.7.10), and Hume asks himself, “to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest?” (T 1.4.7.10). Here, Hume assesses this kind of reasoning negatively: it is useless to others and to himself. Indeed, as Qu points out (Qu 2014, 506), in Hume's reference to ambition "of contributing to the instruction of mankind, and acquiring a name by [his] inventions and discoveries" (T 1.4.7.12), we see that Hume pursues a kind of reasoning that is useful to society. In his discussion of curiosity, Hume also notes that in order for our curiosity to be satisfied, the object of our curiosity, the truth, must have some utility (T 2.3.10.4). Moreover, Hume prioritizes philosophy over religious superstition on the grounds that the former is safe, and the latter is “dangerous” (T 1.4.7.13). Since safety seems to be useful to oneself and others, Hume seems to justify the use of reason on the basis of its utility.

With the textual evidence, the virtue-theoretic interpretation proposes that the reasoning disposition endorsed by Hume is agreeable and useful, and therefore virtuous. Here, the bearers of agreeableness and usefulness can be considered to be some character traits related to the use of reasoning. And although the "Conclusion" does not explicitly refer to something like the “common point of view”, these attributions of agreeableness and usefulness do not seem to be made from the idiosyncratic or biased point of view. As Ridge (2003, 183) points out, Hume's claim that "Where reason is

lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to." (T 1.4.7.11) seems to be a general claim, not merely an expression of his personal, subjective state. If so, then there seems to be nothing to prevent us from thinking of these agreeableness and usefulness as properties that specifically contribute to the attribution of virtue.

Then, the interpretation maintains, in the "Conclusion", Hume ultimately endorses the *virtuous* reasoning disposition. Both options in the "dangerous dilemma" would be dismissed as vices. For, as the text above suggests, credulity and excessive scepticism are disagreeable and useless. The virtue-theoretic interpreters other than Ridge and Qu provide similar textual justifications as above (Owen 1999, 212 ff, Kail 2005, 128, Schafer 2014, 6-7, Sasser 2017, 15-19). These commentators differ on how exactly virtue contributes to Hume's response to scepticism, but they share the view that Hume's account of virtue plays a crucial role in the "Conclusion".[129] "Hume's ultimate defence of philosophy, and the preference for reason, is that those who practice it have the virtue of reasonableness" (Owen 1999, 212). "The considerations Hume mobilizes at the end of Book 1 show that his justification is, in his very broad sense, a moral one that fits strictly with the moral theory we are given in Book 3" (Ridge 2003, 180).

[129] For example, Ridge (2003) thinks that virtue contributes to the epistemic justification of reasoning, but Sasser (2017) thinks that it leads to purely a practical justification, and Hume gives up epistemic justification. The latter might be classified as one of the sceptical interpretations, in thinking that in the "Conclusion", Hume eventually has no epistemic justification of inference. Schafer (2014) finds in Hume's epistemology a distinctively epistemic virtue, rather than moral ones.

3. A Full Account of a Virtue Requires a Motive Other Than a Motive for That Virtue

I argue that strictly speaking, the virtue-theoretic interpretation is not a competitor to various non-virtue-theoretic interpretations of Hume's epistemology, including my own. Given the nature of virtue in Hume, a full account of the virtuousness of a character or motive requires the existence of norms that are independent of virtue. Then, only when combined with some non-virtue-theoretic norms concerning the use of reason, does a virtue-theoretic interpretation provide a full picture of the norms found in the "Conclusion". I draw this proposal from the so-called circle argument (T 3.2.1.7). In this section, I look at how the argument works.[130]

Hume begins the circle argument with the following observations about our practices of attributing virtues:

> when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produc'd them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. (T 3.2.1.2)

> when we require any action, or blame a person for not performing it, we always suppose, that one in that situation shou'd be influenc'd by the proper motive of that action, and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it. (T 3.2.1.3)

[130] I owe much of the following understanding of the circle argument to Garrett (2007, 2015).

Hume takes "motive" very broadly to include any trait that contributes to motivation. These observations say that both praise and blame for an action are based on the praise or blame of the motive for the action. We admire the act of helping those in need because the benevolent motive that generates the act is praiseworthy. From these observations, Hume draws what Garrett calls the "Virtue Ethics Thesis" (Garrett 2015, 264):

> [Virtue Ethics Thesis]: all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives, and are consider'd merely as signs of those motives. (T 3.1.2.4)

From this thesis, Hume draws the following claim about explanatory order:

> An action must be virtuous, before we can have a regard to its virtue. (T 3.2.1.4)

We may be motivated to perform an action by the perception that the action is virtuous, that is, by the "regard to its virtue". However, according to the Virtue Ethics Thesis, in order for us to perceive the virtuousness of an action, it must have already acquired virtuousness from its virtuous motive, or there must have already been a motive that counts as virtuous for the action. Therefore, to think that what makes an action virtuous is the virtuousness of the action is circular:

> To suppose, that the mere regard to the virtue of the action, may be the first motive, which produc'd the action, and render'd it virtuous, is to reason in a circle. (T 3.2.1.4)

Thus, the virtue-bestowing motive must be a motive other than the perception of that virtue, or the perception that it counts as virtuous:

> the first virtuous motive, which bestows a merit on any action, can never be a regard to the virtue of that action, but must be some other natural motive or principle. (T 3.2.1.4)

For example, what makes it virtuous to help others is not a recognition that doing so is virtuous, but a benevolent motive to help others, but that does not take into account the virtuousness of helping others. This claim implies that a virtuous action cannot exist without a motive other than the perception of that virtue, the claim Hume calls an "undoubted maxim" (T 3.2.1.7):

> no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality. (T 3.2.1.7)

This claim requires that for every virtue, there is a corresponding motive other than the motive for that virtue.

One of Hume's own examples is the natural virtue of taking care of children. If the only motive for caring for children, found in human history, were the perception that doing so is virtuous, then caring for children could not be virtuous. Rather, the motive of "natural affection" for children (T 3.2.1.5), where the virtuousness of taking care of one's children is not considered, is what originally makes childcare virtuous. The same is true of the virtue of justice, or respect for property. If the only motive for restoring a loan were the perception that doing so is virtuous, then restoring a loan would not be virtuous. (T 3.2.1.9). Thus, Hume proceeds to elucidate what the motive for justice other than the perception of justice itself is, by appealing to a human artifice.[131]

The above discussions show that, according to Hume, in order to give a complete account of a virtue, it is necessary to identify motives other than the motive for that virtue, or the perception that some act is virtuous. If we cannot identify the motive, then it remains unclear where the virtue comes from, and why we take it as a norm. Helping others is virtuous and praiseworthy, and not doing so is vicious and

[131] However, it is controversial whether the "artificial" virtue of justice is consistent with the nature of virtue described above. For Hume sometimes appears to think that there is no natural motive to justice (e.g., T 3.2.1.17). Garrett (2007) and Sayre-MacCord (2015), among others, propose that the case of justice is consistent with Hume's concept of virtue, while Cohon (2008, 180) suggests that for the artificial virtue of justice in particular, Hume abandoned the undoubted maxim. I am inclined to think that the interpretation that Hume dismisses the undoubted maxim comes at a great cost, given the lack of such textual evidence. In any case, this issue does not affect my present discussion. This concern occurs only with artificial virtues, and Cohon (2008, 180) thinks that natural virtues remain consistent with the undoubted maxim. The virtues associated with reasoning as found in T 1.4.7, if any, seem to be natural virtues, that is, some morally approved motives we naturally have without artifice. Hume states, his motives for certain kinds of reasoning "spring up *naturally* in my present disposition" (T 1.4.7.12, my emphasis). So I don't need to get into the dispute concering the artificial virtue to apply the nature of virtue described above to an interpretation of T 1.4.7.

blameworthy. But this alone does not explain the source of the norm, or where the norm comes from. To answer this question, we need to identify a virtuous motive that motivates us to help others, but does not take into account the virtuousness of doing so (The passion of benevolence is such a motive).

In addition to this necessity to explain where the norm comes from, Sayre-MacCord maintains that unless one identifies the motive other than the motive for the virtue, the determinate *content* of the virtue remains unspecified (Sayre-MacCord 2015, 439). Certainly, we sometimes perform an action because it is virtuous to do so. So what is exactly a virtuous action? It is an action produced by some virtuous motive other than the perception that the action is virtuous. Thus, the perception of the virtuousness alone tells us nothing about what actions we should perform if the corresponding original motive is not specified. For example, we may be motivated to do a benevolent action. Then which action is benevolent? It is the action that a benevolent person would do. However, this motive has no determinate content unless we identify who the benevolent person is, that is, what the benevolent, non-virtue-directed motive is (it would be the passion of benevolence). As an analogy, Sayre-MacCord considers what would happen if "my sole desire were to fulfill the desires of my beloved while her sole desire was to fulfill mine" (Sayre-McCord 2015, 439). Here my desire does not lead me to any action unless she has some desire that does not depend on my desire. Likewise, the motive to perform a virtuous act alone does not direct us to a particular action without the input of some virtuous motive other than the

motive to the virtue. Specifying such a motive is necessary to give specific content or direction to virtue.

Therefore, a full account of a virtue requires a motive other than a motive for that virtue in that (1) such a motive is necessary to explain where the virtue comes from, and (2) such a motive is necessary to give the virtue a determinate content. We do not have a complete account of virtue unless we identify X that is agreeable or useful when seen from the common point of view, and therefore virtuous, where X is a character trait or a motive and is independent of a regard to virtue.

Hume refers to the circle argument in introducing his discussions of "artificial virtues" such as justice (virtues for which its underlying motive requires some artifice). But the argument seems to apply to all kinds of virtues, including "natural virtues" (virtues for which its underlying motive does not require any artifice). As we have already seen, one of Hume's own examples is the natural virtue of taking care of children. Hume also includes not only moral virtues, but also intellectual virtues in his list of virtues. In the attribution of intellectual virtues, we would take beliefs or reasoning, not actions, into account. Still, insofar as motives are still taken to be the primary bearers of virtue, rather than products of motives such as beliefs, the above argument will hold for intellectual virtue as well.

Hume's claim that "no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality" (T 3.2.1.7) is consistently found in his other works. Hume reiterates the same point in his letter to Hutcheson: "if there be no other goods but virtue, tis impossible there can be

any virtue" and "virtue can never be the sole motive to any action" (Letters, 1.35). In the essay "Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature", Hume comments on the relationship between motive and virtue:

> The virtuous sentiment or passion produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel a pleasure in doing good to my friend, because I love him; but do not love him for the sake of that pleasure (EPML Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature, 85-86)

We can interpret this passage as deriving from the above discussions of virtue. Helping one's friend is agreeable and thus counts as virtuous, but the perception of virtuousness is not something that (initially) motivates us to be friendly. What explains the virtuousness of the action is the motive of love for one's friends, rather than the perception that helping her is virtuous.

4. The Significance of Acting from a Regard to Virtue

However, as Reed (2012) convincingly shows, it is important to recognize that all that Hume says is the explanatory point that the perception of virtue does not give a full account of that virtue, not the normative point that we *should not* be motivated by the perception of virtue. Hume accepts as unproblematic that we are often motivated by the perception of virtue. Hume writes:

> What reason or motive have I to restore the money? It will, perhaps, be said, that my regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery, are sufficient reasons for me, if I have the least grain of honesty, or sense of duty and obligation. And this answer, no doubt, is just and satisfactory to man in his civiliz'd state, and when train'd up according to a certain discipline and education. (T 3.2.1.9)

Hume says that a regard to the virtue of justice is a "just" motive to pay debts, while he adds that such a motive cannot be explanatorily fundamental: the motive, as a source of the virtue of justice, or in some natural condition in which no such virtue exists yet, "wou'd be rejected as perfectly unintelligible and sophistical" (T 3.2.1.9). Even in the case of natural virtue, Hume does not seem to regard the perception of virtue as an improper motive for performing virtuous acts. Those who have a natural affection for children, and thereby care for them, are also aware that it is their duty to do so: "A father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children: But he has also a natural inclination to it." (T 3.2.5.6) He "ha[s] the duty in [his] eye in the attention [he] give[s] to [his] offspring." (T 3.2.1.5). In saying theses, there is no indication in Hume that this sense of duty is an improper motive.

Rather, Hume thinks that once virtuous motives other than the perception of virtue are identified, we can be unproblematically motivated to perform an action by

recognizing that doing so is virtuous.[132] In addition, in order for a person to have a motive for a virtue, it is not necessary that *she* had the corresponding original virtuous motive. What the undoubted maxim requires is that there be virtuous motives, distinct from the perception of the virtue, *in human nature*, and not all individuals need to actually have such original virtuous motives. Hume writes:

> When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that principle, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, as much as possible, his want of it. A man that really feels no gratitude in his temper, is still pleas'd to perform grateful actions, and thinks he has, by that means, fulfill'd his duty. (T 3.2.1.8)

The "sense of duty" seems to correspond to what Hume elsewhere calls "a regard to virtue" (T 3.2.1.6). Then Hume is saying here that once virtuous, non-virtue-seeking motives are found in human nature, we can perform virtuous acts on the basis of the recognition that doing so is virtuous. Even if some people lack the natural affection, which is the original, virtuous motive for taking care of children, they are motivated to

[132] However, it is controversial exactly how the perception of virtue motivates, espectially whether it motivates directly or indirectly. For discussion, see, for example, Brown (1989), Abramson (2002), Ainslie (2015b), Santos (2015) and Radcliffe (2018, ch.5).

care for children by the recognition that human beings generally have a virtuous motive for doing it. As Radcliffe puts it, "when a person lacks a natural virtue, she can be motivated by a moral sentiment— disapproval of her own character—to do the action that a person with the virtue would do" (Radcliffe 2018, 128). Motives based on the perception of virtue would be useful not only for those who lack virtuous, original motives. Even if a person already has the original motive to take care of children, the perception that doing so is virtuous would produce an additional motive to do so: "A father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children: But he has also a natural inclination to it." (T 3.2.5.6) That additional motive will reinforce his motive for the virtuous action, especially when he feels reluctant to take care of children.[133] Although the perception of a virtue does not provide a full account of a norm, it plays an important role in adding a powerful psychological force to the content-determining, original motives, and that kind of "regard to virtue" is still respectable.[134]

5. Hume's Response to Scepticism Requires a Non-Virtue-Theoretic Norm

Thus, the reference to virtue alone does not provide a fundamental explanation for a norm, but it does play an important role in strengthening the motivation to follow

[133] In this respect, I agree with Reed's interpretation that "Hume sees the motivating work of the natural passion and the moral sentiment as mutually reinforcing." (Reed 2012, 138) Baron (1988) also argues that virtue is more than just a "back-up system" of motives.

[134] Indeed, the motivational force of virtue plays a fundamental role in Hume's critique of rationalist morality. Simply put, the argument is that morality or virtue cannot be discovered by reason, because it influences action, but reason cannot have such an influence (T 3.1.1.6). Here, Hume is clearly committed to the view that the perception of virtue can be somehow a motive.

an *already* given norm. In light of these aspects of virtue, in this section, I would like to consider the virtue-theoretic interpretation that Hume appeals to the virtuousness of reasoning in his response to scepticism. In particular, I argue that Hume's response to scepticism in “Conclusion” demands a full account of the norms concerning reason, that is, the identification of norms that do not depend on virtue.

The above account of virtue suggests that a full account of the virtuousness of the reasoning requires the identification of the norms or motives concerning the use of reason, other than the recognition that a certain kind of reasoning is virtuous. First, without identifying such a non-virtue-seeking motive involved in reasoning, the source of the virtue, that is, where the virtue comes from, remains unclear. Let's say that the virtue of wisdom saves Hume from scepticism. Where then does this norm of wisdom come from? It comes from a wise motive other than the motive to be wise. The identification of a motive independent of the sense of virtuousness is necessary for the identification of the origin of virtue. Second, the virtuousness of the reasoning disposition alone does not provide the determinate content of the virtue, or does not tell us exactly what kind of reasoning we should pursue. Again, assume that wisdom is the virtue that overcomes scepticism. But exactly what kind of reasoning exemplifies wisdom? To answer this question, we need to identify an agreeable or useful, and wise motive that is distinct from the perception of its virtuousness. The problem can be put more frankly as follows. According to Hume, "if there be no other goods but virtue, tis impossible there can be any virtue" (Letters, 1.35). So, in order to show the

virtuousness of reasoning, it is necessary to show some “goods” of reasoning other than its virtuousness.

Still, the lack of a complete account of the norm concerning reasoning does not immediately lead to any inconsistency. As we saw in Section 4, Hume thinks that the recognition of the virtuousness of an action gives us an important motivational force, insofar as we have already identified an original motive that is distinct from the recognition of virtuousness. Nor does Hume think that such a perception of virtuousness is an improper motive for doing virtuous acts. Some original motive for reasoning might have *already* been established in human nature, and for Hume, the perception of the virtuousness of reasoning might provide him with a powerful motive for reasoning, and in this sense, virtue could be the basis for Hume’s normative epistemology in the “Conclusion”.

The question to be asked, then, is what level of explanation the resolution of scepticism in the "Conclusion" requires. Does it require a complete account of the norms of reasoning? Or are the norms already given, but the “moralization” of the norms gives Hume a powerful psychological force toward reasoning? I think that a full account of the virtue involved in reasoning is necessary to answer the concerns of the radical sceptic. Hume believes that radical scepticism is a universal problem that people who puts authority on reason inevitably face. It stems from a defect of reason (e.g., it's based on trivial and inconsistent propensities of the imagination), which is “common to human nature” (T 1.4.7.3). He also seems to think that the sceptical problem was first conceived by himself: "this difficulty is seldom or never thought of" (T 1.4.7.7).

Then, in the "Conclusion", there does not seem to be any already discovered and shared norm that would overcome such a novel, universal sceptical predicament. Moreover, through his sceptical considerations, Hume reached a point where he could find *no* reason or motive for reasoning, which also suggests that no motive for reasoning has been already established. Hume says, “I cannot find in my heart to enter into them [philosophical speculations] any farther” (T 1.4.7.9), and “I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy” (T 1.4.7.10). Hume's sceptical discussions seems to take place where no epistemological criteria are established. By analogy, consider Hume’s claim that citing a “regard to justice” as a reason for paying debts is a right answer in a "civiliz'd state" where justice is already established. But this answer “would be rejected as perfectly unintelligible and sophistical” “in his rude and more natural condition” (T 3.2.1.9), where justice is not yet established. In the same way, since scepticism in the "Conclusion" seems to be a kind of "natural condition” in which epistemological norms are not yet established, it seems that we need some reasons to pursue reasoning or philosophy, other than that it is virtuous.

Or more simply, virtue alone does not seem to convince radical sceptics. If Hume says that the reasoning that overcomes the dangerous dilemma is virtuous, radical sceptics would ask why they should follow that kind of reasoning, or what is the ground for the norm. It seems that Hume cannot answer these questions unless he shows that there is a fundamental motive for reasoning in human nature that is independent of the perception of the virtuousness. Sceptics will also ask specifically

which reasoning to adopt to escape scepticism, but without identifying a non-virtue-seeking motive for reasoning, Hume's virtue-theoretic response could not recommend specific reasoning.

6. Hume's Distinctively Epistemic Standards Require a Non-Virtue-Theoretic, Epistemic Norm

Independently of the discussion above, we can also draw the necessity of some motives for reasoning other than a regard to its virtuousness from the fact that the issue at hand is specifically *epistemic* norms. Qu (2014) proposes a critique that the virtue-theoretic interpretation collapses the distinction between epistemic and moral normativity, a distinction that Hume is committed to. Hume writes:

> Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable: Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable. (T 3.1.1.10)

This suggests that Hume considers epistemic and moral normativity to be distinct. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 5, Hume's frequent *epistemic* criticisms of superstition suggest that he is committed to narrowly construed epistemic normativity. How can a virtue-theoretic framework capture the distinction between these two kinds of normativity? A virtue is a character trait or a motive that our moral sense approves for

its agreeableness or usefulness to its possessor or to others. In this framework, the criteria of agreeableness and usefulness do not provide a distinction between epistemic and moral normativity: in this picture, both epistemic norms and moral norms are endorsed as being useful or agreeable. Qu's diagnosis is that if such a distinction could be made in this framework, it would be in character traits or motives which are the bearers of agreeableness or usefulness, and thus virtuousness (Qu 2014, 517). In other words, we might distinguish between two kinds of normativity by distinguishing between epistemic (e.g., wise) motives and moral (e.g., benevolent) motives. Now, such distinctively epistemic motives are not captured by reference to agreeableness and usefulness, nor to their virtuousness, because both moral and epistemic normativity are agreeable, useful, and virtuous. Then, if the virtue-theoretic interpretation would like to address this concern, then distinctively epistemic motives for reasoning or truth, independent of their virtuousness, must be identified. Here, the question is whether there are motives that are distinctively related to reasoning or truth, and the concept of "virtue" does not seem to be of much help in considering this issue. Given that sentiments or passions seem to be truth-insensitive, Qu himself is pessimistic about identifying such distinctively epistemic motives that could respond to scepticism in the "Conclusion" (Qu 2014, 520-521). However, in Chapter 5, I made a case for such a distinctively epistemic propensities, by arguing that the reasoning propensities that mixes with the calm passions are truth-sensitive.

7. The Compatibility of the Virtue-Theoretic and Non-Virtue-Theoretic Interpretations

Thus, in order to give a full account of the virtuousness of reasoning in response to scepticism in the "Conclusion", we need to identify the motive or norm for reasoning that does not depend on its virtuousness. The identification of such norm seems to be what non-virtue-theoretic interpretations have attempted to do. The Title Principle (Garrett 1997) and the imaginative tendencies to generate the natural beliefs (Kemp Smith 1941) seem to count as such non-virtue-oriented propensities for reasoning.[135] I myself have suggested as an alternative to these that the pride-worthy reasoning disposition that mixes with the calm passions is what Hume endorses. Explaining the virtuousness of the reasoning disposition Hume arrives at in the Conclusion (that is, identifying the origin of that virtuousness and the determinate content of that virtuousness) seems to require the identification of this kind of non-virtue-involving reasoning dispositions. Moreover, in order to capture the distinctively epistemic aspects of Hume's epistemology, as distinguished from moral normativity, we need to identify the non-virtue-seeking motives or character traits that are distinctively related to reasoning and truth. In Chapter 5, I proposed that the reasoning dispositions that mix

[135] Schafer's virtue-theoretic interpretation identifies curiosity and ambition, motives that are not virtue-oriented as such, but can be virtuous (Schafer 2014). In this respect, he seems to identify the value of reasoning other than its virtuousness, that is, the satisfaction of curiosity. My view and his interpretation that curiosity is a (non-virtue-oriented) epistemic norm overlap in many ways. However, as I have suggested, there is a nuanced difference between my approach and his interpretation. Specifically, there is the concern that curiosity alone, without the indirect passions, may not answer the problem of normativity (Chapter 4, Section 2), and I proposed that curiosity has epistemic value because it is calm, not the other way around (Chapter 5, Section 7).

with the calm passions relate to truth in a distinctive way, in that they are sensitive to factors that contribute to the discovery of truth.

Once these antecedent epistemic norms have been identified, there is no problem in saying that the reasoning disposition that follows those norms is virtuous. Given the frequent appearance of the vocabulary of agreeableness and usefulness in the "Conclusion," as the virtue-theoretic interpretation convincingly shows, the non-virtue-oriented dispositions toward reasoning could be considered virtuous. As far as my interpretation is concerned, the ambition, a kind of pride, "of contributing to the instruction of mankind" (T 1.4.7.12) seems useful to society, and since it is a kind of pride, it is by nature agreeable to oneself. Philosophical curiosity (T 1.4.7.12), as an instance of the calm passions, is clearly agreeable, at least to oneself. Moreover, philosophy, for its calmness, is useful in that it is safer than violent superstition. Hume claims that since superstition "seizes more strongly on the mind, and is often able to disturb us in the conduct of our lives and actions" and "[p]hilosophy…if just, can present us only with mild and moderate sentiments" (T 1.4.7.13), philosophy is safe and superstiton is dangerous. Thus, the calm reasoning disposition, worthy of pride, seems to qualify as virtuous. Indeed, pride is part of the virtue of "greatness of mind", and the calmness seems intimately conntected to the virtue of "strength of mind" (T 2.3.3.10) or "philosophical tranquillity" (EPM 7.16). Still, this virtuousness requires an explanatorily preceding norm that is independent of the virtuousness, and my

interpretation can fill that norm. In this sense, my passion-based, but non-virtue-theoretic interpretation and the virtue-theoretic interpretation are compatible.[136]

8. Virtue and the Epistemic Normativity for Non-Philosophers

However, if my interpretation, or some other non-virtue-theoretic naturalistic interpretations, present epistemic norms that are explanatorily prior to their virtuousness, then what is the point of referring to virtue? What I have been saying, simply put, is that virtuous reasoning requires reasoning that is good in ways other than being virtuous. But if reasoning is already "good" in some sense, what is the point of adding further value of "virtue" to it? In this section, I would like to suggest that focusing on the concept of virtue can be very important for considering important questions that I have not addressed so far.

The question of this dissertation is what kind of reasoning counts as legitimate for an intellectually minded person, such as a philosopher. This question is central to the "Conclusion". There Hume seems to be primarily intereted in the question of what kind of reasoning *philosophers* like him should pursue. This becomes visible when Hume mentions "many honest gentlemen, who being always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing themselves in common recreations, have carry'd their

[136] Garrett (2015, 232) provides the criticism that the virtue-theoretic framework is unlikely to contribute to the resolution of scepticism in the "Conclusion", given that Books One and Three of the *Treatise* were separately published. This criticism may cast doubt on the interpretation that virtue plays a decisive role in the "Conclusion". My point is only that the virtue-theoretic framework and my interpretation are theoretically compatible.

thoughts very little beyond those objects, which are every day expos'd to their senses" (T 1.4.7.14), and says, of these people, "I pretend not to make philosophers" (T 1.4.7.14). In the "Conclusion", he seems to seek epistemic normativity specifically for philosophers. In fact, the epistemic norms I have been presenting are effective only for philosophers. The calm reasoning has normative force insofar as it deserves philosophers' pride. Otherwise, the calmness is just one psychological feature without lack of its normative significance, and Hume seems to think that it is unreasonable to expect everyone to have that calmness (Chapter 5, Section 7).

However, just answering the question concerning epistemology for philosophers is insufficient as a *general* account of the normativity of reason. Non-philosophers, too, are not allowed to reason as they please, but must follow some correct standards of reason. If Hume has nothing to say about such standards, that poses an important problem for Hume's project. In particular, it is not clear on what grounds superstitious people should stop their superstitious reasoning. Since philosophers take pride in truth-tracking, calm reasoning, *from their points of view*, they can dismiss as incorrect superstitious reasoning that leads to falsehoods and involves the violent passions. However, a superstitious person is presumably one who does not feel pleasure or pride in such "correct" reasoning. In other words, such a person is one who lacks motives for correct reasoning, such as theoretical curiosity and pride. From the superstitious persons' points of view, they seem to have no reason to pursue correct reasoning. This seems to be a major problem for Hume, given the importance that the critique of superstition occupies in his entire project.

I think that *virtuousness* of reasoning can play a crucial role here. In the passage quoted earlier, Hume says that a person who lacks a motive for an action can compensate for that lack of motive by the perception of virtue:

> When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that principle, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, as much as possible, his want of it. A man that really feels no gratitude in his temper, is still pleas'd to perform grateful actions, and thinks he has, by that means, fulfill'd his duty. (T 3.2.1.8)

This suggests that even superstitious people who lack a motive for correct reasoning can have a motive for that reasoning through the perception of its virtuousness, insofar as they have moral sense. The perception of virtue is pleasurable, and thus it provides a motivational force to pursue the virtue. In addition, the motivation to pursue virtue is reinforced by various social conditions. In the case of the virtue of justice, Hume states that the motivation to follow the rules of justice is strengthened by the admiration of justice by politicians, private or domestic education, and reputation (T 3.2.2.25-27). These suggest that once the motivation for correct reasoning is "moralized," the intrinsic motivational power of virtue and the additional motivational power of education or reputation compensate for the lack of such motive. Perhaps it is through

this process that most of us come to endorse correct, truth-conducive reasoning, simply because adopting such reasoning is a right or virtuous thing to do. Under the influence of virtue or education, we no longer remind ourselves of the original, content-determining motives for reasoning in human nature, but instead simply seek to be virtuous or rational. The virtue-oriented motives for reasoning would be entirely legitimate. As we saw in Section 4, according to Hume, being motivated by a regard to virtue in a "civiliz'd state" is "just and satisfactory" (T 3.2.1.9).

Of course, more careful thought is needed to justify such a story. For certain reasoning to count as virtuous, the motives for pursuing the reasoning would have to be agreeable or useful in such a way that it evokes moral sentiments. In order to understand in what sense the motive for reasoning is agreeable and useful, and in what sense superstitious reasoning is disagreeable and useless in such a way that superstitious people should change their minds and choose justified reasoning over superstition, it will be necessary to look carefully at Hume's account of virtue,[137] his theory of religion, and perhaps the *History of England*, which contains plenty of descriptions of superstition and enthusiasm, along with recent secondary literature on Hume's epistemic virtues. Moreover, while philosophers may have a natural motive to reasoning, some social condition or artifice may be necessary for non-philosophers to have a motive for reasoning. If so, is being a good reasoner a natural virtue for

[137] In particular, Hume's critique of "monkish virtues" (EPM 9.3), which Hume attributes to the superstitious, seems to be crucial in this context.

philosophers, but an artificial virtue for non-philosophers?[138] To answer these complex questions is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Here, I only suggest the possibility that non-philosophers may somehow have motives for reasoning through the "moralization" of philosophers' motives for reasoning.

Still, the identification of the virtuousness of reasoning cannot be the whole explanation of the norms of reasoning. A piece of reasoning is virtuous when the motive that produces it is virtuous, and without identifying this virtuous, original motive for reasoning, the virtue, education, and reputation that encourage us to be rational would be empty. In this regard, if a philosopher is an example of a correct reasoner, then identifying the philosopher's non-virtue-seeking motive for correct reasoning, as found in the “Conclusion” and Hume’s account of passions, will play an important role in providing the superstitious people with virtue-based motives for correct reasoning. The reasoning a philosopher would pursue would be the archetype of virtuous reasoning. I leave the full justification of this claim for another occasion.

[138] Kopajtic (2015), which argues that the adherence to the calm passions requires some artificial and social conditions, would be very useful to think about this point.

Conclusion

By focusing on Hume's account of passion in Book Two of the *Treatise*, I have proposed to attribute to Hume what I call "epistemic sentimentalism" that certain passions play an important role in the justification of reasoning. Specifically, the indirect passions such as love and pride and the calm and strong passions such as philosophical curiosity play a justificatory role. Calm and motivationally strong reasoning, worthy of a philosopher's pride, is the reasoning that Hume endorses.

This criterion redefines the distinction between justified and unjustified reasoning in such a way as to avoid falling into the radical scepticism that bothers philosophers. The source of the radical scepticism in the "Conclusion" is the fact that reasoning is based on trivial, inconsistent, and shallow propensities of the imagination. The problem is most acute in what Hume calls the "very dangerous dilemma" (T 1.4.7.6). If we follow all the "trivial property of the fancy" (T 1.4.7.7), then the result is total credulity. If we try to reason without the "trivial property of the fancy" (T 1.4.7.7), then the consequence is the extinction of all beliefs. According to my interpretation, the reasoning that is worthy of love and pride (chapters 3 and 4), and that mixes with the calm and strong passions (chapter 5), is the reasoning that Hume endorses, and these epistemic standards offers a path that does not fall into either of these extremes. Extreme credulity would involve reasoning contains falsehoods (or it

may not involve reasoning at all in the first place). If so, the reasoning of the credulous would be influenced by factors such as uncertainty and novelty, and would be accompanied by the violent passions. If a philosopher were to endorse such epistemically flawed and violent reasoning, it would cause anger in other philosophers and the philosopher would feel shame. On the other hand, excessive scepticism that annihilates all beliefs is only accompanied by despair, and thus weak passions. Such inactive reasoning, even if valid, is painful and humiliating for a philosopher. What avoids these two extremes is reasoning that is accompanied by the calm and strong passions, such as philosophical curiosity, of which philosophers are proud. A commitment to truth *to the extent that it generates strong passions* is what satisfies the philosopher's love of fame, ambition, and pride. Even though reasoning or the search for truth is itself based on the trivial, inconsistent, and shallow tendencies of the imagination, it is of great value to the philosopher in that it makes the passions calm and makes us (if we are philosophers) who we are. Since Hume's primary concern in the "Conclusion" is how *philosophers* should respond to the above scepticism, it would be sufficient as an interpretation of the "Conclusion" if we could offer a solution for philosophers.

This interpretation is naturalistic in that it appeals to psychological facts (passions) in justifying reasoning. However, it avoids the problems that have been directed at the traditional naturalistic interpretations. For the problem of normativity according to which it is unclear *why* we should follow the alleged naturalistic standards, the indirect passions provide a response (Chapter 4). Feeling pride or humility is a

constitutive part of seeing us as bearers of responsibility, as distinct from inanimate objects. What makes a philosopher a philosopher is to aim at pride-producing reasoning and to aim to avoid humility-producing reasoning. If so, then insofar as reasoning satisfying the alleged naturalistic criterion leads to pride and love, then being a philosopher gives one a constitutivist reason to follow such a criterion. For the problem of truth-insensitivity, where the alleged naturalistic criterion is not truth-sensitive in such a way that it can excludes superstition, the calm passions provide a response (Chapter 5). The calm passions are truth-sensitive in that the calmness is due to factors such as certainty, custom, and abstractness that contribute to the discovery of truth. However, reasoning that involve calm but weak passions, which would cause radical scepticism, is excluded. The reasoning that is accompanied by the calm and strong passions is what philosophers endorse.

The character traits that involve such reasoning, which involves pride and the calm passions, can be considered virtuous, because they are agreeable and useful when seen from the common point of view. So, my interpretation shares an interpretive direction in many respects with the "virtue-theoretic" interpretation of Hume's epistemology, which has been influential in recent years. In Chapter 6, I argued that my interpretations and the virtue-theoretic interpretation are not in competition. Hume's circle argument suggests that a complete account of norms which offer a response to scepticism requires the identification of the value of reasoning other than its virtuousness. Moreover, Hume's commitment to distinctively epistemic normativity requires a distinctively epistemic motive for reasoning, independently from its

virtuousness. My passion-based, non-virtue-theoretic interpretation supplements the virtue-theoretic interpretation by making up for these parts. On the other hand, I suggested that virtue could play a decisive role in an important question that I have not answered: what kind of reasoning should *non-philosophers* pursue? I suggested the possibility that by "moralizing" the calm reasoning that philosophers pride themselves on, non-philosophers may have reason to pursue such reasoning. In this way, my interpretation and the virtue-theoretic interpretation can complement each other in meaningful ways.

Bibliography

Abramson, Kate. “Two Portraits of the Humean Moral Agent.” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 83, no. 4 (2002): 301–34.

Ainslie, Donald C. “Scepticism about Persons in Book II of Hume’s Treatise.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 37, no. 3 (1999): 469–492.

Ainslie, Donald C. “Sympathy and the Unity of Hume’s Idea of Self.” Jenkins, J., Whiting J., Williams, C. (eds.) *Persons and Passions*, 143-173, University of Notre Dame Press, 2005.

Ainslie, Donald C. *Hume’s True Scepticism*. Oxford University Press, 2015a.

Ainslie, Donald C. “Hume and Moral Motivation.” In Donald Ainslie and Annemarie Butler (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hume’s Treatise*. pp. 283–300. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015b.

Allison, Henry. (2008). *Custom and Reason in Hume: A Kantian Reading of the First Book of the Treatise*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Árdal, Páll. *Passion and Value in Hume’s Treatise*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966.

Avnur, Yuval. ‘Excuses for Hume’s Skepticism’. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 92, 2 (2016): 264–306.

Baier, Annette. *A Progress of Sentiments*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Baron, Marcia. "Morality as a Back-up System: Hume's View?" *Hume Studies* 14, no. 1 (1988): 25–52.

Bell, Martin. "Hume on Superstition." In *Religion and Hume's Legacy*, edited by D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin, 153–70. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999.

Boeker, Ruth. "Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious Differences." *Hume Studies* 41, no. 2 (2015): 105–135.

Boyle, Deborah. "The Ways of the Wise: Hume's Rules of Causal Reasoning." *Hume Studies* 38, no. 2 (2012): 157–82.

Boyle, Deborah. "Hume and Animal Ethics." In A. Coventry and A. Sager (eds.) *The Humean Mind*, 470–480. Abingdon: Routledge, 2019.

Brady, Michael. *Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Broughton, Janet. "The Inquiry in Hume's Treatise." *The Philosophical Review* 113, no. 4 (2004): 537–56.

Brown, Charlotte. "Is Hume an Internalist?" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 26, no. 1 (1988): 69–87.

Brun, Georg, Ulvi Doğuoğlu, and Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), *Epistemology and Emotions*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.

Carlson, Åsa. "There Is Just One Idea of Self in Hume's Treatise." *Hume Studies* 35, no. 1/2 (2009): 171–184.

Cohon, Rachel. *Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Collier, Mark. "The Natural Foundations of Religion." *Philosophical Psychology* 27, no. 5 (2014): 665–80.

Cummins, Phillip D. "Hume's Diffident Skepticism." *Hume Studies* 25, no. 1/2 (1999): 43–65.

Damasio, Antonio R. *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1994.

Davidson, Donald. "Rational Animals." *Dialectica* 36, no. 4 (1982): 317–327.

de Sousa, Ronald, *The Rationality of Emotion*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.

Descartes, René, *The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes*, 3 vol., tr. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, volume 3 including A. Kenny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985–8.

Durland, Karánn. "Extreme Skepticism and Commitment in the Treatise." *Hume Studies* 37, no. 1 (2011): 65–98.

Dye, James. "Hume on Curing Superstition." *Hume Studies* 12, no. 2 (1986): 122–40.

Falkenstein, Lorne. "Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism in Hume's Account of Belief." *Hume Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 29–72.

Falkenstein Lorne. "Hume's Project in 'The Natural History of Religion.'" *Religious Studies* 39, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 1–21.

Ferreira, M. Jamie. “Hume’s ‘Mitigated Scepticism’: Some Implications for Religious Belief.” In *Religion and Hume’s Legacy*, edited by D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin, 47–67. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999.

Fogelin, Robert. *Hume’s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.

Garfield, Jay. *The Concealed Influence of Custom: Hume’s Treatise from the Inside Out*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Garrett, Don. *Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, 1997.

Garrett, Don. “Hume’s Conclusions in “Conclusion of this Book”. in S. Traiger (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise*, 151–176. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006.

Garrett, Don. “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared.” *Hume Studies* 33, no. 2 (2007): 257–88.

Garrett, Don. *Hume*. Routledge, 2015.

Gelfert, Axel. “Hume on Curiosity.” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 21, no. 4 (2013): 711–32.

Gill, Michael B. “Moral Phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 47, no. 4 (2009): 569–94.

Goldhaber, Charles. “The Humors in Hume’s Skepticism.” *Ergo* 7, no. 30 (2021): 789-824.

Goldie, Peter. “Emotion, Reason and Virtue”, in Evans and Cruse (eds.) *Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality*: 249–268, Oxford University Press, 2004.

Greco, Lorenzo. “The Self as Narrative in Hume.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 53, no. 4 (2015): 699–722.

Hakkarainen, Jani. “Hume’s Scepticism and Realism.” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 20, no. 2 (2012): 283–309.

Harris, James A. “A Compleat Chain of Reasoning: Hume’s Project InA Treatise of Human Nature, Books One and Two.” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 109, no. 1_pt_2 (2009): 129–48.

Hickerson, Ryan. “What the Wise Ought Believe: A Voluntarist Interpretation of Hume’s General Rules.” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 21, no. 6 (2013): 1133–53.

Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, tr. E. Curley, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994.

Hume, David. *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Hume, David. *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987.

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Hume, David. *The Natural History of Religion* (published with *A Dissertation on the*

Passions as part of The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume) ed. Tom. L. Beauchamp, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.

Hutcheson, Francis. *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, Aaron. Garrett (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002.

Hutcheson, Francis. *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatise*. Wolfgand Leidhold (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008.

Immerwahr, John. "Hurne on Tranquillizing the Passions." *Hume Studies* 18, no. 2 (1992): 293–314.

Johnson, Clarence Shole. "Hume's Theory of Moral Responsibility: Some Unresolved Matters." *Dialogue* 31, no. 1 (1992): 3–18.

Kail, Peter. "Hume's ethical conclusion". In M. Frasca-Spada & P. Kail (Eds.), *Impressions of Hume*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Kail, Peter. "Understanding Hume's Natural History of Religion." *The Philosophical Quarterly* 57, no. 227 (2007): 190–211.

Katsafanas, Paul. *Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism*. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Kelahan, Emily. "Naturalness and Artificiality in Humean Virtue Theory." *Hume Studies* 44, no. 2 (2018): 249–73.

Kemp Smith, Norman. *The Philosophy of David Hume: with a New Introduction by Don Garrett*. Basingstoke, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Knobe, Joshua, Sandeep Prasada, and George E. Newman. “Dual Character Concepts and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation.” *Cognition* 127, no. 2 (2013): 242–257.

Kopajtic, Lauren. “Cultivating Strength of Mind: Hume on the Government of the Passions and Artificial Virtue.” *Hume Studies* 41, no. 2 (2015): 201–29.

Korsgaard, Christine M. *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Lecaldano, Eugenio. “The Passions, Character, and the Self in Hume.” *Hume Studies* 28, no. 2 (2002): 175–93.

Livingston, Donald W. *Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume’s Pathology of Philosophy*. University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Loeb, Louis. *Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise*, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Loeb, Louis. “Epistemological Commitment in Hume’s Treatise”, in D. Garber and D. Rutherford (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy Volume VI*, 309-347. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Malebranche, Nicolas, *The Search after Truth*, tr. T. Lennon and P. Olscamp, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

Marušić, Jennifer Smalligan. “Refuting The Whole System? Hume’s Attack on Popular Religion in The Natural History of Religion.” *The Philosophical Quarterly* 62, no. 249 (2012): 715–36.

McCormick, Miriam. “Why Should We Be Wise?” *Hume Studies* 31, no. 1 (2005): 3–19.

McIntyre, Jane L. “Personal Identity and the Passions.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27, no. 4 (1989): 545–557.

McKenna, Michael. *Conversation and Responsibility*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Millican, Peter, ed. *Reading Hume on Human Understanding*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Millican, Peter. ‘Hume’s Chief Argument’. In P. Russell (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Hume*, 82–108. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Morris, William. “Hume’s Conclusion.” *Philosophical Studies* 99, no. 1 (2000): 89–110.

Morton, Adam, 2010, “Epistemic emotions”, in Goldie (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, 385-400. Oxford University Press, 2010.

Mounce, H. O. *Hume’s Naturalism*. London: Routledge, 1999.

Owen, David. *Hume’s Reason*. Oxford University Press, 1999.

Pickavé, Martin and Lisa Shapiro (eds.) *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Pitson, Tony. *Hume’s Philosophy of the Self*, London: Routledge, 2002.

Popkin, Richard H. “David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism.” *The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)* 1, no. 5 (1951): 385–407.

Qu, Hsueh. “The Simple Duality: Humean Passions.” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 42, no. sup1 (2012): 98–116.

Qu, Hsueh. “Hume’s Practically Epistemic Conclusions?” *Philosophical Studies* 170, no. 3 (2014): 501–24.

Qu, Hsueh. “Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.” *Mind* 126, no. 501 (2017a): 53–92.

Qu, Hsueh. “Hume’s Dispositional Account of the Self.” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 95, no. 4 (2017b): 644–657.

Qu, Hsueh. “Hume’s Epistemology: The State of the Question.” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 57, no. 3 (2019): 301–23.

Qu, Hsueh, *Hume’s Epistemological Evolution*. Oxford University Press, 2020.

Radcliffe, Elizabeth. “Hume’s Psychology of the Passions: The Literature and Future Directions.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 53, no. 4 (2015): 565–605.

Radcliffe, Elizabeth. *Hume, Passion, and Action*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Reed, Philip A. “What’s Wrong with Monkish Virtues? Hume on the Standard of Virtue.” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (2012a): 39–56.

Reed, Philip A. “Motivating Hume’s Natural Virtues.” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 42, no. S1 (2012b): 134–47.

Ridge, Michael. “Epistemology Moralized: David Hume’s Practical Epistemology.” *Hume Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003): 165–204.

Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg. "'Pride Produces the Idea of Self': Hume on Moral Agency." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 68, no. 3 (1990): 255–269.

Russell, Paul. *Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Russell, Paul. *The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion*.Oxford University Press, 2008.

Santos Castro, J.S., 2015, *The Historical Convergence of Happiness and Virtue: A Reading of Hume's Theory of Moral Motivation*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Alberta.

Sasser, Nathan I. "Hume's Purely Practical Response to Philosophical Skepticism." *Hume Studies* 43, no. 2 (2017): 3–28.

Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. "Hume on the Artificial Virtues." In P. Russell (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Hume*, 435-460. Oxford University Press, 2016

Schafer, Karl. "Curious Virtues in Hume's Epistemology." *Philosophers' Imprint* 1, no. 1 (2014).

Schafer, Karl. "Kant: Constitutivism as Capacities-First Philosophy." *Philosophical Explorations* 22, no. 2 (2019a): 177–93.

Schafer, Karl. "The Artificial Virtues of Thought: Correctness and Cognition in Hume." *Philosopher's Imprint* 19, no. 7 (2019b).

Schmitt, Frederick. *Hume's Epistemology in the Treatise*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Schmitter, Amy M. "Making an Object of Yourself: On the Intentionality of the Passions in Hume." In J. Miller (ed.) *Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind*, 223–240. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009.

Schmitter, Amy M. "17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2021. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2021. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/emotions-17th18th/.

Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, edited by Lawrence Klein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Shoemaker, David. "Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame." *Philosophical Review* 126, no. 4 (2017): 481–527.

Tanaka, Ryo. "Hume on Nonhuman Animals, Causal Reasoning, and General Thoughts." *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 59.2 (2021): 205-229.

Taylor, Jacqueline Anne. *Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and Society in Hume's Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, 2015.

Velleman, David. *How We Get Along*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Vitz, Rico. "Doxastic Virtues in Hume's Epistemology." *Hume Studies* 35, no. 1/2 (2009): 211–29.

Vitz, Rico. "Contagion, Community, and Virtue in Hume's Epistemology." In *The Ethics of Belief*, edited by Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz, 198-215. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Watkins, Margaret. *The Philosophical Progress of Hume's Essays*. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Watson, Gary. "Two Faces of Responsibility." *Philosophical Topics* 24, no. 2 (1996): 227–48.

Waxman, Wayne. *Hume's Theory of Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1994.

Welchman, Jennifer. "Self-Love and Personal Identity in Hume's Treatise." *Hume Studies* 41, no. 1 (2015): 33–55.

Williams, Michael. "The Unity of Hume's Philosophical Project." *Hume Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 265–96.

Wilson, Fred. "Hume's Defence of Causal Inference." *Dialogue* 22, no. 4 (1983): 661–94.

Winkler, Kenneth. "Hume's Inductive Scepticism". In M. Atherton (ed.) *The Empiricists: Critical Essays on Locke, Berkeley, and Hume*, 183–212. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.

Zagzebski, Linda, *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.