

China's National Image Puzzle:  
The Construction of China's Environmental Image in *Le Monde*

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
French Language, Literature and Linguistics

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## Abstract

Despite China's central role in environmental issues on both domestic and international levels and the importance that the country attaches to its national image abroad, few studies have investigated China's national image in the environmental domain on the international scene, and almost none in the Francophone world. With the goals of shedding light on this topic and enlarging the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) literature on French news discourses, this thesis conducts a CDA study of French news on environmental issues related to China to reflect a "western" view of China.

A rigid selection process of relevant news articles from the elite French newspaper *Le Monde* (which was selected for its special status among French media) resulted in 24 news texts on air pollution covering 2013, 2014 and 2015, and 19 news texts on climate change covering 2009 and 2015. By adapting two analytical frameworks, Social Actor Representation (van Leeuwen, 1996) and the Appraisal Theory (Martin & White, 2005), to the analysis of French discourse, this study conducted detailed quantitative and qualitative textual analyses to these news articles.

The study found that China's image constructed in *Le Monde* was fluid depending on the environmental issue in question. Regarding the issue of air pollution, *Le Monde* has represented "China" as a domestic actor. Between 2013 and 2015, an invariably negative image of China was constructed, following a script of a dichotomy between an inactive government and a victimized population. In contrast, *Le Monde's* representations of China in climate change in 2009 and in 2015 have experienced a drastic shift. In 2009, China was negatively portrayed as a country to be held most responsible in tackling climate change along with the US but who

was passive in dealing with climate change, as an enemy to be destroyed rather than an opponent to be recognized. However, in 2015, China was represented as a supporter or promoter of climate change negotiations with positive evaluations.

An examination of *Le Monde*'s representation of China vis-à-vis the Chinese context found that on the one hand, *Le Monde*'s representation of China did not appear to be about what/who China is, and on the other, it did not necessarily fit into general French or European environmental belief either. The key to a full understanding of *Le Monde*'s representation of China seems to lie in *Le Monde*'s identity, which would be revealed in interviews with the journalists and in contextual analysis of the French media, informed by communication theories and other social theories.

## **Preface**

This thesis is an original work by Guangfeng Chen. Part of Chapter 1 of this thesis has been included in the publication: Chen, G. (2015). “Branding China to the world: China in the 2009 UN Copenhagen climate change conference.” *Multilingual Discourses 2.1-2*: 1-35.

## Acknowledgements

It was a relatively long, often lonely, but absolutely beautiful and intellectually fulfilling “adventure.”

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Élisabeth Le, for having helped me in the preparation of the “trip,” such as drawing my map and choosing tools to equip myself, for having advised me when I was confronted with challenges and difficulties on the road, for having guided me back to the right track when I got lost, and for having encouraged me at moments when I felt depressed. Briefly, I would like to thank her for having helped me grow as an academic and person.

A debt of gratitude is owed to my supervisory committee members Dr. Jennifer Dailey-O’Cain and Dr. Thomas Barker. Their expertise, patience and support were indispensable for this adventure to be successful.

I would love to thank my family for their understanding, support and trust. They have always wished the best for me. And my thanks also go to Dr. Huangchao Yu, who has been the best partner ever, on the trip as well as in life.

I also feel grateful for people that I met on the road. They helped me and accompanied me, making this adventure more enjoyable and colorful. Thanks to Dr. Cindy Chopoidaló for editing and proofreading this thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to gratefully thank the CSC (China Scholarship Council) Scholarship and University of Alberta GSA Academic Travel Award, without the support of which I could not have completed this journey.

This journey ends with five chapters written, and a new chapter of my life begins.

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# **Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review**

## **1.1 Background**

Environmental issues such as climate change or pollution are undoubtedly global challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, with chronic human vulnerability and insecurity, in many parts of the world and possibly in the long run, among their effects (Harris, 2011). China, more than any state, is at the center of this great – maybe the greatest – threat facing humankind, both on a practical level and a political level, as Harris (2011) has argued. On a practical level, since 2006, China has been the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases causing global warming. It is estimated that China’s emission of greenhouse gases will continue to increase for some time with its economic expansion, which means increasing use of fossil fuels. Moreover, China is currently confronted with severe environmental pollution. Major Chinese cities such as Beijing are suffering from serious air pollution, known as the “smog crisis.” On a political level, China plays a crucial role in the international negotiations regarding environmental issues, whether to reach an international consensus on attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, or to respond to the inevitable effects of climate change and pollution.

In the international joint endeavors to address environmental problems, China has been making arduous efforts to fight against climate change and to protect the environment in substantial ways, such as improving energy efficiency and developing renewable alternatives to fossil fuel, as well as policy and law making. Briefly, China sees itself as willing to take its due responsibility in this matter and is actively taking measures to do so. However, China’s efforts and achievements have not been recognized by the West and the international

community dominated by the Western media (Wang, 2011). The international community, or more accurately, Western countries such as the United States and the members of the European Union, have high expectations for China, and insist that China has not reacted to environmental crises on an appropriate scale. Worse still, China's environmental issues are one of several factors, such as its military capability, rapid economic growth, and an authoritarian political system, that contribute to its perception as a potential threat (Yee & Storey, 2002). Thus, environmental issues have created much tension between China and the West. Indeed, environmental concerns are both a cause and a consequence of many political tensions and international controversies (Gleick, 1989), as they closely intertwine with the competition for resources, economic interests and social issues.

The potential dissonances in China's image of itself and other nations' perception of it in the area of environmental issues in which China is a central actor (Harris, 2011) constitutes part of the greatest strategic threat for China today. Indeed, Joshua Cooper Ramo (2007), an American analyst of China, has observed that the greatest strategic threat that China faces today is its national image. However, the problem does not lie in whether China's national image is good or bad, but rather concerns a trickier puzzle: "China's image of herself and other nations' view of her are out of alignment" (Ramo, 2007: 12). Thus, one may wonder whether China's "image puzzle" has indeed extended to the environmental domain with gaps between the country's perception of itself and others' image of it.

Since 2006, the Chinese government has put a high priority on environmental protection. It has carried out vigorous initiatives to tackle air pollution, especially in the wake of the 2013 smog crisis when the Chinese government demonstrated its strong political will and implemented "iron fists" measures. In general, these measures produced positive results,

although they required time to significantly improve air quality. China's domestic efforts in improving energy conservation and efficiency can be characterised as comprehensive and remarkable. In this respect, China "has few equals in other countries, developed or developing" (Mastny, 2010:11).<sup>1</sup> Consequently, China managed to significantly control CO2 emissions. China's view of itself in this respect is quite positive: "actively engaged in international efforts to address climate change and committed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and playing a constructive role in international cooperation" ("White Paper": 2008). (See Chapter 5 for a comprehensive account of the Chinese context regarding environmental protection). To investigate whether China's "image puzzle" has indeed extended to the environmental domain, the foremost question is how exactly other states view China with regards to environmental issues. Thus, this thesis will mainly focus on China's environmental image abroad.

The question of China's environmental image on the international scene is of special relevance in the context of China's building of "soft power" (Nye, 1990) where the issue of national image drew much attention among Chinese political leaders. After more than three decades of strong development since the establishment of the Reform and Opening-Up policy in 1978, China is facing a challenging paradox. On the one hand, China is now the world's second leading power, after the United States, according to many measures, with its aggregate economy estimated to outrank that of the US sometime during the next decade (Shambaugh, 2013). On the other, China remains, in Shambaugh's (2013) terms, a "partial power" that faces various challenges in reinforcing its "soft power" (Nye, 1990). In 2007, the then- President Hu Jintao first drew attention to the importance of building China's global soft power in his official

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<sup>1</sup> Mastny is from Worldwatch Institute.



report to the Chinese Community Party Congress. Since then, China has become increasingly sensitive to its relatively poor image abroad (Shambaugh, 2013). The Chinese government regards national image as an important form of soft power, as it helps determine the state's status on the international scene (Nye & Owen, 1996) and affects its relations with other states (Zhang & Cameron, 2003). Thus, the Chinese government has made great investments in building a positive image. For instance, tens of billions of Renminbi have been poured into the major media outlets in 2009 to enhance China's international presence and establish its brand to the world. However, if China wants to build a coherent positive national image, it is important for China to first be aware of and understand its image on the international scene in environmental issues where China occupies a central place nowadays.

## **1.2 Focus of the Thesis**

As a first step in the study of the national image of China on the international scene with regard to environmental issues, this study conducts a Critical Discourse Analysis of news articles in France on environmental issues related to China. It examines the image of China that is linguistically constructed in "western" news media and suggests some avenues for study of the reasons why China is portrayed the way it is in these news articles.

Indeed, news media can be a vital, and even the strongest, former and disseminator of international images (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Tunstall, 1970; Kunczik, 1997). I chose *Le Monde*, a leading elite newspaper in France, as my case study for two main reasons. First, existing studies of China's national image on the international scene have mostly focused on news texts produced in English-speaking countries, and few studies have investigated French news reports on China, despite the power and influence of France in Europe and the broad

international community. Second, *Le Monde*'s special status among the French media, its preeminence on the political stage and in intellectual life, its focus on international news, its influence both in France and abroad, and its non-neutral positions, as argued by Le (2006: 42-44), make it a particularly relevant newspaper for this study.

*Le Monde* occupies a prominent place on the French political stage and within French intellectual life. It was founded in 1944 by Hubert-Beuve-Méry, following the French liberation, to replace *Le Temps* that was the reference daily under the Third Republic. By the end of the 1960s, *Le Monde* was the most influential of the French dailies. In the 1980s, it started to lose some of its audience due to its leftist orientation, and was hit by successive financial crises in 1982, 1985, 1991, 1994, and 2010. However, it remained a reference paper. Even when President François Mitterrand decided to reduce the number of subscriptions by the Elysée from 110 to 20 due to his tense relationship with the daily's director, it was reported that he was still reading it. Nowadays, *Le Monde* is the paper most read by executives, high-earners and opinion leaders ("Le Monde", n.d.). Since 1995, *Le Monde* has also been available on the internet ([www.lemonde.fr](http://www.lemonde.fr)). It is now France's leading information website and, between July 2016 and July 2017, saw more than 109 million visits per month,<sup>2</sup> comparable to [lefigaro.fr](http://lefigaro.fr) and far more than the websites of other French dailies.

International news has always been the pedestal of *Le Monde* (Fottorino, 2009: 2), as the name of the newspaper indicates. Compared with other French dailies, *Le Monde* is noted for its greater coverage of international news. In its code of ethics (*Le style du Monde*) published in 2002, *Le Monde* explicitly positions itself as an international newspaper, and emphasizes

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<sup>2</sup> Number calculated on the basis of statistics monthly visit from July 2016 to July 2017 obtained from ACPM (L'alliance pour les chiffres de la presse et des médias), <http://www.acpm.fr/Support-Numerique/site/lemonde-fr>, accessed August 17, 2017

the importance of contextualizing most events in their international settings for a better understanding of those events. Indeed, since its establishment, *Le Monde* has pursued its goal of providing France with a reliable and internationally respected newspaper. It is visible on every continent with very competent journalists, and provides detailed coverage of world events. Today, *Le Monde* is available in 120 countries and is the most-purchased French national daily abroad, with a monthly circulation of 289 555 in 2016.<sup>3</sup> It might be seen as “the newspaper that best reflects French opinion on international issues” (“French Media”, n.d.). It is also important to note that *Le Monde* does not reflect the position of the French government, although they may agree on certain subjects. *Le Monde*’s special focus on international news also indicates more data on the relatively less reported issue of the environment (feasibility consideration).

Another dimension that makes *Le Monde* an important source for the investigation of China’s image is its overt ideological stance. *Le Monde* does not leave anyone indifferent. In *La face cachée du Monde-Du contre-pouvoir aux abus de pouvoir* (2003), Pierre Péan and Philippe Cohen accused it of having moved from a position of counter-power to a position in which it was abusing its power. Similarly, in *Le pouvoir du Monde-quand un journal veut changer la France* (2003), Bernard Poulet also pointed out that *Le Monde* has come to exhibit the new form of “militancy”, that of a school master who uses human rights as a rule and morality as a sanction, and prefers to comment rather than report balanced facts. Therefore, *Le Monde*’s special status among French media makes it an important news media for the examination of China’s image. Even though *Le Monde* is only one newspaper from France,

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<sup>3</sup> Statistics obtained from ACPM (L’alliance pour les chiffres de la presse et des médias), <http://www.acpm.fr/Support/le-monde> accessed August 16, 2017

which is only one of the diverse elements of the West, the discourse in *Le Monde* is expected to reflect a “Western” view of China.

### **1.3 Literature Review**

To contextualize the exploration of China’s image constructed in *Le Monde*, it is necessary to look first at what national image is and why it is important in international relations (1.3.1), second, at the problem China encounters with its national image (1.3.2), third, at the role of news media in forming and disseminating national images (1.3.3), and fourth, at the existing empirical studies of the Western news media’s representations of China, with a special focus on studies of China’s environmental image (1.3.4). The first three subsections, 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, outline the relevance of this investigation of China’s national image in foreign news media; the final subsection, 1.3.4, points out the gaps in the existing literature on this topic. All of this allows the research question to be defined in 1.4.

#### **1.3.1 National Image in International Relations**

In recent years, “soft power,” which Nye (2004) defines as “the ability to shape the preferences of others” and “to get others to want the outcomes you want,” has been an important topic in China. China, being “a partial power” (Shambaugh, 2013), one that is strong in hard power and weak in soft power, has been actively seeking to reinforce its “soft power.” In its efforts to do so, China has been increasingly sensitive to its national image abroad and has made great investments to build a positive national image of itself on the international scene. Why does the Chinese government attach such an importance to this? This section discusses the concept of national image, its importance in international relations, and its working mechanism.

A national image can be conceptualized as “a generalized and abstract profile of a nation or its people” (Yu, 1964; Frederick, 1993; cited in Huang & Leung, 2005). According to Peng (2016: 10), national image is a broad construct that can cover “perception and assessment towards a specific country’s status” in various realms including politics, economics, culture and geography. It results from a complex historical process that involves the interplay of various elements, including political and social realities, economic power, popular culture, diplomacy, international politics and symbolic representations in the mass media (Peng, 2004). According to Jonathan Mercer (1996), a national image has two major characteristics. First, the way other states perceive a foreign state is based on their own judgments of the state; it is impossible for a state to control the image that other states hold of it. Second, different people may have different explanations of the same behavior. The same action or behavior of a state can generate as many different perceptions as there are observers. Consequently, a state may have different, or even conflicting, national images within different states (Mercer, 1996).

From the perspective of international communication, there are three levels to the national image of a state: the substantial image, the mediated image and the perceived image (Peng, 2016). The substantial image is the original and unevaluated image, the “objective reality” of the state. It serves as the basis of the mediated image, which is systematically constructed in and transmitted by media texts. Although it originates from the substantial image, the mediated image does not necessarily equate to the substantial image for various reasons, such as different text construction mechanisms or different institutional or national agendas. The audience’s perceived image relates to the influences of the various perceptions of a state that are constructed and conveyed by the media (see section 1.3.3), and also relies on the audience’s interpretation of the media messages within their own cognitive, affective and

evaluative frames. It also needs to be noted that the media's construction of a national image may be susceptible to generating and sustaining stereotypes, which Lippmann (1965: 64) defines as "the projection upon the world of our own sense of our own value, our own position and our own rights", especially when the audience has not had previous contact with the state under discussion. Stereotypes are usually oversimplified conception and opinion of socially and culturally remote outsider groups (Lippmann, 1965).

National image is of great importance in international interactions and transactions. A desired image of a state "can often be of greater use than a significant increment of military or economic power" (Jervis, 1970: 6). Many scholars in international politics agree that a nation's image will influence other states' decision-making in formulations of foreign policy towards that nation (Holsti, 1962; White, 1965; Rosenberg, 1965; Holsti, 1968; Hoffmann, 1968), and consequently affect bilateral relationships between nations (Boulding, 1958; Holsti, 1968; Kunczik, 1997; Alexander, Levin & Henry, 2005). Also, national image, as an essential part of a nation's strategic capital (Van Ham, 2001), helps determine the state's status in the international community (Nye & Owen, 1996), and thus plays an influential role in the nation's international affairs. A good national image can also contribute to a more favorable environment for tourism, international trade and business, as well as the international job market (Anholt, 2008). In the 21st century, national image is even more important. As Nye (2011: xiii) stated, "in an information age it may be the state (or non-state) with the best story that wins."

How exactly does a national image influence international relations? The role of a national image in international relations can be better understood using the constructive approach to international politics. This approach emphasizes that shared ideas and norms play

a determining role in shaping state behavior. One of its main theoreticians, Wendt (1999), maintains that international politics is determined by beliefs that states hold about each other. These beliefs are constructed largely via social relationships rather than material realities. Identity, a crucial concept in this approach, is believed to shape the state's interests, which in turn guide the state's behavior. Thus, the image construction of a state can be understood as fundamentally based on its self-identity. A state's projection of its national image to the world can be seen as that state's expression or negotiation of its self-identity in the international community, in order to influence the beliefs that others hold about this state, and thus influence others' behaviors towards it. How a state constructs a foreign state's national image involves its understanding of its own self-identity and the identity of that foreign state, as well as its position vis-à-vis that foreign state. Thus, a state's construction of another state's image can be seen as a process of influencing other nations' beliefs about both the state itself and the other state. In brief, the national image of a state can be seen as a carrier of its identity, and may shape others' beliefs about it and thus their behaviors towards it. An undesirable national image might lead to international conflict. As Holsti (2006: 23) argues:

The relationship of national images to international conflict is clear: decision makers act upon their definition of the situation and their image of states – others as well as their own. These images are in turn dependent upon the decision maker's belief system, and these may or may not be accurate representations of "reality." Thus, it has been suggested that international conflict frequently is not between states, but rather between distorted images of states (Wright, 1957: 266).

How is a foreign state's image constructed by a state related to that constructed by the media of the latter? The image of a foreign country in the media is not solely constructed by the journalists or the media per se. Rather, the portrayal of a foreign state in the media is more

complicated than barely journalistic writing or reporting. The freedom of news media journalists to challenge and oppose authority is coined within the flexible but clear boundaries of acceptable dissent set by editorial policies of newspaper organizations (van Dijk, 1996), whose basic ideologies are jointly produced in interaction with other social actors at various levels, such as power elites and the public, among others. The image portrayed in the media can be seen as a product of interaction of the newspaper with other social actors. This process can be well explained by drawing on the Cascading Network Activation model of Entman (2004). This model conceptualizes social actors at five levels: the Administration, other elites, media, news frames and public opinion. The model describes how ideas that support a media frame “extend down from the upper level through the rest of the system” (Entman, 2004:9). “Each level can be thought of as a network of people and organizations, jostling to influence the political environment, and being affected by it in return” (Entman, 2004:11). Major current of information goes down to the media and finally reaches the public; in reverse, the Public gives feedback to the media, and media frames are received and taken into account by the elites and the Administration (Le, 2010:11). Thus, media, via their frames, interact with other society actors (i.e., the Administration, other elites, and public) and, influence and are influenced by society. By considering media as one of the diverse elements within society, media’s representation can be understood as a product of social interactions within a state.

Given the importance of national image in today’s context of globalization, some governments have become especially attentive to theirs, with a desire to integrate with global markets, to take part in and shape important global issues, and to elevate their status in the international community (Li & Chitty, 2009). The Chinese government, in particular, is paying increasing attention to its national image. It has been trying to build a positive image abroad



through many measures such as investing hugely in its major media outlets to enhance their international presence so as to brand China to the world.

### **1.3.2 China's Image Puzzle**

While the Chinese government is working hard towards a desired national image of China, it faces a tricky image puzzle. In *Brand China*, American analyst Joshua Cooper Ramo (2007: 12) noted that “China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national image.” However, “China’s problem is more complex than whether or not its national image is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but hinges on a more difficult puzzle: China’s image of herself and other nations’ views of her are out of alignment” (Ramo, 2007: 12). On the one hand, China has proactively been seeking to shape a positive image of itself on the international scene via public relation campaigns utilizing modern communication strategies (Zhu, 2012). It wants to be viewed by others as a prosperous, progressive, culturally advanced and peace-loving state. On the other, China has been criticized in such fields as human rights, press and religious freedoms, and authoritarian political regimes (Fook, 2010). Indeed, as Mercer (1996) pointed out, a state cannot control the image others hold of it, and others’ perceptions can be different from its own perception or how it wants to be viewed by others.

If China wants to work towards a coherent and positive image on an international stage, it is meaningful and important for it to first be aware of and understand what image it has in the international community, as well as how and why such an image is being constructed. Given today’s world is witnessing an ever-increasing importance of environmental issues, one may wonder whether environment may produce/create another “image puzzle” for China. In particular, how others view China with regards to environmental issues is becoming more relevant than ever.

### **1.3.3 News Media and National Image Construction**

As shown above (1.3.1, 1.3.2), it is advantageous for China to investigate its image on the international scene. The question that remains is how this investigation can be approached. This section argues that news media constitute an important source for such an investigation and discusses national image construction in news media. It conceptualizes the power of the news media in shaping national image with theories on media influence, discusses how national image is operationalized in news media studies, and probes into the representation of foreign states in the Western press.

Scholars have articulated the importance of media representations of social actors. For example, Silverstone observed that “the world and its players appear in the media, and for most of us that is the only place they do appear. Appearance itself becomes, in both senses of the word, the world” (2007: 10). Orgad (2012: 23) similarly noted that the media's ongoing construction of images about the world cultivates our imagination of the world we are living in, and “they nourish a wide and deep understanding and feeling that guide and frame people's actions and practices.”

Indeed, news media are powerful in shaping people's views on a particular event or issue, to the extent that they “do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct and constitute them” (Fairclough, 1993: 3), and this discursive construction may include the (re)production of an entire social entity such as a state (Jahedi & Abdullah, 2012). Media influence has been conceptualized in the agenda-setting theory, framing theory, and priming theory, and has been investigated in the field of Discourse Analysis.

In the field of mass media studies, the agenda-setting theory of Max McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972) is a frequently-used model of the influence of the media. An agenda can

be defined as “a list of issues and events that are viewed at a point in time in a ranked hierarchy of importance” (Rogers & Dearing, 1988: 565). The major premise of the agenda-setting theory is that “the public learns the relative importance of issues from the mass media” (Wanta & Hu, 1994: 92). Thus, the priority of issues or topics on the media agenda directly affects the salience of issues or topics on the public agenda (McCombs & Estrada, 1997). In essence, this theory suggests that the mass media has the ability to “influence *which* issues people think about, although they may not be able to instigate changes into *how* people think about these issues” (Gooch, 1996: 110). In other words, mass media is a significant influence on the extent of importance that people attach to different kinds of issues.

Some scholars of the agenda-setting theory further postulate that mass media not only tell the audience what topics and issues to think about, but are also successful in affecting how the audience considers these topics and issues (McCombs, 1992). This latter effect is achieved through “framing,” which Rogers et al. (1997: 246) define as “a second dimension of agenda setting.” Framing is a key concept among theories of media influence (Goffman 1974; Gamson, 1989; Entman, 1993), and a standard definition is given by Entman (1993):

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient<sup>4</sup> in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation. (52)

Mass media not only decide what information to provide and which aspects to make salient, they may also interpret and evaluate the problems and even provide solutions. In this sense, they are very powerful in shaping realities. Furthermore, their versions of realities may directly

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<sup>4</sup>According to Entman (1993), salience means making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences (53).

influence the readers' process of making meanings from the reported facts. In other words, by framing, media may tell readers how to think about issues.

Another important theory of media influence is priming theory, which draws on the work of political scientists Iyengar, Peters and Kinder (1982). Priming theory postulates that the content of mass media suggests the salience of some issues at the expense of others, thus influencing the standards by which people evaluate, for example, political candidates or issues, and affecting their judgments about those candidates or issues. Through priming, mass media influence the considerations that the public take into account when making judgments or decisions. In other words, mass media may tell its audience what to think about when evaluating a candidate or an issue.

These theories of the power of the media are based on the direct effects of media content on its audience. Scholars in the field of discourse analysis tend to pay attention to the more covert, overall and ideological influences of the media (van Dijk, 1996). Discourse analysis is a transdisciplinary field in which forms and functions of text and talk are systematically examined in their social, political, and cultural contexts. In its study of news media, this approach postulates that the power of news media can be better understood by examining the structures and strategies of news media discourses and the ways these relate to institutional arrangements and to the readers (van Dijk, 1996). For example, the choice of the passive or the active voice in a headline may subtly affect readers' interpretation of the report.

Indeed, as these theories indicate, news media discourse, through its content, structures and strategies, plays a crucial role in shaping people's perceptions of realities. The media "do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations"; rather, "they construct and constitute them" (Fairclough, 1993: 3). Their discursive construction may certainly include the

(re)production of foreign states. Many scholars consider news media as vital, and even the strongest, formers and disseminators of international images (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Thunhall, 1970; Smith, 1973; Kunczik, 1997). As Galtung and Ruge (1965) explain, news media are critical projectors of the images of nations:

The world consists of individual and national actors, and since it is axiomatic that action is based on the actor's image of reality, international action will be based on the image of international reality.... But the regularity, ubiquity, and perseverance of news media will in any case make them first-rate competitors for the number-one position as international image-former. (1965: 64)

This role of news media is demonstrated in a number of studies that show that exposure to news media can lead to an increase in audiences' attention to foreign states (e.g. Manheim & Albritton, 1983; Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Dell'Orto, Dong, Moore & Schneeweis, 2004), and that the ways in which media in different states portray a foreign state can yield diverse perceptions of that state (Yan, 1998; Harmon, 1998; Lee, 2000; Peng, 2004; Cao, 2007).

Many scholars approach the dissemination of national images by the press in terms of topics, such as politics, culture, economics, disasters, or healthcare; slant of news, whether ambivalent, neutral, favourable, or unfavourable; prominence; and deviance, in which the deviant news items are unusual, sensational, and controversial, and tend to be regarded as 'newsworthy' (Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987; Wu, 2000). Two other dimensions of national image projected in the media that are often referred to are visibility and valence, as defined by Manheim and Albritton (1984). They define visibility as "the amount of media coverage that the state receives"; valence is conceptualized as "the degree to which the content that is available reflects either favorably or unfavorably on the state" (Manheim and Albritton, 1984: 645).

The western media's coverage of foreign states, especially the third world countries, has often been found to be biased, inaccurate, and strongly oriented toward the West (De Beer, 2004; Merrill, 2004). These reports often construct negative images of developing and (post-)communist states, marked by stereotypes of violence and confrontation (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1984). In news reports, binary oppositions are often used to polarize between in- and out-groups, constructing a reductive ideological contrast between positive *us* and negative *them* (Lee, Chan, Pan & So, 2002). *Us* is constructed in a favorable light at the expense of negative *other* representation (Oehlkers, 2000).

This "othering" of foreign states in western media representations is well demonstrated in discourse analytic work that can provide a precise insight into the discursive strategies of news texts (e.g. Yin, 2007; Chen, 2008; Liu, 2012; Jahedi & Abdullah, 2012). For example, Jahedi and Abdullah (2012) examined how linguistic structures and properties played influential roles in the representation of Iran in American newspapers. They found that there was a tendency of binary opposition between *us* (U.S.: good, righteous, peaceful, etc.) and *them* (Iran: evil, violent, etc.). Stereotypical negative attributes are associated with the *other* (Iran) through discursive strategies such as transitivity, thematization and lexicalization.

As to how the *us/them* dichotomy works in news media, Le's (2006) critical discourse analysis on the representation of Russia in *Le Monde's* and *The New York Times's* editorials in 1999-2001 seems to have provided insightful findings. The linguistic analysis and the systematic contextual analysis together illustrated the reciprocal effects between editorials and society. The representations of Russia in *Le Monde's* and *The New York Times's* editorials were to be understood as representations of their own identities (i.e. French newspaper, American newspaper) more than of who/what Russia was. When these editorialists discussed

Russia, they acted as members of their respective national groups and endorsed their respective national values. The editorialists' emphasis on the negative *other* served primarily to accrue positive self-evaluation of national values. One wonders whether the same would be true in *Le Monde's* representation of China.

### **1.3.4 China's National Image and Environmental Image in Western News Media**

Scholars who have studied China's image in the Western news media have mainly focused on American media, and have observed a generally negative image of China. Mann (1999) surveyed China's image portrayed in mainstream American media, and found that it witnessed a dramatic change from decade to decade in the second half of the 20th century:

In the 1950s and the 1960s, the frame was of China as little blue ants or automatons. In the 1970s, following the Nixon administration's opening, the frame was of the virtuous (entertaining, cute) Chinese, displaying their timeless qualities even under communism. In the 1980s, the frame was that China was 'going capitalist'. And for most of the 1990s, the frame was of a repressive China. (102)

Other studies demonstrated that over the past two decades, U.S. news media have produced negative images of China (Peng, 2004; Leung & Huang, 2007; Yin, 2007; Chen, 2008), especially relating to politics and ideologies. Interestingly, although China's increasing national power and international influence led to more reports about China appearing in U.S. newspapers, the negative image in these reports remained consistent and even increased over time (Peng, 2004).

In recent years, China's environmental issues have received increasing news media coverage (Guo, 2010), and it seems that environment has become another important domain for the negative representation of China. With China's image shifting from "a political power"

to “an economic power,” Western media promoted the view of China as an “economic threat” and “military threat” from which is derived the view of China as a threat to trade, to natural resources and to the environment (Guo, 2010). However, few studies have been specifically devoted to the investigation of news media’s construction of China’s environmental image, with Guo’s 2010 study a notable example. In his content and textual analysis of the 218 articles on global climate change related to China that were published in *The New York Times* between 2000 and 2009, he observed various “othering” strategies, such as weakening China’s voice, strengthening America’s voice, and discourse displacement, in the construction of the image of China as negative and irresponsible. Guo’s study, however, neither provided a systematic linguistic analysis of discourse strategies nor probed into the reasons why *The New York Times* constructed this image. Luo (2016) compared reports on China’s smog between 2005 and 2014 in the Chinese newspaper *People’s Daily* with those in the British newspaper *The Times*. Drawing on content analysis, Luo found that *People’s Daily* focused on analyzing the causes of the smog and took a more positive tone, while *The Times* emphasized the impact of the smog and took a more negative tone. Some of the factors influencing these results include differences in media systems in China and the US, differences in financing sources, and cultural differences in terms of collectivism and individualism. Although Luo’s content analysis did detect and attempt to explain these differences on a general level, it does not provide as much detail as a discourse analysis would.

As these studies show, American and British news reports on China are generally critical (Jiang, 2010; Wu & Deng, 2010). Previous studies consider that this negative image of China in Western news reports may be accounted for by cultural factors: Western media tend to adopt a critical approach that originates in an argumentative and satirical tradition, which is closely



related to their discourse of religious history (Liu, 2011). Other factors that influence these critical views include the Chinese government's own behavior, the U.S.' national interests, the Western ideological heritage, and international relations with the U.S. (Leung & Huang, 2007; Shan & Wan, 2008; Chen, 2008). Although these various factors seem to provide some insights on the negative representation of China in western news media, the aforementioned studies were not based on systematic investigations.

A full account of the Western news media's representation of China necessitates a thorough understanding of its context and thus a systematic contextual analysis, something that so far has been lacking from existing studies. Many of the studies that rely on framing theories (e.g. Xie, 2008; Li, 2012) and critical discourse analysis as a theoretical foundation (e.g. Yin, 2007; Chen, 2008; Liu, 2012) have successfully discussed what images of China are constructed and how they are linguistically realized, but they usually do not give a systematic and full account of the context in which these images are constructed and why. Indeed, by analyzing the reporting frames and tones, they revealed how stories about China are presented and what images of China are constructed. Focusing on the discursive strategies, these studies demonstrated how representations of China were linguistically realized and what ideologies were embedded. For example, Liu's 2012 study provides an understanding of the discursive strategies *The New York Times* has used to "other" China. Using van Dijk's social-cognitive approach, Liu found that these discursive strategies included presenting an *us* and *them* dichotomy, pretending to be "objective" by including many voices in a balanced way while according more importance to the voices and positions opposed to the Chinese government than those in favor of it, and presenting a negative portrayal of China through the voices of

witnesses. However, Liu did not include a systematic contextual analysis to fully account for the way China is represented in these news articles.

In summary, previous studies have explored the “othered” representation of China by the Western media, thus shedding light on how the “othering” process is realized linguistically. Nevertheless, in general, the existing literature appears limited in a number of ways in terms of both content and methodology. In terms of content, these studies either examined all the China-related news articles as a whole (e.g. Peng, 2004; Liu, 2012), or concentrated on news coverage on one particular China-related event (e.g. Leung & Huang, 2007), but few paid particular attention to environmental issues despite their increasing importance on the international scene and their absolute relevance for today’s China. The studies have also often limited their selections of Western media to American media (e.g. Cao, 2007; Guo, 2010), and few studies investigated European news discourses such as French news articles, although Europe can be considered an important and non-negligible part of the West and the international community. In terms of methodology (a full account of methodology will be presented in Chapter 2), existing critical discourse analyses of China’s image focused on English texts, and linguistic tools that are effective for English may not be as well adapted to other languages such as French; and these studies rarely systematically investigated the reasons why China is portrayed the way it is in Western media.

## **1.4 Research Questions**

In an effort to fill in part the knowledge gap described above, this study examines news reportage on environmental issues related to China, in the French leading elite newspaper *Le Monde*, to analyze China’s image as mediated in a “western” newspaper. It approaches the

question from two perspectives: China itself on a domestic level and China as an actor in international relations. These two complementing perspectives will help us obtain a more comprehensive picture of the China portrayed in *Le Monde*. Thus, this study focuses on two specific environmental issues: China's air pollution and global climate change. Because air pollution is a domestic environmental concern, the discussion of this issue in *Le Monde* is an example of how China is represented as a domestic actor. On the other hand, global climate change is a challenge for all of humanity, and avoiding its negative consequences requires global joint efforts; therefore, related news coverage demonstrates how China is depicted as an actor in international relations.

The study of China's environmental image constructed in *Le Monde* will be undertaken in relation to a key moment in China's environmental protection: on February 28, 2015, the documentary *Chai Jing's Review: Under the Dome – Investigating China's Smog*<sup>5</sup> was released on the Internet. This self-financed film, directed by the former China Central Television investigative journalist Chai Jing, was watched by more than 150 million viewers within the first three days. The film was revolutionary because until that time, “the issue of pollution in China has been, in many ways, a closed book” (Ren, 2015, para. 1) about which people knew or understood little or nothing. In this documentary, Chai Jing combined both scientific and policy issues “into a coherent and compelling narrative that has empowered ordinary Chinese to join in a policy debate for the first time” (“Chai Jing”, 2015). The film promoted public

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<sup>5</sup> I got to know the importance of this film from my social networks: my friends posted and reposted discussions and comments around this documentary on social media platforms, such as wechat or weibo, shortly after the documentary's release. Almost everyone in my friend's circle knew about it. The documentary certainly raised our environmental awareness. On the leading Chinese search engine, [www.baidu.com](http://www.baidu.com), there are still 1,420,000 records related to the terms “Under the Dome” and “Chai Jing” as of November 25, 2017. Wechat is a Chinese instant messaging application that also allows to post and repost texts, videos, and messages. In 2016, the number of its active users reached about 889 million, according to Tencent's 2017 report on users&ecology ([http://www.sohu.com/a/136382735\\_184641](http://www.sohu.com/a/136382735_184641)). Weibo is a Chinese application similar to Twitter.

awareness of environmental health issues to such a point that even the people who were previously indifferent to environmental issues expressed their willingness to join in the fight against air pollution after having viewed the film. Not surprisingly, environmental issues were a significant concern at the National People's Congress Conference and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, held a week after the film's release, at which agendas for 2015 were set. The top Chinese leaders were firmly determined to push through more meaningful reforms since, according to Chai Jing, the current "war on pollution" is not working. Given its vast and profound impact on Chinese society, this documentary is regarded as the milestone or the turning point in China's environmental protection movement. Indeed, the Chinese Environment Minister, Chen Jining, even compared it to *Silent Spring*, the 1962 book by American marine biologist Rachel Carson that jump-started the US environmental movement. In such a context, it will be useful to look at *Le Monde's* coverage on China's environmental issues before and after the release of this documentary to determine whether the documentary also marks a turning point in *Le Monde's* representations of China. Thus, this study chooses to analyze and compare the related news articles in *Le Monde* before and after the release of the documentary. The research questions being asked here are the following:

1. What is the environmental image of China constructed in *Le Monde's* China environment-related news coverage?
2. How is this construction of China's image linguistically realized, and through what discursive strategies?
3. Are there any differences in *Le Monde's* representations of China before and after the release of the documentary "Chai Jing's Review: Under the Dome – Investigating China's Smog"? If there are, what are those differences?

4. Why is China represented in *Le Monde* in the ways that it is?

## **1.5 Significance of the Thesis**

Overall, this study is expected to contribute to literature on China's national image, particularly its environmental image in the West, and to critical discourse analysis literature on French-language media representations of foreign countries.

This study is one of few to explore China's national image on the international scene with regard to environmental issues. Its focus on French news reports is expected to expand the existing literature on China's national image, which is dominated by studies dealing with English news reports. Its deliberate examination of China's image concerning both domestic and international affairs allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the issue in question.

In terms of methodology, this study has adapted previous models that were originally designed for the analysis of English discourse to that of French. In this sense, the study adds to the literature on applying CDA tools to languages other than English.

## **1.6 Organization of the Thesis**

Chapter 2 is a presentation of the methodology used in this thesis, explaining the theoretical framework and defining the corpus. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present the findings of the linguistic analysis of the corpus in two case studies: air pollution and climate change. Chapter 5 discusses the results through contextual analysis, and concludes the thesis by answering the research questions and addressing the theoretical and practical implications of

this thesis, its limitations and possible areas for improvement, as well as future directions for research.

## **Chapter 2: Methodology**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the methodology that the current study adopts to answer the research questions, including the theoretical framework within which this study is conducted (2.2) and the definition of the corpus for this study (2.3). Section 2.2 includes a review of the main approaches in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (2.2.1) and a presentation of the tools for the linguistic analysis to be conducted (2.2.2). Section 2.3 proceeds with the sampling procedure for the two case studies of air pollution (2.3.1) and global climate change (2.3.2), and the sampling of news articles for individual qualitative analysis in this study (2.3.3). The final section of this chapter presents the analytical procedure (2.4).

### **2.2 Theoretical Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis**

The analysis of language use in *Le Monde*'s articles on China in relation to the broader context is envisaged from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). CDA considers discourse as a social practice that shapes, and is shaped by, social structures, so that all discourse must be understood in relation to its context (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). As discourse analysis "with an attitude", CDA is concerned with how language is used and abused to exercise power (van Dijk, 2001). More than merely linguistics, CDA is an interdisciplinary approach with a linguistic basis to social issues. It aims to investigate social inequalities as they are constituted, expressed and transmitted by language, and thus, the three concepts of power, history and ideology play important roles.

### 2.2.1 Main Approaches in CDA

CDA does not prescribe a specific research methodology, but rather regroups diverse approaches. It is “at most a shared perspective on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis” (van Dijk, 1993: 131). The approaches developed by Jäger, Wodak, van Dijk, van Leeuwen, Scollon, Fairclough and Kress, among others, have made profound contributions to the development of CDA.

Jäger’s dispositive analysis (DA) approach (2001) has its theoretical foundation in Michel Foucault’s discourse theory, which focuses on knowledge transported by discourse and fundamentally shaping society. Knowledge refers to “all kinds of meanings that people use to interpret and shape their environment” (Jäger & Maier 2009: 37). DA aims to identify the knowledges that are contained in “dispositives,” which are “the constantly evolving context of items of knowledge which are contained in speaking/thinking – acting – materialization” (Jäger, 2001: 56). Discourse, as “flow of knowledge – and/or all societal knowledge stored – throughout all time” (Jäger, 2001: 34) are the pre-requisites of “dispositives.” The analysis of discursive practices with various tools, linguistic and otherwise, is the centre of dispositive analysis. The tools should be chosen according to their relevance to the characteristics of the texture of the object of investigation. The other two non-discursive components of the dispositive, action and materialization, are also part of the investigation. Analysis of action may use methods developed in ethnography, and analysis of materialization may draw on multimodal discourse analysis and artifact analysis.

Wodak’s (2001) discourse-historical approach (DHA) emphasizes the historical contexts of discourses. This approach attempts to collect and systematically integrate all available information about “the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields



in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded” (Wodak, 2001: 65). It examines “the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change” (Wodak, 2001: 65), and uses social theories to explain the context of the information that is collected (Wodak, 2001: 65).

Van Dijk regards CDA as an interdisciplinary social problem-oriented approach adopted to oppose and dissent against discursive power abuse, dominance and social inequality (van Dijk 1991, 1993, 1998). His sociocognitive approach to CDA involves the discourse-cognition-society triangle; what is unique in this approach is the place of social and personal cognition. For van Dijk, sociocognition is the mediator between society and discourse. Correspondingly, sociocognitive discourse analysis must involve a solid linguistic analysis, an examination of mental and memory structures, and a consideration of local and global structures in society. Compared to other approaches, van Dijk’s framework distinguishes itself in its attention to the levels of production and reception in analyzing and explaining discourses (Boyd-Barrett, 1994).

Theo van Leeuwen’s social actors approach (SAA) (2001) is based on the idea that discourses are recontextualizations of social practices. The theoretical core of this approach is the primacy of practice: actions establish social structure, and representation is ultimately based on practice. The idea of individual actors permanently constituting and reproducing social structure is linked with a Foucauldian notion of discourse, somewhat similar to DA and DRA (Wodak & Meyer, 2001).

Scollon’s mediated discourse analysis (MDA) (1998) is an action-oriented approach to CDA whose theoretical core is the primacy of sociocultural activity. This approach shares the goals of CDA, but departs from CDA in its strategies. MDA is based on the premise that power

relations are not only discursive, but are grounded in practice. It is through social actions that actors produce the histories and habitus of their daily life. Thus, this approach looks closely at social actions as the unit of analysis, rather than an ethnographic event or a strip of language such as an utterance or turn of talk, although one of its central tasks is to explicate and understand how discourses of social life influence social actions.

In Fairclough's (2001) dialectical-relational approach (DRA), language and other forms of semiosis, such as body language or visual images, are perceived as elements of social practices that are composed of diverse social elements; language is seen as constituting other elements and at the same time being shaped by those elements. This approach places a particular significance on semiosis and is concerned about the dialectical relations between semiosis and other social elements such as issues, problems, and changes. As such, CDA is meant to rest on a solid linguistic analysis and an interdisciplinary engagement with other social methods and theories.

Besides verbal aspects of discourse, non-verbal aspects of communicative events also contribute to the establishment of meaning; a multimodal approach has been increasingly applied to CDA. Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) provide a useful model of how images and composite texts are read. Their analytical methods are based on the semiotic principles of how meaning is made and understood, and examine the syntactic relations between the elements depicted in the images to reveal the meanings that are constructed. These meanings occur on three levels: representational (the representation of physical or semiotic entities), interactive (images construct the nature of relationships among viewers and what is viewed) and compositional (the distribution of information value or the relative emphasis among elements of the image).

In general, CDA studies discourse in society and thus combines two levels of analysis of discourse: a linguistic textual analysis and a social analysis of the text *vis-à-vis* its sociocultural context. The choice of analytical tools depends on the specific research objectives.

To examine the representation of China in *Le Monde*'s news articles, this study starts with Theo van Leeuwen's (1996) sociosemantic inventory (section 2.2.2). Among the existing CDA approaches, van Leeuwen's framework is particularly devoted to offering various analytical tools to explore the representation of social actors in discourses, which seems quite pertinent to this study on the representation of China. Moreover, this framework distinguishes itself from other CDA approaches in its concern with the sociological or critical relevance and the semantic neatness of its categories, as articulated by van Leeuwen (1996) himself:

Yet, unlike many other linguistically orientated forms of Critical Discourse Analysis, I shall not start out with linguistic operations such as nominalisation and passive agent deletion, or from linguistic categories such as the categories of transitivity, but instead seek to draw up a sociosemantic inventory of the ways in which social actors can be represented, and to establish the sociological and critical relevance of my categories before I turn to the question of how they are realised linguistically. (33)

As such, the sociosemantic categories introduced by van Leeuwen can facilitate CDA analysis as the social relevance of the categories is already more or less established. Each sociological category includes all possible linguistic means of realization, allowing a thorough examination of textual structures that contribute to the representation of social actors. In all, this framework is a theoretically adequate and practically usable tool for the purposes of this thesis.

The construction of a state's image in journalistic articles is also particularly linked to evaluation and stance-taking. As Theo van Leeuwen's framework does not explicitly look at this aspect, this study needs another framework focusing on linguistic resources of evaluation

and intersubjective positioning. Among the existing approaches to evaluation and stance-taking, “it is within Systemic Functional Linguistics that the investigation of the systems of evaluative choices available to language users and of their function in discourse has been carried farthest” (Thompson 2014: 48). This refers to the Appraisal theory of Martin and Whyte (2005) that is rooted in the systemic functional grammar tradition and “provides the only systematic, detailed and elaborate framework of evaluative language” (Bednarek, 2006: 32). Thus, this study applies the Appraisal theory to investigate evaluative meanings that journalists express through linguistic means in the news texts (section 2.2.3).

Together, these two models help provide answers to the research questions as to the image of China constructed in *Le Monde* and the ways in which the image construction is linguistically realized. Departing from the results of the linguistic textual analysis, the study will probe into the context and explore some avenues into the question of why *Le Monde* has constructed China’s image in the particular ways that it does.

### **2.2.2 Representation of Social Actors**

Van Leeuwen’s *Representation of Social Actors* (1996) provides a *sociosemantic* inventory of the many possible ways to represent social actors in English discourses. This study adapts van Leeuwen’s framework, with some modifications, to analyze French texts using certain categories whose relevance was determined by the research questions and the prominence of certain linguistic features in the source texts. In particular, the categories of *inclusion* and *exclusion* are first employed to determine which social actors are *foregrounded*, *backgrounded* or *suppressed* in the news texts. This helps us to know who is (not) there. The actors in question are then looked at whether they are represented as individuals, through *nomination*, or as groups, through *categorization*. A further question is whether they are

*associated* or *disassociated* with certain social actors or groups and/or with certain qualities. This helps to reveal who the included social actors are. Finally, the included social actors are discussed in terms of the *active* or *passive* role allocated to them in the text. This aims to reveal what the social actors do. Table 2.1 summarizes the categories to be used and the purposes they serve. This section demonstrates how those categories can be used in French text analysis, with examples drawn from the corpus of the China-related environmental news articles in *Le Monde*, as defined in section 2.3.

Table 2.1: Analytical categories and their purposes

Analytical Categories	Purposes	
Inclusion and exclusion	Who is or is not included in the representation?	
Nomination and Categorization	Are the included actors represented as individuals or as groups?	Who are the included actors?
Association and disassociation	With whom are the included actors associated? With what qualities are they associated?	
Role allocation	What do the included actors do?	

### **Inclusion and exclusion**

Although every social practice involves a set of specific social actors, not all of these are included to the same extent in a given representation. “Representations include or exclude social actors to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for whom they are intended” (van Leeuwen, 1996: 38); therefore, investigating which actors are included or excluded is important for the purposes of CDA.

According to van Leeuwen (1996: 39), representations of social actors can vary according to a continuum, from *foregrounding*, *backgrounding*, *suppression*, to *radical exclusion*. *Foregrounding* means that social actors are explicitly mentioned in relation to a given action; in other words, the social actor and the relevant action are in the same clause.

Backgrounding happens when the social actors involved are not referred to explicitly in relation to a relevant action; however, they do appear elsewhere in the cotext, and readers may infer who they are with reasonable certainty. Backgrounded actors are de-emphasized rather than totally excluded. In the case of suppression, the action is included, but the social actor in question is completely absent in the text. *Radical exclusion* means that both the social actors and their actions are omitted, so that no traces can be found at all in the text. This kind of exclusion can be revealed only “in a critical comparison of different representations of the same social practice” (van Leeuwen, 1996: 39) or when enough contextual information is taken into account.

On the basis of van Leeuwen’s category of *foregrounding*, I shall also take into consideration the Theme-Rheme structure of the sentence, since syntax also has meaning (Halliday, 2004), as will be shown in the examples. This study distinguishes between *Theme foregrounding*, in which the social actor appears in the Theme, and *Rheme foregrounding*, in which the social actor appears in the Rheme. A more detailed discussion of Theme-Rheme foregrounding follows at the end of this section, while Figure 2.1 presents the continuum from inclusion to exclusion. Each category is explained, with examples, in the following subsections.




Figure 2.1. Continuum of inclusion and exclusion of social actors in discourse

- *Suppression*

Suppression can be realized in different ways. One common form is passive agent deletion. Example (1) notes that a “brouillon” [draft text] was distributed to delegates, but who distributed it is not mentioned:

(1) *Le matin, avait été distribué aux délégués des 191 parties à la Convention un « brouillon ».* [In the morning, a “draft text” was distributed to the delegates of the 191 parties at the Conference.]

(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

A non-finite clause that functions as a grammatical participant can also produce suppression. In example (2), the infinitival clause “placer les crédits” [to place the credits] functions as the carrier of the nominative clause, and allows social actors who are involved in the “placing” of the credits to be excluded, although they could have been included by a prepositional phrase, for instance, as “pour les sociétés chinoises” [for the Chinese companies]:

(2) *Placer les crédits n'est pas un problème.* [To place the credits is not a problem.]

(LM, La Chine rafle la mise des crédits carbone, 11 décembre 2009)

A third method of suppression of social actors is by deleting “beneficiaries,” social actors who benefit positively or negatively from an activity. Example (3) does not mention those to whom “nous ne pouvons pas promettre” [we cannot promise], although they *could* have been included, for instance, as “aux participants à la conférence” [to conference participants]:

(3) *Nous ne pouvons pas promettre quelque chose que nous n'avons pas encore.* [We cannot promise something that we don't have yet.]

(LM.fr, La Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat, 15 décembre 2009)

Fourth, nominalization and process nouns can also suppress social actors. “La marginalization” [marginalization] in example (4) and “la course” [the pursuit] in example (5) refer to actions, but the social actors in question are excluded. The suppressed actors *could* have been included, for instance, by using prepositional phrases with “par” [by] or “de” [of or from]:

(4) *L'accord consacre la marginalisation de l'Union Européenne.* [The agreement sacrifices the marginalization of the European Union.]

(LM.fr, La négociation accouche d'un texte sans ambition, 19 décembre 2009)

(5) *La course aux petits prix tue la planète.* [The pursuit of low prices kills the planet.]  
(LM, La course aux petits prix tue la planète, 12 décembre 2009)

Fifth, adjectives can cause suppression. For instance, “légitime” [legitimate] in example (6) allows the suppression of the actors for whom China’s position is legitimate or not. It is simply that the position of China became less legitimate:

(6) *La position chinoise est donc devenue moins "légitime.* [The position of China therefore became less “legitimate.”]  
(LM.fr, Copenhague : neuf acteurs au coeur de la bataille, 7 décembre 2009)

Finally, suppression can also be achieved by using the middle clause, a clause that represents a self-caused process. In the middle clause, ergative verbs are used intransitively; as in example (7), the process in “la discussion...a commence” [The discussion ... started] is represented as self-engendered, instead of being represented as, for instance, “les délégués ont commencé la discussion” [the delegates started the discussion]. In another form of the middle clause, the verb is used in the reflexive form in order to express an anticausative meaning. Example (8) uses the verb “se répartir” [distribute]. The self-causing nature of the process is explicitly marked by “se,” as if the distribution of “les efforts” [the efforts] is actualized through “les efforts” [the efforts] themselves:

(7) *La discussion sérieuse sur les finances et sur les objectifs d'émission a commencé.* [The serious discussion on financial funding and émission objectives started.]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les États-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

(8) *Comment se répartir les efforts?* [How can the efforts be distributed?]  
(LM.fr, Copenhague une semaine pour surmonter les divergences, 14 décembre, 2009)

#### - **Backgrounding**

There are various forms of backgrounding, in which the excluded social actor appears elsewhere in the cotext. In French, a clause should contain a subject and a verb. Thus, non-finite forms of verbs, such as infinitives, present (-ant) or past (-é, -i, -u) participles, can



contribute to backgrounding. In example (9a), the actor, “la Chine” [China], does not appear in the actions “lutter” [fight], “participer” [participate], “promouvoir” [promote], so that China’s agency or responsibility is backgrounded in those actions. This contrasts with example (9b), in which China is clearly foregrounded in the actions. Similarly, in example (10), although “le camp européen” [the European camp] is explicitly foregrounded in relation to the action “venir” [come] in the main clause, it is not explicitly mentioned in relation to the action “effacer” [erase] in “singulièrement effacé dans cette conférence” [singularly erased in this conference]. Although “le camp européen” appears just before “effacé” [erased], and readers may infer with certainty that it is “le camp européen” who is erased, “le camp européen” is backgrounded in the action “effacé” since it is not explicitly mentioned in relation to the verb:

(9a) *«La Chine déploie le maximum d’efforts pour lutter contre les changements climatiques » et «assume sa responsabilité pour participer en profondeur à la gouvernance mondiale et promouvoir le développement partagé de l’humanité », soutient Li Keqiang, cité dans le communiqué.* [“China deploys maximum efforts to fight against climate change” and “takes responsibility for deep participation in global governance and promotes the common development of mankind,” supported Li Keqiang, cited in the statement.]  
(LM, La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat, 30 juin 2015)

(9b) *La Chine lutte contre les changements climatiques avec le maximum d’efforts et elle assume sa responsabilité; elle participe en profondeur à la gouvernance mondiale et elle promeut le développement partagé de l’humanité.* [China deploys maximum efforts to fight against climate change; she takes responsibility for deep participation in global governance and she promotes the common development of mankind.] (sentence constructed by the author for the purpose of illustration)

(10) *Aucune réponse n’est venue du camp européen, singulièrement effacé dans cette conférence.* [No response came from the European camp, singularly erased in this conference.]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

Circumstantial adjunct is another method of backgrounding social actors. For example, “*le représentant chinois*” [the Chinese representative] is backgrounded in the adjunct “*sans répondre directement*” [without answering directly]:

(11) *Sans répondre directement, le représentant chinois s'est montré acerbe à l'égard des Etats-Unis.* [Without answering directly, the Chinese representative was scathing against the US.]

(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

Backgrounding can also occur via paratactic clauses, as in example (12) with the paratactic clause “fournisse des moyens financier” [provide financial resources], which backgrounds “le monde industrialisé” [the industrialized world]:

(12) *La justice sociale exige que le monde industrialisé mette généreusement la main à la poche et fournisse des moyens financiers [...].* [Social justice demands that the industrialized world generously dig into their own pockets and provide financial resources [...].]

(LM.fr, A Copenhague, douze jours pour changer notre monde, 7 décembre 2009)

Methods of suppression can also be used for backgrounding, though the social actors in question do appear in the cotext. As in example (13), the social actors involved in “la discussion” [the discussion] are not mentioned in the clause “le choix est laissé à la discussion” [the choice is left to discussion]; however, readers may infer with certainty that they are “les délégués des 191 parties” [the delegates from the 191 parties] which appeared earlier in the cotext:

(13) *Le matin, avait été distribué aux délégués des 191 parties à la Convention un « brouillon » (draft text). [...] le choix est laissé à la discussion.* [In the morning, a “draft text” was distributed to the delegates of the 191 parties in the Conference.[...] the choice is left to discussion. ]

(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

#### - ***Theme foregrounding and Rheme foregrounding***

As mentioned earlier, the *foregrounding* of social actors in this study is divided into two subcategories: *Theme foregrounding* and *Rheme foregrounding*. This distinction is significant because “in the Theme-Rheme structure, it is the Theme that is the prominent element” (Halliday, 2004: 105). According to Halliday, “the Theme of a clause ends with the first constituent that is either participant, circumstance or process” (1994: 52). It “serves as the point of departure of the message [and] locates and orients the clause within its context” (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 65), while the Rheme is the remainder of the message, which develops

the Theme. Thus, social actors foregrounded in the Theme gain more prominence than those in the Rheme. Theme-foregrounded social actors are what the text is about. This can be illustrated by the comparison of examples (14) and (15). In example (14), both “Washington” and “les grands émergents” [the big emerging countries] are foregrounded social actors; however, Washington appears in the Theme, while “les grands émergents” [the big emerging countries] appear in the Rheme. The statement tells readers what Washington is doing, rather than what “les grands émergents” are doing. Washington has a greater prominence than “les grands émergents,” although both of them are foregrounded social actors:

(14)

Theme	Rheme
<i>Washington</i>	<i>attend un engagement plus net de la part des grands émergents.</i>
[Washington	expects a stronger commitment from the part of the big emerging countries.]

(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

In contrast, although the semantic meaning of example (15), a sentence constructed by the author for the sake of illustration, is the same as that of example (14), “un engagement” [a commitment] appears in the Theme while Washington is in the Rheme. Thus, the statement is about “un engagement” [a commitment] rather than Washington. In this case, “un engagement” [a commitment] is the focus:

(15)

Theme	Rheme
<i>Un engagement plus net de la part des grands émergents</i>	<i>est attendu par Washington.</i>
[A stronger commitment on the part of the big emerging countries	is expected by Washington]

To determine whether a social actor is included in the Theme or Rheme, we need to delimit the Theme-Rheme structure of a sentence. The theme in French is indicated by position, as it is in English (Halliday, 2004: 64; Caffarel, 2006: 168). In the interpretation of the French

Theme, we will follow Caffarel’s (2006) systemic functional grammar of French which was developed on the basis of Halliday’s (2004) work on English. Caffarel suggests that the thematic organization of a clause in French involves “the selection of a marked and unmarked (topical) organization” (2006: 168). In the French declarative clause, the Subject is more likely to have thematic status than the Complement or Adjunct. Therefore, if the Subject has thematic status, it is interpreted as an unmarked theme; if a Complement or circumstantial Adjunct has thematic status, then it is interpreted as a marked theme, as is shown in example (21). Further, Caffarel differs from Halliday, who maintains that the theme includes the first, and only the first, experiential element of a clause. She argues that in French, when a marked Theme is selected, the participant functioning as Subject still has thematic prominence, although to a lesser degree than the marked Theme (2006: 180). For instance, in example (16), the unmarked theme “le représentant chinois” [the Chinese representative] still has a thematic status, although it is less thematically prominent than the marked theme “Sans répondre directement” [without answering directly]:

(16)

Theme (marked)	Theme (unmarked)	Rheme
<i>Sans répondre directement,</i>	<i>le représentant chinois</i>	<i>s'est cependant montré acerbe à l'égard des Etats-Unis.</i>
[Without answering directly,	the Chinese representative	was scathing against the US.]

(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

In other types of sentences, the unmarked Theme may not necessarily be the Subject. Thus, in the imperative mood, the unmarked Theme is the Predicator, such as “devenons” [let’s become] in example (17), while in the interrogative mood, the unmarked Theme will vary depending on the type of interrogation. In a yes/no interrogative, the finite verbal operator plus the Subject functions as the unmarked Theme, such as “peut-on” [can we] in example (18). In

a WH- interrogative, it is the WH- element that is the unmarked theme, as with “Que” [what] in example (19):

(17)

Theme(unmarked)	Rheme
<i>Devenons,</i>	<i>pour le coup, des vrais « consommateurs intelligents » !</i>
[Let's become,	for once, true "smart consumers"!]

(LM, La course aux petits prix tue la planète, 12 décembre 2009)

(18)

Theme(unmarked)	Rheme
<i>Peut-on</i>	<i>encore s'exalter devant le film Home [...] ?</i>
Can we	still exalt before the film <i>Home</i> [...]?

(LM, La course aux petits prix tue la planète, 12 décembre 2009)

(19)

Theme(unmarked)	Rheme
<i>Que</i>	<i>deviendront les MDP?</i>
[What	will happen to the MDP?]

(LM, La Chine rafle la mise des crédits carbone, 11 décembre, 2009)

Theme and Rheme are always coded on the level of one syntactic sentence in this study. Here I illustrate the delimitation of Theme and Rheme with one particular case. In the four following examples, 20a and its variations 20b-d, the clause “cette crise résulte de l'explosion de la pollution entraînée par le développement économique de ces dernières décennies” functions as the direct object of the verb “estime”, while “He Xiaoxia” is the subject of “estime” and “l'une des fondatrices de l'ONG pékinoise Green Beagle” is an inserted clause that modifies “He Xiaoxia.” Thus, the Theme and Rheme structure are delimited as follows:

(20a) *Cette crise, estime He Xiaoxia, l'une des fondatrices de l'ONG pékinoise Green Beagle, résulte de "l'explosion de la pollution entraînée par le développement économique de ces dernières décennies."* [The crisis, says He Xiaoxia, one of the founders of the Beijing Green Beagle NGO, results from “the explosion of pollution caused by economic development in recent decades”]

(Le Monde.fr | A Pékin, la pollution de l'air pulvérise les normes de l'OMS | 14 Jan.2013)

Theme	Rheme
<i>Cette crise,</i>	<i>estime He Xiaoxia, l'une des fondatrices de l'ONG, résulte de "l'explosion de la pollution entraînée par le développement économique de pékinoise Green Beagle, ces dernières décennies".</i>

(20b) “*Cette crise résulte de l’explosion de la pollution entraînée par le développement économique de ces dernières décennies*”, estime He Xiaoxia, l’une des fondatrices de l’ONG pékinoise Green Beagle.

Theme	Rheme
“ <i>Cette crise résulte de l’explosion de la pollution entraînée par le développement économique de ces dernières décennies,</i> ”	<i>estime He Xiaoxia, l’une des fondatrices de l’ONG pékinoise Green Beagle.</i>

(20c) He Xiaoxia, l’une des fondatrices de l’ONG pékinoise Green Beagle, estime: “*Cette crise résulte de l’explosion de la pollution entraînée par le développement économique de ces dernières décennies.*”

Theme	Rheme
<i>He Xiaoxia, l’une des fondatrices de l’ONG pékinoise Green Beagle,</i>	<i>estime: “Cette crise résulte de l’explosion de la pollution entraînée par le développement économique de ces dernières décennies.”</i>

(20d) He Xiaoxia, l’une des fondatrices de l’ONG pékinoise Green Beagle, estime que *cette crise résulte de l’explosion de la pollution entraînée par le développement économique de ces dernières décennies.*

Theme	Rheme
<i>He Xiaoxia, l’une des fondatrices de l’ONG pékinoise Green Beagle,</i>	<i>estime que cette crise résulte de l’explosion de la pollution entraînée par le développement économique de ces dernières décennies.</i>

To summarize, Table 2.2 lists the categories, their methods of realization, and some examples:

Table 2.2. Exclusion and inclusion of social actors in discourse

	Methods of Realization	Examples
Radical exclusion (the actors and their actions do not appear at all in the text)	No traces of either the social actors or their social activities	[without object]
Suppression (the action appears in the text, but the social actors in question do not appear in the text)	Passive agent deletion	(1) <i>Le matin, avait été distribué aux délégués des 191 parties à la Convention un « brouillon ».</i>
	Non-finite clause as a grammatical participant	(2) <i>Placer les crédits n’est pas un problème.</i>
	Deletion of "beneficiaries"	(3) <i>Nous ne pouvons pas promettre quelque chose que nous n’avons pas encore.</i>
	Nominalization and process nouns	(4) <i>L’accord consacre la marginalisation de l’Union Européenne.</i> (5) <i>La course aux petits prix tue la planète.</i>

	Adjectives	(6) <i>La position chinoise est donc devenue moins "légitime".</i>	
	Middle clause: ergative verbs are used intransitively; verb in reflexive form to express the anticausative meaning	(7) <i>La discussion sérieuse sur les finances et sur les objectifs d'émission a <b>commencé</b>.</i> (8) <i>Comment <b>se répartir</b> les efforts?</i>	
Backgrounding (the action appears in the text, and the involved actor appears in the text, but not in the same clause as the given action)	the involved actor appears in the same syntactic sentence	non-finite clause with infinitives, present or past participles	(9) <i>a. La Chine déploie le maximum d'efforts <b>pour lutter</b> contre les changements climatiques » et « assume sa responsabilité <b>pour participer</b> en profondeur à la gouvernance mondiale et <b>promouvoir</b> le développement partagé de l'humanité.</i> (10) <i>Aucune réponse n'est venue du camp européen, <b>singulièrement effacé dans cette conférence</b></i>
		circumstantial adjunct	(11) <i><b>Sans répondre directement, le représentant chinois s'est montré acerbe à l'égard des Etats-Unis.</b></i>
		paratactic clauses	(12) <i>La justice sociale exige que <b>le monde industrialisé mette</b> généreusement la main à la poche et <b>fournisse</b> des moyens financiers [...].</i>
	The involved actor appears in the cotext	in the same way as suppression but concerning social actors who appear elsewhere in the cotext	(13) <i>Le matin, avait été distribué aux <b>délégués des 191 parties</b> à la Convention un « brouillon » (draft text). [...] le choix est laissé à la <b>discussion</b>.</i>
Rheme Foregrounding	Social actor appears in the Rheme	(14) <i>Washington attend un engagement plus net de la part <b>des grands émergents</b>.</i>	
Theme Foregrounding	Social actor appears in the Theme	(14) <i><b>Washington</b> attend un engagement plus net de la part des grands émergents.</i>	

### Nomination and Categorization

Since “nameless characters fulfill only passing, functional roles, and do not become points of identification for the readers or listener” (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 53), it is always useful to investigate which social actors are represented by being *nominated*, in terms of their unique identity, and which are *categorized* in terms of identities and functions they share with others (for example, “les grands émergents” [the big emerging countries]).

- *Nomination*

According to van Leeuwen, *nomination* is typically realized with proper nouns. Social actors are nominated if they are referred to by proper nouns, either in a *formal* way (surname only with or without honorifics or titles, or full name with honorifics or titles, e.g. “M. Cutajar,” or, “le diplomate maltais Michael Zammit Cutajar”), semi-formal (given name and surname, e.g. Nicolas Sarkozy), or informal (given name only, e.g. Nicolas). Table 2.3 summarizes examples of nomination:

In international news, the name of a country or a place is often used to refer to a category of actors. Thus, this paper distinguishes between two functions of a country’s name: a reference to a geographical place, and a reference to a group of social actors, based on the semantics. For instance, in example (21), “Pékin” [Beijing] is a categorized reference to the actors in the Chinese government, while in example (22), “Pékin” refers to the city itself:

(21) *Dans une déclaration commune, Pékin s’est engagé auprès de la France sur le principe d’« un accord juridiquement contraignant » à la conférence de Paris, accompagné de mécanismes de suivi des engagements attendus.* [In a joint statement, Beijing has committed with France to the principle of "a legally binding agreement" at the Paris conference, accompanied by monitoring mechanisms of due commitments.]  
(LM.fr, Climat : François Hollande se félicite du soutien de Pékin, 2 Nov. 2015)

(22) *En novembre 2014, à l’issue d’une visite de Barack Obama à Pékin, elle s’engageait à ce que ces émissions aient cessé d’augmenter en 2030 ou avant.* [In November 2014, after Barack Obama’s visit to Beijing, it pledged that its emissions would stop increasing in 2030 or earlier.]  
(LM.fr, Climat : François Hollande se félicite du soutien de Pékin, 2 Nov. 2015)

Table 2.3. Nomination in discourse

Nomination	Methods of Realization		Examples
Nomination (Social actors are referred to by proper nouns)	formalization	surname only with or without with honorifics or titles	<i>M. Cutajar</i>
		full name with honorifics or titles	<i>le diplomate maltais Michael Zammit Cutajar</i>
	semi-formalization	given name and surname	<i>Nicolas Sarkozy</i>
	informalization	given name only	<i>Nicolas</i>



- **Categorization**

Social actors can be *categorized* according to their identities or functions they share with others. *Categorization* has two subtypes (table 2.4): *identification*, in terms of who they are; and *functionalization*, in terms of what they do, such as “les conducteurs” [drivers]. *Identified* social actors can either be *classified* according to their provenance or hierarchical status (e.g. “les citadins chinois” [the Chinese city dweller]), or be *identified* in terms of social relations such as kinship (e.g. “l’enfant” [the child]) or personal relations (e.g. “ses amis” [her friends]):

Table 2.4. Categorization in discourse

Categorization (Social actors are referred to in terms of the identities or functions they share with others)	Identification (who social actors are)	Classification (according to provenance, hierarchical status, etc.)	e.g. les citadins chinois [the Chinese city dweller]
		Relational identification (kinship and social relation)	e.g. l’enfant [the child] ses amis [her friends]
	Functionalization (what they do)		e.g. les conducteurs [drivers]

**Association and disassociation**

The term *association* is used in two ways. First, as van Leeuwen (1996) defines the term, “association refers to groups formed by social actors and/or groups of social actors which are never labeled in the text (although the actors or groups who make up the association may of course themselves be named and/or categorized)” (50). I shall refer to this kind of association as *actor association*. Second, it refers to the assignment of social actors with certain qualities in a given representation. I shall refer to association of this kind as *quality association*.

- **Actor association**

Actor association may be realized by parataxis, which is the most common way to form a group, as in example (20), in which “des Etats insulaires, des Etats les plus pauvres et des pays africains” [the island countries, the poorest countries and African countries] are formed

into a beneficiary group of the “cadre institutionnel spécifique” [specific institutional framework]:

(20) « *Un cadre institutionnel spécifique* » sera établi pour l'adaptation, en particulier, des *Etats insulaires, des Etats les plus pauvres et des pays africains*. [“A specific institutional framework” will be established for the adaptation, in particular, of the island countries and the poorest countries and African countries]  
(LM, L'accord dont rêvent les pays en développement, 11 décembre 2009)

Actor association can be also realized by circumstances of accompaniment. In the following example, "la Chine" [China] is associated with “l’Inde, le Brésil, l’Afrique du Sud et le Soudan” [India, Brazil, South Africa and Sudan] through circumstances of accompaniment realised by “en accord avec” [in agreement with]:

(21) *Dans un texte confidentiel élaboré par la Chine en accord avec l'Inde, le Brésil, l'Afrique du Sud et le Soudan [...] ils exposent l'accord de Copenhague qui répondrait à leurs desiderata*. [In a confidential text drafted by China in agreement with India, Brazil, South Africa and Sudan [...] they present the "Copenhagen Accord" that would suit their wishes.]  
(LM, L'accord dont rêvent les pays en développement, 11 décembre, 2009)

Particularization appositive, as in the case of “les grands émergents” [the major emerging countries] and “la Chine” [China] in the following example, can also help to realize actor association:

(22) *Washington attend un engagement plus net de la part des grands émergents, la Chine en particulier*. [Washington expects a stronger commitment on the part of the major emerging countries, China in particular.]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

- ***Quality association***

A verbless adjective clause can produce quality association, as in the case of “le Soudan” [Sudan], which is qualified as “très hostile au Nord” [very hostile to countries of the North] in the example below:

(23) *Le Soudan, très hostile au Nord, dirige cette année le G77 [...]*. [Sudan, very hostile to countries of the North, leads the G77 this year [...].]  
(LM.fr, Copenhague: neuf acteurs au cœur de la bataille, 7 décembre 2009)

Another method of quality association is attribution appositive, as in the following example, which describes “la Chine” [China] and “les Etats-Unis” [the US] as “les deux plus gros pollueurs mondiaux” [the world’s two largest polluters]:

(24) *Le fait que la Chine et les Etats-Unis, les deux plus gros pollueurs mondiaux, se soient fixé [...] constitue un pas important dans la bonne direction.* [The fact that the world's two largest polluters, China and the US, fixed... is an important step in the right direction.]  
(LM.fr, A Copenhague, douze jours pour changer notre monde, 7 décembre 2009)

Third, quality association can be realized with relational clauses that use verbs such as “avoir” [have] and “appartenir” [belong], “faire partie de” [be part of], or “être considéré comme” [be regarded as]; or linking verbs such as “être” [be], “paraître” [appear to be], or “devenir” [become]. For instance, in example (25), “elle” [she] is attributed the quality of “leaders mondiaux” [world leaders]:

(25) *Dans l'éolien ou le solaire, elle fait déjà partie des leaders mondiaux.* [In wind and solar power, she is already part of (i.e. one of) the world leaders.]  
(LM, La Chine rafle la mise des crédits carbone, 11 décembre 2009)

Non-finite relational clauses allow quality association. In the example below, China is identified as “le premier investisseur dans les énergies renouvelables” [the leading investor in renewable energies] with the use of the non-finite clause “Devenu depuis 2013 le premier investisseur dans les énergies renouvelables” [Having become the leading investor in renewable energy]:

(26) *Devenu depuis 2013 le premier investisseur dans les énergies renouvelables, ce pays continent devra développer des politiques publiques incitative [...].* [Becoming the leading investor in renewable energy, the continent country should develop incitative public policies...]  
(LM, La Chine se fixe pour objectif d’« atteindre le pic de ses émissions de CO2 autour de 2030 », 1 July 2015)

Premodification or postmodification of an attribute can also contribute to quality association. For instance, “sa prospérité” in example (27) is a premodification, and “la prospérité de la Chine” [the prosperity of China] is a postmodification:

(27) [...] Pékin ne devait pas s'attendre à une aide financière, en raison de sa prospérité [...].  
 [Beijing shouldn't expect financial aid, because of its prosperity.]  
 (LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

Table 2.5 summarizes association in discourse, including association types and their methods of realization along with examples.

Table 2.5. Association in discourse

Association types	Methods of realization	Examples
Actor association	parataxis	(20)« Un cadre institutionnel spécifique » sera établi pour l'adaptation, en particulier, <b>des Etats insulaires, des Etats les plus pauvres et des pays africains.</b>
	circumstances of accompaniment	(21)Dans un texte confidentiel élaboré par la <b>Chine en accord avec l'Inde, le Brésil, l'Afrique du Sud et le Soudan [...].</b>
	Particularization appositive	(22)Washington attend un engagement plus net de la part <b>des grands émergents, la Chine en particulier.</b>
Quality association	verbless adjective clause	(23)Le Soudan, <b>très hostile au Nord</b> , dirige cette année le G77..
	Attribution appositive	(24)Le fait que <b>la Chine et les Etats-Unis, les deux plus gros pollueurs mondiaux</b> , se soient fixé [...].
	Relational clauses with verbs such as "avoir" "appartenir" "faire partie de" "être" "paraître"	(25)Dans l'éolien ou le solaire, <b>elle fait déjà partie des leaders mondiaux.</b>
	Non-finite relational clauses	(26) <b>Devenu depuis 2013 le premier investisseur dans les énergies renouvelables</b> , ce pays continent devra développer des politiques publiques incitative [...].
	premodification or postmodification of an attribute	(27)[...] Pékin ne devait pas s'attendre à une aide financière, en raison de <b>sa prospérité</b> [...]. [premodification] <b>la prospérité de la Chine</b> [postmodification]

### Role allocation

In a given representation, social actors can be grammatically allocated an *active* role or a *passive* role in a particular action. The role allocation of social actors in texts is important because the roles allocated in the text are not necessarily in conformity with the actual roles that these social actors play in practice. Thus, it is noteworthy to investigate “which options are chosen in which institutional and social contexts, and why these choices should have been

taken up, what interests are served by them, and what purposes achieved” (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 43). In this paper, on the basis of Van Leeuwen’s categories, syntax and the transitivity system that categorizes verb types are taken into account in role allocation analysis.

- ***Active or Passive Roles***

*Active* actors are the participants who carry out an action. *Activation* can be realized by “participation” (grammatical participant roles), as is the case with “les Etats-Unis” [the United States] in the following example:

(27) *Les Etats-Unis ont réagi par la voix de Todd Stern [...].* [The US have reacted through the voice of Todd Stern [...].]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

Prepositional circumstantials with such as *par* [by], *de* [from] and *selon* [according to] can also result in activation. Some examples include “l’annonce par l’Europe” [the announcement by Europe] in example (28), “*du camp européen*” [from the European camp] in example (29), or “selon *l’entourage du président français*” [according to the entourage of the French president] in example (30):

(28) *L’annonce par l’Europe d’une aide [...] n’a pas suscité un accueil très chaleureux.* [The announcement by Europe of an aid of 7.2 billion euros over three years on Friday did not elicit a very warm welcome.]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

(29) *Aucune réponse n’est venue du camp européen.* [No response came from the European camp.]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

(30) *François Hollande a « salué » cette annonce, estimant qu’elle « confirmait l’engagement de la Chine à construire une “civilisation écologique” », selon l’entourage du président français.* [François Hollande “welcomed” the announcement, saying it “confirms China’s commitment to build an “ecological civilization”, according to the entourage of the French president.]  
(LM, La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat, 30 June 2015)

Premodification or postmodification of nominalizations or process nouns can also activate social actors. For instance, “leurs” in “leurs émissions” in example (31) is a case of

premodification, while “Un projet danois” [a Danish draft] in example (32) is an instance of postmodification:

(31) *Ils viseraient à atteindre une substantielle déviation de leurs émissions.* [They would aim to achieve a substantial deviation of their emissions]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

(32) *Un projet danois réfléchit l’approche des pays du Nord et un projet des pays du Basic.* [A Danish draft reflects the approach of the Northern countries and a draft of the BASIC countries.]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

*Passive* actors in a process either assume a *subjected* or a *beneficialized* passive role.

The *subjected* actor is what we usually call the “patient,” the participant to which an action is carried out. *Subjection* can be realized by “‘participation’ when the passivized social actor is the “Goal in a material process” (such as *prendre, faire* [take, do]), “Phenomenon in a mental process” (such as *penser, adorer* [think, like]), or “Attribute in an effective attributive process” (such as *avoir* [have]) (van Leeuwen, 1994: 45). “Les ministers” [the ministers] in the following case is an example of a *subjected* actor as the goal in the material process “réunir” [bring together]:

(32) *La présidence danoise réunit les ministres à l’écart du Bella Center pour discuter du texte [...].* [The Danish Presidency brings the ministers together out of the Bella Center to discuss the text [...].]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

Prepositional circumstantials can realize subjection. For instance, the use of “contre”

[against] in the following example passivizes “huit compagnies chinoises” [eight Chinese companies]:

(33) [...] *après l’annonce par Bruxelles de possibles amendes contre huit compagnies chinoises.* [[...] after the announcement by Brussels of possible fines against eight Chinese companies.].  
(LM.fr, Pékin refuse de payer la taxe carbone sur les vols dans l’UE, 18 mai 2013)

A prepositional phrase including “de” [of] postmodifying a nominalization or process nouns can also produce subjection, as with “*la marginalisation de l'Union Européenne*” [the marginalization of the European Union] in example (34):

(34) *L'accord consacre la marginalisation de l'Union Européenne.* [The agreement sacrifices the marginalisation of the European Union.]  
(LM.fr, La négociation accouche d'un texte sans ambition, 19 décembre, 2009)

The social actors assuming a *beneficiary* role constitute a third party that benefits from an action, either positively or negatively. In a material process, the *beneficialized* social actor is the Recipient or Client, such as “*les délégués*” [the delegates] in example (35); in a verbal process, the *beneficialized* social actor is the Receiver, such as “*l'assemblée*” [the Assembly] in example (36):

(35) *Le matin, avait été distribué aux délégués des 191 parties à la Convention un « brouillon ».* [In the morning, a “draft text” was distributed to the delegates of the 191 parties in the Conference.]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

(36) *Le premier ministre danois [...] a communiqué le texte à l'assemblée.* [The Danish Prime Minister [...] communicated the text to the Assembly.]  
(LM.fr, La négociation accouche d'un texte sans ambition, 19 décembre, 2009)

The different realizations of role allocation in a representation can activate or passivize the social actors in different degrees. Realization through participation can most clearly foreground the active or passive role of the actor in question, compare to realizations by circumstantials or possessivation. For instance, in example (37), the active role of “les Etats-Unis” [the US] realized by participation is most clearly foregrounded, while in example (38) the active role of Denmark is very much backgrounded, as it is realized via the postmodifier “danois” [Danish]:

(37) *Les Etats-Unis ont réagi par la voix de Todd Stern [...].* [The US have reacted through the voice of Todd Stern [...].]  
(LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

(38) *Un projet danois réfléchit l'approche des pays du Nord et un projet des pays du Basic.* [A Danish draft reflects the approach of the Northern countries and a draft of the BASIC countries.] (LM, Le sommet vire au duel entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine, 13 décembre 2009)

Table 2.6 summarizes activation and passivation of social actors in discourse and its realisations with examples.

Table 2.6. Role allocation of social actors in discourse

Role allocation		Methods of realization	Examples
Activation		participation	(27) <i>Les Etats-Unis ont réagi par la voix de Todd Stern [...].</i>
		prepositional circumstantials with <i>par de, or selon</i>	(28) <i>L'annonce par l'Europe d'une aide [...] n'a pas suscité un accueil très chaleureux.</i> (29) <i>Aucune réponse n'est venue du camp européen</i> (30) <i>François Hollande a « salué » cette annonce, [...], selon l'entourage du président français.</i>
		premodification or postmodification of nominalization or process nouns	(31) <i>Ils viseraient à atteindre une substantielle déviation de leurs émissions.</i> [premodification] (32) <i>Un projet danois réfléchit l'approche des pays du Nord et un projet des pays du Basic.</i> [postmodification]
Passivation	Subjection	participation	(32) <i>La présidence danoise réunit les ministres à l'écart du Bella Center pour discuter du texte.</i>
		circumstantialization by a prepositional phrase	(33) <i>[...] après l'annonce par Bruxelles de possibles amendes contre huit compagnies chinoises.</i>
		prepositional phrase with "de"[of] postmodifying a nominalization or process nouns	(34) <i>L'accord consacre la marginalisation de l'Union Européenne.</i>
	Beneficialization	recipient or client in material process	(35) <i>Le matin, avait été distribué aux délégués des 191 parties à la Convention un « brouillon »</i>
		receiver in a verbal process	(36) <i>Le premier ministre danois [...] a communiqué le texte à l'assemblée.</i>



- *Syntax and Role Allocation*

Syntax plays an important part in role allocation. As presented above, activation can be realized by possessivation, which, compared to participation, backgrounds agency of the actor to a certain extent as it transforms an action into a “thing.” Further, when such realization is in a rhematic position, the agency is even more backgrounded, as with “l’action du gouvernement” [the action of the government] in example (39a); “les médias d’Etat” [the state media] has thematic prominence over “l’action du gouvernement” [the action of the government], further backgrounding the agency of the government. In contrast, “l’action du gouvernement” [the action of the government] in example (39b) appears in the theme, foregrounding and emphasizing the government’s activity:

(39a) *Même les médias d’Etat, d’accoutumée peu enclins à critiquer **l’action du gouvernement**, ne cachent pas leur scepticisme face à l’action du gouvernement.*

[Even the state media, usually not accustomed to criticizing the action of the government, do not conceal their skepticism towards the government’s actions.]

(LM.fr, A Pékin, les mesures d’urgence contre l’“airpocalypse” laissent sceptiques, December 25, 2013)

(39b) ***L’action du gouvernement** est critiquée par les médias d’Etat qui ne cachent pas leur scepticisme face à l’action du gouvernement.* (sentence constructed by the author for the purpose of illustration)

[The action of the government is criticized by the state media, which do not hide their skepticism towards the action of the government.]

In example (40a), although “Chinois” [the Chinese people] is passivized in relation to the process “vois” [see], but simultaneously activated in relation to the process “porter” [wear], the sentence begins from the perspective of “je” [I]. Thus, the subject phrase is “je vois autant de chinois” [I see so many Chinese people], rather than “Chinois porter des masques” [Chinese people wearing masks]. “Chinois” [Chinese people] is passivized rather than activated in this case, in contrast to example (40b). Similarly, “leur enfant” [their child] in example (41a) is passivized while in (41b) it is allocated an active role:

(40 a) *Je vois autant de **Chinois** porter des masques.*

[I see so many Chinese people wearing masks.]  
(LM.fr, Chine : la pollution de l'air pousse Pékin "à accepter plus de transparence", January 28, 2013)

(40 b) *Les Chinois portent des masques.* (sentence constructed by the author)  
[Chinese people wear masks.]

(41 a) *Des parents font respirer leur enfant dans un embout en caoutchouc.*  
[Parents make their children breathe through a rubber nozzle.]  
(LM.fr, Chine : la pollution de l'air pousse Pékin "à accepter plus de transparence", January 28, 2013)

(41b) *Leur enfant respire dans un embout en caoutchouc.* (sentence constructed by the author for the purpose of illustration)  
[Their child breathes through a rubber nozzle.]

In example (42), the beneficialization of “le gouvernement du premier ministre, Li Keqiang” [the government of the prime minister, Li Keqiang] is in the main clause, while the action “s’assurer” [to ensure] is in the embedded clause; thus, the actor’s passive role prevails over his active role:

(42) *Il s’agit pour le gouvernement du premier ministre, Li Keqiang, de s’assurer [...]*  
[The challenge for the government of the prime minister, Li Keqiang, is to ensure [...]]  
(LM, Acculée, la Chine fait de la lutte contre la crise écologique son chantier prioritaire, August 31, 2013)

- **Transitivity**

The role allocation analysis also takes into consideration the transitivity system, which Halliday (1973) has defined as “the set of options whereby the speaker encodes his experience of the processes of the external world, and of the internal world of his own consciousness, together with the participants in these processes and their attendant circumstances” (134). This system provides resources to investigate how language users construe experiences of the world because “it shows how speakers encode in language their mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience of the world around them” (Simpson, 1993: 88). This system specifies six main types of processes in language according to the characteristics of verbs as presented in Table 2.7 (Halliday, 1985, 1994). All processes are composed of three elements:

(1) the processes, such as doing, happening, feeling, being, or others, that are described by verbs; (2) the participants, which are the entities involved in the process; and (3) the circumstances, which provide additional information associated with the process such as place, time, manner, condition, and so on.

Table 2.7. Halliday’s (1985, 1994) process types

Process types	Meaning	Participants
Material	doing, happening	Actor, Goal
Mental	sensing	Sensor, phenomenon
Relational	being	Carrier, Attribute/Identified, Identifier
Verbal	saying	Sayer, Receiver, Verbiage
Behavioral	behaving	Behaver
Existential	existing	Existent

The transitivity system of French comprises the six process types, and Caffarel (2006) classifies them into three main types: 1) the process of doing, including material processes and behavioral processes, which models our experience in the fields of material doing and happening; 2) the process of projecting, including mental and verbal processes, which allow us to reflect on and project our experience of the world; 3) the process of being, including relational processes and existential processes, which represent relations between things.

The first type of process is generally represented by verbs such as “faire” (do) or “arriver” (happen). Material processes are those in which something is done, and are expressed by action verbs such as “manger” (eat), “aller” (go), or “donner” (give), as well as an Actor (the logical subject) and the Goal of the action (the logical direct object, usually a noun or a pronoun) (Hu Zhuanglin, 1988). Material processes can be active or passive or middle, as seen in the following examples:

(43) *La Chine* (actor) *dévoile* (process) *ses ambitions* (goal) *pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat*. (Active material process)  
 [China (actor) unveils (process) its goals (goal) for the Paris Climate Conference.]

(LM, La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat, 30 June 2015)

(44) *Un « maximum structurel » (goal) a été atteint (process) par la Chine (actor) selon ces deux experts [...]* (Passive material process)

[A "structural maximum" (goal) has been reached (process) by China (actor) according to these two experts [...]]

(LM, La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat, 30 June 2015)

(45) *Comment se répartir les efforts?* (Middle material process)

[How can the efforts be distributed?]

(LM.fr, Copenhague une semaine pour surmonter les divergences, 14 décembre, 2009)

Behavioral processes refer to physiological and psychological behaviors, such as breathing, coughing, smiling, laughing, crying, or dreaming. (Hu Zhuanglin, 1988). In every behavioral process, there is a Behaver that is essential to the realization of the process. As the Behaver is always endowed with consciousness, behavioral processes that construe a mental activity can be similar to mental processes; however, unlike mental processes, behavioral processes cannot project ideas or thoughts. Another distinguishing criterion between behavioral and mental processes is that the second participant (if present) in behavioral processes, the Phenomenon, cannot be metaphenomenal (a fact) or macrophenomenal (an act) as in mental processes. Behavioral processes are demonstrated in the following example:

(46) *« Les étrangers viennent à nous », sourit (process) M. Wang (behavior) [...]*

[ "Foreigners come to us," smiles Mr. Wang (behavior) [...]]

(LM, La Chine rafle la mise des crédits carbone, 11 décembre 2009)

Mental processes construe internal consciousness and reflect our experiences of the world. They express such mental phenomena as perception, emotion, cognition and desideration. A mental process involves two participants: the Sensor and the Phenomenon. The Phenomenon can be phenomenal, metaphenomenal or macrophenomenal. The following example illustrates mental processes:

(47) *[...] le ministre des affaires étrangères (sensor) a conscience de (process) la préoccupation sociale que représentent en Chine les émissions de gaz à effet de serre (metaphenomenon).*

[[...] the Minister of Foreign Affairs (sensor) is aware of (process) the social concern that China poses for greenhouse gas emissions (metaphenomenon).]

(LM, La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat, 30 June 2015)

Verbal processes are exchanges of information that have the potential to project locutions (direct and indirect speech). When they do not project, they have a participant that specifies the name of the verbalization. The participants in these processes are the Sayer, the Receiver, and the Verbiage. Apart from the usual projecting verbs such as “souligner” [to stress] in example (48), verbs expressing processes of verbal impact, such as “saluer” [saluted] in example (49), may also be used:

(48) *la Chine (sayer) souligne (process) aussi que sa priorité reste le maintien de la croissance économique (verbiage) [...]*

[China (sayer) stresses (process) also that its priority remains the maintenance of economic growth (verbiage) [...]]

(LM.fr avec AFP et Reuters, Pékin se fixe des objectifs de réduction de gaz à effet de serre, 26 November 2009)

(49) *François Hollande (sayer) a « salué » (process of verbal impact) cette annonce.*

[François Hollande (sayer) has "saluted" (process of verbal impact) this announcement.]

(LM, La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat, 30 June 2015)

Relational processes establish relations between two things, and can be classified into two types: Attributive and Identifying. Attributive relational processes express what attributes a certain object has, or what type it belongs to. The participants in attributive processes are the Carrier and the Attribute, as seen in example (50). Identifying processes express the identical properties of two entities: the identified and the identifier, as seen in example (51). The reversibility of participants is the distinguishing criterion between attributive and identifying processes; in identifying processes, participants are reversible, whilst those in attributive processes are not:

(50) *Le pays (carrier) est devenu (process) un expert des mécanismes (attribute) [...]*

[The country (carrier) has become (process) an expert on the mechanisms (attribute) [...]]

(LM, La Chine rafle la mise des crédits carbone, 11 December 2009)

(51) *La Chine (identified) est devenu depuis 2013 le premier investisseur dans les énergies renouvelables (identifier) [...]*

[China (identified) has since 2013 been the first investor in renewable energies (identifier) [...]]

(LM, La Chine se fixe pour objectif d'« atteindre le pic de ses émissions de CO2 autour de 2030 », 1 July 2015)

Existential processes, as the name suggests, represent the fact that something exists; each existential process has an Existent, as seen in the following example:

(52) *Derrière tous ces objectifs politiques, il y a (process) des enjeux techniques et économiques (existent).*

[Behind all these political objectives, there are (process) technical and economic stakes (existent).]

(LM.fr, Climat : « On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine », 16 November 2009)

According to Fairclough (2001a), the choices between different processes and participant types have specific ideological meanings. People opt for different process types, participants and circumstances to represent reality, and these process types lead to different representations of the reality. Thus, to investigate the types of processes in which China is involved as a participant can help us understand how the actions related to China are construed ideologically in the discourses and how Chinese actors are shaped.

It needs to be noted that the transitivity system of French also comprises the Agency system, or the ergative model, apart from the Process Type system (Caffarel, 2006). The Process Type system and Agency system are simultaneous and complementary. Where the Process Type projects a classificatory view of experience of the world, such as material events, relations between things, feelings, or thoughts, the ergative model is concerned with whether the process is represented as self-engendering or as engendered by an external cause (Halliday 1985a: 147). However, this study focuses on Process Types in French, due to its interest in whether the actor is allocated an active or passive role, and more specifically a role as doer, sensor, behavior, and/or sayers, as well as its relation with other actors and with the world. Another point that needs to be clarified here is that the concept of agency in this study differs

from that in Caffarel’s French agency system. For Caffarel, the Agent is the external cause of the combination of Process and Medium, where “the Medium is the nodal participant throughout: not the doer, or the causer, but the one that is critically involved, according to the particular nature of the process” (Halliday 1985a: 147). Thus, in this system, agency is the capacity to cause processes from external factors. Consequently, Sayers or Behaviors are usually Mediums rather than agents, and so their responsibilities for their actions are significantly backgrounded. However, Sayers or Behaviors carry out the acts of saying or behaving by themselves, and usually willingly; therefore, they are the agents and take responsibility for their actions. For the purposes of this study, agency is understood as the capacity to act; actors who carry out an action, whether material, behavioral, mental, verbal or relational, are the agents.

### Summary

A summary of my adaptations of van Leeuwen’s framework for the study of French texts appears below in Table 2.8:

Table 2.8. Summary of the analytical categories of social actor representation to be used in the study

1. Who is or is not there in the representation?			
Exclusion & Inclusion	Radical exclusion		No traces of either the social actors or their social activities
	Suppression		The action appears in the text, but the social actor in question does not appear in the text.
	Backgrounding		The action appears in the text, and the involved actor appears in the text, but not in the same clause with the given action
	Fore-grounding	Theme Foregrounding	The social actor and the action appear in the same clause. The social actor appears in the Theme.
		Rheme Foregrounding	The social actor and the action appear in the same clause. The social actor appears in the Rheme.
2. Who are the included social actors?			
2a. Are the included social actors presented as individuals or groups?			

Nomination & Categorization	Nomination	Formalization		Surname only with or without honorifics or titles, or full name with honorifics or titles.
		Semi-formalization		Given name and surname
		Informalization		Given name only
	Categorization	Identification	Classification	According to provenance, hierarchical status, etc.
			Relational Identification	Kinship and social relation
		Functionalization		Functions of social actors
2b. With whom are the included social actors associated or disassociated? With what qualities?				
Association & disassociation	Association	Actor association		Social actors are associated with other social actors and/or groups.
		Quality association		Social actors are associated with certain qualities in a given representation.
	Disassociation		Social actors are disassociated with certain social actors and/or groups, with certain qualities.	
3. What do the included social actors do?				
Role allocation	Activation		Active actors are the participants who carry out an action.	
	Passivation	Subjection		The subjected actor is what we usually call the "patient", the participant upon which an action is carried out.
		Beneficialization		The beneficialized social actors constitute a third party that benefits from an action, either positively or negatively.

### 2.2.3 The Appraisal Theory

Journalists, especially reporters of hard news, usually do not include references to their explicit attitudinal evaluations in their texts, but they are still able to take a position in (dis)favor of a particular event or actor (White, 2012). Such axiological working is often accomplished with directly quoted or indirectly quoted speech, which is “an essential ingredient of news language” (Leitner, 1986: 191). The reported speech allows the author to include viewpoints and versions of events from external voices other than the journalist’s own, and the journalist may take different stances with respect to this interpersonally charged material, thus subtly advancing or favoring a value position.



To investigate how evaluative resources are used in news texts and how they contribute to shaping China's image, I will use the Appraisal theory (Martin & White, 2005) as an analytical tool. The Appraisal theory originated as an extension of the theoretical framework of Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday, 1994) and is particularly concerned with the interpersonal meaning of texts. It offers a discourse analytic framework for analysis of linguistic resources for the expression, negotiation and naturalization of particular intersubjective and ultimately ideological positions (White, 2001). It has three distinct analytical categories (see Figure 2.1): *attitude*, *engagement*, and *graduation*. *Attitude* deals with how feelings are construed within texts (Martin & White, 2005); *engagement* is concerned with how writers/speakers dialogically position themselves with respect to propositions referenced within the text (Martin & White, 2005); *graduation* refers to how writers/speakers modulate the strength or intensity of their utterances in terms of *attitude* and *engagement* (Martin & White, 2005). As such, *attitude* and *engagement* are understood as the core linguistic evaluative resources that allow the speaker/writers to advance/favor a value position. Thus, this study will mainly draw on the systems of Attitude and Engagement to investigate the attitude and stance-taking encoded in the news articles under discussion.

The *attitude* system covers three subcategories referred to *affect*, *judgment*, and *appreciation*. *Affect* is concerned with registering positive and negative emotions. It may be expressed with verbs referring to emotion such as “craindre” [to fear] in example (52), adverbs such as “pensivement” [pensively] in example (53), adjectives such as “mécontent” [unhappy] in example (54) or nominalized forms such as “souci” [worry] in example (55). *Judgment* deals with ethical evaluation of behaviors that we admire or criticize, praise or condemn. It can be realized with adjectives such as “audacieusement, rapidement et ensemble” [boldly, quickly

and together] in example (56), nominalized forms such as “impuissance” [impotence] in example (57) or prepositional phrases such as “aux normes” [up to the standards] in example (58). *Appreciation* involves aesthetic evaluations of semiotic and natural phenomena and things. It is often realized with adjectives such as “grave,” “urgente” [severe, urgent] in example (59) or nominalized forms such as “menace” [threat] in example (59):

(52) *L'Union africaine (UA) a par ailleurs dit craindre que Copenhague débouche sur « l'arrêt de mort du protocole de Kyoto », seul instrument légal contraignant en matière de lutte contre le réchauffement climatique.* [The African Union (AU) has also expressed fear that Copenhagen would result in “the death penalty for the Kyoto Protocol”, the only legally binding instrument on the fight against global warming.]  
(Le Monde.fr avec AFP | Copenhague : la Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat | 15.12.2009)

(53) « *Quand notre fils sera grand, on ira peut-être au Guangxi [province du sud de la Chine] », déclare pensivement ce père de famille.* [“When our son is grown up, we may go to Guangxi [province of southern China],” declared the father of the family pensively.]  
(LM.fr | Dans Pékin pollué, la nuit en plein jour | 03.12.2015)

(54) *[...]de plus en plus conscient et mécontent du problème environnemental chinois.* [[...] more and more aware of and dissatisfied with the Chinese environmental problem.]  
(LM | Le « smog » affole le Web chinois | 2 mars 2015)

(55) *Xiaosheng a un souci [...]* [Xiaosheng has a concern [...]]  
(LM | La vie quotidienne sous le smog de Pékin | 26 mars 2014)

(56) *Les générations futures vont à une « catastrophe irréversible » si la communauté internationale n'agit pas « audacieusement, rapidement et ensemble », a-t-il prévenu.* [Future generations are heading toward an “irreversible catastrophe” if the international community does not act “boldly, quickly and together”, he warned.]  
(LM.fr avec AFP | Climat : Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination | 22 septembre, 2009)

(57) *[...] elle pointe l'impuissance du ministère de l'environnement.* [[...] she points to the impotence of the Ministry of Environment.]  
(LM | Les Chinois aspirent à l'air pur | 03 septembre 2015)

(58) « *[...] aujourd'hui, un tiers des bâtiments dans la construction neuve sont aux normes », raconte Nils Devernois, qui a piloté l'expérience de l'AFD.* [“[...]Today, one-third of the newly constructed buildings are up to the standards,” says Nils Devernois, who piloted the AFD's experience.]  
(LM | La baisse des émissions de CO2 en Chine passe par la rénovation du parc immobilier | 2 Octobre 2009)

(59) « *La menace représentée par le changement climatique est grave, elle est urgente, et elle grandit* » [...] [“The threat posed by climate change is serious, urgent, and growing” [...]]

(LM.fr avec AFP | Climat : Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination | 22 septembre, 2009)

Attitude can be determined from the journalist's authorial voice or from external voices represented via directly or indirectly quoted speech. In the latter case, authors can manipulate the level of their involvement or investment in their attitudinal evaluations and negotiate positions by taking stances that can be investigated through the system of *engagement*. The *engagement* taxonomy features three types of dialogic positioning of the authorial voice with respect to the quoted source: *endorsement*, *acknowledgement*, and *distancing*.

*Endorsement* examines the formulations (typically reporting verbs) that frame the propositions attributed to external voices as warrantable and represent the authorial voice as standing with the quoted source. It can be achieved with the use of reporting verbs such as “démontrer” [to demonstrate], “montrer” [to show], “révéler” [to reveal], “prover” [to prove], or “découvrir” [to find], which present the warrantability of the framed proposition as given or taken for granted.

*Acknowledgement* categorizes formulations that simply recognize the existence of the propositions without overtly indicating where the authorial voice stands towards it, which gives an impression of being “objective.” It can be produced by reporting verbs or adverbials that indicate neither alignment nor disalignment of the authorial voice with respect to the quoted speech, such as “dire” [to say], “rapporter” [to report], “indiquer” [to state], “déclarer” [to declare], “annoncer” [to announce], “croire” [to believe], “penser” [to think], “analyser” [to analyse], “estimer” [to estimate], or “selon/d’après” [according to], among others. Thus, the cotext comes into play in order to determine the author's position with respect to the quoted source and attributed material, whether favorable, unfavorable, or neutral.

*Distancing* regroups the resources that explicitly mark the authorial voice as separate from the quoted external voices and the attributed material. The reporting verb “avancer” [to claim] can encode the author’s disassociation from the quoted voices and attributed propositions.

## 2.3 Corpus

This study intends to examine news articles from *Le Monde* on environmental issues that are relevant to China. As mentioned above, the corpus for this study is composed of articles relating to China with regards to two issues -- air pollution and global climate change. These two issues were the most frequently cited in American mainstream newspapers when they reported on China’s environmental matters in 2000-2013 (Qiu, 2015: 20).

Climate change and air pollution, although usually considered as two separate issues, are closely intertwined in terms of their causes, impacts, and solutions. Many air pollutants and greenhouse gases share common sources. For instance, the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and natural gases is a main source of greenhouse gases (CO<sub>2</sub>) and many air pollutants (SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, CO). Some pollutants such as CH<sub>4</sub> that contribute to global warming also play a part in chemical reactions that produce air pollutants. Thus, tackling climate change may also help to mitigate air pollution, and vice versa. For example, the U.S. Clean Air Act that aimed at reducing the concentration of six main air pollutants resulted in an unexpected effect of slight decline of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions as well.

Climate change is often considered to be a global problem as accumulation of greenhouse gases is predicted to result in a global temperature increase, which would lead to increasing risks for human security and ecosystems. Nevertheless, vulnerability to climate change is

region-specific (Schneider et al., 2007: 791). Different parts of the world have their own local geographic conditions and societies possess varying capabilities to adapt to their environment. Thus, climate change effects can vary considerably at a regional or sub-regional level. In addition, more developed social systems may be better equipped to cope with the threats that climate change may pose.

The problem of air pollution, although most of air pollutants come from local emissions, has a global dimension. First, many cities of the world are affected by air pollution in developed as well as developing or undeveloped countries. Second, air pollutants can be transported worldwide in the atmosphere from their place of origin and, thus, contribute to air pollution elsewhere. Third, air pollution in one country or region can be partly attributed to the production of goods or services destined for consumption in other places (i.e., international trade). Zhang et al. (2017) found that, in 2007, about 12% of premature deaths worldwide was related to fine particulate matters caused by atmospheric long-distance transport of air pollutants, and nearly 22% of these deaths was associated with air pollution caused by international trade.

Briefly, climate change and air pollution have been the objects of noteworthy attention in reports on China's environment; although often considered separately, they are inextricably linked in terms of their causes and solutions, and they both have a global or regional dimension. Thus, it would be interesting to see how *Le Monde* portrays China in regards to these two closely intertwined issues.

This section presents the sampling procedure for this study, including the definition of the corpus for the case of air pollution (2.3.1) and for the case of climate change (2.3.2), as well as a sampling of texts for individual qualitative analysis (2.3.3).

### 2.3.1 Corpus on China's Air Pollution

The relevant articles for this study were collected from electronic archives of *Le Monde's* reports on air pollution in China between 2009 and 2015. Three groups of key words (Chine, smog; Pékin, smog; Chine, pollution, air) were searched in "Tout le Text" [all text], and the timespan was set from 1 January to 31 December for each year. The resulting articles are divided into four categories: China-focused / air pollution-focused (the article is wholly about China's air pollution); China-focused / air pollution-mentioned (the article is on a topic related to China or Chinese people, while China's air pollution is just part of it); China-mentioned / air pollution-mentioned (the article is about other countries than China, while China's air pollution is mentioned in the article); and irrelevant articles (the article contains the key words but does not actually mention China's air pollution).

Table 2.9 displays the number of articles in each category for the years between 2009 and 2015, and Figure 2.2 shows the numerical evolution of each year's relevant articles in *Le Monde*. We can see a sharp increase of relevant articles on China's air pollution since 2013 as compared to previous years. This change in report volume is related to the deterioration of China's air quality at the beginning of 2013, to the point that several Chinese cities were shrouded in smog. People were not only suffering from low air visibility, but also needed to wear masks to protect themselves from the notorious PM2.5, and even the masks did not work. At that time the government could not deny the smog, nor could anyone else ignore it. The smog became a heated topic in news media and inspired many news reports on not only China's environment but also the Chinese government, China's censorship policy, health, economic growth and public diplomacy, consequences to other states, and many other topics. 2013 witnessed a sharp increase in relevant articles on China's air pollution, and 2014 continued to

see an increase in relevant articles. Thus, the news articles from 2013 and 2014 were compared with those appearing between 28 February 2015, the date of the release of the documentary “Chai Jing's Review: Under the Dome – Investigating China's Smog,” and the end of 2015. These articles will help to reconstruct the image of China presented in *Le Monde*, and to reveal any differences in this image following the release of “Chai Jing’s Review: Under the Dome – Investigating China’s Smog.”

Table 2.9. Number of articles on China’s air pollution in *Le Monde* from 2009 to 2015

Categories of articles		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Relevant articles	China-focused, air pollution-focused	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>
	China-focused, air pollution-mentioned	2	6	3	3	12	6	9
	China-mentioned, air pollution-mentioned	4	1	3	3	4	14	16
	Total of Relevant articles	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>38</b>
Irrelevant articles	Contain key-words but not on China's air pollution	10	9	5	9	5	13	16
Total		16	18	14	19	37	48	54

Since the category of “China-focused and pollution-focused” articles is particularly devoted to the issue of China’s air pollution, they have been chosen as the core articles of the corpus for this study. The category of “China-focused and pollution-mentioned” articles mentioned China’s air pollution issue in the context of other Chinese issues, and are therefore expected to help reveal how China’s air pollution is intertwined with other things. These articles are considered part of the corpus as non-core articles. The category of “China-mentioned and pollution-mentioned” articles often have only one sentence or phrase about

China's air pollution. Because they are not of much interest for the analysis, these articles were excluded from the corpus.




Figure 2.2. Evolution of the number of relevant articles on China's air pollution in *Le Monde* during the years 2009-2015

Ideally, the corpus of articles on China's air pollution should include all articles in the category of "China-focused / pollution-focused" (the core articles) and "China-focused / pollution-mentioned" (the non-core articles). However, the textual analysis of one core article is time-consuming; due to time constraints, it is not practical to analyze all the core articles. Therefore, this study focuses on the core articles written by *Le Monde's* two permanent correspondents in China, the articles by the associate directors of the International office, and the editorials. These articles are expected to be representative of *Le Monde's* position. The permanent correspondents of *Le Monde* abroad generally work in the International Office in Paris in order to perfect their knowledge of the diplomatic and political issues of their future region, before they are assigned to a four- or five-year term in a particular region. Once sent to



the countries they have to cover, they send their articles to the columns “International,” “Planète,” “Culture,” among others (Fottorino, 2009). *Le Monde* has two permanent correspondents in China: Harold Thibault in Shanghai and Brice Pedroletti in Beijing. Most of the articles in *Le Monde* relating to China are written by these two authors, although the associate directors of the International Office, François Bougon and Audrey Carric, are important indicators of *Le Monde*’s positions on China as well. The Editorials that appear in the column “Idée” are dedicated to important events in the news and are written by one of the editors or specialized journalists. These articles are not signed because they reflect the point of view of the newspaper as a whole. The articles in the above three categories are the core articles of this study, for which they will be subjected to a detailed textual analysis. The remaining articles in this category are classified as non-core articles, along with the “China-focused / pollution-mentioned” articles; they will not be directly analyzed in this thesis, but reserved for future work.

The corpus for this study of *Le Monde*’s representation of China with regard to air pollution is composed of 24 core articles: 11 from 2013, 8 from 2014 and 5 from 2015 (see appendix 1 for detailed information of these articles).

Table 2.10 gives information on the core articles of the corpus in terms of the journalist and column for each year. We can see that for each year, most of the articles are from the column “Planète,” in which *Le Monde* journalists report on the major trends of globalization by integrating migration-related phenomena, demography, megacities, the environment, climate change, biology and more broadly science and health, as well as food and natural resources. There are also a few articles from the column “International,” which focuses on major diplomatic, political and social events in the world. Then, 2013 and 2014 each feature

one article from the column “Idée,” which reflects the point of view of the newspaper as a whole.

Table 2.10. Core articles on China’s air pollution: journalist and column in the years 2013, 2014 and 2015

Journalists	2013			2014			2015		
	Planète	International	Idée	Planète	International	Idée	Planète	International	Idée
Harold Thibault	3	1	1	1	0	1	3	0	0
Brice Pedroletti	2	2		4	0		1	0	
Thibault et Pedroletti	1	0		0	0		0	0	
Audrey Garric	1	0		0	0		0	0	
François Bougon	0	0		1	1		1	0	
Total	11			8			5		

### 2.3.2 Corpus on Climate Change

To select news articles related to China and climate change for this study, I firstly searched the electronic archives of *Le Monde* between 2008 and 2015. Three groups of key words were used: Chine, climat; Chine, “changement climatique”; Chine, climat, émissions. The timespan for each year was set from 1 January to 31 December of each year. Table 2.11 displays the resulting numbers of news articles found with each of the three groups of key words, and Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of those numbers. As the graph illustrates, the number of articles found with all three groups of key words reached a peak in 2009 and then decreased until 2012. Between 2012 and 2014, the number of articles remained more or less at this low level, until 2015 when these reports sharply increased. It is not surprising that 2009 and 2015 were special years for news on climate change, because two historically significant UN Climate Change Conferences were held in these two years. In 2009, the United Nations Climate Change Conference that involved more than 193 countries was held in Copenhagen to

negotiate a legally binding agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and offer financial support to developing countries for the years 2013-2020, since the commitment period of the first international agreement on prevention of climate change (the Kyoto Protocol) was about to expire in 2012. Then, in 2015, the United Nations Climate Change Conference was to be held in Paris with the objective of achieving a legally binding and universal accord on climate change for the years following 2020. It may well be that these two conferences inspired an increasing number of news articles on climate change in each conference's respective year.

Table 2.11. The number of articles for the years 2008-2015 in lemonde.fr found with three groups of key words in "all the text"

Key words	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Chine, climat	50	266	247	182	157	165	149	309
Chine, "changement climatique"	97	177	109	101	63	63	66	164
Chine, climat, émissions	50	143	70	59	44	38	51	159




Figure 2.3. The number of articles for the years 2008 -2015 in lemonde.fr found with three groups of key words in "all the text"

Although the news articles found with these key words may include irrelevant articles that happen to contain the key words, the numbers obtained from the three groups of key words all showed the same tendency. These results can still give us a sense of the evolution of the relevant articles in *Le Monde* on China in the domain of climate change between 2008 and 2015. Furthermore, this tendency is confirmed if we search for the articles whose headlines contain the key words *Chine* and *climat* or *climatique* or *climatiques* in *Le Monde* during this period. From Table 2.12, which displays the resulting numbers, and Figure 2.4, which shows the evolution of these numbers, we see that 2009 and 2015 also feature the most articles whose headlines contain the key words.

Table 2.12. The number of articles for the years 2008 -2015 in lemonde.fr found with three groups of key words in the title

Key words "only in the title"	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Chine, climat	2	4	4	0	0	0	3	3
Chine, climatique (s)	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	3
Total	2	5	4	1	0	1	3	6

The above information shows that 2009 and 2015 feature the most news articles relating to China and climate change, taking into consideration that these years were important in the history of the world's efforts against climate change. Therefore, this study focuses on *Le Monde*'s news articles on climate change, relating to China, in 2009 and in 2015 following the release in February of "Chai Jing's Review: Under the Dome – Investigating China's Smog."




Figure 2.4. The evolution of numbers of articles during the years 2009 -2015 in lemonde.fr found with key words “Chine, climat” or “Chine, climatique” “Chine, climatiques” in the title

Since the headlines give readers a first impression as well as a general idea of the article (Martin-Lagardette, 2008), the articles whose headlines are directly linked to China and climate are supposed to be the most important articles for the representation of China in climate change. With this in mind, in order to collect the articles for this study, several groups of key words were searched in “le titre seulement” [headline only] within the timespans from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2009 and from 28 February 2015 until the end of 2015, and they generated a respective total of 8 and 11 relevant articles. Two articles from 2009 that contained the words “Chine” and “climat” were excluded because they were on the business climate. The data are summarized in Table 2.13. These articles constitute the corpus of this study for China’s image with respect to climate change. (See Appendix 2 for detailed information on the corpus articles.)

Table 2.13. Number of relevant articles found with different groups of key words in headlines for the year 2009 and the year 2015.

Key words “only in the title”	2009	2015
Chine, climat	4	3
Chine, climatique (s)	1	2
Chine, émissions	1	4
Pékin,climat	1	1
Pékin, effet de serre	1	1
Total	8	11

To give a general idea of the corpus articles, Table 2.14 displays the distribution of corpus articles of 2009 in terms of their sources, columns and length. In 2009, all 8 relevant articles appeared in the column “Planète.” Among them, 3 are from the print version of *Le Monde* and range in length from 640 to 1100 words; 1 article is available only on *Le Monde*’s website LeMonde.fr, with 769 words; and the remaining 4 articles are from Le Monde.fr avec AFP, Reuters, which means that they are “from other press agencies” such as AFP or Reuters, and “the information is not verified by the newspaper but generally credible” (Martin-Lagardette, 2009: 167). These articles are short, containing less than 500 words.

Table 2.14. Corpus articles of 2009: distribution of sources, columns and article length

	Planète	
	No. of articles	Words range
Le Monde	3	640- 1100
Le Monde.fr	1	769
Le Monde.fr avec AFP, Reuters.	4	380-460
Total	8	380-1100

Table 2.15 shows the distribution of corpus articles of 2015 in terms of their sources, columns and length. 9 of the 10 articles are in the column “Planète,” and 1 is in the column “Idée.” Among the 9 “Planète” articles, 5 are from *Le Monde* and range between 810 and 1020

words, 1 is from Le Monde.fr and is 769 words long, and 1 is from Le Monde avec AFP with a length of 436 words. The article in “Idée” contains 587 words.

Table 2.15. Corpus articles of 2015: distribution of sources, columns and article length

	Planète		Idée	
	No. of articles	Words range	No. of articles	Words range
Le Monde	5	810-1020	1	587
Le Monde.fr	4	410-1300	0	none
Le Monde.fr avec AFP, Reuters.	1	436	0	none
Total	10	410-1300	1	587

### 2.3.3 Sampling of Texts for Individual Qualitative Analysis

The corpus articles for the two case studies as defined above in each year will be analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Before conducting the qualitative analysis of the news articles as a whole, I selected one article for each year in both case studies for an individual detailed qualitative textual analysis, to serve as an example. The selection is based on the article’s content impact, which is determined in this study by the number of times that it was shared on Facebook and the number of comments it received from readers. These are the only data that we could obtain on lemonde.fr. Facebook sharing is considered the first criterion, while numbers of comments are the second, because the articles in general have not attracted many comments, and they do not differ much in terms of number of comments, as can be seen from the tables below. Thus, only if two articles are shared to the same extent on Facebook is the number of comments taken into consideration, which did not happen in this study. Thus, the most shared articles in the corpus for each year are chosen for qualitative textual analysis. Tables 2.16-2.20 show the number of times that each article in the corpus was shared on Facebook, as well as the number of comments the article received. For convenience, the articles are referred to by their number, which corresponds to that in the Appendix. (See the Appendix for detailed information of the corpus articles.)

## Air pollution:

Table 2.16. Corpus on air pollution in 2013: number of times shared on Facebook and number of comments for each article

Article	No. 1	No. 2	<b>No. 3</b>	No. 4	No. 5	No. 6	No. 7	No. 8	No. 9	No. 10
Facebook share times	9	68	<b>1347</b>	118	8	19	33	687	5	4
Comments	0	2	<b>25</b>	3	2	6	1	7	0	1

Table 2.17. Corpus on air pollution in 2014: number of times shared on Facebook and number of comments for each article

Article	No. 1	No. 2	No. 3	No. 4	<b>No. 5</b>	No. 6	No. 7	No. 8
Facebook share times	112	39	170	27	<b>1400</b>	26	337	291
Comments	1	2	8	7	<b>43</b>	0	4	4

Table 2.18. Corpus on air pollution in 2015: number of times shared on Facebook and number of comments for each article

Article	No. 1	No. 2	No. 3	<b>No. 4</b>	No. 5
Facebook share times	1442	14	64	<b>5622</b>	471
Comments	2	1	5	<b>14</b>	2

## Climate change

Table 2.19. Corpus on air pollution in 2009: number of times shared on Facebook and number of comments for each article

Article	No. 1	No. 2	No. 3	No. 4	No. 5	<b>No. 6</b>	No. 7	No. 8
Facebook share times	7	27	4	8	15	<b>33</b>	10	4
Comments	5	2	3	9	9	<b>3</b>	11	1



Table 2.20. Corpus on air pollution in 2015: number of times shared on Facebook and number of comments for each article

Article	No. 1	No. 2	No. 3	No. 4	No. 5	No. 6	No. 7	No. 8	<b>No. 9</b>	No. 10	No. 11
Facebook share times	3	14	22	2	28	2	0	166	<b>3538</b>	614	1
Comments	1	2	0	0	3	0	0	7	<b>3</b>	34	3

As a result, the following articles on air pollution were chosen for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively:

- *A Pékin, les mesures d'urgence contre l' "airpocalypse" laissent sceptiques*  
(Le Monde.fr | 25.01.2013 à 15h40 • Mis à jour le 25.01.2013 à 18h41 | Par Audrey Garric | Planète | 1000 w. | 1347 Facebook partager | 25 commentaires |)
- Un bol d'air français vendu à Pékin pour 610 euros  
(11 avril 2014 | M Blog | 308 w. | 1400 Facebook partager | 43 commentaires |)
- Dans Pékin pollué, la nuit en plein jour  
(Le Monde.fr | 02.12.2015 à 09h43 • Mis à jour le 03.12.2015 à 04h45 | Par Brice Pedroletti (Pékin, correspondant) | Planète | 854w. | 5622 Facebook partager | 14 commentaires |)

Similarly, the following articles on climate change were chosen for the years 2009 and 2015, respectively:

- Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington  
(LM | 16.11.2009 à 14h04 • Mis à jour le 16.11.2009 à 14h04 | Par Arnaud Leparmentier | Planète | 893 w. | 33 Facebook partager | 3 commentaires |)
- La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre  
(Le Monde.fr | 25.09.2015 à 06h31 • Mis à jour le 25.09.2015 à 11h39 | Planète | 417 w. | 3540 Facebook partager | 3 commentaires |)

## 2.4 Summary and Analysis Procedure

This chapter presents the theoretical framework and the specific analytical tools adopted in the study and defines the corpus for the analysis. As a result of a rigid selection process, the corpus of this study is composed of two parts. First, the air pollution corpus includes 24 news articles in total from *Le Monde*, with 11 from 2013, 8 from 2014 and 5 from 2015. Second, the

climate change corpus includes 19 news articles, with 8 from 2009 and 11 from 2015. These articles will be subjected to a detailed textual analysis using the analytical tools provided by the framework of social actor representation (van Leeuwen, 1996) and the Appraisal Theory (Martin & White, 2005). They will be examined quantitatively so as to describe the general picture of how China is represented, and qualitatively to deepen our understanding of how China is linguistically represented through local structures of texts. Before conducting the qualitative analysis of the whole corpus, one individual news article for each year was chosen to serve as an example of detailed qualitative analysis.

The analysis of this thesis focuses on verbal language use and excludes other semiotic modes like images. A preliminary examination of the corpus news articles of this study shows that some news texts are accompanied by photos, particularly in the air pollution corpus. The pictures mainly feature a Chinese city (usually Beijing or Shanghai) shrouded in heavy smog to illustrate the magnitude of air pollution in China; they also depict Chinese citizens wearing masks against a smoggy background or suffering from health problems. Unlike picture galleries, advertisements or videos where images have much potential for acting as stories themselves, images included in the corpus news texts do not seem to define the verbal space; rather, they seem to concur with the meanings of the verbal texts. The verbal texts are the dominant feature of the corpus news articles; therefore, verbal texts analysis should suffice to answer the research questions. While it is desirable to analyze the images to see how they interact with the verbal texts to generate meanings, this analysis would not add much (if anything) to the analytical results in this thesis.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present quantitative and qualitative analyses, and in that regard, two points need to be clarified. First, the quantitative results precede the qualitative findings,

although it is understood that when mixed methods are used, the analytical process does not necessarily follow a neat qualitative/quantitative or quantitative/qualitative sequence; rather, the process is cyclical and researchers can move back and forth between qualitative and quantitative analyses to produce meaningful findings. Qualitative analysis provides a precondition for quantitative analysis (Bauer et al., 2000) as the categories used in quantitative analysis are usually delimited based on qualitative readings; at the same time, insights gained from quantitative analysis can also further illuminate the results of the prior qualitative analysis. Therefore, the process of obtaining results from both methods and deciding how to organize them is an ongoing cycle. Second, the analysis is presented prior to the original textual samples in order to foreground the analysis itself, especially in the qualitative analysis sections where textual samples are numerous.

## **Chapter 3: The Case of Air Pollution**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the textual analysis results of the corpus of *Le Monde*'s news texts on China relating to air pollution during the years 2013, 2014 and 2015. To determine what sort of image is constructed of China with respect to air pollution, we must first examine how the issue of air pollution is linguistically framed, as it serves as the departure point for our investigation of the representation of China. Thus, a quantitative investigation is conducted to determine the linguistic framework used for the issue of air pollution, and accordingly, how China is represented in the corpus with regard to this issue (3.2). Then, a qualitative analysis of the local structures of the corpus texts helps to show how China is linguistically represented (3.3): three individual articles serve as examples, followed by a holistic qualitative analysis of the entire corpus. Finally, a conclusion of *Le Monde*'s linguistic construction of China's image in the domain of air pollution is drawn based on both the quantitative and qualitative analysis results presented in the previous sections (3.4).

### **3.2 Quantitative Analysis: Air Pollution as an Internal Issue**

The quantitative analysis results of the corpus show that the linguistic representations of China in the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 are quite similar. The issue of air pollution is linguistically framed as a Chinese domestic issue rather than an international issue: it principally concerns the Chinese (3.2.1); it is closely integrated into Chinese daily life (3.2.2); both the government and the Chinese population are portrayed as the most active and dynamic

forces in this issue (3.2.3), but are never represented as allies standing together to confront it (3.2.4).

### **3.2.1 An Issue That Mostly Concerns the Chinese**

Social actors that are included in the news coverage for the three years all pertain to China, with only a few instances of foreigners. The first three most frequently represented social actors are the Chinese government, the Chinese population and Chinese industry (together accounting for 76.6%), with the remaining 23.4% including the media (Chinese, French, and American), experts and NGOs, among others, who are comparatively represented to a much lesser degree.

Two important patterns can be noticed regarding the first three most frequently represented social actors. First, the most relevant actors in the issue of air pollution are the Chinese government and the Chinese population, as they are the most *foregrounded* among all the social actors, as shown in Table 3.1, Table 3.2, and Table 3.3: they occupy 29.7% and 28.9% of the foregrounding in 2013, respectively; 18.2% and 48.8% in 2014; 26.5% and 38.7% in 2015. Although in 2014 the government was referenced less often than the Chinese population, it is still the second most included among all social actors. Second, the Chinese industry ranks as the third most frequently represented social actor; its relevance was represented as less than half of that of the Chinese population, with 14.4% of *foregrounding* in 2013, 15.8% in 2014, and 8.7% in 2015. We can see that its relevance represented in 2015 obviously decreased, as compared to the previous two years.

Table 3.1. Actor foregrounding in *Le Monde*'s articles on China air pollution in 2013

Categories of Social actors	Theme foregrounding		Rheme foregrounding		Total	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Chinese Government	52	<b>30.1</b>	59	<b>29.4</b>	111	29.7
Chinese Population	52	<b>30.1</b>	56	<b>27.9</b>	108	28.9
Chinese Industry	22	<b>12.7</b>	32	<b>15.9</b>	54	<b>14.4</b>
Media	18	10.4	13	6.5	31	8.3
US	3	1.7	10	5.0	13	3.5
Organizations	9	5.2	11	5.5	20	5.3
Experts	14	8.1	16	8.0	30	8.0
Others	3	1.7	4	2.0	7	1.9
Total	173	100.0	201	100.0	374	100.0

Table 3.2. Actor foregrounding in *Le Monde*'s articles on China air pollution in 2014

Categories of social actors	Theme foregrounding		Rheme foregrounding		Total	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Chinese Government	40	<b>20.1</b>	30	<b>16.1</b>	70	18.2
Chinese Population	107	<b>53.8</b>	81	<b>43.5</b>	188	48.8
Chinese Industry	23	<b>11.6</b>	38	<b>20.4</b>	61	<b>15.8</b>
Media	3	1.5	12	6.5	15	3.9
US	1	0.5	6	3.2	7	1.8
Organizations	19	9.5	16	8.6	35	9.1
Others	6	3	3	1.6	9	2.4
Total	199	100.0	186	100.0	385	100.0

Table 3.3. Actor foregrounding in *Le Monde*'s articles on China air pollution in 2015

Categories of social actors	Theme foregrounding		Rheme foregrounding		Total	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Chinese Government	30	<b>28.3</b>	31	<b>25.0</b>	61	26.5
Chinese Population	41	<b>38.7</b>	48	<b>38.7</b>	89	38.7
Chinese Industry	4	<b>3.8</b>	16	<b>12.9</b>	20	<b>8.7</b>
Media	10	9.4	6	4.8	16	7.0
US	3	2.8	2	1.6	5	2.2
Organizations	0	0.0	6	4.8	6	2.6
Experts	10	9.4	5	4.0	15	6.5
Others	8	7.6	10	8.0	18	7.8
Total	106	100.0	124	100.0	230	100.0

Since *Theme foregrounding* serves as an indicator of the subject matter of the text and the prominence of the social actors, the Chinese government and the Chinese population are found to be the most prominent social actors and the main focus of the stories. In other words, they are the “main characters” (Brown & Yule, 2000:134). As shown in the tables above, they are the most *Theme foregrounded* actors in all three years: the Chinese government and Chinese population, respectively, make up 30.1% and 30.1% of the *theme foregrounded* actors in 2013; 20.1% and 53.8% in 2014; 28.3% and 38.7% in 2015.

Although the Chinese government and population are constructed as the main characters, the industry can be said to be constructed more as a supporting character because it is always more *Rheme foregrounded* than *Theme foregrounded*. The Rheme is what develops the Theme, and Rheme foregrounding indicates less prominence than Theme foregrounding. For both the Chinese government and population, the ratio of Theme/Rheme  $\geq 1$ , while for Chinese industry, the ratio of Theme/Rheme  $< 1$  in all three years. The greater the ratio of Theme/Rheme is for a social actor, the greater the possibility that it is the main character.

Over the three years, industry, which is often considered one of the main causes of air pollution, sees its prominence decreasing in the texts. Industry is less *theme foregrounded* with 12.7% in 2013, 11.6% in 2014 and 3.8% in 2015. In parallel, industry is more frequently cast in the role of supporting character: its Theme/Rheme ratio has become smaller, with 0.79 in 2013, 0.56 in 2014 and 0.29 in 2015. The central role of the Chinese population remains stable: it is the most theme foregrounded in all three years, with a Theme/Rheme ratio of 1.07 in 2013, 1.23 in 2014 and 1 in 2015. The same can be said regarding the centrality of the Chinese government, which has a Theme/Rheme ratio of 1.02 in 2013, 1.24 in 2014 and 1.13 in 2015.

In summary, the foregrounding analysis reveals that air pollution is constructed as a domestic issue that principally concerns Chinese social actors. The Chinese government and population are represented as the most relevant and main characters in this issue, while the third most relevant social actor, industry, was constructed more as a supporting actor.

### 3.2.2 An Issue in the Domain of Chinese Daily Life

The ways in which actors are named or referred to in the news texts under analysis help to frame the issue of air pollution as belonging to the domain of Chinese daily life. Among all the names that appeared in the texts, 25% belonged to the Chinese government and 27% belonged to the Chinese population, with 19% referring to experts, 13% to NGOs, and the rest for others, as Table 3.4 shows. Thus, besides the government and experts, who are usually considered important actors in society, ordinary Chinese people are also represented as important actors in the issue of air pollution, as only important actors are given names in stories. This seems an unusual finding for an elite newspaper such as *Le Monde*, because as noted by van Leeuwen (1996: 53), middle-class-oriented newspapers tend to name high-status persons while working-class-oriented newspapers are inclined to name “ordinary people” even when they are covering the same topic.

Table 3.4. Nomination of social actors in the corpus of *Le Monde*'s articles on China air pollution

Chinese government	Chinese population	Experts	NGOs	Others
25%	27%	19%	13%	16%

The Chinese population is referred to with the names of ordinary Chinese such as a sport agent, village resident, artist or family members (86.5% of the cases, that is 32 of 37 of the named Chinese population, with the remaining 5 being celebrities). As shown in Table 3.5, 46%



of the Chinese population are nominated in a formal way with the surname only, with or without honorifics or titles, or by the full name with honorifics or titles. Others are nominated informally with the given name plus the surname (27%) such as “Liu Lan” (16-12.57)<sup>6</sup> or with the given name alone (27%) as in the case of “Yanyan” and “Kenny” (16-1.5). In contrast, actors pertaining to other categories, such as the government (70% formalization and 30% semi-formalization), experts (88% formalization and 12% semi-formalization) or NGOs (78% formalization and 22% semi-formalization), were not named informally. It is notable that the informal naming conventions for ordinary Chinese all appeared in the news text *La vie quotidienne sous le smog de Pékin* [The Daily Life in the Smog of Beijing]. It was not specified in the news text whether or not this was because these people did not want to be identifiable. Even if it was the case, they could still have been referred to in a formal manner – for instance, honorifics plus surname – but they were not. Unlike formalization, which builds distance, informal naming practices can reduce distance and even create closeness. Therefore, referring to ordinary Chinese people informally has the potential to contribute to the construction of the world affected by air pollution as one that incorporates everyday life; and air pollution is not represented as a remote issue far beyond one’s capacities, but closely integrated into the familiar:

16-1.4 Lui, Kenny, agent sportif de 37 ans, gère la carrière en Chine de trois basketteurs américains. Son épouse, Yanyan, 32 ans, anime un club d'activités d'éveil pour les enfants. [Kenny, a 37-year-old sports agent, manages the career planning of three American basketball players in China. His wife, Yanyan, 32 years old, runs a children's activity club.] (LM. | “La vie quotidienne sous le smog de Pékin” | 26.03.2014 à 12h50 • Mis à jour le 26.03.2014 à 13h26)

16-12.57 « Cela m'a toujours angoissée, et je voulais qu'après la retraite on achète un appartement à Sanya », relate Liu Lan, la grand-mère du petit, 63 ans. [“It always made me

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<sup>6</sup> Each example in chapter 3 is preceded by three numbers: the first one refers to the rank of the news text in the corpus; the second refers to the rank of the paragraph to which the sentence belongs in the news text; the third refers to the rank of the sentence among all the sentences in the text. 0 means the lead in the news text.

anxious, and I wanted to buy an apartment in Sanya after retirement,” says Liu Lan, the 63-year-old grandmother of the child.]  
 (LM. | “La vie quotidienne sous le smog de Pékin ” | 26.03.2014 à 12h50 • Mis à jour le 26.03.2014 à 13h26)

Table 3.5. Nomination of social actors in the corpus of *Le Monde*'s articles on China air pollution

Categories of social actors	Formalization (surname only, with or without honorifics or titles)	Semi-formalization (given name plus surname)	Informalization (given name only)
Chinese Government	70	30	0
Chinese Population	46	27	27
Experts	88	12	0
NGOs	78	22	0
Others	53	47	0

Categorization of the Chinese public also contributes to the representation of air pollution as an issue that affects everyday life. As summarized in

Table 3.6, besides general references such as “le public” [the public] (1-2.5) or “les citadins Chinois” [Chinese city dwellers] (4-1.1), the general population is usually categorized by relational identification (31%), mostly in terms of kinship, as in the cases of “des parents” [the parents] (3-3.8), “leur enfant” [their child] (3-3.8), and “sa grand-mère maternelle” [his maternal grandmother] (16-1.6), or “le couple” [the couple] (16-6.22). They are also referred to in terms of personal relations such as “des amis” [friends] (16-7.26) or occupation (30%), as in the case of “les conducteurs” [drivers] (1-4.10).

1-2.5 Le public a jusqu'au 8 février pour les commenter mais d'ores et déjà les critiques et résistances sont de mises. [The public can comment on them until February 8 but criticism and resistance have already come out]

(LM.fr | A Pékin, les mesures d'urgence contre l'“airpocalypse” laissent sceptiques | 25.01.2013 à 15h40 • Mis à jour le 25.01.2013 à 18h41 )

1-4.10 Les conducteurs devront déboursier des amendes de 3 000 yuans (360 euros) si leur véhicule dépasse les nouvelles limites d'émissions. [Drivers will have to pay a fine of 3,000 yuan (360 euros) if their vehicle exceeds the new emission limits.]  
 (LM.fr | A Pékin, les mesures d'urgence contre l'“airpocalypse” laissent sceptiques | 25.01.2013 à 15h40 • Mis à jour le 25.01.2013 à 18h41 )

3- 3.8 Des parents font respirer leur enfant dans un embout en caoutchouc relié par un tuyau à une sorte de réservoir – il ne s'agit pas d'oxygène, mais d'un mélange médicamenteux. [Parents make their child breathe into a rubber tube connected to certain kind of tank by a hose - it's not oxygen, it's a medical mixture.]  
 (LM.fr | Dans Pékin pollué, la nuit en plein jour | 02.12.2015 à 09h43 • Mis à jour le 03.12.2015 à 04h45)

4-1.1 Les citadins chinois vont pouvoir mesurer les effets de la pollution industrielle et automobile. [Chinese city dwellers will be able to measure the effects of industrial and exhaust pollution.]  
 (LM. | Les villes de Chine contraintes de rendre leur air transparent | 2 janvier 2013)

16-1.6 Ils vivent avec leur fils de 7 ans, sa grand-mère maternelle et la bonne. [They live with their 7 - year - old son, his maternal grandmother and the maid.]  
 (LM. | “La vie quotidienne sous le smog de Pékin ” | 26.03.2014 à 12h50 • Mis à jour le 26.03.2014 à 13h26)

16-6.22 Le couple avait deux véhicules, ils en ont vendu un. [The couple had two vehicles, and they sold one of them.]  
 (LM. | “La vie quotidienne sous le smog de Pékin” | 26.03.2014 à 12h50 • Mis à jour le 26.03.2014 à 13h26)

16-7.26 Autour d'eux, ils ont vu des amis bouger, comme ce couple sino-australien revenu s'installer en Chine mais reparti après quelques mois car leur fillette de 5 ans ne cessait de tousser. [They saw friends around them move away, for instance, a Sino-Australian couple returned to settle in China but left a few months later because their 5-year-old girl kept coughing.]  
 (LM. | “La vie quotidienne sous le smog de Pékin” | 26.03.2014 à 12h50 • Mis à jour le 26.03.2014 à 13h26)

Table 3.6. Categorization of the Chinese population in the corpus of *Le Monde*'s articles on

China and air pollution

Identification		Functionalization (e.g. “les conducteurs” [drivers])
Classification: according to provenance, hierarchical status, etc. (e.g. “les citadins Chinois” [Chinese citizens] )	Relational identification: kinship and social relation (e.g. “des parents” [the parents], “des amis” [friends])	
39%	31%	30%

What the categorization of the Chinese population makes most relevant with regard to the issue of air pollution is shared national or regional identity as Chinese or Beijing people (39%), shared identity as family members or friends (31%), and shared functions in daily life, such as drivers (30%). Thus, such categorization associates the issue of air pollution with the everyday reality of people in China.

### **3.2.3 The Chinese Government and the Population as the Active and Dynamic Force**

Representation can allocate active or passive roles to social actors. Table 3.7-3.9 show how air pollution-related articles in 2013, 2014 and 2015 allocate roles to their respective social actors. We can see that the representations in all three years are similar in that the Chinese government and the Chinese population are represented as the most active and dynamic forces. These categories have the most instances of activation, as compared to others that are also allocated active roles but to a much lesser extent: 32.3% and 28.5% of the activation in 2013 are allocated to the Chinese government and the population, respectively, with 21.7% and 49.1% in 2014, and 33.8% and 32.5% in 2015. In 2014, the difference between agency allocated to the government (21.7%) and that to the Chinese population (49.1%) is the most pronounced. Comparatively, agency allocated to the government and that to the population in 2013 (32.3% and 28.5%, respectively) and in 2015 (33.8% and 32.5%, respectively) are more balanced, although in 2015 both categories are allocated slightly more agency than in 2013. Despite some fluctuations from year to year, they always rank the first two in terms of activation.

Table 3.7. Role allocation in *Le Monde*'s articles on China's smog in 2013

Categories of Social Actors	Activation		Passivation			
	n.	%	Subjection		Beneficialization	
			n.	%	n.	%
Chinese Government	102	32.3	11	21.6	7	26.9
Chinese Population	90	28.5	18	35.3	7	26.9
Industry	25	7.9	17	33.3	6	23.1
Media	28	8.9	4	7.8	2	7.7
US	12	3.8	0	0.0	0	0.0
Organizations	21	6.6	0	0.0	1	3.8
Experts	32	10.1	1	2.0	0	0.0
Others	6	1.9	0	0.0	3	11.5
Total	316	100.0	51	100.0	26	100.0

Table 3.8. Role allocation in *Le Monde*'s articles on China's smog in 2014

Categories of Social Actors	Activation		Passivation			
	n.	%	Subjection		Beneficialization	
			n.	%	n.	%
Chinese Government	58	21.7	12	31.6	10	26.3
Chinese Population	131	49.1	10	26.3	8	21.1
Industry	27	10.1	13	34.2	6	15.8
Media	4	1.5	0	0.0	4	10.5
US	6	2.2	0	0.0	2	5.3
Organizations	35	13.1	2	5.3	7	18.4
Others	6	2.2	1	2.6	1	2.6
Total	267	100.0	38	100.0	38	100.0

Table 3.9. Role allocation in *Le Monde*'s articles on China's smog in 2015

Categories of Social Actors	Activation		Passivation			
			Subjection		Beneficialization	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Chinese Government	53	33.8	3	14.3	4	23.5
Chinese Population	51	32.5	5	23.8	7	41.2
Industry	10	6.4	7	33.3	2	11.8
Media	12	7.6	2	9.5	2	11.8
US	3	1.9	0	0.0	0	0.0
Organizations	2	1.3	1	4.8	1	5.9
Experts	14	8.9	1	4.8	0	0.0
Others	12	7.7	2	9.5	1	5.9
Total	157	100.0	21	100.0	17	100.0

Industry, the third most frequently represented social actor, is more often allocated a passive role than the government and population, who are more frequently activated than passivized, as shown in Table 3.10: in 2013, industry is passivized 47.9% of the time, 41.3% in 2014 and 45% in 2015. Industry is also more frequently subjected – treated as objects undergoing an activity – than beneficialized as a third party that benefits positively or negatively from an action, with 35.4% compared to 12.5% in 2013, 28.3% compared to 13% in 2014, and 36.8% to 10.5% in 2015.

Table 3.10. Role allocation of most frequently represented actors in *Le Monde*'s articles on China's air pollution in 2013, 2014 and 2015

Categories of Social Actors	Activation		Passivization						Total	
			Subjection		Beneficialization		Total			
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
<b>2013</b>										
Chinese Government	102	85.0	11	9.2	7	5.8	18	15.0	120	100.0
Chinese Population	90	78.3	18	15.7	7	6.1	25	21.7	115	100.0
Industry	25	52.1	17	35.4	6	12.5	23	47.9	48	100.0

2014										
Chinese Government	58	72.5	12	15.0	10	12.5	22	27.5	80	100.0
Chinese Population	131	87.9	10	6.7	8	5.4	18	12.1	149	100.0
Industry	27	58.7	13	28.3	6	13.0	19	41.3	46	100.0
2015										
Chinese Government	53	88.3	3	5.0	4	6.7	7	11.7	60	100.0
Chinese Population	51	81.0	5	7.9	7	11.1	12	19.0	63	100.0
Industry	10	52.6	7	36.8	2	10.5	9	47.4	19	100.0

In summary, the quantitative investigation of role allocation shows that the Chinese government and population are constructed as the most active and dynamic forces with regard to air pollution. The industry, on the other hand, is more often represented as being passive than being active. Furthermore, the industry is more often represented as an object undergoing an activity than as a beneficiary of an action.

### 3.2.4 The Government and the Population – Not Allies

Although they are represented as both the most active and dynamic forces with regard to air pollution, the Chinese government and the Chinese population are never represented as allies who share similar positions or make joint efforts to fight against air pollution, as they are never associated with each other across the corpus. In fact, there was only one instance within the entire corpus in which the Chinese communist party (CCP) and the Chinese population were associated (22-3.7) with each other, but this article discussed the likelihood that the Chinese economic model was threatening the stability between the CCP and the general population due to its environmental consequences:

22-3.7 Vorace en énergie et laxiste quand il s'agit d'appliquer les normes environnementales, le modèle chinois a certes permis au pays de s'enrichir, comme l'avait voulu Deng Xiaoping en lançant sa politique de réformes et d'ouverture en 1978. Mais il ébranle désormais les fondements du «contrat social» tacite passé entre **le Parti communiste chinois (PCC) et la**

**population** : une amélioration du niveau de vie et une relative sécurité, en échange d'une forme d'apathie politique. [Voracious in energy and lax when it comes to applying environmental standards, the Chinese mode has certainly allowed the country to become rich, as Deng Xiaoping expected, by launching his reform and opening-up policy in 1978. But it is now shaking the foundations of the tacit "social contract" between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its people: an improvement in life standard and a relative secure environment, in exchange for a form of political apathy.]

(LM | Les Chinois aspirent à l'air pur| 03.09.2015 à 18h05 • Mis à jour le 03.09.2015 à 18h06)

Such an association contributes to the view of air pollution as an issue that leads to public dissatisfaction with the government and a potential split between the government and the public. It is certain that air pollution endangers the lives and security of the Chinese people. However, air pollution appears to be represented very differently from other issues that concern national interests, such as the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, for which the government could mobilize nationalism and thus inspire the population to take the government's position (Wallace & Weiss, 2015). Smog is framed as an internal issue rather than an issue created by a substantial opposition group; the responsibility for dealing with smog is placed on the government, including passing laws to reduce pollution and regulate industry, which is considered a major contributor to air pollution. However, one may ask whether it is only the Chinese government who should take responsibility for this problem, and also what ordinary Chinese citizens are doing to tackle this issue.

### **3.3 Qualitative Analysis: Inactive/Negative Government Vs. Chinese Population as Victims**

The quantitative analysis in the previous section gives us a general picture of the representation of China with regard to the issue of air pollution. Although the quantification made it possible to reveal and compare general patterns, its focus on frequency data detaches the analysis from the cotext and context, thus potentially limiting itself to purely descriptive



analysis “which does not attempt to provide interpretation, critique or explanation for the patterns found” (Baker & Levon, 2015: 231). To complement this weakness of quantitative analysis, it is necessary to conduct qualitative analysis, which enables a more detailed scrutiny of local structures of texts to “identify more subtle linguistic patterns and situate its interpretation of these patterns within a multi-level understanding of the broader ideological context” (Baker & Levon, 2015: 233).

The qualitative analysis of the corpus texts shows that the Chinese government is portrayed in a rather negative light regarding air pollution, while the Chinese population is represented as victims of air pollution. The qualitative analysis of three individual news texts given below helps to illustrate how such representations are systematically located within the linguistic structures (3.3.1), and this analysis is followed by a holistic qualitative analysis of the corpus (3.3.2).

### **3.3.1 Qualitative Analysis: Examples**

The three individual news texts analyzed below are the most shared articles on Facebook in the corpus for 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively.

**1- *A Pékin, les mesures d'urgence contre l' “airpocalypse” laissent sceptiques*** [In Beijing, emergency measures against the “airpocalypse” leave (people) skeptical] (Le Monde.fr | 25.01.2013 à 15h40 • Mis à jour le 25.01.2013 à 18h41 | Par Audrey Garric)

*A Pékin, les mesures d'urgence contre l' “airpocalypse” laissent sceptiques* [In Beijing, emergency measures against the “airpocalypse” leave (people) skeptical] is published on *Lemonde.fr* on 25 January 2013, against the background of the most serious smog in Beijing’s history, which lasted for a total of 25 days in January; the Municipality launched a set of urgency measures in response. The news text under discussion talks about these measures, and

the reactions they caused. An analysis of this text illustrates the negative representation of the government, and the representation of the Chinese public as victims, and the linguistic resources that contribute to these representations.

The headline *In Beijing, emergency measures against the “airpocalypse” leave (people) skeptical* sets an overall negative tone of the evaluation of the measures. The overt evaluation encoded by “sceptiques” [skeptical], which constitutes an explicit negative *appreciation* of the “emergency measures” [les mesures d'urgence] of Beijing, seems to have been constructed as “objective” by the suppression of all human social actors in the headline.

The first two paragraphs constitute an introduction of the situation, and two types of social actors are included. They are, on the one hand “the public” (1-2.5) or “les Pékinois” [the people of Beijing] (1-1.2), and on the other hand, “la municipalité” [the municipality] (1-1.3). The people of Beijing are allocated agency in the action “ont surnommé la situation” [nicknamed the Beijing situation] “airpocalypse” [air apocalypse] (1-1.2). The corresponding word of “l'airpocalypse” (1-1.1) is a recent coinage in Chinese, as 空气末日, which is composed of two words: 空气 (air) and 末日 (apocalypse). When “空气末日” is searched on [www.baidu.com](http://www.baidu.com), the most used search engine in China, which is similar to Google, only around 2740 instances can be found, and around 1000 instances appear simultaneously with the word “外媒” [foreign media]. Then on the Chinese microblogging site Sina Weibo, a Chinese version of Twitter, only 4 instances of “空气末日” can be found, and three of these are related to foreign news media reports. A search for “airpocalypse” on Google reveals about 120 000 instances,<sup>7</sup> which is about 44 times the results from Baidu. It seems that “airpocalypse”

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<sup>7</sup> Statistics obtained on 23 August 2017.

is more frequently used by the foreign media to discuss China's air pollution than 空气末日 is used by the Chinese themselves. However, the nicknaming here is represented as a collective action of the people of Beijing, as the relevant actors are categorized as "les Pékinois." The public is then allocated agency in the relational process "a jusqu'au 8 février pour les commenter" [have until February 8 to comment on them], but their agency in contesting the government is backgrounded using nouns instead of verbs; for example, "de débats et de mécontentement" [debates and unhappiness] (1-1.3) and "les critiques et résistances" [critics and resistance] (1-2.5). This represents what they do or feel as a "thing" rather than an action.

Actors pertaining to the government are referred to as "la capitale chinoise" [the Chinese capital] (1-0) and "la municipalité" [the municipality] (1-1.3) in the discussion of their actions against the smog. Actually, the first nine paragraphs, which focus on the government's reactions to air pollution, mostly refer to the government as "la capitale chinoise" [the Chinese capital] (1-0), "la municipalité" [the municipality] (1-1.3), "Pékin" [Beijing] (1-7.17), "le ministre de l'environnement" [the minister of environment](1-9.21), while the remainder of the text, which concerns negative evaluations of governmental measures (paragraph 10-14), directly refers to "le gouvernement" [the government] (1-11.29, 1-12.31, 1-11.34). In this manner, the term "gouvernement" is surrounded by a cotext of negative evaluation:

1-0 La capitale chinoise a annoncé la fermeture d'usines, le retrait de véhicules anciens et une nouvelle norme d'émissions.<sup>8</sup>

1-1.1 "*L'airpocalypse.*"

1-1.2 C'est ainsi que les Pékinois ont surnommé la situation dans la capitale chinoise, touchée par une pollution de l'air sans précédent.

1-1.3 Lundi 19 janvier, la municipalité a lancé de nouvelles mesures pour lutter contre cette contamination, sujet de débats et de mécontentement grandissants depuis plusieurs mois en Chine.

1-2.4 Ces règles systématisent des mesures déjà prises au coup par coup auparavant – fermeture d'usines, réduction des émissions de charbon, interdiction de certaines catégories de véhicules.

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<sup>8</sup> See Appendix 4 for the English version of the three news articles that are analyzed in this section.

1-2.5 Le public a jusqu'au 8 février pour les commenter mais d'ores et déjà les critiques et résistances sont de mises.

In the next two sections, subtitled “NOUVELLE NORME D'ÉMISSIONS” [new emission standards] (paragraph 3-5) and “USINES POLLUANTES FERMÉES” [closed polluting factories] (paragraph 6-7), which give details on the emergency measures, the positive actions of the Chinese government are suppressed, so that their role as “doer” is backgrounded. These paragraphs extensively use the passive voice and the middle clause, linguistic structures that allow the suppression of social actors. For instance, in the section “NOUVELLE NORME D'ÉMISSIONS,” which gives detail on the newly launched emission standards for vehicles, passive verbs such as “seront retirés” [will be withdrawn] (1-3.6), “sera contrôlée” [will be controlled] (1-3.6), “sera adoptée” [will be adopted] (1-4.8), and middle clause such as “se voir interdite” [see itself forbidden] (1-3.7), “s'appliquera” [will be applied] (1-4.9), suppress the actors who would carry out these actions, such as withdrawing old vehicles from circulation, controlling the number of sales of new cars, and adopting and applying new emission standards. Obviously, these actors belong to the Chinese government. Similarly, in the section “USINES POLLUANTES FERMÉES” [polluting factories closed], the heating systems using coals “will be replaced” (1-5.11); construction of new cement plants and steel mills “will be forbidden” (1-6.13); factories “will also be closed” (1-6.14); and the closed factories “will be authorized” to open again if they respect the norms (1-6.16). Although there are a few exceptions in which the Chinese government is included and allocated an active role in closing a polluting company (1-6.15), the suppression of the government-related actors in this article constitutes a dominant feature of the article. Whether this constitutes a feature of genre or otherwise, the government’s role in taking measures is largely backgrounded in this manner.

At the same time, the ordinary Chinese population are included and given prominence by being put in the thematic position in the sentence whenever they are relevant. Thus, their roles as victims of, or at least affected by, these measures are emphasized: “les conducteurs” [the drivers] should pay fines (1-5.10); “les vendeurs de rue seront en outre passibles d'une amende de 5 000 yuans” [street vendors would be punished by a fine of 5000 yuans] if they cook barbeque on roadsides on smoggy days (1-5.12).

### NOUVELLE NORME D'ÉMISSIONS

1-3. 6 Dans le détail, 180 000 véhicules anciens seront retirés de la circulation cette année et la croissance “*excessive*” des ventes de voitures neuves sera contrôlée – 6 millions de véhicules en 2015, contre 5,2 millions aujourd'hui.

1-3.7 La circulation automobile pourra également se voir interdite en cas de pic de pollution.

1-4. 8 Une nouvelle norme d'émissions, nommée Pékin 5, à l'image de la norme Euro 5 en Europe, sera adoptée le 1er février.

1-4.9 Elle s'appliquera aux véhicules nouvellement immatriculés et devrait permettre de réduire de 40 % les émissions d'oxyde d'azote, rapporte l'agence de presse officielle Xinhua.

1-4.10 Les conducteurs devront déboursier des amendes de 3 000 yuans (360 euros) si leur véhicule dépasse les nouvelles limites d'émissions.

### USINES POLLUANTES FERMÉES

1-5. 11 Les systèmes de chauffage fonctionnant au charbon seront également remplacés par des systèmes d'énergie propre dans 44 000 logements anciens du centre-ville.

1-5.12 Les vendeurs de rue seront en outre passibles d'une amende de 5 000 yuans (600 euros) s'ils cuisent de la nourriture à l'aide de barbecues sur le bord de la route les jours de smog, détaille *China Daily*.

1-6.13 Du côté de l'industrie, la construction de nouvelles cimenteries et aciéries sera interdite.

1-6.14 Les usines se verront par ailleurs fermées lors des situations de pollution exceptionnelles.

1-6.15 Première application concrète : les autorités chinoises ont mis à l'arrêt une gigantesque usine de gazéification du charbon du groupe Shenhua, située à Baotou dans la région autonome de Mongolie intérieure, accusée de graves atteintes à l'environnement.

1-6.16 Elle sera autorisée à reprendre son activité quand elle respectera les normes en vigueur, a indiqué le *Quotidien national des affaires* cité par Reuters, qui précise qu'elle a été condamnée à payer une amende de 100 000 yuans (12 000 euros) pour ses récentes pollutions.

1-7. 17 “*Nous allons accélérer la construction d'une ville magnifique avec un ciel bleu, une terre verte et de l'eau potable*”, a assuré le maire de Pékin, Wang Anshun, lors d'un discours retransmis en direct à la télévision d'Etat.

1-7.18 Pékin s'était engagé le mois dernier à investir 350 milliards de yuans (43 milliards d'euros) d'ici à 2015 pour réduire la pollution atmosphérique.

In the section subtitled HAUSSE DE 60 % DES CANCERS SUR DIX ANS [“rise of 60% of cancer cases in ten years”], the passive voice is used to suppress actors who take these measures; for example, “ont été prises” [have been taken] (1-8.19). Although the minister of environment’s declaration that emissions have decreased in 2012 and are expected to decline in 2013 is quoted in paragraph 9 (1-9.21), this voice is immediately *countered* by the journalist’s own voice: “Mais la Chine ‘fait face à une longue bataille’ dans le contrôle des fameuses PM2,5” [but China “faces a long battle” to control PM 2.5]. Thus, the author emphasizes the difficult situation that China is faced with rather than the improvement of the situation. The author then refers to the state newspaper *China Daily* for statistics on the increase of lung cancer in Beijing. Here, the people of Beijing are aggregated in the form of statistics as “the number of lung cancers” to indicate the serious consequence of PM2.5 on people’s health, a powerful indication that people are suffering from air pollution:

#### HAUSSE DE 60 % DES CANCERS SUR DIX ANS

1-8.19 Ces nouvelles mesures ont été prises alors que la pollution a été particulièrement forte dans la capitale chinoise le week-end du 12 janvier, la concentration de microparticules dans l’air atteignant le pic inégalé de 993 microgrammes par mètre cube d’air ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ ), soit des niveaux près de 40 fois les limites recommandées par l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS).

1-8.20 Après quelques jours d’accalmie due à la neige, la pollution s’est de nouveau aggravée mercredi 23 janvier, dépassant le seuil jugé dangereux de 300  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ .

1-9.21 Les émissions de quatre polluants – dioxyde de soufre, oxydes d’azote, oxygène chimique et azote ammoniacal – ont toutefois diminué de 2 % en 2012 et devraient baisser d’autant cette année, a déclaré le ministre de l’environnement jeudi, comme le rapporte *Reuters*.  
1-9.22 Mais la Chine “*fait face à une longue bataille*” dans le contrôle des fameuses PM2,5, des particules fines de moins de 2,5  $\mu\text{m}$  de diamètre qui s’avèrent très nocives dans la mesure où elles peuvent se fixer sur les poumons et provoquer des maladies respiratoires.

1-9.23 Selon un article paru en 2011 dans le quotidien d’Etat *China Daily*, le nombre de cancers du poumon à Pékin a ainsi augmenté de 60 % au cours des dix dernières années, alors que le taux de tabagisme est resté stable.

In the section subtitled CRITIQUES ET SCEPTICISME [critiques and skepticism], negative evaluation of the government’s new measures is constructed by the inclusion of only

negative comments from Chinese public and Chinese media, and the presentation of these opinions as representative by referring to the quoted persons. Negative evaluations of these measures, such as “just dreams” (1-10.26), or “does not make a big difference” (1-10.27), are quoted in the article. Then, ordinary people [“les gens ordinaires”] and civil servants [“fonctionnaires”] are differentiated, and it is the ordinary people who are most affected by the measures, more than people who work in the government. Rather than giving the quoted persons’ names, the author simply refers to them categorically as “un utilisateur” [a user] (1-10.25), “d’autres” [others] (1-10.27), “on” [one] (1-10.28). In this way, these opinions are not attributed to specific individuals, but more to the category in general. As giving names to quoted persons would increase the credibility of the quotation, here credibility seems to be sacrificed for the sake of representativeness. Secondly, the Chinese official media, categorically representing all media, is allocated the role of “not hiding their skepticism towards the governmental action” (1-11.29). This skepticism is reinforced by association with the quality “usually not inclined to criticize the actions of the government” (1-11.29), followed by a quotation from the *Global Times* that “the new regulations will probably be as inefficient as the previous ones” (1-11.30), to serve as an example. The quoting verb “persifler” [to ridicule] encodes an explicit skeptical attitude towards these measures:

#### CRITIQUES ET SCEPTICISME

1-10.24 La qualité de l'air à Pékin fait depuis quelque temps l'objet d'une attention particulière des autorités car elle focalise le mécontentement populaire sur les inégalités.

1-10.25 De fait, les messages postés sur le site de microblogging chinois Sina Weibo, cités par Reuters, laissent paraître toute l'ampleur de la défiance de la population face au plan d'action annoncé.

1-10.26 “*Ces mesures ne sont que des rêves*”, lâche un utilisateur.

1-10.27 D'autres font remarquer que la suppression progressive des vieilles voitures ne fera guère de différence dans une ville où 250 000 véhicules neufs prennent la route chaque année.

1-10. 28 “*Ces vieilles voitures sont celles que les gens ordinaires conduisent. Vous ne serez légitimes pour prendre des mesures sur la pollution que lorsque vous commencerez à abandonner toutes les voitures des fonctionnaires*”, peut-on encore lire.

1-11.29 Même les médias d'Etat, d'accoutumée peu enclins à critiquer l'action du gouvernement, ne cachent pas leur scepticisme face à l'action du gouvernement.

1-11.30 “*Ces nouveaux règlements seront probablement aussi inefficaces que les précédents*”, persifle le *Global Times*, citant des experts en environnement de la ville.

In the final section, subtitled RÉSISTANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS D'ETAT [resistance of state companies], the Chinese government is described through the voice of the *Wall Street Journal*, which foregrounds the government's role of facing resistance from state companies and local interests, while backgrounding its role in the “fight against air pollution” [lutter contre la pollution de l'air] (1-12.31). Also, the government is allocated a passive role in relation to the challenge of managing state companies (1-14.34) and the functions of state companies (1-14.35), which indicate the government's incapacity to act against these companies:

#### RÉSISTANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS D'ETAT

1-12. 31 Le gouvernement chinois fait en outre face à une vive résistance des tentaculaires sociétés d'Etat et les intérêts locaux dans sa tentative de lutter contre la pollution de l'air, rapporte le *Wall Street Journal*.

1-12.32 Conséquence de décennies de croissance effrénée, les profonds problèmes environnementaux de la Chine, depuis les préoccupations sur la qualité de l'air à la raréfaction de l'eau en passant par la consommation croissante de combustibles fossiles, sont aujourd'hui en effet considérés comme un obstacle potentiel à un fort développement économique du pays.

1-13. 33 Diminuer les émissions sur le long terme impliquera de coûteuses mises à niveau des installations industrielles et des raffineries de pétrole, des investissements auxquels résistent les entreprises étatiques, incapables de répercuter les coûts sur les consommateurs, ainsi que les gouvernements locaux, qui dépendent de la production industrielle pour leur trésorerie.

1-14.34 “*Gérer les petites et grandes entreprises d'Etat sera un défi pour toute volonté de réforme économique de la part du nouveau gouvernement du dirigeant Xi Jinping*”, assure le quotidien américain.

1-14.35 *Alors que ces entreprises sont en concurrence avec le secteur privé au niveau des ressources et du capital, elles sont également d'importants pourvoyeurs d'emplois, sont menées par des chefs d'entreprises liés aux sphères politiques et elles fonctionnent souvent comme des outils pour les objectifs politiques de Pékin, ce qui leur donne un immense poids politique.* ”

In summary, the Chinese government is represented in the text as inactive and incapable of taking positive actions against smog, and this representation is achieved by means of



backgrounding, nomination, and negative evaluation. Meanwhile, the Chinese population is depicted as powerless “victims” by being foregrounded in their role of being affected by the measures rather than being the beneficiaries of those measures, and their agency in their actions to contest the government is backgrounded by the article’s emphasis on the effects of air pollution on their health.

## **2 - PARTICULES CHINE – Un bol d’air français vendu à Pékin pour 610 euros**

[CHINA PARTICLES - A bowl of French air sold in Beijing for 610 euros] (11 avril 2014| M Blog | 308 w. | 1400 facebook partager | 43 commentaires |)

The article headlined *PARTICULES CHINE – Un bol d’air français vendu à Pékin pour 610 euros* [CHINA PARTICLES - A bowl of French air sold in Beijing for 610 euros] was published in *Le Monde Blog* on 11 April 2014. It was *Le Monde*’s most shared article about China’s smog in 2014, shared on Facebook 5622 times. Although the story is about a Chinese artist, Liang Kegang, who auctioned a jar of pure air collected in Provence and sold it for 610 euros, it is constructed, by ways of foregrounding and nomination, more as a social mobilization of artists expressing themselves than as an individual’s story against the existing serious “static” air pollution in China.

In the first paragraph, the actor in the theme “un artiste pékinois” [a Beijing artist] (2-1.1) is categorized in terms of his profession. Thus, the story is more about artists in general than the specific artist Liang Kegang. The artist is associated with the quality “révolté contre la mauvaise qualité de l’air de la capitale chinoise” [revolted against the poor air quality of the Chinese capital] (2-1.1). “L’air de la capitale chinoise” [air of the Chinese capital] is associated with the quality of “particulièrement polluée” [particularly polluted] (2-1.1):

2-1.1 De retour d’un voyage d’affaires en France, un artiste pékinois révolté contre la mauvaise qualité de l’air de la capitale chinoise, particulièrement polluée, a vendu aux enchères un bocal de verre rempli d’air pur collecté en Provence.

2-1.2 Le prix a atteint la somme de 5 250 yuans (610 euros).

The second paragraph quotes the artist's motivation for this performance, to question the existence of polluted air in China and to express his discontent with it (2-2.3). Here, the artist is named, and the quotation is attributed to him as a specified individual. Other artists and collectors are categorized as "une centaine d'artistes et collectionneurs" [about one hundred artists and collectors], except the one who won the auction. However, both the names of the artist and the winner of the auction are in the Rheme instead of in the Theme (2-2.3, 2-3.5); thus, they as individuals are not what the story is about:

2-2.3 « *L'air devrait être une denrée sans valeur, libre d'accès pour tous, y compris les sans-abri ou les mendiants. C'est ma manière de m'interroger sur l'air souillé de Chine, et d'exprimer mon mécontentement* », a dit à Pékin Liang Kegang, devant une centaine d'artistes et collectionneurs.

2-3.4 Son bocal, qui ressemble à un pot de confiture à l'ancienne, porte la mention du village où il a été fermé hermétiquement, le 29 mars : Forcalquier.

2-3.5 L'enchère a été remportée par Li Yongzheng, un artiste et chef d'entreprise originaire de Chengdu, au centre de la Chine, et fan du travail de Liang Kegang.

In paragraph 4, the protagonist of the story is referred to as "le jeune artiste" [the young artist] (2-4.6), which places emphasis on his professional identity. His performance is part of a global movement of artistic protests, a reflection of a widespread discontent in China. "20 artistes chinois" [20 Chinese artists] (2-5.7) and "un groupe d'artistes" [a group of artists] (2-7.9) are allocated agency in performing, signalled by verb phrases such as "se sont allongés" [lay down] (2-5.7) and "avaient organisé un simulacre de funérailles" [had organized a mock funeral] (2-7.9).

No actors in the government or public are included in the text, except for one instance: "la mort imagée du dernier citoyen chinois à cause de la pollution" [the imagined death of the last Chinese citizen caused by pollution] (2-7.9). The agency of Chinese citizens is reduced by the use of the process noun "la mort" [death]. Thus, the consequence of pollution on the public

becomes “a thing” that exists and is inevitable, rather than an action that could be prevented from happening. The Chinese citizen is thus represented here as a powerless victim.

To whom are the artists directing their commentary? Probably, it is to those who could deal with it, but this is not specified. Even in the last sentence in which a specific addressee is possible, they are nevertheless suppressed by the use of the passive voice in the phrase “ne peut être efficacement traité” [cannot be effectively dealt with] (2-7.10):

2-4.6 La performance du jeune artiste s'inscrit dans un mouvement global de protestations artistiques, reflet du mécontentement généralisé en Chine depuis quelques mois, au sujet de la qualité de l'air dans le pays.

2-5.7 En février, au cours d'une *flashmob* (« rassemblement éclair »), 20 artistes chinois portant des masques de protection respiratoire se sont allongés sur la place du temple du Ciel, à Pékin, simulant des morts.

2-6.8 La ville, où la pollution de l'air atteint parfois des taux plusieurs fois supérieurs au niveau d'alerte de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), est plongée dans le smog, un épais nuage de particules nocives quasi permanent.

2-7.9 En mars, à Changsha, une ville de l'est de la Chine, un groupe d'artistes avaient organisé un simulacre de funérailles, pour la mort imagée du dernier citoyen chinois à cause de la pollution.

2-7.10 L'un d'eux avait expliqué : « *Si le smog ne peut être efficacement traité, il ne laissera derrière lui que la mort.* »

In summary, the article constructed a story about the artists collectively revolting against air pollution. The story categorically foregrounds the artists in the theme and the identifiable individuals in the rheme, thus constructing this article as a story about the artists' collective rather than one single specific artist. The artist is associated with the quality of “revolting against air pollution,” and the artists are allocated an active role in protesting air pollution in their various performances.

### **3 - Dans Pékin pollué, la nuit en plein jour** [In polluted Beijing, night in broad daylight]

(Le Monde.fr | 02.12.2015 à 09h43 • Mis à jour le 03.12.2015 à 04h45 | Par Brice Pedroletti | Planète | 854w. | 5622 facebook partager | 14 commentaires |)

The article *Dans Pékin pollué, la nuit en plein jour* [In polluted Beijing, night in broad daylight] was published on *Le Monde.fr* on 2 December 2015 during the worst period of air pollution in Beijing in 2015: on 27 November, the PM2.5 in Beijing reached the “serious level” and above, a situation that lasted for about 110 hours (“2015 年北京”, 2016). The story discusses how serious the pollution was, its effects on ordinary people, and the efforts of people to solve the problem. In this article, the Chinese government is linguistically backgrounded and portrayed as inactive in dealing with air pollution, in contrast to the French, who are represented as active and innovative solution providers while the Chinese citizens are depicted as victims.

The first paragraph begins with a description of the “airpocalypse” in Beijing and elaborates on its seriousness by using statistics. No social actors are included in this paragraph, except “l’OMS” [WHO] (3-1.3) for reference to its standard. The passive voice is employed in “l’alerte a été maintenue à l’orange” [the orange alert has been maintained] (3-1.4) to suppress social actors, in this case China’s National Meteorological Centre, who is in charge of issuing weather alerts:

3-1.1 Le 1er décembre était un jour d’« airpocalypse » à Pékin.

3-1.2 La nuit en pleine journée.

3-1.3 Et des données plutôt alarmantes: un indice de la qualité de l’air (AQI) de 619 et un taux de particules fines de 680 microgrammes par mètre cube, soit près de 30 fois plus que le seuil maximal recommandé par l’OMS...

3-1.4 En dépit de ces niveaux records, l’alerte a été maintenue à l’orange, qui précède le niveau maximum rouge.

The second paragraph discusses actors in industry and the Chinese blogosphere. More than one thousand factories have received “l’ordre de fermer” [orders to close] (3-2.5), but actors who give orders to factories are suppressed. Usually, these are related departments in the government:

3-2.5 Plus d’un millier d’usines ont reçu l’ordre de fermer.

3-2.6 La blogosphère chinoise, elle, oscille entre rire et larmes : y circulent des photos de sites touristiques connus dont les monuments ou immeubles iconiques, invisibles derrière l'épais brouillard, ont été redessinés au crayon.

The third paragraph focuses on the story of ordinary Chinese who make their children breathe medicine in the Capital Institute of Pediatrics (3-3.7). With references to these actors as well as their role allocations, the article presents everyday Chinese people as victims of smog with whom readers tend to sympathize. Examples of ordinary people such as “parents” [parents] (3-3.8), “leur bébé” [their baby] (3-3.8), “la famille de Li” [the family of Li] (3-3.9), “M. Li” [Mr. Li] (3-3.12), and “ce père de famille” [the father of this family] (3-3.12) are placed in the theme, thus gaining prominence. “Parents” [parents] (3-3.8), “leur enfants” [their children] (3-3.8) and “leur bébé” [their baby] (3-3.8) are all categorized in terms of their roles in the family relationship. “M. Li” [Mr. Li] (3-3.12) is formally named, but the use of his surname and honorific, without a given name, does not give his full identity. Thus, “la famille de Li” [the family of Li] can be any Chinese family. Such references to ordinary Chinese people in their daily lives may make readers feel close to them. Secondly, those actors are allocated active roles in activities related to dealing with the consequences of air pollution, such as “font respirer leur enfant” [make their child breathe] (3-3.8), “passé une heure et demie dans les bouchons” [spent one hour and half in the traffic] (3-3.9) or suffering such as “a du mal à respirer” [has difficulty in breathing] (3-3.10). In this manner, they are portrayed as victims of air pollution whose health is negatively affected. Also, Mr. Li is activated in mental processes such as “songe à déménager” [thinks of moving] (3-3.12) and “déclare pensivement” [says thoughtfully] (3-3.12). He is allocated the role of a sensor, which adds a “human” aspect to his depiction in the text:

3-3.7 A l'Institut de pédiatrie de la capitale, difficile de dire s'il y a plus de monde en cette journée de pollution : la salle des inhalations n'est pas pleine.

- 3-3.8 Des parents font respirer leur enfant dans un embout en caoutchouc relié par un tuyau à une sorte de réservoir – il ne s’agit pas d’oxygène, mais d’un mélange médicamenteux.  
 3-3.9 La famille Li, venue du sud de Pékin, a passé une heure et demie dans les bouchons.  
 3-3.10 Leur bébé d’1 an a du mal à respirer.  
 3-3.11 La pollution a aggravé les choses.  
 3-3.12 Parfois, M. Li songe à déménager : « *Quand notre fils sera grand, on ira peut-être au Guangxi* [province du sud de la Chine] », déclare pensivement ce père de famille.

Paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 are subtitled “Rendre Pékin vivable” [Make Beijing livable] and focus on the initiatives that emerged in Beijing to improve the air quality. In this part of the text, foreign actors, especially the French, are represented as active and innovative solution providers, and the Chinese citizens are represented as ordinary people who are beneficiaries of the actions of the French. The foreigners are theme foregrounded, which gives them prominence. The French are the main focus, since they are given full names, such as “Les Français Yann Boquillod et Hervé Robin” [the French Yann Boquillod and Hervé Robin] (3-6.20) while the other foreigners appear in a more categorized way, such as “un Suisse” [a Swiss] (3-5.18) and “des professionnels” [some professionals] (3-5.19). The foreigners are allocated agency in the material processes of making devices or applications for improving air in Beijing; for instance, “mis au point une sorte de « pollutiomètre »” [developed a kind of “pollutiometer”] (3-5.18), “proposent aux expatriés des devis pollution” [offered expatriates pollution estimates] (3-5.19), “lancé leur propre application” [launched their own application] (3-6.20), “modélise les données météo et pollution” [models weather and pollution data] (3-6.22). The French are also activated in other material processes, such as “se rend lui-même chez des gens” [goes to people’s place] (3-7.27), “effectue des visites” [make visits] (3-7.27). Thus, they are represented as the “doers” who, through their actions, are realizing their desire to make Beijing livable for as many people as possible [“rendre Pékin vivable pour le plus grand nombre de gens possible”] (3-7.25). The Chinese actors are either semi-formally named, such as “Mme Shao” (3-7.28), or categorized in terms of their family roles such as “la mère de famille”

[family mother] (3-8.33), “femmes au foyer” [housewives] (3-8.34), “certaines” [some] (3-8.35), or “une voisine” [a neighbour] (3-8.35). They are allocated agency mostly in mental processes such as “sous-estimé les capacités de son petit purificateur d’air” [underestimated the capacities of her small air purifier] (3-8.29), “ne veut pas s’en faire outre mesure” [does not want to be overly concerned] (3-8.33), “paniquent” [panic] (3-8.34). Thus, the Chinese citizens are represented as ordinary people who have emotions and thoughts that we may encounter in daily life. Furthermore, they are also allocated passive roles in relation to the foreigners, such as “le plus grand nombre de gens possible” [as many people as possible] in “rendre Pékin vivable pour le plus grand nombre de gens possible” [make Beijing livable for as many people as possible] (3-7.25), “des gens” [people] in “le jeune entrepreneur se rend lui-même chez des gens” [the young entrepreneur on his own goes to see people at their place] (3-7.27), and “les” [them] in “les sensibiliser” [to sensitize them] (3-7.27). These phrases represent the Chinese people as powerless in relation to the French actors:

« Rendre Pékin vivable »

3-4.13 La pollution de l’air au quotidien, et à plus forte raison un épisode d’« airpocalypse » comme celui de ces derniers jours, interroge sur les mesures à prendre pour se protéger.

3-4.14 Les recommandations sont de « rester à l’intérieur ».

3-4.15 Mais sans purificateur, l’air y est en réalité d’aussi mauvaise qualité qu’à l’extérieur.

3-4.16 Et il est souvent à peine meilleur avec un purificateur si l’appartement n’est pas efficacement isolé.

3-5.17 Dans ce domaine, Pékin est devenu un foyer d’innovation : toutes sortes d’initiatives ont vu le jour.

3-5.18 Un Suisse a ainsi mis au point une sorte de « pollutiomètre », un appareil de mesure très bon marché (environ 75 euros).

3-5.19 Des professionnels proposent aux expatriés des devis pollution pour plusieurs centaines d’euros.

3-6.20 Les Français Yann Boquillod et Hervé Robin, eux, ont lancé leur propre application, AirVisual. 3-6.21 Celle-ci donne la qualité de l’air à Pékin et dans 5 000 villes à travers le monde et fournit des prévisions à trois jours.

3-6.22 « On modélise les données météo et pollution. Un algorithme basé sur l’intelligence artificielle apprend des résultats pour tirer sans cesse de nouvelles conclusions », explique Yann.

3-6.23 Leur start-up est aussi en train de mettre au point un appareil personnel de mesure de la qualité de l'air précis et abordable.

3-7.24 L'enjeu est de permettre aux gens d'améliorer leur degré de protection et de sécuriser leur intérieur.

3-7.25 « *On veut rendre Pékin vivable pour le plus grand nombre de gens possible* », clame Yann.

3-7.26 Leur appareil ne sera en vente qu'en janvier.

3-7.27 En attendant, le jeune entrepreneur se rend lui-même chez des gens qui le lui demandent pour les sensibiliser – il effectue une dizaine de visites par semaine.

3-7.28 Nous l'accompagnons chez Mme Shao, une femme au foyer de 37 ans, très active et consciente des défis environnementaux.

3-8. 29Pourtant, Mme Shao a quelque peu sous-estimé les capacités de son petit purificateur d'air.

3-8.30 L'appareil de Yann indique 190 microgrammes par mètre cube.

3-8.31 Le filtre est usagé et l'appareil ne suffit pas pour l'appartement.

3-8.32 En outre, le « pollutiomètre » indique 700 microgrammes par mètre cube à proximité de l'humidificateur – dont l'eau n'est pas purifiée.

3-8.33 La mère de famille ne veut pas s'en faire outre mesure, elle pense qu'il faut aussi « *s'adapter aux conditions de vie à Pékin* ».

3-8.34 Mais le diagnostic l'a motivée pour « *sécuriser* » davantage son foyer. 8.35 Dans son entourage de femmes au foyer éduquées, certaines paniquent : une voisine a pris ce matin un vol pour l'île tropicale de Hainan.

Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 are subtitled “plus de trente stations de mesure” [more than 30 measuring stations], which are installed by the government. However, this part mostly foregrounds the ordinary Chinese population and backgrounds the government. The Chinese citizens are formally named without full identity, such as “Zhang” and “Mme Shao” [Ms. Shao] (3-9.36), which makes their representations vague. They are also categorized in terms of what they do, as in “ce patron” [this boss] (3-9.37), “ses moniteurs de gym” [his gym instructors] (3-9.38); or in terms of their regional identity, such as “les Pékinois” [the Beijingers] (3-11.42). They are allocated active roles in the action of protecting themselves from air pollution, for instance, “investi dans un purificateur d'air” [invested in an air purifier] (3-9.37), “pris l'habitude de vérifier en permanence [...] la qualité de l'air dans leur ville” [developed a habit of verifying ... the air quality in their city] (3-11.42); and in the material process of daily life, for example, “ouvrent souvent la fenêtre ou la porte d'entrée” [often open the window or the



entrance door] (3-9.38); and relational process to describe emotion, such as “en est plutôt fier” [is rather proud of it] (3-9.37). The government appears only once in this part of the text, in a categorized form, as “les autorités” [the authorities] (3-10.41). They are allocated agency in the action of “ont cessé de se réfugier dans le déni” [have stopped seeking comfort in the denial], as there are more than 30 monitoring stations of air quality in the city to indicate the rate of fine particles every day (3-11.42). However, the phrasing in this example implies that the authorities did deny the smog, invoking a negative judgement of the government’s behavior by suggesting that to stop something negative does not equal engaging in positive actions. Furthermore, even though the government installed the measuring stations, the author backgrounds the government’s action of installing the stations by using the passive voice in the phrase “la capitale est équipée de plus de 30 stations de mesure” [the capital is equipped with more than 30 monitoring stations] (3-10.41):

#### Plus de trente stations de mesure

3-9.36 Le petit club de fitness de Zhang est encore moins bien loti que Mme Shao.

3-9.37 Sensible à la pollution, ce patron a investi dans un purificateur d’air et en est plutôt fier.

3-9.38 Mais, avec le chauffage hivernal, lui et ses moniteurs de gym ouvrent souvent la fenêtre ou la porte d’entrée – or les couloirs des immeubles brassent un air souvent plus vicié qu’à l’extérieur.

3-9.39 Résultat : un indice de la qualité de l’air de près de 400 microgrammes par mètre cube en intérieur.

3-9.40 Là aussi, le purificateur est insuffisant. Et les arrivées d’air trop nombreuses.

3-10.41 Avec les crises récurrentes de pollution qui frappent Pékin et d’autres villes chinoises, les autorités ont cessé de se réfugier dans le déni : la capitale est équipée de plus de 30 stations de mesure de la qualité de l’air qui indiquent toutes le taux de particules fines.

3-11.42 Et les Pékinois ont pris l’habitude de vérifier en permanence, grâce aux applications de leurs téléphones portables, la qualité de l’air dans leur ville.

In summary, the most foregrounded social actors, and thus the most prominent, in this article are the Chinese citizens. They are either formally named without full individual identity so that they could be someone in our daily life, or categorized in terms of functionalization or

kinship relations to which average readers can relate. This method of representation brings the Chinese citizens close to the readers. Furthermore, they are activated in the processes of either suffering from or dealing with the smog, and foregrounded in mental processes such as “songe à déménager” [thinks of moving] (3-3.12) “déclare pensivement” [says thoughtfully] (3.12), “sous-estimé” [underestimated] (3-8.29) and “paniquer” [to panic] (3-8.34). These representations help to humanize the citizens, making it easier for the readers to sympathize with them.

In contrast to the two French individuals who are represented as active problem solvers for the Chinese “victims”, the Chinese government is represented as inactive in dealing with smog. Although actions addressing the problem are most likely to be done by the Chinese government, the government only appears at the end of the article and is foregrounded in the action “ont cessé de se réfugier dans le déni” [have stopped seeking comfort in the denial] (3-11.42), which invokes a negative evaluation.

### **3.3.2 Holistic Qualitative Analysis: Inactive/Negative Government Vs. Chinese Population as Victims**

The qualitative analysis of these texts shows that the Chinese government is portrayed in a negative light with regard to air pollution (3.3.2.1), while the Chinese population are represented as victims (3.3.2.2). This representation can be found not only in the three example texts discussed above, but can be observed throughout the corpus of this study.

#### ***3.3.2.1 The government***

In these articles, the government tends to be backgrounded in positive actions but foregrounded in negative ones, and the journalists tend to encode negative evaluation of the Chinese government, using evaluative linguistic resources.

### **Foregrounding, backgrounding and role allocation**

Although the actors pertaining to the government are allocated the most agency, as shown in the quantitative analysis, a closer qualitative examination shows that they are actually represented as inactive in dealing with air pollution. First, their active roles in the substantive actions to reduce air pollution (which are material processes) are usually backgrounded or suppressed; thus, their role of “doer” making changes to improve the current situation is deemphasized or even removed. Second, their agency is mostly framed as reactions to other social actors such as the US or the Chinese public, instead of as their own initiatives. Although the government’s agency in its actions against smog is mostly backgrounded, it is foregrounded in actions that do not belong to the fight against air pollution. Some such examples include practices related to the oil industry, such as setting the price at the pumps or nominating the directors of oil companies, which emphasize their responsibility in directing oil companies to fight against air pollution; or facing pressure and “resistance” from state companies and local interests in their fight against smog (1-12.31), indicating the government’s difficult situation. The government may also be presented as the subject of the process “bénéficient d’un air filtré de haute qualité” [enjoy high quality filtered air], emphasizing its privileged status (14-9.22); or in actions that encode an explicit negative judgement, such as “ont péché par optimisme” [have sinned by optimism] (14-8.16), even in authoritarian actions such as “le PCC a resserré son contrôle sur la société” [the CCP has tightened its control over society] (22-14.47):

14-9.22 Les hiérarques chinois avaient été conspués lors des pics de pollution de 2013 car ils bénéficiaient d’un air filtré de haute qualité dans le complexe du Parti à Zhongnanhai, la citadelle du pouvoir. [Senior officials of the Chinese government were booed during the pollution peaks in 2013 when they were enjoying high quality filtered air in the Party’s complex in Zhongnanhai, the citadel of power.]

(LE MONDE | Un citoyen chinois porte plainte pour «air pollué» | 26.02.2014 à 12h02 • Mis à jour le 26.02.2014 à 17h49)

14-8.16 Or, les autorités ont péché par optimisme : les mesures prises depuis vendredi n'ont pas amélioré la qualité de l'air. [However, the authorities have sinned by optimism: the measures taken since Friday have not improved air quality.]  
(LE MONDE | Un citoyen chinois porte plainte pour «air pollué» | 26.02.2014 à 12h02 • Mis à jour le 26.02.2014 à 17h49)

22-14.47 Tout cela est loin d'être gagné: sous le mandat de Xi Jinping, le PCC a resserré son contrôle sur la société, réprimant les ONG, les défenseurs des droits civiques et les avocats trouble-fête. [All of this is far from being won: under Xi Jinping's mandate, the CCP has tightened its control over society, cracking down on NGOs, civil rights defenders and trouble-making lawyers.]  
(LE MONDE | Les Chinois aspirent à l'air pur | 03.09.2015 à 18h05 • Mis à jour le 03.09.2015 à 18h06)

In discussions of negative actions, the actors tend to be explicitly referred to as “le gouvernement chinois” [the Chinese government] (e.g. 1-12.31) and “les autorités” [the authorities] (e.g. 3-10.41), or in a similar vein, as “les hiérarchiques chinois” [senior government officials] (14-9.22), “le PCC” [the CCP] (22-14.47). By contrast, the agency in actions related to the solution of environmental problems is mostly allocated to “la capitale chinoise” [the Chinese capital city] (e.g. 1-0), “Pékin” (e.g. 1-7.17), and “le pays” [the country] (e.g. 21-8.13) or “l'Etat” [the State] (e.g. 4-4.7), or to the specific ministries (e.g. 1-9.21) or persons such as the president and prime minister:

4-4.7 En parallèle, pourtant, l'Etat a imposé aux plus grandes villes du pays cette transparence inédite. [At the same time, however, the state has imposed this unprecedented transparency on the country's largest cities.]  
(LE MONDE | Les villes de Chine contraintes de rendre leur air transparent | 2 janvier 2013)

21-8.13 Le pays s'engage à réduire l'intensité énergétique (quantité d'énergie par point de PIB) de sa croissance économique de 3,1 % sur cette année, après les 4,8 % de baisse déjà enregistrés en 2014. [The country is committed to reducing the energy intensity (amount of energy per unit of GDP) of its economic growth by 3.1% this year, after the decline of 4.8% already recorded in 2014.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine veut rester maître de la guerre contre le smog | 09.03.2015 à 12h26 • Mis à jour le 09.03.2015 à 16h06)

### **Negative Evaluation**

The author uses evaluative linguistic resources to represent the Chinese government negatively. For instance, in the voices of Chinese official media, experts and internet users, the

measures that the Chinese government adopted to fight air pollution are associated with negative qualities such as “inefficaces” [inefficient] (1-11.30) and “insuffisantes” [insufficient] (7-9.19). China’s economic development and rapid urbanization is associated with the quality of being “ne sont qu’un vernis” [just a varnish] (5-8.16). Even the decision makers are explicitly associated with purely negative qualities such as “irresponsables, menteurs et corrompus” [irresponsible, liar and corrupted] in “elles touchent au bien-être des individus et cristallisent leur méfiance face à des décideurs perçus comme irresponsables, menteurs et corrompus” [they affect the well-being of individuals and crystallize their distrust of decision-makers perceived as irresponsible, liar and corrupted] (8-4.11). Using the passive voice, such as “perçus” [perceived], allows the author to suppress the actors who perceive the Chinese decision makers in such a way. This linguistic suppression allows the author not only to attribute the responsibility of this quality association to unspecified others, but also to generalize this category of social actors:

7-9.19 Des mesures d'urgence prises par les autorités ont été jugées **insuffisantes** par les experts, et la presse chinoise estime que leur mise en œuvre fut laxiste. [Emergency measures taken by the authorities were considered insufficient by the experts, and the Chinese press considers that their implementation was lax.]

(LE MONDE | Pékin émerge du cauchemar de la pollution | 01.02.2013 à 14h05 • Mis à jour le 01.02.2013 à 14h05 |)

5-8.16 La nouvelle transparence décrétée incite les pékinois à méditer sur la gravité de la situation : le quotidien à grand tirage *Global Times*, connu pour ses positions nationalistes et pro-régime, estimait que cette nouvelle crise révélait que “le développement économique et l’urbanisation à grande vitesse de la Chine **ne sont qu’un vernis**”, et la comparait aux inondations catastrophiques de juillet 2011. [The newly decreed transparency encourages Beijing people to ponder over the seriousness of the situation: the widely circulated daily *Global Times*, known for its nationalist and pro-regime stance, felt that this new crisis revealed that “China’s economic development and urbanization at high speed is only a varnish”, and compared it with the catastrophic floods in July 2011.]

(Le Monde.fr | A Pékin, la pollution de l’air pulvérise les normes de l’OMS | 14 janvier 2013)

Although the journalist acknowledges these negative evaluations from others without taking any overt stance, and trying to achieve an “objective” position, his tendency to include

only those voices that encode negative attitudes may be an indicator of his unfavorable position towards the Chinese government. In fact, this unfavorable position can also be traced by examining how the journalist engages with the voice of the Chinese government. For instance, in text 1, although the journalist's use of the verb "a déclaré" [declared] when quoting the Chinese Minister of the Environment that the emissions of pollutants have decreased in 2012 and were expected to decline in 2013 (1-9.21) does not reveal his position, this minister's voice is immediately countered by the journalist's own voice: "Mais la Chine 'fait face à une longue bataille' dans le contrôle des fameuses PM2,5" [but China "faces a long-lasting battle" to control PM 2.5] (1-9.22). Thus, the journalist emphasizes the difficult situation China faces rather than the improvement of the situation, as the Minister did.

The journalist also uses his own voice to encode implicit negative attitudes towards the Chinese government, suggesting that he supports the value position of others being advanced. For instance, in the non-signed editorial (meaning that it stands for the position of *Le Monde*) "Pollution en Chine: les dégâts du développement sale" [Pollution in China: damage from dirty development] published on 4 March 2014, the journalist uses his own voice to associate Chinese authorities with the quality of favoring discussion of the primacy of economic development rather than taking part in the fight against global warming ["Les autorités chinoises ont l'art de mettre en avant sur la scène internationale un discours sur la primauté du développement économique pour éviter de prendre leur part dans la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique"] (15-6.17). This quality association implies that Chinese authorities are making excuses in order to avoid responsibilities in dealing with climate change. The journalist also associates the Ministry of Environment with the quality of being "criticized" (23-8.18), indicating that the ministry is not fulfilling its duties to a satisfactory extent:

23-8.18 Vivement critiqué, le ministère de l'environnement était donc sur le pied de guerre la semaine suivante pour ne pas être accusé une nouvelle fois de minimiser un phénomène pourtant évident pour tous les habitants de la région. [Severely criticized, the Ministry of Environment was therefore on a war footing the following week so as not to be accused once again of minimizing a phenomenon which was nevertheless obvious for all the inhabitants of the region.]

(Le Monde.fr | Chine : l'alerte rouge de pollution de l'air, dilemme des officiels | 10.12.2015 à 11h00 • Mis à jour le 10.12.2015 à 14h15)

In summary, a purely negative evaluation towards the Chinese government is developed throughout the corpus, through the use of evaluative linguistic resources. Both overt and implicit negative evaluations are channeled through diversity of voices or heteroglossia, and are signaled by the ways in which the author engages with them.

### ***3.3.2.2 Chinese Population as Victims***

By using role allocation and evaluative linguistic resources, the journalists represent the Chinese population as victims who arouse sympathy.

#### **Role Allocation**

The agency of the Chinese population in material processes is limited to actions belonging to daily activities that are related to suffering under the smog (e.g. 3-3.10, 3-9.37) or being affected by governmental measures (e.g. 1-5.10). Unlike actors in the government, the Chinese population is allocated agency in mental processes, such as “penser” [think] (3-8.33) or “paniquer” [panic] (3-8.34), which constructs them as “sensors”. Along with the reference to their daily experience, their role as “sensor” gives them a “human” face that is easier for readers to sympathize with. Their agency in contesting the government and air pollution is reduced by the fact that such actions are usually realized by process nouns or nominalisation instead of verbs, for instance, “de débats et de mécontentement” [debates and unhappiness] (1-1.3), “les critiques et résistances” [critics and resistance] (1-2.5), “une réaction très forte des gens” [a very strong reaction of people] (1-10.24), or “les révoltes des paysans”

[the revolt of farmers] (11-2.9). What they do or how they feel towards the government are represented as “things” or “problems” that simply exist, and which the government has to face and deal with. Thus, the Chinese population is represented more as victim who the readers may tend to sympathize with rather than agentive people who push the government to make a change.

11-2.9 Dans les campagnes, les révoltes des paysans contre la contamination des sols et des usines polluantes se multiplient. [In the countryside, the revolts of farmers against soil contamination and polluting factories are multiplying.]  
(LM | Acculée, la Chine fait de la lutte contre la crise écologique son chantier prioritaire  
31.08.2013 à 10h04 • Mis à jour le 31.08.2013 à 10h52 |)

### **Quality Association and Evaluative Language**

The Chinese population’s role as victim of smog is also realized by explicitly or implicitly associating them with the quality of victimhood through the use of heteroglossia, including the authorial voice and the voices of ordinary Chinese people. For instance, the journalist declares in his own voice, “Près de 500 millions de personnes ont été victimes du dernier épisode de smog...” [Nearly 500 million people were victims of the latest episode of smog...] (15-3.7), and quotes average Chinese citizens: “Li Guixin, qui exige des réparations de 10 000 yuans (1 200 euros), affirme vouloir « montrer à chaque citoyen à travers action que ce sont nous les victimes de la pollution, car celle-ci nous affecte physiquement et financièrement » ” [Li Guixin, who demands repairs of 10,000 yuan (1,200 euros), affirms he wants to “show every citizen through action that it is us the victims of pollution because it affects us physically and financially”] (14-2.6). In both instances, the Chinese population is explicitly associated with the role of “victim” of air pollution. In other instances, this association is implicitly encoded. For instance, the journalist quotes Chai Jing, a former China Central Television journalist who produced the documentary “Under the Dome,” who says that



her daughter is like a prisoner [“comme un prisonnier”] as she cannot go out and play for half of the year because of the smog (20-2.6).

The author takes a sympathetic position towards the Chinese population, which is signaled by his engagement with the voices of Chinese ordinary individuals. He uses reporting verbs that denote emotions, such as “soupirer” [to sigh] (18-5.12) or “déplorer” [to deplore] (18-5.13), to underscore the negative effects of the government’s actions and the people’s concerns about the effect of air pollution on their lives and their health. These verbs not only demonstrate the author’s attitudinal investment in the Chinese individuals he quoted, but also portray the Chinese population’s feelings of weakness or helplessness, arousing the readers’ sympathy:

18-5.12 « On a droit à une prime de pollution de 350 yuans [46 euros] par an, une pitance », soupire M. Wang. [“We are entitled to a pollution allowance of 350 yuan [46 euros] a year, which is a pittance,” sighs Mr. Wang.]  
(LE MONDE | A Tangshan, l’impossible lutte contre la pollution | 08.11.2014 à 10h12 • Mis à jour le 09.11.2014 à 23h08)

18-5.13 Il déplore les cancers des habitants et l’affaissement des sols en raison des mines de charbon. [He deplores the cancers of the inhabitants and the soil subsidence due to coal mines.]  
(LE MONDE | A Tangshan, l’impossible lutte contre la pollution | 08.11.2014 à 10h12 • Mis à jour le 09.11.2014 à 23h08)

### 3.4 Conclusion

This chapter outlines the image of China with regard to air pollution that is constructed in *Le Monde* between 2013 and 2015, as well as how this image is linguistically realized. Based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis results, three conclusions can be drawn regarding *Le Monde*’s construction of China’s image with respect to air pollution, and one point can be made about the comparison between qualitative and quantitative methods.

In all three years, *Le Monde*’s construction of China’s image with regard to air pollution is situated within a representation of air pollution as a Chinese domestic issue instead of an

international issue, as revealed by the quantitative analysis which allows us to compare and generalize the articles in the corpus. Due to different linguistic foregrounding strategies, air pollution is represented as principally involving Chinese social actors, with the Chinese government and the Chinese population being represented as the main characters, while industry is much less prominent and is seen more as a supporting character in the news stories. Nomination and categorization further construct air pollution as an issue that is closely integrated into the tangible everyday reality of the Chinese people.

The quantitative analysis also shows that the Chinese government and Chinese population are constructed as the most active and dynamic forces by being allocated the biggest share of agency among all social actors, while industry is more often treated as an object passively undergoing an activity than as the beneficiary of an action. A clear dichotomy between the Chinese government and the Chinese population is represented by linguistic disassociation: these two groups are never represented as allies who share similar positions or make joint efforts to tackle air pollution. Rather, air pollution is represented as an issue that leads to public dissatisfaction with the government, and the responsibility for dealing with air pollution appears to be represented as only lying on the shoulders of the government.

The qualitative analysis reveals that the construction of China's image concerning air pollution during this three-year period remains invariably negative, and revolves around the same script of a passive or inactive Chinese government in tackling air pollution and a powerless, victimized Chinese population living with the smog. Both the passivity of the Chinese government and the powerlessness of the Chinese population are constructed by a systematic use of linguistic structures of foregrounding and backgrounding in relation to

various kinds of actions, and of referring to each group differently in different situations, along with various patterns of stance-taking using evaluative linguistic resources.

Quantitative analysis produces a general description of the corpus, while qualitative analysis detects representations and positions embedded in detailed linguistic structures. Using the complementarity of these methods contributes to widening and deepening the analysis as a whole. However, sometimes each method may lead to a different understanding of the same element if we are not sufficiently careful. In this study, the quantitative analysis shows that the Chinese government and population are allocated the most agency, while the qualitative analysis reveals the construction of a passive government and a powerless Chinese population facing air pollution. This reminds us not only to be careful when making claims about frequency information without looking at how the data can be interpreted within the context, but also the importance of methodological triangulation.

If we compare *Le Monde*'s constructions of China's image in the issue of air pollution before and after the release of the documentary "Chai Jing's review: Under the Dome – Investigating China's Smog," we can say that the image constructed remains unchanged before and after the release of the film: in the issue of air pollution, which is framed as a Chinese domestic issue, *Le Monde* has negatively represented the government as passive, and has represented the general population as powerless victims that elicit sympathy. There is a clear split between these two categories of social actors, with the former held responsible for tackling air pollution, and the latter dissatisfied with their efforts; meanwhile, industry is represented as a less prominent and more passive social actor. It remains to be seen why *Le Monde* has constructed this image of China, and this question will be dealt with in Chapter 5.

## **Chapter 4: The Case of Climate Change**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter examined *Le Monde*'s representation of China in the issue of air pollution. This chapter presents the results of textual analysis of the corpus of *Le Monde*'s news texts on China in the issue of climate change for 2009 and 2015. Before we can examine the image of China that is constructed in the domain of climate change, we must first see how the issue of climate change is linguistically represented as it serves as the departure point for analyzing the representation of China. Thus, a quantitative investigation will describe the general picture of how the issue of climate change is linguistically framed, and accordingly, how China is represented within this issue throughout the corpus (4.2). Then, a qualitative analysis demonstrates how China is linguistically represented in local structures of texts (4.3): the qualitative analyses of two individual articles serve as examples, followed by a holistic qualitative analysis of the entire corpus. On the basis of the results of the qualitative and quantitative analysis, a conclusion is drawn on *Le Monde*'s linguistic construction of China's image in the issue of climate change (4.4).

### **4.2 Quantitative Analysis: Climate Change as an International Issue and China as an International Actor**

Quantitative analysis results of the corpus texts show similarities and differences between the linguistic representations of China and climate change in 2009 and 2015. The similarity is that in both years, climate change is linguistically framed as an international issue and, correspondingly, China is portrayed as an international actor in this issue (4.2.1): China

is situated within the international community, a world of high authorities instead of ordinary people. The difference is that China in 2009 was portrayed negatively, as one of the world's biggest polluters (alongside the US), while in 2015, it was represented more positively (4.2.2).

#### **4.2.1 Climate Change as an International Issue**

In these news articles, climate change is represented as an international issue concerning various countries including China (4.2.1.1); it is also constructed as a problem to be addressed by state governments and experts rather than by ordinary people (4.2.1.2).

##### ***4.2.1.1 Inclusion: Climate Change Involving International Actors***

In both 2009 and 2015, the news texts in the corpus on China with regard to the issue of climate change have included actors pertaining to various countries from different continents such as Africa or Europe, as well as international institutions. As shown in Table 4.1, the most frequently represented actors in both years are China (21% in 2009 and 53% in 2015) and the US (41% in 2009 and 14% in 2015); also included are other developed countries such as France or Denmark, which account for 15% of actor foregrounding in 2009 and 11% in 2015, as well as other developing countries such as Brazil or India, with 12% of the foregrounded actors pertaining to them in 2009 and 4.2% in 2015. Although to a much lesser degree than the aforementioned countries, international institutions such as the UN and other NGOs are also included (8% in 2009 and 10% in 2015). Thus, climate change is constructed as an issue with a global relevance. In parallel, the representation of China with respect to climate change is situated within the international community.

Table 4.1. Foregrounding of social actors in 2009 and 2015

Categories of social actors		Foregrounding in 2009		Foregrounding in 2015	
		n.	(%)	n.	(%)
Developed countries	<b>the US</b>	175	<b>41</b>	89	<b>14</b>
	Others (Europe, France etc.)	62	<b>15</b>	69	<b>11</b>
Developing countries	<b>China</b>	89	<b>21</b>	340	<b>53</b>
	Others (Brazil, India, Africa etc.)	52	<b>12</b>	27	<b>4.2</b>
Other categories	Experts	12	<b>3</b>	38	<b>6</b>
	UN, NGO etc.	35	<b>8</b>	69	<b>10</b>
<b>Total</b>		425	<b>100</b>	632	<b>100</b>

#### 4.2.1.2 Nomination: A Global Issue for State Governments and Experts to

##### Address

In news stories, as in other stories, readers tend to pay more attention to people with names and to make mental note of those people, assuming that they play more critical roles in the story (Beck, 2008: 46). Nomination invites our attention and accords importance to actors in stories. Table 4.2 shows the nomination of social actors in the news articles for 2009 and 2015.

Linguistic nomination of social actors constructs a world of politicians, high authorities and experts from various countries. In turn, climate change is constructed as a global issue that involves state governments and experts rather than ordinary people. As Table 4.2 demonstrates, news coverage in both years tends to nominate politicians such as American and Chinese presidents, prime ministers, heads of other states and high authorities, and experts. Since usually only important persons are given proper names, the political high authorities and experts gain readers' attention and become the most important actors. These social actors are usually formally nominated, with political or academic titles, constructing climate change as an elite issue removed from everyday life, and as a national or international problem rather

than a personal concern. In other words, average readers may tend to perceive climate change as a problem to be addressed by state governments and experts rather than by themselves.

Table 4.2. Nomination of social actors in news articles in 2009 and 2015

2009		2015
Categories of Social actors	Nomination	Nomination
<b>China</b>	le président chinois Hu Jintao, M. Hu; le premier ministre Wen Jiabao ; l'ambassadeur de Chine pour le climat, Yu Qingtai	Le président chinois Xi Jinping; Le premier ministre chinois Li Keqiang; le chef du Parti communiste chinois Xi Jinping; Xie Zhenhua, le négociateur qui avait pris de front les Américains à Copenhague; la journaliste Chai Jing
<b>Other developing countries (Brazil, Africa, etc.)</b>	le président Lula ; Dilma Rousseff, chef de la Maison civile, équivalent brésilien du premier ministre et dauphine de M. Lula; le premier ministre indien Manmohan Singh; le premier ministre éthiopien Meles Zenawi	la présidence brésilienne Dilma Rousseff
<b>the US</b>	Barack Obama ; George W. Bush ; Bill Clinton ; le président américain Barack Obama ; son conseiller Michael Froman; Le président américain Obama ; Mike Froman, le “sherpa” du président américain ; le sénateur démocrate John Kerry ; Samuel Thernstrom, ancien membre du conseil de George Bush sur l’environnement ; “L’émissaire américain Todd Stern”	le président américain Barack Obama
<b>Other developed countries</b>	M. Devernois de l’Agence française de développement (AFD) ; Le président français Nicolas Sarkozy ; son ministre de l’écologie Jean-Louis Borloo; le président de la Commission européenne José Manuel Barroso ; le premier ministre danois Lars Lokke Rasmussen ; Le premier ministre britannique Gordon Brown ; la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel ; La ministre danoise Connie Hedegaard	président français François Hollande ; le ministre des affaires étrangères, Laurent Fabius; le président Poutine
<b>Experts</b>	Maïté Jaureguy-Naudin, chercheuse et coordinatrice du programme énergie à l’Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI); Paul Bledsoe de la Commission nationale pour la politique énergétique ;l’économiste britannique Nicholas Stern ; Emmanuel Guérin de l’IDDRI	l’économiste du climat Nicholas Stern et l’analyste Fergus Green; Lin Boqiang, directeur du Centre de recherche en économie de l’énergie de l’université de Xiamen; Célia Gautier, responsable des politiques européennes au sein du Réseau Action Climat (RAC); Li Shuo, expert climat et énergie de Greenpeace Chine; Ling Xiong, professeur au centre de recherche sur le changement climatique, l’énergie et l’environnement de Wuhan; Jennifer Morgan du World Resources Institute

		(WRI)
<b>Others</b>	Yvo de Boer le responsable climat à l'ONU; Le secrétaire exécutif de la convention sur le climat des nations Unies Yvo de Boer	Wu Changhua, directrice de l'ONG the Climate Group en Chine ; Jeff Huang, directeur pour la Chine d'Intercontinental Exchange

#### **4.2.2 China as an International Actor**

In 2009, China was portrayed negatively with regard to its role as an international actor in the issue of climate change; in 2015, it was portrayed in a more positive light. In 2009, China was excluded to a large extent in the news content, although the headlines indicated a much greater relevance, while in 2015 this incongruity largely disappeared and China was represented as the main actor in both headlines and news content (4.2.2.1). China's voice was excluded in 2009 but it was included in 2015 (4.2.2.2); it was allocated less agency in 2009 and more agency in 2015 (4.2.2.3). In 2009, China was linguistically closely associated with the US as the biggest polluters in the world, but it was linguistically disassociated from the US in 2015 and was represented as involved in addressing climate change (4.2.2.4).

##### ***4.2.2.1 Inclusion***

The news stories in 2009 and 2015 included almost the same social actors, including actors pertaining to both developed countries and developing countries, experts, and others. Among these social actors, China and the US were the most visible, as shown in Table 4.3: in 2009, the US and China were the most included, with, respectively, 41% and 21% of the foregrounded actors pertaining to the two countries; in 2015, they are still the most included actors, with the proportions being 14% and 53%, respectively. Even though China and the US were the most included actors in the news texts in both years, there are differences in their inclusion patterns.



The 2009 news stories show an incongruity between the inclusion of China in headlines and in the content. In the headlines, China (50%) was more foregrounded than the US (31.3%). However, in the news content itself, China was about half as relevant (21% of foregrounding) as the US (41%); moreover, in terms of theme foregrounding, which indicates the prominence of social actors and the principal subject matter of the texts, only 19% pertain to Chinese actors compared with 39% to American actors; thus, the content of the news texts appears to be more about the US than about China, and China is constructed as less of the main character than the US. Therefore, the inclusion analysis reveals that the headlines seemed to misleadingly overstate China's relevance in the news content. Since headlines of hard news function to summarize the news story and attract readers' attention (Martin-Lagardette, 2008: 135), this incongruity may be interpreted as a sacrifice of summarization in favor of using China to attract reader attention.

This seeming incongruity between headlines and news content disappeared in 2015. China was the most included, thus the most visible, social actor in the headlines (87.5%), as well as in the news content among all social actors (53%). Although the US was also an important actor in the content, it was in second place (14%). Unlike in 2009, China was constructed as the main character of the news stories in 2015, with 54% of the theme foregrounded actors pertaining to China, while the proportion for the US was only 16%.

In summary, the 2009 news texts excluded China to a large extent in their news content although they constructed China as a main character in their headlines. However, the 2015 news texts have constructed China as the main and most prominent actor, both in the headlines and in the news content.

Table 4.3. Inclusion of social actors in news content in 2009 and 2015

Categories of social actors		2009						2015					
		Theme foregrounding		Rheme foregrounding		Total		Theme foregrounding		Rheme foregrounding		Total	
		n.	(%)	n.	(%)	n.	(%)	n.	(%)	n.	(%)	n.	(%)
Developed countries	the US	81	39	94	44	175	41	47	16	42	12	89	14
	Others (France etc.)	33	16	29	13	62	15	28	10	41	12	69	11
Developing countries	China	40	19	49	23	89	21	155	54	175	52	340	53
	Others (Brazil, etc.)	27	13	25	12	52	12	11	4	16	5	27	4.2
Other categories	Experts	11	5	1	0	12	3	17	6	21	6	38	6
	UN, NGO etc.	18	9	17	8	35	8	27	9	42	12	69	10
<b>Total</b>		210	100	215	100	425	100	285	100	337	100	632	100

#### 4.2.2.2 Nomination: China's Voices Excluded in 2009 and Included in 2015

In 2009 China's voices, including those of the politicians and experts, were excluded to a large extent, while in 2015 they were included.

In 2009, American politicians were more frequently nominated and given voices in news content, with 8 American examples and 3 Chinese ones, and 33 instances of American actors and 9 instances of Chinese actors. This pattern was reversed in 2015, with 4 Chinese examples and 1 American example, and 31 instances of Chinese actors and 10 instances of American actors. In 2009, the American actors are all important politicians, including the current and previous presidents, the president's advisor, senators, and others. The various historical and contemporary positions of the US on climate change are also presented alongside the politicians involved. In contrast, the nomination of Chinese actors only focused on three Chinese political figures, including the president, prime minister and climate ambassador. In

2015, among American social actors, only President Obama was named, while the named Chinese social actors included President Xi Jinping, Prime Minister Li Keqiang, the negotiator Xie Zhenhua, and the journalist Chai Jing. Thus, the 2015 stories focus on China. However, as in 2009, the Chinese politicians named in the 2015 article are the president and prime minister and chief negotiator, who did not contradict each other. Thus, the Chinese political positions are thus represented as unified.

In 2009, only western experts are nominated in the news stories (with 4 examples), while not a single Chinese expert appeared in the news stories; it was the American, French, and British experts who gave their opinions or comments on China-related or US/China-related stories; Chinese experts' voices were nevertheless excluded. In 2015, Chinese experts were named in addition to British and French experts, with 3 Chinese experts and 4 from other countries, and 6 instances of Chinese experts out of a total of 16 instances, so that the Chinese perspective was included.

#### ***4.2.2.3 Role Allocation***

Social actors can be allocated active or passive roles in a given representation. Table 4.4 shows how the climate change texts in 2009 and 2015 allocate roles to the included actors. Although in both years, actors pertaining to China and the US are allocated the most agency with the most instances of activation among all included actors, an obvious difference can be seen between the activation of actors pertaining to China and those pertaining to the US.

In the news coverage in 2009, through linguistic activation, the US is represented as the most active and dynamic force (42.6% of all activation), followed by China, which is activated to a lesser degree (23.3% of all activation) than the US in the news texts, as Table 4.4 indicates. In news stories whose headlines included both China and the US, the US usually has many

more instances of activation than China, or at most equally activated (which happens in only one article: *Climat: Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination*). For news stories whose headlines included only China, the US is also represented as an active and dynamic force, second to China. Thus, China was allocated less agency in the news coverage in 2009 than the US. In 2015, the pattern of 2009 is reversed: China was represented as the most dynamic and active force (51.8% of all activation), while the US was allocated less agency (28% of all activation).

Table 4.4. Role allocation of social actors in news content in year 2009 and 2015

Categories of Social actors		Activation (n.)		Passivization (n.)					
				Subjection (n.)		Beneficialization		Total	
		2009	2015	2009	2015	2009	2015	2009	2015
Developed Countries	the US	135 (42.6%)	135 (28%)	7	7	5	5	12 (27%)	12 (23.5%)
	Others (France, etc.)	56 (17.7%)	51 (10.6%)	6	6	1	2	7 (16%)	8 (15.6%)
Developing Countries	China	74 (23.3%)	249 (51.8%)	4	8	2	3	6 (14%)	11 (21.5%)
	Others (India, etc.)	29 (9.1%)	13 (2.7%)	8	8	3	6	11 (25.6%)	14 (27.4%)
Other categories	Experts	6 (1.9%)	33 (6.9%)	0	0	0	0	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
	UN, NGO, etc.	17(5.4%)	38 (7.9%)	3	3	4	3	7 (15%)	6 (11.8%)
Total		317(100%)	481 (100%)	28	32	15	19	43(100%)	51 (100%)

#### 4.2.2.4 Actor Association

There are differences between the actor association patterns in the 2009 news texts and those in the 2015 news texts: a close linguistic association between China and the US was recurrently found in 2009, while this association was weaker in the 2015 news coverage.

In 2009, a recurring pattern of actor association between China and the US was observed. In 62.5% of the headlines (5 of the 8 headlines), China and the US appeared together, mostly through parataxis, such as “les Etats-Unis et la Chine” [the US and China] or “Pékin et

Washington” [Beijing and Washington]. This pattern is also found in the news content of all the stories in the corpus, not only those whose headlines included both China and the US but also those whose headlines included only China. As shown in Table 4.5, which summarizes all the cases of actor association in the 2009 news coverage under discussion, 61% of the actor association (14 of 23 instances) occurs between China and the US. Either by parataxis or circumstance of accompaniment, China and the US are closely associated with each other as G2 in terms of their status as the world’s largest CO<sub>2</sub> emitters and their importance in climate change negotiations, as well as their status as opponents of the EU regarding CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Such association was channeled through different voices, including the author’s own voice, European politicians; and experts’ voices. The association of China and the US as the world’s biggest CO<sub>2</sub> emitters is channeled mostly through the voices of the author (examples 1, 2 and 3), the EU Sweden presidency (example 9) and experts (example 10); their cooperation and importance in climate change was voiced by the author (example 4), the American president (example 7), and the expert (examples 12 and 13). Expectations regarding China’s and the US’ commitment to climate change were channeled through the voices of European politicians (example 8 and 9); while the author’s voice constructed China and the US as designated opponents of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Brazilian President Lula (example 5), which Mr. Sarkozy wants to squeeze (example 6). These examples form a heteroglossia in which the China/US association is expressed. Another strong actor association pattern is related to France and Brazil, who want to forge alliances with other countries to oppose China and the US (examples 18-21).

In contrast, the strong association of China and the US that was seen in 2009 was much weaker in the news coverage from 2015. This association almost disappeared from the

headlines, with 91% of the headlines (10 of 11) foregrounding only China. Although the association between China and the US still concerned 42% of all cases of actor association (14 of 33 instances) in the news coverage, it is less than the 62% found in 2009. As shown in Table 4.6, which presents all the instances of actor association in the news content in 2015, where China and the US had been associated in 2009 as “the world’s biggest polluters,” their collaboration on efforts to resist climate change and their announcement of measures to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions became the focus of news reports in 2015 (examples 22-31). The association between China and US in 2015 was only channeled through the author’s own voice, in contrary to the heteroglossic expression observed in 2009. China is also associated with other countries, such as France, India, and Brazil, in actions of discussing and signing bilateral declarations of curbing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (examples 35-40):

Table 4.5. Actor association in the news content of 2009<sup>9</sup>

<b>Voice</b>	<b>Actor</b>	<b>Activities</b>
Journalist	China + the US	account for 40% of world’s total CO <sub>2</sub> emissions (example 1)
		the two biggest polluting countries (example 2)
		the world's two biggest greenhouse gas polluters (example 3)
		“meeting each other” “discussing” (example 4)
		designated opponent of French president Nicolas Sarkozy and Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (example 5), which Mr. Sarkozy wants to squeeze (example 6)
American president	China + the US	seeking for a “convergence of opinions” on the climate issue (example 7)
Danish minister Connie Hedegaard	China + the US	two pupils in elementary school who wait for the last moment to submit their homework (example 8)
The Swedish Presidency of the EU	China + the US	who account for half of the world’s emissions (example 9) whom the EU calls on to increase their objective of CO <sub>2</sub> reduction (example 9)
Maïté Jaureguy- Naudin, researcher and coordinator of the energy program	China + the US	the world’s two largest CO <sub>2</sub> emitters (example 10)
		“the two countries” that can give impulsion that the negotiations need (example 11)
		“is going to start discussing” on the issue (example 12)

<sup>9</sup> Please see Appendix 3 for original examples in the French news texts.

at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI)		being referred to as “the two presidents” who will try to work on the issue (example 13)
	China + India	countries where the labor cost is cheaper do not undergo the carbon constraint (example 14)
American delegate Todd Stern	China+ Developing countries	the fundamental challenge in climate change will be to reflect on what actions China and the developing countries would take (example 15)
Journalist	Dongtan (a Chinese city) + Singapore	in a technical and financial partnership (example 16)
	US president +Chinese and Indian leaders	Met and realised “progress” (example 17)
	France + Brazil	countries that want to oppose China and the US (example 18)
	Industrialized countries + emerging countries+ most vulnerable countries to climate change	with whom Mr. Sarkozy want to forge an alliance to counter China and the US (example 19)
	German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen	people that Mr. Sarkozy wants to meet to consolidate the position of EU (example 20)
French president	France + Brazil	going to convince the world to oppose China and US (example 21)

Table 4.6. Actor association in the news content of 2015<sup>10</sup>

Voice	Actor	Activities
Journalist	China + the US	the world’s first two powers who appear increasingly divided on major issues marking their relationship, but they turn out to be capable of collaborating in the domain of climate (example 22)
		the two giants who recognized in a joint statement the key role they must play in combating climate change (example 23)
		have announced their intention to significantly reduce their CO2 emissions of their respective country (example 24)
		the two parties of an agreement in which they presented their objectives of greenhouse gas emission reduction (example 25)
		The Chinese president and American president are associated as two actors involved in meeting and announcing their measures to achieve their goals of greenhouse gas reduction (example 26)

<sup>10</sup> Please see Appendix 3 for original examples in the French news texts.

		two countries who were considered for a longtime as two major hindrances to the multilateral negotiations on climate change pressed their accelerator pedal on the multilateral climate negotiations (example 27)
		two partners who wanted to use their international influence to fight against climate change and press other nations to do the same (example 28)
		two stressing on their willingness of reaching an agreement in COP 21 in Paris (example 29)
China + the US (circumstance of accompaniment)		the two parties in an agreement regarding greenhouse gas emission (example 30)
		announced reaching the peak in 2030 (example 31)
		Establish equal relation with the US (example 32)
China + G77 (parataxis)		a coalition of developing countries which polarizes the climate negotiations (example 33)
China + G77 (circumstance of accompaniment)		China is associated with G77, a coalition of 133 developing countries (example 34)
China + European Union/ India / Brazil (circumstance of accompaniment)		China has signed bilateral declarations with them (example 35)
France + China		The French president François Hollande and the Chinese president appear together for the announcement of the “joint statement” (example 36)
		The French president François Hollande and the Chinese president associated as a group in the action of making a declaration in front of the news media (example 37)
		Display their determination to conclude an ambitious and legally binding agreement in COP 21 (example 38)
		French and Chinese negotiation team are associated together for the close discussion of the statement (example 39)
		Laurent Fabius and Chinese diplomacy are associated as the two parties in a telephonic conversation for the conclusion of the joint statement (example 39)
China + the US, India, Brazil (circumstance of accompaniment)		signing bilateral declarations regarding curbing CO2 emissions (example 40)
China + Brazil and Canada (circumstance of accompaniment)		three largest hydropower producers (example 41)
China+ India		the failure to meet air pollution standards (example 42)
Americans+ Europeans (parataxis)		their historical responsibility in global warming (example 43)
India + Brazil (parataxis)		the ones among the major emitters whose contributions are still missing; “key actors in discussions” but who have not revealed their commitments (example 44)



	Turkey + Saudi Arabia + India	countries who notably block the clause of revision every five years (example 45)
	Philippines, Pacific islands, Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, Iceland	“the climate destinations” of the French president since the beginning of 2015 (example 46)
Célia Gautier, director for European policies within the Climate Action Network	the US+ Europe + Canada	historical polluters who refuse to take their responsibility (example 47)
Foreign researchers + Chinese researchers	China	could reach its peak in emissions of greenhouse gas by 2025 (example 48)

In fact, it was in 2013, when Chinese president Xi Jinping came into power, that China and the US began to intensively reinforce their bilateral cooperation to deal with climate change. With the efforts of Presidents Xi and Obama, a historic partnership was gradually forged between China and the US in leading the global response to climate change. In 2014, the two countries signed the milestone China-US joint statement on climate change in Beijing; in 2015, the U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change was signed in Washington (“China-US”, 2016). However, whereas *Le Monde*’s news texts associated China and the US in 2009, the association was much weaker in 2015, which does not appear to be in conformity with the world reality, and the reasons behind that remain to be investigated.

### 4.3 Qualitative Analysis: Bad China in 2009 vs. Good China in 2015

The quantitative analysis reveals general patterns in the representations of China in the issue of climate change in 2009 and 2015, and compares the differences between the two years. In this section, the purely descriptive quantitative analysis is complemented by qualitative analysis, which enables us to identify more subtle linguistic patterns and to interpret those

patterns by situating them “within a multi-level understanding of the broader ideological context” (Baker & Levon, 2015: 233).

Qualitative analysis of the corpus texts show that the representations of China in 2009 and 2015 were both embedded in a horizon of consensual climate politics: in 2009, as a disagreeing party, China was represented as an enemy to be eliminated; and in 2015, as an agreeing party, China was represented as appreciated and welcomed. The qualitative analysis of two individual news texts given below illustrates how such representations are systematically located within the linguistic structures (4.3.1). This is followed by a holistic qualitative analysis of the entire corpus (4.3.2).

#### **4.3.1 Qualitative Analysis: Examples**

The two individual news texts analyzed below are the most shared articles on Facebook in the corpus from 2009 and 2015, respectively.

**1- Analysis of *Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington***  
[Climat: Mr. Sarkozy and Mr. Lula want to conter Beijing and Washington] (LE MONDE | 16.11.2009 à 14h04 • Mis à jour le 16.11.2009 à 14h04 | Par Arnaud Leparmentier | Planète | 893)

International climate change negotiations in the search for a common treaty to tackle global warming have always been marked by disagreement. Despite the widespread and widely accepted idea that humankind needs a collective global action to save us from catastrophic consequences, different regional realities and historical factors result in differing views.

Through a qualitative analysis of one news story from *Le Monde*, I argue that the representation of China, one of the key negotiating parties, but one that disagreed in the negotiation process, is embedded in a horizon of consensual climate politics. “Climat: MM.

Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington” [Climat: Mr. Sarkozy and Mr. Lula want to counter Beijing and Washington] was published on 16 November 2009, against the background that Sarkozy was not satisfied with the level of China’s and the US’s commitment to CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction at the Copenhagen climate conference. The articles construct an antagonistic rather than an agonistic relationship between agreeing parties and disagreeing parties, and China is represented more as an enemy to be eliminated than a legitimate adversary who is recognized.

News headlines are the most crucial part of the article in terms of the interpretation of an event, as they “provide the semantic framework in which local (or ambiguous) details are interpreted” (van Dijk, 1988: 227). The headline of the text under discussion, *Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington*, constructs two adversarial groups of social actors via *association*: MM. Sarkozy and Lula as one group of agents, opposed to Pékin and Washington, who are in a passive role. Here, the *association* and *disassociation* of social actors breaks the categories of developed (Annex I countries) or developing countries (Annex II countries) established by the Kyoto Protocol, thus ignoring the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” between the two groups of countries:

1.1<sup>11</sup> Le président français Nicolas Sarkozy et son homologue brésilien Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva ont décidé, samedi 14 novembre, de se jeter dans la bataille en vue du sommet de Copenhague sur le réchauffement climatique.<sup>12</sup>

1.2 Leur adversaire désigné ?

1.3 Le “G2”, constitué du président américain Barack Obama et de son homologue chinois Hu Jintao, soit les deux plus gros pollueurs de la planète.

The antagonistic construction mentioned above is reinforced in the first paragraph. The *association* between Nicolas Sarkozy and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is emphasized by the

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<sup>11</sup> Each sentence in the individual text under discussion is preceded by a double digit, with the first digit indicating the rank of the paragraph to which the sentence belongs, and the second indicating the rank of the sentence among all the sentences in the article.

<sup>12</sup> See Appendix 4 for the English version of the two news articles that are analyzed in this section.

possessive adjectives “son” [his] (1.1) and “leur” [their] (1.2). The *association* between Barack Obama and Hu Jintao is stressed not only by the possessive adjective “son” [his], but they are even referred to as a category with the term “G2” (1.3). “G2” was initially proposed to refer to the unofficial economic relationship between the US and China in 2005, and then gained more currency and scope in 2009 when the president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, and his chief economist, Justin Lin, advocated the concept in March 2009 for China and the US’s crucial role in the American and world economic recovery against the background of the US financial crisis in 2008. This unofficial term, which connotes power and responsibility, is used here with derision in order to attribute core responsibility to the US and China in climate change negotiations as the world’s two largest polluters, and also to emphasize their essential roles in impeding or promoting the conclusion of a climate treaty. However, this term masks the very different status and positions of the US and China.

In the first sentence, Nicolas Sarkozy and Lula are given full agency by being activated in the action of “ont décidé, samedi 14 novembre, de se jeter dans la bataille en vue du sommet de Copenhague” [decided to jump into the battle for the Copenhagen conference] (1.1). The “battle for the Copenhagen conference” seems a legitimate cause for those who seek to forge a treaty at Copenhagen. The metaphor of “battle” has the immediate connotation of an antagonistic relationship between two parties with one desiring to beat the other. Thus, the negotiating parties are rather in a war than in a collaborative relationship. Later, the justice of Sarkozy’s and Lula’s action is validated by the *association* of G2 with the quality of being “les deux plus gros pollueurs de la planète” [the world’s biggest polluters] (1.3). This negative quality association attributes to the US and China illegitimacy in the issue of climate change, as 90% of the French people believe that the biggest polluters should pay for environmental

protection (Special Eurobarometer 295, 2008). However, the powerful G2 are denied agency via elliptical structure. Thus, an opposition is constructed between a just coalition with full agency – Nicolas Sarkozy and his Brazilian counterpart Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and an unjust coalition who are denied agency – the world’s largest polluters, China and the US. These actors are all formally *nominated* in terms of their title as “president”, suggesting a battle at the level of heads of states.

In the second paragraph, the US and China are *disassociated*, and only the US stance is discussed while the Chinese voice is absent. Although this paragraph seems to describe a “fact”, the US actors are nevertheless activated in non-cooperative actions such as “n’a pas voulu” [did not want] (2.4), “a refusé de prendre des engagements” [has refused to make commitment] (2.5) and “souhaiter reporter à plus tard les engagement contraignants” [to wish to postpone the binding commitments] (2.6). Also, by quoting Obama’s advisor, Michael Froman, who said “le sommet de Copenhague [...] ne serait qu’une étape” [the Copenhagen summit (...) would be just one stage] (2.7), the article affirms that the US did not attach as much importance to the Copenhagen Conference as other countries, contrary to the belief that, in the words of the European Union Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas, it is “the last chance to bring climate change under control before it is too late” (2008, para. 15). This opinion is in line with those of Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Secretary-General, and Nicholas Herbert Stern, the UK’s leading authority on climate change and environment, who both warned of “catastrophic consequences” unless a new international treaty on greenhouse gas emissions is concluded at Copenhagen (Morano, 2015). The author acknowledged Obama’s stance, without taking any position in favor or against, by using the phrase “a fait savoir” [has informed]:

2.4 Le président américain n'a pas voulu que les dirigeants européens se joignent à la réunion du Forum de coopération Asie-Pacifique (APEC), les 14 et 15 novembre à Singapour, pour tenter de dénouer la négociation.

2.5 Pis, l'APEC a refusé de prendre des engagements contraignants de réduction des émissions de gaz à effets de serre.

2.6 Par la voix de son conseiller, Michael Froman, M. Obama a fait savoir que le sommet de Copenhague, qui se tiendra du 7 au 18 décembre, ne serait qu'une étape.

2.7 Les Américains accepteraient de signer un accord portant sur l'aide aux pays pauvres frappés par le réchauffement, mais souhaitent reporter à plus tard les engagements contraignants de réduction des émissions de CO<sub>2</sub>.

In the third paragraph, the author *associates* the US and China as a group, which Sarkozy wants to back into a corner. Sarkozy is *nominated* as “M. Sarkozy” (3.8) instead of “le président français” [the French President], thus removing the official part of Sarkozy’s stance and constructing it as a personal agenda rather than the public agenda. With the intent of squeezing the US and China, Sarkozy wants to form an alliance between “pays industrialisés, grands pays émergents et pays les plus touchés par le réchauffement climatique” [industrialized countries, major emerging countries and countries most affected by global warming] (3.9). Thus, the US and China are represented not only as two countries that are excluded from these categories, but as their opponent, because they are the “world’s largest polluters (1.3). In this way, they are represented as an isolated group that stands against the interest of all other countries in the world:

3.8 M. Sarkozy s’y refuse.

3.9 Rêvant de prendre en tenaille les Etats-Unis et la Chine, il veut forger une alliance entre pays industrialisés, grands pays émergents et pays les plus touchés par le réchauffement climatique (Afrique non méditerranéenne, Etats insulaires menacés, Asie du sud-est...).

3.10 Les engagements unilatéraux pris, vendredi 13 novembre, par le Brésil, après ceux de l'Union européenne, confortent sa stratégie.

The next two paragraphs discuss the Brazilian commitment, which is positively appreciated as “le premier grand pays émergent à s'engager de la sorte” [the first emerging country to commit in this way] (4.11); furthermore, the commitment is not in conflict with Brazilian economic expansion (4.12). This “factual” element implies that it is possible to commit to CO<sub>2</sub> reduction without undermining economic development for developing countries, thus implicitly serving as a counterargument against the position of disagreeing

developing countries, especially China. Although the Chinese position is not explicitly mentioned or recognized here yet, it seems to have already been contradicted:

4. 11 Le géant latino-américain est le premier grand pays émergent à s'engager de la sorte.

4.12 Il ne va pas ralentir son expansion économique, mais s'engage à réduire de 80 % la déforestation de l'Amazonie, à contrôler les effets de l'élevage et de l'agriculture sur la savane, à limiter l'utilisation des nitrates dans l'agriculture.

5. 13 Ces mesures devraient permettre de réduire la croissance attendue des émissions de gaz à effet de serre d'ici à 2020 de 36 % à 39 %, a annoncé Dilma Rousseff, chef de la Maison civile, équivalent brésilien du premier ministre et dauphine de M. Lula.

The sixth paragraph focuses on the positions of the Brazilian and French presidents. Although the positions of the US and China are mentioned, they are nevertheless contained and contested in the voices of Brazilian and French presidents. Brazil's proposed commitment is first appreciated as "équivalent" [equivalent] to the Americans' (6.14), signifying its importance while depreciating that of the US. Then, when the article quotes the Brazilian president, "nous" and "le président Obama et le président Hu Jintao" [President Obama and President Hu Jintao] are differentiated, which again constructs two opposing groups (6.15). "Nous" [We], and thus the position expressed by "nous," is theme foregrounded, while the US and China are in the rheme as the development of the position of "nous" [we]. By activating "nous" in "nous n'avons pas le droit de permettre" [we do not have the right to allow], the position of "nous" is legitimated; by activating "le président Obama et le président Hu Jintao" [President Obama and President Hu Jintao] in "puissent célébrer un accord en prenant pour base les seules réalités de leurs pays" [could celebrate an agreement only based on the realities of their countries], the position of the US and China is constructed as selfish. In the quotation from Sarkozy, "nous" is also theme foregrounded and therefore more prominent (6.17). When the US is theme foregrounded, it is referred to in terms of its economic power as "la première économie du monde" [the world's leading economy] to emphasize its corresponding

responsibility (6.16). No Chinese or American voices are included here to contest those statements:

6. 14 L'effort proposé par le Brésil "est équivalent à la proposition qu'a envoyée M. Obama au Congrès américain", a affirmé le président brésilien, qui était reçu, samedi, à l'Elysée.

6.15 "Nous n'avons pas le droit de permettre que le président Obama et le président Hu Jintao puissent célébrer un accord en prenant pour base les seules réalités de leurs pays", a-t-il mis en garde, annonçant qu'il téléphonerait lundi 16 novembre à M. Obama, pendant la visite de ce dernier en Chine.

6.16 "La première économie du monde doit être à la hauteur de ses responsabilités", a surenchéri M. Sarkozy.

6.17 "Nous n'accepterons pas de prendre des engagements et que d'autres disent : on verra demain. "

Paragraphs 7 and 8 *associate* Sarkozy and Lula as a group and foreground them in their desire to "faire grossir leurs troupes" [enlarge their alliance] (7.18) and "faire le tour de la planète pour convaincre" [go around the world to convince] (7.19). In discussing the plan Sarkozy intended to adopt, the article places "l'Afrique" [Africa] (7.20), "les pays du Sud" [countries of the South] and "les pays menacés" [the threatened countries] (8.21) in the role of beneficiary of the help that this French plan provides. The justice of Sarkozy's righteous position is thus solidified:

7.18 A un mois du sommet de Copenhague, M. Sarkozy et M. Lula veulent faire grossir leurs troupes.

7.19 "Avec le président Lula, on va faire le tour de la planète pour convaincre, parce que le monde est multipolaire", a annoncé le président français, qui compte faire adopter le plan qu'a concocté son ministre de l'écologie, Jean-Louis Borloo.

7.20 Baptisé "Justice-climat", ce texte d'une dizaine de pages prévoit des financements de 450 milliards d'euros sur vingt ans, dont les trois quarts alloués à l'Afrique.

8.21 Destiné à aider les pays du sud à réussir leur transition énergétique et à lutter contre les dégâts du réchauffement, il comporte un vaste plan de développement de l'énergie solaire, des projets de reforestation et de lutte contre l'érosion, des aides aux pays menacés par la montée du niveau des océans.

8.22 Le tout serait financé par une taxe de 0,01 % sur les transactions financières qui rapporterait 20 milliards d'euros par an.

In the next four paragraphs (paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12), Sarkozy, Lula, and Borloo are foregrounded in the actions of persuading the European Union, the Commonwealth countries,



and Africa (9.23). Borloo is particularly foregrounded in the action to split India from China (9.24):

9.23 M. Sarkozy doit rencontrer jeudi 19 novembre à Bruxelles, avant le Conseil européen, la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel et le premier ministre danois Lars Lokke Rasmussen, hôte de la conférence, pour consolider la position de l'Union européenne.

9.24 Il se rendra ensuite au Brésil, où M. Lula compte convaincre les dix pays du bassin amazonien, qui se rencontreront à Manaus, fin novembre, de prendre des engagements analogues à ceux de son pays.

10.25 Le 27 et le 28 novembre, il s'agira de persuader les pays du Commonwealth, qui doivent se réunir à Trinité et Tobago, dans les Caraïbes.

10.26 Le premier ministre britannique Gordon Brown a convié M. Sarkozy à s'y rendre.

10.27 L'enjeu est de rallier les pays d'Afrique anglophone, l'Australie, le Canada la Nouvelle-Zélande et surtout l'Inde.

11.28 New Delhi est un acteur incontournable.

11.29 Pour convaincre le deuxième pays le plus peuplé du monde, M. Borloo, qui a rencontré le premier ministre indien Manmohan Singh vendredi 13 à New Delhi, veut le "découpler" de la Chine.

11.30 Son plan d'aide concerne les pays qui émettent moins de deux tonnes de CO2 par an et par habitant: l'Inde est à 1,2 et la Chine à 4,5 tonnes.

11.31 Pour mémoire, les Etats-Unis sont à 19 tonnes, l'Europe à 10.

12.32 M. Sarkozy envisage enfin de se rendre en Afrique, alors que son ministre de l'écologie a également rencontré, vendredi 13, le premier ministre éthiopien Meles Zenawi, chef de file des Africains.

In the last paragraph, the author advances the idea that Sarkozy is taking advantage of climate change for his own sake. Similarly, in "French president hesitates to jump into the battle" (13.33), Sarkozy is referred to as "French president" in the process "hesitate", implying that it might not be in the country's interest to be involved in "the battle of Copenhagen." The author distinguishes between the interests of Sarkozy as president and his personal interests:

13.33 Le président français hésitait à se lancer dans la bataille de Copenhague.

13.34 Mais il a fait du réchauffement climatique un enjeu de politique intérieure, avec l'introduction d'une taxe carbone impopulaire.

13.35 Après avoir promu l'émergence du G20, il espère finaliser les engagements climatiques lorsqu'il présidera ce forum, ainsi que le G8, en 2011...

13.36 Juste avant l'élection présidentielle de 2012.

In summary, the linguistic structures in this article construct a script of a righteous France-Brazil vs. unjust China-US in climate change negotiations. Table 4.7 shows how the text represents the social actors with linguistic tools.

China, one of the key disagreeing parties, was represented as an enemy of the French righteous war for the Copenhagen conference. The position of China was not recognized, but was rather eliminated and contradicted.

The most prominent finding is that the Chinese voice is totally excluded in the article, as China is only associated with the US. China is represented as one of G2 along with the US, standing against the interests of the whole world. This association between China and the US, along with that between Brazil and France, breaks down the distinction between Annex II countries and Annex I countries, thus ignoring the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” between them, which nevertheless serves as the legitimate negotiation basis for developing countries, including China. This also seems to be a strategy to create coalitions on the basis of whether actively supporting CO<sub>2</sub> reductions and being committed to the effort to a satisfactory extent for the European negotiators. In this way, the issue in climate change negotiations is reduced to a simple question of whether or not solving the problem of climate change, and the North-South controversies on differentiated responsibilities are avoided. By constructing a non-cooperative US that “undermines” the importance of the Copenhagen conference, and by excluding China’s voice, the author subtly aligns China to the US’ position. Thus, China’s disagreeing position, which stands on a different ground than that of the US, is not only eliminated, but also distorted.

Not only is China’s disagreement not mentioned, but it is also implicitly contradicted by the case of Brazil. Brazil, an Annex II country in the Kyoto Protocol that is, like China, an

emerging power, should have shared a similar position to China, but it did not. It is represented as an agreeing party, and it is praised in this text and is portrayed as righteous. In particular, the article explicitly mentions that Brazil is not going to slow down its economy, thus implying that it is possible to commit to CO<sub>2</sub> reduction without undermining economic development for developing countries. This position contradicts that of the disagreeing developing countries, especially China.

Table 4.7. Summary of the representation of China through voices and linguistic tools in the news article

Linguistic categories	Voices		
	Author	France	Brazil
Inclusion & Exclusion	Exclusion of China voices	Exclusion of China's voice	Contained and contradicted voices of China and the US
Nomination	Formal nomination with titles: War at the level of state	[none]	Formal nomination with titles
Association	China and the US as "world's largest polluters"; France and Brazil	France and Brazil	China and the US
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Coalition of like-mindedness (whether to support climate change reductions in the way EU countries wish)</li> <li>-Avoid North-South controversies</li> <li>-Illegitimacy and responsibility of "Polluters"</li> </ul>		
Role allocation	China is denied agency to a large extent	[none]	China is allocated agency in negative actions: "could celebrate an agreement only based on the realities of their countries"

**2- Analysis of *La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre*** [China is ready to commit to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions] (Le Monde.fr | 25.09.2015 à 06h31 • Mis à jour le 25.09.2015 à 11h39 | Planète | 417)

The article *La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre* [China is ready to commit to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions] was published on 25 September 2015, when Chinese president Xi Jinping and American president Obama announced the *U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change* during Xi's state visit to the US. Following the *China-U.S. Joint Statement on Climate Change* that was signed in 2014, the two presidents reaffirmed the seriousness of climate change as one of the biggest threats facing humankind, and they stressed each of their countries' critical role in addressing this problem. They also shared their resolve to work together towards a successful outcome for the Paris climate conference, specified their respective domestic climate actions, and enhanced bilateral and multilateral climate cooperation. China's domestic action includes its plan to launch a national market of carbon credits in 2017, which attracted much attention from the media. This move on the part of the US and China is regarded as an important step forward in international climate negotiations, as they are "getting on board" the fight against climate change. A qualitative analysis of this news text shows that China was represented in a positive light as actively committed to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and its commitment is represented as a forced choice.

In the first paragraph, Chinese president Xi Jinping is the only actor with thematic status (1.1), which indicates that this story is framed as a story about China. Xi is foregrounded in the process "va prendre un engagement historique" [will make a historic commitment], while he is backgrounded in "lancer un programme national en 2017" [launch a national program in

2017] and “à limiter les émissions de gaz à effet de serre et à forcer les industries à acheter des crédits carbone” [to limit greenhouse gas emissions and forcing industries to buy carbon credits]. Thus, China’s image as “committed” to climate change receives more emphasis than its actions:

1.1 Le président chinois Xi Jinping va prendre un engagement historique, vendredi 25 septembre, pour lancer un programme national en 2017, visant à limiter les émissions de gaz à effet de serre et à forcer les industries à acheter des crédits carbone.

The second paragraph elaborates on China’s commitment. However, Xi is suppressed in the action of “announcer” by the passive voice “cette annonce a été faite” (2.2). This may be because the author wants to avoid repetition. What needs to be noticed, however, is that only American actors are quoted in this Chinese story. It might be that the author did not have access to first-hand information sources. Even so, the author chose to quote “le *New York Times*” (2.2), rather than a Chinese newspaper, to write a story about China. Whatever are the reasons behind it, China’s position is thus articulated from the perspective of Westerners.

Unlike the stories that appeared in 2009, the association of the US and China in this story is looser, and China is represented more in a central position because the US appears only in the circumstance of accompaniment “avec le président Obama” [with President Obama] (2.2), and the parataxis “les Etats-Unis et la China” [the US and China] in 2009 became “la Chine et les Etats-Unis” [China and the US] in this article (2.3). China and the US are backgrounded in “divisés sur de nombreuses questions” [divided on numerous questions], while they are foregrounded in “souhaitent user de leur influence au niveau international pour lutter contre le réchauffement climatique et pour presser d’autres nations à faire de même” [wish to use their influence at the international level to combat global warming and to urge other nations to do the same] (2.3). Thus, their willingness to influence the international community to be more

active in the fight against climate change is emphasized, and China is portrayed as a more prominent actor in this endeavor than the US:

2.2 Selon des responsables de l'administration Obama cités par le New York Times, cette annonce a été faite au cours d'une réunion au sommet de la Maison Blanche avec le président Obama.

2.3 Divisés sur de nombreuses questions, la Chine et les Etats-Unis souhaitent user de leur influence au niveau international pour lutter contre le réchauffement climatique et pour presser d'autres nations à faire de même.

The third paragraph elaborates on China's "Marché de quotas en 2017" [Quota Market in 2017]. Again, an American official ["un responsable américain"] is quoted, instead of Chinese sources, for information on China's plan (3.4). China is directly referred to as "le principal pollueur de la planète" [the principal polluter of the earth] in the action of "mené des expériences pilotes" [conducted some pilot experiences] (3.5). Since 90% of French people support "the polluters pay principle" that "the different parties should be held responsible in proportion to the environmental damage they cause" (Special Eurobarometer 295, 2008: 16), the association of China with this negative quality seems to justify China's actions in curbing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, as if any Chinese move in this direction is as it should be, regardless of China's identity as a developing country that shares "common but differentiated responsibilities" in climate change with other developed countries.

The fourth paragraph presents more background information on this plan. Obama and Xi are associated as a group in the action of announcing an agreement in 2014 on their objectives for CO<sub>2</sub> reduction (4.6):

#### **Marché de quotas en 2017**

3.4 Selon un responsable américain, la Chine doit notamment annoncer vendredi la mise en place en 2017 d'un marché de quotas de CO<sub>2</sub> visant à donner un prix au carbone et ainsi encourager les réductions d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre dans le secteur industriel.

3.5 Le principal pollueur de la planète a déjà mené des expériences pilotes, mais il n'a pas encore établi de marché à l'échelle nationale.

4.6 Lors de leur rencontre en novembre 2014 à Pékin, MM. Obama et Xi avaient annoncé un accord inédit dans lequel ils présentaient leurs objectifs en termes d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre : réduction de 26 % à 28 % d'ici à 2025 par rapport à 2005 pour les Etats-Unis, « pic » à l'horizon 2030 pour la Chine.

Paragraphs 5 and 6 are titled “Mécontentement de l'opinion publique chinoise” [Dissatisfaction of Chinese public opinion]. In paragraph 5, Obama and Xi are referred to by one term, “les deux chefs d'Etat” [the two heads of State], in their action of emphasizing their willingness to forge a climate change agreement in Paris in December obliging all countries to limit their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (5.7). Here, the association of Obama and Xi is the strongest, as they are referred to by one term. Also, their political identity is underscored via their categorization by their function, as “state heads.” China and the US are referred to as “deux plus grandes économies du monde” [the world's two biggest economies] (5.7). This association of China and the US with economic power adds to the importance of their willingness to participate in the agreement. The program is appreciated as “une étape importante pour la Chine” [an important step for China] (5.8), where only China is put in the beneficiary role of this plan:

#### **Mécontentement de l'opinion publique chinoise**

5.7 Les deux chefs d'Etat mettront l'accent sur la volonté des deux plus grandes économies du monde à forger un accord sur le changement climatique à Paris en décembre, qui engage tous les pays à freiner leurs émissions.

5.8 Ce programme visant à créer un système de plafonnement et d'échange serait une étape importante pour la Chine, qui s'engagerait ainsi à réduire les émissions des grandes industries telles que l'acier, le ciment, le papier et l'énergie électrique.

In paragraph 6, American social actors, rather than Chinese ones, are again quoted for information on China's plan (6.9). The author allocates a passive role to the Chinese government in relation to “les pressions internes et externes” [the internal and external pressure] (6.10), “le mécontentement de l'opinion publique chinoise” [dissatisfaction of Chinese public opinion] (6.11). The actors who place pressure on the Chinese government and those who are unhappy are suppressed, and thus left uncontested, with only the problems of “pressure” and

“dissatisfaction” that the Chinese government faces being mentioned. Thus, the plan is represented not as a spontaneous act, but a reaction, to the actual problems in China. Although Chinese authorities are allocated an active role in “les autorités chinoises voient aussi des avantages économiques” [Chinese authorities also see economic advantages] (6.12), the government’s agency is only related to the economy. However, the agency in “travailler sur ce plan spécifique” [to work on this specific plan], which seems a positive action, is allocated to “la Chine” instead of to the government (6.9):

6.9 Selon les responsables de l’administration Obama, la Chine travaille sur ce plan spécifique depuis le mois d’avril.

6.10 Les pressions internes et externes ont conduit le gouvernement chinois à prendre des mesures plus fermes pour réduire les émissions provenant des combustibles fossiles, en particulier le charbon.

6.11 Le mécontentement de l’opinion publique chinoise, lassée par la pollution qui enveloppe Pékin et bien d’autres villes, a incité le gouvernement à introduire des restrictions sur le charbon.

6.12 Les autorités chinoises voient aussi des avantages économiques à la réduction de l’utilisation de combustibles fossiles.

In summary, unlike in 2009, when China’s reasons for disputes with other countries were largely excluded from the news coverage, this news article published in 2015 includes China’s motivation. Nevertheless, the author portrays this decision as a forced and reactive choice instead of an active and spontaneous move on the part of the Chinese government, of which China was the beneficiary.

Although the article is a story about China, China’s position is articulated via the voices of the author and American actors, and American officials are quoted for information on Chinese plans to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. In other words, the Chinese voice is still excluded.

Despite all of this, China as a country (not the government) is portrayed in a positive light in this article. As a party that supports CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction, China is more included than it was in news coverage from 2009. Although US actors are included and China is still associated with the US in some instances, the story is framed as a China story instead of a



China/US story, with China in the central position and the US in a more peripheral position. This disassociation of China from the US gives China its own identity as a developing country.

Along with the gain of prominence, China is allocated more agency in the story, with Chinese actors being allocated an active role in more processes. However, China’s act is portrayed as something taken for granted, as it is the planet’s biggest polluter. This fits in the principle, which Europeans widely hold, that “polluters pay” (Special Eurobarometer 295, 2008:16).

China’s influence and power are not recognized on their own, but are always associated with the US. Table 4.8 summarizes the representation of China through voices and linguistic tools in this article:

Table 4.8. Summary of the representation of China through voices and linguistic tools in the news article

<b>China</b>	<b>Linguistic tools</b>
Committed to climate change	Foregrounding
Willing to influence the international community to be more active in fight against climate change	Foregrounding
Influential with the US	Actor Association & Quality association
More agency	Activation.
Efforts taken for granted	Quality association
China’s plan as a forced choice rather than a spontaneous choice of the government, of which China is the beneficiary.	Role allocation

### 4.3.2 Holistic Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative analysis of the linguistic structures of the corpus texts found that China was portrayed in a rather negative light in 2009 but was represented in a more positive light in 2015. This representation can be seen not only in the two texts analyzed in the previous section, but also within the corpus as a whole. Thus, apart from drawing on examples from the three texts presented above, I also use telling examples from other texts in the corpus. The next three

sections feature a qualitative analysis of the headlines (4.3.2.1), followed by a qualitative analysis of the corpus for 2009 (4.3.2.2) and that for 2015 (4.3.2.3).

#### ***4.3.2.1 News Headlines***

News headlines are read five times more than the content (Martin-Lagardette, 2008: 135). Merely browsing the headlines without going into the content constitutes an “economic” strategy for many readers to obtain the most possible information with the least amount of invested time and cognitive efforts (Dor, 2003). Headlines usually summarize the key points of the story, and serve to attract readers’ attention and maximize their interest (Martin-Lagardette, 2008: 135). More importantly, headlines play a crucial role in readers’ comprehension of news texts, because the headlines construct the interpretive framework of a particular representation. News headlines “provide the semantic framework in which local (or ambiguous) details are interpreted” (van Dijk, 1988: 227). Although headlines are expected to provide relevant and accurate summaries of the article, this is not always the case (Ecker et al. 2014: 325). In cases of inaccurate or even misleading headlines, readers who do not read beyond the headlines will probably hold on to the initial misconception as it is given; for those who continue reading the article, their comprehension of the text may be affected both because headlines constrain subsequent processing of the article, and because readers may find it difficult to correct their initial inaccurate understanding of the topic (Ecker et al. 2014: 325).

Table 4.9. Headlines of *Le Monde*'s articles on China climate change in 2009 and 2015

Headline	Date
<b>2009</b>	
1. <i>Réchauffement climatique: les Etats-Unis en appellent à la Chine</i> [Global warming: the United States appeals to China]	29 Mar.2009
2. <i>Climat: Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination</i> [Climate: US and China display their determination]	22 Sept.2009
3. <i>La baisse des émissions de CO2 en Chine passe par la rénovation du parc immobilier</i> [The decline in CO2 emissions in China requires the renovation of the housing stock]	2 Oct.2009
4. <i>Climat : "On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine"</i> [Climate: "One needs the impetus that the United States and China could give"]]	16 Nov.2009
5. <i>Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington</i> [Climate: Mr. Sarkozy and Mr. Lula want to counter Beijing and Washington]	16 Nov.2009
6. <i>Climat : les Etats-Unis et la Chine abattent leurs cartes</i> [Climate: the US and China played their cards]	26 Nov.2009
7. <i>Pékin se fixe des objectifs de réduction de gaz à effet de serre</i> [Beijing sets targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions]	26 Nov.2009
8. <i>Copenhague: la Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat</i> [Copenhagen: China does not want to debate its climate commitments]	15 Dec.2009
<b>2015</b>	
1. <i>La Chine devrait réduire ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre plus vite que prévu</i> [China would reduce greenhouse gas emissions faster than expected]	08 Jun.2015
2. <i>La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat</i> [China unveils its goals for the Paris Climate Conference]	30 Jun.2015
3. <i>« La Chine peut atteindre un pic d'émissions de CO2 entre 2020 et 2025 »</i> [“China can reach a peak of CO2 emissions between 2020 and 2025”]	30 Jun.2015
4. <i>Entre course à la croissance et défi climatique, où en est la Chine?</i> [Between race to growth and climate challenge, where is China?]	01 Jul.2015
5. <i>Climat: la Chine sur la bonne voie</i> [Climate: China on the right track]	01 Jul.2015
6. <i>La Chine se fixe pour objectif d'« atteindre le pic de ses émissions de CO2 autour de 2030 »</i> [China sets the goal of “reaching the peak of its CO2 emissions around 2030”]	01 Jul.2015
7. <i>La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre</i> [China is ready to commit to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions]	25 Sept.2015
8. <i>Pourquoi Pékin s'engage sur la limitation des gaz à effet de serre</i> [Why Beijing is committed to limiting greenhouse gases]	25 Sept.2015
9. <i>Chine, Etats-Unis, un tandem inattendu sur le climat</i> [China, US, an unexpected tandem on climate]	25 Sept.2015

A close examination of the headlines, as listed in Table 4.9, shows that in 2009 China was portrayed in an overall negative light, while in 2015, its portrayal was more positive. The 2009 articles used linguistic actor disassociation to differentiate or even construct confrontational relationships between China and other countries, or between China and the US and other countries. Headline 1, *Réchauffement climatique: les Etats-Unis en appellent à la Chine* [Global warming: the United States appeals to China], describes a call for help from the

US to China. Headline 4, *Climat*: “*On a besoin de l’impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine*” [Climate: “one needs the impetus that the United States and China could give”], differentiates two groups: “on” [one] as one group who needs the help of another group composed of China and the US. Although *Le Monde*’s stylistic guide clearly recommends that its authors avoid the third person singular indefinite pronoun “on” for the sake of precision and clearance (Le, 2007: 32): “*l’usage répété du ‘on’ est déconseillé*” [the repeated use of “on” is discouraged] (Le Monde 2002: 48, cited in Le, 2007: 32), it even appears in the headline in this case. By looking at the headline without its cotext, the reader may have trouble specifying who “on” is, as this “on” might mean “nous” [we] and may include any social actor except for China and the US. The indefiniteness of this headline may have enabled the speaker to “protect” the “nous” that “on” might mean and, thus, “hide” the meaning that “nous” [we] needs help from them [the US and China]. Headline 5, *Climat*: *MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington*, places the French and Brazilian presidents, Sarkozy and Lula, against Beijing and Washington. China, as the one of the two sides in the confrontation, was often denied agency (37.5% of the cases) by being passivized either as the subject of American appeal (headline 1), as the subject that France and Brazil wanted to confront (headline 5), or simply as a circumstantial element to indicate place (headline 3). When it was allocated an active role, it was in negative mental processes such as “*ne veut pas débattre de son engagement sur le climat*” [does not want to discuss its climate commitment] indicating a negative *attitude* (headline 8), that represent it as an uncooperative and stubborn negotiator. When it is allocated an active role, such as in the positive action “*donner l’impulsion*” [give impetus] (headline 4), it is nevertheless in the Rheme with the US and is made less prominent. “On” (i.e. nous) needs them (i.e. the US and China) but does not want to give them too much focus to lessen their

importance. Otherwise, China's agency is given in the actions that are related to commitment to CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions, such as “affiche leur détermination” [display their determination], “abattent leur cartes” [play their cards], or “se fixe des objectifs de réduction de gaz à effet de serre” [set targets for greenhouse gas reduction], in which no overt attitude was encoded.

In 2015, China was always in the theme, gaining more prominence than it had in 2009. It is allocated an active role in actions related to committing to and carrying out CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction. Plus, there was positive evaluation which are realised by linguistic evaluative resources. For example, the headline *Climat: la Chine sur la bonne voie* [Climate: China on the right track] encodes an overt positive *judgment* of China's recent climate moves. Also, the headlines *La Chine devrait réduire ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre plus vite que prévu* [China would reduce greenhouse gas emissions faster than expected] and “*La Chine peut atteindre un pic d'émissions de CO<sub>2</sub> entre 2020 et 2025*” [“China can reach a peak of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 2020 and 2025”] contain a positive *judgment* of China's potential for and ability to curb CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the context that foreign and Chinese experts estimate that China is able to achieve its goal of emissions peak 5-10 years earlier than its announced target of 2030.

Thus, the interpretive frameworks constructed by these two years' coverages differ: the coverage for 2009 features a strong association between China and the US. The conflictual aspect in climate politics was emphasized by the antagonistic relationship constructed between China (and the US) and others via actor association and differentiation. As one of the two parties in the confrontation, China was mostly negatively represented via linguistic passivization, Rheme foregrounding, and negative evaluation (*attitude*). When China is allocated agency and represented without overt attitude, it is in actions that are in favor of

committing to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction. In comparison, the news coverage in 2015 portrayed China in a more positive light on its own, thanks to linguistic actor disassociation and role allocation, and China's ability to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> was positively evaluated by positive *judgment* expressions.

#### **4.3.2.2 Bad China in 2009**

*Le Monde's* news content in the 2009 corpus has constructed a negative image of China, which has been mainly realized by linguistic role allocation, association and exclusion of China's argument, and stance-taking via engagement.

#### **Role Allocation**

In 2009, the allocation of the active role to China in positive actions towards climate change negotiation shows three main characteristics. First, China's actions to engage itself were either framed as responsive or reactive to others [“comme en réponse”] (1), or as following the Americans [“emboitant le pas aux Américains”] (2), or having something to do with the US (3), rather than making its own efforts, yet still wanting to rely on the industrialized countries (4). This representation is contrary to the Chinese government's framing of China's action as voluntary [“une action volontaire prise par le gouvernement chinois”] (3). Second, these actions are often allocated to “the polluters” (5, 6, 7), so that China's efforts were not appreciated, but were represented as their duties and responsibilities that they should assume. Third, China is allocated agency in selfish actions that do not consider others' interests (8), in its desire for developed countries' technologies and funding (9, 10) or in non-cooperative actions that impede the negotiations (11):

1. Il (Barack Obama) a rappelé son objectif de ramener les émissions américaines de gaz à effet de serre à leur niveau de 1990 d'ici à 2020. Il a également précisé qu'il travaillerait à une suppression des subventions publiques aux carburants provenant des énergies fossiles quand il réunirait les dirigeants du G20 jeudi et vendredi à Pittsburgh (est des Etats-Unis).  
*“Mais les pays à la croissance rapide, qui seront à l'origine de quasiment la totalité de*

*l'augmentation des émissions mondiales de gaz carboniques dans les décennies à venir, doivent également faire leur part du travail.”*

**Comme en réponse à cette demande**, le président chinois Hu Jintao s'est engagé à réduire “notablement” la croissance des émissions de gaz à effet de serre de son pays d'ici à 2020 – comparativement à 2005. “*Nous allons vigoureusement développer les énergies renouvelables et l'énergie nucléaire*”, a-t-il ajouté dans une intervention très attendue. “*Nous allons accroître la part des énergies non fossiles dans la consommation du pays à environ 15 % d'ici à 2020*”, a aussi précisé M. Hu.

[He (Barack Obama) reiterated his goal of bringing US greenhouse gas emissions back to their 1990 level by 2020. He also said he would work towards removing government subsidies on fossil fuels when he reunited the G20 leaders on Thursday and Friday in Pittsburgh (eastern USA). “But fast-growing countries, which will be responsible for almost all increase in global carbon emissions in the coming decades, must also do their part.

As a response to this request, Chinese President Hu Jintao has pledged to “substantially” reduce the growth of his country’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 - compared with 2005 levels. “We will vigorously develop renewable energies and nuclear energy,” he added in a much-awaited speech. “We will increase the share of non-fossil energy in the country's consumption to about 15% by 2020,” Hu also said.]

(*Le Monde.fr* avec AFP | Climat : Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination 22.09.2009 à 16h06)

2. Jeudi emboîtant le pas aux Américains, la Chine a, à son tour annoncé qu'elle était prête à réduire l'intensité en carbone de son activité économique de 40 % à 45 % d'ici à 2020. [On Thursday, following the lead of the Americans, China, in turn, announced that it was ready to reduce the carbon intensity of its economic activity by 40% to 45% by 2020.] (LM | Climat: les Etats-Unis et la Chine abattent leurs cartes| 26.11.2009 à 10h43)
3. Au lendemain de l'annonce de la venue du président Obama au sommet, la Chine a indiqué, jeudi 26 novembre, qu'elle sera représentée par le premier ministre Wen Jiabao. Le gouvernement a ajouté vouloir baisser l’*“intensité carbonique”* – la quantité de gaz à effet de serre émise par point de produit intérieur brut (PIB) – de 40 à 45 % d'ici à 2020 par rapport à 2005. “*C'est une action volontaire prise par le gouvernement chinois en fonction des conditions du pays et une contribution importante aux efforts mondiaux pour lutter contre le changement climatique*”, a déclaré le gouvernement, cité par l'agence Chine nouvelle. [In the wake of the announcement of President Obama's visit to the summit, China said on Thursday (November 26th) that it will be represented by Premier Wen Jiabao. The government has added that it wants to lower the “carbon intensity” - the amount of greenhouse gases emitted per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) - by 40 % to 45% by 2020 compared with 2005 levels. “It is a voluntary action taken by the Chinese government based on the conditions of the country and a significant contribution to global efforts to fight against climate change,” said the government, quoted by China News Agency.] (LM.fr avec AFP et Reuters | Pékin se fixe des objectifs de réduction de gaz à effet de serre 26.11.2009 à 08h33)
4. La Chine a récemment affiché pas mal d'objectifs, notamment en terme d'intensité carbone [la quantité de CO<sub>2</sub> émise pour la production d'un point de PIB], mais elle veut pouvoir s'appuyer sur les finances des pays industrialisés pour répondre aux enjeux que constituent le développement de son économie et la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique. [China recently has posted a number of targets, particularly in terms of carbon intensity (the

amount of CO<sub>2</sub> emitted for the production of per GDP unit), but it wants to be able to rely on funding from industrialized countries to respond to the challenges posed by the development of its economy and the fight against global warming.]

(LM.fr | Climat: "On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine" 16.11.2009 à 20h16)

5. Les deux plus gros pays pollueurs de la planète arriveront donc à Copenhague avec des engagements concrets. [The two biggest polluting countries on the planet will arrive in Copenhagen with concrete commitments.]  
(LM | Climat: les Etats-Unis et la Chine abattent leurs cartes| 26.11.2009 à 10h43)
6. Le premier émetteur de CO<sub>2</sub> de la planète a admis, dimanche 27 septembre, qu'il lui serait difficile de réduire, comme prévu, sa consommation d'énergie de 20 % par unité de PIB d'ici à 2010 et qu'il n'obtiendrait, pour 2009, qu'une baisse de 5 %. [The world's largest CO<sub>2</sub> emitter admitted on Sunday September 27<sup>th</sup> that it would be difficult for it to reduce its energy consumption by 20% per unit of GDP by 2010 and that it would only obtain a decline of 5% in 2009.]  
(LM | La baisse des émissions de CO<sub>2</sub> en Chine passe par la rénovation du parc immobilier| 02.10.2009 à 15h11)
7. En l'espace des deux jours, les deux plus gros pollueurs de gaz à effet de serre de la planète, les Etats-Unis et la Chine, ont annoncé qu'ils ne viendraient pas les mains vides au sommet de Copenhague sur le réchauffement climatique, qui se tient du 7 au 18 décembre dans la capitale danoise. [Within two days, the world's two biggest greenhouse gas polluters, the United States and China, have announced that they would not come empty-handed at the Copenhagen summit on global warming, which takes place from 7 to 18 December in the Danish capital.]  
(LM.fr avec AFP et Reuters | Pékin se fixe des objectifs de réduction de gaz à effet de serre, 26 Novembre)
8. "Nous n'avons pas le droit de permettre que le président Obama et le président Hu Jintao puissent célébrer un accord en prenant pour base les seules réalités de leurs pays", a-t-il mis en garde, annonçant qu'il téléphonerait lundi 16 novembre à M. Obama, pendant la visite de ce dernier en Chine. ["We do not have the right to allow President Obama and President Hu Jintao to celebrate an agreement only based on the realities of their countries," he warned, announcing that he would phone Mr. Obama on Monday November 16<sup>th</sup> during the latter's visit in China.]  
(LE MONDE | Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington |16.11.2009 à 14h04)
9. Quand Obama parle de "*convergence d'opinions*", il fait référence aux transferts de technologies propres que souhaite la Chine; technologies que les pays industrialisés ont développées. [When Obama talks about "*convergence of opinions*", he refers to transfers of clean technologies that China wants; technologies that industrialized countries have developed.]  
(LM.fr | Climat: "On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine"| 16.11.2009 à 20h16)
10. La Chine a récemment affiché pas mal d'objectifs, notamment en terme d'intensité carbone [la quantité de CO<sub>2</sub> émise pour la production d'un point de PIB], mais elle veut pouvoir s'appuyer sur les finances des pays industrialisés pour répondre aux enjeux que constituent



le développement de son économie et la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique. [China recently has posted a number of targets, particularly in terms of carbon intensity (the amount of CO<sub>2</sub> emitted for the production of per GDP unit), but it wants to be able to rely on funding from industrialized countries to respond to the challenges posed by the development of its economy and the fight against global warming.]

(LM.fr | Climat: "On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine" | 16.11.2009 à 20h16)

11. Copenhague : la Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat [Copenhagen: China does not want to debate its climate commitments]  
(Le Monde.fr avec AFP | Copenhague : la Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat | 15.12.2009 à 19h06)

China is often allocated a passive role in relation to the industrialized countries. First, the US sends an appeal to China to think about potential actions to mitigate climate change (12, 13, 14). Here, China is represented as the recipient; similarly, in example (15), China is again the recipient of an appeal from Europe, who asked China (and the US) to raise their emissions reduction objectives. Thus, the passivization of China may well add to the representation of China's passivity in dealing with climate change. Second, China is subjected in relation to the French and Brazilian presidents in their actions of combatting or squeezing (16, 17), and is thus represented as an enemy to be destroyed:

12. Réchauffement climatique : les Etats-Unis en appellent à la Chine [Global warming: the United States appeals to China]  
(Le Monde.fr avec AFP | 29.03.2009 à 17h54)
13. Les Etats-Unis ont envoyé un signal fort en direction de la Chine [...] [The United States sent a strong signal to China (...)]  
(Le Monde.fr avec AFP | Réchauffement climatique : les Etats-Unis en appellent à la Chine | 29.03.2009 à 17h54)
14. *"Nous ne pouvons pas chevaucher seuls le cheval blanc et tout régler (...). "L'enjeu fondamental sera de réfléchir aux actions que pourront conduire la Chine et les pays en développement", a-t-il ajouté dans un appel direct au pays le plus peuplé au monde. ["We t cannot ride alone the white horse alone and fix everything (...)."] The fundamental challenge will be to think about actions that China and developing countries can lead,"* he added in a direct call to the world's most populous country.  
(LM.fr avec AFP | Réchauffement climatique : les Etats-Unis en appellent à la Chine | 29.03.2009 à 17h54)
15. La présidence suédoise de l'UE a appelé la Chine et les Etats-Unis, *"qui représentent la moitié des émissions mondiales"*, à relever leurs objectifs de réduction. [The Swedish

Presidency of EU has called on China and the US, “*which account for half of global emissions,*” to raise their reduction targets.]

(LM.fr avec AFP | Copenhague : la Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat | 15.12.2009 à 19h06)

16. Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington [Climate : Mr. Sarkozy and Mr. Lula want to counter Beijing and Washington]  
(LM | Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington | 16.11.2009 à 14h04)
17. Rêvant de prendre en tenaille les Etats-Unis et la Chine, il veut forger une alliance entre pays industrialisés, grands pays émergents et pays les plus touchés par le réchauffement climatique (Afrique non méditerranéenne, Etats insulaires menacés, Asie du sud-est...).  
[Dreaming of taking the US and China in pincers, he wants to forge an alliance between industrialized countries and major emerging countries most affected by global warming (African non-Mediterranean, threatened island states, Southeast Asia ...).]  
(LM | Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington | 16.11.2009 à 14h04)

### **Association and Exclusion of China’s Argument**

Both quality association and actor association systematically detach China from its status as a developing country, which is the basis for its argument in the climate negotiations.

China is associated with the negative quality of being the world’s biggest polluters along with the US. This negative quality attributes to the US and China illegitimacy in climate change issue, as 90% of the people in France, as well as in the EU, believe that polluters should take responsibility for environmental protection (Special Eurobarometer 295, 2008). In example (18), the association of China with the quality of the biggest polluter or greenhouse gas emitter precedes the presentation of the Chinese president’s commitment to increasing the country’s capacity to absorb CO<sub>2</sub> emitted into the atmosphere. This puts China’s actions in the context of its rank in the world’s current carbon emissions. The association here seems to account for China’s actions as a duty and responsibility. Similarly, the references to China and the US as the “deux plus gros émetteurs de CO<sub>2</sub> au monde” (19) or “les deux plus gros pays pollueurs de la planète” (20) underscores China’s status as a polluter. Thus, China’s constructive step

[“un pas constructif”] was not appreciated, but was represented as an obligation held by the polluters towards environmental protection.

This association of China with the bad quality of being the world’s polluter also serves to construct the position of the agreeing parties, especially the European Union, as just and right. When the French and Brazilian presidents decided to oppose China and the US, the justice of their action is validated by the association of China and the US with the quality of being “les deux plus gros pollueurs de la planète” [the world’s biggest polluters] (21). Similarly, the association of China and the US with this negative quality serves as a proper argument for the EU to appeal to them to increase their greenhouse gas emission reduction (22):

18. La Chine est devenue **le premier émetteur de gaz à effet de serre de la planète** devant les Etats-Unis. **Ces deux pays comptent ensemble pour 40 % des émissions mondiales de CO<sub>2</sub>**. M. Hu s'est aussi engagé à accroître la capacité du pays à absorber le CO<sub>2</sub> émis dans l'atmosphère en augmentant la couverture forestière de la Chine de 40 millions d'hectares d'ici à 2020 comparativement à 2005. [China has become the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world surpassing the United States. These two countries together account for 40% of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Hu also pledged to increase the country's capacity to absorb CO<sub>2</sub> emitted into the atmosphere by increasing China's forest coverage by 40 million hectares by 2020 compared to 2005.] (LM.fr avec AFP, Climat: Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination, 22 Sept. 2009)
19. *Maïté Jaureguy-Naudin, chercheuse et coordinatrice du programme énergie à l'Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) y voit “un pas constructif” de la part des deux plus gros émetteurs de CO<sub>2</sub> au monde.* [Maïté Jaureguy-Naudin, researcher and coordinator of the energy program at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) sees “a constructive step” by the world’s two largest CO<sub>2</sub> emitters.] (LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)
20. *Jeudi emboitant le pas aux Américains, la Chine a, à son tour annoncé qu'elle était prête à réduire l'intensité en carbone de son activité économique de 40 % à 45 % d'ici à 2020. Les deux plus gros pays pollueurs de la planète arriveront donc à Copenhague avec des engagements concrets.* [On Thursday, following the lead of the Americans, China, in turn, announced that it was ready to reduce the carbon intensity of its economic activity by 40% to 45% by 2020. The two biggest polluting countries on the planet will arrive in Copenhagen with concrete commitments.] (LM, Climat : les Etats-Unis et la Chine abattent leurs cartes, 26 Nov. 2009)
21. *Leur adversaire désigné ? Le “G2”, constitué du président américain Barack Obama et de son homologue chinois Hu Jintao, soit les deux plus gros pollueurs de la planète.*

[Their designated opponent? The “G2”, consisting of US President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, namely the two biggest polluters on the planet.]  
(LM, Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington, 16 Nov. 2009)

22. *La présidence suédoise de l’UE a appelé la Chine et les Etats-Unis, “qui représentent la moitié des émissions mondiales”, à relever leurs objectifs de réduction.*

[The Swedish Presidency of the EU has called on China and the US, “which account for half of global emissions”, to raise their reduction targets.]  
(LM.fr, La Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat, 15 décembre 2009)

On the other hand, China was subtly disassociated with its quality as a developing country. In fact, it is never referred to in terms of its developing status in the 2009 corpus, even in cases where it is possible. For instance, in “le pays asiatique [China] renvoie les pays industrialisés à leurs ‘responsabilités historiques’” [the Asian country sends the industrialized countries back to their historical responsibilities], China could have been referred to as “le plus grand pays en développement” in terms of its developing status, which seems more logical here because it is the counterpart of the term “les pays industrialisés.” Instead, China is referred to as “the Asian country,” in terms of its geographic location, which is much less relevant here (23). In the quotation of the American President’s appeal to developing countries, China is put in parataxis with the developing countries in “aux actions que pourront conduire la Chine et les pays en développement” [the actions that China and developing countries can take] (24), as if China does not belong to the category of developing countries. Then, the author continues to refer to China by the term “le pays le plus peuplé au monde” [the most populated country] in “a-t-il [Barack Obama] ajouté dans un appel direct au pays le plus peuplé au monde” (24), although there might be other alternatives, such as the biggest developing country or the world’s biggest polluter. Perhaps, there might be less of a possibility to use the term “world’s biggest polluter” here because this term is often used to distinguish between Europeans, and China and the US, rather than a term to differentiate the US from China in the corpus. But, China’s quality as the most populated country is chosen to be presented, although it is no more

relevant here than China's quality as a developing country. We may see that China was linguistically disassociated with its quality as a developing country:

23. Systématiquement, **le pays asiatique** (China) renvoie **les pays industrialisés** à leurs "*responsabilités historiques*", les enjoignant de financer des transferts de technologie "*propre*" vers les pays en développement. [Systematically, the Asian country (China) refers the industrialized countries to their "*historical responsibilities*," enjoining them to finance "*clean*" technology transfers to developing countries.] (LM.fr avec AFP et Reuters | Pékin se fixe des objectifs de réduction de gaz à effet de serre, 26 Novembre)
24. "*Nous ne pouvons pas chevaucher seuls le cheval blanc et tout régler (...)*." "*L'enjeu fondamental sera de réfléchir aux actions que pourront conduire la Chine et les pays en développement*", a-t-il (Barack Obama) ajouté dans un appel direct au pays **le plus peuplé au monde**. [ "*We cannot ride alone the white horse alone and fix everything (...)*." *The fundamental challenge will be to think about actions that China and developing countries can lead,* " he added in a direct call to the world's most populous country.] (LM.fr avec AFP | Réchauffement climatique : les Etats-Unis en appellent à la Chine | 29.03.2009 à 17h54)

On the other hand, along with the dissociation of China with its quality as a developing country, there has been a strong association between China and the US, the biggest developed country. China and the US are associated together in terms of their rank in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions: they are put in parataxis as two equivalents who together account for half of world's greenhouse gas emissions (25); they can even be labeled as a homogeneous group, by being referred to one term such as "les deux plus gros émetteurs de CO<sub>2</sub> au monde" [world's biggest CO<sub>2</sub> emitters] (26) and "plus gros pays pollueurs de la planète" [world's biggest polluters] (27). This homogeneous group is the designated opponent of French president Nicolas Sarkozy and Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (28), which Sarkozy wants to squeeze (29). China and the US are also referred to by the third-person plural pronoun "ils" (35, 36), with the metaphor of two pupils in elementary school who wait for the last moment to submit their homework to characterize them as waiting for the last moment to reveal their emission reduction objectives. This metaphor establishes them as not very willing to take their responsibility for the climate change issue, and as those on whom the EU calls to increase their

objective of CO<sub>2</sub> reduction (26). On the other hand, they are represented as a group in terms of their importance in climate change negotiations: “the two countries” that could provide the impetus that the negotiations need (30). The Chinese president and the American president are closely associated through parataxis, such as “Barack Obama et Hu Jintao” (31, 34), through circumstance of accompaniment, such as “il cherchait avec son homologue chinois” [he sought with his Chinese counterpart] (32), or by being referred to as “the two presidents” (33) who are involved in actions such as “meeting each other”, “discussing” (31, 34), or “will try to work on the issue” (33).

Indeed, China and US are closely associated with one another in the 2009 coverage. The most eye-catching association between them is that they are referred to by the term “G2” (28). “G2”, an unofficial term meant to refer to China and the US’ crucial role in the American and world economic recovery, especially after the US financial crisis in 2009, is adopted here in the domain of climate change. Its connotation with power and responsibility seems to attribute core responsibility to the US and China in climate change negotiations, as the world’s two largest polluters, as well as to emphasize their essential role in the success of the climate change negotiations. However, this strong association masks the very different status and positions of the US and China:

25. *La présidence suédoise de l’UE a appelé la **Chine et les Etats-Unis**, “qui représentent la moitié des émissions mondiales”, à relever leurs objectifs de réduction.*  
[The Swedish Presidency of the EU has called on China and the US, “which account for half of global emissions”, to raise their reduction targets.]  
(LM.fr, La Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat, 15 décembre 2009)
26. *Maïté Jaureguy-Naudin, chercheuse et coordinatrice du programme énergie à l’Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) y voit “un pas constructif” de la part **des deux plus gros émetteurs de CO<sub>2</sub> au monde**.*  
[Maïté Jaureguy-Naudin, researcher and coordinator of the energy program at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) sees “a constructive step” by the world’s two largest CO<sub>2</sub> emitters.]  
(LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l’impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)

27. *Les deux plus gros pays pollueurs de la planète arriveront donc à Copenhague avec des engagements concrets.*  
 [The two biggest polluting countries on the planet will arrive in Copenhagen with concrete commitments.]  
 (LM, Climat : les Etats-Unis et la Chine abattent leurs cartes, 26 Nov. 2009)
28. *Leur adversaire désigné ? Le “G2”, constitué du **président américain Barack Obama et de son homologue chinois Hu Jintao**, soit les deux plus gros pollueurs de la planète.*  
 [Their designated opponent? The “G2”, consisting of US President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, namely the two biggest polluters on the planet.]  
 (LM, Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington, 16 Nov. 2009)
29. *Rêvant de prendre en tenaille **les Etats-Unis et la Chine**, il veut forger une alliance entre [...].*  
 [Dreaming of pinching the United States and China, he wants to forge an alliance between ...]  
 (LM, Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington, 16 Nov. 2009)
30. *On a vraiment besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner **ces deux pays**.*  
 [One really needs the impetus that these two countries could give.]  
 (LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)
31. *Alors que la conclusion d'un accord contraignant sur le réchauffement climatique semble de plus en plus improbable lors du sommet de Copenhague qui se tient mi-décembre, **les présidents américain et chinois, Barack Obama et Hu Jintao**, se retrouvent mardi pour discuter de cette question.*  
 [While the conclusion of a binding agreement on global warming seems increasingly unlikely at the Copenhagen summit which will be held in mid-December, US and Chinese presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao will meet on Tuesday to discuss this question.]  
 (LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)
32. *Le président américain a indiqué qu'il cherchait **avec son homologue chinois** une “convergence d'opinions” sur la question climatique.*  
 [The US president said he was seeking with his Chinese counterpart for a “convergence of opinions” on the climate issue.]  
 (LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)
33. *C'est sur cela que **les deux présidents** vont essayer de travailler.*  
 [This is what the two presidents will try to work on.]  
 (LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)
34. *Je ne pense pas qu'on ait cet effet d'annonce dès cette semaine mais **Barack Obama et Hu Jintao** vont commencer à discuter là-dessus.*  
 [I do not think we will have the announcement this week but Barack Obama and Hu Jintao will start discussing this issue.]

(LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)

35. *En l'espace des deux jours, les deux plus gros pollueurs de gaz à effet de serre de la planète, les Etats-Unis et la Chine, ont annoncé qu'ils ne viendraient pas les mains vides au sommet de Copenhague sur le réchauffement climatique, qui se tient du 7 au 18 décembre dans la capitale danoise.*

[Within two days, the world's two biggest greenhouse gas polluters, the US and China, announced that they would not come empty-handed to the Copenhagen summit on global warming, which would take place from 7 to 18 December in the Danish capital.]

( LM.fr avec AFP et Reuters, Pékin se fixe des objectifs de réduction de gaz à effet de serre, 26 November)

36. *La ministre danoise Connie Hedegaard, qui préside les débats, s'est voulue rassurante: “C'est comme à l'école élémentaire. Ils attendent le dernier moment pour rendre leurs exercices. ”*

[The Danish minister Connie Hedegaard, who presides over the debates, has been reassuring: “It's like in elementary school. They are waiting for the last moment to hand in their exercises.”]

(LM.fr, La Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat, 15 décembre 2009)

## **Engagement**

Even if China and the US are closely associated, the author uses different linguistic strategies to represent the positions of the two countries, and takes different stances towards them.

Qualitative analysis of the article *Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington*, in section 2.2.1, shows that only US voices are included to provide explanation for the American position, while the Chinese voice is excluded. This pattern can also be found throughout the corpus of news texts in 2009. While the US's position is clearly explained, that of China is mostly absent from the texts. For instance, in *Réchauffement climatique: les Etats-Unis en appellent à la Chine*, various voices of the American President, American delegate and even the previous president are included, while not a single Chinese voice can be detected, not to mention China's position and the argument behind it.



When China's position and its explanation are included, the author still subtly confronts it, as, for example, with the author's engagement with quotations from American President Barack Obama and from Chinese President Hu Jintao. For instance, the article *Climat: Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination* [Climate: United States and China show their determination] features quotations from both leaders. When quoting Obama, the author always *acknowledged* Obama's words by using reporting verbs such as "a déclaré" [stated], "a prévenu" [notified], "a reconnu" [recognized], "a affirmé" [affirmed] and "a rappelé" [recalled] (37) without taking any position in favor or in opposition. The article also includes the American president's reason for urging rapidly growing countries to do their part because those countries would account for virtually all the increase in global carbon emissions in the coming decades. This is also the main argument that the developed countries have used to hold China responsible for mitigating climate change. Even though the author uses similar words to quote the Chinese president, thus making the news text seemingly "objective", there are still traces in the linguistic structures of his different stance towards China. For example, China's engagement was framed as a response to this request ["Comme en réponse à cette demande"] (37), aligning China to the American president's position. There are no Chinese arguments for the responsibility of developed countries in the article, and the author comments on Hu's remarks that "developing countries' priority for now is their economic development, eradication of poverty and improvement of life level...mak[e] it clear that a reduction in greenhouse gases is not their priority" (37). In this way, the author makes a negative *invoked judgment* of China's position because, according to a survey by the Pew Center, in 2009, 66% of French people believed that environmental protection should be given priority, even at the

cost of economic expansion and jobs, and 68% regarded climate change as a very serious problem:

37. “*La menace représentée par le changement climatique est grave, elle est urgente, et elle grandit*”, a **déclaré** le président américain Barack Obama, mardi 22 septembre, devant des dizaines de dirigeants du monde entier réunis à l'ONU à New York pour tenter de sortir de l'ornière les discussions sur le réchauffement climatique.

Les générations futures vont à une “*catastrophe irréversible*” si la communauté internationale n'agit pas “*audacieusement, rapidement et ensemble*”, a-t-il **prévenu**. “*Nous comprenons la gravité de la menace climatique. Nous sommes déterminés à agir. Et nous honorerons nos responsabilités à l'égard des générations futures.*” Mais il a **reconnu** qu'au moment où les discussions internationales semblent dans l'impasse, “*il ne faut pas se faire d'illusions, le plus dur reste à faire*” d'ici à la conférence cruciale de Copenhague. Il a **affirmé** la responsabilité que les pays riches ont de donner l'exemple.

Il a **rappelé** son objectif de ramener les émissions américaines de gaz à effet de serre à leur niveau de 1990 d'ici à 2020. Il a également **précisé** qu'il travaillerait à une suppression des subventions publiques aux carburants provenant des énergies fossiles quand il réunirait les dirigeants du G20 jeudi et vendredi à Pittsburgh (est des Etats-Unis). “*Mais les pays à la croissance rapide, qui seront à l'origine de quasiment la totalité de l'augmentation des émissions mondiales de gaz carboniques dans les décennies à venir, doivent également faire leur part du travail.*”

**Comme en réponse à cette demande**, le président chinois Hu Jintao s'est engagé à réduire “notablement” la croissance des émissions de gaz à effet de serre de son pays d'ici à 2020 – comparativement à 2005. “*Nous allons vigoureusement développer les énergies renouvelables et l'énergie nucléaire*”, a-t-il **ajouté** dans une intervention très attendue. “*Nous allons accroître la part des énergies non fossiles dans la consommation du pays à environ 15 % d'ici à 2020*”, a aussi **précisé** M. Hu.

“*Nous allons accélérer nos efforts pour développer une économie verte, une économie à faible taux de carbone, l'accélération de la recherche et du développement et de la dissémination des technologies vertes*”, a-t-il **résumé**. Le président chinois a toutefois rappelé que, pour “*les pays en développement, la première priorité est maintenant la croissance économique, l'éradication de la pauvreté et l'amélioration du niveau de vie*”, **laissant clairement entendre** qu'une réduction de leur gaz à effet de serre n'est pas prioritaire.

(LM.fr avec AFP | Climat : Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination | 22.09.2009 à 16h06)

#### 4.3.2.3 Good China in 2015

*Le Monde's* news coverage in the 2015 corpus has constructed an image of China as a supporter of actions addressing climate change, by using linguistic foregrounding and

backgrounding China in different roles, and positively evaluating China's moves with appraisal resources.

### **Role Allocation, Foregrounding and Backgrounding**

In the climate change corpus of 2015, China was allocated agency in the actions in favor of climate change negotiations that stagnate (38) rather than in substantial actions to tackle climate change, thus emphasizing its promotion of negotiations. For instance, the Chinese President is foregrounded in the process “va prendre un engagement historique” [will make a historic commitment], while he is backgrounded in “lancer un programme national en 2017” [launch a national program in 2017] and “à limiter les émissions de gaz à effet de serre et à forcer les industries à acheter des crédits carbone” [to limit greenhouse gas emissions and forcing industries to buy carbon credits] (39). Similarly, Prime Minister Li Keqiang is foregrounded in the action “a dévoilé sa « contribution » à la lutte contre le changement climatique” [unveiled its ‘contribution’ to the fight against climate change], but backgrounded in “en s’engageant à plafonner ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre autour de 2030 et à réduire radicalement son intensité carbone” [committing to capping its greenhouse gas emissions around 2030 and drastically reducing its carbon intensity] (40). Unveiling the contribution is an action that is required by the Paris Conference for climate change negotiations. Again, in example (41), China and the US are backgrounded in their passive role of being considered as two major obstacles to the progress of the multilateral climate negotiations, and foregrounded in their active role in the action of accelerating climate negotiations. Therefore, we may see that China's image as supporting climate change negotiations is more emphasized than its actions:

38. Premier pollueur mondial, la Chine a envoyé, mardi 30 juin, **un signal très positif** pour les négociations climatiques qui patinent. [The world's leading polluter, China, sent a very positive signal on Tuesday, June 30, for climate negotiations that are stagnating.] (LE MONDE | Climat: la Chine sur la bonne voie| 01.07.2015 à 11h36)
39. Le président chinois Xi Jinping va prendre un engagement historique, vendredi 25 septembre, pour lancer un programme national en 2017, visant à limiter les émissions de gaz à effet de serre et à forcer les industries à acheter des crédits carbone. [Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a historic commitment on Friday, September 25th to launch a national program in 2017 to limit greenhouse gas emissions and to force industries to buy carbon credits.] (LM.fr | La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre | 25.09.2015 à 06h31)
40. A cinq mois de la conférence de Paris, la COP21, le premier ministre, Li Keqiang, a dévoilé sa « contribution » à la lutte contre le changement climatique en s'engageant à plafonner ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre autour de 2030 et à réduire radicalement son intensité carbone. [Five months before the Paris conference, COP21, Prime Minister Li Keqiang unveiled China's "contribution" to the fight against climate change by committing to capping its greenhouse gas emissions around 2030 and to drastically reducing its carbon intensity.] (LE MONDE | Climat: la Chine sur la bonne voie| 01.07.2015 à 11h36)
41. Considérés pendant longtemps comme deux freins majeurs à l'avancée des négociations multilatérales sur le climat, les deux acteurs appuyaient tout à coup sur la pédale d'accélérateur. [Considered for a long time to be two major obstacles to the progress of the multilateral climate negotiations, the two actors suddenly pressed on the accelerator pedal.] (LE MONDE | La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat | 30.06.2015 à 16h07)

The Chinese Prime Minister is subjected to the French President in the action of "remercier" [to thank] for ensuring that this announcement comes from Paris as a sign of support and confidence in the success of COP21 (43). Thus, this passivization indicates that China has done a favor that France appreciated:

42. Il (François Hollande) a par ailleurs « remercié [Li Keqiang] d'avoir veillé à ce que cette annonce intervienne depuis Paris, en signe de soutien et de confiance dans le succès de la COP21 », a-t-on précisé de même source. [He (François Hollande) also "thanked [Li Keqiang] for ensuring that this announcement comes from Paris, as a sign of support and confidence in the success of COP21", said the same source.] (LE MONDE | La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat | 30.06.2015 à 16h07)

The Chinese government is subjected in relation to internal and external pressure ["les pressions internes et externes"] and the dissatisfaction of Chinese public opinion ["Le

mécontentement de l'opinion publique chinoise"] (43). This subjection represents China's commitment to reducing fossil fuel emissions as a forced choice. The Chinese government is also represented as a beneficiary in relation to the current context of deceleration of economic growth ["le contexte actuel de décélération de la croissance économique"], which offered them a unique opportunity to engage in reducing greenhouse gas emission (44):

43. Les pressions internes et externes ont conduit le gouvernement chinois à prendre des mesures plus fermes pour réduire les émissions provenant des combustibles fossiles, en particulier le charbon. Le mécontentement de l'opinion publique chinoise, lassée par la pollution qui enveloppe Pékin et bien d'autres villes, a incité le gouvernement à introduire des restrictions sur le charbon. [Internal and external pressures have led the Chinese government to take stronger measures to reduce emissions from fossil fuels, especially coal. The discontent of the Chinese public, tired of the pollution that surrounds Beijing and many other cities, has prompted the government to introduce restrictions on coal.] (LM.fr | La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre | 25.09.2015 à 06h31)
44. Le contexte actuel de décélération de la croissance économique offre aux dirigeants une occasion unique: du seul fait de la chute de la demande, la consommation de charbon de la Chine a commencé à baisser en 2014. Le gouvernement chinois a su saisir cette chance. [The current context of slowing economic growth offers the leaders a unique opportunity: because of falling demand, China's coal consumption began to fall in 2014. The Chinese government has seized this opportunity.] (LE MONDE | Climat: la Chine sur la bonne voie | 01.07.2015 à 11h36)

Indeed, unlike in the air pollution corpus, in which the Chinese population was represented as powerless victims with their agency in resistance activities significantly reduced, they are represented as active agents who manifest their dissatisfaction with the climate change corpus (45). This might well place pressure on the Chinese government:

45. L'opinion chinoise s'est largement réveillée sur les questions environnementales ces dernières années. Plusieurs centaines de millions de Chinois se sont émus, en mars 2015, lors de la diffusion sur Internet du documentaire alarmant sur les conséquences du « smog » réalisé par la journaliste Chai Jing, et rapidement bloqué par les censeurs. Ils manifestent encore aujourd'hui dans le sud de Shanghai, inquiets de l'éventuelle installation d'une usine pétrochimique, comme ils l'ont fait avant à Chengdu, Xiamen et ailleurs. Comme l'a expliqué le premier ministre, Li Keqiang, l'an dernier, la première chose que font beaucoup de Chinois le matin est de regarder sur leur téléphone portable le niveau de pollution de l'air aux particules fines – généralement inquiétant, surtout dans la moitié nord du pays. [Chinese opinion has largely woken up on environmental issues in recent years. Hundreds of millions of Chinese people became emotional in March 2015, during the Internet dissemination of the alarming documentary on the consequences of the "smog" directed by

the journalist Chai Jing, and quickly blocked by censors. They are still protesting in the south of Shanghai, worrying about the possible installation of a petrochemical plant, as they did before in Chengdu, Xiamen and elsewhere. As Premier Li Keqiang explained last year, the first thing many Chinese people do in the morning is to look at their mobile phone to check the level of air pollution of fine particulate - which is generally disturbing, especially in the northern half of the country.]

(LE MONDE | Climat: la Chine sur la bonne voie| 01.07.2015 à 11h36 )

The Chinese government, for their part, are represented as sayers who articulate their preoccupation with China's air pollution by being allocated an active role in verbal processes such as “déclarait une «guerre contre la pollution»” [declared “war against pollution”], “a expliqué que s'enquérir de la qualité de l'air compte parmi ses premiers gestes le matin” [explained that checking air quality is one of his first acts in the morning], or “reprenait à son compte une aspiration essentielle des citoyens chinois” [echoed an essential aspiration of Chinese citizens](46):

46. De fait, la partie chinoise s'est saisie du dossier. En premier lieu parce que la question du climat, et plus généralement de l'environnement, s'est imposée comme un sujet essentiel en politique intérieure. En mars 2014, le premier ministre, Li Keqiang, déclarait une «guerre contre la pollution», à l'heure où les taux de concentration de particules fines dans l'air atteignent des niveaux alarmants dans les métropoles chinoises. Xi Jinping a de son côté expliqué que s'enquérir de la qualité de l'air compte parmi ses premiers gestes le matin. En novembre 2014, devant les présidents Obama et Poutine, M. Xi reprenait à son compte une aspiration essentielle des citoyens chinois: «Mon espoir est que, chaque jour, nous ayons un ciel bleu, des montagnes vertes et des rivières propres, pas juste à Pékin, mais partout en Chine, afin que nos enfants vivent dans un environnement agréable.» [In fact, the Chinese side has looked after the matter. Firstly because the issue of climate, and more generally, of the environment, has emerged as a key issue in domestic politics. In March 2014, the prime minister, Li Keqiang, declared “war against pollution” at a time when the concentration of fine particles in air reached alarming levels in the Chinese metropolises. Xi Jinping explained that checking air quality is one of his first actions in the morning. In November 2014, facing Presidents Obama and Putin, Xi echoed an essential aspiration of Chinese citizens: “My hope is that every day we have blue sky, green mountains and clean rivers, not just in Beijing, but everywhere in China, so that our children live in a pleasant environment.”]

(LE MONDE | Chine, Etats-Unis, un tandem inattendu sur le climat | 09.10.2015 à 06h41)

### **Appraisal and Quality Association**

A heteroglossia of positive evaluations of China is formed in the corpus. The corpus contains French and American politicians who voice favorable evaluations of China, such as

the French President (François Holland), who welcomed China's announcement and had a positive appreciation of it as a sign of support and confidence in the success of COP2 (47), French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Laurent Fabius), who assured his listeners that China is very committed to climate (48), and the American official who welcomed China's and the US's transparent specification of the steps they would take (49). The voice of the Chinese Prime Minister, who stated "China makes maximum efforts to combat climate change," which can invoke a positive *judgement* of China's behavior, is also included (50), as is that of European expert Célia Gautier, who gives a positive *judgment* of China's taking responsibility for its share of the "global contract" to mitigate climate change as compared to the historical polluters who refuse to take responsibility (51). Finally, the author also voices his appreciation of China's announcement as a very positive signal for climate change negotiations (52). In fact, the author indicates his favorable stance towards China in the climate change negotiation process with his use of reporting verbs such as "assurer" [to assure] (48), "se féliciter" [to welcome] (49), or "soutenir" [to support] (50), which indicates his attitudinal investment in the positions being advanced by the voices he quotes:

47. François Hollande a « salué » cette annonce, estimant qu'elle « confirmait l'engagement de la Chine à construire une "civilisation écologique" », selon l'entourage du président français. Il a par ailleurs « remercié [Li Keqiang] d'avoir veillé à ce que cette annonce intervienne depuis Paris, **en signe de soutien** et de confiance dans le succès de la COP21 », a-t-on précisé de même source. [François Hollande "welcomed" the announcement, saying it "confirms China's commitment to build an "ecological civilization", according to the entourage of the French president. He also "thanked [Li Keqiang] for ensuring that this announcement was made in Paris, as a sign of support and confidence in the success of COP21," said the same source.]

(LE MONDE | La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat | 30.06.2015 à 16h07 • Mis à jour le 30.06.2015 à 16h58 )

48. « **La Chine est très engagée sur le climat**, assure Laurent Fabius, qui s'est rendu sur place à la mi-mai. Le climat est d'abord un problème pour les Chinois eux-mêmes. » ["China is very committed to climate, assured Laurent Fabius, who went on site in mid-May. Climate is first and foremost a problem for the Chinese themselves."]

(LE MONDE | La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat | 30.06.2015 à 16h07 • Mis à jour le 30.06.2015 à 16h58 )

49. « On voit les deux pays préciser les pas qu'ils franchiront et le faire de manière transparente », s'est félicité un haut responsable de l'administration Obama auprès du Wall Street Journal. ["We see both countries specify the steps they will take and implement them in a transparent way," welcomed a senior official of the Obama administration to the Wall Street Journal.]  
(LM | Pourquoi Pékin s'engage sur la limitation des gaz à effet de serre| 25.09.2015 à 11h24)
50. « La Chine déploie le maximum d'efforts pour lutter contre les changements climatiques » et « assume sa responsabilité pour participer en profondeur à la gouvernance mondiale et promouvoir le développement partagé de l'humanité », **soutient** Li Keqiang, cité dans le communiqué. ["China deploys maximum efforts to fight against climate change" and "takes responsibility for deep participation in global governance and promotes the common development of mankind", supported Li Keqiang, cited in the statement.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat | 30.06.2015 à 16h07)
51. « La Chine **remplit sa part** du "contrat mondial" des efforts à déployer pour maintenir le réchauffement planétaire en deçà de 2°C par rapport à la période préindustrielle, au contraire des pollueurs historiques que sont les États-Unis, l'Europe ou le Canada, qui eux refusent toujours de prendre leurs responsabilités, analyse Célia Gautier, responsable des politiques européennes au sein du Réseau Action Climat (RAC). [China is fulfilling its share of the 'global contract' of efforts to keep global warming below 2 ° C compared to the pre-industrial period, unlike the historical polluters of the United States, Europe or Canada, which still refuse to take their responsibilities, analyzes Célia Gautier, director of European policies within the Réseau Action Climat (RAC).]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine se fixe pour objectif d'« atteindre le pic de ses émissions de CO2 autour de 2030 »| 01.07.2015 à 06h41)
52. Premier pollueur mondial, la Chine a envoyé, mardi 30 juin, **un signal très positif** pour les négociations climatiques qui patinent. [The world's leading polluter, China, sent a very positive signal on Tuesday, June 30, for climate negotiations that are stagnating.]  
(LE MONDE | Climat: la Chine sur la bonne voie | 01.07.2015 à 11h36)

The positive evaluation of China seems to construct China as an example for other countries that have not yet made a commitment. In several texts, we may find a part devoted to summarizing which countries have made a commitment and which ones have not done so yet. This summary is followed by an admonition to those that have not submitted their commitments to do so. For instance, in example 53, China's efforts have been positively *appreciated* as welcomed and as having "le mérite de marquer l'entrée en piste des grands pays émergents" [having the merit of marking the entry of the major emerging countries], which is



essential to the success of COP 21 to be held in Paris in December 2017 [“essentielle pour la réussite de la COP21”]. This positive *appreciation* of commitment implies the negative *appreciation* of non-commitment. What needs to be noted is that China here is explicitly associated with the status of not only being an emerging country but also a major one, which is different from the 2009 reportage where China was systematically disassociated from its developing country status. The sentence preceding the sentence “A l’Inde, maintenant, de s’engager” [It is now India’s turn to commit] seems to imply that India, an emerging country like China, should follow China’s example because it is positive; otherwise, India will be negatively evaluated. Thus, this positive *appreciation* of China and the association of China with the quality of an emerging country together seem to construct China as a good example for other emerging countries to follow in supporting climate change negotiations. Similarly, in example 54, China’s commitment is appreciated in terms of its positive influence on the difficult progression of climate change negotiations. It is followed by a statement that “Neither India nor Brazil, key players in the talks, have yet revealed their ambitions”, which invokes a negative judgment of India or Brazil’s delayed commitments:

53. Mais ne boudons pas notre plaisir : les efforts chinois sont les bienvenus et il faut les saluer. La publication des engagements de la Chine, 42e des 195 Etats participant à la conférence de Paris en décembre à faire connaître sa contribution, a aussi le mérite de marquer l’entrée en piste des grands pays émergents, essentielle pour la réussite de la COP21. A l’Inde, maintenant, de s’engager. [But do not sulk our pleasure: Chinese efforts are welcome and we must salute them. The publication of China’s commitments, 42nd of the 195 States participating in the Paris conference in December to make its contribution known, also has the merit of marking the entry of the major emerging countries, which is essential for the success of COP21. It is now India’s turn to commit to it.]  
(LE MONDE | Climat: la Chine sur la bonne voie | 01.07.2015 à 11h36 • Mis à jour le 01.07.2015 à 11h39 | Idee | 587
54. L’engagement de la Chine devrait donner un coup d’accélérateur aux négociations climatiques qui progressent difficilement. **Ni l’Inde ni le Brésil**, acteurs-clés des discussions, n’ont encore dévoilé leurs ambitions. [China’s commitment should give a boost to climate negotiations that are progressing with difficulty. Neither India nor Brazil, key actors in the discussions, have unveiled their ambitions yet.]

## 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter investigates *Le Monde*'s linguistic construction of China's image in its news reports on China with regard to climate change in 2009 and 2015. The quantitative and qualitative analyses presented above lead to the following conclusions.

First, in both 2009 and 2015, *Le Monde*'s portrayal of China in the domain of climate change is embedded in a representation of climate change as an international issue that involves various actors in the international community, as revealed by the quantitative analysis of foregrounding social actors. By using linguistic nomination to establish a world of high politicians and experts, the author represents climate change as an issue that involves state governments and experts, and is distant from the daily lives of ordinary people.

The quantitative and qualitative analyses displayed similar results regarding the representation of China as an international actor in the field of climate change. The representations of China in 2009 and 2015 were different: China was represented negatively in 2009, but positively in 2015. In 2009, China was represented as an enemy to be eliminated rather than a legitimate adversary to be recognized. The linguistic strategies of actor association, quality association, and role allocation established China as the biggest polluter that should be held responsible for tackling climate change but was irresponsible, driven by self-interest and passive in fulfilling its responsibility. China's position and its argument as a developing country in the climate change negotiations, which conflict with those of the developed countries, were systematically excluded by linguistic nomination, actor association and engagement. China was negatively evaluated by the author, who took a negative stance towards China that was different from his neutral stance towards the US, although China and

the US were represented as a homogeneous group. In 2015, China was represented in a very positive light: it is portrayed as a dynamic and active force in tackling climate change, with its image as a supporter of climate change negotiations more emphasized than its substantial actions, due to the author's use of linguistic backgrounding and foregrounding. Unlike in 2009, when China's voice was excluded, in 2015 China's perspective was included to show its commitment to and ability to deal with environmental issues; but as in 2009, its status as a developing country was still avoided. Also, China's activity was represented as a forced choice based on internal and external pressure and the dissatisfaction of the Chinese public with domestic environmental problems. The Chinese population was represented as active agents who manifest their dissatisfaction through their actions. This is different from the findings in the previous chapter, which displayed a representation of a passive China and powerless Chinese population with regard to air pollution. In 2015, the author takes a positive stance toward China, as does the heteroglossia of positive evaluations of China's actions that can be observed in the corpus. The textual analysis shows that this positive evaluation may well serve to encourage other countries that have not yet made a commitment to the 2015 Paris conference of climate change negotiation.

Overall, with regard to the question of climate change, which was framed as an international issue, *Le Monde* has constructed a negative image of China in 2009 and a positive image of China in 2015. It remains to be seen why these differences occurred.

## **Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Chapters 3 and 4 have presented textual analysis results of *Le Monde*'s construction of China's image in their news texts on the issues of air pollution and climate change, including the images of China that were constructed and how these images were linguistically realized. After having answered the "what" and "how" questions, the next question to be asked is "why": why did *Le Monde* construct these images of China regarding air pollution and climate change? This chapter aims to shed light on this question by probing into the broader context. It starts with a synthesis of the findings of the two previous chapters (5.2); then it proceeds with a discussion of the findings by considering the context (5.3); and it concludes with a few comments on the question of why *Le Monde* constructed such images of China regarding air pollution and climate change (5.4).

### **5.2 Synthesis: China's Environmental Image in *Le Monde***

The synthesis recapitulates *Le Monde*'s representations of China on the issues of air pollution (5.2.1) and climate change (5.2.2). Then, based on a comparison between section 5.2.1 and section 5.2.2, *Le Monde*'s linguistic construction of China's environmental image is summarized (5.2.3).

#### **5.2.1 China and Air Pollution**

*Le Monde*'s representations of China's image in air pollution in 2013, 2014 and 2015 are similar, as both quantitative and qualitative analyses demonstrate. In all three years, this image was embedded in a representation of air pollution as a domestic issue for the Chinese

themselves, which was integrated into the tangible daily reality of the Chinese, as revealed by the quantitative analysis of actor foregrounding and nomination. Accordingly, the Chinese government was represented as an actor in its internal affairs.

The quantitative analysis of inclusion shows that in all three years, the Chinese government and the Chinese population were represented as the main characters in this issue. In the meantime, industry, which is often considered one of the main causes of air pollution, was represented as a supporting character, as it is always more Rheme foregrounded than Theme foregrounded; its prominence decreased in the texts over this period as it was less Theme foregrounded and more Rheme foregrounded. The quantitative analysis of role allocation shows that the Chinese government and Chinese population were constructed as the most active and dynamic forces by being allocated the biggest share of agency among all social actors, while industry was more often represented as passive. Industry was more often treated as an object undergoing an activity than the beneficiary of an action whether negative or positive. A clear dichotomy between the Chinese government and the Chinese population was created by linguistic disassociation: these two groups were never represented as allies who shared similar positions or made joint efforts to tackle air pollution. Rather, air pollution was represented as an issue that leads to public dissatisfaction with the government, and the responsibility to deal with air pollution appeared to be represented as a concern only for the government.

Although the quantitative analysis shows that the Chinese government and Chinese population were allocated the most agency, the qualitative analysis reveals that the Chinese government was represented as passive or inactive in tackling air pollution and was negatively evaluated in the news texts. Meanwhile, the Chinese population was represented as powerless

victims living with smog, with whom the readers could sympathize. The author used various linguistic strategies to realize these representations. The Chinese government's passivity in dealing with air pollution was constructed by backgrounding it in its substantial actions to reduce air pollution, while foregrounding it in un-related actions and even authoritarian actions. The negative representations of the Chinese government were constructed in three main ways: referring to it as "the country" or "Beijing" in matters relating to the solution of environmental problems but as "the Chinese government" in matters concerning negative actions; constructing a heteroglossia of negative evaluations of the government; and engaging with the government with a subtle authorial negative stance. The Chinese population was represented as sympathetic victims rather than active agents in three main ways: by allocating agency to them in their daily activities but reducing that agency in contesting the government by using process nouns rather than verbs, or activating them in mental processes with the role of "sensor" to give them "human" faces with which readers can sympathize; by constructing a heteroglossia in the news articles to express the people's identity as victims; and by taking a sympathetic authorial position toward the Chinese public and the voices of ordinary individuals.

*Le Monde's* representation of China regarding the issue of air pollution seems to have remained unchanged during the three years covered in this study. The study focused on the dichotomy of the Chinese government and the Chinese population, with the responsibility of addressing air pollution placed mainly on the former. A negative image of the Chinese government as inactive or passive in tackling air pollution was constructed, while the Chinese population was portrayed as powerless and sympathetic victims of air pollution.

### 5.2.2 China and Climate Change

Air pollution was linguistically framed in *Le Monde* as a domestic issue for the Chinese themselves, and accordingly, “China” was represented as an actor in its internal affairs. In comparison, climate change was represented as an international issue with a global relevance, an issue for the state politicians and experts to address rather than for ordinary people; China was thus represented as an international actor in company with the international community. Where the representation of China with regard to air pollution was found to be invariably negative in 2013, 2014 and 2015, the representations of China with respect to climate change did witness a change from the negative image constructed in 2009 to the positive image constructed in 2015.

Both analyses showed that the negative representation of China in 2009 was characterized by exclusion. The quantitative analysis demonstrates that, although China gained more or equal prominence in the headlines than the US, it was less visible than the latter in the news content. The headlines’ misleading overstatement of China’s relevance in the news content might lead to an interpretation that the headlines were sacrificing their function as summaries of news content in order to use China to attract readers’ attention. The qualitative analysis found that the exclusion of China in the news content may well be an integral part of the systematic linguistic exclusion of China’s position and its argument as a developing country in the climate change negotiations, which conflicted with those of the developed countries. Indeed, this finding was supported by the quantitative analysis of nomination, which showed that the voices of the Chinese politicians were excluded to a considerable extent, and those of the Chinese experts were never present.

The exclusion was accompanied by the association of China with the US when China was included. The quantitative analysis showed a strong association between China and the US in 2009 in terms of their status as “world’s two biggest polluters,” and they were together involved in actions that impeded the climate negotiations, and in terms of their importance in climate change negotiations. The qualitative analysis reveals that such association with the US, with the term “world’s two biggest polluters,” systematically detached China from its status as a developing country, which was the basis for its argument in the climate negotiations, thus excluding China’s position. The coalition between countries was made only on the basis of like-mindedness, in other words, whether or not those countries were committed to tackling climate change.

Although China and the US were closely associated as a homogeneous group, the qualitative analysis of engagement reveals the author’s different linguistic strategies to represent the positions of the two countries: while the US’s position was clearly explained, that of China was mostly absent from the texts. The author also took a negative stance towards China while taking a rather neutral stance towards the US. China was attributed more responsibility for blocking negotiations than the US, and this attribution was realized by linguistically disassociating the US from China.

The quantitative analysis of role allocation shows that China was allocated less agency than the US in the 2009 news coverage. Similarly, the qualitative analysis demonstrates a representation of China as a passive actor in climate change negotiations. China’s actions or commitments were at best represented as responsive or reactive to others, rather than as its own initiatives. China was also represented as self-interest-oriented, impeding the negotiations by being allocated an active role in such actions. The representation of China’s passivity in



dealing with climate change was also accentuated by the passivization of China in relation to industrialized countries such as the US, the EU and France. Moreover, the passivization of China by the use of verbs that denote war or battle contributes to the representation of China as an enemy to be destroyed.

By contrast, the representation of China in 2015 was positive. Quantitative analysis shows that, contrary to the exclusion of China in the news content, Chinese actors gained more prominence in the stories than anyone else, with several Chinese experts' voices (62.5% of all experts) included.

Despite the close Sino-US partnership in dealing with climate change that had been developed since 2013, the linguistic association between China and the US in the corpus was much weaker than in 2009; China gained more prominence on its own in *Le Monde's* news coverage in 2015.

Also, contrary to the representation of China's passivity in 2009, the quantitative analysis of role allocation shows that China is represented as the most dynamic and active force, more so than the US. The qualitative analysis shows that China's image as a supporter of climate change negotiations is emphasized more than its substantial actions due to the linguistic backgrounding and foregrounding of China in different kinds of actions. It should be noted that China's move was represented as a forced choice based on internal and external pressure and the dissatisfaction of the public with China's domestic environmental problems; the Chinese population, meanwhile is represented as active agents who manifest their dissatisfaction in their actions. This representation contradicts the air pollution corpus that represents the population as powerless.

Unlike in 2009, when China was associated with purely negative qualities, the news texts in 2015 associated China with both positive and negative qualities. The qualitative analysis reveals a heteroglossia of positive evaluations of China's actions constructed in the corpus in 2015, and the author himself took a positive stance towards China as well. This positive evaluation was followed by cotext that urges other countries that have not yet made a commitment to the 2015 Paris Conference for climate change negotiations.

In summary, *Le Monde's* representations of China in 2009 and in 2015 were found to be completely different. In 2009, China was negatively portrayed as a country to be held most responsible in tackling climate change, along with the US, but that was passive in dealing with climate change, an enemy to be destroyed rather than an opponent to be recognized. In contrast, in 2015 China was represented as a supporter or promoter of climate change negotiations, and was positively evaluated, although China's actions were represented as a forced choice due to internal and external pressures.

### **5.2.3 *Le Monde's* Representations of China in Environmental Issues**

From examining the results of the two cases, we can say that *Le Monde's* construction of China's image in the domain of environmental issues is fluid, and differs depending on the issues. Air pollution and climate change are two environmental issues that are inextricably linked in terms of their causes and their solutions, as air pollutants and greenhouse gas can result from many similar sources (UNECE, n.d., para. 2). Despite the intertwined relationship between them, the two issues are discursively constructed in *Le Monde* as relevant at different levels, whether domestic/local or international/global, and China's image can also differ.

China's images with regard to air pollution and climate change were constructed on different levels. In air pollution, "China" was constructed as a domestic actor, with a passive

government that is negatively evaluated, a powerless, victimized, and sympathetic population, a clear split between these two categories of social actors with the former to be held responsible to tackle air pollution and the latter in dissatisfaction towards the former, and industry represented as a less prominent and passive social actor. By comparison, China was constructed as an international actor in the issue of climate change, either as an enemy to be eliminated in 2009 or as a much-appreciated supporter of climate change negotiations in 2015.

The positivity or negativity in China's environmental image also depends on the issues. China's image in the issue of air pollution was constructed as invariably negative during the three-year period of 2013, 2014 and 2015. In contrast, on the issue of climate change, the representations of China did change: a negative image was constructed in 2009 while a positive one was constructed in 2015.

The representations of China in 2015 are contradictory: the government was represented as passive and the population was represented as powerless in dealing with air pollution, but with respect to climate change, China was represented as active in tackling environmental problems, even as a forced choice partly driven by the dissatisfaction of the Chinese public with domestic environmental problems, and the Chinese population was represented as active agents.

What is in common in the representation of China in both issues is the tendency to represent the Chinese government in a negative light. Regarding air pollution, negative actions can be allocated to the "Chinese government" or "Chinese authorities," while positive ones are allocated to "the state" or "the country" or "Beijing." In the news coverage of climate change, although China is represented in a positive light, this pattern can also be found. For instance,

the Chinese government and authorities can be represented as passive with regard to climate change as they were to air pollution.

China's environmental image can be nuanced depending on the issues, but the reasons for these differences need to be investigated.

### **5.3 Environmental Issues in China**

This section conducts a contextual analysis of how environmental issues are viewed and treated in China, and links it with the findings presented in the previous section, in order to make sense of *Le Monde's* representations of China. The contextual analysis is conducted at two levels: environmental issues as dealt with by the Chinese government (5.3.1), and environmental issues in the Chinese public opinion (5.3.2). In each subsection, the contextual analysis will be linked with *Le Monde's* representation of China, and a synthesis of this sort will be presented in the last subsection (5.3.3).

#### **5.3.1 Environmental Issues as Dealt With by the Chinese Government**

After having attended the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio in 1992, in 1993 the Chinese government issued "China's Agenda 21 - White Paper on China's Population, Environment and Development in the 21st Century". For the first time, the Chinese government endorsed "sustainable development" in its long-term planning of social and economic development, and began to formulate policies and measures to promote sustainability. In 2006, the National Assessment Report of Climate Change issued by the Chinese government explicitly endorsed low carbon-economy as a national goal. The following year, with the aim to facilitate the implementation of China's sustainable development strategy, the government issued the "Program of Action for Sustainable

Development in China in the Early 21st Century,” for which “Environmental Protection and Pollution Control” is one of the six priority areas.

Air pollution control policy processes and climate change policies in China have been relatively independent from one another (Jin, Andersson & Zhang, 2016: 2), despite a recent trend of integrating these two fields in the context of developing a greener economy (a goal specified in China’s 11<sup>th</sup> Five-Year-Plan, covering 2015-2020). Thus, this section considers these two issues as dealt with by the Chinese government (5.3.1.1 for air pollution and 5.3.1.2 for climate change). Each subsection links with *Le Monde*’s representation of China at the end.

### ***5.3.1.1 Air Pollution as Dealt With by the Chinese Government***

This subsection introduces China’s air pollution problem; continues with the Chinese government’s position, policies and effectiveness; and includes a link to *Le Monde*’s representation of the Chinese government in the issue of air pollution.

#### **China’s Air Pollution**

The problem of air pollution in China is severe and widely distributed. Air pollutants include both primary pollutants and secondary pollutants. The primary pollutants are directly emitted into the air from certain sources (such as SO<sub>2</sub> mainly from coal burning, NO<sub>x</sub> from vehicle emissions, Volatile Organic Compounds from vehicle emissions and in fumes generated by cooking, and Primary Particle Matters in smoke from burning coal and in dust from construction sites). The secondary pollutants are fine particulates resulting from the complex atmospheric chemical reactions of primary pollutants. The air pollution problem in China is dominated by PM<sub>2.5</sub> (particulate matters with aerodynamic diameters  $\leq 2.5\mu\text{m}$ ) that are mainly composed of secondary pollutants. According to the analysis of the 2012-2013 annual PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentration in Beijing, published by the Beijing Municipal Environmental

Protection Bureau in 2014, local emissions of air pollutants account for 64-72% of the total PM<sub>2.5</sub> in Beijing, and regional transmission is responsible for the remaining 28-36%; the main local contributors are vehicles, coal burning, industry and construction sites (31.1% , 22.4%, 18.1% and 14.3%, respectively); 70% of the PM<sub>2.5</sub> analyzed are secondary pollutants such as Organic Matter (OM), Nitrates (NO<sub>3</sub>-), sulfate (SO<sub>4</sub><sup>2-</sup>), and Ammonium salt (NH<sub>4</sub><sup>+</sup>), among others.

The current air pollution problem in China is the result of decades of emissions of air pollutants produced by human socioeconomic activities. According to Jin et al. (2016), air pollution in China can be summarized in three stages, and the sources of air pollution have changed over time: between 1970 and 1990, the major contributor was coal burning, which produces mainly SO<sub>2</sub>, particles, NO<sub>x</sub>, and CO, among others. Between 1990 and 2000, in addition to coal, there was a growing number of vehicles in some Chinese megacities, which led to emission increases in NO<sub>x</sub> and VOCs, primary pollutants that can become PM<sub>2.5</sub>. This resulted in increases of PM<sub>2.5</sub> and O<sub>3</sub>, and the problem of air pollution in China began to form. From 2000 onward, the rise in car ownership in megacities and the dominance of coal burning at the national level, along with other sources, made the air pollution situation much worse. In fact, the Chinese population was not greatly aware of air pollution until the “smog crisis” of January 2013. China’s air quality started deteriorating to such a point that several Chinese cities were immersed in smog with unprecedentedly high indexes of PM<sub>2.5</sub>; the abnormally low air visibility meant that air pollution in China could no longer be ignored.

### **The Chinese Government’s Position, Policies and Effectiveness**

In China, as in many other nations, the core issue of environmental politics is the conflict between the necessity for environmental protection and the imperative for economic

development. The Chinese government's position vis-à-vis the environment and economy can be investigated by reading its Five-Year-Plans (FYPs)<sup>13</sup>. Since FYPs “clarify the national strategic intent and specify the priorities of the government” for the planned five years (12<sup>th</sup> FYP, 2011), they can explicitly reflect the importance attached to issues on the Chinese policy agenda (Qi and Wu, 2013). In general, the more prioritized public areas will be written into independent chapters, with the targets more quantitatively articulated. The targets can be “mandatory,”<sup>14</sup> meaning that they must be obtained and completed through rational allocation of public resources and the effective use of administrative power, or “anticipatory,”<sup>15</sup> the desired goal of the country, the achievement of which mainly relies on the market mechanism. These targets will be “administratively subcontracted” to local governments (Zhou, 2014), and then used for the top-down evaluation of local officials' performance to decide the promotion of the local main leaders.

Environmental protection first became a separate chapter in the 6<sup>th</sup> FYP (1981-1985) with its weight increasing in subsequent FYPs (Wang, 2013; cited in Jin, Anderson & Zhang, 2016). During the 7<sup>th</sup> FYP (1986-1990), environmental protection legally became “a fundamental national policy of China” (Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, the fourth article<sup>16</sup>). The 9<sup>th</sup> FYP (1996-2000) initiated a total emission

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<sup>13</sup> China's FYP, fully named as “Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China”, is approved by the national legislature of China, the People's Congress, and constitutes a long-term plan for all regions. The current FYP is the 13<sup>th</sup> FYP, covering the period of 2016-2020.

<sup>14</sup> In Chinese, “约束性,政府要通过合理配置公共资源和有效运用行政力量, 确保实现” in the 11<sup>th</sup> FYP, accessible at <http://www.chinanews.com/news/2006/2006-03-16/8/704065.shtml>

<sup>15</sup> In Chinese, “预期性, 是国家期望的发展目标, 主要依靠市场主体的自主行为实现。政府要创造良好的宏观环境、制度环境和市场环境, 并适时调整宏观调控方向和力度, 综合运用各种政策引导社会资源配置, 努力争取实现” in the 11<sup>th</sup> FYP, accessible at <http://www.chinanews.com/news/2006/2006-03-16/8/704065.shtml>

<sup>16</sup> This law entered into force on 26 December 1989 and was amended on 24 April 2014. The new version entered into force on 1 May 2015.

control policy of main pollutants, including the air pollutants SO<sub>2</sub> and PMs, which was further specified in the 10<sup>th</sup> FYP. However, the results were discouraging: at the end of the 9<sup>th</sup> FYP, although SO<sub>2</sub> emissions were reduced to some extent, the total emissions remained relatively higher than the level that the environment could bear, and air in 63.5% of the 338 monitored cities were under moderate or severe pollution, according to the Chinese air quality standards (National Environmental Protection 10<sup>th</sup> FYP, 2011). At the end of the 10<sup>th</sup> FYP, the target of 20% reduction of SO<sub>2</sub> on the basis of 1995 level was not achieved; rather, it had increased by 27.8%. Emission of smoke and dust had also increased by 1.5%. Much of the failure can be ascribed to the juncture between policies and implementation, because the targets did not act as a decisive part of the cadre evaluation; thus, the local officials were not as motivated to achieve them.

It was in the 11<sup>th</sup> FYP (2005-2010) that the government set priority on environmental protection, with several quantitative environmental and energy targets becoming mandatory. The 11<sup>th</sup> environmental protection five-year plan stressed a “historical transformation from emphasizing more on economic growth and less on environmental protection to paying equal attention to them”, and “making the enforcement of environmental protection an important means of realizing the adjustment of economic structure and the change of economic growth mode” (2007, para. 8). A total emission control policy of the main air pollutants, such as SO<sub>2</sub>, was formulated with a quantitative target of reduction of 10%, and a reduction of energy intensity per unit GDP of 20%. PMs, especially PM<sub>2.5</sub>, became a focus in the prevention and control of urban air pollution. NO<sub>x</sub> and Organic Matters attracted the attention of policy makers, who put the promotion of research of these pollutants in some megacities on the agenda, in the expectation of finally developing a total emission control mechanism.



Substantial actions were implemented to deal with air pollution and energy saving, such as investing in pollution control infrastructures, closing thousands of outdated facilities and production lines, and promoting clean energy development. At the end of 2010, SO<sub>2</sub> emission was reduced by 14.29%, exceeding the target of 10%; energy intensity was reduced by 19.1%, which was near the target of 20%. The successful implementation of environmental protection policies in the 11<sup>th</sup> FYP was due to the targets having been made unprecedentedly mandatory and integrated into the cadre evaluation system as a veto factor for officials to gain promotion (Wang, 2013), in addition to the establishment of a strict data examination and verification system that allows little space for data fabrication by the local governments (Song, 2015).

In the 12<sup>th</sup> FYP (2010-2015), which was aimed at accelerating the construction of an “energy- saving and environment-friendly society”, the policies and objectives in terms of air quality control are maintained and further extended (12<sup>th</sup> FYP, 2011). Not only emissions of SO<sub>2</sub>, but also of NO<sub>x</sub>, were targeted, with a total emission reduction goal of 8% and 10%. Especially in the wake of the breakout of the smog crisis in January 2013, the central government launched a series of strict policies to respond to air pollution. In June 2013, the state council and the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) issued “Ten Actions”. In September of that same year, Premier Li Keqiang sent a strong political will to combat air pollution, declaring that the Chinese government would treat pollution with “iron fists” (“Li Keqiang Dialogs”, 2013, para. 9). In the same month, the state council and MEP launched the well-known Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan (2013-2017). It set for the first time quantitative objectives for air quality improvement, particularly targeting PM 2.5 within a certain time limit for the key industrial regions, and listed ten actions that covered all major aspects of air quality management: cut down coal use, close polluting factories and promote

cleaner production. A variety of policies were formulated according to this plan. In December 2013, the MEP, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued the “Air Pollution Control in Key Regions for the 12<sup>th</sup> FYP,” which required strict environmental regulation. In March 2014, Prime Minister Li Keqiang officially declared “war against air pollution.” The following month, the Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China was amended for the first time since its initial formulation 25 years before. The amended Environmental Protection Law not only allocated more power to environmental authorities and harsher punishments for polluters, but also specified the duty of local governments to increase investment in environmental improvement and pollution prevention, as well as to support the environmental protection industry.

Indeed, efforts made by the Chinese government to tackle air pollution seem tremendous, with its investment in environmental governance soaring especially in recent years as indicated in Figure 5.1. One may wonder whether the Chinese government’s efforts have been effective and efficient in improving air quality in China. As shown in Figure 5.2, the long targeted total emission of SO<sub>2</sub> passed its peak in 2006, and that of NO<sub>x</sub>, which had been under control since 2010, peaked in 2011 and is declining sharply. The emission intensities of these pollutants have been declining since 2005. Regarding the targeted PM<sub>2.5</sub> between 2013 and 2015, nationwide annual average concentration of PM 2.5 is declining from 71 (um/m<sup>3</sup>) to 55 (um/m<sup>3</sup>); that of PM 10 is also similarly declining, as shown in Figure 5.3:




Figure 5.1. Investment in environmental governance between 2000-2015

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (CNBS)<sup>17</sup>




Figure 5.2. Total annual emissions, and emission intensity of SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>x</sub>, Smoke and dust

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (CNBS)

<sup>17</sup> <http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01>




Figure 5.3. Annual Average Concentration of PM10 and 2.5 in China from 2013-2015

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (CNBS)

The Chinese government, since 2006, has put high priority on environment protection, and their efforts in tackling air pollution seem expansive. Especially in the wake of the smog crisis in 2013, their strong political will and their substantial actions are leading to improvement of air quality. Yet, the problem is far from solved. Since the formation of PM2.5 is a complex atmospheric chemical reaction process, and air pollutants can be transmitted among regions, effective control and solution of air pollution problems will not be easy for China. It takes time for the measures to take visible effect, based on the experience of developed countries that have been trying to solve air pollution in different phases for nearly 100 years (Jin et al., 2016) and still have not achieved total success (if total success is possible).

### ***Le Monde's* Representation**

The survey discussed above shows that since 2006, the Chinese government has taken vigorous initiatives to tackle air pollution, and particularly after the smog crisis in 2013, it has implemented “iron fists”. Those measures had positive results, although they require time for significant improvement in air quality to take place. However, as presented in section 5.2.1, *Le*

*Monde*'s representation of the Chinese government in the issue of air pollution from 2013-2015 remains invariably negative; in particular, the Chinese government was represented as inactive to address air pollution, and was allocated agency in negative actions instead of the actions to tackle air pollution. The contextual analysis very clearly shows *Le Monde*'s lack of reflection on the issue.

#### ***5.3.1.2 Climate Change as Dealt With by the Chinese Government***

This section discusses China's status with regard to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (5.3.1.2.1). It continues with the Chinese government's position, policies and effectiveness (5.3.1.2.2) and considers both China's domestic efforts and its position in international negotiations. It also links to *Le Monde*'s representation of the Chinese government with respect to climate change (5.3.1.2.3).

#### **China as a CO<sub>2</sub> Emitter**

Atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) have been found to be directly linked to global warming on the Earth; carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>), as the most abundant GHG, mostly results from anthropogenic activities, with energy (or more precisely fossil fuels) consumption being the major source ("Climate change", UN, n.d.). Developed countries are responsible for almost 80% of the cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 1850 and 2011 (Figure 5.4), with the US (27%), the EU (25%) and Mexico (17%) being the biggest historical contributors of emissions. The US (16%), China (15%) and the EU (12%) are the major contributors of cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 1990 and 2011 (table 5). In 2006, China accounted for almost a quarter of the total global annual emissions; it surpassed the US and became the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide (Harris, 2013). In 2015, its carbon

emission per capita was 7.5t, ranking 53 in the world, which is, however, below that of some developed countries such as the US (17t), Canada (16t) or Germany (9.9t), among others.<sup>18</sup>

**Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions 1850–2011 (% of World Total)**





Figure 5.4. Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions 1850-2011 (% of World Total)

Source: World Resources Institute<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Statistics in 2015, Global Carbon Atlas, <http://globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions>, accessed 10 May 2017.

<sup>19</sup> See <https://wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world's-top-10-emitters>, accessed 10 May 2017.

### Cumulative GHG Emissions 1990–2011 (% of World Total)



<http://bit.ly/11SMpjA>

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE

Figure 5.5. Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions 1990-2011 (% of World Total)

Source: World Resources Institute<sup>20</sup>

### China's Position, Policies and Effectiveness

Curbing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is the main solution to global climate change. However, the potential constraint on economic growth imposed by reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions constitutes a pressing concern not only for developing countries but also for developed countries. In 2001, President Bush decided to abandon the Kyoto Protocol out of fear that it would cause “serious harm to the U.S. economy” (cited in Sunstein, 2006). In 2011, Canada officially withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, on the basis that withdrawing would allow them “to continue to create jobs and growth in Canada” (Cited in “Canada pulls out”, 2011, para. 9). The deliberation over economic development and climate protection is even trickier for the Chinese government,

<sup>20</sup> See <https://wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world's-top-10-emitters>, accessed 10 May 2017

because the world's biggest developing country still has 14.65% of the total Chinese population living in poverty as of 2008, living on less than \$1.9 per day at 2011 international prices (World Bank, 2017). Nevertheless, the Chinese government has actually made tangible efforts in greenhouse gas reduction over the years.

The Chinese government became involved in climate change in the 1980s, when it started to coordinate a serious scientific study of the potential consequences of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. In 1990, the Chinese government established special institutions to cope with climate change (“White Paper”, 2008). These early efforts were mainly a learning process, focusing on scientific fact-finding about climate change. The results supported China's key decisions in its climate diplomacy: in 1992, the Chinese government became party to the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in 2002 it ratified the Kyoto Protocol (Qi and Wu, 2013: 303). With scientific research shedding light on the numerous negative effects of global warming, the Chinese government has become more concerned about China's vulnerability. In the “White Paper: China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change” issued by the State Council in 2008, China is positioned as “one of the countries most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”. Having learnt that climate change is mainly caused by carbon emissions from economic activities, the Chinese government understood climate change as much more than an environmental issue. The White Paper stated that “Climate change arises out of development, and should thus be solved along with development”. Thus, the State Council proposes “to address climate change within the framework of sustainable development”. This perspective is reflected in Hu Jintao's speech explaining China's position at the opening ceremony of the UNFCCC Copenhagen climate conference in 2009:



Climate change is an issue arising in the course of human development. It is associated with both natural factors and human activities. It is an environmental issue, but also, and more importantly, a development issue, as it is closely connected with the development stage, way of life, size of population and resource endowment of different countries and their places in the international division of labor. In the final analysis, we should and can only advance efforts to address climate change in the course of development and meet the challenge through common development. (Hu, 2009)

### **Domestic Efforts**

From 1980 to 2005, the issue of addressing climate change was not explicitly endorsed in China's national planning, but was addressed indirectly through its energy policies. Since China's implementation of the Reform and Opening-Up Policy in 1978, energy shortage has always been a major concern of the country as the rapid energy consumption increase brought about by its economic growth cannot be met by its energy production increase. Therefore, since the 6<sup>th</sup> FYP (1980-1985), when much emphasis was put on primary energy (fossil fuels and hydro power) conservation and efficiency, energy intensity reduction (energy consumption per unit GDP) has always been an important target in its energy saving-actions.

In the 11<sup>th</sup> FYP (2006-2010), China endorsed a low-carbon economy with energy intensity targets strongly reinforced, and domestic concern and climate protection both explicitly weighted. The importance attached to climate protection is also signified by the establishment of the National Leading Committee on Climate Change in 2007, in which then-premier Wen Jiabao served as the leader, and twenty ministries and government sectors were involved ("Brief Introduction", 2006). During this period, China launched a comprehensive economy-wide energy conservation programme to achieve its fixed targets. The local

governments had to strive to achieve their subcontracted targets as they were made key criteria for the performance assessment of local officials. In addition, a variety of specific policies and initiatives were undertaken to meet its goals, including improving the tax system to encourage reduction of primary energy consumption, and promoting energy pricing reform to facilitate the elimination of production lines that do not meet the government's energy-efficiency standards, and developing renewable energy, among other goals. In his speech at the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, Wen Jiabao demonstrated China's insistent advocacy of tackling climate change by summarizing its historical efforts and achievements in this field:

- China was the first developing country to adopt and implement a National Climate Change Program [...]
- China has made the most intensive efforts in energy conservation and pollution reduction in recent years [...] The inefficient production capacity that China eliminated between 2006 and 2008 stood at 60.59 million tons for iron, 43.47 million tons of steel, 140 million tons for cement and 64.45 million tons for coke. By the end of the first half of this year, China's energy consumption per unit of GDP had dropped by 13 percent from the 2005 level, equivalent to reducing 800 million tons of carbon dioxide.
- China has enjoyed the fastest growth of new energy and renewable energy [...] China ranked first in the world in terms of installed hydro power capacity, nuclear power capacity under construction, the coverage of solar water heating panels and photovoltaic power capacity.
- China has the largest area of man-made forests in the world [...] The total area of man-made forests in China has reached 45million hectares, the largest in the world. (Wen, 2009)

In the 12<sup>th</sup> FYP (2011-2015), response to climate change was explicitly endorsed as a national policy. In order to strengthen guidance for the work of coping with climate change, the State Council issued the “Work Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission Control during the 12th FYP Period”, the “Comprehensive Working Program for Energy Conservation and Emission

Reduction in the 12th FYP Period”, and a series of other important policy documents. Climate change mitigation actions included optimizing industry structure and energy structure, reducing energy consumption and improving energy efficiency, developing renewable energies, increasing reforestation thus carbon sinks, and exploring carbon trading market to promote low-carbon economy. In 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping summarized China’s efforts and achievement in responding to climate change in his speech “Work Together to Build a Win-Win, Equitable and Balanced Governance Mechanism on Climate Change” at the opening ceremony of the Paris climate summit:

In the past few decades, China has seen rapid economic growth and significant improvement in people's lives. However, this has taken a toll on the environment and resources. Having learned this lesson, China is vigorously making ecological endeavors to promote green, circular and low-carbon growth. We have integrated our climate change efforts into China's medium- and long-term program of economic and social development. We attach equal importance to mitigation and adaption, and try to make progress on all fronts by resorting to legal and administrative means, technologies and market forces. China's installed capacity of renewable energy accounts for 24% of the world's total, with the newly installed capacity accounting for 42% of the global total. China tops the world in terms of energy conservation and utilization of new and renewable energies. (Xi, 2015)

In summary, China has made considerable domestic efforts in energy conservation and efficiency improvement, and consequently reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, particularly since 2006. Its effort in this respect “has few equals in other countries, developed or developing” (Mastny, 2010:11).<sup>21</sup> Looking at the emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> over the years, we can see that after a significant increase during 2001-2012, the increase of total annual carbon emissions from 2013 to 2015

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<sup>21</sup> Mastny is from Worldwatch Institute.

has been much slower (Figure 5.6), and the long targeted CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity has declined between 1995 and 2014, despite the slight rise during 2001-2005:




Figure a

Figure b

Figure 5.6. China's Total Annual Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> and CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Intensity

Source: Global Carbon Atlas<sup>22</sup>

## China in International Climate Change Negotiations

### - 2009

The Chinese government's position in the international climate change negotiations in 2009 was based on the following principles: “the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol as the Basis and the Mandate of the Bali Roadmap as the Focus”, “the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities”, “the Principle of Sustainable Development”, “Mitigation, Adaption, Technology Transfer and Financial Support on the Same Footing and as Equal Priorities” (NDRC, 2009). Premier Wen Jiabao expounded this position in his speech at the Copenhagen Conference (Wen, 2009). In this speech, Wen insisted on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” established in the Kyoto Protocol, which took into account the historical responsibility of developed countries and the right of developing

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions>

countries to pursue development. He emphasized that “actions on climate change be taken within the framework of sustainable development and should by no means compromise the efforts of developing countries to get rid of poverty and backwardness” because the developing countries “only started industrialization a few decades ago and many of their people still live in abject poverty today”, and “emissions from developing countries are primarily survival emissions and international transfer emissions”, while “developed countries account for 80 percent of the total global carbon dioxide emissions since the Industrial Revolution over 200 years ago” and “most of their emissions are attributed to consumption”. Therefore, according to him, “it is totally unjustified to ask them [developing countries] to undertake emission reduction targets beyond their due obligations and capabilities in disregard of historical responsibilities, per capita emissions and different levels of development”. He urged the developed countries to “take the lead in making deep quantified emission cuts and provide financial and technological support to developing countries” and “to honor their commitment to reducing CO<sub>2</sub>” as “a review of implementation shows that the emissions from many developed countries have increased rather than decreased”. He said that developing countries “will do what they can to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change in the light of their national conditions”.

At the Copenhagen Climate conference of 2009, China announced its targets to be achieved by 2020, which included lowering carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40% to 45% from the 2005 level, increasing the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to about 15% and increasing the forested area by 40 million hectares and the forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic metres as compared to the 2005 levels. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao emphasized the voluntary nature of the actions: “This is a voluntary action China

has taken in the light of its national circumstances. We have not attached any condition to the target, nor have we linked it to the target of any other country” (Wen, 2009). China has a positive view of itself in international efforts to address climate change, “actively engaged in international efforts to address climate change and committed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and playing a constructive role in international cooperation”, as indicated in the “White Paper: China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change” published in 2008. However, both the EU and the US criticized China, both in terms of its targets and its position of refusing the developed countries’ proposal to subject China’s mitigation actions to international monitoring and verification.

The UN treaties do not require developing countries to agree to binding targets, but the developed countries should assume the responsibility. This was the first time that China had issued firm numerical targets for limiting greenhouse gas emission increases in international climate negotiations. Since the target is measured in terms of carbon intensity, which is different from the traditional measurement of tonnes, there have been debates about how much deviation China’s target indicated from China’s current efforts. China has a good record of carbon intensity reduction: between 1990 and 2005, China has succeeded in cutting 47% of its carbon intensity; during the 11<sup>th</sup> FYP (2005-2010), China had a domestic goal of cutting carbon intensity by 20%, which seemed likely to be achieved at the end of 2009. Still, from China’s perspective, the target was challenging. The achievement of the goal would require “tremendous and remarkable efforts” (cited in Ford, 2009), according to China’s chief negotiator Xie Zhenhua, who argued that the further China would go in energy efficiency improvement, “the more challenging and costly” it would become (cited in Qiu, 2009). If China stuck to its current policies, only a 37% reduction of carbon intensity would be realized by

2020, compared to the 2005 levels (Cohen-Tanugi, 2010). Although “the current energy intensity policy (...) can legitimately be described as severe, even draconian”, and “has forced closure of tens of thousands of factories, power plants, and production lines that failed to meet the standards” (Chandler & Wang, 2009, para. 15), only by even more rigorous efforts would the Chinese target be achieved.

However, the EU and US were not satisfied and expected an even stronger offer from China. The US indicated only a reduction of at least 50 percent in carbon intensity would represent an ambitious commitment from China, while the UK implied that China’s target did not make a meaningful deviation from China’s current efforts in energy efficiency improvement (Watts, 2009). In other words, they regarded this target as not ambitious enough, based on China’s record of carbon intensity reduction. Thus, they urged China to set a more ambitious target that would be consistent with the objective of limiting the increase of global average temperature below 2°C compared to pre-industrialised level.

What received more attention at the Copenhagen Climate conference was China’s opposition to the international monitoring of its pledge, a main reason why China was blamed for the failure of the conference negotiations. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the international monitoring mechanism was to verify whether mitigation actions in Annex I countries (industrialized countries) were properly taken and to ensure that their legally binding commitments could be met, but it did not apply to non-Annex I countries (developing countries), as their actions were taken on a voluntary basis and were not legally binding. However, at the Copenhagen Climate Conference, the US took China’s consent to international monitoring of its commitment as a precondition for its financial support to developing and vulnerable countries (Yang, 2011: 90). China made it clear that its commitment was on a

voluntary basis, and would strongly oppose any kind of international monitoring, except for the mitigation projects funded and supported by foreign countries, and it did not need any financial support.

For the Chinese, this seemingly reasonable demand was in a first place not in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol. Second, the monitoring and verification of China's domestic mitigation actions by outsiders was perceived to hinder on China's sovereignty (Harris, 2013: 75). Indeed, Chinese obsession with sovereignty cannot be overstated. "Mutual respect of sovereignty" and "mutual non-interference in domestic affairs" have been among the fundamental principles that China hold dear in its diplomacy. It does not allow foreign "intervention" of any kind, how slight it is, in its domestic affairs. This has also been the case for China's climate change policies. As Harris (2013:88) has observed,

Demands by the United States and other developed countries for China to take on binding greenhouse gas limitations are resisted by the country's profound sense of historical grievance towards the outside world for past interventions in its internal affairs. China's 'century of national humiliation' featured by the Opium Wars of the nineteenth century and invasions during the first half of the twentieth century, and it extends to perceptions by Chinese that the outside world sought to hold back the country's development in the second half of the twentieth century and continues to do so today (notwithstanding the West's deep economic engagement with the country in recent decades) (Kaufman, 2010).

## **- 2015**

In 2015, China's first intended national determined contribution (INDC) document, ENHANCED ACTIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE, submitted to the UNFCCC Paris climate conference, outlined its general position, which was similar to the one it adopted in 2009. It insisted on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" between developed



and developing countries, and that the negotiations should take into account their “differentiated historical responsibilities and distinct national circumstances, development stages and the capabilities” (NRDC, 2015). It would also “urge developed countries to fulfill their obligations under the Convention to take the lead in substantially reducing their emissions and to provide support of finance, technology and capacity building to developing countries” (NRDC, 2015). In 2015, as in 2009, China has a positive view of itself. In the Chinese INDC, apart from the ambitious actions China intended to take, promoting international cooperation also gained much weight. China explicitly positioned itself “as a responsible developing country” who would “stand for the common interests of all humanity and actively engage in international cooperation to build an equitable global climate governance regime that is cooperative and beneficial to all” (NRDC, 2015).

Sticking to these positions, China submitted its commitment to addressing climate change to the Paris Conference of Climate Change Negotiations in 2015. “Based on its national circumstances, developing stage, sustainable development strategy and international responsibility”, China set its targets including “achieving the peaking of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions around 2030 and making best efforts to peak early”, reducing CO<sub>2</sub> intensity by “60-65% from the 2005 level”, growing “the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20%” and “the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic metres on the 2005 level” (NRDC, 2015).

These targets are estimated by the world’s leading energy institutes to be ambitious. According to the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), one of the world’s top environmental non-profit think tanks based in Virginia, China’s objectives represent “a significant undertaking beyond business-as-usual and will help slow the rise in global

greenhouse gas emissions” (C2ES, 2015: 1); the peaking of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions around 2030 indicates a reduction of China’s emissions by at least 1.7 Gt, or 14 percent, from the most optimistic business-as-usual scenario. China’s targets were generally welcomed by the developed countries.

### **Summary**

Domestically, China had always put its best foot forward to respond to climate change according to its national circumstances and capabilities. It formulated ambitious policies, and made comprehensive efforts to improve energy conservation and efficiency, to increase reforestation, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially since 2006; and it has achieved impressive results. Internationally, it insisted on similar positions at both the Copenhagen and Paris climate change conferences. In 2009, at the Copenhagen Conference, neither the EU nor the US were satisfied with China’s announced goal and refusal of their proposal of subjecting China’s domestic mitigation actions to international monitoring and verification. However, with China’s capabilities increasing, the targets China could afford to offer at the Paris conference in 2015 met, or even exceeded, the expectations of other nations.

### ***Le Monde’s Representation of China***

*Le Monde* has constructed climate change as an international issue. Thus, it neglected China’s positive domestic actions and achievements to tackle climate change, and focused on China in international negotiations. In 2009, China did not offer a target that was to the satisfaction of the EU or the US, and refused their proposal to put China’s domestic mitigation actions under international monitoring and verification. *Le Monde* represented China as an enemy to be eliminated, and associated it with the US as climate negotiation obstructers. The position of China was simplified to a refusal, thus excluding China’s considerations, arguments

and the subtleties of Chinese discourse. In 2015, China had the same positions as in 2009. Its targets in combating climate change were to the satisfaction of the developed countries. *Le Monde*'s representation of China was focusing on China as a promoter of international negotiations with positive evaluations.

### **5.3.2 Environmental Issues in the Chinese Public Opinion**

This section surveys how Chinese public opinion deals with environmental issues, and links it with *Le Monde*'s representation.

#### ***5.3.2.1 Public Passivity***

Since 2013, the Chinese central government has launched a national campaign against air pollution ("New laws", 2016). Besides taking punitive measures against polluters and transforming the energy system by developing clean energy along with other measures to control air pollutants emission, it also tried to call on the Chinese people to participate in this fight. For instance, on January 30, 2013, *China Daily*, the English national newspaper and a mouthpiece of the Chinese government, published on its front page "*Joint effort urged to clean the air*" to call for individual Chinese people to contribute to the campaign to tackle smog by driving less and take more public transportation, as vehicles account for 20% of air pollutants emissions (Wu & Wang, 2013). On 7 May 2015, *China Daily* published an opinion piece, *Everyone responsible for creating a healthy ecological civilization*, following the document issued by the central leadership that advanced the idea that every participant in the economy, including individuals, should engage in the construction of an ecological civilization and restrain themselves from environmentally unfriendly activities ("Everyone responsible", 2015).

Similarly, within the broad national climate change mitigation actions, the Chinese government made it explicit in the China's 12<sup>th</sup> FYP (2011-2013) that they were advocating

green and low-carbon consumption concepts and promoting a green lifestyle for the public. Following this guideline, energy saving and low-carbon campaigns have been launched in schools, institutions, shopping malls, army, enterprises and communities. Various activities have been organized in schools at elementary, middle, high and university levels to promote green lifestyles (NDRC, 2012).

Despite this intended mobilization from the government and the increasing environmental concern among the Chinese public, the attitude of the Chinese public can be said to be characterized by apathy and even opposition when policies hinder on their comfort and convenience. For instance, although 76% of people in China see air pollution as a big problem, according to a 2015 survey by Pew Research Center, while 35% see it as a very big problem and 41% see it as a moderately big problem (Gao, 2015), only 38% of Chinese citizens agreed with the government's policy of banning vehicles with even and odd-numbered license plates on alternate days to reduce car pollutant emissions (Yan, 2016: 58). On the issue of climate change, similar attitudes among the Chinese public have been observed. While 70% of the respondents expressed concerns about climate change and 83% favored practical actions to abate climate change, 72% believed it is the government's primary responsibility to tackle climate change and only 7% recognized the role of individuals in climate change mitigation (He, 2010; cited in Zhou, Hauger, Liu & Lu, 2014). In comparison, 86% of French people and the same percentage of Europeans (EU27) believe in individual roles in environmental protection, along with their belief that the biggest polluters should be held the most responsible (Special Eurobarometer 295, 2008).

This public passivity with regard to environmental protection may be partly explained by the Chinese subscription to the Confucian belief that "a government is mandated to exert

its authority by showing parental care for its citizens”, who, in turn, “owe it to their government to respect and obey rules and mores” (Linstrom, 2016: 171). The Chinese government “has long positioned itself as the country's ultimate problem solver,” as articulated on the *Wall Street Journal Blog* (Ma, 2013, para.10). In this context, Chinese individuals tend to feel that their power and responsibility are limited in tackling social issues, and they would usually look to the government for solutions, which is also the case for environmental protection.

Public passivity in environmental protection may also find its roots in Chinese environmental education. An examination of Chinese middle school textbooks revealed a greater emphasis on the state’s management and responsibility for environmental prevention through national policies and governmental projects than on individual and community involvement (Hall, 2016). In parallel, Hall (2016) found in the same study that the textbooks promote an anthropocentric view of the environment: humans are seen as most morally significant, with environment being regarded as a means and resource to be used by and for humans. This anthropocentric view is often linked to attitudes that environmental problems should be controlled and solved by science and technology, which is beyond the capacity of one individual, but can be provided by the government. Under such education, it is no wonder why more Chinese individuals tend to believe in governmental role than personally responsible behavior in addressing environmental problem.

In summary, the Chinese public ascribes in general the responsibility of environment protection to the government; such view may find roots in their culture and education.

#### ***5.3.2.2 Le Monde’s Representation***

The clear dichotomy and disassociation between the Chinese government and the Chinese population on the issue of air pollution in *Le Monde*’s representation seems to conform

to the Chinese context. However, representation of the Chinese population only as victims, while not advocating their potential role in environmental protection seems to differ from the European or French belief in individual responsibility. The representation of the Chinese population as victims may ascribe more malignancy to the Chinese government, which is represented as inactive.

### **5.3.3 Synthesis**

The contextual analysis shows that *Le Monde*'s representation of China, as examined in this study, was not necessarily in conformity with Chinese reality. There is a difference between the representation of China at the domestic level and the international level. China's image on the domestic level is largely negative: despite the Chinese government's tremendous domestic efforts in dealing with environmental issues, *Le Monde* tends to overlook these efforts or downplay them. For example, in 2009 climate change coverage excluded Chinese domestic efforts, and in 2015 China's image was that of a commitment to climate change and promotion of international negotiations rather than its domestic actions. Although French people or Europeans in general tend to believe in individual responsibility in environmental protection, *Le Monde* has represented the Chinese population as victims of air pollution without questioning their roles at all. *Le Monde*'s representation of China on the international level seems to have adhered to the widely held principle "Polluters pay" without allowing space for the Chinese position: when the price China offered was not satisfactory to the developed countries, China would be condemned; when the price China offered was to their satisfaction, it would be praised.

## 5.4 Conclusions

This thesis, with its aim to investigate China's image in the environmental domain in France, conducted a Critical Discourse Analysis of news articles on environmental issues related to China in the French elite newspaper *Le Monde*. It contributes to the very limited existing literature on China's national image in the aspect of environment in the "West", especially in a language other than English, and also to critical discourse analysis literature on media's representation of a foreign country in the French language.

### 5.4.1 Main Findings

Linguistic textual analysis of the corpus news articles, both quantitatively and qualitatively, found that the image of China that was constructed was fluid depending on the environmental issue in question.

In the issue of air pollution, *Le Monde* has represented "China" as a domestic actor. It has constructed China's image as invariably negative during the period of 2013, 2014 and 2015, following the script of a dichotomy between an inactive government and a victimized population. The responsibility of addressing air pollution appears to be represented as that of the Chinese government, which was nevertheless represented as inactive or passive in tackling air pollution. On the other hand, the Chinese population was portrayed as powerless and sympathetic victims whose responsibility was never questioned.

In contrast, *Le Monde* has represented China as an international actor in the closely related issue of climate change, and China's image has drastically changed between 2009 and 2015. In 2009, China was negatively portrayed and held most responsible for tackling climate change, along with the US, but was seen as passive in dealing with climate change, as an enemy

to be destroyed rather than an opponent to be recognized. However, in 2015, China was represented as a supporter or promoter of climate change negotiations with positive evaluations.

There seems to be no correlation between the construction of China's image and the documentary "Chai Jing's Review: Under the Dome - Investigating China's Smog." Although this documentary raised consciousness among the public, and the Chinese government made many efforts to deal with environmental issues, *Le Monde's* representation of China in air pollution followed the same script and remained consistently negative between 2013 and 2015, while its representation of China with respect to climate change in 2009 was completely different from that in 2015.

How can we understand these representations of China in *Le Monde*? An examination of *Le Monde's* representation of China vis-à-vis the Chinese context shed light on this question. On one hand, *Le Monde's* representation of China was not necessarily in conformity with Chinese realities; in other words, *Le Monde's* representation does not appear to be about who/what China is. China's rigorous efforts in confronting air pollution and climate change at the domestic level tend to be neglected or downplayed in *Le Monde*. Also, *Le Monde's* representation of China as an international actor seems to adhere to the principle widely held in Europe that "polluters pay," without allowing any space for the Chinese position. On the other hand, *Le Monde's* representation of China did not necessarily fit into French or European general beliefs in individual responsibility for environmental protection, as *Le Monde* has represented the Chinese population as victims of air pollution without questioning the role they could play in environmental protection at all. However, this view seems to fit into *Le Monde's* script of a negative Chinese government that emerged from the analysis, as a victimized population would usually solidify the negative image of the government. Thus, a full answer



to the question of how to understand *Le Monde*'s representation of China would lie in the French context where the news texts were written. An examination of the interactions between *Le Monde*'s news discourses and other French social elements in light of social or communication theories, and/or with ethnographic methods such as interviews with journalists is necessary. Among the various directions such an investigation could take, and on the basis of the findings obtained in this study, the following should prove interesting.

One possible research direction could investigate ideologies behind *Le Monde* and in the French society. The interaction between the text and context is not arbitrary – it can be determined by the ideologies of the group to which the author belongs. According to van Dijk (1995):

Ideologies are basic frameworks of social cognition, shared by members of social groups, constituted by relevant selections of social cultural values, and organized by an ideological schema that represents the self-definition of a group. Besides their social function of sustaining the interests of groups, ideologies have the cognitive function of organizing the social representations (attitudes, knowledge) of the group, and thus indirectly monitor the group related social practices, and hence also the text and talk of its members. (248)

Two ideologies might be at play in the analyzed texts, a democratic and anti-communist ideology, and an environmental ideology that emphasizes both polluters' and individuals' responsibility in addressing environmental problems. The textual analysis of the corpus articles with regards to climate change and air pollution revealed that *Le Monde* tends to portray the Chinese government in a negative light (even when China as a country was positively portrayed in 2015). In this respect, the “ideological square” (positive *us* vs. negative *them*), which is often found in media representation, seems to be obvious. Otherization of the Chinese (communist) government may well serve to accrue self-evaluations of democratic regimes.

Moreover, environmental ideologies sometimes come into play. For instance, in the representation of China in climate change, *Le Monde* has firmly adhered to the polluters pay principle. However, when it conflicts with the anti-communist ideology, it is the latter which seems to prevail. In *Le Monde*'s representation of China with regards to air pollution, *Le Monde* seemed to have given up the "polluters pay" principle. The representation focus shifted from the industry, which is usually considered as one of the major causes of pollution, to the Chinese government and population. Moreover, despite the French general belief in individual's responsibility in addressing environmental problems, *Le Monde* has simply represented the Chinese population as victims without questioning their responsibility in dealing with air pollution at all. The victimization of the Chinese population might well contribute to the malign image of the Chinese government.

Besides ideologies, diplomatic motivations/interests seem to be relevant in *Le Monde*'s representation of China, especially when France was involved in the issue. This might explain why in the same year of 2015 China was portrayed negatively with regards to air pollution while represented positively regarding climate change. In 2005, although a negative image of China as a domestic actor was constructed with regards to the issue of air pollution, *Le Monde* constructed a positive image of China as an international actor regarding the issue of climate change. The textual analysis revealed that *Le Monde* constructed China as a promoter/supporter of climate change negotiations, as an example for other developing countries such as India. Since the 21st United Nations Climate Change Conference was to be held in Paris in December 2015, such a portrayal of China would function to ensure the success of this Conference.

Interestingly, despite the overlap between air pollution and climate change, *Le Monde* has represented air pollution as a Chinese domestic issue while climate change as an

international one. Whatever might be the reasons behind the difference in representations, they seem to have allowed *Le Monde* to otherize the Chinese government when French interests were not relevant to the issue while still using the presentation of China to promote their agenda when France was implicated.

The above section constitutes a mere speculation on possible factors that might have determined *Le Monde*'s representation of China with regards to environmental issues. Numerous questions still remain open: Did the suggested factors indeed play a role? To what extent did they influence *Le Monde*'s representation and how did they interplay within the representation? Are there other relevant factors? To answer these questions, it would be necessary to conduct a systematic contextual analysis informed by communication theories to investigate the French media context, and to examine *Le Monde*'s identity, its position in society and its interaction with other social actors. It would also be important to interview *Le Monde*'s journalists who wrote the news texts.

#### **5.4.2 Limitations and Future Study**

The current thesis is not without limitations. First, while the linguistic tools adopted in this thesis were strong and revealing, and the combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis allowed both a general and deep understanding of *Le Monde*'s representation of China, the linguistic analysis in this study was very time-consuming. The corpus that resulted from the rigid selection process cannot be too large, though its representativeness does not change the fact that this corpus was relatively small for quantitative research. Nevertheless, this limitation does not hinder the reliability or the validity of this study.

Although the analysis of the Chinese context conducted in this study shed light on the question of how we can understand *Le Monde*'s representation of China, interviews with the

journalists and investigations of the French context, informed by communication or other social theories, would be necessary to fully understand this question.

The nature of the case study does not allow us to generalize about China's environmental image constructed in *Le Monde*, not to mention France as a whole or even the West. However, the cases chosen in this study are the environmental issues that have captured the most attention from news media, so that a scrupulous and in-depth understanding of these issues is very important in understanding China's environmental image constructed in news media. The case studies in this thesis can reflect a "western" view on China with regard to the environment, and can inform other studies of this kind.

Average readers may not be able to analyze the news texts according to the manner of this thesis. Therefore, the results of this thesis cannot tell us how such readers would receive or consume these news texts or, eventually, how they would perceive China. The purpose of this CDA study is to reveal the images of China mediated in the news texts, and the linguistic structures that would play a meaningful role in potentially influencing readers' reactions. A reception or consumption study of readers' responses with experiential and/or ethnographic methods would be complementary to this thesis.

Despite these limitations, this thesis has fully achieved its objectives and serves as a useful departure for future studies. Two potential avenues for future study might be an investigation that covers more environmental issues and includes more newspapers in France; or a cross-country comparative analysis of the representation of China in environmental issues, such as in France, the US, and China.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Corpus Articles on China with regards to Air Pollution

2013.

Core articles	1. Les villes de Chine contraintes de rendre leur air transparent (LE MONDE   01.01.2013 à 10h38   Par Harold Thibault  Planète 377w.   9 facebook partager   0 commentaires  )
	2. A Pékin, la pollution de l'air pulvérise les normes de l'OMS (Le Monde.fr   14.01.2013 à 11h20 • Mis à jour le 14.01.2013 à 17h16   Par Brice Pedroletti  Planète 679 w.   68 facebook partager   2 commentaires  )
	3. A Pékin, les mesures d'urgence contre l'"airpocalypse" laissent sceptiques (Le Monde.fr   25.01.2013 à 15h40 • Mis à jour le 25.01.2013 à 18h41   Par Audrey Garric  Planète   1000 w.   1347 facebook partager   25 commentaires  )
	4. Chine : la pollution de l'air pousse Pékin "à accepter plus de transparence" (Le Monde.fr   28.01.2013 à 15h38 • Mis à jour le 28.01.2013 à 16h54  International-Asie-pacifique   Brice Pedroletti 1217 w.   118 facebook partager   3 commentaires  )
	5. Chine : le test de la crise écologique (LE MONDE   08.02.2013 à 14h26  Idée   822 w.   8 facebook partager   2 commentaires  )
	6. Dans les villes chinoises, la lutte contre la pollution est freinée par les pétroliers (LE MONDE   04.06.2013 à 14h25 • Mis à jour le 04.06.2013 à 14h26   Par Harold Thibault  international-asie-pacifique   763 w.   19 facebook partager   6 commentaires  )
	7. La Chine adopte un plan national de lutte contre la pollution de l'air (LE MONDE   17.06.2013 à 11h33 • Mis à jour le 17.06.2013 à 18h30   Par Harold Thibault  Planète   485 w.   33 facebook partager   1 commentaires  )
	8. Acculée, la Chine fait de la lutte contre la crise écologique son chantier prioritaire (LE MONDE   31.08.2013 à 10h04 • Mis à jour le 31.08.2013 à 10h52   Par Brice Pedroletti   International-Asie-pacifique   943 w.   687 facebook partager   7 commentaires  )
	9. Après l'"airpocalypse", le soleil revient à Harbin (LE MONDE   23.10.2013 à 15h38   Par Brice Pedroletti   International-Asie-Pacifique   503 w.   5 facebook partager   0 commentaires  )
	10. Pékin émerge du cauchemar de la pollution (LE MONDE   01.02.2013 à 14h05 • Mis à jour le 01.02.2013 à 14h05   Par Brice Pedroletti et Harold Thibault  Planète   827 w.   4 facebook partager   1 commentaires  )

2014.

Core articles	1. En Chine, les feux d'artifice du Nouvel An provoquent une pollution massive (Le Monde.fr   31.01.2014 à 13h02 • Mis à jour le 31.01.2014 à 16h16   Par François Bougon  International-Asie pacifique 192 w.  112 facebook partager   1 commentaires )
	2. Un citoyen chinois porte plainte pour « air pollué» (LE MONDE   26.02.2014 à 12h02 • Mis à jour le 26.02.2014 à 17h49   Par Brice Pedroletti (Pékin, correspondant)  Planète   698 w.   39 facebook partager   2 commentaires )
	3. Pollution en Chine : les dégâts du développement sale (LE MONDE   04.03.2014 à 12h04 • Mis à jour le 04.03.2014 à 12h12  Planète   Editorial  510 w.   170 facebook partager   8 commentaires )
	4. La vie quotidienne sous le smog de Pékin (LE MONDE   26.03.2014 à 12h50 • Mis à jour le 26.03.2014 à 13h26   Par Brice Pedroletti  Planète  1341 w.   27 facebook partager   7 commentaires )
	5. Un bol d'air français vendu à Pékin pour 610 euros (11 avril 2014  M Blog   308 w.   1400 facebook partager   43 commentaires )
	6. Les ONG chinoises surveillent en temps réel les émissions polluantes d'usine (Le Monde.fr   08.11.2014 à 10h12 • Mis à jour le 09.11.2014 à 23h07   Par Brice Pedroletti Planète-pollution   918 w.   26 facebook partager   0 commentaires )
	7. A Tangshan, l'impossible lutte contre la pollution (LE MONDE   08.11.2014 à 10h12 • Mis à jour le 09.11.2014 à 23h08   Par Brice Pedroletti  Planète-pollution   987 w.   337 facebook partager   4 commentaires )
	8. A Xingtai, ville la plus polluée de Chine, on ne voit plus le ciel (LE MONDE   20.02.2014 à 13h15   Par Harold Thibault   Planète   935 w.   291 facebook partager   4 commentaires )

2015.

Core articles	1. Le « smog » affole le Web chinois (LE MONDE   02.03.2015 à 11h16 • Mis à jour le 02.03.2015 à 12h25   Par Harold Thibault  Planète   567w.  1442 facebook partager   2 commentaires )
	2. La Chine veut rester maître de la guerre contre le smog (LE MONDE   9 mars 2015   Par Harold Thibault   Planète  722 w.  14 facebook partager   1 commentaires )
	3. Les Chinois aspirent à l'air pur (LE MONDE CULTURE ET IDEES   03.09.2015 à 18h05 • Mis à jour le 03.09.2015 à 18h06   Par François Bougon  Planète   1574 w.  64 facebook partager   5 commentaires )
	4. Dans Pékin pollué, la nuit en plein jour (Le Monde.fr   02.12.2015 à 09h43 • Mis à jour le 03.12.2015 à 04h45   Par Brice Pedroletti (Pékin, correspondant)   Planète   854w.   5622 facebook partager   14 commentaires )
	5. Chine : l'alerte rouge de pollution de l'air, dilemme des officiels (Le Monde.fr   10.12.2015 à 11h00 • Mis à jour le 10.12.2015 à 14h15   Par Harold Thibault (Shanghai, correspondance)   Planète   844w.   471 facebook partager   2 commentaires )

## Appendix 2: Corpus Articles on China with regards to Climate Change

2009.

<p>1.Climat : Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination (Le Monde.fr avec AFP   22 septembre 2009 Planète 455w.   7 facebook partager   5 commentaires )</p>
<p>2.Climat : “On a besoin de l’impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine” (Le Monde.fr   16 novembre 2009  Propos recueillis par Propos recueillis par Raphaëlle Besse Desmoulières   Planète 769 w.   27 facebook partager   2 commentaires )</p>
<p>3.Climat : les Etats-Unis et la Chine abattent leurs cartes (LE MONDE   26 novembre 2009  Par Laurence Caramel et Corine Lesnes à Washington   Planète 1100 w.   4 facebook partager   8 commentaires )</p>
<p>4.Copenhague : la Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat (Le Monde.fr avec AFP   15 décembre 2009 Planete 434 w.   8 facebook partager   9 commentaires )</p>
<p>5.Réchauffement climatique : les Etats-Unis en appellent à la Chine (Le Monde.fr avec AFP   29 mars 2009 Planète 387 w.   15 facebook partager   9 commentaires )</p>
<p>6. Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington (LE MONDE   16.11.2009 à 14h04 • Mis à jour le 16.11.2009 à 14h04   Par Arnaud Leparmentier Planète 893 w.   33 facebook partager   3 commentaires )</p>
<p>7. Pékin se fixe des objectifs de réduction de gaz à effet de serre (Le Monde.fr avec AFP et Reuters   26.11.2009 à 08h33 • Mis à jour le 26.11.2009 à 12h24 Planète 448 w.   10 facebook partager   11 commentaires )</p>
<p>8. La baisse des émissions de CO2 en Chine passe par la rénovation du parc immobilier (LE MONDE   2 octobre 2009  Par Grégoire Allix   Planète 644 w.   4 facebook partager   1 commentaires )</p>

<p>1.La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat (LE MONDE   30 juin 2015  Par Simon Roger   Planète 1014 w.   3 facebook partager   1 commentaires  )</p>
<p>2.Climat : la Chine sur la bonne voie (LE MONDE   1 juillet 2015 Idée 587 w.   14 facebook partager   2 commentaires  )</p>
<p>3.Chine, Etats-Unis, un tandem inattendu sur le climat (LE MONDE   9 octobre 2015  Par Harold Thibault   Planète 907 w.   22 facebook partager   0 commentaires  )</p>
<p>4.Entre course à la croissance et défi climatique, où en est la Chine ? (Le Monde.fr   1 juillet 2015  Iddri   Planète 1031 w.   2 facebook partager   0 commentaires  )</p>
<p>5.La Chine, arbitre des négociations climatiques (LE MONDE   3 novembre 2015  Par Simon Roger (Pékin, envoyé spécial) et Harold Thibault (Pékin, envoyé spécial)   Planète 957 w.   28 facebook partager   3 commentaires  )</p>
<p>6. « La Chine peut atteindre un pic d'émissions de CO2 entre 2020 et 2025 » (Le Monde.fr   30.06.2015 à 17h11 • Mis à jour le 30.06.2015 à 17h21   Propos recueillis par Harold Thibault (Shanghai, correspondance)  Planète 630 w.   2 facebook partager   0 commentaires  )</p>
<p>7. La Chine se fixe pour objectif d' « atteindre le pic de ses émissions de CO2 autour de 2030 » (LE MONDE   01.07.2015 à 06h41 • Mis à jour le 01.07.2015 à 11h25   Par Simon Roger Planète 1233 w.   0 facebook partager   0 commentaires  )</p>
<p>8.La Chine devrait réduire ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre plus vite que prévu (Le Monde.fr avec AFP   08.06.2015 à 02h15 • Mis à jour le 08.06.2015 à 13h57 Planète 436 w.   166 facebook partager   7 commentaires  )</p>
<p>9. La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre (Le Monde.fr   25.09.2015 à 06h31 • Mis à jour le 25.09.2015 à 11h39 Planète 417 w.   3538 facebook partager   3 commentaires  )</p>
<p>10.Climat : François Hollande se félicite du soutien de Pékin (Le Monde.fr   02.11.2015 à 06h35 • Mis à jour le 02.11.2015 à 17h59   Par Harold Thibault (Envoyé spécial à Pékin) et Simon Roger (Envoyé spécial à Chongqing)  Planète  874 w.  614 facebook partager   34 commentaires  )</p>
<p>11. Pourquoi Pékin s'engage sur la limitation des gaz à effet de serre (LE MONDE   25.09.2015 à 11h24 • Mis à jour le 25.09.2015 à 14h51   Par Harold Thibault (Shanghai, correspondance)  Planète 813 w.   1 facebook partager   3 commentaires  )</p>

## Appendix 3: Original Examples in French for Table 4.5 and Table

### 4.6

1. *Ces deux pays comptent ensemble pour 40 % des émissions mondiales de CO2.* [These two countries together account for 40% of global CO2 emissions.]  
(LM.fr avec AFP, Climat : Etats-Unis et Chine affichent leur détermination, 22 Sept. 2009)
2. *Les deux plus gros pays pollueurs de la planète arriveront donc à Copenhague avec des engagements concrets.* [The two biggest polluting countries on the planet will arrive in Copenhagen with concrete commitments.]  
(LM, Climat : les Etats-Unis et la Chine abattent leurs cartes, 26 Nov.2009)
3. *En l'espace des deux jours, les deux plus gros pollueurs de gaz à effet de serre de la planète, les Etats-Unis et la Chine, ont annoncé qu'ils ne viendraient pas les mains vides au sommet de Copenhague sur le réchauffement climatique, qui se tient du 7 au 18 décembre dans la capitale danoise.* [Within two days, the world's two biggest greenhouse gas polluters, the US and China, announced that they would not come empty-handed to the Copenhagen summit on global warming, which would take place from 7 to 18 December in the Danish capital.]  
(LM.fr avec AFP et Reuters, Pékin se fixe des objectifs de réduction de gaz à effet de serre, 26 Nov.)
4. *Alors que la conclusion d'un accord contraignant sur le réchauffement climatique semble de plus en plus improbable lors du sommet de Copenhague qui se tient mi-décembre, les présidents américain et chinois, Barack Obama et Hu Jintao, se retrouvent mardi pour discuter de cette question.* [While the conclusion of a binding agreement on global warming seems increasingly unlikely at the Copenhagen summit which will be held in mid-December, US and Chinese presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao will meet on Tuesday to discuss this question.]  
(LM.fr, Climat : "On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine", 16 Nov. 2009)
5. *Leur adversaire désigné ? Le "G2", constitué du président américain Barack Obama et de son homologue chinois Hu Jintao, soit les deux plus gros pollueurs de la planète .* [Their designated opponent? The "G2", consisting of US President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, namely the two biggest polluters on the planet.]  
(LM, Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington, 16 Nov. 2009)
6. *Rêvant de prendre en tenaille les Etats-Unis et la Chine, il veut forger une alliance entre [...].* [Dreaming of pinching the United States and China, he wants to forge an alliance between ...]  
(LM, Climat: MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington, 16 Nov. 2009)
7. *Le président américain a indiqué qu'il cherchait avec son homologue chinois une "convergence d'opinions" sur la question climatique.* [The US president said he was seeking with his Chinese counterpart for a "convergence of opinions" on the climate issue.]  
(LM.fr, Climat : "On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine", 16 Nov. 2009)
8. *La ministre danoise Connie Hedegaard, qui préside les débats, s'est voulue rassurante: "C'est*

*comme à l'école élémentaire. Ils attendent le dernier moment pour rendre leurs exercices.* ” [The Danish minister Connie Hedegaard, who presides over the debates, has been reassuring: “It’s like in elementary school. They are waiting for the last moment to hand in their exercises.”]  
(LM.fr, La Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat, 15 décembre 2009)

9. *La présidence suédoise de l'UE a appelé la Chine et les Etats-Unis, “qui représentent la moitié des émissions mondiales”, à relever leurs objectifs de réduction.* [The Swedish Presidency of EU has called on China and the US, “which account for half of global emissions”, to raise their reduction targets.]  
(LM.fr, La Chine ne veut pas débattre de ses engagements sur le climat, 15 décembre 2009)
10. *Maïté Jaureguy-Naudin, chercheuse et coordinatrice du programme énergie à l'Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) y voit “un pas constructif ” de la part des deux plus gros émetteurs de CO2 au monde.* [Maïté Jaureguy-Naudin, researcher and coordinator of the energy program at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) sees “a constructive step” by the world’s two largest CO2 emitters.]  
(LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)
11. *On a vraiment besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner ces deux pays.* [One really needs the impetus that these two countries could give.]  
(LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)
12. *Je ne pense pas qu'on ait cet effet d'annonce dès cette semaine mais Barack Obama et Hu Jintao vont commencer à discuter là-dessus.* [I do not think we will have the announcement this week but Barack Obama and Hu Jintao will start discussing this issue.]  
(LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)
13. *C'est sur cela que les deux présidents vont essayer de travailler.* [This is what the two presidents will try to work on.]  
(LM.fr, Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, 16 Nov. 2009)
14. *[...] alors que dans le même temps, des pays comme l'Inde et la Chine, où le coût du travail est plus faible, ne subissent pas cette contrainte carbone.* [ [...] while at the same time, countries such as India and China, where labor costs are lower, do not undergo this carbon constraint.]  
(Le Monde.fr |Climat : “On a besoin de l'impulsion que pourraient donner les Etats-Unis et la Chine”, | 16.11.2009 à 20h16)
15. *“L'enjeu fondamental sera de réfléchir aux actions que pourront conduire la Chine et les pays en développement”, a-t-il (American delegate Todd Stern) ajouté dans un appel direct au pays le plus peuplé au monde.* [“The fundamental challenge will be to reflect on the actions that China and the developing countries can take,” he (American delegate Todd Stern) added in a direct appeal to the most populous country in the world.]  
(Le Monde.fr avec AFP Réchauffement climatique : les Etats-Unis en appellent à la Chine | 29.03.2009 à 17h54)
16. *Dongtan a été aussitôt remplacée dans les conférences internationales par les promesses de l'éco-cité de Tianjin, issue d'un partenariat technique et financier avec Singapour[...].* [Dongtan was

immediately replaced in international conferences by the promises of the eco-city of Tianjin, resulting from a technical and financial partnership with Singapore (...).]  
(LE MONDE |La baisse des émissions de CO2 en Chine passe par la rénovation du parc immobilier | 02.10.2009 à 15h11)

17. *Le président américain s'est-il, comme il l'a dit, senti suffisamment encouragé par les "progrès" réalisés avec les dirigeants chinois et indiens, qu'il vient de rencontrer à dix jours d'intervalle ?* [Has the US President felt, as he said, sufficiently encouraged by the "progress" made with the Chinese and Indian leaders, whom he has just met ten days apart?]  
(LE MONDE |Climat : les Etats-Unis et la Chine abattent leurs cartes| 26.11.2009 à 10h43)
18. *A un mois du sommet de Copenhague, M. Sarkozy et M. Lula veulent faire grossir leurs troupes.* [One month before the Copenhagen summit, Mr. Sarkozy and Mr. Lula want to make their troops bigger.]  
(LE MONDE |Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington | 16.11.2009 à 14h04)
19. *Rêvant de prendre en tenaille les Etats-Unis et la Chine, il veut forger une alliance entre pays industrialisés, grands pays émergents et pays les plus touchés par le réchauffement climatique (Afrique non méditerranéenne, Etats insulaires menacés, Asie du sud-est...).* [Dreaming of taking the US and China in pincers, he wants to forge an alliance between industrialized countries and major emerging countries most affected by global warming (African non-Mediterranean, threatened island states, Southeast Asia ..).]  
(LE MONDE |Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington | 16.11.2009 à 14h04)
20. *M. Sarkozy doit rencontrer jeudi 19 novembre à Bruxelles, avant le Conseil européen, la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel et le premier ministre danois Lars Lokke Rasmussen, hôte de la conférence, pour consolider la position de l'Union européenne.* [Mr. Sarkozy is scheduled to meet German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, host of the conference, to consolidate the position of the European Union on November 19 in Brussels before the European Council.]  
(LE MONDE |Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington | 16.11.2009 à 14h04 )
21. *"Avec le président Lula, on va faire le tour de la planète pour convaincre, parce que le monde est multipolaire", a annoncé le président français [...]* ["With President Lula, we will go around the world to convince, because the world is multipolar," announced the French president]  
(LE MONDE |Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington | 16.11.2009 à 14h04 )
22. *Leur complicité était loin d'être acquise. Les deux premières puissances de la planète apparaissent de plus en plus divisées sur les sujets majeurs marquant leur relation, comme vient encore de le montrer la finalisation de l'initiative américaine d'un Partenariat transpacifique laissant à dessein Pékin de côté. Pourtant, les Etats-Unis et la Chine se révèlent capables de collaborer dans un domaine qui longtemps les a opposés: le climat.* [Their complicity was far from gained. The first two world powers appear increasingly divided on major issues marking their relationship, as just shown by the finalization of the American initiative for a Trans-Pacific Partnership which leaves Beijing aside on purpose. Yet the United States and China are proving to be able to collaborate in an area that has long opposed them: the climate.]  
(LE MONDE | Chine, Etats-Unis, un tandem inattendu sur le climat|09.10.2015 à 06h41)



23. *Après des mois de négociations en secret, les deux géants reconnaissent dans un communiqué commun le « rôle primordial » qu'ils doivent jouer face au changement climatique.* [After months of secret negotiations, the two giants acknowledged in a joint statement the “primary role” they must play facing climate change.]  
(LE MONDE | Chine, Etats-Unis, un tandem inattendu sur le climat|09.10.2015 à 06h41 )
24. *Barack Obama et Xi Jinping, les présidents des deux pays émettant le plus de gaz à effet de serre, avaient alors annoncé leur intention de réduire significativement les émissions polluantes de leur pays respectif.* [Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, the presidents of the two countries emitting the most greenhouse gases, announced at that time their intention to significantly reduce the polluting emissions of their respective countries.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat| 30.06.2015 à 16h07)
25. *Lors de leur rencontre en novembre 2014 à Pékin, MM. Obama et Xi avaient annoncé un accord inédit dans lequel ils présentaient leurs objectifs en termes d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre.* [At their meeting in Beijing in November 2014, Messrs. Obama and Xi had announced an unprecedented agreement in which they set out their goals in terms of greenhouse gas emissions]  
(Le Monde.fr |La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre| 25.09.2015 à 06h31)
26. *Les présidents chinois et américain, réunis à Washington, devraient annoncer, dans la journée du vendredi 25 septembre, une série de mesures permettant d'atteindre leurs objectifs de réduction d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre, selon la presse américaine, citant des sources au sein de l'administration Obama.* [The Chinese and US presidents, meeting in Washington, are expected to announce a series of measures on Friday, September 25, to meet their greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, citing sources from the Obama administration.]  
(LE MONDE | Pourquoi Pékin s'engage sur la limitation des gaz à effet de serre| 25.09.2015 à 11h24)
27. *Considérés pendant longtemps comme deux freins majeurs à l'avancée des négociations multilatérales sur le climat, les deux acteurs appuyaient tout à coup sur la pédale d'accélérateur.* [Considered to be two major obstacles to the progress of the multilateral climate negotiations for a long time, the two actors suddenly pressed on the accelerator pedal.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat| 30.06.2015 à 16h07)
28. *Divisés sur de nombreuses questions, la Chine et les Etats-Unis souhaitent user de leur influence au niveau international pour lutter contre le réchauffement climatique et pour presser d'autres nations à faire de même.* [Divided on many issues, China and the US want to use their influence at the international level to fight against global warming and to urge other nations to do the same.]  
(Le Monde.fr |La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre| 25.09.2015 à 06h31)
29. *Les deux chefs d'Etat mettront l'accent sur la volonté des deux plus grandes économies du monde à forger un accord sur le changement climatique à Paris en décembre, qui engage tous les pays à freiner leurs émissions.* [The two heads of state will emphasize the will of the world's two biggest economies to forge an agreement on climate change in Paris in December, which involves all countries to curb their emissions.]

(Le Monde.fr | La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre| 25.09.2015 à 06h31)

30. *Le gouvernement chinois confirme l'accord signé avec les Etats-Unis en novembre 2014, avec un pic d'émissions en 2030, et l'engagement de porter la part des énergies non fossiles dans la consommation énergétique primaire à environ 20 %.* [The Chinese government confirms the agreement signed with the United States in November 2014, with emission peak in 2030 and the commitment to increase the share of non-fossil energies in primary energy consumption to about 20%.]  
(Le Monde.fr | « La Chine peut atteindre un pic d'émissions de CO2 entre 2020 et 2025 » |30.06.2015 à 17h11)
31. *De quoi relativiser le caractère « historique » de la barre de 2030 annoncée par M. Xi en compagnie de M. Obama.* [This relativizes the “historic” characteristic of the bar of 2030 announced by Mr. Xi in the company of Mr. Obama.]  
(LE MONDE | Chine, Etats-Unis, un tandem inattendu sur le climat|09.10.2015 à 06h41)
32. *Au cœur de ce concept se trouve la relation d'égal à égal que Pékin entend établir avec Washington, un « nouveau type de relation entre puissances majeures », selon les termes de M. Xi.* [At the heart of this concept is the peer-to-peer relationship that Beijing intends to establish with Washington, a “new type of relationship between major powers,” according to Mr. Xi.]  
(LE MONDE | Chine, Etats-Unis, un tandem inattendu sur le climat| 09.10.2015 à 06h41)
33. *Aujourd'hui, il semble prêt à jouer son rôle d'arbitre des négociations à travers le G77 + Chine, la coalition des pays en développement qui polarise les négociations sur le climat.* [Today, he (Xi Jinping) appears ready to play his role as an arbiter of negotiations through the G77 + China, the coalition of developing countries that polarizes climate negotiations.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine, arbitre des négociations climatiques|03.11.2015 à 10h44)
34. *Associé au groupe dit « G77 », une coalition de cent trente-trois pays qui compte tous les pays en développement, Pékin peut entraîner dans sa roue beaucoup d'Etats réticents à signer à Paris un accord destiné à maintenir le réchauffement sous la barre des 2 °C mais dont les contours sont encore flous.* [Together with the so-called “G77” group, a coalition of with all 133 developing countries, Beijing may be dragging many reluctant states to sign an agreement in Paris to keep global warming under the bar of 2 °C but the contours of the agreement are still vague.]  
(Le Monde.fr | Climat : François Hollande se félicite du soutien de Pékin|02.11.2015 à 06h35)
35. *Sur la thématique climatique, elle a signé ces derniers mois plusieurs déclarations bilatérales avec l'Union européenne, l'Inde et le Brésil.* [On climate issues, she has signed a number of bilateral declarations with the European Union, India and Brazil in recent months.]  
(Le Monde.fr | Climat : François Hollande se félicite du soutien de Pékin|02.11.2015 à 06h35)
36. *Laurent Fabius s'est rendu douze fois en Chine depuis sa nomination à la tête du Quai d'Orsay, s'est amusé à rappeler François Hollande au moment d'annoncer la « déclaration commune » avec son homologue Xi Jinping, lundi 2 novembre, à Pékin.* [Laurent Fabius has been to China for twelve times since his appointment as head of the Quai d'Orsay, François Hollande was joking by recalling this when announcing the “joint declaration” with his counterpart Xi Jinping, Monday, November 2, in Beijing.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine, arbitre des négociations climatiques|03.11.2015 à 10h44)

37. *Ces derniers feront en outre l'objet d'une « revue complète tous les cinq ans », indique la déclaration faite devant la presse par François Hollande et par le président chinois, Xi Jinping.* [The latter will also be subjected to a “comprehensive review every five years,” indicated in the statement made by François Hollande and by Chinese President Xi Jinping in front of the media.]  
(Le Monde.fr | Climat : François Hollande se félicite du soutien de Pékin|02.11.2015 à 06h35)
38. *Dans une formulation typiquement onusienne, les deux présidents (français et chinois) affichent leur détermination à parvenir à « un accord ambitieux et juridiquement contraignant, fondé sur l'équité ».* [In a typically UN wording, the two Presidents (French and Chinese) expressed their determination to reach an “ambitious and legally binding agreement based on equity”.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine, arbitre des négociations climatiques|03.11.2015 à 10h44)
39. *Car le texte de 21 paragraphes rendu public au premier jour de la visite du chef de l'Etat français est le fruit d'une discussion serrée, engagée il y a plusieurs semaines entre les équipes de négociations de Paris et Pékin et conclue sur le fil par deux conversations téléphoniques de quarante-cinq minutes entre Laurent Fabius et la diplomatie chinoise.* [As the text of 21 paragraphs made public on the first day of the visit of the French head of state is the fruit of a close discussion, initiated several weeks ago between the negotiating teams of Paris and Beijing and concluded on the phone by two telephone conversations of forty-five minutes between Laurent Fabius and the Chinese diplomacy.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine, arbitre des négociations climatiques|03.11.2015 à 10h44)
40. *Celui-ci a dernièrement multiplié les signaux encourageants, d'abord par un engagement conjoint avec les Etats-Unis à plafonner ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre d'ici à 2030, puis par des déclarations bilatérales avec l'Inde puis le Brésil, enfin, mardi 30 juin, avec la publication de sa « contribution nationale » de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre en vue de la COP21.* [The latter has recently multiplied the encouraging signals, first by a joint commitment with the United States to cap its greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, then by bilateral declarations with India and then Brazil, and on Tuesday June 30 with the publication of its “national contribution” to greenhouse gas emissions reduction for COP21.]  
(Le Monde.fr |Entre course à la croissance et défi climatique, où en est la Chine ? |30.06.2015 à 16h51)
41. *Pourtant, le pays est également le plus gros producteur mondial de panneaux solaires, l'un des trois plus grands producteurs d'hydroélectricité avec le Brésil et le Canada, et il investit massivement dans l'énergie éolienne.* [Yet the country is also the world's largest producer of solar panels, one of the three largest hydroelectric producers with Brazil and Canada, and is investing heavily in wind power.]  
(Le Monde.fr |Entre course à la croissance et défi climatique, où en est la Chine? |30.06.2015 à 16h51)
42. *Selon les estimations de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) émanant d'une étude scientifique publiée le 16 juin, plus de deux millions de morts pourraient être évités chaque année dans le monde si les normes de pollution de l'air préconisées par l'OMS étaient respectées, surtout en Chine et en Inde.* [According to World Health Organization (WHO) estimates in a scientific study published on June 16<sup>th</sup>, more than two million deaths could be prevented every year worldwide if the air pollution standards of WHO were respected, especially in China and India.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine dévoile ses ambitions pour la Conférence de Paris sur le climat| 30.06.2015 à 16h07)

43. *Non pas pour plier face aux pressions internationales: ses arguments sur la responsabilité historique des Américains et des Européens dans le réchauffement climatique sont recevables dans les discussions internationales.* [Not to bend to international pressures: its arguments on the historic responsibility of Americans and Europeans for global warming are acceptable in international discussions.]  
(LE MONDE | Climat : la Chine sur la bonne voie| 01.07.2015 à 11h36)
44. *Ni l'Inde ni le Brésil, acteurs-clés des discussions, n'ont encore dévoilé leurs ambitions.* [Neither India nor Brazil, key players in the talks, have revealed their ambitions yet.]  
(LE MONDE | Pourquoi Pékin s'engage sur la limitation des gaz à effet de serre| 25.09.2015 à 11h24)
45. *La Turquie, l'Arabie saoudite et plus encore l'Inde, toutes trois fortement productrices et consommatrices d'énergies fossiles, bloquent notamment sur cette clause de revoyure.* [Turkey, Saudi Arabia and even India, all three big fossil fuels producers and consumers, are blocking in particular this review clause.]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine, arbitre des négociations climatiques|03.11.2015 à 10h44)
46. *Depuis le début de 2015, les « destinations climat » se sont multipliées pour le chef de l'Etat : Philippines, îles du Pacifique, Caraïbes, Afrique subsaharienne, Islande.* [Since the beginning of 2015, the “climate destinations” have multiplied for the Head of State: Philippines, Pacific Islands, Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Iceland.]  
(Le Monde.fr | Climat : François Hollande se félicite du soutien de Pékin|02.11.2015 à 06h35)
47. *« La Chine remplit sa part du “contrat mondial” des efforts à déployer pour maintenir le réchauffement planétaire en deçà de 2 °C par rapport à la période préindustrielle, au contraire des pollueurs historiques que sont les Etats-Unis, l'Europe ou le Canada, qui eux refusent toujours de prendre leurs responsabilités, analyse Célia Gautier, responsable des politiques européennes au sein du Réseau Action Climat (RAC). [...] »* [“China is fulfilling its share of the ‘global contract’ of efforts to keep global warming below 2 °C compared to the pre-industrial period, unlike the historical polluters of the United States, Europe or Canada, which still refuse to take their responsibilities, analyzes Célia Gautier, director of European policies within the Réseau Action Climat (RAC. (...))”]  
(LE MONDE | La Chine se fixe pour objectif d'« atteindre le pic de ses émissions de CO2 autour de 2030 »| 01.07.2015 à 06h41)
48. *Dans ce cadre, certains chercheurs étrangers mais aussi chinois tels que Lin Boqiang à l'université de Xiamen estiment que le pays pourrait atteindre un pic de ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre avant 2025.* [In this context, some foreign but also Chinese researchers such as Lin Boqiang at Xiamen University estimate that the country could reach a peak of its greenhouse gas emissions before 2025.]  
(LE MONDE | Chine, Etats-Unis, un tandem inattendu sur le climat|09.10.2015 à 06h41 )

## **Appendix 4: English Version of the News Articles that were Analyzed in Sections 3.3.1 and 4.3.1<sup>23</sup>**

### **In section 3.3.1:**

**1 - A Pékin, les mesures d'urgence contre l'“airpocalypse” laissent sceptiques**  
(Le Monde.fr | 25.01.2013 à 15h40 • Mis à jour le 25.01.2013 à 18h41 |Par Audrey Garric)

#### **In Beijing, Emergency Measures against “Airpocalypse” Leave (People) Skeptical**

“Airpocalypse.” This is how Beijing people nicknamed the situation in China’s capital, affected by the unprecedented air pollution. On Monday January 19th, the municipality launched new measures to combat this contamination, which was a subject of growing debates and discontent for several months in China.

These rules systematize measures already taken on an ad hoc basis - plant closures, reduction of coal emissions, prohibition of certain categories of vehicles. Public can make comments till February 8, but criticisms and resistance have already come out.

#### **NEW STANDARD EMISSIONS**

In detail, 180,000 old vehicles will be withdrawn from circulation this year and the “excessive” growth of new car sales will be controlled - 6 million vehicles in 2015, compared with 5.2 million today. Car traffic may also be banned in the event of peak pollution.

A new emission standard, named Beijing 5, like the Euro 5 standard in Europe, will be adopted on February 1<sup>st</sup>. It will apply to newly registered vehicles and is expected to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions by 40 percent, reports the official Xinhua News Agency. Drivers will have to pay fines of 3,000 yuan (360 euros) if their vehicle exceeds the new emission limits.

#### **CLOSED POLLUTANT PLANTS**

Coal-fired heating systems will also be replaced by clean energy systems in 44,000 old homes in downtown. Street vendors will also face a fine of 5,000 yuan (600 euros) if they do barbecues on roadside on smoggy days, China Daily specifies.

On the industry side, the construction of new cement plants and steel mills will be prohibited. The factories will also be closed during exceptional pollution situations. First concrete application: The Chinese authorities have shut down a huge coal gasification plant of Shenhua Group, located in Baotou in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, accused of serious damage to the environment. The business will be allowed to resume when it complies with the standards, said the Reuters National Business Daily, which states that it has been fined 100,000 yuan (12,000 euros) for its recent pollution.

“We are going to accelerate the construction of a beautiful city with blue skies, green land and clean water,” Beijing Mayor Wang Anshun said in a live broadcast on the State television. Beijing pledged to invest 350 billion yuan (43 billion euros) by 2015 to reduce air pollution last month.

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<sup>23</sup> All the translations are done by the author of the thesis.

## 60% CANCER INCREASE OVER TEN YEARS

These new measures were taken while the pollution was particularly heavy in China's capital on the weekend of January 12th, the concentration of microparticles in the air reaching the unprecedented peak of 993 micrograms per cubic meter of air ( $\mu\text{g} / \text{m}^3$ ), a level close to 40 times of the limits suggested by the World Health Organization (WHO). After a few days of lull due to the snow, the pollution was aggravated again on Wednesday, January 23rd, exceeding the dangerous threshold of  $300 \mu\text{g} / \text{m}^3$ .

Emissions of four pollutants - sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, chemical oxygen and ammonia nitrogen, however, decreased by 2% in 2012 and are expected to decrease by the same amount this year, said the environment minister on Thursday, as Reuters reports. But China "faces a long-lasting battle" in the control of the famous PM2.5, fine particles of less than 2.5 microns in diameter that are very harmful to the extent that they can attach to the lungs and cause respiratory diseases. According to a 2011 article in China Daily, the number of lung cancers in Beijing has increased by 60% over the last decade, while the smoking rate has remained stable.

## CRITICISM AND SKEPTICISM

Air quality in Beijing has for some time been the subject of particular attention by the authorities because it is the locus of popular discontent on inequalities. In fact, the messages posted on the Chinese microblogging site Sina Weibo, quoted by Reuters, reveal the full extent of mistrust of the population against the announced action plan. "These measures are just dreams," unleashes one user. Others point out that phasing out old cars will make little difference in a city where 250,000 new vehicles hit the road every year. "These old cars are the ones that ordinary people drive. You will only be legitimate to take action on pollution when you start abandoning all the cars of the officials," he says.

Even the state media, usually reluctant to criticize government action, does not hide their skepticism about government action. "These new regulations will probably be as ineffective as the previous ones," says the Global Times, citing environmental experts from the city.

## RESISTANCES OF STATE COMPANIES

The Chinese government is also facing strong resistance from sprawling state-owned companies and local interests in its attempt to fight air pollution, according to the Wall Street Journal's reports. As a result of decades of unbridled growth, China's serious environmental problems, from concerns about air quality to water scarcity to increasing fossil fuel consumption, are now seen as a potential obstacle to the country's great economic development.

Reducing emissions over the long term will involve costly upgrades to industrial plants and oil refineries, investments that are resisted by state-owned companies, which are unable to pass costs on to consumers, and by local governments, which depend on industrial production for their treasury.

"Managing small and large state-owned enterprises will be a challenge for any economic reform will of Xi Jinping's new government," assured the US daily. "Whereas these companies compete with the private sector for resources and capital, they are also important job providers. These companies are run by leaders related to political spheres and often function as tools for Beijing's political objectives, which gives them immense political weight."/ AFP

## **2 - PARTICULES CHINE - Un bol d'air français vendu à Pékin pour 610 euros**

(11 avril 2014 | M Blog | 308 w. | 1400 facebook partager | 43 commentaires |)

### **PARTICLES CHINA - A Bowl of French Air Sold in Beijing for 610 Euros**

Back from a business trip to France, a Beijing artist who revolted against the poor air quality of China's capital, particularly polluted, auctioned a jar of glass filled with clean air collected in Provence. The price has reached a sum of 5,250 yuan (610 euros).

"Air should be a worthless commodity, free for all, including the homeless or beggars. This is my way of questioning the unclean air of China, and expressing my dissatisfaction," said Liang Kegang in front of a hundred artists and collectors in Beijing.

His jar, like an old-fashioned jam container, with the name of the village "Forcalquier" printed on it. From the village, the jar was hermetically sealed on March 29th. The auction was won by Li Yongzheng, an artist and entrepreneur from Chengdu, central China, and a fan of Liang Kegang's work.

The performance of the young artist is part of a global movement of artistic protest, a reflection of widespread discontent about air quality in China in recent months.

In February, during a flashmob ("flash gathering"), 20 Chinese artists wearing respiratory protection masks laid in the square of the Temple of Heaven in Beijing, simulating deaths.

The city, where air pollution sometimes reaches the rates several times higher than the alert level of the World Health Organization (WHO), is plunged into smog, an almost permanent thick cloud of harmful particles.

In March, in Changsha, a city in eastern China, a group of artists staged a mock funeral for the metaphoric death of the last Chinese citizen because of pollution. One of them explained: "If smog can not be effectively treated, what leaves behind will only be death."

### 3- Dans Pékin pollué, la nuit en plein jour

(Le Monde.fr | 02.12.2015 à 09h43 • Mis à jour le 03.12.2015 à 04h45 | Par Brice Pedroletti (Pékin, correspondant) | 854 | Planète)

#### In Polluted Beijing, the Night in Broad Daylight

December 1st was a day of “airpocalypse” in Beijing. The night in broad daylight. A rather alarming data: an index of air quality (IAQ) of 619 and a rate of fine particles of 680 micrograms per cubic meter, that is, nearly 30 times higher than the maximum threshold recommended by the WHO ... despite these record levels, the alert was kept orange, which precedes the maximum red level.

More than a thousand factories have been ordered to be closed. The Chinese blogosphere oscillates between laughters and tears: there circulate photos of famous tourist sites whose monuments or iconic buildings, invisible behind the thick fog, were redrawn in pencil.

At the Pediatric Institute of the capital, it is difficult to say whether there are more people on this day of pollution: the inhalation room is not full. Parents make their child breathe into a rubber tube connected to certain kind of tank by a hose - it's not oxygen, it's a medicinal mixture. The Li family, from South Beijing, spent an hour and half in the traffic jams. Their one year old baby has trouble breathing. Pollution has made things worse. At times, Mr. Li thinks of moving out: “When our son is grown up, we may go to Guangxi [South China Province],” the father declares thoughtfully.

#### “MAKE BEIJING LIVABLE”

Daily air pollution, and even more so, an episode of “airpocalypse” like that of recent days, questions the measures to be taken to protect oneself. The recommendations are to “stay inside”. But without a purifier, the air indoors is actually as bad as that outside. And it is often barely better with a purifier if the apartment is not effectively enclosed.

In this field, Beijing has become a hotbed of innovation: all kinds of initiatives have emerged. A Swiss has developed a kind of “pollutiometer”, a very inexpensive measuring device (about 75 euros). Professionals offer expatriates pollution which estimates for several hundred euros.

The French people, Yann Boquillod and Hervé Robin, have launched their own application AirVisual. It shows air quality in Beijing and in 5,000 other cities around the world and provides three-day forecasts. “We model the weather and pollution data. An algorithm based on artificial intelligence learns results to constantly draw new conclusions,” says Yann. Their start-up is also developing a personal air quality measurement device that is accurate and affordable.

The challenge is to enable people to improve their level of protection and secure their homes. “We want to make Beijing livable for as many people as possible,” says Yann. Their device will be on sale in January. Meanwhile, the young entrepreneur goes to people who ask him to raise awareness - he makes a dozen visits per week. We accompany him to Ms. Shao, a 37-year-old housewife who is very active and aware of environmental challenges.

Still, Ms. Shao has somewhat underestimated the capabilities of her small air purifier. Yann’s device indicates 190 micrograms per cubic meter. The filter is worn and the device is not enough for the apartment. In addition, the “pollutiometer” indicates 700 micrograms per cubic meter near the humidifier - the water of which is not purified. The mother does not want to worry too much. She thinks that they must also “adapt to living conditions in Beijing.” But the diagnosis motivated her to “secure” her home. Among a cohort of educated housewives around her, some people panic: a neighbor took a flight this morning to the tropical island Hainan.



## MORE THAN THIRTY MEASURING STATIONS

The situation in Zhang's small fitness club is even worse off than that of Ms. Shao. Sensitive to pollution, this boss has invested in an air purifier and is rather proud of it. But because of winter heating, he and his gym instructors often open the window or front door - but the air in the corridors of the buildings is often dirtier than that outside. The result is an air quality index of nearly 400 micrograms per cubic meter indoors. The purifier is insufficient there, too, due to too many polluted air intakes.

With the recurring pollution crises that hit Beijing and other Chinese cities, the authorities have stopped taking refuge in denial: the capital is equipped with more than 30 measuring stations of air quality, all of which indicate the rate of fine particles.

And Beijing people have developed a habit of constantly checking air quality in their city, thanks to the applications in their mobile phones.

## In section 4.3.1:

### 1- Climat : MM. Sarkozy et Lula veulent contrer Pékin et Washington

(LE MONDE | 16.11.2009 à 14h04 • Mis à jour le 16.11.2009 à 14h04 | Par Arnaud Leparentier | Planète |893)

#### Climate: MM. Sarkozy and Lula Want to Counter Beijing and Washington

French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Brazilian counterpart Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva decided on Saturday (November 14th) to join the fight for the Copenhagen summit on global warming. Their designated opponent? The “G2”, made up of US President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, the two biggest polluters on the planet.

The US President did not want European leaders to join the Asia-Pacific Cooperation Forum (APEC) meetings in Singapore on November 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup>, trying to unravel the negotiations. What’s worse, APEC has refused to make binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Through the voice of his adviser, Michael Froman, Obama said that the Copenhagen summit, which was to be held from December 7 to 18, would be just one step. The Americans would agree to sign an agreement on aid to poor countries affected by global warming, but want to postpone binding commitments to reduce CO2 emissions until later.

Mr. Sarkozy refuses this. Dreaming of pinching the United States and China, he wants to forge an alliance between industrialized countries, major emerging countries and countries that are most affected by global warming (non-Mediterranean Africa, threatened island states, Southeast Asia...). The unilateral commitments made by Brazil on Friday, November 13<sup>th</sup>, after those of the European Union, reinforce his strategy.

The Latin American giant is the first major emerging country to engage in this way. It is not going to slow down its economic expansion, but is committed to reducing 80% of the deforestation of the Amazon, controlling the effects of livestock farming and agriculture on the savannah, and limiting the use of nitrates in agriculture.

These measures would reduce the expected growth of greenhouse gas emissions from 36 to 39 percent by 2020, said Dilma Rousseff, the head of the Civil House, the Brazilian equivalent of prime minister and runner-up to Mr. Lula.

The effort proposed by Brazil “is equivalent to the proposal that Mr. Obama sent to the US Congress,” said the Brazilian president, who was received Saturday at the Elysée. “We do not have the right to allow President Obama and President Hu Jintao to celebrate an agreement merely based on the realities of their countries,” he warned, announcing that he would phone Mr. Obama on Monday on November 16<sup>h</sup> during the latter’s visit to China. “The world’s largest economy must live up to its responsibilities,” said Sarkozy, “We will not accept commitments while others say they will see tomorrow.”

One month before the Copenhagen summit, Sarkozy and Lula wanted to enlarge their troops. “With President Lula, we will go around to convince the world, because the world is multipolar,” said the French president, who plans to adopt the project that concocted by his minister of ecology, Jean-Louis Borloo. Titled with “Justice-climate”, this text of ten pages provides a funding of 450 billion euros over twenty years, three quarters of which are allocated to Africa.

Aimed at helping southern countries succeed in their energy transition and fight against the damage of global warming, this project includes a vast plan for the development of solar energy, reforestation and erosion control program, aid to countries threatened by rising sea levels. The whole thing would be financed by a 0.01% tax on financial transactions that would bring in 20 billion euros a year.

Sarkozy will meet with, in Brussels, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, host of the conference, to consolidate the position of European Union on Thursday, November 19<sup>th</sup>, before the European Council. He will then travel to Brazil, where Mr. Lula intends to convince the ten countries of the Amazon basin in Manaus in late November, to make commitments similar to those of his country.

The issue on November 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> will be persuading the Commonwealth countries, whose representatives will meet in Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has invited Sarkozy to attend the meeting. The challenge is to rally the English-speaking countries including Africa, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and India in particular.

New Delhi is a key player. To convince the second most populous country in the world, Borloo, who met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Friday, 13<sup>th</sup> in New Delhi, wants to “decouple” it from China. Its aid plan concerns countries that emit less than two tons of CO<sub>2</sub> per capita per year: India emits 1.2 tons and China 4.5 tons. According to the record, the United States emits 19 tons, and Europe 10.

Mr. Sarkozy plans to visit Africa at last, while his minister of ecology will also meet with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi, leader of Africans on Friday, 13<sup>th</sup>.

The French president hesitated to embark on the battle of Copenhagen. But it has made global warming an issue of domestic politics, with the introduction of an unpopular carbon tax. After promoting the emergence of the G20, he hopes to finalize climate commitments when he chairs this forum, as well as the G8 in 2011 ... Just before the 2012 presidential election.

## 2- La Chine s'apprête à s'engager à limiter ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre (Le Monde.fr | 25.09.2015 à 06h31 • Mis à jour le 25.09.2015 à 11h39 | Planète|417)

### China Prepares to Commit to Limiting its Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a historic commitment on Friday (September 25th) to launch a national program in 2017 to limit greenhouse gas emissions and force industries to buy carbon credits.

According to Obama administration officials quoted by *The New York Times*, this announcement was made during a summit meeting in the White House with President Obama. Divided on many issues, China and the United States wanted to use their influence at the international level to fight against global warming and to urge other nations to do the same.

#### QUOTA MARKET IN 2017

According to a US official, China should announce on Friday the establishment of a carbon quota market to give a price for carbon and thus encourage greenhouse gas emissions reductions in the industrial sector in 2017. The world's leading polluter has already conducted pilot experiments, but has not yet established a national market.

During their meeting in November 2014 in Beijing, MM. Obama and Xi had announced an unprecedented deal in which they presented their targets in terms of greenhouse gas emissions: a reduction of 26% to 28% by 2025 compared with that in 2005 by the United States, reaching a peak by 2030 by China.

#### DISCONTENT OF CHINESE PUBLIC OPINION

The heads of the two states will emphasize the wish of the two largest economies in the world to forge a deal on climate change in Paris in December, which commits all countries to curb their emissions. This program to create a cap-and-trade system would be an important step for China, who would thus be committed to reducing emissions from major industries such as steel, cement, paper and electric power.

According to officials of the Obama administration, China has been working on this specific plan since April. Internal and external pressures have led Chinese government to take stronger measures to reduce emissions from fossil fuels, particularly coal. The discontent of Chinese public opinion, tired of the pollution surrounding Beijing and many other cities, has prompted the government to introduce restrictions on coal. Chinese authorities are also seeing economic benefits in reducing the use of fossil fuels.