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LANGUAGE AND THE EMERGENCE OF SELF:

TOWARD A THEORY OF

HUMAN PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

by

Ⓒ CHRISTOPHER A. ROBERTS

A THESIS

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TO

Dr. Douglass B. Roberts

-- scholar, father and friend --

ABSTRACT

The human situation may be viewed as encompassing a number of themes which play strongly in the quality of life for man and society. From a psychological perspective, those of socialization and development dominate. The structuring of man's personality, the quality of his relatedness-in-the-world, emanates from the interplay of these two themes bound together by his most distinctive process: language. The purpose of this study is to present an original model of personality development and modes of human existence, based on the changing nature and role of language across the life span.

In the present conceptualization, personality is seen as developing through a possible six levels, each distinguished by a qualitatively different role of language in the regulation of behaviour and emergence of self. Language is seen to shift from that of a means to differentiate aspects of the world, to becoming increasingly involved in the regulation of behaviour and determination of life's motives. At the highest levels of personality development, language is seen to embody the person's existential meanings, paradoxically leading to the silence which resolves the tension between the individual and society. From this perspective the six levels are developmentally successive, and the focus of the present study is to propose a language-action taxonomy of human development.

The levels are, however, not restricted to being suc- cessive; individuals may "regress" to lower levels. Depending on the situation, these regressions may be momentary or fairly enduring, as in brief bursts of anger or chronic depression. Furthermore, not all individuals develop a high degree of self-regulation, spending the majority of their lives acting according to the external values and expectations of society. Such acceptance of conventional meanings is seen as distinguished from a style of related- ness which, by being proactive and creative, is more auto- nomous and authentic. The critical difference is related to the degree of linguistically based self-emergence and self-regulation. A second perspective on personality is therefore proposed, whereby the six developmental levels are discussed in terms of corresponding modes of existence. That is, six modes of existence, each defined in terms of the language-action relationship, are viewed as necessary to account for the wide situational variability of human behaviour.

The six levels of personality development, and six modes of existence, are theoretical conceptualizations based on the view that language is important and central for un- derstanding persons and their actions. A final section of the present study discusses possible implications, both in terms of research and clinical application, for further study into the relationship between language, the emergence of self, and the development and actualization of

personality as a quality of relatedness-in-the-world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The universe is vast. Nothing is more curious
than the self-satisfied dogmatism with which
mankind at each period of its history cherishes
the delusion of the finality of its existing
modes of knowledge....Advance in detail is ad-
mitted; fundamental novelty is barred. This
dogmatic common sense is the death of philosophic
adventure. The universe is vast.

--Alfred North Whitehead--

Over the past five years, I have had the good for-
tune and pleasure of working with a number of individu-
als who, through their own actions, have reflected what
I feel Whitehead valued so highly: an openness to the
many possibilities of understanding human nature and
existence. As we know from experience, a graduate pro-
gram abounds with hoops, hurdles and deadlines. But
there can also be dreams, excitement and a little bit
of magic. It has been these latter aspects which my
committee and others have helped me enjoy and value.

Drs. McFetridge and Schmidt have worked with me
since I first proposed the present study, constantly
offering encouragement, valuable suggestions and con-
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Dr. William Hague has always been a special person. Even before I was a registered student, Bill gave freely of his time to discuss my ideas and, while we now joke about some of those "hair-brained" schemes, we also realize that many of those early thoughts have led to the theory presented in this thesis. Throughout the past five years, Bill has given me the freedom to think and create. He never forced a point of view of his own, but rather supported my own evolution of ideas and perspectives. For this I not only thank him, but respect him deeply for his unselfishness.

Many others have played important roles in the process of my education. I am saddened by the fact that Dr. Metro Gulutsan, an original member of my committee, died before the thesis was completed. Metro introduced me to the philosophy of Cassirer and, in many respects, the awareness that the issue of personality is approachable from many perspectives. Dr. Bruce Bain was instrumental in stimulating my thoughts about the possibilities of language, as well as providing generous amounts of time for discussion.

As the universe is vast, so too is the circle of friends and family who have been important to me in the past five years. A dissertation, like so many of life's

projects, has its lonely moments. Yet, even in lone-
liness, these people have been near, and I am grateful
for their continued support. I hope that they all, in
some small way at least, can share with me this moment
of completion which is, itself, a moment of beginning.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction

The advance of knowledge is often the result of vigourous debate between proponents of oppositional theoretical perspectives. In the field of psychology, major advances have sometimes been made as a result of very clear theroetical juxtapositions, such as in the case of the nature-nurture controversy. At other times, debate has occurred where theoretical positions are so numerous as to preclude the possibility of a compromise in terms of an interaction effect between two major factors. This is particularly evident in the field of personality psychology where theories abound, many with radically opposed presuppositions on the nature of man. The general purpose of the present study is to address this basic state of theoretical opposition within the psychological study of human beings and their development of personality. Specifically, the objective is to present an original theoretical perspective on human development and existence which, rather than directly competing with any given theory of personality, synthesizes several major perspectives by establishing a common unifying bond between them.

The following chapters will attempt to define a single continuum upon which it will be possible to view human personality development as hierarchically sequenced

1.

while, at the same time, accounting for a broad range of possibilities for human action and existence. The continuum, or unifying bond, is represented by man's unique ability to symbolize, to form and transform his world-view based on the experiences of himself and others. Through a comprehensive consideration of the nature, process and functions of human language, a framework for the emergence of self and the structuring of human modes of existence is developed.

At first glance, the statements above may indicate, to the reader that the present study will only add to the confusion in personality psychology rather than contributing to the positive advance of knowledge. In one sense, such a concern is valid since the present study is clearly intended to present a theoretical perpective on the development, and existence, of human beings. A very important point requires immediate attention, therefore, in order that the present conceptualization may be viewed as a distinctly·fresh perspective. This initial point has to do with perhaps the most fundamental theoretical issue in psychology; whether man is an active agent in his own development and behaviour, or whether he is essentially a passive reactor, to forces which determine his nature for him.

Allport (1955) refers to this fundamental issue as reflecting a basic polarity between Lockean (passive) and

Leibnitzian (active) traditions of mind and the nature of man. Of course, this basic polarity could be expanded to include, for example, modern day empiricism and the natural science perspective as juxtaposed to the process views of modern physics and Eastern transcendental psychologies. Regardless of how finely one chooses to subordinate schools of thought within the context of this basic polarity, the issue remains that psychology is faced by an apparently unresolvable debate.

One reason why the debate seems unresolvable is that the evidence for each perspective is logically consistent within the paradigm of that perspective, and equal evidence can often be put forth to support radically opposed theoretical views. For example, the amount of literature resulting from studies aimed at "settling" the nature-nurture controversy, or the debate between continuity and discontinuity supporters should provide ample evidence that the validity of any single position is, at best, a function of the perspective taken by the observer. This is reminiscent of the situation within which physics found itself at the turn of the century, where there was major confusion and disagreement regarding the nature of light. Zukav (1979) speaks of this example, and it is presented here to illustrate the possible implications of a fresh perspective on an apparent fundamental incongruity.

In 1905, light had been interpreted as either wave phenomenon or a particle phenomenon, but not both simultaneously since the two represented mutually exclusive, or complementary, aspects. In that there was strong evidence to support either wave theory or particle theory, physics was faced with a significant inconsistency. In proposing his light-as-a-particle thesis, Einstein admittedly could not refute the wave theory so he merely accepted the apparent contradiction as something which would be understood at a later date. As the history of modern physics has shown, the particle-wave duality of light was eventually accepted and, as a result, quantum mechanics emerged. The point is that rather than confusing the issue, the acceptance of a fundamental paradox, or inconsistency, resulted in a fresh perspective and further advances in the body of knowledge.

Man-as-free and man-as-determined may be seen as mutually exclusive and mutually inconsistent views of human nature. Yet the suggestion is being made that we accept the validity of each position and, rather than attempt to prove one or the other true (or false), we search for a framework by which we can understand human nature from either perspective. The current confusion of psychology is not seen so much in terms of the variety of theoretical perspectives, but rather the lack of a unifying bond between them. Rather than arguing, for example, whether or

not man has freedom of choice, the following study accepts
both possibilities as valid aspects of human development
and existence. Furthermore, the present study attempts
to explicate a framework upon which to ascertain at what
level of development, or mode of existence (free or de-
termined in this example), a person is acting.

The present study suggests that a major limitation
of existing psychological theories is that they view hu-
man nature uni-dimensionally, as being either free or
determined. They take, as it were, a monocular view of
any given action and interpret that action within the uni-
dimensional framework of their theory. In one sense, such
an approach is essential in order to maintain the theory's
internal consistency, but we must remind ourselves that
internal consistency is relative, being a function of the
presuppositions of the theory itself. It would be illogi-
cal and self-defeating for behaviourism, to cite a spe-
cific example, to view a given action binocularly since
it is a uni-demensional theory, based on the assumption
that all behaviour is determined by environmental contin-
gencies. The limitations of any uni-dimensional theory of
man become apparent when external consistency is tested,
such as when behaviourism and psychoanalysis are compared
on their interpretation of a given behaviour. Again, the
point being made is that while the two interpretations
would be inconsistent with each other, each theory's

interpretation would be internally consistent with its own presuppositions and basic paradigm.

The struggle in which psychology often finds itself engaged is the attempted resolution as to which theoretical position is "true", or at least "more valid". The present study is not intended to introduce a true, or more valid, perspective on the actions of human beings. The present study, by accepting a fundamental inconsistency, attempts to provide a multi-dimensional view on human action and behaviour. The fundamental inconsistency is that human nature, and therefore behaviour, is both free and determined, dependent upon the person's level of development and their existential situation. In other words, the present multi-dimensional perspective hypothesizes that persons may develop the capacity to make free choices, but that they do not always exercise this ability.

The framework upon which the following study attempts to establish this hypothesis is based on the unique phenomenon of human language for, as Murray (1972-1974) points out, "Like air itself, it (language) permeates every nook and cranny of existence" (p. 473). The framework of language is further viewed to represent a continnum, from the infant's "preverbal silence". to the development of self-regulative language by the individual, and to the paradoxical "trans-verbal silence" language leads to as we become lost for words in our more mystical or

transcendental experiences. The central thesis of the present study is that, by forming a perspective on human action based on the phenomenon of language, we will then be able to recognize a minimum of six specific levels of personality development and six corresponding modes of human existence.

The important point to be made is that some of these levels and modes are seen to reflect a determined human nature, while others reflect a human nature which is essentially self-determined. That is, the nature of man is seen to change from free to determined and vice-versa, both from a developmental as well as an existential perspective. The "truth" value of any uni-dimensional theory of human nature will therefore depend on, and be limited by, the level of development and mode of existence represented by a particular behaviour of an individual. Furthermore, the key to the analysis of any given behaviour is the careful observation of the nature and role of the individual's language as it relates to the identified behaviour.

An Introductory Overview

The chapters which follow attempt to bring forth specific arguments and assumptions pertinent to the central thesis presented above. As language is being suggested as the unifying bond between the multiple dimensions of human nature and behaviour, the first task is

to establish a conceptual framework from which to view the importance of language in human existence. Chapter II therefore presents a framework, not only in terms of the central importance of language in human existence, but also in terms of man's multi-dimensional nature. The work of Cassirer, who defines man as _animal symbolicum_ (Cassirer, 1944), is emphasized in stressing the importance of language, while the process philosophy of Whitehead is cited to illustrate the possibility of a multi-dimensional nature of man.

Once a framework for the importance of language in a consideration of human behaviour and existence has been established, Chapter III then defines language more specifically. The chapter first deals with the _nature_ of language, presenting three basic theoretical positions: language as verbal behaviour; language as a generative grammar; and language as a world-view. The attempt is made to demonstrate that language itself is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, requiring a broad definition from several perspectives.

Within this section on the nature of language, an extended discussion of Skinner's (1957, 1974) theory of language-as-verbal-behaviour is presented, not to totally refute or accept his view, but rather to suggest how his uni-dimensional theory of language (and man) is compatible with a multi-dimensional theory such as the one being

developed in the present study. The extended discussion
is necessary so that a clear understanding and apprecia-
tion of a fundamental paradox of language and human be-
haviour is possible. This paradox, which is discussed
earlier (in Chapter II), is that language is not only a
powerful means by which man creates his own experiences,
but that it is also a powerful force which controls and
directs the behaviour of man. Skinner's general position
(of mechanistic determinism) reflects the latter instance
but, due to its uni-dimensionality, rejects the possibi-
lity of the first example where man is free to create his
own experiences. By introducing the concept of "pseudo-
symbols" (words which have the power to control and de-
termine human behaviour), the present theory is able to
account for this fundamental paradox of language and human
behaviour.

The _process_ of language is next to be discussed, with
an emphasis on the relationship between language as "in-
ternal schematizing activity" (Werner and Kaplan, 1963),
and the process view of man presented by Whitehead (1938).
Considerable attention is given to the work of Werner and
Kaplan since their theoretical framework is seen to be
relatively consistent with a multi-dimensional view of
human nature and development. Furthermore, their discus-
sion of the process of symbol formation is summarized as
it reinforces the concept of how language development may

be related to inter-and intra-personal interactions. Particular note is made of the early social relationship between the young child and "mothering-one", and this "primordial" relationship is taken to form the social basis for the emergence of self and the development of personality.

The final section of Chapter III deals with the <u>functions</u> of language. Human language functions in many ways; it provides information, expresses feelings, and regulates behaviour. Taxonomies of language function are discussed, but the main point of the section is that the personal functions of language (those involved in expression and regulation of behaviour) represent a superordinate, "existential" function of language. As Murray (1972-1974) suggests, to understand a person we must listen carefully to the metaphor of life he presents through his language. It is through the existential function of language that we create a distinction between ourselves, Others, and objects; by doing so we make the statement "I am; I exist", as a unique person in a world of Others and other things.

The focus of Chapter IV, "Personality", is to define personality from a perspective of process and the emergence of self. That is, personality is defined as a qualitative process of human existence which distinguishes a person as a unique being-in-the-world-with-Others. The early, primordial relationship shared between child and mothering-one is discussed to illustrate the process of

self emergence (as opposed to self embeddedness). The purpose is to demonstrate how the essentially symbiotic relationship between child and Other may be transformed into a reciprocal and coresponsive relationship as the child, through the differentiation and objectification of reality, becomes a more active participant on the stage of life. He is saying his first lines, as it were, establishing a role for himself while, at the same time, learning to share the stage with Others.

The intent of Chapter IV is not to define personality in a manner which would directly compete with other theoretical definitions. Rather, an attempt is made to provide a perspective which would do justice to an hypoth zed relationship between language and the emergence of self. What results is a process view of human persons, from which many dimensions and levels of personality development may be derived. As the final chapters will discuss, it is the emergent and developmental relationship between language and personality which reveals the many essences of human being and becoming across the life span.

Chapter V is essentially a summary and synthesis of the preceeding chapters. It represents the central statement for a theory of the relationship between language, the emergence of self and the development of personality. The chapter is briefly summarized below so that the reader may begin to have a sense of where the following chapters

are leading.

Language is important for an understanding of man and his activities from several perspectives. Cassirer (1944) views language as the activity which molds all other activities, while Whitehead (1938) considers language to be human nature itself. Both recognize that language permeates not only the cognitive and regulative aspects of human lives, but the social and emotional aspects as well. Language is the bond which unites people; yet, paradoxically, it is also a major part of the process which creates psychological, social and political distance between people. It gives man power to define his own experiences, and it has the power to define those experiences for him.

The relationship between language and action is developmental. The preverbal silence of young infants is a signal-based reality; action is in direct response to the most salient stimuli. As the child becomes verbal, a distance is created between the child and the things and events of his world. He no longer confronts reality directly, although a bond remains: the word. This process of distancing allows for the gradual development of self-regulation via the directive function of language and, by becoming self-regulative, the child exists on a more authentic level. He is no longer embedded into the existenc of Others, but rather is emerging as an authentic and unique self. The process of distanciation via the lin-

guistic objectification of reality is fundamental to the emergence of self. Yet there may be instances in the person's life where the distance between self and objective reality collapses, so to speak, as in transcendental or mystical experiences. Such experiences of "silent consciousness" represent one extreme of the language continuum (preverbal silence being the other).

There is a partial correspondence between the continuum of language being presented here and the "three eyes" of knowing and experiencing (discussed by Wilber, 1979): the eye of flesh (sensory experience); the eye of reason (cognitive experience); and the eye of contemplation (transcendental experience). However, where Wilber is content to "simply assume that all men and women possess" (p. 5) all three eyes, the present study suggests that the eyes develop in direct relationship to the development of language. The qualitative aspects of the relationship between the ways of experiencing and levels of language development (preverbal, verbal, transverbal) define personality, and represent the style of a person's being-in-the-world-with-Others.

The parallels between the eyes discussed by Wilber and the language-action continuum presented in the present study is also only partial since the present study hypothesizes that the development of the language-personality relationship proceeds through six distinct levels. Chapter

VI addresses the concept of "levels of development", as well as outlining characteristics and processes of action at each level. The central focus is on the nature and functions of language as these relate to the actions of the person; the chapter is, in one sense, a language-action taxonomy of human development.

In Chapter VII, developmental levels are discussed in terms of "modes of existence". That is, having suggested that humans can develop through six hierarchically-sequenced levels, it now becomes possible to characterize six corresponding modes of existence, each defined in terms of the language-action relationship. The six modes of existence are viewed as necessary to account for the wide situational variability of human behaviour. Humans do not always act in accord with their highest level of development, and it is by positing modes of existence that we may account for changes, which may occur in milliseconds, in the quality of (language-action) behaviour.

In summary, what the present study attempts to construct is a perspective on human personality development within a framework of a continuum of language and corresponding behaviour. As Cassirer (1944) points out, we live in a symbolic universe; language permeates our being-in-the-world and affects our daily lives by its nature and many functions. A theoretical perspective on how language may affect both our development and our day-to-

day existence is the central issue addressed in the fol-
lowing chapters.

A Note on Style:

In the following chapters, the occasion sometimes
arises where a concept is introduced which requires ela-
boration or clarification. Rather than disrupt the gene-
ral flow of the presentation, footnotes are used, with the
raise arabic numeral corresponding to notes which are to
be found at the end of each chapter.

II. Conceptual Framework

What is the importance of language for a view of man and his behaviour? Often, language is cited as that which distinguishes man from the other animals. Yet the point is problematical since some (e.g. Skinner, 1974) suggest that this distinction leads to a false dichotomy, that the only difference between man and other animals is one of complexity rather than form. In this view, language is reduced to mere "verbal behaviour". Many writers (e.g. Britton, 1970; Koestler, 1978) support the opposing view that man and beast are essentially different and suggest a more important role for language. They view language as a new, specifically human behaviour; for it is through language, they argue, that man becomes the only animal able to regulate his own behaviour and become aware of his own existence--aware of the fact of his birth, the experiences of his lifetime, the inevitability of his death.

But what is language if it is not simply a complex human response to environmental contingencies (as per Skinner) or a system of abstract rules of grammar (as per Chomsky)? It is both and yet more, as Bain (1974) points out in his reference to language as a "symbolic trust containing implicit meanings of life experiences" (p. 57). Such an expanded view of language is reminiscent of Vygotsky's (1962) reference to the word as a "microcosm of

human consciousness" (p. 153), which indicates that language has content as well as structure and function. In consideration of the many facets of language, Cassirer (1944) refers to it as the activity which molds all other activities while, for Whitehead (1938) it is human nature itself. From the point of view of the emerging self and the existential stance of the human person, Merleau-Ponty (1970) presents a coalescence of views by suggesting that:

> Perhaps all men, as well as the man of letters, can only be present to the world and others through language; and perhaps in everyone language is the basic function which constructs a life and its works and transforms even the problems of our existence into life's motives. (p. 18)

These definitions all recognize the central importance of language in man's behaviour and very existence. They view language as a basic process or function, intimately related to the forms of all other activities in the construction of a life. They attest to the qualitative uniqueness of man, therefore raising important implications for any psychological theory of human behaviour and development which fails to accept the behaviourists' reduction. The purpose of this study is to further explicate these implications and apply them to the postulation of a theory on the nature and role of language in the emergence of the self and the development of personality--man's process of

constructing a life and its work.

Animal Symbolicum

Accepting the initial position that language is important in man's existence (and behaviour) is only a beginning; it lacks a framework upon which to build a viable theory of man. The second task, therefore, becomes one of searching for a framework, a thread of Ariadne as it were, to serve as a guide through the complex labyrinth of existing theory on man and his development.

Such a framework must provide a unifying bond for the many aspects of man's development and activities. To suggest that language provides this bond, as implied in the initial assumption, further implies that the human situation be considered within a context of language or, as Merleau-Ponty (1968) suggests, that we recognize not only that man has language, but that language has man. In other words, the situation of man is largely seen to be embedded in the medium of language, which is both the creation of man and the creator of man's experiences. The work of Cassirer (1923/1955, 1942/1960, 1944, 1946) is based on the central notion that man lives in a "symbolic universe", and his thesis of man as _animal symbolicum_ provides a substantial framework for the present view of man in the context of language.

Cassirer, who proceeds by the method of categorical analysis to present a humanistic philosophy of culture,

attempts to provide insight into the fun amental structure
of human activities ("culture") so that we may "understand
them as an organic whole" (Cassirer, 1944, p. 68). The
categories comprosing this organic whole are language, myth,
religion, art, science, and history. Cassirer searches
for the common unifying bond between them to discover the
principles according to which we structure our experiences
lest we "remain lost in a mass of disconnected and disinte-
grated data which seems to lack all conceptual unity"
(p. 22)

While Cassirer considers the structure of human acti-
vities, he also contends that "human action is known only
in its realization; only when realized are we aware of its
living possibilities" (1942/1960, p. 37). The unifying
bond, therefore, is provided by man himself as he "rea-
lizes" the possibilities of his actions. Cassirer's focus
on human actions reveals an affinity to existentialist
thinking, perhaps best illustrated by Sartre's (1957) de-
finition of existentialism as a "doctrine of action" (p.51)
and his view that "man is nothing else but what he makes of
himself" (p. 15). For Cassirer, the forms of social life
are determined by man's actions, and man himself has an
active role and an active power in creating and changing
these forms.

Man has an active power, a power he not only uses to
shape his social life (culture) but which also distinguishes

him from all other living organisms. Based on the views of von Uexkull (1957), who proposed that different organisms have their own unique reality since they have their own unique experiences, Cassirer (1944) presents his main theme:

> In the human world we find a new characteristic which appears to be the distinctive mark of human life. The functional circle of man is not only quantitatively enlarged; it has also undergone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the _symbolic system_. This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the other animals man lives not merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality. (p. 24, original italics)

The various forms of man's culture combine to provide not a physical universe, but a symbolic universe; and man interacts with, and operates on, this universe through the process of symbol formation and re-formation. It is man's active nature as _animal symbolicum_ which provides him with underlying unity, harmony, and continuity.

It is essential to note, however, that man's nature as

<u>animal symbolicum</u> also leads to disharmony, as suggested most notably in Cassirer's (1946) analysis of myth and mythical symbolism. Distinguishing between the objectification of sense perceptions (linguistic symbolism) and the objectification of feelings (mythical symbolism), Cassirer stresses the need to look beyond the subject-matter of myth and, rather, consider its function in man's life. His attitude is clearly obvious in his criticism of psychoanalytic theory and its repose upon the Procrustean bed of the sexual instinct and resulting myths. Freud's creative genius, according to Cassirer, is not to be sought in his shifting the scene of the mythical tales from the drama of nature to the eternal story of man's sexual life. Rather, the importance of Freud lies in his recognition of the role of myth and mythical symbolism in the construction of a life, the "thematization" of a life's experiences. It is as though the transformation of the problems of our existence into life motives can be for good or evil, just or unjust p rposes, depending on our history and our situation. The role of language in this transformation process is outlined by Huxley (1940):

> The consistency of human behaviour, such as it is,
> is due entirely to the fact that men have forma-
> lized their desires and subsequently rationalized
> them, in terms of words. The verbal formulation of
> a desire will cause a man to go on pressing forwards

toward a goal even when the desire itself lies dormant. Similarly, the rationalization of the desire in terms of some theological of philoso-phical system will convince him that he does well to persevere in his own way...for evil, then, as well as for good, words make us the human beings we actually are. (p.4-5)

The point to be made at this juncture is that, from the perspective of writers such as Cassirer, Huxley and Merleau-Ponty, to name a few, language must be considered as one of the primary sources of human motivation and ac-tion. The possibilities of human actions with respect to language are many and diverse, and the realization of these possibilities is taken by Cassirer to suggest that language is _the_ activity that molds all other human activities.

Such a view of the role of language in the regulation of human behaviour cl ly makes a distinction between the theory of man put forth by Cassirer and that by the psycho-analysts and behaviourists. The element of humanism in the view of man as _animal symbolicum_ also militates against an adherence to the mechanistic determinism of psychoanalysis and behaviourism. Whereas Frued postulated an internal force to account for human activities and personality, the behaviourists maintain that forces external to the indivi-dual primarily determine actions and personality. In other words, the behaviour of human beings is seen to be the

product of environmental influences related to survival and adaptation; the achievements of man, reduced to complex learned responses or "accidents" in the tradition of Darwin's notion of evolutionary mutation. Similarly, the psychoanalytical interpretation of great art, for example, is likely to be in terms of the release of sexual tension, such as in the much questioned interpretation of Goethe work in the context of his impotence. As Shapiro (1979) reflects, one is left to wonder why Goethe's impotence produced such obvious creative genius while the impotence of others goes virtually unnoticed. The point to be emphasized regarding the interpretations of these mechanistic philosophies is that they both view human activities to be the product of causal forces not under the active control of the individual. Human behaviour, then, is only understood in terms of these forces rather than in terms of the individual's active process in constructing their life.

It is a common criticism of psychoanalysis and behaviourism that each, in its own limitations, fails to recognize man's essential humanity--his autonomy and self-governing modes of action. As a result, a "third force" in psychology has gained recognition. "Humanism",[1] as the movement has often been referred to, is committed to the promotion of human capacities and potentialities, and exhibits primary concern for human subjective experiences and values. According to Maslow (1968), one of the more popular

North American proponents of this third-school psychology,
humans have an inner nature which, if not "overcome by
habit, cultural pressure, and wrong attitudes toward it"
(p. 4), allows humans to transcend their basic survival
needs and fulfill their "metaneeds" (e.g. truth, comple-
tion, justice, etc) as they approach the final ideal state
of self-actualization.

In many ways there is a similarity between the psy-
chology of Maslow and the philosophy of Cassirer. In his
earlier references to action being known only in its rea-
lization, Cassirer (1942/1960) continues by rejecting a de-
terministic view and making implicit reference to the con-
cept of self-actualization:

> Prior to its (action's) realization it is not re-
> stricted to a fixed and cl ly delimited sphere of
> possibilities; indeed, its work is precisely that
> of seeking and creating ever new possibilities.
> This seeking and creating is the achievement of
> the truly great, the truly productive individuals.
> (p. 37)

At the same time, there is constant reference to the ac-
tions of human beings in Cassirer's writings, as opposed
to the emergence of an inner nature through an "active
will" in Maslow's scheme. Even though Cassirer speaks of
the "spirit" of man, his idealistic philosophy is perhaps
not as vulnerable to criticism as Maslow's native-

idealistic psychology. For, in fact, Maslow's brand of humanism still relies heavily on a force, albeit a human force, to expalin human actions and personality. There remains a difference between the "humanistic" force psychologies and the existential humanism[2] perceived in the work of Cassirer. In that consideration of human activities is so essential for the present study, this difference requires further examination.

The Human Dialectic

The difference between Cassirer and the "humanistic" psychologies, according to Graumann (1975), is largely due to a conceptual confusion on the part of the humanistic psychologist. Human nature, writes Graumann:

> does not reside in the interior of an individualis-
> tically conceived personality, ready to be "actua-
> lized" or "evolved" in encounters with humanists,
> but must be looked for in the dialectical interac-
> tions between men and their concrete social environ-
> ments. (p. 15)

Whereas Cassirer provides the initial perspective on the activities of man in the context of his nature as animal symbolicum, Graumann provides a framework for these activities by developing the theme of the human dialectic. This dialectic distinguishes between the person-environment dichotomies (ie., internal-external views of man) inherent in the three "force" psychologies discussed above, and the

person-environment <u>relationship</u> (ie., man as a being-in-the-world).

One important implication of this distinction is that it modifies the framework provided by Cassirer's definition of man as <u>animal symbolicum</u>, a position which implies an essence of man in prior consideration to his existence (Fromm and Xireau, 1968). Writers such as Graumann emphasize the primacy of existence in their notion of the human dialectic, with essence following from action. In other words, human actions are seen to "bring forth" the world of human things and events which, in turn, "motivate new modes of activity in which man accepts, modifies, rejects, or surpasses the structures brought forth" (Graumann, 1975, p. 17). The relationship between a man and his world which ensues represents man's "situation", or "being situated".

Pursuing the main theme of the present study regarding the relationship between language and the development of personality, it now becomes necessary to modify this notion to that of the relation between language and the quality of man's being situated, the quality of man's being-in-the-world. That is, personality is being seen not as an ensemble of personal characteristics, a repertoire of learned responses, or a dynamic psychic structure to be developed by external or internal forces. Rather, personality is being seen in the present study as a process of relationship between man and the things and event in-his-world which his activities bring forth. The key to this concep-

tualization of personality (which will be expanded upon in
a later chapter) is the recognition that man is in constant
and active relationship in-his-world; he is in process,
and must therefore be defined in terms of the notion of
process to maintain his essential humanity.

Man as Process

Freudianism, Behaviourism, and Humanism are limited
in their view of man. Man does bring forth the world mytho-
logically, habitually, and humanistically; but he does so
through his own being situated, his being-in-the-world.
Man is in process, he is constantly active. Through his
actions he brings forth a world which, when analyzed apart
from the fundamental process of man, may result in a charac-
terization which supports the presuppositions of any one
of the three force psychologies. Whitehead (1938/1968),
considered the modern father of process philosophy, intro-
duces the cyclical notion of "process...issue...data"
which parallels that of "action...world...situation" dis-
cussed by Graumann.

Man has traditionally been viewed as a structure of
static matter being pushed or pulled through life by some
essential force (e.g. sexual instinct, environmental con-
tingencies, "human" instincts). As such, the activities
of man are considered in the context of these forces
rather than being considered on their own merit. The
alternative proposed by Whitehead is that man be viewed

as organic activity (ie. process), and his actions be
viewed in the context of his situation resulting from his
process-in-the-world. In other words, man "issues" him-
self, or becomes situated through his actions, into a
world of psychoanalytic, behaviouristic, or humanistic
things and events. These worlds do not presuppose man,
but are rather presupposed by man. Freud, Skinner, and
Maslow give us a _pars pro toto_ in their analyses based on
the results of man's actions in prior consideration of
the causes of these actions. What they fail to give us,
and what can only be gained by a close consideration of
man as a being-in-the-world-in-process, is the existential
meaning of man's actions.

Man issues his world as rational or irrational,
habitual or creative, humanistic or mechanistic dependent
not only on the temporal and spatial characteristics of
his concrete bodily position but, more importantly, on
his "total awareness of (his) posture in the intersensory
world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 100). The spatiality of
the body, therefore, is not a spatiality of position but
rather of situation. It is the dynamic organization of
the human process as the individual's actions bring forth
the situated world-for-that-individual.

Based on this consideration of the human dialectic
and man-as-process, it should be clear that the framework
being developed here has a greater affinity for the exis-
tential humanism of Cassirer, Graumann, and Merleau-Ponty

than to the psychological humanism of Maslow. Man's self-actualization is the product of his own self-regulated actions rather than actions emerging from "human" instincts. Like the behaviourists and the psychoanalysts, Maslow and other nativistic humanists give us but a _pars pro toto_ of the possible range and breadth of human reality and behaviour. Through a consideration of man and his language we will be able to come to grips with the variegated forms of human behaviour and, by doing so, truly appreciate Huxley's acknowledgement of a fundamental paradox in the possibilities of human action. He states:

> Deprived of language we should be dogs or monkeys.
> Possessing language, we are men and women able to
> persevere in crime no less than in heroic virtue,
> capable of intellectual achievements beyond the
> scope of any animal, but at the same time capable
> of systematic silliness and stupidity such as no
> dumb beast could ever dream of. (Huxley, 1940, p.5)

Before proceeding to a consideration of how langauge plays an important role in the emergence of the self and the development of personality, it is necessary to summarize the framework developed to this point. Four propositions stand out as most central to the framework of _animal symbolicum_. In point form, these are:

> 1. Cassirer's initial view of man as _animal symbolicum_ has been modified to emphasize the active nature of man as _animal symbolicum_ constantly

involved in the human dialectic as a being-in-the-world.

2. Through his actions, man brings forth the world of human things and events, and becomes situated in respect to these. His situation in turn motivates further action. This process of "action...world... situation" or "process...issue...data" is cyclical.

3. A break with traditional psychological models is made by proposing that man be viewed as organic process rather than as matter-in-motion as the result of internal and external "forces".[3]

4. As process, man presupposes the worlds he issues, be they consistent with the views of psychoanalysis, behaviourism, or humanism.

Further Considerations For A Framework

While the work of Cassirer, with slight modification and amplification, provides a suitable framework for the present postulation of a theory of language and personality, it falls short in two critical aspects. First, when Cassirer refers to man as <u>animal symbolicum</u> it must be recognized that he is referring to the mature adult of the species. He of course recognizes that the ability to symbolize is not a birth-right but, rather, a skill which develops. He does not, nor is it necessarily his task as a philosopher of culture, discuss the process of human development in a systematic fashion. Again, many of his

tenets are based on principles one would find, for example,
in the developmental theory of Werner (1948). Yet these
principles remain embedded in a generalized statement
about human activities and abilities. A task of the pre-
sent study, indeed a major theme, is to place Cassirer's
framework into a developmental perspective, a perspective
which would relate to all ages and stages across the life
span of the individual.

Similarly, as a philosopher of human culture, Cassirer
is also sensitive to the social aspects of man's life.
Yet again, the emphasis needs to be increased since it re-
presents the second major theme of the human situation.
That is, man is a social animal and, as such, is constantly
in relation to other people. The emergence of the self is,
in a sense, challenged at every step by the pressures of
mass conventionality and social expectations. At the same
time, however, the emergence of the self is basically part
of the socialization process. This seeming paradox and
frequent dilemma for the individual is an essential aspect
of the development of personality and the construction of
a life.

These two basic themes of the human situation--the
process of development and socialization--bound together
by man's most distinctive process--his language--form the
framework for the present study. The purpose of the pre-
sent study is to present an original theory of personality

development based on the changing nature and role of

language across the life span, and within the context of

a society of other personalities.

Notes

1. The term "humanism" has become generic within psychology, referring to a general class or body of psychological literature and thought. Within this general class, however, specific differences exist in terms of presuppositions and assumptions (one issue related to these specific differences is discussed later in the chapter under the heading "The Human Dialectic"). As used in the present context, "humanism" is intended to reflect the basic position outlined by Maslow (1954) that:

> Man has an essential nature of his own, some skeleton of psychological structure that may be treated and discussed analogously with his physical structure, that he has needs, capacities and tendencies that are genetically based, some of which are characteristic of the whole human species, cutting across all cultural lines, and some of which are unique to the individual. These needs are...good or neutral rather than evil...full healthy and normal and desirable development consists in actualizing this nature, in fulfilling these potentialities, and in developing into maturity along the lines that this hidden, covert, dimly seen essential nature dictates, growing from within rather than being shaped from without (p. 340).

2.   The term "existential humanism" is intended to re-
flect theoretical positions which reject notions of
causality by "forces" in favor of the processes of moti-
vation and conscious intent, a primary tenet of existen-
tial psychology as discussed by May '1961) and Hall and
Lindzey (1977). A more complete discussion of this basic
difference between "force" and "process" psychologies
follows in the next section.

3.   While the notion of man-as-process does indeed re-
present a break from the traditional force psychologies,
the concept itself has a long history. While Whitehead
and Graumann approach it from a Western philosophical
perspective, the concept of organic process has been cen-
tral to Eastern philosophical and religious thought for
centuries. For the interested reader, two recent contri-
butions by Capra (1975) and Zukav (1979) provide very
reasonable accounts of the concept, particularly in
terms of the "new" physics which, itself, is having a
significant effect on modern attitudes toward science and
knowledge. A further relationship between modern physics
and psychology is offered by Tart (1975), which may help
complete the perspective intended in the present study.

III. Language

The central problem being addressed in this study
is the nature and role of language in the emergence of the
self and the development of personality. The preceding
chapter established a theoretical framework whereby man
is seen to become an <u>animal symbolicum</u> and, therefore,
establish human experiences and reality. In a sense, the
preceding chapter attempts to postulate a way of consi-
dering the question of the importance of language for an
understanding of human activities, the style of man's
being-in-the-world, the development of his personality.
Yet, to suggest a possible answer to the question of the
importance of language, one must first begin by attempting
to come to grips with the question of what <u>is</u> language.
The following sections address this question from the per-
spective of establishing a framework for the nature of
language, the process of language, and the role (functions)
of language in the "construction of a life".

Nature of Language

Most definitions of language tend to fall into three
main categories of theoretical thought: learning theory,
cognitive-nativistic theory, and cognitive-developmental
theory. In overly simplistic terms, one might say that
the learning theorists (e.g. Skinner) see language pri-
marily in terms of speech sounds, while the cognitive-

nativists (e.g. Chomsky) focus on language as primarily a descriptive grammar system. The third approach, cognitive-developmental, is essentially an integration of the other two, as well as a braoder perspective on language as a "world-view" of the languaging person. No attempt will be made here to review all positions exhaustively; rather, concentration will be on the theoretical basis for each in an attempt to establish a viable framework for the nature, process, and role of language in the development of perso-nality.

Language as speech sounds. Skinner (1957, 1974) has repeatedly argued that what is often referred to as "language" is more productively understood as "verbal behaviour". That is, he sees no reason to suggest that language is anything which could be qualitatively diffe-rentiated from other types of human and animal behaviour. Verbal behaviour, to Skinner and the behaviourists, is no more than highly complex human behaviour, capable of being explained by associational laws of reinforcement theory. Language should therefore be reducible to more primitive forms (ie. verbal behaviour and speech sounds) having as its antecedents the natural laws of behaviour characteris-tic of all animal species. In other words, no discontinu-ity is seen between man and other animals, only a diffe-rentiation in terms of response complexity. According to this mechanistic and deterministic perspective, argues

Skinner, there is no reason to put forth "mentalistic"

arguments regarding the nature of language or the process

of its development in the individual.

According to the behaviourists, language was "born"

(like a Darwinian mutation) when:

> The human species underwent a remarkable change:
>
> its verbal musculature came under operant control.
>
> (Skinner, 1974, p. 98)

Prior to this epochal event, humans had warning cries and

other innate responses, but vocal operant behaviour made

a significant difference in the condition of man because

it "extended the scope of the social environment" (p. 98).

From this perspective, Skinner claims there is no need to

"invent" mentalistic explanations for language since a

much more productive view is that:

> Verbal behavior is behavior. It has a special
>
> character only because it is reinforced by its
>
> effects on people--at first other people, but
>
> eventually the speaker himself. As a result, it
>
> is free of the spatial, temporal, and mechanical
>
> relations which prevail between operant behavior
>
> and nonsocial consequences.... The contingencies
>
> are different, and they generate many important
>
> differences in the behavior which have long been
>
> obscured by mentalistic explanations. (p. 99)

The above quote by Skinner is a good example of how

the behaviourist, through a natural science approach, re-
duces complex behaviour to more primitive forms. While it
is not the intention to review the attempts to reduce lan-
guage to "natural laws", it is important for the purpose
of contrast that the implication of the reduction is clear.
In its simplest, and perhaps most understandable form, the
primary implication is to provide an analysis of any given
(human) behaviour into its constituent parts so that the
conclusion may be reached that "the same basic processes
occur in both animals and men, just as the same kind of
nervous system is to be found in both" (p. 250). Given
this reduction, the conclusion is therefore reached that
the only difference between other animals and man is in
terms of man's greater complexity of response repertoires,
where complexity is measured along a quantitative dimen-
sion rather than in terms of qualitative difference. Fol-
lowing this line of reasoning would imply the possibility
of determining, through empirical study, a direct relation-
ship of processes between animal and man in terms of lan-
guage acquisition, development, and usage. The contingen-
cies may be different, as Skinner suggests, but the pro-
cesses are assumed to be identical.

Indeed, numerous attempts to teach primates a "lan-
guage" which could be recognized as essentially equivalent,
in form if not in complexity, to human language have been
made. While the results of some of the more recent studies

by Premack (1971, 1976) and Gardner and Gardner (1975),
have indicated that animals can be taught to perform seve-
ral "language-like" operations, there appears to remain
a vast difference between these operations and the depth
and richness of human language. The essential differences
were suggested by Klima and Bellugi (1973) to be in terms
of productivity (of novel forms) and grammar. But, they
add, the differences must be qualified, particularly in
view of some recent findings claimed by animal researchers
as regards to the creation of novel forms. It is impor-
tant to recognize, the authors note:

> an _essential_ difference between the sort of pro-
> ductivity that we would ascribe to the behavior
> of (apes) and that that appears to be its counter-
> part in human language.... The linguistic producti-
> vity that we are referring to is not the metaphori-
> cal use of words or the invention of new words, nor
> is it the fanciful distortions of syntax....(it) is
> that that characterizes our ability to produce in-
> finitely many sentences never heard before, whose
> meanings can be understood...by anyone else who
> shares the system.... It is the coupling of _pro-_
> _ductivity_ with interpretibility provided precisely
> by a shared system of grammar that makes human lan-
> guage such a versatile system of communication--so
> versatile that not only can we express things that

are outside our immediate experience, we can even express the inconceivable. (p. 106, original italics)

The basic counter-argument to the behaviourists' position and attempted reduction in terms of response complexity, which is supported by the quote above, is that language represents a difference in quality, or kind, between man and animal. Supporters of this position suggest that man represents a phylogenetic discontinuity; he remains an animal, but an animal of uniquely different form. For many who take this position, it is language which is seen to be the essence of this discontinuity; it is language which provides man with his fundamental and qualitative uniqueness.

Heidegger (1971) comments on the uniqueness of man in such a way that we may clearly understand the basic argument put forth by von Uexkull; that the experiences of an organism define the reality of the organism. In terms of man's experience, language is seen to play a significant role in defining that braoder dimension of reality Cassirer refers to, for in Heidegger's words:

> Man is said to have language by nature. It is held that man, in distinction from plant and animanl, is the living being capable of speech. It means to say that only speech enables man to be the living being he is as man. (p. 189)

Some may argue, nonetheless, that investigators

have demonstrated that other species are capable of "speech".
The literature related to attempts to teach other species
language has become controversial in the past decade.
While animal language has not been conclusively shown to
have all the characteristics of human language, no conclu-
sive evicence exists that other species cannot learn a
valid form of human communication. In his recent review
of the literature, Shapiro (1979) perhaps best sums up the
current position when he states that "Although we still
stand alone as language purveyors and users, we may not be
as far apart from our nearest hominid neighbor as we used
to think" (p. 45). A crucial point remains that, even if
the distance is narrowed to a minimum by the demonstration
that our "neighbors" have the capacity to learn language,
the narrowing will have been an act of man-the-teacher
rather than one of ape-the-creator. Even if such abilities
in other animals were developed, Heidegger's statement
would still hold. Man would not fall from his current
position, but rather, ape would have been elevated by man.

A final point at this time is that there is a need
to make a careful distinction between language _performance_
and language _competence_ when discussing the difference be-
tween man and ape. One could suggest that man's experi-
ments with apes have had the goal of language performance
in order that such performance would then justify a claim
of language competence. In that language performance has

not been demonstrated that would, in all senses, equal
that of man's does not prove that apes are incompetent;
it merely casts serious doubts. The competence of apes can
never be disproven; rather, the methodologies of man s at-
tempts to demonstrate competence must be seen to have
failed.

Theoretical positions antagonistic to Skinner's me-
chanism have stressed the symbolic process as the distin-
guishing, qualitative mark of human existence which tran-
scends the behaviourists' reduction along a singular dimen-
sion of complexity. Underlying the proposed discontinuity
of man, is the distinction between the signal and the
symbol. In a discussion of semiotics, Bain (1974) reviews
the distinction as follows:

> Signals are signs toward which an animal adapts
> in a more-or-less unmediated, automatic manner.
> Symbols are signs toward which a human adapts in a
> more-or-less mediated act of knowing. This diffe-
> rence is seen as being crucial. A signal is part of
> an animal's physical world of being. A symbol is
> part of the human world of becoming. (p. 57, ori-
> ginal italics)

Linguistic symbolism, suggests Cassirer (1944), allows for
the possibility of a life of meanings to supplant a life of
mere impulses, a life of becoming to transform a life of
being. Skinner, however, disagrees with this distinction

and offers an example to make his point:

> Verbal responses are often said to be taken by the
> listener as signs, or symbols, of the situations
> they describe, and a great deal has been made of
> the symbolic process.... Certain atmospheric con-
> ditions may be a "sign of rain", and we respond
> to them to avoid getting wet. We usually respond
> in a slightly different way in escaping from the
> rain itself if we have had no sign of it in ad-
> vance. We can say the same thing about the wea-
> therman's verbal responses, which are no more a
> sign or symbol of rain than the atmospheric change.
> (1974, p. 103)

In one sense, Skinner is right. From the weather-
man's perspective there may be little difference between
the black clouds he actually observes and the words ("It's
going to rain today") he speaks into a transmitting de-
vice which carries the auditory signal to us sitting at
our kitchen table. If we have observed the same clouds,
our response to the weatherman's words may be quite cyni-
cal ("no kidding!"), or a bit more respectful ("I thought
so"). In any event, we are sharing the same observational
experience as the weatherman, so his words are very likely
redundant and, consequently, mean little to us symboli-
cally.

However, if the clouds were not in <u>our</u> field of

vision, and if the sum were shining across our morning
table, the weatherman's words become more meaningful to
us. They do in fact become symbols since they re-present
his experience (observing rain clouds) to those of us
who have not had the same experience at the same point
in time. Without these symbols for an experience which
we do not directly share, we would have no base from
which to plan our future actions.

The notion of planned behaviour is emphasized in the
above example because this is yet another important com-
ponent to the argument. As Skinner says, we typically
behave differently in a situation (e.g. rain) depending
on the information available. A symbol allows us access
to information which we do not have directly in our ex-
perience. Once we have the information, then we act ac-
cordingly in terms of making plans.

The distinction between a signal and a symbol may
also, therefore, be seen in terms of the number of pos-
sible responses. That is, a signal stands in one-to-one
correspondence with an experience, or response; there are
no degrees of freedom, so to speak. On the other hand, a
symbol suggests many possible responses, the variety of
which gives man greater flexibility and allows him to pause
for consideration and plan the most appropriate response
before acting. A signal of danger, such as a loud noise
may only stimulate an animal to flee; whereas the symbol

danger may mean many things to a human, of which flee·ng
may be the least useful.

There is a danger, however, in assuming a mutual ex-
clusiveness, a strict dichotomy, between signal-animal and
symbol-human. As Bain (1974) pursues the distinction, a
signal is part of a closed communication system, bounded
by parameters of species-specific objects and neuro-physi-
cal structure of the animal being considered. On the other
hand, symbols are part of an open system which, being his-
torical in origin, is bounded only by the development of
the particular individual within their culture's conven-
tions. The animal system, therefore, is not open to sym-
bols, whereas the human system is. But symbols, within
the perspective of the previously developed framework, do
not "emerge" as a result of inner forces to replace impul-
ses. Rather, they develop from a signal base to supple-
ment, and dominate in many situations, a life of mere im-
pulses. That is, the human system is open to the symbol,
but not closed to the signal. We can clarify this point
by again considering Skinner's example.

Actually, the example Skinner uses is not a very good
one, particularly as he puts our behaviour into an "escape
from" category. It may be that we would escape from rain
by rushing under-cover if we were attending a garden party
in our best set of clothes, but would we necessarily es-
cape if we were standing on a riverbank fishing? Perhaps,

but perhaps we would stay in the rain in the belief (based on past experience, of course) that it improves our chances of catching a fish. The example of rain, therefore, is not adequate to differentiate between signals and symbols. In fact, there are not many "good examples" when it comes to human behaviour since man does not respond in a one-to-one, strictly predictable fashion to things and events in his world at all times. This is precisely the point where we come to the confusion the behavioural model often promotes. What we are suggesting as a real possibility is that, while man may have true symbols in terms of re-presentatioms of indirect experience, many of these may at times become what we will refer to as "pseudosymbols". That is, the may have the outward appearance of bonafide symbols (defined in terms of man's ability to choose from among many possible plans of action), but in fact operate as <u>signals</u> for direct, non-contemplative behaviour.

Take for example the incident reported by Condon (1966) where a woman was taking sixteen people on a subway in Boston, people who were unfamiliar with the subway and its stops. It was rush hour and the car was very crowded so that the party was split up amongst the press of many commuters. The lady relating the story says that in the course of a conversation she lost track of the stops and, all of a sudden, as the car had come to a halt, realized that they all had to get off very quickly. Not

knowing how much time she had to "pass the word" she de-
cided on a simple solution: she jumped up from her seat
and shouted "We get off here!" at the top of her voice.

The response was, perhaps, predictable. Not only did
her sixteen charges jump up and head out of the car, but
other people sitting with them responded similarly. One
man, who had been peacefully reading a paper, also jumped
up, jammed on his hat and started for the door before he
realized that he did not want to get off at that stop. He
stopped and returned to his seat, not amused to say the
least, but unknowingly provided the means by which we can
make the distinction between symbol and pseudosymbol. As
Condon summarizes the point:

> Man creates a few signs for his immediate reations.
> The alarm-clock buzzer, the class bell, and the stop
> sign are each designed by man to elicit one appropri-
> ate and immediate response. But such signs are few.
> Inappropriate signal reactions are, unfortunately,
> more common. Whether we jump to conclusions, refuse
> to listen to information because of a label we have
> given its source ("don't believe anything she says"),
> or blush at certain words, we are also responding
> signally. Such reactions fail to use the resources
> of language as they might best be used. Learning
> to use language intelligently begins by learning not
> to be used by language. (p. 10)

Condon's final admonition reminds us of the point taken by Heidegger (1971) that while man acts as though he were the master of language, it is language which so often is the master of man. The point to be made here is that the mastery of man by language is brought about through pseudo-symbols, as defined in terms of man responding to words signally.

What we are left with, then, is an account by Skinner of a particular dimension of human behaviour and action. It represents a level of response which is brought about by factors determined by the person's situation. Part of this situation is, of course, the person's ability (such as the man in the subway) to transcend the signal, or pseudosymbol, nature of language. As Condon says, unfortunately this is not always the case in human action and behaviour, either as individuals or groups. It is a point which will be returned to as it represents a crucial stage in the development of personality and the emergence of self in the creation of a mode of existence.

In terms of a definition of language, Condon shares Cassirer's recognition of the importance of the "symbolic dimension" of human civilization and life. In fact, suggests Condon, "The history of human civilization is a history of adaptation and survival, much within the framework of the basic Darwinian principles. Langauge is seen to aid survival in a variety of ways through its many functions

as a "tool, a map, a weapon, a toy, a surrogate, a mask"
(p. 60). These many functions allow man to adopt new
skills as the occasion demands and, therefore, possess
the ability to survive adverse conditions which literally
extinguish other living organisms.

Condon actually represents an interesting middle
ground in the debate on language and the uniqueness, hence
the nature, of man. For like the behaviourists, he is
committed to the Darwinian model of survival and adaptation,
and sees language as man's supreme power in aid of his sur-
vival. Furthermore, he states quite clearly that this
power of man is distinctive in degree, yet permits a be-
haviour that is "utterly different in kind" (p. 60).
The difference between man and animals is that man, through
language, can express his experience in symbols and can,
therefore, share his experiences with his fellow man. This
sharing results in the changes in behaviour and culture
not only from moment-to-moment, but from generation-to-
generation. Consequently, the society of man takes on new
forms as he adapts (in Condon's view) to new situations
and demands. Animals communicate, to be sure, but in
limited ways within closed systems of signals rather than
open symbolic systems. Consequently, the degree of change
possible in the society of tigers, for instance, is extre-
mely limited and they are in constant danger of becoming
extinct. The unfortunate paradox is that it is likely due

to changes in human society which have put the tiger in the greatest danger.

The same could be said regarding the threat man makes upon his own survival through the development of his own means to destroy himself as a civilization. The point that Condon does not choose to elaborate, and that the behaviourists tend to avoid, is man's creation (based on his symbolic capabilities) of the means of his own destruction. One could argue that nuclear energy has been harnessed in the aid of man as in the case of power plants, but even these have become ominously contagious to man's survival, in league with the weapons which preceded them. From this perspective it appears that man, in the very name of survival and self-defense, will ultimately defy his own power to adapt--to himself.

Finally, Sanders (1976) is another author who looks at language and communication within the context of adaptive functioning of human beings in a constantly changing environment. Recognizing the high level of socialization inherent in man's existence, Sanders emphasizes the need for humans to be able to adapt to demands generated by society, and suggests that it is communication with others that makes societal adaptation possible. The functioning of the language system, therefore, not only permits man to adapt to his environment but also to exert control over it. If we take this argument one step further and suggest

that by controlling his environment man also has the power
to change it (and, perhaps paradoxically, bring about the
need for new adaptation within himself), then we begin to
see how it is that, through langauge, man continually cre-
ates and re-creates his world. To do this, however, re-
quires a broader view of language than mere "verbal be-
haviour" and learned speech sounds. Perhaps the most ve-
hement attacks on the behaviourists' position was lauched
by Chomsky (1959), and his cognitive-nativistic approach
forms the basis by which language is seen primarily as a
system of grammatical structure and transformation.

Language as a descriptive grammar. Chomsky's origi-
nal stand on the nature of language held that the role of
learning, so emphasized by Skinner and the behaviourists,
was of very minor concern in understanding a child's lan-
guage. Rather, he argued, the child is born with pre-
existing innate structures (i.e. a "Language Acquisition
Device") which becomes activated through the exposure of
the child to speaking individuals. Universal characteris-
tics of all languages, such as designations for time and
space, causation, etc., were viewed to imply a universal
grammar which is an unobservable construct referred to
as "deep" structure. Other aspects of various languages
which do differ from one language system to the next, are
referred to as "surface" structure since they are, indeed,
observable. In a later article, Chomsky summarizes his

position by suggesting that:

> By studying language we may discover abstract prin-
> ciples that govern its structure and use, pri ciples
> that are universal by biological necessity and not
> mere historical accident, that derive/from mental
> characteristics of the species. A human language
> is a system of remarkable complexity...a mirror
> of mind in a deep and significant sense. It is a
> product of human intelligence, created anew in
> each individual by operations that lie far beyond
> the reach of will or consciousness. (1975, p.4)

The weakness of Chomsky's position, when considered
on its own merit, is primarily two-fold. First, it relies
on innate, hypothetical and therefore unobservable con-
structs. To accept such a position is, in the words of
Stone and Church (1973), to act "on faith" which ulti-
mately confounds the second major critisism. That is,
to accept Chomsky's hypothetical construct of deep struc-
ture and the maturation of innate competence is to accept
the observable inconsistency between the competence of
"ideal" speakers and the performance of actual speakers.
Stone and Church point to this inconsistency between the-
ory and observed behaviour as a serious problem, as does
Ortony (1975) who pursues his own criticism of Chomsky by
suggesting that:

> If competence models are supposed to be models of

the underlying mechanisms, then they must have the power to predict and expalin language behavior.... Unless there is a clear link between what is said of ideal speakers and what happens with real ones, talk of the ideal is irrelevant unless one is assuming that la███████n't for people. (p. 489)

In the past twe████████ a great deal of energy has been expended on ████████of psycholinguistics within th parameters set forth by the so-called "Chomskian Revolution". A great deal has been learned as a result but, as McNeill (1970) points out, there has been a cost as well. That is, the Chomskian position is radically opposed to that of the learning theorist and, as we have seen the position of Skinner is radically opposed to that of the psycholinguists. As McNeill and others (e.g. Ortney, 1975; Stone and Church, 1973) suggest, neither radical position gives the whole picture of language; there is more to language than learning, but there can be no question that learning plays a significant role in language development.

Perhaps the most central and controversial tenet of Chomsky's theoretical position is the assumption that human beings are born with an innate predisposition to achieve the mastery of language; that in Lenneberg's (1973) terms, language is "species specific". To fully appreciate the implications of Chomsky's position, it is essential to recognize the focus on the innate competence

of language, as distinguished from the innate roots of speech. That is, Chomsky is suggesting that it is "natural" for children to become linguistic as they grow up in a linguistic society. The emphasis on "natural" reflects a second major assumption of cognitive-nativistic theory; the development of language is primarily a process in maturation rather than conditioning, reinforcement, or imitation. Furthermore, embedded in this process of species specific maturation, development of linguistic competence is viewed to occur as a result of transformations of hypothetical, underlying "deep" structures. The existence of deep structures and basic language competence is deduced from a strict analysis of "surface" structures reflected in the person's actual language performance.

The psycholinguistic position put forth by Chomsky represents an enigma of sorts in the psychology of language and development. The enigmatic nature of transformational grammar theory is partly due to the fact that perhaps its strongest point is represented by the weakest point of another theoretical perspective. That is, in many ways the "Chomskian Revolution" was not only a revolution against the theoretical position of behaviourism as championed by Skinner, but also the most concrete alternative to the mechanistic determinism of the natural science viewpoint. As Holz and Azrin (1966) suggest in their review of Chomsky's criticism of Skinner, "the

verbal behavior of humans is the last stronghold from
which one can defend the necessity of mentalistic concep-
tions" (p. 794).

Bolinger's (1968) perspective on language, while
showing definite affinity to the nativistic perspective,
moves us a bit closer to a middle position between the ra-
dicalism of Skinner and Chomsky. Bolinger's attempt at a
single sentence definition of language is as follows:

> Human language is a system of vocal-auditory commu-
> nication using conventional signs composed of arbi-
> trary patterned sound units and assembled according
> to set rules, interacting with the experiences of
> its users. (p. 12)

His suggestion is that consideration must be given to three
ingredients in the consummation of language: instinct, a
preexisting language system, and a competence coming from
the application of the instinct to the system. While imi-
tation and learning are seen to play a part in the develop-
ment of language, they are only a part of the larger ques-
tion of how the child learns to manipulate the physical
elements of the system (i.e, sounds and syntactic rules)
while, at the same time, permeating these elements with
meaning. Again, the issue of meaning arises to lead us
to a richer perspective on the depth of the human language
experience. Consideration of meaning leads directly into
the third position on the nature of language to be presen-

ted in the present study.

Language as a world-view. Hayakawa (1964) defines language as being the most highly developed, the most subtle, the most complicated form of symbolism. As he says, human beings can, by agreement, make anything stand for anything (i.e. can symbolize). The system of noises that we all produce and mutually agree stand for the same "happenings" in our nervous systems he calls language. The happenings he refers to are perceptions we each have and share with others through our language system of agreements.

While the above may seem to be a narrow approach to the phenomenon of language, Hayakawa recognizes that, through its many functions (e.g. persuasion and control, information transmission, the language of "social cohesion" and the language of poetry and imagination), language plays an extremely important role in human life. In his own words this importance is from a number of perspectives:

Words can start people marching in the streets--and can stir others to stoning the marchers.... With words we can sugarcoat our nastiest motives and our worst behavior, but with words we also formulate our highest ideals and aspirations. To understand how language works, what pitfalls it conceals, what its possibilities are, is to understand what is central

to the complicated business of living the life of a human being. (p. vii)

Words, according to Hayakawa, play a central role in the shaping of man's beliefs, prejudices, ideals, and aspirations. They constitute man's <u>semantic environment</u>, a phrase Hayakawa uses to denot the "moral and intellectual atmosphere in which (man) lives" (p. viii). In short, language is seen as the "indispensible" mechanism of human lives, lives that are basically social, and which are "moulded, guided, enriched, and made possible by the accumulation of the past experiences of members of our own species" (p. 14). In one sense, and in much the same vein as Cassirer, Hayakawa's view relates to the relationship between language and culture. Man's perspective on his culture, his world-view so to speak, comes to be embodied in his language through the functions Hayakawa points to.

Another proponent of language-as-world-view is Britton (1970) who discusses this notion at some length, with particular reference to the work of Susan Langer (1942), a philosopher of symbolic forms very much in the tradition of Cassirer. In Britton's view, each individual constructs a world representation with the aid of language as the organizing principle, and this construction is continually modified in light of additional experiences to us symbolically. The dynamic structuring and re-structuring of

personal world-views is not only discussed by others, but placed into the social-developmental context so central to the present study. Schmidt (1973), for example, recognizes the fundamental discontinuity between human language and animal communication as central to the social-developmental context of human existence.

Unlike animals, according to Schmidt, the human child must do more than merely adapt to life in a given environment and in a given social group with its powerful structures for shaping development. The fact that a child "discovers" a preexistent language and becomes an active participant in a culture which is, itself, greatly influenced by the culture, complicates the process of the child's socialization. Again, the complications Schmidt is alluding to arise fr m a broader dimension of human existence outlined earlier in relation to the theory of Cassirer and von Uexkull. The major impact of Schmidt's thinking on this point is when he states his central thesis that the development of the child:

Will have to be seen always in the concrete context of the child's interaction with other human beings, with things, and with the language and culture within which he creates his own world of meaning-- and with that his own personality. Among the interactions with other human beings, there is one that deserves special attention, namely that

between the adult who educates and the child who is being educated. (p. 11)

Although Schmidt draws the reader's attention to a possible relationship between language and personality in the above quote, he does not specifically pursue the issue. What he does do, however, is return to the child's creation of a world of meanings and, if we look carefully, we see evidence for the relationship between language and personality within the framework. In discussing the symbolic world of the child, Schmidt goes on to not only amplify on the child's process of development through the creation and re-creation of personal meanings for his experiences, but also puts this process in its proper context of socialization and education. He states:

> It is in this process of discovery and re-creating
> that the developing child gives meaning to his own
> experiences and gives to them an individual as well
> as shared human significance; thus, the individual,
> personal element is inextricably interwoven with
> the cultural. Only _within_ the symbolic systems that
> limit the child's freedom by imposing pattern and
> already developed meanings on him, and by forcing
> him to interpret his experience in terms of the
> possibilities inherent in the symbolic systems,
> can he become creative. The symbolic system _par_
> _excellence_ is language. (p. 65, original italics)

Schmidt reinforces these points when he later refers to a language system as the "very fabric and texture" of the child's personal, yet shared existence. His statement echoes the point made by Brown and Bellugi (1964) that as a mother expands her child's speech she is teaching more than a grammar; she is teaching a world-view for the child to consider and re-consider before generating his own meanings and, therefore, his own world-view. We shall later see that it is this world-view which comes to play such an important role in the formulation of a mode of existence of the child or adult as a personality-in-the-world. Here then lies the crucial foundation for an understanding of the relationship between language, the emergence of self, and the development of personality.

The view of language-as-a-world-view is perhaps the most sensitive of the three positions reviewed to the issue of human development. The behaviourists and psycholinguists speak of development and change, but their theories are weak in the accounting for the nature of developmental changes observed throughout the human life span. Speaking from a developmental point of view, Shapiro (1979) offers the definition of language as "a complex system created by human beings that emerges from the preserved operation of many functions enabling us maximum flexibility in manipulating our world" (p. 12).

More specifically, Shapiro emphasizes four points to

illustrate the nature of language. First, he view language as a complex organization involving motor control, cognitive structuring, and social determinants and influences. By doing so he integrates the views of the structuralists as well as the behaviourists. He sees language as both a competence and a performance. This is reinforced by the second point he emphasizes: that language depends on a complex structure of organizational principles which provide the possibility for productivity and generativity, two important criteria which seem to be lacking in most animal communication systems. Further to these criteria which reinforce a man-animal distinction, Shapiro states a third factor: that language is "evolutionarily specific" and relates to a "specific form at a specific level of phylogenetic development and evolving to a particular structural and functional organization which is somewhat discontinuous from other lower-level communicating organizations" (p. 12-13). His final point is that language evolves over time, and can be studied as its structure changes. Consequently, from a developmental perspective, it can be related to changes in age and the "hierarchic integration of cognitive and ego structures" (p. 12). In other words, language may be viewed within the framework of Werner's orthogenetic principle when considering its nature and role in the life of the individual.

Based on this multi-faceted definition of language,

Shapiro sees language as an important dimension for the study of what is characteristically human, and, since it fits the requirements of a developmental phenomenon, the process of development itself. This view of Shapiro is important since it expresses the perspective being put forth in the present study. That is, by carefully studying the development of the person-as-a-language-being, we are in a position to understand not only the general process of human development, but the specific development of the person as a personality-in-the-world. Before we can do this the task remains to go beyond the nature of language to a consideration of the process of language and how it relates to the process of self-regulation and emergence. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond language as speech sounds, or a grammar, or a world-view. We must consider the developmental framework by which we can understand the relationship between speech sounds, grammar, world-views and the actions of human beings. It is not enough to say that they are related. We require an examination of the means of this relationship if we are to understand how "man has language and language has man".

The Process of Language

Throughout the foregoing discussion of a variety of definitions of what language is (or is not), some commonalities may be recognized. An important one for the present study to focus on is that, on the one hand, many of

the definitions at least in part refer to language as a
product either in terms of a system of symbols having
agreed-upon meanings, or a group of grammatical structures
held together by rules of transformation and generation.
At the same time, there are several indications in the de-
finitions that language is also seen to represent a means,
particularly when viewed from a perspective of the func-
tions language plays in human life and existence. Indeed,
like the wave and particle theories of light in physics,
language may be seen as either a means or an end, depen-
ding on the observer's perspective.

Both perspectives on language are important for a
theory of the relationship between language and persona-
lity. Again, many of the authors cited above have referred
to language as a system which embraces, as it were, the
many beliefs, attitudes, fears, prejudices of the person.
Less has been said, however, of the role language plays
in the actualization of these "characteristics" into a
person's actions or mode of existence. It is at this point
that we need to look more carefully at the language activi-
ty, or process, itself if we are to uncover any meaningful
connection between language and the process whereby the
self emerges. And on again, we need to search for a
framework for the languaging activity, a framework which
will permit us to cross the bridge between language, per-
sonality and behaviour.

As we have seen, most of the definitions of language presented above, with the notable exception of learning theory, view language as a type of symbolization. Many, as we have seen, consider it to be the supreme type of symbolization, guiding other forms of symbolic behaviour. What has been missing, however, is some conceptualization of the symbolizing process aside from references to innate structures, imitation, and other underlying theoretical assumptions. In other words, we tend to hold that man does symbolize, but we have not come to grips with the symbolizing process itself. This is important for us to do since, for the present theory to have consistency, it must be demonstrated or at least hypothesized that there is a close affinity if not a direct correspondence between this basic symbolizing activity and the processes whereby we could understand the emergence of self, the development of personality, and the structuring of a mode of existence.

Prior to acquiring the symbol, the activity of the human infant is characterized by reflex and signal adaptations; the infant leads a life of impulses. During much of this early period, the situation of the infant is one of "absorption into the immediate impression and the urgency of the moment" (Cassirer, 1942/1960, p. 60). Perception is of the overall expressive qualities of the objects and events in the world, their "physiognomies"

(Werner, 1948) instead of their detailed qualities; meanings precede objects in perception. The reality of "physiognomic perception" is a reality of sensations and the infant is "mobilized" to respond organismically in a direct, immediate, and biologically determined manner. Man is in face-to-face confrontation with reality; nothing separates subject and object. There is a unity in the person-world relationship, and "the commerce between body and the world is one of affect and action" (Sardello, 1974, p. 413). Perception and action are, therefore, a unitary process based on the motor-affective reactivity of the infant, the "spatiality" of the body in a world of expression (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).

The physiognomic mode of perception and existence is recognized by both Cassirer (1944) and Werner (1948) as characteristic of the way in which non-human species react in their closed signal system of being. While these species are in direct confrontation with their reality just as is the human infant, man as a developed organism no longer confronts reality directly. Rather, man can create a barrier--a "symbol" curtain--between himself and the concrete objects and events in the world. Perhaps out of a phsyiognomic perception of Platonic wonder, perhaps out of a need to be more than a victim of mere appearance, or perhaps out a dissatisfaction with just doing, man raises the question to himself of what these "things"--feelings,

objects, events, himself--mean. The answers, be they in-congruous, absurd, or the stroke of genius are, in a very real sense, irrelevant. What matters are the questions, the perception and the contemplation of meaning.

Through a process of differentiation in the world of objects and events, "contemplative perception" alters the situation of man and the spatiality of his body. No longer does he respond immediatly in the motor-affective mode of existence. A distance has been created between subject and object, and man's action is delayed by the complex pro-cess of thought. Now when he acts he does so, in the words of Cassirer, as animal symbolicum. It is this active pro-cess of distanciation which allows man to create and re-create new symbols and, hence his reality. As Bain des-cribes the process in terms of the resulting nature of language:

Language is not seen as just a system of abstract
rules of grammar nor just a simple speech response.
It is seen as both--inextricably interwoven with
attitudes, myths, values, images, rituals and all
the fortunate and unfortunate happenings of a
people...a symbolic trust containing implicit
meanings of life experiences.... In a sense, each
child discovers and creates anew the cumulative
and established understandings of his people.
This process of re-discovery and re-creation of

meaning inherent in a particular understanding of life experience is the occasion for each child to give his own meaning to that experience. (1975, p. 57).

The implication is that distanciation is the universal process which leads to individually unique world-views and a comtemplative mode of existence. In this sense, distanciation is also seen as the universal process underlying the emergence of the self.

Whitehead (1927) addresses this process of distanciation (although he does not refer to it as such) in considerable detail in his lectures on symbolism. A particularly crucial point made by Whitehead has obvious implications for a theory of the emergence of unique selves within a society of communicating persons. His point, and it is a familiar one to students of perception, is that the process of contemplative perception and symbolization are "fallible", particularly in terms of individual differences, as a result of variance in the spatiality of the body of each person's situation as a being-in-the-world.

More specifically, two persons may perceive the same object or event in different ways. A circle to one person may appear as an ellipse to another depending on a number of factors, one of which being the position of the perceiving bodies in relation to the object. On a more abstract level, what one person perceives as love, another

may perceive as respect and, still another, overindulgence.
The point is that in relation to each other (and sometimes
in relation to themselves), persons differ in their per-
ception-symbolization process as a function of their dif-
ferent situations and spatialities. In many instances the
differences are small and perhaps insignificant, while in
others these difference become particularly important
On a positive note, such differences in the perception-sym-
bolization process is the "discipline which promotes ima-
ginative freedom" (Whitehead, 1927, p. 19). Imaginative
freedom is, in turn, the process by which we each re-dis-
cover and re-create our unique world-views and give our
own meanings to experience; it is the "stuff" of crea-
tivity.

It is paradoxical, perhaps, that errors of imaginative
freedom also result in problems as well as creative pro-
gress in the life of an individual or society. Differences
of opinion originating in the variance inherent in the
perception-symbolic process account not only for mild ar-
gument, but to war and mass destruction on a societal
level. The process of distanciation and subsequent symbo-
liation is also, therefore, the "stuff" of destruction.
Man's expression of his personality and self reflect this
essential paradox, and the problems of existence which re-
sult are many. Perhaps Rousseau was right when he said
"L'homme qui médite est un animal dépravé".

Contemplative perception, the perception of meanings,
is based on the process of distanciation or, as Werner
(1948) defines it, the increasing differentiation of the
components of a symbol-situation. Werner and Kaplan (1963)
present a detailed account of this process of progressive
distanciation in their organismic (i.e. process) analysis
of symbol formation. A brief review of their analysis is
important as it represents the framework for the present
study, particularly in terms of the role of language (sym-
bolization) in the emergence of the self via the creation
and re-creation of an individually unique world-view.

According to Werner and Kaplan, progressive distancia-
tion begins in the context of the "primordial sharing si-
tuation" where there is little differentiation (i.e. dis-
tance) in experience between the child, the Other, and
the object. At this point in the process, there is shared
contemplation of the object by the child and Other. By
that we mean that the child is first guided to view the
object by the Other; his attention is directed and encou-
raged. The first actions of the child to express his own
world-view, to construct his own world meanings and to
emerge as a unique self, are those of pointing to the ob-
jects. By doing so, he is performing a referencing func-
tion in terms of the object's external, or objective form.
This act of pointing is the child's invitation to the Other
to share, or contemplate, the world from the child's point

of view.

In terms of Werner and Kaplan's theoretical framework,
the child's organismic, internal schematizing activity then
becomes more differentiated in terms of a differentiation
between a world of objects and a world of self; the exter-
nal form of the object is progressively transformed into
internal cognitive schema (organismic process with "form").
The sensory features of the object are consequently "lifted
out" of the concrete (sensory) situation and placed into
a different medium, such as the auditory, which may be con-
sidered as another level of organismic process, and the
object is re-presented as a vocable. It is in this sense,
argue Werner and Kaplan, that the symbol serves a represen-
tational function, a function which is denied in the closed
reality of signals.

The ontogenesis of symbolizing activity is marked by
the progressive distanciation between four components of
the symbol-situation: the addressor (the person who is
speaking); the addressee (the person spoken to); the re
ferent (the object/event of reference); and the symbolic
vehicle used in referential representation (such as the
symbol itself Furthermore, they analyze the process of
progressive distanciation between the four components in
the following combinations: person-object, person-vehicle,
vehicle-object, and person-person (addressor-addressee).
It is necessary to briefly summarize this analysis since,

taken as a whole, these four combinations represent a fun-
damental, underlying process in the dynamic relationship
between language and personality.

Person-object distanciation represents an increasing
differentiation and hierarchic integration of a "stable
world of objects and a stable world of self from a matrix
in which these two poles of experience exist in relative
fushion" (p. 44). Early objects are defined first as
"things of action", consistent with the preceding analysis
of phyiognomic perception and organismic mobilization.
As differentiation progresses, these "ego bound" things
of action are transformed into "ego distant" things of
contemplation. Whereas initial apprehension of the object
is by means of externalized sensory-motor patterns, sub-
sequent re-cognition is accomplished vis-a-vis the trans-
formation of the external form of the object into inter-
nalized cognitive schema which "renders the object amenable
to representation in another medium" (p. 44).

It is important to note that what Werner and Kaplan
refer to as "internalized schematizing activity" is con-
strued as an organic process rather than a "mentalistic"
operation of the "mind". It is the dynamic organization
and orientation of the totality of bodily process which
constitutes the schematizing activity in a given situation,
and the product of this activity is the representational
form of the object in an alternate medium of the body's

organismic functioning. Langer (1970), in his review of
Werner's organismic theory, discusses the schematizing pro-
cess both in terms of its function and its structure:

Schemas have both functional and structural aspects.
Functionally, schemes are self-constructive; these
self-constructive powers serve to organize one's
experience into percepts and concepts. Thus, schemes
are rules for the cognitive organization and satis-
faction of interests, attitudes, and needs. Struc-
turally, schemes are products or representational
forms of knowledge, attitudes and needs, which are
constructed by their own active schematizing opera-
tions. They are the "stuff" of cognition. (p. 742)

The final product of the schematizing activity reflects
not a mirror image of the object's external form, but ra-
ther a synthesis of both the external ("objective") and
the internal ("subjective") forms. In accordance with the
synthesis of continuity-discontinuity vis-à-vis the pre-
servation, but subsidization, of primitive functioning in
more mature functioning the expressive, physiognomic,
and subjective qualities of the object remain a constitu-
tive element in the symbolizing process. Therefore, even
when the object is "objectified" to the Other via the
symbolic vehicle, the re-presentation reflects both objec-
tive and subjective meanings from the addressor's point of
view. In this manner, language becomes a primary medium

for the expression of a person's self since it reflects the continual objective-subjective process of his being-in-the-world. This would also be the case for other symbolizing mediums such as gesturing and writing, although perhaps to a different degree.

The second combination of components in the symbolizing situation which undergo the process of progressive distanciation is that of person-v...... Genetically, primitive symbolic vehicles are basically immersed in the person's immediate affective-motor-imaginal commerce with the world, and are central to a person's direct action upon things. In other words, a child's early representations and references are accomplised by direct bodily actions upon things of differentiation. As inner cognitive structures evolve (as a result of organismic schematizing activity), the medium for the vehicle shifts from pragmatic action upon things, to representational reference via, for example, the vocal utterance. This shift in medium permits a greater degree of functional specificity and autonomization of the symbol compared to pointing, gesturing, and bodily action. The phonetic forms now "visible" are evidence of an increasingly differentiated world-view integrated at a higher level than primitive forms of bodily orientation and mobilization. Furthermore, the phonetic forms are evidence of a closer approximation (of the child's functioning) to the adult medium of inter-

personal commerce. As Harris (1975) pu's it, it is at this point that the child's "code" is becoming transformed into the code of the Mothering-One. As such, learning must be recognized as playing a significant role in onto-genesis in terms of external, inter-personal shaping of primitive phonetic forms into speech symbols which are defined by Werner and Kaplan as "more or less objective, person-independent entities, which can be 'handed over' from one person to another in social intercourse" (pp. 45-46).

Similarly, the internal form of the vehicle (i.e. the connotations or meanings expressed by the vehicle) under-goes a distancing process. In that early forms are "ego-centric" in relation to the child's own organismic process, they tend to be less communicative to the Other. Again, through a process of sharing and shaping, connotations become freed of idiosyncratic meanings to a degree which allows for relative interpersonal agreement and communi-cation while maintaining some degree of intrapersonal ex-pression. This relative blend of the inter-personal and intrapersonal connotations is evident in the ubiquitous phenomenon of differential interpretation ("error") of meaning between addressor and addressee, even when the medium is considered the most objective, such as scientific literature (Whitehead, 1927). Agreement is more a process of consensus than a process of isomorphic schematizing ac-tivity on the part of both persons. As such, agreement is

often fragile, with many implications for both inter-
and intra-personal relationships and the expression of
self.

The third combination discussed by Werner and Kaplan
is the progressive distanciation between the symbolic
vehicle and the referential object (vehicle-object). The
importance of this distanciation is that it breaks the pri-
mordial bond between a thing and its name, consequently
permitting the abstraction of object-properties into gene-
ralized concepts. In one sense, the differentiation of
vehicle-object and the formation of hierarchically inte-
grated concepts may be said to presuppose one another.
For example, to attain the concept of "animal" the child
must transcend the concrete bonds of "dog"/dog-object and
"cat"/cat-object to abstract properties common to the ex-
ternal form of both objects. The vehicles "dog" and "cat"
must become transparent and lose their thing-like quality
before the hierarchical substitution of "animal" is pos-
sible.

Another example of "symbol-realism" (i.e. lack of
vehicle-object differentiation resulting in the vehicle
taking on properties of the actual object) is often ob-
served in instances of extreme phobia where the vehicle it-
self is acted upon in a manner similar to actions upon the
object. For some phobic individuals, the effect of saying
the word "snake" is nearly equivalent to being in direct

contact with the object; they not only avoid saying the word in the first place, but react intensely to its utterance by another person. In this instance, the vehicle "snake" is not transparent but, rather, extremely concrete and becomes physiognomized as if it were the actual object. Finally, to avoid this dilemma, euphemisms are often created which are transparent and, therfore, physiognomized differently (e.g. "fading" for dying; "passed away" for died; "no longer with us" for dead). Again, the distinction made by Werner and Kaplan is in terms of the internal and external forms of both the vehicle and object. Only when both are "handled in their inner forms is the concrete bond between them broken. The symbol becomes transparent and autonomous or, as was discussed earlier in relation to the views of Skinner, the symbol actually becomes a symbol rather than being a pseudosymbol.

The final, and perhaps most comprehensive, differentiating combination is that of addressor-addressee; comprehensive in the sense that it necessarily implies the other three processes of differentiation discussed above. It is of the utmost importance in that the increasing differentiation between self and others reflects an increase in psychological interpersonal distance, a primary consideration for the expression of authentic existence. The significant effect of a progressive distanciation and increasing interpersonal distance is summarized by Werner

and Kaplan as follows:

These polarizations, in toto, bear all importantly
on the _autonomization_ of symbols, that is, on
the development toward a system of vehicles which
enables a person to communicate adequately with an
audience psychologically quite distant from the
addressor. In other words, the greater the inter-
personal distance between the individuals in a
communication situation, the more autonomous must be
the symbolic vehicles in order to be understood,
that is, the more communal and less egocentric, idi-
osyncratic, and contextualized must the vehicle be-
come. (p. 49, original italics)

The important implication is that language, as a re-
sult of progressive distanciation between the four compo-
nents in a symbolizing situation, becomes an "objective"
phenomenon as well as a "subjective" event. The question
remains, or perhaps arises, as to "how, to what degree, and
in what way can the objective, impersonal, universal usage
of linguistic forms be reconciled with the individuality
and subjectivity of the meanings infused into these forms
when enlivened by the communicants?" (p. 50)

Indeed, within a framework of language-cum-personality
this question may be construed as the fundamental problem
of existence. As well as being viewed as a system of
verbal signs and gestures, language is here viewed as an

"investment" of organismic process into the medium of pre-
supposed human social relatedness, the medium of human
being and becoming. Each child entering this medium does
so from a particularly unique, although cultural-histori-
cally influenced, perspective. His experiences become
transformed once again into a second level of sharing-
with-the-Other vis-a-vis the shared meanings of contemp-
lative perception. Where once this sharing represented the
base from which he would eventually emerge as an individu-
al self, second level sharing implies the danger of his
once again becoming engulfed or embedded into the communal
meanings of the Others around him. That is, if his mea-
nings are expressed through pseudosymbols, there will be
no authentic emergence of the self.

It is in this sense that language is paradoxical. On
the one hand it represents the medium for the expression
of a person's self as an authentic being-in-the-world
while, on the other, it represents the medium of engulf-
ment of the person into the background of social conven-
tionality. That is, while man has the power of language
to create and re-create his symbolic universe, he is at
the same time pardoxically subject to the power of the
creations of himself and Others expressed through language.
Language, being both immanent and transcendent, has a sig-
nifying power of its own, it "not only refers to experi-
ence ... but actually defines experience for us by its

formal completeness and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectations into the field of experience" (Sapir, 1931, p. 578). One is reminded here of the thoughts of Lacan (1956/1968) who, from a psychoanalytic perspective, vie the unconscious as functioning linguistically rather than symbolically or instinctually. In a similar fashion, Huxley (1940) summarizes the net result of language paradox by suggesting that:

> The consistency of human behaviour, such as it is,
> is due entirely to the fact that men have forma-
> lized their desires and subsequently rationalized
> them, in terms of words. The verbal formulation of
> a desire will cause a man to go on pressing for-
> wards toward a goal even when the desire itself lies
> dormant. Similarly, the rationalization of the de-
> sire in terms of some theological or philosophical
> system will convince him that he does well to per-
> severe in his way..for evil, then, as well as for
> good, words make us the human beings we actually
> are.... Deprived of language we should be dogs or
> monkeys. Possessing language, we are men and
> women able to persevere in crime no less than in
> heroic virtue, capable of intellectual achievements
> beyond the scope of any animal, but at the same
> time capable of systematic silliness and stupidity
> such as no dumb beast could ever dream of. (p.4-5)

The fundamental point underlying the paradox of language, particularly in terms of the earlier discussion of real versus pseudosymbols, is this: while man presupposes the world which he creates and re-creates, he is also presupposed by the world which is created and re-created through the language of himself and the Others in society. How he acts in response to this dilemma created by language paradox is his expression of his personality, the level at which his self emerges as either authentic or conventional:

Consideration of the phenomenon of language paradox leads us beyond the process of language and into a consideration of how language operates in human lives to effect and mold human activities. At this point in our study we come to a consideration of the various functions of language, the way in which our symbolizing activities relate to the emergence of self and the development of personality.

Functions of Language

Many taxonomies of language functions are available for consideration. The problem, however, is that they are basically different maps to the same territory. That is, the functions of language can be approached very simply or in an extremely analytical fashion. Our purpose here will be to attempt a compromise so that the main question

--the nature and role of language--is kept in proper per-
spective.

Essentailly, language can be said to accomplish two
tasks, although very few taxonomies would be content with
such a broad distinction. First, language provides infor-
mation, be it about the actual or possible reality of man,
or about how man feels about these realities. In other
words, when someone tells us something we can learn two
things: something about that which he is telling us (e.g.
his new car) and something about how he is feeling about
this thing (e.g. his pride of ownership; his concern for
the payments). We learn something about the thing and
we learn something about him as a person.

The second task language accomplishes is the regula-
tionof our lives, both by ourselves and by others. Lan-
guage helps us get things done, and meet our material
needs as well as provide a means of directing our activi-
ties to accomplish certain goals. It also provides an
important medium for cooperation between two or more per-
sons in a common goal. This second task of language,
which is action oriented complements the first, informa-
tion oriented, task.

As mentioned, such a basic taxonomy is not particu-
larly useful since it is too comprehensive. A first step
in clarification might be to consider a tripartate dis-
tinction made by Copi (1953), who outlines three functions

of language: the informative, the expressive, and the directive. The informative is fairly straightforward; it communicates information and descriptions, or propositions, about the world. As Copi suggests, it is typically the language of science, so it aims at the objective aspects of human experience. In juxtaposition to the information function, Copi postulates the more poetic expressive function. This function evinces the speaker's emotions and evokes feelings on the part of the listener. The third function he discusses is the directive function, whereby language causes (or prevents) overt action through commands and requests. That is, language is seen to motivate or effect action rather than to convey information, feelings, or attitudes. It is important to note that the same utterances may, in fact, fulfill all three functions by directing actions, by evoking appropriate attitudes and communicating relevant information to the listener.

Further refinement of these three functions may be suggested, as for example by Halliday (1967) who suggests seven "models" of language in describing the language of children. Briefly, Halliday sees language as a means to get something done (instrumental function) as well as a means of regulating the behaviour of self and others (regulatory). Related to the regulatory function is, by necessity, an interactional function which mediates social relationships and maintains them linguistically.

From an informative perspective, Halliday breaks
language into a number of functions as well. For instance
he postulates a _heuristic_ function to account for lan-
guage as a means of exploring reality by questioning, as
well as a _representational_ function as a means to communi-
cate about reality. Thirdly he specifies an _imaginative_
function for when language is used to create an "ideal"
reality through stories or "let's pretend" games (of both
adults and children).

The last function of Halliday's theory is of particu-
lar interest to the present study since, as he defines it,
it is the _personal_ function of language which is an ex-
pression of identity and self. In other words, he sees
language as a form of the person's own individuality,
playing an essential role in the "process whereby the child
becomes aware of himself, and in particular in the ... de-
velopment of his person lity" (1967, p. 31). The personal
function is more, according to Halliday, than merely an
"expressive" function conveying feelings and attitudes.
It is the personal element in the interactional function
whereby the child (or adult) communicates to the Other and
the world at large, "This is who, and what, I am" or "I
exist".

More recent taxonomies, for example Tough (1977),
reduce the number of functions once again, but perhaps
lose some of the sharpness of the distinctions made by

Halliday. It should be recognized, however, that Tough's "sharpness" is in her breaking of four functions (directive, interpretive, projective, relational) into an elaborate sub-structuring in an interesting analysis of the actual language of preschool children. However, for our present purposes, Halliday's framework is sufficient and, we might add, particularly relevant in terms of its identification of functions which would so clearly link language with the emergence of self and the development of personality.

Of particular interest to the present study are the three functions: regulatory, interactional, and personal. Together they embrace the general concept of self and personality to be presented in this study. The other functions are, of course, not to be excluded since personality permeates the total process of the individual. Yet the three mentioned represent the real base for consideration of the relationship between man's language and his actions. A superordinate function for such a relationship, which encompasses the three functions mentioned, is provided by a consideration of the work of Vygotsky, Luria and their associates on the directive function of speech. While in one sense their work is related to a single function of language, it must be recognized in the context of their underlying philosophy and psychology of human development and socialization. By such an in depth consideration of

their work, we will see how it incorporates elements of all three Halliday functions.

The decisive role which language plays in molding the activities of man is characterized by Vygotsky (1930, 1931/1966) as the "mastery of one's own process of behaviour" (p. 33). The structure of the symbol and the method of its use are, for Vygotsky, central to the determination of behaviour, and the resulting development of "higher mental functions" is seen to follow his socio-genic law that:

> Any development in the child's cultural develop-
> ment appears on the stage twice, on two planes;
> first on the social plane and then on the psycho-
> logical, first among people as an intermental ca-
> tegory and then within the child as an intramental
> category. (p. 44)

Luria (1959/1960) and Luria and Yudovich (1956/1971) extend Vygotsky's law to suggest that what the child first does with the help and instruction of the Other, he later does by himself, supporting his own efforts by his speech. It is this directive function of speech, intertwined with the interactional function, which accounts eventually for the child's mastery of his own, previously shared, actions. If we add to this Vygotsky's definition of the word as a microcosm of human consciousness, we have then brought the personal function of language to bear on the child's

mastery of his own "process of behaviour" which as dis-
cussed in the following chapter, will be defined as "per-
sonality".

In his own research, recently supported by Bain (1976),
Luria (1959/1960) provides data to tentatively support at
least three stages in the development from primitive
(first signal system) to higher levels (second signal sys-
tem) of mental processes. Again, the point is not to pre-
sent a detailed account of this research, but to review
it briefly to indicate a framework whereby we might appre-
-iate the ontogenesis of the relationship between lan-
guage and action.

In the first stage postulated by Luria, which covers
an age range of 10 - 24 months in normal children, speech
has an initiating function, impelling the child to act.
If the child is set to act in one particular way (in
terms of his organismic organization and orientation), ver-
bal instruction to the contrary is ineffective in altering
the direction of behaviour, although it does tend to im-
pel the action of the existing set. It is not until ap-
proximately 30 - 54 months of age when some inhibition of
motoric set by speech is observable, and this second stage
is referred to as demonstrating the inhibitory function
of speech.

As a brief aside, it is interesting to give careful
consideration to these findings, particularly in terms of

the social dynamics between child and Other in the first
two years or three years of the child's life. Many of
the frustrations of parents who claim that their child
"doesn't listen" can perhaps be understood to be the re-
sult not of the child's inability (or unwillingness) to
listen, but rather of the inability of the language of the
parent to re-direct the child's set-to-act, particularly
if the child is already in action. In this instance we
must be careful in assuming a relationship between language
and personality since we may be tempted to suggest that,
since the child does not listen and acts oppositionally
to his parents' commands quite often, he has an "opposi-
tional" personality. The mask we place on the child may,
at first, be one of mistaken identity. Unfortunately, the
common phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecies and living
up to expectations eventually proves us correct in our in-
itial categorization.

The actual regulatory function of speech appears
(at 55 - 73 months according to Luria's data) as the
child gains increasing mastery of his own actions, through
the support of his own speech, in situations of complex
external instructions. Initially, regulation is external,
first being the speech of the child to himself. As develop-
ment progresses, regulatory speech becomes internalized
as thought, and action is then characterized as "voluntary
and conscious" (Vygotsky, 1934/1962). If this internali-
zation is viewed within a framework of organismic activity

as suggested by Whitehead as well as Werner and Kaplan,
"mentalistic" explanations are not required. Indeed, the
process which Luria describes may be viewed as an in-
stance of progressive distanciation between the child
and the symbolic vehicle, consistent with Werner and
Kaplan's analysis.

Conclusion

The point of this chapter has been to present a view
of man and his language which ultimatley may be seen to
underlie the process of his emerging as a unique self and
an authentic personality-in-the-world. Language is seen
in all its functions as a means by which man emerges out
of primordial engulfment and embedded sharing with the
Other, and allows him to create and re-create the expe-
riences of his people with his own subjective meanings.
At the same time, however, he immediately confronts an-
other barrier to his authentic existence, represented
by the communal, conventional meanings and implicit ex-
pectations of Others transmitted through pseudosymbols.
As soon as he has language, as soon as he captures the
symbol, he himself is captured by the power of language,
a power derived from the historicity of his culture. To
avoid becoming engulfed in the nothingness of inauthentic
existence, man must act a delicate balance of the objec-
tive and subjective in his linguistic commerce with him-

self and Others. He himself must construct a life to
solve the problems of his existence.

Notes

1. In the context of the present chapter, "inauthentic existence" may be understood to reflect the partial converse of Vygotsky's Law. That is, "authentic" existence would reflect the child doing for himself what he first learned to do with the help of the Other, whereas "inauthentic" existence would imply that the child continues to "do with the help of the Other". The point here is that dependency on the existence of Others takes many forms, several of which appear extremely subtle in "mature" adults, such as the unreflective acceptance of values determined by external authorities. Unless an individual can be aware of himself as both dependent on, and independent of Others, he risks the danger of disrupting the social harmony of human existence from which the self emerges as authentically visible.

IV. Personality

As in the case of the preceding chapter on language, the task now lies before us to come to grips with a definition of "self" and "personality". And, as in the case with language, an attempt at a single-sentence, all encompassing definition would perhaps be futile since it would be too global to mean much in regard to the theory being presented here. In other words, a defintion such as that originally proposed by Allport (1937):

> Personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustment to his environment. (p. 48).

as a result of his comprehensive survey of personality theories and theorists, can only serve as a springboard for a more specific notion of personality which would be particularly relevant to the frameworks introduced in the preceding two chapters.

Another difficulty in considering an existing definition of personality is that, like language, definitions all tend to reflect the presuppositions of their authors, their theoretical biases and dogma. It has been suggested by Koestler, for example, that:

> All cosmological systems, from the Pythagoreans to Copernicus, Descartes, and Eddington, reflect the

.unconscious prejudices, the philosophical or even
political bias of their authors; and from physics
to physiology, no branch of science, ancient or
modern, can boast freedom from metaphysical bias
of one kind or another. (1959, p. 11)

Within the area of personality psychology, the metaphysi-
cal prejudices reflected by theoreticians relates to a
specific issue--the nature of man. In fact, Allport
(1955) would have it that "among disciplines dealing with
the nature of man psychology, for good or ill, is the
fashion" (p. 2). While Allport's statement is based upon
descriptive statistics (doctoral degrees granted in 1951-
1952) and must be treated only as such, his comment "for
good or ill" raises an important issue. To expand on this
sentiment, reference is drawn to the completion of Koest-
ler's earlier thought:

> The progress of Science is generally regarded as a
> kind of clean, rational advance along a straight
> ascending line—in fact it has followed a zigzag
> course.... The history of cosmic theories...may
> without exaggeration be called a history of collec-
> tive obsessions and controlled schizophrenias; and
> the manner in which some of the most important and
> individual discoveries were arrived at reminds one
> more of a sleepwalker's performance than an electro-
> nic brain's. (p. 11)

It is not difficult to draw the analogy between the science Koestler speaks of and the science of personality psychology (or any other branch of psychology for that matter). Personality psychology has had its share of sleepwarkers--the obsessions and controlled schizophrenias are many.

The purpose here, however, is to merely comment on the condition of man within personality psychology, and our comment is that it is virtually impossible to search personality theory literature for a definition of personality which would do justice to an hypothesized relationship between language and the development of personality. It may very well be that the better strategy would be to evolve yet another <u>perspective</u> on the nature of man through a consideration of language-cum-personality for, as Murphy (1947) suggests, "There is no danger that anyone will succeed in this century in getting the perspective (on man) completely right, or indeed, in defining clearly what personality is" (p. 11).

Yet such a strategy does not eliminate all the difficulties faced by theories of man, not the least of which is the issue of distinction between man's being and becoming--his essence and his process. Obviously, man can be characterized by a variety of "essences" which provide him with his uniqueness when compared to other living creatures. Furthermore, if the history of human culture

is to be considered, it becomes no less obvious that a
theory of man could develop a variety of process "themes".
The distinction between essence and process becomes, there-
fore, one of identification of parts, rather than a defi-
nition of philosophical bias, and man's pursuit becomes
one of integrating the identified parts into a unified
whole. The purpose of the present study is to outline a
model of how such an integration might proceed from the
broad perspective of developmental psychology. The es-
sence to be dealt with is language; the process, persona-
lity. It is important, then, that we attempt to develop
a perspective on personality within this framework of
process.

What is Personality?

Like "mind", personality is but a word, represented
by a particular phonetic blend or spatial display. Yet,
like mind, personality is a word which has been reified
to the status of "thingness" even though, and perhaps be-
cause, its referents are transparent and invisible in most
conceptualizations. This reification, which is an ex-
ample of the conventional wisdom of psychology, o perso-
nality as some thing has led to its description as a pos-
session, something which all persons have. It has become
a constitutive part of the person--the dynamic organiza-
tion of psychophysical systems within the individual--
rather than a constitutive part of the individual's

experience. To be clear, it is only a part of the individual's experience in so much as that experience confirms or disconfirms what that person's personality is believed to be. It has become a template for experience for the purpose of prediction and analysis. It is indeed a mask, an illusion which precedes the person himself.

A more productive, experiential view of personality is that it is not so much a possession of the individual as it is the quality of the person as a being-in-the-world, a being in an active relationship with the objects and events constituting the life-space. Personality is being presented here as the quality of a person's experiences, as a being-in-the-world which render him visible and recognizable by etching out the lines of differentiation between figure and ground, between person and Others. Man is visible, personality is not; it is the invisible mask which constitutes man's objective substance.[1] Invisible as it may be, it does exist for, to deny the existence f personality would be to deny the existence of the individual by rendering him invisible, an amorphous constituent of a diffuse background.

Personality occurs in the midst of our experiences and allows us to become visible, to stand out against the background of our world, to exist. In that we are recognized on relatively independent occasions indicates, that personality is more-or-less stable. However, in

that our re-cognizability varies as a function of our situation indicates that personality changes. We are visible and therefore exist in many of our situations, but our existence as a being-in-the-world varies from that of ghostly apparition to focal point of perspective.

That is, we are at times visible only as a dim outline, embedded as it were upon a flat backdrop behin the stage of life. At times our outline disappears as we become completely embedded within, or engulfed by, the fading perspective of a distant horizon. On such occasions of complete embeddedness and engulfment we cease to exist, we cease to stand out as a personality-in-the-world. On other occasions, however, we appear as the focal point for all lines of perspective forming the background of our being-in-the-world. We are the centre of attention, so to speak, and literally and figuratively stand apart from, but in perspective relation to, our background. Our personality-in-the-world, which is a quality of our actions rather than a possession lying within us, dominates the situation of our being-in-the-world. It is our "existentiality", our active mode of existence.

Existentiality and Modes of Existence

To define personality as existentiality, or mode of existence, is in one sense to beg the original question. While the definition may serve to put personality more into the realm of the experiential process, it only

superficially describes what personality _is_. To answer this question we must once again carefully scrutinize the experiential process and attempt to make visible those constitutive processes of personality which presuppose our own visibility. In turning to the domain of human experience, however, we are in constant danger of looking in the wrong place.

To observe an occurrence of human experience is to observe a human body in relationship to a world of other bodies, ojects, and events. While the quality of the relationship may, as often does, vary, the fact of the relationship is a given in the existential reality of human experience. To focus our attention on either the body _or_ the world is to create a false dichotomy between "internal" and "external" aspects of experience. By dichotomizing we negate the possibility of relationship between being and world, and it is only in relationship that either, and hence experience, becomes visible. Man exists as a being-in-the-world; to deny this factual relationship is to deny his visible existence, to render him invisible. Furthermore, by rendering man invisible, so do we render his world invisible. Man and world presuppose each other in their existence and their visibility.

To speak of personality as a possession, either of the individual or of the individual's society, results

in this false dichotomization of person-world which
ultimately renders both person and society invisible and
non-existent. To make personality the possession of man
the individual is to alienate him from that which he so
much depends on for his visibility: his relatedness to
the world of his being-in-the-world. Without the back-
drop of his world, man becomes lost and alone, fading in-
to nothingness. Conversely, to make personality the pos-
session of the society is to engulf the individual to the
point where his relatedness becomes embedded in the re-
latedness of all Others of the society. The person's
visibility becomes so depnedent upon the visibility of
Others that they, as individuals, once again fade into
nothingness.

To understand personality is to understand man's
quality of relatedness as a being-in-the-world at some
point between these two extremes of nothingness. Per-
sonality is not a thing, nor is it a possession of man or
society. Rather, it is a qualitative process of human
relatedness-in-the-world which differentiates one man's
actions from those of another. In other words, personality
is the multileveled process which renders actions as mean-
ingful and unique, both to the individual and the society
and forms the basis for distinctively human activities
and existence.

Existentiality, defined in terms of our visibility

as a being-in-the-world extends, therefore, into both the
physical domain of the body as well as the social domain
of the world or life-space. It is at the same time both
immanent and transcendent, being experienced from within
as well as from without as the effect of our actions as
a personality-in-the-world have on creating and re-creating
ever new situations for our visible experience. Bodily,
existentiality reflects our innate predispositions, our
physiological and neurological maturation, and our his-
torical accumulation of experiences which constitute our
body schema in our existential situation. Socially it
reflects the range of possibilities for action as deter-
mined by our various situations-in-the-world. The visi-
bility of a person, therefore, is the synthesis of bodily
and social characteristics in constant relationship; it
can never be in isolation, but rather a relative blend of
the two _in situ_. While the body man, for example, exist
sensibly in terms of its physical appearance, the visi-
bility of the person's self is a function of the degree
of social relatedness in terms of the quality of relative
embeddedness or engulfment. This paradox of the sensible-
visible holds for all human beings, and is particularly
evident in the experiences of the newborn infant. Consi-
deration of infant sensibility-visibility will not only
illustrate the relationship between body and world, but
will also permit the contextualization of existentiality

into its proper domain; the process of human development.

Infant Existentiality

To observe a newborn infant is to observe, primarily, a sensible body; very little of the infant's self is visible to us. Because of this, our tendency is to make projections of possibility for the child, just as we often do with each other in adult life; we create masks of visibility and re-cognizability for the Other.

In the case of the infant, we make our projections based on the child's physiognomy and action, although these are, for the most part, reactions to an alien world of comfort and discomfort. The comment that the child "looks like his father" quickly is transformed by our projections into "He's just like his father" and, ultimately, "He has his father's personality". Not only have we failed to see this infant in his existentiality, but we have already placed a mask of visibility on him which, as discussed in the previous chapter, will be a mask hard to take off by the child as he grows up in the world of Others who will reinforce his wearing of the illusion by which they can re-cognize him most easily.

By placing this mask of re-cognizability on the child we have engulfed him and embedded his existence within the world of his father. His existence and existentiality is inauthentic in that it depends on that of his father; he himself remains invisible. His actions have meaning and

effect a difference in his situation only within the frame-
work of the catego es which have been created _for_ him.
The meanings we attribute to his actions are merely dis-
placed from those of his father-as-he-would-act, while _his_
meanings, embedded as such, are invisible.

To pursue this line of reasoning may lead to the con-
clusion that we, as re-cognizing adults, determine the per-
sonality of children by ebmedding their early actions with-
in existential categories which may be visible in their
parents' being-in-the-world. In other words, we may e tab-
lish expectation of existentiality at such an early age that
the child will find them difficult if not impossible to
transcend as he develops and matures. That we do so is
not so much in terms of an intention to engulf the child,
but rather in terms of our intention to render the child
visible within a socially relevant scene (his parents and
family in this example). Furthermore, it is not the scene
which we intend, but the child's visibility; a visibility
rendered as a quality of relatedness _in situ_. The socially
relevant scene is given to us since it is defined by the
child's experiences.

Before proceeding with a consideration of infant
existentiality, it should be noted that the process of our
creating a mask of visibility for the infant is the same
process we engage in with other adults. There are many
situations where we seek to define persons by looking more

at the situation they are in than at what they are doing
in that situation. We choose to see their actions as
related to meanings external to themselves (e.g. social
convention and expectation), rather than from their own
perceptions (which may be social convention and expecta-
tion). In other words, just as with the infant, we often
look to external referents to render persons visible, ra-
ther than attempting to "see" the persons themselves.

To perceive the child as visible we are limited to
the situation of child-with-Other, just as the early ex-
periences of the child are experiences which are basically
shared with the Other (or "mothering one"). Numerous re-
ferences have been made to this basic symbiosis between
child and mothering-one in early childhood development. It
has been variously referred to as the "primordial sharing
relationship" (Werner and Kaplan, 1963), "co-responsive
participation" (Schmidt, 1973), "oneness" (Kaplan, 1977),
or the early phase of "basic trust" (Erikson, 1963). All
of these conceptualizations help set the scene, as it were,
for the initial manifestations of authentic personality on
the part of the young child.

Given this sense of oneness, it is little wonder that
the existentiality of the child is at best dimly visible
in respect to its dominating background(of the Other).
It is fascinating to note the frequency with which refe-
rences to the child's being are made in the first person

plural, as opposed to the second or third person forms more characteristic of adult address. Comments such as "We are hungry" and "What a happy boy we are today" reflect the non-separation, in a psycho-social sense, of child-Other. Perhaps rather than being classified as "journalistic" or "royal", such usage should be referred to as the "symbiotic we" of person-Other relatedness. That is, while the child himself is sensible, he is primarily visible only within the context of his symbiotic being-in-the-world-with-Other. There is little, if any, transcendence of his basic social dependence for existence. However, this transcendence quickly becomes the challenge of the child's lifetime: the development of his authentic existence, his visible existentiality.

As mentioned earlier, existential visibility is the result of some degree of differentiation between the individual and his world; it is a standing apart, but in meaningful relationship to, the world in situ. While the very young child is sensibly visible, the world of his being is largely the construction of the adults around him who control and define the objects and events which he is in relationship to. This apparent existentiality is but a mask, given and shared by those closest to him.

The quality of the child's visibility undergoes a radical transformation as the child becomes more active in first creating, for himself, the reality he has so

intimately shared with the Other, and then re-creating
that reality with meanings particular to his own emerging
world-view. Having first shared a world-view as presented
by the Other, the child now assumes the more active role
of re-presenting the objects and events which constitute
his world-view in relationship to the Other. He "invites",
to use Schmidt's (1973) term, the Other to share now a
broader reality of relatedness than that which they have
previously shared together. The degree to which his acts
of re-presenting effect a difference in his situation of
being-in-the-world-with-Others is precisely the degree to
which he becomes existentially visible. By re-presenting
his situation to himself and the Other, he expresses his
existentiality. "To come into existence, for me", writes
Sartre:

> is to unfold my distances from things and thereby
> cause things "to be there". But consequently things
> are precisely "things-which-exist-at-a-distance-
> from-me". Thus the world refers to me that univocal
> relation which is my being and by which I cause it
> to be revealed. (1956, p. 20)

The point to be made at this time is that the young
child's process of expressing his existentiality, his own
meanings (re-presentations) is governed by the fundamen-
tal law of development insightfully formulated by Vygotsky,
referred to in the preceding chapter as the socio-genic

law of human development: what the child first does with the help of others, he later does by himself. In terms of his existentiality, this law may be generalized to suggest that the child first becomes visible through the Other and, consequently, his visibility is inauthentic, being a mask of appearance. Then, as he develops the means, he "causes" his own existential visibility to be revealed in his relationship with the Other, and his existentiality becomes authentic through his own actions and re-presentations.

From Oneness to Separateness

In the process of separating himself existentially, the first things which a child distan iates (causes to be revealed in his relationship in-the-world) are those which are common to his shared relationship with the mothering-one. They are the things which have become familiar through the process of co-responsitivity between himself and the Other. The child's process of coming into existence first on the social plane is summarized by Schmidt:

> The human child does not begin life as an isolated organism but in a close, almost symbiotic relationship with his mother. He is not alone in his interactions with the world. He not merely perceives and cognizes but does so in cooperation and interaction with his mother. What is cognized will depend on...the altering of the infant by the mother and on

what one might call the <u>co-responsive participation</u>
of mother and child in a common world. In this co-
responsive participation...the infant's cognitions
are constantly supported, reinforced and brought
into relationship with those of the participating
adult. (1973, p. 116, original italics)

The process of distanciation, however rudimentary
or tentative, is fundamental to the child's initial ex-
pression of existentiality, his revealing himself as com-
ing into authentic existence. Furthermore, it is an ac-
tive process whereby he now "alerts" and invites the Other
to experience their relatedness from his particular world-
view, to make their situation <u>his</u> situation as well. Now
he is not only in a situation of relatedness, but also
simultaneously in a situation of separatedness. He now
has the possibility of experiencing what Laing (1965) re-
fers to as a sense of "primary ontological security", a
sense which comes, following physical birth and biologi-
cal aliveness, with the child "becoming existentially
born as real and alive" (p. 41). At this point, Laing
suggests, the child <u>feels</u> alive and real, as well as
having a <u>sense</u> of being an entity, with continuity in
time and location in space. Kaplan (1977), in her dis-
cussion of the development of the infant becoming an indi-
vidual refers to this point as the "psychological birth"
of the child, prior to which he only existed in a situation

of oneness with the mother.

An implied aspect of this shift in scene from the social to the psychological is brought into clearer focus by Langer (1970) in his discussion of Werner's developmental theory. In terms of organism-Umwelt (surrounding world) relationships:

There is a shift in dominance from the biological press of the scene to the contructive activity of the subject...the organism becomes increasingly sovereign in ititiating and determining the character of its own actions; and it increasingly molds or constructs the content of the scenes to suit its own needs or goals. (p. 743)

From this perspective the actions of the infant no longer reflect only reflex reactions to stimuli, or goal-directed sensorimotor actions upon signaled things (i.e. habits or learned patterns of response); now the infant's actions reflect his contemplative knowledge about objects and events.

No longer does the child confront reality face-to-face, playing the role of passive re-actor in situations of biophysical press. Through his first tentative acts of distanciation he reveals the world as it exists for him. He himself becomes visible as the background to his being-in-the-world appears to recede as a result of his distanciations. He has come into existence through his own actions and is, therefore, responsible not only for

himself, but for the others he is in relation with. He is free within the boundaries of his social situation to act existentially, to cause his being to be revealed, but he remains responsible for those actions. The quality of his actions, in terms of his freedom and responsibility, constitute his existentiality, his personality of experience.

Oneness and Separatedness: The Bond That Ties

At this point we come to the central theme for a theory of human becoming, a theory of the emergence of the self and the development of personality as a mode of existence. Through the process of distanciation, the child has revealed himself as visibly distinct from the enormous complex of "things out there". As he performs these first tentative acts, the child emerges into the foreground, becoming a focal point for the other objects and events which constitute the background of his existential situation. Yet he maintains a close relationship to his world; he does not, as it were, lose contact with reality "out there". No matter the distance he creates, a bond remains--the word.

As Vygotsky has said, the word is a microcosm of human consciousness, and Miller (1973) adds that language is the "thread upon which we hang our experiences" (p. 11). As proposed here, the word represents the existential life-line of an individual's being-in-the-world, a line

which he, himself, throws out to capture a world-view
upon which to direct his actions. The existential essence
of a man is to be sought in his language-as-a-world-view,
the mode of existence defined by his actions directed
upon this world view. The degree to which his language and
actions are unique to him, within the boundaries of his
oneness and separatedness, is the degree to which he re-
veals himself visible as an authenitc personality-in-the-
world. The relationship between language and personality
is not causal in a deterministic sense. In that the two
presuppose one another, their relationship is emergent and
developmental, not only revealing a man's becoming, but
defining its very essence over the course of his life.

Notes

1. There is a correspondence between the visible-invisible metaphor as used here, and the basic theme presented in Merleau-Ponty's (1964/1968) book, The Visible and the Invisible. In the first paragraph of his manuscript, Merleau-Ponty sets the central question to be addressed:

> We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind express a faith common to the natural man and the philosopher--the moment he opens his eyes; they refer to a deep-seated set of mute "opinions" implicated in our lives. But what is strange about this faith is that if we seek to articulate it into theses or statements, if we ask ourselves what is this we, what seeing is, and what thing or world is, we enter into a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions.
> (p. 3, original italics).

One of the cul-de-sacs the author warns of is the position of empiricism which, he suggests, underestimates the coherence of the things. In other words, Merleau-Ponty argues that the sensible thing is not merely " a wandering troop of sensations" (p. 123). Rather, there is an "immanent unity" of the things themselves, an internal principle or essence which transcends the sense

data and manifests the thing as visible and recognizable.
'In the midst of the sensuous experience there is an in-
tuition of an essence, a sense, a signification. The
sensible thing is the place where the invisible is cap-
tured in the visible" (p. xli).

V. Language and Personality: An Integration

The task of the preceding three chapters has been to establish a framework for the postulation of an original model of personality development, based on the relationship between language and the emergence of self. The attempt has been made to consider three components to this framework: 1) the importance of language for a view of man and his actions; 2) the nature, process and functions of language; and 3) the development of a perspective on personality consistent with notions of man-as-process and man-as-being-in-the-world. The purpose of the present chapter is to synthesize these three components into a meaningful whole, a framework upon which to build processes and levels of development, as well as modes of existence.

The work of Cassirer, Graumann, and Whitehead provides a view of man immersed in a symbolic, active universe. Man as animal symbolicum has created and re-created a culture unique to himself, and possible only via his transcendence of more primitive modes of functioning. He comes to live a life of meanings rather than a mere life of impulses. Through his creations and re-creations of his own reality, man is seen to bring forth the world in which he is situated. It is this cyclical notion of action-world-situation which characterizes the existence of man.

Whitehead, using different terms, characterizes man's existence as process--issue--data. The metaphysics of Whitehead is one of organic activity and energy, what he refers to as <u>process</u>. He stresses that this view is antithetical to the notions of Newtonian physics wherein reality is seen to consist of material bodies-in-motion due to the action and reaction of natural forces. From a psychological perspective, man-as-process is juxtaposed to theories which emphasize forces to explain the actions and attitudes of man. Rather than being the resultant vector of various forces, man-as-process precedes the world of psychoanalysis, behaviourism or humanism; his existence precedes his essence. His essence is to be understood in terms of his language for, according to Whitehead, language is human nature itself.

The human infant exists biologically before he speaks; he is not born in possession of the word although, for certain, he is born with the capability to capture the word. Whether he captures the word primarily through a process of learning or of nativistic maturation has implications for whether language is viewed as complex verbal behaviour or a complex and universal form of structure, governed by strict rules of grammar and transformation. A synthesis view of these and other theories of language would seem to indicate that language is not only speech sounds and a grammar, but more. It appears as a unique

capacity of man, biologically determined to an exten ,
but dependent upon the learning process. Adding to this
its semantic component, a perspective of language as a
world-view, developed through an essential social rela-
tionship with Others, is possible.

Language may be viewed as an act of verbal behaviour,
governed by the laws of reinforcement and social contin-
gencies. It may also be viewed as an act of grammatical
transformation. Thirdly, it may be viewed as an act of
re-presentation of a perceived reality, based on the in-
ternal schematizing activity of the perceiving person.
When viewed as such, language retains the characteristic
of process, aimed at symbol formation and re-formation.
It is predicated upon the classification of human reality
as an open system of symbols rather than a closed system
of signals as is characteristic of other animals. This
does not imply, however, that humans only act symboli-
cally. Rather, depending on their level of development
and mode of existence, humans act signally, even to the
point of responding to symbols in a signal fashion, there-
by creating pseudosymbols. Human action, therefore, may
be viewed as occurring along a basic symbolizing coninuum,
ranging from signal to pseudosymbol to symbol.

As well as having a nature and being a process,
language has a number of functions; it accomplishes many
things and plays many roles. Detailed taxonomies of

language are available, although most functions can be summarized into three broad categories: informational, expressive, and directive. Language is both objective and subjective, it is denotative and connotative. It tells us something about the perceptions of the speaker while, at the same time, telling us something about the speaker himself. It is also a powerful means by which actions of ourselves and Others are directed toward certain ends or goals, and how an action is maintained once it is begun. Language is not only the contents of a world-view, it is an objective and subjective means of creating and expressing that world-view to self and Others. The three basic functions of language, taken as a whole, form a superordinate role of language in the construction of a life. Langauge, as seen in terms of a world-view and a basic human process, serves an _existential_ function. Not only does language construct a life, but it also presents a life. It literally and figuratively tells a life story which is unique to each and every individual person who acts along its continuum.

The quality of a person's actions which differentiate that person from the Other is the manifestation of personality, or existentiality. Personality is also an active process; it is part of a person's experience rather than a possession of the person's being. One does not observe personality, for it itself is invisible. It

is the invisible mask of symbolic action which allows man
to become visible as a being-in-the-world. Personality is
the statement a person makes when, through his actions as
animal symbolicum, he says "I exist". In such a way he has
distinguished himself from the Other and stood apart as a
personality-in-the-world-of-self-and-Others.

Like language, personality is not present at birth as
much as it is possible. Like language, personality deve-
lops within the context of the individual's relationship
with Others-in-the-world. Like language, personality fol-
lows the fundamental law of sociogenesis; what the child
does for himself, he first does with the help of another.
The visibility of the child is, at first, a mask created
for him by the Other. He becomes an authentic personality-
in-the-world only as he transcends the illusions of social
conventionality. The child comes to exist only by first
existing-with-the-Other. In essence, personality and lan-
guage are both developmental phenomena and, consequently,
their relationship is developmental in nature. The fol-
lowing section of this study attempts to outline not only
the levels of language and personality development, but
modes of existence which theoretically correspond, in a
one-to-one fashion, to these levels. If the initial re-
action to a one-to-one correspondence between levels and
modes is one of seeming contradition, the suggestion is
offered to consider them as physics has come to consider

light as both wave and particle, depending on the per-
spective of the observer. The first perspective, to be
considered in the next chapter, is that of levels of per-
sonality development. Immediately following, Chapter VII
will discuss the second perspective, that of modes of exis-
tence.

VI. Levels of Development

As mentioned at the end of the preceding chapter, the existential visibility of human persons may be viewed from two perspectives. First, as levels of personality development, existential visibility is seen to progressively develop through six steps, defined along a continuum of symbol formation and transformation. Second, existential visibility is viewed to manifest in one of six modes of existence, defined in terms of the quality of a person's relatedness-in-the-world through his actions as man-in-process.

Perhaps the main reason why two perspectives are necessary is that a person's actions do not necessarily reflect consistency across life situations. That is, a person who has developed the competence, so to speak, to act at developmental Level IV may in fact act more according to Level III development in a given situation. It is almost as if Level IV is his developmental competence, while Level III is his present performance, or mode of existence. This principle of action inconsistency is central to the theory being presented here. To fully appreciate its implications and operation, it is necessary to consider each perspective on existential visibility, starting first with the notion of levels of development.

Before defining the six levels per se, it is first

important to clearly understand what is meant by the phrase "levels of development". One key to this understanding is the notion of existential visibility developed in the chapter on personality. In turn, the key to this notion is to understand "existential" in the context of Sartre's (1957) first principle of existentialism. That is, man is what he makes himself to be. Man, according to Sartre, is "condemned to freedom" in that he must constantly choose his own being according to no a priori standards and, by so doing, accepts the responsibility for his choice not only for himself but for all men as well.

Putting this line of reasoning into the context of human development, we must ask whether a person always makes free choices and, consequently, becomes responsible for those choices. In other words, we ask whether the actions of persons are always made on the basis of active contemplation and deliberation among alternatives. By asking this, we necessarily ask to what degree the person's visibility is authentic from an existential perspective; to what degree is the person responsible for his own visibility?

The answer to these questions put forth in the present theory is that persons are not always responsible for their choices and actions, since, developmentally, they are not capable of decisions based on contemplative perception. At times, the distinction between choices which

are responsible and those which are not is quite obvious.
For example, there is a clear distinction between the infant's cry at the face of a stranger and the more developmentally mature person who acts in the presence of a stranger by approaching and introducing himself. At other times, the distinction is quite subtle, as when a person attends a social gathering because it has authentic meaning for him, or because it is the "proper" thing to do. Levels of personality development are based on these distinctions and others like them; between actions which are determined and actions which are authentically chosen by the individual.

In the present theory, the distinctions between the levels of development are based on a continuum of symbol formation and transformation. That is, at each level the person acts or re-acts on the basis of signals, symbols, or pseudosymbols. While the present study postulates six levels of personality development, there is a relationship to the tripartate taxonomy offered by Werner and Kaplan (1963) or organism-Umwelt relationships. Reconstruction of their taxonomy is presented here since it provides a valuable framework for the ensuing discussion (see Table I). The six levels of personality development to be discussed in the present study are: 1) Primary Fusion, 2) Habitual Re-Action, 3) Conventional Re-Action, 4) Proactive Transformation, 5) Existential Commitment, and 6) Secondary

TABLE I

TAXONOMY OF DEVELOPMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS

(from Werner and Kaplan, 1963)

Organism-Umwelt Relationships	Means-ends Relationships
I. Tropistic-reflex reactions to <u>Stimuli</u>	Biophysical and biochemical transmission culminating in stereotyped reaction patterns of parts of, or whole, organism.
II. Goal-directed sensory - motor action upon <u>Signaled things</u>	Specied-specific behaviors and individually learned patterns of response ("habit"); formation of signals (mammals); "natural" tool usage (apes); all predominantly in the service of biological ends.
III. Contemplative knowledge about <u>Objects</u>	Construction of tools and formation of symbols in the service of knowing about and manipulating the environment.

Fusion.

Level I: Primary Fusion

Primary Fusion represents a life of impulses of the
most primitive form. Action is not conscious in the sense
that no latency of response occurs between the presenta-
tion of the stimulus and the following reaction. There
is, as mentioned earlier, an immediate and direct confron-
tation with reality, an organismic fusion of subject and
object. There is no differentiation between the person
and the world of things and Others; existence is essen-
tially embedded, being visible only in terms of something
but itself. Since there is no differentiation, there is
a relationship of "oneness" with nature and symbiosis
with Others, as in the case of the young infant with the
Mothering-one.

The role of language, which is totally the language
of the Other at this level, is that of adding to the com-
plex of environmental stimuli. The spoken word does not
have meaning from a semantic point of view, nor does it
have meaning in terms of eliciting a particular response.
Recent research shows (Condon, 1974), interestingly enough,
that language is a powerful orienting stimulus for human
infants, much more powerful than other sounds in the en-
vironment. So even at this most primitive level of human
development, language appears to have a certain saliency
and prepotency in terms of its expressive function, but

not yet an organized effect on actions.

Level II: Habitual Re-Action

Level II of human personality development still essentially represents a life of impulses and re-actions to stimuli, but at a higher level than in Primary Fusion. The difference between the two levels is the more highly structured and instrumental nature of habits and means-ends relationships appearing at Level II. At this stage action is basically initiated and maintained by the social environment and its contingencies, including the spoken word. Developmentally, the perspective put forth by the behaviourists, such as that by Bijou and Baer (1965), is representative of Level II action on the part of the individual.

At this level, elements of language such as individual words or common phrases fall into the category of signals. Not signals as defined broadly by Skinner (1974), but signals as defined more narrowly by Bain (1975) and Werner and Kaplan (1963). Examples of such signals would be "Fire!", "Stop!"; "We get off here!" where the reaction of a person is immediate and total; there is no delay for contemplation to occur. In many ways, the examples given above are no different than saying "Down, boy" to a dog.

The role of language has changed, then, from that of orienting, or expressive, stimuli to instrumental stimuli.

While there is expression contained in these signals, they are not symbols due to the lack of semantic content and representational capabilities. Consequently, the reaction to them remains as direct as the reactions in Level I. This relationship between the two levels, which is a relationship of both change and permanence, is vitally important, for it exemplifies the underlying principles of development which hold for all six levels. The principles most critical to the present example are not new in that they were articulated by Werner and his associates on numerous occasions (Werner, 1948; Werner and Kaplan, 1963; Langer, 1970). Even Cassirer (1944) discusses them, but not in the same terminology as will be used in the present study.

The two basic principles being discussed are those of orthogenesis and spirality. The orthogenetic principle, as defined by Werner and Kaplan, is the "tendency to move from a state of relative globality and undifferentiatedness towards states of increasing differentiation and hierarchic integration" (p. 7). At each level of development, therefore, changes occur which not only result in more complex structures, but in the emergence of new forms. There is both continuity and discontinuity, with the new forms replacing the old, but the old not being completely lost. The "fate of the more primitive forms is explained in terms of the second principle, that of spirality. As

the authors explain, lower levels of functioning:

> are subordinated to more advanced levels of
> functioning; they may come to the fore again
> under special internal or external conditions,
> for example, in dream states, in pathological
> states, under intoxication by certain drugs, or
> under various experimental conditions. They al-
> so, and characteristically, may come to the fore
> when the organism is confronted with especially
> difficult and novel tasks; in such cases, one
> often finds a return to more primitive modes
> of functioning before progressing towards full-
> fledged higher operations. (p. 8)

As will be discussed in the next section, the description
above may be considered a narrow interpretation. For
now, let it be said that human life is characterized by
a constant fluctuating between levels. If it were not,
the elusive "predition and control" of mechanistic psy-
chology would long ago have become a reality.

Level III: Conventional Re-Action

The transition from Level II to Level III is marked
by the appearance of what have been previously referred
to as "pseudosymbols". That is, action at this level of
development is regulated by symbols rather than signals,
but the meanings given these symbols are essentially the
meanings of Others. Such symbols, or pseudosymbols, are

of social conventionality, particularly in terms of the expectations for re-action they carry with them. In a sense, these pseudosymbols create the illusion of free choice that the behaviourists often speak of. They are the subtle manipualtors of human action and behaviour, behaviour which when carefully considered is seen as re-active, determined, and therefore not responsible. As a result, existence as such is inauthentic; the person remains embedded in the meanings of the Other and is said to be engulfed.

One of the main strengths of the behaviourists' theoretical position in psychology lies in the fact that a great deal of human life is regulated at both the habitual Level II as well as the pseudosymbol conventionality of Level III. The "silliness" that Huxley (1940) spoke of, the various dogmas, creeds and causes that effect the construction of so many human lives on a daily basis are often nothing more than very complex signals, disguised as pseudosymbols, subject to operant control as Skinner (1974) suggests. The rampant consumerism so obvious in modern society's market-place mentality of advertising and disposable income is a ubiquitous example. The transition from signal to pseudosymbol represents a level of its own, although it is not identified in Werner and Kaplan's taxonomy. The third level or organism-Umwelt relationship which they differentiate represents the fourth level of

the present conceptualization.

Level IV: Proactive Transformation

Proactive Transformation refers to that level of development where symbol-formation and transformation take on an individually unique, or "post conventional" dimension. It is at this level where the person, by creating and re-creating his own meanings, transcends the conventional meanings embodied in the ethics of the group. It is at this point where the self begins to emerge as a viable and possible authentic personality-in-the-world. That is, the visibility of the person sharpens as he takes actions which serve to reduce the degree of his engulfment, thereby transcending his existential bondage to the Other. As the individual acts in this manner, he commits himself to a search for meanings and motives to construct a life. At this level, the search begins, but is far from over as the individual must consider many alternatives presented and re-presented to him by Others and himself.

At this level, the delay in response is no longer indicative of whether or not the individual will choose to accept society's conventional meanings. That decision has already been made in the negative, and the act of that decision represents the act which places the individual at Level IV rather than at Level III. Now the delay is indicative of the choice, in situ, of any number of transformed alternatives. Man, at this point in his deve-

lopment, is making a choice to act in one of many ways, which he values, to bring forth his visibility as a unique individual. At the same time, he remains responsible to the Others he is in constant relation with. As Whitehead (1927) suggests, man's actions are now free of "environmental obligations"; he is exercising his freedom and, by doing so, is condemned to accept responsibility for his actions.

As mentioned earlier, the distinction between Level III and Level IV is often quite subtle, therefore making it diffucult to differentiate between authentic and inauthentic existence. Another perspective of the difference between the two may be gained by putting them into the context of language paradox. That is, at Level III the power of language is most clearly evident, consistent with Merleau-Ponty's statement that "language has man", and Heidegger's comment that language is the "master of man". Not until man has, and is the master of, language, not until he can transcend the power of language to direct his own actions, is man developed to Level IV. Cassirer's statement that "man has an active power" only holds true in a developmental sense; it is not an *a priori* essence of man.

Level V: Existential Commitment

Level V of personality development is that stage where the symbol formations and, particularly, the symbol trans-

formations of Level IV become embodied into the life mea-
nings of the individual. Actions are no longer based on
moment-to-moment contemplation of meaning, as in Level IV.
Rather, actions are based on values established as a re-
sult of these earlier contemplative acts and search for
meaning. In one sense, actions at this point may be con-
sidered "habitual", but they are habits based on idiopathic
world-views which have their roots in nomothetic ethics;
they are not bound by the conventions of the group.

It is important to not that the "habits" being re-
ferred to at this point are not the same as those identi-
fied by Werner and Kaplan (1963) in their taxonomy of de-
velopmental transformations (see page 121). The habits
presently being discussed may be regarded as second-order
habits, essentially being derived from a value clarifica-
tion process of the individual person. They represent a
characteristic style or pquality of behaviour which re-
flects responsible decisions and choices of the individual
as a being-in-the-world-with-Others. While these habits
have their roots in the ethics and teachings of the group,
they do not necessarily reflect the conventional expecta-
tions of the group.

The relationship between Levels III, IV and V may be
viewed from the perspective provided by Sartre (1957) in
his discussion of choice and responsibility. At Level
III the individual appears to choose for himself, but

what he actually does is choose meanings provided by the
Others. Consequently, his choice is determined, his exis-
tence inauthentic, and his responsibility limited to the
fact of his membership in the group. At Level IV, the
person actively creates and re-creates all possible mea-
nings before making his choice. Level IV represents man's
search for meaning, his struggle to make sense out of his
life in the face of the often oppressing values of conven-
tional society.

The actions of a person at Level IV may, to the care-
ful observer, appear inconsistent, even radically so.
Such inconsistency is to be expected as the person "tests"
various life meanings via his actions. Although he has
made free choices and is, therefore, responsible for his
actions, he has yet to make a commitment to any one meaning
in the situation under observation. Questioning is a con-
stant process of forming and transforming his world-view.
He is at the point, as suggested by Vygotsky's sociogenic
law, where he has had the help of Others and now reaches
toward his own future with his own help.

Level V marks the point where the person finally
makes an existential commitment to a world-view which he
constructed through Level IV. By "commitment" is meant
that the person clearly stands (exists) for a stated life-
meaning. He has become predictable ("habitual") in the
sense of acting in a consistent manner across situations

which embody his adopted life-meanings. In accordance
with the principle of spirality, however, he as a total
individual will not be predictable across all situations
since his level of development will vary from situation
to situation. This point will be returned to in the fol-
lowing chapter where "modes of existence" are discussed.

Level VI: Secondary Fusion

Level VI, the final level of personality development,
is a difficult one to describe. Perhaps the difficulty
lies in the presence of another paradox, for Level VI re-
presents that point in our experience where language leads
to the silence of being-one-with-nature, standing in awe
of our own perception and creation of unity and harmony
among diverse influences surrounding us. Such silence
would not be possible without language and without the
formations of the more primitive levels. Secondary Fusion
is also a paradox, since, even though it depends on lan-
guage for its emergence, language used in the attempt to
describe the experience only serves to destroy its unity
and harmony. While we can articulate and describe each
part of the experience, the whole-which-is-larger-than-
the-sum-of-the-parts forever escapes our attempts at cap-
turing via the word.

When we listen to Tchaikovsky's "Marche Slave", for
instance, we not only hear the sound of the various instru-
ments, we hear them blended into a harmonic pattern which

we can recognize and, to some degree, anticipate. Furthermore, we can transcend the physical stimulus of the music and re-present numerous images to ourselves; images related to the piece's thematic history, the passions of the composer, or the great hall in London on a warm spring evening when we first heard it performed. As we now listen to the music all these images, perceptions, and sensations occur simultaneously, making an impression upon our life which we cannot articulate in a single word or phrase. We can isolate each, as we have done in writing about them here, but as we do, we lose their meaning-as-a-whole. This inability of ours to express in words our experience, which has been founded on our ability to symbolize and contemplate, is captured by William James (1902/1961) in his reference to "the more" when discussing varieties of religious experiences. The following, taken from James' manuscript, is an example of the failure of our words to express some "thing" which we know to have a significant effect on the meaning of our life:

> Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different.... No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of conscious-

ness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question--for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a map.

(p. 305)

Before leaving the perspective of personality development by levels in favor of a consideration of modes of existence, the following table is presented as a summary of the six levels. Many of the points made in the table, as well as in the preceding narrative, are suitable from either perspective. The next chapter will, however, focus on operational principles and dymanics as an attempt to better understand the relationship between the levels and modes as they occur in the life of an individual.

TABLE II

LEVELS OF PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

I. Primary Fusion	Persons are mobilized to respond organisimically (immediately, biologically), to "participate" in terms of their physiognomic perceptions. Life is one of impulses; the commerce between body and world is one of motor-affect. No distance exists between subject and object either in terms of self-Other or self-self.
II. Habitual Re-Action	Persons react to signals which have meaning only in the sense that they stimulate and maintain species-specific behaviours and individually learned patterns of response ("habits"), predominantly in the service of biological ends (survival).
III. Conventional Re-Action	Persons react to pseudosymbols (words, phrases, slogans, doctrines, creeds) in a signal-like fashion. Pseudosymbols have meaning only in terms of the group they are a product of, not in existential terms of the individual who is reacting. Existence is inauthentic in that it is based on the visibility of the group, within which the individual is embedded, or engulfed.

TABLE II (CONT.)

IV.	Proactive Transformation	Actions of the person are based on their comtemplative meanings in their relationship-in-the-world, and their resultant symbol transformations. Symbols have meaning in terms of the individual who transforms them. Existence is authentic in that it is based on the visibility of the individual within the context of the group he defines by his existence. There is not only distanciation of self from Others, but of subject and object in one's self. The self is emerging from the cacophony of humanity which once held it captive. Man's search for meaning has begun, although it is far from over. The individual remains inconsistent and unpredictable, dependent on his situation.
V.	Existential Commitment	Actions of the person are based on the adopted symbols of Level IV, which now embody man's existential meanings. Persons act according to these meanings without need for moment-to-moment comtemplation and planning. There is a natural harmony between the life meanings embodied in the person's language and his actions as an individual within a society of Others. Language pardoxically leads to the silence which resolves the tension between individual and society.

TABLE II (CONT.)

| VI. Secondary Fusion | The silent perception of unity and wholeness which, via language, may be reduced into constituent parts but, as a result, is no longer experienced as a whole. The "more" of life's experiences which has its foundation in language, as well as its undoing. Mystical and transcendental experiences predominate. |

VII. Modes of Existence

In many ways, the preceding chapter with its table of developmental levels is sufficient to distinguish and define the levels. As well, much of what has been said illustrates the second perspective, that of <u>modes of existence</u>, particularly in terms of indications of life-style characteristics. Yet a number of points need to be made to clearly outline the parameters of the present theory of man. The purpose of this chapter is to make these additional points from the perspective of the six modes of existence which correspond to the levels of development.

The first point was mentioned briefly in the preceding chapter in relation to the principle of spirality. At that point it was suggested that Werner and Kaplan's presentation of the principle was too narrow in terms of considering the totality of human life. In the present model, exmphasis is on the point that "special internal and external conditions" and the presence of "difficult and novel tasks" (which Werner and Kaplan see bringing lower forms of functioning to the fore) describe the majority of life experiences for many people, rather than the exception.

A phenomenon of human behaviour which has caused considerable difficulty for many psychological theories of

man is that human beings are perhaps one of the most un-
predictable, inconsistent organisms on the face of the
earth. It is true that very high degrees of prediction
and control are obtained in carefully designed environments
and situations. Yet we know that life goes on outside
the psychologists' laboratories, and only with "genera-
lized" relationship to the life-as-led-by-human-subjects.

This phenomenon of human existence, referred to here
as the principle of action inconsistency, lies at the heart
of the principle of spirality. The principle of spirality
is an attempt to form a meaningful perspective on human de-
velopment, which it does quite satisfactorily. However,
in terms of human existence it remains narrow, particular-
ly since there is the indication by Werner and Kaplan that
there is a partial return to more primitive modes before
progressing to "fullfledged higher operations". In con-
trast, the present model suggests the possbility of total
return to lower, or other, modes of existence (developmen-
tal levels). Furthermore, movement between modes in the
present conceptualization is more characteristic of quan-
tum leaps than of smooth, basically continuous movements
up or down a spiral curve. This is precisely why we re-
quire the dual perspective.

Developmentally, the six levels appear on the scene
sequentially, each being built upon the foundation of the
one preceding. Existentially, the six modes appear on the

scene almost in a random fashion, depending on the situation of the individual. Shifts from one level of development to the next, in terms of the acquisition of competence, may take years. Shifts from one mode of existence to another may take milliseconds. Furthermore, shifts in developmental level are restriced to three levels: the level of present competence, the level immediately below (the spiral effect), and the level immediatley above as transition begins into the next higher stage. Shifts in mode of existence are restricted only in terms of the number of levels at which the person has acquired competence. That is, existentially speaking a person can shift from Mode V_0 to Mode II whereas, developmentally, the shift from Level V to Level II would not be possible. Consequently, since what is possible existentially but not possible developmentally, even though the definition of the levels and modes is the same, we require the two perspectives. Again, as in physics, light is light; but light is wave or particle, never both at the same time.

The following summary of each mode of existence is presented to further differentiate between them. The presentation pays particular attention to the relationship which underlies the present conceptualization of "personality".

Mode I: Primary Fusion

Language is represented as verbal stimuli, primarily

serving an expressive function, with aspects of the direc-
tive function present in terms of the orienting prepotency
of the human voice. The informational function appears
only at later stages of Level I development where the
Other points out (objectifies) reality by labelling. The
transition to Mode II begins when the person labels rea-
lity in coresponsive participation with the Other.

Action is guided by its own diffuse directionality,
and becomes regularized as selected stimuli become more
salient, including verbal stimuli. Action is immediate
and impulsive, it is "participative" in terms of phyiogno-
mic mobilization of the whole person who is englufed by
the world-view of Others.

Mode II: Habitual Re-Action

Language is present at a signal level only. Automiza-
tion of the symbol is not complete, so it is not yet fully
representational. The expressive function is more diffe-
rentiated in terms of the discriminability of emotions and
states of affect. The directive function is also at a
signal level: words operate as stimuli, but for more com-
plex chains of responses (habits). The informational
function is represented by increasingly complex hierarchies
of stimuli for more complex responses.

Action is very much under the influence of signals
impinging upon the individual. There is still action
which is "free of environmental obligation" such as in

exploration or what has been referred to as "autistic" or 'circular" actions. However, there is increasing pressure from Others to form "acceptable" patterns of behaviour. As these acceptable forms come under the influence of language, the transition to Mode III begins. The existence of the person at Mode II is still engulfed, being characterized in terms of the world of the Other. The person is primarily visible as a being-in-the-world-for-Others.

Mode III: Conventional Re-Action

Language is present at a pseudosymbol level. The autonomization of the symbol is complete, but the internal schematizing activity of the individual is being shaped by powerful contingencies of the social environment. The directive function of language is essentially identical to Mode II, but there is now the illusion of free choice by the person, and this illusion gives the appearance of self-regulation of behaviour. The information function is operative in terms of the person "discovering anew" the meanings and life experiences of his people.

Action is characterized by increasingly complex habits and learned patterns of response. Values are learned, not formulated in terms of the consideration of possible alternatives. Actions are guided by slogans, creeds, passions of the group mentality, and expectations of conventional society. Existence is inauthentic; the person is visible only as a member of the group that

engulfs him.

Mode IV: Proactive Transformation

Language is represented by individualized processes of symbol formation and transformation. The person, having "discovered" the reality of his people, now creates and re-creates his own world-view. Differentation of the expressive function includes Halliday's personal function at a higher level. The person has distanced himself from the conventional meanings of society and, as a result, is emerging as the master of his own processes of behaviour. Self-regulation is emerging as an actual process rather than as an illusion. The person is able to hold two or more semantic perspectives simultaneously.

Action is self-regulative. Often, in similar situations, action is radically inconsistent as the person "tests" reality in his search for life-meanings. The person may act with the group (as in Mode III), but will continually be questioning his own actions. There is distanciation of subject and object in one's self, implying a constant observation of one's self-in-action. Existence is becoming more authentic as the person disembeds himself from the group ethic. He is becoming an authentic being-in-the-world-with-others.

Mode V: Existential Commitment

Language is similar to Mode IV. The primary difference is in terms of the firm establishment and

operation of the superordinate existential function. There is a total _in situ_ commitment of the person to values and attitudes embodied in the symbol transformations occuring at Mode IV. The life structuring process takes visible form in terms of the person's existential actions.

Action may appear habitual in that there is little response latency, as well as a higher degree of consistency and predictability across similar life situations. However, it is a different level of habit than in Mode II since the person now maintains self-awareness via subject-object distanciation. Actions are always open to question, but most likely in response to Mode VI types of experience ("peak" or "mystical"). Existence is authentic, and the person is visible as a being-in-the-world-for-self-and-with-others.

Mode VI: Secondary Fusion

Language per se, is not present. It has provided the foundation, and led to the silence, of unity and harmony with nature. There is a third level of perception, a perception of "wholeness", as opposed to contemplative or physiognomic perception. Articulation of the Mode VI experience immediately results in the person existing at Mode IV (search for meaning), for the process of objectification would recreate the distance between the person and the things and events of the world.

Action is direct participation and immersion into the flow of experiential energy. It is a blending of the organismic process of the person with the surrounding process of nature as embodied in that situation. Persons existing at Mode VI often appear to be in a meditative or hypnotic state, transcending the effects of impinging stimuli.

Before leaving the topic of modes of existence and levels of development, it may be helpful to review them once again from a slightly different perspective, So far, they have been presented in fairly abstract and general terms. Although the main objective of the present study is to construct a theoretical perspective on language and personality, some concrete examples of the six modes and levels may nonetheless be illustrative.

Developmentally, Primary Fusion represents the first nine to twelve months of life, the preverbal period of the infant. Once the infant begins to understand and use language himself, he is viewed to be entering into Level II (Habitual Re-Action).

Existentially, Primary Fusion may not only be evident in the infant's embeddedness into the existence of the Other, but may also be observed in "mature" adults. Extreme impulsivity and emotional reactivity are just two descriptive examples of behaviour in this mode of existence.

As mentioned above, <u>Habitual Re-Action</u> is that deve-
lopmental level wherein there is the initial objectifica-
tion of reality by the young child. This rudimentary pro-
cess of distanciation is extremely important in that it
forms the basis for the emergence of self as distinct
from Others and other things. From a directive point of
view, words operate as signals, impelling the child to act,
but particularly if the child is already "set" to act or
has already initiated an action.

Behaviour in this mode of existence appears as
ritualistic, stereotypic and compulsive. Persons are like-
ly to behave in such a way as to indicate they are perfor-
ming an act of faith because they "have no choice". The
person exists as a self-<u>with</u>-Others, in a close, often
symbiotic, relationship. Behaviour is largely in the in-
terest of survival, gratification and the avoidance of
direct punishment.

In contrast, the characteristic behaviours of <u>Con-</u>
<u>ventional Re-Action</u> are often in the interest of main-
taining the social order, attaining social esteem and
avoiding censure by the group. The person in Mode III is
a conformist, existing as a self-<u>for</u>-Others. He acts as
if "truth" were not only attainable, but known by himself
and others whose views he values. The person will often
become defensive when confronted by an alternative per-
spective, particularly if that alternative goes against

his own value system. He acts according to, or in the name of, creeds and slogans, being under the illusion that these "causes" are the ends that justify the means.

Developmentally, Conventional Re-Action represents the beginnings of self-regulation via the directive function of speech and language. Now the word has both the power to impell and the power to inhibit action; the paradox of language becomes a reality. There is partial emergence of self in that the person can now manipulate language and produce many novel constructions. On the surface, the person's language appears to be "mature" and, furthermore, the person can report that he has "thought about" what he is saying and doing. However, upon close analysis, the semantic content of a person's language would indicate an adoption of conventional, Other-determined meanings. In other words, what appear to be personal symbols on the surface, are found to be pseudosymbols when investigated in depth.

Conventional Re-Action is a critical level of development and mode of existence. It is the level and mode at which the person essentially exists in a state of illusion regarding the emergence of self. The pressures and forces of social conventionality are not only powerful and numerous, but extremely subtle as well. The child at this level of development has begun his formal education, becoming exposed to a broader peer group which sets numerous

standards for acceptance. In order to develop to a higher level, the child must risk losing this acceptance of peers and, perhaps even more importantly, family.

In another sense, Conventional Re-Action represents the mode of superficial security. That is, to act in this mode is to behave within the parameters of societal expectations and, therefore, as a self-for-Others. It is to avoid the risk of unfavorable consequences. Several writers (e.g. Blatz, 1966; Dabrowski, 1970) have expressed the viewpoint that development to a higher, more authentic level of development and security depends on actions by the person which involve either risk or severe emotional shock to shift, or challenge, the person's conventional perspective. The present theory would support such a framework for the process of personality development.

The fourth level of development and mode of existence, Proactive Transformation, requires two conditions to be met. First, the person must at least contemplate, in a rational sense, alternative perspectives, values or actions related to a given situation. Furthermore, this contemplation must occur in an atmosphere of relative, as opposed to absolute truth. The person must be able to see the validity of more than one alternative, even though this validity is not internally consistent with the person's existing value structure. In other words, the person must be prepared to change his values regardless of

the consequences of the ensuing action, which brings us
to the second condition: the person must take action based
on his rational contemplation of alternatives.

The key to the Proactive Transformation mode of exis-
tence is not only in terms of the linguistic and semantic
transformation of conventional ethics, but the correspon-
ding action based on the transformations. As Sartre has
said, a person is as he acts to be, and this view is cri-
tical for Mode IV existence and development. By acting in
a manner which is not determined by social expectations
exclusively, the person is stepping forward, so to speak,
to be recognized and perceived as a unique and authentic
personality-in-the-world. To only speak of acting in an
authentic, self-emergent manner is to fall short of Level
IV development and Mode IV existence. There must be a cor-
respondence of language and action, within the Level or
Mode, for there to be personality integration.

The same principle would apply in Existential Commit-
ment, where the self-regulative language of a person would
correspond directly to actions. The primary difference
between this level/mode and Level IV/Mode IV is that there
no longer is "testing" of alternative value systems. The
person at this level has made a committment to the meanings
searched for at Level IV. The person acts in the name of
causes, but Mode V causes would have both internal and ex-
ternal validity (as compared to the limited external

validity of Mode III causes).

Mode V behaviour would be typified by men and women
whom Maslow (1968) would refer to as highly developed or
self-actualized. In some ways, the behaviour of revolu-
tionary leaders would be typical of Mode V, while the
followers of the movements would likely be acting/at Mode
III.

Again, Secondary Fusion is a difficult level and mode
to describe, whether developmentally or existentially.
Existence at Mode VI can be fleeting, or it can be drawn
out for hours or days. It may occur in solitude, or it
may occur in a concert hall filled with two thousand Others.
There are no words to describe the Mode VI experience with-
out essentially converting it to a Mode IV, objectified
experience.

VIII. Conclusion

As stated in the introduction, the purpose of the pre-
sent study was to present a theoretical perspective on hu-
man personality development, based on a framework of the
importance of language ████████ understanding of human be-
haviour and existence ████████ ding chapters represent
an attempt to synth███████ ber of major perspectives on
the nature of man via the establishment of a unifying bond
between them, a bond which would serve as a mulit-dimen-
sional continuum upon which to interpret and account for
the broad range and variability of human behaviour. The
result has been the construction of a multi-level, multi-
modal theory of human development and existence. The
theory has a central proposition that the nature of man
is both free and determined, depending on the level of de-
velopment and the situation of the person as a being-in-the-
world.

The objective of the present study was not to construct
a "grand" theory of personality and development in the
tradition of, for example, Freud, Skinner, Maslow or Wer-
ner. Nor was the objective to review the many existing
theories from the perspective of how they would, or would
not, account for language. Rather, the objective was to
establish a general statement, or framework, for a theore-
tical relationship between language, the emergence of self

and the development of personality. The six levels of
development and six modes of existence were essentially
presented as logical extensions of the general framework
established in the first five chapters. As such, their
main function at this point in time is to serve as heuris-
tic devices for further elaboration and explication of a
more detailed theory.

What is being stated, obviously, is that the theory,
in its present form, has limitations. The ultimate value
of the theory will be determined by two primary factors.
First, it must be demonstrated that the theory has practi-
cal implications. It must, as Hall and Lindzey (1977) sug-
gest, "be prepared to deal with, or make predictions con-
cerning, a wide range of human behaviour" (p. 15). Second,
the theory must be able to generate testable hypotheses,
not only to determine its empirical validity, but also to
lead to modifications. Each of these two factors may ini-
tially be addressed independently to provide a framework
for future investigations and development, although in the
long run, the two factors will require simultaneous treat-
ment in order to support the theory's validity.

Practical Implications

In terms of practical implications, at least three
broad areas of human development and existence are imme-
diately relevant. First, from the perspective of healthy
social-emotional development, the theoretical relationship

between language and personality has important implications for the relationship between the child and significant Others. (e.g. parents). Through her language, the mother not only guides the child's objectification of reality, but also guides the "subjectification" of that reality by expressing attitudes such as good/bad, approach/avoidance, safe/dangerous, tolerant/intolerant, etc. She not only helps the child discover "things out there", but also helps the child express feelings about these things. She is, as suggested earlier, exposing the child to a world-view which may, depending on the nature of the child-parent interaction pattern, be difficult for the child to later re-create on his own terms. The implication of the theory is, therefore, that the nature of the early linguistic interaction between child and Other may have positive or negative consequences on the child's emergence of self. An interesting, and relevant, case study of the long-term effects of the early parent-child interaction on the emergence of self (or lack of) is discussed by Laing (1965). The careful study of such examples could possibly generate prescriptive guidelines for the development of healthy self-concepts in young children by the way in which parents interact linguistically with their child.

The second broad area to be considered is, in one sense, a corollary of the first. That is, the theory has possible implications for the interpretation and treatment

of unhealthy social-emotional development, particularly
in relation to the inauthentic emergence of self. For
example, a person's directive and self-regulatory function
of language may be relatively weak, either developmentally
by having been exposed to dominant and authoritarian
Others, or situationally due to a lack of knowledge of con-
sequences for alternative actions. In either case, once
the relative weakness has been assessed, treatment can
proceed to alter the person's semantic environment accor-
dingly. In the first instance, this may involve strate-
gies to increase, or strengthen, the directive functions
of language. In the second, it may involve helping the
client overcome the expectations for certain types, or
styles, of behaviour embedded in conventional society's
"labels" (e.g. "depressed", "divorced", etc). Again, the
semantic restructuring would have as its objective the
person (client) becoming an authentic being-in-the-world-
with-Others rather than remaining a being-in-the-world-for-
Others.

The third broad area of practical implication is re-
flective of Cassirer's (1944) statement that the child
deprived of language would be "an exile from reality"
(p. 36) and "life would be confined within the limits of
biological needs" (p. 41). More recently, and more
specifically, Churchill (1972) has suggested that a variety
of childhood pathological conditions, ranging from deve-

lopmental aphasia to infantile autism and childhood psy-
chosis, are all related to an underlying language and
communication disorder. What the present theory provides,
in congruence with the views of Cassirer and Churchill, is
a framework for the importance of early clinical inter-
vention in instances of language delay or disorder. Fur-
thermore, the implications of the theory are important for
intervention, strategies and program design in terms of
treating the whole child since the many functions of lan-
guage permeate all aspects of existence.

Research Implications.

The second primary factor to which the theory must
address itself is the generation of testable hypotheses.
Certainly the practical implications mentioned in the pre-
ceding section would be amenable to empirical study. In
fact, the possible relationship between the person's se-
mantic environment and their self-concept, whether from a
developmental or situational perspective, appears to have
numerous possibilities. For example, it could be hypothe-
sized that the development of self-concept in the young
child is at least partially a function of the development
of the self-regulative function of language. This develop-
ment may, in turn, be a function of the early parent-child
communication patterns. Such studies would be valuable
from both a clinical perspective, as well as from an in-
vestigation of normal child development.

Another possible approach would be to consider the possible effects of different early language experiences on the development of various modes of existence. For example, the early work of Bernstein (1972) on language and social class presents possibilities for further consideration of the effects of early language experiences. From a slightly different perspective, Bain (1975, 1976) has done some interesting work demonstrating differential cognitive effects as a result of the bilingual experiences of young children. It may be that similar effects of bilingual experience on the development of personality could be determined. To date, such attempts have not been reported in the literature.

In many ways, the two main topic areas of the present study--language and personality--are so vast in and of themselves, that the generation of testable hypotheses is virtually unlimited. In fact, the vastness of the topic areas has been a constant source of difficulty for the present study. The problem has been not so much one of gathering sufficient "evidence" to support a theory of language and personality, but rather of limiting the scope of the present study so it would be manageable in the present context. The attempt had to be made to establish an essential framework for the hypothesized theoretical relationship. The same difficulty would confront the search for sound empirical relationships. That is, unless

generated hypotheses are considered _essential_ to the re-
lationship between language and personality, the results
of the studies would have litt   mplication for the theory.
Based on the theory, as well as some of its practical im-
plications, it would seem that the relationship between
language (particularly the directive function) and self-
concept would be a reasonable investigative priority.

The Final Word

The present study has attempted to put forth a theo-
retical framework within which to consider the possible
relationship between language, the emergence of self and
the development of human personality. In its present
form, the theory is limited, paradoxically due to the
enormous scope of its topic areas and possible implica-
tions. On the one hand, the temptation is present to nar-
rowly define a particular aspect of the theory and proceed
with the process of empirical verification. On the other
hand, a quotation from Whitehead, recorded by Price
(1954), is also present. Whitehead says:

> The universe is vast. Nothing is more curious than
> the self-satisfied dogmatism with which mankind at
> each period of its history cherishes the delusion
> of the finality of its existing modes of know-
> ledge.... This dogmatic common sense is the death
> of philosophic adventure. The universe is vast.
> (p. 7)

The process of empirical verification is necessary as well as potentially rewarding. Yet, at the same time, other directions for study are possible and, if we agree with Whitehead's commentary, necessary as well. Natural observation of young children's language development, as well as the language of mature adults, could be valuable in supporting, modifying, or rejecting the proposed theory.

Further elaboration of the six levels of development and modes of existence is also required, particularly in terms of seeking theoretical and empirical congruences in related areas of study in psychology. The point is, that to proceed along any single path in the search for knowledge about language and personality would reflect Whitehead's fallacy of dogmatic finality.

The universe is vast.

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