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IDEOLOGICAL PROLETARIANIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF EDUCATORS

by

Robert Alan Runté

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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IN

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled IDEOLOGICAL PROLETARIANIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF EDUCATORS submitted by ROBERT ALAN RUNTE in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION.

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ABSTRACT

This is a case study in the sociology of work and the professions, and reports on a group of educators working within a provincial Department of Education. The central purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which educators exercise autonomous control over their work.

Most educators consider teaching a profession and so expect to be granted some measure of professional autonomy. A review of the sociological literature, however, reveals that many of our traditional assumptions about what constitutes a profession are invalid. To resolve the conceptual confusion which has surrounded the analysis of trends in the organization of mental labour, a synthesis of the deprofessionalization and proletarianization models is proposed. Within this new analytical framework, two alternative interpretations of professional control are examined. A review of Eliot Freidson's professional dominance model leads to the question "Do educators dominate the public education bureaucracy, and so control education policy, or are they subject to direction from an external bureaucratic management?" Magali Sarfatti Larson's model of technobureaucratic professions raises the question "Does the proliferation of specialized central office positions in education indicate the emergence of new technobureaucratic professions whose usurpation of design functions inevitably erodes the autonomy of classroom teachers?"

To address these issues, the participation of various educators in the development of a provincial program of standardized testing is analyzed. The major finding of this study is that educators in the case study province have autonomous control over the technical aspects of their work, but have little control over the goals of education. Specifically, this investigation demonstrates that the introduction of centralized provincial testing has eroded the teachers' control over student evaluation and the curriculum, but that this loss has been partially obscured by the teachers' continued command of evaluation technique. Freidson's professional dominance model is found to be inadequate, although the emergent specialization of test developer cannot be considered an example of a distinct technobureaucratic occupation. Instead, this case study illustrates Charles Derber's model of ideological proletarianization, in

which the separation of means and goals within heteronomous bureaucracies allows knowledge workers to achieve only a narrow technical discretion.

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First, I would like to thank the Director and staff of the case study site for allowing me essentially unlimited access to their archives and meetings, and for allowing me to interview them in spite of their already overloaded schedules. It would be impossible to find a more open and cooperative organization, and I am deeply grateful for their assistance in this research. As former (and in some cases, current) colleagues, however, I owe much more than just the current research to this group: the Branch also taught me everything I know about the evaluation of student learning. As I have subsequently pursued my own academic career in this field, I have increasingly come to appreciate how advanced was the work done by the Branch, how thoroughly committed to quality and innovation the staff at every level, and how truly unique the staff's responsiveness to classroom teachers. The Branch was and remains one of the finest collection of educators with whom I have ever been associated (the occasionally cynical undertone of my analysis of Branch structures notwithstanding).

My advisory committee was also exceptional. I was greatly honoured that Dr. Pike agreed not only to be the external reader for my dissertation but insisted on actually attending the oral defence in person, at considerable expense to himself. His presence made the experience a much more memorable and rewarding one. Similarly, Dr. Lowe's comments during my candidacy brought needed focus to my initial research proposal, and his comments during the oral defence suggested several avenues I hope to pursue in adapting the present document for possible publication.

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professors.

I would also like to thank my colleagues and students at the University of Lethbridge for their support. The last year of dissertation writing crowded over into my first year of full-time teaching, and I often feel that it was only the uniquely collegial atmosphere of the Lethbridge campus that allowed me to cope with the resulting 16 hour days. Dr. O'Dea deserves especial mention here for the timely pep talks that allowed me to overcome the writer's blocks that inevitably plague the writing of one's final chapters. She gave me the following clipping, which I taped next to my computer screen and read over each morning before beginning the day's work:

> A long and difficult enquiry has the character of a venture which comprehensively engages the self of the enquirer. Anxiety is frequently the prevailing mood, and confusion, dead ends, disappointments, lack of inspiration, and lack of energy combine to generate wretchedness. On the other hand, insights occur unexpectedly, ways open up where there had seemed to be no way, things which had seemed disparate fall together, and so on. Disagreeable experiences probably occupy more of the total time of the enquiry than agreeable experiences, and on reflection, it is often hard to believe that their intensity was less. ——R. K. Elliot[1]

This quotation invariably placed my own dissertation angst in perspective and kept me going in the face of the all too frequent realization that I *still* had another 50 pages to write to get to where I thought I would have been two months ago.

My brother Douglas, too, deserves credit for the many late night conversations that helped me to sharpen my arguments. His willingness to listen and debate at odd hours helped tremendously in banishing the onslaught of thesis malaise.

Thanks are also due to Christine Kulyk for agreeing to copyedit the final draft of this document on very short notice. Sophisticated computerized spelling and grammar checkers notwithstanding, it still takes a skilled human to proofread a manuscript properly, and Christine proved to be among the best.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for putting up with an endless refrain of "I promise I'll do that as soon as I finish my dissertation". I had certainly not anticipated that it would take eight years, or that I would have moved to another city before I could make good on any of those promises. I will try to make it up to you all — just as soon as I finish this next project. . . .

---

[1] "Education and Justification", *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain* Vol. XI (July, 1977).

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INTRODUCTION:

EDUCATION AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS

It is impossible to work in the field of education today without recognizing the erosion of the teacher's independence that has occurred in most Western industrialized nations. The last decade has seen the introduction of national or statewide curricula in systems that had previously relied on local educators to organize instruction; and even in those jurisdictions that have always provided curricular guidelines, there has been a corresponding attempt to "teacher-proof" the curriculum by increasing the reliance on pre-packaged materials, thereby further limiting whatever discretion teachers had retained in the operationalization of these externally set objectives. The same period saw the nearly universal reintroduction of provincial testing, which not only removes the teacher's responsibility for student evaluation, but further narrows instructional discretion by enforcing adherence to the centralized curriculum. This restoration of external testing is only one aspect of the renewed emphasis on accountability currently being imposed on the schools. Educational administration is being restructured to conform more closely to the business models favoured by the conservative governments that have dominated the political landscape throughout the 1980s. Disillusioned by the failure of the human capital model (whose proponents had once advocated massive investment in education as a panacea for all our social and economic problems), these conservative legislators are now committed to imposing both fiscal and managerial restraints on a school system they feel is out of control. Consequently, there has been a subtle but continuous trend towards greater top-down hierarchical direction within education. As Jenny Ozga observes:

> Teaching is going through a period of crisis, from which it is likely to emerge as different in significant ways from teaching as it was characterized in the 1960s, the 'zenith' of teachers' professional autonomy. The nature of teaching is being fundamentally altered by a number of different policy initiatives, the cumulative effect of which is to greatly increase central government control over the teaching force.[2]

Ironically, these developments have been accompanied by a contradictory increase in the rhetoric of teacher professionalism and 'empowerment'. In spite of the trends that are undermining teacher autonomy, many educators continue to subscribe to a professional self-image that impairs their ability to analyze and respond to the situation in which they now find themselves. Education journals and textbooks still feature articles which attempt to interpret occupational changes in terms of a list of — what are presumed to be — professional characteristics, derived from the observation of medicine or law. For example, educators have long sought to lengthen teacher preparatory programs and to raise admission standards, in an attempt to bring these requirements in line with those of the more prestigious professions. These goals were largely achieved in the 1980s, but it would be a mistake to interpret this as representing an improvement in teaching's professional standing. Instead, these reforms are more realistically attributed to the teacher surpluses of the period, and the associated credential inflation. The projected teacher shortages of the next decade are just as likely to reverse the trend, as happened once before in the 1960s. Similarly, while the creation of British Columbia's College of Teachers in 1988 was represented as a step towards greater professional recognition — by direct analogy to the College of Physicians and Surgeons — a more cynical interpretation might be that the transfer of key professional functions from the British Columbia Teachers' Federation to this new body represents a not very subtle form of union busting. Critical analysis of the various empowerment schemes currently in vogue might also suggest that the top-down delegation of authority over a restricted range of technical decisions (such as which of two nearly identical pre-packaged resources best meets the requirements of the centrally mandated curriculum) is a better illustration of controlled participation than of professional autonomy. Thus, it may be time for teachers to reassess their model of professionalism and its applicability in the current context.

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[2] Jenny Ozga, *Schoolwork: Approaches to the Labour Process of Teaching* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), pp. ix-x.

Such an examination must begin with the recognition that our traditional assumptions about what constitutes a profession may be invalid. A review of the sociological literature reveals many inadequacies in both our conception of profession and its continued relevance following a hundred years of political, economic, and technological change. Marie Haug, for example, points to the erosion of professional monopolies of knowledge, and the associated decline in status and authority.[3] Terence Johnson talks about the shift from 'collegiate' to 'mediated' control in the professions.[4] John McKinlay points to a shift from self-employment to salaried employment and the associated loss of control over the work process.[5] Charles Derber is concerned with the 'proletarianization' of the professional's work process; that is, the erosion of professional autonomy to the point where the professional becomes part of a 'new working class'.[6] Magali Sarfatti Larson suggests that:

> . . . the conditions of professional work have changed so that the predominant pattern is no longer that of the free practitioner in a market of services, but that of the salaried specialist in a large organization. In this age of corporate capitalism, the model of profession nevertheless retains its vigor; it is still something to be defended or something to be obtained by occupations in a different historical context, in radically different work settings, and in radically altered forms of practice. The persistence of profession as a category of social practice suggests that the model constituted by the first movements of professionalism has become *an ideology* — not only an image which consciously inspires collective or individual efforts, but a mystification which unconsciously obscures real social structures and relations.[7]

This obfuscation of real social structures and relations, according to Larson, leaves professional workers open to proletarianization. Whatever their theoretical perspective, most sociologists agree that the achievement and maintenance of one of the most important professional privileges, that of autonomous control over the work process, can no longer be taken for granted.

---

[3] Marie R. Haug, "The Deprofessionalization of Everyone?" *Sociological Focus* 8 (1975): 197-213, and "A Re-Examination of the Hypothesis of Physician Deprofessionalization," *The Milbank Quarterly* 66, suppl. 2 [1988 (©1989)]: 48-56.

[4] Terence J. Johnson, *Professions and Power* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1972).

[5] John B. McKinlay, "Toward the Proletarianization of Physicians" in Charles Derber (ed.) *Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1982), pp. 37-62; and "The Changing Character of the Medical Profession " [Introduction], *The Milbank Quarterly* 66, suppl. 2 [1988 (©1989)]: 1-9.

[6] Charles Derber, *Professionals as Workers: Mental Labour in Advanced Capitalism*, pp. 3-34.

[7] Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), p. xviii.

Sociologists began challenging the core elements of the professional model nearly 20 years ago, but it is only very recently that these ideas have been introduced to the parallel discussions in education. Alexander Lockhart's *School Teaching in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), for example, Alexander Lockhart's *Schoolteaching in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), for example, was the first general text to address these issues as they apply to teaching in this country. Like Ozga, Lockhart concludes that:

> *It is apparent that the occupation of schoolteaching is undergoing a crisis that threatens the integrity of one of the most all-encompassing public service institutions in the nation. If this crisis is to be effectively resolved, some greater awareness of the realities, as distinct from the ideologies and mythologies, of the occupation of schoolteaching is required of all concerned.*[8]

It is therefore crucial that educators end their preoccupation with the illusory goal of professionalization and begin instead to analyze the actual nature of teachers' work.

Jenny Ozga's 1988 reader, Schoolwork: Approaches to the Labour Process of Teaching, was an important step in this direction, but focused almost entirely on the classroom teacher. This is only natural given the pioneering nature of the work, but it is now necessary to turn our attention to the rapidly growing ranks of non-classroom educators: the curriculum designers, test developers, central office consultants, and others, who — although they have no direct interaction with students — are playing an increasingly prominent role in education. The emergence of these new specializations within education has attracted little attention in either the education or sociological literature, but may have profound implications for both fields. For example, though nominally part of the same profession, these non-classroom educators work under very different conditions than what Lockhart terms the "collegial isolation" of the classroom setting.[9] More important, these educators are now making many of the decisions formerly considered part of the classroom teacher's responsibility, and the emergence of these new superordinate positions may be seen as a direct threat to the continued independence of their classroom colleagues.

---

[8] Lockhart, pp. 17-18.

[9] Lockhart, p. 59.

The very term 'teacher', however, connotes the classroom setting and distracts attention from these other categories of educator. Teacher colleges and faculties of education are generally preoccupied with issues related to either classroom instruction or system administration, and so have not directed their attention to the intermediate, but perhaps more crucial, ranks of curriculum designers or test developers.[10] Restating the question as an investigation of the labour process of 'education workers' would help to broaden the discussion to include those segments of the education community previously overlooked. This is necessary not only because the work process of these other educators is equally worthy of study, but also because such an analysis raises important issues concerning the fragmentation of the teaching role implicit in the proliferation of non-classroom specialists. In other words, it is impossible to understand the teacher's work process in isolation from the changing division of labour within the school system.

There is a similar blind spot in the sociological research. Although sociologists have understood the importance of role fragmentation for the professional's work process, the focus has tended to be on how this new division of labour affects the rank and file practitioner — while the work process of these newly created specialists has attracted little attention. As intermediate and superordinate specializations continue to proliferate in the professions, greater attention needs to be paid to these new occupational categories.

The range of professions studied also needs to be expanded. Much of the sociological investigation of the professions has focused on medicine and law, though as Larson points out, there is little reason to assume that developments in these occupations will be typical of other knowledge workers. Educators constitute the largest group of workers engaged in mental labour but have attracted far less attention from labour theorists than have most other professionals.

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[10] This inattention is ironic because the leadership role formerly enjoyed by the university-based researcher is itself threatened by the proliferation of specialist positions within the provincial bureaucracy. Not only do these government experts form a rival professional elite, they have the advantage of hierarchical authority to enforce their interpretation of appropriate professional goals and standards over those of the trainer-researcher.

This dissertation is an attempt to rectify these oversights.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

This study addresses several issues simultaneously.

At one level, it is an attempt to resolve important theoretical debates in sociology concerning the current status and the prognosis for the future of those occupations commonly thought of as the professions. There has been considerable and unnecessary conceptual confusion surrounding the analysis of current trends, as ideological divisions have perpetuated essentially three separate research traditions advocating the contradictory interpretations of the professionalization, deprofessionalization and proletarianization models. A new synthesis of these separate approaches is proposed in Chapter 1, which in turn leads to an analysis of the relationship between bureaucratization and professionalization.

Of particular interest here is the debate between M. S. Larson and Eliot Freidson over the nature of professional control. Both authors have noted a trend towards an increasing vertical differentiation within professional bureaucracies, but have interpreted this in fundamentally different ways. The creation and growth of specialized central office positions in education, at both the local and provincial levels, provides an example of this trend and therefore a useful case study for these alternative interpretations.[11]

A second issue arising out of the sociological literature requiring empirical verification is Charles Derber's reinterpretation of the proletarianization model. Derber is careful in his analysis to distinguish between means and ends, arguing that control over these two aspects of the work process may vary independently. Thus, knowledge workers who believe they have professional autonomy because they have retained control over the *technical* aspects of their daily practice may still have undergone ***ideological proletarianization***, the loss of control over the profession's goals and standards. The trends that are eroding the teacher's control over education provide an exceptionally clear illustration of the processes Derber describes. By undertaking a case study of the erosion of professional autonomy in education, it will be possible to specify the conditions under which ideological proletarianization is likely to occur, and to identify some of the mechanisms through which it is accomplished.

---

[11] Significantly, both authors illustrate their arguments through explicit reference to the divisions between classroom teachers and school superintendents within the teaching profession, but neither addresses the emergence of more recent specializations such as curriculum design or test development. Because it is ambiguous whether these specialists should be considered as practitioners or administrators, they provide a particularly demanding, and therefore appropriate, test case.

At another level, this is also a study of how current developments in education are changing the educator's work process. While a case study of the ideological proletarianization of educators will hopefully produce insights with general applicability to other knowledge workers, educators will be interested in the study primarily for what it has to say about their own situation. For example, if theorists such as Larson and Derber are correct, then the emergence of superordinate specializations within education implies the fragmentation of the teaching role and the profession's loss of control over the goals of education. If, on the other hand, Freidson's *professional dominance* model is correct, then the concentration of design functions within a hierarchical elite need not diminish the profession's input into education policy. Both interpretations hinge on an analysis of decision making within this new division of labour, and so require a case study of the non-classroom educator, but the results of this analysis will provide the prognosis for schoolteaching.

At the same time, if teachers are to retain any control over their own work, then they must first be able to anticipate, understand, and respond to educational issues with some awareness of the implications for their own labour process. One of the most significant current trends in this regard is the renewed emphasis on external examinations. Sociologists concerned with the school's role in the reproduction of the social order have always defined testing issues in terms of their implications for the students, but it is not the school's selection and allocation functions that are driving the current resurgence of centralized testing. Instead, the introduction of assessment-driven curricula and the increasing reliance on standardized testing seem more a reflection of governments' increasing obsession with accountability. The Council of Ministers of Education (Canada), for example, recently announced the adoption of a national testing program designed to compare, not individual students, but rather the performance of entire school systems. By holding educators accountable in this fashion, governments are implicitly rejecting the profession's claim to self-regulation, and asserting greater direct control over education. The introduction of centralized testing is therefore likely to affect the teacher's work process, and the nature and significance of that impact is one of the issues to be addressed in the current study.

At a third level, this is a case study of the labour process of the non-classroom educators themselves. How much influence does this group really have over the formulation and implementation of education policy? Do these specialists provide hierarchical direction to classroom teachers, or are their own decisions restrained by the rank and file's assertion of collegial authority? Are they more or less autonomous than classroom teachers? Just as classroom teachers need to see through the rhetoric of increasing professionalization to understand the actual changes in their work process, non-classroom educators need to look beyond their hierarchical titles, presumed career ladders, and committee structures to analyze how and by whom decisions are actually made.

For their part, schoolteachers will be interested in the fortunes of these non-classroom educators, not only for the impact these roles have on the teacher's work, but also because many classroom teachers aspire to these specialist positions. For example, even before the current proliferation of central office jobs, a survey conducted in Ontario indicated that 55 per cent of male teachers anticipated that they would eventually leave teaching for careers in school administration.[12] Obviously only a few will succeed, but all may be interested in what awaits them if they do.

This is also, of course, a case study of a particular organization, which in the event turned out to be a fascinating illustration of good intentions subtly subverted by false consciousness and the daily compromises with expediency. Much that was observed in this study contradicted the stated objectives of the participants, and while there was no deliberate conspiracy by the local management to undermine the professional autonomy of either classroom teachers or their own professional staff,[13] the consequences were often the same as if there had been. Observing how organizations go wrong is always a useful (if sometimes frustrating) exercise, and though not the central focus of the study, forms the backdrop against which the rest of the story unfolds.

---

[12] A. J. C. King and R. A. Ripton, "Teachers and Students: A Preliminary Analysis of Collective Reciprocity," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 7(1): 35-48; cited in Lockhart, p. 63.

The central research problem of this study, then, is to determine the extent to which educators exercise autonomous control over their work process. 'Educator' in this context includes both classroom teachers and non-classroom specialists. By 'work process' I mean both (a) the goals, objectives, and policies guiding and defining the institutions in which the educator is located and (b) how the technical tasks and procedures performed by the educator are carried out. This problem gives rise to several specific research questions

1. What is the relationship between professionalization, deprofessionalization, and proletarianization?
2. What is the relationship between bureaucracy, hierarchical control, and knowledge worker autonomy?
3. What is the relationship between specialization (role fragmentation) and knowledge worker autonomy?
4. What is the relationship between autonomous control over goals and autonomous control over means?
5. What are the specific mechanisms that undermine or reinforce knowledge worker autonomy?
6. Who controls education?
    a. Who establishes the general goals for education?
    b. Who decides how those goals will be operationalized and implemented?
7. What are the implications of centralized testing for the classroom teacher?
8. Are educators undergoing professionalization, deprofessionalization, or proletarianization? That is, what is the prognosis for the teaching profession's autonomous control over the work process?

Changes in the educators' labour process are obviously influenced by a variety of social, political, and economic factors and an effort has been made in Chapters 4 and 9 to locate the current study within this larger context. The focus of the dissertation, however, is on an examination of the specific factors which may have attributed to the erosion of the educator's professional autonomy, without necessarily attempting to account for these external developments. For example, it is neither necessary nor practical to include an in depth analysis of the resurgence of conservatism that typified the Reagan/Thatcher/Mulroney era simply to note that these administrations encouraged a renewed emphasis on teacher accountability, which in turn led to a number of initiatives which appear to have eroded teacher autonomy.

---

[13] I will argue in Chapter 4 that there *was* such a conscious policy at the highest levels within the Ministry and Cabinet.

Nor has there been any attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the specific skills or daily tasks required of educators employed in non-classroom settings. While such a study would compliment the growing body of research now available on classroom teaching,[14] it remains outside the scope of the current investigation. Rather than a detailed examination of the substantive complexity of the educator's work process, the current study focuses specifically on the dimension of autonomous control.

ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

There are nine chapters following this Introduction.

Chapters 1 and 2 provide a review of the relevant literature. Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the theoretical issues drawn from the essentially separate research traditions of sociology, business management, and the various professions. This section also introduces Charles Derber's distinction between *technical* and *ideological* proletarianization, the empirical verification of which is a central theme of this study. A new analytical framework is then presented in the second half of Chapter 1, based on a synthesis of the deprofessionalization and proletarianization models, and concludes with an analysis of the impact of bureaucratization on knowledge worker autonomy. The contrasting approaches of Freidson's professional dominance model and Larson's model of the emergence of technobureaucratic professions are given some prominence here as one of the theoretical debates to be investigated. The discussion of profession and professionalization within the education literature is briefly considered in Chapter 2, though most of the material reviewed is dismissed as misconceived, ideologically motivated, and 20 years out of date.

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[14] See, for example, Sidney Hilsum's classic study, *The Teacher at Work* (Slough, Bucks, United Kingdom: National Foundation for Research in Education in England and Wales, 1972).

The case study is introduced in Chapter 3. The research site and the reasons for its selection are described, along with the case study methodology. (Planning documents for the interviews, including a detailed blueprint of specific research questions, are included in Appendix A.[15] The interview schedule itself is included in Appendix B.)

Chapter 4 begins with an overview of the likely implications of centralized testing for the educator's work process, thus delineating what is at stake. The decision to reintroduce provincial testing (and consequently, to establish a specialized examinations Branch) is then used to illustrate how and by whom the basic goals of education are established in the case study province. This analysis focuses primarily on the government at the Cabinet and Ministerial levels, but includes a summary of the relevant ideological context.

This discussion is then extended in Chapter 5 to an examination of the decision-making process within the testing Branch itself. The organizational structure is outlined, and the policy role of each rank is assessed in turn. Several informal barriers to active participation in the formulation of policy are also identified.

Following this explication of the nature of goal setting within the Ministry and Branch, the analysis in Chapter 6 narrows the focus to the day-to-day decisions of test development. Here the discussion centres on the elaborate committee structures which are a major feature of this Ministry's operations.

The participation of classroom teachers in the test-development process is investigated in Chapter 7. The case study Ministry is exceptionally active in seeking input from classroom teachers and so provides an especially useful test case for the arguments developed in this chapter.

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[15] Note that the data collection included several issues not dealt with in the current study. This dissertation represents the first third of what I hope will be a very thorough investigation of issues related to profession. Since access to this site represented a unique opportunity, it seemed best to collect all the relevant information at once, rather than attempt to repeat the entire process for the subsequent studies.

Chapter 8 returns to a more detailed analysis of Branch staffing to determine whether these are members of the public service profession of teaching or members of the distinct technobureaucratic profession of educational administration.

Chapter 9 summarizes the study's major conclusions and explores their implications for both sociology and the education worker. An attempt is also made to place the current study within a larger context by speculating on the social, economic, and political changes which may have affected the fortunes of the teaching profession in the case study province.

A glossary and a simplified organizational chart of the case study site are provided in Appendix C.

The chapters related to the case study generally begin with a description of the relevant roles or procedures and build towards interpretation as the patterns inherent in the data are progressively revealed. However, since the descriptive material is often quite lengthy, some readers may prefer to begin Chapters 5 through 8 by first reading the chapter summary or conclusion, which might then facilitate their reading and assessment of the chapter.

CHAPTER 1

REVIEW OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE

OVERVIEW

There are four competing paradigms of professionalism current in the literature: trait models, structural-functionalism, the Chicago school, and Marxism. These four perspectives are divided among three nearly separate bodies of literature: the sociological, the professional, and the managerial. The professional literature may be usefully subdivided into that of the established and the aspiring professions. The literature may also be divided into four broad themes: professionalization, professional dominance, deprofessionalization, and proletarianization. Table 1 summarizes how these interrelate.

In Table 1 we see that sociologists have largely abandoned the trait model and structural-functional approaches in the study of professionalism, but that these paradigms continue to flourish in the applied literature. Practitioners and managers continue to define 'profession' in terms of various trait models, and commentators in these fields often refer to sociological studies that are 20 to 30 years old to support their positions. Similarly, practitioners in occupations aspiring to professional status continue to argue the case for a general trend towards professionalization, even while those in the established professions use the same structural-functional model to come to exactly the opposite conclusion. It remains necessary, therefore, to provide a brief outline of these outmoded sociological approaches and to highlight their more glaring inadequacies.

TABLE 1: RESEARCH TRADITIONS, PARADIGMS, AND TRENDS IN THE STUDY OF THE PROFESSIONS

	RESEARCH TRADITION:			
PARADIGM:	SOCIOLOGICAL	PROFESSIONAL (ESTABLISHED)	PROFESSIONAL (ASPIRING)	MANAGERIAL
TRAIT THEORY E.g., Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933), Millerson (1964)	No Longer Current	Profession Defined	Profession Defined	Profession Defined
STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM E.g., Parsons (1954), Wilensky (1964), Goode (1970)	No Longer Current	Deprofessionalization E.g., Haug (1975, 1988)	Professionalization E.g., still cites Wilensky, Goode	Professionalization (Managing Knowledge Workers) E.g., Kelly (1985), Shapero (1985), Drucker (1988)
CHICAGO SCHOOL E.g., Hughes (1958), Freidson (1970-1986), Abbott (1988)	Professional Dominance E.g., Freidson (1986) Or: Inter-Professional Struggle E.g., Abbott (1988)	Professional Dominance E.g., Freidson (1970-1986), Wolinsky (1988)	Minor Interest Only E.g., occasionally cites Freidson	Not Cited
MARXIST PERSPECTIVES E.g., Oppenheimer (1973), Larson (1977), Derber (1982)	Political Economy E.g., Johnson (1972), Larson (1977) Proletarianization E.g., Johnson (1977), Derber (1982)	Proletarianization E.g., McKinlay (1982) Corporatization E.g., McKinlay and Stoeckle (1988)	Rarely Cited	Never Cited

Trait Models

The sociological investigation of the professions began in the 1930s with attempts to identify the defining attributes or traits that distinguished the professions from other occupations.[1] While the precise content of these models varied from writer to writer, the most commonly cited traits were (1) skill based on abstract knowledge, (2) provision for training and education, (3) certification based on competency testing, (4) formal organization, (5) adherence to a code of conduct, and (6) altruistic service.[2] A substantial body of research quickly developed in which investigators undertook case studies of various occupations to determine the degree to which each exhibited these traits and, consequently, whether they could be considered as 'true' professions.

Popular as trait models were, however, they all suffered from a general atheoretical approach. Most took the established professions of medicine and law as their starting point and simply assumed that the unique characteristics of these two occupations accounted for their professional status. As Larson has since pointed out, however, there was no basis for concluding that medicine and law were not themselves exceptional cases and therefore unsuitable as models for other professional occupations.[3] Even if one ignores the obvious tautology of defining as professional those traits found in the established professions, there was no theoretical rationale provided for selecting or emphasizing one set of professional characteristics over some other. (Indeed, the selection of characteristics considered relevant was usually based on the author's desire to argue for or against a particular occupation's claim to professional status.) In other words, there was little attempt to establish the causal relationships between various elements of the model, such that it was unclear which traits gave rise to the others, or whether all the elements arose independently from unexplained outside forces.[4]

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[1] Typical of these early works was A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The Professions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933).

[2] G. Millerson, *The Qualifying Associations: A Study in Professionalisation*, Table 1.1, p. 5.

[3] Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis*, p. 37.

[4] Terence J. Johnson, *Professions and Power*, pp. 24-25.

Furthermore, the traits themselves were never clearly defined, because one was never told precisely *how much* training was required, *how esoteric* the theoretical knowledge needed, *how restrictive* the certification obtained, and so on, before an occupation could be considered professional. Even if one were to take the average length of training in medicine or law (which varies considerably between jurisdictions and among specializations) as the standard, is this an absolute or a relative standard?[5] Does the increasing length of training in an occupation indicate its growing equality with medicine and law, or merely credential inflation? For that matter, can years of formal training be equated with quality of training? Given the model's inability to precisely define relevant traits, their interaction, or their origins, trait theories have been largely discredited within sociology.

Nevertheless, trait models continue to be an important aspect of professional *ideology*. As the professions' definition of themselves, traits models remain a useful ideological resource to inspire collective action and to justify demands on managers, the legislature, and clients. Many commentators continue to measure their occupation against various trait models of professionalism in an attempt to support their occupation's claim to professional status, or to demonstrate the need for particular reforms within their occupation to bring it closer to a supposed professional standard. Thus, while no longer taken seriously by sociologists, trait models retain their hold over the literature of various professional occupations.

Similarly, trait models remain popular in the administrative literature precisely because they are atheoretical. As descriptions of a distinct group of employees requiring special administrative arrangements, trait models provide an easily articulated framework for the prescription of specialized management techniques. Since management is primarily concerned with the maximization of the appropriation of surplus value from professional employees, administrators are probably even less interested in demystifying actual social structures than are the professionals themselves. Thus, as an ideological resource, trait models can be used by management to either (1) accommodate employees' demands by granting the superficial trappings of professionalism without increasing their actual autonomy (e.g., allowing self-monitoring of management-set tasks) or (b) to reject outright the claims to professional status and autonomy of those employees who fail to marshal a sufficient number of required traits.[6]

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[5] Ibid.

Structural-Functionalism

The structural-functionalists built on trait models by providing the theoretical rationalizations required to interrelate the various traits that had been observed. Bernard Barber, for example, identified four essential attributes of professional groups: (1) a systematic body of knowledge; (2) orientation to the community rather than self-interest; (3) self-control through internalized codes of ethics and through self-governing voluntary associations; and (4) a system of rewards (monetary and honorary) which are primarily symbolic of work achievement and so an end in themselves rather than the means to some end of individual self-interest.[7] Barber then argued that the potential for exploitation implied by the monopoly of specialized knowledge in '(1)' is restrained through the creation of a professional role which is self-regulating, service-oriented, and interested in material rewards (profits) largely for their symbolic value. Similarly, Durkheim saw in the professions a counterforce to society's growing *anomie*, the collapse of traditional integrative norms, and the resulting tendency for powerful groups to exploit the weak. The emergence of the professions was seen as a result of society's need to protect itself from monopolies of knowledge held by individuals. The professional codes of ethics which emphasized altruism and service to others and (seemingly) rejected the profit motive as the major focus of production ensured that crucial institutions would be protected from the exploitation and social disintegration that were otherwise rife in market economies.

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[6] The wide variation in traits cited by different authors makes this latter alternative a particularly flexible response, since one can always claim as the key professional characteristic the one or two traits the aspiring occupational group lacks.

[7] Cited by Johnson, *Professions and Power*, p. 33.

Talcott Parsons also viewed theoretical knowledge as the key element of the professional complex. New professions emerged through the institutionalization of new intellectual disciplines, and the professional form was dominated by the value of cognitive rationality. The primacy of cognitive rationality gave rise in turn to other associated values such as functional specificity, affective neutrality, and universalism.[8]

Given this emphasis on a body of theoretical knowledge as the determining attribute of professionalism, it follows that as the knowledge base of modern society continues to expand and the division of labour leads to greater specialization, additional occupational groups will develop monopolies of specialized knowledge and will consequently take on some of the secondary characteristics associated with the professions. According to this view, the professions are merely the purest expression of a general trend: all occupations will undergo eventual 'professionalization' as their knowledge base increases.

Professionalization

In its broadest sense, the concept of 'professionalization' referred to the general expansion of white collar occupations and the growth of educated labour. Given the explosive growth of higher education in the 1960s and early 1970s, the trend towards an ever increasing proportion of the work force acquiring professional qualifications seemed both obvious and desirable.[9] Various theorists announced the arrival of the 'information age' or 'post-industrial society', and argued that a 'new class' of technocrats was rising to dominance.

These theories had tremendous popular appeal, because they reflected the hegemonic values of progress, science, expertise, and above all, social mobility. The creation of new professions would not only provide for the upward mobility of particular occupational groups, it implied the upward movement of the entire baby boom generation through the proliferation of new professional careers. In other words, the only way to accommodate the nearly universal expectation that one's children would achieve a better life than their parents was to hold out the promise that, in the future, we would all be professionals.

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[8] Talcott Parsons, "The Professions and Social Structure," *Essays in Sociological Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1954), pp. 34-49; and "Professions", in *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills (New York: MacMillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), pp. 536-547.

[9] See for example Joseph Ben-David, "Professions in the Class System of Present Day Societies", *Current Sociology* 12, No. 3 (1963-64).

Such optimistic and global projections were challenged almost as soon as they were made. Both Wilensky's 1964 article "The Professionalization of Everyone?"[10] and William Goode's 1969 paper "The Theoretical Limits of Professionalism"[11] argued that only specific types of knowledge required the protection and restraint of the professional role and that therefore only a tiny minority of occupations would be granted professional status. To quote Wilensky:

> If the technical base of an occupation consists of a vocabulary that sounds familiar to everyone (social science and the arts of administration) or if the base is scientific but so narrow that it can be learned as a set of rules by most people, then the occupation will have difficulty claiming a monopoly of skill or even a roughly exclusive jurisdiction. In short, there may be an optimal base for professional practice — neither too vague nor too precise, too broad nor too narrow.[12]

Furthermore, this optimal knowledge base had to contain some element of threat to the client. To quote Goode:

> The crucial difference, we have argued, is whether the substance of the task *requires* trust, and therefore autonomy, and therefore some cohesion through which the occupation can in fact impose ethical controls on its members.
> . . .
> [For example,] the image of the librarian is primarily deprecatory, not threatening: he is thought to be able to help, but not to harm. In the public view there is little reason to give the librarian any autonomy or trust, because he can do his job perfectly well without it. At only one point is he viewed as threatening — the selection of books — and that matter is taken out of his hands with respect to nearly all doubtful cases.[13]

Thus, even with a significant increase in their theoretical knowledge, most occupations would fail to achieve professional autonomy because their work tasks could be more easily structured within existing bureaucratic or market alternatives.

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[10] Harold L. Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?" *American Journal of Sociology* 70: 137-158.

[11] William J. Goode, "The Theoretical Limits of Professionalism," originally published in *The Semi-Professions and Their Organizations: Teachers, Nurses, and Social Workers*, A. Etzioni, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1969).

[12] Wilensky, p. 148.

[13] Goode, "The Theoretical Limits of Professionalism," as reprinted in *The Professional as Educator*, Arthur W. Foshey, ed. (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1970), p. 46.

More narrowly defined, then, 'professionalization' refers to the process through which specific occupations achieved professional status; for some theorists, such as Theodore Caplow (1954) and Harold Wilensky (1964), this included a specific series of steps in more or less fixed order:

(1) the emergence of a full-time occupation; (2) the establishment of a training school; (3) the founding of a professional association; (4) political agitation for protection of the association by law; and (5) the adoption of a formal code of ethics.[14]

The professionalization thesis remains attractive (almost by definition) to those occupational groups which aspire to professional status. Authors in these occupations continue to quote Wilensky's stages as a sort of 'how to' manual,[15] even though the main thrust of his larger argument was to question the potential for universal professionalization.For Wilensky, the whole point of developing a stage model was precisely to *refute* the claims to professional status of emergent occupational groups:

> Another clue to the obstacles to any marked growth of professionalism is in the difference between the process by which the established professions have achieved their position and the process pursued by occupations aspiring to professional status. In the recent history of professionalism, the organization push often comes before a solid technical and institutional base is formed; the professional association, for instance, typically procedes university-based training schools, and the whole effort seems more an opportunistic struggle for the rewards of monopoly than a "natural history of professionalism".[16]

The continued acceptance of Wilensky's stage model in the applied literature a generation after sociologists have abandoned it as too deterministic, and the very selective citation of only those portions of his argument that can be used to support claims to professional status, strongly suggest that the retention of the professionalization thesis in the applied literature is ideologically motivated.

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[14] Wilensky, as paraphrased by Johnson, *Professions and Power*, p. 28. For Caplow (*The Sociology of Work* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954]), the formulation of a code of ethics preceded political agitation.

[15] To give just one example, Theresa Canada's 1986 conference paper, "Counseling: Issues in Professionalism and Professionalization", suggests that "Counseling as a profession can be analyzed using the six characteristics of American professions, as adapted from Wilensky's (1964) study . . . . Counseling must maintain and increase its level of professionalization in order to become a fully recognized profession." One is also compelled to point out that a lot has happened in the sociology of the professions since 1964, but this is only now coming to the attention of schoolteachers, librarians, counsellors, and other aspiring professionals.

[16] Wilensky, p. 157.

Critique of Structural-Functional Approaches

The structural-functional approach scores over the atheoretical trait models in that it does provide a basis for including or excluding particular attributes. It also suggests some causal relationship between the monopoly of specialized knowledge and the need for self-regulation, and so on. It suffers, however, from a reification of society and the implicit causation that the functional need for a particular role is sufficient to give rise to it. As Goode has pointed out, however, "societies, like people, need a great many things they will not get".[17] Aside from the endearing political naiveté of a model which views extrinsic rewards in terms of their intrinsic symbolic value, one has to question the validity of the 'invisible hand' that both creates and rewards a professional role in the name of a single organismic 'society'. There is no reason to assume that the emergence of a professional role was the only possible response to the increased division of labour or that rational considerations motivate either society or individuals. It is equally reasonable to assume that different segments of society hold different interests and values, and that the emergence or existence of professional occupations may not serve the interests of all of these segments equally. To take Rueschemeyer's example, lawyers are the instrument of those groups powerful enough to have had their interests codified into legislation and cannot be said to serve those segments of society whose views of justice are radically opposed to the interests of these powerful groups.[18] Furthermore, even if we granted that the initial impulse towards professionalization was a functional response to a general societal need, does it therefore follow that the need has continued, that the professions continue to meet that need, and that professions which fail to meet that need are decertified and replaced? Rueschemeyer points out that, "such 'feed-back' mechanisms are present, if at all, only to a very limited extent and that other factors, not included in the model, buttress professional privilege and autonomy — even in the face of a considerable gap between reality and claims to effective self-control".[19]

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[17] Goode, p. 300.

[18] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, "Professional Autonomy and the Social Control of Expertise," in *The Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors, and Others,* Dingwall and Lewis, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 43-44.

The structural-functional approach also suffers from a limited historical and cultural perspective. 'Profession' is itself largely an Anglo-American concept and few French or German sociologists ever accepted that there was a fundamental difference between professions and other occupations.[20] The high degree of centralization and government control, for example, of the corresponding occupational groups in Western Europe (let alone the former Soviet bloc) makes nonsense of functional explanations of the rise of professional autonomy in England and America. Similarly, there is little indication that the continuing development of specialized knowledge has led to a corresponding increase in the number of occupations achieving professional status. If anything, the predicted trend towards universal professionalization has been seen to reverse, such that many observers are now questioning whether even medicine and law still retain the characteristics of a profession.

Deprofessionalization

Deprofessionalization represents a reworking of the structural-functional model of professionalism,[21] even though its new pessimistic tone contrasts with the naive optimism of Durkheim and Parsons. Marie Haug, for example, argues that

> presently designated professions are rapidly losing their control over their knowledge domain as a result of inroads from computerization, new occupations in the division of labor, and increasing public and client sophistication. As a result, their autonomy is challenged and demands for accountability and client rights are on the rise.[22]

Here we see the typical knowledge-based model of professionalism, tied to an analysis of factors which relate to the rational utilization of expertise. Where once the professional's monopoly of knowledge was thought to lead inevitably to the emergence of the professional characteristics of self-regulation, autonomy, and disinterestedness, etc., the erosion of this monopoly — through the rise of general levels of education, the spread of specific knowledge from the professional's field, and the use of computers or auxiliary occupations to provide alternate sources of information — is seen as leading just as inevitably to a decline in professionalism. In other words, where the professions were once a functional response to the needs of society and the division of labour, they have become redundant or dysfunctional and have subsequently fallen into decline.[23]

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[19] Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[20] See for example C. W. R. Gispen, "German Engineers and American Social Theory: Historical Perspectives on Professionalization," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (1988): 550-574.

[21] Janet Storch, "Deprofessionalization", unpublished paper, University of Alberta.

[22] Marie R. Haug, "The Deprofessionalization of Everyone?" *Sociological Focus* 8, no. 3 (August 1975): 211.

Since the deprofessionalization model is based on a structural-functional conception of profession, it is open to the same objections. First, it reifies society. It assumes rational motivations and outcomes. It assumes that the functional need for a development automatically produces the required response. Second, it suffers from a technological determinism. Changes in the division of labour are depicted as an objective reflection of advances in technology and scientific knowledge. The primacy of cognitive rationality is still seen as the motive force for change. Third, universal deprofessionalization is as implicitly teleological as the original assumption of universal professionalization. Given a sufficiently advanced scientific base, all knowledge could be codified, routinized, and therefore deprofessionalized. Once anyone can access the necessary information on their home computer, the need for professional monopolies of knowledge disappears.[24] 'Professionalism' then becomes a stage through which occupations pass during that period when their knowledge base is insufficiently rationalized to eliminate the experiential and intuitive elements.

An additional problem with 'deprofessionalization' is that the term itself implies that the occupation under consideration was at some time a recognized profession. Quite aside from the implicit acceptance of the claims to professional status that this entails, this deflects attention from the existence of the same trends in non-professional occupations. It is perfectly reasonable to assume, however, that other occupations may be faced with similar difficulties concerning client revolt and eroded autonomy without ever having passed through the stage of full-fledged professionalism. Similarly, new 'professional' occupations may be created during this period already in a 'deprofessionalized' state. It is therefore something of a loaded term.

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[23] Storch.

[24] As an aside, note that this does not apply to those responsible for producing this knowledge. The profession's university-based knowledge elite will continue to require the esoteric knowledge and intuitive judgement with which to generate innovation. These scientists could therefore claim a monopoly over the creation and selection of knowledge to be added to the practitioner's database. Thus, the academics who advance the deprofessionalization thesis are themselves immune to deprofessionalization.

The deprofessionalization model holds little attraction for practitioners in those occupations aspiring to professional status, since it undermines the concept of professionalization, one of the main ideological supports for upward occupational mobility. Thus, for example, there is practically no mention of deprofessionalization in the education literature: it appears in only 2 articles out of the 509 dealing with professionalism or professional autonomy between June 1983 and April 1990.[25] For practitioners in the established professions, on the other hand, the deprofessionalization model is adopted as both a dire warning and a clarion call to action: potential countermeasures are almost always included in articles outlining the threats to professional privilege and status.

Deprofessionalization has also found some proponents among non-professionals and managers. The client revolt against professional monopoly and self-regulation has produced its own body of literature in the work of such writers as Ivan Illich (e.g., *Disabling Professions*). The emergence of this independent literature is both a symptom of deprofessionalization and an attempt to expand the concept from the mere observation of a trend into a deliberate policy. Similarly, the managerial literature dealing with the regulation of 'independent' professionals often adopts a deprofessionalization stance, arguing against professional monopoly, autonomy, and self-regulation, on the grounds that these are no longer (if they ever were) functional. Slayton and Trebilcock's *The Professions and Public Policy* provides a number of examples. Even for managers in professional bureaucracies, the deprofessionalization model serves the ideological function of presenting the decline of professional power as the inevitable consequence of impersonal social forces (primarily the erosion of the professional's knowledge monopoly) rather than as a result of management's increasing control over, and fragmentation of, the professional's work process.

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[25] Analysis of abstracts drawn from the Educational Resources Information Centre (ERIC) Databases *Current Index to Journals in Education (CIJE)* and *Resources in Education (RIE)*, searching on descriptor 'professional autonomy' or identifier 'professionalism'.

So far, I have reviewed the outmoded trait and structural-functional models of professionalism (as illustrated in rows one and two of Table 1) and suggested the probable ideological underpinnings which keep these outmoded concepts alive in the applied literature. I now turn to the current theoretical perspectives (as illustrated in rows three and four of Table 1) and the current theoretical debates that this thesis will attempt to address.

Eliot Freidson and the Chicago School

The Chicago school is distinguished by its emphasis on process rather than structure, and an ethnographic methodology that contrasts sharply with the abstract analysis of ideal types by structural-functionalists, or of classes by the Marxists. Far from assuming disinterestedness, as in the structural-functional model, the Chicago school sees professionalism enmeshed in power relations and an ongoing everyday struggle over resources, delegation, and control.[26] Where structural-functionalists emphasized the growing similarity between occupations undergoing 'professionalization', and Marxists the similarity of occupations undergoing 'proletarianization' (see below, page 30), proponents of the Chicago school argue that the 'professional' label obscures both major differences between occupational groups so labelled and, more significantly, the internal power struggles over definitions of the nature and limits of any particular professional organization.

The most important theme to emerge from the Chicago tradition is the 'professional dominance perspective' embodied in the work of Eliot Freidson. Freidson argues that the key distinguishing characteristic of profession is the profession's dominance over its sphere of work. This dominance includes: (1) autonomy in the work process; (2) control over the work of others in one's domain; (3) institutional power and licensure; and (4) client deference.[27] For example, both doctors and nurses may claim to be specially educated and dedicated to the ideal of service, but it is the doctors who issue instructions to the nurses; who enjoy autonomy in their work; who control licensure[28] and the hospital bureaucracy; and who enjoy significantly higher prestige and deference.

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[26] Or in Dingwall's phrase, they were engaged in "economics with the money left out" (Robert Dingwall, *The Sociology of the Professions*, p. 7).

[27] Donald Light and Sol Levine in "The Changing Character of the Medical Profession: A Theoretical Overview," *The Milbank Quarterly* 66, suppl. 2 (1988):

This dominance is accomplished in two stages. First, the occupation demonstrates that it does valuable and reliable work by marshalling the familiar trappings of educational requirements, certification, licensing, professional associations, codes of ethics, and so on. Second, it persuades relevant publics to grant it autonomy and dominance over associated occupations.[29] Obviously, only one occupational group can achieve such dominance in any one field. Thus, while nurses may be able to marshal all of the requirements for the first stage (i.e., meet the supposed criteria for 'professionalization'), they are unlikely to achieve full professional autonomy since this would require the public to first unseat doctors.

Marie Haug's deprofessionalization hypothesis clearly has implications for professional dominance. As computerization of codified bodies of knowledge, increases in the general level of education, and the emergence of new specializations within the medical bureaucracy erode the doctor's knowledge monopoly, the initial stage of the assertion of professional dominance (the demonstration of a uniquely valuable and reliable service) is undermined. Furthermore, client revolt not only undermines client deference as a source of professional dominance, but also the public sponsorship that is the crucial second stage for its attainment and maintenance.

Freidson, however, explicitly rejects any trend towards deprofessionalization. He correctly challenges Haug's limited historical perspective:

> Haug seems to highlight the cultural and political events of the 1960s and early 1970s and assume that they would persist and even intensify in the future. But many of these movements have simply collapsed; others have become so conventional that they are barely recognizable; and still others, if they have not disappeared entirely, have at least become considerably attenuated and altered by countermovements.[30]

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[27](cont'd) 12-13. They also note that in recent years Freidson has retreated to an emphasis on (2) and (3) only.

[28] In Alberta, for example, a 'nurse practitioner' must be sponsored by two MDs.

[29] Fredric D. Wolinsky, "The Professional Dominance Perspective, Revisited", *The Milbank Quarterly* 66, suppl. 2 (1988): 35-36.

[30] Eliot Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control," *Annual Review of Sociology* 10 (1984): 6.

Having thus dismissed the question of client revolt, Freidson argues that the professional's knowledge base has remained untouched:

> The professions . . . continue to possess a monopoly over at least some important segment of formal knowledge that does not shrink over time, even though both competitors and rising levels of lay knowledge may nibble away at its edges. New knowledge is constantly acquired that takes the place of what has been lost and thereby maintains the *knowledge gap*. Similarly, while the power of computer technology in storing codified knowledge cannot be ignored, it is the members of each profession who determine what is to be stored. . . . With a continual knowledge gap, potentially universal access to stored data is meaningless. In sum, while the events highlighted by proponents of the deprofessionalization thesis are important, the argument that members of the professions are losing their relative prestige and respect, their special expertise, or their monopoly over the exercise of that expertise over time is not persuasive.[31]

For her part, Haug concedes that "Although there is considerable evidence favoring the [deprofessionalization] hypothesis, the findings do not, to date, appear sufficient to retain it with 95 percent confidence", but still argues that "there is no evidence favoring rejecting it either".[32] Thus, the question remains unresolved and open to empirical investigation.

While the theme of continued professional dominance provides some reassurance to those in the established professions, it clearly represents a threat to claims of professional status for those in the aspiring (and therefore subordinate) professions. Consequently, Freidson's argument is better received by the former than by the latter. Even for the established professions, however, Freidson's ideas are something of a mixed blessing. If Freidson is right, then the professional dominance model could serve as the basis for a critique by those regulators and non-professionals in favour of active deprofessionalization (e.g., Slayton and Trebilcock, and Illich). If Freidson is wrong, then the professional dominance model reinforces a false consciousness among the established professions which obscures the processes of deprofessionalization and proletarianization.

Freidson's analysis, however, is immediately open to two criticisms. First, he tends to reify 'the public'. His analysis of the second stage of professional dominance would be greatly improved by closer attention to issues of class and the larger forces shaping the division of labour. Here, Larson's work in linking the rise and fall of the professions with the associated rise and fall of their sponsoring elites is particularly interesting. Second, his critique of the deprofessionalization thesis refers only to the profession *as a corporate entity*.[33] For Freidson, the *profession as a whole* retains its dominance so long as its university-based theoreticians continue to generate sufficient new knowledge to maintain a knowledge gap, even if the vast majority of the rank and file practitioners are undergoing *de facto* deprofessionalization. It may be more useful, however, to conceive of the profession's campus-based knowledge elite as a distinct occupational category (that of 'university academic') and thus acknowledge that the hands-on practitioner might be open to deprofessionalization and therefore to deskilling and proletarianization — of which more in a moment.

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[31] Ibid., p. 8. Emphasis added.

[32] Marie R. Haug, "A Re-Examination of the Hypothesis of Physician Deprofessionalization," *The Milbank Quarterly* 66, suppl. 2 (1988): 54.

In general, the Chicago school's process approach remains current in the sociological literature but is limited in scope. The Chicago school suffers from a surplus of narrowly defined case studies and an undue preoccupation with medicine. As with the trait and structural-functional models, Freidson and the Chicago school lie open to Larson's criticism that medicine may be atypical.[34] While they have produced some excellent works in microsociology, there are few attempts to link professionalism to the larger issues of the division of labour or the class structure. Consequently, the Chicago school has had little impact on the sociological literature outside the specific field of medicine (and to a lesser extent, law) on which it has chiefly focused.

One purpose of this dissertation, then, is to undertake a case study in education to expand the examination of professional processes beyond medicine and law.[35]

Marxist Perspectives

Political Economies

Terence J. Johnson's *Professions and Power* (1972) is an important transitional work which owes more to Weber than to Marx, but which nevertheless feeds into the proletarianization thesis. (Johnson himself adopted a more explicitly Marxist framework shortly thereafter.) Following a devastating critique of trait and structural-functional models, Johnson introduced a simple typology of occupational control based on the relationship between the producer and the consumer of professional services: (1) the collegiate model, in which the practitioner defines both the goals and the means by which these are to be met for the client, and in which regulation is provided by autonomous professional associations; (2) the patronage model, in which consumers define their own needs and the manner in which they are to be met, and exercise direct control over the practitioner; and (3) the mediative model, in which a third party (the state or private capital) intervenes between the practitioner and the consumer. Professionalism in its ideal type is usually identified with collegiate control, yet today most professionals find themselves in patronage or mediative work situations.

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[33] Wolinsky, p. 41.

[34] Larson, p. 37.

[35] The larger study, of which this dissertation is the first third, will then attempt to link these internal processes with the larger developments in the division of labour and the class structure.

While Johnson's model represented a significant advance and quickly became part of the vocabulary of the sociology of the professions, it had little immediate impact on the applied literature. Recognition of the shift from collegiate to patronage or mediative control would have undermined professionalism as an ideological resource. In the current literature, Johnson's initial typology has been subsumed by the proletarianization thesis.

Larson's political economy of the professions, on the other hand, continues to stand as the basis of our understanding of the rise of professionalism. Larson suggests that the professions made themselves into special and valued kinds of occupations during the industrial revolution which reorganized Western society around the 'cash nexus' of the market. Possession of special skills became a typically modern form of property. Through her analysis of the emergence of the medical profession, Larson argues convincingly that professionalism arose as an attempt by practitioners to monopolize an expanding market for their services. By claiming to possess unique skills based on scientific knowledge acquired through long training at a professional school (usually associated with a university), professionals were able to convince the appropriate elites to ban competing paradigms and practitioners from the marketplace. Far from seeing professionals as disinterested, as seeking to serve the community interest rather than their own, Larson views professionals as those occupational groups that were successful in forging organic ties with the rising industrial capitalists. It is this elite sponsorship which was crucial, rather than the development of specialized technical knowledge. Consequently, an occupation is 'professional' only to the extent that it can convince appropriate elites to grant it monopolistic control of the market for its services, to protect it from external evaluation, and to grant its practitioners autonomy.

Larson concludes by suggesting that the historical conditions that gave rise to the professions no longer pertain and that as society moves towards a mature corporate capitalism, most professionals are no longer independent practitioners in an open market of services, but rather salaried specialists in large organizations. Consequently professionalism is reduced to an ideological resource.

Larson's work has been slow to diffuse to the applied literature. Besides the obvious problems her analysis poses for the continued maintenance of the ideology of professionalism, her dense style makes *The Rise of Professionalism* difficult reading for a non-sociologist.

Proletarianization

The proletarianization literature expands on Johnson's initial analysis by linking changes in the producer-consumer relationship to larger changes in the class structure, and projects Larson's largely historical analysis into the future. Where once the professional occupations were able to achieve upward mobility through forging organic ties with the rising entrepreneurial class, they are now subject to the same decline as their sponsors. As the logic of capitalist accumulation leads to an increasing concentration of capital in a few giant corporations, the power of the competitive sector steadily declines in relation to monopoly capital, and with it, the fortunes of the professional class. As the professions are absorbed into the structures of monopoly capital (or the state sector), they become salaried occupations and surrender their control over the market for their services.

John McKinlay, for example, describes proletarianization as:

> the process by which an occupational category is divested of control over certain prerogatives relating to the location, content, and essentiality of activities and is

> thereby subordinated to the broader requirements of production under advanced capitalism. The prerogatives lost or curtailed through proletarianization are all variously associated with the relative power of an occupation and usually involve the loss over the criteria for entrance (e.g., the credentialling system and membership requirements), the content of training, autonomy regarding the terms and content of work, the objects of labor (the commodities produced or clients served), the tools of labor, the means of labor (e.g., buildings, harbors, land), and the amount and rate of remuneration for labor.[36]

Commentators in this tradition point to the declining percentage of professionals in independent practice and argue that professionals within a profit-making corporation are as subject to the exploitation of surplus value as any other worker.[37] Thus, professionals may find themselves subjected to increasing Taylorization:[38] supervision and loss of autonomy, standardization of time, increased specialization to the point where a task is broken down into its component parts, enforced measures of production, and the associated restriction on profit accumulation. Professionals are now facing the same problems of unemployment, reduced or blocked mobility, isolation from policy making, and declining intrinsic rewards as other workers. This in turn leads to discontent as the higher expectations of highly educated professional workers are frustrated, manifest in health problems, growing dissent, unionization or increased militancy among professional associations, and cynicism towards the ideal of service.

Deskilling[39] is an important aspect of this process. Portions of the professional's knowledge are codified, routinized and delegated to subordinate workers. The replacement of highly trained and expensive professionals with less skilled — and therefore cheaper — labour is management's easiest route to cost effectiveness in knowledge-intensive fields, and the greatest threat to the professional's market monopoly. When the independent practitioner delegates a portion of the workload to a less skilled assistant (e.g., a dentist hires a dental technician), the professional benefits from the resulting generation of surplus value; but when the same deskilling occurs in an institutional setting, the organization, rather than the individual professional, benefits.

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[36] John B. McKinlay, "Toward the Proletarianization of Physicians", in *Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism*, ed. Charles Derber (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1982), p. 38.

[37] The same is true for professionals in the state sector. Here the focus is on bureaucratization and the adoption of capitalist logic. Governments caught up in the fiscal crisis of the state become as concerned with accountability, cost effectiveness, and the extraction of surplus value as any corporation. (See Charles Derber, "The Proletarianization of the Professional: A Review Essay", *Professionals As Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism* [Boston: G. K. Hall, 1982], p. 10.)

[38] 'Taylorization' refers to the application of the principles of the 'scientific management' movement, after its founder and chief proponent, Frederick Winslow Taylor.

[39] Deskilling is defined here as the removal of skills or responsibilities from a job category through the redesign of the work processes. Craig Littler provides a convenient summary of the concept as it has been traditionally applied: "The concept of deskilling refers to four processes: (i) the process whereby the shopfloor loses the right to design and plan; i.e., divorce of planning and doing; (ii) the fragmentation of work into meaningless segments; (iii) the redistribution of tasks amongst unskilled and semi-skilled labour, associated with labour cheapening; and (iv) the transformation of work organization from the craft system to modern,

Equally important, deskilling leads to the separation of design and execution. Management is not only able to husband expensive skills by concentrating them in the design function, it is also able to assert greater control through the concentration and centralization of decision making. The discretionary power of the professional practitioner is steadily eroded as management designs, fragments, and restricts the work task in the interests of efficiency.

Deskilling among rank and file professionals also implies the creation of new managerial categories within which the design and decision-making functions can be concentrated. For example, where once the hospital administrator was simply the most senior doctor, hospital directors and managers are now increasingly recruited from schools of hospital administration. Consequently, these new superordinate ranks within the profession take on an identity separate from that of the rank and file practitioners and, having been trained in management thinking, are more receptive to the adoption of managerial systems which undermine the professional autonomy of the practitioners below them.[40] Alternatively, the delegation of routine tasks formerly handled by the profession may lead to the creation of new subordinate occupational categories, leaving the profession as a whole to adopt a managerial role. As managers, they regain some measure of autonomy and decision making, yet are still restrained by the next higher level of management and are ultimately excluded

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[39](cont'd) Taylorized forms of labour control." (Craig Littler, *The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies: A Comparative Study of Work Organizations* [Heinman Educational Books, 1982], p. 25).

[40] Charles Derber, *Professionals As Workers*, p. 198.

from policy making or goal setting at the highest levels.[41]

The proletarianization model is largely convincing in demystifying the professional role and identifying current professional work relationships. It is largely unconvincing, however, when its proponents urge unionization and militancy on professionals to resist this bureaucratization. It is difficult to see how the consumer is likely to benefit by the successful reassertion of special privilege by the professional occupations or how the replacement of the professional association by the professional union will help democratize society or encourage social innovation. For example, Marcia Cohen and David Wagner argue in "Social Work Professionalism: Reality and Illusion"[42] that professionalism serves a conservative function and prevents social workers from joining with clients to achieve effective social change. While social workers' pretensions to professional status are devastatingly exposed in this article, it is difficult to see how the proposed solution of unionization would be more likely to promote the good of the clients.

A second weakness of this 'new working class' model is that it is as deterministic and teleological as the structural-functional approach, and there is even a corresponding tendency to reify capitalism. Part of the problem here has been the confusion over the use of the term 'proletarianization' to refer interchangeably to trends at both the macro and micro levels. Charles Derber provides a partial solution by distinguishing between 'historical proletarianization', the shift from self-employment to salaried employment, and 'structural proletarianization', the subordination of labour to managerial control. Historical proletarianization refers only to the absorption of professionals within capitalist relations of production at a macro level, while structural proletarianization refers to the specific changes in the labour process at the micro level which allow management to exercise effective control over professional labour.[43] Most writers in the proletarianization tradition have confused the two concepts, or assumed that historical proletarianization inevitably leads to structural proletarianization. As we will see, however, deskilling and Taylorization need not automatically follow from the shift to salaried employment.

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[41] Ibid., p. 21.

[42] In Charles Derber, ed. *Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1982), pp. 141-164.

[43] Charles Derber, "Managing Professionals: Ideological Proletarianization and Post-Industrial Labor," *Theory and Society* 12 (1983): 311.

For one thing, deskilling and Taylorization may not always be in management's best interests. While deskilling cheapens professional labour and increases managerial control, it decreases the organization's flexibility and its ability to respond to emergencies or changes in the external environment.[44] These may be important qualities in some industries, while only a minor consideration in others. Certainly in the short term, management may be unable or unwilling to direct their attention to deskilling schemes as other priorities and external factors (such as market conditions) call forth organizational responses that are unrelated to labour costs.[45] Furthermore, as Peters and Waterman argue convincingly in their best seller *In Search of Excellence: Lessons From America's Best-Run Companies.* (New York: Warner Books, 1984.), a motivated work force is the key to corporate success, and deskilled workers are seldom motivated workers. Similarly, Friedman's analysis of the adoption of 'responsible autonomous workgroups' in industry — in response to worker resistance to Taylorization — is readily translatable to professional workers.[46] Thus, a crude form of structural proletarianization may not be the only or the best management strategy for cheapening labour or increasing efficiency.

Here again, Derber provides a key insight by distinguishing between 'ideological' and 'technical' proletarianization. The former refers to a lack of control over the goals, objectives and policies guiding and defining the organizations in which one works; the latter refers to a lack of control over how the technical tasks and procedures one performs are to be carried out.[47] Where most authors in the proletarianization tradition have assumed that ideological proletarianization was the first stage in a process leading to technical proletarianization, Derber argues convincingly that ideological proletarianization is a viable alternative management strategy to deskilling and Taylorization in the control of knowledge workers. This case study will provide empirical confirmation of this theoretical insight.

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[44] Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 20th Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

[45] This would be particularly true of the monopoly sector, since higher labour costs can simply be passed on to the consumer.

[46] A. Friedman, "Responsible Autonomy Versus Direct Control Over the Labour Process," *Capital and Class* No. 1: 43-57.

[47] Derber, *Professionals as Workers*, p. 30.

A third problem with the proletarianization model is its failure to take adequate account of the differences between industrial and post-industrial work processes. By direct analogy to the deskilling of craft workers in the 19th century, most proletarianization theorists depict the technical proletarianization of knowledge workers as the inevitable result of their historical proletarianization, thus failing to recognize the fundamental differences between craft and professional workers. Professional monopolies of esoteric theoretical knowledge may, however, operate as a key basis of resistance to structural proletarianization. Given a command of essential information, professionals may be able to dictate conditions of employment to management. Thus, where the deprofessionalization model overemphasizes the role of technology and the professions' knowledge base, the proletarianization model ignores these factors, and so fails to adequately account for resistance. Even Derber failed to recognize that the strategy of ideological proletarianization may be forced on management when dealing with knowledge workers because professionals are able to successfully resist management's attempts at more direct control through deskilling and Taylorization.

Consequently, proletarianization theorists have tended to overlook the importance of the ideological context in shaping the work process. The assertion of professional status in the face of bureaucratic structures, for example, is not simply an example of false consciousness, as is generally implied, but can also represent a collective strategy of resistance to further structural proletarianization. Professional workers can manipulate ideologically favourable elements of the professional model to convince management that further technical proletarianization is either unnecessary or unworkable, while simultaneously marshalling support for their position among clients and the general public. Of course, 'professionalism' is a two-edged sword and may also serve management in the ideological proletarianization of knowledge workers but, as such, may require management to abandon the more blatant forms of deskilling and Taylorization. Gerald Grace, for example, has shown that the early Taylorization of teachers was reversed and a renewed professionalization encouraged to forestall teacher solidarity with unionized workers.[48]

And finally, proletarianization cannot account for the decline of those professions outside the capitalist sector (such as the clergy) or in non-capitalist societies (such as pre-perestroika Eastern Europe).

The proletarianization model, then, would seem to have nearly as many weaknesses as the deprofessionalization model, and the choice between them would seem to come down to one of competing paradigms. Once again, however, we see that the proletarianization thesis is more palatable to some groups than to others.

Its primary proponents are, of course, Marxist sociologists for whom it is part of an ongoing challenge to capitalist hegemony. By emphasizing the actual working conditions of the majority of professional workers, these sociologists undermine the ideological supports for the professions' residual power over, and their separation from, clients and other workers.

The proletarianization thesis therefore receives a mixed response from the established professions. Some professionals reject it because it threatens the ideological foundations of their power, and they turn instead to the deprofessionalization theme, which holds out the promise of a revitalized professionalization provided the occupation can reassert control over an expanded body of knowledge. Others reject the individualistic strategy of professional mobility (which they perceive as no longer a realistic alternative), in favour of collective action. They see proletarianization as an argument for professional unionization and 'worker' solidarity.[49]

Practitioners in more marginal professions, however, are unlikely to adopt a proletarianization perspective, because it suggests their professionalization efforts are futile and misdirected. Again, we find practically no mention of proletarianization in the education literature,[50] for example, though a good case could be made for the deskilling, Taylorization and bureaucratization of classroom teachers. Only a handful of educators, usually those urging stronger unionization and greater solidarity with other workers, refer to proletarianization.

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[48] Gerald Grace, "Judging Teachers: The Social and Political Contexts of Teacher Evaluation," *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 6, no. 1 (1985): 10-12.

[49] One may assume that the minority of superordinate professionals who are benefiting from the concentration of power that results from the deskilling of the rank and file professional would reject both proletarianization and deprofessionalization models in favour of a continued assertion of professionalization.

[50] Only 1 article out of 509 abstracts drawn from the ERIC Databases *Current*

Similarly, non-professionals are only likely to stress proletarianization in an attempt to achieve working-class solidarity. Attacks on professional monopoly, such as those undertaken by Ivan Illich, seem somewhat redundant if one accepts that professional workers are themselves proletarianized.

Corporatization

Corporatization is a recent variant of the proletarianization thesis in the literature of the established professions (primarily medicine). To quote Light and Levine's summary:

> It refers to the experience of being subjected to forms of corporate control — such as utilization and quality review, incentive pay structures, restrictions on practice patterns and the organization of practice, and the restructuring of the marketplace from solo or small-group providers to multi-institutional complexes. . . . Corporatization also refers to the paradox of physicians relying on complex organizations and financial arrangements to carry out their sophisticated work, yet realizing that these institutions intrude on their work, mediate their relations with patients, and potentially injure their credibility with society as a whole. Legitimacy is both extended and threatened.[51]

This is essentially a restatement of the proletarianization thesis shorn of its Marxist assumptions, and may be dismissed as a backward step. While this approach avoids some problems associated with the Marxist perspective — notably the reification of capital and the unresolved debates over the class position of professionals — it does so by abandoning explanation for mere description. Corporatization is presented as a given, and no explanation is provided for the mechanisms behind the change in medical practice, beyond an implicit technological determinism. Corporatization also tends to overemphasize the evils of bureaucratization, which, as discussed below, need not be incompatible with professionalism. While the absence of Marxist rhetoric makes it more palatable to conservative readers, its

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[50](cont'd) *Index to Journals in Education (CIJE)* and *Resources in Education (RIE)* for June 1983 to April 1990, searching on descriptor 'professional autonomy' or identifier 'professionalism'. Another four articles were identified for this period through other means.

[51] Light and Levine, p. 19.

usefulness as sociological theory may be safely subsumed under proletarianization.

Furthermore, the corporatization literature is not relevant to the aspiring professions, which have always existed within corporate or state bureaucracies. Similarly, the management literature takes the professional's location within a corporate structure largely for granted, since the major function of this tradition is to prescribe management techniques for supervising professional labour.

Overview Conclusion

It is obvious, then, that much of the writing about the professions has been ideologically motivated and therefore of questionable scientific value. It is inappropriate for commentators to continue to write in their separate traditions, oblivious of the contradictory models of professionalism advocated by their neighbours. What is required is either the diffusion of recent sociological advances to the applied literature, or a synthesis of current approaches, or both.

SYNTHESIS OF THE DEPROFESSIONALIZATION AND PROLETARIANIZATION MODELS

If deprofessionalization and proletarianization are thought of not as competing descriptions of the same phenomenon, but as analytically distinct processes, it is possible to produce a synthesis of these two approaches. Deprofessionalization is primarily concerned with status issues arising out of the professional's control over a body of theoretical knowledge. Proletarianization, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with structural changes in occupations, such as the shift from self-employment to salaried employment, or the professional's loss of control over the work process; it is thus largely concerned with the relations of production, or class issues. These are separate dimensions and may vary independently.

Take for example the role of school principal. Fifty years ago the school principal was a major figure in the community, an individual of considerable prestige and influence.

Today, principals are much less likely to be key figures, and their pronouncements outside a narrowly defined area of educational expertise are less likely to be accepted. This decline in relative status is clearly not the result of proletarianization, for the conditions of employment have not changed substantially during this period. What has changed is the larger societal environment within which the occupation is located. Urbanization has eroded the school's position as a focus of community life and consequently the visibility of the principal's role in the community. In the typical modern district, the principal is no longer *the* principal, but only one of several such individuals, each of whom administers a school which draws students from all over the city, so that the principal may not even be well known in a particular neighbourhood.

Similarly, as the general level of education has risen, the principal's relative position has declined. The high school principal is no longer one of the few educated, articulate individuals in the community. Again, this is not a change in the occupation but in the social context in which this occupation is located. It is not that the principal's knowledge base has been routinized, codified, and deskilled, but that the larger population has had its knowledge base expanded to a point where the principal's *monopoly* of knowledge has been effectively eliminated, save for a narrow educational expertise. The principal's role can therefore be said to have undergone some degree of deprofessionalization, but not proletarianization.

A similar case could be made for other professions, such as the clergy. Here, the emergence of competing occupations (such as marriage and guidance counsellors), the rise in general levels of education, and the secularization of society have led to a clear decline in the power and breadth of the clergy's professional role. This decline cannot be attributed to changes within the occupation, to deskilling and Taylorization, to the worker's loss of control over the work process. Nor can it be attributed to class struggle or the expansion of market relations and the logic of capitalist accumulation, except indirectly as these influence secularization, levels of education, and so on. The relative decline of the professional clergy must therefore be seen as the result of deprofessionalization, rather than proletarianization.

On the other hand, professions such as medicine and law seem to be undergoing both deprofessionalization and proletarianization. It is quite reasonable to accept both Haug's and McKinlay's descriptions of the medical profession as accurate. Haug's description emphasizes the erosion of the professional's monopoly of knowledge relative to both the general public and other occupations; while McKinlay emphasizes their loss of control over the work process. Each has got hold of only half the phenomenon but attempts to attribute the entire picture to this single dimension.

This becomes clearer if we compare Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 illustrates the standard model of professionalization. Here we see that there is an increase in both the relative size of the occupation's knowledge base and its control over the work process. The reverse trend has been labelled either deprofessionalization or proletarianization, yet is more properly thought of as both, as illustrated in Figure 2. That these are in fact distinct dimensions can be seen in Figure 3, where the roles of school principal and local clergy are again said to vary primarily along the knowledge dimension; their relation to the means of production has not changed.

The question then arises whether there may also be occupations undergoing proletarianization without deprofessionalization, as illustrated in 'A' in Figure 4. ('B' in Figure 4, where initial knowledge levels are relatively low, corresponds to the replacement of subcontractors by foreman in the early craft period of industrialization.) This seems unlikely. While it is possible that a profession's standing relative to other occupations may change as a result of changes external to the profession (such as a general rise in education and the consequent decline in the profession's monopoly of knowledge), it is difficult to see how a major downgrading of the profession's work process could fail to affect its relative standing. This is an important point and deserves some elaboration.

If we assume that one's relation to the means of production is more fundamental then one's participation in a status grouping, it logically follows that as an occupation is proletarianized, it must necessarily be deprofessionalized as well. Proletarianization without deprofessionalization would be inherently unstable, and could only be sustained by a high level of false consciousness, not only on the part of the exploited workers, but also on the part of

FIGURE 1:
PROFESSIONALIZATION


HIGH
KNOWLEDGE MONOPOLY
-advanced education
-certification
-high status
market monopoly
LOW CONTROL
Over Work Process
-mediated/patronage
-goals set by others
-means set by others
HIGH CONTROL
Over Work Process
-collegiate
-sets own goals
-sets own means
LOW
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE
-little training
-no certification
-low status

managers, clients, and the general public. In effect, the situation would be one of professional-level recruitment to essentially non-professional work tasks, which is neither economically efficient nor conducive to peaceful industrial relations.

It is important to note, however, that the relationship is dialectical and reciprocal rather than unidirectional and deterministic. While proletarianization leads to deprofessionalization in the sense that one is unlikely to find the former without the latter, the actual causal model is more complex.

FIGURE 1:
PROFESSIONALIZATION


HIGH
KNOWLEDGE MONOPOLY
-advanced education
-certification
-high status
market monopoly
professionalization
LOW CONTROL
Over Work Process
-mediated/patronage
-goals set by others
-means set by others
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-collegiate
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FIGURE 2:
DEPROFESSIONALIZATION AND PROLETARIANIZATION


HIGH
KNOWLEDGE MONOPOLY
-advanced education
-certification
-high status
LOW CONTROL
Over Work Process
-mediated/patronage
-goals set
-means set
HIGH CONTROL
Over Work Process
-collegiate
-sets goals
-sets means
deprofessionalization
observed phenomena
proletarianization
LOW
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE
-little training
-no certification
-low status

In Figure 5 we see that proletarianization is a normal consequence of the logic of capitalist accumulation [F→E], particularly capital's need to increase control over the work process and to cheapen labour. A profession's vulnerability to proletarianization, however, is conditioned by its relative ability to retain control over a body of knowledge [B→C→D]. The higher the indetermination/technicality ratio[52] of a profession's body of knowledge, for

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[52] Jamous and Peloille identified two components of professional knowledge: a body of systematic knowledge on which certification and legitimation rest, and a mystique of intuitive knowledge which excludes outsiders. The former may be codified, routinized, fragmented, and otherwise subjected to deskilling and managerial control; the latter cannot. To the extent that a profession is an 'art', a gestalt greater than the sum of the body of knowledge that makes up its expertise, it is resistant to proletarianization. While the lay public may acquire specific pieces of information that belong to the professional's body of knowledge, they are unable to reach the same conclusions, because they lack the synthetic insight that is only acquired through professional socialization.

FIGURE 3:
DEPROFESSIONALIZATION WITHOUT PROLETARIANIZATION


HIGH
KNOWLEDGE MONOPOLY
-relatively higher education
-high status
school principal 1930
clergy 1800
LOW CONTROL
Over Work Process
-mediated/patronage
-goals set
-means set
HIGH CONTROL
Over Work Process
-collegiate
-sets goals
-sets means
school principal 1990
clergy 1990
LOW
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE
-little additional training
-low status

example, the more resistant the profession will be to the erosion of its knowledge monopoly, and therefore, of its delegated authority over the work process. Similarly, the generation (or appropriation) of new knowledge through the profession's university-based researchers [A] allows the profession to maintain a 'knowledge gap' between the profession and management (or competing occupations). In other words, a profession's ability to resist proletarianization is determined in part by its ability to resist deprofessionalization [C→D→E].

A profession's ability to resist deprofessionalization depends in turn on the profession's ability to resist the role fragmentation, deskilling and routinization which threaten to erode its knowledge monopoly [E←G←H]. In other words, a profession's ability

FIGURE 4:
PROLETARIANIZATION WITHOUT DEPROFESSIONALIZATION


HIGH
KNOWLEDGE MONOPOLY
-advanced education
-certification
-high status
A
?
market monopoly
LOW CONTROL
Over Work Process
-mediated/patronage
-goals set
-means set
HIGH CONTROL
Over Work Process
-collegiate
-sets goals
-sets means
B
industrial
foremen
craftmaster
subcontractor
LOW
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE
-little training
-no certification
-low status

to resist deprofessionalization is determined in part by its ability to resist proletarianization. Thus, deprofessionalization and proletarianization form a reciprocal relationship.

One 'external' factor in resisting deprofessionalization (and therefore proletarianization) is the ideological context in which the profession operates [A]. The willingness of clients and superordinates to accept the profession's claim to expertise and monopoly is conditioned by the acceptance of the ideology of professionalism and the ideological importance assigned to the 'content' of the profession. For example, the professionalism of educators was encouraged in the late 1960s because the then dominant human capital model both accepted the ideology of professional expertise and emphasized the importance of education in economic development.

FIGURE 5:

SYNTHESIS OF
DEPROFESSIONALIZATION AND PROLETARIANIZATION


Structural-Functional
Identified Factors
DEPROFESSIONALIZATION
Synthesis
Marxist
Identified Factors
PROLETARIANIZATION
A.
External Factors: E.g., creation of new knowledge, changes in dominant ideology, general levels of education, etc.
B.
Internal Factors: Knowledge monopoly (indetermination/technicality ratio), ideological resources (e.g., service ideal), organizational capacity, etc.
C.
Degree of Professionalization or Deprofessionalization
D.
Degree of Vulnerability to Proletarianization
E.
Degree of Proletarianization:
-historical
-structural
-ideological
-technical
F.
External Factors: (Pressures for proletarianization) capitalist accumulation, fiscal crisis of the state, etc.
G.
H.

Another factor is the profession's ability to manipulate the market forces of supply and demand through control of training, certification, and licensure.

BUREAUCRACY

Closely related to the twin themes of deprofessionalization and proletarianization is a concern over the professional's place within bureaucratic structures. Many commentators in the applied literature continue to argue that professionalism is incompatible with the principles of bureaucratic organization. For example, they emphasize the self-governing nature of professional occupations, and contrast professional authority (based on expertise) with bureaucratic authority (based on hierarchical position). Celia Davies provides a convenient summary of the supposed differences between bureaucracy and professionalism in Table 2.[53]

In the last decade, however, this approach has been increasingly challenged. Several writers have argued that the *assumption* of professional/bureaucratic conflict is based on a discussion of abstract ideal types rather than an examination of specific elements of actual organizations.[54] This argument takes two forms.

First, by breaking down the ideal types of bureaucracy and profession into their constituent elements, it becomes clear that even at this level of abstraction, the assumption of a global professional/bureaucratic conflict cannot be supported. While some elements of the two models may be in conflict, other dimensions may be common to both and therefore mutually reinforcing. For example, the tension between hierarchical and expert authority is eliminated if one acknowledges that bureaucratic recruitment may include professionalism as a criterion of promotion.[55]

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[53] Celia Davies, "Professionals in Bureaucracies: The Conflict Thesis Revisited," in Dingwall and Lewis (eds.), *The Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) p. 178 .

[54] Larson, pp. 190-191; and Davies, pp. 182-183.

[55] Indeed, Richard Hall found a strong positive association between bureaucracy's reliance on technical competence in selection and advancement and all the dimensions of professionalism. Similarly, Hall found only a *weak* negative relationship between the two bureaucratic dimensions of hierarchy of authority and the presence of rules and most professional variables, and a positive relationship between these and the professional's sense of calling. Only the professional preoccupation with autonomy

TABLE 2:

BUREAUCRACY VERSUS PROFESSIONALISM

	BUREAUCRACY	PROFESSIONALISM
task	partial, interdependent with others	complete, sole work
training	short, within the organization, a specialized skill	long, outside the organization, a total skill
legitimation for act	is following rules	is doing what is, to the best of one's knowledge, correct
compliance	is supervised	is socialized
loyalty	to the organization	to the profession
career	ascent in the organizational hierarchy	often no further career steps in the organization

Second, actual bureaucracies and actual professionals are much more flexible than was formerly suggested and these vary from their ideal types in ways that reduce the degree of conflict between the two forms. Larson, for example, notes that many large corporations have isolated their professional staff in special units which play a consultant role to line managers in much the same way as would an outside fee-for-service professional, thus reducing the friction between line and staff positions.[56] The many studies in the management literature of 'professional bureaucracies', matrix organizations, dual career ladders, and so on, indicate how bureaucratic structures have been modified to successfully incorporate knowledge workers.

Similarly, studies of professional socialization challenge the assumption that all professional workers share the same characteristics or are likely to react to bureaucracy in the same way. Given a wide range of individual personalities and motivations, some professionals — such as those who have a high need for security — might actually seek out bureaucratic

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[55](cont'd) showed a strong inverse relationship with most dimensions of bureaucracy (Hall, cited by Larson, p. 191).

[56] Larson, p. 194.

employment over private practice and therefore experience less conflict in bureaucratic settings. Furthermore, various aspects of bureaucracy may affect different types of professions in different ways. As Larson points out, for example, involvement in decision making is the strongest determinant of work satisfaction among social workers but a matter of near indifference to aerospace scientists, who are instead preoccupied by questions of 'research freedom'.[57] Thus, different bureaucratic dimensions may be matched with different professional orientations to produce various levels of conflict.

This brings us to an important distinction between the deprofessionalization and proletarianization literature. Because deprofessionalization refers primarily to the profession's status relative to both clients and other occupations, the bureaucratization of the professional worker is not an issue for writers in the deprofessionalization tradition. Marie Haug, for example, has rejected the role conflict thesis by arguing that professionals often benefit from their location in bureaucracies:

> Much sociological theory has tended to put the two structures in conflict, but it appears that increasingly professionals are buttressed in their authority relations *by virtue* of their location in complex organizational settings. The shift from a fee-for-service to a salaried mode, and from solo to organization practice, has strengthened rather than weakened the professional's control. Professional power at the point of service delivery is power over *clients*. Location of practice in bureaucratic systems is utilized to enforce their decision. If clients are disinclined to comply with the advice of the expert, legal or quasi-legal rules and regulations can bring them into line.[58]

This differs sharply from the proletarianization literature which often implies that the mere shift to salaried employment (Derber's 'historical proletarianization') indicates a major erosion of professional power. This assumption must be challenged on two grounds: first, as argued here, the location of the professional worker within bureaucracies may not be inconsistent with professionalism; and second, the negative evaluation of salaried employment depends on its comparison with an idealized version of private practice.

In reality, there is little reason to suppose that private practice provided significantly greater independence for the majority of practitioners, who often found themselves in the shadow of their more powerful colleagues or at the mercy of the business cycle. Doctors, for example, were always dependent on those powerful individuals who controlled hospital boards and therefore the access to hospital facilities which were crucial to any practice. General practitioners were always dependent on a circle of specialist colleagues to whom difficult cases could be referred; and such referrals were absolutely necessary for the successful establishment of the specialist's practice. Thus, bureaucratization can be viewed in this context as simply the formalization of dependent relations which had always been inherent in professional practice, and not as a significant change.[59] Furthermore, the private practitioner is more vulnerable to market fluctuations, the withdrawal of patronage by key clients, competition from entrenched colleagues, and so on. To quote Freidson:

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[57] Ibid., p. 192.

[58] Haug, "The Deprofessionalization of Everyone?" p. 201; typographical errors adjusted from original.

> When we examine the conditions surrounding self-employment in actual historical circumstances, it is impossible to argue that the self-employed enjoy greater economic security, higher economic rewards, and more autonomy at work than the employed. Owning property or the means of production, whether it is a professional practice or a shop, is not important in and of itself in assuring control over one's economic fate and autonomy in one's work.[60]

Even where there is evidence that bureaucratization has eroded professional autonomy, it should be recognized that this is only one of several dimensions of professionalism, and that losses in one area may be compensated by gains in another. Gordon Horobin, for example, found that the general practitioner in England had paid a price for successful resistance to further bureaucratization:

> . . . But the point is perhaps worth making that the insistence on 'independent contractor' status on the part of the GPs and local competition for patients (which necessitated collective regulation through 'professional ethics and etiquette'), weakened their bargaining position with both their hospital colleagues and with Government. While they remained relatively free to organize their own practices, they had little power to influence recruitment, selection, training, and licensing. In comparison, doctors in the hospital sector had a much greater measure of influence over these issues, but because of the combination of bureaucratic and collegial control, relatively less freedom over their own work practices.[61]

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[59] See, for example, Zola and Miller, "The Erosion of Medicine From Within," in *The Professions and Their Prospects*, ed. Eliot Freidson (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 158-163 for a description of how colleague circles grew into bureaucratized group practice. See also Eliot Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control", *Annual Review of Sociology* 10 (1984): 13.

[60] Eliot Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control", p. 9.

[61] Gordon Horobin, "Professional Mystery: The Maintenance of Charisma in General Medical Practice", in *The Sociology of the Professions*, ed. Robert Dingwall and

A distinction should also be made here between those professions, such as medicine and law, that are undergoing bureaucratization and those that have always been conducted in bureaucratic settings. For the majority of the professions, the lost golden age of self-employed autonomy is purely mythical. Not only are most of the newer professions at home in bureaucratic organizations, they *required* the institutionalization of bureaucratic forms to successfully achieve professional status.[62] Larson, for example, describes the emergence of the social work profession through the

> redefinition of the organizational form which was to render service. The search for efficiency in mainly private philanthropic agencies led to bureaucratization. Thereafter, bureaucratization and professionalization efforts were conjugated. The bureaucratic tendency was prolonged and confirmed by the state's appropriation of the relief function. Not coincidentally, the professional goal of making entry dependent on formal education was considerably advanced in the 1930s — that is to say, at the time when the state's welfare function was finally institutionalized.[63]
>
> The emergence of paid full-time social workers, as well as their subsequent quest for expertise, were originally the outcome of a largely heteronomous move towards the bureaucratization of welfare work.[64]

Thus, if one is to equate bureaucratization with proletarianization, one is forced to the ludicrous conclusion that these occupations were simultaneously undergoing both professionalization and proletarianization.

A partial solution to this paradox is found in Derber's distinction between historical and structural proletarianization. That these professions arose in bureaucratic settings strongly suggests that historical proletarianization (that is, the shift to salaried employment) does not necessarily imply structural proletarianization (that is, the loss of control over the work process). This is an important point, and one frequently overlooked in the proletarianization literature.[65]

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[61](cont'd) Anthony Lewis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 91.

[62] Larson, pp. 190, 179.

[63] Ibid., p. 182; emphasis deleted.

[64] Ibid., p. 181.

[65] Or to quote Freidson:

> Overall, then, employment status is not a good, direct measure of control or lack of control over one's work. The prime argument of the proletarianization thesis that we must still assess is the assertion that bureaucratization——i.e. the organization of professional work into a complex division of labor ordered by a hierarchy of positions——has led to the loss of professionals' traditionally asserted right of self-determination. (Freidson, "The Changing Nature of

A more complete analysis of the relationship between proletarianization and bureaucratization can be undertaken through an application of Larson's distinction between techno-bureaucratic and public service professions. Bureaucracies generate professional occupations in one of two ways: through the concentration and differentiation of administrative and managerial functions; and through the expansion of services (particularly in the state sector bureaucracies).[66] These two types of profession occupy different positions within the bureaucracy and are therefore subject to different levels of structural proletarianization.

The public service professions emerge as a result of the state bureaucracy's appropriation of additional functions, a close parallel to the expansion of capital through the process of commodification. Since the creation and expansion of the market for their services depends on further 'state commodification' of educational, welfare, and regulatory functions, these occupations are favourably disposed towards employment in the state sector and the horizontal expansion of the state bureaucracy. Thus, one thrust of these emergent professions is to support and encourage the horizontal expansion of the state bureaucracy by providing the state sector with (generally a monopoly of) professional expertise. The state is only able to appropriate additional functions because it can claim both the expertise and the disinterestedness to know, and to do, what is best for its clients. Thus the state bureaucracy borrows from professional ideology at the same time as the emergent profession borrows bureaucratic authority.[67]

Simultaneously, however, the profession must protect itself from structural proletarianization. A second major thrust of the professionalization effort is, therefore, to resist vertical bureaucratization; that is, the build up of multiple levels of hierarchical authority above the professional, which is associated with deskilling. Here, professionalism is used to limit bureaucratization. "For these aspiring occupations, the claim of expertise — sanctioned by external sources of credentialling — represents a possibility of acquiring

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[65](cont'd) Professional Control", p. 10.)

[66] Larson, p. 179.

[67] It should not be surprising that one of the rare articles I was able to locate on the "Deprofessionalization of Teachers" (Thomas R. McDaniel, *Education Forum*, January 1979) dealt with the threat to teachers' professionalism posed by court decisions that would allow the rise of private schools outside the state bureaucracy!

countervailing power vis-à-vis the bureaucratic hierarchy of the organizations within which they are contained."[68] The degree of professionalization or structural proletarianization they will experience is determined by the interactions described in Figure 5.

The emergence of the 'technobureaucratic' professions, on the other hand, may be seen as the *result* of the structural proletarianization of subordinate professionals. The separation of design and execution, which is the essential feature of structural proletarianization, creates a small professional elite responsible for the direction of subordinate professionals. These technobureaucratic professions are created not so much by the horizontal expansion of state bureaucracies (though this is a minor factor) as by the differentiation and concentration of authority through vertical bureaucratization. The professionalization effort for the technobureaucratic professions is not aimed at either the capture of markets or resistance to proletarianization, but at the legitimation of pre-existing bureaucratic power. To quote Larson:

> Here, the claim of specialized or 'professional' expertise for technobureaucratic functions which are unspecific and polyvalent does not aim at asserting independent professional status; rather, it borrows from the general ideology of professionalism to justify technobureaucratic power. Significantly, subordinate professionals are included among the relevant publics to which this claim is addressed.[69]
>
> School superintendents, ***after bureaucratization had clearly differentiated them from teachers***, moved to create a distinctive program of training based on systematized experience and on methods borrowed from business and economics. It then became possible for them to prove and legitimate expertise by the typical means of university courses of study and degrees.[70]

For these technobureaucratic professions, then, the professional project is almost an afterthought, the appropriation of a suitable status to legitimate the continued exercise of power which is actually derived from their location in the bureaucracy. While their professionalism may allow them to resist those yet higher in the bureaucracy, its main function is to erode the ability of subordinate professionals to resist their direction. Teachers, for example, can assert their expert knowledge of 'what is best for their students' to resist demands made on them by lay school boards; but this appeal to professional expertise fails when a superintendent can produce equally valid or superior professional qualifications. The professionalization of superintendents is therefore necessary to retain effective, legitimated control over teachers, as much as it is to assert the superintendent's independence of lay boards. For their part, teachers can successfully resist professionalized superintendents only by combining their claim to professional expertise with unionized collective action.

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[68] Larson, p. 179.

[69] Ibid., p. 179.

[70] Ibid., p. 182. Emphasis in original.

The technobureaucratic professions are, almost by definition, less susceptible to structural proletarianization than the public service professions. Since their power is derived primarily from their bureaucratic position rather than from their expertise, their professional fortunes depend on their ability to appropriate bureaucratic resources (i.e., empire building). The model presented in Figure 5 must be replaced for the technobureaucratic professions with that presented in Figure 6.[71]

Larson's distinction between technobureaucratic and public service professions is a key one for two reasons: (1) it allows us to challenge Freidson's view of professional dominance (of which more in a moment); and (2) it provides one measure of structural proletarianization. If the rate of growth of the technobureaucratic professions is greater than that of the public service professions, then the public service professions are likely undergoing structural proletarianization.[72] In other words, if a profession has a low level of vertical bureaucratization, a career ladder with only one or two steps, it is likely less deskilled than one with a

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[71] The initial impulse for the creation of technobureaucratic professions arises in heteronomous organizations (A), which determine the bureaucratic power of that professional role (B). The technobureaucrat's power over subordinate professionals (B) is mediated through the subordinate profession's ability to resist (C). The actual degree of proletarianization of the subordinate professionals (D) is determined by the pressure for proletarianization (E) which acts both directly on the profession (G) (through such mechanisms as inflation), through pressure on the employing bureaucracy (A) (through fiscal crisis), and through the attempts by the technobureaucratic professions to appropriate a larger share of resources and control (B). Once established, the technobureaucratic professions create a legitimating body of expertise associated with external credentialling (F). This increases their professionalism (H) which increases their resistance to proletarianization (G) while at the same time eroding the ability of subordinate professionals to resist their power (C).

[72] I say 'likely' here because the growth of technobureaucratic professions may be unrelated to proletarianization in 'top-heavy' administrations. Where the proliferation of technobureaucratic professionals is proceeding faster than the expansion of the exploitation of surplus value from the public service professionals, the organization will experience an economic crisis which will force either a slowing of technobureaucratic growth or an acceleration of the proletarianization of subordinate professionals.

FIGURE 6:
PROLETARIANIZATION OF
TECHNOBUREAUCRATIC PROFESSIONS


A.
External Factors: E.g., increase or decrease in bureaucratic resources, relations with elites, changes in dominant ideology, etc.
B.
Degree of bureaucratic power over subordinate professionals
C.
Degree of subordinate professionals' vulnerability or resistance to proletarianization
D.
Degree of proletarianization of subordinate professionals
-ideological
-technical
E.
External factors: (pressures for proletarianization) capitalist accumulation, fiscal crisis of the state
F.
Technobureaucrat's development of knowledge base and external credentialling
G.
Degree of technobureaucrat's vulnerability or resistance to proletarianization
H.
Degree of technobureaucrat's professionalization

highly developed hierarchy of authority or with a large number of technobureaucratic staff positions.

For education, the question can be stated simply: Is the type and number of 'central office' and governmental administrative positions increasing at a faster rate than classroom teaching positions? In this context, the emergence of various program consultants, project directors, curriculum specialists, and so on, can be seen as the separation of design from execution as a consequence of the ongoing deskilling of classroom teachers.[73]

The Test Development Specialist (TDS), for example, is a new profession generated by the provincial bureaucracy: the position was created by ministerial decree along with the provincial testing program. This cannot be viewed as the expansion of services into new areas, for student evaluation was a function that was already being served by the classroom teacher. The expansion of the Student Evaluation Branch clearly represents the (at least partial) removal of the evaluation function from teachers and its concentration within the provincial bureaucracy. The emergence of the TDS as a technobureaucratic profession can therefore be seen as a direct threat to the professionalism of classroom teachers.

This interpretation depends, however, on our acceptance of Larson's distinction between public service and technobureaucratic professions. Eliot Freidson rejects this distinction and focuses instead on the nature of the superordinates. He argues that most workers are supervised by a separate rank of managers, specially trained in management skills and recruited from outside the organization rather than from the ranks of the workers they supervise. Managers of professionals, on the other hand, tend to be recruited from the ranks of the professionals they supervise and are therefore members of the same profession. By arguing that public service and technobureaucratic professionals are part of the same professional family, Freidson is able to claim that the professions have retained control over their work processes:

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[73] Alternatively, the proliferation of consultant and supervisory positions may be in part a response to demographic pressures. As the baby boom generation reached mid-career, there were insufficient administrative vacancies to accommodate the sudden bulge in demand, so that a large proportion of those who would normally have gone on to become principals or superintendents found their career aspirations frustrated. The corresponding decline in the school-age population meant that the need for classroom teachers was dropping just as the demand for additional supervisory positions was peaking, creating strong pressures for the internal reallocation of resources. It could therefore be argued that the creation of these non-classroom positions does not represent deskilling of the rank and file, but merely a form of professional featherbedding. It remains to be seen, however, whether the advent of the next teacher shortage will reverse this trend or whether, once created, these new positions become a permanent and superordinate category at the expense of their proletarianized colleagues.

> For a great many professional employees, on the other hand, members of their profession routinely fill the supervisory, managerial, and often even executive positions. In industrial firms employing scientists and engineers, supervisory, managerial, and even higher positions in the hierarchy are filled primarily by employees with professional credentials. . . . At the very least, the first line of hierarchical supervision of professional employees is *always* filled by a professional. For most professionals — accountants, librarians, social workers, nurses, physicians, lawyers, and schoolteachers, among others — the managerial levels above the immediate supervisor are also filled by qualified professionals because it is mandated by law, required for institutional accreditation or chartering, or effectively sustained by custom and convenience.
>
> . . .
>
> Thus while rank and file professional workers may have to take orders just as blue collar or clerical workers have to, these orders are given by a superordinate colleague, not by someone trained in management or some other field. Where the work of the professional employees is formally delineated in some detail — 'formatted' in the case of engineers . . . — it is not done by outsiders who have expropriated the professional's skills, but rather by members of the same profession who have specialized in the accomplishment of such tasks. While this formatting does reduce the use of discretion and judgment by individual rank and file professional workers, it does not represent a reduction in the control of professional work by the *profession* itself, for other professional workers create it and supervise and manage the rank and file. It is therefore entirely inaccurate to say that the professions as corporate bodies have lost their capacity to exercise control over their members' work, even though individual professionals may have.[74]

There are two objections that can be raised to Freidson's position. First, there is the question of whether the various ranks within a profession should be considered as one or several distinct occupational categories, and second, whether 'professional dominance' is of any significance if the vast majority of rank and file practitioners are open to proletarian-[illegible].

If we accept Larson's interpretation, then clearly the supervisors that Freidson describes as 'fellow professionals' are in fact members of a different professional category. What Freidson glosses over as a pattern of continued professional self-regulation could be an example of deskilling through the concentration of decision making in the hands of superordinate professional categories. While classroom teachers and superintendents are all 'professional educators', it may be more useful to distinguish between the *public service* classroom professional and the distinct *technobureaucratic* profession of school administrator.

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[74] Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control", p. 12.

There are two factors on which Freidson's claim to professional unity rests: the recruitment of superordinates from rank and file professionals, and the community identity among all members of a profession.

Freidson himself acknowledges the pressures which are undermining community identity, though apparently without conceding that this amounts to the emergence of distinct technobureaucratic categories:

> The fiction that colleagues are essentially equal in competence, authority, and power and that they basically share the same interests has also been weakened, particularly in the case of professional organizations that are large enough to require full-time administrative officers. The professionals who serve in executive, managerial, and supervisory roles are clearly delineated by their formal rank, and their authority is distinct from that of their rank and file 'colleagues'. Professional stratification in organizations involves differences in official authority and power that in turn produce varying perspectives on the professional enterprise. Rank and file professionals are primarily preoccupied with performing their work according to their own view of the intrinsic practical problems and of the necessary means of coping with them on a day-to-day basis. . . . In contrast, supervisory professionals are accountable for the aggregate performance of the workers under them and they tend to have an organizational perspective. They identify as much, if not more, with the type of professional organization they represent as with the practicing profession.
>
> As the threat of legal action, government regulation and, in commercial enterprises, investor pressure for higher profits all increase an organization's accountability for the performance of its professional workers, those in the administrative elite will be more likely to assume a less collegial and a more superordinate relationship with their subordinate colleagues.[75]

And again:

> Consider schoolteachers: Their administrative superiors — principals and superintendents — usually have had training as teachers in schools of education and some years of experience in classroom teaching. Indeed, such training and experience are often prerequisite qualifications for their positions. Similarly, the experts who formulate the guidelines and standards employed in schools are usually faculty members of schools of education, or are professionally qualified staff members of the state boards of education. Even though they perform different functions, all may be seen as part of the same profession. The divisions among the three strata are so great, however, that in effect they are separate. There is even militant trade unionism among the rank and file practitioners, which is a rare occurrence among professions in the United States. . . . Medicine, law, dentistry and other professions that have not been subject to formal controls up to now may move in the same direction.[76]

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[75] Ibid., p. 15.

[76] Ibid., p. 18.

While Freidson is prepared to acknowledge the *potential* breakdown of community in *particular* professions, he nevertheless continues to overstate the case for professional recruitment.

If recruitment to the superordinate ranks is a near universal outcome of routine progression up a career ladder, then we would have to accept that we were dealing with a single occupation. The various ranks of university academics are clearly part of a single profession, even though working conditions and remuneration may differ markedly, because all sessional instructors may reasonably expect to become tenured professors in due course.[illegible] Similarly, department chairs and faculty deans are often elected to brief terms of office by the rank and file members they are to administer, generally retain at least a token involvement with teaching or research, and are more likely to return to the role of rank and file instructor/researcher than to circulate to equivalent administrative positions in other departments or institutions. At the other extreme are those industrial and white collar occupations (against which Freidson contrasts the professions) where the managers are recruited from outside the ranks of the workers they supervise.

Many professions, however, fall in a grey area somewhere between these two extremes, such that: (1) promotion to superordinate positions is limited and not the automatic outcome of normal career progression; (2) supervisors are appointed by higher bureaucratic authority, not elected by the rank and file; (3) supervisory positions are increasingly isolated from hands-on practice; (4) administrative positions are terminal in that a return to the rank of practitioner would be considered a demotion; (5) recruitment to superordinate ranks requires additional formal training and certification (that is, experience as a rank and file professional is a necessary ***but not sufficient*** qualification); and (6) promotion to superordinate positions may entail changing one's professional association.

Where does one draw the line, then, between internal professional promotion and the emergence of a distinct technobureaucratic profession? At what point does the requirement

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[illegible] On the other hand, see George Van Arsdale, "Deprofessionalization of Part-Time Faculty," *American Sociologist* 13, no. 4 (1978): 195-201, for an account of the proletarianization of sessional instructors.

for graduate course work in administration, for example, cease to be a mere competitive edge for promotion ***within*** an occupation and begin instead to represent the emergence of a monopoly of theoretical knowledge by a *distinct* occupational category? How sharply do the distinctions between superordinate and rank and file professionals have to be drawn before we can judge them as separate?

Argued in the abstract, the debate quickly degenerates into arbitrary assertion — the ideologically motivated adoption of either the professional dominance or proletarianization hypotheses. What is required is an empirical investigation of particular professions to determine: (a) the extent to which members of the profession continue to feel themselves part of a larger united community, or members of separate superordinate professions; (b) the actual pattern of recruitment within and between ranks; and (c) the impact of these two factors on the actual work process. Chapter 8 of this thesis explores these issues for the field of education.

The second objection to Freidson's professional dominance theme is that he seems to insist that if the exploitation of subordinate professionals is undertaken by senior partners (capitalist-professionals) or supervisors (technobureaucratic professionals), then the 'professions themselves' are still in control, and he therefore rejects the proletarianization thesis. This reification of 'the profession' is highly misleading, however, for even Freidson has to accept that the rank and file professionals may be undergoing structural proletarianization. Surely the deskilling of the majority of professional workers is of concern, whether this proletarianization is carried out under the agency of capitalist managers or that of the professional elite. In other words, even if superintendents are considered part of the same profession as classroom teachers, the deskilling of classroom teachers remains a significant sociological phenomenon.

This remains, then, largely an empirical question. As Freidson points out, the theoretical literature he reviews:

> raise[s] strong doubts about the propriety of assuming — without careful, case-by-case analysis of empirical evidence — that the controls that are exercised place professionals in a position directly analogous to that of the industrial worker, i.e., being subject to close supervision, having their skills expropriated, lacking discretion

in the performance of their work, and the like."[71]

Some of these case studies were provided in Derber's 1982 *Professionals as Workers*, but education was not among them. By undertaking a case study of non-classroom educators, it will be possible to establish (a) whether the growth of non-classroom educators does imply the structural proletarianization of classroom teachers; (b) whether the technobureaucratic professions are themselves subject to structural proletarianization; and (c) what forms, if any, this takes.

SUMMARY

So far, I have suggested that there are four separate research traditions in the sociology of the professions; that these evolved independently within the literature of various interest groups; and that these divisions are perpetuated for ideological and political reasons. I have proposed a synthesis of theoretical perspectives which would bring together several of these separate traditions, and thus begin to break down some of these artificial barriers.

Furthermore, I have raised several theoretical issues which bear investigating. I have suggested that public service professions are undergoing proletarianization; that this is related to the emergence of technobureaucratic professions; that the technobureaucratic professions are less susceptible to structural proletarianization than the public service professions; and that bureaucratization (historical proletarianization) is not the determining factor in the devaluation of the work process (structural proletarianization). I have argued that deprofessionalization and proletarianization are analytically distinct processes: that deprofessionalization is primarily the result of an erosion of the profession's monopoly of knowledge, and particularly of those aspects of the knowledge base with a high indetermination/technicality ratio, while proletarianization represents the devaluation of the work process.

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[71] Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control", p. 11.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE EDUCATION LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION: TYPES OF SOURCES

There are three types of statements on professionalism within the education literature. First, there are the policy statements by governmental bodies and professional associations, such as the Canadian Education Association and the Alberta Teachers' Association. Their theoretical content tends to be drawn primarily from early trait models and to focus on 'persuasive definitions'[1] of profession intended to either expand or limit the occupational power of teachers. They are therefore of interest largely as 'data' rather than for their contribution to theory.

Second, there are review statements in textbooks intended for teacher training. These adopt a variety of approaches. Some texts simply reprint and debate the policy statements mentioned above. Others produce their own statements independently, but these too generally adopt a trait model approach, and so may be grouped with the previous category.

Other texts focus on those characteristics of the 'professional' educator into which it is deemed desirable to socialize the prospective teacher, or otherwise inform the student of occupational traits.[2] Again, these reflect the educator's self-image and are of interest more as 'data' than as theorizing. For example, it is interesting to compare John Almack and Albert Lang's 1925 *Problems of the Teaching Profession* with current teacher texts to see how little changed are the arguments. If modern texts can still speak of the need to increase the professionalism of teachers in exactly the same tone 65 years later, one has to question whether the occupation is ever likely to reach this fabled goal. Similarly, it is fascinating to track various 'professionalism' issues through the six editions of Robert Richey's *Planning for Teaching* from the late 1950s to the early 1970s as each edition attempts to reflect changed attitudes towards, for example, union affiliation.

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[1] See Cogan, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 29, no. 7 (1955): 105.

[2] Some typical examples include: Sidney Dorros, *Teaching as a Profession*, Merrill's Foundations of Education Series (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), which lists 10 professional responsibilities and then devotes a chapter to each; Owen A. Hagen, *Changing World, Changing Teachers* (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1973); Albert J. Huggett and T. M. Stinnett, ed., *Professional Problems of Teachers* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956); and Robert W. Richey, *Planning for Teaching* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958, 1963, 1968, and 1973).

A few textbooks review the literature on the sociology of the professions and then attempt to apply this to education. Most of these are embarrassingly anachronistic, however, as the advances in the sociology of professions have been very slow to diffuse to the literature of any of the aspiring occupations, including education. Even most of the texts on the sociology of education currently in use, such as the Mifflens' *The Sociology of Education: Canada and Beyond*, continue to perpetuate trait models of professionalism.[3] That the Mifflens describe themselves as sympathetic to Marxist perspectives[4] makes it all the more amazing that they seem to take no account of more than a decade of attacks by various conflict theorists on the trait and structural-functional models of professionalism.

Third, there are original articles, monographs and conference presentations dealing specifically with the issue of the professionalism of educators. These may usefully be further subdivided into three types of literature: that of the various specializations within education; the field of educational administration; and the sociology of education. All three types were dominated by trait and structural-functional models until at least the mid-1980s, when the rhetoric of professionalism was quite abruptly dropped.

As with other aspiring occupations, practitioners of the various content specializations within education debated the professional status of their particular subdiscipline by comparison with the usual trait models and asserted the need to bring their occupation more closely in line with the model,[5] usually through increased specialized training or certification. The desire of school counsellors, early childhood services, music teachers or other subject specialists to introduce additional training and credentialling following initial teacher certification reflects both the dynamic of credential inflation and an attempt to initiate a professional project to constitute a monopoly over the provision of certain services within the public schools. As such, it references professionalism as an ideological resource and contributes little to our theoretical understanding.

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[3] Frank J. Mifflen and Sydney C. Mifflen, *The Sociology of Education: Canada and Beyond* (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises Limited, 1982), pp. 232-234. The brevity of this two page section in a text devoted to the sociology of education also demonstrates how woefully inadequate is the attention paid to professionalism issues in the education literature.

[4] Ibid., p. 2.

Interestingly enough, I have been unable to identify any articles in this tradition after about 1986. Possibly, educators have come to recognize that the trait model of profession is no longer considered acceptable sociology, thus undermining its usefulness as an ideological resource. Alternatively, one is tempted to speculate that these professional projects have stalled as a consequence of the baby boom generation reaching an age where the acquisition of further credentials is seen as more effort than it is worth. Or, perhaps such articles have simply fallen out of fashion as constant repetition of the theme failed to produce tangible results.

The research in educational administration was similarly dominated by an organizational analysis based on the trait and structural-functional models. As with the more general managerial literature from which educational administrative frameworks were largely derived, articles on professionalism in educational administration journals tended to be preoccupied with the organization and management of the schools' knowledge workers, with the occasional foray into union bashing.

Since about 1986, however, discussion of professionalism in these administrative journals has been almost entirely displaced by the new jargon of 'empowerment'.

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[5] A typical example would be Lilian Katz, "The Nature of Professions: Where Is Early Childhood Education?" (September 1985):

> In the scientific conceptions of the term profession, eight criteria must be met: social necessity, altruism, autonomy, code of ethics, distance from client, standards of practice, prolonged training, and specialized knowledge. The current status of different aspects of early childhood education is then assessed in relation to meeting these individual criteria.

(Quoted from the ERIC abstract.)

'Empowerment' refers to a top-down delegation of authority to classroom teachers and is of significance largely as indirect evidence of the now total assertion of authority by school administrators. The empowerment movement may be seen as an obfuscation of the ideological proletarianization of teachers through their controlled participation; that is, the reduction of their mandate to inconsequential matters of technique rather than full participation in goal setting. A more optimistic interpretation of the empowerment movement would be that it is an attempt to reverse the excessive concentration of authority in the school system's technobureaucratic professionals, which still suggests that classroom teachers are now generally powerless. In either event, the empowerment literature is entirely atheoretical and contributes nothing to our understanding of professionalism.

Finally, there is the sociology of education. Again, the field has been dominated until very recently by trait and structural-functional models, and has tended to follow rather than lead developments in the sociology of the professions. Alexander Lockhart's *Schoolteaching in Canada* is the most recent (1991), and so the most useful of these works, providing an overview of the teaching profession based on an up-to-date summary of the relevant studies from both the sociological and education research literatures. While a commendable exercise in the diffusion of sociological insights to a general readership, Lockhart's book contributes little that is truly new to our understanding of either labour theory or education. Only a very few of the studies in the sociology or history of education have contributed to advances in the sociology of the professions. Ozga and Lawn's *Teachers, Professionalism, and Class: A Study of Organized Teachers* is one example, important for clarifying the class location of professionals, and in expanding our understanding of the ways in which professionalism can be used as an ideological resource. Another is Gerald Grace's "Judging Teachers: The Social and Political Contexts of Teacher Evaluation",[6] which provides a useful illustration of how developments in the broader political context are related to the professional's autonomous control over the work process. The contributions of Myron Liberman's *Education as a Profession* (1956) and the collection by Arthur Foshey, ed., *The Professional as Educator* (1970), were also significant in their day, though now dated. A few others, such as Sidney Hilsum's empirical work on the day-to-day activities of teachers,[7] may have implications for the theory of professionalism, though these have not yet been pursued. For the most part, however, the sociology of education has little to offer the sociology of the professions.

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[6] *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 6, no. 1 (1985): 3-16. Grace's *Role Conflict and the Teacher*, Bedford Way Papers no. 15 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972) should also be mentioned as an attempt to contribute to the sociology of education in light of the dominant paradigm of its time, but Grace's work has significantly improved since he has adopted a more conflict-oriented perspective.

EDUCATORS AS PROFESSIONALS

Several themes can be identified as central to the literature on teachers as professionals.

First, as suggested above, a great deal of energy has been expended in the literature arguing whether teaching, or some specialized aspect of it, may be considered a profession. Even today, many writers persist in comparing educators against various lists of professional criteria to determine their current standing, or else suggest reforms that are hoped to improve the match. While this material may offer some minor insights into current conditions in the profession, it is wasted effort as far as theory building is concerned.

Second, there is a long-running debate over the role of the professional association in union activities. These debates are often highly polemical in nature and generally start from the assumption that professionalism and unionization are alternative or opposed forms of collective organization.

The intensity of the debate in the American literature paralleled the relations between the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA), the former being strongly union-oriented, while the latter originally rejected unionism in favour of undertaking a professional project. Most textbooks, for example, seemed to take a strong position against strike action and union affiliation as 'unprofessional' during the 1950s and 1960s, but as the NEA found itself forced to move to a compromise position (both through competition with the AFT and in reaction to the increasing militancy of its own membership), the majority of textbooks seemed to do likewise. Several American authors now talk about 'professional unions' and suggest that unionism and professionalism may not be contradictory. The issue is far from resolved, however, as evidenced by the first draft of the recent Alberta School Act which originally proposed to break the Alberta Teachers' Association into separate 'professional' and 'union' organizations.[8]

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[7] Sidney Hilsum, *The Teacher at Work* (Slough, Bucks, United Kingdom: National Foundation for Research in Education in England and Wales, 1972).

In terms of theoretical statements, the most definitive work on this subject so far is that of Ozga and Lawn. The main thrust of their work is that professionalism and unionism are not incompatible and that professional behaviour may represent an orientation of union action rather than an alternative to such action. Furthermore, they argue that different groups in different historical periods have placed different meanings on the term 'professionalism'. Consequently, opposing groups may both appear to be appealing to the same 'professional' ideal while in fact they are appealing to quite different aspects of professional ideology, and the term is made to serve quite different ends. To quote their own summary, the ideology of professionalism has been used:

> to assign teachers to a middle class social class location, to characterize them as collaborators with the state, and to mark them off from other workers who were unionized. We suggest that the concept of professionalism had not been fully developed in terms of its strategic importance to monopoly capitalism as an ideology which denied class conflict and co-opted key groups of workers into the bureaucratized state. We also argued that professionalism, as an ideology, presents management with problems, in that it reinforces a craft ethic in these workers which sets up pressures for autonomy in the professional task and concern for the service offered. All these contradictory and ambivalent strands within professionalism need to be understood and developed, rather than presenting simple dichotomies between it as a descriptive concept on the one hand and unionism on the other.
>
> . . .
>
> To sum up, our position is that teachers are workers, who have used professionalism strategically and had it used against them, that they have allied with organized labour in the past and, as a consequence of pressures for proletarianization, may develop such alliances and strategies again.[9]

The unionization issue is of interest to the sociology of professions because the debate is largely transferable to the other public service professions. Similarly, the work of Prandy[10] and others in the sociology of the professions may have some bearing on the debate in education.

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[8] Such action was in fact implemented in British Columbia with the creation of the B. C. Teachers'College, which was given responsibility for the certification of all teachers in that province in 1988.

[9] Jennifer Ozga and Martin Lawn, *Teachers, Professionalism, and Class: A Study of Organized Teachers* (London: The Falmer Press, 1981), pp. 145-147.

A third theme concerns the impact of professional and bureaucratic organization on scholarship and teaching. Peter Blau's *The Organization of Academic Work* is a typical example, though focused more on universities than public school teaching.[11] This overlaps with some of the literature in the sociology of the professions, such as Gouldner's study of 'cosmopolitan' and 'local' orientations among college teaching staff,[12] the interest in 'dual career ladders', and so on.

This theme would also include debates over such issues as 'burnout', compensation, teacher evaluation, career ladders, and so on, in which various positions are related back to some aspect of the model of professionalism or bureaucracy. T. M. Stinnett's (ed.) *The Teacher Dropout* is typical: the high turnover among teachers is seen as inhibiting education's development as a profession, and is itself said to be due to various bureaucratic features of 'the system' which deny teachers' professionalism and drive them away in frustration.[13] The focus of these discussions is usually more on specific practical issues than on theorizing, but they are useful in identifying the symptomatic tensions over the opposing trends of professionalization and proletarianization, and in revealing the implicit model of professionalism upon which recommendations are often based.

A fourth set of concerns addresses the educator's role in relation to other institutions. This is related to the larger debate in the sociology of education over whether the school is an 'open' or 'closed' system. To the extent that other institutions and external events impinge on the professional role, it is necessary to place the educators' professional project within this larger context. For example, Mario Fantini describes the erosion of the educator's traditional authority as ghetto communities begin to react to the schools' failure to meet their needs. As leaders in these communities begin to demand control over the educative process within inner city schools, education 'experts' are no longer able to prescribe both goals and means to their clients. Thus, Fantini argues that teachers need to redefine their professional role so that they become facilitators and more responsive to local needs and community self-determination.[14] Similarly, Powell's *The Uncertain Profession: Harvard and the Search for Educational Authority*[15] reveals how the internal politics and economic imperatives at Harvard affected both the organization and ideological content of the professional role of school administrators. In other words, the success or failure of the administrators' professional project depended largely on events far removed from their own field and their own control.

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[10] Kenneth Prandy, *Professional Employees: A Study of Scientists and Engineers* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1965).

[11] Peter M. Blau, *The Organization of Academic Work* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973).

[12] Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Towards an Analysis of Latent Social Roles" Parts 1, 2. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 2 (December 1957, March 1958): 281-307; 400-428.

[13] See especially Arthur Corey, "Overview of Factors Affecting the Holding Power of the Teaching Profession," in *The Teacher Dropout*, ed. T. M. Stinnett (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1970).

Again, these case studies are largely atheoretical, but they do provide some insight into how educators 'accomplish' profession; that is, they describe how educators have attained, defined, and defended their professional role through interaction with other publics.

A related, though minor, theme that emerges from this literature concerns the relationship between theorists and practitioners in education. Haberman, for example, suggests 23 reasons researchers and practitioners find it difficult to cooperate.[16] This has obvious implications for knowledge-based models of professionalism. Alan Knox talks about the division between practitioners and discipline-based scholars and suggests the creation of a new role (the Ed.D.) which would focus on a new discipline of education.[17] Again, the existence of a profession where there is a lack of correspondence between the producers and users of the theoretical knowledge base would seem to have implications for the sociology of the professions. Similarly, Wolcott's argument that administrators and classroom teachers have opposing subcultures and perceive changes in their profession's cognitive base in fundamentally different ways may reveal something about the role of ideology in the interaction between professional groups, in shaping the professional role, and in the social creation of professional knowledge.[18] On the whole, this theme in the education literature seems to have evolved independently from the similar concern with the distinction between the creators and reproducers of knowledge in the work of Hughes, Geiger, Ben-David, and Mok.[19]

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[14] Mario Fantini, "The Emergence of the Community as an Agent of Urban School Reform," in *The Professional as Educator*, ed. Arthur Foshey.

[15] Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980.

[16] Martin Haberman, "23 Reasons Universities Can't Educate Teachers", *Journal of Teacher Education* 1971: 52-56.

[17] Alan Knox, "Professional Roles in Graduate Schools of Education", in *The Professional as Educator*, ed. Arthur Foshey (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1970).

SUMMARY

Overall, then, the education literature has little to offer the sociology of the professions, but the sociology of the professions has a great deal to offer to our understanding of education. Continued comparisons of various teaching specializations against trait and structural-functional models of professionalism not only represent wasted effort, but perpetuate a false consciousness that encourages both the exploitation of teachers and the surrender of their responsibilities to a handful of technobureaucrats. A case study examining deprofessionalization and proletarianization among educators is long past due.

On the other hand, the concentration of much of the professional [illegible]ure on the professions of medicine and law leaves virtually unexamined many theoreti[illegible]es pertaining to the public service and technobureaucratic professions. The case study of education presented in the following chapters is an attempt to address these hitherto neglected areas.

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[18] Harry F. Wolcott, *Teachers Versus Technocrats: An Educational Innovation in Anthropological Perspective* (Eugene: Center for Educational Policy and Managment, University of Oregon, 1977). I am not convinced that Wolcott has understood the implications of his own work, since he talks in terms of 'cultures' rather than ideology, but it may prove useful nonetheless.

[19] See, for example, Albert L. Mok, "Professional Innovation in Post-Industrial Society," in *The Professions and Their Prospects*, ed. Freidson, pp. 107-109.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

Although Larson employed a theoretical distinction between 'public service' and 'technobureaucratic' professionals nearly 15 years ago, no one has undertaken a specific study of the latter group. As more professions increasingly experience an internal division of labour that creates specialist positions in superordinate and intermediate ranks in their occupation's hierarchy, greater attention needs to be paid to the significance of these new occupational categories. Understanding the role of technobureaucrats is central to our understanding of the relationship between bureaucracy and professionalism,[1] and between ideological and technical proletarianization.

A case study of non-classroom educators is also likely to be more applicable to other knowledge workers than one of classroom teachers. Located in the familiar setting of the office, the education specialist lacks the isolated environment of the classroom which provides teachers with much of their *de facto* autonomy.

A case study approach was adopted because it is a "way of organizing social data so as to preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied".[2] Since the research concerns the political, economic, and ideological contexts of the work process, this was an important consideration.

"A second major strength of a case study lies in the fact that it permits the researcher to explore the dynamics of organizational structure — the internal *processes* of an organization".[3] This is clearly a requirement in any study of the work process.

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[1] See the discussion in Chapter 1, pp. 51-60.

[2] William Josiah Goode and Paul K. Hatt, *Methods of Social Research* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), p. 331.

[3] R. S. Pannu, "Collegial Bureaucracy", (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta,

THE RESEARCH SITE

The research site chosen for this case study is a Branch of a provincial Department of Education. This Branch was chosen for four reasons.

First, as the branch responsible for the development and administration of provincial examinations, its mere existence may have significant implications for the professionalism of the classroom teacher. In the area of curriculum development, for example, the introduction of province-wide testing would seem to restrict the classroom teacher's independence by enforcing the official, centrally determined curriculum. Where once the classroom teacher was relatively free to develop materials in response to the particular needs of the students, teachers must now focus instruction more narrowly on what will be tested. Similarly, the existence of provincial examinations threatens teachers' professional monopoly over the evaluation of their product. To the extent that the Branch assumes responsibility for student evaluation, the teacher loses the power to define client success. A central question of this thesis is whether the emergence of centralized examination programs administered by a few design experts *necessarily* represents deskilling of the classroom teacher's role, and this will be addressed in Chapter 4.

Second, the Branch employs a variety of non-classroom educators, such as Examiners, Test Development Specialists (TDS), Assessment Resources Officers (ARO), Research Officers (RO), and various levels of administrators and managers. These non-classroom educators provide typical examples of technobureaucratic professionals in education. They therefore provide an appropriate test case.

Third, this is a new organization. Established January 21, 1981, the Branch (and the associated emergence of the TDS role) provides an excellent opportunity to examine recent trends in the organization and staffing of non-classroom specialties. Without a long and clearly defined tradition, the Test Development Specialists' role was open to negotiation and struggle, and therefore was particularly revealing of the factors which shape the work process.

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[3](cont'd) 1973), p. 101; emphasis in original.

Furthermore, the short history of the Branch meant that its entire record could be encompassed within this study, and that informants could still accurately reflect on its antecedents and history.

Finally, as a former employee of this particular Branch, having joined it in November 1981 and worked in various capacities through to the present, I have had a unique opportunity to trace its development over a ten-year period. As I was familiar with (and to) the Branch, my ability to negotiate access to its personnel and records, to understand the universe of discourse, and to quickly assimilate relevant information was greatly facilitated.

TRIANGULATION

Several complementary data-collection techniques were employed in this case study: informal participant observation, document review, formal observation, and interviews. A multi-method or 'triangulation' approach has the advantage that:

> using a combination of data-gathering techniques (interviews, questionnaires, and documents) yields a more complete picture of organizations. Triangulation overcomes the disadvantages of a single methodology in that weaknesses of one methodology are often the strengths of another, and by combining methods, observers can achieve the best of each while overcoming their unique deficiencies.[4]

INFORMAL PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

As mentioned previously, I was an 'insider'. It is therefore incumbent upon me to trace my history with the Branch, as this constitutes both a source of data and of potential biases.

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[4] Mary Zey-Ferrell, "Criticisms of the Dominant Perspective on Organizations", *The Sociological Quarterly* 22 (Spring 1981): 199; following Campbell and Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multi-Trait-Multi-Method Matrix", *Psychology Bulletin* 56 (1959): 81-105; Webb, "Unconventionality, Triangulation and Inference", in *Proceedings of the 1966 Invitational Conference on Testing Problems* (Princeton, New Jersey: Educational Testing Service), pp. 34-43; and Dezin, *The Research Act* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). Peter Blau and W. R. Scott make much the same point:

> Using a variety of approaches allows him to examine subtle differences which otherwise would escape attention, like that between private feelings and public behavior. Interlocking methods also provide a check on bias by bringing into juxtaposition two or more sets of data on the same problem. . . .

Peter Blau and W. R. Scott, *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 20-21.

I joined the Branch as a Research Officer in November 1981, shortly after completing my Master of Education Degree. By January of 1982 I had been transferred to a test development team, and on April 1, I was officially appointed a Test Development Specialist. I greatly enjoyed this work initially, but by late 1983 I was becoming increasingly frustrated as (a) I was given a new assignment related to the elementary grades, for which I had no training or experience; (b) I did not feel I enjoyed the confidence of my associate director; and (c) there were growing tensions with one of my co-workers. Given the very high pressure and low morale in my unit, and the rumours of impending staff cutbacks, I decided to leave, and submitted my resignation in November 1983, effective January 31, 1984. I remained on staff as an Examiner, however, until September 1984, when I returned to university to take up my doctoral studies.

Coincidentally, the first course I took on campus that year concerned professionalism, and the contrast between the models presented and my own work experience produced my current research interest.

I continued to work for the Branch on a part-time basis during the winters and full-time during the summers until September 1986, when the terms of my Social Science and Humanities Research Scholarship restricted the number of hours I could work off campus. Even then, I continued to serve as a Head Marker during the twice-yearly marking sessions. During this period, then, I had the opportunity to observe the Branch informally and to form some initial hypotheses. I continued to socialize with my former colleagues, and our conversations gradually became non-structured exploratory interviews through which I was able to identify guiding questions for my research. These 'collaborators'[5] were aware of my

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[5] Following William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1943). Brief notes were taken during these interviews and detailed accounts written up immediately following the discussions.

It must be noted that there is some danger of these discussions having 'contaminated' my data, since some of my ideas and concerns must inevitably have influenced the collaborators' own perceptions. All five of my key informants, however, came from the same unit, and there is relatively little interaction between units. Consequently, any contamination should have been recognizable as a difference between this and other units. In all the interviews, I can only identify one comment research interest, and contributed greatly to my understanding, not only by providing me with updates and the details of ongoing events, but by suggesting alternative interpretations of them.

For example, an issue that was current in the Branch as I began my formal research was the restructuring of the Test Development Specialist (TDS) position to place Senior High TDSs in management while leaving Elementary-level TDSs in their current unionized positions. Exploratory interviews with two collaborators indicated that some Senior High TDSs (and the personnel officer present at a preliminary meeting addressing this issue) expressed concern that this apparent promotion to management ranks actually represented a demotion, while some Elementary staff felt that the failure to include them in the reclassification confirmed their status as 'second-class citizens' within the Branch. Thus, this issue became a case study within the case study, and was included as a topic of the formal interviews.

I received official permission from the Branch on October 29, 1987, to conduct my research, and I began my formal observations in the Branch on November 3, 1987. I concluded the bulk of my research by September 1988, though the last interview was not conducted until November 24, 1988.

In September 1988, I returned to campus and began the tedious process of transcription, inbetween work as a part-time sessional. In December I was offered a one-year contract with the Branch to replace a test developer who was to be made acting manager while the manager took an education leave. Given the opportunity to return to the Branch as a participant observer (and, not incidentally, replenish my depleted finances), I accepted.

During this period I took very few formal notes, as I felt that my first priority should be to the Branch. I was also concerned that colleagues needed to be able to address me in confidence as a co-worker without having to worry that everything they said or did was being filed away for inclusion in my thesis. Nevertheless, this additional informal participant observation allowed me to (a) track a number of issues to their conclusion;

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[5] (cont'd) that appears directly attributable to one of my own hypotheses.

(b) experience for myself the changes that had occurred since I had last held a full-time professional position in the Branch; and (c) review my previous experience from the perspective of eight years of hindsight, additional training, and personal growth. In all of these areas, it proved a very successful year.

By bracketing my formal research with these periods of informal participant observation, I have gained an intuitive appreciation for the research site not available to any outsider. I am able, for example, to place the case study within its larger temporal context and to judge whether 1988 was a typical year for the Branch or whether the Branch was at a 'high' or 'low' point in terms of work [illegible] staffing, morale, or any of the other factors that affect the work process.

Yet my perspective is not entirely that of an 'insider'. Following my initial period of employment, I had no intention of returning to the Branch. My self-identity has been that of a graduate student/academic, and I have viewed continued employment with the Branch as a sort of 'summer job'. This has, I believe, allowed me to maintain a degree of detachment.

DOCUMENT REVIEW

Document review provided an outline both of the basic structures within which the professional's work processes are conditioned, and of the progress of competing ideological positions. Policy statements, organizational charts, minutes, memoranda, job descriptions, and so forth, detail both the changing structures and the rationalizations used to legitimate them. For example, the job description for the province's Regional Consultants in the late 1970s stressed expertise in a particular curriculum area, an appropriate credential for the Consultant's role as in-service leader, committee member, and provider of professional guidance. The current description for the same job de-emphasizes curriculum expertise in favour of administrative experience and credentials, thus revealing a renewed emphasis on the consultant's role as 'school inspector'.

The document review phase of the research was initiated January 6, 1988, and concluded April 12, 1988. I was given complete access[6] to the Branch's newly centralized filing system, an office in which to work onsite, and permission to use the office photocopier. In total, I examined 354 sets of minutes; 538 internal memoranda; 112 external letters; and 259 position papers, organizational charts, operations manuals, internal surveys, commissioned studies, annual reports, and other documents.

The document review process was straightforward. I read and made notes on the above documents at the research site from 8:00 AM to about 6:00 PM each day.[7] While I kept detailed logs of everything I reviewed, I did not use a formal coding scheme, preferring to approach the data phenomenologically. As this was an exploratory study, I wanted to be free to identify issues and questions as they emerged from the data.

There are three main limitations on the data.

First, minutes are subject to the recorder's screening and selection of events. This draft is then subject to editing by management[8] and amendment by the committee as a whole. This repeated screening introduces a number of biases which limit both the objectivity and the completeness of the formal record. Indeed, minutes are often intentionally vague, and will render heated debate as "there was some discussion". Thus, formal minutes often strip the recorded events of much of their context and meaning. Nevertheless, even the bare bones of topics discussed and motions passed can prove quite revealing.

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[6] The only exceptions here were that I was not allowed access to secured examination materials or to confidential personnel files. Current exams and their answer keys are kept in a special vault and are understandably off limits. This did not represent a limitation on the research because examples of the Branch's product could be drawn from previously administered examinations. Similarly, the confidential personnel files are kept in a separate area to which I did not have access. While some of these files may have been relevant, my long personal acquaintance with many of the staff made it inappropriate for me to access this material. Whatever information could have been gained from a review of annual performance appraisals, for example, would have been more than offset by the potential alienation of key informants. The general structure and criteria of these appraisals, however, can be determined from the blank forms, and to some extent from my own experiences. Related data, such as the curricula vitae of Branch staff, I obtained instead through interviews.

[7] The Branch's security alarm system precluded other hours.

[8] I am aware of two incidents in which such 'editing' is alleged to have amounted to falsification. In both cases this involved a manager's application of hindsight to 'correct' erroneous statements made or directives given at a committee meeting. These face-saving changes were made while the minutes were still in draft form, and the action may even have been unconscious. Consequently, from the perspective of the overall accuracy of the data, these incidents may be dismissed as essentially trivial, although noticed by, and upsetting to, the other staff who had attended the meetings in question. (Field note 86.12.01)

Second, not all memos, correspondence and documents make their way to the central filing system. Much of the mundane day-to-day paperwork of the Branch —— requests for holidays or purchase orders for HB pencils —— either remains in the personal files of Branch staff or is simply trashed. Thus, documents that are deemed sufficiently important to be worthy of preservation in the central files are screened through the biases of the individual who forwards them.[9]

This is a particularly important point given that the central filing system was still evolving when I arrived. On the one hand, there was still some confusion among both the professional and support staff over which documents were to be forwarded to central files; on the other, the two support staff in charge of the system had expended considerable effort seeking out relevant documents to ensure that the files were complete.

Third, the selection of documents for review, and the aspects that I noted, are obviously subject to my own biases.

FORMAL OBSERVATION

To go beyond the formal arrangements represented in the official documents to their actual day-to-day implementation,[10] however, I observed 71 meetings between November 3, 1987, and July 14, 1988. This proved invaluable in several ways.

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[9] The first Director, for example, had a reputation for putting very little on paper, and held few formal meetings, whereas the second Director established regular biweekly meetings and insisted that everything be put in writing. This obviously has a significant impact on the completeness of the document review for each period.

[10] Official records and formal structures can present a misleading picture. For example, 40 to 60 per cent of the person-hours in the Branch are worked by individuals who are not officially employees of the Department of Education. This has obvious implications for control over the work process, since these individuals can be terminated at will. Similarly, there are few instances of authorized overtime, yet Branch workers are expected to meet critical deadlines, and consequently, many routinely take unpaid work home.

First, while official minutes record meeting outcomes, they provide little information on the actual process of decision making within the committee. By attending a representative sample of meetings in person, I was able to observe which individuals had input; whether that input was carried forward; the nature of relations between management and staff; the nature of relations between those internal and external to the Branch; interdisciplinary tensions; the degree of sexism present; and so on.

Second, it allowed me to follow several issues as information, recommendations and decisions moved up or down through the hierarchy of Branch committees. I was struck, for example, by how the affective context was often stripped from decisions moving down through the hierarchy, so that they arrived at those implementing them merely as "orders from on high", without the accompanying 'vision' that might have generated some enthusiasm for these tasks.

Third, because the formal observation provided me with access to a level of decision making to which I had not previously been exposed as an employee of the Branch, I was able to place my own experiences into context and so overcome many of my initial biases. Where I started with a view sympathetic to the role of the Test Development Specialist, I quickly discovered that things looked a great deal different from the management side of the committee table. In following the Director from meeting to meeting, for example, I was able to observe and share his frustration at the constant negativity and defeatism with which many of his initiatives appeared to be greeted by the test development staff (though I was aware that that negativity was greatly exaggerated by a committee process that accentuated negative feedback). Without this opportunity to observe Branch operations at all levels, my status as a former 'insider' might have jeopardized (rather than facilitated) the validity and reliability of my study.

As with the document review, I was given complete access to all meetings. Permission to attend was always sought from all participants and in every case granted without hesitation or reservation. Locating meetings was sometimes a bit tricky: the Branch booking records turned out to be hopelessly unreliable as planned meetings were cancelled or rescheduled at the last moment, or new meetings called to respond to emergent crises. I quickly developed the habit of hovering around the meeting rooms,[11] however, and staff were very cooperative in informing me of impending meetings.

As a former staff member, my presence at meetings went almost unremarked. Following my initial formal introduction to the membership of each committee, little further notice was taken of me. Given the large number of committee members external to the Branch, and the not uncommon practice of sending alternate representatives when a regular member could not attend, even those staff members who did not already know me accepted my presence without apparent reactivity.

If anything, I was faced with the opposite problem. Occasionally, former colleagues on these committees would seek my opinion, and I had to avoid being drawn into the discussion. Clearly, such participation was out of the question, since it would have disturbed the group dynamic I was attempting to observe. On a very few occasions, however, I judged it less reactive to answer a specific question than to again draw attention to my role as observer. These occasions never involved matters of substance, however, but were restricted to such things as how to spell a word, which of two phrasings represented better grammar, and so on. In general, however, I managed to remain inconspicuous.

Field notes were always completed as soon after the observation as possible, and always within the same waking period. Anything not recorded the same day was considered lost. As I had been provided with office space at the research site, I was generally able to type my observations directly into my computer[12] immediately following any conversation. At formal meetings I took handwritten notes which I transcribed the same evening.[13]

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[11] On one occasion this proved mildly amusing, as the Branch had, unbeknownst to me, loaned its meeting space to an outside group. When I arrived to take notes, I was asked which committee I was looking for, and replied innocently that I didn't care, any meeting would do. Whereupon one of these outsiders turned to the others and exclaimed, "What did I tell you? Government workers!"

[12] My research was greatly eased by having two Osborne computers. With one at the research site and one at home, I was able to transfer the day's files home every night by carrying a single diskette back and forth. Furthermore, as the Osborne is an 'orphaned' CP/M-based computer, and so completely unfamiliar to anyone else at the research site, I was confident that the simple security precautions I had taken (such as using invisible directories) made it extremely unlikely that anyone could have gained unauthorized access to my notes or transcripts in my absence.

In the field notes, I distinguished between verbatim quotations and approximate quotations by enclosing the former in quotation marks and the latter in *semi-quotes*, that is, a quotation mark above a dash: $\underline{\text{“}}$ $\underline{\text{”}}$.[14] I also incorporated my commentary on what I observed directly into the field notes to preserve insights as they occurred, and as a record of the evolution of my own theorizing. This material was set off from the rest of the text with italics and square brackets.

INTERVIEWS

Following completion of the document review and the initial phase of the formal observation, I was able to design an interview schedule that addressed the issues that had emerged from those two studies. (See Appendix A for the interview blueprint and planning documents, and Appendix B for the interview schedule and release form.) Again, the interviews served several purposes.

First, they were necessary to confirm whether my own experiences in the Branch could be generalized to other staff members. Most of my experience in the Branch had been in the Social Studies and Reading Diagnostic areas, and my observations did not necessarily apply to those working in the Sciences or Administration. Where individuals did report different experiences, the interviews allowed me to identify the factors responsible (such as gender, rank, type of work, previous experience, political beliefs, personal idiosyncrasies, and so on).

Beyond verifying facts, the interviews also helped to corroborate or —— as was more often the case —— correct my interpretation of events. Here, semi-structured interviews have a clear advantage over questionnaires, because they allow informants to provide their own definition of the situation and to identify what they regard as relevant, rather than relying upon the investigator's notions of relevance.[15] For example, while many workers in the Branch reported extremely heavy workloads, it subsequently emerged that the majority still considered their current positions to be *less* demanding than classroom teaching. This might not have become clear had I relied on a questionnaire that simply asked respondents to rate their workload.

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[13] Notetaking at committee meetings is a nearly universal and therefore non-reactive activity. I discovered, however, that the timing of the researcher's notetaking has to match that of the other people present. Initially, I would observe intently as key points were being discussed, and then make notes furiously during the lulls, but I found that this confused and unnerved the participants who wondered what I could find to write about when they could not.

[14] Semi-quotes have a 50-year tradition in my avocational subculture, but I am not aware of their application in field studies before now.

Second, interviews were necessary to ensure an accurate description of the work process. The work process is complex, varied and indeterminate. Questionnaires or brief periods of observation would not have been able to address seasonal changes, long-term trends, or the subtler aspects of the work process. Similarly, while document review can identify the existence of, say, an oversight committee, only interviews and participant observation can evaluate the meaning that that committee has for workers, and its actual impact on the work process.

Furthermore, since we are dealing with mental labour, at least part of the work process is inaccessible to direct observation. For example, workers who appear to be self-directed may not be: Managerial control over mental labour is often a matter of workers internalizing the directives, criteria, and tastes of supervisors who are not physically present. Indeed, one issue for members of a newly formed unit in the Branch was that they continued to function on the basis of 'old messages', rules set down in their previous unit which they were shocked to discover no longer applied. Speed-ups, deskilling, routinization, and other changes to the work process may take subtle forms in mental labour, and interviews provide the best method for collecting this type of data.

Third, I had hoped that the interviews would allow me to assess the ideological stance of various employees. Whatever the objective working conditions of the professional staff, ideological commitment could intensify or defuse their resistance to work rationalization. An initial assumption of the study, therefore, was that the definition of professionalism would vary significantly between managerial and professional staff. This type of material cannot be easily obtained from questionnaires since it is important that the individual generate the definition spontaneously rather than merely responding to those elements suggested by the questionnaire. Interviews also have the advantage that the respondent cannot jump ahead on the instrument to see where the questions are leading. In the end, I did not find systematic differences between the definitions of management and staff, but of course that is itself an equally interesting finding.

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[15] Lewis Anthony Dexter, *Elite and Specialized Interviewing*, Handbooks for Research in Political Behaviour (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 5.

Finally, the interviews generated a number of new insights as respondents provided unexpected observations which were then followed up.

Interview Procedure and Rapport With Respondents

All interviews were tape-recorded.[16] Respondents were assured of anonymity, that I would be the only person to hear the tape, and that the tape would be erased as soon as it was transcribed.

It is difficult to judge the respondent's reaction to the presence of the tape recorder. A few members of the staff are experienced with formal media interviews to the point of near routine, and all the professional staff, as former teachers and current in-service leaders, are accustomed to public speaking. This past experience might have had no effect; or it might have allowed them to dismiss the presence of the recorder more completely than could an average citizen; or it might have triggered the adoption of an official public persona.

Two respondents commented directly on the tape recorder:

> #16: Be, before we go on, can I just interject something?
>
> I: Sure. Sure.
>
> #16: You know, it's funny, I was kidding about not having a tape recorder, uh, before we started the interview, and even, you know, back [I: Yeah] weeks ago, yet I'm being much more formal in what I'm saying, and I think it's because of the tape recorder, so. Usually, I wouldn't be as, you know, I am structuring my language quite formally, and I wouldn't do that. So it's interesting. I think, I think, the tape recorder, [I: Reactive] yeah, becomes, becomes like a third individual in the room.

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[16] The last ten minutes of Interview #01 were not recorded, due to an equipment malfunction. Fortunately, the malfunction was discovered and the missing discussion reconstructed (using the interview schedule as a memory aid) and typed up immediately following the interview. (Note that the interview numbers used here do not represent chronological order.)

> I: Even though it's just me listening.
>
> #16: Yeah, yeah. Strange.[17]

And:

> I: Did the tape recorder bother you?
>
> #32: I was speaking to the tape recorder. Didn't you notice? I wasn't speaking to you, I was speaking to the tape recorder. I was very conscious of wanting it to be part of the official record. Though in some ways that's not good.[18]

Other respondents indicated nervousness by asking that the tape recorder be turned off briefly,[19] by whispering briefly below the volume threshold of the recorder, or through general body language. On the other hand, not all signs of nervousness can be attributed to the presence of a tape recorder. When I asked one early respondent the following day if the tape recorder had bothered him, he replied, "No, I never thought of it. Not at all" and attributed his nervousness instead to the feeling that he was in a job interview.[20]

In any event, the problems introduced by the use of a tape recorder were considered less serious than the difficulties of trying to obtain accurate data relying only on notetaking and the interviewer's short-term memory, especially given the length of some interviews. Furthermore, the negative effects of the tape recorder's presence may have been offset by the unusually good rapport between interviewer and respondents.

Rapport was exceptionally good for several reasons.

First, I was well known to most respondents and was widely perceived as a peer. For those staff who had worked and socialized with me, the interview was merely a continuation of an ongoing conversation. For others, my acceptance by the former served as both letter of introduction and personal guarantee.[21] With equal sponsorship from both co-workers and management, acceptance was essentially universal.

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[17] #16, lines 1623-1662.

[18] Reconstructed comment by #32 after the tape recorder had been switched off. #32, lines 1225-1230.

[19] #03, lines 7-15, 1103-1110.

[20] After interview comment by #41, lines 859-873. #18 (lines 2268-2271) also commented on the resemblance to a job interview.

[21] For example, one respondent quoted another to me concerning confidentiality:
#39: [?She says?] "believe me, I tried to pump him, but I couldn't get a word out". Heheh.
I: Heheh.

Second, Branch staff, as educators, are conditioned to helping students (graduate or otherwise) and are therefore more approachable than would be an average cross section of the population.[22] Furthermore, Many staff had themselves undertaken graduate studies and were therefore sympathetic to graduate research, and some had even conducted interview research themselves. This easy acceptance of my status as 'researcher' also helped put me at ease when interviewing higher-status respondents (i.e., my former bosses).

Third, once dragged away from their desks, many respondents appeared grateful for the opportunity to reflect on their careers, or just to take an hour out from their hectic schedules.[23] By remaining as sensitive and flexible as possible in scheduling interviews, and by spreading the interviews over a four-to-six-month period to accommodate the seasonal ebb and flow of workloads within the various units, I was able to minimize my disruption of the respondent's day. This ensured a better rapport than would be possible for an outsider who would likely be interrupting essential work.

Interview Sample

Interviews were conducted with all Branch personnel,[24] excluding only non-

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[21](cont'd) #39: She says, "He's dead serious about this confidential", heheh.
I: Heheh, well I'm glad to hear it, I mean.
#39: Yeah, that your reputation's still safe. (#39, lines 5-15)

[22] I also believe that the Branch has been successful in recruiting an elite group of highly committed educators, further exaggerating this tendency to helpfulness.

[23] A typical example:
I: Is there anything you'd like to add?
#08: No, but I've enjoyed this. I don't very often get a chance to sit and talk. Heheh.
. . .
I: Okay, well thanks a lot for doing this.
#08: That's fine, I, I enjoyed it and I don't often get a chance to do it. (lines 1283-1296)

[24] Determining the number of staff in the Branch is itself an interesting exercise, as not all of the education specialists found at its desks are actual employees. For example, for every permanent, project, or seconded Test Developer, there was at least one full-time but unofficial Examiner (sometimes called a "back-up"), a varying number of part-time 'wage' staff, and a number of seasonal workers who help with specific tasks such as administering field tests and organizing marking sessions. I am including these active but unofficial members in my definition of

professional support staff, for a total of 43 interviews. While I had ample reason to regret this decision during the interminable transcription phase, I wanted a total sample for several reasons.

First, a large sample was required to compare responses between different levels in the hierarchy; to compare responses between different functional units; and to reduce the influence of idiosyncratic factors.

Second, my status as a former employee already familiar with many of the respondents raised the potential problem of bias in the selection of any subsample. Based on my past interactions with former colleagues, I found approaching some members of staff less intimidating than others. I also knew that interviewing certain respondents would almost certainly allow me to document my own impressions; while interviewing others was likely to provide unexpected insights precisely because they operated outside my former peer group. Such preknowledge makes the objective selection of a representative sample difficult. Even had I been able to construct an entirely random subsample, it might not have been perceived as such by potential respondents. The selection of a total sample was easiest and unambiguous.

Third, since a central research question concerns the definition of professionalism, I was hesitant to risk skewing the data by adopting a too narrowly defined sample. Thus I included (a) anyone who held a teaching certificate or who *might* hold equivalent qualifications, this sometimes being difficult to determine prior to the actual interview; (b) anyone who held a management position; (c) anyone who held a graduate degree; and (d) anyone not clearly in a support position.[25]

Thus five staff members were included who are marginal to this study: a systems analyst, a translator, the office administrator (i.e., accounts), and two junior managers. None of these individuals held teaching certificates or education degrees. Nevertheless, these interviews proved useful by allowing the additional comparison between educators and non-

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[24](cont'd) 'Branch staff'.

[25] Wordprocessors, secretaries, receptionists, data entry clerks, machine operators, shippers, artists, illustrators, and summer students were defined as support staff.

educators within the Branch, thus serving as a sort of informal 'control group' for the interview schedule.[26] I also included one Clerk IV in the sample, but this individual had recently completed an education degree and was subsequently promoted to Examiner.

During the interview phase, 14 additional staff joined the Branch in a newly formed unit, and one new individual replaced a previously interviewed staff member who was transferred elsewhere. These individuals were not added to the sample. One staff member was transferred just prior to my scheduled interview and was deleted from my sample, and his replacement was interviewed in his stead. It should be noted, however, that this replacement had worked in the Branch for several years on a previous occasion and so was not really new to the organization.

Only one person declined to be interviewed, stipulating that while he was willing to discuss the details of his work, he was unwilling to discuss his opinions, feelings, or perceptions. I am not sure whether this reflects that individual's reservations about his own career,[27] or the fact that there had been some history of tension between us. While I might have been able to convince him to change his mind once everyone else had been interviewed, especially as relations between us subsequently improved, he was killed in a traffic accident before I could approach him a second time.

Interview Sequence

Interviews were conducted between June 6, 1988, and November 24, 1988, with the bulk of the interviewing completed by August 30.[28] While every attempt was made to keep the interviews within a short timeframe (as issues and perspectives are bound to change over time), it was often difficult to schedule interviews with staff who were struggling with extreme workloads or unmanageable deadlines. Furthermore, respondents often had to cancel and reschedule interviews as they were called away to meetings, presented with unexpected tasks, or otherwise made suddenly unavailable.[29]

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[26] Again, the greatest insights tend to come from such unexpected sources, precisely because they were marginal to the perspective of the central group.

[27] It was widely perceived that this individual's recent transfer within the Branch represented a demotion, the appropriateness of which was the subject of debate.

[28] Some respondents (#05, lines 21-28; #09, lines 1803-1905; #12, lines 274-285; and #39) reported that they had also undergone job audit interviews within this timeframe, which they suggested were very similar in content to the questions I was asking. It is unclear how this slightly negative experience may have affected their subsequent interviews with me.

I began the interviewing with the professional staff and worked my way upwards towards and through the management levels.[30] This approach was based on three assumptions.

First, that the location of senior management in the organization allows them a broader view than the more specialized professional staff. That is, the higher one moves in the hierarchy, the more abstract and externally referenced the responses are likely to be. Since this is an exploratory study, I wished to work from the specific to the general, and so started at the bottom and worked up.

Second, since managers are responsible for setting the official structures and policies, they are more likely to take the official line than those below them, because if managers had perceived a problem with current arrangements, they would have changed them. Consequently, problems are more likely to be identified by the professional staff than by senior management. Since one advantage of interview-based research is its responsiveness to emergent issues, it makes practical sense to start at the level where the most issues are likely to arise.

Similarly, when dealing with ideological issues, it is important to be able to penetrate the official explanations and rationalizations which obscure real social relations. Since a researcher's mindset is likely to be heavily influenced by one's initial respondents, it is important to start with the definitions of the weakest group and move forward to confront the most powerful respondents, rather than starting with the officials who will likely reinforce an already dominant perspective.

Third, I was better able to refine both my interviewing technique and the interview schedule by beginning the interviewing with former colleagues. Not only were both interviewer and respondent more at ease, but if a new issue emerged, there remained others of a similar rank in the sample to whom the new or revised questions could be addressed. This would have been more difficult among the smaller ranks of managers.[31]

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[29] Doing research on proletarianization, speed-ups, and extreme workloads is not unlike offering a course on Time Management: it does not apply to anyone who can manage to keep the initial appointment.

[30] The exception here are those stragglers who managed to put their turn off until after I had already passed through their rank to the next level.

Matrix Sampling

Given the large number of respondents and the lengthy interview schedule, it seemed unlikely that the Branch would be prepared to sacrifice so many person-hours in the name of research, especially given the heavy workloads and the absolute inflexibility of deadlines. This problem was addressed in two ways.

First, as a former employee of the Branch, I was in the unique position of being able to swap my labour for interview time. By carefully logging the length of each interview and prorating the respondent's hourly wage against my own, I was able to work off the person-hour cost of the interviews to the Branch. While this added about four weeks' work to my research time, it was still considerably easier than trying to track down and interview respondents after hours. And of course such work also added to my participant observation.

Second, I adopted a matrix sampling design to limit the length of any one interview.[32] This consisted of dividing the interview into four roughly equal forms, each of which contained questions related to a particular theme, plus a few questions common to all four forms. The items in common gathered basic demographic information, such as job title, or addressed issues that required a universal sample to generate accurate data, such as the perception of sexism in the Branch. To eliminate any systematic bias in the assignment of forms, staff were listed by unit, then arranged alphabetically within units, and assigned forms in strict rotation. This ensured that each form was administered at least once in each unit. Copies of the interview schedules are included in Appendix B.

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[31] There is also the possibility that a researcher who begins with the management ranks will be identified with management in the minds of the workers, who may therefore be reluctant to respond candidly. I doubt that was an issue here, however, since I was already well known to most respondents.

[32] Since Branch staff were considering adoption of a matrix testing design for one of their own programs, most respondents were already familiar with the concept of matrix sampling.

Interview length varied from 40 to 135 minutes, depending on the length of time available to the respondent and how quickly and directly they spoke. Everyone completed at least one interview form, but time permitting, I would administer a second, third, or even fourth form.[33] As these were semi-structured interviews, I would also occasionally ask follow-up questions from another form if a respondent volunteered information normally covered on another schedule. I also dropped questions where the respondent's previous replies clearly indicated that these items would have been redundant. Thus, the number of respondents for each question varies.

Interview Data

The responses generated in these 43 interviews may be classified into six distinct categories:

Simple Survey Data

At the lowest level, interviews generate simple survey data similar to that which could be collected through a written questionnaire. In asking everyone whether sexism is an issue in the Branch, for example, it is possible to determine (1) how many people perceive sexism as a problem and (2) how this perception varies (a) by gender, (b) by unit, (c) by rank, (d) by age, and so on. One must be cautious in generalizing from this quantitative data, however, as the sample size is relatively small.

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[33] The desire for complete information had to be balanced against the need for accurate information, and some respondents complained that they found the interview process tiring when it lasted over 80 minutes, leading me to hold back in subsequent interviews. (See for example #18, lines 2248-2263 and 2280-2283; #22, lines 1549-1551, 1632-1635 and 1046-1057; and #43, lines 1887-1915, and 1957-1958)

Additional forms followed an alphabetical rotation to further control bias in the selection of questions. Thus, form A was always followed by forms B, C, and then D; form D was followed by A, B, and then C. In other words, as much of the full interview schedule was administered as possible, but the selection of omitted questions was controlled to maintain unit representation.

Complex Survey Data

Because interviews preserve the context of the respondent's remarks, one can move beyond simple quantitative survey data to a richer, more complex understanding. For instance, the respondents not only stated whether sexism was an issue, but generally provided examples. Such examples allow for considerable refinement in our interpretation of the quantitative data.

First, they may modify and clarify the simple 'yes/no' of the survey responses, as when, for example, it became clear that the complaints about sexism in the Branch were focused on one particular manager. Had one simply analyzed the pattern of responses by unit, sexism would have appeared much more widespread, because even women in other units were referring to this particular individual, rather than to their own immediate associates.

Second, the respondents' comments place their 'yes/no' responses within a context. It is not enough to know simply whether people in the Branch perceive sexism to be an issue; one needs to know the specific behaviours to which respondents are objecting, since the definition and extent of the problem may vary. For example, one woman stated that her manager was sexist in that he was much less formal in his interactions with women than with male colleagues, but qualified this by stating that he was scrupulously fair in his dealings with both. In other words, she noted, but did not greatly object to, this difference in attitude. This stands in sharp contrast with the criticism of the first manager, whose behaviour was considered unfair. Such distinctions would be lost in a discrete answer questionnaire.

Third, the examples provide illustrations of both the nature of phenomena and the often subtle processes that produce them. Interviews provide the 'colour commentary' that allow the researcher not only to measure the phenomenon but also to understand it. Being male, I was never particularly aware of sexism in the Branch and would have been at something of a loss to interpret the finding that many women perceived sexism to be an issue, had I not had access to their own detailed explanations. For example, some women felt that since women tend to work in the humanities rather than in the sciences and since test development in the humanities tends to be a more involved and time-consuming process than in the sciences, the males in the Branch tend to have more 'spare' time in which to respond to management proposals, initiate new projects, and otherwise come to the attention of their superiors, than do females. This is an extremely subtle mechanism, and one which is completely divorced from the conscious intentions of the males in the Branch. Such information could not be collected on questionnaires.

Complex survey data also assist in the detection and correction of flaws in the operationalization of the interview schedule. For example, it quickly became apparent from their replies that some respondents had misinterpreted "sexism" as "sexual harassment", and that, in another question, I had mistitled the "Department's Core Values" document as the "Department's Goals". Unlike questionnaires, ambiguous wordings can be clarified for the respondent during interviews and rephrased in subsequent use.

New questions may also be added to the interview schedule as issues emerge out of the responses to previous interviews. For example, the question "Have you ever done anything in the Branch which you weren't supposed to do?" arose out of an early interview where the respondent volunteered this information in response to the question "Have you ever tried to avoid doing something you were asked to do in the Branch?"[34] Similarly, the opening statements used to introduce the interview were modified to incorporate the answers to questions posed by the first respondent at the conclusion of his interview. Printed questionnaires do not have this flexibility.

Interpretive Data (Respondent)

Many respondents will go beyond simple statements of fact to provide their own interpretation of structures and events. As participant observers, respondents are often able to make sense of their own situations and provide insights which might otherwise escape the researcher. While one must be cautious in accepting a respondent's explanation at face value (because the respondent is restricted to a local perspective, or because the respondent may be deluded by false consciousness), the interview allows us to examine how the respondent constructs meaning out of his/her situation. This is obviously crucial data in research addressing issues of conflicting perceptions, perspectives, and ideologies. Respondents are much more likely to speak at length in an interview than they are to provide lengthy answers on a questionnaire, even when it is open-ended.

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[34] #43, lines 1308-1312. (Again, note that interviews are not numbered in chronological order.)

Interpretive Data (Interviewer)

Interpretative data is particularly important when combined with participant observation. As a former employee of the Branch, I necessarily brought a number of preconceptions and biases to the study which had to be overcome.

First, as mentioned earlier, most of my previous seven years of experience with the Branch had been confined to two units, and it was necessary to determine whether my observations could be generalized to the larger organization. By contrasting my experiences with those of colleagues from other units, I was able to define the limits of my own localized vision. Thus, it became clear that some of the problems I had experienced while working in the Branch had been unique to my area, or indeed, due to my own personal history and character.

Second, and more dangerous, researchers 'native' to the case study risk grinding their own axes. While document review can correct faulty memory, and formal observation can reveal evidence which contradicts the researcher's preconceptions, both must still be interpreted through the filter of the researcher's biased perceptions. Only by confronting one's biases with the contrary interpretations of others is one forced to acknowledge (and hopefully compensate for) the biases one brings to the investigation. In other words, as the respondents are in some sense themselves participant observers duplicating the research, it is important to learn where their interpretations differ from that of the researcher, and why.

For example, one respondent explicitly stated that he felt the researcher had been part of, and influenced by, an age group that was atypically negative, and was therefore biased in favour of finding fault with the organization:

> #17: I think sometimes, they create their own problems. I do really. [I: Umhum.] I think they look for the low points, rather than looking for the high points. [I:

> Umhum.] I think you do it too. I think you did before. [I: Yeah.] I don't think you do it now. But I think you did before. You belong to that group, you see, that age group. You look for the low, instead of the nigh. . . .[35]

Even allowing for the unusually good rapport between the interviewer and respondents in this case study (bred by long acquaintance), when a respondent directly challenges the interviewer's biases in this manner, one may conclude that the point is strongly felt, and must be taken seriously.

And, upon reflection, I had to concede that I had initially suffered from a negative bias, and that this was partly due to the personal negativity of one or more of my key collaborators.[36] There may also have been a subconscious desire to vindicate my own initial resignation from the Branch, though this was largely offset by my continued association and subsequent re-employment with the Department.[37]

Another advantage of the interpretive data collected in interviews is that the researcher can check his/her interpretation of the respondent's replies directly, with echo and summary probes.[38] Asking the respondent to verify the interviewer's summary introduces an additional safeguard against misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the respondent's position which is not available through other research techniques.[39]

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[35] #17, lines 532-538. See also lines 229-272, 390-405, and 512-572 for #17's discussion of the value of positive thinking and the negativity of youth.

[36] Much of the superficial negativity of my initial informants could be dismissed upon closer examination. To quote one respondent:

> #24: . . . When you hear people talk sometimes it sounds as if they are uh negative about the Branch. But I don't think it's anything very serious. I think it's just surface bitchiness. If you want to quote me on that, I don't care. [I: Heheh] But it is. It's just · · flip of the tongue sort of thing. Watching people work here is the best way of telling that everyone is committed to what they're doing. And I think there's real loyalty. They want to make it work. (Lines 358-365.)

Similarly, even my most negative collaborators modified their criticisms when speaking for the record, not because they were afraid to speak their minds, but in the interests of accuracy. Nevertheless, this "surface bitchiness" influenced my initial perceptions of the Branch.

[37] Perhaps even more insidious is the tendency of the theoretical perspective itself to seek out managerial conspiracies and champion the oppressed worker. Hopefully this is balanced in my case by an equally cynical attitude towards the restoration of professional privilege, and a rejection of conspiratorial reification.

[38] "Echo probe" refers to the interviewer's verbatim repetition of something the respondent has just said, generally leading the respondent to elaborate further. E.g.:

> #34: I see myself as the same.
> I: The same?
> #34: Umhum. I see my task somewhat different, of course, but in terms of responsibility, I don't see a difference.

A summary probe is where the interviewer summarizes the points made by the respondent. E.g.:

Authoritative Historical Data

Of a completely different order than questionnaire data is the historical interview. Here, policy makers are interviewed about decisions for which they were personally responsible, or to which they were a party. For example, when I ask the Director why a particular committee was struck, I do so in the reasonable expectation that he will be able to provide both the official rationale for the decision and its behind-the-scenes implications. Much of the data generated in the interviews is of this nature.

Authoritative Interpretive Data

A number of the Branch staff are themselves qualified scholars and researchers, holding Ph.D.s or other academic qualifications in business or education administration, anthropology, linguistics, career counselling, and so on.[40] When these informants respond to questions in their particular area of expertise, their responses may be regarded more as a consultation than as simple survey data, and may be cited as authoritative secondary sources.

By the same token, however, this high level of expertise introduced certain difficulties into the interview process. All of the test developers, for example, are by definition experts

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[38] (cont'd)

I: Okay, so you're saying that sexism is a very serious issue, but that that came to a head.
#14: Umhum.
I: And as a response to that, there're at least some efforts to——
#14: Exactly.
I: ——mitigate the situation.
#14: Boy you're good. You put it all in a nutshell. (Lines 1140-1148.)

[39] Care must be taken, however, that summary probes do not become leading questions or challenge the respondent's position. Research has suggested that very few respondents will correct an inaccurate summary.

[40] See #32's mention of his anthropological background (lines 1166-1171) or #03's discussion of the "division of labour and uh hierarchy, span of control, rule and procedure" (lines 185-196) as examples of responses that indicate that the interviewee is bringing an expert perspective to bear on the questions. One respondent (#08, lines 1268-1281) even reported having made a presentation on professionalism at a regional conference.

in the precise and concise wording of test items. They were therefore hypersensitive to the subtleties of the wording of interview questions. Similarly, questions which were accepted at face value by most respondents could trip up those with particular areas of expertise. For example:

> I: ..But if uh someone were to ask whether they should take a position [with the Branch], what would be your advice?
>
> #42: Well, that would depend on what their alternatives were. After all, you forgot I used to be a career counsellor.
>
> I: Heheh. True enough. I, I haven't defined that question very — heheh.
>
> #42: Because this rings very differently to my ears than most.[41]

Or:

> I: Okay. Uh, how would you describe the management style of your immediate supervisor?
> #36: Um, well I could go back to my university days and I could give you some scale of different management styles, but I won't do that.[42]

In cases such as these, where the respondent's expertise tended to focus on an unintended aspect of the question, the item had to be reoperationalized on the fly. Fortunately, the interview format permits this flexibility.

Ironic Data (Self-Revealing Statements)

The final type of data generated in the interviews is the unintentionally revealing statements made by some respondents. For example, one respondent stated that he considered himself a professional because he placed the interest of his students first, and that professionals "weren't supposed to be money grubbers, they were supposed to be interested in, in their clients".[43] Yet he himself discussed money and job security issues more than any other respondent, bringing up salary in the context of career choices, staff morale, his advice to colleagues, his input into policy decisions, and so on.[44] One is therefore inclined to take the claim of professional disinterest in financial reward with a grain of salt. Similarly, several respondents who assured me that the word "professional" is never used in the Branch used it themselves during the course of the interview in contexts other than those directly addressing the concept.

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[41] #42, lines 77-86.
[42] #36, lines 795-800.
[43] #2, lines 846-856.
[44] See for example, #2, lines 62-74, 420-429, 540-556, and 678-696.

Transcription

Tapes were transcribed in three distinct periods [45]

I undertook to type my own transcriptions for four reasons: First, even if a professional typist had been able to complete the work in half the time, I did not have the financial resources to pay for 400 hours of secretarial support. Second, the guarantee of complete confidentiality to my respondents meant I could not avail myself of secretarial support from anyone connected with the Department of Education, even where this was offered at reduced rates. Third, typists from outside the Department of Education would have found the extensively used Departmental shorthand and educational jargon difficult to recognize and accurately transcribe. Gorden suggests that "the amount of inaudible material will be much greater if the interviewers are not responsible for doing their own transcribing"[46]. Finally, I wanted a verbatim transcription, whereas most typists are trained to eliminate such things as the "ums" and "uhs" and silences that occur in normal dictation. Ensuring quality control was easiest by doing it myself.

Five interviews were transcribed between June and August 1988, during the interview phase itself, in the gaps between scheduled interviews and at night. This provided useful feedback on interview technique. For example, I was able to identify and correct an initial tendency to interrupt respondents. Another five interviews were transcribed between September and November of 1988, between my duties as a part-time sessional. I then suspended work on my thesis while returning to full-time employment at the Branch for 1989.

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[45] To transcribe the over 61 hours of interviews took approximately 800 hours. While Gorden suggests that "it may require from 3 to 12 hours of typing for each hour of recording" (*Interviewing: Strategy, Techniques, and Tactics*, p. 223), I had hoped that the introduction of modern word-processing equipment would considerably lower the upper end of this range. That this did not occur suggests either that my keyboarding skills are not up to the speed of professional typists or that I set too high a standard for the accuracy of the transcriptions.

[46] Ibid., p. 228

The remaining 33 interviews were transcribed between January 1 and April 4, 1990.

Following the initial transcription, the tape was replayed and the transcript checked.[47] This proved to be an essential step. The use of an adjustable-speed tape recorder greatly facilitated transcription efficiency but sometimes resulted in the misinterpretation of words played at slow speed. It was therefore necessary to review these transcripts by replaying the tape at normal speed. Similarly, in backspacing a tape whenever a speech outran my typing, it was possible to mistake a doubled word or phrase for a single occurrence, or vice versa. It was therefore necessary to replay the tape through, essentially without interruption, to ensure complete accuracy. This step also allowed correction of typographical and spelling errors.

Once a tape was transcribed and checked, it was erased.

Two problems were identified during transcription. First, Interview #11 was discovered to contain several sections that were very nearly inaudible. While I always checked my equipment before an interview, and checked the tapes immediately following, this problem went undetected because both the beginning of the first tape and the final section of the second tape were perfectly normal. Consequently, the transcript contains many blanks, and while the general nature of the responses may be determined, many are too fragmentary to be quoted verbatim. Second, Interview #18 was conducted in an office that contained a squeaky desk chair. While this went unnoticed during the interview, the high-pitched squeak of the chair was picked up more clearly by the tape recorder than the respondent's voice. Consequently, whenever the respondent shifted in the chair, the recorder would lose two or three words. In spite of these annoyances, however, there remains a total of 1,256 pages (534,083 words) of usable transcripts.

Table 3 lists the conventions I found useful to adopt in transcribing interviews.

Note that all names have been removed from the transcripts, and that transcripts are identified only by job title and interview number. Even after the removal of identifying information, access to the full transcripts was restricted to the investigator and the thesis

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[47] Where possible, a different machine was used for this replay, as the slight variations in acoustics between machines were sometimes significant in identifying misheard words.

TABLE 3:
TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

Convention	Meaning
I:	Interviewer.
#1:	Respondent, where the number is the number of the interview.
R:	Respondent, where use of interview number might reveal respondent's identity through cross-referencing.
[#1]	Substituted for name of person identified by another respondent, where the number is the number of the interview of the person identified. (This maintains confidentiality while permitting cross-references between interviews.)
[ARO], [TDS], *or* [Director]	Substituted for name of person identified, where the person's rank, rather than personal characteristics, is relevant to the current discussion.
[school], [city], *or* [name]	Substituted for proper noun.
[?dress well?]	Indicates best guess at a word or phrase that was too faint, garbled, or obscured by a second speaker to transcribe with guaranteed accuracy.
[?well/swell?]	Indicates two possible interpretations of a faint, garbled, or obscured word or phrase.
[-?-] *or* [-?-?-?-]	Indicates a word or phrase too faint, garbled, or obscured to transcribe. The number of question marks suggests the approximate length of the vocalization.
Cough *or* *Sigh*	Indicates coughing, throat clearing, sighing, and other unspellable vocalizations.
heheh	Indicates laughter.
#34: Um · · what I'm doing now is · · uh *or* #34: · · · Some of both	Dots indicates silence, where each dot represents approximately two seconds.

TABLE 3 - *continued*

I: So you're not getting paid at that level— #34: Certainly not.	A dash at the end of a speech indicates second speaker has interrupted the first speaker.
#24: Yeah, uhuh, I think— I: Is that a possibility? #24:—I'd be a much better teacher than I was.	A dash at the beginning of a speech indicates first speaker has continued speaking in spite of second speaker's vocalization/interruption.
#24: That's why I've been—You know, if it were a matter of	A dash indicates speaker has 'interrupted himself/ herself', that is, abruptly changed subject midsentence.
[I: Yeah.] *or* [#37: Umhum.]	Indicates vocalization by interviewer or respondent while the other is talking, which does *not* interrupt the other's speech. That is, second speaker's vocalization has occurred during a natural pause in the first speaker's speech.
And I'm STILL here.	All uppercase indicates a word given particular emphasis. [Used in transcription stage only (to avoid having to pause to insert control characters while transcribing), and have been replaced with Italics in current text.]
===	Indicates beginning or end of tape, often cutting in or out midsentence.
[[mimes signing form]] *or* [[Note: This contradicts earlier answer.]]	Double square brackets indicate editorial clarification or comment inserted into the transcript.

supervisory committee, so that a respondent's identity could not be deduced even from context. In the preliminary stages, interviews were assigned numbers chronologically, but to further increase anonymity, the numbers used in this thesis represent a new, randomly assigned, sequence.

Analysis of Transcripts

Four copies of each transcript were made.

One copy was retained intact in a master file of all the interviews. This served as a reference against which the accuracy and context of quoted material could be checked.

A second copy was cut into question-and-answer sections[48] and the sections filed by interview question. This allowed for a quick analysis of such things as the number of respondents who were asked a particular question, the range of responses, the number who gave a particular response, how the responses varied by unit or rank, and so on. Filing by interview question, rather than by the content of the response, also allowed the respondents' priorities to emerge, rather than those of the investigator. For example, when asked to identify the changes in the Branch over the past five years, several respondents began their answers with a discussion of the turnover in the directorship. Had these responses been filed by the topic of the response (that is, under "comparison of the directors") rather than by the topic of the question, it may not have been obvious that the change in leadership was perceived by some respondents as a significant change.

A third copy was cut into sections and sorted by topic, where the respondent's comments illustrated some point other than the immediate question posed. Where material could be classified into more than one category, the fourth copy was used.[49]

Thus, the first copy of a respondent's answer to a question on staff morale was retained in context of the overall interview; the second copy was filed under "staff morale"; the third copy might be filed under "staff mobility"; and the fourth copy might be filed under "sexism".

Information in different files was cross-referenced by interview and line number.

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[48] A section typically included an interview question, the response, and one or more follow-up questions and answers, and could vary in length from a few lines to several pages.

[49] As the file headings were broad, a fifth copy of the transcripts proved unnecessary. On the rare occasions when a further classification of a response was possible, a simple handwritten cross-reference was entered into the appropriate file.

Once the initial filing was complete,[50] the contents of each file were themselves sorted so that similar responses were grouped together. In this way, the subcategories into which the data were classified emerged from the respondents' own statements and reflected their perspectives and priorities with a minimum of coding bias. For example, when asked why they joined the Branch, eight respondents cited as a major motivation the opportunity of working in the provincial capital; thus, 'location' emerged as a significant factor in an analysis that might otherwise have overlooked it. As the content of each page in the file was reviewed, responses were summarized and tabulated, and typical quotations identified for possible use as illustrative material.[51] This produced a 2-to-40-page summary document for each file, which represented the initial analysis of the interview data.[52]

These summary documents were then arranged into a point-form draft of Chapters 6 through 8. The document and field note files were then reviewed chronologically, and their content integrated into this point-form draft. Thus the conclusions were allowed to emerge from the data with a minimum of biasing interference from the researcher.

Quotations From Transcripts

While transcripts were as exact as possible, material quoted here may have been altered slightly to increase confidentiality.

First, the personal pronouns "he", "she", "his", and "her" have been reassigned at random (coin toss) to preserve the anonymity of both respondents and the individuals about whom they are speaking. For example, only one of the five Associate and Assistant Directors is female, and so the use of the feminine pronoun would immediately identify that individual.

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[50] This step took approximately 120 hours.

[51] I found it useful to 'signoff' each sheet of paper as it was processed by writing the respondent's interview number on the back. This served several purposes: (1) I was forced to acknowledge and process every response rather than form a biased impression based on a selection of 'interesting' or 'useful' quotations: (2) it ensured that I did not accidentally miss a sheet or lose my place should I be interrupted midfile; and (3) it allowed me to sort the file contents numerically once the summary files had been typed, so that I could easily refer back to the original source for any summary note I made.

[52] This step took approximately 900 hours.

By assigning pronoun gender at random, confidentiality is increased and sexist language and assumptions are avoided.[53]

Second, foreign language syntax and accents have been modified to standard English constructions and spellings where these would otherwise reveal the identity of the respondent.

Third, idiosyncratic speech patterns may have been modified slightly. For example, one respondent said "Right?" at the end of nearly every sentence, an obvious giveaway to his identity. Such identifying phrases have therefore been edited out of short quotations or altered to equivalent expressions (e.g., "you know?") in longer quotations.

Naturally, no changes have been made that would alter the meaning or nuances of quoted material.[54]

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[53] An exception may be made to this procedure for the discussion of sexism (which I hope to undertake using this data following the conclusion of the present study), since in that particular context it will be necessary to retain the original gender.

[54] The thesis supervisory committee was invited to verify the accuracy of the excerpts used in the thesis.

CHAPTER 4

THE CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

The central research problem of this study is to determine the extent to which educators retain autonomous control over the work process. As suggested earlier, 'work process' here includes both (a) the formulation of the goals, objectives, and policies guiding and defining the institutions in which the educator is located and (b) how the technical tasks and procedures performed by the educator are carried out. This study is primarily concerned with the former.

To answer the question, "Who controls education?" it is necessary to address two quite separate issues:

First, how are policy decisions in education in the case study province initiated and made? Key questions here are: To what extent are the basic decisions made outside the education hierarchy and imposed on it? To what extent is decision making "top-down" within the hierarchy? How much practical control is exercised by the non-classroom expert over the larger system? To what degree is the rank and file practitioner subject to decisions made by the education hierarchy? How much input does the rank and file have into major policy decisions? In other words, does the centralization of design functions necessarily imply the deskilling of rank and file practitioners? Chapters 4 to 7 will therefore examine the questions: (a) how are general education policies established — specifically in this case, the decision whether to have centralized testing; (b) once established, who determines the policies governing the operation of the testing Branch; and (c) how are the specific characteristics of each examination determined?

Second, are the decision makers and the rank and file implementing those decisions part of the same, or separate, professional categories? On the one hand, we have Freidson's model of professional dominance, in which the practitioners control the institutions in which they work through a monopoly on recruitment to superordinate positions; on the other, we have Larson's model in which these superordinate professionals form a separate category of technobureaucrat, who disenfranchise the rank and file practitioners, even as they defer to the decisions of those yet higher in the bureaucracy. Does the hierarchical differentiation of a profession necessarily reflect the structural proletarianization of the rank and file? Chapter 8 will therefore examine (a) the extent to which members of the bureaucracy feel themselves to be part of a larger professional community, or members of a separate superordinate profession and (b) the actual pattern of recruitment within and between ranks.

THE IMPACT OF CENTRALIZED EXAMINATIONS ON THE EDUCATOR'S WORK PROCESS

Before attempting to answer the questions raised above, it is first necessary to indicate why this is a suitable case study by briefly reviewing the implications of the reintroduction of centralized examinations for the teacher's work process.

Chapter 1 explained how knowledge workers are deskilled through a process that separates them from design functions, which are then concentrated in the hands of a few technobureaucrats. Thus, whenever one sees the emergence of a new professional category as a consequence of the centralization of a responsibility formerly managed by the rank and file, one is fairly certain to be dealing with an example of deskilling. By definition, the introduction of provincial examination programs (and the associated emergence of Test Development Specialists) reduces the classroom teacher's responsibility for the evaluation function and concentrates it within the provincial bureaucracy. The introduction of centralized examination programs strongly suggests, therefore, that classroom teachers may be undergoing a process of deskilling.

The introduction of centralized testing threatens teachers' control over the work process in four ways: (1) by deskilling the evaluation function, (2) by enforcing a centralized curriculum, (3) by removing the teachers' right to evaluate the outcome of their own activity, and (4) by introducing new (and possibly inappropriate) measures of productivity.

Deskilling Through the Centralization of Evaluation Design

At first glance, the mere presence of centralized testing seems sufficient evidence that the evaluation function has been deskilled. Social reality, of course, is never quite so straight-forward, and there are several mitigating factors in the case study province which may serve to minimize the deskilling impact of centralized examinations.

First, only 50 per cent of the student's final grade is based on the provincial school-leaving examination; the remaining 50 per cent is based on the teacher-assigned mark. In part, this likely reflects a political compromise intended to appease teachers who were generally opposed to the reintroduction of provincial examinations. Officially, however, it acknowledges that any one-shot, time-limited, paper-and-pencil test is an incomplete measure of student ability which must, therefore, be blended with the teacher's assessment of the student's progress over the school term to provide a more accurate and general assessment. Or, to put this in sociological terms, the provincial authorities recognized that the evaluation function contained a number of techniques with a high degree of indetermination which could not easily be routinized and deskilled, and must therefore be left to the classroom teacher. Deskilling has therefore been limited to those aspects of student evaluation which lend themselves to provincial assessment (multiple-choice questions and time-limited essays), while teachers retain responsibility for assessment of those areas (class participation, speaking skills, group work, term papers, etc.) which present insurmountable logistical problems for centralization.

Teachers therefore retain at least half their responsibility for student evaluation, and must still be trained in student assessment techniques. Thus, the evaluation function is not being deskilled in the narrow, literal sense of replacing highly skilled teachers with cheaper, less skilled technicians.[1] On the contrary, the provincial testing program may increase teachers' assessment skills through their participation in test-writing, field-testing, and marking committees (of which more in a moment). Far from cheapening labour, the introduction of provincial examinations requires additional expenditures for a function that was already being performed at no cost by teachers.[2] Nevertheless, the introduction of provincial testing may still represent deskilling in the larger sense of forcing teachers to surrender their control over the evaluation function.

This raises, however, the second point: The case study province has adopted a unique structure of classroom teacher input that allows the Branch to suggest that the rank and file are still essentially in control of the evaluation function. All test questions are initially written by classroom teachers; classroom teachers provide feedback during the questions' field test trials; two classroom teachers (double the representation of other stakeholder groups) sit on the advisory committee which approves each examination; classroom teachers mark all the written work; and the testing Branch routinely undertakes surveys of teacher opinion on every major Branch initiative or proposed change to the examinations. Just as one can imagine a group of independent professionals agreeing to collaborate on a particular project and so coordinate their activities through a central office (without surrendering any of their collegiate control to that central clearing house), it could be argued that if the provincial examinations are produced with the full participation of the rank and file, then centralization is simply an administrative convenience, and there is no deskilling. Does the extensive involvement of classroom teachers in the examination-development process amount to continued collegial control over the evaluation function, as management would like to suggest, or is it merely an elaborate form of controlled participation and co-optation? This issue is addressed in Chapter 7, but the important point here is that centralization only represents deskilling if it can be shown that the design function has been appropriated by the central authority.[3] The case study province may have developed a mechanism that arguably allows for the introduction of centralized testing without deskilling the evaluation function.

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[1] Some technical deskilling may occur if teachers come to rely too heavily on old departmentals for their own in-class evaluation and teaching. Such 'teaching to the test' is universally regarded as inappropriate, however, and is condemned alike by the provincial authorities, local superintendents, and the majority of teachers, as unprofessional behaviour.

[2] For example, each year approximately 1,200 teachers are flown to the capital, put up at hotels, provided with meals, and paid an $18-an-hour honorarium to mark the same papers they used to mark at home for free.

Third, only two of the Branch's products include compulsory examinations: The Grades 3, 6, and 9 Achievement Tests are administered on a rotational basis in Social Studies, Mathematics, Science, and Language Arts to generate provincial benchmark data (that is, they are not used for student promotion purposes); and the Diploma Examinations are compulsory school-leaving examinations used to certify individual student achievement. Everything else the testing Branch produces is available to teachers on an optional basis.

Thus, even if these other products were completely designed by a small group of central office technobureaucrats, this might not represent deskilling if the rank and file retain control over the use of these products. A professional cannot be considered deskilled simply for using the intellectual product of other knowledge workers. Every profession must have an elite category of researchers responsible for the generation of new knowledge if the profession is to renew its knowledge monopoly and maintain the knowledge gap that separates it from other specialists and the general public. This research elite is usually located in the university faculties responsible for training and certifying the profession's rank and file practitioners, but may also include researchers in the private sector or, as in this case, local central office staff and those in the provincial bureaucracy. The key here is the application of the practitioner's professional judgement over whether to adopt, and when to apply, these new intellectual products.

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[3] There is one sociologically trivial exception here which as a test designer I feel compelled to mention. If centralization results in the unchanging use of a particular test model or format, this format will eventually come to dominate all evaluation in the province and have a deadening effect on both evaluation and instruction. As teachers begin to anticipate and teach to the particular format used on the central examinations, they effectively undergo deskilling as they slide into formulaic instruction, whether that format was originally designed by technobureaucrats or their own colleagues. The problem can be avoided, however, by the simple expedient of ensuring that the examination format undergoes continual modification. (Runté, Scraba, and Dunn, "Writing Prompt Design in Large-Scale Ongoing Examination Programs", in press.)

Much of what the testing Branch produces falls into this research category, such as the new observational techniques for measuring students' oral proficiency. These techniques were developed to assist classroom teachers in the assessment of one aspect of the curriculum that cannot be measured by paper-and-pencil testing, and that therefore does not lend itself to centralized provincial assessment. This research was provided as a service to classroom teachers, and it is entirely up to their individual discretion whether to adopt these techniques. Thus, the Branch initiative in this area cannot be taken as an example of the deskilling of the evaluation function.

Another example of the testing Branch's research function is the Diagnostic Testing Program, which produced a reading diagnostic kit and a mathematics diagnostic kit for use in the elementary grades. These diagnostic testing materials were developed (with the involvement of classroom teachers) to assist teachers to undertake the kinds of interventions formerly associated only with reading specialists or resource room teachers. While this may suggest the deskilling of reading specialists and mathematics consultants, and the delegation of their routinized procedures to less well trained professionals (that is, to regular classroom teachers), it nevertheless represents a resource for professional self-development for the rank and file. Even though these materials provide simplified and routinized procedures for the operationalization of very complex diagnostic and instructional strategies, they would only represent deskilling if their use were compulsory.[4]

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[4] As it happens, the major criticism of this program was that there was insufficient 'compulsion' in the follow-up:

> #01: Well, my hope is that [teachers] feel it uh to be a great service. But the only way we will find that out is to show that it is simple, is usable, and has great benefit. . . . And uh, we are already getting requests from teachers who want to pilot this because they think it's going to be a useful thing. But my big fear is, we've got to train teachers, or show them how to use it. If we don't spend a great deal of effort after it's written, it's going to stay on the shelves. [I: Umhum.] That's my biggest fear. Just my biggest fear. That we spend so many thousands of dollars developing this, and hours spent on writing with all these 35 teachers and so on, and then we say, "well it's up to the counties", or "up to the school boards to

The Achievement Tests occupy an ambiguous position because, while they are compulsory, they are not used for purposes of student promotion. Thus, elementary teachers retain control of the evaluation function as it applies to individual students. The Achievement Test's significance for the teacher's work process lies primarily in its enforcing the centralized curriculum and in providing an (inappropriate) measure of teacher productivity.

The Diploma Examinations, on the other hand, may represent the deskilling of the evaluation function since they are compulsory and replace at least half of the teacher's responsibility for student assessment. It is to these sorts of compulsory school-leaving examinations that most observers are referring when they complain about centralized testing and the proletarianization of teachers. Even here, however, there are two very interesting mitigating factors in the case study province.

First, the Ministry's initial attempt to establish centralized school-leaving examinations included a provision for optionality. The original Comprehensive Examination program was a unique experiment in providing a mechanism for the certification of student achievement and the creation of a province-wide standard without interfering with the classroom teacher's responsibility for evaluation. The Comprehensive Examinations were designed for the top 20 per cent of the student population, and were true school-leaving

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[4](cont'd) in-service this." Boy, it just does not work. I think even more effort should be spent on in-servicing than is spent on writing. I know they want a good product. That's fine. I agree. It has to be a perfect product. But the perfect product has to be exposed to the use of teachers. That's my really big concern. If they don't put in a tremendous effort on doing this, it's just going to be staying on the shelf.
If I had anything to criticize the department for is not in their products that they produce, but in the amount of energy and money they spend on in-servicing.
I: The follow-up.
#01: Yeah, the follow-up. 'Cause, time and time again, when we wrote monograph for problem solving, they said, "Well, they ship one out to every principal, every administrator," and that's where it is. And I said, "Well what are we going to do with it?" "Well, it's up to the supervisor or the county people to in-service this." And, just had the experience the other day where we had a team of nine people from grade 9 writing for us here, particular monograph. Five out of those nine teachers had not seen it. And they, it has been in existence for four years. So you see what I mean by in-services [I: Umhum] is kind of. (1.668-729)

examinations in that they assessed curricular objectives from all three high school grades, not just grade 12. Thus, the classroom teacher retained full responsibility for the student's grade 12 mark, but students could choose to write this additional examination to document their achievement against a provincial standard for university entrance, competitive scholarships, or the tightening job market. The program failed after two years in the face of teacher opposition and the lack of public acceptance, and the Ministry retreated to the more familiar Grade 12 Diploma Examinations. Although the Comprehensives were withdrawn, it is interesting to note that it is possible to have centralized, standardized examinations without seriously deskilling classroom teachers, at least in terms of the evaluation function.

Second, unlike the centralized testing programs in most other jurisdictions, the Diploma Examinations are made public following their initial administration. Furthermore, the tests are of a high quality and incorporate many technical innovations.[5] Consequently, they are able to serve as a role model in evaluation technique for the province's teachers. To quote one Test Development Specialist:

> #33: So I see them a way of being able to serve, what I'm trying to do is reflect back to all the [subject] teachers in the province, the interesting and effective evaluation techniques used by some of their colleagues, so it's almost a sort of advertising. (1.1486-1490)

This suggests that in spite of their compulsory nature and their deskilling potential, the Diploma Examinations are still able to serve a research or in-service function. To the extent that the examinations provide an opportunity for the rank and file to collaborate in a reciprocal process of professional development, the program cannot be said to be deskilling.

The evidence here is ambiguous, however, as teachers seem split in their reaction to the examination and therefore to its in-service potential:

> #20: Some people see it as a gross intrusion and they refuse to have anything to do with the testing uh program, except that they feel obliged to administer it once a semester. Others are much more interested. They say, "Oh this is a fascinating

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[5] For example, the case study province has been a leader in designing multiple-choice questions capable of assessing higher thinking skills, and was also the first to develop 'scanable' test items, which revolutionized the design of questions in the maths and sciences by overcoming the problem of students' solving equations through trial-and-error substitution using the multiple-choice distractors.

> process and I didn't know you could make an exam like this" and they like to get involved either with item building, or marking or rangefinding. (1.421-429)

Unfortunately, the only direct survey of teacher reaction to the examinations is open to conflicting interpretation. Of the teachers surveyed, 43% agreed that "The diploma examinations have set a good example about how to develop a test", as opposed to only 18% who disagreed,[6] which may suggest either approval of the involvement of classroom teachers in the development process, or of the tests as a role model, depending on how teachers interpreted the question. Similarly, 43% disagreed with the statement "The diploma examinations have set a good example on [sic] how to evaluate students", as compared with only 31% who agreed,[7] which may mean either that they reject the examination as a model test, or that they reject provincial testing as an appropriate method of evaluation. The latter interpretation seems the more likely, since 73% agreed that the "diploma examinations are well constructed", while only 15% disagreed.[8] Perhaps the best evidence that some teachers felt that the examinations' potential for professional development outweigh the potential for deskilling is the somewhat surprising result that 41% of the teachers agreed that "The diploma examinations have positively affected the way in which I teach", compared with 32% who disagreed.[9]

It is clear, then, that the introduction of centralized testing has not led to the wholesale deskilling of the evaluation function in the case study province. Even teachers in the narrow range of grades and courses subjected to compulsory testing have not undergone technical deskilling, because they are still responsible for providing their students with a 'school mark'. Furthermore, the extensive involvement of classroom teachers in the examination-development process may suggest continued collegial control over even those specific assessment techniques appropriated by the central authority.

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[6] Peter Calder, *Impact of Diploma Examinations on the Teaching-Learning Process*, p. 54. This study was commissioned by the provincial teachers' association and incorporated public hearings, interviews, and survey data, but in all three cases the number of respondents was exceedingly small and the samples largely self-selecting. The survey, for example, was based on an accidental sample of only 135 teachers, and so the statistics cited here and in the following may not be particularly representative. Nevertheless, it is the only study available, and may at least serve to identify some of the issues involved.

[7] Ibid., p. 55.

[8] Ibid., p. 53.

[9] Ibid., p. 40.

Nevertheless, the introduction of centralized examinations must entail *some* deskilling of the evaluation function. Whatever the mitigating factors, the classroom teacher's responsibility for assessment has clearly been eroded, even if this has not been as thoroughgoing as one would have initially expected. For one thing, there may be good reason to suspect that rank and file participation in the examination process does *not* in fact amount to collegial control. For another, the shift in evaluation leadership from the profession's university-based researchers to the provincial technobureaucrats may suggest a form of ideological proletarianization.

Deskilling Through the Centralization of Curriculum Design

Of greater immediate significance to the teacher's control of the work process, however, is the deskilling implied by the centralization of curriculum design that accompanies the centralization of testing. Both the Diploma Examinations and the Achievement Tests are curriculum-based. For students to score well on either, teachers must obviously devote the majority of their instructional efforts to those curricular objectives covered by these tests. Centralized testing therefore functions to enforce the centralized curriculum.

> Almost half of the teachers reported that the diploma examinations were a force to cause them to stick to the Program of Studies. Nearly one-quarter responded that they would deviate from the Program of Studies if there were not a diploma examination in the course they were teaching.[10]

One the other hand, an argument could be made that the provincial examinations' role in enforcing the central curriculum need not imply an unwarranted limitation on professional autonomy if that curriculum is controlled by the teachers. Working to external standards established by the profession is wholly consistent with professional autonomy, provided that the rank and file participate fully in establishing those standards. Given sufficient teacher involvement in curriculum development, centralization appears as little more than the coordination and convenient sequencing of the services to be provided to the client.

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[10] Ibid., pp. 40-41.

This is not, however, entirely the case. While the degree of teacher involvement has obvious implications for professional control and autonomy, the mere fact of centralized testing suggests a change in the *type* of curriculum involved. Centralized examinations tend to narrow the definition of 'education' to a basic, measurable set of curricular expectations that largely excludes, for example, personal development and self-actualization. The teacher's autonomy is maximized in child-centred systems because the teacher requires the freedom to be able to respond to the child's individual needs; whereas a curriculum-centred school system necessarily restricts the teacher's autonomy by specifying what is to be taught. The greater the degree of curriculum specificity, the greater the potential for deskilling. By enforcing the centralized curriculum, the introduction of provincial examinations implies a shift towards a curriculum-centred school system, and therefore the erosion of teacher autonomy.

Of course the potential for curricular deskilling is conditioned by the specificity of both the curriculum and the examinations. If the curriculum contains a high proportion of elective material and considerable optionality in the teacher's choice of instructional strategies, pacing, and so on, then the teachers may retain technical — if not always ideological — autonomy, even where there is a provincially mandated program of studies. For example, prior to the reintroduction of provincial examinations, the Social Studies curriculum left 20 per cent of the course open to the classroom teacher.[11] The mere presence of centralized testing, however, compromises this elective component, because almost by definition, the provincial examination must focus on that core curriculum which the examiners can be confident that all students in the province will have been taught. Faced with the inevitable pressures associated with external evaluation, few teachers or students will want to devote instructional time to topics which will not appear on the examination. Even though teachers could use their remaining 50 per cent of the course mark to reward student work on optional topics, the pressure to cover the core mandated curriculum may constrain the teacher's ability to pace the course in a way that would allow for the introduction of this optional material. The Calder study confirms that this was a problem for many teachers:

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[11] This 20 per cent was eliminated in a later revision to the curriculum, partly in response to the Keegstra incident, partly in response to the realities of provincial testing, and partly as a manifestation of a general trend towards a more curriculum-centred school system mandated by the Progressive Conservative government.

> The teaching of elective material also seems to have been affected by the Diploma Examinations. In response to "I still have time to teach a fair amount of 'elective material'," a majority of teachers disagreed with the statement. The degree to which pressure has been placed on teachers to cover the various topics seems to vary. Teachers generally disagreed (59 percent) with "The diploma examinations force me to jump across topics and teach at a superficial level." However, 23 percent of teachers did feel they could agree with the statement. Most teachers felt able to cover the topics adequately and in the depth that they wish to teach them but nearly one-quarter felt rushed or that the topics have not been dealt with adequately.[12]

On the other hand, the examiners did make every effort to preserve some degree of optionality by designing tests that emphasize skill development, critical thinking, and a generalizable understanding of the subject matter, rather than rote learning and factual memorization.[13] In theory at least, teachers can still meet curricular objectives while exercising a fair degree of autonomy in how they choose to operationalize the core curricular concepts. The examinations' success in this area is reflected in the survey result that only 19% of teachers thought that the examinations encouraged rote learning rather than an understanding of process, while over a two-thirds majority (69%) disagreed.[14] Less encouraging is that teachers split over the statement "I find that I am in a dilemma, either helping the students get higher marks on the diploma examinations or teaching the 'real nature of the subject'", with 43% agreeing against 46% disagreeing.

Some 'teaching to the test' is probably inevitable given the pressures associated with external evaluation, and indeed "teachers reported that they found themselves spending more time teaching to the examinations and were dissatisfied because of the narrowing of the curriculum that has resulted in an examination-oriented teaching style".[15] The majority, 63%, still reported teaching more to the Program of Studies than to the examinations; 16% neither agreed nor disagreed, which suggests that they may not have seen any conflict between program and test objectives; and only 22% said they felt compelled to 'teach to the test'.[16] One third said they thought it was "professionally appropriate to 'teach to the examinations'", while 45% disagreed.[17]

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[12] Calder, p. 41.

[13] This stands in sharp contrast to the school-leaving examinations produced by some other provincial ministries.

[14] Calder, p. 55. It would be interesting to have these figures broken down by course subject, as I suspect the humanities may have been more successful in this area than, say, mathematics.

[15] Ibid., p. 14.

There are different degrees of 'teaching to the test', of course, and a corresponding range of deskilling. At best, one could hope that a renewed emphasis on the centralized curriculum would still leave the teacher free to improvise individual teaching strategies. At worst, the teacher may abandon any pretence of self-direction and simply drill students on past examinations.[18] Interestingly enough, however, this extreme form of deskilling is regarded as completely unacceptable by the provincial technobureaucrats. To quote one senior manager on the need for "revitalization":

> #10: The truth of the matter is, that what we knew was happening was that in many subjects 90 per cent of the school mark was nothing but old exams. All of the school mark was nothing but old exams. Uh, if exams don't change, then there's no pressure on those people to hold up the curriculum. It's just give the kids old exams, starting in September. Well, that's the worst scenario of what exams can do to a school system. And in other instances, uh, you know several kinds of abuses so that people would take the exam and say, "Okay, this is all I'm going to teach". The curriculum specs[19] for social studies say, "That's it, we're going to study these things. And I've looked on the last five exams and there've been two questions on China so we're not going to study China but there've been 10 questions on Sweden, so we'll study Sweden." So people starting to make really bad educational decisions. [I: Umhum.] Well, we know, there's no point even talking about it, we know that exams drive what goes on in classrooms. So we're operating from the principle that exams should drive the curriculum in the right direction. (1.1253-1270)[20]

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[16] Ibid., p. 53.

[17] Ibid., p. 52. Caution should be exercised in interpreting these results, as this item may not have been sufficiently clear to respondents. Some teachers may have interpreted 'teaching to the test' to mean exclusively drilling students on old test questions beginning the first day of classes, while others may have interpreted as asking whether they felt it appropriate to familiarize students with the examination's format, which is an officially recommended procedure.

[18] Evidence that drilling was widespread can be found in the survey of students conducted as part of the Calder study, in which 46% agreed with the statement "We spend a lot of time reviewing old examinations in class", compared with 39% who disagreed (Ibid., p. 49). Of course, "a lot of time" is open to interpretation.

[19] The *Curriculum Specifications* are a series of subject-specific documents that were produced following the introduction of provincial testing to clarify for teachers (and other interested parties) which curricular objectives would be considered appropriate for inclusion on the test and their approximate weighting. The original program of studies, having been designed prior to provincial testing, was not sufficiently specific to allow teachers to deduce this.

[20] Note the acknowledgement of a technical deskilling of the evaluation function: that is, that teachers were not taking proper advantage of their 50 per cent of the school mark, or using alternative forms of evaluation.

We see plainly here not only a renunciation of any desire to subject teachers to technical deskilling, but also the belief that what deskilling has occurred was initiated *by the teachers*! Throughout my experiences with the Evaluation Branch I observed the test developers' disdain for the minority of teachers who lacked the 'professionalism' to teach to the curriculum rather than to the test. Convinced that their tests allowed for a curricular flexibility that many teachers either failed to appreciate or to utilize, they saw *teachers* as the ones retreating from their curricular responsibilities. Far from attempting to erode the teachers' autonomy, the focus of "revitalization" efforts was as often as not to wean teachers from what was perceived as an overdependence on old examinations and formulaic teaching.[21] The examiners varied the test design and broadened its scope to force teachers back into attending to the wider curriculum.

This cannot, I think, be dismissed simply as another example of 'blaming the victim'. Rather, it is a telling verification of Derber's distinction between technical and ideological proletarianization. The ideological proletarianization implicit in centralizing curricular decisions — the desire to have teachers use their independent judgements to further state-determined goals and values — is seen clearly in this example as a preferred *alternative* form of control to technical deskilling, not just an early stage. It is clearly not in management's interests to push technical deskilling even as far as a minority of teachers have already gone, and it is seen as necessary to pull these teachers back from their deskilled state.

The Evaluation of Students Using Provincial Test Results

Quite aside from the dangers of technical deskilling, the centralization of evaluation threatens the classroom teachers' monopoly over the assessment of their own product.

This is a key professional privilege. In the same way that doctors define acceptable levels of health for their patients ("There's nothing wrong with you, it's all in your head") and lawyers define what is legal, teachers used to be able to define acceptable levels of attainment for their students. Centralized examinations seriously erode the teachers' ability to define both 'knowledge' and 'success' for their students, and to that extent, teachers are alienated from the product of their labour.

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[21] These efforts were sabotaged to some extent by the highest levels of the bureaucracy, which insisted on licensing the sale of old examination questions to private publishers, who then flogged a limited selection of these outdated materials to students and teachers at inflated prices.

The degree of this alienation will be determined, in part, by the percentage of the student mark assigned to the provincial examination. In Canada, all of the provinces that have adopted centralized testing still leave at least some portion of the student mark with the classroom teacher. In the case study province, most teachers (64%) find the current 50-50 split between school and test mark acceptable, while 22% would prefer the tests to count for 25% of the final mark, and 8% would like to eliminate the provincial tests altogether. Surprisingly, 7% would actually prefer a higher rating, including 4% who would like to see the provincial examination count for 100% of the student's mark.[22]

One would expect teachers to be unanimous in their demand for a complete monopoly over assessment if they are to resist either technical or ideological proletarianization, but this appears not to be the case. One possible explanation is that the teachers have undergone ideological co-optation to the extent where they no longer perceive any difference between their own goals and those of the central bureaucracy. In this case, the weighting preferred for the examination would simply reflect their impression of its technical quality compared with their own assessment techniques. While an overwhelming 86% rejected the suggestion that the Diploma Examination marks were more valid than their own, the 6% who did 'agree'[23] may be sufficient to explain the 4% who wish to increase the weight of the examination to 100% of the student's mark.

Alternatively, if teachers have been successful in retaining collegial control over the examinations, then they could use this external assessment as an instrument of bureaucratic authority to reinforce their own position. In this light, one could interpret the acceptance of the 50-50 split as an indication of how much influence classroom teachers believe they have over the examination-development process.

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[22] Ibid., pp. 41-42.
[23] Ibid., p. 54.

In any event, retaining control over 50 per cent of the student's mark cannot be directly equated with continued control over 50 per cent of the definition of what goes on in the classroom. For one thing, it is well established in the literature that students view examinations as revealing the real aim of teaching and learning, conclude from test items which concepts are important, and judge themselves by their performance on the examinations.[24] Consequently, the external examination is likely to have a disproportionate influence on student learning, and so undermine the teacher's definitions of appropriate knowledge and performance where these are at odds with those of the examination. For another, the two marks will inevitably be compared. Where they are discrepant, the relevant audiences are likely to see one or the other mark as the more valid, rather than as separate but equal. Of those teachers surveyed, 47% agreed (and only 20% disagreed) that "Administrators see diploma examination marks as being more valid than the ones which teachers assign"; 47% agreed (and only 14% disagreed) that "Parents see the diploma examination marks as being more valid than teacher-assigned marks"; but 39% disagreed (and only 23% agreed) that "Students see diploma examination marks as being more valid than teacher-assigned marks". To quote Calder:

> From a teacher's perspective, it would seem that teachers and students would be more likely to view the teacher-assigned mark as more valid whereas administrators and parents would believe that the diploma examination mark was more valid. Perhaps, the large number of neither agree or disagree choices in these questions relates to the belief that the two scores are equally valid or in some way not comparable.[25]

If Calder is correct, then the 30% to 40% of these teachers choosing 'neither agree nor disagree' may be indicating that their mark reflects different values and goals from those defining acceptable knowledge on the examinations, that is, that they have been able to use their course mark to resist ideological deskilling to some extent; whereas the 47% who say that administrators place greater emphasis on the examination mark may provide an indication of how widespread is the pressure on teachers to bring their assessment more closely in line with the examination, and therefore to conform to the goals and values of the central bureaucracy.

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[24] Ibid., p. 12.
[25] Ibid., p. 38.

The assault on the teacher's right to define student success is usually depicted as the result of client revolt. Governments supposedly intervene in the evaluation function in response to public pressure for external accountability. At the Achievement Testing Program level, this means establishing benchmark data to determine whether student achievement is improving in the province as a whole, or in particular districts. Such external measures are said to be necessary to reassure taxpayers (whose skepticism over the objectivity of the teaching profession's self-evaluation may not be entirely unfounded) that their money is well spent. At the Diploma level, this means ensuring that individual students are compared against a provincial standard, rather than to a local subsample which may be atypical, or left to the idiosyncratic biases of particular teachers. Parents, potential employers, post-secondary institutions, and the students themselves are well within their rights to ask for a 'second opinion'. Highly publicized cases of students or their parents suing school districts for failing to provide them with the basics, or of teachers exploiting curricular flexibility to teach inflammatory material, support the impression of a grass-roots reaction against the abuse of professional autonomy and privilege. Indeed, 50% of the teachers in Calder's study accepted that "The reason we have diploma examinations is that some teachers aren't trusted", compared with 31% who disagreed.[26]

There is good reason, however, to suggest that this is not so much an example of client revolt as of ideological proletarianization. In Chapter 1, I argued that deprofessionalization and proletarianization are analytically distinct processes, and this is one of those occasions when that distinction becomes useful. Client revolt is usually a manifestation of deprofessionalization, a change in either the knowledge gap between practitioner and client or of their relative social status. Neither of these seems a particularly significant factor here. The centralization of assessment in no way increases the clients' control over either evaluation or curricular objectives, except as this may be expressed indirectly through their participation in the political process. In practical terms, individual clients are now likely to have even *less* control over local practitioners as both have to respond to the expectations of the central bureaucracy.[27] The question then becomes, who controls the provincial bureaucracy?

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[26] Ibid., p. 56.

If, as is sometimes suggested, the participation of classroom teachers in curriculum development and evaluation design amounts to continued professional control, then the 'public demand' for accountability has been betrayed. Centralized professional control may increase individual accountability, but the alleged basic conflict of interest in the profession's monitoring its own performance remains. To quote one Branch member on the role of the oversight committees:

> #03: For example, if the average of the grade 9 students who wrote the Achievement Test, uh, if it came out um, let's say 75%, the standing committee . . . might tell the public that, "Hey, look at this. Our grade 9 student performance, had better performance", you know, "high percentage of performance, that means they achieved at a high level". [I: Umhum.] But in the meantime, um, since they are the ones, they are the committee, they are the ones who approved the test, they might not tell the public that they, the test is easy, unless they are asked, but I believe, they wouldn't, wouldn't, wouldn't say that. (1.886-896)

If, on the other hand, centralization has meant the assertion of 'public' accountability through the objective monitoring of teacher performance by the state, then this represents a shift in the locus of control from individual practitioners to the state, which is a significant structural change in the teacher's work process. Rather than client revolt, this is more correctly interpreted as the assertion of ideological control over education by the sectional interests which control the legislature, and therefore as ideological proletarianization. I will return to this point in some depth later in the chapter, but for the moment, it is sufficient to note that centralized evaluation will likely serve the ends of the state, rather than those of either the profession or its clients.

The Evaluation of Teachers' Performance Using Student Test Results

For many teachers, the previous three issues are abstract and remote considerations at best. Evaluation design is seldom a particular interest, and many would gladly surrender it to be able to devote more of their energies to the immediacy of classroom interaction.

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[27] This is certainly true of the students. In the Calder study, for example, 60% of teachers rejected the suggestion that "Having diploma examinations undercuts the authority of the teacher in the classroom", compared with only 21% who agreed (Ibid., p. 56).

Curriculum design in Canada (as opposed to, say, England) has traditionally been a provincial responsibility, so most teachers do not particularly expect professional autonomy in this area, and restrict their complaints to the examination's impact on their ability to effectively operationalize the mandated program of studies. The ideological proletarianization associated with the loss of their monopoly over the evaluation of their own product is both subtle and comes late in the process of ideological co-optation. The threat presented by the evaluation of the teachers' performance based on test results, however, is immediate and compelling.

> #21: The teachers I've, I've met are quite concerned about the pressure as brought to bear on them from the marks that are generated by the test. Generally speaking they are supportive of the test and they are are appreciate I think that it is improving the quality, but what is really concerning them is how, how marks scheme is used. And uh, how their school mark is used in comparison to the mark the test generates. And this is their, I would say, primary concern. (1.732-739)

The lack of objective measures of productivity is a key element in the knowledge worker's ability to resist technical proletarianization. So long as professionals retain a monopoly over the evaluation of their product, they also retain the right to self-evaluation. Once an objective measure is available, their performance can be compared against external expectations or the performance of other workers. Centralized testing is an obvious candidate as an objective measure of teacher productivity.

> #28: . . . I know when I was, in my earlier years, uh, I, me as a teacher and others as teachers when the old departmentals were still on, that school board was using this as a means of getting back at us during negotiations, salary negotiations. [I: Mmm.] And they would bring this back and throw this, "You guys deserve more money? When look what you did!" You know, that kind of — it hurts. (1.872-877)

This remains a concern with the current Diploma Examinations, as test results are often published in local papers, with invidious comparisons made between schools or districts, with little understanding or acknowledgement of situational factors, differences in student bodies, and so on. The failure to interpret test results within this context represents a major abuse of an apparently objective statistical measure. These problems are further exacerbated by the varying degrees of deskilling among teachers:

> It was pointed out that more teachers are spending the vast majority of their time teaching only that part of the curriculum that will be examined. The fact that teachers assign 50 percent of the final grade is no assurance that teachers will [not] teach to the test. This creates an unlevel playing field when the test results are used

> to compare students, teachers, and schools.[28]

Teachers also complain that administrators often base their judgements of teacher competency on a single test, rather than on trends established over three or four, and so interpret the normal statistical variation between classes as a reflection on the teacher. I have also myself encountered administrators who decried the fact that half their students were below average, with no apparent understanding that this is what an average means. Resentment over the (mis)use of test scores as enforced measures of productivity is the main source of teacher opposition to the Diploma Examination Program.

> #26: A lot of opposition, a lot of the reason that, that teachers might say no they don't want it, is the way the boards are using the marks. [I: Um.] I think that's, you know, right down to the department heads. "We weren't number one last year, we're below provincial average. You've got to," you know, that kind of pressure that teachers are getting, would cause a lot of them to say, "Yeah, let's get rid of them." I think. (1.785-792)

This is supported by Calder's study:

> The greatest concern of teachers seem is [sic] the apparent misuse of test results in the evaluation of teachers. Most teachers interviewed reported that the results are misused, but when asked to give concrete examples of misuse were hard pressed to give examples. When examples of misuse were observed they were more likely to be that teachers were rewarded for the good performance of their class.[29]

A typical illustration of how this 'positive' reinforcement can still be used to pressure teachers is available from my own data:

> #26: But then when superintendents start that, that push it goes down to, I was in [school] yesterday, and the department head there has got these big notices on the board, and they were number one in the city, with their science average, they had good science average, so they can't fall back from that then. It's like, if you're really good teachers you'll be number one again, not that, like it's got nothing to do with the students, the test, or anything else, just get out there and really work and we'll still be number one. And so there really is an onus put on teachers that, that's unfair. (1.832-841)

To return to the Calder study:

> Teachers would seem to be aware of the limitations of using diploma examination scores for teacher evaluation purposes and are wary of having them used in any way that would pit teacher-assigned marks against diploma examination scores. In response to "The results of my students on the diploma examinations have been used inappropriately by administrators to evaluate me", almost half disagree with the statement. But what is more significant is that 21 percent of the teachers agreed with the statement. This would indicate that the Diploma Examination scores are

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[28] Ibid., p. 25.
[29] Ibid., p. 26.

> seen as being put to uses other than those which are viewed as appropriate.[30]

Similar concerns were also evident in my data at the elementary level over the Achievement Tests:

> #18: This is definitely an intrusion. This is an absolute, it's seen as a cudgel, it's seen as a, it's seen as the method by which they see themselves being evaluated. And you can't blame them because the language that we have used to promote the Achievement testing has led to that kind of thing. I mean, we use the word "monitor". "Monitor, monitor, monitor". Now you may not pick up the word monitor and say ah ha, that's what it basically means, but it creates, sets the mood. And you have idiots in the schools who, who can't recognize, you know, that you can't compare the average of 20 students with 30,000. The knowledge of how you use test results and testing in central offices and in schools, the lack of knowledge, is abysmal. (1.1865-1879)

Calder concludes "The potential for misuse is of great concern for teachers and seems to be unrelated to the length of time that they have been teaching or their general security as a teacher."[31]

Interestingly enough, however, this is also a major concern among Branch staff, who view the use of student marks in teacher evaluation as an abuse of their product.

> #20: Uh, [exams] can be [used to 'hammer' teachers]. I suspect that increasingly they are. And that's an abuse on the part of the administrators and superintendents, and parents, around the province. Uh, the exam, the Diploma Exam program has taken on a sort of mythology that I'm not really happy with. It's become the be-all and end-all of the kid's year, you know. You go to school for 12 years and take all these fancy courses and it comes down to the final exam. So schools — student population is dependent upon delivering good exams or having the highest marks in the province, and everybody is trying to get the above-average Diploma results. Teachers who perform poorly are under the gun from administrators, and parents. It's a real mess. It's very involved and the whole program has taken on a life of its own, because parents put on, put pressure on superintendents who put pressure administrators and they in turn put pressure on the teachers, and the [teachers' association] gets involved and we try to defend the use of statistics and exams, and uh. It's not quite out of control but I could see that it could be if we're not careful. (1.434-451)

Similarly, at the Achievement Test level:

> #22: I think what the real problem is the abuse, when the superintendents and I think, you know, in our meetings we've talked about that, and school boards get these results and get teachers upset, or worry, or principals, and it just goes all the way down to the children, and that is not a good thing. I think the test itself is a very, is a fair test, and just take it for what it's worth, you know, for the little children. But what's been done with it is causing a problem and resentment with teachers. (1.1116-1123)

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[30] Ibid., p. 39.
[31] Ibid., p. 26.

That the Branch staff define as an abuse any attempt to use test results as a measure of teacher productivity is fairly revealing given that both programs originated in the expressed desire for greater "public accountability". Many TDSs (myself included) were initially so focused on the technical issues surrounding the creation of quality test instruments that they ignored the likely consequences of provincial testing for the teacher's work process. To quote the same staff member who earlier complained of how the old departmentals were used against teachers in salary negotiations:

> #28: I hope the teachers now don't think that way, but uh, I haven't had any, uh anybody say that to me, I think I'd be very hurt, because it's certainly not intentionally, nothing intended. And if anybody feels that, then must be guilty. (1.878-881)

Besides providing a fine example of ideological proletarianization, the failure to recognize this 'unintended' application of provincial testing meant that they were unprepared for the backlash from classroom teachers, with whom they largely identified.

Thus, there were two distinct phases of, and two separate strategies for dealing with, the resistance to the examinations:

> #11: . . . and like the initial thrust of, of the Department [[sic: Branch]] when it first opened, I think was predominantly one of uh, gaining teacher credibility and acceptance. Without which the product would not be used, properly. Uh, there was a lot of animosity within teaching at that point towards it, and [?may still be?]. But uh, that certainly had to be broached and dealt with. Sort of the breaking down of the hallowed walls of the white tower to ensure that we could peek into the corners, and see what was happening, make sure that they felt comfortable that the process was fair, aboveboard, and treated them well. Well then the, the initial, if you like, cycle of that meant a series of marks, etc., which were then interpreted by yet a third party, the jurisdictions. And uh, that applied more pressure to teachers, which meant there has been sort of another fire one must stamp out somehow, and then it becomes very uh clear that you must communicate well with the jurisdiction, precisely what the marks mean, and how they can be used, and since jurisdictions are free agents, you know, they're very much like universities souls, they uh, they have a totally different mandate which is untouchable in one sense. And at that point, if they wish to fire a teacher over their marks, they can do so. If they wish to praise them over their marks, they can do so. And uh now you have the job of making sure they take the appropriate actions and not [-?-?-?-]. (1.200-224)

Initial resistance, then, centred on issues of deskilling and professional control and was dealth with by adopting a structure of teacher participation which reassured teachers that they retained collegial control over the process. The second wave of resistance was over the use of test results to evaluate teachers, and here the Branch attempted to distance itself from the abuses by attributing them to the separate technobureaucratic structure of the school superintendents.

> #21: I try to shift the responsibility, not because I'm trying to play a game, but because I think it needs to be shifted, that is I'm just, not this Branch's fault that teachers are being pressured to have their marks conform to the mark the test generates. That's another area's problem, [I: Heheh.] and I think that's true. [I: Yeah.] It isn't just shifting the buck. If superintendents and administrators misunderstand the evaluation scheme and they demand conformity between the two marks from their teachers then somebody has to educate them. Now, should that be [the Department] in the broad sense? Probably it should. Should it be my responsibility as a Test Development Specialist, not, I don't think it should be. Um it would have to come from some other area of [Department of] Ed, or from the Superintendents' Association or somebody else. But here the teachers need some protection, because they're being squeezed unfairly. (1.743-757)

This attempt to shift the responsibility onto superintendents amounted almost to official Branch policy:

> #19: Uh, I think there've been uh three or four individuals at this Branch who have had a really profound impact into making sure that teachers did not have that . . . impression. [I: Umhum.] The exams are there. We make up the exams and how those exams are interpreted are not the responsibility of [the Department of Education]. [I: It's not our fault, yeah.] Yeah. The interpretation is totally up to the superintendents and, and their organization, or whatever they do. You know, if they wanna, if they want to base teacher salaries on how well their teachers do exams, then that's not [Department of Education], that's out of the field of [Department of Education] and I think there've been a few individuals, [#09] to name, just to name one, who's, you know, who's made contact with a lot of teachers and specifically said that.
>
> I: Have they got the message?
>
> #19: Yeah . . . He's, I know he published a paper in the, in the uh [subject journal], which uh, really struck a chord with a lot of [subject] teachers. Nice to know that there're some people on our side, even, even here. But I admit that I really don't like the whole, a lot of superintendents are interpreting the results, and the pressure that a lot of teachers are under. I mean, the expectation that all teachers in the whole province be above average is a little ridiculous. (1.1732-1759)

Similarly, note in the following the explicit attempt to achieve solidarity with the classroom teacher, in contrast to the apparent disdain in which superintendents are held.

> #33: The internal audit role, they know it is there, and many would like me to start intervening with some superintendents on the interpretation of results, and things like that. [I: Umhum.] . . . Didn't realize how far it has sunk when you're dealing with those guys, with superintendents. So that therefore, they're aware of my internal audit role, and this is another reason . . . for keeping teaching [at night] so that I'm a regular, I'm in a staff room, you know, where basically nobody knows what my regular · · · I think that that's very useful.

And again:

> #18: At the end of the two days, when they walk out of the item writing, they

> always say, "This is the best in-service I've ever had," and I say, "And you got paid for it too!" Heheh. Because you know what I do, it's not strictly item writing. I also talk about interpretation of Achievement Test results. You've got Achievement Test results, how do you interpret them? Okay, what kinds of concerns do you have? What's your principal been saying about achievement tests? Your particular results. Okay, here's some of, I give them ammunition, basically. (1.1848-1854)

Besides demonstrating that the Branch staff tend to side with the teachers against the local administration, the above quotation also begins to hint how teachers can effectively resist the pressure from superintendents.

A central component of professional privilege and ideology is that the profession's knowledge monopoly excludes the possibility of external assessment. Management must therefore create superordinate technobureaucratic positions which can combine bureaucratic authority with the same professional expertise as those being supervised. Even then, the rank and file practitioners can resist negative evaluations by asserting their superior knowledge of the immediate situation when making professional judgements, thereby forcing management to rely on the less satisfactory authority of bureaucratic position. Management therefore requires an additional monopoly of management knowledge (the 'big picture') to effectively manage knowledge workers.

Centralized testing provides such a knowledge gap by arming superintendents with the big picture and with an objective measure of individual productivity. The trick to successful resistance to these external measures of productivity, then, is to deny management the monopoly over their interpretation.

> #18: That's when I talk about the whole issue of how they can make interpretations and try to give them some strategies. I say, "There's no point in you waiting for somebody in central office to do the interpretation for you". I say, "the moment you get the results", and after I've given them a spiel on how to make the interpretation, "Do the interpretation yourself and beat 'em to the punch". Because the first person who reads it, is, "Okay this guy has got it fairly well written, okay that's good". You know, rather than coming up with something else that has a completely negative cast to it. You understand [I: Yeah.] the tactic that I'm talking about? It works every time. (1.1886-1895)

Given a low score on, say, map-reading skills, the teacher can either accept the administrator's judgement of personal failure or use the information to support demands against the administrator for increased funding to buy better maps.

Summary

In summary, then, the actual deskilling of the evaluation function as a result of the introduction of centralized testing is both less thorough and less crucial than the deskilling of the curriculum function, at least in the case study province. This suggests that the introduction of centralized testing is more significant in the ideological proletarianization of education than as a mechanism for the cheapening of labour. Furthermore, the deskilling implications of centralized testing seem of secondary importance to the erosion of the teachers' monopoly over the assessment of their own product and therefore over the definition of acceptable knowledge and student success. The central bureaucracy seems to actively discourage the more extreme forms of deskilling, and is far more concerned with ensuring that teachers are following the mandated curriculum; that is, with enforcing ideological proletarianization. While teachers are now feeling the pressure of externally enforced measures of productivity as a result of centralized testing, this pressure originates from the superintendents, and not the central bureaucracy.[32]

Thus, the centralization of testing provides an excellent example of the ideological and perhaps technical proletarianization of classroom teachers, and therefore a useful test case for issues concerning professional control. The emergence of Test Development Specialists appears to be a typical example of a technobureaucratic occupation which separates design and control functions from the rank and file and concentrates them within a central hierarchical structure.

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[32] The local school boards are generally controlled by competitive sector capital and oriented to keeping education costs down. Monopoly sector capital, on the other hand, is less concerned with costs and more interested in ideological hegemony. Thus, it should not be surprising to find the provincial technobureaucrats siding with classroom teachers against local administrators, in maintaining that the cheapening of labour is not a legitimate application of the testing programs. Instead, the alienation of the assessment and curriculum functions from the classroom teacher is an important step in the state's assertion of ideological control over education.

Government Versus Commercial Examinations

Finally, a cautionary note: The focus here is on the centralization of design functions within provincial or local board bureaucracies. This is in contrast to much of the literature in the sociology of assessment which addresses the somewhat different problems presented by commercially produced examinations. There are three key differences between government- and publisher-created tests that should be kept in mind.

First, publishers' tests represent the commodification of evaluative functions by the private sector, rather than the emergence of a superordinate category of technobureaucrat within the education profession. With the possible exception of the employees of the Educational Testing Service (which produces such well-known American tests as the SAT, GRE, and GED), most publishers' exams are contracted out to individual educators or psychologists whose primary role is other than that of test developer. Thus, the deskilling of rank and file practitioners does not in this case conform either to Larson's model of vertical differentiation within a profession, or to Freidson's model of professional dominance, but instead is an example of deprofessionalization through the external routinization and appropriation of a portion of the educator's knowledge monopoly.

Second, since private publishers design tests to be marketable to as many school jurisdictions as possible, their tests are very rarely curriculum specific. While the Diploma Examinations and Achievement Tests in the case study enforce a centralized curriculum, the generalized nature of publishers' tests are likely to distract teachers from the official program of studies. In such circumstances classroom teachers still undergo deskilling of the evaluative function and are still subject to enforced measures of productivity, but with the added disadvantage that both the teachers and their students are being measured against an instrument which is largely unrelated to what was taught. This relative lack of curricular validity, coupled with the pressure to raise marks by teaching to the test, inevitably leads to an erosion of the mandated curriculum, thereby eroding both the significance of local control and whatever input into curriculum local rank and file professionals might have had. In other words, standardized subject testing that is not based on a particular program of studies imposes a *de facto* centralization of a curriculum of the 'lowest common denominator'. Teachers still lose control over the curriculum, but here it is to diffuse market forces rather than to a specific, lobbyable government or professional bureaucracy.[33] Even where the recent 'teacher empowerment' rhetoric has resulted in teachers being granted the freedom to choose which tests are used, this has not resulted in any real increase in the teachers' professional autonomy, for there is little to choose between commercial tests. Since publishers compete against each other for the same or similar markets, they are therefore driven to the same bland product.

Third, the vast majority of commercial tests are of dubious quality. In attempting to avoid anything too unique or controversial, publishers' examinations (and textbooks) often end up purging everything even remotely interesting to students. This 'lowest common denominator' approach is also more likely to produce tests that focus on factual recall or the most basic of skills, as more advanced material is likely to vary from district to district. Such tests are also likely to consist solely of multiple-choice questions, since written-response formats require elaborate and expensive marking procedures which are difficult to market across jurisdictions. Furthermore, driven by the logic of any for-profit organization, publishers are less likely to be able to afford the person-hours, the field testing, or the other quality-control mechanisms available to the state.[34] Thus, much of the criticism of standardized testing in the literature applies to commercially produced tests, and not to the curriculum-specific, teacher-directed, government-funded testing in this case study.

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[33] On the other hand, a case could be made for professional dominance if it could be shown that educators had a greater input into publishers' tests than they did into locally controlled curricula; that is, that publishers were less intrusive than locally elected boards. While investigation of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of the current study, I think it is safe to speculate that the publishers' need to market to the lowest common denominator translates to a similar or even greater level of interference. For example, while a local board may expunge any reference to Darwin from their biology curriculum over the objections of their biology teachers, the publishers' need to sell tests to both this and other boards likely means that Darwin will be eliminated from tests even in those districts where evolutionary theory is acceptable. Thus, the erosion of local control through the commodification of assessment cannot be seen as an example of the increased professional control of biology teachers.

[34] Of course, as the fiscal crisis of the state forces a capitalist logic on governments, cutbacks may lead to a similar underfunding of state examination programs.

Nevertheless, the potential for deskilling and the implicit erosion of the rank and file's autonomy represented by the introduction of centralized testing remain an issue with provincial assessment programs.

GENERAL GOALS: THE DECISION TO ADOPT CENTRALIZED TESTING

Who, then, controls the basic goals of education? Specifically in this case, who initiated the various testing programs in the case study province, including the reintroduction of province-wide school-leaving examinations? Whose decision was it to establish the testing Branch and create an entirely new 60-member bureaucracy, complete with the two new occupations of Test Development Specialist and Assessment Resources Officer? To what extent was this decision made outside the education profession and imposed on it? And what was the context in which these decisions were made?

The Ideological Context: The Trend Towards Centralized School-Leaving Examinations

About half the provinces that dropped centralized school-leaving examinations in the early 1970s have now reintroduced them.[35] While each provincial ministry depicts this decision as an independent response to local public pressure, there is clearly a general trend towards greater reliance on standardized examinations among all the advanced capitalist nations. It is therefore useful to briefly review recent trends in the broader social and intellectual climate which have led to this renewed interest in centralized testing.

First, the accelerating fiscal crisis of the state, combined with the failure of the human capital model to provide an obvious economic return on investment in education, has led to a growing preoccupation among conservative legislators with the need to curb education expenditures. This in turn has led to greater attention to accountability in education. Centralized examinations provide one obvious mechanism of public accountability since they provide a readily understandable standard of performance against which students, teachers, schools, and school jurisdictions may be compared. In some American jurisdictions accountability has been taken to such an extreme that state funding is tied to a school's performance on a standardized test of basic skills, a move which harks back to the days when teachers were paid by the yard of written work produced by their students.

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[35] Calder, p. 17.

In Canada, this renewed interest in accountability may be seen not only in the growing number of provinces reintroducing provincial examinations, but also in the recent announcement by the Council of Education Ministers that it was funding the development of a new system of consistent "indicators" that would allow comparisons between the 12 separate provincial and territorial jurisdictions. The centrepiece of the project is a new achievement test of literacy and numeracy to be administered to samples of 13- and 16-year-olds in each province.

Second, the failure of the human capital model to make good on its extravagant promises to eliminate poverty, regional underdevelopment, and so on, undermined the liberal optimism of the late 1960s and 1970s and contributed to a resurgence of conservative ideology in the 1980s. Reaganomics, Thatcherism, and their Canadian equivalents not only represented a commitment to cutbacks in all types of social programs, but also a conservative revolution in the internal ideological frameworks of those programs. "In education these changes can be symbolized by the replacement of many of the catchwords and key phrases of the 1970s — *student needs, growth and development, relevance, individualism* — by a new set of terms with a distinctly more conservative resonance: *excellence, quality education, basic skills, standards*."[36] Christopher Hurn provides a convenient summary of this ideological shift:

> the crisis in schooling in 1972 or 1973 meant something very different from the crisis in schooling in 1984 or 1985. The educational catchwords or cliches of the early 1970s (and late 1960s) were *equality, relevance, individualism,* and *growth and development*. The crisis to which these terms referred involved essentially two ideas that are heard much less frequently today. First, schools were failing to provide a minimally adequate education for disadvantaged students and the promise of equal opportunity had been betrayed. Second, traditional schools, instead of meeting the students' needs for growth and development, regimented and controlled students in an essentially authoritarian manner which stifled intellectual and emotional growth. . . . Schools were asked to *individualize* instruction, introduce new *relevant* curricula, provide more *options* and elections for students, and become far more sensitive to the

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[36] Christopher J. Hurn, *The Limits and Possibilities of Schooling: An Introduction to the Sociology of Education*, p. viii.

> special *needs* of minority and disadvantaged students.
>
> Today of course, the crisis in schooling is defined quite differently. Schools are attacked for encouraging educational mediocrity rather than excellence. The relevant courses of the seventies have become the frill courses of the eighties; elective courses that were designed to meet the students' individual needs are now seen as interfering with concentration on basic subjects; open admissions and liberal promotion practices that were advocated as ways of maximizing educational opportunity are now decried as symbols of the abandonment of academic standards.[37]

Three related subthemes may be detected here: (a) a concern with excellence; (b) the rise of the "back to the basics" movement; and (c) the decline of progressive education.[38]

The search for excellence, and the associated demand for standardized testing to certify its achievement, represents a retreat from the pursuit of equality of educational opportunity and a renewed attempt by culturally advantaged groups to assert control over the selection and allocation functions of schooling. To quote Hurn:

> In part this controversy reflects the beliefs of elite and middle-class groups that their children's futures are in jeopardy because educational standards have been lowered to accommodate the demands of minorities and disadvantaged groups for equality of educational opportunity. And, indeed, the pressure to raise standards seems likely to benefit the privileged rather than disadvantaged students.[39]

The elite's ability both to define relevant evaluation criteria and to marshal superior cultural capital virtually guarantees their children's superior performance in any testing situation, but centralized school-leaving examinations have the added advantage that their children are compared against every student in the province, not just with their peers in elite neighbourhood schools. Indeed, in many provinces the existence of a provincially set examination in a course distinguishes between the academic and non-academic streams, with the implication that the potential for excellence in the latter is so low that it is not even worth providing a vehicle for its assessment. Similarly, the pursuit of excellence can be used as a partial justification for raising entrance requirements at the postsecondary level, since the introduction of quotas on faculty admissions can be associated with the maintenance of high standards, though this should more realistically be viewed as a result of funding cutbacks.

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[37] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[38] The term 'progressive education' refers to the child-centred pedagogy advocated by John Dewey (see especially *Democracy and Education*) and the Progressive Education Association.

[39] Hurn, pp. 8-9.

With provincial examinations serving as a supposedly accurate and objective screening mechanism, disadvantaged students individualize and accept their failure to achieve university entrance, rather than demanding that more places be made available to accommodate them. Thus, both the search for excellence and the adoption of centralized testing legitimate the reproduction of the current social order.

The "back to the basics" movement suggested that there are certain essential learnings that everyone must possess to be even minimally functional in our society, but from which the schools were said to have strayed. " . . . books with titles like *Educational Wastelands* dramatized the claim that progressive educators had captured the schools and eroded much of their serious academic content in favor of an emphasis on life adjustment."[40] The withdrawal of centralized examinations was often cited as a key symptom of what was perceived as the school's failure to enforce even minimal standards of performance.

At first glance, the "back to the basics" movement, with its focus on fundamental skills and knowledge, may seem to contradict the demand for excellence, which is often associated with more advanced levels of achievement or the "critical thinking" movement. In fact, both are symptomatic of the shift from the human capital to the manpower model in education.[41] The bifurcated nature of the labour market in advanced capitalist societies means that the highly trained technical elite which undertakes the design functions in the work process (and for whom "excellence" is a key selection criterion) must be balanced by a large, disciplined army of labourers for whom basic skills are quite sufficient. Here the industrial discipline instilled by rote learning and the other fundamental virtues advocated by the back to the basics movement are as important as the subject matter itself. At its worst, an emphasis on basics can lead to a corresponding de-emphasis on higher-level thinking skills and a preoccupation with procedure and technique at the expense of understanding and independent thought. Even in its more liberal formulations, however, back to the basics implies a narrowing of the definition of education to pragmatic and measurable outcomes. The de-emphasis of personal development, self-actualization, and life adjustment in favour of marketable skills represents a profound shift from child-centred to curriculum-centred schooling.

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[40] Ibid., p. 2.

[41] For a discussion of the human capital and manpower models of education, see Robert Runté, "The Emergence of the Open University Concept in Alberta", M.Ed. thesis, University of Alberta, 1981.

Furthermore, underlying the pressure to identify and provincially prescribe 'essential learnings' is the conservative assumption not only that these will be equally applicable to all children, but that they can be readily agreed upon by all members of a harmonious, organismic 'society'. This reification of 'societal' interest is difficult to argue against when one is dealing with basic literacy and numeracy, but quickly becomes problematic when one has to choose between, say, labour history or Adam Smith's theory of free enterprise in designing a social studies course. Even with basic spelling, the hidden curriculum is never far below the surface. The introduction of centralized testing is a powerful weapon in the hands of the sectional interests which are able to impose their definition of acceptable knowledge on the schools, because anything that is not tested is by this definition irrelevant. The 'back to the basics' movement thus attempts to narrow the curriculum to those skills and knowledge which support the status quo and the manpower needs of capital.[42]

Again, this may seem to conflict with the simultaneous demand for a greater emphasis on 'critical thinking', but in practice 'critical thinking' tends to be operationalized in the schools as problem solving, rather than as creative inquiry. The subtle difference here is that problem solving focuses on innovative solutions within the boundaries of a previously defined issue. By focusing students' creativity on problem-solving, the schools develop a trained incapacity to define the issues for oneself or to challenge the status quo. The monopoly sector's need for excellence and original thinking in its knowledge workers does not include the questioning or setting of corporate goals. Thus, even when tests appear to assess higher thinking skills, they necessarily do so within the narrow limits of the prescribed curriculum and the specific problems presented on the examination.

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[42] For example, the proponents of the basics movement often cite international competition as their rationale for educational change, but it is not the 'province' which is competing — it is the corporations. One never hears these proponents arguing that we need to increase the orientation to union membership in the schools because the province is falling behind other nations in the introduction of labour protection laws.

Both the search for excellence and a return to the basics, then, imply a shift from child-centred to curriculum-centred schooling and a greater emphasis on measurable outputs consistent with the shift from the human capital to the manpower model. This in turn provides pressure for the reintroduction of centralized examinations that enforce provincial curricula and provide one measure of the schools' productivity.

All of this reflects the sharp decline of progressive education. Progressive education represents not only a philosophical orientation towards democracy, progress, and child-centred education, but also a significant ideological resource for the classroom teacher's claim to professional autonomy, since child-centred learning requires a highly trained, autonomous knowledge worker capable of responding to the child's individual needs by developing, or at least adapting, appropriate curricular materials. Thus, the role of the central bureaucracy in a progressive education system is simply to provide coordination, resource materials, and professional development. This is perfectly consistent with the human capital model in which any investment in education is thought to be equally beneficial, and so teachers can be left to exercise their autonomous professional judgements concerning the child's needs. Under the manpower model, however, only those specific learning objectives related to marketable skills are considered worthy of investment, and consequently need to be clearly specified in a centralized curriculum. To implement this curriculum, it is necessary that the central bureaucracy increase its role in defining essential learnings and assigning resources, and that professional development give way to the ideological proletarianization of the classroom practitioner.

In other words, the sectional interests advocating 'back to the basics' and the 'search for excellence' must first break the teaching profession's monopoly over curricular decisions and impose a centralized curriculum. As we have seen, provincial examinations are a powerful tool for enforcing the provincially mandated curriculum, as teachers are pressured to "teach to the test" to ensure that their students achieve adequate scores. Thus, as these sectional interests gain control over the education hierarchy (through their control of the legislature), they will apply pressure for the reintroduction of centralized testing. As the normal processes of capital accumulation and concentration give rise to similar corporate elites with a similar need to intervene ideologically in education, the trend towards more standardized testing is likely to continue in all the advanced capitalist nations.

Thus, the decision to reinstate examinations originates outside the education profession and is imposed on it:

> Where examinations are in place or where there is pressure to have them in place the primary pressure to institute them seems to be political pressure from outside of education and not from educators. They usually report that the public demanded them; however it is unclear as to how that demand was expressed.[43]

"Public Demand"

At this point it may be useful to address the role of the public in setting educational goals. Given the trends described above, one might be tempted to attribute the decision to reintroduce provincial examinations simply to the renewed 'public demand' for accountability and the need to restore public confidence in the school system. Certainly this was the rationale provided by the government in the case study province. To quote a typical example from the Minister responsible:

> The 1979 Report of the Minister's Advisory Committee on Student Achievement noted, and the public emphatically confirmed, that our citizens expect better appraisal of student achievement.
>
> . . . It is our citizens who continue to question the extent of knowledge and understanding, the degree of skill that graduating Grade XII students can demonstrate. Unfortunately, we are not currently in a position to respond persuasively to these legitimate public concerns.
>
> The position of the Government of [province] is educationally sound and responsive to public expectations. Public confidence in the quality of education must be re-established. The Government has decided that the educational system in the province deserves and requires a comprehensive, constructive evaluation program, of which student evaluation is an important part.[44]

There are several reasons, however, why this must be regarded as an inadequate explanation.

First, the reification of 'public demand' glosses over the diversity of interests and opinions present in any society, and attempts to represent the views of a particular lobby as universally held. I have argued on the contrary that the ascendancy of the manpower model represents the interests of the corporate sector, and that if these ideas have caught the 'public imagination', it is only because the dominant ideas of any age are always the ideas of the dominant class. Even if the general population was won over to the idea of testing — and there are good reasons to suspect that public opinion was carefully orchestrated to produce the findings the government wanted to hear[45] — the impetus for these reforms is located in specific sectional interests.

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[43] Calder, p. 18.

[44] Statement by the Minister of Education, November 9, 1982.

Second, the reification of 'public demand' misrepresents the *desire for* change as the actual *mechanism of* change. The 'public' may wish for any number of things without getting them. (The demand for a children's hospital, for example, is still unfulfilled more than a decade after the issue was initially raised.)

> That a certain sentiment existed, in the form of diverse grumblings and concerns on the part of some parents, employers and others, is beyond question. But what one begins to wonder is, how did this inchoate sentiment result in the systematic reorientation of our education system? How did this reorientation get accomplished, with such coherence and inclusiveness, so quickly?[46]

Furthermore, since the chief defining characteristic of a profession is its ability to control its own work process, client opinion is unlikely to result in structural change short of the complete collapse of the knowledge gap between practitioner and client. So long as the professional can assert that there are compelling reasons — recognized by anyone initiated into the profession's knowledge monopoly — why the reform should not be adopted, it can be successfully resisted. For client revolt to succeed, it must be supported by the active intervention of the state; that is, the profession must first lose the continued sponsorship of relevant elites.

Third, a generalized 'public demand' for 'excellence' or 'the basics' is insufficient to explain the specific educational decisions taken to operationalize that demand. There are any number of ways of ensuring public accountability, for example, other than the use of compulsory school-leaving examinations. For instance, Ontario sets standards and monitors the quality of evaluation without encroaching on teacher autonomy by collecting samples of the work graded by teachers in their classrooms; and New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Manitoba all administer tests to a sample of students to monitor standards and curriculum implementation without using the tests for individual student promotion.[47] Other alternatives include the creation of a normed provincial item bank from which individual teachers could choose those items appropriate to their classrooms, but still be able to compare their students' performance against provincial standards; or specialized researchers could develop diagnostic tests similar to the reading and math kits currently in use in the case study province, but for senior grades, and with the expectation that all students achieve mastery; or the post-secondary institutions could introduce entrance examinations; or independent examination boards could be given the responsibility for administering a variety of school-leaving tests; or intensively trained teams of teachers and administrators could administer oral examinations.[48] Thus, the specific decision to introduce the Comprehensive Examinations, and then later the Diploma Examinations, must be located elsewhere than in 'the public'. To quote Calder:

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[45] See below, pp. 140-141.

[46] K. E. Krawchenko, "Politics in Educational Policy-Making: A Study of Educational Discourse in the Alberta Legislative Assembly, 1976-1984", pp. 1-2.

> While each province might be unique it is the author's contention that the similarities are far greater and that the examination policies developed are more a reflection of the will of the departments of education rather than the will of the electorate. The author finds it difficult to believe that the will of the people of Ontario is so different from the will of the people of Alberta that [this] could account for the great differences in high school leaving examination policy. The author is of the view that parents and educators across Canada share most of the same concerns. How these concerns are met are the decisions of politicians and educators.[49]

The Government as Actor

The obvious next question, then, is whether politicians or educators set the basic goals of education.

In legal terms, of course, ultimate responsibility for education policy lies with the legislature, not the teaching profession. In practice, however, the cabinet and Minister have often delegated much of their authority to the provincial bureaucracy, and so control of education policy often passes to an elite group of educators working within the ministry. Although classroom teachers have always been subject to ministerial direction, the nature, independence, and role of this bureaucratic elite has varied considerably. During the latter years of the progressivist era, this bureaucratic elite was able to assert its knowledge monopoly to obtain a high degree of independence from the legislature, while at the same time, its commitment to progressivist ideology led it to enact policies which gave the classroom teacher unprecedented opportunities for autonomous action.

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[47] Calder, pp. 17-18, 21.

[48] The last three alternatives are currently in use in Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany respectively.

[49] Calder, p. 17.

The political influence of the education elite has been in steady decline, however, since the election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1971.[50] Armed with their own and often socially superior academic credentials, the new corporate elite in Cabinet rejected the education elite's claim to a knowledge monopoly over education. Beginning with its second term in office, the Progressive Conservative party took an active interventionist role in education.[51]

The Cabinet asserted control over education both through direct legislative action and through the establishment of new bureaucratic structures.

An early example of direct legislative action was the passage of *The Goals of Schooling and Education In [Province]*, which narrowed the schools' mandate to the acquisition of basic knowledge and skills, while leaving self-actualization and personal fulfilment primarily to "various community influences, among which the home is most important". The schools were directed to "strive for excellence" but cautioned that the "achievement of the broader goals of education must be viewed as a shared responsibility with the community". This explicit imposition of the basics/excellence program represented a thorough renunciation of the progressivist principles held by the education elite and, unlike their own Worth Report which it overturned, had the full authority of law. Its passage signalled not merely a change in policy, but a new relationship between Cabinet and the education elite, as the Premier sought to bring education more fully within his government's jurisdiction:

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[50] For a discussion of the education elite and its interaction with the legislature, see Robert Runté, "The Emergence of the Open University Concept in Alberta", M.Ed. thesis, University of Alberta, 1981.

[51] The following discussion, including the various excerpts from *Hansard*, is drawn from Krawchenko.

> Frankly, at times I have felt apprehensive at the danger of not having such goals, which leaves it beyond the scope of the public policy of this Legislature, to the conclusions or diverse aspirations of the educational establishment in the province . . . to determine on an *ad hoc* basis what should be the basic course content and curriculum development of our education system. It strikes me that it is clearly a rudderless situation for one of the very important jurisdictions of a provincial Legislature, the area of education and public policy in education.[52]

Even the Premier clearly recognized, as Krawchenko points out, that this was a significant departure from the traditional stance taken by Canadian governments towards education:

> It had, unfortunately in our view, been a tradition in legislatures throughout Canada, and in the [provincial] Legislature to a degree, to abdicate our responsibility to establish public policy in this area. I'm very pleased that we are embarking on this discussion today, to bring back where it should be the appropriate responsibility that rests on our shoulders and cannot be abdicated.[53]

The second mechanism used to undermine the education elite's control over education was the creation of new structures outside the existing bureaucracy to challenge the education elite's monopoly of information. These included the Curriculum Policy Board (CPB), established in 1975; the Minister's Advisory Committee on Student Achievement (MACOSA), established in 1977; the Harder Report, commissioned by the CPB; and various commissioned Gallup polls.[54] These functioned both to collect input to support the government's predetermined position and, in the case of the CPB and MACOSA, to originate policy.

That these bodies served the sectional interests represented by the Progressive Conservative party is seen by the values promoted in the selection of questions to be asked. The MACOSA study of student attitudes towards the world of work, for example, was concerned that students "appreciate the importance of hard work" and have "faith in the economic system's ability to provide them with meaningful employment",[55] reflecting not only a preoccupation with the work ethic, but also an explicit manpower orientation towards educational goals. Thus, the questions asked determined to a significant degree the type of input received, and it is not difficult to see how the government was able to marshal a mandate for fundamental change based on 'public demand'. Krawchenko argues persuasively that the government had already decided the direction of that change at the very outset of the "public discussion" these measures were supposedly to encourage, as evident in this Speech From the Throne on February 24, 1977:

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[52] *Hansard*, 1978, p. 1189.

[53] *Hansard*, 1978, p. 1189.

[54] Krawchenko, p. 7.

[55] The Minister's Advisory Committee on Student Achievement, *Attitudes Toward the World of Work, Executive Summary and Administration Manual*, Edmonton: Alberta Education, March 1979. Cited by Krawchenko, p. 23.

> There will be a reassessment of goals and objectives of our basic education system, and the priorities that should be given to certain goals and objectives. A shift in emphasis to basic skills may be indicated. Recommendations from members of the Assembly, the Curriculum Policies Board, the general public and interest groups will be welcomed. The levels of achievement of our students will receive close scrutiny by the Minister's Advisory Committee on Student Achievement. Further consideration will be given to the place of provincial examinations in our educational system.[56]

As Krawchenko notes:

> . . . all of the Premier's prognostications have come to pass: a shift to the basics, achievement tests, provincial exams. We have been given to understand that in each case these changes resulted from research and public feedback from the bodies mentioned by [Premier] above. Yet he and his government had clearly identified and articulated what would happen at least as early as 1977.[57]

Having thus defined the direction of change, these new bureaucratic structures began to impose the government's view on the education elite. The CPB provides a textbook example of the erosion of professional dominance in education. Note, for instance, the explicit reference to breaking the professional monopoly over educational policy in the following comment by the Education Minister:

> The other area I'd like to touch on very quickly is the greater involvement in education of the everyday people of [Province]. I've already made the announcement with respect to the changes in the CPB which will see half of the members of that new board . . . composed of non-educators, people from everyday [Province]. Their thoughts and their points of view will be reflected in curriculum development in the years to come.[58]

Of course, displacing the education elite from half the seats on the board is less significant than their replacement with political appointees. The "everyday people" referred to above were hardly a random selection of citizens, but supporters of the sectional interests behind the basics/excellence program. There were no representatives from labour, for example, among the initial appointments.[59] As one departmental spokesperson acknowledged:

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[56] *Hansard*, 1977, p. 2.

[57] Krawchenko, p. 13.

[58] *Hansard*, 1976, p. 308.

[59] Krawchenko, p. 26. This omission proved so blatant and controversial that it was eventually rectified some years later.

> Who gets appointed depends a great deal on political leanings and affiliations. The first group were hand picked by [Premier] and [Minister] . . . I think people are unaware of the political implications of who the Curriculum Policies Board members are. The Board is the overseeing body for everything now and will not allow anyone to implement anything without its approval.[60]

And note the explicit acknowledgement of ideological proletarianization by an associate director of curriculum:

> The Curriculum Policies Board membership is one-half nominated with the approval of the government. This opens up the whole question of ideological control over the curriculum. . . .[61]

Nor did the government's influence stop at this level. Though classroom teachers continued to participate on the various curriculum working committees, their input, and the influence of the remaining progressivist technobureaucrats, was severely constrained by the CPB:

> The influence of the Curriculum Policies Board was always felt in our deliberations. There was a constant pressure of second-guessing the 'mind' of the Curriculum Policies Board. Progressive suggestions and proposals frequently were rejected or compromised because it was felt that "the Curriculum Policies Board will never let it pass".[62]

The third mechanism used to assert ideological control over education, and perhaps the most fundamental, was the manipulation of funding. Besides the obvious mechanisms of giving funding priority to only those programs, such as centralized testing, which were consistent with the government's new policies, and the use of fiscal restraint both to constrain the bureaucratic ambitions of the education elite and to terminate or cut back those previously established programs now viewed as 'frills', the Cabinet occasionally circumvented normal channels entirely. For instance, the Cabinet-controlled Heritage Savings Trust Fund allocated over $9 million in 1977 for the development of curricular materials to increase the teaching of history and geography.[63] (The shift from a social inquiry to a history and geography focus in social studies is a key element of the back to the basics movement.) This clearly represents the Cabinet's direct intervention in curriculum design, and completely bypasses all the normal curriculum and budget approval processes within the education bureaucracy.

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[60] Cited by Krawchenko, pp. 25-26.

[61] Ibid., p. 26.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid., pp. 36-38.

Clearly, these measures represent the ideological proletarianization of the educators in the case study province, in that the basic goals of education are now being set outside the profession and in opposition to majority opinion among the education elite. The shift from the human capital to the manpower model and from child-centred to curriculum-centred schooling implies that educational decisions are now being based on the needs of the state rather than on those of the students. Teachers agreed two to one, for example, with the statement "diploma examinations are required more for political reasons than educational reasons".[64] Educators were powerless to resist these political pressures, however, and few dared to challenge the government's right to intervene in educational matters. Given the government's overwhelming electoral mandate and its ability to marshal 'public opinion' through bodies such as the CPB, resistance to ideological direction would have appeared as professional intransigence. To quote the Premier's dismissal of the opposition:

> Mr. Speaker, a few but not many educators, or I suppose representatives of the educational establishment in the province, have expressed some concern at the vision of government interference in this matter of education. I am glad that it is a small, not a large number of people who have held to that view, because I think it's disturbing. I would have thought that they would welcome this Legislative Assembly to be debating the question of what the goals of schooling and education would be. I think the vast majority do.[65]

The Government/Education Interface

Having set the general direction of education policy, the Premier, caucus, and Cabinet must delegate the day-to-day responsibility for education to the Minister of Education and the provincial bureaucracy. Since the Minister is necessarily a politician, the incumbent is likely to have little background in education and so have to rely on advice from the Deputy or bodies such as MACOSA and the CPB. One would expect a good deal of negotiation and compromise as the political priorities of the Minister were implemented by a provincial bureaucracy that was, initially at least, still largely committed to progressive education.[66] Even now, it is unclear whether the Minister or the Deputy is the more influential. At least one senior manager I interviewed seemed to doubt whether the Minister was involved in policy formation, and looked instead to the Deputy's office for direction:

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[64] Calder, p. 56.

[65] *Hansard*, 1978, p. 1189.

[66] The television series "Yes, Minister" provides a satirical but nevertheless insightful portrait of such interactions.

> I: So policy flows from the Minister—
> #10: Oh, I don't know from the Minister, but it certainly does from the Deputy.
> I: —er, from the Deputy?
> #10: Oh sure. Sure. (1.1133-1138)

Depending on the incumbent, this may reflect an actual separation of functions, with the Minister devoting most of his or her time to external relations, or it may reflect the natural tendency in any hierarchy for individuals to see clearly only one or two steps above their own rank. While it is beyond the scope of this study to locate precisely where on the Premier-(Kitchen Cabinet)-Cabinet-Minister-Deputy-Assistant Deputy chain of command the specific decisions regarding the introduction of provincial testing were taken, there are one or two general observations that can be made.

First, it is generally accepted that the last of the Deputy Ministers with progressivist leanings retired in 1982 and that the current Deputy's reorganization of the Department effectively purged the last remainders of progressivist influence from the top levels of the hierarchy. Most of those at the Director level and higher are, if not actual card-carrying members of the Progressive Conservative Party, then at least sympathetic to its ideological program. The slow but continuous attrition of progressivist officials, and the selective promotion and outside recruitment of replacements supportive of the government's policies, has allowed a succession of conservative Ministers to gradually erase the progressivists' hold over the education leadership. In general terms, conservative influence has penetrated from the top down, to reshape the top levels of the education hierarchy from nearly independent professional elite into a bureaucratic management. This is not to suggest complete unanimity of purpose between the education hierarchy and the government, but simply that the current educational leadership would no longer endorse the Worth Report, even if free to do so; and that this paradigm shift resulted from a change in the profession's external sponsorship rather than from the internal creation of new knowledge by the profession's (university-based) research elite.

Echoes of progressivist sentiment remain, however, among the ranks of technical experts such as the Test Development Specialists. Here, ideological orientation seems to split more along subject matter lines than rank, with the maths/sciences tending to conservatism while the humanities tend to progressivist views. Nevertheless, there is a line at about the Associate Director level between those who generally support the government's program and those who may have some reservations about the basics/excellence emphasis in education and consequently see their role as 'damage control'.

Second, from the perspective of those within the middle ranks of the bureaucracy, the distinction between decisions made by the Legislature and those initiated by the (now conservative) education leadership is somewhat blurred:

> #02: Now if you're talking about the, the big policy decisions, uh that override even things like the existence of the Diploma Exams, the they're obviously made beyond this building. [I: Umhum] Uh, uh, within the Legislature, or at the Deputy Minister level, on down. . . . But you must remember, that just like the exams, you know, the decisions to have Diploma Exams was not made in this building. It was made at the Legislative grounds and we don't know if next year there's going to be a big cutback in education and the bureaucrats are going to come back and say, there will be no more Diploma Exams. I mean, decisions like that will be made outside this building. (1.420-435)

This blurring of the government/bureaucracy interface by the TDS is hardly surprising given upper management's ideological conformity with the sectional interests currently dominating the Legislature. The important point for the TDS is that goal setting occurs elsewhere, somewhere 'out there', in the unknown and unknowable hierarchical heights. And note especially the use of the phrase "the bureaucrats" to refer to those making policy decisions, and the implied self-identification as something other than a bureaucrat, even though located within the same provincial bureaucracy. This lack of identification with the senior administration may suggest that some middle-rank educators view these senior officials as external managers rather than as a professional elite. This, I would argue, reflects the structural change in education from a profession dominated by a progressivist elite that manipulated its technobureaucratic authority in support of a general professional project to the current government-dominated management whose technobureaucratic authority is being asserted to proletarianize the rank and file.

In any event, the 'professional staff'[67] are isolated from policy decisions taken by the Minister, the Deputy, or the Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADMs).[68] There is virtually no face-to-face contact between professional staff and the education leadership. In my entire decade with the Branch I only met the Minister once, and that was the third Minister, newly appointed, brought on a whirlwind glad-handing tour of a marking session. I saw [illegible] was not introduced to) the Deputy on only three occasions: two staff Christmas parties and one anniversary tea; conversations with the professional staff in this context were primarily social rather than policy-related. I only once attended a meeting addressed by the former ADM, and have never even seen the new ADM. As a TDS, I had only limited contact with the first Director, perhaps a half-dozen meetings in two years. The second Director made a point of maintaining a regular social contact with all his staff, but I cannot recall ever having had a discussion of any actual substance. The third Director is approachable but prefers issues to be referred through channels whenever possible. Typically, the TDS level has input only to its immediate supervisors, the Coordinators and Associate Directors.

Thus, the major decisions, including the basic decision of whether to test at all, are made well above the level to which those implementing the decisions have direct access. They therefore tend to resign themselves to 'damage control':

> #33: I think that uh, I think in general for instance, that stakeholder groups, whatever their private views, recognize that the exams were imposed on us - - by our political masters. [I: Umhum.] And therefore we have the responsibility to make sure that they are the best educational value that they can be. (1.1653-1657)

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[67] From here on, 'professional staff' will refer to the Test Development Specialists, Assessment Resources Officers, and Examiner ranks. In other words, I am using 'professional' here as synonymous with 'technical' or 'staff' ranks, in contrast to 'administrative' or 'line' positions.

[68] These ranks are known collectively within the Department as the 'Senior Officials'.

CHAPTER 5

SPECIFIC GOALS: BRANCH POLICY

INTRODUCTION

If the general goals of schooling are established by the Legislature and the fundamental decisions concerning program structure are determined at the interface between the government and the highest levels of the state education hierarchy, then how are the specific policies which shape and guide the Evaluation Branch determined? This question requires an examination of two separate issues: How is general Branch policy decided, and how are the specific details of each test determined? In other words, how much input do the professional staff have in setting the specific goals guiding their work process, and how much autonomy do they retain in the technical decisions regarding their product? Chapter 5 addresses the former question, while Chapters 6 and 7 address the latter.

FORMAL STRUCTURES

The first issue, then, is how are Branch policies established? How collegial is this process? What are the formal lines of authority, and how much informal influence can the professional staff assert? Have the professional staff undergone ideological proletarianization even at this level, or are they able to assert collegial control over at least their local worksite?

The Senior Officials/Branch Interface

Of course, Branch policy is necessarily constrained by the larger ideological framework of the official goals mandated by the Legislature and the policies and structures established by the Senior Officials. In the words of one Branch manager, the Branch operates within the framework of general direction from the "Minister and the Deputy in light of concerns in the

Legislature" (#10:1.675-676). This constraint on Branch policy takes two forms: explicit instruction and internalized direction.

In the former, those above simply assert their formal authority to priorize funding, establish structures, and issue instructions to those below. Decision making in any bureaucracy is likely to be top down, and education is no exception:

> #10: I think it's quite autocratic. Uh, I think it's based on [a] perceived rational approach. I think it's essentially authoritarian.
>
> I: Fairly directive then?
>
> #10: Fairly directive. Yes. Yep, and I think that's the model under which the Department works. If, if a superior gives a direction, the inferior responds. And that, that's the model throughout the Department, *and that's not necessarily a bad model. I mean, it works.* (1.1119-1129, emphasis added.)

Here we see a pragmatic willingness to defer to the authority of those higher in the bureaucracy. While occasionally frustrated by their inability to talk their superiors out of 'poor' decisions, Branch managers accept the Senior Officials' right to overrule their own professional judgements. In my experience, Branch management rationalize their acceptance of disagreeable directives by reference to the electoral mandate held by the governing party.

This is an excellent example of what Derber refers to as ideological desensitization:

> The precise meaning of ideological desensitization is a denial or separation of self from the ideological context of one's job. Denial involves simply a refusal to acknowledge that one's work has ideological dimensions or serves the interest of particular social groups. Separation or distancing typically takes the form of disclaiming responsibility for whatever uses others make of one's knowledge and skill.[1]

By blurring the government/bureaucracy interface, Branch staff are able to extend to the Senior Officials the electoral mandate claimed by the government, and therefore to accept that it would be inherently undemocratic for them to assert professional privilege in what they have now come to define as matters of public policy. Unlike those knowledge workers (such as engineers) who simply profess a disinterest in goal setting, educators remain keenly interested in the uses to which their knowledge and skills are put, but deny the appropriateness of maintaining professional control in the face of public demands for reforms. That the 'public demand' used to justify the government's decisions may represent only sectional interests is apparently lost on the majority of these educators. Branch staff regularly grumble about decisions made by the hierarchy above them, but they do so in much the same manner one complains about the weather: that is, with the understanding that they are powerless to do anything about it — other than, perhaps, very indirectly through participation in the electoral process. The physical separation of the Branch worksite from the offices of the Senior Officials may further reinforce the impression that these fundamental decisions are outside their purview.

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[1] Charles Derber, *Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism*, p. 181.

Even when dealing with those policies for which they are formally responsible, however, Branch managers are likely to have internalized the expectations of the Senior Officials, and so initiate policies consistent with the ideological position of their superiors, even in the absence of explicit instructions. Note, for example, how this TDS attributes to Senior Officials not only the fundamental policy decisions, but also those initiated by her own Director:

> #43: On the major things, I would say that it's people outside the Branch.
> I: Outside where?
> #43: The Assistant Deputy and Deputy.
> I: So up above in the hierarchy. Okay.
> #43: Up above in the hierarchy. So that while [Director] may establish a policy, you know exactly where the policy is coming from. It didn't come from his head. (1.551-562)

Similarly, we have already seen how the various curriculum working committees self-censored any proposals that they anticipated might prove too radical for the CPB. The same process is at work at every level of the bureaucracy, as those below focus their energies on only those projects for which they have a reasonable expectation of receiving approval.[2] Thus, the knowledge worker's initiative is effectively channelled to support the ideological goals of management, and — given the sense of ownership which arises from control over even just technical matters — often results in the worker's eventual acceptance of those goals as one's own.

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[2] Indeed, one of the chief frustrations expressed by some staff was the feeling that they were too isolated from the senior ranks to be able to always guess correctly what was wanted.

> . . . and very often the lack of clarity of objectives, you know, and here I guess I sort of speak to my particular responsibilities, because, you know, we often hear the term, you know, "I'll know what I want when I see it." Sometimes we go through a lot of, a lot of work trying to anticipate what it is that somebody wants. And uh, heheh, it seems to me if we could sort of meet face to face with the people that we're writing these documents for, and have a good talk as we are right now, uh that some of that strange kind of dynamic might be uh, avoided. (1.234-242)

This accommodation to the ideological position of senior management is an example of what Derber calls ideological co-optation:

> Ideological co-optation refers to a redefinition or recasting of goals and moral objectives to make them consistent with organizational imperatives. Unlike desensitization, this form of defensive accommodation to ideological proletarianization does not require a renunciation of all moral aspirations in work, but rather an identification of self with moral purposes defined by others. Professionals who adopt this defense accommodate peaceably to managerial control of goals and objectives by minimizing disparities between professional and organizational interests and by perceiving their institutions as committed to their own underlying values and purposes. The initial investment of trust in the organization, a normal psychological condition of accepting employment [or promotion], leads, under conditions of ideological proletarianization, to a routine acceptance and growing identification with organizational ends. Their own survival and career development depend on such identification. . . .[3]

I added the phrase "or promotion" to Derber's comments because both the need and the tendency to identify institutional goals with one's own is likely to increase as one moves up the hierarchy into positions where one can directly influence policy. Whereas most Branch staff can simply dissociate themselves from responsibility for what they now define as matters of public policy, the senior managers are required to actively participate in policy formation. Recruitment to management may therefore require a reorientation from progressivist to conservative beliefs. As individual progressives are recruited upwards, conservative ideology slowly moves downwards through the ranks of the hierarchy, as individual managers modify their own views to accommodate those of their superiors. Thus, the ideological proletarianization of education involves not merely separating rank and file practitioners from goal-setting and design functions, but the resocialization of the professional leadership through attrition and co-optation.

In this context, the comments of this Director concerning his interaction with the Senior Officials is rather revealing:

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[3] Derber, p. 185.

> There are certain things that I know are on [Assistant Deputy's] agenda, um, and I don't think that there is anything that is on his agenda that I have a lot of difficulty with. I mean, there are some things, but most things I think we're in agreement with. Uh, and I can say that fairly safely with the Deputy Minister. Uh, sometimes when I disagree with them, we end up both learning. And I have been able to convince both [the Deputy Minister] and [the current Assistant Deputy], and [the former Assistant Deputy] when he was there, uh to change their minds. And sometimes I've had to find a way to accept what they would prefer to do and, and uh, and uh learned something too in the process. But uh most of the time, what I take forward is accepted. (1.1429-1439)

We note here that this Director feels himself in general accord with the position of the Senior Officials, and that most of the recommendations he takes forward are routinely accepted — though this latter may reflect a certain degree of self-selection, given his recognition of the ADM's "agenda". He is also able on occasion to convince his superiors to modify their views, which may represent a form of negotiated resistance if this includes goals rather than just means. Where he is forced to acknowledge and defer to the Senior Officials' formal bureaucratic authority, however, he recasts this in terms of "learning": that is, as a deference to superior expertise which is then internalized. This is an unusually explicit illustration of the process of co-optation.

Located at the interface between the Branch and the Senior Officials, the successful co-optation of the Branch Director is crucial to the Senior Officials' control of Branch policy, as he becomes 'their man in the Branch' rather than the professional staff's 'man in the administration'.[4] Thus, while the Director feels he has a relatively free hand in initiating policy, he does so within the well-understood and internalized limits of the Department's ideological framework.

The Role of the Director in Determining Branch Policy

The formal responsibility for Branch policy, then, lies with the Branch Director.

> Director: Who decides Branch policy? Uh, I think ultimately I have responsibility for that. But once again the processes that we use in determining Branch policy is

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[4] Which is not to suggest that either side is involved in a conscious conspiracy. Rather, a progressivist recruit who failed to accommodate to the Senior Officials' ideological framework, insisted on asserting his professional autonomy in policy formation, and attempted to adopt an independent course for his Branch would simply strike his superiors as a 'loose cannon'.

> one of consultation and uh, uh the Associate Directors should come to me, and that's my expectation, that they come to me with uh a policy that has been well considered and discussed extensively with others who are affected by the policy. (1.1411-1418)

This is a clear statement of the management model used throughout the Branch and, to a large extent, the Department. Ultimately, authority derives from bureaucratic position, but decisions are based on consultation with peers and subordinates. This approach represents, however, a slight shift towards a greater emphasis on formal hierarchical authority and personal accountability than the earlier, more collegial committee-based model under the previous Deputy. To quote a senior manager:

> #38: Uh, I do know that uh, that when [current Deputy] became Deputy Minister that he expressed concern about the decision-making process. Because he was of the opinion, and I think he was true, it was true, that in some quarters you had committees making decisions, you know, and uh, and that's not good, I don't think that['s] a good way to do it because uh I think the decisions have to be made with, by the individual responsible for the area, with proper input of course. (1.1328-1336)

In other words, where committees formerly had the power to pass motions and so outvote the chairing manager, the new model gives the manager the authority to overrule the unanimous opposition of the committee. Nevertheless, input from those below is actively and continuously sought at all levels with the expectation that collegial-style consultation, involving negotiation and compromise, will predominate over rule by decree. While the bottom line is bureaucratic authority, persuasion and consensus remain the ideals to which the majority of managers aspire. As one senior manager put it:

> #10: Uh, I mean there are people who are uh good listeners and still autocratic. And there are other people who never listen to anybody, who just are, take a dictatorial position, and, and I don't think we have that here. (1.1147-1150)

Everyone has the opportunity to have their say, but once a decision has been made, absolute compliance is expected. The one unforgivable sin in the Department is to continue to publicly criticize a policy after it has already been approved by this consultative process.

Of course, the question then becomes how real is this consultative process? If the ultimate decision rests with the responsible official, is consultation merely a form of controlled participation? The answer, as I will attempt to demonstrate, is that the desire for input is genuine but constrained by senior management's control over the framing of the issues. The consultative process is real and significant but must not be confused with collegial control.

Normally, then, a Director consults extensively with his Associate Directors and, through them, receives input from the rest of the staff, before formulating policy.[5] This consultative process has been regularized as "Management Council". But the formal responsibility for Branch policy remains the Director's. To quote one senior manager:

> #09: Now, you know, uh, [the Director] is still the leader, there's no doubt I don't think in anybody's mind, and uh, there are certain things that he wants and he'll do it, but with a lot of things I feel uh, he does accept my input, and he accepts the input of the Branch, of, of the Manager Council. . . . (1.708-713)

The Role of Management Council in Determining Branch Policy

Management Council consists of the Director (who chairs), the Associate and Assistant Directors, the Unit Coordinators, and the Manager of Administrative Services. Other members of staff, or guests from other Branches, are invited to attend as the need arises. It meets regularly for four hours every second Monday afternoon. It is the main clearinghouse for the movement of information within the Branch, the delegation of tasks between units, the review of Branch reports and documents, and the formulation of policy. It is therefore the focal point of Branch management, and was even identified by some respondents as the body responsible for policy.[6] Yet it has no official standing since it appears on none of the organizational charts, and it passes no motions. It does have written agendas, minutes, and 'action items', and its minutes are circulated to all staff to keep them informed of management discussions.

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[5] I can only identify a single occasion on which the Director initiated a major policy change without prior consultation. This concerned the need to "revitalize" the examinations. As an internal Branch matter concerning quality control, this unusual invocation of the Director's authority to overrule all objections may have been a deliberate provocation to shake the professional staff out of what may have been perceived as their growing complacency.

[6] To quote one member of Management Council:

> #36: Well Branch policy is · · · · Branch policy is decided on by Management Council, essentially, is what it is. It is reviewed and approved by Management Council. (1.1781-1783)

That Management Council does not represent collegial control is clear from two points: First, it is cancelled or rescheduled whenever the Director is unable to attend, thus signalling that it serves no need other than the Director's; and second, no votes or motions are ever taken, and so it can never overrule the Director. Its influence on Branch policy is entirely restricted to the ability of its members to persuade the Director to their views.

In practice, discussion at Management Council can be classified into three broad categories: Director-initiated, document review, and information exchange. Information exchange may be initiated by anyone-and is generally very open and frank.

> #36: . . . [policy] can be instigated by anyone in the Branch. More often than not it is brought forward to the Management Council table, either by [the Director] or one of his Associates or Assistants, but the idea may have sprung from anywhere in the Branch. (1.1787-1791)
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> #09: . . . like I think policy, for example, has come from the managers, and the managers have received it from the field, you know, from teachers and that. In fact, I, I would say that a lot of the policy actually comes from, from the field. Now it may come from the field through to the Director, uh, you know, information he or she has obtained over the time and has decided, you know, suggested a policy change, and the same with the managers, they've received information, the feedback they get. . . .[*] (1.991-999)

Typically an issue or suggestion will be brought forward and the group will have some initial consensus-building discussion prior to the Director's referring it to a specific unit for detailed study or action. Or two managers will debate the conflicting needs of their units, occasionally in heated terms, with the Director refereeing. Or a representative from another Branch will be invited to review his program with the members of Management Council, who then proceed to politely but bluntly point out the program's fatal flaws.

Document review is often equally blunt, but focuses on more specific suggestions for changes. It is, in a sense, the later stages of information exchange, as a report, document or policy comes back to Management Council for approval or modification. In one working meeting I observed, for example, the group literally rolled up their sleeves and collaborated on writing a series of job descriptions for the Branch reorganization. This meeting was entirely collegial in its functioning — an ideal brainstorming session.

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[*] Managers even bring forward ideas with which they personally disagree, as in this example from my field notes: "I had to assure an ERC member I would bring it forward to Management Council, but I'm not supporting it". (Field note 88.03.07, p. 11.)

Discussion initiated by the Director, however, may take on quite a different tone if he is introducing his own policies or attempting to implement a decision by the Senior Officials. Where the Director has already tentatively adopted a position on an issue, the atmosphere changes to that of a coach attempting to inspire his team — while the team members cautiously question the plan's desirability and feasibility. It is essential in this situation that staff avoid giving the impression of negativity, of overt resistance, because the Director will simply reject this as laziness or rigidity. A constant theme in the Branch (following a series of workshops based on the *In Search of Excellence* materials[8]) is that there are no such things as 'problems', only 'challenges'.

There is still real opportunity for debate even here, but with the proviso that the Director will have already thought through his position carefully, leaving the other members at something of a disadvantage in marshalling their counter-arguments. To quote one Management Council member:

> #36: [Director]'s style is very much a humanitarian one, at the same, it's almost autocratic at times. . . . when he has decided or thought through a scenario or situation, he's thought through it carefully. It isn't something that has come to his mind while he's talking about it. He gives it a great deal of thought, and therefore is committed to any discussion that he has. And in that sense it becomes more autocratic, because he's already committed to it. [I: Umnum.] So in terms of a management style it's one that's uh very receptive. You know, I think he's very open to discussion, to challenge to, to his position, and I do that sometimes. Uh, at the same time he's fairly autocratic, because he expects that you will come to him well prepared, as he is prepared. (1.800-813)

Another manager thought this true of both this and the founding Director:

> #09: Well, uh from · · · I guess all of them have been, I was going to say autocratic, but they all have been that to some degree. Maybe they have to be, you know. . . . Um · · but I think they're both sort of autocratic, like I think, they both you know, they both have their minds made up and know what they want to do and they'll do it. Uh, you need a pretty good argument to make them change their minds, you know. (1. 671-684)

Nevertheless, this same manager goes on to maintain that:

> #09: So from a manager's point of view, I view it as being fairly collegial. You know? [I: Umhum.] It's group effort to a large degree, not total, but to a large degree.

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[8] Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr. *In Search of Excellence: Lessons From America's Best-Run Companies.* (New York: Warner Books, 1984.)

What this self-contradictory testimony seems to suggest is that there is some variation in the *type* of input Management Council has. From my observation, the greatest collaboration occurs in technical matters, such as the wording of job descriptions or discussion on the best method of achieving particular goals, and the least in questions of fundamental policy, especially where this has been initiated by the Director or those higher up. Senior managers are free, indeed encouraged, to bring issues to the table and to formulate policy for their own units. A typical example would be the question of whether students should be allowed to use calculators when writing the examinations. Such questions do represent Branch policy, but at a lower level than, say, the Branch Goals Statement. Management Council plays a significant role in the formulation of policy at this more specific level, but is constrained in its ability to influence those fundamental policies that set the Branch agenda. In providing leadership and vision for the general direction in which the Branch should go, the Director necessarily reduces the level of input from his senior managers, such that they are left to adopt a largely reactive role. The high level of input on questions of technique and in the formulation of intermediate-level Branch policy, and the relatively low level of input on goal setting, explains the respondents' depiction of the Director's management style as simultaneously collegial and autocratic.

The Role of Individual Managers in Determining Branch Policy

Nevertheless, senior managers — that is, those with seats on Management Council — are generally satisfied with their level of input, which they typically characterize as "pretty good actually" (#10:1.708). One even detects here a slight tone of pleasant surprise, as if they had not really expected to be afforded even as much involvement as they have. Furthermore, they clearly place the onus for such involvement on themselves:

> #36: I feel I have the opportunity for input whenever I want it. If there's something that I feel we need to do, I, very often, it would be my fault if it wasn't raised. It wouldn't be anyone else's fault. [I: Yeah.] I don't see any barriers or constraints placed on me to prevent me from raising issues and developing Branch policy if it's always needed. I might not have the other, the support of the rest of the Branch, [I: Heheh.] but I certainly have every opportunity to bring it to the table. (1.1796-1803)

Similarly, where the Director's views have prevailed over their own, they are as likely to blame the timidity of their peers as to accuse the Director of pulling rank:

> #08: There's some people on Management Council who totally agree with me, but will not stand up for it. . . . There's a number on Management Council, uh, that won't stand up to the Director on a contentious issue. Well, if the Director's made his feelings known, uh, they're not going to argue. (1.762-777)[9]

They do, however, acknowledge three types of constraint on their input. First, that it is often necessary to defer to decisions made outside the Branch by the Minister or Senior Officials:

> #10: And in fact, where input uh is, is futile is in cases ordinarily around here where decisions are being made outside. And uh, that's fine. That's just the way things are. Other people's agendas sometimes govern our lives, and uh, that's the way it is. (1.729-731)

This is a clear, straightforward illustration of ideological desensitization (the separation of self from goal setting) in the face of ideological proletarianization.

Second, several respondents mentioned that they limit their input to their area of special expertise.[10] For example, the Manager of Administrative Services makes no attempt to influence educational policy (in which she has little background) and restricts herself to discussing the logistical and budgetary implications of the recommendations before Management Council. On the other hand, the Director and Associates tend to defer to her recommendations in matters of finance and administrivia, where their own expertise is weaker. This sort of self-limitation is entirely consistent with professional autonomy and need not concern us further.

Third, and most subtle, Management Council is often simply swamped into compliance. For example, each biweekly meeting may include literally hundreds of pages of documents to read, absorb, review, and perhaps rewrite by the following meeting.[11] New reports and other tasks over and above the managers' regular workload are also assigned. Important policy documents risk receiving only a cursory review, and even where deadlines permit deferral to a later meeting, this simply postpones the inevitable and increases the pile of intervening paper.[12] The situation is made even worse by the nature of the Branch's product, which dictates very tight deadlines and high levels of seasonal stress, which tend to undermine the full consultative process:

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[9] My own impression, based on my field observations, is that some managers were indeed overly cautious in challenging the Director, and that the Director is a good deal more receptive *on most issues* than is sometimes recognized, but that this timidity has resulted from previous incidents in which managers attempted to object to those fundamental policies on which the Director could brook no opposition. The ability to distinguish clearly between the types of policies on which input is or is not likely to be welcome is a key diplomatic skill for senior managers.

[10] E.g., #10:1.708-715; #08:1.528-555.

[11] Field note 88.04.11, p. 10.

> #08: Uh, that breaks down totally when we get into a very stressful, uh, situation with an immediate deadline and the need to make immediate decisions. Uh, communication all goes to hell. Uh, except for those that are directly involved. At other times, you know, when things carry on nicely, uh, in general day-to-day operations, uh, no, it's relatively open. (1.1044-1050)

Consequently, simple survival dictates that managers restrict themselves to those issues that will have an immediate impact on their own units, and leave the initiation and discussion of more general policies to others. I will return to this issue later in the chapter, but for now it is sufficient to note that the senior managers' heavy workloads tend to narrow the focus of their policy interests.

In general, junior managers — that is, those not on Management Council — feel a bit more isolated from decision making than the senior managers, though this is not necessarily perceived as a problem.

> #05: Well, it's indirect through uh my senior manager. Assistant Director, and, and from that viewpoint there is some influence, and uh, some of what, of what we want I think becomes implemented. (1.333-335)

For this and other middle-management administrators, the issue is not whether they have input into goal setting, but how policies that might affect their units are to be implemented. Located in service units, these administrators are primarily concerned with ensuring that whatever goals are adopted are logistically feasible, but are otherwise not particularly concerned with having a say in where the Branch is headed.[13]

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[12] Such delays may also prove very frustrating:

> #09: They ask for feedback by next meeting, so you struggle to get it done in two weeks, then when it comes up, they say they need more time and defer it! It frustrates me! It frustrates my workers!
> I: Like the army, 'hurry up and wait'.
> #09: Exactly! (Field note 88.05.09, p. 18.)

[13] #05:1.398-406; #06:1.368-379; #08:1.543-556.

Other middle managers want more input and express frustration at their isolation from decision makers:

> #39: But that, here again, it's kind of a sheltered situation. I have things that I would like to be aired in front of people, like [the Assistant Deputy], before they implement policy, like [gives example] but I can only take this as far as [immediate supervisor]. Take my concerns and reservations about these things, I can itemize them, submit them in memo form, and say, "These are my concerns, concerns so far as, insofar as they affect my unit". And [supervisor] takes them to them, and that's as far, as much as I can say about it. And hope that he presents it correctly. [I: Heheh. Okay.] You know, I'm not there when it happens. (1.1325-1335)

Similarly, another complained about a proposal he had sent forward which was so altered going up through channels that only the title of the document remained recognizable when it finally emerged from Management Council.[14] These two managers definitely want more input than they feel they have.

Somewhere in between is the manager who argued that one can have input, but that this requires taking on extra work:

> #16: . . . that's when you can be innovative, when your regular duties don't take up your whole day. Then you can do the extras. But to expect people whose regular duties fill up the entire day to somehow do something extra, that's when people— you know, if, if, if I were ambitious, and really wanted to get ahead, my regular duties are going to be taken care of in the regular time. I would have then, to start, if I wanted to do something extra, if I had my own little special project I wanted to spring on the boss, or something like that, I'd have to do that in, on my own time. But I'm not ambitious, so I don't get caught up in that stuff. (1.1974-1983)

Here again, we see that participation in policy formation is constrained by the heavy workloads, but at the same time, the speaker is clearly placing the onus for that responsibility on the managers themselves:

> #16: I know that, that I can make a difference if I have the courage to speak up at the right time. Uh, and uh, you know that's something people should be aware of. . . . And uh, you know, an organization is, can be, as strong as its strongest member, provided that, that those strong members are willing to, to offer up themselves. The unfortunate organization is, is the one that becomes as weak as its weakest member. (1.1860-1873)

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[14] #40:1.806-813.

The Role of the Test Development Specialists in Determining Branch Policy

The Test Development Specialists (TDSs) are the core production staff in the Branch; that is, they are the ones charged with writing the actual tests and reports that represent the Branch's primary product. All are certified teachers, most have Master's degrees, and a few have Ph.D.s. How much input does this level have in determining the general goals and policies of the Branch?

In theory, the TDSs are supposed to have input via their managers into Management Council, and through it to the Director, and so on to the highest levels. Associate Directors or Coordinators are expected to hold regular unit meetings at which TDS staff can be informed of management decisions, and at which they can raise their concerns for their manager to take back to Management Council. Occasionally a TDS will even attend Management Council in an acting capacity for an absent manager, but generally input is indirect.[15]

They may also, of course, approach the Director directly, but this is generally perceived as 'going over the head' of their manager, and is usually reserved for matters of grave import. While the Director is open to, and appreciative of, direct contact with TDS staff, he works on the assumption that the organization functions best through normal channels and that no news is therefore good news. To the best of my knowledge, no TDS has ever gone over the head of the Director to speak with an Associate Deputy, the Deputy Minister, or the Minister, and those officials never sought direct input from the TDS staff. Thus, the TDSs are largely isolated from direct contact with the highest levels of the bureaucracy and expected to limit their input to discussions with, or memos addressed to, their immediate manager, or at most, the Director.

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[15] The rank of Assessment Resources Officer is equivalent to or very slightly higher than that of the more numerous TDSs. The former are essentially responsible for all of the statistical analysis of test results, but in recent years have also increasingly functioned as an elite research unit within the Ministry. For most purposes of this study they may be conveniently grouped with the TDSs, but they have an important advantage in matters of policy: Their understanding of both statistics and computers gives them an additional and more clearly defined knowledge monopoly to which managers often have to defer. Consequently, they are consulted on technical matters slightly more often than is the average TDS, and this gives them a slightly higher level of access within the Branch to both Management Council and the Director. This was particularly true of the Branch's formative period when the AROs reported directly to the Director, and the early AROs had a significant impact in defining and resolving a large number of technical issues. Even today, their special expertise is more likely to involve them in any initiative undertaken by the Branch, and therefore direct contact with the Director, than a TDS. Furthermore, as the statistical management of Branch tasks has become routine, the AROs are being increasingly redirected to preparing reports requested by the Assistant Deputy's Office, and their influence is therefore extending to policy matters beyond even the immediate mandate of the Branch. (Some time after the conclusion of my study this had reached the point where there was serious discussion of removing the AROs from the Evaluation Branch and placing them with the Ministry's planning unit, but the move was blocked by the Branch Director.) Nevertheless, their input remains indirect, through the Director, and is largely restricted to technical matters.

Nevertheless, the TDSs recognize that there are some decisions which by their very nature have to be made at a much higher level than their own, and they are prepared to see these issues carried up through channels:

> #02: Um, one of the things that concerns me right now is the, the increasing numbers of students, percentage wise, that are taking [subject]. And the uh, when you move from 50 per cent to 60 per cent, you pick up say an extra ten per cent of the kids writing, those tend to be weak students. And it starts messing up your average, and yet you've got to control the average. So I have started to assemble all the numbers on that. The [Regional Office] Consultants are very concerned about it, uh, [Associate Director] is very concerned about it, here on the our own floor, but there is one which is going to have to be uh made beyond this level. And what we're going to do is wait until we get the numbers in on June examination and then I will come up with some definitive averages. Because although the provincial average might be 65, it's quite feasible that the examination is turning out a 70 average on the target group. Whatever that is. [I: Umhum] For instance, maybe our particular course is intended to be only written only by 50 per cent of the population. So if you throw in a bunch of other people, maybe you should ignore them, and set the average. Now if we ever went that route, somebody in the Legislature might have to be able to stand up and say, "The provincial average in [Subject] is only 53 per cent and we're quite happy with that". And the politics, uh, would be tough. So there's one, that I know, uh is going to have to go beyond this building.
>
> I: But you feel that you have the opportunity to put together some sort of—
>
> #02: I've already started.
>
> I: —package and you're going to have that input.
>
> #02: Yeah.
>
> I: Okay, great.
>
> #02: I don't know whether anybody will listen, [I: Heheh.] but uh, I will certainly send on my concerns and what I think should happen, you see. (1.443-484)[16]

There is a difference, however, between this sort of deliberate initiative, carried forward at the urging of the Regional Office Consultants and with the full support of one's

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[16] As it happens, this initiative failed.

Associate Director, and regular involvement in decision making. Several TDSs expressed uncertainty over whether their input was routinely sought and listened to. They were often hard pressed to recall a specific suggestion of theirs which had been carried forward and implemented.

> #34: I probably have but I can't give you examples right now. I have written memos over the years that uh, where I can see a problem and I've suggested something where obviously I'm calling for some policy to be made. A lot of that happens though, comes up at our unit meetings and is carried forward by the Associate Directors who then take credit for the policy. (1.1666-1671)

Notice especially the phrasing of the last sentence, which suggests that even when their ideas are carried forward, the TDSs feel a loss of ownership. The isolation from key decision makers and the need to work through channels can be alienating, even when successful.

Even the senior managers seem uncertain how effective such channels actually are in providing the TDSs with real opportunities for input, though they try to be optimistic.

> #38: Right now? From where I'm sitting. . . .I'm quite confident that the issues are discussed. At least, I hope. No, maybe I'm not quite confident. [I: Heheh.] I think they are discussed. I think that, that some of the issues are and one important issues are discussed. Uh, I have had, not had individuals come to me to say, you know, "This is not a good idea, uh, and yet we haven't had a chance to discuss this in any way". . . . I don't know, did you think there was opportunity to offer input? (1.1456-1465)

> #09: Now how much of that actually ends up, huh, is a good question; but no, I know myself, a lot of policies that I have to achieve and develop and so on have come from the TDS level. (1.1009-1012)

When TDSs did cite particular policies on which they felt they had had some input, these tended to be (a) matters related to the specific programs in which they were involved, such as the design of the Enhancements to the Achievement Testing Program;[17] (b) matters related to their particular position, such as rewriting their own job descriptions during the Branch reorganization;[18] or (c) some sort of exceptional circumstances, as when a TDS was asked for input on the translation policy because he happened to be one of two bilingual staff members.[19] It is also common for recent secondments or recruits from the schools to be asked to react to proposals *from the viewpoint of a classroom teacher*;[20] that is, not in their role as

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[17] #04:1.2068-2069.

[18] #04:1.2073.

[19] 1.1733-1750.

[20] #27:1.523-530.

TDS, but as an outsider, and only in their first six months or so in the Branch. Thus, even when TDSs could cite some role in policy formation, this tended to be at a fairly low or specific program level. In other words, their input can be largely characterized as coming under 'technical discretion' rather than goal setting. Note, for example, how this TDS makes that explicit distinction herself:

> #43: · · I think there are um there are policies and there are policies. For example. There are policies that meant, are policies for public consumption, versus policies meant for how this Branch will operate. So it is Branch policy that we shall do such and such. . . . I would say if I had any impact at all, it would be on those Branch policies . . . it's on those policies that are for internal consumption only. Okay, how shall we behave on such and such a thing, and it's more procedure more than policy. Yeah, I think some [of my recommendations] have [been accepted]. Many haven't. I mean, certainly in terms of the broad scope of things, the public, no, because I [tend] to view things not from a political perspective. I would — see I always say that, for me, what's technically correct is what's my first judgement. And around here, much of it is politically correct. So naturally, I'm off target many times. Heheheh. (1.589-632)

This is a straightforward illustration of ideological proletarianization.

Predictably, a few TDSs responded by retreating completely into technicality (ideological desensitization through separation):

> #02: · · I don't really concern myself with those things. I uh · · I read through the minutes of uh the different things and I read the little bulletins coming around and the changes and what's going on. Uh, take a look at uh the School Act and, but, I don't really reflect on those at all. I basically look at the, the product that I am producing, and ask myself how could it be better. And, and I'm looking at that, more so than the whole Branch or worrying about our policies at that level. (1.489-496)

> #27: No, it's just that what I have to do, I'm able to do within whatever policy that's set up. So I don't feel I need to change it. . . . And I feel that a good job's being done, so that's not really my role. If they want some input, then I'll give it to them, but as far as me going up to them and saying, that "This has to be changed", I don't feel at this point that I, I need to do that. If I did I suppose I would. (1.507-560)

Most, however, expressed a strong desire for input,[21] but felt that they had less input than they would have liked.[22]

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[21] For example:

> #26: Oh, yeah. I mean, if you work under them, it would be nice to be part of them. (1.966-967)

And note the explicit appeal to professionalism in the following:

> #34: Yes. I think that, uh I think it's quite important if I'm going to be treated as a professional. (1.1641-1642.)

[22] E.g., #33:1.1727-1728.

This lack of inclusion was particularly acute in one specific unit in which an ineffectual manager failed to carry information back from Management Council to his unit or take his unit's concerns forward in any kind of systematic fashion.

> #43: . . . you see, one of the problems is that there is no vehicle to express that opinion. [I Umhum.] In other words, there isn't a representative — there is but there isn't — at the management meeting where a lot of this stuff gets discussed. Now if I had the time, to sit down with [manager] and say, "This is my position on it and I would like you to bring it forward in you know, like the political process", then there would be a vehicle. But that vehicle doesn't exist. So I can have all the feelings, all of the thoughts that I want about policy, I often have no way to constructively send them the message. . . . Well [manager], um I never know what the policy is until after it's been established, because he never comes back from a management meeting and says, "This is what we discussed". Minutes, these cryptic notes come out two weeks after the fact, with the titles saying this is what they addressed and this is the resolution, okay, with a big gap in between. So you have to know what is an issue before you can reflect on it and decide, I mean much of my reflection comes after the fact. (1.692-713)
>
> #04: There just seem so many things that pop up that we have, that we were never consulted about. Maybe I should have said lack · · · · · · lack of inclusion in the decision-making process. . . . There is a lack of communication. Um things pop up that we know nothing about, about them. Which maybe points out too the fact that if they're going to have this extra step, this Coordina—Coordinator position, that they should put some parameters on it. Get a job description, heheh. (1.1066-1075)

Part of this breakdown in communication revolved around problems with this particular manager, but notice that the second speaker also attributes it to the ambiguous nature of the unit Coordinator role. For many TDSs, the unit Coordinators represented a redundant layer of management which cut them off from direct access to the Associate Directors and Management Council. The elimination of the Coordinator position represented a significant increase in the TDS workload, but for many TDSs this appears to have been an acceptable trade-off for greater access to Branch policy. To quote a TDS from another unit:

> #26: [The Associate Director] seems very receptive to ideas, and it seems that I can, can quite easily get around something that I thought was uh a policy by just going to the [Associate Director] and discussing it with him and saying, "I want to do this". And he says, "Yes, just go ahead and do it". Branch policy. When I first started here I was frustrated by some of the policies that didn't make any sense to me, that, that we did, and I think some of it was to make it easier for the Coordinator to keep us all doing the same thing. In fact I'm sure they were. And so some of them were frustrating because you're working under a Coordinator who says, that "Okay, it's easier if we all do it this way", and so [subject] started doing it that way, and it was the easiest way, so now I am in [different subject], I have to do it that way too. And that used to frustrate me. But that's sort of changing. . . . (1.897-917)
>
> I: So the elimination of the Coordinator position eliminated a lot of bureaucracy that you found constraining?

> #26: I think so. It makes it uh, I suppose a bit more work and a bit more uh, like sometimes you, you aren't informed of what's going on, but then if you don't have to do it the same, maybe it doesn't matter. (1.950-956)

The key issue, however, is that the TDSs feel themselves cut off from access to information — that often by the time they find out about an issue, the decision has already been made. The problem for the staff with the noncommunicative manager was not simply that they had no recourse if they were unhappy with their representation on Management Council, but that not knowing what the issues were, they could not even demand a greater say in them. (And notice that even the third speaker complains that "sometimes you aren't informed", even though there is no longer a Coordinator position in that unit.) The circulation of Management Council minutes is supposed to keep staff informed, but the first speaker dismisses this as ineffectual and "after the fact". For TDSs to become involved in decision making, a senior manager must seek to involve them, which means the manager has to define the issue as one requiring their input. Even granting management the best intentions, the TDS's role in policy formation is obviously going to be constricted if management is responsible for both framing the issue and identifying relevant audiences.

For example, the unit with the ineffectual manager ironically contained the one TDS who described himself as having a "fairly large scope" in policy matters and being generally satisfied with his level of input.[23] Ostensibly, the unit manager had come to depend entirely on this particular TDS to draft all of the unit's policy recommendations, to the exclusion of the other staff, including even the manager himself. Because this particular TDS had more free time available (but also, perhaps, because he was the only male TDS in the unit), it had simply never occurred to the unit manager that any of the other TDSs would want the additional, and to his mind onerous, task of drafting policy papers. (In fact, what the other TDSs wanted was a more equitable distribution of the routine work tasks so that they *could* have time to participate in policy discussions.) Again, while this was a problem with a particular manager, it illustrates the underlying issue that TDSs' involvement is entirely at the managers' discretion.

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[23] L.2160-2161; 2181; 2191.

Note, for example, how the issue identified by this next TDS is one that likely struck management as far too trivial to require the involvement of the professional staff, but which remains a central annoyance ("insultingly insensitive") for this TDS:

> #15: . . . partly I think, that uh, decisions are made - - without, without consulting with those of us who would, sometimes at least, be in a much better position to - - uh, contribute something. I don't know why it sprang to my mind, but decisions about uh the catering services over at the Annex during marking were obviously made by uh, people who don't normally make coffee and, and drink and mark all day. Uh, they were, I mean, it was just insultingly insensitive, to me. It would just take five minutes to just pick up the phone and say, uh, you know, "Could you make some recommendations about catering, what's the bottom line?" And no one's ever done that. [I: Umhum.] And that's a minor detail - - - - And I suppose that's what management is all about, is, is uh, making yourself so separate from the actual nitty-gritty that you can, you can dream and uh, and you can set these goals, but I, I haven't quite come to believe that's the only way to do it. (1.464-472)

Catering may appear a trivial concern to management, but for the TDS it represents not only control over the work environment, but an important factor in staff morale. A TDS concerned with the productivity of his markers (especially given the speed-ups apparent in the decreasing person-hours allocated to this function) is keenly aware of the impact of a shortage of morning coffee, or the wave of complaints that follows a bad luncheon. As hundreds of teachers must be cajoled each session into volunteering to give up a week of their holidays to come marking, complaints about the quality of the juice and coffee begin to loom large in the minds of the professional staff who are the ones on the firing line. In the end, the speaker himself concedes that this is a "minor detail", but it [illegible]ly offered as symptomatic of a more general exclusion from decision making [illegible] the lowest levels. Selective consultation on only those issues that senior managers deem appropriate inevitably means that the TDSs will have much less input than they want and perhaps need.

This isolation from goal setting and decision making was not the TDSs' only complaint. A number of TDSs reported being considerably rankled on those occasions when the Director asserted his bureaucratic authority to overrule staff on matters they felt to be within the area of their own special expertise. One recurring complaint concerned the Director's imposition of the field-testing procedures he had designed for his own unit (while still Associate Director) on the entire Branch, following his promotion to Director.[24] As this decision reversed long-standing practice elsewhere in the Branch and was over the unanimous objections of both professional staff and cooperating classroom teachers, this was not only a highly unpopular decision, but one that brought home to many professional staff how little control they had over even their own work.[25]

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[24] #21:1.776-782.

Another common grievance concerned the Director's "revitalization" program. The Director's insistence on the need for innovative question design was interpreted by many TDSs to imply that the current examinations were thought substandard or that the Director was placing form above substance:

> #43: Another impression of mine about the revitalization is that in many cases it's only important that cosmetic changes be made. There might be concern about appearance, form, more than content. And by that I, now this may be an isolated incident, I don't know, but I can remember when it was, revitalize the [subject] exams, there was more emphasis on it looking different. They didn't want us to make those tests better so that are, so that they'd give us a more, interpretations that are more valid in terms of the constructs that they're measuring. We only want that kind of change if it looks different. I get a sense that we're on a lot of band-wagons, and it goes throughout the whole Department. (1.980-991)

A number of the science TDSs, for example, complained that the Director (along with all the other non-science staff) was 'scientifically illiterate', and therefore unable to appreciate just how innovative their product truly was:

> #26: I do agree that in [subject] we did have to change from the kind of question that the kids can predict. But I started doing that before [Director] came up with this innovative idea. . . .I like the idea of getting some new and different questions, but they have to be recognized, and, and [Director] doesn't seem to recognize the science questions as being new and different unless they look totally different. [Gives example of innovation] and that wasn't good enough, because he didn't recognize it. It was still a straight old multiple-choice question. And so, what he wanted was something that looked different as well as was different. I mean any [subject] teacher and any [subject] student recognizes that as a very different type of question. But they have to be different enough that [Director] recognizes that, and he doesn't. There are some things he doesn't recognize. (1.1310-1334)

This is interesting both as an example of management's intrusion into matters normally within the TDS's technical discretion, and as an example of the professional's appeal to specialized knowledge to justify resistance to management direction.

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[25] Personally, I thought the Director's decision here the only one possible, and view this incident as a useful reminder that professional autonomy may not always be a good thing, the general tone of this dissertation notwithstanding.

This potential for resistance forces management to adopt a consultative model, because where management fails to persuade the professional staff to its views and has to rely on its formal authority, it is likely to obtain only formal compliance:

> #15: . . . actually see there isn't a lot of · · open questioning going on. We were, you know, we got the word from [Director] who passed it on to [Associate Director] who passed it on to us, and we sort of raised our eyebrows and were told that this "must be done", so there was no question here. Um, so, then what you do, then it becomes a sort of a game, you parry a little bit, and suggest, uh, several possibilities. Well, in a way it was kind of exciting. Because I did, I thought, okay, all right then, let's do something different, let's have creative solutions, and uh. But that was sort of a game too, because I knew many of the · · procedures I proposed were · · uh logistically impossible. Such as allowing students to use their books, their textbooks. Why not? . . . Of course, that proved impossible. (1.751-766)

Resistance, then, represents a significant component of the TDS's input into policy formation:

> #34: · · I have input into policy but in an unfortunate way. Certain policies will be made, uh, will be incorporated into the Branch, will be made without consultation, hence will cause problems, and hence a lot of bitching and complaints around the floor which may lead to policy change or adaptation. And in fact I've had input by default. In other words, the effect that uh that a policy hasn't worked or it caused grumbling on the floor or has caused, or our policy doesn't work because people are resisting, then we've had kind of a half-assed input into policy. Now there are policies where I feel I have had input. Consultation. Particularly at the unit level, policies that we've established on marking for example and what we'll do, and I suppose, though I can't cite an instance of it, I have had input into terms of policy about other matters, particularly when [Director] has called us into his office and something has come up and it's been discussed. But by and large, I don't feel I've had a great deal of input on certain things. (1.1646-1662)

Note the contrast developed here between those policies on which there was consultation and therefore some sense of ownership, and those policies on which there was not, and therefore resistance. The predominant form of resistance among professional staff is simple negativity: 'based on our specialized knowledge, we tell you this cannot be done'. As will be recalled from the discussion of Management Council, this form of resistance is denied to senior managers, whose involvement in decision making automatically co-opts their knowledge base as well as their goals. Management therefore needs to involve the professional staff in a similar process of co-optation through participation in policy formation, as is clearly recognized here by the Director:

> And uh maybe, maybe that [negativity] suggests to me that they haven't been involved properly or, or perhaps it suggests that uh, that they haven't been given sufficient opportunity to, to participate, so they're going to just say, "No, this is not

> a good idea". But that's uh, not a preferred way of operating, and it's not a way I would like to have it operate. What I would prefer is for them to participate as much as they possibly can in the decision-making process. (1.1481-1488)

This is not to suggest, of course, a conscious, cynical manipulation of the professional staff. That the desire to move towards a collegial management style (at least as far as this is possible within the limits of externally imposed goals) is genuine can be seen in the desire for greater TDS participation in the initiation of policy:

> Director: Uh, you know, at no time do I feel that a good idea has to come from a manager. [I: Yeah.] That's nuts, you know, and I mean, I, I really personally appreciate that when a Test Development Specialist or anybody in the organization, uh comes forward with an idea.
>
> I: Does that happen very often? Rarely, or?
>
> Director: Not as often as I would like it. Uh.
>
> I: Okay.
>
> Director: I guess I can accept some of the blame for that because there has to be, I'm sure that there has to be a means of managing, working with people, to foster that. (1.1578-1593)

Indeed, some staff did express reservations about approaching the Director directly, citing either his preference for protocol and proper channels, or his inaccessibility. Nevertheless, the TDSs generally accepted as sincere the Director's expressed desire to involve the professional staff in decision making:

> #34: I think that [Current Director] is a little more genuine in terms of wanting input and so on. But at the same time I know that [he] is up to his eyeballs in work and as much as he would say drop in any time, he really doesn't have uh a lot of time to just discuss the uh time of day with somebody.

Others cited the circulation of Management Council minutes as a positive step towards attempting to keep staff informed and involved.[26]

Such measures are in sharp contrast to the management style of the founding Director, who

> #34: . . . tended to uh to really hobnob with the, upper management within the Branch, and didn't really have much to do with us. But I know full well that I was so busy around here at the time that it didn't matter a hell of a lot to me. I had to worry about getting things done and it didn't concern me too much about what was being talked about in the management meetings. (1.782-787)

Indeed, the founding Director was largely invisible to staff:

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[26] #29:1.697-702.

> #15: I didn't have, very little to do with him. So, so that was one, uh, almost, I don't know, almost unaware of his existence, you know, except in a, in the sense that I knew he was the Director of the Branch and, and that - - as Director he would have a great deal to do with the whole exam program, so somewhere in there his hand must have been. (1.1083-1089)
>
> #39: I wish I'd met [him] before half the year was out. . . . He was there for a whole, about four months, before I realized that he was my boss. He was the head honcho.
>
> I: Oh really?
>
> #39: Yeah, I used to pass in the hallway, I thought he was the janitor or somebody. [I: Heheh.] He'd say, "Oh hi, [#39]". You know, I'd say, "Who is that guy?" (1.1468-1481)

While amusingly phrased, this clearly reveals the complete isolation of the professional staff from the senior management, and therefore from access to policy discussions, during the crucial period of the Branch's formation. Note, for example, how the first speaker (#34) describes being too preoccupied with questions of technicality to concern himself with the issues over which the founding Director and his Associates were closeted.

The change to a more visibly open management style probably reflects differences in the personalities and values of the two Directors as individuals, but may also be a consequence of organizational maturation. As the Branch moves into its maintenance phase, the professional staff may have more time to reflect on their work beyond issues of technicality and therefore the opportunity to demand a greater role in decision making. At the same time, both the staff and the wider profession will have already accommodated to the basic program framework, including its larger ideological context, so that management can safely delegate more decision making within these externally defined goals. Some evidence for this interpretation may be found in the suggestion that in the units developing new programs, or undertaking major initiatives in those previously established, staff has again become too preoccupied with issues of technicality to challenge management's monopoly over policy decisions. Furthermore, whenever crises or contentious issues do arise, management often reverts to an autocratic style.

> #34: . . .we're becoming now a little more routine in what we're doing. There's been more acceptance of what we're doing. It will be interesting, as the [new unit] area and the [new program] areas expand, and uh encounter some of the hurtles that we've climbed over, as to how [Director] will, will he maintain this kind of open

> professional atmosphere, but I see emerging, it's not entirely there because often the bureaucracy will form into ranks and you will be told what you will have to do without any discussion, period. And this will, often occurs when there is a crisis of some kind. Or when there is a debate, far wide-ranging debate and it will often come down to decisions being made, and that's the decision in spite of how you feel, you will go along with this decision. (1.616-629)

The evidence is ambiguous here, however, as the management style of various Associates and Coordinators varies between units, and the line between goal setting and mere technical discretion is often blurred. In one unit, for example, the TDS was able to define the parameters of a new program, but did so in the absence of the Coordinator (who was away on leave) and with the delegation of authority from a newly appointed and overextended senior manager. On the other hand, the professional staff working on the other major Branch initiative, who complained about their isolation from policy levels, were those under the Coordinator we have already identified as uncommunicative. And even here, the TDSs [illegible] relatively more autonomy to set their own policies *at the unit level* than in other units, precisely *because* the manager was ineffectual[27] and because it was a new unit with fewer precedents to restrict their actions. Thus it is difficult to separate out the broader developmental trends from individual differences, but in general, TDSs tended either to focus their complaints on specific personalities, or to express a tentative optimism for improvement under the current Director.[28]

The Role of the Examiners in Determining Branch Policy

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[27] The professional staff, for example, organized their own weekly staff meetings when the Coordinator failed to provide direction, and began setting unit policy for themselves. It should be noted, however, that this could as easily be interpreted as the Coordinator providing opportunities for collegial control. Instead of objecting to this mutiny, for example, he simply asked if he might join the meetings. In other words, he may have been labelled as 'ineffectual' because he was (ironically) viewed as insufficiently autocratic. In a more collegial environment, he might well have functioned admirably. When complaints about the Coordinator eventually provoked a reaction from his superiors, it was to reinforce hierarchical control and a more directive management style.

[28] An example of the latter:

> #22: I would be surprised if we didn't have any input, because that's not good management. [I: Umhum.] And I know [Director]'s following from what, seems to be, [Director] seems to be following good management principles in other things. (1.1148-1151)

This leaves the Examiners.[29] The Examiners are subordinate to the TDSs and are usually referred to as "backups". The position does not even appear on the organizational chart, and is therefore limited to either wage or contract personnel. Having no official standing in the Branch, their only input is through the TDS to whom they report, or through discussion at unit meetings with their Coordinator or Associate Director. Nevertheless, they are all certified teachers, some with over 30 years of classroom experience, others with advanced credentials, including three with Ph.D.s; a few are recent graduates putting in time with the Branch until a classroom position can open up for them.

The Examiners generally feel themselves too low on the hierarchy, and too vulnerable, to attempt to have any input into major policy decisions.

> #20: Oh, minimal. Because of my position. I can be replaced by somebody who is much more willing [illegible] and go with the flow. I have input as far as field tests, how many [illegible] should go out and how many questions go on this and I make suggestions and again I ask questions about policy, but as far as deciding what Branch policy is, I don't have any input at all, to be realistic. (1.574-580)

This does not, however, present a problem to most of the Examiners. Most accept a definition of Examiner as essentially a support position several steps removed from decision making, and are entirely focused on questions of technique rather than on Branch goals. For some, the job with the Branch is strictly temporary, and consequently they do not feel it appropriate that they have any say in policy, even when they are personally interested in the issues being discussed:

> #19: Uh no, Well, I, I, I'm only temporary, seems kind of ridiculous for a temporary person to be involved in Branch policy. . . . Oh, I'm interested, yes. I'm interested from a, from a, I'm trying to stay away from the word professional — [I: Feel free to use it. Heheh.] Heheh. I'm interested from a professional viewpoint, but that's all. (1.1800-1806)

> #11: I, I, as I say, I started to become quite interested in it, and then I thought, well, you can't argue for these things if you're not going to be here to fight for them or whatever, and I back down a little bit. (1.1035-1038)

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[29] As mentioned in Chapter 3, two other staff members were included in the interview sample: a systems analyst and a translator. Not surprisingly, neither felt that they had much input, both would like a bit more as it applied to their own work, but neither seemed particularly interested in influencing the organization's goals. Even here, however, there was a certain *de facto* input as, for example, where the programmer decided to adopt one particular style of documentation over another.

Even some of those who have been with the Branch for years and hope to continue on as Examiners do not feel it necessary or appropriate to become involved in Branch policy, preferring to leave such matters to the managers:

> #28: I'm not, I never was, even in high, even in the schools. I, I kept a low profile, so that. It comes from them and they're getting paid for it, and uh, as long as it's reasonable, for the betterment of, of the school or the Branch, that's fine with me. I was never one to, to resist anything like that, you know. (1.901-905)
>
> #07: Ego-wise I would like it, but not, it's not necessary. . . . At some point it has to be their job. I mean, they're, that's what they're paid for. [I: Umhum.] They've got to make those decisions. Uh, I hope that when they make them, they aren't doing it sitting in the bathtub. That there is communication with other people. [I: Umhum.] And that's, that's I guess my biggest concern sometimes, is, are they looking at a total picture or not? (1.1288-1300)
>
> #25: I'm happy with the way it is because I don't like to split my consciousness in too many different directions, and it's very nice, it's very refreshing, stimulating, challenging, satisfying to, to um, to have input here and there, now and then. But for the most part, of course, one must get on with one's job, that's the primary purpose of being here. So, uh, I'm fairly satisfied. I wouldn't mind seeing more constant communication of decisions that are being considered and made. I think that would be a good idea. (1.1515-1526)

Even at the Examiner level, however, there are traces of a collegial model at work, an approach to decision making that seeks to involve everyone, or at least everyone who is interested.

> #28: Oh, we're given an opportunity. Surely if anybody wants to, I imagine he could, but uh, as I say— (1.910-911)
>
> #25: We all have a say to some extent. It's very satisfying. I'm uh - - aware of a uh - - of a real effort on an intermittent but regular basis, to involve us all in one thing or another that represents the development of, of Branch policy. Now the major, some of the major, most of the major decisions will not be made by lower echelons, but by upper echelons and that's the way it has to be. We develop tests, without dealing with everything else at the same time. But there is, I guess what I'm saying is, I, I do feel, uh a kind of professional respect on the part of management for people in positions such as mine. Where we will be consulted regarding uh opinions, possibilities, new directions. Sometimes things, of course, are just dumped, [I: Yeah, right.] just land on, and it has to be that way most of the time, but it could be that way all of the time, couldn't it? And it isn't. (1.1487-1505)
>
> #30: I think that we are given consideration of, of uh voicing, you know, concerns we have about proposed ideas or concepts and I think it's uh open to us as much as it can be, but I think much of the decisions and policies are, are governed by upper management. (1.1266-1271)

But contrast this last statement to the same speaker a few minutes later:

> #30: . . . and there's another facet [of Unit] that's, that's very ruthless, and very, you know, strait and narrow, and you don't [have] any say in it and uh, uh, almost

> impossible to discuss anything because uh, there's no time or, you know, forget it, it's already been decided. (1.1841-1846)

What begins to emerge is that the consensual model is inconsistently applied, an ideal to which senior management is not always able to aspire. Indeed, some Examiners felt that they were never consulted, and deeply resented that lack of input and recognition.

> #03: Sure, why not, you know? Because we are um, members of the Branch so we should have the right to our opinion, what our, you know, our thoughts, our opinions are. Because we are the ones who perform the routine tasks, first of all, and then we know what the, what the problems are. Let's say the everyday problems, you know. And in the meantime it's no harm to, you know, to just listen to the voice of magpie or robins or whatever and then gather them all together to solve the problem. (1.1024-1031)

INFORMAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE FORMATION OF BRANCH POLICY

In addition to the formal hierarchical structure described above, there are a number of other factors which limit effective staff participation in policy formation.

Staff Turnover

Several respondents commented that they were too new to have had much input into Branch policy but that they expected to have more as they settled into their jobs.

> #21: I think as I become more comfortable with my task and feel a little more secure with building tests that I would want to be more involved in policy that directly affects my job, yes. . . .I see other people, my colleagues, having more input and that is because [they have] more courage and knowledge than I have at this point. (1.800-813)

> #22: If I were here a year and I hadn't had any input into some Branch policy, I'd be raising my eyebrows, but I haven't been here long enough.

If anything, newcomers tend to be overwhelmed by the scope of their technical discretion:

> #22: I think I was a little bit surprised that I was listened to as much, you know, being a rookie. Heheh. And the responsibility, you know, every now and then, "Goodness, I'm, I'm responsible for this!" [Grade] and [program] tests, you know, this provincial thing, oohh. . . . But yeah, I think, it, it's more than what I thought, actually. I thought it would be more of a, because when I worked [as an Examiner] with the [another unit], I was more of a girl Friday. I don't know if you noticed that, but I didn't have too much, I didn't have to stay awake at night. You know what I mean? . . . But I find now I have to really think. (1.411-421)

What makes these responses interesting is that (as will be seen in Chapter 8) a significant proportion of the professional staff is on secondment, on short-term contract, or in project positions. Management places a great emphasis on keeping the professional staff current with classroom practice by recruiting classroom teachers for short tours of duty in the Branch, especially at the TDS rank. Consequently, at any one time, a significant proportion of the professional staff will have cast themselves in a temporary learning rather than long-term advocacy role, thus restricting the TDS input into policy. In contrast, the managers all hold permanent positions.

The Timing of Staff Input

As already suggested in the discussion of the TDS role in policy formation, the staff must be kept informed and involved in initiating and defining issues, if they are to have genuine input. In practice, the professional staff often are only asked to respond to management proposals, and are given few opportunities to raise issues directly themselves.

> #34: Sometimes I feel I've input, sometimes I don't. Uh, like, I expect the Director could remedy some of this by giving us some Branch planning days that are meaningful and uh so on. It would serve him well to meet with us more often too, to deliberately, methodically call on the [Unit] and say, "Now look. I don't want this to be a bitch session necessarily, but what are some of the things that are bothering you?" He doesn't do that. (1.1691-1698)

Similarly, staff often feel that their involvement comes too late in the process to be meaningful:

> #26: · Well, we're always addressing [issues] after the fact. You get sort of ticked off by it, then you, I mean, but at this point it's gone to a publisher, and "So what?" kind of deal. (1.1039-1041)

One particularly revealing variant on this theme emerged from the Branch reorganization. A whole range of issues relating to Branch structure was put on hold as various managers waited to be confirmed in their new positions and the TDSs awaited reclassification as managers. This went on for over 18 months, with the resulting ambiguity and confusion effectively cutting the professional staff off from decision making during this crucial period.

#22: I haven't heard too much about anything. But again, that may be because of

> the whole change around too. You know, you're sort of interviewing at a time where there is change. I keep being reminded that things aren't settled. [I: Heheh.] Maybe, what, what [Director]'s policy regarding policy we have input, but so far I haven't seen any evidence. (1.1144-1148)

The implication here is that this TDS does not expect to be involved in policy discussions until things are more "settled" in the Branch, but obviously by then, any staff input as regards those larger changes will have become redundant.

Response Time

The most common complaint of staff at all levels[30] concerning their role in policy formation is that they do not have sufficient time to respond properly to the policy initiatives and other documents placed before them. The inherent inflexibility of examination timelines often means that the introduction of policy changes must be completed within a very tight schedule, and other Branch matters must be given similarly severe timelines or risk languishing indefinitely on the back burner. I have already alluded to the mountains of paperwork which pass through Management Council, and at least a portion of this will continue on to the professional staff for their input at some stage. Given the heavy workloads, it is often extremely difficult for staff to keep up with this deluge of material in a timely fashion. Similarly, senior management may have three to a dozen "Action Requests" (questions or assignments from the Minister or Senior Officials) in a week, many with far-reaching policy implications, but each of which requires a turnaround of less than three days. Policy formation is therefore constantly rushed, as the next deadline or the next project approaches. When one senior manager, for example, was asked whether there was enough time to reflect on Branch policy, the initial response was one of helpless laughter:

> #10: Hehehehhahahhee. Well, yes and no. Uh, in a practical sense, sometimes no simply because the timelines around here are, are pretty tight. But on the other hand, uh, I just make it a practice to think those things through as much as my time will allow. And I've learned that it's not wise to do otherwise. So it's really silly. We can leap into something without having; almost everything that happens around here, for almost every problem, the most readily presented solution may well just create five other problems. Uh, because everything we do around here affects so

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[30] With the exception of the Director, though even he conceded that he had occasionally felt pressured into making hurried decisions which he later had had to reverse. (1.1514-1542)

> many people at a given moment, uh the complexity of decision making and consequently the complexity of the policy, just simply can't be ignored. So, I, I've certainly learned that it's silly of me not to pay attention. (1.736-748)

The pressure of short response times may be more keenly felt by the junior managers, even though, as in the following example, they are often focused primarily on issues of technicality:

> #06: I don't have a lot of time to think about anything, really. Our schedule's really tight. I think sometimes the questions uh the answers to some of these questions are wanted too quickly. You know, there are lot of things to take into consideration with some of the policies that are being put in place, not, not just from is it right or wrong, but how are we going to manage it? And those are the kinds of things I think you need to think about. "What's the best way of handling this?" And I don't think you can respond to those questions in an hour. You know, I think you do need some time to think about those and try and think about all of the possible repercussions, implications and try to cover, so you can cover all of the bases when you put the policy into operation. Major policy changes that are not given sufficient time, uh, to be implemented I think create trouble down the road. (1.310-324)

Similarly, the following example demonstrates how time constraints effectively reduce the TDS's input from a substantive role in policy formulation to that of editorial review, even though the professional staff may officially have a week or more to respond to a document:

> #26: Well, it, it really often happens, because, if we're, . . . because I might've been out of town for the three days previously. . . . Really often, we're out of the office or working with committees, and so you do end up just hurriedly going through something and not putting enough thought into it. So that's why I said earlier, it may be my own fault if I don't have enough input into these, because there just isn't, there seems to be the right circumstances meshed together. There is not time set up, I guess, for that. No time set aside for that, it has to come with the rest. It may sound like you only need a second, but, but when you've got 12 teachers up there [in the committee room], whoa, to work with, and it ends up just laying on your desk. I'm not exactly sure if I really, I don't think you want to — with, with something like that you're not going to make major changes without a fair amount of time to put into it, or you're going to end up looking rather foolish, so you end up doing an editing job rather than some input into something. (1.1052-1066)

The problem with tight timelines and hasty decisions even applies to public and 'stakeholder' participation:

> #43: Major changes. I know that the concern for revitalization is causing the Department to, to make changes hastily. We intended when we were given the direction to change the [program] to begin by going out and surveying stakeholder groups to determine precisely what it was that they wanted. And we were told that we didn't have time to do that. And now the feedback coming back from some of the stakeholders is that this is, [Deputy Minister]'s idea isn't it, and it's being imposed on us. We don't want these changes, it's being imposed. (1.971-980)

Thus, the undue haste with which the administration approaches many policy matters effectively disenfranchises much of the staff. The extremely short timelines ensure that by the time the material works its way down to the professional staff, it is often already too late for them to have an impact, and their opportunity to think through a response and marshal counter arguments or proposals is severely restricted. The common observation that communication "breaks down totally when we get into a very stressful, uh, situation with an immediate deadline and the need to make immediate decisions"[31] takes on rather more significance when one recognizes that such crises are both routine and structural in nature.[32] Government may move with glacial slowness from the clients' point of view, but the attempt to decrease response times necessarily erodes collegial control. Even for those professionals located within the bureaucracy, haste equals ideological proletarianization.

Opportunity for Reflection

The problem of too little time to reflect on policy extends beyond the issue of tight deadlines, however. The point is not just that a particular document may have been handed to the professional staff too late for changes, or that senior management has an unrealistic view of timelines, but that staff never have time for anything other than their immediate responsibilities. The heavy workloads and the high stakes associated with their work[33] often prevent TDSs from availing themselves of even those formal opportunities for input which are afforded them.

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[31] #08:1.1044-1046, cited previously on page 158. See again also #34's comments on page 169.

[32] This was brought home to me when I still worked for the Branch by a visiting psychometrician who marvelled at our constant refrain that "if we could just get through this next crisis" things would settle down. He pointed out to us that this is what we had been saying on his previous visit four years before, and that if things had not been sorted out after all this time, we were either dealing with incompetent management — or [illegible] were being 'conned'. While I have observed, and others remarked upon, a significant movement towards rational planning and away from the crisis management [illegible] of the Branch's early years, tight deadlines and emergent crises continue to allow management to effect premature closure on contentious issues.

[33] If a classroom teacher makes a slip, 30 students may notice. If a test developer makes a mistake, 30,000 students, their parents, teachers, principals and superintendents, and the provincial press may notice. Many Branch staff feel this pressure acutely.

> #18: But, you know, to be able to reflect in terms of Branch policy you need a good backup,[34] to do some serious thinking about it. You know, I find myself lurching from one mini-crisis to another.
> . . . Thought about it no. Because it doesn't have that much of a direct impact in the sense that I can't get canned for not thinking about it. Heheh. But if my test score is crazy, yeah, I can get canned for it, so there's a sense of survival mentality takes over, heheh. (1.2199-2214)

> #04: No. Now, opportunity probably, but time, no, heheh. (1.2082)

> #17: I didn't give them [the Department's core values] that much attention, I'm sorry to say, Robert. I think I was too busy trying to get my test to print. . . . No, I haven't had time to reflect on it. I haven't had time to reflect on it. (1.1432-1443)

> #27: No! Heheh. Time? No. Heheh. But I can work it in, like I do look through the minutes and see what they're doing. But I, I don't spend a lot of time on that, no. . . . Well, that I don't have the time. Basically. If I had more time, then there'd be more time for discussion. But I don't, so. (1.539-558)

> #22: It's a matter of time. I haven't had much time to think about it. (1.1155)

> #29: I'm too busy running around trying to keep up. Heheh. No. No. I probably not uh · · · so the fault's probably with me. You know. I don't know— (1.467-469)

Note that the last speaker is verging on acceptance of the idea that since the formal opportunity for input exists, her failure to take advantage of it may reflect badly on her own professionalism.[35] This is an interesting manifestation of the continual ideological struggle between workers and management over the definition of 'a fair day's work'. On various occasions I have observed senior managers suggesting that complaints about workloads are really a reflection on the complainant's time management skills. Certainly in the following example we see an easy dismissal of the nearly unanimous concern among TDSs that they have no time for reflection:

> #38: If I were a TDS, I think I would have time. . . . They are at a level, uh, in the organization where they can be quite critical and they can think about alternatives and so on. I don't think that that uh that they're so tied up in the details that they're not permitted the opportunities to think beyond them. I don't think that that needs to be the case. Perhaps they feel that way, but that doesn't have to be

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[34] That is, "I need an Examiner to whom I can delegate the routine maintenance tasks, leaving me free to plan and innovate"; not "I need to delegate reflection to the backup". That a similarly qualified backup might resent this particular division of labour seems to have escaped this TDS.

[35] This is also true of speaker #26 on page 177: ". . . it may be my own fault if I don't have enough input into these, because there just isn't, there seems to be the right circumstances meshed together".

> the case. (1.1552-1565)

And notice how failure to find time for reflection is turned into a personal, professional attribute:

> #38: Well it's very much a, and that's an interesting thing about, about professionals, because uh, uh there are professionals who uh who may reflect on their work and what they do and so on, more so than others. Uh, and I know that people probably say that one's less professional than the other. Uh, but uh, but it may be a different approach to their work and so on. And uh and it's present here. But I would like, I would like uh staff certainly to engage in that activity. (1.1571-1578)

Some TDSs, on the other hand, recognize speed-ups when they see them.

> #21: Uh, not while on the job. I would have to reflect on my own time. Um, I sense from talking with [#23], my colleague, that uh, that we have may be more busy or have more tasks to do with cuts or hold the line in your budget and reduce the number of committees um I think uh you have less time to reflect also and we have to take most of our time just for, for shall we say, turning out the product. (1.817-823)

The implication here is that by increasing or maintaining heavy workloads, management effectively narrows the knowledge workers' focus to issues of technicality, whatever the formal opportunities for input. Genuine input requires the allocation of sufficient free time not only to reflect on, but to formulate and articulate — usually in written form — alternatives to current practice. Clearly, the TDSs do not feel that they have this time.

Similarly, the Examiners either say that they have no time for anything other than their specific duties[36] or feel even more alienated from policy, and so see no point in even trying:

> #03: Very minimum. Very minimum. . . . Since I know the decision has been made already, I don't think of the, any, you know, I just perform routine task, day by day. That's all. (1.1040-1059)

Even the managers tend to claim that they have no time for reflection, but usually qualify this by suggesting that their regular duties include a continuous focus on policy and decision making:

> #36: Uh, no, we're too busy. Heheh. . . . I implement Branch policies all of the time. In terms of reflecting whether it's appropriate or not, I do that, you know, I don't just sit down and just reflect on it. It's part of the uh decision-making

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[36] For example:
#23: Well we've been, we're really so busy that uh, doing things we can't, we don't have much time to think about policy. (1.1230-1231)

> process, it's part of implementation of what we do. . . . And if there's a weakness in them, that's where they emerge. (1.1822-1834)
>
> #38: No I haven't got time to think. Heheh. Um, I think that reflection on Branch policy occurs whenever there is a problem that has been raised uh that is, I think that's the time that we really say, okay well is this a good policy? Is it working well for? I don't, I know I don't sit here and say, "Okay, well let me think, the Special Needs Policy, is that functioning well now?" you know, I know I don't think about that. . . . However, in the development of it and the approval there's a lot of thought and consideration. (1.1492-1503)
>
> #09: Well, I make the time. Like actually I do think a lot about it, uh, about Branch policy, particularly to this area. [I: Umhum.] Um, I don't spend — well that's not true. I was going to say I don't spend much time during the working day, uh, it's a lot of after-hours type thing, but that's not true, because I do spend a lot of the day in discussion with my people and in effect what we are doing, a lot of times, not all the time of course, but a lot of times, we're discussing, you know, a certain policy and we should be making changes or we should be developing policies here, so yeah, actually I do spend a lot of time uh thinking about it and discussing it even. . . .(1.1029-1039)

Notice the difference in tone between these statements by senior managers, who incorporate policy review into their daily work process, and those by the TDSs quoted above, whose lack of reflection seems to imply a complete dissociation from goal setting. The TDS's "I was too busy trying to get my test to print" suggests something quite different from "I don't just sit down and just reflect on it. It's part of the decision-making process". The exceptions here are those 'service unit' managers whose focus is on administration rather than policy, and who are therefore as preoccupied with technicality as are the TDSs:

> #08: Oh hell no. I haven't got time — the only time you reflect on Branch policy is when it, you want to do something and the Branch policy is the other thing, then you turn around say, okay, which is reasonable, uh, and if it isn't the Branch policy, how do we get it changed so that it is? Uh, no, I don't, not at all. (1.592-596)
>
> #05: Some. Partic—the ones that I really reflect on, are certainly ones that have direct effect on [my unit] procedures. I suppose they all do to some degree, but some more so than others. (1.390-393)

One common theme which emerges from all five management examples is a tendency to be reactive, rather than proactive. (This may explain some of the tendency towards crisis management mentioned earlier, but is to be expected in any organization.) Only #09, who "makes time" after hours, shows any indications of anticipating the need for policy development. Even here, however, there appears to be a focus on only those policies that are likely to affect his own unit. Thus, even for the senior managers, time constraints tend to narrow their focus to issues within their own area of technical discretion to the exclusion of reflection on broader, long-range goals.

Professional Reading

A related problem is the lack of time for professional reading and development. Managers and professional staff alike are expected to keep current with the field, but there is no time available during working hours for this crucial professional activity. Professional reading is important as the likely source of the self-analysis, criticism, and alternative approaches from which proactive policy initiatives may spring. Ideological desensitization and co-optation essentially blind those within an organization to that organization's 'misdirected' goals, 'mistaken' policies, and technical limitations. While an entire field, or its major journals, may suffer from the same ideological proletarianization, this is less likely than it is for a single bureaucracy, and there are almost always critics of the status quo to be found somewhere.[37] Without the opportunity for professional reading, the chances of Branch staff's encountering professional (as opposed to client) criticism of current practice is greatly reduced, and their ability to reframe issues or to challenge current goals similarly constrained.

Professional reading is a key component of professional autonomy and privilege, and time for it is built into the job expectations of doctors, lawyers, researchers, the professoriate, and so on. Its absence in a workplace strongly suggests at least the beginnings of deskilling and ideological proletarianization. It is therefore revealing to find even senior managers in the Branch complaining that they have no time for reading:

> #35: And uh, I, I frequently take reading home because I find that there is no opportunity whatsoever to read anything at work, um, other than the memos that you have to deal with, but you know articles and materials, we get quite a bit of it here, and most of it I just send on without hardly looking at it, but uh, if there's something that I wanna read quietly and digest, again the only place to do it is over lunch hour here, or uh, close the doors or something, or take it home. . . . But by and large I would say that uh, for, you know, quiet reflection and sort of professional reading, for me, there is no opportunity at all. Just not at all. (1.454-461)
>
> #10: Oh, of course not. But I don't suppose anybody does. You know, I mean,

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[37] If for no other reason than that the stance of 'maverick' is often a successful career strategy for young academics in a profession's university-based knowledge elite.

> look at the stack. There's a stack of professional reading that I've been meaning to attend to for several months. I don't have time to get to it. Here's the stack of stuff has to be written in the next week or so, that should have been written two days ago. Uh, and here's a stack of phoning and uh. There's never enough time, but I rather suspect, that uh, *sigh* when the time gets bigger, work · ·
>
> I: work expands—
>
> #10: Expands to fill it. You know, eh, it's hard to know where [?saw-off?] is. I would like more time to do more professional reading. I'd like a day a week. I'd like a day a month, that I could say, absolutely nothing can happen except I will be able to read on this day, and uh, one could say, well you're in the position to do that. The fact of the matter is if you look at my calendar, it's almost solidly booked every day from now until, almost Christmas. With something that somebody else needs. Either attendance at a meeting, uh, some time with staff, preparation for this · · (1.769-788)

The same problem is echoed by the TDSs:

> #15: No. No, no. And I know that's considered uh, I mean sometimes it appals me, I'll stop and think how important a part of my job that is. Um, and I have · · I suppose that's my problem, but I, I mean we should be doing at least a half a day a week. If not a full day a week. And I, know there are some, so, I guess it's something um, I'm going to have to budget more rigorously for. I don't know whether, I mean, I've said this many times. . . . (1.335-342)

Even the 'elite' researchers in the Branch, the AROs, have no time for reading:

> #13: Uh, not much, because, as I said earlier, we've been so hectic we have a hard time just keeping up with our daily work. You know, so you have no time to [I: think about it] no time to do professional reading, unless it's really necessary, I would like to check if a formula we're using is correct, pull out a textbook, you know. (1.928-933)

And of course, this also applies to the Examiners and other staff. One Examiner even singled this out as the Branch's greatest weakness:

> #07: It would be nice if they encouraged uh at least a half hour, hour every day, to just read. I think there's a problem in trying to keep current sometimes. . . . I think that's probably the biggest. If, if I had to pick a weakness in the Department, that would be it. (1.1780-1788)

The same applies to other professional development activities, such as attendance at conferences and courses:

> #35: I've had to cancel them, cancel them all, because of, of work here I haven't been able to get to away to any of them. (1.474-475)

Travel to out-of-province conferences is in any case restricted to management ranks,[38] and attendance at in-province conferences restricted to those TDSs representing the Branch in an official capacit[illegible]s, presenting papers or workshops). Examiners and other staff are excluded from attendance at even conferences held locally.[39]

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[38] I am aware of a few exceptions where AROs were allowed to *accompany* managers to national conferences or meetings, a consequence of the AROs' monopoly of exceptionally specialized knowledge. More generally, it was a source of minor, but regular, annoyance to the professional staff that senior managers were able to fly to exotic locales, ostensibly to attend conferences on esoteric psychometric topics, for

This lack of opportunity for professional development, then, discourages the staff from rising above their day-to-day preoccupation with technicality. Without sufficient reading time, they are effectively isolated from those creating the new knowledge in their field essential to the maintenance of their knowledge monopoly and the knowledge gap between themselves and classroom teachers, or between themselves and their managers. Furthermore, the heavy demands the Branch places on its knowledge workers discourages the kinds of professional reflection and interaction which would allow them greater initiative in policy formulation.

> #16: Uh, we don't have time to do, to be as, as involved professionally as, as we, many of us would like to be. We don't have time to do continuous research, in the way many of us would like to do. Uh, because there are so many demands day to day, just in maintaining our programs, and keeping up with our deadlines, uh, you know, most of our energy, if not all of it, goes into that, and, and the extras, the things that could make it a nicer place to, to work, are not there. We don't socialize as a staff very much. That would help, I think. If we could find — it's just that you're so drained, Robert, by the end of the day, that all you want to do is, is take it easy. (1.1901-1911)

The Oral Tradition

If Derber is correct that ideological proletarianization is an alternative management strategy to Taylorization for the control of knowledge workers, rather than just an early stage of a generalized deskilling, then professional bureaucracies will likely differ from other hierarchical organizations by placing much less emphasis on following written procedure. This is partly definitional, since if the procedures can be spelled out in written form, they can be routinized and the profession deskilled, but it also reflects the habitual delegation of a great many decisions to the professional's technical discretion. Given the indeterminate nature of the professional's work process, and the need for flexibility, it is often most efficient simply to allow the professional to respond to emergent conditions as they arise rather than to

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[38](cont'd) which the TDSs felt themselves to be the better-qualified candidates.

[39] They are of course free to take time off without pay, pay their own conference fees, and attend on their own.

attempt to anticipate every situation in a pre-established procedure. Furthermore, given the internalized self-discipline and motivation of knowledge workers, there is little need to specify procedures as a means of controlling recalcitrant workers. Having drafted the broad policies that represent the ideological framework within which the professional is to work, intermediate-level policy can often be left to the professional's unspecified judgement. In other words, written policy need only be invoked where the professional staff are moving in an unwanted direction, or when there is a change in the bureaucracy's ideological framework.

It is therefore revealing that there was a growing fascination with written goal and mission statements within the Department during the course of this study. Various Senior Officials and Branch Directors (including the Director of the Evaluation Branch) became interested, for example, in the *In Search of Excellence* materials, which emphasize the need for everyone in an organization to be pursuing [illegible] goals. That the Department purchased and used the associated workshop kits not only partly explains the sudden burst of goal-setting activities, but suggests a continuing effort to push the government's conservative ideological framework another rung or two down the education hierarchy. The Evaluation Branch, for example, ran a number of motivational workshops for managers and a full-day Branch planning session for all staff built around the *In Search of Excellence* materials, and another Branch planning day built around the newly written *Core Values* and *Branch Goals* documents. These activities can be interpreted as an attempt to have staff, and particularly senior management, 'buy into' the goals set by the Senior Officials, and therefore to further erode the remaining traces of progressivist influence. How successful this penetration of conservative ideology into the professional ranks was is unclear, but this remains a striking example of the mechanisms of ideological co-optation.

In any event, while various written directives and mission statements attempt to define the ideological context within which the Department must operate, there are relatively few written policies or procedures at the Branch level. When asked, for example, who decided Branch policy, one respondent answered appropriately enough, "Sometimes nobody.

Hehehch".[40] Many of the Branch procedures and intermediate-level policies have evolved on an ad hoc basis:

> #10: Well, policy and procedures around here, uh, to some extent have developed by osmosis. I mean, there's been a history around here of having to get things done, and then worrying about the policy and procedures afterwards, because the timelines simply haven't allowed us to establish policy first, and then, and procedures, and then do whatever it is. (1.689-694)

This ad hoc creation of policy often leads to organizational norms with no clear origin or reference. This has several interesting implications.

First, this leaves large grey areas where the line between technical discretion and established procedure may blur. The staff work under these shared understandings as if there were a policy somewhere, but may ultimately be able to exercise their own judgement because, if challenged, they could always demand to be shown "where does it says that?" In theory, this not only allows the professional staff a broader mandate in interpreting and implementing policy, but may also give them a greater role in the *de facto* formation of policy than is otherwise recognized.

In practice, however, the same holds true for the managers, whose own *de facto* input is likely to be as great or greater than that of the TDSs. The norms under which the Branch operates are therefore as likely to reflect the staff's internalization of management's previous directions as they are to represent habituation to the professional staff's previously developed work strategies. Furthermore, the professional staff never challenge management or defend their own actions by adopting the legalistic stance that there is no official written policy on the matter. The norms associated with 'professional' workers militate against such references to external authority, and the TDSs simply defer to management wishes and direction. For example, although the TDSs are members of the union of provincial employees,[41] no one has ever grieved a management decision.[42] Thus, while the absence of formal written policy signifies the delegation of greater responsibility to the professional's technical discretion, it does not significantly increase the professional's ability for independent action. At most, it permits the professional greater access to policy formation, in that unwritten policy is likely to be negotiable with one's immediate supervisor(s). In other words, the knowledge worker still has to defer to the unit manager, but the unit as a whole may be able to pursue more independent action.

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[40] #43:1.550.

[41] Except those TDSs on secondments, who remain employees of their local boards, and therefore members of the provincial teachers' association.

[42] The only official grievance taken to the union by the TDSs in the ten years of the Branch's existence concerned an interpretation of the contract clause on overtime payments in relation to flex time, a highly specific contract matter set and settled

Second, this unwritten policy is necessarily handed on orally. This suggests that seniority of tenure might in some instances outweigh seniority of rank, since the newcomer has to rely on the old-timer's interpretation of Branch traditions. In practice, however, this tends to disadvantage the TDS and Examiner ranks in policy formation, since many of them are on short-term secondments, contracts, or project positions, while managers all hold permanent positions. It is therefore the managers' idiosyncratic preferences which tend to be elevated to traditional (though unofficial) practice.

> #26: I know there are certain statements but it seems to me that there are lot of policies that have never been written down, and I have, I have worked under a variety of different people, I've been working under this what I thought was Branch policy and found out really it wasn't the Branch policy it was just something [former Coordinator] believed and he pushed. So he was the Coordinator, so all the [subject] people did. And now [Associate Director] doesn't really, isn't really that concerned about it, so now we don't have to do. And so now this policy is changed, and it's this policy. [I: Heheh.] And seems to me that there are just dozens of these things, that I call policy. I, I'm working under a certain policy that sort of evolved to mean this, but all of sudden, somebody else's interpretation is different, they change it, they do something different that I thought was totally wrong, that couldn't be done. Nothing happens so I start doing it, and it's fine. It, it evolved in that way. Now I know there are certain policies that are established by the Minister, that are interpreted by, by the uh ADMs and those policies we work under, but the interpretations of those is, is to be, in this Branch is very big. (1.860-879)

Third, because many policies are unwritten, they are sometimes more difficult to change. Note that in the previous quotation, for example, the TDS continued to work under an unwritten policy established by a manager long after that manager had moved on. There is therefore a certain functional fixedness inherent in unwritten policy, as the professional staff are often inhibited from policy innovation by following 'old messages'. On several occasions I have observed management's frustration with the professional staff's apparent inability to

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[42](cont'd) by union and Department officials from outside the Branch.

suggest alternatives, where neither group realized that the sought-after innovation was being discarded from consideration on the basis of unstated and outdated assumptions.[43] Ironically, the chief benefit of regular infusions of new TDS recruits is not so much their recent classroom experience as their lack of experience with the Branch, which allows them to be innovative.[44]

A fourth and related problem is that management often fails to fully communicate policy changes to the professional staff. As suggested earlier, the formal channels of communication and the circulation of management minutes may not even be adequate to keep staff involved with official policy formation, let alone the subtle changes in direction which occur in unstated assumptions. Staff therefore often find themselves working on 'old messages'.

> #25: I wouldn't mind seeing more constant communication of decisions that are being considered and made. I think that would be a good idea. . . . You don't need to be always consulted, but simply to be informed. I think communication is always, can never be, have a negative effect, in a body like this. [I: Umhum] Because sometimes you know, decisions may be made, and perhaps ***because the decision has been made, you think you have communicated the decision, and so carry on as if everybody knew***. You know, this must happen in every situation where there are human beings. And it's awkward sometimes. I mean, it's understandable. (1.1531-1541, emphasis added.)

Thus, the 'shared understandings' under which management is operating can occasionally be completely at odds with those guiding the professional staff.

One recurring theme in my observations was the way information moved up and down the hierarchy shorn of its affective content. I was constantly impressed, for example, by the Director's personal sense of vision and his ability to inspire that same vision in others, but this required direct personal contact. Typically, I would observe the Director introducing a new or subtle change in direction at a Management Council meeting, and this would be dutifully passed on by the Associates and Coordinators to the staff at subsequent unit meetings. But whereas the Director's original comments would include a whole persuasive subtext, the message that eventually filtered down through channels to the TDSs was often a much more autocratic-sounding "The Director says we have to do this now".[45] Besides encouraging a certain resentment at such apparently arbitrary decisions, the staff were cut off from the subtle but ultimately more important vision that had given rise to this decision. In other words, memos and directives communicated changes in formal policy without always indicating the associated changes to unwritten policy. For professional staff to recognize and alter unstated assumptions, they need to have direct personal contact with the manager involved, but they are isolated by formal channels and protocol.

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[43] This problem is further aggravated by the lack of opportunities for professional reading and the almost complete lack of socialization between units, so that the professional staff are seldom exposed to alternative approaches even from within the same Branch. It was only when, for example, the Branch reorganization brought TDSs from several different subjects together in the new Achievement unit, that they were able to discover that many of the norms under which they had been operating were peculiar to their old units and no longer applied.

[44] Unfortunately, this advantage is offset by the constant need to reinvent the wheel, as seconded staff often have to return to their classrooms just as they are beginning to master the TDS position.

By the same token, complaints and problems were much more likely to be communicated up through channels than positive messages, often giving the Director and senior managers the unjustified impression that staff were rigid, resistant, and overwhelmingly negative concerning various management initiatives. Where there was real resistance, it often resulted from a manager's attempting to apply the unwritten policy from one unit to another with a contradictory set of assumptions and procedures. Since formal channels were often inadequate at identifying and communicating the nature of these unstated assumptions, these tensions were often unresolved until the emergence of a formal written policy which usually struck one group or the other as arbitrary and inappropriate.

Nevertheless, reliance on such formal channels has increased in recent years[46] and

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[45] Or as one Examiner phrased it, "The Gods say". (#07:1.1732)

[46] With the second Director more than the founder:

> #39: "Would you document this report and uh generate five more reports to show why this came to be", and get everything on paper. (1.1135-1138)

And the third Director more than the second:

> #03: Oh, it has changed a lot. You know, the style of management for one. Before it was quite general and simple and, like personal, you know. The director would come around and talk to you personally, spend a couple of minutes to talk to you and ask what you are, uh what, "How are you?" or something. But in the meantime he has spotted what, what you, you know, what you are doing. Uh, and uh, the way we do things, the rules and procedures were less; less rules, less procedures, less uh, what, hierarchy, you know. But after the reorganization, after, the under the new, new director, I

there has been a general trend towards a greater emphasis on formal, written policy:

> #10: Now, as time goes on and as we have more and more things in place, we're, we're more and more in a position where we can rationalize practice by developing policy and procedures that put current practice into some kind of rationalized framework. Then when we start, if we're going to start anything new, from a policy position rather than from a, a kind of ad hoc "let's get it done" position. And there's something to be said for both approaches. (1.694-701)

Here we see the erosion of the professional staff's technical discretion, and the routinization of "current practice into some kind of rationalized framework", in other words, further deskilling. Since, as has been indicated, the senior managers have greater access to the formulation of written policy than do the TDSs, this shift from ad hoc to formal written policy would seem to further isolate the TDSs from goal setting. It may also indicate the further tightening of centralized bureaucratic control; that is, the penetration of government and Senior Official influence beyond the Branch level to the unit level. As one TDS put it:

> #33: Uh, I think that uh, getting more, more top-down leadership over the last year or so, compared with uh what was there before. That there's an idea to mould the Branch according to a particular view, rather than to coordinate, to coordinate differing views of how things should be done. And uh · · therefore the · · many ways that you'd be getting, it's becoming more a uh corporate arm of government as opposed to uh an independent bureau, it would, happened to be paid by government. That uh, in the first year, year and a half I was here, I got the feeling that Branch could be, could have been attached to, attached to the [university], attached to either the [teachers' association] or [school trustees' association] or a major board, as well as to the government. Now I get, now the feeling that we are more an arm of the government than we were say two years ago. (1.653-665)

Thus, there has been a steady erosion of technical discretion and unit independence as written policy is increasingly invoked to bring the professional staff under direct control.

**(cont'd) feel it's more a structure, it's more structured. . . . uh there are lot of these memos around and that indicates that there are many levels of hierarchy. . . from one to the other, which we never had that before, you know. If we would do something, finish something, when you finished your work you just submitted this to that. But now we have to [?complete?] a lot of forms. (1.774-793)

SUMMARY

Branch policy, then, is often dictated by the Minister and Senior Officials or negotiated with the Branch through the person of the Director. The Director also provides some leadership in initiating Branch policy, though this is constrained by an awareness of, and deference to, the agenda of the Assistant Deputy Minister or those yet higher in the bureaucracy. Policies initiated by the other senior managers within the Branch tend to be more specifically oriented to their own areas of responsibility and so often fall into the realm of 'means' rather than 'goals'.

Below this level, the workers' isolation from Management Council essentially precludes any participation in goal setting. The TDSs, for example, do have some formal opportunities for input, but their effective participation in policy formation is often prevented by such unrecognized barriers as high staff turnover and a reliance on an oral direction. The professional staff's heavy workloads often prevent them from taking an active role in current policy debates, because they have little opportunity either to reflect on these issues or to seek alternatives through professional reading. The Examiners lack even the TDSs' level of input, but tend not to notice since most define their role as one exclusively concerned with technical matters.

CHAPTER 6

THE USE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES

INTRODUCTION

If the fundamental goals of the Ministry are established by the Premier and Cabinet, the structure of programs determined by the top levels of the bureaucracy with the approval of Cabinet, and Branch policy shaped by the Director with senior Branch management in response to the demands of the Senior Officials, then can there be said to be any real input from the TDS/ARO level at all?

In theory, of course, the TDS is responsible for the design of particular examinations, but this may be better characterized as control over 'means' rather than 'goals'. The TDSs have therefore undergone 'ideological', but not necessarily 'technical', proletarianization.[1]

Nevertheless, this may still represent a considerably higher degree of control over the work process than that in many occupations where employees are given very specific directions not only on the 'what', but also the 'when' and 'how' of their jobs. The non-classroom educator's monopoly of technical expertise may still be sufficient to ensure superior working conditions and a significant say in how programs are implemented. Furthermore, the creation of the TDS position, even if it is limited to control over means, may still represent the centralization of design functions and the deskilling of classroom teachers. It is therefore necessary to investigate the degree of control the TDS has over the actual implementation of Branch policies. In other words, who sets the character of the examinations?

The formal structure of the Branch hierarchy has already been introduced in the previous section: The Branch is headed by a Director, who reports to an Assistant Deputy Minister and gives direction to, and accepts input from, a Management Council consisting of senior managers; the senior managers direct junior managers, AROs, and TDSs, and collect input from them; the TDSs direct the work of the Examiners; and professional staff at all levels direct the activities of the support staff. While this predominantly top-down hierarchical structure is sufficient to describe the decision-making process for Branch policy (that is, the setting of Branch goals), a number of *additional* steps are introduced in the approval process for Branch product (that is, the implementation of those goals).

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[1] See Chapter 1, page 34.

A unique and perhaps surprising feature of this particular provincial bureaucracy is the extensive use of advisory committees. These committees are always drawn from outside the Branch, usually represent 'stakeholder groups' from outside the Department, and are charged with reviewing essentially everything that the Branch produces. There are several different types of committee.

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES

InterBranch Committee

After an examination has been drafted by the TDS and the Examiner, proofed by their unit colleagues and approved by both the Coordinator[2] and the Associate Director, it goes before the InterBranch Committee. "The InterBranch Committees review and suggest revisions to the preliminary drafts of Achievement Tests and Diploma Examinations prior to their presentation to Test or Examination Review Committees for final approval."[3] There is a separate InterBranch for each subject area. The InterBranch is chaired by the Associate Director for that subject, and consists of the TDS, the five Regional Off[illegible] ult[illegible]s from that subject area, the appropriate subject specialist from the Curriculum Branch, a[illegible] representative from the Correspondence School Branch.[4] Depending on the time period, subject area, and reputation of the individual involved, the appropriate Examiner is usually, but not inevitably, included.

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[2] The Coordinator position was officially eliminated from the two Diploma Units during the Branch reorganization in 1988, but was retained in the Achievement, Diagnostic, and Analytic Units. Several TDSs commented that the elimination of the Coordinator position also meant the elimination of peer review within units as there was no one to initiate or chair such meetings.

[3] Memo 88.02.02 from the Director to the Assistant Deputy Minister re "Branch Committees".

[4] The Correspondence School Branch representative is a recent addition to the

The purpose of the InterBranch is threefold:

First, it acts as a preliminary screen to catch any errors or problems in the examination itself. It is quite common for outsiders to be able to identify, for example, unintended but legitimate interpretations of examination instructions or questions, ambiguous phrasings, awkward constructions, and the other potential flaws which are by definition invisible to a document's authors.

Second, the InterBranch Committee provides an essential avenue of communication between the Student Evaluation Branch and the other Branches of the Ministry. The Regional Office subject Consultants, for example, are expected to speak knowledgeably about Department policy and to represent the Department in their district. Consequently, they need to be kept appraised of any changes to assessment formats.[5] At the same time, they collect feedback from the field for the testing Branch by keeping track of the sorts of queries they encounter, and track changes in actual classroom practice they observe during school visitations.

Third, as the primary avenue of inter-Branch communication at the Associate Director level and below, the InterBranch is the major site of conflict resolution over the details of policy implementation. InterBranch members are expected to air any reservations they may have in this 'in-house' forum, and then to accept whatever consensus is formed, as part of a united Ministerial front with which to face various stakeholder groups and the general public.[6] Consequently, the InterBranch can be the site of sustained conflict between Branches and may play a significant role in shaping policy details.

The InterBranch has no formal authority and is strictly limited to an advisory role. While it would be politic lly unsound to routinely override the unanimous motions of an

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[4](cont'd) InterBranch Committee. One Associate Director has advocated further expanding the InterBranch Committee to include representation from both Language Services and Native Education, but nothing has come of this so far (#11:1.280-312).

[5] #02:1.184-198; #38:1.979-982.

[6] See below, page 224-225.

InterBranch, the responsibility for particular examinations lies with the Associate Director for that subject. This reflects the Deputy Minister's view that individuals rather than anonymous groups should be held accountable for decisions.[7]

Examination Review Committee (ERC)

After a Diploma Examination has been revised on the basis of the feedback from the InterBranch Committee, it goes before the Examination Review Committee. "The purpose of these committees is to review and approve the final drafts of the Diploma Examinations, and when appropriate, to review the design, blueprint, administration, scoring and reporting for the examination."[8] In other words, the ERCs have a sweeping mandate to review all aspects of the examination's implementation.

The ERC is also chaired by the Associate Director, and consists of a representative from the provincial association of school superintendents, one from the province's universities, another from the colleges and technical institutes, an Associate Director from the Curriculum Branch, one Regional Office Consultant, and two representatives from the provincial teachers' association, plus the appropriate TDS and Examiner(s). There is also some effort to ensure that the committee members represent a cross section of regions, a balance of male and female, and so on, though this is not always possible given that members are selected by their sponsoring bodies rather than by the Branch.

The ERC's functions are entirely parallel to those of the InterBranch, but here an attempt is made to involve various "stakeholder" groups from outside the Ministry as well. The superintendent represents the interests and perspectives of local school boards; the universities, colleges, and technical schools have a clear stake in the quality of school-leaving examinations which also serve as their entrance criteria; and the teachers' association has an obvious need to ensure that the examinations serve the interests of its members. The presence of the representatives from the Curriculum and Regional Office Branches not only ensures a voice for these key Branches, but also provides some continuity from the InterBranch meetings.

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[7] See above, #38, page 152.

[8] Memo 88.02.02, "Branch Committees".

Of immediate interest here is the double representation of the provincial teachers' association. This double vote was both an explicit acknowledgement of the importance of teacher input and cooperation in provincial testing programs, and a demonstration of good faith on the part of the Ministry.[9]

As with the InterBranch, the ERC provides an external screen to review the examination's clarity of language, curricular fit, balance, standards, and so on;[10] a vehicle for communication with key publics; and — the Branch hopes — a sense of participation and ownership on the part of the sponsoring bodies and their members. And again, the committee's role is advisory: they can only make recommendations to the Director.

Test Review Committee (TRC)

The TRCs are identical to the ERCs, except that they deal with the Achievement Tests.[11] Since the TRCs deal with examinations at the grades 3, 6, and 9 levels, there is usually an attempt to ensure that one of the provincial teachers' association's representatives is from junior high or upper elementary and the other is from lower elementary.

Interestingly enough, the Branch insisted on university representation on the TRCs even though the universities have no direct stake in their outcome and therefore little interest in participating. To quote from a 1986 internal Branch memo:

> The Universities Coordinating Council has indicated . . . that they are not interested in representation on the Achievement Testing Review Committee. They are primarily interested in reviewing the Diploma Examinations. Therefore . . . [representatives] will have to be nominated by the department chairman concerned.[12]

This insistence on the participation of university subject experts on the TRCs over the indifference of their representative body suggests one of three things: (1) that the presence of university personnel is still valued at these grade levels for their editorial contribution as part of an external review process, even though they no longer serve any 'political' function; (2) that it is hoped that the university community will still accept partial ownership for, and lend its prestige to, the Achievement Tests through even this 'unofficial' contact; or (3) that the presence of these knowledge experts is necessary to provide a check on the knowledge monopoly of the TDS. I will return to this issue at the conclusion of this chapter.

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[9] #11: Uh, we have [teachers' association] represented, and their representation is two people so that they have a, [?get/yet?] a stronger voice. Now the [teachers' association] representation tends to be teachers, again, so they, again, they wear a dual hat uh as such.(1.319-322)

The gesture is offset somewhat by the double vote accorded postsecondary institutions, but in that case, it was necessary to accommodate the two distinct coordinating bodies involved.

[10] #37:1.197-235.

[11] Memo 88.02.02, "Branch Committees".

[12] Memo 86.01.06 from Associate Director to Director.

Validation Committees

Following approval by the TDS's peers, manager(s), the InterBranch, and the ERC/TRC, the examination is often given a final check by a Validation Committee. Such committees consist of one or more classroom teachers who simply come in and write the test. They act both as a final external screen to catch last-minute glitches, and to represent as closely as possible the viewpoint of their students who are about to write the examination. Again, their role is advisory, but here, they report to the TDS, not to management.[13]

Steering Committees

Steering Committees are often established to oversee those Branch projects where there is no existing InterBranch/ERC/TRC structure. The Steering Committee operating during the course of my observations, for example, was responsible for the development of diagnostic testing materials. The committee included a superintendent, a Regional Office Consultant, a principal, and several classroom teachers. Each committee member came from a different region and chaired the development team in their area. These development teams were then staffed entirely by classroom teachers. Steering Committee members were nominated by their respective school jurisdictions, rather than recruited by Branch staff.[14]

Here again we see a pattern of regional and stakeholder representation, and the attempt to provide every Branch product with an effective external screen, a direct line of communication with classroom practitioners, and a sense of participation and ownership throughout the education community.

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[13] #11:1.267-280.

[14] #27:1.189-194; 211-239; 243-297; 412-427.

Other Committees

Practically every aspect of the Branch has some external committee associated with it. For example, the unit responsible for the logistics of examination administration consults with the Principals' Advisory Committee, a representative group of principals balanced for region, school size, urban/rural districts, and Protestant/Catholic schools. The Branch manager responsible for the intake and issuance of student mark data chairs the Computerized Boards Committee. In almost every case where the Branch interacts with educators external to the Branch, an advisory committee is struck.

In addition to these formal standing committees, there are a number of important ad hoc committees struck to address particular issues or problems. Again, these are always structured to reflect all of the affected stakeholders in the education community. Typical is the Ad Hoc Student Evaluation Technical Advisory Committee struck to resolve a number of psychometric issues during the early stages of the new examination program: "The purpose of the Committee will be to review the technical aspects of the Student Evaluation Program and to make such recommendations as it deems appropriate to the Director of Student Evaluation of [Ministry]."[15] While the committee was to consist of "people who are knowledgeable and interested in psychometrics", it included an Associate Director (Chair) and two AROs from the Branch, one representative from each of the universities, one representative from each of the two largest school jurisdictions, a representative of the provincial association of school trustees, and a representative of the provincial teachers' association.[16]

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[15] Minutes of the Technical Advisory Committee, 83.02.01.

[16] Minutes of the Technical Advisory Committee, 83.02.01; and its Preliminary Report, 83.05.15.

Committees and the Corporate Culture

While the focus of this study is on the Evaluation Branch, it is important to note that this type of committee structure is absolutely typical of this Ministry as a whole. The Minutes of the Social Studies Council Meeting of June 26, 1985, for example, describe the "Typical curriculum committee composition" as having "Two or three [provincial teachers' association] representatives; a CASS representative; and a university coordinating committee representative". Efforts are always made to include "a balance of school jurisdictions (urban, rural, Protestant, Catholic) and grades taught (primary, elementary [upper], junior high, senior high)".[17] Advisory committees are deeply ingrained in the corporate culture of this Ministry, and budgets for any major initiative always seem to include provision for them.

Similarly, the committee structure used in the Branch, or at least the general principle of striking advisory committees consisting of representatives of external stakeholder groups, clearly predates the formation of the Branch itself. To quote one senior manager when asked to describe the origins of these stakeholder committees in the Branch:

> #38: Um. The uh, oh, I have to think back now. There was a structure way back, and I think perhaps that the structure was borrowed from the MACOSA days. Uh where they set up committees to judge the quality of the instrument and then the responses, but I think that from the very beginning this Branch adopted that model and uh and so in a general way, and so I would point towards [name] as being a key individual in that, because [name] was directly attached to MACOSA, and of course [founding Director] and [name] who were the original individuals involved here.
>
> I: But that structure was there when you came on?
>
> #38: Uh, the uh, not exactly the way that we now have it, but the concept was there . . . what I think we did afterwards was to refine and define those committees just a bit. Uh, for example, uh we worked on, on identifying who exactly may sit on those committees, uh. The InterBranch Committee was something that I think, I may be wrong, but I think that about when I arrived was something that we started I think. Because of the problem of, with communicating with Regional Office people. Uh they were having to respond to questions about the exams and uh so we brought them into the process. I think that I was part of that decision. But the ERCs and TRCs, that general concept was I think present before. But we did work on defining who may sit on it, for how long, we set up terms and that kind of thing. (1.958-984)

Note here that the external ERC/TRCs were set up first, automatically, and the department's internal InterBranch Committee only later in response to a specific felt need. This suggests that the decision to strike stakeholder committees cannot be explained away as a sort of generalized bureaucratic impulse or as the result of 'empire building', but reflects a deliberate and specific policy of involving stakeholder groups. This has obvious implications for the theoretical debate between Larson and Freidson.

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[17] Minutes of the Social Studies Council Meeting of June 26, 1985, p. 4.

Conspicuous by its absence is any representation from the business community on any of the Branch committees. Given the obvious claim employers have to an interest in the quality of the system's graduates, and the previously mentioned penetration of political appointments to key departmental committees like the CPB, it is highly revealing that ERC membership is restricted to educators. The ERC's lack of 'public' representation may suggest either that it is not considered sufficiently senior to warrant direct ideological control, or that it is entirely the creation of the education elite. While I have argued that the education elite in the case study province has been successfully co-opted from its progressivist roots, this committee structure clearly emerges out of that progressivist tradition. Such committees are highly unusual in other education ministries across Canada or elsewhere, and the composition of these committees strongly hints at a form of professional dominance. The question then becomes, is this merely an administrative holdover, a structural continuation of a tradition now stripped of its ideological context, or does it represent a continuing progressivist influence at the middle ranks of the education hierarchy? As with the consultative process within the Branch, I will argue that the desire for input is genuine and significant, but must not be confused with collegial control.

THE ACTUAL FUNCTIONING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Having briefly outlined the formal structure of these advisory committees, it remains necessary to analyze how closely their stated functions correspond to social reality before exploring further the theoretical implications of their existence. This presents us with two basic questions: How do they actually function, and how much influence do they exert over the shape of the products they review?

The Editorial Function

By far the greatest portion of any InterBranch or ERC/TRC meeting is spent reviewing the actual tests that are about to be administered.[18]

This editorial function includes a review of the phrasing of test items, curricular fit, psychometric validity, and so on. Certain reservations may be raised, however, concerning the suitability of these committees to perform this function.

First, since appointments to the review committees are made on the basis of position or by external agencies, the actual personnel are not always the content specialists one might expect to find. Regional Office Consultants, for example, have fairly broad portfolios, and a 'Science' Consultant might be expected to sit on the physics and biology InterBranches although his/her expertise is in chemistry; or a Social Studies Consultant might be expected to sit on both the senior high ERC and the elementary TRC, although his/her own teaching experience has been limited to the former and s/he may have little understanding of the needs of grade 3 students. Unable to comment on the real substance of the examination under review, but still expected to contribute to the discussion, some committee members may content themselves with "getting picky with the English".[19]

Second, many InterBranch and ERC/TRC committee members are years removed from the classroom, and while their presence on the committee may be important in terms of communicating with other publics or setting examination policy, their intervention at this very specific level of editorial review may be less appropriate than the input from the two classroom teachers or the Validation Committees. To quote one Examiner:

> #28: Well - -I really, I could never see the role of the InterBranch. I can see a role of the teacher Validation Committee. They are directly involved in the teaching of, I think they can offer a lot of help, because it is, you know, they're, you might say at the grass roots of the thing. . . . You tell me what a university professor, I'm not suggesting he doesn't know what he's talking about, but how close is he to a high school situation? [I: Umhum.] You know? So if he wants things changed so as to be

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[18] Of the six InterBranches and nine ERC/TRCs directly observed in this study, only one ERC devoted a significant proportion of its energies (two hours out of a six-andahalfhour meeting) to a discussion of general policy. The rest seldom addressed any issues not directly related to the specific examination in front of them, and in no case spent more than an hour on other matters.

[19] #26:1.339-346; 265-274.

read on the university level, I don't think it's fair. (1.649-696)[20]

Third, since the examinations are considered 'secure materials' and may not leave the Branch prior to their administration, committee members have no opportunity to read over any of these materials before the meeting. Thus, they have at most only a single day in which to identify problem areas, debate issues, make suggestions, and arrive at a solution. This necessarily implies that at least some of their changes may be rushed and ill-considered. Hastily suggested solutions to one problem may introduce others which only become apparent much later as the TDS attempts to operationalize the amendments in subsequent drafts. While the Associate Director is always free to overrule any change that, upon reflection, appears to have overlooked some important factor, the biannual meeting format makes it difficult to maintain an ongoing dialogue concerning particular phrasings. Consequently, the committees are better at identifying problem areas than at suggesting fully thought-out solutions.

The problem then becomes one of staff morale. If committees are encouraged to find fault without being held accountable for proposed solutions, then there is the danger of developing a cavalier attitude towards the product of the TDS's labour. Certainly the TDSs and Examiners can find it demoralizing to have a question they spent days perfecting completely rewritten or discarded after only a moment's discussion, but when this is coupled with a lack of clear direction for the question's revision, it can be devastating. In one early incident,[21] for example, a 'perfectly good item' was discarded because a Regional Consultant said he had only "a lukewarm feeling about it". This phrase so exemplified the arbitrary power of the committee to overrule the TDS without having to provide any rationale that it became the subject of much bitter humour for years afterwards within that particular unit. On the other hand, given the time restraints under which these committees must function, it is equally unreasonable to expect them to be able to provide completely thought-out criticisms. Furthermore, if the committees are forced to spend time trying to articulate specific problems and phrasings, they are to that extent further distracted from their communicative and policy-making functions.

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[20] Or similarly,

> #26: Sometimes the, the uh, the people from the universities and colleges interpret the content differently and feel that, that there is a problem with content from the point of view of how they do it at university, when it isn't a problem at the high school level. And sometimes they get really fairly adamant about that, and I have, rather than change it, because I know it would confuse kids, I've replaced questions, when I really think the question would have been okay as it is. (1.459-466)

[21] This incident occurred to a colleague during my tenure with the Branch, circa 1983, and is, hopefully, no longer typical.

Finally, this editorial review takes place late in the examination-development process. This means that, on the one hand, even minor changes in wording are likely to invalidate the test item's carefully field-tested response profile; while on the other hand, if the committee resist the temptation to tamper with previously field-tested items, they are reduced to a mere rubber stamp. Too active a committee can undermine a three-year test-development process that involved the input of dozens of classroom teachers in item writing and field testing; the work of Examiners, TDSs, editors, and managers in the Branch; and even earlier advisory committees. To return to the speaker just cited:

> #28: Well · · I really, I could never see the role of the InterBranch. . . . The ERC of course a necessary thing I guess, because they are the one — but what gets me, the ER— the InterBranch would make a suggestion for us to change, we change, the ERC would tell us to change it back. [I: Change it back.] Now you tell me, what was the purpose of that in the first place? (1.649-658)

On the other hand, I have seen external committee members so intimidated by a question's statistical performance on a field test, or by assurances that the issue has been discussed at a previous stage in the process and that this was the best practical solution, that they backed down from challenging the question's curricular fit or face validity.

Consequently, although the editorial function is the one that consumes the majority of the InterBranch's and ERC/TRC's time and energy, it may not be their most effective or important role. At least one senior manager I interviewed hoped to begin downplaying the editorial function in favour of refocusing the InterBranch on its 'in-service' function, and the ERC on its role in policy making (#11:1.357-383; 583 [illegible]).

The editorial function is best served by the Validation Committees, whose only function is editorial review.

> #02: We've got another committee which is made up in the area of [subject] which is just four teachers which are basically selected by myself. Uh, we ask the board to release them, but the names are basically identified uh by myself, to go over the examinations uh to estimate difficulty levels, like, is this exam hard, easy, where are there going to be trouble spots, checking on language and the like. And that one's fairly nitty-gritty. (1.198-205)

Because the Validation Committees consist of practising classroom teachers from the relevant subject area, they do not share the problems of the InterBranch or ERC/TRC. Recruited by the TDS, they are by definition people whose opinions the TDS values and respects. Consequently, when called, the Validation Committees operate pretty much as described.

There is, however, some confusion surrounding the "Validation" label. Since the committee is called by, and reports to, the TDS, it is largely up to the TDS whether to include this step. Some TDSs occasionally have other, more pressing tasks for which they recruit one or more classroom teachers and call that a "Validation Committee" since the title pre-exists as a budget category. Similarly, the term "Validation Committee" has sometimes been attached to ad hoc committees called by senior management to resolve particular testing issues.

> #43: No, and in many cases I have, I have simply not had a Validation Committee. So for me it's an ad hoc committee, it's a one-time-only affair, it's a group of people that I have selected to be on them. Uh, that's another word that has been bandied around. I mean, I can remember having [#38] strike a Validation Committee for grade 6 that had 10 people from across the province, all consultants, on it, with [#38] chairing it. As opposed to a validation in which is bring two teachers in after school to read through the test. (1.378-386)

In these cases, the "Validation" Committee may be serving communication or policy functions.

The Communication Function

As suggested earlier, the InterBranch Committee was originally struck to improve communication with other Branches within the Department, and especially the Regional Office Consultants; while the ERC/TRCs were designed, in the phrase of one TDS, "as bridges into the educational community" (#18:1.1653). Unfortunately, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the process is not working entirely as advertised.

The most obvious problem is that the committees have become distracted by attending too closely to the review of specific examinations. To quote one senior manager's discussion of the InterBranch:

> #11: . . . it's an unseen responsibility. . . . that is, you come to a meeting of the InterBranch, and because it's set by us, you come to the meeting cold. I mean, there's no thought about what [-?-?-] going to discussed [-?-] today's exam. You get there, you look at the exam, you go home. End of argument. Three weeks later, you get a call in from a teacher, says, "What's going on with such and such?" "I don't know, phone them." And when the call is sort of put back to, "Well, you guys will have to answer this." "Well you never tell us anything." So there's a lack of understanding of that, what they've learned at that meeting needs to be incorporated into their mindset, so it can be used. Now, that's maybe one of the reasons we need to change that structure so that the InterBranch is more of a discussion of direction, an overall view, etc., with a buying-in, more of an in-service to that group, on what we're doing, as opposed to the details of the exam. (#11:1.366-382)

On the other hand, it could be argued that even when the committees are limited to the discussion of the particular test before them, the members' comments will inevitably reflect the perspectives of their respective stakeholder groups. There are, however, three problems with this assumption.

First, there are high levels of absenteeism on some committees:

> #26: I guess we've had a pretty poor committees in [subject]. We've had, my ERC committees . . . last, for the August Exam, one person showed up . . . one teacher showed up. The others didn't notify us, didn't come, so there's been one ERC since then. Three people didn't show up: my superintendent, my college rep, and my university rep. And so in my particular case, yeah, I've found they haven't been that effective. (1.253-261)

Similarly, only the two teacher representatives turned up at one of the TRCs I observed (88.04.14). Naturally, the Branch tries to rectify this situation, but it is always at the mercy of the sponsoring organization:

> #26: . . . the representative from [province] colleges, I have never met him, and I've been here three years.
>
> I: Heheh. He's never shown up in three years he's been—!
>
> #26: We asked for a replacement, and uh they replaced him with himself. We got the list back from the College Board, saying these are the people, and his name was on it again. So [Associate Director] phoned him and talked to him, and uh, yeah, he'd be here. Well, we had a meeting again three weeks ago. Guess who didn't arrive? (1.280-291)

It is interesting, however, that when the university representative to the ERC kept forgetting and missing meetings, the TDS arranged to have another professor come in and informally review the examination. This suggests that the editorial function is seen as sufficiently important that it is invoked even when the communicative and policy-making functions are not being served.[22]

Attendance was also a problem in other subject areas at the InterBranch level:

> #10: [Subject] InterBranch sometime last year for various reasons, only two of the Consultants showed up for a three-day meeting and each of they, when we ended up having a two-and-a-half-day meeting, but each of those days we only had one person there for the whole day and two people for a little bit of time, and it was never the same two. Well under those circumstances, clearly we're going to take that advice with a certain grain of salt. (1.498-506)

Attendance problems may be attributed to two related factors: declining interest in the committees and the press of other priorities. Where the original committee meetings had featured heated debates over the details of the implementation of the examination design, many of these decisions had now been set by precedent, and the committees' function consequently reduced to the much less exciting role of editorial review. As the committees' work lost some of the urgency associated with the operationalization of a major initiative and became merely a routine procedure in the maintenance phase of an established program,[23] it is not surprising that the attention of some of the external representatives would turn to other priorities; only the teacher representatives retained an immediate stake in the examination and therefore had an essentially perfect attendance record.[24] Furthermore, as the fiscal crisis pressed the entire educational community, external stakeholder representatives often found both their own workloads and the number of crises with which they had to deal within their own organizations increasing. Thus, even where their commitment remained strong, committee members might not be able to attend as easily as they once did.

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[22] Or, alternatively, an example of pointless bureaucratic functional fixedness.

[23] #43, Field notes 88.04.14, p. 4. While two of the senior managers disputed that there were now fewer policy issues to be decided, and cited counter examples of recent issues , this was certainly the case with the specific meetings where attendance was a problem. The TRC on 88.04.14, for example, for which only the two teacher representatives showed up, consisted entirely of editorial review.

[24] #26:1.324-333. Or, to put this another way, the shift in emphasis from the policy and communication functions to the editorial function increased the relevance of the teacher representatives' knowledge base, since they are the ones with the recent classroom experience to judge such things as whether reading levels and vocabulary are appropriate. The representatives of the other stakeholder groups lack this recent classroom experience and therefore cannot contribute as effectively to the editorial function. As their effective contribution was steadily eroded by the growing preoccupation with the editorial function, their motivation to attend in the face of other priorities is therefore likely to decline.

> I: Is attendance at InterBranch falling?
>
> #10: Uh, it, yeah, it has been, from time to time. And that's really because of the nature of the Regional Office job. Uh, they will very often have school evaluations preempt all other previous booked — they, they're very cooperative in trying to advance for a year in advance, but, uh, life being what it is, they are often preempted.
>
> . . . I really have to hand it to them because it's a pretty tedious process to come in three times a year and go through an exam, question by question. And they have been really marvellously cooperative. I'd think they might, they'd have every reason to say, "Humph, I don't want to do this anymore, it's boring." They've been very good. (1.517-535)

While outside the period of formal observation, my impression is that attendance subsequently improved as the examinations responded to major changes in the curriculum at the senior high level and to a complete redesign of the Achievement Tests at the elementary and junior high levels.

Second, even when ERC/TRC members do show up, there is no reason to assume that they are either working on instructions from, or reporting back to, their sponsoring organizations:

> #10: Well, technically as representatives of their various organizations, either of [superintendents' association] or the [provincial teachers' association], uh, or the [universities coordinating body], technically one would presume they have some official responsibility to report back to their originating body, about what in fact they're doing. Practically of course, we know that simply doesn't happen. It's the nature of that kind of committee structure. Now, there's been some discussion, as a matter of fact, discussion with the university, of perhaps formalizing a reporting-back procedure, so that when the university sends a representative to sit on one of our committees, that person has some responsibility to let the governing body [of] that university know that this has been his or her input and this is the state of things. That kind of system would alleviate the problem of people at the university saying, "We never have any input", when in fact the university has quite a bit of input, it's just not generally known in the university community because after all there's only one person representing all of the universities in the province siting on one exam review committee. Or conversely, on a curriculum development committee. *So, I mean, there's this principle I'm parading that people are representing their organizations, but the truth of the matter is, that they don't.* They don't go to their organizations and say, what do you care about, with respect to the [subject] examination? They get appointed as individuals because they may have some background in [subject], and they might make an informal report that says they attended three meetings. But their reports back, from what I can figure out from what little information I have, tend to be, "I went to the meeting". And the request we get from their, their appointing organizations are often, "Did so-and-so come to the meetings?" So, I mean, *I think we would be uh fools to say that our teacher representatives represent a studied [teachers' association] position. They don't.* They

> tend to represent uh a view that's perhaps somewhat wider than their own personal view, if they have integrity, and they do seem to make an effort to have an idea of what other teachers in that subject area think and to care about. So I think as a matter of fact we get a fairly broadly representative view from some of our teacher reps, as well as a kind of personal position. (1.241-278, emphasis added.)

Clearly, then, the communication function is served only indirectly here, as the Branch is relying entirely on the personal initiative of the committee members to informally poll their professional peers. This casual approach to official representation strongly suggests that the committees serve a 'public relations' function rather than serving as a conduit for the efficient exchange of information. Note, for example, how this senior manager denies the reality of the communication function even as he raises it:

> #38: It's communication too. Communication goes both ways, but what, I think what's happened uh and we have to realize this, is that we cannot assume that uh, that the individuals who sit on those committees report to anybody else. They simply don't, you know. But it is useful for us, I think, to, when you want to demonstrate about our open exam system, to say that these are discussed with representatives from various stakeholder groups. And so it demonstrates uh, in a very definite way, a very real way, uh that we value advice of others, uh that our exams are open to scrutiny, it's not a closed shop. So.
>
> I: So it's serving a political function there as well?
>
> #38: Oh, I would think so, sure. Sure.

It could be argued, then, that the 'real' function of the committee is to deflect criticism through controlled participation. By appointing representatives to the committee, the various stakeholder groups essentially constrain others of their membership from challenging the examinations:

> #11: 'Cause we get, and the universities are probably the biggest offender here, I think, probably [?hard to say?], in that you'll get a guy who sits [in] his the office right next door phoning up and saying, "What are you guys doing? Why do we never see this, get any information about this?" I say, "Well, so-and-so is on the committee, you know". "Well, yeah, but he doesn't speak for us." Yes he does. Yes he most definitely does. Which is one of the reasons why that committee structure cannot be appointed by us, it must come through the [universities coordinating body], the officials there . . . I think that needs to be cleaned up. . . . Colleges, I have the same kind of concern. (1.394-406)

I will return to this theme in the section on the legitimation function, but it should be noted here that the tenor of these senior managers' comments suggests that they genuinely regret that the committee members are not making greater efforts to report to their sponsoring bodies, and there is even some indication in #10's comment that the Branch is exerting pressure on the appointing agencies to improve the situation. Nevertheless, to this point at least, the ERC/TRC structure has not been an effective mechanism for the exchange of information with other organizations. When the teachers' or superintendents' association wants to make a point, it approaches senior management directly, rather than working through its ERC/TRC representatives (#10: 1.287-288). The committees' role in communication has essentially been restricted to an accidental sample consisting of one person per organization.[25]

Third, the appointees on the ERC/TRC committees may be neither typical nor appropriate spokespersons for the stakeholders they supposedly represent, because there is very little screening of representatives by the sponsoring organizations.

> #10: . . . even the appointment procedure is a bit shaky from their end. They don't actually have a screening mechanism at their end. People's names come and get put on file, and that's kind of it. They might ask people on their information sheet to give them some information about what courses they've taken and what they're teaching and how many [teachers' association] committees they've served on, but, they don't seem to have uh a means of going then to other people who are leaders in that particular field to say, "So-and-so's name has come in as possible representative on the TRC or ERC, is that a reasonable person to have there?" We have turned around and said to them, "You've given us these three names, our experience with [a] large number of teachers would indicate that two of those names are inappropriate. Would you go back to your people and find out if you have the right people?" In other words, we've done the screening for them because we seem to have closer contact with the field. (1.293-313)

Note here both (a) the direct intervention by the Branch in the selection process and (b) the claim to closer contact with the field. If the Branch is already better informed and better able to select committee members than the sponsoring agency, why bother involving these other organizations in the first place? The answer, obviously, is that the official sponsorship serves a legitimating function, and that the ERC/TRC's role in legitimating the examination program is more important than its communication function.

On the other hand, it is important to stress that the Branch's intervention in the selection process is to *increase* the diversity of views with which their product will be confronted, rather than to stack the deck with 'yes men':

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[25] This is less true of the Principals' Advisory Committee, which consists of a cross section of 20 principals and which therefore much more closely approximates a representative sample.

> I: But it does sound like you're appointing their representatives to your committees.
>
> #10: Well, we are. The fact of the matter is that what happens is that they will submit nominees to us, and from those nominees we will do some selecting. Now there are some reasons for that. They can't know, uh, when we're replacing somebody on a committee if we need somebody from an urban district, a rural district, a large school, a small school, a male, a female, etc. And in all of our subjects there are certainly very different points of view if you go from north to south in the province. And on an ERC with the teacher representatives particularly, I've tried to be pretty sensitive to make sure those points of view have some representation. I don't want, for instance, two very strongly academic urban teachers both of whom teach in an upper socioeconomic school, large high school, sitting on my [subject] Exam Review Committees, because then the [program] side isn't going to get any kind of input, the rural side of things isn't going to get any input. I don't want each of those people to be either men or women, I want one of each preferably, because sexual bias is a really important issue in the [subject] tests, all of the [subject] tests. So if we have a committee that's largely male or largely female, just inadvertently, the tone of an exam cannot be attended to. [Subject] is a real problem that way. The [teachers' association] may give me three names, all of whom are male, when I really need a female representative. I mean, I'm in that position right now with [subject] Exam Review. And it's not their fault, they can't know what my needs are. Where I think they may want to have a bit more, or pay a bit more attention, is to make sure that they are nominating people who are perceived in that community to be uh representative of that community. Now, I can't complain about the people that we have. We have very good people. But I do know that we know more about those people than the [teachers' association] knows about them.
>
> I: So your criterion in selecting people then is to get as many diverse points of view as possible on that committee, even if some of them might be a bit opposed to what you're doing.
>
> #10: Definitely, definitely. Uh, I don't want a rubber-stamp situation. I mean, it seems to me that's the quickest way for us to get into trouble. On the other hand, I don't want a situation that's unnecessarily confrontational. Uh, so I think it's important for our staff to know what's possible. I think it's important for them to know what's the stakes are, where changes can be made. It's really important for them to listen to what the issues are, and you know, to work from that. (1.324-367)

Again, we see here an attempt to make the communication function viable by increasing the representativeness of the committee members. The various advisory committees in the Branch cannot, therefore, be cynically dismissed simply as a 'public relations' ploy. At the same time, however, it must be conceded that the committee structure as it currently exists is probably not as effective at collecting and disseminating information to target publics as other available channels. Branch staff get a far clearer picture of the reaction of classroom teachers, for example, from their personal interaction with a cross section of up to 200 teachers per subject area at a marking session than they are likely to receive from the two teacher representatives on the ERC/TRCs.

The communication function is most effective at the InterBranch level, since the committee members are themselves the target audience, but even here, the key communication often takes place outside the context of the official agenda. For example, one Social Studies InterBranch I observed[26] devoted its time to a meticulous editorial review of the current examination form with no hint of any discussion of issues beyond the level of "Does a country always take the feminine pronoun?" — until the coffee break. As the committee broke for coffee, the Director joined them with the comment, "I thought I heard laughter". One of the Regional Office Consultants immediately began sounding out the Director's opinion of the teaching-learning model adopted by a particular urban high school. The Director agreed with the Consultant's reservations and there followed a brief consensus-building discussion of the model's flaws. The Director then initiated a discussion of why a particular urban school board had been experiencing a steady decline in its Achievement Test scores. There followed a consensus-building discussion of the flaws of that board's policies of decentralization and 'outcomes'-oriented planning. (Total elapsed time, six minutes.) Finally, the Director took 15 minutes to discuss his proposed changes to the Achievement Testing Program, a very major initiative, and concluded by saying, "If you have any questions or comments let me know soon because the more I talk about this, the further down the road to implementation we are". The Director then left the meeting, as the committee *went back to work* reviewing the examination.

Several points become clear from this example. First, the networking function occurred entirely outside the formal structure of the meeting — indeed, it was interpreted at some level as an *interruption* of its legitimate functioning. Consequently, the communication function was largely invisible: it required no official motions, left no official records, and was largely unrelated to the official purpose of the meeting. This informality may even be an essential element in consensusbuilding, a close parallel to the suspension of critical judgement in a brainstorming session. For example, had the Director's initiative been vehemently opposed at this stage, it could have been withdrawn or reworked prior to its official announcement with no loss of face. Failed initiatives at this stage simply never existed, whereas once they become an official agenda item, careers may be staked on their passage. Thus, the communication function of the official meeting (as distinct from its *policy* function) may be simply to provide a forum from which members may adjourn for lunch or coffee. In other words, a semi-annual luncheon would serve the same purpose equally well.[27]

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[26] Social Studies InterBranch, 88.03.11.

Second, the communication was extremely fast, lasting only 21 minutes, and yet solidified a united interpretation of two major issues current in the education community and apprised the regional office consultants of the Director's intention to launch a major new initiative.

Third, and the hardest to document meaningfully, I was particularly struck by the affective aspect of the communication. When the Director outlined his proposed initiative, for example, he was able to communicate his personal 'vision' of these proposals over and above the factual details. As mentioned previously, a major recurring theme of the observational research was how the hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy strips vertically moving information of its accompanying 'vision'. No matter how rich the informational content of directives, instructions, policies, or guidelines, the underlying vision is invariably lost *unless* there is direct personal contact with either the initiative's originator or a close disciple. Based on my observation of directives moving down through the committee structure, it became clear to me that without this accompanying 'vision', the ranks responsible for implementing these decisions usually perceived them either as speedups or as arbitrary interference in their work, and consequently something to be resisted. In contrast, wherever the Director made personal contact with his professional staff concerning these initiatives, they were usually perceived as 'inspiring', 'exciting', or at the very least 'necessary'. Personal contact emerged, therefore, as a vital component of leadership because it inspired compliance in a way that was impossible for written or secondhand communication. Thus, even the brief personal contact at the InterBranch was crucial for establishing solidarity between the Branch Director and the Regional Office Consultants over and above even the agreement on specific issues or proposals. By 'touching base' in this fashion, they reaffirmed that they were all working from the same belief system, that they were all 'on the same wavelength'. This may have an important function in maintaining and strengthening the corporate vision of the Ministry, but at the very least, is an important element in establishing and extending the Director's personal power and influence. Because the Director is particularly skilled in articulating his 'vision' and inspiring others, it was my impression that such encounters usually ended with the Regional Office Consultants moving closer to his position.

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[27] This is not to suggest that the communication function never takes place within the formal context of the meeting. Later in the same meeting, I observed a discussion clarifying for the Regional Office Consultants the philosophy behind the selection of teachers recruited to serve as markers, followed by a review of the results of a teacher survey, and so on.

What we can conclude, then, is that the editorial function (for which the InterBranch may not be particularly well suited) 'fronts' for the communication function. It would be difficult to convince the bureaucracy's accountants to fly the Regional Consultants to the capital twice a year for an informal 30-minute luncheon, but this brief personal contact is absolutely vital to the Ministry's smooth functioning. Consequently, the InterBranch justifies its existence by attending to the secondary, but still useful, task of editorial review.

This type of networking function, however, applies only to the InterBranch, where the target audience is the committee members themselves. Whatever benefits were derived from the brief, informal, direct, and affective communication illustrated in the above coffee break example are lost when filtered through secondhand communication or the formal written reports made by a representative to another organization. For the ERC, TRC, Steering, and various other advisory committees, the efficacy of the communication function must be questioned.

The Policy Function

By soliciting input from these advisory committees, the Branch hopes to anticipate and accommodate the views of the various stakeholder groups and so provide a product that is perceived as useful, appropriate, and fair by all concerned. This is clearly the *raison d'être* for the ERC, TRC, and Steering Committees, and a significant function of even the

InterBranch Committees. Here again, however, the same problems are evident.

First, as the various assessment programs have entered their maintenance phase and there are fewer fundamental issues to be resolved, the InterBranch and ERC/TRC Committees may have become preoccupied with their editorial function. As Branch policy has become increasingly formalized, the limits within which the committees have been able to operate have steadily narrowed under the weight of precedent.

> #43: I also see that it used to take us till 5 o'clock to arrive at the end of the day, where now at 2 o'clock we can be through. And that implies to me a number of things. Number one, there just aren't as many issues to discuss because a lot of decisions are in stone right now, [I: Umhum.] it doesn't take as long, but I think also, I don't know, maybe they've lost interest because things, like there's no point in making a recommendation when they know they aren't going to be listened to anymore, because they can't be. I mean because it's set in stone. You know, somebody will say something, we'll say, "Well yes, we'll keep that for the future but we can't change it now". (1.247-258)

Similarly, the slow pace at which the bureaucracy adopted their earlier suggestions may have discouraged some committee members from asserting their policy function. To quote one senior manager concerned with revitalizing the ERC's role in policy formation:

> #11: They need to be familiar with Branch policy as to what's allowable, what's isn't allowable, sort of how far can you push what, but they also have to feel, and this is, if there's any breakdown in that committee structure in the last few years, is they must feel they serve a purpose besides simply looking at the test. I think they carry much more of a validity of, "This is okay", but they also carry a torch for the direction it must go [I: Umhum.] and what must be done, and uh I can think of some area where they've, for sometime, said, "Well, this needs to be attended to in the following way". Nothing's been done, nothing's been done. And after a year or two, they say, "What the hell, you don't listen to us". So they have to see, I think, a usefulness to what they're doing. Perhaps that we can work on. That's one of the roles I hope to work on in fact in committee. (1.593-606)

Second, the preoccupation with the editorial function and a growing sense of powerlessness in the face of precedence may have contributed to the problems of absenteeism,[28] which in turn could erode the continuity, credibility, and effectiveness of the committees' input.

Third, the failure of the committee members to report to, or seek direction from, their sponsoring organizations again raises the issue of whether the views expressed in these committees are truly representative of the various stakeholder groups. (See #10's comments above, pages 207-208, and again on page 209.) Certainly none of the organizations has ever used their representation on an ERC, TRC, or Steering Committee as a channel through which to present a formal position on examination policy, preferring instead to approach the Minister directly, or to work through senior Branch management. Far from establishing mechanisms to ensure that their members' opinions are effectively polled and presented, there is little evidence that the organizations involved have even informed their membership of the existence of the advisory committees or their representation on them.[29] Consequently, committee members cannot be said to be representing a mandated or studied position.

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[28] E.g., #43: I'm sure with the InterBranch, there's not a whole lot of excitement on the part of most of those people to be there anymore. (1.360-362)

Nor can it be assumed that their own views will necessarily reflect those of the larger stakeholder group. Since selection procedures in several of these organizations consist merely of forwarding the first name received,[30] there appears to be no mechanism to ensure that those appointed represent a typical[31] or balanced[32] sample. Given the variety of competing interests even within a particular stakeholder group, there may be good reason to question whether the committee members represent any views other than their own.

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[29] To return to the quote on pages 207-208:
I: Has there ever been an occasion that . . . [organization] has passed a motion . . . and their representatives have taken that forward to ERC or TRC? . . .
#10: No. As a matter of fact the ERC/TRC hasn't been used as a vehicle in that way. Uh, [organization] will do things and uh, will contact me directly.
I: So . . . they don't think of that as that kind of mechanism?
#10: My guess is that *they don't even know that they exist*. (1.280-294, emphasis added.)

[30] For example, I observed one senior manager complaining to a college representative on an ERC (whose term had just ended) that the provincial association of public colleges was not even a 'real' organization. The colleges' representative agreed that the college association was merely a central mail drop where the Branch's request for the appointment of his successor would simply be photocopied and circulated to member colleges, where the letter would likely languish in the in-baskets of their respective presidents. Potentially interested parties would have little opportunity even to learn of the opening on the ERC, and the first college to respond would likely have its nominee accepted. (Field notes 88.03.03, p. 8)

[31] Indeed, such a "first come, first served" procedure may instead bias selection in favour of atypical appointments, since those with a particular axe to grind may be more motivated to volunteer.

[32] One TDS complained, for example, that both of the teachers on her ERC were using the same text, and had therefore failed to recognize the validity of examination materials drawn from the other approved text for that course, even though it was more widely used. It had therefore been a constant struggle to prevent them from slanting the examination, and therefore provincial policy, to favour their own text (#26:1.499-508).

Fourth, the lack of screening of nominees by their sponsoring agencies may mean that those appointed have neither the background nor the commitment required to make a positive contribution to policy formation. To quote one Examiner:

> #20: Partly it's public relations on the part of the Branch, and partly I think, it does serve a purpose. To what degree that purpose is served, I think, depends on the individuals involved. More so than the Branch or the actual meeting. You can have good committees and bad committees; people who care about what goes into the exam and people who are there for a free day, to come up to [the capital]. (1.209-215)

Of course, the same could be said about any committee structure, but the problem may be especially acute here, not only because the selection of specific individuals is left largely to the 'luck of the draw', but also because appointments to the advisory committees are by definition based on institutional affiliation rather than psychometric or subject area expertise. While such political appointments are clearly required to fulfil the advisory committees' communication function, the lack of screening for relevant areas of expertise may undermine the committees' ability to contribute constructively to the editorial and policy functions, at least where these revolve around technical issues.

Fifth, the advisory committees' role in initiating policy is constrained by the imbalance between the time and resources available to committee members and that available to Branch staff in the preparation of proposals. Generally speaking, committee members come to the meetings cold, while Branch staff have had six months or more in which to prepare elaborate documentation with which to support their initiatives (or to refute earlier suggestions from the committee). It is rare, for example, for agenda-related materials to be sent to committee members prior to the meeting, even where these are not 'secured' by reason of being directly related to a specific upcoming examination. Committees are often asked to respond immediately to policy questions placed before them, with no opportunity for extended reflection. For example, during one ERC I observed, the TDS devoted the first two hours to a discussion of several proposed changes to existing policy. In each case, the TDS identified the issue, illustrated with examples, suggested a solution, and then distributed the results of a survey of classroom teachers supporting his conclusion. Faced with this onslaught of logically constructed argument and supporting documentation, the committee agreed to all the proposals, even though this was their first exposure to any of these issues.[33]

Similarly, in none of the meetings I observed did a committee member initiate a policy change, though I am aware of a few other occasions when this did occur. In general, however, the committees do not so much create policy or guide its development as merely provide a sounding board for Branch initiatives.

> #27: I think it's because they don't have the time to think it through like I do. They're all very busy people, don't you know. We're picking people out of a full-time job, heavily committed, and they come to these meetings and they're just there at the meeting. That's about it. They're not, they, they're, they don't have the, the time maybe to think about all these things, [that] is required. Because it is a massive undertaking, so they're sort of leaving it up, I think, tell us, [the Branch] to make the major decisions, and then they just sort of look at it. But most of them are made by us, and is just okayed by them.
>
> I: So it's more of a sounding board.
>
> #27: That's right. Yeah.
>
> I: They react to what you bring in.
>
> #27: They react. Exactly.
>
> I: So if you did something totally outrageous, they'd probably say, "Well, just a minute"—
>
> #27: That's right.
>
> I: —but as long as it sounds okay.
>
> #27: That's right. That's how it's working. (1.358-384)

Even restricted to a largely reactive role, however, the advisory committees may still serve a useful policy function. By bringing individuals from the major stakeholder groups together, the advisory committees may still ensure that Branch policy anticipates and accommodates their views.[34] (How much influence these committees actually have over policy is, however, a separate matter, to which I will return in a moment.)

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[33] Field notes, 88.03.03.

[34] How well the committee performs this function depends in part on how truly representative the members are of their respective publics, which, as I have already suggested, there may be good reason to doubt. On the other hand, I have also noted previously that the Branch occasionally tampers with the selection process to ensure balanced representation and to increase the diversity of viewpoints with which Branch proposals are to be confronted.

The Legitimation Function

I have already alluded to this topic in the discussion of the communication function, but it is sufficiently important to warrant closer attention here.

The advisory committees legitimate Branch policy by demonstrating the Branch's willingness to listen to and accommodate outside input.

> #38: But it is useful for us, I think, to, when you want to demonstrate about our open exam system, to say that these are discussed with representatives from various stakeholder groups. And so it demonstrates uh, in a very definite way, a very real way, uh that we value advice of other, uh that our exams are open to scrutiny, it's not a closed shop. (1.1005-1014)

Note that what is important here, however, is the *claim* to stakeholder representation rather than its actuality. In reality, all three of the senior managers quoted earlier (pages 207-209) conceded that the so-called representatives on the advisory committees were not in fact acting on instructions from, or reporting back to, their sponsoring organizations; consequently, there is no firm basis on which to claim stakeholder approval. This need not detract from the claim's effectiveness, however, provided that this failing does not become too transparent to the relevant publics. The legitimation function is served simply by the committees' formal existence.

Thus, none of the problems identified with the three previous functions apply here, because it does not matter whether committee members accurately represent the views of their stakeholder groups, whether they know anything about the subject matter or assessment techniques, or even whether anyone actually shows up for the meetings; it is enough to be able to say that these external publics had the *opportunity* for that input.

Once having formally availed themselves of that opportunity (however ineffectually), the stakeholder groups necessarily add their own seal of approval to the committees' decisions. Thus, it is not only the claim to openness, but also the claim to shared responsibility that provides Branch policy with legitimation. Both the individual committee members, and the stakeholder groups they supposedly represent, are placed in the position of having to defend Branch product.

> #21: They should be able to defend uh the product because they participated in it and hope that they can also defend me, so uh in that sense they have a very

> important role to buffer uh the Test Development Specialist and serve as a both as a support and a screening= = =/Tape Side One Ends (1.667-678)
>
> #23: It's a safety thing for us too. That it isn't just our opinion, it's, it's the committee's uh considered opinion, that it should be this way. So it's really a safeguard too. (1.1145-1147)

Since a seat on a Branch advisory committee forces one to take some responsibility for the Branch product that passes through it, the advisory committee structure can also represent a strategy of co-optation. Stakeholder groups which might otherwise resist particular projects may be brought on-side by being given representation on the appropriate advisory committee.

> #22: I think some of it is political too. You know, we, we get certain people on because it's politically good for us. We want to sell something, well, we'll get people from various things to sit on, we all know that . . . sometimes it's [?you need is?] representative from the [teachers' association] to keep lid on there. I suppose it all makes sense. I don't have any problem with that. You have to do that, it's PR [.?.] but it's not really a dirty word [?it seems to become?]. (1.963-981)

Similarly, particularly vocal individuals may be sought out and appointed to a committee where their criticism may be contained.

> #04: But very little gets settled around the, around the table. We usually talk about issues that · · well actually, when I think about my TRC, [name] dominates them, and he's one of those superintendents from the south who disagrees with, heheh, with everything, so uh · · that part of it isn't constructive, except that it's, it's nice to · · I mean, if, if, if people like [name] were working out there, uh, in isolation, I think there would be an adversarial · · role, but because we have thought it was, it's good PR, to bring him into the committee.
>
> I: So the committee is a mechanism to co-opt this guy?
>
> #04: Yes, and I know that we're co-opting this person for the uh, what is it? The Design Committee, or the. One of the committees for the Enhancements. I know we're doing that too. Getting another person—
>
> I: Because he's a particular troublemaker—
>
> #04: Yes!
>
> I: —you're going to put him on the—
>
> #04: Yes, yes. That's #43's idea. Heheh. (1.1911-1931)

By absorbing external critics into the structure of the advisory committees, management both reinforces the claim to 'openness' (which is itself legitimating),[35] and limits criticism to a forum it can control. The central paradox of the advisory committee structure is that by providing this channel for external input into Branch policy, Branch management is better able to limit and control public participation.

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[35] For many critics, the mere opportunity for a thorough hearing is sufficient: " . . . they gain a sense that they have made valid contribution, uh, that their ideas and concerns are heeded, paid attention to . . . " (#10:423-425); "They're reasonable people. Uh, they've come up with an idea, they don't expect that their idea must be there" (11:642-643). For others, the challenge posed by amending those aspects of Branch policy to which they object forces them to concede that some of their criticism may have been unfounded, impractical, or based on a

First, the committee structure limits public input by defining which publics are to have that input. For example, the absence of business or labour representatives on the ERC committees effectively disenfranchises whole segments of the community, even though employers and apprenticeship programs may have as great a stake in the calibre of high school graduates as do universities and colleges. Even if the committee system worked as advertised, the 'external' input would be limited to a closed group of educators.[36] Similarly, representatives from the Correspondence School were added to the InterBranch Committee only recently, and Language Services, Native Studies, and other Branches still lack representation, though a case could be made for their participation.

Second, individuals within acknowledged stakeholder groups are effectively prevented from challenging Branch policy by being restricted to the 'proper channels' of their supposed representation on the committee, even though this representation is clearly ineffectual. Often the individual may not even recognize his/her membership in the relevant organization. Few professors, for example, are more than vaguely aware of the existence of the universities' provincial coordinating body, let alone that it appoints representatives to Branch committees, and that this is the mechanism through which they are supposed to have input into Branch policy. (See again speaker #11 on page 208, and speaker #10, page 215.) Few critics have the patience or resources to discover and take advantage of this indirect and limited opportunity for input, but any attempt to criticize outside these channels may be dismissed as 'unofficial' and therefore inappropriate or irrelevant.

This tactic may even be used with other officials and spokespersons. To quote one senior manager:

> #11: . . . if I got a call from the [teachers association] office, from someone saying, "Hey", you know, "What are you guys doing with such and such, we don't know

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[35](cont'd) limited perspective.

[36] This, I hasten to add, is as it should be. These observations are not necessarily intended as criticisms.

> what you're doing", then I can say, "You have representation there. Have you sought their advice yet?" You know, they should be going through that channel. If they have major concerns with what we are doing, they should go through that channel first. . . . (1.422-428)

Yet the speaker here himself acknowledged that ". . . many of the [teachers' association] people I had [on my advisory committees] weren't always been aware — even after they were sort of told that — they weren't always aware that they were representing the [teachers' association]"[37] Clearly the representation cannot be considered meaningful or effective if the committee members themselves are unaware of their status as delegates.

Third, the committee structure defines and limits the nature of the debate. The larger sociological implications of provincial evaluation, for example, are never discussed. By accepting a position on an ERC or TRC, one has already essentially granted the inevitability of provincial testing, and the discussion becomes focused on implementation rather than goal setting. The advisory committees thus function as a mechanism of ideological desensitization.

Furthermore, even within the narrow range of topics deemed to be appropriate to an advisory committee, the debate tends to be focused on the agenda set by the Branch staff. As suggested earlier in the discussion of the policy function, the advisory committees tend to be reactive rather than proactive. Input is thus limited to those issues and questions introduced by the Branch. The agenda may even be deliberately manipulated to some degree as the TDSs attempt to get their exams past the ERC/TRC.

> #15: So, I mean this is the way I run InterBranch and, and ERC meetings too. You propose something, you, you, you sort of play your audience, and uh, if you want to save something from the axe, you uh propose something else that uh, you might even suggest, that uh, you'd like a few suggestions about this, like a little input, so your other project is safe. That's always, heheh. (1.756-773)

In this light, the preoccupation of the InterBranch and ERC/TRC Committees with the editorial function becomes slightly sinister. Whether deliberate or not, the more discussion becomes focused on issues of technicality, the greater the degree of ideological proletarianization evident in the committee. In other words, critics who concerned themselves primarily with the wording of test items have been effectively silenced on more substantial issues.

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[37]. #11:1.484-487.

Fourth, the committee structure imposes closure on debate. Once a committee has adopted a policy, it is expected that every member of that committee will support that decision, regardless of his or her personal convictions. This is especially true for the InterBranch members:

> #11: [With the InterBranch] sometimes meetings get that hostile, that's fine, that's the place for it. What I really resent if and when it happened, is that we would be at a meeting that is not [?internal?] and that must never show. If we go to an ERC meeting, for example, then I want the [Regional Office] Consultant that's there to understand that he does not represent his views, he does not represent anything other than the government view, that we have previously agreed upon. Now sometimes, with the little things, that's fine. But don't bring up glitches in "why the hell are you doing that?" when that should be discussed at another, another [?stage?]. (1.521-531)

Even for those committee members representing agencies external to the Department, it is expected that having fought and lost a battle in committee, the losers will abide by the decision of the majority. This is basic to the successful operation of any committee, but it implies that the criticisms from any particular stakeholder group may be contained by a 'divide and conquer' strategy which pits it against the majority. Having accepted a seat on the committee, the entire stakeholder group necessarily surrenders its right to further resistance, even on those issues on which it remains fundamentally opposed.[38]

Finally, the committee structure limits debate to the invisible forum of closed meetings. In the absence of formal reporting procedures, the entire debate is removed from public view. External criticism is curtailed as individual stakeholders are forced to assume that their representatives have already raised their concerns and obtained the best accommodation possible. Furthermore, as outspoken critics and opinion leaders are drawn into the committee structure, their ability to continue to criticize Branch policies in more public forums (such as the stakeholder's newsletter) is constrained by the practical limits on their time and energy, if not by committee etiquette or their own culpability in the committee's decisions.[39]

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[38] This becomes particularly problematic in the absence of specifically mandated instructions from the sponsoring organization, which might otherwise have allowed the outvoted committee representative to maintain and continually re-raise a minority position.

[39] On the other hand, the Branch needs to attract these opinion leaders to its

The advisory committee structure, then, legitimates Branch decisions through controlled participation. Given the many problems with, and constraints on, the previous three functions, it is tempting to argue that this may be the 'real' or primary function of the committees. Certainly there are those within the Branch who would agree with that interpretation:

> #04: . . . I think we have the TRCs uh because of politics. I think that's the political wing of the, that's the forum where people like [name] can come and · · . . . Um · · I think that's a committee that we probably could do without, but we have that committee because of political reasons. Right? (1.1851-1858)

While Branch staff frequently commented on the 'political' function of the various committees — which suggests that many of these legitimating and controlling strategies are quite conscious — it is nevertheless important to avoid too cynical an interpretation of Branch motives. Staff at every level appeared sincere in seeking to improve the quality and range of the communication and policy functions, and many of the structural flaws in the advisory committees must be laid at the door of the participating stakeholder groups, rather than with the Branch itself. Though aware and appreciative of the legitimation function, few of the staff were prepared to accept that the advisory committees were *only* for show. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the legitimation function could be maintained without at least some accommodation of stakeholder demands, since, as this senior manager argues, a completely manipulative structure would eventually become transparent to the participants.

> #11: Uh, committee structure within government, maybe I'm on a limb saying it this way, but my own perception of what happens is, there are some people who would believe that we keep the committee structure around so that these people uh can feel they've got input when in fact they don't. "Let them do what they want, we make our own decisions." Well, as long as that's, why have one? I mean, they have to have a point. [I: Umhum, yeah, right.] They'll see through it within a short time. Like I said, three years later, they'll see through it. [I: Heheh.] Some of them are slow. Some of them will take five years, but some of them might see through it even sooner, heheh. Like, in one meeting! So you've got a bit of a problem if you continue that, you see. And I'm not sure that hasn't happened. (1.611-623)

This naturally leads to the question, how much input into Branch policy do the advisory committees actually have? To answer, it will be necessary to analyze the differences between types of committees, the nature of the interaction between the committees and Branch staff,

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[39] (cont'd) committees for the communication function to be effective.

and who gets the final word in case of a disagreement.

Differences Between Committees

Staff at all levels essentially agreed that the advisory committees exerted significant influence on the Branch, but there was some minor variation in responses depending on the type of committee under discussion.

ERCs and TRCs, for example, tended to be taken more seriously than the InterBranches:

> #24: When it comes to ERC, I believe they have a great deal of say in what happens to that exam. I have yet to hear anyone say, "Oh well", you know, "So what if that's what they want to do, we won't do it". InterBranch is a little different. You still have another committee who will say "yea" or "nay" about it, and uh, the ERC tends to take things more seriously in general, so no, they have, [.?.] a great deal to say. (1.905-911)

This may reflect, in part, the ERC/TRCs' greater formal authority, since these are the only committees which pass motions recommending approval of the examination to the appropriate Associate Director.[40] As will be recalled from the descriptions of their mandates (on pages 195 and 193 respectively), where the ERC/TRCs 'approve' examinations, InterBranches merely 'suggest' revisions. (The Validation Committees, because they report to the TDS rather than to the Associate Director, appear to have even less formal authority.)

In part, the higher prestige of the ERC/TRC committees may (as suggested by the speaker above) also reflect their intervention at a later stage of the approval process — though this would not explain the relatively low authority of the Validation Committees, which are the last to see the examination. Recommendations and decisions made at an InterBranch are frequently overturned by the subsequent ERC/TRC, whereas attempts by the Validation teachers to alter the exams will often be vetoed on the grounds that a particular phrasing has been dictated by the ERC/TRC.

The logic here is that the Branch accepts the InterBranch's advice to achieve a united departmental position with which to confront the external agencies, but that the Department as a whole is then prepared to modify its position in negotiations with the representatives on the ERC/TRC. The education community having thus achieved a consensus, further changes to the test at this stage would threaten to unravel that agreement. Consequently, the Validation Committee is restricted to only minor copy editing which will not significantly alter the substance of the examination.

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[40] In actual practice, the formalities of passing a motion are sometimes forgotten, it being assumed that having spent the previous six hours discussing the test item by item, the members approve of the finished product overall.

An even more important factor may be the difference in the types of feedback the different committees provide:

> #33: Uh, okay, the InterBranch, I think, most of them are fairly expert in psychometrics, so I look on those as checking technical psychometric competency of the exam itself. Floating ideas on blueprints and things like that through. Uh, I regard that as somewhat less important than the Exam Review Committee. The Exam Review Committee, uh, I've been lucky, I've had, I've had a good committee and what we do is sit down and go through it in [?detail?] like for instance, okay, that these standards, like the standards of . . . Dr. [name], [university], you know he could set down an inviolate standard there, and that is useful, because you know, similarly, the two teachers, knowing that, knowing that the exam is fair and open to uh that external scrutiny. . . . We use the word that we 'defend' the exam through the committee. It doesn't bother me if I have to make a few changes as a result . . . because, the thing is that you've got to make sure, it's to make sure that - - all the ideas are subject to public scrutiny.

Here we see that, on the one hand, the InterBranch is offering expertise which overlaps the TDS's own, namely psychometrics, while on the other, the ERC is providing external perspectives that are significantly different from anything available within the department itself. (Note also the emphasis on the ERC's legitimating function.) Several of the TDSs emphasized the importance of the ERC/TRCs' role as a thermometer of public response:

> #21: As I see it right now, they have a very important role in guiding the way the exam, the exam is administered and marked, even though they serve in the direct, as making recommendations, to ignore them, would be pretty costly to me. Because they pick up as superintendents and so on, they pick up the public responses. The student, teacher, parent response, the other administrative responses to my product . . . (1.667-673)

Similarly, note how the following TDS distinguishes between an openness to the ERC's input on the written response assignments (which are not field-tested, and therefore always an unknown quantity), and the potential for contesting the committee's input on the multiple-choice questions (in which the TDS feels more secure):

> #29: Now, the essay for example, they uh, often we have fairly major changes to the essay topic and, and quite often it's, they're right about it. They offer some very good suggestions because they're teachers. [I: Umhum.] And some of them are

> teachers. And uh, multiple-choice questions, we do have our stats, as you know, and I think they're careful, and if we explain that the question worked really well, and explain why we said it worked, [.?.?.] they usually understand. But I find them more helpful in the written, written portion. I find them very helpful. (1.264-273)

This selective weighting of committee input suggests that the committees are most influential in those areas where their members have a particular knowledge monopoly, either by virtue of greater expertise (such as a university professor's authoritative knowledge of the subject matter) or a particular perspective (such as a superintendent's knowledge of 'the big picture') that would otherwise be unavailable to the TDS.

This leaves the Validation Committees in an ambiguous position, because while the teachers' current classroom perspective is highly valued,[41] their expertise is subsumed by that of the TDSs, whose psychometric skills are based in part on their own considerable classroom experience. Thus, input from the Validation Committee tends to be accepted only within the limits of a narrowly defined editorial function — where their current classroom experience gives the teachers an edge on issues such as 'readability' — and any attempt to address basic design issues is rejected as too late in the process and outside their purview.

Outside the InterBranch–ERC/TRC–Validation stream, respondents most often stressed the other committees' usefulness as a sample of the project's intended audience, as in this comment on a Steering Committee involved in the development of in-service kits:

> Yeah, we do take every bit of advice from them and, and after, we do incorporate it, because they're the ones who['re] going to use it. (1.650-652)

Lacking the element of compulsion associated with the examination programs, these other projects actively solicit the advice of their Steering Committees to improve the marketability of their completed programs. Similarly, this comment on the Principals' Advisory Committee emphasizes the need to win over the principals' willing cooperation:

> A fair amount because, again, you know, the success of administering those exams depends entirely on the principals, so if they have uh certain things that they're advising or recommending, I mean, we really have to listen to it carefully, because as I say, we depend on their cooperation, so I'd say quite a bit, quite important. Uh yeah. (1.873-878)

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[41] For some staff, advice from the Validation Committee was *more* highly valued than from the InterBranch or even the ERC/TRC precisely for this reason. (See again #28, page 201.)

Both comments illustrate a willingness to listen to the committees' input, but in a way which emphasizes the committees' communication function over the policy function; that is, the Branch staff are turning to these committees for information, but not necessarily seeking their approval:

> Well, we're not asking them to rubber-stamp anything. We're simply using them to exchange ideas, to get suggestions concerning administration. To find out if, if they have, if, we want to know, for them to tell us if they feel there are things going wrong with the administration. . . . Um, it's suggestions we're looking for and uh, we don't necessarily rubber-stamp what they're saying, but we are interested in what they do have to say. And no, they uh, they do not have, uh, we don't have to accept things they say, but we certainly do listen to what they have to say. (1.280-292)

The tone seems to be one of a willingness to accommodate the committees' suggestions *as long as these are consistent with Branch priorities*:

> But we have to listen, and uh, and as long as they're not conflicting with our policy, we will certainly institute changes according to their, uh, suggestions. (1.258-262)

There is a slight but nevertheless discernible difference between these respondents and those discussing the ERC/TRCs, who invariably felt an even stronger compulsion to follow the committees' input. To quote a senior manager on the ERCs:

> I: So you're saying you feel it's incumbent upon you to use their advice—
>
> #11: Absolutely.
>
> I: —wherever possible.
>
> #11: Absolutely. More so than incumbent. I would think that uh one would have to show me fairly good logic for not using it. . . . Now obviously we made the decision, etc., etc., etc., but where did we get the ideas from? You know, why did we go that way? Well, we took [?their advice?]. So in that sense, it is very definitely there. So it isn't a matter of - - I can take it or leave it, I must take their input. (1.678-705)

Again, the key difference here is that the ERC/TRC, while still only advisory, has the formal role of recommending or withholding approval, whereas the other committees merely provide feedback and suggestions. In other words, whereas an ERC meeting tends to have the atmosphere of a thesis defence,[42] the tone of the other advisory committees may be closer to that of public hearings.

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[42] The analogy is a close one: In both cases, the document's author has invested considerable effort and ego in the project; the chairing Associate Director parallels the role of the thesis advisor; the other senior Department personnel fulfil the roles of the professors; and the presence of externals is thought to keep everyone honest. Given the large number of TDS staff who hold a Master's or Ph.D., the use of the term "defend" noted by #33 above (on page 225) may not be entirely

Whatever the committee, it was clear that staff at all levels were open to this input and took it seriously. As one senior manager put it, "Well, I never ask anybody for advice if I don't intend to either take it or really consider it carefully. So I think that they have considerable influence."[43] My own experience and observations would tend to confirm this: advice from the various committees does influence Branch thinking and thus Branch product. The question remains, however, whether the committees are providing the Branch with direction, or only with information; that is, does this influence ever amount to collegial control? This leads to two questions: Are the interactions between Branch staff and the advisory committees collegial or adversarial; and in the event of a disagreement, who has the final word? Since the case for collegial control appears to be strongest for the InterBranch–ERC/TRC stream, the discussion that follows will focus primarily on those committees.[44]

Staff–Committee Interactions

With a few exceptions, most staff see their relationship with the advisory committees as collegial rather than adversarial. Senior managers tended to be the most positive:

> #10: Uh, I just have such positive feelings about all of the committees, about the sincerity of the input that people give us, about the effort that people put, it's not easy to do a review of an exam, it can be very tedious. But people do approach it very seriously and uh I think give us really solid advice. (1.390-395)

Such comments were typical of the managers who chaired the various ERC/TRCs, but were usually qualified by conceding that some tensions did exist:

> #10: Now that doesn't mean there have not been some very heated discussions. Uh, but I see that as essentially really healthy. It seems me that it's through people having to articulate their views that we come to some kind of consensus and

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[42](cont'd) coincidental.

[43] #38:1.1190-1192.

[44] While the InterBranch has had slightly less influence recently, it used to exercise considerable authority, at least in my own subject area, and so is included in the following discussion. Furthermore, it is not always possible to distinguish whether a respondent is referring to an ERC or to an InterBranch when speaking about "the committee(s)", but the principles illustrated in the following section should apply to both.

> understanding of what's really important. (1.386-390)

The speaker is quite correct to suggest that such tensions are not incompatible with collegiality, and may even be a necessary feature of an active committee. The senior managers are generally able to distance themselves from these tensions in their role as meeting chair. The TDSs and Examiners, on the other hand, may feel these tensions more acutely since they are more ego-involved with the product under review. Their perceptions of collegiality may therefore depend to a greater extent on the examination's reception by their committee. To quote one TDS:

> #33: . . . they're collegial and reasonable I would agree, but if I gave them, if I put a bad exam in front of them, the animals would get me. Heheh. [I: Heheh.] I would want to be in Argentina or someplace like that. Heheh. (1.1640-1643)

Complaints about collegiality from the TDS and Examiner ranks, when they did occur, usually concerned the committee's 'unwarranted negativity':

> 28: . . . but what I would like to see more is, these committees should not, not come here with the idea that "Everything is wrong. Let's see if we can find something good". [I: Yeah.] They should work at it the other way: "Hey, these guys are professionals", or whatever that means, "This is good. Now see if we can improve this." [I: Yeah] Rather than, "We know it's no good". You know? "Let's see if—." So, sometimes I think, especially the ERC, they come with that attitude that — although I haven't sat on that many ERCs — but just, you know, they destroy for the sake of destroying, rather than the sake of actually uh, making the thing any better. And I still think that they should think of "Hey, this is a good test. Maybe we can just polish up a few areas rather than thinking that, you know, [I: Yeah.] they come with that negative attitude. At least that's the impression I get. (1.661-674)

Notwithstanding this occasional defensiveness on the part of some workers, most respondents (and my own observations) indicated that the current interactions between the advisory committees and the Branch staff may be characterized as primarily collegial rather than adversarial.

This has not always been the case in the Branch. Most respondents qualified their positive remarks by noting that the committees had started out during the Branch's formative period as distinctly adversarial. To quote one senior manager:

> #38: When I came here there was real animosity uh, that the committees were not very healthy. Um, but I think that towards the end, there was a change. (1.1092-1094)

This antagonism was such a significant feature of early Branch history that it still forms a cornerstone of the staff's 'oral tradition'. Note, for example, how this TDS, who had just recently joined the staff, is aware of both the earlier conflicts and the remaining tensions that trace back to that period.

> #21: I've had feedback on that from a couple of sources now that perhaps that has changed over the last several years. (1.606-608)
>
> #21: The chatter that goes on here on the floor, prior to these committee sessions would give me the impression as a neophyte coming in, that it is adversarial and the terminology used to describe the committee members and the attitude that goes with that is negative. "Well, we're going in to see the barracudas" or whatever. And uh thinks that's necessary. In my own personal belief that we are all working together and I hope you sensed that last week. I thought, got feedback from that meeting, from people who have been associated with the exam now for several years, that the atmosphere has changed. I don't know why, but it has. And even some, shall we say, people who tend to tangle from past years' experience were congenial and even were willing to admit, as you heard, "Well, we agreed with each other, isn't that nice", you know. [I:Heheh.] And uh, that to me is a healthy sign. And I certainly feel that with the ERC at least, as much as seven or eight people can, you know, working together for a common goal, and that's what it should be. (1.612-628)

The question then becomes, what accounts for this improvement in attitude? There are several possibilities. An obvious one is simply to attribute it to changes in committee personnel, and several respondents did identify the departure of particularly intractable committee members as the key to the improvement in their committees. While undoubtedly a factor in their particular committees, it is difficult to see how this could account for a systematic, Branch-wide improvement. Given the nearly random selection of committee members, one would expect 'troublemakers' to be fairly evenly distributed between committees and over time. Certainly, other respondents had no hesitation in identifying certain current committee members as disruptive,[45] or in drawing comparisons between the attitudes of committees working in various subject areas. For example, having praised the members of his own ERC/TRC, a TDS complained about his experience sitting in for an absent colleague: "That one was war. Oh shit! Heheh. [I: Heheh.] We were having uh, oh it was really, don't let the bastards grind you down. Heheh." [46] This would seem to suggest that the committees are just as likely to attract 'combative' personalities today as they ever were. In the words of one TDS: "And it's not as if they're padding these committees or anything like that. The new faces are appearing uh, and often very strong individuals. . . ."[47] If anything, the Branch will often deliberately go out of its way to recruit potentially disruptive members onto its committees as part of its strategy of co-optation, as was previously discussed under the section on the legitimation function (see #04 above, page 219).

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[45] #04: But very little gets settled around the, around the table. We usually talk about issues that · · well actually, when I think about my TRC, [name] dominates them, and he's one of those superintendents from the south who disagrees with, heheh, with everything, so uh · · that part of it isn't constructive. . . . (1.1911-1914)

[46] #33:1.1622-1624.

Furthermore, not all of the faces on the InterBranches or ERC/TRCs *have* changed.[48] This senior manager, for example, notes that the committee atmosphere has improved even though his own nominee for most troublesome committee member continues to sit on it:

> #38: Yeah, well, that's a good question, because maybe we did get a few, get rid of a few individuals who were nothing but pains in the butt, but I don't think so. I think that, I mean there were individuals who were — [name], for example. Uh, who will always be that way.. I mean that, that's the way he is. But I think the meetings uh became very positive and constructive. And even though, and I think what we came to all understand is if [name] said something rotten, uh, that we somehow accepted and tolerated it. (1.1116-1124)

Thus, we must reject changing personalities as an explanation and look for larger structural factors, as was explicitly recognized by several respondents:

> #43: Well, yes, partly a function of individuals, but I also believe that the system permitted that to occur. You could get the same group of individuals, and if they happened to work in a different organization that said, "No, we don't play the game this way", they wouldn't have behaved that way either. (1.323-327)

The most obvious structural change is organizational maturation. When the committees were initially formed, there were more fundamental issues to be resolved, and consequently more potential for conflict. As the committees hammered out early compromises, these became the basis for further decisions, and the weight of precedent slowly settled the ERC/TRCs into more routine review functions. Thus, the committees' tasks have steadily become both narrower and less controversial.

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[47] #34:1.1439-1441.

[48] Even many of the 'new' faces are not that new. It is not uncommon to find that as individuals circulate in their careers, they circulate through positions on the committees. The superintendent on the Social Studies committee, for example, is a former Regional Office Consultant who used to sit on the InterBranch; and the current Associate Director of the Science examinations used to sit on the committee as the representative from Curriculum Branch; and so on.

> #34: And again, I guess it was because the a lot of the tasks were new, and the committees that did look through our work weren't exactly sure as to what they're looking for. Now that a pattern has been established, uh, they have a sense of what's expected and also greater confidence in what I'm doing. (1.1400-1406)

At least one senior manager, however, rejected the suggestion that there were fewer potentially controversial issues facing the committees today. The struggle for resources between the supporters of the bilingual and immersion programs, for example, was tearing the local school community apart, but the Branch committees addressing the testing implications of that issue remained collegial. Furthermore, there were several new programs being introduced in the Branch, and major initiatives being undertaken in the established ones which reopened many 'settled' issues, and yet committee relations had not deteriorated to the antagonisms of the Branch's formative period.[49] Instead, this senior manager attributed the positive change in the committees' atmosphere to the Branch's successful track record.[50]

The Branch's success may indeed have changed the attitude of both Branch staff and external representatives. Partly as a result of the early committees having fought through the issues to some good decisions, the Branch turned out a high-quality product which was well received by the target audiences. As Branch product proved itself, and the worst fears of the external agencies failed to materialize, the atmosphere on the committees may have become somewhat more relaxed.

Similarly, a successful track record meant greater acceptance for individual TDSs.

> #26: I think I had to prove myself. Like the first test I went in with, they just -- they were sure it wasn't any good, essentially, I think. [I: Really?] And now they're, they're very supportive, very complimentary about my tests. I couldn't convince them that what I had in there was the right thing to have. Like I would say, "Well, this is the way it's done in, in the field." "Well, no, we'd better go with this." I mean, they didn't want to give me the [.?.] so I, that was when [former Associate Director] was here and he probably didn't have that much confidence in me either because we always had to go with what they say. But now, uh, now they're quite willing to let me decide. But I had to earn that. I had to get some tests that came in.
>
> . . .
>
> Yeah, they, they seem to have uh, they seem to have -- they seem to think I know what I'm doing now. They weren't very sure to start with. (1.359-384)

Thus, the committees may now be more prepared, if not to defer to the expertise of the TDS, then at least to engage in a collegial dialogue rather than to adopt the adversarial stance of an oversight committee.

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[49] #38:1.1103-1157.

[50] #38:1.1163-1179.

Past successes may also have influenced the attitude of Branch staff by instilling greater self-confidence. As a completely new Branch, many of the original TDSs had to be recruited straight from the classroom or department head positions, often with little background in psychometrics. Learning as they worked, they often found it difficult to respond to challenges from the higher-ranking, more experienced personnel on the committees. Most TDSs had had little previous experience dealing with superintendents, university curriculum experts, Associate Directors, or even with the Regional Office Consultants; yet these were the people facing them across the committee table.

> #43: I felt threatened. Defensive, and inferior. That these were experts or something, and I was beneath them. I don't feel that way at all anymore, and I attribute a lot of that change in feelings to changes in me, not necessarily changes in the committee. Okay? (1.269-273)
>
> #43: And it was my, in many ways it was my sense of inferiority that made that an unpleasant committee to work with. I don't really think that committee really was, you know, what I mean, if I, if I was to go back to, back and be who I am now, then, I don't think it would have been an unpleasant experience at all. (1.312-317)

As the TDS staff became more experienced, more knowledgeable, and more successful,[51] they no longer felt intimidated by the other experts in the Department or elsewhere in the education community, and may consequently have been less defensive and more receptive to committee input.[52]

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[51] The TDSs themselves became high-profile figures, as the constant exposure of in-services, field testing, and marking sessions allowed them to become known (and generally respected) figures in their specific subject areas.

[52] As one senior manager pointed out, some of the external committee members may also have been intimidated by others on the committee or by the TDSs themselves:
#38: Uh, but you know, I'm sure that there were people who felt that they were external and therefore this, either their opportunity to jump all over what was presented, or they'd be intimidated. And I think that our staff was not as aware of the intimidation perhaps as they ought to have been, but they're certainly aware of those individuals who wanted to jump all over them. Heheh. (1.1079-1085)
The teacher representatives on the ERCs may have been especially vulnerable to this intimidation. Several current members with whom I have spoken informally commented on their initial discomfort with sitting next to superintendents or attempting to challenge the TDS, but noted that the extremely open atmosphere of the committee eventually encouraged them to participate fully.

Similarly, the TDSs may have become habituated to the need for their examinations to undergo change as a result of the committee review process.[53] Coming from the high level of autonomy and isolation found in their former classroom positions, some TDSs may have had difficulty adjusting to the need for their work to undergo the constant revision found in any hierarchical committee structure. Having survived this process a few times, however, and realizing that the revisions were a function of the structure and not necessarily a reflection on the quality of their own work, the TDSs were better able to relax and avoid a confrontational mode when accepting suggestions from the committees. Committee review having since become a routine expectation of the process, new TDSs can now be socialized into the norms of committee (re)writing without this initial loss of ego.

The external committee members in their turn may also have become more sophisticated in their understanding of both psychometrics and the committee process. The TDSs are constantly called upon to explain the meaning of statistics or the finer points of item writing in justifying their design decisions. Thus, long-term members of the InterBranches and ERC/TRCs have essentially been exposed to a short course in test design during their tenure on the committee, and so may now offer better, more relevant advice. This may also reflect a more sophisticated appreciation of psychometrics throughout the province generally, as new committee members are drawn from a population that has now had nearly a decade of experience with the provincial examinations. The involvement of large numbers of teachers each year in field testing, item writing and marking, and the twice-yearly release of an examination which is itself an excellent role model, has provided the education community as a whole with a much better understanding of the limits and possibilities of provincial assessment, and this may be reflected in the types of questions now raised at an InterBranch or ERC/TRC.[54]

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[53] #38: Uh, and I don't know, it's difficult for me to say whether, whether staff hid their feelings better uh, than they did before, or whether they really saw the wisdom of what we were trying to achieve. I don't know that. But certainly the tone of the meetings were much more positive. (1.1094-1098)

[54] Some staff also noted an improvement in the subject-content knowledge of recent committees:
#07: Uh, again, the quality of feedback is much higher now than it was in the

Furthermore, committee members may now have a clearer understanding of their mandate. All of the InterBranch and ERC chairs mentioned having at one time or another to remind their members that these were only advisory committees.

> #36: There are some committees that have not been excellent. Uh -- it really depends on the individuals on the committees. Some of the individuals would like a more autonomous role as a committee as opposed to an advisory role. It needs to be clearly stated as to what exactly the roles are for these committees.
>
> . . .
>
> #36: Yeah, they would like to make the final decision, and that responsibility lies with my director. So in that sense they're advisory, and if they ask why something wasn't done, well. (1.1702-1713)

> #38: Uh, I remember one -- uh, one committee member in particular, who, who came expecting that, you know, there was, that they're going to sit there and judge the work and you know, that sort of thing, and that person came to me afterwards and said that was not the experience and they were expecting this, but that's not the way it turned out. Uh, so that they uh — see what I was after was trying to get at the cooperative approach to saying, "Well, here's the task, we have to analyze this exam and make it the best possible exam we can, let's work together on it". That was certainly my intent. (1.1070-1079)

What is interesting here is that this need to remind the committees of their limited mandate (and the associated appeal to a collegial process found in the second example) appears to have been a recent phenomenon. The mere fact that such confusion could have arisen strongly suggests that the early committees may have been given much freer rein than is now deemed desirable. In other words, the earlier committee members may have been encouraged in their erroneous belief that they had final say over the TDS's work by seeing most of their initial suggestions adopted — even where this was over the strenuous objections of the TDS.

Thus, underlying much of the discussion of the increasing collegiality and the improved tone of the committee interactions is the even more fundamental issue of the decline in the power exercised by the committees over the TDS's work.

> #34: They had considerable say in the beginning. Considerable say. In other words, as much as I might object to a point made by an individual on these committees, I was told [by management] that I would make that change in some fashion. Now,

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[34] (cont'd) past In the past, sometimes they would want to change the wording so it said, the [subject content] was, was no longer valid. And now that's not true. Most of them, probably 80 per cent of the times now, when they, uh, come up with ideas as to wording or stuff, it's, it's a definite improvement on it. (1.1133-1139)
One possible explanation for this perceived improvement might be that the tests have been successful in refocusing attention on the specific core curricular objectives of the tested programs.

> where obviously a change is suggested and I agree with it, no problem; where there is some differences of opinion, uh, the approach [now] is that we will take such suggestions under advisement. This was not the case in the first years. In other words, my superior now is much more willing to take second looks at something and maybe not change something that one of these committee members has recommended. Uh, with fear of offending them in some way or that they represent some kind of final authority. (1.1467- 1478)

What this suggests, then, is that the *key* change in the committee structure that has resulted in a more collegial tone is the change in the attitude of senior management chairing the meetings.[55] Where once management were more likely to support the external committee and to overrule the TDS, they are now more likely to side with the TDS. But what accounts for this change in management attitude?

Again, several TDSs attempted to explain these changes in terms of the specific individuals involved, rather than as part of a wider trend:

> #26: Well, officially, [the committees] are advisory only. [I: Umhum?] And I think that depends on who's running the meeting. Like when [manager] and when I first started, they uh, had too much say, because they could change the English, they could change things. But now uh [current manager] runs the meeting, he pretty well let's me have my say, and I'm sure that I could, could talk them out of most things. So they don't have a lot of say. They are advisory. (1.389-396)
>
> #43: But I do also think that the change of personnel at our end has also caused that change. Under [manager], what the committee said, went. We originally, and I don't know if you have any memory of this, we were not to speak until, unless we were spoken to, at a certain level, okay, and I have a sense that that shifted now. I now find myself to be much freer to say, "Oh, you know, as you guys were reading, I sort of noticed this. Um, geez, I wonder how I missed that before. What do you think about this?" Or "You know, I thought about maybe doing this; what do you think about that?" Where I never would have done that before; and again, I don't know if that's all me, just me, change of manager, change of the committee, development over time. I can't attribute it to why. (1.269-285)
>
> #34: Also, I think it . a personality thing here, Robert. I think what I what I'm dealing with is [manager's] attitude towards me. . . . Uh, the, I don't think it was that with [name] you see, as, when he was manager. I think he only was a teacher for a very short period. And may have formed some quick judgements about teachers. Uh, in other words, . . . I might in one of these early InterBranches, disagree with the consultant on a [technical] point, and the reason I disagreed is because in preparing myself as a classroom teacher I read extensively in [subject] or whatever. This individual had been away from it, had been away from the classroom and hence, was wrong, but [former manager] did not want to antagonize that person further, or whatever, and I was told to make those changes. And sometimes they did

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[55] As #43 noted earlier, "I also believe that the system permitted that to occur. You could get the same group of individuals, and if they happened to work in a different organization that said, 'No, we don't play the game this way', they wouldn't have behaved that way either" (1.323-327).
"The system", of course, is an obfuscation of management.

> backfire into our face like crazy. But that was [former manager's] attitude, that, also might have been the fact that he had been a Regional Consultant at one time himself, and maybe would not want to, to uh somehow recognize that there was some kind of an idiot serving as a Consultant 'cause this would have an impact on the whole status of what he had once been. With [current manager] then, I think there is uh, much more, great, or much more respect. (1.1482-1514)

I think this explanation must be rejected, however, for much the same reason that personality was rejected as a factor for the external committee members. What we are seeing here is a systematic pattern which seems to apply equally to all managers in all units.

A more significant factor seems to be the managers' increased confidence in their professional staff. Take, for example, #26 above. The *reason* the previous manager allowed the committee freer rein is clear from #26's earlier comment (page 232 above) that "he probably didn't have that much confidence in me either because we always had to go with what they [the committee] say". When subsequently asked, "So the difference between before and after here is that you had different managers running the meeting?" #26 went on to add:

> #26: More or less. Like I feel it is. I guess that's not the total difference. I think [former manager] might have come around also, because I, uh, probably the difference is I had some successful exams go out, with some positive feedback from teachers, I think that's the difference. (1.401-406)

The others quoted above similarly qualified these statements elsewhere in their interviews:

> #34: Well, it's changed to the extent that uh the uh originally I was sort of the workhorse who, who not only accomplished the goals that I was told to do immediately within the Branch but also roles that emerged or agendas that emerged on the part of these individuals, and I was not to necessarily comment about one way or another I felt about this. Now, and this is see, maybe it needs more clarification of what we were talking about earlier. There seems to have been some subtle changes in terms of, of more professional respect for what I'm doing. Which is interesting, Robert, when you think about it. We must have, we must have done some things fairly well. God knows if we hadn't done, it would have been still that kind of situation. "You've got to try harder, [#34]. You're not clicking. I know what I want and you're still not clicking on what I want." Hmmm. Interesting.
>
> . . .
>
> #34: Yeah. "We trust you", yeah. Trust is has been est— yeah, that's it, that's the word. Trust has been established. (1.1415-1435)
> I: Well, what accounts for that change?
>
> #34: I think it's hinging, or verging around this greater acceptance of the professionalism of the, of the TDS. (1.1482-1483)

> #43: I felt that initially, uh, in both situations [[i.e., both InterBranch and ERC/TRC]], both meetings, there was perhaps a lack of faith on the part of my manager, that I had anything to offer. And that's not to say I did. I mean, maybe, maybe I now have more to offer than I did, okay? Nevertheless, I still think that there was some of that there. (1.339-344)

And again:

> #43: Well, I think w[illegible] after we had gotten over the initial jitters and had a chance to actually learn [illegible] jobs, because for many of us there was no, many came without any professional, like training or experience, prior experience in test development, so there was a fairly lengthy period of time to acquire our professional standing, if you will. . . . Well, around here you get hired, then you get your training and expertise. So there was, perhaps legitimately so, a period of time when we weren't treated very professionally, and maybe we weren't very professional. But I think our actual professionalism outgrew their ability to perceive us that way. Heheh.[56] (1.1735-1749)

It seems likely, then, that the initial lack of collegiality on the advisory committees was at least partly a consequence of management's lack of confidence in the TDS staff. By accepting the external members' input as more likely correct than that of their own inexperienced staff, the Branch management effectively changed the advisory committees into oversight committees. As the TDS staff gained experience and established a successful track record, management became more prepared to accept their input, and so to rein-in the committees. They have done this by reemphasizing the committees' advisory status and by appealing to the norm of professional collegiality.

THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES' CURRENT LEVEL OF INFLUENCE

As suggested earlier, respondents at all levels essentially agreed that the committees exerted, or had the potential to exert, considerable influence over Branch product. Different ranks tended to emphasize different issues, however, when framing their responses.

For the managers, the problem was to be able to characterize the committees as highly influential, while simultaneously asserting their own formal authority to decide examination policy. Too great an emphasis on their ability to overrule the advisory committees would have been inconsistent with the committees' legitimation function and with management's self-image as open to external input. On the other hand, too great an emphasis on the obligation to take the committees' recommendations would have been to deny their own authority during the very period when they were attempting to rein-in the advisory committees and increase the input from their own TDS staff. Their discussion therefore tended to alternate between these two positions. For example, the senior manager quoted earlier (page 227) as saying it was "more so than incumbent" upon him to take the committee's advice, that "it wasn't a matter of -- I can take it or leave it, I must take their input", is here seen moving towards the opposite assertion:

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[56] The tendency to attribute the change in atmosphere to the change in specific managers may be explained in part by this time lag. Given the psychological importance of first impressions, it is quite likely that the managers under which the TDS recruits initially worked retained their low assessments of these staff, even after they began to experience some success. The new managers, on the other hand, would make a new assessment, and curtail the committee's relative influence accordingly. In other words, managers characterized as always taking the committee's side might not do so when circulated to a new unit where they could make a more objective assessment of their staff's abilities.

> #11: And uh, I think it's important that uh, that they do have [a] 'say'. Now, how you treat that 'say', how you incorporate that, I think is, that becomes part of my job, and that is, uh, I must earnestly take what they say, I think we have to use that as input, we make the decision, but uh we certainly consider the input, and we go back to them with "This is what we want to do about it", and rationalize why. They're reasonable people. Uh, they've come up with an idea, they don't expect that their idea must be there. Sometimes you'll get a content thing like that, uh, you know, [subject] person or whatever will say, "No, no, that's", you know, "I object to having any [example] on this test whatsoever", and you come back with the position that we don't see it that way, and he says, "Well, what do you want me for?" I mean, that's a real extreme case, I've never really seen it happen, but it could I guess. But they don't have the say, they don't have, I mean it is advisory in all cases, they aren't policy-making committees at all, and uh I think it's simply a must to make sure that they know that, that communication is kept there, and I don't think it's a problem. (1.635-653)

Conscious of the need to remind the committees of their advisory status, but at the same time wanting to avoid understating the importance of the committees' input, managers often make what at first glance appear to be self-contradictory statements:

> #10: And we choose to use that advice in a larger context or to disregard it, but um, you know, we take that advice. (1.181-182)

The paradox of claiming both authority over and deference to the committees is resolved, however, through reference to the committees' expertise.

> I: So those committees are, have real power?
>
> #38: I think so. They derive their power not from, a hierarchical system but from their ability to convince.
>
> I: Okay.
>
> #38: Which in my view is more powerful.
>
> I: Can you think of any occasions where you overruled a recommendation from a committee, rejected them?

> #38: Ah, yes. Heheh.
> I: Is that a frequent occurrence?
> #38: No.
> I: Really rare?
> #38: Rare indeed.
> . . .
> #38: Well, usually they're wise decisions. I mean, they have merit. . . . I'm bound more by the merit of the decision than I am by the notion that these committees have power. (1.1194-1224)

By distinguishing between management's hierarchical authority and the committees' knowledge-based authority, it is possible for management to retain their formal monopoly over policy decisions while still claiming that they routinely defer to the committees' expertise. Thus, they acknowledge that when they disagree with the committee, they always get the final word; but having said that, they are anxious to note that this veto is exercised only very rarely.

The suggestion that the committees' authority is derived from the quality of their advice has the further corollary that on those rare occasions when management *have* overruled the committees, they have done so because the committees *failed* to provide a convincing argument. In other words, implicit here is the claim that, far from 'pulling rank' to simply overrule inconvenient committee recommendations, the managers only exercise their veto when they have access to additional or better information. We see this in even the very brief quotation from #10 (above), which implies that the criteria for accepting or rejecting the committees' input is the "larger context", to which management can always claim unique access.

Similarly, note the appeal to the values of collegial compromise in #11's comments (page 239). Management's veto need rarely be invoked, because the committee members are "reasonable people" prepared to negotiate rather than to adopt an uncompromising position. The committee's power to convince management is therefore constrained by management's power to convince the committee in its turn. Given the unlevel playing field inherent in the greater time and resources that Branch staff can bring to bear on assessment issues, it is hardly surprising that management seldom has to resort to its formal authority to deal with the committee's suggestions.

The role of the advisory committees is therefore clearly depicted here as one of providing information, of "coming up with ideas", rather than one of dictating policy to the Branch. Whatever influence the committees have is channelled through, and must ultimately be approved by, senior management.

The TDSs, on the other hand, do not have a veto over the committees. Their discussion therefore tended to focus more specifically on how they dealt with situations in which they disagreed with the committee's recommendations.

As mentioned in the previous section, several of the veteran TDSs commented that the committees' say over their work had declined in recent years, while their own influence with the senior managers had increased. In contrast to the Branch's formative period when TDSs were not even to speak at InterBranch or ERC meetings unless spoken to,[57] it is now considered appropriate for them to argue it out with the committee members.[58] The norm remains, however, that they will accommodate the committees' suggestions as far as possible.

> #33: It's advisory, but advice that you take very very seriously. Uh, I believe that it is · · I believe that they have almost a directive. I believe that it would be unethical for me, to, if the ERC asked me to make a change, to go hohum, you know, sort of yup, and then not do it. I believe that if I am going to object, to an ERC, an ERC suggestion, I must do it right at the meeting. (1.1552-1557)

It is not always possible, however, to anticipate and object to all of the ramifications of the recommended changes during the committee meeting itself, and the TDSs occasionally have to find alternative solutions to those initially proposed and accepted.

> #21: No, it's quite influential. Now I know in the print it says they can make recommendations. How we in the test development Branch could override their recommendations if we thought that their suggestions were just off-the-cuff and weren't carefully thought out, but we certainly do so, heheh, at risk shall say, and

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[57] See #43 above, page 236. This was also my own experience.

[58] For example, " . . . when somebody raises a point that, with which I disagree, I am not going to sit on my hands and just not say anything" (#04:1.1891-1892). Similarly, the following clearly indicates that the TDS views herself as an active participant in the process:
#18: . . . you have to, as you know, negotiate your test through the rocks and cliffs of various committees and various individuals who have their pet horses, hobbyhorses. And you have to be willing either to stand up to them or at least to be able to negotiate yourself around them, you know. . . .And communication skills are very important then. (1.1007-1014)

> have to think pretty carefully why you did not go along with the direction. And just using last week's example again, I found most of their recommendations to be very helpful. Now one of them has backfired, and I'm not quite sure which direction to go. And I was talking to the person who initiated the suggestion yesterday in fact, and he's having second thoughts about it already.[59] Is that a good recommendation or not. Um, he didn't see all the implications of changing the question. But no, serves a very important function. (1.633-646)

This illustrates the principle that when the TDS rejects the committee's advice, he does so on the understanding that the committee, given more time or the additional information now available to the TDS, would come to the same new conclusion. In other words, even where the committee's suggestions must be rejected, this almost never involves returning to the TDS's original proposal, but leads to a search for alternative solutions consistent with the committee's direction.

On those rare occasions when the TDS feels it necessary to completely overturn a committee recommendation and return to the original wording or policy, it is done only with the approval of the TDS's Associate Director. Note in the following, for example, that the TDS needs to call in both the Examiner and a neighbouring (more senior) TDS to consult with the Associate Director before the latter is sufficiently reassured to reject the committee's recommendation:

> #02: The committees— no. The committees all basically give advice to Student Evaluation and uh, on one of the exams uh this year, there were two items that they wanted reworded. And they gave us the suggested rewording. And when we came back here we uh got together, talked it over, uh, [the Examiner], myself, [the Associate Director], we even brought in [another TDS], and talked about it and decided that uh, we would like to follow the, the wording that was done on an earlier exam, something very parallel to it. Uh, so basically, uh, we just, you know, overlooked, uh set aside. Now when you go to the next meeting, we always tell them, you know, "You advised us to do this, but we decided to do that". And so it's, it's not done on a clandestine, under-the-table way. But I think the committees uh, are told up front, quite early that, that they are in an advice-giving mode. Now I'll know better for that next year because the committees, it's basically all the new people starting for next year. And uh, the meeting will have to start with some of those rules and regs, right off the bat, so everybody knows basically where they are in the process.
>
> I: So it's an advice, it's uh, as you say, sort of a screen to go through and point out things maybe you missed. But it doesn't have any real power—
>
> #02: And I, and I, that's right, and I, and I would say that uh 80 to 90 per cent of the things that they were saying, maybe even higher, are, are quite acceptable to us. I mean they are refinements, and people are happier with them, and they make for

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[59] The encounter with this committee member was coincidental, and not part of a follow-up on the proposed change.

better exams, that everybody likes, uh, so there's no problem. (1.253-281)

This was one of the few statements by a TDS to emphasize the committee's status as merely advisory, and perhaps not coincidentally was made by a relative newcomer to the Branch. Enjoying the confidence of her senior manager (based on a previously established reputation as a leader in her field), this individual had not experienced the earlier period in the Branch when TDSs were routinely overruled by the committees. In contrast, other TDSs (as with #21 above) emphasized that the committees exerted a much greater influence than one might deduce/conclude from the formal limitations on their authority. And even #02, while in the midst of illustrating the application of the Branch veto over the committees, is still anxious to note that the Branch nevertheless accepts over 90 per cent of the committees' input.

Here the apparent inconsistency in #02's position may be resolved through reference, not only to the quality of the committee's advice, but to the manager's veto. Note how #02's description of the process of collegial discussion within the unit glosses over the fact that the "Branch's" decision to overrule the committee must actually be taken by the Associate Director. The answer to "Who gets the final word in a disagreement between the TDS and the committee?" is "neither one".

A similar emphasis on the committees' advisory role and the collegial nature of the decision-making process can also be found in this Examiner's comments:

> #25: Ultimately, ultimately it's a weigh-andconsider influence.
>
> I: Okay, so uh, they make suggestions, and you think about whether or not you want to accept them?
>
> #25: Well, in the course of the committee operation, whichever committee it is, it's if something is going to be changed, it is decided by us all at the committee, at the meeting, that it will be changed. If there is something left to consider, then it's up to us to make a change or not make a change. Usually, the suggestions are valid. Sometimes they are not, and one must use one's very best judgement to and decide which is which, because, well, after all, we are the test makers, so the responsibility lies with us. (1.1370-1387)

This is an accurate description of what I observed for the committees this Examiner attended. Many questions were settled during the meeting itself through discussions in which everyone was more or less equally involved;[60] while on other issues, the senior manager would call closure with something like, "We'll take a look at that in-house and see what we can come up with". Nevertheless, this was an atypical response for an Examiner.[61] The force of this particular individual's personality, and the highly respected quality of her work, allowed her in many instances to appropriate the status of a TDS, and consequently, many of her responses were more typical of that rank than of her fellow Examiners.

More than other staff, the Examiners tended to characterize the committees as extremely powerful:

> #23: In theory, uh, maybe not that much, but in actuality, they have a lot. (1.1081-1082)
>
> #19: They, they have a very large say. In fact, most of what they, what they propose is usually uh ironed out at the table, and then put into the exam, as uh, I think they have the most say. They have more say than I do. They have more say than the TDSs in the long run. (1.1630-1634)
>
> #28: Oh, I think it [[ERC]] has all the power, I think.
> I: Too much power?
> #28: I think so. I think that when they, you know, because when they say "Make these changes", uh as far as I know, they're pretty well mandatory, you know, [I: You have to do whatever they tell you.] you make them.
> I: Whether you agree or not?
> #28: That's right. And I know we've made these changes. You know, some of the most insignificant changes. Some of them, I'm not saying, might be good, but uh, a lot of them were just change for the sake of change. . . .
> I: . . . Okay, you see them as powerful and having a fair bit of say over your work.
> #28: I think so, yes. Oh definitely. (1.722-754)

That the advisory committees generally appear more powerful to the Examiner ranks than to those higher up should come as no surprise. For one thing, the Examiners are not always included in the committee meetings and consequently may have no opportunity to argue their case. Since, as we have seen, it is the ability to persuade the Associate Director that determines whether the committee's recommendations will prevail over those of the staff, the Examiners' isolation from senior management places them at a distinct disadvantage. In other words, as lower-ranking and often temporary workers, they are less likely to enjoy the confidence of their Associate Director than either the TDSs or the external committee members.

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[60] The senior manager did tend to dominate the discussion, but this appears to have been as much a personal characteristic as a structural one; that is, this individual is just naturally talkative.

[61] Though, see #20 below, pages 249-250.

Furthermore, the Examiner's role usually involves work at a very applied level, as opposed to the TDS's involvement in test design and the senior manager's concern with an even broader level of goalsetting. Consequently, many of the 'minor' revisions recommended by the committee — and willingly accepted by a management anxious to appear accommodating — represent changes to the Examiner's work. Changes that appear to management as essentially too trivial to bother resisting may loom somewhat larger from the perspective of the Examiners.

This raises an important issue. While all the staff essentially agreed that 90 per cent of the committees' recommendations were adopted, it may be useful to ask *which* 90 per cent. Because no one in the Branch ever distinguishes between the committees' editorial, communication and policy functions, it is possible for the Branch to gloss over its resistance to suggested policy changes by emphasizing its openness to editorial changes. To the extent that the committees remain preoccupied with their editorial function, this 90 per cent acceptance rate may amount to (in the words of #28 above) "just change for the sake of change". Most of the examples offered by the respondents of recent committee input seemed to be limited to either editorial or formatting changes. For instance, the following description of the committees' role alludes to only the legitimation, communication, and editorial functions:

> #02: And a certain amount of that is uh, is public relations. Just letting everybody that uh, if you like, is a client, I guess we're back to that, have a go at the exams. Uh, the only ones who aren't represented in here are the students. Heheh. But uh, they're all having sort of a look and some input, and we take suggestions to them, uh, as to what we would like to do to, with the exams, and how we would like to maybe change their format. Uh, you remember at the last meeting we were going to them with the idea about the [innovative item design], keeping them informed, and basically they all thought that was a good idea, and. There's not a lot of things come from them, in the area of suggestions. They react more to what we've got. They fine-tune things. Uh, they make suggestions with respect to wordings. [Gives example where] they wanted that in boldface on uh each of the uh instruction pages on the exam. So some of it does come from them. But it's just a final screen, to make sure that uh different groups are happy with it. (1.211-229)

Thus, it is difficult to assess how much influence the committees actually exert over Branch policy while they remain preoccupied with the editorial function:

> #43: Currently, well, they're a rubber stamp to the extent that it's essentially cosmetic changes that they make to, to the document. But if they ever chose to exercise some significant power, I really don't know what would happen. So I can't answer. (1.411-415)

Similarly, note #02's comment (above) that "There's not a lot of things come from them". This raises the second reservation that, in contrast to the senior managers' claim that the committees are a source of ideas,[62] some TDSs complained about the lack of direction from their committees. Here, for example, is a comment on a Steering Committee:

> #27: They're, they're, well rubber stamp — they are powerful, yes. If they said something and uh, you know, I would listen to them, if that's what you're saying, and I would take their advice, you know, we would have to patch it through, so yeah, they're, they're a guiding force, but in the sense of powerful, that power isn't seen as coming through. Like it's more my ideas going to them, and I'm saying, "Do you think this is fine?" and they always say yes. Heheh.
>
> I: So they generally go along with—
>
> #27: So the ideas go that way, they don't go this way very much. Yeah.
>
> I: So in theory it's quite powerful—
>
> #27: Yeah.
>
> I: —but in practice it pretty much does what you tell it.
>
> #27: Pretty much. (1.330-350)

The failure of at least some committees to take the initiative represents a serious limitation on their ability to influence policy. Reacting to Branch proposals is quite a different matter from presenting the Branch with their own agendas; and saying that the Branch rejects only 10 per cent of the feedback it thus solicits is quite different from suggesting that it accepts 90 per cent of the demands made upon it by these external agencies. In other words, the boast that the Branch accepts 90 per cent of the committees' input is rather less impressive if it turns out that the committees are not providing any.

Of course, it is quite possible, especially given the previously discussed failings of the selection process, that #27 just happened to have a particularly weak committee:

> #27: I don't get the strengths I thought I would get from them. They were

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[62] See, for example, #11 on page 227: "Now obviously we made the decision, etc., etc., etc., but where did we get the ideas from? You know, why did we go that way? Well, we took their advice."

> presumably supposed to be top-notch people and giving me guidance, and it's not working out that way. They're not, in many cases.
>
> I: They're not that strong?
>
> #27: They're not that strong. They, they don't seem to be coming across the way I thought they would. But maybe I was expecting too much, I don't know.
>
> I: Is that a problem, do you think, with the structure of the committee or with the individuals you happened to get?
>
> #27: It, yeah, it could be the individuals I happened to get. [I: Just luck of the draw.] Because I think there's stronger ones out there. Just I didn't, see they, those names were submitted to me. I had really no control over that. . . . and I guess they felt they were strong. And in some cases, they are. I've got some good ones. But I've got some that are very weak, and they really show up. (1.217-237)

On the other hand, several respondents argued a general decline in the policy function of the committees under the weight of precedent, such that they now serve a primarily reactive role. For example, when asked about the committees' say over his work, one senior manager responded:

> #36: Very lit— well · · · in some ways, they have a lot. Because we review with them all of our blueprints, our processes, and things like that, and get them to sort of recommend approval for the, for the development processes that we use. We've been established now for quite a long time, and so we sort of have a tradition and routine of the development processes which work, so their role is less important in an advisory capacity now than it was when we first set up the Branch. [I: Umhum.] Their roles at that point would have been more, more influential in [the] sense of setting directions. They're, they are critical in terms of providing us with the assurance that what we're doing will be accepted by our different audiences as well. Because if they react in a negative way, certainly others will react in a negative way. (1.1717-1729)

Similarly, this TDS suggests that the committees' current lack of initiative is simply the result of the advisory committees' having *already* fulfilled their policy function, and that they may again become active when new decisions need to be made.

> #43: Again, that's changing. That's a relative. [I: Okay.] They will have more say than they are, well, it's a hidden say. Having made the decision about what the program will look like, that was certified by the ERC and InterBranch [I: Umhum.] then as long as I keep building the same test, their say · · [I: Continues.] continues, if you like, if that makes sense. So, if we now restructure the program, then in theory, those committees should have a more overt kind of say. (1.396-403)

> #43: In the past, their word meant significantly more than it does now.
>
> I: Okay, why does it mean less now?
>
> #43: Well, maybe it doesn't mean less. Maybe what it is, is that I perceive it to mean less because they've been saying less. You understand what I'm saying? [I: Umhum.] If again they suddenly started to, to you know, meetings started to take to 5 o'clock again, I'm sure it would have more meaning.
>
> I: Okay, so what you're saying then is that, uh, they had some say to start with in

the design of the program, but having said that—
#43: There's not a whole lot left to say. (1.419-434)

There are, however, several reasons to reject the suggestion that the decline in the committees' policy function is only temporary.

First, as #43 himself admits, there is no evidence that the committees actually became more active when programs with which they were connected undertook major initiatives or policy changes:

> #43: I do know that uh the TRCs and InterBranches haven't had a whole lot to say in terms of the proposed [revisions to the] program. . . . I have had an ERC and an InterBranch since we decided to review the [title] program, and what we did was essentially "For Your Information" only. In other words, we transmitted information to them, we did not ask for them to certify it, stamp it, reject it, we did not ask for their judgement in any way. So maybe they do have less power. (1.442-445)

Second, not all the programs observed in this study were in their maintenance phase, yet those committees attached to the programs undergoing major restructuring or involved with developing new programs were often among those mentioned as lacking initiative. I could detect no systematic differences between committees that related to their program's stage of development. The decline in the policy role of the advisory committees seems to have been Branch-wide.

Third, even in a program's maintenance phase there are likely to be emergent issues that must be addressed. While I did observe some such discussions, these were always initiated by Branch staff,[63] who not only identified the issues for committee members, but often simultaneously provided the proposed solution and whatever evidence they could marshal in its support. (See page 217, and #43's comments above.) Even if the weight of precedent explains the committees' current preoccupation with the editorial function, their failure to take the initiative on emergent issues strongly suggests a more general decline in their policy role.

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[63] It is important to note, however, that Branch initiatives may well be in reaction to feedback from outside the Branch, including even informal comments made at previous committee meetings. Tracing the initial origins of an idea prior to its emergence as an official agenda item is an extremely complex task and one which is beyond the scope of the current study. Nevertheless, interaction with the committee members is undoubtedly one influence on Branch thinking.

Finally, the decline in their policy function seems part of a more general decline in the advisory committees' influence; that is, the committees may not be making even as many editorial changes as they once did. Note, for example, how this TDS initially characterizes the committees as highly powerful — as having an effective veto over the TDS's work — but subsequently admits that they seldom exercise this power:

> #04: · · What they say goes. If, if they were to say, "Throw out a passage", I would have to throw out a passage.
>
> I: Do they do that a lot?
>
> #04: No.
>
> I: So mostly they just approve anything you put before them?
>
> #04: Umhum. (1.1944-1953)

Of course, this may simply mean that the committee is entirely pleased with the product set before them; that the TDS and Examiner have internalized the committee's expectations, which therefore exercise an invisible influence over their work, as #04 confirms:

> I: So they are a kind of a rubber stamp?
>
> #04: Yes, but I think that they could throw a monkey wrench into the works, but I think we would have to listen to them.
>
> I: Does that mean then that in anticipation of not doing anything to, that would cause them to do that, you're sort of prescreening stuff?
>
> #04: Oh, yeah, I mean the prescreening process here is incredible. (1.1955-1963)

On the other hand, the lack of committee intervention might also suggest a growing complacency in the face of the Branch's successful track record. Note, for example, how this Examiner occasionally feels the need to prod the committee members into providing more input:

> #20: Um, my own feeling is that it tends towards being a rubber-stamp committee and you sort of have to beat them into paying attention. The last couple of committees I've been to, I've made an effort to ask a lot of questions, some of which I knew were going to be yawned at and were not really important, but I want to get them to start thinking more carefully about the exam. I think it's after four years, almost five, of producing these exams, it's too easy to say, "Well, they've been at it a long time and they put out a good product, and I assume this is just as good as the last one". You can't do that every time. The exams are good, there's no doubt about that, we do put out a good product, but every once in a while an individual question will blow up, and I'd rather avoid that if at all possible. (1.241-253)

A third possibility may be that as the TDS rank has become more experienced, knowledgeable, and self-confident, their ability to "manage" committee discussion has also increased. Several TDSs identified as an essential requirement for their job "communication skills" or "people skills", which included the ability to negotiate their tests unscathed through the various committee meetings:

> #18: You know, you learn when to fight them and you learn when to sit back and watch. . . . How to really gingerly handle some people, if you want to get things done. (1.805-809)
>
> #18: . . . you have to, as you know, negotiate your test through the rocks and cliffs of various committees and various individuals who have their pet horses, hobby-horses. And you have to be willing either to stand up to them or at least to be able to negotiate yourself around them, you know. . . . And communication skills are very important then. (1.1007-1014)

Lacking the formal veto of the senior managers, the TDSs can nevertheless deflect unwanted direction by persuading committee members that their suggestions run counter to the statistical evidence[64] or are impractical in this instance;[65] by misdirecting the committee's attention to the less important editorial or formatting issues;[66] and by manipulating closure.[67] Thus, the InterBranches and ERCs may be recommending fewer changes to the examinations because the TDSs have become more skilled in heading off objections before discussion reaches the stage of open confrontation (in which the TDS would run the risk of having the senior manager side with the external committee members).

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[64] For example, see above, page 225-226:
#29: And uh, multiple-choice questions, we do have our stats, as you know, and I think they're careful, and if we explain that the question worked really well, and explain why we said it worked, [.?.?.] they usually understand. (1.268-271)

[65] For example:
#26: Yeah, I, if I, if it's an area where I don't have a lot of questions, then I'll, I'll kind of push to the point where I'll say, "Well, look, I'll try and change it if I can", knowing that I'm not going to be able to. But we send, you know, we send minutes back to those people, and so they can, we don't uh. If I say that I'm going to change it, I do; I don't just change it behind your back afterwards. Heheh. (1.470-476)

[66] See above, page 221:
#15: So, I mean this is the way I run InterBranch and, and ERC meetings too. You propose something, you, you, you sort of play your audience, and uh, if you want to save something from the axe, you uh propose something else that uh, you might even suggest, that uh, you'd like a few suggestions about this, like a little input, so your other project is safe. That's always, heheh. (1.765-773)

[67] An interesting example of this is that while the Branch expects committee members to give up a protest after the decision has been made, the Branch is always free to reopen discussion if its staff is dissatisfied with the result:
#22: Um. . . . they have some [[say]], but it, for instance, one thing we, we didn't agree with we presented again. . . . We were trying to work out which way to go with our Pilot. The way that they agreed was not the way that we were hoping. And I think too, uh there might have been some confusion because [senior manager] didn't present it — he had it all on the same, this same board and it was really [illegible] and I'm not sure that they, what they voted on was what they really [illegible]. It was one of those things. And that happens. So uh, in that case, we disagreed quite a bit with that one, so we were going to bring it back again and get it to go our way, and as it happened, "Yeah, well, we thought we

For their part, the committee members may find it increasingly difficult to challenge the TDS's judgement when faced with the program's successful and growing track record. Without specific instructions from their sponsoring agencies, it is difficult for them to know which issues to continue to pursue, which emergent issues to take up, or which changes to propose. It has already been noted that the mere existence of the advisory committees serves a legitimating function by implying that the stakeholder representatives will have already obtained the best possible compromise on any issue, rendering further external protest futile. Here we may add that this lack of protest or direction from the sponsoring organizations may in turn suggest to committee delegates that their associations are now entirely resigned to the status quo. The examinations having become routine, and the various stakeholder groups having accommodated to them, committee members will be hard pressed to present their continued objections as anything other than their own personal hobbyhorses.

Whatever the reason — genuine satisfaction with the product as presented, complacency in the face of a successful track record, or manipulation by a better-prepared Branch staff — there has been a noticeable decrease in both the length of many committee meetings and the volume of comment initiated by committee members.

This decline in their general level of activity, then, is further evidence of the advisory committees' diminished role in the formation of Branch policy. Their preoccupation with the editorial function and their apparent inability to take the initiative call into question the claim that they represent significant stakeholder input. Yet staff at all levels continued to describe these committees as influential bodies. The managers talked about the committees as a crucial

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[67](cont'd) said that", you know, so I think ultimately, we pretty well do what we want to do anyway. But, and that doesn't sound good, I know [I: Heheh.] but, we do listen though, you know, like some of the ideas are good. "Oh yeah, we'll do it that way", but when it comes down to the crunch, when something is really wrong and we do have a bit more knowledge, I think, you know, we don't live and die by their — because they can make mistakes just like we can too — but, big [.?.] out, heheh, we'll do it our way. (1.1013-1032)

source of expertise, while the professional staff continued to characterize them as essentially oversight committees. These attitudes do not simply represent a holdover from an earlier period when the committees played a more visible role, but accurately reflect the committees' current importance as a check on the TDSs' authority. The existence of the advisory committees as a *potential* barrier to the TDSs' initiatives remains a central factor in the TDSs' work process.

MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

Stakeholder Input and Managerial Control

As will be recalled from Chapter 5, there has been a subtle but significant shift in the decision-making model within the Department of Education. The Ministry continues to make extensive use of the committee structures that evolved during the progressivist era, but now emphasizes the formal hierarchical authority and personal accountability of the committee chair. Where decisions were formerly taken by the committee as a whole, such that the chairing manager could be outvoted, the new model gives the manager the authority to overrule even the unanimous opposition of the committee. (See above, page 152.)

The committees struck to consult on the implementation of the reinstated examination program were an early example of this new model. From the beginning, the ERC/TRCs' recommendations were subject to senior management's veto, and the other advisory committees often lacked even the ERC/TRCs' authority to initiate formal motions. Thus, while the existence of stakeholder committees may suggest collegial control to the casual observer, closer examination reveals that they now lack the formal authority once associated with these committee structures. This was not immediately obvious to either the stakeholder representatives, who often behaved as if they were members of an oversight committee, or the Branch professional staff, who were directed to defer to committee recommendations as if these carried the weight of official rulings. It is only recently, as senior managers have begun to place more confidence in their own professional staff and so sought to rein-in the committees, that this formal limitation on the committees' role has been emphasized.

The inability to overrule senior Branch management is significant, however, because it provides a key distinction between collegial control and ideological proletarianization. Collegial control implies that the rank and file practitioners have some say over the programs implemented by the technobureaucrats; but the purely advisory nature of the Branch committees ensures that they cannot dictate policy to Branch management.

Of course it could be argued, as several of the senior managers did, that the committees "derive their power not from a hierarchical system but from their ability to convince".[68] Even without the formal authority to overrule Branch management, the committees might still exert sufficient influence that it amounts to the same thing. Here, for example, a senior manager rejects the obvious interpretation of his initial statements emphasizing the limitations on the committees ("they don't have the say, . . . it is advisory in all cases, they aren't policy-making committees at all") by arguing that the committees provide insights which a manager would be foolish to ignore unless given some compelling reason:

> I: So you're saying [the committees] don't have that much say over your work? That it's strictly up to you whether or not you pay attention to what they're saying?
>
> #11: Well, I wouldn't word it that way at all. I guess, and that's, and maybe I'm just trying to squeeze out of a, a spot . . . I wouldn't say it that way at all. I would say they have a great deal of control, if they can influence me. But they must influence me.
>
> I: So it's persuasion?
>
> #11: —Yeah. Uh, tempered with clear logic and, folly as to "Here's what you're doing". You know, it's the same thing, if I want to jump off the top of the building I certainly can do so, if I can find a way up there. Uh, but all kinds of people have input to, preventing me from doing that, and it's how I then end up using that input, I agree, but it's only if they meet the closed door, if they meet an individual who refuses their input, [I: Umhum.] then of course they have no say. And that can happen. But it isn't the way it should work.
>
> I: So you're saying you feel it's incumbent upon you to use their advice—
>
> #11: Absolutely.
>
> I:—whenever possible.
>
> #11: Absolutely. More so than incumbent. I would think that uh one would have to show me fairly good logic for not using it.[69] (1.655-686)

As indicated earlier, managers are willing to accommodate committee input as long as it is consistent with Branch policy; and even when they disagree with the committees, they are reluctant to use their formal veto. Blatant and routine use of management's veto would clearly undermine the committees' legitimation function, and might eventually so alienate committee members as to destroy the effectiveness of even the communication and editorial functions. Staff at all levels talked about the importance of submitting Branch product to the "fresh perspectives"[70] of these external committees, and of seeking their input as an indication of the likely response of larger publics.[71] Thus the committees appear to have had considerable influence on Branch policy, especially during the crucial period of the Branch's formation, and management's veto may be only a formality.

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[68] #38:1.1196-1201. See above, page 240. The speaker concludes: "Which in my view is more powerful".

[69] See also page 228, and speaker #21, page 225)

I think not, however. While the committees may have been influential, there is good reason to question whether this input ever amounted to collegial control.

First, the administrative problems outlined earlier suggest that the committees may not be able to effectively represent stakeholder publics. The high levels of absenteeism on some committees, the absence of screening mechanisms in the appointment procedures, and the failure of sponsoring organizations to provide specific instructions for — or to demand reports from — committee members, are all weaknesses that undermine the potential for collegial control. As presently constituted, the committees cannot be said to represent rank and file practitioners, because there is no systematic mechanism for collecting their opinion and forwarding it to committee members, who are themselves often unaware of their status as delegates. The committees may well be providing excellent input, but this is more properly interpreted as coming from independent consultants *working for the Branch* than as representing stakeholder feedback or as an example of collegial control.

Second, the committees' mandate has always been to advise on the implementation of goals set by the Minister and the Senior Officials. This focus on issues of technicality clearly divorces the committees from the more fundamental policy role of goal setting. Having accepted a position on the committee, participating groups essentially concede acceptance of the basic program and so are co-opted into a supporting and legitimating role. Thus, far from collegial control, the committees provide a clear example of managerial control through ideological proletarianization.

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[70] Examiner #24:1.867.

[71] See again speaker #21, pages 225 and 242, for typical comments from a TDS.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the operationalization of even pre-established goals may still require some policy decisions, and so a case could be made that the advisory committees have played a significant role in the formulation of policy at this lower level.

Even here, however, the committees have remained largely reactive, responding to Branch proposals and questions, rather than defining their own issues. Indeed, the committees have often become entirely focused on the content of specific test instruments and thus have allowed their preoccupation with the editorial function to effectively disenfranchise them [illegible] policy matters.[72] The committees' lack of initiative is significant because it means that they are providing the Branch with information, not direction. The senior managers are quite sincere when they claim to listen to the advisory committees, but the role of this input is to enable management to better anticipate, and so overcome, potential objections to the goals that have already been determined by the Minister and Senior Officials. Thus, the committees' input functions to increase management's control over the stakeholder publics, rather than the other way around.

In other words, the mere presence of stakeholders on these committees does not make them "stakeholder committees" in the sense that they serve stakeholder purposes. The sponsoring agencies routinely bypass the committee structure and make direct representations to the Minister, Senior Officials, or senior Branch management because they do not recognize the advisory committees as having anything to do with them. For the participating organizations to place so little importance on the selection and direction of their delegates, they must see the committees either as ineffectual or, more likely, as serving the Branch's purposes rather than their own. The advisory committees should therefore not be misunderstood as a meeting of delegates negotiating a settlement between organizations; their recommendations are binding on neither the Branch nor the participating agencies.[73] Instead, the advisory committees may be thought of as a structured sample of consumers on which Branch management conducts its market research. Thus, rather than functioning as oversight committees intruding into Branch policy and imposing stakeholder agendas on it, the advisory committees clearly serve the policy needs of the Branch, and specifically, those of the senior managers.

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[72] This was explicitly recognized by the senior manager who complained that "if there's any breakdown in that committee structure in the last few years, [it] is [that] they must feel they serve a purpose besides simply looking at the test" and argued that the committee should "also carry a torch for the direction [the exam] must go" (see #11 above, page 214). His comment that "That's one of the roles I hope to work on in fact in committee" sounds promising, but his subsequent comments, and my own informal observations, clearly indicated that this strengthening of the policy role was still limited to seeking the committee's reaction to issues raised by the Branch.

Third, even if the committees actively and accurately represented the various stakeholder publics, they could still not be considered an example of collegial control unless it could be demonstrated that the stakeholder groups were all part of the same profession. From some perspectives, the university and college professoriates, school superintendents, senior Department personnel, and classroom teachers are all part of the same community of educators, but even Freidson grants that "the divisions between the . . . strata are so great, however, that in effect they are separate" (see above, page 58). There is little unity of interest between the various stakeholder groups, beyond the affirmation that they all "want what is best for students". This has two implications.

First, from the perspective of rank and file practitioners, the claim to collegial control is considerably weakened by the presence of "stakeholder" representation from superordinate categories such as the superintendents' association. As discussed earlier, the Validation and working committees staffed by classroom teachers are effectively cut off from any direct policy function, while the InterBranch, ERC/TRC, and most Steering Committees are dominated by non-classroom educators. Even with their double representation on the ERC/TRC, classroom teachers are clearly in the minority and may be consistently outvoted by the "managerial ranks".

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[73] Though, as we have seen, the Branch often responds to its critics through reference to these external committees, as though their decisions *were* binding on members of the participating organizations, glossing over its own power to veto committee recommendations (see #11 above, page 208 and 220-221).

Second, the divergent interests of these various stakeholder groups allow Branch management to pursue a tactful policy of "divide and conquer", to both resist the intrusion of external agendas and increase its own influence over external publics. Indeed, as this senior manager notes, there are clear regional, subject speciality, and ideological divisions even within particular stakeholder groups, so the Branch is exposed to many conflicting inputs that have to be reconciled before policy decisions can be made and implemented:

> #10: And, and the tasks, the audiences are actually, have rather different uh agendas. For instance, uh, the, the teaching group . . . particularly if they have complaints, are not united in their particular agendas, certainly not provincially. They have quite specific agendas vis-à-vis exams and curriculum and what goes on in their own classrooms, that don't necessarily, at least on the face of it, coincide with the agendas of some of their administrators. They might, but they don't necessarily, and it varies from area to area. So, a task done to meet the stated and perceived needs of the teaching group, if it were done to meet only those needs, and done only to meet the needs of the teaching group that had launched the complaint (let's say it was in response to a complaint), would end up being really ineffective because it would meet those particular needs; it wouldn't meet the perceived and stated needs of other groups of teachers elsewhere in the province. And it may or may not meet the perceived and stated needs of administrative groups. So part of my job is kind of pulling that all together. Knowing what each group has [as] an agenda, having some idea of the context from which they're coming, and having a pretty good idea of what the curricular philosophy and context is and finding a way to pull that together in a sort of priorarchical [[i.e., priorized]], workable way that's going to work for students. (1.80-108)

The senior manager's role in "pulling it all together", then, explains the emphasis on the need for committee members to "persuade" the chair, rather than on the passing of formal motions. Given the diversity of views between and within stakeholder groups, votes need to be weighed, rather than counted, to ensure that one group's agenda does not have unintended negative consequences for another. By claiming unique access to "the big picture", senior management can usually obtain committee acceptance of Branch proposals without having to resort to its formal veto.

This undermines collegial control in two ways. First, there will be an obvious tendency for the chair to accept uncritically opinions that support Branch policy and to challenge those that do not.[74] Given the diversity of interests represented on the committee, objections raised by one group are unlikely to have the support of the others, and it is a simple matter to use a shifting majority to overrule each group in its turn.[75] On the other hand, as long as one member supports the chair's position, senior management can always claim that meeting the needs of that particular group is, in this instance, sufficiently crucial to outweigh the combined objections of the others. Since each group recognizes that they in turn may have to appeal to the chair's knowledge of their own special situation to protect them from disastrous majority decisions, they are all prepared to accept the legitimacy of the principle that votes be weighed rather than counted, and therefore to defer to the senior manager's judgement.

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[74] My observation of one senior manager, for example, revealed that when a committee member persisted in arguing a particular point, the chair would go around the table and ask each of the other members where they stood on the issue, and as often as not, the disputant would be outvoted and consequently back down. Ensuring that everyone speaks to a controversial point is, of course, entirely

Second, the emphasis on the senior manager's role in "pulling it all together" reduces the committee's recommendations to just one input among many. A key alternative source of input will be directions from the Senior Officials, as this senior manager explicitly acknowledges:

> #11: . . . the chairperson of that ERC . . . has the responsibility to take the input from that, as well as the other inputs he would have, to the direction [?program is going?]. So obviously one of my other points of input here is, uh, our Ministry. You know, the Minister, [Deputy Minister], and right on down, uh, to the Director. They have input as well, and so my job in that sense is to coordinate that. [I: Umhum.] I must take the various components and do the job as I see it to satisfy whatever members. The ERC is one of those, components, and uh, if you don't use them that way, I guess you could say they don't have any input. But I, to me it's a function of this job. You must use them, and you do it that way. (1.715-731)

While input from the various committee members is considered in the manager's synthesis, there will be a natural tendency for directions from higher in the Ministry to be given a much

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[74](cont'd) appropriate, but by definition, only disagreements with Branch policy were seen as controversial. When dominant personalities supported Branch policy, there was seldom a similar attempt to verify that these opinions were shared by the less vociferous members. Thus, simple group dynamics biases discussion in favour of Branch policy when meeting outcomes are left to the chair's impressionistic summary rather than the passage of formal motions.

[75] In other political forums, this tendency is offset through "backroom deals" in which members agree to support each other's positions. This requires, however, a consciousness of one's role as a delegate and the political nature of the discussion, whereas here the lack of mandated proposals from the sponsoring agencies and the committees' preoccupation with the editorial function militate against this awareness. Furthermore, since the committee members generally have no advance warning of agenda items, and are in any case from such entirely different institutions that there is virtually no contact between them outside the committee meeting, there is little opportunity for striking alliances.

heavier weighting. For one thing, the process of ideological accommodation described in Chapter 5 would suggest that the Associate Directors, to achieve and maintain their position, will to some extent have already absorbed the viewpoint of the Senior Officials as their own starting point. In other words, their attempts to "make sense" of the committees' input will tend to be framed from a management perspective rather than that of the rank and file. Even where they take personal exception to Ministerial policy, the Associates will be keenly aware of the need to achieve a compromise acceptable to their superiors. Contrasting the diversity of interests represented on the advisory committees with the consistent and compelling voice of the Senior Officials, it seems likely that any decision-making process that relies on an informal synthesis by the committee chair is inevitably going to favour the latter over any one of the participating stakeholder groups. Consequently, input from the teacher representatives on these committees is unlikely to amount to anything approaching collegial control.

Expertise, Peer Review, and Managerial Control

The appeal to progressivist sentiment inherent in the use of committee structures is not just aimed at the classroom teacher or at potential sites of external resistance such as the universities (whose education faculties house the profession's knowledge elite) or the superintendents (who have both the expertise and the independence to be critical of the provincial administration). In addition to co-opting these external opinion leaders, the committee structure greatly increases management's control over its own professional staff.

In Chapter 5, I described the top-down hierarchical nature of the decision-making process within the Education Ministry. While formal provision for collegial consultation exists at nearly every level, practical considerations severely limit the ability of those below to contribute meaningfully, and so policy remains principally dictated from above.[76] The high indetermination/technicality ratio of the test-development process, however, clearly threatens managerial control over the implementation of that policy. [illegible] for managers to share the precise combination of esoteric skills possessed by their professional staff (item writing, psychometrics, curriculum development, expertise in the subject matter, an understanding of child development, and so on), and even where they do, it is still difficult to exercise close supervision over the creative process. Consequently, the normal bureaucratic structures may not be sufficient to ensure that subordinates are faithfully implementing the intent of Ministerial policy.

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[76] Senior managers in the Evaluation Branch, for example, believe that they have considerable input into Branch policy through Management Council; but close examination of Management Council reveals strong parallels with the external advisory committees: the formal authority of the chair; the reliance on 'persuasion' and the Director's subjective synthesis rather than on formal motions; the tendency for

This *de facto* professional independence may be particularly problematic for the Education Ministry because many of those below the Associate Director level continue to work from a child-centred, progressivist tradition potentially at odds with the curriculum-centred, conservative agenda of the Senior Officials.[77] The professional staff may therefore be tempted to implement policy in such a way as to mitigate the negative consequences of what they may view as the 'educationally unsound' decisions taken (usually without, but sometimes in spite of, their own considerable input) by those higher in the hierarchy. This potential for technobureaucratic sabotage is eliminated, however, by the introduction into the approval process of a number of *additional* steps outside normal bureaucratic channels. Whether it is a deliberate management strategy or an unintended consequence of a committee structure that evolved for other purposes, the requirement that all Branch product be reviewed by a series of external advisory committees increases senior management's control over the TDS and Examiner staff in two fundamental ways.

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[76](cont'd) members to take the initiative only in matters directly related to their own units and otherwise to simply react to the Director's proposals; the separate and often conflicting agendas of the various units represented; and the Director's greater openness on questions of technicality. All of these suggest that the Associates may ultimately have much less influence on policy than they recognize.

[77] Conservative elements in the Ministry were still consolidating their control at the level of the Senior Officials when the Branch was formed, so the initial situation in some units within the Branch was reversed: managers with progressivist leanings blocked the reintroduction of traditional-style examinations and pushed their staff into the much more difficult task of developing test instruments more consistent with progressivist ideals. Whichever paradigm is being enforced, however, the principle of using the committee structure to enforce ideological conformity remains the same.

Advisory Committee Expertise as a Managerial Resource

First, the presence of other educators on these committees breaks the TDSs' knowledge monopoly. Not only do these committee members scrutinize Branch product from the perspective of their particular stakeholder community, their personal expertise in relevant disciplines is often equal to or greater than that of the TDS. The university and college representatives on the ERC/TRCs tend to be content specialists; the classroom teachers bring an understanding of students and the curriculum; the superintendents and InterBranch members often have strong backgrounds in psychometrics or the curriculum. Together, they provide the senior manager with an alternative source of information with which to counter the influence of the TDSs and Examiners.

The committees are therefore a crucial source of expertise for the senior managers, not only in predicting the probable reaction of the stakeholder publics, but also in the supervision of Branch staff. Management uses the committees both to detect any deviation from the original intent of the program[71] and to identify specific areas of weakness in the staff's performance.

The committees' role in offsetting management's dependence on the TDSs' expertise was particularly important in the beginning, when initial implementation of the program provided the greatest opportunity for 'creative interpretation' by the professional staff, and management lacked the experience to be sure of identifying for themselves all of the implications of recommendations brought forward by their staff. As the program has matured, the weight of precedent has both restricted the potential for sabotage and increased management's self-reliance.[79] Major initiatives are now undertaken within a known framework, and a seasoned management need no longer rely so heavily on the committees' expertise to counteract their reliance on the professional staff. Consequently, there has been a general decline in the committees' influence, even in relation to new programs within the Branch.

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[71] This is particularly true of the InterBranch Committee, partly because it is the first to screen draft proposals and examinations, but also because it consists of other management-level staff from within the Ministry who may be relied upon to share senior management's ideological orientation. In contrast, the various external publics represented on the ERC/TRC Committees may not share the Senior Officials' aims, and so cannot be relied upon to object to those 'creative interpretations' of Ministerial policy that professional staff are able to slip past both their senior manager and the InterBranch. Even here, however, the lack of agreement between the competing agendas represented on the committee makes it unlikely that significant alterations in the program's intent would go unremarked by at least one committee member. Once alerted to the issue, the chairing manager can direct the TDS to make the changes necessary to uphold management's interpretation of policy, even if a majority of the committee supported the TDS's original formulation.

On the other hand, the committees continue to serve a useful role in monitoring the effectiveness of particular development teams. Management is faced with the problem that the high indetermination/technicality ratio of test development makes it extremely difficult to devise and enforce simple measures of productivity. Attempts, for example, to fix the number of multiple-choice questions to be written per person-hour are unlikely to be successful, not only because it is impossible to quantify the dimension of 'quality' (without which any such production quota would clearly be self-defeating), but also because the creative process simply does not work that way. One may produce a dozen test items in the first hour, but only a single item in the next two days. Close supervision of professional staff is therefore likely to prove both difficult and unproductive. This leaves scrutiny of the finished document as the only practical alternative; but then management still has to cope with the indeterminate nature of the product. Since each document submitted for approval represents an original and unique interpretation of the basic test design, the senior managers cannot be expected to know, short of attempting to duplicate the entire development process themselves, whether this is the best possible result that could have been achieved with the resources available to the TDS.

With the advisory committees, managers are able to avoid spending inordinate amounts of time in the detailed review of particular examinations. As this senior manager points out, it is neither expected nor necessary that the committees be particularly precise in their criticisms — only that they alert the manager to potential problem areas, which the manager can then pursue more fully:

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[79] For example, managers are now generally able to articulate their expectations through reference to current product, whereas in the initial period, it was often necessary to ask staff to "try again" without being able to identify the precise nature of the dissatisfaction. The "I'll know what I want when I see it" syndrome is symptomatic of an inexperienced but ideologically committed management.

> #10: We've certainly learned that it's almost always the case that if someone raises an issue with a question or with an assignment, that they may not have uh because of haste, hit on exactly what the problem is. They may not be able to articulate that, but they certainly will have identified a place where there is in fact a problem, 99 per cent of the time. [I: Umhum.] I rarely feel that I get advice that has to be discarded. That's almost never the case. Now that doesn't necessarily mean that all pieces of advice will be acted on in the direction that the advice giver has suggested, but I think that's legitimate too because in the course of a meeting, about all the advice giver can do is say "I see something wrong here" and try to speculate about what the problem is. Our staff has more leisure then to look at that and try to identify the problem more precisely, and may not act in the exact direction of the advice. That's legitimate, it seems to me. They have more time. It's a factor of time. (1.394-411)

By drawing the manager's attention to particular weaknesses, the committees both simplify quality control and provide an external standard (committee satisfaction) against which the performance of particular staff may be gauged.

Again, note that the committees are serving management's purposes by assisting in the supervision of Branch staff, rather than servering stakeholder purposes. What is at issue here is not the acceptability of the policies introduced by the Senior Officials, but the specific details of the product of the professional staff's labour. Management may well be open to the committees' input "99 per cent of the time", but as this appears to be entirely within the context of the editorial function, what we are seeing is the assertion of managerial control over Branch staff, rather than responsiveness to stakeholder publics.

The Committees As Peer Review

The committee structure also functions to legitimate managerial control over the professional staff. This is crucial, given the indeterminate nature of the test-development process, because effective supervision of daily tasks requires that staff accept and internalize managerial direction. On the other hand, the very specialized expertise of the TDS, the limited time available to the reviewer compared with the originator, and the inevitable variations in personal style and taste make it difficult to evaluate the TDS's work in a manner which will not appear as simply the arbitrary assertion of the manager's bureaucratic authority. The professional staff can always resist (or at least resent) managerial direction by claiming that they have superior knowledge of factors that the manager has failed to consider; that having devoted many hours to seeking alternatives, the TDS knows this to be best available formulation; or that the manager is unreasonably applying idiosyncratic criteria.

The introduction of the advisory committee structure helps to dissipate this resentment by confronting Branch staff with a panel of qualified reviewers, rather than with just the unsupported opinion of a single manager. I have already discussed how this undermines the TDS's claim to special expertise, but even more fundamentally, it distracts attention from the senior manager as the locus of bureaucratic authority. It is not just that the committee structure spreads responsibility for unpopular decisions among more individuals — though increasing the number of people arguing against the TDS's position greatly increases the pressure on the TDS to conform — but that the entire decision-making process is (mis)represented as collegial rather than hierarchical. Whereas instructions issued by a supervisor may be resented as an intrusion, committee review is presented as a normal function of the editorial process — as merely an attempt to identify weaknesses that are by definition invisible to a document's originators.[80] Such peer review is entirely consistent with professional autonomy (as exemplified in the refereed journal), and so is accepted by the professional staff as both necessary and desirable.[81] The appeal to democratic values inherent

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[80] For example, when asked whether his staff viewed the committees as adversarial or a barrier to their work, one senior manager responded:
#10: As a matter of fact, and I don't think our professional staff, generally speaking, feels that. Uh, at least I hope not. It seems to me that uh that for the most part, the input that we get from those committees is useful enough that, that the professional staff recognizes that and says, "We think we've got this to a pretty good state, but that there are some very pleasant surprises of things that people have seen that we've missed." [I: Umhum.] And so it's an additional screen that's really useful. (1.444-451)

[81] The following comment by an Examiner on the function of the committees is typical:
#24: Uh, to · · bring fresh perspectives to what we're doing. You know, I think we tend to lose sight very quickly of what's going on outside our hallowed halls. But also to give us roots, so that we have someone to depend on if they felt what we're doing is acceptable. . . . As far as the ERC and InterBranch, I've enjoyed working with them, but respected every person that I've met, their opinions, and the amount of work that they put into going through these exams, is, uh, admirable. They really chew, well, you've seen it, they chew things right apart, basically. It's good to see. (1.867-893)

Note here also some suggestion of the committees' role in anticipating the reaction of external publics ("outside our hallowed halls") and perhaps in in the committee structure, as well as simple group dynamics, greatly reinforces compliance with managerial direction, which can be represented as arising out of a group decision.

The appearance of collegial decision making is misleading, however, because these committees are controlled by management, not majority vote. By playing the committee members and the professional staff against each other, management is able to obscure the fact that program details are, in the final analysis, determined by the senior manager alone.

To begin with, nothing goes to committee which has not already been at least tentatively approved by management. Obvious disagreements between the manager and the professional staff must be resolved beforehand, but even here, the committee structure plays an important role in legitimating managerial direction. When managers are uncomfortable with preliminary drafts or proposals, they will often couch their objections in terms of what will be acceptable ***to the committee***.[12] "We'd never be able to get this through ERC" not only sounds a good deal more collegial than "Do it my way or else", it elevates the personal preferences of the manager to an exhortation from the entire educational community.

It is practically impossible for the TDS to challenge the manager's adoption of the committee's mantle, however, because it is extremely unlikely that the committee will spontaneously come up with the TDS's rejected design. Given the lack of specifically mandated proposals brought forward by stakeholder representatives, and the growing preoccupation with the editorial function, the committees remain largely reactive, merely responding to whatever proposals are placed before them. There are therefore few

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[11](cont'd) legitimating Branch product with those publics ("someone to depend on if they felt what we're doing is acceptable"). The professional staff share management's interest in anticipating the probable reaction of external publics and using the committees to legitimate Branch product with them, but seldom distinguished between these functions and straightforward editorial review.

[12] This was particularly true in the Branch's early period, when newly recruited staff were less used to dealing with the superintendents, university personnel, and other experts sitting on the committees than were the senior managers, and were therefore prepared to grant that their managers might well be in a better position to anticipate committee response. Now that staff are more comfortable dealing with committee members, they are still constrained from presenting radical proposals by their own internalization of previous committee direction, even though this committee precedent was based entirely on the limited range of proposals management initially allowed to be presented.

opportunities for the professional staff to test whether the committee might in fact have favoured the designs the TDSs were not permitted to present.[83]

If, then, the advisory committees accept what is placed before them, well and good: government policy gains legitimacy with external publics, and the quality of the professional staff's work is verified for management. If the committees suggest revisions with which both senior management and the professional staff agree, also well and good: the product has been improved, the Branch has demonstrated its openness to stakeholder input, and the committee process has been confirmed as necessary and collegial.[84] If the committees propose revisions that are acceptable to the senior manager but not to the professional staff, the latter will simply be overruled and directed to make the indicated changes.

Thus, from the staff's perspective, the advisory committees do function as oversight bodies, and committee instructions must be followed unless the TDS can demonstrate compelling reasons why the senior manager should, in this particular instance, grant special dispensation. Managerial direction therefore appears to originate from the advisory committees, rather than from the Associate Director. Whereas Branch staff might otherwise be able to resist hierarchical authority by asserting the professional's traditional claims to autonomy and specialized knowledge, such appeals can not succeed in face of the management's claim that the advisory committees represent the larger professional community and hold equivalent expertise.

The situation is very different, however, if the committee attempts to take a position at odds with that of the senior manager. From management's perspective, the committees are strictly advisory and should not be able to impose their will on the Branch. Note, for example, the explicit disclaimer in #10's statement (page 264) that he feels no obligation to accept specific direction from the committees, only assistance in identifying areas for further review.[85] As #10's comments illustrate, concerns raised by the committees are habitually referred for further study in-house. Committee members are generally satisfied that their input — having been taken under advisement — has been accepted, and are prepared to concede the chair's need to impose closure on debate so that discussion may move on to subsequent agenda items. Once having removed the item from the committee's view, however, the manager can (a) simply override minor revisions as ill-considered, using the previously cited justification that Branch staff had more time to consider all the ramifications of these recommendations; (b) assent to the professional staff's making only minor cosmetic changes; or (c) direct staff to gather whatever additional evidence is necessary to refute the committee's position on those few issues deemed sufficiently important to take back to a subsequent meeting.

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[83] Even on those very rare occasions when an external member coincidentally suggests something similar to the TDS's rejected initiative, professional etiquette requires the TDS to continue to support the proposal previously agreed upon in-house — that is, the manager's version (see above, page 222).

[84] Again, the failure by any of the participants to distinguish between the editorial and policy functions means that the TDSs can be encouraged to view the committee's input as merely editorial review, and therefore nonthreatening, while external publics are simultaneously assured that the many changes introduced by the committees demonstrate considerable stakeholder influence.

For their part, the professional staff will interpret the manager's resistance to the committee's revisions as a vote of confidence in their own work. Relieved that the chair has not accepted the committee's suggestions outright, and that they will now have further opportunity to argue their case in-house with the senior manager, they remain focused on the committee as the source of the criticism. But as we have seen, the committees identify only the general problem, while it is the manager who defines precisely which revisions will be necessary. By controlling not only which committee suggestions are to be accepted, but how far they are to be taken and (most subtly) how they are to be interpreted and operationalized, the managers are able to intrude very deeply into the details of the professional's work. Any resentment arising out of this intrusion, however, is directed elsewhere. Indeed, any moderation of committee input by senior management is likely to be interpreted by the professional staff as in response to their own arguments, and therefore functions to further legitimate the manager as a sensible, open-minded, and collegial supervisor. Where the manager forces staff to make changes with which they do not agree, this is always done *in the*

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[85] Recall also #11's comment (above, page 240) that "Now, how you treat that 'say', how you incorporate that, I think, is, that becomes part of my job. . . . They're reasonable people. Uh, they come up with an idea, they don't expect their idea must be there."

name of the committee, even if the resulting alterations retain only a tenuous connection with the committee's original comments.

Alternatively, the manager may choose to challenge committee recommendations directly at the meeting by stressing some aspect of expertise in which staff are better versed than are the external members. To continue #10's previous comment:

> #10: It's not very often, as a matter of fact it's fairly rare, uh that if a committee says there's a problem with a question that we wouldn't do some revision. And usually they're right. Now where we do have [a] bit of a problem is that from time to time we'll have a question that has TA [[totally acceptable]] stats, and very strong TA stats, and a committee will say that there is something wrong with this question. Rather than get into a position of having to take that question and revise it in spite of our better judgement, I will try to hassle that out at the meeting. [I: Umhum] Uh, I make a point if the stats are good that the adult perception of what's wrong with that problem is not borne out by what happened with students. Sometimes on second thought people will look at the question and say, "Okay, I can see that". (1.470-483)

Here we see not only the Branch monopoly over field-test data used to good advantage, but also the senior manager's prerogative, as committee chair, to decide which issues warrant being 'hassled out' at the meeting. This control over closure is a subtle but important factor in allowing the senior manager to determine whether the views of the TDS or the external member [illegible] adopted. Without the senior manager's support, a TDS cannot continue to argue a point in committee, but must instead accede to the committee's recommendation. Note, for example, how the TDS's statistical evidence, which the senior manager supported a moment earlier when he wished to resist committee-initiated changes, is subsequently brushed aside as irrelevant in the conclusion to the above quotation:

> #10: Sometimes they [[the external members]] will say, "I don't care what the stats say, there's still something wrong with the question". They will be right. In that instance they will be right. Now the professional staff will often feel reluctant to revise that question that has solid statistics. But they will be losing sight that there are two kinds of validity, and there's also a face and curricular validity, and they're not always compatible. [I: Umhum, yeah.] And, and I see that, I see bringing those two things together as one of the roles that the review committees do. (1.483-495)

In other words, Branch documents not only need to be technically correct, they need to be *seen* to be correct. Thus, any attempt by the TDSs to assert their specialized knowledge independently of the senior manager is automatically defeated by the manager's appeal to the democratic values inherent in the committee process. The chair's ability to decide which points TDSs should be allowed to resist, which they should concede, and which should be referred for further in-house discussion, ensures that in every case the choice being implemented is that of the senior manager.

In theory, it should be possible for a situation to arise in which Branch staff align themselves with the external members against the senior manager. In practice, this is extremely rare. Any committee-initiated change implies both inadequacies in the TDS's original formulation and additional work for the TDS under very tight timelines. Consequently, there is a natural reluctance for professional staff to concede even those points on which they agree in principle. Furthermore, I have already discussed the strong prohibitions against staff continuing to argue for positions rejected at a previous stage in the approval process, and the unlikelihood of external members spontaneously re-creating a suppressed proposal. Even were some committee members to side with the TDS, the diversity of interests among the various stakeholder groups is so great that unanimous opposition to the senior manager is extremely unlikely. As long as the manager can find one voice raised in support of his/her position, s/he can always maintain that the needs of that particular stakeholder group are sufficiently critical in this context to veto the rest, including his/her own staff.

Thus, if the senior manager is not bound by advice from the committee, but only chooses to defer to their input when it is convenient to overrule Branch staff, then what we are dealing with is not so much peer review as a managerial strategy of 'divide and conquer'.[86] The advisory committees legitimate managerial control and enforce ideological conformity on the professional staff. As such, the appearance ofcollegial consultation becomes a key mechanism of ideological proletarianization not only within the larger educational community, but within the Branch as well.

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[86] This is not to suggest, however, the conscious or cynical manipulation of the committee process by the senior managers. I think it reasonable to assume that all of the senior managers are wellintentioned individuals who are sincere in their belief that they are responsive to both external committee members and their own staff. From their perspective, of course, they are not playing the committee and the professional staff against each other, but merely trying to choose what is most 'sensible' from the advice presented to them. Attempting to balance the competing demands of the varied agendas with which they are confronted probably does not *feel* much like dictatorial control, even if they do have a virtual monopoly over the final decision.

SUMMARY

Far from representing a form of collegial control, then, the advisory committee structure actually *increases managerial control* over rank and file practitioners. Government-initiated policy is legitimated through the appearance of collegial consultation, but the committee structures arising out of the progressivist tradition have been subtly shorn of actual power, such that all their recommendations must be filtered through, and ultimately approved by, senior management. Committee members function more as lobbyists than as an oversight body, but are constrained even in this more limited role by the greater resources available to Branch staff in preparing proposals, through the Branch's manipulation of agendas and closure, and by management's ability to 'divide and conquer'. By choosing which of the diverse committee inputs it wishes to attend on any particular issue, management is generally able to obtain those options closest to the Senior Officials' original goals, while assigning responsibility for the decision to the stakeholder groups.

Yet the committees *do* represent a crucial source of information for the senior managers. By providing a structured sample of consumers, the advisory committees allow management to anticipate, and so overcome, potential objections to proposals prior to their implementation. The committees have little if any control over the formulation of policy, but their input on implementation ensures the smooth adoption of the Senior Officials' program. The advisory committees therefore serve legitimation and co-optive functions that undermine the teaching profession's ability to resist the administration's appropriation of design functions. Consequently, the committees are a key mechanism of ideological proletarianization.

The advisory committees also increase managerial control over Branch professional staff. The mistaken impression that the advisory committees are intended to serve an oversight function, when they in fact have little influence over Ministerial policy, arises from their role in constraining the independence of the TDSs. The advisory committees' feedback assists management not only in evaluating staff performance, but also in ensuring the professional staff's conformity to Ministerial objectives. By providing senior management with an alternative source of expertise, the advisory committees break the TDS's knowledge monopoly, thereby bringing the TDS's interpretation and implementation of Ministerial goals under managerial direction.

Furthermore, just as they co-opt the various stakeholder groups, the advisory committees legitimate the ideological proletarianization of Branch professional staff by distracting attention from the senior manager as the locus of bureaucratic authority. Staff resistance to managerial direction is undermined because the hierarchical imposition of goals is misrepresented as a process of peer review.

The advisory committee structure, however, is only one of the mechanisms through which the Ministry claims to be responsive to stakeholder publics and classroom teachers. Direct feedback from rank and file practitioners on surveys, through the marking sessions, and through submission of test items for provincial instruments may provide more representative and accurate input than a handful of randomly selected spokespersons. It is therefore necessary to examine the Ministry's claim of extensive participation by classroom teachers in the test development process to see whether this amounts to the continued collegial control of the evaluation function by the rank and file.

CHAPTER 7

THE INVOLVEMENT OF CLASSROOM TEACHERS

INTRODUCTION

So far, I have focused on decision making within the education Ministry. It is now necessary to determine how this affects the broader profession by returning to an issue raised in the first half of Chapter 4.[1] The centralization of evaluation design within the provincial bureaucracy strongly suggests the deskilling of rank and file teachers, but the situation is rendered ambiguous in the case study province by the continued involvement of large numbers of classroom teachers in the actual production of evaluation instruments. Indeed, most observers (myself included) would agree that the extensive involvement of classroom teachers in every stage of the test-development process has not only maintained, but significantly increased, the average teacher's knowledge of evaluation technique. Far from attempting to concentrate evaluation design in the hands of a few technobureaucrats, the Ministry has from the outset been committed to the principle of involving as many practising teachers as possible in the evaluation program. Given sufficiently high levels of involvement by the rank and file, centralization may be seen as merely an administrative convenience without deskilling implications. This chapter will therefore attempt to determine whether the extensive involvement of classroom teachers in the examination-development process amounts to continued collegial control over the evaluation function, as management would suggest, or whether it is merely an elaborate form of controlled participation and co-optation.

This requires that one ask the same basic questions regarding rank and file participation as were raised for the advisory committees: What are the formal structures for collecting input from classroom teachers? On what basis are participating teachers selected?

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[1] See above, pages 105-107 and 111-112.

Are participants truly representative? What type of input is solicited? How seriously is this input taken into consideration? Does this input in fact amount to collegial control?

TEACHER INVOLVEMENT ON THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES

The nature of the advisory committees has already been discussed at some length, but a brief summary of the implications of teacher representation on these committees may be usefully undertaken here.

As stated earlier, the provincial teachers association appoints two representatives to each of the ERC and TRC Committees. The double vote thus accorded to classroom teachers acknowledges both the unique perspective contributed by these front-line workers and the significance of committee decisions for the teachers' work process.[2] While the selection and direction of delegates by the teachers' association may be somewhat questionable, the Branch does what it can to ensure that a broad cross section of rank and file opinion is accurately represented on these committees.

In theory, membership on these committees allows the rank and file to retain some control over the technobureaucrats coordinating the evaluation function. This control takes two distinct forms.

First, the rank and file avoid ideological proletarianization by retaining their a in the decision-making process within the Ministry. The presence of duly appointed representatives not only safeguards the interests of classroom teachers but also allows them some say in determining professional goals and standards.

In practice, however, the stakeholder committees are isolated from goal setting, which generally occurs at the highest levels of the bureaucracy, or at the interface between the Ministry and Legislature. It was never intended that the advisory committees should originate policy, and — lacking direction from the sponsoring agencies, subject to manipulation or veto by the chair, and preoccupied with the editorial function — the stakeholder committees have largely confined themselves to vetting managerial initiatives. Even if these committees played a much more important and effective role in policy formation than they do currently, the two teacher representatives would still be in the minority and so easily outvoted by representatives of the "managerial" ranks.[3] Consequently, teacher representation on the ERC/TRC does not qualify as an effective safeguard against the ideological proletarianization of the rank and file.

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[2] In the case of the TRCs, which deal with grades 3, 6, and 9, the double membership also allows for separate representation from both elementary and junior high levels.

Second, the rank and file resist deskilling by asserting their right to oversee the decisions of the professional staff directly responsible for Branch product. If the TDSs were allowed to assert their professional autonomy to obtain a free hand in determining the details of evaluation design, then evaluation decisions would be taken out of the hands of classroom teachers. By restricting the autonomy of the TDS and Examiner ranks, the ERC/TRC Committees constrain the professional project of these emergent technobureaucrats and, to that extent, safeguard the autonomy of the rank and file.

As demonstrated in Chapter 6, however, the committees' role in the supervision of Branch staff is performed on behalf of management, rather than the stakeholder groups the committees supposedly represent. While it often serves management's purposes to portray the ERC/TRC as an instrument of collegial oversight, the committee's recommendations are not binding on the Branch and are accommodated only when management finds it convenient to do so. Hence, the limitations on the TDS role neither originate from the committee nor provide an opportunity for greater stakeholder control over evaluation policy. Rather than an indication of continued collegial control by the rank and file, the TDS's lack of autonomy simply suggests that low-level technobureaucratic positions may be created in a state of ideological proletarianization. The claim to collegial control is in any case suspect, since the committees are dominated by non-teachers. As it is unclear whether the stakeholders are part of the same or different professions, one could as easily argue that whatever influence the ERC/TRCs do exert represents external interference and a further erosion of rank and file autonomy, rather than the assertion of collegial control. Consequently, teacher representation on the ERC/TRC does not indicate continued control over design functions.

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[3] On the other hand, ERC/TRC votes tend to be weighed rather than counted, and the opinions of the classroom teachers are often judged by Branch staff to be more credible than those of the superintendents, other administrators from within the Ministry, or the university and college instructors, all of whom tend to be somewhat removed from current school experience. This disproportionate influence is misleading, however, because the teacher's classroom expertise is regarded as relevant only on technical issues related to specific test instruments; that is, on matters related to the editorial rather than the policy function. On matters relating to policy at the jurisdictional level, the single voice of the superintendent is more likely to carry the day, and the representative of the Curriculum Branch often has the last word on matters related to the mandated curriculum, and so on. Consequently, although often highly regarded, the classroom teacher representatives cannot safeguard the professional interests of the rank and file through participation on these committees.

The Validation Committees, on the other hand, are staffed entirely by classroom teachers, but lack any policy function whatsoever.[4] Their input comes late in the test-development process, and their suggestions are completely constrained by the directives of the InterBranch and ERC/TRC Committees. Furthermore, they report to the TDS rather than to management, so they cannot be considered as oversight committees. There is, for example, no follow-up by management to ensure that the TDS staff have incorporated or responded to Validation Committee input, and in many cases, even the decision whether to have a Validation Committee review is left entirely to the TDS's discretion. Nevertheless, since the committees are recruited directly by the TDS and therefore consist of teachers in whom the TDS has considerable confidence, their suggestions often carry great weight. However, since this input is entirely editorial in nature and biased by the TDS's selective recruitment, it cannot be considered as an effective instrument of collegial control. The centralization of evaluation design can only be interpreted as coordination rather than appropriation when three conditions are met: (1) that policy committees are established and staffed exclusively by representatives of the rank and file; (2) that these committees exercise an oversight function; and (3) that the committees (or a parallel body) interact with the highest levels of the bureaucracy. As matters stand now, classroom teachers are in a state of ideological proletarianization because the profession's goals and standards are set by the sectional interests that dominate the Legislature rather than by the rank and file.

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[4] #02: Uh, and as I indicated earlier, we also have that one committee which is uh, completely classroom teachers, where four people come in and actually write [[i.e., take]] the exam, go through it in its entirety, uh, gauge the difficulty to make sure that we're not off key, again suggest changes to diagrams, wording changes, or whatever. Uh, now that's a rather secretive committee because we don't want them under a lot of pressure. I mean if uh people out there knew that Mr. uh, X, Y, Z, and U have all seen the exam, you know, I mean uh, so it's not the sort of, uh, widely publicized one. So the teachers, I think, have a lot of input throughout the whole process. (1.294-303)

This is not to suggest, of course, that the rank and file formerly exercised collegial control. The progressivist elite may well have been as isolated from the majority of classroom teachers as are the conservative ideologues who currently dominate the education hierarchy. Nor is there any reason to presuppose that collegial control is in any sense more ***desirable*** than that by the Legislature, at least from the point of view of the system's clients. While I am personally more sympathetic to the values of the former progressivist elite, it is difficult to argue that collegial control is any less likely to place sectional interests (in this case, professional self-interest) ahead of the interests of client groups or the general public. Thus, I am not suggesting that the current advisory committee structures are inappropriate, only that they do not function entirely as advertised. The participation of classroom teachers on the advisory committees does not constitute continued professional control of the evaluation function or in any way mitigate the deskilling potential of the appropriation of evaluation design. If the centralization of evaluation has not resulted in a thoroughgoing deskilling of classroom teachers, this must be attributed to the other structures discussed in this chapter.

THE STRUCTURE OF TEACHER INVOLVEMENT

Respondents at all levels agreed that classroom teachers have a great deal of input, in terms of both the wide variety of tasks in which teacher involvement is solicited and the very large numbers of teachers who do in fact participate in some aspect of the examination-development process. The following comment by a senior manager is typical:

> . . . classroom teachers have a very great deal of input. Uh, they sit on all the item development committees, on all the Validation Committees, and uh of course they mark. And the input we get from them then is, is varied. There's, there's actual generation of questions. And our selection of passages and vetting and approval of passages and material. That's quite specific work. At the same time we get from them advice about general direction, about tone, advice about shape, advice about balance, advice about weighting, uh, expression of issues, concern, expression about issues of the impact of the exam on curriculum, etc. Uh, I mean, we make a direct point of asking the markers every marking session, to tell us what they think in the

> present exam, to answer questions about future directions. Similarly through field testing. You know, I think our contact with teachers in field testing is extremely important. I don't think there's a person in this unit who doesn't really really value that experience of being in the schools, with real kids and real teachers. [I: Umhum.] It's so easy to get completely removed from that. (1.541-560)

A TDS will typically come into direct contact with close to 200 different teachers each year.[5] When this is multiplied by more than a dozen different subject areas, plus an Achievement Test Program that rotates through three different grade levels and several additional large-scale projects (such as the development of the diagnostic reading and math programs), then the number of teachers who have worked with or for the Branch over the last decade rises into the thousands. This not only represents a broad sample of teacher opinion but a real commitment by Branch management to involve as many classroom teachers as is feasible.[6] It is therefore not uncommon to find Branch staff at every level suggesting (as in the following comment by a TDS) that teacher involvement is so extensive that it amounts to collegial control:

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[5] To quote one TDS:

> #26: Oh, I've involved uh · · · a year ago, I kept track of the people I'd had over about a year and a half, and I'd had 200 teachers.
> I: Writing items?
> #26: Different teachers. I had contacted 200 different teachers.
> [I: Wow.] I went down, I was going to plead my case with [school board personnel officer] in [city] to stay a little bit longer. So I listed the number of teachers, the different jurisdictions, and school boards and areas where I had been and met teachers, and tried to tell them this was an advantage both to them and me. [I: Heheh.] I just went in, and he said, "Sure, you can have another year", so I had all this information ready, but I didn't need it. But I had contacted totally almost 200 teachers.
> I: That must be a pretty good cross section of the [subject] teachers.
> #26: Yeah. (1.637-656)

Indeed, this represents one of the major differences (some would say benefits) between the TDS's work process and that of a classroom teacher. Where teachers are engaged in independent (sometimes isolated) practice behind the closed door of their classroom, the TDS is aware of, and involved with, a much larger provincial community. Even recruits from large high schools find this requires something of an adjustment:

> #21: Well, um, just, some of the skills had to do with contacting and relating to a variety of [subject] teachers in the province. It's really opened up my contacts tremendously. I would say that I've been in touch with close to 200 teachers uh this year. Compared to working with [subject] alone, working with maybe half a dozen teachers. (1.301-306)

[6] #38: Lots, lots. When we — in fact, we work hard to give them opportunities for that input. And that's not easy, because we're talking about quite a large group out there. (1.1241-1242)

> #21: Uh, okay, at the grounds roots level or the, the writing part, absolutely, they write the questions. But then in field testing they have a chance, and they do, they look through the tests, and uh make comments that are taken seriously, we look at them all. Um. And in the marking session, this involves another um hundred or more different teachers a year, and uh, and all of these contacts with teachers have an impact on the design and quality of the test. And uh it would be unfair for someone to say, from my point of view, that the test is a product of [the Education Ministry], and not a product of the teachers of [Province]. And when people make that criticism, and again try to push us into an adversarial position, I get really personally upset. Because that test is really a product of the teachers of the province. Um both in its construction and in the writing phase and also in the marking phase. (1.701-715)

Classroom Teachers and Field Testing

The lowest and most common level of involvement in the evaluation program is simply to administer a Branch-originated test. While many teachers remain opposed to the provincial examinations, I am not aware of any incident in which a teacher felt so strongly as to refuse to administer a required test, since this could result in disciplinary action and the eventual loss of their teaching certificate. However, being mandatory, compliance with provincial regulations does not indicate a significant level of involvement, and so need not concern us further here. The Branch also produces a number of evaluation instruments to be used at the discretion of the teacher (such as the diagnostic reading kits), but as there is no way of ascertaining how widely, or under what conditions, teachers make use of these materials, the discussion in Chapter 4 must suffice for this topic. This leaves field testing as the next lowest form of collaboration by the rank and file in provincial evaluation programs.

Prior to any item appearing on a provincial examination, it is field-tested by the Branch to determine its suitability. Field testing consists of administering a test with between 25 and 75 raw items to a sample of between 100 and 250 students. As each TDS puts out between four and a dozen field tests each semester, hundreds of classrooms are needed each year. Thus, field testing involves a great many teachers, all of whom have volunteered. Some indication of the scope of rank and file participation can be found in the Calder study, in which 85 per cent of the teachers polled said they had been involved in field testing.[7] Care is taken to ensure that the student sample is representative, structured to include urban/rural, Catholic/Protestant, and academic/nonacademic classrooms from across the province. Consequently, the teachers involved also represent a good cross section of the profession.[8]

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[7] Peter Calder, *Impact of Diploma Examinations on the Teaching-Learning Process*, p. 52.

Teachers volunteer primarily to provide their students with additional practice in answering questions of the type they will shortly encounter on the actual test.[9] Many teachers are also motivated by the belief that field testing is an important element in the success of the examination program and feel a professional obligation to take their turn, even when this may be inconvenient.

What makes field testing of interest is not simply that large numbers of teachers voluntarily participate — though such broad involvement by the rank and file does imply a general acceptance of the evaluation program — but that this is one channel through which teachers can have some input. To quote one Examiner:

> #19: Uh, I think they see it as a service they're providing, to be honest with you. They're allowing the field test to be tested in their school. And so they're, I think they also see it as some input into, into uh exam development through the field test. 'Cause they get a copy and they're allowed to, to go through the field test and uh edit anything or any question they like or dislike, they're allowed input in that form. So actually, we get their input in their own classroom, [.?.]. And uh, their students have input into the exam through their statistics I suppose.
>
> I: And uh, you pay a lot of attention to the feedback you get on the field tests?

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[8] Rural schools in extremely isolated conditions may be slightly underrepresented. Even here, however, Branch staff will attempt to accommodate anyone wishing to participate, even if it means bending regulations, as in the following example:

> Because, uh, for one thing, uh would you see any sense in me sending somebody from here to [remote location] to administer one uh English, one social, and two math tests to the same two students? [I: Heheh.] You know, at the cost it is to go to [remote location]? So now [remote location] phoned one time — this is a while back — and said, "So what's the matter? We black?" You know? "I would like to get some field tests. Don't you guys, [have someone to administer field tests here]?" I said, "No, I can't find anybody at all. I don't have anybody at [remote location]". But I says, "I tell you what I'll do. You give one of your grade 1 or grade 2 or grade 3 teachers two days off. Thursday and Friday of this week. And I'll hire that person as a field test supervisor and they'll." That's what we did. And [remote location] has been doing field tests for us, that way, [I: Heheh, yeah.] you know. . . . You know, and so, I've got to figure out ways around some of this, but. Because I think it's a farce not to be able to include all the schools.

[9] Or occasionally are volunteered by their principals, for similar reasons. In theory, the Branch requires the approval of both the superintendent and school principal before making arrangements with the teacher, but in practice, this is merely a formality and only very rarely denied.

> #19: Uh, yes. Definitely. Uh, field test that I had in January, in uh, yeah in January, I remember quite specifically a certain, a couple of long answer questions where, where uh, teachers said that, you know, "I think there should be a graph on a certain question, or graph, graph lines to answer the question". And when the question was finally selected to be on the Diploma Exam, I mentioned it to [TDS] that "I think, I think it would be a good idea because a lot of teachers mentioned that there should be graph lines put on, on this question", and, and [TDS] went with it. And I think, I think, yeah, they do have a lot of input.
>
> I: Taken seriously.
>
> #19: Yeah.
>
> I: Uh—
>
> #19: I mean that's, that's, that's, that's, that's one of the things that I really think is really professional about this Branch, that they have a lot of student, I mean a lot of teacher input, and even student input. Uh students uh on a lot of field tests, students are allowed to make their comments.
>
> I: Those are paid attention to?
>
> #19: Those are paid attention to. Uh, as far as I know, that's true of all the Diploma Exams. [I: Okay.] In [subject area] anyway. (1.1687-1726)

Some teachers also have an opportunity to speak directly to Branch staff as they visit the schools to administer the field tests, though the logistics involved require that at least some of the field testing be conducted by outside help contracted specifically for this purpose.[10]

The question, however, is how significant is this feedback? Close examination of #19's statement, which was one of the longest and most positive concerning field test comments, reveals some of the limitations on this input.

First, if the input from teachers is taken no more seriously than the feedback from students,[11] then this suggests that the teachers' "validation comments" may be regarded as a sort of consumer survey, rather than as a collegial review. In other words, it may be that teachers are being asked for their opinions because they are the end users of the product, not because they are thought to have any specialized skills or knowledge. Of course, there is a good deal of evidence that, on the contrary, Branch staff do place great emphasis on the teachers' expertise, especially as this relates to current classroom practice. The point here is simply that teacher involvement in field testing does not in itself signify continued control over the evaluation function by the rank and file, because the same purpose can be served even if the rank and file have undergone extensive deskilling.

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[10] Each staff member is required to devote ten working days a semester to field testing, a significant commitment given Branch workloads and deadlines. While this is partly a budgetary measure, it is also grounded in the belief that direct personal contact with classroom teachers is vital to the success of the program. (See, for example, the last comment by the senior manager quoted on pages 276-277.)

[11] In my own experience, students seldom had the opportunity to write comments since they were too busy completing the test. Supervisors would often direct students to make comments if they finished early, but I suspect more as a method of classroom management than out of compelling interest in the student's opinion. When students did comment, the papers were often shredded unread, since only copies labelled "Validation Copy" (the copy with the teacher's comments) were routinely forwarded to the TDS. Only if the TDS administered the field test in person, and then went to the trouble of examining each copy to see whether there were any comments from students, would these comments be seen. On these occasions, the comments were generally serious and well considered, but redundant in the face of the field test statistics, which generally identified the same problems and in a more systematic manner.

Second, notice that it was the Examiner who reviewed the field test comments and chose which ones were to be passed on to the TDS. The delegation of this task to the Examiners may not be a significant barrier to the information's reaching the TDS, since the two ranks tend to work very closely together, but it may indicate something of the priority assigned to validation comments. While everyone in the Branch agreed that the validation comments could be useful, it is my strong impression that the pressure of competing priorities often prevented staff from reviewing these comments in any systematic fashion.[12] Often test items would be revised solely on the basis of field test statistics, which are in any event more compelling and less idiosyncratic than the opinions of reviewers. In my experience, when consulted at all, the validation comments merely confirmed what the TDS had already concluded from the item's statistical analysis, or else they were dismissed as "crank calls" when they ran against the statistical evidence. In theory, if the teachers identify an item as curricularly invalid, this should overrule even perfect statistical performance, but unless dozens of teachers all spontaneously and unanimously condemn the same question,[13] the TDSs will tend to trust their own judgement and assume it is the teachers who have misunderstood the intent of the curriculum. The only time validation comments are fully exploited is when a TDS finds the statistical performance of a particular item puzzling, and turns to the teachers' remarks for a possible explanation.

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[12] Only one respondent described having such a system:

> #26: I always get two or three teachers to come in and go through the comments on all the Validation Copies and write them in on my questions so that I can take the classroom teachers' comments into consideration. So they, they have a lot of input into the tests. (1.623-627)

Significantly, perhaps, this is the same TDS to whom #19 refers in his example. Furthermore, even this TDS conceded that "And I have, I have a few Validation Copies that I look through in greater detail than I do the masses, too" (1.621-623), which may suggest either that the comments on the field tests receive less attention than those from the Validation Committee, or that this TDS attends most closely to field test comments from teachers with whom the TDS is familiar.

Similarly, there is no mechanism to enforce the implementation of changes based on the teachers' comments. As this TDS notes, that makes the reality of the teachers' input somewhat ambiguous:

> #43: Yes and no. They have potential to have input on my field— on the content of the test, as in the specific questions, through the field testing program. And it's up to me how much or how little I use that feedback. Because there's nobody there saying to me, "Let's see the comments that you got from field testing. Did you address them?" Okay? So I can choose to ignore them all if I want — at my own peril, perhaps — but I can choose to do that. (1.450-456)

Thus, the TDSs control the teachers' input, rather than that input controlling the TDSs.

I do not wish to leave the impression that teachers are wasting their time when they write validation comments on field tests. On the contrary, I have myself often used insights from such feedback to significantly improve test instruments. But neither should any teacher be under the mistaken impression that having complained about an item on a field test, they are then assured that it will not turn up again on the actual examination. Naturally, the TDSs will adopt any suggestion that appears to them to improve an item (assuming always that staff have had time to review the validation comments), but this is quite a different matter than, say, granting the field test teachers a veto over items they view as inappropriate. Thus, from a sociological perspective, this is an example of the rank and file contributing their expertise to strengthen the work — and therefore the position — of the technobureaucrats, rather than an example of the rank and file exercising control over them.

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[13] Note, for example, the phrasing in this TDS's description of field testing:

> #02: Uh, the exam's items are then field-tested and the teachers are given the opportunity again to comment on the field tests, and what they liked about the questions, don't like about the question. And a lot of those things are taken into account when you start uh selecting items. I mean, if there's a great hue and cry about a particular item, it will never make it to uh, to a Diploma Examination. (1.288-294)

Classroom Teachers and Marking

The next most common form of teacher involvement in the evaluation process is marking. The number of teachers involved in each session varies from none at all for the Grade 3 Math, Science, and Social Studies Achievement Tests (which are entirely machine-scored) to several hundred each for the Grade 12 English and Social Studies Examinations. Because most senior high schools use a semester system, the Diploma Examinations are administered and marked twice a year,[14] which further increases the opportunity to become involved, and there may well be over a thousand different teachers hired to mark in a given year. After a decade, essentially every qualified teacher[15] interested in marking has had the opportunity to do so. This is confirmed by the Calder study, in which 73% of the teachers responded that they had participated in marking.[16]

Initially, more teachers volunteered[17] than could be accommodated and the Branch went to some lengths to ensure that those selected were a representative cross section of the profession. Strict attention was paid to balancing representation from different regions, public and separate boards, urban and rural schools, different schools from within jurisdictions, and (as far as possible given the obvious divisions between subject areas) gender. As sessions were repeated, the Branch attempted to involve as many new people each time as possible.[18] More recently, the initial interest in marking sessions has declined somewhat, and the Branch now has less opportunity to pick and choose, but still seems to manage to obtain a remarkably balanced cross section.

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[14] Actually, there is a third administration in the summer for students who wish to retake the test, but this involves only a handful of markers, all of whom must have marked in one of the two previous sessions, and so it need not concern us here.

[15] Teachers require a permanent teaching certificate, must be currently teaching the course, and must have taught the course at least twice, before they are qualified to mark.

[16] Calder, p. 51. Another approximately 5% of the sample had not been teaching long enough to qualify.

[17] Again, teachers are formally recommended by their principal to the superintendent, who then nominates teachers to the Branch, but in practice, these administrators normally forward the names of anyone who expresses interest and meets the minimum criteria. The exception here is the January sessions, since these require the teachers to be absent from classes during the start of the new semester. Branch policy has been to expect each jurisdiction to supply the same proportion of markers as its students make up of the papers to be scored, but where the number of volunteers exceeds this required quota, the jurisdiction would be in its rights not to release all those interested in participating.

[18] Since teachers require the permission of their principal and superintendent, the Branch does not have complete control here. For the most part, however, the norm

Teachers may have several reasons for volunteering. First, the marking session provides participants with useful information on how to prepare their students to write the examinations.[19] Second, many teachers are motivated by the $18-an-hour honorarium provided by the Branch.[20] Third, marking not only includes an all-expense-paid trip to the capital, it often represents the only opportunity teachers have of interacting with between 50 and 200 other teachers in their own subject area.[21] Fourth, beyond the (sometimes legendary) parties this entails, the marking sessions have developed a reputation as one of the province's best in-services, as teachers swap advice and resources and informally argue their way through

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[18](cont'd) has been for teachers to take turns where more than one staff member per school has been interested in marking.

[19] This comes through both the formal training provided to markers and the actual experience of scoring hundreds of papers. Marker training explains such things as how scoring criteria are to be interpreted in much greater depth than could be obtained from merely reading the relevant documents back in the classroom. The experience of marking a much larger sample of papers than is available to a typical classroom teacher is also useful in allowing the teachers to understand the real range of student abilities provincially, and therefore to better calibrate their own standards. Similarly, the mind-numbing experience of reading 300 essays written to the identical formula is quite edifying for those who might otherwise have believed that students should be discouraged from being "too creative" in their responses.

The need to have gone through at least one marking session was particularly motivating in the first few years of the program, and later, following substantial changes to the questions or scoring criteria. The Branch now experiences some difficulty in attracting volunteers in sufficient numbers, and teachers who decline the invitation often cite the fact that having done it once, they no longer feel the need to participate. Fortunately, as the baby boom approaches retirement age, there are now sufficient numbers of new recruits teaching Diploma courses for the first time each year that this decline in interest has not yet reached crisis proportions.

[20] Markers are required to work from 8:00 AM to 4:30 PM, but may volunteer to stay until 8:00 PM each evening, and many teachers amass sizable cheques by the end of the session. Given a decade of inflation and rising taxes, however, this is not as attractive as it once was. As the teaching force ages, many are now choosing to turn down the extra money rather than surrender a portion of their summer holidays. There are also intermittent petitions from markers to raise the rate (the figure of $22 an hour is most commonly mentioned), but given the fiscal restraints on the Ministry, this is not realistic. Indeed, some of the older administrators fondly recall the days when markers received nothing beyond expenses, and the honour of being invited to mark was considered sufficient reward.

[21] While one often talked about the "Social Studies community" or "Physics community" prior to the introduction of the centralized examination program, it was only following the interactions at the marking sessions that this became more than merely an abstraction.

many of the issues of the day to a provincial consensus.[22] Finally, as marking sessions become more routine, teachers take their turn increasingly out of a sense of professional obligation.

Rank and file participation in marking is a key to continued collegial control of the evaluation function. To begin with, the marking itself is an important expression of the teacher's monopoly over pedagogical knowledge. It would be much cheaper, for example, if test papers could be scored by an army of clerks. The mere fact that the Ministry feels justified in flying hundreds of teachers into the capital twice a year to mark papers is a fundamental acknowledgement of the classroom teacher's specialized expertise. Indeed, the marking sessions absorb nearly three-quarters of the total budget for each examination, and there is frequent pressure from outside the Ministry to eliminate the written portion of the tests and therefore the expense of marking.[23] Obviously, a switch to complete machine scoring would represent the ultimate expression of routinization and deskilling of the teacher's evaluation function. That the profession has been able not only to resist these pressures, but actually expand the written portion of some examinations, suggests that there may be limits to the control that can be imposed on teachers from outside.[24]

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[22] #15: . . . the way we've involved teachers and the way uh, the way we make it possible and in fact even encourage them to communicate with each other, the marking parties, uh, marking camp, summer marking camp, has had some quite uh, positive repercussions. Many teachers have, are sharing of materials now, and realize that there are hundreds of them out there, and, I think has, uh, eased that sense of isolation, alienation, I guess. (1.1006-1011)

Many Branch staff would claim that "the teacher training job that we do here [[in the Branch]] is probably in the long term more important than any other role that we do (#33:1.110-111)", but the in-service function of activities such as the marking sessions or item building is largely unrecognized outside the Ministry. Since much of the networking occurs informally or outside marking hours, it remains invisible to nonparticipants.

[23] There are a number of studies which suggest that student scores on multiple-choice questions are so closely related to their scores on written-response items, that the extra expense of the latter cannot be justified. Educators respond with two arguments: (1) that however reliable they may be, multiple-choice items are not valid for testing certain curricular objectives, and (2) without a written-response section, it would not be possible to monitor whether classroom teachers are teaching writing skills. The first argument asserts a professional monopoly over an understanding of evaluation technique; the second, the need for public accountability. One suspects that it is the latter argument that carries the day.

[24] Similarly, there are repeated pressures to drop the requirement that each student paper be scored three times (since this obviously triples the expense of marking), but the profession has successfully resisted this pressure through appeals to its monopoly of expertise concerning good evaluation practice.

There is much more at stake here, however, than simply the right to score individual student papers. At first glance, participation in marking sessions does not appear to involve teachers in the decision-making process, but in fact it involves a number of steps which are important to control over the evaluation function.

Range Finding

Prior to each marking session, a team consisting of roughly equal numbers of Branch staff[25] and classroom teachers reviews a sample of the written responses from the current examination. This serves several purposes.

First, the range finders identify any problems with the current assignment and propose solutions. It is not unusual to discover that a portion of the students have interpreted a question in a manner other than was originally intended, or that (to take a Social Studies example) events in the news immediately prior to the test caused students to focus on a particular but only marginally appropriate case study. Such unanticipated responses may require an interpretive ruling on, or some adaptation of, the scoring criteria for that session. The range finders read a 10 per cent sample of the papers, so that such problems can be identified and resolved prior to the actual commencement of marking, where they would otherwise lead to conflicting interpretations and therefore unreliable scoring.

Second, the range finders attempt to match papers from the current assignment against the scoring criteria. As every administration of the test is dealing with a different sample of students, and as every assignment calls forth different responses, it is necessary to norm each assignment separately. The provision of range finding allows the Branch to create a marking system which incorporates elements of both norm and criterion referencing. Having identified the range of responses achieved on this particular assignment, the range finders choose exemplars for each scoring criterion and write up rationales drawing attention to the specific aspects of each sample paper which caused them to give it the score they did. By identifying papers which they believe typify a particular score, the range finders play a crucial role in establishing standards for the marking sessions and therefore for the province.

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[25] Typically, this will include the authoring TDS and Examiner, the TDS and Examiner from the same subject area at another grade level, and possibly a TDS from a related subject. When there were still subject area Coordinators, these also participated. The Associate Directors will often participate, the pressure of other priorities permitting, and will usually at least review the range finders' work prior to its being taken forward.

Third, the range finders identify general problems with the scoring criteria and suggest modifications for the future. Since Branch staff are not directly involved in marking,[26] this is their only opportunity to see how well the scoring criteria apply to real papers, and it is significant that classroom teachers are present in these deliberations.

Fourth, range finders identify papers for the reliability reviews (of which more in the next section).

The teachers recruited to the range finding committees have been previously identified by Branch staff as top markers and opinion leaders within their subject community and will often have previously served as group leaders (see below). Again, attention is paid to obtaining a committee which is representative of a variety of regions, urban and rural schools, Catholic and Protestant boards, academic and nonacademic schools, is balanced for gender, and so on.

While selection is perhaps slightly biased by Branch perceptions of competence, these are by no stretch of the imagination committees of "yes men". On the contrary, the teachers on these committees tend to be much more vocal than those on the ERCs, perhaps because here they equal or outnumber Branch staff. They are also engaged in an activity in which they have had considerable experience, both through previous marking sessions and their own current classroom duties, and consequently are as confident in their expertise as the TDSs. Since they are handpicked by the Branch, they will tend to be individuals to whom staff are prepared to defer.

Furthermore, there is no question of the chair overruling committee decisions or deferring contentious issues to further in-house study. Decisions are made by a show of hands, and discussion tends to be dominated by personality rather than rank. The major constraints on the range finding committees are the very tight timelines and the rather narrow focus of their mandate. In other respects, they represents an ideal collaboration between technobureaucrats and members of the rank and file. Of course, the sample of teachers at this point is quite small, but committee outcomes are then vetted by the group leaders.

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[26] Since markers must be currently teaching the course to qualify, Branch staff are, by their own definition, excluded.

Group Leaders

Markers are divided into groups of five or six, and each group is chaired by a group leader. Thus, a typical English or Social Studies marking session will have about 30 group leaders. Again, group leaders are selected from experienced markers on a representative basis (balanced for gender, urban/rural, Catholic/Protestant, etc.), and an attempt is made to rotate everyone through the group leader role at least once over the course of seven or eight marking sessions. The group leaders serve several functions.

First, they vet the sample papers, rationales, and any changes to the scoring guides brought forward by the range finders, as well as other training materials prepared by Branch staff. (The group leaders are brought in a day before the rest of the markers for this purpose.) While these sessions have become somewhat routine for the Diploma Examinations in recent years as a provincial consensus on standards has been broadly achieved and internalized, they were initially the sites of heated debate. It was not at all uncommon for group leaders to throw out sample papers, rewrite rationales, or demand changes to the scoring guides. Thus, they played a key role in establishing the provincial standards.

Second, the group leaders chair the reliability review discussions at their tables. Twice a day during the marking session, all markers are given photocopies of the same paper to score. Following independent marking, everyone then compares the score they gave this paper to the scores it received from all the other markers. This not only allows individual markers to adjust their own scoring standards to bring them more in line with that of the other markers, it reaffirms the interpretation of the scoring guides across the marking floor, and therefore across the province. The group leaders ensure that discussion remains on task and strive for a consensus at their table,[27] but it is really the entire body of markers who are establishing the standards here.

Third, they rescore discrepant papers. Each student's paper is scored three times, but a few receive such discrepant scores that a fourth reading is required to finalize the mark. In other words, the discrepant papers can be interpreted as a breakdown in the rank and file's consensus on standards. The technical details of the how and why of this need not concern us here. What is significant is that, whereas a case could be made for having discrepant papers read by Branch staff, the entire scoring sequence remains within the hands of the rank and file.

Taken together, these activities represent an important role in setting and maintaining provincial standards, and so in maintaining rank and file control over the evaluation function.

Standard Setting

Until recently, when it was abandoned as too expensive and redundant,[28] another 20 markers were chosen (this time completely at random) to set the standard on the multiple-choice portion of the examination. In theory, the statistics generated by following a complicated standard-setting procedure allowed the Branch to compare the results on different examinations within a subject in an equitable manner. In practice, the TDSs were able to use the field test statistics to construct examinations which were so nearly equivalent that there was never any need to have recourse to the standard setting results. Thus, while not in the event very useful, an attempt was made to involve the rank and file in all aspects of standard setting.

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[27] Markers are randomly reassigned to different tables for each reliability review to ensure that no one group drifts too far from the general consensus.

[28] Standard setting was also a task most markers found vaguely annoying, since it requires the application of an odd mindset to a boring task for obscure ends. Consequently, no one missed it when it was dropped.

Marker Surveys

Another important aspect of the marking session is the marker survey. Faced with a captive and representative sample of up to 200 classroom teachers, Branch staff routinely survey marker satisfaction with the current examination, solicit input, air proposals, and respond to evaluation issues.

> #34: Also there's lots of input of a different nature when we poll, when we give questionnaires to hundreds of markers over uh over the years that we have. And always ask them to comment on the multiple-choice, comment on the essay, these things are not taken lightly.
>
> I: They're looked at seriously?
>
> #34: Oh yeah. A report is prepared, and so on and so forth.
>
> I: And you actually use that feedback in your decisions?
>
> #34: Umhum. (1.1534-1546)

As #34 indicates, the surveys always include items about the current test, the feedback on which guides future design. But often, the surveys also solicit the rank and file's opinion on broader issues, thus providing a real avenue for collegial input at a policy level.

> #25: . . .Well, they [[teachers]] have quite, uh quite a lot of impact on our work, really, because we are in constant touch with them through the two major marking sessions of the year, January and June. Uh there's a lot of communication with the teachers on the, you know, the development, the development of exam designs, on the, uh their response to the exam, the current exam which is just being written, marked, whatever, uh this is all discussed. Uh, the general course of the subject as the years progress is always discussed. Marking sessions are like a massive uh professional development session. And we are privileged to be part of that, to have our ear to the ground and to pick up what's happening in the field, to talk directly with them. Uh, there are, every marking session except August which is very minor sitting, [I: Umhum.] uh there are pretty comprehensive surveys uh distributed to the teachers, which is about 200 teachers every sitting, and uh those surveys are reviewed, conscientiously by us, and weighed and considered so there is, there is a real tie between Branch and field, and it's not uh, it's not treated lightly. It's not rubber-stamp kind of thing. (1.1413-1437)

Note that both speakers mention that the survey results "are not treated lightly". Indeed, several TDSs commented that their managers would not entertain any changes to examination policy or design unless and until rank and file support for the proposal could be demonstrated through marker survey results.[29] Thus, in contrast to the teachers' comments on the field tests, management does pay close attention to the marker surveys. Observe, for example, this senior manager's reaction when he discovered that one unit was intending to skip the marker questionnaire:

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[29] 10: And he wants to make sure you've got it right, before he proceeds, wants to know it's going to work. . . . What it did was make me go to the, the teachers at the marking sessions with questionnaires that addressed all those issues, to find out that we were okay. Uh, once all the data was there, and it was clear that everything was okay, then that was fine. (1.779-790)

> #38: Well, I was astounded in, I think it was January of 1987, um, that they weren't doing this.
>
> I: So it was you that instigated that input from teachers?
>
> #38: Well, uh, I certainly asked those questions, why they weren't asking for feedback. Uh, if I remember correctly, though, they said something about having checked back in 1984, I think, when they first did, they had some sort of feedback, and then that was that. (1.863-872.)

Needless to say, this lapse in seeking marker input has since been rectified.

Given the structured nature of the sample and the sheer number of teachers involved, one is inclined to view the information garnered through the marker surveys as more likely representative of the opinions of the rank and file than are the opinions expressed by the two teacher delegates on the ERC/TRC Committees. Just as the ERC/TRC Committees tend to lack initiative, however, the rank and file are restricted by the questionnaire format to responding to Branch initiatives. Fortunately, Branch staff are also a captive audience to their 200 markers, and the rank and file are not shy about volunteering their opinions.

Direct, Informal Contact

As #25 observed above, the marking sessions allow Branch staff the opportunity for personal contact with hundreds of markers, "And we are privileged to be part of that, to have our ear to the ground and to pick up what's happening in the field, to talk directly with them". While it is difficult to trace or document how particular comments made by a marker might affect a Branch member's thinking, and so eventually Branch policy, it was clear from both my own experience and the interview data that staff form their impressions of "the consensus in the field" primarily through this informal networking during the marking sessions. Unlike the formal survey data, however, these comments are weighed rather than counted, and what this input gains in forcefulness, it may lose in representativeness. Note, for example, how the following respondent emphasizes the importance of the speaker's credibility:

> #24: I think what they tell us at marking sessions is taken into consideration. Very much so. We try to do whatever we can. When teachers that we know and respect, you know, I mean, if somebody phones up and says something on the phone, well, you'll listen to them, but people that you've worked with or that you know, coming out of a marking session, if they say, "Hey, this is a problem", you really try to do something about it. So, you really listen to them. (1.934-942)

On the other hand, the network of contacts established through the marking sessions is so extensive that it cannot help but take in a fairly representative sample of the profession's opinion leaders, as this senior manager observes: ". . . simply because of the magnitude of the marking and exam-development process. I mean there are hundreds of teachers with whom I maintain a fairly close contact".

Thus, the marking sessions provide an essential avenue for rank and file input on scoring, on evaluation criteria and standards, and on general evaluation policy.

Classroom Teachers and Item Writing

The highest level of teacher involvement in the test-development process, and the most obvious claim for continuing collegial control, is item development. In theory, all of the questions — and therefore all of the tests — put out by the Ministry are created by committees of classroom teachers. The TDSs' role is supposedly merely one of coordination. The TDSs provide the teacher committees with their initial in-servicing, coordinate item production between committees, and compile the teacher-written items into a balanced test instrument.[30] Theoretically, it is the teachers who write the actual items, and at most, the TDSs then edit the items for grammar and format. In practice, however, every TDS has had to write at least the occasional question, either as a last-minute replacement for an item knocked out in field testing, or to fill a hole in the test blueprint where the teacher committees were unable to supply an item for a difficult-to-measure objective. In some cases, however, they may end up doing much more, as will be seen in a moment.

Nevertheless, a number of TDSs indicated that the majority of questions originated with the classroom teachers, and that even if these were often heavily edited, the original intent of the item was generally preserved.

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[30] In some cases, classroom teachers are even hired to compile the field tests.

> #34: Well, a great deal, I would say. Um, in terms of uh, originally building the items. I think that many of the ideas that find their way onto the exam are, originate with teachers. Because of the item building committees that we have now. The revision that occurs of course is a major responsibility of myself. . . . (1.1527-1531
>
> #27: Well, a lot. They're writing the items and we have meetings, like, uh, lots of meeting with the teachers. At each of those meetings we're discussing the format for the items, and they, they have their input, and then when their items are written we do make changes but we generally discuss it with the teachers up to this point. Now, now we're at the end of it and we're going to start to finalize some of the items so after this now we're going to start axe some of them and not ask the teachers.
> [I: Heheh.] We don't have the time. So up to this point, yeah, there's been total rapport back and forth, so they've had input and they, they've discussed it and now they've passed it in and they say, "This is the way we want it and if you still want to make a few changes, then that's okay with us". 'Cause that's basically what they're saying.
> [I: Umhum.] So, but, we're more or less on the same wavelength, because we've had so many meetings. Yeah, so they're, they're heavily involved. (1.380-404)
>
> #02: They are basically writing 90 per cent plus of the uh, the items that are being field tested. So that they have a lot of impact on the sorts of things they would like asked. (1.286-288)
>
> #03: Oh, they have a great deal of input you know. When we ask them to come to do item writing for us, the item writing committee, uh, all of their uh work is taken. Their raw items. And then later polished according to the Branch procedures, you know. For example, we have to uh write in sentences, even numbers have to be written in words, those sorts of things. But they have a big influence on us and we, we try to keep the original idea and original work, unless you, unless we felt [it] is not curricularly valid. If we cannot get an item from them, then it is my job, it is TDS job, to create it.
>
> I: Do you do that a lot, or?
>
> #03: Uh -- sometimes quite a lot. You know, for example, when it comes to the initial stage, like the year-end tests, you run out of those teacher items so you have to do it yourself. (1.996-1011)
>
> #07: They prepare virtually all the questions that we pull. And teachers will actually put, pull questions to put together exams. And then, I will either, if they have put together exams, I go over them. Uh, usually keep most of the questions. Sometimes, some of the questions are still not good, so I'll, I'll drop them. Rewrite the odd question, or simply take questions out of the, from the raw, put the test together myself. (1.1175-1181)

Other staff, however, were less certain of how much of the teachers' original work survived the editing process.

> #24: And we have item development committees that come in and their, their work is invaluable to us. But then we rip it all to shreds. Heheh. [I: Heheh.] Start over with it. So it's not necessarily— I suppose it's the groundwork for the exams, but it is not the finished product, so I think that their role as advisors is probably as important or more important than the item developers'. (1.876-882)

If we were to track a typical item from the time it was written by the teacher to its appearance on the final form of the examination, we would observe a number of constraints on this teacher input.

To begin with, the TDS must decide that the item shows promise and set it aside for possible revision. While the Branch does not keep statistics on this, and it may well vary by discipline and grade level, I would estimate that there is a 50 per cent or higher attrition rate even at this preliminary stage. Much of the teachers' output will never see the light of day — but then, one could hardly expect otherwise given the demanding nature of this particular exercise.

Promising questions are then either banked as raw items or taken to another teacher committee for further review and revision. Field tests are then compiled from raw items, at which stage the questions will often undergo extensive revision by the Examiner and the TDS.

When there were still Coordinators, they would often convene unit reviews in which the TDSs and Examiners from several different subjects or grade levels within the unit would, along with the Coordinator, suggest additional revisions prior to field testing. This step is now largely missing.

The item will then be field tested, and revised further based on the field test statistics. Some items may undergo a second round of field testing and revision. Branch planning guidelines suggest that there is approximately a 75 per cent attrition rate again at this stage. Surviving questions are banked as usable items.

Once placed on the actual test, the items are reviewed and perhaps revised by the Coordinator or Associate Director. Then the test goes to the InterBranch Committee, where it is subject to further editorial review. Then back to the TDS. Then to the ERC or TRC Committee. Then back to the TDS. Then to the teachers on the Validation Committee. Then finally back to the TDS, though at this stage, there is a natural reluctance to tamper any further.

The attrition rate for the committee review process has dropped considerably in recent years, as TDSs have internalized and prescreened for the committees' criteria, and as relations between the TDSs and the committees have become less confrontational (as was previously discussed in Chapter 6). Typically, only one or two questions, if that, will be rejected outright by an InterBranch or ERC/TRC. Instead, the committees will often demand extensive revisions, which frequently amount to creating an entirely new item. Whether the question is revised at the meeting or referred for further in-house study, the rewritten item may now bear little resemblance to the one initially intended by the classroom teacher. Indeed, my experience has been that when the items appear in their final form on the actual examination, the originating teachers are often unable to recognize their authorship.[31]

This is assuming, of course, that any of the teachers' questions have made it this far. In a few cases, TDSs confessed to having written virtually the entire test themselves:

> #43: . . . You're, uh, coming to me and I'm not a very good judge of this because I build all of the items myself, which I'm not supposed to do. I mean, it's supposed to be the teachers, so you're right, I have to go back and say, the philosophy of the Branch is, the content of the tests is from the teachers.
>
> I: Okay. Well, I'm very interested in that. So okay, in actual fact, it's not, that you end up doing it yourself.
>
> #43: Umhum. Large parts of it.
>
> I: Why?
>
> #43: Because the structure that I have, where I would have teachers come in one year and not have them come in again for four years, meant that I did not see them for a long period of time and I was dealing with people, in grade 3, grade 6, who were not subject specialists, did not have a lot of item building experience in the classroom, and I would go through the motions and try different things. They would go out and build me items, and I would go "Yuck!" and throw them away. So I would put the passages and let them build items. And I might take some of their items back and say, "Well, okay, let's work from here". But I was the one who actually selected the passage which was a major determiner of what the content is going to be. Expedience is the only way I can put it. It was just more expedient to do it myself.
>
> I: Is that because you had superior expertise in that area to the classroom teacher?
>
> #43: I think it is. (1.477-508)

This is confirmed by my own initial experience with the Grade 3 Social Studies Achievement Test. Since there is no subject specialization in lower elementary, most grade 3 teachers had only a passing familiarity with the Social Studies curriculum when the Tests were first introduced.[32] None had any previous experience writing multiple-choice questions, since this is not a format one would normally use in a grade 3 classroom. Thus, much of what these teachers produced was essentially unusable, and I was constantly torn between the need to carry forward the teachers' recommendations and the need to produce a valid and reliable instrument. In the end, I had to write many of the items myself. The situation may have improved somewhat in recent years as the Achievement Testing program has forced greater attention to the curriculum and teachers have become more familiar with the multiple-choice format through its use on the provincial test, but I suspect that the four-year rotation cycle still makes it difficult to develop and maintain a cadre of good item builders.

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[31] On the other hand, most item builders seem to be generally pleased with the revisions to their items, once these are pointed out to them. The overwhelming exception here is the oft-heard complaint that, in an attempt to achieve a legalistic precision in the wording, the InterBranch and ERC/TRC Committees have inflated a question's vocabulary to the point where the reading level may become a problem for some students.

In contrast, I was able to carry forward with only minor revision a much higher percentage of the items written by the grade 9 teachers. Whatever the specific problems at the lower elementary level, most of the items on most of the tests may well be based on questions written by classroom teachers.

It is important to note in this context that even where they feel forced to do so, the TDSs do not particularly want to write their own items. The more and better the questions by the item building committees, the easier the TDS's job. The writing of the occasional item by the TDSs should not, therefore, be seen as an example of the deskilling of the rank and file by the technobureaucrats. On the contrary, the in-services provided by the TDS staff are an attempt to increase rank and file skills in this area. Indeed, the introduction of the Achievement Test and Diploma Examination programs may have significantly increased item writing skills as the tests have forced a greater awareness of the curriculum on teachers and "reflect back to all the . . . teachers in the province, the interesting and effective evaluation techniques used by some of their colleagues".[33] Consequently, a higher percentage of teacher-originated items may now be reaching the final form of the examination than was initially the case:

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[32] At my second grade 3 item building committee meeting, for example, one experienced and well-respected teacher asked me what a Curriculum Guide was. When I presented her with a copy, she claimed never to have seen it before. I was not, therefore, overly surprised to discover that what she had been teaching bore little resemblance to the mandated curriculum. While admittedly an extreme case, it is symptomatic of the lack of emphasis on subject content then characteristic of lower elementary grades.

> I: Umhum. So uh, a lot of your work is really just editing then, work that classroom teachers have done?
> #31: In terms of, yes, at this point. When I first came, I had to do a lot of the writing myself.
> I: But as they've gotten better, they've taken on more of that responsibility?
> #31: That's correct. (1.1183-1192)

Even where the items do originate with classroom teachers, however, the constant revision by the technobureaucratic ranks and the screening through various advisory committees mean that the item builders lose control over the items almost as soon as they are committed to paper. The rank and file are therefore alienated from the product of their labour, as their expertise is appropriated by management to further goals and policies over which the rank and file have no control. For example, my earlier complaint that the grade 3 teachers seemed incapable of authoring good multiple-choice test items rather begs the question of why the Ministry had determined to use a multiplechoice format for a grade 3 examination in the first place. When my predecessor toured the province soliciting suggestions, almost none of the grade 3 teachers thought multiple- choice appropriate for their students, and most of the testing literature I reviewed agreed. The decision to use multiple-choice questions was based entirely on budgetary considerations. Thus, even if each of the items on the grade 3 test were written by classroom teachers, the test itself could not be viewed as product of the rank and file, since they would never have accepted either the test or its current format, given the choice. Similarly, while many of the items which appear on the Diploma Examinations originate from classroom teachers, the items are written to the specifications established by the technobureaucrats rather than the item builders themselves.

Clearly, the item builders do have considerable input into the examination-development process, but this input must not be confused with collegial control. It could be argued, however, that collegial control is simply impractical in this instance, since it would require that the item builders also be responsible for all item revision and the selection of items on the final form. Given that the Branch has already committed considerable resources to the involvement of classroom teachers[34] and that school boards are already releasing large numbers of teachers for item building, marking, and committee work, it may be unreasonable to demand further rank and file involvement. By cycling classroom teachers though the TDS positions (see the discussion in Chapter 8) and appointing two representatives to the ERC/TRC Committees, the Branch can claim that it has at least achieved a close approximation of such rank and file control.

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[33] 33:1.1486-1490. See above, Chapter 4, page 110.

The other alternative, of course, is simply to hire a single author to write the whole examination from start to finish. The previous examination program, however, was criticized for a development process which apparently involved hiring a not very representative team of three or four teachers to compose an examination over the course of a couple of weekends. While this allowed the authoring teachers to retain control over the whole examination, this was much more alienating for the vast majority of the rank and file who were entirely excluded from the development process and therefore left to cope with the authors' sometimes idiosyncratic interpretations of the curriculum. The current assembly line approach may mean that the item builders are technically alienated from the product of their labour, but this surrender of control over the final product is legitimated by the initial involvement of relatively large numbers of teachers. Most item builders therefore seem to regard the current multi-stage review as an acceptable and inevitable aspect of a collaborative process.

This leads naturally to the question of the current scale and representativeness of teacher involvement in item building. Numbers here are considerably smaller than for either field testing or marking, but still include a significant portion of the rank and file. Indeed, nearly half (47%) of Calder's sample said they had been involved in item development.[35] Typically, a TDS will work with between 16 and 35 different item builders per subject, divided between four to six committees.[36] Each committee will be based in a different urban centre to ensure regional representation, and the usual attention is paid to obtaining an urban/rural, Catholic/Protestant, and gender balance.[37] Since teachers may be released for committee work by their boards for a total of only six days each year, the committees generally hold three two-day meetings.[38] Where the need for raw items is particularly acute and the budget permits, TDSs will sometimes call additional ad hoc item building meetings on weekends, when teachers do not require superintendent approval to participate. These may involve either current item builders or veterans from previous committees, and so may raise the total number of teachers involved in a given year.

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[34] In addition to the honoraria, there is the cost of supplying substitutes for these teachers' classrooms and, for out-of-town participants, travel and room and board expenses, all of which quickly mount up, given the number of teachers involved.

[35] This figure seems high to me, and may indicate that Calder's self-selecting sample overselected for those with an involvement in the examination program.

Generally, the Branch attempts to recruit individuals it has identified as outstanding in their field. These teachers are often identified through the staff's personal networks with colleagues still in the field, through contact at the marking sessions, through recommendations from the Ministry's field representatives, and through recommendations from the school jurisdictions. Teachers sometimes volunteer their services, but will generally be vetted through one of the above channels before being accepted. Once identified, teachers must obtain the permission of both their principal and superintendent to participate (since this requires missing school), but this is usually forthcoming.[39]

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[36] Some respondents reported considerably higher figures:

> #26: . . . but I use every name possible that was sent in to me. In one year, I know that I met with 120 different teachers in seven jurisdictions.
> I: Wow.
> #26: So I had large committees, all over. (1.661-667)

[37] Where there are clear divisions within a subject, such as two competing programs or texts, the Branch will also make an effort to obtain representation from both approaches.

> #26: I think that's why the uh improvement in the comments from the field, because we've been getting questions that came from programs other than the [program]. [I: Yeah.] Everybody, you know, I make sure that I get some of everybody working on it. And that those people all have a good background in, in [subject]. (1.627-632)

[38] Fiscal restraint may now have reduced this to four days a year (Update 92.01.02, #29).

[39] There are some interesting exceptions here.

First, on at least one occasion of which I am aware, a superintendent refused permission for his teachers to work on any government committee as one strategy in a feud with the Minister over other matters.

Second, principals or superintendents will sometimes withhold permission on the grounds that a staff member is becoming too involved in out-of-classroom

Teachers participate for the opportunity to help shape the examination, because they have heard that the experience is an excellent in-service,[40] or because they are honoured to have been asked. Once involved, they often comment that they find item building an intellectual challenge and a revitalizing break from classroom routine. Until recently, the Branch also paid item builders an honorarium of $50 a day ($18-an-hour on weekends) which was in addition to their regular salary.[41]

Item building requires creativity as well as expertise, and it takes considerable practice to develop the necessary skills. Some otherwise talented teachers never seem to master it. Because item building is both an art and the cornerstone of the development process, it raises a number of recruitment issues which are not present for the other forms of teacher input. An Examiner explains:

> #20: That's interesting. There are written and unwritten rules for that kind of thing. When we're choosing committee members there's, I've forgotten how many, [capital], [major city A], [major city B], [major city C], and occasionally one of either [city D] or [city E], I think, but anyway, four committees during the year,

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[39](cont'd) activities to the detriment of teaching responsibilities. These problems were sometimes exacerbated by repeated requests for the same individuals as different Branches of the Ministry unknowingly competed for the same opinion leaders when trying to staff their separate committees, though this has now been partly resolved through better interBranch coordination. Some local jurisdictions are similarly reluctant to have too many of their staff out of class at one time. (Other superintendents were always anxious to encourage as many of their teachers to participate as possible, since they felt this gave their teachers valuable in-servicing, and the jurisdiction an "edge" in the examinations.)

Third, as the various Branches of the Ministry repeatedly sought to include the same outstanding individuals on their committees, some superintendents came to view this as the Ministry's exploitation of human capital developed at the jurisdictions' expense. Consequently, some of the larger jurisdictions have adopted the policy of charging an additional fee on top of their normal billing for substitute costs where the Ministry asks for a teacher *by name*. (Revealingly, they chose the same rate then paid as honorarium to the teachers. From the superintendent's point of view, there is no reason that teachers should be paid by both the board and Ministry for the same day's work, and this money should therefore be redirected to the board. From the teachers' point of view, this is an obvious example of the jurisdiction attempting to appropriate their earnings by inserting itself between the producer and consumer.) The Branch's response has been to stop asking for specific teachers and to simply request that superintendents nominate the required number of personnel, in which case the fee does not apply.

[40] #18: At the end of the two days, when they walk out of the item writing, they always say, "This is the best in-service I've ever had". . . . (1.1846-1848)

[41] The weekday honoraria were discontinued in 1990, with the result that some teachers now decline the invitation to build items, citing the extra work required to prepare lessons for substitutes and to "catch up" on their return to the classroom.

> consisting of four members each. The way we're *supposed* to select those is, like markers, ask superintendents if anybody is interested, in building items, and then you get a sense also I think, from the marking sessions, from people who talk to you, if people are interested in building items. To a degree we are obliged to choose new people and let everybody have a chance to participate, which is all very nice except some of these new people build shitty items. So in a quiet way, [#34] and I will, for next year, in a quiet way, try to load committees with certain people that we know and we're satisfied build excellent items. I don't mind bringing in new people, because there's certainly a wealth of information out there, but it's very expensive and time-consuming to bring in people who just aren't good item builders, and a real waste. So the official side is that we'll bring in new people and people with some experience in teaching and been in various school system for long time and give them a chance. And the unofficial is that we'll deliberately bring in a few that we know are good. We'll stack committees. (1.323-340)

Thus, the TDS's need for productivity is sometimes opposed to management's goal of involving as wide a cross section of the profession as possible. From the TDS's point of view, it is vital to include as many dependable item builders as possible to ensure a reliable supply of questions. Since it often takes several years to develop a new recruit to the level of supplying consistently good items, many TDSs are reluctant to take on too many beginners. From management's point of view, however, some TDSs' overreliance on a few trusted item builders verges on pork barrelling, especially since many of those now identified as veterans were recruited in the Branch's formative period through the only reliable screening mechanism then available: personal contact with the TDS.

The TDS's dependence on a cadre of established item builders tends to introduce both gender and regional biases. One former high school department head, for example, had initially turned to the other department heads from that system, as trusted colleagues, for his item builders. Unfortunately, this overlooked the problem that women are underrepresented as department heads in that discipline. Subsequent attention to gender equity through the inclusion of more women required that the TDS surrender an experienced and productive male for a unknown newcomer. On the other hand, once he accepted the need to rotate committee membership, the TDS was willing to include women and, now that some of these have attained veteran status, is as unwilling to part with them as he had been the initial group of males. Similarly, while the system of regional committees was designed precisely to prevent TDSs from recruiting all of their item builders from one community, this same TDS tended to hold all of his additional ad hoc weekend committee meetings in his home community.

Furthermore, when selecting individuals for the committee in that region, there was a natural tendency to continue to rely on his own small circle of former colleagues. Utilizing the TDSs' network of personal contacts is, of course, an advantage in identifying potentially strong recruits, but may also unintentionally limit rank and file representation to a particular faction or viewpoint.

On the other hand, forcing the TDS to include new individuals each year, or to accept everyone who is recommended by the jurisdictions, can lead to problems with productivity. The less experienced the committee members, the more time needs to be devoted to in-servicing. The greater the in-service function, the more superintendents will be tempted to follow their own professional development agendas in recommending teachers to the Branch.

> #26: . . . Like a lot of the boards use the submission of names as a bit of a, sort of an in-service thing for teachers. And so sometimes you don't get that good a set of items. But I, when I first came here I was under the impression that, that you had to use everybody, and since I've been here I've realized that it's a good idea to use everybody in item writing, and even if you don't use their items, it's, it's a good way to get people involved and get a good feeling from everyone about the exam process. So, I have contacted lots of teachers.[42] (1.674-682)

Note, however, the explicit reference here to the co-optative function of involving large numbers of the rank and file, even when their expertise is not always highly valued. Management's need to legitimate the program through teacher participation may be greater than the TDS's need to maximize productivity.

From management's point of view, the quality of the initial item is very nearly irrelevant, since it is subject to replacement or extensive revision later in the development process. Through its control of the review structure, management can ensure that the end product will meet its standards, even if this requires that the TDS rewrite the entire instrument. On the other hand, allowing the TDS to develop a prolific but unrepresentative cadre of item writers could place the program's basic acceptability at risk. Limited turnover among the item writers not only threatens to produce a narrow, predictable, and idiosyncratic test instrument (which is the official justification for broad teacher involvement), but would undermine the illusion of collegial control. A test written by a small, anonymous committee will still appear as an imposition on the profession by the Ministry, even if the authors are identified as classroom teachers. In effect, such a committee would merely be filling the role of TDS and as such would represent the expansion of the technobureaucrats at the expense of the rank and file. In contrast, an item-development process which involves nearly half the rank and file will appear collegial, even if (as in #43's example on page 294) none of the teachers' items actually appear on the test.

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[42] Similarly:

> #17: . . . Because I think there're stronger ones out there. Just I didn't, see they, those names were submitted to me. I had really no control over that. And superintendents submit the names, and I guess they felt they were strong. And in some cases they are. I've got some good ones. But I've got some that are very weak, and they really show up. Not only just at the Steering Committee, but the other meetings. But I guess that's par for the course. (1.232-239)

Passage Review

Many test questions require that students be provided with data they can manipulate or passages to which they can respond. As speaker #43 indicated above (page 294), the selection of the passages on which test items are to be based is of fundamental importance in determining the nature of the test instrument. In some subject areas, the selection of data is considered part of item building, but in others, the selection of passages is a separate task.[43] Where it is part of item building, the classroom teachers are often asked to bring their own resources to the meetings, and the Branch benefits from the teachers' files of clippings as well as from their expertise, but the item builders retain complete control over both aspects of the process. Where passage selection is a separate activity, the item builders have to apply their expertise in a much more constrained environment. Rank and file involvement in passage selection is therefore an important aspect in retaining collegial control over the work process.

In one subject, the logistics of passage management had been delegated to a specialized Examiner, who here describes the committee process:

> #30: Um, well, heheh, we review the materials as a body collectively and, and we make a decision together, because um when I prepare the materials and they're

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[43] The distinction here is that in some disciplines, it is permissible to create one's own data (as in a math problem), while in others, it is desirable to use authentic material (as in a literature assignment).

> submitted, I do, I do screen them, and I do edit them, you know, I do have control that way about what we get to see, but we, and I try to be quite, you know, objective about that, even though sometimes I don't feel the passage is, is my favourite or it won't work, I sometimes, you know, say, "All right, I'll have to see what the other committee people think", and we'll at things together and, and everybody will see something different in it and voice their concerns and then together, collectively, we'll agree to accept it or reject it. And um, and then sometimes it'll be taken to a[[n item building]] committee that doesn't like it or won't work on it, and if we think that there's quite a bit of merit behind a passage, we'll take it to another one, and, you know, before we throw it out, because there's quite a bit of, of work involved behind a passage. You don't want to uh just throw it away after all that work's gone into it because maybe one committee is being a little bit funny that day or, you know, [I: Yeah.] being uncooperative. So, um, I have more or less control to a large degree about what we initially see as a committee, but collectively as a committee, we decide together. (1.1115-1135)

We see here a collaboration between teachers and Branch staff, but there is some evidence that rank and file involvement in passage selection has been eroded in recent years. Besides #43's confession above (page 295) that he had assumed total responsibility for passage selection in his subject area, there has been a general tendency to rely more heavily on in-house staff.

> I: Uh, how big is that committee?
>
> #30: Uh, it varies. It used to be larger than it is now. But we've decided to keep, uh, it a little bit smaller and mostly use in-house staff uh because generally, we're more familiar with the concerns, that govern the, you know, acceptance of the passage. And uh, so, um, someone coming [from] outside, an outside reader, outside participant, um, may voice issues and concerns that aren't, you know, sort of within keeping, and so that makes, can make it difficult, wasting time and stuff like that and. So we keep it to people who are familiar with those concerns. So that they're in-house staff, and um, may also include people who are working for the Department at the time. For instance, [name] and [name], who do some work for us. They're retired teachers. Um, sometimes we'll use um, teachers who are on um, leave and are maybe um, doing a Masters at the [university], who have been maybe involved in the marking and with the Department to some degree. We also have a few people who read for the Department who submit passages, um, and we might ask them to, to come in as well. So there would be about, um 8 to 10, mainly.
>
> I: And they're usually not classroom teachers? Is this what you're saying?
>
> #30: Um—
>
> I: I mean, not currently teaching.
>
> #30: No, we don't call in, call in currently teaching classroom teachers. But, but where we might get that is, is uh, say uh a classroom teacher who is uh, seconded to the [university], uh, we might use them. So, you know, the same with like [name] and [name], they haven't taught for, I think this is their second year out of the classroom, but that certainly is more recent than, say, myself or [#25] or, you know, [#15].
>
> I: Is that for security reasons?
>
> #30: No, no.
>
> I: Why is that, then?

> #30: That we don't use classroom teachers?
>
> I: Yeah.
>
> #30: Well, they wouldn't um, I don't think the Department could, could request their time [I: Okay.] and be, and receive it.
>
> I: Okay.
>
> #30: We have a difficult enough time getting teachers, you know, uh to come and build items during classroom time. Same with range finding—
>
> I: So this is prep work, just isn't crucial enough to bring—
>
> #30: Not crucial enough—
>
> I: Yeah, right, okay. Okay.
>
> #30: Something that can be managed with in-house staff and a few extras. Because ultimately, those passages will be taken to the classroom teachers, and, and they will decide whether they will work on them or not. You can't force them to, [I: Yeah.] you know. (1.1141-1205)

Several points emerge from this discussion. First, for this examination at least, practising classroom teachers are not involved in the passage selection. Rank and file participation is at best *approximated* through the involvement of retired teachers or practicum associates at the university. Second, the reasons given for this exclusion are contradictory.[44] On the one hand, we are told that it is simply a matter of expediency, that the teacher involvement in item building and other activities is already so heavy that the system cannot sustain the burden of this additional task. On the other, there is the earlier comment that in-house staff are "more familiar with the concerns that govern the . . . acceptance of the passage" in contrast to the rank and file who "may voice issues and concerns that aren't . . . within keeping". This suggests that the concerns of the rank and file are not identical with those of Branch management, and that the removal of passage selection from classroom teachers may indeed include elements of ideological control.

I am inclined to reject a conspiratorial interpretation here, however. While I acknowledge the very real potential for ideological control through the selection of, say, "free enterprise" rather than "socialistic" passages for the examinations, I am reasonably convinced that passage selection is not currently influenced by the sectional interests which dominate the Legislature.[45]

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[44] Interestingly enough, the respondent explicitly rejects the one unassailable justification for excluding current classroom teachers — that knowing which passages would be on the examination could provide their classes with a significant advantage. No item builder could remember a sufficient number of questions (most of which will not make it to the final form in any event) to make a difference, but since an entire exam may be based on fewer than half a dozen passages, it is theoretically possible for a committee member to take advantage of this information in coaching students.

Furthermore, as #30 points out above, the item writing committees retain some potential for resistance. One suspects that normal group dynamics would prevent an item building committee from rejecting *all* the passages set in front of it, but as long as one assumes that there are at least some acceptable choices, then item builders can reject those few passages which they view as inappropriate. Of course, by holding the monopoly over passage selection, the Ministry retains the initiative and, as #30 also points out, can always take a rejected passage to another of the four or five committees working in that subject and try again. The situation therefore remains somewhat ambiguous.

Other Forms of Teacher Input

Summer Backups

In some subject areas, notably the sciences, TDSs set up committees of classroom teachers during Christmas, Easter, or summer holidays to work in the Branch, in lieu of hiring a full-time Examiner.

> #26: . . . They helped me put together my unit tests. I have my unit tests put together by teacher committees. I don't have a backup [[i.e., an Examiner]]. I couldn't find a successful backup. So I, I had to get the work done. So I get it done over the summer. I bring in six teachers that I know, that I work with, and they put together my unit tests, they edit my unit tests. So they do, they along with me, like we do it together sort of, most of it, except for actually sitting down and putting the [[final]] test together. I do that, based on the stats. But everything up to that, there's a lot of teacher input, and not just one backup doing it. I'd say about six teachers.
>
> I: Six teachers?
>
> #26: And they aren't the same six teachers all the time. I've got a couple that've stayed the same, since I started, but I, I worked with them a lot. I get, I get them in

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[45] On the other hand, my confidence in the ideological independence of the selection committee may simply suggest that I share their prejudices and am therefore unable to recognize their biases. On at least one occasion, for example, a marker complained to me about the "human secularist" influence evident in the selection of examination passages, and requested the inclusion of more stories with a "positive" outlook. While I had difficulty accepting his suggested alternatives as "real literature", I have to acknowledge that the examinations are to some extent biased against a fundamentalist worldview.

> almost on a backup basis over the summer. I get a couple for three weeks, then a different couple for three weeks. And I get them to work most of the summer. I get two large committees in over the spring break, of teachers and uh, I get them approved for at least six days during the year, six teachers for six days, for the year. So I get a lot [of] input from the classroom teachers.
>
> I: Are these the same six teachers every stage, or?
>
> #26: Uh, no, they're probably a total, maybe there are, not more than 12 teachers. Though since I came here, they have changed. There are two or three who have stayed the same, but they're not the same, maybe 24 teachers recently.
>
> I: Over the three years?
>
> #26: Over the, yeah. (1.566-599)

While the number of classroom teachers involved is small, it does more closely approximate continued rank and file control over the items after they have been written.

> I: You said "reviewing" the items? A separate step, they write the items initially, raw items, and then what's reviewing them?
>
> #26: Well, I get teachers, all over, to write the items. I get teachers that I request, as well as ones that are, their names are submitted to me, [I: Umhum.] so I don't, I don't do any, whoever's name is sent in, I use, and so I get [a] large number of teachers to write the items. And then I get a select group of teachers on a committee to put those items into unit tests, and when they do that, they work through and edit those items, to get some of the errors out. When they get them in the unit tests, another group of teachers will edit the unit tests, and work through the unit tests, and key-check it. (1.606-618)

Having the initial items submitted from a broad cross section of the rank and file and then edited by a slightly more select committee of their peers would seem to be as close to the ideal collegial process as any centralized coordination can come. These teachers may well be building and processing items to someone else's specifications, and so may have undergone ideological proletarianization, but there is little evidence here of rank and file deskilling. In this subject area at least, the teachers seem to be retaining control over technique through very nearly the entire development process:

> #19: Uh, they're involved all the way through, as far as I know. Uh, [#26] has uh one teacher come in every Tuesday afternoon, another teacher coming every Friday afternoon, uh, he has teachers come in for three, for four days at a time from different schools. I've met so many teachers here [I: Heheh.] it's ridiculous. Uh, yeah, they're involved with every step along the way, you would have three or four teachers. If you're editing or involved in development of some sort. (1.1655-1663)

Recruitment to Staff

The issue of staff recruitment will be dealt with in more depth in Chapter 8, but it is appropriate to note here that the circulation of practising teachers through the TDS position provides another form of rank and file input.

There is a genuine concern, for example, that test developers have recent classroom experience, as the comments by this senior manager demonstrate:

> #38: Yeah. I know that I have always been keen on that, but I think that there was a structure here that involved teachers. Although, I'm remembering now, one of the things that I really object[ed] to when I just arrived were a number of people who were helping develop tests and examinations who had been out of touch with the classroom. And I think, that was my immediate response, and as a real greenhorn, I mean, I guess I didn't even, and should have, taken the time to appreciate what these people had to offer. But my initial reaction was to get rid of them. Because they had not been attached to classrooms uh recently, and uh or if they were, they had been retired from service for some time uh, and I was concerned because, I think maybe the real reason that got me into a flap on that one was because the quality of our tests and examinations were not good. And I saw that the advice that we were getting was not adequate. (1.1251-1291)

This concern is echoed by many of the TDS staff. Note, for example, how this TDS is prepared to talk herself out of a job, even though she does not wish to return to the classroom:

> I: Uh, do you have any plans for what's going to happen after that, or?
>
> #33: Uh, I'm not fully sure. I would, I would hope for one further renewal, but then after that, I feel that uh, it should be a teacher who has taught the new program, who should take the job on when the new program uh, is up for examination. So that therefore, I would feel that I could [[work]] here effectively until 1991. August 1991, before the first for that critical 1991-92 school year, uh, that uh, somebody who's taught the new course and taught the, the nuances of it, because uh, basically, you're guided by a curriculum document, but in terms — I don't think it's appropriate for somebody who has not taught the course, to guide the development through the examination process. (1.59-72)

What makes this emphasis on recent classroom experience particularly interesting is that it goes beyond merely the desire for curricular currency, to essentially make the claim that the TDSs *are* classroom teachers.

> I: Okay. You're saying you want to see how the course has been operationalized by teachers in the classroom, and they should be brought in to do the exam?
>
> #33: No. I would, I would go even stronger. I would feel that I would have, I would have no authority to do that.
>
> I: No authority. Okay.
>
> #33: Because I believe that my, my present authority is not that which is uh given

> to me from, from my employer, but my authority is the respect that uh my colleagues in the field show to me, and that's on the basis of academic education, and uh, years of teaching experience. And if one of those years, one of those um, crutches is taken away with a new program of studies, I believe that my natural authority uh is gone.
>
> I: Okay.
>
> #33: So that therefore I would be looking for something else from · · yeah, I would think you would need something else uh from '91 onwards. (1.74-95)[46]

Indeed, this TDS felt so strongly about the need to be identified as a classroom teacher, rather than as a bureaucrat, that she continued to teach night school in non-examination courses so that she could retain that staff room contact:

> #33: So that therefore, [[teachers are]] aware of my internal audit role, and, this is another reason why I believe you've only got an effectiveness period of between four and six years, and you've got to keep, also the other reason for keeping teaching so that I'm in a regular, I'm in a staff room, you know, where basically nobody knows what my regular · · · I think that that's useful. (1.1693-1699)

From one perspective, this is clear confirmation of Freidson's model of professional dominance. If the TDSs are themselves thought to be representatives of the rank and file, then their replacing or revising the teacher-originated test items is merely an example of collegial coordination. Indeed, when such coordination is combined with their in-service role, their function is analogous to the creation of new knowledge by a profession's university-based research elite, and so entirely consistent with collegial control. As long as recruitment to the TDS position is restricted to current classroom teachers, then the rank and file retain considerable influence over the evaluation function. For example, this TDS believes that his former colleagues see him as "their man in the government", rather than as a bureaucratic outsider:

> #34: No, they see, well, they see me, this is interesting, as performing a service, there's that aspect to it. But I've picked up, and I've had some of them been, some of my friends be quite candid with me in saying that they're glad that I'm the position that I'm in. That somehow they feel that I have a sense of what's going on and hence will develop exams which are going to be fair. Which is rather flattering. It's often a bit flattering to you when I've heard this [-?-] to me.
>
> I: Okay, so there's not a them/us kind of feeling? It's you're one of them as far as they're concerned?
>
> #34: Right.
>
> I: Okay.

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[46] In the event, she did leave this position prior to 1991 to work on a national testing project which was not dependent on a specific curriculum.

> #34: That will change as I stay in this job more and more, they'll know that I haven't been in the classroom for many years. So I'm · · ·
>
> I: So you think over time that they'll see more of a division as you lose touch?
>
> #34: Right. Or if I ever have to go to speak to department heads and, say "Well, this is the way it's going to be". Right now it's a case of I'll often speak to department heads, and I'll want input into things. And they appreciate that. (1.1561-1587)

Note, however, that both speakers place a time limit on their identity as classroom teachers. In their view, one can no longer claim membership in the rank and file once the transfer to TDS becomes too "permanent". This is a factor which Freidson's analysis overlooks. What Freidson's model glosses over as a pattern of continued professional dominance is revealed as a process of resocialization from a collegial to an institutional orientation[47] in which rank and file identity — and therefore credibility — expires after a given period. If the transfer between categories is terminal, then it is more useful to see the technobureaucratic ranks as a separate occupation. Thus, one way of increasing the program's legitimacy is to limit the number of permanent TDS positions in favour of secondments and two-year contracts, thereby maintaining a steady recruitment from the rank and file. I will return to the issue of permanence again in Chapter 8, but for now it is sufficient to note that there is enough staff turnover at the TDS level to ensure there is always someone fresh from the classroom. These individuals are then constantly sought out as surrogate sources of rank and file input:

> #18: The funny thing about this job is, that when you first come on stream, I notice this with every new TDS, for about the space of three or four months, or five months, they suddenly become the classroom expert. "So what do you think teachers in the classroom are going to say?" or "What do you think people in school are going to say about this?" Jesus Christ, guy, I've only been out of the class for about a year! You can ask me! [I: Heheh.] "Okay, you're the new species out there; tell us." But it's true, you do tend to sort of get cut off in a sense, and it's kind of like living in a vast bottle, and so you say, "Well, am I losing my touch? Am I not losing my touch?" So you go to these secondary sources. (1.853-854)

The experience of this newly seconded TDS is typical:

> I just did a, I just reacted to their Enhancements, their Achievement program. The

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[47] Or in Gouldner's terms, from a "cosmopolitan" to a "local" orientation (Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Towards an Analysis of Latent Social Roles" Parts 1, 2. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 2 (December 1957, March 1958): 281-307; 400-428).

> Enhancements? And they, they're developing a document to send out to the teachers. They picked me as being a teacher, sort of being uneducated in the Achievement part of it, to react [to] it, on the, on the level of what the average teacher would say. So I did. And then they took it, and they incorporated some of the ideas, and then they showed me their new document, and it'd changed. That was [Director], the Director. (1.523-530)

The discussion of whether this pattern of recruitment constitutes continuing control of the evaluation function by the rank and file will have to wait until Chapter 8, but it clearly represents a form of input. The sample may be both limited and significantly biased by the hiring process, but the information obtained has the forcefulness which comes from sustained personal contact with a credible (by definition, since they *were* hired) spokesperson. At a minimum, the emphasis on recent classroom experience demonstrates an interest in, and a responsiveness to, the rank and file's perspective.

General Surveys

In addition to the regular administration of surveys to markers, the Branch occasionally undertakes a more general poll of teacher views. A senior manager describes the two surveys undertaken during the period when I was interviewing:

> R: A lot. For example, with the proposed Enhanced Achievement Testing Program, we will be sending a circular to every teacher in the province.
>
> I: Oh really?
>
> R: In three weeks. With the Diagnostic Reading Program, in terms of whether there's a need for further in-services, we sent out 10,000 questionnaires throughout the province to get feedback from schools. Sent some to one-third of the schools in the province, we sent questionnaires out to them, to have them fill out and respond to. (1.1738-1749)

While this information was carefully compiled and studied, I do not believe it constitutes a significant element of rank and file input. To begin with, the surveys were not always well constructed. As a sociologist, I may be somewhat oversensitive to issues of survey design, but even some of the Branch staff, including this manager, expressed methodological reservations:

> #35: . . . for example, with this [program], uh, as we sort of bounce along uh, from sort of one stage to another in the process of, of consulting, as it were or at least getting feedback, uh, to the proposal, we uh, we advance very slowly and uh, we get feedback and examine it very carefully as we go. I wonder about our particular technique from a researcher's perspective. It seems to me that there might

> have been uh, a couple, of least, of uh other better ways of gathering the feedback and then designing the program to suit the information gleaned from the feedback, rather than the way that we went, but that's uh, the path having been chosen, we're now on it, and so, so 'way we go. (1.194-205)

The two most important issues here are: (1) many of the questions appear to have been leading, so that it would be difficult for respondents to provide feedback which management did not wish to obtain; and (2) teachers were restricted to responding to a narrow range of Ministerial initiatives. I am aware, for example, of two qualitative research projects proposed to the Ministry which were rejected by the Senior Officials because the open-ended nature of the questions meant that they could not anticipate the type of feedback they would receive. While neither of these was directly related to the Branch, a similar attitude seems to prevail there. The survey concerning changes to the Achievement Testing Program, for example, took the continued existence of the program for granted, and merely asked for feedback on the specific nature of the proposed enhancements. There was no opportunity to propose alternatives. Thus, as this TDS indicates, teachers often are not asked for their opinion until after many of the fundamental decisions concerning a program have already been made.

> #43: I know from the, from the way that this whole . . . program has been going in the last six months that there is not a great deal of concern about what teachers want. There has not been, there has been almost, there has been, I think, an intentional decision not to ask teachers at this point. You know, to "rustle the underbrush". So they have input after the fact, you know, "Here was the test, what did you think of it?" As they come to mark it. "Any changes you would like to see in the future, now that the program is written in stone?" So that we permit them to make cosmetic changes. (1.457-466)

Though impossible to document, it is my strong impression that the purpose of these surveys was not so much to solicit alternatives from teachers as to obtain a mandate for the direction Branch management had already decided on, but now needed to sell to the Senior Officials and the Minister.

Of course, the same charge could be levelled against the surveys distributed to markers, but these tend to be much less contrived. For one thing, they are usually written quickly by the TDS — in contrast to the full committee treatment accorded to the much more public and expensive general surveys — and therefore somewhat more candid. Since the marker survey results are retained in-house, management may be prepared to air proposals at a much more preliminary stage. Whereas marker survey results seldom travel above the level of the TDS or Associate Directors, both the Senior Officials and the general public will demand to know the outcome of a public survey. Obviously, Branch management is not about to propose something in a questionnaire distributed to 10,000 teachers unless reasonably confident that it will be well received.

Furthermore, the marker surveys tend to be more specific and detailed. Whereas the general questionnaires are constrained by the need to be both accessible and motivating to a general respondent, the marker surveys benefit from a knowledgeable and captive audience, and so may seek more detailed information in the reasonable expectation that respondents will be both willing and able to reply at length. The marker surveys may therefore provide more opportunity for the respondent to suggest counter proposals or other unanticipated replies. Consequently, even where the marker surveys are limited to questions of technique, they seem to provide more real opportunity for rank and file input than the much more widely distributed general surveys.

Informal Networking

Beyond all of these formal opportunities for teacher input, most Branch staff retain an extensive personal network through which they keep in touch with the reactions of the rank and file. Note how this Examiner — even though a recent graduate and therefore without external contacts of his own — remarks on the importance of this networking function to the Branch:

> #20: Also I, we're certainly conscious, I think, of the general feel, or mood, around the province. [#34], I noticed, last exam, the day it was written, phoned a bunch of his friends around the province in [city] and [capital], and said, "What did you think of the exam?" And I did the same during marking. I said, you know, "What was this like?" "What questions were really a problem?" That kind of thing. So we get verbal feedback, and indirectly I guess, that turns into input, because I remember these things for the next time we're building items. (1.302-310)

One TDS went so far as to suggest that the networking function was sufficiently important to the smooth operation of the Branch that it should be considered part of the job description:

> #33: . . . And uh, I think the major thing for success, is to develop a first-class network of colleagues outside the office, your teachers, your classroom teachers, to get the product and to develop good marking systems, marking procedures. . . . But I think a very good · · network almost a condition, a condition of the job.
>
> I: Okay.
>
> #33: Uh, that if, if I were hiring a TDS, I would want, probably to ask, you know, "Who would sort of, can you give me a list of 20 to 30 of your colleagues that you would use as critics and sounding boards?" Then we've got a fair idea of what the profession is, you know, who, names, and then almost, you know, help judge by his, judge the quality, you know, are dealing, are you leading, possibly by [?voting?] a group of general losers, or have you developed a network of people who uh, will both contribute, tell you to go to hell when, when you're offline, so I think that, that, that you're in fact, instead of, you're hiring, you're hiring a network, as well · · [I: Heheh, an individual.] as an individual. (1.1102-1140)

The implications of this informal networking for rank and file control are ambiguous. On the one hand, it suggests a sensitivity to rank and file opinion, but on the other, the input received may not be particularly representative. The tension between these two factors is evident in the comments by this Examiner:

> #23: Well, I think, if, if there's a telephone call about some problem, uh we certainly try to deal with it right away, and not put it off or avoid it. And uh, and I think we try to deal with people quickly, rather than, so they don't have a long time to wait. And be pushed aside, and wait, and uh. No, I think the Branch just goes beyond, really goes uh, really does a very good job of going beyond that.
>
> I: Any, any sense that it goes overboard?
>
> #23: Yes, I think sometimes it, one little complaint can maybe cause a ripple that it shouldn't have to. You know, I think, maybe a little too sensitive to public opinion and perhaps pressure. (1.620-633)

This was a minor but recurrent theme in the interviews. Pride in the Branch's reputation for responsiveness was balanced with annoyance at what some staff perceived as management's oversensitivity to random critical comments. This raises two important points.

First, there is a clear hierarchical structure to the networking relationships between the Ministry and the field. Superintendents tend to phone the Director, principals tend to phone Associate Directors,[41] and teachers tend to phone the TDSs. Partly, it reflects the parallel

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[41] As illustrated in the comments by this senior manager:

> I: Okay. Um, do you have any uh, direct contact with classroom teachers in this position?
>
> #09: Not nearly as much. Uh, just let me think now, how much do I? Hmm? · · · You know, I don't think I do have much, heheh, now that I think about it. Yeah, and actu— you know, at least, as a result of this position. I mean, I still see the people that I worked with in [subject], but really, as a result of this position. I guess the only time I have direct contact

hierarchical structures in jurisdictions and the Ministry, such that each bureaucratic rank prefers to deal with its opposite number in the other system. Partly, this reflects the nature of the issues involved: teachers tend to be concerned with matters related to specific test instruments, whereas superintendents tend to be interested in broader policy matters, which therefore requires that they approach those higher up in the administration. And partly, it reflects official protocol. Branch policy officially restricts the TDSs to contact with classroom teachers. If the Branch needs to contact principals or superintendents, this must be undertaken at the Associate Director level or above. When setting up an item building committee, for example, the TDS must wait until the Associate Director has contacted the appropriate superintendents and obtained their approval before the TDS may initiate contact with the teachers.

Consequently, the higher one moves in the hierarchy, the greater the isolation from rank and file input. While TDSs often commented that their circle of teacher contacts was greatly expanded by their move to government, the number of such contacts a manager can maintain must necessarily decline as they concentrate on networking with other officials. To quote one Associate Director:

> #10: . . . but at any rate, uh, school system personnel, administrators, at various levels from superintendent down to supervisor, so I'm, I deal with people who have administrative concerns as well as people who have particular subject concerns. Uh, my staff deal more directly with teachers, although I end up having uh a lot of peripheral contact with subject teachers and a great deal of interest in what subject teachers have to say, because uh their views about what we are doing shape a lot of what the professional staff do, so uh. Certainly as well, people from external agencies, I deal with rather extensively. From time to time, the press. Certain

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[41](cont'd) with the teachers is when they phone uh, asking for information. They may ask for something, you know, materials we've got or some information, uh regarding===TAPE SIDE ONE ENDS.
TAPE SIDE TWO BEGINS: I:===according to your work. Like you said when they're phoning up to ask they're really getting stuff from you. Do they ever have input into your work?
#09: · · Well · · I guess where they would have input · · · well no, really, in terms of [area], uh they have, they don't have a lot of input, no. . . . I'm not talking about input there, so, I'd have to say no. Uh, [I: Okay.] which would be an unfortunate thing, but they really don't.
I: How about the next level up, uh, principals. Do you get a lot of input from them?
#09: Yeah, yeah. Principals have a lot of input, into. Probably more than they uh, than either superintendents or teachers, probably. . . . (1.916-952)

> people at the universities, people at the our postsecondary institutions, um, part of what I've been asked to do in the next year is to deal a bit more with the general public. It's fairly broad. (1.41-55)

Just one step removed from the TDS, and we already find that contact with teachers has become "peripheral", and is therefore diluted — and perhaps overwhelmed — by more direct input from school officials, representatives of other institutions, and the general public. Thus, informal networking provides the rank and file with access to the TDS level, but as one moves up the hierarchy towards the policy-making levels, teacher contact becomes much more attenuated. Unlike the continuous routine interaction of the TDS with former colleagues, teacher calls to management tend to be exceptional and specific. They also tend to be negative and highly reactive, because to penetrate past the TDS level usually implies that the complainant was unable to obtain satisfaction from the TDS and is now determined to appeal the matter higher up. Letters to the Minister, for example, automatically generate an "action request", which requires Branch management both to formulate a response for the Minister's signature and to consider what, if anything, may be done to avoid further challenges in this area. It is, of course, a bureaucratic maxim that one should avoid drawing the Minister's attention in this manner too frequently, not only because action requests represent an interruption in, and an addition to, one's regular responsibilities, but because Ministers do not wish to be unpopular. Hence the complaint by some staff that management occasionally overreacts to "a couple of calls from principals".

On the other hand, because the contact with upper management tends to be exceptional and impersonal, it loses its networking qualities and becomes merely another example of "public opinion". As such, it is external to the normal mechanisms of collegial control and becomes, instead, part of the political process.

THE USES OF TEACHER INPUT

How responsive is the Branch to teacher input? How cordial are relations with teachers? Staff at all levels took obvious pride in what they perceived to be the Branch's extensive, open, and positive interactions with classroom teachers. In addition to listing the many avenues of teacher input discussed above, some staff, as with this Examiner, went so far as to suggest that classroom teachers were their primary reference group:

> #33: I think the loyalty to the Branch, loyalty to, to the people that you're servicing. I, like I feel most loyalty to the teachers that I'm, and I [I: Clients.] think the Branch, the clients, uh, I, I think the Branch as a whole will bend over backwards to try and please them, and do whatever we can. We go out of our way, I think.[49] (1.386-391)

Others contrasted the Evaluation Branch with other Branches of the Department which they perceived to be less open.

> #02: You see, I never worked, say, within the Curriculum Branch, but I, I feel that this end, what I'm with now, is a little bit more receptive to uh, to change and, and listening. The Curriculum Department always seemed to be very rigid in, uh, the directions they wanted to go. "This is what we are doing", and they would do it. And they didn't want to listen to teachers. Uh, when I was on the ad hoc committee, working on the [subject], somebody in the Curriculum Department had made the decision that there would be a 20 per cent elective component, and that was just the word of God. [I: Heheh.] I mean, it was just nonnegotiable, and uh we went back with a few counter proposals, we, you know, other ideas as to how this could be handled or implemented, and it was just "No". And there was no discussion on the matter. And uh - - in that particular case, I think it was uh just a situation where uh, one of the chiefs had decided this is what he was going to do and no amount of reason was going to change it, and he did it. I don't see that kind of rigidity here. [I: Uhuh.] I think people are listened to here more so than, than other parts of [the Ministry].[50] (1.822-837)

A few staff even suggested that the Branch could occasionally go overboard in accepting teacher advice:

> #23: . . . we sometimes call teachers to see, to ask their opinion, or their advice on something, so, they have, they have quite a bit of say.
>
> I: Is that ever an issue for you, or problem?
>
> #23: - - Well, some, yes, in some ways. I think sometimes teachers uh, teachers are probably the pickiest creatures on Earth, [I: Heheh.] and sometimes I think they are needlessly picky. And their opinion about really what is on the curriculum or even sometimes what is even correct [subject content] is, is sometimes questionable. (1.1159-1169)

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[49] It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that this Examiner did indeed value the input from classroom teachers, such as those on the Validation Committee, more than advice received from the InterBranch or ERC.

[50] Alternatively, the speaker's perception that Evaluation Branch management is more receptive to input could simply reflect the change in his own position. Now that he works within the Ministry, he may be in a better position for his opinions to receive a hearing, or be more conscious of the extent to which Departmental staff are asked to accommodate teacher input. I am inclined, however, to the view that the Evaluation Branch really is exceptional in its openness to teacher input.

See also speaker #22, Chapter 8, page 412, for an example of the high regard in which teachers hold the Evaluation Branch compared with other divisions within the Ministry.

Further evidence that positive relations with teachers is the norm within the Branch may be found, ironically, in the reservations expressed by a few staff about the professionalism of particular units or managers whom they suspected of lacking in this commitment:

> #15: I do feel, I must say I feel in our section, that there is more attention given to what I consider to be important aspects of, of interaction with teachers. Uh, I regard teachers' impressions as, as being vital. Now, I get the feeling that everyone in the Branch does not feel that way about teachers. I, I sense an antagonistic attitude towards teachers around here, not in our section so much, I mean, at least not in [subject]. . . . (1.535-541)

> #14: . . . Actually, from the way that they perceive teachers out there, sometimes. Uh, I feel that they're, they're not being professional, in the way that they refer to the most important entity of our educational system which are teachers. . . . But there are others who have a very professional management style. And I always refer to [Director] as being professional. Always. Because it doesn't matter if you are a kindergarten teacher or a superintendent, you will get the same listening, the same, it's always important to [Director] to hear from everyone. (1.872-882)

> #20: I would say positively. I mean, people at this Branch are former teachers. They've lost a certain contact, I think, with the classroom because they've been here for a lot of years, but generally I think this is a pretty professional group, pretty solid individuals. None of them are really stupid or view teachers with any degree of contempt. I have a suspicion about a couple of the administrators on this floor who don't seem to hold teachers in very high regard, but I think that the exam builders — the managers [[i.e., TDSs]] and backups — both in Achievement and in Diploma, are pretty good. I think that the relationship that those people have with teachers is very constructive and positive. It's the upper levels that I'm worried about. (1.373-384)

For their part, while acknowledging that they could not always accommodate teacher demands, most managers[51] appeared to place great emphasis on maintaining and encouraging an open and honest dialogue with classroom teachers:

> #10: . . . the relationship is very positive. Uh, classroom teachers seem to know that they can contact this team and get a straight answer to the question. It won't necessarily be an answer that they like, but they seem quite free to do that. They seem to know that we're [?accommodating of questions?]. Uh, they seem to feel quite free to tell us what they think about the exams. I think that's really important. (1.568-574)

Of course, it is entirely unreasonable to expect that the Branch should take every piece of advice it receives, if for no other reason than that the input from teachers is not always consistent. #10's comment in Chapter 6 applies equally well here:

> #10: . . . the teaching group . . . particularly if they have complaints, are not

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[51] I should clarify that none of the managers offered a contrary opinion, just that some stressed this theme at every opportunity while others did not mention it.

> united in their particular agendas, certainly not provincially. They have quite specific agendas vis-à-vis exams and curriculum and what goes on in their own classrooms. . . . it varies from area to area. So, a task done to meet the stated and perceived needs of the teaching group, if it were done to meet only those needs, and done only to meet the needs of the teaching group that had launched the complaint (let's say it was in response to a complaint), would end up being really ineffective because it would meet those particular needs, it wouldn't meet the perceived and stated needs of other groups of teachers elsewhere in the province. (1.80-108)

Often when the Branch makes what appears to some teachers to be an arbitrary or weak decision, it is a necessary attempt to achieve a provincial consensus based on the lowest common denominator:

> #02: Uh, I don't think that they have uh an appreciation of the difficulty of building an exam which is going to uh meet the needs of ten to eleven thousand students, and their teachers, uh at a sitting. Because they all have ways that they phrase things in their classroom, and they know how they say it, and when they say it that way, their students understand them, but there's no guarantee that the student in another situation uh would be able to handle it. And that happened over one question. I was out at [school] today, one of the teachers was asked about one of the questions on the January exam. And they say, "Well, I think you should have said it that way". And I said, "Well, we did it this way because," and the way we did it was right. I mean uh, there was no problem with it at all, but that's not the way he did it. And uh, until you've really tried to get some of that common ground, and worked on a lot of the committees where you have people in from different jurisdictions, I don't think, I don't think a lot of teachers realize just how hard it is to get, to get that constancy. (1.372-389)

The tendency towards the lowest common denominator is an inevitable drawback to centralized examinations. This does represent some erosion of the classroom teacher's professional autonomy, since ultimately the teachers will have to adjust their phrasing to match that on the provincial test, but is not in itself inconsistent with collegial control. The introduction of any professional standard requires that members of the rank and file accommodate to the provincial norm. The issue is whether the consensus is formed by the rank and file or imposed on them from above.

Obviously, not every teacher can be polled on every decision, but the Branch does seem to have provided a number of opportunities for the expression of representative views at each stage of the examination-development process. Some of these avenues are more fundamental and effective than others. I have argued, for example, that teachers' validation comments on field tests are probably overwhelmed by the statistics generated by the actual performance of their students, and that the general surveys of teacher opinion are merely a form of controlled participation. Item building and the various marking activities, on the other hand, do seem to suggest the continuance of at least partial collegial control over technique. Two minor reservations may be cited here before proceeding.

First, I have already alluded to the slight tendency for the TDSs to favour productivity over representativeness on the item building committees, and perhaps something similar may be detected in the selection of the range finders. This slow turnover need not, however, undermine rank and file control. In my experience, the veteran item builders also tend to be teachers with reputations for excellence, and so opinion leaders among their peers. It might well be that if the rank and file were called upon to elect representatives to the committees, the same names would be brought forward.[52] Furthermore, the problem may be self-rectifying as the current generation of veteran item writers rapidly approaches retirement age, and TDSs are increasingly forced to bring in new recruits. In any case, unlike a situation in which decisions are being made by a separate rank of technobureaucrats, it is unlikely that the interests of even an entrenched committee membership would diverge significantly from those of the rest of the rank and file,[53] since they continue on in their role as classroom teachers.

Slightly more worrisome is the threat to the entire process posed by fiscal restraint. There has been a steady reduction in the funds available for item building, for example, which has already led to a 33 per cent reduction in committee meetings and the elimination of the honoraria formerly paid to participants.[54] This was clearly of concern to the senior managers even before the current round of cuts:

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[52] It must be admitted, however, that it is sometimes unclear whether selection for Branch committee work is an acknowledgement of a preexisting reputation or the initial bestowal of elite status on the participants. I am inclined to the former view, but I can think of at least one occasion when an individual who was recommended to me solely on the basis of seniority, and about whom I had subsequent misgivings, was nevertheless able to parlay participation on my item building committee into appointment to a more senior advisory body, and so on, until eventually achieving an influential (but to my mind, wholly undeserved) reputation. But this was not part of my formal observation, and I raise the point purely as a personal aside.

[53] Provided, of course, that the last traces of gender imbalance are eliminated from these committees.

[54] #29 stated that while boards are still officially asked to release committee members for six days, the Branch typically has funding for only four (update 92.01.02).

> #11: It's like uh we place a great deal of importance to our teacher input, on our item writing, and then don't provide funds for item writing, what are we saying? [I: Umhum.] Well, we're saying we place all that importance on it but we're not going to do it. (1.624-627)

A related problem is that TDSs have been given some responsibility for budgeting as one consequence of Branch reorganization and the elimination of the Coordinator position. This not only increases the tendency for the TDSs to place productivity above representativeness in committee selection, but also reinforces an institutional rather than a collegial orientation,[55] as this TDS explains:

> #15: I, I sense an antagonistic attitude towards teachers around here. . . . I don't know why that would have evolved, or why that exists, except, that it could become the logical result of more attention paid to making your budget work out than to getting some kind of useful product out there. [I: Umhum.] And you could start doing that. As a matter of fact, I felt kind of frustrated with some of our teachers myself. Uh, who I thought were maybe padding their expense claims. Uh, so, and, and partly that is now because those budget concerns are mine, in my field, when they weren't before. I mean they were only indirectly, [I: Umhum.] I wasn't, I didn't have to prepare this budget, and then, uh, try to live up to it. (1.539-551)

These reservations notwithstanding, marking activities and initial item development do seem to represent considerable teacher input. The question, however, is whether this input amounts to collegial control over the evaluation function or whether it is merely a form of controlled participation.

The crucial factor here is the nature of the input being sought and the level at which it enters the Branch. In each of the structures described above (with the possible exception of the general surveys, which may be discounted), the bulk of teachers' interactions with the Branch are with the TDS or Examiner ranks. The higher one goes in the hierarchy, the more cut-off one becomes from direct teacher contact. Since decision making within the Ministry and Branch is essentially topdown (as documented in Chapters 4 through 6), this means that rank and file influence is far removed from the level at which goal setting takes place. For example, whereas the TDS requires special dispensation from senior management before overriding recommendations made by the advisory committees (which are themselves largely limited to only minor issues), this is clearly not the case for recommendations from the teacher committees:

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[55] Or again, in Gouldner's phrase, a heightened concern with "local" interests at the expense of a "cosmopolitan" orientation.

> #28: And uh, if the, if the ERC had clearly conflicting demands and desires from the uh senior management of the Branch, I would expect that uh senior management would discuss those concerns with them, I believe they're that, that important. [I: That important.] If it was an item writing committee or a group of markers, no. (1.1572-1577)

This in turn strongly suggests that the rank and file have undergone ideological proletarianization, and that their input is sought only on questions of technique.

The issue then becomes, why is there such great emphasis on obtaining classroom teacher input on questions of technique?

One obvious factor is the Ministry's need for the skills and knowledge over which the teaching profession has a monopoly. This is certainly the most common explanation offered by Branch staff.

> I: Why do you think [teacher input]'s important?
> #38: Because they have, they have an experience I suppose that we need, and capitalize on. Uh, their recent involvement with, with students or continuing involvement with students uh brings a perspective that is absolutely essential in making a quality examination, because our exams have to communicate with kids, and since we can't talk to kids, we need to get somebody who is recently talking to kids. I think, you know we, we field-test on students, but uh but we need that kind of input, recent classroom experience, all the time. I mean, no matter how good we get here, we'll still always need that, it seems to me. (1.1344-1355)

This can only be part of the explanation, however, as this expertise could be obtained in other, more cost-effective ways. Indeed, the initial test-development process proposed for the Branch was much more limited, with the TDS contracting out work to a few private suppliers, as this senior manager points out:

> #38: Yeah. But it's interesting how you develop and grow. Um, I know that back in 1981, it would have been easy for us to have gone the other direction. I mean, not us, because I wasn't here yet, but it would have been easy for the Branch to have gone for the B.C. route. Because if you look at, it's interesting, because we looked at some of the old position descriptions? And all, a lot of them had like "the purchase of exam questions", "the contracting out of", and that kind of thing. And uh, we certainly changed that.[56] (1.1303-1311)

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[56] The shift towards the extensive involvement of classroom teachers appears to have been a Branch-level initiative taken by the first Director. #38 continues:

> So that, you know, this whole notion of the exam-development process was one that I, I think I had an input on, which required of course involvement of classroom teachers. But, but uh, but I don't think that was an original thought.

The decision to change from a contractual model (which one would expect to have been more attractive to the free enterprise sentiments of the conservative faction then ascending to dominance within the Ministry) to a model which stresses collegial participation suggests that there was more at stake than simply obtaining the necessary expertise.

It appears likely that management was drawn to this collegial model at least partly in response to the anticipated resistance to the program from the rank and file. Recall, for example, #11's comment in Chapter 4 (page 124) that

> . . . the initial thrust of, of the Department [[i.e., the Branch]] when it first opened, I think was predominantly one of uh, gaining teacher credibility and acceptance. Without which the product would not be used, properly. Uh, there was a lot of animosity within teaching at that point towards it, and [?may still be?]. But uh, that certainly had to be broached and dealt with. Sort of the breaking down of the hallowed walls of the white tower to ensure that we could peek into the corners, and see what was happening, make sure that they felt comfortable that the process was fair, aboveboard, and treated them well. (1.200-211)

We see here the suggestion that teachers had the potential to resist the effective implementation of the examination programs and that this potential called forth a response designed to win the teachers' cooperation. The establishment of structures to involve a significant number of classroom teachers undermines resistance and smooths the state's reappropriation of the evaluation function in two fundamental ways.

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[56](cont'd) I think that, that the notion was certainly here with [the first Director].
[I: Okay.] I think with [the first Director], and I say that because I don't think that [Associate Director A] and [Associate Director B] were of that bent.
I: What about higher up?
#38: Um—
I: Did the Deputy or the Minister have a particular, beliefs involving teachers?
#38: I don't think · · There was a tradition in the Department for involving classroom teachers in a variety of kinds of things. Uh. I do know that uh, that when [name] became Deputy Minister, that he expressed concern about the decision-making process. Because he was of the opinion . . . that in some quarters you had committees making decisions, you know, and uh, and that's not good, I don't think that's a good way to do it, because uh I think the decisions have to be made with, by the individual responsible for the area, with proper input of course. (1.1311-1336)

While the interpretation of the sentence beginning "I don't think . . ." depends on whether the following "there" is capitalized, the sharp distinction the speaker makes between the responsibility of those within the hierarchy to set goals and take decisions and the desire to have those outside provide only advice and technical input is clear enough.

First, by enlisting a broad cross section of practising teachers, the Branch was able to develop a product notably superior to that in most other jurisdictions. While any judgement of "quality" is necessarily subjective, anyone who had the opportunity to compare the initial tests produced in the case study province with those of, say, British Columbia during the same period[57] invariably concluded that the Branch's tests were not only superior, but a role model which other provinces should emulate. Indeed, when the Council of Education Ministers of Canada agreed some years later to the free exchange of examination questions between jurisdictions, the Branch could find none from the other provinces which it wished to use, but other jurisdictions frequently copied question design or actual test items from the case study province. The superior quality of the Branch's examinations is attributable to the accumulation of expertise brought to bear on their development through the participation of large numbers of creative individuals with divergent experiences — that is, 50 heads are better than one — and to the representativeness of the large sample of teachers involved.[58]

This superior quality is not only important for its own sake, but is also crucial to the program's political acceptability. Clearly teachers would have been much more united and effective in their resistance to the reintroduction of provincial testing had the test instruments themselves been shoddy. Instead, it has proved very difficult for opponents to explain to the public — or even to other educators — why they continue to object to provincial testing when the examinations are so obviously superior to anything individual teachers could be expected to produce for their own classroom. Many of the educational principles compromised by centralized testing are too abstract to be readily understood outside the profession, and so opponents are placed in the untenable position of having to assert their monopoly of specialized knowledge under circumstances where this will appear as merely a self-serving rejection of accountability. Even many of the objections to centralized testing found in the professional literature may be weakened if the Branch can claim that its instruments are of a sufficient quality that they avoid the usual failings of such programs. For example, I would be prepared to claim that the Branch's social studies tests support, rather than undermine, an inquiry approach and provide sufficient flexibility to allow classroom teachers to continue to respond to the individual needs of their students. Not all social studies teachers would agree, but then they would either have to take the principled but distinctly unfashionable position that no testing program could *ever* be satisfactory, or become entangled in a debate over the technical merits of Branch product, which distracts attention from the larger issue of state control over the evaluation function. Thus, the high quality of the *means* is used to legitimate the *goals*, and the Branch's response to any criticism of provincial testing becomes simply, "But they're damn good tests!"

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[57] Significantly, the British Columbia Teachers Federation had initially boycotted the development process in that province, and the tests had been privately contracted to various non-educators who could claim subject area expertise. After a few well-publicized problems, the British Columbia Ministry raided the Branch for key personnel, who then revised B.C.'s development process to increase teacher involvement and eventually won over the teachers, with the result that that province's tests now closely resemble those of the case study province.

[58] For example, an important criterion for any testing program is that there be an exact match between instruction and evaluation, and as this senior manager argues, the best way of ensuring that match is to involve those providing the instruction in the evaluation process.

> #11: . . . I would be adamant about the aspect that, at the interface level of the examination, that those be teachers. Uh, so that, first of all, that uh, tight control over what we do versus what goes on in the classroom, and there is a uh face validity that, uh, content expert validity, type of situation within the exam itself. Uh, I don't know how else you'd validate the exam against the curricula, in another way. It's one of the easiest ways to do it. So you've got that kind of content in the Validation Committee, in, in the item writing committee, uh, and the markers. (1.271-280)

The larger the sample of teachers involved, the more likely the examinations are to achieve at least face validity. Of course, the best match is achieved by eliminating centralized testing and leaving evaluation entirely in the hands of the classroom teacher.

Second, the invitation to participate in the test-development process, and the Ministry's sincere responsiveness to teacher input at the *level of technique*, creates the appearance of collegial collaboration. As I have demonstrated, actual control rests firmly with management through supervision of the TDS and the review process, but the involvement of large numbers of classroom teachers both legitimates the program and co-opts a significant portion of the rank and file.

A key element here appears to be ideological desensitization; that is, the denial or separation of self from the ideological context of one's work.[59] By soliciting teacher input, the

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[59] Charles Derber, *Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1982), p. 181. See above, page 148.

Branch has been very successful in convincing even those fundamentally opposed to the program to contribute to it.

> #10: There's the group of people who uh still very strongly feel that any kind of centralized testing program is wrong and bad and educationally inappropriate. Now, I think what is laudable and uh, [-?-?-?-?-?] particularly in the [subject A] community, not so much in the [subject B] community, but certainly in the [subject A] community, that group of people who are very, very strongly opposed to any kind of centralized testing, still hold that view, but have been extremely supportive of our exams, who worked very cooperatively with us, who are participants, and who essentially said, "If we have to have them, these look like about the best we can manage".[60] Uh, they, from time to time, will still make statements about how they don't like exams, but almost universally, they've certainly conceded that whatever we're doing certainly seems to be about as good as you can get. Now, that is no small feat [I: Yeah.] of cooperation. [I: That's pretty incredible.] Particularly with that community. Because that, that community had the potential to completely sabotage this program, and they could have done it.
>
> I: That's interesting. Why do you think they didn't? Can you speculate on that, or?
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> #10: Well · · well, I like to think that in part it has to do with the process that we used in dealing with that community. Uh, we've actually asked their opinion, and we've done so sincerely, and we've listened to it. Nobody did that before. It was never done before. People simply said, "Here it is; like it or leave it." And, and the fact that our development process takes the other approach, which says, "We're going to have exams; what do you think should be in the exams? How can the exams best support the curriculum?" I think that's been really important. (1.608-639)

Note here the clear separation between the presentation of the goal as nonnegotiable ("We're going to have exams") and the entirely open nature of the invitation to participate at the level of technique ("what do you think should be in the exams?"). Teachers are thus faced with a difficult choice. On the one hand, they can choose to resist the goal by boycotting the development process — but if unsuccessful, this strategy places at risk the quality of the tests with which they will still have to contend.[61] On the other hand, a strategy of cooperation which allows the rank and file to retain some input at the level of technique (and so mitigate the worst consequences of the external imposition of these programs) requires that teachers effectively concede goal setting to the government. This is not always recognized, however, and many teachers seem under the illusion that they can effectively oppose the program even while they labour to ensure its success.

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[60] Note how the appeal to technical quality is used here both to legitimate the rejected goal, and to co-opt the participants by appealing to their pride in the product of their labour.

[61] Interestingly, #10's comment that the teachers "had the potential to completely sabotage this program" suggests that a strategy of resistance might have been successful, as in some sense was the earlier resistance to the Comprehensive Examination program.

> #26: I think there are [a] lot of teachers that would like to see the exams gone. For various reasons. But the uh, to be able to work on the exam, to mark the exam, they see as an advantage to them, most of them. Since the exam is here anyway, they want to get involved and, and work on it and try to improve it and be aware of what's going on. So they see it as, as a positive thing to do, but I think even those teachers that work on it and do a good job working on it, given their choice — "Would you like to have the exams or not?" — would say, "No". (1.750-758)

Note here the suggestion that the motivation for choosing the cooperative option is not just the opportunity to help improve the program, but the need to keep informed about the details of the examinations. As mentioned earlier, involvement in item writing, marking, or other test-development activities carries with it considerable in-service benefits, including a clearer understanding of what is to be tested and how.

> #07: In, in the [subject] we'd done a fair amount of what I consid— what I call in-servicing: getting committees together, helping them, helping to prepare questions, helping to prepare tests, *so that they learn as to what the information is, what type of questions you're looking for,* uh, that the questions should be, a reasonable [content]. (1.529-534, emphasis added.)

Whatever their stand on the examinations, many teachers feel compelled to participate, especially in marking, to obtain the information necessary to prepare their own students to succeed on the tests. Once involved, however, the teachers quickly succumb to a fixation on technique.

> #10: I think the other thing that has really turned it, a tremendous number of people around, is the marking process. Nobody who has marked has ever said that's not the best in-service they can get, and it's a good in-service from a whole bunch of perspectives. And it's a really good in-service because we've given them something that allows them to look at a really crucial part of their programs in a way that many of them haven't done so before. It's curricularly sound, it's rooted in research, it has the student at the heart of it, uh, I mean it's good stuff. And they're not stupid. They're not stupid. (1.639-655)

But in one sense they are, because this is a classic example of ideological desensitization. Mesmerized by the technical virtuosity of the marking process and by the in-service benefits which they derive from participation, the teachers are seduced into willing collaboration, even when they disapprove of centralized testing. Note in the following, for example, the implicit suggestion that those who refuse to become involved are responding to the program's goals, while those who choose to partake are responding to the program's innovative techniques.

> #20: Some people see it as a gross intrusion and they refuse to have anything to do

> with the testing uh program, except that they feel obliged to administer it once a semester. Others are much more interested. They say, "Oh, this is a fascinating process and I didn't know you could make an exam like this", and they like to get involved either with item building, or marking or range finding. (1.423-429)

This focus on technique allows participants to disclaim responsibility for the purposes to which their expertise is being used by the Branch. Most fail to recognize that technique is not neutral, and that by increasing their testing skills, they are implicitly accepting a general shift in education towards accountability, curriculum-centred rather than child-centred schooling, and so on. There are any number of areas in which teachers could become more knowledgeable, including a better understanding of the "big picture", which might lead to the greater politicization of the rank and file; but instead, they are developing only those skills which serve the specific needs of the sectional interests which are attempting to dictate policy to the schools. The more knowledgeable teachers are about testing — the more that evaluation skills come to be seen as a normal and expected component of the professional's knowledge base — the greater the predisposition to accept centralized testing as natural and desirable.

From the Branch's perspective, therefore, it is important to be able to include as many people as possible in the test-development process. First, the greater the pool of expertise on which the Branch can draw, the greater the probability of producing an excellent product. Second, the higher the proportion of the rank and file cycled through item building and marking, the wider that superior quality can be publicized, and the better the program legitimation. Third, the more teachers who partake of the in-service benefits of the development process, the greater the awareness of, and receptivity to, testing procedure. This heightened awareness of evaluation technique in turn builds the available pool of expertise on which the Branch can draw, creating a feedback loop within the profession that simultaneously intensifies rank and file commitment to the cooperative option and distracts attention from the larger ideological context of centralized testing.

Consequently, it becomes increasingly difficult for individuals to resist the lure of participation and to continue boycotting the development process.

> #21: And I've found that the teachers at this point in time are eager to participate

> and I have very few refusals that are simply are um because they don't approve or support the test. I've had one, where the teacher just outright told me, "I still don't approve of the test and I'll register—" He registered his disapproval by not participating, even though he was recommended by a superintendent to [I: Umhum.] participate in writing. But for the most part, we've had people asking, "Could we help, could we mark, could we write?" (1.715-723)

As more and more of their colleagues succumb, the minority who continue to resist place themselves at an increasing professional disadvantage, and their principled objections begin to be characterized as stubbornness or ignorance. It is difficult, for example, to appeal to specialized professional knowledge as the basis for one's boycott when 200 to 300 of one's colleagues already have implicitly endorsed the process through their own participation. Of course, many of those already involved will still claim to be opposed to the program and disclaim responsibility for its negative consequences (even though it is a product of their labour), but this merely increases the pressure on the few holdouts by suggesting that it is possible to abandon their boycott without abandoning their principles.

Once involved, however, the participants are open to ideological co-optation in much the same way as are regular Branch staff. Participants naturally come to feel some ownership for those evaluation procedures in which they have participated, and as the proportion of the rank and file rotated through the various committees increases, teachers begin to see the examinations as their own. This belief is, of course, encouraged by Branch staff at all levels. To quote an Examiner:

> #07: And, and the selling job, in terms of having the teachers make the questions, help put together the test, helps to give them a, a feeling of ownership. [I: Right, right.] Which I think is extremely important for the whole system to succeed, and succeed, I think, reasonably well. (1.560-564)
>
> #07: And [name] did a good fill-in job, in terms of helping to set up the committees and doing a lot of in-servicing, trying to get that ownership across. (1.1220-1223)

In other words, by delegating technique to broadly based teacher committees, the Branch is able to suggest that rank and file input is equivalent to collegial control.

Not only does the involvement of classroom teachers legitimate the product, it brings the rank and file into direct personal contact with Branch staff, allowing the formation of collegial relationships.

> #20: This is mostly speculation, but I think that classroom teachers view the exam managers and field test people pretty well. I think it's sort of schizophrenic, I think. I believe that teachers view the people here in a positive light, or at least with a fair degree of tolerance. But I think still that teachers are suspicious and unhappy with the very idea of Diploma Exams, and therefore on the one hand, you dislike the whole process, the Department and the people and the exams themselves you can hold in great contempt, but the people uh, you can't help but like them, I think. So it's a little strange. (1.388-397)

Negative attitudes towards the examinations can be partially overcome if teachers begin to associate the program with individuals they respect, admire, or trust. If these individuals, and a growing number of one's peers, appear to support the program through their participation, then one's own reservations may be called into question.

Or, to put the same point another way, it is important for the Branch to avoid giving the impression that the program is being imposed on the rank and file by a faceless, uncaring, and unresponsive bureaucracy. To quote a senior manager:

> #10: Well, uh, I mean, teachers are, just sort of, I think it goes with the territory doesn't it? I mean, that uh, initially, for anyone who hasn't had any contact with us it seems to me there's a given, and that given is a connotation that government will screw up, okay? So it seems to me, initial contact, with anyone — teacher, whomever — who hasn't had any dealings with us, is going to have to be, to disavow [[sic: disabuse?]] them of that [I: Umhum.] impression. It just seems to me to be a given. Uh, it seems to me, once we get over that, that uh, with very few exceptions, the people with whom we deal, the teachers with whom we deal, seem to know that they can tell us what they think, we'll listen to that, and we'll act on it if it's possible for us to act on it, we'll take it into the whole barrel of advice that we get from people, and I think they trust that. I think they feel that when we ask them for their opinion, we're being sincere.[62] (1.587-601)

Viewing Branch staff in a positive light is an important factor in the co-optation of the rank and file, not only because the teachers need to trust in the sincerity of Branch responsiveness to their input, but because the illusion of collegial control requires the blurring of the distinctions between the technobureaucratic and classroom ranks. The government's reappropriation of the evaluation function is obscured if the technobureaucrats can claim to be part of the same professional body as the rank and file. Branch staff attempt to identify themselves with teachers in two ways.

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[62] Note that there is no suggestion here of rank and file control, simply that their input will receive a sincere hearing. As with the advisory committees, however, this input is mixed into the "whole barrel of advice" (which includes directives from the Senior Officials) and it is the senior manager's synthesis which prevails.

First, by bringing the rank and file into the development process and fostering a sense of community among those teaching in a particular subject area, the government has been able not only to further encourage teacher participation, but also to place Branch staff at the very centre of those collegial relations.

> #15: I know that from out there in the street it's just government, we're just all government, and uh, I think in, in my field, [subject], I think quite a few teachers have changed their attitudes about, I don't think are quite so suspicious. I think, uh, we get quite thoughtful, positive comments on questionnaires, and I think that has a lot to do with the way present, the way we've involved teachers and the way uh, the way we make it possible and in fact even encourage them to communicate with each other, the marking parties, uh, marking camp, summer marking camp, has had some quite uh, positive repercussions. Many teachers have, are sharing of materials now, and realize that there are hundreds of them out there and, I think has uh, eased that sense of isolation, alienation, I guess. (1.999-1009)

Involving teachers in development activities, then, helps to erode the boundary between the technobureaucrats and the rank and file, thereby increasing the latter's receptivity to Branch programs.

> #30: If there were difficulties, that may have been in earlier years when the Department [[i.e., the Branch]] was um relatively unknown, and uh, and so I think a lot of teachers didn't have any kind of affiliation and sort of maybe felt separated, or you know, didn't have any kind of involvement or understanding of how to use field tests or, you know, exposure ourselves to— heheh [I: Heheh.] —ourselves to the public, and teachers and students, that um our reputation and public relations image has certainly become more positive and uh, I, I, oh classroom teachers receive us quite positively. (1.1216-1227)

Branch staff, and particularly the TDS and Examiner ranks with whom teacher contact is most common, are therefore often at some pains to present themselves as fellow educators, rather than as government bureaucrats.

> #30: With new teachers who maybe haven't had any participation in, in the Department, or with the Department, I would see them as kind of that's you're the "you" and we're "us", and you know, but they're always, they're quite interested, and so I think when they know that I was a classroom teacher too, you know, that I don't have any big high position with the government, or, you know, I'm no influential, you know, big guy, you know, their reserve, you know, somewhat lessens. With teachers who have had us field testing in the classroom or have marked, there's no problem at all. They feel quite comfortable, and I think they consider them, you know, as one of us. They know their involvement is crucial, that it's important to us, and that they matter, and uh so I think they, for those teachers, they, they think of "us" collectively. (1.1216-1246)

In other words, the teachers appear to have bought into the illusion of collegial control at least partly on the grounds that they feel themselves to be on an equal footing with the

Examiner and TDS staff in the development process. Unfortunately, even were this true, these non-classroom educators have also undergone ideological proletarianization and are themselves relatively powerless within the bureaucracy. Thus, while the Ministry presents a human, sympathetic, and responsive face to the rank and file, it is not the face of anyone who *matters*.

Second, Branch staff attempt to identify themselves with the interests of classroom teachers by distancing themselves from the negative consequences of the program. As will be recalled from Chapter 4,[63] for example, Branch staff denied any responsibility for the use of the examinations in the evaluation of classroom teachers by attributing such "abuses" to the separate technobureaucratic structure of the local superintendents. To cite a typical comment by a TDS:

> #22: I think what the real problem is the abuse, when the superintendents and I think, you know, in our meetings we've talked about that, and school boards get these results and get teachers upset, or worry, or principals, and it just goes all the way down to the children, and that is not a good thing. I think the test itself is a very, is a fair test, and just take it for what it's worth, you know, for the little children. But what's been done with it is causing a problem and resentment with teachers. (1.1116-1123)

Of course, this attitude that "it is a fair test. . . . But what's been done with it is causing a problem and resentment with teachers" is another classic illustration of ideological desensitization. Even staff who had themselves felt threatened by the examinations when they were teachers conceded that they had not thought about the issue since joining the Branch.

> #24: I would hate to think of that. And that's something I haven't spent a long time thinking about, even though when I was teaching and had to teach the [subject] and was just terrified that they were going to uh use their final marks against me. Uh, I suppose that attitude is out there, and yet, I have not seen it thrown up, in my direction anyway. I don't, I don't like that idea, I don't like to see that kind of division. And I wouldn't respect um administrators or anyone who used them in that way; that's not the purpose of it.[64] (1.989-997)

By glossing over their own culpability in the examination's "internal audit" function, the staff are able to downplay this potentially divisive factor in their relations with classroom teachers.

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[63] See above, pages 124-125.

[64] As an aside, it is interesting to note that the speaker considers withdrawal of his respect as a significant act of censure. This is a typical expression of professionalism as an ideological resource in knowledge worker resistance.

Recall, for example, the TDS who considered her identity as a practising teacher sufficiently important that she continued to teach night classes in non-examination subjects. Her self-imposed time limit for remaining with the Branch reflected the belief that she could be effective only as long as she was not too strongly identified as a bureaucrat, and therefore with the "abuse" of Branch product.

> #33: Then, so that is, in that regard, the internal audit role, they know it is there, and many would like me to start intervening with some superintendents on the interpretation of results, and things like that. [I: Umhum.] So that they would recognize that I have more influence than they did. Didn't realize how far it has sunk when you're dealing with those guys, with superintendents. So that therefore, they're aware of my internal audit role, and, this is another reason why I believe you've only got an effectiveness period of between four and six years, and you've got to keep, also the other reason for keeping teaching so that I'm in a regular, I'm in a staff room, you know, where basically nobody knows what my regular ··· I think that that's useful. (1.1687-1699)

Since, from the Ministry's perspective, the ideological co-optation of the rank and file is a much higher priority than the cheapening of labour through the enforcement of production quotas, Branch staff are inclined to side with the teachers against local boards. Note how in the following example (cited previously in Chapter 4), the lure of the in-service benefits provided by the TDS is further enhanced by the inclusion of strategies for coping with the administration's (mis)interpretation of examination results:

> #18: At the end of the two days, when they walk out of the item writing, they always say, "This is the best in-service I've ever had," and I say, "And you got paid for it too!" Heheh. Because you know what I do, it's not strictly item writing. I also talk about interpretation of Achievement Test results. You've got Achievement Test results, how do you interpret them? Okay, what kinds of concerns do you have? What's your principal been saying about Achievement Tests? Your particular results. Okay, here's some of, I give them ammunition, basically. (1.1848-1854)

Providing such "ammunition" serves two functions. First, it allows the TDS to demonstrate her solidarity with the teachers, thereby obscuring the TDS's role in the ideological proletarianization of teachers. Second, it serves to legitimate Branch product by suggesting that the tests themselves are neutral and can be made to serve teachers' purposes as well or better than the purposes of the administration. The irony of needing to brief committee members on how to minimize the damage created by the product of their own labour is apparently lost on all concerned.

Thus, the co-optation of the rank and file depends in part on both Branch professional staff and external participants undergoing ideological desensitization (that is, the complete separation of means and ends) so that collegial relations can develop and obscure the separate and potentially threatening function of the technobureaucrats.

> #10: And I think the other thing too, is that large numbers of those people have been able to see that despite surface things that they may not like, despite the abuses of exam programs in, by people in systems, etc., that the people here who are putting exams together genuinely care about what goes on in classrooms. And I think, I think that they're aware of that. And that's made a big difference. (1.649-655)

The use of extensive and direct teacher input as a successful strategy of co-optation was a recurrent theme in much of the interview data. As one senior manager put it, "To know us is to love us."

> #38: Well, um, we'd probably have to sort out, because I'm sure there are individuals who feel that that's what we're doing, that we are uh intruding, that we're removing their freedom and so on, and they're very much against examinations, and despite all of our efforts to involve them in the process and so on, will still say that. But I'm heartened by the large number of teachers who, markers, item developers, people who I don't even know, but know my wife, who speak to her about— [it,] you know, it's that kind of distant feedback, that sort of comes through and up a number of different ways, uh personal ways and informal ways and that kind of thing — who say that they have found their involvement with our Branch to be extremely valuable to them. And so.
>
> I: So the majority of the profession in the province would be uh supportive about the Branch?
>
> #38: I think that uh certainly those who know us love us.
>
> I: Okay.
>
> #38: But, I mean, with a majority of those who know us love us, but I don't think we could say that about a lot of other teachers who have not had the contact with us. I think that they may go on the basis of uh, oh, I think uh just the notion that they would prefer not to have any intrusion in their classrooms. (1382-1406)

In summary, then, teacher input is useful because it improves and legitimates the product, and because it creates the illusion of collegial control.

> #10: No, I tend to see it, I tend to see it as a co-optive process. It seems to me that, that it's in fact it's like a great number of things that we do, uh, by involving people in what we're doing, we gain: we gain information, and we gain perspective, we gain opinion, we gain awareness of issues, and as a consequence we can field more appropriate, better exams. Similarly, those people gain as well: they gain an awareness of the process, they gain a sense that they have made [a] valid contribution, uh, that their ideas and concerns are heeded, paid attention to. I think, think it's a very useful and cooperative model. (1.416-426)

While it seems highly likely that the speaker *intended* to say "a cooperative process" rather "a co-optive process" and while one should perhaps avoid reading too much into the phrasing "they gain a *sense* that they have made valid contribution, that their ideas and concerns are heeded", the pattern of co-optation is nevertheless clear.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I began this chapter by asking whether the centralization of the evaluation function within the provincial bureaucracy has resulted in the deskilling of the rank and file. At first glance, the evidence appears to be somewhat contradictory.

On the one hand, I have shown that teachers have little contact with the highest levels of the bureaucracy and are therefore isolated from goal setting. Their extensive involvement in the test-development process does not extend to control over the goals, objectives, and policies guiding and defining the testing program. As with any other assembly line, the test-development process has been fragmented into discrete steps in which design has been separated from execution, leaving the workers alienated from the product of their labour. The item builders, for example, must write to the Ministry's specifications, and have virtually no control over what happens to their completed work in terms of either the individual items or the testing program as a whole. Clearly, rank and file input cannot be equated with collegial control when " . . . even those teachers that work on it and do a good job working on it, given their choice — 'Would you like to have the exams or not?' — would say 'No'."[65] On the contrary, the centralization of design decisions within the upper levels of the Ministry represents the reappropriation of the evaluation function by the state, and therefore the deskilling of the rank and file.

On the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest that skill levels have actually declined. Teachers retain their responsibility for student evaluation within the classroom, and for student promotion at every level except grade 12, and even there, the provincial examinations account for only 50 per cent of the student's mark in a handful of subjects. Furthermore, the extensive involvement of classroom teachers in the test-development process has allowed them to retain or increase their command of testing technique. Had the examinations become the sole mechanism for student promotion, and had the Branch attempted to produce the examinations on its own (or by contracting them out to private publishers), then there might have been grounds for suggesting that centralization represented an attempt to strip evaluation technique from the teacher role. But this has clearly not been the case. If anything, the introduction of provincial testing has led to much greater attention being paid to evaluation technique within the profession, as classroom teachers respond to the presence of these tests and benefit from Branch research, in-servicing, and leadership. Thus, teachers cannot be said to have undergone deskilling.

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[65] #26:1.756-758.

This paradox is entirely definitional, however, and stems from the undifferentiated use of the term "deskilling". Craig Littler, following Braverman, provides a convenient summary of the term as it has traditionally been applied:

> The concept of deskilling refers to four processes: (i) the process whereby the shopfloor loses the right to design and plan; i.e., divorce of planning and doing; (ii) the fragmentation of work into meaningless segments; (iii) the redistribution of tasks amongst unskilled and semi-skilled labour, associated with labour cheapening; and (iv) the transformation of work organization from the craft system to modern, Taylorized forms of labour control.[66]

The first two processes apply to the current situation, while the latter two do not.

It may therefore be useful to draw a distinction between ideological and technical deskilling to parallel Derber's discussion of proletarianization. *Technical deskilling* would refer to the actual degradation of skill levels, while *ideological deskilling* would refer to the fragmentation of the work process or the separation of design and execution, but without accompanying changes in the occupation's knowledge base.[67] In this case, the rank and file have undergone ideological but not technical deskilling.

In other words, the rank and file have been stripped of their authority over evaluation policy, but without losing responsibility for evaluation technique, so they have undergone ideological but not technical proletarianization.

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[66] Craig Littler, *Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies: A Comparative Study of Work Organizations* (Heinman Educational Books, 1982), p. 25.

[67] These terms are essentially synonymous with Derber's ideological and technical proletarianization, but may help to alleviate the confusion generated by various authors using "deskilling" to refer to either all four of Littler's processes or, as with Derber, only the latter two.

The question then becomes whether this is merely a preliminary stage leading to the eventual technical deskilling of the rank and file or, as Derber suggests, a distinct and alternate managerial strategy. Most labour theorists have tended to focus on workers in the profit sector and so, like Braverman,[68] assumed that the motivation for deskilling was to increase the extraction of surplus value through the cheapening of labour. Even studies of professional-level workers within state bureaucracies have tended to emphasize management's adoption of capitalist logic in response to the fiscal crisis of the state, and therefore have interpreted deskilling as an attempt to cheapen professional labour. Consequently, the fragmentation of the work process and the separation of design and execution (that is, ideological deskilling) have generally been seen as the preliminary steps in a managerial strategy of skill delegation and Taylorization (that is, technical deskilling). In this view, ideological deskilling would serve little purpose unless accompanied by technical deskilling. Proponents of this model would therefore predict that the ideological deskilling represented by the centralization of evaluation design is only the first stage in a process leading to eventual technical deskilling of the teaching force.

Derber, on the other hand, argues persuasively that

> . . . ideological proletarianization may be a foundation of a new system of labor process control in "post-industrial" capitalism that does not require the technical proletarianization of workers in order to effectively subordinate them to capitalist production. Technical knowledge and skill controlled by workers is fundamentally inimical to capitalist production only if workers perceive their interests as different from management and are organized in a manner to enforce their own objectives. Where workers are characterized by strong internal discipline and identify with the objectives of their organization, their continuing possession of technical knowledge and skill may serve management's interests more than it threatens them. To the extent that effective systems exist for the integration and motivation of workers, imperatives of technical proletarianization diminish.[69]

Derber fails to specify the conditions under which ideological proletarianization is likely to emerge as the preferred strategy, but I would like to propose at least three: (1) where an occupation is resistant to technical deskilling because its expertise is characterized by a high indetermination/technicality ratio and so does not lend itself to routinization, codification, and the delegation of tasks to subordinate workers;[70] (2) where rapid changes in the external environment make organizational flexibility a higher priority than the cheapening of labour;[71] or (3) where an occupation crucial to social reproduction is able to assert its professional status to resist technical deskilling, because too blatant an attempt at Taylorization might jeopardize its continued loyalty.[72] All three conditions obtain in education.

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[68] Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 20th Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
[69] Derber, p. 335.

The third condition is particularly interesting because it has drawn relatively little attention from labour theorists. As Littler has pointed out, one major criticism of Braverman is that he failed to recognize that the school, the family, and other social institutions outside the workplace may inculcate a work ethic which undermines worker resistance.[73] It therefore follows that the capitalist's first priority is ideological hegemony over these institutions. In this context, ideological deskilling makes sense as an end in itself, because the fragmentation of the work process and the separation of design and execution can be techniques of ideological control. Since the product here is the reproduction of the social order rather than material goods, ideological control of these institutions outweighs any concern over labour costs — especially since these costs are in any event borne by the taxpayer rather than by the capitalist directly.

From this perspective, the technical deskilling of teaching is inevitably counter-productive because only the *training* aspects of schooling are amenable to routinization, codification, and accountability, but it is the teacher's less definable *socialization* functions which are actually crucial to social reproduction. The negative consequences of attempting to enforce productivity through standardized testing, for example, are well documented and readily understood by the public as sacrificing "true education" to the promotion of specific skills. To quote from a typical recent study:

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[70] See Chapter 1, pages 34, 42-46.

[71] See Chapter 1, page 34.

[72] See Chapter 1, page 35. This may also apply to those occupations involved in the appropriation of surplus value from other workers on behalf of the capitalists, that is, senior management.

[73] Littler, p. 27.

> The focus on material that the test covers results in a narrowing of possible curriculum and a reduction of teachers' ability to adapt, create, or diverge. . . . "Social studies is hashed!" So despaired a sixth-grade teacher in our study. What we saw in one school's sixth-grade was a transition, as the school year progressed toward ITBS [Iowa Test of Basic Skills] testing in April, from laboratory, hands-on instruction in science several days a week, to less frequent science out of textbooks (choral reading from the text and answering comprehension and vocabulary questions on worksheets), to no science instruction at all in the weeks before the test, to either no science at all or science for entertainment value during the ITBS recovery phase, to science instruction precisely tailored to the questions in the district criterion referenced tests, to no science at all. The same group devoted about 40 minutes each day to writing projects in the fall, but the class wrote no more after January, after which they spent the time on worksheets covering grammar, capitalization, punctuation, and usage. . . . Social studies and health instruction disappeared altogether. . . . Not only were social studies, science, writing, project work, critical thinking projects, and the like slighted because of the mandated testing, but also teachers tended to slight topics within math and reading that the test does not cover.[74]

We see here that the technical deskilling of teachers is ineffective, not only because the external testing of every topic of every subject at every grade level would be completely impractical,[75] but because important aspects of instruction, such as critical thinking and attitude development, are by definition not susceptible to fragmentation and routinization. To the extent society wants educators rather than trainers, the teaching profession is resistant to technical deskilling.

Similarly, even the school's role in vocational training[76] requires that it remain responsive to changes in the external environment, rendering the detailed specification of the teacher's task inappropriate. Even the definition of basic skills changes regularly, so that these now seem to include "computer literacy", when as recently as five years ago, instruction in computers would have been considered a frill.[77] Teachers require the flexibility to retool their instruction to keep pace with the shifting manpower needs of local, regional, and monopoly capital. These interest groups require sufficient control to ensure that teachers remain responsive to their needs, but must avoid becoming so controlling that this responsiveness is then inhibited.

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[74] Mary Lee Smith, "Put to the Test: The Effects of External Testing on Teachers," *Educational Researcher* 20, no. 5 (June/July 1991): 8-11. Note that the testing programs in the case study province are much less prone to these difficulties because they support rather than undermine the local curriculum, are not minimal skills tests, and are generally of a higher quality. (See above, pages 128-130, and 324-325.)

[75] Smith estimated that standardized testing was already taking a 100-hour bite out of each year's instructional time in the schools she studied, and as she illustrates, these tests were completely inadequate in their coverage of course objectives.

[76] For a brief overview of education's relation to capital in the last three decades, see Joel Spring, "Education and the Sony War," *Phi Delta Kappan*, April 1984. See also Runté, "The Emergence of the Open University Concept in Alberta", for a model of educational paradigms illustrating the shift towards a manpower orientation.

Furthermore, attempts at technical deskilling risk the politicization of teachers, as in fact occurred in the case just cited:

> We saw two contrary trends. The first was accommodation by the teachers who incorporated district and principal expectations about the need to focus instruction so as to raise test scores and keep them high. . . . The contrary trend we saw was one of resistance. . . . Resistance also took the form of political action. Teachers went outside the school organization to lobby the state legislature in its deliberation over the form of state testing. They were successful in encouraging legislation that removed the mandated testing of first graders.[78]

While the public is likely to be indifferent to the ideological proletarianization of teachers, the fragmentation, codification, and routinization of the learning process required for the technical deskilling of the teaching force necessarily implies that the children are also undergoing technical deskilling. This is clearly incompatible with the school's promise of individual empowerment. Teachers are therefore likely to be able to marshal public support for resistance to technical, but not ideological, proletarianization.[79]

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[77] For example:

I: Okay. Um · · Where would you stand on the "back to basics movement"?
#16: Well, I, I uh prefer to think of it as "forward to the basics".
I: "Forward to the basics"? Okay.
#16: Uh, I think the basics are important. I think that, that you need, you need basic skills, you need to able to have those basics, but what was basic in 1930 and what's basic in 1990 may not be the same. The skills may have changed. You may have different kinds of skills. Uh, I think you've always needed to be able to find information, even in 1930, 1920, 1900, whenever, but the way you go about finding information has changed. Uh, I think that, that for instance, spelling, you know: "Those kids don't know how to spell. They've got to know how to spell". I think that will become less and less important as technology advances and uh you have machines that can spell for you. So, you know, what is basic? You have to redefine what's basic, and certainly basics are important, they always will be important, but what they are will perhaps vary. (1.804-824)

[78] Smith, p. 10.

[79] I am, of course, oversimplifying here in the reification of "the public". As the classic studies by Jean Anyon (such as "Elementary Schooling and Distinctions of Social Class," *Interchange* 12, no. 2/3, 1981) and the more recent work by Alison Jones ("The Cultural Production of Classroom Practice", *British Journal of Sociology*

Similarly, professional status and job autonomy help to divide teachers from the working class, so a blatant attempt at technical deskilling might also risk pushing them into a leadership role in the labour movement. As the school is a major agent of political socialization, it may not be in capital's best interests to alienate the teaching force by subjecting it to extreme forms of Taylorization. Any stirrings of class consciousness among teachers triggered by resentment of their own working conditions threatens not only disruptive industrial action within the schools, but the very fabric of capitalist ideological hegemony. Gerald Grace, for example, has argued that the early Taylorization of teachers in England had to be reversed in the 1920s and a renewed professionalization encouraged to forestall teacher solidarity with unionized workers.[80]

Thus, there may be good reason to assume that teaching does not lend itself to technical deskilling and to conclude that the ideological proletarianization of teachers observed in this case study is an alternative managerial strategy, not merely a preliminary stage to technical proletarianization. A brief review of some of the features observed in this case study confirm this interpretation.

The creation of the Test Development Specialist position is fascinating sociologically because it provides an example of management's appropriation of the rank and file's knowledge base without any corresponding attempt to strip the workers of these skills. On the contrary, the rank and file have retained their evaluative role in all but a handful of grade 12 subjects, have been brought into the centralized test-development process at every opportunity, and have benefited from an ongoing commitment to in-servicing and upgrading in these specific skill areas. It is as if a factory owner established a design department but still left all the day-to-day decisions to the workers on the shopfloor — and, further, required

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[79](cont'd) *of Education* 10, no. 1, 1989) indicate, Taylorized workers and their children expect, and may even demand, routinized and deskilled forms of schooling. The technical deskilling of teachers in working-class schools is therefore less contentious than attempts to deskill teachers in more wealthy districts where parents anticipate their children entering skilled professions. Or, to put it another way, the teaching force cannot be deskilled faster or further than their students' parents.

[80] Gerald Grace, "Judging Teachers: The Social and Political Contexts of Teacher Evaluation," *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 6, no. 1 (1985): 10-12.

that all proposals initiated by the design department be developed in full consultation with the shopfloor workers. To Braverman and his followers, this would represent a contradiction, because the whole point of separating design from execution is to husband expensive skills within the design department and to assign the resulting fragmented, specialized, degraded shopfloor tasks to cheaper, unskilled labour. Instead, we find that skills and costs[11] have both increased with centralization.

Similarly, the fragmentation of the test-development process into its component steps (separate committees approve the test blueprint, select passages, write test questions, assemble the tests, field-test, mark papers, and interpret the results) makes little sense from a deskilling perspective except to cheapen labour.[12] Here, however, there has been no attempt to routinize, codify, and delegate the simpler tasks to less skilled labour. The Branch does not even encourage specialization in these separate functions, but instead rotates as many different teachers as practical through each of these committees. All of this work is conducted by classroom teachers at the same $18-an-hour rate, and often by the very same individuals.

Both of these measures are effective, however, as mechanisms of ideological control. Management needs to close the knowledge gap between itself and the rank and file to eliminate the potential for resistance, but it can achieve this as effectively by developing its own expertise as by eliminating rank and file skills. (Indeed, the latter course would leave the profession as a whole vulnerable to client revolt or other external threats; whereas this way, the superordinate and subordinate ranks can continue to assert a united professional project relative to the public, whatever their internal struggles. It is interesting to note, in this context, the lack of non-educators on any of the committees reviewed in Chapter 6.) By bringing members of the rank and file into the bureaucracy as Test Developers, management gains access to, and control over, the necessary expertise to appropriate the evaluation function.

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[11] The introduction of provincial testing requires considerable extra expense for a function which merely duplicates one already fulfilled by the rank and file as part of their regular duties. Teachers must be flown to the capital, housed, fed, and paid to mark essays that used to be marked by the same teachers for free.

[12] This is called the Babbage Principle. To quote Braverman:

> Insofar as the labor process may be dissociated, it may be separated into elements some of which are simpler than others and each of which is simpler than the whole. Translated into market terms, this means that the labor power capable of performing the process may be purchased more cheaply as dissociated elements than as a capacity integrated in a single worker. (Braverman, p. 81.)

Once co-opted to the Branch, the TDS rank is itself subject to ideological proletarianization through the elaborate committee structures which allow management to monitor and control the TDS's expertise. Isolated from the crucial design decisions taken higher in the bureaucracy, the TDS is open to ideological desensitization and co-optation, and thus becomes an instrument in the monitoring and control of the rank and file.

Having broken the rank and file's knowledge monopoly, it is now safe to utilize their expertise to further management's ends. The fragmentation of the actual test-development process into discrete steps allows management, through the TDS, to intervene at each stage to reconfirm managerial aims and control. Equally important, this fragmentation distracts attention from the end product and leaves the rank and file focused on questions of technique associated with the individual steps, and thus vulnerable to ideological desensitization.

The question then becomes, why bother involving the rank and file at all when the same expertise is already available in the person of the TDS? In the previous section, I demonstrated that great emphasis was placed on seeking the teachers' input at the level of technique to improve the quality and representativeness of the tests, but more especially to foster the illusion of collegial control. Thus, ideological deskilling allows management to safely adopt a strategy of ***controlled collegial participation***.

A key element in the successful adoption of a strategy of controlled collegial participation — and the strongest indication that ideological deskilling does not inevitably lead to technical deskilling — is the considerable effort the Branch puts into ***increasing*** skill levels among the rank and file. As much as the Branch needs to appropriate classroom expertise to its own ends, it also needs to in-service teachers, both to allow them to implement Branch policies, and to develop their theoretical understanding of evaluation technique.

> #01: The, the nice part about that is that [it's] surprising how much learning there is there. I don't know which is greater: them learning from us, or us learning from them. Uh, I think it's both, because we kind of developed the theoretical background and they know the practical background. "Will it work?" and. They try

> it out and then they say, "Yeah, I tried it out with my students and this worked, but this one didn't and here's why". And so these are the kind of things. But you see, uh, there's a sort of ulterior motive in this, because when we get this finished, we'll have 35 teachers who are very well trained in this kind of thing. And seems to be the policy here of the people that uh the teachers ought to be involved as much as possible. (1.624-635)

In other words, involving teachers in the test-development process not only gives the participants a sense of ownership, it creates a cadre of evaluation experts who spread Branch gospel when they return to their local communities.[83]

By increasing the rank and file's skills in evaluation through its in-servicing, role-modelling, and research, the Branch is simultaneously inculcating more favourable attitudes towards external evaluation. As teachers become more knowledgeable about, and comfortable with, testing technique, they are likely to become more receptive to a conservative agenda which attempts to define educational issues in terms of the "maintenance of standards", "the pursuit of excellence", and "the need for accountability". The renewed emphasis on evaluation technique within the profession creates a climate in which, without ever quite realizing it, the rank and file are weaned from the progressivist commitment to child-centred education and redirected towards a curriculum-centred pedagogy.

Thus, instead of a trend towards technical deskilling, we find a strategy of *ideological enskilling*. Ideological enskilling is the process of systematically increasing an occupation's *technical* sophistication to induce a "trained incapacity" to question the goals towards which these skills are applied, leaving the workers open to ideological desensitization and co-optation.[84]

So far, the discussion has focused strictly on the evaluation function itself. Centralized examinations also serve, however, to enforce the mandated curriculum and as external measures of productivity. The reappropriation of the evaluation function is, therefore, part of a larger pattern of deskilling which could arguably lead to the Taylorization of classroom teachers. Attempts by local school superintendents, for example, to enforce labour discipline through the greater accountability provided by provincial testing would seem to represent the preliminary stages of a more thoroughgoing technical deskilling. A complete examination of this issue lies outside the scope of the current case study, but there are two indications that the technical deskilling of teachers has already reached its limit.

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[83] The careful selection of representative samples in the recruitment to Branch committees is repaid with maximum coverage and penetration back into the teaching community.

[84] The corresponding term *technical enskilling* refers to speedups resulting from the redesign of the labour process to incorporate additional skills or responsibilities (or the reabsorption of previously deskilled and delegated tasks) in a particular job category. The most obvious example is the increasingly common expectation that middle managers acquire keyboarding skills so that they can use their desktop computers to eliminate the need for secretarial support staff.

First, there are the previously cited examples of Branch staff's assisting classroom teachers to resist this pressure from local administrators. Branch staff at all levels labelled the use of (single) test results in teacher evaluation as an abuse and spoke against the practice whenever they encountered it. During the course of this study, the Branch publications in which test results are reported began to include a section outlining the many limitations on the appropriate interpretation and use of test data. The technical deskilling objectives of some superintendents therefore reveal a structural contradiction between local and provincial bureaucracies, and may lead to local aberrations in the teachers' work process (particularly where these reflect socioeconomic differences between districts — that is, working class districts may be expected to tolerate higher levels of technical deskilling than others) but do not represent the general trend.

Second, the test designers have made a concerted effort to develop examinations which support rather than undermine the broader scope of the curriculum, in the hope of discouraging formulaic (that is, technically deskilled) teaching. The Branch regularly varies test formats to discourage an overreliance on old test questions to guide instruction. During this study, the Branch was immersed in a major "revitalization" of the examinations at least partly motivated by the desire to ***reverse*** whatever degree of technical deskilling had already occurred. Recall, for example, #10's argument that it was the ***teachers*** who had embraced deskilled forms of instruction, and that Branch management insisted on resisting this trend (see above, page 115). And again, in this example:

> #20: Certainly when you're dealing with marking and range finding you get a sense that there is some BAD teaching going [on] out there. Some really weird stuff. And

> when we're developing items, or developing a model for the written-response questions, sometimes it does turn into a "us" versus "them". "These guys are abusing the, our exams, our model for teaching kids how to write essays, so we're going to fix them, make sure this doesn't happen anymore." But uh I think overall if we stop and think about it, we're all working together. I don't see myself as having an adversarial relationship with teachers or the teaching community in the province at all. I think we're all working in the field of education and trying to put out a good product. (1.403-415)

In summary, then, I have argued that the reappropriation of the evaluation function appears to have been an attempt by the sectional interests which control the Legislature to assert ideological control over the education system, rather than an attempt to reduce labour costs. I have further argued that ideological proletarianization has the advantage over technical deskilling that it does not require the detailed codification and regulation of tasks, a process which might risk (1) overlooking the indeterminate but more crucial aspects of the teacher's work process; (2) inhibiting organizational flexibility and responsiveness; and (3) triggering a teacher revolt which might in turn threaten the capitalist ideological hegemony over a major institution of social reproduction.

To this might be added the observation that because ideological proletarianization co-opts teachers to serve externally imposed goals, it provides a greater span of control over the work process than just the design functions directly appropriated by management. For example, the Diploma Examinations, which account for only 50 per cent of the mark in a few core subjects, nevertheless allow the technobureaucrats to influence evaluation and instruction in nearly the entire school system:

> #15: . . . well, everything chan— everything changes as a result of as massive a program as this is. I mean, it does affect every high school student in the province. . . . Every student is affected; therefore, almost every high school teacher is affected too. And in fact, junior high school teachers are starting to be effected by what they think, uh, might help them prepare their students to be better high school students. . . . (1.982-990)

The mere presence of the examinations has enforced worker discipline, not only on teachers but on students as well, by changing the corporate culture of the schools.

> #12: And I said, "Do you know", I said, well, this is one of my lines, and it's very true, I said, "You know, when the Diplomas first came in, I thought, I wondered how much talking, if any, I'd have to do with my children. You know, would they apply themselves, did they understand how important it was, this new development, etc., etc., etc. You know, it was the best thing that happened. I didn't have to speak to any of them anytime about applying themselves". And I said, "Do you

> know, their the Diploma marks and the school marks were very high and equivalent". And I said, "I want to tell you, I think this", and then I really get to the point, "I think, honestly, this is the best thing that's happened". I said, "There's room for initiative in the schools", but, I said, "if you [?want to know, they're a fair deal?] for your children", I said, "you'd better believe the work that we put into those, the work we [-?-?-] in putting out the exam". I said, "Now it made me happier than ever", I said, "because I know what was happening." I said, "Particularly when, you know, your son wants to go to a quota faculty, anything like that". And I said, "Boy", I says to him, "made me very happy, any principal in a high school very happy. Made a fantastic difference in the school". I mean, it was getting out of hand when I was there. You know, because I was there when they took them away. [I: Heheh.] You know, it was a bit loosie-goosie, you know, it was taking off the shackles for a while. (1.801-825)

Finally, I have concluded that classroom teacher involvement in the test-development process is an example of controlled collegial participation, and does not represent collegial control.

There still remains, however, one potential counterargument which must be addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 8

THE EROSION OF PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE

INTRODUCTION

To this point, the discussion has focused on tracing how education policies are initiated and implemented in the case study province. I have demonstrated that decision making generally flows from the top down within the provincial bureaucracy, and that input from the various stakeholder groups and from the rank and file is essentially limited to a form of controlled participation. The extensive advisory committee structures are utilized to monitor and control the TDSs' knowledge monopoly, which is in turn used to harness the expertise provided by the participating classroom teachers. While classroom teachers retain nearly autonomous control over the technical aspects of their work, they have been effectively divorced from goal setting. Consequently, the rank and file have undergone ideological but not technical proletarianization.

This is not quite the same, however, as suggesting that the teaching profession *as a whole* has lost control over education policy. It could be argued, following Freidson, that since the decision makers within the Ministry are themselves generally educators rather than external managers, the teaching profession continues to dominate education policy. To repeat a key passage from Freidson quoted earlier:

> For a great many professional employees, on the other hand, members of their profession routinely fill the supervisory, managerial, and often even executive positions. . . . supervisory, managerial, and even higher positions in the hierarchy are filled primarily by employees with professional credentials. . . . At the very least, the first line of hierarchical supervision of professional employees is *always* filled by a professional.
>
> . . .
>
> Thus while rank and file professional workers may have to take orders just as blue collar or clerical workers have to, these orders are given by a superordinate colleague, not by someone trained in management or some other field. Where the work of the professional employees is formally delineated in some detail . . . it is not done by outsiders who have expropriated the professional's skills, but rather by

> members of the same profession who have specialized in the accomplishment of such tasks. While this formatting does reduce the use of discretion and judgment by individual rank and file professional workers, it does not represent a reduction in the control of professional work by the *profession* itself, for other professional workers create it and supervise and manage the rank and file. It is therefore entirely inaccurate to say that the professions as corporate bodies have lost their capacity to exercise control over their members' work, even though individual professionals may have.[1]

As suggested in Chapter 1 (pages 54-60), there are two objections to Freidson's argument.

First, the claim to continuing professional self-regulation glosses over significant changes in the nature and locus of professional control. As Freidson himself notes, sociologists first became interested in the professions because they seemed to provide a more collegial alternative to other forms of occupational control.

> . . . the emphasis in the traditional sociological literature has been on the self-governing character of the professions. Indeed, the Webbs (1917) assessed the professions in depth, searching for a model of worker self-governance (or producer cooperatives) that might provide a viable alternative to the more hierarchical practices they considered typical of capitalism.[2]

Professional control has therefore traditionally implied some form of democratic consultation between peers, but the hierarchical structures which Freidson describes contrast sharply with this ideal of collegial interaction among independent practitioners. It is therefore extremely misleading to equate hierarchical direction of subordinates with the collegial negotiation of professional standards, even though both forms may constrain individual practitioners in superficially similar ways.

Instead, professional autonomy should be viewed as consisting of three components: (1) individual autonomy — the individual's discretion over one's own daily practice; (2) collective autonomy — the practitioners' control over the profession's goals, procedures, and standards; and (3) occupational autonomy — the occupation's independence from external influence. Historically, independent practitioners have been prepared to exchange individual autonomy for collective autonomy to further the occupation's professional project. Although the individual practitioner may be constrained by increasingly specific standards and standardized procedures, this stage of professionalization represents a strategy of collective upward mobility, rather than deskilling, because the rank and file retain an active role in determining the nature of the work process.[3] As independent practice has given way, however, to salaried employment and the emergence of formal hierarchical structures (that is, as various professions have undergone historical proletarianization), the locus of control has shifted from the rank and file to a supervisory elite. As collegial control has been replaced by these formal hierarchical structures, the rank and file have generally been deprived of their role in professional self-governance, and consequently, any subsequent erosion of individual autonomy must be interpreted as structural proletarianization.

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[1] Eliot Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control", ***Annual Review of Sociology*** 10 (1984): 12. (See above, pages 55-56.) Freidson failed to distinguish between technical and ideological deskilling, and so the discussion here is focused on the former, but the principle remains the same in either case.

[2] Ibid., p. 2.

This erosion of collective autonomy considerably weakens Freidson's case for continuing professional control, since it is obvious that the rank and file *have* lost the capacity to govern the profession's work. The disenfranchised rank and file's claim to be "the profession" is at least as good as that of the tiny supervisory elite, and from their perspective, it makes very little difference whether their deskilling occurs at the hands of capitalist managers or superordinate colleagues.

Nevertheless, Freidson is correct to suggest that these proletarianized professionals may retain their independence relative to clients or to other workers within the institution — that is, maintain their occupational autonomy — and so continue to pursue a professional project, under the leadership of this new hierarchical elite. Since the degree of deskilling varies with one's location in the hierarchy, and since the precise nature of these structures is likely to be obscure to outsiders, those lower in the profession may be able to wrap themselves in the generalized prestige of their still autonomous superiors to resist client revolt and deprofessionalization. Similarly, although erosion of individual autonomy may have left most practitioners open to direction by superordinates, the rank and file may still be able to assert occupational autonomy to resist interference originating from outside the profession. Freidson's error is in believing that this continuing professional dominance allows a rejection of the proletarianization thesis. That doctors retain the right to oversee nurses is no guarantee that their own work process will be immune to ideological and technical proletarianization. While many professionals retain their occupational autonomy, the loss of individual and collective autonomy is of much more immediate significance to their own freedom of action. At best, the profession's monopoly over recruitment to superordinate positions may allow its expertise, and therefore its implicit worldview, to dominate policy in its field.[4]

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[3] In practice, of course, procedures and standards are largely researched and promulgated by the profession's university-based knowledge elite, rather than by the rank and file practitioners, but the point here is that the practitioners were able collectively to ratify goals or paradigms, and individually chose which innovations to adopt, adapt, or ignore. In contrast, these choices are now made by the hierarchical elite and imposed on the rank and file. (See Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control", p. 16.)

This monopoly over superordinate positions is not, however, sufficient to guarantee even this more limited occupational autonomy. There is a fine, but important, distinction between working within a large but autonomous professional organization (a law firm or college) and working within a heteronomous bureaucracy (the state or a multinational corporation). In both scenarios, the rank and file may be subject to equal degrees of ideological and technical deskilling under the supervision of a professional elite, but in the latter, this professional elite is itself subject to external direction. One is then dealing with ideological proletarianization rather than occupational autonomy, *even if* the occupation can maintain professional dominance relative to clients or other workers. Freidson's failure to distinguish between technical and ideological proletarianization prevented him from recognizing that even where superordinate professionals retain control over technical design functions, they may have lost control over basic goals.

Turning then to the current case study, individual classroom teachers can be seen to have lost much of their former autonomy. For example, by establishing standards for student achievement which are by definition external to particular classrooms, the Diploma Examinations have undermined the teachers' right to set acceptable levels of attainment for their own students. On the other hand, grade 12 teachers collectively retain considerable influence in defining these provincial standards through their participation in range finding, marking, reliability reviews, and other standard-setting activities. Thus, what autonomy the teacher loses at an individual level may nevertheless be retained at the level of the collective through the emergence of an internalized provincial consensus on, for example, what constitutes a satisfactory social studies essay. Had the move towards establishing these standards originated from the rank and file, it would have been a clear example of collegial control and therefore professional autonomy, even though individual teachers would have had to abide by this collectively negotiated consensus. This was not the case, however, since the impetus for the reintroduction of provincial testing originated outside the profession and was imposed on it against the wishes of a majority of its members. Consequently, it cannot be considered an example of occupational autonomy, but rather an illustration of ideological deskilling through ideological enskilling.[5] The same reasoning applies to most of the other policies examined in this case study.

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[4] This is a key point for Freidson, who argues that "lacking its own authority of expertise, the administrative elite must invoke the standards and guidelines of the [university-based] knowledge elite in its directives aimed at formulating and evaluating the work of the rank and file" (Ibid., p. 16). That the profession might be subject to the imposition of external agendas through the ideological co-optation of either the administrative elite or knowledge elites does not seem to have occurred to Freidson, yet is an important element in the current case study.

Furthermore, from the discussion in the latter half of Chapter 4 (pages 138-142), it is clear that, in this case at least, the shift to hierarchical control was imposed on the teaching profession by the Legislature as part of a deliberate strategy to break the former progressivist elite's hold over education policy. In other words, the current structures are not simply a neutral outcome of the historical bureaucratization of education, but a deliberate assault on professional dominance. While a historical analysis of professional self-governance under the progressivists is beyond the scope of the current inquiry, there may be reason to suggest that the teaching profession in the case study province more closely approximated collegial control and collective autonomy during the progressivist period.

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[5] The issue is further confused in this instance by the somewhat blurred distinction between goals and technique frequently encountered in the analysis of mental labour. When individual practitioners establish standards, this represents goal setting. In this instance, defining student achievement allows teachers to define what constitutes both "knowledge" and "success" for their students. When the collective initiates procedures to reach agreement on standards, this remains a goal-setting activity. When, as here, the standards are implemented in response to external pressure, then the standard setting procedures are by definition reduced to a mere exercise in technique. The new techniques developed to achieve this externally set goal are therefore a textbook example of ideological enskilling.

First, the progressivist commitment to populist ideals encouraged the adoption of democratic structures which may have permitted greater rank and file input. As mentioned earlier, for example, the committee structures seen in the current study were largely inherited from this progressivist period, but with the key difference that at that time, committee chairs could not simply overrule committee motions.

Second, the progressivist belief in expertise encouraged administrators to defer to professional monopolies of knowledge, while the progressivist belief in progress encouraged a "tradition of innovation".[6] Input from the profession's university-based knowledge elite often played a key role in policy formation,[7] and progressivist influence therefore represented the assertion of professional dominance over the education hierarchy.[8] This contrasts sharply with the current situation (as described in Chapter 5, pages 147-153), in which education officials are expected to accommodate to the externally imposed agenda of the sectional interests that control the Legislature.[9]

Third, the progressivist orientation to child-centred education encouraged the central authorities to grant the classroom teacher greater individual autonomy so that the teacher would be able to respond to the unique needs of each child. The elimination of the provincial examination program in the early 1970s was the most obvious example of the delegation of greater responsibility to the rank and file.

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[6] See Runté, "The Open University Concept in Alberta", p. 104.

[7] The final manifestation of this influence was the adoption of the Worth Report (*A Future of Choices, A Choice of Futures: Report of the Commission on Educational Planning*, 1972) and the subsequent appointment of its author as Deputy Minister.

[8] Deference to the profession's university-based knowledge elite is a key element of Freidson's claim to professional dominance. (See Freidson, "Professional Control", p. 16.)

[9] The current Deputy Minister, for example, has adopted the slogan "Education is too important to be left to educators!" as the central theme in several of his recent addresses. (Given the discussion that follows, this also has interesting implications for his own self-identification.)

Under the conditions that prevailed during the progressivist period, then, Freidson's argument that a professional monopoly over recruitment to superordinate positions permits continuing professional control — in spite of the emergence of hierarchical structures and direction — would be somewhat more plausible. The current situation, however, is entirely different. The new hierarchical structures introduced by the Conservative government were clearly intended to break this professional monopoly. Recall, for example, the Minister's announcement that half the membership of the new Curriculum Policy Board would be "composed of non-educators, people from everyday [Province]. Their thoughts and their points of view will be reflected in curriculum development in the years to come".[10] But even where teachers retain their hold over superordinate positions, these hierarchical structures often represent ideological proletarianization simply by their existence. The roles of Test Development Specialist and Assessment Resources Officer, for example — indeed, the entire Student Evaluation Branch — were created by Ministerial fiat as a corollary to the imposition of provincial examinations. No matter who fills these positions, the job descriptions alone represent the profession's loss of control over education policy and goals, and the nearly inevitable erosion of individual and collective autonomy. Under these conditions, Freidson's model of continuing professional dominance is clearly untenable.

The extensive involvement of classroom teachers in Branch programs helps to obscure the full significance of these structural changes. The ideological enskilling of the rank and file helps to distract attention from the ideological deskilling of the evaluation function represented by the creation of the Test Development Specialist position. It is difficult to recognize that the profession's control over goals has declined when its responsibility for technique has continued and skill levels have, if anything, increased. Consequently, *controlled collegial participation allows the external imposition of hierarchical control to be misrepresented as merely the shift from individual to collective autonomy.*

The question then becomes whether these structural changes are limited to the shift from collective autonomy to hierarchical control *within* a single profession, or whether they constitute the emergence of entirely *new* occupations. Freidson himself is prepared to concede that the shift to formal hierarchical control "may lead to divisions within any given profession as a whole that are too deep to contain within a nominally unified corporate body"[11] but argues more strongly that:

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[10] *Hansard*, 1976, p. 26. See above, pages 140-141.

> it is by no means inevitable that professions that undergo a formalization of collegial relations, with a division into administrative elites, knowledge elites, and rank and file workers, will break up into distinct and separate corporate entities.[12]

For Larson, on the other hand, it is important to distinguish between the *public service* professions (which are generated by the horizontal expansion of state bureaucracies), and the *technobureaucratic* professions (which are generated by the bureaucracy's vertical differentiation), because the emergence of the latter is always at the expense of the former. The horizontal expansion of state bureaucracies creates or enlarges the market for a profession's services, thereby supporting its professional project. In return for loaning the state its monopoly of expertise, the profession receives the bureaucratic authority necessary to secure its client base. In contrast, the vertical expansion of the bureaucracy through the build-up of multiple levels of hierarchical authority undermines professional control by concentrating design and decision-making functions within a managerial elite. Far from a pattern of continuing professional dominance, such vertical differentiation invariably means that the profession has undergone deskilling and structural proletarianization.[13] Thus, what is for Freidson merely a continuum of lesser or greater community identity among a variety of hierarchically ranked specialists within a single profession, are for Larson two analytically distinct categories.

Thus, the second possible response to Freidson's model of continuing professional self-regulation is simply to deny that the superordinate ranks are part of the same occupation. If, instead of viewing the staff of the Student Evaluation Branch as members of the same profession as classroom teachers, one sees them as members of the separate occupation of Test Development Specialist or government administrator, then clearly the teaching profession has lost control over education policy. On the other hand, if they are all members of the unified profession of "educator", then there may be grounds for suggesting that educators still play a significant (if reduced) role in education policy. To adequately answer the question "Who controls education?" it is therefore necessary to determine whether those responsible for education policy are part of the same profession as the disenfranchised rank and file, or a separate managerial profession.

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[11] Freidson, "Professional Control", pp. 1-2.

[12] Ibid., p. 18.

[13] Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 179-207.

This is ultimately an empirical question because the mere presence of hierarchical structures or a heavily supervised lower rank is insufficient to indicate the emergence of distinct technobureaucratic professions. Interns and articling lawyers may be subject to intense supervision and exploitation, but it would be incorrect to characterize their superordinates as technobureaucrats since the two categories are merely points on the same career path. Similarly, deans and university presidents exercise considerable administrative authority but, on many campuses, retain their identity as members of the professoriate because they are elected to limited terms of office by their peers, maintain at least token teaching and research duties, and return to their former duties upon completion of their term.

Freidson identifies two factors on which professional unity depends: the rank and file's monopoly over recruitment to superordinate occupations, and community identity among all members of the profession. This chapter will therefore examine the extent to which members of the bureaucracy feel themselves to be part of a larger professional community or members of a separate superordinate profession, and the actual pattern of recruitment within and between ranks.

In Chapter 1 (pages 57-58), I proposed six criteria to more clearly distinguish between unified professions and the presence of separate technobureaucratic specializations. I suggested that technobureaucratic professions may be expected to have the following characteristics:

1. Recruitment is limited and not the automatic outcome of normal career progression.
2. Recruits are appointed by higher bureaucratic authority on a competitive basis, rather than elected by peers or selected as part of a representative sample. (This might also be expanded to include the criterion that the job description itself is dictated by higher bureaucratic authority rather than evolving out of developments in the

profession's knowledge monopoly; that is, suggested by the profession's university-based knowledge elite or demanded by the rank and file.)

3. Recruitment is terminal, such that a return to the rank of practitioner would be considered a demotion.

4. Experience as a rank and file professional is not in itself sufficient qualification for recruitment. Most technobureaucratic professions will require some rank and file experience, to ensure that recruits have at least minimal training in the areas they are to supervise and to maintain the fiction of professional unity necessary to legitimate bureaucratic power, but the emphasis will be on different or additional qualifications and certification. The briefer the necessary tenure as a rank and file practitioner, the greater the divergence between the two career paths and therefore between the two professional categories.

5. Professional activities are fundamentally different from those of the rank and file. The transfer from general practitioner to hospital obstetrician may require additional certification, may be terminal, and may be a competitive appointment rather than the automatic outcome of normal career progression, but since both positions are engaged in fundamentally similar activities (direct patient care), they would still be seen as part of the same general profession. Since technobureaucratic occupations emerge out of the deskilling of the rank and file, one would expect to find a much heavier emphasis on design and decision-making functions than on direct practice. Consequently, technobureaucratic professions are usually characterized by isolation from direct contact with clients or hands-on practice, by an emphasis on administrative or supervisory tasks, by a centralized location, and by a more autonomous work process when compared with the rank and file.

6. Self-identity is primarily focused on the technobureaucratic specialization rather than the rank and file profession, and is usually formalized in a separate professional association. School superintendents, for example, are unlikely to retain their membership in the teachers' association, but subscribe instead to their own publications, conferences, training programs, and so on. When pressed for a professional synonym, superintendents are likely to choose the inclusive identity of "educator" rather than the rank and file identity of "teacher".

Points 1 to 4 qualify Freidson's assumption that the monopoly over recruitment to superordinate positions guarantees professional dominance. Point number 5 is clearly the most fundamental for proletarianization theory, since it is the basis for Larson's distinction between technobureaucratic and public service professions.

Point number 6 is fundamental to Freidson's claims for professional dominance but must be approached with caution, because self-identity, professional association, and even formal job title are all open to manipulation and false consciousness. Technobureaucratic managers may choose to downplay their distinct identities and instead claim collegial links to the rank and file to better legitimate their own bureaucratic authority. Similarly, non-technobureaucratic specializations (e.g., Early Childhood Specialists) within the rank and file may adopt the trappings of distinct job titles, associations, and perhaps even certification, in a bid to advance their own professional project, but nevertheless must be considered here as part of the same professional family because these specializations have not emerged as a result of the deskilling of the rank and file. (Specialization that results from one faction's developing or obtaining a monopoly over a particular subset of the profession's knowledge base should not be confused with work fragmentation through the separation of design and execution. While factions with equivalent specialties may contend for prestige and resources, this is quite different from the vertical differentiation and hierarchical direction that results from the appropriation of design and decision-making functions.)

Nevertheless, an examination of formal and self-identity may prove helpful as an indicator of professional dominance. Where the technobureaucrats' reference group is the larger profession (what Gouldner called a "cosmopolitan orientation"), it is reasonable to suggest that the rank and file, or the profession's university-based knowledge elite, will have greater influence over policy than when the technobureaucrats identify themselves with the heteronomous bureaucracies from which they draw their authority (Gouldner's "local orientation").[14]

A brief examination of how the above criteria apply to the different levels of the staff working for the Student Evaluation Branch, combined with what has already been discussed about their respective roles in policy formation, will help to clarify the relationship between proletarianization and professional dominance.

NON-PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

The Examiners

As mentioned earlier, the Examiner position does not officially exist on any organizational chart, but is simply the title given to the wage and contract staff brought in to assist the TDSs.[15] Since there is no official job description, the range of duties assigned varies considerably from unit to unit. At one extreme are the Examiners who see their role as general factotum to the TDS and content themselves with proofreading, filing, and other forms of close logistical support. At the other extreme are the Examiners whose duties are essentially indistinguishable from those of a TDS. In between are those who search for likely sources of test materials, compile preliminary drafts of field tests, draft answer keys, and so on. As previously discussed in Chapter 5, none of the Examiners play a direct role in policy formation.

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[14] Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Towards an Analysis of Latent Social Roles" Parts 1, 2. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 2 (December 1957, March 1958): 281-307; 400-428.

[15] Of those Examiners responding, four identified themselves as Examiners; one said

While recruitment to the Examiner rank is restricted to those with professional teaching credentials[16] and all of the Examiners identify themselves with the teaching profession, none of them were actually teaching when recruited.

Four were recent graduates who took the job as a fill-in while they impatiently awaited openings in the classroom. Three of these had previously served a year as interns (that is, taught a reduced course load for half salary under the supervision of an experienced teacher), while the fourth had previously worked in the Branch as a clerk. The pay is approximately three times what they had earned as interns, and is higher even than they could expect as first year teachers. Two mentioned that they thought the experience might look good on their resumes,[17] but the primary motive for taking the position appears to have been

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[15](cont'd) he was not sure but thought his title might be 'Examiner'; one said "Backup"; and two said they had no official title as such.

[16] All but one of the Examiners held at least a Bachelor of Education degree, and several held advanced degrees, including three with doctorates. The exception here was one of the Ph.D.s whose considerable teaching experience at the college level may still qualify him as an educator. Significantly, the Clerk IV included in the interview sample was not reclassified as an Examiner until completion of his Education degree. Examiners are paid $18 an hour, the rate for classroom teachers working on Branch committees. It seems likely that teaching credentials are required to qualify for this rate of pay, thus introducing what amounts to an official restriction on recruitment, even though the position does not officially exist.

[17] For example:

> #20: There are certainly advantages that I work here. It's in my field, it's directly related to teaching, it's an enormous steppingstone to something else. (1.74-76)

And the following:

> I: Um, do you think that being in this job will help you get that job.
> #19: Yeah, I think it will.
> I: Why?
> #19: Um - - I think, I think the Branch is seen in a very good light by most school boards. Like I think the job done, that is done here, is done

that the alternative was either unemployment or underemployment as a substitute teacher. The job is not, therefore, part of a career ladder or plan:

> I: So you've only recently moved into education. [#24: Umhum.] You had a year of internship and a year of part-time teaching [#24: Umhum.] and then this. [#24: Uhmum.] So this is uh a step up?
>
> #24: Yes.
>
> I: Okay.
>
> #24: From what?
>
> I: Well, from part-time teaching.
>
> #24: I suppose.
>
> I: But I mean you're hoping that this will lead on to bigger and better things in education?
>
> #24: I don't see this as leading - - into a better position, teaching. Personally, I see this as enriching, but, um, I don't expect that this will make my path into teaching [.?.?.].
>
> I: Okay. Uh, what are your current career goals then?
>
> #24: I would like to get my permanent teaching certificate. That's as far as it goes right now.
>
> I: So no long-term plans, just be a teacher for awhile.
>
> #24: Yeah, I think, I would, I believe I'd be very happy teaching for any number of years. If I could just get my foot in the door. [I: Heheh.] But uh as far as wanting to go into administration, or any of those things, it's not, I don't [?know/no?], particular aspiration. (1.88-122)

Thus, for these individuals, the job is seen as pre-service employment, not unlike a long-term summer job, rather than as an entrance-level position to further government service or a permanent transfer to administration. (This contrasts with, for example, the British tradition where central office staff split off from the teaching force almost immedia begin a slow climb through the parallel career ladder of school administration.)

Similarly, three of the Examiners were retired teachers who approached the position as essentially a hobby activity:

> #28: I was just, I wanted to do something, that's you know. But as I say, I didn't ask for it. It, I was just phoned and uh asked if I would like to do some work. And basically, this is what I wanted to do all along. You know, kind of, if I could do something like this, just to stay active, you know, rather than stay home and uh. And now, of course, I enjoy it, . . . and let's say that I'm marking time, till the wife

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[17](cont'd) extremely well. The finished product looks extremely well.

I: So they'll look at your's uh resume and say, "Oh, that's a year of good experience, for this guy".

#19: Yeah. And "He knows", you know, "He, he must have learned something in that year, and he uh he can share, share that with other teachers and increase, increase the knowledge level", I suppose. (1.1231-1249)

> decides to pull the plug, 'cause wife is schoolteacher. So I look at [it] this way: if the wife does that for two years yet, and if I'm still wanted here, I'll stay. Because as I say, I'm just sort of marking time. [I: Umhum.] Because soon as she decides to, pull the plug, I, I—
>
> I: When she retires, you'll—
>
> #28: Oh, for sure—
>
> I: —probably retire.
>
> #28: —oh, for sure. (1.125-149)

For these three, the Examiner role represents not a career move but post-career service.

Another Examiner was a new mother who took the job because she had decided not to return to teaching, and the Examiner position offered flexible part-time employment. This is again an example of someone having retired from teaching, rather than someone seeking advancement through transfer to an alternative career line.

Two others were effectively excluded from classroom teaching due to circumstances beyond their control: One was a highly qualified[18] immigrant, whose lack of oral proficiency in English prevented her from obtaining more suitable professional employment. Like the recent graduates, she aspired to permanent employment elsewhere, either as a classroom teacher or school administrator, but was forced into the Examiner job as a temporary expedient. The other had originally taken employment with the Branch after failing to obtain a particular teaching post on which he had been counting following graduate school. Once working for the Branch, however, he came to prefer it, and was the only Examiner to see the transfer as relatively permanent and to define himself as "an educator" or "consultant", rather than as a "teacher".[19] He suffers from a medical condition that would make contending with the rigid schedule and the demands of a regular teaching position difficult, whereas contract employment in an office setting provides the necessary flexibility to cope with his health problems. The forcefulness of his personality and the particular nature of his duties, however, allows him to informally appropriate the status of a TDS, and so for most purposes he may be more appropriately included in that sample

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[18] She had served as a high school department head in her home country and, since arriving in Canada, had obtained a Master's degree in Educational Administration.

[19] On the other hand, he was also one of those who used a very inclusive definition of "educator", and so he did not see himself as distinct from teachers. "I have always been very conscious of the fact that we are all colleagues and uh sought to articulate that consciousness." (1.1451-1453)

The remaining Examiner included in the interview sample was a full-time college professor moonlighting in the Branch to supplement his income. Employment with the Branch is therefore entirely outside his primary career line.

This pattern of recruitment from outside the classroom contrasts sharply with the emphasis on current classroom experience in hiring for the TDS position. Nevertheless, the Examiners essentially see themselves as classroom teachers (including even the college professor). For example, when asked about relations with teachers in the field, one Examiner responded: "Well, I am a teacher. Heheh. What kind of question is that!"[20] The only hesitation in identifying themselves as teachers was a certain humility on the part of some of the interns: "I don't think I would ever, when you use the word 'colleague', I don't see myself as a colleague to the teachers, in that they probably work a heck of a lot harder."[21]

Thus, the Examiners meet Freidson's dual criteria of identification with the rank and file and a restriction on recruitment to those with professional credentials. The question here, however, is not whether the Examiner rank forms a distinct technobureaucratic specialization, but whether it is a professional position at all. As temporary,[22] and often part-time, employment, it is attractive only to pre-career, post-career, or otherwise marginalized recruits. Lacking even a formal title, it is obviously not part of the normal career ladder for either classroom teachers or senior Branch staff. Only one Examiner was ever directly promoted to the TDS rank, for example, and then only in an "acting" capacity to cover for a TDS temporarily assigned other duties.[23] (Movement to the ranks above TDS is inconceivable, since those with the necessary qualifications are generally in their retirement phase.[24]) Far from being a terminal position, those incumbents seeking a career in education aspire to leave the Examiner role at the first opportunity, and movement into the rank and file is seen as a step up, not down (the initial reduction in salary for first-time teachers notwithstanding). Partly, this is due to the complete lack of security provided by a position that does not officially exist, and that is created and dissolved by the bureaucracy as budgets and human resource needs dictate. But for the interns at least, it is also a question of their wanting to begin their careers as classroom teachers. In other words, no matter how gratifying employment with the Branch may be, they do not perceive it as part of their chosen profession. Thus, Examiner is not a career position, but simply a job.

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[20] #19:1.1667-1671.

[21] #24:1.971-974.

[22] "Temporary" in this context means that there is no commitment to permanence by either the employer or employee, and the position includes no employee benefits, but in many cases, Examiners have remained with the Branch for years. As one Examiner put it, "Temporary, but it's one of those permanently temporary jobs". (31:1.107-108)

[23] Two others have worked as both Examiners and TDSs, but without moving directly from one to the other. In one case, a respected classroom teacher had taken temporary employment as an Examiner while concluding her graduate studies, and, after having returned to her classroom, was later seconded to a TDS position. In my own case, when I resigned my TDS position to return to university, I accepted part-time employment as an Examiner to supplement my Teaching

There is an even more fundamental reason, however, for suggesting that the Examiners are casual rather than professional workers: The work itself consists entirely of tasks delegated from, and supervised by, the TDS. In other words, the Examiner position is inherently proletarianized, because its purpose is by definition to take over that portion of the TDS's work process which can be delegated to subordinate workers.

Thus, while the teaching profession retains an effective monopoly over recruitment to the Examiner rank, this does not represent professional dominance, because all of the design and decision-making functions remain elsewhere. Since the Examiners are completely cut off from policy formation and generally have only limited input in even technical matters (though this varies considerably from individual to individual), the fact that these positions are occupied by teachers is completely irrelevant to the profession's control of the evaluation function. On the contrary, the bureaucracy's ability to require professional credentials for even as tenuous, temporary, and heavily deskilled a position as Examiner demonstrates the existence of a reserve army of professionally qualified but marginalized workers, which in turn strongly suggests the teaching profession's vulnerability to further ideological deskilling.

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[23](cont'd) Assistantship. Three years later, I accepted a one-year term as an acting TDS.

[24] Again, this is not to say that someone who once served as an Examiner might not later in their career return to the Branch as an Associate Director, but this would be coincidental (or at most the reflection of a continuing interest in evaluation issues) and not a direct or expected career path.

Of course, the $18-an-hour salary still compares favourably with many other jobs, and from this perspective, the exclusion of other workers from even this casual employment within the Ministry represents the profession's successful capture of the potential market for its services. On the other hand, over a quarter of the professionally qualified workers in the Branch, and nearly half of those working directly with the examinations and classroom teachers, are in positions that provide neither tenure nor benefits. The Examiners appreciated the wage, but were concerned about this lack of security and benefits.

> #20: Well, um, the lack of security is somewhat stressful. It's a case as long as there is work to be done, and as long as there is funding for my position, and as long as they like me, then I can work here. And the money is quite good. If anything goes wrong, if I have an accident, or if they get budget cutbacks, I can be released tomorrow, or this morning, with no notice and no severance pay, and I'm not eligible for unemployment insurance. So I am out on the street with my little coffee cup in hand selling pencils. And that creates a certain amount of anxiety. (1.57-65)

> #31: I literally have nightmares about it, about going to a dentist and not being able to afford my root canal or whatever it is I need. And that's something that really, that I think about a lot. (1.121-124)

> #24: Umhum. Lack of security. Difficult to support a family when you don't know, you know, where you're going to be in six months. But other than that, it's been fine. [?It's?] an acceptable wage, and uh, the major disadvantage of it all is that there are no deductions taken off, no income tax. You, you know. It um, it makes it appear like you're making more than you are. [I: Heheh.] And so that's a real disadvantage. (1.58-64)

Instead of professional dominance, then, the recruitment of teachers to the Examiner's position may also be interpreted as evidence of a serious erosion of the profession's traditional working conditions and privileges. While a detailed analysis of the recent general trend in both the state and corporate sectors towards a greater reliance on temporary and part-time employees is beyond the scope of the current study, it is certainly something of which the Examiners themselves are highly conscious:

> #31: . . . I think, frustrating to be on wages, if that's what you're on, because I mean it's hard, hard to get on salary, it really is. I think you could be stuck a long long time before you actually get · · · ·
>
> I: So the [being on] wages is an issue as well. The lack of security · ·
>
> #31: Yeah, well, the whole, and I think that's the way this Branch and maybe the whole [provincial] government is going, is contracts and uh, and wages, but nothing [-?-?-] to actually sign · · · (1.1262-1271)

The Examiner position, then, has several important theoretical implications. First, it demonstrates that Freidson's criteria of professional recruitment and community identity are not sufficient to guarantee professional dominance. That the Examiners are all teachers has not meant that teachers have been able to exert control over the Examiner's work, in terms of either its product or its conditions of employment.

Second, the nature of the Examiner role also suggests a minor qualification for Larson's model, namely that bureaucratic structures could be used to subject public service professionals to technical proletarianization without the creation of distinct technobureaucratic occupations. While still a long way from such a situation here, the Examiners illustrate how the bureaucratic ranks might themselves be so heavily deskilled, and design functions so attenuated within a finely graduated hierarchical structure, that instead of the emergence of [illegible] technobureaucratic professions, one might find merely technobureaucratic *jobs*.

Third, the professional-level recruitment to technical-level positions characteristic of the Examiner rank provides an illustration of ***technical enskilling***. The superior skills and internalized discipline of the professional worker provide a better return on the government's salary investment than a greater number of less well-paid, but also less skilled, clerks. Technical enskilling is particularly useful when, as here, the work tasks are highly volatile, abstract, or intuitive, and so resistant to detailed formatting. The Examiner's professional skills and discipline free the TDS from the need to exercise the close supervision that would be required to achieve the equivalent work from clerical staff, such that the difference between the Examiner's and clerk's salaries is more than compensated by both the Examiner's greater productivity and the saving in cost of the TDS's time.

Finally, and most interesting, the fragmentation of the TDS's work process so that lesser tasks may be delegated to the Examiner does not represent the technical proletarianization of the TDS role. In Chapter 1 (page 32), I argued that "When the independent practitioner delegates part of his/her task to a less skilled assistant (e.g., a dentist hires a dental technician), the professional benefits from the resulting generation of surplus value; but when the same deskilling occurs in an institutional setting, the organization, rather than the individual professional, benefits." In this case, the organization presumably benefits from the cheapening of labour that results from hiring temporary, inexpensive Examiners during peak production periods for approximately half of the development positions, rather than an equivalent number of permanent, and therefore significantly more expensive, TDSs. Nevertheless, the situation is rendered ambiguous here because the individual TDS, rather than management, decides what and how much to delegate to the Examiner. Since the TDS retains responsibility for, and control over, the functions delegated to the Examiner, the TDS role cannot be said to be deskilled. Instead, the TDS is able to personally benefit from the concentration of design functions in the TDS role, much as if in independent practice. Furthermore, the fact that the Examiners are technically enskilled greatly exaggerates this benefit. Note, for example, how [illegible] wishes to pursue his own career goals and increase his own influence over policy at the expense of an equally qualified colleague by appropriating design functions to his own work process:

> #18: I need a really competent backup. Someone who's got the same kind of education experience, you know, seven or eight years of, same level of [subject] expertise, because I also want it to be dialoguic kind of thing. Where we sit down and dig into a question and we can discuss the merits of that question as equals. But at the same token, I know I can trust on him, to say, look if I want to make sure that these graphs are done this way, this way, I know that he can take care of that, he can, he can talk to [the artist] whoever the case may be, the editors, and deal with those kinds of issues. And I can be left more freely to work with the curriculum initiatives. Because to write, to come up with ideas, to organize, the way the paper ought to be written, if it's a position paper, all these things, you need time to think, to organize that. You need time to do some research, to read, and I would want to be freed up for those kinds of things, to do the kind of job that I want to do.[25]

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[25] On the other hand, this often worked to the Examiner's advantage as well. Because their duties were assigned by the TDS or senior manager rather than formally set down in a job description, at least a couple of the recent graduates were able to negotiate job expansions, or moves to new areas, which provided them with professional development benefits:

> #20: I'm starting to get involved more in other areas. Originally my job was to act as a backup or support person for [#34]. Building field tests primarily and then whatever paperwork or flunky work need to be done. However, at this point I'm starting to get more involved in [subject] and [different subject], [different grade level], I'm helping to mark this summer; I'll be working, a little bit, on the new model for [yet another subject's] written response. Plus I do a fair amount of just reading and research. I don't know if this will turn into anything, but had [Associate Director] suggested, "Read a pile of this, and read some more of this", and there seems to be an opportunity to get involved with other aspects of the job or other things relating to this field. So I think that much has changed, and I suspect that by the time I'm done, I will have

(1.1384-1399)

The catch here, of course, is that while retaining responsibility for delegated tasks allows the TDSs to avoid the externally imposed fragmentation of their work process, it leaves them vulnerable instead to technical enskilling (through the reabsorption of formerly delegated tasks) at a later date. Again, a close examination of the TDS's work process is beyond the scope of the present study, but one particular speed-up in the TDS role may be briefly sketched to illustrate this point. When the Coordinator role was being phased out and the TDSs asked to assume the Coordinator's administrative duties for their own area (which is itself a classic example of deskilling through the enskilling of subordinates), the TDSs were each given an Examiner as a backup. The Examiners not only provided the TDSs with sufficient free time to absorb these new administrative duties, but confirmed the TDS title change to "Program Manager" by providing the TDSs with someone to manage. As time passed, the new budgeting and administrative duties came to be seen as a routine requirement of the TDS job. At this point, budget cuts eliminated the ephemeral Examiner positions, and the TDSs, who retained responsibility for the tasks formerly carried out by the Examiners, had to reabsorb this workload.

> I: Has the workload changed at all since—
> #18: Yeah.
> I: How has it changed?
> #18: It's gone right through the roof.
> I: Yeah?
> #18: Yeah. And I'm doing it alone. Previously I had a backup.
> I: So does that mean your workload has—
> #18: Hence, no lunch hours. Yes. Yeah. (1.1366-1380)

Deskilling, then, should not be thought of as a simple, unidirectional, and irrevocable process. Tasks are routinely fragmented and recombined in whatever combination best suits the current needs of management (or that the professional staff are temporarily able to

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[35](cont'd) ended up doing more things than my predecessors. Different variety of tasks. (1.133-147)

These informal learning experiences were seen by the Examiners as being of value to their future careers as classroom teachers, but note that there was never any suggestion of further advancement within the Branch.

appropriate), and arrangements which may benefit the professional staff at one point may later prove disadvantageous. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 1, however, the general trend to be expected in a heteronomous bureaucracy will be towards disempowering the professional ranks.

For the purposes of the current discussion, the important conclusion here is that although the Examiners are credentialled professionals, the Examiner role is not a professional position.

The Junior Managers

In Chapter 5, I defined as 'junior manager' any manager who does not sit on Management Council. This includes those in the positions of Administrative Officer/Manager-Is, Supervisors, and one of the Coordinators. Precise job titles were often difficult for the incumbents themselves to identify because the Branch was in the midst of a major reorganization. The Coordinator, for example, had only discovered his current title a few days before,[26] and had gone through four job descriptions in the previous year, as senior management attempted to finalize the organizational chart. To further confuse the issue, most of these managers were in 'acting' positions entirely different from those for which they had been hired, so that their current duties bore little or no relationship to their official classification.[27] (For example, two-thirds of these managers were still members of the union of provincial employees.[28]) This was not entirely related to the reorganization, however, as some of these individuals had been reassigned their current duties years before, but had never been officially reclassified.[29] Unlike the Examiners, however, all of these managers are permanent government employees.

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[26] The job title had been altered on the organizational chart some months before, but he had only learned of this change when the personnel department called him in for a job audit interview to challenge this reclassification.

[27] For example: "My official title is still 'Research Officer I', and my working title is 'Manager, Student Certification and Evaluation Similarly: " . . . as far as I know, officially, my job description, my employee number, everything else still says that I'm the [subject] TDS."

[28] "Exactly, Yeah. I'm getting paid as a [original position], and I'm getting, I'm putting in for overtime and getting it because I'm still with the union, okay, but I'm getting uh, I['m] doing the responsibilities for, associated with the management aspects of that, making decisions, etc., and running . . . this whole unit. So I'm functioning as one but getting, but, you know, I'm the other one."

Regardless of title, the junior managers run the service units responsible for logistical support functions, such as the placement of field tests, the management of student record information, and the publication of Branch reports. Their supervisory role is generally restricted to overseeing clerks rather than other educators. Since they do not sit on Management Council, their policy role is limited to submissions to their senior managers, and usually concerns only their own area of responsibility.

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[29] R: No, my duties have changed drastically. In, in two years series it seems. Every two years I get drastically different, heheh, um, responsibilities. [I: Okay] And in fact this last year they did a random, what they called a random survey of AO-Is and RO-Is in the Department, and I got a little, uh, kind of a summary I guess of the whole thing, and they stated that uh, they were not, my responsibilities in no way go with, comparable to anybody else in the Department who was an RO-I or an 0-II, and uh, they were not, but however, they were not going to pink-slip me because I was in the process of being reclassified, and they knew that.

. . .

I: What, what kind of tasks have you done over the six years you worked here.?
R: Okay. Oh, my goodness, I started out · · at the very beginning, I started out · · · working on uh, we had our first [?cuts?] of some reports, for example, our first drafts of some uh Comprehensive Test blueprints, we started working on sample items for language arts tests, um · · we started the [General Education Diploma] program, we started finding out what that was all about, and tried to amass all sorts of literature from other places just to get the program on the road. That took about a year and a half to two years—
I: So development, material?
R: Yeah, basically, yeah. And then after that I worked for [founding Director] as his assistant, I guess for half a year or so. So I attended all the meetings and things in the Department. And then I went upstairs uh, I worked with Exam. Admin., for two and a half, from May '84, May 7 of '84 uh · · 8 last May, '87. But that was my longest period of work. I kept the same functions, same duties, and you know learned something about the job and finally got on top of it, and so, so I did that for three years. That was Exam. Administration. And then after that I was sent over to uh Student Records Branch to facilitate the integration of the two Branches and assist in the implementation of the, uh, what do they call, the interfacing of the groups and the kinds of—
I: I see, heheh.
R: And ended up here. Ended up in charge of one of the units that was there. They split, they split up what was there into two units, and I took, I became responsible for one of them.
I: So would it be fair to say that you started as a Research Officer—
R: I never really did any Research Officer-related like things, such as, you know, such as statistical analysis or anything that was in my job outline. [I: Oh, okay.] I have never done anything that was in my job, original job description, that I applied for, okay?
I: Okay. So you applied for a job but that wasn't the job you got.
R: Never. I, at no point have I done any aspect of that job. Heheh. (1.142-219)

Both the tasks performed by and the staffing of these junior management positions strongly suggest that they are not part of the education profession. This is most clearly the case for the Administrative Officer/Manager-I rank, the lowest tier of management. Both of these positions primarily involve the supervision of clerks, and are largely isolated from other Branch activities. Thus, they are more appropriately thought of as management rather than professional positions. As one respondent put it: "This is the manager of a department store for example. Manager of a meat department of Safeway's. Something about that level." Like the Examiners, these managers have only very limited independence of action:

> R: Uh · · in my present position · · I would see myself as more professional, but my position would not be viewed by the public as, as professional. They'd be more professional because they're teachers and they make more money and they kind of, they run their own classrooms. Here again, autonomy thing. I think that's the basic thing with me, the basic grievance, lack of autonomy.

Indeed, there was some initial debate over whether these included sufficient responsibility to even be considered as managerial positions:

> R: We're having trouble getting these two positions through, [I: Umhum] okay, justifying, providing the rationale to Personnel that these are in fact management positions. [I: Okay.] We've had them come back twice now, and they feel that some of the tasks are not either, either they're not defined clearly enough or they're, they don't reflect enough management uh type work to get reclassified as management positions, . . . both Manager-I, junior managers. Which is something new for the Branch too, you know, [I: Yeah.] we've never had to deal with that level. (1.45-54)

Furthermore, while the Ministry would have preferred to have staffed all of its managerial ranks with educators (an illustration either of the profession's dominance over the potential market for its services, or of the exploitation of professional labour through technical enskilling), these Administrative Officer positions appear to be either too low, or their duties too unrelated to the profession's core skills and knowledge, to be attractive to even the marginalized educators taking employment as Examiners. Consequently, the incumbents have no teaching credentials, but have instead worked their way up through the ranks of government service:

> I: Okay. Can I ask you what your qualifications were when you took this job?
> R: When I took this job? Um · · I don't know that I had any. Um, the uh, I think the posting had called for a Bachelor's degree or equivalent amount of education and

> experience, and I had a high school diploma and, and I had experience [[i.e., as a senior clerk]] in the test development area which, uh, sort of worked under [name] but I had no connection to. I was fortunate. I applied for the job when hiring was such that there weren't a lot of qualified people out there.
>
> I: But it was sort of a case of your working your way up within the system.
>
> R: Umhum, umhum. (1.1046-1060)

These junior managers recognize that further advancement or lateral transfer to other positions within the Branch is impossible without an education degree.[30] Since they report directly to an Assistant Director (a rank normally associated with a Masters degree and extensive school-based administrative experience), and since they are not directly involved in any of the Branch's professional activities, there is no obvious next step for promotion, even if they were now to obtain a Bachelor of Education degree.

> I: Okay. So you didn't have a B.Ed.?
>
> R: No.
>
> I: Anything, no certificates in that line?
>
> R: No, I have, I've tried to uh, I have made three attempts to get a B.Ed., but I have not managed to get through a single course, yet, beyond the second lecture. Heheh.
>
> I: I think I *won't* ask you why that is, heheh.[31]
>
> R: I was very sincere at first, I was going to do it, but then I realized that after putting what would have amounted to about two years of evenings and summer schools I would have come back to a higher salary and the same work. If it had been a different job, yes, but coming back to the same job, investing all that money and time, energy, [I: Yeah.] with, with the same duties, is not worth it to my way of thinking, at the time anyway.

Thus, the Manager-I positions may be interpreted as the top of the career ladder for the clerical, administrative, or support workers within the Branch, rather than as either the bottom rung of the management ladder or an entrance-level position for the teaching profession. In spite of their employment within the Education Ministry, these Administrative Officers could not be considered educators.

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[30] For example: " . . . but really, you don't have much choice because there's nothing, with the reclassification you know, where they had almost a position . . . and then [Director] announced further to that he wanted a B.Ed. for uh the Exam Admin unit, which is where I would have gone." (1.560-563)

[31] This respondent, who holds professional credentials in an unrelated field, had previously expressed his contempt for the low intellectual level of the education faculty's evening course offerings.

The Coordinator and the Supervisors do hold education credentials, including several with Master's degrees, but their professional knowledge is of only indirect relevance to the performance of their current duties.

> I: Uh, does your experience from classroom teaching, your knowledge of classroom teach[ing], apply here at all?
>
> #05: Uh, not to, uh, well. to the degree that you have to be rather organized to be a good teacher. You have to plan always. But here the planning is uh much much more so. . . . (1.1273-1278)
>
> #16: Yes, yeah. Because the relationships that I have with students very often are same, the kind of relationship I have with the people I'm working with. [[That month, the speaker was supervising the army of university students hired each summer to help sort and process returning examinations.]] (1.1569-1571)

And again, from a slightly different approach:

> I: Okay, uh, do you ever feel that you're overqualified for the work you're doing?
>
> #05: Well, certainly . . . I have degrees in areas which one might question whether it's . . . helping me right now or not. . . . But certainly I have degrees which, others might question, and I might question as to how much good they're doing me at this point. Heheh. Because, well, I say, well, my courses in, in Ed. Admin. and, or an otherwise uh, in education and uh I picked earlier up at the undergrad level in courses in supervision and administration, are the ones you say are directly affecting my work now. But on the other hand, without the background, uh, degrees in other areas, and the experience I've had, I might feel a little shortchanged in understanding what I'm doing in some areas. (1.862-874)
>
> #16: Yup. Especially in my present position. I believe that you don't need a Master of Education to do [position title]. (1.2010-2011)
>
> #40: All the time.
>
> I: All the time?
>
> #40: My favourite comment is, "I'm very high-priced clerical staff". Uh, for 90 per cent of my work could be done by clerical staff. I spend, well, today, today I spent uh, what, maybe an hour on the phone -- a typical day would be, an hour on the phone, two hours on the computer, two hours recording in the books, doing recordkeeping, probably an hour on the Kodak doing photostatting, probably half an hour, an hour searching for stuff in the filing cabinet or something, then once a week, or maybe once every two weeks, I have to draft up a letter for superintendents, and so there comes my professional sort of work in, but uh, the regular people working in [unit] wouldn't need that, you know. [I: Umhum.] If they're, if you took real good, you [illegible] need people real good on the telephone, you know, a Clerk IV, Clerk V could do the job, just as well as I do. Cheaper. They keep saying that it needs a professional, but the professional portions of the job, they don't let you do. (1.756-7[illegible]

Why, then, insist on recruiting professional educators to these positions if their professional knowledge is not relevant?

A large part of the answer is simply protocol. As previously mentioned in Chapter 6, contact between the Ministry and school-based personnel tends to be restricted to interaction between equivalent hierarchical levels, and so to avoid impugning the dignity and independence of local school officials, any position that involves such contact must be filled by a qualified professional. Thus the comment by #40 that his only professional duty is to draft the letters to superintendents.

Similarly, as fellow educators, these managers have a greater understanding of the needs and attitudes of school-based personnel than would a manager recruited from outside the profession:

> #05: Well, I wasn't a principal but I was in a uh junior high and senior high situation uh for many years and then, uh a few schools, so I had fairly extensive background coming into this, which certainly helped. Because when you get into field testing and you're talking to principals and department heads, you're talking with first hand knowledge. You know how they operate. I know how a big school and a small school operates. When you're talking to them, you're on the same wavelength and you understand what they're saying with you, and can negotiate with them with I think with a high degree of success because of the good understanding of their operation. I think someone just coming into, say, a role like field testing, not worked in the system for a number of years, simply is not going to have the empathy for what is happening in the school and is not going to be able negotiate with them quite as successfully. They detect pretty quickly if you know what you're talking about. You in turn detect pretty quickly if they know what they're doing. Heheh. And you can detect pretty quickly whether the department head's on the bit or not. Heheh. Some are better than others. (1.654-672)

At first glance, this professional monopoly over recruitment to managerial positions would seem to confirm Freidson's analysis of professional dominance. Upon closer inspection, however, this is revealed as a classic illustration of Larson's discussion of the role of the ideology of professionalism in technobureaucratic occupations. The emphasis on these managers' ability to empathize with principals and department heads, rather than on specific professional skills, suggests that the primary function of professional-level recruitment to these managerial positions is to legitimate pre-existing bureaucratic authority. It is clear from #05's comments, for example, that his professional knowledge is not used to inform policy — which is generally decided at the next higher level of Branch management — but rather to be able to identify himself as a 'fellow educator' to school-based personnel. Claims of professional collegiality are therefore used to legitimate and smooth acceptance of centralized direction, even though this direction is issued from managers who are otherwise indistinguishable from the external management Freidson and the professional dominance model reject. In other words, professional-level recruitment to management positions is used here as a technique to undermine resistance to ideological deskilling by implicitly misrepresenting hierarchical control as collective autonomy.

Thus, in terms of their central tasks, and the type of expertise actually used to perform these tasks, these must be considered managerial rather than professional positions.

It is somewhat harder to generalize about career pattern and recruitment, since there are three distinct routes to these more senior supervisory positions. Nevertheless, there may also be good reason to question whether these appointments are part of a normal career ladder within the education profession.

First, some of the Supervisors had not so much been recruited to management as removed from their former TDS positions. Lacking the classroom experience considered crucial for TDS work, and lacking the confidence of their senior managers, they appear to have been banished to the service units in what amounts to disciplinary action. One TDS, for example, was removed from the development unit essentially for refusing to take direction from his advisory committee (which, in the context of Chapter 6, is itself highly interesting).

> 40: Yeah. And in uh times I have totally ignored it, if you will. Uh, in legal ways. One happened a long time ago with uh [name] when he was on the, they weren't ERCs then, but the same thing as an ERC. . . . And at the committee, he said, "I want these 11 questions, [[gestures thumb over shoulder]], they're all garbage". I said, "Why?" and he said, "Because I don't like it". I said, "They've been field-tested, they have good stats, why don't you like them? What's the matter?" "None of your business, I don't have to tell you why I don't like 'em. I'm the boss, I don't like 'em, move 'em." And, but that's what he said: "move them". So after the meeting was over, I took and I moved them. To another part of the exam. [I: Heheh.] I put the exam out, the exam came back, and this was one of my mistakes uh, this was shortly before [name] was hired, and I think that's was why I was kicked off as the TDS for [subject], because the test got administered, the results came back, we went to the follow-up meeting, and [name] said, "See, if you hadn't've done like I told you to, those stats [I: Heheheheh.] would have come in bad". I said, "Here's a copy of the original, here's a copy of the test that was out there, you show me where I took out your questions you didn't like". I said, "Every one of them are still in there". And he went right through the roof. But anyway, I should have kept my mouth shut. [I: Heheh.] But no, uh, he wanted me fired and a whole bunch of things, but he didn't work because— If it had've bombed, that might have been [a] different thing. But uh, usually, I've never twisted the rules and not

come out on top. So.[32]

While officially merely a lateral transfer to other equally important duties, these moves were universally interpreted as "firings" by the other professional staff. Note, for example, the context and manner in which another TDS makes reference to one of these transfers:

> #18: So far, so good, but you have to really be careful. You know what this is like? This is like being in combat. You're alone to a very large degree, you don't know the players who are with you, in the platoon that's [.?.] because there are new players that come in they go out, so the new team still hasn't jelled yet, you're out on patrol, the place is littered with land mines, and you never know when your leg is going to go off. Or you may get even get nailed. I mean, to me, the event that took place to a particular TDS some time back, spoke volumes. When the [subject] exam uh had problems, and what was done to the, the incumbent in that position was an object lesson to me.
>
> . . .
>
> #18: For instance, if you've been to a boys' school, and somebody does something wrong and that particular boy, all the others boys are brought out then and this boy is being given corporal punishment, you know, it's supposed to have a salutary effect on other people. That's exactly— Well, this may not have been the intent, it certainly reminded me of my childhood days, this boarding school days. I picked up the message very clearly: "If you screw up, forget it!"
>
> I: "Forget it" in what way?
>
> #18: Forget it. I mean, your career is just blown, goes to complete · · · I mean the way that he was moved out sent a powerful message to all the [subject] teachers in the province. That his judgement could not be counted upon. It was, professionally he was ruined. (1.1568-1589)

The connotation of these transfers, then, is that while these individuals continue to be usefully employed by the Branch, they are no longer employed in professional positions.

The second recruitment pattern is closer to a technobureaucratic occupation, though again with some ambiguities. Those incumbents who had volunteered for these positions did so out of an interest in administration, and saw themselves as a slightly different breed than classroom teachers. Here, a successful manager reflects that administration is not for the majority:

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[32] This particular individual seems to have prospered as a Supervisor. From my informal observation, his irreverent attitude towards authority continues to be a source of annoyance to his superiors, and of distress or amusement to his colleagues, depending on whether they are on the receiving end or not. Nevertheless, he is successfully managing an important logistical function, the scale of which has grown tremendously since he first took it over. Since most of the professional staff would rather have their teeth drilled than take over this particular administrative function, they seem generally appreciative of the job he is doing.

> #05: This particular capacity, I wouldn't say uh a very high percentage [[of classroom teachers]] could [[do it]] or would, or perhaps would want to. Uh · · I think you have to have maybe the bent to want to do it. Administration, first of all. I think many classroom teachers are not interested in that. They want to deal with their subject matter. Getting away from that and dealing with something entirely different is not particularly their piece of cake. When the [job title] job was advertised, I think that most of the people who went after it were in fact department heads, where there has to be some administrative skills; running a part of the school. (1.1344-1354)

Thus, those applying for these positions tend to be those who wish to leave the teaching profession for administration.

What made even these junior government positions so appealing for many teachers was that mobility within local school systems was almost completely blocked. The traditional career ladder for ambitious (especially male) teachers had been to build on classroom experience to become a department head, and from there work up to vice principal and then eventually to a full principalship or a central office position. These expectations were frustrated, however, as the baby boom generation all reached their midcareer point at roughly the same moment, and so were all competing for the same handful of administrative positions. As is clear in this respondent's description of his own history, even the modest first step of becoming department head was completely unattainable during this period.

> #05: No. But I was, shall we say, the right-hand person, senior person to the department head. Department head positions for many years were very static and stagnant, as were administration, and the whole school setup, for the last quite a number of years, uh very very little turnover, and so department heads tend to be entrenched as did administrative posting, and uh, very very little movement. So [I: Yeah.] I was probably then the right-hand person, the senior person working [with] the department head, and uh, worked a lot with him, his duties, and his duties, but I had no official title. (1.1091-1100)

Teachers were therefore prepared to accept junior administrative postings simply to escape the appearance of career stagnation.

> I: Uh, did you see taking the job with the Branch as a promotion?
>
> #05: I would say, I would say so, yes. Though the money didn't reflect it. (1.1118-1121)

It also seems likely that the teachers who applied for these positions did so in anticipation of future promotion; that is, they saw these as entry-level positions to educational administration within the Ministry. Unfortunately, mobility within the Branch is just as clogged as in the school systems, and what had looked like a foot in the door became instead a leg in the trap. Unable to go forward, neither were they able to go back.

> #05: Someone in my stage to uh go back into the school system, into the classroom or as a department head uh, who needs an overqualified, older, overly paid person to step in? They don't need him, they don't want him, I'd have to go to a central office position. (1.1154-1158)
>
> . . .
>
> I think it [?really?] becomes very restrictive and I think that's true for many many people in the Branch uh, it's not easy to move back once you, you uh · · you make the break. It's not easy to move back in so, from my viewpoint, to move back into the school system would have to be into a central office, into uh some type of supervisory or uh assistant superintendent role. (1.1172-1177)

Thus, it is difficult to determine whether the transfer to these positions has been terminal because the position represents a separate technobureaucratic profession, or whether this is simply a consequence of demographics. The lack of mobility back to the classroom may indicate that the incumbents would perceive such a move as a demotion (which would suggest that administration was perceived as a separate function, in contrast to, say, academia, where administration is often undertaken as a temporary tour of duty), or it may simply mean that returning to the classroom is no longer an option for these individuals.

> #05: Uh · · oh, I wouldn't say I would refuse such a position, but the chances of moving into such a position are very remote. When you see the long long waiting list of people trying to get into the classroom, uh, and uh, they can hire somebody at $30,000, why should they hire somebody at $45,000? (1.1163-1167)

Similarly, none of the junior managers has been able to move up. But is this because these positions are isolated from higher rungs of the career ladder (like the Manager-I positions), or merely because the higher positions are already occupied? The managers themselves recognize that they are trapped, but tend to blame it on the times rather than the position:

> #05: I think to some degree, especially, I, I think it's, it's the times that we're at, that we feel trapped. If we went back 15 or 20 years when you could apply to any jurisdiction, get just about any level position you wanted, and there was fairly rapid uh, rapid mobility uh. I don't think it's the position as such, it's the times that we're in, [I: Umhum.] where we feel trapped. It's just, like graduating students, cannot get into a classroom. [I: Yeah, so true.] Uh, yeah, it's the times we're at. The opportunities for any different individual are so few right now, it's that kind of thing which traps a person. When there's fairly rapid mobility in the school systems, yes, you could feel you could make the ladder, or, or slightly upward move, uh it's, it's that, simply the lack of mobility which traps one right now. (1.1199-1211)

On the other hand, that the new senior management positions created in the Branch reorganization — including that of the Assistant Director to whom most of these junior managers report — were filled from the development units, rather than from the service units, strongly suggests that the junior management positions are simply dead-end jobs.

The third pattern of recruitment is completely different again. Here, certain Supervisory positions are filled on a strictly temporary basis by successful TDSs, rather than through direct recruitment from the rank and file. Partly, this is a pragmatic response to the specific nature of the position:

> R: I don't think a huge percentage of teachers could handle it either, because, [*cough*] at least not right away, because it demands a knowledge of the organization that uh, teachers wouldn't have. [*cough*] It may take a while. I think the best person to put into [job title] is someone who, who's, is been connected with the organization for awhile. Like one of the TDSs, [*cough*] as, as a covering-off position, to give them a bit of a break from that high level of stress for a while. I think that's perhaps the way that, that the position should be used, is to put a person in, like an internal secondment, [I: Yeah, yeah.] put a person into it to give them a break from what they're doing for awhile. Also allow them to open up their minds a bit, to that, the broader picture of what the Branch is doing. And then bring them out again. (1.1748-1761)

The need for insider knowledge motivates senior management to fill these positions internally, while the lower demands compared to the development role, and the opportunity to gain some administrative experience, motivate successful TDSs to accept the placement *on the understanding* that it is a strictly temporary assignment.

On the other hand, the professional staffing is also used to alter the basic nature of the position. Previously, when the position had been filled by external managers, it had simply involved the coordination and supervision of a number of specialized but non-professional staff. Once TDS staff were assigned to the role, the job expectations were informally expanded to include various special projects and tasks that had hitherto fallen through the cracks of the organizational chart.

> R: In fact, I've talked to [Associate Director] about this. The only reason that, that you need someone with my credentials is because of the, the covering-off of things that— I've been largely a trouble-shooter up there. The regular duties are not such that—
>
> I: [.?.?] Uh, what percentage of day would you be doing things that could be done by a less qualified person?
>
> R: Not much, because I don't, I, you know, I don't concentrate on those, those, that part of the job. I let it happen. Uh,
>
> I: So you go find the things that—

> R: Right. Like, like doing the [special project]. I mean, I volunteered for that. Uh, the, I, you know, you could make that job a lot different. You could be uh in the [name] or [name]'s back pockets all the time. You know, you could be [[knocks on door]] making demands on those people. "You shall do this, and you're going to do it this way." That, that would be a different kind of role than what I have done there. And I think the way I've handled it has been more positive, and better for the Branch. I mean, you look at the people who have been in that position, that, did you know some of those people? [name]? [I: Oh, yes, right.] [[Gives physical description]] Uh, there was [name] who was doing the function. I mean, these people had no credibility. They were kind of people that were going to stand over people and look over their shoulder. Very, very counterproductive. You know, you need someone— That the reason, I guess, that you need someone with a teaching certificate and that kind of experience, as [job title] is so that the special projects, like this [example], can be taken over by that person, and worked on. And the supervisory function is, is not crucial. [I: Almost incidental.] Almost incidental, yeah. Now, you know, it just so happens with that uh, that staff could stand a little more supervision than I give them, [I: Heheh.] but so be it. If I have a weakness, it's in disciplining. I don't like that, that part of it. (1.2015-2051)

This, then, is an example of the assertion of professional control. Professional staff were moved into a formerly nonprofessional supervisory position to correct problems with the management of these service units, and to initiate policy in some areas that had not previously been addressed. Furthermore, since the transfer was explicitly intended as a temporary tour of duty, these individuals are clearly not changing their professional affiliation or self-identity.

Nevertheless, these positions are widely viewed as inherently less professional than those in the development units, because they are not perceived as requiring professional expertise. Here a respondent compares the TDSs with her own supervisory position:

> R: Because these people [[the TDSs]] are tied to a subject specialty, to, they're seen as being members of a priesthood, if you like. You know, that these guys have knowledge that, that other people don't have, and therefore they're, they're in some way more professional— You know, I've been working in [service unit] for the last year, and that really is the black hole of, of the Branch. I mean, you know yourself that the kind of individuals who have gone into that, at least in some part, have been failures in the development units. There are some good people in there. Don't get me wrong. But there are others who are not. And uh, you know, I think that unit is viewed largely as, as not having any particular expertise that anyone else couldn't jump into it and take. I mean, even when, even [Director] when he offered me the job was, you know, not, not directly saying it, but you know, "You don't want to be in, in [position title]. You can, you can do better than that." So, uh, that feeling that it's largely clerical, and it is, largely administrative. I mean, you know you set up decent procedures and then you just maintain those procedures. So it's not—
>
> I: So it's not really— That administration section is not professional, uh, because it doesn't have the same expertise that [[one does]] in . . . exam development.
>
> R: Right. Yeah.

> I: Okay.
> R: More people can do administration than can do exam development.
> I: Okay.
> R: It's supply and demand, in part, I suppose. Heheh.
> I: Heheh. Is—
> R: But there is that notion of, of having, having a body of knowledge, you know, that this other group doesn't have, and therefore that makes you more professional. (1.647-686)

Thus, even for those junior management positions that are filled on a rotating basis by successful educators, the positions themselves are not perceived as part of the profession, but rather as external administrative postings.

The junior management ranks, then, demonstrate the importance of not confusing contiguous positioning on an organizational chart with membership in the same profession. Promotion from the Manager-I rank is inconceivable without formal teaching credentials, even though at least one of the incumbents holds a Ph.D. in another field and has had considerable teaching experience at the college level. As a professionally qualified academic trapped in a dead-end job that otherwise requires only a high school diploma, this worker illustrates not only the overproduction of Ph.D.s and the associated credential inflation common in the Canadian economy of the 1970s,[33] but also the exclusionary recruitment patterns within the Ministry.

At first glance, the education profession's monopoly over recruitment above the Manager-I level appears to confirm Freidson's principle of professional dominance; but when the same reasoning is applied to the other junior management positions, it may instead be seen to support Larson's model of the emergence of distinct technobureaucratic professions. Take, for example, the junior managers recruited directly from the classroom. If they were subsequently promoted to the senior management ranks, then these positions could be interpreted as forming a single career ladder and a unified profession. This does not, however, appear to have been the case. While it is obviously dangerous to overgeneralize from the small sample and limited timeframe available within this case study, there is nevertheless reason to suggest that promotion to senior management requires more than simply professional credentials.[34] Essentially everyone in senior management in the Branch had attained at least the level of department head within the public school system before transferring to government.[35] In spite of the apparent continuity between junior and senior management ranks, this informal requirement for school-based administrative experience appears to form a nearly impenetrable barrier to promotion to or above the Assistant Director level. Just as non-educators may be excluded from anything above the Manager-I level on the grounds that they are not members of the profession, non-administrators may be excluded from anything above the Coordinator rank on the grounds that they are not members of the emergent technobureaucratic fraternity of educational administration.

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[33] See for example Alexander Lockhart, "Graduate Unemployment and the Myth of Human Capital," in *Social Space: Canadian Perspectives*, ed. D. I. Davies and Kathleen Herman (Toronto: New Press, 1971) pp. 251-253. Of course, credential inflation may also involve an element of technical enskilling.

Consequently, those teachers who transferred to low-level government positions because they were not able to move up within their local school systems are caught in the catch-22 that without this prior school-based experience, neither can they move up within government. Experience as a junior manager does not seem to qualify one in quite the same way, perhaps because the position does not involve the supervision of other educators or the application of education expertise to the formulation of policy. Certainly, there is no possibility of promotion for those TDSs appointed to junior management positions as a result of disciplinary actions, and even those who volunteered for Supervisory positions have so far been unable to use this in-house administrative experience to rise above the Acting

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[34] Although the current discussion is in the context of the junior managers, my conclusion here is drawn from my observation of the promotion patterns for all of the Branch staff who had been recruited directly from the classroom. I am aware, for example, of several occasions where successful TDSs subsequently applied for the better-paying position of Regional Office Consultant, but were passed over in favour of individuals who were considerably less qualified in terms of their subject area expertise, but who had had experience as principals or central office administrators, even though these positions were supposedly subject-specific. Furthermore, many of my informants themselves remarked on what they perceived as a growing emphasis on administrative experience as a criterion for promotion throughout the Department.

[35] The single exception here rose instead through Regional Office and rapid advancement within the Department. His early recruitment to a distinct career line within the government following only limited classroom experience, however, still suggests a pattern of sponsorship mobility typical of an emergent technobureaucratic profession. (See below, pages 431-433.)

Coordinator level.

Thus, while movement from teaching to the ranks of the junior managers is feasible, mobility to the senior ranks of the profession via this route appears to be blocked. Like the gulf between commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the army, senior management appears to be recruited from a different pool of potential candidates than are the junior managers. If there are no direct routes up from the ranks of junior management into senior management, then they can hardly be considered parts of the same profession. In terms of recruitment, then, the break between the public service profession of teaching and the technobureaucratic profession of educational administration seems to occur at the Assistant Director level.

In terms of central tasks, on the other hand, the break is clearest between junior management and classroom teaching. Like the senior technobureaucrats, the junior managers differ from classroom teachers in that they work in a centralized location where they are isolated from direct contact with students and hands-on activities; there is an emphasis on supervisory tasks; and they are no longer affiliated with the teachers' association. These superficial similarities with senior management, however, overlook the more significant differences that the junior managers supervise only clerks rather than subordinate educators, and that they have little influence over policy.

Thus, there may be good reason to question whether these managers are part of either the public service profession of teaching or the technobureaucratic profession of educational administration. Whereas both classroom teachers and senior managers must utilize professional bodies of knowledge in their daily activities, the junior managers do not require education expertise or credentials, other than for legitimation purposes. Since their role is indistinguishable from that of managers in non-education settings, they may be more appropriately thought of as members of the management profession rather than of the teaching profession.

This is reflected in the self-image of those permanently assigned to junior management. These individuals tended to stress their identity as managers over their identity as educators, at least *when addressing internal audiences*. Notice, for example, how this Supervisor asserts the importance of managerial skills over professional knowledge in an explicit attack on the professional monopoly over recruitment to senior management positions.

> R: . . . in Education they have the funny feeling that if you're a good principal, or a good teacher, or a good superintendent, or whatever, you're also a good manager. And I think that's a crock, you know. And uh, I think Education could go a long way if they would hire managers to run each department. Like within the Department, have your professionals, but you know. I can't see having somebody that. I, I agree with one of [Director]'s statements, or was it the Director before him, [second Director], that uh, all the TDSs and that should have a Master's degree in that subject or, you know. I, I can't argue with that. But I see no reason why the Associate Directors or the Director has to have those degrees. And the Director especially I think should be a manager, to be able to manage that resource, the human beings that are working under him, you know. And I haven't seen much of management capabilities in any of the bureaucracy of [the Ministry].
>
> . . .
>
> I see a little here and there. Uh, I considered [Associate Director] a pretty good manager at one time, but I don't anymore. I don't know whether the Department washed that out of him. Like [another Associate Director] I think is a pretty good manager. So's [name], but it appears like as they move up the ladder in management, that disappears. And that's probably some pressures from the [?you know?] other parts of the Department. But, no true managers. I mean, I don't see any true managers in management in Education at all. [I: Umhum.] You know, I don't agree with the Department that if you can manage a classroom of grade 12 students, that you're quote "a manager". Heheh. It's different managing, you know. [I: Yeah.] (1.305-335)

That this view of the distinct and importance nature of mangerial skills does not prevail, and that the junior managers are excluded from further promotion within the bureaucracy, is consistent with Freidson's model of professional dominance only if one accepts the separate occupational identity of these "true" managers.

Conclusion

Professional recruitment, then, is not sufficient to indicate that a position is part of a professional career ladder. Neither the junior managers nor the Examiners can be considered as holding professional positions, though for almost opposite reasons. The Examiners are educators, but employed as casual labour in nonprofessional positions. The junior manager positions, on the other hand, are professional-level and permanent, but cannot be considered as part of the teaching profession. With minor exceptions, neither junior managers nor Examiners have any significant input into policy, and both have only limited autonomy over their own work process. The recruitment of classroom teachers to these positions does not, therefore, indicate continued professional control.

PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

In contrast to the Examiners and junior managers, the Test Development Specialists' status as educators in professional-level employment is not in question. The central issue here is instead whether the TDSs should be interpreted as continuing to hold membership in a unified education profession or as constituting a separate technobureaucratic specialization. In spite of many ambiguities, the evidence on the whole supports the conclusion that the Test Development Specialists are part of the public service profession of teaching.

Recruitment Issues

One reason for viewing TDSs as part of the teaching profession is that they are recruited directly from the classroom and are not expected to have specialized credentials or expertise in evaluation. As previously discussed in Chapter 6, great emphasis is placed on the currency of the candidate's classroom experience,[36] and several TDSs commented on their concern that too long an absence from the classroom would seriously undermine their credibility as Test Specialists. (One even went so far as to continue teaching night school simply to retain this classroom contact.) Most TDSs rated knowledge of classroom teaching as the most fundamental component of their professional expertise, and almost all have had extensive teaching experience.[37]

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[36] One recently hired TDS, for example, recalled this as the main theme stressed by the recruiters interviewing her for the job: " 'We want people like you who are familiar with the field', you know, and uh, with whatever I bring here. They're very aware of that" (#22:1.312-314).

[37] Of those responding, one had had 29 years of experience, the last 5 as department head; two had had 23 years' experience at a variety of grade levels; one had had 15 years, including 5 as department head; one 13; and one 10 years. Even the Examiner working as an Acting TDS had had several years' experience as a substitute teacher, and was well known and respected in her district. Only one of the regular TDSs lacked extensive teaching experience, and like myself, had been recruited in the opening days of the Branch. The Branch had inherited a number of professional employees from elsewhere in the Department when it first opened, but

Approximately half the TDSs also have additional professional credentials. Of those interviewed,[38] five had been hired with only a Bachelor of Education degree, though of these, one had since obtained a Graduate Diploma in Educational Administration, another had obtained a Master's degree in Educational Psychology, yet another had completed all but her thesis for a Master's, and a fourth had a Ph.D. in physics. The other five all had Master of Education degrees. Besides these formal academic credentials, two had served as department heads, three had piloted high-profile experimental programs, one had authored a series of popular textbooks, and all had been well known and respected in their subject specialties and local communities.

It could, therefore, be argued that teaching experience alone is an insufficient qualification for a TDS position, but this would be highly misleading. While the Branch is obviously interested in recruiting from among the best and most successful teachers, and while possession of a Master's degree is an obvious competitive edge, there are no *specific* formal requirements beyond classroom experience.[39] For example, in the entire history of the Branch, I am aware of only three TDSs whose Master's theses were in any way related to evaluation (and one of those chose the topic as a *consequence* of working as a TDS). Certainly, none of the 14 TDSs included in the interview sample had had any previous formal training as test developers, or thought a knowledge of psychometrics an important criterion for the position.

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[37](cont'd) with the exception of this single TDS (whose unique writing, curricular, and psychometric skills helped to compensate for a short teaching career), all those who lacked current teaching experience had been subsequently transferred to either junior management or ARO positions.

[38] The reader is reminded that, to keep interview lengths manageable, each respondent was asked only a subset of the entire interview schedule. Thus, while there were a total of 14 TDSs included in the study, only ten were asked to respond to this item. Similarly, the interviews included several respondents who had been hired as TDSs but subsequently transferred to other positions. Where their reminiscences were relevant to the current discussion, I have expanded my sample of the range of TDS experiences in the Branch by including their comments as well.

[39] Job descriptions were in flux during the reorganization, but the one in effect when the interviewees were hired called for a "B.Ed. or equivalent in work and education; some classroom experience; a teaching certificate; a familiarity with item development and test construction procedures" as "essential" requirements. The level of familiarity with test construction procedures required could be met by any competent teacher. "Master of Education; five years of teaching; a knowledge of statistics" are listed as "desirable".

Secure in their understanding of students and the curriculum, they learned their evaluation skills on the job:

> #21: The next thing has to do with gaining some understanding of, of item writing and item construction, and also taking those items and putting them into a test format that is balanced and statistically based. That's still a very important area of growth for me, there's challenge there. My background in statistics, in testing, in measurement, uh, is quite weak, and I was informed when in my interview that I could pick that up on the job, and they weren't too concerned about the level of understanding as an incoming uh appointee. So um, that is an area of growth. (1.307-314)
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> . . .
>
> #21: Okay, so a good background in the discipline, a good understanding of students who are taking the course, now the most challenging and I would say one of the areas I'm not as well prepared for in terms of my background is actual test item writing and test construction. Um. As I came up through my formal training, I received a pretty weak background in that area. Um and so this is, this is been developed on the job and from the tests I've built for myself in my classroom, but there it, you don't refine them or fine-tune them to the same extent as is necessary here. So this is an area, that's uh, needs pretty careful examination. I'm not sure right now where a person would gather these skills in a formal way. I have a hunch, I'm not sure, but I would suspect you'd have to go outside the province. (1.416-427)

A knowledge of statistical technique was considered even less important. Several respondents literally did not even know the meaning of the word:

> I: Uh, what about psychometrics? Is that important in your job?
>
> #21: Psychometrics? You've got me there. Heheh.
>
> I: Things like being able to read statistics on field tests and—
>
> #21: Oh that! Oh yeah, right. Okay, yeah that's important. Uh, and that's a weak area for me, I took one testing evaluation course, course way back. But uh, it's sort of reviving. But I would like to increase my knowledge in that area. So I'm quite dependent on those people in analysis to give me guidelines. Yeah. Good thing they're here.
>
> I: Heheh. Okay. Uh, so perhaps less crucial than some of the other [[skills]].
>
> #21: Right. But I, I, I wish I had more of that, that's right. That's one area I would really like to [I: Okay.] develop some better knowledge of. (1.1867-1884)

Similarly:

> I: Okay, but then writing is lesser important than organizational and classroom skills that you brought?
>
> #34: Yes, I would say.
>
> I: What about psychometrics?
>
> #34: No, I, that hasn't been a key thing. It's important, uh, but not compared to the other. (1.1216-1221)

> #18: To tell you the truth, you don't even need to have taken any courses in statistics to do a job as a TDS.
>
> I: It's not important?

> #18: It's not important because what you learn on the job, you need an operational understanding, and that comes through experience, and God, anybody who can add two plus two can get, pick that experience up on the fly. (1.791-799)
>
> #33: I think you can learn those. You can learn those, relatively speaking, on the job. (1.1248-1249)
>
> #09: To be quite honest I don't, no. No, I really don't. I, to me, I really feel that uh, like the knowledge of the subject and uh, and the ability to work with people to me are probably the two most important things. More than anything. Stats, everything, like the amount of knowledge of stats really was not a critical thing, I didn't think. My stats background is very weak, but for the amount of stats we need, in that, in a Test Development position, I mean I picked up in uh, in a week. I mean, to me, that's not a key factor. So, as I say, I think it's, you have to know and understand your subject material, Test Development Specialist, very clearly, very well, and I think the other thing is very important is, is working with people and being able to establish good relationships and, and contact with other teachers. Because I think the success the Test Development has, Specialist has, to a large degree is, their sort of a network they have out in the, out in the field, and uh you need to establish that, so. (1.375-391)
>
> #22: Not psychometrics. Uh, I do so many different things, it's hard to nail it down. I think, I think my, okay, what is saving me, is what I've mentioned before, just a general knowledge as a classroom teacher. Also, being able to deal with people, not deal with them, but work with people. I think that, I use that a lot. . . . (1.573-576)

The theme that constantly recurs in these interviews, then, is that in spite of the title "Test Development Specialist", there is very little specialized knowledge actually required for the position.[40] The necessary talents for a TDS include a combination of teaching, curriculum, writing, communication, and networking skills which are already possessed by the best teachers. Thus, while those recruited to the TDS position may constitute an elite, their status as instructional leaders is based on their personal credibility, not on specialized training or formal certification.

Recruitment is therefore based on identifying these outstanding individuals among the rank and file. Most TDSs were known to Branch staff prior to their being hired, as a result of their having worked on various government and Branch committees; from their participation in high-profile activities such as authoring texts and working on local board projects; or through personal networking.

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[40] Only a single respondent (and perhaps not coincidentally, this was also the only TDS who lacked extensive classroom experience) thought technical expertise important: "Again, that's not a fair question because I could not survive without my body of knowledge in terms of the content, but I think my strength in this Branch is not my content knowledge, it's my exp— it's my technical expertise" (1.1439-1442). Note that even here, the respondent sees psychometrics as a personal strength rather than as a fundamental requirement, while knowledge of the curriculum is seen as an essential prerequisite for the position.

> #04: I worked on, I worked on Curriculum, um Committees, on Policy Advisory Committee to the Minister, an ECS [[Early Childhood Services]] Coordinator Committee for [?four?] years, uh, I worked on the Articulation Policy for the uh province, that policy which has just been released. I had nothing to do with [the Branch].
>
> I: But you were well known to the government? It sounds like you were involved in a lot of projects.
>
> #04: Yes. I have been through the years, yes.

> #18: Oh yeah. Well, I don't know how far you want to go, but um, you know, when this Branch was first set up, I did a lot of item writing for the [subject] people, I did a lot of marking. I was Head Marker, those kinds of things. Uh I used to come down here and work in the summer months. So I have done that for the government. (1.175-180)

> #22: Oh, I worked with . . . the [project], that's the television scriptwriting, for television. . . . what we were doing, scripts were written in the States, and I had to review them to make sure they matched Canadian expectations, . . . that sort of thing. Also . . . I was on a committee to look at products, and I had to go through the objectives to see if they matched the curriculum. Oh, other little things. Every now and then I would be called in, but it was, I suppose this had been going on for some time.

> #21: And I guess I've been, how my name came to surface, shall we say, um, as department [head] I invited Branch personnel out to speak to [subject] teachers and present curriculum ideas and evaluation ideas, and they saw me in operation in that context and also knew some of my colleagues and uh my name came through that channel I guess. (1.275-280)

> #26: I had, I had worked a lot for [Coordinator] because [he] was the department head at [school A] and I was a teacher at [school A].
>
> I: So he knew you.
>
> #26: And so, and [#09] was a teacher at [school A]. So, uh, [Coordinator], as soon as [[he]] came up here [[to the Branch]] — he came in December — he came back down in January with some work for me to do to put two tests together in 10-20, and uh, and then I came up here every Easter and summer until I came up to stay. (1.1560-1566)

Once identified through one of these routes, suitable potential candidates will often be sought out and actively courted by Branch management whenever a TDS position comes open.

> I: Umhum. Why'd you choose to come to the Branch?
>
> #26: Uh · · probably had uh · · · because [Coordinator] kept asking me I guess.

> #21: Umhum. I was invited to apply, so I did.
>
> I: They sought you out?
>
> #21: Yes. (1.138-142)

> #04: Well, actually, uh, when I was, this job came about in a really strange way because I had, I was on leave of absence until last December working at the university, and I was phoned about this position, I guess in September, and uh, I think it was [Associate Director Achievement] who phoned me, and he said, [name], and told me who he was and whatever, "I want you to come in and talk about this position that we have in uh in [the Branch]". And I thought, well, okay, I'll go in and talk to him about it, and so I came in, and I arrived uh and uh, obviously what they had set up was a formal interview with [the Associate Director, the Coordinator, the Director] in formal suits and uh with uh you know, the questions, the new technique of interviewing with all the questions on the sheets. And this was, I thought, I was just coming in to talk about this, about this job out of the blue, you know, I didn't know what. And uh, during that interview uh um [Director] said to me, at, oh, I guess after a little while, I had, a little bit of time had transpired, he said, "[#04], we never do this, but we would really like you to come to work for us, what can we give you to have you come and fill this position?" (1.107-126)

Since, almost by definition, suitable candidates are usually deeply enmeshed in their own innovative projects, it often takes considerable coaxing to entice them to join the Branch.

> #22: Oh, uh, that was probably one of the most difficult decisions that I've ever had to make, because I loved what I was doing and, uh, I was at a meeting up, upstairs, on the 8th floor [[i.e., in meeting rooms of another branch of the Ministry]] one day, and [Associate Director] uh popped in, he'd been phoning [hometown] all day trying to find me, and I was upstairs, [I: Heheh.] and said he'd like to see me after. So I went, so I met with him after, and he told me, uh, about this [Branch] program. I said— see the thing with that is that what he was telling in [Branch program] is how, everything I believe is how children should learn: using [new technique], all this, and I said, "Yes, [Associate Director], that's exactly, how, what we should [be] doing, is understanding, none of this workbook, worksheet", you see, I'm a sucker for that, so I got all excited over there, and I thought, 'no, no, I'm not going to leave my little nest of birds [[i.e., students in innovative program]] back there. So I said, "That's really nice, but", I said, "it's just come at the wrong time, forget it". So he said, "Well, just think about it some more", and uh so I did, I thought about it, I mean, I, I drove away that night thinking, "Oh, what a nice man, and, and yeah, that would be, that would be terrific, too bad". But I thought about it and I talked to my husband about this and— you see, my, my goals were to eventually, I'd like to have more, impact on what's being done. But, and I thought, you know, maybe I mightn't get this chance again. I don't know. I, uh, it's hard, it's fate, it's just everything else. So I phoned back and I said, "I'd like to know a little bit more", and he told me some more and, and uh, I talked to my principal, it was really mixed emotions, I was really, I was very very sad to leave. (1.160-181)
>
> I: Why did you originally join the Branch? What was it that made [Associate Director]'s phone call attractive?
>
> #04: *Sigh* Well, when he phoned, I thought it was only polite to come in and hear what he had to say.
>
> I: Heheh. Okay, and then when you found out it was an interview and they started saying, you know, join the Branch—
>
> #04: Yes. I was quite flattered I suppose. I was probably swept off my feet. [I: Heheh.] Flattery will get you everywhere on that kind of thing. (1.237-248)

What emerges here, then, is a very different pattern of recruitment than that which would be associated with movement up a hierarchical career ladder. Rather than rank and file members seeking admission to a limited number of superordinate positions, Branch recruiting is more like corporate headhunting, where successful executives are lured away to parallel positions with the competition. Movement from a classroom to the TDS position is generally presented more as a unique opportunity to experience something completely different, or to make a contribution to the profession, than as a promotion. In other words, switching to the Branch exactly parallels changing schools, switching grades, or being recruited to help set up an innovative or experimental program.

For several of the recruits, moving to the Branch was simply a continuation of a pattern of constant circulation between equivalent but distinct specializations *within* teaching:

> #04: And it's something that in my, how long have I been in education now, 23 years? It was something that was totally different.
>
> I: So a learning experience.
>
> #04: Yes, than I had ever done before. I've taught senior high, I've taught ECS [[i.e., Early Childhood]], uh elementary, I've been a [[local board]] consultant, I've been on sabbatical. [-?-?]
>
> I: So having done it all.
>
> #04: There's still something left. (1.301-306)

For others, the move was attractive precisely because they had remained in the same classroom for years, and now felt caught in a rut:

> #21: Uh, I was due for a change of scenery, a new experience. I'd been in the same high school for 20 years I guess, and it was time to do something else. (1.128-130)

> #34: I guess it was a case of that many of us do go through uh stages of our life, of kinda of seven year itch of wanting to try something different. Uh, not so much, I wasn't ambitious to rise up some kind of ladder, but more just to be trying some different things. It was kind of an intellectual thing and could I, could I do something different, and uh, and in this instance I was uh not unhappy with, with looking at, becoming a Test Development Specialist because I quite enjoyed building uh test items. It was a challenge to me. And hence I saw the job was one of nothing more than expanding challenges and in, in many ways, it has been that. (1.874-884)

In both cases, the motivation seems to have been primarily a desire for personal challenge and development, rather than hierarchical advancement.

> #27: . . . I was intrigued with working with that. I thought it would be a challenge. And it is. It would be very interesting. And I thought it would give me experience uh, that I wouldn't be able to get in the classroom, which it has done, so there's lots of reasons for me to try it.
>
> . . .
>
> Well, the, it's not only interesting, I figured that I would grow as a result of it. Like

> I would be learning and developing so it would be almost like going back, and you know, taking four courses at university. That kind of thing. It's to develop—
>
> I: Sort of an in-service kind of stuff—
>
> #27: That's right. Yeah, which is true, it has done. (1.1514-1533)

For yet others, the TDS position was attractive because it provided an opportunity to make a personal contribution to the field:

> #18: I saw it as a change in skills. I didn't see it as much of a promotion. But I also saw something else there. I saw it as an opportunity to have a direct impact on the curriculum in the classrooms. And I knew I couldn't do that as a teacher. Because I knew through the exams you could make some subtle changes that [-?-?-?-?-]. That was a definite plus. [I: Okay.] of this job. (1.298-303)

> #42: . . . the people working in the Branch . . . have come from teaching jobs, including the managers, and, and have made sacrifices in terms of working conditions, in order to work at our Branch. They're uh, they've often made some gains in, in terms of, say, job security perhaps, or, or pay, but not large ones. Minimal ones. And have sacrificed uh the perks of being [a] teacher, in terms of the holidays, time off, and the shorter working day — in theory, shorter working day — uh, and they've done this willingly, because they feel that uh they can make a different contribution. They're all teachers at heart, but they want to make a contribution in a different kind of way, for a while anyway. (1.417-427)

Of course, for at least some recruits the appeal did include the possibility of achieving an end run around blocked mobility within the administrative hierarchy of their local school system.

> #34: Well, uh, I, I think I was in my mid- to late 30s and I was at a point where I was wondering if I was going to remain as a department head for the rest of my working days.. Uh, I was, felt at the time a bit of frustration because I had applied on two occasions to go to a different high school because I did want to uh to sort of get myself doing different things, and so on, and I was kept at the high school I was at because apparently they felt I was doing a good job there, that's the old story. Also I had applied for a number of positions with the central office in [city] and uh had uh been interviewed and had not got the positions, so I uh, found out about this particular one and uh and applied for it. (1.863-874)

> #18: I had the feeling that I was falling behind. I don't know behind what.
>
> I: Heheh. So it was a sense that you wanted to advance your career?
>
> #18: Yes, yes absolutely. (1.286-288)

For those looking for career advancement, the interest in personal development was subsumed within the context of gaining additional professional credentials from the experience. While the TDS position was not itself a step up, they hoped to be able to use it as a staging area from which they could transfer to other Ministerial positions.

> #18: I would like to be able to go from this position to other positions within the

> Branch and get to know the workings of the Branch. Because whatever the Branch is doing to some degree, can be transferred to other branches. I see this Branch as being a fantastic training ground. In the army you have something called staff colleges. It's exactly the same thing, and I'll tell you why. The demands that are placed on the individuals within this Branch, and possibly Curriculum Design, I don't know, are probably fairly high. The expectation of work is fairly high. And if the reputation of this Branch remains high then the people as coming out of this Branch will be seen as being fairly competent as well. (1.346-365)

Thus, the TDS position was not perceived as a promotion by any of these recruits. Either they saw the TDS role as a potentially interesting but equivalent assignment, or as a transfer to a comparable but entrance-level or preparatory position in an alternate career line. In either case, most recruits saw themselves as merely passing through the TDS position, and it was not intended as a terminal transfer to a new occupation.

Given management's emphasis on the need for the TDSs to have had recent classroom experience, and the recruits' penchant for seeking new challenges (or their desire for career advancement), there has been recurrent interest in keeping test development a seconded position through which teachers could be rotated on brief tours of duty. This would have the advantage of keeping the Branch current with developments in the field through a steady influx of new blood, while simultaneously raising general skill levels in the teaching community by returning a steady stream of teachers with TDS experience. There are several practical difficulties, however, that militate against this arrangement.

First, it often takes several years for a new recruit to really learn the job, and too rapid a turnover would threaten the quality of the product. Not only do individuals need time to develop their skills, but the Branch as a whole requires some continuity in personnel. As mentioned in Chapter 5, a significant proportion of Branch policies are contained within an oral tradition. Furthermore, since most recruits enter without previous training in evaluation technique, they must rely on their colleagues to teach them many of the necessary skills. Consequently, at least some tenured TDSs are necessary to pass on testing folklore and Branch traditions.

Second, from the perspective of the local boards, constantly renewing secondments is not always practical because they need either to retrieve or replace these instructional leaders for their own programs. It is often inconvenient for boards not knowing whether seconded staff might subsequently decide to stay on in the TDS position, or to stay on in the capital rather than return to their home district, or to seek yet other challenges in completely new positions.

> #04: Oh, uh, a secondment is usually for one year. Sometimes you extend it for two years, but I think that's only fair to do if you know at the end of, of two years that you will be going back to a school board and uh, although they have said to me that I am welcome back anytime, uh, that this doesn't work out, or whatever, uh, I felt that it was only fair that I made a decision one way or the other, and not leave them hanging. (I.86-92)

Third, if instead of secondments, the Branch relies on three-year project positions, the problem then becomes one of job security for the TDS. Given the limited opportunities for upward mobility within the government bureaucracy, and the tight job market for teachers generally, the question that naturally arises is what happens to the TDS at the end of those three years? Even those who assume that they are only taking the TDS position on a temporary basis are often reluctant to do so without the security of its being a permanent position. The Branch must therefore compromise its need for a constant influx of new recruits with the recruits' need not to become disposable.

Consequently, test development is a mixture of secondments, project, and permanent positions. Two of the TDSs had in fact been recruited directly to project positions, even though this had required sacrificing their tenure as classroom teachers. At least one of these had been motivated to risk the insecurity of a term project because it appeared to be the only alternative to completely blocked mobility in his local school jurisdiction.

Three other project positions are filled by staff who had originally been recruited on secondments but were then asked, or wanted, to stay on after their secondments ran out. All three have specific, highly marketable skills that allow them to be nearly indifferent to job security.

> I: Um, what's your current employment status with the Branch?
> #22: Um, it hasn't been all that, maybe it has been clear, but I got this all earlier on and I can't remember. Originally, as I told you, I was seconded, but then it changed to a project position which I think comes up after, I think it's a three-year thing, and uh, and if I want to opt out of this, I was given this, [Associate Director] told me I could get out after a year, if things didn't work out for me. But uh, I think, I think that they're looking at me to stay for three years, anyway.
> I: So you're in a project position?

> #22: I think it's a project, yeah, they call it. It's sort of like a, it's more, it's almost like a permanent thing, but it's not. You know, I think they're not allowed to do that, just in case, it just gives them an out.
>
> I: Yeah. What are the implications of that for you?
>
> #22: The fact that it's, uh—
>
> I: A project. It make any difference to you?
>
> #22: None at all. Because I feel fairly confident that I can get a job. You know, I've been asked to make sure I go back. So I'm, I, no problem at all. (1.59-80)

Note that while this respondent is aware that project positions are to an employer's advantage, the situation is nevertheless one in which management is attempting to talk her into staying the full term, rather than one in which she feels her position is at risk. In other words, these three TDSs should be interpreted as essentially in secondments, even though the growing use of project positions in the Branch may also be interpreted as part of a more general trend in government towards temporary, non-tenured employment.

In addition, the three TDSs in secondment positions see this as to their advantage, not the Branch's. All three had initially been offered project positions but had instead insisted on secondments because the government could not offer them the same salary or benefits as their current teaching positions.

> #02: Well, I was offered a, a full-time job, doing this, last January and again this most recent January when the secondment, they started to talk about it again, so I could have come on, if you like, full-time, both uh, both occasions, and told them basically that I couldn't afford to. Because, uh the job, whether it's called a TDS or whether it's call uh, Program Manager, the pay is going to be the same, is about $4,000 less than I was making as a teacher. It uh only gives 3 weeks of holidays instead of 11 as a teacher, so I'd have to give up 8 weeks of my life, for $4,000 less. The job with the Department would be a project, it would not be a permanent position, so I'd have to give up all my tenure. Uh, I think that's enough reasons. Heheh.
>
> I: Not, not very attractive.
>
> #02: I find it, I find the job very interesting. I jumped at the chance to do it. But uh, unless the secondment could have been worked so I could maintain my benefits, I wouldn't have taken that kind of a beating. (1.62-81)

> #21: Uh, it's to my advantage in that I don't have to transfer my benefit package or my retirement plan and I'm only obligated to work the same number of days that a teacher would in his position, rather than a full year, and I do not give up my holidays or that sort of thing. [I:Okay.] It's a disadvantage to [Ministry] in that it's more expensive. (1.43-48)

> #27: Yeah. No, they just wanted me to uh take a leave for two years like that, and then assume the position here, and I wanted a secondment. For a couple of reasons why: One, was to get my years of uh teaching in, so you see, when I seconded it's

> counted as years of teaching. Yeah. And then the other I guess, is, you know, I, I thought it was the holiday status . . . . See, as a secondment they have to give me my teacher holidays . . . .[41] (1.66-72)

There is also some indication that these individuals would not have been anxious to give up teaching and take permanent positions, even had the material rewards offered been more nearly equivalent.

> #27: Well, it, I guess the advantage is that I have a choice, possibly a choice, at the end of two years, if I go back to teaching or if something opens up here. Uh because I do like teaching. So if you're permanent here, then you're off the list for teaching and it's hard to get back on. [I: Yeah.] So I, you know I can see it being an advantage, particularly if you like teaching, like I do. (1.39-45)

> #21: Um, but I don't think that uh [[teachers]] would give up their present job, for mine, present job I'm fulfilling. Say I [.?.?.] I don't think that this particular job would be appealing to all those who are well qualified to do it. Um, and there's where I have my own personal reservation about a long-term commitment. A good teacher, who enjoys teaching and in this particular role doesn't offer the same kinds of rewards. I'm not talking about money, I'm talking about job satisfaction. And I guess that's what I really miss, I miss sort of teaching opportunities, although on the other side, of course, why people stay in this position, uh they do enjoy not having to take home work and uh the stress of teaching is becoming more and more a negative factor I think in the. And this job has different stresses, but uh so it's difficult to uh see the total balance. Back to where we started, um, I do not think the position as is currently established and financial package would be attractive to the best for the job. (1.458-476)

Since secondment was the teacher's choice, not management's, this cannot be interpreted as an externally imposed restriction on entrance to the TDS role. On the contrary, that these teachers chose to retain their official status as school employees, rather than transfer to government, confirms that test development and teaching are roughly equivalent positions. (If anything, the lower pay and benefits attached to test development suggest that test development is lower than classroom teaching.)

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[41] Another consideration for this particular generation of potential candidates was that the Branch reorganization, and especially the reclassification of the TDS position, had not yet been finalized.

> #21: Uh, no, no. The invitation is, at least it was this year, would be to become an employee of [Ministry]. But the job description had not been clarified, so I was not sure what I was invited to [I: Do, yeah.] join, or what type of job classification I would have, so in the meantime they were willing to extend the secondment and so was my employer, so that was fine with me. Heh. (1.56-61)

In the event, the reclassification did not go through.

Of the 14 TDSs included in this study, only 5 held permanent positions.[42] Again, this is a strong indication that test development is not a distinct technobureaucratic profession, since it does not represent a terminal transfer for at least two-thirds of those so employed. For the project and seconded staff, at least, test development is simply a temporary assignment, and most of these individuals fully intended to return to the classroom.

Even those in permanent positions often toyed with the idea of returning to teaching.

> #34: I would go back to the classroom. Not because I'm dissatisfied with this job, but because there are aspects of classroom teaching that I really miss. Really. Sometimes it's caused me to have profound regrets. But then, also I feel I'm performing something that's important here as well. (1.224-228)

> I: Uh, you ever think about going back to the classroom?
>
> #16: Yeah, uhuh. I think—
>
> I: Is that a possibility?
>
> #16: —I'd be a much better teacher than I was, uh now. It is a possibility at some point, sure. Again, what would probably have to have, would be that the offer would have to come, not that I would search for it. That's been my recent experience. Is that, you know, I'm going to do what I can do, I'm going to try to do the best I can where I am, and if a call comes that I'm interested in, then yeah, I'll go, I'll go to it. (1.1342-1354)

A few of the permanent staff had in fact applied for positions with local boards, but like the junior managers, had found it difficult to break back in. More often, however, they remained as TDSs because they enjoyed what they were doing, or because they had reservations about current conditions in the schools and their own energy levels as they got older.

> #34: Right. Robert, this is I'm finding a lot with colleagues in the profession who have expressed uh astonishment when I've said to them, well, I would go back teaching. And they've said, "What?!" In other words, even since '81, there must, there has been apparently some changes that have caused teaching, classroom teaching, to become quite a stressful experience. Now it could be too that it becomes more stressful as you grow older, and that when you're younger uh, it's not as stressful, I think there's some truth to that. So uh, uh, those are some of the things I've picked up on anyway. (1.923-932)
>
> . . .
>
> #34: Again, not because of job dissatisfaction here, but because I would enjoy staying here, I would enjoy if the opportunity came up, to go back to the classroom. I know, I know that I might be changing this opinion in the next few years because

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[42] Observant readers will note that this breakdown leaves one TDS position unaccounted for, but this was filled by an Examiner serving in an 'acting' capacity. As a contract employee, she is one step above the insecurity of casual wage labour, but one step below the project TDSs, in that contract staff receive no benefits.

> of my age, because I'm losing that bit of contact, but I think I could go back now. One thing that revitalizes me is each year when we go out field-testing. I find that I'm often taking right over in the classroom once the kids are through and uh, the old tendencies come back and so on. (1.988-996)

What is significant here is that there was no suggestion that a return to the classroom would represent a demotion or career setback. Senior managers, in contrast, were noticeably less enthusiastic about the possibility, and such a return would have been completely unthinkable for, say, a superintendent or Regional Office Consultant.[43]

Four of the TDSs did intend to leave teaching. One quit the field entirely to enter the private sector. The other three hoped to be able to move up to senior management. (A fifth had had some interest in moving to Regional Office as a Consultant but, by the time of this study, had resigned himself to remaining a TDS.) Even those TDSs who saw the position as a potential steppingstone to a career in government, however, recognized that they were not yet on the bottom rung of the management ladder. While the additional experience they gained as test developers and government workers strengthened their overall réasumé, their presence in the Branch gave them little more access to higher Ministerial positions than would the equivalent position in a local board.[44] In other words, they were expanding their professional experience in much the same way as they might have benefited from changing subject areas or grades, taking additional university courses, or assuming leadership roles in the teachers' association, but they had not yet changed career ladders.

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[43] For example, this TDS contrasts her [illegible] attitude to that of a former administrator:

> #22: . . . 'cause I always say, you know, the greatest privilege is to be in a class, a class of children, because these parents have a faith in you to, to work with these children. I've got a different philosophy. He thinks it's something else . . . .
>
> . . .
>
> What uh, now I hear that this poor man, the superintendent in [town] is going to put him in a classroom. And [name] will be devastated because, [name] had told me one day, well, he'd teach, but he didn't like teaching, that's why he's where he is. Heheh. Because he thinks being in a classroom, a classroom teacher is lower than a superintendent. You see, like I've got a different view. He's got this big hierarchy— (1.326-344)

[44] This must be qualified by noting that their location within the Branch would allow them an additional edge in personal networking, which is often crucial in any employment situation.

According to all four of the criteria related to recruitment, then, the TDS staff qualify as members of the public service profession of teaching, and not as a separate, superordinate technobureaucratic occupation.

The Nature of the Test Development Specialist Role

The Test Development Specialists do have some technobureaucratic traits, the most obvious of which is that they work in a central location isolated from face-to-face contact with students. This may be slightly misleading, however, since their work does have an immediate impact on many students in the province, and the examinations do involve a type of direct interaction with students. The parallel here might be to the medical researchers and clinicians who help to develop new diagnostic procedures: While usually not in direct face-to-face contact with patients, these individuals are still involved in hands-on medical practice, and so may still be considered as part of the medical profession, in a way that a hospital administrator is not. Certainly the TDSs are closer to the field than are, say, the junior managers, who are restricted to supervising logistical functions.

Some support for this view may be found in the responses of the nine TDSs who identified students as their primary clients (as opposed to only two who said teachers or administrators). This evidence is not entirely satisfactory, however, because many of the other members of the Branch who have virtually no direct contact with students made essentially the same claim. Indeed, the Branch motto is "Students First". Consequently, the claim that students are always uppermost in their minds may be more ideological than factual.

More fundamental is their relationship with classroom teachers. Almost by definition, the TDS role incorporates some deskilling of the rank and file. As discussed at length in previous chapters, however, the ideological deskilling of teachers may be expressed ***through*** the TDS, but the TDS is not the one who actually decides or dictates policy to teachers. While TDSs do supervise a variety of teacher committees, these are invariably run in a collegial, not managerial fashion. TDSs approach item building committees as in-service leaders soliciting input, rather than as overseers enforcing production quotas.

> #33: · · · On a personal level, I think I'm conceived to be helpful, because what uh we do is have the chance that I would regard these productivity indicators on an item writing, for instance, I find them to be totally and completely inappropriate. If I get maybe three questions out of a group, but the group has had good discussion about where the stuff is coming, I feel that I've done, that, so for, therefore when people are talking about the productivity of committees and so things like that, my thought is, "Oh God". (1.1679-1687)

The TDS role does include some design and decision-making functions at the level of technique, but its primary function is one of coordination.

This becomes clear when the TDSs' own skills are examined. Not only do the TDSs have no specialized training or certification when initially recruited, they receive no formal training or in-servicing in the Branch. There is not even any formal orientation to Branch procedures:

> #22: They showed me where the coffee room was. Well, that was fine, but, you know. (1.561-562)
>
> #29: . . . you're just plunged in, you're given a desk and sat down . . . . (1.1032)
>
> #26: I would say none. [Coordinator] handed me a pile of stuff and said, "Here".
> I: "Go to it."
> #26: Yeah, you see, I sort of came at Easter time and started editing his banks [[of test items]], and I just kind of gradually moved ahead. I really found I had no concept of what was going into this before I, no concept at all. But I, I just sat at the desk and worked on, to start with, on [subject] questions and expanded that a bit, and uh, asked a lot of questions. (1.1672-1677)
>
> #04: I know that [name] had a really hard time because there was nothing formal for her. That is, that is a fault in this department. There are no, I mean if there'd been something that I could have visually read, procedures, for each task, that kind of thing, but there was nothing. (1.544-548)
>
> #18: None. . . . No one trained me. I just was parachuted in and I, and I did have the good fortune that most TDSs did not. I was left alone for two or three days while everybody else was at the marking centre. So what that allowed me to do was to very quickly go through the orientation teachers' manuals[45] as well as all the archival stuff, [.?.?.] files, which I had, to give me a sense of where things had been, where they were, and where we had to go to · · in fact I did do a standard setting in the fifth or sixth day of my job.
> I: So you received no formal orientation to the Branch at all?
> #18: Oh, good heavens no. (1.680-696)
>
> #16: Well, we learned by osmosis. You know, you're thrown into the deep end and expected to swim, and those that can swim, survive. No, no on-the-job training, formal— (1.1518-1520)

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[45] That is, the documents intended for use with classroom teachers.

This is not, of course, merely the result of bad management.[46] There are a number of reasons why formal in-servicing is neither available to nor appropriate for the Test Development recruits.

First, the high indetermination/technicality ratio characteristic of test development to some extent defies codification and routinization:

> #15: I don't know what the uh · · alternative. I think it's a good thing that our jobs evolved kind of from organically. I think that's probably healthy. And in fact, every time I'm instructed to make a list, you know, to draw up procedures, I always resist, because uh, I just think, uh, well, next year I might not do it the same way. So I wouldn't want to, I don't like to have to commit myself to a strict system. I would feel uh, I mean I'm always reluctant to do that. I mean, I think I'd find that less comfortable. (1.1039-1048)

Second, as members of a new Branch, many of the original staff had to design the procedures and techniques themselves from scratch. In other words, there was no one available with the necessary skills to provide an in-service.

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[46] Though bad management was a contributing factor identified by several respondents. The extreme workloads and stress levels that typified the Branch for many years meant that no one felt that they had adequate time to attend to the orientation of new staff.

> #22: I think they, I think everyone was so involved . . . I think a little bit may have been overlooked, you know, because they were busy and that, but uh · · I wonder why they didn't. (1.552-556)
>
> #26: In fact I wasn't even intro— I must have been here two months before I was even introduced to anybody. 'Cause [Coordinator] was really busy. He was, he didn't have a [subject area] person, he was in dire straits so he needed somebody really badly. And I didn't know who anybody was, or what, what the relationship was between people, just what I had to know to get the job done, I would find out. (1.1677-1683)
>
> . . .
>
> Okay, and uh, he was also too busy to do it. I'm sure he intended to do it always. Like I, I worked here for, I don't know how long, until just before [name] left, and I'd never even taken an oath. (1.1721-1725)
>
> #13: . . . when I got into this new job, everybody was so busy, nobody had time to train anybody, so you just have to learn, you know, partly by myself, and I have very specific questions, I just ask my colleague. (1.672-676)
>
> #34: Uh, a lot then, of training aspect, no, I have not really taken any. There hasn't been any in-service. There is in-service available, like each year they come arou— some brochure floats around the floor as far as different workshops and so on, but uh, oft times there's just not time to do that, you know, if take a week off, deadlines that there are. Maybe more true now, as I say there's a bit more routine nature to what we're doing, but I have to be very careful in saying that, uh, I could see where suddenly there are emergencies. (1.1138-1148)
>
> . . .
>
> And also, there's also an aspect to that is that I did not have time for training as well. (1.1159-1161)

> #42: . . . because nobody knew then what I know now. So nobody could have told me— (1.91-92)

> #34: Well, a lot I had to pick up myself. There was never really any formal training. Um, again, because we were finding our way at the beginning. And uh, a lot of the skills that I think I developed were things that I had to develop, find out myself, and also from those around me. (1.1130-1134)

On the other hand, notice the reference by the second speaker to collegial learning. When the Branch was initially formed, skill development included the active involvement of the Coordinators and often even the Associate Directors.

> In other words, uh, [Coordinator] was very helpful at times, and of course had expertise from his years as uh working with evaluation that he could pass on to me, which he did. [first Associate Director] to an extent. These, now I'm just talking that first year, the most difficult one. . . . Uh, so a lot of the skills, and to repeat myself, just one gained by work experience rather than any type of formal training. (1.1130-1150)

> #43: No. None. I mean, "formal" formal. Uh, [Coordinator], my supervisor, would sit down and go through tests with me and go through bah-blah bah-blah bah-blah. In terms of uh; no, I mean my overall gut response is that there was very little formal training. (1.1760-1763)

This has now changed. With the elimination of the Coordinator position, mentoring is now left almost entirely to the experienced TDSs or, occasionally, even veteran Examiners.[47]

> I: Um, how much training did you receive on the job?
>
> #04: Uh, thanks to [name of TDS] I was given about a month. I worked with her for about three weeks.
>
> I: So there was a formal orientation to the job, some in-servicing?
>
> #04: No. It was informal, thanks to her.
>
> I: So, you're saying she sort of acted as a mentor, [#04: Yes.] but there was no formal orientation. [#04: No.] No formal training. (1.514-525)

> #16: No formal orientation. I was lucky, because I was working with [name] and she had been in the Branch for, you know, two or three years.
>
> I: So it's almost an apprenticeship kind of process?
>
> #16: Right, yeah. That's a good term for it. (1.1524-1540)

> I: Did you pick it up by osmosis or --
>
> #43: Yeah, if you happen to be lucky enough to have a mentor, somebody who will honestly take you under their wing and systematically go through it with you, it's wonderful. But I've seen people who— actually no, no, my experience has been most people are sympathetic enough around here and caring enough that they take

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[47] Examiners were sometimes aggrieved to discover that they were expected to help orient and train the TDSs who were supposedly supervising *them*.

> people under their wings and so it's one professional to another, it's not a formalized procedure in this Branch at all — quite the opposite. (1.1767-1774)
>
> #33: Informally, uh, a fair bit. Uh, and on a similar, on a similar basis now, I've got the responsibility of giving, giving help and assistance when required, because I think the TDS job is one that takes at least a year to learn. (1.1086-1089)
>
> I: So there was no formal in-servicing at all?
>
> #26: None.
>
> I: And then you picked up the skills you needed for the job by osmosis, or?
>
> #26: Yeah. Yeah. I worked near [Examiner], do you remember [Examiner]?
>
> I: Vaguely.
>
> #26: She, she sort of did the [subject] until [name] came. . . . And uh, anything I need to know, I asked her, and she had been here since day one almost, working $18 an hour too, and, and she'd say, "Well they do it this way" or "They do it this way". (1.1685-1700)

Thus the need for some permanent TDS staff.

Third, and most significant, training was not emphasized because the recruits were expected to have the necessary skills already.

> #22: Probably they thought, well, I had some skills, and I think · ·
>
> #33: Uh · · well, I think it's a process, I think we could do with a week of in-service on uh initial going, things like editing standards, budget requirements, that sort of stuff. But in terms of the academic and intellectual content, of the product, then · · I think, you're being hired for what, what you know of that and also the sort of feeling of well, that question will fly, this one will not. Or I need, uh, in budgeting, that this set will be a bastard to mark compared with that, and therefore allow for them, for the budget, to try to balance two, balance two tests, you can balance for length, you can balance two for difficulty, balancing for tone is much more difficult. [I: Umhum.] And uh, I think the major thing for success, is to develop a first-class network of colleagues outside the office, your teachers, your classroom teachers, to get the product and to develop good marking systems marking procedures. . . . But I think a very good · · network almost a condition, a condition of the job. (1.1099-1128)
>
> #09: . . . probably, you know, the assumption was that uh they were · · trying to get classroom teachers to develop, to be the TDS, Test Development Specialists. I think it was, um, you know, uh, the people who they were hiring supposedly had the necessary background and training, I think that's the basis that they were going on, and I accepted that too. (1.364-370)

What makes this so interesting is that we have already established that the TDSs did not bring any evaluation skills or training with them when they joined the Branch, beyond what could be expected from any competent classroom teacher. If they have no special training or certification when they join, and receive nothing in the Branch except informal peer mentoring — from yet other teachers who themselves joined the Branch with no previous special training — then clearly what we are dealing with here are normal classroom teacher skills.

This presents an interesting variation of technical deskilling. Normally, when a labour process is fragmented, skills are concentrated in a single design role, creating a knowledge gap between this newly created design position and the deskilled rank and file. There is, however, no knowledge gap between the TDSs and classroom teachers. Consequently, the TDSs cannot be considered a distinct technobureaucratic occupation. All the Branch has done is bring a sample of teachers into an environment where management can control the operationalization of their knowledge through its committee structures. But they still remain teachers. How can they be other than teachers, when their professional knowledge base is identical?

There is of course some technical deskilling implicit in the TDS role, in that they concentrate on only a single aspect of the classroom teacher's function. The TDSs also serve a technobureaucratic role in coordinating, and thereby harnessing, classroom teachers' labour for the Branch. The latter partly explains the emphasis on the TDS's ability to network as a more fundamental requirement of the job than either test writing or psychometrics. (See #33's comment above, and #09's comment on page 387.)

Finally, one would expect a technobureaucratic profession to include policy as well as technical design functions. As suggested in Chapter 5, however, TDS input into policy is constrained by the top-down hierarchical nature of decision making within the Ministry, and by many informal barriers such as a lack of information about the decisions being considered and insufficient free time to draw up a response. The TDSs are further constrained by the committee structures discussed in Chapter 6, and consequently have only limited autonomous control over their own work process. Even the recruitment patterns discussed in this chapter imply a serious constraint, in that the constant rotation of new recruits through project and secondment positions means that two-thirds of the TDS staff may be too new to take policy initiatives, or too briefly in the position to follow through properly.

Thus, the nature of the tasks central to the TDS role are not sufficiently different from those of classroom teachers to justify the TDS's classification as a distinct technobureaucratic profession.

Self-Identity

Whenever asked directly about their professional identity, TDSs always responded with some variation of "I still consider myself a teacher" (#02:1.878).[41] This is not quite as straightforward as it appears, however, since the definition of 'teacher' is partly what is at issue here. It is therefore necessary to establish exactly where these individuals draw the boundaries of their professional identity by examining their responses to questions concerning which job categories they would include. Some indication of the hierarchical relations between specializations was also obtained by having respondents indentify which roles they considered more or less professional than their own.[49] While nearly every respondent drew the line in a slightly different place, the following response is typical.

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[41] The single exception here was again the TDS who had only limited teaching experience and who therefore based his self-identity on his psychometric expertise instead. When asked with which profession he identified, he replied:

> R: Well · · no one, in a way. I mean, I see us, I see me, I mean that's the problem, I don't even identify with half the people around here, okay, that's the problem, because I know many of the people here identify themselves with teachers, [#26], you know, [#04], sees herself as a teacher. I don't. I do not identify myself with teachers at all. And I find myself when I identify with them, it's as their leader. Because when I'm working with them, usually I'm supervising them in some capacity. And so, I personally have no ident— I do not see myself as being a teacher, except as one who instructs people. So I may teach the teachers, okay, [I: Mmhum.] but I do not see myself, I don't identify with being a classroom teacher.
> I: Okay, so you wouldn't include classroom teachers.
> R: No.
> I: How 'bout Regional Office people?
> R: Nope. Not at all. I don't identify myself with anybody in the Department of Education. I would tend more to identify with uh, I identify more with [names respected university statistics professor] than I do with people around here, in the Department. And yet I also realize that I'm not an academic, I'm not in that, so I don't, I have trouble identifying with anybody. (1.1578-1603)

Note, however, that the respondent himself recognizes that his self-identity is not consistent with his current role. (That is, since this individual does not identify with any other Ministerial staff, the fact that he does not see himself as a teacher cannot be generalized to other Branch staff.) Throughout the interview, his responses resembled those of the AROs rather than those of other TDSs, and he subsequently left the Branch to pursue a Ph.D. in psychometrics and is now teaching evaluation in a university faculty of education. From my long association with this informant, I think it safe to conclude that this individual had felt himself a teacher when he joined the Branch, and that what we are seeing reflected here is a new *emergent* identity which was the precursor to a major career change.

> I: Um, what profession are you a member of?
>
> #18: Teaching.
>
> I: Teaching? So if a census taker were to ask you to help define 'teaching', who would you include in that group? Classroom teachers obviously— [#18: Yes.] Who else?
>
> #18: I would include TDSs. [I: TDSs?] Yeah. Because TDSs are primarily teachers who have been thrust into the testing arena.
>
> I: Okay. What about people from like Curriculum Branch? Would they be—
>
> #18: Teachers. Curriculum Designers. They'd be teachers as well.
>
> I: So they'd be included?
>
> #18: Absolutely. Yeah.
>
> I: What about principals and vice principals; would they be included?
>
> #18: · · · Principals who are teaching would be cons— teachers first and principals second. Principals who are not teaching, they wouldn't, I wouldn't consider them as, no.
>
> I: What about superintendents?
>
> #18: Oh, Christ no! They're cut from a different uh, they're cut from a different bolt of cloth altogether.
>
> I: What about managers in the Branch here? Are they included in your profession?
>
> #18: No, I don't see them as being teachers. I think they have a very different agenda.
>
> I: Okay. Um, do you see yourself as being more or less professional than a classroom teacher?
>
> #18: Equally professional.
>
> I: Equally?
>
> #18: I don't see myself as being above them or them being below me, or any of that kind of things. No.
>
> I: Okay. Do you see yourself more or less professional than a principal?
>
> #18: · · More or less professional than a principal? No, I see my job as being equivalent to them as well.
>
> I: Okay. What about as a superintendent?
>
> #18: · · · Definitely more professional. They're political animals. *Snicker*
>
> I: Okay. What about managers in the Branch? Do you see yourself as more or less professional?

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[49] For some respondents, the latter question was simply a non sequitur since they saw professionalism as a personal attribute that varied from individual to individual, thereby making comparisons between groups inappropriate. Nevertheless, since this suggests an attitude that would reject the hierarchical ordering of specializations within a profession, I think these responses may be appropriately grouped with those who saw teaching and test development as equivalent categories.

> #18: Ah, that's where it gets dicey. I really don't know. Uh. I see myself as being equally professional as them.
>
> I: Okay, if someone was to say that they were moving from a classroom position to a TDS position, would you see that as a step up? A promotion? Or lateral move?
>
> #18: I would see it as a lateral move.
>
> I: What about if they moved from TDS to management?
>
> #18: · · · If there's an increment in salary, yeah, I'd see that as an upward move. (1.1925-1999)

Everyone essentially agreed that teachers, TDSs, and other central office specialists were all members of the same profession, and equivalent in status.[50] Most also included principals.[51] They were often slightly more hesitant to include senior Branch management or Senior Departmental Officials, however, and generally rejected superintendents. Significantly, a number of staff depicted superintendents as *less* professional than either themselves or classroom teachers, on the grounds that the superintendent's role includes political and business orientations that are likely to conflict with professional standards.

> #33: It depends, is the, a superintendent that considers himself a, an instructional leader · · uh, I would probably class, he is a professional because he understands the, the teaching profession and, you know, is a former full-time member of it and still doing it. But many uh superintendents have the approach of being corporate CEOs.
>
> . . .
>
> I would take views of such a corporate superintendent less seriously than I would um a teaching and instructional leadership superintendent.
>
> . . .
>
> #33: . . . on the grounds that I have a more clearly defined set of external standards. While the Superintendent having the, the, both roles of CEO and instructional leader will not uh, will not be so bound by the external standard as I am. (1.211-311)
>
> #14: Yeah. They're professionals · · but · · oh boy, that's difficult. They're

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[50] Again, the exception here was the TDS who saw himself as a psychometrician. Like, I see the testing profession as being something very separate and distinct, and when this Branch started, I think [list of names] were the only ones who really belonged to the evaluation, testing profession. The rest of them came from the teaching profession. (1.1784-1796)

[51] It should be noted that in the case study province, principals are currently included as members of the teachers' association. One respondent noted, however, that this was in danger of changing:

> #14: Um · · I would have said at one time principals, but I'm, I'm afraid to now, because even with the [teachers' association], they're trying to make them go over to the other, to the management as they call it. Because of uh, because of this new wave of business managing it, rather than instructional leaders, I think. But I would say that I would have to give a weak 'go' for those people, because there are, I'm lumping just my [[former school]] system, it's not like that everywhere. So I would say, principals are also part of the education profession. (1.643-651)

> professionals, but they are working at a level that is very far removed from the students' learning. [I: Umhum.] So I think they're turning into more of a business professional than · · educator, as an educator, quote "professional". (1.782-786)

> #17: Heheh. Oh, I don't want the superintendents to hear this, I think superintendents are, are lower on the echelon of the profession than the others. Because a large number of them now are doing routine paperwork. They, you know, they're doing routine paperwork.
>
> I: So that sort of takes them out of the education profession?
>
> #17: Uh, yeah, in that sense. I mean, they count number of pupils in a classroom and they, and uh, how much money is being spent here in that. They do, they do things that are vital to the profession, somebody's got to do that, account for money and account for pupils and account for the number of classrooms that are available, and so on, but I think they've left behind, they left behind, I think, the uh · · the meat of the profession. (1.1241-1255)

The claim of professional unity seems to have largely broken down in terms of the superintendency,[52] which may suggest that the fragmentation of the teaching profession into separate public service and technobureaucratic categories is fairly far advanced at the local board level. The division between the provincial bureaucracy's senior management and the rank and file is much less clearly drawn by the TDSs, which may mean either that these divisions are less significant, or that they are more thoroughly obscured by false consciousness.

Some evidence for the former view may be found in one TDS's comparison between the growing emphasis on hierarchical relations within her former school board and what she perceived as the collegial style and instructional leadership of senior management in the Branch. (Note also that this was a major consideration in her decision to become a TDS.)

> #14: Because all budgets became decentralized from my board, which meant that at the school level, the principal became a business manager, the assistant principal became his assistant business manager, and her, and most likely they were always "his", they were always men. Which, fine, I worked with some great men and learned a lot from them. Uh, but that it would turn them into, where they were supposed to be instructional leaders, which is the first and foremost, it, it became apparent that that was not so. They didn't have time to learn the kid's name and deal [with] issues, it was more of a public relations kind of deal. I always felt, can I say this? [I: Sure.] That it was like a McDonald's chain. That the head office was [jurisdiction] and those were all the chains, and McDonald's, and all had to show a

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[52] For example:

> I: What about superintendents?
>
> #34: · · · No, because, I think then that they would be caught in, there's a conflict of interest that might emerge there.
>
> I: So they're members of a different profession.
>
> #34: I think so. (1.167-174)

> profit, but not a profit where it counted, you know, a profit in balancing the budget. Cutting teachers and giving kids, as I had the last year, I had 32 students, but that was only my little 32. On top that, I had other classes, 28 and 30 kids, to do [subject] with. And uh, luckily, if I was lucky, I had 30, maybe an hour, but never an hour of professional development time. And it's, and whenever I was seeking any help, it, it seemed that it wasn't there. Help for personal growth, or help for kids, really kids in, in peril I call it. It, we had to justify asking consultative help, because, because it was decentralized budgeting, so you had to do a how times, and so it turned teachers into the same kind [of] thing. Had to make long, long-range plan, but not professional, educational plans, but more about the needs that you have for this service and that service and how many textbooks and, you know, how would you know, what you'd need, and tell them? So that was one of the main reasons, and I, and I was, I was uh, I was feeling that we were moving away from being child-centred to being business-centred, so. So I thought yes, I have the best of two worlds here. I've been asked to come on a secondment, I'll see what it's like and, and see what contributions I can get and learn from it too. And uh, I have to say in all honesty, the first year was just fabulous here for me. I, I had leadership and uh, and [current Director] was the Associate Director of [unit], and [current Associate Director] was my Coordinator. And uh, I learnt more in that year than I have learned in the three I have been here. I really had leadership and ·· educ— and they had vision, both of them. [Associate Director] in [subject] and the way children learn, is uh,.as far as I'm concerned, the best kind of mentor I could have had. And [TDS], I must never forget that, because her experience is, a wealth. I sometimes one forgets here, you know. So, that, that's the main reason I came.
>
> I: So it was dissatisfaction with what you saw was happening in the local board—
>
> #14: Generally speaking, yes.
>
> I: And what looked like a really good attitude here.
>
> #14: Very. Very. I, I will never uh, stop and, I will always continue to say how much. I felt that uh [Director] and [Associate Director], who were then people that I would deal with, and the other committee members that worked with me, and us, on these different committees, really valued our teacher uh, teacher experience. And uh, so that, that was really quite, uh, exciting for me, to come to work for such professional people. (1.309-368)

On the other hand, much of the preceding discussion in this dissertation has described how the hierarchical structures within the Ministry often manage to give the appearance of being much more collegial than is actually the case. The failure to recognize the separate technobureaucratic identity of senior management may therefore be an example of false consciousness. Significantly, the managers themselves invariably define the profession in the broadest possible terms, such that anyone with a teaching certificate (and in some cases, even a few groups without, such as university professors) is included. Such a broad definition obviously has ideological implications in that it helps to legitimate senior management's direction of both Branch staff and education policy in general. In Chapter 6, for example, I described how management controls the TDSs through an elaborate committee structure which gives the superficial appearance of collegial control and collective autonomy but which is in fact an example of hierarchical control. That many TDSs accept the definition of senior management and/or the various stakeholder representatives as part of the same profession greatly assists in the legitimation of these control structures.

The same observation, however, can be made for the TDSs as well. Note, for example, how these TDSs stress their collegial identities to legitimate themselves in their interactions with classroom teachers.

> #22: But I'm fairly um, I'm fairly quick to let them know that I'm a, I'm a classroom teacher, you know. I don't like them to think that I'm a someone from, from heaven. So once they get that understood, they relax and we have a good time. (1.1083-1087)
>
> I: Okay, How would you describe your relationship with classroom teachers?
>
> #18: A-1. Really good.
>
> I: Um, do you ever get the feeling that there's a "them/us" kind of division?
>
> #18: Yeah, but I never make it a "them/us", I make it a "them/us" meaning "us" teachers here and "them" over there. In other words, I become part of them.
>
> I: So you're saying you identify with teachers but against — whose the "them"?
>
> #18: Whoever they want "them" to be.
>
> I: Can you give me an example?
>
> #18: Superintendents.
>
> I: Okay.
>
> #18: People with Master's and Ph.D.s in administration.
>
> I: So that when you're dealing with classroom teachers, you're viewed as a colleague, not as somebody from the Department?
>
> #18: Exactly, and I take great deal of, great pains to ensure that they treat me as a colleague. (1.1813-1841)

These examples can be interpreted either as the TDSs' siding with their classroom colleagues against the various ranks of technobureaucrats — thereby confirming the TDSs' self-identity as teachers — or, on the contrary, as their attempting to disguise their own technobureaucratic exploitation of the rank and file by promoting the fiction of collegial identity.

On the whole, I am inclined to the former view. Some support for this position may be drawn from the apparent annoyance expressed by many TDSs with those senior staff whom they sometimes accuse of not sharing their collegial perspective.

> #26: . . . I think the fact that I understand teachers and still see myself as a

> teacher, is valuable. Some people that get here, just as some people become principals, they suddenly forget they were classroom teachers and view themselves up here and classroom teachers down here. I think I still identify with the classroom teacher. . . . And, and it also en— enables me to treat the teachers with respect when I meet them, and I think they respond in the same way. (1.1733-1743)

(See also the examples in Chapter 7, pages 317-318.)

Furthermore, on those few occasions where a TDS suggested a difference between the professionalism of teachers and that of the TDSs, they invariably rated the teachers as higher.

> I: They're the same, you wouldn't see someone who went from classroom to being a TDS would necessarily be moving up?
>
> #27: Moving up, no.
>
> I: Or down. It's all the same?
>
> #27: Parallel.
>
> I: It's parallel.
>
> #27: I would say that if you talk about professionalism and the importance of the job and the use to the society, I think your classroom teacher [?heart of the .?. where?] the action is. I don't, don't say I said that to anybody. [I: Heheh.] I strongly feel that way.
>
> I: So if anything, the classroom teacher's at the height of the profession.
>
> #27: Profession. That's right. Yup. They're doing a good job in their classroom with those kids, you know, doing what they're supposed to do, they're they're really, in my mind, great. Yeah. That's the height of professionalism. (1.1261-1293)

Of course, such statements could be mere lip service to an ideologically motivated ideal, but at least for those intending to return to the classroom themselves, the sentiments expressed are probably sincere enough.

On the other hand, the TDSs did tend to view themselves as an elite among teachers. When asked, for example, how many classroom teachers would make good TDSs, estimates ranged from a low of 2 per cent to a high of 50 per cent.[53] Again, the emphasis here was not on evaluation per se, but rather on excellent teaching and communication skills in general.

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[53] #22: Uh, I'm just thinking of my staff. I had about, what? 25, and out of the 25, let's see, I would probably say, could work here. . . . Uh · · you know, probably 5 at most, that would suit. Not, and they can be excellent teachers and excellent with a lot of things, but would really, really kick into what we're trying to do here. I just, it's a commitment I guess.
I: So you're saying about 20 per cent.
#22: Yeah, yeah.
I: Okay.
#22: That's, that's being pretty generous. [I: Heheh.] Yeah, generous. (1.636-646)
#33: 5 to 10 per cent would be able to do it · · to what we['re] expecting, to the standards that the Branch are expecting, and uh, I think another 30 to 40 per cent could do an adequate, an adequate to good job. (1.1375-1378)
#16: Oh gosh. Not very many. I mean, they can, we even have, we have TDSs and TDSs. There, there're people here who shouldn't be TDSs. Uh, so if you want

> #26: A good job of it. I would say, not all teachers, maybe 25 per cent.
>
> I: 25 per cent.
>
> #26: Uh, that's a guess, but just in trying to think about the teachers I've met across the province, a lot them don't have the [subject] background. A lot of them don't have, like the communication skills, for one thing. They can't write what they mean for something in the questions. They can't proofread or pick up the errors in a question. I've had trouble finding the 10, 12 teachers that I really can rely on, and they could do a good job of what I'm doing, I think, so maybe it's a smaller 25, I don't know. But probably not, [I: It would be a minority anyway.] because I haven't met all the teachers. [I: Right.] That's what I feel anyway. I, and they also have to get along with teachers and, and have some personal skills too, I think, that, that allows them to communicate with teachers and get, get the work out of teachers. (1.1824-1827)

> #18: I've asked myself that question very often. There are very many people out there that could probably do the job just as well as I'm doing, if not better.
>
> I: So a majority you think?
>
> #18: I would say, about 10 per cent could do the job.
>
> I: 10 per cent could do it?
>
> #18: Yeah.
>
> I: So only a minority?
>
> #18: Yeah, yeah, about 10 per cent could do this job.
>
> . . .
>
> #18: And communication skills are very important then. And some teachers, they don't have it, the communication skills. And that's why I say 10 per cent. It's not because they don't have the wherewithal to do it. (1.977-1017)

> #27: Yeah. A lot. A lot, I think. Uh · · in the area of elementary, the only problem with [subject] in the elementary is that you don't have a lot of high-qualified [subject] people to teach in elementary school. They're more reading when they're in elementary schools. So that's my concern. But if you took, like I'm secondary, so if you look at secondary people that are high, highly qualified in [subject], and then they were given training, to understand the younger children, they could do it. Sure. So.
>
> I: Majority, or?
>
> #27: I would say well, uh, not the majority. I'd be looking probably about, over 50 per cent though. 50 percent. 'Cause like I'm saying, I wouldn't be able to take the average elementary [subject] teacher to do it. Again, that, that's not, there's very very few. So I'm looking more at the secondary [subject] teacher, okay, but there's, yeah, a majority of those people I think. As long as they were given the training like I was, that you extend yourself. Yeah.
>
> I: So a majority of secondary [subject] teachers would have the background that you have to come in, but elementary teachers [#27: Don't.] don't really have that expertise?

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[53](cont'd) that kind of TDS, then, you know, a larger percentage of people could be it. But if you want someone who, who is truly doing the job, I don't think there's a large percentage of— maybe 5 per cent. If, that might even be too large a figure. (1.1730-1736)

> #27: That's right. Yeah, that's for sure. (1.1936-1998)

They also believed that their status as a collegial elite was universally recognized.

> #16: I know that, that the teaching staff out in the field, for the, the most part, believes that we're the best thing in the Department. You get that time and again when working with teachers. So uh, I think, that's almost a surprise in some ways, that we have that kind of credibility. You know, as a testing unit, because tests are, external tests to a teacher are very threatening uh things and for us to have that credibility speaks well of the people who work here. (1.1458-1466)

Similarly, note how this TDS contrasts the Branch's reputation with that of another branch of the Ministry, and attributes the higher reputation of the former to its policy of recruiting staff with recent classroom experience.

> #22: Well, uh, [other government position] is something that I would like to do, but right now I'm fully aware of where they, they don't have much credibility unfortunately, and I'm speaking here as uh, I've been out in the field, I know what the opinions of principals and superintendents are of these [other branch] people: they've been there for too long, they haven't been in the classroom, they're old, . . . but people like, I don't know if you know these people, but [name] is a joke, [name] is a joke, [name] is a joke or a disgrace, and I, I don't want to be associated with that. At our Branch planning meeting, I know what [Director] mentioned when he said that we, we really are viewed in the field, Student Evaluation, as about the top notch. There is a lot of respect here. [Director] has an enormous amount of respect. I don't know what the feelings in the Branch are here, but I know from the field, because— He just commands that, he commands, he wants excellence and uh, and that's fine by me too, but they don't have it in [other branch], and I know, I know they don't have the same camaraderie, you know, there's not teamwork, they're all striving to get to Directors, which is what I hear from a friend of mine who works there, she does work hard, and does deserve credit, but it's really the bottom. And yet I didn't realize that, I didn't know that, 'cause that was one of the things when my [principal] asked. He said, "Well, is this, this isn't [other branch] is it?" And I said, "Well, no." You know when I was talking about, I said, "Student Evaluation". He said, "Oh well, that's different", he said. "This would be good for you." In fact, he encouraged me, to take this job. (1.277-299)

This is significant because it suggests that the TDSs' self-image as an elite group does not arise out of their hierarchical position, which is officially lower than that of either superintendents or the Ministerial staff named by #22, but rather is based on their personal credibility as teachers.

The TDSs, then, define themselves as teachers, but consider themselves among the top of their profession. Since this status is based on personal abilities rather than hierarchical rank, movement back to the classroom is irrelevant to their professional standing. Furthermore, the abilities stressed are those of any top classroom teacher, and are not the specialized skills of a technobureaucratic occupation. Consequently, the TDSs see themselves as forming a collegial elite rather than a superordinate specialization.

This distinction between knowledge-based and hierarchical authority is reinforced by a subtle but significant division in the career ladder between Branch professional staff and senior management. The TDSs' self-identification as teachers is in some ways mutually exclusive with senior managements' informal requirement for administrative experience. As with the junior managers, the TDSs are trapped one rung below the entrance-level positions to educational administration. Before examining the TDSs' potential for upward mobility, however, there are two other points that need to be made about their official status.

First, the distinction between teachers and management is perpetuated in part by the government's classification of Test Development Specialist as a union rather than management position. Officially, the TDSs are members of the union of provincial employees,[54] and part of a local that includes the instructors at the provincially run schools and vocational colleges. In practice, union membership enters the TDSs' consciousness merely as another monthly deduction from their paycheque, and plays little role in their self-image.[55] Nevertheless, their official exclusion from the management association makes it clear that the TDS position is still one step below the bottom rung of the management ladder.

Second, most TDSs retain their memberships in their professional associations. Most are members of at least one specialty council of the provincial teachers' association, and a number continue to be very active in national and international groups such as the Canadian Council of Teachers of English, Phi Delta Kappan, and Delta Kappan Gamma. One TDS, for example, continued as Regional Director of the Canadian Association of Immersion Teachers, Treasurer for the French Council of the provincial teachers' association, and a member of the Early Childhood Education, English Language Arts, and Modern Language Councils. That many TDSs have taken or currently hold leadership roles within these professional associations confirms that they are recruited from a collegial elite within the profession. That many TDSs continue their intimate involvement with these associations suggests not only that they still see themselves as part of the teaching profession, but also that they are accepted as such by their classroom colleagues.

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[54] This does not apply, of course, to those in seconded positions, who are officially still employed by their local boards, and so are members of the provincial teachers' association rather than the government union.

[55] No TDS, for example, has ever been active in negotiating committees, or could even name their union steward. In the ten-year history of the Branch, I am aware of only a single grievance proceeding initiated by the professional staff.

Mobility to Senior Management

Contrary to my expectations when I began this study, there has now been some mobility from TDS to management ranks. Close analysis of these emergent career patterns, however, still suggests that movement up from the TDS position is the exception rather than the rule.

Approximately a third of this mobility may be quickly discounted, since it involved transfers to junior management. I have already described the two patterns involved: disciplinary actions in which the transfer to management is widely perceived as *downward* mobility; and temporary assignments that serve as a sort of TDS sabbatical to gain administrative experience. As suggested earlier, however, I strongly suspect that the type of experiences available as a junior manager are not sufficient to qualify one for the different, more policy-oriented tasks of senior management. What remains to be seen is whether successful tenure in *both* the education-oriented TDS role and the administration-oriented role of junior manager can produce the necessary gestalt to qualify for educational administration. So far at least, none of those rotated through junior management positions have been able to parlay this administrative experience into movement above the Acting Coordinator level. It would be inappropriate to read too much into this, however, as the slow turnover in senior management has not yet provided an opportunity to see whether external applicants with school-based administrative experience would be preferred over these internal alumni.[56]

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[56] The problem is further complicated in that at least one of these junior management alumni professes not to want advancement to senior management:

> I: Okay. Uh, so you didn't take this position as sort of a route to promotion?
> R: No. No.
> I: Really wasn't why you—
> R: I'm not particularly interested in that.

Four TDSs and one ARO have also served as Coordinators, the lowest rank of senior management.[57] Three of the five, however, have since returned to their former TDS/ARO rank without any apparent long-term career benefit from the experience.[58] Another remains in an acting capacity, covering for a senior manager temporarily assigned to a national project, and so presumably will also be rotated back to a TDS position in due course. Only one TDS in the last decade has ever been promoted to, and remained in, a permanent Coordinator position, and then only after having returned to his local district and serving for a year as a school principal.

Three other TDSs have been promoted. One was able to transfer out of the Branch to a position in another part of the Ministry roughly equivalent to that of a Coordinator. Like most TDSs, he had been recruited directly from the classroom. Teaching in a small rural school, he had gained what limited school-based administrative experience was available to him before joining the Branch.

> Well, you see it was a small country school that went from K to 12. So what happened was that I became department head in [[all but]] name. In other words, if there was anything that had to be done in [subject]-related kinds of things for school, the principal simply let me do it. Obviously the understanding was that while you do all these tasks, you shall not be paid for it. [I: Hehum.] And since somebody had to do it, that was fine. But you also had a slightly different setup in our school, it's not very common in other schools. The staff meetings were staff meetings. Meaning that they were not chaired by the principal. The staff set the agenda and the principal, just like any other member of the staff, would put his issues on the agenda, and I chaired the staff meetings. Even though we did have a vice principal as well. So it was much more of a democratic structure. And I think that it really worked quite well.

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[56](cont'd) I: Okay.

R: That's why I've been— You know, if it were, Robert, I would not now be an acting manager. I would have made a lot of, I would have stood up and shouted and yelled, "Look, here you are, you expect me to do this kind of stuff, you'd better make it permanent", whatever, you know. I, I, just, the reason I haven't done that is that I don't really care about it. (1.1413-1429)

[57] Note that my personal association with the Branch has allowed me to track mobility patterns over a ten-ear period, and so my observations extend beyond the 14 TDSs, 3 AROs, and 4 former TDSs included in the interview sample.

[58] One of these subsequently left government service to pursue a career in psychometrics, so it is difficult to judge whether a year as Acting Coordinator on her résumé will be of future benefit or not. I would speculate, however, that the decision to leave the Branch was based at least partly on the feeling that further mobility within the Ministry was effectively blocked, the experience as Acting Coordinator notwithstanding.

He had also served as "President of the local [teachers' association] for many, many, many years".

His potential talent for administration was well recognized by his colleagues and superiors, but the district offered him no opportunities for upward mobility. Thus, he was one of those who took the TDS position explicitly in the hope of future advancement.

> R: I'll be honest with you. What had happened was that I had applied for an administrative position within the county. And even though I'd been told earlier that I, while I was immensely qualified for the position, I would not get the position because the school trustees are involved in the selection for administrative positions. So while the superintendent felt that I could do a bang-up job, the problem lay with the trustees.[59] You see I had established a very good relationship with the previous superintendent. But I figured, you know, well, I'll go for it. It's one of those funny things, I don't know whether, how much you believe in intuition, but I believe intuition can tell people a lot about how other people may perceive them. I believe it's a holistic method of telling you that maybe, that gives you your warning lights, so to speak. And uh, prior to that I had also been told by my superintendent that I think you should really get to know these people on a social level. And uh I really didn't feel that I should get to know them on a social level because I really didn't have anything in common with them. And I figured I'm just not going to get to know people simply because I want to become an administrator. And during the interview, I could, they, it was a really funny situation. They decided on a horseshoe-shaped table. They never said a word. You sat on a separate table and you sort of answered the questions that were directed, that were written on a table, pasted on a table. The local press was there, and all these kinds of things taking place, so. It wasn't the ideal situation for an interview. But I didn't let that bother me. But [what] really got to me was the fact that I could actually detect hostility from the, many of the board members. And uh, in one or two instances it was, it was absolutely apparent. And in many cases they weren't even listening. And I don't think I gave a bad interview. And certainly I wasn't using a monotone or anything. As it turned out, a good friend of mine who was teaching in the city got that job and they did get themselves somebody who, he was a local boy. He did get the job, he had roots in that community and uh as it turned out I'm really glad that I didn't get that job because I think it would have turned into, probably, I don't know if I would have enjoyed it as much as what I'm doing now. And then I looked around at all the positions, all the other positions, uh in administration that were around me, and they were all occupied by people who had another 10 to 15 years left in them and they were all going to stay there. So I had to cast about somewhere to get out. And this job happened to come along, so I pulled out.
>
> I: So you're taking this job as an opportunity to step out of the community you sort of saw yourself being stuck in. Not— There was no opportunity there so you coming here—
>
> R: There was no opportunity for professional growth, for learning these things. My own principal had begun hounding me, that I should be doing some other things and I should not simply remain on in the classroom, though my students enjoyed my work, and I certainly enjoyed . . . being in front of them and talking to them, and I really enjoy that.

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[59] While the respondent did not say so, the problem alluded to here may have included ethnic biases.

What may be significant here is that, although he was blocked from an administrative position by the political interference of the lay board, he was nevertheless encouraged by his superiors to pursue a career in administration. What this suggests is that although this candidate lacked formal experience as a school-based administrator, he was nevertheless recognized as a potential member of that fraternity. In other words, he had acquired sufficient informal administrative experiences to have undergone the resocialization from classroom teacher to neophyte administrator. While I move here into the realm of speculation, I do not think it unreasonable to suggest that his rapid rise through the Ministerial hierarchy, at least in comparison with other TDSs, may represent an example of sponsorship rather than contest mobility.[60]

By this, I mean that his potential as a candidate for the more elevated position that he now holds was less directly attributable to his brief tenure as a TDS than to his having the appropriate attitudes and image which were already present when he initially joined the Branch. He did, as it happens, have an exceptional number of opportunities to demonstrate his administrative abilities while in the TDS role, and the TDS role did afford him significant opportunities for personal contact with other members of the Department. It would therefore be incorrect to suggest that his working as a TDS had not been helpful. My point, however, is that the TDS position is not part of a career ladder which is directly connected to his current position: Experience as a TDS was neither a prerequisite for this job (the way current classroom experience is for the TDS position), nor a sufficient qualification (since other equally well-qualified and successful TDSs have not been able to rely on their much greater experience to move to equivalent positions). The crucial factor in his getting the job were the personal characteristics that identified him as a 'latent administrator'. For example, several of my informants identified him as someone "on the way up" almost as soon as he entered the Branch.

Turning now to the two TDSs ever to be promoted above the Coordinator level, one was appointed to one of two new Assistant Director positions created in the Branch reorganization. During the period of my interviews, this position was still officially classified as a Manager-III — the same designation as the Coordinator rank — but the Branch was working on the assumption that it was to be reclassified as Senior Manager-I. As with the Manager-I designations, however, the Branch was encountering considerable resistance from the personnel department, which was not entirely convinced that this position incorporated sufficient responsibilities to warrant a senior management designation.

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[60] Following Ralph Turner, "Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System", *American Sociological Review* 25 (December 1960): 855-867.

> But uh, you know, the only, I guess if there's any frustration, if there's anything that causes me to be frustrated and sor— not sorry, but uh disappointed with the government is if they don't feel this position warrants a senior manager classification. Like I don't know if you're aware that, well, you must be aware, we're in the process of having these reclassified. And some of our personnel people are questioning whether this position is a senior manager position, whether it warrants that or not. Naturally, I feel it does, I'm biased, you know, so. But that would disappoint me. Uh, if that, didn't go through. That would be probably the only one big thing.

Ultimately, the Branch won its case, but partly on the grounds that a senior rank was required by hierarchical protocol because "I have to deal directly with superintendents, principals, etc., regarding security, and do investigations". In any event, as a Senior Manager-I, this is the lowest level above Coordinator, lower even than the other Assistant Director position, which was classified as a Senior Manager-II.

This individual, then, went from classroom teacher to school department head, from department head to Test Development Specialist, from TDS to Assistant Coordinator, from Assistant Coordinator to Coordinator, and from Coordinator to Assistant Director, and so presents the appearance of steady progression up a consistent career ladder. What is noteworthy here is that the first four vacancies were created by his predecessor. His former department head moved to the Branch to become Coordinator, leaving behind a vacancy that allowed our subject to become department head, then recruited him as a TDS, subsequently appointed him Assistant Coordinator, and then moved to another branch, leaving the Coordinator spot open. While many of his peers in the baby boom generation were trapped by the congestion surrounding a limited number of administrative openings, he was fortunate enough to have a route cleared ahead of him by his predecessor's mobility. In any event, he is the only TDS to successfully negotiate this ladder, and in that context, it is important to note that both the Assistant Coordinator and Coordinator positions have since been eliminated from that unit.

The only TDS to make it to the Associate Director level was also promoted during the Branch reorganization, but is an even more interesting case because she had had previous school-based administrative experience, and so is another example of a 'latent administrator'.

> R: Well, I was quite overqualified for the job that I had in one way, and underqualified in another way. [I: Umhum?] I came with my Master's, I came with, you know, almost 15 year's teaching experience, 5 year's administrative experience, working with large staff in some cases, 37, 40 people. Um.
>
> I: You say administrative experience?
>
> R: Umhum. Five years of it I had as assistant principal.
>
> I: Assistant principal.
>
> R: Yeah.
>
> I: Okay.
>
> R: I came also with having worked, you know, in many other areas. Leadership roles, for example. I was PD [[professional development]] chairman in the local, organized Institute days for all of the teachers, you know, I had a committee that I put together. I was president of the [teachers' association] local. I was uh in different roles, chairman of different projects in the community, I was president of the [club] in [town]. I coached and managed the women's travelling fastball team in [town]. And while those may seem unrelated, what they do is they, they allow you growth in terms of working with people and managing people and resources, in a different way. [I: Umhum.] But it's really, I believe that it's really closely tied in. [I: Sure.] I've drawn on those experiences often, in terms of continuing to work with people.

When her spouse had insisted on moving from their smaller community to the capital, she had had to give up her vice principalship and accept a nonadministrative position in the Branch. Thus, her tenure in the TDS position had in some ways been a temporary dislocation, and while many in the Branch were greatly surprised at her rapid promotion to Assistant Director over the heads of many more senior professional staff, it was entirely predictable in the context of her identity as an educational administrator.

What emerges, then, is a pattern which suggests that the opportunities for upward mobility for TDSs are normally restricted to temporary circulation through the Coordinator position. The two TDSs who were eventually able to penetrate this barrier and rise above the Coordinator level did so under exceptional circumstances: One had seen his Manager-III position reclassified (over the protests of the personnel office, which believed it was really a Coordinator position) to Senior Manager-I; while the other is revealed to have been something of a 'ringer', and not 'just' a classroom teacher at all. With the elimination of most of the Coordinator positions from the Branch, the gap between TDS and management ranks has now widened considerably,[61] and it is unlikely that even the limited mobility that has occurred in the past could now be duplicated.

A brief analysis of those TDSs and AROs who did not make it to management may also be revealing. Many TDSs, of course, see themselves as classroom teachers merely passing through the Branch on temporary assignment. Many of these are not sure they would even want to continue working as a permanent TDS, let alone seek promotion to management.

> I: So you intend to go back to the classroom?
>
> #27: Yeah, that's likely at this point in time.
>
> I: Is that the ideal pattern? Is there anything you'd rather do? Like, wave my magic wand and give you anything?
>
> #27: · · Mmm, well, I don't know. I'm interested in working here at the Branch. If that's a possibility. I don't know what openings might be here. But I'd have to, I'd have to see. But it's, it's, I find the work fascinating, and it's kind of interesting. But if, if it did come around I'd have to weigh it, because like I say, I, I do best at teaching, so I'd have to consider it. And I would have to resign [[from my board]], and I don't know if I'd wanna do that at this point. So I haven't made a decision on that at all.
>
> I: What about moving up in administration? Would you like to be a vice principal or principal or—
>
> #27: Oh that, no.
>
> I: —superintendent. No interest in that?
>
> #27: None.
>
> I: Is there anything else in government here that might be [of] interest, like Regional Office Consultant or Curriculum Branch or?
>
> #27: Oh, Curriculum Branch maybe. I don't know. Yeah, it might be interesting to work there too, in the area of [subject]. Yeah, that's true. But uh, yeah, there's lots of other opportunities, I mean, if there, you know, you can grow if you try different jobs. So, yeah, I'd be interested in looking at all different kinds of things, but right at this time, I'm not, I couldn't say, 'cause I don't even know what's going to be. We're looking at the end of next year, I don't know. So, but I'm quite happy with the experience I've here, then go back teaching. (1.1550-1587)

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[61] According to the organizational chart proposed for the reorganization, the TDSs were to be reclassified as Manager-IIs, reporting to the Associate Directors, who are Senior Manager-IIIs. Since the Manager-III positions were eliminated from those units, this means that a TDS moving to the Associate Director level would have to jump three steps in the provincial hierarchy. Even in the two units that retained Coordinator positions, the TDS would still have to jump two steps to reach an Associate Director position, or transfer to the Assistant Director position in charge of the service units, which may again be a dead end. In the event, the TDSs were not reclassified, and so are not part of the management ladder at all.

Note again the emphasis on personal development through lateral transfers to equivalent positions, rather than any desire for hierarchical advancement.

This was also true of some permanent staff, who enjoyed test development in much the same way as the secondments enjoyed classroom teaching, and had no particular desire to enter administration.

> #16: . . . and I guess if there's a problem in the organization it's that— And yet, you know, I, I was going to say, "It's the wrong people get promoted", but look at me, [I: Heheh.] I don't want to be promoted, so what the hell are you going to do, eh? Heheh. So if, you know, if, if you're not willing to, to take the responsibility formally, then what the hell have you got to complain about? (1.2190-2196)

Several of those in both permanent and project positions, however, expressed a strong desire for upward mobility. For those few seeking a career in the Ministry, the first hurdle is to be able to move from a project to a permanent position. As we have seen, however, there are few permanent positions available in the Branch, partly because management wants the staff to be current with the field, but also because there has been a general trend in government away from permanent employment.

> #04: No, the problem uh with uh permanent positions in [Ministry], as I understand it, in fact in the whole government, is that there are very few given out because of the recession. [I: Okay.] That's my understanding. (1.100-103)

> I: You said that you realized it was difficult to get a permanent TDS position. Why is that?
>
> #44: Uh, I'll tell you what my perceptions are on it. They may be completely off base. There are two reasons: The first reason is the fact that, that uh at this particular moment, I don't think the government wants to be seen as expanding. They want to keep the lid on the numbers down. In fact if they could even reduce the amount of civil servants, that would probably be even better. It would play really well in the next provincial election. Certainly. And uh, so politically there's definitely a climate where it makes it difficult to get on being permanent.
>
> Secondly, within the whole government structure we have "managers" and "others". I think managers have really taken good care of themselves and so if there are any permanent positions to be handed out, I think they will probably go within the managerial caste first, before they'll be given to other people, though there one or two exceptions may be made. For instance, if you need a good Wang operator to support your department and you don't want to get by on wage personnel which could have an overall effect on the smooth functioning of the department, you might say, "Well all right, we'll get a permanent position given to a particular Wang operator." So that gives it also the feeling of yeah, actually, that the handing out of management [[sic: permanent]] positions is a fairly democratic and a fair process, but I think if you really take a look at it the managerial ranks are all staffed by permanent positions. Indeed, even in this Branch, the moment you get into being manager you're made permanent, so. Um, so for those two reasons I think there's [a] problem, so I would have to either get into the managerial ranks before I could

> [be] permanent, and I don't see that happening because the, there are two things again here: The, the, the current Branch structure is like a plateau. And the positions that are being occupied by managers right now, just speaking simply demographically, they're not either going to be retiring for a very long time, there is practically no movement. So I can see myself in this position for a fairly long time, um, you know, seeking the Holy Grail called "permanent staff". (1.62-96)

Several points are worth noting here. First, the professional staff are perfectly aware of the trend away from permanent employment in government. As teachers, they come from a field in which stable employment is the norm, so although they tend to see themselves as an elite (and so are confident in their own abilities), the lack of permanence is an issue for those who intend to seek a career in government.

> R: I've been here now for two years, and they simply renewed it at a year at a time. I believe that the letter has now been sent off to ensure that everybody who is on a project position be on a project for at least three years, but I haven't heard anything back from it yet, so currently I would say I'm probably still going to go from one year to another.
>
> I: Okay. Um what are the implications of that for you?
>
> R: Well, I'll tell you what the implications are. It learn, it gives— It does some things to me in the sense that, my ultimate goal is to become a permanent employee. In fact, that is something I am trying to work as hard as I can to try and get, though I realize that is going to be a very long time before that actually transpires. Um failing that, I'll be happy with a three-year project. But a position from year to year, I know it's a gamble, I knew I was taking a gamble when I took the job because I gave up a very comfortable job, a permanent position for a project position. But I felt confident in my abilities that uh, that I would be employed. Mind you many people have been employed and were good at their own jobs and at the age of 40 have become redundant, so yeah, there's a definite fear and it's something that I do consider and I do think about it because basically it has an impact on my family. It's really not a major thing for me, because if I were to become unemployed and if I were single, I would immediately go back to university and take on the life of Riley again, but uh with a family it's a very different situation. I'm manacled to the material world. Heheh. (1.39-57)

Second, as #44 explicitly mentioned above, the interest in a management position is partly fuelled by the desire for permanence and security. Her comment that "even in this Branch, the moment you get into being manager you're made permanent" is often literally the case:

> I: When did it become permanent then?
>
> R: Hmm. I think in the middle of the second term I think.
>
> I: So while you were still a TDS?
>
> R: Yeah. Yeah, I became a permanent. Though the fact is, when uh [Director] uh decided to appoint me uh Assistant Coordinator.
>
> I: So at that point you decided you should be permanent if you're going to be a—?

R: Yeah, and then they, he had a permanent position available so they—
I: Matched you up.
R: Yeah. That was great. (1.208-226)

Third, that all management staff are in permanent positions while two-thirds of the TDS staff, and all of the Examiners, are in temporary employment draws yet another line between the development staff and management. Like union membership, lack of permanence is one of the characteristics that separate the teachers in the TDS and Examiner roles from the educational administrators in management and the specialized psychometricians in the ARO positions (who are also all in permanent positions).

Fourth, note that while the government is blamed for failing to allocate permanent positions to professional staff, lack of mobility to the permanent management positions is attributed here to baby boom congestion: "And the positions that are being occupied by managers right now, just speaking simply demographically, they're not either going to be retiring for a very long time, there is practically no movement." Several TDSs, however, were also aware of the Catch-22 that they could not penetrate to management ranks without school-based administrative experience.

> #33: . . . because this job is one of those which uh, is difficult to decide, because in the schools, it is not regarded as an administrative job. So that therefore uh, being able to transfer from here to a school at a principal or vice principal job is iffy. And secondly, in other branches of the government, of the Department, tend to want experience as a principal or vice principal as a, so that therefore you're caught in that regard. (1.901-908)
>
> #34: Oh, that's, also the fact that probably some of the important things that they want in candidates, I may not have, too. Obviously there's reasons why I didn't get the job. Like administrative experience and so on. (1.974-977)

This is perhaps the motivation for at least some permanent TDSs accepting rotations through junior management, though again I personally doubt whether this will be considered sufficient to make up for their lack of school-based administrative experience, particularly for those seeking positions in other branches, such as the inspectorate.

While the TDS and senior management positions appear connected on the organizational chart, they are in fact separated by an invisible line. This division between the classroom teachers and educational administrators is best symbolized by the divisions between union and management, and between temporary and permanent tenure, but the crucial factor seems to be administrative experience. The qualities that make an outstanding teacher are the same qualities that make an excellent test developer, but are not necessarily the qualities that management is looking for in its own recruits. Consequently — and in sharp contrast to recruitment to the TDS level — movement to management is not possible simply through the accumulation of teaching experience, academic credentials, or even seniority in the Branch. As with the junior management positions, test writing alone may not provide the necessary opportunities to develop and demonstrate the skills in policy formation and the management of subordinate professionals[62] necessary for successful mobility to senior management. In other words, even long-term tenure in a permanent TDS position may not provide the resocialization experiences necessary to move from the profession of teaching to the profession of educational administration.

Thus, most of those who joined the Branch in expectation of eventually moving to management or other Ministerial positions have been disappointed. So far, only two TDSs have ever been able to rise above the Coordinator level, and as we have seen, that was possible in only the exceptional circumstances created by the Branch reorganization. (And even then, one of these two was a former vice principal and so had the prerequisite school-based administrative experience.) Given the limited number of permanent positions available even at the TDS level, and the elimination of three of the five intermediate Coordinator positions, it appears increasingly unlikely that there will be much future mobility from the development units to senior management.

For that minority of TDS staff who are seeking a career in the Ministry, then, the TDS position has usually turned out to be part of what I have labelled as a *false career ladder*. False career ladders are part of the fiction of professional unity. If management claims to be part of the same profession as the rank and file, then members of the rank and file will naturally assume that there is a direct route up from where they are into management. Since Test Development Specialist is obviously a professional position, and since it reports directly to senior management on the organizational chart, it is not surprising that many teachers believe that Test Development is part of a continuous career ladder into management — particularly now that the TDS position has been renamed "Examination Manager". In fact, the two careers diverge much earlier, and the extensive teaching experience that is necessary to qualify for a TDS position almost by definition precludes sufficient advancement along an administrative career to allow later entrance into senior management.[63] Significantly, the TDSs and Examiners who said that senior managers were part of the same profession as they were are the ones who are still trapped in the Branch; while those who were careful to draw a line between teachers and senior management are the ones who have since achieved their career goals.

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[62] With the continued budget cutbacks, most TDSs no longer even have the semi-professional Examiner staff to supervise.

Summary

Close examination of the six criteria outlined on pages 356-357, then, suggests that most test development specialists are closer to the public service profession of teaching than they are to constituting a separate technobureaucratic profession. Recruitment to the TDS position is a normal part of a teacher's career progression in the sense that a tour of duty in test development is equivalent to any of the other assignment rotations that many classroom teachers routinely undertake to enliven their professional careers. It is equivalent because, for most incumbents at least, it is a temporary assignment that leads back to classroom teaching, not to an alternate career line. It is equivalent because the incumbents define the position as equivalent (or perhaps as even slightly lower on some scales), and not as a promotion; nor is their return to the classroom a demotion or career setback. It is equivalent because there is no additional knowledge and no separate certification required: successful and extensive rank and file experience is both necessary and sufficient for recruitment as a TDS. It is equivalent because whatever knowledge gap exists between the TDS and the rank and file is purely experiential, and so no different than, say, the gap between someone who has taught at both elementary and secondary levels and someone who has not. Finally, the test developers are teachers because they define themselves as teachers and are generally accepted as such by their classroom peers. Only their isolation from daily hands-on interaction with students, their narrow focus, and their implicit collaboration in the ideological deskilling of classroom teachers could allow them to be classified as a technobureaucratic profession.

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[63] In this context, it should be noted that the former vice principal who became a TDS did so through an internal transfer, having originally entered the Branch in an ARO position that does not require the same emphasis on recent classroom experience, though of course as a vice principal, this individual had not yet lost contact with the classroom.

SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS

To some extent, the discussion in previous sections has already anticipated the conclusion that senior management constitutes the distinct technobureaucratic profession of educational administration. A brief examination of the recruitment, work tasks, and self-identity of these career bureaucrats will confirm this.

There are eight senior managers included in the interview sample: The Director, three Associate Directors, two Assistant Directors, one Coordinator, and an Administrative Officer-I.[64] The Administrative Officer-I (whose Branch title is Manager of Administrative Services) is not, however, an educator. Concerned entirely with budgeting and logistics, and lacking any credentials, background, or particular interest in education, she is defined by all concerned (herself included) as a pure administrator.[65] Consequently, she is not really part of the same sample, and is therefore not included in the following discussion.[66]

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[64] A further Coordinator position existed on the organizational chart, but the incumbent was on a leave of absence, and the position left vacant.

[65] I: How do [you] define the profession that you're in? Who'd be included?
R: Well, I'd go back to the municipal end of it. Certainly the town managers, municipal administrators, uh, an office manager in a law office, uh, people that are doing uh, basically an office-type management, and I think that's getting, being really quite specific, but an office administrative type of function, with uh, many sort of fingers out from that, you know, various areas, [I:Umhum.] planning, budget, uh, clerical support, uh, you know, steno, uh, records, uh, functions that go on to support the workings of a [-?-] organization.
I: Okay, so any sort of an administrator, whether in the government or in private industry - -
R: Yup. (1.1144-1160)

[66] There are, however, two minor points of interest here: First, she was one of only two females in senior management; and second, hers was the only management position not monopolized by educators. This created an interesting (albeit *extremely*

As with the junior managers, there was some incongruity between job title and the incumbent's official classification. At the time of the study, only the Director and one of the Associates held their positions officially; everyone else was working in an acting capacity. One was on secondment from another branch within the Department;[67] the rest were awaiting approval of the Branch reorganization and the associated reallocation of management positions before they could officially apply for, and be confirmed in, the positions in which they had been working for the previous one to two years. As a result, five of the seven managers had been handling responsibilities one or two levels above their official classifications and (not incidentally) being paid at the lower rate.[68]

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[66](cont'd) minor) issue for the Branch because it is the Director's habit to cover his brief absences by assigning each senior manager as Acting Director in turn. For some, the inclusion of this Administrative Officer in the rotation confirmed the Director's democratic and nonsexist attitudes, while for a few others, it represented a loss of professional control and a (token) threat to professional dominance:

> R: That's why I would be · · extremely · · disappointed and also wary if uh you had a professional administrator who had not, who was not a teacher and who had not taught, as Director of the Branch. Off the record, I think — I know it was only for a couple of days — I don't believe that they had the right, when uh, [name] was made Acting Director of the Branch, for a couple of days. I know it was only a caretaker · · I—
> I: So it was inappropriate because she didn't have that teaching background?
> R: Yes. (1.139-150)

There was, of course, no personal animosity involved, and the professional staff were reluctant even to raise the issue publicly when it was so obviously trivial, but it does provide a compelling illustration of professional exclusiveness. Clearly, the appointment of such an 'outsider' on a permanent basis to any other senior management position would have been unacceptable to the professional staff, and she herself accepted that most other positions within the Ministry were closed to her.

[67] This was also true, incidentally, of the Administrative Officer.

[68] To quote one respondent:

> #12: The implication is that uh I'm acting unpaid at a much higher level, with greater responsibilities than, than I had. Uh, that's the implication.
> I: So for a year and a half you've been doing work at one level but being paid at another?
> #12: Right. To be fair I did get an increment adjustment (which was not satisfactory), with the uh understanding and, and the word of the Assistant Deputy Minister that when and if this reorganization was planned I would be retroactive to · · when I assumed these duties. (1.34-45)

Note however:

> I: Oh, so there is, in the long run, a chance that uh—?
> #12: Well, uh, there is, however, this in a way, uh, is not entirely within the Assistant Deputy's power to uh, to authorize this. It requires the authority of the Public Service Commissioner. (1.47-52)

Informal promises of this nature were a common pattern in both initial recruitment and promotion within the Ministry. Recruits were frequently enticed to accept

This was a source of some minor nervousness, not only for the managers themselves, but also for the professional staff they supervised.

> #22: There's a bit of uncertainty, and I think it might be because of all this 'acting'. Everyone is Acting Associate and from what [Coordinator] has been telling me, he's uncertain, and [Associate Director] is uncertain, and there's a lot of insecurity. [I: Heheh.] And until we get them, I think when we get the top management settled down, and then I think it will gradually settle. But right now, I feel a little bit of, no one's quite sure of who's doing what, and uh, definitely our managers don't know everything that's happening yet, with each of us, and there's a lot to learn, it's not their fault, it's just that there's a mass of information that they, that's happening. I'm off to item writing one minute, and [#04] is trying to get markers to come in and, you know, it's terrifically busy. (1.779-789)

> I: Okay. Uh, does the 'Acting' part of that title present any issues to you?
>
> #36: · · No.
>
> I: No?
>
> #36: No it hasn't. I think, believe it did for the first few months. It doesn't at this point anymore, it hasn't for quite a long time. It's been 'Acting' for nearly a year now. [I: Yeah.] September will be a year. For the first two or three months, I had to resolve within myself exactly · · you know · · how entrenched I would allow myself to become in this particular position. Whether or not I would fulfil the responsibilities without considering the fact that it was an 'acting' job, knowing that in the future my performance would be [?reviewed?]. But I've, I guess I've just outgrown that? [I: Yeah.] I've had to deal with so many situations, some delicate, some other, that I now, I'm just not concerned about it. Anything that [Director] wants to know about me, he will know, so I don't have any corners to hide around. Heheh.
>
> I: But uh, is there any element that uh, I mean you're doing the work uh associated with the position, and yet you don't actually have uh, I mean—
>
> #36: I don't feel that now, though. I did that, I did for the first few months. [I: Yeah] There's a difficulty with acting positions you aren't compensated properly, financially, those, that's a difficulty. (1.37-59)

Though unusually widespread during the reorganization, this was a common enough pattern for promotion within management. A position often would be left vacant for more than a year while one of the potential candidates filled it in an acting capacity. At least two of the senior managers suggested that the slow pace at which these appointments commonly were finalized was part of an informal but deliberate Ministerial policy to save money and

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[61](cont'd) positions on the understanding that their superiors would "try" to obtain particular benefits over which the Branch in fact had no authority and was often in the event unable to deliver. This was the source of some bitterness for two staff members whose subsequent careers had not lived up to their recruiter's promises, but the majority accepted the sincerity of their superiors and blamed instead the faceless bureaucrats of the personnel department.

encourage speedups.[69] All of those interviewed were eventually confirmed in their positions, but on at least one other occasion I observed, the position did not go to the acting incumbent. In any event, these managers are all permanent government employees, so although their promotions were not guaranteed, their jobs were secure.

Recruitment Issues

As discussed in the previous section on the test developers, only one of the Assistant Directors and one of the Associate Directors had been promoted from the TDS rank. If recruitment is not based on a career ladder leading up from the ranks of the professional staff, then where did the other senior managers come from?

The two other Associate Directors were also internal promotions, but in this instance from the Coordinator position. Like several of the TDSs, they had both served as department heads in large urban schools before joining the Branch. Unlike those TDSs rotated through the Coordinator post, however, both these individuals had been recruited directly to this position, and therefore explicitly recruited for their administrative experience and managerial potential. While many of the TDSs came from similar backgrounds, the criteria against which they were screened for the TDS position would necessarily have been different. Consequently, those TDSs rotated through the Coordinator position are taking the Branch equivalent of the role of department head, and so are at the top rung of the 'teaching' ladder; whereas those recruited directly to a permanent Coordinator position are by definition undertaking a terminal career change, and so entering the bottom rung of 'educational administration'. Thus, depending on the incumbent, the Coordinator role alternately represented the top of one ladder or the bottom of the other, without actually providing a connection between the two. Because the Coordinator position stood halfway between teaching and administrative roles,[70] it could not itself provide the necessary experiences to resocialize those who did not already have the necessary administrative qualifications to move up. The Coordinator position did provide a link between classroom teaching and administration, but only for those who moved directly from department head to Coordinator.[71]

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[69] Note that the saving here is not so much the short-term difference between pay rates at the two levels as the long-term implications:

> R: A year now, yeah. That isn't the problem for me as much as the difficulty of percentage of increase in base salary which I wouldn't have anyway in an acting position, even if they were paying me someone else's. The percentage of increase allotted to this position was given to me in a lump sum, because I'm not in the salary range of the position that I'm holding. So in the future, when I, if I ever got this job permanently, I will have lost the percentage of increase in salary this year. You know, they may compensate for that, in placing my salary, at an appropriate level, [I: Yeah.] if I got the job. However, there's uh, you know, five years down the road, that adds up to a lot of money. That's where the real difference comes in. Being compensated for this job, you know, [I: Yeah.] a couple of hundred a month is no big deal. The base salary, I think, is a big deal. [I: Yeah.] In 20 years, multiplied by a percentage of 1 or 2 per cent, makes a big difference, or 3, whatever the salary increases are. (1.80-96)

Similarly, speedups occur as candidates attempt to impress, or more especially, when the candidates have had to assume the duties of their immediate superior in an acting capacity, but are still expected to retain their own regular duties (as sometimes happens), thus filling two positions for the price of (the cheaper) one.

The other senior managers were all recruited from senior administrative posts. One had been a school principal, deputy superintendent and acting superintendent. Another had been a principal, acting superintendent, and then a manager in another branch of the Ministry. The third had served as a subject consultant in a local school jurisdiction, as a university associate, a Regional Office Consultant, and then special assistant (Senior Officer-II) to the Deputy Minister. One of the three had also had extensive corporate and banking experience.

This pattern was also typical of the previous senior managers. One of the previous Directors had been a superintendent; the other, a Regional Office Consultant and a career administrator within the Ministry (including, I believe, a brief tour as a provincially appointed superintendent). Similarly, the three founding Associate Directors had all had previous administrative careers within the Ministry.

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[70] #11: . . . And the Coordinator's position, as it was here, was · · an odd position, it was an odd in-between position, it was uh an odd job description. (1.127-129)

[71] Note that while the "Coordinator" designation is used in both the service and development units, my comments here apply only to the development units. The Coordinator role in the service units does not involve a seat on Management Council and the associated opportunities for input into policy formation. Nor does it provide the same opportunities for the 'department head' role, since junior management does not involve 'teaching' activities. Consequently it can be considered neither the bottom rung of the senior management ladder, nor the top of the 'teacher' ladder, whatever the pattern of recruitment, but instead is the top of the separate non-educator ladder of junior management.

Most of these senior managers cannot be considered classroom teachers because they were not recruited directly from the classroom. In contrast to the emphasis on current classroom experience for the TDS rank, the careers of most of these administrators had diverged from teaching from 5 to 15 years before they were recruited to senior Branch management. Note, for example, how this respondent is concerned that he may have remained too long in the classroom to have sufficient time left now to pursue a career in administration:

> #09: · · Not that uh, I mean, I'm not going to be terribly disappointed if I don't achieve that, because again I know my limitations. Uh, I think I started moving late, I, I, maybe I was too happy in the classroom, I don't know, but uh, I really wasn't interested in administration until the last, say, half-dozen years of teaching. And uh, and then things started to happen, and so, really, um, I not too, oh, I guess I could still move if I really was, and uh, what it takes to do that, but I don't have real high expectations in that, uh, you know that at all costs I'm going to be a Director, [I: yeah, no.] or, you know, Deputy. (1.271-280)

Whereas the TDS's credibility is at risk after too long an absence from the classroom, the senior management positions require that candidates be able to distance themselves from classroom teaching by demonstrating sufficient intervening administrative experience to justify recruitment or further advancement.

Even recruitment to the lowly Coordinator positions requires, at the very least, previous experience as a department head,[72] and two of the Coordinators had also served as

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[72] The job description for the Coordinator of Diagnostic Testing, for example, lists "A minimum of 3 years of teaching at the elementary school level, and some supervisory experience" as essential requirements.

Some feeling for the administrative experiences available as the department head of a large urban school can be seen in this respondent's reminiscences during discussion of another topic:

> R: Um, I was a department head in a large high school, I had a department of 16 teachers, 8 of whom were qualified to teach [subject], and the other 8 who were peripheral. They all required, because of how I saw my job, now, I could have said, "I'm not going to do anything with you guys, you can go teach your one class, I'm not going to do anything with you", but my responsibility was to make sure that every kid in that school got a decent program. So that meant I worked a lot, individually and collectively, with those peripheral people with making sure they had lesson plans, making sure they knew what the materials were, making sure that they had assistance from other people, and blah blah blah bablah. We also had a policy in the school that

Acting Superintendents. Certainly promotion above the Coordinator position is unthinkable without at least five years experience in a purely administrative role. This is apparent not only from a review of the actual backgrounds of the incumbents, but is also an explicit requirement of the job descriptions. The job description for the Associate Director of the Humanities, for example, lists "Demonstrated capability in social science research, 5 years of successful managerial or administrative experience in the context of an educational institution" as essential qualifications, and "Research skills, administrative capacity" as the "specific skills" required for the position. Similarly, note how these managers see previous administrative experience as necessary to develop the skills required for their positions:

> I: . . . What, what percentage of classroom teachers could I recruit to fill your chair?
>
> #36: What percentage of classroom teachers? · · · Five percent at the most.
>
> I: Five percent.
>
> #36: At the most.
>
> I: Okay. Uh, maybe I should elevate that. What percentage of vice-principals?
>
> #36: · · A percentage, more of them.
>
> . . .
>
> #36: And so I would rate people like, uh principals, a lot of them could come and do this. People on superintendency staffs could come right into here, easily. Uh,

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[72](cont'd) kids who were having difficulty or weren't happy with their marks weren't getting along well in a class could would see the classroom teacher and then they would see the department head, because usually we could clear things up at that level. So not only did I see all my own students on a daily basis, I probably saw 8 or 10 students from somebody else, all of whom had complaints or whatever. Now I could have chosen to not do that, but that was a policy that we put in place and we thought it was important. Uh when I finally left that school, I left with, with a classload of 150 kids who I saw every single day, okay? So every single day I had 150 kids and 16 teachers, for whom I had an immediate and, and considerable responsibility. Again partly because of how I get satisfaction out of what I do, I could have said, "I'm not having anything to do with any of you 16 teachers except when we have a department meeting." Well, ultimately that would have made my job a lot harder. So I made a point of trying to see most of those people every day and kind of have an idea of what was going on. As well I had, you know, I had the administration to deal with, I did some extracurricular activities . . . . But I taught for almost 18 years, 17 or 18 years, I loved it. . . . So by the time I left teaching I really felt I had done a lot of the, I'd done pretty well everything I'd wanted to do. [I: Umhum.] Uh, I done a great deal of curriculum development, I done a lot of in-service presentations, uh, I done a lot of experimental things, I done some experimental teaching, I'd done some graduate work, I had worked with all kinds of kids, uh, I'd pretty well done what I wanted to do. So, so making the move here was, was for me a good job. (1.1570-1614)

> principals, not all of them, but a lot of them. Vice principals, there are some. [I: Okay.] I don't know that I could give you percentages on that. (1.1514-1542)

> #10: Well okay, supposing somebody was applying for an Associate Directorship · · · I don't know. Uh, I could tell them that, certainly would have to have some administrative experience to even consider applying because that's one of the requirements that the Department and [Director] hold as being important. [I: Umhum.] They certainly would have to have some experience in working with large groups of teachers and administrators because again, that's something the job requires and [Director] holds as a value. People who haven't had those kind of contacts would be in a very poor position to get a job. So, you know, it would be, doesn't, wouldn't mean that they couldn't necessarily do it. (1.1313-1323)

Movement to senior management also represents a terminal career change, a deliberate decision to leave teaching and to enter a new career. In contrast to the TDS role, where the ideal is a brief secondment leading back to the classroom, none of these managers has any intention of ever returning to teaching. To have to do so, as illustrated in the first comment below, would be interpreted as a major career setback.

> R: Oh yeah, yeah. I uh, I went up through the ranks. I went to principal and then acting superintendent of [town]. [I: Oh really?] They changed the School Act in seventy— whatever it was— '72. Then I found myself deficient in terms of qualifications for the superintendency,[73] so · · after that I came down to [Capital] and worked for two years as a research economist while I was part one of the Masters program. And I went back to [district] · · as a classroom, as a [department head]. And then I found I could not revert to the very stringent requirements of a classroom teachers in terms of time, I just found it too hard to take. So that satisfied me that I couldn't go back to the classroom teaching per se.

> #09: Well I suppose · · uh, kind of a strange thing in some ways, like I enjoyed teaching. Uh, I still enjoying it eh, and I hadn't been department head that long, and I also was enjoying the department headship as well, the administrative part of it, but I knew that I did not want to teach for another 10, 15 years, I didn't want to teach until I retired, I didn't want to stay in the classroom forever, even though I was enjoying it, I knew there was something else I wanted to, to uh, go to eventually, and ideally I would have liked to have, say, if I could have, say, stayed at that school for another, say, three years even, you know, two, three, four years as department head, and then been able to, but when this came up, . . . I thought well, here's a good opportunity that uh, you know, for me to go, get out of the classroom, uh, even though the timing isn't perfect, I thought well, I'll go for it now while I, you know, while I can, because [I: Yeah.] you never know, when you don't go for that, then it may be 10 years later, 15 years later, you're still sitting there. And like I have taught for, what did I say, 13 years? Uh, actually 15 years. . . . but I could see that I was, uh, didn't have the same energy, I'd see young teachers coming in, like with extracurricular things, [I: Yeah.] you know, with clubs, uh with coaching, and I just didn't have the same enthusiasm, and uh, and I could see that, and, you know, that the, the new teachers, the younger teachers did, and of course, and then I, you also see teachers who teach till they retire, and you see that they're uh, you know, they may do the job in the classroom, but that's it. It's a nine to

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[73] The School Act now requires superintendents to have "A Master's degree from a university in [province] or from a university of an equivalent standard".

> five job, nine to four job, and uh I just, you know, I could see that in another 5 to 10 years I'm going to be like that well, and uh, so I, you know, didn't want stay there all, forever. So the opportunity came, went for it. (1.128-165)
>
> #38: No, I didn't have any intention to go back to the classroom. Uh, One of the things I've had problems with as an individual is sticking to a job once I've felt that I've done it. Relatively good job of it. As long as I'm wanting to improve and grow, then I like the job, but I've been there and I feel that I've done what I could, and feel satisfied, then I'm looking for other things. [I: Okay.] So I have not stayed for long periods of time uh in any one position. (1.1915-1921)

Furthermore, the goal is not only permanence but also upward mobility. Where the TDS position is typically incorporated in a career pattern that involves the teacher's circulation through a number of different but equivalent assignments, the senior management positions are part of a well-defined career ladder. Lateral transfers were occasionally undertaken, "but", to quote one manager, only "with the promise of bigger and better things". Where most TDSs were uninterested in seeking promotion, most senior managers hoped to climb yet higher within the Ministry or, failing that, were sometimes surprisingly bitter at the lack of such prospects.[74]

Another restriction on recruitment to senior management is the requirement for additional academic qualifications. The job description calls for "equivalent to a Master's degree in education" and lists "Ph.D. or equivalent" as desirable. All the incumbents had Master of Education degrees, and while none of the incumbents held a doctorate, one had completed all but his dissertation,[75] another had been nominated for a doctoral study leave but not yet taken it, and most of their predecessors had had doctorates. Most believed that a Ph.D. would be useful for further advancement, noting that a Ph.D. was the norm for the Associates and Directors in most of the other branches of the Ministry, and certainly for all of the officials above that level.

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[74] On the other hand, the much greater resentment evident among managers than TDSs over their lack of upward mobility may have been merely a reflection of the interview timing. Interviews were conducted just following the Branch reorganization, and so those managers who felt passed over were likely near the height of their resentment, whereas those TDSs who had been disappointed in their own progress would have recognized that they were trapped some time before. It is also probable that most TDSs were still anticipating their reclassification to Program Manager in the (mistaken) belief that this would constitute a promotion. (In the event, the personnel representative explained that a Manager-II was *below* the TDS rank, and the proposed reclassification was dropped.)

[75] He did not, in the event, complete the degree before his time limit elapsed.

> #09: . . . I suppose uh possibly uh, like I think one barrier could be maybe um, a Ph.D. Like I, I think that if I want to really go for it, I think I have to try to work on a Ph.D. And that may be wrong, I don't know. Uh, but I'm not a real uh, I'm not a good politician, not a real extrovert, I can't do it that way. Uh, maybe I'm not a dynamic enough person, I don't know, to uh, uh, really do things that uh will, you know, make people take notice, that's sort of my, my perspective anyway, so maybe I'd have to go the education route maybe, with, with some, with a Ph.D. I might have a little better chance of, you know. I don't know. It's uh, well I guess what I try to do is, I try, I try to do the job but I don't go out of my way to do the necessary politics, to be quite honest.
>
> . . .
>
> I: Okay. And so you [see] that Ph.D. as really uh the necessary certification to get into a superintendency or Directorship?
>
> #09: For me. Not for everybody, but for me I think. (1.285-319)

As with the TDSs, however, the need for additional academic credentials is not sufficiently restrictive to classify senior management as a technobureaucratic profession on this basis alone.

First, while a Ph.D. is becoming the norm for senior management within the Ministry, it is not yet an official requirement. The Ph.D. must therefore be interpreted as a market advantage — a competitive edge in upward mobility — rather than as certification for a distinct profession.

Second, the Master's is now sufficiently common among the teaching force in general that it cannot be interpreted as a distinct technobureaucratic qualification either. Since none of the senior managers actually has a doctorate at this point, there is little discernible gap between management and the professional staff in terms of academic credentials. As indicated earlier, many TDSs, junior managers, and Examiners also hold higher degrees. This is not, then, a dimension on which the management ranks can be decisively distinguished from the rank and file.

Third, only one of the senior management job descriptions specified that the Master's should be in educational administration, and that was for a position phased out in the reorganization.[76] If educational administration were a distinct technobureaucratic profession, one would expect academic requirements specifically related to certification as an educational administrator. On the contrary, most of the incumbents had specialized instead in curriculum and instruction. Like the TDS position, then, educational administration requires only a generalized socialization into a professional elite. Here, for example, a respondent suggests that any Master's degree will help to resocialize the classroom teacher to the broader perspective that she believes is required for effective administration:

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[76] The job description for Associate Director of Technical Services (which primarily involved responsibility for the service units) listed "Equivalent to a Master's Degree in educational administration or program evaluation" as an essential requirement. The new job descriptions were not yet finalized at the time of my study, but of the

> R: . . . it depends on how many of those classroom teachers have gone back for formal training to give them sort of the springboard to considering sort of the theory behind the management of people, and while all those of things may appear to be sort of irrelevant when you're studying them, they allow you to draw upon those studies to think about situations in a different way than you would as a classroom teacher. Management of people is a different ballgame than, than working in a classroom where you deal with children and with parents.
>
> I: So you're saying a Master's in administration is uh, [R: Yeah.] really helpful?
>
> R: Yeah.
>
> I: What's your Master's in?
>
> R: It's in curriculum and instruction.
>
> I: Curriculum and instruction. And so, yeah, okay. You said that was important too. So someone with a Master's in curriculum or administration or uh.
>
> R: Well, there's different ways, a Master's in reading or a Master's in another area would be suitable too, because it gives you the realm of expertise in dealing with people on a different level, that's what it does.
>
> I: But you're looking for that academic training at some level.
>
> R: Yeah. I would think for this job— That's one of the reasons I believe that this job requires that type of background. You get it in different ways. You could get it through experience. Like working through school systems, superintendencies, and drawing on it that way. If you haven't gone that route, you need something to draw on, and uh, I think that would give it to you. (1.1551-1586)

Thus, if educational administration is an emergent technobureaucratic profession, it has not yet been able to assert cognitive exclusiveness over an identifiable body of knowledge.

The requirement for a Master's degree, then, should be interpreted as certification of advanced status *within* the teaching profession rather than as membership in a separate and superordinate specialization. The catch, however, is that while a Master's degree is a necessary qualification for recruitment to senior management, it is not sufficient. Successful experience as a classroom teacher and the possession of a Master's, even in educational administration, will not suffice without school-based administrative experience. It is therefore

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[76](cont'd) two Assistant Directors now responsible for these areas, only one has a Master's in educational administration.

this experiential dimension that defines the technobureaucratic occupation.

In other words, recruits to senior management are not drawn from the general population of the rank and file but only from that specific segment previously identified as part of the educational administration fraternity. Often, as with the following respondent's experience while working for a local school board, that identification is quite explicit and formalized:

> #38: . . . Uh, I was in the Leadership Potential, they had this Leadership Potential Pool, where uh, you had to have certain characteristics and experiences and references and so on, I was all set for that, there was no problem. I suppose if I had given them, if I had stayed I would probably ended up as an assistant principal and then principal, probably. Um because of my record, and I'm not saying that because I want to crow, or anything like that, because of my record—
>
> I: It was a career pattern that was set up.
>
> #38: Looking back now, I can see individuals who were at that position and that's clearly where they were headed. But I didn't want to do that. (1.1957-1971)

Furthermore, as with the TDSs, there is also a significant amount of direct recruiting. Here, a former school-based administrator describes how he was brought first into the Ministry, and then the Branch:

> R: To put it quite simply, first of all, while I was in [town], and, both as a principal and acting superintendent . . . I uh requested the board to invite the Department to come and evaluate [jurisdiction] because I wanted him [[the Minister]] to see a first-class school district in operation. They came in, did the usual week, of inspection and evaluation, and subsequent to that, after presentation to the board, I had a private visit from two well-known personalities in the Department, who are still in the Department, and they encouraged me to, uh, I should apply to the Department because they felt I could contri— contribute to uh leadership in education. That's, uh, being modest, that's exactly what happened, and that's [I: Yeah.] although, uh, I put in an application, but I wasn't immediately accepted, right. And, it's rather strange, then two years after I left . . . I got a phone call from uh the Director of Personnel, "Was I still interested?" And my response was, "Interested in what?" And he said, "Joining the Department".
>
> . . .
>
> I: So they, they came and got you, in other words?
>
> R: Yeah, I, initially I did apply based on the evaluation of course, which, you know, I found to be positive, very complimentary, and I felt that it was time to get in at the top where one hoped leadership was exercised and uh—
>
> I: Okay. What about uh coming into the Branch here?
>
> R: Well there again, the persons who encouraged me to join the Department, um, had visited me in my appointment and saying it was time for a change and I hoped that the Department, you know, at the Deputy level, would see fit to make a change, 'cause I'd done six years, and they wanted me to come as part of the project team to start the new Branch. (1.127-154)

The same pattern is apparent for upward mobility within the Ministry. Here, a former Regional Office Consultant (a position roughly equivalent to Coordinator) describes his initial and unanticipated recruitment to the ranks of senior management.

> I: Once you entered Regional Office, did you then, "Well this is also a way up into the Department"?
>
> R: No.
>
> I: That wasn't · · ·
>
> R: When I went— Well, when I went to work at Regional Office I really wanted to become the best Consultant that I could be, I mean, that really was my goal, and I was having a good time at it too. Uh, I was there for two and a half years, and um, I really enjoyed it. In fact, that was one of my favourite jobs. Uh, but one day I got a call from [Assistant Deputy Minister] and uh he said that the Deputy Minister is looking for a special assistant and they are going to interview three people and my name was one of them. Be up here on such and such a day. Heheheh.
>
> I: Hehehe!
>
> R: And so · ·
>
> I: So that wasn't really one you applied for, that was one they, they yanked you out of there.
>
> R: And I could have said no. Clearly. . . . In fact, I really thought about it, a lot, because I liked what I was doing and I wanted, really, to stay a little longer. . . . But I thought, and I spoke to my Director, and uh he said that people aren't offered these opportunities more than once sometimes, usually, he said that you should. . . . (1.2003-2030)

This direct recruitment introduces an element of sponsorship mobility that creates further discontinuities in the structure of career ladders within the Ministry. Unlike organizations where subordinates routinely replace their superiors in a steady career progression up the organizational chart, possession of the required qualifications and satisfactory work performance in one's current position may not be sufficient for promotion. Rather, management vacancies are filled through open competition, so that one cannot assume automatic advancement simply because the position above has come open.

> #35: . . . In that respect, uh, because you have to compete for positions every time when you move up the ladder. You, one isn't promoted to that, [I: Umhum.] you compete every damn time. That's a strange kind of, in some ways it's a legitimate process, but it's a strange kind of process too. You know? Uh, the screen, the, the process of being promoted is a different one in government from what it would be in the army or in industry. You just, you don't do good work and get promoted, you do good work and then compete, with others, for a higher-level position. But that's what you do. And uh · · so there's this chicken dance that you go through in the name of, of, of uh, of a competition that may or may not be a sort of a legitimate way of helping you to move. (1.899-911)

Since promotion is not automatic but conducted through an open competition, and since higher management routinely seeks out candidates it can invite to enter these competitions, advancement actually requires the active sponsorship of those yet higher in the hierarchy.

As suggested in Chapter 5, there has been a steady attrition of progressivist officials and their replacement with educators more favourably disposed to the conservative agenda of the sectional interests that control the Legislature. It may therefore be reasonable to suggest that an appropriate ideological orientation, or the ability to accommodate to it, has also become a significant requirement for entrance into educational administration.

Taken together, all of this suggests that there is no career ladder connecting the Branch professional staff with senior management. Examiners, TDSs, AROs, and junior managers are recruited from the ranks of classroom teachers, whereas senior managers are recruited from a separate pool of administrators. Even those few classroom teachers who manage to obtain a permanent position within the Branch cannot assume that lengthy tenure at this level will eventually allow them to move into senior management. On the other hand, those with previous administrative experience and the confidence of their superiors can, as we have seen, be pulled from their TDS position and promoted to Senior Manager-III, without having occupied any of the intervening three steps.

In summary, all four criteria related to recruitment support the conclusion that senior management is part of the distinct technobureaucratic occupation of educational administration. Recruitment to senior management is limited and not the automatic outcome of normal career progression for Branch professional staff, let alone the average classroom teacher. Recruits are selected by higher bureaucratic authority from a distinct pool of candidates, such that the qualities that make an excellent teacher or TDS are not necessarily the qualities sought by senior management when recruiting to their own ranks. Experience as a rank and file professional is not in itself sufficient qualification for recruitment. On the contrary, the two paths tend to diverge early in the candidate's career, suggesting that these are two separate career paths and therefore separate professions. Transfer between occupations is terminal and unidirectional. Consequently, on all four criteria related to recruitment, educational administration is more nearly a distinct technobureaucratic occupation than a part of a unified education profession.

The Nature of the Senior Manager Role

Much more even than the TDSs, senior managers are isolated from direct contact with students. Not only are they several steps removed from the immediacy of classroom instruction, they have little hands-on participation in test development.

Nevertheless, all those polled stated that they considered students to be their primary clients.

> I: . . . Who are your clients in this job?
>
> #38: Well, students first of all.
>
> I: Students?
>
> #38: Students first of all. Then teachers, principals, superintendents, and we don't think enough about parents as being clients, but we should be.
>
> I: Okay. So if you're doing something and you say to yourself, "Boy, this came out really well, they're really going to like that", who's the 'they' in that sentence?
>
> #38: Ha. Um, I think that 'they' are still who I said, although, although if the materials are such that have to go through our Deputy Minister for example, uh, that it may be coloured by that route, a bit, except I'm quite confident that his clients are the same as mine, and so I don't feel that I'm aiming for something different than he is. (1.882-901)

> #36: My clients are the children of this province, mostly.
>
> I: So if you're writing something, you say, "Boy, they're really going to like what I just did now"—
>
> #36: No, but I ask myself how is this impacting on, happening with the kids of this province. Because they are, they are the bottom-ine client that we deal with.
>
> I: Okay, so they're always uppermost in your mind, or?
>
> #36: Yup. When we do something, I wonder how this going to affect them. What are the repercussions in terms of what's going to happen to children.
>
> I: Okay. Uh—
>
> #36: That's where the buck stops all the time.
>
> I: Okay. Uh, are there different clients for different tasks?
>
> #36: Certainly. Sure there are. The different client groups that I work with are · · superintendents, I work with other [Ministerial staff], Regional Office staff, things like that, I work with administrators a lot, I work with classroom teachers quite a lot. Uh, it's expanding. School board members I'm in touch with. Uh· · · let me see, who else am I in touch with? I think that probably captures most of it. (1.1634-1661)

> I: Okay. Who are your clients in this job?
>
> #11: Uh, probably, they haven't changed, the uh, I would suspect, uh, certainly the student would be the major client, that you would have to look at. Uh I believe teachers and jurisdictions are also clients, along with the public. Uh, dealt with in a

> tremendously different manner, so if you go by product production then uh, I would hope that the bulk of this Department is devoting its energy and time and money to the first part, the student. Uh secondly to the school systems, with the teachers coming in at the jurisdiction level as well as the teacher level, to ensure proper uh manipulation in that system, but I think the spinoffs of that have to be public awareness and [-?-program-?-].
>
> . . .
>
> #11: Yeah. But you've got to consider, in order for that to happen, the teacher must like it, the parent must understand it, and the jurisdiction must also see it as rewarding.
>
> I: So you always balance all of those at the same time?
>
> #11: Yeah, you have to I think, yeah. If you don't then you're going to end up with a product that satisfies a given market, like if you want to please the kids, eh, give 'em drugs and smokes, [I: Heheh.] what the heck, that'll do it. I don't think the student is really uh appreciator in one sense, and that is that uh I don't think the student would look at us as saying, "Oh gosh, that's for me. They're doing it for me, isn't that wonderful". Right? So in one sense you've got, you've got, that's the market, but that is not how you can direct it. (1.147-196)

While undoubtedly sincere, the managers' claim that students are their primary clients must be qualified by both their lack of direct interaction with students and, more especially, their need to be responsive to the many other client groups also listed here. As pointed out by #11 in the comments above, it is not the students themselves to whom the senior managers react, but rather these other stakeholder groups. Students remain an abstraction, while the senior managers' direct face-to-face interaction is with other administrators or the representatives of various lobby groups.

Part of the senior managers' mandate, then (as detailed in Chapters 6 and 7), is to reconcile the separate and often competing agendas of these various publics.

> #10: So part of my job is kind of pulling that all together. Knowing what each group has [as] an agenda, having some idea of the context from which they're coming and having a pretty good idea of what the curricular philosophy and context is and finding a way to pull that together in a sort of priorarchical [[i.e., priorized]] workable way that's going to work for students. So in, in the long term, the, the group from my point of view, my personal point of view, that's most important is students. And although each of those groups is going to claim to have students as their particular goal, the well-being of students, I think that's sometimes suspect. (1.98-108)

Consequently, the senior manager's work includes a political component that is absent from other ranks of the profession.[77] Even other Branch professional staff do not share this

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[77] For example:

> #35: I'm uh, I think I'm a politically astute person and I'm aware that what we do is uh, is under scrutiny always by any number of external parties or groups. And that makes it political in that what we do is uh, therefore, uh

broader political perspective, because they are primarily focused on the technical issues involved with evaluation and have only limited input into policy. While the TDSs recognize the need that their own technical decisions occasionally be constrained by these larger political considerations, they see the political function as residing with their managers rather than themselves.

> #43: That you be sensitive to political issues. There is no question that that's a function of the management style of this place. In private industry I think management style tends to be, I guess it's not really management style, but it's the almighty profit. And all of your decisions, will be made on the basis of will it make money. Well, around here, a large part of the decision making is will it fly politically. Now that's not style, not management style, but it does flavour [I: Philosophy.] philosophy. (1.1367-1375)

Not only are the senior managers isolated from direct contact with students, they have relatively little interaction with the rank and file. As detailed in Chapter 7 (pages 314-316), the higher one moves in senior management, the more cut off one becomes from classroom teachers. Where TDSs run item writing, field testing, marking, and in-service activities with teachers, the senior managers primarily interact with other technobureaucrats. Here, one of the senior managers with the most contact with classroom teachers still lists interactions with teachers after school-based administrators, supervisors, consultants, and even university personnel:

> I: Okay, so what you're saying then is that your job is to try to balance the demands of a number of different groups. [#10: Yup.] Ultimately, to meet the needs of students. [#10: Umhum.] Okay, uh, you said you could rank order them in terms of the number of contacts. [#10: Uhuh.] You said, that would be mostly administrators, and then?
>
> #10: Um, yes, probably overall, I mean if I looked at my phone messages for instance, the ones that are currently on my desk, the last 14 calls have been from system people, who are trying to accommodate us in various ways. Uh, I've spent the morning at the university with university people, so that would, I mean, that's not untypical.
>
> I: The general public then, or then teachers?
>
> #10: Um, I would say teachers, next, simply because of the magnitude of the marking and exam-development process. I mean there are hundreds of teachers with whom I maintain a fairly close contact. And certainly their supervisors. I have more contact, well, principal contact actually with consultants and supervisors. Certainly much more contact than the [[TDS]] staff do.
>
> I: What about people in other branches of the Department, or officials higher up, or?

"(cont'd) potentially controversial. . . . (1.186-190)

> #10: Yes. Certainly that as well. So it becomes my job to make sure that people in other branches who need to know what we are doing, know what we're doing and have an understanding of what we're doing and are as involved as they need to be involved. Uh, and similarly, part of what I do is give advice either through [Director] or directly to our Senior Officials. (1.110-141)

A few of the senior managers complained that they lacked even these external contacts with other administrators and so felt completely isolated from the rest of the profession:

> #35: Um, in, in this particular job, I, I think I enjoy no profile at all. I don't get out much to talk with, with other professionals in the field, I see Departmental people very very little. Um, I was serving on an interdivisional committee that met to — about four, five times a year — to deal with issues related to private schools and home schooling. And I was, I think perceived to be quite effective on that committee but going to the [major Branch project] and the work that will, has to be done here, I was [illegible] I was removed from that committee and another member of the Branch was appointed. I did enjoy that, that contact with other, you know people outside of the Branch. And to say, at this time, given that we're here, uh in [building], and away from uh the rest of the Branch pretty— or rest of the Department pretty well, I have very little contact. And I, and I sometimes feel in certain ways, and I certainly don't with, with my colleagues, the people that I supervise, and others in the Branch, the relationship is great, but in terms of um, of that sort of professional, uh external professional contact, I feel sometimes, often in fact, quite isolated, in a way I haven't felt before. As a school-system-based person you have just so much exposure to other departments. Uh, I remember as a, a central office person you're involved always in major planning decisions, all the planning applications for example, would come across your desk. Because schools, and education, is always part of community planning. I remember being involved in what I thought were some really quite exciting types of issues. Sometimes pretty hot ones too, but uh. [I: Heheh.] Anyway, anyway. (1:295-322)

Thus, much more than even the TDSs, the senior managers often find themselves cut off from direct contact with any recognizable client group, and are instead simply tied to their desks like other government bureaucrats.

> #35: And, you know, together with the necessity just, always to be here, [I: Umhum.] at this spot, you know. If not at this desk, uh within sight of it at least. Uh, I find that personally very constraining. (1.329-332)

Indeed, some senior managers felt their work so far removed from the classroom or test production that they, themselves, often found it difficult to identify the product of their labour. The following description illustrates not only the intangible nature of the administrative and supervisory tasks typical of technobureaucratic professions, but also the deep sense of alienation that this sometimes engenders.

> #35: Uh, it's uh, because, because I don't produce a product, I'm not a TDS, I'm a, a manager managing a whole array of programs within a larger program which is itself in a state of, of significant change, we think we have some notion as to the

> shape of its uh, final uh design, but it's uh, it's hard for me, it's a challenge for me if you like, to derive uh a sense of, of, of satisfaction for having done something. My days are phenomenally busy. God, I uh, uh, sometimes, you know, I don't hardly take a uh, uh, quiet breath all day, and yet at the end of day, I say, you know, "What have I done?" Well, that pile of papers is gone, but there's another one over there that's just as big. And the phones continue to ring, and people continue to come and uh, and go, and directions are asked, and directions are sought and so on. It's uh, it's, there's a different, I, I, at least, perceived different, a very different kind of focus in terms of, of uh work accomplished. I'm having to develop, I think for my own sense of my well-being, a a very different notion of what, you know, uh what is, what management is in government. . . . But in terms of sort of the day-to-day functioning, of, of a uh, middle manager, someone like myself, it may be true for the other senior managers too, uh, it's, it's hard to see uh, accomplish, even for myself, to recognize, that I've, you know, [#35], has, has achieved something this week, or this month. You can't put it in a pile, it's hard to write it up even on a piece of paper sometimes. Because many of the issues that I deal with are sort of messy and they don't have a nice clear beginning and they don't have a nice clear ending, they just sort of are there, and then they're not there.
>
> I: It sounds like housework.
>
> #35: Well, yeah!
>
> I: You never have a product you can point to and say, "I did that".
>
> #35: It's a really, really appropriate uh, uh—
>
> I: It's always similar tomorrow, heheh.
>
> #35: —analogy. Yeah, yeah. It's very much like that. Very much like that. (1.243-293)

> #35: . . . I find that many, many of the tasks that I do to be um · · · · administratively necessary, but, but not especially enjoyable.
>
> I: So it's not particularly rewarding?
>
> #35: Well, no, I think that the, much of the exciting work that goes on, goes on in the realm and in the offices of the TDSs. [I: Mmm.] I feel like uh, sort of high plate spinner-cum-lion tamer-cum-pencil counter, much of the time. And uh, and for that, and for that, too, a lot of the decisions that I have to make are, require, if I may say, a fair bit of statesmanship, too. Too. So I see that in many of the things that I do, uh but I think, but again, I think middle management in government is sort of an animal, a creature, unto itself. If I could, if I could let myself sort of be that bureaucrat that I was talking about a while ago, I'd probably be a lot more comfortable. Uh, but I · · don't think I want to let that happen. (1.387-404)

This emphasis on administrative and supervisory tasks is particularly true of the two Assistant Directors who run the service units. Like the junior managers they supervise, these two are focused primarily on managerial, not instructional, skills.

> I: Uh, what type of knowledge or skills would you say you use most in your current position?
>
> R: Okay, now, the knowledge I think you have to have a very good knowledge of the Branch · · · first of all. school systems and understand uh, you know, the school system, the functioning of school systems, and uh the schools themselves, you know, uh because, you know, we interact with the schools so much, uh especially the administration, the principals, that type of thing. Uh, and you have to have, I guess, your skill, I think again, but I guess that's true in any position, that's being

> able to work with people, you know. And of course, you have to, I mean organization. Hoo! I don't know if I have it or not, but you really have to sort of have an organizational ability, I believe, too.
>
> I: What about uh management skills?
>
> R: Yeah, management skills definitely. Uh, I think much more so than uh in the development units, I think, because it's a much larger unit in terms of the number of people, and there so many different aspects, and uh yes, you'd have to have, managerial skills are very important, I think, in this position.
>
> I: Uh, do classroom skills carry over at all?
>
> R: · · · · Probably not as much, no. No, I don't, not as much, say, when I say not as much, that, say, a manager in a development unit, although even there, uh, no I don't think so, no.
>
> I: Okay. Uh what about things like curriculum and instruction. Is that important to you here? Knowledge of that field?
>
> R: · · · No, no I can't honestly say, I mean it's a help, definitely, obviously, but not that, not an important thing, no, no. In this particular position the managerial is more important than the, you know, the, the C&I background, yes. (1.424-462>

Nevertheless, as with the junior managers, they require an education background to maintain their credibility with school-based administrators. Here, a respondent was asked whether a non-educator could do his job:

> R: Yeah, I know what you're saying. Uh · · yeah, since this in confidence, and in all honesty, yeah, you could. You could in this position. . . . The only thing is that I, I don't think you would have the same knowledge of school systems, and, like I think you've got to come at it from sort of a teacher's perspective. Like, because so much, like a documents we produce, the, the interaction we have with the superintendents, I think you have a different attitude. Like if you gain your knowledge through teaching, I think that's an advantage than if did[n't]. Somebody from Finance could come over and do it, but I, and they may have a knowledge, but I don't think they would have quite the same advantage.
>
> I: Right, so it really is uh, useful—
>
> R: I think an assistance. I think it's useful. [I: Okay.] It's not necessary. But I do think, at least me it's helped. I really do. Like I can, you know, even just interacting with principals, and even when we have to interact with teachers, to me, the fact that I've been a teacher— That's the other thing. Like uh, in terms of advice, like we, you know, [?someone come in and?] ask me a lot of questions about, uh say, going into [example], and things like that, and uh, and the fact that I've been a teacher for the 15 years is a help, just in, in terms of the credibility for dealing with them. [I: Umhum.] So that's a help, you know. (1.505-530)

Credibility with school-based personnel was also a major consideration for the senior managers in the development units, but since these respondents supervised other educators engaged in the implementation of education policy, they tended to place greater emphasis on the need for an appropriate background in education for the actual performance of their supervisory and policy functions.

> #36: Because everything that you do relates to program delivery, a knowledge of the background, a knowledge of how schools and school systems operate, I'm in constant contact with superintendents, delivering and field-testing, and a knowledge of all of that is, is really essential, in terms of just being able to work with other educators. Uh, credibility is what, what sort of comes with that. You know, I can phone places and I know, I know that they're talking about, they know what I'm talking about, is what it is. It's a credibility factor. [I: Okay.] Plus there's a certain knowledge base that comes with having a background and the training in that area that you can't get in other fields. I have a lot of details, you don't need knowledge in everything, but you certainly, I think, need expertise in one or two areas. I have that in [subject]. I can go, I could deal and do any of the jobs in [subject], for example. In developing tests right through to what I'm doing. And uh, that allows you to know what the processes are, and, and what has to be done in the other areas as well, because you have experienced that. (1.1438-1455)

> I: Okay. Is it necessary in the sense, though, could I take a Director from Agriculture or another department, government department and just drop him in?
>
> #38: Well, you could, but then you'd probably run into difficulties. Because I think it is more, even though I've said that these are sort of managerial and administrative kinds of skills, those are all supported with an understanding of what we're about.
>
> I: So at some level you need classroom experience.
>
> #38: Uh, yes, and I think also you need to have some insight into educational issues. Uh and uh, oh, there's just, in fact, in this position I'm using more of my professional training than ever before. Having to draw on it and use it in a variety of ways. (1.2272-2287)

Furthermore, in contrast to the junior managers who tended to emphasize the uniqueness of their managerial skills, the senior managers in the development units tended to argue that all classroom teachers (and by extension, they themselves) necessarily had these administrative abilities.

> #38: Sure. I think, I think I depend on that experience a lot. In terms of organizing, in terms of focusing on goals and trying to achieve them, getting people to work with me on those goals, it's not unlike working in a classroom situation.
>
> I: So you're saying classroom teachers sort of have managerial people skill kind of thing?
>
> #38: They don't realize it, but they do. They could, and most teachers could do better at it than they are, if they just realized what they're doing, then perhaps it would become better. (1.2260-2270)

In other words, these senior managers tended to see managerial skills as subsumed within the profession's general knowledge base.

On the dimension of work tasks, then, the senior managers, like superintendents and hospital administrators, appear to constitute a distinct technobureaucratic profession. Isolated from their primary clients and direct hands-on practice, they devote themselves instead to the administrative and supervisory tasks typical of technobureaucratic occupations. Furthermore, as documented in Chapters 5 and 6, the senior managers play the largest role of any of the Branch staff in the development of policy. While still constrained by those yet higher in the bureaucracy, they devote much more of their time to goal setting and decision making than do either classroom teachers or the TDSs. This is, of course, a key indicator of the emergence of a technobureaucratic profession resulting from the ideological deskilling of the rank and file.

Self Identity

Unlike the TDSs, who invariably defined themselves as 'teachers', all but one of the senior managers adopted the much more ambiguous label of 'educator'. Perhaps significantly, the single exception here was the former TDS whose career line had diverged from teaching only recently.

> R: Uh, I still classify— uh, educator. [I: Educator.] And a lot of times I'll say I'm a teacher, yet. I still sometimes feel. Like I, I feel proud I'm a teacher. When people ask what I do, I'm a teacher. And uh, you know, a lot of times I'll say an educator. [I: Umhum.] I'm in the field of education and uh, you know, no matter what job, I, say, if I, we talk, say, an assistant superintendent or maybe a supervisor of curriculum, or something maybe like that [I: Umhum.] uh, whatever I go into, it will be to do with education. Uh, I'm happy with that field in general, whether as a teacher, this, or whatever, you know. But educator is what I feel like. (1.1610-1620)

The ambivalence over whether to use 'teacher' or 'educator' evident in this response also illustrates the very broad definition of the profession unanimously adopted by the senior managers. As mentioned previously, their definition of the profession included everyone with a teaching certificate or Bachelor's degree in education. Where the Examiners and TDSs would often exclude superintendents and the senior ranks of the government bureaucracy, the senior managers invariably included everyone, both in local board offices and in the Ministry, excepting only the obvious non-educators such as business managers and accountants, and the Minister herself. That this view of a unified profession helps to legitimate senior management's direction of the rank and file has already been discussed at some length in the corresponding section on the TDSs and so need not be belaboured again here. What is significant is that the 'profession' under discussion differs subtly between the TDSs and senior managers, in that the former are defining 'teachers' while the latter are defining 'educators'. The latter term may indeed subsume the former, without requiring the senior managers to put forward the more dubious claim that they are teachers.

Similarly, the senior managers unanimously rejected any attempt to rank different roles along the dimension of professionalism, arguing essentially that teaching, test development, the superintendency, and their own positions were all equivalent.

> #38: Oh same, same. I mean once again it's different if we're talking about managerial hierarchy, that's [I: Umhum.] um and I don't think that I would confuse that with professionalism.
>
> . . .
>
> #38: Oh yeah, yeah. I think that's kind of important that we recognize each other's, each other's skills and abilities and knowledge and so on and respect that. That's, I have no trouble with that at all. (1.242-257)

This indicates a commitment to democratic ideals and a unified profession which is undoubtedly quite sincere. Indeed, several of the senior managers were especially praised by other respondents for their acceptance of ordinary classroom teachers and the absence of any elitism.[78]

On the other hand, this does provide an interesting contrast to those TDSs who rated teachers *higher*, and superintendents *lower*, than themselves. As one moves up the administrative ladder, work tasks become increasingly detached from direct hands-on practice and decision making increasingly open to political and economic influences rather than strictly professional considerations. Consequently, there may be grounds to argue that senior managers, like superintendents, are in some ways less professional than classroom teachers. Thus, the rejection of status differences between roles also has the effect of further downplaying senior management's technobureaucratic traits and so legitimating their control over the rank and file.[79]

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[78] For example: #14: "Because it doesn't matter if you are a kindergarten teacher or a superintendent, you will get the same listening and the same, it's always important to [Director] to hear from everyone" (1.879-882).

[79] I had hoped to be able to draw some conclusions about their actual degree of elitism by asking how many teachers they believed could do their jobs, but as it happens, only two of the senior managers responded to this item. One stated that only 5 per cent could do his job without extensive school-based administrative experience, while the other said one in three. My impression, however, is that most senior managers feel themselves to be as good as anyone in the field, but not

Like the TDSs, then, the senior managers make a point of claiming collegiality and professional unity with classroom teachers, and have generally been rewarded with an excellent working relationship as a result.

> I: Okay. How would you describe your relationship with classroom teachers? · · · Do you come into contact with them much or?
>
> #36: Yeah, well, workshops, when I put on sessions at conventions. The relationship we have [with] them, it's not a personal relationship. The relationship that [Ministry] has with them is a different kind of relationship. There's that adversary role where it's government and, and others.
>
> So you get a "them/us" kind of division?
>
> #36: Yeah, yeah that happens and that comes forward with different individuals, and that's voiced at different times. So, my role at that point is, is to direct us to what, what our real goals are, and that our goals are exactly the same, that is, we're working towards improving the quality of education for the children. So, [*cough*] I have several roles that, different hats that I wear, at different times. A PR hat, there's an expertise hat, there's all kinds of hats that I wear. Basically I would say with the people that we work with, and I would relate that to the marking centre, our relationship is, is really excellent. Uh, people by and large are positive when dealing with our Branch. (I.1756-1777)

Chapter 7 described in detail the efforts senior management takes to establish and maintain collegial relations with teachers, and to downplay hierarchical differences. That the claim of professional unity may serve legitimating purposes is also clear in this context.

Another indicator of self-identity is membership in a professional association. Here again, the senior managers may superficially appear to belong to the same profession as classroom teachers. Most senior managers belong to both the provincial teachers' association's specialty councils and various national organizations, as do the TDSs. Unlike the TDSs, however, these memberships are largely incidental to their self-images, often being acquired by accident:

> #38: [Provincial teachers' association]. And I believe I'm a member of the International Reading Association. But I've got to tell you, the reason that I have those associations is because I attended conferences, and part of your, part of your

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[79](cont'd) better than the best teachers, whom they readily accept as their peers.

The senior managers' sincere acceptance of classroom teachers as peers contrasts with the attitudes of some officials in other branches, some superintendents, and most especially their counterparts in some other provinces. Attempts by one senior manager involved in a national project, for example, to convince his counterparts in other ministries to include classroom teachers in the project's development process were met, first with incomprehension, and then active hostility, by officials who spoke instead of the need to "teacher-proof" the materials.

conference fee covers that.
I: So that's sort of an accidental membership—
#38: I did not seek it out. (1.103-110)

On the other hand, neither are they members of their own separate professional association. Unlike superintendents, there is no specific organization, publication, or annual conference dedicated to these educational administrators. This may suggest that their professional project is insufficiently advanced for such an organization to have yet evolved; or that their numbers nationally are not sufficient to achieve the necessary critical mass; or that their location in heteronomous bureaucracies may not allow them sufficient autonomy to make an external professional association worthwhile; or that they may in fact be teachers. Significantly, the lack of a professional organization did not seem to be an issue for any of the senior managers, and they were notably uninterested in forming or joining an organization that would emphasize administration:

I: . . . Okay. Uh, do you belong to any sort of, uh, management association?
#38: No. [[Makes a face.]] (1.117-120)[10]

Whereas the junior managers sometimes asserted the distinctive nature of their managerial skills, the senior managers based their self-identity on their educational expertise. Thus, their self-image is derived from their identity as educators rather than as administrators or government bureaucrats. Career alternatives were always discussed in terms of advancement within the Branch or Ministry, or movement to a central office position in a local board. None of the senior managers evidenced even a remote interest in pursuing administrative careers outside the context of education.[11]

Nevertheless, the senior managers tend to identify with the perspective of other educational administrators rather than with classroom teachers. Here, for example, an ARO discusses how one of the Directors retained his perspective as a superintendent and so tended to seek input from, and side with, other school-based administrators.

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[10] While all the managers are automatically enrolled in the provincial government's management association, this has no more relevance to their self-image than does membership in the union of provincial employees for the permanent TDSs. The significance of this membership to the present analysis is entirely limited to the line it draws between management and professional staff within the provincial hierarchy.

[11] This contrasts with a few of the junior managers, one of whom was interested in the hotel industry, and another of whom had recently applied for a position in the agricultural ministry.

> . . . his perspective was very much that of a superintendent's. And it is my feeling, shared by many teachers and other people in the Branch and even people in Regional Offices, that the biggest problem with the output of the Branch is the misuses to which superintendents put it. And [name] of course, having been a superintendent, didn't feel that superintendents were likely to do that kind of thing. [I: Heheh.] Whereas the rest of us felt differently, so, there were some disagreements there. There's, you know, there was no basic problem with the, the basic concept as to what kind of statistics were useful, and uh, how it was right to use them, except in areas of teacher evaluation, uh - - and really, many of us in the Branch felt that uh it's dangerous and misleading to use either Achievement or Diploma Exam results for teacher evaluation. Uh, and they were likely to be misused and we had to constantly guard against presenting things in ways as to promote this misuse. Uh, it's not quite clear to me whether [name] felt that what we felt were misuse were appropriate uses, or whether it, superintendents had the uh expertise or the professionalism to not to misuse those, or they had, either that or he felt that they had the right to, to do the things we felt were likely to be misuses. So there [.?.] was some disagreement there. . . . Uh, and he took the idea of group level reporting to superintendents and principals, and they said, "That's a great idea", but he didn't ask teachers. And we have since heard from the [teachers' association] representatives, saying, "Not such a great idea. Superintendents are now turning this into teacher evaluation." But nobody, none of the principals said that, you know, that's. I guess that shows where principals stand. Heheh. (1.705-735)

This distinct perspective is derived, of course, from the resocialization experiences that candidates for senior management encounter during their tenure as school-based administrators. Indeed, it is this distinct perspective that is the main criterion for sponsorship into senior management ranks.

Consequently, while the self-identity of the senior managers is carefully ambiguous and allows them to claim collegiality with classroom teachers, this claim is not entirely convincing. As 'educators' rather than 'teachers', they seem to have developed a distinct identity from the rank and file, but avoided articulating their separateness by using a more inclusive, rather than a more specific, label. In other words, the technobureaucrats are recognizable as a distinct group because they are the only ones who do not share the rank and file identity of 'teacher'.

Summary

Examination of all six criteria, then, confirms that the senior managers are more properly seen as members of the technobureaucratic profession of educational administration than of the public service profession of teaching. Recruitment to senior management is not an automatic outcome of normal career progression even for that tiny subsample of teachers employed within the Branch as TDSs. Successful experience as a classroom teacher and advanced academic credentials are necessary but not sufficient qualifications. Instead, recruitment to senior management is restricted to those with school-based administrative experience.[12] Consequently, the two career paths tend to diverge early in an individual's career, and transfer to educational administration is expected to be terminal, such that a return to the classroom (or the TDS rank) would be seen as a demotion.

Most significantly, the senior managers are sufficiently isolated from hands-on practice that they no longer retain their self-identity as teachers, but instead see themselves as educators. As educators, they still draw their expertise from the field of education, rather than from management, but their focus is very different from that of the classroom teacher. Isolated from direct interaction with either students or teachers, the senior managers are primarily involved with policy formation and administrative tasks that require an orientation to 'the big picture'. To recall Freidson's observation (see Chapter 1, page 57):

> Professional stratification in organizations involves differences in official authority and power that in turn produce varying perspectives on the professional enterprise. Rank and file professionals are primarily preoccupied with performing their work according to their own view of the intrinsic practical problems and of the necessary means of coping with them on a day-to-day basis. . . . In contrast, supervisory professionals are accountable for the aggregate performance of the workers under them and they tend to have an organizational perspective. They identify as much, if not more, with the type of professional organization they represent as with the practicing profession.[13]

The senior managers may still view students as their primary clients, but interpreting student needs at a provincial level requires an emphasis on somewhat different issues than those faced by a classroom teacher dealing with particular individuals. Indeed, reconciling the views of various regional, specialty, and ideological factions within the rank and file is an important aspect of senior management's role. Since senior management's goals are considerably broader, their identification with the rank and file is necessarily imperfect. Furthermore, because they are located within a heteronomous bureaucracy, these educators cannot limit themselves to the goals, standards, and procedures advocated by the teaching profession, but must instead accommodate the needs of various other stakeholders. While the senior managers still share in the teaching profession's knowledge monopoly, their goals are influenced by these external stakeholders, and particularly by the sectional interests that dominate the Legislature and so set the agenda for the Ministry. In other words, educators are members of the teaching profession in matters of technique, but technobureaucrats in their purposes.[14]

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[12] Or, given the stagnant mobility patterns resulting from baby boom overcrowding, those identified as having this potential prior to their recruitment by the Ministry.

[13] Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control", p. 15.

The same logic, of course, also applies to the Ministry's Senior Officials. The higher one rises within the administrative hierarchy, the more isolated one becomes from the classroom, and the more interactions tend to be restricted to Ministerial staff, school-based administrators, and stakeholder lobbyists. At the highest levels, the Senior Officials' primary reference group is much more likely to be the Minister and Cabinet than members of the teaching profession.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

What may initially appear as the teaching profession's continued dominance over education policy through a monopoly over recruitment to Ministerial positions is instead revealed to be an example of ideological proletarianization. The public service profession of teaching does not control superordinate positions within the education hierarchy, because classroom teachers are only recruited to those positions that are equivalent to, or perhaps even slightly below, their own rank.

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[14] Or, in Gouldner's terms, they have a cosmopolitian orientation in terms of technique, but a local orientation in terms of goals ("Cosmopolitans and Locals: Towards an Analysis of Latent Social Roles." Parts 1, 2. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 2, 3 (December 1957, March 1958): 281-307; 400-428).

Take, for example, the job of Examiner. That this position is restricted to certified teachers does not represent professional dominance over the Branch, because the Examiners are completely isolated from the level at which decisions are made. Not only do they have no input into policy, they often lack autonomous control over their own work processes. Even in those units where the Examiners operate as quasi-TDSs, their role is inherently proletarianized because their duties consist entirely of tasks delegated by the TDS. At best, the requirement that the Examiners be certified teachers ensures the maintenance of professional standards, in that the Examiners are less likely to introduce the sort of procedural errors that might be made by a less thoroughly trained clerk. On the other hand, that certified teachers could be reduced to accepting underemployment as technically enskilled assistants in positions that lack even minimal security or benefits clearly indicates the existence of a reserve army of marginalized workers, and the erosion of professional privilege. That the Branch can fill these positions on short notice and without apparent difficulty demonstrates, not the profession's dominance over the market for its services, but rather the structural proletarianization of at least a segment of the teaching force.

The teaching profession's near monopoly over the junior management positions is even more irrelevant, since their location in the service units prevents them from addressing questions related to either goals *or* means.[15] Like the Examiners, the junior managers are isolated from the level at which policy is formulated; unlike the Examiners, their managerial tasks provide few opportunities for them to apply their educational expertise. While their formal rank and permanence allow them a greater role in policy review than the Examiners, their input tends to be restricted to assessing the logistical feasibility — rather than the educational desirability — of Branch initiatives. The arbitrary and redundant requirement that junior managers possess educational credentials could be interpreted as an example of the teaching profession's capture of additional employment opportunities within the Ministry, but even this more modest manifestation of professional privilege is suspect. Those teachers recruited directly to junior management believed that they were moving to entrance-level positions in educational administration, but so far, this has proven to be a false career ladder. In other words, recruitment to such service unit positions distracts attention from the fact that classroom teachers are excluded from direct recruitment to actual (that is, senior) management positions.[86] That most of the junior managers have educational credentials does not increase the profession's control over the Ministry, but may increase the Ministry's control over the profession by legitimating those charged with implementing this centralized direction. Professional-level recruitment to junior management positions undermines resistance to ideological proletarianization by implicitly misrepresenting heteronomous hierarchical control as collective autonomy.

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[15] The exception here was the TDS on temporary secondment to a Supervisory position who essentially ignored his managerial duties to take on a series of special projects. As informal Branch troubleshooter, he did have considerable opportunity to exercise educational expertise, and may even have had some minor impact on policy. Since the assignment was strictly temporary, however, this individual's influence may more appropriately be seen as arising out of his identity as a successful TDS rather than as a normal part of the supervisory role. That educational expertise is not required for the regular junior management positions is amply demonstrated by the transfer to these roles of those permanent staff who lacked both classroom experience and the confidence of their superiors.

Similarly, the requirement that the TDS positions be filled by classroom teachers does not afford the teaching profession significant control over evaluation policy. While most TDSs retain their identity as classroom teachers, and so seek to promote the goals and interests of that profession, they are isolated from the level at which Ministerial policy is initiated and debated. Even with the elimination of (some of) the intervening Coordinator positions in the Branch reorganization, the TDSs remain at least one step removed from Management Council. Consequently, they have only limited and indirect input into Branch policy, and almost none into the more fundamental decisions undertaken by the Minister and her Senior Officials. In spite of their location in the central bureaucracy, and their responsibility for coordinating the work produced by the various teacher committees, their policy role is as limited as that of other teachers. The only advantage that TDSs have over their classroom colleagues in matters of policy is their greater personal access to the Associate

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[86] Again, this observation must be qualified by noting that the sample involved here is very small, and while I believe my interpretation to be sound, I may be generalizing beyond the reasonable limits of the data.

Directors, but this is more than offset by their correspondingly greater exposure to direct supervision by senior management, and the associated pressures for ideological co-optation and desensitization.[17]

Direct recruitment of classroom teachers to the TDS position, on the other hand, does provide the teaching profession with greater influence over evaluation technique than might otherwise be the case. As explained in Chapter 7, teacher participation in provincial evaluation programs is subtly restricted through the fragmentation of the test-development process into separate committees. Unable to pursue a single test through all the steps of its development, committee members are necessarily alienated from the product of their labour, and vulnerable to ideological desensitization and co-optation. This ideological deskilling allows management to intervene directly at each stage in the process to reconfirm its direction and control over the teacher committees. The teachers' loss of control over the *technical* aspects of this work is partially compensated, however, by the provision that the individuals responsible for directing, selecting, and editing teacher committee output are themselves teachers. Because there is no knowledge gap between the teachers and the TDSs, the technical standards applied by the TDSs are necessarily drawn from the profession's knowledge base, and so are the same as those that would be applied by any competent teacher involved in peer review. Consequently, the TDSs' role in reviewing committee output may be interpreted as an example of collective autonomy.

This collective control is restricted, however, to questions of technique, and does not alter the fact that both the TDSs and the committee members are working to management-specified objectives. Furthermore, while the TDSs are able to follow a test through the entire development process (and so are less ideologically deskilled than the members of the teacher committees), they are still subject to the top-down hierarchical nature of Ministerial decision making, the elaborate committee structures, and direct supervision by their Associate Director (or Coordinator), all of which constrain the TDSs' influence. Since the TDSs are themselves subject to close hierarchical direction, a monopoly over the TDS role provides the teaching profession with only very limited influence, even in matters of technique. In other words, merely occupying a role does not necessarily guarantee control over it. Indeed, the very existence of the Test Development Specialist role represents the erosion of the teaching profession's occupational autonomy, since the position was created by Ministerial fiat. Given the narrow scope and extent of this particular expression of collective autonomy, a monopoly over recruitment to the TDS positions cannot compensate for the far greater loss of individual autonomy resulting from the introduction of centralized testing.

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[17] This last is particularly true of those TDSs in permanent positions (or with administrative ambitions), whose lengthening tenure (or identification with management) increases their vulnerability to ideological desensitization and co-optation. Thus the time limit on their claim to membership in the teaching profession, and the probability that veteran TDSs will take on more of the characteristics of technobureaucrats.

Only the senior managers have any significant role in policy, but classroom teachers are never recruited directly to these positions. The teaching profession cannot be said to control these positions, since they are neither elected by the rank and file (as in the professoriate) nor the end point of normal progression along a continuous career ladder.[13] Consequently, the senior managers are not teachers, but educators, recruited from the separate pool of those with previous school-based administrative experience. As such, they form a separate category of technobureaucrats whose very existence implies the appropriation from teachers of student evaluation design and decision-making functions. The concentration of these policy functions within senior management necessarily represents a significant c of the teachers' individual, collective, and perhaps occupational, autonomy.

Thus, instead of a pattern of professional dominance through a monopoly over recruitment to Ministerial positions, we find a pattern of selective mobility. Members of the teaching profession are readily recruited to the Examiner, junior manager, and Test

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[13] Note that it is not just that a classroom teacher has not progressed through enough intermediate positions to qualify for these higher ranks, but that there are no alternatives to the specific resocialization experiences provided by tenure as a school-based administrator. Many TDSs had rotated through a variety of eminent teaching positions, pioneered experimental programs, authored texts, earned advanced degrees, or otherwise distinguished themselves, but without, apparently, improving their chances for promotion to senior management. On the other hand, those with administrative experience were often able to obtain senior administrative posts without having occupied any of the intermediate ranks.

Development Specialist positions, but no higher. The circulation of classroom teachers through these ranks is yet another example of controlled collegial participation, which allows the external imposition of hierarchical control to be misrepresented as merely the shift from individual to collective autonomy. The senior managers legitimate their control at least partly through the illusion that the top-down organizational chart is balanced by a bottom-up pattern of recruitment, but this turns out to be a false career ladder. In reality, the teaching profession is excluded from mobility into those ranks where policy is made, and is therefore in a state of ideological proletarianization.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that the emergence of Ministerial technobureaucrats has not, in this case at least, led to the technical proletarianization of the rank and file. As educators, the senior managers share the same university training and draw on the same knowledge base as the teaching profession, and so are likely to side with teachers in matters of technique. Moreover, the senior managers' rejection of a self-identity as bureaucrats, or managers in the narrow sense, includes a rejection of the validity of specialized managerial expertise.[89] Instead, they define their managerial skills as a subset of their expertise as educators; that is, as part of the communication and classroom-management skills they share with teachers. Consequently, they are less likely to embrace the technical deskilling schemes that emerge from the principles of 'scientific management' or other external managerial traditions.

Neither is it in the senior managers' self-interest to erode the professional status of teachers, since their own status may rest in part on a joint professional project. Managers' salaries in the Department of Education, for example, have traditionally been considerably higher than those for corresponding positions in other ministries on the grounds that they must keep pace with, or stay ahead of, the salaries of the teachers they supervise. It would not, therefore, be in management's best interest to introduce policies intended to cheapen teachers' labour. Consequently, while the senior managers' own professional project requires that they appropriate goal setting from the teachers, there is little motivation to adopt technical deskilling schemes that would risk degrading the status of educators generally. Ideological enskilling is therefore the preferred strategy because it allows the rank and file to undergo simultaneously the contradictory processes of ideological proletarianization and (apparent) professionalization

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[89] Particularly in this instance, where the majority of the senior managers hold Master's in curriculum and instruction, rather than educational administration.

That the senior managers are former teachers, then, does provide a measure of professional dominance in the area of technique, and assists the teaching profession in resisting technical deskilling schemes. It does not, however, provide significant control over policy or allow teachers to resist ideological proletarianization. While the senior managers share the teachers' knowledge base, they do not always share the teachers' goals.

This breakdown in the administrators' identification with the larger profession may take place at two levels. The administrators' orientation to 'the big picture' necessarily erodes their identification with the front-line practitioners, but may still permit close connections with the profession's university-based knowledge elite. Like the administrators, portions of this knowledge elite may also adopt an interest in macro-level issues, and may be similarly distanced from the rank and file by their status as members of the separate structure of the professoriate.[90] Nevertheless, since both the classroom teachers and the administrators depend on the professoriate for research and training, a unified professional identity may be maintained because all three segments of the occupation share the same goals, standards, and procedures.

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[90] To quote Freidson:

> Since the standards of the knowledge elite are grounded in the abstract world of logic, scientific principles, and statistical probabilities rather than in the concrete world of work, in experimental designs and controlled laboratory findings rather than in the untidy, uncontrolled area of practice, and in circumstances that are considerably less subject to the constraints of time, money, equipment, and other resources than is true of everyday practice, it is not hard to understand the skepticism of the rank and file professional. Indeed, historically, resentment and tension between town and gown, between practitioner and academic, have existed coterminously with the university itself as well as with its professional schools. With the formal invocation of academic standards as a means of legitimizing the increasingly self-conscious, formal, and public control of everyday practice, the tension between the rank and file practitioner and the knowledge elite cannot fail to grow as well, creating a deeper division between them than existed when practitioners were free to ignore the standards established by the latter, if they so chose. (Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control", p. 16.)

This appears to have been the situation in the case study province during the progressivist era, when the Ministerial elite clearly looked to the university-based knowledge elite for direction. More recently, however, the sectional interests that control the Legislature have been more successful in asserting control over the Ministry (as detailed in Chapter 4), and has displaced the profession's knowledge elite as senior management's primary reference group.

This erosion of the technobureaucrats' occupational autonomy (and by extension, that of the teachers beneath them) is manifest as both a greater emphasis on hierarchical authority within the Ministerial bureaucracy,[91] and a correspondingly tighter control over recruitment to senior Ministerial positions. Promotion now seems to be based on sponsorship rather than contest norms, and to include an ideological screen. Even successful administrators within the Ministry can no longer assume automatic promotion,[92] but must gain the active sponsorship of their superiors, usually by adopting the 'correct' (neoconservative) policy orientations. Consequently, the senior managers are more vulnerable to ideological co-optation than either the TDSs or the Examiners (most of whom have no interest in hierarchical advancement, and therefore no need for such sponsorship).

Ironically, the senior managers' lack of either a distinct professional association or the cognitive exclusiveness of a specific requirement for advanced credentials in educational administration may serve to further isolate them from the teaching profession by exacerbating this vulnerability to externally imposed agendas. Without a formal professional association or knowledge base from which alternative standards and goals may be sought, the senior managers have no basis on which to resist external direction. In other words, the technobureaucrats cannot adopt a cosmopolitan orientation to professional standards without an independent association or knowledge base, and so inevitably acquire a local institutional orientation.

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[91] As evidenced by the subtle change from authority being vested in committees and their motions, to residing exclusively in the person of the committee chair.

[92] For example, the founding Director of the Branch was passed over for an Assistant Deputyship in favour of an even more conservative ideologue brought in from outside the Ministry, apparently as part of the ongoing attempt to break the progressivist hold over the education hierarchy.

In summary, then, direct recruitment of classroom teachers to low-level Ministerial positions allows the teaching profession to retain some control over technique, but at the cost of further eroding control over policy by collaborating in what amounts to a strategy of controlled collegial participation. Classroom teachers are effectively excluded from recruitment to levels at which they might participate in policy formation. Recruitment to senior management is reserved for those who have left the teaching profession and undergone preliminary resocialization as administrators (and increasingly, who share the neoconservative ideological orientation of the faction that currently controls the Ministry). These (emergent) technobureaucrats share the same knowledge base, but have a local rather than cosmopolitan orientation. They are therefore predisposed to permit teachers continued discretion over technique, even while their own technobureaucratic role necessarily restricts the teaching profession's ability to set its own goals and standards. Consequently, the teaching profession in the case study province has undergone ideological, but not technical, proletarianization.

CHAPTER 9

EDUCATION AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS REVISITED

The central conclusion of this study is that the educators in the case study province have retained autonomous control over the technical aspects of their work process, but have lost control over the goals of education. Specifically, this investigation has shown that the reintroduction of centralized provincial testing has eroded the teachers' control over the evaluation and curriculum functions, but that this loss has been partially obscured by the teachers' con[illegible] command of evaluation technique.

What, then, are the implications of this finding for sociological theory, and what are the practical consequences for the education worker? To answer these questions, it is necessary not only to summarize the major conclusions of this study, but also to locate them within a larger context by speculating on the social, economic, and political changes which may have affected the fortunes of the teaching profession in the case study province.

The deterioration of the teaching profession's occupational autonomy is not an example of historical proletarianization (since it has always functioned in bureaucratized settings) or of deprofessionalization (since there has been no relevant technological change or sudden erosion of the educator's knowledge monopoly). Nor is it an unintended consequence of policies adopted for other purposes. The ideological proletarianization of teachers was and remains a deliberate government policy — though not, of course, articulated in quite those terms. Instead, politicians speak of the need to make the education system (and by implication, educators) more accountable. The imposition of provincial testing on the teaching profession is only the most obvious example of a series of Ministerial initiatives intended to increase centralized control over the school system. Where once provincial testing was focused exclusively on the certification of student achievement, the current North American obsession with external examinations arises primarily out of the desire for greater accountability. In the case study province, for example, the Grades 3, 6, and 9 Achievement Tests are not used for student promotion purposes, but collect only aggregate data. Even the more traditional school-leaving Diploma Examinations are now routinely analyzed to identify strengths and weaknesses at the system, school, and instructor levels. Such external measures of the profession's performance are by definition antithetical to the principle of professional self-regulation.

Officially, this assault on the teaching profession's occupational autonomy is in response to the public's loss of faith in the education system. The failure of the human capital model to deliver on its promise of limitless [illegible] mobility through equality of educational opportunity led to widespread disillusionment with the school system. Graduate underemployment in the 1970s left many questioning the value of their training and fuelled the debate over the purpose of education. Public cynicism in the postWatergate era has also produced a growing scepticism concerning any public sector institution's claims to self-regulation or professional privilege. The need to restore public confidence in the school system is therefore often cited as the justification for the adoption of the various measures (including external testing) that are eroding the teacher's occupational autonomy.

The public demand for accountability is not in itself, however, sufficient to explain the ideological proletarianization of teachers. Were the decline in the profession's dominance over the school system simply a manifestation of client revolt, then one would expect to find a corresponding increase in the clients' control. It is not at all clear, however, that the public's input into provincial policy has increased, or that there has been any significant change in parent/teacher or teacher/community relationships. If anything, the introduction of provincial testing has ***decreased*** the public's ability to influence the schools at the local level, since parents and schools boards are forced to defer to the centralized curriculum and provincial standards represented by the tests in exactly the same way as are teachers

Furthermore, client revolt is generally associated with deprofessionalization, but there has been little or no change in the knowledge gap between teachers and their clients. Teachers presumably still know more than their students, and while the educational credentials of parents and community leaders have been improving steadily, there has been no recent acceleration of this process that could account for the sudden collapse of the educators' professional dominance. Certainly in terms of the evaluation function, the reintroduction of provincial testing has resulted in a significant increase in the teachers' skills, which has strengthened their knowledge monopoly relative to students, parents, and community leaders, and so *reduced* the potential for challenges from these quarters. If the demand for greater accountability did originate in client revolt, the public has been singly unsuccessful in wresting control over the schools away from the provincial bureaucracy.

There is good reason to suggest, however, that public disillusionment with education was never as great nor as uniform as is generally depicted by conservative politicians. To quote Lockhart:

> While the excessive idealism that characterized the birth of this system has now passed into a more sceptical maturity, the public's willingness to sustain, if no longer indulge, its educational system seems reasonably secure. Indeed, to the extent that broadly representative public-opinion samples reveal a consensus, the Canadian population appears to be more willing than their elected representatives to continue paying the price of quality and accessibility of public education.[1]

As suggested in Chapter 4, the conservative legislators were not so much responding to negative public opinion as *creating* it. As the major capitalist economies went into recession and governments were increasingly squeezed by fiscal crisis, it became fashionable for the ascendant conservative ideologues to scapegoat the schools for economic failure, and to advocate cutbacks in educational expenditures as the solution to government deficits. The rhetoric of accountability allowed the newly elected conservative governments to wean the public from its former unreserved support for the continued expansion of the education system. The careful orchestration of public opinion to 'demand' the changes already announced by the Legislature suggests that client revolt was at most an intervening variable in the erosion of professional dominance.

Instead, the main factor in the collapse of the teaching profession's dominance over education policy was the change in government regime. The election of the Progressive

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[1] Alexander Lockhart, *Schoolteaching in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in Association with Statistics Canada, 1991), p. 102.

Conservatives in 1971 represented not only a change in political parties, but of ruling elites. Just as the professional fortunes of educators had prospered under the previous administration, the loss of this elite sponsorship doomed any further professional aspirations.[2]

Prior to its defeat in 1971 (after which it ceased to be an effective force in provincial politics), the Social Credit Party had governed without interruption for over 35 years. The Social Credit Party was rural, populist, and favourably disposed to education. The movement had begun as "essentially an educational enterprise" with the 'study group' as its basic organizational unit.[3] Its first Premier, a radio evangelist and school principal, exemplifies its roots in religious and social proselytism. Its proponents' belief in 'spreading the word' applied not only to the gospel and the party line, but also to formal education.

Social Credit ideology had also given priority to the needs of the individual. The movement had its origins in the Great Depression in the demand for monetary reform, that is, in the desire to restructure the economy to better meet the needs of the province's largely rural population. While the monetary reforms and Douglas economic theories were abandoned early in the party's history, the priority given to the social welfare of the individual persisted as a commitment to social services. This commitment became especially pronounced in the mid-1960s when, abetted by the general acceptance of human capital theory, human resource development became the chief platform of Social Credit campaigns. Drawing on oil revenues, the Social Credit government steadily increased its spending on social services such as education, libraries, and health care until it had the highest per capita expenditures in these fields of any province in Canada.

It was under Social Credit sponsorship that the progressivists became the dominant faction in the provincial bureaucracy and through this alliance, that teaching was accorded many features of professional status. The progressivist critique of traditional curriculum-centred schooling received a responsive hearing from the early Social Credit governments which, dissatisfied with the institutional failures that had led to the Depression, were open to radical experimentation. Daring to use the schools to build a new social order, they gave the progressivists free reign.

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[2] The following discussion is drawn from Robert Runté, "The Emergence of the Open University Concept in Alberta", pp 102-116.

[3] John Irving, *The Social Credit Movement in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), pp. 86, 110, 341-343.

Once installed in the provincial bureaucracy, the progressivists pushed for the professionalization of teaching as a prerequisite to the implementation of their reforms. They were quickly successful in legislating an effective professional association, changing the normal school into a Faculty of Education, raising the profession's postsecondary training, developing a knowledge elite with a distinctive vision, and so on. The obvious successes of this professional project (within the context of the general expansion of the education system) ensured the progressivist leadership acceptance by, and dominance over, the teaching profession for the next four decades.

This in turn greatly strengthened the education elite's position relative to the Social Credit caucus. Armed with Ph.D.s in educational administration or other specializations, the education elite was able to assert a knowledge monopoly over education policy. In contrast, most of the Social Credit legislators, including the Cabinet, lacked postsecondary credentials, and those few with university degrees were often themselves former teachers. Lacking administrative or professional expertise independent of their governmental role, the Social Credit caucus was perhaps a little in awe of the education elite's credentials and expertise.[4]

While a complete historical analysis is beyond the scope of the current study, it seems likely that educational administration during the tenure of the Social Credit government more closely approximated Freidson's model of professional dominance than it does today. The education elite's claim to a monopoly of expertise in matters of educational administration, the high priority given education under the Social Credit government, and the basic compatibility of the education elite's progressivist ideology with the populism of the Social Credit Party, meant that the Social Credit caucus was inclined to give the education elite carte blanche on education policy. The rank and file were still subject to hierarchical direction from the provincial Ministry, but that direction would have represented the goals, standards, and interests of the profession as a corporate entity. The progressivists' reliance on the profession's university-based knowledge elite, their commitment to collegial structures, the high value placed on classroom teacher input, the steadily increasing delegation of professional judgement to the rank and file practitioner (culminating in the elimination of provincial testing), and the leadership's command over both goals and technique suggest that the profession had achieved collective autonomy.

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[4] Note, for example, this Deputy Minister's similar observations concerning their relationship with university educators:

> Byrne: The universities had no trouble with the Social Credit Cabinet. The Ministers were impressed and over-awed by university people to the point that they didn't tangle with them. They gave the universities pretty much what they wanted. If any of the Ministers were university graduates, they were likely to be schoolteachers.
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> Interviewer: So they stood in awe of the university?
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> Byrne: That's right. Lawyers can be contemptuous of the university because they graduated at the top of the heap, but not educators. Educators maintain identity with the university because it sets them a little apart from the heap.

T. C. Byrne, in interview with R. G. McIntosh and R. C. Bryce, "Challenge in Educational Administration", *The CAS Bulletin* 15 (1977): 102.

All this changed with the election of the Progressive Conservatives. The Progressive Conservatives came to power on the dual platform of economic diversification and reduced spending on social services, and so were committed to limiting further educational expansion. Briefly stated, the Progressive Conservative position was that the Social Credit government had been relying on oil revenues, a depleting resource base, to finance social services instead of investing in industrialization, and that in the long term, the province would be left without a viable economic base to continue to support this very high level of expenditure. In contrast to Social Credit's populism, which had given priority to the needs of the individual, the Conservatives accorded priority to investment in the province's economy: if one took care of the economy, the economy would take care of everything else.

This in turn represented a significant change in the Legislature's attitude towards education. Where the Social Credit administration had interpreted human capital theory to say that any expenditure on education was an investment in human resources (and so in the future of the economy), the Conservatives adopted a narrower interpretation (the manpower model[5]) in which only expenditures on 'the basics' or programs with a specific vocational component could be viewed as an investment in economic development. All other education expenditures were viewed as a form of consumption. Thus the renewed emphasis on a cost/benefit approach to accountability, the attempts to define "essential learnings", and the fascination with external testing and "outcomes-based schooling".

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[5] Robert Kanté, "The Emergence of the Manpower And Consumerism Models of Higher Education in Alberta", paper presented at the Alberta Educational

In addition to this ideological shift, the Conservative caucus brought with them a wealth of administrative experience from the boardrooms of the province's leading corporations. The Conservatives' attitude is that 'administration' is a function distinct from the content of whatever is being administered: that is, an efficient administrator could as easily run a chicken ranch, a government portfolio, or a school system, and familiarity with the 'product' is neither necessary nor even particularly desirable.[6] Technical advice on the particular activity of the institution can be easily acquired from one's advisors and experts, but the administrative procedures themselves are independent of content.

Thus, with the election of the Progressive Conservatives, the role of the education elite was severely curtailed. Instead of automatically deferring to the administrative expertise of the senior Ministerial officials, the Conservatives supplied their own. The predominance of lawyers and graduates of business administration in the Conservative caucus meant that their professional credentials were at least as prestigious as those of the education establishment, whom they in any case tended to dismiss as 'ivory tower' types out of touch with the real world. The Conservatives entered the arena of education policy with their own procedures, techniques, and measures, and with the conviction that spending on education must be brought within bounds.

At one level, this could be interpreted as an example of deprofessionalization. The education elite was able to mount a successful professional project under Social Credit because it was able to claim both superior educational and administrative expertise, but it found this knowledge (and prestige) gap abruptly reversed with the election of the Progressive

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[5](cont'd) Foundations Conference, University of Calgary, May 2, 1985.

[6] For example, the former Minister of Advanced Education was appointed head of the Hog Marketing Board on the grounds that his complete lack of knowledge of hog marketing procedures would preclude his having any biases, while his proven administrative abilities were deemed sufficiently important to justify an honorarium ten times that of regular Board members.

Conservatives. The deprofessionalization model, however, addresses only the practitioner-client relationship (in this case, the teachers' knowledge monopoly relative to students, parents, or — broadly conceived — the larger community), which in this instance has not changed significantly. The deprofessionalization model does not provide an adequate analysis of changes in the ideological context. Where the deprofessionalization model assumes the state's neutrality, it is clear that the changes initiated by the Progressive Conservative administration led, rather than followed, public opinion, and caused, rather than responded to, changes in the teacher's knowledge base and work process.

This sudden erosion of the educator's autonomy is much better understood, therefore, as an illustration of Larson's contention that it is elite sponsorship, rather than objective levels of technical expertise, that determines the success of a professional project. Having forged organic ties with the rural populist movements of the 1930s, the fortunes of the teaching profession's progressivist leadership became inextricably linked to those of the Social Credit regime. As the province's agricultural sector declined, the growing urban middle and professional classes eventually displaced Social Credit's rural power base, and they subsequently elected a party representing urban and corporate elites. The sudden collapse of Social Credit left the education establishment dangerously exposed. The teachers' professional project was now at risk, not only because the the progressivist faction had been so long and deeply entrenched, but because teacher's claims to professionalism had been grounded almost entirely in progressivist ideology.

Not only did teachers lose the ideological and personal linkages they had enjoyed under the previous administration, they had become an obstacle to the new political elite consolidating its control over the education system. As a major instrument of both economic policy and ideological hegemony, control over the schools is vital to any government. Since the existing education establishment was by definition committed to the wrong goals, it was necessary to disenfranchise the teaching profession and to assume direct legislative control over education policy.

There was, of course, a slight lag between the Conservatives' election and the waning of progressivist influence. The new administration required time for its ideological position to crystallize and to gain the necessary governmental experience to begin restructuring education within its vision of the post-Keynesian state. Nor could it realistically engage in a wholesale purge of progressivists from the Ministry, but must wait for natural attrition and selective promotion to install a new education leadership more favourably disposed to the Conservatives' position. Consequently, Ministerial initiatives during the Conservatives' first term often remained couched in progressivist language, and it is difficult to identify a single turning point in either the ideological reorientation of the system or the slow erosion of the educator's professional dominance.

Nevertheless, Krawchenko's analysis of provincial education policy (see Chapter 4, pages 137-142) reveals a pattern of active intervention by the Premier and Cabinet beginning in the mid-1970s. The Progressive Conservatives achieved ideological control over the education system through direct legislative action, the manipulation of funding, and the creation of new bureaucratic structures (such as the lay-dominated, politically appointed Curriculum Policy Board). While this appropriation of direct political control was characterized (through reference to the Progressive Conservatives' electoral mandate) as improved public accountability, it is clear that many of these measures went far beyond merely monitoring how well the system was performing, to make fundamental changes in the basic goals of education.

Given that education policy is now determined outside the teaching profession and imposed on it, the Education Ministry has necessarily reverted to a top-down hierarchical model of administration, in spite of a continuing rhetoric of collegial consultation inherited from the previous progressivist administration. Policy generally flows from the Minister and Senior Officials to a selectively recruited senior Branch management, which is vulnerable to ideological co-optation. Branch professional staff, such as the Test Development Specialists, are afforded few opportunities for effective participation in policy discussions, the good intentions of their senior managers notwithstanding. Consequently, many of these educators have become ideologically desensitized and, like the junior managers, concern themselves primarily with the technical feasibility, rather than the educational desirability, of Ministerial initiatives. Below the level of the TDSs, a significant portion of the educators working for the Branch are in marginalized contract and wage positions that are not even listed on the organizational chart, and so can have no official input into policy.

Nor do those educators outside the Ministerial bureaucracy have much say in determining the profession's goals. Representatives of various constituencies within the education community, including the teachers' association, are invited to participate on the external stakeholder committees that supposedly advise on education policy, but their input is sought too late in the process and at too low a level to influence basic goals. The advisory committees established with the creation of the testing Branch, for example, were clearly intended to consult on the implementation of the preestablished goals of a provincial testing program, and are not in a position to challenge any of the program's basic assumptions. The committees therefore serve legitimation and co-optive functions rather than an effective policy role.

Furthermore, analysis of the actual workings of these committees reveals that to the extent that they do fulfil an oversight function, this is performed on behalf of Branch management, rather than the stakeholder groups. The committees allow senior management to tighten its control over the TDSs, both by providing an alternative source of expertise with which to challenge the TDSs' knowledge monopoly, and by allowing management to misrepresent its own hierarchical direction as a process of 'peer review'. Legitimated hierarchical control over the TDSs in turn allows management to use the TDSs' expertise to safely harness the direct participation of classroom teachers in the test-development process.

The Ministry's continuing tradition of involving a broad cross section of schoolteachers in a variety of decisions and procedures, including test development, does provide educators in the case study province with an unusual degree of control over the *technical* aspects of their work process. This influence is further enhanced by the direct recruitment of teachers to the professional (though not to the administrative) positions within the provincial bureaucracy. Classroom currency is accorded a high value in the corporate culture of this Ministry, and the Branch regularly seeks out and defers to teachers' expertise in the implementation of its programs. This stands in sharp contrast to many other provinces and states which appear to discount teacher expertise and to rely entirely on ministerial staff or external consultants.

The involvement of classroom teachers in the technical aspects of testing must not be confused, however, with control over the evaluation function. While teachers retain an active role in the implementation of provincial programs, this role is limited to providing the Ministry with the skills and current classroom knowledge it needs, and does not provide the profession with a corresponding access to policy. Since the teachers' input is only sought within the context of predefined goals, it represents a form of controlled participation. Even the teachers' command of evaluation technique is ultimately constrained by the fragmentation of the development process into the separate steps of data selection, item writing, field testing, range finding, marking, and so on. Management is able to intervene at each stage in the process to reconfirm its direction and control, leaving the participants open to ideological desensitization and co-optation.

The current situation, then, could not be characterized as one of professional dominance, even though it superficially conforms to Freidson's model. Freidson believes that a monopoly over recruitment to superordinate positions allows a profession to retain control over the work process as a corporate entity, even if the rank and file practitioners are technically deskilled. The current case study, however, reveals several flaws in that assumption.

Freidson's argument rests on contrasting the external management with which most workers have to contend to the supervision by senior colleagues which characterizes most professional bureaucracies. This distinction works well when describing, for example, the professoriate, where tenured staff rotate through brief stints as department head and then return to their regular duties. Similarly, it could reasonably be argued that the capture of the provincial bureaucracy by members of the teaching profession's knowledge elite during the

Social Credit era ensured that the profession was self-regulating, even though teachers were subject to the Ministry's directives. With the election of the Progressive Conservatives, however, the senior administrative ranks have begun to resemble those of an external management.

Partly, this reflects the Conservatives' imposition of their own managerial logic on the teaching profession. The senior bureaucrats may be former teachers, but the new emphasis on accountability and system outcomes has increasingly led them to draw on the techniques and metaphors of the business sector. Freidson's model assumes, however, that the superordinate professionals are drawing on the techniques and standards developed by the profession's university-based knowledge elite:

> By itself, the administrative elite is in a position to assert economic and administrative, but not technical or cognitive, power. They may be technocrats . . . but they do not produce the professionally legitimate technical knowledge that they use to order, assess, and direct the work of the rank and file. The source of such knowledge is another elite segment of the professions composed of those who devote themselves on a full-time basis to research.
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> . . .
>
> Lacking its own authority of expertise, the administrative elite must invoke the standards and guidelines of the knowledge elite in its directives aimed at formulating and evaluating the work of the rank and file.[7]

That the Education Ministry is instead invoking the administrative standards and guidelines from another field entirely must either mean that Freidson's model is in error, or that the Ministry is no longer controlled by educators. In other words, since the supervision of the rank and file is now increasingly conducted according to generic managerial principles, the Senior Officials are behaving *as if they were* an external management, whatever their professional origins.

Moreover, the recruitment patterns revealed in this case study strongly suggest that there is a growing division between staff and line positions within the profession, and that senior management may best be characterized as a separate technobureaucratic occupation. Classroom teachers are never directly recruited to the policy-making ranks of the provincial bureaucracy, and the entrance-level positions to which they do have access are the dead-end jobs of "false career ladders": Even lengthy tenure in such staff positions as Test

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[7] Freidson, "The Changing Nature of Professional Control", pp. 15-16.

Ddevelopment Specialist does not seem to provide an avenue for upward mobility into the ranks of administration. Instead, senior Branch management (and higher) seems to be recruited from the separate pool of those with prior school-based administrative experience. This restriction to those with an administrative background ensures that the policy ranks have been at least partially resocialized to a managerial logic (although Branch-level management may continue to rely on the profession's knowledge base for its particular content expertise). Even here, however, promotion is highly selective, and requires the active sponsorship of those yet higher in the bureaucracy. While difficult to document, this now seems to include an ideological screen, further isolating management from the rank and file and from the profession's (still largely progressivist) university-based knowledge elite.

Freidson acknowledges that a profession's administrative ranks may eventually emerge as a separate technobureaucratic occupation, but is unable to satisfactorily account for this erosion of community identity or to predict which professions will experience this breakup, or to what timetable. The current study, however, suggests that this fragmentation originates in the erosion of occupational autonomy. As discussed in the conclusion to Chapter 8, a unified professional identity is maintained to the extent that the practitioners and administrators both depend on the same knowledge elite for research and training -- that is, so long as all three segments of the occupation share the same goals, standards, and procedures. Here, however, the senior administrators take their goals, and increasingly their managerial techniques, from the sectional interests that control the Legislature. It is this breakdown in the community of goals that is the key to the emergence of a separate technobureaucratic profession.

The central weakness of Freidson's model, then, is his failure to distinguish between control over the technical aspects of the work process and control over goals. As is evident in the passage quoted above, Freidson not only assumes that the administrative ranks must rely entirely on the occupation's *own* knowledge elite for their expertise, but equates this with professional control. That a monopoly over recruitment to superordinate positions is no guarantee that the profession's expertise will dominate is amply demonstrated by the junior managers' (the positions responsible for Branch logistical support) almost exclusive reliance on generic administrative skills unrelated to their educational expertise. The only purpose served by the requirement that they hold professional credentials is to legitimate their contacts with, and direction of, school-based personnel. Even were an occupation successful in excluding any expertise not part of its own knowledge base,[1] this says nothing about the purposes to which this expertise is applied. While professional-level recruitment to the Examiner rank ensures a high level of technical competence, the Examiners themselves are essentially powerless. Classroom teachers may monopolize the Test Development Specialist positions, but the application of their expertise is constrained by an elaborate committee structure and a tightly controlled approval process. Even senior Branch management remains subject to hierarchical direction and vulnerable to ideological co-optation. Moreover, however great the technical discretion of these individuals, the job descriptions themselves represent an erosion of occupational autonomy, because the decision to reintroduce provincial examinations was not taken by the teaching profession, but imposed upon it. A monopoly over recruitment to these positions offers, at best, limited influence over program implementation, but the fundamental decisions concerning program goals have already been defined and are beyond the profession's control.

Yet it is control over goals that is the true measure of professional dominance. There is, for example, an obvious and important difference between educators dictating policy to the government under the Social Credit Party, and the government dictating policy to educators under the Progressive Conservatives. Freidson recognized that elite sponsorship is fundamental to professional dominance, but failed to realize that autonomous control over the technical aspects of the work process could be granted separately from control over goals.

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[1] The further complication that the occupation's knowledge elite might itself be vulnerable to heteronomous control must also be considered. Most university research is government-funded, and the definition of relevant topics again a reflection of the interests of the currently dominant elite. The renewed interest in centralized testing, for example, has been echoed in the course offerings, research priorities, and staffing of Faculties of Education concerned with remaining relevant. To the extent that the knowledge elite follows rather than leads developments in the education system, such accommodation qualifies as ideological enskilling.

Derber's distinction between ideological and technical proletarianization is therefore crucial to understanding the educator's work process. The central conclusion of the current investigation is that educators in the case study province have undergone ideological but not technical proletarianization. This finding not only provides empirical verification of Derber's contention that these are independent managerial strategies (rather than stages in a single process) but also calls into question the teacher's self-image as a 'professional'.

As with other knowledge workers, the educators' preoccupation with 'professionalization' leaves them vulnerable to ideological manipulation. Resistance to the erosion of the teaching profession's autonomous control over its work process in the case study province, for example, has been undermined by a rhetoric of professional control that few educators have been able to penetrate. Continued control over evaluation technique, for example, has been misrepresented as demonstrating the teachers' continued control over the evaluation function, but as this study has documented, the teachers have lost any effective say in policy formation. The involvement of classroom teachers in a heavily fragmented and tightly controlled test-development process cannot compensate for the considerable narrowing of the teachers' curriculum and evaluation functions that results from the reintroduction of provincial testing. This erosion of autonomous control is often represented, however, as an example of the teacher's *increasing* professionalism, because the widespread involvement of teachers in the test-development process has raised the average level of evaluation skills. In other words, by defining professionalism in terms of technique, teachers are susceptible to the subtle control of ideological enskilling, in which management is able to redefine relevant skills and so create a trained incapacity to challenge the system's goals. Knowledge workers within heteronomous bureaucracies must always be suspicious of management-initiated 'empowerment' schemes, since the top-down delegation of discretion over a limited range of technical judgements is more likely to amount to controlled participation than to an actual increase in occupational autonomy.

Similarly, because the traditional model of professionalism focuses on an occupation's knowledge monopoly, and because management (especially at the Branch level) continues to defer to professional standards in matters of technique, the administrative elite has been able to claim a shared professional identity with classroom teachers. This claim obfuscates the growing gulf between the goals of the administration and those of the rank and file, thereby allowing externally imposed hierarchical direction to be misrepresented as an expression of collective autonomy. The administrative elite is, however, increasingly isolated from the rest of the profession in terms of both career patterns and its orientation to the goals of the heteronomous bureaucracy rather than those of the university-based knowledge elite. Knowledge workers must therefore be careful to distinguish between those claims to collegiality that are based on shared goals and standards and those based solely on shared technique, so that the latter may be rejected. In other words, in order for knowledge workers to recognize that their autonomous control over the work process has been significantly eroded or to undertake appropriate countermeasures, they must first reject their current models of professionalism.

Unfortunately, the usual response to a rejection of the ideology of professionalism is a retreat into unionism. Unionism is not a viable response to the current crisis in the teaching profession for two reasons.

First, unions have historically focused on issues related to remuneration and working conditions rather than attempted to intervene in the employing institution's definition of appropriate technique and goals. Consequently, by abandoning the ideology of professionalism, the teachers' associations may find that the range of issues to which they can lay rightful claim has also narrowed.

Second, and more significantly, the crucial factor in professional dominance is elite sponsorship. Militant unionism, however, is far more likely to alienate relevant publics than to garner their support. To quote Lockhart:

> This highlights the fundamental problem encountered by all public service employees in utilizing the industrial strike tactic. The disruption created is not felt so much by their employers as by the public in general, and their clients in particular. The damage done is not to profits (indeed, the employing agency saves money during a strike), but to the special relationship of trust between the worker and the community.[9]

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[9] Lockhart, p. 94.

Williams argues that it was the teachers' strategy of militant unionism that, ironically, called public attention to the profession's relatively privileged position, thereby setting the stage for the profession's subsequent decline:

> As the recession increased in severity, educators, with their traditions of tenure and job security and with their increased profile due to a period of increased militancy during the 1970s, became more and more visible and vulnerable as having a protected status significantly 'different' from the rest of the working population. A rash of teacher strikes in the 1970s and early 1980s had raised the ire of large numbers of an otherwise dormant public. The growing militancy of some provincial teachers' groups, notably those in Quebec and British Columbia, where direct challenges to the government took place, eroded the historical status of teachers.[10]

The sectional interests that currently control the Legislature have been able to use the issue of accountability to drive a wedge between teachers and their natural allies, the parents. The government is able to use the school board structure to isolate itself from direct union action and to play the dissatisfactions of the teachers against those of the public. To again quote Lockhart:

> Most certainly, if teachers are subjected to the same alienating forces experienced by other industrial workers, it must also be expected that they too will be forced, often reluctantly, to abandon socially responsible goals in order to pursue economic goals, which the collective bargaining process so singularly promotes. But if . . . teachers remain frustrated over their exclusion from the decision processes that determine their occupational satisfactions, so too has a more enlightened public remained frustrated over their exclusion from participation in public education policy-making. This dual frustration, which appears to stem from the same source, has all too commonly resulted in conflicts which pit teacher 'demands' against public 'indignation'. Since both teachers and the public have been denied access to the level of decision-making that could in any significant way resolve their mutual frustration, this teacher/community conflict has not led to innovative resolution.[11]

What, then, is the prognosis for the teaching profession? Educators in all the major capitalist nations have undergone a process of ideological proletarianization similar to that documented in the current case study. While the timing and specifics may differ slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, all the Western democracies have been faced with the same economic and demographic trends, leading to similar outcomes. Even a cursory analysis of these trends suggests that it is unlikely that education workers will be able to regain the modest level of autonomous control they once had, because the ideological context in which they have to function is now less favourable.

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[10] Thomas R. Williams, "Canada: Education Policy-Making: Impacts of the 1980s Recession", in *Education, Recession and the World Village: A Comparative Political Economy of Education*, ed. Frederick M. Wirt and Grant Harman. (London: The Falmer Press, 1986), p. 34.

[11] Lockhart, p. 111.

In the 1960s, a number of factors came together to produce conditions uniquely favourable to the teaching profession. Economic and governmental elites adopted new economic theories which promoted the belief in education as a panacea for all social and economic ills. The human capital model encouraged elite sponsorship of education by arguing that expenditures on education represented an investment in the economy. The following statement by the influential Economic Council of Canada is typical of the economic leadership of the period.

> In its studies the council has found the rate of return from investment in education, both to the individual and the economy as a whole, is at least as large, and probably larger than, almost any other form of investment. This has led us to recommend that the advancement of education and training at all levels in Canada be given a very high place in the public policy and that investment in education be accorded first place in the scale of priorities.[12]

The human capital model also encouraged individuals to view continued schooling beyond compulsory-attendance grade levels as an investment in their own careers and so an avenue of upward mobility. This provided the teaching profession with considerable public support from students and their parents, the voters. The postwar baby boom, combined with this general support for schooling, led to a rapid and massive expansion of the education system This explosive expansion created a teacher shortage, which in turn encouraged initiatives to make teaching a more attractive occupation. Taken together, these factors created an environment in which relevant publics were prepared to sponsor teacher professionalism and occupational autonomy.

By the mid-1970s, however, these trends had begun to reverse. As the baby boom began entering the labour force, the resulting oversupply of entry-level workers inevitably resulted in increased unemployment, particularly among the 18 to 24 age group. Since the human capital model had promised full employment on the erroneous assumption that unemployment is the result of insufficient training, the rising unemployment rate seriously compromised the model's credibility. Public support for education began to decline as credential inflation eliminated educational gains and career advancement failed to meet expectations. Faced with their own high levels of under- and unemployment, the public was less willing to support educators' claims to special status.

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[12] John Deutsch (Economic Council of Canada), *University Affairs* 8 (February 1967): 2.

Furthermore, governments everywhere were plunged into fiscal crisis when the formation of OPEC in 1973 triggered the first of several major recessions. Having stretched Keynesian economic policies beyond their logical limits, many governments found themselves overextended and increasingly hard pressed to continue financing the high levels of expenditure that had typified the 1960s. As recurring waves of recession revealed serious weaknesses in the economies of all the major democracies, acceptance of the exaggerated promises of the human capital model began to waver.

> Isolated statements which question the heretofore unquestioned assumption that investment in education is an investment in national productivity and national welfare are also beginning to emerge. Given the horrific drops in productivity, GNP and the increases in unemployment, particularly in the 18-24 age group, some critics are now calling into question the assumption that 'the country can never spend too much on education'. With increasing frequency, Canadians are having it publicly called to their attention[13] that, ' . . . The optimistic estimates about the benefits of expanded expenditure upon education have not been vindicated, although education spending has increased with almost fanatical energy' (Carrigan, 1983). Criticisms such as these are then juxtaposed against the nation's unemployment rates, weak secondary industries and the uncompetitive state of resource industries. For instance, a recent Ontario government budget paper argued that a higher quality education system was required for the sake of the province's trading position (Ontario, 1984).[14]

Governments everywhere began to retrench, with education often taking the brunt of the cutbacks.

Given that education is a provincial responsibility, one might anticipate the potential for different responses, or at least varying degrees of retrenchment, between jurisdictions. In fact, there was surprising conformity. In part, this reflects the universality of the demographic and economic trends involved, but it also reflects the active intervention of the federal government.

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[13] Note the phrasing here, perhaps intending to suggest that the dissatisfaction with education expenditures is less an example of client revolt, and more one of the loss of elite sponsorship.

[14] Williams, p. 33.

> The federal government, through its restraint actions, established a climate which allowed dramatic changes to occur in the status of public sector employees such as teachers. Further, through its actions in renegotiating agreements with the provinces, the federal government has increased the revenue dilemma of the provinces even more than might have occurred if those jurisdictions were dealing with recessionary pressures under traditional funding patterns. Provincial governments have been forced by the federal government into more draconian stances than they might otherwise have taken on issues of wage control, bargaining rights, interprovincial spending differences and spending per pupil within a given province.[15]

The federal pressure towards public sector retrenchment became particularly pronounced with the election of the federal Progressive Conservatives.

Another factor which undermined government and public support for education was the inevitable falling off of enrolments as the baby boom completed their schooling. With fewer students, and fewer voters with children in the school system, the need for continued expansion of the education system became moot. Declining enrolments and baby boom crowding in the teaching profession (and in those alternate careers to which teachers might otherwise have transferred) also led to a teacher surplus, leaving the profession vulnerable to proletarianization. As costs continued to escalate but demand fell, there was an increased emphasis on accountability, and so less willingness to grant educators occupational autonomy. The key question here, however, is "accountability to whom, and for what?"

In the 1980s, public sector retrenchment led to, and was then further accelerated by, changes in the ruling regimes (at the national level) in Canada, Britain, the United States, and elsewhere. As in the case study province, the emergence of these new administrations represented a shift in the coalition of sectional interests dominating their respective legislatures, leaving the teaching profession in each country dangerously exposed. These new conservative governments not only replaced the former Keynesian economic approaches of their predecessors with the monetary policies of Milton Friedman, but routinely scapegoated education for the economy's poor performance. Again as in the case study province, these governments created, rather than responded to, much of the negative public opinion on schooling through reports such as *A Nation at Risk*. In contrast, without their elite sponsorship, teachers had difficulty getting their own message out to the public:

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[15] Ibid., p. 43.

> . . . teachers' organizations . . . have marshaled data in the form of reports to present the 'real facts' to the public. Interestingly, these responses of the educational community to the growing criticisms have received little public exposure in the major media. Meanwhile the number of critical statements by politicians, members of the corporate community, science and technology interests, and newspaper editors and columnists continues to increase.[16]

As Joel Spring has pointed out, however, most of the economy's problems can be traced to economic factors such as high deficits and runaway inflation (caused in the U.S. by the Vietnam War, the government's response to the oil crisis and, later by the Reagan administration's arms buildup), and not to any failure of the education system. While such problems as low productivity are habitually blamed on the schools, they are in fact the result of shortsighted decisions made by the corporate elites that the conservative government parties represent.[17]

For example, as the baby boom entered the workforce in the 1970s, entry-level wages fell because labour supply exceeded demand. As labour costs declined, businesses chose to become more labour-intensive and consequently decreased their capital outlay on new technology, plant modernization, and so on. Since productivity is defined as output per person, however, this trend towards labour-intensive production necessarily meant that productivity declined during this period. By the 1980s, the baby boom was past and the supply of inexpensive entry-level labour exhausted. The shrinking pool of qualified entry-level workers threatened to drive wages up, so the corporate sector attempted to enlarge the available pool of labour by working with the schools to improve the education of those who would have been considered only marginally employable in the 1970s. This attempt to increase the reserve army of unemployed but employable workers is behind the renewed emphasis on the basics.[18]

At the same time, there has been a renewed emphasis on math and science training, as government and industry look to the schools to solve the technological and competitive crises caused by a decade of delayed capital investment. The sudden renewed interest in productivity is simply a reflection of the fact that a preponderance of workers are now older and more senior — and therefore more expensive.[19]

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[16] Ibid., p. 33.
[17] Joel Spring, "Education and the Sony War", *Phi Delta Kappan*, (April 1984): 534-537.
[18] Ibid.

> Both of these trends in educational policy are designed to provide U.S. business with an expanded pool of potential employees — and consequently a decline in wages. . . . If these two trends are successful, the market will be flooded with high school graduates with good work attitudes and minimum basic skills for entry-level positions and with highly qualified scientists.
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> . . . Thus the public school system becomes a captive of the profit motive of U.S. industry. And let me emphasize again, this relationship guarantees neither an improved economy nor a higher standard of living for individuals. Indeed, such a close connection between education and industry might lead to *lower wages*, as different segments of the labor market are flooded by workers channeled there by the public school system. In effect, American business would be using the public school system to exploit the American worker.[20]

As the new conservative administrations responded to the needs of industry, they increasingly pushed public education towards a narrow vocationalism. This in turn required the ideological proletarianization of the teaching profession to substitute the goals of industry for those of the education elite, as detailed in this example from Williams' observations on the Canadian experience:

> The apparent drop in public support for the arguments or proposals of educators on education matters is . . . being reflected in a decrease in the traditional influence of educators on changes to educational programs. As the recession deepened and the Canadian economy ground to a virtual halt, pressures from the business community (particularly the high technology sector) for the schools to provide 'better trained manpower' for employment in the private sector increased. During the recession it became more publicly clear that Canada's productivity record could not compare with that of other technologically advanced countries such as Japan. Hence, there has been growing pressure on school systems, particularly at the provincial policy level, for increased vocationalism, science and technology, basics and standards. As a result of these concerns, several provinces began to consider (on the direction and initiative of the ministers of education and *not* the professional civil servants in ministries of education) ways in which standards could be 'improved'. It is significant that these considerations of changes in the direction of educational policies both originated in, and were pursued from, the political arena and not, as tradition would have it, through professional bureaucratic routes.
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> Despite the lobbying efforts of teachers, several provinces have introduced revised curricula which limit the freedom of student choice of subjects which characterized the 1970s. Others are rapidly moving toward the compulsory introduction of technology related courses. Several have reintroduced compulsory, central examinations in an effort to control grade inflation and to 'ensure standards'. While policies such as these were discussed sporadically prior to the recession, the major variable precipitating these changes was the 'sour' economy which allowed the issues of program and standards, relative to national economic goals and performance, to be raised as publicly discussable topics. When this was combined with the plummeting policy influence of educators and their decreased public status,

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

> the balance of power shifted with the result that ministers of education pushed through significant program changes over the loud public protests of the teaching profession. Whereas the traditional policy scenario in Canadian education saw the educational professional dominating the process, the recession saw this position changed; the elected provincial politicians now exert the dominant influence. These elected officials respond far more directly to the influence efforts of other constituencies such as the business community and the media rather than to professional educators and local boards of education. Consequently, the policy-making process in most provinces in 1984 reflects strong political, as opposed to professional, dominance.[21]

Ozga makes a similar observation concerning the relation between education workers and the state in the United Kingdom:

> The historical references point to the fact that the crisis in teaching is not new but forms an episode in a relationship between teachers and the state which is characterized by different degrees of tension, depending on the extent of the need to exert control over the teaching force. In times of economic crisis, foreign competition and political dissensus, the central state tends towards strong, directive management which imposes controls on teacher recruitment, training, salaries, and status, and curriculum and examination content. In relatively relaxed periods, when resources available for education are sufficient to permit a broad interpretation of priorities, and there is at least the appearance of consensus, management is less crisis-led, appears more relaxed, is more strategic in nature and consequently relies heavily on the promotion of teacher professionalism as a form of control.[22]

While the current case study is the first to document some of the mechanisms through which the ideological proletarianization of educators is achieved, the relative decline in the influence of even those educators located within the provincial bureaucracies has been generally recognized:[23]

> Traditionally, at both the provincial and local levels, professional educators (including Ministry or Department of Education civil servants) have played the dominant role in the formation of education policy. The late 1970s saw elected officials such as ministers of education and local school trustees gradually increasing their power. The rancorous, public airing of disagreements concerning educational issues began to increase in the 1970s resulting in a dramatic increase in the involvement of interest groups in the policy-making process.[24]

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[21] Williams, pp. 35-36.

[22] Jenny Ozga, *Schoolwork: Approaches to the Labour Process of Teaching*. (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), pp. ix-x.

[23] A possible exception here is Lockhart, who states:

> In purely formalistic terms, public schools and those who teach in them are accountable to their provincial legislatures through the minister of education. In practice, direct responsibility for school standards and teacher performance is administered by the provincial ministries of education. (Lockhart, p. 70.)

It is not entirely clear from the context whether Lockhart is referring here to education policy or merely the direct supervision of classroom teachers.

[24] Williams, p. 31.

And again:

> Even within the provincial civil services, the influence of educators has waned. Elected officials, the ministers of education and their cabinet colleagues are directing the educational policy-making process on a scale not seen in Canadian education for decades. Elected provincial figures are now very much in control of educational policy. While constitutionally this has always been the case, operationally, as is the case in most parliamentary democracies, the civil service had exercised a dominant steering effect on educational policy. As a result of the recession, education became visibly vulnerable as a cost centre. Further, political gain and financial savings were to be made by 'educator bashing'. This has seen a rise in the operational influence of ministers of education, and a concomitant decrease in that of the education professionals, particularly educational civil servants. As ministers have moved to exert more of their own authority while discounting the influence of members of the public education community, they have accorded increased influence to other groups such as the business community.[25]

The experience of other provinces and nations, then, confirms the general trend of ideological proletarianization. The emergence of the manpower model out of the ashes of human capital theory has resulted in attempts to improve the economic return on investment in education by increasing the profession's accountability to corporate interests. Neither militant unionism nor the trappings of greater professionalization will likely have any impact on the externally imposed redefinition of the purpose of education which is moving the system towards a curriculum-centred vocationalism. Without the progressivist rationale that teachers require autonomous control over the work process to be able to respond to the individual needs of clients in a child-centred system, the sectional interests that dominate the Legislature in the case study province have no need to delegate greater control over the goals of education to the teaching profession. Consequently, the only potentially effective strategy that education workers could adopt to regain professional dominance would be to forge organic ties with a rising governmental elite within a new coalition of political interests; that is, engage in direct political action to help elect a more populist government.

While this strategy of direct confrontation with the government was adopted (with mostly disappointing results) by teachers in both British Columbia and Quebec during the 1980s, the adoption of this strategy by teachers in the case study province does not appear to be very probable. The government's reliance on the techniques of ideological proletarianization and enskilling avoids the sorts of confrontation that might trigger direct political action. The current case study has been written from the point of view of the education worker, but perhaps it should be noted here that it also stands as a manual for Ministers wishing to assert political control over the profession. Indeed, relations between teachers and the central bureaucracy in British Columbia improved considerably following that province's adoption of several key features of the test-development process from the case study province.

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[25] Ibid., p. 44.

Or to put it another way, it seems likely that the attempts at technical proletarianization imposed on teachers in some other jurisdictions will ultimately fail. As Derber has pointed out, technical proletarianization is more suitable to the control of industrial rather than mental labour. While Derber failed to specify the conditions under which ideological proletarianization is likely to emerge as the preferred strategy, I suggested in Chapter 7 three factors that militate against the technical deskilling of education workers: (1) teaching's high indetermination/technicality ratio does not lend itself to routinization, codification, or the delegation of tasks to subordinate workers; (2) rapid changes in the external environment make curricular flexibility a higher priority than the cheapening of labour; and (3) capital's need to maintain ideological hegemony over a major institution of social reproduction could be put at risk if too blatant an attempt at Taylorization were to trigger a teacher revolt. To these may be added the fourth point from Chapter 8 that it is in the vested interests of the profession's administrative elite to minimize the technical deskilling of the rank and file, as the deprofessionalization of teachers might well undermine the educational administrators' own professional project. Indeed, one of the primary benefits of ideological deskilling is that it allows management to appropriate control over the rank and file's work process without exposing the occupation to deprofessionalization.[26]

Thus, in those jurisdictions which experimented with the technical proletarianization of their teachers, we are already witnessing a variety of "empowerment" schemes designed to return at least partial technical control to the classroom teacher, as the disastrous consequences of technical deskilling become increasingly apparent. Similarly, while teachers in the case study province are unlikely to regain their professional dominance in the foreseeable future, neither are they likely to find their position deteriorating further.

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[26] This implies one final modification to the analytical model proposed in Chapter 1: it is possible for an occupation to undergo *ideological* proletarianization without experiencing deprofessionalization.

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APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW PLANNING AND BLUEPRINT

Much of the data for this research was obtained through interviews. Careful planning of the interviews was therefore crucial to the project's success. The following two documents were useful in focusing this planning.

The first is an interview checklist derived from points in Raymond Gordon's excellent *Interviewing: Strategy, Techniques, and Tactics.* While Gordon's is not the only useful text on interviewing, it is certainly the most thorough. Listing Gordon's major points in this way, and analyzing their applicability to the current study, allowed me to systematically review the relevant methodological issues and to make appropriate planning decisions.

The second document is the blueprint from which the interview schedule in Appendix B is derived. The first column lists the interview objectives. These objectives were drawn from three overlapping sources: the initial thesis proposal; a review of the relevant sociological literature; and the initial phases of the on-site research (informal participant observation, discussion with Branch informants, document review, and some initial formal observation). The second column identifies the theoretical issue related to each objective. The third column indicates the issue's relevance in this case study. The final column indicates the actual interview question. Note that the blueprint (as with the interview schedule itself) includes a number of items that are not addressed in the current study. I expect to make use of this data in a subsequent study, as outlined in Chapter 9.

Such blueprinting is second nature to any test developer, but few sociologists make explicit reference to this important document. While the theoretical concept that a particular interview question attempts to operationalize will often be obvious to the reader, this is not always the case. It would therefore be useful if researchers began to provide the interview blueprint along with the interview schedule.

INTERVIEW PLANNING CHECKLIST

GORDON'S POINT:	APPLICABILITY TO CURRENT STUDY	RESPONSE
STRATEGY INHIBITORS		
competing time demands	probable problem	use short interviews, matrix sample
ego threat	may apply to some respondents	non-judgemental/confidentiality
etiquette	likely not a problem	peer access
trauma	likely not applicable	
forgetting	probable problem	will focus on current issue
chronological confusion	probable problem	will focus on current issue
inferential confusion	probable problem	will focus on current issue
unconscious behaviour	ideological viewpoints to be identified	operationalize in questions
STRATEGY FACILITATORS		
expectation of cooperation	require permission of Director	obtain and circulate memo
recognition	'selection' approach unconvincing	knowledge of staff's achievements
altruistic appeals	likely to apply	staff commitment to research/education
sympathetic understanding	likely to apply	as former staff with same experience
new experience	not likely to apply	may appreciate as break from routine
catharsis	likely to apply for some respondents	may vent theory/practice differences
need for meaning	may apply to some respondents	may help respondent place in broader perspective
STRATEGY CHOICES		
Single vs. Multiple contacts	multiple contacts	because: (a)exploratory (b)too much information required for one contact (c)easier to establish rapport

GORDON'S POINT:	APPLICABILITY TO CURRENT STUDY	RESPONSE
STRATEGY CHOICES (cont.)		
Problems with multiple contact:		
-danger of contamination	likely to apply	issue /subtopic focus change rapidly
-'role confusion'	could apply	assure confidentiality
TYPES OF RESPONDENT		
-key informants	am using collaborators	identify issues/maintain contact
-special informants	management personnel	may have to include extra-Branch sample
-representative informants	case study of representative sample	all staff to be interviewed
INTERVIEWER CHARACTERISTICS		
	age, sex, race not relevant to study speech, grooming, etc.	compatible because former staff
Insider/Outsider roles	could be perceived as either by different respondents	
Outsider advantages		
-*violations of insider code*	may or may not benefit here	assure confidentiality
-will reveal manipulation of insiders	unlikely to benefit here	assure confidentiality
-need for new experience	benefit would not apply here	*too well known in Branch*
-*need for recognition*	*benefit would apply*	sufficiently outside to ask
-need for objective view	may or may not benefit here	respondent may not feel need
Insider advantages		
-in-group violating larger norms	may or may not benefit here	depends on nature of violation
-same universe of discourse	benefit would apply here	limit sample to Branch
-concern over security violations	benefit would apply here	have access to most materials already
-etiquette barrier removed	benefit would apply here	researcher not viewed as 'visitor'

GORDON'S POINT:	APPLICABILITY TO CURRENT STUDY	RESPONSE
Interviewer Status		
-higher status	professional support staff only	not really significant
-equal status	majority of respondents	absence of ego threat
-lower status	managerial staff	absence of ego threat
QUESTION SCOPE (Topic Control)	(see table, page 205 of Gordon)	
Broad Questions Vs. Narrow	exploratory study uses broad questions	
Advantages of broad questions		
-paths of respondent's associations	important	
-relative importance of various aspects of topic to respondent	important	
-respondent's frame of reference	important as reflects ideology	
-chronological order	useful technique	
-vocabulary used by respondent	important as reflects ideology	
-reducing ego threat by not revealing relation between items	important to avoid leading questions	
-stimulate memory because not forced to recall before ready	useful technique	
-allows for sympathetic hearing	important for most respondents	
-encourages catharsis	important for some respondents	
Answer Structure (Topic Control)		
-open	exploratory study uses open questions	same as for broad questions
-closed	measurement phase [not included in current study]	efficiency, reliability

GORDON'S POINT:	APPLICABILITY TO CURRENT STUDY	RESPONSE
QUESTION PATTERN		
Funnel Vs. Inverse Funnel	exploratory study uses funnel pattern	
Advantages of funnel		
-initial broad question may eliminate need for subsequent specific questions	efficient	
-allows for emergence of respondent's own frame of reference	*important in exploratory study*	
-assists respondent in recall since follows own paths of association	useful technique	
Leading Questions		
loaded by context	use here unlikely	provide neutral context unless faced with resistance
loaded by emotionally charged phrases	to be avoided	neutral wording
loaded by omitting a category	potential problem for measurement phase	extensive exploratory stage
one-sided challenging statements	to be avoided	examine tape transcripts
Uses of Probes	standard techniques apply	
INTERVIEW STRUCTURE		
Introduction		
common amenities		
sponsoring organization	thesis research	*clarify management* permission but not management study
purpose of interview	professionalism	related to models of education
selection of respondent	all staff	*importance of complete sample*
providing anonymity	*individuals assured*	Branch identity obvious?
lead-in question	useful technique	

GORDON'S POINT:	APPLICABILITY TO CURRENT STUDY	RESPONSE
INTERVIEW STRUCTURE (cont.)		
Context		
-define terms	not for professionalism	want definition to emerge
-provide timeframe	e.g., specify issue	specify project
-provide spatial perspective	e.g., unit/Branch/government/profession	
-provide criteria for judgement	not applicable in exploratory phase	criteria to emerge
-discover respondent's context	main thrust of interviews	
Vocabulary		
-universe of discourse	no problem	interviewer long-term participant
-specific meanings	tricky bit	non-scheduled interviews
-establish insider relation	applies	
-supplying etiquette terms	likely not applicable	

INTERVIEW PLANNING CHECKLIST: TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS

Interview planning includes establishing a checklist against which the implementation of appropriate interview technique may be monitored. Again, these points are drawn from Gordon:

Attitudes expressed by Interviewer

Towards interviewing task
(not applicable as interviewer is researcher, not hired staff)

Towards information received
- nonjudgemental
- shows interest in information
- painstaking details and pace = accuracy

Towards respondent as person
- doesn't forget/ignore previous responses (Bob and Ray's Komodo Dragon skit)
- appropriate use of probes
- tone; shows interest
- appreciation of respondent's efforts

Leading Questions Used?

Signs of Respondent Resistance?

- repression
- hesitation
- evasion
- simple emphatic denial
- elaborate subtle denial
- minimization
- defence
- confession

Appropriate Use of Motivating Contexts?
- arousing interest
- recognition of special qualifications
- reducing ego threat
- preventing falsification
- reducing etiquette barrier
- stimulating memory
- reducing chronological confusion
- discovering unconscious factors

Appropriate Use of Probes(listed in order of topic control)

- silent probe
- encouragement probe
- immediate elaboration
- immediate clarification
- retrospective elaboration
- retrospective clarification
- reflective probe
    - -echo probe
    - -interpretive probe
    - -summary probe
    - -mutation

INTERVIEW BLUEPRINT

SECTION I: GUIDING QUESTIONS FROM THESIS PROPOSAL

GUIDING QUESTION	THEORETICAL ISSUE ADDRESSED	RELEVANCE TO BRANCH	INTERVIEW QUESTION
I. EMERGENCE OF EDUCATORS	HISTORICAL PROLETARIANIZATION	Creation of TDS role.	
1. Is the # of educators increasing relative to classroom teachers?	Emergence of technobureaucratic professions.	Growth of Ministry.	[N/A: Document Review Only]
2. Is the # of types of educators increasing?	Emergence of technobureaucratic professions.	Survey of types of Branch.	[N/A: Document Review Only]
3. What is the significance of the emergence of education specializations for:	Emergence of technobureaucratic professions.	Emergence of Branch.	[Management informants]
a) Prof. control of education and educ. bureaucracies?	Technobureaucrats: Larson vs. Freidson; ideological proletarianization.	Role of Branch; control of Branch.	Any teacher input into policy? #20,21,22,23,24, & 25
b) Content and process of education?	Ideological proletarianization; paradigm shifts.	Role of Branch; Branch policy and policy changes.	[Management informant interviews only]
c) Classroom teachers?	Separation of design and execution; deskilling vs. 'relieving burden'.	Relation of Branch to classroom teachers.	Any teacher input into Branch policy? Branch service to teacher or intrusion? Is teacher opinion surveyed? #16,17,20,21,41 [13]

d) Teacher unions?	Proletarianization through deprofessionalization vs. power on committees.	Relation of Branch to teachers' association.	How much and how seriously is teachers' assoc. input taken by Branch? #17, 18, 19
c) Non-classroom educators?	Rise of technobureaucrats; fragmentation of technobureaucrats; deskilling; enskilling; Taylorization; client confusion; ideological proletarianization.	Role of TDS, ARO, etc.; evidence of Taylorization; of ideological proletarianization; of enskilling; of deskilling; Branch working conditions.	Working conditions; job satisfaction. Management style. #27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37. Changes in role over time. #29, 38, 49, 50. TDS input into policy? #22, 23, 24, 25. Who are your clients? Students? Teachers? Administrators? or Branch management? #16
	Technobureaucratic career patterns.	Career patterns.	Staff career plans, aspirations, and expectations and how these may have changed while working at the Branch; why they decided to work for the Branch. #1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 10,11 [14, 15]
4. Does this division of labour imply fragmentation of teacher's role?	Proletarianization through deskilling.	Relation of Branch to classroom teachers.	Intrusion or service? (Branch as teacher advocate or 'hammer'. #20, 21

II. STATUS OF EDUCATORS	PROFESSIONALISM	PROFESSIONALISM	
1. Are non-classroom educators officially classed as administrators, professionals, or technicians?	Professionalism as an official status.	Reclassification of Diploma TDSs.	#1,2, [3-4], 8, [11], 39, 40
2. Do educators consider themselves to be administrators, professionals, or technicians?	Professionalism as ideology.	Self-definition.	Which body of knowledge most important? Source of expertise? Etc. #1,2, [3-4],11,37,39,40, [41]
3. Are educators perceived as more or less 'professional' than classroom teachers?	Professionalism as ideology.	Ideological commitment.	How would you rank...? #41
4. Do educators perceive professional status as an important issue?	Professionalism as ideology.	Professionalism as ideology in Branch.	Is professionalism an issue for you? #8,38,39,40,42,43
III. CONTROL			
1. To what degree do classroom teachers (or their representatives) have control over the decisions of educators?	Professional control: Larson vs. Freidson.	Teacher input in Branch.	Why was the Branch designed this way? Whose decision was it? How has it changed over time? How significant (real) is this input? [Management Informant interviews &:] #17,18,19,20,21,22
2. To what extent are the decisions of educators independent of the classroom teacher?	Professional control: Larson vs. Freidson.	Teacher input in Branch decisions.	Same as above. #17,18,19,20,21

3. How influential are the various committees of 'stakeholder groups' in determining education policy?	Professional control: Larson vs. Freidson.	Stakeholder input in Branch decisions.	Same as above. #17,18,19,22
4. Have educators achieved professional autonomy?	Professional control: Larson vs. Freidson.	TDS/ARO, etc., input in Branch decisions.	Do you have professional autonomy in Branch? Input into policy? #17,18,19,20,22,23,24,25,26
IV. ROLE OF EDUCATIONAL PARADIGMS	EDUCATIONAL PARADIGMS AS INTERVENING VARIABLE		
1. How do paradigmatic commitments affect:	Educational paradigms as intervening variables.	What paradigms are evident in Branch?	What are goals of education? #44 What are the appropriate means to achieve these goals? (E.g., back-to-basics, progressive educ.?)
a) Management attitudes towards professional staff?	Educational paradigms as ideology.	'Excellence' as ideology; manpower model implications; Taylorization.	
b) Professional staff attitudes towards management?	Educational paradigms as ideology.	'Progressivism' as prof. ideology; resistance.	
c) Professional staff attitudes towards classroom teachers?	Educational paradigms as ideology.	TDS as teacher advocate; as 'hammer'.	#21,41
c) Professional staff attitudes towards their work process and various issues in education?	Interaction of professionalism as ideology and educational paradigm as ideology.	TDS attitudes towards work process and various education issues.	#16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23, 24,25,26,27,28,30,31,38, 39,40,42,43,44,45,46,47
V. ROLE OF PROFESSIONALISM	PROFESSIONALISM AS IDEOLOGY	ROLE OF PROFESSIONALISM	

1. How do competing definitions of professionalism affect the organization of the educator's work process?	How do competing definitions of professionalism affect the organization of the work process?	What are the definitions of professionalism used in Branch? Do these differ systematically between levels or units?	#38,39,40,41,42,43

SECTION II: OTHER THEORETICAL ISSUES FROM LITERATURE REVIEW

LITERATURE REVIEW TOPIC	THEORETICAL ISSUE ADDRESSED	RELEVANCE TO BRANCH	INTERVIEW QUESTION
I. TRAIT MODELS	PROFESSIONALISM		
1) Advanced, lengthy training; expertise.	Knowledge monopoly; gap between prof. staff and managers; between staff and classroom teachers.	Expertise of TDS, ARO, etc.; rarity.	What is your expertise? Does your manager have similar expertise? Do classroom teachers? How easily can TDS be replaced? #11,13,14,15
	DEPROFESSIONALIZATION (erosion of knowledge monopoly)	Is expertise eroding or increasing?	#9,10,11,12,13,14,15
	INDETERMINATION/ TECHNICALITY RATIO	Is test development an art or a science?	Is test development an art or a science? Attempts to routinize? #12
2) Certification. 3) Uni-portal.	Professional control of recruitment.	What qualifications are required. How recruited?	What qualifications do you have? What qualifications do you look for when recruiting to these positions? #4,9,10,11; 14,15
4) Disinterestedness (neutrality).	Professionalism as ideology.	Test 'fairness'.	[N/A: Not in Interviews]
5) Altruistic service.	Professionalism as exploitation.	Invoke professionalism to meet deadlines, etc.	Do managers ever refer to professionalism? When? #42

6) Professional code of ethics.	Redundant in bureaucracy.	Proposed code for use of Branch results.	[Document Review Only]
7) Professional association.	Not required for Branch. Indicator for Larson vs. Freidson.	Which associations available for Branch?	To which professional associations do you belong? #39,40
II. PROLETARIANIZATION			
1) Differentiation of functions of global capital from collective labourer (Johnson).	PROLETARIANIZATION	Global capital or collective labourer?	[N/A: Not in Interviews]
Decline of independent practice, incorporation, exploitation of surplus value.	HISTORICAL PROLETARIANIZATION	Teachers always in bureaucratic setting.	[N/A: Document Review Only]
2) Leads to unemployment (reserve army), blocked mobility; declining intrinsic rewards.	STRUCTURAL PROLETARIANIZATION	Examples of structural proletarianization.	Working conditions questions. #26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33
3) Portions of the professional's knowledge are codified, routinized, and delegated to subordinate workers; the separation of design and execution.	DESKILLING	On teachers by existence of Branch. Examples within Branch	#20. Separation of design and execution in Branch. #18,19,20, #[18-21]; 22,23,24,25,27,30

4) The professional's workload is increased by incorporating tasks formerly undertaken by subordinate workers; the loss of ability to delegate; an increase in 'execution' tasks without a corresponding increase in 'design' tasks (used where indetermination/technicality ratio too high to deskill, but increased workload leads to ideological proletarianization).	ENSKILLING	Examples in Branch.	Has there been an increase in the number and types of tasks you are asked to perform? Do you do your own typing or paste-ups? [Are you concerned about computerization?] #32,33
5) Loss of control over how the technical tasks and procedures they perform are to be carried out.	TECHNICAL PROLETARIANIZATION	Of teachers by existence of Branch. Examples within Branch.	[N/A: Not for Interview] Do you have full discretion over how you do your job? #26
6) Increased supervision, loss of autonomy; standardization of time; increased specialization, fragmentation of role; enforced measures of production;	TAYLORIZATION	Examples within Branch?	Working conditions questions. [26]; 27,28,29,30,31
isolation from policymaking.	IDEOLOGICAL PROLETARIANIZATION	Of teachers by existence of Branch.	Teacher input into policy; input into test development, etc. #17,18,19,20,21.
		Within Branch	Do you have input into Branch policy? #22,23,24,25
7) The creation of a new professional management class.	RISE OF TECHNOBUREAUCRATS	Creation of TDS.	[N/A: Not for Interview]

III. PROPOSITIONS

1) Public service professions are undergoing proletarianization; this is related to emergence of technobureaucratic professions.	Proletarianization; deskilling	What impact has Branch had on teaching role?	Complaints about 'hammering' teachers #21,40,41
2) Technobureaucratic professions are less susceptible to structural proletarianization than public service professions since their power is derived primarily from bureaucratic position rather than expertise. [May mean TDS hybrid].	Structural proletarianization.	Is there any evidence that Branch technobureaucrats are undergoing deskilling, etc., in contradiction to theory?	Working conditions questions, etc. Vary by unit; rank? Degree to which position based on rank rather than expertise? #27,29,28,30,31,36,37
3) Bureaucratization is not the key factor in the devaluation of work process.	Bureaucracy (historical proletarianization).	Bureaucratic character of Branch.	Examples of bureaucracy in responses to working conditions questions.
4) Deprofessionalization and proletarianization analytically distinct processes; both are related to structural changes in advanced capital.	Deprofessionalization; proletarianization.	Can these trends be separated in Branch?	[N/A: Not Interview Topic]
5) Profession's ability to resist proletarianization (loss of control over work process) is determined in part by its ability to resist deprofessionalization (loss of knowledge monopoly; gap between professional and managerial knowledge).	Proletarianization; Deprofessionalization; Resistance.	Resistance in Branch; success.	Knowledge gap between professional staff and managers. #9,10,11,12,13,14,15 Examples of resistance? #34

6) The higher the indetermination/technicality ratio, the less susceptible the profession is to structural proletarianization.	Indetermination/technicality; resistance.	What is the indetermination/technicality ratio of TDS, ARO, etc.? Are there differences in their ability to resist?	Is test development an art or a science? #12. How rare is your skill? #9,10,11,13,15.
7) Some professions (notably education) have always been conducted in bureaucratic settings; TDS requires vertical expansion of bureaucracy.	Expansion of bureaucracy.	Rationale for Branch; career patterns.	[Management Informant Interview] Career pattern questions. #2,3,4,5,6,[7],8
8) Larson: If rate of technobureaucratic growth is higher than growth of public service professionals, public service professionals are likely undergoing structural proletarianization.	Structural proletarianization; rise of technobureaucratic professions.	Is type and size of central office staff growing faster than teaching positions? To what extent is there an attempt to create a career ladder?	[N/A: Document Review Only]
IV. SUMMARY QUESTIONS			
1) What role does professional ideology play in promoting or resisting proletarianization?	PROFESSIONALISM AS IDEOLOGY	Is professionalism used as an ideological tool in Branch? By management? By professional staff?	Professionalism questions. #38,39,40,41,42,43
2) How does the paradigm which regulates the nature and importance of the professional's product interact with the ideology of professionalism?	ROLE OF EDUCATIONAL PARADIGMS	What education paradigms are there in Branch? What other ideologies?	Ideology questions. #44,45,46,47,48

3) What are the mechanisms which increase or decrease the indetermination/technicality ratio of a profession's knowledge monopoly?	Indetermination/technicality ratio.	Indetermination/technicality ratio in Branch.	Is test development an art or a science? #12
4) Can structural and superstructural variables be synthesized into a single model of occupational change?	Macro sociology.	N/A	N/A
5) What are the mechanisms which allow the removal of the 'global functions of capital' from a particular occupational group?	Macro sociology.	N/A	N/A

SECTION III: EMERGENT ISSUES FROM CASE STUDY

RESEARCHER-IDENTIFIED ISSUES	THEORETICAL ISSUE ILLUSTRATED	RELEVANCE TO BRANCH	INTERVIEW QUESTION
1. UNMANAGEABLE WORKLOADS	TAYLORISM	Productivity squeeze.	#27,28,29
a) Constant crises. b) Constant deadline pressure. c) Constant interruption (no limit to extra requests). d) Constant 'initiatives'. e) No limit to workload demands ("would add up to 120%").			
f) Professionalism as unlimited responsibility.	Professionalism as ideology/exploitation.		
2. LIMITED POLICY INPUT	IDEOLOGICAL PROLETARIANIZATION		
a) Professional staff reactive only.			#22,23,24
b) Haste: short turnaround times.		Limited opportunity for thoughtful input.	#25
c) Heavy workload precludes goal-setting opportunities.		Limited opportunity for input: limited interest in taking time for input.	#23,25
d) Lack of ownership of policy.	Alienation from goals.	Lack of interest in goalsetting; no belief that will be permitted meaningful role.	#23
e) Responsibility without authority.			#18,22,24,26
3. TECHNOBUREAUCRATIC RECRUITMENT			

a) Wage personnel.	PROLETARIANIZATION		#2a
i) 1/2 staff not permanent ii) designed with nonpermanent backups.	RESERVE ARMY OF UNDEREMPLOYED	No job security; no collective action possible.	#2a
b)Seconded Staff		Undermines long-term control; no expectations for workload; burnout; replaceability emphasized.	#2a
c) False career patterns.	Enskilling.	Dead-ended; blocked mobility.	#3,5,6,7,8
d)Pension shortfalls.		Barrier to recruitment of professionals to management.	#6c
e) Collegiality.		a) 'Wartime' friendships. b)'Making a difference.'	#31,48
4. INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS	PROFESSIONAL CONTROL		
a) Teacher involvement.	Professional control.		#20,21
b) Stakeholder involvement.	Other-controlled.		#17,18,19
c) Co-optation	Managerial control.		Significance of input?
d) Oversensitivity to input.	Other-controlled.		#19
e) Vocal minorities.	Other-controlled.		Representativeness of input.
f) Branch attitudes towards teachers.	Other-controlled.		#21,40,41
g) Branch attitudes toward board administrators.			#40, 41
h) Branch attitudes toward board technobureaucrats.			#40,41

5. ROLE OF IDEOLOGY			
a) Vision (ideological leadership).	Ideological control.	Leadership; commitment.	#36,37
b) Clash between *Legislature* and educ. elite; purge of elite.	*Professional control.*		N/A
c) Clash between management and *professionals.*	Professional control.		#16,31,34,35,36,37
d) 'Professionalism' as ideology			
i) for professionals.	Resistance.		#34,35
ii)for management.	Exploitation.		
e) Management ideology of 'Excellence'.	Exploitation.		#47
f) Role of educational paradigms.	Ideology.		#44,45,46,47,48
6. SEXISM			
a) Sex discrimination against female professional staff.			#49b,c,d
b) Feminization of teaching profession.			N/A
c) Recruitment to technobureaucratic ranks.			#49a,b
7. BUREAUCRATIC ISSUES			
a) Trusted worker theme.			[Management Informants]?
b) Flextime.	TAYLORIZATION	Efficiency; morale.	#31
8. TIME FOCUS			
9. THREE PERIODS IN BRANCH DEVELOPMENT			#50,51,52

10. BRANCH PLANNING
DAYS ('Excellence')

#44,45,46,47,48

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE AND RELEASE FORM

This is a master list of all 53 interview questions. Most respondents were asked only a subset of questions based on a random assignment of interview forms. (See Chapter 3, pages 87-88.) Form A included questions 4-15; Form B, questions 16-26; Form C, questions 27-36; and Form D, questions 37-48. All respondents received the same introduction, and all were asked questions 1-3 and 49-53.

Interview questions are listed in uppercase; follow-up probes are listed in lowercase. Follow-up probes were used selectively, depending on the respondent's comments.

INTRODUCTION

A. Thank you for agreeing to this interview.

B. Confidentiality of interview explained.

C. Purpose of the tape recorder.

D. Purpose of the study explained.

E. Matrix sampling explained.

F. Respondent asked to sign release form.

1. WHAT IS THE OFFICIAL TITLE OF YOUR CURRENT POSITION?

2. WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS?

   (Clarification: Permanent, Acting, Seconded, Contract, or Wage?)

   [If Non-Permanent:] What are the implications of [*Acting, Seconded, Contract or Wage*] employment for you?

3. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN THIS POSITION?

   Follow-up: When did you join the Branch?
   What is your history with the Branch?
   What other positions have you held in the Branch?
   For how long each?

* * *

SECTION I: TECHNOBUREAUCRATIC RECRUITMENT / KNOWLEDGE BASE

4. WHAT DID YOU DO BEFORE YOU JOINED THE BRANCH?

   Follow-up: [If 'teacher':] Did you ever serve as department head, consultant, administrator, etc.?

5. WHY DID YOU ORIGINALLY JOIN THE BRANCH?

   Follow-up: Dissatisfaction with teaching (etc.)?
   Did you see job with Branch as a promotion?
   Interesting work?
   Lack of other opportunities?

6. WHAT ARE YOUR CURRENT CAREER GOALS?

   Follow-up: What would be the ideal pattern for you?
   What are your current expectations of achieving these goals?
   What are the barriers to your achieving these goals?
     Pension shortfalls?
     Salary inversions?
     Different type of work?
     Lack of opportunity/openings?
     Feel trapped?
     Need advanced degree?
   What would be the most appropriate career pattern for this type of work (permanent, seconded, etc.)?

7. HAS YOUR JOB WITH THE BRANCH MATCHED YOUR EXPECTATIONS?

   Follow-up: on basis of answers to #5 and #6.

8. [For Non-TDSs:] HOW HAS THE RECENT REORGANIZATION OF THE BRANCH AFFECTED YOU?

   [For TDSs:] HOW HAS THE RECLASSIFICATION OF DIPLOMA TDSs AFFECTED YOU?

   Follow-up: Has the reclassification changed the nature of your work?
   Has your reclassification affected your salary?
   Your pension?
   Has your reclassification increased your responsibilities?
   Has your reclassification raised any issues for you?

9. WHAT QUALIFICATIONS DID YOU HAVE FOR THIS JOB WHEN YOU APPLIED?

   Follow-up: Official/paper credentials?
   Experience?
   Work on other government committees, projects prior to working for the Branch?

10. WHAT TRAINING DID YOU RECEIVE ON THE JOB?

    Follow-up: Any formal in-servicing?
    What sort of new skills have you acquired since you joined the Branch?

11. WHAT TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE/SKILLS DO YOU USE MOST IN THIS JOB? (THAT IS, ON WHAT BODY OF KNOWLEDGE IS YOUR EXPERTISE BASED?)

    Follow-up: Classroom teacher, psychometrics, writer, managerial, organizational, typing, etc?
    Are your skills as a classroom teacher directly relevant to this position?

12. WOULD YOU SAY THAT [*job title*] WAS MORE OF AN ART OR A SCIENCE? (ARE [*job titles*] MADE OR BORN?)

13. WHAT PERCENTAGE OF CLASSROOM TEACHERS HAVE EXPERTISE IN THIS AREA? (THAT IS, COULD DO YOUR JOB?)

14. WOULD YOU NEED NEW OR DIFFERENT SKILLS TO HANDLE [*next highest position*]?

15. DOES YOUR CURRENT MANAGER HAVE EXPERTISE IN [*respondent's expertise*]?

* * *

SECTION II: PROFESSIONAL CONTROL (Ideological Proletarianization)

16. WHO ARE YOUR CLIENTS?

Clarification: For whom are you providing a service? Who uses your services?

Follow-up: When you complete a task and say to yourself, "Boy, that came out well, they're really going to love this", who are "they"?
Are there different clients for different tasks?
Which clients are the most important?

17. There are a number of committees in the Branch which include representatives from the other Branches, the ATA, CASS, and the universities or colleges.

WHAT IN YOUR VIEW IS THE ROLE OF THESE COMMITTEES?

18. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THESE COMMITTEES?

Follow-up: Good working relationship or adversarial?
Do they initiate suggestions or react to recommendations?
Committee a rubber stamp or powerful?
Has this relationship changed from when you first started with the Branch?
[If yes:] How has it changed?
Why has it changed?

19. HOW MUCH SAY DO THESE COMMITTEES HAVE OVER YOUR WORK?

Follow-up: Has this changed from when you first started with the Branch?
[If yes:] How has it changed?
Why has it changed?

20. OTHER THAN THEIR REPRESENTATION ON THE STAKEHOLDER COMMITTEES, DO CLASSROOM TEACHERS HAVE ANY INPUT INTO YOUR WORK?

Follow-up: Use summary probes.

21. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASSROOM TEACHERS?

Follow-up: Do teachers see you as providing a service or as an intrusion on their work?
As "'Us' and 'Them'" or as colleagues?
How would you respond to the suggestion that your work is used to "hammer" classroom teachers?

22. WHO DECIDES BRANCH POLICY?

(Where does the responsibility for setting Branch policy lie?)

Follow-up probes: Caucus; Minister, Deputy Minister, Senior Officials; Division Council; ADM; Management Council; Director; managers; professional staff?

23. DO YOU EVER FEEL IT NECESSARY TO BECOME INVOLVED IN BRANCH POLICY?

24. HOW MUCH INPUT DO YOU HAVE INTO BRANCH POLICY?

Follow-up: Have you ever suggested a policy or policy change?
    [If no:] Why not?
        Satisfied with current policies?
    [If yes:] To whom did you make the suggestion?
        Was it acted upon?
        [If no:] Do you know if it was taken forward?
            Were you told why it was rejected?

Have you ever been asked for input or to provide feedback on Branch policies?
[If no:] What about the Branch goals document?
[If yes:] Can you think of an example?
    Did you provide the input requested?
    [If no:] Why not?
    [If yes:] Was it acted upon?
        [If no:] Do you know if it was taken forward?
            Were you told why it was rejected?

25. DO YOU HAVE MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO REFLECT ON BRANCH POLICIES?

26. WHO DECIDES HOW YOUR JOB WILL BE DONE?
HOW MUCH DISCRETION DO YOU HAVE OVER HOW YOU DO YOUR JOB?

Follow-up: How much authority do you have in your job?

* * *

SECTION III: WORKING CONDITIONS (Taylorization)

27. IMAGINE A FRIEND WAS THINKING OF APPLYING FOR A JOB WITH THE BRANCH AND ASKED YOU WHAT IT WAS LIKE: WHAT WOULD YOU TELL HIM/HER?
What do you wish you had been told?

28. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR CURRENT WORKING CONDITIONS?

Follow-up: Is the work interesting?
    Is there much variety?
    How is the workload?
    Do you ever take work home?
    Are you given enough time to meet deadlines?
    Do you have time for professional reading? For research?

29. HAS THE WORKLOAD CHANGED SINCE YOU STARTED HERE?

    Follow-up: Has this been a change in the number of tasks, the type of tasks, or just the volume of the same task?

30. HOW DOES WORKING FOR THE BRANCH COMPARE WITH WHEN YOU WERE TEACHING?

31. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE MORALE AMONG THE PROFESSIONAL WORKERS IN YOUR UNIT? THE BRANCH?

    Follow-up: Collegiality?
    Isolated?
    Loyalty to the management?
    Loyalty to the Branch?

32. DO YOU EVER FEEL LIKE YOU ARE OVERQUALIFIED FOR THE WORK YOU ARE CALLED UPON TO DO?

33. HOW MUCH TIME DO YOU SPEND DOING TASKS WHICH COULD BE DELEGATED TO NON-PROFESSIONAL STAFF, SUCH AS PASTE-UPS?

34. HAVE YOU EVER TRIED TO AVOID DOING SOMETHING YOU WERE ASKED TO DO?

    Follow-up: [If no:] Have you ever wanted to?
    [If yes?:] What and why?

35. HAVE YOU EVER DONE SOMETHING YOU WEREN'T SUPPOSED TO DO?

    Follow-up: Cut corners, cut red tape?

36. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE MANAGEMENT STYLE OF YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR?

37. WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS TYPICAL OF THE BRANCH?

* * *

SECTION IV: PROFESSIONALISM

38. WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOURSELF AS A PROFESSIONAL?

39. WHAT IS YOUR DEFINITION OF PROFESSIONALISM?

40. TO WHICH PROFESSION DO YOU BELONG?

Follow-up: To which professional associations do you belong?
[also ask about subdivisions within organizations, such as membership in specialty councils within provincial teachers' association]

41. IF A CENSUSTAKER WERE TO ASK FOR YOUR ADVICE IN DEFINING YOUR PROFESSIONAL GROUP, WHO WOULD YOU INCLUDE AS MEMBERS OF YOUR PROFESSION?

Follow-up: What about: Classroom teachers?
Regional Office Consultants?
Learning Resources Officers?
Subject area consultants with local boards?
Principals?
Superintendents?
Branch Coordinators?
Associate Directors?
Department Directors?
Senior Officials?
Minister?

42. DO YOU SEE YOURSELF AS MORE OR LESS PROFESSIONAL THAN A CLASSROOM TEACHER?

Follow-up: Than subject consultant with local board?
Than principal?
Than superintendent?
Than Coordinator?
Than Director?
Than Senior Officials?

43. HAS THE WORD 'PROFESSIONALISM' EVER COME UP IN DISCUSSIONS IN THE BRANCH?

Follow-up: Have you or one of your colleagues ever discussed professionalism? When? What did you say?

Has any manager ever made reference to professionalism? When? What did s/he say?

* * *

SECTION V: EDUCATIONAL PARADIGM (Ideology)

44. WHAT, ULTIMATELY, ARE THE GOALS/PURPOSE OF EDUCATION?

45. IN SETTING THE GOALS FOR EDUCATION, WHICH SHOULD COME FIRST, THE NEEDS OF INDIVIDUALS OR THE NEEDS OF SOCIETY?

    (To satisfy the personal needs and aspirations of individuals or to produce graduates ready to make a positive contribution to society? Self-fulfilment vs. marketable skills?)

    Follow-up: Should there be more emphasis on mastering the 'basics' or on personal growth?
    Where do you stand on the 'back to the basics' issue? "Essential Learnings"?

46. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S "CORE VALUES"?

47. ARE THE DEPARTMENT'S GOALS THE APPROPRIATE ONES?

48. THERE HAS BEEN SOME INTEREST IN "THE SEARCH FOR EXCELLENCE" IN THE BRANCH LATELY. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THIS?

* * *

SECTION VI: SEXISM

49. IS SEXISM AN ISSUE IN THIS BRANCH?

    Follow-up: Would a woman have a harder time getting a job with the Branch?
    Do women employees have a harder time getting promoted into management?
    Are men and women likely to be assigned the same type of tasks?
    Do male employees have any advantages?
    Do female employees have any advantages?

* * *

SECTION VII: TIME FOCUS

50. HOW HAS THE BRANCH CHANGED WHILE YOU'VE BEEN HERE?

51. HOW WOULD YOU COMPARE DIRECTORS?

52. WHAT CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THE RECENT CONCERN IN THE BRANCH WITH 'REVITALIZATION'?

* * *

SECTION VIII: CONCLUSION

53. IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD?

THANK YOU.

STUDY ON THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROFESSIONALISM

RESEARCHER: Robert Runté, Graduate Student, Department of Educational Foundations, University of Alberta

I am interviewing educators working for Alberta Education to obtain information about their work experiences. The information will be used in a study about the changing nature of professionalism. The study forms part of my Ph.D. thesis research.

This study has been approved by the Director of the Student Evaluation and Records Branch.

The answers to questions are considered confidential and identifying information will not be given to any other party without your consent. Although information from this study may be published, your name will not be used in any publication.

I will attempt to answer any questions you may have concerning my research procedures to make sure that you fully understand them. If you wish to contact me, my home phone number is 468-3108 and my university office number is 432-5775.

My thesis supervisor is Dr. R. S. Pannu, Department of Educational Foundations, University of Alberta, and may be contacted at 432-3726.

I understand that I may decline to enter the study or withdraw from the investigation at any time.

Signature of Subject:

Date Signed:

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY

Achievement Tests: Province-wide curriculum-specific tests in science, mathematics, social studies, and language arts which are administered on a four-year cycle at the grades 3, 6, and 9 levels. (That is, each of these grades writes one test per year, thereby covering all four subjects after four years.) These tests are designed to generate data for program evaluation and are not used for student promotion purposes (that is, they do not 'count' for the individual student).

ADM: Assistant Deputy Minister. See organizational chart, page 540.

ARO: Assessment Resources Officer; the job title of those Branch professional staff with particular responsibility for statistical, psychometric, and computer analyses. See Chapter 5: The Role of the Test Development Specialists in Determining Branch Policy, footnote 15.

collective autonomy: The degree to which a profession's goals, procedures, and standards are established through collegial negotiation among independent practitioners. See Chapter 8: Introduction, page 349.

collegial control: An occupation's goals, procedures, and standards are established by its membership; that is, its practitioners enjoy a high degree of collective autonomy. (The concept is similar to Johnson's collegiate control, but where his typology contrasts collegiate control with state mediation, I am interested in examining the practitioners' control over the work process within heteronomous bureaucracies.)

collegiate control: In Terence Johnson's typology of producer-consumer relationships, occupations in which the practitioner defines both the goals and the means by which these goals are to be met for the client and in which regulation is provided by autonomous professional associations exhibit collegiate control. Guilds and professions are both examples of collegiate control. See Chapter 1, page 28-29.

Comprehensive Examinations: A discontinued provincial school-leaving examination program, subsequently replaced by the Diploma Examinations. The Comprehensives were optional examinations designed to cater to the top 20 per cent of the school population. Students who wished to certify their superior standing could choose to write one or more Comprehensive Examinations in a variety of academic subjects. Unlike most school-leaving examinations, the Comprehensives covered material from all three years of high school, not just the final year.

CPB: Curriculum Policy Board; a largely lay board charged with advising the Minister on matters of curriculum policy. It does not include any Branch staff.

deskilling: "The concept of deskilling refers to four processes: (i) the process whereby the shopfloor loses the right to design and plan; i.e., divorce of planning and doing; (ii) the fragmentation of work into meaningless segments; (iii) the redistribution of tasks amongst unskilled and semi-skilled labour, associated with labour cheapening; and (iv) the transformation of work organization from the craft system to modern, Taylorized forms of labour control" (Craig Littler, *The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies*, page 25). See also: 'ideological deskilling' and 'technical deskilling'.

Diploma Examinations: Provincial school-leaving examinations in English (language arts), social studies, mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics. Test scores constitute 50% of the student's final mark in the course, while the classroom teacher retains responsibility for the other 50%.

ERC: Examination Review Committee. Each subject area has an Examination Review Committee consisting of representatives of the Examination, Curriculum, and Field Services Branches of the Education Ministry, the universities, the colleges, the superintendents' association, and two representatives of the provincial teacher's association. The committee is chaired by the appropriate Associate Director of the Evaluation Branch. The ERC reviews and recommends for approval to the Branch Director the Diploma Examinations (and associated documents and policies) prior to their release. See Chapter 6: The Formal Structure of the Advisory Committees, pages 195-196.

Examiners: The informal title given to wage or contract staff who assist the TDSs; also frequently referred to as 'backups'. See organizational chart, page 540.

false career ladder: The mistaken equation of lines of authority with lines of promotion and recruitment. See Chapter 8, page 424.

historical proletarianization: The ". . . historical process of the loss of control over work, associated with a shift from self-employment to salaried employment or with the loss of autonomy sustained during a period of prolonged dependent employment" (Charles Derber, "Managing Professionals: Ideological Proletarianization and Post-Industrial Labor", page 311). By extension, the absorption of mental labour within capitalist relations of production, even where these occupations have not enjoyed a previous period of independent practice. See Chapter 1: Proletarianization, page 33.

ideological desensitization: "A denial or separation of self from the ideological context of one's job. Denial involves simply a refusal to acknowledge that one's work had ideological dimensions or serves the interest of particular social groups. Separation or distancing typically takes the form of disclaiming responsibility for whatever uses others make of one's knowledge and skill" (Charles Derber, *Professionals as Workers*, page 181).

ideological deskilling: The fragmentation of the work process or the separation of design and execution, but without accompanying changes in an occupation's knowledge base. Ideological deskilling allows management to intervene at each stage in the production process to reaffirm managerial direction, and also promotes ideological desensitization. See Chapter 7: Conclusion, page 336.

ideological enskilling: The systematic increase in an occupation's skill or knowledge requirements which, while increasing the occupation's technical sophistication, induces a trained incapacity to question goals, leaving the workers open to ideological desensitization and co-optation. See Chapter 7: Conclusion, page 344.

indetermination/technicality ratio: Jamous and Peloille identified two components to professional knowledge: a body of systematic knowledge on which certification and legitimation rest, and a mystique of intuitive knowledge which excludes outsiders. The former may be codified, routinized, fragmented, and otherwise subjected to deskilling and managerial control; the latter cannot. Therefore, the higher the indetermination/technicality ratio, the more resistant the occupation to technical proletarianization.

ideological proletarianization: The professional's loss of control over the goals, objectives, and policies guiding and defining the organizations in which they work (Charles Derber, *Professionals as Workers*, page 30). See Chapter 1: Proletarianization, page 34.

individual autonomy: The degree to which individual practitioners retain autonomous control over their own daily practice. See Chapter 8: Introduction, page 349. Individual autonomy is always constrained to some degree by economic competition and informal peer pressure, and in the professions, is also conditioned by the provision of formal training and credentials. (A successful professional project usually requires the introduction of standardized paradigms and procedures which necessarily represents a shift towards collective autonomy.)

InterBranch Committees: Each subject area convenes a committee consisting of the appropriate subject specialists from the Curriculum Branch, the five Regional Offices, the Correspondence School, and the Evaluation Branch. The committee is chaired by the appropriate Associate Director of the Evaluation Branch. The InterBranch Committees are charged with reviewing preliminary drafts of Achievement Tests and Diploma Examinations prior to these documents' presentation to an ERC or TRC Committee. See Chapter 6, pages 193-195.

junior managers: Those Branch managers who do not have a seat on Management Council, including the Administrative Officers, Supervisors, and some Coordinators. See organizational chart, page 540.

MACOSA: The Minister's Advisory Committee on Student Achievement. Convened in 1977, the committee's studies and reports ultimately contributed to the formation of the case study Branch.

Management Council: A committee consisting of the senior Branch managers including the Director, the Associate Directors, the Assistant Directors, and some Coordinators. See Chapter 5, pages 153-156.

occupational autonomy: The degree to which an occupation is able to establish its own goals, standards, and procedures independent of external influence. Occupational autonomy is subsumed under collective or individual autonomy. Occupational autonomy differs from collective autonomy in that the occupation's goals or procedures may be established by a knowledge or administrative elite and imposed on the membership rather than collegially negotiated. See the introduction to Chapter 8, page 349.

professional dominance: The degree to which an occupation achieves autonomous control over its work process, control over the work of others in its domain, institutional power and licensure, and client deference. (Following Eliot Freidson, see Chapter 1, page 25.

professional project: A strategy of collective mobility in which an occupation's practitioners band together to lobby for elite (usually state) sponsorship, market exclusiveness, and autonomous control of their work process. The ultimate goal of a professional project is to achieve professional dominance.

progressivists: Those educators working in the tradition of the progressive education movement which arose out of the work of John Dewey (see especially ***Democracy and Education***) and his followers. Progressivist pedagogy is characterized by a commitment to child-centred instruction and democratic ideals such as equality of educational opportunity. Its liberal ideological orientation includes a belief in innovation, progress, expertise, and professionalism.

senior management: The managers who sit on Management Council (of the testing Branch): some Coordinators, the Assistant Directors, Associate Directors, and the Director. Though senior managers within the Branch context, they are still subject to direction from the Ministry's Senior Officials. See organizational chart, page 540.

Senior Officials: The senior ranks in the Ministry, including the Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers. The Senior Officials are senior to senior management at the Branch level. See organizational chart, page 540.

Steering Committees: Any of a number of committees convened to oversee those Branch projects where there is no existing InterBranch/ERC/TRC structure. Steering Committees usually include representatives of relevant stakeholder groups such as school superintendents, classroom teachers, and university specialists. See Chapter 6, pages 197-198.

structural proletarianization: ". . . the structure of the labor process at a given point in time, specifically to a delineated form of subordination to management control, associated with a particular period of dependent employment" (Charles Derber, "Managing Professionals: Ideological Proletarianization and Post-Industrial Labor", page 311). See Chapter 1: Proletarianization, page 33.

Taylorism (Taylorization, Taylorized): Synonym for the 'scientific management' movement, after its founder and chief proponent, Frederick Winslow Taylor. A form of management which advocated the use of time and motion studies to fragment the work process into its simplest steps, which could then be assigned to specialized workers, as in an assembly line. Scientific management encouraged the separation of mental and physical labour, the close supervision of workers, the standardization of time, enforced measures of production, and incentive payments. Taylorized workers are generally highly alienated from the product of their labour.

TDS: Test Development Specialist; job title of the Ministerial staff charged with the production of provincial test instruments. The job title for the TDSs in the Diploma Examination Program was subsequently changed to Examination Manager. See organizational chart, page 540.

technical deskilling: A decline in an occupation's skill or knowledge requirements resulting from a redesign of its work process. See Chapter 7, page 336.

technical enskilling: The redesign of the labour process to incorporate additional skills or responsibilities in a particular job category, usually as a form of speedup. Professional-level recruitment to technical-level employment is also an example of technical enskilling. See Chapter 7: Conclusion, page 346, footnote 84, and Chapter 8, page 365.

technical proletarianization: The workers' loss of control over how the technical tasks and procedures which they perform are to be carried out (Charles Derber, *Professionals as Workers*, page 30). See Chapter 1: Proletarianization, page 34.

TRC: Test Review Committee; subject-specific committees charged with reviewing the grades 3, 6, and 9 Achievement Tests; exactly parallel to the ERCs. See Chapter 6, pages 196-197.

Validation Committee: Generally an informal, ad hoc committee of current classroom teachers convened to proofread tests and examinations to catch last-minute glitches just prior to their release. See Chapter 6, pages 197 and 203-204.

FIGURE 7:
SIMPLIFIED ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
OF THE RESEARCH SITE


Minister of Education
SENIOR OFFICIALS
Deputy Minister
Assistant Deputy Minister
Assistant Deputy Minister
Assistant Deputy Minister
Senior Managers
Branch Director
Associate Director
Associate Director
Assistant Director
Assistant Director
Unit Coordinator
Unit Coordinator
Junior Managers
TDSs (Exam Manager) Secondary
TDSs Elementary
Supervisors (Former TDSs)
Administrative Officer(s)
Examiner(s)
Examiner(s)
Unit Staff (Clerks)
Unit Staff (Clerks)