

The Constitutional Democrats and the Jews:
National Election Campaigns in Kiev Province, 1905-1912

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Department of History and Classics

University of Alberta

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ABSTRACT

This study explores a period of vibrant political life in Imperial Russia through the prism of electoral politics, a powerful modernizing force. In the early twentieth century, the empire embraced practices which transformed the power balance between the imperial centers and borderlands, with local initiative becoming an influential factor in imperial politics. The Russian Revolution of 1905 brought constitutional monarchy to multinational Imperial Russia, with almost universal male suffrage, and ushered in a new reality of mass politics. The elections to the State Duma – the first Russian parliament – and the preparation for them provided an avenue for politically active citizens of the Russian Empire to influence the future of Russia. Among them were Jews, who were legally deprived, but whom the election law had nevertheless enfranchised. They were restricted to reside in the Pale of Jewish Settlement, fifteen provinces in the Russian western borderlands, where they became prominent players in the national elections as candidates, political activists, and voters. Jewish support for the liberal party of Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) emerged as a prominent feature of provincial politics in the Pale.

This study focuses on the multiethnic province of Kiev and examines how the Kiev Kadets developed their electoral strategies to enlist the support of local Jews. Jews joined the Kadet provincial organization in large numbers and played a key role in articulating electoral strategies to mobilize Jewish support for the Kadets. In contrast to previous works of the Kadet Party, which have studied it from above, and those which examine Jewish electoral politics, this research places the Kadets' engagement with the Jewish population in Kiev province into the broader story of imperial politics and shows how ethnic politics influenced the Kadets' electoral strategies. Unlike other local studies that emphasize

confrontations among political parties or between the Christian population and the Jews, this dissertation tells a story of rapport and compromise in provincial politics.

This dissertation argues that electoral politics created a special realm which forced empire-wide political parties, provincial groups, and voters to raise and discuss questions of loyalties, identities, and political preferences in a modernizing empire. The measure of the Kadets' success in Kiev province lay in their ability to pursue a policy of cooperation in an increasingly divisive political environment. Despite rising Russian, Jewish, and Ukrainian nationalisms and polarization of society along class lines, the Kadet-Jewish cooperation repeatedly produced results, which illustrates the potential that the liberal program enjoyed among ethnic minorities. On a broader scale, this study shows that the liberals' electoral politics in Kiev province shaped the development of regional identities that were congruent with loyalties to a modernizing empire.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasure to acknowledge the material and intellectual support of the institutions and individuals that made the research and writing of this dissertation possible. At the earlier stages, the Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Scholarship, the Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky Award, and the Provost Doctoral Entrance Award funded my graduate education and research trips to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kyiv. The Kathryn Davis Graduate Student Travel Grant Program funded my trip to the Summer Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois. Grants from the Department of History and Classics at the University of Alberta allowed me to travel to numerous conferences to present the findings of my research.

My greatest debt is to my supervisors, David Marples and Heather Coleman, who advised me in my research and writing over many years. I benefitted greatly from the guidance of David Marples, who allowed me to explore the broader perspectives of my research and helped me shape the initial direction of my inquiry. Over the years, his comments and suggestions taught me to pay attention to the details and to write with more clarity. I am grateful to Heather Coleman for taking the supervisory duties later. She shared her extraordinary expertise in Imperial Russia with me and encouraged me to explore larger themes of my research. She helped me put my research back on track after I experienced a complete change in my life with the arrival of my daughter and guided me to complete my dissertation. I am grateful to my advisors for many more things that would be difficult to describe here.

I thank my professors and colleagues for their suggestions and criticism that I received at the East Europeanist Historians' Circle at the University of Alberta, especially Elena Krevsky, Victor Taki, and Eduard Baidaus. John-Paul Himka has served on my

committee and gave me his support. I have appreciated his stimulating questions, which inspired me to see new perspectives. Justine Gill patiently read early versions of two of my chapters, edited many pages of my brainstorming, and gave me encouragement. Aileen Friesen has carefully read many conference papers as well as parts of my chapters and worked with me to improve my presentations. On one key occasion, her insight helped me overcome a deep organizational crisis. She has been an exemplary colleague and friend, who inspired me with her thoughtful questions and reassuring comments.

I would like to thank the late John D. Klier for introducing me into the Jewish history in Imperial Russia. Alexei Miller advised me on my initial research question. My mentors Aaron Retish, Robert Weinberg, and Joshua Sanborn have counselled me through the period of intensive writing. Faith Hillis and Alexandra Corros offered me their advice at a time when I felt discouraged and sought a way out of an intellectual impasse. My thanks to all of them for their interest in me and my project. My friends Anna Eraut and Anna and Dmitry Nerukhs have always believed in me more than I have believed in myself. During the last two years, my friend Oksana Parhomenko read a daily portion of my writing every day, offering incomparable warmth and cheer. I am grateful to my students at the University of Alberta and University of Manitoba, as well as my students and colleagues at the private gymnasium in Ukraine, for stimulating my thinking about broader concepts in Russian history.

In four countries, librarians, archivists, and staff provided valuable assistance in my research. In Russia, I have worked in the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Historical Archive, and the Russian National Library. In Ukraine, I used the materials of the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, the State Archive of Kiev

Oblast, the State Archive of Kiev, and the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine. My special thanks to the staff of its Newspaper Department, whose assistance helped me complete my research at the shortest possible time. I have benefitted from attending the Summer Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois, where Joseph Lenkart and other librarians provided essential assistance in my working with primary sources. The staff of the library of the University of Alberta managed my numerous book requests. My special thanks to the librarians of the Interlibrary Loan Department, who found and delivered materials from all over North America and also from Germany and Russia. In St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kyiv, I enjoyed hospitality of Elena and Alexander Kalmykovy, Maria Kharshiladze, and Dar'ya Movchanets.

Finally, I would like to give my special thanks to my family. My husband Alexander, who agreed to relocate with me to Canada from Ukraine so I could pursue my doctorate, has supported me financially whenever my funds faded out and most importantly, he has retained his sanity throughout this journey. My daughter Elizabeth decided to be born in the middle of my research and since then has kept bringing her special approaches to my writing. My parents and mother-in-law took turns to endure many winter months in Edmonton, taking care of their granddaughter, while I travelled to Russia and Ukraine to work in the archives. My brother Pavel has always showed me his love and I value his friendship. My aunt Nadezhda has been by my side during many trying months for our family. My parents, Tatyana and Boris Sidorovy started me on my academic journey long before they became aware of this fact. My mother did not live to see the completion of my dissertation. To her and my father, I dedicate this work.

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Table 1. Qualifications of voters in the different groups according to the December 1905 electoral law.¹

DUMA 412 members from European Russia					
20 large cities elect 28 members of Duma			53 provincial electoral assemblies elect 384 members of Duma 6,041 electors		
City assembly		Provincial assembly			
Electors of (A) and (B) elect members of Duma from city		Electors of (C) , (D) , (E) , ² and (F) elect members of Duma from province			
Urban curia (A)	Worker curia (B)	Urban curia (C)	Land owner curia (D)	Peasant curia (E)	Worker curia (F)
		1341 electors (22.2%)	1,958 electors (32.4%)	2,527 electors (41.8%) ³	215 electors (3.6%) ⁴
Urban curia (G) (city voters)	Worker curia (H)	Urban curia (I) (city voters)	Land owner curia (J)	Peasant curia (K)	Worker curia (L)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Real estate owners 2. Owners of enterprises 3. Taxed artisans 4. Rent tax payers 5. Lessees of apartments 6. Employees of government and railroads elect electors (A)	Delegates from industrial enterprises (M) elect electors (B)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Real estate owners 2. Owners of enterprises 3. Taxed artisans 4. Rent tax payers 5. Lessees of apartments 6. Employees of government and railroads elect electors (C)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Large land owners 2. Large owners of land and other real estates 3. Owners of mining concessions 4. Managers of large land estates 5. Lessees of large land estates 6. Delegates from preliminary county assembly (N) elect electors (D)	Delegates from local assembly (O) elect electors (E)	Delegates from industrial enterprises (P) elect electors (F)
	Workers in larger enterprises (M) (having 50 or more employees) elect delegates to (H)		Preliminary county assembly (N)	Local assembly (O) (<i>volostnoi skhod</i>)	Workers in larger enterprises (P) (having 50 or more employees) elect delegates to (L)
			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Small land owners 2. Small land owners of land and other real estate 3. Clergymen elect delegates to (J)	Selectmen (<i>vybornye</i>) elect delegates (<i>upolnomochennye ot volostei</i>) to (K)	
				Peasants elect selectmen to (O)	

¹ Based on E.A. Goldenweiser, "The Russian Duma" in *Political Science Quarterly* 29, no 3 (September 1914): 408-422. Iu.A. Vedeneev and I.V. Zaitsev, "Rossiskoe obshchestvo i vybory," in *Vybory v I-IV Gosudarstvennye dумы Rossiiskoi imperii*, ed. A.V. Ivanchenko (Moscow: Tsentral'naia izbiratel'naia komissia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2008), 22.

² The total number of **(C)**, **(D)**, and **(E)** is 5,826 electors. *PSZ. Sobranie tretie. T. XXV. Otdelenie II. Prilozheniia*, 384-396.

³ The number of **(C)**, **(D)**, and **(E)** and the percentages are calculated. *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid. Otdelenie I.* 878-879.

Table 2. Qualifications of voters in the different groups according to the June 1907 electoral law.⁵

DUMA 403 members from European Russia						
5 large cities elect 16 members of Duma: 8 members from (A) and 8 members from (B)			53 provincial electoral assemblies elect 387 members of Duma 5270 electors			
First urban curia (well-to-do city voters) (A)	Second urban curia (poorer city voters) (B)	Provincial assembly of electors (C), (D), (E), (F), and (G) elect members of Duma from province				
1. Large real estate owners 2. Owners of large enterprises	1. Small real estate owners 2. Owners of small enterprises 3. Taxed artisans 4. Rent tax payers 5. Lessees of apartments 6. Employees of government and railroads	First urban curia (C) 736 electors (13.9%)	Second urban curia (D) 590 electors (11.2%)	Land owner curia (E) 2,664 electors (50.6%)	Peasant curia (F) 1168 electors (22.2%)	Worker curia (G) 112 electors (2.1%)
		First urban curia (H) (well-to-do city voters)	Second urban curia (I) (poorer city voters)	Land owner curia (J)	Peasant curia (K)	Worker curia (L)
		1. Large real estate owners 2. Owners of large enterprises elect electors (C)	1. Small real estate owners 2. Owners of small enterprises 3. Taxed artisans 4. Rent tax payers 5. Lessees of apartments 6. Employees of government and railroads elect electors (D)	1. Large land owners 2. Large owners of land and other real estates 3. Owners of mining concessions 4. Delegates from (M) (Preliminary county assembly) elect electors (E)	Delegates from local assembly (N) elect electors (F)	Delegates from industrial enterprises (O) elect electors (G)
				Preliminary county assembly (M)	Local assembly (N) (volostnoi skhod)	Workers in larger enterprises (O) (having 50 or more employees)
				1. Small land owners 2. Small land owners of land and other real estate 3. Clergymen elect delegates to (J)	Selectmen (vybornye) elect delegates (upolnomochennye ot volostei) to (K)	elect delegates to (L)
					Peasants	
					elect selectmen to (N)	

⁵ Based on E.A. Goldenweiser, "The Russian Duma" in *Political Science Quarterly* 29, no 3 (September 1914): 408-422. Iu.A. Vedeneev and I.V. Zaitsev, "Rossiskoe obshchestvo i vybory," in *Vybory v I-IV Gosudarstvennye dумы Rossiiskoi imperii*, ed. A.V. Ivanchenko (Moscow: Tsentral'naia izbiratel'naia komissia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2008), 22.

Table 3. Kiev province. Qualifications of voters in the different groups according to the December 1905 electoral law.⁶

DUMA					
16 members from Kiev province and city of Kiev			16 members from Kiev province and city of Kiev		
1 member of Duma from city of Kiev		Provincial electoral assembly elect 15 members of Duma from Kiev province 234 electors			
City assembly		Provincial assembly			
80 electors of (A) and ? electors from (B) elect members of Duma from city		234 electors of (C), (D), (E), and (F) elect members of Duma from province			
Urban curia (A)	Worker curia (B)	Urban curia (C)	Land owner curia (D)	Peasant curia (E)	Worker curia (F)
		71 electors (30.3%)	74 electors (31.6%)	80 electors (34.2%)	9 electors (3.8%)
Urban curia (G) (city voters)	Worker curia (H)	Urban curia (I) (city voters)	Land owner curia (J)	Peasant curia (K)	Worker curia (L)
1. Real estate owners 2. Owners of enterprises 3. Taxed artisans 4. Rent tax payers 5. Lessees of apartments 6. Employees of government and railroads elect electors (A)	Delegates from industrial enterprises (M) elect electors (B)	1. Real estate owners 2. Owners of enterprises 3. Taxed artisans 4. Rent tax payers 5. Lessees of apartments 6. Employees of government and railroads elect electors (C)	1. Large land owners 2. Large owners of land and other real estates 3. Owners of mining concessions 4. Managers of large land estates 5. Lessees of large land estates 6. Delegates from preliminary county assembly (N) elect electors (D)	Delegates from local assembly (O) elect electors (E)	Delegates from industrial enterprises (P) elect electors (F)
	Workers in larger enterprises (M) (having 50 or more employees) elect delegates to (H)		Preliminary county assembly (N) 1. Small land owners 2. Small land owners of land and other real estate 3. Clergymen elect delegates to (J)	Local assembly (O) (<i>volostnoi skhod</i>) Selectmen (<i>vybornye</i>) elect delegates (<i>upolnomochennye ot volostei</i>) to (K)	Workers in larger enterprises (P) (having 50 or more employees) elect delegates to (L)
				Peasants elect selectmen to (O)	

⁶ PSZ. *Sobranie tret'ie. T. XXV. Otdelenie II. Prilozheniia*, 384-389. Also "K vyboram v gos. dumu," *Kievskie otkliki*, 17 (30) January 1906, p. 5.

Table 4. Kiev province. Qualifications of voters in the different groups according to the June 1907 electoral law.⁷

DUMA 403 members from European Russia						
Members of Duma from city of Kiev 1 member from (A) and 1 member from (B)			Provincial electoral assembly elect 13 members of Duma from Kiev province 150 electors			
First urban curia (well-to-do city voters) (A)	Second urban curia (poorer city voters) (B)	Provincial assembly of electors (C), (D), (E), (F), and (G) elect members of Duma from province				
1. Large real estate owners 2. Owners of large enterprises	1. Small real estate owners 2. Owners of small enterprises 3. Taxed artisans 4. Rent tax payers 5. Lessees of apartments 6. Employees of government and railroads	First urban curia (C) 16 electors (13.9%)	Second urban curia (D) 15 electors (11.2%)	Land owner curia (E) 78 electors (50.6%)	Peasant curia (F) 36 electors (22.2%)	Worker curia (G) 5 electors (2.1%)
		First urban curia (H) (well-to-do city voters)	Second urban curia (I) (poorer city voters)	Land owner curia (J)	Peasant curia (K)	Worker curia (L)
		1. Large real estate owners 2. Owners of large enterprises elect electors (C)	1. Small real estate owners 2. Owners of small enterprises 3. Taxed artisans 4. Rent tax payers 5. Lessees of apartments 6. Employees of government and railroads elect electors (D)	1. Large land owners 2. Large owners of land and other real estates 3. Owners of mining concessions 4. Delegates from (M) (Preliminary county assembly) elect electors (E)	Delegates from local assembly (N) elect electors (F)	Delegates from industrial enterprises (O) elect electors (G)
				Preliminary county assembly (M)	Local assembly (N) (<i>volostnoi skhod</i>)	Workers in larger enterprises (O) (having 50 or more employees)
				1. Small land owners 2. Small land owners of land and other real estate 3. Clergymen elect delegates to (J)	Selectmen (<i>vybornye</i>) elect delegates (<i>upolnomochennye ot volostei</i>) to (K)	elect delegates to (L)
					Peasants	
					elect selectmen to (N)	

⁷ Based on E.A. Goldenweiser, "The Russian Duma" in *Political Science Quarterly* 29, no 3 (September 1914): 408-422. Iu.A. Vedeneev and I.V. Zaitsev, "Rossiskoe obshchestvo i vybory," in *Vybory v I-IV Gosudarstvennye dумы Rossiiskoi imperii*, ed. A.V. Ivanchenko (Moscow: Tsentral'naia izbiratel'naia komissia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2008), 22.

ABBREVIATIONS

d.	delo (file unit)
DAK	Derzhavnyi arkhiv mista Kyeva
DAKO	Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyivs'koi oblasti
f.	fond (archival group)
GARF	Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii
l.	list (sheet, page)
op.	opis' (archival subgroup)
PSZ	Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii
RGIA	Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv S.-Peterburga
TsDIAK	Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, m. Kyiv

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND DATES

I have provided a glossary of Russian words and terms. Except for names well known to readers of English in established transliterations, I have used the Library of Congress transliteration system. Names of residents of the Russian Empire as well as geographical names are given in Russianized form – thus Antonovich, not Antonovych or Antonowicz, and Kiev, not Kyiv or Kijów. Names such as Nicholas II and Witte appear in their familiar English form. All dates are given according to the Julian calendar, which Russia used at that time. In the twentieth century, the old calendar was thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar used in the West.

MAP 1



Provinces (*gubernii*) of European Russia. The Pale of Jewish Settlement outlined in bold. Drawn by the author.

MAP 2



Counties (*uezdy*) of Kiev province (*guberniia*) in early 20th century. Drawn by the author.

INTRODUCTION

For two months, in December 1906 and January 1907, the local police in the county town of Uman', located in the Russian borderland province of Kiev, was perplexed by short and seemingly random gatherings in the streets. They seemed not to be political demonstrations or public meetings; as soon as a police officer approached the group, all participants stopped their discussions and disappeared into the crowd. Eventually, the police found out that these were spontaneous electoral discussions that the rabbi of Uman', Aleksandr Grigor'evich Al'ter, was carrying out among local Jews in order to encourage them to participate in the upcoming national elections. Together with his associates, among whom were Jews and Christians, the rabbi Al'ter regularly conducted such conversations and reached informal electoral agreements with Jewish voters right in the streets – “on the fly,” as the police reports explained. These activists wanted to mobilize the Jewish vote for the liberal party of Constitutional Democrats in the upcoming elections to the State Duma – the Russian Imperial Parliament.⁸

The idea that Jewish voters would support a liberal party was not new in the Russian Empire, or outside it. However, such street tactics that brought electoral success to the Constitutional Democrats in the small borderland town of Uman' were uncharacteristic of this liberal party. It was closer to the illegal ways that the revolutionary parties in Russia used to involve ordinary people in politics and in stark contrast to the open public lectures the liberals usually preferred. Other moves, which included electoral discussions and negotiations under the guise of charitable and cultural societies' sessions, were more in line

⁸ Report of the assistant head of Kiev provincial police office in Uman' county, *Perepiska s Departamentom politsii, nachal'nikom Kievskogo okhrannogo otdeleniia i drugimi uchrezhdeniiami o vyborakh vo 2-u Gos. Dumu*. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 141.

with the liberals' traditional political techniques. Running such semi-legal gatherings at private homes was a risk that local organizers were apparently willing to take to bring electoral success to the liberals. This examination of local politics reveals a complex picture of ethnic, religious, and social relations in the Russian western borderlands. Here local initiative played a key role in how electoral preferences were formed and what political alliances became possible.

The early twentieth century was a period of vibrant political life in Imperial Russia that witnessed the emergence of new identities as well as profound changes in the existing ones. Along with this transformation, manifestations of persisting continuities in identities were abundant. This study explores this period through the prism of electoral politics, which became a powerful modernizing force in Imperial Russia. It focuses on the Constitutional Democrats, the largest empire-wide political party, which preached liberal principles of human dignity and individual rights. During these years, the power balance between the imperial centers and borderlands was transformed, with local initiative becoming an influential factor in imperial politics. The Russian Revolution of 1905⁹ brought constitutional monarchy to multinational Imperial Russia, with almost universal male suffrage, and ushered in a new reality of mass politics. The elections to the State Duma – the first Russian parliament – and the preparation for them provided an avenue for politically active citizens of the Russian Empire to attempt to influence the future of Russia.

⁹ Important works on the Revolution of 1905 are: Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905*, 2 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Laura Engelstein, *Moscow, 1905: Working Class Organization and Political Conflict* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Sidney Harcave, *First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905* (New York: Macmillan, 1964); *The Revolution of 1905 and Russia's Jews*, ed. Stefani Hoffman and Ezra Mendelsohn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Robert Weinberg, *The Revolution of 1905 in Odessa* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1993); Robert Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia's Southwest* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987).

Among them were Jews, a persecuted minority, whom the election law had nevertheless enfranchised with voting rights. They became important players in the first national elections and those that followed as candidates, political activists, and voters.

The liberal party of Constitutional Democrats (also known as the Kadets, based on the first letters of the party's name in Russian) showed interest in the status of Jews in Russia and the issue of infringements of their rights. The Kadets strove to mobilize the Jewish vote in provinces with a large Jewish population. In turn, Jews sought the support of the Kadets as an empire-wide political party that advocated the advancement of civil rights for all citizens of the empire. During the election campaigns, both sides were involved in joint electoral actions and mutual negotiations for electoral blocs. For many Jews, this cooperation with the Kadets meant a possible peaceful solution of the "Jewish question" in Russia. The national elections, for both the Kadets and Jews, heralded the birth of democratic culture in Russia, which offered the possibility for all Russian subjects to become involved in modern politics and, thereby, become Russian citizens.

National electoral campaigns are, of course, fought out on the ground in the provinces. Therefore, to succeed nationally, the Kadets had to carefully attune their election campaigns to local circumstances. Kiev province's special geographical and political position in the empire and the Pale of Jewish Settlement makes it an important site for a case study of how ethnic politics worked in the multinational western borderlands. The Pale was an area of fifteen Russian borderland provinces and Russian Poland, to which the Jews of Russia were officially restricted to reside. The city of Kiev, officially seen as the cradle of Russian statehood, was legally excluded from the Pale, which made even short stays in the city complicated for Jews, but did not keep them out completely. For a long

time, Kiev remained an attractive place for Jews to settle. The city was also the capital of the vast Southwestern Region,¹⁰ with a sizable Polish minority of Catholic faith, Orthodox Russians and Little Russians (Ukrainians), and a large Jewish population.¹¹ Kiev province's multiethnic composition played a major role in shaping the electoral strategies of the Kadets as well as other all-Russian and regional political parties and groups. During the election campaigns, the Kiev Kadets learned to cooperate with Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish national groups; some members of these groups were formally affiliated with the Kadet party. Along with the support of the local population for the Kadets, these interethnic ties often resulted in a broader success, as was the case when liaisons with the socialist party of the Jewish Bund led to a provincial electoral agreement between the Kadets and another empire-wide party, the Social Democrats.

The Kadets' focus on the mobilization of the Jewish vote was a prominent feature of their election campaigns in Kiev province. In the electoral competition, Jewish support mattered for a number of reasons. At the early stage of the parliamentary period, the Jewish community, due to their self-organizing efforts, quickly advanced in their electoral preparations. In contrast to some other key areas of the Pale, like Warsaw, where the Jewish community remained passive and waited for Polish political organizations to clarify and

¹⁰ The Southwestern Region was a subdivision of the Russian Empire included provinces of Kiev, Podol'e, and Volyn'. It corresponded to the Kiev Military District with the Governor General as its head.

¹¹ According to the Jewish Colonization Society, 12.03% of the province population was Jewish. *Sbornik Materialov ob Ekonomicheskoi Polozhenii Evreev v Rossii*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Evreiskoe Kolonizatsionnoe Obshchestvo, 1904), xxiv. However, Jews were concentrated mostly in the *uezd* towns. By the census year 1897, Kiev's Jewish population had reached 32,093 (12.09%). In 1910, of the city's nearly half-million population, 58,387 (about 12%) were Jewish. Michael Hamm, *Kiev, A Portrait, 1800-1917* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 128. Natan Meir, *Kiev, Jewish Metropolis: A History* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 277.

express their position toward the national elections,¹² many Jewish activists became a driving force of electoral politics in Kiev province. They readily joined the large conversation about national minorities' rights that the local Kadets voiced at public meetings and in the provincial press. As many local Jews became active participants in the Kadet campaign and designed many Kadet electoral strategies, they naturally directed their efforts at engaging the Jewish community in electoral politics. Thus, the Kadets' mobilization efforts toward the Jewish electorate were inextricably connected to the proactive position of provincial Jewish activists.

The multiethnic context of Kiev province complicated the Kadet-Jewish interaction. As in many other borderlands of Imperial Russia, national election campaigns triggered changes in the existing balance of manifold ethnic, religious, and social forces. As a result, the political profile of the province underwent a dramatic transformation over the years 1906-1912 since new political groups emerged, including socialist and monarchist, some of them with certain national – Ukrainian, Jewish, Polish, and Russian – overtones and of particular regional orientation. The Kiev Kadets themselves were transformed in the process of electoral preparations and administrative repressions, but also when dealing with the increasingly diversifying political landscape in the province. In particular, they started with open “regular” (pravil’nye) electoral meetings and frequent discussions in the local press, but soon resorted to “door-to-door” canvassing or conducting

¹² In his study of the Revolution of 1905 in Warsaw, Scott Ury examines electoral preparations to the First and Second Duma and shows that some Jewish leaders criticized the idea of an open alliance with the Kadets, fearing that it “might be seen as a threat to Polish demands for local rule.” Overall, the new democratic practices led to polarization of Warsaw society into two major national camps – Polish and Jewish. Scott Ury, *Barricades and Banners: The Revolution of 1905 and the Transformation of Warsaw Jewry* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 178.

“meetings on the fly” without protocols. Later, the cooperation with existing and emerging local Jewish groups became indispensable to the Kiev Kadets’ electoral campaigns.

In addition, the regime’s attempts to suppress the Kadets’ activities forced them to find ways around new administrative restrictions. The fact that the Kadet party was eventually denied official registration made their members look for political strategies that were not typical for liberals, who preferred practicing politics in the open and legal field. The government left less and less room for the Kadets to exist and operate openly, let alone to address the electoral expectations of the diverse provincial electorate. By summer 1912, the Kiev Kadets’ electoral rhetoric included hardly any specific references to national minorities’ rights or any regional overtones and increasingly resonated with the agenda that the Kadet leaders developed in the imperial centers. Yet it did not mean the end of the liberals’ advocacy of Jewish emancipation nor did they cease to see the need to mobilize the Jewish vote. The Kadets shifted their focus to what they perceived to be the fundamental solution of the problem: the need to establish the environment for achieving equality for Russian citizens. Thus, during the Duma period, the Kiev Kadets adjusted and readjusted their electoral policies in order to find new strategies to resolve new questions.

This study examines who the Kiev Kadets were and how they developed their electoral strategies to enlist the support of local Jews. Jews joined the Kadet provincial organization in large numbers in late 1905 and early 1906 and some of them played a key role in articulating electoral strategies to mobilize Jewish support for the Kadets. Remarkably, not only Jewish liberals, but also Zionists and some socialist Jewish elements supported the Kiev Kadet branch, which also included pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian moderates. This means that the Kiev Kadets successfully cut across traditional social and

communal lines. In this regard, the Kadet-Jewish cooperation shows that many Russian and Ukrainian liberals embraced a policy of inclusion of Jews. In turn, Jewish activists supported the Kadet Party despite manifestations of anti-Semitic attitudes among some local Kadets. In other words, liberalism provided a basis for interethnic and intercultural cooperation and became a foundation in the borderlands for certain electoral blocs that did not materialize elsewhere in the country.

This dissertation argues that electoral politics, which included electoral discussions at meetings and in the press, negotiations for electoral blocs and alliances as well as mastering the process of registration and providing legal aid for it, created a special realm which forced empire-wide political parties, provincial groups, and voters to raise and discuss questions of loyalties, identities, and political preferences in a modernizing empire. As a result, loyalties and identities were transformed, new ones were created, and political preferences were formed. In the process, the Kiev Kadets engaged in different activities such as educating voters about legal procedures and attempting to enlist the support of provincial political organizations and non-affiliated voters. The measure of the Kadets' success in Kiev province lay in their ability to pursue a policy of cooperation and agreement in an increasingly sophisticated and divisive political environment, when tensions rose between the landlords and the peasants, the Russian gentry and the Poles, the Jews and the Russian rightists, the provincial authorities and the Kadets. In the environment of rising Russian, Jewish, and Ukrainian nationalisms and polarization of society along national and class lines, Kadet-Jewish cooperation repeatedly produced results, which illustrates the potential that the liberal program enjoyed among ethnic minorities.

Imperial Russia is rarely seen as a country that experienced liberal culture. Often liberalism is perceived as a failed historical alternative to the tsarist autocracy or communist rule.¹³ As a philosophy of human dignity and human rights, Russian liberalism developed later than elsewhere in Europe. Most importantly, in contrast to some European countries, its origin was philosophical rather than being rooted in the political reality. It did not reflect a social process that had been long under way; rather it represented the theoretical explorations of several individuals, who were attracted to liberal ideas from Europe.¹⁴ Among those who embraced liberal thinking were some tsarist officials and the tsar Alexander II himself.¹⁵ At that time, rather than being a coherent theory that had arisen from social circumstances, Russian liberalism constituted several ideological trends. Many

¹³ In a historiographical overview, a leading Russian historian on Russian liberalism, V.V. Shelokhaev, analyzes the body of Russian-language scholarship on liberalism in Russia and Western Europe that emerged during the 1990s. His article outlines major trends in studying liberalism by Russian scholars as well as problems such as the shift of what he calls the Marxologist scholars to liberalism studies, who focus on “inculcating liberal values in social consciousness.” More fundamentally, Shelokhaev criticizes the theoretical and historiographic fragmentation of approaches, positions, and methods that scholars of liberalism have espoused. English translation V.V. Shelokhaev, “Russian Liberalism as a Historiographical and Historico-Philosophical Problem,” *Russian Studies in History* 37, no. 3, (Winter 1998-1999): 7-31. Russian version V.V. Shelokhaev, “Russkii liberalizm kak istoriographicheskaia i istoriosofskaia problema,” *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1998): 26-41. Shelokhaev is chair of the editorial board of the encyclopedia of political parties in late Imperial Russia. *Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets 19 – pervaiia tret’ 20 veka* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996).

¹⁴ On the humanist tradition in Russian philosophy see G.M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole, “Introduction” in *A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830-1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defense of Human Dignity*, ed. G.M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Randall A. Poole, “Editor’s Introduction: Philosophy and Politics in the Russian Liberation Movement” in *Problems of Idealism*, ed. Randall A. Poole (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 2003).

¹⁵ In his research on Russian liberalism, Victor Leontovitsch looks for liberalism in a broader sense. He pays attention to any move that could possibly set Russia on a liberal path. Therefore, he includes in his study many of the judicial ideas of Catherine the Great along with activities of the Union of Liberation on the eve of the 1905 Revolution. The first edition of his book was published in German in 1957. The first translation in Russian appeared in 1980. Victor Leontovitsch, *Istoriia liberalizma v Rossii, 1762-1914* (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1980). See also Anton Fedyashkin, review of *The History of Liberalism in Russia* by Victor Leontovitsch, *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 39 (2012): 285. In contrast to George Fischer, who examines liberalism as opposition to the government to bring changes into the Russian political system by the gentry and then later by the intelligentsia, Leontovitsch finds liberal strains in the highest state officials and considers reformist policies a part of Russian liberalism. George Fischer, *Russian Liberalism. From Gentry to Intelligentsia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958).

of the first liberals of the pre-reform and reform era of the 1860s, as well as those who espoused liberalism afterwards, looked to the autocratic state to promote liberal values and establish civic institutions. For example, Boris Chicherin, a nobleman and a scholar of philosophy and legal theory, belonged to the group of the liberal gentry who believed in gradualism and legal opposition. Their liberalism often consisted of their insistence on laws and legality and on the completion or continuation of the Great Reforms of the 1860s.¹⁶

The social base of the first Russian liberals was the lower nobility; the zemstvo institution that the government introduced in thirty-four inner Russian provinces as part of the Great Reforms became the first arena where they met, discussed, and developed their ideas. George Fischer outlines a broad picture of Russian liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century when it grew from being a state of mind into a political movement, before it set foot on the political stage of the Duma period. He argues that Russian liberalism moved from the rural self-governing institution of the zemstvo, where it was owned by the middle landowning nobility, to a liberal party of the Constitutional Democrats, which was comprised of the new professional middle class. Fischer stresses the role that this new class – the intelligentsia – played in the development of liberalism in Russia in the absence of a strong Russian bourgeoisie. The zemstvos became a meeting point for the liberal intelligentsia and the liberal gentry. Over the 1890s the intelligentsia

¹⁶ The key early theorists of Russian liberalism were Konstantin Kavelin (1818-1885) and Boris Chicherin (1828-1904). On Kavelin see Daniel Field, "Kavelin and Russian Liberalism," *Slavic Review*, 32, no. 1 (March 1973): 59-78. On Chicherin see G. M. Hamburg "Peasant Emancipation and Russian Social Thought: The Case of Boris Chicherin," *Slavic Review* 50, no. 4 (Winter, 1991): 890-904 and G.M. Hamburg *Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism, 1828-1866* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

assumed the leadership of what was becoming a liberal movement; as a result, the movement shifted left and the gentry lost its prominence in it.¹⁷

The findings of this dissertation confirm several problems with Fischer's attempt to explain the "leftward shift" in Russian liberalism, which those historians who pay attention to the transition period of 1900-1905 have emphasized. First, Fischer overlooks the importance of the journal *Osvobozhdenie* and the Union of Liberation, which organized broader members of society around the liberation program in 1902-1905. Gregory Freeze and Judith Zimmerman critique Fischer's notion of two types of liberal leadership.¹⁸ Instead, Freeze accounts for it as the outcome of gradual radicalization of the zemstvo members – the gentry as well as the intelligentsia – as a response to the pressure from the government on the zemstvo. He underscores the liberals' increasingly mixed background and the role that the Union of Liberation played in the broadening of the liberal movement. Both Freeze and Zimmerman polemicize with Fischer from the perspective of the imperial center and find his approach inadequate for explaining the principal changes in liberal leadership.

¹⁷ George Fischer, *Russian Liberalism. From Gentry to Intelligentsia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958). In his illuminating essay on two types of Russian liberalism, Michael Karpovich stresses the diverse definitions of the middle class. Its middle position, Karpovich explains, "indicates its central position in a given society, and consequently the nature of the middle class can vary from one country to another, in accordance with the country's social structure." "Two Types of Russian Liberalism: Maklakov and Miliukov," Ernest J. Simmons, ed., *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1955): 129. On one of the earliest organizations which played a transitory role for the constitutional-reform movement from the zemstvo to political parties see Terence Emmons, "The Beseda Circle, 1899-1905," *Slavic Review* 32, no. 3 (September, 1973): 461-490.

¹⁸ Gregory Freeze, "A National Liberation Movement and the Shift in Russian Liberalism, 1901-1903," *Slavic Review*, 28, no. 1 (March, 1969): 81-91. Judith Zimmerman, "Between Revolution and Reaction: The Russian Constitutionalist-Democratic Party, October 1905-June 1907" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1967). On the Union of Liberation, see Shmuel Galai, *The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900-1905* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973). In the article on the *Beseda* circle, another organization outside of the zemstvo which embraced members of the constitutional-reform movement, Terence Emmons shows the diverse range of political opinions of its members. Terence Emmons, "The Beseda Circle, 1899-1905," *Slavic Review*, 32, no. 3 (September, 1973): 461-490.

Second, Fischer's analysis of how Russian liberalism took shape underlines the significance of the zemstvo institution in this process at the earlier stages. However, beyond the scope of the picture that Fischer creates are the imperial borderlands, multiethnic and otherwise diverse, where the zemstvo system was not launched until 1911. In Kiev province, where there was no zemstvo, but where a branch of the Union of Liberation – an oppositional organization that embraced many intelligentsia members – did exist at least in 1904-1905, liberalism's story was different. As in the rest of the borderlands, many future Kadet members in Kiev province belonged to the national minorities' intelligentsia, whose political aspirations were tied to the fate of these minorities in Russia. This fact reveals a more sophisticated interpretation of the liberals' social base than Fischer presents when he lists the press, universities, and professions as key arenas for Russian liberalism at the turn of the century. The presence of some former zemstvo members among the Kiev Kadets only confirms the thesis about the complexity of the liberal leadership in the borderland provinces.¹⁹

Previous studies on the Kadet party and the Duma period have provided the imperial context from different perspectives. Melissa Stockdale's biography of the leader of the Kadets, Pavel Miliukov, offers many insights into how the Kadet leadership operated and how decisions within it were made. She illuminates the challenges for the liberal party of the Kadets when operating in an illiberal climate.²⁰ The works and memoirs of the Kadet leader, Pavel Miliukov, are a special body of the literature that falls into a special category

¹⁹ The future head of the Kiev Kadets, Ivan Luchitskii had strong zemstvo connections, but in the city of Poltava city, where he served an elective member. In Kiev, he became a member of the city council (duma). He was a prominent historian of medieval France, "Luchitskii" in *Entsiklopediia Brokgauza i Efrona*.

²⁰ Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880-1918* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

of primary sources. Miliukov's educational background as a historian influenced many of his writings tremendously. He was well aware of his role as a politician whose activity would influence not only the immediate future of Russia, but also distant events. In his editorials in the Kadet newspaper *Riech'*, Miliukov sometimes engaged in explanation not only for contemporary audience, but also for posterity. As to his memoirs, Miliukov was interested in the empire-wide decisions that the leadership of the party had to make. He describes events in the provinces outside of St. Petersburg and Moscow if he participated in them, such as his trip to Kiev concerning the complications of the celebration of the Shevchenko anniversary in 1910. In emigration, Miliukov returned to his research and wrote extensively on the history of Russia, including the Duma period.²¹ Although Miliukov's position was teleological and positivist, his writings display broad erudition and sharp understanding of events. Therefore, they can be treated as part of the historiography of the subject matter.

Russian scholars have researched the Kadets as a "bourgeois" or "counter-revolutionary" party during the Soviet period and continued their work with increased effort after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Naturally stressing the class character of the Kadets, the most prominent Russian historians of the Kadets, V.V. Shelokhaev and N.G. Dumova, have examined the party from the imperial center. They focus their research on broad questions such as the role of the Kadets in the Revolution of 1905, their politics during the First World War, or their relationship with the Social Democrats. Shelokhaev continues his investigation of the Kadets beyond the 1907 threshold. He explores the

²¹ P.N. Miliukov, *Natsional'nyi vopros: proiskhozhdenie natsional'nosti i natsional'nye voprosy v Rossii* (Moscow: Gos. publichnaia istoricheskaia biblioteka Rossii, 2005), *Vospominaniia* (New York: Izd-vo im. Chekhova, 1955), and *History of Russia*, v. 3 (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968).

ideology, political program, tactics, and organizational structure of the party, including the general picture of its weakening local groups. Along with Dumova's first political biography of P.N. Miliukov, Shelokhaev's works remain the major research on the Kadets available in Russian.²²

National elections in Imperial Russia have received attention from English- and Russian-language scholars. Terence Emmons' study of the elections to the First Duma analyzes how the existing political organizations coalesced into parties in a country where the state had a monopoly on politics. Emmons emphasizes that the electoral preparations became a formative experience for the two major political parties that he defines as "constitutionalist" – the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Union of October 17 – and their allies in the provinces. Fundamentally, he tells the story of how these parties came into existence in the process of rapid political mobilization and how they interacted with each other. Emmons aims to present a broad geographical perspective of the first national elections. By doing so, he brings into sharp focus existing political forces that supported a constitutional order in Russia by that time, namely the Kadets and the Octobrists.²³

Alfred Levin researched the Second and the Third Duma, including elections to both. His account of the Second Duma centers on the attitude towards parliamentary work and the elections of the Social Democratic Party. Levin also examines the work of the

²² V.V. Shelokhaev, *Kadety – glavnaia partiia liberal'noi burzhuazii v bor'be s revoliutsiei 1905-1907 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983) and Shelokhaev, *Ideologiya i politicheskaia organizatsiia rossiiskoi liberal'noi burzhuazii, 1907-1914* (Moscow: Nauka, 1991). N.G. Dumova and V.Ia. Laverychev, *Kadetskaia partiia v period pervoi mirovoi voiny i Fevral'skoi revoliutsii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), N.G. Dumova, *Liberal v Rossii: istoricheskii portret P.N. Miliukova* (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1993), A.I. Zavelev and N.G. Dumova *Istoriia politicheskikh partii Rossii* (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1994). For an extensive list of Russian historians, who have worked on Russian liberalism, see *Liberalizm v Rossii*, ed. V.F. Pustarnakov and I.F. Khudushina (Moscow: Institut filosofii RAN, 1996).

²³ Terence Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1983).

Duma itself. The second book focuses more narrowly on the elections to the Third Duma and its profile. In it, Levin illustrates how the process of national elections consisted of multiple divergent activities across the provinces of the Russian Empire. He shows, for example, how branches of the Social Democrats and their attitude to the elections varied in the borderlands. Levin thus questions the inevitability of Russia's radicalization.²⁴ Like Stockdale, Levin looks into the period from the imperial center. Both scholars do pay attention to various regions of the country and hint at the possibilities that regional and local research can offer; however, they focus on the overall picture.

This dissertation draws on this English and Russian scholarship in many ways and treats it as a starting point for regional research. It moves the emphasis, however, from the capitals and broader context to the borderlands. Its microhistorical perspective is instrumental for understanding how electoral alliances in the provinces were made and how ethnic differences complicated this process. The few studies of provincial Kadet organizations in the elections suggest that they faced distinctive local contexts in running their election campaigns. Illuminating local studies of the national elections include works on Nizhnii Novgorod province in 1905-1907 by F.A. Seleznev and the Ekaterinburg Kadets by I.V. Narskii. In his study of Ekaterinburg province, Narskii argues that the local Kadets became the primary target and concern for both the leftists and the rightists during the electoral campaigns to the First and the Second Duma.²⁵ Natal'ia Selunskaiia and Rolf Torstendahl's examination of democratic culture in Russia studies two sets of Russian

²⁴ Alfred Levin, *The Second Duma: A Study of the Social-Democratic Party and the Russian Constitutional Experiment* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966) and *The Third Duma, Election and Profile* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973).

²⁵ F.A. Seleznev, *Vybory i vybor provintsii: partiia kadetov v Nizhegorodskom krae, 1905-1907 gg.* (Nizhnii Novgorod: Izdatel'stvo Nizhegorodskogo universiteta, 2001). I.V. Narskii, *Kadety na Urale* (Sverdlovsk: Izdatel'stvo Ural'skogo universiteta, 1991).

provinces in the national elections in 1905-1907 – Voronezh, Vladimir, Kaluga, Tambov, the Don Military Region, and Nizhnii Novgorod. These case studies reveal differences in electoral experience even within geographically close central provinces, which proves the importance of regional research in the diverse Russian Empire.²⁶ This dissertation also centers on a particular province in Russia, which was fundamentally different due to its location in the multiethnic and religiously diverse western borderlands. This unique story of Kiev province is an essential part of Russian imperial history.

The timeframe distinguishes this dissertation from the aforementioned local studies. My research spans a longer period of electoral politics and includes all four elections campaigns that took place in Imperial Russia. By doing so, it provides a look into some general political trends in the country. If the Revolution of 1905 opened up new avenues for Russian subjects to partake in the governance of the country, the later period, from summer of 1906 through the first half of 1907 saw more closed doors for political freedom and negotiations with the regime. After the dismissal of the Second Duma and illegal change of the electoral law in June 1907, the political atmosphere stiffened significantly. Nevertheless, there is value in extending the timeframe beyond this threshold as the activity of the oppositional parties – liberal as well as leftist ones – continued throughout the period of reaction. Of course, while revolutionary parties had already had experience in operating illegally, non-revolutionary parties had to adjust their work to the current political conditions and devise new electoral strategies. As they did not give up on their work, the examination of all the four electoral campaigns is expedient for our

²⁶ Natal'ia Selunskiaia and Rolf Torstendahl, *The Birth of Democratic Culture in Late Imperial Russia. Reforms and Elections to the First Two National Legislatures, 1905-1907* (Englewood, CO: Altus History, 2012).

understanding of deeper changes in Russian society and the extent to which democratic political culture took root in late Imperial Russia.

Some specific developments in Kiev province also invite investigation beyond the 1907 boundary. The rightist movement, which the opposition forces regarded as a major actor in Russia's politics, was especially prominent in the Southwestern region. The city of Kiev was one of its important centers; the Kadets with their interest in the Jewish vote became a key target of the rightists. Don Rawson maintains that the rightists' struggle against liberal constitutionalism and revolutionary violence lost its momentum after 1907, when both their enemies had been contained. Yet, as this dissertation reveals, the Kiev Kadets and the rightist coalition were close rivals, who effectively mobilized voters during the third electoral campaign, after the revised electoral law was introduced. Moreover, in the Third Duma the dramatic change in the Octobrists' position and the rise of the nationalist group, which soon coalesced into the Nationalist Party, transformed the political environment all over Russia, but most prominently in the Southwestern Region. Geoffrey Hosking explores the 3 June [1907] system, an alliance of Stolypin's government with the Octobrist majority in the Duma, which eventually failed by 1911. Hosking illustrates the complicated nature of the period of constitutional experiment.²⁷ In turn, Robert Edelman explores the rise of the nationalists in the Duma, whose headquarters Kiev province became, and shows its impact on the power balance in Kiev tremendously²⁸ and made the

²⁷ Geoffrey Hosking, *The Russian Constitutional Experiment. Government and Duma, 1907-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). On the Duma politics in Russian, see old but thorough research of the Soviet historians A.Ia. Avrekh and V.S. Diakin. A. Ia. Avrekh, *Stolypin i tret'ia Duma* (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), *Tsarizm i tret'eiiun'skaia sistema* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), *Raspad tret'eiiun'skoi sistemy* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985). Also V.S. Diakin, *Samoderzhavie, burzhuaziia i dvorianstvo* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1978) and *Burzhuaziia, dvorianstvo i tsarism* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1988).

²⁸ Robert Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the eve of the Russian Revolution. The Nationalist Party, 1907-1917* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1980).

electoral campaign to the Fourth Duma important for understanding the Kiev Kadets' attitude toward the national minorities. Challenged by the Kiev nationalists as being a pro-Jewish party, the Kiev Kadets conducted their electoral campaign in the atmosphere of the absence of the Jewish electorate. This study traces changes in Kadet policies through all national elections and dwells on long-term tendencies in the Kiev Kadets' relationship with Jewish voters.

Essential to this study is the Jewish perspective. Jews' legal position in Russia was far more challenging than that of any other non-Russians. They represent an illuminating example of how a local community was transformed and how its members embarked on taking their fate in their own hands. Specialists in Jewish history have explained much of the story about the role that politics played in the plight of the Jews in Russia. Some important studies focus on the Jewish socialist or national movements or activities of Jewish political parties rather than the interaction between Russian and Jewish political camps.²⁹ Christoph Gassenschmidt studies Jewish liberal politics in Russia on the eve of the First Russian Revolution and during the Duma period. He defines this period as a new stage in Jewish politics, when Jewish social and political activists participated in Russian politics by establishing political parties and organizations. Gassenschmidt explains that political demands for equality of rights and national and cultural autonomy for the Jews became the main themes of disputes and conflicts among the groups of the Jewish political

²⁹ Useful for this dissertation is Joshua Zimmerman's study of the Jewish Bund and Polish Socialist Party in the late imperial period in Russia. He examines the politics of nationality from both national (Jewish and Polish) and class (socialist) perspectives. Zimmerman argues that the interaction between Polish and Jewish socialists affected the formation of a national agenda in the Jewish political camp. Joshua Zimmerman, *Poles, Jews, and the Politics of Nationality: The Bund and the Polish Socialist Party in Late Tsarist Russia, 1897-1914* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); and Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 862-1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

camp. He also addresses electoral politics and offers a general picture of the electoral competition among Jewish parties and groups. He connects his analysis of the Jewish situation to mainstream Russian politics and imperial history, and shows how empire-wide context affected Jewish activists.³⁰

This dissertation examines many of the questions that Gassenschmidt raises, but from the Russian liberals' point of view. By making the Kadets' engagement with the local Jewish population its focus, this work shows how ethnic politics influenced the Kadets' electoral strategies. There are further important differences. This study treats Jewish members of the Kadet party not as a separate group, which they were not, but as an organic part of the party. Furthermore, like many students of this period in Russian history, Gassenschmidt leaves the fourth electoral campaign outside his investigation. By contrast, this research follows the electoral story through 1912, providing a more nuanced picture of electoral negotiations in a particular province and explaining how practical considerations led to decisions about political cooperation. Overall, Gassenschmidt's account provides a middle-range context for the current work.

In his study of the 1905 Revolution in Warsaw, Scott Ury challenges the concept of the continuity of "the Jewish community." He suggests studying life among Jews beyond Jewish communal institutions and aims to problematize the very notion of a separate Jewish history.³¹ Rather than discussing political ideologies and movements, Ury is interested in

³⁰ Christoph Gassenschmidt, *Jewish Liberal Politics in Tsarist Russia, 1900-1914* (New York: New York University Press, 1995).

³¹ In his introduction, Scott Ury explains that he challenges two concepts of Jewish history: modernity and agency in Jacob Katz' model and Simon Dubnov's theory of Jewish communal autonomy. As to the former, Ury challenges the idea that Jews were the ultimate masters of Jewish history and fate and that they were able to control them. In case of Dubnov's concept of the Jewish community, Ury disagrees with the continuity of the communal institutions and sees it as Dubnov's motivation to regularize the past at the moment of an

the more basic questions such as the culture of modern Jewish politics. This dissertation, by contrast, is situated thematically at the crossroads of the two mainstreams of history – Jewish national and Russian imperial – and pays attention to those individuals who have been often seen if not as marginal then not central in either. The Jewish liberals espoused a political outlook less nationally coloured than that of many other Jewish parties’ supporters (with the exception of the Bund). They also did not form a separate Jewish liberal party, but established the Jewish People’s Group when they were pressed to respond to the organizational moves on the part of the Zionists. Thus, they did not move in the same direction as many other Jewish parties. In turn, the provincial Kadets with their multiethnic composition were different from the Kadets in the capitals of St. Petersburg and Moscow. In fact, they were different from other borderland provinces too. More studies on the Kadets in borderlands will reveal their differences, thereby providing a better understanding of Russian liberalism.

Ury’s work provides a valuable case study of urban politics, which shows how Jewish support of the Kadet party was not natural or imminent as it did not happen in the city of Warsaw. To understand why such support occurred in Kiev province, it is important to analyze other factors that were in play here, such as the presence of other ethnic groups. The city of Kiev was the center of Russian Ukraine, thus scholars who have researched it pay attention to Ukrainian nationalism.³² Yet local studies of elections in this region are scarce. The few that exist emphasize confrontations between political parties and the success of divisive anti-Semitic or anti-bourgeois appeals, and the fanning of national

insecure present. Scott Ury, *Barricades and Banners: The Revolution of 1905 and the Transformation of Warsaw Jewry* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

³² See, for instance, Olga Andriewsky, *The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 1904-1912* (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1991).

rivalries more generally. Faith Hillis's extensive analysis of urban politics in Kiev and Natan Meir's account of Kiev as a Jewish metropolis underscore divisions between ethnic groups and within them and Michael Hamm's work emphasizes the class struggle and anti-Semitic violence.³³ Amidst these tendencies, however, this work points to a story of connection and compromise during the election campaigns to the State Duma in Kiev province. This case study reveals what other scholars have missed: how ethnic politics created opportunities for local actors to cooperate and how liberals used these opportunities, providing a workable political framework for those alliances.

Fundamentally, this is a story of cooperation, the fluidity of regional and imperial loyalty, of accepting diversity and recognizing its workability. The liberal party of the Kadets played a unifying "above-parties" role for politically and ethnically diverse elements in Kiev, including the Ukrainian liberals and the Jewish socialists, which saw the advantages of compromise over confrontation and intransigence, and formed complex electoral alliances, however short-lived and expedient, on that basis. Anti-Semitism's role in these processes went far beyond rivalry. Whereas the traditional story attributes the failure of liberal politics in Kiev to anti-Semitism and interethnic strife, the examination of politics on the ground demonstrates that anti-Semitism not only challenged the liberal movement, but also spurred a political dialogue among moderates and of moderates with leftists, leading to a broad political compromise based on a liberal platform. Liberalism

³³ Michael Hamm, *Kiev. A Portrait* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). Faith Hillis examines the formation of the Russian national project in the imperial periphery centered around the city of Kiev. She suggests that rival interactions between activists of the Ukrainian and Russian national projects contributed to shaping their competitors' movements. Faith Hillis, *Children of Rus': Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of the Russian Nation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). Natan Meir focuses not only on Kiev Jewry and its lived experience, but also on rising anti-Jewish hostilities, the tsarist regime's policy of segregation and Judeophobia. Natan M. Meir, *Kiev, Jewish Metropolis, 1859-1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

rose from the ashes during each election campaign to reject the politics of division and antiliberalism, despite the difficulty of actually achieving representation in the carefully rigged system of post-1907 electoral procedures.

The Kadets' sophisticated campaigns to mobilize the Jewish vote reveal the complexity of the relationship between liberalism and anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia. Despite the potential benefit of playing the anti-Jewish card in provincial politics, the case study of Kiev province shows the Kadets' resolute refusal to engage in and with anti-Semitic discourse. The willingness of various provincial political groups to cooperate with the Kadet party illustrates that, along with their staunch allegiance to particular national and political agendas, they accepted the principles of liberal ideology and saw its increasing relevance to broader imperial politics. Their support of liberal politics in the national elections demonstrates that anti-Semitism did not doom liberalism to failure in Imperial Russia.

Furthermore, the evolution of the Kadet-Jewish relationship, from the Kadet party being a welcome and powerful leader for local national minorities group to the Jewish organizations' rejection of cooperation with the Kadets as they tried to assert their own emancipation agenda, shows not that the Jews were alienated from liberalism, but that they learned from the cooperation with the Kadets that the Jewish voice could matter in determining their own future, the future of the province and thus of the empire. The seeming divorce of the Jewish politics from Russian liberalism was a stage in their relationship when Jewish groups wanted to find their distinct ways to participate in imperial politics. Therefore, it became important for them not to merge with the larger party of Constitutional Democrats, but to establish themselves as its more equal partners. The case

of the Zionists, who hoped to set up a separate section within the Jewish liberals' League for the Attainment of Full Rights of the Jewish People could serve as an example of such an approach.

Not only does this study take a regional approach, it explores Russian liberalism's electoral politics from below, starting at the grassroots. Beginning from the electoral preparations for the consultative, "Bulygin" Duma, whose convocation was announced in August 1905, many local figures demonstrated a capacity to organize efficient and sophisticated electoral campaigns without guidance or urging from the capital. In this respect, Jewish activists were especially successful in mobilizing the Jewish community for participation in the preparations and elections. The search for the particular and non-typical drives this work to explore what constituted the modern culture of mass politics outside the imperial core. The aim of presenting the case study of Kiev province is not to prove universal tendencies developing in a constitutional Russia, or to confirm what studies of the central regions and capitals have found, but to explore divergences and find questions that might challenge the existing approaches. Therefore, this research values and presents the local stories revealed by archival sources and the local press. The lived experience of those who engaged in electoral campaigns is at the core of this work.

The journey begins with people on the ground, their reaction to the news about the introduction of the Duma, their willingness, as Scott Ury phrases it, to "[seek] and [fight] to control their own fates"³⁴ by becoming involved in political discussions, their initiative to master politics and to lead local communities through this process. When politicization gained momentum, many clashes of opinion and conflicts developed, even though they

³⁴ Scott Ury, *Barricades and Banners. The Revolution of 1905 and the Transformation of Warsaw Jewry* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 2.

were sometimes driven by the desire to reach the same goal but in different ways or just at a different pace. At the same time, local political groups started interacting with each other and with empire-wide political parties as well as encountering a response from the authorities. Overall, the process of alliance building contributed to the development of manifold cleavages, which in turn created the necessity for more sophisticated compromise and negotiations during electoral preparations. The stakes were higher than just a victory in a particular province; national elections provided a ticket to national politics and an opportunity to raise local concerns at one of the highest bodies of power. This dissertation follows the events on the ground and seeks to explain how personal choices were made and what were the outcomes of this process. Therefore, a key theme here is provincial politics.

This dissertation studies the Kiev Kadets and their electoral strategies toward the Jews as a useful perspective to make larger inquiries in Russian history. Russia was becoming modern, and in the various peripheries this occurred in their own, distinctive ways. One of the indicators of this process was the development of political differences and divergences, which means that disparate new identities were being formed and some existing ones were reinforced due to the electoral mobilization at that time. The Kadets' electoral strategies contributed to the differentiation of the provincial political landscape. Their drive to build and lead the oppositional coalition provides a useful framework for studying such questions as why provincial actors were willing to pursue politics of cooperation and how it worked. By crossing the divide of the 1907 political crisis, this study illustrates that these sentiments persisted despite severe restrictions that the tsarist regime placed on the political activity of the Kadet party. The Kadets looked for new ways of reaching their voters via cultural and professional unions, but due to the pressure of

political persecution – police searches, arrests, and bans on public meetings, – communications between party branches weakened and vertical links also withered within the party. By 1912, the party existed only during election campaigns and depended entirely on provincial resources and individual initiatives. Under these circumstances, the Kiev Kadets continued successfully to build an electoral coalition, although its nature changed. Thus, this study shows that the Kiev Kadets took seriously the possibility of reaching across cleavages and that their efforts resonated with many voters of the province, including Jewish ones. Therefore, liberalism had much to offer that the peripheries would be willing to consume.

The problem of anti-Semitism runs through this research as it became a challenge and provided opportunities for electoral politics of the Kiev Kadets. The Kiev rightists, capitalizing on Jewish engagement in liberal politics, embraced anti-Semitic rhetoric as a tool for their own consolidation. As a result, Kiev emerged as the birthplace of the Russian rightist movement.³⁵ The infamous 1911-1913 trial of Mendel Beilis on the accusation of blood libel, which took place in Kiev, illustrates the growth of anti-Semitism in Russia and reveals sharp ideological divisions within society. Yet it also demonstrates how modern politics penetrated the provinces as Russian nationalist actors openly called on their colleagues to learn from the liberals how to efficiently engage in electoral practice. The Kiev liberals organized not only their own provincial activities, but they also influenced their staunch rivals' attitudes toward electoral politics. Politics descended to the grass roots

³⁵ In the survey of the Russian rightists, Don Rawson devotes a separate chapter to the western borderlands. Don Rawson, *Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For an analysis of the formation of the Russian Nationalist Party, whose social base became the Russian gentry of the western borderlands, see Robert Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907-1917* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980).

and acquired a mass character. The process of becoming modern was self-perpetuating in the provinces.

This study makes use of a wide variety of sources from both the imperial and the provincial centers. In the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) in Moscow, I worked with the records, reports, and correspondence of the Police Department, including government correspondence with local authorities, provincial reports to the imperial center, and secret police files on the surveillance of political activities in the provinces. I studied the internal documents of the Kadet party and its Central Committee, and papers of its leader, Pavel Miliukov – two vast bodies of documents that have been also preserved in the State Archive. I also worked with sources from the provinces of the south-western region such as official reports and materials of electoral campaigns produced by political organizations other than the Kadets. The Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA) in St. Petersburg preserves the minutes of voting at the provincial assemblies as well as the internal correspondence of the League for the Attainment of Full Rights of the Jewish People in Russia. In Kyiv, I surveyed the files of the secret police in Kiev province and the Southwestern Region at the Central State Historical Archive in Kiev (TsDIAK) and the State Archive of Kiev Oblast (DAKO), as well as the personal files of the Kiev Kadets' head, Professor Ivan Luchitskii, at the Institute of Manuscripts of the Vernadsky National Library. In addition to these archival materials, this study draws on a wide range of printed sources such as political pamphlets and memoirs of prominent Kadets as well as their political rivals. Key to this study is the central and local periodical press, which I accessed in many university and state libraries in Ukraine, Russia, Canada, and the USA. By bringing together voices of personal correspondence of Kadets, internal records of the

Kadet party institutions, the archives of government, and the periodicals from the imperial and provincial centers, this dissertation aims to recreate a dynamic picture of the liberals' participation in the national elections with their hopes and frustrations, promises and negotiations, regional patriotism and rivalries, cooperation and intransigence, imperial loyalties and sensitivities to political ideologies from the perspective of Kiev province.

This dissertation opens by setting up the circumstances within which the Constitutional Democrats sought to establish themselves as an empire-wide political party in the wake of the 1905 Russian Revolution. It explores how the Kiev provincial branch was formed and how it developed its attitude toward the Jewish electorate. The preparations for the elections to the First Duma became a formative experience for the Kadets. From the outset of the Kiev Kadet organization's existence, its multiethnic leadership attached great importance to the question of Jewish emancipation and included it into its electoral campaign. In turn, the political self-mobilization of the Jews in Russia had been on the rise since March 1905, when The League for the Attainment of Full Rights for the Jewish People, the largest legal Jewish political organization in Russia, was founded.³⁶ Under its leadership, many Jews of Kiev province – both members of Jewish political groups and those who were not affiliated with any parties – united their efforts in preparation for the elections. The two organizations, the Kiev Kadets and the Jewish League's branch in Kiev province, drew on each other's initiative and expertise and supported each other. The overlap between their memberships was remarkable; it conditioned a high level of cooperation, although the unity of Jewish provincial activists was problematic due to their communal and political differences. The first chapter thus

³⁶ *Soiuz dlia dostizheniia ravnopraviiia evreiskogo naroda v Rossii.*

tells the story of the emerging Kadet-Jewish cooperation and explores controversies within it. It explains how the Kiev branch of the Kadet party managed to remain above the tensions within the Jewish camp and succeeded in enlisting the support of Jewish voters in the first national elections.

Chapter Two focuses on how the Kiev Kadets responded to the changes in the political landscape which took place after the first elections and the short session of the First Duma. Held under the same electoral law, the second elections returned a more balanced picture of voting patterns because the socialists entered the electoral competition, and the Russian rightist political groups started organizing themselves across the country and most prominently in Kiev province. With the Jewish political camp experiencing the process of differentiation, local Jewish groups sought to establish themselves as independent political players and to assert their influence on voters. Thus, the Kadets' insistence on the universality of their program as a foundation of a united opposition front became problematic for some Jewish as well as other national groups. They feared that they would be dissolved within this broad empire-wide movement. The Kadet-Jewish alliance came to a stalemate with no prospect of reaching a tangible result. As the government policies toward the Kadets reduced their abilities to maneuver and serve as an overarching framework for local political groups, the Kiev Kadets turned to a strategy of narrower alliances and more balanced partnership. Overall, this chapter reveals how the Kiev Kadets developed electoral connections within the socialist camp with the assistance of the Jewish Social Democrats. This was a remarkable achievement, which became possible due to the ethnic diversity factor in Kiev province. It also shows that a local

condition offered an important potential for connecting the Constitutional Democrats with the masses.

The next chapter deals with the national elections, which were held in an atmosphere that some described as reactionary because the authorities stepped back from the October Manifesto and changed the electoral law in favor of more conservative forces. The work of the Second Duma was even shorter than the first one; it did not have time to achieve much. Yet the dismissal of the Second Duma did not mean the end of the constitutional period. On the contrary, the government changed the rules of the game exactly because it planned to assert its role in the constitutional environment and ensure cooperation between the Duma and the Cabinet of Ministries. This study shows from the regional perspective that although the official policies were detrimental for the Kiev Kadets' ability to mobilize the Jewish vote, they also brought some benefits as they altered the power balance within the leftist camp. In Kiev province, the Kadets, as the least persecuted, did not have to compete on the left, thus they could focus on the electoral struggle against the monarchists and the Russian rightists.

The final chapter deals with the electoral campaign to the Fourth Duma, which occurred five years after the turmoil of the revolutionary period of 1905-1907. Unlike the previous elections, it was the work of the Duma itself that shaped the broad context of this electoral period. Because the Duma's full-term operation confirmed its institutional resilience, most political parties and organizations planned to work in the upcoming Duma rather than use it as a public tribune as had been the case with the first two Dumas. This time, due to several reasons, including the government's restrictive policies targeting Jewish voters and the complicated relationship with Jewish political groups, Jewish support

for the Kadets dwindled. Consequently, the Kiev Kadets instead centered their electoral preparations on mobilizing the non-Jewish, i.e. Christian voters. Yet in that period, the Kadets sent a powerful message to the Jewish community by organizing the legal defense of Mendel Beilis, whose trial unfolded in Kiev in 1911-1913 and acquired countrywide publicity and even European resonance. The Kadet lawyers, both from the capitals and from Kiev, took an active part in the trial of Beilis, which became the background of the fourth national campaign not only in Kiev province, but also across the empire. Thereby, the Kadets continued to show interest in the fate of the Jews in Russia.

Tables One and Two outline the electoral process in Russia according to the December 1905 and June 1907 electoral laws. Tables Three and Four provide numbers of electors and members of the Duma for the city of Kiev and Kiev province.

CHAPTER 1

ELECTORAL POLITICS ON THE RISE.

TOWARDS THE FIRST NATIONAL ELECTIONS, AUGUST 1905 – APRIL 1906

The Constitutional Democratic Party emerged as the largest party in the First Russian Duma, winning 179 of 478 seats.³⁷ The first election campaign played a formative role in encouraging the organization of local provincial branches of the party. These branches focused their attention on preparing the electorate for the forthcoming elections. The imperial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg provided the main organizational direction, through the founding party congresses which took place in October 1905 and January 1906, respectively. Initiatives also came from the provinces, as local activists – mostly members of local Union of Liberation groups and Zemstvo Constitutionals – established provincial and municipal party groups of the Kadet party. The central committee coordinated and directed their work, building this network into a solid and effectively functioning organization.

Given the magnitude and regional diversity of the Russian Empire, the Kadets – like some other political parties – faced the challenging task of establishing themselves as a country-wide party. The Kadet leadership intended to build a “big democratic party”³⁸ drawing support from all possible strata of society throughout the empire. This was a critical issue, stemming from the Kadets’ conviction that “the regime would submit to

³⁷ Some deputies were not strictly speaking Kadets or did not have a clear-cut party affiliation. As this chapter discusses below, some of them stood to the left of the Kadet party.

³⁸ Terence Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1983), 44.

significant reform only if confronted by a broadly mobilized citizenry.”³⁹ Its leaders planned to unite “the broadest elements of the ‘non-revolutionary intelligentsia,’ ” who, they believed, would help provide a large popular following in the future. In the western borderland provinces with their multiethnic and religiously diverse population, the Kadets expected that the national minorities’ intelligentsia would bring mass support to the party. To add to the party’s appeal, Kadet leaders explicitly extended the demand for the equality of all citizens before the law and the guarantee of basic civil and individual liberties to national minorities.⁴⁰ This move was particularly important in the multiethnic province of Kiev, where the zemstvo element, a powerful source of support for the liberals, was absent until the government introduced the zemstvo system there in 1911. Along with the Russian intelligentsia, Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish local activists emerged as the vanguard of the Kadet election campaign in Kiev and some other borderland provinces. This ethnically mixed composition of the Kadet organization in Kiev province allowed its members to use the diversity of the local population as a powerful electoral resource.

This chapter studies the formation of the Kiev provincial branch of the Kadet party, its organizational efforts, how it dealt with the first governmental persecutions, and developed electoral strategies. It examines how the Kiev Kadets tried to mobilize the Jewish vote by involving Jewish political organizations as well as ordinary Jewish voters. The Kadets believed that a focus on Jewish emancipation would trump political affiliations and social differences among Jewish voters and unite them under the leadership of the

³⁹ Terence Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1983), 46.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

Kadet party. *The League of Full Rights (soiuz polnopraviia)* – the largest legal Jewish political organization in Russia at that moment – was instrumental in the Kadets’ attempts to win over Jewish voters. Its full title suggests what goals it pursued – *The League for the Attainment of Full Rights for the Jewish People in Russia*.⁴¹ By taking the lead in the *League*, the Jewish liberals attempted to extend their leading role over all the Jewish currents within the Pale of Jewish Settlement and later used it to mobilize Jewish support for the Kadets.

The local perspective allows us to see the Kadet-Jewish interaction in more detail. In Kiev province, additional nuances came into play and complicated electoral politics. When the Kiev Kadet organization launched its electoral preparations, it unintentionally contributed to the establishment of a rival Jewish organization in the city of Kiev – the *Non-Party Group of Jewish Voters* and had to deal with multiple Jewish political forces on the ground. In mobilizing the Jewish vote, the Kiev Kadets relied on the Jewish activists’ experience in their electoral campaign. This chapter argues that it was the Jewish liberal activists – in particular, Jewish members of the Kiev Kadets – who played a crucial role in bringing Jewish voters to support the Kadets in the elections. Using Kiev province as a case study, it shows that by preserving the status of the Jewish League as an above-party organization, and supporting its political competitor, the Non-party Group of Jewish Voters, the Kadets strove to engage all Jewish political groups. As the process of political diversification acquired momentum, various splits within the Jewish political camp began to show. Yet the partnership with the Kiev Kadets appealed to regional Jewish political

⁴¹ The Russian name is *Soiuz dlia dostizheniia polnopraviia evreiskago naroda v Rossii*.

groups. With massive Jewish support, the Kiev Kadets emerged victorious in the elections to the First Duma.

This chapter will follow the electoral preparations chronologically, approaching them from two directions. It will discuss, first, the formation of the Kiev Kadet organization, and, second, the electoral campaign in the Jewish camp. Then, it will examine the Kadet-Jewish cooperation and show how it helped unite and mobilize the Jewish vote, when differences in opinions and approaches among Jewish activists came to the foreground and threatened the Kadet electoral campaign in Kiev province. The conclusion will assess the relationship between the two – Kadet and Jewish – sides and also analyze problems that arose.

The Formation of the Kiev Kadet Organization, 1905 – Early 1906

The first national electoral campaign was launched twice, in August and October 1905, as the regime, reacting to the continuing revolution, made concessions to it. On August 6, the central government decided to mollify the discontent of the population by the creation of a representative institution. It announced the establishment of the Duma – popularly known as the Bulygin Duma – as a consultative legislative body and promulgated the electoral law.⁴² Although it did not announce the election date, preparations for the elections started immediately. The provincial authorities proceeded to the composition of voter lists. For their part, local activists observed this process and scrutinized the lists, looking for mistakes and urging and assisting voters to correct them. Other than that, there was little

⁴² *Polozhenie o vyborakh.*

campaigning. In August and September, activists of the Union of Liberation and the zemstvo-constitutionalists discussed the formation of a political party at their respective congresses.⁴³ Their two committees worked together to develop the program for the future Constitutional Democratic Party and organized its founding congress, which was scheduled for 12 October 1905.⁴⁴ At that time, members of the two movements debated the August 6 electoral law and the elections. However unacceptable as the electoral law seemed, they recognized that the Bulygin Duma – the consultative one – was a fait accompli.⁴⁵ As a result, initial electoral debates centered on whether to participate in the elections.

The October Manifesto introduced a Duma with legislative functions and gave a new impetus to electoral activities. The consequent December 11 electoral law enfranchised broader categories of the population. Back in October, in the midst of the general strike that had paralyzed Russia since September, the zemstvo-constitutionalists and some members of the Union of Liberation gathered at a joint congress in Moscow to discuss the formation of a liberal party. When the news about the introduction of the legislative Duma arrived, the congress decided to announce the formal establishment of the Constitutional Democratic Party.⁴⁶ Once the Duma had received legislative responsibilities and the electorate had been broadened, the elections became the Kadets' focus. The

⁴³ P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia, 1859 – 1917* (New York: Izdatel'stvo imeni Chekhova, 1955), 303, 304, 307.

⁴⁴ P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia, 1859 – 1917* (New York: Izdatel'stvo imeni Chekhova, 1955), 306. Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 142.

⁴⁵ P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia, 1859 – 1917* (New York: Izdatel'stvo imeni Chekhova, 1955), 303, 304, 305.

⁴⁶ P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia, 1859 – 1917* (New York: Izdatel'stvo imeni Chekhova, 1955), 310.

Russian liberals proceeded to the creation of provincial party branches and the development of general and local electoral strategies. The electoral campaign formally started; its most active phase ran from January to March 1906.

Participation in the elections to the Duma became the burning issue for all parties. The Kadets discussed this question at their second party congress in January 1906. Pavel Miliukov, the party leader, insisted that the matter of participation in the election campaign and participation in the work of the Duma should require separate decisions. He saw the election campaign as playing an important role in the formation of the party's structure.⁴⁷ Similarly, other party leaders attached value to the election campaign not only as a means to win the elections, but also as an opportunity to bring political awareness to voters, enlighten the populace about the party's program, and shape public opinion about the Russian Duma.⁴⁸ Therefore, the Kadet leadership decided to participate in the election campaign with these purposes in mind. Their further advocating of participation in the electoral preparations aimed to counter the leftists' effort to promote the idea of boycotting the elections.

The two processes – the formation of the party and the mobilizing of the public – went hand in hand: as supporters of the Kadet party in the provinces worked on preparations for the elections, they established provincial party committees to coordinate work among their members. Provincial activists organized political meetings open to the public, free legal consultations, and other activities to educate voters on the terminology

⁴⁷ *S"ezdy i Konferentsii Kostitutsionno-Demokraticheskoi Partii 1905-1907*, vol.1 (Moscow: Rosspen, 1997), 64.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 181, 182. Also Petr Struve's address to the second congress. *Ibid.*, 125.

and political rhetoric and, simultaneously, popularize the Kadet program. During that period, the party central committee established closer ties with the provinces as speakers from St. Petersburg and Moscow travelled across the country. Among guest speakers were members of the Kadet central committee – Pavel Miliukov, Maksim Vinaver, and Fedor Rodichev. Their names drew large audiences and helped local liberals boost the election campaigns. Their public presentations in the provincial capitals made the Kadet campaign more consistent across the country, setting the tone and standards of political discussions, especially at the initial stages of the campaign. Overall, the central committee of the party outlined general directives, but it was the local party committees that were responsible for the campaign *per se*.⁴⁹ Local leaders and rank-and-file members held the fate of the campaign in their hands – their energy, resourcefulness, experience, and knowledge of local circumstances played a crucial role in finding ways to connect with the populace and to mobilize the vote. That is why before long, they and those who were nominated as candidates to become Duma deputies became the primary target of the political repression, when the authorities retaliated in the provinces.

In Kiev province, the Kadets, after establishing their local organization, immediately turned their attention to the multiethnic character of the province. The Kadet group gathered for the first time on 21 November 1905; it accepted the Kadet program and elected the local committee to coordinate the group's activity. The committee consisted of members of the Kiev intelligentsia such as lawyers Iu.A. Kistiakovskii and Ia.S. Gol'denveizer, philologist V.P. Naumenko, historian I.V. Luchitskii, and the former

⁴⁹ The central committee of the Kadets gathered data about the election campaign and electoral prospects for the Kadet Party from Kadet provincial committees. "Moskva. Po telefonu i telegrafu," *Riech'*, 26 February (11 March), 1906, p. 3.

professor L.N. Iasnopol'skii. It distributed the Kadet program as a supplement to Kiev newspapers as well as mailed it to some prominent individuals and sold it at newspaper kiosks. At their general meeting on December 8, the Kiev Kadets approved the committee's appeal designed as an introduction to the party program. Significantly, they circulated this material in the Russian, Ukrainian, and Yiddish (*evreiskii*) languages. Its Polish version received the approval of the Polish Progressive Democratic Group, which distributed it among the Poles of the province as well.⁵⁰

The Kadet branch built up a complex structure in January and February 1906. The regional (*oblastnoi*) committee in Kiev claimed authority over party groups in the three provinces of the Southwestern Region – Kiev, Volyn', and Podol'e.⁵¹ The growth of party membership there was rapid, although uneven within each of them. By early January 1906, the Kadets reported over 400 members in Kiev province.⁵² During the next few months, the organization continued to increase. In the city of Kiev, the party municipal organization was the largest in the region and numbered some 1400 people by mid-February 1906, that is a month prior to the first stage of the elections. This number was quite significant; by comparison, the Petersburg group had about 1500 members only a few months earlier.⁵³ The structure of the Kiev city group reflected the administrative division of the city with a

⁵⁰ "Kievskaiia gruppа konstitutsionno-demokraticeskoi partii," *Svoboda i pravo*, 5 January 1906, p. 4. Later, in January 1906, on the suggestion of the Volyn' party members, the committee meeting of the Kadets considered printing the call in Czech for distribution in Czech colonies of Volyn' province. "Zasedanie komiteta konstitutsionno-demokraticeskoi partii," *Svoboda i pravo*, 3 January 1906, p. 4.

⁵¹ The regional committee in Kiev also supervised the provinces of Chernigov and Poltava. It sent the party literature to these two provinces and advised the party committees on the electoral events. GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 1.

⁵² "V konstitutsionno-demokraticeskoi partii. Obsheche sobranie," *Svoboda i pravo*, 7 January 1906, p. 4.

⁵³ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 2, 4.

Kadet sub-group in each of the five electoral municipal districts (*uchastki*).⁵⁴ Elsewhere in Kiev province, many county (*uezdnye*) towns and even villages had their own local Kadet party organizations, which had considerable independence. By early 1906, local party groups were established in the county towns of Uman' and Cherkassy and in the counties of Vasil'kov (the town of Fastov), Tarashcha (villages of Stavishche and Koshevatoe), Kanev (the village of Steblevo), Cherkassy (Lozanovka), and Chigirin (Revovka). Local Kadet groups were established and the format of the data on their membership that they reported to the regional party committee means that local initiative became the driving force behind the formation of the party infrastructure in Kiev province. Later estimates by the central committee were approximate as the local groups reported their statistics using different categories.⁵⁵ As the Kiev Kadets continued their election campaign, party membership increased dramatically.

Initially, the Kiev Kadets appealed to the broad masses of the populace, without articulating particular differences in their electoral strategies based on social or ethnic affiliations of the population. They defined their primary goal as encouraging the largest number of voters to exercise their voting rights and assisting them with the electoral paperwork. For this purpose, the Kiev Kadets and their supporters went from door to door (*obkhod kvartir*), advocating the idea of participation in the elections. Apartment residents often granted the Kadet representatives the right to apply for their enrollment on the voter lists on their behalf.⁵⁶ At that time, campaigning for the Kadet program was secondary to

⁵⁴ The data on the Petersburg Kadet organization GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 2, 4.

⁵⁵ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 2, 4.

⁵⁶ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 3.

the promotion of the very idea of the elections. Although in February 1906, the Kiev Kadets moved toward more specific actions – including public meetings and lectures and smaller discussions in various districts of Kiev – they continued to campaign without strategically tailoring their actions to target specific audiences. At this stage, while the Kadets emphasized different issues for their audiences – for example, the resolution of the land question for the peasants and equal rights for the Jews, – they aimed to engage the broad masses into a general discussion about what changes the upcoming elections could bring. Overall, the Kiev Kadets became active and, as a result, their popularity grew in the province.

Printed materials played a great part in the Kadet campaign. Party committees in the capitals as well as local Kadet organizations worked to produce and circulate electoral publications. The regional committee of the Kiev Kadets established a brochure commission, which published political pamphlets, explanatory notes, and leaflets. Many of them were reprinted copies of party literature from the Kadet publishing house “Narodnoe pravo” in St. Petersburg. They mostly addressed general electoral questions: *The Electoral Law*, *What Order to Follow during the Elections*, *On the October Manifesto*, and *On Freedom of the Press*, each of them having print runs from 1,500 to just under 4,000 copies. One of the few targeted leaflets, *To the Peasants*, was intended for circulation throughout Russia and did not address any provincial specifics.⁵⁷ Otherwise, the elections and electoral procedure remained the main focus of the publications that the Kiev Kadets distributed in the province. With local publications, this trend changed; the Kiev Kadets started to cover

⁵⁷ *Izbiratel'noe pravo, Kakogo poriadka derzhat'sia pri vyborakh, O manifeste 17 oktiabria, O svobode pechati, Krestianam.* GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 5.

the Kadet program and the context specific to the province. The number of these publications was high; *The Call of the Kiev Group and the Program of the Kadet Party*⁵⁸ alone sold 60,000 copies. Other titles included *What the Kadet Party Wants* (10,000 copies), *To the Voters of the City of Kiev* (2,000), and *A Letter to the Province* (500).⁵⁹ From January 1906, the Kiev Kadets published and circulated the newspaper *Svoboda i pravo (Liberty and Law)* in the city of Kiev and the three provinces of the Southwestern Region – Kiev, Volyn’, and Podol’e.⁶⁰ Along with smaller leaflets and brochures, the newspaper constituted a powerful tool of the Kadet electoral campaign.

As the electoral campaign unfolded, various factors came into play in each city, town, and village and local differences began to manifest themselves. The authorities contributed to this situation as their treatment of open political activity varied across the country. First, the regime reacted to strikes and protests differently across the country. By early 1906, many provinces had been placed under martial law (*voennoe polozhenie*), while some had been under “reinforced safeguard” (*usilennaia okhrana*), or “extraordinary safeguard” (*chrezvychainaia okhrana*). Differences were frequent even within one province, which was the case in Kiev province.⁶¹ Hence, the provincial context depended on what level of the state of emergency had been introduced in a particular locale. Yet

⁵⁸ *Vozzvanie Kievskoi gruppy i programma kadetskoii partii*. GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 5.

⁵⁹ *Chego khochet kadetskaia partiia, Izbirateliam Kieva, Pis'mo v provintsiuu*. GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 5.

⁶⁰ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 6.

⁶¹ Various parts of Kiev province were under martial law of “extraordinary safeguard” from late November 1905. “Tablitsy miestnostei Rossii, nakhodiashchikhsia na iskluchitel'nom polozhenii,” *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 5 March, 1906, No 2, p. 103-106. The introduction of the state of “extraordinary safeguard” or “reinforced safeguard” meant that the government received extra powers in the particular locale.

personal attitudes that the provincial authorities exercised toward electoral preparations also played their part. For instance, the Governor of Ekaterinoslav province was less tolerant toward meetings and electoral debates than that of Kiev province even at the early stages of the campaign. The Ekaterinoslav Kadets were not able to campaign as consistently as the Kiev Kadets did.⁶²

Second, the notion of national elections caused a great deal of confusion among local authorities. Initially, not only the local administration, but also the central government did not know how to respond to electoral initiatives in the provinces. As a result, they often banned them, partially or universally. On one occasion, the Prime Minister Sergei Witte even had to explain to the Minister of the Interior P.N. Durnovo that posting non-revolutionary electoral appeals and posters was part and parcel of campaigning.⁶³ In Kiev province, as in many other places, the police randomly interfered in electoral activity, reducing the chances for some provincial Kadets to establish ties with the local population and promote their electoral programs, but letting other Kadet groups to operate more freely. According to internal party documents of the Kiev regional committee of the Kadets, the Kiev governor's administration treated the Kadet party leniently. Throughout the province, however, the official attitudes varied. While the authorities of Cherkassy county initially

⁶² "Provintsial'nyi otdel. (Pered vyborami). Ekaterinoslav, 22 fevralia," *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 5 March, 1906, No 2, p. 116.

⁶³ GARF, f. 102, op. 1906, OO, 2 d-vo, d. 25, l. 1. Repressions could differ in those provinces which were under the same state of emergency. For instance, while the Kadet committee in Kiev province continued its work and publication of the local Kadet press, the police arrested all members of the Kadet bureau in Ekaterinoslav at the end of December 1905 and released them on bail only at the beginning of February 1906. GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 209, l. 3, 4. Afterwards, the Ekaterinoslav Kadets could hardly carry out any electoral preparations. "Provintsial'nyi otdel. (Pered vyborami). Ekaterinoslav, 22 fevralia," *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 5 March, 1906, No 2, p. 116. Likewise, the Volyn' governor considered the Kadet party revolutionary and prohibited its initiatives. GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 5.

refrained from any repression toward the Kadets, in Uman' county, the local police banned all electoral activities of the local Kadet committee.⁶⁴ In other words, the county administrations used their own discretion when encountering electoral initiatives of the local Kadets as well as other political parties, thereby creating different political contexts across the province.

As a rule, if the local police and administration did not intervene, the Kadets often succeeded in enlisting the support of voters from various walks of life. As a result, the makeup of the Kadet organizations grew socially and ethnically heterogeneous. The support of some social categories was rather an exception than a rule and can be attributed to specific local circumstances such as the presence of particular personalities, who served as a connection between a community and the Kadet party. As of mid-February, the Kadet regional committee recorded the following data. A considerable and almost exclusively peasant membership was reported in the villages of Revovka and Lozanovka in Cherkassy county,⁶⁵ which were the only such cases for the Kiev Kadet organization. The response from other categories of the population was more diversified. In Kanev and Tarashcha counties, the local group reported that about 5-10% of the local clergy supported the Kadet program, while Kadet sources from other counties described the priests' attitude toward the party as universally hostile.⁶⁶ The merchants, town-dwellers, municipal officials, and

⁶⁴ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 5.

⁶⁵ The regional (*oblastnoi*, that is, related to the Southwestern Region) committee explained that peasants usually received the Kadet program with approval if local activists managed to connect with them. GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 2, 3.

⁶⁶ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 5.

workers also became the focus of the Kadets; however, the party's regional committee reported that it had made little headway with these groups.

Concerning the ethnic and gender composition of the Kadet party, the Kadet statistics provided only a general picture of the city of Kiev. Even more than it provides data on the ethnic profile of the Kiev Kadets, it points to several questions regarding the Kadet-Jewish interaction and cooperation in the province. Remarkably, the nationality categories that the Kiev Kadets used were in fact two religious divisions. The first group, which made up 61% of the Kadet membership, was described as “the Russians, Poles, and other nationalities all together.” As the second group consisted exclusively of the Jews – they numbered 39% of the party members – “other nationalities” of the first group must have been Little Russians, Czechs, and Germans. These data show the Kiev Kadets' awareness of the ethnic diversity in the province; their attention to Jews as a separate category is notable. Whereas the latter fact might reflect the Kadets' inclination to treat the Jews as profoundly “other,” the visible presence of Jewish activists in the Kadet leadership of Kiev province as well as a large share of Jews that this statistic reported suggests some practical reasons. Jewish political initiative was on the rise; as I will show in the next section of this chapter, by the time the provincial Kadet organization was established, Jews had already commenced their electoral preparations. Thus, as the largest potential source of voters, the Jews required special attention. The high percentage of Jewish members of the Kadets implied a high level of their self-mobilization. In terms of gender division, the Kiev municipal branch of the Kadets enlisted 82% males and 12% – females.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 4. Though it is not surprising that women were less numerous as only men were enfranchised, the numbers indicate that women were not foreign to electoral politics.

The leadership of the regional Kadet organization consisted of prominent members of the Kiev intelligentsia. The head of the Kiev regional committee was Ivan Luchitskii,⁶⁸ a renowned historian and professor at the St. Vladimir University in Kiev from 1877 to 1901. His liberal views, combined with his interest in the Ukrainophile movement, made him an important connection between, on the one hand, Ukrainian liberals and socialists and, on the other, pro-Russian and Russian liberals in Kiev and both capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg. In particular, he had been a member of the Kiev (Old) Hromada, a Ukrainian enlightenment society, which was active in the 1860s and 1870s. Among its members were Vladimir Antonovich, Mikhail Dragomanov, Pavel Chubinskii, and others. Later, in 1901 Luchitskii formally entered the General Ukrainian Organization (*ZUO – Zahal’na Ukrain’s’ka Organizatsiia*),⁶⁹ which V. Antonovich and the Ukrainian writer Alexander Konisskii had founded to unite Ukrainian activists in 1897.⁷⁰ The member of the Kiev Hromada, Evhen Chykalenko, however, criticized Luchitskii for a condescending and rather indifferent attitude toward the Ukrainian cause. Overall, Luchitskii, a native of Poltava province, was interested in the fate of Ukraine. But as a moderate liberal, he

⁶⁸ Ivan Vasil’evich Luchitskii (1845-1918) was an historian of eighteenth-century France. He also wrote extensively on the history of the commune and the communal lands in Little Russia in the 18th century. Among his students were the Russian historian, E.V. Tarle and the Ukrainian liberal activist, V.P. Naumenko. “Luchitskii,” in *Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaiia tret’ XX veka. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 325-326.

⁶⁹ “Luchitskii,” in *Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaiia tret’ XX veka. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 326.

⁷⁰ See Lilya R. Vegera, “V. P. Naumenko Sociopolitical Activity (Second Half of XIX Century – 1917 Year).” *European Researcher* 80.8-1 (2014): 1453. The General Ukrainian Organization, its full name was the All-Ukrainian General Non-Party/partisan Democratic Organization (Ukrainian: *ZUO – Zahal’na Ukrain’s’ka Organizatsiia*, Russian: *VUO – Vseukraiinskaia Organizatsiia*), was a clandestine federative union of autonomous Ukrainian communes in Imperial Russia. It was founded in 1897 and presumably included several hundred members in Kiev and other cities of Russia. “Vseukraiinskaia Organizatsiia,” in *Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaiia tret’ XX veka. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 139.

supported Ukrainian *cultural* – as opposed to national – autonomy within a reformed federated Russia.⁷¹ Besides connections with the Ukrainian movement, Luchitskii's personal ties included members of the provincial Jewish intelligentsia, some of whom became involved in the Kiev Kadets' activities, such as the lawyer, Iakov Solomonovich Gol'denveizer.⁷²

Luchitskii's public activity went beyond the interests of the Ukrainian movement. He was also more than just the leader of the Kadet provincial and regional organizations. Throughout his life, Luchitskii had close ties with noted members of the Russian intelligentsia such as the philosopher Petr Lavrov and Russian writers Ivan Turgenev, Vladimir Korolenko, and Nikolai Leskov. His European connections reached as far as the French politicians Louis Blanc and Georges Clemenceau.⁷³ The scale and importance of his professional and public authority made his name stand out from the rest of the Ukrainophiles and Kiev Kadets, which was reflected in the fact that Luchitskii was elected to the Kadet central committee during the party constituent congress in October 1905. In this regard, his political and national outlook played an important role in navigating the Kiev Kadet organization in provincial politics. Luchitskii's involvement in the Kadet central committee served as a direct connection between Kiev members and the party

⁷¹ Evhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* (New York: Ukrains'ka Vil'na Akademiia Nauk u SShA: 1955), 300, 320. In late 1917, I.V. Luchitskii, along with B.A. Kistiakovskii and V.P. Naumenko, was a member of the organizing committee of the short lived Ukrainian Federative Democratic Party. *Ukrains'ki politychni partii kintsia 19 – pochatku 20 stolittia. Programovi i dovidkovi materialy*, ed. V.F. Shevchenko (Kyiv: Konsalting, Feniks, 1993), 170.

⁷² "Lyst advokata Gol'denveizera Ia.S. do Luchyts'kogo z pryvodu pozytyvnykh dlia partii kd vyboriv v pershu Dumu po Kyevu. Z Drezdenu do Kyeva," The Institute of Manuscripts of the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine, f. III, N 8045.

⁷³ "Luchitskii," in *Politycheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaiia tret' XX veka. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 325-326.

central leadership. Overall, Luchitskii was an outstanding public figure whose influence on the Kiev Kadet organization can hardly be overestimated.

Another member of the Kiev Kadet leadership was Vladimir Naumenko, a philologist and popular gymnasium teacher and later the director of a private gymnasium.⁷⁴ Even more than Luchitskii, Naumenko represented a remarkable example of a member of the Kiev intelligentsia who belonged to two camps: Ukrainophile and Russian liberal. He had dedicated much of his time to the Ukrainian enlightenment movement and been a long-time editor of its monthly journal *Kievskaia starina* (*The Kiev Past*). As he often hosted the Kiev Hromada's meetings, he played an organizing role in them and, since Antonovich had left the Hromada by that time, became the de facto head of the Kiev Old Hromada in the early 1900s.⁷⁵ In 1901, after some hesitation, Naumenko led the Kiev Hromada to enter the General Ukrainian Organization; as a well-known Ukrainophile, he was elected a member of its executive council (the *rada*), and became a representative of its conservative wing.⁷⁶ Naumenko continued his involvement in the Ukrainian movement when he became an elected member of the Kadet provincial committee.⁷⁷ Together with Luchitskii,

⁷⁴ Vladimir Pavlovich Naumenko (1852-1919) was a student of M. Dragomanov, I.V. Luchitskii, and V.B. Antonovich during his study at the St. Vladimir University in Kiev. "Naumenko," in *Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaiia tret' XX veka. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 384-385.

⁷⁵ Although Chykalenko admits that Naumenko was a devoted Ukrainophile, he assesses his professional reputation as less significant than that of V. Antonovich. Chykalenko praises Naumenko's practical work in the Kiev Gromada and his readiness to carry out public work without any remuneration. Evhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* (New York: Ukrains'ka Vil'na Akademiia Nauk u SShA, 1955), 296. See also "Naumenko," in *Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaiia tret' XX veka. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 384-385.

⁷⁶ Evhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* (New York: Ukrains'ka Vil'na Akademiia Nauk u SShA, 1955), 320-321. "Naumenko," in *Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaiia tret' XX veka. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 384-385.

⁷⁷ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 1.

Naumenko edited the local newspaper *Kievskiiia otkliki* (*Kiev Comments*), which later took the Kadet stand and became the unofficial Kadet press organ in Kiev province. He co-edited *Svoboda i pravo* (*Liberty and Law*), the official Kadet newspaper in Kiev, which the Kadet regional committee launched in early 1906.⁷⁸ In other words, Naumenko had been a long-time reliable professional partner and political ally of Luchitskii. Unlike Luchitskii, however, whose outlook and expertise were broader, Naumenko's primary focus was local affairs, either concerned with the Ukrainophile movement⁷⁹ or Kadet activities.

At this formative stage, the provincial leadership was mostly engaged in coordination and guidance of local groups and had more obligations than power. In the first election campaign, one of the major functions of the Kiev Kadet committee was to register emerging local party groups, and to collect data and establish ties with them.⁸⁰ It also distributed party literature, which was an effective way to carry out the election campaign, especially at its early stages. This was a strong side of the Kadet party in principle, because Kadets' educational background and professional experience helped them succeed in publishing. Like the central committee, its provincial committees often consisted of professors, lawyers, medical doctors, and other professionals, many of whom held university degrees and could contribute to the party press with articles and commentaries in their professional fields. The Kiev regional committee numbered at least eight professors among its almost thirty members; I.V. Luchitskii, V.P. Izhevskii, A.A. Radtsig, V.F.

⁷⁸ *Svoboda i pravo*, 4 January 1906, p. 1.

⁷⁹ In 1906, for instance, Naumenko was a co-founder of the Ukrainian scientific society in Kiev. He took part in the development of its statute. "Naumenko," in *Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaiia tret' XX veka. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 384-385.

⁸⁰ "Lyst umans'kogo hromads'kogo diiacha [E. Shol'pa] pro kadets'ku partiiu i vybory v Derzhavnu Dumu," The Institute of Manuscripts of the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine, f. III, N 9663.

Timofeev, E.F.Votchal, and A.V. Korchak-Chepurkovskii⁸¹ were among them.⁸² The local party periodical *Svoboda i pravo*, and those that informally supported the Kadet party – such as the newspaper *Kievskiiia otkliki*, became very popular due to their excellent analytical editorials, their critical attitude toward the regime, and the polemical nature of their articles. In addition, with the party provincial infrastructure at the initial stage of formation, circulating periodicals and proclamations allowed prompt responses to the constant change and rapid developments: the promulgation of the new electoral law (the December 11 law), arrests of potential candidates, and the increasing party membership. Finally, publishing was usually a commercial enterprise that provided for the party's financial needs as political leaflets and brochures sold in large numbers.

In many provinces, and particularly in the ethnically mixed peripheries such as Kiev province, cooperation with local political parties and groups became indispensable to provincial electoral politics. The Kadet party leadership considered it expedient to make agreements and cooperate not only with the kindred organizations, but also with local “natural [existing] social groupings.”⁸³ In this vein, Petr Struve defined the ideal of the Constitutional Democratic party as a broad association of federations of various ethnic and

⁸¹ According to Evhen Chykalenko [Chikalenko], in the beginning of the 1880s, Avksentii V. Korchak-Chepurkovskii had been the head and a leading figure at the Student Gromada in Kharkov and an “active and staunch Ukrainian.” At that time, the Kharkov Gromada focused on organizing cultural events such as the Shevchenko literary meetings. Evhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* (New York: Ukrains’ka Vil’na Akademiia Nauk u SShA: 1955), 118.

⁸² GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 1, 2.

⁸³ In his report, Struve referred to the All-Russian Peasant Union, whose main programmatic demand was “the nationalization of all land and transferral of it to those who will till it with the help of their family, without hired labor.” *S’ezdy i Konferentsii Kostitutsionno-Demokraticheskoi Partii 1905-1907*, vol.1 (Moscow: Rosspen, 1997), 125-126.

tribal (*plemennye*) and social groups.⁸⁴ In practice, agreements with national groups became an important factor in the Kadets' success in the borderlands, which local branches utilized readily. To be sure, electoral alliances became more than the simple sum of individual parties and groups because the overlap of their memberships was often significant and, no less important, fluid. Given the multinational character of Russian borderlands, provincial Kadet organizations became heterogeneous, which affected electoral strategies that local Kadet groups used in their campaigns. We now turn to the Kadets in Kiev province to learn how.

Mobilizing Jewish Voters: The Kadets' Electoral Campaign, Early 1906

The Kiev Kadets had multiple faces, both in terms of their ethnic makeup and their political aspirations. Their major components were liberal and pro-socialist elements that to various extents supported Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, or Jewish national projects, but they also included many activists who were less inclined to engage in any national ideologies. Admittedly, the divisions between them were blurred and many could fall into more than one category. If the distinction between, for instance, a Jewish liberal and a Ukrainian socialist could be sometimes clear, it could be often impossible to categorize some Russian-speaking Kiev Kadets who combined their liberal ideology with local patriotism and who, for this reason, also supported the Ukrainian Democrats. Therefore, the terminology based on ideological projects which this study utilizes has clear limitations; yet it is useful for understanding the decisions the Kiev Kadets made in their election campaigns. Treating

⁸⁴ The second congress passed a resolution about founding household/domestic (*bytovye*) and professional party groups (peasants', workers', tradesmen, salesmen, etc.). *S'ezdy i Konferentsii Kostitutsionno-Demokraticheskoi Partii 1905-1907*, vol.1 (Moscow: Rosspen, 1997), 185.

political concepts as a subject for analysis, rather than its analytical tool, this study demonstrates that it was the ambiguity of identities that made some connections between political groups possible and feasible.

The Kiev Kadets' relationships with local political groups unfolded along several lines. In the Southwestern Region, the Poles formed a separate Polish Constitutional Democratic party of Ukraine, Volyn', and Podol'e.⁸⁵ For this reason, few Poles joined the Kadet party directly, but the two Kadet organizations formed a bloc. The Kiev Kadets also made an alliance with Ukrainian liberals. However, their ties were more complex, as the Ukrainian activists were more numerous and heterogeneous than the Kiev Poles. First, personal connections between the Kadets and Ukrainian liberals were quite close at the leadership level. Many members of the Kiev Old Hromada joined the Kiev Kadet branch in addition to Luchitskii and Naumenko: historian Nikolai Vasilenko, Professor Fedor Leontovich, and others were among them.⁸⁶ Second, in early 1906, the Kiev Kadets had to deal not with the General Ukrainian Organization, but the nascent political party of the Ukrainian Democrats, set up by the Ukrainian progressives in 1904.⁸⁷ This Ukrainian party readily supported the Kiev Kadets as it remained weak and divided and could not hope to elect its own candidates to the First Duma in March 1906.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the Kiev Kadets

⁸⁵ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 4.

⁸⁶ Evhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* (New York: Ukrains'ka Vil'na Akademiia Nauk u SShA: 1955), 427.

⁸⁷ See Yury Boshyk, "Between Socialism and Nationalism: Jewish-Ukrainian Political Relations in Imperial Russia, 1900-1917," in *Ukrainian-Jewish relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2010), 180.

⁸⁸ In fact, they split into two parties, the Ukrainian Democratic party (Evhen Chykalenko, Ivan Shrag) and Ukrainian Radical party and united under a joint name the Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party. Yury Boshyk, "Jewish-Ukrainian Political Relations in Imperial Russia," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of

had to take into account the programmatic goals of this ally. In a situation when overlapping membership was common, some Ukrainian liberals ran for the Duma elections as Kadet candidates, in which case the victory of a Kadet candidate meant that a representative of the Ukrainian Democrats received a seat in the Duma. This was the case in Chernigov province, where the Ukrainian liberal Ivan Shrag won his seat as a Kadet.⁸⁹ Not only did some members of local national parties join all-Russian political parties such as the Kadets, but also some Kadets became members of local parties. In his memoirs, Evhen Chykalenko gives the example of the Kiev Kadet Baron Fedor Shteingel', who preached autonomism-federalism for the future regime in Russia and, for this reason, joined the Ukrainian Democratic party.⁹⁰

The Kadet organization in Kiev paid a lot of attention to the considerable Jewish population of the province. According to the Jewish Colonization Society, 12.03% of the province's population was Jewish;⁹¹ to be sure, not all Jews were eligible to participate in the elections, but they nevertheless made up a substantial part of the urban electorate that could not be ignored.⁹² In turn, many Jews joined the Kadets and even organized the local Kadet committees. At the time of the foundation of the Kadet organization in Kiev

Ukrainian Studies Press, 2010), 184. On the regrouping of the Ukrainian liberals see also Evhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* (New York: Ukrains'ka Vil'na Akademiia Nauk u SShA: 1955), 415-421.

⁸⁹ Evhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* (New York: Ukrains'ka Vil'na Akademiia Nauk u SShA: 1955), 386.

⁹⁰ Chykalenko also praised him for his support of the Ukrainian movement and promotion of Ukrainian language among Ukrainians despite the fact that Shteingel' himself did not speak Ukrainian. Evhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* (New York: Ukrains'ka Vil'na Akademiia Nauk u SShA: 1955), 418.

⁹¹ *Sbornik Materialov ob Ekonomicheskome Polozhenii Evreev v Rossii*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Evreiskoe Kolonizatsionnoe Obschestvo, 1904), xxiv.

⁹² The percentage of Jews were significant in the towns in cities of the Pale as Jews were forbidden to reside in the countryside. For this reason, Jewish presence was noticeable in the municipal electoral curia.

province, which soon took over the entire Southwestern Region, several Jewish activists were among its leadership. From November 1905, the lawyer Ia.S. Gol'denveizer, and later, from January 1906, Crown Rabbi S.A. Lur'e and the optometrist M.E. Mandel'shtam – all Jews – were elected to the regional committee of the Kiev Kadets. The two latter individuals had already been crucial in Jewish politics; they also became influential during the electoral campaign to the First Duma, when the Kiev Kadets were developing their strategies for mobilizing the Jewish vote.

As the formation of the Kadet party continued at its second party congress in St. Petersburg in early January 1906, its Kiev organization began its electoral preparations. Among other things, its leaders explored the question of how to draw the Jewish population into its orbit. On 2 January 1906, the Kiev committee of the Kadets⁹³ discussed the distribution of party literature among the Jews and decided to start with 15,000 copies of the Kadet program, with the Yiddish version of the Kiev Kadets' call for Jewish support as its preface. Next the committee decided to organize a special commission (*komissii*) which would publicize the platform of the Constitutional Democratic party among the Jewish population exclusively.⁹⁴ What the Kiev Kadets began discussing as a policy of special attention to the Jews, soon received further development in the direction of a separate electoral campaign for targeting specifically the Jews. Interestingly, it was the Jewish Kadets who initially suggested some special electoral steps toward Jewish voters and later kept proposing to organize the pre-electoral work around this principle.

⁹³ The general meeting of the Kiev Kadets that took place on 5 January 1906 re-elected many members of this temporary committee into the permanent one. *Svoboda i pravo*, 7 January 1906, p. 3. "V konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii. Obshchee sobranie," *Svoboda i pravo*, 7 January 1906, p. 4.

⁹⁴ "Zasedanie komiteta konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii," *Svoboda i pravo*, 4 January 1906, pp. 3-4.

An approach that envisioned two separate, although connected, campaigns received further impetus during the ensuing debates among voters. On 15 January 1906, a meeting was organized by the Kadets in Lybed' municipal district of Kiev, a city neighborhood which was heavily populated by Jewish residents. Attendees agreed to approach the two target audiences – Christian and Jewish – separately. The doctor S.I. Benderskii suggested the Kadets and the Jews work in parallel with each other. This proposal could be construed as a suggestion for cooperation, which it definitely was; most importantly, however, this cooperation envisioned two distinct organizational electoral campaigns, which would deal with Jewish and non-Jewish voters. During the discussion, Gurevich emphasized the expediency of sending Jewish activists to the Jewish community and Kadet representatives (read non-Jewish, that is Christian – M.M.) to the Christian voters. To reiterate: this policy meant that the Jews and Christians would remain two (separate) target audiences of voters. In addition, safety concerns also suggested dividing the electorate into Jewish and Christian categories for door-to-door actions: the committee decided that the Jewish activists should stay away from campaigning among the Christian population to avoid any possible troubles, which evidently implied antisemitic reactions from the Christian owners of apartments.⁹⁵ Essentially, the main point of these debates was the practical necessity to carry out two electoral campaigns, with Jewish activists focusing exclusively on the Jews. This became a leitmotif of the general design of the Kadet campaign in Kiev province and of its practical implementation.

⁹⁵ “Iz zhizni politicheskikh partii. Uchastkovoe sobranie chlenov izbiratelei konstitutsionno-demokraticeskoi partii,” *Kievskii otkliki*, 15 January 1906, pp. 3-4.

The Kadets were not the only party which engaged in political mobilization of the Jews. Jewish parties and groups also sought the support of the Jewish electorate, in particular, the Zionists, whose immediate goal in that period was to improve the legal conditions of Jews. Others, such as the Jewish Bund, staunchly advocated the active boycott of the elections and the Duma. Its members planned to discredit the idea of the elections by disrupting electoral discussions and provoking the authorities to ban or close electoral meetings. They also hoped to persuade Jewish voters to ignore the elections, thereby preventing them from happening.⁹⁶ What the Kadets offered to the Jews was not a particular political ideology, but the general principle of constitutionalism, which translated into the idea of legal equality for the Jewish people. With this thesis both the Kadet leadership and the Kiev Kadets intended to attract all Jews to the Kadet party – whether as members or electoral supporters. The Kiev Kadets believed that this principle combined with the Kadet program was sufficient for the party to count on the unconditional support of the Jews. On several occasions, including the January Kadet electoral meeting in Lybed' district, Jewish activists emphasized the electoral potential of the Jewish non-party masses and expressed confidence that the notion of legal equality should appeal to ordinary Jews.⁹⁷

It was Crown Rabbi S.A. Lur'e who took the initiative into his hands to establish an organization that, first, focused exclusively on Jewish voters and, second, advocated the

⁹⁶ “Ob areste chlenov Bunda za vystupleniia protiv vyborov v Gos. Dumu v iugo-zapadnom krae,” TsDIAK, f. 442, op. 856, d. 195, ll. 1-9, 9 ob. Also “Delo o meshchanine g. Tarashchi Gershele Shulimove Pogrebyskom, zaderzhannom za prinaldlezhnost' k rev. soobshchestvu Bund i prepiatstvovanie sobraniu dlia vyborov v Gos. Dumu,” TsDIAK, f. 442, op. 856, d. 199, ll. 1-2, 2 ob.

⁹⁷ “Iz zhizni politicheskikh partii. Uchastkovoe sobranie chlenov izbiratelei konstitutsionno-demokraticeskoi partii,” *Kievskiiia otkliki*, 15 January 1906, pp. 3-4.

Kadet party program – *the Non-Party Group of United Jewish-Voters of the City of Kiev*. The rabbi – who, as noted above, was a member of the Kiev committee of the party – called on every synagogues community to send ten representatives to a consultative conference (*soveshchatel'noe sobranie*). He also sent invitations to those Jews who did not have close ties to synagogues – such as doctors and lawyers. He managed to secure a permit from the police to hold the conference, which took place no later than 11 January 1906 and gathered some 200 Jews. Lur'e cautiously limited the discussion to the mobilization of the Jewish vote, avoiding any debates about support for any political party. He opposed the attempts of some attendees to make references to the Kadet party as the best political ally for the Jews. The overall goal of the conference was to encourage Jews to take part in the elections to advance the resolution of the “Jewish question” in Russia via the work of the State Duma.⁹⁸ The leaflet that the non-party group circulated in Kiev reflected this position. It appealed to all Jews: “Jews of all parties, unite for the attainment of [your] civil rights!”⁹⁹

Summing up, in January 1906, the official Kadet campaign to the First Duma began. The Kiev Kadets developed their own plan, specific to the province. On the initiative of some of their Jewish members, the non-party group of Jewish voters became that special electoral enterprise with which the Kiev Kadets undertook to target Jewish voters in the province. However, by the time it had appeared in the Jewish street, other Jewish political activists had already taken steps to mobilize the Jewish vote within the Pale of Settlement, including the province of Kiev. In fact, from the Jewish perspective,

⁹⁸ “Soveshchatel'noe sobranie po voprosu uchastiia evreiskogo naseleniia goroda Kiev v vyborakh v gosudarstvennuu dumu,” *Svoboda i pravo*, 12 January 1906, p. 3.

⁹⁹ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 66.

the non-party group owed its emergence to a conflict – political and personal – within the Jewish camp. It began competing with a prominent Jewish organization, to which we now turn our attention.

Jewish Activists and Electoral Politics

The organization that became crucial in involving the Jewish population in the electoral campaign to the First Russian Duma was the *League for the Attainment of Full Rights for the Jewish People in Russia*.¹⁰⁰ It was founded in Vilna in March 1905 and its fundamental aim was “the realization to their full extent of the *civil, political, and national rights* of the Jewish people in Russia.”¹⁰¹ The leadership of this political organization kept the term “league” – instead of “party” – to ensure its inclusive character, since it aimed to unite broad elements of the Jewish population under its banner. Diverse Jewish political elements entered the Jewish League, including liberals (‘assimilationists,’ as their Jewish opponents dubbed them) and Zionists, as well as those with socialist leanings. Even its leadership reflected its heterogeneous character and included prominent Jewish figures such as the liberal Genrikh Sliozberg, the Laborist (*Trudovik*) Leon Bramson, the Zionist Shmarya Levin, the autonomist Simon Dubnov, the Socialist Revolutionary Mark Ratner, and others. Despite this diversity, the League mostly represented the liberal camp.¹⁰² It was

¹⁰⁰ *Soiuz dlia dostizheniia polnopraviia evreiskago naroda v Rossii*. Sometimes referred to as the Jewish Union, the Jewish League, the Attainers (*dostizhentsy*), and the Society of Jewish Full Rights (*Obshchestvo evreiskago polnopraviia*).

¹⁰¹ S.M. Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1920), 111. See also *Ustav Obshchestva dlia dostizheniia polnopraviia evreiskago naroda v Rossii*. TsDIAK, f. 1335, op. 1, d. 973, l. 27.

¹⁰² Sidney Harcave, “Jewish Political Parties and Groups and the Russian State Dumas from 1905 to 1907,” Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1943, p. 65.

headed by Maxim Vinaver, a prominent legal scholar and a leader of the Russian Jewish intelligentsia. Characteristically, he was also a co-founder of the Kadet party and a member of its central committee. Not only did the leadership of the two organizations overlap,¹⁰³ but a great part of their grassroots membership did as well.¹⁰⁴ For Russian liberals, the Jewish League served as an essential instrument for reaching the broad masses of Jewish voters and propagandizing the national elections as a way to attain equal rights. As a consequence, the part of the League's members whose political preferences did not necessarily correlate with the Kadet program involved in the Kadets' sphere of influence.

The general approaches of the Kadets and of the League to the first election campaign had much in common. Both were concerned with the political education of the population, assisting voters' applications for registration, and free legal consultations. The two organizations connected with their local supporters by sending their experienced speakers to the provinces. The Kadets were building a broad oppositional front to establish the constitutional order in Russia. In turn, the Jewish League invited Jewish political parties and groups to unite their efforts to advance Jewish emancipation. Both the Kiev Kadets and the Jewish League encouraged disenfranchised parts of the population to participate in political discussions and even in preliminary candidate nominations; the Jewish League, of course, focused on the broader masses of Jewry. For example, the provincial convention of the Jewish delegates from the counties, held on October 14 and 15, 1905 in Kiev, adopted

¹⁰³ Shmarya Levin, a Zionist and a deputy to the First Duma, indicates that Vinaver was the single leader of the Jewish deputies in the First Duma, including Zionists. Shmarya Levin, *The Arena* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932), 299-300.

¹⁰⁴ Levin, *Ibid.*, 287. It is difficult to pinpoint the overlap, but some clues can be found in the report of the Kiev provincial committee of the Kadet Party. Its estimate as of mid-February 1906 was that Jewish members numbered 39% of the Kiev Kadets. GARF, f. 523, op.1, d. 216, l. 4.

a resolution: “Considering that it is necessary for the electors from the Jews to be representatives of the entire Jewish people, the convention proposes that [Jewish activists] approach organizations (where they exist) or [the Jewish] masses directly, within reason, [in order for the Jews who are not qualified] together with [the Jews who are] qualified to elect electors; then the aforementioned electors are to go through the votes of the qualified.”¹⁰⁵ Similarly, the Kadets attempted to draw the disenfranchised masses into the electoral discussions.

In principle, the common ground between the two lay in the Kadets’ demand for general equality and the League’s goal of Jewish emancipation. For the time being, these commonalities ensured the League’s support for the Kadet party as both organizations saw the national elections as the fundamental means of achieving this goal. The Jewish League remained a separate political organization, but the Kadets played an important role in the activity of the League. Later on, it increasingly became a Kadet enterprise, designed to rally the Jews around it, bring Jewish voters under the umbrella of the Constitutional Democratic party, and to facilitate Jewish support for the Kadets in the elections.

Chronologically, the Jewish League had launched its electoral campaign well before the formal foundation of the Constitutional Democratic Party and its Kiev branch. The League began their electoral preparations in response to the establishment of the consultative (Bulygin) Duma in early August 1905. It sent its most prominent speakers, such as Maxim Vinaver and Vladimir Zhabotinskii, to the provinces of the Pale of Jewish

¹⁰⁵ The convention was chaired by the doctor Max Mandel’shtam, who later became a member of the Kiev regional committee of the Kadets in February 1906. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), l. 39.

Settlement to publicize its program.¹⁰⁶ The League also sent special envoys to the provinces of the Pale and to those outside of the Pale in which the Jewish population was abundant. One of their functions was to collect and report data on the political moods and preferences of local Jewish communities and the status of the League's provincial branches to its central bureau in St. Petersburg. The envoys were also to look into provincial resources and opportunities and to suggest strategies to organize electoral preparations. In addition, the envoys consulted members of the League's bureaus and committees on some frequently raised legal questions, as they often travelled across many provinces and gradually accumulated practical knowledge. Their guidance and suggestions added uniformity to the overall campaign and connected the central bureau of the League with its local branches.¹⁰⁷

The election campaign served as a strong catalyst for political debates in the Jewish street and triggered attempts at self-organizing, including further development of the Jewish League's structure. When the central bureau's envoy Ioann Fride arrived in Kiev in early September 1905, he found not only local committees and bureaus of the League there, but also a few grassroots Jewish organizations. These were the "circles" or "unions," which members of the Kiev intelligentsia and business elite had organized to guide the Jewish community in participating in the elections to the Duma. Seeing the Duma as a means to achieve Jewish emancipation, they defined their immediate mission as enlightening the Jewish masses on electoral procedures and persuading Jewish voters to participate actively in the elections.¹⁰⁸ The League envoy's task, then, was to establish contact with local

¹⁰⁶ Christoph Gassenschmidt, *Jewish Liberal Politics in Tsarist Russia, 1900-1914* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 34.

¹⁰⁷ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), l. 12.

¹⁰⁸ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, l. 27.

activists who agreed to follow the political platform of the League. In particular, in Uman' county, a certain N. D. Fishman headed such a group, which had already started the electoral preparation on its own initiative.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, the Berdichev electoral group that numbered more than 30 Jews started electoral discussions on whether to vote for Jewish candidates only or to include some Christian names on the list as well.¹¹⁰

Often, members of the local organization were eager to enter the League when invited. First, it raised their political clout within the Jewish community and gave a wider hearing to their goals. Second, the legal support and advice that the central bureau provided – provincial activists drew on St. Petersburg lawyers' and politicians' erudition and professional experience – was vital encouragement to their campaigning efforts. Many Jewish activists saw the larger League as a source of emotional and political support; they even appealed to the central bureau when contradictions and quarrels arose within local circles. Participation in the League formalized and unified the electoral preparation within the Jewish camp. Generally, the formal process took the following path. Members of the League's provincial chapter, its supporters, or local figures would call a meeting of Jewish voters to discuss participation in the election. Then, if they decided to take part – and they usually did – the meeting would elect a provincial election committee, which organized local election committees at the lower – county (*uezd*) – level within the province. These local election committees would supervise and direct preparations for the elections: distribute information brochures about the elections, aid voters to register, and explain complicated election procedures. For the most part, the League directed the work of local

¹⁰⁹ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, l. 15, RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 38, ll. 4-5.

¹¹⁰ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 184-185.

election committees and acted as a strong lobbying group, thereby influencing the choice of Jewish candidates.¹¹¹

The Rise of Competition within the Jewish Political Camp

In Kiev province, burgeoning Jewish politics produced several Jewish groups which plunged into electoral politics.¹¹² Gradually, two major groups formed and, although both of them advocated Jewish emancipation, they began competing with each other.¹¹³ One group was centered around Lev Brodskii, who was a rich Kiev entrepreneur and exerted influence in practically all Jewish matters in Kiev.¹¹⁴ As he donated generously to many city institutions, he attempted to assume responsibility also for leading the electoral preparations and even, according to Fride, to nominate the candidate of his choice – Brodskii wanted that G.E. Afanas'ev, the director of the Kiev State Bank, to represent the entire Jewish community in Kiev province.¹¹⁵ This ran contrary to the intentions of the League's officers in St. Petersburg, who hoped to engage the entire Jewish community – not only Jewish voters, but also those who did not qualify – in the electoral debates and nomination of candidates to the Duma. As a consequence, many Jewish activists opposed Brodskii's electoral manipulations, which essentially represented his usual way of dealing

¹¹¹ See also Sidney Harcave, "The Jews and the First National Election," *American Slavic and East European Review* 9, no. 1 (February 1950): 36.

¹¹² For example, Uman' Jews organized a group to coordinate the electoral campaign in the county. In Berdichev, an electoral committee consisted of 30 individuals. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 27, 185, 186.

¹¹³ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 23.

¹¹⁴ Natan Meir, "Brodskii Family," YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe. http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Brodskii_Family (accessed May 4, 2016).

¹¹⁵ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 175-180. The Kiev authorities later reported G.E. Afanas'ev in the list of Kiev Kadet members. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1424. ll. 43-45.

with the Jewish matters – he sponsored many projects in Kiev and felt entitled to make decisions.¹¹⁶

Apparently, Brodskii's influence in Kiev was so great that even those Jewish activists who did not agree with his approach could not ignore his position. Upon his arrival in Kiev in early September 1905, the central bureau's representative, Ioann Fride, for instance, found himself in an awkward situation as he attempted to change the way that Brodskii and his close associates were organizing the electoral campaign among Jews. At a meeting that Brodskii convened to initiate electoral preparations, Fride failed to persuade the attendees to engage the broad masses into the planning and decision-making processes. Clearly, Brodskii did not need the supervision and support from the Jewish League that Fride could offer him. Claiming that local conditions were unfavorable for founding the committee on an elective basis, members of this meeting took over the provincial electoral committee, albeit temporarily. Undoubtedly, this was done with the encouragement of Brodskii, who chaired the gathering. Fride could do nothing, except to register his dissatisfaction in his correspondence to the St. Petersburg committee of the League. He complained later that the attendees revealed their ignorance of the electoral law (the August 6 law) and of basic electoral data such as the number of Jewish voters – though he admitted it only in his reports to the League's leadership, to be sure.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, he remained at this meeting and, as he later recounted in his explanatory note to the central bureau, asked

¹¹⁶ Faith C. Hillis, "Between Empire and Nation: Urban Politics, Community, and Violence in Kiev, 1863-1907," Ph.D. Diss., Yale University, 2009, p. 209. Nathan Meir, *Kiev*.

¹¹⁷ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, l. 178.

those present for help in his mission. He received some response; however, he reported that he did not expect any practical outcome from the promised aid.¹¹⁸

Beside Brodskii's associates,¹¹⁹ other attendees were Ilia Zlatopol'skii, and Moisei Mazor, described by Iulii Gessen, the secretary of the Jewish League's central bureau, in his letters to Fride, as the "democratic group of youth."¹²⁰ Other figures of this group included Mark Ratner, Maks Mandel'shtam, Mark Tsitron, G.E. Gurevich, Iakov Gendel'man, and Grigorii Bykhovskii. While Mandel'shtam was over 65 at that time, the majority were in their thirties and forties and represented a younger generation in Jewish politics, one that preached mass politics over the traditional imperial ways of running the Jewish matters via *shtadlanim* (mediators, or representatives), who negotiated with the state on behalf of the Jewish community. Fride's inquiries upon his arrival in Kiev led him to conclude that the Brodskii group exercised marked influence within the community, especially among *tsenzoviki* – residents with property, who qualified for the elections. However, later in his report he explained that this group was ineffective in terms of mobilizing the general Jewish vote, which they had not planned in earnest.¹²¹ Similarly, the Brodskii group's opponents accused its members of being undemocratic and usurping the power of the election committee.¹²²

¹¹⁸ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, l. 179.

¹¹⁹ Among them were lawyers A.M. Gol'denberg and I.P. [Izrail' Pavlovich, Srul Favelevich] Kel'berin. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 22, 178.

¹²⁰ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 22, 178.

¹²¹ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, l. 179.

¹²² RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 23.

The relationship between the two groups was complicated. First, while it was more or less clear that Lev Brodskii was the central figure in the first group, the make-up of the second group was loose and fluid. In fact, it was a less coherent group than an association of Jewish activists who roughly agreed on Jewish participation in the national elections. As they had not developed mature political platforms yet, they overlooked their programmatic differences for the time being – territorialists Iakov Gendel'man and Arnol'd Margolin, Socialist (Seimist, that is a member of SERP¹²³) Mark Ratner, and others cooperated with each other to mobilize the Jewish community for the elections. Second, some members of both groups had worked together on various occasions before 1905. One area of their joint work was the OPE – the Society for the Promotion of Enlightenment among Jews in Russia,¹²⁴ in which some of the Kiev figures such as Brodskii, Mandel'shtam, Kulisher, and Zlatopol'skii had many opportunities to work together. In other words, the connections between the two groups and within the second group were multiple and long-standing. They lived in one city and knew each other personally or by name. Finally, some figures moved back and forth between the two main factions and blurred the border between the rival groups, in particular, Ilia Zlatopol'skii.

Despite these Jewish figures' complex and rich ties with each other and probably because of them, tactical issues of reaching an agreement on the slate of possible candidates caused spiraling tensions. Overall, there were several rifts within the Kiev branch of the League as well as bridges that held these activists together, but the division between the

¹²³ SERP stands for the Russian name of the party – the Socialist Jewish Workers' Party (*sotsialisticheskaia evreiskaia rabochaiia partiia*).

¹²⁴ *Obshchestvo dlia rasprostraneniia prosvieshcheniia mezhdv evreiami v Rossii (OPE)*.

Brodskii group and the other members was the most serious. When the central bureau's representative Ioann Fride came to Kiev and tried to work with all the feuding factions, engaging with every possible source of influence on Jewish politics, he also became involved in the rivalry and thereby exacerbated it.¹²⁵

The unity within the "democratically disposed" group was also questionable. However, whereas the rift between the Brodskii group and other Jewish activists mostly reflected the refusal of the latter to accept "the plutocratic politics" of the former, the disagreements between Zlatopol'skii and Margolin, Ratner and Zlatopol'skii, *or* Margolin and Fride signaled the rise of local initiative in the province. Their rivalry was not so much over electoral ideology as over competition for recognition of their services to the Jewish community or the Jewish League. All of them worked to engage the Jewish masses in the electoral process. Zlatopol'skii cooperated with the Jewish League to establish local circles and enjoyed the respect of the Jewish League's central bureau well before the electoral campaign commenced. On his own initiative, Margolin toured the province and spoke in the synagogues of Kanev, Uman', Berdichev, and other county and smaller towns as early as August 1905. His aim, according to his own account, was to publicize the Jewish League and educate the Jews on electoral procedures.¹²⁶ Yet some Jewish activists did not appreciate Margolin's efforts. Some even suspected that in undertaking this tour, Margolin might have had the goal of self-promotion, because it had been solely his own decision what route to take and what to say in his public presentations. He also focused on

¹²⁵ Both Gurevich, at the request of Fride, and Zlatopol'skii reported that two competing electoral conventions would be likely to take place in Kiev. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), ll. 19, 23.

¹²⁶ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), l. 14.

establishing direct ties with the central bureau and deliberately attempted to circumvent Zlatopol'skii,¹²⁷ who was the established contact person for the central bureau in Kiev province.¹²⁸ Margolin supported the principles of the electoral campaign that the Jewish League had developed, yet competed for the recognition of his status against other activists inside the League. In other words, each of them – Zlatopol'skii, Margolin, Gurevich, and the rest of Kiev Jews from the Jewish League – were activists of mass politics. Their goal was to involve the Jewish populace in the elections and encourage them to vote for a Jewish candidate. They eagerly promoted the idea of the attainment of Jewish emancipation by parliamentary means, thereby expressing a position close to that of the Kadets on nationality issues.

To this end, Jewish activists succeeded in organizing a province-wide electoral congress. Preparations for it involved many Jews both voters and the disenfranchised. First, on October 3, the League had organized a convention of local circles' representatives, which elected an electoral committee.¹²⁹ Then, the committee organized a provincial congress of representatives of county electoral committees (*s'ezd pretstavitelei uezdnykh evreiskikh izbiratel'nykh komitetov*). The congress, held on October 14-15, became the highest point of the electoral campaign as more Jewish communities engaged in its work and reached the widest Jewish audience so far. The two resolutions that the congress approved aimed to democratize the elections and defined its attitude toward Jewish and

¹²⁷ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), ll. 14-15.

¹²⁸ In his letter to the central bureau, G. Gurevich discussed how Zlatopol'skii had been its contact in Kiev province. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), ll. 23, 24.

¹²⁹ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), l. 21.

non-Jewish candidates.¹³⁰ First, the congress decided to involve the Jewish masses in the discussions of the candidates. Second, it declared a preference for Jewish candidates and recommended voting for progressive Christian candidates only in the absence of Jewish ones. Overall, the provincial congress of county Jewish representatives passed the resolutions that closely followed the mandate of the central bureau of the Jewish League. Therefore, in Kiev province electoral collaboration of local Jewish activists of different political shades was taking place essentially under the Jewish League's guidance.

The electoral campaign not only mobilized the Jews for the elections, but it also rendered them a powerful force in the Russian political arena. However, the factors that brought these Jewish activists together eventually contributed to their divorce. In Kiev province, their quarrels manifested themselves at early stages of the first electoral campaign and became known to the central bureau of the Jewish League. The central leadership urged Jewish activists in Kiev to unite their efforts.¹³¹ Yet some rifts such as the division between Lev Brodskii and the rest scuttled any attempts to overcome divisions. As a result, Brodskii did not participate in the provincial congress. The mutual aversion between Zlatopol'skii and Margolin also turned serious. Margolin attempted to ignore Zlatopol'skii's work on several occasions, which the central bureau quickly noticed, since the latter was its main contact for correspondence in Kiev.¹³² Margolin competed with

¹³⁰ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), ll. 39, 41.

¹³¹ The central bureau sent a separate telegram to Mandel'shtam, with copies to Ratner, Margolin, Brodskii, Zlatopol'skii, and Gurevich. In the telegram, Vinaver, Sliozberg, and two more members of the bureau asked the addressees to unite for the sake of the cause. All but Brodskii agreed. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), ll. 32, 35, 36.

¹³² Along with Ratner, Margolin gathered a circle that intentionally excluded Zlatopol'skii. On the suggestion of the central bureau's representative Fride, the member of this circle Gurevich reported this fact to St.

Fride for the leadership in the province: a local versus a guest from the capital. Being acquainted with Sliozberg and, evidently, with other members of the League's leadership, Margolin tried to correspond with them directly on the League's activity. Yet Fride was the representative of the central bureau and had powers to act on behalf of the League. The fact that he strove to bring together all provincial Jewish forces under the Jewish League without acknowledging Margolin's services to the Jewish cause made him an ally of Zlatopol'skii in the eyes of Margolin.

These two examples – of Lev Brodskii and David Margolin – demonstrate how strained the relationships among some Jewish leaders in Kiev province were, but also how strong and energetic local initiative was. In early October 1905, the provincial congress of the Jewish League witnessed many debates among local activists where they strove to assert their influence over Jewish electoral politics. Clearly, the Jewish League's popularity grew but so did tensions and rivalries in the Jewish camp. As to Brodskii, he refused to engage the broad masses and preferred to continue his politics of personal influence, supporting his decisions by financial aid such as charity and money contributions to city projects and needs. His approach allowed little room for electoral debates which the Jewish League organized. The case of Margolin represented a mixed case. Margolin was eager to work in the Jewish League; however, his actions did not often correspond to policies that founders of the Jewish League laid down. On the whole, while the split between Brodskii and those who decided to join the Jewish League developed sooner, other disagreements, reinforced by various political ideologies, would also later deepen.

Petersburg. Gurevich also criticized Margolin for being a self-promoter at the expense of others and admitted that such his behavior hampered the productive work. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), ll. 23-24.

Two days after the Kiev congress, the political situation in the country changed dramatically. For several months, Russia had been in a state of general strike, including the closure of railroads. Then, on October 17, 1905, the tsar signed the Manifesto that established the legislative Duma. As a result, the electoral system was liberalized; the December 11 electoral law broadened the electorate by lowering some property qualifications and enfranchising some categories of workers. All the participating players – the authorities, political parties, organizations, and voters – had to adjust to the newly established state order. The day after the Manifesto was published, a pogrom disrupted the life of the Jewish community in Kiev province.¹³³ It continued for three days from October 18 through 20 in Kiev and spread outside of the city subsequently. It claimed between 47 and 100 lives and injured 300. The material destruction was large – at least 10.5 million rubles.¹³⁴ As a consequence, the League focused on dealing with the outcomes of the pogrom, in particular with finding and providing financial and juridical aid for its victims from scarce local resources.¹³⁵

¹³³ On the causes of the pogrom in Kiev and how it unfolded as well as the reasons for the local authorities' attitude toward the street violence in October 1905, see Gerald Surh, "The 1905 Pogrom in Odessa and Kiev," *Jewish Social Studies*, 15, no. 3 (Spring/Summer 2009): 39-55.

¹³⁴ With fewer "casualties... than in Odessa, Kiev probably suffered more material destruction... than any other city." Michael Hamm, *Kiev, A Portrait, 1800-1917* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 191. Hamm also reports that 300 to 400 were hurt and 3,000 Jews were left without a place to work. Other sources give different numbers: 27 dead and 300 injured (Faith C. Hillis); 47 dead (Victoria Khiterer). Faith C. Hillis, *Children of Rus': Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). Viktoriya Khiterer, "The October 1905 Pogrom in Kiev," *East European Jewish Affairs*, 22, no. 2 (1992): 34. Shlomo Lambroza's number is 100 killed and 406 wounded in the city of Kiev, his source being *American Jewish Yearbook (AJY)*. It is unclear how he calculated the number of killed for Kiev as *AJY* does not give that number.

¹³⁵ *Delo o deiatel'nosti "Kievskogo soiuzia dlia dostizheniia polnopraviia evreiskogo naroda v Rossii,"* TsDIAK, f. 275, op. 1, d. 869, ll. 1ob., 18.

For some time, the pogrom interrupted the election campaign and reduced Jewish interest in the elections. The Kiev League had to restore its membership lists and sort out its finances.¹³⁶ Although after the pogrom the mandatory membership fee of 50 kopecks was a significant burden for many members, the Kiev branch kept most of its membership. When the police searched the apartment of the doctor Iakov Gendel'man in early December, they seized a list of the Kiev membership numbered more than 200 Jews, who were mostly merchants of the first and second guild, some lawyers, and a few others.¹³⁷ It is unclear if this was the full list of the League's members in Kiev province. In their December 17 letter to the central bureau, Gendel'man and Margolin stated that the Kiev membership was around 1,200 individuals.¹³⁸ It was likely that their count included the League's members in the counties of the province. In other words, the organization continued its electoral activities, although the pogrom affected electoral politics in Kiev province.

The Kiev branch of the Jewish League soon resumed its efforts to organize the election campaign to the Duma as its members, seeing a direct connection between the pogrom and legal restrictions on Jews, continued to place their hopes on the Duma to achieve Jewish emancipation. At the same time, two trends began to emerge within the Kiev branch of the League. First, Jewish politics saw a radicalization of political goals, slogans, and demands. Whereas in its earlier stages in August and September, the electoral campaign was mainly about mobilization of the Jewish community and launching

¹³⁶ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 55.

¹³⁷ *Delo o deiatel'nosti "Kievskogo soiuza dlia dostizheniia polnopraviia evreiskogo naroda v Rossii,"* TsDIAK, f. 275, op. 1, d. 869, ll. 7-15.

¹³⁸ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 55.

discussions on legal procedures, three months later, the Jewish liberals and Zionists, who were the main forces in the Jewish League, jointly articulated radical aspirations in a confident tone. On 16 and 19 November at their joint meeting, representatives of 31 local circles of Kiev province elected three delegates to the congress of the Jewish League in St. Petersburg scheduled for 22-24 November. The Kiev meeting developed several proposals for the upcoming congress, including a call for a constituent assembly or at least for the Duma to be declared a constituent body. However, the final reading of the call included a demand only for a constituent assembly, without any reservations. While the pogrom interrupted the electoral campaign, it definitely gave the campaign a new momentum, along with the shift to the left in the Jewish camp.¹³⁹

Second, the Kiev meeting revealed the strengthened position of the Zionists within the Kiev branch of the League. One of its proposals prepared for the congress' consideration referred to a major concern of the Zionists. The meeting urged the impending congress to take steps to regulate Jewish emigration, which had dramatically increased throughout the Pale of Jewish Settlement since the October pogroms.¹⁴⁰ Apparently, this proposal corresponded to the spirit of the moment – Jewish emigrants would appreciate any aid, even legal consultations and advice on paperwork. Indicating a possible shift of the balance of power within the Jewish League to the Zionists, this proposal showed that the Zionists perceived the League as a useful and influential all-Jewish organization and even planned to utilize it in their politics. In particular, they proposed to establish a special

¹³⁹ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 48-51.

¹⁴⁰ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 49.

emigration commission within the Kiev branch of the League.¹⁴¹ While dealing with the exodus of Jews from Russia did not correspond to the founding goals of the League – the attainment of equal rights for the Jewish people in Russia – it reflected the Jewish liberals’ success in achieving the tactical goals: to unite the Jewish people and mobilize it for political work in Russia.

A sizable part of the Kiev Jewry remained outside the Jewish liberals’ electoral mobilization. The Jewish Bund, which had established its presence in Kiev province since 1900, became their staunch opponent. After the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1903 in many cities of the Pale, the Bund had a rift with the Russian Social Democratic Party, which did not recognize the Bund’s claim to special status as the single representative of the Jewish proletariat. In late 1905 and early 1906, the Bund was coming back to the Russian Social Democrats and participated in heated debates within the revolutionary camp on the matter of participation in the elections. Overall, the leftists were divided on the necessity, expediency, and ability of their parties to partake in the elections. Eventually, the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democrats resolved to pursue an active boycott, that is, non-participation combined with active resistance to the preparations for the elections on the part of other parties. The Bund, relatively weak in the south of the Pale of Settlement, followed the lead of its Russian partner in its general attitude toward elections to both the Bulygin Duma and the Duma established by the October Manifesto.¹⁴² As the authorities

¹⁴¹ Some other Zionist questions also manifested themselves in the meeting. Mandel’shtam made a presentation on territorialism, which concluded the meeting. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 51-52. Territorialist Zionism (or Jewish territorialism) advocated the formation of the Jewish homeland and did not limit its choice to Palestine.

¹⁴² Moshe Rafes, *Ocherki po istorii “Bunda”* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1923), 185.

repressed both the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks in Kiev province, the Bundists alone remained quite active and interfered in electoral meetings and disrupted electoral preparations that the Jewish liberals and other activists organized within the Jewish political camp.¹⁴³ In the trip across Kiev province before the August 6 electoral law, Margolin had clashed with the Bundists.¹⁴⁴ The Bund's position did not have an immediate effect on the liberal electoral campaign, because the August 6 electoral law did not enfranchise the workers. The December 11 law gave representation only to workers in factories with over fifty employees. Most Jewish workers were employed in smaller enterprises, and were thereby excluded from the electoral process. However, the disruptions that the Bundists brought to the electoral meetings organized by the Kadets contributed to tensions between the authorities and the Kadets.

The Kiev Kadets, Their Jewish Allies, and Jewish Voters

In November 1905, a new stage in the electoral campaign began. New political parties and groups emerged and older ones were establishing their presence in Kiev province in the wake of the October Manifesto. Combining antisemitic sentiment with anti-liberal rhetoric, the rightist parties expanded quickly.¹⁴⁵ While the Octobrists did not have a presence in Kiev province, some minor parties such as the right-leaning Party of Legal Order emerged.¹⁴⁶ The liberals created provincial and regional (which covered the Southwestern

¹⁴³ Moshe Rafes, *Ocherki po istorii "Bunda"* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1923), 172, 174, 187.

¹⁴⁴ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, l. 185.

¹⁴⁵ Faith C. Hillis, "Between Empire and Nation: Urban Politics, Community, and Violence in Kiev, 1863-1907," Ph.D. Diss., Yale University, 2009, p. 429-430.

¹⁴⁶ Robert Edelman addresses the weakness of the Octobrists in the Southwestern Region. In his study of the Nationalist Party, he explained that in Kiev province, the Nationalists took the place in the political

Region) organizations of the Kadet party. Kiev's ethnic groups organized their political clubs and parties, such as Polish and Ukrainian activists. Jews, in turn, had resumed their electoral efforts and worked within the provincial branch of the Jewish League. Members of the weak leftist camp either refrained from electoral preparations or found ways to participate in the elections via legal political groups and organizations, including the Kadets.¹⁴⁷

As the newly established Kadet Party began its electoral campaign in the provinces, the Jewish League held its second all-imperial congress in St. Petersburg in late November 1905.¹⁴⁸ Inspired by the work of the congress, the Kiev delegates Gendel'man and Margolin returned to the province to report on the congress at the meeting of county representatives. In addition to discussions of the October pogroms, the congress debated the electoral campaign. In its electoral preparations, the Jewish League advanced significantly further than did the Kiev Kadets and for a short time the party and the League worked in parallel. Their cooperation initially was based on personal ties at their leadership and grassroots levels. In particular, the optometrist and Zionist Max Mandel'shtam, who chaired many of the Jewish League meetings, was a member of the Kiev regional committee of the Kadets.¹⁴⁹ The two organizations drew readily from each other's expertise

spectrum which the Octobrists did in the provinces with less ethnic diversity. Robert Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907-1917* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1980), 93-100.

¹⁴⁷ The Social Democrat M.B. Ratner was an activist of the Jewish League in Kiev.

¹⁴⁸ The congress was made up of delegates and representatives of local electoral committees. *Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia*, ed. L. Katsnel'son (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvo dlia Nauchnykh Evreiskikh Izdaniy and Izdatel'stvo Brokgauz-Efron, 1908-1913), vol.14, col. 516.

¹⁴⁹ GARF, f. 523, op.1, d.216, l. 1.

and experience. The Kiev Kadets benefited from the work that the Jewish League had done in the Jewish community, which had become more familiar to electoral politics. In turn, the Jewish League found a strong partner in the imperial arena, which was essential, since the Russian rightists in Kiev developed their antisemitic rhetoric and grew increasingly confident in applying the Russian-versus-alien (non-Russian) dichotomy in their politics.

The names of some future Kadet members became a subject of electoral negotiations among Jewish voters well before the Kadet provincial branch formed. Along with questions of the mobilization of the Jewish vote and clarifications of electoral procedures, the problem of Jewish versus Christian candidates came to the fore. Jews remained divided on the matter. The Brodskii group agreed that “there is no use trying to have a Jewish deputy because it is not possible for the Holy city [of Kiev].” However, many towns of the Southwestern region insisted on Jewish candidates.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, outside of the city of Kiev, Jews also debated this question. In Berdichev county, some advocated the election of Jewish candidates wherever it was technically possible – they wanted all ten electors from Berdichev townsmen to be Jewish. Others suggested that the Jews should vote for a list of Jewish *and* Christian candidates. Conspicuously, summarizing his impressions of his tour around Kiev province, Fridé indicated that it was well-to-do Jews who advised against electing only Jewish electors, fearing the possible reaction of non-Jews – “what would non-Jews say [about it]?” – to such an electoral outcome.¹⁵¹ As to the non-Jewish candidates, the names of historian I.V. Luchitskii, Prince E.N. Trubetskoi, the director of the Kiev branch of the State bank G.E. Afanas’ev, and Professor S.N. Bulgakov

¹⁵⁰ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, l. 178.

¹⁵¹ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, l. 192.

– all of whom joined the Kadets when the Kiev branch formed in November 1905 – were discussed at these meetings.

In the Jewish camp, local initiative was on the rise, which resulted in the mobilization of the Jewish community, but also brought diversification and acute competition to Jewish politics. Even their common aspirations – such as to partner with the Kadets – did not guarantee unity among Jewish political groups. Commonality of goals often clashed with differences in strategies and with the desire to take a lead in the cause. The Brodskii group stirred up discontent among other Jewish activists who protested against its attempts to handle the electoral campaign, especially its reluctance to engage the broader Jewish masses in pre-electoral discussions.¹⁵² The central bureau of the League also criticized Brodskii for refusing to involve the broad masses in the decision-making process. For him, there was no question that the candidate from the city of Kiev should not be a Jew as well as that the broad mobilization of Jewry was undesirable.¹⁵³

By contrast, Arnol'd Margolin spent much energy connecting with ordinary Jews across the province. However, his activities annoyed Jewish activists in Kiev province as well as the central bureau's representative Fride, although for different reasons. Although Margolin was more open to public electoral discussions than the Brodskii group,¹⁵⁴ Fride insisted that Margolin campaigned in accordance with his personal understanding of the Jewish cause. Fride did not doubt that he also wished to promote himself as a potential candidate to the Duma by taking on responsibilities instead of building a team of provincial

¹⁵² RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 24.

¹⁵³ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 27

¹⁵⁴ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 17, l. 184.

activists and working toward mobilizing and engaging the Jews in the electoral campaign. To be sure, Margolin attempted to build a circle of activists – he invited Gurevich, Gendel'man, Tsitron, Mandel'shtam, and Ratner to work together – but he was selective about the members of the group and wanted to be a leading figure.¹⁵⁵ He was unwilling to cooperate with Zlatopol'skii,¹⁵⁶ who had already been involved in the Jewish League's work.

Apparently, Margolin sensed Fride's disapproval and, perhaps for this reason, attempted to avoid him. Numerous signs of mutual antagonism were present in the relationship between the two. On one occasion in March 1906, Margolin, with the support of his father who provided his apartment for a gathering of Jewish activists, manipulated the attendees to choose him as a nominee to be elected to the Duma. He had failed to invite Fride, who was travelling to towns of Kiev province at that time, to this meeting. Margolin's rivalry with Fride was also evident in other instances. He made some attempts to usurp Fride's role as the central bureau's representative in the province. In mid-December 1905, Margolin's close associate Gendel'man asked the central bureau to assign Margolin as its representative in Kiev province. The central bureau refused to do so, referring to some formalities.¹⁵⁷ Essentially, Margolin's approach differed from what the Jewish League leadership expected from their activists. For Margolin, democratization of

¹⁵⁵ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 24.

¹⁵⁶ In his letter to Iulii Gessen, the secretary of the central bureau of the Jewish League, Zlatopol'skii complains that A. Margolin was ignoring him and did not invite him to the congress of the Jewish League in Kiev. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 19.

¹⁵⁷ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 61-62.

the electoral preparations – the strategy that the Jewish League had been pursuing – was more rhetoric than a fundamental principle.¹⁵⁸

By early 1906, rivalries had been tearing apart the Kiev branch of the Jewish League; Jewish activists took on initiative after initiative, gathered at meetings and congresses, discussed electoral strategies, and travelled across the province – however, they quarreled with each other and sent their complaints to St. Petersburg, hoping that the central leadership would support the sender over his rivals. However, the central bureau did not show any inclination to do so and continued to engage all the parties, calling on them to cooperate with each other. It was at this moment – in January 1906 – that the Crown Rabbi of Kiev, Solomon Lur'e, following the plan of the Kiev Kadets to target the Jewish electorate, organized *the Non-Party Group of United Jewish Voters of the City of Kiev*. Its declared principles and goals coincided with those of the Jewish League – both aimed to mobilize Jewish voters to achieve the resolution of the “Jewish question” in Russia in the Duma. This basic similarity in goals, however, did not bring unity to the Jewish liberal camp. From its very nascence, the Non-Party Group of Jewish Voters competed with the Jewish League in electoral preparations; the Jewish League paid back in kind.

Although the Non-Party Group originated with the Kiev Kadets' search for effective electoral strategies to mobilize the Jewish community, the Jewish context of its origins provides a more accurate picture. First, in terms of the non-party group's composition, it embraced some of the moderate elements of Jewry, which questioned the authority of the Kiev branch of the League to represent the Jewish community and organize

¹⁵⁸ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 61, 62.

the electoral campaign on their behalf.¹⁵⁹ When Lur'e sent out his invitations, many responded and joined the group. Prominent figures in this respect were I.S. Zlatopol'skii, who remained an important contact of the League's central leadership in Kiev province,¹⁶⁰ and G.B. Bykhovskii, an ex-member of the League.¹⁶¹ Second, the long-standing personal rivalry between Lev Brodskii and other influential Kiev Jews such as the father of Arnol'd Margolin, D.S. Margolin, on the one hand, and Solomon Lur'e, on the other,¹⁶² could explain why Lur'e chose to use the Kadet card as an opportunity to launch his own electoral campaign among Jews of the province, rather than join the existing Kiev committee of the Jewish League. This personal contention between the two leaderships aggravated the relationship between the two organizations.

For some time, the competitors worked in parallel. In March 1906, the central bureau's representative, A. Iasvoin, reported from Kiev that both groups carried out their electoral campaigns around the same principles and undertook almost identical strategies. They organized electoral committees of Jews in the county towns to coordinate electoral preparations to the Duma.¹⁶³ These electoral committees verified official electoral lists, urged Jewish voters to participate in the elections, and consulted them on application

¹⁵⁹ *Kievsksaia zhizn'*, 14 February 1906, p. 2.

¹⁶⁰ "Soveshchatel'noe sobranie po voprosu uchastiia evreiskogo naseleniia goroda Kieva v vyborakh v gosudarstvennuu dumu. Okonchanie," *Svoboda i pravo*, 13 January 1906, p. 3.

¹⁶¹ "Soveshchatel'noe sobranie po voprosu uchastiia evreiskogo naseleniia goroda Kieva v vyborakh v gosudarstvennuu dumu," *Svoboda i pravo*, 12 January 1906, p. 3.

¹⁶² Natan Meir explains that from the time Lur'e was elected as the crown rabbi, he was received with animosity by the Kiev Jewish establishment, which included Lev Brodskii. However, his own leadership style was criticized for not being open to a fully democratic process in his own organization. See Meir, *Kiev*, 277.

¹⁶³ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), l. 103-104.

procedures. Both organizations considered fundraising to ensure Jewish voters could get to the polling stations. At the later stages, when the authorities finalized electoral lists, they both sought an electoral alliance with the Kadets. According to Iasvoiu, the Non-Party Group followed the League's program more closely than the Kiev branch of the League itself, for it did not make concessions to non-Jewish political parties and insisted on Jewish candidates more rigidly than the Kiev committee of the League did.¹⁶⁴ However, the similarities in the work of both competing groups caused a great deal of confusion within the provincial Jewish community. On one occasion around mid-October, each group planned a provincial convention of county representatives and scheduled them within two days of each other. In the counties, some misunderstood the situation and asked for clarification about the date of the convention, assuming that it was going to be one meeting.¹⁶⁵ The central bureau of the League made constant attempts to reconcile the feuding parties, but without success.

The Kiev League's leadership was criticized not only from outside, by the Non-Party Group, but also from below, by activists in the counties, although the latter did so only occasionally. Their major concern was that the League's leaders continued to make electoral decisions on behalf of the entire Jewish community of Kiev province without consultation. This was the case when the League invited its county representatives (*upolnomochennye ot gorodov i mestechek*) to a two-day congress on March 12. Delegates from ten (out of twelve) counties arrived and were persuaded to nominate candidates that Jewish voters would support during the elections. Two members of the meeting raised their

¹⁶⁴ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), ll. 103-104.

¹⁶⁵ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 95.

disappointment with the congress outcome. One attendee, the delegate from the town of Cherkassy M.I. Samsonovich, disagreed with the decisions of the congress on the grounds that both nominees to the Duma that the congress approved – Margolin and Zlatopol'skii – belonged to the upper Jewish bourgeoisie. Another dissenting participant – M.P. Bukhgalter of Berdichev – questioned the right of the League to represent all Jews. Both Samsonovich and Bukhgalter expressed their positions in writing and attached them to the minutes of the congress.¹⁶⁶ Clearly, members of local groups were attentive to the ways the Kiev branch of the League operated; they were ready to challenge procedures and decisions and to outline limitations of these decisions. In other words, the League's leadership did not enjoy universal support even on the part of the organization's own members, which hardly strengthened it in the face of the electoral competition and in its rivalry with the Non-Party Group.

During this same month, the situation in the Jewish camp became so convoluted that some members of the two rival organizations hoped that the regional committee of the Kadet party (which was conducting electoral negotiations with both groups simultaneously) would openly choose between the two sides.¹⁶⁷ However, it did not happen at least for two reasons. First, this step ran contrary to the Kadets' aspirations to play an over-arching role for disparate political forces, including various Jewish elements. As the central Kadet newspaper *Riech*' continued to emphasize, the party's objective consisted of "the organization of public forces and public opinion under the liberation slogans and

¹⁶⁶ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), ll. 71-74.

¹⁶⁷ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24 (1905-1907), l. 103-104.

demands.”¹⁶⁸ Second, the Kiev Kadets needed the influence of both organizations. Neither the Kiev branch of the Jewish League nor the Non-Party Group could prevail in their conflict. Each could only sustain antagonism, which weakened both. The Jewish League also experienced internal conflicts. Each, however, had established ties with Jewish voters and worked toward their mobilization. Finally, the Kiev Kadets were a branch of an empire-wide party; in this campaign, they intended to embrace all local parties and groups.

In addition, the League’s central leadership, which overlapped with that of the Kadets, had designed the League as an all-Jewish organization. Thus, the representative of the League’s central bureau, Fride, kept trying to bring consensus to the League and coordinate its work with the Non-Party Group during February and early March 1906. The fact that he approved the activity of the Non-party Group infuriated Kiev officers of the League – in particular, Ia.E. Gendel’man and A.D. Margolin – but eventually they accepted the coalition.¹⁶⁹ When the Non-party Group approved the idea of a coalition on March 9, its head, Rabbi Solomon Lur’e, withdrew from the Non-Party Group.¹⁷⁰ On March 29, the meeting of the League’s representatives of Kiev province approved the merger on the part of the League; Iakov Gendel’man and Arnol’d Margolin left their positions in the League as well.¹⁷¹ Thus, a formal alliance took place, with some changes in the leadership;

¹⁶⁸ The editorial “S.-Peterburg, 26 fevralia,” *Riech*, 26 February (11 March), 1906, p. 1.

¹⁶⁹ Protokol ekstrennogo sobraniia predstavitelei kruzhek soiuza dlia dostizheniia polnopraviia evreev v Rossii 29 marta 1906 g. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 79-81.

¹⁷⁰ In his letter to the central bureau of the League, I.I. Dizengof explained that on March 9, 1906, the two organizations had held a joint discussion about the coalition. A. Margolin had reluctantly proposed the merger, S. Lur’e had objected to it. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 95.

¹⁷¹ There is no evidence to assume that Gendel’man and Margolin continued their electoral work outside of the Jewish League.

however, members of both organizations continued to compete for influence. Such tensions undermined any significant cooperation.¹⁷² The coalition did not remove differences.

On the eve of the elections, multilateral negotiations ended in an agreement among the Jewish League, the Kadets, and the Ukrainian Democrats. Remarkably, the general alliance between the Kadets and League failed because the “pro-Socialist” elements of the League opposed it.¹⁷³ In the middle of March, the Jewish League and the Non-party Group of Jewish voters together with the Kiev Kadets issued a leaflet, in which they called on “brother Jews” to vote for particular candidates, whom the authors of the leaflet also identified as Kadet candidates.¹⁷⁴ The leaflet reflected the joint work of the Jewish League, the Non-party Group, and the Kadets. First, it declared the liberals’ goal of the attainment of equal rights for the Jewish people as the mandate for candidates to the Duma; second, the authorship evidenced unification – at least formal – of the two Jewish groups; finally, the Yiddish translation accompanied the text, which was in line with the Kiev Kadets’ intention to issue electoral leaflets in local languages to reach the broad masses.

In late March, the first round of elections began: Kiev province set about to vote for its electors. The final round of the elections occurred in late April, just on the eve of the convocation of the First Duma, which opened on 27 April 1906. In Kiev province, out of 71 electors chosen, 16 were Jews.¹⁷⁵ Ironically, on the eve of the elections, Arnol’d

¹⁷² Protokol ekstremnogo sobraniia predstavitelei kruzhkov soiuzia dlia dostizheniia polnopraviiia evreev v Rossii 29 marta 1906 g. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 78-83.

¹⁷³ Harcave, *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁷⁴ TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1424, l. 32.

¹⁷⁵ Vladimir Levin, “Russian Jewry and the Duma Elections, 1906-1907,” in *Jews and Eastern Slavs*, ed. Wolf Moskovich, Leonid Finberg and Marten Feller, vol. 7 of *Jews and Slavs*, ed. Wolf Moskovich (Jerusalem-Kyiv: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Institute of Jewish Studies, 2000), 237.

Margolin, an elector whom the Jewish League in Kiev province planned to support as a candidate to the Duma, and the non-Jewish elector V.M. Chekhovskii were disqualified by the authorities.¹⁷⁶ In the Kiev provincial electoral assembly (*gubernskoe izbirate'noe sobranie*) – at the final round of the elections – Polish electors from the landowners' curia joined the bloc with the Kadets at its head. Consequently, for its 15 allocated seats, Kiev province sent two Jewish deputies to the Duma, both of whom were members of the League – the physicians Meilakh Chervonenkis (a leftist) and Solomon Frenkel' (a regular Kadet).¹⁷⁷ In total, eleven deputies identified with the Kadets. In the city of Kiev, Jews did not nominate their own candidate, but voted for the Kadet candidate, Baron Fedor Shteingel', who won the election. Altogether in Russia, 12 Jewish deputies won seats in the First Duma. This was the highest number in the short history of the Imperial Dumas, as only two, four, and three Jewish deputies were victorious in the following elections. Yet none of them would be elected from Kiev province anymore.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the formation of the provincial Kadet branch in Kiev province. This organization embraced many ethnic and political as well as professional elements within the province – Ukrainian Socialists, Zionists, Polish landowners, professors of St. Vladimir university, lawyers, doctors, teachers, and others. From its birth, it showed an interest in mobilizing the Jewish vote, for which purpose its leadership took

¹⁷⁶ Arnol'd Margolin, *Ukraina i Politika Antanty* (Berlin: Efron, 1921), 19-20.

¹⁷⁷ Jewish deputies were successfully elected in those provinces where the Kadets played an independent role in provincial assemblies, for instance, Ekaterinoslav and Poltava. *Ibid.*

recommendations from its Jewish members and allowed them to organize a separate electoral campaign to reach Jewish voters. Crown Rabbi S. A. Lur'e, also a member of the Kadets, initiated and headed the enterprise under the name of the Non-Party Group of Jewish Voters. On the Jewish political scene, this group was one of the last to appear. As the Jewish Bund had adopted the tactic of boycotting the elections and the Jewish League had been populated by the better off and liberal Jewish elements, the Non-Party Group embraced the Jewish elements outside these two groups. The presence of the two liberal organizations – the Jewish League and the non-party group of Jewish voters – in the province, the interest on the part of the Kadets in cooperation with both of them, and overlaps in the membership of the three sides make Kiev province an important case study. The relationship between the Jewish League and the Non-party Group demonstrates the significance of tension within the Jewish camp. The Kadets did not engage with this Jewish rivalry and kept ties with both sides. This policy, together with the Kadet Jews' engagement in the Jewish League and the Non-Party Group demonstrates the fluidity of ethnic and political affiliations, which allowed the three parties to ally in the first elections.

The election campaign to the First Duma, which lasted from August to October 1905 and then from January to April 1906, revealed several important matters about the Kadets in Kiev province. First, the reliance of the Kadet party on its provincial branches turned out to be a productive electoral strategy. While the Kadet central committee outlined only key principles of electoral preparations, the Kiev Kadets used their knowledge of the conditions in the province to design specific electoral activities. In turn, the Kiev Kadets entrusted their Jewish members to mobilize the Jewish community. This principle of delegating essential tasks to its local members shows that the Kadets valued local initiative

and successfully utilized it. For an historian of Imperial Russia, it means that provincial case studies can better our understanding of the empire and its diverse political, social, and ethnic landscape. Second, the Kiev Kadets consisted of several ethnic groups and espoused quite a broad range of political views. The Kadets' diversity could be a source of disagreements; yet in practice, it allowed them to communicate with a heterogeneous population of the province. Thus, the Kiev Kadets planned to reach potential voters in their native languages. Thus, the Kadets were not afraid of diversity; on the contrary, they were ready to promote and exploit it.

For the Jewish community, their experience of cooperation with the Kadet party provided them with an opportunity to enter the empire-wide political arena. It offered a legal alternative to the Jewish Bund for those who did not support the revolutionary rhetoric of the Social Democrats or those who found the workers' movement alien. Significantly, Jewish activists gained insight into their ability to influence the electorate. They became increasingly aware of the benefits to be derived, for example, by insisting on voting for Jewish electors in order to negotiate at the final round of elections. Many Jewish activists took responsibility for the fate of the electoral campaign not only in the Jewish camp, but they also felt confident in designing electoral strategies of the Kadets in Kiev province. Therefore, the Jewish-Kadet cooperation provided ways for Jews to participate in Russian electoral politics.

The electoral campaign to the First Duma brought many innovations to Imperial Russia: open electoral discussions, electoral procedures, formation of political parties and groups, negotiations between them, and the criminalization of the voters who did not fit the image of law-abiding citizens from the authorities' point of view. Many, including

Jews, hung their hopes on these elections. In this sense, the first campaign was unique, as it was devoid of any – productive, fruitless, or unfair – previous electoral experience. However, the speed with which the mobilization of voters, and the Jewish ones, in particular, occurred shows that the ideas of a constitutional order and national elections were penetrating the minds of the people and thus was taking root in Russia.

CHAPTER 2

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE ELECTORAL SPHERE. CAMPAIGNING TO THE SECOND DUMA, JULY 1906 – FEBRUARY 1907

Less than a year separated the first and second national elections, which occurred in March-April 1906 and January-February 1907, respectively. Yet the experience that the regime, political parties, and the population gained during these months and events which brought about this experience was dramatic. The short-lived First Duma, which lasted only for 72 days, had nevertheless quickly established itself as the center of political life. Its unexpected¹⁷⁸ – although long anticipated – dissolution on July 8, 1906 became a blow not only to the Kadets, who constituted the majority of deputies, but also for all oppositional forces in the country. The period between the two Dumas lasted for more than seven months, during which the Stolypin government undertook many legislative initiatives, one of them being the agrarian laws.¹⁷⁹ Overall, this time was politically unstable, with extraordinary courts-martial placed in the hands of local administrations as the regime's response to terrorist attacks across the country. Quite predictably, many doubted that the Second Duma would in fact assemble eventually.¹⁸⁰ Then, when finally, in November 1906, the government announced the term for elections to the Duma, the second electoral

¹⁷⁸ On July 8, the day when the dissolution of the Duma was signed, Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin informed the chair of the Duma, S.A. Muromtsev, of his intention to make his presentation on the Belostok pogrom inquiry in the Duma on Monday, July 10, thus pretending that the Duma would convene on the next business day. *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 20 July 1906, No 19-20, p. 1223.

¹⁷⁹ The Stolypin government aimed at putting an end to peasant communal land tenure.

¹⁸⁰ On this see, for instance, *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 20 July 1906, No 19-20, p. 1220.

campaign officially commenced. Electioneering was particularly intense in the months immediately preceding the elections to the opening of the Duma on 20 February 1907.¹⁸¹

On the whole, the second election showed a more balanced picture of voting patterns than the first one, although both were held under the same electoral law. First, the country had already gone through a national electoral campaign, which left an indelible impression on society and the state. Society became more politicized. New terminology, including names of political parties and some of their programmatic principles came into common use (while not necessarily being fully understood by those who used them). The population became used to new electoral rhetoric, so political parties had to develop more sophisticated approaches to win the voters' support. Electoral alliances gained more priority due to differentiation of existing political programs and the emergence of new ones. In turn, the authorities, having developed their portion of experience in electoral politics, began to discern various types of ideologies and political currents. State officials now tended to employ subtler techniques when dealing with organizers of meetings and rallies. Overall, both voters and the regime had become familiar with the process of campaigning and elections.

Second, the political spectrum of participating parties became fuller; the government took a more active stand in electoral preparations. Leftist parties renounced their boycott strategy toward elections and the Duma and joined the electoral competition, thereby depriving the Kadets of their status as the only major opposition party and drawing a sizable part of their former electorate from them. The rightists completed the range of

¹⁸¹ In Kiev, local newspapers kept discussing this situation until January 1907. See, for example, *Kievskaja molva*, 5 January 1907, p. 1.

parties at the conservative political end of the spectrum. By fall of 1906, when the second electoral campaign gradually began, they had become fully fledged parties and also entered into electoral struggle. In turn, the government used the inter-Duma period to change the political context: to pacify the country, it introduced some reforms, thus, seizing some initiative from the opposition. On the other hand, it placed many provinces, including Kiev, under martial law – in fact, most of the country was under “reinforced safeguard” in the period between the two Dumas. As a result, all the participants, including the Kadets, had to adjust to a transformed political environment.

This chapter explores the changes in the political landscape in Kiev province and how the Kiev Kadets responded to these changes in their dealing with the Jewish electorate, which remained their focus in the electoral campaign to the Second Duma. In addition to the general difficulties that the Kadets faced across the empire, specifics in the province included the particular prominence of the rightist and Russian nationalist parties, which targeted the Kadets as advocates of Jewish emancipation. Yet even more challenging became the Kadets’ relationship with the Jews, whose visions of the possible solution to the “Jewish question” in Russia as well as of the immediate course of action for achieving emancipation often diverged from that of the Kadets. Some Jewish parties such as the Jewish Bund and newly formed Zionist parties competed with the Kadets for the Jewish electorate. With the Jewish political camp experiencing differentiation, the Kadets faced the dilemma of how to mobilize the support of many disparate Jewish political groups and parties and those Jews who remained outside any political organizations.

This chapter argues that although official policies hindered the Kadets in their efforts to unite oppositional forces and closed many opportunities for electoral blocs and

the formation of the united electoral coalition, diversity – class, ethnic, and religious – remained a powerful resource for the Kiev Kadets in their electoral politics and even reversed some negative effects of the official repressions. After some initial attempts to recreate a platform for a united electoral front in the province – similar to what they had built for the first elections, – the Kiev Kadets developed an array of local solutions, including a narrower electoral agreement with the Jewish Bund and, consequently, with the local Social Democrats. The Kadets hoped to build an alliance with the Social Democrats empire-wide, but failed to achieve it in the capitals and many central provinces. Although the final outcome of this electoral bloc for the Kadets was rather dubious in the provincial elections and did not work out as planned in the city of Kiev, it showed the potential of local resources and that politics in the provinces could succeed where imperial politics had failed.

The Transformed Political Space

For the Kadets, the time between the two Dumas became a trying period. In response to the dissolution of the First Duma in early July 1906, they initiated and authored the Vyborg Manifesto, in which they called the country to passive resistance, non-payment of taxes and draft avoidance. The Duma deputies who signed the document hoped to use societal pressure to reverse the tsar's decision to disband the Duma. The country did not respond to its call and the Manifesto's ineffectiveness immediately became a serious problem for the party. First, it brought some complications for the Kadets' electoral campaign to the Second Duma. The Manifesto revealed that the Kadet party, which had received the overwhelming support of the electorate in the elections to the First Duma just two and a

half months earlier, lacked unconditional popular support for their actions *against* the regime. In addition, the regime retaliated for the Vyborg Manifesto by prosecuting some 120 Kadet members of the First Duma, thus removing them from the next electoral competition.¹⁸² Many prominent Kadets who comprised moderate elements of the party could not run for the Duma in the subsequent campaigns.

Second, the Vyborg Manifesto conflicted with the notion of the next election campaign in principle. The Manifesto called for the eventual restoration of the status quo, that is, the cancellation of the tsar's order to dissolve the Duma. If the Kadets considered the work of the First Duma finished and announced the second campaign, then the Manifesto would lose its purpose. Therefore, at the Fourth Party Congress, which the Kadets held illegally in Helsingfors, Finland, on September 22-24, 1906,¹⁸³ they analyzed the failure of the Manifesto. The Kadet leader Pavel Miliukov surmised that the population had not responded to the call because it was not politically mature – as Miliukov put it, “had not been ready for it.” Furthermore, congress discussions revealed that the attitude toward the Vyborg Manifesto was ambiguous even among a number of party members. Some delegates doubted the possibility of implementing the Manifesto at least on technical grounds – for instance, in localities where Kadet organizations did not exist. Others accepted the Manifesto partially, such as those who agreed to support the financial boycott only.¹⁸⁴ Miliukov defended the expediency of the Vyborg Manifesto by insisting that it had

¹⁸² P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia (1859-1917)*, v. I. (New York: Izdatel'stvo imeni Chekhova, 1955), 415.

¹⁸³ See the discussion at the Fourth Party Congress in late September, 1906. *S"ezdy i konferentsii*, 363-364, 368.

¹⁸⁴ *S"ezdy i konferentsii*, 363-364, 368.

already played its role of open and non-revolutionary non-compliance with the actions of the government. After heated debates, the congress agreed that passive resistance could be a major force in political struggle, but more preparatory work was needed for it to be efficient.¹⁸⁵ Eventually, the congress decided to move on and begin preparations for the elections.

An important lesson learned from the Vyborg Manifesto was that the connection of the Duma and the Kadet party with the grassroots population was effectively lacking. In order to lead a popular movement, the Kadets reasoned, the Duma needed wide popular support. Thus, in their election campaign, the Kadets decided to focus on connecting the Duma and the party with the rest of the country. However, the task of popular mobilization differed from that of the previous campaign. In fall 1905 and early 1906, voters were inexperienced and politically immature, so the Kadets based a great deal of their electoral campaign on educational events such as public meetings, explanations of the application procedures in newspapers, free legal consultations regarding electoral registers, and so on. Now, in late summer and fall 1906, the masses had undergone various degrees of politicization. Most voters had already been through the election procedure and knew how to register and what to expect in the electoral meetings; many had joined political parties. To succeed in the second elections, the Kadets needed more than a mobilizing campaign. Now they faced multiple challenges ranging from more sophisticated audiences at electoral meetings to severe criticism from socialist and rightist parties. The burning question of participating in the elections versus boycotting them – the one that all political parties had

¹⁸⁵ The congress recognized passive resistance as a constitutional – not revolutionary – means of political struggle. *S'ezdy i konferentsii konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii 1905-1907*, vol.1 (Moscow: Rosspen, 1997), 364.

widely discussed during the previous campaign – almost disappeared in the second campaign. In other words, whereas the chief task of the first campaign was to mobilize society to vote, in the second campaign the Kadets needed to mobilize voters to support the Kadet candidates.

The party planned to reconnect with its potential electorate¹⁸⁶ by decentralizing the election campaign and bringing it closer to the provinces. To this end, the party central committee delegated, to a greater extent than in the previous campaign, its authority into the hands of local Kadet organizations.¹⁸⁷ Strategically, the central committee limited itself to coordinating the campaign empire-wide and outlining the party's programmatic goals without developing an elaborate electoral platform: the introduction of universal suffrage, responsible government, civil freedoms, and the redistribution of state and church lands (and a certain amount of landlords' estates) to peasants.¹⁸⁸ Pre-electoral party and public meetings in the provinces discussed the platform in accordance with these general principles.¹⁸⁹ The Kadets planned to develop their general platform by gathering findings of public discussions piece by piece, listening to ideas and strategies developed in the provinces. Furthermore, by diversifying their campaign across the provinces, the Kadets also hoped to address the growing unevenness of the political landscape of the country.

Decentralization of the electoral campaign also meant that the Kadet leadership gave the prerogative of making agreements with other political parties and groups to their

¹⁸⁶ *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 5 November 1906, No 35, p. 1784.

¹⁸⁷ *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 5 November 1906, No 35, p. 1781.

¹⁸⁸ This included compensation for these lands.

¹⁸⁹ *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 5 November 1906, No 35, p. 1783-1784.

local organizations,¹⁹⁰ thus, significantly empowering them. This reflected a serious change in the attitude toward coalitions¹⁹¹ and became especially important in Russia's western borderlands, including Kiev province, whose multinational and religiously diverse character made them a particularly complex political arena. Initially, the Kadets here focused on exploring their previously established ties and, with regard to the Jewish electorate, tried to restore their influence by renewing their former alliances with Jewish political organizations. In the Pale of Jewish Settlement, they considered the Jewish League for the Attainment of Equal Rights of the Jewish people to be their major organizational tool to mobilize the Jewish vote, hoping to capitalize on its all-Jewish status as before. Yet their attempts to build a united Jewish front – under the banner of the Jewish League and eventually of the Kadet party – ran up against increasing politicization of the Jewish population. With Jewish parties on the rise, the Kadet party faced the prospect of competing with them for a large part of its former electorate. In this sense, the provincial Kadets faced the consequences and effects of the political mobilization of the country, to which they had contributed their share during the first electoral campaign.

In Kiev province, the Jewish-Kadet cooperation, which had proved successful for both sides in the first campaign and even helped to overcome communal frictions among Kiev Jews, took on a different shape in the second. The Jewish League of Full Rights – the Kadets' major Jewish ally – remained severely divided over personal and class issues after

¹⁹⁰ *Viestnik partii narodoi svobody*, 5 November 1906, No 35, p. 1781.

¹⁹¹ In the first election campaign, the Central Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party made several attempts to form blocs with other parties, but they failed. Local alliances blocs with other parties resulted from the work of provincial Kadets.

the first electoral campaign ended in April 1906.¹⁹² The problem grew so serious that by August, even members of the League kept in touch more readily with the League's central leadership than with each other. Samuil Lozinskii, a prominent member of the League's Kiev organization,¹⁹³ complained to the central bureau that in the absence of any instructions from the capital the work of the League almost stopped in the province: "no one is doing anything (*nikto nichego ne delaet*) so far."¹⁹⁴ Other current and former members of the League in Kiev reported that feuds within the Jewish camp prevented the League from functioning efficiently. In an October letter, Iakov Gendel'man, who had resigned from the League's provincial committee at the end of the first electoral campaign, bemoaned local disagreements to the League's central leadership. He also accused the Non-Party Jewish Group, which had resumed its activity in the second campaign, of challenging the League's authority and thus threatening its existence. And yet, soon the leadership of the Non-Party Organization itself complained in a telegram to Iu.I. Gessen – the secretary of the League in St. Petersburg – about the disunity among the Jewish activists of Kiev

¹⁹² On May 5, 1906, in the aftermath of the first electoral campaign, the electoral committee of the Jewish League gathered 186 League members from Kiev province to elect a new committee to manage Jewish political and municipal matters. The nomination of Arnol'd Margolin and Iakov Gendel'man caused the protest of other nominees from former Jewish electors (*vyborshchiki*) and some leaders of the Jewish League, who refused to run for the new committee. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 130.

¹⁹³ Samuil Goratsievich Lozinskii (1874-1945) was a historian of late medieval and early modern Europe and a student of I.V. Luchitskii. He headed the foreign department at the newspaper *Kievskiiia otkliki*. *Sotrudniki RNB [Rossiiskoi natsional'noi biblioteki] – deiateli nauki i kul'tury*. Biograficheskii slovar'. http://www.nlr.ru/nlr_history/persons/info.php?id=643 (accessed July 12, 2017). Lozinskii was also the acting editor of the Kiev newspaper *Otgosloski zhizni (Echoes of Life)*. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 134. In March 1906, the Kiev organization of the League appointed him as its envoy to the province's counties (*upolnomochennyi po gubernii*) with the task to coordinate the electoral campaign within Kiev province. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 75. In May 1906, Lozinskii along with Dr. L.E. Motskin and A.D. Margolin was a provincial delegate to the congress of the Jewish League in St. Petersburg. RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 109.

¹⁹⁴ "Letter from S. Lozinskii to Iu.I. Gessen, August 9, 1906," RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 134.

province and asked for assistance in ending communal quarrels.¹⁹⁵ Clearly, ethnic ties were insufficient for reaching political cooperation as well as solidarity among the Kiev Jewry.

Some formal circumstances also prevented the League from gathering momentum and developing into a stable foundation for Jewish liberals to unfold their electoral campaign among the Jewish voters. In accordance with the law “On temporary rules about societies and unions,” issued on March 4, 1906, only a legalized society could hold meetings and carry out any public activities. The Kiev Governor set up July 14 as the deadline for implementing it in Kiev province. G.E. Gurevich, who took up the task of the League’s legalization in Kiev province, unsuccessfully struggled to gain the approval of its statute by the authorities.¹⁹⁶ Upon his inquiry to the central bureau, Gurevich received a telegram from the secretary of the League’s central bureau, Iu.I. Gessen, who confirmed that the Ministry of the Interior had legalized the League. Gessen suggested applying for legalization of the Kiev organization as a branch of the Jewish League in St. Petersburg.¹⁹⁷ The matter dragged on for several months as the Kiev provincial authorities would not approve the statute of the League. In September, to aid Gurevich in his application, Gessen sent a copy of the League’s statute with the notarized signature of St. Petersburg’s city prefect (*gradonochal’nik*). Apparently, this did not help. Gurevich continued to correspond with Gessen about legalization well into November, eventually appealing to some high profile Jews in Kiev – G.B. Bykhovskii (a leader of the Non-Party Jewish Voters), I.S. Zlatopol’skii (a Zionist), A.S. Frenkel’, and L.Ia. Mandel’berg. He also considered turning

¹⁹⁵ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 162-164.

¹⁹⁶ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 132.

¹⁹⁷ “Telegram from Gessen to Gurevich,” RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 133.

to Ia.L. Poliakov, L.I. Brodskii's son-in-law.¹⁹⁸ In other words, he returned to the old strategy of negotiations on Jewish matters with the authorities by using personal ties as his last resort. This did not help to procure legalization either.

The government attempted to come to terms with the reality of mass politics, to understand the policies and programs of growing political parties, and to develop its long-term strategies toward electoral politics. Local authorities started to collect data on public figures, former electors and Duma deputies, potential candidates, activists of national movements, and so on, suspecting that some of them were members of revolutionary parties in disguise. The landslide electoral victory of the Kadets in the first elections, their anti-government position in the First Duma, and the Vyborg Manifesto naturally attracted the government's special attention to this party. Immediately after the first elections and without waiting for the opening of the First Duma, the Commander of the Special Corps of Gendarmes ordered its provincial departments to thoroughly examine the activity of the Kadet party:

Recognizing... the necessity constantly to be informed about activities of this party and its immediate goal, ... [I] order [you] to use the current period, when this party – its most influential leading members – openly come forward in the field of political struggle; in order to find out ... the structure of this party in your region, its most prominent leading and influential local activists, the direction of their propaganda, and also the true goals and intentions of the party, immediately begin composing lists of such leaders.¹⁹⁹

Over several months, the local police gathered information about the Kadet membership and reported overviews of the party's local branches to the provincial gendarme offices

¹⁹⁸ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 140.

¹⁹⁹ *Spiski lits, prinadlezhashchikh k konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii tak nazyvaemoi "Narodnoi svobody" po uezdnam Kievskoi gubernii i gor. Kieva.* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1424, l. 1.

(*gubernskiiia zhandarmskiiia upravleniia*).²⁰⁰ As a result, by analyzing and assessing the outcomes of the first elections, the authorities formed a comprehensive picture of the Kadet party's structure, overall strength, the social makeup of its supporters, and so on.

Several months later, this proactive approach paid off during the preparations for the second elections. The collected information became an important source for the authorities, when they decided to intervene in the electoral events organized by oppositional activists – for instance, while making decisions about arresting certain liberal candidates or banning some non-party public meetings. In November 1906, the Director of the Police Department M.L. Trusevich instructed local police and the political police departments (*okhrannye otdeleniia*) to find any possible pretexts for prosecution of activists of the electoral campaign and candidates to be electors (*kandidaty v vyborshchiki*). His primary concern was revolutionary parties, but in practice, this order also affected liberals and their candidates.²⁰¹ Most importantly, by removing undesirable candidates from the electoral competition, the government employed legal means to influence the electoral results. In his November directive, Trusevich specified that “making arrests only for participation in the electoral campaign without criminal prosecution (*ugolovnoe presledovanie*) [should be] discouraged.” This signified a dramatic change from the straightforward ban on posting electoral appeals in January 1906, which had required the prime minister's interference in the electoral campaign to subtler techniques of formally legitimate prosecutions of anti-regime campaigners in November of the same year.

²⁰⁰ The head of the Kiev gendarme office received reports from his subordinates in counties of Kiev province during May and June 1906. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1424, ll. 2, 3, 9, 12-13, 16-19, 27-29, 38, 43-54.

²⁰¹ TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1347, l. 148.

Thereby, the authorities adjusted their policies to the new reality and recognized that electoral mass politics had become an integral part of life in Russia.

The government position took its toll on what little the Jewish League's members could achieve even in the absence of any repression. This organization needed to gather disparate Jewish forces periodically to develop a common strategy and nominate its candidates. However, to the central bureau's inquiry about scheduling a provincial congress of the League, Gurevich explained that the severe repression on the part of the provincial authorities prevented any possibility of calling large meetings even for electoral discussions:

The repressions here are not a joke, recently there have been searches at the residences of liberal parties' activists and [the police] takes any lists and minutes, everything altogether that it can lay its hands on. Apparently, [the authorities] intend to terrorize and stop from working (*sdelat' nerabotosposobnymi*) all activists of liberal parties.²⁰²

Gurevich and his colleagues hoped that December 7 – when the official publication of voter lists was scheduled – would open some possibilities for meetings. They thought that the only way to carry out electoral discussions among Jewish voters was to conduct a series of small private meetings of eight to ten individuals from all over province.²⁰³ Under this administrative pressure and given disagreements within the provincial branch of the League that manifested themselves throughout the inter-Duma period, legalization became less and less needed. The failure to legalize the League in Kiev province along with divisions in the Jewish political camp eventually led to the complete disintegration of the

²⁰² RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 142.

²⁰³ RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 24, l. 142.

organization. The League formally ceased to exist by early 1907, at the height of the second electoral campaign.

The disintegration of the League took place across the entire Pale of Jewish Settlement. For Jewish liberals and the Kadets, this process not only caused a decrease in their popularity among the Jewish community, but also the transformation of the Zionists, their former ally on the Jewish scene, into their rival. Jewish liberals strove to preserve the Jewish League as an above-party Jewish organization, as it provided them with means to unify participating Jewish groups and parties. However, by the end of 1906, the League's programmatic goal of achieving Jewish emancipation within the broader question of civil rights for Russian citizens²⁰⁴ – an essentially Kadet approach to the “Jewish question,” on which they would rely for their electoral alliance with Jewish voters – ceased to satisfy many politically mobilized Jews, who became increasingly differentiated along burgeoning political party and group lines, both Jewish and empire-wide ones.

At least two of the Jewish groups and parties sided with their Russian counterparts – the Bundists with the Russian Social Democrats and the Jewish liberals with the Kadets. Other Jewish organizations – such as the Jewish People's Party (*Folkspartei*) of the Jewish middle class – focused on more national programs. The Zionist movement developed into several currents: a bourgeois Russian Zionist Organization and socialist ones, with the latter splitting into Seimist-Zionist, Poalei Zion, and Socialist Jewish Workers' Party

²⁰⁴ In the documents of the Jewish League and its members' correspondence, this principle appeared as the Vil'na platform. According to its statute, the Society for the Attainment of the Full Rights of the Jewish People in Russia (the Jewish League of Full Rights) “set the goal of attaining the cancellation of all existing legal restrictions, rules, and directives concerning Jews and their exercise of full civil, political, and national rights on par with the rest of the population.” *Ustav Obshchestva polnopraviiia evreiskago naroda v Rossii*. TsDIAK, f. 1335, op. 1, d. 973, l. 27.

(SERP).²⁰⁵ In Kiev province, the police recorded many existing Jewish parties during 1905 and 1906, although their presence was uneven from town to town. According to the police reports, six Bundist local organizations worked in Kiev, Radomysl', Belaia Tserkov', Cherkassy, Skvira, and Berdichev during summer 1905, with the Berdichev group being the most active.²⁰⁶ In Cherkassy county, the Poalei Zion (Socialist Zionists), the SERP (Socialist Jewish Workers' Party), and the Bund carried out illegal meetings.²⁰⁷ Police records contained some errors in the descriptions of Jewish parties' ideologies: for instance, the Zionist Territorialists did not insist only on the resettlement of the Jews to Palestine, as the police indicated in its internal correspondence about the investigation of illegal political meetings of Jews in the county town of Skvira.²⁰⁸ However, the police definitely noticed various types of Jewish political groups and even discerned several socialist trends in Jewish politics – the Bund (Social Democratic) and diverse Zionist groups such as the Territorialists and Poalei Zion. In other words, the police recorded the proliferation of many currents in the Jewish political camp.

Although one of the central points in the programs of Jewish political parties was Jewish emancipation, they diverged on *how* the Jews were to achieve it. These seemingly technical differences made cooperation among them and between Jewish parties and the Kadets nearly impossible, as the problem of self-affirmation for many groups became a

²⁰⁵ Semen Dubnov, "Evrei," in *Formy natsional'nago dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh. Avstro-Vengriia, Rossiia, Germaniia*, ed. A.I. Kastelianskii (S. Peterburg: Izadnie t-va "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za, 1910), 412-419.

²⁰⁶ TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1049, l. 37.

²⁰⁷ TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1049, ll. 61, 71.

²⁰⁸ TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1270, ll. 39, 70.

priority. The party programs also differed in their degrees of nationalism. However, personal competition was sometimes a stronger factor than nationalist solidarity. One letter seized by the police described a notable incident that took place during the electoral discussion among Jews in the town of Kanev. While the author of the letter was expecting an ideological dispute, another speaker, the Zionist Miliavskii, turned the discussion to the national angle and appealed to national pride (*evreiskoe samoliubie*) to persuade the attending Jews to consider voting for a Jew, regardless of the political views he might hold. The author of the letter explained that because Miliavskii promoted himself to electors by resorting to “dirty insinuations (*griaznye insinuatsii*)” concerning the author, the latter would not mind if the two Russian progressives became electors instead of Jews.²⁰⁹ Differentiation among Jewish political groups was happening along national, political, and personal lines and, in addition, it could be fluid. Often, power struggles or personal rivalries within the Jewish camp sometimes prevailed over ideological attitudes.

Contrary to the liberals’ approach to Jewish emancipation, the Zionists, who had supported the Jewish League in 1905 and during the election campaign from January through March 1906, now advocated dealing with the Jewish question as an independent matter and even called for a separate Jewish faction in the First Duma.²¹⁰ In late November 1906, they launched a campaign of ‘cautious struggle’ within the Jewish camp, which meant that in those localities where the Jewish majority was to ensure the election of Jewish electors and deputies to the Duma, the Zionists would conduct their electoral campaign

²⁰⁹ “Vypiska iz poluchennogo agenturnym putem pis’ma iz Kaneva k M. Margolinu,” *Perepiska s Departamentom politsii, nachal’nikom Kievskogo okhrannogo otdeleniia i drugimi uchrezhdeniiami o vyborakh vo 2-u Gos. Dumu*. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 14.

²¹⁰ “K voprosu o natsional’noi gruppe v Gosudarstvennoi Dumie,” *Evreiskii golos*, 14 May 1906, p. 590-593.

apart from other Jewish groups.²¹¹ And even in provinces like Kiev, where Jews were represented unevenly and thus could only influence election results by uniting, the Zionists intended to join general Jewish electoral committees, but to campaign within them separately. In other words, although they were willing to benefit from common organizational efforts, they reserved the right to withdraw their support for Jewish candidates who did not recognize the Zionist platform.

Eventually, the Zionists, the Jewish liberals' closest partner on the Jewish political front in the first campaign, became their competitor in the second. Above all, Jewish liberals felt that the Zionists' approach might jeopardize their efforts to present the Jewish struggle for full rights within a broader political reform. Liberals feared, according to *Riech*, that by waving the banner of Jewish emigration in the Duma, the Zionists would stress Jewish "otherness," which the rightist and reactionary forces would then seize upon to declare Jews foreigners who would not need emancipation.²¹² By the end of the year, at the height of the election campaign, Jewish liberals found it impossible to work within the League because the Zionists had managed to take it over and left the Jewish liberals with only a marginal role. In order to separate themselves from the Zionists, the founding fathers of the League, Maksim Vinaver, Genrikh Sliozberg, Mikhail Kulisher, and others created the Jewish People's Group (*Evreiskaia Narodnaia Gruppya*) within the Jewish League on the anti-Zionist principle, thus, responding to the coordinated politics of the Zionists within the League and essentially advancing its collapse.²¹³ Jewish liberals could not get rid of the

²¹¹ *Evreiskii Izbiratel'* 1906, Dec 5 no 1. pp. 9-10. (RGIA, f. 1565, op. 1, d. 136).

²¹² *Riech*, 1907, January 4 (16), no. 3, p. 2.

²¹³ "Evreiskaia Narodnaia Gruppya" in *Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia Brokgauza i Efrona*. See also Semen Dubnov "Evrei" in *Formy natsional'nago dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh*, ed. A.I. Kastelianskii (St.

Zionists in the League, but they intended at least to dissociate themselves from them. Essentially the establishment of the Jewish People's Group ended the unifying mission of the Jewish League. Henceforth, the Jewish liberals, calling all enemies of the old regime to unite, would exclude the Zionists, thus firmly dividing the Jewish camp into Zionist and anti-Zionist parts.

The Problem of Legality for the Kadet Party

In addition to the dwindling influence on the Jewish front, Jewish liberals suffered from the weakened position of the Kadet party, whose empire-wide political clout had played an important role in overcoming communal disagreements within the Jewish camp during electoral negotiations and providing Jewish political forces with access to empire-wide politics. The Kadet party itself experienced the problem of legalization, which the March 4 law "On temporary rules for societies and unions" required for all existing parties and societies along with newly established ones. As this chapter has already discussed, the Kiev authorities did not approve the registration of the Jewish League in Kiev province, which limited the possibilities for the Jewish liberals to operate within the legal sphere. Like the Jewish League, the Octobrists, and others, the Kadets were supposed to register their party by submitting the party statute and other legal documents and receiving the approval of the authorities.

The Kadet party in Kiev province – as in the rest of the empire – had been established in the aftermath of the October Manifesto, without prior permission (*iavochnym*

Peterburg: Izdanie t-va "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za," 1910), 410. Also "Evreiskaia Narodnaia Gruppy. K grazhdanam evreiam," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 9 January 1907, pp. 13-15.

poriadkom),²¹⁴ in late 1905. When the government attempted to regulate the emergence of political parties and to establish control over the existing ones by issuing the March 4 law, the first electoral campaign was nearing its end. The Kadets concluded their election campaign to the Duma without legalization, like other parties did. The government did not implement the law for weeks and the Kadet party continued to openly issue their electoral leaflets and receive the censor's approval after the law was introduced.²¹⁵ However, in order to prepare for the second elections, the Kadets needed such registration. Without acquiring a legal status, they could not apply for a permit to organize party meetings and invite voters to discuss nominations.²¹⁶

The Kadets initially viewed the legalization as a formality. In August 1906, their leadership submitted the party statute to the St. Petersburg municipal office for societies registration (*gorodskoe po delam ob obshchestvakh prisutstvie*), but received a refusal. The central committee of the Kadets updated local party branches that the St. Petersburg authorities “did not find it possible to register the submitted statute because they had detected purely formal omissions, which were,” the Kadet leadership thought, “inessential to the matter.”²¹⁷ The central leadership expressed its confidence that submission of a revised edition, which took place ten days after the refusal, would result in legalization of

²¹⁴ TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1424, ll. 43-45. See also chapter 1 on this: “Kievskaiia gruppa konstitutsionno-demokraticeskoi partii,” *Svoboda i pravo*, 5 January 1906, p. 4.

²¹⁵ In Kiev province, for example, on March 10, 1906, the Kadet regional committee issued a leaflet *From the Party of People's Freedom to Employees of Commercial and Industrial Enterprises, [to] Salesmen, Workers and All the People of Labor* received on March 10, 1906. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1424, l. 32 b.

²¹⁶ In addition, the government issued a pre-electoral instruction, which prohibited printing lists of electors; it also set a special form for electoral blanks and allowed to issue them to legalized parties only. See, for instance, “Vnutrennee obozrenie,” *Kievskaiia molva*, 5 January 1907, p. 1.

²¹⁷ TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1347, l. 148.

the party within days. The Kadet officers believed that they had addressed all of the issues on which the authorities had based their decision; therefore they supposed that there were no legal pretexts for rejection. Since the authorities had also turned down legalization of the Octobrists and the Party of Legal Order at that time, the Kadets assumed the refusal was routine and technical.²¹⁸ However, several months later, the question was still hanging in the air. By January 17, 1907, when *Kievskaiia mysl'* reported on “rumors about the legalization of the Kadet party,” this no longer looked like a formal procedure. Rather, planned negotiations between Kadet leader P.N. Miliukov and Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin appeared to be underway to ensure legalization in exchange for the Kadets’ non-alliance with leftist parties.²¹⁹

Indeed, the government tried to exploit the question of legalization of the Kadet party in the inter-Duma period. Stolypin pursued the policy of pacifying the country and simultaneously building the rule of law (*pravovoi poriadok*), the latter being essentially a conscious attempt to rescue the monarchy.²²⁰ Along with court-martials, introduced in

²¹⁸ The Kadets submitted the revised statute on September 11, 1906. According to the law on societies and unions, the authorities were to consider the case within two weeks. In the absence of refusal from the authorities, the party or society was considered legalized.

²¹⁹ “Russkaia zhizn’. Slukhi o legalizatsii k.-d. partii,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 17 January 1907, p. 2. Two days later, the newspaper *Kievskaiia mysl'* reported some details of the legalization which partially contradicted the previous message. It cited the newspaper *Russkoe slovo* that the St. Petersburg municipal office for societies registration had given its approval for legalization of the Kadet party, but the city prefect von-der-Launits protested its decision. The legalization of the Kadet party was passed to the Senate. *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 19 January 1907, p. 3.

²²⁰ A.F. Smirnov, *Gosudarstvennaia Duma Rossiiskoi Imperii 1906-1917 gg.: Istoriko-pravovoi ocherk* (Moscow: Kniga i biznes, 2010), 267, 269. The Kiev newspaper *Kievskaiia molva*, however, expressed doubts about the possibility of achieving what Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin declared to be the Duma’s task: “My hope and my intention is to abolish (*likvidirovat'*) the bureaucratic regime with the help of the Duma.” The major critique was that if it was illegal to criticize the bureaucracy at electoral meetings, it was not possible to achieve a change of the regime. *Kievskaiia molva*, 1907, 6 January p. 2.

August 1906,²²¹ Stolypin embarked on a policy of reforms – essentially what the Kadets wanted to introduce via the Duma. For this purpose, he invited some moderate public figures – such as leaders of the zemstvo movement D.N. Shipov and Prince G.E. L’vov – to enter his cabinet. However, the agreement between public figures – the *obshchestvennost’* – and the government did not take place, nor did the Kadets yield to the prime minister in his endeavors to make liberals renounce their alliance with the revolution. Stolypin’s attempt to create a coalition cabinet failed, the Kadets did not receive legalization from the government and subsequently could not conduct an open electoral campaign. From then on, they had to constantly look for ways to bypass this restriction.²²²

This non-legalized status prompted many Kadet members who were involved in public and state service to leave the party, even though some of them continued to support the Kadets. It was a serious blow to provincial Kadet organizations, as administrative pressure in the provinces was often tighter than in the capitals. In November, the Kiev police conducted a search of the office of the Kiev Kadets. As a result, many state and public employees whose names were on the Kadet lists that the police seized were dismissed from their positions. Among them were the assistant secretary of the Kiev provincial council (*Kievskaiia gubernskaia uprava*) I.L. Ditinenko, the Kiev city sanitary inspector A.V. Korchak-Chepurkovskii, the head of statistics bureau of the Kiev city council L.N. Maress, and the acting sanitary inspector of the Kiev city council N.N.

²²¹ On August 20, 1906, the government published the rules of establishment of court-martials. “Obzor zakonodatel’sstva v 1906 godu,” *Kievskaiia molva*, 5 January 1907, p. 1.

²²² On the evolution of the Kadet attitude toward terror, see Melissa K. Stockdale, “Politics, Morality and Violence: Kadet Liberals and the Question of Terror, 1902-1911,” *Russian History Slavic Review*, 22, no. 4 (Winter 1995/Hiver 1995): 455-480.

Sharov.²²³ The authorities also worried that some of those whose names appeared on the Kadet lists exercised a harmful influence (*vrednoe vliianie*) on society through their engagement in secondary and professional education institutions. They noted, for instance, the director of the women's commercial college N.N. Volodkevich, the inspector (*nabludatel'nitsa*) L.N. Volodkevich of the same college, the owner of the dentistry school M.S. Golovchiner, the teacher at the Divil'kovskii private college O.I. Divil'kovskaia, the instructor at the Duchinskaia private women's high school Iu.V. Moshkova, and the instructor at the Ignat'eva private school M.I. Khudoshchenko.²²⁴ Thus, due to its non-legalized status, membership of the Kadet party could jeopardize one's employment and entailed more troubles than before. The central committee could not support local party branches to the extent it had done in the first campaign, for example, by providing legal assistance. Most importantly, local members and liberal activists could not hold political meetings on behalf of the Kadet party and had to rely on private resources and ties, that is, on themselves. Overall, the Kadet party became much weaker in the provinces – due both to its reduced provincial membership and the harassment of its members, with its non-legalized status contributing to both.

In mid-fall 1906, hoping for a successful outcome in the matter of legalization of the party, the Kadet regional committee in Kiev still planned to carry out an open electoral campaign – meetings of voters, open political discussions, party sessions, distribution of party literature, getting feedback from voters on nominated candidates to electors and

²²³ In his report to the General Governor of the Southwestern Region about the search in the Kadet bureau's office in Kiev, acting Kiev Governor P.G. Kurlov noted the dismissal of these employees. TsDIAK, f. 442, op. 857, d. 27, l. 1, 1 ob.

²²⁴ TsDIAK, f. 442, op. 857, d. 27, l. 1 ob.

Duma deputies, and so on. Meanwhile, since it was no longer possible to hold open meetings, party discussions, and legal consultations, the Kiev Kadets resorted to utilizing their personal networks. To keep in touch with activists in the counties and receive updates from them on the political mood of the local populace, the Kiev Kadets' special commission, established in October 1906, sent out personal letters across the province. These letters, structured as questionnaires, aimed to organize local resources and give a direction to electoral activities across the province. Looking for possible ways to distribute party printed materials – various types of brochures and leaflets – the commission encouraged recipients to take the initiative. It asked them to report on the attitude of the locals toward political parties, including the Kadets, about other parties' willingness to form electoral blocs, and the local administration's position toward electoral preparations. No less importantly, the special commission hoped to extend the circle of its correspondents and asked the addressees to indicate the contact information of those who might regularly update it about the local situation.²²⁵ Overall, what the Kiev Kadets planned – to establish a wide network of local agents and correspondents to register the mood of voters and adjust their moves accordingly – was a less proactive approach, as they intended not to shape public opinion but to follow it first. On the other hand, it corresponded to the general task of reconnecting with the masses which the Kadets had set up as their goal in the aftermath of the Vyborg Manifesto.

During the fall of 1906, the general political conditions grew tense. The Kadets' two vital avenues for campaigning – the use of public meetings and the press, which had

²²⁵ *Perepiska s Departamentom politsii, nachal'nikom Kievskogo okhrannogo otdeleniia i drugimi uchrezhdeniiami o vyborakh vo 2-u Gos. Dumu.* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 25.

been efficient and major ways to reach the masses – were severely undermined. As for the press, its role in electoral agitation grew ambiguous. The police followed many discussions in the progressive press and readily used any information and ideas to prosecute political activists. Reports on prospective interparty blocs, names of potential candidates to serve as electors (*kandidaty v vyborshchiki*), or successful election strategies could do a disservice to the opposition.²²⁶ While the party literature was also often confiscated, newspapers were under the threat of being shut down for political reasons and their editors being prosecuted. Therefore, the liberal press ceased to be an eloquent mouthpiece in the election campaign. By late 1906 repression had intensified and the Kiev Kadets experienced more harassment from the authorities. On December 20, the police searched the premises of the Kiev bureau of the Kadet party on the provincial governor's orders, confiscated all party documents, and closed the party's office.²²⁷ The dragging case of legalization ended with the complete halt of even the semi-legal existence of the Kadets in Kiev. After that, the Kiev Kadets had to develop electoral strategies that would work in the transformed political environment.

Immediately, the Kadets modified their rhetoric in the press, significantly reducing mentions of the party's name and started referring to themselves as “oppositional forces” and “progressive groups.” In particular, talking about electoral blocs in the town of Uman', they connected the terms “the Party of People's Freedom” and “progressive elements” by referring to the first campaign and comparing it to the second: “[i]n the first elections, when the Poles formed a bloc with the Party of People's Freedom and the Jewish Non-Party

²²⁶ The police correspondence preserved in the Kiev archives include a fair number of paper clippings from the liberal press attached.

²²⁷ “Provintsial'nyi otdel. Kiev,” *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 31 December 1906, No 43, p. 2357.

Organization, [the bloc] gave them one elector. But now, when such a bloc with the Poles does not exist, ... the Poles ... will vote with the rightists against oppositional parties, it would be an unforgivable error to give [the insignificant group of Poles] ... one elector in Uman.”²²⁸ Instead of mentioning the bloc of the liberals with the Jewish voters, now the press employed the terms “Christians” and “progressives” to define the non-Jewish side of the alliance. *Kievskaiia mysl'* reported that in Belaia Tserkov' (Vasil'kov county, Kiev province), “[a]t the crowded meeting on 18 January, by the agreement between the Christians and Jews, three Jews and one Christian were nominated to as candidates to be electors (*vystavleny kandidatami v vyborshchiki*) electors... – all are progressives.”²²⁹ The same newspaper published a note that in the town of Kamenets-Podol'sk in neighboring Podol'e province, “the Jews refused to form a bloc with the Poles, finding [the Polish] candidate non-progressive.”²³⁰ In many cases like these, the press only alluded to the implied indisputable interest of Jewish voters in supporting progressive candidates, which often meant the Kadets.

The non-legalized status affected not only the Kadets' electoral rhetoric, but also their campaigning strategies, including that targeting the Jewish electorate. They became more passive, aiming to gauge the mood of the populace rather than encouraging it to embrace a particular political view. Often, policies were justified on practical rather than ideological grounds. Uman' county represented a remarkable example of the change in the electoral strategy that the liberals employed to mobilize the Jewish vote. Instead of

²²⁸ *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 20 January 1907, p. 3.

²²⁹ “Bielaiia Tserkov', 19 ianvaria,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 20 January 1907, p. 3.

²³⁰ “Kamenets-Podol'sk, 19 ianvaria,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 20 January 1907, p. 3.

persuading Jewish voters to support the Kadet program – as the Jewish League of Full Rights had campaigned in the first campaign, now the Kiev liberals appealed to electoral arithmetic rather than political interests, although it was more than just a concession to numbers: “the progressive elements, taking into account that the general number of Jewish voters [in the town of Uman’] is about 60 per cent, composed the list of the candidates to electors of three Christians and four Jews.”²³¹ In the previous campaign, the Jewish League had taken the self-organized Uman’ Jews under its wing and led them to an agreement with the Kadets. This time the newspaper *Kievskaiia mysl’* refrained from promoting a Kadet-Jewish alliance and reservedly suggested that the Uman’ Poles, whose number was insignificant, employ their political prudence which should lead them to support the progressives; however, it still feared that the Poles’ nationalist emotions and narrow-minded jealousy against the Jews might make them vote for the rightists.²³²

When the Kiev Kadets attempted to call public meetings and lectures – which was the other major electoral strategy that they had successfully used in the first campaign – they encountered the authorities’ reluctance to issue permits for meetings organized by oppositional activists or members of an unregistered party. Even when permission was granted, public meetings often became pointless, because the authorities did not approve public debates on such subject matters as the work of the First Duma, the government’s decisions and moves, and general assessments of the current regime. Public lectures were another target; in rare cases when organizers managed to receive permission for meetings, the attending police officer (*pristav*) often shut them down in the middle on various

²³¹ “Nakanune vyborov v Umani. (Pis’mo v redaktsiu),” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 20 January 1907, p. 3.

²³² “Nakanune vyborov v Umani. (Pis’mo v redaktsiu),” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 20 January 1907, p. 3.

pretexts. As a partial solution to this, the Kadets continued their party meetings as private parties in small groups.²³³ But it was too little, for these did not provide the Kadets with a way to connect with large numbers of voters.

By late summer 1906, the rightist forces rose into an influential factor in Kiev province.²³⁴ The conspicuous victory of the liberals in the first elections and the widespread Jewish support for the Kadet candidates contributed much to mobilizing Russian and Ukrainian nationalist movements, which often centered their anti-liberal arguments on anti-Semitic sentiment. For instance, the strength of the monarchists in the county town of Vasil'kov prompted the Spilka – the Ukrainian Social Democrats – to consider disregarding its tentative agreement with the Jewish Bund and the Jewish Non-Party Group and focusing instead on political education of the masses even at the risk of losing the elections.²³⁵ Whereas the Kadets had been losing many of their supporters due to the latter's political differentiation and the presence of the leftists in the electoral competition, the rightists had coalesced their power and, using the backing of the authorities, managed to reach urban residents as well as peasants. In September 1906, Kiev hosted a nationwide congress of monarchist parties.²³⁶ In some locations, the rightists saw limited success – for instance, in Berdichev, where activists Suvchinskii, Bielokopytov, and Bubnov struggled

²³³ The report from the Kiev provincial gendarme office to the Police Department in St. Petersburg, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 49.

²³⁴ Sources on the rightists' success: on the city of Kiev see Faith C. Hillis, "Between Empire and Nation: Urban Politics, Community, and Violence in Kiev, 1863-1907," Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2009, p. 421. Also on Kiev province see TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350.

²³⁵ The letter intercepted by the police and addressed to the Chief Committee of Spilka. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 11.

²³⁶ *Viestnik partii narodnoi svobody*, 1 October 1906, No 30, p. 1624-1626.

to mobilize the support of Russian landowners and Orthodox priests in December 1906.²³⁷ On the whole, the Russian nationalists established themselves and grew stronger in the province.

In their first weeks of existence in political formations, the rightists tried and mastered various avenues of mass politics. In addition to engaging in anti-Semitic propaganda in leaflets, newspapers,²³⁸ they also organized religious processions (*krestnye khody*) for their campaigning. They also learnt electoral strategies from the liberals and emulated the oppositional forces' practice in the previous campaign such as reviewing voting lists and scrutinizing some categories of voters. On one occasion, this resulted in questioning the voting rights of 907 Jewish voters of Lybed' district of the city of Kiev.²³⁹ Overall, consolidation of the Kiev rightist forces took place at a time when many of the Kadets' former supporters argued on particulars of political principles among themselves.

As the election approached, the Kiev Kadets made little progress in their electoral campaign either in the province or within the Jewish political camp. In late November 1906, the legalization question remained unresolved and the Jewish political scene was in disarray: half a dozen political parties and groups developed their own paths and prepared their own electoral strategies, including electoral blocs among themselves and with empire-wide Russian parties, not necessarily the Kadets. The Jewish League, the Kadets' chief tool for mobilization of the Jewish population in the Pale, continued its existence as the Jewish

²³⁷ However, the county police officer (*ispravnik*) in Berdichev reported that neither the leftists nor the rightists organized public electoral meetings in Berdichev county. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 110.

²³⁸ *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 9 January 1907, p. 15.

²³⁹ *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 9 January 1907, p.15

People's Group, but its non-legalized Kiev chapter was too weak, partially because of lack of legalization. Beside internal rivalries caused by social differences, local Jewish liberals had to address the increasing presence of rightist parties and groups, which enjoyed the moral and administrative support of the central and provincial authorities.

Surprisingly, the advances of Russian nationalist forces in the province did not unite the Jewish parties. On the contrary, the rightists' policy of exclusion hardened the anti-Zionist sentiments of Jewish liberals, who in turn saw their anti-Zionist measures as necessary for fighting against the rightist reactionaries. As Maksim Vinaver, the leader of the Jewish People's Group and member of the central committee of the Kadet Party explained, the liberals feared that reactionaries in the Duma would use the banner of Zionism to prove that Jews in Russia were aliens.²⁴⁰ It would make it harder for the Kadets to compel the Duma to consider Jewish emancipation as it would seem no longer necessary. Therefore, the Kadets, following the Jewish liberals, decided to part with the Zionists and look for other ways to mobilize the Jewish vote. In these dire circumstances, they had to find new strategies that would be adequate for the changed conditions.

The Crisis of the Kadets' Electoral Campaign and the Turn to Local Solutions

The Kiev Kadets' hopes for carrying out any electoral campaign remained bleak as strong administrative pressure along with their unregistered status compelled them to exist semi-legally and illegally. In this endeavor, Kiev members, like the Kadets in the rest of the country, were ineffective, since they positioned themselves as a legal party, only

²⁴⁰ "The Response by Maxim Vinaver to the Open Letter by Mr. Arnol'd Zaidenman." *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 9 January 1907, p. 4.

developing open ways to act. Significantly, they had little experience in underground work. Yet they had to work in both – open and secret – avenues, gathering voter support piece by piece. The opportunities they explored were just small trickles of what a full-fledged campaign could be. By trying minor moves, the local Kadets eventually found some electoral strategies that worked in the transformed political environment in the provinces such as small-scale provincial alliances with local branches of all-Russian parties, as well as with parties of the national minorities. They did not bring as impressive results as a sweeping and broad campaign would have done, but given the political tendencies of differentiation, let alone the authorities' aim to block the Kadets' activities, it was an approach that allowed the Kadets to overcome the deadlock in their campaigning.

On the Jewish front, the Kadets had hinged their hopes on the slogans of the previous campaign and continued to offer Jews the same set of promises – emancipation via building a democratic Russia. The Jewish liberals remained the Kadets' main force in mobilizing the Jewish vote. Now they were organized in the Jewish People's Group, which was essentially the consolidated remnants of the Jewish League, and also needed to apply for legalization. However, there was no time to focus on the uncertain legal procedure as the first stage of voting – the elections of provincial electors in the counties – was approaching on January 22. Instead, in early January 1907, the group launched the biweekly *Svoboda i ravenstvo (Liberty and Equality)*, which became the central mouthpiece of Jewish liberals. As the organ of the Jewish People's Group, the periodical consistently asserted its anti-Zionist position. Published in St. Petersburg and circulated across the Pale of Settlement, the newspaper provided consistent electoral guidance for local Jewish activists in provinces in the Pale and became the center for correspondence

with local branches of the group.²⁴¹ The Jewish People's Group also issued four electoral leaflets – 40,000 copies of each in Russian and Yiddish – and sent them out to cities and towns of the Pale.²⁴² In them, the Jewish liberals called Jewish voters to participate in the elections, to form electoral blocs within the Jewish camp and outside of it, and advised them to withdraw their support from Zionist candidates.²⁴³

Although the Jewish People's Group aspired to unite Jews under the banner of the all-Jewish organization, Jewish national aspirations remained secondary to their programmatic principles. In one of the first issues of *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, the group declared that “our violated [Jewish] rights are the violated rights of all peoples of Russia. Our struggle for justice is a part of the common struggle for freedom and the order of law in Russia.”²⁴⁴ This group of Jewish liberals aimed to use national sentiment as a tool to mobilize the Jewish voters to participate in the democratic transformation of the country in accordance with the Kadet program, which would serve as the starting point for the fulfillment of various national programs for Jews and other non-Russian peoples of the empire. In other words, by capitalizing on Jewish emancipation as Jewish national liberation, the liberals dressed the liberal program for the Jews into national garments. The

²⁴¹ “Blizhaishaia zadacha,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 9 January 1907, pp. 1-3. In the pre-electoral period from January till February 20, each issues of the newspaper contained the rubric “Obzor izbiratel'noi kampanii,” which covered the preparations to the elections in provinces and analyzed their general electoral tendencies and problems in the country.

²⁴² *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 14 January 1907, pp. 15-16.

²⁴³ The newspaper *Svoboda i ravenstvo* also published the texts of these leaflets. “K grazhdanam evreiam,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 9 January 1907, pp. 13. “The Response by Maxim Vinaver to the Open Letter by Mr. Arnol'd Zaidenman.” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 9 January 1907, p. 3-5. “S kem vstupat' v izbiratel'nyia soglasheniia?” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 14 January 1907, pp. 15-16. “Kogo vybirat' v Gosudarstvennuu Dumu?” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 14 January 1907, p. 16.

²⁴⁴ *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 14 January 1907, p. 16.

call for the attainment of equal rights (*ravnopravie*) of the Jews, the Jewish League's initial policy in 1905, was transformed later into the aspiration for full rights (*polnopravie*). The Jewish People's Group, whose members authored the Jewish League's program, continued to adhere to the full rights program and even included more national overtones to respond to the rise of several national movements and parties within the Jewish population and to address the nationalist sentiments of Jews. In his review of national currents of the Russian Jewry, L. Shternberg analyzed the degree and the meaning of nationalism in the politics of Jewish parties and groups. He explained that a demand for equal rights of the Jews corresponded to aspirations for their political and civil rights, while the declaration of the principle of full rights aimed to ensure the attainment of national rights of the Jews.²⁴⁵

In addition to the rise of nationalism in Jewish politics, the class ideology that manifested itself in the programs of the leftists such as the Jewish Bund, but also among the traditional Jewish leaders, represented another challenge for the Jewish liberals. The liberals criticized the class principles of the Jewish establishment and the leftists, applying a different logic, but in both cases they used a subtle touch of national sentiment. As to the former, they ridiculed the class interests of "the satiated and rich people (*strakh sytogo cheloveka*)," whose fear of the revolution, they implied, revealed the fear of their own people.²⁴⁶ Targeting their rivals on the right and accusing them of their alienation from the Jewish masses allowed the liberals to picture themselves in democratic terms. As to the leftists, the liberals aimed to compete against them for mass support and to form an

²⁴⁵ "Natsional'nye techeniia v russkom evreistve [National Currents of the Russian Jewry]," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 14 January 1907, p. 7.

²⁴⁶ "Obzor evreiskoi pechati," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 9 January 1907, p. 9.

electoral bloc with them. One might say that the liberals hoped to cope with the competition on the left by forming the alliance with the leftists. By criticizing the leftists' position on class, the liberals attempted to persuade them that both sides – the liberals and the leftists – were gradually getting close. In his aforementioned article, L. Shternberg discusses the Jewish Bund's evolution and argues that the party had been unable to stick to its class principles and had to shift toward a political program that envisioned serious elements of Jewish nationalism. He maintains that the move showed the vitality and importance of nationalism over the principles of class-consciousness.²⁴⁷ Thereby, the liberals aimed to bridge the class divide between themselves and the leftists.

Ideologically, the Jewish liberals continued to prioritize their constitutional program over the national and class principles that other Jewish parties espoused. The liberals hoped to persuade the leftists to downplay, at least temporarily, their class interests, which would allow the liberals to build an oppositional coalition with the leftists. In turn, Jewish liberals decided to make concessions to nationalism, which they recognized as an essential part of voters' mindsets and programs of political parties. The Jewish People's Group planned to mobilize the Jews to struggle for the new constitutional order by dressing Jewish emancipation in national clothes. The question, however, remained: with whom to partner, whose support to mobilize or whom to support? With little prospect of uniting the Jewish voters, whose numbers were diligently reduced by the authorities, the liberals looked outside the Jewish camp to find an ally.

²⁴⁷ “Natsional'nye techeniia v russkom evreistve,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 14 January 1907, p. 7.

In mid-January 1907, the Jewish People's Group circulated several electoral leaflets in the Pale of Jewish Settlement. One of them, titled *With Whom [We Should] Make Electoral Agreements*, called on the Jews to support the peasants in the upcoming elections.²⁴⁸ The liberals saw the peasants as a progressive force that would support a new, just (*spravedlivyi*) constitutional order. The above-mentioned leaflet and later discussions on the electoral agreements in *Svoboda i ravenstvo* explained that the support for the peasants and their candidates was logical as the other option was to side with the landlords, which at best would produce an extra Jewish candidate, but would lead to the election of a reactionary Duma.²⁴⁹ In a landlord Duma, "twenty or thirty Jewish deputies will be lost and actually powerless; they will cry to dead walls there." Therefore, the newspaper continued, it was "the duty of the Jews in every possible way to assist in the creation of a oppositional Duma" – which would supposedly satisfy the peasantry – "even at the price of reducing the Jewish representation."²⁵⁰ Apparently, the Jewish People's Group hoped to find a common language with the peasants by downplaying their Jewishness, as they stressed a natural alliance between the urban residents and the countrymen.²⁵¹ They recognized, however, that the proposed bloc could be hard to achieve and thus called on the Jews to support the peasants' candidates even unilaterally. Ironically, the concluding note undermined this subtle reasoning for the Jewish-peasant union and reminded the Jews

²⁴⁸ "S kem vstupat' v izbiratel'nyia soglasheniia?" *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 14 January 1907, p. 15.

²⁴⁹ "S kem vstupat' v izbiratel'nyia soglasheniia?" *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 14 January 1907, p. 16. M. Pr., "Izbiratel'naia kompaniia," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 18 January 1907, p. 9.

²⁵⁰ M.-in, "O soglasheniakh," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 18 January 1907, p. 7.

²⁵¹ M.-in, "O soglasheniakh," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 18 January 1907, p. 6.

that if the peasants lost the political game, they would direct their irritation against the Jews.²⁵²

The mobilization of the peasants in support of the Kadet program, let alone Jewish emancipation, had remained problematic since the first electoral campaign. There were few locales where peasants consistently kept in touch with the Kadets and joined the party. The most notable was Cherkassy county, where among the six peasant electors, there were three Kadets – Kuz'ma Emel'ianovich Maliarenko of Smela town, and Gavriil Andreevich Donchik and Moisei Alekseevich Ponomarenko, both of Lozanovka village.²⁵³ The isolated case of Cherkassy only confirmed that the Kadets and the peasants were almost completely disconnected. Jewish members of the Kadet party were no more successful in reaching the peasants. Yet the liberals continued to cherish their plans to connect disparate parts of society under their leadership until the end of December 1906.

By January 1907, the last attempts of the liberals – the Kadets and their Jewish members – to form a broad electoral opposition faded; it was clear that they had also failed to launch the planned broad campaign. Provincial activists, who were disconnected from the centers and each other, worked hard to find some local ways to campaign. In Kiev province, the situation was tense, but not hopeless. In comparison with the previous campaign, the Kiev Kadets came to the elections much weaker and with declining influence. Due to their unregistered status, they did not have access to legal campaigning. However, there were some unexpected benefits. Some provincial groups no longer

²⁵² M.-in, "O soglasheniakh," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 18 January 1907, p. 7.

²⁵³ Report of the assistant head of Kiev provincial police office in Cherkassy county, *Perepiska s Departamentom politsii, nachal'nikom Kievskogo okhrannogo otdeleniia i drugimi uchrezhdeniiami o vyborakh vo 2-u Gos. Dumu*. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 434.

perceived the Kadet party as too powerful and began to consider creating partnerships with the Kadets. In turn, the Kiev Kadets also became more inclined to build smaller electoral blocs to elect specific candidates instead of uniting large and small provincial groups into the oppositional movement. This change in the Kiev Kadets' strategy came gradually, as they searched for electoral partners in the province.

The Kiev Kadets considered numerous options for making electoral blocs. Yet many of them turned out to be problematic because not all prospective partners sought an alliance with them. Apart from Jewish liberals and the Kadets, socialist parties actively campaigned on the Jewish front. For the Kadets, an electoral agreement with the Russian Social Democrats was the most desirable. Relations between the two parties had always been troublesome. Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats, criticized the Kadets vehemently, in particular, for not participating in the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy, while exploiting the results of uprisings for their political benefit.²⁵⁴ For several months, the Kadets had been trying in vain to connect with the Bolsheviks to create a united opposition to the government. This aspiration became a chief ideological theme of the Kadets' second campaign. Editorials in their central newspaper *Riech*, for instance, criticized the unwillingness of the Social Democrats to form a coalition with the Kadets as often as they accused the government of backwardness. Many provincial Kadet organizations worked toward the creation of a Kadet-SD alliance, explaining the need to unite against the "black-hundred" danger. No less important was the tangible influence that the Social Democrats exercised among the

²⁵⁴ Vladimir Lenin, "Pobeda kadetov i zadachi rabochei partii," in *PSS*, V. 12, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1960), 291.

urban electorate all over Russia. However, like many other local Kadet groups, the Kiev Kadets faced the prospect of lengthy negotiations with the Social Democrats with the other side uninterested in forming the electoral bloc.

The prospects on the left for the Kadets were bleak within the Jewish camp as well, despite the Kadets' advocacy of civil rights for Jews. Beside diverse Zionist groups and parties – such as the Zionist Socialists or the Poalei Zion, other Jewish socialist parties decided to limit themselves to blocs with socialist parties only. Such was the case with the Seimists (the Jewish Socialist Labor party), which preferred to join with the Bund rather than another Jewish socialist party²⁵⁵ or the Kadets. As the Kiev Kadets continued their negotiations with the Social Democratic camp, they also considered an agreement with the provincial branch of the Jewish Bund, which preferred the Kadets over any Jewish leftists, based partly on the empire-wide political influence that the Kadets generally enjoyed, but no less on the unstable position of the Kadets in the current electoral situation.²⁵⁶ The partnership with the Kadets attracted the weak branch of the Bund in Kiev because the latter could assert its position in this alliance. The rise of the rightist coalition, including their tireless recruitment of workers,²⁵⁷ did not escape the Bund's attention and became an additional incentive for the Bund to consider the Kadet partnership. The Kadets in turn realized that although the Bund did not have a large presence in Kiev province at that time, it had experience in working illegally. Moreover, the Bund had reasserted its presence in

²⁵⁵ *Evreiskii Izbiratel'*, 5 December 1906, no 1. p. 10.

²⁵⁶ Moshe Rafes, *Ocherki po istorii "Bunda"* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1923), 193-194.

²⁵⁷ Don Rawson, *Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 101.

many provinces of the Pale, potentially drawing a fair number of Jewish voters from the Kadets. In addition, the Kadets were sensitive to the Bund's success in establishing connections with political parties that represented other ethnic minorities in the borderlands. In particular, the Ukrainian Social Democrats frequently cooperated with the Bund, and the two had even smuggled illegal party literature from abroad together.²⁵⁸ Therefore, the Kiev Kadets decided to launch negotiations with the Bund.²⁵⁹

The electoral deal between the Kadets and the Jewish Bund eventually occurred on the eve of the elections in mid-January 1907. The leadership of the two parties negotiated technical details such as the number of candidates as well as coordinating campaigning strategies, slogans, and so on. Ideologically, the agreement with the Bund was based on shared anti-Zionism and to a great extent became possible due to deep divisions between Jewish socialist parties. However, the basis of this cooperation lay not only in the power balance of political parties in the province. Observations of the local police in towns and villages in counties²⁶⁰ suggested that another level of ties and connections existed among political groups and parties. At the end of January, the elections in all counties of Kiev province occurred. Many of the candidates to electors, electors, or candidates to the Duma had affiliations with more than one party or group. Combinations of some affiliations were more frequent than others; not all of them are easy to explain in terms of political

²⁵⁸ Yury Boshyk, "Jewish-Ukrainian Political Relations in Imperial Russia," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2010), 178.

²⁵⁹ "Vypiska ia pis'ma s podpis'u 'Papa,' Vasil'kov, ot 12 dekabria 1906 g. k Mikhailu Bezymianskomu, v Kiev, Universitet," TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 5.

²⁶⁰ On the request of the government, which had started to collect information about the victorious Kadet party in the aftermath of the first elections and during the work of the First Duma, the county police sent specific personal data about local Kadets to the St. Petersburg office. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1347, l. 148.

ideologies. In particular, the list of electors from the town of Belaia Tserkov' (Vasil'kov county) mentioned that the doctor Fridel' Ovsei Khaimov Lander and the contractor of the county zemstvo board Pinkhas Iosev Turii supported the Kadet program and that of the Jewish League of Full Rights; another elector, the collegiate assessor (*kollezhskii assessor*) Kel'man Gertsev Gal'bershtadt combined Kadet and Bundist views.²⁶¹ While the first two electors' political affiliations were the ones that the Kadets and Jewish liberals openly designed during the first electoral campaign, the Kadet-Bundist match hardly emerged as one driven from above. In Radomysl' county, at least four of the five electors from the town curia were Jewish and at least three of them shared Kadet views;²⁶² two of the latter – the doctor Kugel' Lazarov Tsveifel' and town dweller Vul'f Abramovich Vainshtein – also belonged to the Bund.²⁶³

These cases of dual membership of Jewish electors from the counties of Vasil'kov and Radomysl' in both the all-Russian party of Kadets and a Jewish political organization suggests that the Kadet-Jewish League model that the Kadets had initially built in the borderland provinces also worked for their cooperation with other local parties. As the League disintegrated, some elements that had been involved in its work, such as socialists, retained their connections with the Kadets. To be sure, mistakes or misunderstanding in

²⁶¹ "Imennoi spisok vyborshchikov ot Vasil'kovskogo uezda, uchastvovavshikh v Gubernskom izbirate'lnom sobranii, pri vyborakh chelnov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy v 1907," *Perepiska s Departamentom politsii, nachal'nikom Kievskogo okhrannogo otdeleniia i drugimi uchrezhdeniiami o vyborakh vo 2-u Gos. Dumu*. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 59.

²⁶² "Gorodskie vyborshchiki ot kievskoi gubernii. Radomysl'skii u.," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 27 January 1907, p. 5.

²⁶³ "Spisok lits izbrannykh v gubernskie vyborshchiki ot krest'ian, melkikh i krupnykh zemlevladel'tsev i lits gorodskogo sostonianiia, Radomysl'skii uezdnyi ispravnik," *Perepiska s Departamentom politsii...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 103.

interpreting the electors' affiliation on the part of the police were probable. Apparently, the police possessed incomplete information and county officers (*uezdnye ispravniki*) had difficulty to clearly define the political views of activists and candidates, some of whom hid their views, such as the afore-mentioned Kel'man Gal'bershtadt, who, according to the Vasil'kov county officer, was a staunch Kadet, while pretending to be a moderate progressive;²⁶⁴ some preferred to run as independents, for instance, the son of the merchant Mordukhai Magazinik of Berdichev;²⁶⁵ while others positioned themselves as moderates such as the doctor Vol'f Nukhimov Gallakh of Berdichev county.²⁶⁶ Similarly, the dual membership of some Kadets was also quite frequent at the grassroots level. In late June 1906, the Zvenigorodka county police officer submitted a list of local Kadets, eleven of whom – mostly students at St. Vladimir University – were also Bundists.²⁶⁷ These data, which the police registered, only prove that the border between parties on the ground were not clear-cut and that the political affiliation of some electors could be mixed, which, in some instances, might have brought them victory in this first round of elections, when independent voters cast their ballots. It was at this level and at this stage – the elections of

²⁶⁴ “Imennoi spisok vyborshchikov ot Vasil'kovskogo uezda...,” *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 59.

²⁶⁵ Report of the assistant head of Kiev provincial police office in Berdichev county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 111.

²⁶⁶ “Spisok gubernskikh vyborshchikov ot g. Berdicheva i Berdichevskogo uezda,” *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 119.

²⁶⁷ The list of members of the Party of People's Freedom, [who] lives in Zvenigorodka county, sent by the county police officer. *Spiski lits, prinadlezhashchikh k konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii tak nazyvaemoi “Narodnoi svobody” po uezdam Kievskoi gubernii i gor. Kiev.* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1424, l. 3.

the electors to the final, provincial electoral assembly (*gubernskii s'ezd*) – that personal connections and overlaps in the political leanings mattered most.

Jewish electoral politics – which occurred mostly within the municipal curias²⁶⁸ – varied across the province, although it resulted in the selection of a majority of Jewish electors in every county but Cherkassy. Some counties voted for candidates who belonged to or supported one particular party. Two counties – Lipovets and Vasil'kov – preferred Kadet electors.²⁶⁹ Some counties which produced a mixed composition of electors – in Uman' county, of seven municipal electors, there were at least five Kadets and a Social Democrat. In Skvira county, the nominees were prominent locals: two Jews – the town doctor Solomon Naumovich Krol' and Crown Rabbi of Skvira Usher-Genzel' Iampol'skii, and one non-Jew – the chair of the Skvira justices of the peace Sergei Vasil'evich Tolmachev. Diversification of provincial politics manifested itself even in this list of three – Iampol'skii was a Zionist and Tolmachev was close to the Kadets. In provincial politics, the name and personal reputation could weigh as much as the political mindset and adherence to some ideological principles. This phenomenon would become more common during the next campaign, when party meetings and political discussions in public were almost universally forbidden; yet it manifested itself partially in the second electoral campaign. In the town of Khodorkov of Skvira county, the Jews shortlisted two candidates, whom the police report described by their social status, without specifying what political

²⁶⁸ The workers' curia was the other one in which the Jews participated. However, the impact of workers' voting was much more limited than for any other curia.

²⁶⁹ Report of the county police officer in Lipovets county. *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 139. "Imennoi spisok vyborshchikov ot Vasil'kovskogo uezda, uchastvovavshikh v Gubernskom izbiratel'nom sobranii, pri vyborakh chlenov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy v 1907 g.," *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 59

program they advocated if they did at all: the owner of the local sugar refinery Moisei Borisovich Gal'perin and the director of the same refinery Mikhail Kalinovich Vasil'ev.²⁷⁰

Despite such differences in the political outlook of the candidates whom the Jewish voters supported, there was an important similarity among these electoral cases. Little campaigning had occurred in these counties; applications for open meetings were scarce and the local police permitted only a few of them. Even in towns where it did take place – such as Vasil'kov, – the contrast with the electoral campaign to the First Duma was striking. The Vasil'kov police noted its moderate scale and the fact that it was limited to private gatherings (*domashnie kruzhki*).²⁷¹ Similar reports were coming from Skvira, where voters' indifference toward the elections resulted in a county-wide lull, with hardly even any secret political gatherings. Doctor Krol' and Crown Rabbi Iampol'skii, who succeeded in organizing a single meeting in the town of Skvira in order to nominate candidates to electors from Jewish voters, disguised it as a charity discussion.²⁷² In Lipovets, even small private parties did not arouse the suspicion of the police, which regarded electoral enthusiasm as on the wane, including among Jewish voters.²⁷³ The Chigirin county police officer offered his explanation for the lack of movement in the Jewish camp. The rightists had started to establish their presence in the town of Chigirin – they had opened a local branch of the Russian Monarchist party in late December 1906, so the Jews, fearing

²⁷⁰ Report of the county police officer in Skvira county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 73. The elector from Khodorkov became the doctor Riazanskii. "Gorodskie vyborshchiki ot kievskoi gubernii. Skvirskii uezd," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 1907, p. 5.

²⁷¹ Report of the county police officer in Vasil'kov county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 55.

²⁷² Report of the county police officer in Skvira county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 73.

²⁷³ Report of the county police officer in Lipovets county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 137.

possible pogroms, were afraid to campaign openly. He, however, promised to closely watch the Jews, “this energetic and rebellious people,” as he suspected some unpleasant surprises.²⁷⁴ Overall, in a number of localities of Kiev province, the electoral campaign was reduced to a single, often secret or disguised gathering where its attendees nominated candidates to electors. There was little room for debates at these meetings; nevertheless, Jews voted for quite a few Kadets or their Jewish and non-Jewish supporters. The idea of Jewish emancipation on the Kadet scenario remained popular among the Jewish population.

A different pattern showed itself in Berdichev county. Preparations for the elections were more sophisticated in its administrative center, Berdichev. The police noted several clandestine meetings of local branches of leftist parties along with the oppositional bourgeoisie in December 1906 and early January 1907.²⁷⁵ Those were the only series of such joint gatherings which were documented by the authorities or participating groups across Kiev province – beside the city of Kiev, of course. The list of candidates to electors evolved from the moderate to heavily leftist in several stages. The initial nomination mentioned the owner of a watch shop, Khaskel’ Manzon, the accountant of Magazinik’s shop, Raigorodetskii, a person without definite occupation, Lipa Livshits, and a worker from the Progress factory, Borganovskii. Several weeks later, the police learned about an updated list, which turned out to be fake; on the final, real list, three leftist candidates replaced more moderate ones. Overall, lengthy negotiations resulted in the most diverse

²⁷⁴ Report of the county police officer in Chigirin county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 316.

²⁷⁵ Report of the assistant head of Kiev provincial police office in Berdichev county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, ll. 105, 111.

profile of Jewish electors from the counties of Kiev province. The six electors from the town of Berdichev were a Kadet, an independent, a Zionist, a Social Democrat, a Laborist (*Trudovik*), and a Bundist: 1) the Kadet – the doctor Idel’ Iudko-Iosevich Ansheles, 2) the independent – the son of a merchant, Mordukhai Abram Berovich Magazinik, 3) the Zionist – the son of a merchant, Leib Khaimovich Motskin, 4) the Social Democrat – the private tutor and dentist, Duvid Froimovich Brodskii, 5) the Laborist – the former member of the First Duma, the doctor, Meilakh Rakhmievich Chervonenkis, and 6) the Bundist – the son of a second guild merchant, the assistant pharmacist, Iosif Ruvinovich Fertman.²⁷⁶ In other words, despite a high degree of political differentiation, the Jews of Berdichev showed cooperation under unfavorable conditions. Of course, their major electoral advantage in the municipal curia was the high share of Jewish voters.

Similar to the Berdichev case, the electoral campaign in Uman’ county represented a remarkable example of local politics in Kiev province, but in a different sense. It was the product of a subtle cooperation of local activists between themselves and with grassroots Jews, which involved the Kadet ideology, leftist experience in working with masses, and the blurred political affiliation of Jewish political activists. The outcome of the electoral campaign, which lasted for just over a month, was favorable for the Kadets, as the Uman’ municipal curia sent mostly Kadet electors to the provincial elections. In all other counties that voted for Kadet electors, the electoral campaign was reserved and usually limited to private parties or circles, since the Kadets rarely resorted to illegal gatherings on their own initiative. Jewish activists in Uman’, however, used a different

²⁷⁶ Report of the assistant head of Kiev provincial police office in Berdichev county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 119.

approach. They did not attempt to organize special meetings, either secret, private, or under some legal pretext, but, according to the data that police data, they held special and spontaneous discussions right in the streets – “on the fly” (*letuchim poriadkom*), as the police reports explained. During these short and informal street meetings in December 1906 and early January 1907, the participants debated a list of candidates from among the Jews. The Uman’ rabbi, Doctor Aleksandr Grigor’evich Al’ter, was the main driving force behind this street campaign.²⁷⁷ Together with other Jews – Kruglyi, Zvonitskii, and Fridenberg – and some Christian colleagues, he conducted electoral discussions with Jewish voters, so the list of candidates gradually took its final, mostly Kadet profile by the time of the first stage of the elections in late January.

As a result, Rabbi Al’ter, apparently himself a member or at least a supporter of the Kadet party, became one of the electors from Uman’ county; the other four Kadet electors were the lawyer Zakharii Ivanovich Krakovetskii, the merchant Nukhim Ber Fishman, the son of a merchant Berko-Ber Borukhov Fridenberg, and the member of the Uman’ county court, the collegiate councilor (*kollezhskii sovietnik*) Mikhail Mikhailovich Kovesnikov. All except Kovesnikov were Jewish. The two other electors, both leftists, were the doctor Lazar’ Marovich Bilinkis, a Jew, and the engineer Ivan Ivanovich Kirienko, a Christian.²⁷⁸ In other words, the Uman’ electors from the municipal curia were mostly Kadet and mainly

²⁷⁷ Report of the assistant head of Kiev provincial police office in Uman’ county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 141.

²⁷⁸ The political affiliation of Bilinkis and Kirienko is not entirely clear. The police report indicated that they belonged to the Socialist Revolutionaries. However, the oppositional newspaper *Kievskaiia mysl’* considered them Social Democrats. Report of the assistant head of Kiev provincial police office in Uman’ county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, ll. 140, 158. “Gorodskie vyborshchiki ot kievskoi gubernii. Umanskii uezd,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 27 January 1907, p. 5.

Jewish; non-Jewish candidates were elected by the same voters, who themselves were overwhelmingly Jewish. Thus, Uman' supported the Kadets, both Jewish and non-Jewish.

To be sure, the street electoral campaign could not serve as a substitute for a full, broad-scale campaign such as the one that had unfolded in the lead-up to the previous elections. However, it was a workable alternative to narrow private parties, illegal secret meetings, or no campaigning at all. It involved more participants and was less legally compromising for its participants. Little evidence about it is available; the police had a hard time catching the discussants, who naturally did not produce any meeting minutes – those informal consultations simply concluded with oral agreements. As a result, Uman' Jews, who made up the overwhelming majority (80%)²⁷⁹ of the municipal curia, supported the Kadets as their electors. However, the kind of electoral tactic that brought this success to the Kadets was uncharacteristic of the Kadet party. It was closer to the illegal ways that the revolutionary parties used to involve people into politics and in stark contrast to the open public lectures which the Kadets had relied previously on. Some Bundist sources mention similar street events elsewhere in Russia, a technique often employed by leftists for developing a party network in localities where it was impossible to organize a mass gathering or mobilize the population for political actions.²⁸⁰ Clearly, the cooperation between the Kadets and the revolutionary parties manifested itself in the Uman' case.

Another factor that contributed to the joint work of oppositional forces and their subsequent success in the Uman' municipal elections was the fluidity of political outlooks

²⁷⁹ The report from the Kiev provincial gendarme office to the Police Department in St. Petersburg, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 49

²⁸⁰ Moshe Rafes, *Ocherki po istorii "Bunda"* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1923), 206.

of key Uman' Kadet electors, who themselves were not always "pure" Kadets. Crown Rabbi Al'ter appeared in various police dispatches as "a Kadet" and "holding Kadet views" along with "listed among members of revolutionary parties."²⁸¹ These different versions could reveal the ambiguity of Al'ter's views, or else the misunderstanding or lack of information on the part of the county police officer who composed the documents. The fact that Al'ter headed – and carried out – the electoral campaign and promoted Kadet candidates suggests his support of the Kadet party and familiarity with leftist practices. Another Kadet elector, the lawyer Krakovetskii also had a mixed political profile. Apparently, he had furnished financial assistance to some Social Democrats in the town of Uman' before 1905. In 1906, he joined the local branch of the Kadet party and participated in its meetings, sometimes even hosting them. In the same year, the police prosecuted him for the distribution of revolutionary literature, although he remained in the ranks of the Kadets until 1908. Apparently, Krakovetskii's political views could not easily fit into a program of either the Kadets or Social Democrats, so he later joined the Spilka – the Ukrainian Social Democrats.²⁸² The third Kadet elector Kovesnikov, also a lawyer, held views more consistent with the Kadet program than Al'ter and Krakovetskii, while his presence in the cohort of Uman' electors underlined his acceptance of diverse views among his fellows. In turn, the cases of Al'ter and Krakovetskii and others like them show that even if the membership in a particular party was problematic for provincial activists due to

²⁸¹ Report of the assistant head of Kiev provincial police office in Uman' county, *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, ll. 143, 158.

²⁸² *Kopii spravok iz del Kievskogo GZhU o raznykh litsakh, obviniaemykh v prinallezhnosti k nelegal'nykh partiiam, rasprostraneni nelegal'noi literatury, vyskazyvanii protiv tsaria i za uchastie v nelegal'nykh skhodkakh i demonstratsiakh.* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 3684, ll. 5, 6, 9.

their politically borderline views, the latter could also become the source of political cooperation and agreement in provincial politics.

On the whole, the mixed character of electoral strategies that the Jewish liberals along with their political partners employed across Kiev province reveals the multitude of opportunities that political activists in the counties could see and develop in an electoral campaign. Many who had remained in the shadow of provincial politics took the lead and used their understanding, experience, and energy to organize the electoral campaign in the counties without any consistent guidance or support from either the provincial committees of the Kadet party or the Jewish People's Group, and under severe administrative pressure. Oppositional activists in the counties took the initiative in exploring various avenues to mobilize the voters. Often, their individual actions – talking to the voters, hosting charity and private parties – drove the electoral campaign forward and were its essence.

On January 22, 1907, the elections of the municipal electors (*gorodskie vyborshchiki*) from the twelve county towns and thirteen largest *mestechki* (other towns) took place across Kiev province. Overall, according to sources close to the Kiev Kadets, of 71 electors, 61 were progressives and 10 were rightists. The progressive electors were mostly Kadets – 51 of them; the Social Democrats took 8 seats.²⁸³ The affiliation of two electors is unknown. The electors Miliavskii of Kanev and Iampol'skii of Skvira appeared as Zionists elsewhere in the police correspondence and seized private letters,²⁸⁴ not as

²⁸³ “Gorodskie vyborshchiki ot kievskoi gubernii,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 27 January 1907, p. 5.

²⁸⁴ “Vypiska iz poluchennogo agenturnym putem pis'ma iz Kaneva k M. Margolinu,” *Perepiska s Departamentom politsii, nachal'nikom Kievskogo okhrannogo otdeleniia i drugimi uchrezhdeniiami o vyborakh vo 2-u Gos. Dumu*. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 14.

Kadets as the Kadet source indicated. Even so, the Kadets won an overwhelming majority in the municipal curia of Kiev province. As the majority of the residents in the towns and *mestechki* were Jews, it means that it was their support that secured the victory for the Kadets in the first stage of elections. At the same time, most of the electors who held liberal – “progressive” – views were Jewish. In other words, the overlaps between the Kadets and Jews on the list of municipal electors were significant. Taking into account that many of them were affiliated with Jewish parties as well, it is clear that in the counties of Kiev province, the Kadets became a unifying electoral ground for various local political groups. The overlap between the Kadets and Jews was significant: 51 Kadets and 45 Jews were among the 61 progressive electors.²⁸⁵

The ten rightist electors came from the three counties – Cherkassy, Vasil’kov, and Tarashcha, specifically, their administrative centers, which selected *only* rightists. The town of Tarashcha sent two rightist electors, the town of Vasil’kov – three, and the town of Cherkassy – five. The liberal press, assessing this rightist victory in the municipal curia in these towns, gave some accounts of the reasons for this. In Cherkassy, *Kievskaiia mysl’* blamed the electoral commission for the failure to comply with the rules.²⁸⁶ In Vasil’kov, however, the newspaper accused the Jewish activists of tactless pre-electoral moves, which ruined the Jewish-progressive alliance and resulted in two separate lists – Jewish and Russian progressive. The nascent alliance had been technical, envisioning two Jewish and one Christian elector from the town of Vasil’kov. On the eve of the elections, the Jewish activists put forward three new Jewish candidates: first, this overrode the agreement with

²⁸⁵ “Gorodskie vyborshchiki ot kievskoi gubernii,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 27 January 1907, p. 5.

²⁸⁶ “Cherkassy,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 1 February 1907, p. 5.

the Russian progressives and, second, Jewish voters were not consulted regarding these new, self-nominated candidates. Russian and many Jewish voters refused to support this newly-baked Jewish list. The monarchists took advantage of the situation and called on the Russian progressives to vote for the rightists, threatening that otherwise only Jewish candidates would succeed. As a consequence, without any hope of victory, the Russian progressives ran a separate list.²⁸⁷ Evidence from the police sources supports the explanation given by *Kievskaiia mysl'* in principle and provides an insight into the makeup of 'the Russian progressives.' The participants of the electoral bloc were the Spilka (the Ukrainian Social Democrats) and the Bund; then later the Bundists, without the Spilka activists' consent, made an agreement with the non-party Jewish voters on behalf of the initial (Bund-Spilka) bloc. The Spilka considered leaving the bloc even though it had no hope of electoral success.²⁸⁸

Whereas the Kadets relied on the initiative of individual Jewish activists and their initiative in the towns of the province, in the city of Kiev they eventually received indirect support from a Jewish organization besides the Jewish Bund – the Society of Non-Party Jewish Voters in Kiev province. Ironically, the provincial authorities' actions played an important role here as, having denied legalization to the Jewish League and the Kadet party, including the Kiev branch of the Kadets, they approved legalization of the Non-Party Group,²⁸⁹ which gave it the right to gather meetings of voters and hold electoral discussions

²⁸⁷ "Vybory v nashem krae. Vasil'kov," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, January 30, 1907, p. 5.

²⁸⁸ Excerpt from a private letter. *Perepiska s Departamentom politsii, nachal'nikom Kievskogo okhrannogo otdeleniia i drugimi uchrezhdeniiami o vyborakh vo 2-u Gos. Dumu*. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 11.

²⁸⁹ Letter of the [acting] Kiev Governor (executive officer – *upravliaushchii guberniei*) P.G. Kurlov to the Governor-General of Kiev, Volyn', and Podol'e. TsDIAK, f. 442, op. 636, d. 647, l. 239.

– at least formally. Although the office of the Kiev governor issued the registration only on February 3, 1907, when the first stage of elections was over, the Non-Party Group of Jewish Voters had been active in December and January, while its founders developed its statute and applied for legalization. Among its founders were the same Jewish activists who had participated in the group during the first campaign – the lawyer M. Mazor, the doctor M.I Aleksandrov, the doctor G.B. Bykhovskii, the lawyer I.P. Kel’berin, and the doctor M.S. Frenkel’.²⁹⁰ Many of them were active in the Jewish League, thus the Kadets had strong connections with this group. While the society did much to engage Jewish voters in the electoral process, it inherited some communal rivalry from the first campaign and thus contributed to the differentiation of Jewish politics.

The Kiev Kadets tried to engage this society, too. The society’s legalized status provided an opportunity for local Kadets, including Jewish liberals and their allies, to partake in open campaigning among the Jewish masses. In view of the fact that the Kadet party was deprived of official status, the Society of Non-Party Jewish Voters provided it with some useful leverage in Kiev province, especially when public action was needed. In particular, when in December 1906, the Kiev governor introduced an additional electoral restriction for apartment renters, the Kiev authorities excluded some 4,000 Jewish voters from the list of voters, applying the new rule. The non-party Jewish electoral committee petitioned Prime Minister Stolypin and Kiev Governor-General Sukhomlinov for cancellation of the rule. Eventually, the governor’s decree was revoked; a large portion of

²⁹⁰ The Statute of the Society of Non-party Jewish Voters of Kiev province. TsDIAK, f. 442, op. 636, d. 647, l. 240.

the city's Jews were re-enfranchised,²⁹¹ many of whom were supporters of the Kadet party. However, the non-party group was a relatively small organization and worked mostly in Kiev; its goals were limited to mobilizing independent Jewish voters – which was essentially the reason why the society's legalization had been approved. Cooperation with it was useful and lay within the legal range of electoral tactics, yet it represented only one small avenue of what the Kadets needed on the Jewish front.

While personal ties and initiative proved crucial during pre-electoral negotiations and mobilization of the Jewish vote in the counties, inter-party negotiations and agreements played an important role at the second stage – in the provincial elections. The Kiev branch of the Jewish People's Group became a link between the Kadets and the Bund. Although both negotiating parties aimed to conclude a technical electoral agreement, it could not be reached without some shared principles between the partners. In particular, they overlapped on their position on the attainment of full rights for Jews. Essentially, both the Jewish People's Group and the Bund were anti-Zionist. They were also both less nationally coloured than other Jewish political groups. The Jewish People's Group's concern with equal rights for Jews took precedence over Jewish national autonomy, although the group explained that the attainment of full rights for Jews was a means to struggle for Jewish national life.²⁹² Simon Dubnow, a Jewish historian and an advocate of Jewish autonomy, commented on the Jewish People's Group's program: it revealed neither a developed

²⁹¹ *Evreiskii Izbiratel'* 8 December 1906 [no. 2], p. 20. [RGIA, Fond 1565, op. 1, d. 136]. The governor narrowed the definition of a separate apartment, whose renters were eligible to vote. According to the governor's decree, only the apartments with a separate entrance and a kitchen gave their renters the right to vote.

²⁹² *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 14 January 1907, No 2. P. 6.

attitude toward the Jewish national question nor a negative position toward assimilation of Jews.²⁹³ According to Dubnow, the Bund in turn limited its program to the minimum of national autonomy.²⁹⁴ As both groups were relatively weak and faced the prospect of campaigning under pressure from the rightists and the authorities, the agreement between them took place due to a subtle balance of commonalities and interests. Thus, the Bund, via its agreement with the Jewish People's Group, became the Kadets' ally in Kiev province. Eventually, because the Bund had re-established its relations with the Social Democrats in 1906, the Bund-Kadet local agreement aided the Kiev Kadets in negotiating with the Kiev branch of the Social Democrats.

The elections of the deputy to the Duma from the city of Kiev took place on February 6, 1907. Of 82 electors, 80 attended the meeting – 42 rightists and 38 leftists. Two electors from the progressive camp, the engineers A.A. Mikulin and V.I. Deisha, could not participate in the elections as they had to be elsewhere to perform their official duties – the oppositional press speculated that the authorities sent them away on purpose. Even if all progressive electors had been present, they would have remained in a minority and could not technically elect their own candidate, the head of the Kiev Kadets, professor I.V. Luchitskii. The progressives attempted to question the electoral outcome in advance on some legal pretext. The electoral commission agreed only to attach their protest to the electoral minutes, yet this did not affect the electoral results. Bishop Platon, the candidate

²⁹³ Semen Dubnov, *Formy natsional'nogo dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh*. Ed. A.I. Kastelianskii. (St. Petersburg, izdanie t-va "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za," 1910), 410.

²⁹⁴ Semen Dubnov, *Formy natsional'nogo dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh*. Ed. A.I. Kastelianskii. (St. Petersburg, izdanie t-va "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za," 1910), 411.

from the rightists, received 43 affirmative votes and became the deputy to the Second Duma from the city of Kiev.²⁹⁵

Two days later, *Kievskaiia mysl'* discussed the opposition's defeat and determined its cause as the partial split in the bloc of the Kadet-Social Democratic bloc at the first stage – when the elections of electors took place – that had caused the failure of the opposition at the second stage, when electors voted for candidates to the Duma. The matter was, as one discussant S. D-r argued, that the negotiations between the two sides were trying, with the Social Democrats yielding several times to the Kadets, but finally stepping independently forward in Ploskii electoral district of Kiev. S. D-r concluded that the Kadet candidates, who received less (in the range of 635-656 votes) than the Social Democratic candidates (735-761), should have supported the Social Democratic candidates in Ploskii district, thus bringing the number of the oppositional electors to 42, that is, the majority for the second, final stage of elections.²⁹⁶ Another discussant, who gave his name as Jgnotus, disagreed with these electoral calculations. He explained that as the Social Democrats could not hope to elect their deputy to the Duma from the city of Kiev, they should not have opposed the Kadets, who were a larger political party in the city. Jgnotus insisted that it was the Kadets who had ignored leftist political parties in Kiev and, simultaneously, unabashedly relied on the leftist votes.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ “Vybory deputatov. Pobieda oppozitsii. Vybory chlenov gosud. dумы ot kievskoi guber.,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 7 February 1907, pp. 3, 4. The elections continued during three days – on February 6, 7, and 8.

²⁹⁶ “Kadety na vyborakh. Iz pis'ma v redaktsiu,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 8 February 1907, p. 2.

²⁹⁷ “K voprosu o prichinakh porazheniia oppozitsii v Kieve... (Otvét S. D-ru),” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 8 February 1907, p. 2.

In other words, both discussants described the Kadets playing the role of an overarching organization for the oppositional parties, which caused some of their electoral partners – according to Jgnotus, the Mensheviks and Bundists – to worry about their political standing, and thus they decided to assert their influence on the elections at least in some electoral districts. Apparently, the two sides – the Social Democrats and the Kadets – misunderstood and misinterpreted each other's intentions and saw the electoral bloc differently. Seemingly, the Kiev Kadets ascribed to themselves a more universal role than their political partners were ready to recognize. In short, both sides recognized that they formed an agreement, but treated it as no more than a technical decision. When it broke down in one city district, it led to the overall failure of the opposition in the elections of the deputy from Kiev. The Kiev Kadets' stakes were higher, their loss was greater: they could have elected a Kadet candidate from the city of Kiev. Ironically, Luchitskii won the Duma seat from Kiev in the next elections, which were held in accordance with the more conservative electoral law of 3 June 1907.

On the same day, 231 electors – with only one absentee – gathered to elect 15 members of the Duma from Kiev province. There were two Jewish candidates on the progressive list – the doctor L.Kh. Motskin and the lawyer A.D. Margolin. The opposition celebrated a victory when 14 electors from the progressive list became Kiev deputies, yet no Jewish candidates won this time in Kiev province.²⁹⁸ The fifteen deputies were mostly peasants, many of whom did not belong to any party but defined their political views as close to the leftists. Few of them openly admitted their affiliation with the Kadet party or

²⁹⁸ *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 2 February 1907, p. 3.

support for it. Yet the Kadets claimed victory in the provincial elections as their electoral bloc with the Bund and Social Democrats had supported these candidates. On February 9, the day after the elections, when the fourteen progressive newly-elected deputies gathered for a meeting, a delegation from the Jewish electors showed up and addressed the attendees with the call:

Forty-five Jewish electors consciously voted for the peasants in the last elections, not the landlords, ... because being themselves ill-fated and oppressed, [peasants] will defend the interests of [those, who are] similarly ill-fated and oppressed... [A]s there will be no Jewish deputies in the State Duma, the Jewish curia entrusts the peasant [deputies] with responding to those dirty accusations, which the gentlemen Krushevans will put forward. Jews greet their deputies and express their full confidence that Kiev province has sent its best people to the Duma.²⁹⁹

On the suggestion of the leftist – apparently a Social Democrat – engineer I.I. Kirienko, the meeting responded to this call with a resolution to defend the interests of the Jews “as people and as an oppressed nation.”³⁰⁰ In other words, the appeal of the Jewish People’s Group for Jews to support the peasants was realized at the final stage of the elections. The Jewish electors voted for the peasant candidates, which brought about their victory. Two days later, *Kievskaja mysl’*, analyzing the course of the provincial elections, praised the Jewish electors, who supported the peasant deputies despite the fact that the peasant electors did not support the Jewish electors. The newspaper called the peasant deputies to publicize this generous position of the Jewish electors among other peasants in the province to show them that the toiling Jewry was sincere friends of the peasants.³⁰¹ Now, according

²⁹⁹ “К выборам от киевской губернии,” *Kievskaja mysl’*, 10 February 1907, p. 3.

³⁰⁰ “К выборам от киевской губернии,” *Kievskaja mysl’*, 10 February 1907, p. 3.

³⁰¹ “По итогам выборов по киевской губернии,” *Kievskaja mysl’*, 11 February 1907, p. 3.

to the Kadets' scenario, it was the turn of the peasant masses to extend a friendly hand to the Jews.

Two prominent episodes which occurred in Chigirin county later illustrate how naïve were the electoral hopes that the Jewish voters placed in the peasant deputies to the Duma.

More than 200 people, peasants and Jews, gathered at the Fundukleevka railway station [of Chigirin county] to see off on the train [the elector] Lagno Dionisii Andronikovich, a peasant... On his departure for Kiev [for participation in the provincial elections] Lagno said: "Sirs, I do not know whether I will come back, but I ask you, when you leave for home, to live quietly, not to cause robberies, violence, and disorder, so that the tears of the offended will not fall on me. [You should] know that I will demand land, liberty, and freedom for the people." Upon his return from Kiev on February 10, Lagno [already elected a deputy to the Duma] addressed the audience, mostly Jewish, which was meeting him at the railway station. [He said] that in the Duma, he would demand equal rights for the Jews, amnesty for political prisoners, and abolition of martial law, court-martials, and the death penalty. In response, some peasants from the crowd suggested he give up his intentions and not insist on equal rights for the Jews, but take care of the interests of the Orthodox people, as whom he had been [elected to] represent. Apparently, he agreed as [he did] not talk about Jewish emancipation and amnesty on his departure for St. Petersburg on February 14.³⁰²

According to this police account, it took the peasant elector Lagno little time to adopt the idea of Jewish emancipation. Allegedly, Lagno's participation in the voting in the provincial capital, where other categories of electors met together to elect deputies from Kiev province, exposed him to this concept. However, his position toward equal rights of the Jews did not last long and disappeared upon the encounter with his fellow peasants.

Another episode took place at the Kamenka railway station in Chigirin county, when some 150 locals, up to thirty of whom were peasants and the rest were Jews, came to

³⁰² Report of the county police officer in Chigirin county. *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 353.

bid farewell to the deputy Ivan Krasiliuk.³⁰³ The dentist Leiba Leibshin – a Jew – called Krasiliuk [to support] the abolition of martial law and court-martials. The Jewish woman Esfir' Umanskaia asked the deputy to remember his native country and also the Jews and to make sure that pogroms like the Belostok one³⁰⁴ would not occur anymore. She put a paper ribbon on him and explained that it was from the people. Krasiliuk took off the ribbon; Umanskaia left.³⁰⁵ In these two Chigirin cases, the Jews in attendance revealed a forlorn hope that non-Jewish deputies would stand for the improvement of their plight. However, the ground for this hope was rather shaky. Ultimately, the liberals' intention to connect the national group – the Jews – and the social class – the peasants –worked out poorly on the peasant side. Jewish hope of cooperation did not last long.

Conclusion

The second national election campaign proved a challenging political experience for many all-Russian political parties as well as local groups and public organizations. The eight months between the dismissal of the First Duma and the opening of the second one saw the unswerving development of Russia's political landscape and its increasing diversification. Many disparate political forces emerged and entered national and provincial politics; some of the existing political parties and groups disintegrated. The government now had more experience in dealing with mass politics and met the electoral events better prepared,

³⁰³ Krasiliuk's last name was also spelled Kraseliuk. "Kievskaiia guberniia. Kraseliuk Ivan Nikitich" in M.M. Boiovich *Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy (portrety i biografii). Vtoroi sozryv. 1907-1912* (Moscow: Tipografiia T-va I.D. Sytina, 1907), 127.

³⁰⁴ The Belostok pogrom occurred on 1-3 June 1906, during the work of the First Duma. It claimed 70 Jews killed and 80 injured.

³⁰⁵ Report of the county police officer in Chigirin county. *Perepiska...* TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1350, l. 353.

exercising more sophisticated control over the electoral campaign and subtly influencing election results. Overall, Russia experienced a deepening political transformation, which led to more categories of the population being involved in shaping the fate of the country.

The Kadets, the political party that had enjoyed the support of the majority in Russia in the first elections, encountered multiple challenges in this transformed landscape. In the first elections, the Kadets had been the only legal party in opposition to the government, their chief task was to mobilize society to vote. They successfully channeled the oppositional mood of voters into support for their candidates and played an overarching role for disparate political center-to-left parties and groups, including those of ethnic and religious minorities. Now they had to deal with a more experienced audience at electoral meetings, the severe criticism of rival parties, and persecution by the government. With the leftist and rightist parties joining the electoral competition, the Kadets faced the prospect of competing with them for a large part of their former electorate. In some provinces, the Kadets even became the primary target for both the leftists and rightists, who blamed them for the setbacks of the First Duma. The Vyborg Manifesto brought another complication as it gave the government a useful tool to prosecute the prominent party members who had signed the document and thereby to remove them from the electoral competition. Therefore, the overall balance of power changed and became more complex.

In multiethnic Kiev province, the ethnic and religious diversity complicated the situation further. While the leftist presence in the province was relatively weak, the rightist parties managed to unite and entered the elections fully organized. Under these circumstances, Jews remained an important target audience for the Kadets. However, in the second elections, the unwavering Jewish support for the Kadets gave way to the

development of alternative political solutions of the Jewish question, with Zionist, cultural autonomist, and Social Democratic scenarios among them. The increasing politicization of the Jewish population transformed the nature of the Kadet-Jewish relationships. Therefore, the Kadets had to develop new approaches to mobilize the Jewish vote. However, over several months, from late summer through the end of 1906, the Kadets persisted in pursuing their sweeping supra-party unifying role. In the Jewish camp, this Kadet tactic contributed to the split between the Jewish liberals and the Zionists, which led to the disintegration of the Jewish League of Full Rights. The Kiev Kadets' search for allies resulted in their partnership with the Jewish People's Group and the Society of Non-Party Jewish Voters, which was hardly an impressive achievement. Summing up, until the Kadets strove to implement the strategy that had brought them success in the first campaign, they could not advance in their electoral preparations for the second elections.

For months the Kadets had desperately tried to organize a proper electoral campaign; their failure to legalize the party put an end to these attempts and forced the party to abandon their provincial and county activists in dealing with this problem. Ironically, the weakening of the Kadets made cooperation with them more attractive for some local organizations. The Kiev Kadets decided to use the opportunity and form electoral alliances with local groups and branches. This approach became their new tactic across the province. As a result, they gained several local allies in the Jewish camp – among them the Jewish Bund, which had undergone its own trying evolution within the Social Democratic camp. Most importantly, the cooperation between the Kadets and the Bund was the achievement of local activists, Jewish and Christian. Another outcome of the absence of a unified campaign was that at the county level, where the provincial electors

were elected, individual enthusiasm as well as personal ties remained the Kiev Kadets' only electoral resource. Those self-guided actions became a perfect illustration of what diverse local initiative could achieve even in the most difficult circumstances. Local activists coordinated the electoral campaign via secret gatherings, discussions in the disguise of charitable meetings, and spontaneous street conversations. The county municipal curia sent primarily oppositional electors – mostly Jewish – to the provincial elections, where they became a powerful leverage for the Kadets.

The Jewish Kadets provided an essential piece of electoral guidance to the Jewish voters that shaped the final profile of the deputies to the Duma from Kiev province. The electoral appeal of the Jewish People's Group that called on the Jews to support the peasants against the landlords was realized at the provincial elections. Forty-five Jewish electors gave their votes to the peasant candidates, which ensured the latter's victory. It remains open if the Jewish-peasant alliance could be sustainable. While some peasants could see Jewish emancipation as a part of the changes that the country needed, the majority of peasants did not approve their representatives' involvement in the resolution of the "Jewish question." The Jewish-peasant cooperation, although unilateral on the part of the Jews, showed that the Kadet plan to unite disparate parts of the population in Russia for a political purpose was feasible, although it was unsteady. In this sense, the fact that even with the majority of the deputies being peasants, the Kiev Kadets claimed victory in the provincial elections reflects their intention to build a united opposition.

The Kadets fostered their alliance with the Social Democrats on the national level, but their hopes for an interparty dialogue and a united oppositional front came true only in the peripheries as local blocs. In the city of Kiev, the Kadets succeeded in forming an

alliance with the Jewish Bund, which brought about their agreement with the Social Democrats. Essentially, Jewish activists played a key role in this. Consequently, the Kiev Kadets had a good chance to elect their candidate and rightfully felt strong. However, the Kadets' ambitious position had its repercussions. Seeing the leftist support as a fait accompli, they overlooked the ambitions of the weak Social Democrats. The Kiev Kadets stumbled in the elections in one city district, which eventually cost them the entire city. The Kadets' failure in Kiev reveals the subtle nature and complexity of electoral negotiations in the multinational borderlands. Fragility of electoral blocs could arise from different purposes of participating sides.

Overall, the case of Kiev province shows that in the borderlands, it was possible to achieve something that was not achievable in the capitals of the Russian Empire. The province functioned as an arena of cooperation and small local practical solutions to principal questions. Local politics mattered not only on a mass scale – for instance, for the mobilization of the local vote, forming electoral blocs, and shaping the rhetoric of the campaign, – but also on a more private level, when the personal will and drive of particular local residents influenced the outcome of the national historical processes and events, in particular, the makeup of the Russian Duma. Finally, diversity – ethnic and religious – possessed powerful potential for bringing large parties such as the Constitutional Democratic closer to the grassroots of society.

CHAPTER 3

ELECTORAL POLITICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1905 REVOLUTION. THE THIRD ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN, JUNE – OCTOBER 1907

On 3 June 1907, Nicholas II dismissed the Second Duma and unconstitutionally changed the electoral law. Russia faced the prospect of new national elections. The third election campaign followed closely after the first two; however, it differed from them in many respects. First, the country had undergone significant transformation since the tsar signed the October Manifesto in 1905. The political landscape became diversified and less fluid as political groups crystallized, many of which had developed steady alliances and hostilities. In summer 1907, all political actors had their electoral past and all of them were cognizant of the experience of the two previous Dumas, which they took into consideration while planning their participation in the third election campaign. The electoral process became more routine for voters as well as the authorities – the composition of voter lists, the distribution of political programs, the campaigning of parties, and even arrests of undesirable candidates were familiar features of the electoral practice. Second, the regime set a different time period for the electoral preparations, which was significantly shorter than the previous ones. If the dissolution of the First Duma had generated fears that the next elections might not occur at all, this time the government immediately announced the dates for the beginning of the voting rounds and for the convocation of the next Duma – September 1 and November 1, 1907, respectively.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ “Vazhnieishiia izvestiia,” *Riech*, 5 June 1907, p. 2. It was different from the period between the First and the Second Duma, when the government had announced the date for the convocation of the Duma, but did not set the date for the elections. Oppositional parties feared that the elections might not occur at all. See chapter 2.

Time became an important factor in the electoral preparations because political parties had only three months – from June through August 1907 – to develop and conduct their campaigns and form electoral blocs, if they chose to do so. Because of the short period that the government allocated for the campaign, the third electoral campaign was generally more straightforward. Local authorities had to immediately begin collecting data to compose new voter lists. Political parties and organizations had to decide whether to participate in the elections or boycott them, what electoral platform to propose, whether to include blocs and agreements in their general electoral strategy or make them on the spot, basing them on the unfolding balance of forces. There was little time for developing sophisticated electoral strategies and tactics, for collecting data from the provinces, and for conducting negotiations. Therefore, many participants preferred to outline briefly their platforms and then to get down to work. In these circumstances, political groups had to rely on existing and former ties with other groups and the electorate in the provinces.

In addition, the third electoral campaign commenced in an atmosphere of unfolding repressions. Not only did the police arrest the Social Democratic deputies and their colleagues in the capitals and across the country, but they also prosecuted many other former deputies and electors and even carried out mass arrests. In Kiev province, the police prepared to arrest two peasant deputies Dionisii Lagno and Ivan Krasiliuk on their way home. The latter noticed the police officers waiting at the Kamenka railway station, Kiev province, so he got off the train on the other side of the railway platform. This made no difference as Krasiliuk was arrested upon his arrival home.³⁰⁷ In Kiev, the newspaper

³⁰⁷ “Kiev, 8 iunia,” *Riech*, 5 June 1907, p. 3.

Riech’ reported, 130 searches and 100 arrests were made on the night of 5 June³⁰⁸ – just two days after the Duma was disbanded. In the following days, arrests took place across the province too. Strikingly, the popular reaction to the dissolution of the Duma was mostly indifferent – even more so than to the dismissal of the previous one. The press reported few episodes of indignation let alone resistance³⁰⁹ and assessed the overall popular reaction as insignificant.³¹⁰

The 3 June electoral law brought about a major change for the national elections; it introduced different rules of electoral competition with the aim to limit the representation of the opposition in the Duma. The new law inherited some features from its predecessor and altered others. The electoral procedures remained multistage, with the most complicated four-tier one for peasants and the most direct one for large landowners. On the whole, however, the law introduced principal changes. The overall number of Duma deputies fell from 524 (478 were elected to the Second Duma³¹¹) to 442. Of twenty-four major cities of the empire, only seven – St. Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw, Riga, Kiev, Lodz, and Odessa – retained the right to elect their own separate deputies. The new law redesigned the previously existing curias³¹² and reduced the representation of peasants,

³⁰⁸ “Oblastnoi otdel. Rospusk Dumy i provintsiiia,” *Riech*’, 9 June 1907, p. 3.

³⁰⁹ There were disorders in the Kiev engineering battalion (саперный батальон). There was no indication, however, that they were a reaction to the political events in the country. “Telegrammy. Kiev, 5 iunia,” *Riech*’, 5 June 1907, p. 2.

³¹⁰ Alfred Levin, *The Second Duma. A Study of the Social-Democratic Party and the Russian Constitutional Experiment* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1966), 342.

³¹¹ The number of deputies were smaller because elections in some localities did not take place or were cancelled by the administration on various pretext, usually when leftist deputies were elected. See chapters 1 and 2.

³¹² The number of categories of voters increased from four to five – the peasants, the landowners, the first and the second curias of urban residents, and the workers – electing their electors under/by different

workers, and urban residents, so that the final outcome was determined in favor of the conservative forces.³¹³ The proportion of electors at the final round – the provincial assembly where the deputies were to be elected – gave a consistent electoral majority to the nobility and the propertied classes. In particular, electors from the landowners and upper bourgeoisie numbered 3,382 as compared to 1,870 electors from other categories of voters, who would be more likely to elect oppositional candidates.³¹⁴ In other words, no matter what the number of oppositional electors, they would be almost always in the minority for the final vote.³¹⁵

This chapter explores how the local Kadet organization in Kiev province responded to the electoral challenge of the 3 June electoral law and shows how the Kiev Kadets mobilized the Jewish vote in circumstances that seemed extremely unfavorable to them. It argues that the persecution of the leftist parties by the provincial authorities determined both the Kiev Kadets' electoral failure in the province and their limited, but remarkable success in the city of Kiev. In their preparations for the elections, the Kiev Kadets managed to hold semi-legal party congresses and meetings and made electoral agreements with some Jewish, Polish, and Ukrainian political groups. However, to reach their voters, the Kiev Kadets needed to organize a broad electoral campaign, which the local authorities did not

procedures. *Vysochaishe utverzhdennoe polozhenie o vyborakh v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu, 1907 goda, iunia 3.*

³¹³ The provincial assembly of all electors of a particular province elected deputies to the Duma from this province; peasant and worker electors did not elect their own deputies anymore. *Vysochaishe utverzhdennoe polozhenie o vyborakh v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu, 1907 goda, iunia 3.*

³¹⁴ “Kiev, 18-go sentiabria 1907 g.,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 18 September 1907, p. 2.

³¹⁵ As the oppositional newspaper *Kievskaiia mysl'* challenged optimistic estimates of chances of electing an oppositional Duma, which some central newspapers offered: “The entire power of the 3 June law will work out only in the final stage of the electoral procedure.” “Shansy oppozitsii na vyborakh,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 21 September 1907, p. 2.

allow them to do. Although the regime severely weakened the Kiev Kadet organization and reduced the Kadets' electoral chances, it also unintentionally played into the Kadets' hands by affecting the balance within the opposition camp. Repressions also contributed to the reduction of rivalries among the Jewish parties and groups and shifted their attention from their political differences to the task of preventing the victory of "Black Hundred" candidates. Disagreements in the rightist camp, which potentially could give some electoral advantage to a leftist candidate, became the major theme that the oppositional press discussed with regard to the elections. Eventually, official policies unintentionally tipped the balance of Jewish support in favor of the Kadet candidate, Professor Ivan Luchitskii, who became one of two Duma deputies from the city of Kiev.

The structure of the chapter is the following. First, it will deal with the official attitude toward preparations for the elections and explain how the government used the electoral law as a tool to shape the electoral stage, continuously adjusting and readjusting it to its needs. The analysis of the electoral law will show how it worked in principle and how particular articles applied to the city of Kiev and Kiev province, which resulted in new electoral conditions. Then, the analysis of the Kadet campaign will fall into two parts – the activity of the central leadership and the Kiev Kadets' initiatives to mobilize the Jewish vote in the province, including their relationship with Jewish political groups. The chapter will also show how the split of the conservative forces influenced the course of elections in the city of Kiev. Finally, the chapter will summarize the "silent" campaign of the opposition, including the Kiev Kadets, and discuss the electoral results and the factors that contributed to them on a more general level. The conclusion will deal with some trends

common to the first three campaigns and with the role of the Kiev Kadets in provincial politics during 1905-1907.

The Government and the Kadets: The Trial of Strength in the New Settings

As soon as the Second Duma was disbanded, the government centered its preparations for the elections on achieving the most desirable electoral outcome and closed with confidence many doors that had been available to the Kadets and other oppositional parties. As, in contrast to the socialist parties, the Kadets did not carry out underground activities, they found themselves limited in their campaign to criticizing the electoral law and drawing support from those scattered resources that remained loyal to liberal values. Yet some official moves benefited the Kadet party in an unexpected way. The police focused on hunting down revolutionary parties, which often left the Kadets outside of the government's primary attack against the leftists. On the day of the dismissal of the Second Duma, the St. Petersburg police were openly watching the office of the Kadet faction of the Duma from outside. The message was clear – the Kadets were treated as “unreliable” (*neblagonadezhnye*). However, policemen did not conduct a search of the Kadet office as it did, for instance, that of the Laborist faction.³¹⁶ Therefore, while repressions greatly affected the Kadets, depriving them of minute possibilities to campaign and forcing them into inaction, they also removed their socialist rivals from the electoral race, thus unintentionally channeling the support of the second urban curia that revolutionary parties might have otherwise enjoyed to Kadet candidates.

³¹⁶ “К роспуску Gosudarstvennoi Dumy,” *Riech*, 9 June 1907, p. 2.

The authorities took an active part in the electoral preparations beyond the persecution of oppositional parties and their candidates and the ban of their electoral meetings. As before, the electoral law was replete with numerous juridical uncertainties, which provided the government with a wide variety of possibilities to interpret particular cases in its favor. This time, however, the law explicitly left it to the discretion of the government to determine many essential provisions, which the local authorities used to shape the specific electoral environment in each province. Consequently, the electoral scene was extremely fluid. It was not sufficient for the Kadets to be familiar with the electoral law to develop any coherent plan for electoral preparations. They had to wait for further instructions and clarifications on the part of the government, which, in turn, was not in any hurry to provide voters with concrete policy rulings on electoral arrangements. For instance, several articles of the electoral law entrusted the Minister of the Interior with splitting electoral curias into local divisions on various criteria in each province, if he found it expedient.³¹⁷ Most importantly, this principle gave the minister a useful tool to control the process of establishing electoral districts and their subdivisions in the provinces, including the division into nationalities curias in the provinces with ethnically mixed populations.³¹⁸

Local authorities played a key part in this process, because they suggested to the minister various schemes which would give even more electoral advantages to the rightist parties. They also continued their manipulations of voter lists, on various pretexts

³¹⁷ *Vysochaishe utverzhdennoe polozhenie o vyborakh v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu, 1907 goda, iunia 3.* Art. 29, 30, 35, 38. *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii. Sobranie Tret'e (1881-1913)*, vol. 27 (St. Petersburg, Gos. Tip., 1907), 324, 325.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.* Art. 29, 35.

excluding or conveniently losing the names of those voters who would likely support oppositional candidates. As the authorities gradually developed the terms and circumstances of elections – by including voters from several ethnicities into single non-Russian curias, by choosing a location for the elections in a town that was often inconvenient to access for the majority of voters of a county, or by informing voters late about the location of elections – the electoral balance kept changing against the opposition. Obviously, such constant shifting reduced the possibility for the Kadets to develop comprehensive electoral strategies and implement them consistently.

The new electoral law differed from the previous one in several respects. First, it favored propertied estates, since the proportion of electors from different social classes was designed to give the advantage to the landed nobility (*pomestnoe dvorianstvo*).³¹⁹ As a result, 65% of electors belonged to the well-to-do and educated classes. The electoral law revealed that the government had ceased to see the peasants as reliable (*blagonadezhnye*) and did not count on their universal support anymore. Thus, peasant representation was reduced from 42% to 22.5% of electors. The major increase occurred in the landowner curia – from 31% to 50.5%.³²⁰ While this shift towards the propertied classes was intended to enhance the rightist wing of the Duma, it also helped the Kadets, who lacked any mass following among the peasants, to compete with the leftists in some provinces. The Kadets, however, preferred not to discuss this point openly even in their general internal party

³¹⁹ Miliukov explained that the Third Duma received the name “barskaia” and “lakeiskia” for its social composition and for the desire of its majority to comply with the government. P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia, 1859 – 1917*, vol. 2 (New York: Izdatel'stvo imeni Chekhova, 1955), 8.

³²⁰ A.F. Smirnov, *Gosudarstvennaia Duma Rossiiskoi Imperii 1906-1917 gg.: Istoriko-pravovoi ocherk* (Moscow: Kniga i biznes, 2010): 339. “S. Peterburg. 8 iunia,” *Riech*, 8 June 1907, p. 1.

meetings and conferences. When this issue was raised, it was on rare occasions, usually voiced by the provincial press or provincial party members. One example occurred at the fifth congress of the Kadet party in October 1907 – that is, when the elections to the Duma had almost ended – when the Ekaterinburg delegate, L.A. Krol', openly admitted: “[We] have to win the sympathy of the populace because otherwise there is a danger that leftist parties will beat us, [which is] what would have occurred if it were not for the 3 June law.”³²¹ Although no one at the meeting refuted this conclusion, no one took up the theme in the discussion that followed. It is unclear whether party members were aware of this fact and hoped to lead the opposition nevertheless or they just could not do anything about it.

Another change affected municipal electors, whose percentage remained approximately the same; however, the new law grouped them differently. The urban residents, who had made up one voter category, were now divided into two. The first urban curia comprised the less numerous propertied voters and the second one – all other urban residents, except workers who . The percentage of electors from the less numerous voters of the first curia was higher,³²² which was all-important at the final stage of elections. This factor weakened the Kadets and enhanced the electoral chances of the rightists and Russian nationalists in cities and towns. The Kadets received a small advantage in the cities with separate representation – St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, and Riga – as the electoral law increased the number of apartment renters, who were eligible to vote within the second municipal category and who had often supported the leftists in the past two elections. A

³²¹ “Piatyi s’ezd. Otchet o vechernem zasedanii 24 oktiabria,” in *S’ezdy i Konferentsii Kostitutsionno-Demokraticheskoi Partii, 1908-1914*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000), 582.

³²² P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia, 1859 – 1917*, vol. 2 (New York: Izdatel’stvo imeni Chekhova, 1955), 11.

large part of the Jewish population also belonged to this category of voters and would potentially vote for Kadet candidates.

In addition, the government utilized the nationality question in its electoral agenda. The overall representation from the borderland provinces, where many non-Russians (*inorodtsy*) resided, decreased;³²³ ethnic minorities were deliberately given less power in the Duma. Poland and the Caucasus elected fewer deputies, while the population of Central Asia was completely deprived of electoral rights. In addition, the Minister of the Interior received the power to divide Russian and non-Russian voters of cities and towns into separate electoral curias in provinces with ethnically mixed populations.³²⁴ The local authorities were to determine the composition of nationality curias (*natsional'nye kurii*) and the number of electors that each curia elected, which the authorities employed with an eye to providing an advantage to Russian electors.

The electoral system for the cities with separate representation provided remarkably different prospects for oppositional parties and their candidates. The seven cities constituted a special (*osobyi*) electoral space with direct elections of Duma deputies. That is, urban voters directly elected two deputies from each city – except St. Petersburg and Moscow, which elected six and four, respectively. There were no preliminary stages or intermediate elections of electors or representatives like in the provincial elections, which meant that in those cities, oppositional parties faced an electoral competition which remained similar to the elections to the two previous Dumas. The major change lay in the

³²³ “Evreiskaia Narodania Gruppy,” *Riech'*, 13 September 1907, p. 3.

³²⁴ “Vysochaishe Utverzhdennoe Polozhenie o Vyborakh v Gosudarstvennuu Dumu. Article 35,” in *Gosudarstvennaia дума v Rossii v dokumentakh i materialakh*. Ed. F.I. Kalinychev (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1957), 363-364.

general division of the urban voters into two electoral curias instead of one. As in the rest of the constituencies, the first curia was made up of propertied urban voters; the second curia included the rest of eligible residents of the city.³²⁵ In the city of Kiev, the first curia numbered 2,324 voters and the second one – 16,911,³²⁶ the latter being seven times higher than the former. Each curia voted separately and elected one of two Duma deputies from the city.³²⁷ Therefore, although possibilities for conducting the electoral campaign were extremely limited in both the city of Kiev and the wider province, the outcome of the elections in the city was far from being predetermined. Monitoring of voter lists, negotiations and inter-party alliances, slogans and electoral promises acquired particular significance as now nuances mattered more than in the previous campaigns.

Changes in the electoral law affected not only the numbers of electors from various curias and principles of forming curias. The character of the elections became fundamentally different for oppositional parties, including the Constitutional Democrats, since they did not enjoy support among the propertied classes, and thus, the electoral competition was almost a lost cause for them. Other leftist parties recognized this fact too and had to decide whether to participate in the elections under the new rules. It did not take many of them long to conclude in favor of participation and proceed to developing their

³²⁵ See Art. 1, 5, 7 in “Vysochaishe utverzhdennoe Polozhenie o vyborakh v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu, 1907 goda, iunia 3,” *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii. Sobranie Tret'e (1881-1913)*, vol. 27 (St. Petersburg, Gos. Tip., 1907), 321-322. See also “Addendum to Art. 5,” *Ibid.*, 195.

³²⁶ “K vyboram v gosudarstvennuiu dumu. Chislo izbiratelei po g. Kievu,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 5 September 1907, p. 3.

³²⁷ Urban voters in these cities had to meet slightly more lenient [less rigid] requirements for the ballot papers, for which urban voters could use piece of papers, not necessarily official blanks. “K vyboram v gosudarstvennuiu dumu. K vyboram po Kievu,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 21 September 1907, p. 2. See also the analysis of the Instruction on the electoral procedure in the cities with separate representation in “Kiev. 16-go sentiabria 1907 g.,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 16 September 1907, p. 2.

electoral platforms. Since the new electoral law had deprived them of the opportunity to achieve an influential position in the future Duma, they looked for other meanings in their electoral preparations, which they quickly found. The Kadets chose to compete for the role of the opposition in the Duma, which Maksim Vinaver described as *reine Scheinung* (“a pure appearance”). Thus, during the electoral campaign, they aimed to publicize this goal among the populace. They called on voters to support their party as a way to express their disagreement with the government. Ideologically, the Kadets planned to criticize the 3 June electoral law and promote their political program among the masses.³²⁸ Thus, the Kadets preferred to use the electoral conditions that the government offered to them rather than protest against the new electoral law by boycotting the elections or by calling the country to disobedience, as they had done when they issued the Vyborg Manifesto in response to the dissolution of the First Duma. Therefore, the Kadet electoral campaign was transformed from being an electoral competition for participation in the parliamentary work of the Duma to being a contest to assume the mantle of parliamentary protest and resistance to the regime.

The attitude toward the dismissal of the Duma and the introduction of the new electoral law varied within society and brought about numerous discussions all over Russia. The oppositional press immediately termed the change of the electoral law a coup d'état.³²⁹ This interpretation has remained subject to debate since then; some scholars have hesitated

³²⁸ “N 104. Plenarnoe zasedanie TsK. 10-11 iunia [1]907 [g.],” in *Protokoly Tsentral'nogo Komiteta konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii, 1905-1911*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress-Akademiia, 1994), 206.

³²⁹ See S.A. Muromtsev, the legal scholar, the chair of the First Duma, and one of the authors of its Nakaz. S.A. Muromtsev, “Budushchee Dumy,” in *Stat'i i Riechi*, vypusk 5 (Moscow: Tip. Ob-va rasprostr. polezn. kn. Preemnik V.I. Voronov, 1910), 107-109.

to call the events of 3 June a coup because the previous regime remained in place and the Duma as a two-chamber parliament continued to enjoy the same rights.³³⁰ However, the Kadets treated the matter as a violation of the law. On June 7, 1907, the Central Committee along with party provincial representatives gathered in Terioki, Finland, to discuss whether the party should boycott the elections, whose legitimacy the Kadets questioned.³³¹ All attendees considered the electoral change unconstitutional, but the majority insisted that it was important to participate in the elections, since the Duma remained the center of political life in the country. Vinaver raised the concern that if the Kadets boycotted the elections, non-party voters would choose to join or support other parties, in which case “[the Kadets] [would] free [themselves] of responsibility, but also of [their] existence (*my osvobodimsia ot otvetstvennosti, no osvobodimsia i ot svoego sushchestvovaniia*).”³³²

The Terioki meeting resolved that the party would participate in the electoral competition as the elections would allow voters to express their attitude toward the regime by supporting the Kadet party. The meeting also outlined the theses of the Kadets’ electoral platform. Its general principle was to stick to the current party program and not to seek any allies either on the right or the left. In the provinces, technical electoral blocs – that is, only for electing particular candidates – were allowed. The attendees decided that a party

³³⁰ A.F. Smirnov, *Gosudarstvennaia Duma Rossiiskoi Imperii 1906-1917 gg.: Istoriko-pravovoi ocherk* (Moscow: Kniga i biznes, 2010): 339, 340.

³³¹ The Central Committee gathered on 7 June 1907 to develop its approach. Then, it convened the meeting with provincial representatives in Terioki, Finland, which resolved in favor of participation in the elections. “N 102. Zasedanie [TsK] 7 iunia [1907 g.],” in *Protokoly Tsentral’nogo Komiteta konstitutsionno-demokraticeskoi partii, 1905-1911*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress-Akademiia, 1994), 202-209. *S’ezdy i Konferentsii Konstitutsionno-Demokraticeskoi Partii, 1908-1914*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000), 532.

³³² “N 104. Plenarnoe zasedanie TsK. 10-11 iunia [1]907 [g.],” in *Protokoly Tsentral’nogo Komiteta konstitutsionno-demokraticeskoi partii, 1905-1911*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress-Akademiia, 1994), 206.

congress would soon – presumably no later than the end of August – be convened. It was supposed to develop and approve a more detailed electoral platform.³³³ However, the congress gathered only in late October 1907, when the electoral campaign was nearing its end. Its discussions naturally centered not on the elections, but on the Kadet tactics in the Third Duma.³³⁴ Thus, the resolution of the Terioki meeting became the guiding outline for the Kadet electoral campaign.

In their party press, the Kadets developed their position on the matter of the future elections and the Duma. The Kadets' attitude toward the 3 June electoral law defined their approach toward the future Duma. In doing so, they tried to find a balance between the fact that they did not accept a Duma whose composition would be defined by the controversial electoral law and their decision to participate in the elections. Thus, they announced that they did not seek a position of influence in a Duma which they did not see as a genuine parliament. The Kadets reasoned that if they lost the election, then they would at least remind the government and the country about the nation's constitutional aspiration, which they saw as a means to meet the needs of the people. In the case of an electoral victory, the Kadets intended to interpret it not as their adaptability to the arbitrary electoral law, but as proof that the country did not want to authorize the 3 June events.³³⁵

As to the cooperation with other parties, the Kadets criticized both of their political neighbors in the Duma – the Octobrists and the leftists. However, while they accepted the

³³³ *S'ezdy i Konferentsii Kostitutsionno-Demokraticheskoi Partii, 1908-1914*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000), 532.

³³⁴ "S'ezd k.-d.," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 26 October 1907, p. 4.

³³⁵ "St. Peterburg, 10 iunia," *Riech'*, 10 June 1907, p. 1.

possibility of an electoral alliance with the Octobrists depending on the course of future events, they rejected any notion of agreement on the left. The Kadets criticized their leftist colleagues in the Second Duma for being loyal to their dogma rather than parliamentary opportunities: “[Our] former ‘friends on the left’ ... revealed [their] hopeless inability for common sense and played into hands of the ‘conspirators’ on the right.” The Kadets dissociated themselves from the leftist parties and especially their non-parliamentary ways of doing politics. This statement echoed Stolypin’s attempts to have the Kadets denounce revolutionary terror. Thus, the Kadets separated themselves from allies, neighbors, and enemies and announced the purity of their program as their major value.

Even though the Kadets rejected alliances with other political parties in principle, they needed to establish partnership with other leftist parties to reach voters. The government policies that deprived the Kadets of the means to employ their traditional ways to campaign made the Kadets continue to discuss the importance of unity among various political forces as the only way for the opposition to express its discontent with the official policies. What they meant, of course, was the unifying support of voters for the Kadet party as the embodiment of the opposition. Thus, the Kadets shifted their focus from campaigning for a particular slate of candidates to promoting their strategy of resistance to the government via participation in the elections. However, this Kadet strategy ran contrary to other oppositional parties’ plans for elections. Because winning the elections was technically impossible, the leftists aimed to exploit this campaign as an opportunity to reach the masses. As a result, many if not all leftist parties did not actively seek any alliances; the question of unity did not appear on their electoral agenda. One by one, the oppositional parties announced that they would not build electoral alliances, but would

campaign separately. As a result, the Kadets cut themselves off from anything that their potential electoral partners could offer to them and chose to center their electoral campaign on enlightening the voters on the Kadet program. They had to admit that they were deprived of most legal means to achieve even this.

The position of the Kadet party was also aggravated by the fact that it entered the electoral campaign still not legalized. The law “On temporary rules about societies and unions,” which the government had issued on the eve of the election to the First Duma in March 1906, gravely affected the position of the Kadets later. During the second election campaign, the government refused to legalize the party, which became an aspect of the administrative pressure that it put on the Kadets. Shortly before the dismissal of the Second Duma, Prime Minister Stolypin raised the matter of the Kadet party’s legalization in his private discussion with the Kadet leader Miliukov. “[Stolypin] openly announced his condition: if the Duma denounce[d] revolutionary terror (*revolutsionnye ubiistva*), then he [was] prepared to legalize the Party of People’s Freedom [the Kadets],” Miliukov wrote in his memoirs.³³⁶ Had the Kadets acquiesced, this move would have meant that they had turned to support the government in its endeavors to stop the wave of terroristic attacks, which differed from criminal murders less and less. Miliukov explained that Stolypin’s move to make an agreement with the Kadets was his attempt to resist the attack from the right and save the Duma, which had found itself at an impasse with the government. Specifically, Stolypin wanted the Duma (with the support of the Kadet deputies) to lift the

³³⁶ P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia, 1859 – 1917*, vol. 1 (New York: Izdatel’stvo imeni Chekhova, 1955), 430.

immunity of Social Democratic deputies, whom he planned to arrest for treason.³³⁷ The Kadet deputies refused to support Stolypin without proper investigation by the Duma commission. After some hesitation and on the advice of the elder Kadet, Ivan Petrunkevich, Miliukov did not comply with Stolypin's request to publish a newspaper article condemning revolutionary terror. Thus, the government disbanded the Duma and arrested those Social Democratic deputies who had not gone into hiding yet;³³⁸ the Kadet party remained non-legalized. In February 1908, the Senate ultimately formally denied the Kadet party legalization.³³⁹

As a party whose *modus operandi* envisioned doing politics by constitutional means, the Kadets had suffered from their uncertain status since the second electoral campaign. During the third campaign, however, although the question of the Kadets' legalization was formally under consideration by the Senate, the authorities treated them not as a party that was in the process of application for legalization, but as one whose legalization had been turned down. Thus, the Kadets had to disguise their initiatives as those which ordinary voters organized, especially as the government increased its pressure on the Kadets. Most importantly, the party could not hold open party conferences and congresses,³⁴⁰ which made it difficult to hold the provincial party organizations together

³³⁷ On the decision and preparations to dissolve the Second Duma, see Alfred Levin, *The Second Duma. A Study of the Social-Democratic Party and the Russian Constitutional Experiment* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1966).

³³⁸ "K rospusku Gosudarstvennoi Dumy," *Riech'*, 5 June 1907, p. 3.

³³⁹ "S. Peterburg, 26 sentiabria," *Riech'*, 26 September 1907, p. 1. "Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskaia partiia," in *Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaiia tret' XX veka. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 268.

³⁴⁰ Beginning in September 1906, when the Minister of the Interior Stolypin refused to permit a Kadet party congress, party congresses took place illegally in Finland. This situation continued until March 1917.

and even renew credentials of its central committee. Some provincial and regional committees of the Kadets also faced challenges to their mandates, as the head of the Kiev Kadets, Professor Ivan Luchitskii, put it referring to the Kiev organization: “the provincial committee had overstayed its authority (*peresidel svoi polnomochiia*).”³⁴¹ In addition, the absence of official registration decimated the Kadet membership as the government prohibited state officials to be affiliated with a non-legalized political party. Those members who officially had to withdraw from the Kadet membership became less involved in the party. Their support became more ephemeral.

The Kadets expected that in multiethnic provinces, smaller national minorities’ groups and organizations would continue to support their candidates. This strategy stemmed from the experience of the two previous campaigns and was backed up by the party program’s assertion of the principle of equality of ethnic minorities. This time, by contrast, the Kadets did not explicitly advocate autonomy for Poland and Finland as in the previous campaigns, neither did they stipulate that other minorities were to be granted equality. Overall, they hardly advertised the matter of ethnic minorities’ rights in the third campaign. To be sure, even though the promise of autonomy to Poland disappeared from their electoral rhetoric, they did not change their attitude on the subject or consider it unimportant. As before, the Kadets continued to count on the support of national minorities, but now they did so quietly. They took alliances with them for granted; the plenary meeting of the central committee, which involved representatives from the provinces, concluded that “there are no obstacles to electoral blocs with the Poles, Jews,

³⁴¹ “N 107. [Plenarnoe zasedanie TsK. 18-19 avgusta 1907 g.],” in *Protokoly Tsentral’nogo Komiteta konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii, 1905-1911*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress-Akademiia, 1994), 222.

and Polish-Jewish bloc, however, those [blocs] are technical” and no special resolutions about them were necessary.³⁴² Thus, the Kadets preferred not to elaborate on this question, which seemed rather formal at that point given the pressing circumstances, but which would signify a serious shift in the Kadet general approach toward a more supranationality, empire-wide outlook five years later, in the fourth election campaign.

As an example, the major appeal that the Kadets addressed to the population of the empire did not contain any mention of national and religious minorities’ status. By late summer, the Kadets had issued a declaration which outlined their attitude toward the dismissal of the Second Duma and the 3 June electoral law and elaborated on the electoral goals of the party in the upcoming elections.³⁴³ Not once did the declaration refer to any nationality of Russia – be it Russian or Polish or Jewish – despite the fact that a new principle of national sections within electoral curia, which the electoral law had introduced, had become a matter of many electoral debates in provincial politics, including in the multiethnic western borderlands. Obviously, the declaration dealt with fundamental questions that the new electoral law had affected – the existence of the constitutional domain in the country and the role of the Duma – not with the particulars. The nationality principle did not apply to all the provinces; therefore, in the declaration that the Kadets

³⁴² “N 106. Plenarnoe zasedanie Tsentral’n[ogo] K[omite]ta v Moskve. 15-16/VII 1907 g.,” in *Protokoly Tsentral’nogo Komiteta konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii, 1905-1911*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress-Akademiia, 1994), 213. On August 19, Kolubakin suggested the plenary meeting should announce that electoral blocs between the Kadets, on the one hand, and religious and ethnic groups, on the other, were desirable; the meeting refused to issue a separate resolution about these blocs. *Ibid.*, 224.

³⁴³ “Obrashchenie TsK partii narodnoi svobody k izbirateliam pered vyborami v 3 Gos. Dumu,” GARF, f. 579, op. 1, d. 676, l. 1. It was published in *Riech’* and other newspapers. In Kiev province, see “Deklaratsiia k-d.,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 25 August 1907, p. 3.

intended to circulate across the country, they addressed the issues that they considered important for all Russia.

Despite its seemingly unifying style and intonation, the Kadet electoral declaration offered an extremely divisive description of the political scene. On the one hand, the declaration did not distinguish between some categories of voters, calling them “citizens, [who] belonged to the most democratic sections of the population” (*demokraticheskie sloi naseleniia*), “the toiling populace” (*trudiashcheesia naselenie*), or simply “the people” (*narod*). This was the camp into which the Kadets placed themselves and they promised to work in the Duma to overcome the political crisis in the country in the interests of the people. The names that the Kadet declaration used for the other, adversary side were the “upper classes,” the “old privileged classes,” the “upper landowning nobility” (*krupnye zemlevladel'tsy-dvoriane*), and the “bureaucracy.” The declaration accused them of arbitrary rule and pursuing of self-serving interests.³⁴⁴ Therefore, the Kadets suggested the division of the country on the class principle: the conservative self-serving ruling nobility versus the toiling masses. The central problem, of course, was that many Kadets, especially their leadership, did belong to the nobility and the majority of them did not belong to what they defined as the toiling masses. For the western borderlands, this declaration ran counter to some essential inter-ethnic electoral blocs, which local Kadets were contemplating, including with the Poles in Kiev province. For the Kiev Kadets, whose major electoral opportunities lay in cross-class alliances of ethnic groups, the approach that the declaration advocated was extremely counter-productive.

³⁴⁴ The declaration used several synonyms for these two accusations: *proizvol*, *beskontrol'noe khoziainichan'e*, *soslovnye i vladel'cheskie interesy*, and so on. Ibid.

The Kiev Kadets and the Jews: Unity through Isolation

The Kiev Kadets started electoral preparations by collecting resources available to them in the province, all the while being fully aware of the dire electoral prospects for themselves as well as other oppositional groups. The changes affected both the city and the province. The city of Kiev now selected two deputies instead of one. Yet the total number of voters fell from 26,000 in the previous campaign to around 19,000, with the major decrease occurring in the second curia, which affected the potential supporters of the Kadets. This decrease happened primarily because fewer – by 6,500 – apartment renters applied for participation in the elections.³⁴⁵ In Kiev province, according to the timetable (*raspisanie*) that accompanied the electoral law, the number of electors was 150, which was a significant drop from 234 in the two previous campaigns.³⁴⁶ The decrease occurred in the peasant, workers' and urban curias; only the number of electors from the landowners increased slightly, from 74 to 78. Now, the peasants chose 36 electors instead of 80, the workers – 5, rather than 9. The total number of urban electors fell from 71 to 31, with the first urban curia now electing 16 and the second one – 15.³⁴⁷ Like the urban curias in the city of Kiev, the first urban curia in the province was less numerous, comprising 8,060 voters; 40,613

³⁴⁵ “Telegrammy. Kiev, 13 avgusta,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 14 August 1907, p. 2. *Riech'* indicates the same total number for the previous elections: 26,000 voters of the first and second urban curias. For the first urban curia in the third elections, the newspaper gives 2,312 voters. The number of voters in the second curia should be higher than in the first; therefore, 1,700 voters in the second urban curia, according to *Riech'*, is clearly a typographical mistake. Instead, 17,000 sounds more realistic and corresponds to the data of *Kievskaiia mysl'*. “Telegrammy. Ot nashikh korrespondentov. Kiev, 13 avgusta,” *Riech'*, 14 August 1907, p. 2.

³⁴⁶ “Izbitatel'naia kampaniia,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 7 September 1907, p. 9. Local newspapers also published the structure of electoral curias in provinces. See, for instance, “Raspisanie chisla gubernskikh vyborshchikov,” *Kievskie otkliki*, 8 (21) June 1907, p. 3.

³⁴⁷ “Niekotorye itogi izbitatel'noi kampanii po kievskoi gub.,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 27 September 1907, p. 1.

voters made up the second one.³⁴⁸ Thus, the 78 electors from the landowner curia, considered to have a conservative outlook, made up the absolute majority at the final stage of the provincial elections because the rest of the electors altogether numbered 72.³⁴⁹ Overall, by comparison with the previous elections, the Duma representation of Kiev province decreased; Kiev voters now elected not 15, but 13 deputies. The Kadet *Riech'* stated that Kiev province remained “the most hopeless in the sense of opposition” and even questioned the expediency for the government to reduce the number of deputies who had been supportive of the regime in the previous campaign and would likely be the rightist candidates in the elections to the Third Duma.³⁵⁰

As was the case with their colleagues in many other provinces, the Kiev Kadets' attempts to organize public meetings or party gatherings met constant administrative pressure. In late September, *Kievskaiia mysl'*, summarizing the empire-wide character of official repressions, would report that the difference between the capitals and the provinces disappeared as the government prohibited electoral meetings in the capitals too.³⁵¹ Provincial party organizations weakened so severely that the central committee sent out its representatives to the provinces to coordinate and most of all organize some basic electoral activities instead of giving public lectures.³⁵² While the Kiev Kadets discussed possible

³⁴⁸ “Kiev, 24 sentiabria 1907 g.,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 24 September 1907, p. 1.

³⁴⁹ “Izbitatel'naia kampaniia,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 7 September 1907, p. 9.

³⁵⁰ “Predstavitel'stvo ot gubernii po zakonu 3 iunia,” *Riech'*, 5 August 1907, p. 1.

³⁵¹ “Kiev, 18-go sentiabria 1907 g.,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 18 September 1907, p. 2.

³⁵² In the minutes, these representatives were called “gastrolery-organizatory.” “N 108. Tsentr[al'nyi] K[omite]t. 20/VIII [1]907 [g.],” in *Protokoly Tsentral'nogo Komiteta kostitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii, 1905-1911*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress-Akademiia, 1994), 225-226.

electoral strategies at their few party meetings, they could do little to promote the elections even among their loyal supporters, let alone to mobilize broader voters' support. In early September, the reports submitted by delegates, who returned from the provinces, to the Kadet central committee described a picture of fragmented and suppressed Kadet organizations in many localities, including Kiev province. The delegate to Poltava and Kiev provinces, Nikolai Chernenkov, reported about the existence of student Kadet factions at the Kiev Polytechnical Institute and St. Vladimir University, but assessed the Kiev regional organization to be weak and disconnected with the Southwestern Region and Kiev province.³⁵³ Therefore, because the Kiev Kadets could not organize a general campaign in the province, the activity of smaller political parties and organizations that were interested in supporting Kadet candidates became the Kiev Kadets' essential resources. In contrast to the general approach that the Kadet electoral declaration preached, that is, unite voters, not parties, electoral blocs with local ethnic groups and national minorities' political parties – Jewish, Polish, and Ukrainian – became a key strategy of provincial politics.

For the Kiev Kadets, Jewish voters remained an important resource in the electoral competition. In their quest for Jewish support, the Kiev Kadets had relied on their Jewish members in the two previous campaigns; this time Jewish liberals were also indispensable to the Jewish-Kadet cooperation. Beside Jewish liberals affiliated with the Kadet party, there were no other practical connections between the Kadet party and Jewish voters. However, it was not easy to utilize even this link, because hardly any campaigning was

³⁵³ “N 109. 9/IX [1]907 [g.],” in *Protokoly Tsentral'nogo Komiteta konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii, 1905-1911*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress-Akademiia, 1994), 227.

possible for the opposition. The Kadets consciously hoped that voters still remembered the previous campaign and Kadet slogans and calls – in other words, the work that Jewish members of the Kadets had conducted in 1905 and 1906.

The rich heritage of this past work included close ties, relationships, and agreements, but also acute rivalries and organizational problems. As we have seen, the Jewish liberals' project of uniting the Jewish people under the banner of the above-party Jewish League³⁵⁴ had worked well in mobilizing the Jewish vote to support the Kiev Kadets in the first election campaign. Signs of a rift within the League was already showing at that stage; a crisis developed and prevented the organization from being instrumental in the second campaign. Jewish liberals saw the Jewish League's mission as uniting *individuals* and therefore they could not put up with the policy of the Zionists, who preferred to work as a separate *organization* within the Jewish League.³⁵⁵ Jewish liberal activists continued to work as members of the League; their personal initiative remained the driving force of the Kadet campaign within the Jewish camp, where more parties and groups emerged. At the later stages of the second campaign, the Kiev Kadets had to agree to partner with the Jewish Bund and thereby received access to Jewish workers, although they were not numerous in Kiev province and their electoral support was not decisive as was that of Jews in the urban curia. In other words, the Kadets' attempts to serve as an umbrella organization for the Jewish electorate did not work as they had hoped; the Kadets had to deal with emerging Jewish political groups rather than rally the support of the voting masses. The

³⁵⁴ The Jewish League for the Attainment of Full Rights of the Jewish People in Russia.

³⁵⁵ "Iz zhizni Evreiskoi Narodnoi Gruppy," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 7 June 1907, pp. 25, 26.

increased politicization of the Jewish population was to a great extent the outcome of the Kadets' previous enlightening electoral efforts.

By the end of the second campaign in early 1907, the burgeoning and diversifying Jewish political camp had represented several organizations, some of which were undergoing a process of political divorce and regrouping. Even the Jewish liberals, who gravitated towards the empire-wide Kadet party, organized themselves into a separate Jewish organization, to be sure, a group, not a party. The remnants of the Jewish League, which liberals Maksim Vinaver and Genrikh Sliozberg had united in the non-party Jewish People's Group in January 1907, became the Kadets' main partner in the third campaign.³⁵⁶ This organization was weak and was virtually reduced to its central committee. It had its individual followers in the provinces of the Pale of Jewish Settlement, who were often members or supporters of local Kadet party organizations. During the work of the Second Duma, the Jewish People's Group focused on collecting data on the existing Jewish legislation in Russia, analyzing all legislative initiatives in the Duma from the Jewish perspective, and developing legal (*iuridicheskie*) documents for future discussions of the Jewish question in the Duma.³⁵⁷ In other words, the Jewish People's Group advocated parliamentary means of achieving Jewish emancipation and entered the third election campaign to mobilize the Jewish vote to support the Kadets.

The Kiev Kadets did not seek to resume their electoral partnership with either the Bund or Russian Social Democrats, which as revolutionary parties were among the main

³⁵⁶ Other members of the Central Committee of the Jewish People's Group were M.I. Kulisher, M.I. Sheftel', G.A. Gol'dberg, M.L. Gol'dshtein, and others. "Iz zhizni Evreiskoi Narodnoi Gruppy," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 15 September 1907, p. 23.

³⁵⁷ "Iz zhizni Evreiskoi Narodnoi Gruppy," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 7 June 1907, p. 26.

targets of the sweeping repressions that the government unleashed in summer 1907 and later, during the elections to the Third Duma in September and October. The Bund, in turn, restored its relationship with the Russian Social Democrats and focused on its engagement in the revolutionary camp. Both the Social Democrats and Kadets decided to conduct independent campaigns. Former members of the disintegrated Jewish League – the Zionists, the Folkspartei, and the Jewish Democratic Party – also prepared to conduct electoral preparations separately. During summer 1907, the government's policies reduced the Kadets' activity to several small pockets of internal party discussions. However, they also brought some unexpected advantages for Jewish liberals as well as other Jewish organizations. By banning any broad public electoral discussions, which often brought programmatic nuances and technical details to the fore, the regime removed essential points of discord in the oppositional camp, including its Jewish part. Therefore, it became easier for Jewish liberals to develop their own electoral discussions without participating in communal disagreements.

Repressions returned electoral tasks to a more basic level. While the first and the second electoral campaigns had witnessed a steady increase in the sophistication of the electoral rhetoric and diversification of the Jewish political camp, the June 3 regime made Jewish groups articulate and voice their political goals in general terms, coming back to fundamental demands, as opposed to the second campaign when the Jewish liberals had been unable to find common ground with the Zionists. As a result, the Zionists' strategy became closer to that of the Jewish People's Group. In particular, both organizations strove to mobilize the Jewish vote, elect as many (of the few possible) Jewish deputies as possible, and support progressive candidates. What the Jewish People's Group could not agree with

in the Zionists' electoral platform was their requirement for the Jewish candidate to promise to work in the Jewish parliamentary group in the Duma to lobby for Jewish interests.³⁵⁸ Many Jewish liberals were affiliated with the Kadet party and thus preferred to work on the Jewish question in the Duma committees on empire-wide questions such as equality of citizens, rather than participating in autonomous national minorities groups in the Duma. As the new electoral law eliminated any possibility for Jewish voters to elect a Jewish deputy from Kiev province, it unintentionally lessened the tension in the debates within the Jewish electorate as to whether to vote for a Jewish or a progressive candidate. This benefitted the Kadets, as a Kadet candidate would be the most likely alternative for Jewish voters. As for the Bund, it accepted electoral alliances as exceptions and decided to consider electoral blocs only with oppositional parties; the Kadets were their last choice even if Black Hundred candidates became the favorites to win the elections.³⁵⁹ Thus, all Jewish parties and groups called on the Jews to unite and vote in unison for a Jewish candidate, but they worked as separate political teams.

Of all the parties and political organizations, the Jewish People's Group was the only one that openly advocated voting for progressive candidates, be they Jewish or not, at the provincial assembly. This electoral concept came from its headquarters in St. Petersburg. The group's electoral preparations were also initiated from the center down to the provinces of the Pale. The Central Committee of the Jewish People's Group convened two major regional meetings in the Pale – in the cities of Kiev and Vil'na – to develop a plan for the electoral campaign. The regional meeting in Kiev took place in the early stages

³⁵⁸ "Izbiratel'naia kampaniia," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 19 July 1907, p. 11.

³⁵⁹ "Izbiratel'naia kampaniia," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 19 July 1907, p. 12.

of the electoral campaign, in late June 1907 – just a few weeks after the Duma had been dismissed. Representatives of the Jewish People’s Group from Kiev, Volyn’, Podol’e, and Poltava provinces agreed to organize a network of electoral committees which would direct electoral preparations along two principles – first, to mobilize the Jewish vote to elect as many Jewish electors as possible and, second, to elect those Jewish electors who would support progressive candidates at the final stage. The meeting resolved that in each province activists of the Group would organize a Provincial Committee, which would coordinate all subordinate electoral committees on negotiation and nomination of Jewish candidates in counties and would also make decisions regarding electoral blocs with political parties as well as curias and other groups of voters. The Committee’s decisions regarding the voting strategy in the final stage of elections would be mandatory for provincial electors.³⁶⁰ Thus, the central leadership of the Jewish People’s Group defined the main principles of its electoral campaign, while provincial activists developed strategies to carry out the campaign. Significantly, Kiev province received special attention at the regional meeting. As the city of Kiev was to elect separate deputies to the Duma, it was resolved that the procedure for establishing the Provincial Committee in Kiev province would depend on local circumstances and could be different from that of other provinces of the Pale.³⁶¹

Therefore, Kiev members of the Jewish People’s Group were dependent on their own electoral devices. However, the authorities limited electoral possibilities for campaigning and gradually eliminated them totally. Most importantly, the government

³⁶⁰ “Iz zhizni Evreiskoi Narodnoi Gruppy,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 5 July 1907, p. 24.

³⁶¹ “Iz zhizni Evreiskoi Narodnoi Gruppy,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 5 July 1907, p. 24.

refused to legalize the Group. Like the Kadets, the Jewish People's Group could not convene electoral meetings and had to rely at best on the press, which had limited influence because the fines that the authorities diligently imposed on local periodicals and the arrests of their editors made the newspapers self-censor their publications. Thus, provincial newspapers preferred avoiding many election-related topics.³⁶² The Jewish press often featured electoral discussions around the question of boycott, which in fact was the question of participation in disguise. Jewish liberals re-published and analyzed many of these discussions in their periodicals. Both the original publications and their analytical reviews now centered on the dilemma – why should Jewish voters go to the polls when it was clear that the 3 June electoral law made it impossible to elect a Jewish deputy to the Duma?³⁶³ Jewish parties – similarly to Russian oppositional parties – had already rejected the idea of a boycott and planned to educate the masses on politics, promote their political programs, and to win the first round of elections for mobilizing purposes, even if victory was not possible in the final round.

Themes of anti-Semitism and “Black Hundred” danger became a key part of the electoral rhetoric of Jewish liberals. They called on Jews to support Russian progressive elements in order to elect an oppositional Duma: “every Jewish vote is a vote against a Black Hundred candidate and for a progressive candidate.” They also indicated that Jewish deputies in the upcoming Duma would be few, hence, it was important to elect the ablest Jews, those who were most prepared to advocate the Jewish cause in the presence of

³⁶² “Izbiratel'naia kampaniia,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 19 July 1907, p. 10.

³⁶³ “Izbiratel'naia kampaniia,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 19 July 1907, p. 7.

hundreds of anti-Semites.³⁶⁴ To achieve this goal Jewish liberals suggested that all Jews unite their electoral efforts, leaving party disagreements behind. They proposed to elect Jewish candidates who would meet two criteria. A Jewish candidate should be a democrat and defend the interests of all Jews of Russia in the Duma, not “his narrowly national sectarian doctrine” (*uzko-natsional’naia sektantskaia doktrina*).³⁶⁵ Thus, the electoral tactics that Jewish liberals proposed within the Jewish camp remained generally the same as in the previous campaigns: Jews of all political affiliations should unite to support a Jew who would defend the human and civil rights of the Jews and their right to national self-determination; alternatively, they should unite to support a progressive non-Jewish candidate who would be able to do the same. The new feature of the current campaign was that they raised the spectre of the anti-Semitism of the Russian rightist parties to unite Jewish voters.

Jewish liberals called on Jews to see the possibility for electoral alliances with new partners and suggested working on small practical goals. For instance, they suggested considering a partnership with Polish landowners in the Northwestern and Southwestern Regions. As the new electoral law reduced Polish representation in the Duma, the infringement on their national interests looked like a good basis for cooperation between the Poles and the urban voters in the provinces of the Pale, including numerous Jews. According to the periodical *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, Polish landowners had more lands in their possession than did Russian ones in the provinces of the Pale, with few exceptions such as Kiev province, where Russian landowning elements possessed 59% of the lands and Poles

³⁶⁴ “Izbiratel’nyi lozung,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 28 June 1907, pp. 1-2.

³⁶⁵ “Izbiratel’nyi lozung,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 28 June 1907, p. 2.

– 34%. However, even in Kiev province, Polish landowners outnumbered Russian ones. In Uman’ county, there were 22 Russian and 50 Polish landowners,³⁶⁶ in Tarashcha – 28 Russian and 57 Polish landowners, in Lipovets – 36 Russian and 85 Polish landowners,³⁶⁷ in Skvira – 28 Russian and 53 Polish landowners.³⁶⁸ Therefore, the suggested alliance between the urban residents and Polish landowners would build upon the national grievances of the Poles, who might forgo their class interests to support oppositional candidates.

However, anti-Semitic attitudes were present not only among the Russian rightists. The discussion of anti-Semitic moods among Polish liberals unfolded in Jewish newspapers such as the Bundist *Folkszeitung*. Yet the Jewish liberal press ignored the anti-Semitism of the Poles. They continued to explore what an alliance with the Poles could offer. In particular, they pointed to a Jewish-Polish bloc as the lesser evil in view of the fact that not only Russian landlords, but also some Russian peasants would likely elect Black Hundred and rightist electors. On the other hand, they hoped that “the [Russian] bureaucracy [would] take care that the Poles remain in the ranks of the opposition.” Therefore, as the electoral law favored the conservative elements, the Jewish liberals saw the split between Russian and Polish landlords as the only electoral hope for the Jews.³⁶⁹

The idea that the Russian and Polish landlords might come to the elections separately was neither naïve nor groundless. The Russian rightists, who formed an electoral

³⁶⁶ “K segodniashnim vyboram. Vybory ot zemlevladel’tsev,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 24 September 1907, p. 2.

³⁶⁷ “K vyboram v Gosud. Dumu,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 5 July 1907, p. 10.

³⁶⁸ “Skvira,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 10 August 1907, p. 4.

³⁶⁹ “Izbitatel’naia kampaniia,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 19 July 1907, p. 10-11.

bloc as early as the beginning of July,³⁷⁰ were deeply divided on whether they should pursue an alliance with the Polish landlords. The oppositional *Kievskaiia mysl'* reported debates on this matter that unfolded during the Congress of Russian voters of the Southwestern Region, at which the Kiev rightists gathered on 5 and 6 September. Those who advocated an electoral partnership with the Poles gave two reasons for it – first, the hostile attitude of the peasants toward the landlords and, second, the autonomist movement among the Ukrainians. “What will happen to us [Russian landlords] in the future, if their aspirations are realized?” asked a participant at the congress. The opposite side warned the congress against any alliances with ethnic minorities, no matter what their political outlooks were. They called on the Russians to become the only true masters of the Southwestern Region.³⁷¹

The position of some presenters fell in between these two extremes as they supported cooperation with those Poles who did not pursue the autonomy of Poland. A journalist at the rightist newspaper, *Kievlianin*, Anatolii Savenko, who had spoken against the electoral bloc with the Poles earlier at the congress, allowed that he was personally acquainted with some “truly Russian Poles” (*istinno-russkie poliaki*), with whom he agreed to partner in the electoral competition. On the same note, he suggested “spreading truly Russian views among the Poles.” In the hope that of two options – a bloc with the peasants or the Russian landlords, – the Polish landlords would choose to support the latter, the

³⁷⁰ See the analysis of the rightist meetings later in this chapter.

³⁷¹ “Oblastnoi s’ezd ‘russkikh izbiratelei iugo-zapadnago kraia,’ ” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 7 September 1907, p. 3.

congress resolved to form a bloc with those Poles who, in turn, supported the Russian landlords and did not pursue the autonomy of Poland.³⁷²

Therefore, the Polish landlords gained considerable attention in the debates of the Jews and the Russian landowners. Both groups observed closely to see which side the Polish voters of the landowner curia would prefer. In turn, the Polish side continued to debate what electoral tactic it should undertake. On 10 August, *Kievskaiia mysl'* reported on two meetings of representatives of Polish large landowners of the Southwest that took place in Kiev in late July and early August. Participants spoke against the idea of autonomy for Poland and refuted the program of the Polish *kolo* – the Polish faction in the Duma. They advocated the equality of rights for Poles and called on them to cooperate with the Russians in defending the state interests.³⁷³ On 1 and 2 September, Kiev hosted “a congress of delegates of Polish voters of Lithuania and Ukraine.” It gathered to develop an electoral platform and the policies platform for the Polish deputies in the future Duma.³⁷⁴ There was no indication that these Polish delegates would choose to align with the Russian opposition.³⁷⁵

³⁷² “Oblastnoi s’ezd ‘russkikh izbiratelei iugo-zapadnago kraia,’ ” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 7 September 1907, p. 3.

³⁷³ Count Mikhail Tyshkevich (Tyszkiewicz) and Count Olizar chaired the meetings. “Khronika. Soveshchanie pol’skikh zemlevladel’tsev,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 10 August 1907, p. 3.

³⁷⁴ “K vyboram v gosudarstvenniiu dumu. S’ezd delegatov ot pol’skikh izbiratelei Litvy i Ukrainy,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 5 September 1907, p. 3.

³⁷⁵ By contrast, the Poles in St. Petersburg contemplated an alliance with the Kadets. However, those Poles were mostly professionals, rather than landlords. On 14 September 1907, a meeting of Polish voters in St. Petersburg agreed that as the electoral law reduced the representation of Poles, the latter should seek the support of the Russian progressive deputies in the Duma. Therefore, the Poles should support those candidates in the elections. “Russkaia zhizn’. Vybory,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 18 September 1907, p. 3.

Besides the Polish landlords, Jewish liberals drew the attention of Jewish organizations to the Orthodox clergy, whose political preferences, they observed, were mixed. Because Article 62 of the 3 June electoral law moved many peasants who had previously been qualified to vote in the petty landowner category³⁷⁶ into the peasant curia, the priests found themselves in the majority in the petty landowner category in many provinces. In Kiev province, the petty landowners included 1,327 Orthodox priests out of a total of 5,032. The percentage of the clergy was high in this category across most counties; in some cases, the priests made up an absolute majority in preliminary county assemblies.³⁷⁷ Jewish liberals saw some good signs in the fact that the rightist press reported on deviations from monarchist preferences in the mood of the Orthodox priests.³⁷⁸ The hope was that at the final stage, the priests' vote might tip the electoral scale in favor of oppositional candidates. A similar desperate idea was expressed regarding Russian landlords – that several landlords might vote for an oppositional candidate if they saw that the opposition was united.³⁷⁹ Consequently, Jewish liberals looked not for major blocs and alliances, but for small cracks in the monarchist camp. However, they could hardly do anything to widen those cracks, beyond watching whether their calculations were correct.

Besides the Jewish activists who were involved in the Jewish People's Group, the Kiev Kadets potentially had another partner in the Jewish camp – the Society of Non-Party Jewish Voters. In the second campaign, its leadership's very reserved approach to electoral

³⁷⁶ The categories of large and petty landowners were based on the size of their landholding.

³⁷⁷ Preliminary county assemblies of small land owners chose delegates to the land owners assemblies. The latter then selected electors from all land owners. See *Table 2*.

³⁷⁸ "Izbiratel'naia kampaniia," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 16 August 1907, p. 10.

³⁷⁹ "Izbiratel'naia kampaniia," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 7 September 1907, p. 10.

preparations helped it secure a licence from the local police to hold electoral meetings. This time, however, the authorities viewed things differently. In late July, a group of Jewish professionals who had stood very close to the Kadets in the previous campaigns and who would potentially support this party in the third elections unsuccessfully attempted to begin campaigning by resuming the work of the Society of Non-Party Jewish Voters.³⁸⁰ The Society's leadership – lawyers M. Mazor and I.P. Kel'berin, and doctors M.I. Aleksandrov, G.B. Bykhovskii, and M.S. Frenkel', many of whom had been members of the Jewish League of Full Rights less than two years earlier – applied for an official permit to legally reregister the society. They received a refusal; the official explanation for it sounded paradoxical: “the activity of the society is one of the ways to conduct the electoral campaign (*est' odnim iz sposobov predvybornoi agitatsii*).”³⁸¹ The refusal itself and the reason that the officials offered revealed the fundamental principle that the authorities followed in handling the preparations for the elections to the Third Duma. Even though the government was organizing national elections, it did not follow from it that campaigning was permitted in principle. For the Kiev Kadets this meant that even those local technical solutions that had worked in the second campaign were not available to them anymore. The authorities strictly regulated and banned any activity that oppositional groups might plan.

The example of the Society of Non-Party Jewish Voters, whose attitude toward electoral discussions had never been ideologically charged, confirmed this thesis. The Society was established in the midst of the electoral competition within the Jewish camp

³⁸⁰ The Statute of the Society specified that the registration of the Society should be resumed for every electoral campaign.

³⁸¹ “К выборам в госуд. Думу. Отказ от легализации общества беспартийных евреев избиратели,” *Kievskaia mysl'*, 19 July 1907, p. 2.

in the first electoral campaign and was a weaker rival of the Jewish League. Later, in the second campaign, it remained the only officially registered political organization that supported the Kadets without, however, advocating their program directly.³⁸² Its modest electoral goals – to organize the Jews to participate in the elections to the Second Duma – and the self-imposed time limit of its activity to January-February 1907 helped Jewish activists in Kiev to secure its legalization. Unlike the Kiev Kadets and the Jewish League for the Attainment of Full Rights of the Jewish People, the leadership of the society limited electoral discussions to organizational issues only and was quite careful not to discuss even the names of potential candidates, let alone political parties the Jews might support. Nevertheless, it did not secure the local authorities' trust in summer 1907. In other words, no matter what kind of preparations the oppositional groups organized, the authorities preferred keeping the electoral field clear of political discussions that were not initiated by the pro-government or rightist forces.

The Setup of the Electoral Stage

While regulating electoral activities in the province, the local administration also worked to compose electoral lists, which became another point of contention between the leftist parties and the authorities. Because the new electoral law gave lower representation to many potential supporters of oppositional parties, the electoral value of every such vote increased. In late June and almost all of July, the town and county councils (*upravy*) prepared and submitted data on the voters to the provincial electoral committees. Some

³⁸² The Jewish Bund was the other ally of the Kiev Kadets in the Jewish camp. As it was a revolutionary party, it campaigned illegally.

categories of voters – such as tax-exempt apartment renters – were supposed to apply to be included in the lists. The press reported that many of them could not submit their applications as the Kiev police refused to issue various documents such as certificates of authority (*doverennosti*) on the pretext that the special instruction on the elections did not specify the procedure.³⁸³ These and similar complications of the application procedure discouraged many eligible voters from applying for enrolment on the lists. In the counties of Kiev province, some town councils did not deliver lists of residents to the electoral committees at all.³⁸⁴ Some people lost their right to vote due to organizational problems, which arose when the heads of town and zemstvo councils as well as railway offices did not meet the deadline of 25 July for submitting the lists of their subordinates to have them included in voter lists. For instance, this was the reason for which twelve employees of the Kiev technical railway college were disqualified from voting in the second urban curia.³⁸⁵ Some technical issues also affected the number of voters in the province. In particular, the provincial printing office sent out the issue of *Kievskiiia Gubernskiiia Vedomosti* with voter lists across to provincial towns one week later than the date of the issue. This reduced the period during which voters could apply for any changes to the lists, thus affecting the number of urban voters in the seven of twelve counties of Kiev province.³⁸⁶

By the end of July, the local authorities had completed most voter lists. The decrease in the number of urban voters was even more dramatic than the electoral law

³⁸³ “K vyboram v Gosud. Dumu,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 5 July 1907, p. 11.

³⁸⁴ “Izбирatel’naia kampaniia,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 19 July 1907, p. 9.

³⁸⁵ “Lishenie izbiratel’nykh prav,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 18 August 1907, p. 3.

³⁸⁶ In the counties of Kiev, Vasil’kov, Lipovets, Radomysl’, Uman’, Cherkassy, and Zvenigorodka. “K vyboram v gosud. dumu. Sokrashchenie sroka dlia obzhalovaniia spiskov izbiratelei,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 3 August 1907, p. 3.

envisioned. In Kiev county, the number of voters in both municipal curias was about 3,680 (680 in the first and 3,000 in the second), which was lower by 496 people than in the voter lists for the second elections.³⁸⁷ In the county town of Skvira, the total number of urban voters was 3,916 – 833 voters in the first and 3,083 in the second curias, which was 212 fewer than in the second elections.³⁸⁸ Overall, the number of urban voters in Kiev province declined by 56% compared to the previous campaigns.³⁸⁹ The total number of urban voters in the province was 40,613.³⁹⁰ Jewish liberals blamed these and similar moves of local administrations, along with the 3 June electoral law, for the decrease in the municipal curias, which had a snowball effect and contributed to the indifference of voters, many of whom gave up on the elections even before the campaign began.³⁹¹ The non-Jewish oppositional press offered similar explanations.³⁹²

Therefore, in June and July 1907, political parties and groups tried to orient themselves in the transformed electoral scene and come up with workable campaign strategies. It was a difficult task for the leftist parties to plan ahead as the electoral law left it to the government to determine numerous particulars of the electoral preparations. As oppositional parties expected, provincial authorities would use their power to further

³⁸⁷ “Pechatanie spiskov,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 21 July 1907, p. 2.

³⁸⁸ Only one holder of the pension and none of the renters of the tax-exempt apartment applied for voting. In comparison, in the second campaign, there were 170 of those renters. “Skvira,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 27 July 1907, p. 5.

³⁸⁹ “Predvybornye perspektivy,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 28 July 1907, p. 1.

³⁹⁰ “K vyboram v gosud. dumu,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 3 August 1907, p. 3. [“Cheraksskaia gorodskaia uprava,” In Cherkassy county, the number of urban voters was 5424.]

³⁹¹ “Izbitatel'naia kampaniia,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 19 July 1907, pp. 9-10.

³⁹² “Predvybornye perspektivy,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 28 July 1907, p. 1.

reduce chances of “unreliable” (*neblagonadezhnye*) candidates. Furthermore, in the borderland provinces, it was expected that the nationalities curias would be introduced on a custom basis. Only after that, the numbers of electors from each nationalities section in each curia would be known and the electoral commissions would be able to compose voter lists for these sections. As a result, during the first two months, the electoral campaign remained general and focused mostly on mobilizing voters to participate in the elections. Any specifics and suggested strategies were speculative rather than part of a practical plan for campaigning until electoral lists for the Russian and non-Russian curias were finalized.

In mid-August 1907, the government issued an Addendum to the electoral law that instructed the provincial authorities how they should apply Article 35 of the electoral law, which regulated the division of voters into nationalities sections. All curias were subject to this additional division if the authorities found it necessary.³⁹³ The purpose of the instruction was to weaken non-Russian minority voters in the multiethnic and religiously diverse borderlands and privilege Russian voters. The division into nationalities sections raised discussions about the criteria that the authorities applied to determine who was Russian. The newspaper *Svoboda i ravenstvo* reported that some provincial authorities included Germans, Tatars, Moldovans, Greeks, and Bulgarians in Russian electoral sections. Others included Lutherans. However blurred the definition of the Russian nationality was, some important principles seemed clear. The Jewish liberal press correctly noted that under no circumstances could Poles and Jews be included in the Russian curia.³⁹⁴

³⁹³ “Khronika. Vybory v Gos. Dumu,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 16 August 1907, p. 11.

³⁹⁴ “Pervoe dopolnenie k izbiratel’nomu zakonu,” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 16 August 1907, pp. 1-2. *Kievskaiia mysl’* reported that in one of the counties of western provinces, the police “invented” a new nationality – a “Russian Greek.” In some other places, the police avoided the term *Pole* and therefore divided voters into Russians and Catholics. “K vyboram v gosudarstvennuiu dumu,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 23 August 1907, p. 3.

Thus, in many provinces, the elections to the Third Duma separated Russian voters from Jewish ones, although this did not mean that Jews had the non-Russian sections at their disposal. They were often grouped with other nationalities, which complicated things further.

The right to divide the municipal curias into nationality sections belonged to the Minister of the Interior; however, the local authorities took the initiative into their own hands and submitted their suggestions for the implementation of this rule. In early July, the heads of the towns of Kiev province and the city of Kiev gathered at a meeting and resolved that the municipal voters of Berdichev, Uman', and Cherkassy counties needed to be separated into nationality sections.³⁹⁵ It took the bureaucracy more than two months to process this recommendation, which suspended the development of possible electoral strategies on the part of the oppositional parties. The Governor of Kiev province issued his order to divide urban voters into nationality sections only on September 19, that is, on the eve of the first stage of the elections. In the four counties – Berdichev, Vasil'kov, Uman', and Cherkassy, – urban curias were to consist of a Russian section and a non-Russian one. The latter included the Jews and Poles.³⁹⁶

Jewish liberals tried to bring whatever meaning to the electoral campaign they could as electoral competition became pointless for the Jews throughout the Pale after the nationalities sections were formed. In mid-September, they acknowledged that the official policy had a devastating effect on the prospects to elect oppositional deputies who would

³⁹⁵ "K vyboram v Gosud. Dumu," *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 5 July 1907, p. 11.

³⁹⁶ "K vyboram v gosudarstvennuiu dumu. Delenie s'ezdov gorodskikh izbiratelei kievskoi gubernii po natsional'nostiam," *Kievskaja mysl'*, 19 September 1907, p. 3.

advocate Jewish emancipation, let alone Jewish deputies. They explained that the current election campaign revealed critical mistakes of previous campaigns, which had centered on electoral issues such as ideas, principles, and alliances. Often, they said, the focus had been on Jewry, while it should have been also on connecting the Jews with the rest of the empire's populace – especially, the peasants. Jewish liberals called on the Jews to turn to organic work:

[We] shall remember that neither this Duma nor this electoral law were the beginning [of the constitutional cause]; nor will they end [it]. Jews, like all the population of the [Russian] Empire, should prepare for a better time, when the popular representation becomes genuine. And we should work for it [to happen]... The electoral period [is] a period of the rise of emotions and excitement (*period pod'ema i vozbuzhdeniia*); it is the most favorable for this [work]... Like all our fellow citizens, we ... should prepare the ground for a change of the current conditions in the future.³⁹⁷

Although the Jewish liberals had feuded with the Zionists in the second campaign, which led to the disintegration of the Jewish League of Full Rights, now they focused less on this rivalry. Apparently, they were even confident that “the majority of Russian [bourgeois] Zionists [would] prove, as before, to be Kadets.”³⁹⁸ The Jewish liberals closely followed the rhetoric at the conference of the Russian Zionists in The Hague, which took place on the eve of the Eighth Zionist congress in early August 1907.³⁹⁹ *Kievskaiia mysl'* reported that while discussing domestic politics in Russia, the Zionists leaned toward downplaying their Zionist program for the electoral campaign and continued to play the national card, advocating more of a broad Jewish alliance (*obshchenatsional'nyi*

³⁹⁷ “Vozderzhanie ili bor'ba?” *Svoboda i ravenstvo*, 15 September 1907, p. 2.

³⁹⁸ “Krakh politicheskago sionizma,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 10 August 1907, p. 2.

³⁹⁹ 14 – 21 August 1907, New Style.

podkhod).⁴⁰⁰ This time, however, their policy embraced an important element of the electoral strategy that the Jewish liberals had pursued in the Jewish League in the previous campaigns. The Zionists hoped to organize united Jewish electoral committees and proclaimed their inclusive character for all Jewish political groups and parties. At the same time, they disapproved of the alliance between a Jewish minority and the “non-Jewish element,” apparently meaning the Jewish liberals, many of whom were affiliated with the Kadet party.⁴⁰¹ The Jewish liberals did not need to worry about these reservations because the only option that was available to the Jews at the provincial assembly – the final stage of the elections – was to vote for an oppositional candidate, be he a Jew or, what was more likely, a non-Jew.

By late August 1907, when the authorities published voter lists for the city of Kiev and announced the time period for voters to apply for corrections,⁴⁰² the Kiev Kadets’ attempts to launch a broad campaign remained unrealized. All their electoral activities consisted of fragmented moves, many of which they could not even advertise in the press, but could only report later if at all. Even the party regional conference – which the Kiev Kadets held instead of a local congress – was covered by the rightist *Kievlianin*, not by the oppositional press. To be sure, along with a serious description of the conference and

⁴⁰⁰ “Krakh politicheskago sionizma,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 10 August 1907, p. 2.

⁴⁰¹ “Vybory v gos. dumu,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 12 September 1907, p. 2.

⁴⁰² On August 22, voter lists were posted up (*vyvesheny*) in the statistic bureau of the municipal board, police stations, and other public institutions. Voters had several days to apply for corrections if they found any. “K vyboram v gosudarstvennuu dumu,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 22 August 1907, p. 3.

resolutions that it had passed about energetic participation in the elections,⁴⁰³ *Kievlianin* could not help mocking the Kadets' slogans:

The "conference" forgot to include on the list of "party" tasks [the following:] "the wide use" of lies by instigations [of people] to activities which are harmful to the people, servile service to those who gave and [continue to] give money for the galvanization of the "party," toadying to the extreme leftist elements, and all that was characteristic of the "party" earlier and that it does not deny now. Or are the Kiev "Kadets" already no longer "Kadets?"⁴⁰⁴

For the Kiev Kadets, to receive even this kind of advertisement was better than nothing. At least, the message was clear that the Kiev Kadets existed and operated.

As the Kadets' ability to shape the political preferences of the broad masses was reduced, they hoped at least to gain voters' feedback on potential Kadet candidates in the second urban curia. For this purpose, the Kiev Kadets intended to organize a two-stage plebiscite. First, they planned to circulate a list of names among party members to shortlist candidates, and then repeat the same procedure among the wider public to check if the shortlisted party candidates enjoyed support outside the party organization.⁴⁰⁵ The Kiev Kadets had already practiced this type of electoral activity in the first campaign. In 1906, it was one of many pre-electoral actions that the Kadets used to involve voters as well as non-voters in the electoral discussions; now they limited this strategy to party members and voters only. It was the Kiev Kadets' attempt to connect with the masses, since they

⁴⁰³ It informed the reader that the main tasks of the Kadet party in the Duma would be to introduce a bill for the electoral law according to the four-tail formula, to control the government's activities by submitting inquiries, to introduce reform of local self-government, and universal primary education, and so on.

⁴⁰⁴ "Kievskie 'kadety,'" *Kievlianin*, 26 August 1907, p. 4.

⁴⁰⁵ "K vyboram v gosud. Dumu. K plebestitu konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii po g. Kievu," *Kievskaja mysl'*, 24 August 1907, p. 2.

could barely campaign for their candidates and only register their relative popularity among voters.

In addition to the plebiscite, the Kiev Kadets looked for local partners among the national minority groups. In a provincial landscape that had become politicized along several ideological lines, the Kadets continued to enjoy support among moderate ethnic minority elements. Consequently, they hoped to reach voters via national minorities' organizations. In particular, working as a closed, almost private group, the Kiev Kadets negotiated with local leftist organizations such as the non-party Jews, independent Poles, and the Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party. They formed a progressive bloc, with each group delegating two members to a joint committee; the Kadets were thus not the unconditional leader of this bloc, at least formally. The groups that constituted the bloc were semi-legal. They were not illegal, as they all advocated parliamentary means of doing politics; however, they were not legal, since none of them had been officially registered, or legalized. The Kadets had attempted to register their party during the second electoral campaign, but failed; since then, they operated within the grey area of semi-official existence. Likewise, during the third campaign, their supporters from the non-party Jews,⁴⁰⁶ as discussed earlier, found themselves in the vulnerable position of non-permitted organizations, which the police could in principle end at any time.⁴⁰⁷ It is unclear whether the non-party Poles made any attempts to apply for registration of their organization. The

⁴⁰⁶ Technically, the Society of Non-Party Jewish Voters did not differ from the Jewish People's Group because the latter called on all non-party Jews, which excluded the Zionists, to join and support the Kadet candidates. "Vybory i evrei," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 26 September 1907, p. 2.

⁴⁰⁷ The partners of the Kadets from the Jewish League of Full Rights and its successor the Jewish People's Group were in the same situation since the authorities did not approve their application for registration. See Chapter 2.

Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party did not try at all. Therefore, the progressive bloc consisted of fragmented political groups, which could not develop regular internal organization since none of them had experience in working illegally. Even though their leadership conducted negotiations and formed an electoral alliance, they had few means to discuss their decision in public or openly promote it among their potential supporters. They might have also preferred not to draw the police's attention to it.

The progressive bloc between the Kiev Kadets and the local nationalities groups emerged on the eve of the elections in the urban curia in counties, which were held on September 24. It led to a visible outcome only in Kiev county, where it nominated its candidates in both urban curias – the doctor Vigdor Nisonov Podraiskii and the Professor of Kiev Polytechnic Institute Sergei Gavrilovich Navashin.⁴⁰⁸ The elections in the city of Kiev occurred several weeks later; thus, under the leadership of the Kiev Kadets, the bloc was able to conduct some joint actions there. Specifically, it became instrumental in carrying out the final part of the plebiscite – among voters – that the Kiev Kadets had already started among their party members in early September. Whereas the tactic of using communal networks could not be compared with public meetings, where feedback of more voters could be collected, local nationalities groups helped the Kiev Kadets run the plebiscite among broader audience than just members of the Kadet party. As a result, the progressive bloc decided to support the member of the city board, Nikolai Fedorovich Stradomskii,⁴⁰⁹ in the first urban curia and to nominate Professor Ivan Vasilievich

⁴⁰⁸ “К wyboram v gosudarstvennuuu dumu,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 21 September 1907, pp. 2-3.

⁴⁰⁹ N.F. Stradomskii was well known to the Kiev Kadets as he was among those Kiev activists – such as Ia. S. Gol'denzeizer, Iu.A. Kistiakovskii, V.P. Naumenko, and I.V. Luchitskii – who had organized the Kiev branch of the Kadet party in late November 1905. Initially, Stradomskii joined the organizing committee, but soon left it. “Kievskaiia gruppa k.-d. partii,” *Svoboda i pravo*, 5 January 1906, p. 4.

Luchitskii as the progressive candidate in the second one.⁴¹⁰ Therefore, the alliance with the local nationalities groups, the plebiscite, and nomination of candidates were the few actions that the Kiev Kadets were able to conduct up until the elections in Kiev.

During the summer months of 1907 and especially in September and October, the oppositional press closely followed the debates of the rightists. As meetings of the rightists occurred quite often, they provided a convenient framework to discuss various electoral themes. For the press, there was no risk of being closed down or fined for covering the opinions that participants at these gatherings discussed – a great reminder to Jewish voters about the anti-Semitism of the rightist camp and the necessity to consolidate their support for the progressives. By contrast, the leftist newspapers covered little of the electoral activities of the Kiev Kadets – because the latter’s gatherings were limited to some private meetings and they did not want to advertise some of their moves, especially successful ones such as their negotiations with local organizations. Articles about a split that was seemingly beginning to show among the rightists could make up for dry reports of names of Kadet candidates, electoral irregularities, universal indifference of voters to the elections, and the scarcity of events in the oppositional camp. Most importantly, any division within the rightists could give the Kadets some tangible hope for electoral success.⁴¹¹ This was also one of the ways to draw voters’ attention to the electoral preparations in the province.

⁴¹⁰ “Kandidaty k.-d. partii,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 7 September 1907, p. 3.

⁴¹¹ “Kiev, 24 sentiabria 1907 g.,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 24 September 1907, p. 1.

The rightist bloc in Kiev consisted of the same seven parties and organizations that had also worked together in the second campaign – the Kiev branch of the Russian Assembly, the Kiev Monarchist Party, the Kiev branch of the Party of Legal Order, the Russian Brotherhood, the Union of Russian Workers, the Kiev branch of the Union of the Russian People, and the “Double-Headed Eagle” Society.⁴¹² Similar to their debates about Polish landlords, mentioned earlier in this chapter, their quarrels about candidates revealed disagreements between their moderate and extreme wings. The candidate of all rightist organizations in the first urban curia in the city of Kiev was the former city head V.N. Protsenko. However, *Kievskaiia mysl'* reported, two rightist candidates competed in the second urban curia – the journalist of *Kievlianin* A.I. Savenko from the non-party Russian voters and the teacher I.G. Khrapal' from the Union of the Russian People.⁴¹³ The newspaper stated that on 24 September, at a meeting of the Kiev branch of the Union of the Russian People, Gnevushev acknowledged that a split among the “true Russians” had occurred because some had joined the non-party committee of Russian voters. He accused them of plotting to vote for a constitutionalist, apparently implying Savenko, who was also the head of the moderate rightist Party of Legal Order in Kiev. At this meeting, the name of a third candidate, from the Union of the Russian People, emerged – Professor Rekashev. *Kievskaiia mysl'* concluded that the three candidates would compete in the second urban curia.⁴¹⁴ In another issue, however, it admitted that the meeting held by the non-party Russian voters on the same day sought to restore the unity with the “true Russians” in the

⁴¹² “Blok pravyykh,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 20 September 1907, p. 3.

⁴¹³ “K vyboram v gosudarstvennuuiu dumu. Kandidaty pravyykh,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 20 September 1907, p. 3.

⁴¹⁴ “Iz zhizni partii v Kieve,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 24 September 1907, p. 3.

face of the “Kadet danger.”⁴¹⁵ It was a rare time when the Kadets were the subject of electoral debates within the conservative camp in Kiev province during the third campaign. It looked like some of the extreme rightists were more concerned with the fact that a young journalist – Savenko – would run for the Duma than with the progressive bloc’s chances for electoral success. Therefore, the oppositional newspaper stressed the fragile nature of the unity within the rightist camp, which voters in the urban curia could interpret as a good sign.

While diligently covering the rightists’ events, which occurred almost every other day during the peak of the electoral season in late September and early October, the oppositional press registered not only the arguments of presenters, but also the way they conducted debates, their rhetoric, and mutual accusations. It insistently reported disagreements within the monarchist camp, showing that its candidates did not enjoy respect even among their own associates. Apparently, the moderate rightists attempted to smooth over friction, while the staunch monarchists found it convenient to keep criticizing the former’s candidate Savenko, accusing him of advocating a limited monarchy. On 26 September, the candidate of the rightists, Khrapal, spoke to a monarchist meeting of 500:

We’ve had enough of discussions, persuasions, complaints, the monarchists should now forget about all of these [members of] the Legal Order (*pravoporiadtsy*) and the non-party (*vnepartiinye*), but carry out independently our cause... It is we, the monarchists, who can say that Savenko and others split off from us, while we remain unchanged; it was not we who did damage to the cause, but they, the Legal Order [“Legal Orderists,” *pravoporiadtsy*], are responsible.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁵ “Vybory ot gorodskikh izbiratelei. Sobranie ‘vnepartiinykh,’ ” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 26 September 1907, p. 3.

⁴¹⁶ “Izbiratel’naia kampaniia pravykh,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 28 September 1907, p. 3.

In response to Khrupal's further speech, *Kievskaiia mysl'* observed, the audience agreed with the speaker, furiously shouting: "Down with Savenko! He is together... with the Yids!"⁴¹⁷ Even without any comments from the newspaper, its message was clear – the rightists were active, but they argued among themselves and could not settle on a candidate. By highlighting anti-Semitic attacks of the rightists against their ex-partners, the oppositional press revealed that the rightists skilfully used anti-Semitic rhetoric even against their own associates. Of course, doing so could not win the support of the rightist followers for the Kadets, but it could consolidate Jewish support for a liberal candidate, because the splits and disagreements within the rightist camp increased the electoral chances of the progressives.

The Voting in Kiev and the Province: Self-Reflections in the Opposition Camp

On September 23, all provincial electors were selected in Kiev province. Of the 23 urban electors chosen, the majority were progressives, including the Kadets, their partners in the progressive bloc, and some other leftists – 14 in total. Of the 12 counties of Kiev province, only three counties elected rightists – Vasil'kov (1 rightist out of a total of 3),⁴¹⁸ Berdichev (the same), and Cherkassy (1 rightist elector). In Vasil'kov, the elections failed (*ne sostoialis'*) in the Russian section of the second curia due to low attendance. All rightist electors came from the Russian national curia; most progressive electors were Jewish, some

⁴¹⁷ "Izbiratel'naia kampaniia pravykh," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 28 September 1907, p. 3.

⁴¹⁸ The county town of Vasil'kov was much smaller than another town in the country, Belaia Tserkov', with 60,000 residents, of whom 3,000 were eligible to participate in the elections. Vasil'kov, where the electoral station was located, could not host such a number of visitors. Therefore, many urban voters, including Jews, were disenfranchised. "Bielaiia Tserkov'. Vybory. Uprazhnenie gorodskoi kurii," *Riech'*, 20 September 1907, p. 5.

of them were non-Jewish. In particular, two progressive electors in Vasil'kov county were the doctor Lander, a Jew, and Putievskii, a non-Jew. In Kiev county, the doctor Podraiskii, who was Jewish, and Professor Navashin, a Russian, became electors from the progressive bloc.⁴¹⁹ The progressive electors that made up the majority in the urban curia constituted a small share of the overall provincial picture – their total number was no more than 23-28. Even some 20 non-party electors could not make up for the huge difference between the rightists, who were elected from the landowner curia, and the rest. Of 78 electors from the landowner curia, only 1 elector was progressive and another two not affiliated with any party, which meant that this curia provided 75 rightist electors.⁴²⁰ Sure enough, the provincial assembly, which was held on October 14, elected rightists for all 13 seats allocated to Kiev province. Of them, there were five landlords, six priests, and two peasants.⁴²¹

Thus, the electoral competition came to an end for the Kadets in Kiev province once the electors were selected, because the profile of provincial electors from the landowners pre-determined the defeat of the progressive bloc. The only thing that the Kiev Kadets could do was to analyze the electoral results in order to assess voters' support and the party's position in the province. On the whole, Kadet candidates enjoyed the support of the urban residents in Kiev province. However, this support did not translate into the popularity of the Kadet party. More than for any other category, the absence of socialist

⁴¹⁹ "Vybory ot gorodskikhkh izbiratelei," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 24 September 1907, p. 3.

⁴²⁰ "Vybory po Kievskoi gubernii," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 28 September 1907, p. 4.

⁴²¹ "Vybory deputatov po kievskoi gubernii," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 15 October 1907, p. 2.

parties in the electoral race raised the Kadets' support. In other words, the names of prominent individuals that ran for election and the leftist moods of the urban population were key factors that played into hands of the Kadets. At the same time, the Kadets were not the favorites in the towns; the support of urban residents for the rightists was also significant. The Kiev Kadets, whose Jewish component was visible in the province, were losing the competition for the national sentiments of the Christian population, both Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking. The principle which had allowed the Kadet party to build alliances with disparate political organizations and across class and ethnic borders could be detrimental to the party's popularity. Everyone who supported the party's program could find his place in the party; because of this, everyone could also find his bitter political adversaries there too. The Kadet party's weakness was its overarching, above-the-class, principle; organizations with a more narrow program looked more attractive for particular categories of the populace.

In just over two weeks between the selection of electors and their final vote for provincial deputies, the opposition parties made final efforts to gather their resources. The Kiev Kadets hoped to come up with some miraculous alliance with some groups of electors – the peasants, the priests, or the Polish landlords. However, the Kadets could do little to achieve it. Conspicuously, the oppositional press in Kiev province continued to discuss disagreements within the Kadet central committee, in particular, the fact that one of its Moscow members, Mandelshtam, had left the Moscow Kadet board in the midst of the electoral preparations. The situation was complex and involved many long-term and immediate factors. In principle, Mandelshtam protested against a possible, even technical electoral alliance with the Octobrists that the central committee contemplated as a partial

solution in some locales. The Kadet party, Mandelshtam argued, needed to look for cooperation with the leftists in order to connect with the masses.⁴²² Several oppositional newspapers, including *Kievskaiia mysl'* and *Kievskii kur'er*, reported the crisis within the Kadet leadership and openly criticized the leader Miliukov for being too optimistic and self-confident.

In managing the elections and preparations for them, the authorities kept the situation uncertain and slow-moving. A reason for this was the electoral law, which, as we have seen, left much of the decision-making in the hands of the authorities, both central and local. The latter continued to keep the terms and conditions undefined, if not intentionally then due to bureaucratic overload. The government announced the actual dates of the final stage of the provincial elections only on September 30, 1907, and in the cities with separate representation only on October 4, 1907 – two weeks before the events.⁴²³ Another factor that contributed to the slackening of the electoral campaign was the division of urban curias into nationalities sections. Not only did this cause apathy among those groups that had little chances of influencing the electoral results, but also among those whose votes were decisive within their curia. For instance, in the town (shtetl) of Gorodishche, Cherkassy county, Jewish voters did not care about electoral preparations because, as the press reported, “Jews vote separately. [Thus,] there is no Black Hundred danger all the same. Why spend several hundred rubles to go to Cherkassy, when two Jews will be the electors in any case; it is not important whether [the elector is] X. or Y.”⁴²⁴ The

⁴²² “Pozitsiia k.-d.,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 28 September 1907, p. 3.

⁴²³ “Naznachenie srokov dlia proizvodstva vyborov,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 30 September 1907, p. 5. “Naznachenie sroka vyborov,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 4 October 1907, p. 4.

⁴²⁴ “Korrespondetsii. Gorodishche,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 26 September 1907, p. 5.

electoral preparations did not constitute one single field, in which political parties and groups competed, argued, and mobilized the vote, but numerous poorly connected pockets of self-mobilizing efforts on the part of the oppositional forces, including individual calls, appeals, or complaints, without much energy even in the protests and critiques.

Rarely did the authorities resort to influence the electoral preparations by issuing corrections and additional requirements for the voter registration or other administrative measures. Since the 3 June electoral system absorbed many of the adjustments that Senate interpretations had provided to the previous electoral law, the authorities' appeals to the Senate also ceased to be a frequent tool for tuning in the electoral procedure. Even corrections from the Ministry of the Interior were infrequent. For example, in the midst of the final stage of the preliminary elections, at which electors to the provincial assembly were selected, a new directive, which amended the minister's July directive, explained that voters who were absent from the electoral meeting could nevertheless run for electors.⁴²⁵ This directive did not affect all provinces; in Kiev province, for instance, all preliminary elections had already occurred (on September 24). Unlike some Senate interpretations which had once excluded several thousand voters in the urban category in the previous campaign, this directive did not change the balance of power in Kiev province. The conservative parties' electoral prospects were so bright that no drastic measures were necessary to ensure the results that would be favorable to the regime.

In addition, in comparison with the previous electoral campaigns, cancellations of electoral results on the technical pretext occurred infrequently. In this respect, revealing

⁴²⁵ "Novye raz'iasneniia," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 30 September 1907, p. 2.

was the instance in the urban curia in Kiev county, when the above-mentioned Podraiskii and Navashin were running to be electors. When the electoral commissions counted the ballots, it turned out that in both curias, more than half of the voters had submitted their ballots on paper of a slightly different format than the law required. The ballot count showed that the numbers were in favor of the progressive candidates if the non-standard ballots were taken into account. These ballots on the paper of the wrong format would have been a strong reason for cancellation of the electoral results in the second campaign, especially considering the pending victory of the opposition in this curia. Had the commission declared the non-standard ballots invalid, it would have declared the elections as failed. This would have reduced the number of oppositional electors by two (and increased the number of the rightist electors) at the final, decisive round of the provincial elections. However, this time the electoral commissions refrained from making a decision and asked the Kiev governor for instructions on the matter;⁴²⁶ he considered the incorrectly formatted ballots invalid, but forwarded the inquiry to the Ministry of the Interior. The ministry generously allowed the commission to regard the ballots on the “wrong” paper as valid.⁴²⁷ Apparently, the authorities were confident that two extra progressive electors would make no difference at the final stage of the provincial elections.

On the very eve of the elections in the city, the authorities allowed the opposition to make some isolated public moves in preparation for the elections. First, they permitted the Jewish non-party organization, which had not been legalized, to issue a formal electoral

⁴²⁶ “Vybory ot gorodskikh izbiratelei,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 24 September 1907, p. 3.

⁴²⁷ “Vybory ot gorodskikh izbiratelei,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 26 September 1907, p. 3. “K vyboram v gosudarstvennuu dumu,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 28 September 1907, p. 3.

appeal to Jewish voters and circulate it in Russian and Yiddish. The appeal was also published in local oppositional newspapers. The non-party organization urged the Jews to participate in the elections to the Duma for the sake of Jewish emancipation and, hence, to support “honest, progressive elements of the Russian people.” It called on the Jews to vote for Luchitskii because “the lion’s share of our salvation lies in the victory of the progressive elements.”⁴²⁸ The rhetoric of this document was in line with the campaign that the Jewish liberals had conducted in the two previous campaigns. It contained the major point that the Kadets offered to the Jews and other ethnic minorities in their party program in 1906 – an alliance with their party to achieve legal emancipation. In other words, the call did not provide any new reasoning; it reiterated openly the position of Jewish members of the Kadets. This could certainly appeal to those existing Jewish voters who had supported the Kiev Kadets; it is unclear if more could be added.

Another action that the authorities permitted the opposition to carry out was a meeting of Polish voters of both curias in Kiev, which took place on October 7. Some presenters spoke in favor of a union with the rightists. Others discussed the problem of the Duma’s unpopularity. The lawyer Glembotskii made an interesting point about Luchitskii, stating that he was known to be championing in public the decentralization of government, including the autonomy of Ukraine. Thus, Glembotskii concluded, one could expect that Luchitskii would advocate the autonomy of Poland in the Duma. All attendees but one voted in favor of supporting both progressive candidates – Stradomskii and Luchitskii.⁴²⁹ This meeting was the only one that Polish voters held in Kiev; there were no heated debates

⁴²⁸ “K vyboram v gosudarstvennuu dumu,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 1 October 1907, p. 3.

⁴²⁹ “Predvybornoe sobranie,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 9 October 1907, p. 2.

about electoral strategy – almost all speakers knew their preferences; the discussion centered on the question of why they would vote for the progressives, which had been the clear choice for them even without debates. It was the report about the meeting that was even more important than the meeting itself, because it reminded voters about the existence of the progressive bloc.

The elections in the city of Kiev were held on October 17, 1907, the day of the second anniversary of the October Manifesto, which had introduced the Duma into the political life of Russia. The editorial in *Kievskaiia mysl'* suggested that readers think about this coincidence and reminded them that the next day, October 18, was the second anniversary of the pogrom – implying the anti-Jewish pogrom – that had begun in Kiev and taken many lives. The article developed a civilizational argument about European and Asiatic choices using simplistic dichotomies of “light” and “darkness” and called on voters to choose the path to Europe, not Asia: “happiness, joy, and sunlight comes from this symbolic number [17], ...[while] 18 looks gloomy, [as if it is] a bloody, wide stroke, and guides us to Asia.” Not a single time did the article mention the word *Jews*. It indirectly mentioned them as victims of the bloodshed and the pogrom and called on the city to “choose between “Europe” and “Asia,” between Life and Death.”⁴³⁰ In the final call, the article depicted the electoral choices by using the theme of anti-Semitism and framing the electoral alternatives as voting for a just or criminal future. *Kievskaiia mysl'* had discussed pogroms before; this time it stressed the violence and not the fact that Jews were the victims. Clearly, it was not an appeal to Jewish voters, but an attempt to address non-Jewish

⁴³⁰ “Na perevalie,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 17 October 1907, p. 1.

voters by referring to the just, constitutional order that many had hoped the October Manifesto would bring.

The elections in both urban curias in the city of Kiev were direct and did not envision preliminary stages to select electors. On the due date, voters cast their ballots for several candidates. In the first urban curia, the support for V.N. Protsenko, the candidate from the rightists, and N.F. Stradomskii, from the progressive bloc, was roughly equal, with Stradomskii leading by just several ballots: Protsenko received 749 votes, Stradomskii – 756. The total number of voters was 1,875, which was a turnout of 50.5%. The oppositional press reported the victory of Stradomskii on the grounds that he had received the higher number of ballots. In all electoral districts of the city, the votes were divided approximately equally.⁴³¹ There were invalid ballots submitted for either side, which became a point of dispute in the electoral commission. There was also the question of whether the candidates had passed the absolute majority threshold – given the fact that some ballots were questionable (*somnitel'nye*) – as the electoral law did not specify how to count them. After the discussion, the commission resolved to include all 14 doubtful ballots for the rightist candidate Protsenko and declared him the Duma deputy from the city of Kiev.⁴³²

In the second curia, the situation was similar, but the difference between the votes for the two major rivals was greater. Therefore, the elections of the Duma deputy ran in two rounds, as the law envisioned for instances when no candidates had an absolute

⁴³¹ “Vybory v Kieve,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 19 October 1907, p. 3.

⁴³² “Kiev, 20 oktiabria 1907 g.,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 20 October 1907, p. 1. “K vyboram v Kieve,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 21 October 1907, p. 4.

majority of votes. Initially, five candidates ran to be the deputy for the city of Kiev: A.I. Savenko, I.G. Khrapal', and Rekashev from the rightists, I.V. Luchitskii from the progressive bloc, and lawyer K.K. Chekerul'-Kush from Social Democratic organizations.⁴³³ Luchitskii received the majority, 6,067 votes, Savenko – 5,437. However, both candidates lacked the endorsement of the absolute majority of the 12,382 voters who participated in the elections.⁴³⁴ After the results were known, the Social Democrats withdrew their candidate Chekerul'-Kush and encouraged their supporters to vote for the progressive candidate Luchitskii.⁴³⁵ The electoral commission announced the run-off vote for the second urban curia, which occurred on October 23. The turnout was slightly higher, with 12,415 voters making up 82,8% of the total number. Luchitskii won 6,152 votes, Savenko – 6,074.⁴³⁶ Therefore, in the second urban curia, the city of Kiev elected a Kadet deputy to the Third Duma.

The victory of Luchitskii looked like a remarkable Kadet achievement in a province that had voted for thirteen rightist candidates in the provincial elections and one more in the elections from the city of Kiev. The initial reaction of the oppositional press was

⁴³³ "Vybory deputatov ot Kievskoi gubernii," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 15 October 1907, p. 2. "Vybory v Kievie," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 19 October 1907, p. 3.

⁴³⁴ Other candidates received insignificant numbers of votes: Khrapal' – 501 votes, Chekerul'-Kush – 205, and Rekashev 31. "Vybory v Kievie," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 19 October 1907, p. 3. "Rezultaty vyborov. Vtoraia kuriia," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 19 October 1907, p. 3.

⁴³⁵ "Rezultaty vyborov. Vtoraia kuriia. Sniatie kandidatury K.K. Chekerul'-Kusha," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 19 October 1907, p. 3. *Kievskaiia mysl'* reported that Luchitskii and Chekerul'-Kush together received 6,272 votes, which means that the latter received 205 votes. "Kiev, 19 oktiabria 1907 g.," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 21 October 1907, p. 2.

⁴³⁶ "Vybory v Kievie," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 25 October 1907, p. 2.

emotional, with the main message about “the victory of the leftist Kadet,” I.V. Luchitskii, despite all obstacles and violations of the electoral law:

This is a really outstanding fact. The Black Hundred mobilized all [its] forces,... their physiognomies [faces] and noses testified to which party [its voters] belonged... while many thorns befell on the opposition. To overcome all these obstacles, one needed much perseverance, determination, and even selflessness. To spend two days, running for passports, experiencing thrift needlings [derisions/pricks, *melkie ukoly*] and chicaneries [*iuridicheskie uvertki*], ... one had to have much conscientiousness to pass through all barriers. And now the progressive voter can say proudly that he elected his candidate to the Duma... Without campaigning, without noise, everyone had been taking his decision [to the polling stations]... Kiev voters spectacularly passed their examination for political maturity.⁴³⁷

This was quite a eulogy, depicting the period of electoral preparations as a “hard struggle.” However, it was not the victory of the Kiev Kadets that was presented here, but that of the oppositional candidate supported by the oppositional voter. It proved to be not a matter of terminology, but of a principled position on the part of local activists, which differed from that of the Kadets.

Indeed, in the days that followed the elections in Kiev, several contributions to *Kievskaiia mysl'* severely criticized the central leadership of the Kadets and especially their leader Pavel Miliukov for celebrating a general electoral victory of the Kadet party, which, as their authors correctly pointed, had not occurred. The celebration was called “exultation without grounds” and “the victory [of the Kadets] over democracy.” Heated polemics unfolded in the pages of the oppositional press about the electoral results of the Kadets – some leftist newspapers accused them of not recognizing their privileged position in comparison to that of other leftist parties. Their major argument was that those islands of electoral victories in major cities were the successes of the opposition, not the Kadets. They

⁴³⁷ “Pobeda,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 25 October 1907, p. 2.

criticized Miliukov's approach of attributing all victorious results to the success and popularity of the Kadet party, while dismissing the Kadets' defeats as staged electoral injustices implemented by the authorities.⁴³⁸ Surely, the irritation with such optimistic statements was merited, especially in the provincial curias in Kiev that elected all rightist and monarchist deputies to the Duma. Undoubtedly, some oppositional forces felt that the Kadets misinterpreted their mandate to lead the opposition.

Conclusion

The dismissal of the Second Duma marked a turning point in the political life of the country in general and in the fate of the Duma as an institution, in particular. During the preparations for the Third Duma, the government seriously took up the task of forming a cooperative Duma. Thus, the elections to the Duma came under much tighter control of the central and local authorities. The new electoral law signified the consolidation of the government's position toward the Duma as an institution and determined key changes that occurred in the electoral strategies of political parties. The law embraced most of the clarifications and interpretations that the Senate had issued during the two previous election campaigns and transformed the electoral environment accordingly. Most importantly, it provided the government with the means to shape the electoral conditions further, which made them fluid and unpredictable for the oppositional parties and groups, including the Kadets. Under these circumstances, it became hard to plan electoral campaigning and especially to coordinate joint electoral actions between potential partners. The Kadets'

⁴³⁸ "Bezsnovatel'noe likovanie," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 26 October 1907, p. 2. "Pravda glaza kolet," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 30 October 1907, p. 2. "Kiev, 31 oktiabria," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 31 October 1907, p. 1.

decision to campaign without entering electoral blocs was in line with similar attitudes of other oppositional parties and led to the deep fragmentation of the electoral environment during the preparations for the Third Duma.

In Kiev province, electoral agreements – ideological as well as technical – between local parties and groups had been indispensable due to the multiethnic composition of voters. The Kiev Kadets continued to rely on Jewish support and their Jewish members remained their most reliable link to the Jewish electorate. Their role in mobilizing the Jewish vote grew even more important in circumstances where most ties were severed and open calls and appeals – in the press or public meetings – ceased to be an option. However, this link became severely weakened due to the rising competition within the Jewish political camp. Jewish liberals had had to organize themselves into a separate political group to be able to fend off the attacks of the Zionists – their rivals for the Jewish electorate. Each group now worked its own area, without communal quarrels.

Administrative pressure made open campaigning almost impossible in principle. Local political organizations – including the Kiev Kadets and various Jewish groups – planned some electoral meetings, but eventually could not conduct them. Essentially, electoral debates with their own close associates were often the only possibility. Reaching voters became an impossible mission to accomplish. Most activists from local organizations were limited to reminding the electorate about their existence, hoping that some would recall their programmatic declarations from the previous campaign earlier in 1907. A single announcement in the press about the position of a political party was sometimes the only action that local political organizations managed to carry out. In other words, electoral preparations in Kiev province constituted numerous small pockets of

electoral discussions within closed circles of associates, disconnected from each other and from voters.

The repressions that the government applied across the country while preparing for the elections brought about some unexpected outcomes, from which the Kadet party benefitted in some respects. In Kiev province, the government electoral policies eliminated key electoral disagreements within the Jewish political camp, because they reduced electoral discussions among Jewish activists to a more basic level, that is, the question which candidates of the *non-Jewish parties* would best advocate Jewish interests in the Duma. The ideological differences between Jewish liberals and the Zionists, which had led to the disintegration of the Jewish League, ceased to be of any significance in the third electoral campaign, as it became technically impossible to elect a Jewish candidate from either the city of Kiev or from Kiev province. Thus, although various Jewish organizations worked separately and retained only a limited impact on Jewish voters, essentially they advocated the same electoral goal: to elect Jewish electors who would vote for the most progressive candidates to represent the city of Kiev and the province in the Duma. Therefore, their efforts were uncoordinated, but they were in accord with each other. Thus, the regime had brought some unity to the Jewish political camp.

By levelling the political demands of the Jewish organizations and eliminating socialist candidates from the electoral race the government unintentionally contributed to the Kadets' success in the city of Kiev. As a result, the Kadet candidate, Ivan Luchitskii, became the Duma deputy from the second urban curia of the city of Kiev. Although the rightist candidate V.N. Protsenko defeated the Kadet candidate Nikolai Stradomskii in the first curia, the latter came very close to victory, which the electoral commission overrode

in favor of Protsenko. In the provincial elections, the artificial Jewish unity and the absence of socialist rivals did not result in the same outcome as in the city. Because the electors from the landowner curia, which consisted mostly of conservative elements, had a technical majority at the final stage of voting, oppositional candidates stood no chance to be elected as Duma deputies.⁴³⁹

Overall, the main characteristic of the Kiev Kadets' electoral campaign was electoral silence – not inaction, not inertia, but the absence of any propaganda and agitation. The Kiev Kadets did plan an electoral campaign, however modest and narrow, but were unable to function, holding no public meetings or door-to-door discussions. The rightist meetings and the circulation of their electoral materials stood out against the absence of slogans and messages from the opposition. The conservative parties focused on consolidating their forces, conveniently using the anti-Jewish rhetoric in their debates. The unity of the rightists was ambiguous because they did not spare each other from accusations of pro-constitutional, pro-oppositional, and even pro-Jewish sentiments. The meetings of the rightist groups were frequent and the oppositional newspapers did not lose a chance to cover them in their pages even as a pretext to remind voters about the elections. Threats against Jews that the rightists raised served as a serious message for Jewish voters and undoubtedly contributed to mobilizing the Jewish vote for the oppositional, often the Kadet, candidates.

Thus, in the electoral campaign to the Third Duma in the “hopeless” province of Kiev – from the perspective of the Kadet success in the elections – showed a limited but solid support for the Kadets, mostly among urban residents. The regime left Jewish voters

⁴³⁹ As a reminder, the landowner electors numbered 78 out of a total of 150 electors from Kiev province.

no choice but to vote for the opposition, which was often represented by Kadet candidates. As the voting in the city of Kiev was direct, this support resulted in the Kiev Kadets' success. Although the government relegated the Kadets to a grey area of semi-legal existence and deprived them of their means of campaigning, it also raised the probability of the Jewish support for the Kadets, which the latter could not technically utilize in the final stage of the provincial elections. The government ruthlessly played its role in the elections; the defeat of the Kadets in the elections from the province was crushing.

CHAPTER 4

THE “JEWISH QUESTION” IN ELECTORAL POLITICS PREPARATIONS FOR THE FOURTH DUMA, JUNE – OCTOBER 1912.

The fourth electoral campaign formally began when the term of the Third Russian Duma ended in June 1912. For the first time since the introduction of popular representation in 1905, it had finished its work not as a result of a political conflict in the country, but as the law envisioned after the Duma had served its five-year term. There was much to analyze about its work. Therefore, as political parties were getting down to the election campaign, they dwelt on the results of the Duma’s work, its achievements and failures. These discussions of the role of the Third Duma on the Russian political scene became a point of reference for many, including the Kadets, throughout the election campaign and especially in its beginning. Because the Third Duma had lasted for so long it changed the general perception of the elections in the sense that it became clear that the upcoming elections could affect the political landscape in the country for the next five years. Therefore, observing the Duma’s more stable position, many parties closely revised lessons they had learned from previous election campaigns.

Beside political parties, other actors had also drawn their conclusions. Election campaigns, and other rapidly developing forms of mass politics which Russia had experienced since 1905 also influenced the ways the regime operated in the modern political setting. Not limiting itself to its traditional role – setting the rules, arresting undesirable candidates, overlooking discrepancies in the documents of preferable ones, manipulating and cancelling electoral results – the government explored various avenues for its involvement in the elections on a par with political parties and groups. It attempted

to mobilize resources hitherto not utilized. With its encouragement, the church leadership called on Orthodox priests to “save Russia by coming to the ballot boxes one and all.”⁴⁴⁰ In turn, the conservative and oppositional press paid much attention to the role of the Orthodox clergy in the elections. The liberal press insisted that the priests became involved in the electoral process on an unprecedented scale.⁴⁴¹

The discussion about the clergy’s potential electoral choices became a prominent feature of the election campaign to the Fourth Russian Duma all over the country.⁴⁴² At an October electoral meeting in St. Petersburg, Miliukov described his vision: “[it was] the deputy of the Minister of the Interior who elected [members to] the previous Dumas, whereas [it is] the Ober-Procurator of the St. Synod [who] is electing [members of the current Duma].”⁴⁴³ The difference that Miliukov pointed out concerned not only the involvement of the clerics in the election campaign, but in reality it also meant a major change in approach on the part of the government. The Synod did not set the electoral rules as had the Ministry of the Interior in the previous and the current campaigns. The Orthodox clergy entered the elections as ordinary voters, whose power lay in their mass participation and coordinated voting rather than in their position of authority. By encouraging the Orthodox clergy to participate in the election campaign, the regime relied not only on its coercive apparatus, but also on new strategies on the internal scene and, thus, showed itself to be a player of modern politics.

⁴⁴⁰ “Dukhovenstvo na vyborakh,” *Kievlianin*, 9 July 1912, p. 1.

⁴⁴¹ “Kiev, 5 avgusta,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 5 August 1912, p. 2.

⁴⁴² Priests made up about 15% of all electors. “Vybory v Gosudarstvenuiu Dumu,” *Riech’*, 9 October 1912, p. 3.

⁴⁴³ “Vybory v Gosudarstvenuiu Dumu. Predvybornye sobraniia,” *Riech’*, 9 October 1912, p. 3.

Almost all existing parties started their campaigning to the Fourth Duma with some previous experience of political struggle; practically every political group grappled with its electoral past, which encompassed established, burgeoning, and failed rivalries and alliances. At the end of the Third Duma, these complex political relationships came into new prominence: some were apparent immediately, while it took some time for the others to manifest themselves in the context of the electoral campaign. In particular, like other branches of the party, the Kiev Kadets initially focused on the Octobrists, who had played a key part in the Third Duma's work, and criticized them mercilessly both in form and in content. Since the first electoral campaigns, the Octobrists had remained a prominent target of attacks by the Kadets, who accused them of support for and alliance with the government. In summer 1912, the Kiev Kadets continued to criticize the Octobrists along the same line, adding to their traditional critique the Octobrists' prominent role in the Third, reactionary Duma. By doing so, the Kadets strove to replace the critique of the Duma as an institution with that of the Octobrists and blame them along with the government for the current political conditions. In turn, the Kiev Kadets themselves had received a fair amount of criticism from the local Russian nationalists even before the Kadet campaign in Kiev took shape. As the nationalists started to mobilize the Christian population, they brought the Kadet-Jewish cooperation into focus by drawing the picture of an alleged danger of this "revolutionary-alien camp,"⁴⁴⁴ in which they ascribed the Kadets and Jews the roles of the revolutionaries and the aliens, respectively.

This chapter studies the Kadet-Jewish interaction during the fourth election campaign to the Russian Duma and shows how the Kiev Kadets dealt with the accusation

⁴⁴⁴ A. Savenko, "Dumy i nastroeniia. LXXXIII Kiev pered vyborami," *Kievlianin*, 8 July 1912, p. 3.

that they were leading the non-Russians (*inorodtsy*) and revolutionaries in their struggle against the Russian government. It argues that although the Kiev Kadets remained interested in mobilizing the Jewish vote and hoped for wide Jewish support of their party's candidates, they exercised a more cautious approach to forming political alliances with Jewish voters than they had done in the previous campaigns. The reasons for this change in their attitude toward Jewish voters lay not only in administrative pressure, which limited available opportunities for electoral campaigning, but also in much deeper processes that had been taking place in society. In the Russian western borderlands, including Kiev province, various groups of local population such as the Jews got involved in politics and became increasingly independent actors with their own political agenda. Along with non-Russian political organizations, the emergence of Russian nationalist parties and political groups there tremendously complicated the Kadets' task in the national elections and thus transformed the Kadet electoral campaign in the provinces.⁴⁴⁵

The Kadets on the Eve of the Inter-Duma Period

The Kiev Kadets began their fourth election campaign in circumstances that were, at the very least, unfavorable to them. They put enormous effort into enlisting the voters' support with few or practically no resources. Amidst the population that was tired of previous elections and did not see the elections as providing effective leverage for meaningful change, this opposition party remained hopeful about the prospects of liberalism in the

⁴⁴⁵ The local rightist newspaper *Kievlianin*, which regularly published articles using anti-Jewish rhetoric and treated Jews as a single and homogeneous group, noted the difference in attitude of the Jews toward the elections: many Jews did not want to participate in the elections because they were disillusioned with the work of the Duma, while other Jews hoped that the oppositional Duma would bring equality to the Jews. "Dumy i nastroeniia. LXXXV Pokhod protiv umerennosti," *Kievlianin*, 19 July 1912, p. 2.

country, for a change of the regime, and even for its electoral success. In describing their mood or attitude toward the situation in the country, the Kadets showed considerable emotional resourcefulness that manifested itself in the rhetoric of the Kadet newspapers, protocols of party meetings, and other party documents. These sources conveyed confidence in the success of the constitutionalist cause in Russia and expressed serious hopes for popular support of the Kadet program, especially because they hoped that voters had become disillusioned with the pro-government position of the Octobrists in the Third Duma.⁴⁴⁶ In this regard, the worsening – in their perception – situation in Russia only proved that the current regime was obsolete and incapable of surviving. Arguing thus, the Kiev Kadets echoed the party leadership and Kadet central newspapers, which admitted that difficulties were abundant and that the possibilities for any propaganda for the party were few. Another question about which the Kiev Kadets also preserved a confident tone, concerned their immediate prospects in the electoral campaign. They did not express any doubts about the expediency of conducting the electoral campaign and the ability of their party to have an impact on the election outcome.

The Kadets' high spirits were neither naïve nor paradoxical. They arose not only from the moral fortitude shown by the Kadet leadership and some rank-and-file members. Rather, a particular perspective informed their interpretation of the current political situation and allowed the Kadets to remain highly positive. They saw a tense political situation as a sign that their drive for liberal reforms in Russia was even more necessary and that their mission was to bring constitutional order to the country. In addition, they

⁴⁴⁶ "Zapiska (Moskovskoe otdelenie TsK kadetskoï partii) ob organizatsii i podgotovke predvybornoi kampanii v chetvertuiu Gos. Dumu," GARF, f. 579, op. 3, d. 61, l. 3.

reasoned that the 1907 electoral law showed the government's weakening authority among the population of Russia rather than its strength, because it had resorted to changing the Fundamental Laws without the approval of the Duma. The Kadets, both local and in the central leadership, were inclined to see the voters' support for the rightists as artificial and deliberately crafted, as the 1907 electoral law had deprived entire categories of the population of their voting rights. They continued to insist that the disenfranchised population, much of which constituted their former electorate in the first electoral campaign, would support the opposition parties, not the rightist or nationalist ones, should the electoral law be democratized.⁴⁴⁷ They conveniently omitted the fact, however, that the 1907 electoral law disfavored their socialist competitors more than the Kadets themselves, thus lamenting repressions and simultaneously benefitting from them.

In turn, the authorities themselves, both imperial and local, helped generate the sentiment that the Kadets had powerful resources in their possession. Many times, provincial officials received inquiries from the Minister of the Interior about whether the Kadets were organizing any activities. The absence of any evidence of electoral preparations on the part of the Kadets produced more anxiety among the authorities. In Kiev province, they did not doubt the abilities of the party members to conduct an election campaign:

“[t]he most dangerous political party is the Kadet party, which consists of energetically talented persons, [who are] disciplined in political [party] activity and strong in numbers, [whom we will have to] take into consideration[,...] [p]ersons of the free professions from the Russian as well as non-Russian population [*inorodcheskoe naselenie*], some petty landowners, along with the majority of the Jews.”⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁷ Bezpartiinyi, “Vopros, kotorago nel'zia oboiti,” *Russkaia mysl'*, July, 1912, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁸ *Agenturnyia sviedenii*, GARF, fond 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27.

The official anxiety about the practically non-existent Kadet party's strength became a major theme in the correspondence of the secret police. The Kadets' spirit and the local authorities' fear of that spirit ran through the entire fourth national election campaign.

The Kadets' electoral enthusiasm was more visible in the provinces precisely because reasons for it were fewer as political circumstances became more adverse and possibilities for campaigning reduced. This was the case in Kiev province too. By 1912, when the elections to the Fourth Russian Duma took place, the years of political reaction had taken their toll on the Kadet provincial membership; the scope of its activities had also diminished. Its composition grew more ambiguous; membership in the party became more nominal than factual as the possibility for the party to collect membership fees and convene regular party meetings and conferences were limited. As the Kadet party organization definitely disintegrated, its existence was more ephemeral⁴⁴⁹ and manifested itself mainly in the ideas that various moderate local political parties and groups supported. There were fewer and fewer pure Kadets in Kiev province; more and more of them espoused political views that included not only the liberal values of equality but also the national aspirations of Jews, Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians. Perhaps, it is better to say that many of the Kiev Kadets were members of various local political groups that supported the programmatic principles of the Kadet party.

⁴⁴⁹ Even in the second municipal curia, which was a natural stronghold of the Kiev Kadets, they had some 1,500 party members. They estimated the same number of supporters outside the party membership. "Doklad Miliukova dlia Peterburgskago gorodskogo komiteta," GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, l. 25. See also "Zapiska (Moskovskoe otdelenie TsK kadetskoj partii) ob organizatsii i podgotovke predvybornoi kampanii v chetvertuiu Gos. Dumu," GARF, f. 579, op. 3, d. 61, l. 10.

Unlike during the previous preparations, the Kiev Kadets approached the fourth electoral campaign from a less local and more national perspective. To a great extent, administrative pressure all over the empire was so intense that it was hardly possible to undertake anything specific to the province. In his memoirs, Miliukov gave a rather bleak description of the campaign:

And what a campaign it was! All [whom the authorities considered] politically suspicious were being unceremoniously removed from participation in the elections. Entire categories of persons were being deprived of their voting rights or the possibility to actually participate in the elections. ...The undesirable [outcomes of] elections were being cancelled. Electoral meetings were banned and [it was] even forbidden to voice, write, and mention the names of undesirable parties in the press. The electoral curias were formed in accordance with arbitrary principles in order to achieve an artificial majority.⁴⁵⁰

Although the Kadets had criticized the official policies before and their current complaints differed little from that of earlier ones, at least in tone, this reference of the campaign reflects the picture that also emerges from the press or the police reports. In these circumstances, the Kiev Kadets chose to follow the lead of the central press. In that limited space for campaigning that the local authorities left available to them, the Kadet press in Kiev echoed the central newspapers and reported on the course of the electoral preparations all over the country – most specifically in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and then Odessa,⁴⁵¹ Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and so on. Regarding local matters, it tended to confine itself to reports on administrative issues such as the number of electoral applications submitted in counties of Kiev province, the deadlines for these applications, the slow rate of submission

⁴⁵⁰ P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia (1859-1917)*, (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1955), 2: 158.

⁴⁵¹ “Odessa, 10 avgusta” and “Pomoshch’ izbirateliam,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 11 August 1912, p. 3.

of applications, and descriptions of some infrequent pre-electoral meetings of mostly rightist or nationalist political groups.⁴⁵²

The Kiev Kadets and Jewish Politics: Between the Province and the Empire

Jews remained a visible group in Kiev province and Jewish voters, despite being often disenfranchised by the Senatorial interpretations, remained a potentially sizeable Kadet electorate in Kiev province. The Kadet party continued to advocate equal rights for all citizens of Russia and thus the Kiev Kadets still counted on the Jews as their natural allies. Yet their interest in focusing specifically on mobilizing the Jewish vote declined, and they did not intend to encourage Jewish political activism as they had done in the first and second campaigns by bringing the Jews into the Jewish League (*soiuz polnopraviiia*). Having struggled with voters' apathy during the previous election campaigns, the Kadets achieved some unexpected results. As the Kiev Kadets found out, many Jews who became involved in politics and who initially sided with the Kadets later often chose instead to follow the Zionists of various shadings, Bundists, or Russian Social Democrats. The mobilization of the Jewish vote, as the Kadets had an opportunity to see, often led to the intensification and diversification of Jewish politics rather than to Jewish support of the Kadet party in its struggle for the advancement of equal rights. In other words, the Kadets now faced the problem of how to steer the awakened activism of the Jews and other national minorities in the Russian borderlands toward building a constitutional order in the country according to the Kadet scenario, which envisioned a one and indivisible Russia. Therefore,

⁴⁵² Often, newspapers treated the term *local* broadly, including the provinces adjacent to the Southwestern Region in the notion of "our region" (*nash kraï*), for example, the provinces of Poltava and Chernigov. See numerous reports on the preparations for the election under the title "In Our Region" ("*Po nashemu kraiu*"). *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 6 August 1912, p. 4, 11 August 1912, p. 3.

the Kiev Kadets discussed the Jewish question as a part of a bigger picture, showing their commitment to its resolution while at the same time stressing their above-nationality approach – similar to what the Kadet leadership in the capitals did.

This shift in the Kiev Kadets' attitude toward the Jewish vote signalled a gradual but steady and profound transformation in their political mentality toward national, all-Russian concerns. Several other factors stimulated this change: the rising Russian nationalist movement and the attitude of the regime toward the Kadet Party. In Kiev province, where the Russian socialist parties were weak,⁴⁵³ increasing Jewish political activism had become a concern not only for the Kadets, but also for the provincial Russian nationalists. The latter constantly emphasized the prominence of Jews in the Kadet Party and the Kadets' advocacy of the national minorities' equal rights despite the fact that Jewish support for the Kadet party was by no means unequivocal and province-wide. The Russian nationalists labelled the Kadets "Yido-Kadets" and champions of "Yids' " demands and worked to channel the anti-Semitic sentiments of the Christian population against the Kadets. In particular, in early July 1912 the conservative newspaper *Kievlianin* urged the Russian political camp to unite because "in Kiev, where the united Jews and other militant aliens [*inorodtsy, non-Russians*] and Russian dregs of society, headed by the Kadets, combat Russian statehood," every vote counted.⁴⁵⁴ Regardless of whether the Kadet-Jewish cooperation continued to play any role in summer 1912, the nationalists kept labeling the Kadets as the allies of the Jews and the revolutionaries. In

⁴⁵³ According to the police reports, the Laborists (*Trudoviki*), Social Democrats, and Socialist Revolutionaries were few in number in Kiev province, GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, l. 35.

⁴⁵⁴ *Kievlianin*, 4 July 1912, p. 3.

August, *Kievskii Eparkhial'nyiia Vedomosti*, the official biweekly journal of the Russian Orthodox Church in Kiev province, also connected the Kadets with the Jews and the revolutionaries in a disapproving sense, using such concepts as “the campaign of the Jewish-‘progressive’ camp” and “the Kadet-demagogic propaganda” interchangeably.⁴⁵⁵ Both the nationalist and clerical publications claimed the “anti-state” and “anti-people” nature of the Kadet-Jewish cooperation.

Neither in the capitals, nor in Kiev, did the Kadets attempt to discuss the rhetoric that the nationalists used and to justify their advocacy of Jewish equality. They eventually addressed this issue, but in an indirect way. In their struggle to mobilize the vote of the Christian population, the Kiev Kadets could not ignore the label of Yido-Kadets, which the Russian nationalists bestowed upon them. Without downplaying the Jewish question, the Kiev Kadets moved their focus to the general principle of national minorities’ rights and underscored the juridical aspect of the state of Jews in Russia as one of the many nationalities deprived of political rights. Within this approach, the mobilization of the Jewish vote ceased to be a priority for the Kiev Kadets.

The second factor that made the Kiev Kadets turn toward all-Russian questions was administrative pressure, which was much stronger in the peripheries than in the capitals, especially in the borderland provinces. Essentially, the regional authorities left the Kadets without the two most powerful resources to which they had had access before and at which they were proficient – public electoral meetings and the press.⁴⁵⁶ In order to hold any public

⁴⁵⁵ “K predstoiashchim vyboram v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu,” *Kievskii Eparkhial'nyiia Vedomosti*, 12 August 1912, p. 737.

⁴⁵⁶ GARF, f. 579, op. 3, d. 61, l. 1.

gathering, its organizers had to apply for permission from the Governor-General of the Southwestern Region. By 1912, it was hardly possible not only for the Kadets but even for the Octobrists to receive such permission for a public meeting. It is remarkable that in one instance, when the Octobrists applied, the negative official reply came with an explanation that if the Octobrists were granted a permit, then the authorities would have to allow the Kadets the same, which they considered unacceptable.⁴⁵⁷ Public meetings were a powerful and indeed the primary tool that the Kadets had used – successfully – in the first two campaigns. As they hardly organized (or aimed to organize) any underground activities,⁴⁵⁸ continual bans on public meetings literally cut off the party from the voters, meaning that the Kadets lost touch with the local populace.

In turn, the local press remained the only mouthpiece of the Kiev Kadets, which, under the current circumstances, they had to use wisely, not jeopardizing their existence by discussing burning local issues in a provocative manner. Instead of heavy self-censoring, the Kiev Kadets changed the topics of their discussions rather than the tone, style, or principles. Their newspapers such as *Kievskaiia mysl'* remained alive, featuring qualitative analytical articles and sharp observations about political life in Russia. Their focus shifted toward broader topics that concerned Russia in general – such as the unity of the oppositional movement and its confrontation with the government, the Octobrists in Moscow, the work of the nationalists in zemstvo offices, the position of Russia in the Balkan war, and so on. On the whole, the Kiev Kadets looked less and less local; they

⁴⁵⁷ “Donesenie Kievskomu General-Gubernatoru,” *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 44.

⁴⁵⁸ One of the Bundist sources makes a reference to some insignificant Kadet underground activities, I doubt that the Kadets had any. Moshe Rafes *Ocherki po istorii Bunda* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1923), 207.

showed more interest in the overall composition of the future Duma or the unity of the Kadet party rather than in alliances with the political parties which were active in Kiev province.⁴⁵⁹

In this regard, the coverage of the Beilis case that took place in Kiev illustrates how the Kiev Kadets' focus moved toward an empire-wide perspective. The drama of the Kiev Jew Mendel Beilis, accused of the ritual murder of the Christian boy Andrei Iushchinskii, had been unfolding since July 1911. He was arrested at that time, then the indictment against him was withdrawn in January 1912 and a second indictment was drawn up in March 1912. Several prominent Kadets participated professionally in the trial – the lawyers Vasilii Maklakov from St. Petersburg and Arnol'd Margolin from Kiev led the defense of Mendel Beilis. In 1911-1912, the investigation made headlines in the national and Kiev press, both liberal and rightist. It became a backdrop to the fourth election campaign not only in Kiev province, but also in all of Russia. Well before the trial itself, which took place in 1913, the Beilis case ceased to be an essentially local matter as it developed an all-Russian resonance.⁴⁶⁰ During the final sessions of the Third Duma in June 1912, the Kadet leader, Miliukov called for hearing of the case in the Duma. The Social Democrat deputy, Nikolai Chkheidze, responding to Miliukov, tied the case to the problem of Jewish emancipation. In turn, the rightists expressed their readiness to discuss the matter to prove

⁴⁵⁹ The professor Ivan Luchitskii, who was a member of the Kadet Central Committee, headed the Kiev Kadets and had been the member of the Third Duma from Kiev province. Although the fact that he played a significant role among the Kiev Kadets and edited *Kievskaiia mysl'* may explain why Kiev Kadets were focused on more general, empire-wide questions, it also shows that there were few local Kadets that pursued a local agenda.

⁴⁶⁰ The St. Petersburg newspaper *Riech'* reported the matter under as the Iushchinskii murder (*K ubiistvu Iushchinskogo*) rather than the Beilis case. The Russian nationalist newspaper *Kievlianin* emphasized the topic of the blood libel and accused the Jew Mendel Beilis of the ritual murder of Andrei Iushchinskii.

the ritual character of the murder.⁴⁶¹ Therefore, discussing this initially local matter, the Kiev Kadets ended up analyzing the most infamous trial of the entire Imperial period, which became a telling prelude for the fourth electoral campaign in the country. For Kiev province, the Beilis case illuminated the Kadets' attitude toward the Jewish question – the most the Kiev Kadets could do to mobilize Jewish electoral support.

The Development of the Electoral Strategy

For the first time in the Duma period, the national election occurred on schedule. Preparations took place from June through September 1912; the two final stages of the elections – the elections of the electors and the electors' voting on the candidates to the Duma – were held in October. However, the Kadet central leadership began planning the fourth election campaign as early as in 1910, that is more than two years before the actual elections. The dismissal of the two previous Dumas haunted the oppositional parties; long before the Third Duma finished its work, they discussed early elections as highly probable. Eventually, the Third Russian Duma served its full five-year term. It survived for so long due to its more conservative make-up compared to those of the two previous Dumas and its growing willingness to support Stolypin's government. However, the Kadets saw the Duma's support for the current government not only as the source of its stability, but also as its weakness. They were concerned about the unstable position of Stolypin's government, which political elements outside the Duma were willing to overthrow.⁴⁶² The

⁴⁶¹ *Iuzhnaia kopeika*, 10 June 1912, p. 4.

⁴⁶² Moscow Department of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party. *Zapiska ob organizatsii i podgotovke predvybornoi kampanii v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, GARF, f. 579, op. 3, d. 61, l. 1. The Octobrists also discussed the possible resignation of Stolypin and part of the cabinet. Geoffrey Hosking, *The*

Kadet leadership expected that the resignation of the cabinet would entail the dismissal of the Duma, and thereby trigger another election. It speculated that the election could occur at any time. Therefore, the Moscow department of the Kadet Central Committee, which had organized and led Kadet election campaigns in the country, drew up a note about possible directions for the fourth election campaign. The local party committees, where they had still existed, were expected to adjust the general election recommendations to the local situations.

There were other reasons why the Kadets began to discuss preparations for the elections early. The situation on the ground was infinitely unfavorable for the Kadets, as the 3 June 1907 electoral law, which remained in force, favored the conservative forces, not the opposition. The interpretations of the electoral law's articles that the Senate kept releasing made that law even tougher in practice for the Kadet Party. The Kadets could hardly benefit from the convenient side effect of the weak or almost absent socialists, because the rightists had consolidated in the western borderlands and the all-Russian Nationalist Party had risen in Kiev.⁴⁶³ In addition, the Kadet central leadership correctly expected that the local authorities would eagerly put as much administrative pressure on the party as they could. Indeed, fearing the ability of Kadet speakers to discuss political themes within the context of any topic, the Kiev Governor A. F. Girs banned lectures and public talks that were organized by educational (*prosvietitel'skiia*) societies, especially if

Russian Constitutional Experiment. Government and Duma, 1907-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 93.

⁴⁶³ Robert Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907-1917* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1980), 93-100.

the speakers were politically suspect (*neblagonadezhnye*). In the absence of a formal pretext for a ban on such lectures or talks, the governor recommended that heads of police departments in the province assign police officers of class ranks (*klassnye chiny*) to attend these public meetings and submit reports about their proceedings.⁴⁶⁴ Neither in the press nor on the ground, could the Kadets hope to conduct a powerful and open election campaign under these circumstances. Complicating the situation further was the fact that many Kadet provincial organizations had practically disintegrated at that time and the party as a single entity had ceased to exist. Therefore, since broad campaigning was inconceivable and the formation of new local branches had become highly problematic, the Kadets needed more time to gather their scarce resources and reconnect with the remnants of local branches and former members, who would attain even greater importance for mobilizing the vote in the provinces.⁴⁶⁵

The general picture that the central committee of the Kadet party kept receiving from the provinces led it to recognize that not only were the possibilities for a large-scale campaign limited, but also it would be hardly possible even to coordinate whatever little the local branches would be able to initiate. In addition, provincial politics grew more sophisticated with numerous political actors emerging on the scene, especially in the borderlands, where Russian nationalist parties and national minorities' groups of various political shades entered the electoral competition. This made it more difficult for the Kadet leadership to come up with a common electoral strategy for all the provinces, except for

⁴⁶⁴ "Kievskii gubernator nachal'nikam politsii Kievskoi gubernii," *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 23, 23 ob.

⁴⁶⁵ Moscow Department of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party. *Zapiska ob organizatsii i podgotovke predvybornoi kampanii v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, GARF, f. 579, op. 3, d. 61, l. 1, 1 ob.

some general principles and direction. As early as February 1912, the police department also noted the importance that local political groups would play in the upcoming electoral campaign. It reported that the general drive would come from the provinces rather than from the capitals to the peripheries.⁴⁶⁶ Thus provincial politics became increasingly relevant to broader imperial politics in the absence of unified and concerted large-scale actions.

In addition to such an unpromising state of affairs for the Kadets, the general atmosphere during the fourth election campaign differed from the previous ones in that electoral politics had become more routine in Russia by that time. Unlike in the first campaign, now the cause of voter inertia⁴⁶⁷ was emotional fatigue and dissatisfaction with or disinterest in the work of the Third Duma, rather than ignorance of election procedures or the novelty of the idea of national elections. As a police official from Lipovets county reported in early September 1912, less than a month before the elections: “the mood of voters is completely indifferent as if no elections have been scheduled.”⁴⁶⁸ Five years separated the fourth campaign from the first three, which all ended less than twelve months after each other – in April 1906, February 1907, and November 1907. This period of 1905-1907 was rich with political changes and social processes – including the rise of the population’s political awareness, the formation of new parties and political groups such as the Russian rightists, and the rise of Jewish emigration from Russia, let alone the elections

⁴⁶⁶ *Agenturnyia sviedeniia*, GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 165, ll. 7-8.

⁴⁶⁷ The existing sources suggest various reasons for voter inertia, including the attitude toward the Duma as another unpromising bureaucratic body and the absence of legal meetings to discuss the Duma’s achievements. See, for instance, “Doneseniia gubernatorov,” *Kievskaiia Mysl’*, 5 August 1912, p. 4.

⁴⁶⁸ “Donesenie Vr. i. d. Lipovetskogo Uezdnoho Ispravnika, 11 sentiabria 1912,” *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 72.

themselves. The Kadets complained about administrative pressure during the first and second elections. Yet never again would they enjoy such freedom and the opportunity to openly discuss their program or criticize the government.

Indeed, the introduction of a more conservative electoral law in June 1907 and hard administrative pressure forced the Kadets to limit their campaigning to private party meetings and reserved debates in the press in both the third and fourth campaign. However, the two campaigns differed a great deal. As the third campaign took place shortly after the previous two, the Kadets reasoned that they could rely on the voters' support because the spirit of the previous campaign, including Kadet slogans, concepts explained in Kadet leaflets, and newspaper discussions, continued to influence the voters' mood. Thus, the Kadets nominated their candidates, hoping that voters' memory would help them even though the authorities made it impossible to carry out a widescale electoral discussion. In combination with the socialists being knocked out by the electoral law, this strategy partially worked in the third campaign. However, by the beginning of the fourth campaign, the revolutionary atmosphere had subsided, as had the population's interest in politics; the Kadet Party, practically non-existent as an organization on the ground, had to rise from the ashes to find a way to reach its voters.

Even to a greater extent than in the third campaign, the Kadets, on the one hand, needed to draw voters' attention to the party and its candidates and, on the other, to conceal from the local officials *who* the party's candidates were and *what* electoral tactics the party planned to adopt. In other words, the Kadets aimed to become influential among the population and voters but at the same time to remain invisible to the authorities, whose

animosity toward their party the Kadets considered permanent and irreversible.⁴⁶⁹ With this goal in mind, the Kadets designed their electoral campaign without employing illegal methods as did the revolutionary parties. First, as elsewhere in the empire, the Kadets hid the names of the party's candidates by presenting them as those who enjoyed popular support on their own – candidates without any party affiliation. When describing an ideal candidate, they refrained from defining him as a member or a supporter of a political party. Instead, they underscored such characteristics as political honesty or loyalty, which they interpreted as being faithful to one's political credo and not switching sides. Another important merit was the candidate's education, which the Kadets considered useful for legislative work in the Duma. Finally, the political position of the candidate should include sensitivity to the needs of the people.⁴⁷⁰ In other words, the Kadets described their requirements for candidates in general terms, without referring to the political program of their party. In addition, they literally hid the candidates to the position of elector from the authorities by developing two lists of candidates, fake and real. The Kadets kept the list of their real candidates secret until the eve of the elections.⁴⁷¹ They had already employed this strategy in the previous campaigns, but only occasionally. In the fourth campaign, they rarely developed a single list of candidates, if only because the police diligently arrested Kadet candidates under various pretexts.

⁴⁶⁹ *Neskol'ko soobrazhenii ob izbiratel'noi taktike v chetvertuiu Dumu [internal documents of the Kadet party]*, GARF, f. 579, op. 3, d. 680, l. 2.

⁴⁷⁰ "Predvybornyia sobraniia," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 3 October 1912, p. 3.

⁴⁷¹ The party meeting of the Kadets was held on 30 June 1912 in Moscow. *Delo po vyboram v Gosudarstvennuu Dumu*. GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, l. 24. A police official in Radomysl' reported that all parties keep the names of their candidates secret. *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, ll. 70, 71.

Second, the Kadets conducted their campaign under the veil of a broader oppositional movement, which could have appeal beyond the Kadet party program.⁴⁷² In particular, internally the Kadets referred to themselves and their allies and supporters as *constitutionalists*. *Progressive* was another term that the Kadets had coined in their previous campaigns and sparingly used to describe local coalitions and to target those potential voters who were not aware of more sophisticated political terminology or were not inclined to choose between specific party programs.⁴⁷³ Now, in the fourth campaign to the Duma, the Kadets deliberately avoided such terms as *Kadet*, *Constitutional Democratic*, and the party's other name *Party of People's Freedom* and replaced them with the *progressive forces* and *liberal movement*. These word games were not just a matter of terminology, but also reflected how the Kadets organized their local party resources. Provincial Kadet organizations had been decimated; those that survived could not act openly under their real political names. So, the Kadet party leadership did not encourage their supporters to develop a full-fledged network of provincial groups or to resurrect local party branches that had previously existed. Instead, they decided to build a wide electoral movement and position the party's supporters and activists within it. Local Kadet and progressive organizations would conceal their political credos and work under the banner of a non-party liberal union (the progressives).⁴⁷⁴ Those provincial Kadet organizations

⁴⁷² *Neskol'ko soobrazhenii ob izbiratel'noi taktike v chetvertuiu Dumu*, GARF, f. 579, op. 3, d. 680, l. 1.

⁴⁷³ As Nikolai Kishkin, a member of the Moscow department of the Kadet Central Committee, observed during the discussion of the preparation for the election campaign to the Fourth Duma: "the progressivists have been already labeled *Kadets*. [We have to] use [this fact]." *Doklad N.M.Kishkina na plenarnom zasedanii TsK o podgotovke vyborov v Gosudarstvennuuu Dumu. 25 apreliia 1910 goda*, GARF, f. 579, op. 1, d. 656, l. 1 ob.

⁴⁷⁴ *Neskol'ko soobrazhenii ob izbiratel'noi taktike v chetvertuiu Dumu*, GARF, f. 579, op. 3, d. 680, l. 2.

that had survived the reactionary assaults would operate without drawing attention to themselves, in parallel with the liberal union, and support and complement its work with their initiatives. Thereby, the party hoped to influence voters' preferences and have the opportunity to hear popular electoral sentiments and shape them. Hidden within a broader electoral movement, it would remain less vulnerable to attacks by the local authorities.

One of the Kadets' electoral strategies in the first three campaigns was their extensive political discussions in the press. They began publishing their newspapers in many provinces and sometimes used already existing ones for their propaganda. During the second and the third electoral campaigns, the authorities arrested many Kadet editors and closed their periodicals. Now, it was impossible for the Kadets to launch new party publications due to administrative pressure and the lack of funds.⁴⁷⁵ It was also contrary to their new tactics of concealing their party activity within a broader opposition movement. Nevertheless, the press remained a successful tool for Kadet propaganda as many newspapers across the country cooperated with the Kadets and published articles from pro-Kadet and Kadet authors. These included the newspapers *Sovremennoe slovo* (*The Contemporary Word*), *Birzhevye vedomosti* (*The Stock Exchange Bulletin*), and *Peterburgskaia gazeta* (*The Petersburg Newspaper*) in St. Petersburg; *Russkoe slovo* (*The Russian Word*), *Ranee utro* (*The Early Morning*), and *Utro Rossii* (*The Morning of Russia*) in Moscow; *Pridneprovskii krai* (*The Dnieper Region*) in Ekaterinoslav, *Kievskie viesti* (*The Kiev News*) in Kiev, *Odesskie novosti* (*The Odessa News*) in Odessa, and some others. The police suspected that some newspapers depended on Kadet funds, however

⁴⁷⁵ *Agenturnyia sviedeniiia*, GARF, f. 102, op. 1910, OO, d. 339, l. 240.

scarce they were, but it admitted that it was less the direct financing and more Kadet publications that increased newspapers' income from the subscription and retail sales.⁴⁷⁶

These pro-Kadet and oppositional newspapers were instrumental in shaping the general impression that Kadet propaganda was highly successful and that the Kadets would have significant influence on the outcome of the elections. Even more important was the enthusiasm of party members and their allies. In fact, it was not positive circumstances, but the optimistic *interpretation* of these circumstances that became a key feature of Kadet electoral politics in the fourth campaign. In particular, a closer look at what the Kadets considered their victory in the elections shows that they were ready to embrace various outcomes of the elections and treat them as successes. While they had been building a broad oppositional front intended to disguise Kadet propaganda under the progressive banner to support their candidates, they spread their ideological net wider. They stretched their definition of the opposition and added any anti-government force to it – from the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries to the leftist Octobrists.⁴⁷⁷ Thus, they prepared to interpret the total number of non-rightist elements in the Duma as the achievement of the opposition and, consequently, as their own.

There are some more examples of this “interpretational” approach that the Kadets purposefully used at this time. One of them demonstrates that the moral spirit of the Kadets was high indeed. As it had in the previous electoral campaign, the party sent its prominent speakers to the provinces to deliver public lectures. At the end of 1911, Fedor Rodichev, a

⁴⁷⁶ *Agenturnyia sviedenisia*, GARF, f. 102, op. 1910, OO, d. 339, ll. 72, 134.

⁴⁷⁷ *Agenturnyia sviedenisia*, GARF, f. 102, op. 1910, OO, d. 339, ll. 3-4, 162.

member of the Central Committee of the Kadets, was about to tour several provinces. The Kadets assumed that it was highly probable that the authorities would ban his lectures at some point. They claimed a positive outcome from both scenarios. If the authorities allowed his lectures, Rodichev and the Kadets would achieve their goal of promoting the Kadet platform. If not, the Kadets would discuss this ban in the press as widely as possible and would assert that “because [the government was] afraid of the Kadet truth, [it] did not permit perfectly legal lectures.”⁴⁷⁸ In other words, reality often did not matter. As the Kadets had limited capacity to influence events, they concerned themselves with discussing and interpreting them.

The Electoral Competition against the Right, June – July 1912

The Third Duma finished its work on June 9, 1912. By that time, many political parties and groups in Russia had launched their preliminary preparations for the fourth electoral campaign. The work of the Duma became a convenient starting point for critiques and electoral debates. The opposition parties directed their primary attacks against the Octobrists, who had held the majority in the Third Duma and shaped the direction of its work.⁴⁷⁹ The Kiev Kadets criticized the Octobrist party in the local press. Often, they were extremely sceptical even toward some straightforward statements made by the Octobrists. For instance, *Kievskaiia mysl'* (*Kiev Thought*) ridiculed the Octobrists for allegedly equating the state and the government in Russia and called such logic a special Octobrist science, which allowed such equations. The Kadets themselves stressed that the Russian

⁴⁷⁸ *Agenturnyia sviedenii*, GARF, f. 102, op. 1911, OO, d. 27, l. 14.

⁴⁷⁹ *Iuzhnaia kopeika*, 24 June 1912, p. 1.

state and the regime were not the same, kept criticizing the government, and remained highly suspicious of its actions.⁴⁸⁰

During the fourth campaign, the Octobrists served as a key target for the Kadets, both at the center and on the peripheries, but for different reasons. In general, the Octobrists remained a serious rival to the Kadets in several central Russian provinces and the Kadets hoped to make significant inroads into the left wing of the Octobrist membership and electorate. Therefore, they tried to show that both parties had some common ground – both valued the principles enunciated in the October Manifesto of 1905 – and maintained that the Octobrists failed to recognize this basic fact. In Kiev province, however, the Octobrists did not even organize a party branch. In the polemic with them, the Kiev Kadets felt safe enough to quote entire paragraphs from central Octobrist publications, only to conclude that their logic was unworthy of serious consideration as the Octobrists violated their own programmatic principles. They insisted that the Octobrists were politically immature. Clearly, the Kiev Kadets felt safe to criticize the Octobrists, who did not have a strong support in the province, if at all.⁴⁸¹ Conspicuously, the Kiev Kadets dwelt on a matter that had an empire-wide significance, but which did not help them advance their electioneering in Kiev province.

Much more aggravating for the Kiev Kadets was the electoral activities that the rightists and Russian nationalists waged in the province. From the inception of their electoral campaign in June and July of 1912, the Russian nationalists interchangeably used

⁴⁸⁰ *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 2 August 1912, p. 1.

⁴⁸¹ As the police report noted, “there was no organized [branch of] the Party of 17 October in the [Kiev] province.” GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, l. 35.

anti-*inorodtsy* (anti-alien; anti-Jewish, in the first place) and anti-Kadet rhetoric for mobilizing purposes. The Kadet leadership in St. Petersburg admitted that the western borderlands were strongholds of the rightist parties; they had some grounds, however, to hope that disagreements among the rightists could manifest themselves.⁴⁸² At the beginning of July, the nationalist newspaper *Kievlianin* announced the unity between the so-called Russian nationalist camp and the rightists, celebrating the failure of the Jews and “progressivists” to create divisions in the Russian camp. The divisions, however, were real and existed along many lines, as participants of this electoral bloc were numerous – the Russian Brotherhood, the Russian Assembly, The Union of Russian Workers, the provincial and the railway departments of The Union of the Russian people, The Kiev Monarchist Party, and “The Double Eagle Society.” In principle, however, the newspaper asserted that it was anti-Kadet sentiment that had brought the rightist-nationalist alliance into existence in Kiev province.⁴⁸³ Thus, the “Kadet (read also Jewish) danger” closed ranks of the rightist and Russian nationalist forces, which reduced electoral chances for the Kiev Kadets.

The Kadet leader Miliukov pointed to the Orthodox clergy as another factor contributing to the unification of rightist elements in the Southwest. He speculated that it would play the role of fighters against Polish landowners and great landowners,⁴⁸⁴ thus, enhancing the anti-*inorodcheskii* sentiment among voters. To be sure, the impact of the

⁴⁸² “Doklad Miliukova dlia S. Peterburgskago gorodskogo komiteta,” GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, ll. 25-30.

⁴⁸³ “Dumy i nastroeniia. LXXXIII. Kiev pered vyborami,” *Kievlianin*, 8 July 1912, p. 3. In Kiev, there were 23 monarchist organizations at that time. *Riech*, 20 September (3 October) 1912, p. 2.

⁴⁸⁴ “Doklad Miliukova dlia S. Peterburgskago gorodskogo komiteta,” GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, ll. 25-30.

clergy was strong in the neighboring provinces of Volyn' and Podol'e, but it also affected Kiev province. The priests were involved in the electoral preparations by participating in electoral meetings, which were often coordinated with the landowners of the Russian curia. In late June 1912, A.I. Savenko, a journalist from *Kievlianin* and a candidate from the nationalists, was invited to the missionary convention in the town of Cherkassy to discuss the electoral bloc between the gentry and the Orthodox clergy.⁴⁸⁵ This kind of agreement did not remain on paper. When voter lists were prepared, this cooperation went further. In Kiev county, special meetings in each parochial district elected two clergy representatives – 12 altogether – to send them to the meeting of Russian voters of the landowner curia, held on August 17 in Kiev. Eventually, these clergy delegates, along with 12 landowner delegates, formed an electoral committee to run electoral preparations in the county of Kiev.⁴⁸⁶ Similar meetings were held in other counties.

In the presence of the Black Hundred danger, Jewish parties and groups in the province became even more important and reliable partners for the Kadets in the electoral campaign. However, the electoral agenda of the Kadet central leadership for the western borderlands, including Kiev province, did not prioritize the mobilization of Jewish voters against the rightist bloc or seeking agreements with the Jewish political parties. Miliukov articulated the Kadet strategy against the united rightist camp: building a united progressive front like elsewhere in Russia. In order to overcome “certain nationalist instincts” of voters in borderland provinces, Miliukov proposed nominating progressive candidates who were

⁴⁸⁵ “Donesenie pomoshchnika nachal'nika Kievskogo zhandarmskogo urpavleniia po Cherkasskom I Chigirinskom uezdakh,” *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 41.

⁴⁸⁶ “Donesenie Kievskomu gubernatoru Kievskogo Uezdnoho Ispravnika,” TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 51.

not renowned for their Kadet views and those with less well-known names, who, therefore, would look more acceptable for both the Russian and non-Russian population (*inorodcheskoe naselenie*). He stressed that, since the label “progressive” sounded less powerful (*ne tak sil’no*) than that of the “Kadet,” such candidates, he hoped, could play a role during the final stage, in the provincial elections. Rightist peasants could potentially vote for them, which could produce a split within the rightist camp.⁴⁸⁷

The Kadet leader counted on the support of Jewish voters only in the second municipal curia. Yet the Jewish political camp was diverse; the relationships with it and within it were quite tense. Although Miliukov considered inessential any frictions among Jewish political parties, solidarity within them was disputable. A serious split between the Zionists and Jewish liberals had emerged on the eve of the second elections in late 1906. Later, the Zionists challenged the Jewish liberals in the second elections; however, later they themselves sustained divisions. Meantime, the Kiev Kadets managed to make an electoral alliance with the Jewish Bund in the second campaign on an anti-Zionist basis. By the third campaign, the Kadet-Bundist cooperation ended. Since then the Jewish liberals had not created a separate political party and continued to pursue their goals within the Kadet party – in Kiev province as well as elsewhere. In other words, numerous disagreements burdened the Kadet-Jewish relationships. The alliance between the Kadets and other Jewish parties was by no means full, natural, or general. As for ordinary Jewish voters, the Kadet campaign did not envision specific plans to mobilize them in order not to further arouse the Jewish camp, as any political stirring of the Jews could bring undesirable

⁴⁸⁷ “Doklad Miliukova dlia S. Peterburgskago gorodskogo komiteta,” GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, ll. 25-30.

outcomes for the Kadets. Thus, Jewish support for the Kiev Kadets could be neither universal nor complete.

The Decrease of Jewish Voters: The Struggle around Voter Lists, August-September 1912

Jewish backing further thinned out as the important stage of the electoral campaign unfolded around the composition of voter lists in August and later in September 1912. The city authorities began questioning the eligibility of Jews for participation in the elections and refused to include many Jewish voters on the lists on various grounds such as the difference in spelling of voters' names in their documents or the absence of confirmation of their residential status. These and similar issues, which required making decisions on a case by case basis, arose despite the fact that the electoral law had not changed since 1907 and that it had been already applied in the elections to the Third Duma. The Senate continued to issue numerous special interpretations (*raz''iasneniia*), which had become the indispensable guide for the local authorities in implementing particular articles of the electoral law. They targeted the Jews most mercilessly. As a result, Jewish voters made up the lion's share among the "interpreted" (*raz''iasnennye*), or disenfranchised.⁴⁸⁸ One of the frequent reasons for excluding Jews from voting lists, or not including them on the list at all, was their residential status. In order to qualify to vote outside of the Pale of Settlement, which was the case with the city of Kiev but not with other municipalities of Kiev province,

⁴⁸⁸ At the party meeting of the Kadets, which was held on 30 June 1912 in Moscow, the participants admitted that the mass "interpretations" of the Jews left the Kadet party without many of its supporters. *Delo po vyboram v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*. GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, l. 24. See also "O bor'be za svobodu izbiratel'noi kampanii. Otdel'nyi ottisk iz Izveshcheniia Organizatsionnago Komiteta o konferentsii organizatsii RSDRP," *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 216.

a Jew had to have an unconditional residence permit (*bezuslovnoe pravo zhitel'stva*). As a result, holders of a trade licence, pharmacy apprentices, and sales clerks, or those whose residence the authorities determined to be temporary were thus deprived of their voting rights.⁴⁸⁹ Still Senatorial interpretations left much room for ambiguity and speculation. Therefore, general governors, mayors, and political parties attempted to use this mechanism to tilt the electoral balance to their own benefit. They initiated inquiries to the Senate, referring to local precedents. The Senate responded with more interpretations, which sometimes even defeated the intentions of the law-maker.

Sometimes the central government even had to proactively rectify the distortions which occurred when the local authorities applied the electoral law in the provinces. For instance, the Minister of the Interior A. A. Makarov issued a directive regarding first guild Jewish merchants who had paid their first guild license for ten years outside of the Pale and five years within it. The directive ordered the local authorities to include first guild merchants' sons on general voter lists without any special applications. In practice, however, when applying to have their missing names added to the lists, the applicants had to submit supporting documents to initiate verification of their residential status.⁴⁹⁰ Even being on the list did not end the verification for the Jewish voters. The next stage involved the checking of their residence status by the authorities. For this purpose, on August 7, 1912, the statistics department of the city council sent the names of 4,755 Jews to the city address bureau to determine whether they had unconditional residence permits for the city

⁴⁸⁹ *Iuzhnaia kopeika*, 16 June 1912, p. 2.

⁴⁹⁰ "Iсполнение tsirkuliara A. A. Makarova [The implementation of Makarov's directive]," *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 4 August 1912, p. 3.

of Kiev. Those whose residence status was determined as temporary were to be removed from the vote lists. The lists of the non-Jewish voters were subject to the same examination to ensure that there were no Jews among them.⁴⁹¹

According to Kadet sources, the general number of Jews who were deprived of voting rights in Kiev in this way was at least 5,500.⁴⁹² This did not happen overnight; the process unfolded during the entire period of the electoral preparations, from June through October 1912. It got into its full swing at the time when the statistics departments of municipal and provincial councils were drawing up the electoral lists in late July and early August. Local newspapers reported a more detailed picture. As of August 11, the number of Jews to be included on the lists was 4,726. The city registry of Kiev, on the basis of the personal information that the police had submitted, marked this list with notes about the professional status of Jews – doctor, engineer, pharmacist, lawyer (*prisiazhnyi poverennyi*), and so on. The registry analyzed its notes and left only 231 Jews (i.e. less than 5%) on the electoral list. In addition, the statistical department included 166 Jewish merchants of the first guild in the list. Finally, another 116 Jews who applied for participation in the elections and personally submitted their documents managed to prove their voting rights. Overall, the Kiev authorities applied the Senatorial interpretations and registered only some 500-600 Jews for both municipal curias in the city of Kiev, instead of the 5,005 Jews who were eligible to participate in the elections according to the 1907 electoral law.⁴⁹³

⁴⁹¹ “V Kieve,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 8 August 1912, p. 4.

⁴⁹² Ia. L. “Vybory” in *Ezhegodnik gazety Riech' na 1913 god*, (St. Petersburg: Izdanie redaktsii gazety “Riech’,” 1913), 205.

⁴⁹³ “V Kieve. Vybory v gosudarstvennuu dumu,” *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 11 August 1912, p. 3.

Jews were often taken off the electoral lists also on non-Jewish criteria as well. The municipal statistics department would include very few Jews on the electoral lists unconditionally, on the basis of their employment in state or public offices or in estate and railway enterprises. A great number of Jews qualified to vote as renters of tax-exempt apartments. The authorities questioned their voting rights; so, they had to apply for participation in the elections and to prove their voting right by submitting various supporting documents. The application was a slow process that required several steps. For Jews, it doubled the paperwork as they had to prove their residence status as Jews and show their property qualification as, for example, apartment renters. On some days, few – two or three – or no applications came in to the statistical department.⁴⁹⁴ Both the Jewish and non-Jewish population remained passive; not many were eager to spend their time and energy on bureaucratic procedures.⁴⁹⁵ The only exceptions to this pattern were cases when the nationalists collected applications from voters and submitted them as a package to the statistical department. For example, on August 8, 1912, out of 53 applications, the members of the Union of the Russian People submitted a package of 51 applications on behalf of apartment renters. On the same day, only one Jew applied. By that time, the total number

⁴⁹⁴ About the general pace, see “K vyboram v 4-iu Gosud. Dumu,” *Kievlianin*, 20 July 1912, p. 4, “Osushchestvlenie izbiratel’nykh prav,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 10 August 1912, p. 4. Also “V Kieve. Vybory v gosudarstvennuu dumu,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 8 August 1912, p. 4. (Specifically on the submission of Jewish voters’ applications see, for instance, the latter and *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 9 August 1912, p. 3).

⁴⁹⁵ The applicant had to submit the application and the local police certificate which verified that the applicant had rented the apartment for at least one year [*dannoe litso zanimaet na svoe imia kvartiru ne menee goda*]. In order to obtain the latter, the applicant had to submit a lease agreement [*kvartirnaia knizhka*] or a note from the home owner, which verified that the applicant had effectively lived in the apartment for one year, to the local police office. *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 5 August 1912, p. 4.

of submitted applications in this category was 272; out of this number, the members of the monarchist organizations had collected and submitted 193.⁴⁹⁶

Some other Senatorial interpretations and special telegrams of the Minister of the Interior concerned lower-class voters, and thus, excluded the Jewish voters on the basis of their property qualification. Specifically, when the authorities tried to decide how to identify those voters who had rented taxable apartments by August 1912, they could not do so because no data had been collected for the current year. The solution to this problem was purely bureaucratic and its implementation extended the requirement to pay taxes from one year to two.⁴⁹⁷ This excluded quite a few names from the lists only due to technical reasons. In many instances, bureaucratic procrastinations prevented the voters from meeting the application deadlines.⁴⁹⁸

Summing up, Jewish support became problematic for the Kiev Kadets. As the Jewish electorate had been dwindling, Jews ceased to be a much-valued source of votes and the Kadets needed to find other ways to campaign in the province. Contrary to the previous electoral campaigns, especially the first one, the Kiev Kadets did not raise the issue of equal rights when violations of the electoral law occurred.⁴⁹⁹ Only central

⁴⁹⁶ *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 9 August 1912, p. 3. *Kievskaiia mysl'* reported similar cases daily. On 7 August a member of the monarchist organizations submitted 58 applications, collected mostly from apartment renters in Luk'ianovskii electoral district of Kiev. No other applications were submitted in this category. *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 8 August 1912, p. 4.

⁴⁹⁷ The newspaper *Kievlianin* explained that as the publication of the voter lists was scheduled in August 1912, only those who had paid apartment taxes in 1911 could be included on the vote lists. Thus, the payment period formally increased to two years (1911 and 1912). "K vyboram v 4-iu Dumu," *Kievlianin*, 20 July 1912, p. 3.

⁴⁹⁸ Ia. L. "Vybory," *Ezhegodnik gazety Riech' na 1913 god* (St. Petersburg: Izdanie redaktsii gazety "Riech'," 1913), 203.

⁴⁹⁹ Of course, the participation of many Kadet lawyers in the Beilis case enhanced the visibility of the Kadet-Jewish political partnership.

newspapers such as the Kadet *Riech*’ discussed this question more readily and freely, if only because censorship in the provinces was stricter. As the Kadets did not have solid support in a particular class, they had to gather their electorate piece by piece and thus could not neglect Jewish voters. Yet they needed to do so in a balanced manner so as not to bring about too much mobilization into the Jewish political camp and, at the same time, not to provoke a further labelling of the Kadet party as defenders of the Jews and other aliens. The Kadet leadership’s approach toward the Jews differed from that for the general voters. If the Kadets hoped to hide within the opposition bloc by using the name of progressives, they subtly tuned their rhetoric for the Jewish audience. They proposed to campaign in the second curia, in which the presence of the Jewish political element was the strongest, with their open, Kadet face.⁵⁰⁰ By doing so, they stressed the long-time role of the Kadets as advocates of Jewish rights, which had formed in the minds of the voters, including the Jewish ones. It was also a reference to the previous election campaigns, when the Kadets more openly advocated equal rights for all citizens of Russia, including the legally deprived Jews.

In general, the Kadet campaign was less a political program, than an effort not to take steps that would harm their position. The Kiev Kadets, weakened and decimated, had to balance between the local progressive, Ukrainian, and leftist parties, all of whom, according to Miliukov, recognized the necessity to form a bloc against the Black Hundred danger.⁵⁰¹ However, divisions between the Kiev Kadets and other local groups were serious

⁵⁰⁰ “Doklad Miliukova dlia S. Peterburgskago gorodskogo komiteta,” GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, ll. 25-30.

⁵⁰¹ “Doklad Miliukova dlia S. Peterburgskago gorodskogo komiteta,” GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, ll. 25-30.

enough to prevent them from coming to an agreement even against the nationalist bloc. While the Kadets moved to a strategy of advocating equality for all and dropped their emphasis on the autonomy of Poland and Finland, the local national parties and groups became more focused on particular achievements for the Jews, Poles, Ukrainians, and so on. Two episodes from the work of the Third Duma illustrate the Kadets' struggle to balance their own agenda and the demands of local nationalist groups. In 1909, the Ukrainian activists requested that the Kadet faction call on the Duma to introduce the Ukrainian language in local schools. The member of the Duma from Kiev, Ivan Luchitskii, though sympathetic, replied that the time for such a move was inopportune.⁵⁰² The second episode, which occurred approximately at the same time, resulted in a different outcome. The Jewish parties – the Zionists and Bundists – exercised such pressure on the Jewish liberals that the Kadet faction in the Duma finally, after many months of dithering, called for the elimination of the Pale of Jewish Settlement in Russia.⁵⁰³ The bill was delayed in the Duma commission and the Third Duma never came back to the subject. Although the Kadets yielded to the Jewish groups and not to the Ukrainian ones, both calls ran contrary to the Kadet strategy to promote the general principle of civil equality rather than respond to particular aspirations of specific nationalities.

In Kiev province, this strategy of giving a priority to a fundamental transformation of the empire's legal order over local interests led to repercussions during the election

⁵⁰² Luchitskii Ivan Vasil'evich. *O postanovke i obsuzhdenii voprosa v Gosudarstvennoi dume po ukrainizatsii shkol*. The Institute of Manuscripts of the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine, f. 66, d. 255, 1909, ark. 1-4.

⁵⁰³ Alexander Orbach, "The Jewish People's Group and Jewish Politics in Tsarist Russia, 1906-1914," *Modern Judaism*, vol. 10, no. 1 (February 1990), 8.

campaign, as it resulted in the failure of the Kadets to build an oppositional coalition wide enough to compete with the rightist bloc. By the beginning of the fourth election campaign, the Ukrainian parties no longer supported the nomination of Luchitskii to the next Duma. Therefore, if the “Kadet danger” closed ranks of the rightist and Russian nationalist forces, the idea of “Black Hundred danger” did not unify the opposition front that the Kiev Kadets had been building. By August 1912, Miliukov, assessing Kiev province’s electoral potential, admitted that the Kadet leadership had to consider Kiev province lost and that the Kadets’ only hope was to gain votes from the divisions among electors.⁵⁰⁴ The unfolding events confirmed Miliukov’s forecast.

The struggle around the voter lists continued well into the middle of August. For two more weeks after the publication of these lists in *Kievskii gubernskii Vedomosti* (*The Kiev Provincial News*), the official newspaper in the province, it was permitted to contest the presence or absence of particular voters’ names on the lists. The rightists, Russian nationalists, progressives, Kadets, and leftists as well as the local authorities themselves worked to achieve changes to the lists that would work in their favor. They called upon the voters to attend to their civic duty and to closely examine the lists – to check the spelling of their names or if their names were found to be missing from the lists, to submit supporting documents to prove their eligibility to vote. The rightists and Russian nationalists went to the masses, explaining the importance of participation in the elections and offering to collect individual applications – in other words, they adopted the tactics for which they had criticized the Kadets in the second election campaign. Admittedly, the

⁵⁰⁴ “Doklad Miliukova dlia S. Peterburgskago gorodskogo komiteta,” GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, ll. 25-30.

nationalists were less scrupulous about legal procedures than the Kadets had been and gave much cause to criticize them for numerous frauds and manipulations. The newspaper *Riech* mentioned that the nationalists submitted applications from children and students of primary schools in the city of Kiev.⁵⁰⁵ The chairs of the electoral commissions, some of whom were lawyers, did not object to such applications. The nationalists also received powerful assistance from the police, which verified the numerous – Kadet sources claimed several thousand – applications from the alleged renters of tax-exempt apartments, who in reality were ineligible, as they were renters of rooms and even corners in the apartments. The Kadets complained that the police processed a high number of the applications in several days, such as would never have happened to supporters of the progressives.⁵⁰⁶

After the two-week period allocated to correct the voter lists, it was still possible to remove voters' names from the lists if some fraud or controversy regarding their voting qualifications could be proven. The provincial authorities at various local levels used every such opportunity and kept removing Jews' names by hundreds under various pretexts. In the town of Zvenigorodka and its county, 140 voters of the second municipal curia, mostly Jewish, were excluded due to alternative spellings of their names in their documents. In Lipovets county, 391 voters of the first and second municipal curias, almost all Jewish, were excluded.⁵⁰⁷ Clearly, the interest in the elections was in decline, as voters did not submit a single complaint about their missing names in the published lists.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁵ "Predvybornyia vpechatleniia. V Kieve," *Riech*, 20 September (3 October) 1912, p. 2.

⁵⁰⁶ "Predvybornyia vpechatleniia. V Kieve," *Riech*, 20 September (3 October) 1912, p. 2.

⁵⁰⁷ "Predvybornyia vpechatleniia. V Kieve," *Riech*, 20 September (3 October) 1912, p. 2.

⁵⁰⁸ "[Donesenie] po Chigirinskomu uezdu," *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 65.

The Role of the “Jewish Question” in the Kiev Kadets’ Electoral Politics

The Kadets counted on Jewish support, both lay and that of the Jewish parties. They considered the latter their strongest allies in the borderlands and were confident of an opposition victory here in the second municipal curia.⁵⁰⁹ The presence of the noticeable Jewish minority, along with other non-Russian ones – the Poles, Czechs, and Germans, had given an impetus for the rise of Russian nationalism, which embraced the function of defending the Russian population and Russianness against the aliens in the borderlands.⁵¹⁰ In early July, the local nationalist newspaper *Kievlianin* announced that the nationalist and rightist parties and groups had formed an electoral bloc in Kiev province. The organized and united clergy supported this bloc, which made the position of the Kiev Kadets even less sustainable.

By targeting Jewish voters, the authorities significantly undermined the position of the Kiev Kadets, yet forced them to focus on the non-Jewish electorate. Jewish support became less significant, although it remained relevant. In addition, by removing a large number of Jews from the electoral equation, the authorities broke the existing balance in the Russian nationalist camp as well. In late September, the central Kadet newspaper *Riech’* reported that the disagreements within the nationalist bloc were significant enough to raise some anxiety in the provincial administration about the probability of a split and to give the Kiev Kadets some hope for a victory.⁵¹¹ Ironically, the absence of the Jewish element

⁵⁰⁹ “Doklad Miliukova dlia S. Peterburgskago gorodskogo komiteta,” GARF, f. 102, op. 1912, OO, d. 27, l. 27

⁵¹⁰ “Predvybornyia vpechatleniia. V Kieve,” *Riech’*, 20 September (3 October) 1912, p. 2.

⁵¹¹ “Predvybornyia vpechatleniia. V Kieve,” *Riech’*, 20 September (3 October) 1912, p. 2.

made the electoral prospects of the Kiev Kadets more promising as the divisions in the camp of their rivals became an asset for the Kadets.

The problem of the absence of the Jewish element that the Russian nationalists faced was exacerbated by the establishing of nationality curias. Once the rightists could not unite around anti-Semitism, the nationalist camp must face its internal divisions. In the county town of Cherkassy, where the authorities divided the voters of the two municipal curias into two nationality categories – Russian and for other nationalities (non-Russian, alien, *inorodcheskaia*), – the police reported that the question of candidates from the Jews lost its importance for the Russian parties as the main struggle unfolded now between the nationalists and the progressives for the Christian voters within the Russian curia. The debates within the nationalist camp also became complicated. In particular, to discuss the candidacies of their potential electors, the nationalists scheduled no less than five electoral meetings of voters from the first municipal curia – on September 16, 23, 26, and 30 and October 1.⁵¹² The progressive bloc did not enjoy such a luxury, of course. Even during the first electoral campaign, when the authorities had been lenient towards electoral meetings, meetings of voters were less numerous.

In Uman' county, where both municipal curias were also organized into two separate nationality categories, Russian voters became the major focus for both the progressives, on the one hand, and Russian nationalists and rightists, on the other. The Uman' newspaper *Provintsial'nyi golos (Provincial Voice)* expressed its confidence that the progressives would enjoy the support of voters – Jews, Catholics, and others – in both

⁵¹² *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, ll. 63, 63 ob., 64

non-Russian municipal curias (the first and the second curias). Therefore, the newspaper explained, the electoral struggle would unfold in the Russian curias. It called on the Russian voters to vote for the progressives, pointing out that the latter defended the broad masses' interests against the existing regime.⁵¹³ Such an approach made this county newspaper sound like a central national daily rather than a local periodical which was concerned with provincial affairs. In other words, once Jewish and other non-Russian voters were removed from the electoral discussion, the debate shifted from interethnic relationships to economic and social issues. Rather than, for example, bringing up the question of equality, the oppositional rhetoric moved to general, all-Russian themes – the renovation of Russia and the adoption of laws to alleviate lives of the masses.⁵¹⁴

Although the Jewish vote ceased to be decisive for the Kiev Kadets' electoral politics, the Kadet-Jewish cooperation was still important for both sides. Even in the absence of a broad campaign, Jewish voters, who espoused a wide range of political views from Zionist to Bundist to liberal as well as non-party, remained the Kadets' allies, not rivals. Now the mechanism of Jewish support took a different path. The division of the electoral curia into nationality sections created a sphere where Jews became the only, or at least, the main players, because non-Russian curia comprised mostly Jewish voters.⁵¹⁵ The counties of Zvenigorodka and Berdichev with a Jewish majority of 90% of the total number of voters in the urban curia serve as prominent examples. In the counties, the Jews relied

⁵¹³ “Kogo vybirat’. *Provintsial’nyi golos*, 28 September 1912.” *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 427 ob.

⁵¹⁴ “Kogo vybirat’. *Provintsial’nyi golos*, 28 September 1912.” *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 427 ob.

⁵¹⁵ Along with a fraction of Poles and some other nationalities such as Germans and Czechs.

on their own resources when nominating candidates to the positions of elector. During this process, they faced their own diversity; their nominee, later their elector, was more than often a Jew, although there were instances when a non-Jew became their choice. The Radomysl' police department reported that the Jewish voters planned to nominate the elector from amongst themselves (*iz svoei sredy*).⁵¹⁶ The Cherkassy police department reported that the Jewish voters of the non-Russian curia nominated and elected “their own,” that is, a Jewish candidate.

At the next stage, the provincial round of elections, Jewish electors faced the dilemma of either voting for a Jew, whose political views could range from leftist to liberal, or a non-Jew who would advocate Jewish emancipation, that is, often a progressive candidate. In his interview with the newspaper *Iuzhnaia molva* (*Southern Talk*), the elector of the non-Russian section of the first municipal curia, Osher-Itsko Moshkov Shapiro of Berdichev county, explained that his preference would be a Jew with a progressive mindset. As an example of a Jew with “honest societal instincts,” he mentioned the Kiev lawyer, Arnol'd Margolin, who, by his own admission, was not a progressive or liberal, but close to the left wing of the Kadets.⁵¹⁷ If required to choose between a Russian progressive and a “true” (*istinnyi*) Jew who was a rich financier, Shapiro would vote for a Russian progressive such as Dmitrii Grigorovich-Barskii, a Kiev Kadet and lawyer. Incidentally, Grigorovich-Barskii participated in the defence of Mendel Beilis. As to his own political views, Shapiro defined himself as an independent (*bezpartiinyi*) who supported “all honest

⁵¹⁶ *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 70.

⁵¹⁷ Margolin mentioned the political programs of the Laborists and of the People's Socialist Party as the closest to his political views. Arnol'd Margolin, *Ukraina i politika Antanty* (Berlin: Izdatel'stvo S. Efron, 1922), 24.

progressive and democratic currents of Russian life.”⁵¹⁸ Similarly, an Uman’ elector from the second curia, Izrail’ Shmukler, whom the internal police correspondence described as “a Jewish Kadet” (*evreiskii Kadet*), would also be likely to support Kadet candidates.⁵¹⁹ Such a position of Jewish electors who believed that progressive candidates could better represent Jewish interest than some Jews meant that the Russian liberals could count on Jewish support during the final voting of the Duma elections at the provincial electoral assembly. The Kadets and the Jews needed each other; the Jews continued to stake their hopes on the Kadets in local politics.

The Beilis case played an important role in the electoral campaigns of all political forces. For the Kadet party, it worked as the only official tribune available to them to address the Jewish masses. Of course, they did not mean to campaign for their party among the Jewish population by working toward the acquittal of Beilis. Their major goal was the legal case in principle, the defence of the innocent individual, but more so it was the defence of justice in Russia. It was the Russian nationalists who were responsible for bringing the Beilis case into their electoral rhetoric. While the Kadet sources reported the murder of Iushchinskii in a very dry and legalistic manner, the nationalists’ newspapers, leaflets, and brochures made many references to the case and the elections, in which they accused the Jews of maintaining ritual murder as a Jewish tradition. Such actions inadvertently reminded Jewish voters that it was the Kadet lawyers who defended Mendel

⁵¹⁸ An excerpt from the newspaper *Iuzhnaia molva*, N 220. *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 426 ob.

⁵¹⁹ *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 298.

Beilis and that their logical option in the elections would be to vote for the Kadets in their progressive disguise.

Sometimes the nationalists omitted the Kadet party from their anti-Semitic rhetoric. When the editors of the Russian nationalist organization “Double Eagle” issued a leaflet in which they campaigned against the progressive candidate Grigorovich-Barskii, they accused him of defending Beilis and being a protégé (*stavlennik*) of the Jews. Their verbal attacks on Professor Sergei Ivanov, the Kadet candidate in the second municipal curia in Kiev, labeled him a henchman of the Jews. Not once did the leaflet directly mention the Kadets or progressives. The nationalists preferred to target these candidates for their individual connections with the Jews. The Jews remained their main target. In this case, the nationalists went anti-Semitic rather than anti-liberal.⁵²⁰

As the elections approached, administrative pressure intensified, but it also became focused on specific issues and, later, on particular individuals – electors whom progressives nominated as their candidates to the Duma. In order to limit electoral discussions, in September 1912 Governor General of the Southwestern Region, F.F. Trepov would forbid electoral meetings of any political groups except those of the Russian nationalists.⁵²¹ In the same vein, Governor of Kiev province A.F. Girs cancelled all evening classes for adults at the elementary people’s colleges (*nachal’nyia narodnyia uchilishcha*) in August and September. The reason he gave for this was that it was extremely difficult to put these

⁵²⁰ “K delu Iushchinskago,” *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 321. The leaflet also made a reference to the assassination of the prime minister Petr Stolypin by the Jew Dmitrii Bogrov.

⁵²¹ “Vybory v Gosudarstvennu Dumu. Za nedelu,” *Riech*, 17 September 1912, p. 2.

classes under proper surveillance, when the attention of the population would be drawn to the elections.⁵²² His fears were, of course, that these classes would become disguised electoral or public political meetings or that the enlightening of voters on election-related matters would take place there. Similarly, as early as in December 2011, the governor had already tried to monitor public lectures that local enlightenment societies organized on account of upcoming elections to the Duma.⁵²³

When the progressives disclosed their candidates, the authorities attempted to find possible pretexts to remove them from the electoral race. An episode with prosecuting a progressive candidate shows how the Kiev authorities used the “Jewish question” in manipulating the election campaign in the province. In September, after the first stage of the elections, the Kiev Prosecutor’s office targeted the progressive elector, Dmitrii Grigorovich-Barskii,⁵²⁴ who became the main rival of the nationalists’ candidate, Vsevolod Demchenko in the first municipal curia in Kiev.⁵²⁵ Grigorovich-Barskii was accused of signing the appeal against the blood libel earlier that year – in April, that is, almost five months before the prosecution commenced. At that time *Kievskaiia mysl’* published the document on its pages, along with names of people who signed it.⁵²⁶ No one else whose names appeared on the list but Grigorovich-Barskii was prosecuted. As later Grigorovich-Barskii himself explained, the appeal was issued as a response to several anti-Semitic

⁵²² *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 34.

⁵²³ *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 23.

⁵²⁴ “Russkaia zhizn’. Delo D. N. Grigorovicha-Barskago,” *Riech’*, 11 (24) September 1912, p. 5.

⁵²⁵ V. Ia. Demchenko was a former railway engineer and the chair of the Kiev county zemstvo office. *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 418.

⁵²⁶ “Protiv krovavago naveta,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 8 April 1912, p. 4.

leaflets, which had been circulated on the eve of the Passover.⁵²⁷ The appeal, which urged against the blood libel, contained no references to the Iushchinskii (Beilis) case. Yet the Kiev civil prosecutor (*Kievskii okružnoi prokuror*) Zatsepin interpreted Grigorovich-Barskii's participation as an attempt to exert pressure on the jury in the Beilis case.

Essentially, the Grigorovich-Barskii case was born out of the Beilis case; its electoral implications as well as timing were so straightforward that its role in the official policies toward progressive candidates was unquestionable. The central Kadet newspaper *Riech'* discussed probable reasons behind it. Grigorovich-Barskii conveniently combined all necessary attributes: he was a progressive candidate to the Duma, the Beilis' defender, and one of those who signed the protest against the blood libel.⁵²⁸ The Kadets approached this case from the legal perspective; the authorities had removed several thousands of Jews from electoral lists and later they brought them back figuratively by employing a sensitive issue of interethnic relations in electoral politics. By connecting the progressives and the Jews, the officials inadvertently kept reminding the Jews about the role the Kadets played in the Beilis case, in particular, and in advocating the Jewish rights, in general. It was clear that the Kadets provided the essential assistance to Beilis by mobilizing their professional resources. They also brought prominence to the case not only in the domestic scene, but also helping it achieve the international resonance.

The Kadet party, including the Kiev Kadets, directed their main efforts to the electoral fight against the government as a common target for the progressives. However, the disagreements in the oppositional camp were serious enough to draw a part of the

⁵²⁷ In 1912, the Passover fell on March 20; the Orthodox Easter was on March 25.

⁵²⁸ "Russkaia zhizn'. Delo D. N. Grigorovicha-Barskago," *Riech'*, 11 (24) September 1912, p. 5.

Jewish vote from the Kadets despite their resonant participation in the Beilis case. The Social Democrats were their chief rival in rallying Jewish support. The Jewish Bund, which became the Kadets' technical ally in Kiev province in the second elections, had strengthened its position within the Russian Social Democratic Party since then and decided to join the Kadets only in the face of the Black Hundred danger and only at the final, provincial balloting. From the very beginning of the electoral campaign, the Kadet leadership had held negotiations with the Social Democrats, trying to break the ice between the parties. The leftists staunchly rejected the Kadet invitation to build an oppositional coalition stating that the Kadets might betray the oppositional bloc and make an agreement with the government.⁵²⁹ They consistently attacked the Kadets and labeled them as the most dangerous competitor.

At the end of June, the Kadets conducted several meetings with the Social Democrats. Both parties came to their own, nearly opposite, conclusions, which showed that they did not listen to each other. The Social Democrats resolved that they could not trust the Kadets as the Kadet program had swung to the right since 1905.⁵³⁰ They planned to nominate their own candidates and make agreements *against* the liberals in the cities of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, and some others. Their policy envisioned the bloc with liberals against the Octobrist-Black Hundred and the government parties (the rightists) only at the final stages of the elections.⁵³¹ Along with the main party electoral policies, the

⁵²⁹ *Agenturnyia sviedeniia*, GARF, f. 102, op. 1910, OO, d. 165, ll. 45-46.

⁵³⁰ *Agenturnyia sviedeniia*, GARF, f. 102, op. 1910, OO, d. 165, ll. 47-48.

⁵³¹ *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, l. 27.

Jewish Bund intended to go in the elections independently and accepted the bloc with the Kadets for the provincial ballot (*gubernskie vybory* – the final stage of voting) only.⁵³² Although the Kadets did not receive a positive answer from the Social Democrats, they were confident in proving their case and inferred that they gained a serious victory over the antagonism of the Social Democrats.⁵³³ Apparently, the Kadets did not lose their hope to bring the Social Democrats into the united opposition; therefore, they interpreted the absence of a negative answer from the leftists as a positive sign.⁵³⁴ The Kadets continued making efforts to involve the Social Democrats in the joint opposition; the Social Democrats would follow their resolutions and reject the partnership with the Kadets. These relationships dragged on until the elections started in October and, along with the disagreements that had unfolded earlier between the Kadets and the Zionists, drew off from the Kadets a number of the scarce Jewish votes that the Kadets still enjoyed.

Even though party programs often envisioned clear cut political outlooks, the reality lent itself to numerous intermixed variations. This was especially true in the borderlands, where voters often did not distinguish between particular wings of a party and even different parties as the line between their ideologies was often blurred. For instance, one could support a large, empire-wide party, such as the Kadets or Socialist Revolutionaries, and at the same time be a member of a local group whose programmatic goals concerned aspirations of local national minorities, such as the Ukrainian Democrats

⁵³² *Delo po vyboram v chetvertuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu*, TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 2648, ll. 74, 75.

⁵³³ *Agenturnyia sviedenii*, GARF, f. 102, op. 1910, OO, d. 165, l. 49.

⁵³⁴ During meetings, the Kadets kept offering various reasons for an alliance to the SDs, while the SDs refrained from the positive answer.

or Jewish non-party group. Sometimes it was the matter of logistics – personal connections had developed when some parties transported illegal party literature together or stored it in one safe place.⁵³⁵ During searches the police could find a wide range of political literature – from socialist to Kadet publications – in one apartment.

A more revealing mix of the Kadet and Social Democratic loyalties also occurred. There were quite a few examples of fluid political identity which the police registered in Kiev province. Zakharii Ivanovich Krakovetskii, a notary public in the county town of Uman', materially supported members of the Uman' organization of the Social Democratic party until 1906. Then he joined the Uman' department of the Kadets and participated in their election campaign to the Third Duma. Later in this year, the police arrested him for his participation in Uman' revolutionary committee, spreading the revolutionary literature, and calling to a revolution for the purpose of separation of Little Russia (Malorossia) from Russia. He remained in the Kadet party until 1908, when he joined *Spilka*, the Ukrainian Social Democratic party. By 1912, as the police registered, he had become a *mazepinist*, a supporter of the Mazepa movement – a collective name that the police officials used for the Ukrainian national movement.⁵³⁶

This illustration of the political evolution of a local activist had its limitations, of course. First, the police officers used many political terms such as *revolutionary*, *mazepinist*, and *Kadet* in the widest possible meaning, sometimes to hide their poor

⁵³⁵ Yury Boshyk, "Jewish-Ukrainian Political Relations in Imperial Russia," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2010), 178.

⁵³⁶ *Kopii spravok iz del Kievskogo GZhU o raznykh litsakh, obviniaemykh v prinallezhnosti k nelegal'nykh partiiam, rasprostranerii nelegal'noi literatury, vyskazyvanii protiv tsaria i za uchastie v nelegal'nykh skhodkakh i demonstratsiakh*. TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 3684, l. 5.

command of a local situation. Second, many officers just could not identify the differences within the oppositional camp. However, this is what this example reveals – that the police often could not identify one’s affiliation with a specific party or support for it, sometimes because an outsider or politically inexperienced person could easily combine support for two or more parties. Given the fact that that the provincial Kadets frequently espoused more radical views than their colleagues in St. Petersburg and Moscow, their rank-and-file members could accept the leftist outlook readily and switch from the Kadets to the Social Democrats and back and even support both of them simultaneously. In other words, the Kadet vision of the united progressive front had many reasons to emerge, especially in the borderlands, where the support of equality for nationalities could be considered as revolutionary. Even if the Kiev Kadets did not cherish the hope, they did not leave their efforts to achieve it.

Despite Kadets’ hopes for the quarrels among the rightists and for the prevail of “good sense” and unity in the progressive camp, the miracle did not happen. The Kiev Kadets lost the elections to the Fourth Duma and their failure as well as that of the entire opposition was unquestionable. Out of 13 members of the Duma, Kiev province elected 10 nationalists, two rightists, and one Octobrist. The city of Kiev sent its two representatives to the Duma, one of them was a nationalist and the other – a Kadet, Professor Sergei Ivanov.⁵³⁷ In other words, there was only one Kadet of the total 15 members from the city and province. However, the Kadets did not become despondent or despair at the loss. On the contrary, the tone and spirit of the liberal press in Kiev remained high and confident. As had been throughout the entire electoral campaign, its favorite topics were the

⁵³⁷ “Chetvertaia Gos. Duma. Itogi,” *Riech*, 26 October 1912, p. 4.

pessimism of the rightists, the illusion of the rightist victory in the elections, the hopeless Octobrist activity in the Third Duma in particular and on the political scene in general, and the leftward shift in the mood of voters. As they did during the entire election campaign, the Kiev Kadets continued to project hope regarding the outcome of the elections even when it became clear that they had lost.

To a great extent, their high spirits were nourished by the overall picture, which showed some visible support of the voters – not for the Kadets, but for the broader opposition, which the Kadets had aspired to form and lead.⁵³⁸ They saw other signs for hope too. They reasoned that the 1907 electoral law showed the government's weakening authority among the population of Russia rather than its strength and the power to change the Fundamental Laws without the approval of the Duma. The Kadets, both local and the leadership, were inclined to see the support of the voters for the rightists as artificial and deliberately crafted in light of the fact that entire categories of the population were deprived of their voting rights by the 1907 franchise law. They did not seem to doubt that the disenfranchised population, much of which constituted their former electorate in the first electoral campaign, would have supported the opposition parties, not the rightist or nationalist ones, should the electoral law be democratized.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁸ See, for instance, "Gde oni pobiedili?" *Kievskaiia mysl'*, 2 November 1912, p. 2.

⁵³⁹ Bezpartiinyi, "Vopros, kotorago nel'zia oboiti," *Russkaia mysl'*, July, 1912, p. 1.

Conclusion

The fourth election campaign to the Russian Duma came at a time which some contemporaries considered a reactionary period in contrast to the 1905 Russian Revolution, when the October Manifesto announced the beginning of parliamentary politics. Many had hoped that the First Russian Duma would become the source of the ongoing change in Russia. Seven years later, hopes lost their iridescence; they gave place to understanding that the Duma still needed to find its way to become a productive legislative body. However, the five-year existence of the Third Duma shifted the perception of the elections from the immediate event to one that had a long-term impact. This study showed that in 1912 the elections were becoming a political routine in Russia. Mass politics had generated a new environment where diversified political forces operated and new alliances and rivalries existed along with the old ones. The Kiev Kadets approached the mobilization of the Jewish vote on transformed principles. While they hoped for wide Jewish support, they did not invest much effort into a straightforward mobilization of the Jewish voters as such. Rather, they occupied themselves with building such a wide oppositional front that Jewish voters would enter it in all their diversity.

The Kiev Kadets increasingly saw themselves as the national elite and occupied themselves with the all-Russian perspective of the events, problems, and concerns. The “Jewish question” ceased to be the local issue, with the Beilis case acquiring all-Russian resonance; the Kadets put lots of their professional resources into providing judiciary aid for Beilis. Yet their only electoral strategy, which was specifically geared toward Jewish voters, was to remind the Jews about their real Kadet name. It is unclear to what extent administrative pressure played a role in the transformation of the Kadets attitude toward

the Jews. Admittedly, although by disenfranchising masses of Jews, the regime reduced a considerable part of the Kadets' electorate, it also did the Kadets a good turn as it deprived the Russian nationalists of their major consolidating agent, the Jewish dimension of the Kadet supporters. Now, without Jews, the Kiev Kadets were engaged in navigating their way between the Russian nationalists and the local authorities to reach the non-Jewish voters, which enhanced the all-Russian relevance of the local liberals.

Despite numerous divisions and divergences in the outlooks and goals, political parties and the government participated in a general process of political negotiations, fundamental to the entire Russian Empire. Through election campaigns and the work of the Duma, the constitutional experiment absorbed new participants and made even the regime address the existing issues with modern strategies and tactics. Instead of changing the electoral law, the government occupied itself with supporting a positive electoral strategy of mobilizing the Orthodox clergy. It aimed to achieve favorable results playing by the rules, not only by exercising pressure on the oppositional candidates, manipulating the voter lists, and issuing bans on public meetings. Political parties responded to the government's move by criticizing or supporting it – in any case, the electoral race was taking place across Russia.

Electoral politics brought the provinces closer to the centers. The police reports from the core and borderland provinces were flowing to the Minister of the Interior and covered all sorts of topics, including loyalties of various communities, relationships between local branches of political parties, their possible points of disagreement, forecasts of electoral blocs – thereby, making up the map of mindsets and political interests of the local population and familiarizing the central authorities with the provinces. Central

leaderships of political parties also drew on the ideas and solutions that peripheries offered to specific local situations. This was the case with the Kadet party. Severely persecuted and not yet legalized, it had to leave its supporters in the provinces to their own devices. The overall outcome of the elections more than ever depended on the initiative and consistent work of local activists. In particular, the Kiev Kadets relied on their personal and professional ties and the oppositional press, however moderate the views and reserved comments it expressed. As to the Jewish vote, ironically, the Beilis case became the public tribune that was available for them to express their attitude toward the rights of the Jews in Russia. The participation of the Kadet lawyers in the defence of Beilis served as a background for the election campaign and a solid foundation for the Kadet-Jewish rapport in Kiev province. As Russian nationalist movement, which had germinated here and spread then to central provinces, the Kadet-Jewish cooperation went beyond the provincial significance with the Beilis case resonating all over Russia. Rapidly, provincial politics ceased to be narrowly local. It was becoming a determinant of broader imperial trends and became even more important in the absence of a unified and large-scale electoral campaign.

CONCLUSION

The Revolution of February 1917 brought the downfall of the Russian monarchy and an end to the era of national elections. The Provisional Government, which consisted primarily of liberal and centrist parliamentarians, was to lead Russia along the thorny road of preparations for the Constituent Assembly, while the country participated in the war with Germany and Austro-Hungary. The convocation of the Assembly and the demand for the constituent functions of the State Duma had appeared frequently in the appeals of the Kadet party as early as the first electoral campaign to the Duma in 1905; some regional and provincial branches of the party continued to raise these issues well after the domestic situation stiffened in June 1907.

In this regard, it is notable that the Kadets, who dominated the first cabinet in 1917, welcomed the idea of the Assembly, but arguably bore the main responsibility for the repeated delays and postponements of the elections.⁵⁴⁰ To be sure, some of the Kadet central leadership, many regional party leaders, and grassroots favored speedy elections. When the elections were eventually held on November 12, the total return for the Kadet party was only 4.77% nationwide; in Kiev province, the result was even weaker, at 1.44%.⁵⁴¹ This result stood in sharp contrast to the elections to the First Duma in 1906,

⁵⁴⁰ The initial dates for the elections to the Assembly and its convocation were September 17 and September 30, respectively. The elections took place on November 12, the Assembly met only on January 5, 1918. *Riech*, 14 June 1917, p. 3. *Riech*, 9 August 1917, p. 3. The Kadets explained that their desire to provide the fullest participation led them to postpone the elections. The Kadets' weak position among voters may have been no less serious reason for their procrastination. Lionel Kochan, "The Kadet Policy in 1917 and the Constituent Assembly," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 45, no. 104 (January 1967): 184, 186.

⁵⁴¹ The figures are calculated on the basis of the data in Oliver H. Radkey, *The Elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917* (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1950), 18-19, 148-149. The Socialist Revolutionaries won the majority of 38% and the Bolsheviks came the second, with 24%.

when the Kadets emerged victorious.⁵⁴² Subsequently, the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks, which followed shortly after, closed the brief constitutional period in Russia.

This dissertation has examined Kadet-Jewish interaction and cooperation during the bursts of political activity engendered by the election campaigns. It explored their relationship to each other, the electoral tactics and rhetoric used by the Kiev Kadets, how they made their situational decisions and to what extent they pursued liberal ideology in their practical work. The story of election campaigns to the Duma points to the period between the 1905 Revolution and the demise of the regime in 1917 as a time of profound transformation of society, far from being a lull, an advance of reaction, or a steady drift toward socialist revolution. Among other factors, electioneering affected all categories of society as well as the way the regime functioned. Electoral rivalries, communal disagreements, personal competition, and disputes as well as commonalities, negotiations, and alliances contributed to changes of loyalties, identities, and political sympathies and antagonisms. Residents of the empire experienced the process of self-identification, mastered a new language of politics, and internalized the responsibility for their own fate via their involvement in the political life of the country. The authorities also adjusted their treatment of public debates and developed the agenda that they pursued during the electoral preparations. In other words, the elections became an arena for interaction – confrontation, or negotiations – among the regime, parties, activists, and voters, which in itself was a new phenomenon in imperial politics in Russia.

⁵⁴² As a reminder, Kiev province elected 11 Kadet deputies of a total of 15 in the first national elections. The deputy from the city of Kiev was also a Kadet. See Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

Crossing the 1907 divide allows this study to follow the story of electoral politics beyond the stormy years of the first Russian revolution. Although the government succeeded in taking control of the country, the severe pressure of administrative persecutions could not eliminate political preferences, inclinations, and electoral choices that manifested themselves during later elections. Moreover, the analysis of the electoral preparations for the Third and Fourth Dumas reveals that the absence of political guidance from the capitals did not prevent agitation, negotiations, and coordination of electoral tactics and strategies from happening in the peripheries. All these activities were signs of the modernization of the empire, which took place not only at the level of the individual and communities, but also within the state. The regime (its various structures) and society (its multiple actors) together went through the complex process of choosing and running the parliament. Although the government aimed mostly to restrict organization and debate, the outcome of its efforts was not necessarily detrimental to electoral politics of the parties. This research provides a vivid example of how official repressive policies benefitted the Kadets, once the authorities persecuted the socialists after the dismissal of the Second Duma. This research confirms the persistence of democratic culture after the 3 June 1907 regime was introduced, which manifested itself in individual attitudes toward the regime, various political parties, national minority groups, as well as toward prominent personalities who dared to stand at the head of political movements.

The provinces were the epicenters of the national election campaigns. The liberal Kadet party thrived on the challenge that the diversity of the Russian Empire presented. Its provincial organizations consisted of local activists who often combined their affiliation in the party with membership in local national parties and groups. This made the Kadet party

diverse; its local members, who possessed insider knowledge of the power balance in the provinces and of voters' concerns, were often its most powerful resource. Such was the case in the province of Kiev, where the Kadet organization included Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews, and was supported by local Poles. When the central leadership "wrote off" Kiev province in the second campaign, the Kiev Kadets did not give up; instead they campaigned and, by negotiating with various leftists in the province, achieved decent electoral results. In other words, the polarization of society along national and class lines that occurred in Kiev province was not the only trend in the political environment; negotiations were not only possible, they also took place in multiple forms. Moreover, local activists found successful ways around administrative pressure on their own initiative.

The Constitutional Democrats in Kiev province are the main characters in this dissertation. They embraced various ethnic elements with disparate visions of a future Russia. They espoused more leftist views than the Kadets in the capitals and Russian central provinces, and developed a strong awareness of the necessity to build a mass following. As a result, they advocated partnership with – rather than leadership and control over – more leftist parties and other groups, such as the Ukrainian socialists, in the province. Jewish members, who made up a large share in the Kiev Kadet organization, were initiators and a driving force of many of the electoral initiatives of the Kadets. They also provided a link between the Kadets, on the one hand, and Jewish voters and Jewish political parties and groups, on the other. Most importantly, by joining and supporting the Kiev Kadet organization – a provincial branch of an empire-wide liberal party – its Jewish members entered the all-Russian political arena. Rather than restricting themselves to

ethnic politics, they were eager to contribute their energy to the cause of Russia's modernization.

The Kadet-Jewish perspective of this dissertation illustrates the significance of Jewish political elements in the advocating of liberalism in the borderland provinces. Although the "Jewish question" generated many complications for the opposition forces, Kadet-Jewish cooperation repeatedly brought electoral benefits to the Kiev Kadets and illustrated the relevance of the liberal program to ethnic minorities. Like other Kiev Kadets, Jewish members combined regional patriotism with loyalty to the Russian state: they wanted to raise local concerns, including Jewish inequality, bring them to the attention of the central authorities, and resolve them in the legal domain. In other words, many Jews perceived it to be their legal obligation to participate in the political life of the empire, because they saw their relevance to shaping the future of Russia.

The microhistorical perspective of the present research offers a useful lens into democratic culture in the Duma period. This study analyzed discussions, articles, activities, and other moves that local activists undertook. Many of their names appear in the pages of this dissertation: some are mentioned only once or twice, others emerge more often. Events such as electoral campaigns that influenced and often defined historical processes were happening due to the efforts of these little-known individuals. In addition to grassroots activism in the epoch of nascent mass politics, this dissertation introduces people who do not fit easily into the existing categories of Jews, Kadets, Bundists, and bourgeois. Thus, following the lead of previous researchers, this microstudy problematizes the notion of a separate Jewish history. It shows that the broader story of imperial politics should include the borderland perspective, such as the Kadets' engagement with the local Jewish

population in Kiev province. The history of national elections in the western borderlands does not lend itself to separate interpretations of Jewish, Ukrainian, or Russian imperial histories. Thus, it suggests studying this region, which was a part of Russian Ukraine, using broader and at the same time basic questions such as how everyday politics happened in the peripheries, how participation in the elections affected self-identification of voters, and what hopes residents of the provinces placed in the work of their representatives in the Duma.

This dissertation brings together all the imperial-era national election campaigns. There was a significant degree of continuity between them, but also many disruptions. The changing circumstances of each electoral campaign illuminated different characteristics of the Kiev Kadets and their cooperation with the Jews. The Kadets organized their preparations for the first elections as a broad and systematic electoral campaign. In Kiev province, Jewish liberals played a prominent role in establishing the local branch of the Kadets and contributed to the mobilization of the Jewish vote to support the Kiev Kadets. The second campaign witnessed a more sophisticated relationship, which eventuated in the Kadets' tactic of small agreements: instead of embracing other oppositional groups, they now sought to partner with them. The Kadets' Jewish ties became an essential factor in achieving the electoral alliances not only with the Jewish Bund, but also with the local Social Democrats. The 3 June regime again changed the Kadet-Jewish electoral relationships. The reactionary policy of the government unintentionally mobilized the Jewish vote for the Kiev Kadets, since it reduced electoral opportunities for Jewish candidates, disqualified significant numbers of Jewish voters, and silenced the Jewish electoral camp. In the absence of the socialist competitors, the Kadets became a very likely

choice for the Jews. Indeed, the Kiev Kadets could barely campaign, but their expectations proved right; Jewish voters supported Kadet candidates.

Finally, in 1912, the “Jewish question” grew larger than the fourth campaign and the Kadet-Jewish liaison due to the resonance of the Mendel Beilis case. The defence that prominent Kadet lawyers organized for Beilis served as a solid confirmation that the Kadets stood staunchly against the unequal position of the Jews in Russia. As in the third campaign, the Kiev Kadets expected that Jewish voters would support them. This time, however, the Kadets shifted their attention to the non-Jewish electorate, because the share of Jewish voters was the lowest in the fourth elections due to government policy and the efforts of the provincial authorities. Despite fewer Jewish voters to woo and with less effort on the part of the Kiev Kadets to engage the Jews in the elections, the fourth campaign witnessed many allegations about the Kadets’ Judeophile approach in the rightist press and the Russian nationalists’ electoral leaflets. The Kiev Kadets made hardly any attempts to refute this description. The image of the Kadet party advocating Jewish emancipation that the rightist propaganda created was a powerful message to Jewish voters. Thus, the absence of electoral campaigning on the part of the Kiev Kadets did not prevent the Kadet-Jewish relationship from continuing.

The story of the Kiev Kadets and Jews is unique to this region and yet important for understanding the character of politics in the multiethnic borderlands and the nature of the “Russian constitutional experiment.” Much cooperation, rapport, and compromise happened during the period when the regime attempted to preserve the status quo or even to reverse the consequences of the population’s involvement in electoral politics. Later events in 1917, in particular, the elections to the Constituent Assembly, seemingly pointed

to the futility of the Kadets' attempts to popularize liberal values in society. Nevertheless, the Kadets could claim their share of victory because they had been staunch promoters of the parliamentary means to rebuild the empire on the principles of law and equality, which the Constituent Assembly epitomized. Democratic procedures and the notion of the parliament became more familiar to residents of the Russian Empire due to the efforts of local activists, Jews among them, who perceived their electoral work as of the utmost importance, risking their careers, incomes, and often freedom. Local initiative and self-organization revealed that the drive to participate in politics was sincere and enthusiastic. Provincial actors took the elections to the Duma seriously; local activists believed in the Duma, its relevance to their life, and its potential to change Russia for the better.

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