

Remaking *Terra Cosacorum*:
Kozak Revival and Kozak Collective Identity
in Independent Ukraine

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation was undertaken to test the premise whether the modern Kozak revival was or could be used as a platform by the Ukrainian national cultural establishment for renegotiation, reformation, and consolidation of national identity in post-Soviet Ukraine. Its primary aim was to observe the relevance and function of deeds, images, traditions, memories and spaces—that is, the symbolic sources of the Kozak forefathers in addressing the problems of national consolidation in the present time. Secondly, it was to explore the tools used in communication, propagation and negotiation of Kozak identity in Ukraine today.

To observe the functions of Kozak symbolic sources, the dissertation traces them from the late 17th century to the fall of the Soviet Union. To investigate the tools used for communicating, propagating and negotiating Kozak identity the dissertation examines modern-day Kozak communities, and Kozak physical and cultural spaces.

Working on the presumptions

—that post-Soviet Ukraine would require national consolidation,

—that bridging the Kozak past into the present would constitute an essential process of national consolidation, and

—that via Kozak symbolic sources nationally oriented Ukrainians would efficiently rediscover, reinterpret and regenerate the Kozak identity,

an examination of the primary and secondary sources, and the original oral narratives gathered in the course of on-site fieldwork demonstrated

convincingly that the Kozak revival has been an active and effective tool of the Ukrainian national establishment in negotiating and propagating national identity in independent Ukraine.

PREFACE

This dissertation is an original work by Huseyin Oylupinar. This research project, of which this dissertation is a part, received research ethics approval from the University of Alberta Ethics Board, Project name “Kozaks in Ukrainian Collective Memory”, No. HERO Pro00015060, April 28, 2011.

To my mentors

and

To my parents

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Note on Transliteration

In this dissertation the Ukrainian National Transliteration system is used for Ukrainian personal names and toponyms. For Russian personal names and toponyms are transliterated with Passport 2013 ICAO system. Toponyms are transliterated from the language of the country in which they are located now. City names will appear as they are established in English language. In controversial cases such as Kiev versus Kyiv this dissertation will stick to the Ukrainian transliteration. Zaporozhia will refer to the region, while Zaporizhia will refer to the city proper.

INTRODUCTION

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form . . . Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory (by which I understand genuine glory), this is the social capital upon which one bases a national idea.

Ernest Renan¹

In this dissertation I attempt to investigate if the post-Soviet revival of the Kozak movement had a role in the negotiation of memories, symbols and traditions in modern-day Ukraine. My initial ideas, which laid the basis for this dissertation, started with questions about the place of Ottoman Turks in Ukrainian collective memory. My hypothesis was that, after centuries of interaction, the Ukrainian collective memory would carry traces of Turks. My first attempts to test the hypothesis introduced me to the Ukrainian epic tradition (*dumy*). In fact, *dumy* texts are graphic in picturing Kozak–Ottoman (Turkish) interaction, which was often characterized as conflictual and warlike in nature. In content, *dumy* are full of descriptions of historical figures, actual locations, deeds of heroism, the heroic death of the Kozak in his struggle with the “Turk–Tatar,” and impact of Kozak–Turkish relations on daily lives.² My study of the oral texts led me to elaborate my hypothesis: after long centuries of interaction, modern-day Turks would remain in the collective memory of

Ukrainians, and under the impact of the *dumy*, this collective memory would be a negative one. However, the oral texts were not sufficient to test the updated hypothesis. Assuming that the major impact of the *dumy* texts would be through actual performances of the *dumy* in the social space, I set out to observe *kobzari* (pl., sing. *kobzar*) in their public performances. When I looked for them in the streets, I noticed only a few. I could see them near churches or on street corners. They were interesting for some passersby, who would stand and listen to them, and even be photographed with them. For many others they seemed not to exist. This rare public presence of the *kobzari* led me to assume that the impact of the *kobzari* and *dumy* was very limited in the social space. However, I then got to know Taras Kompanichenko, a prominent *kobzar*, in Kyiv whom I personally met while he was on a Canadian tour in February 2009. Meeting him again in Kyiv in summer 2009 opened to me the world of modern-day *kobzari*. I followed his performances at the *Kobzari Trinity Sunday* (Kyiv), the Ethno-Festival *Land of Dreams* (Kyiv), and *the Festival of Kozak Radoslav* at the 350th Anniversary of the Battle of Konotop (Shapovalivka near Konotop, Sumy Oblast) and at the Holodomor monument opening in Zikrachi (a village in Kaharlyk district near Kyiv). Following these performances I was introduced to other *kobzari*, such as Mykola Tovkailo, Mykhailo Koval, Taras Sylenko and Yarema Shevchenko.

My participant observations in the events and interviews with the audience led me to an interesting conclusion which challenged my initial hypothesis that the *dumy* would construct a negative place for Turks in the Ukrainian collective memory. The conclusion from my early tests of the

hypothesis, after the participant observations and interviews, was that—even though the *dumy* narrated and reminded modern-day Ukrainians about the evils of the Turks—the audience did not connect the “evil” Turks of the narrative to modern-day Turks. They demonstrated neither resentment nor anger towards Turks. Although listeners would assert that Turks once brought destruction and pain to Ukraine, they pointed out that this was a long time ago. Therefore, in their own perception, the past was in the past, and they had no problems with Turks; they were certainly not looking to settle historical accounts. The *kobzari* performing or the audience listening to the performances were not changing their current positive or neutral perception of modern-day Turks. Rather, more surprisingly, I found that, when the *dumy* were recited, performers and audiences were recalling evils perpetuated by the Russians/Soviets, automatically translating the Turks of the *dumy* texts into Soviets and Russians, and directing their exasperation and resentment to the modern-day Russians.

Following my initial fieldwork in Ukraine, particularly with performers of the epic cycle, I realized that *kobzar* performances taking place in public space were indeed negotiating identities in the post-Soviet era. However, these performances hardly signified the constitution of a negative impression of the Kozak–Turkish past. In light of that finding, I needed to update my hypothesis to which I will return after few more words about another significant finding.

My initial fieldwork observations also allowed me to realize that the *kobzari*, their performances, and their symbolic value in modern-day Ukraine, were taking place within a larger social phenomenon which I will call the

Kozak revival. While following the *kobzari* from one performance to another during my early fieldwork, I found myself mostly in locations which were somehow related to the Kozak past. The *kobzari* were performing at commemorations, festivals, ceremonies dedicated either to a Kozak figure or to an important event of Kozak history. In such locations I observed that *kobzari* and *dumy* constituted only a part of a larger Kozak revival movement. The larger framework included negotiation of Kozak identity through symbols, traditions, values, memories and spaces, and the *kobzari* and *dumy* were one of the active components of the negotiated Kozak identity.

Following on these observations and preliminary results, I decided to dedicate my Ph.D. dissertation research to the exploration of the larger framework—the Kozak revival. Therefore, this dissertation operates on the hypothesis that the Kozak revival would function, despite a major break in national cultural making of the Kozak identity during the Soviet era, as a source of national identity and collective memory. It also would work as a solid platform for Ukrainian cultural nationalists to reform, renegotiate and consolidate contemporary identities in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Even though Soviet nationalities policies have made a profound impact on Ukrainian collective identity through Sovietization of the national interpretations of the Kozak past, and suppressed expressions of Kozak roots in the social sphere, the hypothesis that I tested showed that the reemergence of Kozaks in independent Ukraine bore a strong national underpinning, and still carries the potential to be a solid platform for the formation and negotiation of contemporary identities.³

In testing this hypothesis, I follow the following conceptual framework.

A Presupposition That Newly Established States Need National Consolidation

In the age of nations, when many people claimed a sovereign state of their own, Ukrainians could not achieve full national realization because of the absence of a Ukrainian nation state. As a consequence, nation-building remained as a major task for independent Ukraine. Therefore, consolidation of national unity appears, as Gellner indicated, an urgent task for such ethnic groups that have acquired a state.⁴ In cases when ethnic groups achieve statehood, factors such as shared ethnic roots or promising political and economic prospects would not promise state sovereignty. If nations wish to survive, together with their states, as Anthony Smith argued, they should “have, or find, a living past,” and this past should reproduce the necessary human element, legends and landscapes which would “locate the nation and direct its future.”⁵ The Kozak past, in this sense, appears to have the potential to serve as a living past.

The “urgent task” cannot be achieved simply by positioning it as a need. There is a reason why such a task qualifies as urgent and critical for assuring the existence of a nation. The “populations with shared ancestry, myths, histories, and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” had to come to terms with formulating an attempt to generate an active social and cultural core that keeps reproduction of the society operating.⁶ In this sense, the challenge is to find mechanisms to

activate and operate social reproduction. If that is the case, it is possible to assume that an active social and cultural core operates when the past and present are successfully bridged.⁷

A Presupposition That Bridging Past and Present Lies at the Center of Ethnic Revival

The question of ethnic revival emerges when an active social and cultural core is challenged by an overarching process which either slows down or suppresses the operation of the core. In countries such as Ukraine, Sovietization and Russification have formed an “alternative social and cultural core” to suppress and transform the ethnic core in line with an ideology. The fall of the ideology meant that the “alternative social and cultural core” could be discarded, offering a chance to reactivate the ethnic core. The process can be characterized as ethnic revival.

The revival is about bringing back that which had been taken away by the “alternative core.” The revival is about a return to a former state, a nostalgia—and therefore, it demands a social change with an eye on the past to respond to conditions in the present; in the meantime, however, it requires a practice of “cling[ing] to traditions and values that embody personal and collective memories of a former way of life from which [people] are loath to be wholly sundered and to some aspects of which they are loath to return.”⁸

The revival process inherently requires a look into the past to locate the time and space where heroic ancestors lived. The need for reference to the past is conditioned by the need in the present to make sense of space on which an ethnic community’s journey has taken place. This orientation allows members

of the community to relocate their place, which was ruined by the “alternative core.” The process is not only about one’s relocation in space and time, but also redefinition of meanings attached to space and time. Transporting meanings from the past, community members can explain pending questions and respond to compelling challenges. Thus, the past is used to explain the present, and it is, in this context, as Jonathan Friedman argued, “very much a mythical construction, in the sense that it is a representation of the past linked to the establishment of an identity in the present.”⁹ Therefore, the Kozak forefathers and their heritage might appear as a usable past to respond to the needs of the present, and hence, allow us to assume that it would be a platform for the negotiation of memories, symbols and traditions in modern-day Ukraine.

A Presupposition That Processes of Rediscovery, Reinterpretation and Regeneration Allow the Negotiation of Symbols, Memories, Traditions, Spaces, and Identities

Anthony Smith sees acts of nationalism and nationalists in three layers: rediscovery, reinterpretation and regeneration. Rediscovery involves “the recording of memories, the collection of indigenous myths and traditions,” and working with epic poetry. Reinterpretation is about “weighing the sources, sifting the traditions, fixing the canon of ethno-history, selecting from myths and memories . . . to make national aspirations of the present appear authentic.” Regeneration is about referring to members’ emotions to mobilize them to serve “the national goals, so as to reform and renew the community.”¹⁰

John Hutchinson, defining two sorts of nationalism, argues that political nationalism is interested in assuring state and sovereignty, while cultural nationalism is interested in the moral remaking of the community.¹¹ Cultural nationalism appears to be functional when societies confront other societies in a hierarchical relationship which induces a retreat into history to find help from great forefathers. At this stage, tasks of rediscovery, reinterpretation and regeneration are undertaken by cultural nationalists and appear to be relevant to address the needs of the society.

Functions of cultural nationalism in countries like Ukraine operate in references to symbolism, memories, traditions, and spaces. Symbols, imposing themselves on the communal imagination, constitute a communal sense of union. Travelling through time, they form a link between the past and the present as they carry and reinterpret meanings that were and are communicated to the community. In the Kozak case the *oseledets* (the Kozak lock of hair), hetman's *bulava* (mace), the *kobza* and the epic songs of the Kozak cycle are constitutive in forming a sense of identity.

Memories are central to the sense of communal continuity, and therefore, inherent in social life. Depending on needs and social conditions, the community collectively constructs the past in the present.¹² Therefore, collective memory, as Pierre Nora argues, is “what remains of the past in the lived experience of the groups, or what these groups make of the past.”¹³

Memories are formed and negotiated in the community, and therefore, memories are meaningless without a social context. Maurice Halbwachs argues that it is the social environment which conditions the state of memory.

Thus, individuals “recall, recognize, and localize their memories.”¹⁴ Individuals remembering and localizing memories in community naturally share their memories. This usually takes place through collective commemorations which “enact and give substance to the group’s identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future.”¹⁵ Commemorative acts communicate and negotiate a past while achieving an awareness of past events. Because one cannot have a personal memory of events which are beyond one’s lifetime, commemorative acts provide an gate to the past. With the commemorative acts members of the community travel through time and “remember” events which are not individually experienced. Commemorations, being an gate to an inaccessible past, allow the community in the present to meet its ancestors. With their repetitive nature, commemorative acts transform identities.

Traditions form another fundamental basis for negotiation of identities, because often the revival of an ethnic group calls for regeneration, change and novelty in traditions. However, in this sense the platform of tradition and regeneration, change and novelty around it, contradicts the perception of tradition as a sign of backwardness. Edward Shils defined tradition as being material objects, beliefs, practices, and rituals “created through human actions, through thought and imagination” and “handed down from one generation to the next.”¹⁶ It is another link which connects past to present: “It is the past in present but it is as much part of the present as any very recent innovation.”¹⁷

Traditions carry symbols, images, values and meanings and they function as a platform for socialization and assimilation into community

culture. In some cases traditions are transferred from actual past practices, and in some cases community members simply believe that a tradition was performed by the forefathers. When there is a need, communities can invent traditions to meet the needs of the day and later believe that the invented tradition is inherited from olden times.¹⁸ In either case traditions, as “the lore of folk groups as well as the process of communicating that lore,”¹⁹ articulate certain versions of memory of a communal past and communicate and propagate modern-day values. Catherine Bell argues that performance assures transmission of meanings and values, as it “indirectly affects social realities and perceptions of those realities.”²⁰ Through repetitive performance, “the cultural content of a tradition is organized and transmitted,” thereby community membership is verified and a sense of belonging to an ancient community is perpetuated.²¹ The tradition which is revived and repetitively performed is selective tradition and, as Dan Ben-Amos indicated, has to do with selection of heroes from the communal past to embody their state in the present.²²

Spaces carry meanings and meanings make spaces. In this sense spaces are central in the negotiation of identities and determine values and interests which give direction to individual and collective lives.²³ Spaces become active makers of identity if battles, heroes, victories, defeats have taken place in a particular space. Such spaces become an active part of community life as a usable past can be negotiated at monuments, graves and battlegrounds.²⁴ Marked spaces become regular and repetitive gathering points for masses. As Nancy Wingfield argues, “[c]onstructed of durable materials, monuments are

the most conservative form of commemoration because they provide a fixed point, stabilizing the physical and cognitive space.”²⁵ Marked spaces preserve the past and become a location of competition for national and counter-national narratives.

Research Objective

This dissertation argues that newly established, post-Soviet Ukraine needed national consolidation, and this need motivated the return of Kozaks to the public sphere. Bridging past and present constitutes the core of national consolidation efforts and, therefore, of ethnic revivals. Bridging the past and present involves the processes of rediscovery, reinterpretation and regeneration and these allow negotiation of symbols, memories, traditions, spaces, and identities. With all that considered, this dissertation operates on the hypothesis that the Kozak revival would function as a source of national identity and collective memory and be used by the cultural nationalists as a solid platform for formation and negotiation of contemporary identities in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Objectives and Methodology

This dissertation adopts the conceptual framework offered for research by the ethno-symbolists. For ethno-symbolists focus on the study of memories, traditions, values, myths and symbols—which they define as constituent symbolic sources—is essential to explore the sense of identity carried by communities. According to them, these constituent symbolic sources correspond to the “accumulated heritage of cultural units of population.” Ethno-symbolists favor focusing on “subjective and symbolic resources in

motivating ideologies and collective actions.”²⁶ Study of constituent symbolic sources is important for ethno-symbolists, because of the fact that “combinations of these elements played, and continue to play, a vital role in shaping social structures and cultures, defining and legitimating the relations of different sectors, groups and institutions within a community.”²⁷

In this respect to test the hypothesis, it is essential to examine the process in which “constituent symbolic sources” evolved and were carried to the present. In this sense, this dissertation examines how the Kozak past is connected to the present. To achieve the task, the dissertation explores and describes historical processes, significant events and figures. I will not attempt to provide a complete narrative of the Kozak past. Instead, I will review certain aspects of the Kozak past from the view of their connections to the present. More precisely, I will focus on issues which contributed to the formation of constituent symbols and still have an impact on present-day memories, traditions, symbols and values.

The dissertation, to provide a background for how past is bridged to present, will examine selected works of 19th-century Ukrainian intelligentsia. Investigation of the 19th century and tendencies are important to explain the Kozaks’ potential as a constituent symbol and to display how relevant they were for the early 20th-century and modern-day Kozak revivals. To further explore the sources for the contemporary Kozak revival, the dissertation examines the Soviet period with selected examples taken from different periods of the Soviet Union. However, this dissertation does not examine the image of the kozaks as it is presented and developed in literature and film.

The dissertation will further examine the contemporary revival period by focusing on the formation and development of Kozaks and their impact on physical and cultural space. The study of the processes will bring forward the aspects and qualities related to symbols, traditions, memories, spaces and values which are inherited, borrowed, and invented in the present.

For exploration of the contemporary Kozak phenomena, I relied on ethnographic fieldwork. The ethnographic fieldwork comprised participant observations and interviews which were conducted regularly from 2009 to 2011. Data collection was limited to towns and cities connected to the Kozak past either as significant historical centers or as scenes of major battles. Such pre-decided major locations were Baturyn, Konotop, Poltava, Zaporizhia, and Kyiv. Also, random occasions led me to other locations, usually for archival research and interviews, in and near Bakhmach, Kapulivka, Nikopol, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk and the villages of Stritivka (Kyiv Oblast), Kriachkivka (Poltava Oblast) and Holtva (Poltava Oblast).

The observations and interviews were conducted particularly at commemorations, festivals, and ceremonies, as well as in private meetings. The interviews were conducted in an unstructured manner. The questions and content of the interview was determined by the conditions and content of the occasion. In most cases, after some introductory questions, the interviewee was set free in his narrative. This method was employed to avoid the observer-expectancy effect as much as possible, and to observe actual narrative forms that are used to convey recollections of past, descriptions of the contemporary identity, feelings about space and time.

The participant observation method was used in occasions where commemorations, celebrations, ceremonies, and festivals were taking place. I used the method in several ways: the first is passive participation during which I simply stayed in the crowd and took notes. If I was ever noticed, I usually was taken as a journalist because of the equipment I was using. If necessary, I conducted interviews, usually after the event. On some other occasions I took active participation in the events. This, in practice, meant that I danced folk dances at festivals, sat down on the grass with the rest of the audience when *kobzari* performed, participated as a student in a *kobzar* workshop of *kobza* making, stood with the crowd during a prayer dedicated to the “Kozak forefathers,” and where there was a feast I joined in the toast. In such cases, I was not using my fieldwork equipment, and acted as a member of the community. Yet on each occasion at least some members of the community were aware of my identity and tasks as a researcher.

In the case of interviews, the interviewees were informed who I was, where I came from, and what my research was about. In each instance they were asked for their consent for the use of information in my research and for its public access at the Bohdan Medwidsky Ukrainian Folklore Archive at the University of Alberta. The consent was recorded in the particular sound file of each interview. In all cases except one, my interview inquiry was accepted. In one exceptional case, a Kozak leader of one of the Kozak formations, which is surveyed in the dissertation, took me a “Turkish spy,” refused to give an interview, refused to provide his name, and asked me to leave the headquarters of the Kozak formation in Kyiv.

Here my “imagined identity” comes into question. I am trained to speak Ukrainian and I consistently conversed with my interviewees in Ukrainian, which often created a positive impression on the interviewees. For most of them, the Ukrainian language had a special meaning, and hearing their language from a foreigner was something very rare and considered praiseworthy. However, in some cases I was questioned why I do not speak Russian. One such case took place in Konotop where a woman asked why I did not speak in Russian. When I responded that I was not trained to speak Russian she asked me if I was from western Ukraine. Even to think that a foreigner would speak Ukrainian was not an option.

In all cases, I introduced myself as a Ph.D. student who studies in Canada, and I also mentioned that I am actually from Turkey. In most cases, even though I avoided defining myself as an “ethnic Turk” or clarifying my ideas on religion, I was either taken, as a given, for a Turk and a Muslim, or questioned about my ethnic background and religion. Unless directly asked, I avoided correcting my “imagined identity” in the eyes of my interviewees. In such cases the interviewees particularly preferred to make up their arguments through talking about “my fellow Turks and Muslims” and brought examples from Turkey or Islamic belief. In all cases, when I was directly questioned, I responded that I do not define myself ethnically and that I am not affiliated with a religion. In most cases this answer was puzzling to my interviewees. I came to realize with later repetitions that for them it was difficult to position a person who does not identify himself with reference to an ethnic group or a religious confession. In such cases the nature of the interview was seriously

affected by the confusion over my identity. Further along in my fieldwork, I decided to give more details about myself and told my collocutors that if asked, my father and mother would most likely define themselves as ethnic Turks. However, I mentioned as well that they would also narrate their mixed Balkan and Caucasian heritage and mention the fact that one of my grandmothers carried the first name “Olga” as a second name. As to my relation to religions, I mentioned that I recognize a creator, and read and learn about religions, and when the occasion arises, join prayers of different beliefs. These explanations helped my interviewees to find some comfort.

In addition to fieldwork data, this dissertation used primary and secondary sources, newspaper archives and internet material.

Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter One, “Bridging the Kozak Past: From the Origins to the Fall in the 18th Century,” harks back to Kozak history to locate major issues and events which have influenced the course of Kozak identity formation. The main interest here is to provide historical sources for the question why and how Kozaks remain relevant in the present.

Chapter Two, “Rediscovery, Reinterpretation and Regeneration of Kozaks: From the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union,” first explores the publications of 19th-century national intellectuals to discover how the Kozaks were interpreted. Here focus is on the elite perceptions of the Kozaks. Secondly, the chapter studies the folk imagination of the Kozaks. The third section of the chapter looks at the ways Kozaks were interpreted in the Soviet

Union; the section highlights Soviet interpretations and uses of the Kozaks within an ideological framework.

Chapter Three, “Kozak Revival: From the Late Soviet Era to Independent Ukraine,” sets out a framework of events and figures that affected the revival process. The chapter looks at Ukrainian national interpretations, which were challenged by non-nationalist Kozaks. The discussion of the topic brings forward issues related to memory, symbols, spaces, and values. The chapter attempts to show how the Kozak revival has been politicized.

Chapter Four, “Revival and the Making of Modern Kozak Spaces,” explores Poltava, Baturyn, Konotop and Khortytsia to discuss how these spaces were transformed into symbolic spaces where memories are negotiated. In the cases of Baturyn, Konotop and Khortytsia, the revival and restoration processes of the spaces are examined, while in the Poltava case the discussion is more on how space, monuments and commemorations became sources of conflict.

Chapter Five, “Construction of the Kozak Cultural Space,” explores the means by which the Kozak phenomenon has been shaping the social sphere. Here the focus is placed on the tools and processes related to the revival of traditions through festivals, celebrations, and imagined Kozak spaces.

Endnotes

¹ Ernest Renan, “Lecture at Sorbonne,” March 11, 1882, *Discours et Conférences* (Paris, Calman-Levy, 1887), 277–310. English translation quoted from Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, ed., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 41–55.

² The term *duma* was used in 16th century writings to refer to all poetical and creative works of Ukraine, not exclusively to heroic epics. The use of the term *duma* in Polish writings, in a close reference to genre, first appears in a work of the Polish translator Sebastian Petrycy (died in 1626), when the author talked about “songs, which are laments, *dumy*, laments of the Rus.” See Kateryna Hrushevskya, *Ukrainski narodni dumy* (Kyiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1927), xiii. The word *duma* in reference to the genre is a literary term which emerged in the early 19th century. However, from the folk perspective, songs of this genre were known to people as Kozak songs, heroic songs, Kozak laments, and laments of captives. See Hryhorii A. Nudha, *Poetychnyi epos Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1969), 18.

³ For a discussion of Sovietization, see the following: Robert Conquest, *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986); Dmitry Gorenburg, “Soviet Nationalities Policy and Assimilation,” in *Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Dominique Arel and Blair A. Ruble (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 273–304; Terry Martin, *An Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–39* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Rasma Karklins, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective from Below* (Boston: Unwyn Hyman, 1986); Walker Connor, “Nation-building or Nation-destroying?” *World Politics* 24 (1972): 319–55; Peter Blitstein, “Stalin’s Nations: Soviet Nationality Policy between Planning and Primordialism, 1936–1953” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1999).

⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Worcester: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 39.

⁵ Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 207.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁷ For a recent treatment of nationalism see Azar Gat, with contributions from Alexander Yakobson *Nations: The Long and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁸ *Ibid.*, 174–175.

⁹ Jonathan Friedman, “Myth, History and Political Identity,” in *Modernities, Class and the Contradictions of Globalization: The Anthropology of Global Systems*, ed. Kajsia Friedman and Jonathan Friedman (Lanham, New York, Toronto: Altmira, 2008), 91.

¹⁰ Anthony Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 177–178.

¹¹ John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State* (Boston, Sydney, Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1987).

¹² Robert Gildea, *The Past in French History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 10.

¹³ Pierre Nora, “Memoire Collective,” in *La Nouvelle histoire* ed. J. Le Goff, R. Chartier, and J. Revel (Paris: Retz, 1978), 398.

¹⁴ Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 38.

¹⁵ Barbara A. Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering* (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2003), 7.

¹⁶ Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 12.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁸ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

¹⁹ Martha Sims and Martine Stephens, *Living Folklore: An Introduction to the Study of People and Their Traditions* (Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press, 2005), 65.

²⁰ Catherine Bell, *Ritual, Theory, Ritual Practice* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 43.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 39.

²² Dan Ben-Amos, "Toward a Definition of Folklore in Context," *Journal of American Folklore* 84 (1984): 114–115.

²³ Caroline Humphrey, *The Unmaking of Soviet Life: Everyday Economies after Socialism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), xix.

²⁴ Nancy Wingfield, *Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 39

²⁶ Anthony Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 16.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

CHAPTER ONE

BRIDGING THE KOZAK PAST:

FROM THE ORIGINS TO THE FALL IN THE 18TH CENTURY

Valerii Smolii, a prominent contemporary historian of the Kozak era, begins his 1500-page Kozak history by stating that, “Kozakdom and Ukraine, the Kozaks and the Ukrainian nation are concepts that have long been associated with one another. This is not accidental. Thus, through Kozak history, the entire epoch of the Ukrainian past and its people was refracted.”¹ Smolii’s work reflects a major line of national historiography which established a linear narration of historical events dating from the time of Kyivan Rus. This historical line positions Kozaks and Ukrainians as overlapping phenomena or concepts and credits the Kozak past as the space and time when Ukrainian nationhood and statehood emerged for the first time.

To better understand the impact of the Kozak period on Ukraine’s national emergence and to show the paths through which Kozakdom has developed in contemporary Ukraine, it is essential to look at the Kozak experience from the 16th century to the second half of the 18th century. Because this chapter will cover a large span of time, emphasis will be placed on selected historical periods and events that have made a major impact on the Kozak experience and eventually left a lasting mark on the collective consciousness of future generations. For its purposes the chapter will first review the processes of the emergence of the Kozak stratum and Kozak uprisings. Secondly, the chapter will look at the post-Khmelnyskyi uprising period, with particular attention to the Mazepa era. As the third and final task

this chapter will undertake is reviewing the decline and fall of the Kozak polities, with its concomitant destruction of the Kozak social order and incorporation into the Russian administrative system. Particular attention will be focused on the Kozak formations that served in the Russian army.

The Kozaks emerged on the territory of modern-day Ukraine as an open steppe phenomenon, to the south of the Dnipro River.² While there are no documents to explain the early periods of their emergence, it is likely that external conditions such as the unfavorable circumstances caused by continuous Tatar raids and the abusive Polish feudal system played a seminal role. From this perspective, Tatar raids took lives and created material losses which, most likely, provided an impetus for an armed defensive reaction. It has been argued that, simultaneously with the Tatar raids, the Polish feudal system was pushing restive masses further into lands at the southeastern edge of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and along the lower Dnipro River bordering the Crimean Khanate. These masses, it is argued, were joined by elements “that were immigratory, multinational, and disparate in tradition, language, and religion.”³ This is also believed to have contributed to the formation of the core of a social group which came to be known as the Kozaks of Zaporozhia.⁴

The multinational and multicultural background of the Kozaks is mentioned in several sources. For example, a Khazar origin of the Kozaks was mentioned, through mythical legends, by the Kozak chronicler Hryhorii Hrabianka (1686–1737?), the unknown author of the *Istoriia Rusov* (late 18th or beginning of 19th century). Later the Russian historian Aleksandr Rigelman (1720–1789) also referred to Khazar origins. In addition to the Khazars, the

Qaraqalpaqs (Black Hats), a Turkic tribe, the Circassians, and some other Tatar tribes are listed as groups who mixed with the local population and contributed to the ethnic roots of the Kozaks.⁵

The mainstream historiography in contemporary Ukraine explains the emergence of Kozaks through the concept of the “great frontier.” The “great frontier” is argued to separate the world of the “primitive” nomads from the world of the “civilized Christian” of sedentary Europe.⁶ According to this argument, the frontier, being largely depopulated in the aftermath of the Tatar invasion of the 13th century, appears to be advantageous for runaway Slavic serfs because it allowed steppe hideouts beyond the rapids of the lower Dnipro River.⁷ The interpretation further posits that at these steppe hideouts and in neighboring areas, the Slavic serfs could gradually develop a distinctive way of life as warriors and thus become Kozaks, adopting the ways of “steppe guerrilla warfare.”⁸ Mykhailo Hrushevskyi considered that Kozaks originated from the “Ukrainian Black Sea population cast out of civilized, sedentary life by a torrent of nomads. Owing to centuries of existence next to the nomadic hordes, this population adapted to the conditions of that fearful and hard life; it became hardened and warlike . . .”⁹

The “great frontier” concept is challenged by those who defend the view that the steppe was not a frontier but a part of the Turkic world: “The borderline of the steppe zone, on which the Kozaks formed, was not in between the ‘east and west,’ but an organic part of the east where Turkic people, for ages, lived and had their states, such as the Pecheneg Khanate, Cumania, the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khanate, the Nogai Horde, and the

Budzhak Horde.”¹⁰ Therefore, the alternative approach concludes that the Kozaks emerged in a social environment which was defined by mixed Slavic and Turkic ethnos, and amalgamated linguistic, traditional and religious traits.

The earliest references to Kozaks were made in 1492. The first relevant record is mentioned in *Lithuanian Metrica*. This source narrates an attack on a Crimean boat by people from Kyiv and Cherkasy.¹¹ The Tatar Khan Mengli Giray later wrote a letter to the Lithuanian Grand Duke Alexander and complained about the attack. The Duke in his response assured that he would investigate the “Kozaks,” who possibly had carried out the attack.¹² In a later account the Khan identified the aggressors as Kozaks when the Ochakiv fortress, then an Ottoman fortress, was destroyed in 1493.¹³ Hrushevskyi, the recognized father of Ukrainian national historiography, provided a picture of those people. In his modest picture the Kozaks were described not as wealthy, fame seeking lords, but as “poor, exploited, homeless people—courageous Ukrainian frontiersmen,” who were trying to free themselves from the feudal system. Even in the first half of the 16th century, Hrushevskyi posited, Kozaks had “no significant social stratum with even a modicum of organization.” According to him, Kozakdom was more of an occupation rather than a stratum. The occupation essentially was that a group of people would forage in the spring and return when the season came to a close. These foraging people gradually mixed with town burghers, villagers and petty boyars, and it seems plausible that the steppe provided a necessary space which assured livelihood through hunting and trade.¹⁴

While the number of Kozaks was increasing throughout the 16th century, it was actually their superior combat skills that gained them wider fame. Their reputation allowed them to rent their services, usually by ways of border protection against the constant raids of Tatars, initially to the Duchy of Lithuania. According to Hrushevskiy, Kozaks were deployed, in the first half of the 16th century, by the “agents of government” against Tatars to conduct “guerrilla warfare in the entire area from Kyiv and Cherkasy to Bar and Khmilnyk ...”¹⁵ In terms of social class relations, Hrushevskiy places emphasis on the fact that government agents, such as hetmans, border guards, royal agents (*starosty*) and lords, have grouped and led Kozaks into border conflicts and “all [government agents] practiced the Kozak ways” (*kozakuvaty*) giving impetus to the formation of a Kozak identity.¹⁶ Yet according to Hrushevskiy, Kozaks were still “... homeless riffraff, outcasts” in the mid-16th century, and were to be called “younkers” not Kozaks.¹⁷

In the evolution of the Kozaks as a social phenomenon, establishment of a fortified Kozak headquarters (Sich) played a major role. The first Sich was constructed in 1556 on “Little Khortytsia” Island, which is located on the lower Dniro River. The Sich project was initiated by a “government agent”: Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi, *starosta* of Cherkasy and Kaniv and nephew of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania, Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi. After establishing the Sich, Vyshnevetskyi sought Lithuanian and Muscovite support for his anti-Tatar policies. However, Tatars learned about Vyshnevetskyi’s plans and destroyed the Sich on Little Khortytsia Island. Second was the Tomakiv Sich, which was founded soon after the destruction of the first. The fate of the second Sich was

similar to that of the first and it was destroyed by the Tatars in 1593. Kozak Siches were often attacked and destroyed, thereby forcing Kozaks to move to new ones. This led Kozaks to establish Siches in seven different locations.

The foundation of the Sich as a Kozak institution had significance on several counts. With the foundation of the Sich, Kozaks managed to centralize their power and gain a more organized character. Centralization of power and organizational development marked the Kozaks' rising role as a bulwark against Tatars and brought them further success in their campaigns against them. The Kozak Sich also assured the Kozaks a good level of visibility and respect vis-à-vis neighbors because the existence of the Sich shored up Kozak authority. Eventually, the existence of the Sich enabled the Kozaks to become actors in international politics.

The Sich also had an impact on social life. It paved the way for the emergence of a distinct Kozak stratum, which was first recognized by government statutes in the 1570s and 1590s.¹⁸ For example, the statute in 1572 consolidated the Kozaks' social status and provided them with immunities. The statute, while exempting them from the authority of government agents, placed Kozaks under the authority of their elected leader.¹⁹

Gradually, the stratum bifurcated into the warrior Zaporozhians (the Sich Kozaks) and the town Kozaks. The Zaporozhians were involved in military activity the year round, they made their living on fees and rewards for military services and by raids, war booty, trade, fishing, hunting and beekeeping. The town Kozaks' life was mostly characterized by a sedentary life style; they dwelled in towns and villages, where they were occupied with

trade and agriculture. However, when opportunities arose, the town Kozaks joined the Sich ranks to fight battles, run campaigns, and participate in raids. Later, after combat, they resumed their sedentary life or they could decide to remain at the Sich.

The level of freedom which the Kozaks enjoyed posed two major challenges to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. The first is that the Kozaks acted, usually at their own will, against Tatars and Ottomans. This created trouble for the king at times when the Commonwealth was at peace with the Ottoman Empire. The Kozaks' unrestrained attacks provoked the Sultans to continuous complaints, which could easily be turned into a bloody war between the Commonwealth and the Ottoman Porte. The Commonwealth authorities, considering the political complications the Kozaks caused, prohibited them from entering Ottoman territory. However, Polish local officers, who were based near the frontier and concerned with local security, supported the Kozak attacks on the Tatars and Ottoman Turks.²⁰ This unavoidably led to Ottoman campaigns into the Commonwealth. As a second factor, the unrestrained Kozak activities as well as the constant Tatar raids hampered colonization of the steppe. This eventually lowered opportunities for economic exploitation on the part of the Polish nobility (*szlachta*). The *szlachta* came to be more and more interested in exploiting the steppe as the steppe population grew and the *szlachta* realized that they could benefit from the emerging economic potentials through enserfing the peasants and imposing taxes.

The Commonwealth's response to challenges coming from unregulated steppe life was to register some of the Kozaks, especially in the last quarter of the 16th century, in the Commonwealth's service (registers were made in 1572, 1578, 1583, and 1590).²¹ The Registered Kozaks were based in Trakhtemyriv, and received a flag from the king as a symbol of their status under the Polish state. The Registered Kozaks were to enjoy the privileges of the 1572 statute, though privileges were revised with subsequent charters. Privileges assured by the statute contained the following: immunity against the local judiciary and against the demands of the local gentry; tax exemptions; the right to own land; the right to elect officers; and the use of insignia such as flags and drums. The Registered Kozaks were also promised a regular payment for their services, since they then became an integrated section, titled the "Zaporozhian Army," of the Polish military establishment. However, the attempt to regulate Kozak life through the registration system soon failed because the Polish budget could not assure the promised salaries. The Registered Kozaks, disgruntled by broken promises, fought against the nobles and renewed their attacks on Tatars for booty. As a regular backlash, the king often decreased the number of the registered Kozaks and revoked their privileges. However, again as a regular practice, whenever the king would need Kozak support for a Polish war effort, he would increase the register, and return some of the privileges.

Certain rights and privileges promised to the Registered Kozaks did level their status with that of the landed gentry. Moreover, state registry of the Kozaks proved inconsistent. At times of war, the registry reached over ten thousand, while after the war the numbers were cut. The unregistered Kozaks

were then degraded to their former status, which was peasantry, servitude or both. While the lack of budget allocations to maintain a larger paid army of Kozaks was the major reason for the unstable nature of the registry system, the Kozaks were also often denied the status of fully-fledged members of the Commonwealth society.

The denial of privileges and the decreased registry of Kozaks caused a stronger demand on the part of Kozaks for rights and recognition of their status as an estate equal to that of the Polish nobility. Crystallization of the Kozak stratum and their prerequisites against the uncompromising Polish nobility led to a crisis within the Commonwealth's feudal system and caused uprisings in 1591, 1595, 1625, 1630, 1635–38, and 1648. The first (1591–93) was led by Krzysztof Kosinski, a Registered Kozak chieftain and later hetman of the Kozaks, against Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi, a prominent Ruthenian magnate. The uprising gained limited peasant support and was soon crushed by the Polish forces. The second uprising (1595–97) was led by Severyn Nalyvaiko, who was the commander of an independent Kozak regiment. He rose against the nobility and managed to receive support from the Zaporozhian Kozaks. However, Nalyviako's uprising was also crushed by the Polish army and this uprising resulted in the revocation of Kozak privileges (partially reinstated in 1601). The third uprising (1625) was led by a Registered Kozak named Marko Zhmailo. The uprising ensured an increase in the number and the salary of the Registered Kozaks; however, the non-registered Kozaks had to return to their former status, namely peasantry and serfdom. This period marked a crystallization of differences among the Kozaks. The Treaty of Kurukove

which ended the uprising, “institutionalized the differences and disparities already apparent by that time between the registered Cossacks” in the area where the registered were settled to the north of Zaporizhia and the “Zaporozhians of the lower Dnipro . . . In the 1620s . . . the settled area became the abode of the more established and comparatively prosperous Cossacks, while Zaporizhia turned into the base of the poor Cossacks . . .”²²

The 1630 uprising was led by the hetman of the non-registered Kozaks Taras Fedorovych Triasylo. This uprising assured an increase in registration numbers to some extent to cover non-registered Kozaks. However, the number of the new registrations was far from satisfactory and left many Kozaks unregistered. The unregistered Kozaks remained as a malcontent source for future uprisings. The 1638 uprising was led by Yakiv Ostrianyn, the hetman of the unregistered Kozaks; this rising did not succeed. Eventually, Zaporozhian autonomy was revoked and the Bazavluk Sich, the Kozak military headquarters since 1594, was destroyed. This decisive Polish victory led to strict state control over the Kozaks.

One result of this series of uprisings was increasing attention to the Kozaks as an organization. Issues and problems pertaining to Kozaks entered in the public sphere for negotiation. Secondly, the Kozaks became more conscious of their own group identity and demanded immunities and privileges not only for the registered but for all. Because all who were included in the Kozak army could claim immunities and privileges, more and more people joined the Kozak ranks. This gradually gained Kozakdom the adherence of more landowning and farming elements of society.²³ And third,

long periods of conflict and battles turned the Kozaks into a more organized force. The Kozak involvement in wars against the Ottomans transformed them into an active player in regional politics.

At the turn of the 17th century, the Kozak stratum started to occupy a central role in Ukrainian affairs as defenders of the Orthodox Church and the Ruthenian tradition. By the time the Orthodox faith, professed by the Ruthenians (Ukrainians and Belarusians) of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, appeared to be under siege. Following the schism of 1054 between the Eastern and Western Churches several attempts tried to heal the breach. Thus, the Union of Florence (1439–1445) reconciled the Orthodox ecclesiastical metropolia of Kyiv with Rome putting the Union into practice was complicated both by the opposition of Moscow—which was in Kyiv’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction—as well as the Western religious hierarchy’s interest in Latinization rather than a genuine union.²⁴ As a result, the Florentine Union by the start of the 16th century was a dead letter.²⁵ However, a new initiative by the Orthodox hierarchy of the Commonwealth led to the new Union of Brest (1596), which allowed the Ruthenians to follow the rites of the Eastern Church while accepting ecclesiastical communion with Rome. Nevertheless, the Union of Brest did not gain full acceptance and came to be perceived by large segments of the population as part of Polish expansion over Ukraine. Together with parts of the Ukrainian nobility and the lower classes, the Kozaks became ardent supporters of the anti-Union initiative.²⁶ In 1616 Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi enrolled the entire Zaporozhian Host as members of the Epiphany Brotherhood in Kyiv—an act that put on stage a strong

defender of Orthodoxy at a time when a church hierarchy did not exist. Some historians have called this the moment of “nationalization” of the Kozak Host.²⁷ Under Kozak protection an Orthodox hierarchy was re-established in 1620, recognized by the Polish state in 1632 “The Orthodox clergy of the early seventeenth century turned to the national Rus’ past,”²⁸ and the Kozaks openly maintained their support for the reconstituted Orthodox metropolitanate and declared themselves protectors of the Rus traditions.²⁹ The evolving role and close Kozak relationship with the Orthodox Church is reflected in a memorandum written in 1621 by an Orthodox bishop and quoted by Hrushevskyi:

As for Cossacks, we know that these military man are our kin, our brothers, and Christians of the true faith. They are thought to be simpletons, with neither knowledge nor intelligence, who have been instigated by the clergy . . . They have their inborn wit and intellect given them by God. And surely zeal for and love of faith, piety . . . when they go to sea, they first pray, stating that they are going against the infidel for the Christian faith.³⁰

Eventually, this emergence of the Kozaks as a significant factor in the social space was affirmed by their role in religious sphere and this role crystallized with the uprising of 1648.³¹

The most influential of all uprisings, which firmly anchored the Kozaks in the center of the political stage, began in 1648, led by the renowned Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. A Registered Kozak, Khmelnytskyi was a member of the lesser nobility, thus, he was entitled to certain privileges.³² After a Polish nobleman, Czaplinski raided his estates, and with no recourse from the Crown,

Khmelnyskyi turned against the Polish nobility. Joining the Zaporozhian Kozaks, he soon became hetman and led the most momentous Kozak uprising from 1648 to 1649-50.

The Khmelnyskyi uprising, by comparison with earlier ones, was the largest in the geographical area covered, the size of the armies involved, and the number of battles fought by the Zaporozhian Kozaks, the Orthodox peasants and thousands of nobles who joined the fray, and the allied Tatars against the Commonwealth forces.³³ While in the earliest battle, at Zhovti Vody, the Kozak/Tatar forces numbered 9000, in the Battle of Pyliavtsi the number of the anti-nobility army reached 100,000, some 40,000 of whom were Kozaks. In the Battle of Berestechko the Kozak/Tatar army numbered around 150,000.

Khmelnyskyi's uprising quickly gained success and his march proceeded as far west as Lviv. At one point, the Kozaks had the chance to destroy the Commonwealth. However, the Kozak elite, rejecting destruction of the Commonwealth, sought to create conditions that would secure their rights and privileges on an equal footing with the Polish nobility. Thus, the upper Kozak strata aimed at transforming the political system in favor of their own interests. Consequently, they failed to support the abolition of serfdom, and instead focused more on consolidating upper class privileges for themselves. This preference caused a rift between the officers and the common Kozaks. The peasants' main purpose in joining the uprising was to gain freedom from the abusive feudal system. However, as soon as the Kozak officer class gained

control over landed estates, they replaced the former landlords and forced peasants into compulsory labour.³⁴

Frank Sysyn has argued that the uprising was “one of the most ‘revolutionary’ upheavals in early modern Europe in that it overthrew an existing political, social, and economic order and established a new political-social order.”³⁵ The uprising also gained the Kozaks a fragile state polity which was known as the Zaporozhian Host or the Hetmanate³⁶, and extended over territories on the Left and Right bank of the Dnipro.³⁷ However, given the neighbors’ claims on the regions, the political conditions proved tentative for the Kozak political elite. Khmelnytskyi, realizing the fragility of the political balances, searched for viable alliances to assure the outcomes of the uprising. Collaboration with the Tatars proved troublesome throughout the uprising; therefore, Tatars were not trusted allies for future collaboration.³⁸ However, more distant neighbors, such as the Sublime Porte and Sweden were considered as options, and Khmelnytskyi eventually accepted overlordship of the Ottoman Sultan in 1648³⁹ and in 1651.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, neither the Swedish nor Ottoman alliance proved viable in the long term. The Russian option was the remaining one on the political map of the time, though Russia, recovering from the Time of Troubles (*Smutnoe vremia*), did not want to involve itself in risky political adventures for a time. Eventually, once other options proved less feasible for the Kozaks and Russia recovered from the political crisis, Kozak-Muscovite relations gained momentum. With the Pereiaslav Treaty (1654) Khmelnytskyi and his Kozaks swore an oath of loyalty to the tsar.⁴¹ The tsar in turn agreed to assure the rights and privileges of the Kozak elite:

Kozak rights and liberties were reinstated, Kozak judges were to work without intervention, and the Kozak register was to increase to 60,000. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that the promised Ukrainian autonomy would be crippled by increasing Russian interference in the Kozak Hetmanate.

The questions considered in this section about the Kozak origins and identity showed that Kozaks developed gradually as a distinct social class, with organized institutions and varying interests well-formulated by the end of the 16th century. The crystallization of peculiar ethnic features and the consolidation of common interests among the Kozaks positioned them against the political entities encircling them and further contributed to the formation of identity. However, how they related themselves to these encircling political powers also provided grounds for further differences in political interests which eventually led to splits among the ruling elite and the common Kozaks. The following section will expand on the deepening differences among Kozaks, and the identities and collective memories formed along these cleavages.

Towards Destruction: Ivan Mazepa's Quest and the Fall of the Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Host

The post-Khmelnyskyi uprising period also has a central role in the formation of Ukrainian identity. The importance of the era lies in the fact that the uprising marked the emergence of the Kozaks as an independent polity. However, it also marks rising Russian control over the Kozak realm. With these two aspects considered, the events that followed the Khmelnytskyi period determined the historical path to the formation of multiple collective

memories and identities. Therefore, the following section will review the events in the post-Khmelnyskyi period, with particular attention to the repercussions of the Ivan Mazepa era on the Kozaks, including divisions among them. This section looks at the events of the period with an eye on providing a basis for discussion of the modern Kozak revivals and their orientations with reference to the Kozak past.

In the post-uprising period, the Hetmanate was in persistent political turmoil, the Pereiaslav Treaty failed to bring the stability and opportunities the Kozaks were expecting. Soon after their oath to the tsar, it became clear to the Kozaks that the autonomy they were hoping to consolidate under the Russian tsar was unrealizable. This was confirmed when the tsar quickly moved to gain control of Hetmanate politics as he garrisoned Russian troops in Hetmanate towns. Prolonged Polish-Russian hostilities also hampered stabilization efforts in the Hetmanate while exhausting its material and human resources. Moreover, Khmelnytskyi died in 1657 and left behind his sixteen-year-old son Yurii to be elected his successor. The political impasse was largely a result of Yurii's inexperience, and came to an end with his abdication and the election of Ivan Vyhovskyi as hetman. Vyhovskyi, realizing the threats posed by Muscovite policies, abandoned the Russian alliance and reached an agreement with the Commonwealth. The Treaty of Hadiach in 1658, reflecting the aspirations which Kozaks had long fought for, revised the political and social structure to form the Commonwealth of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine.⁴² In the aftermath of the agreement, the new Kozak–Commonwealth alliance, joined by the Tatars, fought a successful battle against Russia at Konotop

(1659). However, Hetman Vyhovskyi failed to secure a new order. The Kozaks, the Kozak elite, and the peasants of Ukraine were polarized by the splits which emerged through varying political affinities. The post-Khmelnyskyi period came to be known as the Ruin, characterized by constant internal hostilities and rivalries between Left-Bank and Right-Bank, and interventions by Poles, Russians, and Ottomans. Nor did this period come to an end in 1667 by Treaty of Andrusovo when Russia and Poland divided the Kozak Hetmanate polity along the Dnipro River with the Left and the Right Banks under Russian and Polish rule respectively.⁴³ Briefly a third orientation gained ascendancy—the project by Hetman Petro Doroshenko to unite Ukraine under Ottoman suzerainty on the model of Wallachia and Moldova.⁴⁴ By the late 1670s this, too, failed, with Turkish campaigns adding to the ongoing depredation. The Ottomans remained as an important player in the Right Bank until 1699.

Under Russian suzerainty on the Left Bank the Hetmanate survived as an autonomous polity headed by the hetman, a privileged officer elite and increased Kozak register. However, the Hetmanate's autonomous rights eroded in parallel with a gradual increase of the tsar's control over the Hetmanate's internal affairs. The process quickened under Peter I. This eventually led the tsar's erstwhile favorite, Hetman Ivan Mazepa (term of office 1687–1709), to ally with the Swedish King Charles XII against Russian Tsar Peter I during the Great Northern War. In retribution Peter's army destroyed the Hetmanate's capital Baturyn in 1708 and massacred its inhabitants. In the following year Peter's army defeated the allied forces of

Mazepa-Charles in the Battle of Poltava. Hetman Mazepa was forced to take refuge in Ottoman territory where he soon died as Peter revoked a good part of the local privileges and maximized his control over the Hetmanate.⁴⁵

Mazepa's failed revolt was a major blow to the Hetmanate's fragile relations with Russia. In the aftermath Peter I had a hetman elected whom he could easily manipulate. In addition, breaking with the tradition, he did not re-recognize the terms of the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654. To gain further control in the Hetmanate, Peter appointed a representative to oversee the hetman's activities. With similar motivations, he also appointed colonels to the Kozak regional administrative units (regiments). He granted large pieces of land in the Hetmanate to his generals while destroying or suppressing the local elite.

In 1722, upon the death of Hetman Skoropadskyi, Peter I did not allow the election of a new hetman and abolished the Hetmanate's ruling office. In its place, as an administrative structure, he established the Little Russian Collegium, on the grounds that the Kozak administration had failed to meet the needs of society.⁴⁶ This new administrative body, composed of six Russian military officers, started to act as a second government in the Hetmanate. To further undermine the legitimacy of the Hetmanate's autonomy, Peter I declared all hetmans, including Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, traitors. After Peter's reign, the Collegium was found inadequate in regulating the domestic needs of the Hetmanate, a change in the Russian position towards the Collegium, and in 1727 the Russian government abolished it.⁴⁷ The office of hetman was revived and Danylo Apostol was elected as the hetman. Apostol's death in 1734,

however, provided another pretext for the new Russian administration of the Empress Anna Ioannovna to abolish the hetman's office yet again.

While these events were taking place, the Zaporozhian Kozaks, who had also taken an oath of loyalty to the tsar in 1654, remained as a separate polity following the Khmelnytskyi uprising and the formation of the Hetmanate. In principle, the Zaporozhians opposed the hetmans of the Hetmanate, perceiving them and the upper Kozak officer strata as being motivated by aristocratic aspirations. In fact, the Kozaks constituted their own stratum separate from the peasant masses.⁴⁸ Zaporozhians were critical of the fact that the Hetmanate elite ignored the concerns of the peasant masses and rank-and-file Zaporozhian Kozaks. No doubt, the Hetmanate under the circumstances had to function as a state-building institution, while the Zaporozhians remained captive to the traditional mentality of following short-term military projects.⁴⁹ With their negative attitude toward the Hetmanate, the Zaporozhians enjoyed Russian support against the hetmans, who were more often in opposition to the tsar.

The Zaporozhians' attitude toward both tsar and hetman shifted in the late 17th and the early 18th century. The underlying reason for the shift was the tsar's plans to destroy the Tatars once and for all. This meant the destruction of the Zaporozhians' *raison d'être*. The existence of the Tatars justified the Zaporozhians' existence as a military structure established to deter Tatar raids. Therefore, the Zaporozhians, realizing the tsar's future aims, decided to shift sides and allied with Ivan Mazepa when he turned against Peter. However, like Mazepa, they had to pay dearly for their decision. After the Battle of Poltava,

the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed and they had to take refuge in Crimea. Later, on the condition that they would serve the Russian army and remain subject to the orders of the Russian governor of Kyiv, the Zaporozhians were allowed to return to Zaporozhia. Taking the oath of loyalty to the Empress Anna Ioannovna, they reconstructed their Sich once again in 1734.⁵⁰ Henceforth, to its last days in 1775, the Sich remained under Russian protection. In return, the Zaporozhians joined Russian campaigns against the Ottoman Empire. However, they gradually lost their liberties and territory as the Russians started to construct fortifications and colonize the Zaporozhian lands. The establishment of the New Serbia region (1752), which was carved out of Zaporozhian territories, and the Russian-controlled Serbian colonization were significant signs for diminishing Zaporozhian Kozaks' autonomy vis-à-vis Russia.

Catherine II (1762–1796), a champion of centralization, was against autonomous structures within the empire. The Hetmanate, its autonomy already crippled, could not escape Catherine's centralizing policies. Two years into her reign, Catherine II decided to abolish the Hetmanate as an autonomous polity (1764) and the office of the hetman, which was occupied by the Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovskyi since 1750.

Catherine II, after abolishing the hetman's office, ordered the re-establishment of the Collegium (1764–1786) to govern the former Hetmanate territories and control the Kozak elite. Petr Rumiantsev was named governor-general of "Little Russia" and head of the Collegium. Under Rumiantsev's rule, the Collegium enjoyed the institutional capacity to transform the

Hetmanate's structures through conducting reforms in social, judicial and economic matters. These reforms had a particular impact on the Kozaks of the former Hetmanate. One such impact was the governor-general's plan to transform the Hetmanate Kozaks, at the price of their traditional rights, into a more organized military unit;⁵¹ thus, the Hetmanate's ten Kozak regiments were abolished and integrated into the Russian army (1783).⁵² The Kozak officer class, now in possession of owners of large estates, hoped the post-Hetmanate transformation would bring them equal standing with the Russian aristocracy. The Russian rulers, responding to these expectations, recognized the Kozak officers' hold on properties and agreed to attach peasants to their lands.⁵³ Eventually, the privileges granted to the Russian nobility were also extended to "Little Russia." Meanwhile, peasants of the former Hetmanate lost their liberties, and their fate was handed over to the landlords.⁵⁴ Such imperial practices transformed the Hetmanate into an imperial province with an aim to achieve Catherine II's instruction: "To root out from the Ukrainian population any idea of being a different people from the Muscovites,"⁵⁵ to accomplish her command which demanded that "when the hetmans are gone from Little Russia, every effort should be made to eradicate from memory [of Little Russians] the period [of hetmans]."⁵⁶

The destruction of the Hetmanate provided Russia with full access to the human and material sources which could be exploited in support of Russia's war efforts. Such occurrences proved crucial during the war against the Ottomans (1769–1774). Relying on the Hetmanate's resources, the governor-general of Little Russia, Petr Rumiantsev, became a victorious

commander-in-chief of the Russian army against the Ottomans. The war against the Ottomans, culminating in a decisive Russian victory, which was achieved with the participation of the Hetmanate Kozaks and the Zaporozhians, weakened Ottoman control over the northern Black Sea and made the Crimean Khanate independent of the Sultan's rule.⁵⁷

Zaporozhian autonomy, like that of the Hetmanate, remained a problem for the Russian Empire in the post-Poltava period. After the Battle of Poltava, the Zaporozhians fled to the Crimean Khanate, where they established Oleshkivska Sich (1711–1734). Their return in 1734, to establish the New Sich (1734–1775), assured Russian domination over the Zaporozhians, as they recognized the Empress Anna Ioannovna as their sovereign ruler. In return for this submission, the Zaporozhians regained the traditional Kozak rights and autonomous control over their territories, which technically remained beyond Russia's and the Hetmanate's direct control. However, the Zaporozhian submission to the Empress reinstated Zaporozhia's function as gathering point for the Russian armies at times of war, and the region served as a defence line against the Ottoman and the Tatar incursions. Nevertheless, as soon as the Crimean Khanate was neutralized, and the Ottoman influence was pushed back to the Balkans, the Zaporozhian Sich lost its *raison d'être* for the rulers of the Russian Empire. Thus, after the successful completion of the war against the Ottomans, the Russian army was given orders to destroy the last Zaporozhian Sich (the New Sich) in 1775. With its destruction, the Zaporozhian Kozaks lost their territory and liberties. Some of the Zaporozhians were enserfed, and some others joined the Russian army as

carbineers.⁵⁸ Eventually, the Zaporozhian lands were colonized by Serbs (since the 1750s), Bulgarians, Armenians and Germans.⁵⁹

These Zaporozhians who refused to accept Russian rule, initially numbering 7,000⁶⁰ to 10,000, after assuring themselves of the Sultan's protectorate,⁶¹ escaped to the Ottoman territories. Their numbers gradually increased and reached upward of 12,000 in 1778.⁶² They managed to set up a new life near Ochakiv, Ottoman Moldova, Tylihul (Deligöl), and near the mouth of the Danube.⁶³ However, their stay in the Ottoman territories proved complicated as the Sultan, in accordance with the Treaty of Aynalikavak (1779) with Russia, ordered all Kozaks to settle around the Danube. The Sultan wished the runaway Zaporozhians to stay away from the Russian border and the Black Sea shores. Furthermore, the Sultan envisioned resettling Kozaks to the southern Balkan provinces, which would have destroyed traditional Kozak life.⁶⁴ The Sultan's plans proved unpalatable for most Kozaks, and many moved north from the Danube area and settled in districts around Ochakiv. In addition to resettlement plans, Ottomans used the Danubian Kozaks, to their discomfort, to fight the Russians, and to put down uprisings among the Ottoman Christian populations. Eventually, in 1785, eight thousand Danubian Kozaks left the Danubian Sich to serve the Austrian Emperor.⁶⁵ Those that remained numbering around 1500 returned to Russia in 1828 and formed the basis for the Azov Kozak Sich (founded 1831); later they were incorporated into the Kuban Kozaks (1865).

The flight of Zaporozhian Kozaks after 1775 did not please the Russians, since the Zaporozhians, joining Ottoman war efforts, could threaten

the Russian frontier. According to Hrushevskiy, to stop their further flight Grigorii Potemkin, the governor-general of the New Russia and Azov Gubernias (regions),⁶⁶ decided to reinstate the Zaporozhians as a military force.⁶⁷ Another argument for the re-establishment of Kozak armies was the Russian need to protect newly gained territories and prepare for a future war with the Ottomans.⁶⁸ Volodymyr Milchev, favoring the latter argument, notes that Russian rulers declared in 1783, that they would form a volunteer army to attract Zaporozhian Kozaks to serve in the Russian army.⁶⁹ The new Kozak formation, then known as the Loyal Kozak Host, was proclaimed in 1787, ahead of the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787–1791. To attract recruits and achieve better control of the new Host, former Kozak officers Zakhar Chepiha and Sydir Bilyi were assigned as the Kozak commanders. Under their leadership, 700 men joined the Host by the end of 1787.⁷⁰ A year later, when the Host gained a better organizational scheme and prospects, the army was renamed the Black Sea Kozak Host (1788). To attract more Kozaks to the Host, the Russian administration expanded Kozak privileges, such as tax waivers, service under former Kozak officers, and revisions in social status and payments. Thanks to these measures, the Host had 12,620 Kozaks in 1791.⁷¹ The Host gained more power when it was joined by the Danubian Kozaks, who changed allegiance and became part of the Black Sea Kozak Host.

The Host took part in a number of significant battles and played a critical role in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787–1792. For its services, the Host was allocated a piece of land between the rivers Buh and Dniester, where

the Kozaks settled starting from 1790.⁷² In 1792, however, the Kozaks asked the Russian administration to allow them to transfer to Kuban.⁷³ Upon approval, part of the Kozaks resettled in there, while the rest preferred to remain. Those Black Sea Kozaks who settled in Kuban were renamed Kuban Kozaks in 1864.⁷⁴

Ottoman-Russian wars continued to be a motivation for the Russian administration to foster Kozak formations. The 1806–1812 Ottoman-Russian war came as a reason for the formation of the Ust-Dunaiske Budzhatske Kozak Host. According to Olena Bachynska, the local Russian regiment perceived former Danubian Kozaks who were settled around the castle of Brailiv as a threat to their war strategy. They were concerned that these former Danubian Kozaks could be manipulated by the Ottomans against Russian war plans. Therefore, assuring Kozaks' allegiance to Russians became an important undertaking, and the Danubian Kozaks of Brailiv were given privileges similar to those enjoyed by the Black Sea Kozaks. These privileges caught the Kozaks' attention and the Kozak host was formed following Zaporozhian traditions (1807). In addition to the Danubian Kozaks, the Black Sea Kozaks, Ukrainians and Russians joined the ranks of the Host, the number of which reached 2000 in 1807. However, after desertions to the Danubian Sich, the Russians decided to cancel the project. These Ust-Danubian Kozaks, then numbering around 2500, were later resettled in Odessa. Some of the resettled Ust-Danubian Kozaks decided to change allegiance and joined the Danubian Sich, the one which remained loyal to the Ottomans. While some of

the remaining Kozaks resettled in Bessarabia, the rest joined the Kuban Kozaks.

In the late 1820s, the Ust-Danubian Kozaks, then joined by the Danubian Kozaks, left Ottoman territories for Russia and settled near Akkerman.⁷⁵ In 1828, the Russian administration recruited the Ust Danubian, the Black Sea, and the Danubian Kozaks, who were then living in the Bessarabia and Kherson regions, to form a Kozak host. The Host, which came to be known as the Danubian (New Russian) Kozak Host, was joined by various other ethnic groups such as Moldavians, Russians, Bulgarians, and Roma. This Host survived until 1868.⁷⁶

In the early stages of the Ottoman–Russian war of 1828–1829, a new Kozak host was formed to accommodate those Kozaks who deserted the Danubian Sich. Russian strategists planned this Host, which came to be called the “Special Zaporozhian Host,” to serve as an irregular regiment during the war. After the war, the Host was liquidated and its members resettled near Berdiansk. Once resettled, they were renamed as the Azov Kozaks. In their new environment, the irregular Azov Kozaks served as patrolling units to secure the Russian Azov shores and they took part in a number of wars on the Russian side. The Azov Kozaks continued to perform their tasks until the time they were resettled in Kuban. The resettlement lasted from 1862 to the Host’s final liquidation in 1865.⁷⁷

The period which extends from the end of the Khmelnytskyi era to the abolition of the Hetmanate and the destruction of the Zaporozhian Host shows that some parts of the Kozak establishment were disturbed by the growing

Russian control of the Kozak territories. Unfolding events in the period under consideration prove that the attempts by Vyhovskyi and Mazepa to break Russian control led to deepening differences between pro-Russian and pro-autonomy Kozaks. Therefore, the events stand as the main lines of identity differences and collective memory narratives which would contribute to the formation of identities and memories in the future.

The fate of Kozaks in the post-Hetmanate and the post-Zaporozhian Host show that events have also led Kozak populations to decide between living under Russian control or escaping to neighboring countries. Life under the Ottomans and Russians also produced different experiences for Kozaks and left a heritage for the future. The Kozak service to the Russian colonization effort is ignored, to a good extent, by the Ukrainian national intelligentsia who glorified the Kozaks as freedom loving forefathers.

Conclusion

This chapter, intended to provide a background for the discussion of Kozak identities in the present, revisited the historical processes of the formation of the Kozak stratum, registers and uprisings. As the historical record shows, the Kozak stratum did not form until the second half of the 16th century. The emergence of the Kozak Sich as a center of Kozak social life contributed greatly to the formation of Kozak identity and the stratum. The fact that the Sich represented organized Kozak life, centralization of Kozak power, and a stronghold against the Tatars contributed to the Kozaks' visibility and made them an actor with a political agenda. Eventually, the

emergence of a political agenda corresponds to the crystallization of interests of different sections of the Kozak society.

Simultaneously with the emergence of the Sich, the Commonwealth's aim to colonize the steppe area where Kozaks lived had an impact on the way the Kozak stratum was formed. The introduction of Kozak registers caused divisions in Kozak society, as when the registers provided some Kozaks with special privileges. The registers upset the Kozaks on two counts. The first is that it left a significant number of Kozaks without privileges. This turned most of the unregistered against the registered Kozaks, and also against the Commonwealth. The second is that the Commonwealth's failure to commit to the promises given to the registered Kozaks caused rising tensions among the registered and paved the way for uprisings.

The emergence of the Kozak strata along the registered versus the unregistered defined varying Kozak interests. On the part of the registered, the practice of service to the Commonwealth's interests and protection of the state provided a basis for Kozak culture. On the other hand, the anti-Commonwealth attitude of the unregistered Kozaks led to their cultural and political opposition to a state organism which pursued its interests at the expense of their own. These two tendencies formed two cultural trends—that of submission to state power, and that of resistance to state oppression.

The historical process shows that Kozaks were not a homogeneous group. The diversity of political aspirations contributed to the development of the Kozak strata. Particularly, the separate historical development of the Zaparozhian Kozaks and the Hetmanate was a marker of development of

different Kozak identities. The Hetmanate came to be seen as an elite phenomenon, whereas the Zaporozhians came to be seen as closer to the peasantry.

Also contributing to the development of different identity definitions were political preferences. The review of the events indicates that Kozaks were divided over the question of which power they would side with. The pro-Russian Kozaks were countered by Kozaks who favored autonomy and a Polish alliance. Some Kozaks even favored an Ottoman protectorate. In this process Mazepa's decision to act against Russia marked a turning point and determines the fate of the Hetmanate, resulting in an expanded Russian control. The Russian victories over the Ottomans eventually determined the fate of the Zaporozhians.

The integration of Kozaks into the Russian military machine and further colonization of Ukraine and Ottoman-Tatar territories put an end to Kozak, Tatar and Ottoman control over the territories where modern Ukraine would rise. The Russian colonization of Kozak lands also meant the end of Kozak political life; therefore, this delayed a possible early emergence of Ukraine as an independent entity. However, 19th century developments served the formation of the Ukrainian national idea and aspirations for independent statehood. The following chapter will consider the Kozaks' role in the crystallization of a Ukrainian national idea as well as the Kozaks' practical activity in the early 20th century to attain freedom for Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Endnotes

¹ Valerii A. Smolii, "Introduction," in *Istoriia ukrainskoho kozatstva: narysy u 2 tomakh*, ed. Valerii A. Smolii et al. (Kyiv: Vydavnychi dim "Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia," 2006), 5.

² An important issue to clarify here is that Kozaks were found not only in Ukraine. As a social and military phenomenon associated with the steppe frontier, there were, and still are Kozaks of Russia as well. While Ukrainian Kozaks emerged in the Dnipro River basin, Russian Kozaks emerged in the Don River basin. While many ethnic groups contributed to the genesis of the two groups, the Russian Kozak groups, were largely formed by Russian ethnic elements. Russian Kozaks are first mentioned in chronicles from 1444 and were based in Ryazan Principality. By the 18th century Russian Kozaks formed four main groups: Don, Terek, Yaik and Siberian. Ethnically the Don Kozaks were formed mostly from groups from Ukraine, Circassians, Tatars and Nogais. The Tereks were formed mostly of Caucasian groups such as Kabardins, Chechens, Kumyks, Nogais, Georgians, and Circassians. After immigrations of Russians, following the destruction of Terek Kozak units in the war with Iran, Terek Kozaks gained a Russian ethnic component. Yaik Kozaks were formed by Tatars, Kalmyks, Karakalpaks, Turkmens and Kazakhs, while Siberian Kozaks were largely composed of Tatars, Lamuks, Lithuanians, Poles, Germans and Swedes.

Kozaks, including Zaporozhians, were engaged by the state authorities at the end of the 17th century and started to be controlled by them through the 18th century. This control lasted until the end of the Russian Empire in 1917. Russian Kozaks functioned as a major force for colonization of the Asian steppes, control of territories, and in wars.

In 1880 the Don Kozak population was around 330 thousand, ten thousand of whom were Kalmyks and Tatars. In 1917 Don Kozaks were numbered around 1.5 million and they were registered as Russians except for thirty thousand Kalmyks. In 1723 the Terek Kozak population was around 2–3 thousand while the number reached 260 thousand in 1917. Yaik Kozaks numbered around 174 thousand, and the Siberian Kozaks were 162 thousand (10 thousand of them non-Russians) in 1917. For details see M. N. Guboglo, *Kazaki Rossii* (Moskva: Rossiiskaia Akademiia nauk, In-t etnologii i antropologii im. N. N. Miklukho-Maklaia, Koordinatsionno-metodicheskii tsentr prikladnoi etnografii, 1992); A. E. Mokhov, *Kazachestvo i Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo* (Moskva: Vuzovskaia kniga, 2011); Valerii Shambarov, *Kazachestvo istoriia volnoi Rusi* (Moskva: Algoritm, Eksmo, 2007); Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks* (New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Sphere Books, 1969); Andreas Kappeler, *Die Kosaken* (München: Uwe Göbel, 2013).

³ Wladyslaw Serczyk, “The Commonwealth and the Cossacks in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2 (1978): 73.

⁴ It is necessary to emphasize that the focus of this dissertation is on the Ukrainian Kozaks. The Russian Kozaks comprised eleven armies and existed in different locations in the Russian Empire. They are defined as descendants of former frontiersmen. The majority of Russian Kozaks were loyal to the tsars and largely spoke Russian. They played a great role in the expansion of Russian territory.

⁵ For such arguments see M. M. Karamzin’s works. The Russian 16th century *Voskresenk Chronicle* also refers to the multiethnic background of Kozaks. These issues are discussed in Natalia Yakovenko, *Narys istorii serednovichnoi ta rannomodernoi Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2005), 179.

⁶ For an example see Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1970), 151.

⁷ Among those who defended this point of view were Volodymyr Antonovych, Mykhailo Maksymovych, Mykola Kostomarov, Panteleimon Kulish, Dmytro Yavornytskyi and Mykhailo Hrushevskyi.

⁸ Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History* (Winnipeg: Trident Press Limited, 1975), 131.

⁹ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, The Cossack Age to 1625, Vol. 7, trans. Bohdan Struminski (Edmonton-Toronto: CIUS, 1999), 58.

¹⁰ Yakovenko, *Narys istorii*, 182.

¹¹ Boris V. Cherkas, “Ukrainske kozatstvo naprykintsi XV–u pershii polovyni XVI st.,” quoted in Smolii et al., *Istoriia ukrainskoho kozatstva*, 57.

¹² Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, Vol. 7, 61.

¹³ Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, (1970), 154. See also Oleksandr B. Holovko, “Problema doslidzhennia istorychnykh poperednykiv ukrainskoho kozatstva,” in Smolii et al., *Istoriia ukrainskoho kozatstva*, 17–18.

¹⁴ Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, (1970), 155.

¹⁵ Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, Vol. 7, 76.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 77.

¹⁸ Ibid., 102.

¹⁹ Ibid., 110.

²⁰ Vitalii O. Shecherbak, “Reiestrovi kozaky na derzhavnii sluzhbi,” in Smolii et al., *Istoriia ukrainskoho kozatstva*, 73.

²¹ Dates are as quoted in Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, Vol. 7, 178. It is also necessary to note here that most of Ukraine was part of Lithuania until the Union of Lublin (1569).

²² Serhii Plokyh, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 36.

²³ Ibid., 210.

²⁴ For the details of the Florentine Union and its fate in East Slavic lands, see Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West*, 2nd ed. (Edmonton, Toronto: CIUS, 2009), 133.

²⁵ Ibid., 134.

²⁶ Ibid., 136, 142.

²⁷ Mykhailo Hrushevsky mentioned the point. Lubomyr Hajda of Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, recalls that such was the view of Omeljan Pritsak. Personal communication, 6 May 2014, Cambridge, MA.

²⁸ Frank Sysyn, “Recovering the Ancient and Recent Past: The Shaping of Memory and Identity in Early Modern Ukraine,” *Eighteenth Century Studies* 35 (2001): 79.

²⁹ Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West*, 143.

³⁰ Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, Vol. 7, 305–306.

³¹ Particularly after Kozak strongholds started to emerge in the neighborhoods of Kyiv the Kozaks became yet closer to the Church and increasingly affected by the national and cultural life. As protectors of the Church, Kozaks also increasingly gained leverage within the Church as they negotiated its interests. See Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, Vol. 7, 305, 314, 331.

³² Although the scholarly literature on the Khmelnytskyi Uprising is vast, a definitive biography of the hetman remains to be written. Thus, Ivan P. Krypiakevych’s *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, 1954), despite its Soviet-era limitations still remains indispensable.

³³ See Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* 4th Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 128, 132.

³⁴ Doroshenko, *A Survey*, 339–340.

³⁵ Frank Sysyn, “The Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising: A Characterization of the Ukrainian Revolt,” *Jewish History* 17 (2003): 125.

³⁶ While Polish authorities were trying to establish control over the Ukrainian steppe and looking to augment their power and income, they destroyed the autonomy of localities. This led to increasing control over villages and towns by the noble class and the establishment of sloboda settlements, on the Left-Bank Ukraine and in the steppe area, which remained outside the nobility’s reach. These settlements formed the basis for the

Sloboda Ukraine, which later extended over parts of contemporary Sumy, Kharkiv and northern parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It also expanded into the contemporary Russian regions of Belgorod and Kursk. In the 1650s the Tsar decided to form five Kozak regiments out of the Sloboda Ukrainian population: Izium, Sumy, Kharkiv, Ostrogozhsk, and Okhtyrka. These regiments had Kozak privileges while being ruled by a Kozak elite headed in the beginning by a voivode and later by regional governors. While the administrative order of regiments was similar to that of the Hetmanate and Zaporozhia the Russian government had a direct control over the elite and self-government of Kozaks. See Frank Sysyn, "Ukrainian Social Tensions before the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising," in *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Samuel H. Baron and Nancy S. Kollmann (Illinois: Northern Illinois University, 1997), 61. See also Volodymyr Masliichuk, *Slobidska Ukraina* (Kyiv: Zhytomyrska obldrukarnia, 2008).

³⁷ Anglophone and Ukrainian historiography coins various terms to call the Kozak polity. Omeljan Pritsak calls it the "Kozak Hetmanate State" interchangeably with the "Kozak State" and also the "Hetmanate." Orest Subtelny and Zenon Kohut prefer to use the "Hetmanate State." In contemporary Ukrainian scholarship one can notice such usages as "Ukrainian Hetmanate" (see Taras Chukhlib) or simply "Hetmanate" (see V. M. Horobets). Another popular usage is "Ukrainian Kozak State."

³⁸ In the early stages of the uprising Crimean Tatars joined forces with Khmelnytskyi's Kozaks; the joined forces gained early victories against the Polish forces. Joining forces with Kozaks, the Crimean Tatars were serving, on the one hand Ottoman interests against the Poles, while on the other hand, gaining a considerable number of captives during and after the battles. For Tatars, who were major actors in the slave trade in the region, the war effort meant increasing economic prospects because of increasing slave sales. However, the Tatar loyalty was compromised in response to benefits offered by the Poles. For example, the Tatar khan, having been promised great benefits by the Poles, forced Khmelnytskyi to agree to a peace in Zbarazh where Kozaks surrounded the Polish army. In a similar fashion the Tatar khan deserted Khmelnytskyi at the Battle of Berestechko. Moreover, the Tatars took Khmelnytskyi temporarily as a captive, leaving his army without a commander.

³⁹ For Khmelnytskyi's interest in an Ottoman protectorate see Omeljan Pritsak, *Soiuz Khmelnytskoho z Turechchynoiu, 1648 roku* (München: Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka, 1948), 22 pages. See also Omeljan Pritsak, "Das erste türkische-ukrainische Bündnis," *Oriens* 6 (1953):

266–298. For a Turkish translation see Omeljan Pritsak, “İlk Türk-Ukrayna İttifakı,” *İlmi Araştırmaları* 7 (1999): 255–284.

⁴⁰ See Taras Chukhlib, *Ukrainskyi Hetmanat: Problemy mizhnarodnoho utverdzhennia* (Kyiv: Nash Chas, 2007), 58–59.

⁴¹ See on the Pereiaslav Treaty, for example, the major study by John Basarab and the literature cited therein. John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto Press, 1982).

⁴² Doroshenko, *A Survey*, 269.

⁴³ The ethnically Ukrainian lands under Russian rule were divided into three Kozak regions: the Hetmanate, Zaporozhia and Sloboda Ukraine. While the Hetmanate and Zaporozhia possessed rights of self-rule, Sloboda Ukraine was directly subordinated to the Tsar.

⁴⁴ The Ukrainian historian Dmytro Doroshenko collaborated with the Czech orientalist Jan Rypka on the first Turkish source-based study of Hetman Doroshenko’s Turkish orientation. This article was subsequently incorporated into Dmytro Doroshenko’s exhaustive monograph on the Hetman that was completed in the 1930s but published only in 1985: Dmytro Doroshenko, *Hetman Petro Doroshenko: Ohliad ioho zhyttia i politychnoi diialnosti* (New York: Vydavnytstvo Ukrainskoi Vilnoi Akademii nauk u SSHA, 1985). See also D. Doroshenko, and J. Rypka, “Hetman P. Doroshenko a ioho turecka politika,” *Časopis Národního Musea* 1–2 (1933): 1–55. See also the monographs of Zbigniew Wojcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji: 1674–1679: studium z dziejów polskiej polityki zagranicznej* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowyim. Ossolińskich, 1976).

⁴⁵ For a biography and Mazepa’s struggle with Peter, the Swedish alliance, and the defeat at Poltava, see Serhii Plokhy, *Poltava 1709: The Battle and the Myth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). For an older biography, see Oleksandr Ohloblyn, *Hetman Mazepa ta yoho doba* (New York, Paris, and Toronto: S. N., 1960). For a new biography, see Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva, *Ivan Mazepa i Rosiiska imperiia: istoriia “zrady”* (Kyiv: Klio, 2013).

⁴⁶ The Collegium was reestablished in 1764.

⁴⁷ Zenon Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988), 72.

⁴⁸ Oleh Gerus, “Manifestations of the Cossack Idea in Modern History: The Cossack Legacy and its Impact,” *Ukrainskyi Istoryk* 1–2 (1986): 25.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁵⁰ Paul R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto, 2010), 269.

⁵¹ For quoted aspects of transformation under the Collegium, see Zenon Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 104–116.

⁵² Doroshenko, *A Survey*, 441. For a detailed account of the military transformation, see Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 218–222.

⁵³ Doroshenko, *A Survey*, 441.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 437.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 435.

⁵⁶ Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 186.

⁵⁷ Kohut only mentions Hetmanate Kozak participation from the Hetmanate and states that 9000 Kozaks were involved in the war effort. Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 123.

⁵⁸ Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, Vol. 7, 456.

⁵⁹ Doroshenko, *A Survey*, 476–77.

⁶⁰ Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, Vol. 7, 456.

⁶¹ Olena A. Bachynska, “Zadunaiske Kozatstvo,” in Smolii et al., *Istoriia ukrainskoho kozatstva*, 2, 320.

⁶² P. K. Shchabalskii, *Potemkin i zaselenie Novorossiiskogo kraia. Sbornik antropologicheskikh statei o Rossii i stranakh ei prilezhashchikh* (Moskva, 1868), 183, as quoted in Bachynska, “Zadunaiske Kozatstvo,” 320.

⁶³ Volodymyr Milchev, *Zaporozhtsi na viiskovomu kordoni Avstriiskoi imperii 1785–1790 rr.* (Zaporizhia: Tandem-U, 2007), 27.

⁶⁴ Bachynska, “Zadunaiske Kozatstvo,” 323.

⁶⁵ For detailed information see Milchev, *Zaporozhtsi*, 2007.

⁶⁶ New Russia gubernia (Novorosiiska gubernia) was an administrative structure formed to rule regions to the north of the Crimean Khanate. It was first formed in 1764 to include parts of Zaporozhian territories. As the Russian Empire expanded southward the gubernia covered former Zaporozhian, Tatar and Ottoman territories to the north of the Black Sea.

⁶⁷ Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, Vol. 7, 457.

⁶⁸ Milchev, *Zaporozhtsi na viiskovomu*, 27. Another author favoring the argument is Roman Shyian, *Kozatstvo Pivdennoi Ukrainy v ostannii chverti XVIII st.* (Zaporizhia: Tandem, 1998), 4.

⁶⁹ See in Roman Shyian, “Chornomorske kozatske viisko,” in O. A. Bachynska et al., *Kozatstvo na Pivdni Ukrainy. Kinets XVIII-XIX st.* (Odesa: Druk, 2000), 94.

⁷⁰ Milchev, *Zaporozhtsi*, 27–28.

⁷¹ Roman Shyian, “Chornomorske kozatske viisko,” 96.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Roman Shyian, *Kozatstvo Pivdennoi Ukrainy*, 61.

⁷⁴ This dissertation will not expand on post-Zaporozian Kozak formations in great detail. However, it should be noted here that coming from Zaporozhian roots, the Black Sea Kozaks and later Kuban Kozaks preserved the Ukrainian language and folk traditions to a certain extent. However, with their integration into the Russian army their traditional social structure was significantly transformed. The case of a large part of the Kozak officer class, which by 1792 gained nobility status, is a graphic example. These Kozak officers, after gaining privileges, quit their Kozak responsibilities and started to live on their estates. Despite russifying social tendencies, by the end of the 19th century, around 50% of the Kuban population was of Ukrainian origin. See Dmytro Bilyi, *Ukrainci Kubani v 1792–1921 rokakh. Evoliutsiia sotsialnykh identychnosti* (Lviv, Donetsk: Skhidnyi vydavnychiy dim, 2009); Borys Herasymenko, *Ukrainska kultura na Kubani: Istoryko-kulturolohichni narys* (Ternopil: Prosvita, 2005).

⁷⁵ Olena A. Bachynska “Ust-Dunaiske Budzhatske kozatske viisko,” in Bachynska, *Kozatstvo na pivdni Ukrainy*, 120–126.

⁷⁶ Olena A. Bachynska, “Dunaiske (Novorosiiske) kozatske viisko,” in Bachynska, *Kozatstvo na pivdni Ukrainy*, 177–181.

⁷⁷ Liudmyla M. Malenko, “Azovske Kozatske Viisko” in Bachynska, *Kozatstvo na pivdni Ukrainy*, 138–143.

CHAPTER TWO

REDISCOVERY, REINTERPRETATION AND REGENERATION OF KOZAKS: FROM THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE TO THE SOVIET UNION

In the 19th century, the Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Host were already long gone, and the Kozaks were being transformed into a regular peasantry. Some Kozaks, however, were integrated into the tsarist Russian military. The Kozak upper classes, in the post-Hetmanate period, had attempted to protect their former privileges and demanded recognition of the Hetmanate's elite as equivalent to the Russian nobility. Eventually, in the period from 1783 to 1785, the Kozak elite achieved their goal. However, in the last decade of the 18th century, the Russian administration revoked such recognitions of nobility. This led to a renewed Kozak struggle to regain their status in the first quarter of the 19th century.¹ To regain the imperial recognition, the former Kozak nobility needed to document their origins. This requirement gave birth to an interest in the study of the Kozak past which in turn was followed, in the early 19th-century, by publications documenting the Kozak past. This early immersion into their Kozak heritage by the elites was followed by publications engendered by the emerging Ukrainian intellectual movements. This chapter will examine, after a brief look at the sampled works of the 17th and 18th century works, the 19th century publications to track representations of Kozaks. In order to provide a folk perspective on the popular imagination of the Kozaks, the chapter will focus on the *kobzari* and *dumy* traditions.

Since the early the 20th century, ideas fostered by the Ukrainian national intelligentsia and by the non-urban masses found their reflections in the establishment of a number of societies, organizations, military and paramilitary formations. This chapter, as its second goal, will survey the occasions on which images and meanings carried by the Kozaks of the past served to construct meanings, values, interests and political agendas in the present. As its last goal, this chapter will examine the changes in images and meanings of Kozaks sustained under Soviet rule.

Rediscovery and Reinterpretation: The 19th- and the Early 20th- Century National Intelligentsia and Articulations of the Kozak Past

The Kozak myth, which laid the basis for the role of Kozaks in the 19th century at the center of emergent Ukrainian national identity, developed in the first instance in the church writings and Kozak chronicles of the 17th and 18th centuries. With regard to the writings of churchman, Hrushevskyi pointed out that the Kyivan Orthodox hierarchy and schools of the 17th century “owed their existence to the Cossacks and their upper classes. This obligated them not only in matters of church policy but also in their literary creativity to consider most seriously the Cossacks’ desires and demands.”² Among such writings, with their tendency towards glorification and, to an extent, mythologization of the Kozaks, one can mention *Protestatsia* (Protestation, 1621) and *Virshi* (Laments, 1622).³ Also probably from the 1620s is the Hustynia Chronicle by an unknown author, published in the mid-19th century and extensively utilized, particularly in reference to Kozak-Church relations, in the seventh volume of

Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus*.⁴ Thus, the chronicle describes the travels of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanes, in Ukraine in 1620–1621 in the company of Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi and his Kozaks, and their visit to the Hustynia Trinity Monastery. The chronicle depicts Sahaidachnyi as “a warrior dreaded by his enemies.” Even the patriarch’s guard likens the Kozaks’ role to that of bees in relation to the queen of the hive: “as bees protect their mother, so the sheep protect their shepherd.” No doubt, the allusion here is to the Gospel of St. John, where patriarch is the Shepherd, and the Kozaks are here presented as sheep protecting the Shepherd and the Church. The Kozaks are seen as liberators and champions, in medieval crusader fashion, of the true religion—that is, the Orthodox faith. This attitude of the Church, therefore, served to justify the Kozak wars and their plunder of the Turks and Tatars, as well as and also their battling all who were at odds with the Orthodoxy—that is, Roman Catholics and Uniates. This view permeates the chronicle, which frequently uses the epithet “pious” for the Kozaks.⁵

An important source and interpretation of Kozak history from 1648 to 1702 is the Eyewitness Chronicle (*Litopys samovydtisia*), written by an unknown author, assumed to be a member of the Kozak *starshyna*.⁶ The particular importance of the chronicle lies in the fact that the author provides first-hand witness accounts of the events around the Khmelnytskyi uprising that formed the basis for the later histories by Hrabianka and Velychko. However, it differs from the latter in its distinctive feature of not glorifying Khmelnytskyi and the Kozak deeds.⁷

According to Hrushevskyyi, the catastrophe that followed the Battle of Poltava stimulated writing of such glorifying Kozak histories, which in essence were motivated to raise the readers' pride and spirits. This creative impulse found clear embodiment in the chronicle Hryhorii Hrabianka's. Known to be a rank-and-file Kozak in 1686 and a colonel in the 1730s, Hrabianka authored the chronicle known as The Course of the greatest, bloodiest and, from the beginnings of the Polish nation, unprecedented war of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Zaporozhian hetman against the Poles . . . (Diistviia prezilnoi i ot nachala poliakov krvavshoi nebyvaloi brani Bohdana Khmelnytskoho, hetmana Zaporozhskoho, s poliaky . . .).⁸ Like the others, Hrabianka reflects the perspective on the Kozak history from the point of view of the Kozak officer class (*starshyna*).⁹ To defend Kozak autonomy, the author provides proofs of Kozak distinctiveness and draws a glorious picture of the mid-17th-century Kozaks and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi.

Behold, therefore, how brave and unconquerable
Is Cossack strength in war, how unyielding and how many!
And humble beneath our feet the heads of our enemies!
May the Cossack mother always be fruitful
And her children in strength ever flourish.¹⁰

Thus he summons his readers to recall the spirit of the period of the Khmelnytskyi Uprising:

. . . seeing the victories [of the Kozak Uprising] sunk in the depths of oblivion, it was some love for glory, but for the sake of common

benefit that I decided not to leave the deeds of our most faithful son, the blessedly wise leader Bohdan Khmelnytskyi . . . to languish in the ashes of silence.¹¹

Samiilo Velychko (1670–1728), author of the third and most expansive of the Kozak chronicles, shared the motivations of Hrabianka in recalling and recording the Kozak past. Written in four volumes by 1720, his chronicle cover events of 1620–1700, Velychko describes the pain and destruction inflicted by tsarist policies and people’s forgetfulness of their forefathers that motivated his writing.¹²

Then I saw in various places many human bones dry and bare under the naked sky, and I asked myself: Whose bones are these? My answer was: the bones of all those who died in those wastes. My heart and spirits were oppressed, since our beautiful land, the Little Russian Ukraine, which before was full of the blessings of this world, has now been turned by God’s will into a desert, and our own glorious forefathers have been forgotten. I have asked many old people why this has happened, for what reasons and by whom was this land of ours turned into ruin.¹³

Velychko’s narrative reveals that he was mainly drawn to the destruction of his native land, for which he blamed people who did not record and keep memory of the deeds of their Kozak ancestors. For him, keeping record of the “glorious” Kozak deeds would help people to remember those days and to find a way out of the calamities that befell Kozak autonomy and privileges. In this sense the chronicles of Hrabianka and Velychko were products of a deep concern over the loss of communal memory.¹⁴ In a state of

loss of memory, glorification of the Kozaks and the mythology created around them become what Plokhy has termed “national ideology,” which subsequently evolved from a local memory to an elaborate tool of nation building.¹⁵ Time has proven the validity of this observation. The Kozaks came to form the basis of collective memory and identity for the 19th-century Ukrainian national awakening.

The early 19th century witnessed numerous publications on representations of the Kozak cultural heritage that hearkened to old Kozak days, evoked nostalgia, and kept the Kozak past alive in the collective memory of the intelligentsia. As Zenon Kohut observed, “[the old Kozak nobility] were unable to restore institutions of the Hetmanate, [but] they sought at least to preserve the memory of it. As a result, from the time of the abolition until the 1840s, the Ukrainian nobles compiled and published topographical descriptions, genealogies, local histories, family archives, and several works of synthesis.”¹⁶

The Little Russian elite’s need for justification was not the only motivation that raised interest in the Kozak past. National ideas, which were spreading fast throughout Europe, found a response among the Little Russian intelligentsia. Under their influence some members of the Little Russian intelligentsia challenged the literate strata, which were then integrated largely into the Russian worldview, to recognize and articulate differences between Russians and Ukrainians. Their call was also a reaction to the Russification of Ukraine, which had been underway since the mid-18th century.¹⁷ Kohut observed the impact of Russification in the post-Hetmanate period:

Not only were the institutions of the Hetmanate replaced by imperial ones, but a part of Ukrainian society was assimilated and Russified. A basic polarization resulted; the town, with its ethnically mixed population and numerous officials, became Russified, while the countryside, inhabited by Kozaks, peasants, and nobles, remained on the whole Ukrainian and the Kozaks were merged into the peasantry. Being Ukrainian was virtually synonymous with being a peasant.¹⁸

In response, the emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia began to articulate the notion that there existed a larger group of people, a hypothetical Ukrainian nation. However, to gain validity and to put a stop to Russification, the Ukrainian national intelligentsia first had to challenge the all-Russian idea.¹⁹

According to the all-Russian idea, the East Slavic peoples of the Russian Empire constituted one Russian people. The idea derived from the *Sinopsis* (1674), a work probably authored by Innokentii Gizel, a Kyivan monk. The book formulated the notion of unity of the Great and Little Russians (Russians and Ukrainians), and argued that both derived from the same historical roots and formed a single Russian people. It gained great influence, as it was used in the Russian Empire as the only history textbook until the 1760s, and continued to be widely circulated until the mid-19th century.²⁰ Moreover, it paved the way for the Russian historical narratives²¹ of Nikolai Karamzin, Nikolai Ustrialov, Sergei Soloviev and Vasiliï Kliuchevskii.²²

The all-Russian narrative was particularly convenient to the tsarist authorities to mute the separatist/nationalist discourses of the Slavic peoples

within the empire. As soon as the consolidation of the unitary structure of the empire became a major concern, the idea that Little Russians and Great Russians comprised “all-Russians” was to serve to the empire’s consolidation efforts.

The imperial all-Russian narrative was elicited from the Little Russian elite. But there were those who insisted on the existence of Ukrainian distinctiveness. The Russified intelligentsia largely subscribed to the all-Russian idea. The Little Russian elite faced the challenge of defending the idea that the Little Russians (Ukrainians) had followed a separate historical line of development. To make their case that the Ukrainians were a distinct people, they pointed to major events of the Kozak era, such as the Khmelnytskyi Uprising, the Pereiaslav Treaty and its consequences, growing Russian control in the aftermath of the Battle of Poltava, and took sides in the polemics over the “treason or heroism” of the hetmans.

One of the earliest 18th-century works that referred to the idea of Ukrainian distinctiveness was Semen Divovych’s poem from 1763 *Razgovor Velikorosii s Malorossieiu* [The Conversation of Great Russia with Little Russia] in which the author argued that *Malo Rosiia* should not become an integrated part of the empire given the account of history and Ukrainian national rights.²³

Another early work that vigorously promoted Ukrainian distinctiveness was the *Istoriia Rusiv* [History of the Rus]. The book circulated in numerous manuscripts since the 1820s and was first published in 1846.²⁴ In his historical overview the unknown author covered the period from the genesis of the Slavs

to the 1770s.²⁵ The author provides an account of the Kozak era, where he introduced the Kozaks as warriors who fought Poles, Tatars, and Russians to liberate their lands. However, while glorifying the Kozaks, the author approved the all-Russian discourse that would “ease the integration of the Cossack elites into the Russian nobility and society at large.”²⁶ Outdistancing the author’s intention, the book has “served as a basis for the creation of a new national narrative of Ukrainian history.”²⁷ Especially, narrating the particularities of the Kozak past, the work argued in favor of nobility privileges for the Kozak elites and provided justifications for the legitimacy of ideas of separatism from Russia. Lastly, through its evocation and specific representation of the Kozak past, the book had a significant impact on the development of national consciousness of such future national figures like Taras Shevchenko and eventually contributed to the development of Ukrainian separatist views.²⁸

Other early 19th-century publications provided the formulations for claims to Ukrainian distinctiveness and contributed to the emergence of a Ukrainian national intelligentsia. Works such as Nikolai Tsertelev’s *Opyt sobraniia starinnykh malorossiiskikh pesen* [An Attempt at Collection of the Ancient Little Russian Songs] (1819),²⁹ Mykhailo Maksymovych’s *Malorossiiskie pesni* [Little Russian Songs] (1827) and *Ukrainskie narodnye pesni* [Ukrainian Folk Songs] (1834) and Izmail Sreznevsky’s *Zaporozhskaia starina* [Zaporozhian Antiquity] contained accounts of Kozak history and collections of Kozak songs, tales, letters and chronicles. While Maksymovych was Ukrainian, Tsertelev was a Russified Georgian, and Sreznevsky Russian;

although it is possible to classify them as romantics inspired by local patriotism and traditionalism, it is not possible to argue that these collectors followed a nationalist agenda. However, their collections did serve the emergence of Ukrainian nationalism, because they showed Ukrainian ethnic distinctiveness through documenting the Kozak cultural heritage. The content of these works also had an impact on the self-identification of the national intellectuals of the 1840s and 1850s. As Panteleimon Kulish later testified, these works caused some Little Russians to drop their all-Russian identity, and take on a “Little Russian” one:

Nikolai [Kostomarov], like all of us, students of the Russian schools, at first scorned everything Ukrainian and did his thinking in the language of Pushkin [in Russian]. Yet to both of us, in two different points in Little Russia, this unusual event happened. In Kharkiv he came across the 1827 collection of Ukrainian songs by Maksymovych, and I, in Novgorod Siverskii, also by accident came into possession of the Ukrainian *dumy* and songs of the same Maksymovych, published in 1834. In one day both of us changed from Russian into Little Russian populists.³⁰

Under the influence of such works, a new generation of intellectuals, such as Mykola Kostomarov (1817–1885), Panteleimon Kulish (1819–1897) and Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861) emerged and spearheaded the Ukrainian national renaissance.³¹ Their works in a variety of genres—poetry, fiction, academic histories, documentary publications, essays—gave a place to the glorious deeds and setbacks and tragedies of the Kozaks. Mykola Kostomarov, for example, in his work titled, *Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu* [*The Books*

of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People] (1846) wrote in a bible-verse format and glorified Kozak deeds. With its format and style, Kostomarov's piece presents itself as a manifesto of the absolute historical and spiritual truth of Ukrainian history, which aimed its appeal at the Russified intelligentsia. For this purpose, the author creates a world of dualities: "God-loving" pure Kozaks versus the "torturer" tsar and the oppressive Poles.³² In such a juxtaposition, Kostomarov presents the Khmelnytskyi Uprising as the Kozaks' struggle against oppressive "masters". The Pereiaslav Treaty Kostomarov defines as a unification of one Slavic people that is "indivisible but separate in the image of the Trinity." However, the author viewed Russian control over the Hetmanate as a "fiendish captivity by Muscovy."³³ He praised Kozak democracy, moral purity, and wholehearted commitment to defend the "pure belief" (Orthodoxy). These were presented in a way as to convince the readers that their "forefathers" were the servants of "pure truth" acting against the "evil" others.

Panteleimon Kulish, belonging to the same generation of intellectuals, also worked with Kozak themes. Inspired by the *Istoriia Rusiv*, he wrote *Mikhail Charnyshenko* (1843), a historical novel about the late Hetmanate period. As George Luckyj observed, in this work, Kulish was "driven by overwhelming nostalgia for the glory of Cossack Ukraine."³⁴ In the same year he also produced an epic poem, *Ukraina* (1843), which focused on events of the Khmelnytskyi period. Additionally, *Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi* [Notes on Southern Rus] (1856–1857), and *Chorna Rada* [Black Council] (1857)—focused on aspects of the Kozak past and brought Kozaks into the cultural

sphere.³⁵ Kulish, believing in the mass education of peasants, also published the primer *Hramatyka* (1857), in which he provided nationalized, glorious images of Kozaks. In his primer, he placed special emphasis on the uprising period and evoked the deeds of Khmelnytskyi, whom he considered the defender of the rights of the peasants.³⁶ Kulish later in life became critical of Kozaks. In particular, he held the Kozaks themselves responsible, not necessarily the Russians, for the calamities that followed the Pereiaslav Treaty. By the time he developed his negative perception of the Kozaks in the 1870s, he and his fellow intellectuals had already constructed an image of Kozaks as their glorious forefathers. He confessed his and his fellow intellectuals' transgression: "We are disunited people—descendants of those brigands [Kozaks] whom we turned into heroes."³⁷

The most influential figure of this era, one who made extensive use of Kozak themes in his works, was Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861). In his artistic creations he especially turned to themes of Kozak struggles against foreign oppression, love of freedom, and the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich.³⁸ Such themes can be traced in his poem named after the Hetman Taras Fedorovych (Triasylo), who in 1630 led a rebellion against the Poles.³⁹ In the poem Shevchenko reflects his longing for the glorious olden days of the hetmans, when Kozaks fought the oppression of "Mongols, Poles and Muscovites" and "lived freely."⁴⁰

Evoking the "Kozaks' freedom," he recalled the Sich and its destruction by the Russians. As reflected in his poems, the Sich represented the embodiment of the "freedom-loving" spirit of the Kozaks.⁴¹ Shevchenko

also pondered the fateful Pereiaslav Treaty, which he deemed responsible for the catastrophes that subsequently befell Ukraine. Lamenting the catastrophic results of the Treaty, he characterized Khmelnytskyi as a thoughtless leader who failed to foresee the future consequences of the treaty.⁴²

Shevchenko also turned his thoughts to Ivan Mazepa, and referred to key moments of his hetmanate, such as the destruction of his capital Baturyn and the Battle of Poltava. In his poem *Great Mound*, Shevchenko gave an account of Baturyn's destruction and portrayed a graphic picture of the catastrophe. Another poem, *Irzhavets*, was a lament for the loss in the Battle of Poltava, for which Shevchenko placed the blame on those Kozaks who acted against Mazepa.⁴³

In his works Shevchenko focused on critical moments of the Kozak past. With that emphasis, he sought to discover the historical underpinnings for the "evil fate of the Kozak folk." Looking at past events, he linked a chain of events which, he considered, brought the Kozaks under the rule of Russians. His pondering through his poems on the reasons why Ukrainians had to live through such hardships spoke to large segments of the Ukrainian society. Shevchenko's works eventually became a cornerstone of the Ukrainian national consciousness, in which the Kozaks emerged as the forefathers of the nation.

The 1860s marked a critical turning point in Ukrainian national emergence. The premature death of Taras Shevchenko (1861), the abolition of serfdom (1861), and increasing pressures on Ukrainian culture and language, starting from 1863, had a significant impact for years to come. Suppression of

Ukrainian culture and language put a brake on the progress of the Ukrainian national awakening beginning with the Valuev Circular (1863), which forbade printing books in the Ukrainian language. A second milestone was the Ems decree (1876), which banned the import of Ukrainian language books, translations into Ukrainian, including musical texts, as well as theatrical performances, public readings and educational instruction in Ukrainian. Lastly, local libraries had to discard their Ukrainian language collections.⁴⁴

In the second half of the 19th century, despite worsening conditions for the Ukrainian national movement, a new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals emerged. Prominent among them was the historian Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908), who was greatly influenced by the ideas of Kostomarov, Kulish and Shevchenko. With his friends he founded the socio-cultural organization Kyiv “Hromada” (1861), which prioritized the education of peasants, publication of text-books, and organization of cultural events. However, the tasks he undertook were complicated, especially with the pressure the Valuev Circular placed on the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A major undertaking of Antonovych as historian was to challenge the all-Russian narrative, which constructed the Kozak past as an integral part of Russian history.⁴⁵ Antonovych, for his purposes, attempted to undo the all-Russian narrative with works such as the *O proiskhozhdenii kozachestva* [On the Origin of Kozakdom] (1863), *Poslednie vremena kozachestva na pravom beregu Dnepra po aktam 1679–1716 g.* [The Last Period of the Right-Bank Kozakdom: according to the Documents of 1679–1716] (1868), *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* [Monographs on the History of

Western and South-Western Russia] (1885) and *Besidy pro chasy kozatski na Ukraini* [Conversations on the Kozak Period in Ukraine] (1897). With such works, he set out to establish a linear connection between the Kozak and the Kyivan Rus periods.⁴⁶ To establish the link he focused on “Kozak democracy” and traced the sources of the “democratic” aspects of Kozak culture to the Rus period.⁴⁷ With this orientation, Antonovych aimed to trace a separate Ukrainian historical line of development between Rus, the Kozaks, and his own time in order to undermine the hegemony of the all-Russian narrative.

Antonovych’s intellectual venture was brought to completion later by his student Mykhailo Hrushevskiy (1866–1934). Hrushevskiy took on the task with his works such as *The Traditional Scheme of Russian History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs* (1904),⁴⁸ *Survey of the History of the Ukrainian People* (1904)⁴⁹ and his magnum opus *History of Ukraine-Rus* (written from 1894 to 1934).⁵⁰ In these works he persuasively traced a continuous line of historical developments for Ukraine and the Ukrainians. Hrushevskiy begins his history of Ukrainian statehood with Kyivan Rus, starting in the 9th-century Kyivan Rus, traces its successor in the Galician-Volhynian principality (13th–14th centuries), and continues with the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania (14th–16th centuries), followed by their joint Commonwealth from 1569. The last four volumes of his *History of Ukraine-Rus* are devoted to the Kozak era, but still reach only the year 1658—although his one-volume synthesis continues to his own days. Thus, Hrushevskiy’s vision was to attempt to establish a causative line of events for an entire millenium. No doubt, in linking events

over such a long period, Hrushevskyi risked imposing categories of his own time retrospectively on the Kozak past. For him, the Kozak past took place in “Ukraine,” whatever the time period and contemporary terminology, and the “Ukrainian people” existed as a self-contained social group since ancient times. Thus, Hrushevskyi considered that Kozak-like phenomena had existed in the Kyivan Rus period, and their later “reemergence” came as a “hope to the downtrodden Ukrainian people.”⁵¹ He also promoted the myth of Kozak democracy and freedom; like his predecessors, Hrushevskyi constructed the Kozaks as “freedom-loving people” of the steppes, who recognized no superior power but their own “elected” leader. Depicted as “freedom-lovers,” Kozaks coursed the steppes fighting against the brutal Tatars raids and giving relief to the peasants tilling the soil. As to the Poles, Hrushevskyi argued that as soon as Kozaks became more powerful they started to “hold a promise of freedom for the masses of Ukrainian people.”⁵² For him, the crucial issue was the “bitter struggle against Polonization.” This was the premise for the “Ukrainian national movement” (i.e., the uprisings), which aimed to sustain “Ukrainian national unity.”⁵³ Consequently, the “heroic” Khmelnytskyi period and “the Ukrainian War of Liberation” (i.e., the Khmelnytskyi Uprising) marked the culmination of the “Ukrainian national” revival. Thus, the Hetmanate came into being as the result of a “national movement.” However, the movement faced challenges. Given the circumstances, in Hrushevskyi’s interpretation, the Pereiaslav Treaty was the last resort for the Kozak leadership to keep the “nation” intact. With regard to Mazepa, Hrushevskyi stressed his longstanding collaboration with the Russian tsar as well as his

focus on the interests of the Kozak elite rather than the peasantry. Still, Hrushevskiy defined Mazepa as the “last warrior, a statesman of Khmelnytskyi’s type, and the last loyal representative of the policy of Ukrainian independence.”⁵⁴

The Khmelnytskyi period had an enormous influence on the formation of the myth about the Ukrainian Kozaks’ role in nation building. This influence can be traced through the various sources, Ukrainian (Kozak) and foreign, devoted to the Khmelnytskyi period. The notes to the English translation of Hrushevskiy’s *History of Ukraine-Rus*, provide a comprehensive review not only of the sources and literature devoted to the times of Khmelnytskyi, but a through, contemporary survey of historical tradition within which such sources and historiography came into being.⁵⁵

Hrushevskiy, in his review pays particular attention, to the Kozak chronicles written in the first half of the 18th century, especially the Eyewitness Chronicle, the Hrabianka Chronicle, and the Chronicle of Samiylo Velychko. The latter especially raises the question of reliability and mythologization, Velychko himself admitted that his chronicle was supplemented “where anything was lacking” from “the diary of Samiilo Zorka, Khmelnytsky’s secretary” and “from other chroniclers and Cossack notes.”⁵⁶ The authenticity of Zorka’s diary has been much in dispute among historians. Hrushevskiy himself informs us that the diary contained a very detailed history and correspondence of Khmelnytskyi, but further argues that “one can be of various minds as to whether he [Velychko] was merely indulging in mystification here or was himself the victim of mystification.”⁵⁷ Despite

Hrushevskyi's argued that prominent scholars such as Kostomarov, Antonovych and Lazarevskyi "have believed in their [chronicles] authenticity until the most recent times."⁵⁸

Hrushevskyi in his notes to volume eight of *History of Ukraine-Rus* shows that the historical study of the Kozak period merges with the collecting efforts of Kozak folklore by ethnographers during the development of Ukrainian historiography in the 19th century.⁵⁹ The authors of this era widely referred to both the chronicles and folklore, and in this way the Kozak myth moved into academic literature. Sysyn, studying the impact of the Kozak chronicles on the creation of the Ukrainian national movement underlined that "modern Ukrainian identity was forged under the influence of the chronicles. Through Kostomarov's reading of Hrabianka and Shevchenko's of Velychko, the tenets of modern Ukrainian identity were established. There has been a tendency to see the use of name 'Ukraine,' the national cult of Khmel'nyts'kyi, and the myth of the Cossack Ukrainian nation as products of the Romantic period."⁶⁰

Hrushevskyi, by constructing an unbroken historical link from Kyivan Rus to his present, and by placing the Kozak past at the center of the "Ukrainian" experience, endowed the Ukrainians with a coherent national historical narrative. The national history manifested itself as the essential step towards legitimizing the existence of the Ukrainian nation against Russian claims. Needless to say, integration of the "glorious" Kozak past into the entire narrative of the "Ukrainian" past offered Ukrainians evidence for their nationhood.

Finally, the Kozak theme and its embedding in the Ukrainian consciousness was sealed by the verses of *Shche ne vmerla Ukraina* [Ukraine Has Not Perished], the future national anthem of Ukraine. The poem was written by Pavlo Chubynskyi, an ethnographer of Kozak origins, in 1862.⁶¹ He had the opportunity to meet Mykola Kostomarov, Panteleimon Kulish and Taras Shevchenko, under whose influence he became interested in the study of folk traditions, wrote poems and collected folk songs.

Chubynskyi published his poem in Lviv (1863) and it gained popularity throughout Ukraine.⁶² The poem contained references to the Kozaks and Kozak leaders:

Soul and body we will sacrifice
For our freedom
And show that we brothers
are of the Kozak clan.
Hey, hey dear brothers
Of Kozak clan
It is time to do our work
Hey, hey it is time to stand-up,
It is time to gain freedom!

Nalyvaiko, Zalizniak
And Taras Triasylo⁶³
Calls us from beyond the grave
For the sacred deeds.
Recall the glorious death of
Warrior-Kozaks
Not to lose vainly
Our youth.

. . .
Oh Bohdan, Bohdan
Our glorious hetman
For what did you hand over Ukraine
To evil Moscovites
...⁶⁴
. . .

Looking at the main patterns of the 19th- and early 20th-century narratives of the Kozak past by Ukrainian intellectuals, we could conclude that the narratives planted the past into the present to serve the political agenda of the present. In accordance with the political agenda, the Kozaks were glorified and elevated to the status of forefathers. This was achieved through a narrative pattern that reflects a continuous struggle between the “pure” Kozaks and the “evil” Muscovites, Poles and Turks-Tatars.⁶⁵ This narrative also expanded upon the themes of struggle between the “freedom-loving Kozak” and the “abusive Polish nobility” or “autocratic” tsar, alluding to a struggle between the progressive and democratic Kozak society and the authoritarian-abusive neighboring systems. Along with such narratives, the Sich, the seat of the Zaporozhians, was heralded as a center of progressiveness, the place from where ideas of freedom spread and united the Ukrainian people for a common purpose. Such narrative constructions did not fully neglect the failures of the Kozaks, but because, all in all, failures were perceived to have been visited by the “evil” on the “good,” the failures were presented as a source of honor.

Assessing their impact on the Ukrainian collective consciousness, it would appear that works of history, folklore, and literature in the 19th century had limited public circulation. They were accessible mostly to the literate

land-owning and urban elites. In the second half of the 19th century even this limited access was increasingly suppressed. But notwithstanding such conditions, publications of the 19th century were successful enough to raise a discussion of identity within the intelligentsia. With these discussions, articulations of the Kozak past crystallized and became a basis for ideas that defended the political and/or cultural separation of the Ukrainians.

Folk Sources and the Imagination of the Kozak Forefathers

The abolition of the Hetmanate and the destruction of the Zaporozhian Host were mentioned earlier in this dissertation. Thereafter, assimilation into Russian culture seemed only a matter of time for the Kozak elite. And indeed, shortly afterwards a significant part of the elite underwent a process of Russification. Others, who failed to prove themselves eligible for integration into the Russian nobility, kept the Kozak traditions and developed nostalgia for the Kozak past. This nostalgia fuelled the motivation for the preservation of the Kozak traditions and later, starting in the early 19th century, provided the impulse for the collection of Kozak folklore. On the part of the peasant masses of Ukraine, the oral storage of folk prose remained as a part of folk memory, and *dumy* represented a part of their memory. This section will examine the folk interpretations of the Kozaks through the study of *kobzari* and *dumy*. For this purpose it is necessary to review the collections of the 19th century, the content of the *dumy*, and the *kobzar* tradition

Some members of the Russian cultural elite had a vision of Ukraine as an ethnic region of Russia that had a peculiar richness of folk culture. The differences between Russian and Ukrainian cultures were exciting to explore

as the variations were perceived as an all-Russian treasure. Thus, some members of the Russian cultural elite, being not necessarily ethnic Ukrainians but Ukrainophiles, worked with folkloric material. Their publications contributed eventually to a clarification of ethnic lines of cleavage between Russians and Ukrainians.

The use of the term “*duma*” gained popularity especially after Maksymovych’s work (1827), where he used the term in a more academic sense and imputed to it the quality of a genre. The first collected *duma* texts appeared in Kondratskyi’s collection; the *duma* texts which are known as *Kozak Holota* and *Netiaha* were recorded by him in 1684. However, these first texts were only brought to light in the 1920s by Mykhailo Vozniak during his research in Krakow’s Jagiellonian University.⁶⁶

The earliest handwritten collections of *dumy* are dated as early as 1804–1809. These texts were taken down by Vasilii Lomikovskii and comprised thirteen *dumy*.⁶⁷ The second collection was published in St. Petersburg (1819) by Nikolai Tsertelev and contained nine *dumy* texts.⁶⁸ Soon after followed Kondratii Ryleev’s collections from 1821 to 1823; finally, all Ryleev’s collections were compiled in a book published in 1825⁶⁹ which first time mentioned the term “*duma*.”⁷⁰ Major progress came with Mykhailo Maksymovych’s first work, printed in Moscow in 1827, which contained variants to earlier *duma* collections;⁷¹ he published additional collections in 1834 and in 1849.⁷² Maksymovych linked the *dumy* to ethnic identity; thus, helped establishment of the *dumy* as one of the building blocks of Ukrainian national culture.

Izmail Sreznevskii also contributed to the collections (from 1833 to 1838);⁷³ Sreznevskii, too, found characteristics of Ukrainian culture which differentiated Russian and Ukrainian folklore. Further studies on the *dumy* included the work of P. Lukashevych (1836), which contributed five new *dumy* not included in the previous *dumy* collections.⁷⁴ Lukashevych worked only as a collector and he had no interest in the form of the texts, the performances and the *kobzari*.

Two additional works were published before the 1850s. The first was a dissertation by Mykola Kostomarov (1843) in which “*Duma about Captives*” was published.⁷⁵ Second was Maksymovych’s last collection, which was printed in 1849. The latter was a rich collection of earlier publications but also contained three newly added *dumy* texts. Maksymovych, with his work, initiated the analysis of the poetic form of the *dumy*.

Interest in the *dumy* did not decline in the second half of the 19th century. Hryhorii Bazylevych’s article (1853) first brought attention to the performer, the *kobzar*. Bazylevych worked with the *kobzar* Andrii Shut and inspired his contemporaries and future collectors to take the performer into consideration. Amvrosii Metlynskyi added to the *dumy* corpus some newly recorded items and many new variants (1854).⁷⁶ His collections had informative notes; he also noted the source (*kobzar*) from whom the oral text was recorded and provided a list of the known *kobzari*. P. Kulish followed Metlynskyi’s work in 1856.⁷⁷ Kulish worked with the *kobzar* Andrii Shut under the impact of Bazylevych’s article and paid much attention to *kobzar* creativity.

No major new work came out until Volodymyr Antonovych and Mykhailo Drahomanov made a major contribution to *dumy* studies in the 1870s.⁷⁸ In the remaining part of the century and in the early years of the 20th-century collections of *dumy* continued to be published, though diminishing in numbers. Some of these new works gave a new direction to the study of *dumy*; particularly, Filaret Kolessa's work added musical aspects to the analysis of the genre.⁷⁹

Publications on the *dumy* continued in the Soviet period. However, the frames of analysis had to conform to the Marxist world-view. Non-conformists, such as Kateryna Hrushevka, were persecuted. To quote Georgii Kasianov, Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism was defined as "any kind of show of national consciousness, cultural, ideological or political tendencies which did not coincide with state ideology on the nationality question . . . and become the basis for separatist tendencies."⁸⁰ In this sense, Hrushevka's first volume (published in 1927) and second volume (published in 1931) came to be seen as hostile to state ideology and carried separatist potential. Her further publications were suppressed and the volumes in print were confiscated; Hrushevka herself was arrested in 1938.⁸¹

Most of the works on the *dumy* in the first half of the 19th century were produced by ethnic Russians or Russified foreigners. What was common for all of them was the romantic love and sympathy they felt for Ukrainian folklore. With the works of Ryleev, Tsertelev, and Maksymovych the *dumy* gained higher value because the texts were presented to the readers as sources from the heart of the culture, as representations of the common people's spirit.

Maksymovych's work was especially significant as it pulled all the published *dumy* together and added new ones as well. Moreover, his efforts formed a framework for the analysis of collected *dumy* texts. Works of the first half of the 19th century had also played an important role for the future national intelligentsia when they provided conclusions on differences between Ukrainian and Russian folklore.

In the second half of the 19th century authors such as Metlynskyi, Kulish, Antonovych and Drahomanov expanded *duma* scholarship by providing more data on the social context, variants of texts and performance. Antonovych and Drahomanov, especially, contributed significantly to scholarship by producing the first *dumy* compilation that contained all available variations of *dumy* texts. Even though they did not focus on the performer, they further opened the way for comparative by providing multiple versions of the texts as completely as possible.

Mykhailo Hrushevskyi's comment on Antonovych and Drahomanov's work clarifies the function of *dumy* scholarship for the purposes of nation-building: "Even with the commentary, this was not an ordinary collection of ethnographic material. It was a history of the Ukrainian people told by themselves [the Ukrainian people], narrated in poetic form."⁸² From this perspective, *dumy* collectors of the second half of the 19th century approached their subject matter largely with a national point of view. In the process of maturation of national sentiments among the Ukrainian-speaking intelligentsia, collections of *dumy* made a major impact since they perceived

these materials as bearing the core of the ethnic group, and therefore, irrefutable proofs of a separate identity.

The Performance and the Performer

Kostomarov discussing the qualities of *dumy* recognized an important feature: the impact of the performer on the tradition. He wrote,

Folk creations under this name [*dumy*], which in content are epics, are not sung but recited in accompaniment with the sound of the *kobza*, *bandura* or *lira*. These are not a product of all people, but of *kobzari*, singers, usually blind men, who wander from place to place with their instrument, and sing to those who are interested.⁸³

The point Kostomarov made is that it was the performer and the performance that have kept the tradition of *dumy* alive through orality. *Dumy* were an oral tradition; that is, they were transmitted and learned orally. A certain social milieu was required for this interaction of teaching and learning to take place. This environment was provided by the institutionalized *kobza* players within *kobzar* guilds. Guilds were social institutions for intra-profession solidarity; they provided support for members and imposed a control system to keep the tradition and *kobzar* values under supervision.

As a rule the *kobzari* were blind, and from a young age children would become apprentices to master *kobzari* and acquire training. This training would last three to six years during which the apprentice would learn the repertoire, the secret language of the *kobzari*, their life style and world-view.⁸⁴ Once training was completed, the apprentice would go through initiation and gain all the rights specified by the guild—the right to sing and beg within a delimited geographical space. The *kobzar*, then, would wander and perform

his repertoire (containing religious and historical songs, laments, and *dumy*). The place of performance could be the streets or at times, upon invitation, in the homes. *Kobzari* also would travel to places where festivals were held. There they would have more chances to encounter larger audiences, and therefore, could earn more money than they would make for the music they offered on the streets or in homes.⁸⁵ After ten years as a *kobzar*, guilds would extend him the status of master, from which point they could take their own apprentices to train as new *kobzari*.⁸⁶

These mechanics of the profession played a significant role in preserving the *dumy* texts until the time they were recorded. The performers who trained under such an educational and professional order survived until the early years of Soviet rule.⁸⁷ Searching more specifically for *kobzari*, the records mention three *kobzari* who were involved in an uprising in 1770. These were Prokop Skriaha, Mykhailo the son-in-law of Sokov, and Vasyl Varchenko. However, nothing is known about their musical background; there is just some information about their involvement in the events. Early *dumy* collectors were not interested in the background of *kobzari* and ignored anything other than the texts. Tsertelev, for example, did not even record the name of his source *kobzar*. Lukashevych recorded his source's name as *kobzar* Ivan Strichkyi but fell short of noting down any background information. However, starting from the mid-19th century, collectors have had an interest in the performer and, therefore, more and more information became available about the *kobzari*. Among those recorded in the second half of the century was Andrii Shut (died in 1872). In his repertoire he had the *dumy* on *Khmelnyskyi*

*and Barabash, Ivan Bohun, and Kozak Netiaha.*⁸⁸ He was the source for collectors in the second half of the 19th century and was at the center of attention of *dumy* scholarship. Also, another major figure among the 19th-century *kobzari* was Ostap Veresai (died in 1890). He had a wide repertoire of *dumy* and many other songs. His talent in improvisation made him popular with the folk;⁸⁹ he became a source for collectors as well. Another important figure was Ivan Kravchenko (died in 1885). Like others, he enjoyed wide popularity and was called the “great *kobzar*.” Another significant *kobzar* of the old tradition was Mykhailo Kravchenko (died 1917). He had *dumy* in his repertoire and he himself also composed *dumy*. Other significant *kobzari* of the late 19th century and the early 20th century were Arkhyn Nykonenko, Tryfon Mahadyn, Pavlo Bratsia, and Terentii (Tereshko) Parkhomenko.⁹⁰

The turn of the century saw the weakening of the traditional values and ways of *kobzari*. Natalie Kononenko argues that this had to do with the fact that *kobzari* become the center of increasing attention from society and scholars. Kononenko, further argues that this rising popularity had an impact on the traditional performance style and transformed into stage performances. Thus, *kobzari* moved away from their traditional context into a new one.⁹¹

The Content of the *Dumy*

In addition to the collection of texts, the content of the *dumy* is important for understanding the folk image of the Kozaks. The Ukrainian elite saw the analysis of the content as a service to the national idea. In this context, the analysis of the inner dynamic of texts became possible only after various versions of *dumy* texts were published. From that point on *dumy* studies

focused on observing variations among the different versions to find the changes in the texts. Antonovych and Drahomanov recognized the need to work on variants and they also recognized such work as a service to the emerging Ukrainian nation.

It is necessary to bring texts and their variants together. It is further necessary to explain their roots on which the study of Little Russian history is rising . . . Only after [completion of] such work will the poetry of the Ukrainian nation (Little Russians) be understood and [poetry] fully become a source for the history of the nation.⁹²

What is the essence that endows *dumy* with the potential to be a “source for the history of the nation” and therefore, a source of collective memory? The answer lies in the content. *Dumy* tell stories of times when Kozaks interacted with their neighboring Turks/Tatars, Poles, Jews and also the times of the Khmelnytskyi Uprising.⁹³ Therefore, there are two major themes—the relations with others, and the uprising—that run through the cycles of *dumy*. Another cycle of *dumy* is about the everyday issues related to Kozak life. However, the content of the *dumy*, beyond these three themes, is richer and reflects the Kozaks’ interaction with the “other,” their worldview, morality and beliefs.

Kozaks in struggle with the Turks is one major narrative of the *dumy*. The narrative of the interaction is usually about the captivity of Kozaks and peasants at the hands of the Turks, as *dumy* texts call the Ottomans.⁹⁴ The slave trade on the Black Sea was an old practice. After the Ottomans gained control of Constantinople (Istanbul) and expanded towards the north in the

15th and 16th centuries, they gained control of this trade. The Crimean Tatars, who came under Ottoman rule in the last quarter of the 15th century, were the Ottoman middlemen in this human trade. Turks and Tatars would freely attack villages and take women and men to slave markets. These enslaved people were sold to serve in remote regions of the Ottoman realm.

The pain of those enslaved left a deep impact on the collective psyche, and for that reason it influenced folk creativity; eventually stories of enslaved captives became a main theme of *dumy*. For example, the *Duma about the Lament of the Captives* vividly pictures the Kozak and peasant captives in the hands of their Muslim suppressors. The *duma* depicts the cry of captives in a Turkish galley that was possibly taking captives to Istanbul either to be sold or to be exchanged for ransom. In graphic description the *dumy* presents a picture of a captive chained by his feet and tortured by “the infidel Turkish pasha, a renegade Christian.” The “infidel pasha” orders “Turkish Janissaries” of the galley to torture captives. The captives in such a condition pray to the “Lord” to liberate the “poor” captives from “bitter Turkish slavery, from infidel captivity.”⁹⁵

Another *duma* of the captive cycle is the *Duma about the Lament of a Captive* and depicts the pain of a Kozak in the hands of the Turks. The narration pictures those Kozaks who were longing for freedom and for their loved ones. In this *duma* the captive Kozak, calling the Turks “bandits,” is worried that his parents will fall into the hands of “bandits,” “the bandits—the Turks and the Janissaries—will raid them . . . they will sell them [the parents

of the captive].” Missing his family and worried for their freedom, the Kozak was suffering bodily pains:

The chains chafed his arms and legs,
the raw leather thongs cut the Cossack flesh⁹⁶
to the yellow bone,
the poor captives looked at the blood and flesh,
they thought about the Christian faith,
they cursed the Turkish land and infidel faith.⁹⁷

Another sample of the captivity theme is the *Duma about Ivan Bohuslavets*. Bohuslavets, pictured as a Kozak hetman, escapes from captivity after ten years. During his captivity he resists religious conversion. Religious conversion would guarantee him his freedom and make him ruler of the Ottoman town of Kozlov (modern-day Yevpatoriia). He accepts conversion to assure the release of his fellows. However, his Turkish wife insults him. Bohuslavets, later deserting the castle, returns with his fellow Kozaks to Kozlov to take revenge.⁹⁸ The *Duma about Marusia from Bohuslav* is another captivity story. The *duma* relates that 700 Kozaks were kept in captivity for thirty years. The Ukrainian slave girl named Marusia, either a servant or one of the *harem* women, opens the doors of the dungeon and sets the Kozaks free.⁹⁹ The *Duma about Samiilo Kishka* is also another Kozak captive struggling for freedom. This *duma*, like others, provides details of the nature of interaction between the “oppressor” and the captive.¹⁰⁰ This time 350 Kozak captives, Samiilo Kishka being their hetman, were in a galley travelling from the Anatolian town of Trabzon to the Crimean town of Kaffa (modern-

day Feodosia). Captives arriving in Kozlov (modern-day Yevpatoria) made the formerly Christian, now Muslim, galley jailer drunk, acquired the keys to their chains and they broke free. They killed the “Turks,” destroy the city of Kozlov and sailed back to the Black Sea.

The *Duma about the Flight of Three Brothers from the City of Azov* is a narrative of the escape of three brothers during which the two elder brothers, each in possession of a horse, faced a dilemma. They could either put the youngest one on the horse and risk their flight, or they could leave him on foot to save their own lives with a faster escape. This is a failed escape, in contrast to other captivity stories, since the two mounted brothers were killed by the pursuing Janissaries, while the youngest was killed by animals.

Besides the theme of captivity one can find other *dumy* pieces in which the Kozak’s confrontation with the Turk takes place. Such are the *Duma about the Three Brothers of Samarka*, the *Duma about the Widow of Ivan Sirko*, and the *Duma about the Old Otaman Matiash*. These texts contain scenes from Kozak–Ottoman conflicts.

Some *dumy* are known as the Khmelnytskyi cycle. The content of this cycle is graphic in displaying the Polish nobility’s and Jewish middlemen’s abuse of peasants. This theme can be observed in the *Duma about Khmelnytskyi and Barabash*, where Khmelnytskyi is pictured as holding a council with the members of the Kozak elite to start a war against the Polish nobles. Another, the *Duma about the Battle of Korsun*, starts with a narration of a conflict between Kozaks and Poles. The *duma* displays the Poles as dishonest and abusive. From the text it is understood that this lack of trust

between Kozaks and Poles and rising anger leads to the conflict between the parties. Another sample of this cycle is the *Duma about the Polish Oppression of Ukraine after the Treaty of Bila Tserkva*. This one depicts a moment in the uprising when parties reached a peace agreement; however, conflicts arise after the agreement. Here the major theme is the oppression and the discontent of the Kozaks and peasants. In this cycle of *dumy*, the Kozaks' and peasants' interaction with Jews comes into the picture. For example, in the *Duma about the Battle of Korsun*, the Jew appears as another source of Kozak and peasant anger. The Jew joined in the exploitation of the peasant masses:

You Jews, you children of pagan parents,
Why did you raise such rebellion and alarms?
Why did you build three taverns per mile?
Why did you collect such high tolls
from every wagon half a coin?
From every man on foot, two small coins.
You did not leave even the poor beggars alone, but took away their
millet and eggs.¹⁰¹

The narrative continues with the flight of Jews as they are threatened by the Kozaks. The *duma* ends with the scene of Jews being killed by Kozaks. Another sample is the *Duma about the Oppression of Ukraine by Jewish Leaseholders*. This one, too, provides additional depictions of the Jewish economic oppression:

The Jewish merchants rented all the Cossack roads,
And for every mile, they built three inns,

They built inns in each valley,
They erected masts on the tall grave mounds,
. . .
They rented all the Cossack markets in glorious Ukraine,
And they demanded as tax a half a gold coin from each wagon,
And from every man on foot they took three small coins
From a poor beggar they took chickens and eggs.
As a response to this exploitation Kozaks unleash violence against

Jews following Khmelnytskyi's order:

Before sunrise, Hetman Khmelnytskyi was sending Cossacks to war:
O Cossacks, my children, my comrades,
Arise from your sleep, recite the Lord's Prayer.
Go to glorious Ukraine,
Cut the Jewish merchants down,
Mix their Jewish blood with the yellow sand of the fields,
Do not let your Christian faith be insulted,
Do not honor the Jewish Sabbath . . .¹⁰²

Some other *dumy* deal with the everyday life issues of the Kozaks. One of them is the *Duma about Kozak Life*, where a Kozak leaves his wife against her wishes in order to join other Kozaks. The *Duma about the Kozak Saying Farewell to His Family* pictures a similar situation when a Kozak leaves home to join a campaign.

An observation applicable to all the *dumy* is that the content is about heroism, heroic death, the dramatic conditions of Kozak and peasant life, and the struggle against oppressive “others.” The undercurrent of events, which led to the traumatic situations of heroic death or tormenting life conditions, were

determined by the involvement of the “other” in Kozak life and social milieu. Therefore, it is clear from the content that the Poles, the Turks, the Tatars and the Jews prepared the conditions of life that led to trauma and eventually to folk creation of the *dumy*. In the case of the Ottomans, under the traumatic conditions inflicted by the “Turk,” Kozaks withstood tortures and humiliations. In most cases the captive Kozak heroically resists the riches of the Sultan’s lands which he would gain at the cost of his religious belief¹⁰³ and dies heroically with honor and piety. Natalie Kononenko considers this pattern as “heroism in the face of defeat” which is a “supreme form of heroism.”¹⁰⁴ While sometimes death comes to the Kozaks, in some other cases the Kozaks escape and return to take successful revenge. Therefore, as Kozaks die heroically they also fight back heroically. As the Kozaks resist conversion, reject Ottomans blandishments, their moral quality shines through and emphasizes the good pious nature required for the status of a hero. In the Khmelnytskyi cycle one can observe the same heroic deeds, but in this case the Kozaks oppose the economic exploitation by the Poles and Jews. In the Khmelnytskyi cycle, in contrast to the Turkic/Tatar cycle, the Kozak is victorious against the “other.”

The material examined in this section about the collection, performance and the content of the *dumy* show the power of the folk imagination about the Kozaks. The collections of texts and their publication by the national intellectuals display the folk perception of the Kozaks and trace their use for nation-building purposes. On the other hand, the traditions related to the performer and the performance display the way *dumy* were kept in folk

memory and how they were relevant to social and cultural life. Finally, the content analysis of the *dumy* shows the power of texts in keeping the memory of the Kozak past. The texts also show how Kozak identity was formed through the Kozaks' relations to the neighboring "others."

The power of both elite and folk articulations of the Kozaks manifests itself in the emergence of Kozak formations in the first quarter of the 20th century. The following section will examine these Kozak formations and their imaginations of the Kozak forefathers.

Kozak Formations in the First Quarter of the 20th Century

Formations inspired by the Kozak cultural heritage started to emerge in the first quarter of the 20th century in western Ukraine where there had been no Kozaks. This took place particularly in Galicia in the Habsburg Empire which was not controlled by the Russians. The stimulus for the emergence of formations articulating the Kozak past happened thanks to Kozak images and memories promoted in the publications of the Ukrainian national elite. Also contributing to formation was the folk images and representations preserved in the *dumy*. The timing of the emergence of the formations and the way they were formed with Kozak symbols and values are significant to examine how the Kozak heritage travelled through time and space and prepared the Kozak revival in modern-day Ukraine. The following section will locate and examine the cases when and where Kozak images, symbols, and history were used to form Kozak paramilitary and military units.

The first case to consider is the Sich Society that was established as a sport and firefighting society in Zavallia village of Sniatyn district (1900).

After the establishment of a number of district branches, the society was renamed the Ukrainian Sich Union (1912). By 1913, the Union had 900 district Siches and around 8000 members.¹⁰⁵

The establishment and development of the society were undertaken by Kyrylo Trylovskyy, a Ukrainian activist and a member of the pro-independence Ukrainian Radical Party (est. 1890). As a reflection of the political background of its founder, the members of the society were largely composed from the ranks of the Radical Party.

The patriotic agenda of the party and the need for militaristic formations to support the Ukrainian national cause were hidden under the guise of a firefighting association.¹⁰⁶ However, as the name of the society indicated, the society articulated its national agenda with the symbolism and structures of the Zaporozhian Kozaks. As with the case of the Kozaks of the past, the Sich leader carried the title of *otaman*. An *otaman*, in line with the earlier Kozak traditions, carried a *bulava* (mace) and *bunchuk* (horse-tail standard) as Kozak symbols of power. Additionally, the Sich flags pictured various historically prominent figures, such as the Kozak Hetman Petro Doroshenko and the poet Taras Shevchenko on one side, and the eight-cornered star of the Sich on the other.¹⁰⁷

Members of the Sich were defining themselves as Kozaks. The officers of the Sich would even take additional second names after prominent historical Kozak figures, such as Bohun.¹⁰⁸ They would also proclaim their connection to the Kozak identity singing songs mythologizing the Kozaks of old.¹⁰⁹ Not only did they sing their own Kozak songs, but also tried, eventually, to induce

a militaristic spirit with references to the Kozak forefathers.¹¹⁰ This was reflected by Kyrylo Trylovskyi as he argued that “it was necessary to fight against the so-called antimilitarist [spiritual] state of the people. It was necessary to try to renew the old Kozak liberation traditions, and most importantly to provide people military training.”¹¹¹

Kyrylo Trylovskyi’s plan to militarize the people and spread patriotic feelings through Kozak revivals was realized with the establishment of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (Sichovi Striltsi) on March 18, 1913.¹¹² While the early formation was under the control of Ukrainian Sich Union, the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen soon acquired an independent identity. Starting in 1914, the Sich Riflemen legion recruited its men from the ranks of the Sich Society and numbered 2500 strong in 1914. This legion served as a part of the Austro-Hungarian Army during the First World War. However, the legion continued to attach itself to the Kozak past as its officers carried Zaporozhian officer titles such as *polkovnyk*, *pidpolkovnyk*, *khорunzhii*, and *otaman*.¹¹³ Identification with the Kozaks also symbolically surfaced with the adaptation of a military cap called the *Mazepynka*, which was inspired by the Kozak cap depicted in Ilya Repin’s painting, “The Zaporozhians’ Letter to the Turkish Sultan” (1880). Additionally, fellow Sich Riflemen addressed each other as *tovarysh*, following the Zaporozhian tradition *pane-tovaryshu*.¹¹⁴ Another manifestation of their connection to the Kozak roots was the Sich Riflemen’s military training (April 1914), which was dedicated to the 250th anniversary of the death of Ivan Bohun, a prominent 17th-century Kozak leader.

The Sich Riflemen legion successfully fought against the tsarist Russian forces in Galicia. After the Bolshevik Revolution, when the Russian army ceased to pose a threat, the Sich Riflemen, upon the invitation of the *rada* (Ukrainian term for council, a representative state governing body) of the Ukrainian People's Republic (independence declared on January 22, 1918), proceeded into Right-Bank Ukraine. Their primary task was to meet their fellow Ukrainians and support the newly declared Ukrainian People's Republic. The *rada* of the Republic needed to explain, with a declaration, the existence of Sich Riflemen calling, their own soldiers Kozaks: “[t]hey are [Sich Riflemen] coming purely to help our Cossacks who are staunchly defending our country, our land, and our freedom from the armed attacks of the Russian government”¹¹⁵ Eventually, the Sich Riflemen engaged the Bolshevik forces near the city of Oleksandrivsk (Zaporizhia) and helped the Ukrainian independence cause.¹¹⁶ Actually, in Oleksandrivsk, the Sich Riflemen came across Kozak military formations of the Zaporozhian Army Corps, namely the Second Zaporozhian Regiment, which were mentioned as Kozaks in the Ukrainian People's Republican *Rada's* declaration. Men of the regiment, shortly before meeting the Sich Riflemen, and shortly after conquering Oleksandrivsk (April 1918), held a ceremony on Khortytsia Island (location of the first Zaporozhian Sich) and erected a cross, the text of which read: “From Modern Kozaks to their Ancestors.”¹¹⁷ The Sich Riflemen and the Second Zaporozhian Regiment, both claiming to bear Kozak heritage, established friendly relations during the former's more than half-year¹¹⁸ stay in Ukraine.¹¹⁹ The Zaporozhian Army Corps (active 1918–1919) was a section

of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic and housed several regiments inspired by the Kozak past. The regiments were the following: the 1st Zaporozhian Infantry Regiment named after Hetman Petro Doroshenko, the Third Zaporozhian Infantry Regiment named after Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (established in 1917 as the 1st Ukrainian Kozak Regiment named after Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi), the 1st Zaporozhian Mounted Haidamak Regiment named after Koshovyi Otaman Kost Hordiienko, and a regiment named after Hetman Polubotok.

Upon their return to Bukovina, the Sich Riflemen formed the basis for the Western Ukrainian National Republican Army (1918–1919). However, the title of the Sich Riflemen was already popular and inspired Ukrainians in Kyiv. Eventually, inspired by the Sich Riflemen's structure, the Galician-Bukovinian Sich Riflemen corps was established in 1917 to fight against the Bolsheviks.¹²⁰ In a similar fashion to the Sich Riflemen, the Galician troops also took on Kozak symbolism and wore the *Mazepynka* caps. However, this military unit was disbanded when Pavlo Skoropadskyi took over the Ukrainian People's Republic on April 29, 1918. Many of the disarmed Galician-Bukovinian Sich Riflemen joined the Zaporozhian Army Corpus.

Pavlo Skoropadskyi's term in office (April 29–December 14, 1918) witnessed the revival of Kozak traditions.¹²¹ On the day of his *coup d'état*, he issued a decree, the "Temporary Law of State Organization" (issued on April 29, 1918) in which he declared himself Hetman of all Ukraine and replaced the earlier coat of arms of the Ukrainian People's Republic with the one used

by the Zaporozhian Army. His decree defined Kozaks as a distinct ethnic group.¹²²

Hetman Skoropadskyi was also interested in establishing military formations that were designed to revive the memory of the former Kozaks. One of the formations was the Serdiuk Division (est. July 1918) which was inspired by the Serdiuk regiments of Ivan Mazepa. This formation contained four regiments, one of which was named the Lubenskyi Serdiuk Mounted Kozak Regiment. All the rank and file, 5000-strong who served in the regiments bore Kozak appellations. Other such military Kozak formations of Skoropadskyi's term in office were the Special Detachment of Lower [Dnipro] Kozaks, which was also known as the Zaporozhian Kish, and the 1st Kozak Riflemen Division of Greycoats.

Skoropadskyi had an interest in supporting Kozak movements in Ukraine. He paid special attention to the Free Kozaks who became active in the late 1910s. The Free Kozaks were established in April 1917. The Free Kozaks, as a military organization, was formed following the former Kozak organizational scheme. This Kozak formation managed to recruit 15,586 registered and around forty thousand unregistered volunteers by October 1917. The formation defined its aim as the protection of the Ukrainian people's freedom.¹²³ The ranks were filled mostly by peasants particularly after the heritage of the town Kozaks were used as a promotion tool.¹²⁴

On October 3–6, 1917, the Free Kozaks held a meeting in Chyhyryn, the capital city of the Kozaks from 1648 to 1669.¹²⁵ During the meeting the Kozaks elected Pavlo Skoropadskyi, at the time Commander of the 1st

Ukrainian Corps of the Russian Army, as the honorary *otaman* of the Free Kozaks. In June 1917, in an attempt to claim both the heritage and the authority of the forefathers, a Free Kozak Regiment travelled to Petrograd. By force, they took all Kozak insignia and standards from the Historical Museum and returned them to Ukraine.¹²⁶ To emphasize and display their Kozak heritage, some Free Kozak regiments, following historical practice, wore dark blue and red Kozak coats (*zhupany*), and the Kozak forelock (*oseledets*). Last but not least, some Free Kozak leaders used accessories such as Kozak swords and Kozak-style fur hats.¹²⁷

The Free Kozaks had an affinity for Skoropadskyi. Initially, the Free Kozaks took part, starting from August 1917, in the formation of the 1st Ukrainian Regiment named after Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, a regiment of the 1st Ukrainian Corps led by Pavlo Skoropadskyi. Later, before usurping power by a *coup d'état*, Skoropadskyi relied on the support of the Free Kozaks and other regiments manned by Kozaks.¹²⁸ In return, once Skoropadskyi gained control of the state, he paid special attention to the Free Kozaks. First, he gave orders to form a *rada* (council) of Kozaks. This *rada*, he expected, would establish central control over the Kozaks, and thus would Skoropadskyi. Second, he issued a charter in which he promised to revive Kozak rights and privileges.¹²⁹ In line with his promise, the legislation for the revival of Kozaks was passed on August 10, 1918,¹³⁰ and came into effect on October 17, 1918. This legislation affirmed Skoropadskyi's place as the leader of the Kozaks and also planned to "revive the majestic past of Ukraine, and help the revival of the motherland and assure its statehood."¹³¹ Furthermore, the legislation ruled that

membership in the Free Kozaks required one to affirm Kozak descent and affiliation to the Orthodox Church.¹³² Soon after, Skoropadskyi issued a manifesto and announced the reinstatement of the Kozaks and explained the rationale as: “with blessings we preferred to revive Kozaks in all their historical cities to strengthen the power of our state. We place Kozak-warrior traditions, which were brought to us by history from the times of Kozak Ukraine’s struggle for freedom, at the core of the revival.”¹³³ However, in two months’ time Skoropadskyi lost his office (he abdicated December 14, 1918) following an uprising that was provoked by Skoropadskyi’s decision to join Russia within a federal political structure and his land policies. The following period witnessed increasing Bolshevik control over Ukraine. As soon as the Bolsheviks gained the upper hand they crushed the Kozak resistance in 1920, and those Free Kozaks who survived the Bolsheviks had to leave Ukraine. The Free Kozaks continued to operate in Germany, Austria and the United States.

Skoropadskyi’s regime was followed by the Directorate, the ruling body of the re-established Ukrainian People’s Republic. The revived republic lasted until 1920 when the Bolsheviks gained control in most parts of Ukraine. While the political events of the period do not fall into the interests of this chapter, the two-year period of the Directorate rule displayed a number of moments when Kozak heritage was articulated to justify authority. The first such case concerned Symon Petliura, member of the Directorate and the Chief of Military Forces. Starting from February 1919, he served as the leader of the Directorate. He himself was of Kozak heritage, and just after Skoropadskyi’s regime fell he was elected as the “supreme otaman” (*holovnyi otaman*), a title

that follows old Kozak ranks.¹³⁴ Petliura, having occupied the seat of the supreme otaman, became a symbolic figure in the Directorate's resistance against Bolsheviks.

In addition to the fact that the Directorate's leader was of direct Kozak heritage and led the Directorate with an adapted Kozak title, this period also witnessed the emergence of some additional Kozak military formations. One such was the Mounted Division of Black Zaporozhians (*Chorni Zaporozhtsi*), which was founded by the Directorate in December 1918. While successfully serving in the battles against the Bolsheviks, as other Directorate forces retreated into the Polish territories, the Black Zaporozhians too had to fall back and were interned by the Polish forces in 1920.¹³⁵ Apart from its active military services, this division's formation reflected the Kozak heritage as its officers were called *starshyna* and its rank and file soldiers Kozaks. They wore Kozak-style uniforms and the *oseledets*, the Kozak forelock.

In addition to the Black Zaporozhians, similar Kozak formations took part in battles against the Bolsheviks on the side of the Ukrainian People's Republic and under the Directorate's command. Such formations were the Kharkivskyi Slobidskyi Kish, the Second (later 20th) Mounted Regiment named after Hetman Ivan Mazepa, the Zaporozhian Sich of the otaman Yukhym Bozhko,¹³⁶ and the Black Sea Insurgent Kozak Army which was led by the otaman Semen Zabolotnyi.¹³⁷

Kuban, in addition to Kozak inspired movements and formations in the mainland Ukraine, was also a center of national revival. Starting from the second half of the 19th century, Ukrainians of Kuban, as heirs of the

Zaporozhian Kozaks, claimed cultural rights. In the early 20th century, Kuban Ukrainians started to ask for political privileges, such as autonomous rights.¹³⁸

Kuban and mainland Ukraine had close ties. This became visible far before the fall of the empire which manifested itself in a demonstration that took place with the participation of twenty-five thousand Ukrainians, led by Kuban Kozaks who marched with Zaporozhian Kozak flags and insignia.¹³⁹ Later, Kuban representatives cooperated with the Central *Rada* and delegations were exchanged in an attempt to develop common plans of action. In the meantime, Free Kozak formations were established in Kuban. This was an addition to earlier Kuban Kozak formations such as the Black Sea Kish, Haidamak Kish and Hetman Doroshenko Kish.¹⁴⁰

With the fall of the Russian Empire these claims led to the proclamation of the Kuban People's Republic (February 16, 1918–March 17, 1920). The Kuban Kozaks occupied five seats out eleven in the government of the new republic.¹⁴¹ During Skoropadskyi's term a delegation from Kuban arrived in Kyiv to negotiate either annexation of Kuban into the Ukrainian State or a federative union of Ukraine and Kuban to which the Don region and northern Caucasus might also join (May 28, 1918).¹⁴² This position, which was shared by the government in Kyiv, was a reflection of the Kozak elite in the government of Kuban.¹⁴³ Skoropadskyi recognized the roots and ambitions by greeting the delegation: "I am pleased to greet, on your behalf, the Kuban Kozaks who are heirs of the glorious Zaporozhian Army . . . I hope now that glorious Kuban walks with the young Ukrainian state to realize dreams. [The Ukrainian state] appeared [in dreams] of our fathers as a leading star."¹⁴⁴

During the meeting a secret unification agreement was signed.¹⁴⁵ However, these efforts did not last long because of the growing Bolshevik control over Ukraine and Kuban.

To counter the above-mentioned Kozak formations, particularly the Free Kozaks, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (December 25, 1917–March 1918) established the Red Kozak formations in Kharkiv (December 28, 1917). The first such Kozak troops were led by Vitaly Prymakov. The ranks of the Red Kozaks were filled with Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Tatars, Greeks and others. In the Red Kozak ranks there were indeed some who had Kozak origins. Nevertheless, there is no indication that the Red Kozaks formed a basis in terms of training, organization and symbolism for the revival of Kozak traditions. In this respect, the Red Kozaks were a regular cavalry formation in the Soviet army.¹⁴⁶ The inspiration for “Kozakdom” was not insignificant in the society and the Red Kozak formation used the popularity of “Kozakdom” but avoided making references to Kozak identity or traditions.¹⁴⁷

The Red Kozaks supported the Bolshevik troops in their operations in Ukraine and fought against the troops of the Central *Rada*. In June 1918 the Red Kozaks became part of 1st Katerynoslav Insurgent Detachment and later in September 1918, the 1st Insurgent Division that fought against troops of the Directorate.¹⁴⁸ In 1920–1922 Red Kozaks took active part in operations against Ukrainian troops acting against the Bolsheviks.¹⁴⁹

All of these formations, except for the Red Kozaks, referred to former Kozak concepts in their organizational structures, and tried to revive the martial and cultural traits of the Kozak “forefathers.” The articulations of the

Kozak past attracted men to these formations; the Kozak images constructed by the 19th century intellectuals provided the Kozaks of the early 20th century a source of virtue and a spiritual motivation to fight for their land.

Soviets and Kozaks: From the 1920s to the 1980s

Once Soviet rule was consolidated, Kozaks, who resurfaced during the short independence era, once again vanished. The war against the Bolsheviks was lost, and the establishment of Soviet rule in Ukraine meant a decisive defeat for those Kozaks. The following section will examine the impact of Soviet rule on the images and articulations of the Kozak past.

The establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922/1924 marked a major paradigm shift in all aspects of Ukrainian life, and within the new paradigm Kozaks could not survive as social groups or paramilitary organizations that followed or revived Kozak traditions. Kozaks who had been mobilized against Russian rule and the rising Bolshevik power were either destroyed or forced to leave Ukraine. However, it was clear to the Bolshevik leadership that many Ukrainians were identifying themselves with the Kozaks, either through family lineage or simply by imagined identification formed under the impact of the publications of the intelligentsia. Recognizing the status the Kozaks had in Ukrainian society and realizing the fragile political circumstances at the early stages of Soviet state building, Soviet rulers could not negate the Kozaks entirely. Instead, the Soviet policy makers preferred to present Kozaks within the Soviet paradigm and Sovietized the meanings and identities attached to the Kozaks.

Ukrainian Kozaks did not survive in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic as independent formations which were established on the basis of living or revived Kozak traditions.¹⁵⁰ However, their images and representations remained in the social space. One could see them in Soviet historiographies, movies, staged dramas and literature. Nevertheless, popular images of the Kozaks and meanings associated with them in various cultural media were determined by the political dynamics of the Soviet Union.

A significant political dynamic that defined the cultural space and, therefore, the interpretation of Kozaks was Soviet nationalities policy. The Soviet Union was composed of many nationalities, which were brought together on the principle of self-determination. The principle assumed that, “[a] nation can arrange its life according to its own will . . . Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.”¹⁵¹ This political position was based on the views of Lenin and Stalin, who imagined a national identity and consciousness as a natural and necessary preliminary step on the way to the achievement of a classless society. Lenin defended the position when he said, “Mankind can proceed towards the inevitable fusion of nations only through a transitional period of the complete freedom of all suppressed nations.”¹⁵² Stalin also spoke in favor: “We are undertaking the maximum development of national culture, so that it will exhaust itself completely and thereby create the base for the organization of international socialist culture.”¹⁵³ In line with this paradigm the central administration of the Soviet Union allowed the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic to initiate policies to “nourish” its Ukrainian nationhood.¹⁵⁴

The underlying motives and expected results of the nationalities policies were various. The most significant among them was that the Ukrainians, like many other Soviet nationalities, were considered lagging in the formation of class structures in comparison to the Russians. To assure the success of the Soviet project, which was to create a classless society, those “backward” ethnic groups had to be brought to a level of maturity where class structures would dissolve themselves and help the eventual integration of all groups living in the Soviet Union. This initiative was put into practice with policies of the modernization of Soviet nationalities in line with the principle of “indigenization” (korenizatsiia), which meant to let non-Russian cultures flourish.

The second motive of the Soviet nationalities policy was conditioned by the young Soviet state’s attempt to appeal to the masses. The challenge, in the creation of the appeal, had to do with the negative memories of the tsarist Russian “great power chauvinism.” Soviet rulers considered that the “great power chauvinism of the Russian Empire had oppressed and tormented the non-Russian ethnic groups which earlier lived within the Russian Empire.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, Soviet rulers perceived the memories of oppression and torment as a challenge to the stabilization of the Soviet regime. Eventually, Soviet decision-makers devised the indigenization policy to erase the memories of dissent left over from the empire. In line with the policy, the political establishment of the Soviet Union started to support national and cultural revivals of the non-Russian ethnic groups. The policy eventually sought to assure Soviet nationalities’ loyalty to the regime and communist ideals.¹⁵⁶

The indigenization policy produced concrete results in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Having been extensively applied until the early 1930s, it led to an increase in levels of literacy, and an expansion of Ukrainian language instruction in schools.¹⁵⁷ It also had an indirect impact on how Kozaks were viewed, as it allowed quasi-nationalistic research to be continued in the Soviet Union. This took place mostly through the works of Mykhailo Hrushevskiyi, “the dean of bourgeois nationalist Ukrainian historiography.”¹⁵⁸ With the relaxed spirit of the time, which was defined by indigenization policies, Hrushevskiyi could return to Ukraine and produce non-Marxist historical works. In fact, Hrushevskiyi, particularly with his *History of Ukraine-Rus* and his coverage of the Kozak period, played a central role in the formation of Ukrainian national identity. He also had an impact on Ukrainian national and political life as he led the Central *Rada* from 1917 until when Pavlo Skoropadskiyi’s *coup* took place.

Hrushevskiyi had emigrated in 1919.¹⁵⁹ He returned in 1924 on the promise that he would remain loyal to the Soviet regime.¹⁶⁰ Upon his return, Hrushevskiyi initiated extensive research programs at the Academy of Sciences,¹⁶¹ and soon completed the ninth and tenth volumes of his *History of Ukraine-Rus*. These two volumes were significant contributions to the study of the history of the Kozaks, because they covered the Khmelnytskyi and the post-Khmelnytskyi period up until the Hetmanate of Vyhovskiyi. According to Serhii Plokhyy, Hrushevskiyi, after his return to Ukraine and functioning as the head of the Archeographic Commission at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, led other projects related to the Kozaks. Such projects were the

“publication of documents on Cossack history covering the years 1628–1638 compiled by Panteleimon Kulish,” and “publication of Herasymchuk’s collection of documents on the post-Khmelnyskyi era.”¹⁶² Another project he wanted to pursue was the publication of Ukrainian diplomatic documents, which would start with the Khmelnytskyi era proclamations.¹⁶³ While Hrushevskyi could publish his ninth volume in 1931, changing political tides did not allow him to complete either the tenth volume or the other projects he conducted.¹⁶⁴

The trends were changing in the 1920s when the Marxist history of Ukraine was employed to dismantle the “bourgeois-nationalist” history of Ukraine that was promoted by Hrushevskyi. In dismantling the “bourgeois-nationalist” history, a history which does not correspond to the Soviet ideology, the works of Mikhail Pokrovskii played a major role. Being a Bolshevik historian, Pokrovskii brought Marxist analysis to the study of Ukrainian history in which he interpreted the Kozak past through class conflict, the working class, and capitalism. Plokhy in his study of Mikhail Pokrovskii, took the Khmelnytskyi Uprising as a case study and pointed out that early Soviet historiography classified the uprising as a bourgeois revolution.¹⁶⁵ And yet within this “bourgeois revolution,” the role of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was downplayed, and he was introduced not as a hero but as an important figure.¹⁶⁶ Such interpretations were spread to the public realm, particularly with the use of Pokrovskii’s work in the Soviet education system, and it, therefore, impacted the way society imagined Kozaks.¹⁶⁷

Starting from the early 1930s the indigenization policy ground to a halt and was then reversed. Several dramatic developments caused the reversal. The first was the man-made famine (or Holodomor) that between 1931 and 1933 claimed the lives of millions in the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, Soviet policy makers purged the Ukrainian SSR's cultural elite on the charge that they were fostering bourgeois nationalism—which Soviet authorities perceived as a threat to Soviet nationalities policies. Historians were arrested and some executed on the pretext that they were idealizing Ukraine's heroic past, particularly the Kozaks. Hrushevskiy himself could not escape the purges. He was arrested in Moscow on March 22, 1931, and held under surveillance until his suspicious death in November 1934. To discredit his public image and his works on the Kozaks, he was declared an enemy of the regime:

Hrushevsky advocated a bourgeois-nationalistic, anti-scientific approach to the conflict between Ukrainians and Russians in their historical past. He attempted to substantiate the completely false and politically harmful idea about the full 'sovereignty' of the Ukrainian people in the past as in the present ... He constantly contrasted Ukrainians to Great Russians by associating the former with the peoples of western Europe. Hrushevsky's works are falsifications of history.¹⁶⁸

Such changes in the political environment were reflected in the historiographical and the public representations of the Kozaks. For example, in Soviet historiographies, Khmelnytskyi ended up being presented as a traitor

and enemy of the peasants.¹⁶⁹ In the public realm, Soviet decision-makers downplayed Khmelnytskyi's glorified image by covering his monument in Kyiv with wooden panels during Soviet celebrations. In a similar vein, Ukrainian museums stopped idealizing Kozak history.¹⁷⁰

The changing tides of Soviet articulations of the Kozaks lasted until 1938–39. The Soviet regime, clearing the intellectual and public sphere from the “remnants of the bourgeoisie,” consolidated its influence on the intelligentsia. However, Soviet leaders, perceiving a future global war, needed to strengthen the cavalry forces and they decided to use the Kozak theme as a basis.¹⁷¹ In this case the masterminds of the initiative allowed ceremonial uniforms inspired by the pre-revolutionary Don and Kuban Kozak uniforms. However, the established five Red cavalry divisions did not have Kozaks among their ranks, and as was the case earlier with the Red Kozak cavalry initiative it did not revive Kozak traditions.¹⁷²

Kozak divisions (established for the first time in 1936) served, with modifications over time, during the Second World War under the Kuban Kozak Cavalry and Don Kozak Cavalry. Establishing the Kozak units under the titles of Kuban and Don, the Soviet decision makers were seeking to increase the attraction of volunteers from the Don and Kuban regions into their ranks. Indeed, the formations drew volunteers; however, most of the volunteers were not even of Kozak descent and not from Don and Kuban regions.

The imminence of a war with Germany justified new and rather “bourgeois” interpretations of the past. The wartime propaganda preferred to

praise the Kozaks and Khmelnytskyi in order to mobilize Ukrainians to battle. Historical accounts and public discourse were modified to reflect propaganda preferences.¹⁷³ For example, on July 6, 1941, Nikita Khrushchev, as the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, referred to the “glorious” Kozaks to mobilize Ukrainian public opinion against the Germans:

The cursed enemy has captured part of our native Ukraine by a perfidious attack. This cannot frighten our mighty militant people. The German dog-knights were slashed by the sword of the warriors of Danylo of Galicia, by the sabres of Cossacks under Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, and the Kaiser’s hordes were destroyed by the Ukrainian people under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin in 1918.¹⁷⁴

In addition, to back up the propaganda, the Soviet authorities created the “Order of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi” to decorate Soviet heroes. The reason was that Soviet heroes, from the propagandists’ point of view, performed just like the “glorious patriot” Khmelnytskyi, who was assumed to have fought to liberate his people from the “foreign yoke” and who also managed to reunify the Ukrainians with the Russians.¹⁷⁵ Another means of propaganda where Kozaks were used was film. The movie “Bohdan Khmelnytskyi,” which was first screened in 1941, gained wide popularity and proved to be effective in motivating the Ukrainian masses. Other means of propaganda, for the sake of empowering the regime, was to create spaces bearing the name of Khmelnytskyi. This was put into practice in the city of Pereiaslav: it was renamed Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi.

Red Kozak formations in the Soviet army aimed to counterbalance the Kozak formations that were active in the Nazi-German army. The first volunteer Kozak formations serving the Nazi army as local security forces emerged in the fall of 1941. The 1st Kozak cavalry division (*I. Kosaken-Kavallerie-Division*, fall 1942) and the “Kozak Estate” (spring 1943) were formed and joined by former Kozaks and locals.¹⁷⁶ These formations—Kozak Estate being a paramilitary group—did not reflect traditional Kozak ranks and order, but operated according to German military order, and its officers had to converse in German. Because most of the ranks were filled by Kuban Kozaks, they reflected a certain level of cultural heritage and group identity.

Such politically driven articulations of the Kozak past carried two main messages into the 20th-century Soviet public realm. The first was about transmitting the exalted ideals of liberation and freedom. This message was communicated through the mythological freedom-loving Kozak image and the Kozaks’ patriotic struggle against oppressors. The second message was the reunification of Ukrainians with Russians. The latter often evoked Khmelnytskyi and the Pereiaslav Treaty as a moment when “two brotherly peoples re-united.” This “reunification” was transferred to the present conditions to establish a mythological reunion of “brotherly nations,” Ukrainians and Russians, within the Soviet context. Both of these messages served to encourage the war effort and consolidate the Ukrainian place in the Soviet Union.

The public interpretation of the Kozak past in the 1950s did not display a major shift from the wartime version.¹⁷⁷ The Pereiaslav Agreement

continued to be praised as a historical marker of the “reunification” of two Slavic peoples. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was again evoked as the leader who fought oppressors and also as the one who advocated the “reunification” of Slavic peoples.¹⁷⁸ The reunification discourse reached its peak with the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty in 1954. This celebration period encouraged Soviet scholars and artists to produce works to promote and praise “reunification.”¹⁷⁹ The same rhetoric of reunification was highlighted when the 250th anniversary of the Poltava Battle was commemorated in 1959. Soviet rulers, making good use of the 250th anniversary, constructed a Soviet discourse in the public realm through various publications. In the ensuing narratives, the battle was introduced as “one of the victorious events in the history of *our* motherland.”¹⁸⁰ Such narratives presented Mazepa as a “traitor” and mentioned how “the Ukrainian people” fought against the Swedes and the “traitor Mazepists.”¹⁸¹ The Soviet historians of the time emphasized that as soon as they heard of Mazepa’s “treason” “all the Ukrainian people acted against the Mazepists” and fought the “traitors” to protect the unity of peoples, that is, the unity of Ukrainians and Russians. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union characterized Mazepa as a “foolish traitor who tried to tear Ukraine and Russia apart and to establish a foreign yoke.”¹⁸²

The period from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, the post-Stalin era, witnessed a relaxation in the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union.¹⁸³ This period is characterized by the reemergence of a wave of cultural productions, the revival of the traditional cultural values of Ukrainians, and articulations of

Kozak images and themes in the public realm.¹⁸⁴ Compositions and choreographies, using folklore as a source, presented Kozak images to the masses, staying more or less within the lines of the Soviet interpretations of history. Prominent among these were the ballets *Taras Bulba* by V. Soloviev-Sedoi, *Marusia Bohuslavka* by A. Svechnikov and opera *Zaporozhets za Dunaiem* based on the 19th century opera by S. Hulak-Artemovskiyi. The *hopak* Kozak dance, especially, through staged choreographies, was elevated as a symbol of the people's heroism, spirit of freedom, and love for the Soviet motherland.

The period under Petro Shelest as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (in office from 1963 to 1972), allows us to examine the impact of cultural relaxation in relation to the treatment of the Kozak heritage in Ukraine.¹⁸⁵ With Shelest in office, Ukrainian culture, language and particularly the Kozak heritage received more attention. This might have had to do with the personal background of Petro Shelest, who was of Kozak lineage. According to the family history passed down from Shelest's father, the great-grandfathers of the Shelest family had Kozak origins. To prove the claim, Petro Shelest's son, Vitalii, argued that their surname was mentioned in the Kozak chronicles and that his father had respect for the Kozak period as an ideal social order.¹⁸⁶ What is far more certain than the Kozak genealogy of Shelest is that Shelest was accused, especially after his book *Our Soviet Ukraine* was published, in 1970, of idealizing Kozaks and the Zaporozhian Sich, thereby contributing to rise of bourgeois nationalism.¹⁸⁷

The first ever attempt at reviving Khortytsia Island and the Zaporozhian Sich well illustrates the spirit of the times of Shelest and how the Kozak heritage was represented and interpreted in the public realm. The attempt at reviving Khortytsia in Zaporozhia as a Kozak heritage site represents changing tides in the public sphere. As mentioned above, the post-Stalin era provided a relaxation in nationalities policies and this allowed people in Ukraine to voice more openly their demands. One such figure was Volodymyr Holobutskyi, a historian of the Ukrainian Kozak period. Holobutskyi, at the order of Petro Tronko, Vice-President of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, prepared a report (November 1964) on the historical significance of the Zaporozhian Sich. Holobutskyi's report was unique because it proposed the first program in Soviet Ukraine for the erection of monuments to mark historical Kozak sites, as well as the construction of memorials and the preparation of expositions with Kozak themes.

Holobutskyi's reasoning for the proposed program is worth mentioning simply because it reflects the Soviet perception of the Kozaks in the 1960s. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet interpretations of the Kozak past put emphasis on the progressiveness of the Sich and the "reunification of Ukraine with Russia." Holobutskyi, conforming to the major lines of Soviet interpretation, praised the favorable qualities of the Sich, such as serving as the embodiment of the Ukrainian people's resistance "to serfdom and national enslavement," and simultaneously attacked nationalist interpretations:

Nameless heroes of the people created the Zaporozhian Sich. First among the people were Ukrainian peasants, all of whom searched for freedom beyond the Dnipro rapids, [escaping] from landowners and foreign invaders. This is important to underline in the face of many distortions and falsifications of Zaporozhian history by the enemies of Marxism and Leninism. First among them [the enemies] are the authors of nobility and those who have a Ukrainian bourgeoisie-nationalist background¹⁸⁸

Furthermore, Holobutskyi justifies the Zaporozhian Sich with the political qualities it demonstrated well in advance of its times. The qualities he referred to were Sich as a center for democracy, Kozak equality, and the Kozak *rada* (council) as the highest deliberative body and elected officers for Kozak administrative and military offices. With such qualities, Holobutskyi argued, the “Zaporozhian Sich stood as a progressive phenomenon among the feudal states of that time” and therefore deserves Soviet appreciation.¹⁸⁹

Another interpretative basis for Holobutskyi’s treatment of the Sich was the theme of “reunification” (*voziiednannia*) of Ukraine and Russia. To form grounds for the reunification claim, Holobutskyi depicted Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and his uprising as an attempt to “destroy the Polish yoke for an eventual reunification with Russia.” It was only after the reunification, Holobutskyi argued, that the Zaporozhian Kozaks could fight against serfdom in a “brotherly union” with the Russian peasants and the Russian Kozaks.¹⁹⁰

After providing the foregoing justifications, Holobutskyi suggested that it would be possible to honor Kozaks with monuments, panoramas, films, art albums, postage stamps and tokens, to publicize the heritage of Zaporozhians

and to publish scholarly works. More specifically, he proposed the preparation of a series of sculptures in Dnipropetrovsk and the opening of a special exhibition at the Museum of Dmytro Yavornytskyi.¹⁹¹ In addition, he proposed the formation of a similar sculpture group in Zaporizhia and Nikopol, and the erection of obelisks in the villages of Tomakivka and Pokrovskiyi, and finally, the renaming of squares in the former Zaporozhian cities.¹⁹²

On August 17, 1965, a remarkable letter marked the revival of commemorating the Zaporozhian Sich. The letter, signed by O. Tytarenko and F. Mokrous, was sent from the Zaporozhian Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Regional Executive Committee to Petro Shelest and P. Kazantsia, the Head of the Council of Ministers. The letter, arguing the key role of the Zaporozhians to resist “enslavers” and secure “reunification” with Russia in the “War of Liberation” of 1648–1654, asked for the proclamation of Khortytsia, the first Sich of the Zaporozhian Kozaks, as a State Reserve of the History of Zaporozhian Kozaks.¹⁹³ The authors of the letter proposed a theme park where a panorama museum would be built. The authors also asked the Council of Ministers to decorate the territory with sculptures of “progressive figures such as Khmelnytskyi, Nalyvaiko, Sirko, Sulyma, etc.”¹⁹⁴

Petro Tronko, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine, and Andrii Skaba, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, supported the ideas expressed in the letter, and brought the issue, with an ensuing report, to higher authorities. Eventually, Petro Shelest gave an

affirmative response to the proposition, and acknowledged the aims of the project, which would make Khortytsia a Zaporozhian Kozak memorial.¹⁹⁵

For our purposes, the content and reasoning of the report is important because of the arguments presented in favor of the Zaporozhian Kozaks. The first argument was that the Zaporozhians were always in solidarity with the oppressed peasants and fought the exploiting Polish nobility, Tatar invaders, and the Ottoman Sultan; even more importantly, the Zaporozhians fought for Ukraine's reunification with Russia.¹⁹⁶ Second, the Zaporozhian Kozaks collaborated with Russians in a brotherly way to fight against serfdom, and the Zaporozhian Kozaks played a "progressive" role in the history of Ukrainians and Russians.¹⁹⁷ Based on the Zaporozhians' "progressive" undertakings, the protection of archeological remains and sites was deemed necessary. Therefore, Tronko and Skaba's letter demanded the creation of a historical-cultural State Reserve on Khortytsia Island. Such a reserve, containing museums and exhibitions, was expected to reflect the "brotherhood of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, and display their patriotism and their ardent love for their fatherland." This site, the authors argued, should show the common struggle against class enemies and foreign interventionists. In Tronko and Skaba's view these representations would secure the development of the "glorious" traditions of the Zaporozhians.¹⁹⁸

Meanwhile, the local intelligentsia, more precisely local ethnographers, gave support to the project. Their voice was heard in yet another letter. Viktor Fomenko, a local ethnographer, writing on August 22, 1965 to Mykola P. Kytsenko, the Head of the Zaporozhian Regional Executive Committee, asked

for the specification of sites where memorials dedicated to the Kozaks would be placed. Both Fomenko and Kytsenko, as local ethnographers, were interested in the Kozak past and Kozak historical sites. Kytsenko used his institutional powers to transform Zaporozhia into a memorial as soon as he became the head of the Regional Executive Committee. It was in this capacity that Viktor Fomenko wrote his letter and asked for measures to protect the remains of fortifications on Khortytsia and proposed a series of monuments to be placed on the island. Some of the proposed items were a sculpture representing the brotherly struggle of a Russian soldier and a Zaporozhian Kozak against Crimean Tatars, the sculpture of a Zaporozhian “like Taras Bulba with a sword and a pistol while lighting up his long Turkish pipe and a [Russian] soldier, who has thrown a coat over his shoulder” and a monument of a mounted Kozak and a Russian dragoon looking at the Tatar shores. Other proposed monuments were of Taras Shevchenko, Prince Sviatoslav of Kyivan Rus times and Taras Triasylo.¹⁹⁹

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine issued a resolution on August 31, 1965, and declared Khortytsia Island a State Historical and Cultural Reserve. Following this Party resolution, the Council of Ministers of Ukraine also issued a resolution on September 17, 1965, which ordered the construction of a theme park on Khortytsia.²⁰⁰ A report by the Ministry of Culture, issued in September 1965, provided a detailed list of plans for the transformation of Khortytsia.²⁰¹ The list projected the creation of a Zaporozhian Kozak theme park that would contain sculptures and monuments dedicated to the Zaporozhian leaders.²⁰² In addition, construction

of a house of Kozak elders, a Kozak *kurin*, and a Kozak boat (*chaika*) was envisaged.²⁰³ To realize the Ministry of Culture's plan, a competition for projects was announced. Meanwhile, a communiqué posted by F. Mokrous, the head of the Zaporozhian Regional Executive Committee, to P. Tronko proposed including in the plan monuments representing Kyivan Rus, the Civil War and the Second World War.²⁰⁴

A regulation, issued in 1968, settled the organizational structure of the reserve. According to the resolution, the reserve should reflect four main orientations: the history of the Zaporozhian Kozaks, the history of the island of Khortytsia, a panorama of the Capture of Kaffa, and ethnographic and decorative arts.²⁰⁵ The final project, which won the competition and was accepted in 1970, proposed to display in the ethnographic section and at the theme park: the Zaporozhians against Turks, Tatars and Poles, and the reunification with Russia.

The revival of interests in Kozaks in Zaporozhia and the transformation of Khortytsia into a heritage site provide a good case study for examining the changes in the post-Shelest period. The end of Petro Shelest's career in office in May 1972 marked another period in the Ukrainian political life. Volodymyr V. Shcherbytskyi, who replaced Shelest—formally elected for the office on May 25, 1973—acted against his predecessor's policies. In the Khortytsia case, for example, not long after Shcherbytskyi took office, the project, which was then still in the making, took a different direction. M. Vsevolozhskyi, the First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in Zaporozhia, writing a letter in March 1973 to the Communist Party of

Ukraine, asked for changes in the project. The changes he proposed comprised changing the name from the Museum of Zaporozhian Kozak History, the construction of which was suspended since January 1973, into the Museum of Zaporozhia. He also asked for a change in the content of the museum. For him, in addition to the Zaporozhian Kozaks, the exhibitions should be devoted to the history of the revolution, the socialist transformation of society, and Leninist projects.²⁰⁶ While not asking for the destruction of the work done thus far, Vsevolozhskyi proposed the erection of monuments near the sculptures of Kozaks dedicated to the architects of the DniproHES (the hydroelectric power plant facing Khortytsia Island). He also insisted that the ethnographic part of the project was not relevant to Soviet ideals. Vsevolozhskyi's letter received a response in April informing him that the necessary orders were given to state organs to make the proposed changes in the "character" of the museum and the reserve.²⁰⁷ A report issued following the response letter indicated that the project, dedicated to preserve the memory of the Zaporozhian Kozaks, "received excessive scope,"²⁰⁸ particularly with the "attention given to the project by the press and by particular administrators who gave unjustified and exaggerated place to the project in the cultural life of the republic and provided it [the project] with an undesirable meaning."²⁰⁹ The report further argued that the museum themes "do not draw attention clearly and firmly to class related issues; [instead] all attention was given, first and foremost, to the national view."²¹⁰ The Zaporozhian Kozak memorial project, the report argued, exalted the Kozak elite and ignored the peasant masses and, therefore, "gave a nationalist and chauvinist interpretation of the figures of the past."²¹¹

Giving credit to the proposed changes, the report asked for the replacement of sculptures of the “Kozak on Patrol” and the “Kurhan of Kozaks” with a monument dedicated to the working class. The ethnographic content was ordered to be updated. Also monuments dedicated not only to Kozaks, but also to the heroes of Kyivan Rus and World War II.

About a month after the report, the Communist Party of Ukraine issued a resolution (August 25, 1973) to make changes to the earlier resolution (dated 1965) “On the perpetuation of the memorial sites related to the Zaporozhian Kozaks.”²¹² The new resolution recognized Khortytsia Island as the common memorial site of the “brotherly” Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples, and agreed that the State Historical-Cultural Reserve shall continue to exist. The construction of the museum shall continue and once completed shall reflect the main events of the Zaporozhian past, namely, the history of the Zaporozhian Kozaks, Soviet Ukraine, the friendship of the Soviet peoples, the friendship of Ukrainians and Russians, the Revolution, and lastly, the socialist transformation of Zaporozhia. With this major shift in the design of the reserve, Soviet Ukraine’s first and last Zaporozhian Kozak memory project was halted prematurely. However, the first sections of the museum were completed in 1983 without a particular Kozak emphasis.²¹³

This section tried to present the way Kozaks were portrayed in relation to the shifts in interpretation of the Soviet paradigm. From our survey of Soviet attitudes to the Kozaks, we see that Soviet policy makers tried to instill political content into the representation of historical events and looked to forge a collective memory of the past that would better serve Soviet ideals. With the

mass education of the Ukrainian people, such Soviet interpretations reached out to mass audience with a primary task of erasing the nationalistic overtones pertaining to Kozaks.²¹⁴ Khortytsia was a graphic example where a symbol of Ukrainian nationhood was retrofitted into a Soviet frame. However, with changing political circumstances, the case took a different turn, which brought in a different interpretation of the Soviet paradigm.

Volodymyr V. Shcherbytskyi, as discussed earlier in this section, acting against Shelest's approach to Kozakdom and its representations particularly in the Zaporozhian case, undid his predecessor's policies. Shcherbytskyi's attitude to the interpretations of the Kozak past was reflected also in his attack on Ukrainian dissidents. Particularly in 1972 waves of mass arrests and repression took place in Ukraine, and hundreds of intellectuals and students were purged. Those Ukrainians who thought and acted outside of the "Soviet ways" were pursued, brought to courts, psychiatric prisons and concentration camps. These purges were part of fresh efforts directed at destruction of national cultures and speeding up the Russification process. During this process "whole series of retirements, various job transfers" took place and "at regional, city and district committee levels of the [Communist] party, 25% of the secretaries in charge of ideology matters were replaced."²¹⁵ The purges also took their toll on the history and historians of Ukraine. Historical interpretations were re-examined and research in Ukrainian history was banned.²¹⁶ New history books with "updated" content were prepared and those historians "who do not agree with this state of affairs were thrown out of [their] establishments."²¹⁷ But not only in historiography— traces of

suppression could be seen in the social and cultural life. Particularly in relation to our topic here one has to mention that performances of the *dumy* and historical songs in relation to the Kozak past were completely forbidden.²¹⁸ Ivan Honchar's Ukrainian Museum was shut down on the orders of the KGB, and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's monument in Zboriv was replaced by a statue of Lenin in December 1972.²¹⁹ The Zaporozhian Kozak revival project could not escape the purges, and its fate was a reflection of the spirit of the time.

As much as the period was marked by increased levels of cultural suppression of Ukrainians, the purges paved the way for the Kozak revivals that will be further discussed in the next chapter. The looming changes of the 1980s were foreseen by a Ukrainian nationalist in 1972: "Sure, the situation is extremely difficult now. Brezhnev is following . . . the internal policies of Stalin. But, how many times in the past has our future looked hopeless? Yet after things quiet down, the whole process somehow regenerates itself. And it will happen again. These things come in cycles."²²⁰

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the Kozak phenomenon from the 19th century to the early 1980s. The cases examined in the pre-Soviet era demonstrate that the publication of national intellectuals and their depictions of the Kozaks, combined with the folk imagination and articulations situated the Kozaks in the center of national identity. The place of honor the Kozaks held was reflected in the formation of Kozak units at times of political instability and when there was a hope for Ukrainian independence. The Kozak organizations of various sorts actively involved in the political realm became

parts of various political agendas that seemed to be promising hope for them and the society.

Also the cited examples suggest, the formations were diverse in character, but, nevertheless, they were able to attract people to their ranks and undertake serious military efforts. The appeal to Kozak formations shows the strength of the Kozak images, ideas, values and ambitions in bringing people together centuries later to identify with the Kozak forefathers, even if they could not literally claim Kozak origins.

The strength of Kozak identity in Ukrainian society was proved by the Soviet policy that was devised to use Kozak past for its own ideological purposes. In the first place the indigenization policy allowed for Kozak images and interpretations with a nationalized perspective. By the end of the indigenization policy, Marxist interpretations replaced and excluded “bourgeois-nationalist” interpretations. However, during the Second World War, Kozaks were used as a propaganda tool to rally Ukrainians for the war effort. In the post-war period the Kozak past was used to articulate and buttress the ideas of “reunification” of Ukrainians and Russians.

Throughout the Soviet period Kozak images continued to exist in the cultural sphere. Soviet movies and stage performances represented images and stories of Kozaks. The way the Zaporozhian Project developed, the Kozak past and heritage initiated a change in the way that Kozak physical spaces were perceived.

Endnotes

¹ Serhii Plokyh, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 43.

² Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, “Some Reflections on Ukrainian Historiography of the 18th century,” *The Eyewitness Chronicle I*, ed. Omeljan Pritsak (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972), 10.

³ Ibid.

⁴ The chronicle was first published in *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, Vol. 2 (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiia Eduarda Pratsa, 1845). For a recent reprinting of the text, see V. Krekoten, V. Shevchuk and R. Ivanchenko, eds., *Zbirnyk kozatskykh litopysiv* (Kyiv: Vydavnytsvo “Dnipro,” 2006), 7–193. A full scholarly edition, with a monograph-length introduction, was published in 2013 by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute as *The Hustynja Chronicle*, ed. Oleksiy Tolochko, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: Texts, Vol. 11 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press for Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2013).

⁵ See “Letopisets o pervom zachatii i sozdanii sviatyia obiteli monastyria Hustinskoho, sviatyia zhivonachalnyiia Troitsi, khrama obshchezhitelnoho v leto bytiia mira 7108,” in *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, Vol. 40: *Gustinskaia letopis*, eds. Yu. V. Ankhimiuk et al. (Sankt Peterburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003), 153–169.

⁶ The original copy has not been preserved; however, manuscript copies from the 18th century have survived, the oldest being that by P. Iskrytsky in 1734. An edition of the chronicle by Orest Levytskyi was printed in 1878 by the Kyiv Archeographic Commission; “This edition was republished, with a new preface by Omeljan Pritsak, as part of the Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies. See Omeljan Pritsak, “Editor’s Preface,” *The Eyewitness Chronicle I*, 5–6. The chronicle also was published in Soviet Ukraine with an introductory article of Yaroslav Dzyra. See Ya. Dzyra, ed., *Litopys samovydtisia* (Kyiv: Vydavnytsvo “Naukova dumka,” 1971).

⁷ Frank Sysyn, “The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14 (1990): 602.

⁸ For a recent analysis of the chronicle, see Andrii Bovhyria, *Kozatske istoriopysannia v rukopysnii tradytsii XVIII st.* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, 2010), 71–95.

⁹ The work was known to be distributed in some fifty copies in the mid-18th century and was “first published in 1793 in the St. Petersburg journal *Rossiiskii magazine*.” See Yuri Lutsenko, “Introduction,” *Hryhorij Hrabianka’s “The Great War of Bohdan Xmel’nyč’kyj”* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1990), xvi–xvii.

¹⁰ Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, “Some Reflections on Ukrainian Historiography of the 18th century,” *The Eyewitness Chronicle* I, 15.

¹¹ R. H. Ivanchenko, trans., *Litopys Hadiatskoho polkovnyka Hryhoriia Hrabianky* (Kyiv: T-vo “Znannia” Ukrainy, 1992), 12. My translation into English.

¹² The Kyiv Archeographic Commission published Velychko’s work in 1848–1864 as *Chronicle of Events in Southwestern Russia in the 17th Century, 1848-1864 (Letopis sobytii v Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII)*. In 1991 the chronicle was published in modern Ukrainian language. V. Shevchuk, trans. *Litopys* Vol. I–II (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo khudozhnoi literatury “Dnipro,” 1991).

¹³ Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, 48–49. See also Dmytro Doroshenko, *Ohliad ukrainskoi istoriohrafii* (Praha: Drukem derzhavnoi drukarni v Prazi, 1923).

¹⁴ Frank Sysyn, “Recovering the Ancient and Recent Past: The Shaping of Memory and Identity in Early Modern Ukraine,” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 35 (2001): 80.

¹⁵ Sehii Plokhyy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 171.

¹⁶ Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 275. Such nostalgia-inspired works were produced by Roman Markovych, Tymofii Kalynskyi, Vasyl Poletyka, Adriian Chepa, and Fedir Tumanskyi.

¹⁷ See Andreas Kappeler, “Mazepintsy, Malorossy, Khokhly: Ukrainians in the Ethnic Hierarchy of the Russian Empire,” in *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian–Russian Encounter (1600–1945)*, ed. Andreas Kappeler et al. (Edmonton: CIUS, 2003), 176.

¹⁸ Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 303.

¹⁹ For Russian policies with regard to Little Russia (Ukraine), see Alexei Miller, *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the 19th century* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003).

²⁰ Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, “The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building,” *Slavic Review* 22 (1963): 229. The article was reprinted in O. Pritsak and J. Reshetar, “The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building,” in *The Development of the USSR*, ed. D. Treadgold (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 236–67. It was also separately published in O. Pritsak and John Stephen Reshetar, *From Kievan Rus’ to Modern Ukraine* Cambridge (Mass.: Ukrainian Studies Fund, Harvard University, 1984).

²¹ Miller, *The Ukrainian Question*, 21.

²² Serhy Yekelchuk, “The Grand Narrative and Its Discontents: Ukraine in Russian History Textbooks and Ukrainian Students’ Minds 1830s–1900s,” in Andreas Kappeler, *Culture, Nation*, 231.

²³ For an excerpt in English see Semen Divovych, “A Talk between Great Russia and Little Russia” in *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine*, ed. Ralph Lindheim and George Luckyj (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 69–70. For full text in original language see http://izbornyk.org.ua/old18/old18_31.htm. Accessed on June 17, 2014.

²⁴ Mykhailo Maksymovych testified that the *Istoriia Rusov* was widely read in the 1830s. See Valerii Shevchuk, “Vstupna stattia,” in *Istoriia rusiv* (Radianskyi Pysmennyk, 1991), 8.

²⁵ Suspected authors are a group of Orthodox monks; Heorhii Konyskyi, an Orthodox bishop; the circles around Nikolai Repnin, the governor general of Little Russia; Hryhorii Poletyka, a deputy to the Legislative Commission of 1767–1768 and translator to the Academy of Sciences; and Vasyl Poletyka,

son of Hryhorii Poletyka. For a detailed discussion see Serhii Plokhy, *The Cossack Myth: History and Nationhood in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 69–87.

²⁶ Plokhy, *Ukraine and Russia*, 64.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 51.

²⁹ Nikolaj Tsertelev's (1790–1869) work *Opyt sobraniia starinnykh malorossiiskikh pesen* [An attempt at a Collection of Ancient Little Russian Songs] (Sankt Peterburg, 1819), stressed that Russian and Ukrainian folklore are clearly different from each other. For details, see George S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Shevchenko* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1971), 26–28.

³⁰ Quoted in George Luckyj, *Between Gogol*, 33.

³¹ Kostomarov, Kulish and Shevchenko were members of the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood (1846–1847), a secret society aiming to transform the social order. The Society was investigated by the tsarist authorities and banned on the pretext that it espoused separatist tendencies. The forementioned three were sent into exile. The Society marked a milestone in the maturing of Ukrainian national ideology. About the society see George Luckyj, *Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Kiev, 1845–1847* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991).

³² “Ukraine loved neither the tsar nor the Polish lord and established a Kozak host among themselves, i.e., a brotherhood in which each upon entering was a brother of the others ... and the Kozaks were all equal amongst themselves ... the Kozak host grew and multiplied and soon all the people in Ukraine would have become Kozaks, free and equal, and there would have been neither tsar nor a Polish lord over Ukraine, but God alone...” Mykola Kostomarov, *Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People* / with a commentary by B. Yanivskyi (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), 40-41.

³³ Ibid., 43.

³⁴ George Luckyj, *Panteleimon Kulish: A Sketch of His Life and Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 12.

³⁵ See George Grabowicz, "Ukrainian-Russian Literary Relations in the 18th Century: A Formulation of the Problem," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter Potichnyj and Marc Raeff (Edmonton: CIUS, 1992), 214–245. See also G. Grabowicz, "Three Perspectives on the Cossack Past: Gogol, Shevchenko, and Kulish," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* V (1981): 179–194.

³⁶ George Luckyj, *Panteleimon Kulish*, 117. Kulish later became critical of the Kozak elite. This is reflected in his collection of poems *Dosvitsky* [Glimmers of Dawn] (1862).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 165.

³⁸ For an exhaustive study of the Shevchenko's poetic world of symbolism and mediation with the history of Cossacks see George Grabowicz, *The Poet as Mythmaker* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

³⁹ "There was a time when Hetmans ruled
Lost is that ancient style;
There was a time when we were lords,
But gone are all those days...
Yet Cossack glory we recall
In never-ending praise."

...

"A Cossack dreams of Hetmans' days and sheds his tears again
There was a time when Cossack fame and freedom regained in state
The fame still shines, but freedom's cause has met an evil fate."

See C. H. Andrusyshen and Watson Kirkconnell, trans., *The Poetical Works of Taras Shevchenko: The Kobzar* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 34, 38.

⁴⁰ In addition, other poems by Shevchenko such as “Ivan Pidkova,” “Hamaliia” and “Endless Ravines are Spread Around” (1847). See Andrusyshen, *The Poetical Works*, 296. For discussion of the Kozak poems see Grabowicz, *The Poet as Mythmaker*.

⁴¹ This narrative of the Sich surfaces in his works such as “Perebendia”; “...He would intone the grief of all, the crushing of the Sich.” Andrusyshen, *The Poetical Works*, 48–50. Also in “To Osnovianenko”: “The rapids rage...The Sich is gone, and gone is he who led them all yore. The Sich is gone...” Andrusyshen, *The Poetical Works*, 51, 54. “What happened in Ukraine of old, why she in bondage lay, and how the Kozak fame was born and through the world made way.” Andrusyshen, *The Poetical Works*, 53.

⁴² Images of Khmelnytskyi as the one who inadvertently brought foreign rule in Ukraine emerge in such poems as “The Great Mound” and “Subotiv.” Shevchenko painted Khmelnytskyi as naive, addressing him in “Subotiv” as “You have ruined derelict Ukraine by your most friendly plan.” See Andrusyshen, *The Poetical Works*, 228.

⁴³ See Emile Kruba, “Les Cosaques dans le Kobzar de Taras Ševčenko,” in *Les Cosaques de l'Ukraine: rôle historique, représentations littéraires et artistiques: actes du 5e colloque international franco-ukrainien*, eds. Michel Cadot and Emile Kruba (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1995), 175–90.

⁴⁴ These decrees stayed in power until 1905. For a discussion of the Valuev Circular and the Ems Decree see Fedir Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876 r. The Suppression of the Ukrainian Activities in 1876*. With an editor’s preface by Omeljan Pritsak and with an introduction by Basil Dmytryshyn. (Reprint of the 1930 edition by the Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, München: W. Fink, 1970).

⁴⁵ Olga Andriewsky, “The Russian-Ukrainian Discourse and the Failure of the ‘Little Russian Solution’, 1782–1917,” in Kappeler, *Culture, Nation, and Identity*, 182–214.

⁴⁶ Kyivan Rus was the first East Slavic state, whose origins date to the 9th century and collapse traditionally to the mid-13th century. For a discussion of its place in Ukrainian and Russian historiography see Jaroslaw Pelenski, *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus’* (New York: Boulder, 1998).

⁴⁷ Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1992), 189.

⁴⁸ Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi, “Zvychaina skhema ruskoi istorii i sprava ratsionalnogo ukladu istorii skhidnoho sloviaanstva,” in V. I. Lamanskii, *Stati po slavianovedeniiu* (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiia imperatorskoi akademi nauk, 1904), 298–304. Find also in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, “History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs,” *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* 2 (1952): 355–364.

⁴⁹ Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi, *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda* (Sankt-Peterburg: Obshchestvennaia polza, 1906).

⁵⁰ Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi’s ten volume *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* was published in Kyiv and Lviv (1898–1936). The English translation is being printed by Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Particular feature of the translation project is that it provides editor’s notes on sources in addition to Hrushevskyyi’s himself. Volumes 7, 8, 9 and 10 covers the Kozak period, and all but last were translated and printed.

⁵¹ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 161.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 179.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 193.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 347.

⁵⁵ See especially Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi, “Note Five,” in *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, Vol. 8, *The Cossack Age, 1626–1650*, trans. Maria Daria Olynyk, 670–683.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 677.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Hrushevskyi, Vol. 8, 678.

⁶⁰ See the study of early Kozak revival in: Frank Sysyn, “The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14 (December 1990): 593-607.

⁶¹ See the study of the anthem in: Mykola P. Lynnyk and Valentyna M. Ponomarenko, eds., *Derzhavnyi himn Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo “Muzychna Ukraina,” 2006), 11.

⁶² The poem was first published in 1863. P. Chubynskyi, “Shche ne vmerla Ukraina,” *Meta* 4 (1863): 271–272. Even if not formally accepted, it was sung widely as a national anthem during Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi’s period (1918). Later in 1939, after the establishment of the Carpathian Ukrainian State, it was accepted there as the state anthem. It formally became the state anthem of independent Ukraine in 1992.

⁶³ Severyn Nalyvaiko was Kozak hetman in 1596. Maksym Zalizniak was a Haidamak leader. Taras Triasylo was a hetman of unregistered Kozaks.

⁶⁴ Translated by the author of the dissertation. The abbreviated version of the poem was accepted as the official anthem in 2003. The anthem retained the following part:

Soul and body we will lay down
For our freedom
And show that we brothers are of the Kozak nation.
Hey, hey dear brothers
Of Kozak nation.

⁶⁵ For a graphic example, see Shevchenko’s “Irzhavets” where he symbolized Kozaks as “white” and Tatars as “black.”

⁶⁶ Hryhorii A. Nudha, *Poetychnyi epos*, 17. For a detailed analysis of Kondratskyi, see M. Vozniak, *Iz zbirnyka Kondratskoho kintsia XVII v.* (Lviv: Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka, 1927), 146, 155–156.

⁶⁷ Kateryna Hrushevska, *Ukrainski narodni dumy* (Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1927), XIX. Vasilii Lomikovskii had a Kozak Hetmanate elite heritage. The original title of his work is “O Malorossii. O drevnikh, obychaiakh malorossiiskikh, o sluzhbe voinskoi i grazhdanskoi, o chinakh i dolzhnostiakh chinovnikov. Po alfabitu. Pisano 1808 goda.” *Kievskaia starina* (1894).

⁶⁸ “Opyt sobraniia starinnykh malorossiiskikh pesen.”

⁶⁹ P. D. Pavlii, M. S. Rodina, and M. P. Stelmakh, eds., *Ukrainski narodni dumy ta istorychni pisni* (Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk Ukrainkoi RSR, 1955), VIII.

⁷⁰ S. I. Trytsa, *Melos ukrainskoi narodnoi epiky* (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1979), 194.

⁷¹ The work was titled “Malorossiiskie pesni.”

⁷² The titles are “Ukrainskie narodnye pesni” (1834), which did not contain new texts but expanded on the study of the *dumy*. Also “Sbornik ukrainskikh pesen” (1849).

⁷³ The title of the work is *Zaporozhskaia starina* (Kharkov: Universitetskaia tip., 1833–1838).

⁷⁴ Hrushevska, *Ukrainski narodni dumy*, XLII–XLIV, XLII.

⁷⁵ The dissertation title is “Ob istoricheskom znachenii Russkoi narodnoi poezii.”

⁷⁶ Amvrosii Metlynskyi, *Narodnye yuzhnorusskie pesni* (Kyiv: Universitetskaia tip., 1854). For commentary see Hrushevska, *Ukrainski Narodni*, LIX.

⁷⁷ In his work “Zapiski o Yuzhnoi Rusi.”

⁷⁸ V. Antonovych and M. Drahomanov, *Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo naroda s obiasneniiami* (Kyiv: Izdatelstvo russkogo imperatorskogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, 1874).

⁷⁹ For musical content, see Filaret Kolessa, *Melodii ukrainskykh narodnykh Dum Serii I* (Lviv: materialy do ukrainskoi etnolohii EK NTSh, 1910). See also F. Kolessa, *Melodii ukrainskykh narodnykh Dum Serii II* (Lviv: Materialy do ukrainskoi etnolohii EK NTSh, 1913).

⁸⁰ Georgii V. Kasianov, “Ukraiinskyi natsionalizm: problema naukovoho pereosmyslennia,” *Ukraiinskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* 2 (1998): 39–54.

⁸¹ Yaroslav Malyk, “Kateryna Hrushevka,” *Ukrainskyi Istoryk* 3–4 (1992): 272.

⁸² Quoted in Hrushevka, *Ukrainski narodni dumy*, LXXXIX.

⁸³ *Istoriia kozachestva v pamiatnikakh Yuzhno-russkogo narodnogo pesennogo tvorchestva* (1906), 693, as quoted in Mykola Dmytrenko, “Ukrainski narodni dumy yak fenomen tradytsiinoi kultury,” *Ukrainska folklorystyka: aktsenty sohodnennia* (Kyiv: Stal, 2008), 20–69. Also accessed in June 15, 2011 at http://www.culturalstudies.in.ua/knigi_6_1.php

⁸⁴ Natalie Kononenko, *Ukrainian Minstrels And the Blind Shall Sing* (New York, London, England: M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1998), 9.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 11, 13.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁸⁷ Natalie Kononenko dates the time of traditional *kobzari* as 1850–1930. *Ukrainian Minstrels*, 9.

⁸⁸ Maksym T. Rylskyi et al., eds., *Ukrainska narodna poetychna tvorchist*, Vol. I (Kyiv: Radianska Shkola, 1958), 451.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 453.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 455.

⁹¹ Natalie Kononenko, “Duma Pro Chornobyl: Old Genres, New Topics,” *Journal of Folklore Research* 29 (1992): 140.

⁹² Rylskiy, *Ukrainska narodna poetychna tvorchist*, I, LXXXVIII.

⁹³ Some scholars provide sub-branches for this cycle. These are: flight from Turkish captivity, lament of captives, sea campaigns against Turks, death in battle of the Kozak, and victorious fights of the Kozaks with Turks/Tatars. See A. Ivanytskyi, *Ukrainska narodna muzychna tvorchist* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo “Muzychna Ukraina,” 1990), 135.

⁹⁴ For studies about the Ottoman slave trade, see Carl M. Kortepeter, “Ottoman Imperial Policy and the Economy of the Black Sea Region in the 16th Century,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 86 (1966): 86–113. Suraiya Faruqi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004).

⁹⁵ George Tarnawsky and Patricia Kilina, trans., *Ukrainian Dumy* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1979), 23.

⁹⁶ The quoted texts use common English usage “Cossack” to refer to Kozak.

⁹⁷ Tarnawsky and Kilina, *Ukrainian Dumy*, 27.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 32.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 37.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 47.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 163.

¹⁰² Ibid., 167.

¹⁰³ Natalie Kononenko explored the Church's impact on the content of the *dumy*. See Natalie Kononenko, "The Influence of the Orthodox Church on Ukrainian *Dumy*," *Slavic Review* 50 (1991): 566–575.

¹⁰⁴ Kononenko, "Introduction," in *Ukrainian Dumy*, Tarnawsky and Kilina, 11.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ See Trylovskyy's comment: Petro Trylovskyy, *Hei, tam na hori "Sich" ide!...: propam 'iatna knyha Sichei* (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Trident Press, 1965), 19.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 26.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹¹⁰ See *Spivanyk Ukrainskykh sichovykh striltsiv* (Viden: Tsentralna uprava Ukrainskykh Sichovykh Striltsiv, 1918).

¹¹¹ Trylovskyy, *Hei, tam*, 18.

¹¹² The formation of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen was led by the members of the Sich Society.

¹¹³ For a detailed history see Tetiana Kanarska, *Istoriia sichovykh striltsiv* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1992). For a brief history and biography of its founder and significant Sich figures see Petro Arsenych, *Zasnovnyk Sichi Kyrylo Trylovskyy* (Ivano-Frankivsk: Lileia-NB, 2000).

¹¹⁴ Vadym Zadunaiskyi, *Vykorystannia kozatskykh viiskovykh tradytsii u lehioni "Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi"* (Donetsk: Nauka, relihia, suspilstvo, 2003), 140.

¹¹⁵ Quoted in Taras Hunczak, “The Ukraine under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy” in *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution*, ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), 61.

¹¹⁶ Ivan Ivanets and Vasyl Sofroniv-Levytskyi, *Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi: 1914–1920* (Montreal: Vydavnytstvo Ihoria Fediva, 1955), 98.

¹¹⁷ Petro Diachenko, *Chorni Zaporozhtsi. Spomyny komandyrta 1-ho kinnoho polku chornykh zaporozhtsiv armii Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliky* (Kyiv: Stiks, 2010), 22–23.

¹¹⁸ Mykola B. Lazarovych, “Ukrainski sichovi striltsi v revoliutsiinykh podiiakh u lystopadi 1918 r. v Skhidnii Halychyni,” *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal V* (1998): 41.

¹¹⁹ Ivanets and Sofroniv-Levytskyi, *Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi*, 98.

¹²⁰ Commanded by Yevhen Konovalts.

¹²¹ Plokyh, *Ukraine and Russia*, 174. See also Zenon Kohut, “Making the Ukrainian Armed Forces Ukrainian: The Role of National (Non-Soviet) Military Traditions,” in Kostiantyn Morozov et al., *The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History: Its Role in the Construction of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. Conference Proceedings* (Cambridge, MA: HURI-Harvard University, 1995), 1–22.

¹²² The relevant section of the law is titled “Rights and Responsibilities of the Ukrainian Kozaks and Citizens.”

¹²³ H. Yurtyk, “Zvenihorodskyy kish vilnoho kozatsva,” *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk II* (1922): 125–133.

¹²⁴ Vladyslav F. Verstiuk, “Vilne kozatsvo” v Ukraini revolutsii 1917–1921 rr.,” in Valerii A. Smolii et al., *Istoriia ukrainskoho kozatstva: narysy: U 2 tomakh*. (Kyiv: Vydavnychi dim “Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia,” 2006), I, 423, 434–435. See also V. Lobodaiev, *Revoliutsiina stykhiia. Vilnokozatskyi rukh v Ukraini 1917–1918 rr.* (Kyiv: Tempora, 2010).

¹²⁵ For detailed analysis see V. Musiienko and V. Lobodaiev, “Heneralna Rada vilnoho kozatstva: stanovlennia, politychna pozytsiia, diialnist (zhovten 1917–kviten 1918 rr.),” *Istoriia Ukrainy* 37/38 (2000): 5–6.

¹²⁶ Kalenyk Lysiuk, “Tsikave z istorii UVK 1917 r.,” (Spohady avtora v yoho lystakh z 1-ho i 11-ho lypnia 1968 r. do redaktsii “UK”), *Ukrainske kozatstvo* 3–4 (11–12) (1968): 18–19.

¹²⁷ Verstiuk, “Vilne kozatsvo,” 423.

¹²⁸ Pavlo Hai-Nyzhhyk, “Derzhavnyi perevorot 29 kvitnia 1918 r. Prychyny ta perebih zakhoplennia vlady P. Skoropadskym,” *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* IV (2011): 145.

¹²⁹ Ruslan Pyrih, “Ukrainska hetmanska derzhava 1918 roku,” *Istorychni narysy* (Kyiv: Natsionalna akademiia nauk Ukrainy, 2011), 141.

¹³⁰ 10/8–1918 r., 10 serpnia 1918, “Zakon Rady ministriv Ukrainskoi Derzhavy pro vidnovlennia ukrainskoho kozatstva,” Accessed, July 4, 2014. http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=1219503.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Pyrih, “Ukrainska hetmanska derzhava,” 142.

¹³⁴ Petliura held this title until he died in 1926.

¹³⁵ For detailed information on the services of Black Zaporozhians, see Petro Diachenko, 2010.

¹³⁶ Zaporozhian Sich of the Otaman Bozhko was formed in late 1918, and had infantry, cavalry and artillery *kureni*. It was manned by 3,000 Kozaks. The Sich fought against the Anarchist Black Army of Nestor Makhno. Later it went under the command of the UPR’s army. The Kozaks of Bozhko assumed

the Zaporozhian heritage and wore baggy trousers, Kozak boots and Kozak caps. Sich Kozaks also adopted the Kozak hair style.

¹³⁷ See S. Bohdan, “Chornomorske povstanske kozatske viisko u borotbi za Ukrainku derzhavnist u 1920–1922 rr.,” *Naukovi zapysky. Zbirnyk prats molodykh vchenykh ta aspirantiv*, VI (Kyiv: Instytut ukrainskoi arkheohrafii ta dzhereloznavstva M. S. Hrushevskoho NAN Ukrainy, 2001), 355–362.

¹³⁸ For detailed discussion, see Igor Vasilev, *Ukrainskoe natsionalnoe dvizhenie i ukrainizatsiia na Kubani v 1917–1932 gg.* (Krasnodar: Kubankino, 2010).

¹³⁹ Dmytro Bilyi, “Ukraina i Kuban v 1917–1921 rokakh. Shliakh spilnoi borotby,” accessed May 25, 2014, <http://www.spas.net.ua/index.php/library/article/257>

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Vasyl Ivanys, *Borotba Kubani za nezalezhnist* (München: Ukrainisches Technisch-Wirtschaftliches Institut, 1968), 28.

¹⁴² Dmytro Doroshenko, *Iliustrovana Istoriiia Ukrainy*, Vol. II (Uzhhorod: Svoboda, 1930), 189.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 195.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 196.

¹⁴⁵ Dmytro Doroshenko, *Zakordonna polityka Ukrainskoi derzhavy 1918 roku* (Toronto: Vilne Slovo, 1978), 56.

¹⁴⁶ Vadym Zadunaiskyi, *Boiove mystetstvo ta viiskova spadshchyna ukrainskykh kozakiv v kintsi XIX–na pochatku XXI st.* (Donetsk: Vydavnytstvo Nord-Pres, 2006), 195.

¹⁴⁷ A. Martinov, *Chervonoe Kazachestvo, 1918–1923* (Kharkov: Izdatelstvo “Put prosveshcheniia” i “Molodoi rabochii,” 1923).

¹⁴⁸ In 1921 it was formed as the First Cavalry Division, and soon after it was renamed the First Zaporozhian Red Kozaks Cavalry Division. For a timeline of the further transformation of the Red Kozaks, see N. Dubinskii and N. Savko, *Pervaia chervonaia (1917–1929)* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatelstvo, 1931), 12.

¹⁴⁹ For details see Ya. Lozhkin, *Chervone Kozatstvo* (Kharkiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1928).

¹⁵⁰ Soviets again established a Red Kozak cavalry before the Second World War. The case will be discussed further in this chapter.

¹⁵¹ Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (New York: International Publishers, 1942), 23–24.

¹⁵² Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 5.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ For this new paradigm and its design see Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” *Slavic Review* 53 (1994): 414–52; and Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

¹⁵⁵ The great power chauvinism of Russia was denounced in 1923, during the 12th congress of the Soviet Communist Party and later in 1930 at the 16th Congress. See John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, 163.

¹⁵⁶ See Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR,” 417–19. See also Susannah Lockwood Smith, “Forum: Russian Folk Art under Lenin and Stalin. From Peasants to Professionals: The Socialist-Realist Transformation of a Russian Folk Choir,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 3 (2002): 393–425.

¹⁵⁷ See James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemma of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge:

Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983), 217–233. See also Valerii A. Smolii, ed., *Ukrainizatsiia 1920-30-kh rokiv: peredumovy, dobutky, uroky* (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 2003), 84–106.

¹⁵⁸ Serhy Yekelchuk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 15.

¹⁵⁹ For a detailed account of his activities in emigration, see Christopher Gilley, “The ‘Change of Signposts’ in the Ukrainian Emigrations: Mykhailo Hrushevskii and the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 54 (2006): 345–374.

¹⁶⁰ See Yurii I. Shapoval and Marta D. Olynyk, “The Mechanisms of the Informal Activity of the GPU-NKVD. The Surveillance File of Mykhailo Hrushevskii,” *Cahiers du monde russe* 42 (2001): 208.

¹⁶¹ Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevskii and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 233.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 259.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 260.

¹⁶⁴ Hrushevskii could complete the first chapter of the tenth volume and this was published posthumously in 1936.

¹⁶⁵ Serhii Plokhy, “Bourgeois Revolution or Peasant War?” in *Synopsis: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Zenon Kohut*, ed. Serhii Plokhy and Frank Sysyn (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2005), 345–369.

¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, it would not be fair to assume that the Soviet historiography was based on monolithic interpretation. Plokhy underlined that, the All-Union interpretation of the history, which was constructed by Mikhail Pokrovskii, received responses from other historians such as Volodymyr Sukhynko-Khomenko and Fedir Yastrebov. The latter two constructed a Marxist but also a national interpretation of the Kozaks, while underlining the

Kozak era's role in the national revival of Ukrainians. See Serhii Plokhy, "Bourgeois Revolution or Peasant War?," 354–365.

¹⁶⁷ See M. N. Pokrovskii, *Russkaia istoriia v samom szhatom ocherke* (Moskva: Gos. izdatelstvo, 1920).

¹⁶⁸ A typical Soviet view of Hrushevskiy is found in V. E. Illeritskii and Iosif Kudriavtsev, eds., *Istoriografiia istorii SSSR s drevneishykh vremen do kontsa Velikoi Oktiabrskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii* (Moskva: Izdatelstvo sotsialno-ekon. lit-ry, 1961), 488, as quoted in Stephen M. Horak, "Michael Hrushevsky: Portrait of an Historian," *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes* 10 (1968): 348.

¹⁶⁹ *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* [Great Soviet Encyclopedia] (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii, 1935). Quoted in Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, 165.

¹⁷⁰ Yekelchuk, *Stalin's Empire*, 17.

¹⁷¹ The decision in this matter was made in April 1936.

¹⁷² Zadunaiskyi, *Boiove mystetstvo*, 195–196.

¹⁷³ S. M. Belousov, K. H. Huslysty et al., *Kratkii kurs istorii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy, Akademiia nauk USSR, 1940) presented Khmelnytskyi as a great Kozak patriot while the same account railed against Ivan Mazepa as a traitor because of his anti-tsarist actions. For critics of this work in the 1940s, see Liubov Alekseevna Sidorova, "Kratkii kurs istorii Ukrainy v kontekste sovetskoi istoricheskoi nauki kontsa 1940-kh gg.," *Bylye gody* 2 (2012): 48–53.

¹⁷⁴ Quoted in Hiroaki Kuromiya, "Political Leaders of Ukraine, 1939–1989: The Burden of History," *The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. Title VIII Program* (2004), 3, accessed January 13, 2012, http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2004_819-21g_Kuromiya.pdf

¹⁷⁵ Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 1985), 169.

¹⁷⁶ Zadunaiskyi, *Boiove mystetstvo*, 230–231.

¹⁷⁷ For interpretations see *History of Ukrainian SSR* (Kyiv: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk Ukr. SSR, 1954).

¹⁷⁸ See Yekelchuk, *Stalin's Empire*, 102.

¹⁷⁹ For example, publication of “The Reunification of Ukraine with Russia.” See Yekelchuk, *Stalin's Empire*, 105. Kozak themes were also incorporated into the opera Bohdan Kmelnitskyi which was composed by Kostiantyn Dankevych and premiered on January 29, 1951 (libretto by O. Kornichuk and V. Vasylevska).

¹⁸⁰ Stress is mine. See L. G. Beskrovnyi et al., *Poltava: K 250-letiiu Poltavskogo srazheniia* (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1959), 3. See also A. Markevich, *Velikii podvig: K 250-letiiu Poltavskoi bitvy* (Kyiv: Izdatelstvo Kievskogo universiteta, 1959); S. Epifanov, “Poltavskaia bitva, 1709–1959,” in *Poltavskaia pobeda: iz istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii nakanune i posle Poltavy*, ed. M. B. Grekov and V. D. Koroliuk (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1959). After the premier of the opera, it was declared as a bourgeois-nationalist interpretation. Increasing criticism led to the revision of the opera and this second version was released in 1953.

¹⁸¹ Evgenii I. Porfirev, *Poltavskoe srazhenie* (Moskva: Voennoe izdatelstvo, 1959).

¹⁸² Oleksandr Ohloblyn, “Hetman Ivan Mazepa i Moskva,” in *Ivan Mazepa i Moskva: istorychni rozvidky i statti*, ed. M. Slaboshpytskyi (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo “Rada,” 1994).

¹⁸³ This followed Stalin’s death in 1954 and Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign begun in 1956.

¹⁸⁴ Henrieta Borymska, *Samotsvity ukrainskoho tantsiu* (Kyiv: Mystetsvo, 1974), 21.

¹⁸⁵ See Yekelchuk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory*, 160.

¹⁸⁶ Yurii Shapoval, “Stolitnii Shelest,” *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* 5 (2008): 27.

¹⁸⁷ See Petro Shelest, *Ukraino nasha radianska* (Vydavnytstvo politychnoi lit-ry Ukrainy, 1970). On the Soviet criticism, see Lowell Tillet, “Ukrainian Nationalism and the Fall of Shelest,” *Slavic Review* 34 (1975): 752–768.

¹⁸⁸ O. H. Bazhan et al., eds., *Zberezheмо tuiu slavu. Zbirnyk dokumentiv ta materialiv* (Kyiv: Ridnyi krai, 1997), Document 2, 27.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Document 2, 29.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁹¹ Dmytro Yavornytskyi (1855–1940) was a historian of the Kozak era. He also studied the ethnography and folklore of Kozaks.

¹⁹² Bazhan et al., *Zberezheмо tuiu slavu*, 32.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, Document 3, 33.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ Bazhan and et al., *Zberezheмо tuiu slavu*, 12.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Document 5, 38.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 41. The authors claimed that Zaporozhian traditions were “strikingly” transformed, following Lenin’s national policies, during the rule of the Communist Party.

¹⁹⁹ Bazhan et al., *Zberezheмо tuiu slavu*, Document 4, 36.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., Document 7, 44.

²⁰¹ The plan also projected placing monuments or plaques at other sites related to the Zaporozhian Kozaks: Horodyshe, Nikopol, Kapulivka, Kamianka, Tsiuriupynsk, Pokrovske, Maslivka, Bohuslava, Kaniv, Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Velyki Matsevychi, Polonne, Cherkasy, Nizhny, Yevpatoriia, Karasubazar, Bakhchysarai, Kilia, Khotyn fortress, Lutskiy castle, Perekop, Feodosiia, Izmail, Yeni Dunia, Medzhybizh, Zbarazh, Berdychiv, Lubny, Chernihiv, Komsomolske, Starokostiantyniv, Bar, Zboriv, Krasne, Stina, Monastyryshche, Braha, Busha, Pliasheva, Zhorniv, Ripky, and Sokal.

²⁰² Projected names were Ivan Pidkova, Severyn Nalyvaiko, Petro Sahaidachnyi, Taras Fedorovych (Triasylo), Ivan Sulyma, Dmytro Hupia, Samiilo Kishka, Pavlo Pavliuk (But), Yakiv Ostriany, Ivan Bohun, Maksym Kryvonis, Danylo Nechai, Martyn Nebaba, Ivan Sirko, Maksym Zalizniak, Ivan Honta, Semen Nezhyvyi, and Semen Palii.

²⁰³ Bazhan et al., *Zberezheмо tuiu slavu*, Document 8, 46–47.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., Document 16, (November 1966), 82–83.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., Document 7, 185.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., Document 94, 336–337.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., Document 96, 340–1.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., Document 97, 342.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 344.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 344–5.

²¹¹ Ibid., 345.

²¹² Ibid., Document 98, 351.

²¹³ The Museum had four dioramas: “Sviatoslav’s Battle on the Shores,” “Uprising of the poor Kozaks of the Zaporozhian Sich (1768),” “Construction of DniproHES” and “Night Assault at Zaporozhia–October 1943.” See <http://www.ostrov-hortica.org.ua/museum/>

²¹⁴ Quoting Plokhy, “the main victim of new uniformity [historical] was the concept of nationhood and all historical symbols considered too closely related to the national paradigm of Ukrainian history. Cossackdom, for example, became a symbol of all that was wrong with the national paradigm.” Serhii Plokhy, *Ukraine and Russia*, 132.

²¹⁵ Maksym Sahaydak, comp. *The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7–8. Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R., An Underground Journal from Soviet Ukraine* (Baltimore, Paris, Toronto: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1976), 129.

²¹⁶ An interesting exception was the work conducted at Dnipropetrovsk State University by Mykola Kovalskyi and some of his students, such as Yurii Mytsyk. Ironically, the Dnipropetrovsk University at the time was subordinated directly to Moscow, and thus was free of Shcherbytskyi-era interference from Kyiv. See Serhii Plokhy, “Zhytteva misiia Mykoly Kovalskoho,” *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, November 10, 2006, accessed June 15, 2014, http://gazeta.dt.ua/SOCIETY/zhitteva_misiya_mikoli_kovalskogo.html

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 133–134.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 149.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 153–154.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

CHAPTER THREE

KOZAK REVIVAL: FROM THE LATE SOVIETS TO INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

Kozak nostalgia emerges as a grassroots phenomenon conditioned by Soviet cultural and linguistic policies. The modern Kozaks, who set out to reclaim a long-denied cultural heritage and to reconstruct individual identities, gradually became interested in the physical spaces beyond their own individual spaces and started to rediscover ancestral territory, re-sanctify places of burial, and restore collective memory. Emerging from hiding, the Kozaks received popular attention, built for themselves a nationalist/patriotic outlook, and assumed an anti-regime stance. This politicization injected them into the chaotic political scene of the late Soviet era. Along with other Ukrainian national forces, the new Kozak movement claimed independence for the historical territory, employed social and cultural tools, such as commemorative events, expeditions to historical sites, the practice of folk rituals, revival and invention of folk traditions, and construction of a collective memory and a collective identity which they believed had been taken away by the regime. The available data for this research does not provide insights into how those early groups were differentiated in terms of their perceptions of the past and their varying emphases in reviving the Kozak heritage. Available data allow me to argue that at the initial stages the movement carried a patriotic and national character. Starting with Ukraine's independence, differentiation in political agendas and methods of restoring the heritage became clearer.

This section, examining the period from the late 1980s to Ukraine's independent era, will focus on the maturation and further politicization of the Kozak movement. It will also discuss the main lines of differentiation in reviving and claiming the heritage, and the eventual making of collective memories and identities. The main interest of this section is to examine the steady transformation of the initial nostalgia that focused on the rediscovery of cultural and historical roots, which were followed by politically oriented reinterpretation and regeneration efforts. It is important to note here that reinterpretations and regenerations are multiple and find their source in the multiplicity of collective memories of the past and interests of the present.

1980s: The Failure of Sovietization, Rising Nationalism and Kozak Nostalgia

A major turning point in late Soviet politics was Mikhail Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985. The Soviet project was already seen as flailing, with indicators showing economic stagnation, corruption, and the persistence of the nationalities question.¹ Gorbachev, realizing the pressing need for extensive reforms, attempted to restore the system by initiating processes made famous by the terms *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (reconstruction). With opportunities opened by these policies, the Kozaks started to return to the public sphere and engage in a nationalist discourse. Increasing in numbers, the Kozaks became politically involved in the cause of Ukrainian independence.

The return of the Kozaks, as social formations, to the public sphere had much to do with the nature of Sovietization. The Soviet project, as discussed earlier, set out to create a classless society. The creation of a classless society

relied, on the ethnic level, on the theory of the flourishing (*rastsvet*) of ethnic groups, their subsequent drawing together (*sblizhenie*), and ultimate merging (*sliianie*). With the projected achievement of the merger process—once posited as a global achievement, but then revised as being achievable within one country—Soviet society would become one, homogenous and equal. However, theory failed to match reality. The notion of a supra-national society, which was to be attained by the last stage, was transformed, starting from the late 1930s, into an exaltation of Russian culture and melting into Russian identity. The assumption of the Russian identity, therefore, became the core element of Soviet patriotism.² This meant, as Gleb Struve argued, that all Soviet people had to be proud of Russian glories, territorial expansion and military heroes.³

The favored status of Russian culture and the way it was imposed on other ethnic groups produced memories of repression, disappointment, and discontent among the Soviet nationalities. This became particularly true in the post-war period, when the Soviet leaders increased pressure on national identification and the expression of national traditions. Gradually, the nationalities were pressed to emphasize their real or purported connections to Russian culture and to avoid emphasizing unique aspects of their own culture or their cultural connections with neighboring ethnicities.⁴ Such Russifying policies were employed throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, and continued with the increasing use of the Russian language, the affirmation of Russian leadership among other nationalities, and with the increasing domination of top political offices by Russians.⁵

Even though Soviet leaders claimed that the USSR's nationalities question was solved once and for all, it actually remained a high priority topic on the Soviet political agenda.⁶ The problem was that the regime, while manipulating or eliminating many aspects of national culture, failed to create a sufficiently strong pull towards assimilation into the projected supranational community called the Soviet people (*Sovetskii narod*).⁷ Soviet policy-makers, for the sake of assimilation, invented various means to control and transform the social realm; for this purpose, new rituals, such as red baptisms, red weddings, red funerals and passport ceremonies, were introduced.⁸ The rites of passage, such as birth, marriage, coming of age, and death were reformed while keeping certain folklore references. But such an intervention in folk-life, which was based on old traditions, meant an intrusion into the old beliefs and value systems of ethnic groups, and particularly of individuals. While such "red" rites were partly accepted by Ukrainian society, they caused significant resistance and eventually failed to pull and transform the entire society in the way Soviet leaders had hoped. Resistance to the way traditional lifestyles were manipulated also fed nationalist feelings, which for a time remained silent, under suppression. In the Ukrainian case, this silent nationalism carried forward the potential return of the Kozaks in a "bourgeois-nationalist" framework.⁹

A factor to consider in understanding the reemergence of the Kozaks is the regime's preference to leave no independent social space to individuals and groups. The Soviet system was set on reaching and controlling all sections of social life and regulating it with Soviet values. This regime preference left

no space between the state and society, and allowed the party to manipulate the preferences of the people.¹⁰ Fearing a resurgence of “bourgeois-nationalism” in uncontrolled social spaces, the Soviet system repressed the “bourgeois-nationalist” interpretations and presentations of historical events and figures of the Kozak past. Such a stance was not limited to the way the Kozak past was interpreted in historiographies. People of Kozak heritage could not aspire to the rights once recognized by the empire and could not enjoy their traditional prestigious social status. Sympathizers of the Kozak cultural heritage could not express any ideas other than the official interpretations of the Kozaks. The Soviet system imposed this strict repression of Kozak identity to the extent that, as Anatolii Lyshchenko acknowledged, one could not even talk of his grandfather’s connection to the Kozaks or claim his cultural heritage. Acting in others ways meant a “bourgeois” crime and could end in exile to Siberia.¹¹

The most graphic example is the repression of Kozak heritage, of the *kobzari* and their Ukrainian epic (*dumy*) repertoire. *Kobzari* and the *dumy* repertoire had gained the status of a national symbol. As such, *dumy* performances meant a direct connection to the heritage of the forefathers and, therefore, they constituted oral sources of national memory, the Ukrainian collective memory of Kozaks.

First, the scholarly study of the *dumy* was repressed. The collection and publication of *dumy* was subjected to Soviet suppression. For example, Kateryna Hrushevska, the folklorist and daughter of Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi,

was persecuted soon after her collection of *dumy* was published. The pretext was that her presentation of the texts was a work of “bourgeois-nationalism.”

Second in line of fire were the *kobzari*. They also could not escape Soviet attention, both for their status as a national symbol and as repositories of collective memory.¹² Quite a few of them,¹³ in addition, who were not blind, had served in the Kozak divisions formed between 1917 and 1922, and gained notoriety in the eyes of the Soviet rulers.¹⁴ Understanding the *kobzari*'s symbolic value as culture bearers and their impact on the society, the authorities proceeded to undermine the *kobzari*'s activity on the grounds that they were inciting nationalism. To assure control over the *kobzari*, the Soviet administration initiated a register of their instruments (*kobza* or *bandura*) in the 1920s. Those who did not register were jailed. During this period the instruments had to be registered at police stations, the repertoires were to be approved at the National Commissariat of Education, and the venues of individual and collective musical activity needed to be reported to state bodies.¹⁵ Eventually, the *kobzari* were forbidden to perform altogether.¹⁶ Begging was also banned, the traditional *kobzari*'s method of sustenance as they travelled from place to place to perform. The Soviets feared that in raising national consciousness, the *kobzari* were propagating with their repertoire anti-regime ideas.¹⁷

Finally, in 1933, during a plenary session of the All-Ukrainian Union of Art Workers, Deputy Commissar of People's Education of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, A. Khvyliia, called the *kobzari* class enemies.¹⁸ At one point in 1930s (the date is uncertain due to lack of documents) the *kobzari*

were summoned from all corners of Ukraine to Kharkiv to attend a conference.¹⁹ Their numbers are quoted variously in the several hundreds (the figures range from 200 to 337); however, what is clear is that they disappeared during the convention.²⁰ Dmitrii Shostakovich recalls the event in his memoirs:

I am not a historian. I could tell many tragic tales and cite many examples, but I won't do that. I will tell about one incident, only one. It's a horrible story and every time I think of it I grow frightened and I don't want to remember it [I]n the mid thirties the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Lirniki and Banduristy was announced, and all the folk singers had to gather and discuss what to do in the future. 'Life is better, life is merrier,' Stalin has said. The blind men believed it. They came to the congress from all over Ukraine, from tiny, forgotten villages. There were several hundred of them at the congress, they say. It was a living museum, the country's living history. All its songs, all its music and poetry. And they were almost all shot, almost all of those pathetic blind men killed. Why was it done? Why the sadism—killing the blind?²¹

No doubt the man-made starvation, Holodomor (1932–1933), which claimed millions of lives in Ukraine, had an impact on the death of the *dumy* and the *kobzari* tradition.²² In 1939, when the First Republican Congress of the *kobzari* was convened, the number of participants was only thirty.

In the post-Stalin era, musicians could again train in the art of the *kobza*. However, the traditional *dumy* cycle was not in favor. Instead, the *kobzari*'s repertoire now was comprised largely of new “*duma*” pieces such as, “*Duma* about Lenin,” “*Duma* about Moscow,” “*Duma* about Unification,”

“*Duma* about the Party,” and “*Duma* about the Red Army, about Father Lenin and his Faithful Sons.”²³ No trace was left of the traditional *kobzar* guild. The master-apprentice relation and oral transmission were gone. Even blindness was not the rule anymore. Lastly, the narrations of the Kozak “forefathers” in *dumy* performance could no longer be heard by the masses.

Similar suppression took place in the 1970s, when people revived the singing of traditional Christmas carols in traditional dress, including the Kozak Mamai costume. Such singing groups, numbering twenty, were arrested on the premise that they practiced antiquated traditions and recalled the Kozak forefathers. Some *bandura* players who held unofficial concerts and played beyond the approved social spaces had the same fate.²⁴

The repression of Kozak identity, exacerbating the feelings of victimization that the regime caused, eventually constituted one of the primary sources of the undercurrent of nationalist movements against the Soviet system. The rejection of individual space and group rights, keeping national feelings alive, justified dissent. Dissenters, as Lane argued, “espoused values that are in disagreement with the regime” and such values were “expressed outside the formal political arrangements of the state.”²⁵ The reemergence of the Kozak formations in the public space within the framework of a nationalist discourse, therefore, represented a point of escape from the reaches of the legal Soviet framework, with a potential to challenge the Soviet political order.

Escape from the reaches of the system also took place within a social environment where society carried a heavy load of traumatic collective memory. The Ukrainian collective memory included the repression of Kozak

identity and cultural heritage, Russification, the purges, as well as more distant traumatic memories, such as the Holodomor and the Stalinist persecutions of the cultural and political elites. The content of collective memory is decisive in the way Kozaks emerged because the traumatic experience of the past prepared the way for the emergence of restorative nostalgia to balance out the complex nature of the traumatic memories. Under the impact of restorative nostalgia, people started to recall the narrations about the “good and glorious” times before the “unpleasant experience,” and revived the folk ways of the forefathers. The restorative process, a process of social healing, requires people, therefore, to face the trauma by referring to the “desires and memories that initially formed their personalities and that remain at the core of identity.”²⁶ In our case, the restorative nostalgia, for some of those Ukrainians who were traumatized by Sovietization, was guided by the search for their roots and by the heroic Kozak ancestry.

The nostalgia focused on the following historical and cultural matters that were repressed by the Soviets: language, cultural heritage, historic-geographical heritage, and folklore. One example of such restorative nostalgia and revival of a tradition was the *kobzari* and their repertoire. In fact, only by the end of Soviet Union, specifically after *perestroika*, the *kobzari* returned to the public space as national symbols. Their reinstatement as national symbols contributed to the rising communal awareness about the independence of Ukraine.

From 1989 onwards, Ukrainian *kobzari* resurfaced and started to play and recite *dumy* pieces. Their reemergence with the *dumy* pieces marked a

major change in Soviet popular discourse. Therefore, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the *dumy* and *kobzari* returned to their pre-Soviet status as expressions of the Ukrainian national worldview, and with a task of transforming a Sovietized society through the cultural heritage of the Kozak forefathers.

As discussed in the introduction, traditions allow a social group to impress its own sense and form a connection point to past generations. The *kobzar* and *dumy* revival of the late 1980s and in post-1991 had these two main functions. The *kobzari* were destined to make an emphasis on a need for reformulating the communal identity that was transformed by the Soviet regime. There was a need to define the group, the Ukrainian nation, and the heritage of the Soviets had to be cleansed. There was also a need, on the part of Ukrainian cultural nationalists, for Ukrainians to face the threat posed by the Soviets to the definition of their ethnic identity. Therefore, the ways of the forefathers taken away by the Soviets were revived through the traditions of *kobzari*, with references to the processes of reinterpretation and regeneration of the tradition. One of the prominent *kobzari* of the revival era, Mykola Budnyk, also pointed:

To respect the tradition in the face of our history in last the century we want to give a new life to the *bandura*. Ukrainian history is a difficult one for us and we need to free ourselves from grief. This is a misfortune and it has to come to an end ... How to comprehend our tragedy in the past century? This [question] opens up the understanding of how we need to deal with it [the tragedy]: [We need] to push it aside.²⁷

Budnyk also indicated what the revival was all about: “It is for sure that we will not be able to revive the flesh of the old singing; however, we can revive its spirit.”²⁸ Indeed, the return of the *kobzari* and *dumy* repertoire did not particularly require a process of rediscovery of the texts, because the *dumy* corpus was in print, and books were available for public access. Rather, the revival in the late 1980s and 1990s was about reassessing and reinterpreting the written sources of the tradition, sifting through the corpus of *dumy*, reinstating the canon of ethno-history represented in the *kobzari*’s symbolic identity and the eventual revival of traditions.

Reinterpretation and revival were motivated by some cultural dynamics. One of these are the tradition bearers.²⁹ Hryhorii Tkachenko (1898–1993) was one of the rare living tradition bearers, who could recite eight *dumy*. The revival-era *kobzar* generation was inspired by Tkachenko’s techniques, repertoire, and singing/reciting manner.³⁰ Among such revival era *kobzari* are Mykola Budnyk, Volodymyr Kushpet, Viktor Mishalov, Mykola Tovkailo, Eduard Drach, Taras Sylenko, Yarema Shevchuk, Taras Kompanichenko and Yurii Fedynskyi.

Another source of reinterpretation and revival were guilds. With the help of the mentioned *kobzari*, the number of *kobzari* increased, starting with independence. However, because the guild tradition which raised the *kobzari* was long gone, most of the revival-era *kobzari* were formally trained musicians, including even most of the students of Tkachenko. Yet Tkachenko’s experience and knowledge allowed certain parts of the tradition

to be passed on. Thus, from late the 1970s, students of Tkachenko were interested in reviving the guild tradition. With the independence of Ukraine, students of Tkachenko established the Kyiv *Kobzar* Guild. The founders defined the task of the guild as the return of folk culture: “During the Soviet era the essence of the traditional folk culture was ignored; and now we have to return the treasures [of folk culture].”³¹ Therefore, the guild is tasked “not only to renew the ancient music tradition, but also to construct traditional *kobzar* instruments.”³² The founders of the Kyivan Guild studied the findings of Filaret Kolessa (ethnographer and folklorist, 1871–1947) on the workings of the traditional guilds and decided to adhere to traditional principles. The guild should therefore be under the patronage of a church. The rules of conduct, economic issues, and admission of new members would depend on decisions taken at a general meeting. Additionally, the guild had to have a permanent location in a town, and this would define its area of activity and would protect its traditions. The guild is built on the old professional hierarchy of the “brotherhood,” which sees itself as the continuation of the forefathers: master, apprentice, and students. Again the tradition ruled that, in the guilds, only men can be masters.³³

The case of the *kobzar* Yarema Shevchuk’s experience stands as a proof of the argument made so far about the revival of the tradition. Shevchuk, a member of the guild and a student of Mykola Budnyk, recalls his interests in the early revival era and his master:

In the beginning it was Budnyk [who took me as a student] ... I wanted to learn old-world music; however, there was very little information. I felt it, but I could not formulate exactly what it was. I started to take academic bandura classes; it was interesting. But, it was not what I was looking for. I understood this afterwards precisely when I heard the authentic lyre [hurdu-gurdy] played by Mykhailo Nehai, and everything fell into place. I then found Mykola Budnyk and asked to be his student. Since then my *kobzar* practice continues.

He also considers the *kobzari* and Kozaks of modern-day Ukraine related phenomena.

Twenty years ago when we occupied ourselves with Kozakdom and considered ourselves Kozaks, this had an impact on the cultural level. This had, no doubt, to do with being a *kobzar*. [We] reconstructed instruments, went on foot with old-time outfits for various cultural marches [with our instruments] to Kyiv, Zaporizhia, to the grave of Ivan Sirko in Kapulivka. Also, I had the honor to be part of the campaigns with *kobzari* and instruments on the [Kozak] *chaika*, the Kozak boat.

Yarema considers that his family environment in Ukraine led him to play the *kobza*. He talks about a cultural affinity to the *kobza* through forefathers who were repressed before the Second World War. When he was taking academic *bandura* classes, he went to his grandmother's village to perform and he was surprised by the reaction:

They were surprised to see me playing this instrument, because I understood that for them this was something not unknown. They burst into tears ... You know older people live more in the past, with the repression of national culture and repression of the leaders of this

culture. No doubt, they felt the pressure and they were anxious ... It is characteristic of Ukrainians. I want to be a conscious Ukrainian and I want my children to be dignified Ukrainians. Absolutely, I have a real need for such symbols of being Ukrainian. These are with us and they are musical instruments.

Yarema also discusses the current *kobzar* tradition and the functions of the guild:

The fundamental task of the guild is to recreate and to pass on all the classical *kobzari*'s inheritance in the way in which it existed in past times ... The Kharkiv and Lviv guilds have a certain time in the year to commemorate predecessors ... we are always pleased to organize common plans and events with our brothers in other guilds ... No doubt, the [*kobzari*'s repertoire] recreates the spiritual culture of the Ukrainian people in the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Because in our time there is something missing in our modern life which could actually correct our national life, lead to the correct [ends].

Considering the needs for symbols in society Yarema sees his performances as “propaganda activities”:

Any time I travel for my profession as a restorer of old religious texts, I always take my instruments with me. I am working in Kaniv at a church of the 12th century. I constantly perform the traditional repertoire near the grave of Taras Shevchenko, and teachers of middle schools invite me to perform for students ... Nobody remains indifferent to this repertoire because it appeals to the depths of the subconscious. People's historical memory wakes up when they hear these melodies and texts. There were occasions when people forgot their language and people were alienated from their culture and when they heard this [music] this transformed them.³⁴

The nostalgia for the Kozak past, intertwined with the *kobzar* tradition, came into public life with the first known informal Kozak formation, which emerged in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk. The Kozak Community of Students and Historians of the Donetsk State University became active in September 1984 as a result of the initiative taken by the nationally oriented history students of the University.³⁵ These students, led by the future historians Vadym V. Zadunaiskyi and Dmytro D. Bilyi, mobilized by their feelings of discontent and reacting to the Soviet version of history writing and its impact on identity politics, acquired an interest in the Kozak past.³⁶ Zadunaiskyi explained the spirit of the time as follows:

We started to converse in the Ukrainian language, learned the Kozak heritage of songs. Then, we formed the community and used Kozak terminology, visited glorious [Kozak] lands, museums, attempted to create Kozak uniforms and trained in the Kozak martial arts.³⁷

In addition, the members of the same group turned to their cultural roots by reviving old rituals as they organized the first *vertep* (puppet theater)³⁸ in the city of Donetsk and the surrounding regions. This was in line with their rediscovery of the Kozak ways, reinterpretation of the cultural heritage, and reconstruction of lost traditions and customs.³⁹ Returning to their Kozak roots and claiming Kozak identity and the traditions attached to it, the group attempted to bring back what was taken away by the Soviet regime.

After Gorbachev's reform attempts, emerging groups, like the one in Donetsk, claimed wider justification for their activities. The reason was straightforward. Gorbachev's reform initiative provided Soviet society with novel platforms to vocally discuss the restructuring of the failing Soviet project. The discussion took place in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as well and provided a platform for national sentiments to become publicly visible. However, as much as the new platforms of discussion were intended to produce new ideas for the revival of the Soviet project, they unintentionally prepared grounds for the return of national sentiments that were often oriented towards the political independence of non-Russians.⁴⁰ Therefore, while *glasnost* was expected to produce a solution for the pending Soviet nationalities question, it paved the way for stronger ethnic nationalisms. *Perestroika* eventually led to a new social formulation in which "Soviet values were replaced with national values ... cultural stultification with national rebirth and frustrated expectations with separatist hopes . . ." ⁴¹ In such a political and social environment, the legitimacy of the regime was further challenged and led to stronger nationalist revivals and public mobilizations, and the emerging Kozak movement represented one such case for Ukraine.⁴²

In Ukraine, the long suppressed nationalist circles started to openly criticize the Soviet system. Indeed, recalling the "great freedom-loving" Kozak forefathers and placing them in the parameters of national discourse proved a spring-board in a quest to define a Ukrainian nationhood separate from the Russian one and moved Kozaks to the center of ethnic identity.⁴³

By this point the Kozak revival was not an informal and hidden movement, however; it was politicized. With the politicization of the restorative Kozak nostalgia, the nature of the movement transformed into a systematized claim of Kozak heritage. Rothchild, discussing the politicization of ethnic groups, argues that the process “renders people cognitively aware of the relevance of politics to the health of their ethnic cultural values and vice-versa, mobilizes them into self-conscious ethnic groups, and directs their behaviour towards activity in the political arena on the basis of this awareness, concern, and consciousness.”⁴⁴ In this sense, in the reform era, the restorative Kozak nostalgia began to utilize the political environment to rediscover and reclaim the Kozak cultural heritage and physical space.⁴⁵ The political agenda at this stage transformed Kozak nostalgia into an organized sense of heritage. This transformation meant the use of the past as a cultural and political resource in the present, and control of the processes of rediscovery and reinterpretation of the Kozak heritage.⁴⁶ Such transformation took place in the Donetsk group. While in the beginning they were simply interested in expressions of the Kozak culture, later, as they gained certain political consciousness, they started to create for themselves a wider area of activity in an effort to rediscover and reinterpret the Kozak past beyond Soviet reach. This proved feasible in June 1987 when the group spearheaded the first independent historical-ethnographical expedition to the territory of the former “Samarska Palanka,” an administrative unit of the Zaporozhian Sich (the *New Sich*, 1734–1775) in the 18th century. Further signs of politicization of the Kozak revival surfaced in 1989 when the Donetsk Kozak formation fostered

close relations with People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), the newly formed Ukrainian national movement.⁴⁷ The members of the early Kozak formation were composed largely of Rukh activists, and the two formations collaborated at all levels.⁴⁸ In return, Rukh members also became active, as members, in the development of Kozak organizations.⁴⁹

The early informal student community, enjoying the extended platform of activity and collaboration of politically affiliated groups, re-established itself as the Donetsk Historical Ethnographical Society *Kurin* (1989). The *Kurin* received support from the Ukrainian Language Society named after Taras Shevchenko,⁵⁰ which was also led by Rukh members. Gaining wider recognition and support, the *Kurin* continued to revive Kozak ways and placed common folk rituals, which are not necessarily Kozak, to the center of the revival to replace Soviet rituals and traditions. In that sense, they continued to organize folk customs such as *verteps*, sing *koliadky* (Christmas carols), celebrate the day of *Ivan Kupalo* (midsummer feast) and combined all these with other efforts towards the rediscovery and reinterpretation of the Kozak culture.⁵¹

The Kozak revival in this period attempted to reconstruct the long-lost forefathers' homeland when Rukh and the Ukrainian Language Society, in coordination with the early Kozak formations, organized festivities to mark the putative 500th anniversary of the establishment of the Zaporozhian Kozaks on August 3–5, 1990. The commemorative event was not randomly selected as it marked a return to origins and the original homeland. It was aimed at

reinstating a long repressed national dignity and aspired to regain physical space from Soviet tutelage.

In many ways the commemorative event achieved its aims. It attracted large masses and was attended by several hundred thousand Ukrainians. The events started with invoking the memory of prominent historians such as Dmytro Yavornytskyi and continued with the delegations' stay at a tent camp at the site where once the Chortomlytska Sich of the Zaporozhians stood. Events also drew attention to the new (nationalist) perspectives on the study of the Kozak history when a conference was held in Nikopol, near the Chortomlytska Sich, during the commemorative events.

The event also restored the images of the Kozak leaders such as the prominent Sich leader Ivan Sirko. For this purpose, a cross was erected on the monumental mound by Sirko's grave. Participants brought pieces of soil from their home towns to make the Kozak mound,⁵² allowed Kozak symbols to be consecrated, and took an oath of loyalty to Ukraine and Kozakdom.⁵³

The location of the first Sich, Khortytsia Island, was also restored and, in a way, regained, as the crowd, sporting period dress, sang Kozak songs, and chanting "From Kozak freedom to Ukrainian freedom,"⁵⁴ marched through the city of Zaporozhia and past the island. Events of a similar sort, but on a smaller scale, took place at the historical Kozak sites Berestechko, Baturyn and Khotyn. The following year, in June 1991, shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union, the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic capitalized on the commemorations as it announced an expedition named "Along Kozak Trails," during which students were encouraged to

discover former Kozak routes.⁵⁵ Another state attempt to capitalize on the late Soviet Ukrainian Kozak revival came when the Chernihiv Communist Party *nomenklatura* tried to establish the “Red Kozaks” (*Chervone Kozatstvo*). However, the attempt failed due to lack of public support.⁵⁶ By capitalizing on the commemorations, the Communist party wanted to “ensure that *Rukh* and Western Ukrainian ‘extremists’ would not be able to carry on propaganda campaigns during the celebrations.”⁵⁷

This early Kozak revivals were examined by three scholars.⁵⁸ Frank Sysyn showed how images and attitudes with regard to Kozaks have changed over time through the end of the Soviet Union, and in particular looked at the period from 1989 to 1990. Importantly, he discussed how the Ukrainian national movement referred to the reemerging Kozakdom as “a means of raising national consciousness in the southeastern Ukraine”⁵⁹ and underlined the service of the “cult of Cossacks . . . [to] the Ukrainian nature of the territory in popular consciousness.”⁶⁰ Udo Gehrman, referring to sources mostly from 1992 and a few from early 1993, focused on the case of the “Ukrainian Kozaks” and the commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the establishment of the Sich, and examined the use of Kozaks in the creation of a patriotic spirit as a tool for unification of society, arguing that Kozaks are “a national response to . . . Russian ambitions.”⁶¹ Jana Bürgers, who in her monograph observed manifestations of Kozaks in Ukraine through 2003, recognized the contribution that the two earlier scholars made on the functions of the anniversary, and also called attention to the communists’ recognition of the potential of Kozakdom and its manipulation.⁶²

During the commemorative event at Khortytsia, the Kozaks took a further step to better organize the Kozak revival. For this purpose, a register of Kozaks was created in Donetsk. From this register another Kozak organization, called the “Donetska Sotnia,” was formed. This new formation continued cooperating closely with Rukh and the Ukrainian Language Society named after Taras Shevchenko.⁶³ Under the leadership of the “Sotni,” other regional Kozak formations emerged in places such as Mariupol, Sloviansk, Selydove, and Kramatorsk. The Kozaks of the region took another step to consolidate their efforts and better organize in late 1990, and established the “Kalmiuska Palanka of the Zaporozhian Kozaks.” Taking the title “Kalmiuska Palanka,” the formation revived the historical administrative unit of the Zaporozhian Kozaks and placed a stronger emphasis on reclaiming Kozak forefathers’ geographic and administrative space.⁶⁴

Donetsk was not alone in restoring the Kozak heritage. In Lviv, already in 1985, activists established a school of Kozak martial arts called “Combat Hopak.”⁶⁵ The formations in Donetsk and Lviv were followed later in the 1980s by formations in various other regions: informal groups in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi and its surrounding region;⁶⁶ the Carpathian Sich in Lviv oblast; the Polissia Sich in the Zhytomyr oblast; the Prykarpatska Sich in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast; the Bukovyna Sich in Chernivtsi oblast; the Kherson Kish, the Volhynian Sich; and the Zakarpatska (Transcarpathian) Sich; the Zaporozhian Kozak Brotherhood of “Zaporozhian Sich” (est. 1990) and the Kozak Brotherhood of the Kyiv Area (est. 1990). Another Kozak movement in Zaporozhia made preparations to revive Zaporozhian Kozaks in 1990.⁶⁷ As the

Soviet era was coming to a close, the number of such formations reached 63, and membership was around 3000.⁶⁸

Politics of Kozak Revival

As the number of Kozak formations increased and their structures developed, the Kozak communities found themselves in a protracted political competition. The study of this competition provides grounds for observing the post-Soviet transformation because the politics of the Kozak restoration reflect the post-Soviet dilemmas of Ukraine.

Soon after Ukraine gained independence, leaders of the Kozak groups made an effort to unify all Kozak organizations. For this purpose the All-Ukrainian Founding *rada* of Kozaks gathered in October 14, 1991, a day sacred for Kozaks (the feast of *Pokrova*, the Protection of Our Most Holy Lady Theotokos and Ever-Virgin Mary). As a result, the “Ukrainian Kozaks” (*Ukrainske Kozatsvo*) was formed as the umbrella organization for all Kozak groups. During the *rada*, Viacheslav Chornovil, then the leader of *Rukh* (and later a runner-up candidate for president in December 1991), was elected the first hetman in Ukraine since Pavlo Skoropadskyi (Figure 3-1, 3-2).⁶⁹

The *rada* had symbolic importance in the way it underlined its nationalist inclination. It was symbolic in the sense that it “restored” the post of hetman for the first time since 1918. The *rada*, to bring all Kozaks under the leadership of Chornovil, restored the mythologized “father” (*batko*) status that was once used for Zaporozhian Kozak leaders. Another symbolic importance of the *rada* was that the Kozaks used this opportunity to revive certain Kozak traditions—calling their meeting *rada*, and using Kozak voting

procedures. They also revived the Kozak officer class and reinstated other Kozak military ranks. In another revival of old Kozak traditions, Patriarch Mstyslav (1898–1993) of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church blessed the Kozaks and their hetman.

In addition to its symbolic significance, the *rada* adopted resolutions that clarified its political position. The *rada* made it clear that the “Ukrainian Kozaks” were determined to work towards reviving Kozakdom in Ukraine, and declared the wish to promote Kozakdom as the heritage of the entire Ukrainian people.⁷⁰ The second significant political statement was that the *rada* considered itself a direct continuation of the historical Kozak administrations. This became clear when the *rada* decided to annul the Pereiaslav Treaty (1654) which had been agreed to by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi.⁷¹ Thus, the *rada*, both symbolically and politically, asserted its direct link to the Kozak forefathers and declared itself the sole heir of their physical and spiritual heritage. Moreover, the *rada* became a platform to display anti-Russian sentiments among the Kozaks of the early 1990s.

Hetman Viacheslav Chornovil, then a Member of Parliament, decided to give up the office of Hetman in 1992, because of his full time involvement in politics and his intention to avoid conflict of interests. The *Ukrainian Kozak* officers thereupon elected, on Chornovil’s advice, Volodymyr Muliava (Figure 3-3), a Rukh activist, a PhD in Philosophy and Major-General of the Ukrainian Army (from 1992), as the next Hetman (in office 1992–1998).

Volodymyr Muliava’s personality and activity provide us with rich material to study the further development of the “Ukrainian Kozaks” and the

political preferences of the Kozak leading cadres. In late 1980s, Volodymyr Muliava became an active member of the Rukh. Once Ukraine became independent, he started to work for the Ministry of Defense. In 1992 he was named as a general of the Ukrainian army. In this capacity, he later became the leading figure in the creation of the Ukrainization program for military personnel. The program, which he prepared and conducted through the Social Psychological Service of the Ministry of Defense, had nationalist underpinnings. This program accepted the nationalist reading of Ukrainian history and glorified the past military traditions and formations, including the SS Division Galicia and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).⁷²

The Kozaks, too, became part of his Ukrainization program. Muliava defended the Kozaks' place in the program in the following manner:

We do not look at Kozaks simply as a military formation or a social entity. It is a state of soul, a way of life and a mode of behaviour. [After an] analysis we found that Ukrainians are in essence a Kozak nation. The Kozaks were the highest embodiment of national patriotism.⁷³

With such views of the Kozak past, Muliava came to play a major role in the elimination of Russian and pro-Russian personnel in the officer corps of the new Ukrainian military. These purges later had an impact on the Kozak revival's path of development.⁷⁴

Muliava's election as hetman actually signified continuation of his state-authorized Ukrainianization initiatives in the context of a non-

governmental organization. According to Muliava, soon after his election as hetman, Chornovil looked for someone to whom to hand over the “hetman’s *bulava*” and tried to convince Muliava to take over from him the *bulava*.⁷⁵ However, Muliava, being in active service as a general and holding office at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, was not allowed, by statute, to take a role in a non-governmental organization. When Chornovil insisted him to assume the post of hetman, Muliava brought the question to the Defense Minister, Konstantyn Morozov, and the latter agreed that Muliava could take the post of hetman.⁷⁶ However, President Leonid Kravchuk’s permission was still needed, but he also agreed after taking some time to consider the matter.⁷⁷ The way Muliava became hetman, and the involvement of state officials in the process allows me to argue that the Kozak revival, which initially emerged from sheer nostalgia, was rapidly transformed into a political movement with an agenda at the state level by 1992. The political agenda of the Kozak revival was deemed conducive for the nation-building process of the new state to such an extent that it was adopted by the political elite as a means to Ukrainianize Ukrainians.

The election of Muliava was followed by a ceremonial march. The hetman, the Kozak officer class, and fellow Kozaks of the “Ukrainian Kozaks,” joined by veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, made their way through the streets of Kyiv and proceeded to the location where the Patriarch Volodymyr of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyivan Patriarchate) blessed them all. With the blessing of the Kyivan Church and the support of Ukrainian nationalists, Muliava’s hetmanship appeared headed towards activating the

Kozak cause in defense of Ukrainian independence and support for the Kyivan Church as an alternative to the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

While the organizational scheme developed swiftly, the internal maturation of the “Ukrainian Kozaks” was a rather painful process. Organizational stability was challenged by the ethnic and cultural composition of the Kozak ranks. As mentioned earlier, the first members of the Kozak organizations, later unified under the name “Ukrainian Kozaks,” were largely Ukrainian nationalists. These early members claimed Kozak heritage, became interested in reinstating Ukrainian culture and language, and aspired to an independent Ukraine. However, as soon as the Kozak movement gained visibility and a certain leverage in state bodies, and formulated a political agenda, it received closer attention from people who initially had no interest in the ideas which the founders of the movement fostered. Among them were those interested in using the “Ukrainian Kozaks” and Kozakdom as a tool for negotiating their positions in a transitional society where Soviet-era privileges and status had been lost.

The most significant factor in this sense was the poor performance of Ukraine’s economy through most of the 1990s. The dire economic situation necessitated reduction in the number of army personnel. Ukraine had inherited some 750,000 troops from the Soviet era, the second largest army in Europe at the time.⁷⁸ In the face of economic constraints, the government opted for a steep reduction in the armed forces, down to 450,000 by 1995.⁷⁹

In the meantime, the nationalization of the military men on the Ukrainian soil was a major challenge. The upper ranks of the officer corps

were composed of people predominantly of Russian origin and Russian-speaking Ukrainians.⁸⁰ In the nationalization process, some of these officers took an oath of loyalty to Ukraine. Some opted for retirement and stayed in Ukraine, others rejected both the oath and retirement and left Ukraine.⁸¹ Those Soviet-trained officers who remained in service were largely discharged by the second half of the 1990s.⁸² In the meantime, the Social Psychological Service (later the Main Directorate for Educational Work), under the control of Volodymyr Muliava (until 1993), used its authority to discharge many of the Russian and Russified personnel.⁸³ Some of those discharged and retired officers became members of the “Ukrainian Kozaks” to rehabilitate themselves in the Kozak ranks and uniforms. This caused a radical change in the character of the Kozak membership. With the flooding of Kozak ranks by army retirees, the member profile of the “Ukrainian Kozaks” substantially changed. The newcomers usually had neither Kozak heritage nor nationalist inclinations. Increasingly, the “Ukrainian Kozaks” became a platform for a clash of interests between the impoverished Soviet-schooled army officers and some of the Kozaks. In as much as the core nationalist Kozak faction held on to control in the “Ukrainian Kozaks,” divisions became inescapable.

The anti-core wing began to form and eventually solidify under the name Union of Ukraine’s Kozaks: Zaporozhian Army, initially as a branch of the “Ukrainian Kozaks.” This group asked from the nationalist *Ukrainian Kozak* leadership to recognize the Moscow Patriarch as the patron of Kozaks, respect Russian as a state language and, finally, to collaborate with the Russian Kozaks. Not surprisingly, the national-minded “Ukrainian Kozak”

leadership rejected these requests. In turn, the Zaporozhian Army decided to quit the “Ukrainian Kozaks.” They formed a new Kozak formation, the Zaporozhian Kozak Army of the Lower Dnipro.⁸⁴

The new formation gathered its first Great *Rada* on Khortytsia Island on September 17, 1994. As a display of their Kozak identity and political preference, clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate and members of the Russian Kozaks from Moscow, the Urals, Kuban and Don participated in the gathering. The *rada* was also attended by the members of the Communist Party and the Society for Retired Soviet Officers. It elected Oleksandr Panchenko (Figure 3-4), who earlier had led the separatist faction, as its supreme otaman.⁸⁵ As an indication of the new formation’s orientation, Panchenko argued that their decision was a reaction to the Muliava-led “Ukrainian Kozak’s” anti-Church and anti-Orthodox (that is, anti-Moscow Patriarchate) policies.⁸⁶ With the separation, Panchenko claimed that they had established the “authentic orientation which is true to the spirit and the legacy of the warriors of the Dnipro.”⁸⁷ No doubt, by following a Russia-friendly line and declaring in favor of the Russian Orthodox Church, Panchenko’s Kozaks recalled those Zaporozhians who maintained loyalty to Russia after the Pereiaslav Treaty.

All this was taking place when Ukraine was confronted with identity discussions centered on matters of language, religion, and culture. The debate between the national “Ukrainian Kozaks” and the non-nationalist Kozak factions was a microcosm of the general trends in the country.

Having proclaimed their Kozak identity on grounds other than the nationalist elite of the “Ukrainian Kozaks,” Panchenko’s Kozaks soon gained

numbers. The organization grew with the adherence of retired military personnel and the support of local oligarchs. The fact that Panchenko established the basis of his Kozak organization within the framework of a private security company he owned, gained him time to confront the “Ukrainian Kozaks” which tried to tag him and his Kozaks as “Russophiles” and “imperial chauvinists.” Otaman Oleksandr Panchenko worked for Leonid Kuchma’s presidential bid. In 1999, however, he was convicted of embezzling campaign monies and eventually had to serve three and half years in prison; before his term in jail was over, he was pardoned by President Kuchma.

After Panchenko’s return, his Kozaks focused on expanding their network of branches to compete with the “Ukrainian Kozaks.” To this end, the Zaporozhian Kozak Army of the Lower Dnipro integrated regional formations (*palanky*) in Poltava, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Crimea.⁸⁸ With this expansion the Zaporozhian Kozak Army of the Lower Dnipro started to use the title of Union of Ukrainian Kozaks (Soiuz Kozakiv Ukrainy), which served as an umbrella organization following the “Ukrainian Kozaks” fashion.⁸⁹ In 2009, still under Panchenko’s leadership, the Union of Ukrainian Kozaks realized further expansion of its influence by unifying with the Kozak Martial Arts Federation Spas,⁹⁰ and the International Union of Kozaks-Zaporozhian Sich.⁹¹ Jointly, these three unified organizations are called the Zaporozhian Army.⁹²

Panchenko continued to promote his political agenda. He supported Kuchma’s party of power *Za Yedynu Ukrainu* in the 2002 parliamentary elections. In the 2004 presidential elections he supported Viktor Yanukovich.

Following the Orange Revolution, fearing political reprisals, he escaped to his fellow Kozaks in Russia. During the presidential elections of 2010, Panchenko, as a loyal ally of the Party of Regions, gave full support to the Yanukovych campaign. The collaboration was marked with an agreement, which was signed before the elections (Figure 3-5). Yanukovych promised full support to Panchenko's Kozaks in case of his election (Figure 3-6).⁹³

Muliava was aware of the possible future impact of this alternative Kozak movement and made great efforts to suppress the alternative Kozaks who had no interest in the nationalist agenda. During his term as the hetman, Muliava used his personal connections in the government and blocked Kozak organizations other than "Ukrainian Kozaks" with their pro-Russian undertones in their attempt to gain state registration.⁹⁴ However, this was possible only until Muliava was partially paralyzed in 1998; eventually his health forced him to give up the hetman's office while remaining as the honorary hetman of "Ukrainian Kozaks." With Muliava's departure the Kozaks handed Muliava's *bulava* to Ivan Bilas (Figure 3-7).⁹⁵

Muliava's retirement marked a turning point for the "Ukrainian Kozaks." The post-Muliava period was characterized by increasing fractiousness within the organization. Splits resulted in the first instance from religious differences between those who followed the Moscow Church, the Kyivan Church, the Greek-Catholic Church, and the Ukrainian neo-pagans (*Ridna Ukrainska Natsionalna Vira*). Additional splits were caused by political affinities and business relations. Therefore, under Bilas rule, the following organizations emerged out of the "Ukrainian Kozaks": The

Association of Nestor Makhno Huliai-Pole (1998), the Azov-Black Sea Kozak Army (1999), the Union of Kozak Organizations of Ukraine (1999), the Kozaks of Ukraine (2001), the Traditional Society of Ukrainian Kozaks (2001), the Kharakterni Kozaks (2001), the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks (2002), the Territorial Kozaks Defense (2002), the International Union of Kozaks (2002), the Kozak Army of Ukraine (2002), the United Kozaks of Ukraine (2003).

Ivan Bilas' tenure posed a temporary challenge to the supremacy of the nationalist core of the "Ukrainian Kozaks." In order to pursue his political ambitions, he supported Kuchma's reelection for President in 1999. Once reelected, Kuchma, in turn, appointed him as the head of the newly formed Coordination Committee (under the President's Office) for the Development of Ukrainian Kozaks. To display his gratitude, Bilas handed Kuchma the hetman's regalia and declared him honorary hetman. These deeds were noted by the nationally oriented core Kozak ranks. However, Bilas continued with his political ventures. Thanks to his dedication to the political forces in league with Leonid Kuchma, he was appointed an adviser to Prime Minister Yanukovich in 2003. This, no doubt, did not make his nationalist Kozak compatriots happy. As a final move, he decided to follow an anti-Orange path and supported Viktor Yanukovich in the 2004 elections. After his last move some "Ukrainian Kozaks" decided to strike and declared him an "unreliable" hetman (December 2004). They fired him from the hetman's post and deprived him of his Kozak credentials.

The Orange Revolution led to the final and most important split in the “Ukrainian Kozaks.” When the confrontation between the “Orange” and the “Blue” parties reached its peak, Muliava, the “honorary” hetman of the “Ukrainian Kozaks”, called members of his organization to stand by Yushchenko.⁹⁶ This caused dissension among the Kozaks. Some were unwilling to support Yushchenko, particularly members of the regiments in eastern Ukraine. Others argued that the “Ukrainian Kozaks” should not become politicized during a crisis and should play a constructive role.

Nevertheless, when Yushchenko was recognized as the legitimate President of Ukraine, the Kozaks from the western regions of Ukraine, particularly those from Volyn, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil and Khmelnytsky, held a Great Kozak *Rada* where they decided to elect Yushchenko hetman. The day before his swearing in as president, Yushchenko was handed the *bulava* by the Kozaks led by Muliava and the supreme Otaman of the Galician-Volhynian palanka Ihor Vardynets on St. Sophia Square in Kyiv. He was also recognized as hetman by twenty other Kozak organizations later during a ceremony held on Khortytsia Island.

Some among the “Ukrainian Kozaks”, mostly in the eastern regions, were disturbed by the fact the organization’s leadership elected Yushchenko hetman. The most prominent figure of the opposing camp was Mykola Panteliuk, former Soviet military officer. Since 1998 he was Otaman of the Kalmiuska Palanka, one of the regiments established still in Soviet times. Panteliuk collaborated with Bilas during the 2002 elections and supported Kuchma; in return, he became the second man after Bilas. However, after

Bilas's reliability began to be questioned, he, too, lost his post—but not his membership—in the “Ukrainian Kozaks.” During the Great *Rada* of December 2005, in the absence of the “Ukrainian Kozaks” from the western regiments, Panteliuk was elected as Hetman of the Kozaks (Figure 3-8, 3-9). The decision practically divided the “Ukrainian Kozaks” in two. Hetman Panteliuk controlled the “Ukrainian Kozaks,” while the Ternopil-based Kozaks of Western Ukraine changed their by-laws and regrouped under the newly established International Association of Ukrainian Kozaks, headed by Supreme Otaman Ihor Vardynets, who also served as adviser to the former President Yushchenko (since October 3, 2008).

This section will take only a brief look at the proliferation of Kozak organizations in the 2000s.⁹⁷ Given their great number—some fifty national and international organizations and around a thousand local district organizations—an extensive study of the organizations is not feasible. Therefore, I will undertake two additional case studies of Kozak revivals that represent different Kozak identities and tendencies.

Splits in the Kozak movement also motivated counter-initiatives for unification. In this sense, the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks is a successful attempt to occupy the middle ground between the “Ukrainian Kozaks” and the Zaporozhian Kozak Army of the Lower Dnipro. An internal crisis in the “Ukrainian Kozaks” prompted the emergence of the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks. The root organization, which preceded the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks, was called the Union of Donetsk Kozaks, which operated under the jurisdiction of the “Ukrainian Kozaks.”⁹⁸ The Union of Donetsk Kozaks,

under the leadership of Anatolii Shevchenko, aspired for more independent control over the eastern regions. This ambition was turned down by the leadership of the “Ukrainian Kozaks.” The contention eventually led to the departure of Shevchenko and those Kozaks loyal to him from the “Ukrainian Kozaks.” The new organization, the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks, became operational in July 2002. As hetman the founding *rada* elected Shevchenko, a former Soviet KGB agent and Ukrainian secret service officer, Ph.D. in Technical Sciences and Theology, and Rector of the Donetsk State University of Information Technology and Artificial Intelligence. (Figure 3-10, 3-11).

Shevchenko, like other modern hetmans, has been involved in politics, with a quite pragmatic record in his Party of Spirituality and Patriotism (established 2000). First he supported Leonid Kuchma’s *Za Yedynu Ukrainu* (For a United Ukraine) coalition during the 2002 elections. Later in the controversial 2004 presidential elections he, and many Ukrainian Registered Kozaks, stood on the side of Viktor Yanukovich. Nevertheless, as soon as Yushchenko became President, he offered him his services and became one of the Kozak leaders who voted in favor of electing Yushchenko as the new hetman of all Ukrainian Kozaks.⁹⁹ He served as a member of the Committee of Kozak Affairs under Yushchenko and supported the president’s efforts to find a common ground for Ukrainian Kozaks.

Unification of the Kozaks was Shevchenko’s key slogan from the very beginning. With this intent he defined and designed the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks in a fashion to attract Kozaks from all backgrounds. In religious matters, for example, the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks declared that it is a

home for Kozaks of all churches and beliefs. In practice, the *starshyna* of the Registered Kozaks did not impose membership in any church. Therefore, members of the branches in Lviv could comfortably ask for blessing by the Greek-Catholic clergy and enjoy their church services. On the other hand, Registered Kozaks affiliated with the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv and or, alternatively, the Moscow Patriarchate, could conjoin their Kozak identity and their religious belief.

Shevchenko introduced himself as a global Kozak wanderer, who visited many countries, and claimed to be the only global Kozak representative. For the purposes of achieving world-wide recognition, he even visited Pope John-Paul II (Figure 3-12) and the Moscow Patriarch Aleksei II (Figure 3-13).

In terms of Ukrainian-Russian relations, Shevchenko offered a conciliatory discourse and asked for the peaceful coexistence of Russians and Ukrainians as nations having a common history as well as distinctive cultural and historical aspects.¹⁰⁰ The organization treats the linguistic question in a similar fashion and respects both the Russian and Ukrainian languages.

Shevchenko's constructive and unifying discourse no doubt appealed to and rehabilitated the Russian-speaking masses and followers of the Moscow Patriarchate, especially in eastern Ukraine. Thanks to this discourse, the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks succeeded in becoming the largest Kozak organization of Ukraine with around 70,000 members. This power of attraction garnered it large political leverage as well. In the presidential election of 2010, Shevchenko sided with Yuliia Tymoshenko against Viktor

Yanukovych. Accordingly, the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks refused to sign the political collaboration pact proposed by Yanukovych.

The Ukrainian Registered Kozaks build their identity on the tradition of the historical Registered Kozaks. As was discussed in the first chapter Kozaks were paid for their services either by the Polish or the Russian administration. They fought on occasion as their fellow Kozaks—the Zaporozhians. To rationalize their modern-day identity, the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks offer an alternative history of the historical registered Kozaks that denies that Kozak registers were created by the Poles to control Zaporozhian activity. They also ignore the fact that under Russian registry the Kozaks had to remain loyal to the Russian cause and fight alongside the Russian army. Thus, the Ukrainian Registered Kozaks’ public discourse overlooks certain aspects of history, emphasizing that the Registered Kozaks were an “active power in defense of the liberty and independence of Ukraine.”¹⁰¹ In line with the historical engagement with the state on the part of the registered Kozaks of the past, contemporary registered Kozaks, too, claim that they are dedicated to the state. They associate themselves with service to Ukraine, regardless of which party may be in power.

On the other hand, emphasizing the privileges and near-nobility status that the registered Kozaks possessed in the past, the contemporary Registered Kozaks present themselves as an enlightened elite. They emphasize their elite status in the contemporary context, and this differentiates them from the Zaporozhian groups in particular, and from the others in general. This elitist emphasis, no doubt, compromises their all-inclusive discourse.

There are also Kozaks who praise the multiple traditions represented within the Kozak movement. The “Zaporozhian Kozaks” is one such example.¹⁰² The first distinctive quality of this group is that they are at peace with the different backgrounds among the Kozaks in Ukraine. At the same time, however, they do not accept religious diversity among modern Kozaks. The second is that they build a discourse that affirms the existence of the Ukrainian state, but they also profess close affinity to Russia and Russians. Lastly, the case is significant because the group has relatively more visibility among other Zaporozhians.

The organization is led by Dmytro Sahaidak (b. 1942),¹⁰³ who claims personal Kozak roots extending back to Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi (1570–1622), the otaman of the Zaporozhian Army (*koshovyi otaman*) and hetman of registered Kozaks (Figure 3-14). Sahaidak claims that he discovered his Kozak heritage back in 1972, when he started to read about Kozaks and came to appreciate their role in Ukrainian history. When the 1980s arrived, Sahaidak took part in the emerging Ukrainian national movement. Later, in 1989, he became an active Kozak in Vyshhorod’s Kozak *sotnia* (military unit of hundred). In 1990 he became the otaman of the Vyshhorod *Kurin* and deputy to Hetman Muliava in 1994. In 1996 he resigned from his latter post and left the “Ukrainian Kozaks.” Available data shows that Sahaidak departed, along with Oleksandr Panchenko, after religious differences led to a break up, Sahaidak, as a devout follower of the Moscow Church, fell out with Muliava and left the ranks of the “Ukrainian Kozaks”.¹⁰⁴

After his departure Sahaidak collaborated with Panchenko and formed the Union of Ukrainian Kozaks-Zaporozhian Army.¹⁰⁵ While he shared religious values with Panchenko, Sahaidak and his movement are different in various aspects. First, Sahaidak has more positive feelings than Panchenko towards the Ukrainian state, and takes an affirmative stance towards Ukrainian independence. This attitude surfaces with his frequent references to the Ukrainian independence attempt in 1917–1922. Particularly, he often praises the Fourth Universal of the Central *Rada* (January 1918) which proclaimed Ukraine’s independence. With that reference he identifies his heritage with the Kozak formations active in 1917–1922. He praises particularly the Free Kozaks who served Pavlo Skoropadskyi.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, Sahaidak’s Kozaks foster positive feelings to Russia and Russians. Sahaidak was born and raised in Russia. He does not hide that he has a personal connection to Russian culture and states that “[o]ther than Russia there is no country to which Ukraine has a closer relationship, because the two are connected by religion and cultural traits.”¹⁰⁷ He has demonstrably close relations with the Kozaks in Russia, as well as with the Russian political elites. In a display of his leanings he decorated Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former Russian ambassador to Ukraine, with the rank of Marshall of the Kozaks.¹⁰⁸

Without turning against Russia, and showing no sympathy to religious diversity among the Kozaks, Sahaidak and his Kozaks decided to support Viktor Yushchenko’s hetmanship on Khortytsia Island, where a total of 22 (out of 40) Kozak organizations elected Yushchenko as their hetman. In return for his support, Sahaidak was later granted the post of adviser to the President

of Ukraine and led the Committee for the Coordination of the Development of Ukrainian Kozaks in the Presidential Office.¹⁰⁹ However, as soon as he realized that the Committee was attempting to establish the primacy of “Ukrainian Kozaks” among other Kozak organizations, he decided to resign (2006). His departure also had religious grounds. He was disturbed by the religious diversity of the Kozaks in the Committee. While stating his belief that everybody can believe in any religion, he argues that the Kozak’s forefathers were followers of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, and Kozaks of the present should follow in the Kozak forefathers’ footsteps. Building his Kozak identity on a Ukrainian and Russian religious and cultural platform, he could not make peace with the fact that the new Kozaks are “revising” the “Kozak heritage.”¹¹⁰

An overview of Kozak restoration shows that the Kozak revival of the independence era had political underpinnings. The main Kozak organization, “Ukrainian Kozaks,” was controlled by pro-independence and anti-Russian Kozak leaders. However, an examination of available data also shows that the organization came to accommodate Kozaks who have a different political agenda than the Ukrainian nationally conscious elite. The Ukrainization goals followed by this Kozak elite led those Kozaks who were perceived as pro-Russians to leave and establish their own organizations.

The post-Soviet revival period, therefore, witnessed different cleavages formed along lines of religious affiliation, collective identities and memories. The pro-independence, pro-Ukrainian and nationalist Kozaks claimed the historical heritage of Khmelnytskyi, Vyhovskyi and Mazepa, and of those

Zaporozhians who resisted Russian rule. On the other hand, some Kozaks could be classified here as pro-Russian Kozaks, because they were inspired by those Kozaks of the past who remained loyal to the principles of the Pereiaslav Treaty and served the Russian Empire. As the example of the modern Registered Kozaks has shown, the heritage of the historical registered Kozaks of the past is also claimed by some Kozaks today. With such complex networks of identity definitions, present-day Kozaks take part in the political games in Ukraine that serve various political ends. The speed of the Kozak revival and its political potential has called for a state response. State involvement in the Kozak revival is the subject of the following section.

State Legislation and the Kozak Revival

As shown earlier in this chapter, the Kozak revival reflected various political agendas, tendencies and aspirations. Emphasis, however, was placed on the grassroots movements, which were essentially led by groups of people who identified themselves with the heritage of their (real or putative) Kozak forefathers. Thus, the earlier section was an attempt to understand the bottom-up efforts of the Kozak revival. However, there was also a top-down process that tried to define the way the Kozak phenomenon was to be revived. At first, the top-down initiative was rather a response to the increasing number of Kozak organizations and their growing visibility in Ukrainian society. But potential political benefits also pushed Ukrainian political figures and forces to invest in and possibly regulate and even manipulate the Kozak movement. The examination of the content and motivations of state intervention offers additional grounds for understanding the Kozak revival in post-Soviet

Ukraine. Therefore, the following section will offer a chronological review of the state attempts to regulate the Kozak revival efforts.

By the end of Leonid Kravchuk's term as president (December 5, 1991–July 19, 1994) the Kozaks were not yet receiving any attention from the government in the form of legislations. Thanks to Leonid Kuchma, the first legislation came out in the form of a presidential decree. The decree (issued on January 4, 1995) was titled “On the revival of the historical-cultural and economic Traditions of the Ukrainian Kozaks” and aimed to support revival and popularization of traditions of the Ukrainian Kozaks.¹¹¹ The decree recognized the rising popular demand for a revival, and defined the Ukrainian Kozak formations as a unifying factor for Ukrainian society.

The aforementioned decree guaranteed the revival of Kozaks on various accounts. First, it assured the Kozaks a place in society and promoted the reinstatement of historical Kozak places and Kozak historical objects. Thereby, it envisioned a renovation and maintenance of Kozak monuments. Second, the decree allowed for Kozak symbols to be used in state institutions. Third, the decree called for the training of youngsters in the Kozak traditions. To this end the decree ordered state organs to give assistance and facilities to Kozak organizations their festivals and sports events. Lastly, the decree asked related state ministers to consider and evaluate the possibilities of drafting members of Kozaks from Kozak organizations as separate military troops.

As much as the decree was ambitious in terms of the measures it envisioned for the Kozak revival, the fact that Ukraine was living through a harsh economic crisis did not permit such measures to be realized. This

situation lasted throughout the 1990s, and Kozaks failed to receive the guaranteed state support for their activities.

The second cycle of presidential decrees started in the late 1990s under influence from various factors. The first was that by the end of the 1990s the Kozak movement gained maturity, both in terms of its organizational development and membership growth. While the number of Kozak organizations was steadily increasing, lack of a legal framework offered these organizations an unregulated space. The second factor was related to figures close to the state's decision-making circles. The hetman of the "Ukrainian Kozaks," then Ivan Bilas, was a member of parliament. He could, therefore, lobby for certain Kozak aspirations. Another figure who had an impact in this area was Viktor Yushchenko, who claims Kozak heritage and served as Prime Minister in the years 1999–2001.

Concerning the issue of organizational maturation, most important was the Kozaks' own maturation in terms of group identities and consciousness. The rising group consciousness brought about a crystallization of group interests. As these became clear, the Kozaks became interested in forming spaces to pursue their goals and achieve their social, political, and economic aspirations. This in turn required state recognition of the Kozaks and the creation of specific and privileged spaces for the Kozaks' own use. Therefore, the development of the Kozak movement prepared the grounds for ongoing more persistent Kozak demands. These efforts actually resembled the "forefather" Kozaks' struggle to gain privileges from the Polish lords. The contemporary case of Kozak demand for state recognition and assurances for

their economic privileges parallel, in fact, another aspect of the Kozak heritage.

With the factors above in mind, the second presidential decree, though very limited in content, was issued on August 7, 1999. The decree declared October 14 to be the Day of Kozaks.¹¹² This decree recognized the “historical meaning and the services of the Ukrainian Kozaks for the assertion of Ukrainian statehood and their substantial contribution to the state-building process.” On December 22, 1999, a more elaborate presidential regulation was issued.¹¹³ This legislative act was significant in that it established an advisory unit in the presidential administration: The Coordination Board on the Question of Development of Ukrainian Kozaks. The Board assumed the task of analyzing the development of the Ukrainian Kozaks and playing a mediatory role between the government and the organizations. With this coordination, the state would be able to track and control the restoration of the Kozaks’ “historical, patriotic, cultural and economic” traditions.

The Board’s structure was formed in a fashion to deal with issues raised in the first decree, such as the question of raising youngsters in Kozak traditions, providing Kozaks with facilities for their activities, acquiring of bank credits for Kozak economic activities, drafting Kozaks for military divisions, protecting historical monuments, planning festivals, and sports competitions.

The coming of the 10th anniversary of the re-establishment of the Kozaks encouraged state involvement. For the anniversary, the Office of the President issued an order on October 10, 2000 and assigned tasks to various

governing bodies to mark the anniversary. Furthermore, the order asked for the expansion of the “revival” process and required members of the government and Ivan Bilas to work out a national program for the development of the “historical, cultural, military, spiritual and economic” traditions of the Ukrainian Kozaks.

A national program for the development of Ukrainian Kozaks for 2002–2005 was prepared in about a year and made public on November 15, 2001. The language employed in the text is interesting in the way it shows the state’s approach to Kozak restoration. First of all, the program defined contemporary Kozaks as inheritors of the “earlier generations of forefathers.” The rationale section of the text argues that modern Kozaks, inheriting the “good aspects” of their forefathers, are defending the Ukrainian national idea and serving social consolidation. This discourse, no doubt, was designed to establish unbroken links between the past and the present, and state-building and nation-building were recognized as the main task of modern Kozaks. To achieve its task, the program further promised to pay attention to the patriotic upbringing of youngsters, to attract Kozaks to military service. In addition to earlier regulations, the program proposed the use of Kozak traditions in all aspects of social life and propagation of the historical and cultural heritage of the Ukrainian people.

Once Yushchenko was elected as president (term of office 2005–2010), the state approach to the Kozak revival changed. Throughout his presidency Yushchenko argued strongly in favor of shaping the memory of the Kozak past as a major source of national consciousness and national unity. Not only

did he evoke the Kozak past by means of political rhetoric, but he actually undertook to put his rhetoric into practice through presidential decrees. His first decree entitled Decree of the President of Ukraine on the Council of Ukrainian Kozaks (June 4, 2005), aimed to enhance coordination between Kozak organizations and the president. The decree simply recognized Kozak organizations as protectors of the Kozak legacy.¹¹⁴

The second decree was issued in 2007 and ordered the government to prepare a program to ensure the revival of the Kozaks in the period 2008–2010.¹¹⁵ The proposed measures were multi-faceted. They included the promotion of research activities for the exposition of new memorabilia from Kozak history; encouragement of the publication of documents; promoting particular interest in the genealogies of Ukrainian hetmans, colonels and other *starshyna* figures; the creation of a “register of objects of historical-architectural heritage.”

The decree also paid special attention to the revival of Kozak sites through stipulating implementation of “measures for the restoration, reconstruction, and improvement of the history and culture of Ukrainian Kozaks, including repair of buildings, structures and old Sich fortifications, the preservation of the natural history of the landscapes of Kozak battles.”

This decree also encouraged the organization of festivals to introduce Kozak folk creations, and Kozak martial arts competitions; the use of museums to propagate the Kozak history, culture and traditions of Kozaks; and the production of artistic films inspired by the history of the Ukrainian Kozaks.

To encourage Kozak-related domestic and foreign tourism the decree asked state bodies to take measures for the development and introduction of new tourist routes, which would include places and objects representing the history and traditions of the Ukrainian Kozaks. The promotion of burial places of Ukrainian hetmans and Kozak warriors, which remained beyond contemporary borders, was also planned. Aiming at developing touristic routes, the decree also planned the reinstatement of historical names to settlements and localities related to the history of the Ukrainian Kozaks. The production of souvenir items that would represent the Kozaks was also ordered by the decree.¹¹⁶

The last decree issued by President Yushchenko was in 2008. This decree aimed to mark the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop (1659), a major Kozak victory against the Russians. It illustrated the political agenda of Viktor Yushchenko: "... to restore the historical truth and national memory, the dissemination of full and objective information about the events that took place in mid-17th century Ukraine."¹¹⁷ The decree ordered the Ukrainian government to prepare for the 350th anniversary commemoration of the battle by holding an all-Ukrainian festival of Kozaks. The decree also called for the conduct of archeological research at the battle site, ordered the production of a historical movie about the Battle of Konotop; and the planning of means to popularize Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi, who led the Kozaks in the historic battle. The construction of a memorial complex to honor the army of Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi was commissioned. The renaming of streets, areas in the

settlements of Ukraine, army detachments, educational establishments to honor the victory in Konotop were all covered by the decree.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the patterns of Kozak revival in independent Ukraine. Needless to say, the number and diversity of Kozak movements in Ukraine cannot be covered in one research project. Therefore, I have selected examples of major Kozak organizations that articulated clear discourses on how they orient their identities in the present.

The data provided in this chapter demonstrate that the diversity of Kozaks in the past has a reflection in the present. Kozaks are divided by interests, values, identities, traditions and memories. The diversity among Kozaks follows the patterns of diversity in independent Ukraine. Language, religion and ethnic identity are continuously discussed in Ukrainian daily life. Kozaks being part of the Ukrainian social map cannot escape from the questions and challenges posed by political agendas around language, religion and ethnicity. Nevertheless, characteristic of the Kozak case is that Kozaks are involved in the discussion with their own particular interests. Such interests are usually defined by the historical heritage with which they identify. The historical duality of the registered and unregistered, the elite of the Hetmanate and the rank-and-file Zaporozhians, and pro-independence and pro-Russian lines of heritage are still defining the nature of Kozakdom in Ukraine.

The evidence also shows that the Kozak revivals are deeply engaged in political agendas. While the argument requires further analysis, it is possible to argue that the power base that the Kozaks constitute provides fruitful grounds

for the political elites to pursue their political agendas. In return, only in Viktor Yushchenko's case can we observe a genuine interest in the revival of Kozaks with the support of the state. Conditioned by his Kozak heritage and his nationalist political discourse, he aspired revive of the Kozak phenomenon within the national, and even nationalist, framework. He considered such a political initiative as an investment for the consolidation of national identity.

Endnotes

¹ See for example, Bohdan Nahaylo and Viktor Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 214.

² Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

³ Gleb Struve, *Russian Literature under Lenin and Stalin, 1917–1953* (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 223–24.

⁴ H. Seton-Watson, “Soviet Nationality Policy,” *Russian Review* 15 (1956): 5–6.

⁵ See Dina Zisserman-Brodsky, *Constructing Ethnopolitics in the Soviet Union: Samizdat, Deprivation, and the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 28–29, for the case of Ukraine, see 78–79.

⁶ See Leonid Brezhnev, “50th Anniversary of the October Revolution Speech,” November, 5, 1967. Accessed on June 15, 2014 at: <http://www.beersandpolitics.com/discursos/leonid-brezhnev/50th-anniversary-of-the-october-revolution/1185>

⁷ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Integration and Ethnic Nationalism in the Soviet Union: Aspects, Trends, and Problems,” in *Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR: A Soviet Dilemma*, ed. Carl A. Linden and Dimitri K. Simes (Washington, DC: The Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, The George Washington University, 1977), 33.

⁸ Vladimir Brudnyi, *Obriady vchera i segodnia* (Moskva: Izdatelstvo “Nauka,” 1968), 66–67.

⁹ See Rakowska-Harmstone, “Integration and Ethnic Nationalism,” 37.

¹⁰ David Lane, *Soviet Society under Perestroika* (London, Sydney, Wellington: Unwin Hyman Publishing House, 1990), 90.

¹¹ This might have also concerned publicizing one's own Kozak heritage. While this issue requires further exploration, some of those Ukrainians who had Kozak family roots might have indeed hidden their background. See "Interview with a Poltava Kozak Anatolii Lyshchenko," file access no: Poltava-001. David Lane, in agreement with the point made by Lyshchenko about punishments, states that anti-state activity could be punished in carceration from six months to seven years and exile of two to five years. See Lane, *Soviet Society*, 91. However, Lyshchenko's claim may not apply to other regions. For example, Dmytro Bilyi, a historian at the Donetsk Institute of Domestic Affairs and himself of Kuban Kozak heritage, informs that Kozak identity was not repressed in Soviet Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts): "I have Kozak roots and I never hid this because it was safe [to say that]. I was born in 1967 and I did not hide my Kozak roots either in my school years, or during my university studies. On the contrary, I emphasized [my Kozak identity]. This had no negative [impact] on my studies that I . . . started teaching at the university and conducted academic research . . . When I was a student I could say 'I am not a Russian, not a Ukrainian, but a Kuban Kozak.' I do not know if [people were] persecuted for [doing] that in other regions of Ukraine. I do not remember such a case in Donbas." Dmytro Bilyi, Personal Communication. Web conversation, June 11, 2014.

¹² Natalie Kononenko, discussing the historical sources of the dumy notes that Kozaks are considered as the "creators" of the epic texts, and that the texts were created either by Kozaks who were unable to fight and traveled with their fellow warriors and sang the Kozak deeds, or by specially designated bards for Kozaks' entertainment. See Kononenko, *Ukrainian Minstrels*, xii.

¹³ Even though Kobzars were traditionally bilind there were non-blind ones and these could serve in the Kozak divisions.

¹⁴ See the list by Kost Cheremskiyi, *Povernennia tradytsii* (Kharkiv: Tsentr Lesia Kurbasa, 1999), 23.

¹⁵ M. Lytvyn, "Rozstriliani zizd kobzariv," *Narodna tvorchist ta etnohrafii* IV (1998): 95–99.

¹⁶ A case of ban was documented in Konotop. See Cheremskiyi, *Povernennia tradytsii*, 40.

¹⁷ See documents, *ibid.*, 47–52.

¹⁸ Kost Cheremskiy, “Zakatovana pisnia,” accessed June 5, 2014, <http://www.parafia.org.ua/biblioteka/statti/rozstrilyane-ukrajinske-kobzarstvo/zakatovana-pisnya-kobzarstvo/>

¹⁹ Yehor Movchan, a Kobzar who had been invited to the conference but failed to attend, recalls the year as 1935, and quotes the number of attendees as 225. See H. Minialo, “Kobzarska pisnia pro Zaporizhsku Sich,” *Narodna tvorchist ta etnohrafia*, I (1991).

²⁰ See Minialo, “Kobzarska pisnia.” See also, O. Yushchenko, “Iz svidchen pro trahichniy ziyzd kobzariv,” *Narodna tvorchist ta etnohrafia* IV (1998): 99–100. Another source on this issue is the following: Yu. Kotliar, “Kobzarstvo v chasy Radianskoho totalitarnoho rezhymu,” *Naukovyi visnyk Ukrainiskoho universytetu*, Vol. 10 (2006).

²¹ Solomon Volkov, ed., *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dimitri Shostakovich* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 214–215.

²² Heorhii Tkachenko, “Rosповід pro kobzartvo,” voice recording, accessed May 22, 2013, <http://kobzari.org.ua/?page=music>

²³ Rylskiy, *Ukrainska narodna poetychna tvorchist*, Vol. II, 206.

²⁴ Quoted in Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationalities Policy: 1957–1972* (Unpublished Dissertation: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1977), 177. See also Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Era* (The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980).

²⁵ Lane, *Soviet Society*, 91.

²⁶ Michael S. Roth, *Memory, Trauma and History: Essays on Living with the Past* (New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2012), viii.

²⁷ Mykola Budnyk, interview by Roland d’Hoop, in “Bandoura,” a film by R. D’Hoop. RTBF Centre de Production de Bruxelles, 1996, accessed on May 25, 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8P9CfK7kEU>

²⁸ “Mykola Budnyk,” accessed May 25, 2013, http://ceh.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=19&Itemid=47

²⁹ Tradition bearers are defined as people with deep knowledge and skill to perform and create a cultural heritage.

³⁰ Heorhii Tkachenko, “Rospovid pro kobzarstvo,” voice recording, accessed May 22, 2013, <http://kobzari.org.ua/?page=music>

³¹ “Kyiv Kobzar Guild,” accessed May 25, 2013, http://ceh.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=15&Itemid=43

³² “Kyiv Kobzar Guild,” accessed May 25, 2013, http://ceh.org.ua/index.php?option=com_datsogallery&Itemid=63&func=viewcategory&catid=2

³³ “Kyiv Kobzar Guild,” accessed May 25, 2013, http://ceh.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=19&Itemid=47

³⁴ Yarema Shevchenko, interview by author, VN350214. Kriachkivka Village, Poltava, July 24, 2011.

³⁵ Donetske istoryko-etnohrafichne tovarystvo “Kurin.”

³⁶ Both Zadunaiskyi and Bilyi claim Kuban Kozak ancestry.

³⁷ “Donetsk Kozaks,” accessed April 5, 2012, <http://www.slovoidilo.com/kultura/donetski-kozaky-vidznachyly-svyato-uroromantychno-destruktyvnomu-dusi.html>

³⁸ *Vertep* is a puppet theater where a “standardized enactment of the Nativity with merry interludes depicting secular life is performed . . . The secular part in *vertep* contained . . . a Zaprozhian Cossack puppet.” See Danylo Husar Struk, *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, s.v. “Vertep,” (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1984).

³⁹ “Donetsk Kozaks,” accessed April 5, 2012, <http://www.slovoidilo.com/kultura/donetski-kozaky-vidznachyly-svyato-u-omantychno-destruktyvnomu-dusi.html>. See also V. Zadunaiskyi, *Spohady pro molodizhnyi kozatsko-prosvitnytskyi rukh na Donechchyni (1984–2009)* (Donetsk: Kafedra istorii Ukrainy, vydannia UIT im. M. S. Hrushevskoho, 2010).

⁴⁰ Alexander Motyl, “Empire or Stability? The Case for Soviet Dissolution,” *World Policy Journal* 8 (1991): 506.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 512.

⁴² See Serhy Yekelchuk, “Out of Russia’s Long Shadow: The Making of Modern Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova,” in *Europe’s Last Frontier? Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine between Russia and the European Union*, ed. Oliver Schmidtke (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 24.

⁴³ “Ethnic group” is understood as a group within a larger cultural and social system, that claims a special status with real and imagined traits that the group inherited or believes that it inherited from the past. Ethnic traits can have their sources in cultural, religious, linguistic, and folkloristic characteristics. See for definition: Dina Zisserman-Brodsky, *Constructing Ethnopolitics*, 2.

⁴⁴ Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 6.

⁴⁵ Svetlana Boym indicates that “restorative nostalgia is often closely linked to politics.” Svetlana Boym, “Nostalgia and Its Discontents,” *The Hedgehog Review* June 22 (2007): 18.

⁴⁶ See Martin Gegner and Bart Ziino, “The Heritage of War: Agency, Contingency, Identity,” in *The Heritage of War*, ed. Martin Gegner and Bart Ziino (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.

⁴⁷ For a discussion of *Rukh* and its interest in Kozaks to raise national ideas see Frank Sysyn, “The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology,” *Social Research* 58 (1991): 854–859.

⁴⁸ Vadym Zadunaiskyi, “Ukrainske kozatske vidrozhennia ta narodnyi rukh Ukrainy: kinets 80-kh–pochatok 90-kh rr.,” *Skhid* 6 (2009).

⁴⁹ For a detailed study of the emergence and development of the Rukh see Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

⁵⁰ Donetske oblasne tovarystvo ukrainskoi movy im. T. H. Shevchenka: The society was established in January 1989 with an aim to promote prestige of the Ukrainian language. This society later published the journal “*Kozatskyi kraj*” in 1993.

⁵¹ “Iryna Matviievka,” a member of the *Kurin*: <http://www.slovoidilo.com/kultura/donetski-kozaky-vidznachyly-svyato-u-romantychno-destruktyvnomu-dusi.html>

⁵² See documentary about the commemorative ceremonies, *Na zemli Kozatskoi slavy*, avtor stsenariiu V. Horodko, 1991, accessed on June, 22, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9acq8HAFy0&feature=related>

⁵³ For participant observation see the following: Oleh Oliinykiv, *Storinky istorii Chornomorskoho kozatskoho viiska* (Odesa: Astropryt, 2001), 98.

⁵⁴ H. H. Honcharuk, *Narodnyi rukh Ukrainy: Istoriia* (Odesa: Astropryt, 1997), 77.

⁵⁵ S. V. Tymofeieva, *Suchasne ukrainske kozatstvo na pivdni Odeshchyny* (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy: SND SP, 2005). Find also at http://zhurnal.lib.ru/u/ushanova_s_w/kozactvo1.shtml

⁵⁶ “Dvatsiatylittia kozatskoho tovarystva Chernihivshchyny ta Chernihivskoho polku Ukrainskoho kozatstva,” *Hetman III–IV* (2011).

⁵⁷ Sysyn, “The Reemergence,” 859.

⁵⁸ The Kozaks revival has not generated a substantial scholarly interest, with only a few notable exceptions. These include two articles, by F. Sysyn and U. Gehrman, and a book by Frank Sysyn, “The Reemergence of the

Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology,” *Social Research* 58 (1991): 845–864. J. Bürgers. Udo Gehrman, “Die Kosaken – Traditionalismus nationale Erneuerung in der Ukraine,” *Berichte Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* 23 (1994): 3–39. Jana Bürgers, *Kozakenmythos und Nationsbildung in der postsowjetischen Ukraine* (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 2006).

⁵⁹ Sysyn, “There Reemergence,” 858.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 861.

⁶¹ Udo Gehrman, “Die Kosaken,” 37.

⁶² Jana Bürgers, *Kozakenmythos und Nationsbildung*, 49–58.

⁶³ The Society was established in February 1989 with an aim to revive the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and also beyond Ukraine.

⁶⁴ The area roughly corresponds to the contemporary Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of contemporary Ukraine.

⁶⁵ Sportyvna shkola kozatskoho mystetstva “Boiovyi hopak.” Emergence and development of “Combat Hopak” until 2003 is discussed in detail in Bürgers, *Kozakenmythos*, 73–76.

⁶⁶ S. V. Ushanova, *Suchasne kozatstvo Zadnistrovia* (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi: Otaman, 2010), 11.

⁶⁷ This ideal was realized in January 9, 1991, under the title of the Zaporozhian Kozak Community “Zaporozhian Sich.” The community was long led by Otaman V. Melnyk, who was a military medical doctor. After the breakup of the “Ukrainian Kozaks” those who belonged to the Runvira, an organization of Ukrainian Neo-pagans formed their own organization (Oriiana) in 1996. After this breakup the Zaporozhian Kozak Community “Zaporizhska Sich” was renamed as the Zaporozhian Army of the Lower “Zaporozhian Sich.”

⁶⁸ Vadym Zadunaiskyi, “Ukrainske kozatske vidrodzhennia,” (2009).

⁶⁹ Members of the Free Kozaks continued to operate in exile. After Skoropadskyi, Ivan Poltavets-Ostrianytsia was elected hetman in exile (1926). Later the leaders of the Free Kozaks used the title *koshovyi otaman* instead of hetman.

⁷⁰ See also Udo Gehrmann, “Die Kosaken,” 14–17.

⁷¹ In accordance with the treaty the Kozaks accepted the Russian Tsar as their overlord.

⁷² Andrew Fesiak, “Nation Building in the Ukrainian Military,” in *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 147.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁷⁴ In late 1993, Muliava was fired from his military position for his anti-Russian, anti-Communist, anti-Soviet and nationalistic views.

⁷⁵ It is an attribute of hetmans, a ceremonial mace.

⁷⁶ Kostiantyn P. Morozov, *Above and Beyond: From Soviet General to Ukrainian State Builder* (Cambridge, MA: Distributed by the Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute, 2000).

⁷⁷ See interview with Volodymyr Muliava on 30.08.2011. File access number: VN350226.

⁷⁸ Valeriy Izmalkov, “Ukraine and Her Armed Forces: The Conditions and Process for their Creation, Character, Structure, and Military Doctrine,” *European Security* 2 (1993): 289.

⁷⁹ By year 2000 this number was further reduced to 275,000 (plus 90,000 civilian personnel working in the defense establishment). In 2010 the number of military men was 159,000.

⁸⁰ Ethnic Russians comprised 90% of the general officers, 60% of the field officers, and 50% of the general staff officers. Stephen Olynyk, "Ukraine as a Post-Cold War Military Power," *JFQ* Spring (1997): 91.

⁸¹ In total around 10,000 officers, out of 100,000, declined to take the oath. Taras Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 100. In 1993, six thousand officers who did not take oath of loyalty were ordered to leave Ukraine. Andrew Beniuk, *The Formation of the Ukrainian State, 1990–1994. The Kravchuk Years* (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Alberta, 2002), 123. See also Morozov's memoir, *Above and Beyond*, 188-193.

⁸² Olynyk states that by 1995 Ukrainian military schools graduated 27,000 new officers and that 33,000 ethnic Ukrainian officers returned from other former Soviet republics to serve in the Ukrainian army.

⁸³ John Jaworsky, "Ukraine's Armed Forces and Military Policy," in *Ukraine in the World: International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State*, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 236.

⁸⁴ Kozatske viisko zaporozhske nyzove (the Kozak Army of the Lower Dnipro).

⁸⁵ This is the historical title traditionally given to the Zaporozhian Sich Kozak leader. "Hetman" became restricted to the supreme leader of the Hetmanate polity.

⁸⁶ The author of this dissertation does not have data to check the validity of the Panchenko's claims. However, it is clear the Muliava-led Kozak elite was openly against Russification. "Kozak Army of the Lower Dnipro," accessed August 22, 2011, <http://kvzn.zp.ua/?go=katalog&catid=129&podcatid=674>

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ The term Palanka comes from the Ottoman word for a frontier fortification, possibly derived from Hungarian. For Kozaks the word stood for an administrative center.

⁸⁹ The Union of Ukrainian Kozaks was not registered formally. Therefore, this organization uses Kozak Army of the Lower Dnipro for formal purposes while using the Union of Ukrainian Kozaks for public access.

⁹⁰ “Vseukrainska federatsiia “Spas,” accessed June 2013, <http://day.zp.ua/news/1017.html>

⁹¹ Kozaks of Volodymyr Melnyk.

⁹² The Russian Orthodox Church decorated Panchenko with the order of St. Volodymyr for his knightly services to the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

⁹³ Panchenko and his organization did not respond to the author’s efforts to arrange a meeting for an interview.

⁹⁴ See interview with Volodymyr Muliava on 30.08.2011. File access number: VN350226.

⁹⁵ Ivan Bilas was a member of parliament 1994–2002 (served in 1994–1998 as an independent PM and a member of the Rukh fraction in 1998–2002) and General Lieutenant of the Ukrainian Army.

⁹⁶ See *Hetman*, I (2004): 2.

⁹⁷ “Society of Kozak Organizations of Ukraine” (2001), “Kozak Army of Zaporizhia—Ukraine” (2001), “Common Community of Ukrainian Kozaks” (2001), “Typical Kozaks” (2001), “Ukrainian Registered Kozaks” (2002), “Kozak Territorial Defence” (2002), “International Union of Kozaks” (2002), “Kozak Army of Ukraine” (2002) and “United Kozaks of Ukraine” (2003).

⁹⁸ Spilka kozatstva Donechchyny.

⁹⁹ Twenty-two of the some forty all-Ukrainian Kozak organizations at the time took part in this election.

¹⁰⁰ A. Shevchenko, “Zvernennia Pereiaslav-Khmelnyskoi Velykoi rady Ukrainskoho reiestrovoho kozatstva do ukrainskoho i rosiiskoho narodiv,” *Ukraina Kozatska*, 3–2 (2004).

¹⁰¹ “Ukrainian Registered Kozaks,” accessed on June 14, 2011, <http://www.kozatstvo.org.ua/ua/history.php>

¹⁰² Mizhnarodna hromadska orhanizatsiia, Kozatstvo Zaporozke.

¹⁰³ In the Soviet period Sahaidak served in various positions. He was a faculty member in the Information Academy and the Academy of Defense, Security and Rule of Law (in Russia), and later an adviser on military-technical issues in some Southeastern and Central Asian countries.

¹⁰⁴ Later, still critical of Muliava, he asked “if [anyone] had seen Muliava in church.” See the interview with Dmytro Sahaidak. *Hetman III–IV* (2011): 16.

¹⁰⁵ Spilka kozakiv Ukrainy Viiska Zaporozhskoho.

¹⁰⁶ Dmytro Sahaidak, “Ukraina. Druhyi Hetmanat: chy bude tretii?” *Hetman*, III–IV (2011): 69–77.

¹⁰⁷ *Hetman*, 2 (2007): 36.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 5–6 (2005): 17.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 6 (2006): 6–7.

¹¹¹ Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 14/95, 4 sichnia 1995 r., “Pro vidrodzhennia istoryko-kulturnykh ta hospodarskykh tradytsii ukrainskoho kozatstva.”

¹¹² Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 966/99, 7 serpnia 1999 r., “Pro Den ukrainskoho kozatstva.”

¹¹³ The decree was issued the very same day that V. Yushchenko took office as Prime Minister. This decree was rescinded by presidential decree 916/2005, 04.06.2005.

¹¹⁴ “Ukrainian Registered Kozaks,” accessed on June 14, 2011, http://kozatstvo.org.ua/norm_baza/ukaz4_e.php

¹¹⁵ “Ukrainian Registered Kozaks,” accessed on June 14, 2011, http://kozatstvo.org.ua/norm_baza/ukaz378_r.php

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ “Ukrainian Registered Kozaks,” accessed on June 14, 2011, http://kozatstvo.org.ua/norm_baza/ukaz207_e.php

CHAPTER FOUR

REVIVAL AND THE MAKING OF MODERN KOZAK SPACES

The third chapter examined the ways the Kozak movement was revived in social space. However, this process cannot be fully comprehended without an examination of the Kozak revival in the physical spaces historically related to the Kozaks. The study of spaces is central to the investigation of modern Kozakdom because meanings, with which communities construct their identities, are formed through histories narrated in physical spaces. Therefore, the consolidation of national identity with reference to the Kozak past in the actual Kozak sites is one of the central questions that this chapter will address.

The study of the revival of the Kozak movement through the exploration of physical spaces has to do with collective memories. Chapters one and two focussed on the factors and processes that determined the way the Russian imperial and the Soviet periods affected the collective memory of the Kozak period. With the changes brought about by independence, the Ukrainian public space turned into a battleground of conflicting collective memories and identities. On this battleground the nationalist discourse tried to undo the impact of the imperial and the Soviet eras. The Kozak past and its related spaces then transformed into a competitive arena where the nationalist, and imperial/Soviet discourses clashed. The major collective memory battlegrounds on which these wars were fought were Poltava, Baturyn, Konotop and Khortytsia (Zaporozhia). This chapter will look at these cases through the prism of data collected in the field, and will examine the

transformation of spaces in an attempt to promote a nationalist version of Kozak collective identity and memory.

Poltava: From Russian Glory to Kozak Restoration?

The significance of Ivan Mazepa's policy at the time of the Great Northern War and its impact in its own day were discussed earlier. However, for our examination equally important is the impact of the Poltava Battle in the centuries to come. The transformation of the battlefield into a memorial site of glory in the tsarist period, and the meanings, associations and narratives the site embodied had a major impact on the way Kozaks were represented in the public space. This section attempts to explore the processes that transformed the battlefield into a site of Russian glory. Its second task is to examine the reflections of the modern Kozak revivalist efforts in independent Ukraine on the Poltava battlefield.

Competing historical memories of the Battle of Poltava represent a major source of conflict in the definition of identities in modern Ukraine. The historical events took place between 1708 and 1709. Their three major protagonists were Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709), the Russian Tsar¹ Peter I (1672–1725) and the Swedish King Charles XII (1672–1718). Ivan Mazepa was the Hetman of the Kozak Hetmanate, in office since 1687, who gained the trust and friendship of the young Peter. In return Mazepa joined Peter's campaigns against the Ottomans (the Azov campaign of 1695–1696) which eventually gained the Tsardom of Muscovy its first access to the Black Sea. But, Muscovy also joined in competition with Sweden over the control of the Baltic Sea. Eventually, the competition for supremacy led to the Great

Northern War (1700–1721), in which Peter I gained the support of anti-Swedish Denmark and Poland. In the early phases of the war, Charles of Sweden was victorious over Denmark and Muscovy; he later captured Warsaw by the year 1702. Peter, to counter this Swedish expansion, ordered Mazepa to seize territories in Poland. Mazepa, complying with Peter's orders, gained control of Kyiv, Volhynia, and Lviv in 1705. He was to rule over these newly gained territories, unifying Right-and Left-Bank Ukraine for the first time in decades. In the meantime, Mazepa continued to provide troops for the tsar's war efforts.² At the same time, Mazepa's *starshyna* (ruling officers) were becoming disaffected with Peter's demands on Ukraine's resources, while Sweden's allies in Poland tried to draw Mazepa into the anti-Russian camp.

In 1708, Charles XII marched into the Hetmanate with his army. Mazepa's request to Peter for assistance in the face of the approaching Swedes was met with refusal. Mazepa, whose resources were scarce, was left alone to defend his land—and Russia—against the Swedish army. It was at this moment Mazepa decided to join forces with the Swedes.

Mazepa's decision created strong and divided reactions among the Hetmanate's political-military elite and the Church clergy; the lower strata of society and the Kozak rank-and-file showed little enthusiasm. In the end, Mazepa joined Charles with only a small number of Kozaks.³ Mazepa's decision infuriated Peter who said on the November 1, 1708 that "former Hetman Mazepa forgot fear of God and his oath, betrayed us, the great Lord, without any reason."⁴ To punish Mazepa, Peter ordered his commander Alexander Menshikov to destroy the Hetmanate's capital of Baturyn

(November 2, 1708). However, by the time Menshikov's army arrived at Baturyn, Mazepa had already departed with his Kozaks, leaving behind several thousand Kozaks to defend the town. Menshikov's superior forces took and burnt down the town and massacred its residents.⁵

The main battle that became a source of identity constructions for many decades to come took place on June 27, 1709. The army of Charles joined with Mazepa's Kozaks and fought Peter's army at Poltava. Peter gained a decisive victory over the alliance, and both Charles and Mazepa had to take refuge in Ottoman territories. Several months later Mazepa, who was sick and old, died.⁶ In the wake of this defeat, the Hetmanate was further limited and restricted in its autonomous rights by Russia.⁷ Poltava opened the path for the full integration of the Hetmanate, which took place some fifty years later.

As mentioned earlier, Mazepa's decision had caused rifts and divisions among the Kozak upper strata. Mazepa's decision divided the Hetmanate's upper strata into two camps. The first, perceived Mazepa's decision to shift sides as a violation of the oath of allegiance taken in 1654 at Pereiaslav. It was considered as much a moral transgression as a strategic mistake. For the second group, on the other hand, Mazepa's decision was timely because the tsar was oppressive and abusive in exploiting the Hetmanate's resources for his war efforts. Thus, the Mazepists argued that Muscovy's war efforts caused heavy losses to the Kozaks without any significant returns for the Hetmanate. Furthermore, the Kozaks were mistreated in Peter's extensive construction plans, and, not the least, the Russian army maltreated the Hetmanate's

population. This group of the Kozak elite, especially prominent in its upper echelons, stood with Mazepa and supported his decision.

Peter was determined to destroy any pro-Mazepa views among the Kozaks and the wider community. Therefore, to eliminate positive images and impressions of Mazepa developed over two decades, a ceremony took place in the aftermath of Mazepa's defection. Plokhy describes the ceremony of November 5, 1708: "Hlukhiv witnessed a shocking ritual. An effigy of their hetman, Ivan Mazepa, . . . was dragged through the streets of the town."⁸ The ceremony was the culmination of events following Mazepa's decision to turn against the tsar and marked a historic breaking point.

The ceremony continued on November 5: "[a]t a freshly built scaffold, [where an effigy was brought] Alexander Menshikov . . . read out a list of Mazepa's crimes and tore the sash of the Order of St. Andrew from the effigy."⁹ The effigy was then hanged. It is not known how supporters of Mazepa (the Mazepists) reacted to this, or if they held a counter event in support of the hetman. One thing is sure, however: most *Mazepists* were either executed or exiled on Peter's orders.¹⁰

Soon after the destruction of Baturyn, Peter I issued an edict and called Mazepa's decision "anti-national," "anti-Christian" and a "personal breach of loyalty," and claimed that Mazepa wanted to inflict "injury to Russia" and "the Russian State."¹¹ To further blacken Mazepa's image as a "traitor," religious ceremonies were held. Peter I made the Orthodox Church anathematize Mazepa, and on November 12, 1709 the hetman was declared damned for all eternity. Peter himself took part in the ceremony of damnation that was held in

Moscow. Simultaneously with the ceremonies in Moscow, the newly elected Hetman Skoropadskyi participated, with the loyalist Kozak elite present, in the anathematization ceremony in the new capital of Hlukhiv.¹² To further assure its impact on the society, the anathema was nailed to the doors of all churches.¹³ The impact of Mazepa's anathema on Ukrainian collective memory endured for centuries as the anathema and damnation were proclaimed anew annually;¹⁴ this meant that literally the same ceremony took place every year until 1905 in all churches of the empire.¹⁵ From first to last in the anathema ceremony Mazepa and his "betrayal" were associated with the Biblical figure of Judas. These images were recalled every first Sunday before the Great Lent. According to Subtelny's observation, such ceremonies impacted both the elite and the folk; "[l]arge segments of the Ukrainian population joined in the chorus of condemnation and, for centuries to come, Ukrainian peasants would not mention the name of Mazepa without appending to it the epithet of 'accursed.'"¹⁶

In addition to the ceremonies attached directly to the memory of Mazepa's act, Peter wanted to assure that the memory of his Poltava victory would survive the test of time. For that he undertook efforts to make an impact on the physical space, and soon after the war, he ordered the construction of a memorial church on the Poltava battlefield. This church was meant to honor the Russian army and its "glorious victory."¹⁷ However, due to the prolongation of the Northern War and subsequent funding shortages, the church dedicated to the Byzantine saint Sampson could not be built.¹⁸ The Moscow Military Governor General Sergei Stroganov (d. 1892) revived the

idea of building a church to memorialize the military glory of Poltava only in 1840. In 1847 Emperor Nicholas I gave orders anew, for the construction, and the memorial church was completed in 1852. The church underwent renovation many times; however, a major one was in connection with the 200th anniversary of the battle, which transformed it into a larger building (Figure 4-1). For this anniversary, on the outside wall of the church was added a mural depicting Peter I addressing his soldiers before the war. The speech was carved on a marble plaque:

Warriors! The time has come that will to determine the fate of the Fatherland. You should not think that you will fight for Peter, but for the state which was entrusted to Peter for his kin, his Fatherland, and for Orthodoxy and our Church. Keep in mind that truth and God are fighting on your side, and place your hopes upon God, who is One and Almighty in His armor. And know that Peter's life is not dear to him. What is important is that Russia lives in bliss and glory for your well-being.¹⁹

On the day following the Battle of Poltava, Peter did something else in addition to ordering the construction of a memorial church. The tsar placed a cross on the graves of the Russian soldiers. The plaque on the cross read: "Pious Warriors, crowned with the piety of blood. In the year after the Word of God 1709, on June 27."²⁰

For the centenary commemoration of the Battle of Poltava a mausoleum project was prepared to replace the plain cross with a more prominent monument. However, the project was not realized. The wooden

cross, as Peter placed it, was renovated at various times, but it was only in 1890 that the Holy Synod took the decision to replace the wooden cross with a granite cross monument which came to be known the “Monument at the Common Grave of the Perished Russian Soldiers.” This plan was realized in 1894 on the burial mound (Figure 4-2). Plaques containing the titles of regiments were placed around the monument. The main plaque reads:

Constructed in 1894, by the authority of the most pious Emperor Alexander III and the decree of the Holy Synod to His Grace Bishop Illarion of Poltava and Pereiaslav, at the expense of Privy Counselor Joseph Stepanovich Sudienko, who provided the capital to perpetuate the great victory at Poltava. Done in St. Petersburg . . . under the supervision of master architect Nicholas A. Barinov.²¹

The original text of the plaque, affixed by Peter himself, was kept as part of the new monument, together with a fragment of Peter’s pre-battle speech in adapted form: “Peter knew that his life was not dear to him, only the life of Russia.”

In addition to the two earlier monuments at the battle site itself, a memorial was built in the town center of Poltava. This monument was first erected in 1778 with funds provided by the local resident P. Rudenko. This monument was later dismantled and rebuilt, again funded by Rudenko to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the battle. However, the project could not be completed by the date of the anniversary in 1809 and was opened only on June 27, 1811.²² The Victory monument was erected at the point where Peter I allegedly met with locals after the battle. The monument was

constructed in obelisk form. The top part was decorated with an eagle and a snake in the eagle's mouth, representing Russia and the evil enemy, i.e, Mazepa. The pedestal part was designed to picture the war and to display army insignia. Eighteen cannons were placed around the monument (Figure 4-3).

A fourth monument was erected at the spot where Peter I rested the day after the Battle of Poltava. The monument was made in St. Petersburg and unveiled in 1849 to mark the 140th anniversary of the Battle. Its composition includes a warrior's helmet, a sword and a shield. The plaque placed on it reads: "Peter rested here after his heroic deeds on June 27, 1709." The monumental composition has a relief of a double-headed eagle (Figure 4-4).

The 200th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava in 1909 was marked by pompous celebrations. It was a high-protocol event, with participation of international delegations and the Emperor Nicholas II himself. With the emperor's particular attention, the approach of the 200th anniversary triggered large-scale planning of commemorative events and construction of new memorials. Monuments were unveiled on the day of the anniversary in the presence of the emperor, foreign delegations, and the local peasantry.²³ The new monuments placed on the battlefield bore the inscriptions "To the Swedes from Russians," "From the Swedes to the Swedes," "To the Defenders of the Poltava Fortress and Commander O. S. Kelin," and the "Monument where the Russian Army crossed the Vorskla River." The first one, commissioned by the tsar, is a modest composition of a cross with a memorial plaque that reads in Russian and Swedish: "To the eternal memory of the brave Swedish soldiers who fell at the Battle of Poltava on June 27, 1709." The second, "From the

Swedes to the Swedes,” is a Swedish creation brought and erected by the Swedish delegation. This granite monument, containing no symbols, has a bilingual plaque reading: “To the memory of Swedes fallen in 1709, this stone is erected by their fellow countrymen in 1909.” The third monument, located in the town center, is dedicated to the commander and the defenders of the Poltava fortress during the battle. The monument features a bronze double-headed eagle, which, however, after the revolution of 1917 was dismantled. Of two plaques on the monument, the first reads: “To the Heroic Colonel Commandant of Poltava: Kelin, and to the glorious defenders of the city in 1709.” The second gives information about the siege laid to the fortress: “On April 1st, 1709 Charles XII laid siege to Poltava. For three months the fortress and city dwellers heroically resisted all Swedish attacks. The last bitter assaults were repulsed by heroic Poltavians on June 2–22, 1709.” The fourth monument of the 200th anniversary was a marker, erected on the spot where the Russian army crossed the River Vorskla; this monument was renovated in Soviet times for the 250th anniversary in 1959.

The last monument of the tsarist period was the “Monument to Peter I,” a project prepared by graduates of the Poltava cadet corps in 1915. However, even though the monument was completed, the collapse of the Russian Empire did not allow the monument to be erected. However, it was preserved and stored in the cadet school. It was emplaced only in 1950 in front of the present-day Museum of the Battle of Poltava located on the battlefield (Figure 4-5).²⁴ The only addition to the Poltava Battle memorial complex in the Soviet

times was the plaque installed in 1973 at the spot where Peter I commanded his army.²⁵

With this review of the efforts at memorialization on the battle site we can conclude that for Peter the Battle of Poltava was a historic turning point, if for no reason than that it removed a major opponent from the map in the Great Northern War.²⁶ He wanted to mark the victory with two commemorative initiatives. The first one was the construction of a church, which could not be completed in Peter's lifetime; second, he ordered the erection of a cross over the graves of his soldiers. With these early memorial projects, Peter placed the corner stone of a collective memory of his victorious war. When the centenary of the battle arrived, memory-making through constructions of monuments was not a major interest. We can observe the preparation of a plan to transform the cross erected by Peter into a memorial complex, but this produced no results. The second project, planned for the centenary in 1809, could only be realized in 1811. The symbolism of this Victory monument (1811), with an eagle with a snake in its mouth, speaks to the fact that "the evil" was destroyed by a victorious Russia. A century later, the treatment of the battle and the physical space seems to have changed. The 200th anniversary of the battle initiated a large wave of preparations and attracted large public participation (Figure 4-6). The emperor himself and a Swedish delegation were present to unveil the monuments. As the *Poltavskii Vestnik* of June 27, 1909, reported, "the Monument of Victory Choir comprised 500 members and led by Dmitrii Akhsharumov performed Fedor Glinka's opera *Life for the Tsar*. The celebration became an event of all-Russian scale."²⁷ According to a report

published in the *Russki vedomosti* (Russian Bulletin) the ceremonial procession was 500 meters long with “coats of arms for the memory of unification of Little Russia, along with many massive crosses . . .”²⁸ On the day of the ceremonies four monuments were opened, one of them was brought by the Swedes. In addition to these, a Stone Arbor was dedicated to the celebrations of the 200th year, and the same year also witnessed the opening of the Museum of the Battle of Poltava. All available evidence, therefore, speaks to the fact that there was a major change in the physical space to further emphasize the battlefield as a memory site, and illustrates the extensive interest in preserving the memory of the victory through commemoration and monuments. Evidence also shows a tendency on the part of Swedes and Russians towards reconciliation as they commemorated the battle together and as the Russian side erected a monument to the memory of the Swedish soldiers.

When it comes to the Hetmanate, Mazepa and the Ukrainians, there is no indication of reconciliation. Instead, nationally conscious Ukrainians were roused by these massive commemorative events. They first raised their voice on the occasion of the erection of monuments to Pushkin at several places in the first decade of the 20th century. Pushkin was not particularly appreciated for his depiction of Mazepa and his “defection.” Ukrainian nationalists’ anger in this regards surfaced on November 3, 1904. On this day a public demonstration was held in Kharkiv to protest the erection of a monument to Pushkin. A leaflet was distributed which read: “Pushkin is a Muscovite writer, who in his works meanly and falsely described the personality of our patriot

Ivan Mazepa. Ukraine still has no monument to Shevchenko, and the government with the taxes it collected from the Ukrainian population erects monuments to individuals hostile to us. Shevchenko is our great poet—Pushkin is yours.”²⁹ In the same spirit the nationalist Nikolai Shapoval said, “Ukraine has no Shevchenko monuments; I cannot stand other monuments.”³⁰ It such circumstances the Poltava ceremonies of 1909 led to more hostile reactions, and an attempt to blow up the Victory monument took place.³¹ The attack was timed precisely to match the 200th anniversary ceremonies. The bomb, failed to destroy the iron cast monument, but inflicted partial damage.³² As the mood of the times was rather conflictual for nationally conscious Ukrainians, the historical scholarship unleashed in 1909 did not help to calm Ukrainian nationalists. A school book, for example, published in 1909 represented the decision of Mazepa in the following way: “Little Russian people acting against the treason of Hetman Mazepa, except for a negligible few, have continued to believe in their lawful monarch”³³ On the other hand, during the Soviet period mass commemorations of the Poltava Battle did not take place. Nevertheless, Soviet authorities, usually critical of “bourgeois art,” did not touch the monuments. Starting in the 1950s we can observe a growing interest in the Battle of Poltava and the monuments. This interest was stimulated in part by the approach of the 300th anniversary of “reunification” of the “brotherly” Russian and Ukraine peoples in 1954. The rhetoric of reunification resurfaced during the 250th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava in 1959. In this period, the battle represented the salvation of the motherland and depicted Mazepa in a totally negative fashion.

The Poltava case displays the impact of the imperial and the Soviet eras on the collective memory of Ukrainians. However, the collective memory counter narrative, with a Ukrainian nationalist interpretation, of the Kozak past had a different nature after the emergence of Ukraine as an independent country in 1991. The nationalist discourse now could have social grounds to reclaim the Kozak past. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the collective memories and identities promoted in imperial and Soviet times clashed with the newly reemerging Kozak collective memory. The first reflection of the change of times was the introduction in 1992 of the ten hryvnia bill (currency) which had the reconstructed portrait of Mazepa.³⁴ The ten hryvnia bill received criticism because of the collective counter-memory existing in sectors of Ukrainian society, particularly among the members of the Communist party and pro-Russian activists.³⁵

Inevitably, the clash of collective memories centered on Poltava. It surfaced in the physical realm with the erection of the monument named “Perished Ukrainian Kozaks” (1994) (Figure 4-7). This monument marks a paradigm shift in its two ways. To start, this is the first ever monument in Poltava, in almost 300 years, erected to the memory of the Kozaks who fought in the Battle. It is a narrative redirection from the imperial and Soviet collective memory discourse. The monument is opening a new public narrative of collective memory as a step towards reinstating the honor of the “traitor” Kozaks. Moreover, the monument is the first “legal” monument dedicated to the memory of the Kozaks. This underlines the fact that imperial and Soviet narratives about the Battle continued to fight back the nationalist

drive to transform the discourse on the memory site. What follows will address the details of the clash of memories.

As discussed earlier, Kozakdom surfaced in the public realm late in the Soviet period to forge a collective memory with the aim to challenge the narratives of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. With the independence of Ukraine, nationalist discourse found a political platform not only to deconstruct Russian-Soviet narratives but also to formulate and introduce a new collective memory over the master narrative of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the late Soviet period of glasnost and perestroika, and the era of independence signalled a major attack on the imperial and Soviet master narrative of the Kozak past. The attempt at making a paradigm shift in Poltava stood as one of the major challenges to undermine the master narrative because the site itself, with the narrative constructed around the monuments, was and still is a source of outrage and insult for Ukrainian nationalists. The outrage was reflected in the words of a scholar Nikolai Stepanenko: “the bloody royal eagle on the obelisk [referring to the Victory monument] breaks the heart of people. Prometheus drinks their [Ukrainians’] blood every day of the week.”³⁶

Poltava wounds the feelings of nationally conscious Ukrainians. However, there are also significant numbers of Ukrainians who subscribe to the imperial and Soviet master narrative. The fact that this narrative is supported by the Russian Federation makes the issue even more conflictual. The persistence of the imperial and Soviet master narrative places collective

memory of the nationally conscious Ukrainians against the collective memory of the Russians of Ukraine, Russified Ukrainians, and the Russian Federation.

The clash of collective memories became fierce during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010). One of the major goals Yushchenko set for himself was the remaking of national collective memory. In this effort, he focused mainly on the Holodomor, the Soviet man-made famine of the 1930s; the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists of the inter-war period and its military offshoot, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; and the Kozak past. These he perceived to be essential to fasten a truly independent Ukraine. His efforts on behalf of the restoration of Kozak collective memory became controversial when Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed on February 12, 2007 a joint commemoration, including Swedes, Ukrainians and Russians, of the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava. While Yushchenko could not openly reject this proposal, it was not difficult for him and his team to imagine that the Russians would use the occasion to celebrate their “historical triumph.” Of course, the offer infuriated the right-wing of Ukraine’s civil society. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists declared that if Poltava was to be celebrated jointly, then the anniversary of the Battle of Konotop (1659), where Russians suffered a major defeat also needed to be celebrated together with the Russians. In response to the nationalists’ argument, the head of the Poltava City *rada*, reflecting the imperial and Soviet collective memory and in line with the “reunification” discourse, argued that this “Slavic victory” is a source of pride for most of the *rada* members.³⁷

Soon after Putin's offer, on October 9, 2007, possibly realizing a potential Russian usurpation of the event, President Yushchenko issued a presidential decree entitled "On the Commemoration of 300 years of events related to the military-political stance of the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazepa and the making of the Ukrainian-Swedish alliance."³⁸ The decree ordered the following: preparation of an action plan by the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine to organize events marking the tercentenary of the Battle of Poltava,³⁹ forums on the role of the "Sovereign Ukrainian Kozak State," the production of films to reflect the activities of Mazepa and his alliance with the Swedes, restorations at the battlefield, the reconstruction of the town of Baturyn, and erection of monuments to Ivan Mazepa and Charles XII in Poltava. The decree also ordered the installation of plaques at places related to Mazepa's life. Six days after the decree, the Poltava Regional State Administration put the decree into force and ordered the local *rada* to hold a conference, to give support to Kozak organizations to participate in events, to erect monuments and place plaques, and to repair "objects related to the Battle."⁴⁰ It was clear from these measures that the Ukrainian presidential administration had no intention to organize joint "ceremonies." Instead, the presidential administration took measures to promote the collective memory that is held by nationally-minded Ukrainians.

While such was the case on the Ukrainian front, the measures found a different response in Russia. When asked about the possibilities of a joint ceremony, Gleb Pavlovskii, the head of the internal politics division in the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, said that "on history,

especially when it comes to Russia, the Ukrainian authorities reveal retrospective anger and revenge. Therefore, I think that a joint celebration⁴¹ is impossible.”⁴² In a similar vein Viktor Chernomyrdin, then the ambassador of Russia to Kyiv, was infuriated by the decision to erect monuments dedicated to Mazepa and Charles XII: “Well, imagine now that we erect a monument to Hitler in Stalingrad. How will it look?”⁴³ Responding to the concerns of those in whose collective memory Mazepa appears as a “traitor,” the Poltava City *rada* refused to accept funds allocated by the presidential administration. The rejection of the funds also undermined the other plans for the construction of a Museum of Kozak Glory, the restoration of the Museum of the Battlefield of Poltava, and the construction of memorials at Perevolochnia, a settlement at the confluence of the Vorskla and Dnipro where the armies of Mazepa and Charles crossed the waters. In response, those who supported the erection of the monument initiated a charity fund to finance the Mazepa monument privately. The local *rada*, rejecting monies allocated by Kyiv, remained short of funding and signed a memorandum with V. Chernomyrdin to prepare for the commemoration with Russian funds.⁴⁴

As the anniversary day approached, people who collected one million hryvnias for the Mazepa monument became anxious to have the unveiling take place exactly on the anniversary date (June 27, 2009).⁴⁵ However, this proved impossible. The city *rada*, led by Mayor Ivan Matkovskyi of the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc, blocked the efforts and fenced in the area where the monument was to have been erected (Figure 4-8). Svoboda, a far right political party, responded to the local administration’s blocking effort by placing ads on

the billboards throughout the city and Ukraine. The billboards contained a picture of Mazepa and a text that read: “Mazepa is Victorious, the Ukrainian State Exists” and “We are in our God-given land” (Figure 4-9). This, too, was quickly removed by the orders of the Mayor of Poltava.

Russian, Swedish, Ukrainian, German, Danish, Polish and Turkish delegations participated in the official commemorations. Ukraine was represented by the Head of the Presidential Secretariat Maria Stavnychuk. The Russian delegation, six hundred strong, was led by the Head of the Presidential Administration Sergyi Naryshkin. The Swedes were represented by two hundred delegates. All joined in the opening of the Rotunda Monument for the Fallen Participants of the Poltava Battle.⁴⁶ Not surprisingly, the monument was funded by Russian sources. As part of the formal program, a memorial service was held in the church of St. Sampsonia for the fallen, but Mazepa’s name was excluded because the anathema of 300 years ago was still in place.

Separately from the formal agenda, a private memorial church service was held for Mazepa in Poltava in the presence of five thousand people. Another memorial service took place at the Monument to Fallen Ukrainian Kozaks (erected 1994). Both memorial services mourning the “tragedy” of Poltava found no coverage on Ukrainian television channels. However, many other pictures of the “celebration” appeared in the Ukrainian media. Such were participants wearing t-shirts with an imprint of Peter I announcing “the Russian Army Won,” as well as some participants dragging a Mazepa effigy, tagged “Mazepa—Judas,” and setting it on fire.⁴⁷

Offended by the official ceremonies and misrepresentation of their own view, some members of local nationally minded organizations took the initiative to erect a cross on the Poltava battlefield. The event, which failed to receive permission from the local administration, took place at dawn on July 7, 2009. The wooden cross five meters in length carried an inscription that read: “To the Unsubdued! To the Ukrainian Kozaks, glorious warriors of Ivan Mazepa, from grateful Poltavians.” However, the cross did not remain long on the battlefield, as unidentified individuals bulldozed it in September. The cross was found in the woods a couple of kilometers from the location, lying in some garbage. The activists—members of the All-Ukrainian Association of Political Prisoners and the Repressed, and the Kozak Organization “Sich”—cleaned and re-erected the cross at the same location on the field; however, the cross did not survive, being taken away by the local government on the pretext that this was a breach of the law (Figure 4-10). The local activist defended themselves arguing that they were following presidential orders for commemorating the Battle, Mazepa and his Kozaks.

The last among the attempts to change a narrative of the past in physical space concerned Mazepa’s love affair with Motria Kochubei (b. ca.1688). Daughter of the Hetmanate’s General Judge Vasyl Kochubei, Motria was Mazepa’s goddaughter. Despite this religious impediment and the great age difference, the two wished to marry in 1704; but without consent from Motria’s family this marriage proved impossible. Added to the story of hopeless love was also a political intrigue: in 1708 Motria’s father denounced Mazepa to Tsar Peter for treason, but was returned to the hetman and

beheaded. After Mazepa's defeat, Motria Kochubei, was exiled to Siberia and, after returning to Ukraine, spent her entire life in the Ascension Women's Monastery at Pushkarivtsi on the outskirts of Poltava. The location of her grave was unknown. However, one of the activists, who had taken part in the erection of the "illegal" cross on the battlefield in 2009, paid from his funds to build a "mock grave" for Motria on the monastery land (Figure 4-11). The site is marked by a large cross and a plate with her name and the years she lived.

This section has detailed the historical process that stamped the Poltava battlefield as a site of Russian glory. The narratives established through the tsarist and Soviet periods, have constructed a collective memory that leaves no space for the Kozak impulse for independence. Tarned with the name of Mazepa, all who aspired to freedom were tagged traitors. An attempt to change the narrative and reconstruct collective memory of the site was made after Ukrainian independence. The strong determination of Ukrainian nationalists, pro-Ukrainian Kozaks, and Viktor Yushchenko to put an end to the Russian narrative failed to succeed. However, as following sections will show, they looked for other battlefields where they had better chances of winning. One such Kozak historical site where a modern-day battle has taken place is Baturyn.

Baturyn: Rebuilding Kozak Dignity

With a past closely related to Poltava's, Baturyn was the capital of the Kozak Hetmanate from 1669 to 1708, a period that included Ivan Mazepa's term in office (1687–1709).⁴⁸ As mentioned earlier, because of Mazepa's alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII, the city was attacked by the

Russian army. Even though the Kozaks and residents defended the town valiantly against superior Russian forces, the capture of the city took place in November 1708. The Hetman's residences and the town were burned to ground, and the town's inhabitants were killed in large numbers.⁴⁹

After the destruction, the town remained desolate and in ruins for forty years. During Kyrylo Rozumovskyi's hetmanate (1750–1764) the town regained its former status as the center of the Hetmanate. However, in 1764 the Hetmanate was abolished, and the development of the town halted. Today Baturyn is located in Chernihiv oblast, with the status of “a settlement of urban type” and a population of some 2–3,000.

Scholarly publications with even a mention of Baturyn's destruction were suppressed both in the Tsarist and Soviet periods. While the Kozak uprising and the Battle of Poltava were taught in Soviet schools, and Ivan Mazepa was introduced as a traitor, the historiographical narrations excluded the Baturyn event entirely.⁵⁰ Any inquiry into what transpired in Baturyn, particularly archeological excavations, was banned, and the site of devastation was left in oblivion and largely erased from collective memory.

After Ukraine's independence, Baturyn returned to popular consciousness with efforts directed towards rediscovery, recovery and reconstruction of the Hetmanate's former capital city. The first archeological excavations to uncover the early 18th-century remnants of the town started in 1995, under the direction of Volodymyr Kovalenko, an archeologist from the Shevchenko State Pedagogical University of Chernihiv. These early

excavations only lasted until 1997, when political interest in the project sharply decreased and led to eventual financial cuts.⁵¹

The study conducted by these early expeditions was significant because they brought to light traces of the destruction and the outline of the town for the first time in almost 300 years. Volodymyr Kovalenko, the head of excavations, recalling the very first work at the site, claims that “the archeological research [in Baturyn] ... presented to the whole world irrefutable evidence of the bloody tragedy of Baturyn which some ‘historians’ so long tried to deny.”⁵² The remains of the Russian devastation was brought to public attention, ending the decades long Russian and Soviet silence and the resultant gap in collective memory. Another important achievement of this brief period of activity was the status of a State Historical-Cultural Reserve called the “Hetman’s Capital” that was given to Baturyn, with bylaws dated May 26, 1994 by the President’s Representative in Chernihiv Oblast.⁵³ These bylaws did not ensure continuous excavations at the site, but they formed the legal basis for protection of the site and made future studies possible.⁵⁴

In 2001, a second round of excavations started, thanks to Ukrainian diaspora funding from North America.⁵⁵ The diaspora contribution was matched by the Ukrainian government’s decree promising to support further excavations at the site.⁵⁶ The renewed excavations brought to light the foundations of the Hetman’s brick palace, remnants of the wooden Resurrection Church, and the house of a Kozak officer in Baturyn’s citadel.⁵⁷ Excavations were also conducted at the country residence of Hetman Mazepa, which was looted and deserted in 1708 and abandoned to oblivion.⁵⁸

The restoration and reconstruction of the destroyed town became another project starting in 2005. Until then, the only attempt to mark Baturyn as a memory space was the erection of a memorial cross on the destroyed citadel territory with funds provided by the Our Ukraine Party led by Viktor Yushchenko. However, after Viktor Yushchenko took the President's Office (January 2005), state bodies also directed attention towards Baturyn. Reflecting Yushchenko's interest in Baturyn, the restoration of historical and architectural monuments and the reconstruction of the destroyed citadel fortifications and other structures in the citadel area started.⁵⁹ In addition to government subsidies, President Yushchenko established the Charitable Fund "the Hetman's Capital" to provide funding for excavations, restorations and reconstructions.⁶⁰ With funds from the Charitable Fund, the restoration of Kochubei's Court House (17th century),⁶¹ the Kyrylo Rozumovskyi Palace (1803),⁶² the Church of the Resurrection (1803),⁶³ and the Resurrection School (1904)⁶⁴ was started as early as 2005.⁶⁵ The restoration of the Kochubei house was completed later in 2005 and was named the Museum of the Hetman's Court. The Resurrection School was then planned to serve as the Baturyn Archeological Museum,⁶⁶ likewise, the Rozumovskyi palace was planned to become the Museum of Hetman's Glory.

On the excavations front, by 2005 the excavation team had completed its work on the foundations of the Hetman's house (1670s) and the wooden Resurrection Church (endowed by Mazepa in the 1690s and destroyed in 1708). With these tasks completed, archeologists could reconstruct the original plans of the destroyed structures in the citadel area.⁶⁷

In the excavations were found foundations of burned houses and artifacts. In 2006 the number of graves opened reached 138, 65 of which belonged to the massacred inhabitants of the town.⁶⁸ The excavations of 2006 brought to light the foundations of Baturyn's main cathedral of the Holy Trinity; construction of the cathedral had been funded by Mazepa (1687–1693). Along with the rest of the town, this cathedral, too, had been destroyed during the Muscovite attack in 1708.

The excavation and restoration of the town was meant to reconstruct the collective memory of the destruction of Baturyn by the “arch-enemy,” the Russians. Viktor Yushchenko wanted to propagate the fact that the Russians were and still are the major threat to Ukrainian independence. To imprint this in the Ukrainian collective memory, he deemed essential the transformation of Baturyn into a memory site. To achieve this, he issued three presidential decrees. The first (No. 955/09.10.2007) is entitled “On celebrating the 300th anniversary of the events related to the military and political campaign of Ukraine's Hetman Ivan Mazepa and the Ukrainian and Swedish Alliance.”⁶⁹ In addition to a number of other measures, the decree reviewed the Baturyn project with close attention and ordered state bodies to continue the restorations at the Rozumovskyi Palace, the construction of the citadel and the improvement of the memorial cross erected in 2004 in the citadel territory. Not surprisingly, Yushchenko's second presidential decree bestowed upon Baturyn the status of a “national reserve”⁷⁰ due to “its role in shaping the historical consciousness of the Ukrainian people, educating the young generation in a respectful attitude towards the history of the Ukrainian state . . .”⁷¹

The third and the last decree was titled “On some questions about the development of the National Historical-Cultural Reserve “the ‘Hetman’s Capital’ of Baturyn” was issued on November 21, 2007. This decree took measures for the further development of the reserve “given Baturyn’s prominent role in Ukraine’s history, and in shaping the historical consciousness of the Ukrainian people in the process of the formation and development of the Ukrainian state ...” The decree specifically ordered the implementation of the reconstruction of the citadel fortifications, towers, gates and items which were located in the citadel area, such as the Hetman’s palace, the Hetman’s treasury, the wooden Resurrection Church, and beyond the citadel—the Holy Trinity Cathedral and Mazepa’s Palace. In addition to these, the decree also called for the transformation of areas adjacent to the already restored buildings into parks (such as the Kochubei House) as well the areas adjacent to the Rozumovskyi Palace.⁷² Following this decree, the Charitable Fund was liquidated and the works in Baturyn, starting from 2008, became dependent on the funds coming from the presidential administration.

In terms of restorations and reconstructions, a faster pace of work was observed in 2008. Contracted companies could complete, in the space of almost a year, the reconstruction of the wooden fortifications of the citadel (Figure 4-12, 4-13, 4-14). Additionally, the Hetman’s building (Figure 4-15), the Hetman’s treasury and the wooden Resurrection Church (1690s) (Figure 4-16) were completely reconstructed on the original remaining foundations. In these projects, the data and graphical reconstructions provided by the archeological expeditions contributed to the rebuilding of the structures and

fortifications.⁷³ The citadel section of the Baturyn project was completed on January 22, 2009, with the addition of a memorial complex. The opening ceremonies were held in a fashion to overshadow the Poltava commemorations.

Konotop: Claiming Kozak Glory in the Present

Another front where the Kozak past has been articulated to fight back imperial and Soviet collective memories is the Konotop Battlefield. The Battle of Konotop took place on June 28, 1659, between allied Kozak, Crimean Tatar and Polish forces and the Russian army. The allied forces managed to defeat the Russian army on the battlefield located between modern-day Shapovalivka and Sosnivka villages near the city of Konotop (today in Sumy oblast). The allied forces were led by the Hetman of the Kozaks, Ivan Vyhovskyi (office 1657–1659), who was the successor to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (after a brief interlude of Yurii Khmelnytskyi). Vyhovskyi was uneasy about the growing influence of Muscovy on Kozak lands, which became a protectorate of the Russian tsar by the Pereiaslav Treaty in 1654, and tipped the balance of his policies in a pro-Polish direction. His vision found expression in the Treaty of Hadiach with Poland which meant to transform the dual Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into a tripartite one, with a Ruthenian (Ukrainian) principality as the third component. In his policy he was opposed by pro-Russian Kozaks, and had to suppress a pro-Russian Kozak uprising led by Otaman Martyn Pushkar of the Poltava regiment (1658). Therefore, the battle against the Russian army was an outgrowth of divisions among Vyhovskyi's Kozaks

between those oriented towards Moscow and those who wanted to minimize Russian influence.

As was the case with the destruction of Baturyn, the Kozak victory in Konotop was also erased from the collective memory of Ukrainians. For Russian imperialists who needed to imprint the idea of Ukrainians and Russians as constituting one people, the existence of anti-Russian Kozaks and victory at Konotop constituted a counter narrative that had to be suppressed. For the Soviets, the historical cases of Russian-Ukrainian conflict, particularly the Battle of Konotop, were subversive of Soviet arguments in favor of “the eternal Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood,” and had to remain in oblivion.⁷⁴

After Ukraine’s independence, the narrative of the battle was reformulated and collective memory reshaped, particularly in the light of increasing research on the Battle of Konotop and the publication of alternative histories to the prevailing Russian and Soviet accounts. Another step in this direction was the inclusion of the battle in the secondary school curricula. Public attention was increasingly drawn to the battlefield event as commemorations started to take place in the 1990s. Among the earliest steps were public prayers held at a memorial dedicated to “all” who had fallen. Members of the nationalist movements, especially, started to visit the battlefield site from 1995 onwards. Starting in 2001, regular local state administration-sponsored events were held on the site.⁷⁵ In 2002, a memory plaque was placed on the battlefield to the memory of the fallen.

A major step towards introducing the battlefield as a commemorative space came during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency. On March 11, 2008, he

issued a presidential decree to mark the 350th anniversary of the “victory of the army which was led by the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Vyhovskyi in the Battle of Konotop.”⁷⁶ The reasoning underlying the decree was that it proposed measures to “renew the historical truth and national memory” and to “propaga[te] objective information on the events of mid-17th century-Ukraine.” With these proclaimed aims, the decree stipulated that commemorative events should be held at the site; events related to the battle promoted in schools and streets, squares and educational institutions named after Vyhovskyi; and exhibits with authentic material displayed in museums. To mark the space and transform the battlefield into a commemorative site, the decree ordered the undertaking of archeological excavations at the site and construction of a series of memorials dedicated to the victory.

When the anniversary day arrived on July 10, 2009, all possible measures were taken to reclaim the Kozak victory at the battle site. The commemorative events included secular and religious ceremonies near the cross on the burial mound and at the memorial plaque. Ceremonies were also held at memorials newly erected on the battlefield, such as the chapel, the (Figure 4-17) eight-meter high monument picturing Kozak arms dedicated to the honor of the victory, and the four-meter high sculpture of Hetman Vyhovskyi (Figure 4-18). Some monuments were erected at the Konotop town center, where the city was defended against the Russian troops. The first was the newly built Kozak church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary (Kyivan Orthodox Patriarchate) (Figure 4-19). The second was the memorial rock dedicated to the “heroic defense of the Konotop fortress” (Figure 4-20).

The third was the bust dedicated to one of the major supporters of Vyhovskyi, Hryhorii Hulianytskyi.⁷⁷

Khortytsia: The Center of Kozak Fame

The fourth and the last item of Kozak space to be analysed in this chapter is Khortytsia Island. Earlier in this dissertation we examined the Soviet Ukrainian initiatives to revive Khortytsia Island and Zaporizhia as a site of collective memory. As noted in the second chapter, this Soviet Ukrainian initiative failed to mark the space as a memory site. However, efforts to revive Khortytsia as the headquarters of the Zaporozhian Kozaks of old did not subside. Here we will examine the process of the revival of Khortytsia as a Kozak site of glory.

In the late 1980s, when *glasnost* and *perestroika* reverberated through Soviet society, the idea of memorialization of Khortytsia Island reemerged in the public arena and found voice in April 1987. A proposition prepared by a commission of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine reflected concerns over the preservation of the Kozak heritage on the island and asked for proper measures to be taken.⁷⁸ Additionally, the Ukrainian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Heritage prepared a report and called attention to the destruction of Khortytsia's historical heritage.⁷⁹ In similar fashion, the Committee for the Protection of Peace issued a declaration in February 1988 claiming that the "Khortytsia Reserve is a great treasure for our people and should be protected accordingly."⁸⁰

Following the emerging public voices, state organs reconceptualized the design and content of the reserve and renamed the museum on the island

the “Museum of Zaporozhian Kozak History” (1988). Even though the museum was renamed, enthusiasts had insufficient time to revise the themes and change the exhibitions at the museum as the collapse of the Soviet Union left local administrators powerless.

In contrast to the absence of administrative actions, popular interest and initiative transformed the Khortytsia Reserve into a site where nationalist and separatist feelings were openly expressed. During the “Great March” of August 1990, when some hundreds of thousands⁸¹ marched to Khortytsia, the reserve was monumentalized as a place of collective memory. In accordance with the growing public attention to Khortytsia, and following its elevation to a national symbol of independence, the reserve was assigned the status of “National Reserve”⁸² status by then Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma (April 6, 1993). Kuchma’s resolution provided a legal basis for the protection of the historical heritage of the island. However, it did not make reference to the unfinished tasks proposed in the early 1970s, and the political will was lacking to revive the idea of creating a theme park, a museum of ethnography, monuments or plaques. The resolution elevated the status of the reserve but fell short of transforming the island into a memorial complex.⁸³

The Khortytsia National Reserve did not attract direct state interest until it was included in the “National Program to Revive and Develop Ukrainian Kozaks, 2002–2005.” The program was proclaimed in 2001 by presidential decree.⁸⁴ The program was tailored to provide a legislative basis for a full-fledged revival of the “Ukrainian Kozaks,” with an emphasis on protection and restoration of physical spaces and memorial sites. Among other

measures, Khortytsia was to be developed with a program dedicated to its revival. The program for the period between 2002 and 2005 did not produce a large-scale impact on the reserve; but it did succeed, however, in reviving the long forgotten theme park concept of the 1960s and 1970s.

In 2001 plans and projects for the construction of the theme park under the name “Zaporozhian Sich” were initiated. In 2005 the state budget released funds for the construction of the “Sich” which was planned to contain a reconstruction of a 17th-century-style Sich with a Kozak church, the houses of *starshyna*, and *kurins*. The project attracted private funding as well. Zaporizhstal, an industrial corporation, played a leading role in supporting the construction project.

The major state impact in Khortytsia came when Viktor Yushchenko took office in January 2005. Soon afterwards, he issued the decree entitled “On urgent measures to develop the Khortytsia National Reserve” (April 29, 2005),⁸⁵ which defined Khortytsia as a unique spiritual center of Ukraine and called for popularization of the site in Ukraine and abroad. To undertake this task, the decree ordered the cabinet of ministers to create a committee to promote an all-Ukrainian campaign entitled “We are Reviving Khortytsia.” The plan’s aim was to create a stable mechanism to protect historical and cultural objects related to the Zaporozhian Kozaks. Moreover, the decree ordered the development of the museum at the reserve and the erection of “symbolic objects to reflect the history of the Zaporozhian Kozaks.” To allow these plans to take effect, the president asked the cabinet of ministers to assign funds from the state budget. Accordingly, the government of Premier Yuliia

Tymoshenko (in office from January 24 to September 8, 2005) allocated 5 million hryvnias for the “Zaporozhian Sich” project.

The decree of April 29, 2005 was followed by the “State program for the development of Khortytsia National Reserve, 2006–2010” (August 30, 2005).⁸⁶ The five-year program was designed to provide protection for historical monuments and objects, reorganize the territory of the reserve, and create an environment for the revival and development of the patriotic traditions of the Zaporozhian Kozaks. These were expected to “create consciousness of the historical significance of Khortytsia Island as a spiritual, state and political symbol of the Ukrainian Nation [natsia],” and to provide a platform for a “patriotic upbringing of youngsters in the heroic traditions of Zaporozhian Kozaks.”

Meanwhile, the theme park construction continued to progress. The reconstructed Sich has two main sections: the inner *Kish* (fortified Kozak camp, borrowed possibly from Crimean Tatar language) and the outer *Kish*. The inner section was planned to reflect the life of the Kozaks and contained six *kurins* and the headquarters of a Zaporozhian Otaman. In addition, the inner part has Kozak offices such as the military chancellery, the Sich school, and lastly the Kozak church of the Protection of Our Most Holy Lady Theotokos and Ever-Virgin Mary (Figure 4-21). The external section, which is yet to be completed, has more interactive purposes and contains units such as the smithy, pottery works, defense towers, ditches, palisade and bulwark. As the project progressed, it gained further public attention, and even the Russian movie “Taras Bulba” (released in 2009) was shot on the reserve and in the

newly constructed “Zaporozhian Sich.” The Sich, made up of twenty-three buildings, was opened with celebrations on October 11, 2009, and was touted as the first Sich after 234 years.

While this was the outward picture in memorializing Zaporozhian Sich, the political competition between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yuliia Tymoshenko that began immediately after the Orange Revolution also found reflection in the Khortytsia initiative. Viktor Yushchenko wished to imprint his name on the project and therefore took an early initiative in 2005 with the decree “On urgent measures to develop the National Reserve-Khortytsia.” To further assure his control over the Khortytsia Reserve, he appointed his man Kostiantyn Sushko as director of the reserve (April 2005). However, as mentioned above, following Yushchenko’s decree, Tymoshenko’s government played its role in the project by budgeting for the memorialization of Khortytsia, and assisted the “We are Reviving Khortytsia” plan by supporting government regulations. Yushchenko’s political discourse on Kozaks was clear to Tymoshenko even before the Orange Revolution, and as the Orange pact fell apart, Tymoshenko wanted to take her credit for the Kozak revivals. Calculating, no doubt, the potential for political benefit, she capitalized on the revival of Khortytsia, maneuvering Yushchenko out of the game. This was achieved with the help of Mykola Tomenko, once a comrade of Yushchenko, who changed allegiance to the Tymoshenko team during the 2005 break-up of the Orange pact and served as her vice-prime minister for humanitarian affairs. Sushko, the Yushchenko appointed director, was replaced by the Tymoshenko-friendly director

Maksym Ostapenko in 2007. Subsequently, Tomenko and Ostapenko took the lead in propagating the memorialization of Khortytsia, and attracted state and private funds to the “We are Reviving Khortytsia” campaign.

The complex “Zaporozhian Sich” was opened on October 11, 2009, with Yuliia Tymoshenko in attendance. At the time the Kozak *rada* gathered on the square of the Sich for the first time in 234 years.

Conclusion

Earlier in this section I discussed the importance of space in the formation of collective memories and examined four different locations connected to the Kozaks. The examination of all cases has shown that space has a major importance in the existence or absence of collective memories.

In the Poltava case, the highly monumentalized town still keeps the narration of the monuments that were placed there to perpetuate the impact of a Russian tsarist victory on collective consciousness. The data suggest that the transformation of the physical space through monuments, churches and plaques displays the strength of this collective memory discourse embedded in the physical space. The data suggests that the strength of the discourse remained even as Ukrainian nationalism gained strength in the early 20th century. The attempt to blow up the Victory Monument serves as a sign of how far the discourse constructed around a battlefield could be disturbing to the Ukrainian nationalist idea. The data from the modern era further suggests that the Ukrainian national establishment could not eradicate the Russian-controlled meanings around the space even in independent Ukraine. Therefore,

one can conclude that the defeat in Poltava remains as a defeat in the present and the Russian discourse in Poltava has not surrendered.

The data suggest that the Ukrainian national enterprise, realizing its imminent defeat in the narrative competition over the Battle of Poltava, searched for other sites of Kozak-Russian interaction where its victory would be more certain. The Baturyn initiative appeared to present a viable option. While excavations provided solid proof of Russian destruction and brutality, on the one hand, the attempts at renovations and reconstructions emphasize Baturyn as a site of “glory” of the Kozak forefathers. The Konotop case was also chosen as a major moment where Kozaks were militarily victorious, and could therefore, be taken as a counterpoint to argument against the discourse of Russian glory in Poltava. The monumentalization of Khortytsia Island as the headquarters of the Kozak glory bears a strong subnarrative of love for freedom and motherland. This subnarrative negotiates a position in favor of national sovereignty gained after long decades of submission to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. With the historical narrative it communicates, thousands of visitors are exposed to a national historical and cultural narrative, and therefore go through a national identity making process and de-Sovietization.

Examination of all of these cases shows a central thesis of this chapter—that control of physical space also assures control of the meanings carried within memory spaces. In all of these cases, therefore, there is a power negotiation within the social strata of Ukrainian society: the national and the pro-Russian discourses. In all of these cases we can observe the national

enterprise to undo and eliminate the pro-Russian discourse, which is seen as an obstacle to the consolidation of collective memories and identities of Ukrainians.

Finally, the data adduced in this chapter suggest that the efforts by the Ukrainian nationalists to transform space through a national formulation of the Kozak collective identity is proof of the fact that the factor of Kozakdom (discussed in the previous chapter) is gaining power against the imperial Russian Soviet collective memories and identities.

Endnotes

¹ In 1721 he assumed the title of Emperor.

² Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists, Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 21. See also Theodore Mackiw, *English Reports on Mazepa, 1687–1709* (New York: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1983), 60–69.

³ The figures are not certain. Subtelny (*Mazepists*, 35) gives the number as 4,000. Serhii Pavlenko quotes Mazepa's forces as composed of 1300 Kozaks based on a letter written during the events. S. Pavlenko, *Zahybel Baturyna 2 Lystopada 1708 r.* (Kyiv: Ukrainiska Vydavnycha Spilka, 2007), 42–43.

⁴ “Manifest Gosudaria Petra I. 1.XI.1708,” in *Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh*, Vol. I (Moskva: Univ. Tip., 1859), 175–176, as quoted in Taras Chukhlib, “Mazepynska Ukraina u Pivnichnii viini 1700–1721 rokiv: osoblyvosti mizhnarodnoho stanovyshcha ta zminy polityko-pravovoho statusu,” *Istorychna Pamiat II* (2009): 7.

⁵ It is estimated that some 7,500–8,000 Kozaks were killed during the defense of Baturyn. For a detailed account of the destruction, see Pavlenko, *Zahybel Baturyna*, 83. The number of residents, all of whom were slaughtered, is put at about 6,000.

⁶ For an historical account see Peter Englund, *The Battle That Shook Europe: Poltava and the Birth of the Russian Empire* (London: V. Gollancz, 1992). V. O. Mokliak, ed. *Poltavska bytva 1709 roku: pohliad kriz pryzmu trokh stolit, 1709–2009: zbirnyk naukovykh statei* (Poltava: TOV “ASMI,” 2009). See also special issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 31 (2009–2010).

⁷ For a treatment of post-war measures taken by the tsar see Vitalii Shcherbak, “Imperski peretvorennia v Hetmanshchyni pislia Poltavskoi bytvy,” *Istorychna Pamiat II* (2009): 10–14.

⁸ Serhii Plokhly, *Ukraine and Russia*, 66.

⁹ Ibid. The Order of St. Andrew had been granted him Peter himself. Mazepa also held the title on the grant of the Habsburg Emperor Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists*, 24.

¹⁰ The term “Mazepists” later came to refer to Ukrainian separatists at different time periods. See Ivan Rudnytsky, “The Intellectual Origins of Modern Ukraine,” in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, ed. Peter Rudnytsky (Edmonton: CIUS, 1987), 126. For a discussion of the conditions that led to Mazepa’s decision, see Hrushevskyi, *A History of Ukraine*, 1970, 347–363.

¹¹ Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 195

¹² Subtelny, *The Mazepists*, 1.

¹³ Oleksa Bintoniak, “Anafema na Hetmana Mazepu,” in *Ivan Mazepa i Moskva: istorychni rozvidky i statti*, ed. Larysa Bondarenko (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo “Rada,” 1994), 81.

¹⁴ Only in 1918, at the request of Symon Petlura, a requiem was first held in memory of Mazepa at St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. See Pavlenko, *Zahybel Baturyna*, 133.

¹⁵ Oleksandr Ohloblyn, “Hetman Ivan Mazepa i Moskva,” in *Ivan Mazepa i Moskva*, 15. See also O. Vintoniak, *Anafema na Hetmana Mazepu* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1991), 112. B. Bidnov, “Tserkovna Anafema na Ivana Mazepu,” *Starozhytnosti* (1992): 11. See also Serhii Plokhyy, *Ukraine and Russia*, 67.

¹⁶ Subtelny, *The Mazepists*, 40.

¹⁷ For “Ukaz gosudaria Petra o postroenii bliz goroda Poltavy, v pamiat oderzhannoi tam nad shvedami batalii, kamennogo muzheskogo Petropavlovskogo monastyria s pridelom Sampsona Strannopriimtsa i piramidy” see N. A. Markevych, *Istoriia Malorossii*, T. 4 (Moskva: O. I. Khrystalev, 1842), 300–301. See also Yelena Pogosyan, *Petr I—arkhitektor rossiiskoi istorii* (Sankt-Peterburg: Iskusstvo, 2001), 115.

¹⁸ Pogosyan, *Petr I*, 115.

¹⁹ The mural has disappeared over time but the marble plaque has remained. The text on the plaque is an edited version of the speech. For the full text, see Viacheslav Borisov, *Poltavskaia bitva, 1709–1909* (Sankt-Peterburg: Ob-vo revnitelei voennykh znanii, 1909), 3. Accessed on June 7, 2012. <http://vvpb.shpl.ru/3pagevpb.html>

²⁰ “Poltava Battle,” accessed June 7, 2012, http://www.battle-poltava.org/ukr/monuments/russian_soldiers/

²¹ Volodymyr Chukhno, “Osyp Stepanovych Sudiienko ta yoho blahodiini spravy,” *Siverianskyi Litopys* 94 (2009): 333–373.

²² “Poltava Battle,” accessed July 12, 2012, <http://vvpb.shpl.ru/6pagevpb.html>. Inscribed on the plaque was:

“Bogu blagodeiavshemu, v pamiat pobedy, oderzhannoi v 1709 godu iunია 27 Gosudarem Rossii Petrom Velikim nad korolem Shvetsii Karlom XII na sem meste v Poltave, v blagopoluchnoe tsarstvovanie Vsemilostiveishego gosudaria-imperatora Aleksandra I zalozhen sei monument malorossiiskim general-gubernatorom kniazem Kurakinym v leto ot Rozhdeniia Khrista 1804 iunია 27.” However, the plaque has not been preserved. See “Poltava Battle,” accessed on June 16, 2012. <http://www.day.kyiv.ua/271959/271568>.

²³ “Poltava Battle,” accessed March 23, 2010, <http://www.battle-poltava.org/>

²⁴ The inscription on this monument reads simply “Peter I.”

²⁵ The plaque reads: “This was the place of command of the Russian Army in the Poltava Battle June 27, 1709.” “Poltava Battle,” accessed March 23, 2010, <http://www.battle.poltava.ua/ukrainian/camp.htm>

²⁶ S. F. Platonov, “K istorii Poltavskoi bitvy,” *Sochineniia*, Vol. 1, Stati po russkoi istorii, (Sankt-Peterburg, 1912), 106. Accessed on June 5, 2011. , <http://vvpb.shpl.ru/16pagevpb.html>. See also N. G. Ustrialov, *Russkaia istoriia do 1855 goda*, II (Petrozavodsk: Novaia istoriia, 1997), 480–483.

²⁷ Quoted in Anatoliy Chernov, “Siianie chuzhoi slavy: Nekotorie razmyshleniia k 370-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Ivana Mazepy, 300-letiiu Poltavskoy bitvy, i arkhitekturnogo pamiatnika-monument Slavy,” *Den*, 27.03.2009.

²⁸ “Poltavskie torzhestva,” *Russkie vedomosti* (26 iunia, 1909).

²⁹ Quoted in Chernov, “Siianie chuzoi slavy.”

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Mykhailo Hrushevskiy was also attentive to the anniversary and published his views on Mazepa. Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, “Na ukrainsku temu: ‘Mazepynstvo’ i ‘Bohdanivstvo’,” *LNV* 15 (1912): 94–102; Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, “Shvedsko-ukrainskyi soiuz 1708,” *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 92 (1909): 7–20.

³² Ibid.

³³ S. F. Platonova, *Poltavskii sbornik v pamiat 200-letii Poltavskoi pobedy: dlia starshego shkolnogo vozrasta* (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdanie Upravleniia, 1909), 109.

³⁴ The Ukrainian bill and the Kozak context of the Ukrainian national anthem was discussed also in Bürger, *Kosakenmythos*, 209–214.

³⁵ For anti-Mazepa statements see Denis Necheporuk, “Mazepa pozorit grivnu,” August 21, 2010, accessed at <http://h.ua/story/287494/> on June 11, 2014. See also “Regional Kolesnichenko o portretakh na grivne: Kakoy Shukhevich? Ottuda i predatelia Mazepu nado ubrat,” 19.09.2011, accessed June 11, 2014, http://censor.net.ua/video_news/182131/regional_kolesnichenko_o_portretah_na_grivne_kakoyi_shuhevich_ottuda_i_predatelya_mazepu_nado_ubrat

³⁶ Anatoli Chernov, “Siianie chuzhoy.”

³⁷ Nezaboryma natsiia, accessed on April 25, 2010, http://nezaboryma-naciya.org.ua/show_month.php?id=15

³⁸ Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 1102/2007, 16 lystopada 2007 r., “Pro nadannia statusu natsionalnogo derzhavnomu istoryko-kulturnomu zapovidnyku ‘Hetmanska stolytsia.’”

³⁹ As well as the “Baturyn tragedy” and the “destruction of the Sich in 1709.”

⁴⁰ Rozporiadzhennia Holovy Oblasnoi Derzhavnoi Administratsii, 437, 15.11.2007, “Pro vidznachennia 300-richia podii, poviazanykh z voienno-politychnym vystupom hetmana Ukrainy Ivana Mazepy ta ukladenniam ukrainsko-shvedskoho soiuzu,” accessed April 25, 2010, <http://www.mazepa.name/news/Poltava-437.html>

⁴¹ Even terminology generated fierce discussions. The Ukrainian national discourse rejected the use of the word “celebrations” in favor of commemorations. Kyrylo Halushko, “Sviatkuvannia chy vidznachennia, abo doky tryvatyme dlia ukraintiv Poltavska bataliia?” *Den*, 06.23.2007.

⁴² Ihor Petrovych, “Poltavska bytva tryvaie?” *Lvivska hazeta*, 28.03.2008.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ “Rosiiia profinansuie sviatkuvannia 300-richia Poltavskoi bytvy,” accessed April 25, 2010. <http://gazeta.ua/index.php?id=217718&id=dufchxppur>
Faktor Kapital, a business conglomerate headquartered in Ukraine and operating in Russia, provided charitable funds for the restoration of the “Monument at the Common Grave of the Perished Russian Soldiers.” At the time *Faktor Kapital* was under criminal investigation and looking to expand its base in Russia. For a report on *Faktor Kapital*’s involvement in Poltava, see Oleh Snihur, “Tserkva pid kurhanom u Poltavi restavruit bratsku mohylu rosiiskykh voiakiv tsaria Petra I,” *Ukraina moloda*, accessed June 14, 2014, <http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua/regions/0/219/0/46173/>

⁴⁵ Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute's academic periodical *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* issued a special volume for the 300th anniversary of the battle in which the battle was examined from various aspects. Particularly on the 2009 commemorations, see Guido Hausmann, "Poltava 2009: Deimperializing an Imperial Site of Memory," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 31 (2009–2010): 657–679.

⁴⁶ The plaque on the monument reads: "Time heals wounds. To the eternal memory of the brave fallen soldiers at the Battle of Poltava June 27, 1709."

⁴⁷ "Poltava odna bytva dva vidznachennia," accessed September 10, 2011. http://zaua.org/pg/article/editorial/read/1873/Poltava_odna_bytva_dva_vidznachenna

⁴⁸ A possible etymology of the unusual name Baturyn is the Turkic word *batur*, referring to noble and heroic personality. The word *batur* is possibly related to *bağatur* (attested in the medieval Turkic Codex cumanicus), *bagatur* (Mongolian), *bohatyr* (Ukr.), and *bahadur* (Farsi). *Batur* was used as a name for boys in the old Turkic language. See Sevan Nişanyan, *Sözlerin Soyağacı* (Istanbul: Everest, 2009). During my visit to Baturyn in the summer of 2009 Volodymyr Kovalenko and Volodymyr Mezentsev, co-heads of the Baturyn archeological excavations, informed me that the area was once populated by Turkic tribes, which possibly explain the source of the town's name.

⁴⁹ The death toll is quoted differently in various sources. Zenon Kohut and Volodymyr Mezentsev give a range of 11,000–14,000. See Z. Kohut and V. Mezentsev, "Ukrainsko–kanadskyi proekt arkheolohichnykh doslidzhen u Baturyni v 2001–2008," in *Baturynska starovyna: zbirka naukovykh prats, prysviachena 300-littiu Baturynskoi trahedii*, ed. Zenon Kohut et al. (Kyiv: Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2008).

⁵⁰ See Volodymyr Kovalenko, "Peredmova," in *Serednovichni starozhytnosti Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: Materialy VII mizhnarodnoi studentskoi naukovoï arkheolohichnoi konferentsii*, (Chernihiv: Siverianska dumka, 2008), 3.

⁵¹ Volodymyr Kovalenko, "Peredmova," 3.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ The site was established as a secured zone in 1996, with a regulation issued by the Chernihiv Oblast State Administration. For details see, V. Kovalenko, “Arkheolohichni Baturyn,” in *Materialy mizhnarodnoi naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii z nahody 295-i richnytsi z dnia smerti hetmana Ukrainy Ivana Mazepy ta 10-richchia zapovidnyka “Hetmanska stolytsia,”* 25–26 travnia 2004, ed. Kovalenko et al. (Nizhyn: Polihraf, 2006), 76.

⁵⁵ The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) took the leading role and sponsored the excavations in collaboration with academic institutions in Ukraine. To support the excavations CIUS also led the fund-raising efforts and activated many North American Ukrainian organizations and individuals.

⁵⁶ Prime minister Anatolii Kinakh’s government, under pressure from Viktor Yushchenko’s parliamentary bloc “Our Ukraine” (Nasha Ukraina), issued a regulation dated 17.08.2002 and numbered 1123, entitled “On the Completion of a complex program of conservation of the memorial “State Historical-Cultural Reserve: ‘the Hetman’s Capital’ and technical and transportation substructure of Baturyn.” See the text at <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=1123-2002-%EF>

⁵⁷ The citadel, being at the edge of the fortified area on the Seim River, was the administrative core of the town fortress where the Hetman’s house, the wooden Resurrection Church, the Hetman’s treasury building, and the Kozak House were located. This citadel is also known as the *Lytovskiy Zamok* (Lithuanian Castle).

⁵⁸ Details of the excavations are quoted from V. Mezentsev, “Canada-Ukraine Archaeological Expedition,” *CIUS Annual Review* (2002): 13–14.

⁵⁹ All in all, forty-two items in Baturyn were listed as historical and cultural-national valuables. (It should be noted that not all of these items belong to the era of the town’s destruction by the Muscovite army). The breakdown of these items by categories appears as follows six architectural monuments (four of which are of national importance), twenty-four archeological monuments (remnants), and twelve historical monuments with artistic value.

⁶⁰ To head the Fund was appointed Mykola Butko, an Economist at the Chernihiv State Technological University and an ex-governor, with the status of advisor to the President.

⁶¹ During Mazepa's tenure as hetman, Vasyl Kochubei—the father of Motria—served as general chancellor and general judge. The Court House is located beyond the old fortress area at a point closer to Mazepa's palace at Honcharivka. For details see Volodymyr Mezentsev, "An Archaeological and Historical Survey of Baturyn, the Capital of Hetman Ivan Mazepa," in *Mazepa e il suo tempo, Storia, cultura, societa*, ed. Giovanni Siedina (Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2004), 234.

⁶² Kyrylo Rozumovskyi was the last hetman (1750–1764). The palace was commissioned by him and completed when Rozumovskyi died in 1803. Having had some restorations at different times, the palace was for a long time deserted and on the brink of collapse before the recent restorations. Originally the palace had two separate wings on the sides. These two wings were destroyed in 1914 and 1930. See Volodymyr Mezentsev, "The Baturyn Excavations, 2003–2004 Report from Ukraine's Historical Town Baturyn," *The Ukrainian Image (Obraz)* January (2005).

⁶³ Its construction was funded by Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovskyi. The hetman is buried in this church.

⁶⁴ Sources refer to this building also as the Sunday School or the Parish School.

⁶⁵ "Pershyi etap prohramy vidrodzhennia Baturyna povynen buty zavershenyi do kintsia lystopada 2006 roku," 02.07.2005, accessed April 9, 2010, <http://prostir.museum/news/ua/detail?id=522>

⁶⁶ The Resurrection School (now Baturyn Archeological Museum) is located in the vicinity of the citadel.

⁶⁷ V. Mezentsev. "Report On The Excavations In Baturyn in 2003–2004," *CIUS Press Release* 14.12.2004.

⁶⁸ Martin Dimnik and V., Mezentsev, "The 2006 Excavations at Baturyn," *News Release*. August 5, 2010, http://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/announce/media/Media%202007/2007-01-26_Excavations%20at%20

Baturyn%20in%202006%20(eng).pdf. See also *Ukrainian-Canadian Magazine-Osnova*, July, 2007, 45–48.

⁶⁹ Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 1131/2007, 16 lystopada 2007 r., “Pro nadannia statusu natsionalnoho derzhavnomu istoryko-kulturnomu zapovidnyku ‘Hetmanska stolytsia.’”

⁷⁰ The highest recognition for a historical site in Ukraine.

⁷¹ Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 1102/2007, 16 lystopada 2007 r., “Pro nadannia statusu natsionalnoho derzhavnomu istoryko-kulturnomu zapovidnyku ‘Hetmanska stolytsia.’”

⁷² Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 194/2008, 04.03.2008, “Pro deiaki pytannia rozvytku natsionalnoho istoryko-kulturnoho zapovidnyka ‘Hetmanska stolytsia’ ta selyshcha Baturyn (Iz zminamy, vnesenymy zhidno z Ukazom Prezydenta).

⁷³ Z. Kohut, V. Mezentsev and V. Kovalenko, “Rozkopky u Baturyni 2008 r. ta vidznachennia 300-littia Baturynskoi trahedii,” *Homin Ukrainy* (10.02.2009), 10.

⁷⁴ The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian studies made an effort to return the information about the era (1654-1657) leading to the Konotop Battle by translating and publishing Volume 9, Book 2, Part 2 of Hrushevskyyi’s *History of Ukraine-Rus’* in 2010. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, The Cossack Age 1654-1657, Vol. 9, Book 2, Part 2, trans. Marta Daria Olynyk (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2010).

⁷⁵ Among such events the major one is the festival of “Kozak Radoslav.” This festival will be addressed in the next chapter.

⁷⁶ Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 207/2008, 11.03.08, “Pro vidznachennia 350-richchia peremohy viiska pid provodom hetmana Ukrainy Ivana Vyhovskoho u Konotopskii bytvi.”

A cabinet resolution organized the action plan for the commemorative events proposed in the President’s decree. Kabinet Ministriv Ukrainy, 783-r, 28 travnia 2008 r. “Rozporiadzhennia pro pidhotovku ta provedennia zakhodiv

do 350-richia peremohy viiska pid provodom hetmana Ukrainy Ivana Vyhovskoho u Konotopskii bytvi.”

⁷⁷ He took part in the Khmelnytskyi Uprising, as well as in the Battle of Konotop.

⁷⁸ Bazhan et al., *Zberezhemo tuiu slavu*, Document 114, 388.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Document 119, 401.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Document 120, 402.

⁸¹ Some sources put the number of the participants as high as 300,000 to 500,000.

⁸² The area of the Reserve was to cover Baida (Little Khortytsia), Dubovoho, Roztbina, Try Stohy, Serednia, Blyzniuky, and Vyrvy.

⁸³ Document 124, 407–9.

⁸⁴ Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 1092/2001, 15 lystopada 2001 r., “Pro natsionalnu prohramu vidrozhennia ta rozvytku Ukrainskoho kozatstva na 2002–2005 roky.”

⁸⁵ Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 732/2005, 29 kvitnia 2005 r., “Pro nevidkladni zakhody shchodo rozvytku natsionalnoho zapovidnyka Khortytsia.”

⁸⁶ Rozporiadzhennia Kabinet Ministriv Ukrainy, 373-r, 30 serpnia 2005 r., “Pro skhvalennia Kontseptsii Derzhavnoi prohramy rozvytku Natsionalnoho zapovidnyka ‘Khortytsia’ na 2006–2010 roky.”

CHAPTER FIVE

CONSTRUCTION OF THE KOZAK CULTURAL SPACE

After examining the social aspect of the Kozak revival in the third chapter and the physical space aspect in the fourth, this chapter will examine the evolution of the cultural space mostly from the perspective of regeneration. Regeneration, as discussed by Anthony Smith, refers to the mobilization of the emotions of individuals to have them serve national goals, so as to reform and renew the community. This chapter pays attention to major events, figures and social phenomena related to the mobilization of the masses within the framework of Kozak articulations. For its purposes this chapter will examine *dumy* and the *kobzar* tradition and their revival and regenerative force, the festivals and their power to communicate and negotiate symbols, memories and values.

Regeneration at Kozak Spaces: Festivals and Commemorations

The process subsequent to creating physical space in shaping the images, symbols, memories and identities in the community is regeneration. Regeneration is about engendering emotions to mobilize people to serve national goals with an eventual aim of reforming and renewing the community. But how can this mobilization be efficiently achieved? To answer the question it is necessary to study collective memory as a tool of mobilization. My fieldwork shows that this tool is extensively used in festivals and commemorations. In Ukraine I found that festivals and commemorations are often overlapping; therefore, in this section, I provide an examination of both through selected cases.¹

Why should memory provide a platform for mobilization and thus regeneration of a community? Memory is the foundation of identity, and it can be perceived in both the individual and the collective context. While I agree with the argument that individuals are the primary memory holders, for the purposes of this section I would like to consider the role of society (collectivity). While pieces of memories lie in individual minds, the individual memory cannot form and hold information without social interaction. However, the immediate question is—what sort of social interaction forms a memory? Here I would like to pay attention to such collective interactions, as festivals and commemorations, venues at which memory is collectively expressed. With a collective act, memory is transported to the physical realm; and this allows space to become an active venue for the workings of memory. Therefore, interaction at a certain place brings out memories of the past and blends them with contemporary experiences.²

Collective commemorations have a certain setting adorned with ceremonial, festive and ritualistic patterns. Such patterns are planned and promoted by those who are interested in conserving what they define as the memory of the community. Such community members might be termed the political and/or cultural elite. In recognition of this factor, Nancy Wingfield argued that “popular memory is an ongoing process of collective consciousness that incorporates elements of state-guided or elite remembrance”³ Therefore, the elite, via festivals and ceremonies, would usually be disposed to control collective space to promote a certain version of the past, displacing the alternative versions of other community members.

Control of the collective space, where contending memories exist, requires manipulation of meanings and activation of political power mechanisms. In the process of manipulation, holders of alternative memories react, and there emerges a conflict over the narratives and symbolism pertaining to the event. Such a conflict usually takes place around the narratives of defeats, victories, mass killings, genocides, independence wars or uprisings. Eventually, ceremonies, commemorations, festivals, heritage sites, and monuments become special places around which conflicts of contesting memories take place.

As examined in the previous chapter, spaces of memory (physical sites of memory) are loaded with meanings and their impact on consciousness is transformative. Spaces of memory, amplified with ceremonies, commemorations and festivals, are increased in their impact and become sites of conflicts. This is because of the loaded meanings of the physical spaces. Katharine Hodgkin recognizes the complexity: “[t]he establishment of memorial sites, places where the past is not only preserved as fetish but also transmitted as signification, is inevitably a focus for struggle for meaning: whose monument is permitted, and what meanings may it convey.”⁴ However, as much as it looks like a struggle, it also appears as an essential process to provide grounds for contemporary human consciousness, simply because it provides a platform for interaction, for movement. Halbwachs provided an insight about the importance of such conflictual situations when he stressed the nature of memory as emerging on occasions where individuals can position themselves vis-à-vis others.⁵

As much as places of memory have central importance in forging collective memory, their impact reaches full capacity with ceremonies in the form of festivals and commemorations. Paul Connerton draws attention to the injected “narrative” in the act of commemoration: “[in commemoration] the community is reminded of its identity as represented by and told in a master narrative ... its master narrative is more than a story told and reflected on, it is a cult enacted. An image of the past, even in the form of a master narrative, is conveyed and sustained by ritual performances.”⁶ Therefore, physical sites and monuments are largely speechless without ceremonies organized at those places and without the attendance of large numbers of people. Attendance, coupled with commemorative acts, reproduces a preferred “narrative.” Sites and monuments then concretize the meanings of past events in the public realm.

Ukrainians of the late Soviet era were not ignorant of the power of festivals and ceremonies. From the early days of the Soviet Union to the late period, the nationalities of the Union were subjected to state controlled festivals and ceremonies dedicated to promote Soviet ideals. Even in the economic crisis of the 1920s, the newly established regime needed to recruit people to the newly created revolutionary mythology. Soviet festivals, as James von Geldern argued, “were a medium that allowed for the enactment of revolutionary stories.”⁷ On a very basic level, festivals of the early Soviet era promoted the new regime by displaying the heroism of the revolution. Collective acts, in the form of ceremonies, festivals, and commemorations, were used for the regime’s legitimacy.

Knowing that ethnic components would draw more people to the system, Soviet policy makers focused more on the ethnic particulars of the nationalities. Eventually, they tailored Soviet celebrations, such as wedding rituals, army and school initiation ceremonies, internal passport granting rituals and solstice holidays to include an ethnic flavour. These Soviet festivals were designed as a platform for propaganda to popularize the regime and communicate ideas.

Glasnost and *perestroika* caused new social movements in the public realm. The political and cultural elite of the respective Soviet republics and nationalities started to discuss the shortcomings of the Soviet project. While this discussion took place, it allowed, as Richard Stites has argued, new trends in popular entertainment. The relaxation during *glasnost* and *perestroika* in this sense, from Stites' perspective, had two priorities. The first was to allow greater participation by the masses in the "national renewal" via "seeing problems dramatized or fictionalized in song, story, television drama, or comedy routine."⁸ Second, he argued, was that the new approach allows a "pluralism" in which "religious freedom, greater privacy, personal security and autonomy, preservation of past culture" were promised.⁹ It was under the impact of the spirit of the time the nationally oriented Ukrainian elite became involved in the newly emerging late Soviet society and openly reacted to the issues related to the Russification of Ukrainian culture.

The nationalist tendencies in Ukraine found their voice in the formation of the People's Movement of Ukraine (*Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy*). The movement emerged in 1989 as a civil movement with Ukrainian dissident

roots. This civil movement was formed to make an impact on the Soviet system and its original name continued “. . . for Perestroika”; however, it later gained a larger political agenda to promote Ukraine’s independence. While this dissertation cannot give an historical account of the movement, the ceremonies and public events that were organized are essential. These activities re-defined physical space, revived a certain version of collective memory, and eventually re-defined identity for Ukraine.

The first of such events was the human chain, formed on January 22, 1990, which extended from Lviv to Kyiv and was also attended by those from further east. The chain was dedicated to the commemoration of the Act of Unification (*Akt Zluky*). This act was signed on January 22, 1919, and declared the unification of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic. The human chain formed in January 1990 had a large impact because it physically linked large masses of people. The Ukrainian Soviet authorities stated that the number of participants was 450,000, while organizers claimed from 4 to 5 million. In either case, thousands took to the streets to recall a past political unification. This historical event represented a political statement for the present as people wanted to show that Ukraine is united. The symbolism of the event transported the past occurrence to the present and reconstructed the image of the “Ukrainian” geographic space and reclaimed it. Eventually, the event displayed the power of the Ukrainian national orientation.

The second of such late Soviet Ukrainian events, organized by the Ukrainian nationalist circles, was another commemoration. The

commemoration was dedicated to the establishment of the Zaporozhian Sich, the military headquarters of the Kozak army. The commemoration lasted five days (July 1–5, 1990). Leading organizers were the Rukh (People's Movement of Ukraine) and the Ukrainian Language Society named after Taras Shevchenko. The first day of the commemoration was dedicated to the memory of the prominent historian of the Kozak era, Dmytro Yavornytskyi. On the second day, participating delegations established a tent camp at the site where the Chortomlytska Sich of the Zaporozhians once stood. On the third day, a conference was held in Nikopol, near the Chortomlytska Sich, dedicated to the history of the Zaporozhian Sich. The conference was followed by ceremonies and public speeches. The fourth day was reserved for the commemoration of a prominent Sich leader, Ivan Sirko (c. 1610–1680) (Figure 5-1). During the ceremonies, a cross was erected on the monumental mound near Sirko's grave. Participants brought a handful of soil from their home towns to make the grave.¹⁰ On the last day of the ceremonies participants gathered on the island of Khortytsia. The crowd later marched through the city of Zaporizhia and the island. Events of a similar sort, but on a smaller scale, took place at historical Kozak sites such as Berestechko, Baturyn and Khotyn. These Kozak commemorations brought the Kozak past back into the Soviet context. The commemoration of the establishment of the Kozak Sich debunked the Soviet historical reading of Kozaks in an effort to replace it with a national one. Participants demonstrably claimed their Kozak heritage, which they could not openly do in the Soviet Union. Recalling their forefathers' deeds, participants proclaimed a Kozak identity and this new

identity was manifested in Kozak dress and Kozak songs. Moreover, they claimed historical Kozak space. And again, as was the case in the first example this event eventually meant to dismantle the Soviet meanings attached to given physical spaces.

In addition to commemorations of past events, musical festivals proved effective for the agenda purposes of Ukrainian nationalists. Festivals create a designated space and time for the participants. This means that the festive space and time are “insularly delimited.”¹¹ It creates a liminality within which a person is taken out of his/her daily life and brought into a particularly created space of images, symbols and meanings. In this sense, these musical festivals successfully created spaces isolated from Soviet identities and culture. In these festive spaces national traditions were revived and negotiated. The *Chervona Ruta* music festival which took place in Chernivtsi on September 17–24, 1989 demonstrated the power of festivals. The event was named after the popular song *Chervona Ruta*, whose author Volodymyr Ivasiuk died under suspicious circumstances in 1979. The song and Ivasiuk had acquired a deep symbolic meaning for Ukrainian dissidents.

The festival gathered singers from all over Ukraine. They sang only in Ukrainian, and many participants expressed, either in their speeches or songs, their reaction to the Soviet persecution of Ukrainian culture and language. The event was planned and run by the nationalist cultural elite of Ukraine, and technical equipment was provided by the Canadian-Ukrainian music production company “*Kobza*,” which was co-owned by one of Heorhii Tkachenko’s students, Canadian-Australian Viktor Mishalov. With its

nationalist emphasis, the festival gained such symbolic importance that it has been repeated biannually across the full breadth of the country.

Another variant of such musical festivals was held in 1989 under the title of Oberih. The event again was planned by the national cultural elite of Ukraine. Around thirty performers, including *kobzari*, arrived from all over Ukraine, and emphasized their protective goals for Ukrainian culture.

After independence, festivals and ceremonies continued. However, the innovative and haphazard organizational fashion of the late 1980s was replaced by more regulated events, related to the establishment of an independent state. With independence, the Ukrainian cultural elite, composed of people of different backgrounds but sharing the aim to transform the Soviet cultural heritage, could more openly organize and regulate the content of the festivals and ceremonies. As was the case previously, the elite wanted these festivals to create spaces where they could “regenerate” a certain formulation of collective memories and identities.

Here we may return to the *kobzari*, and bring forward some examples to show how they become involved in the regeneration efforts. The first example is the annual traditional music festival held on Trinity Sunday, organized by the Kyiv *Kobzar* Guild. The event is named *Festival of the Ukrainian Epic Tradition: Kobzari’s Trinity Sunday*, which takes place every year since 2008 during the Feast of the Holy Trinity. When for first time I participated in the events as an observer in 2009, I discovered that the event was planned to take place at the Ivan Honchar Folk Culture Museum, located on Ivan Mazepa Street, on the stretch now renamed Lavrska Street, in Kyiv.

Upon my arrival at the site I noticed that the festival brought *kobzari* from all over Ukraine to Kyiv. There were *kobzari* of different generations. Because the major aim of the event organizers is to assure “revival” and “continuation” of the tradition, the older and younger generations of *kobzari* were performing together in the front courtyard and also in front of the walls of the museum (Figure 5-2). I noticed that during such performances *kobzari* wanted to be visible to passersby and to showcase the *kobzar* tradition as a phenomenon exclusive to Ukraine and as a unique heritage of the past.

According to the data I collected during my participant observations, the festival has regenerative purposes because both organizers and performers aim at attracting public attention to Ukrainian national traditions and to the cultural and historical heritage. For this purpose organizers and performers provide, besides *kobzar* performances, lectures about certain aspects of the tradition. They also organize workshops for instrument construction. New publications about the tradition are also introduced. Particular attention is given to the new generation and schools are invited to participate with their students in the lectures and workshops.

Following the precedent of the historical *kobzari*, present day masters and students go to the streets to perform. While performing on the streets, they usually place a box in front of them to collect money. From my observations the bypassers are not indifferent to them. Performers gain enough attention on the street that they can even make money. To emphasize the tradition, all *kobzari* in the event wear the Ukrainian traditional shirt (*vyshyvanka*). Even though there is no established knowledge that old-time *kobzari* wore

vyshyvanky, (sing. *vyshyvanka*), the shirt has the status of a national symbol, and modern-day *kobzari* would like to emphasize their attachment to the national idea with the shirt. Moreover, to emphasize their attachment to the traditions of the old-time *kobzari*, modern-day *kobzari* attend church services on Sunday and have their instruments blessed.

In addition to the *kobzar* guilds and their members, the Ukrainian National Union of *Kobzari* is an active participant in the process of communicating *kobzar* images and symbols. The union was established in 1995 and functions in ten regions and three cities. Its membership reached 450 *kobzari*. In contrast to the guilds, the union has no claim to reinterpret and revive the old *kobzar* traditions. It rather follows the academic musical development of the *kobzar* arts. Yet the union defines one of its major tasks as “checking the systematic character of collections and records of *kobzar* inheritance.” The union also makes efforts to “propagate and popularize *kobzar* music from times immemorial through the means of mass propaganda.”¹² For its purposes the union organizes festivals, competitions, and workshops for the preparation, reconstruction and restoration of traditional instruments. Annual events are held in Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kremenchuk, and Chernihiv. In addition, to attract youngsters to the tradition, the union organizes performance competitions.

To further study the formation of the cultural space by the *kobzari* I refer to the case of a festival organized by the Ukrainian National Union of *Kobzari*. I was invited to the event by Volodymyr Yesipok, the head of the National Union. Introducing the event he said proudly that this festival would

be a unique event and that it would take place near the Stritivska High Pedagogical School of *Kobzar* Arts on July 4, 2009. Yesipok told me that there would be private bus service to the festival location to transport people from Kyiv. Upon agreement on where and how to meet him he strongly advised me to wear a *vyshyvanka* and mentioned that this is a rule for participation.

Indeed, upon my arrival at the festival site I could see what Yesipok meant by claiming that the festival would be a unique happening. It was a significant event because the festival was called to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the School of *Kobzar* Arts and had collected 176 *kobzari* from all over Ukraine to perform at the same time (Figure 5-3). This collective *kobzar* performance was recorded in the book of Ukrainian records.

In terms of symbolism, the event presenting the *kobza* as the Kozak instrument constructed direct links between the Kozaks and the *kobzari*. The festival flyers pictured the *kobza* with Kozak war insignia. The same image was selected for the festival flag. The image contained a *kobza* lying on Kozak swords and pikes (Figure 5-4). The flag was carried on long poles around the festival space by youngsters in Kozak outfits. Also, the design of the flier contained scenes from paintings: Kozaks on horses and a family in sorrow listening to a performing *kobzar*. The stage was reached through a pond and the pathway over the pond was occupied by Kozaks holding up Kozak swords and greeting the arriving participants. On stage, in addition to the *kobzar* performances, the Kozaks of the “Spas” Organization staged Kozak martial

arts performances and fired Kozak cannons.¹³ Kozaks cooked the Kozak food *kulich* (a gruel prepared from millet) and served it to the participants (Figure 5-5).

Another festival in which *kobzari* perform is *the Land of Dreams* (*Kraina mriy*). Unlike those so far examined this festival is not organized either by the guild or the union. However, one of the two masterminds behind this festival project is the *kobzar* Taras Kompanichenko.

The *Land of Dreams* annual festival series started in 2004 and gradually became one of the biggest and most popular international ethno-festivals in Ukraine. The festival takes place each year in Kyiv's *Spivochi Pole*, an outdoor venue on the high bank of the Dnipro, at a date, which more or less corresponds to the folk festival *Ivana Kupala* (Midsummer's night). International in scope, the festival hosts bands and musicians from various countries. However, despite its international aspect, Ukrainian music and folk culture find a large place in the festival program. The festival program is rather traditionalized, with events that occur every year. Each year the festival program provides a platform for various activities such as expositions for folk art objects, competition for the best embroidered shirt, a workshop for making embroidered shirts, folk games, folk tale reading sessions for children, Ukrainian folk dance workshops, shows of Kozak martial arts, and performances by popular bands, and finally *kobzar* performances. During two days of events one could visit the tents of folk art masters from all over Ukraine (Figure 5-6). The folk art presented here often involves Kozak images, figures, and sabers. *Kobzari* also perform their repertoire, including

dumy, in their traditionally designated corner. (Figure 5-7). The folk band *Khorea Kozatska*, led by Taras Kompanichenko, often takes the stage and performs pieces from the *kobzari*'s repertoire (Figure 5-8). The *kobzari* not only perform their repertoire, but often explain the background of the pieces they perform and establish a connection between the present and the past. One of many such cases was at the *Land of Dreams 2009* when the day of the festival was the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava. Before his performance the *kobzar* Mykola Tovkailo, the head master of the Kyiv Guild, reminded the crowd that it was the day of the battle.

Today is an extraordinary day, the day of the Poltava Battle, an unfortunate event for Ukrainians and for our army. As you know, Hetman Mazepa, with the support of the Swedes, stood against Peter I. Unfortunately, our army sustained a defeat and the enemies were victorious . . . And even though president [Viktor Yushchenko] said that this is a day to mourn, the remaining enemies are celebrating the Poltava Battle in Poltava. I have just arrived from Pereiaslav, and there we held a requiem for the memory of Mazepa at the cathedral built by the funds provided by him... He built many churches and cathedrals in Ukraine. There I performed a song that I would like to perform now. It was authored by Mazepa himself ... here is the folk version ... and there is also a *kobzar* version and it is possible that Mazepa performed his song either on a *kobza* or *torban* which is still preserved . . .¹⁴

The same day other *kobzar* performances by Mykhailo Koval, Yarema Shevchuk and Taras Kompanichenko followed Tovkailo's example and

performed songs and recited *dumy* to honor the Kozaks and their heroic deeds.¹⁵ Taras Kompanichenko, presenting his reconstruction of the 18th-century “Poems of National Coat of Arms, Zaporozhian Army: Distinguished Warrior,” explains that “it is the Kozak with a Musket, this was the national coat of arms at those times [in the past]. The meaning is that it was the representation of the nation [*natsia*], that is to say the [Kozak] does not want to give his own land to anyone except God in the heavens. This is a characteristic of the era of Mazepa.”¹⁶

When the two-day festival ended around midnight with performances on the main stage of popular ethnic music bands, Taras Kompanichenko appeared alone on the huge stage to close off the event with his *kobzar* outfit which included Kozak baggy pants or *sharavary*. His greetings and wishes to meet next year were applauded by the participating thousands.

So far I have taken examples of festivals to illustrate how *kobzari* are inherent to the communication and negotiation of Kozak images, symbols, values and memories. In all of these cases, the *kobzari* are either the main organizers or primary partners in the organization of festivals. In this part I would like to move on to festivals that are primarily organized by the Kozak formations which I have already discussed. Such festivals are organized by most of the Kozak formations and take place frequently in the Ukrainian cultural sphere. The numbers of such festivals cannot be estimated, however, since many such festive events take place in villages as well as in cities. Here I would like to provide two examples of festivals in which I participated.

The first Kozak-organized festival is the *International Kozak Festival of Customary Culture: Living Fire Uniting Ukraine* which is organized in Vinnytsia by the local Kozak regiment of the “Ukrainian Kozaks” named after Ivan Bohun. The fact that the organization takes its name from the famous Kozak leader Bohun has to do with the latter’s service in the city as a captain.¹⁷ Oleksandr Moiseiev, a Kozak of the regiment, defined the festival as a “Kozak ethnic festival” intended as an attempt to “revive [Kozaks]” in Vinnytsia (Figure 5-9). The ultimate goal he argued is “reviving the country.” He further explained that the festival is an initiative of local Kozaks and enthusiasts.¹⁸

The festival has taken place every year since its start in 2009. I had the opportunity to follow the first festival of the annual series. When I arrived in Vinnytsia I was not sure at what sort of space the event would take place. Then, I found that the festival was actually taking place on Kempa Island, which is in the city center and located on the Southern Buh River.¹⁹ The preference for the festival location symbolically recalled the location of Kozak headquarters, Khortytsia Island on the Dnipro River.

As soon as I walked over the bridge and arrived at the island, I was met by Kozaks in *vyshyvanky* and baggy Kozak pants. Behind the Kozaks a shaman was playing drums and entertaining children in his designated corner. A few meters behind the shaman were a number of Kozaks in baggy pants and wearing the forelock (*oseledets*), practicing their swordsmanship. There were children practicing with wooden Kozak swords. A few meters away from the sword-practicing grounds was a tent-camp. Here I found that Kozaks, arriving

from all over Ukraine, established an encampment following the Kozak tradition with an aim to revive the spirit of the forefathers. Festival organizers declare that the festival takes the “Kozak model of society” where everybody is part of Kozak divisions. In this spirit, they encourage arriving Kozaks to set up their tent camp with fellow Kozaks in the form of the Zaporozhian Sich, which they consider a “desired state model.”²⁰ Also, to refer to the meanings carried by folk calendar celebrations, the festival took place a day before *Ivana Kupala*.

Festival programs for such events share many similarities. Like all Kozak festivals, this one offers guests performances of Kozak war games and martial arts. This part of the program is reserved for those Kozak formations which focus especially on reviving Kozak fighting arts. The performers display techniques of the martial dance *hopak*, rank-against-rank (*lava na lavu*), boxing, fencing, archery, crossbow, shooting with cannons, and Kozak equestrian shows. In addition, Kozak food, Kozak dress, and folk art are present in the festival space. Horseback riding is also a popular festival activity. Kozaks even arrive at the location on horseback from far distances. As a rule *kobzari* take part in the festival, and this Kozak festival also reserves a special place for *kobzar* performances, which include recitals of *dumy* and a mini-festival entitled “*Kobzari*’s Songs.”

In the following section I will move on to the regeneration efforts made in spaces that are part of the historical Kozak realm. I will start with a survey of regeneration in Kozak historical sites with the festival “Kozak Glory—Healing Spring.” This festival is held at Shar-Hora near Hovtva

(Kozelshchynskiy district, Poltava oblast). The location, Hovtva, is promoted as one of the oldest recorded settlements from the times of Kyivan Rus; the plaque, placed by modern Kozaks in 1995, commemorates the 900th anniversary of the settlement. In the Kozak period the region also was the arena for a number of conflicts and battles. For, the modern Kozaks, therefore, this location is a marker of “glory” because the “Ukrainians” have owned these lands for many centuries. However, more importantly for the Kozaks, Hovtva was one of the locations where hetman of the unregistered Kozaks Yakov Ostrianyn led his uprising in 1638 against the Poles. In the uprising, Ostrianyn Kozaks defended their ranks victoriously against the Polish army at Hovtva.

I conducted observations at the festival “Kozak Glory—Healing Spring” which took place in 2010. I arrived at the festival site, which was rather difficult to reach from urban centers, shortly before the opening ceremonies. Considering the location and hardships of transportation I was not expecting a big turnout. However, I was surprised by the thousands of festival participants, who continued to arrive until late hours.

The festival, established the connection of the location with the historical past with the march of modern Kozaks, led by a personification of Hetman Ostrianyn and his Kozak elite through the festival space (Figure 5-10). The crowd gathered round the marching Kozaks and followed them to the center of the festival space. The actual Kozak festival then started. The program, similar to programs of other festivals, included a dramatization of the classic *Kozatskomu rodu nema perevodu* [The Kozak Clan Shall Have no

End], a musical performance of the *Heirs of Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, a theatrical battle between Kozaks and Turks (Figure 5-11), “modern Kozaks on steel horses: the Biker Show,” Ukrainian dances performed by “Kozak Merrymakers,” and the initiation ceremony of new Kozaks. Many folk artists were displaying and selling their folk art inspired by Kozak images, and guests were provided with the Kozak dish *kulich*.

Another festival which transforms the cultural realm at a historical Kozak site is the *Festival of Kozak Martial and Traditional Arts: Spas on Khortytsia*. In terms of its characteristics, this is a festival held in a historical space, organized by the local Kozak organization *All-Ukrainian Federation: Spas*.²¹

Spas [Savior] is the name popularly applied to the Feast of the Lord’s Transfiguration that falls in the Old Style Orthodox calendar on August 6 (August 19 New Style). Its timing coincides in the agricultural cycles with the harvest, and thus its observances incorporate many elements of the harvest season (blessings of fruits, etc.), which in turn have become linked with beliefs, legends and folk traditions of all kinds.²²

The organization has been active since 2005 in the All-Ukrainian Federative framework. However, the activities of *Spas* go back to the early 1990s (Figure 5-12). The president of *Spas*, Oleksandr Prytul, explained that they “started in 1990, to revive Kozak customs and traditions which are known as *Spas*.” He further defines what *Spas* actually means to the Kozaks:

According to our research, there are a couple of versions explaining what *Spas* is. Firstly, *Spas* is what saves you in combat. There was a Kozak Petro [Prytul spoke here about a legendary Kozak figure] . . . and when he was saved in a combat he was told: ‘you are *spased* [saved]. The second version is about the Christian feasts—the three *spasy*—which had their origins in the pre-Christian times, in the pagan period. Therefore, *Spas* is the feast of the harvest . . . in September. Why? Our people harvested, and people added to their wealth, it was time to expect an attack. There was such a custom in Ukraine: the members of a kin who remained alive [after an attack] who would send young Kozaks to the south of Ukraine where they underwent military training. They would sprinkle [water] over the great kurgan and honor their forefathers, so that they would return [from their quest]. After this [ritual] the Kozaks would depart. This was all done during the feast of *Spas* [harvest]. The third version is about the honor of people who can save [*spasaty*], they are saviors [*spasyteli*] of the land, the Ukrainian and Kozak land. This is a state in life to which people reach. When they attain to this state, they do not to allow their people, land and culture to be destroyed. Therefore, they become saviors [*spasyteli*].

Prytul’s narration displays the fact that he and people around him were involved in rediscovery, which is directed towards collection of data, of old practices. “A group of enthusiasts gathered under my leadership in the 1990s in Zaporozhia. [This group] went on expeditions to collect mementos and manifestations of *Spas*: the national martial arts. This lasted eighteen years. We have been to all over Ukraine, Kuban and the Don, and collected, in villages, the remnants that were preserved . . .”

Moreover, in Prytul’s narrations we can observe how traditions were carried on by the tradition-bearers and passed on to him. “I was blown away

when I met, in this life, with Leonid Petrovych Bezklubyi . . . He was from Odesa and heir of the Black Sea Kozaks . . . This was a very meaningful occasion. This person preserved the internal essence of *Spas*, and I was an acolyte of his. Unfortunately he passed away . . . Anatolii P. Bondarenko was also a carrier of the *Spas* tradition, he passed away as well. This tradition was long carried on within the Kozak kin. However, it was forgotten . . . This is our national martial art.”²³

Prytul’s organization uses festival occasions for reviving and emitting the tradition of *Spas* that they recovered. The first “*Spas* on Khortytsia” festival was held in 1997 and brought together most of the Kozak formations that concentrated on reviving Kozak martial arts, such as: the School of “Martial Hopak” located in Lviv and led by V. Pylat, the School of *Spas* located in Poltava and led by V. Mahas, the School of Hopaky-*Spas* located in Kyiv and led by M. Hodyna, the School of *Spas* located in Zaporizhia and led by O. Prytul, and the School of Traditional-*Spas* located in Odesa and led by L. Bezklubyi. Representative Kozaks of these formations participated in tournaments of Kozak martial arts during the festival.

In contrast to the other festivals surveyed, “*Spas* on Khortytsia” starting from the year 2000, included scholars and school teachers, and they studied the impact of Kozak martial arts on the upbringing of youngsters. Again starting in the year 2000, the festival included the Kozak march, which lasted about two weeks, on horseback through Khortytsia and prominent Kozak locations. The festival also included a special concert of *kobzari*.

The “*Spas on Khortytsia*” usually takes place in mid-October in connection with a feast especially sacred to the Kozak forefathers, the *Pokrova* feast (Protection of Our Most Holy Lady Theotokos and Ever-Virgin Mary). The feast is celebrated on October 14. On the same day, due to its significance for Kozaks the Day of Ukrainian Kozaks is marked (Figure 5-13). The *Festival of Kozak Martial and Traditional Arts: Spas on Khortytsia* is organized within this contextual frame of meanings and traditions, lasts usually four days and aims:

To revive the Ukrainian Kozak traditions and introduce the best of them to Ukrainian life and the Ukrainian youngsters. [It also aims] to develop Ukrainian martial arts and Kozak creative arts. [Other aims are] the endorsement of the status of Zaporizhia as the heart of Kozak freedom and the center of Kozak spiritual heritage; and also to take steps to raising new generations as faithful sons of their land.²⁴

To implement these aims, organizers provide a festival program which contains, in addition to martial art tournaments, a photo exhibition “*Spas-Customs of Kozak Kin*,” an exhibition of folk artists, and a course on Kozak horse riding techniques. In addition, organizers conduct lessons about Kozaks and workshops of embroidered shirts at the local high schools and universities.

The event attempts to link the Zaporozhian Kozak past to the present, the revival of symbols, traditions and the remaking of memories and identities from different periods of the Kozak past. In this context one can also observe in the festival “*Spas on Khortytsia*” the revival of the Black Zaporozhians whom I have mentioned in the discussion of Kozakdom in the first quarter of

the 20th century. In the contemporary setting the organization called the Regiment of the Black Zaporozhians conducts a revival of the early 20th century Kozak formation. Because of the fact that Oksandr Prytul, the head of the Federation “Spas,” is also one of the Kozaks of the Black Zaporozhians, the festival he organizes is attended by the Black Zaporozhians. The modern-day Black Zaporozhians wear the actual military uniform that carries a badge picturing a skull and bones and the inscription “Ukraine or Death.” Prytul himself participates in most cultural events in his Black Kozak uniform and popularizes the Black Kozak movement.

So far this section has examined those festival occasions that were organized by either *kobzari* or Kozaks. The focus was concentrated on the bottom-up processes of forming cultural space with references to the Kozak heritage. The following part will examine cases of festivals at historical Kozak spaces where state organs organized the festivals and commemorations in a top-down manner.

The first case is Baturyn. The commemorations and festivals in Baturyn had a bottom-up character in the beginning. People from various neighboring localities started to hold commemorations in Baturyn from the early 1990s. Available data shows that the people would randomly gather in the town and hold haphazard commemorative ceremonies. The ceremonies were held at the former citadel area and at the simple wooden cross by Mazepa’s former palace. These gatherings were mostly accompanied by prayers and a liturgy served by a priest. Such ad hoc events became traditional gatherings at a fixed date starting from the early 1990s. Thus, throughout the

1990s and until today the second weekend of June came to be celebrated as the Kozak festival in Baturyn.

Fieldwork data speaks to the fact that the early version of the Kozak Festival was organized in 1990, as part of the “cultural march” “Dzvin,” by the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Association and the People’s Movement (Rukh). It was actually planned as a march to create awareness of national traditions of Ukrainians. Therefore, the march of 1990 included events such as public meetings, concerts, memorialization of prominent Ukrainians, and the distribution of leaflets, and materials about Ukrainian history. The march started on July 21, 1990, and participants travelled from Chernihiv to Sumy, visiting Baturyn on their way (July 24, 1990). In Baturyn they participated in the Kozak Festival and commemorated the destruction of Baturyn. They recalled Mazepa and prayed for him. Dzvin was repeated in 1991 with a special focus on the Kozaks, and the march was called “On the Kozak Path Way.” Participants followed the route of former Kozak sites and paid visits to villages, met with locals and sang Ukrainian songs.²⁵ The event gradually gained visibility and recognition and, starting from Dzvin in 1992, the local Kozaks started to organize the event’s Baturyn part.

Throughout the 1990s turnouts for the festival and other commemorative events in Baturyn were rather low. This was largely due to the ignorance of Baturyn’s destruction and because the gatherings were organized in the framework of certain communities. Participation and the ways of organization of the commemorative acts started to change with the proclamation of the site as a state reserve. The organization of the event was

usually made in collaboration of the Chernihiv Regional Administration, the Bakhmach Town Administration, the Baturyn Town Council and the local culture office. With increasing state involvement in Baturyn, the Kozak Festival came to be a state regulated event starting from 2000s.

As mentioned in the earlier chapter, when the site was declared a state reserve, a number of monuments were recovered, renovated and rebuilt. With such changes in the physical space, the commemorative acts were added at those monuments. In the case of the Kozak Festival held in the 2000s before the Yushchenko period, commemorations started with prayers for the lives lost in the destruction of Baturyn. The crowd would then walk to the fortress area and lay flowers at the monument (built in 2004) dedicated to the fallen. Then, the crowd would march to Kochubei's Palace where the festival area is located.

My observations in the field and available data show that in the post-2007 period, the commemorative ceremonies underwent a shift, and the ceremonies were now organized in a manner to include all major monuments and memorial sites in Baturyn. In this period the crowd would first gather at the Kyivan Church, newly built in the Yushchenko era, to hold a requiem for the fallen. After the construction of the church of the Lord's Resurrection, which is located in the fortress area, prayers started to be held there as well (Figure: 5-14). Then, the crowd, accompanied by a band playing Kozak songs, would proceed to the newly built fortress area and lay flowers at the monument for the fallen and at the newly built collective monument to hetmans. In the fortress area the crowd would sing the national anthem. The

crowd would then march to Kochubei's Palace where the actual festival would proceed (Figure 5-15).

My field observations established that the festival participants are largely from Baturyn and neighboring towns such as Konotop, Bakhmach, Nizhyn, Pryluky, and Chernihiv. Particularly in the 2000s, the festival gained larger recognition in the region and in the post-2005 era the number of festival goers increased. In terms of the motivations of participants, the greater part of participants is politically oriented towards Ukrainian national movements. Political orientations surface through the banners carried by the crowds. Here one can notice the banners of nationalist movements such as the "All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda" and "Ukrainian Patriot."²⁶ The latter, being a racist organization, posted stickers in the major locations of Baturyn which read "White People—Great Ukraine" and often includes the heroic 17th century Kozak standing next to modern-day "Ukrainian Patriot" in military uniform.

Kozaks comprise a significant part of the participants in the commemorative events. With their participation they play an important role in the formation of the social space where the collective memory of the Kozak past is restored and the Kozak traditions and identity are revived. Kozaks who participate in the commemorative events and particularly in the festival are members of Baturyn, Prylutsk, Borzna, and Konotop formations.²⁷ The Baturyn Kozaks, who identify themselves as continuators of the 17th-century forefathers, play a particular role in the events. In fact, Baturyn's inhabitants had taken part in the Khmelnytskyi uprising, and the town became the part of the Kozak administrative structure as a company (sotnia) center (1648). The

Baturyn *sotnia* took part in the defense of the town when it was attacked by the Russian forces in 1708. The field-work I have conducted in Baturyn shows that the *sotnia*, which was abolished in 1782, was revived in 1992 with twenty Kozaks from Baturyn and the neighboring villages (Figure 5-16). The backgrounds of these Kozak are varied; however, they are unified around their respect for the Kozaks and their heritage, and some among them either by family oral histories or through certain documents in their possession can claim a Kozak heritage. With such a social background the local Kozaks undertook the task to revive Kozakdom in Baturyn. First, they revived Kozak agricultural activities on lands acquired for the use of the Kozaks (1994). Second, they assumed “spiritual tasks” such as training youngsters to become Kozaks, participating in activities where possible and creating awareness of their organization and the Kozaks. Furthermore, the group took an active part in ceremonies held at Kozak locations in the region and elsewhere in Ukraine.

Another case is the commemorative festival dedicated to the Battle of Konotop in 1658, which marked a significant victory for the Kozaks, Poles and Tatars over the Russians. The event program has been organized, on an annual basis, by the local state administration since 2004.

According to my fieldwork observations, the 350th anniversary of the Battle provided an opportunity to claim the space and time in a most grandiose manner. One of the biggest stages I have come across at such festivals was established on the Konotop battlefield. Numerous artists and performers from all over Ukraine participated in the event.

The festival was attended by many *kobzari*. A great number of them performed at the All-Ukrainian Festival of Kozak Radoslav and the All-Ukrainian Festival of *Kobzar* Arts named after Ostap Veresai. In addition, ensembles from all regions of Ukraine performed folk songs.

The event area contained many Kozak-themed wooden settlements representing historical regiments. In these settlements Kozak food was served, folk material arts were exhibited and sold; folk songs and dances performed, and martial arts and Kozak theater presented to the audiences (Figure 5-17).

Regeneration in Imagined Kozak Spaces

“Kozak Mamai returned and national dignity revived.
Mamaieva Sloboda: The Revived Honor of the Forefathers’
Glory!”²⁸

After examining the cultural space in historical Kozak sites, I will take the case of an “imagined Kozak space” which is actively involved in the regeneration process of Kozakdom in Ukraine. Mamaieva Sloboda, a Kozak theme park in the center of Kyiv, has no particular significance in the Kozak history. However, its creators designed it as an imagined Kozak space where Kozak symbols, traditions and memories are vigorously propagated and communicated to visitors. As the founder argued, “it was created to consolidate the eternal aspiration of Ukrainians to live their own national and cultural life on their forefathers’ lands.”²⁹ The following section will examine the process of this “consolidation.”

The mastermind behind the initiative is Kostiantyn Oliinyk. At present Oliinyk is the administrator of the “Mamaieva Sloboda Settlement,” and also a general of the “Ukrainian Kozaks.” When I asked him his occupation in 2009, during the opening ceremonies of Mamaieva Sloboda, he defined himself as a Kozak by profession.³⁰

Oliinyk, towards the end of the Soviet Union, took part in the Rukh and established one of the district administrations for the movement. He was then a young man of twenty-seven. An activist in the national movement, he took part in street demonstrations for the defense of the Ukrainian idea. According to him, the idea to establish a Kozak Village emerged in those days.³¹ Therefore, Oliinyk’s very first intention was to form a physical space to revive Kozak traditions. As discussed earlier, the revival of Kozaks was gaining strength in the second half of the 1980s. Thus, Oliinyk, with his idea to generate a Kozaks physical space, reflects the spirit of the time.

He established the Ethnological Center Kozak Mamai as a juridical entity on July 9, 1990. Having established the center, Oliinyk had to find a suitable place to realize his Kozak dream village. He found the Soviet orchard, Vidradenskyi Park, on Mykhailo Donets Street in the Borshchahivka district of Kyiv. Before Soviet times, the place belonged to the Monastery of St. Michael of the Golden Domes. Oliinyk had to fight for the land for a long time. The Kyiv Municipality provided him the plot to transform into a heritage park only in 1993. However, much interference kept him from realizing the heritage park before he had everything installed for visitors in 2009. In the meantime Oliinyk had had to face critical economic conditions and, more importantly,

the mafia. He was threatened by mafia many times to cede his very valuable land plot of nine hectares. However, he stuck to his ideal and constructed the first building of the park: a small chapel constructed from the sketches of a painting of Taras Shevchenko. The chapel was consecrated in 1994 by the Patriarch of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. The religious affiliation with the Autocephalous Church, a church outside of Russian influence, carried a political message in favor of independent Ukraine. However, the chapel did not last long: in 1998 it was torched by unknown individuals.

The second construction was the new church of the Protection of Our Most Holy Lady Theotokos and Ever-Virgin Mary (*Pokrova*). In 2003 the new church was consecrated by the Patriarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate. The church was very important for its symbolic and physical qualities. It symbolically was important simply because it was represented as the only Kozak Church to be constructed after the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775. The church is also introduced as an example of Kozak art because it was constructed without a single nail and the interior was designed in the Mazepa Baroque style. The outside area features a bell tower and a wooden engraved gate. The church offers regular religious services. To reflect Kozak traditions, the church choir is composed only of males. Parishioners can attend Sunday services, baptize children, get married and celebrate religious feasts.

One of the most important events for the new church was a meeting of the *Ukrainian Kozaks* (the organization), on the very same day as the consecration—October 14h, 2003, the sacred Kozak feast day of *Pokrova* and

Ukrainian Kozak Day—to hold their Great *Rada*. Convening the *Rada* in front of the church the Kozaks re-elected Ivan Bilas as their hetman. They presented the church with a gift of a piece of an old oak that survived from the times of the Kozaks of the 17th century. In 2004 Patriarch Filaret endowed the church with the special status of *Stavropihiia* (subordination to no other authority than the Patriarch) within the Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate. Two years later, on October 14, 2005, for the 230th anniversary of the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, 38 stone crosses were erected in the church yard (Figure 5-18, 5-19). The crosses were inscribed with the names of 38 Zaporozhian administrative districts. They, too, were blessed by the clerics of the Kyivan Church. In 2006 the still incomplete site was visited by President Viktor Yushchenko. He also participated in the Orthodox feast of the Baptism of the Christ (January 19) at Mamaieva Sloboda and immersed himself in the ice-covered pond near the church.

Between 2003 and 2009 Oliinyk constructed a Kozak village that numbered ninety-seven structures in addition to the church. Important among these is the estate of the Kozak elite, which was built in the Kozak baroque style of the late 17th century. The farmstead contains a stone house, and the army treasury building, the nobility entrance, the supplies gate, the stable and tools depot, storehouse, and a horse pond.

Another section of the settlement is the farmstead of the potter. This section contains a sheep shed, oxen shed, and a well. The additional settlement is the farmstead of the church warden. This section contains a bakery, storehouse, water well, and a pigsty. Another settlement, located next to the

warden's farm, is the farmstead of a young Kozak. This section has a Kozak home, stable, and a hen house. An interesting section is the farmstead of the fortune teller-midwife-sorceress. This features the home of the fortune teller, a hen house, sheep shed, lime pit (medicine house), and a swing. Another part of the heritage village is the tavern. This contains a distillery, a cellar, a storehouse. Another is the farmstead of the blacksmith. This section has a blacksmith shop, a stable, a barn, and a storehouse. Other individual items are the Kozak watch tower, windmill, water mill, chapel (*kaplychka*), exhibition square, kurgan of Mamai, Kozak dugout, shed for boats, signal tower, army office, and army office storehouse.

Kozak Mamai is a national symbol, a symbol of ethnic identity. He is a legendary folk figure pictured in homes, on doors and walls and household objects. In the figure of Kozak Mamai the ideals of love for freedom, warrior strength, loyalty and self-sacrifice are all embedded. He was often pictured as a seated figure, with items reflecting his background and nature such as his horse, *kobza*, saber, spear, goblets and cups. He often sings to the accompaniment of a *kobza*. A repository of all the imagery, once Zaporozhian Kozaks were destroyed in the second half of the 18th century, Kozak Mamai remained as a connecting link to the heroic past. In short, Kozak Mamai emerges as the holder of the collective memory of a once heroic past.

For Oliinyk, Kozak Mamai was the “figurative embodiment of the national character of Ukrainians.”³² He served the purpose for Oliinyk “to try to push Ukrainians to have a taste of national life.” In doing so Oliinyk argues that he is realizing the article of the constitution which guarantees the national

development of Ukrainian culture, and, the settlement “Mamaieva Sloboda” is a kind of materialization of the “right of Ukrainians to live on the lands of their forefathers in a way that is particularly nationally and culturally [Ukrainian].” This physical space has to do with the national dignity of Ukrainians. This came about when Oliinyk said that “[Mamaieva Sloboda] is raising the prestige of Ukrainian culture and ... will overcome the image of Ukrainians as uncultured people. When I look at torn-down houses, I cannot believe that my forefathers lived in such an impoverished country. Our people were not always serfs. I would like to raise the self-esteem of Ukrainians and I want to show them the real richness of Ukrainian architecture. This means Ukrainians are better than Poles, Germans and Russians.”³³

One of the major ideas is to make an impact on the consciousness of youngsters. This became clear when Oliinyk argued that the settlement is in essence “a school of ethnology . . . where our children are introduced to the traditions and customs of their forefathers . . . if they come for a concert, if they listen to Ukrainian songs and stand by the stage only then could they acquire the traditions and customs.”³⁴

In similar fashion, Taras Kompanichenko, who practically functions as the curator of Mamaieva Sloboda and performs often at the settlement, has said that Mamaieva Sloboda is about the revival of the unknown and forgotten Ukraine (Figure 5-20). He argues that task of the Mamaieva Sloboda is to focus on various aspects of culture and introduce culture through children’s games within the context of military sports.

In brief, the idea around which the space was created is the protection of the national cultural values of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian language, religion, and the traditions and customs of the Kozak forefathers. To accomplish this task certain activities must accompany the physical space. The following part will address the nature of the social activities in the physical space which are expected to eventually engender change in the consciousness of the people.

The activities in Mamaieva Sloboda may be divided into regular and special events. Regular activities include church services such as the weekly Sunday liturgies, baptisms, and marriage ceremonies (Figure 5-21). There are also regular pottery and blacksmith classes. The restaurant serves Kozak food on a regular basis. The premises can be hired for weddings, celebrations, and special nights. Accommodations are available in the houses of the blacksmith, potter, sorcerer and the church warden.

There are also special events such as book presentations. One such event was the launch of Vasyl Halaiba's book on Marian churches in Kyiv—"The Second Jerusalem."³⁵ Mamaieva Sloboda funded the publication and President Yushchenko wrote the introduction. During the ceremony Patriarch Filaret blessed the book and the church choir, and the Kozak musical band *Khorea Kozatska* of Taras Kompanichenko sang songs.³⁶

The second example of a special event is the Day of the National Flag, when a 75.17 meter-long Ukrainian flag was extended over the Mamaieva Sloboda territory. The number 75.17 was explained as representing the 7517 years from the creation of the world in the old Biblical reckoning, and suggesting that Ukrainians existed since the beginning of the world. Oliinyk

emphasized that: “it is worth always remembering that Ukraine is not eighteen years old but thousands of years more [than eighteen years]. We are not a newly created country; we are a state with an enormous historical and cultural heritage.”³⁷ The event included performances of Kozaks on horses, concerts of folk music, an exhibition of folk arts, and the usual Kozak food *kulich*.

Recurring special events include various concerts where antique and traditional folk music are performed. These activities are accompanied by events such as equestrian Kozak competitions, folk arts fair and cooking exhibitions, workshops of blacksmiths, potters, and weavers (Figure 5-22).

The formal Day of Kozaks and Feast of Protection of Our Most Holy Lady Theotokos and Ever-Virgin Mary (*Pokrova*) is celebrated at Mamaieva Sloboda annually on October 14. In anticipation of Christmas winter classes of baking honey cake (*mykolaichyk*) with the recipe of the “forefathers” are organized. This event is followed by the opening of the home of the winter Saint Nicholas. As usual, antique and traditional music follows these celebrations. The events related to St. Nicholas last throughout December.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to examine the regenerative attempts in the Ukrainian cultural space through articulations of Kozak images, symbols, traditions, values, memories and spaces. The definition of regeneration as quoted earlier addressed the task of controlling community emotions of members to mobilize them for “the national goals, and with that to reform and renew the community.” The data covered in this chapter allowed me to

observe the regenerative efforts made by the cultural elite and, to a limited extent, by the state.

Observations on *kobzari* prove that they have a specifically broad impact on the social space. Looking at the content of their repertoire and performances, it is possible to argue that they are playing a main role in the reconsolidation of communal identity. The *kobzar*, performing *dumy* and historical songs, brings the past events and battles of the Kozaks in to the moment of the performance. However, the findings of this research have shown that *kobzar* performances of *dumy* are bridging the present also to the Soviet past. The audience at performances recalling the Kozaks' captivity at Ottoman hands, establish a link to present time and remembers it also need to break free from the calamities brought by the Soviets. *Kobzari* make them recall that Kozaks acted heroically against oppression even under the most difficult conditions. The audience is also reminded that if necessary the Kozak sacrificed his life to defend the land and his fellow Kozaks. With such a linkage of the past to the present, the audience is called upon by the *kobzar* to act to protect the nation, the land and their values. Therefore, the performances of *kobzari* have an altering impact in the perception of the listeners and transport them to the time and space of the *duma*. However, the political context and the freshness of the Soviet experience connects the narrations of the *dumy* to a time and space in the more recent past. This allows listeners to re-calculate and re-think their situation in the present and to draw conclusions applicable to their own lives.³⁸

The performance and the festival create a liminal space where the audience connects the present to the past and experiences the present from the perspective of the past. This liminality is created with symbols, images and traditions that surround the participants in the festive space. This liminality thereby creates a sense of a “dream country” or an “imagined community” which actually does not exist beyond the festive space.

The data suggest that the cultural elite and the tradition-bearers see festive spaces as battle grounds where they win battles in their struggle against the Soviet and Russian cultural core. In such cultural battles, Kozak spaces are the battlefields, and the main weapons are Kozak symbols, past traditions and values, while the warriors on the battlefields are the modern Kozaks.

The findings of this chapter demonstrate that the revival of traditions is having an impact on the formulations of communal identity. The data produced by the research show that the fall of the Soviet Union stimulated a significant interest in the rediscovery and reinterpretation of traditions. The cases of Tkachenko and Bezklubyi show that even though a natural social context of tradition may have died, through a few remaining tradition bearers enthusiasts could reinterpret and adapt past practices to the present time. The creation of the *kobzar* guild and its functioning on the basis of past values, in the light of present needs, shows that tradition has adapted itself to new conditions. The *kobzari* in the past were entitled to wander in a limited space and performed in villages and streets. They could only perform before small audiences. At present, one can still see *kobzari* on the streets; however, the

kobzari of the present wander from one festive event to another and perform before hundreds and even thousands.

In terms of the creation of Kozak cultural spaces through the negotiation of Kozak symbols, traditions, memories and values the festivals proved themselves to be a successful means to transform the community and consolidate a culturally Ukrainian state. This chapter reviewed nine cases. In three of the cases, *Trinity Sunday*, *Kozak Lyre*, and *Land of Dreams*, the *kobzari* are leaders in the cultural construction of spaces. They create the events content and define the discourse. All of these cases were not only accessible to the participants and audiences physically present, but also they all found significant coverage in the mass media. One of the events, the Land of Dreams, is one of the biggest of its kind, most influential in transforming Ukrainian society. The *Living Fire Uniting Ukraine*, the *Kozak Glory—Healing Spring*, and the *Spas on Khortytsia* are Kozak initiatives. These festivals are organized by most of the Kozak formations in Ukraine and constitute a source of pride for them. The cases of Baturyn and Konotop represent state-regulated festivals and commemorations. The state's attempt to control the content of the Kozak cultural space has to do with political purposes. The last case is a private and permanent space, a Kozak village in an urban space. The particularities of the case have already been discussed in this chapter; however, the case is important also to show how the Kozak theme park could be both a lucrative investment and also a rich cultural environment for the transformation of the society.

Endnotes

¹ For a detailed discussion of Kozak images in commercial advertisements and consumer products see Bürgers, *Kosakenmythos*, 215–235.

² Pierre Nora, “Memoire collective,” 398.

³ Wingfield, *Flag Wars*, 5.

⁴ Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, *Memory, History, Nations: Contested Past* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 11.

⁵ Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 33.

⁶ Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 71.

⁷ James Von Geldern, *Bolshevik Festivals 1917–1920* (Berkeley and London: University of California, 1993), 3.

⁸ Richard Stites, *Passion and Perception: Essays on Russian Culture* (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, 2010), 236–237.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See the following documentary film about the commemorative ceremonies: “Na zemli Kozatskoi slavy.”

¹¹ Mona Ozouf, “Space and Time in the Festival of the French Revolution,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17 (1975): 372.

¹² “Union of Kobzars,” accessed May, 27, 2013, <http://kobzari.org.ua/?page=articles&subpage=1>.

¹³ I will touch upon Spas further in the chapter.

¹⁴ Mykola Tovkailo, Interview by author, VN350021. Kyiv, June 27, 2009. The video of the performance is available on: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gq7LHhQ08nA>.

Torban is another stringed Ukrainian musical instrument.

¹⁵ Kobzar Stage at Dream Country, voice recording by author, VN350022. Kyiv, June 27, 2009.

¹⁶ Taras Kompanichenko, voice recording by author, VN350030. Kyiv, June 27, 2009.

¹⁷ The death of Ivan Bohun (1664) is commemorated in Lviv. For pictures, see “Bohun Commemoration,” accessed March 19, 2011, <http://photo.unian.net/eng/themes/11513>.

¹⁸ Oleksandr Moiseiev, Interview by author, VN350011. Vinnytsia, June 21, 2009.

¹⁹ I conducted the fieldwork in 2009.

²⁰ “International Kozak Festival: Living Fire Invitation,” accessed May 28, 2012, <http://rukotvory.com.ua/nevdovzi/mizhnarodnyj-kozatskyj-festyval-zvychajevoji-kultury-zhyvyj-vohon/>

²¹ The event was also supported by several non-governmental organizations. As is the case with all instances examined the local state administration provides necessary permits and technical support.

²² Yevhen Onatskyi, *Ukrainska Mala Entsyklopedia*, Buenos-Aires, s.v. “Spas.”

²³ Oleksandr Prytul, Interview by author, VN3500217. Zaporizhia, August 12, 2011.

²⁴ “Spas on Khortytsia,” accessed May 28, 2013, <http://festyvali.org.ua/2012/10/xiv-й-міжнародний-фестиваль-козацьких/>

²⁵ See for a reference to Stephan Horlach, *I tak... ya zhyv*, accessed May 28, 2012, <http://www.mnru.mk.ua/viewstory.php?sid=85388>

²⁶ Svoboda is an ultra-nationalist party that existed until 2004 as the Social-National Party and carried a party symbol which to critics resembled a Wolfangel. Ukrainian Patriot was established in 2005 and serves under the “Social-Nationalist Assembly.”

²⁷ These locations were Kozak regimental (regional) centers after the Khmelnytskyi Uprising.

²⁸ “Opening slogan of “Mamaieva Sloboda,” accessed May 28, 2013, <http://mamajeva-sloboda.ua/publ.php?id=148>.

²⁹ “Mamaieva Sloboda,” accessed May 28, 2013, <http://mamajeva-sloboda.ua/publ.php?id=85>.

³⁰ Kostiantyn Oliinyk, Interview by author, Mamaieva oliinyk1. Kyiv, July 9, 2009.

³¹ “Mamaieva Sloboda,” accessed May 28, 2013, <http://www.moemisto.com.ua/13768>

³² Kostiantyn Oliinyk, Interview by author, Mamaieva oliinyk. Kyiv, July 9, 2009.

³³ “Mamaieva Sloboda,” accessed May 28, 2013, <http://www.umoloda.Kyiv.ua/number/260/189/9284/>

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ The book is Vasyl V. Halaiba, *Sviato-Bohorodychni khramy u “druhomu Yerusalymi,”* (Kyiv: Avtohrاف, 2008).

³⁶ For a detailed description of the book, the ceremony of its presentation, and citations from relevant documents, see “Presentatsiia knyhy “Sviato-Bohorodychi khramy u Druhomu Yerusalymi’ misti Kyievi”

vidbulas 7 travnia 2009 roku,” <http://mamajeva-sloboda.ua/publ.php?id=324>. Accessed on June 20, 2014.

³⁷ “Mamaieva Sloboda.” Accessed on May 28, 2011.
<http://www.mamajeva-sloboda.ua/news.php?id=359>.

³⁸ For an argumentation of the issue, see David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 44.

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I have presented the results of my research into the contemporary Kozak revival and tested if it is used as a platform by cultural nationalists for renegotiation, reformation, and consolidation of identities in post-Soviet Ukraine. This dissertation has, therefore, first given an account of and the reasons for the widespread use of Kozak constituent symbolic sources in the public space. It was then possible to turn to the hypothesis posed in the beginning and to postulate that the Kozak revival indeed has played a significant role in the social, physical and cultural spaces for negotiating and communicating identities. This dissertation argues that the Kozak constituent symbolic sources are negotiated and communicated by the Kozak organizations. It also explains the central importance of Kozak spaces in the circulation of symbols and the formation of collective memories. The study investigates cultural space and argues that the Kozak revival takes place in the public space with a strong transformative capacity particularly through the leadership of cultural nationalists.

The main questions that guided this research were as follows: if the Kozak revival functions as a platform, how could it remain relevant in the present after the disappearance of Kozak political institutions in the 18th century? If it is indeed relevant in the present, the next question is: How does it function? What are the tools of cultural nationalists in renegotiating, reforming and consolidating Ukrainian national identity through Kozakdom? These questions defined the structure of the dissertation. To discover the

Kozaks' relevance in the present, I first traced the transmission of Kozak images and identities through time. To explore the functions and tools in renegotiating, reforming and consolidating the Ukrainian national identity through Kozakdom I have examined Kozak communities, and physical and cultural spaces.

In testing my hypothesis I worked with several assumptions. My first, at the very beginning of the research, was that after the fall of the Soviet Union Ukraine would need national consolidation. Knowing the significance of the works of 19th-century Ukrainian national intelligentsia, which placed Kozaks in the center of their imagination of Ukrainian national identity, I presumed that Kozaks would return to the social space to serve the purpose of national consolidation in independent Ukraine.

A corollary was my assumption that for an ethnic revival the bridging of past and present would be essential, and that Kozaks would play an effective role in the establishment of identities in the present by linking the masses to the Kozak past.

Yet another assumption was that—in order to negotiate and form identities in the present—processes of rediscovery of the past, reinterpretation of the cultural heritage, and regeneration of the masses would be a central requirement of the independence era. Therefore, in this process symbols, memories, traditions, spaces, and identities become essential tools to allow a Kozak-based negotiation of identities in Ukraine.

An intriguing question here was how it was possible that symbols, memories, traditions, and spaces—the constituent symbolic sources of the Kozak revival—could be relevant in the present. For this, of course, it was necessary to investigate relevance and relationship of the Kozak historical experience to the present. This I did through a survey of the Kozak experience in history that provided me with an understanding of how Kozaks survived the test of time and remained a relevant phenomenon in the present. The survey of important events and figures of Kozakdom, their survival in memory from the destruction of the Sich and the abolition of the Hetmanate to the present, increased my understanding that Kozak symbolic sources played a role in different periods as constituent elements in communities. The study of the cases from the late 18th century to independent Ukraine confirmed that the symbolic sources travelled through time by two carriers. First is the works of national intelligentsia—in the first instance historians and writers. This transmission was most efficient among literate urban populations. The second is folk oral memory. This means of transmission was related to the rural populations where people knew about and remembered Kozaks from oral histories, the narrations of story tellers, and particularly through *kobzari* and epic poetry.

The cases from the late 18th century to independent Ukraine also suggested that the Kozaks who had joined the Russian army could preserve some aspects of the Kozak culture. Moreover, they remained visible in the

public space and therefore, to an extent, helped the masses to keep memories of the Kozaks alive.

Investigation of cases from the first quarter of the 20th century confirmed that Kozaks were used as a source of identity when there was an active political agenda for asserting political interests. The data reveals that such cases were mostly related to nationalist aspirations.

The examination of the Soviet era brought forward cases where Kozaks remained symbolic sources for constructing identities. However, evidence shows that Soviets made considerable attempts to reinterpret meanings carried by the symbolic sources. It is clear that the Soviets did not allow Kozaks to exist as a social group. They also did not allow Kozak heirs to define themselves as Kozaks. Lastly, they tried to clear the public space of national interpretations and representations of Kozaks.

The survey of the Kozak revivals in the late Soviet era suggests that they were conditioned by a general relaxation of Soviet policies represented by *perestroika* and *glasnost*. However, the revival movement was also a reaction to the traumas inflicted by the Soviet regime. This early Kozak nostalgia connected the past to the modern era and transported meanings and values of the forefathers to the present. The evidence also speaks to the fact that the revival was politicized and became an integral part of the national agenda for gaining the independence of Ukraine. This supported my presumption that Kozak symbolic sources have been reinterpreted to consolidate a national identity before the fall of the Soviet Union. Here the data allowed me to argue

that there were intensive efforts to rediscover, reinterpret and regenerate the community with reference to Kozak symbolic sources. The evidence speaks to the fact that processes of rediscovery, reinterpretation and regeneration were directed in order to place Kozaks at the center of an aspired social state within which all wounds of the past would be healed.

The case studies examined proved my presumption that Kozak symbolic sources have played a constituent role in the making of identities and contributed a platform for negotiation and formulation of identities in the present. The case of “Ukrainian Kozaks” evidenced that until 1998 “Ukrainian Kozaks”’ nationally oriented elite tried to negotiate and reformulate the Kozak identity in particular, and the Ukrainian identity in general, along nationalist interpretations of Kozak symbolic sources. There is also ample reason to support that the “Ukrainian Kozaks”’ attempt to impose a nationalist version of Kozak identity backfired and sharpened alternative discourses of identity.

Evidence is strong that the pro-Russian Kozaks are a social element which nationalist Kozak revival wanted to remove from society for the sake of national consolidation. For nationalist Kozaks, the pro-Russian Kozaks are a product of the Soviet and Imperial periods who act against national consolidation. The data covered show that these pro-Russian and anti-nationalist Kozaks are strong enough to challenge the nationalist regenerative forces.

The study of organizations also provided evidence to prove my assumption that symbols, memories, traditions, and spaces would become

essential tools for identity negotiation. Indeed, Kozak organizations actively used Kozak symbols in the daily expression of their identity. Moreover, divisions between Kozaks were also defined by which set of memories they subscribe to and what Kozak heritage they claim. As shown in chapters four and five, Kozak organizations were rigorously active in their claims to Kozak spaces and historical lands through marches, ceremonies, festivals and commemorations.

The data also proved that the authorities have also developed an interest in regulating the Kozak revival. The presidential decrees under Leonid Kuchma were issued either under the influence of Kozak leaders close to state decision-makers or because of political pragmatism. Under Viktor Yushchenko, the number of presidential decrees grew exponentially. Indeed, Yushchenko defined himself as a Kozak and claimed a Kozak family heritage. He truly believed that a nationalist Kozak revival could transform and consolidate society. In his term in office, therefore, there was a massive physical transformation of Kozak cultural sphere.

One of my central assumptions was that spaces are crucial in the production of meanings, memories and, therefore, identities. The cases examined in the dissertation provided evidence to argue that spaces related to the Kozak past have become central to the production of meanings and communication of the nationalist reading of Kozak history. Thus evidence shows in the case of the Battle of Poltava, the nationalists, even with support of the president of the country, could not occupy the cultural and physical

space, and Poltava still communicates the Russian victory over Mazepa. The findings on Baturyn, Konotop and Khortytsia, on the other hand, proved that—particularly after the physical transformation of the spaces—these locations were successfully incorporated into the nationalist discourse. The revived Baturyn narrates a nationalist interpretation of history and claims victory long decades after defeat and destruction. The symbolic preeminence of Khortytsia makes it a source of communication and negotiation of the Kozak past and identity for the purposes of national consolidation. However, as was presumed at the beginning of this research project, physical spaces are much stronger in their impact when there is cultural content. As the data provided in the chapter five suggests, with the festivals and commemorations in Baturyn and Konotop, Kozak spaces gain their full impact in transforming collective memories and identities.

I presumed that Kozak traditions would also be central to the negotiation of national identity in Ukraine. Through the study of *kobzari* and the epic tradition it was possible to display how the Soviet period impacted the tradition and also to show how the tradition was subsequently reinterpreted and used in a regenerative manner in the independence era. The case studies spoke to the fact that *kobzari* and epics are loaded with meanings as national symbols and represent most essentially the Kozak heritage and show that they are adapting the tradition to the present conditions and, with their performances; communicate the values and morality of Kozak forefathers. Our survey of the annual festivals shows that they are organized around the dates

of folk calendar celebrations and speak to the fact that these festivals claim to gain a certain level of traditionality. Thereby they are becoming more effective in the creation of a sense of communal identity. Festivals organize the cultural content of traditions and transmit them. With this power base the impact of the festive space on the participants is significant. The cases examined were those in which nationalist Kozak symbolic sources were actively communicated. The study of the cases also proved that the acts of cultural nationalism, by referring to Kozak traditions, aimed the rebuilding of morality from within the historical-cultural roots of the society and removing the Soviet heritage. They prove, therefore, that Kozak symbolic sources playing an effective constituent role in the society.

The methodology of my research was interdisciplinary and combined the tools of history and ethnography. Primary and secondary sources were used to survey the past to find articulations of the Kozaks. Oral narrations were used to explore and reconstruct the last years of the Soviet Union. The study of the organizations was guided by ethnographic methods of conducting interviews and participant observations. The various internet sources, online and print newspaper archives, and documentary collections were also used to explore the modern Kozak phenomena.

No doubt, the research for this dissertation is subject to limitations. This researcher could not collect in many of the former Kozak localities. Furthermore, given their already large numbers, it is almost an impossible task to map out all the Kozak organizations in Ukraine. The number of festivals

and commemorations stands as yet another limitation to the collection and analysis of data related to the revival of Kozaks in Ukraine. These limitations limited the extent of my research activity to selected festivals and commemorations. Finally, the collected data exceeded by far what could be systematized and covered within the framework of this dissertation. These limitations, no doubt, are reflected in final product.

Another limitation of the dissertation, particularly because it was not included in the research agenda, is the comparative study of the constituents of the Ukrainian national identity, such as the language, Holodomor and Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The western part of the country remained outside of the research area of this dissertation. A further study which examines the Kozak groups of western Ukraine can provide better grounds for comparative study of national constituents and evaluation of the strengths of Kozak identity vis-a-vis other sources of identity.

When I decided to move from the field of Political Science to Folklore and History my intentions were simple: I wanted to get good sense of Ukraine. Indeed, travelling from town to town and village to village, taking interviews, and participating in events, I experienced an exciting sense of curiosity, and great pleasure of discovery. I realized that in the process of this research I could, through the microcosm of the Kozaks, achieve a good sense of the Ukrainian macrocosm. I also realized that there is much more to learn about Ukraine.

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Figure 5-14: Photograph taken by Baturyn Kozaks.

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APPENDICES—FIGURES



Figure 3-1



Figure 3-3



Figure 3-2



Figure 3-4



Figure 3-5



Figure 3-6



Figure 3-7



Figure 3-8



Figure 3-9



Figure 3-10



Figure 3-11



Figure 3-12



Figure 3-13



Figure 3-14



Figure 4-1



Figure 4-2



Figure 4-3



Figure 4-4



Figure 4-5



Figure 4-6



Figure 4-7



Figure 4-8



Figure 4-9



Figure 4-10



Figure 4-11



Figure 4-12



Figure 4-13



Figure 4-14



Figure 4-15



Figure 4-16



Figure 4-17



Figure 4-18



Figure 4-19



Figure 4-20



Figure 4-21



Figure 5-1



Figure 5-2



Figure 5-3



Figure 5-4



Figure 5-5



Figure 5-6



Figure 5-7



Figure 5-8



Figure 5-9



Figure 5-10



Figure 5-11



Figure 5-12



Figure 5-13



Figure 5-14



Figure 5-15



Figure 5-16



Figure 5-17



Figure 5-18



Figure 5-19



Figure 5-20



Figure 5-21



Figure 5-22