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TITLE OF THESIS...Electoral Perceptions of Federalism:.....  
.....A Descriptive Analysis of the Alberta.....  
.....Electorate.....  
UNIVERSITY....of Alberta.....  
DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED....Ph.D.....  
YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED.....1973.....

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

ELECTORAL PERCEPTION OF FEDERALISM:

A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF

THE ALBERTA ELECTORATE

by



DAVID K. ELTON

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1973

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the relationship between the Alberta elector and the federal structure of government under which he lives. The study examines federal-provincial relations between Alberta and the Federal Government in historical perspective and places special emphasis upon the issues and problems of the 1968 to 1969 period. The data from a 1969 Alberta survey is also examined and five dimensions of the electorate's perceptions of federalism are examined: (1) the electorate's awareness of the division of powers between the federal and provincial government; (2) the degree of concern that Albertans have towards the maintenance of the Canadian federal system; (3) the extent to which individual electors become involved in following federal-provincial matters; (4) the citizen's evaluation of Canadian federalism; (5) the relationship of party identification to perceptions of federalism.

The data presented in this study is based upon a provincial survey of 567 Alberta residents. A random sampling procedure was utilized and the population was proportionately stratified geographically to ensure the sample would be representative. All interviews were conducted by professional interviewers on a face to face basis.



An analysis of the data shows that most Alberta electors were aware of which government is responsible for looking after broad areas of jurisdiction that are primarily within the responsibility of either the federal or provincial government(s). Those who did err in identifying areas of responsibility with the appropriate government tended to underestimate provincial powers and overestimate federal powers. Also, awareness of the division of powers was found to be positively associated with education.

Concern over the maintenance of a division of powers between the two governments was manifest by most Alberta electors. Two basic reasons were given: provincial governments were seen as necessary because they were closer to the people (geographic proximity), and were more capable of providing a personalized service to the citizen.

The electorate's evaluation of the division of powers indicated support for the status quo. Most electors indicated they would prefer to see a clear division of powers between the two governments rather than a sharing of jurisdictional responsibilities. There was no indication that awareness of a government's jurisdictional responsibilities was related to ones preferences regarding increased federal or provincial powers. However, concern over the maintenance of the division of powers was found to be positively associated with a stated preference

for increased provincial responsibility.

Party identification was not found to be associated with perceptions of federalism. No evidence was found to support the balance of power theory which states that electors elect a different party to office provincially than that which is in power federally to effectively balance the power of the party in power at the federal level. The rationale given by provincial Social Credit party supporters for their support of this "provincial party" was based primarily upon administrative, leadership, and candidate considerations. The Alberta electorate seems to perceive the provincial and federal party systems in classical federal terms - independent within their spheres of jurisdiction.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is not often that a doctoral candidate is given the opportunity to undertake field research on a provincial level simply because of the financial realities of survey research. I would therefore like to acknowledge the financial assistance given me by the Special Committee on Constitutional Matters of the Government of Alberta, which not only provided me with the funds to undertake the necessary fieldwork involved in this study, but also refrained from placing any restrictions (other than finances and time) on the scope of the study. I would also like to acknowledge the kind cooperation of Mrs. Vern Hardman who organized and supervised a province wide field force of professional interviewers who competently interviewed many Alberta residents under sometimes trying circumstances. Special recognition should also be given the hundreds of Alberta electors who willingly participated thus providing me with the necessary data.

Throughout the research and writing which is culminated with the completion of this thesis I have received guidance, assistance, and support from many colleagues at the Universities of Alberta and Lethbridge to whom I owe an intellectual debt. I would particularly like to single out my thesis committee, Professors J. Peter Meekison, Fred C. Engelmann and Robert R. Gilsdorf, whose advice and constructive criticism was most helpful and appreciated.

I am particularly indebted to Professor Meekison for his scholarship and friendship which I consider to have been my most valued asset from the conception of the research to its completion. I am grateful to these scholars for their help and am convinced that had I been able to better incorporate all their criticisms this would have been a better thesis.

To my wife and family I record a special acknowledgement for putting up with a husband and father who exposed them to a great deal of inevitable churlishness.

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I

ELECTORAL PERCEPTIONS OF FEDERALISM

With the initiation of constitutional conferences in February 1968, the importance of federal-provincial relations was brought effectively into public view. To the participants, the televising of the proceedings "underlined the importance of the discussions and facilitated public involvement in planning the future of our federal system."<sup>1</sup>

While it was all well and good for statesmen to speak of public involvement in federal-provincial negotiations and thereby justify the televising of the proceedings, there were underlying assumptions regarding the public's knowledge of federalism and the importance of federalism to the individual. Of what import is federalism to the individual? Does it make any difference to the public that the division of powers in Canada allocates

responsibility for education to the provincial government rather than the federal government? Would it make any difference to the citizens of Alberta whether or not their old age pensions or family allowance cheques came from the provincial government rather than Ottawa? To the political scientist, the constitutional lawyer, and the federal or provincial politician the answer to these questions, although not always clear, would be affirmative. But what about the average citizen? Does it make any difference to him whether the federal or provincial government provides the necessary services? Questions of this nature are often answered by the academic or the politician on behalf of the electorate, but unfortunately little empirical evidence is available concerning the understanding of, or the attitudes of the electorate towards such problems.<sup>2</sup> This lack of data concerning the citizen's perception of federalism points out a shortcoming in recent survey research projects. Most behavioral studies deal with voting behavior as it relates to candidates, political parties, and issues, not formal governmental structure. This study is an exploration of the hitherto unexamined relationship between the Alberta elector and one aspect of the formal governmental structure under which he lives: federalism.<sup>3</sup>

#### The Nature of Canadian Federalism

K.C. Wheare defined the federal principles as "the method

of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent."<sup>4</sup> The essence of this definition lies in the coordinate and yet independent relationships established between regional and central governments. The basis of these two relationships is directly related to the division of powers between the two governments. Wheare suggested that a federation might have as a basic requirement a written constitution that stipulates the areas of responsibility within which each government is to function. In the event of conflicts and disputes over jurisdiction, the division of powers provides those charged with interpreting the constitution a reference or check list. The difficulty is that words take on new meanings and governments assume new powers which the constitutional draftsmen could not possibly conceive. Thus, the division of powers as outlined in the Canadian Constitution has changed considerably since 1867.<sup>5</sup>

Although the authors of the B.N.A. Act were relatively painstaking in delineating the powers assigned to the two levels of government, the language they used to define those powers was still, of necessity, general and abstract. Phrases such as "peace, order and good government," "trade and commerce" and "property and civil rights," which appear in Sections 91 and 92, . . . are obviously replete with ambiguities. Even though some of the other subject matters of legislation are more precisely described, the list taken as a whole, could never anticipate the enormous range of complexity of problems which through the course of time have concerned Canadian legislators . . . nor indeed have the appropriate legislative responses to them often emerged in a way which brings them clearly under national or provincial heads of power.<sup>6</sup>



While the courts played a meaningful role in interpreting the legislative powers of the two levels of government during the 19th century, there was a noticeable decline in the role of the courts since the late 1930's. Bora Laskin suggested, "It is as if a stalemate has been reached in the legal relations of Canada and the Provinces, but with no legal, no judicial means of resolving current conflicts."<sup>7</sup> He suggested that there are two discernible reasons for this state of affairs:

Moreover, from the late thirties on, the political disposition appeared to be to rely on constitutional amendment for effective change; and, failing that, to seek to reconcile the difficulties of divided jurisdiction through administrative co-operation which would permit unified action while leaving existing juridically-declared limits of constitutional authority undisturbed. Clearly enough, political federalism has been, for many years, much more dominant than legal federalism in this country.<sup>8</sup>

The displacement of legal federalism by political federalism is not the only change that has taken place. By 1946, when Wheare wrote his book, Canadian federalism had changed considerably from the days of Macdonald. Rather than having a dominant federal government capable of disallowing provincial legislation, Canada had evolved from this quasi-federal state (wherein the federal government was dominant), through the classical federal stage of coordinate and independent status, to a state of mutual dependency between the two levels of government.<sup>9</sup> This development of cooperative federalism within Canada has been the result of the interplay of many forces. This would include war, depression, and

the transformation from an agricultural and rural society to an industrialized and urban society.<sup>10</sup>

The effects of these factors have been to necessitate direct negotiations between federal and provincial politicians thereby facilitating the regulation of the activities between the two levels of government through administrative cooperation. This has been done very effectively through federal-provincial conferences which have perpetrated a maze of intergovernmental arrangements, committees of civil servants, special meetings between the ministers of the two levels of government, and as of 1968 a "Continuing Constitutional Conference" with a continuing committee of officials.<sup>11</sup> This has resulted in what D.V. Smiley refers to as "executive federalism."<sup>12</sup> The resulting labyrinth of ad hoc political agreement reached by these various governmental bodies which for lawyers, academics, and politicians determine the proper activities of regional and federal governments, may, according to John Porter, have precipitated confusion among the electorate:

Because the distribution of powers that now exists between the two levels of government taxes the capacity of the constitutional lawyer and the political scientist to understand it, . . . it is difficult to see what provincial autonomy means for vast segments of the electorate . . . . In this sense the myths that go to support the continued fragmentation of the political system need some critical examination.<sup>13</sup>

Indeed, a critical examination of Canada's federal system has been undertaken during the past two decades.

The various authors who have taken it upon themselves to examine the effects and repercussions of Canada's federal system, have taken basically one of three positions: (1) to predict the demise of Canada's federal system of government through an evolutionary process whose ultimate goal is a unitary form of government; (2) to predict the demise of Canadian federalism through the balkanization of the country into its various regional entities; and (3) to predict the maintenance of a federal constitutional form for Canada by extolling the virtues of this particular system of government and its ability to adapt to the forces of change within the Canadian polity. All three of these positions are based on certain assumptions regarding the meaningfulness of federalism to the Canadian electorate.

#### The Inevitability of Unitary Government

J.A. Corry in an article written during the 1950's suggested several factors which in his estimation have attributed to the development of federal dominance in many areas constitutionally within the jurisdiction of the provinces: nationalization of sentiment among the various elites of the country,<sup>14</sup> the increased demands of big business for uniform labor, monetary and fiscal governmental policies, national governmental leadership in taxation policy, the resulting centralization of decision-making due to the first and second war, etc.<sup>15</sup> Professor Corry also took

special note of the centralizing effects of conditional grants by suggesting that, "[t]he tendency is for the provinces to become dignified and haughty pensioners rather than partners of the national government."<sup>16</sup> The essence of this article was that Canada, due to the increasing interdependence of governments at both the provincial and federal levels, and the necessity for central economic controls (based on an argument of efficiency), had evolved into a type of unitary system of government with the provinces becoming merely administrative branches of the central government.

As for the individual citizen's support of, or reaction to these developments, Corry suggested, "The truth is that the bulk of the people are not really aware of what is at stake in federal-state issues."<sup>17</sup> This observation concurs with the position taken by W.H. Riker in a more recent article. His condemnation of federalism and preference for a unitary state is much more explicit as he suggested that federalism is nothing more than a legal fiction. Riker concluded his criticism of both the recent writings on the subject of federalism and the academics and lawyers who perpetuate this fictional notion by noting:

. . . the ordinary citizen is quite indifferent to the idea of federalism. Indifference is a function I suspect of the realization that federalism is no more than a constitutional legal fiction which can be given whatever content seems appropriate at the moment.<sup>18</sup>

### Inevitable Balkanization

During the 1960's another group of analysts emerged who felt federalism was an outmoded form of government for Canada. These individuals saw regional diversities as requiring a greater independence than that which a federal union affords. While the former argument conforms to the maxim of Lord Bryce that federalism is merely a transient form on the way to a unitary state,<sup>19</sup> the forecasters of eventual balkanization suggest that Canadian federalism is an experiment which has not worked. Some French-Canadians, for example, claim that the forces that bind Canada's two nations together (sociologically speaking) are not strong enough even to maintain federalism nor allow the development of a unitary state. During the past decade the most outspoken and well publicized proponent of this position was Rene Levesque.<sup>20</sup>

In Option Quebec, Rene Levesque dwells upon the differences between French and English Canadians and differs from the former arguments in that he sees balkanization as a result of irreconcilable social differences. In depicting the fundamental differences, which to him demand expression through an independent political entity, Rene Levesque dwells upon language rights, culture, French-Canadian history, and an esprit de corps found within the French-Canadian populace.<sup>21</sup> Unlike Corry and Riker, who speak of the citizenry's indifference toward formal governmental structures, Levesque feels that the residents of at least one of Canada's

provinces, Quebec, are very jealous of the ability of their province to develop social and economic programs independent of the national government and as a result are not only hostile towards increasing federal power but would prefer to dissolve confederation.<sup>22</sup>

Although Levesque's argument deals with but one of Canada's provincial governments and is an extreme position,<sup>23</sup> the repercussions of this movement are felt throughout the entire Canadian federation. Admittedly, the extent to which similar feelings exist in other provinces is dependent upon the economic, social, and political atmosphere of each individual province. One must consider, however, the effects which discontent within one province may have on other provincial governments. Although the feeling of separatism in Quebec may not be shared by persons outside of the province, that does not mean other provinces are not affected by the demands for more autonomy. Premier Robarts was very emphatic on this point in addressing the February 1969 Constitutional Conference:

We must recognize that events in one jurisdiction can have an influence on another jurisdiction many miles away. In this respect, no one province is an island that can act solely on its own, because whatever it does is going to be reflected in attitudes taken by people in other parts of Canada.<sup>24</sup>

Basically one of the two possible reactions on the part of the other provinces may be precipitated as a consequence of political developments within Quebec: (1) strike a sympathetic cord among

both the populace and elite of one or more of the other provinces resulting in either demands upon the central government for greater autonomy or, there is a remote possibility that separatist tendencies within other provinces may be kindled; also, (2) cause a type of backlash effect thereby resulting in demands for greater solidarity between the other provinces and federal authorities.<sup>25</sup> Should it have the former effect, it is possible that other spokesmen favoring the balkanization of Canada will emerge.

#### Federalism: The Answer for Canada

The proponents of federalism are varied, but basically they all agree that federal theory is sound and in practical terms the only constitutional form of government adequate to meet the demands of Canada's diverse geographic, cultural, and economic regions. This does not mean that those who support federalism necessarily accept Wheare's approach which demands a balanced division of the total sovereign powers between regional and central governments in such a way as to guarantee the complete independence of one another. Instead, federalism is seen as a dynamic institutional arrangement capable of continual change through cooperation between the two spheres of government.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau has suggested:

. . . the political future of Canada will lie in the direction of greater centralization in some areas and greater decentralization in others. But at all times, cooperation and interchange between the two levels of government will be, as they have been, an absolute necessity.<sup>26</sup>

In an article written in 1966, Edwin R. Black and Alan C. Cairns support the maintenance of federalism in Canada by pointing out that regardless of the "French fact," the diversities of the English speaking communities demand regional political expression. Their argument is based upon the development of regional, social, economic, and political loyalties:

A general preoccupation with discovering forces tending to create an impressive nation-state led many to ignore the creation and effects of social, political, and physical communication networks within the provinces, the growth of regional economies with international as well as national ties, and the burgeoning provincial bureaucratic and other elites which confidently manage state systems bigger in scope, competence, and importance than some foreign sovereignties.<sup>27</sup>

The implications of Black and Cairns' article is that Canada has both a social and structural federal system. Thus the interplay of political forces responding to economic and social forces tend to entrench even more the perpetuation of the federal system.

#### Parties, Voting and Electoral Perceptions of Federalism

One manifestation of this interplay of political forces is the propensity of some Canadians to support regionally based parties, while at the same time maintaining a relatively stable two plus party system nationally. Alberta has been one of the most consistent provinces in maintaining this pattern, although Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Quebec voters have participated in similar voting patterns. Explanations of this phenomenon on



a national basis have been attempted by several authors by making certain assumptions about electoral perceptions of federalism.<sup>28</sup>

In an article written by Steven Muller in 1961, entitled "Federalism and the Party System in Canada," it was suggested that the Canadian electorate in general not only understood the intricacies of Canadian federalism, but that they voted for different parties provincially than federally in an effort to ensure continued representation of regional interests.<sup>29</sup> Muller's thesis is that at the very heart of Canadian federalism there is an innate tension between the two levels of government which is controlled by a unique development within the party system.

Muller argued that the tension between the two levels of government is primarily caused by federal-provincial financial relations. He suggested that because the federal government has been subsidizing the provinces since Confederation, no satisfactory arrangement has every been devised to balance fiscal needs (real or perceived) with fiscal means. Thus a real strain is periodically placed upon the relationship between the federal and provincial governments as the financial demands of the latter, regardless of the party in power, invariably outdistance the ability of the former to appease the provincial desires. When this point is reached tension builds up between the two governments and it becomes a political necessity to shift the blame for inaction, miscalculations, unpopular policies, etc. Muller contended that it

is politically embarrassing and very difficult to shift the blame from the provincial government to the federal government when the same party is in power both provincially and in Ottawa. Within the provinces the pressure to place the blame upon the national government builds up and eventually the party in power is faced with the choice of overtly confronting their national affiliate, or being defeated.<sup>30</sup>

In the first instance (i.e., the provincial party criticizing its national affiliate), Englemann and Schwartz pointed out some of the instances in which this has taken place:

. . . provincial governing parties have had a long record of serving as de facto opposition to the federal government. This they have done regardless of party. The Liberals of British Columbia under Pattullo, the Liberals of Ontario under Hepburn, and the Liberals of Quebec under Lesage did, just as the Liberals under Thatcher do, oppose Liberal governments in Ottawa on various issues.<sup>31</sup>

In the second instance (i.e., the provincial party being defeated because of its association with the Dominion government party), Muller suggested there is empirical evidence to indicate that it not only takes place, but that it is part of a "classical cyclical pattern":

A Dominion government will be established with a majority in the federal parliament that rests on the support of a majority of the provincial party organizations. As that government stays in power in Ottawa, the governments of the provinces will gradually turn against it. Where the parties in power in the provinces bear the same name as the party in power in Ottawa, these parties in the provinces tend to face defeat. To complete the cycle, a majority of party organizations in the provinces hostile

to the government in power at Ottawa will in the end elect the opposition party to office in the Dominion parliament. Thus, for example, when the Liberal party under Mackenzie King returned to power in Ottawa in 1935, Liberal parties were in power, alone or in coalition, in all of the then nine provinces except Alberta, where Social Credit had just come into office. When the Liberal party was defeated in the Dominion election of 1957, Liberal parties remained in power, alone or in coalition, in only three of the provinces; and in two of these, Manitoba in 1958 and Prince Edward Island in 1959, Progressive Conservative governments came into office at the next provincial election.<sup>32</sup>

The balance of power thesis is supported by both F.H. Underhill and Dennis Wrong in other articles. Underhill has suggested, for example, that "[t]he Canadian people have apparently decided that, since freedom depends upon a balance of power, they will balance one party dominance at Ottawa with effective opposition in the provincial capitals."<sup>33</sup> Wrong, on the other hand, suggested: "Many Canadian voters choose to counter the power of the national administration not by electing a strong federal opposition but by voting against the Liberal party in provincial elections."<sup>34</sup>

The balance of power explanation regarding alternate voting is not substantiated by the foregoing arguments. Rather than suggesting that the electorate is knowledgeable about federalism because of non-Liberal governments succeeding in provincial elections, it seems more feasible to determine first, the extent of electoral perception regarding federal-provincial relations and then infer whether or not party success in either provincial or federal elections is dependent upon what Muller referred to as a "pragmatic

perception of the federal circumstances . . . ."35 The question that still remains unanswered in light of the dubious manner in which the argument has been made is whether there does, in fact, exist a pragmatic perception of federalism among Canadian voters. A second question that also emerges, is whether those numbers of the electorate that actually alternate from one party to another between federal and provincial elections do so explicitly because they want to see different parties in power at the two levels of government.

#### Objectives of the Study

The Province of Alberta and its position within confederation has, since the inception of Social Credit, received considerable attention as attested to by the series of studies sponsored by the Canadian Social Science Research Council. All of these studies deal with Alberta politics in historical perspective.<sup>36</sup> While such an approach yields invaluable insight regarding Alberta's position within confederation, there is a paucity of empirical data concerning the citizen's perception of provincial and federal governments.

The overall objective of this study is to examine the Alberta electorate's perception of federalism. This general objective encompasses five specific objectives:

- (1) To determine the extent of the Alberta electorate's knowledge of federalism.
- (2) To examine the degree of concern that Albertans have regarding the continuance of a federal system.

- (3) To determine the extent to which individuals are involved in federal-provincial matters.
- (4) To study the citizen's evaluation of the federal system.
- (5) To examine the relationship, if any, between political parties and an individual's evaluation of federalism.

As is evident from the above statement of objectives, the primary objective of this study is to gain an understanding of the electorate's perceptions of federalism and obtain, where possible, a precise description of this particular aspect of the individual's political perceptions. In addition, several specific kinds of relationships will be tested.

First, in determining the extent of the Alberta electorate's awareness, concern, involvement, and evaluation of federalism, six key demographic characteristics will also be taken into consideration: education, sex, age, residence (urban or rural), religion, and occupation. In examining the degree of association between these demographic characteristics and the individual's knowledge of federalism several hypotheses will be tested:

- (1) Awareness of federalism increases as the level of education increases.
- (2) Concern about federalism will increase as education increases.
- (3) As is the case with political participation, the higher the socio-economic status of the individual the greater his tendency to become involved in federal-provincial matters.

The second specific set of relationships to be examined is concerned with the degree of association between the three aspects of federalism mentioned above. Four specific hypotheses will be tested:

- (1) As awareness of federalism increases concern about federalism increases.
- (2) As awareness of federalism increases involvement in federal-provincial matters increases.
- (3) As involvement in federal-provincial matters increases concern increases.
- (4) An individual's evaluation of federalism changes as a result of his awareness, concern, or involvement.

A third relationship involving the degree of association between the individual's perception of federalism and his provincial party affiliation will be tested:

There is no difference in the degree of awareness, concern, involvement, or evaluation between the supporters of the four provincial parties.

While awareness, concern, and involvement are fundamental aspects of one's "cognitive and affective map of politics," evaluation is the "stuff" of political life.<sup>37</sup> This study will, therefore, examine the electorate's evaluation of federalism to determine three aspects of the Alberta electorate's perceptions of federalism:

- (1) The extent to which Albertans favor a maintenance of the current division of powers between the two spheres of government.

- (2) Whether Albertans are in favor of a division of powers rather than a sharing of powers between the two governments.
- (3) Whether the Alberta electorate opposes the initiation of federal government programs (medicare and housing) in areas of provincial jurisdiction.

While several specific hypotheses are stated in the above statement of objectives, it should be underlined that this study is primarily exploratory. It seeks to discover the extent of awareness among Albertans concerning federalism, to lay the groundwork for a more systematic and rigorous examination of the electorate's perception of federalism, and to determine whether these factors are interrelated and/or relate to specific socio-economic variables.

#### Outline of the Study

Since this study deals primarily with the electorate of Alberta, federal-provincial relations between Alberta and the federal government are placed in historical perspective. A brief overview of Alberta federal relations from the latter part of the 19th century through to the post World War II period is examined in Chapter II. Particular emphasis is placed upon the development of Alberta's distinctive stance on federal-provincial relations and the expression given this position through intergovernmental relations.

Recent issues and problems of federal-provincial relations

are discussed in Chapter III which sets the stage for the substantive chapters which follow. Important aspects of federal-provincial relations, such as the politics of federal-provincial financial negotiations, the impact of Quebec's quiet revolution, and the influence of a minority government in Ottawa, are discussed in this chapter.

In Chapters IV through VII the data, generated from a province-wide study taken in Alberta in 1969, are examined and the findings of the study are presented. The findings concerning the electorate's knowledge of federalism are examined in Chapter IV. In Chapter V the extent of the Alberta electorate's concern about federalism and involvement in federal-provincial matters is discussed, and the relationship between knowledge, concern, and involvement in federal-provincial matters is explored. Chapter VI focuses on the electorate's evaluation of the division of powers between the two governments. The seventh chapter concerns itself with the provincial party system and the relationship between Alberta parties and the electorate's perception of federalism is discussed. Particular emphasis is placed upon the alternate voter and the rationale for this behavior. The eighth chapter summarizes the findings of the study and makes some tentative conclusions about the Alberta electorate's perception of federalism.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, First Meeting, 1968 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. iv.

<sup>2</sup>John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 379-85. See articles and bibliography in J.P. Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (2nd ed; Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1971); P.A. Crepeau and C.B. Macpherson (eds.), The Future of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).

<sup>3</sup>Mildred Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 92-95. Schwartz utilizes data from numerous Canadian Institute of Public Opinion studies in this book and provides a general analysis of Canadian federalism and public opinion; Fred Schindeler et al., Attitudes Toward Federal Government Information (Toronto: Institute for Behavioral Research, York University, 1969), pp. 20-25; Fred Schindeler, "Perceptions of Federal-Provincial Relations in Ontario," (paper read at the Canadian Political Science Association meeting, Montreal, June, 1972).

<sup>4</sup>K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 10.

<sup>5</sup>Jean-Luc Pepin, "Co-operative Federalism," in Meekison, op. cit., pp. 309-17. Also see J.R. Mallory, "The Five Faces of Federalism," in Crepeau and Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 3-15.

<sup>6</sup>Peter Russell, Leading Constitutional Decisions (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), pp. xiv-xv.

<sup>7</sup>Bora Laskin, "Reflections on the Canadian Constitution After the First Century," in J.P. Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1968), p. 135.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>9</sup>Wheare, op. cit., pp. 53-58; Mallory, op. cit., pp. 3-15.

<sup>10</sup>Pepin, op. cit., pp. 320-28; Mallory, op. cit., pp. 3-15.

<sup>11</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, First Meeting, 1968 op. cit., p. 547.

<sup>12</sup>D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972), pp. 66-72.

- <sup>13</sup>Porter, op. cit., p. 384.
- <sup>14</sup>J.A. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," in Meekison, (first edition), op. cit., pp. 54-64.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 57.
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 64.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 57.
- <sup>18</sup>W.H. Riker, Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, October 1969, p. 145.
- <sup>19</sup>Referred to by Edward McWhinney, Comparative Federalism (second edition; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 4.
- <sup>20</sup>Rene Levesque, Option Quebec (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969), pp. 13-19.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>23</sup>For a further exposition of this position see also Daniel Johnson, Egalite ou Independance (Montreal: Les Edition Renaissance, 1965).
- <sup>24</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, Second Meeting, 1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), p. 228.
- <sup>25</sup>The extent to which developments within Quebec have fostered demands for greater provincial autonomy, or, conversely, demands for greater solidarity, are not easily determined. There have been no studies undertaken to this author's knowledge concerning this matter.
- <sup>26</sup>Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), p. 134.
- <sup>27</sup>Edwin R. Black and Alan C. Cairns, "A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism," in Meekison, (first edition), op. cit., p. 82.
- <sup>28</sup>See Steven Muller, "Federalism and the Party System in Canada," in Aaron Wildavsky (ed.), American Federalism in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); F.H. Underhill, In Search of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: Macmillan, 1961), p. 237; Dennis Wrong, "The Pattern of Party Voting in Canada," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1957, p. 255.

<sup>29</sup>Muller, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>31</sup>F.C. Engelmann and M.A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1967), p. 201.

<sup>32</sup>Muller, op. cit., p. 150.

<sup>33</sup>Underhill, op. cit., p. 237.

<sup>34</sup>Wrong, op. cit., p. 255.

<sup>35</sup>Muller, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>36</sup>See footnote 1 in Chapter II.

<sup>37</sup>The phrase "cognitive and affective map of politics" is defined in Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 15. "The elements of politics that are visible to the electorate are not simply seen; they are evaluated as well. Evaluation is the stuff of political life, and the cognitive image formed by the individual of the political work tends to be positively and negatively toned in its several parts. This mixture of cognition and evaluation of belief and attitude, of percept and affect is so complete that we will speak of the individual's cognitive and affective map of politics."

## II

### ALBERTA AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The problems of western discontent over the policy decisions and actions of the federal government are rooted in the history of the Northwest Territories' struggle for provincial status which dates back before the creation of Alberta as a separate political entity. While the issues have changed somewhat, Albertans have continually voiced dissatisfaction with varied aspects of federal government policy. A survey of the literature and the problems which have generated friction between this province and the federal executive from 1900 to the mid 1950's attest to this observation.<sup>1</sup>

#### Territorial Government and Ottawa

The conflict which arose between the Northwest Territories

government and Ottawa was basically economic in nature but had both political and cultural repercussions. During the period from 1895 to 1905 the prairies were undergoing a phenomenal growth stage which resulted in demands for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, better transportation facilities, etc. This, of necessity, resulted in the creation of a debtor region, not at all uncommon in frontier development, since government and individuals borrowed heavily in an attempt to provide themselves with necessary material goods and services. Morton notes for example:

The settlement of the West was an experiment in marginal agriculture, in which the costs, both material and human, were high, and the process of successful adaptation to new conditions slow. As a result, western Canadians were quickly sensitive to economic and political disabilities that people enjoying a greater degree of security would have accepted with comparative indifference.<sup>2</sup>

The need for increased government services placed a great financial burden upon the Territorial Legislative Assembly, since this body was dependent upon the central government for its funds. The resulting demands of the Territorial Legislative Assembly to Ottawa for increased funds to cope with these problems met with little success. In Territorial Government in Canada, Cecil Lingard noted:

Despite the numerous annual memorials, resolutions, and missions to the federal authorities at Ottawa, with reference to the financial and transportation conditions of the territories, Parliament failed to meet the

moderate requests of the Legislative Assembly. In each successive year the Territorial government saw its needs mounting far beyond its means, and yet it possessed no other recourse, in its existing state of "tutelage," but to seek relief from the federal government.<sup>3</sup>

Lingard concluded that this disregard for the magnitude of the West's problems by the central government was due to a lack of understanding on the part of the cabinet. Furthermore, few if any members of the Dominion government possessed a first-hand knowledge of conditions on the prairies. Not only was the West underrepresented in the House of Commons due to the lag between redistribution and population growth, but the West had little, and sometimes no representation in the Dominion cabinet.<sup>4</sup>

The lack of funds received by the Territorial government from Ottawa was not the only conflict between the two governments, however, as the Dominion lands policy was severely criticized in the West. F.W.G. Haultain, Territorial Premier from 1895 to 1905, claimed that the use of land grants to railroads for the purpose of stimulating colonization hampered the development of local community life since the countryside was divided up in a patchwork fashion with every other section being reserved for the railroads. This rendered community development expensive and hindered the development of communication patterns. These problems, coupled with the inability of the railroads to provide adequate storage and shipping facilities for the wheat produced by the western

farmer, resulted in the development of serious animosities between the regional and central government. To the Territorial premier and his colleagues, the only feasible answer seemed to be the procurement of provincial status which hopefully would result in an increased ability to handle the financial problems of the West.<sup>5</sup>

By 1901 the Territorial Legislature had concluded that provincial status was necessary and representation to Ottawa was officially made. It was felt by those who favored provincial status that the Territories' financial dilemma and development would be vastly improved if the Territories had the constitutional ability to better anticipate and control the finances available for their use. It was also anticipated by those who supported provincial status that the land development policy of the region, which according to the Territorial government had been grossly mismanaged by the federal government, would become the administrative responsibility of the new province.<sup>6</sup>

While there is little doubt that the Northwest Territories constituted a unique enough geographical, economic, and even social unit to justify political expression through the development of a new political unit within the Canadian federation, the practical political realities of the time, as seen by the central government, hindered the immediate realization of an autonomous province in the West.

One of the most serious questions facing the central

government was the volatile question of education rights. The Manitoba school issue was still very much in the minds of the Dominion cabinet and the inevitable question of constitutional guarantees regarding minority educational rights threatened to become a divisive issue throughout the country.<sup>7</sup> There was also concern over the ability of the Territorial government to govern itself once it passed out from under the protective tutelage of Parliament. Furthermore, the federal government did not want to give up its control of the Crown lands or relinquish its policy of cheap land for homesteading purposes.<sup>8</sup>

During the national election of 1904, after having had pressure exerted by the leader of the opposition, Prime Minister Laurier promised that should his government be re-elected it would enable the creation of a province, or provinces, in the Territories. Although the question of provincial autonomy did not play an important part in the election of 1904, the Prime Minister nonetheless did present legislation to Parliament in 1905 requesting the creation of two provinces.<sup>9</sup> Laurier's rationale for two provinces rather than one, which was contrary to the desires of a large majority of the Territorial Legislative Assembly, was based on the premise that such a province would be too large and could, if immigration continued, overshadow the position of the existing provinces within confederation.<sup>10</sup> The reported comments of a Quebec M.P. illustrate this point well:



A Quebec member declared that the division of the territories into two provinces was in accord with public opinion all over Canada. He submitted that two provinces in the North-West would maintain the balance of power among the members of Confederation more equally than one, and expressed fear that one huge province, extending from Manitoba to the Rockies, would soon become overgrown and devour its creator.<sup>11</sup>

Whatever the reason, there is little doubt that the boundary chosen to separate the two provinces was indeed arbitrary and was not based upon geographical, cultural, or political differences.

Although Alberta and Saskatchewan were established as provinces in 1905 so that the people of these regions might better cope with the development and financial problems which existed under the Territorial government system, the two provinces were nonetheless denied full provincial autonomy. For example, the federal government imposed a separate school system upon the new provinces rather than allowing them to develop their own.<sup>12</sup> This was not seen as a serious infringement upon the autonomy of the new provinces as the separate school system was not of much interest to the residents of the Territories. Of serious concern and consequence was the federal government's failure to give the provinces responsibility for public lands and natural resources. From the federal point of view, there was fear that a provincial government might hinder the flow of immigration to the West through legislation detrimental to the low cost of land and the homestead system. From the provincial point of view, federal control meant that little concern would be given to local

conditions or needs, and that settlement of the territories would take place with little regard to local conditions.<sup>13</sup> Thus, while the new provinces gained more control over the extent and use of federal grants and general fiscal policy for the region, dissatisfaction over federal control and intervention in regional matters still existed.

#### The Provincial Party System and Federalism 1905-1911

With the establishment of provincial government status came the development of provincial branches of the two old-line parties. Partisan politics on the provincial level was not the established norm on the prairies, however, as noted in Premier Haultain's address to the Territorial government:

From the earliest times . . . there has been a practically unanimous opinion on the part of the country that this House, in addressing itself to the business intrusted to it, should not introduce questions, names, and cries which had nothing to do with the particular business in hand . . . .<sup>14</sup>

Haultain's position was that the issues, concerns, and eventual policies of regional government were separate from those of the national government. He saw no reason why national party politics should play a role within the regional government structure. This was evident in the executive council of the Territorial government as federal adherents of both old-line parties were counted among Haultain's colleagues.<sup>15</sup> It was generally accepted that elected members of the Northwest Territories government were free to

support whatever party they desired federally, but provincially one should adhere to non-partisanship.<sup>16</sup> Macpherson suggested that the rationale for this non-party stance was based upon two factors: first, the nature of the problems facing the Territorial government were administrative in nature and required a "business-like" approach; and secondly, the Territorial government recognized the need for a united front in presenting the West's case before the federal government. The role of opposing ideology, or, as Haultain suggested, the introduction of "questions, names, and cries" was seen as irrelevant to the solution of the business at hand and crippling to the development of the prairies.<sup>17</sup>

Although a tradition of non-partisanship had been established in Alberta before its creation as a province, the appointment of a Liberal government in 1905 by Laurier was not overtly opposed as evidenced in the election of a provincial Liberal administration that same year. This has not been interpreted by most authors as an acceptance of old-line party politics by the Alberta electors, but rather as an indication of the overriding concern for effective administrative government, regardless of party affiliation.<sup>18</sup> As long as the administration of the province was conducted in an acceptable "businesslike" manner, the Liberal party was successful, as there seemed to be very little opposition to the Liberal provincial government. As one historian has noted, "On the important questions of the hour there was little difference in

the policies of the parties."<sup>19</sup>

Notwithstanding the evidence of a partisan provincial administration non-party sentiment in Alberta continued to grow. Macpherson suggested that the needs of Alberta vis-a-vis the party system were fundamentally different from those of other provinces within Canada. Two characteristics, homogeneous class composition and quasi-colonial status, were singled out by Macpherson as being detrimental to the development or introduction of the party government, the former making such a system unnecessary, and the latter providing a rationale for a positive aversion to a party.<sup>20</sup> The notion of quasi-colonial status is of particular interest as it relates specifically to federal-provincial relations.

The quasi-colonial status of the West was, according to Macpherson, not only economic, but also political in nature. He argued that:

Unlike the provinces which had entered confederation at the beginning, the prairie provinces were creations of federal government; and the federal government retained control over their natural resources until 1930. They were not equal members of a federation; the federal government was to them not only a federal but an imperial government. It was therefore essential to the purposes of the provincial community that its government should be an effective and defensive weapon against this imperial power.<sup>21</sup>

The introduction of the old-line parties into provincial politics, despite the non-party tradition and sentiments in Alberta, was done in an effort to meet the demand of the parent federal party.

It was argued, for example, that if a strong provincial party organization existed then the federal party need not maintain a separate party organization for federal elections but may simply use the machinery already established by the provincial arm of the party.<sup>22</sup> The problem with this theory of party organization is that it does not allow the provincial arm of the party any policies separate from national party policy. The provincial party would, therefore, be primarily an integral part of the central party with very little opportunity to develop regional policy which might from time to time be critical of national party policy. Thus, while an alternate party system wherein the regional branches are an integral part of the national organization may be inappropriate for provincial purposes, there is, nonetheless, "strong pressures from the continuing needs of the federal parties to introduce and maintain provincial party affiliates."<sup>23</sup>

During its first term in office the Liberal party of Alberta had little trouble in maintaining its credibility as a party capable of serving the interests of the province's population. However, in 1910 the Alberta Great Waterways Railway Scandal, which directly involved several members of the provincial Liberal administration, weakened the party and at the same time gave a added support to the developing cynical distrust of politicians.<sup>24</sup>

Scandal within the provincial government was but one of several factors leading to the general discontent of Albertans. A second important factor lay in the continuance of economic dependence upon Eastern Canada which, along with a lack of solidified social or political traditions among a population primarily made up of immigrants from Great Britain and the United States, resulted in an exaggerated sectionalism. Morton, in speaking of the 1911-1916 period suggested:

The characteristic frontier malaise of debt, dislocation and restlessness was active in the province. . . . Alberta was the last frontier by virtue of distance from the original centers of settlement. Distance meant increased freight charges, an intensified sense of being at the mercy of remote metropolitan powers, the bankers of Montreal, the grain buyers of Winnipeg, the politicians of Ottawa.<sup>25</sup>

Given the economic, social, and political unrest, it is little wonder that the United Farmers of Alberta developed and were distinctively different in principle and action from the Grain Growers Association of either Saskatchewan or Manitoba.<sup>26</sup> Most historians agree that the United Farmers of Alberta had no intention of developing a political philosophy, or engaging in overt political activity at its inception.<sup>27</sup> However, the general unrest of its members regarding the political environment under which they lived culminated in political action.

#### Henry Wise Wood and the U.F.A.

The eventual political platform which resulted in U.F.A.

success within the province was an outgrowth of a general theory espoused by Henry Wise Wood. The basic tenets of Wise Wood's theory considerably influenced Alberta's elected representatives on both the provincial and federal levels for over a decade.<sup>28</sup>

The fundamental concept within Wood's theory was one of a continuing competitive economic order composed of two classes, the masses and the plutocratic classes. It was his belief that the struggle between these two classes for control of society was an escalating one in which, as the masses became more aware of the struggle, occupational groups would be formed thereby resulting in open conflict. Wood surmised that once the plutocratic forces within society were defeated, competition between the classes would be replaced by cooperation.<sup>29</sup> While the theory goes on and integrates this class struggle into the historical development of society, the political implication was that the plutocratic classes within the Canadian polity controlled the central government and the old-line parties. Wood therefore felt that it was the moral responsibility of Westerners to organize into occupational classes to confront and defeat these sinister powers. Translated into political action this meant defeat of the old-line parties provincially as well as at the national level by the election of individual occupational representatives.<sup>30</sup>

Wood's perception of party was not new to the West as a decade of political discussion within the western press had

suggested that the party system was a corrupt instrument of plutocracy. The Grain Growers Guide of 1916 indicated for example:

The time has come when the Western representatives should represent Western people and Western views and cut off connection with the privilege-ridden, party blind, office hunting Grit and Tory parties that make their headquarters at Ottawa.<sup>31</sup>

Wood's condemnation of the central government was due primarily to the kind of people who controlled the old-line parties and the inability of Western Canadian representatives to appreciably alter the situation. In a speech given in 1919, the plutocratic classes (who supposedly controlled the old-line parties and therefore the federal government) were cast in the role of middleman gaining advantage from the producer and the consumer. Alberta residents were depicted as the producers of wheat and receiving little for it, while as consumers they were paying an inflated price for manufactured goods because of a protective tariff.

Today we have . . . the most efficient system of manufacturing, transporting and distributing that the world has ever seen . . . . It should have brought the primary producer and the ultimate consumer much closer together . . . and even the luxuries of life in reach of more people than . . . ever . . . before . . . . Today they are farther apart than they have ever been before . . . . The first cause is that the plutocratic classes have organized as economic classes, . . . operating between the primary producer and the ultimate consumer, and getting as much out of each as possible. The second cause is that this great economic force has also developed into a dominant political power operating through the political party system . . . . The political party is a structure ideally adapted to plutocratic control.<sup>32</sup>



A change in party personnel alone would not solve the problem since Wood was convinced that structurally the alternate party system was corrupt. What was needed was a change in the party system itself. The practices which were most often criticized were party solidarity and the executive's prerogative of dissolution.

The concept of party solidarity, it was agreed, stifled the individual representative's initiative and ability to express his constituents' desires. In fact, any attempt to utilize central control of elected members was seen as a perversion of democracy. Furthermore, caucus procedure whereby individual representatives were to subordinate personal opinion to the collective wisdom of the whole, or even worse to party leadership, was unacceptable. The use of party whips was also considered undemocratic. Even the parliamentary practice of all party members supporting a particular piece of legislation whether or not they were personally in favor of the legislation was considered a perversion of democratic government. Any organizational technique which imposed the decisions of a few men (the cabinet) upon the elected representatives of the people was looked upon as being autocratic. As far as Wood was concerned, democracy meant that decision making began with the elected representatives, not with the cabinet.<sup>33</sup>

Wood suggested that one way in which the above-mentioned

"undemocratic practices" might be corrected was to allow the individual representative to vote as he saw fit on any particular piece of legislation without threatening the dissolution of Parliament simply because the executive had initiated legislation which was consequently defeated in the House. The contention was that responsible government could still function by modifying the concept of a vote of confidence. Rather than giving the executive the prerogative of deciding for itself what constituted a vote of confidence, Parliament could only be dissolved on a specific vote of non-confidence in the executive that was in no way tied to any specific piece of legislation. This, he felt, would free individual members of the legislative body to oppose legislation without specifically opposing the administration as a whole.<sup>34</sup>

With the breakdown of party solidarity and the development of a modified vote of non-confidence, Wood felt that occupational groups would then have an opportunity to become effective spokesmen with the parliamentary setting through the election of their members to the Legislature with the specific objective of representing the interests of their individual groups. This, it was thought, would result in an equilibrium of interests. Each occupational group rather than having hired lobbyists would elect their own representatives.

There is little doubt but that Wood's conception of political institutions varied considerably from the then existing parliamentary

structure. In discussing Wood's theory Morton noted:

Wood, and those who thought with him, had advanced far beyond the simple political demonstration planned by the Council of Agriculture in the autumn of 1918. They were attempting to draft a program of group representation on the political movement.<sup>35</sup>

Wood's ideas by no means met with the approval of all segments of the agricultural community, however. The Manitoba Free Press denounced Wood's doctrine vehemently by suggesting that it was the doctrine of class war which would result in the establishment of the Soviet system of government in Canada.<sup>36</sup> Notwithstanding this kind of criticism, the concept of "group government" and its resultant disdain for traditional parliamentary practices nonetheless permeated the United Farmers of Alberta and Wood's political philosophy was accepted by U.F.A. elected representatives on both the provincial and federal levels.

#### The U.F.A. Enters Federal Politics

One of the most direct catalysts which transformed the United Farmers of Alberta from an agrarian association into a political movement, was the quasi-political action of the Canadian Council of Agriculture which sponsored a Farmers' Platform and sought to influence the old-line parties to adopt its platform.<sup>37</sup> With the refusal of the two national parties to adopt the Farmers' Platform agrarian associations across the country began to organize for political action. The U.F.A. was one of these groups and, although

with some trepidation on the part of Wood, the U.F.A. authorized its local organizational bodies to prepare for political action in the federal electoral districts for the 1921 election.<sup>38</sup> Support for the federal old-line parties had dissipated considerably in the West due to the unique situation which developed as a result of the formation of the Union Government. The Liberals lost support over their anticonscription stand, while the Conservatives on the other hand were opposed to the West's demands for tariff reductions.

The Canadian West is overwhelmingly for the vigorous prosecution of the war. It is equally pronounced in its support of national and fiscal policies which, to the occupants of the ministerial benches at Ottawa, represent the extreme of heterodoxy. It has no confidence in the present Dominion Government as a whole or in any member of it as an individual. It admits of no allegiance either, to the leaders of the other side of Parliament House. The Canadian West is in the mood to break away from past affiliations and traditions and inaugurate a new political era of sturdy support for advanced and radical programs. The breakup of parties has given the West its opportunity; and there is no doubt but that it will take advantage of it.<sup>39</sup>

While it is not the intent of this overview to deal in any depth with the development of the Progressive movement, it should be noted that Alberta's representatives were distinctively individualistic and ideologically inclined. The anti-party philosophy of Wood permeated the thinking of the successful U.F.A. candidates to such an extent that it hindered Crerar, the national leader of the Progressive movement, in his attempts to organize the movement. The formation of either a coalition with the Liberals, or accepting

the position of the official opposition party in the national legislature, even after having won considerably more seats than the Conservatives, was denied the Progressive's primarily due to the Alberta representatives' distaste for any semblance of party politics.<sup>40</sup> The difference between the U.F.A. Members of Parliament and other members of the Progressive caucus resulted in a split within the movement by 1924. In speaking of the legislative behavior of the U.F.A. members Morton suggested:

The pre-eminence of the Albertan members and the radical nature of the measures they advocated had the effect, however, of still further differentiating them from their Manitoban colleagues and of causing some uneasiness among these more orthodox Progressives. The friction in the party marked the beginning of the split which in 1924 produced the Ginger Group.<sup>41</sup>

The "Ginger Group" officially broke their ties with the Progressive caucus in 1924 over basically procedural matters. Their fear was that the Progressive movement was developing the tendencies of a political party:

As we see it there are two species of political organization--one the "Political Party" that aspires to power, and in so doing inevitably perpetrates that competitive spirit in matters of legislation and government generally which has brought the world well nigh to ruin; the other is the democratically organized group which aims to co-operate with other groups to secure justice rather than to compete with them for power.<sup>42</sup>

Although the "Ginger Group" was not joined by all Alberta Members of Parliament, its membership was predominantly Albertan.<sup>43</sup> It can, therefore, be argued that the Alberta Members of Parliament

during the Progressive era were distinctive and very regionally oriented. While they shared many of the ideas held by other members of the Progressive movement, they were nonetheless a distinguishable entity within this agrarian protest movement. The dogmatic insistence upon, and promotion of, Wood's concept of group government was a necessity to the Alberta M.P.'s as they felt that such a system of government would better able them to obtain the objectives of their constituents.<sup>44</sup>

#### The U.F.A. and Provincial Politics

While there was initially no intention of political action within the sphere of provincial politics, considerable pressure was exerted upon the U.F.A. by its membership and the Alberta Non-Partisan League, to become active in nominating candidates for the provincial legislature.<sup>45</sup> This action resulted in the entrance of a U.F.A. candidate in a by-election held in the Cochrane riding in 1919. The success of the U.F.A. candidate in this by-election gave impetus to U.F.A. local organizations throughout the province and, by the time of the general provincial election in 1921, it was evident that the U.F.A. would run candidates for the election in almost all of the ridings within the province.<sup>46</sup>

The election of 1921, as far as the U.F.A. was concerned, was fought on the need for reform within government. The U.F.A. platform (called the U.F.A. Declaration of Principles) stated:

Believing that the present unsettled conditions in Canada politically are due in large measure to dissatisfaction with the party system of government, and believing that present day political institutions fail to measure up to the requirements of present day conditions, in that the present system has failed to develop a sufficiently close connection between the representative and the elector, and that the people desire a greater measure of self-government, . . .

. . . . .

and believing that individual citizenship can only be made efficient and effective through the vehicle of systematically organized groups, . . . we the United Farmers of Alberta, base our hopes of developing a social influence and a progressive force on becoming a stabilized, efficient organization.<sup>47</sup>

In an effort to create a closer connection between the representative and the elector, the following reforms were articulated in the U.F.A. platform: (1) proportional representation with a preferential ballot in single member constituencies; (2) endorsation of the principle of initiative, referendum and recall; and (3) direct vote of want of confidence necessary to defeat the government. In addition to these structural changes, the platform also contained a demand for action regarding the provincial regulation of natural resources and the abolition of patronage.<sup>48</sup>

The results of the 1921 provincial election thrust upon the U.F.A. the responsibility of forming the government and the opportunity to change the structure of the political machinery of the province according to their concept of a democratic parliamentary process. As Macpherson noted, however, the U.F.A. found itself faced with a dilemma:

Thus within the pattern established with the attainment of a majority in the 1921 elections and the formation of the first U.F.A. government, two contradictory forces were at work: on the one hand, in the members of the legislature, a lively sense of independence of party discipline and cabinet control, flowing from the emphasis, in convention and platform and campaign, on direct responsibility of the member of his constituency and the freedom of members from the threat of dissolution; on the other hand, the predominance given the premier by allowing him to choose his own cabinet and to assume full responsibility for the work of the government.<sup>49</sup>

While there was considerable opposition to the continued practice of cabinet government, within a relatively short period of time (given the U.F.A.'s stated abhorrence of dissolution) it became evident that there would be no deviation from accepted parliamentary procedure. The lack of reform zeal on the part of the new U.F.A. cabinet was evident in the handling of a reform proposal, submitted to the Legislature by a U.F.A. backbencher, which stated that no government should be considered defeated except by a direct vote of want of confidence. In speaking of this same incident Macpherson concluded that:

The premier (Greenfield) showed himself fully aware of and content with the implications of cabinet government; he intended, he said, to follow the unwritten rule of British parliamentary procedure.<sup>50</sup>

The desire to create a close connection between the representative and the elector was thwarted, not by sinister powers, but rather was found wanting from a practical organizational standpoint and was effectively discarded by the leadership of the very party that



espoused the principle.<sup>51</sup>

The differences between the administrative activities and the structural procedures of the province under the U.F.A. did not differ significantly from that of the previous Liberal administration. Nor for that matter was there a significant change in the province's concern over the federal government's land development procedures. Furthermore, the question of natural resources was, as was the case under the previous Liberal government, a source of continuing federal-provincial dispute.<sup>52</sup>

Although Premier Stewart claimed in 1921 that settlement of the natural resources question was assured, the U.F.A. renewed negotiations with the federal government soon after taking office.<sup>53</sup> The main point of contention was not whether the province should control its own natural resource development, as both the Dominion government and the province had concluded that the western provinces should have the same rights and privileges in this regard as the older provinces within confederation, but rather the U.F.A. were convinced that the Dominion government had no right to withhold these powers in the first place. Therefore, it was contended that the federal government should compensate the provinces for the material benefits the Dominion had derived from the sale and/or allocation of land or natural resources since 1870. This argument was based upon the premise "that the retention of the western natural resources had always been a violation of certain inherent

'provincial rights' which antedated and were in no way abrogated by confederation."<sup>54</sup> The federal government, on the other hand, was willing to make an accounting for their control of natural resources as far back as 1905.<sup>55</sup> An agreement in principle was finally concluded in 1924 wherein the federal government agreed to compensate the province for the 1905 to 1924 period, but no compensation whatsoever was offered for lands disposed of prior to the creation of the province as an independent political entity.<sup>56</sup>

While it was assumed that control over natural resources would be handed over to the province in 1925 or 1926, a dispute arose concerning those sections of the act dealing with the disposition of school lands, and the rights and privileges of separate schools. This dispute was taken to the courts and several years elapsed before a final decision was reached.<sup>57</sup> During this time period, the terms of settlement and the apparent unwillingness of the federal government to accept the Alberta position was a continual source of strain on federal-provincial relations. The U.F.A. in both the 1926 and 1930 provincial elections made special mention of its attempts to obtain provincial jurisdiction over the natural resources and the federal government's unwillingness to cede to their demands.<sup>58</sup> At the Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1927, the Maritime and Prairie provinces supported one another in their claims for better treatment from the central government. The Maritime provinces' claims were for recognition of their economic plight; the Prairie

provinces' claims were for the provincial control of natural resources.<sup>59</sup> It was not until 1930, after the Privy Council had concurred with the decision of the Supreme Court regarding the disposition of school lands, that Alberta and Saskatchewan gained control over their natural resources.

During the U.F.A. administration in Alberta there were several other areas of contention between the province and the central government; freight rates were a continual source of irritation, as western farmers felt they were being overcharged on both the transportation of manufactured goods to the province and the cost of shipping their agricultural products east or west.<sup>60</sup> Canada's protective tariff was seen as discriminatory and as a result was continually challenged by varying organizations within the province, and in particular, by the U.F.A. Of particular concern to the province was the national railway policy and the unwillingness of the federal government to intervene on the province's behalf regarding the administration and purchase of the Alberta Northern Railway.<sup>61</sup> All of these grievances led to considerable disenchantment with the central government both within and without provincial government circles. At the 1924 annual convention of the U.F.A., for example, a resolution was proposed regarding western separation. While no action was ever taken on this proposal, it is indicative of the sentiments of at least one vocal segment of the Alberta populace.<sup>62</sup>

With the beginning of the depression, the U.F.A. administration found itself hopelessly short of funds yet faced with continual demands for more and more governmental assistance. The inability of the province to procure adequate funds for the various programs undertaken to combat the problems, created not only by the depression but also by a deterioration of the agricultural industry during the 1930-32 period, resulted in Premier Brownlee moving a resolution in the provincial legislature urging the Dominion government to appoint a special Royal Commission to investigate the plight of agriculture in Western Canada.<sup>63</sup> The seeming inaction of the central government to substantially aid the province, or even seem interested in the problems of the West during this period of economic chaos, did little to enhance dominion-provincial relations.

#### Social Credit and the Dominion Government

With the deepening of the depression Alberta citizens became even more disillusioned with the existing political order than had been evident during the early years of the U.F.A. John Irving, in writing of the early depression period and the resultant rise of Social Credit suggested:

No conditions could have been more favorable for the development of such unrest than those which existed in Alberta in the autumn of 1932. The farmers of the province had experienced every possible agricultural ordeal; they had been made the playthings of the high tariff manipulators; they had built up markets in the United States only to have them ruthlessly cut off; they had suffered drought and every agricultural

pestilence from root-rot to grasshoppers; they had seen prices drop to such incredibly low levels that sometimes it did not pay to haul their produce to market. Under such circumstances, they found it well-nigh impossible to keep up the payments on their heavily mortgaged farms. The discouraged farmers, looking for some tangible cause for all their miseries, focused their resentment and hate upon the banks and loan companies.<sup>64</sup>

Social Credit offered a new social order to the dejected Albertan. It identified the large eastern industrial and financial interests as the causes of their troubles (a role they had been cast in by Wise Wood more than fifteen years earlier) and advocated the establishment of a truly functional democracy rather than the constitutional democracy utilized by the party machines.<sup>65</sup> The functional democracy of which the Social Credit spoke was very similar to that which the U.F.A. had proposed. The representative was to be responsible to his constituents rather than his party: a relaxing of party solidarity was advocated, and the establishment of an advisory board of experts to guide the government in its initiation of Social Credit was suggested.<sup>66</sup> In essence, the selfsame perpetrators of western misfortune that had plagued Albertans for decades were once again identified and castigated for their self-serving utilization of the political machinery of the country.

Where the Social Credit movement differed significantly from its predecessors--the U.F.A.--was its frontal attack upon the existing economic system. Social Credit did not only identify the financial industry of the country as the perpetrators of Alberta's problems,

but also challenged the very economic system upon which the financial community was based, and proposed unorthodox remedies which stressed greater government involvement and control of all phases of the financial community.<sup>67</sup>

Unlike the Progressive movement which received considerable support from other areas of the country electorally, the Social Credit failed initially in its efforts to obtain political office outside of Alberta, and, therefore, found it necessary to utilize the power of the provincial legislature in its efforts to change national policy.

The near disintegration of the Canadian federation under the impact of the depression, coupled with the failure of the Social Credit forces to make any substantial gains elsewhere, led to an attempt to attain the objectives of the movement by exploiting the power and position of the provincial legislature rather than by modifying national policy through securing legislative change in Ottawa.<sup>68</sup>

Aberhart, therefore, found it necessary to concern himself with federal matters as the nature of the western economy was such that the problems facing Alberta (e.g., agricultural policy, transportation, the establishment of tariff policy, the flow of capital) lay within the federal government jurisdiction or were of concurrent jurisdiction with federal paramountcy. Thus, while there was little doubt from the outset as to the outcome of any constitutional confrontation between the two governments vis-a-vis the legitimate powers to administer programs and/or pass legislation dealing

particularly with money and banking, the Social Credit nonetheless felt that the B.N.A. Act gave it enough latitude to initiate a modified Social Credit program.<sup>69</sup> It is, therefore, of particular interest to this study that the provincial government of Alberta under Social Credit was willing to enter into a constitutional battle with the central government over money and banking regulations and related areas of jurisdiction, even though most constitutional experts considered the powers of the federal government unequivocal. Aberhart was convinced that the supporters of Social Credit were so dissatisfied with federal government policy that they would support his administration in its fight for greater provincial autonomy.<sup>70</sup>

Shortly after obtaining office the Aberhart government requested that the federal government initiate a Royal Commission to study in detail the problems of Western Canada. When the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois Commission) was established in 1937, Aberhart was highly critical of the personnel chosen to conduct the inquiry and flatly refused to cooperate with the Commission in any way. Rather, the Aberhart government chose to establish a special study of its own which resulted in the publication of The Case For Alberta.<sup>71</sup> The foreward of this document articulates well the Social Credit government's concern over the Rowell-Sirois Commission, and gives evidence that Aberhart and his followers anticipated that the Commission would recommend increased centralization given the personnel chosen to conduct the inquiry.

Alberta was among the first in asking for the appointment of a Royal Commission to consider the many problems which beset Western Canada. It was a matter of deep regret to the Government of the Province that when a Commission was set up by the Dominion Government, it was of such a nature and it was appointed under such circumstances that the Alberta government was obliged to register a strong protest. Without in any way reflecting upon the integrity of the personnel of the Commission it was the considered opinion of the Alberta Government that neither the qualifications of the personnel as a whole, nor the terms of reference which were to guide them, would yield a recognition of the fundamental causes of our troubles or an appreciation of the action necessary to deal with them . . . . The recommendation for increased centralization of control by the Dominion Government and by the Bank of Canada; . . will not be acceptable to the people of Alberta.<sup>72</sup>

The Case For Alberta then goes on to state that "[t]he province was not consulted either in regard to personnel or terms of reference, and both Saskatchewan and Alberta are without representation on the Commission."<sup>73</sup> It was, therefore, the considered opinion of the Alberta government that an exposition of the province's position should be made by those sympathetic to their problems and rather than presenting Alberta's case to a biased Royal Commission, its appeal would be to "the highest court in the land--the Sovereign People of Canada."<sup>74</sup>

#### The Case for Alberta

The Case For Alberta is perhaps one of the most comprehensive research reports compiled by a Western Canadian province regarding federal-provincial relations. The study reviews the effects of



federal government policy upon Alberta from prior to 1905 to 1938. The range of subject matter indicates the extent to which the Social Credit government believed that the federal government had utilized the West for the building up of the Western Canadian economy to the detriment of Western Canada. The 432-page document was separated into two parts: Part I dealt with the problems arising out of federal land settlement policies, freight rates, protective tariff policy, Dominion monetary policy, the marketing of Western Canadian products, public finance and taxation as it affects social services such as public health, welfare benefits, old age pensions, mother's allowance, unemployment, and aid to the farmer. Part II, a 55-page brief, was a statement of Social Credit monetary policy and the need for a complete reorganization of the economic system.<sup>75</sup>

While it is not the purpose of this study to analyze Social Credit polemic, the Alberta government's documentation of the effects of federal policy upon the province's development is of considerable importance to many as the problems articulated in The Case For Alberta are still found in the briefs of the Alberta government.<sup>76</sup>

One of the most important grievances that the province had with the federal government concerned the transportation of Alberta commodities, both produced and consumed. The province claimed that "[t]he people of Alberta suffer the highest freight charges on goods exported from the provinces, and pay the highest rate on incoming goods."<sup>77</sup> To Alberta, the national transportation policy was

discriminatory and the federal government was allowing the railways to take undue advantage of the province as freight rates imposed on goods destined for, or coming from, Alberta were higher than the rates charged in other parts of Canada.

The Case For Alberta documents with considerable detail the considered inequities in freight rates and makes comparisons of the shipping costs of commodities from all parts of Canada to Alberta and even contends that shipping costs within the province were exorbitant.<sup>78</sup> The report concludes that "Alberta stands at the very apex of the freight rate structure" and suggests that the burden of paying for the transportation of produce should be carried nationally and not disproportionately.<sup>79</sup>

Another area of considerable concern was the economic burden placed upon the province as a result of the federal tariff policy. This policy was attacked on the basis that Alberta citizens were being asked to pay an extraordinary amount in relationship to other provinces for the benefits Alberta received. The main contention of the province was that each province should bear the costs of the federal tariff policy proportionately to its share of the non-economic benefits achieved.<sup>80</sup> The rationale for this position is found in the provincial government's espoused view of the Canadian federation:

We take this attitude because Canada is a federation and not a unitary state, which implies that a province in the dominion has rights quite different from those

(e.g.) of a municipality, from which wealth may be drawn, without compensation, for the good of the larger whole, on the basis of ability to pay. Each province should enjoy for the benefit of its own citizens whatever wealth arises from its people and its resources, subject only to the obligation to contribute toward national purposes on a proportional or other more accurate "benefit received" basis. The common feeling that "no province should be worse off in the federation than it would be out of it," sums up this viewpoint fairly aptly.<sup>81</sup>

A third area of contention between the province and the federal government concerned federal monetary policy. The central government was criticized in the Alberta report for its inability to develop policy which would have partially insulated the farmers from the disastrous fall in agricultural prices within the international market place. Here again, it was the opinion of Alberta that one section of the nation was being sacrificed to benefit another through the maintenance of a relatively high external exchange value.<sup>82</sup>

With regards to the marketing of Alberta products, the policies of the Canadian government were found wanting in many areas. The producers of Alberta coal, petroleum, and livestock felt that that federal government was remiss in not taking a greater interest in obtaining or establishing markets for their products either at home or abroad. High United States tariffs and quotas on coal, petroleum, and livestock prohibited the importation of large quantities of Alberta products into the Northwestern United States markets, while transportation costs and lack of a Canadian protective barrier

resulted in closing off Eastern Canadian markets to Alberta products. While these problems were not new to western producers, the ability to accept them as legitimate factors in the market place was lessened with the deepening of the depression. Furthermore, the practice of the federal government to establish reciprocal trade agreements with other countries by allowing the importation of livestock into Canada duty free so the Canadian secondary producers might gain access to foreign markets was hardly palatable to the western primary producer: "[t]he policy of assisting secondary producers at the expense of primary producers goes steadily on and adds to the general discontent of the West."<sup>83</sup>

The unavailability of markets was not the only concern of the provincial government in relation to the marketing of Alberta products, however. The Government of Alberta also charged that the federal government had callously disregarded the need for equitable marketing procedures. It was claimed that the large meat packing companies had actually established a monopolistic concentration which had resulted in the unacceptable practice of often paying the primary producer less for his product than what it cost him to produce it, but yet at the same time permitted the packing companies to operate at a substantial profit. It was, therefore, concluded that "[t]he present system is unsound economically, as it does not protect the efficient primary producer in the matter of his production costs and reasonable profit, whereas the processor is protected irrespective

of the effect on the producer."<sup>84</sup>

In the area of social services the Government of Alberta stated concern over rising costs. The report deals in considerable detail with health costs and complains bitterly about the manner in which grants-in-aid are unilaterally withdrawn:

The government of Alberta takes the stand that Federal grants which operate for a temporary or uncertain period are not satisfactory, as the Province assumes certain duties by reason of the grants, and finds it difficult to terminate a service after the Federal grant ceases.<sup>85</sup>

The request by the province to the federal government to enter into a cost sharing arrangement regarding several programs, makes it quite clear that the Government of Alberta was not opposed to cost sharing per se, but rather wanted assurances that once a program was established on this basis it would be continued until such time as there was a mutual agreement to change the financing of the program.

With regards to two other services, old age pensions and unemployment, the province requested that the federal government take over complete responsibility. The province argued that both of these programs required a uniform and national set of standards and therefore the federal government should establish and maintain these programs throughout the Dominion.<sup>86</sup>

The Case For Alberta graphically illustrates the broad basis of Alberta's frustration with federal government policy. Throughout

the document it is apparent that the Government of Alberta perceived the federal government to be unsympathetic to the needs of the people of Alberta. Nonetheless, it is evident from the recommendations made by the Social Credit government that they felt that satisfactory arrangements could be made if only the federal government would treat the province on an equal basis with central Canada.

The failure of the federal government to heed the needs of Albertans, as articulated by the provincial government in this document, was seen as adequate cause for massive rejection of national goals and objectives. The report made reference often to the unwanted consequence of national disintegration:

The outstanding fact which dominates any consideration of Dominion-Provincial relations and the needs of the present critical period in our dominion's history is that no mere partial or half-way measures will suffice. At all costs Confederation must be preserved, but unless courageous action is taken in time to deal with the fundamental economic causes from which our troubles arises, national disaster is certain.<sup>87</sup>

#### The Social Credit Legislative Record From 1935 to 1943

Until the fall of 1937 there was no open conflict between the federal government and the province regarding the passage of unacceptable legislation, although two acts relating to Social Credit policy were passed in the 1936 sessions of the Alberta legislature. The Social Credit Measures Act, passed in the spring of 1936, was a general Act which stated the government's intention to "bring about the equation of consumption to production, and to afford each person

a fair share in the cultural heritage of the people of the province."<sup>88</sup> The Alberta Credit House Act was passed a few months later in a special autumn session of the provincial legislature. This Act was much more specific than its predecessor as it established a branch of the government for the purpose of issuing credit. While both of these Acts initiated a modified Social Credit program, no action was taken by the federal government even though the legislation dealt indirectly with money and banking.<sup>89</sup>

In the fall of 1937 a four day session of the Alberta legislature was held and three rather contentious pieces of legislation were passed and signed by the Lieutenant Governor. Two of the three Acts (The Credit of Alberta Regulation Act and the Bank Employee's Civil Rights Act) dealt directly with the regulation of the credit policy of chartered banks. The third Act, the Judicature Act Amendment Act prohibited anyone from challenging the validity of provincial statutes in the courts. The federal government immediately disallowed the legislation on the basis that they were all ultra vires the provincial government's legislative powers.

Mallory suggested that the Aberhart administration had not thought that the federal government would resort to using disallowance.<sup>90</sup> The disallowance of the legislation was responded to by Aberhart calling a second special session of the legislature and passing a modified Credit of Alberta Regulation Act with all references to banks, and banking being replaced by the terms "credit"

or "business of dealing in credit."<sup>91</sup> In addition, a Bank Taxation Act was enacted. This piece of legislation was essentially punitive in nature and was designed to encourage chartered banks to cooperate with the provincial government or face increased business taxes.<sup>92</sup> Also, an Accurate News and Information Act was passed to control the news media's attacks upon the Social Credit government's activities. These three Acts met with different fate than the legislation of but a month previous, as they were reserved by the Lieutenant Governor for the Governor General in Council.<sup>93</sup>

The conflict between the two governments was now open and bitter. The Aberhart administration had not thought either the power of disallowance or reservation would be used as they were considered obsolete.<sup>94</sup> The reactions of the Social Credit government to the usage of these two powers was to publicly attack the federal government and its appointee, the Lieutenant Governor, as being autocratic and utilizing outmoded powers of questionable constitutional validity.

From a practical political point of view the consequential constitutional battle which ensued as a result of this open schism between the two governments was that Aberhart's support within the province seemed to be growing rather than diminishing. The Alberta electorate's support of Aberhart's open confrontation with Ottawa was contrary to what the Mackenzie King administration had anticipated. Mallory suggested, for example, that the Liberal



government's position was "that it would be far better for the Aberhart regime to suffer for its own excess of zeal than for the Liberals to incur political odium by interfering."<sup>95</sup> When it became apparent that the legislative activities of the Social Credit would not be censored by their own electorate federal government intervention became necessary.

Rather than disallowing the three bills reserved by Alberta's Lieutenant Governor, the federal government referred the legislation to the Supreme Court, and in addition, asked the Court for a decision regarding the constitutionality of the powers of disallowance and reservation.<sup>96</sup> The Supreme Court considered first the question regarding the constitutionality of the powers of disallowance and reservation. In both instances, these powers were found to be constitutional and in no way diminished as a result of what Alberta referred to as "constitutional evolution."<sup>97</sup> The Court's decision regarding the three Acts under the Court's consideration found ultra vires, but the original Social Credit Measures Act and the Alberta Credit House Act were also considered ultra vires.

On March 4, 1938, the Supreme Court handed down its judgement. It was unanimously of the opinion that all three bills were ultra vires of the provinces. It went further. The Chief Justice, in the principal judgement, recalled the central scheme of the Alberta Social Credit Act to find that this Act was itself ultra vires, and thus the whole legislative edifice of social credit was brought to the ground in a single judgement.<sup>98</sup>

The actions of the federal government in disallowing the province's first major attempt to establish Social Credit, the

Lieutenant Governor's subsequent reservation of legislation, and the Supreme Court's rejection of all Social Credit legislation, was adequate to convince the Aberhart administration that Social Credit legislation per se would not be interpreted as being within the constitutional power of a provincial government.

The second phase of the Alberta's legislative struggle with Ottawa dealt with public debt legislation. The province, in seeking to ease the impact of the depression's effects upon its citizens, developed a program of debt legislation. It was not that debt legislation was a novel legislative program of Social Credit that resulted in further friction between Alberta and the federal government, but rather it was Alberta's interpretation of what constituted legitimate government control and interference in debtor-creditor relationships that was at issue. Even the large institutional creditors (insurance companies, trust and mortgage companies, etc.) were willing to accept debt legislation which was limited to the postponement of payment. Federal legislation, the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act of 1934 went even further in that it permitted an adjustment of principle and interest on the basis of the debtors' ability to pay under some circumstances. What neither the creditors of Alberta's property owners, nor the federal government, were willing to accept however, was legislation based upon the premise that the creditors should share the responsibility of having created conditions which made it impossible for conscientious debtors to

repay their debts. It was upon the last two concepts of debt legislation, and particularly upon the last premise regarding mutual responsibility that the Government of Alberta based its debt legislation.<sup>99</sup>

During the 1936 to 1943 period, six of Alberta's attempts to regulate debt in Alberta were disallowed.<sup>100</sup> The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were called upon continually throughout this same period to declare in excess of ten acts and amendments to acts relating to debt legislation ultra vires the provincial government's jurisdiction on the basis that the regulation of interest and principle, and bankruptcy and insolvency, were both areas of federal government jurisdiction.<sup>101</sup> The final blow to Alberta's debt legislation program came in 1943 when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found Alberta's basic piece of debt legislation, the Debt Adjustment Act, ultra vires on the basis that "the Act as a whole constitutes a serious and substantial invasion of the exclusive legislative powers of the Parliament of Canada."<sup>102</sup>

Upon taking office in 1935 the new Social Credit government found themselves faced with a substantial public debt of approximately 160 million dollars, which meant that Alberta's net debt charges per capita were the highest of any province in Canada.<sup>103</sup> The Social Credit policy developed to cope with Alberta's debt was one of interest rate reduction. This policy was not acceptable to either Alberta's creditors or the Dominion government, however. The

rejection of the province's attempts to reduce the public debt resulted in the development of yet a third area of contention between the two levels of government.

Alberta did not resort to legislation concerning the control of public debt until the fall of 1936. Prior to this time the province approached its creditors asking that they accept a 50 percent reduction in interest rate as the Province was not able to meet the existing debt payments.<sup>104</sup> The rejection of this proposal by the bondholders resulted in the application by the province to the Dominion government for special grants to meet the quarterly payments. The central government responded to the requests by the Social Credit government in 1935 but indicated that some type of agreement would have to be reached before the April 1, 1936 payment fell due.<sup>105</sup>

At the Dominion-Provincial Conference held in December of 1935, a proposal was made by the Dominion government to establish a National Loan Council. The Loan Council was to consist of the federal Minister of Finance, the Provincial Treasurer, and the Governor of the Bank of Canada. The purpose of the Loan Council was to facilitate the refunding of provincial debt through the auspices of the federal government. The Dominion government was willing to guarantee the provincial loans on condition that no further borrowing would be undertaken by a province without the Loan Council's sanction.<sup>106</sup>

Although Alberta's opposition to this proposal was not apparent at the outset of the discussions, as the negotiations between the two governments progressed it became apparent that Alberta was not willing to accept the proposed Loan Council's ability to curtail the province's borrowing. The Dominion government on the other hand refused to grant the province the necessary funds to meet its April payment. The impasse resulted in the province defaulting on its payment to its bondholders.<sup>107</sup>

The Provincial Securities Interest Act, enacted at a special session of the Legislature in August of 1936 to enforce the reduction of interest rates on outstanding provincial debts as had been proposed earlier, was not the solution to Alberta's problems.<sup>108</sup> The province's bondholders immediately challenged the constitutionality of the Act and the Alberta Supreme Court declared the Act ultra vires on the grounds that the pith and substance of the legislation was the reduction of interest, a subject matter that was solely within the Dominion government's jurisdiction.<sup>109</sup> The decision of the Court did not deter the Aberhart administration however, as the province repealed this Act and replaced it with three other acts in 1937, which were destined to accomplish the same objective. Once again the legislation was challenged and found ultra vires by the Supreme Court of Alberta.<sup>110</sup> The Court decisions failed to effectively deter the province as Alberta simply paid its creditors at a

reduced interest rate and defaulted on the outstanding balance. This policy resulted in the province defaulting on the payment of nearly 12 million dollars during the 1936 to 1939 period.<sup>111</sup>

The Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations

By the time the Rowell-Sirois Commission reported its findings and made its recommendations to the federal government, World War II had broken out and the foreign threat to Canada preoccupied all levels of government. Prime Minister Mackenzie King nonetheless felt that the matter of improving Dominion-Provincial relations was of such importance that he requested a Dominion-Provincial conference be held in January of 1941 to discuss and hopefully adopt the major recommendations of the Commission.<sup>112</sup> The Commission's recommendations as interpreted by Prime Minister Mackenzie King were basically fourfold:

- (1) the Dominion government would take over the whole burden of provincial net debt;
- (2) unemployment would be looked after by the Dominion government;
- (3) the exclusive rights to succession duties, corporate taxes, and personal income taxes would be taken over by the Dominion government;
- (4) a national adjustment grant would be made to the provinces to replace present provincial government revenues from succession duties, corporate taxation, personal income taxation, and Dominion government subsidies.<sup>113</sup>

While Alberta had requested in The Case For Alberta that the payment of unemployment and a large portion of the provincial debt

be taken over by the Dominion government, the Social Credit administration abhorred the centralization of control that they felt would result from the Commission's recommendations. Premier Aberhart, although accepting the invitation to attend the conference, made it very clear that Alberta found the Dominion government's support of the Rowell-Sirois Commission's recommendations reprehensible.

Surely it must be evident to any loyal British subject that to sit calmly and indifferently by while we are being hoodwinked and inveigled into a financial dictatorship or a fascist state, at a time when we are giving the best of our manhood to the empire and are sacrificing our all to overcome that foul thing which has raised its head in the world in many guises--a totalitarian order of centralized control and regimentation--is not only ridiculous but dangerously criminal.<sup>114</sup>

It is understandable, given the hostility of Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario, that the conference closed abruptly after only two days of consultation and without any agreement regarding the implementation of the Commission's recommendations.

#### Alberta and Post World War II Dominion-Provincial Relations

Although Alberta refused to accept the recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Commission, the province agreed to a five year tax rental agreement with the Dominion government in 1942. The necessity of supporting the Dominion government in its war efforts was not the only factor that seemed to ameliorate Alberta-Dominion relations during the 1941 to 1945 period however. During the war

years Alberta found itself in a much better position to meet its financial obligations and no further attempts were made to circumvent or thwart Dominion government monetary policy.

As the war came to a close the Dominion government once again called a federal-provincial conference to deal with a broad spectrum of Dominion-Provincial relations which were neither solved nor dissipated during the war years. The conference was officially titled the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction. From the outset of the conference the Dominion government made its proposals clear and precise. Basically what the Dominion government wanted to do was take over those programs within provincial jurisdiction, that would in their estimation, be better administered on a national basis. The programs encompassed mainly the area of health and welfare, but also included such things as the building of a national highway.<sup>115</sup>

The Dominion government was not alone in its preparation for the conference however, as the Province of Alberta also prepared a comprehensive proposal inclusive of an agenda for the plenary conference itself. Although neither Alberta's proposals (which dealt more with the premises upon which decisions should be made rather than specific programs),<sup>116</sup> nor its agenda were utilized as the basis for discussion, it was apparent from the outset of the conference that the province's view of reconstruction differed fundamentally from that of the Dominion government. While the Dominion



government's proposals emphasized national programs requiring central government direction and involvement, Alberta advocated decentralization. Premier Manning in addressing the conference stressed the necessity of maintaining the principle of decentralization.

Long ago it was discovered that the weakness of a central representative government being granted over matters which were of particular importance to various areas of the country, was, that whereas the representatives of those areas might press for action on a matter of the utmost local importance, they would be met by indifference or even opposition on the part of representatives from other localities, with the result that matters of general concern invariably took precedence and it was almost impossible to get effective action on local issues.

Any program based on the premise that more power and authority should be centralized under the jurisdiction of the Dominion Government, is in the light of experience, unsound in principle and a negation of the basic policy of decentralization. . . .<sup>117</sup>

While the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction struggled through two rather lengthy plenary conferences within a ten month period in an effort to resolve the differences of opinion which existed between the several governments, it ended in a similar fashion to the 1941 conference. Alberta, like many of the provinces, was simply not willing to accept the contention that greater central government involvement was either necessary or advantageous to the orderly development of government services.<sup>118</sup>

The rejection of the Dominion's proposals for reconstruction by not only Alberta but the other provinces as well, did not deter

the central government however. Alberta's position regarding decentralization was effectively circumvented in the post war years by the piecemeal acceptance by the province of Dominion programs. The province renewed its tax rental agreement in 1947, 1952, and 1957. Furthermore, numerous cost sharing arrangements were entered into between the province and the Dominion government. The St. Mary Irrigation project in Southern Alberta is a good example of such a federal-provincial cost sharing program. In sum, as Donald Smiley observed, "A very large number of federal-provincial conditional grant programs had been established relating to the fields of hospitalization, general and categorical public assistance, public health, the development of agricultural and forestry resources, and the Trans-Canada Highway."<sup>119</sup>

The amelioration of Alberta-Dominion relations during the post World War II era was the result of many varied conditions. The first factor influencing a rapprochement between Alberta and Ottawa was the increase in revenue to the province from natural resources which increased the province's ability to meet the financial demands placed upon it. In addition, the province experienced the increased influence of program specialists within its civil service. The province's administrators had much in common with their federal counterparts professionally and found it advantageous to cooperate with them. This facilitated the development of joint programs as the mutual objective of both

the federal and provincial administrators were to settle their differences among themselves rather than face the possibility of unwanted intervention by politicians in the development of programs.<sup>120</sup>

A third factor that accelerated the need for increased cooperation between all provinces and the Dominion government was the rigid nature of the formal constitution. The Constitutional Conference of Federal and Provincial Governments which took place in 1950 was unsuccessful in devising an amending formula for those sections of the British North America Act of concern to federal and provincial governments. Thus, it was argued that "the development of effective devices for intergovernmental articulation at the political executive and treasury levels was retarded."<sup>121</sup>

Albertans participated with other Canadians in the expansion of national economy during the post World War II years. With an improvement in the standard of living, the problems of government jurisdiction no longer seemed to play as important a role as they had in the depression years. Both levels of government found, through the increased usage of conditional grants, a mechanism through which their mutual objectives could be achieved. Opposition from Alberta to the increased participation of the Dominion government within such fields as health and welfare was almost non-existent during the early 1950's and it seemed as though the jurisdictional problems which had created dissention between the

two governments during the past three decades were no longer contentious issues for public debate.

The relative calm during the 1950's was not to be long lived. Alberta's discontent over increased Dominion government activity within areas of provincial jurisdiction once again resulted in open confrontation between the two levels of government during the late 1950's and early 1960's.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> A series of studies sponsored by the Canadian Social Science Research Council regarding the Social Credit movement in Alberta forms the basis of the literature concerning Alberta politics. This series of studies consists of ten books written by Canadian scholars from several disciplines: history, economics, political science, and sociology. The series was edited by S.D. Clark and the various studies were undertaken during 1950 to 1959. Eight of the ten studies are related to the subject matter of this thesis: W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950); Jean Burnet, Next-Year Country (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951); C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953); J.R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954); W.E. Mann, Sect, Cult, and Church in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955); V.C. Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957); L.G. Thomas, The Liberal Party in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958); John A. Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959).

<sup>2</sup> Morton, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Cecil Lingard, Territorial Government in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Sessional Papers of Canada, 1903, Vol. XIII, Paper No. 116a, Haultain's letter of Jan. 30, 1901 to Minister of the Interior, Mr. Sifton.

<sup>6</sup> Sessional Papers of Canada, 1903, Vol. XIII, Paper No. 116, cited by Lingard, op. cit., pp. 38-45.

<sup>7</sup> Lingard, op. cit., pp. 153-179.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 135-137.

<sup>9</sup> Canada, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 1 (1905), pp. 1421-59.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>11</sup>Lingard, op. cit., p. 202.
- <sup>12</sup>Canada, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 5 (1905), pp. 8796-98.
- <sup>13</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup>Regina Leader, May 3, 1900, cited by Lingard, op. cit., p. 118.
- <sup>15</sup>Lingard, op. cit., p. 117.
- <sup>16</sup>Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 21-24.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup>John Blue, Alberta Past and Present (Chicago: Pioneer Historical Publishing Co., 1924), p. 122.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>20</sup>Macpherson, op. cit., p. 21.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 24.
- <sup>23</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>24</sup>Thomas, op. cit., pp. 58-94.
- <sup>25</sup>Morton, op. cit., p. 37.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 37-40.
- <sup>27</sup>Macpherson, op. cit., p. 4.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 28-37.
- <sup>29</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>31</sup>Editorial in the Grain Growers' Guide, August 30, 1916, p. 5, cited by Morton, op. cit., p. 43.

- <sup>32</sup>H.W. Wood, "Neither Farmers Nor Labor Can Break Into the Plutocratic Classes," cited by Macpherson, op. cit., p. 41.
- <sup>33</sup>Morton, op. cit., pp. 89-91.
- <sup>34</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 92.
- <sup>36</sup>Editorial, Manitoba Free Press, November 5, 1919, p. 13.
- <sup>37</sup>The Farmers Platform (Winnipeg: The Canadian Council of Agriculture, 1916). See also Appendix B & C in Morton, op. cit., pp. 300-305.
- <sup>38</sup>Morton, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
- <sup>39</sup>Editorial, Manitoba Free Press, June 28, 1917. p. 9.
- <sup>40</sup>Morton, op. cit., pp. 132-136.
- <sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 188.
- <sup>42</sup>The U.F.A., July 2, 1924, pp. 12-13. The open letter written by the disenchanted U.F.A. Members of Parliament is quoted in its entirety by Morton, op. cit., pp. 194-197.
- <sup>43</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>44</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>45</sup>Editorial, Alberta Non-Partisan, June 5, 1919, p. 8.
- <sup>46</sup>Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 67-70.
- <sup>47</sup>U.F.A. Annual Report, 1921, p. 29.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid. See also the Canadian Annual Review (Toronto: Canadian Review Company, 1921), p. 851.
- <sup>49</sup>Macpherson, op. cit., p. 75.
- <sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 77.
- <sup>51</sup>Ibid., pp. 75-80.
- <sup>52</sup>Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1922, p. 807.

- 53 Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1921, p. 849.
- 54 Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939), p. 135.
- 55 Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1924, p. 425.
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1927-28, p. 532; Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1930-31, p. 269.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 The Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, op. cit., pp. 134-135.
- 60 Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1924-25, pp. 426-27.
- 61 Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1928-29, p. 497.
- 62 Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1924-25, pp. 426-27.
- 63 Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1931-32, p. 293.
- 64 Irving, op. cit., p. 4.
- 65 Ibid., p. 7. The Social Credit concept of constitutional democracy relates to party control of the individual representative. Functional democracy on the other hand was when the individual M.P. was under direct and continuous control of the electors.
- 66 Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 157-160.
- 67 Ibid., pp. 142-44.
- 68 Mallory, op. cit., p. 57.
- 69 "The Douglas System of Social Credit," The Agricultural Committee of the Alberta Legislature, Edmonton, 1934, p. 19; see also Mallory, op. cit., pp. 61-64.
- 70 Mallory, op. cit., pp. 65-57.
- 71 The Case for Alberta (Edmonton: King's Printer, 1938).
- 72 Ibid., p. 4.



<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-10.

<sup>76</sup>A Case for the West (Edmonton: Queen's Printer, 1969).  
The official position of the Government of the Province of Alberta  
presented at the Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conference,  
February, 1969.

<sup>77</sup>The Case for Alberta, op. cit., p. 142.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., pp. 145-57.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>82</sup>A.E. Forsey, "The Pulp and Paper Industry," The Canadian  
Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. I, No. 3,  
(August, 1935), p. 501.

<sup>83</sup>The Case for Alberta, op. cit., p. 242.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 296.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 374.

<sup>88</sup>Mallory, op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., pp. 76-77.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

- 95 Ibid., p. 77.
- 96 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
- 97 Ibid.
- 98 Ibid., p. 87.
- 99 Ibid., p. 90.
- 100 Ibid., pp. 100-120.
- 101 Ibid.
- 102 Ibid., p. 120.
- 103 Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, op. cit., p. 171.
- 104 Mallory, op. cit., p. 127.
- 105 Ibid., p. 130.
- 106 Ibid., p. 128.
- 107 Ibid., p. 135.
- 108 Ibid., pp. 135-140.
- 109 Ibid., p. 139.
- 110 The three acts were: Provincially Guaranteed Securities Act, 1937; Provincial Guaranteed Securities Act, 1937; Provincial Securities Interest Act, 1937. See Canadian Annual Review, op. cit., 1937-38.
- 111 Mallory, op. cit., p. 139.
- 112 Dominion-Provincial Conference (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941), pp. v-vi.
- 113 Ibid., p. 7.
- 114 Ibid., p. 59.
- 115 Dominion-Provincial Conference (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), pp. 384-389.

<sup>116</sup>Dominion-Provincial Conference (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1945), pp. 36-42, 182-188.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid., pp. 391-496.

<sup>119</sup>Donald V. Smiley, "Public Administration and Canadian Federalism," in J.P. Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (first edition; Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1968) p. 277.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid., pp. 278-79.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid.

### III

#### RECENT FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS

A series of events, which started in the late 1950's, resulted in considerable tension and strain within the Canadian federal system, characteristics which dominated federal-provincial relations during the sixties. The provincial need for expanding sources of revenue, the increased demand for provincial governmental services, the defeat of the Liberal party in 1957, and the quiet revolution in Quebec all had important influences on federal-provincial relations. An overview of the economic, political, and cultural factors underlying the intensification of recent federal-provincial relations, is important to this study as the individual citizen's knowledge, awareness, and evaluation of federalism is made meaningful when put within the context of recent interactions between the two levels of government.

### The Politics of Federal-Provincial Financial Relations

In the post World War II period, provincial governments, with the exception of Quebec, generally welcomed the development of federal conditional grant programs.

Federal financial assistance for costly provincial functions were welcome and the federal conditions under which these moneys were made available usually did not seem onerous, particularly when in respect to many joint programmes the provinces themselves had no clearly formulated priorities or directions. Furthermore, provincial leaders--those outside Quebec, of course, may have sensed the impracticability of mounting an effective defense against the centralizing directions of federal policy.<sup>1</sup>

By 1957 the provinces were beginning to seriously question the value of federally initiated programs within areas of provincial jurisdiction and the provinces began to resist further federal incursions into these areas. Provinces viewed the federal government's ability to "buy control" of particular provincial functions as inappropriate and even as a violation of provincial responsibilities.<sup>2</sup> Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in an essay written in 1961, suggested that the federal spending power, or so-called "power of the purse," was being construed as a federal right to decide whether provincial governments were properly exercising their constitutional rights.<sup>3</sup> Trudeau went even further, by suggesting that the federal government had developed paternalistic instincts.

It almost seems as though whenever an important segment of the population needs something badly enough, it is eventually given to them by one level of government or the other, regardless of the constitution. The main

drawback to such an approach is that it tends to develop paternalistic instincts in more enterprising governments at the expense of democratic maturation in others. In areas where there exists a clear division of responsibilities between the federal and provincial levels, there is no doubt that the only proper censor of a government which competently discharges its obligations is the electorate of that government and not some other government responsible to some other [level of] electorate.<sup>4</sup>

A federal government that develops programs and pursues policies within areas of provincial jurisdiction through the use of its spending power often finds itself being condemned not only by the provinces, but also by the Opposition in the House of Commons.<sup>5</sup> The Liberal government of Prime Minister St. Laurent found itself in such a predicament. One of the major issues of concern to the Progressive Conservative party in the 1957 election campaign was the Liberal government's unwillingness to provide adequate tax revenues to the provinces under the 1957-1962 Tax Sharing Arrangements Act. In their election platform the party argued:

How can there be national unity with Federal-Provincial Relations in the mess they are with Provinces and Municipalities handcuffed by inadequate sources of revenue--with several of the Provinces unable to discharge their constitutional responsibilities and to promote the development of natural resources?

. . . . .

. . . the Federal system is threatened by the centralization complex of the St. Laurent Government, . . . a healthy balance of revenues as between the Federal and Provincial Governments (including Municipal Governments) must be assured.<sup>6</sup>

The platform went on to state unequivocally that a Progressive Conservative government would "halt the ever-increasing trend to centralization of power in Ottawa whether directly taken, or indirectly through taxation measures."<sup>7</sup>

In accordance with the election promises of his party, Prime Minister Diefenbaker called a federal-provincial conference shortly after taking office in 1957. In his opening remarks to the conference, Prime Minister Diefenbaker indicated that he was sympathetic toward the problems of the provinces and stated that "the Dominion Government shall not take advantage of the legitimate needs of the provinces to undermine the essentially federal nature of our Constitution."<sup>8</sup> Diefenbaker's position was in marked contrast to the "take it or leave it" attitude of the former St. Laurent government, and the provinces took full advantage of this opportunity to repeat their request for substantial increases in their portion of standard taxes.<sup>9</sup>

The results of the 1957 federal-provincial conference brought some concrete relief with an amendment to the newly enacted tax rental agreement giving the provinces 13 percent of personal income tax as opposed to the ten percent agreed to by the previous Liberal administration. More important than the immediate relief obtained in 1957, was the apparent recognition by the newly elected government that the provinces had legitimate needs for revenue if they were to meet their constitutional responsibilities. As Black

and Cairns noted:

The provinces, in continually asserting their needs and rights to more tax money have had the obvious justification that they and not Ottawa are constitutionally entrusted with authority over most of the expanding areas of government activity.<sup>10</sup>

In seeking to meet the increasing demands being made upon them, the provinces sought not only temporary relief through obtaining larger portions of the standard taxes (i.e., personal and corporate income taxes and succession duties), but also demanded general and more satisfactory tax sharing arrangements. With the initiation of discussions concerning the 1962-67 tax sharing arrangements in 1960, the provinces not only made new demands for increased revenue, but also challenged the validity of the formula upon which the agreements were based. Premier Manning, for example, noted that the percentage allocated to both levels of government was purely arbitrary.

The percentages allocated to the provinces are arbitrary percentages. In the view of the provinces they are percentages which are too low . . . . At the time when the first tax transfer agreement was signed . . . it was pretty well recognized by everyone that what happened was that the federal authorities finally decided they could spend so many dollars to satisfy the demands of the provinces, and then they worked out a formula that gave that result.<sup>11</sup>

The Alberta Premier suggested that the existing tax rental system had from the outset been undertaken on a temporary basis. He argued that the present system was outmoded and that a more equitable arrangement should be undertaken whereby the provinces



would "share with the federal government the responsibility for those taxes, the revenue from which is going to be divided between the two levels of government."<sup>12</sup> Premier Manning then advocated the development of a tax sharing arrangement which would allow each level of government the freedom to impose income and corporate income taxes with each level of government being held responsible for their actions by their respective electorates.<sup>13</sup>

The Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangement Act of 1961 embodied the change in form advocated by Premier Manning and others by developing a tax sharing arrangement which permitted provinces to increase or decrease personal or corporate tax rates within their own province but at the same time maintain the federal government's national tax base and collection system.<sup>14</sup> The advantage of this change in the federal-provincial taxation arrangements was that it permitted the provinces to impose whatever personal or corporate income tax level they thought necessary and prudent within their own province without affecting other provinces, or, necessitating the administrative costs of establishing and maintaining their own tax collection department. This would, it was argued, be beneficial not only to both levels of government but also it would ensure that the individual citizen would be more fully aware of the level of government imposing the tax. Only two provinces, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, immediately took advantage of this new arrangement. Thus although the

provinces were now given a practical way of raising their revenues by increasing income and corporate taxes evidently most provinces considered it politically imprudent to do so.<sup>15</sup>

The new tax sharing agreement, while alleviating some of the pressure upon the provinces through an increase in their share of the standard taxes, did not satisfy provincial demands for more revenue, nor placate their concerns over conditional grant programs. Quebec, for example, had in 1960 argued against the constitutionality of many of the federal government's conditional grant programs, and requested that the federal government cease participating in joint programs within the jurisdictional responsibilities of the province.

Conditional grants made by the Federal government to provinces in connection with joint programmes administered by the provincial governments create all sorts of difficulties.

Experience shows that often these joint programmes do not permit the provinces to use their own revenues as they wish nor to take local conditions sufficiently into account . . . . The existing joint programmes have played a stimulating role in the economic and social development of the country; in many cases, they have supplemented provincial initiatives. But these programmes are now sufficiently well established on the provincial scale to enable the Federal government to cease taking part in them and to vacate these fields.

The Federal government should be prepared to accept this request. Obviously, in such a case, it would be necessary to compensate the provinces fully for the additional financial responsibilities assumed by them.<sup>16</sup>

Lesage's demands did not go unheeded. The platform of the Liberal

party in 1962 contained this same principle.

If some provinces wish, they should be able to withdraw without financial loss, from joint programmes which involve regular expenditures by the federal government and which are well established. In such cases, Ottawa will compensate provinces for the federal share of the cost by lowering its own direct taxes and increasing equalization payments. This will be done also if some provinces do not want to take part in new joint programmes . . .<sup>17</sup>

With the election of a Liberal government in 1963 a major turning point in federal-provincial relations took place. The policy of the Pearson government towards federal-provincial relations was one of accommodation. Beginning at the 1964 federal-provincial conference, the Quebec delegation pressed for and received a method of opting-out of certain shared cost programs. Quebec was alone, however, in its acceptance of "opting-out" since none of the other provinces indicated a desire to utilize the arrangement.<sup>18</sup> In addition to the implementation of the opting-out formula, shortly after the March 1964 conference (in April, 1964) the new Liberal government also agreed to amend the 1962-1967 agreements, made by the previous Conservative government, by increasing the provinces' share of personal income taxation by a further two percent in both 1965 and 1966 bringing the provincial share of personal income tax to 24 percent as opposed to 20 percent.<sup>19</sup>

While the new Liberal government advocated an opting-out formula, it was not committed to the termination of federal programs

generally considered to be within areas of provincial jurisdiction. The proposed legislative program of the new federal government included student loans, municipal government loans, a Canada pension plan, and eventually a medical care program, all of which would utilize the federal spending power to initiate governmental services constitutionally within provincial jurisdiction and requiring provincial implementation. The development of these programs intensified provincial opposition, particularly at the federal-provincial conferences.<sup>20</sup>

In 1964 the federal government, after lengthy negotiations with the provinces, established a pension plan which was accepted by all provinces, except Quebec, who chose to establish her own pension plan.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the student loan program was established with all provinces but Quebec accepting the federal program.<sup>22</sup> Again Quebec preferred to make her own arrangements with Ottawa for financing such a program. A substantial change was made to the federal municipal loan program, however, as a result of objections from several provinces concerning the proposed direct payment of funds to the municipalities by the federal government. As a result of provincial opposition the federal government agreed to reroute the payments to the municipalities through the provincial governments of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec, while the other six provinces permitted the loans to be made directly to the municipalities.<sup>23</sup>

The Government of Alberta was particularly critical of the federal medicare plan from both an ideological and practical standpoint. Premier Manning took it upon himself to forewarn the federal government of the gross error he thought was being made even before the Bill passed the House of Commons. On national television in September of 1965, Premier Manning addressed the nation's citizens and urged them to openly oppose medicare. Premier Manning suggested that while he was personally convinced of the sincerity and good intentions of Prime Minister Pearson and his colleagues, he felt that they had been wrongly advised by "socialist advisers" and that acceptance of the program, because of its compulsory nature, would lead to a "flagrant violation of each citizen's inalienable right to freedom of choice in a free society."<sup>26</sup> The Premier went on to point out that the program would be unreasonably expensive thereby skewing public expenditures and denying the provinces the right to provide other needed services.<sup>27</sup>

Another biting assessment of the medicare program in particular and the federal government's usage of the federal spending power in general was made by Premier John Robarts of Ontario at the 1969 Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conference.

We the province of Ontario . . . object very strenuously to the use of the federal spending power to really alter the Constitution . . . medicare is a glowing example, a Machievellian scheme that is in my humble opinion, one of the greatest political frauds that has been perpetrated on the people of this country.<sup>28</sup>

Although the federal government had in 1957, 1962, and again in 1963-64 ceded to the pressures placed upon it by provincial governments and had "given up tax room," in the financial negotiations of 1966 it staunchly resisted further encroachment by the provincial governments upon the three standard taxes. As Mitchell Sharp stated in September of 1966:

We must get away from what is tending to become a conventional notion that the federal government can and should be expected to give greater tax room to the provinces when they find their expenditures rising more rapidly than their revenues. This has been possible and has been done, in the past decade, but it cannot be accepted as a general duty.<sup>24</sup>

The provinces did not accept the federal government's position, and requested a greater share of the standard taxes, but to no avail. However, the federal government did agree to abate an additional four points of income tax and one of corporation tax to meet the demands for federal assistance to higher education.<sup>25</sup>

Although provincial government opposition to programs had been somewhat sporadic and disjointed regarding the pension plan, student loan program, and municipal loan payments, the initiation of the federal medicare program in 1966 was vigorously opposed by many provinces that had previously permitted federal government initiatives within areas of provincial jurisdiction. Criticisms of the federal medicare legislation were numerous since several premiers took it upon themselves to openly oppose the federal scheme.

Although the federal government was successful in initiating their medicare program during 1968, with seven provinces joining the federal program by October of 1969, provincial opposition to the federal spending power did not go unheeded as the federal government agreed in the second meeting of the constitutional conference in February of 1969, to complete a review of not only the federal spending power, but also to review the fields of taxation allocated to the two levels of government.<sup>29</sup> This conference took place in June of 1969, but unlike the previous conferences it was held in camera.<sup>30</sup>

The federal government presented two working papers to the June 1969 conference, Taxing Powers and the Constitution of Canada and Federal-Provincial Grants and the Spending Power of Parliament. Both of these papers contained several proposals which suggested the federal government's willingness to ameliorate some of the perennial problems of federal-provincial financial relations. No specific agreements were reached, however, because agreements regarding the taxing and spending powers were inextricably interrelated to the questions surrounding the review of the division of powers.<sup>31</sup> A detailed discussion of this latter area was not undertaken at this conference. Thus, while the June 1969 conference succeeded in generating a frank discussion between the two governments over possible constitutional amendments relating to financial matters which ultimately might lead to a

reduction of tension, no concrete decisions were made, the whole matter being referred to its Continuing Committee of Officials for further study.<sup>32</sup>

### Partisan Politics

During the period under consideration (1957-69) many changes were taking place within the Canadian party system. For federal parties the 1957-68 period was disquieting since Canadians gave the Progressive Conservative party the largest legislative majority in Canada's history in 1958 and yet shortly thereafter subjected both the Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties to the necessity of governing the country with minorities in the House of Commons in three successive elections during the 1962-1968 period. In contrast, the period was one of stability for provincial parties. Most provincial premiers were supported by substantial majorities within their respective legislatures and there were few changes in governing parties at the provincial level.<sup>33</sup>

The instability of the national party system after 1957 was in marked contrast to the stable Liberal governments of Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent. The Liberals' twenty-two year tenure in office from 1935 to 1957 permitted the party to implement its programs without interruption. Black and Cairns suggest that "to many observers the system seemed stable almost to the point of boredom."<sup>34</sup>



As has been mentioned earlier, the governing party in Ottawa often finds that opposition to their initiatives with respect to the federal system is exerted not only by the provinces, but also by the opposition party(s) in the House of Commons. The provinces, on the other hand, rarely find themselves in a similar position. Parties in power at the provincial level are seldom seriously challenged by opposition parties in the provincial legislature regarding the province's stance in federal-provincial negotiations.<sup>35</sup> The unanimity between provincial political parties in their approach to federal-provincial matters was exemplified by Prime Minister Daniel Johnson of Quebec in the 1968 Constitutional Conference when he noted that the two major parties in that province were in agreement regarding the powers needed to provide Quebec with the necessary capability to meet the demands being placed upon the provincial administration by her citizens.<sup>36</sup>

This near unanimity that often exists between provincial parties regarding the province's position vis-a-vis the federal government permits a premier to appear as a strong spokesman for his province. The Prime Minister of Canada, on the other hand, in speaking for the federal government does so with full realization that the opposition parties may gain an advantage over him should he alienate the provincial governments. It provides the opposition with the opportunity of advocating federal government acceptance of provincial demands.

It is not possible to conclude how important the strong provincial rights platforms of the Progressive Conservative party in 1957 and the Liberal party in 1963 were in the electoral victories of 1957 and 1963 respectively, since none of the data collected regarding these two elections indicate that the provincial rights platforms of either party were particularly potent in influencing voters.<sup>37</sup> It is possible to assert, however, given the party platforms presented to the electorate during these two elections, that the parties themselves considered that the advocacy of provincial rights had a strong voter appeal.<sup>38</sup>

The provincial rights platform of the Progressive Conservative party in 1957 was significantly different from the Liberal party provincial rights program of 1963. Both platforms were concerned with improving the provincial governments' ability to meet their constitutional responsibilities. The difference was that the Progressive Conservative position in 1957 sought to redress what was considered to be an excess of centralization, while the Liberal position in 1962 and 1963 sought to permit the expansion of provincial government activity while at the same time trying to maintain a strong federal government.<sup>39</sup> Admittedly, both parties were meeting very different kinds of needs. Provincial government dissatisfaction with federal policies during the late 1950's were basically

financial, whereas Quebec's "quiet revolution" resulted in the intensification of that province's opposition to federal government programs not only due to financial considerations, but also political and cultural factors were involved.<sup>40</sup> In its efforts to develop a satisfactory policy, the federal Liberal party from 1963 through to 1968 found themselves in the unenviable position of supporting and facilitating the development of provincial autonomy in an era when the maintenance of the Canadian federal system was threatened by increasing demands for greater provincial autonomy.

In its desires to accommodate the Lesage administration, the Pearson government acted as if almost everything were negotiable, there seemed to be no discrimination made between what was essential to the effective functioning, if not the survival of Canadian federalism and what was not.<sup>41</sup>

While Professor Smiley's observation might be an overstatement of the apparent acquiescence of the Liberal government regarding Quebec's demands, the impact of Quebec's "quiet revolution" affected federal-provincial relations for all provinces.<sup>42</sup>

#### Quebec and Canadian Federalism: 1957-1969

The traditional negativism towards the federal government's conditional grant programs and its use of the federal spending power, was of minimal aggravation to either the federal government or the other nine provinces during the Duplessis administration in Quebec. Even though Quebec had continually argued on behalf of

provincial autonomy per se since World War II, other provinces found little advantage in supporting or assisting Quebec in persuading the federal government to cease making lucrative conditional grant payments to the provinces.

The emphasis placed upon provincial autonomy by the Lesage administration was of a somewhat different nature, however, as the new Quebec government stressed the need for provincial independence to develop, initiate, and administer new programs for the citizens of their province rather than wait for the federal government to propose whatever programs they felt would be in the best interests of all Canadians.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore the Lesage administration, rather than developing policies that would isolate the French culture, sought to expand the provincial government's control and influence over economic and cultural development within the province. Quebec's position had changed from one seeking "la survivance," to that of promoting and encouraging "l'epanouissement" of the French-Canadian way of life.

We [the Government of Quebec] are not defending the autonomy of the province, simply because it is a question of a principle, but rather because autonomy is to us the basic condition, not of our survival which is assumed from now on, but of our assertion as a people.<sup>44</sup>

In federal-provincial affairs, Quebec's objective was to secure a larger share of the standard taxes, and to reduce or even eliminate conditional grant programs. The argument for increased revenues was based upon increased demands for provincial

government services, while the criticisms of national programs centered upon three complaints: the inability of federal programs to adapt to provincial peculiarities; the conflicting nature of federal programs with existing or planned provincial programs; the distortion of provincial priorities through the financial demands placed upon the provincial revenues by conditional grants.<sup>45</sup>

As the Quebec government expanded its programs the frequency with which federal initiatives conflicted with provincial programs or plans increased. By 1965 the situation had become serious. Rene Levesque's documentation of the Quebec government's grievances, in his submission as Minister of Family and Social Welfare of the province to the national War on Poverty Conference in 1965, concluded that the only solution to the problem was for the federal government to limit their activities to areas solely within their constitutional jurisdiction. Furthermore, he argued that it was imperative that the federal government consult with the provinces prior to the initiation of any program that would affect provincial governments so that provincial and federal programs would not conflict one with another.<sup>46</sup>

The expansion of the Quebec government's activities were not restricted to "traditional" areas of provincial jurisdiction, as the federal government's occupancy of international relations was also challenged. In 1965 the Quebec government entered into negotiations with the French government concerning an exchange

program for teachers and students which resulted in an "agreement between Quebec and France on the Programme of Exchange and Cooperation in the Field of Education."<sup>47</sup> The agreement was considered to be "the first official agreement concluded between a provincial government and a foreign state"<sup>48</sup> by those who advocated that Quebec had the constitutional right to make international agreements. The federal government saw the matter differently, however, and claimed that the agreement reached between Quebec and France was completed under auspices of a special agreement between Canada and France, which allowed provinces to conclude such agreements.<sup>49</sup>

The development of umbrella agreements was an innovation within the international community and offered a unique structural arrangement which permitted both the central and provincial governments considerable flexibility. The concept was not too well received in Quebec, however.<sup>50</sup> Although the umbrella agreement between France and Canada successfully "saved face" for the federal government, it nonetheless thwarted Quebec's desire for limited international recognition and forestalled a confrontation between the two governments. It was argued in the official brief of the Quebec government to the federal-provincial conference in 1968 that:

We wish to reiterate for the record that Quebec has never questioned the federal government's jurisdiction in matters of foreign policy. The areas in which we are interested are, in the field of cooperation and

technical or cultural exchanges. In our view, therefore, Quebec should have, within the limits of Canadian foreign policy, a recognized capacity to negotiate and sign her own agreements with foreign governments on matters subject to her internal jurisdiction.<sup>51</sup>

In January of 1969 the question of Quebec's international status was once again brought to the attention of the Canadian public. Three provincial delegations (Ontario, New Brunswick, and Quebec) attended an educational conference of French speaking countries in Kinshasa and the circumstances of the arrangement by which the Quebec delegation was "duly identified" were far from clear.<sup>52</sup> The federal government's concern was that the conference host gave Quebec the same recognition it did other sovereign countries thereby implying its acceptance of Quebec as a sovereign state. This conference was followed by an international conference of la Francophonie in the capital of Niger, Niamey, in February where once again special consideration was given provincial delegations.<sup>53</sup>

Shortly after the conference in Niamey the second federal-provincial constitutional conference was held in Ottawa and the Quebec delegation tabled a Working Paper on Foreign Relations which proposed that provinces should have the authority to negotiate and sign those treaties which they are expected to execute. The brief also argued that this would be done within the limits of the federation's foreign policy by setting up an arrangement whereby the federal government would be allowed to determine the

compatibility of the agreement with federal foreign policy. This position reiterated the desire of Quebec to extend provincial influences in international affairs yet at the same time was conciliatory in that it recognized the federal government's jurisdiction in matters of foreign policy in that the central government would retain a veto power over provincial commitments under the proposed arrangements.<sup>54</sup>

#### Bilingualism and Biculturalism

The increasing demands of the Quebec government on behalf of Quebec's citizens was but one phase of the developing national crisis in which federal-provincial relationships were of central importance. By 1962, the violent activities of separatists in the streets of Montreal, the formation of separatist political parties, and the general increase in public concern over the objectives of French-Canadians, were all involved in the decision by the leader of the opposition, Lester Pearson, to call for a national inquiry into the matter. "We have now reached a stage when we should seriously and collectively review the bicultural and bilingual situation in our country," Mr. Pearson observed in 1962.<sup>55</sup> He therefore called for an in-depth examination of bilingualism and biculturalism and solicited the participation of not only the federal government, but requested provincial participation as his proposed study included an analysis of the



impact of all aspects of education upon bilingualism and biculturalism.

Many of the most important problems to be solved fall within provincial jurisdiction especially those arising out of the teaching of both languages. Therefore, if this wider inquiry into the means of developing the bicultural character of Canadian confederation is to be undertaken, the provincial governments would have to be associated with it.<sup>56</sup>

Mr. Pearson felt that the federal civil service and the business community should also be examined concerning the use of the French language and the hiring of French-Canadians. In general, the study was perceived as a process for national self-examination.

Shortly after the 1963 election, Prime Minister Pearson contacted the provinces concerning the advisability and feasibility of establishing a Royal Commission to study the question of biculturalism and bilingualism. The response of the provinces was, on the whole, positive and the terms of reference were accepted by all except Alberta who questioned the concept of basing the study on the premise that there were two founding nations in Canada. Alberta was in favor of a multicultural approach but rejected the bicultural approach.

If . . . the objective is to encourage citizens of all racial and ethnic origins to make their maximum contribution to the development of one overall Canadian culture embracing the best of all, we feel this would meet with widespread endorsement and support.

If, on the other hand, the objective is to give some form of official recognition to a dual English and French culture, we suggest that this is unrealistic

and impracticable and we doubt that it would meet with any widespread public acceptance.<sup>57</sup>

Despite the reactions of the Alberta government, the federal government established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism with the directive "to report on . . . the basically bicultural character of our country and . . . to recommend what should be done to improve that role."<sup>58</sup>

After two years of intensive investigation and research, which included numerous studies and a series of public forums, a preliminary report was published in 1965 that concluded, "Canada is in the most critical period of its history since Confederation."<sup>59</sup> The Commission was concerned that unless decisions were taken immediately Canada would almost surely disintegrate. In its first report, The Official Languages, published in December 1967, the Commission once again stressed that the "crisis" still existed. In accordance with their own admonition, "that decisions must be taken," the Commission recommended several fundamental changes to the British North America Act concerning the usage of English and French in the Parliament of Canada, the federal administration, the legislatures of Quebec, New Brunswick, and Ontario, and further advocated the establishment of bilingual districts throughout Canada wherever adequate numbers of French or English speaking people resided.<sup>60</sup> In response to the Commission the federal government placed its recommendation on the agenda of a federal-

provincial conference in February of 1968. This conference became the first of a series of conferences devoted for the question of constitutional reform.

#### Constitutional Conferences, 1968-69

With the increasing tensions in federal-provincial relations and the mounting dissatisfaction of Quebec with their place in Confederation, Prime Minister Pearson convened a federal-provincial conference into session in February of 1968 to discuss three things: the entrenchment of a charter of human rights in the constitution which included a guarantee that both English and French languages would be viewed as official languages in Canada; the recommendations of the first Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism; and the problems of regional disparity.<sup>61</sup> The conference was made accessible to all Canadians through radio and television coverage of the proceedings.

In November 1967, an interprovincial conference was convened in Toronto entitled the Confederation of Tomorrow Conference. This interprovincial conference was convened by the Government of Ontario with the stated purpose of providing a forum for an exchange of views between provincial governments concerning the problems facing Confederation.<sup>62</sup> The Conference was open to the mass media and the entire three and one-half day proceedings were televised nationally. The agenda consisted of a discussion of the goals of

Canadians, an appraisal of the role of the English and French languages, a general examination of ways in which the federal system could be improved, and a discussion about the machinery and structure of federal-provincial and interprovincial relationships in Canada.<sup>63</sup> Although the federal government was not officially represented at the conference, the provincial delegations utilized the opportunity to state publicly their concerns about provincial taxing powers, federal spending powers, and a need to amend the constitution with regards to the delegation of powers between the two levels of government.<sup>64</sup> The Province of Quebec also utilized the conference to table a rather comprehensive statement of that province's position regarding constitutional reform.<sup>65</sup> The Toronto conference set the stage for the meetings held in Ottawa some two and one-half months later.

In Prime Minister Pearson's opening address to the Constitutional Conference in February, he impresssd upon the provincial delegates and all Canadians the seriousness of French-Canadian dissatisfaction.

We all know that French Canada today feels a deep dissatisfaction with its place in Confederation. The reasons for that are complex and of varying significance. I have said in the past, and I repeat now, that I believe most of those reasons to be valid and justified. But this is not the occasion either to try to analyse why there is discontent in French Canada, . . . . What is far more important is to admit that this dissatisfaction is a fact and to recognize that, if it is allowed to continue without remedy, it could lead to separation and to the end of Confederation.<sup>66</sup>

The Prime Minister also stated that the federal government accepted the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and were committed to the implementation of those recommendations pertaining to the federal government "as quickly as we can."<sup>67</sup>

All provincial delegations responded positively, although in widely varying degrees, to the Prime Minister's request for remedies by stating their willingness to further bilingualism and biculturalism within their provinces. Premier Robarts of Ontario delineated in some detail the steps his province was taking in its examination of the findings of the official languages report of the Commission. He committed the Government of Ontario to providing bilingual public services wherever necessary within the province, indicated that the province was helping municipalities to establish bilingual public services, noted the formal recognition of French in the Ontario Legislature, and emphasized the increased usage of French languages instruction in the educational system of the province.<sup>68</sup>

The Government of Newfoundland exemplified the cooperative spirit of the constitution with regards to language rights by indicating its intention to enact legislation that would make French an official language of the Newfoundland Legislature. The Premier of Newfoundland, Mr. Smallwood, went even further by indicating the province's intention to provide bilingual courts

and schools in Labrador.<sup>69</sup>

The Government of Alberta was the least enthusiastic province in its acceptance of bilingualism. Premier Manning, while promising that his province would promote bilingualism through the expansion of provincial educational facilities, questioned not only the findings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, but also once again questioned the very assumptions upon which the Commission based its research and rejected "the concept of Confederation being the union of two races."<sup>70</sup> As for the findings of the Commission, the Alberta Premier questioned whether it was possible to implement any constitutional amendments given the previous experiences at trying to find an amending formula. He also stated his doubts about whether the constitutional changes would produce the desired results. Premier Manning then questioned the intent of Quebec's search for greater provincial autonomy and suggested that before any constitutional changes took place Canadians had a right to know the extent of Quebec's demands. The Premier's opening remarks to the conference were concluded with the following statement:

The Government of Alberta, therefore, is not prepared to concur in any fundamental constitutional amendments with respect to this issue without precise knowledge as to the sum total of the demands the Province of Quebec intends to make on behalf of its French-Canadian citizens.<sup>71</sup>

The discussions concerning regional disparity were somewhat less amicable than the discussion regarding language rights. Each province voiced its concerns over the usage of the federal spending power. The Maritime provinces favored the continuation of sweeping federal spending powers, while the other provinces wanted the federal government to restrict the usage of this power to its own areas of jurisdiction. Premier Smallwood effectively articulated the position of the Maritime provinces by stating:

Anything that tends in the direction at all of reducing Ottawa's importance, reducing Ottawa's authority, reducing Ottawa's strength, strikes a blow at us. We are weaker when Ottawa is weaker. We are weaker when Ontario and British Columbia or Alberta or Quebec are stronger constitutionally and politically. We are made weaker.<sup>72</sup>

While the discussion of regional disparities was far from productive, the discussions regarding the need for constitutional review resulted in the establishment of a "Continuing Constitutional Conference" and a "Continuing Committee of Officials." The terms of reference were unrestricted although several specific areas were to be further examined: official languages; fundamental rights; distribution of powers; reform of institutions linked with federalism, including the Senate and the Supreme Court of Canada; regional disparities; amending procedure and provisional arrangements; and mechanisms of federal-provincial relations.<sup>73</sup>

Although only one year lapsed between the first and second Constitutional Conference, it was apparent from the outset of the

second conference that the amicable spirit of cooperation that pervaded the 1968 conference was no longer present. During the interim period, the federal government had initiated an official languages bill which provoked considerable controversy in western Canada. The premiers of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba openly criticized the federal legislation before the conference convened, and in their opening remarks to the conference all four provinces renewed their attack on the official languages bill. The western provinces questioned the validity of the federal official languages bill on basically two grounds: (1) whether or not the federal government had the constitutional authority to pass a bill that dealt with the imposition of language rights in areas of provincial jurisdiction (e.g., the provincial courts) and (2) whether the bill would be beneficial to the development of Canadian unity.

In addressing themselves to the question of whether the bill was ultra vires the federal government, the Province of Saskatchewan, in its opening statement to the conference, stated:

We believe there is serious question as to whether the Official Languages Bill is constitutional.

We are of the opinion that the British North America Act, by an amendment made in 1949, specifically precludes the Federal Parliament unilaterally amending the Constitution with respect of languages.<sup>74</sup>

The statements from the premiers of British Columbia, Alberta, and Manitoba similarly challenged the legality of the bill and stated



their intention to challenge the legislation in the courts.<sup>75</sup>

With regard to the impact of the bill on Canadian unity, the four western provinces were most adamant in pointing out the harmful aspects of the legislation, especially in Western Canada. Manitoba, like the other three provinces, argued that the bill was forcing bilingualism on Canadians.

The present constitutional provision regarding the language rights should continue to be accepted by a process of "gradualism" as the people are ready to accept and support it. All of us here have a responsibility to provide reasonable and progressive leadership to the people in helping to form this opinion. Any attempt to expand language privileges beyond what the public will accept belies the fundamental rule of parliamentary democracy.<sup>76</sup>

Saskatchewan was somewhat more explicit in suggesting that the bill would result in hiring practices within the federal civil services that "would be highly discriminatory against the great majority of Saskatchewan citizens."<sup>77</sup> Both Alberta and British Columbia pointed out that the question of linguistic rights was not, according to Quebec, the basis of Quebec's problems and that the federal government was creating problems within the nation where none previously existed by insisting upon the implementation of their official languages bill.<sup>78</sup>

In addition to their opposition to the federal government's official languages bill, the four western provinces also openly opposed the proposed entrenchment of linguistic rights in the constitution. British Columbia's opposition to entrenched

linguistic rights was characteristic of the other provinces' viewpoint as Premier Bennett claimed, "linguistic rights are not the kind of natural rights which traditionally have been the subject of constitutional protection in those jurisdictions that have enacted Bill of Rights."<sup>79</sup> Premier Bennett also noted that constitutionally guaranteed linguistic rights would tend to discriminate against some Canadians in favor of others and therefore entrenchment of such rights in the constitution was contradictory to the very nature of a bill of rights.

In addition to criticisms from Western Canada on the language bill, most provinces were critical of the federal government's usage of conditional grant programs and the exercise of the federal spending power. Some provinces vented their frustrations over the process of "meaningful consultations" between the two levels of government.<sup>80</sup> Of particular concern to the provincial delegations was the manner in which medicare was imposed upon the provinces, and, Ontario along with British Columbia urged the federal government to commit itself to cease using the spending power to implement programs within areas of provincial jurisdiction.<sup>81</sup>

Of particular interest to this study is the brief presented by Premier Harry Strom entitled A Case for the West. The Alberta government's brief did not really discuss constitutional matters per se but rather centred around what Premier Strom referred to

as "western alienation," and the discriminatory practices of the federal government in its handling of Western Canadian interests.

We must recognize the deep feeling of aliation and inequality of treatment that are felt by regional groups in Canada, which are neither of French extraction, French-speaking, or residents of the Province of Quebec. These feelings may not be cultural in nature, but could prove to be just as dangerous to Confederation as friction between the English and French cultures.<sup>82</sup>

The Premier suggested that the accommodations sought by western Canadians concerned changes in attitude and orientation within various departments of the federal government, and in particular, Premier Strom suggested that there was a need for the "creation of new policies to cope with the causes of our dissatisfaction."<sup>83</sup> Interestingly, the federal government's policies of concern to Alberta were very similar to those raised in the 1938 Case for Alberta.<sup>84</sup> Tariff regulations, national transportation policy, and agricultural development were discussed by the Premier. Alberta's concern went somewhat further however, in that the Premier encouraged the federal government to involve themselves in the development of international markets for Western Canadian products. "Let the Canadian Government send joint Canada-Quebec delegations to French educational conferences in Africa," suggested Premier Strom, "but at the same time, let the Federal Government send new and stronger joint Canada-Manitoba, Canada-Saskatchewan, Canada-Alberta and Canada-British Columbia trade delegations to the nations of the Pacific community."<sup>85</sup>

While Premier Strom's speech was adamant in its demands for federal government recognition of Western Canada's economic concerns and supported by the other three western provinces, little attention was given to it in the Conference communique delineating the conference's resolutions.<sup>86</sup> Much more emphasis was placed upon the need for an accelerated review of the division of powers between the two levels of government as the Continuing Committee of Officials were directed "to give its immediate attention to this aspect of the Constitution."<sup>87</sup>

With the decision to accelerate the pace at which constitutional review was taking place, a working session of the conference was held in camera in June 1969. The subject matter of the June discussions centred around the taxation powers of the two levels of government and the use of the federal spending power. The federal government presented two prepared briefs to this conference concerning proposed changes to the federal use of its spending power and the manner in which the various fields of taxation should be shared between the two levels of government, but no decisions were reached and the conference received little publicity. It was agreed, however, that another open session of the Constitutional Conferences should take place in December of 1969 to discuss further the subject matter of the June conference.

Federal-Provincial Relations and the Public: 1967-69

It is evident from the foregoing discussions that federal-provincial relations during the 1957-69 period touched upon many varied aspects of Canada's political environment. During the last three years of this period the availability of medical care, the question of language rights, and the initiation of public constitutional conference proceedings all combined to bring information about federal-provincial relationships to the front pages of the nation's newspapers and a frequently recurring news item found in radio, television and magazine news reports or commentaries.<sup>88</sup>

The issues mentioned above were not the only issues of public concern that related to Canadian federalism. The handling of what was considered to be a national housing crisis also received considerable attention during 1968 and 1969 and involved federal-provincial negotiations.<sup>89</sup> Certainly the whole question of the Quebec separatism movement was a factor which related to Canadian federalism.<sup>90</sup>

Throughout this discussion of recent federal-provincial relations the position of the Alberta government has been made apparent where possible.<sup>91</sup> The Alberta government's initial opposition to medicare and bilingualism was noted, the province's disinterest in constitutional change was mentioned and Premier Strom's position on Western Canada's position within confederation

discussed. As has been noted above, Alberta did not take a stand all that different from that of the other western provinces on these issues. Unlike the 1936-39 period when the provincial administration undertook to confront the federal government single handedly, in the period of immediate concern to this study (1967 to 1969), Alberta often acted in corroboration with the other three western provinces.

Whether or not the 1967 to 1969 period represents a potential apex in public concern over federal-provincial relations can not be conclusively stated. Certainly the examination of federal-provincial relations in general and Alberta-federal relations in particular suggests that, with the possible exception of the 1936 to 1939 period, the relations between the two governments were probably as visible to the public as they had ever been. The relationships between federal and provincial governments became an important aspect of Canadian politics for all segments of the country.

During the 1967-69 period the meaningfulness of Canada's government structure was brought to the attention of Canadians very forcefully. For the first time in Canadian history the ordinary citizen was given an opportunity to become involved, if only vicariously, in a debate concerning the organization of Canadian government. That this study was undertaken during a period in time when federal-provincial relations had reached an apex of public exposure was not seen as a limitation, but rather it was

considered a unique opportunity to study how the individual citizen perceived the government structure under which he lived.

Whether or not the activities of the two levels of government vis-a-vis federal-provincial relations are salient to the individual citizen is now the question to which this thesis addresses itself. In a period when the relationships between the two governments are purposefully made public for the stated purpose of facilitating "public involvement in planning the future of our federal system,"<sup>92</sup> the question still remains: do Canadians, or more specifically Albertans, really see federal-provincial matters as being important or is it like Riker has suggested, "the ordinary citizen is quite indifferent to the idea of federalism"?<sup>93</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Donald V. Smiley, The Canadian Political Nationality (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1967), pp. 51-52.

<sup>2</sup>A. Milton Moore et al., The Financing of Canadian Federation (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1966), pp. 43-69.

<sup>3</sup>Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 131-142.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 138.

<sup>5</sup>Steven Muller, "Federalism and the Party System in Canada," in Aaron Wildavsky (ed.), American Federalism in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 152.

<sup>6</sup>D. Owen Carrigan, Canadian Party Platforms 1967-1968 (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1968), p. 226.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>8</sup>Dominion-Provincial Proceedings, 1957 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), p. 9.

<sup>9</sup>Moore, op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>10</sup>Edwin R. Black and Alan C. Cairns, "A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism," in J.P. Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (first edition; Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1968), p. 89.

<sup>11</sup>Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1960 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), p. 91.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>14</sup>Moore, op. cit., pp. 70-74.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1960 op. cit., p. 130.



<sup>17</sup>Carrigan, op. cit., p. 262.

<sup>18</sup>Moore, op. cit., pp. 88-90. Moore explains that opting-out is a procedure whereby a province is permitted to obtain tax abatements from the federal government in lieu of accepting specific conditional grants.

<sup>19</sup>Moore, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

<sup>20</sup>For a detailed discussion of federal-provincial conferences from 1963-70 see Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972).

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 43-65.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 54-55.

<sup>23</sup>Moore, op. cit., p. 81.

<sup>24</sup>Federal Provincial Tax Structure Committee (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), p. 23.

<sup>25</sup>Simeon, op. cit., pp. 75-79.

<sup>26</sup>E.C. Manning, "National Medicare - Let's Look Before We Leap," mimeograph, 1965, p. 5.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 5-8.

<sup>28</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, Second Meeting, 1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), p. 161.

<sup>29</sup>See Appendix A of Constitutional Conference Proceedings, Second Meeting, 1969, op. cit.

<sup>30</sup>News item in Canadian News Facts, Vol. 3, No. 11, June 19, 1969, pp. 274-275.

<sup>31</sup>Simeon, op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>There were 30 provincial elections during the 12 year period, and only six changes in governing parties. Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island experienced one change of government while Quebec was the only province that experienced two changes in governing parties.

<sup>34</sup>Black and Cairns, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>35</sup>Audrey Doerr, "Erosion of Federal Power in Canada," unpublished M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, pp. 93-95.

<sup>36</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, First Meeting, 1968 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 219.

<sup>37</sup>In his analysis of the 1957 election, John Meisel argued that federal-provincial relations were an important issue: "Dominion-provincial relations, particularly their fiscal aspects were also among the important issues of the election. A substantial proportion of voters must have known that the level of municipal taxes was related to this question, and almost everyone in the country felt the pressure of rising local taxes," in The Canadian General Election of 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 54.

<sup>38</sup>J. M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1968), pp. 300-307, and pp. 366-371.

<sup>39</sup>A.W. Johnson, "The Dynamics of Federalism in Canada," in J.P. Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (second edition; Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1971), pp. 115-120.

<sup>40</sup>Smiley, op. cit., pp. 64-86.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 83-84.

<sup>42</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, First Meeting, 1968, op. cit., pp. 1-5.

<sup>43</sup>Smiley, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

<sup>44</sup>Quoted in Alexander Brady, "The Transformation of Quebec," in Paul Fox (ed.), Politics Canada (third edition; Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 26.

<sup>45</sup>Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1960, op. cit., pp. 129-132.

<sup>46</sup>Brady, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>47</sup>Y.J. Morin, "International Law - Treaty - Making Power - Constitutional Law - the Position of the Government of Quebec," The Canadian Bar Review, Vol. LXV (1967), p. 161.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs  
Release No. 72, November 17, 1965.

<sup>50</sup>Morin, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

<sup>51</sup>Government of Quebec, "Quebec and Foreign Relations," in  
Meekison, (first edition), op. cit., p. 379.

<sup>52</sup>See news report in Canadian News Facts, Vol. 3, No. 1,  
January 19, 1969, p. 194.

<sup>53</sup>See news report in Canadian News Facts, Vol. 3, No. 3,  
February 19, 1969, p. 210.

<sup>54</sup>Government of Quebec, Working Paper of Foreign Relations,  
(Quebec: Queen's Printer, 1969).

<sup>55</sup>Canada, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1962. p. 2725.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>A Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism  
and Bilculturalism (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), p. 170.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>60</sup>Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and  
Biculturalism: Book 1 The Official Languages (Ottawa: Queen's  
Printer, 1967), pp. 147-149.

<sup>61</sup>See foreward to Constitutional Conference Proceedings,  
First Meeting, 1968, op. cit., p. iv.

<sup>62</sup>See foreward to The Confederation of Tomorrow Conference  
Proceedings (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968).

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 132-144.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., Appendix B.

<sup>66</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, First Meeting, 1968,  
op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., pp. 33-41.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., pp. 177-181.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 547.

<sup>74</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, Second Meeting, 1969,  
op. cit., p. 115.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., pp. 68, 79-81, 218.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., pp. 188-196.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 126.

<sup>84</sup>See Chapter II.

<sup>85</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, Second Meeting, 1969,  
op. cit., p. 129.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., pp. 395-400.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 397.

<sup>88</sup> Although no comprehensive content analysis was undertaken of news media coverage during a four week period in October and November, 1969, numerous news reports concerning bilingualism, Quebec separatism, and Quebec-federal government foreign relations were found on the front pages of all of the Alberta newspapers. For examples see the following: Calgary Herald, November 21, 1969; Lethbridge Herald, October 15, 1969; Albertan, November 1, 1969; Edmonton Journal, October 20, 1969.

<sup>89</sup> See news report in Canadian News Facts, Vol. 3, No. 8, May 5, 1969, p. 249.

<sup>90</sup> Constitutional Conference Proceedings, First Meeting, 1968, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>91</sup> No public statement regarding the Alberta government's official position concerning the recommendations of the Hellyer Task Force on Housing and Urban Development was made.

<sup>92</sup> Constitutional Conference Proceedings, First Meeting, 1968, op. cit., p. iv.

<sup>93</sup> William H. Riker, "Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does it Matter?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, October 1969, p. 195.

#### IV

#### AWARENESS OF GOVERNMENT JURISDICTION

Is the Alberta electorate confused about the division of powers between their provincial and federal governments or does it have some idea about which government looks after the many varied programs of modern government? Although the British North America Act does not delineate all the powers of both governments in an explicit manner, it does allocate both the provincial and federal governments general categories within which they are given "exclusive power."<sup>1</sup> As has been noted in Chapter I, it is questionable whether Canadian citizens are aware of this division of powers between the two governments, given their interdependence and the tendency for their activities and programs to cut across the formal division of powers. What this chapter seeks to discover then, is the extent to which Alberta citizens perceive

the provincial or federal government to be responsible for particular government activities.

#### Measurement of Jurisdictional Responsibilities

It was originally intended that the measurement of the electorate's awareness of the constitutional division of powers between the two governments would have examined only the constitutional aspects of the division of powers by asking respondents "which government is constitutionally responsible for the following governmental activities." By asking this question, respondents could have selected jurisdictional responsibilities on the basis of the division of powers found within the constitution and it would have been relatively simple to determine what constituted a correct response. But, the analysis of the initial pretest pointed out that few respondents understood what was meant by the phrase "constitutionally responsible" until it was clarified (in some cases it was impossible to clarify), and then it was found a large proportion of the respondents felt intimidated by the academic nature of the question and refused to respond.<sup>2</sup> This type of response pattern necessitated the development of a more simplified approach to the wording of the question, and also required a different approach regarding the possible interpretation that could be made of the responses obtained. After several revisions were made and pretested, it was finally decided that respondents would be asked "which government actually

looks after these matters (specific areas of government activity) at the present time." This was the only question format that was understood by all segments of the population sampled.<sup>3</sup>

Nineteen areas of government jurisdiction were examined in this study: eight areas were allocated primarily to the federal government, another eight were allocated to the provincial government, while three of the areas examined were considered to be of joint jurisdiction.<sup>4</sup> For each of the 19 subject areas chosen, all respondents were asked to identify which government actually looked after the activity mentioned. Any one of four responses was recorded: (1) Federal government; (2) Provincial government; (3) Both governments; (4) Respondents not sure (don't know). Those who responded "don't know" to any one of the 19 categories when the question was first read to them by the interviewer were then encouraged to choose one of the first three responses as the interviewer was instructed to ask, "Which government do you think looks after this matter?"<sup>5</sup> This procedure resulted in an exceptionally high response rate, since at least 98 percent of those interviewed indicated they thought they knew which government(s) were responsible for administering the 19 areas of jurisdiction tested.<sup>6</sup>

Given the scope and number of conditional grant programs plus the spill-over effect of federal and provincial government



programs, it is possible to argue that both governments are involved at least to some extent in each of the 19 areas of jurisdiction examined. Even in areas such as foreign affairs, banking, and education, it can be argued that both governments are actively involved in developing and/or maintaining specific programs.<sup>7</sup> Thus, although it is not possible to divide the powers of government into "watertight compartments"<sup>8</sup> that are solely the responsibility of either the federal or provincial government, it is possible to allocate to each government broad jurisdictional powers for specific programs on the basis of paramountcy.<sup>9</sup> For example, although the provincial government is primarily responsible for building roads, the federal government has been involved in this area through the Trans-Canada Highway program. In addition, the federal government is responsible for road construction within the national parks. Thus one can say that both the federal and provincial governments are, in a literal sense, responsible for looking after roads. But, the fact that both governments carry out some activities does not mean that the primary responsibility for the building of roads is shared, for the building and maintenance of roads is primarily a provincial government responsibility.<sup>10</sup>

A similar argument could be made concerning the federal government's involvement in medical care, hospitals and asylums, and welfare programs. Both governments are involved in all

of these areas but the provinces are primarily responsible for these areas. Nonetheless, to a question which asks which government is responsible for looking after these matters, it could be argued that there are two acceptable responses, the provincial government or both governments. In addition, concurrent jurisdictions such as agriculture, immigration, and income taxation can complicate the measurement of an individual's knowledge of government jurisdiction.<sup>11</sup> Inasmuch as this study is mainly concerned with the citizen's ability to differentiate between the responsibilities of the two governments, this second factor was of limited interest since only three areas of concurrent jurisdiction were examined: income taxation, pollution control, and housing.<sup>12</sup>

In order to take into consideration the confounding aspect of overlapping governmental programs, two classification schemes were initially established to determine the correctness of the respondent's answers: (1) jurisdictional areas were classified according to the government primarily responsible for a particular jurisdiction, and (2) jurisdictional areas were classified according to the actual activities of the two levels of government within the areas of jurisdiction examined. This meant that in several instances two responses were considered correct when determining the functional correctness of a response. The

following analysis examines first the level of awareness among the Alberta electorate when but one answer is accepted as correct, after which an analysis is made using the second classification procedure.

#### The Knowledgeable Electorate

An examination of the specific areas of government jurisdiction indicates there is little doubt in the minds of most Albertans concerning which government is responsible for foreign affairs, banking, primary and secondary schools, city government, or family allowances, since nearly nine of ten respondents identified the government primarily responsible for these areas. Similarly, most respondents identified the government primarily responsible for old age pensions, people on welfare, Indians, hospitals and asylums, broadcasting, the building of roads, and unemployment insurance. As Table 4-1 indicates, in 12 of 19 areas of jurisdiction nearly two out of three Albertans were aware of the government primarily responsible for the matter examined.<sup>13</sup>

A close examination of the responses regarding the division of powers indicates that many individuals are familiar with the federal government's areas of jurisdiction. As can be seen in Table 4-2, 75 percent of the federal government's jurisdictional areas were identified with that government by over three of four

Table 4-1      Number of Correct Responses, Frequency  
and Percent of the Electorate\*

Number of Correct Responses	Frequency	Percent
0 - 8	37	6.5
9	40	7.1
10	52	9.2
11	84	14.8
12	97	17.1
13	99	17.5
14	84	14.8
15	53	9.4
16 - 18	21	3.7
		N=567

\*The government primarily responsible for the 19 areas of jurisdiction examined is as follows: (1) federal government--foreign affairs, banking, family allowances, old age pensions, Indians, broadcasting, unemployment insurance, control of inflation; (2) provincial government--primary and secondary education, city government, hospitals and asylums, building roads, people on welfare, property and civil rights, medical care, natural resources; (3) both--income taxation, pollution control, housing.

respondents. All areas of federal jurisdiction were perceived to be within the responsibility of the federal government by over 50 percent of the sample.

Table 4-2 Accuracy of Awareness of Jurisdiction and Level of Jurisdiction

Government Responsible	Less than 50%		50% to 74%		75% or More	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Federal	-	-	2	25	6	75
Both	3	100	-	-	-	-
Provincial	3	37	3	37	2	25

Considerably fewer respondents indicated that they were familiar with the provincial government's jurisdictional responsibilities. Three areas of provincial jurisdiction were recognized by less than 50 percent of the sample, and only two areas were recognized by over 75 percent of the respondents. One of the most important areas of provincial jurisdiction under the constitution, property and civil rights, was recognized by only 39 percent of the sample. In fact, slightly more people indicated this areas as being a responsibility of the federal government.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps a greater number of respondents would

have correctly associated this power with the provincial government had this governmental power been stated in more concrete terms such as the power to regulate labor, minimum wages, or the sale of property. Notwithstanding the possibility that the practical aspects of this power might very well have been recognized more often as being within the jurisdiction of the provincial government, the results presented in Table 4-3 indicate that very few respondents were familiar with the phrase "property and civil rights" and the constitutional importance of this clause for the provincial governments.

The confusion about which government looks after medical care was also considerable. Just four months prior to interviewing the respondents, Alberta introduced a medicare program which required every resident in the province to register under the new program. Notwithstanding this experience, and the attempts of an organized group of citizens to dissuade Albertans to register for this program, only 39 percent of the sample identified the provincial government as being primarily responsible for medicare.<sup>15</sup>

Natural resources was yet another area of jurisdiction that many respondents failed to relate properly with the provincial government. Apparently the province's prominence in this matter has not been grasped by a large portion of the electors even though Alberta benefits considerably from provincial ownership

Table 4-3 Knowledge of Government Jurisdiction:  
Constitutional Division of Powers

Government Responsibilities	% Correct Answer			% Most Freq Wrong Answer			% Least Freq Wrong Answer		
	Freq	%	Gov't	Freq	%	Gov't	Freq	%	Gov't
Foreign Affairs	539	95	Fed	10	3	Both	5	2	Prov
Banking	526	93	Fed	20	4	Prov	18	3	Both
Education	491	87	Prov	44	8	Fed	31	5	Both
City Government	489	86	Prov	33	6	Fed	33	6	Both
Fam. Allowances	483	85	Fed	59	10	Prov	24	4	Both
Inflation	474	84	Fed	65	12	Both	22	4	Prov
Old Age Pensions	462	81	Fed	72	13	Both	31	5	Prov
Indians	428	76	Fed	76	13	Both	61	11	Prov
Hospitals/Asylums	413	73	Prov	81	14	Both	71	13	Fed
Broadcasting	392	70	Fed	92	16	Prov	80	14	Both
Roads	381	67	Prov	133	24	Both	52	9	Fed
Welfare	369	65	Prov	100	18	Both	97	17	Fed
Unemployment Ins.	347	61	Fed	176	31	Prov	38	7	Both
Property/Civil Rts.	101	18	Both	242	43	Fed	221	39	Prov
Medical Care	207	37	Prov	227	40	Fed	133	23	Both
Income Tax	176	31	Both	364	64	Fed	27	5	Prov
Nat. Resources	165	29	Prov	265	47	Fed	136	24	Both
Pollution	149	26	Both	289	51	Fed	124	22	Prov
Housing	126	22	Both	292	52	Fed	146	26	Prov

and control. Here again, as was the case with property and civil rights, had practical aspects of this power been mentioned such as the collection of oil royalties, it might have resulted in a higher percentage of respondents identifying these activities as being under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. Whatever the actual explanation might be, there was a serious misunderstanding on the part of many respondents concerning the province's prerogatives regarding natural resources.<sup>16</sup>

The response distribution concerning the government responsible for looking after pollution and housing is almost identical (Table 4-3). In both cases a majority of respondents (51% and 52% respectively) felt that the federal government was responsible for looking after housing and pollution, while fewer than one in four stated that both governments were responsible. While it is not known why most respondents perceived both of these areas to be a federal jurisdiction, there are several possible explanations. It could be hypothesized, for example, that the publicity given the federal government's Task Force on Housing during 1968 and 1969, and an awareness of the federal government's Crown corporation, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, may have led many to believe that housing is primarily a federal government responsibility.<sup>17</sup> In the case of control of air and water pollution a possible explanation is less evident. One might speculate that the national scope of



this problem led some respondents to believe that the federal government should be responsible and therefore ipso facto is responsible for pollution control. Also, during 1969 there was considerable discussion of federal control over pollution in the Arctic which emphasized the activities of the federal government in this area and therefore could have resulted in some respondents concluding that the federal government was primarily responsible for pollution control.<sup>18</sup> Whatever the basis for respondents concluding that this responsibility lies with the federal government, it is evident that only a small portion of the sample was aware of the province's authority to legislate in either of these areas.

In the six areas of government jurisdiction most often erroneously identified with a particular government, two important patterns emerge. First, the shared jurisdictions were correctly identified by fewer than one in three respondents. The response distribution in these three instances (income taxation, pollution control and housing) suggests that few Albertans are fully aware of the joint responsibilities in these matters, even though both governments actively utilize the news media to explain their involvement. A second tendency is the persistent overrating of the federal government's scope of responsibility. Although none of these areas of jurisdiction are the sole responsibility of the federal government, in all six cases the largest proportion

of the respondents felt that the federal government had jurisdictional responsibility. This finding suggests that the federal government's responsibilities are frequently exaggerated since it was seen by many respondents as possessing sweeping jurisdictional powers.<sup>19</sup>

Although the electorate misperceived the jurisdictional responsibilities of the two governments in some instances, an overview of the findings presented in Table 4-3 shows that many respondents were aware of the government primarily responsible for the areas of jurisdiction under consideration. When one takes into consideration the correctness of a response in terms of the areas of jurisdiction in which both governments have developed programs an even more convincing argument concerning the electorate's awareness can be made. As was stated earlier, both governments are involved in the building of roads in the sense that the federal government participated in the building of the Trans-Canada Highway and also maintains the roads in the national parks. A similar argument can be made for respondents answering "both governments" in the areas of hospitals and asylums, people on welfare, and medicare, given the conditional grant programs that exist within these areas. In the case of income taxation, it can be argued that respondents indicating that the federal government was responsible for this area may have done so on the strength of the central government's collection

of the tax on behalf of the provinces.<sup>20</sup> In the case of housing, a respondent who indicated that the provincial government was primarily responsible was not wrong. In fact, it could be, and has been argued that the provincial government has paramountcy as far as housing is concerned.<sup>21</sup>

Given that there are two plausible responses for income taxation and housing, acceptance of the correctness of either response would mean that a majority of the sample correctly identified the government(s) responsible for these two areas of jurisdiction. Table 4-4 shows the classification according to this somewhat looser "functional" criteria. More than two-thirds of the respondents correctly associated the various areas of jurisdiction with the appropriate governmental level in 14 of 19 cases when the second classification procedure was used. With this broad interpretation of the correctness of a respondent's answers the only areas not identified by a majority of respondents were natural resources, pollution control and property and civil rights.

The utilization of the second classification scheme is instructive in that it shows that, with three exceptions, very few respondents perceived either the provincial or federal governments to be primarily responsible for an area of jurisdiction or a program with which there would be little or no justification to substantiate their choice.

Table 4-4 Knowledge of Government Jurisdiction:  
Functional Division of Powers

Government Responsibilities	Functionally Correct Answer (%)		
	Freq	%	Gov't
Foreign Affairs	539	95	Fed
Banking	526	95	Fed
Education	491	87	Prov
City Government	489	86	Prov
Family Allowances	483	85	Fed
Old Age Pensions	462	81	Fed
Indians	428	76	Fed
Hospitals	494	87	Prov/Both
Broadcasting	392	70	Fed
Building Roads	514	91	Prov/Both
Welfare	469	83	Prov/Both
Unemployment Insurance	347	61	Fed
Property & Civil Rights	221	39	Prov
Medical Care	340	57	Prov/Both
Income Taxation	540	95	Both/Fed
Natural Resources	165	29	Prov
Pollution	149	26	Both
Housing	272	48	Both/Prov
Inflation	539	84	Fed
N=567 in all of the above response categories			

Whether the first or second classification procedure is utilized, the general conclusion that one can make from these data is that Alberta electors do seem to be aware of the broad division of powers between the federal and provincial governments. Even though the two governments share the responsibility for looking after certain programs or broad areas of jurisdiction, a majority of the electorate identified the appropriate level(s) of government as being primarily responsible for 16 of 19 areas of jurisdiction.

#### Awareness of Federalism Within the Electorate

Both of the classification techniques utilized above point to a rather knowledgeable electorate regarding the division of powers between federal and provincial governments. However, not all respondents were equally aware of the government(s) responsible for the several areas of jurisdiction and programs examined. Several demographic variables have been cross-tabulated with the number of correct responses each respondent gave to determine whether particular segments of the Alberta electorate are particularly knowledgeable about the division of powers.

In categorizing the respondents according to the number of "correct" or "incorrect" responses they made to each of the 19 areas of jurisdiction examined, some decision had to be reached regarding what constituted a correct response. Inasmuch as the

objective was to categorize respondents in terms of their relative awareness of the two governments' responsibilities, the second classification technique utilized above was discarded in favor of the first. The reason for this decision was based primarily upon the fact that there was a much greater chance of distortion due to random guessing in the second classification procedure since two of three responses were accepted as correct in six of the 19 areas examined. Also, it was decided that utilization of the second classification technique increased the possibility that an individual's actual knowledge of the division of powers would be overestimated, whereas the first procedure increased the risk of underestimating an individual's awareness of the division of powers.<sup>22</sup>

Using the first criterion, respondents were grouped into four categories according to their level of awareness. The somewhat uneven distribution of respondents over the entire range of the 19 areas, plus the absence of "natural" breaks in this distribution produced a similarly uneven set of classes (see Table 4-5). Attributing differences in awareness to adjacent categories is therefore cautioned. Greater confidence can be placed in differences in levels of awareness of respondents in the lowest and highest of the four categories, so fluctuations in these percentages are of major interest.

Table 4-5                      A Categorization of  
Level of Awareness

Number of Correct Responses	Category	Freq	Percent
2 to 10	Low	129	23
11 and 12	Medium Low	181	32
13	Medium High	99	18
14 to 18	High	158	28

The impact of education upon an individual's awareness of the political process is certainly substantiated in this study.<sup>23</sup> As can be seen in Table 4-6, there is a monotonic relationship between the level of formal education a respondent has received and the number of constitutionally correct responses. Only 23 percent of those with less than a high school education identified 14 or more jurisdictional areas with the appropriate government. Among respondents who had completed high school, 30 percent ranked in the upper category, while 40 percent of those with a post high school education scored high in awareness of areas of jurisdiction.

Age, occupation, and sex were cross tabulated with awareness to determine whether an individual's experience in dealing with government may have influenced the respondent's level of awareness.

Table 4-6

Awareness and  
Personal Attributes

Attributes*	Low		Medium Low		Medium High		High	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
<b>Education</b>								
Less than high school grad	96	28	110	32	57	17	78	23
High school grad	18	18	37	37	15	15	30	30
Post high school	15	12	34	27	27	21	50	40
<b>Age</b>								
19 - 25	16	26	24	39	6	10	15	25
26 - 35	23	18	42	33	24	19	37	29
36 - 45	27	20	38	28	29	22	41	30
46 - 55	23	21	39	35	20	18	29	26
56 - 65	13	26	14	28	9	18	14	28
Over 65	21	36	20	35	6	10	11	19
<b>Occupation</b>								
Professional/Managerial	25	20	32	25	26	20	45	35
Clerical	31	20	56	36	26	17	42	27
Agricultural	22	31	25	35	10	14	15	21
Blue Collar	51	24	68	32	37	18	56	26
<b>Sex</b>								
Male	58	21	86	31	44	16	88	32
Female	71	24	95	33	55	19	70	24

\*The degree of association between each of the personal attributes and awareness is as follows:

Education	$\chi^2=41.4$	df=12	$P<.001$	Tau'=.17
Age	$\chi^2=16.8$	df=15	$P>.30$	Tau'=.04
Occupation	$\chi^2=11.2$	df= 9	$P>.25$	Tau C=.01
Sex	$\chi^2=4.6$	df=3	$P>.20$	Tau C=.00



As can be seen in Table 4-6 none of the three demographic characteristics are associated with awareness.

The findings pertaining to age indicate that the only age group that varies from the sample norm is the over 65 group. As shown in Table 4-6, this group was less familiar with which government was responsible for the powers examined than were the younger respondents. This difference disappears when the education of the respondent is controlled as age is negatively correlated with education. The length of exposure one has to the federal system of government, and the probable increase in contact with government appears to have little or no effect upon an individual's awareness of jurisdictional areas.

Similarly, there is very little variation between occupational groupings. In only two instances is there any appreciable deviation. Professional and managerial people tended to be more aware of government jurisdiction with 35 percent of this group being ranked high in their level of awareness. Also, there is some indication that those engaged in agricultural occupations were less aware than others since only 21 percent of this group correctly identified 14 or more of the 19 areas of jurisdiction. Once again, as was the case with age, when the education level of the respondent is controlled this relationship disappears.

Although more male than female respondents were high in awareness, the differences are not significant. This finding

tends to refute earlier studies which have suggested that men tend to be more familiar with political matters than do women. It indicates that knowledge of government jurisdiction is not significantly influenced by the respondent's sex. Furthermore, as was the case with the noted differences between age and occupational groups, when the educational level of the respondent is controlled the difference in the level of awareness between male and female disappears.<sup>24</sup>

#### A Conflicting Point of View

In 1968 a national survey research project was undertaken by the York University Institute of Behavioural Research which examined public knowledge of federal-provincial jurisdictions. The study was initiated on behalf of the federal government's Task Force on Government Information, and a national sample of 6,800 Canadians 15 years of age or older were interviewed by Canadian Facts Ltd. in November and December of 1968.<sup>25</sup> The study asked respondents to identify 17 areas of jurisdiction and after analyzing the findings concluded that "the general level of knowledge about government jurisdiction is quite low."<sup>26</sup>

Since the conclusion reached by the national study is contrary to the findings of this study, an analysis was made of the national study to determine specifically what differences existed between the two studies' data. Since both studies

examined the public's awareness of foreign affairs, people on welfare, primary and secondary education, unemployment insurance, and medicare, a comparison of the findings pertaining to these five jurisdictional areas was made. For comparative purposes, the Alberta portion of the national sample (457 respondents) was extracted from the national sample and its responses categorized in the same manner that was followed in the Alberta electorate study.<sup>27</sup> The results of this comparative data analysis are reported in Table 4-7.

While there are some differences between the two studies, the findings are very similar in four of the five areas of jurisdiction. The difference in the findings concerning medicare are not surprising given the changes that took place in Alberta between the fall of 1968 and the fall of 1969 regarding the province's medicare plan.<sup>28</sup>

Why then did the two studies come to contradictory conclusions? The answer to this question lies primarily in the fact that they examined basically different aspects of the division of powers. The Alberta study was concerned with broad areas of jurisdiction which were considered to be of some importance to a cross section of the population. Also, this study chose to examine mainly areas of jurisdiction which could be designated within the responsibility of either the provincial or federal government. The federal government information study,

Table 4-7 Knowledge of Government Jurisdiction: A Comparison of Responses Between the Alberta Electorate Study and the Government Information Study of 1968

Government Responsibilities	Correct Answer			Most Frequent Wrong Answer			Least Frequent Wrong Answer		
	Freq	%	Gov't	Freq	%	Gov't	Freq	%	Gov't
Foreign Affairs									
Alberta sample,									
National study	348	89	Fed	41	11	Both	4	1	Prov
Alberta study	539	95	Fed	15	3	Both	10	2	Prov
Welfare Services*									
Alberta sample,									
National study	280	67	Prov	89	21	Both	51	12	Fed
Alberta study	369	65	Prov	100	18	Both	97	17	Fed
Public/High Schools									
Alberta sample,									
National study	335	81	Prov	59	14	Both	22	5	Fed
Alberta study	491	87	Prov	44	8	Fed	31	5	Both
Unemployment Ins.									
Alberta sample,									
National study	291	70	Fed	67	16	Prov	57	14	Both
Alberta study	347	61	Fed	176	31	Prov	38	7	Both
Medicare									
Alberta sample,									
National study	74	18	Prov	215	53	Fed	116	30	Both
Alberta study	207	39	Prov	227	43	Fed	133	18	Both

\*There is a slight difference in the jurisdictional areas examined. The national study asked respondents to indicate who they thought looked after "homeless children", whereas the Alberta study asked who looked after "people on welfare".

on the other hand, chose to examine some programs of broad application, but several areas examined were of a limited scope.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, the national study chose in most cases to measure public knowledge of areas of joint jurisdiction rather than responsibilities that were within the authority of the federal or provincial government.

#### Summary

The difficulties in measuring electoral awareness of the division of powers place limitations upon the findings presented in this chapter. Notwithstanding these limitations, the data reveal several important findings. First, most respondents were familiar with broad areas of federal government responsibility such as foreign affairs, money and banking, and Indians. Second, specific federal government programs such as family allowances, old age pensions, and unemployment insurance were recognized by most respondents as being federal government programs. Third, provincial government responsibilities were not identified with the province as often as were federal ones with that level, and in several cases provincial government areas of importance (such as natural resources and property and civil rights) were not recognized by many as being areas of provincial jurisdiction. While it is not altogether clear as to why this is the case, it is possible that federal government involvement in these areas

may have affected the responses of some respondents.

An analysis of the incorrect responses yielded the fourth finding for it was noted that many respondents exaggerated the authority of the federal government. In areas of shared responsibility the tendency to overrate federal government authority was particularly evident. Most respondents perceived the federal government as having more sweeping jurisdictional powers than is actually the case.

A fifth finding pertains to the relationship of this study to recent research of a similar nature. Although the conclusions of this chapter contradict the published findings of the government information study, which concluded that "the general level of knowledge about government jurisdiction is quite low," an analysis of that study's data yielded results similar to those reported herein. Fortunately, as has been noted, both studies examined five similar areas of jurisdiction thereby permitting a limited comparative analysis of the data, which found that the two studies' findings complemented one another.

By combining the findings of the two studies it is evident that most respondents were aware of broad areas of government jurisdiction which are primarily within the authority of one level of government. Very few individuals, on the other hand, indicated an awareness of areas of shared jurisdiction.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Section 92 of the British North America Act uses this phrase in referring to the 16 enumerated powers allocated to the provinces.

<sup>2</sup>Most respondents felt as though they were being given a civics test when asked to indicate what they knew about the Canadian Constitution, and thus pleaded ignorance or refused to respond. Those taking the pretest also reported that many respondents became somewhat uneasy when asked this kind of question, thereby making it difficult for the interviewer to maintain rapport.

<sup>3</sup>See Appendix B, question 8, for the complete question format.

<sup>4</sup>The 19 specific areas examined are noted in Table 4-3.

<sup>5</sup>The potential distortion of the data as a result of random guessing could be considerable. Total elimination of random guessing is of course not possible in a field study of this nature, but it is possible to limit the amount of guessing by encouraging a "don't know" response. To encourage the respondent not to respond to a question poses another problem other than that of random guessing, as such a procedure could result in an unacceptably high proportion of the respondents refraining from answering the question. The procedure utilized in this study was for the interviewer to record the respondent's initial response as given, but, if the respondent answered "don't know" then the interviewer was instructed to ask "Which government do you think looks after this matter?" If the respondent answered he just didn't know, then a "don't know" response was recorded. In most cases fewer than one percent of the respondents answered "don't know." See Appendix C, questions 8 and 9.

<sup>6</sup>Admittedly, if the respondents were to guess in all 19 cases as to which of the three responses was correct, they would probably be correct in six or seven of the 19 cases. There is less than five chances in 100 that an individual would get more than nine correct simply by guessing, and there is less than one chance in 100 that anyone would correctly identify 12 or more areas of jurisdiction by chance.

The formula for computing the probability of correctly identifying areas of jurisdiction by random guessing is  $P_c = (1/3)^c (2/3)^{n-c} \binom{n}{c}$ , where  $c$  equals the number of correct answers, and  $n$  equals the total number of questions. See William L. Hays and Robert L. Winkler, Statistics: Probability, Inference and Decision (Toronto: Hold, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), p. 319.

<sup>7</sup>The interdependence of provincial and federal governments is such that in most areas of jurisdiction, it is possible to argue that both governments have some jurisdictional prerogatives. Take for example foreign affairs: the cultural and trade agreements between provinces and foreign countries are numerous. Nonetheless, as both Mitchell Sharp and his predecessor Paul Martin have argued, provincial governments do not have the constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations per se. For a more detailed analysis see Paul Martin, Federalism and International Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968); Mitchell Sharp, Federalism and International Conferences on Education (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).

The argument can also be made that the provinces, particularly Alberta, have the power to create financial institutions which perform most of the functions of a bank. The Alberta Treasury Branches are a good case in point. On the other hand, the federal government also provides Indians with welfare services and have jurisdiction over municipal government within national parks.

<sup>8</sup>This phrase was used in an important judicial decision in 1937 wherein their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council argued that it was possible to divide government powers into exclusive areas of jurisdiction. See Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario [1937] A.C. 327.

<sup>9</sup>The footnote in Table 4-1 indicates which government(s) were considered to be primarily responsible for the 19 areas of jurisdiction examined.

<sup>10</sup>The criterion utilized in determining which government was responsible for each of these areas or programs was a mixture of constitutional prerogative and the extent to which either or both of the governments were actually involved in the administration of these matters. There is, for example, little question concerning who is responsible for looking after foreign affairs, banking, family allowances, old age pensions, Indians, broadcasting, unemployment insurance, control of inflation, education, city government, road construction, and natural resources. Nor would many question the decision to consider pollution control or income



taxation areas of joint control. The allocation of the remaining six areas is admittedly somewhat more contentious. The rationale for considering medical care, welfare recipients, hospitals, and property and civil rights to the provincial government is based upon both constitutional and practical grounds. Housing was considered a joint responsibility primarily because of the federal government's extensive programs in this area through the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation. It can, as is mentioned in Chapter VI, be argued that this is an area of provincial jurisdiction, but Prime Minister Trudeau notwithstanding, practically speaking federal governments have been involved in this area for decades, and have been primarily responsible for the construction codes and financing of housing.

This writer is aware of the limitations in allocating the 19 areas and programs studied. Undoubtedly, this allocation distorted the measurement of some respondent's true understanding of the division of powers. It is not felt that this distortion is excessive given the format of the question and the broad categories utilized in Table 4-5.

<sup>11</sup>Section 95 of the B.N.A. Act specifically states that immigration and agriculture are areas of concurrent jurisdiction, but it also stipulates that the federal government shall have paramountcy in this area. Joint jurisdiction over income taxation is based upon the utilization of Section 91 (3) by the federal government, "The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation," and through the provincial governments' power to impose direct taxation as set out in Section 92 (2) of the B.N.A. Act.

<sup>12</sup>Some government programs are developed for particular segments of the population rather than for all Canadians. Quite often these programs are developed to help a particular industry or region to meet specific problems. Examples of such programs are the Agricultural Rural Development Act and Urban Renewal Grants. To ask a cross section of the population to identify the government responsible for looking after such programs would ensure a low correct response rate. The intent of this study was to measure the knowledge that Albertans have about the activities of their provincial and federal governments at a very basic level.

<sup>13</sup>As has been noted in footnote 6 of this chapter, the probability of obtaining these findings by chance is less than .01.

<sup>14</sup>In January 1968, the then Justice Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, wrote A Canadian Charter of Human Rights and this publication was submitted to the 1968 Constitutional Conference as

part of the federal government's proposals for constitutional change. The relative merits of the national constitution enshrining a charter of human rights was debated at both the 1968 and 1969 conferences. It is not surprising therefore that a considerable number of respondents would indicate federal government control in this area. See Pierre Elliott Trudeau, A Canadian Charter of Human Rights (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968).

<sup>15</sup> See Chapter VI for a more detailed discussion.

<sup>16</sup> The federal government's involvement in the export of oil in the Arctic and the discussions of a continental energy resources approach by federal authorities may have confused some respondents. Also, the federal government's policies concerning control of natural resources in the Northwest Territories were in the news during the period in which the field work for this study was being undertaken. See news item in Canadian News Facts Vol. 3, No. 11, June 19, 1969.

<sup>17</sup> For a more detailed discussion of the housing issue see Chapter VI.

<sup>18</sup> During June of 1969 the huge oil tanker, the Manhattan, made a successful voyage through the Arctic Ocean to explore the possibility of shipping Alaska oil via an Arctic sea route. There was some discussion at the time of the federal government passing pollution laws to control potential oil spills that might take place in the Arctic at some future point in time. In October, during the period in which the field work was being done, the federal government indicated that they would pass pollution control laws to protect the Arctic. It is possible that the publicity given the federal government initiatives in this area skewed the response rate somewhat. See news item in Canadian News Facts Vol. 3, No. 19, November 4, 1969.

<sup>19</sup> This finding is substantiated by previous research. See Fred Schindeler et al., Attitudes Toward Federal Government Information (Toronto: Institute for Behavioral Research, York University, 1969), pp. 20-25.

<sup>20</sup> This argument is strengthened by the fact that 78 percent of the sample indicated that they were aware that the province received a portion of the income tax. See Appendix C, question 13.

<sup>21</sup> See Chapter VI for a more expanded discussion of this matter.

<sup>22</sup>Admittedly, there is also some distortion in refusing to accept functionally correct responses, especially in the area of income taxation. As is customary in the Social Sciences however, this study accepts the possibility of making a conservative estimate.

<sup>23</sup>For an examination of the association between education and political awareness see Lester W. Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), pp. 53-64. See also Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 315-324.

<sup>24</sup>For a discussion of the research findings concerning the impact of sex upon political participation see Lester Milbraith op. cit., pp. 135-136.

<sup>25</sup>Schindeler, op. cit.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>27</sup>In order to compare the data of the two studies it was necessary to exclude the don't know categories. In their original analysis of the data Schindeler et al. encouraged respondents to indicate "don't know" in an effort to decrease the possibility of guessing. This approach necessitated the exclusion of all "don't know" responses from both studies for the purpose of comparison.

<sup>28</sup>For a more detailed discussion of medicare see Chapters III and VI.

<sup>29</sup>Of the 15 areas examined by the Federal Government Information study one-third of them were specialized programs: (1) sending experts to underdeveloped countries; (2) Agricultural Rural Development Act; (3) retraining unemployed; (4) maintaining farm prices; and (5) scientific research.

V

THE SALIENCY OF FEDERALISM

The saliency of the public's perception of federalism is multifaceted since it pertains not only to the individual's awareness of the functions performed by the two levels of government, but also to his concern and willingness to become involved in matters pertaining to federal-provincial relations. As Schwartz suggests in Public Opinion and Canadian Identity,

Ideally an adequate measure of salience should involve a series of questions beginning with whether respondents had heard anything about the issue. In the case of the informed we should also know how strongly they hold their opinions and how involved they personally feel in the outcome.<sup>1</sup>

In measuring the degree of concern that Alberta electors showed towards federal-provincial matters in 1969 two different approaches were used. The first approach was to utilize an indirect method and obtain responses to open-ended questions

regarding the major problems facing both Canada and Alberta. This procedure permitted each respondent to mention whatever issue area was of concern to him and to place whatever emphasis he wished upon the issue area.<sup>2</sup> The objective was to determine what the electorate perceived to be the major issues thereby facilitating the placement of federal-provincial matters within proper perspective. The second measure was more direct since each respondent was asked to evaluate the importance of maintaining a division of powers between the federal and provincial governments.<sup>3</sup> In addition to measuring concern about federal-provincial matters, involvement in the 1968 and 1969 Constitutional Conferences is also measured in this chapter thereby permitting an analysis of the three components of saliency: awareness, concern, and involvement.

#### The Issues

During the 1967-69 period there was considerable discussion about the question of Canadian unity among different segments of the population, brought about in part by the Centennial celebrations of 1967, the Confederation of Tomorrow Conference of 1967, the Constitutional Conferences of 1968 and 1969, and the overriding threat of Quebec separatism throughout this period. The discussions of the maintenance of Canadian unity, according to Smiley, had led some Canadians to conclude "that this self

questioning was dangerously close to collective masochism."<sup>4</sup>

While some of the respondents may have agreed with Smiley, the primary concern of most Albertans was the day-to-day problems of maintaining and/or improving their standard of living. The rising cost of living, the problems facing farmers regarding the sale of their grain, the need for improved housing facilities, and unemployment were uppermost in the minds of 48 percent of the respondents. Other social problems such as the welfare system, drugs, crime, and educational opportunities were also mentioned by many respondents, as can be seen in Table 5-1.

Although financial matters were certainly dominant in the minds of most respondents, bilingualism, separatism, and the problems of maintaining Canadian unity in general were also of primary concern to 18 percent of the respondents. As one middle-aged electrician stated, "Bilingualism is a major problem--the leaders are trying to change everything to French. It looks like the Queen will soon have to pay tribute to France."<sup>5</sup> Another respondent, who was somewhat more concerned about the impact of the Quebec separatist movement, noted,

Unity is important. It would appear that certain segments of Quebec are talking about separating--this could spread to other parts of Canada such as the west, who have probably a more unfair status than Quebec.<sup>6</sup>

When respondents were asked to identify the major problems facing Alberta, economic issues once again were mentioned more

Table 5-1 Problems Facing Canada

Issue Areas	Frequency	Percent
Financial Matters (inflation, cost of living, unemployment, taxes)	200	35
Canadian Unity (bilingualism, French Canada, separatism)	99	18
Social Problems (poverty, welfare services, drug abuse, crime)	62	11
Grain Sales	44	8
Housing	31	5
Pollution Control	14	2
Education	13	2
Other (foreign affairs, immigration, unions, religion, leadership, etc.)	105	18

Table 5-2 Problems Facing Alberta

Issue Areas	Frequency	Percent
Grain Sales	98	18
No Problem	76	14
Social Problems	57	10
Inflation	42	8
Housing	39	7
Educational Costs	37	7
Natural Resources	33	6
Medicare	25	4
Pollution Control	21	4
Unemployment Insurance	13	2
Other (need for opposition, American immigration, Lords Day Act, etc.)	118	21

frequently than any other issue area.

Other problems mentioned were indirectly related to federal-provincial relations. For example, in 1969 the housing policy was an issue of considerable concern and there was some debate between the two governments concerning this issue and how it might be handled.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, one of the basic aspects of the medicare program, which four percent of the sample singled out as being the most important problem facing Alberta, pertained to federal-provincial relations. The issue of grain sales, mentioned by 18 percent of the sample, also had created considerable tension in federal-provincial negotiations during this period. While it is not possible to determine the extent to which federal-provincial relations were perceived as being an important element of each of the issues mentioned, it is evident from the data that the discussions which took place between the two governments during the 1967-69 period dealt with the problems that were of concern to many respondents.

#### The Division of Powers

The data obtained from an examination of salient issue areas do not indicate the extent to which respondents were concerned about federal-provincial relations per se. There are other indicators which suggest that federal-provincial relations were of considerable importance. The number of respondents who



indicated concern over the dominant role played by either Quebec or Ontario in confederation gives some indication that this may be the case. Sixty-seven percent of the respondents indicated that they felt one or the other of these central provinces were more powerful than they should be. This finding varies considerably from the results obtained in a national sample taken in 1960 by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, as can be seen in Table 5-3. Not only were respondents sensitive to the fact that some provinces occupy a position of power within the federal union, but the data suggest that either a marked increase in perception that Quebec was too influential has taken place, or, that Albertans were more concerned with Quebec's position than Canadians as a whole.<sup>8</sup> This concern over the extraordinary influence exerted by the Province of Quebec may help to explain the anxiety expressed by many of the respondents over the maintenance of Canadian unity.<sup>9</sup>

Another, but more direct measure of concern with federal-provincial matters was obtained from a specific question regarding the importance individuals placed upon the maintenance of a division of powers between the federal and provincial governments. Sixty-two percent of the Alberta electors interviewed indicated that it did make a difference to them which government provided the necessary governmental services. The reasons given by these respondents are listed in Table 5-4.

Table 5-3 Provincial Government Inequality

Relative Power of Provinces	Canada* 1960	Alberta 1969
	%	%
Agree one province is more powerful:		
Ontario	14	19
Quebec	23	48
Other provinces	-	1
No province is more powerful than another	61	32
* Source of data: Mildred Schwartz, <u>Public Opinion and Canadian Identity</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), Table 31, p. 92.		

Most respondents who indicated they were concerned about maintaining the division of powers felt that provincial governments were better able to appreciate local conditions and problems than was the federal government. The manager of a small business expressed this sentiment when he stated, "I'd sooner see things handled by the province as we're closer to them. There would be much less to go through. It's impossible to negotiate with the federal government."<sup>10</sup> Other responses in favor of maintaining the division of powers noted that a balance of power is necessary to ensure that neither government becomes too

Table 5-4

Importance of Maintaining  
a Division of Powers

Division of Powers*	Frequency	% of Category**	% of Total
Important			
Proximity of Provincial Government	164	48	30
Maintenance of Division of Powers	47	14	9
Favor Provincial Government Administration	54	15	10
Federal Government Control Advocated	33	10	6
Other Responses	44	13	8
Not Important			
Services Provided Regardless of Government Responsible	106	71	19
Governments Are Interdependent	12	3	2
Prefer Federal Government Control	6	4	1
Other Responses	26	17	5
Don't Know	58	-	10

\*The data displayed in this table were obtained through a series of three questions. The first question asked, "Does it make any difference which level of government provides the necessary governmental services?". Sixty-two percent (351 respondents) answered "yes", 28 percent (158 respondents) answered "no". Those respondents who said "yes" or "no" were then asked, "Why do you say that?". The responses above indicate the number and percentage of respondents who answered that question within the context of their first response. Due to interviewer and/or coding error, 17 cases were not ascertained.

\*\*There are three categories: Important, Not Important, Don't Know.

powerful. A lawyer articulated this position rather well, "The country is too big to have a central form of government. There needs to be more than one unit."<sup>11</sup> Other respondents noted the efficiency of the provincial government's administration and expressed preference for provincially administered programs.

While most respondents concerned about maintaining the division of powers stressed the importance of provincial independence, ten percent indicated that there was a need for greater federal control. In most cases those concerned about federal powers were not fearful of the federal government losing control over existing areas of federal jurisdiction, but rather felt that there was a need for increased federal government involvement in areas of provincial control. As one university student suggested, "I would like to see the federal government look after the major problems--things like education."<sup>12</sup>

A sizeable minority, 28 percent of the sample, was not convinced that the division of powers was really meaningful. Most of these respondents were not concerned about the maintenance of a division of powers; it was the services that mattered, not which government provided the services. As one housewife remarked "So long as they [necessary government services] are provided, I don't care which government provides them."<sup>13</sup> Several other responses were given in explanation of the disinterest shown by some respondents in the maintenance of a

division of powers. Eight percent reasoned that the interdependence of the two governments was such that it was not necessary to bother about which government looked after which specific service.<sup>14</sup> There was also a small number of respondents (4%) who seemed to prefer a unitary form of government as they reasoned that the federal government should have the authority to look after all important governmental matters. With the exception of this latter group, all other respondents were primarily concerned with utility; for them it was basically a question of which government could provide the necessary services most efficiently and effectively.

Given the importance of this question in determining the overall perception of the individual respondent towards federalism, and to ascertain whether any particular segment of the population was proportionately more concerned about federal-provincial matters, the demographic characteristics to those who indicated they were concerned were compared to those who indicated they were not concerned about this matter. As can be seen in Table 5-5, a significant degree of association was found to exist between education and one's concern over the maintenance of a division of powers. Seventy-seven percent of those respondents with a post-secondary education indicated concern whereas only 64 percent who did not graduate from high school shared a similar opinion.<sup>15</sup>

Table 5-5

Concern Over the Division of Powers  
and Education

Level of Education	Not Concerned		Concerned	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
Less than High School Grad	105	36	144	64
High School Grad	26	29	65	71
Post High School	27	23	91	77
$\chi^2=6.4$ $df=2$ $P<.05$ $Tau'=.17$				

Five other demographic variables (occupation, income, sex, religion, residence) were cross-tabulated with concern over the division of powers but none were found to be significantly associated with this measure of concern. Particular care was taken to determine whether one occupational group, farmers, were more concerned about this matter than other respondents. It was reasoned that farmers might differ from others because they are in constant contact with both levels of government.<sup>16</sup> But, farmers were not found to be any more, or less, concerned about the division of powers than was any other group.<sup>17</sup> Thus, there is no reason to suppose that frequent contact with both levels of government is related to concern over the division of powers.

Notwithstanding the differences in the level of concern

found within the different levels of education, the maintenance of a division of powers between the two governments was considered to be an important element of the Canadian government structure by a majority of the respondents from all segments of the community. This concern was based primarily upon one of three practical considerations: (1) the proximity of government to the citizen; (2) the ability of provincial governments to efficiently and effectively administer programs; and (3) the maintenance of a viable balance of powers between provincial and federal governments.

In order to determine whether there was any relationship between an expressed concern about Canadian unity and a concern over the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments, the responses to the two questions were cross-tabulated. For purposes of analysis all responses to the question concerning the problems facing Canada were collapsed into two categories: (1) those who indicated that some aspect of Canadian unity was the most important problem facing Canada; and (2) all other responses. As can be seen in Table 5-6, no significant degree of association was found to exist between the two variables. Individuals concerned about Canadian unity were not any more likely to indicate that they would like to maintain a viable division of powers between the two governments than

Table 5-6                      Problems Facing Canada and Concern  
for Maintenance of Division of Powers

Problem	Not Concerned		Concerned	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
Other Problems*	128	32	266	68
Canadian Unity	24	27	66	73
$\chi^2=1.05$ $df=1$ $P>.30$ $Tau'=.05$				

were those respondents who indicated a concern over economics, social, or ecological matters. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that concern over Canadian unity is indicative of a concern over the maintenance of a federal system of government. Although the maintenance of Canadian unity may very well be dependent upon the continued existence of a viable division of powers between the two governments, there is no indication that the electorate relates Canadian unity to the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments.

#### Involvement in Federal-Provincial Relations

In 1968 and 1969 Canadians were given the opportunity to witness one of the greatest spectacles concerning intergovernmental matters in recent years, the televised federal-provincial constitutional conference proceedings of February 1968 and



February 1969.<sup>18</sup> Not only were the conferences themselves televised on a daily basis, but there was a proliferation of special public affairs programs pertaining to the conference proceedings and the discussions that took place at the conferences.<sup>19</sup>

As was discussed earlier, one of the motives for televising the conferences was to inform the public of the pressing issues facing both federal and provincial governments and to create an awareness among the Canadian public about the constitutional problems under discussion.<sup>20</sup> The success of this endeavor in creating interest among the citizenry was reportedly high immediately after the 1968 conference. For example, one survey found that 80 percent of Canada's population either watched, listened to, or read about the conference.<sup>21</sup> But Albertans, when asked if they followed the proceedings of the 1968 or 1969 constitutional conferences, did not indicate such a high degree of involvement. As Table 5-7 shows, less than half the respondents indicated they followed the conference proceedings. The number of respondents who found the conference of considerable interest was even less since only 35 percent of those who followed the conference indicated that they were very interested. Fifty-six percent admitted to a moderate interest in the proceedings, and ten percent indicated that, even though they followed the conference, they were not very interested in the proceedings.<sup>22</sup>

Table 5-7                      Involvement in Constitutional  
Conference Proceedings

Number of Conferences Followed	Frequency	Percent
1968 Conference	33	6
1969 Conference	63	11
Both Conferences	163	29
None	285	50
Can't Remember	23	4

An analysis of the respondents' demographic characteristics found that education, occupation, and income all significantly correlated with involvement.<sup>23</sup> However, the significant degree of association between a respondent's occupation, income level, and involvement in following the conference proceedings, does not remain significant when the respondent's level of education is controlled. While people in managerial and professional occupations did follow the conference proceedings more often than those in other occupational groupings, there is no indication that their occupation had anything to do with their involvement in the conferences, but rather the explanation lies in the fact that these same individuals tend to be more educated than those respondents in other occupational

categories. Similarly, when the education of the respondent is controlled no significant relationship is found to exist between income and involvement. Thus, both of these latter relationships, occupation with involvement and income with involvement, are spurious as the only real correlation is that which exists between education and involvement.

Table 5-8                      Involvement in Constitutional Conference Proceedings and Education

Level of Education	Didn't Follow Conferences		Followed One or Both Conferences	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
Less than High School Grad	189	58	136	42
High School Grad	56	56	43	44
Post High School	39	36	70	64
$\chi^2=16.9$ $df=2$ $P .001$ $Tau'=.14$				

As can be seen in Table 5-8, it was primarily those respondents with more education who reported they followed the conference proceedings. Those respondents who had obtained post high school education were by far the largest single group of individuals who followed the conference proceedings since 64 percent of this group indicated that they followed either one or both of the conferences.

On the other hand, only 42 percent of those respondents who had not completed high school indicated that they followed one or both of the conferences.

The finding that education is significantly associated with both concern and involvement is not particularly surprising. This observation is well substantiated by numerous studies on political participation which have found that higher educated individuals are much more apt to participate in political matters. As Almond and Verba noted in their five-nation study when discussing whether or not people paid attention to political and governmental affairs, "On the university level almost all respondents in each country follow politics."<sup>24</sup> These authors concluded:

As in most other studies of political attitudes, our data show that educational attainment appears to have the most important demographic effect upon political attitudes. Among the demographic variables usually investigated - sex, place of residence, occupation, income, age, and so on - none compares with the education variable . . . . The uneducated man or the man with the limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a higher level of education.<sup>25</sup>

The findings reported in Tables 5-5 and 5-8 confirm this observation.

#### Awareness, Concern, and Involvement: An Analysis of the Interrelationships

The relationship between awareness, concern and involvement is documented in previous political research.<sup>26</sup> What is not well known about these three variables is whether knowledge precedes

concern, involvement precedes concern, or even whether involvement precedes knowledge. Does an individual become involved in following constitutional conference proceedings because he is more concerned about federalism, or does he become more concerned about federalism as a result of the exposure he had had to federal-provincial matters? This study does not answer this question; rather it affirms that people who are concerned about the maintenance of the division of powers are more likely to have been exposed to intergovernmental negotiations than those who did not indicate any concern. Furthermore, people who were found to be more knowledgeable about the division of powers were also more likely to have followed the constitutional conference proceedings.

Table 5-9 indicates that significantly more of those respondents with a high degree of awareness followed the conference proceedings. Thirty-four percent of those respondents with a low degree of awareness indicated that they followed either one or both of the conferences while 58 percent of those with a high degree of awareness followed one or both of the conference sessions.

Given the significant degree of association between education and both involvement and awareness, the education of the respondents was controlled to determine whether the relationship between involvement and awareness was spurious. As would be expected, given the strong relationship between the control variable education and both the original variables, the correlation

Table 5-9 Involvement and Awareness

Awareness of the Division of Powers	Didn't Follow Conferences		Followed One or Both Conferences	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
Low	82	66	43	34
Medium Low	91	53	80	47
Medium High	48	50	48	50
High	63	42	88	68
$\chi^2=16.3$ $df=3$ $P<.001$ $Tau'=.15$				

between involvement and awareness was reduced, but it did not disappear. Thus, although those who followed the conference proceedings tended to be better educated, as did those who indicated a high degree of awareness, there is nonetheless a tendency for those who were involved in following the conference to be more aware of the division of powers between the two governments than were those respondents who failed to follow the conference proceedings. What does all this mean? Two tentative conclusions can be drawn: (1) involvement through following the conference was successful in increasing people's awareness of the division of powers; and/or (2) those individuals who already had a high awareness of the division of

powers chose to become involved in following the conference to a greater extent than did those members of the electorate who had a low degree of awareness.

The degree of association between concern and involvement was also found to be significant (see Table 5-10). Seventy-four percent of those who followed the conference indicated concern over the maintenance of a division of powers whereas only 52% of those who did not follow the conference were equally concerned. While it is not possible to ascertain whether concern over the maintenance of the division of powers motivated people to follow the conferences or, conversely, that following the conferences resulted in increased concern over this matter, it is evident that there was a greater tendency for those who followed the proceedings to be concerned about the maintenance of the division of powers between the two governments.

As was the case with the relationship between involvement and awareness, the possibility of the relationship between concern and involvement being more a function of education than a direct correlation was a distinct possibility. The education of the respondents was therefore controlled to determine whether this initial correlation would be substantially reduced. An analysis of the relationship between concern and involvement within particular education categories indicated that although those

most concerned about the division of powers and involved in following the conference tended to be better educated than those who were not concerned or involved, the correlation between concern and involvement was not weakened when education was controlled.<sup>27</sup>

Table 5-10                      Involvement and Concern for  
Maintenance of Division of Powers

Involvement in Conference Proceedings	Not Concerned		Concerned	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
Didn't Follow Conferences	101	41	147	59
Followed One or Both Conferences	53	22	191	78
$\chi^2=20.0$ $df=1$ $P .001$ $Tau'=.20$				

Basically two conclusions can be drawn from this finding: (1) individual Albertans who indicated a concern over the division of powers tended to involve themselves in the conference proceedings; and/or (2) those who followed the conference proceedings tended to become concerned about the division of powers between the two governments.

Considering that involvement in the conference proceedings was positively associated with concern over the maintenance of



a viable division of powers, is it not also possible that concern over Canadian unity might be positively associated with involvement? As can be seen in Table 5-11, although those respondents who followed the conference proceedings did tend to identify Canadian unity as being Canada's most serious problem more often than did those who did not follow the conference, (22% and 15% respectively) the difference was not significant.<sup>28</sup>

Table 5-11                      Problems Facing Canada  
and Involvement

Involvement in Conference Proceedings	Other Problems		Canadian Unity	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
Didn't follow Conferences	229	85	41	15
Followed One of Both Conference	193	78	53	22
$\chi^2=3.08$ $df=1$ $P .05$ $Tau'=.08$				

Unlike the relationship between awareness and involvement, or involvement and concern, there is no significant relationship

between awareness and concern (see Table 5-12). Those with a high degree of awareness did not indicate they were concerned about the maintenance of the division of powers much more often than those with a lower degree of awareness.


This finding is not particularly surprising given the subject matter under examination. It should be remembered that many of the respondents who did not indicate a concern felt confident that necessary governmental services would be provided regardless of which government was primarily responsible for a particular activity. This opinion is not at all an unrealistic one.

Table 5-12                      Concern and Awareness

Awareness of Division of Powers	Concerned		Not Concerned	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
Low	73	66	38	34
Medium Low	110	68	51	32
Medium High	63	69	28	31
High	105	72	41	28
$\chi^2=1.0$ $df=3$ $P>.8$ $Tau'=.04$				

At the outset of this chapter it was suggested that an adequate measure of salience should involve three factors: awareness, concern, and involvement. Given the foregoing discussion, it is now possible to measure the saliency of federalism by combining the data obtained concerning each individual's awareness, concern, and involvement vis a vis federal-provincial matters. This was accomplished by creating an index which ranked the respondents' saliency according to their awareness (low, medium low, medium high, high), the extent to which they were concerned about the maintenance of a division of powers between the two governments, and the extent to which they became involved in following the constitutional conferences.<sup>29</sup>

Figure 5-1                      A Saliency Continuum



As can be seen in Figure 5-1, some respondents found federal-provincial matters to be relatively unimportant to them since 14 percent of the sample were unaware of the two governments' jurisdictional responsibilities, not concerned about the division of powers, nor did they follow the constitutional conference proceedings of 1968 or 1969. On the other hand, 17 percent of the sample were found to be aware of the two governments' jurisdictional responsibilities, indicated that they were concerned about the maintenance of the division of powers, and followed either one or both of the constitutional conferences. However, the bulk of the respondents, 69 percent, ranked in the middle of the continuum.

What does a profile of the Alberta elector who finds federal-provincial matters salient look like? An examination of the demographic characteristics of those respondents who scored high on the saliency index reveals that a male respondent with a university education, engaged in a managerial or professional occupation, and making over \$10,000 per year is most likely to find federal-provincial matters salient.<sup>30</sup> Conversely those with less than a high school education who are blue collar workers by occupation and, who make less than \$6,000 per year, do not find federal-provincial matters salient.<sup>31</sup>

### Summary

The measurement of the saliency of federalism undertaken in this chapter utilized basically two measures: first, the degree of concern displayed by Alberta citizens about the division of powers between the two governments; and second, the extent of the individual's involvement in the constitutional conference proceedings of 1968 and 1969. These two measures were then correlated with the individual's degree of awareness about the constitutional division of powers between the provincial and federal governments.

The examination of the citizens' concern over the division of powers found that nearly two of every three Alberta electors (62%) indicated that it made a difference to them which government looked after the necessary government services. The primary reason given by the respondents for the maintenance of a viable division of powers centered around the concept of governmental proximity to its citizens. The federal government was considered to be too far removed from many of the local problems that confronted citizens and it was felt that the provincial government was better able to cope with these kinds of problems. Most of the respondents who indicated that it did not make any difference which level of government provided the necessary services (28%) indicated that the ability of government to provide the necessary services was the important factor, not whether those services

were provided by a provincial or federal governing body.

Although less than 50 percent of the sample indicated that they followed the constitutional conference proceedings of 1968 or 1969, a substantial portion (46%) did follow them to some extent. Whether or not this minimal degree of involvement was beneficial in the sense that it improved the respondent's awareness of the jurisdictional responsibilities is not known, but the association between a respondent's awareness and his involvement in following the conference proceedings was found to be significant, thereby leaving open the possibility that the conference was informative. It is also possible, however, that those with a high degree of awareness of the division of powers followed the conference proceedings more than did those with a low level of awareness.

No significant degree of association was found to exist between awareness and concern over the maintenance of the division of powers. But, the relationship between a respondent's concern over the division of powers and his or her involvement in following the conference proceedings of 1968 and 1969 was found to be significant. As was the case with the relationship between awareness and involvement, it is not possible to determine

whether the respondent's concern motivated him to follow the conference proceedings or vice versa. What is evident is that there is a greater tendency for those who followed the conference proceedings to be concerned about the division of powers between the two governments. Thus, although it can be argued that the conference proceedings may have increased the Alberta electorate's knowledge of the constitutional division of powers between federal and provincial governments, it can also be argued that the televising of the conference may have increased people's concern over the maintenance of the division of powers.

By combining the three variables of awareness, concern, and involvement into an index of saliency, federal-provincial matters were found to be particularly significant to 17 percent of the population, while 14 percent of the electorate were found to be neither aware, concerned, or involved in federal-provincial matters. An analysis of the demographic characteristics of those respondents at both ends of the saliency continuum showed that those who found federal-provincial matters to be salient are basically the same group of people that many other studies have found, namely the upper socio-economic strata of the community. Those who did not feel federal-provincial matters are salient were primarily of the lower socio-economic strata.

While saliency is an important aspect of the electorate's

perception of federalism, there is yet another dimension that needs to be examined: the individual's evaluation of federal-provincial matters.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Mildred Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 217.

<sup>2</sup>Another possible approach to the measurement of intensity of feeling would have been to establish a list of the major problems facing Canadians and then asked the respondents to rank them in order of their importance. This procedure has been experimented with previously in Canada and the results have been very similar to those obtained by using the open-ended question. See Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 228-230.

<sup>3</sup>For a more explicit presentation of the approach utilized see the interview schedule in Appendix B, question 7.

<sup>4</sup>Donald V. Smiley, The Canadian Political Nationality (Toronto: Methuen, 1967), p. ix.

<sup>5</sup>See Appendix D for a more complete listing of the responses obtained to open-ended questions.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>A discussion of the housing issue is undertaken in Chapter VI.

<sup>8</sup>Schwartz, op. cit., p. 92. It should be expected that these figures would vary somewhat given that there is less likelihood that people in Quebec and Ontario (respondents from these two provinces would undoubtedly make up a large portion of the total national sample) would perceive their provinces as being more powerful than it should be.

<sup>9</sup>See Table 5-1.

<sup>10</sup>See Appendix D for a listing of typical open-ended responses.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>These respondents advocated cooperation between the two governments in handling necessary services. Quite often, as is

the case with the example cited in Appendix D, the respondent was primarily concerned about how well the job would be done, not which government would look after the matter.

<sup>15</sup>The association between education and the maintenance of a division of powers is to be expected. Dr. Schwartz noted: "Increased education not only results in increased information, but also sensitizes individuals to available sources of knowledge and is associated with greater use of communication media. Education, too, leads to skill in handling new and difficult ideas. It also contributes to a greater feeling of competence manifested in an increased willingness to participate in politics . . . ." Schwartz, op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>16</sup>Agriculture is constitutionally a concurrent jurisdiction. Both the federal and provincial governments have rather large departments who service the needs of farmers, consequently farmers are in constant contact with both levels of government.

<sup>17</sup>The following cross tabulation of occupation and concern over the maintenance of power shows that farmers are neither more or less concerned than are other occupational groupings:

Concern Over the Division of Powers  
And Occupation

Occupation	Not Concerned	Concerned
	%	%
Professional/Managerial	23	77
Clerical	29	71
Agricultural	35	65
Blue Collar	37	64

$\chi^2=6.8$        $df=3$        $P .05$        $\text{Tau } C=.01$

<sup>18</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the Constitutional Conference proceedings see Chapter III.

<sup>19</sup>During the week of February 10-16, 1969, in addition to the televising of the conference proceedings themselves and extensive coverage in the news, a special CBC network program was presented February 12 at prime television time (7-10 p.m.) concerning the conference proceedings and their implications.

<sup>20</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, First Meeting, 1968 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. iv.

<sup>21</sup>Peter Regenstreif, "Survey Finds Support for Bilingualism," Edmonton Journal, February 22, 1969.

<sup>22</sup>The data concerning this question is found in Appendix C, question 10d.

<sup>23</sup>The degree of association between each of the personal attributes and involvement in the Constitutional Conference proceedings is as follows:

Education:	$x^2=33.3$	df=8	P .001	Tau C=.04
Occupation:	$x^2=20.8$	df=6	P .01	Tau C=.02
Income Level:	$x^2=18.0$	df=6	P .01	Tau C=.02

<sup>24</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1963), p. 56.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 315-16.

<sup>26</sup>Milbraith, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

<sup>27</sup>In each of the educational categories a significant degree of association was found to exist between concern and involvement of approximately the same strength as that shown in Table 5-10.

<sup>28</sup>In commenting on the impact of public televised conferences upon the Canadian population J.P. Meekison suggested the following: "Televised conferences and reported reference to shortcomings on the constitution and the need to reform certain areas could have deleterious effects over the long run." J.P. Meekison, "Constitutional Reform in Canada," in J.P. Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (second edition; Toronto: Methuen, 1971), p. 247.

<sup>29</sup>The index was constructed by allocating the following weight to each response category of the three variables:

- (1) Awareness: Low = 1, Medium Low = 2, Medium High = 3, High = 4;
- (2) Concern: Not Concerned = 1, Don't know = 2, Concerned = 3;
- (3) Involvement: Didn't follow either conference = 1, Followed one conference = 2, Followed both conferences = 3.

<sup>30</sup>Seventeen of 19 respondents (89%) in this category scored seven or higher on the saliency index.

<sup>31</sup> Twenty-three of 44 respondents (52%) in this category scored less than six on the saliency index.

## VI

## AN EVALUATION OF FEDERALISM: THE ELECTORATE'S PREFERENCES

Would the electorate prefer to see any change in the existing division of powers? What powers should the provincial and federal governments exercise? These questions need to be answered before a clear understanding of the electorate's perception of federalism emerges. This chapter examines three aspects of the electorate's evaluation of federalism and provides some tentative answers to the above questions. First, the preferences of individual electors concerning the level of government they feel is most capable of looking after specific areas of jurisdiction is examined. Second, an analysis is made of the consistency with which electors tend to favor federal or provincial government control. The third aspect of federalism to be examined pertains to the individual's position on four issues which were debated by

the federal and provincial governments in 1969. The relationship between these three aspects of the electorate's evaluation of federalism is then summarized in light of the degree of saliency with which they view Canadian Federalism.

#### The Division of Powers: An Evaluation

When asked to indicate which government should look after each of 19 specific areas of government jurisdiction, three basic patterns emerged: (1) some respondents indicated that they would like to see several changes take place in the division of powers; (2) some respondents indicated satisfaction with what they perceived to be the existing division of powers; and (3) other respondents indicated a preference for joint federal-provincial government responsibility within particular areas of jurisdiction. Tables 6-1 through 6-3 list the 19 areas of responsibility, indicate the preferences of the Alberta electorate, and show the differences between their awareness and preferences.

As indicated in Table 6-1, nearly 90 percent of the respondents indicated that they would like to see the federal government continue to look after foreign affairs and banking. Fewer respondents were committed to the idea that the federal government should maintain its jurisdictional control over inflation, old age pensions, family allowances, Indians, broadcasting, or

unemployment insurance.

Even though 69 percent of the sample felt that the federal government should be responsible for controlling inflation, this figure is considerably lower than the 84 percent of the sample who felt the federal government was actually responsible for this matter. As can be seen in Table 6-1, 18 percent felt that both governments should be responsible for inflation while fewer respondents (9%) felt that this matter should be primarily under provincial government jurisdiction. The shift in responsibility is not really away from the federal government, but rather it suggests a preference on the part of some respondents for coordination between the two governments in dealing with this problem.

As with inflation, over 80 percent of the sample were aware that the federal government was primarily responsible for old age pensions, but fewer respondents (68%) felt that it should continue to look after this matter. The change is attributable to an increase (from 6% to 18%) in the number who thought the provincial government should look after this matter. Unlike inflation, where the major shift was from federal government jurisdiction to joint responsibility, in the case of old age pensions, the major shift was towards provincial government control. Clearly, there is some support within the electorate for provincial government control of pensions.

Table 6-1

Federal Government Jurisdiction:  
Awareness of Division of Powers Compared  
to Preferred Division of Powers

Federal Government Area of Responsibility	Presently Responsible		Should Be Responsible		Percentage Change
	Freq	%	Freq	%	%
Foreign Affairs					
Federal Gov't	539	95	499	88	- 7
Provincial Gov't	10	2	15	3	+ 1
Both	15	2	36	6	+ 4
Doesn't matter	-	-	13	2	+ 2
Banking & Paper Money					
Federal Gov't	526	93	504	89	- 4
Provincial Gov't	18	3	24	4	+ 1
Both	20	4	26	5	+ 1
Doesn't matter	-	-	7	1	+ 1
Inflation					
Federal Gov't	474	84	393	69	-15
Provincial Gov't	22	4	48	9	+ 5
Both	65	12	103	18	+ 6
Doesn't matter	-	-	13	2	+ 2
Old Age Pensions					
Federal Gov't	462	81	385	68	-13
Provincial Gov't	31	6	101	18	+12
Both	72	13	51	9	- 4
Doesn't matter	-	-	27	5	+ 5
Family Allowance					
Federal Gov't	483	85	331	58	-27
Provincial Gov't	59	10	126	22	+12
Both	24	4	36	6	+ 2
Doesn't matter	-	-	70	12	+12
Indians					
Federal Gov't	428	76	287	49	-27
Provincial Gov't	61	11	136	24	+13
Both	76	13	137	24	+11
Doesn't matter	-	-	13	2	+ 2
Broadcasting (Radio & TV)					
Federal Gov't	392	69	262	46	-23
Provincial Gov't	92	16	131	23	+ 7
Both	80	14	83	15	+ 1
Doesn't matter	-	-	84	15	+15
Unemployment Insurance					
Federal Gov't	347	61	228	40	-21
Provincial Gov't	176	31	251	44	+13
Both	38	7	60	11	+ 4
Doesn't matter	-	-	23	4	+ 4



There was considerable disagreement about who should look after family allowances even though the vast majority of respondents (85%) were aware that the federal government was responsible for this program. The shift was primarily towards provincial (22%) rather than joint control (6%) of this program. It should be noted that a sizeable number of respondents (12%) were ambivalent regarding this matter.

The third social welfare program analyzed within the jurisdiction of the federal government was that of unemployment insurance. As was the case with old age pensions and family allowances, many respondents (44%) indicated that they would prefer to see the provincial government look after this matter. This is the only area of jurisdiction examined wherein a greater proportion of the sample favored a change of jurisdictional responsibility from one level of government to the other.

Less than 50 percent of the sample felt that the federal government should maintain jurisdiction over Indian affairs or broadcasting. In both cases, Indian affairs and broadcasting, nearly one in every four respondents felt that the provincial government should be given these responsibilities while many other respondents (24% and 15% respectively) indicated that they preferred concurrent jurisdiction.

Federal government jurisdictions were not the only areas

where the respondents preferred changes in the division of powers. As can be seen in Table 6-2, only in the area of city government was there nearly unanimous approval for provincial jurisdiction. While a majority of the respondents preferred that the provincial government continue to look after primary and secondary education, hospitals and asylums, road construction, welfare recipients, and medical care, less than 50 percent of the sample felt that the province should look after property and civil rights or natural resources.

Even though the cost of education and road construction makes up a large portion of the budgetary allocations of the provincial government, it is important to note that some respondents felt that these two jurisdictional responsibilities should be looked after by the federal government or both governments. In the case of education, 42 percent indicated that they would prefer that federal authorities either look after this matter or at least share the responsibility with the provinces. With regards to road construction, while a few respondents wanted the federal government to be primarily responsible, 31 percent felt that the responsibility should be shared between the two governments.

A closer look at the respondents' preferences regarding hospitals and asylums indicates that while 59 percent of the

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Table 6-2

Provincial Government Jurisdiction:  
Awareness of Division of Powers Compared  
to Preferred Division of Powers

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Provincial Government Areas of Responsibility	Presently Responsible		Should Be Responsible		Percentage Change
	Freq	%	Freq	%	%
City Government					
Federal Gov't	33	6	35	6	-
Provincial Gov't	489	86	461	81	- 5
Both	33	6	42	7	+ 1
Doesn't matter	-	-	19	3	+ 3
Hospitals & Asylums					
Federal Gov't	71	13	122	22	+ 9
Provincial Gov't	413	73	336	59	-14
Both	81	14	93	16	+ 2
Doesn't matter	-	-	10	2	+ 2
Building Roads					
Federal Gov't	52	9	46	8	- 1
Provincial Gov't	381	67	333	59	- 8
Both	133	24	175	31	+ 8
Doesn't matter	-	-	7	1	+ 1
Primary and Secondary Education					
Federal Gov't	44	8	139	25	+17
Provincial Gov't	491	87	315	56	-31
Both	31	6	96	17	+11
Doesn't matter	-	-	12	2	+ 2
Medical Care					
Federal Gov't	227	40	144	25	-15
Provincial Gov't	207	36	309	55	+19
Both	133	23	90	16	- 7
Doesn't matter	-	-	16	3	+ 3
People on Welfare					
Federal Gov't	97	17	113	20	+ 3
Provincial Gov't	369	65	306	54	-11
Both	100	18	133	24	+ 6
Doesn't matter	-	-	10	2	+ 2
Property & Civil Rights					
Federal Gov't	242	43	185	33	-10
Provincial Gov't	221	39	214	38	- 1
Both	101	18	146	26	+ 8
Doesn't matter	-	-	16	3	+ 3
Natural Resources					
Federal Gov't	265	47	184	33	-14
Provincial Gov't	165	29	210	37	+ 8
Both	136	24	156	28	+ 4
Doesn't matter	-	-	8	1	+ 1

sample would prefer to see the provinces continue to look after this area of social welfare, there are, nonetheless, a substantial number of people who felt that the federal government should either be responsible for hospitals and asylums (22%) or at least share the responsibility (16%) with the provinces. Just exactly why these respondents would like to see federal control is not known, but what is evident from the response distribution is that a sizeable portion of the Alberta electorate favors the idea of having the national government involved in this aspect of social welfare.

As was mentioned in Chapter IV, the respondents' perceptions of which government is actually responsible for medicare were less than uniform. When asked which government they preferred to look after medicare, 55 percent of the respondents indicated a preference for provincial control, 25 percent favored federal control, and 16 percent felt that both governments should jointly look after medicare. A similar response pattern to that found in the area of medicare emerged when respondents were asked who should look after people on welfare. Even though 65 percent of the respondents indicated that they thought the provincial government was responsible for this area of jurisdiction, only 54 percent preferred provincial control whereas 20 percent preferred federal responsibility and another 24 percent indicated they would like to see

both governments share this responsibility.

An examination of the distribution of preferences concerning property and civil rights and natural resources indicates that in both jurisdictional areas, fewer respondents preferred federal government responsibility compared with the number who perceived this level of government to be responsible for these two areas. From an aggregate point of view, the electorate's preferences do not indicate that any one government is particularly favored above the other. However, in both instances, over 25 percent of the sample indicated a preference for joint jurisdiction. This should not be taken as being particularly significant, since there is a distinct possibility that the preferences indicated for these two areas of responsibility were obtained by chance.<sup>1</sup>

Table 6-3 indicates that there was as much disagreement over who should look after areas of joint jurisdiction as there was over which government was responsible for looking after them. Only in one area, income taxation, was there agreement among a majority of respondents. In this instance, 60 percent indicated they would prefer to see the federal government responsible for this matter. In the area of housing, it is evident that there is a great difference between the respondents' perceptions and preferences with regard to federal jurisdiction. Only 27 percent felt that the federal government should look after housing

whereas 40 percent felt that the provincial government should be responsible and 30 percent felt this jurisdiction should be concurrent. Many of those who perceived the federal government to be looking after housing desired provincial government involvement.<sup>2</sup>

With regards to pollution control, the data suggest that a majority of respondents would prefer to see some provincial involvement in this area. Table 6-3 indicates that 36 percent of the sample preferred to see joint government responsibility in this area. This is the only instance wherein a full one-third of the sample indicated a preference for joint government responsibility.

The respondents' preferences concerning present federal government responsibilities indicate that there is some support for provincial government involvement in federal social welfare programs. This support is clearly evident in the area of unemployment insurance, and to a lesser extent in the areas of old age pensions and family allowances. Similarly, the data in Table 6-2 indicate that a segment of the Alberta population would prefer to see the federal government's jurisdictional responsibilities expanded into areas of provincial government jurisdiction. For example, 42 percent of the sample preferred to see the federal government either share the responsibility for education or obtain

Table 6-3                      Joint Government Jurisdiction:  
Awareness of Division of Powers  
Compared to Preferred Division of Powers

Areas of Joint Responsibility	Presently Responsible		Should Be Responsible		Percentage Change
	Freq	%	Freq	%	
Income Taxation					
Federal Gov't	364	64	338	60	- 4
Provincial Gov't	27	5	94	17	+12
Both	176	31	108	19	-12
Doesn't matter	-	-	22	4	+ 4
Housing					
Federal Gov't	292	52	155	27	-25
Provincial Gov't	146	26	226	40	+14
Both	126	22	171	30	+ 8
Doesn't matter	-	-	8	1	+ 1
Air & Water Pollution					
Federal Gov't	289	51	232	41	-10
Provincial Gov't	124	22	113	20	- 2
Both	149	26	206	36	+10
Doesn't matter	-	-	9	2	+ 2

primary responsibility for looking after this policy area. At least one in five respondents indicated a preference for federal government jurisdictional control of medicare, hospitals and asylums, and welfare recipients. Nonetheless, there was not the same proportion of change in preference for an expansion of federal powers in existing areas of provincial control as there was for an expansion of provincial jurisdiction in what are now areas of federal control.

Although the foregoing data (see Tables 6-1 through 6-3) give some indication of the Alberta electorate's preferences regarding the division of powers, it does not indicate the degree of importance that is placed upon this preferred division of powers. It may be that only a small portion of those who would prefer to see the provinces look after city government consider this opinion to be critical. Were the opinions stated regarding the preferred division of powers peripheral or central to the individual's overall conceptualization of what constitutes legitimate federal or provincial authority? This question cannot be answered by the data since intensity was not measured. What the above information does do, however, is indicate that Alberta electors do have opinions regarding the division of powers, which is a critical component of any federal system. Thus, although this study does not conclusively reject Riker's contention that federalism is of no importance to the public at large, no evidence to support this position can be found herein.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to analyzing the electorate's preferences concerning a specific area or program, the overall preferences of Albertans regarding jurisdictional preferences was undertaken to determine whether people wanted to see any substantial change in the scope of activities of either government. The extent to which Albertans prefer to see the two government's overall



involvement be maintained, increased, or decreased, is shown in Table 6-4: 18 percent preferred that the federal government be primarily responsible for 12 or more of the 19 areas examined, while 11 percent indicated a preference for provincial jurisdiction in 12 or more of the 19 jurisdictional matters. But, the vast majority (71%) preferred to see both governments maintain a broad scope of activities. Thus, although some Albertans would prefer to see increased federal or provincial activity, it seems as though most citizens are generally satisfied with the relative positions of the two governments.

The distribution of the total number of preferences regarding provincial or federal responsibility points out that there is a tendency among a minority of Albertans to prefer an overall increase in federal or provincial activity. This finding brings up the question of federal-provincial orientation. Are there identifiable segments of the Alberta electorate who are more oriented towards one level of government than the other? And, perhaps even more important, does an individual's federal or provincial orientation affect his evaluation of particular government programs or policies? Before either of these questions can be answered some measure of federal-provincial orientation needs to be found.

Table 6-4      Percentage of Respondents Preferring  
Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction by  
Aggregate Number of Jurisdictions

Number of Jurisdictions	Prefer Provincial Jurisdiction		Prefer Federal Jurisdiction	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
0	21	3.7	11	1.9
1	25	4.4	11	1.9
2	31	5.5	22	3.9
3	42	7.4	23	4.1
4	45	8.0	30	5.3
5	60	10.6	46	8.1
6	70	12.4	63	11.1
7	64	11.3	56	9.9
8	50	8.8	61	10.8
9	42	7.4	50	8.8
10	32	5.7	46	8.1
11	20	3.5	45	8.0
12	25	4.4	28	5.0
13	19	3.4	23	4.1
14	9	1.6	17	3.0
15	3	.5	9	1.6
16	2	.4	9	1.6
17	1	.2	5	.9
18	-	-	5	.9
19	-	-	6	1.1

### Federal-Provincial Orientation

The determination of an individual's federal or provincial orientation is a difficult task, as Fred Schindeler noted in a paper presented at the meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association in June 1972.<sup>4</sup> A particularly perplexing aspect of this problem is that, in addition to determining the extent to which one might be oriented towards the federal or provincial government, it is also possible that there may be specific dimensions to federal-provincial orientations. Schindeler suggested, for example,

It may be quite possible for a person to perceive of one level (the provincial) as affecting him most on a day-to-day basis and yet to remain convinced that the other level (the federal) was still the most important because it had responsibility for some of the grander areas of public policy. It seemed reasonable therefore to hypothesize that we would find not only degrees but also dimensions of federal-provincial orientation.<sup>5</sup>

Schindeler reasoned that there are four potentially discrete dimensions of federal-provincial orientations: (1) a jurisdictional dimension which relates to the individual's opinion of which government looks after the most important problems; (2) the personal dimension which concerns the individual's perception of the impact of the two governments upon the personal life of the respondent; (3) the power dimension which relates to the individual's perception of the relative power of the two governments vis-a-vis one another; and (4) the political

participation dimension which concerns the individual's willingness to vote in a provincial or federal election. Schindeler found after analyzing the data gathered from a 1968 study conducted in Ontario that "the four separate and distinct dimensions of federal-provincial orientation that we hypothesized might exist cannot be isolated."<sup>6</sup>

Although separate dimensions of federal-provincial orientations were not isolated in the Ontario study, several individual aspects of the electorate's federal-provincial orientation were examined. Of particular importance is the analysis Schindeler undertook of the personal aspect of this matter.

In analyzing the degree of association between this personal aspect of federal-provincial orientation and the respondent's demographic characteristics, Schindeler tested the following hypothesis: "Those respondents who were in age groups most directly affected by provincial government programs would be more provincial in their orientation."<sup>7</sup> This hypothesis was formulated on the basis of the following rationale:

. . . we expected to find not only the young . . . but also the elderly; the former because they would be close to the educational system, involved in property transactions, concerned with licensing, automotive transportation and other matters falling within the provincial jurisdiction, and the latter because they would be generally less mobile and more parochial in their interests and because they would often be concerned with various welfare measures that fall under provincial jurisdiction.<sup>8</sup>

The Ontario study substantiated this line of reasoning.<sup>9</sup>

There is reason to doubt these findings, however, as the argument that provincial government programs are of more importance to young people or older people, is questionable. For example, for those young adults who attend post-secondary educational institutions (university, trade or technical institutions), the federal government's student loan program may be a very important factor. In addition, for those young couples contemplating the purchase of a home, federal housing policy may be an important consideration. Similarly, for the older citizen federal programs, such as old age pensions, are undoubtedly of importance. It is, therefore, possible to argue that federal programs may be as important for these two age groups as are provincial programs. Also, it would be an oversimplification to suggest that the middle-aged individual may not be concerned about provincial matters. What then can be concluded? Is age really associated with the perceived importance of one or the other of the two governments? The Alberta study data provide contradictory evidence to that presented by Schindeler.

The number of individuals who perceive the two levels of government to be important to them are comparable (see Table 6-5). Forty-one percent of the Ontario sample compared to 43 percent of the Alberta sample felt that the federal government was most

important, while 44 percent of both the Alberta and Ontario respondents identified their respective provincial governments as being the most important government in affecting their personal lives.

Table 6-5      Personal Federal-Provincial Orientation:  
A Comparison Between the Alberta and  
Ontario Electorate

Most Important Level of Government	Ontario Electorate		Alberta Electorate	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
Federal Government	574	41	239	43
Both Governments Equally Important	182	13	65	12
Provincial Government	612	44	241	44
Neither Government Important	28	2	6	1

While the frequency distribution between the two studies is almost identical, the Alberta study found no significant degree of association between age and federal-provincial orientations, as can be seen in Table 6-6. Both young and old Albertans perceived the federal government to be just as important to them as did middle aged Alberta respondents.

Table 6-6                      Personal Federal-Provincial  
Orientation by Age

Age	Federal Government		Both Governments		Provincial Government	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
19 - 25	26	43	5	8	30	49
26 - 35	57	48	12	10	50	42
36 - 45	58	45	19	15	52	40
46 - 55	46	43	13	12	49	45
56 - 65	23	47	6	12	20	41
Over 65	18	33	11	20	25	46
$\chi^2=7.67$ $df=10$ $P>.6$ $Tau'=.02$						

Both the provincial and federal governments are involved in programs that are important to all age groups. Given the discrepancy between the findings of the Alberta and Ontario studies, there is indeed reason to question whether federal-provincial orientations result from the impact of particular programs oriented to a specific segment of the population. Both governments have developed important programs that affect all segments of the electorate.

Although there is little likelihood that one's personal perception of the importance of the federal or provincial government

is significantly associated with the demographic characteristics of the individual, it may be associated with his evaluation of the division of powers.<sup>10</sup> To find out whether there was any correlation between these two variables, a series of cross-tabulations was undertaken which indicated that in 11 of the 16 cases, a significant degree of association existed.<sup>11</sup> In the remaining five areas of jurisdiction, although the relationship was not significant, there was a positive relationship between the two response patterns. Those individuals who considered the federal government to be personally the most important level of government for themselves and their families, also tended to prefer federal control. Similarly, those who perceived the provincial government to be important also tended to prefer provincial control. Also, those respondents who felt both governments were equally important tended to prefer concurrent government jurisdiction.<sup>12</sup>

An index of federal-provincial orientation was constructed by utilizing each individual's overall preferences for federal or provincial control in the 19 areas of jurisdiction examined. The index was constructed by simply totalling the number of times an individual indicated a preference for either federal or provincial jurisdiction. Those who preferred to see the federal government responsible for 12 or more of the 19 areas studied were considered to be federally oriented, while respondents who preferred



to see the provinces look after 12 or more of the 19 areas of jurisdiction were considered to be provincially oriented. Respondents who did not indicate a preference for either the federal or provincial jurisdiction in 12 or more areas were not considered to be federally or provincially oriented. This index is used throughout the analysis which follows and is referred to as the jurisdictional orientation index.<sup>13</sup>

In analyzing the relationship between the personal orientation measure utilized by Schindeler and the jurisdictional orientation index, it was found that there was a moderate degree of association, as can be seen in Table 6-7. Those who were most likely to prefer a substantial increase in federal responsibilities also personally perceived the federal government to

Table 6-7 Jurisdictional Orientation Index and Personal Orientation

Jurisdictional Orientation Index	Federal Orientation		Neither		Provincial Orientation	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Federal	57	58	12	12	29	30
Neither	161	42	50	13	171	45
Provincial	20	31	4	6	40	63
<hr/>						
$\chi^2=18.9$	df=4	P .01	Tau'=.10			

be most important. Those who were most likely to prefer an increase in provincial responsibility personally perceived the provincial government to be most important.

The above-mentioned findings substantiate the claim that some Albertans are federally or provincially oriented, but the question posed earlier still remains--who are they?<sup>14</sup> Are those most aware of federalism oriented towards the federal or provincial government? What about those most concerned about Canadian unity or the maintenance of the division of powers--are they more oriented towards one level of government than another? To answer these questions the relationships between each measure of federal-provincial orientation discussed above and the measures of saliency discussed in Chapters IV and V were analyzed.

In order to simplify the discussion of the relationships between the two measures of federal-provincial orientation and the several component measures of saliency, a corrected Tau was calculated for each of the ten correlations.<sup>15</sup> As can be seen in Table 6-8, the degree of association between federal-provincial orientation and awareness, concern, involvement, and the composite measure of saliency are very low in eight of ten instances. There was a tendency for those who felt that Canadian unity was the major problem facing Canada to perceive the federal government to be most important to them personally.<sup>16</sup> Also, those who indicated that they would prefer to see the provinces increase

their jurisdictional responsibilities were found to be more concerned about the maintenance of a division of powers.<sup>17</sup> Despite these two moderate relationships, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that federalism is any more salient for those who tend to be oriented towards the federal or provincial government than it is for those who are neither federally nor provincially oriented.

Up to this point it has been found that people do have preferences regarding which government should look after a particular matter, and there is reason to believe that some

Table 6-8  
Corrected Tau Values for  
Measures of Saliency by Measures of  
Federal-Provincial Orientation

Measures of Federalism	Measures of Federal-Provincial Orientation	
	Personal Importance of Level of Government	Preferences for Increased Jurisdictional Responsibility
Awareness	-.06	-.03
Major Problem Facing Canada	-.14	-.02
Maintenance of Division of Powers	.04	.12
Involvement in Constitutional Conf.	-.04	-.03
Overall Saliency	-.02	.01

individuals are more oriented towards one level of government than the other. However, this orientation towards either the provincial or federal government has not as yet been found to be very helpful in understanding one's overall perception of federalism.

The foregoing discussion does not deal with the possible impact which controversial issues may have on one's orientation to the federal system. It could be argued, for example, that an individual's position concerning the appropriateness of a national medicare plan is influenced by his federal or provincial orientation. A similar argument could be made concerning one's position on bilingualism, housing policy, or one's perception of the extent of federal disregard for Western Canada's problems. Are opponents of bilingualism provincially oriented? Are supporters of medicare federally oriented?<sup>18</sup>

### Issues

Four of the issues of central importance in federal-provincial relations during the 1968-69 period were medicare, housing, bilingualism, and western discontent. Two of them, medicare and housing, are examined below to determine the electorate's preferences regarding these two matters. The other issues, bilingualism and western discontent, are examined to determine whether an individual's evaluation may be reflective

of an underlying federal or provincial orientation.

Medicare and Housing: Who Should Be Responsible?

When Alberta officially entered into the national medicare program on July 1, 1969, a group of Alberta citizens formed an organization known as Boycott Alberta Medicare (BAM). They urged Albertans to break the newly instituted provincial law which required all citizens to register for this new program.<sup>19</sup> Several members of the organization openly challenged the provincial government to bring charges against them for refusing to comply with the legislation.<sup>20</sup> The government refrained from taking action against anyone not complying with the legislation, noting that those who failed to comply to the legislation would be required to pay their own medical bills rather than having them paid by the province.<sup>21</sup> Some publicity was given BAM's endeavors to thwart the registration of individuals, but by the fall of 1969 it became apparent that there was little public support for their cause.<sup>22</sup>

Given the publicity that the struggle between opponents and proponents of the national medicare plan received, and the public nature of the appeal made by this group of citizens, it was decided to measure the extent to which the Alberta electorate supported or opposed the idea of federal involvement. Each respondent was asked to state whether he agreed or disagreed with

the following statement:

Medicare is a national problem and therefore should be dealt with on a national basis as the government in Ottawa has done.

	Freq	Percent
Agree strongly	25	4
Agree	273	48
Disagree	243	43
Disagree strongly	22	4

As can be seen from the above response distribution, the Alberta electorate was divided over whether the federal government should or should not be involved in medicare, even though the statement itself argues in favor of federal involvement.

When positions on all the various aspects of federalism discussed thus far (i.e., awareness, concern, involvement, personal orientation, and preferred increases in jurisdictional responsibilities) were cross-tabulated with opinions on this question, only two of the six measures were found to be associated with medicare. As Table 6-9 indicates, there is a weak positive correlation between concern over the maintenance of the division of powers and a preference for provincial jurisdiction over medicare, while a much stronger relationship was found between a pro-provincial or federal position on medicare and the federal-provincial jurisdiction orientation index.<sup>23</sup> Seventy-nine percent of those who were federally oriented agreed that medicare should be looked after by the federal government. Sixty percent of

Table 6-9

Corrected Tau Values for  
Measures of Saliency and  
Evaluation by Medicare Issue

Measures of Saliency and Evaluation	Medicare Issue
Awareness	.07
Maintenance of Division of Powers	.09
Involvement in Constitutional Conferences	-.06
Overall Saliency	.06
Personal Importance of Level of Government	.02
Federal-Provincial Jurisdictional Orientation Index	.23

those who were provincially oriented indicated that they opposed federal government involvement in the area of medicare.<sup>24</sup> This finding supports the premise that one's preferences regarding medicare are reflected by general jurisdictional preferences.<sup>25</sup> However, before concluding that this index is beneficial in reflecting one's preferences regarding specific policy views, additional evidence should be found.

During the 1968-69 period, housing policy became a major political issue to both federal and provincial governments. In

the 1968 federal election campaign all major parties promised to do something about what was often referred to as "the housing crisis."<sup>26</sup> Following the June 1968 election the Liberal Government established a special task force headed by one of the senior cabinet ministers in the Trudeau government, Paul Hellyer. The task force was charged with examining the housing situation across Canada and with reporting back to the government in January 1969.<sup>27</sup>

In its January 1969 report, the task force made several recommendations concerning the need to increase the federal government's ability to cope with the housing situation.<sup>28</sup> But, due in part to several proposals which recommended that the federal government increase its jurisdictional responsibilities, the provinces were critical of the housing report. Of particular concern to them were the following proposals: (1) the federal government should make direct loans to municipalities to encourage the acquisition, servicing, and sale of land; and (2) a department of housing and urban affairs should be established by the federal government.<sup>29</sup>

Not unexpectedly, at an in camera meeting of provincial and federal housing officials in February 1969, the provinces made it clear that the responsibility for housing and urban affairs was within their jurisdiction and they were capable of looking after this responsibility.<sup>30</sup> While this conference received little attention from the press or the public, the



question of provincial and/or federal involvement in housing programs was made a major political issue when Mr. Hellyer resigned from the Trudeau government in April 1969. Mr. Hellyer's reported reason for leaving the cabinet was that the Liberal Government of Prime Minister Trudeau seemed unwilling to act upon the recommendations of the task force because of the constitutional problems this action could create. Mr. Hellyer argued that such a stand was irrelevant to the people of Canada:

People really don't care which level of government has the primary responsibility, or whether the initiative should come from the federal level or the provincial level . . . . They're interested in decent accommodations for their families, and they don't really appreciate buck-passing back and forth between politicians and government.<sup>31</sup>

Mr. Trudeau's response to Hellyer's assertion that the division of powers was irrelevant to Canadians was simply to restate his belief that it was constitutionally impossible for his government to interfere in this area of jurisdiction.<sup>32</sup>

As was the case with the medicare issue, the measurement of the Alberta electorate's preferences regarding this issue was undertaken by asking respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with one of the arguments made by proponents of federal involvement in housing.

The present housing crisis in Canada should be dealt with by the federal government because it is a national problem of considerable magnitude.

	Freq	Percent
Agree strongly	74	13
Agree	353	62
Disagree	132	23
Disagree strongly	6	1

Given that 24 percent of the sample opposed federal involvement in housing, Hellyer's statement must be qualified somewhat. Some Albertans felt that it did matter which government looked after housing, but certainly the majority tended to accept the position that the federal government needed to become involved in this matter.

In analyzing the relationship between the housing issue and the several measures of saliency and evaluation, a similar pattern emerged to that discovered in the analysis of medicare. In only two cases was a substantial degree of association found to exist. Once again it was found that concern over the maintenance of the division of powers increased with provincial orientation; and there was a high correlation between federal or provincial orientation regarding housing and the jurisdictional orientation index. Ninety-two percent of those who were federally oriented agreed that the federal government should be involved in housing, while 42 percent of those who were provincially oriented opposed federal involvement.<sup>33</sup>

Table 6-10                      Corrected Tau Values for Measures  
of Federalism and Housing Issue

Measures of Federalism	Housing Issue
Awareness	-.03
Maintenance of Division of Powers	.04
Involvement in Constitutional Conferences	.00
Overall Saliency	.03
Personal Importance of Level of Government	.00
Federal-Provincial Jurisdictional Orientation Index	.21

Given that in the case of both medicare and housing, one's score on the jurisdictional orientation index was found to be indicative of an individual's preference regarding federal or provincial control, some confidence can be placed in this measure. But, both of the above issues were phrased in terms of the division of powers between the two governments. Whether or not this index helps one predict an individual's position on matters not directly related to the division of powers is another matter.

### Regional and National Perspectives

The question of bilingualism and biculturalism has been a particularly emotive issue in Alberta since the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.<sup>34</sup> As was noted earlier, the Alberta government not only vigorously opposed the creation of the Royal Commission, but also threatened to challenge the constitutionality of the Official Languages Act of 1969, which provided for the establishment of bilingual districts in Canada on the basis of the percentage of French-speaking people within a given locality.<sup>35</sup> But there is reason to doubt whether this opposition was shared by a majority of the respondents sampled.

If acceptance of bilingual districts in Alberta is necessary for the proper development of a bilingual nation then I'm in favor of the law passed by the federal government.

	Freq	Percent
Agree strongly	17	3
Agree	270	48
Disagree	232	41
Disagree strongly	36	6

Whether the extent of support that existed for bilingualism influenced the Government of Alberta's decision not to challenge the constitutionality of this legislation is not known.<sup>36</sup> It is evident from the above data that there was a considerable difference of opinion among the voters regarding the merits of this legislation. But why does this difference of opinion exist?

Could it be that there is some correlation between bilingualism and views on federalism? To answer this latter question, the degree of association between the bilingualism issue and the several measures of federalism previously discussed is given in summary form in Table 6-11.

Table 6-11  
Corrected Tau Values for  
Measures of Federalism and  
Bilingualism Issue

Measures of Federalism	Bilingualism Issue
Awareness	.02
Major Problems Facing Canada	.03
Maintenance of Division of Powers	.08
Involvement in Constitutional Conferences	.00
Saliency	.03
Personal Importance of Level of Government	.05
Federal-Provincial Jurisdictional Orientation Index	-.04

The data show that in no instance was a strong degree of association found to exist. Those who opposed the establishment of bilingual districts are no more likely to support an increase

in the scope of the federal powers than are those who indicated support for bilingualism. Thus, although on the surface it might be thought that opposition to bilingualism would reflect an underlying provincial orientation, there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case. Nor is there any evidence to indicate that one's opinion regarding bilingualism is influenced by the saliency of federalism.

#### A Dissatisfied West

In 1969 Western Canadians were reportedly "fed up" with the way in which the federal government was treating them.<sup>37</sup> It was even suggested that support for western separatism was growing rather rapidly in Alberta and other western provinces.<sup>38</sup> Certainly the Alberta position paper presented to the Constitutional Conference in February 1969 stressed that there was a profound dissatisfaction among many Western Canadians due to the lack of understanding or appreciation on the part of the federal government concerning the West's problems and aspirations.<sup>39</sup> The data in Table 6-12 tend to confirm Premier Strom's observations. In three separate statements respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with statements concerning Western Canada's inequality within confederation and in each case a majority indicated that they felt Western Canadians were not being treated fairly.

Table 6-12 Albertans' Sense of Dissatisfaction

Statement	Agree Strongly		Agree		Disagree		Disagree Strongly	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
1. The Eastern Canadians receive more benefits than do Western Canadians from being part of the Dominion of Canada.*	68	12	258	46	229	40	7	1
2. The West is always getting a raw deal because the national government imposes high tariffs to protect eastern manufacturers.*	47	8	254	45	248	44	6	1
3. The government in Ottawa is more concerned about the problems of Eastern Canadians than they are about the problems of Western Canadians.*	56	10	287	51	210	37	10	2

\*The degree of association between these three statements is as follows: between statements one and two,  $Tau'=.64$ ; between statements one and three,  $Tau'=.48$ ; between statements two and three,  $Tau'=.43$ .

Although a majority of the sample indicated that they felt Western Canada was not being treated fairly by the federal government, there is little indication of the intense dissatisfaction alluded to by Premier Strom in his 1969 address to the Constitutional Conference. Only eight to 12 percent of the sample strongly agreed with the statements in Table 6-12.

In analyzing the demographic characteristics of those respondents most dissatisfied with the way in which the federal government was treating the West, no significant relationships were found. Highly educated people were just as dissatisfied with the federal government's handling of Western Canadian problems as were those with little formal education. Similarly, all age groups shared the same opinion as the feeling of dissatisfaction seemed to exist among all segments of the population.

When the three statements utilized in Table 6-12 were cross-tabulated with the several measures of federalism (see Table 6-13) it was found that there was a moderate relationship between each of the statements and concern over the maintenance of the division of powers--those respondents concerned about maintaining the division of powers also tended to indicate discontent with the federal government's treatment of the West. Also there was a moderate relationship between the first two measures of western discontent and involvement. Those who



followed the conference proceedings more often indicated discontent with the federal government's handling of the West's problems.<sup>40</sup> Given the high degree of association between the western discontent variables and both the concern and involvement variables it is not surprising that there is a moderately strong correlation between saliency and these measures of western dissatisfaction. For example, 67 percent of those who found federalism highly salient agreed that the East received more benefits than the West.

Neither of the two measures of federal-provincial orientation were found to be strongly related to the three measures of western discontent. This latter finding does not necessarily suggest that western discontent is not related to some underlying federal-provincial orientation. Rather, it may very well be that there are different dimensions of federal-provincial orientation which are not related to jurisdictional considerations. Admittedly, no significant degree of association was found to exist between the response patterns of these two issues and the jurisdictional orientation index. Although this index is of some utility in measuring jurisdictional preferences, when placed within the context of the division of powers between the two governments, this measure does not reflect regional or national perspectives.

One measure relates to all aspects of federalism discussed and that is concern over the maintenance of the division of powers. A closer look at the relationship between concern over

Table 6-13  
Corrected Tau Values for  
Measures of Federalism and  
Western Discontent

Measures of Federalism	More Benefits for East	West Gets Raw Deal	Ottawa Concerned with East
Awareness	.07	.03	.02
Major Problem for Canada	-.04	-.03	-.03
Maintenance of Division of Powers	.14	.16	.11
Involvement in Constitutional Conferences	.12	.09	.01
Saliency	.15	.11	.02
Personal Importance of Level of Government	.04	.08	.01
Federal-Provincial Jurisdictional Orientation Index	.03	.06	.05

the maintenance of powers and the measures of discontent shows that in all instances over 60% of those who were dissatisfied with the way in which the federal government was treating the West were concerned with maintaining the division of powers. It is not unreasonable to suggest, given the above relationship, that most of those who are concerned about the maintenance of the division of powers are skeptical of the federal government's ability to

either meet or protect the objectives of Western Canadians. Even though the question format does not in and of itself in any way explicitly request a respondent to indicate a preference for either the federal or provincial government, concern over the maintenance of the division of powers is related to provincial orientation in all four issues analyzed.<sup>41</sup>

In looking at the degree of association between the four issue variables analyzed two important findings emerge. First, as might be expected, there was a strong relationship between the medicare and housing variables ( $\tau = .20$ ). Eighty-four percent of those who agreed that medicare should be looked after by the federal government agreed that this government should also be involved in housing. However, the relationship between either of these two variables and the bilingualism or western discontent variables was considerably weaker.<sup>42</sup> It cannot therefore be concluded that opposition to national medicare or housing programs is necessarily reflective of a regional perspective. The second finding that emerged from this analysis was that there was a moderate relationship between the bilingualism and western discontent variable. For example, 65% of those respondents who opposed the creation of bilingual districts agreed that the East receives more benefits than does the West.<sup>43</sup> This latter finding

supports the notion that opposition to bilingualism is related to a regional orientation.

Both of the above findings tend to confirm the notion expressed by Schindeler in his paper on federal-provincial orientations. There do seem to be dimensions to federal-provincial orientations as well as degrees of federal-provincial orientations. Just exactly what these dimensions are is as yet unclear. What does seem to emerge from these data, however, is that federal or provincial jurisdictional orientation is not necessarily related to regional orientations.

#### Summary

The findings in this chapter indicate that Albertans do have preferences concerning which government should be responsible for a particular program or area of governmental activity. In most instances the electorate seem to prefer that either the federal or provincial government be given primary responsibility for a particular area rather than opting for a situation in which both governments would share the responsibility one with another.

It was also noted herein that there are individuals within the electorate who would prefer to see a change in the existing balance of power between the two governments. Only a minority of Albertans would support a substantial change in the division of

powers. The preponderance of the electorate, while indicating a preference for some changes in the division of powers is not particularly interested in seeing the federal or provincial government dramatically increase or decrease their overall areas of responsibility.

Although there are measurable differences among the electorate concerning their level of awareness regarding the division of powers as indicated in Chapter IV, there is no indication that awareness is in any way related to one's evaluation of how the powers of government should be divided between the two governments. Similarly, one's involvement in following the constitutional conferences was not found to be a particularly important factor in relationship to one's evaluation of federal-provincial relations. However, a significant degree of association was found to exist between concern over the maintenance of the division of powers and the jurisdictional variables that measured federal-provincial orientations. Those who indicated a concern over the division of powers were more prone to be provincially oriented.

An analysis of several issues which pertain to federal-provincial relations found that most Albertans favor federal government involvement in social welfare programs such as medicare. Also, little opposition was found to exist to the idea of federal

involvement in housing. The electorate was found to be split over the development of bilingualism, but there was little question about the existence of discontent among all segments of the electorate regarding their perception of the federal government's Eastern Canadian bias.

An analysis of the relationships between the four issue variables and the several measures of federalism developed in Chapters IV, V, and VI found that only one variable consistently correlated with all four of these issue variables: concern over the maintenance of the division of powers. As was mentioned above, most of those respondents who indicated they would like to see a division of powers between the two governments maintained, tended to take what was considered to be a provincial stance on all of the issues analyzed. It can be inferred from these findings, therefore, that the federal system is supported more by those who prefer provincial government activity. Those who are nationally oriented do not tend to perceive federalism to be a meaningful structure of government.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The response distribution to the questions regarding the electorate's preferences concerning property and civil rights and natural resources indicate that approximately one-third of the sample chose one of three responses to each question. Given a confidence interval of approximately  $\pm 5$  percent, the distribution obtained in these two instances could have happened by chance.

<sup>2</sup>Thirty-two percent of those who perceived the federal government to be responsible for housing indicated that they would prefer to see the provincial government look after this matter. Ten percent of those who perceived the provincial government to be responsible indicated they would prefer to see the federal government responsible for housing.

<sup>3</sup>W.H. Riker, Comparative Politics Vol.2, No. 1, October 1969, p. 145. For a discussion of this matter see Chapter I, pp. 6-7.

<sup>4</sup>Fred Schindeler, "Perceptions of Federal-Provincial Relations in Ontario," (paper read at the Canadian Political Science Association meeting, Montreal, June, 1972).

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 27-30.

<sup>10</sup>In addition to being correlated with age, the personal perception variable was cross tabulated with sex, occupation, income, region and religion. None of these demographic variables were significantly related to the personal perception variable.

<sup>11</sup>Three of the 19 cases were not examined: foreign affairs, city government and banking. In all three of these cases there was near unanimity among the electorate regarding their preferences.

<sup>12</sup> Of the 11 areas of jurisdiction wherein a significant degree of association was found to exist, the strongest relationships were between the personal importance variable and jurisdictional responsibility for medicare (Tau'=.14), hospitals (Tau'=.05), education (Tau'=.11), housing (Tau'=.12), and people on welfare (Tau'=.05).

<sup>13</sup> A second index of overall preference for an increase in federal and/or provincial government responsibility was constructed from the responses obtained in Table 6-1 through 6-3. This index calculated the frequency with which an individual respondent indicated a preference for a different level of government than that which was perceived to have actually been responsible for the program.

The index was constructed as follows: if an individual responded that the provincial government was responsible for road construction and yet he indicated a preference for the federal government to look after this matter, it would be considered an indication of federal government preference. If this same individual was aware that the provincial government was responsible for education, urban affairs, hospitals and asylums, and yet indicated a preference for federal government responsibility in each case, the respondent would score in the 90 - 100% category, had these been the only areas he was aware were within the jurisdiction of the province. A similar procedure was utilized in determining the number of respondents favoring increased provincial responsibilities only in this case the change from awareness of a federal government jurisdiction to a preference for provincial action was calculated.

When respondents were categorized according to the extent of change they would prefer to see take place vis-a-vis a transfer of powers from one government to the other, it was found that only a small segment of the population advocated wholesale changes. As can be seen in the following table only 24 percent wanted to see 50 percent or more of the powers of the two governments changed.

As the data below indicates, this procedure was not successful in isolating those respondents with predominately federal or predominately provincial orientations. Those respondents who preferred an increase in provincial government jurisdiction were found to be just as likely to prefer an increase in federal government responsibility. This index was therefore discarded.



Federal Government Preference by  
Provincial Government Preference  
(Number of Changes Measured by Percent of Sample)

Prefer Federal Powers Be Transferred to Province	Prefer Provincial Powers Be Transferred to Federal Government							
	No Change		Few Changes (1-25%)		Some Changes (26-49%)		Numerous Changes (50% or more)	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
No Change	94	17	66	12	30	5	2	-
Few Changes	63	11	31	6	13	2	3	-
Some Changes	90	16	49	9	26	5	9	2
Numerous Changes	35	6	32	6	18	3	6	1
$\chi^2=15.1$ $df=9$ $P>.09$ $\text{Tau}'=.06$								

<sup>14</sup> The jurisdictional orientation index was cross-tabulated with sex, age, occupation, income, education, place of residence, and religion. None of the above variables were found to be significantly related to the jurisdictional orientation index.

<sup>15</sup> This measure of association permits one to determine whether two ordinal variables are positively related, negatively related, or not related to one another. The corrected Tau (written Tau') takes into consideration both untied and tied pairs of individuals. This measure has been referred to as probably the best measure to use for data of the nature presented herein. See Theodore R. Anderson, and Morris Zelditch, Jr., A Basic Course in Statistics (second edition; Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1968), pp. 152-155.

<sup>16</sup> Fifty-seven percent of those who mentioned Canadian unity as being Canada's most important problem also indicated that the federal government was of greatest importance to themselves and their families.

<sup>17</sup> Eighty-four percent of those who wanted to see an increase in provincial powers indicated they felt that it was important to maintain the division of powers.

<sup>18</sup>It is possible that an individual's opposition to the position that one government has taken on a particular issue may influence his view of the appropriateness of that government's activities in other areas. For example, strong opposition to the federal government's position on bilingualism may affect one's view pertaining to the propriety of that government's actions in other issues such as medicare or housing. More precise measures of intensity than those used in this study would be necessary to confirm or reject this hypothesis.

<sup>19</sup>News item in the Albertan, March 31, 1969, p. 1.

<sup>20</sup>News item in the Lethbridge Herald, June 27, 1969, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., September 5, 1969, p. 13.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Fifty-two percent of those who felt the provincial government was most important to them disagreed with the statement advocating federal involvement in medicare.

<sup>24</sup>Those who were neither federally nor provincially oriented were no more likely to agree than disagree with the statement (49% agreed and 51% disagreed).

<sup>25</sup>The relationship between the jurisdictional orientation index and the medicare issue is distorted somewhat because medicare is one of the 19 areas of jurisdiction.

<sup>26</sup>News item in Canadian News Facts (Toronto: Marpep Publishing Limited, 1968), Vol. 2, No. 15, September 4, 1968, pp. 121-122.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 2, February 4, 1969, p. 202.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 4, March 4, 1969, p. 217.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 8, May 5, 1969, p. 249.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Those who were neither federally nor provincially oriented tended to support federal involvement in housing (74% in favor and only 26% opposed).

<sup>34</sup>For a discussion of this matter see Chapter III.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>As has been noted in Chapter III, the Alberta government threatened to challenge the constitutionality of the federal legislation, but the matter was dropped by the province shortly after the February 1969 conference and no further action was taken.

<sup>37</sup>Walter Stewart, "Coming Showdown with the West," Macleans Vol. 82, July 1969, pp. 34-35.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Constitutional Conference Proceedings, Second Meeting, 1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), pp. 125-127. See also Chapter III for a more extended discussion of this matter.

<sup>40</sup>Sixty percent or more of those who followed the conference(s) agreed with the three statements.

<sup>41</sup>See Tables 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, and 6-13.

<sup>42</sup>The following table indicates the corrected Tau values calculated as a result of cross-tabulating each of the issue variables one with another.

Issue Variables	Medicare	Housing	Bilingualism
Medicare	-		
Housing	.20	-	
Bilingualism	.11	.03	-
More Benefits for East	.10	.03	.14
West Gets Raw Deal	.05	.01	.12
Ottawa Concerned with East	.10	.00	.13

<sup>43</sup>Similarly, 68 percent of those who opposed bilingualism agreed that the federal government is more concerned about the East. Sixty percent of those who opposed bilingualism also agreed that the East receives more benefits from confederation than does the West.

## VII

### THE ALBERTA PARTY SYSTEM, THE ELECTORATE, AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM

From 1957-71 the Alberta electorate persistently supported a different party in provincial elections than the one which they have tended to support in federal elections.<sup>1</sup> As was mentioned earlier, some of the literature on Canadian political parties attempts to explain this aspect of voting behavior by suggesting that electors vote for different parties at the two levels of government to insure that a balance of power is maintained within the Canadian federal system.<sup>2</sup> Whether or not this explanation is applicable to the Alberta party system will be examined in this chapter. In addition, an analysis is made of the degree of association that exists between party identification and awareness, concern,

involvement, and evaluation of federalism as described in Chapters IV, V, and VI. Before examining the relationship between federalism and the Alberta party system, a brief resume of the electoral support of provincial parties is presented.

#### Electoral Support of Provincial Parties

The election in 1971 of a Progressive Conservative government in Alberta marks the first time in this province's history that that party has formed the government. From 1935-1971 the Social Credit party dominated the provincial legislature by winning from 61 to 95 percent of the seats.<sup>3</sup> As is well known, the winning of a much larger percentage of the legislative seats in a single member plurality electoral system does not always reflect the relative percentage of support that the winning party received from the electorate.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, maldistribution of legislative seats also skews the relationship between legislative seats and electoral support.<sup>5</sup> An examination of aggregate voting data as presented in Table 7-1 reflects much more accurately the relative strengths of the Alberta provincial parties than does legislative representation.

All three provincial opposition parties during the 1935-71 period have at one time or another been successful in obtaining 25 percent or more of the electorate's support. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) in the 1944 and 1948 elections was second only to the Social Credit party in electoral

Table 7-1 Percentage of Popular Vote 1905-1971 by Provincial Party

Election Year	Liberal	Progressive Conservative	Social Credit	United Farmers of Alta.	C.C.F./N.D.P.	Others	Total Popular Vote
1905*	61	35				4	23,336
1909	59	32				9	50,004
1913	49	45				6	96,833
1917	36	30				34	151,499
1921	33	11		28		28	298,087
1926**	27	23		41		9	175,137
1930	25	14		39		23	188,219
1935	23	6	54	11		5	301,752
1940	1	-	43		11	46	308,864
1944	-	-	52		25	23	282,106
1948	18	-	56		19	7	294,793
1952	22	2	56		14	5	298,335
1955	31	9	46		8	5	378,179
1959	14	24	56		4	2	413,515
1963	20	13	55		9	3	403,444
1967	11	26	45		16	3	498,341
1971	1	46	41		12	-	637,969

\*Source: 1905-1921 data obtained from Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1905-1921.

\*\*Source: 1926-1971 data obtained from Government of Alberta, Provincial Election Returns, 1926-1971.

support. In 1952 and 1955 the Alberta Liberal party gained some electoral support and in the latter year succeeded in reducing the Social Credit party's portion of the vote to 46 percent. It was anticipated by many provincial Liberals that 1959 would see a further strengthening of their electoral support, but instead, their election support was reduced to 14 percent. As for the Alberta Progressive Conservative party, although the party showed some strength in 1959 by obtaining 24 percent of the vote, in the 1963 election only 13 percent of the electorate voted Progressive Conservative. In 1967 the Progressive Conservative party once again obtained a substantial percentage of the vote, with 26 percent of the electorate supporting it. This resurgence of the Progressive Conservative party, coupled with a growth in the number of N.D.P. supporters, reduced Social Credit electoral support to 45 percent in 1967, the lowest it had been in 27 years.

Since 1935, the Social Credit party has received as much as 56 percent of the electorate's votes, and in only four of the ten elections from 1935 through 1971 did the party receive less than 50 percent of the vote. In these four instances, the party's electoral support did not drop below 40 percent. While there are many possible explanations as to why Social Credit was so successful during this period, there has been a paucity of empirical research upon the subject. With a few exceptions, what research has been

done has dealt with voter support of federal parties; but this tells us little about provincial party supporters.<sup>6</sup>

#### The Social Basis of Provincial Party Support

In order to obtain a better understanding of the composition of party support for each of the four provincial parties, an analysis was made of the social characteristics of those respondents who indicated either a formal affiliation or an informal identification with one of the four political parties. The proportions of respondents who identified with each party are as follows: Liberal party, 11 percent; Progressive Conservative party, 23 percent; Social Credit party, 42 percent; New Democratic Party, 6 percent. Eighteen percent of the sample did not identify with any party.<sup>7</sup>

The data in Tables 7-2 and 7-3 show that the Social Credit party was supported by all segments of the population regardless of their education, occupation, economic status, age, or their sex.<sup>8</sup> There was a difference in Social Credit support among the religious denominations; 47 percent of the Protestants and 68 percent of the members of various sects supported the party. On the other hand, only 29 percent of the Catholic respondents indicated a preference for the Social Credit party.<sup>9</sup> Finally, there was a tendency for respondents in small cities to identify more with the Social Credit party.



Table 7-2 Provincial Party Affiliation and Personal Attributes  
of Occupation, Education and Family Income

Personal Attributes*	Liberal		Progressive Conservative		Social Credit		New Democratic Party		Independent	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
<b>Occupation</b>										
Professional/Managerial	14	11	34	27	56	45	4	3	16	13
Clerical/Sales	21	14	31	20	63	41	7	5	31	20
Agricultural	8	11	17	24	31	43	6	8	10	14
Skilled/Unskilled Workers	19	9	46	22	85	41	15	7	45	21
<b>Education</b>										
Less than High School										
Grad	26	8	77	23	50	44	23	7	62	18
High School Graduate	13	14	24	25	36	38	5	5	18	19
Post High School	23	18	27	22	49	39	4	3	22	18
<b>Income Level</b>										
0 - 5,999	17	10	32	16	80	46	13	7	33	19
6,000 - 7,499	13	13	21	21	40	39	7	7	21	21
7,500 - 9,999	12	9	37	28	55	42	4	3	24	18
10,000 and Over	19	15	31	24	53	41	8	6	20	15

\*None of these personal attributes were found to be significantly associated with party affiliation at the .05 level of significance.

Table 7-3 Provincial Party Identification by Personal Attributes of Sex, Age, Region, and Religion

Personal Attributes*	Liberal		Progressive Conservative		Social Credit		New Democratic Party		Independent	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Sex										
Male	31	11	56	21	120	44	21	8	44	16
Female	31	11	72	25	115	40	11	4	58	20
Age										
19 - 25	14	23	9	15	23	38	1	2	13	22
26 - 35	14	11	35	28	49	39	8	6	20	16
36 - 45	13	10	34	26	52	40	9	7	24	18
46 - 55	11	10	23	21	51	47	5	5	20	17
56 - 65	3	6	8	16	21	43	4	8	13	27
Over 65	4	7	12	21	27	48	4	7	9	16
Region										
Urban	42	12	85	24	149	42	21	6	60	17
Small Cities	4	7	12	22	29	54	2	4	7	13
Rural	16	11	31	21	57	39	9	6	35	24
Religion										
Protestant	25	8	73	25	136	47	16	6	40	14
Catholic	24	19	34	27	37	29	5	4	-	-
Others	2	9	1	5	15	68	-	-	4	18
No Church	11	9	20	17	47	39	11	9	32	26

\*Religion was the only one of these attributes that was significantly associated with party affiliation at the .05 level of confidence.

As with the Social Credit party, the Progressive Conservative party received support from all segments of the sample proportionate to their province-wide support of 23 percent. Only one of the seven factors studied showed more than a five percent deviation from the sample norm of 23 percent, as can be seen in Table 7-3, only five percent of those who indicated they belonged to a church other than Protestant or Catholic identified with this party.

The Alberta Liberal party, more than any of the other three parties, received much of its support from particular segments of the population. First, 23 percent of the 19-24 year old age group supported the Liberal party while six percent of those 55 years or over identified with this party. Second, 19 percent of the Catholic respondents preferred the Liberal party, whereas less than ten percent of the respondents in the other religious categories indicated a similar political preference. And finally, 18 percent of those attending post-secondary educational institutions preferred the Liberal party, whereas only seven percent of those with no high school education were attracted to this party.

Due to the small number of respondents who indicated a preference for the New Democratic Party, it is not possible to determine with any degree of accuracy whether any particular segment of the sample was attracted to this party. The data point out, however, that the party was preferred by respondents from all

segments of the population.<sup>10</sup>

Independent electors in Alberta are, like party supporters, found in substantial numbers among both sexes, all age groups, all religions, and within each social strata. There are proportionally more independents among the skilled or unskilled workers and clerical or sales occupational groupings, as can be seen in Table 7-2. Similarly, there is a greater tendency for people without any religious affiliation to refrain from identifying with a party.

#### The Rationale for Party Support

Basically seven reasons were used by those who voted in 1967 to explain their behavior: administrative record (32%), party platform (18%), local candidate (17%), party leadership (13%), tradition (9%), the perceived need for a change (8%), and dislike for a particular party, leader or candidate (2%).<sup>11</sup> As indicated in Table 7-4, 91 percent of those voters who felt administrative record was the most important factor favored the Social Credit party. Also, 65 percent of those who felt leadership was important voted Social Credit. Other Social Credit voters rationalized their voting behavior on the basis of party platform, local candidate appeal, or simply because they had always voted Social Credit and saw no reason to change (tradition).

For Progressive Conservative voters, there were basically three reasons given for their voting behavior: local candidate

Table 7-4                      Party Vote, 1967 by  
Reason for Supporting Provincial Party

Reason for Vote	Liberal		P.C.		S.C.		N.D.P.	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Administrative Record	3	3	5	5	96	91	1	1
Party Platform	10	17	18	30	26	43	6	10
Candidate	12	22	22	40	19	35	2	4
Leadership	4	9	9	21	29	65	2	5
Tradition	10	33	6	20	13	43	1	3
Need for Change	4	15	15	56	-	-	8	30

$\chi^2=133.3$        $df=15$        $P<.001$       Tau C=.20

appeal, party platform, and the perceived need for a change. These three factors accounted for 73 percent of those voting Progressive Conservative in 1967. Few Progressive Conservative voters supported the party because of its leader.

The Liberal party attracted voters as a result of local candidate appeal, party platform, and tradition. Seventy-four percent of those who voted Liberal indicated they did so because of one of these three reasons.

Two factors were important for New Democratic Party voters, party platform and the perceived need for a change. Seventy percent of those voting New Democratic Party justified their voting behavior by mentioning one or the other of these two factors.

Of particular interest to this study is the fact that of the 369 respondents who voted in 1967, only three respondents voluntarily indicated that they wanted to maintain a different party in power in the province than that in power in Ottawa. Only one of these three respondents utilized the balance of power theory.<sup>12</sup> The other two respondents indicated a belief that the Social Credit or Progressive Conservatives were more provincially oriented than the other two parties.<sup>13</sup> There is, therefore, little indication of any conscious concern on the part of respondents to balance the federal government's powers through electing a different party to office in the province than that which is in power in Ottawa.

#### Perceptions of Federal-Provincial Relations and Provincial Party Support

One of the assumptions underlying the balance of power concept is that Social Credit supporters in particular, have a basic understanding of Canadian federalism. This assertion is examined below by determining whether those who are more aware, concerned, and/or involved in federal-provincial matters identify with a provincial party such as the Social Credit. Also, it may be that those more concerned about the province maintaining its autonomy regarding the development of provincial programs such as medicare and housing tend to support Social Credit more often

than they do an old line party. Finally, do those who are provincially or federally oriented support one party more than another?

An analysis of the data presented in Table 7-5 indicates that there are few inter party differences vis a vis the saliency of federalism. Social Credit party supporters are found to be somewhat higher than the sample norm in their awareness, concern, and involvement, but the perceptions of Social Credit and old line party supporters regarding federalism do not significantly differ from one another. The most striking differences in Table 7-5 are between those who do not identify with any party and the rest of the sample. Independents ranked lowest in terms of all three aspects of federal perceptions. The summary measure of saliency shown in Table 7-5 depicts this fact rather well: 30 percent of the sample were considered to place little importance upon federal-provincial matters whereas 44 percent of the Independents were found in this category. Similarly, while 34 percent of the sample as a whole ranked high on the saliency index, only 23 percent of those who did not identify with one of the parties were found in this category. This finding has interesting implications if one accepts the premise that in close elections it is the decision of the independent voter to

Table 7-5 Measures of Saliency and  
Provincial Party Identification

Measures of Saliency	Lib.	P.C.	S.C.	NDP	Ind.	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Awareness						
Low	21	23	21	19	25	22
Medium Low	34	32	30	16	40	32
Medium High	18	19	17	22	17	18
High	27	26	32	44	18	28
(Number of Cases)	(62)	(128)	(235)	(32)	(102)	(559)
Concern						
Concerned	83	66	73	69	57	69
Unconcerned	17	34	27	31	43	31
(Number of Cases)	(53)	(116)	(217)	(29)	(86)	(501)
Involvement						
Didn't Follow						
Conferences	55	47	47	45	70	52
Followed						
Conference(s)	45	53	53	55	30	48
(Number of Cases)	(60)	(123)	(224)	(21)	(97)	(535)
Saliency						
Low	27	35	24	16	44	30
Medium	37	29	38	48	33	36
High	37	36	38	36	23	34
(Number of Cases)	(60)	(123)	(223)	(31)	(105)	(542)

The degree of association between the measures of saliency and party identification are as follows:

Awareness-Party Identification	$\chi^2=16.0$	$df=12$	$P=.2$	Tau C=.01
Concern-Party Identification	$\chi^2=15.4$	$df=4$	$P<.01$	Tau C=.03
Involvement-Party Identification	$\chi^2=16.6$	$df=4$	$P<.01$	Tau C=.03
Saliency-Party Identification	$\chi^2=20.6$	$df=8$	$P<.01$	Tau C=.02



support a particular party that determines which party will win the election. Given that federal-provincial matters are not particularly salient to the non-aligned voter such issues would probably not be an important factor in determining their vote.

Given the findings in Table 7-5, it must be concluded that there is little empirical evidence to suggest that there is a strong relationship between party identification and the saliency of federalism. Old line parties, New Democratic Party, and Social Credit party supporters hold similar views regarding those aspects of federal-provincial relations examined above. But what about the evaluation aspect? Perhaps Social Credit supporters are more provincially oriented than the supporters of other parties.

An examination of inter-party differences on issues related to federal-provincial matters indicates that on three of the four issues a majority of the Social Credit party supporters are provincially oriented. As can be seen in Table 7-6, in comparison to the sample norm a disproportionate number of Social Credit supporters opposed federal involvement in medicare, opposed the development of bilingual districts, and indicated discontent with the way the federal government was handling western Canadian problems.

Social Credit supporters were not entirely alone in their provincial orientation. While Progressive Conservative supporters

Table 7-6 Provincial Party Identification and  
Federal-Provincial Orientation on Issues

Issues	Lib.	P.C.	S.C.	NDP	Ind.	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Medicare and Federal Involvement						
Favor	57	55	46	75	46	62
Oppose	43	45	54	25	54	39
(Number of Cases)	(62)	(126)	(234)	(32)	(109)	(563)
Housing and Federal Involvement						
Favor	84	73	74	72	76	75
Oppose	16	27	26	28	24	25
(Number of Cases)	(62)	(128)	(234)	(32)	(108)	(564)
Bilingualism and Federal Districts						
Favor	63	50	45	47	62	52
Oppose	37	50	55	53	38	48
(Number of Cases)	(62)	(125)	(227)	(32)	(108)	(554)
Western Discontent East Benefits More						
Agree	43	65	63	72	45	58
Disagree	57	35	37	28	55	42
(Number of Cases)	(61)	(127)	(232)	(32)	(109)	(561)
West Gets Raw Deal						
Agree	37	66	57	59	44	54
Disagree	63	34	43	41	56	46
(Number of Cases)	(62)	(125)	(227)	(32)	(108)	(554)
Federal Government Favors East						
Agree	55	65	68	63	46	61
Disagree	45	35	32	37	54	39
(Number of Cases)	(62)	(127)	(234)	(32)	(108)	(563)

The degree of association between issues and party identification are as follows:

Medicare-Party Identity	$\chi^2=12.0$	df=4	$P<.02$	Tau C=.02
Housing-Party Identity	$\chi^2=3.0$	df=4	$P>.5$	Tau C=.00
Bilingualism-Party Identity	$\chi^2=11.8$	df=4	$P<.02$	Tau C=.02
East Benefits-Party Identity	$\chi^2=4$	df=4	$P<.01$	Tau C=.02
West Gets Raw Deal-Party Identity	$\chi^2=20.2$	df=4	$P<.01$	Tau C=.04
Federal Government Favors East-Party Identity	$\chi^2=16.6$	df=4	$P<.01$	Tau C=.03

were not found to be as provincially oriented as their Social Credit counterparts, many of this party's supporters also opposed both federal involvement in medicare and the establishment of bilingual districts. Furthermore, there was just as much criticism of the federal government's handling of the West's problems among Progressive Conservatives as there was among the Social Credit supporters.

Liberal Party supporters were more inclined to be federally oriented. On all four issues Liberal supporters tended to support the federal position more often than did Conservatives or Social Credit supporters. New Democratic supporters were noticeably more federal oriented on the medicare issue. However, the New Democrats were just as critical of the federal government's handling of western Canada's problems and bilingualism as were other party supporters.

The above findings suggest that both Social Credit and Conservative supporters are more provincially oriented than are Liberal supporters. While this may be a result of provincially oriented respondents choosing to associate themselves with what they consider to be more provincially oriented parties, it is also possible that these findings are indicative of the respondents' tendency to reflect the stated position of the party with which they identify. It might very well be that Liberal supporters were found to favor increased federal involvement because their

party is in power nationally. New Democratic support for increased federal involvement in medicare is probably due to that party's traditional advocacy of a national medicare program. The New Democratic Party supporters' tendency to agree with the western discontent statements is understandable if seen in terms of opposition to a Liberal government rather than in opposition to the federal government per se. Also, it could be argued that Conservatives opposed federal involvement because they opposed the party in power in Ottawa: the Liberals. Social Credit supporters may have opposed federal involvement in the areas examined because their party opposed the national medicare program and the establishment of bilingual districts.

An analysis of the relationship between the two orientation measures developed in Chapter VI, (the jurisdictional orientation index and one's personal perception of which government is personally most important) and party identification indicates that only one of the two measures of orientation, personal evaluation, was significantly related to party identification. The data in Table 7-7 show that Social Credit supporters were personally more oriented to the provincial government: 51 percent of these respondents felt that the provincial government was more important to themselves and their families. Here again, as was the case with the interpretation of the relationship between issues and parties, there are two plausible reasons. First, it could be argued that this finding

indicates that those who are provincially oriented chose to support the Social Credit party. The second, and more likely rationale for this relationship, is that identification with the party in power provincially tends to influence one's perceptions of the relative importance of the provincial government in their personal lives. This second reason is supported by the data in Table 7-7 regarding the jurisdictional orientation index, since Social

Table 7-7  
Federal-Provincial Orientations  
and Party Identification

Federal-Provincial Orientation	Lib.	P.C.	S.C.	NDP	Ind.	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Personal Evaluation						
Federal Government						
Most Important	49	52	35	47	49	44
Both Equally						
Important	12	8	14	22	10	12
Provincial Government						
Most Important	39	40	51	31	42	44
(Number of Cases)	(59)	(123)	(229)	(32)	(101)	(544)
Jurisdictional Orientation Index						
Federal	13	21	17	19	20	18
Neither	79	66	72	69	69	71
Provincial	8	13	11	12	11	11
(Number of Cases)	(62)	(128)	(234)	(32)	(110)	(566)

Personal Evaluation-Party Identification

$\chi^2 = 16.2$      $df = 8$      $P < .04$      $TauC = .02$

Jurisdictional Orientation Index-Party Identification

$\chi^2 = 4.3$      $df = 8$      $P > .8$      $TauC = .00$

Credit supporters were not found to be any more provincially oriented than were the supporters of any other party.

What seems to emerge from these data on party identity, issues, and federal-provincial orientation, is that there is little indication that supporters of any one party tend to consistently support or oppose federal or provincial involvement. The significant relationship discussed above may be based upon something other than perceptions of federalism. There is, therefore, no alternative but to conclude that there is little likelihood that electoral support for a particular party is based upon one's preferences concerning federal-provincial matters.

#### Alternation of Party Support

An analysis of Alberta's aggregate voting data suggests that Alberta electors have not been reluctant to change their voting preferences from one party to another in national elections. As Table 7-8 indicates, nearly half of both the Liberal and Social Credit national party supporters of 1957 defected to some other party in 1958. This situation was short-lived with both the Liberal and Social Credit parties regaining much of their electoral support by 1963. All three national parties maintained the same relative support in 1965, but in 1968 Social Credit support was eroded by the disintegration of the federal party, notwithstanding

a feeble attempt by some supporters to maintain a viable national entity.<sup>14</sup>

The consistent electoral support received by the national Progressive Conservative party since 1957 was not matched by its provincial counterpart. The latter's support has fluctuated considerably during the five provincial elections from 1955 to the present. As noted in Table 7-1, ten percent of the electorate supported the Progressive Conservative party in the 1955 provincial election, while they received 24 percent of the vote in 1959 and only 13 percent in 1963. Their 1967 performance was far superior to that of 1963 as the party received 26 percent of the four-party vote. The increase in the Progressive Conservative vote in 1971 was even more dramatic as 46 percent of the electorate voted Progressive Conservative. Only in this latter provincial election did the provincial party's percentage of the vote approximate that received by the federal party.<sup>15</sup>

Notwithstanding the rise in Progressive Conservative support in 1967, the provincial Social Credit party was consistently supported by a majority or plurality of Alberta electors from 1935 through 1967. The consistent tendency of Alberta voters to support the Social Credit party in substantially larger numbers at the provincial than at the federal level since 1957 has resulted in alternating voting behavior.

Table 7-8      Percentage of Federal Popular Vote 1905-1971 by Federal Party

Election Year	Liberal	Prog. Cons.	Social Credit	Progressive	C.C.F./N.D.P.	Others	Total Popular Vote
1908	50.2	44.4				5.3	45,972
1911	53.3	42.5				4.1	69,775
1917	35.5	61.0				3.5	127,818
1921	15.8	20.3		52.5		11.3	172,904
1925	27.6	31.8		31.5		9.1	160,477
1926	24.5	31.5		38.7		5.3	157,016
1930	30.0	33.9		30.4		5.7	200,302
1935	21.2	16.9	46.6		13.0	1.6	238,513
1940	37.9	13.0	34.5		13.0	1.5	269,343
1945	21.8	18.7	36.6		18.4	4.5	310,773
1949	34.5	16.8	37.4		9.3	2.0	338,131
1953	35.0	14.5	40.8		6.9	2.8	340,241
1957	27.9	27.6	37.8		6.3	.3	427,652
1958	13.7	59.9	21.6		4.4	.4	449,889
1962	19.4	42.8	29.2		8.4	.2	501,985
1963	22.1	45.3	25.8		6.5	.2	549,526
1965	22.4	46.6	22.5		8.3	.2	531,427
1968	35.7	50.4	1.0		9.3	2.7	563,779

Source: J. Murray Bech, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968), passim.



Although there were twelve alternating party preference patterns possible, considering that four parties competed in both the provincial and federal elections, two party preference patterns tend to dominate the findings, whether one considers actual voting behavior or party identification.<sup>16</sup> Respondents who were Social Credit provincially tended to support either the Progressive Conservative (40%) or the Liberal (29%) party nationally.<sup>17</sup>

The rationale for supporting different parties at the national and provincial levels varied as indicated in Tables 7-10 and 7-11. The reasons mentioned most often by respondents who indicated they preferred a different party nationally than that which they supported provincially can be seen in Table 7-10.<sup>18</sup>

Table 7-9      Federal Party Identification According to  
Provincial Party Identification

Provincial Party Identification	Liberal		Prog. Cons.		Social Credit		N.D.P.		Inde- pendent	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Liberal	55	89	4	7	-	-	-	-	3	5
Prog. Cons.	17	13	99	78	2	2	2	2	7	6
Social Credit	68	29	94	40	45	19	6	3	21	9
N.D.P.	1	3	3	9	1	3	26	81	1	3
Independent	9	9	9	6	1	1	3	3	83	81

$$\chi^2 = 782.6$$

$$df = 16$$

$$P < .001$$

$$\text{TauC} = .33$$

Table 7-10      The Alternating Voters' Reasons For  
Preferring a Different Party  
Nationally (percentages)

Reasons	Freq	Percent
Social Credit No Chance Nationally	34	19
Liberal Government Administrative Record	29	17
Leadership of National Parties (P.C. or Liberal)	24	14
Progressive Conservative Represent West	22	13
Local Candidate Appeal	10	6
Prefer a National Party	9	5
Tradition (always voted that way)	6	3
Other	42	24

The coding of responses obtained from respondents who preferred different parties federally than provincially was very difficult since care had to be taken to discern whether the respondent was explaining why he changed parties at the provincial level or at the federal level. For example, if a respondent said he voted for different parties because of leadership, then it became necessary to find out whether it was the leadership at the national level or at the provincial level that had influenced him to change his party vote. In a few instances respondents gave separate reasons for supporting different parties at both the provincial and national levels. Most respondents were more concerned about explaining their party preference at the national level, but many also offered reasons for their party preference

provincially.<sup>19</sup> The reasons given for a different party preference provincially than nationally were very similar to those indicated in Table 7-10. As can be seen in Table 7-11, emphasis was placed upon administrative record much more often than was the case nationally. Premier Manning's leadership was also mentioned as being an important factor (12%), as was the fact that some respondents did not feel the Progressive Conservative or Liberal parties were capable of forming a provincial government and were not willing to waste their vote.

The data presented in Table 7-10 and 7-11 support one of the findings mentioned earlier, for while some respondents indicated they wanted to support a "national" or "provincial"

Table 7-11      The Alternating Voters' Reasons For  
Preferring Different Party Provincially

Reasons	Freq	Percent
Good Social Credit Administration	60	51
Social Credit Leadership	14	12
P.C./Liberal No Chance Provincially	12	10
Wanted to Support a Provincial Party	6	5
Oppose Social Credit	5	4
Other	21	18

party, only two respondents were found to have utilized the balance of power notion to explain his voting behavior.<sup>20</sup> Not even among alternate voters, when asked to explain their voting behavior, was

that they voted for different parties in order to maintain a balance of power in Canada. Here again, these findings do not eliminate the possibility that this may be a minor consideration in the minds of those who vote for different parties, despite the fact that they offered different reasons for their behavior. What it does suggest is that Alberta voters support different parties provincially and nationally primarily for administrative, leadership, or candidate reasons, or the desire to support a winning party, rather than for the more abstract conception of a balance of power within the Canadian federal system.

A closer analysis of alternating party supporters (hereafter referred to as "party alternators") was undertaken to determine three things: (1) whether party alternators tend to come from any particular segment of the population; (2) whether federalism is more or less salient among party alternators than it is among those who do not alternate parties (hereafter referred to as "party loyalists"); and, (3) whether party alternators are more provincially or federally oriented than party loyalists. An examination of the relationship between the standard demographic classifications (education, occupation, income, age, religion and sex) and party identification patterns failed to provide any guidance in identifying those who alternate parties.<sup>21</sup> Nor was it found that there were any significant differences between party

alternators and party loyalists regarding either saliency or orientation on federal-provincial matters.<sup>22</sup> Although the above findings do not conclusively rule out the possibility that one's perspective of Canadian federalism might be a contributing factor in influencing party identification, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that this might be the case.

#### Summary

The foregoing analysis of Alberta's provincial party system reveals several important findings. First, through an examination of the socio-economic characteristics of the four parties' supporters it was found that with but few exceptions all parties obtained proportionate support from all segments of the population. The Social Credit party did gain a greater proportion of support from Protestants and older people, but it received equal support from respondents in all regions, income groups, occupations, sexes, and levels of educational attainment. Like Social Credit, the Progressive Conservatives received equal support from all segments of the sample. The Liberal party was found to have more support among younger electors, Catholics, and the more educated respondents. Due to the small number of respondents, it was impossible to determine accurately whether the New Democratic Party was appealing to any particular segment of the population.

A second finding concerns the reasons respondents gave for their party identification. Most of the respondents who supported

the Social Credit party did so because of its administrative record while in office, the party's leadership, the party platform, or the local candidate. The Progressive Conservative identifiers explained their support for this party by mentioning the need for a change in government, the appeal of the local candidates, or the platform of the party. Liberal and New Democratic Party supporters gave reasons similar to those offered by the Progressive Conservative supporters. Of particular interest is the fact that only one person utilized the balance of power concept to explain their support of the Social Credit party. There is therefore, no evidence available to suggest that the balance of power notion is an important determinant of electoral behavior in Alberta provincial elections.

Given the collapse of the national Social Credit party in 1968, it became necessary for most of those electors who supported the provincial Social Credit party in 1967 to change parties in 1968 if they wished to vote in the federal election. Although it is noteworthy that both the national parties received substantial support from the provincial Social Credit supporters, the third factor of importance to this study does not deal with the way in which the Social Credit party vote split between the Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and the N.D.P., but rather pertains to the reasons respondents gave for changing parties. Here again, as was the case in analyzing the rationale for

provincial party voting, few respondents indicated that federal-provincial matters were of primary concern to them. Most respondents were concerned about administrative competence, party leaders, local candidates and party platforms. Only five percent mentioned any aspect of federal-provincial matters as a rationale for supporting a different party nationally and then only in the context of supporting the more competent provincial or federal parties. Once more, as was the case in analyzing the reasons people gave for supporting a provincial party, even when considering only those who alternate parties, there was no indication that the balance of power notion was an important consideration for Alberta electors.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> A comparison of Tables 7-1 and 7-6 shows that the relative strengths of the parties differ considerably in provincial and federal elections.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter I, pp. 11-16.

<sup>3</sup> J.A. Long and F.Q. Quo, "One Party Dominance," in Martin Robin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> In 1963 the Social Credit party received 55 percent of the popular vote yet won 95 percent of the seats. Similarly the Progressive Conservative party in 1971 received 45 percent of the votes and 63 percent of the seats. See Alan C. Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1968), pp. 55-56.

<sup>5</sup> J.A. Long, "Maldistribution in Western Provincial Legislatures: The Case of Alberta," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. II, No. 3 (September 1969), pp. 345-355.

<sup>6</sup> See Robert A. Alford, "The Social Bases of Political Cleavage in 1962," in John Meisel (ed.), Papers on the 1962 Election (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), pp. 203-234; S. Peter Regenstreif, "Some Aspects of National Party Support in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1963), pp. 59-74; John Meisel, "Some Bases of Party Support in the 1968 Election," in Hugh Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada (3rd edition, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 36-78; J.A. Long and F.Q. Quo, op. cit., pp. 16-26.

<sup>7</sup> Party affiliation was determined by the responses obtained from a series of three questions. All respondents were asked whether they belonged to a political party, and if so, which one. Seven percent of the sample indicated a formal association with one of the four provincial parties. Those who indicated no affiliation with a political party were then asked which party they tended to favor provincially. Seventy-four percent of the sample indicated a tendency to support one of the four provincial parties. A total of 18 percent refrained from identifying themselves with any one of the four parties. Due to the small number of respondents that were formally affiliated with a political party, it was not possible to analyze these respondents' social characteristics separately. It was therefore decided to place them in the same category with those who formally identified themselves with each of the respective parties.



<sup>8</sup>The analysis undertaken regarding the social basis for party support examines proportionate differences between the sample and each of the sub-groups studied. Minor variations of less than five percent are not mentioned in the body of the paper as variations of this size are not significant given the sample size.

<sup>9</sup>The religion categories include the following: Catholic includes both Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox; Protestant includes Anglican, United Church, Baptist, Presbyterian, Lutheran; Others include Jehovah Witnesses, Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostal and other sects. There is a separate category for those who indicated they did not belong to any church.

<sup>10</sup>As Table 7-1 shows, the N.D.P. received 16 percent of the popular vote in 1967, yet only six percent of the sample indicated they identified with this party. This discrepancy is due in part to the regional support that they received in areas not heavily sampled. This party received a substantial proportion of the vote in the Grande Prairie-Peace River region. See Returns, Alberta Provincial Election, 1967 (Edmonton: Queen's Printer, 1967).

<sup>11</sup>The data discussed in this section are of necessity based upon party voting behavior rather than party identification. The proportion of the sample that indicated they voted for each of the four parties is as follows: Liberal, 15 percent; Progressive Conservative, 25 percent; Social Credit, 53 percent; New Democratic Party, 8 percent. As can be noted in Table 7-1 these figures differ from the actual results as far as the Social Credit and New Democratic Parties are concerned.

<sup>12</sup>A clerical worker in Edmonton explained his Social Credit vote by explaining, "It keeps the two [parties in power] divided-- I'm afraid we might get some party in power that isn't good for us."

<sup>13</sup>The wife of an accountant in St. Albert indicated she voted Social Credit because "Social Credit has done more for the province than a national party would have." A farmer from northern Alberta explained his Progressive Conservative vote by noting, "The Progressive Conservative party is more concerned for the west and its problems than are other parties."

<sup>14</sup>In March of 1967 Robert Thompson resigned as the leader of the national Social Credit party claiming that he could no longer carry on in this capacity since the national party was not receiving adequate moral and/or financial support from the provincial parties (see item in the Lethbridge Herald, March 10, 1967, p. 1). The party remained without a leader for several months. In August of 1967, Ernest C. Manning published his book, Political Realignment (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), which argued for a merger of the national Social Credit party and the Progressive Conservative party (see item in the Lethbridge Herald, August 5, 1967). Shortly after the publication of Manning's book in the spring of 1968, both Thompson and H.A. Olson, the only two Social Credit Members of Parliament from Alberta, crossed the floor of the House of Commons and joined other parties. Thompson joined the Progressive Conservative party, and Olson joined the Liberal party. This left the national Social Credit party in Alberta in a state of disarray just prior to the June 1968 general election.

<sup>15</sup>This study was done nearly two years before the 1971 election and the data reflect the electorate's preferences at that point in time.

<sup>16</sup>Due to the disintegration of the national Social Credit party in all but three of Alberta's 19 federal ridings, it was felt that an analysis of alternate party identification would be more meaningful than alternate voting behavior. When comparing 1967 provincial voting behavior with 1968 national voting behavior, there could have been numerous Social Credit supporters who were forced to vote for another party because there was no national Social Credit candidate running in their constituency. Each respondent was questioned about his alternate party identification rather than his alternate voting behavior. An analysis of the alternate voting behavior indicates that there is very little difference between party identification and party vote thereby suggesting that the above mentioned assumption was not correct as there is a very high degree of association between party identification and party vote in 1968:  $\chi^2=667.9$ ,  $df=9$ ,  $P .001$ ,  $Tau C=.70$ . As expected given the high degree of association between national party identification and national party vote, the association between national party vote and provincial party vote is very similar to that found between federal party identification and provincial party identification, as can be seen by comparing the following table with Table 7-7.

## Federal Party Vote and Provincial Party Vote

Provincial Party Vote	Liberal		P.C.		S.C.		N.D.P.	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Liberal	44	88	6	12	-	-	-	-
P.C.	17	21	65	78	1	1	-	-
Social Credit	63	38	82	49	18	11	-	-
N.D.P.	6	21	4	14	-	-	18	64
<hr/>								
	$\chi^2=242.5$		df=9		P<.001		Tau C=.22	

<sup>17</sup> F.Q. Quo, "Split-Ticket Voting in Alberta," (paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, June 5, 1968, Appendix, Table III). In this paper the author noted that the major pattern of alternate voting is similar to that mentioned above. His analysis focuses on the 1965 federal election and the 1967 provincial election. He noted that 48 percent of the alternate voters were Progressive Conservative nationally and Social Credit provincially, while 25 percent voted Liberal nationally and Social Credit provincially.

<sup>18</sup> Once again party identification rather than voting preferences was used to determine the alternate party identifiers. This procedure was utilized rather than party vote because of the fact that many Social Credit party supporters were not given an opportunity to vote for a federal Social Credit candidate in 1968.

<sup>19</sup> A total of 89 percent of the respondents (176 of 198) that preferred different parties at the two levels of government gave reasons why they preferred a particular national party. Another 60 percent (118 of 198) gave reasons why they preferred a different party provincially. Obviously a portion of the same gave reasons for both their provincial and federal party identification.

<sup>20</sup> Here again, as was noted in footnote 12 of this chapter, the six respondents singled out in Table 7-9 as wanting to support a provincial party felt that the Social Credit party was more concerned about Alberta than other parties and therefore they voted for them. There was no indication even after probing that the respondents supported this party provincially because they wanted to maintain a balance of power.

<sup>21</sup>This finding is similar to that reported by Perlin and Peppin in their 1967 study of two Ontario constituencies. See George Perlin and Patti Peppin, "Variations in Party Support in Federal and Provincial Elections: Some Hypotheses," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 1971), pp. 280-286. On the other hand, F.Q. Quo's study of the Alberta electorate suggests that occupation and income are related to vote alternation. F.Q. Quo, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

<sup>22</sup>When analyzing the data regarding federal-provincial party identification, the saliency of federalism, and orientation, the party identification variable was broken into six categories: Liberal loyalists, Progressive Conservative loyalists, Social Credit loyalists, New Democratic Party loyalists, Social Credit-Progressive Conservative alternators, and Social Credit-Liberal alternators. None of these groups were found to be significantly associated with the measures of saliency developed in Chapter V nor the issue orientations discussed in Chapter VI.

## VIII

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Discussion of the merits of either federal theory or of federalism itself is not a common occurrence among the general population. The observation made by Richard Leach that "it would be difficult to demonstrate that there is now or ever has been a widespread public understanding of [the concept of] federalism,"<sup>1</sup> is certainly substantiated by this study. However, the inability of the public to discuss or define correctly the merits or demerits of classical, cooperation, or executive federalism does not mean that the federal system has no meaning to the public. Federalism is a working arrangement, a process or a way of doing things: "It is an arrangement whose virtue lies in what it permits to be accomplished rather than in the degree to which it adheres to a set of binding tenets."<sup>2</sup>

This study sought to answer four questions. First, do Albertans possess a pragmatic perception of the federal circumstances, as Muller and others contend, or is federalism nothing more than a legal fiction about which political scientists, lawyers and politicians concern themselves, but of which the ordinary citizen is neither aware nor concerned.<sup>3</sup> Second, are the Alberta citizens concerned about the maintenance of the division of powers? Third, are there segments of the province's population who would like to see the division of powers substantially changed, or, are most Albertans satisfied with the way in which the powers are distributed at the present time? The fourth objective was to examine the effects of federalism upon the electoral behavior of Albertans. Is there any relationship between perceptions of federalism and party identification? Have some Albertans consciously chosen to support a third party in order to maintain a balance of power within the Canadian federal system? The findings pertaining to each of these matters are summarized below and discussed within the context of the theory of federalism.

Most of the Alberta electorate were aware of which government was responsible for looking after broad areas of jurisdiction that are primarily the responsibility of either the federal or provincial government. Both provincial and federal powers were,

with few exceptions, correctly identified. Those who did err in identifying areas of responsibility with the appropriate government tended to underestimate the scope of provincial power and overestimate federal powers.<sup>4</sup>

This ability of Alberta electors to readily identify many areas of provincial or federal jurisdiction with the appropriate level of government implies that an awareness of the division of powers between the two governments is an integral part of the political socialization process in Canada. Whether this information is obtained through formal education channels or through exposure to the day-to-day activities of the two governments is not altogether certain, but the indication is that formal education does influence awareness.<sup>5</sup> Regardless of how they become informed of the division of powers, it can be asserted with some certainty that the people are capable of distinguishing between basic areas of federal and provincial responsibilities and therefore capable of holding the appropriate government accountable for their actions within these areas of jurisdiction.

The high incidence of familiarity regarding areas of provincial and federal activity was offset somewhat by the inability of a large segment of the population to recognize the interdependence of the two governments in areas of joint responsibility. This latter finding is of considerable

significance given the increasing interdependence and interaction of the two governments.

The greater ability of the electors to correctly identify areas of federal responsibility, and the fact that they overrate these responsibilities, may be significant. Albertans, like all other Canadians, are continually exposed to media that is predominately nationally oriented. Newspaper, radio, and in particular television are more prone to present information pertaining to the national government. It would not be unreasonable, therefore, to infer that the media may be partially responsible for the public's distorted perceptions of federal powers. Another possible source of distortion, which is interrelated with the potential influence of the media on public perceptions, is the existence of conditional grant programs in areas of provincial primacy. The medicare program is a good example. Federal initiation and participation undoubtedly misled many to believe that the national government was primarily responsible for this program. Misperceptions of this kind are detrimental to the overall accountability of governments to their electorate.<sup>6</sup>

In The Vertical Mosaic, John Porter stated that "it is difficult to see what provincial autonomy means for vast segments of the electorate."<sup>7</sup> W.H. Riker referred to the relationship between federalism and the citizen in more concrete terms by



stating that "the ordinary citizen is quite indifferent to the idea of federalism."<sup>8</sup> The data presented in Chapter V suggest what provincial autonomy means to Albertans and refutes Riker's generalization about the citizen's indifference towards the practical implications of federalism. It does make a difference to most electors which government looks after necessary governmental services. The two basic reasons cited concerned the concept of the relative proximity of provincial governments and their ability to render a more personalized service to the citizen. It can be implied, therefore, that the geographical proximity of the provincial government has a positive impact upon individuals. Ottawa is evidently perceived as being physically too far removed from Alberta and communications too depersonalized. The provincial government, on the other hand, seems to be perceived as less bureaucratized, more accessible, and more attuned to the needs of Albertans.

While most Alberta citizens were found to be both aware of and concerned about the division of powers, the data presented in Chapter VI reveal that there is little argument within the electorate regarding which level of government should be responsible for specific areas of jurisdiction. Most respondents agreed that foreign affairs and banking should be looked after by the federal government, and that city government should

remain within the jurisdictional control of the province, but there was less agreement about other areas of jurisdiction. This should not be interpreted as an indication of mass dissatisfaction with the existing division of powers, however, as in only one of 19 areas of jurisdiction did a plurality of respondents indicate a preference for a change in jurisdictional responsibility from one government to the other. Thus, although portions of the electors indicated that they would prefer to see changes take place, support for the status quo was much more substantial than was support for change.

With only few exceptions, most electors were committed to the maintenance of a clear division of powers between the two governments rather than a sharing of jurisdictional responsibilities. Joint responsibility was not considered as an appropriate way to look after the several areas of governmental responsibility examined.<sup>9</sup>

The above observation should be qualified. No attempt was made to distinguish between the administration and funding of a particular program. It is possible, therefore, that provincial administration of programs such as medicare is desired in conjunction with national guidelines. The willingness of most Albertans to accept the premise of federal government responsibility for programs of a national scope while at the same time

extolling the virtues of provincial administration indicates that the existing structure of cooperative federalism accurately reflects the Alberta electorate's perception of an acceptable federal arrangement. As J.M.S. Careless has suggested, "The implicit aim of every regional community has been maximum autonomy for itself, consonant with the maximum advantage to be gained from an overriding central regime."<sup>10</sup>

It has long been asserted that "[T]he essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal and constitutional terminology, but in the forces--economic, political, cultural--that make the outward forms of federalism necessary."<sup>11</sup> It is therefore advocated that emphasis be placed on identifying, and ultimately quantifying, territorially grouped diversities. In an article written in 1952, W.S. Livingston suggested what kind of diversities might be looked for:

Differences of economic interest, religion, race, nationality, language, variations in size, separation by great distances, differences in historical background - all these may produce a situation in which the particular interests and qualities of the segments of the large community must be given recognition.<sup>12</sup>

Livingston then advocated that an examination of the instrumentalities that gave expression and protection to the diversities

in a society should be undertaken. He proposed that not only should institutions such as the cabinet, the senate, and federal-provincial conferences be examined, but also that "attitudes" and "acceptances" were important instrumentalities of federalism.<sup>13</sup> It is the latter two instrumentalities that this study has been concerned with.

The historical overview of Alberta-federal relations presented in Chapter II confirms that even before Alberta's creation as a province diversities existed to foster and sustain the existence of a distinct regional or provincial sub-culture. The feelings of isolation and exploitation by central Canada that has been prevalent throughout Alberta's history still exists at the present time, in fact it could be argued that a quasi-colonial mentality still exists in Alberta.<sup>14</sup>

Many recent writings on federalism have enlarged upon and refined Livingston's notion that regional diversities must exist for the maintenance of a federal system. It has been asserted, for example, that a close study should be made of both diversity and unity since these factors must be closely balanced if a federal system is to be maintained. Black and Cairns argue that this balance of forces is a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of the Canadian federal system:

. . . if the state is to survive as a federation, it must embody a delicate balance between the forces of centralization and decentralization, a balance that obtains not only within the country as a whole but within each region as well.<sup>15</sup>

In a recent publication Constitutional Adaptation and Canadian Federalism, Donald Smiley asked the following question:

"Does contemporary cooperative federalism require widespread popular attitudes which are pragmatic and equivocal as to the appropriate level of government for carrying out particular public responsibilities?"<sup>16</sup> Smiley partially answered the question by observing:

It seems unlikely that the federation could survive if the prevailing attitudes came to the point of considering one or the other level more legitimate in respect to all public activities believed important. If there were consensus through the country about this matter the system might either disintegrate in a peaceful and orderly way or evolve into a unitary state. It is more likely, however, that no such agreement will be established and if the conflicts about legitimacy are pushed to the limits we have a "recipe for civil war."<sup>17</sup>

Inasmuch as the scope of this study is limited to Alberta it is not possible to determine whether or not Canadians as a whole consider one level to be a more legitimate administrator of all important public activities. It can be inferred, however, that there is a balance between the forces of centralization and decentralization within the Alberta population. Since the proportion of respondents who perceived the federal government to be most important was approximately equal to the proportion of respondents who perceived the provincial government to be most important, coupled with the

fact that no numerically substantial portion of the electorate advocates total provincial or federal control over all important areas of government activities, there is reason to believe that for most Albertans there is an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Canadian federal system itself. The existing support for Canadian federalism that is manifest throughout the data suggests that Albertans accept and support the maintenance of the Canadian federal system. Albertans seem not only to possess a commitment to their nation and province, but they also seem to perceive the existing federal structure as both legitimate and necessary.

The analysis of political parties undertaken in Chapter VII points out several important aspects of party politics within the province. First, the basis of electoral support for the Social Credit party was found to be heterogeneous. Substantial support both in terms of identification and voting was obtained in nearly equal proportions from all segments of the electorate. Second, the Social Credit party was supported for its administrative record and the image of its former leader, Ernest Manning. Although the Social Credit movement was originally based upon the concept of monetary and political reform, there was no evidence that these factors were any longer considered important by even a small number of its supporters.

The third aspect of the Alberta party system pertains to the role of alternating voters and the balance of power theory. A majority of the electors interviewed changed parties when voting in both the 1967 provincial election and the 1969 federal election. It is not the sheer number of voters that changed parties between 1967 and 1968 that is of prime importance, rather it is the reasons given for this behavior that is particularly important. None of the electors interviewed utilized the balance theory to explain their voting behavior. A few favored Social Credit provincially but changed parties nationally because they wanted to support a national party. Others said that they supported the Conservative national party because it represented the West. Similarly some mentioned that they supported the provincial Social Credit party rather than either of the two old-line parties because it was provincially oriented. But none of this can be interpreted as support for the balance theory.

What then is the relation between federal and provincial electoral behavior? Provincial parties are perceived as being rather independent of their federal counterparts. The same factors tend to influence voting behavior (i.e. administrative record, party leadership, local candidates, and issues) at both levels. There is no indication that provincial administrative

records are necessarily linked to federal administrative matters. Federal party leaders were not found to be influential in provincial elections, nor were provincial leaders found to be influential in federal elections. Furthermore, although few specific findings were generated concerning issues, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the issues in provincial election campaigns are considerably different from those that emerge during a federal campaign. It is suggested, therefore, that the relationship between the provincial and federal party systems reflects traditional notions of federalism and the federal and provincial party systems in Alberta are coordinate and independent.<sup>18</sup>

In his book The Responsible Electorate, V. O. Key argues that the voters in the United States are not the fools that they have sometimes been portrayed to be: "straight-jacketed by social determinants or moved by subconscious urges triggered by devilishly skillful propagandists."<sup>19</sup>

To be sure, many individual voters act in odd ways indeed; yet in the large the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it.<sup>20</sup>

The same claim that V.O. Key makes on behalf of the United States' electorate is being made here regarding Alberta voters and their behavior in federal and provincial elections. It may be



that Muller was correct in asserting that Canadians have a pragmatic perception of the federal circumstances which influence their voting behavior. The result is not that they elect different parties at the two levels of government to counter-balance one another, but that provincial and federal parties are elected independently of one another based upon the issues, government performance, and executive personality of each party within their own spheres of electoral activity.

#### Future Research

The findings presented in this study tentatively answer several questions concerning the electorate's perception of federalism. The study also raises other questions which need to be answered. Some of these include:

- (1) While people seem to be aware of the broad areas of jurisdiction studied, what degree of knowledge do they have about other areas of government activity?
- (2) Are electors capable of differentiating between the administrative and financial responsibilities of the two governments?
- (3) How strongly do people feel about federal or provincial jurisdiction over specific responsibilities.

- (4) Would electors prefer to see the provinces and the federal government jointly establish and administer programs or is provincial administration preferred even though federal funds may be involved?
- (5) Is there electoral support for the development of a permanent federal-provincial body to coordinate federal-provincial programs?
- (6) How do people obtain information about the division of powers between the two governments?
- (7) Could a better measure of federal-provincial orientation be devised by stressing the inter-dependence of the two governments and asking the respondents to differentiate between the financing and administration of a program?<sup>21</sup>
- (8) Do political parties encourage electors to alternate in their party support between elections?<sup>22</sup>
- (9) How autonomous are provincial party organizations?

Given the present findings there is reason to believe that federalism is a meaningful structure of government not only to political scientists, lawyers, civil servants, and politicians, but also to the average citizen who seems to be concerned and supportive of federalism. It is the view of this writer that the viability of Canadian federalism is dependent, in part, upon

whether or not federalism is a meaningful structure of government to the citizens who live within its framework. The findings of this study support the assertion that Canadian federalism is in some ways meaningful to a majority of the residents of Alberta. To determine whether it is meaningful to other Canadians can and should be the basis for further research endeavors.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Richard H. Leach, American Federalism (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), p. 17.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>3</sup>See Chapter I, pp. 7-12.

<sup>4</sup>See Chapter IV, pp. 4-12 and 4-13.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-19 and 4-21.

<sup>6</sup>For an extended discussion of the impact of conditional grant programs on the accountability of governments to their electorate see Donald V. Smiley, "Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism: The Issues," in J.P. Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1968), pp. 260-262.

<sup>7</sup>John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 381-385.

<sup>8</sup>W.H. Riker, "Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does It Matter?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October, 1964), pp. 135-146.

<sup>9</sup>See Chapter VI, pp. 185-195.

<sup>10</sup>J.M.S. Careless, "Limited Identities in Canada," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 (March, 1969), p. 9.

<sup>11</sup>W.S. Livingston, "A Note on the Nature of Federalism," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 1 (March, 1952), pp. 83-84.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 89-90.

<sup>14</sup>For a discussion of this matter see Chapter II, pp. 31-32.

<sup>15</sup>Edwin R. Black and Alan C. Cairns, "A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism," in J.P. Meekison (ed.) Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (2nd edition; Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1971), p. 99.

<sup>16</sup>Donald V. Smiley, Constitutional Adaptation and Canadian Federalism Since 1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 6.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>See S.J.R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: Interpretations of Canadian Federalism," in J.P. Meekison (ed.) second edition, op. cit., pp. 121-140. This article suggests that the constitutional model of democracy developed by Arend Lijphart would help explain why the party systems might be independent one of another.

<sup>19</sup>V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 7-8. This is a growing body of literature that tends to support this point of view. For a discussion of this literature see Walter De Vries and Lance Tarrance, Jr., The Ticket Splitter (Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmands Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 39-55.

<sup>20</sup>Perhaps meaningful data could be obtained by asking respondents to indicate the extent of perceived and preferred interdependence between the two governments rather than asking who is primarily responsible for specific areas. Such data could be obtained by several means. First, respondents might be asked to indicate the extent of federal or provincial involvement in specific programs. A screening question could be used: "Are both the federal and provincial governments involved in medicare?" If the respondent said 'yes' then he would be asked to indicate the extent of both governments' involvement: "To what extent is the provincial (or federal) government involved?" The latter question would be open ended thereby allowing the respondent to indicate the extent of his knowledge on the subject. A second approach

might be to evaluate the respondents' perceptions of government responsibility by using a continuum for each government in specific jurisdictional areas and asking an individual to indicate 'how much' provincial and/or federal involvement there is in each area.

		Provincial Government Involvement							
	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Family Allowances	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Old Age Pensions	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Income Taxation	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Foreign Affairs	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Unemployment Insurance	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Medical Care	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Education	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved

		Federal Government Involvement							
	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Family Allowances	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Old Age Pensions	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Income Taxation	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Foreign Affairs	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved
Unemployment Insurance	Not Involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Involved

<sup>22</sup>Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 85-94.

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APPENDIX A

ALBERTA ELECTORATE STUDY 1969:  
METHODOLOGY

## Alberta Electorate Study 1969: Methodology

### Sample

A sample of 600 potential respondents were chosen from 41 of Alberta's 65 provincial constituencies. The sample universe was limited to the major urban centres, Edmonton and Calgary, and those small cities or rural areas that were reasonably accessible to the professional interviewing personnel available. While on the surface one might conclude that such a sample universe would be much too small to be referred to as a provincial study, it must be remembered that there are vast areas of Alberta that are sparsely populated. Over 75 percent of the 1967 Alberta electorate lived in the 41 constituencies from which the sample was drawn.

Once the parameters of the study were defined, the primary sampling objective became that of ensuring that respondents were selected by a random process (i.e. every individual within the population from which the sample was drawn had a non-zero probability of being selected in the sample).

In order to meet the criteria of randomness, and yet ensure a geographically representative sample, the sample was proportionally stratified on the basis of major urban centres (Edmonton, Calgary), small urban centres (Lethbridge, Medicine Hat, Red Deer), and the rural areas (inclusive of small cities and towns such as Camrose,

Fort Macleod, Vulcan, etc.). This resulted in the following allocation of interview schedules: 65 percent of the interviews were taken in the two urban centres; 10 percent were taken in the small cities; and 25 percent were taken in the rural areas of the province.


Table A-1 Interview Schedule Allocation by Geographical Location

Geographical Location	% of Samples	Number of Eligible Electors	Interview Schedules
Edmonton	35%	207,304	210
Calgary	30%	178,110	180
Small cities	10%	57,230	60
Rural	<u>25%</u>	<u>151,385</u>	<u>150</u>
TOTALS	100	594,029*	600

\*Total names of electorate list was 795,034.

Due to practical considerations (i.e. finances, time and distance), it was decided that but six of the 18 rural constituencies would be sampled. These six constituencies were randomly selected with consideration being given to the relative size of their respective populations. Each constituency was given the same chance of being selected in proportion to the number of eligible electors within that constituency.

Once the six rural constituencies had been selected the sample



design then called for a proportionate number of interviews to be taken within each constituency commensurate with the number of eligible electors within the constituency. A limited number of polls in each constituency were then randomly selected so that approximately five interview schedules would be taken within the boundaries of any particular poll. The actual number of interviews taken in any one poll was determined by the relative size of the population of the other polls selected. This resulted in as few as one interview being allocated in a rural poll with only 28 eligible electors, to as many as ten interviews in an urban poll with 662 eligible electors. A total of 116 polls were chosen.

The final stage of the sample design called for the actual selection of the individual eligible elector. Inasmuch as the list of electors for each of the constituencies to be sampled was not available (nor for that matter would they be reliable two years after an election), it was decided that family dwellings would be randomly selected. The addresses of these homes were then noted and placed on the interview schedule as the 'Primary Respondent.' The interviewers were then instructed to contact a specific individual at that residence. There is a portion of our society that is very mobile and while they may have permanent residence at a specific address, they are in fact rarely there. In particular travelling salesmen fit this category. Unmarried young people are also rarely found at home. Yet a further complication for



interviewers are the electronic devices used in high rise apartments which severely limit the personal contact between interviewer and interviewee during the crucial introductory stage of the interview.

In order to adjust for those individuals who are, for one reason or another, inaccessible to interviewers, a substitute or 'Alternate' for each primary respondent was selected. In effect two samples were drawn. The interviewers were instructed to call back on the primary respondent three times before proceeding to the alternate respondent's address. Where the primary respondents refused to be interviewed, the alternate respondent was then substituted and the same procedure described above repeated.

The selection of a particular potential respondent at a given address was determined by age and sex. The sample design called for 50 percent men and 50 percent women respondents. The sex of each succeeding potential respondent and his or her address was specified thus alternating the male-female interview schedules by indicating to the interviewer the sex of each potential respondent beforehand. To determine which eligible elector within a household would be interviewed, where there was more than one eligible elector of the same sex, the potential respondents were listed according to age, from youngest to oldest. The individual with whom the interview was to be taken was predetermined on the basis of the age relationship between all potential respondents of the same sex within a selected household.

The above mentioned procedure of selecting constituencies, polls within constituencies, family dwellings within polls, and individuals within households, was necessitated so that the random nature of the sample could be maintained. Sampling techniques of the type employed in this study generally produce results which permit inferences to be made, within calculable levels of accuracy and risk, to the population as a whole. For example, this study utilizes a significance level of .05, which means that if 60 percent of the sample indicated that they would favor increased federal government activity in the field of education, there are 95 chances out of a 100 (this is the significance level) that the survey estimate (60%) is within approximately  $\pm 4$  percentage points of the survey estimate, thus yielding a confidence interval of 56 to 64 percent. The percentage reported (in this case 60%) represents the best estimate of the parameter in any given interval.

#### Sample Validation

A comparison of the results of this study with the results of available census statistics is shown in percentages in the following tables. Some of the differences are due to the procedure used in gathering the data. These differences are explained by noting that the census statistics are of 1961 origin and therefore may be inaccurate in detail. They do nonetheless illustrate rough parameters with which this study corresponds.

Table A-2

Alberta Study 1969		Census Statistics 1961*		
Education	Percent	Education	Percent	Percent Difference
Elementary	28.5	Elementary	38.0	-9.5
Secondary	55.7	Secondary	54.2	+1.5
Some University	8.6	Some University	4.1	+4.5
University		University		
Graduate	7.0	Graduate	3.5	+3.5
Religion**		Religion		
Protestant	66.2	Protestant	67.6	-1.4
Catholic	28.9	Catholic	25.7	+3.2
Sect	5.0	Sect	6.7	-1.7
Age***		Age		
19 - 25	11.3	20 - 24	15.8	-4.5
26 - 35	23.3	25 - 34	23.7	- .4
36 - 45	25.0	35 - 44	20.5	+4.5
46 - 55	20.4	45 - 54	16.8	+3.6
56 - 65	9.3	55 - 64	11.7	-2.4
65 and over	10.7	65 and over	11.6	- .9

\*The 1961 census data from Alberta census divisions 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 11 were used in compiling these figures. As can be seen from the map on page 306 the boundaries of these 6 census divisions closely approximate the sampling boundaries.

\*\*Although precise information was obtained regarding specific religious affiliations, the information was coded into four categories (i.e., Protestant, Catholic, Sect, no church/other). The fourth category is not utilized since this study used a different question format to determine religious affiliation (See p. 327)

\*\*\*Slightly different categories were used in the Alberta study than those used by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics in 1961.

### Interviewers

Professional interviewers were used in this study. Each interviewer attended two training sessions. Interviewers were familiarized with the interview schedule and the objectives of the study. Care was taken to ensure that the field work was conducted in a uniform manner throughout the province. Even though the interviewers had had considerable experience with academic survey research, continual supervision was maintained.

### Timing

It was initially anticipated that the actual interviewing would take place during the month of September. Upon further reflection it was decided that a more appropriate timing of the survey would be in the latter part of October and early November. This timing was changed so that a more accurate sample of the rural areas could be taken (i.e. taking the interviews at this period of time rather than in September increased the probability of finding farmers at home, or at least more willing to participate in the survey). The survey was, therefore, conducted during a four-week period extending from mid-October to mid-November, 1969.

### Statistical Techniques

In analyzing the data in Chapters IV through VII, several different kinds of measurement techniques have been used. Where tables consisting of cross tabulations between two variables are

presented both percentages and cell frequencies are given in most cases. Under each table, where applicable, the chi square ( $x^2$ ), degrees of freedom (df), probability (P), and appropriate measures of association are presented. Simply stated, the purpose of the chi square measure is to determine whether the relationship between the two variables in the table is likely to be due to chance. To interpret the chi square it is also necessary to know what the likelihood is that a particular value of chi square will occur. This information is obtained through the utilization of statistical tables which indicate the level of significance for any particular chi square value given the degrees of freedom of the particular table from which the chi square is calculated. The degrees of freedom (df) of a particular table are therefore, indicated each time the chi square measure is calculated along with the level of probability (P). Thus, when a probability of .05 (i.e. when the P .05) or less is indicated under a table it can be concluded that there is less than five chances in 100 that the relationship indicated in the table occurred by chance.

The chi square measures the levels of significance but does not measure the degree of association between two variables per se. The Goodman-Kruskal Tau C and the corrected Tau (written Tau') performs this task. The purpose of Tau C is to state the degree of relationship between two nominal variables by noting the extent to which the independent variable permits the prediction of the

dependent variable.<sup>1</sup> The Tau' is interpreted in a similar manner to the Tau C but is used with ordinal data.<sup>2</sup>

#### Source of Funds

The objective of this study was to obtain a cross section of the Albertans which would permit inferences to be made regarding the Alberta electorate's opinions on federal-provincial matters. To accomplish this objective it was necessary to design a survey research study of manageable proportions given the limited facilities at the disposal of the investigator.

Survey research is expensive and funds are often hard to obtain. It is possible for the researcher to substitute considerable time and energy of his own to decrease the costs of such an undertaking, but there are nonetheless sizeable expenditures which must be made. In 1969 the Alberta Government established a Special Cabinet Committee to study constitutional matters. This committee was contacted by the author and requested to support this research project. A grant of \$5,000 was obtained from the committee to help defray the costs of this study. Given the limitations imposed (i.e. time and finances) by the sponsor, both the sample size and universe of the study were affected. Notwithstanding these limitations, both the sample size and population universe are adequate for the purposes of this exploratory study.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>E. Terrence Jones, Conducting Political Research (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 113. This author describes the value of the Goodman Kuskal Tau C as follows:

If the two variables are perfectly related, then knowing one will enable us to predict the other with unerring accuracy; if the two variables have absolutely no relationship, then knowing one will be of no help in predicting the other; and in the most normal situation - the two variables are partially related - then knowing one will improve our ability to predict the other. Tau tells us precisely how much our predictive value has been increased.

The values of Tau C are easily understood as they range from 0 to 1 and can easily be equated with percentage figures as this statistic measures the total reduction in error.

<sup>2</sup>T. R. Anderson, M. Zelditch, Jr., A Basic Course in Statistics (2nd edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 152-155.

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE



## THE ALBERTA ELECTORATE STUDY

Hello. My name is \_\_\_\_\_. A group of professors at the Universities of Lethbridge and Alberta are conducting a survey of individuals in the Province of Alberta to find out what people think about some of the present problems facing government. How many men/women\* are there living at this address who are eligible to vote in a provincial election?

IF THERE ARE NO RESIDENTS OF THE HOUSEHOLD WHO ARE OF THE APPROPRIATE SEX AND ELIGIBLE TO VOTE IN A PROVINCIAL ELECTION THEN TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW (TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY THE RESPONDENT MUST BE A CANADIAN CITIZEN OR A BRITISH SUBJECT, 19 YEARS OF AGE, AND A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF ALBERTA).

IF THERE IS BUT ONE POTENTIAL RESPONDENT ASK: Is he/she at home now?

IF 'YES' ASK TO SPEAK WITH HIM/HER AND BEGIN THE INTERVIEW. IF THE POTENTIAL RESPONDENT IS NOT AT HOME, OR IS OCCUPIED, OBTAIN HIS/HER NAME AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO CONTACT THEM AT ANOTHER TIME. (NOTE: THREE CALLBACKS ARE TO BE MADE.)

IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE POTENTIAL RESPONDENT OF THE APPROPRIATE SEX ASK: Who are they?

LIST THEIR NAMES AND/OR RELATIONSHIP (I.E. FATHER, SON, COUSIN, UNCLE, ETC.) IN ORDER OF AGE BELOW, AND ASK TO SPEAK WITH THE PERSON LISTED WHOSE NAME FALLS CLOSEST TO THE RED 'X'. IF HE/SHE IS NOT AT HOME FOLLOW THE SAME PROCEDURE AS ABOVE.

	Name or Relationship	Red 'X'
youngest		
oldest		

\* A 50% ratio of men and women respondents was desired, therefore, the interview schedules were printed on yellow and white paper. The white interview schedules were used for male respondents, and the yellow interview schedules were used for female respondents. The sex of the respondent that corresponded with a particular address was predetermined (i.e., the sex of the first interview schedule was randomly chosen and thereafter male and female interview schedules were alternated) and the interviewers were not allowed to substitute a male respondent with a female respondent or vice versa.

## INTRODUCTION

You were randomly selected as part of a representative sample of citizens and it is very important that we find out what you think about the following matters.

You may answer freely because most of the questions being asked are questions concerning your own personal opinions and there are, as a result, no right or wrong answers.

1. In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing Canada today?

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2. What do you think is the major problem facing Alberta today?

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3. We have heard a lot of talk lately about changing the Canadian constitution. Do you think Canada's constitution should be changed?

- 1 ( ) Yes  
2 ( ) No  
3 ( ) Don't know  
4 ( ) No opinion

IF 'YES' OR 'NO' IN QUESTION 3 ASK:

- 3a. Why do you say that?

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4. As far as you are concerned personally, which government is more important in affecting how you and your family get on? The one in Ottawa or the one in this province?

1 ( ) Federal  
2 ( ) Provincial  
3 ( ) Equal  
4 ( ) Neither  
5 ( ) Don't know  
6 ( ) Not ascertained.

5. Is any one province more powerful in running Canada than it should be?

1 ( ) Yes  
2 ( ) No  
3 ( ) Never thought about it  
4 ( ) Not ascertained.

IF 'YES' IN QUESTION 5 ASK:

- 5a. Which one?
- 

6. Do you worry at all about the ability of the province to maintain its independence?

1 ( ) Yes  
2 ( ) No  
3 ( ) Never thought about it  
4 ( ) Not ascertained.

7. Does it make any difference to you which level of government provides the necessary governmental services? That is, would you prefer the provincial government to look after certain matters rather than the government in Ottawa, or does it matter?

1 ( ) Matters  
2 ( ) Doesn't matter  
3 ( ) Don't know

IF ANSWER IS 'MATTERS' OR 'DOESN'T MATTER' ASK:

7a. Why do you say that?

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8. Here is a list of some things which the two levels of government do. I would like you to tell me which government actually looks after these matters at the present time.

GO THROUGH LIST WITH RESPONDENT

	Federal	Prov.	Both	Don't Know
a. Family allowances	( )	( )	( )	( )
b. Old age pensions	( )	( )	( )	( )
c. Income taxation	( )	( )	( )	( )
d. Foreign affairs	( )	( )	( )	( )
e. Unemployment insurance	( )	( )	( )	( )
f. Building roads	( )	( )	( )	( )
g. Medical care	( )	( )	( )	( )
h. Hospitals and asylums	( )	( )	( )	( )
i. Primary and secondary education	( )	( )	( )	( )
j. Broadcasting (radio and T.V.)	( )	( )	( )	( )
k. City government	( )	( )	( )	( )
l. Control of inflation	( )	( )	( )	( )
m. Housing	( )	( )	( )	( )
n. Air and water pollution	( )	( )	( )	( )

		Federal	Prov.	Both	Don't Know
o.	Natural resources	( )	( )	( )	( )
p.	People on welfare	( )	( )	( )	( )
q.	Property and civil rights	( )	( )	( )	( )
r.	Indians	( )	( )	( )	( )
s.	Banking and issue of paper money	( )	( )	( )	( )

9. Now, which level of government do you think should look after these activities, or does it matter? (That is, does it make any difference to you which government looks after these matters?)

		Federal	Prov.	Both	Doesn't Matter	Don't Know
a.	Family allowances	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
b.	Old age pensions	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
c.	Income taxation	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
d.	Foreign affairs	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
e.	Unemployment insurance	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
f.	Building roads	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
g.	Medical care	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
h.	Hospitals and asylums	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
i.	Primary and secondary education	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
j.	Broadcasting (radio and T.V.)	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
k.	City government	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
l.	Control of inflation	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )

		Federal	Prov.	Both	Doesn't Matter	Don't Know
m.	Housing	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
n.	Air and water pollution	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
o.	Natural resources	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
p.	Property and civil rights	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
r.	Indians	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
s.	Banking and issue of paper money	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )

10. During the past two years, two constitutional conferences have been held involving the premiers from each of the provinces and the Prime Minister of Canada. Did you follow the proceedings of either of the conferences by radio, T.V., or through the newspaper?

- 1 ( ) Yes  
2 ( ) No  
3 ( ) Not ascertained.

IF 'NO' IN QUESTION 10 SKIP TO QUESTION 11:

IF 'YES' IN QUESTION 10 ASK:

- 10a. Which conference did you follow?

- 1 ( ) 1968  
2 ( ) 1969  
3 ( ) Both  
4 ( ) Not ascertained.

- 10b. After having seen/read about/listened to the conference, would you say you feel more or less optimistic about the future of Canada than before the conference(s)?
- 1 ( ) More optimistic
  - 2 ( ) Less optimistic
  - 3 ( ) No change
  - 4 ( ) Not ascertained.
- 10c. Did you gain most of your information from watching T.V., listening to the radio, or reading the paper?
- 1 ( ) T.V.
  - 2 ( ) Radio
  - 3 ( ) Newspaper
  - 4 ( ) Two or more
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
- 10d. Would you say you were very interested, moderately interested or not very interested in the discussions that took place during the conference?
- 1 ( ) Very interested
  - 2 ( ) Moderately interested
  - 3 ( ) Not very interested
  - 4 ( ) Not ascertained.
11. At the present time there are some people in this province who are talking about the possibilities of forming one large prairie province--that is, the uniting of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Would you be in favor of this kind of union or not?
- 1 ( ) Yes
  - 2 ( ) No
  - 3 ( ) Don't know.
12. The government of Alberta has recently established a committee on the constitution to examine the position of Alberta in the Canadian federation. Do you feel that this committee should discuss the possibility of Alberta separating from the rest of Canada?
- 1 ( ) Yes
  - 2 ( ) No
  - 3 ( ) Don't know
  - 4 ( ) Not ascertained.

IF ANSWER IS 'YES' OR 'NO' IN QUESTION 12 ASK:

12a. Why do you say that?

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13. In your opinion, does the provincial government receive and spend any of the money collected from income taxation?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No
- 3 ( ) Don't know
- 4 ( ) Not ascertained.

14. With regard to the present relationship between the provincial and the federal governments, would you say the situation is poor, satisfactory or excellent?

- 1 ( ) Poor
- 2 ( ) Satisfactory
- 3 ( ) Excellent
- 4 ( ) Not ascertained.

15. Some provincial leaders see grants of money from the federal government to the provincial government as a good way of sharing wealth in Canada. Others argue that the provinces would be more independent if they had more money to themselves. With which side do you most agree?

READ ALTERNATIVES

- 1 ( ) Welcome grants
- 2 ( ) Need more sources of revenue
- 3 ( ) Neither
- 4 ( ) Don't know.

16. Was the medicare program started by the federal or provincial government?

- 1 ( ) Federal
- 2 ( ) Provincial
- 3 ( ) Both
- 4 ( ) Don't know
- 5 ( ) Not ascertained.



Here are a series of statements that other people have made concerning the problems that we have been discussing. Would you please indicate on each statement whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with each statement. HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD

NOTE: ENCOURAGE RESPONDENTS TO CHOOSE A RESPONSE AS IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT EVERY STATEMENT BE RESPONDED TO.

17. Our Alberta school system should encourage English-speaking students to learn French by providing more courses in French.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
18. The learning of the second official language, that is the learning of French by English-speaking students and English by the French-speaking students should be compulsory in Alberta schools.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
19. The eastern Canadians receive more benefits than do western Canadians from being part of the Dominion of Canada.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
20. If acceptance of bilingual districts in Alberta is necessary for the proper development of a bilingual nation then I am in favor of the new law passed by the federal government.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.

21. Alberta would be better off if it were a separate country rather than simply a province of Canada.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
22. Since the provincial governments have been given the responsibility of dealing with health and welfare, the federal government has no right to force medicare upon the people of Canada.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
23. The west is always getting a raw deal because the national government imposes high tariffs to protect eastern manufacturers.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
24. Medicare is a national problem and therefore should be dealt with on a national basis as the government in Ottawa has done.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.

25. The three western provinces should join together and form one large province.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
26. The present housing crisis in Canada should be dealt with by the federal government because it is a national problem of considerable magnitude.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
27. It doesn't matter which level of government looks after the health of Albertans. What matters is that Alberta citizens receive proper medical treatment.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
28. The government in Ottawa is more concerned about the problems of eastern Canadians than they are about the problems of western Canadians.
- 1 ( ) Agree strongly
  - 2 ( ) Agree
  - 3 ( ) Disagree
  - 4 ( ) Disagree strongly
  - 5 ( ) Not ascertained.
29. How long have you been a resident of Alberta?
- 1 ( ) 0 - 1 year
  - 2 ( ) 1 - 3 years
  - 3 ( ) 3 - 5 years
  - 4 ( ) 5 - 10 years
  - 5 ( ) Over 10 years.

IF LESS THAN FIVE YEARS ASK:

29a. Where did you live before moving to Alberta?

---

30. Sex (by observation)

- 1 ( ) Male
- 2 ( ) Female

31. What is your marital status?

---

32. What is your occupation? OBTAIN SPECIFIC RESPONSE

IF RETIRED ASK: What was your occupation before you  
retired?

---

IF FEMALE AND MARRIED ASK:

32a. What is your husband's occupation?

---

33. What is the highest grade of formal education you have  
completed? OBTAIN SPECIFIC GRADE OR NUMBER OF YEARS

---

34. Do you consider yourself a member of a particular church  
or religion? Which one?

---

35. Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular  
ethnic or national group?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No

IF 'YES' IN QUESTION 35 ASK:

35a. Which national group is that?

- 1 ( ) European
- 2 ( ) Other
- 3 ( ) Not ascertained.

36. Do you speak any language other than English?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No

IF 'YES' IN QUESTION 36 ASK:

36a. Which language is that?

---

37. Could you look at this card HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD and pick the number which you think best describes the level of income for yourself and your family for one year? Which number is that?

---

38. Could you look at this card HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD and pick the number of the age group to which you belong. Just give me the number please.

---

39. Are you a member of a trade union?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No

40. Is your husband/wife a member of a trade union?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No

41. Do you belong to any community groups or organizations?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No

IF 'YES' IN QUESTION 41 ASK:

41a. Which ones?

---

42. Do you belong to a national political party?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No
- 3 ( ) Refused to answer.

IF 'YES' IN QUESTION 42 ASK:

42a. Which one?

- 1 ( ) Liberal
- 2 ( ) Progressive Conservative
- 3 ( ) New Democratic Party
- 4 ( ) Refused to answer
- 5 ( ) Not ascertained.

IF 'NO' IN QUESTION 42 ASK:

42b. Which political party do you tend to favor nationally?

- 1 ( ) Liberal
- 2 ( ) Progressive Conservative
- 3 ( ) Social Credit
- 4 ( ) New Democratic Party
- 5 ( ) Other
- 6 ( ) None

43. Do you belong to a provincial political party?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No

IF 'YES' IN QUESTION 43 ASK:

43a. Which one?

- 1 ( ) Liberal
- 2 ( ) Progressive Conservative
- 3 ( ) Social Credit
- 4 ( ) New Democratic Party
- 5 ( ) Other
- 6 ( ) None

IF 'NO' IN QUESTION 43 ASK:

43b. Which political party do you tend to favor provincially?

- 1 ( ) Liberal
- 2 ( ) Progressive Conservative
- 3 ( ) Social Credit
- 4 ( ) New Democratic Party
- 5 ( ) Other
- 6 ( ) None

NOTE: IF RESPONDENT INDICATES A DIFFERENT PARTY NATIONALLY  
THAN PROVINCIALLY (SEE QUESTIONS 48 & 49 AND 51 & 52) ASK:

44. Why is it that you favor the . . . (give party name)  
nationally and the . . . (give party name) provincially?  
PROBE

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45. Did you vote in the 1967 provincial election?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No

IF 'YES' IN QUESTION 45 ASK:QUESTIONS 45a AND 45b:

45a. For which party did you vote?

- 1 ( ) Liberal
- 2 ( ) Progressive Conservative
- 3 ( ) Social Credit
- 4 ( ) New Democratic Party
- 5 ( ) Not ascertained.

45b. What would you say were the major reasons you voted for this party?

---

---

---

46. Did you vote in the 1968 federal election?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No

IF 'YES' IN QUESTION 46 ASK QUESTIONS 46a AND 46b:

46a. For which party did you vote?

- 1 ( ) Liberal
- 2 ( ) Progressive Conservative
- 3 ( ) Social Credit
- 4 ( ) New Democratic Party
- 5 ( ) Not ascertained.

46b. What would you say were the major reasons you voted for this party?

---

---

---



47. Is there any provincial political party in Alberta which you think better represents the interests of Albertans than any other party? Which one?

- 1 ( ) Social Credit
- 2 ( ) Progressive Conservative
- 3 ( ) New Democratic Party
- 4 ( ) Liberal
- 5 ( ) Not ascertained.

48. Would you permit us to re-interview you at a later date?

- 1 ( ) Yes
- 2 ( ) No

APPENDIX C

AGGREGATE TABLES

	Frequency	Percent
1. What in your opinion is the most important problem in Canada today?		
a. Inflation	139	25
b. Canadian Unity	74	13
c. Wheat Sales	44	8
d. Housing	31	6
e. Cost of Living	29	5
f. Separatism	25	4
g. Drug Abuse	24	4
h. Social Inequalities	24	4
i. High Taxes	21	4
j. Pollution	14	2
k. Crime/Juvenile Delinquency	14	2
l. Education	13	2
m. Unemployment	11	2
n. Other	103	18
o. Not Ascertained	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	99
2. What in your opinion is the most important problem in Alberta today?		
a. Wheat Sales	98	17
b. No Problem	76	14
c. Inflation	42	7
d. Housing	39	7
e. Educational Costs	37	7
f. Natural Resources	33	6
g. Social Inequalities	29	5
h. Medicare	25	4
i. Pollution	21	4
j. Welfare Services	16	3
k. Unemployment	13	2
l. Drug Abuse	12	2
m. Other	118	21
n. Not Ascertained	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	567	100

	Frequency	Percent
3. Do you favor changing the Canadian Constitution?		
a. Yes	190	33
b. No	175	31
c. Don't know	128	23
d. No opinion	69	12
e. Not ascertained	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	567	100
3a. YES: Reason		
a. Constitution needs updating	107	56
b. Do away with monarchy	12	6
c. Other	47	25
d. No reason given	<u>24</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTALS	190	100
3b. NO: Reason		
a. Constitution adequate	98	56
b. Good constitution	15	9
c. Anti-French Canadian	11	6
d. Other reasons	38	22
e. Not ascertained	<u>13</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTALS	175	100
4. Which level of government is most important to you and your family?		
a. Federal	239	42
b. Provincial	241	43
c. Equal	65	11
d. Neither	6	1
e. Not ascertained	<u>16</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	567	100

	Frequency	Percent
5. Is one province more powerful than it should be?		
a. Yes	370	65
b. No	128	23
c. Never thought about it	50	9
d. Not ascertained	<u>19</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	567	100
5a. Which province is too powerful?		
a. Quebec	258	70
b. Ontario	101	27
c. Other	6	2
d. Not ascertained	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	370	100
6. Do you worry at all about the ability of the province to maintain its independence?		
a. Yes	90	16
b. No	383	68
c. Never thought about it	75	13
d. Not ascertained	<u>19</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	567	100
7. Does it make any difference which level of government provides the necessary governmental services?		
a. Matters	351	62
b. Doesn't matter	158	28
c. Don't know	<u>58</u>	<u>10</u>
TOTALS	567	100

	Frequency	Percent
7a. MATTERS: Reason		
a. Proximity of provincial government	164	47
b. Division of powers	47	13
c. Provincial government has good administration	44	13
d. More federal control needed	33	9
e. Medicare provincial concern	10	3
f. Other reasons	44	13
g. Not ascertained	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTALS	351	100
7b. DOESN'T MATTER: Reason		
a. Services provided no matter which government has power	106	67
b. Equal services advocated	12	8
c. Federal government dominant	6	4
d. Other reasons	26	16
e. Not ascertained	<u>8</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTALS	158	100
8. Which level of government actually looks after the following matters at the present time?		
a. Family allowances		
1. Federal	483	85
2. Provincial	59	10
3. Both	24	4
4. Don't know	1	-
b. Old age pensions		
1. Federal	462	82
2. Provincial	31	6
3. Both	72	13
4. Don't know	2	-

	Frequency	Percent
c. Income Taxation		
1. Federal	364	64
2. Provincial	27	5
3. Both	176	31
4. Don't know	-	-
d. Foreign Affairs		
1. Federal	539	95
2. Provincial	10	2
3. Both	15	3
4. Don't know	3	1
e. Unemployment Insurance		
1. Federal	347	61
2. Provincial	176	31
3. Both	38	7
4. Don't know	6	1
f. Building roads		
1. Federal	52	9
2. Provincial	381	67
3. Both	133	24
4. Don't know	1	-
g. Medical care		
1. Federal	227	40
2. Provincial	207	37
3. Both	133	24
4. Don't know	-	-
h. Hospitals and asylums		
1. Federal	71	13
2. Provincial	413	73
3. Both	81	14
4. Don't know	1	-

	Frequency	Percent
i. Primary and secondary education		
1. Federal	44	8
2. Provincial	491	87
3. Both	31	5
4. Don't know	1	-
j. Broadcasting (radio & T.V.)		
1. Federal	392	69
2. Provincial	92	16
3. Both	80	14
4. Don't know	3	1
k. City government		
1. Federal	33	6
2. Provincial	489	86
3. Both	33	6
4. Don't know	10	2
l. Control of inflation		
1. Federal	474	84
2. Provincial	22	4
3. Both	65	11
4. Don't know	6	1
m. Housing		
1. Federal	292	51
2. Provincial	146	26
3. Both	126	22
4. Don't know	3	1
n. Air and water pollution		
1. Federal	289	51
2. Provincial	124	22
3. Both	149	26
4. Don't know	5	1



	Frequency	Percent
o. Natural resources		
1. Federal	265	47
2. Provincial	165	29
3. Both	136	24
4. Don't know	1	-
p. People on welfare		
1. Federal	97	17
2. Provincial	369	65
3. Both	100	18
4. Don't know	1	-
q. Property and civil rights		
1. Federal	242	43
2. Provincial	221	39
3. Both	101	18
4. Don't know	3	1
r. Indians		
1. Federal	428	76
2. Provincial	61	11
3. Both	76	13
4. Don't know	2	-
s. Banking and issue of paper money		
1. Federal	526	93
2. Provincial	18	3
3. Both	20	4
4. Don't know	3	1
9. Which level of government do you think should look after the following matters?		
a. Family allowances		
1. Federal	331	58
2. Provincial	126	22
3. Both	36	6
4. Doesn't matter	70	12
5. Don't know	4	1

	Frequency	Percent
b. Old age pensions		
1. Federal	385	68
2. Provincial	101	18
3. Both	51	10
4. Doesn't matter	27	5
5. Don't know	3	1
c. Income taxation		
1. Federal	338	60
2. Provincial	94	17
3. Both	108	19
4. Doesn't matter	22	4
5. Don't know	5	1
d. Foreign affairs		
1. Federal	499	88
2. Provincial	15	3
3. Both	36	6
4. Doesn't matter	13	2
5. Don't know	4	1
e. Unemployment insurance		
1. Federal	228	40
2. Provincial	251	44
3. Both	60	11
4. Doesn't matter	23	4
5. Don't know	5	1
f. Building roads		
1. Federal	46	8
2. Provincial	333	59
3. Both	175	31
4. Doesn't matter	7	1
5. Don't know	6	1
g. Medical care		
1. Federal	144	25
2. Provincial	309	55
3. Both	90	16
4. Doesn't matter	16	3
5. Don't know	8	1

	Frequency	Percent
h. Hospitals and asylums		
1. Federal	122	22
2. Provincial	336	59
3. Both	93	16
4. Doesn't matter	10	2
5. Don't know	6	1
i. Primary and secondary education		
1. Federal	139	25
2. Provincial	315	56
3. Both	96	17
4. Doesn't matter	12	2
5. Don't know	5	1
j. Broadcasting (radio and T.V.)		
1. Federal	262	46
2. Provincial	131	23
3. Both	83	15
4. Doesn't matter	84	15
5. Don't know	7	1
k. City government		
1. Federal	35	6
2. Provincial	461	81
3. Both	42	7
4. Doesn't matter	19	3
5. Don't know	10	2
l. Control of inflation		
1. Federal	393	69
2. Provincial	48	9
3. Both	103	18
4. Doesn't matter	13	2
5. Don't know	9	2

	Frequency	Percent
m. Housing		
1. Federal	155	27
2. Provincial	226	40
3. Both	171	30
4. Doesn't matter	9	2
5. Don't know	6	1
n. Air and water pollution		
1. Federal	232	41
2. Provincial	113	20
3. Both	206	36
4. Doesn't matter	9	2
5. Don't know	7	1
o. Natural resources		
1. Federal	184	33
2. Provincial	210	37
3. Both	158	28
4. Doesn't matter	8	1
5. Don't know	7	1
p. People on welfare		
1. Federal	113	20
2. Provincial	306	54
3. Both	133	24
4. Doesn't matter	10	2
5. Don't know	5	1
q. Property and civil rights		
1. Federal	185	33
2. Provincial	214	38
3. Both	146	26
4. Doesn't matter	16	3
5. Don't know	6	1
r. Indians		
1. Federal	287	49
2. Provincial	136	24
3. Both	137	24
4. Doesn't matter	13	2
5. Don't know	3	1

	Frequency	Percent
s. Banking and issue of paper money		
1. Federal	504	89
2. Provincial	24	4
3. Both	26	5
4. Doesn't matter	7	1
5. Don't know	6	1
10. Did you follow the proceedings of either of the constitutional conferences?		
a. Yes	259	46
b. No	285	50
c. Can't remember	<u>23</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTALS	567	100
10a. Which conference did you follow?		
a. 1968	33	13
b. 1969	63	24
c. Both	<u>163</u>	<u>63</u>
TOTALS	259	100
10b. How optimistic do you feel about the future of Canada?		
a. More optimistic	115	44
b. Less optimistic	56	22
c. No change	86	33
d. Not ascertained	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	259	100
10c. Which was your main information source?		
a. T.V.	95	37
b. Radio	12	5
c. Newspapers	54	21
d. Two or more	<u>98</u>	<u>38</u>
TOTALS	259	100

	Frequency	Percent
10d. What was your interest level in the conference?		
a. Very interested	90	35
b. Moderately interested	144	56
c. Not very interested	<u>25</u>	<u>10</u>
TOTALS	259	101
11. Are you in favor of one prairie province?		
a. Yes	130	23
b. No	373	66
c. Don't know	63	11
d. Not ascertained	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	100
12. Do you feel that the Alberta committee on the constitution should discuss the possibilities of Alberta separating?		
a. Yes	31	6
b. No	488	86
c. Don't know	34	6
d. Not ascertained	<u>14</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	567	101
12a. YES: Reason		
a. Potential should be explored	9	29
b. Other	<u>22</u>	<u>71</u>
TOTALS	31	100

	Frequency	Percent
12b. NO: Reason		
a. Canadian identity	188	39
b. Alberta too small	114	23
c. No advantage in separating	48	10
d. Cultural advantages	26	5
e. Against separatism generally	22	5
f. Status quo	17	3
g. Other	55	11
h. Not ascertained	<u>18</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTALS	488	100
13. Does the provincial government receive any money from income taxation?		
a. Yes	440	78
b. No	27	5
c. Don't know	99	17
d. Not ascertained	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	100
14. How would you rate federal- provincial relations?		
a. Poor	137	24
b. Satisfactory	416	73
c. Excellent	4	1
d. Not ascertained	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTALS	567	100
15. Would the provincial government be better off to accept grants of money from the federal government or to be more independent with more money to themselves?		
a. Welcome grants	245	43
b. More sources of revenue needed	192	34
c. Neither	31	5
d. Don't know	55	10
e. Not ascertained	<u>44</u>	<u>8</u>
TOTALS	567	100

	Frequency	Percent
16. Who initiated medicare?		
a. Federal	390	69
b. Provincial	136	24
c. Both	8	1
d. Don't know	28	5
e. Not ascertained	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	567	100
17. Our Alberta school system should encourage English speaking students to learn French by providing more courses in French.		
a. Agree strongly	63	11
b. Agree	348	61
c. Disagree	142	25
d. Disagree strongly	13	2
e. No response	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	99
18. The learning of the second official language, that is the learning of French by English speaking students and English by French speaking students, should be compulsory in Alberta schools.		
a. Agree strongly	34	6
b. Agree	179	32
c. Disagree	300	53
d. Disagree strongly	<u>54</u>	<u>10</u>
TOTALS	567	101
19. The eastern Canadians receive more benefits than do western Canadians from being part of the Dominion of Canada.		
a. Agree strongly	68	12
b. Agree	258	46
c. Disagree	229	40
d. Disagree strongly	7	1
e. No response	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	567	100



	Frequency	Percent
23. The west is always getting a raw deal because the national government imposes high tariffs to protect eastern manufacturers.		
a. Agree strongly	47	8
b. Agree	254	45
c. Disagree	248	44
d. Disagree strongly	6	1
e. No response	<u>12</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTALS	567	100
24. Medicare is a national problem and therefore should be dealt with on a national basis as the government in Ottawa has done.		
a. Agree strongly	25	4
b. Agree	273	48
c. Disagree	243	43
d. Disagree strongly	22	4
e. No response	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	567	100
25. The three western provinces should join together and form one large province.		
a. Agree strongly	21	4
b. Agree	108	19
c. Disagree	349	61
d. Disagree strongly	85	15
e. No response	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	567	100
26. The present housing crisis in Canada should be dealt with by the federal government because it is a national problem of considerable magnitude.		
a. Agree strongly	74	13
b. Agree	353	62
c. Disagree	132	23
d. Disagree strongly	6	1
e. No response	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	99

	Frequency	Percent
20. If acceptance of bilingual districts in Alberta is necessary for the proper development of a bilingual nation then I'm in favor of the new law passed by the federal government.		
a. Agree strongly	17	3
b. Agree	270	48
c. Disagree	232	41
d. Disagree strongly	36	6
e. No response	<u>12</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTALS	567	100
21. Alberta would be better off if it were a separate country rather than a province of Canada.		
a. Agree strongly	5	1
b. Agree	24	4
c. Disagree	328	58
d. Disagree strongly	209	37
e. No response	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	100
22. Since the provincial governments have been given the responsibility of dealing with health and welfare, the federal government has no right to force medicare upon the people of Canada.		
a. Agree strongly	119	21
b. Agree	312	55
c. Disagree	119	21
d. Disagree strongly	13	2
e. No response	3	1
f. Not ascertained	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	100

	Frequency	Percent
27. It doesn't matter which level of government looks after the health of Albertans. What matters is that Alberta citizens receive proper medical treatment.		
a. Agree strongly	71	13
b. Agree	388	68
c. Disagree	98	17
d. Disagree strongly	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTALS	567	100
28. The government in Ottawa is more concerned about the problems eastern Canadians than they are about the problems of western Canadians.		
a. Agree strongly	56	10
b. Agree	287	51
c. Disagree	210	37
d. Disagree strongly	10	2
e. No response	4	1
f. Not ascertained	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	101
29. How long have you been an Alberta resident?		
a. 0 - 1 year	12	2
b. 1 - 3 years	17	3
c. 3 - 5 years	25	4
d. 5 - 10 years	36	6
e. Over 10 years	<u>477</u>	<u>84</u>
TOTALS	567	100
29a. IF LESS THAN 5 YEARS: Where did you live previously?		
a. Saskatchewan or Manitoba	20	37
b. Ontario or Quebec	18	33
c. British Columbia	7	13
d. Other	<u>9</u>	<u>17</u>
TOTALS	54	100

	Frequency	Percent
30. Sex		
a. Male	276	49
b. Female	<u>291</u>	<u>51</u>
TOTALS	567	100
31. What is your marital status?		
a. Married	473	83
b. Single	54	10
c. Widowed	28	5
d. Divorced	6	1
e. Separated	5	1
f. Not ascertained	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	100
32. What is your occupation?		
a. Proprietary and Managerial	30	5
b. Professional	62	11
c. Clerical	55	10
d. Agricultural	42	7
e. Skilled workers	64	11
f. Sales workers	25	4
g. Students	16	3
h. Service workers	32	8
i. Unskilled workers	50	9
j. Housewives	<u>191</u>	<u>34</u>
TOTALS	567	100
32a. What is your husband's occupation?		
a. Proprietary and Managerial	26	10
b. Professional	31	12
c. Clerical	12	5
d. Agricultural	33	13
e. Skilled workers	69	26
f. Sales workers	31	12
g. Service workers	15	6
h. Unskilled workers	35	13
i. Others	<u>9</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	261	100

	Frequency	Percent
33. What is the highest grade of formal education?		
a. Primary school	41	7
b. Junior high school	121	21
c. Some high school	149	26
d. Some high school plus technical training	30	5
e. High school grads	100	18
f. High school grads plus technical training	37	7
g. Some university	49	9
h. University grads	32	6
i. Post graduate training	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	567	100
34. What is your religious affiliation?		
a. Protestant	293	52
b. Catholic	128	23
c. Sect	22	4
d. No church	<u>124</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTALS	567	101
35. Are you a member of an ethnic or national group?		
a. Yes	48	9
b. No	<u>519</u>	<u>92</u>
TOTALS	567	101
35a. Which national group is that?		
a. European	8	17
b. Other	<u>40</u>	<u>83</u>
TOTALS	48	100
36. Do you speak a second language?		
a. Yes	190	34
b. No	<u>377</u>	<u>66</u>
TOTALS	567	100

	Frequency	Percent
36a. Which language is that?		
a. French	53	28
b. German	38	20
c. Ukrainian	18	9
d. Dutch	15	8
e. Italian	10	5
f. Japanese	6	3
g. Other	27	14
h. Combination	<u>23</u>	<u>12</u>
TOTALS	190	99
37. What is the level of your family income?		
a. 0 - 1,999	23	4
b. 2,000 - 3,999	66	12
c. 4,000 - 5,999	87	15
d. 6,000 - 7,499	104	18
e. 7,500 - 9,999	134	24
f. 10,000 - 14,999	102	18
g. 15,000 - 24,999	25	4
h. Over 25,000	7	1
i. Refused	<u>19</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	567	99
38. What is your age?		
a. 19 - 25 years	61	11
b. 26 - 35 years	126	22
c. 36 - 45 years	135	24
d. 46 - 55 years	110	19
e. 56 - 65 years	50	9
f. Over 65 years	58	10
g. Not ascertained	<u>27</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTALS	567	100
39. Are you a member of a trade union?		
a. Yes	70	12
b. No	<u>497</u>	<u>88</u>
TOTALS	567	100

	Frequency	Percent
40. Is your husband/wife a member of a trade union?		
a. Yes	61	11
b. No	420	74
c. Not ascertained	<u>86</u>	<u>15</u>
TOTALS	567	100
41. Do you belong to any community groups or organizations?		
a. Yes	253	45
b. No	<u>314</u>	<u>55</u>
TOTALS	567	100
41a. Which group are you a member of?		
a. Community	63	25
b. Church	34	13
c. Service group	34	13
d. Cultural	29	11
e. Sport	19	8
f. Social	9	4
g. Combinations	<u>65</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTALS	253	100
42. Do you belong to a national political party?		
a. Yes	31	6
b. No	531	94
c. Refused to answer	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	567	101
42a. To which national party do you belong?		
a. Liberal	9	29
b. Progressive Conservative	19	61
c. New Democratic Party	2	6
d. Refused to answer	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	31	99

	Frequency	Percent
42b. Which political party do you tend to favor nationally?		
a. Liberal	144	27
b. Progressive Conservative	188	35
c. Social Credit	49	9
d. New Democratic Party	35	7
e. None	<u>115</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTALS	531	100
43. Do you belong to a provincial political party?		
a. Yes	39	7
b. No	526	93
c. Not ascertained	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	567	100
43a. To which provincial political party do you belong?		
a. Liberal	6	15
b. Progressive Conservative	16	41
c. Social Credit	14	36
d. New Democratic Party	2	5
e. Not ascertained	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	39	100
43b. Which political party do you tend to favor provincially?		
a. Liberal	57	11
b. Progressive Conservative	112	21
c. Social Credit	221	42
d. New Democratic Party	30	6
e. None	100	19
f. Not ascertained	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	526	100



	Frequency	Percent
44. Why do you favor a different party nationally than provincially?		
a. Social Credit no chance nationally	34	17
b. Good administration record	29	15
c. Leadership	24	12
d. Represents west	22	11
e. Local candidate	10	5
f. National party preferred	9	4
g. Tradition	6	3
h. Other	42	21
i. Not ascertained	<u>22</u>	<u>11</u>
TOTALS	198	100
44a. Why do you favor an alternate party provincially?		
a. Good administration	60	51
b. Leadership	14	12
c. P.C.-Liberal no chance	12	10
d. Provincial party support	6	5
e. Oppose Social Credit	5	4
f. Other	<u>21</u>	<u>18</u>
TOTALS	118	100
45. Did you vote in the 1967 provincial election?		
a. Yes	405	71
b. No	<u>162</u>	<u>29</u>
TOTALS	567	100
45a. For which party did you vote?		
a. Liberal	56	14
b. Progressive Conservative	95	23
c. Social Credit	203	50
d. New Democratic Party	28	7
e. Not ascertained	<u>23</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTALS	405	100

	Frequency	Percent
45b. What were the major reasons you voted for this party?		
a. Administration record	105	26
b. Party platform	60	15
c. Candidate	55	14
d. Leadership	43	11
e. Tradition	30	7
f. Need a change	27	7
g. Anti-party and/or anti-personality	8	2
h. Federal-provincial concerns	3	1
i. Other responses	<u>74</u>	<u>18</u>
TOTALS	405	101
46. Did you vote in the 1968 federal election?		
a. Yes	430	76
b. No	<u>137</u>	<u>24</u>
TOTALS	567	100
46a. For which party did you vote?		
a. Liberal	169	39
b. Progressive Conservative	185	43
c. Social Credit	19	4
d. New Democratic Party	28	7
e. Not ascertained	<u>29</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTALS	430	100
46b. What were the major reasons you voted for this party?		
a. Leadership	122	28
b. Party platform	118	27
c. Candidate	55	13
d. Anti-party and/or anti-personality	30	7
e. Need a change	23	5
f. Tradition	20	5
g. Administration Record	14	3
h. Other responses	<u>48</u>	<u>11</u>
TOTALS	430	99

	Frequency	Percent
47. Is there any provincial political party in Alberta which better represents Albertans?		
a. Yes	296	52
b. No	175	31
c. Not ascertained	<u>96</u>	<u>17</u>
TOTALS	567	100
47a. Which provincial party best represents Albertans?		
a. Social Credit	177	60
b. Progressive Conservative	78	26
c. New Democratic Party	22	7
d. Liberal	<u>19</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTALS	296	99

## APPENDIX D

### OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES

The following are responses solicited from the interviewee where no indication was given as to the expected responses. These respondents are not necessarily typical of the comments coded in any one category, but they do give the reader an idea as to the type of responses obtained and their resulting classification.

OPEN-ENDED RESPONSESQuestion #1

In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing Canada today?

(a) Inflation

1. Inflation! - everything is going up and people like myself on lower incomes find it hard - I think there are more people in the lower income groups now than there ever has been.  
(Housewife - Grade 8 Education)
2. Inflation. High cost of living - you get a raise in pay and most of it goes back into taxes - you can't win. I think the government is going to have to put on some controls of some kind.  
(Housewife - Grade 9 Education)

(b) Canadian Unity

1. The unity of the country - the federal government has made fools of the English people. The French want preference not equality. I'm violently against the present policy of the federal government.  
(Male - Electrician - Grade 12 Education)
2. National unity - finding our identity and not being tied up with bilingualism.  
(Male - Chemical Engineer - B.Sc. Degree)

(c) Wheat Sales

1. Selling grain and helping the farmers in the west.  
(Male - Plumber - Grade 8 Education)
2. Trying to sell wheat - it affects all Canada and the people in the east should know more about it.  
(Male - Elevator Agent - Grade 8 Education)

(d) Housing

1. Housing should have something done about it. I can see why there's a problem - we need more low rentals.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)
2. Housing problem is very serious. Rents are very high.  
(Housewife - Grade 8 Education)

(e) Cost of Living

1. An economic problem of an unequal rising of costs. There seemed to be more of a parody years back when the average wage earner's buying power was in a better position to procure the basic necessities such as housing.  
(Male - Salesman - Grade 11 Education)
2. Cost of living is too high. The government should do something to level things off. The government should put some kind of control on goods and wages.  
(Male - Bus Driver - Grade 10 Education)

(f) Separatism

1. Separatism - the west and east should stay together and not separate.  
(Male - Geologist - B.A. Degree)
2. The problems of separatism - the whole idea of whether Canada should or shouldn't be one nation.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)

(g) Drug Abuse

1. Narcotics. They should be more strictly controlled. I am sure they could stop this garbage coming into Canada.  
(Female - Dress Shop Manageress - Grade 10 Education)

2. Drugs. As far as I'm concerned too many children 14 and up are involved in this problem and parents should not be so reluctant to admit their children are taking drugs.  
(Female - Nurse - R.N. Degree)

(h) Social Inequalities

1. Prejudice - people think there isn't any in Canada, but this is not so. Race and religion are the first questions asked when applying for a job - capabilities are not first considerations as it should be.  
(Male - Laborer - Grade 9 Education)
2. The Indians. They don't have the breaks that we have. They can't vote or anything and the places they live in are like slums.  
(Female - Bank Clerk - Grade 12 Education)

(i) High Taxes

1. The high cost of living. Taxes, not taxing the right people - the middle income people are being taxed too heavily and they should catch higher income industry and business.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. The question of money - economics, taxation problem, the white paper - they are going to stifle business. They are obviously taxing in such a way that it will be virtually impossible to make money - bad for people starting business. Becoming too welfare minded.  
(Housewife - Some University Education)

(j) Pollution

1. The sad state of the rivers and the lack of control over industry.  
(Male - Correctional Officer - Grade 10 Education)
2. Water pollution.  
(Female - Hairdresser - Grade 11 Education)

(k) Crime/Juvenile Delinquency

1. Teenage boys taking drugs and getting drunk. Prisons don't do any good. I think they should have stiffer sentences and teach them a trade or something while they are in prison.  
(Housewife - Grade 6 Education)
2. Sentences in relation to the crime committed have no bearing on the criminal code. They are becoming lighter all the time.  
(Male - Electrical Contractor - Grade 11 Education)

(l) Education

1. Education. They've changed the system so much that parents can't help children. It should be standardized across Canada.  
(Female - Saleslady - Grade 9 Education)
2. Education. The way it is being handled - students should not be allowed to protest on campus - they should be treated like anyone else when destroying public property.  
(Male - Teacher - B.Sc. Degree)

(m) Unemployment

1. I'm in construction and there is going to be a lot of unemployment before too long because of the lack of money for building.  
(Male - Construction Supervisor - Grade 10 Education)
2. In my trade there is a problem of being unemployed after Christmas. I think something should be done instead of the "do it now" campaign.  
(Male - Painter - Grade 11 Education)

(n) Other Problems

1. Leadership. Not enough choice when it comes to voting. If you haven't enough money you don't get in as a leader.  
(Male - C.N.R. Car Inspector - Grade 9 Education)



2. Trying to find a place in the world food markets and finding a place in the world powers - gaining a separate identity of our own and a say in keeping peace.  
(Housewife - Some University Education)
3. Gullible as Canadians - immigration - we let too many of a race in and pretty soon they form their own communities and keep their own culture.  
(Female - Secretary - Grade 11 Education)
4. Too big a spread between wages. The cost of living is the same for everyone but some people get \$1.75 per hour for the same thing people in another province get \$2.50 per hour for. The powerful unions have people who set their own wages. Poor people have no say.  
(Male - Life Underwriter - Grade 12 Education)
5. I think the young people up to the age of 30 should not be taxed on income especially in the lower income groups otherwise they can't get started.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)

Question #2

What do you think is the major problem facing Alberta?

(a) Wheat Sales

1. Farmers in Alberta work hard and don't know if they can sell products. They need such a large investment in machinery and land and the profits are small.  
(Female - Teacher - Some University Education)
2. I think probably wheat sales should be governed by Alberta rather than the Dominion.  
(Male - Telephone Technician - Grade 10 Education)

(b) No Problems

1. I don't think there is much wrong with Alberta.  
(Male - Auto Mechanic - Technical Training)
2. I don't think we have any major problems. We have had a good government over the years and I think we still have.  
(Female - Cook - Grade 8 Education)

(c) Inflation

1. The price of everything in Alberta.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)
2. Cost of living is too high.  
(Housewife - R.N. Degree)

(d) Housing

1. Housing - I think the monthly payments are too high. People can get the down payment down to a reasonable amount but the lower the down payment, the higher the monthly payments.  
(Female - Lab Technician - Grade 12 Education  
and Technical Training)

2. Housing - the prices are so high the young can't buy a home and there are not many at a reasonable price.  
(Hous wife - Grade 12 Education)

(e) Educational Costs

1. We need a more equitable method of spreading education costs.  
(Hous wife - Grade 11 Education)
2. The spiralling cost of education.  
(Female - Sales Clerk - Grade 11 Education)

(f) Natural Resources

1. Protection of our own natural resources is a problem. We need foreign investment but if we are not careful, they will milk us dry.  
(Male - Aircraft Engineer - Grade 10 Education)
2. Oil finds in Alaska - that could take away some of our American markets and that would affect Alberta's economy drastically.  
(Female - Nurse - R.N. Degree)

(g) Social Inequalities

1. Indians - problems involved with integration - help them become first class citizens.  
(Housewife - B.Sc. in Nursing)
2. Indians have been kept down and should be given a fair chance.  
(Housewife - Grade 5 Education)

(h) Medicare

1. Medicare - cost is far too high for coverage. There is a waste of money for administration of the scheme.  
(Female - Nurse - R.N. Degree)

2. I don't like the health plan. The employer should deduct it at work so you don't have to take it out of your own pocket.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)

(i) Pollution

1. Pollution - water and air. I don't think the provincial government is looking after this properly even though they are aware of the situation.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. Air pollution - the provincial government is afraid to limit oil companies who are polluting the air in the Pincher Creek area - B.A. Shell, etc. Politicians are concerned about themselves not about getting something done. The oil companies are too powerful in Alberta and the governments are afraid to do anything.  
(Male - Farmer - Some University)

(j) Welfare Services

1. All rules come from the federal government. Finances and welfare systems are really bad - welfare has got to be restricted for only those who need it - get rid of those who don't need help.  
(Male - Laborer - Grade 9 Education)
2. Not enough investigation into welfare at present. Over radio and T.V. citizens are asked to report infractions, and when I did this I was told to mind my own business.  
(Male - Laborer - Grade 9 Education)

(k) Unemployment

1. Lack of employment in lower income brackets.  
(Female - Hairdresser - Grade 11 Education)
2. Labor - not enough opportunities for the younger generation.  
(Male - Auto Mechanic - Grade 8 Education)

(1) Drug Abuse

1. These drugs that are going on. It's going to be tough on them in later years. I don't know why they have to take them.  
(Male - Butcher - Grade 7 Education)
2. Drugs - so many accidents caused by drugs and drinking.  
(Female - Bookkeeper - Grade 11 Education)

(m) Other Problems

1. Strom says that we in the west are too far away from Ottawa and they are more or less dictating to the west and we are being run by the east. Cooperation by the federal government is the only answer to helping th. west.  
(Male - Proprietor - Grade 12 Education)
2. The opposition in the government of Alberta is inadequate.  
(Male - Student - Grade 12 Education)
3. Americans - by the influx of Americans our prices are going sky high. If Alberta is your home, employment opportunities here should be for qualified Albertans first.  
(Female - Secretary - Grade 11 Education)
4. Wages must be put in control. There is too big a speaad between minimum and maximum wages. The government will have to step in soon.  
(Male - Life Underwriter - Grade 12 Education)
5. Right to see Sunday movies and this sort of stuff - nothing happens here on a Sunday - everything closes down - need more action on Sunday activiies.  
(Male - Student - Grade 12 Education)

Question #3a

Why do you think the Canadian constitution should be changed?

(a) Constitution Needs Updating

1. Get rid of some of this old English law from away back and there is one law for the rich and one law for the poor. This should be changed. The law for Indians should be made fairer.  
(Male - Electrician - Grade 11 Education)
2. The B.N.A. Act was suited to economic conditions of many years ago and does not fit in today.  
(Male - Farmer - Grade 8 Education)

(b) Do Away with Monarchy

1. I think the Act needs to be clarified so that all responsibility rests in Canada - and we should not have to consult Westminster for anything.  
(Female - Teacher - B.A. Degree)
2. We should declare full independence from England.  
(Male - Laborer - Grade 9 Education)

(c) Other Reasons

1. Areas of education, welfare and health have to be funded locally - more local control - new tax powers have to be given to provinces - decentralized administration as much as possible.  
(Male - Druggist - Ph.D. Degree)
2. I think the whole Act should be applied to the federal field. I'm for the English language and think there should be one language only so this should be changed.  
(Male - Power Engineer - Some University Education)

3. The country is in a state of provincial and federal bickering - evident with Quebec and other provinces. There must be clear definitions given as to what fields belong to which level of government.  
(Housewife - Some niversity Education)
4. It should be more in line with the American constitution. We have freedom but the people should have more say.  
(Housewife - Some University Education)
5. More definition needed between federal and provincial powers.  
(Male - Agriculture Department Employee - B.Sc. Degree)

Question #3b

Why don't you think the Canadian constitution should be changed?

(a) Constitution Adequate

1. Satisfactory the way it is - more democratic the way it is.  
(Male - Proprietor - Grade 12 Education)
2. It has been this way for years and we've been successful - why change it now?  
(Male - Salesman - Grade 9 Education)

(b) Good Constitution

1. Because they are on the right road - just a little more stress needed on some of the rules.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)
2. Should stay the way it is. There is nothing wrong with it.  
(Housewife - Grade 9 Education).

(c) Anti-French Canadian

1. I think the only reason for this question is Quebec. We seem to have got along well with this Quebec business.  
(Male - Store Supervisor - Grade 12 Education)
2. If the Constitution was changed now it would be more in favor of Quebec than the rest of Canada.  
(Male - Firefighter - Grade 12 Education)

(d) Other Reasons

1. I do not feel that there is a necessity to change the constitution. I believe the problems can be solved through arrangements between the provinces and the central government.  
(Male - Accountant - C.A. Degree)



Question #7a

Why does it make a difference to you which level of government provides the necessary governmental services?

(a) Proximity of Provincial Government

1. I'd sooner see things handled by the province as we're closer to them. There would be much less to go through and it's impossible to negotiate with the federal government.  
(Male - Manager - Grade 12 Education)
2. I think the provincial government can better look after certain matters but they don't get the funds - for instance, medicare. The federal government should give them more help.  
(Housewife - Grade 13 Education)

(b) Division of Powers

1. Matters because some concerns should be solely provincial while other matters should be in federal hands.  
(Male - High School Principal - B.A. Degree)
2. Country is too big to have a completely central form of government; it needs to be more than one unit. This problem is growing fairly important.  
(Male - Lawyer - LL.B.)

(c) Provincial Government has Good Administration

1. A lot of things could be handled more effectively by the provincial government - for instance if the provincial government had more say in the matter of grain it would be better for the farmer.  
(Male - Clerk - Grade 12 Education)
2. Provincial government should be able to look after the responsibilities better.  
(Female - Cosmetician - Grade 12 Education)

(d) More Federal Control Needed

1. I would like to see the federal government look after the major problems, things like education.  
(Male - Second year university student)
2. Ottawa is better equipped in some instances to do the job - say in road construction.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)

(e) Medicare Provincial Concern:

1. As with medicare, I would prefer the provincial government look after it provided the finances are there.  
(Male - Geologist - B.Sc. Degree)
2. For instance, the medical care we had was much better than it is now. It should have been made a must.  
(Housewife - Grade 8 Education)

(f) Other Reasons

1. Each province should look after their own people and Ottawa should give them the money.  
(Male - Retired Farmer - Grade 1 Education)
2. Provincial affairs should be restricted to the provincial government and international affairs left to the federal government.  
(Male - Controller - Grade 12 Education)
3. If Ottawa controls the lot, then there will be less attention for Alberta. The provinces should have some control.  
(Male - Motor Mechanic - Grade 12 Education)
4. Should be done in one place, less people employed, less taxpayers money spent.  
(Male - Letter Carrier - Grade 11 Education)
5. A lot of red tape could be cut if we didn't have to go to Ottawa.  
(Female - Clerk - Grade 12 Education)

Question #7b

Why doesn't it make any difference to you which level of government provides the necessary governmental services?

(a) Services Provided No Matter Which Government Has Power

1. So long as they're provided I don't care which government provides them.  
(Housewife - Grade 9 Education)
2. Each province is represented in the government anyway; they all have a vote.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)

(b) Equal Services Advocated

1. Things like welfare are jointly done and the province provides guidance.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. Both governments work together so it doesn't matter which one handles things as long as they get done.  
(Male - Safety Supervisor - Grade 12 Education)

(c) Federal Government Dominant

1. The federal government has the say anyway - so what's the difference who looks after it.  
(Male - Lift Truck Operator - Grade 11 Education)

(d) Other Reasons

1. Same red tape no matter which government is involved.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)

2. Powers are assigned properly now.  
(Housewife - Grade 9 Education)
3. The only purpose of government is to  
enforce laws concerning individual  
rights.  
(Male - Laborer - Grade 12 & Technical Training)

Question #12a

Why do you feel a committee on the constitution should discuss the possibility of Alberta separating from the rest of Canada.

(a) Potential Should Be Explored

1. It should be discussed although it is not feasible.  
(Male - Elevator Agent - Grade 8 Education)
2. A bigger area would be better, so I think they should discuss joining with other provinces.  
(Male - Policeman - Grade 12 Education)

(b) Other Reasons

1. As far as the farmers are concerned it might be a good idea.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)
2. Federal government is taking too much money out of the provinces without building up the provinces after.  
(Male - Accountant - Some University Education)
3. Maybe they are going to do something - maybe something good will come of it.  
(Housewife - No Education)
4. Would prefer to see the federal government assume responsibility if separation occurred.  
(Female - Hairdresser - Grade 11 Education)
5. We should keep aware of Alberta's potential as a self-sustaining region.  
(Female - Secretary - Grade 12 Education)

Question #12b

Why do you feel that the committee on the constitution should not discuss the possibility of Alberta separating from the rest of Canada?

(a) Canadian Identity

1. Because I think our energies should be toward a strong united Canada.  
(Male - NAIT Section Head - Grade 11 Education)
2. That's all it would be is talk. A few people can't change something like this, people would like to be with the States but this will never happen. We are a province and belong to a Dominion.  
(Male - Farmer - Grade 12 Education)

(b) Alberta Too Small

1. Wouldn't be possible for Alberta to exist. Couldn't see a lot of people being paid to sit around and discuss that when there are so many other things to be done.  
(Male - Student - Some University Education)
2. Alberta isn't big enough to go it alone.  
(Male - Civil Servant, Photographer - Grade 11 Education)

(c) No Advantage in Separating

1. We couldn't survive economically. It would be a schemozzle.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. We are not mature enough. We would be having the same problems that Quebec is having now.  
(Male - Shipper - Grade 10 Education)

(d) Cultural Advantages

1. I don't think it is populated well enough. I don't think there are enough people to live alone.  
(Male - Retired - Grade 8 Education)
2. I feel that each province contributes to Canada and receives concessions as being part of the nation.  
(Male - Appliance Repairman - Grade 12 Education)

(e) Against Separatism Generally

1. Because it is part of the nation and should remain that way. Many disadvantages - could not survive alone. I would like to see Canada join the U.S.A.  
(Male - Teacher - B.Sc. Degree)
2. That's separatism and I don't think they should break away.  
(Male - Seismic Shooter - Grade 9 Education)

(f) Status Quo

1. The units as set up are administratively possible. The west should work more on regional influence. Problems can be presented better in loose cooperation. Maintain status quo.  
(Male - Teacher - University Education)
2. I think the provinces are very well as they are. Look after their own and get their guidance from Ottawa. That is why we have progress.  
(Housewife - Grade 9 Education)

(g) Other Reasons

1. If ever there was a dictatorship, it's the Alberta government. They will not make the necessary changes to provide representation by population and until they do there is no way it's going to be anything but a dictatorship.  
(Male - Insurance Agent - Grade 13 Education)

2. Be sort of squeezed in like a European country.  
I don't think it would be advantageous in any way  
to do that.  
(Female - Seamstress - Grade 12 Education plus  
Technical Training)
3. I see no particular problem that might require  
discussions regarding separatism.  
(Male - Foreman - Grade 11 Education)
4. I would not want them to be separated from the  
east but I would like to see the western provinces  
amalgamated.  
(Male - Clerk - Grade 10 Education)
5. There is a benefit to being united and large - travel  
freely and share resources.  
(Male - Mechanic - Grade 8 Education)



Question #44a

Why do you favor a different party nationally than provincially?

(a) Social Credit No Chance Nationally

1. I would go Social Credit nationally if there was a stronger national party across Canada.  
(Male - Plumber - Grade 8 Education)
2. Social Credit is good for Alberta but not strong enough for handling western matters in Ottawa.  
(Male - Retired Farmer - Grade 9 Education)

(b) Good Administration Record

1. The Progressive Conservatives have done a good job federally.  
(Male - Farmer - Grade 12 Education)
2. Mr. Diefenbaker helped western farmers and there was less compulsory things like there is now.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)

(c) Leadership

1. Probably because of the leaders. We felt the Liberals are better with Trudeau.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. I think John Diefenbaker had a lot to do with it. I took no interest in politics until Diefenbaker got in.  
(Male - Construction Superintendent - Grade 10 Education)

(d) Represents West

1. The Progressive Conservatives are a federal booster for the west.  
(Male - Drilling Superintendent - Grade 12 Education)

2. The Progressive Conservatives gave western Canadians more recognition.  
(Male - Production Clerk - Grade 12 Education)

(e) Local Candidate

1. I vote on the man running in my constituency.  
(Housewife - Grade 10 Education)
2. I vote depending on the individual candidate.  
(Male - Gas Agent - Grade 11 Education)

(f) National Party Preferred

1. Because I like the Liberals nationally and like the Social Credit in the province.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. Since the time of the forming of Canada, Sir John A. MacDonald was a Progressive Conservative. I would say they have the experience of governing our country. Only two parties capable of doing it - the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals and I prefer the Progressive Conservatives.  
(Male - Power Engineer - Some University Education)

(g) Tradition

1. It is a tradition in the family. Also it is not the party - it's the man.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. It is a tradition and they have done a good job.  
(Housewife - R.N. Degree)

(h) Other Reasons

1. I think the Progressive Conservatives are doing more than the Liberals.  
(Male - Nursing Orderly - Grade 12 Education)

2. Right now I feel the Progressive Conservatives can carry an election federally and that's why I favor them nationally.  
(Female - Seamstress - Grade 9 Education plus Technical Training)
3. Basically it's the same system - the Liberals federally and the Social Credit provincially.  
(Female - Sales Clerk - Grade 12 Education)
4. We thought we needed a change federally.  
(Housewife - R.N. Degree)
5. With the Liberal governemnt we always get along better in foreign affairs and with the U.S.A.  
(Male - Oil Valve Repairman - Grade 7 Education)

Question #44b

Why do you favor a different party provincially than nationally?

(a) Good Administration

1. Social Credit represents the people of Alberta and their record over the years has been one of good management and integrity.  
(Male - Engineer - B.A. and B.Sc. Degrees)
2. Favor Social Credit provincially on the basis of their past performances.  
(Male - Fireman - Grade 12 Education)

(b) Leadership

1. I feel Mr. Manning was a fine person and believed him to be ethical and moral.  
(Male - Geologist - B.Sc. Degree)
2. Provincially, it's the leader of the party. The Social Credit has done a lot.  
(Female - Bankteller - Grade 12 Education)

(c) Progressive Conservatives - Liberals No Chance

1. I pretty well agree with Social Credit. Liberals have no platform provincially.  
(Male - Postal Worker - Grade 10 Education)
2. The Progressive Conservatives have no way of getting in provincially although they have done a good job nationally.  
(Male - Farmer - Grade 12 Education)

(d) Provincial Party Support

1. Social Credit was a good government for Alberta.  
(Male - Auto Body Mechanic - Grade 11 Education plus Technical Training)

2. Social Credit is better for the province.  
(Housewife - Some University Education)

(e) Oppose Social Credit

1. We have a Social Credit in the Dominion government and he hasn't done anything.  
(Male - Retired Rancher - Grade 12 Education)
2. No use voting Social Credit. They can't do anything anyway.  
(Housewife - Grade 10 Education)

(f) Other Reasons

1. Social Credit are better in the province. The national and provincial parties should be different as opposition is needed between the two, otherwise everyone would have to be nice to everyone else and nothing would get done.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)
2. I thought I might as well try them out. The N.D.P. say they can do so much.  
(Male - Retired Farmer - Grade 1 Education)
3. I don't really think the Liberal policies would work provincially.  
(Male - Student - B.A. Degree)
4. Social Credit is too radical to be federal.  
(Male - Steam Cleaner Superintendent - Some University Education)
5. I believe it is better of have a different party provincially than federally.  
(Male - Pharmacologist - Ph.D. Degree)

Question #45b.

What were the major reasons you favored this party in the 1967 provincial election?

(a) Administration Record

1. The Social Crediters pulled Alberta up out of the slump in the 30's and rebuilt Alberta.  
(Housewife - Grade 9 Education)
2. I like the record and the leadership. There is no opposition which I consider to be satisfactory as an alternate.  
(Male - Petroleum Engineer - B.Sc. Degree)

(b) Party Platform

1. I am for the medicare program and auto insurance program that they have as their policies. They also favor the working class.  
(Male - C.P.R. Conductor - Grade 11 Education)
2. Social Credit promised to help the laborers.  
(Female - Nursing Attendant - Grade 8 Education)

(c) Candidate

1. I liked the man that ran in this area - Don Getty.  
(Male - Estimator - Grade 12 Education)
2. Mainly because of the local representative - a good man.  
(Male - Engineer - B.A. and B.Sc. Degrees)

(d) Leadership

1. I see Peter Lougheed as a strong leader who will make better terms for Alberta in Ottawa.  
(Housewife - Grade 9 Education)

2. Mr. Manning is very conscientious. He had the confidence of the people.  
(Male - Laborer - Grade 9 Education)

(e) Tradition

1. Brought up to vote that way - no other reason.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. It's family tradition.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)

(f) Need a Change

1. I think we need a change. I'm tired of Social Credit.  
(Male - Farmer - Grade 12 Education)
2. I feel that they could do a better job of governing the provinces and besides that, Alberta is ready for a change.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)

(g) Anti-Party and/or Anti-Personality

1. I am against the Social Credit. They have too much power.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. I have no confidence in Manning.  
(Male - Trucking Farm General Manager - Grade 12 Education)

(h) Federal-Provincial Concerns

1. The Progressive Conservatives have done more for Alberta and western Canada - creating jobs, trying to better the provinces.  
(Male - Machine Operator - Grade 11 Education)
2. They have done a lot for the province. Proof of what they have done is all around us - beautiful roads and old folks homes.  
(Housewife - Grade 8 Education)

(1) Other Reasons

1. I like to be with the winner and Social Credit has always been a winner.  
(Male - Clerk - Grade 10 Education)
2. To provide a stronger opposition to the Social Credit.  
(Male - Teacher - Some University)
3. I chose Social Credit for personal reasons.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)
4. You need opposition in democracy. They all make mistakes.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
5. Just the fact that I voted Liberal in the federal election. Not really interested.  
(Housewife - Grade 8 Education)



Question #46b.

What were the major reasons you voted for this party in the 1968 federal election?

(a) Leadership

1. Mr. Trudeau is a very intelligent man and I feel he had more of a chance to keep Canada united.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)
2. I liked Mr. Trudeau's personality. Mr. Stanfield didn't seem dynamic.  
(Male - Mechanic - Grade 8 Education plus Technical Training)

(b) Party Platform

1. I voted because of the medicare program and auto insurance, and they are for the working man.  
(Male - C.P.R. Conductor - Grade 11 Education)
2. I thought they would give us farmers a better chance to sell our grain.  
(Male - Farmer - Grade 6 Education)

(c) Candidate

1. I voted for the candidate because of his stand on the pipeline issue.  
(Housewife - Grade 9 Education)
2. I thought Mahoney was going to be a good man, but I've since changed my mind.  
(Housewife - Grade 11 Education)

(d) Anti-Party and/or Anti-Personality

1. The Liberals seemed eastern oriented, and big business was too involved with the Liberals. I don't like Mr. Trudeau.  
(Housewife - Some University Education)

2. I did not like Trudeau and his ideas like pushing the flag issue and bilingualism.  
(Male - Railroad Yardman - Grade 9 Education)

(e) Need A Change

1. I wanted a change in government and I did not like Trudeau.  
(Housewife - Grade 10 Education)
2. Everybody thinks it will be different and we're due for a change.  
(Housewife - No Education)

(f) Tradition

1. I vote traditionally for Progressive Conservative. Always have - especially for Diefenbaker.  
(Male - Farmer - Grade 3 Education)
2. Mine is a traditional way of voting.  
(Male - Minister - B.A. and D.D. Degrees)

(g) Administration Record

1. Past performance shows they are more likely to get something done. Example - St. Lawrence Seaway.  
(Male - Chemical Supervisor - Grade 12 Education)
2. Good government record.  
(Female - Waitress - Grade 10 Education)

(h) Other Reasons

1. My union supports N.D.P.  
(Male - Electrician - Grade 11 Education plus  
Technical Training)
2. I just wanted to show my opinion that a Social Credit government should be in power.  
(Male - Farmer - Grade 10 Education)

3. I believe Social Credit is more humanitarian.  
(Housewife - Grade 10 Education)
4. Mr. Trudeau came west to talk to us and that's  
cheaper than a Royal Commission.  
(Male - Farmer - Grade 9 Education)
5. They stay out of other countries' business -  
wars and troubles.  
(Housewife - Grade 12 Education)

**END OF  
REEL**