University of Alberta

Developing Solidarist International Society? An Inquiry into Substantive
Ethical Advancement in Canadian and British Foreign Policy Theory and
Practice

by

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If we call ourselves moral men and women, we must make the effort, and the evidence is that we regularly do so. If we had all become realists like the Athenian generals or like Hobbists in a state of war, there would be an end alike to both morality and hypocrisy. We would simply tell one another, brutally and directly, what we wanted to do or have done. But the truth is that one of the things most of us want, even in war, is to act or to seem to act morally. And we want that, most simply, because we know what morality means. – Michael Walzer [1]

Introduction

Broadly, I am interested in exploring the relationship between ethics and foreign policy within international society. I am keenly interested in the English School debate emerging out of the work on pluralist versus solidarist conceptions of international society.[2] The debate hinges on the question of the type and extent of norms, and on the question of rules and institutions that an international society can form within the context of the foundational rules of sovereignty and nonintervention that define it as part of a society of states. I argue that solidarism does not necessarily entail a conflict with principles of sovereignty and nonintervention. Sovereignty can, in principle, embrace more political convergence than is conceivable under realism.

My inquiry into ethics, foreign policy and international society will include the controversy surrounding the development of a value oriented foreign policy with a clear humanitarian ethical agenda in Canada and Britain. A main source of contention is the question of whether ethically based policies represent deeply illiberal shifts in policy development or, rather, reflect the development

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[1] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 20.
[2] While different substantive interpretations of the terms 'pluralism' and 'solidarism' exist, my use of these terms is framed within the English School interpretation of international relations thought. Detailed descriptions of these terms can be found in section III. See Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers* for further elaboration.

of an increasingly solidarist international society. I examine the Canadian and British practical responses to changed normative conditions within international society (which arguably necessitate substantive ethical promotion through foreign policy) to support my hypothesis that what Kim Richard Nossal and like-minded scholars label as deeply illiberal foreign policy developments are actually representative of the development of international society along solidarist lines.

I look at elements of Canadian and British foreign policy over the last two decades, to advance the claim that a shift toward the development of international society along solidarist ethical lines is occurring. I argue that the Canadian and British examples are indicative of the evolution within the society of states normatively, and practically, to sign on to solidarist ethical principles and practices while maintaining a commitment to the institution of state sovereignty. Other states such as Norway and France are also demonstrating a solidarist ethical commitment in their foreign policy agendas. My argument is that the substantive humanitarian ethics advanced within Canadian and British foreign policy are paralleled by a shift in which international society has come to embrace broader ethical agendas and more substantively humanitarian norms.

To begin, I discuss the context of the ethical shift in international society and the role of ethics in the functioning of the society of states. In assessing how sovereign states have come to advance substantive humanitarian ethical agendas in their foreign policy formulations, I look at the relationship between ethical development, or value projection, and international society in terms of

the evolution of conceptions of norms, legitimacy and interest, obligation, order/justice and sovereignty.

I proceed to discuss differing interpretations of the Grotian tradition.[3] I hope to show that Grotian principles relating to order can be practically applied in more diverse ways than usually perceived. While Nossal indicates that Canada and like-minded states are moving away from a liberal, Grotian tradition in foreign policy, I argue that this (mis)reading stems from a pluralistic conception of the Grotian tradition. I contend that the relatively recent foreign policy efforts to promote substantive ethics internationally represents a shift to the solidarist side of the Grotian tradition where Canadian interests are being redefined in terms of a greater concern for international order and the promotion of good international citizenship.

I then proceed to examine elements of Canadian and British foreign policy. I seek to establish that a shift has occurred in their foreign policy priorities over the last two decades as their policy agendas have evolved from reflecting pluralistic to solidarist principles. I consider how Canada and Britain have tried to promote in practice the norms they espouse rhetorically. In evaluating the Canadian and British good governance initiatives, I look at both economic justice and sustainable development, as well as at human rights protection and promotion. I also focus on the extent to which their foreign policy practices and rhetoric still recognize and support state sovereignty even as they promote more sustentative international ethics or norms.

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[3] See section III for an introductory discussion of the Grotian tradition.

I assume a broad based constructivist approach. Peter Sutch explains that constructivism addresses "moral skepticism...and recognizes that justifiable principles must be built from predicates that are themselves accessible to all the relevant parties...[in order] to come to terms with the plurality of moral convictions in an interconnected world."[4] As Nicholas Wheeler has done, I incorporate Quentin Skinner's position that "the range of legitimating reasons that any actor can invoke is limited by the prevailing morality...any course of action is inhibited from occurring if it cannot be legitimated."[5]

The relationship between ethics and foreign policy and, more specifically, the possibility of ethical statecraft presented by solidarist theory is "one of the most under-developed areas in the traditional work of the English School."[6] I hope to show how an international commitment to the ethical principles behind the solidarist theory of international justice can facilitate progress toward effectively supporting substantive human rights objectives in foreign policy practice. I also demonstrate that norms associated with a solidarist perspective of international justice can, in principle and in action, "serve to constrain even the most powerful states in the international system."[7]

I provide systematic analyses of pluralist and solidarist theoretical perspectives and consider how they have influenced Canadian and British foreign policy, a task that remains largely untouched. I provide my own

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[4] Peter Sutch, *Ethics, Justice and International Relations: Constructing an International Community* (London: Routledge, 2001), 4.
[5] Q. Skinner in Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7.
[6] Ibid., 7.
[7] Ibid.

assessment of their ethical implications and their potential for "shaping the normative possibilities of international society."[8]

I believe that exigency attaches to my proposed research as international security is a matter of increasing concern – a concern that is frequently linked to ethical dimensions and foreign policy practice. Through an analysis of Canadian and British foreign policy, I seek to illustrate the development of a society of states with a more solidarist ethical orientation in normative and substantive policies and to demonstrate that a more just, humane and sustainable international society is possible. As John Schaar observes: "the future is not a result of choices among alternative paths offered by the present, but a place that is created - created first in mind and will, created next in activity."[9]

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[8] Institute of Politics and International Studies, "Reconvening the English School of International Relations Theory," University of Leeds, 2000, http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/ (accessed September 2, 2002).
[9] John Schaar in Charles Beitz and Michael Washbum, *Creating the Future* (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), i.

Between those who said we could do nothing and those who said we could do it all there has to lie a position where the ethics of commitment meet the ethics of responsibility, where the commitments we made...can be backed by believable and achievable strategies... If we cannot find [such a position] then policy and public opinion are likely to lurch between...over commitment and cynical disenchantment. -Michael Ignatieff [10]

I. Substantive State Based Ethical Advancements within International Society

Context of Ethical Evolution within International Society

The post-Cold War environment has seen a substantial increase in discussion on the relationship between ethics and the foreign policy behavior of states. Lloyd Axworthy has observed that: "the end of the Cold War was hailed by many at the time as the beginning of an era of unparalleled peace and prosperity."[11] However the years since have been stained with much bloodshed and a great deal of conflict. It is no longer viable to focus merely on protecting state security; ethical statecraft is increasingly sought by both policy makers and the public, albeit more often in word than action.

The academic community has observed that states are increasingly relating foreign policy decisions to ethical standards; a considerable debate has developed on the role of ethics in international politics and a proliferation of academic publications has resulted. It is important to look closely at this debate in order to understand its broader implications for international politics. Further, since states often refer to specific ethical standards when explaining

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[10] Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1997), 99-100.
[11] Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership," *International Journal* 52 no. 2 (1997): 183.

their behavior, it is necessary to consider the philosophical and theoretical context of these standards in order to evaluate their explanations.

My inquiry into the role that ethics play in international society, and thus in foreign policy formation, will be shaped around my contention that states, through consensus within international society, have begun to promote a relatively wide range of substantial humanitarian ethics. I will first examine the general international context that has enabled and compelled states to promote substantive ethics in their foreign policy agendas. In considering how states have come to promote substantive ethics internationally, I will look at the concept of ethics in a society of states and then at conceptual shifts in international society relating to norms, legitimacy and interests, obligation, order/ justice and sovereignty.

A basic contention surrounding ethical and normative development within international society, and thus its manifestation in foreign policy, is the belief that "we need to shed the [Western] sense of immunity and impunity, that deeply rooted belief that we are safe from history's dangers."[12] Peter Sutch indicates that the normative evolution perceived in international society is the result of globalization and the ensuing augmentation of international interdependence between both states and individuals. He states: "the increasing interconnectedness of our everyday lives requires that we take account of a wider political and social arena when we build new political and social

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[12] Michael Ignatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada," (The O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa, ON, March 12, 2004), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/skelton/lecture-2004-en.asp (accessed August 14, 2004).

institutions or act through existing ones."[13] This perception of interdependence

leads Sutch to discuss the relative novelty of an interdependent international

system:

> For almost 300 years the highest authority in international
> politics was thought to be the sovereign state. Any ethical
> issues were thought to arise only within the confines of the state
> and the issues of international politics were thought to be
> merely functional. But the half century since the end of the last
> war has seen a dramatic change in the way we expect
> international politics to be conducted. Normative international
> relations theory is now hard to avoid for anyone who wishes to
> ask questions of the world around us.[14]

I will proceed to discuss concrete and practical factors that have facilitated this

reevaluation of ethics within international society and the promotion of

substantive ethics in foreign policy agendas. Sutch attributes this shift, at a

normative level, to a constructivist turn within international society – arguably

the result of the factors discussed below.[15]

Universal moral outrage is a key factor in the normative shift in

international society. Michael Ignatieff suggests that the desire to help

strangers "was forged out of the horrors of the Holocaust and that it is

predicated on humanity's shame at its abandonment of the Jews, which created

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[13]Peter Sutch, *Ethics, Justice and International Relations: Constructing an International Community* (London: Routledge, 2001), 3-4.

[14] Ibid., 1.

[15] I use the term 'constructivism' in a relatively limited sense. My contention is that international norms are socially constructed within international society. I advance the notion that in the context of normative development, the relationship between theory and practice is crucial. I contend that practice drives the formation of theory – as states manifest new or divergent behaviors based on prevailing normative standards, new theoretical notions may be developed and advanced.

a new kind of crime: the crime against humanity."[16] Thus a key premise in the

ethical agenda currently being advanced is that governments are responsible for

human rights both at home and abroad. Hedley Bull articulated this sentiment in

the 1983 Hagey Lecture: "it is a profound change in our perception of this

matter that in the second half of the twentieth century the question of justice

concerns what is due not only to states and nations but to all individual persons

in an imagined community of mankind."[17] Francis Kofi Abiew indicates the

significance of moral outrage in leading to a greater concern for human rights:

"the conviction that human beings have certain rights, which governments have

a duty to respect, is essentially a reaction or response to a feeling of revulsion

occasioned by acts of political, religious or economic repression."[18] He

elaborates: "this consciousness draws on the moral resources of humankind's

belief that there is an underlying universal humanity and that it is possible to

achieve...a society that strives"[19] to protect fundamental human rights.

A second factor that necessitated a reevaluation of the international ethical

orientation and led to the normative shift which we are experiencing was the

crushing reality that the end of the Cold War had not significantly increased

international peace or stability. After the Cold War, peaceful coexistence

seemed as illusory as it had during the Cold War. Critics of Cold War politics

argue that narrow Cold War security considerations "led to a paradoxical

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[16]Michael Ignatieff in Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 302.
[17] Hedley Bull in Rosemary Foot, "Introduction," in *Order and Justice in International Relations,* eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 12.
[18] Francis Kofi Abiew, *The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 85-86.
[19] Ibid., 86.

failure: the pursuit of national security was ultimately not able to provide security from many of the threats that appeared on the horizon."[20] As the Cold War wound down, new threats appeared. A cursory list of these 'new threats' includes "resource shortages, civil wars and conflict, threats to human rights, global warming, and destabilization caused by poverty and famine."[21]

In addition to the disappointment experienced by those who had hoped that the Cold War's conclusion would mark the beginning of more sustainable international development, there came the realization that "globalization appeared to make the notion of a 'hard shell' of national sovereignty and national security increasingly problematic in the context of rapid global communication and exchange."[22] A globalized world system was blaringly incompatible with a system of bounded ethical conceptions; at a very basic level, state leaders had to recognize that national policies would now inevitably affect the international sphere.[23]

In the Brandt Commission's *Common Crisis North–South: Cooperation for World Recovery,* there is an explicit argument that on account of the dense interconnections present in international society, only through concerted international effort can humanity save itself, and then only through the adoption of sustainable development practices and norms. The Brandt Commission states: "our situation is unique…Never before was mankind capable of

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[20] Rosalind Irwin, "Introduction," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 3.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] For a discussion of globalism and globalization please see Ulrich Beck, *What is Globalization?* Oxford: Polity Press, 2000.

destroying itself, not only as the possible outcome of a world-wide arms race, but as a result of uncontrolled exploitation and destruction of global resources as well."[24] The Brandt report continues by identifying the pressing need for a shift in economic norms within international society. Responding to the realist ethic of the early 1980s, the report indicates that "we may be arming ourselves to death without actually going to war – by strangling our economies and refusing to invest in the future."[25] The proposals in *Common Crisis* "are directed to averting world economic collapse and the subsequent chaos and human suffering and to creating conditions leading to world economic recovery."[26] They have been designed "to avoid strangulation of world trade through increased protectionism and to move it back to growth, to make developing countries more self-sufficient in food and energy production, and to improve the negotiation process between North and South."[27]

The proposals in *Common Crisis* clearly indicate the need for sustainable development measures and for increased international solidarity and commitment to these issues through a reformulation of the relationship between the developed and developing worlds. The Commission is explicit in its assertion that "everybody should know what immense dangers the present international crisis holds, and that only a new relationship between industrialized countries and developing countries can help overcome this

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[24] Willy Brandt, *Common Crisis North-South: Cooperation for World Recovery* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1983), 9.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., 13.
[27] Ibid.

crisis."[28] The Brandt report states that "financial and economic crises that lead

to weak or failing governments are often the result of inadequate or inequitable

development."[29] The point is that international cooperation can result in

development "which relieves men and women from the indignity of poverty,

which replaces social deprivation with social justice"[30] and can help to maintain

international stability and order, thereby facilitating the promotion of

international justice. The argument, then, is that "supporting equitable

development is both morally preferable to and less expensive than the military

and other measures its absence may make necessary."[31] Thus a main purpose of

sustainable development and the establishment of more equitable financial

systems internationally is to facilitate "the creation of nation states capable of

sustaining their own political independence"[32] – an essential element of the

maintenance of international stability and the promotion of international justice

norms.

In his 1983 Canberra Lecture, Bull expressed the same type of concerns

and recommendations that are found in *Common Crisis*. He stated that "no

international order can endure in the future unless these states and people

believe themselves to have a stake in its continuance."[33] He indicated that we

must take development issues and "the Third World seriously primarily because

of the vital interest we have in constructing an international order in which we

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[28] Ibid., 9.

[29] Ibid., 36.

[30] Ibid., 37.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., 36.

[33] Hedley Bull in Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will," *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1996): 101.

ourselves will have a prospect of living in peace and security into the next century and beyond."[34] Bull's response to issues of global economic inequality "was to argue that an unjust world would be a disorderly one."[35]

The tension between the globalization of the international system and the aged pluralistic conceptions of ethics and security "led critics of the traditional approach to articulate more positively the nature of the linkages between ethics and security considerations in international relations and specifically in the foreign policy decision making process."[36] Indeed "new threats require that we see security increasingly in terms of human, rather than state needs."[37] It seems that economic globalization, through augmented market integration, has had the "important normative implication [of] buttress[ing] claims for moral [solidarism]."[38] Thus, for solidarists, "globalization has eroded the boundaries of political communities whose particular cultures, traditions and ways of living are given so much weight by [pluralists]."[39] Although globalization has resulted in remarkably high levels of interdependence and in a sense that security threats have taken on a global nature, this is not to suggest "that traditional state based security concerns are

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[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., 105.

[36] Rosalind Irwin, "Introduction," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 3.

[37] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, "The Axworthy Revolution," in *The Axworthy Legacy*, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 80.

[38] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 37.

[39] Ibid., 37.

obsolete."[40] A vital point is that "human security and national security are not mutually exclusive... [rather] they are opposite sides of the same global security coin."[41] The emerging consensus is that with courage and imagination, the narrow-minded, pluralistic, state-bound conception of international society may be overcome and global problems addressed through international solidarity.

State Based Ethical Advancements and International Society

After looking at factors which through combination in the international arena have prompted a reevaluation and shift in conceptions of ethics within international society, it seems clear that the most elemental "basis of international association lies in deference to practices that embody recognition of the fact that we must coexist on this planet with others with whom we sometimes share little beyond a common predicament."[42] We are, as British Foreign Minister Robin Cook asserted in 1997, "increasingly [becoming] neighbors in a global village."[43] The concept of international society is becoming increasingly important, for in the "modern world all nations [and individuals] belong to the same international community."[44] Andrew Hurrell extends the view that a shift in ethical considerations is occurring within

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[40] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, "The Axworthy Revolution," in *The Axworthy Legacy*, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 80.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 324.
[43] Robin Cook, "Human Rights into a New Century," (Speech, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, England, July 17, 1997). Available at http://www.fco.co.uk
[44] Ibid.

international society and consequently in the foreign policy practice of states.

He states:

> A more coherent global justice agenda can be identified both
> within recent practices of world politics and in the explosion of
> academic writing on international normative theory; the notion
> that all individuals should receive the treatment that is proper or
> fitting to them; the idea that international legal rights, duties and
> entitlements should be respected and acted upon and that wrong
> doing be punished wherever it occurs; and the broader notion
> that the major international and global social, political and
> economic institutions that determine the distribution of benefits
> and burdens should be organized and, if necessary, restructured
> in accordance with principles of global justice.[45]

Hurrell indicates, further, that these developments have occurred in the context

of a more normatively ambitious international society of states. The normative

shift described here is attributable to the factors listed above regarding evolution

within the international environment which has facilitated the promotion of

more substantive ethics within international society.

Developments in the international arena point to recognition by states and

foreign policy practitioners of the fact that "the basis for any world order – or

any national or regional order – must be respect for individual people and their

essential rights…Otherwise, there would be no true economic and social

development and, above all, there would be no justice, freedom or peace."[46]

According to Wheeler, the implication is that "states that abuse human rights

forfeit the right to be treated as legitimate members of the international

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[45] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations,* eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 31- 32.
[46] Willy Brandt, *Common Crisis North-South: Cooperation for World Recovery* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1983), 8-9.

community and should become the subject of international scrutiny and

censure."[47] Thus, as Hurrell indicates, "the narrow conception of what

international society could, or should aspire to…was challenged by more far-

reaching, maximalist, or solidarist conceptions of order."[48]

Hurrell contends that "a retreat to pluralism is impossible: pluralism

both as a way of thinking about justice and as a limited model of state-based

order."[49] Instead, he perceives development of an international society "with a

denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within

which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more

securely established."[50] He sees a greater consensus on conceptions of justice

among states and, accordingly, an international society which encourages the

promotion of more substantive ethical conceptions, policies and practices.

I will now briefly discuss the changing nature of the international society

of states, an important matter as my contention is that international society

shapes the realm of possible ethical advancement in foreign policy formulation.

I argue that states advance ethics through their foreign policy rhetoric and

practice and that these developments can only occur within the realm of

possibility and legitimacy derived from international society. International

society creates an environment that is more or less permissive of particular state

based ethical advancements; however the development and existence of

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[47] Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?" in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 170.
[48] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 32.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid. 36.

international society is derived from state practices and interactions. Thus, my contention is that norms are advanced through the existence of a shared framework in international society developed through state interactions. This shared framework of understanding is, in itself, a set of shared norms. New norms advanced by states are legitimate to the extent that they link in with other existing norms in international society. In this context rhetoric is of vital importance.

States advance and contribute to the evolution of international society by rhetorically promoting new ideas and norms, however the norms they espouse must align with the general parameters of the existing normative framework that states have consensually developed through their interactions. Thus rhetorical contributions are arguably of even more importance than material practice, especially at the outset of normative promotion. States cannot proceed to the material assertion of norms if they do not have the support of other states, demonstrated through a permissive environment within international society (the shared framework of analysis).

Chris Brown indicates that reference to "international *society* is simply a way of drawing attention to the (posited) norm-governed relations between states, the fact that there are general practices and customs of international law and diplomacy to which states usually adhere."[51] The usage of this term involves "a comparison with the idea of an international system, which is the key concept of neorealist thought, and whose premise is that relations between

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[51] Chris Brown, "Moral Agency and International Society," *Ethics and International* Affairs 15, no. 2 (2001): 89.

states are based on patterns that emerge as a result of the operation of power

politics."[52] Brown conceives international society as almost equivalent to "an

'association' or a 'club' of states [and] clubs and associations *do* act."[53]

Employing this analogy, Brown states that:

> casting an understanding of international society in this way
> opens up the possibility of a serious discussion of agency, as
> clubs may possess legal personality, and they are
> characteristically attributed with the ability to act as agents,
> even moral agents...it makes perfect sense in ordinary language
> to speak of a sports club taking decisions, that is, exercising
> agency. Moreover, clubs are commonly believed to possess the
> capacity to behave morally or immorally...[further] a
> committee acting on behalf of the club usually sets down [codes
> of conduct or] discriminatory rules.[54]

An exploration of international society will help elucidate factors which

enable states to promote a more substantive ethical agenda internationally. In

this regard states may, as Wheeler indicates, be seen as the practical agents of

international society's normative agenda. A foreign minister's ability to

develop and implement policy, for example, is arguably "enabled and

constrained by the rules that constitute their respective positions of authority."[55]

For this reason, a discussion of the society of states encompasses

essentially all elements that influence foreign policy formation. I will discuss

the possibilities presented by the society of states in relation to current foreign

policy formulation and state practice in Canada and Britain. This initial

discussion focuses on the way in which states have moved toward promoting

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[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid., 90.
[55] Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 22.

more substantive ethics internationally. While there are definite shifts in the

types of norms that can legitimately be advanced in international society, states

have never been free to operate in a vacuum without the framework provided by

international society. Historically, states have necessarily been concerned with

their standing in relation to the requirements of international society.

As a scholar whose writing demonstrated sympathies, at various junctures,

to both the pluralist and solidarist positions, Bull seems well positioned to offer

a basic definition of the society of states. He indicates:

> A society of states (or international society) exists when a group
> of states, conscious of certain common interests and common
> values, form a society in the sense that they conceive
> themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
> relations with one another, and share in the working of common
> institutions. If states today form an international society...this
> is because, recognizing certain common interests and perhaps
> some common values, they regard themselves as bound by
> certain rules in their dealings with one another, such as that they
> should respect one another's claims to independence, that they
> should honor agreements into which they enter, and that they
> should be subject to certain limitations in exercising force
> against one another. At the same time they cooperate in the
> working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of
> international law, the machinery of diplomacy and general
> international organization, and the custom and conventions of
> war.[56]

Further elucidation of the society of states was provided by Francisco

Suarez when he stated that "although a given sovereign state...may constitute a

perfect community in itself,...each one of these states is also,...a member of the

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[56] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,* 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 13.

universal society."[57] Standing alone, states "are never so self-sufficient that they do not require some mutual assistance, association and intercourse, at times for their own greater welfare and advantage, but at other times because also of some moral necessity or need."[58] In these basic descriptions of international society, it is evident that "an ethical dimension to foreign policy, far from being a novel idea, is actually part of what is involved in the very idea of membership in international society."[59]

The demise of Cold War hostilities led to a dramatic shift in international society which saw the establishment of "the idea that international society could, and should, seek to promote greater justice."[60] It is important to note, here, the interplay between international society and individual states. States are the agents through which norms relating to notions of legitimacy and interest, obligation, order and justice and sovereignty are implemented first in foreign policy and then, conceivably, in action. States become enabled to promote certain substantive ethical agendas through the legitimatization of these ethics and norms in the context of the prevailing normative mentality of international society.

The crucial point regarding international society is that "if the order produced by the society of states has moral value, it is because it provides in

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[57] Francisco Suarez in Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 10.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Chris Brown, "Ethics, interests and foreign policy," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 26.
[60] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 31.

some measure for the security of humankind as a whole." Nicholas Wheeler

and Tim Dunne assert that "the moral value of the society of states has to be

judged in terms of what it contributes to the achievement of individual

justice."[61] They indicate this requirement due to their perception that "the value

of interstate order is only 'a derivative value,' and what is ultimately important

has to be reckoned in terms of the rights and interests of the individual person of

whom humanity is made up, not the rights and interests of states into which

these persons are now divided."[62]

State Based Ethical Advancement: Norms, Legitimacy and Interest within International Society

Inquiry into how states have come to advance more substantive ethics

within international society demands examination of the normative context.

States can advance ethical agendas in their foreign policy formulations only if a

supportive and appropriate normative context exists within international society.

In this sense, international norms may be both regulative and constitutive.

According to Hurrell, Bull attaches centrality to the claim that "norms, rules and

institutions create meaning and enable, or make possible, different forms of

social action, and the idea that many of the most important features of

international politics are produced and reproduced in the concrete practices of

states."[63] Friedrich Kratochwill indicates that "norms and rules…are not just

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[61]Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will," *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1996): 99.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Andrew Hurrell, "Forward," in Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), xi.

constraints on action, but serve as 'reasons' that decision makers find more or less persuasive in their calculations."[64] Accordingly, states appear as agents, developing and advancing national foreign policies within the realm of possibility presented by international society's normative values.

While the concept of the state as an agent is present in both pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society, the difference between the two conceptions of agency should be noted. Hurrell elucidates that difference: "within the pluralist world, states could be understood as 'agents' simply in the sense of those acting or exerting power and of doing so for themselves: the law of nations [was] the law of sovereigns."[65] However, today "the expanding normative agenda of solidarism has opened up a second and different meaning of agency: the idea of an agent as someone who acts for, or on behalf of another."[66] The ability of states to advance particular ethical agendas is either facilitated or constrained by the normative context of international society.

Andy Knight explains that "norms do not necessarily determine outcomes, but they can create permissive conditions for foreign policy action."[67] Further, "the more robust a norm, the more influential it will be on interests, on an individual actor's behavior, or on the collective practices and outcomes of a

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[64] Friedrich Kratochwill in K. J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 23.

[65] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations,* eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 40.

[66] Ibid.

[67] W. Andy Knight, "Soft Power, Moral Suasion, and Establishing the International Criminal Court: Canadian Contributions," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 117.

number of like-minded actors."[68] He goes on to explain the process through which new norms emerge or develop. His discussion is enlightening as one can see the close connection between state-initiated ethical advancement and the ethical advancement states are 'coerced' to promote through the requirements placed on them by international society, most notably by the desire for a sense of international legitimacy in their foreign policy initiatives.

Knight claims that the first stage of normative development is "facilitated by norm entrepreneurs, who attempt to persuade and convince other actors to embrace a particular or 'new' norm."[69] The second stage in his formulation portrays "an attempt to socialize other actors into becoming followers."[70] It is only at the third stage where "norms may gain the status of being taken for granted, particularly if they are perceived as robust."[71] Knight's construct shows how the ability of states to promote ethical agendas can be enabled or constrained by the normative horizon of international society. The ability of states to pursue more substantive ethical initiatives in foreign policy is dependent upon these states acting as 'norm entrepreneurs' to develop the support within international society for new and divergent norms or upon states promoting ethical agendas already in line with the prevailing norms of international society.

In the context of the current foreign policy emphasis on human security and sustainable development, it is important to remember that states do not

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[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.

develop or advance ethical agendas in a vacuum. Knight indicates that "norms, such as those associated with human security, do not simply appear...They are actively built by agents who have a strong notion of appropriate behavior in their community...[states] call attention to, create, and frame issues in a way that makes them desirable."[72] Thus, "if a new, emerging, or remodeled norm can be portrayed as corresponding with the existing logic of appropriateness,...it is much more likely to gain influence than...if it challenged the existing logic."[73]

The idea of an underlying common morality, or 'logic of appropriateness' is also discussed by Terry Nardin. Nardin views common morality as "a critical morality possessing wider authority than the moral practices of particular communities, and for this reason, it provides a standard by which to [judge] these practices."[74] The practical foreign policy significance of the idea of a common moral realm is that "in appealing to common morality, the [foreign policy practitioner] is appealing to principles whose authority has already been granted, implicitly if not explicitly, by a great many people [and a great many states] within international society."[75]

Legitimization for state action and foreign policy goals is very important in the context of international society. If a state wishes to pursue an ethical agenda not sanctioned by the rules of international society, "it recognizes that it owes other states an explanation of its conduct, in terms of rules that they

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[72] Ibid., 118.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Terry Nardin, "The Moral Basis for Humanitarian Intervention," in *Just Intervention*, ed. Anthony F. Lang, Jr. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 18.
[75] Ibid.

accept."[76] While norms are not material barriers to state ability to promote particular foreign policy agendas, their "constraining power derives from the social disapproval that breaking them entails."[77] Rosalyn Higgins indicates that new and divergent ethical agendas "cannot emerge without the vast majority of states engaging in a contrary practice and, crucially, 'withdrawing their *opinio juris*.'"[78] It is important to note that "as the density and complexity of the international legal system increases and as globalization opens up new channels of transnational political action, so the process of norm creation becomes harder for the powerful to control."[79]

There has also been a conceptual shift regarding what constitutes legitimate power. Traditional hard power methods of advancing foreign policy agendas are no longer unquestioningly viewed as legitimate. International legitimacy for a state's foreign policy rhetoric and practice is no longer determined by huge stores of weapons or large armies. While states can conceivably do as they wish with their weapons and armies, they are constrained by prevailing norms of international society and, ultimately, by their own desire to be seen as legitimate international players. The notion of power has become one where consensus matters – 'powerful' states are able to advance their foreign policy agendas through establishing consensus and working within the boundaries of international society. In this light, the move

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[76] Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 24.

[77] Ibid., 4.

[78] Rosalyn Higgins in Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 47.

[79] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations,* eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 35.

to 'value' oriented foreign policies is understandable; today states advance their foreign policy agendas by demonstrating that the values they promote are legitimized by the norms of international society. States, then, demonstrate their power as they advance their agendas through their ability to influence the development and evolution of norms and through the promotion of values which have been deemed legitimate by international society.

Soft power strategies include "building and institutionalizing norms, remodeling international norms to make them more robust and reshaping or creating international institutions."[80] It should be noted that "none of these activities is 'cheap'...They may not require as much material capital as hard power strategies and techniques but they certainly use up a lot of human capital."[81] While hard power tactics such as humanitarian intervention may be legitimized in circumstances where an internationally agreed upon norm is being violated, as when human rights norms are grossly violated by 'acts that shock the consciousness of mankind,' soft power techniques are the order of the day.

In Knights' view, "rethinking the way in which we measure power and shifting away from the standard positivistic methodologies generally utilized in neorealist scholarship may be a constructive start in the renewed analysis of foreign policy."[82]

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[80] W. Andy Knight, "Soft Power, Moral Suasion, and Establishing the International Criminal Court: Canadian Contributions," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001),131.
[81] Ibid., 131–132.
[82] Ibid., 132.

Notions of legitimacy and interest in relation to the normative context of international society which shapes the realm of possible foreign policy initiatives must be considered at this juncture.

The norms currently prevalent in international society include "abstention from forcible intervention in the affairs of others, obedience to international law, cooperation with others wherever possible, and arguably, humanitarian intervention to stop gross violations of human dignity."[83] These norms require and enable the promotion of substantial justice-related ethics in foreign policy agendas. They "mandate that governments take an enlightened, rather than a narrow view of their self-interest."[84] The noticeable shift toward the promotion of substantive ethics in foreign policy is inextricably linked to an evolutionary broadening of the conception of interest.

Brown maintains that the concept of self-interest has even undergone a shift in realist thought; the narrow minded account of interest is no longer prevalent. He states: "the work of Alastair Murray and Joel Rosenthal has demonstrated how thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan were far more interested in the interplay between general moral principles and the contingencies of international politics than pop-realist accounts suggest."[85] Today, only "a hyper-realist such as John Mearsheimer comes close to arguing that normative principles have no purchase at all on state action."[86]

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[83]Karen E. Smith and Margot Light, "Introduction," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6.
[84] Ibid.
[85]Chris Brown, "Ethics, interests and foreign policy," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 24.
[86] Ibid.

The move toward a broader and more inclusive conception of interest was essential to establishing the normative context within which states have come to advance more substantive ethical agendas. General consensus within international society has come to find "a mutual interdependence between the provision of national security, the strengthening of international order, and the promotion of human rights."[87] Significantly, the advancement of human security and sustainable development ethics, while aimed at meeting broader conceptions of national interest, do not mandate that "ethical states...sacrifice their vital security interests out of fidelity to the rules of international society."[88] However, states "are required to put the welfare of international society ahead of the relentless pursuit of [their] own national interests."[89] This said, it is important to note that there need not be a great deal of conflict between national and international interests; states operate within an international society that "highlights the shared conceptions of interests and common values and the shared consciousness of being bound by legal and moral rules."[90]

The perception of common interests has been a powerful factor in the promotion of a more substantially humanitarian ethical agenda in foreign policy statements and practice. Linking the common morality of international society with the very formation of national interest, Bull indicates that 'national

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[87] Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 169.

[88] Andrew Linklater in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 171.

[89] Ibid

[90] Andrew Hurrell in Hedley Bull, T*he Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), xii.

interest' in and of itself means very little. He states that "the criterion of

'national interest,' or 'interest of state,' in itself provides us with no specific

guidance either in interpreting the behavior of states or in prescribing how they

should behave – unless we are told what concrete ends or objectives states do or

should pursue."[91]   Bull continues his elucidation of 'interest' as follows:

> to say that a state's foreign policy should be based on pursuit of
> the national interest is to insist that whatever steps are taken
> should be part of some rational plan of action; an approach to
> foreign policy based on the national interest may thus be
> contrasted with one consisting simply of the uncritical pursuit
> of some established policy, or one consisting simply of
> unconsidered reactions to events....[further] a policy based on
> the idea of national interest...may be contrasted with one based
> on a sectional interest, or one based on the interests of some
> group wider than the state, such as an alliance or international
> organization to which it belongs.[92]

Recognition of the goals a country's foreign policy aims to meet is vital

in the formulation of the notion of 'interest'; the ends which foreign policy

goals strive to achieve are determined in the normative context of international

society. Thus "the conception of national interest or interest of state does have

some meaning in a situation in which national or state ends are defined and

agreed [upon], and the question at issue, then, is by what means they can be

promoted."[93] Accordingly, it seems strange that historically such a wide chasm

has been created between 'interests of state' and broader conceptions of

'interest'. There is nothing explicit within the idea of 'interest' that disallows

states, in an integrated and interdependent international society, from viewing

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[91]Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 63.
[92] Ibid., 64.
[93] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 63-64.

their national interest in a broader context and thus promoting substantive ethics which have been sanctioned as legitimate by international society. Bull believes that "the fact of human interdependence for material needs leads [states] to perceive a common interest in ensuring respect for agreements [within international society]."[94] This argument aligns with the contention that "it is no longer morally tenable in a world of interdependence to concentrate only on the interests of those within states and ignore our obligations to the whole of humanity."[95]

State Based Ethical Advancement and Obligation within International Society

Examining how states come to advance particular ethics within international society, one must consider the notion of obligation. The current conception of obligation in international society is aptly described by Robin Cook as he reminds the international community that "the right to enjoy our freedoms comes with the obligation to support the human rights of others."[96] Ignatieff implicitly asserts the need for promotion of substantive ethics in foreign policy formulation; he believes that a sense of obligation is integral to the functioning of international society. He states that the orientation of Canadian foreign policy should be toward the consolidation of "peace,

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[94] Ibid., 51.

[95] Rosemary Foot, "Introduction" in *Order and Justice in International Relations,* eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 12.

[96] Robin Cook, "Human Rights into a New Century," (Speech, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, England, July 17, 1997).

order,...good government,... enduring democracy and equitable development...[these] entail a continuum of responsibilities that bring to bear all the expertise and capabilities of the Canadian government, and the international community."[97]

The idea of obligation should be apparent in any foreign policy formulation as the state is always working toward an end, goal or good that it perceives to be in its interest. With the evolution of international society, the notion of obligation in foreign policy has come to allow, and require, that states promote more substantial international ethics, thus they view obligation in a broader context. Today, individuals are commonly thought to be the primary holders of rights in international society. Brown presents this clarification: "states have a primary duty to pursue the interests of their peoples but in the context of a set of wider duties towards other states, and through other states, the rest of humanity."[98] He continues: "both of these sets of duties involve moral obligations and it is a mistake to think of the first as simply interest based, while the second constitutes the 'ethical dimension' of foreign policy. Both sets of duties involve both interests and ethics."[99] Through the conception of obligation facilitated by international society, states have come to advance more substantive humanitarian ethics in harmony with the pursuit of their own self-interests.

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[97] Michael Ignatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada," (The O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa, ON, March 12, 2004). http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/skelton/lecture-2004-en.asp (accessed August 14, 2004).
[98] Chris Brown, "Ethics, interests and foreign policy," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 26.
[99] Ibid.

In the Hagey Lecture, Bull speaks of individual states acting "as local agents of world common good."[100] While states now advance substantial ethical agendas in their foreign policy rhetoric and action, their positions as 'agents of world common good' are legitimized by the prevailing norms within international society. Interestingly, the international society which normatively governs state action has "no real–world existence independent of the communal imagining that conjures them into existence…states are the agents who, through their [communal] interactions constitute the practices of the society of states."[101] Although international society constrains foreign policy orientation and the ethics that can reasonably be advanced, the way in which foreign ministers "play their role within international society is not predetermined; rather, it is up to each individual to maneuver within the rules as he or she sees fit."[102]

The conception of obligation described above and perpetuated by international society provides evidence that a great deal of normative evolution has occurred. Ignatieff describes the shift: "for most of human history, the boundaries of our moral universe were the borders of tribe, language, religion or nation…the idea that we might have obligations to human beings beyond our borders simply because we belong to the same species is a recent invention."[103] In the past, consensus within international society did not encourage a sense of obligation between states and individuals; the normative framework of

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[100] Hedley Bull, *Justice in International Relations* (Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1983), 14.
[101] Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 22.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1997), 4.

international society was pluralistic in character. The pluralist understanding denoted a state-centered, not an individual-centered approach to international relations. Evidence of the shift from pluralist to solidarist principles is evident in that states, today, perceive a humanitarian obligation to individuals around the world.

State Based Ethical Advancement and Order/Justice within International Society

The notion of good international citizenship advanced by countries who promote more substantial ethical agendas in their foreign policy formulations is "one version of [the] old liberal belief that order and justice can be reconciled."[104] Rosemary Foot observes that "the ending of the Cold War prompted many [humanitarian] expectations and accelerated certain normative and material processes already under way, which themselves encouraged a new exploration of the order and justice connection."[105] The idea of a symbiotic relationship existing between order and justice has provided a basis from which states may promote more substantial ethical agendas. Bull states that "order in any society is maintained not merely by a sense of common interest in creating order or avoiding disorder but by rules which spell out the kind of behavior that

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[104]Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 169.

[105] Rosemary Foot, "Introduction," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 7.

is orderly."[106] These rules influence both the realm of state practice and the realm of policy formation. In seeking to advance more substantial ethics, states often rely on conceptions of order to help legitimate their cause – there is a firm assertion that justice can only be realized in the context of order.[107]

Hurrell indicates that throughout the 1990's there have been increasingly powerful arguments "that order itself is dependent on the satisfaction of justice claims: for example, that peace was bound up with the ending of...oppressive regimes, or that greater equality was a central requirement of global sustainability."[108] Thus Wheeler's contention seems sound in the present context: "states have a long term security interest in promoting and enforcing human rights because an unjust world will be a disorderly one."[109] Wheeler has refined this point. Because "respect for human rights is central to the welfare of international society, states...not only have to place order before the pursuit of narrow commercial and political advantage, they are also required to forsake these advantages when they conflict with human rights."[110]

In the not so distant past, scholars expressed a very "limited conception of order and [an] even more constrained view of justice."[111] Hurrell asserts that the reason for the disjunction between order and justice "was a deep skepticism

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[106] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 52.

[107] Ibid., 89.

[108] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 31.

[109] Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 301.

[110] Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 171.

[111] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 27.

about claims regarding the existence of consensus and shared values across international and global society."[112] There is currently a concerted international effort to reconcile notions of order and justice. The concern for reconciliation derives from the realization that "order in social life is desirable because it is the condition of the realization of other values...International order, or order within the society of states, is the condition of justice or equality among states and nations."[113] With recognition of the need for a close connection between order and justice, states can promote more substantial ethical agendas on the basis that these agendas will stabilize society and advance justice claims which, in turn, will ensure the continuation of international order and stability.

As states within international society have evolved from perception of an incompatibility between order and justice on the international level toward a position that recognizes their mutual compatibility nationally and internationally, "individuals rather than states have [become] the starting point in the search for global justice."[114]

State Based Ethical Advancement and Sovereignty within International Society

The promotion of state based substantive ethical agendas has also been facilitated through a reconceptualization of state sovereignty which has normatively been legitimated by international society. As international society became aware that the development of a symbiotic relationship between order

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[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid., 28.
[114] Ibid., 12–13.

and justice depended on the creation of a more solidarist society of states, the state-centric conception of sovereignty also had to evolve.[115] Before states could promote more substantial ethical agendas, the conception of sovereignty had to shift from the traditional state-centric view to one where sovereigns act "first, as agents for [those] that they are supposed to represent – hence the move towards sovereignty as responsibility – and, second, as agents...of some notion of an international public good and some set of core norms against which state behavior should be...evaluated."[116] In this light, the advancement of more substantial ethical agendas is essentially a requirement.

While the conception of sovereignty has shifted, the institution remains vital. Kal Holsti encapsulates the continuing relevance and importance of sovereignty in these terms: "without sovereignty we would not have international law; without international law we would not have a society of states and without a society of states we would have little order, stability and predictability."[117]

While international society is involved in a constant evolutionary process, the institution of sovereignty has the capacity to incorporate evolving international norms and values; states have "developed and adapted over time in the context of a society of states which has itself undergone dramatic

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[115] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will," *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1996): 98.

[116] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations,* eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 40.

[117] K. J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 142.

development and change in substantial terms."[118] A case in point is the matter

of humanitarian intervention, which has become a legitimate international

response in certain situations.

I will proceed to briefly examine the role of sovereignty in maintaining

international order. Bull states that "the order which men look for in social life

is not any pattern or regularity in the relations of human individuals or groups,

but a pattern that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such

that it promotes certain goals or values."[119] He continues: "unless men enjoy

some measure of security...they are not able to devote enough energy or

attention to other objects to be able to accomplish them."[120] Bull identifies the

starting point of international relations as "the existence of states...each of

which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular

portion of the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human

population."[121]

Strong states are arguably the best positioned to further both national

and international order and security. Georg Sorensen indicates that "the

creation of stronger states is a necessary condition for both individual and

national security."[122] Neil Englehart writes that since September 11th 2001,

"state failure has become an increasingly important policy concern...

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[118] Georg Sorensen, *Changes in Statehood: The Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 151.

[119] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 3-4.

[120] Ibid., 5.

[121] Ibid., 8.

[122] Georg Sorensen, *Changes in Statehood: The Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 143.

strengthening or reconstructing failed states has even become an explicit goal of American foreign policy."[123]

The desire to prevent the failure of states is, perhaps, a response to Thomas Hobbes' account of life without the state – a life he characterized as nasty, brutish and short. Englehart supports Hobbes' view: "the monopoly of violence and rule of law together create the potential for [individual] rights...without states the legal enforcement of rights is almost inconceivable."[124] Thus there are ethical reasons for the promotion of state sovereignty. Englehart continues: "strong states capable of policing their own territories, accountable for the activities of their agents and participating in international trade and multilateral institutions, are better for their own citizens as well as for other states."[125] Perhaps even more importantly, the state system is able to provide a foundation for the development of civil, social and political rights that can become legally enforceable. "If failing states are part of the problem [which inhibits] creating a more just domestic order, strong states must be part of the solution."[126]

It is essential to remember that state sovereignty remains a vital institution and, further, that sovereignty and the promotion of substantive ethical agendas must be involved in a close relationship if humanitarian ethical standards are to be advanced. Sovereignty provides important foundational elements on which to develop human-rights law; little ethical advancement can be made without

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[123] Neil A. Englehart, "In Defense of State Building States, Rights and Justice," *Dissent* (Fall 2003): 1.
[124] Ibid., 3.
[125] Ibid., 10.
[126] Ibid.

international order or stability. Rather than shielding states from normative and enforcement obligations, the sovereign power of states helps to legitimize international human rights norms and laws.

The normative shift in sovereignty discussed above is well documented in *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS). The ICISS report indicates that "sovereignty has come to signify, in the Westphalian concept, the legal identity of a state in international law."[127] The ICISS affirms sovereignty as "a concept which provides order, stability and predictability in international relations since sovereign states are regarded as equal, regardless of comparative size or wealth."[128] The report also explicitly deals with the normative shift in the conception of state sovereignty. It indicates that a "necessary recharacterization [was] involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties."[129] There is a threefold significance in conceiving of sovereignty as responsibility. First, the shift in the normative understanding of sovereignty implies that "authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN."[130] Thirdly, "it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions, that is to say, they are accountable for their

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[127] ICISS, "The Responsibly to Protect," *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), 12.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid., 13.
[130] Ibid.

acts of commission and omission."[131]   Sovereignty within the context of the

legitimate interventionist practices is discussed at length by the ICISS. The report

states:

> the defense of state sovereignty, even by its strongest supporters,
> does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do
> what it wants to its own people. The Commission heard no such
> claim at any stage during our worldwide consultations. It is
> acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility:
> externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and
> internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people
> within the state. In international human rights covenants, in UN
> practice, and in state practice itself, sovereignty is now understood
> as embracing this dual responsibility. Sovereignty as
> responsibility has become the minimum content of good
> international citizenship.[132]

Instead of hindering enforcement, state sovereignty can play a meaningful

role in promoting and, on occasion, enforcing global humanitarian norms. While

international society creates a normative environment which is more or less

permissive of substantive ethical advancements, it is up to individual states to

translate these norms from rhetoric to material practice.

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[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid., 8.

II. Criticism of 'Value' Oriented Foreign Policy Formulation

Although, as I have discussed above, the climate in international society seems to facilitate and, further, to require that states advance humanitarian ethical agendas, scholars such as Nossal, J. L. Granatstein and Denis Stairs deliver scathing evaluations of state attempts to promote substantial ethical agendas in the foreign policy context.

Regarding Canada's current foreign policy agenda, critics point to what they see as a dangerous illegitimate and illiberal intertwining of Canada's values and interests. I argue that Canadian foreign policy objectives are not deeply illiberal and that Stairs, Granatstein, Nossal and others have misinterpreted the international context and the nature of international society within which the horizons of foreign policy formulation are shaped. While I deal with the issues underlying these criticisms (the tension between values and interest) throughout my paper, I will specifically counter the criticism presented here in the concluding section of my paper.

Discussing the current state of Canadian foreign policy, Stairs indicates that: "this undisciplined meshing of values and interests...may be good politics at home in the short run. It may or may not be good politics at home in the long run. Either way, it is almost certain to be *bad* politics in the world at large, whether in the long run or the short."[133] He contends that if the "new imperialism of values were not open to question on *normative* grounds,...it could still be contested on *practical* grounds. We have dramatically raised our

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[133] Denis Stairs, "Canadian Foreign Policy and Intervention Abroad," 5.

levels of aspiration, and...produced a seemingly endless supply of immodest...displays of self-adulation."[134]

In Granatstein's view, "our values are important to us, but they must be subordinated to interests. Canada needs to re-balance its understanding of national interests and values...Our values will count for nothing if the nation does not survive and for very little if we fail to prosper." [135] His criticism continues: "if Canada carefully assesses its national interests and weighs them in relation to its values, the nation should be able to chart a course for its future. We have muddled through long enough, too often neglecting our interests, too frequently mistaking transitory values for permanent national goals."[136]

Britain, too, has faced harsh criticism regarding its foreign policy agenda "from both right and left and on the grounds of both hypocrisy and ineffectiveness."[137] Christopher Hill indicates that "Britain's interests are now difficult to distinguish from those of the world as a whole...The Blair-Cook effect has been to bring a surprising degree of courage and ambition to British foreign policy, but it runs a distinct risk of hubris."[138] Further, "in foreign policy the fact of the matter is that intentions, however sincere, are inherently difficult to translate into significant change because of the extent to which they depend on other people and other, often intractable, societies."[139]

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[134] Ibid., 15.
[135] J. L. Granatstein, "The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S." (Benefactors Lecture, C. D. Howe Institute, Toronto, ON, October 21, 2003), 8.
[136] Ibid., 26.
[137] Chris Hill, "Foreign Policy," in *The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997 – 2001*, ed. Anthony Seldon (London: Little, Brown and Company), 334.
[138] Ibid., 349.
[139] Ibid., 334.

In orientating oneself to Nossal's position, it is important to consider his theoretical allegiance. As he argues against what he perceives to be illiberal violations of key Grotian tenets, his contribution represents the pluralist view of international society. In section IV, I will contend that the Grotian tradition constitutes a diverse body of scholarship, encompassing conceptions of international society based on both pluralist and solidarist understandings of Grotian ideals.

Nossal's argument is decidedly pluralistic in nature. He "sees states, but not necessarily any particular state, and the apparatus of state sovereignty as providing a container for pluralism and a framework for the protection of diversity."[140] This conception of pluralism "is often tied [to] the related argument that justice belongs inside national borders and that it is only identification with a national community that can foster meaningful citizenship and provide a secure basis for both grounding and implementing conceptions of social justice."[141]

Exemplifying the Canadian attempt to advance more substantial ethics in the foreign policy arena, Nossal presents a quotation from a speech by then Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham. Graham stated: "the world we want…is much like the Canada we want: a sustainable future of shared security and prosperity; of tolerance and respect for diversity; of democracy and

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[140] Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 29.
[141] Ibid. 30.

the realization of human rights; of opportunity and equal justice for all."[142] A

central contention from Nossal is that "after almost a decade of being told by

their government that one of the primary aims of Canadian foreign policy was to

project 'Canadian values' abroad, Canadians, it would seem, [have] grown so

accustomed to the idea that they no longer [question] it."[143] His concern is that

because Canadians are so well versed in the promotion of 'Canadian values,'

they are not able to objectively consider that their value laden and ethically

oriented foreign policy agenda may represent a deeply flawed conception of

foreign policy goals which "might fly in the face of decades of a particular

'Canadian way' of seeing the world and Canada's place in it"[144]

Nossal's main contention is that value projection through the advancement

of substantive ethics in foreign policy agendas is a deeply illiberal practice. He

believes that "there is no relationship between the values that are dominant in a

political community and that country's foreign policy."[145] Clearly representing

the pluralist view of international society, Nossal details his objection to the

promotion of humanitarian ethical agendas in the foreign policy context. He

indicates that "a country's foreign policy will always reflect a community's

particular values...[because] each country's history, its founding myths, its

ideology, and its political culture will all affect how a country defines its

interests, and therefore its foreign policy goals."[146] Accordingly, the imposition

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[142] Kim Richard Nossal, "The World We Want? The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals, and Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy," 1.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid, 7.
[146] Ibid.

of one state's values on another is both deeply illiberal and not in the imposing state's best interests. Nossal fears that in the Canadian context "values, instead of just *determining* Canada's foreign policy objectives, have been *turned into* Canada's foreign policy objectives."[147] Further, he believes that as "Canada's values *became* Canada's foreign policy objectives....those foreign policy objectives were no longer to be driven by Canada's *interests*."[148] Granatstein reiterates this view: "our values are important to us, but they must be subordinated to interest."[149]

Nossal relates his concerns regarding the value oriented approach to Canadian foreign policy in terms of four key objections:

1. Trying to project 'Canadian values' abroad sets impossible tasks for Canadian foreign policy.
2. The expansive foreign policy vision requires far more resources than Canadians are willing to commit.
3. The values projection too quickly turns into an exercise in hypocrisy.
4. Values projection is at bottom not only an illiberal project, but also a radical departure from Canada's traditional liberal approach to global politics.[150]

Although various criticisms are raised concerning the incorporation and promotion of substantive ethical agendas in the foreign policy context, the central contention seems to concern the perceived tension between values and interests. Critics argue that Canada, Britain or any other state cannot attend to

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[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid.
[149] J. L. Granatstein, "The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S." (Benefactors Lecture, C. D. Howe Institute, Toronto, ON, October 21, 2003), 8.
[150] Ibid., 8–12.

vital national interests – which may ultimately concern their continued existence

- if the role of values and interests is confused in foreign policy formulation.

III. Diversity in the Grotian Tradition: Pluralism and Solidarism

The Grotian Tradition: Diversity

The Grotian tradition is based on a diverse grouping of scholarship loosely

deriving from the writings of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). Although current

'Grotian' scholarship has arguably "evolved away from its author,"[151] certain

linkages remain, allowing contemporary scholarship to be contextualized within

different branches of the tradition. Thus Grotius' writings have had a lasting

affect on international society scholarship. Development of his ideas on

"certain fundamental features of international society...have been refined or

recast in different ways as later generations have grappled with old or new

problems in their contemporary contexts."[152] Benedict Kingsbury and Adam

Roberts relate the notion of a weak Grotian tradition as follows:

> most commonly the claim that there is a 'Grotian tradition' is
> intended to embody only a relatively weak sense of 'tradition';
> such claims are often based, at core on the proposition that there
> can be discerned a pattern of issues and of approaches to them,
> with which the tradition has been centrally and distinctively
> concerned. Claims that there exists a 'Grotian tradition' in this
> weak sense are readily defended.[153]

Accordingly, the following claim regarding the Grotian tradition may be seen as

the basis of both pluralist and solidarist claims regarding the society of states:

"the Grotian tradition is characterized by a commitment to the idea of an

international society comprising sovereign entities and other actors who

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[151]Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International
Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury,
and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 5.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid., 51.

recognize the benefit they derive from maintaining and strengthening the operation of that society."[154]

Discernibly Grotian tenets include the idea of a society of states where states are bound by certain rules and recognition of the importance of order to international life. The Grotian tradition, in all its variations, may be contrasted with the Hobbesian tradition in that "the Grotians contended that states are not engaged in simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts with one anther by common rules."[155] The Grotian tradition also contrasts with the Kantian or universalist perspective in that "the Grotians accept the Hobbesian premise that…the immediate members of international society are states rather than individual human beings."[156] Bull observes that "the importance of Grotius lies in the part he played in establishing the idea of international society…and that, for better or worse, provides the constitutional principle in terms of which international relations today are in fact governed."[157]

Kingsbury and Roberts note that Grotius was mainly "concerned with principles applicable to a society of states…of the sort described by Bull…but [Grotius] is easily read as allowing some scope for an international society of greater depth – a society…in which states and other international entities are the

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[154] Ibid.

[155] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 25.

[156] Ibid.

[157] Hedley Bull, "The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 93.

dominant but not the only participants."[158] Thus, in trying to elucidate the distinctly Grotian elements in the "modern conception of international society, it is important to observe that while Grotius does not portray a cosmopolitan international society consisting primarily of individual humans, neither does he present an international society comprised only of states."[159] It is easy to see how the Grotian tradition has led to divergent conceptions of international society.

Bull indicates that "by no means all that Grotius has to say serves to support…a solidarist point of view; the pluralist conception may also be found in Grotius who, on this issue as so many others, may be found wrestling with contending doctrines."[160] A key reason for the theoretical diversity that has appeared rests with Grotius' lack of clarity regarding whether states or individuals were to be the primary holders of rights in international society. According to R. J. Vincent, Grotius' work "begs the question of the weight which we are to give to the individual as against the state, and it is [this] ambiguity…which allows him to be called up in both the [pluralist] doctrine of state sovereignty and the [solidarist] notion of the rights of individuals."[161]

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[158] Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 11.

[159] Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 11 – 12.

[160] Hedley Bull, "The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 89.

[161] R. J. Vincent, "Grotius, Human Rights, and Intervention," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 246.

Bull cites an element in Grotius' work that lends itself to both conceptions of international society. He indicates that both pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society may be derived from Grotius' "treatment of war as being in some cases contrary to the law of international society, but in other cases sanctioned by it and evidence of its functioning."[162] Apart from his views on "war and international law, [Grotius] did not have a great deal to say about the institutions of international society."[163] Kingsbury and Roberts conclude that "Grotius...is [not] fairly characterized by one or other of [the] sweeping labels."[164] The wide range of theoretical positions which have been derived from "Grotius' works, and the tradition of thought with which they are associated, capture a significant dimension of the past, present, and future of international relations."[165]

The Grotian Tradition and the Pluralist Conception of International Society

"Pluralism" is not just another word for realism. The normative gap between realist and pluralist conceptions is evident as Wheeler explains that "the recognition by states of the existence of rights and duties among them ...separates a pluralist conception of international society from a realist position."[166] A key difference lies in the pluralist focus on rules of sovereignty and non-intervention. Wheeler points to this difference; while realists perceive

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[162] Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 15.
[163] Ibid., 27.
[164] Ibid., 32.
[165] Ibid., 64.
[166] Ibid., 64

that "states only keep rules of sovereignty and non-intervention when it is in their...interest to do so....[pluralists...contend that] states obey the rules of international society not just out of a sense of national interest but also because the rules are seen...as having...moral and legal authority."[167]

The pluralist wing of the Grotian tradition contends that the "state or national community [is] an enclave of special responsibilities that are distinct and justified separately from general or global responsibilities."[168] Pluralism presents a heavily state-centered approach to international justice; "the morality of a pluralist conception of international society...depends upon the assumption that states are valuable in themselves."[169] Pluralists depict "states and not individuals [as] the principle bearers of rights and duties in international law;"[170]..."in the international community until very recently the only rights and duties that were recognized were those of states, and the question of justice in international relations was taken to be one that arose in relation to states only."[171] Nevertheless they continue to frame most issues surrounding international justice in terms of the role of states in international politics.

Theorists from this group contend that "international society is constituted by a rule-governed framework that enables sovereigns...to protect the values of

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[167] Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention," *Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 3 (1992): 467.
[168] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 200.
[169] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will," *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1996): 96.
[170] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11.
[171] Hedley Bull, *Justice in International Relations,* (Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1983), 12.

individual life and communal liberty within their borders."[172] They defend their

overt focus on this system "on the ground that [rules] uphold plural conceptions

of the good."[173] The rule-based system has great importance for states

themselves, for "it is in international society that these rights of independence

are enjoyed, and from its rules they derive."[174] The essential rules are

commonly acknowledged as non-intervention and a shared understanding in the

international community that each country is a sovereign entity. The "Grotian

emphasis on norms and laws leads pluralists to claim [Grotius] as one of their

own."[175]

Peter Penz writes that pluralism "offers a clearly moral principle – non-

intervention in the affairs of other countries."[176] This focus on non-intervention

arose from recognition that the "politics of necessity and the politics of morality

develop, in the first instance at least, within the political community."[177]

Although pluralists regard non-intervention as an essential element of the

international community, this is not to imply "avoidance of relations with other

countries; it merely means avoiding interference that runs counter to that state's

internal management of its affairs."[178]   Pluralists emphasize that "the

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[172] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 27.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid., 13.
[175] Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 62.
[176] Peter Penz, "The Ethics of Development Assistance and Human Security: From Realism and Sovereigntism to Cosmopolitanism," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 40.
[177] Peter Sutch, *Ethics, Justice and International Relations: Constructing an International Community*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 66.
[178] Peter Penz, "The Ethics of Development Assistance and Human Security: From Realism and Sovereigntism to Cosmopolitanism" in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 40

practices of the communities and traditions of which a given individual is part...offer substantial promise for working out an account of justice and other normative issues appropriate to that community."[179]

Onora O'Neill frames the pluralist conception of justice as territorially 'bounded.' The focus on bounded, community based justice points to an important theoretical belief. Pluralistic accounts of international justice, conspicuously, do not reflect an understanding of "how actors are embedded within a normative context."[180] The possibilities presented by normative consensus building among states are not pursued in pluralist discourse. According to Kingsbury and Roberts, pluralism entails an "agreement on certain principles of order..[but] this agreement [does] not extend to the enforcement of law or of more elaborate principles of justice or cooperation."[181] Andrew Linklater, similarly, observes that the pluralist conception of international society allows states "to agree on the need for order despite their competing views of justice."[182]

Pluralists reveal skepticism regarding the ability of states to "develop beyond a minimum ethic of coexistence."[183] Order and justice are seen locked in a perennial tension, with order conceivable only within a bounded territory

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[179] Onora O'Neill, "Bounded and Cosmopolitan Justice," *Review of International Studies* 26, (2000): 47.
[180] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4.
[181] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 33.
[182] Andrew Linklater as cited in Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will," *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1996): 95.
[183] Ibid., 11.

where community has bred commonality.[184] Justice, the universal ideal, seems

far from possible in a theoretical system that focuses on the power of difference

rather than on the power that states possess to cooperate through a shared

normative framework. According to Wheeler and Dunne, "pluralists privilege

order over justice in the belief that there is not sufficient solidarity among

humankind to provide for the latter."[185] They claim that the "great strength of

pluralism is that it enables states with different conceptions of justice to provide

for a minimum interstate order."[186]

Given rule-based biases, pluralistic theoretical views on humanitarian

intervention are not surprising. A pluralist theory of international justice

typically does not accept intervention as a defensible practice.

"Intervention…is generally believed to be legally and morally wrong: sovereign

states or independent political communities are thought to have the right to have

their spheres of jurisdiction respected and dictatorial interference abridges that

right."[187] Bull writes: "The idea that states have a duty not to engage in

intervention is not easily separable from the idea that they have a right to

external sovereignty or independence; nor is the idea that states are equal in

rights, which means no more than that they are equally or alike sovereign."[188]

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[184] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11.

[185]Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will," *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1996): 98.

[186] Ibid., 96.

[187] Hedley Bull, *Justice in International Relation ,(*Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1983), 14.

[188] Stanley Hoffman, "The Problem of Intervention," in *Intervention in World Politics*, ed. Hedley Bull (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 8.

The pluralist's normative objection to intrusive practices such as humanitarian intervention is "predicated on the claim that it is our identity as citizens that constitutes the outer limits of our moral duties...State leaders...do not have duties to stop barbarities beyond borders, and, if a government has broken down into lawlessness, or is behaving in an appalling way towards its citizens, this is the moral responsibility of that state's citizens and political leaders."[189] Pluralists base their objection to humanitarian intervention, in part, on the belief that states will intervene only if it is in their national self-interest to do so. Ignatieff describes this, and arguably the whole solidarist project, as illiberal and imperialistic: "wealthy strangers are taking...upon themselves the right to rule over those too poor, too conflict ridden, to rule themselves."[190] Further, "in the absence of a strong international consensus, humanitarian intervention tends to resemble the intervention of powerful states against the weaker ones."[191] Pluralists believe that perception of imperialism undermines the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Walzer observes that "interventions are so often undertaken for reasons of state that have nothing to do with self-determination that [pluralists] have become skeptical of every claim to defend the autonomy of alien communities."[192]

In summary, the pluralist view of international society maintains that "states are the principle bearers of rights and duties in international

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[189]Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 31.

[190] Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1997), 80.

[191] Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, "The 'New Look' in Canada's Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), 742.

[192] Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Rescue," *Social Research* 62 (Spring 1999): 59.

law,…individuals only have the legal rights states provide,…states are capable

of agreeing only for minimal purposes… [and] international order depends on

rules [like] sovereignty and non-intervention."[193]

The Grotian Tradition and the Solidarist Conception of International Society

Kingsbury and Roberts demonstrate that "solidarist principles

are…clearly discernable in Grotius' writing."[194] The solidarist branch of the

Grotian tradition presents views which contrast sharply with pluralistic positions

on international society and on the legitimacy and feasibility of the promotion

of substantive humanitarian ethical agendas in foreign policy formulations.

Claire Cutler indicates that "the most profound component of the Grotian world

view is the assumption that there is a universal standard of justice and morality

against which the actions of states [and individuals] may be judged."[195]

Solidarism contends that "states form a society in the sense that they conceive

themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one

another."[196] It cautions that although these constraints are normative rather than

physical, "the fact that they are socially constructed does not make them any

less real."[197]

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[193] Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention," *Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 3 (1992): 467.
[194] Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 8.
[195] A. Claire Cutler as cited in Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention," *Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 3 (1992): 468.
[196] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 24-25.
[197] Ibid., 22.

The solidarist argument has a constructivist underpinning: "principles of politics and ethics must be constructed [through political interactions] rather than discovered or assumed."[198] Solidarists claim "to have constructed principles of international justice that can be fairly and legitimately universalized to form the basis of a just international community."[199] To avoid implication of imperialistic or illiberal inclinations, solidarists argue, "international norms will have to be thin enough so that it can be really said that they are shared."[200] Further, they stress that a system of international justice must not attempt to create consensus around western liberal values but, rather, must be based upon the decision to act only on principles that are actually shared. Responding to allegations that the promotion of human rights norms was illiberal, Vincent stated that "he recognized that different cultures had varying conceptions of human rights,…but that there is a floor of fundamental human rights. The idea of 'basic rights' seeks to put a floor under the societies of the world, not a ceiling over them."[201] The solidarist goal is not characterized by imperialist inclinations to institutionalize a particular community's set of values or rights internationally but, rather, to consensually determine what minimum standards of humanity need to be established and upheld before other goals can be pursued. Sutch states that "this method leads

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[198] Peter Sutch, *Justice and International Relations: Constructing an International Community* (London: Routledge, 2001), 80.
[199]Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 9.
[200] Ibid., 136.
[201]R. J. Vincent as cited in Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention," *Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 3 (1992): 479.

the [solidarists] to conclude that some expressions of political and social culture are not permissible or tolerable in international politics."[202]

Currently, shared solidarist conceptions of international justice include a commitment "to upholding minimum standards of common humanity...[and] placing the victims of human rights abuses at the center of its theoretical project."[203] This view is quite different from the pluralist state-based theory which holds that the sovereign identity of the state is of utmost importance. The solidarist conception "is predicated on the assumption that sovereign boundaries are moral constructions that are not immutable."[204] Further, once it is "accepted that there is nothing natural or given about sovereignty as the outer limit of our moral responsibility, it becomes possible to argue for a change in our moral horizons such that it becomes legitimate for state leaders to risk the lives of their soldiers and citizens"[205] to arrest gross violations of human rights. Solidarist theorists claim that there is a consensus around the ideal that outsiders must intervene in "supreme humanitarian emergencies...where civilians in another state are in imminent danger of losing their lives or facing appalling hardship, and where indigenous forces cannot be relied upon to end these violations of human rights."[206]

In terms of international stability, solidarists believe that "all states have an interest in [international solidarity], global stability and even in global

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[202] Peter Sutch, *Ethics, Justice and International Relations: Constructing an International Community* (London: Routledge, 2001), 80.
[203] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 38.
[204] Ibid., 39.
[205] Ibid.
[206] Ibid., 50.

humanity, and in the case of wealthy and powerful states…this interest is seconded by obligation."[207] They argue that a mutual interdependence exists between order and justice. Wheeler states that "rather than see order and justice as locked in a perennial tension, solidarism looks to the possibility of overcoming this conflict by developing practices that recognize the mutual interdependence of the two claims."[208] Solidarists believe that efforts to create and maintain a stable international order will ultimately "strengthen the legitimacy of international society"[209] through a greater, more serious commitment to justice. These theorists assert that all states have a security-based interest in promoting and enforcing minimum standards of humanitarian treatment; an unjust world necessarily leads to international unrest and ultimately to international instability.

While asserting that international action may, on occasion, be necessary to halt human atrocities, solidarists recognize the importance of state sovereignty:

> sovereignty does still mater…Those states which can call upon strong regional alliances, internal peace, and a strong and independent civil society, seem clearly best placed to benefit from globalization. They will also be likely to be those most respectful of human rights. And in security terms, a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of effective states, confident of their place in the world, than in an environment of fragile collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities.[210]

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[207] Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Rescue," *Social Research* 62 (Spring 1999): 59.
[208] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11.
[209] Ibid.
[210] ICISS, "The Responsibly to Protect," *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center), 7-8.

Solidarists claim that state sovereignty is a precondition for proper governance and justice due to the stability it provides. They contend that "justice, no matter how defined [depends] on a settled stable social bond. Outside of a settled social bond justice…[it is] unlikely if not impossible."[211] Ignatieff is explicit about the continuing importance of sovereignty: "instead of regarding state sovereignty as an outdated principle, destined to pass away in the era of globalization, we need to appreciate the extent to which [it] is the basis of order in the international system and…represent[s] the best guarantee of human rights."[212] Solidarist theorists maintain, nevertheless, that the rights sovereignty entails "derive from the rules of the international community…and are limited by them."[213]

A related issue is that of the relationship between legitimacy and power in international society. Solidarists believe that it is important to distinguish between "power that is based on relations of domination and force and power that is legitimate because it is predicated on shared norms."[214] Most theories of international relations maintain that international society is governed by power based relations; these theories do not adequately recognize that states are strongly pressured towards acquiring international legitimacy for their actions. Solidarists argue that power and legitimacy are not antithetically related. Rather, as Innis Claude indicates, "the two concepts are complementary, since the

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[211] Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott, "Justice Unbound?," *International Affairs* 75, no. 3 (July 1999): 485.
[212] Michael Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry* (London: Chatto and Windus, 2001), 35.
[213] Hedley Bull, *Justice in International Relations* (Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1983), 11.
[214] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.

obverse of the legitimacy of power is the *power of legitimacy*; rulers seek legitimization not only to satisfy their consciences but also to buttress their positions."[215] Solidarists observe that changing norms provide states with new public legitimating rationales by which to justify behavior. This normative evolution seems to have occurred in the area of humanitarian intervention as intervention is now considered morally acceptable in extreme humanitarian emergencies.

Solidarists believe that there is a necessary role for humanitarian intervention even in a world comprised of sovereign states. They claim that "states that massively violate human rights should forfeit their right to be treated as legitimate sovereigns, thereby morally entitling other states to use force to stop the oppression."[216] Further, states must satisfy minimum standards of decency before they legitimately have the right to territorial integrity and non-intervention. If these standards of decency are not met, if particular states are systematically and massively violating human rights, then there may fall to the international community a moral duty to intervene. Wheeler supports solidarist claims with the argument that "unless states choose to promote their interests through naked threats, it is incumbent on those who want to legitimate their actions to domestic and international constituencies to make appeals to shared norms and rules."[217]

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[215] Innis Claude as citied in Ibid., 4.
[216] Ibid., 12.
[217] Ibid., 26.

Traveller, there is no path. Paths are made by walking.- Antonio Machado[218]

IV. The Advancement of an Ethical Agenda in Canadian Foreign Policy

The Contextual shift in Canadian Foreign Policy

In this section I will describe the shift in Canadian foreign policy which, I will contend, marks the transformation from a policy agenda guided by pluralist conceptions of international society to one guided by solidarist ethical considerations. I will argue that as solidarist principles are embraced by international society, countries like Canada are increasingly demonstrating and promoting substantive solidarist ethical agendas which seek to institutionalize interventionist practices.

As a prominent advocate of substantive humanitarian ethical advancements, former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy asserted that pluralism's bounded conception of justice was no longer viable: "in the days of the old Cold War certainties, international issues were compartmentalized. The world was divided into massive opposing blocks, and the line between national and international concerns was clearly drawn."[219] In contrast, today, "if there is one characteristic that defines this new landscape, it is integration. We have realized the issues we once dealt with separately are now interlinked."[220] Accordingly, Canada "began to develop a new foreign policy replete with a

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[218] Antonio Machado as cited in Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2003), 422.

[219] Lloyd Axworthy, "Sustainable Development in Canadian Foreign Policy," (Speech, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April 17, 1997). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=1997&Language=E (accessed on March 25, 2003).

[220] Ibid.

fresh set of priorities and initiatives,"[221] a foreign policy guided by solidarist

principles, designed to meet humanitarian ethical obligations. The Canadian

government's response "to post Cold War security issues suggests a profound

change in Canada's foreign policy, one that adopts a radically different

approach to civil wars and human rights violations in foreign countries."[222]

Foreign policy development in alignment with solidarist ethical perspectives can

be traced to events in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti. These events

"have acted as a catalyst for Canada's political leaders to reassess past practice

and to lay the groundwork for a significantly different approach to civil

conflicts and human rights violations in other countries."[223]

The evolution of governing ethical principles is confirmed by the

statements and actions of the Canadian government in the early 1990's. These

statements "as well as some specific decisions suggest that there has in fact been

a radical shift in Canada's [foreign policy agenda]...the current policy is no

longer guided by the traditional pillars of state sovereignty and non-

intervention."[224] Canadian state practice was discernibly influenced by

solidarist principles by 1991: "the government placed increased emphasis on

promoting democracy, respect for human values, and market-based economies.

By identifying these areas as important, the government was perforce

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[221] Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, " (Speech, DFAIT, June 16, 2000). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ minpub/ListPublications. asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=2000& Language=E (accessed on March 23, 2003).
[222] Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, "The 'New Look' in Canada's Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), 720.
[223] Ibid., 721.
[224] Ibid., 724.

announcing a greater interest in [global] domestic conditions."[225] The adoption

of these priorities naturally "led the government to support intervention by

multilateral institutions to assist in achieving these objectives."[226] Thus

Canadian foreign policy was no longer guided solely by pluralistic

considerations.

The new Canadian foreign policy priorities of the 1990's were rooted in

the solidarist philosophical idea that "the most fundamental requirement of any

system of political morality is, whether domestic or international, that

institutions should respect the equal moral standing, or…the equal moral worth

of everyone whom they affect."[227] Rooted in cosmopolitan ethics and enforced

by the community of states, human security, as articulated in the "many policy

statements of Foreign Minister Axworthy appears to have embraced and

promoted [solidarist principles]…as an ethical guide to foreign policy."[228]

Alluding to such principles, Axworthy stated: "in 1899, the Hague Conference

on Peace set an agenda. In 1999, the world needs a new agenda – one that puts

people at the heart of its foreign policy."[229] Implying a normative evolution in

ethical horizons, he continued: "in Canada we are determined to help establish

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[225] Ibid., 725.

[226] Ibid.

[227] Rosalind Irwin, "Introduction," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 5.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Lloyd Axworthy, "Civilians in War: 100 Years After the Hague Peace Conference," (Speech, DFAIT, September 24, 1999).
http://webapps.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002& Year=1999& Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).

the new agenda; we intend to make a real difference in the lives of the people actually living through conflict today."[230]

The new Canadian approach to foreign policy was explicitly solidarist in nature: "strengthening norms, creating the instruments to apply them, and integrating them with practice in other areas – in essence, helping to set standards to protect civilians and taking international action to uphold them."[231] Axworthy fully recognized the importance of shared norms and their constraining power. He stated: "by itself, a new Protocol won't stop abuse...but it will create a new norm."[232] The new norm can legitimate an international response to halt the abuse. Inherent in the solidarist perception of international justice is the cosmopolitan notion that "rights violations in one place in the world [are] felt everywhere"[233] and must, on occasion, be responded to with solidarity and force. Through its focus on human security initiatives based on the solidarist perception that national and international interests can be mutually compatible, Canada created a reputation "as a country motivated by conscience as well as by interest."[234] Motivation by conscience is an important element in Canada's substantive ethical advancement, however pragmatic reasons also exist for the embrace of interventionist practices.

Canadian foreign policy practitioners have been motivated to adopt a set of more substantive ethics, in part, to maintain order both nationally and

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[230] Ibid.
[231] Ibid.
[232] Ibid.
[233] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 308.
[234] Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Rights in a Changing World," (Speech, DFAIT). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/mi.../101028.htm&bPrint=False&Year=&ID=&Language= (accessed on March 25, 2003).

internationally. The maintenance of international order is of vital importance in the Canadian context. Ignatieff reiterates this point: "for Canadians, the crisis of state order is not a distant issue. Our concern is not simply humanitarian. It has a direct impact on our interests."[235] A bond between normative advancement, legitimacy, interest and order has been established. The promotion of a substantive international ethical agenda is framed in the context of Canadian self-interest; by ensuring the continuation of order nationally and internationally, Canada is protecting its vital national interests. In a cyclical fashion the norms advanced by Canadian foreign policy initiatives are internationally legitimized because they fit with the normative consensus in international society and are also nationally legitimized because they are seen as enabling the protection of vital Canadian interests.

A brief discussion of the changing notion of state sovereignty is required at this point. It is important to recognize the extent to which interventionist practices have been developed and promoted within the context of ongoing, resolute support for the institution of state sovereignty. Sovereignty is seen as an integral requirement for the promotion of substantive humanitarian ethics. It is through the agency of sovereign states that international obligations are responded to and, ultimately, that matters of order and justice are addressed. Through inclusion in international society, states are seen as advancing consensually determined, thus legitimate norms which ultimately speak to

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[235]Michael Ignatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada," (The O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa, ON, March 12, 2004). http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/skelton/lecture-2004-en.asp (accessed August 14, 2004).

national interests regarding the need for the creation and the perpetuation of national and international order and stability.

Immigration concerns provide a good example of the interplay between Canada's advancement of a substantive ethical agenda, the permissive normative context which serves to legitimize Canada's increasingly interventionist practices, and a concern for international obligations regarding the advancement and safeguarding of order and justice. These issues are all addressed within the parameters of state sovereignty. The central role played by the state is implicit in the immigration issue: "three of our most important recent immigration streams – from Somalia, Sri Lanka and Haiti – have come from failed or failing states."[236] Canadian leaders have unequivocally stated that neither past experience nor the prevailing norms of international society indicate that Canadians "can live securely in a world populated by rogue states."[237] The key is to bolster national stability, thus preserving international order.

Advancing good governance initiatives internationally helps create more stable states, states that citizens can embrace rather than flee; as a result, the systems of international order and justice continue to be mutually reinforced, thus preserving international stability. Ignatieff stresses the need for strong states and a stable global order – minimum conditions for the establishment and promotion of international justice. He asserts that it is "not obvious how any

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[236] Michael Ignatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada," (The O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa, ON, March 12, 2004). http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/skelton/lecture-2004-en.asp (accessed August 14, 2004).
[237] Ibid.

rich and favored country like Canada can expect to maintain effective immigration control and population management if we find ourselves living in a global order where state order is collapsing in twenty-five to thirty states around the world."[238] In that situation, he sees the attainment of order, justice and vital national interests as highly unlikely, if not impossible. Ignatieff provides the following exhortation: "a focus upon peace, order and good governance [will help] us to meet a vital national interest...if we love our own land, we have good reasons to help others create political orders that deserve the same fierce attachment."[239]

Ultimately, according to the ICISS, "prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect."[240] The ICISS report explicitly calls for states to undertake interventionist practices – to preserve national and international order and justice - while adhering to notions of international normative legitimacy and promoting the continuation of sovereignty as an institution. It states:

> intra-state warfare is often viewed, in the prosperous West, simply as a set of discrete and unrelated crises occurring in distant and unimportant regions. In reality, what is happening is a convulsive process of state fragmentation and state formation that is transforming the international order itself. Moreover, the rich world is deeply implicated in the process. Civil conflicts are fuelled by arms and monetary transforms that originate in the developed world, and their destabilizing effects are felt in the developed world in everything from globally interconnected terrorism to refugee flows, the export of drugs, the spread of infections disease and organized crime.[241]

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[238] Ibid.

[239] Ibid.

[240] ICISS, "The Responsibly to Protect" *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center), xi.

[241] Ibid., 5.

Ignatieff cautions that "a global order in which states are no longer able to protect their own people and their own territory presents Canada with a real and growing danger."[242] The shift in Canada's foreign policy agenda has been timely. Its promotion of substantive humanitarian ethics has been enabled in the context of a permissive international society – interventionist practices have become legitimated by the society of states through international normative evolution and, importantly, material practice.

Canada seems well placed to promote solidarist principles; "we have the resources – and most of all, the political memory – that give us a unique ability to turn danger into opportunity."[243] Former Foreign Minister John Manley indicated in April 2001: "we have become more engaged...because it is in Canada's interest to be engaged. Our future prosperity is intimately linked to our ability not just to recognize opportunities but to show leadership in the development [and promotion of an ethical agenda]."[244] Further, "in a world where foreign ministers sit down to discuss global warming, hate propaganda, and child labor...it is clear that zero-sum applications of hard power are not

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[242] Michael Ignatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada," (The O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa, ON, March 12, 2004). http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/skelton/lecture-2004-en.asp (accessed August 14, 2004).

[243] Ibid.

[244] John Manley as cited in Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot, "The Return to Continentalism in Canadian Foreign Policy," in The Axworthy Legacy, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 13.

going to solve all the problems we face."[245]   Instead of waiting for the magical

creation of a new, more just world, Canada has decided to promote norms and

values that are deemed necessary preconditions for the advancement of

international order and justice, thus "a new approach to foreign policy."[246]

Tom Keating indicates that "this change in norms of conduct within the

international community reflects a new emphasis [on order] - on cooperative

conflict resolution, humanitarian aid, democratization and preventative

diplomacy."[247]   The shift may be seen as indicative of policy development in

accordance with "what Hedley Bull once described as a Grotian view of the

world – a view that privileged order above other values, in part because order

served Canadian interest, but also because order allowed for the pursuit of more

substantive goals."[248]   The formation and promotion of a substantive ethical

agenda was "rooted in real interests and [was] aimed at facilitating the

pragmatic resolution of real problems as they happened to come along."[249]

The development of Canadian foreign policy initiatives which support and

promote a more interventionist solidarist ethic can be traced to 1989, when the

"[Brian] Mulroney government [began to embrace] this more ideological and

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[245]Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, "The Axworthy Revolution," in *The Axworthy Legacy*, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 77.
[246]Ibid., 83.
[247] Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 226.
[248] Ibid., 227.
[249] Denis Stairs in Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 56.

interventionist approach to foreign policy."[250] Paul Gecelovsky and Tom

Keating detail the shift in normative policy emphasis that occurred through the

adoption of the good governance initiative. They indicate that "the most

dramatic change in policy...occurred in 1990 with the adoption of the values of

good governance as a foreign policy priority."[251] This initiative explicitly

focused on a "respect for human rights, democratic government and sound

public administration."[252] A key element of this initiative was "the belief that

[good governance] values should be adopted by other political communities

around the globe and used by multilateral associations in assessing the

credentials of member governments."[253] In seeking to establish a substantive

ethical agenda in Canadian foreign policy, "the Mulroney government elevated

the salience of human rights considerations to a 'basic principle, or a

'fundamental, integral part' of Canada's foreign policy."[254] As the Mulroney

government sought to establish in practice the rhetorical norms it espoused,

"initiatives were taken to demonstrate the government's commitment to

enhancing the place of human rights in Canadian foreign policy."[255]

Reflecting the development of an increasingly solidarist international

society, the substantive norms promoted in the Canadian context were being

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[250] Paul Gecelovsky and Tom Keating, "Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative," in *Diplomatic Departures*, eds. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 195.

[251] Ibid., 194.

[252] Tom Keating, "Promoting Democracy in Haiti: Assessing the Practical and Ethical Implications," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 210.

[253] Paul Gecelovsky and Tom Keating, "Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative," in *Diplomatic Departures*, eds. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 194.

[254] Ibid., 196.

[255] Ibid.

legitimized at the national level. Canada did not pull these initiatives out of a

policy vacuum. Gecelovsky and Keating observe that "in charting this new

course the Conservatives were... borrowing themes and practices that had been

adopted elsewhere and that reflected significant changes in the world at

large."[256] International society provided a permissive context for the

development and promotion of good governance norms; "there were a number

of critical external developments that eased the way for political leaders in

Canada to raise the banner of good governance and encouraged an emphasis on

democratic rights and procedures."[257] A consensus had been developed within

international society which allowed Canadian policy-makers the freedom to

legitimately advance interventionist policies and practices. Keating states that

the "decision to give a higher priority to these objectives in Canadian foreign

policy, while a departure from past practice in Canada, was consistent with

developments in other countries, including among others, middle powers, such

as the Netherlands and Norway."[258]

Another reflection of the development of solidarist principles in Canadian

practice and rhetoric was the coupling of substantive human rights initiatives

with "a marked change in the perception of the principle of national sovereignty

and its corollary, non-intervention."[259] Mulroney asserted that a "'rethinking'

of the principle of...sovereignty had to be undertaken because 'problems

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[256] Ibid., 195.

[257] Ibid., 197.

[258] Tom Keating, "Promoting Democracy in Haiti: Assessing the Practical and Ethical Implications," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 210.

[259] Paul Gecelovsky and Tom Keating, "Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative," in *Diplomatic Departures*, eds. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 196.

respect no borders' and because Canada recognized that there are 'certain fundamental rights that all people possess – and that, sometimes, the international community must act to defend them."[260]

The pluralistic era has passed, it seems. Gone are the days when "human rights considerations were regarded as 'essentially the domestic concerns of other states and Canada had 'no firm [or] fixed rules for raising and discussing' these issues with others."[261] Canada has responded to international normative evolution by embracing solidarist principles in rhetoric and, increasingly, in material practice.

Sustainable Development and Economic Justice

Justice and caring are also due to the dispossessed of the world who feel cut off and ignored by the rich developed world as they languish in camps of refuge and displacement or are left to die of AIDS or malaria unattended and alone. They need inclusion and the better distribution of wealth. - Lloyd Axworthy[262]

The promotion of a substantive ethical agenda in the context of sustainable development and economic justice highlights the underlying theoretical shift in Canada's foreign policy initiatives. Canada's interventionist ethical agenda has been articulated, in part, through progressive approaches and reforms to economic development. The change in emphasis in Canadian policy from

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[260] Ibid.

[261] Tom Keating and Paul Gecelovsky, "Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Evolution of Canada's Human Rights and Good Governance Policy During the Conservative Era" (Paper presented at Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy Conference, Hull, PQ, November 18 -20, 1999), 2. (cited with permission).

[262] Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2003),7.

national economic development to sustainable development and economic justice provides evidence of a shift from pluralist to solidarist principles.

Interventionist economic measures suggestive of solidarist underpinnings were first demonstrated in the Canadian context in the late 1980s by the commitment of the Mulroney government to "enhancing the place of human rights in Canadian foreign policy [through measures] including...linking levels of official development assistance with a state's human rights record."[263] Gecelovsky and Keating explain that "governments began to attach 'political conditionality'... as [a] 'legitimate intervention by aid donors in the domestic affairs of borrowing countries in order to alter the political environment in ways that will sustain human as well as economic development.'"[264]

Regarding the advancement of a substantive ethical agenda evident in Canada's interventionist economic stance, it is important to note that these reforms were normatively legitimated by international society. According to Gecelovsky and Keating, "within this international context, Canadian foreign policy-makers saw both the need and the opportunity to move in the [normative direction legitimated by international society]...The need reflected an interest in maintaining credibility with like-minded states."[265]

The interventionist nature of the good governance initiative in the economic realm was marked by a "general acceptance of a 'new orthodoxy' in which the economic reforms called for by structural adjustment programs

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[263] Paul Gecelovsky and Tom Keating, "Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative," in *Diplomatic Departures*, eds. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 196.
[264] Ibid., 198.
[265] Ibid., 199.

(SAPs) were married to political reforms."[266] While SAPs historically imposed conditions on those receiving funds, the shift in the late 1980s and early 1990s was remarkable in that "political considerations and government practices [became] part of the development discourse."[267] Gecelovsky and Keating indicate that "the range of political reforms viewed as necessary were some or all of the following: the adoption of the rule of law, the creation of representative institutions, accountable and responsible public administration, and respect for human rights."[268] The linking of required political reforms to the receipt of financial aid marked a distinctly interventionist shift in Canada's economic policy. Gecelovsky and Keating observe that "the addition of political conditions to SAPs marked a change in development thinking...political reform was no longer viewed as a product of economic development but, rather, was now viewed as a condition of receiving it."[269]

Canada's interventionist agenda is also practically demonstrated through its concern with debt relief. Keating indicates that "corruption, excessive military spending, declining export revenues, and questionable investment have left a legacy of debt throughout much of the developing world."[270] Thus, "between 1980 and 1997, the total debt of the world's poorest nations grew from US$568 billion to over US$2.9 trillion in principal and interest payments over that same period."[271] Further, "as their debt continued to grow, the

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[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.
[268] Ibid.
[269] Ibid.
[270] Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 202.
[271] Ibid.

economies of these countries became geared toward export and revenue, rather than taking care of their own people. Health care, education, housing and other basic needs have been cut drastically in order to service...debt."[272] In response to this debt crisis, "since 1978, Canada has written off more than CAN$1.3 billion of debt to some of the poorest countries in the world...this places Canada among the more generous countries of those governments that have forgiven debt."[273]

Canada has been active in promoting recognition of the need for debt relief within international society, in trying to get an increasing number of countries to understand the importance of debt relief – and to act on it. Keating indicates that "Canada and Britain led the charge for greater debt relief at the Cologne summit...it was on debt relief of the poorest that Canada's intellectual, policy, and structural leadership was most fully expressed."[274] To conclude this discussion on Canada's debt initiatives, I draw attention to Keating's statement:

> the success of Canadian efforts at the Cologne summit suggests, perhaps, a renewed concern with the barriers to sustainable development in the South....It also suggests Canada's continuing interest in using multilateral diplomacy and institutions to shape the political, economic, and social conditions of other countries in ways that are more direct and interventionist than those used in the past.[275]

Canada's recognition of the importance of sustainable development and economic justice represents a response to the pleas of the Brandt Commission in the early 1980s. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has

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[272] Ibid., 203.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Ibid., 204.
[275] Ibid.

incorporated an explicit sustainable development mandate which exemplifies

solidarist theoretical commitments "to support sustainable development in

developing countries in order to reduce poverty and contribute to a more secure,

equitable and prosperous world."[276] CIDA acknowledges that "the prospects for

global sustainable development today are set against a complex backdrop of

progress and setback in international development."[277] CIDA's *Sustainable*

Development Strategy: 2004–2006 indicates:

> there is unprecedented international consensus on development
> goals, a new partnership of shared responsibility and
> accountability between developed and developing countries,
> renewed global commitment to development financing and
> sustainable development, and a set of international principles
> for development effectiveness that include clearer recognition
> that there must be greater coherence between aid and non-aid
> policies to improve prospects for global development.[278]

The focus on sustainable development and economic justice reveals

commitment to solidarist principles. There is an emphasis on the promotion of

an internationally legitimated, consensual normative agenda which is positioned

to advance both national and international interests. International society has

created an environment which sanctions the rhetorical and material

advancement of interventionist practices; in the economic realm this is

demonstrated, in part, through CIDA's sustainable development strategy.

Recognizing the interdependence of the modern world, CIDA's

initiatives establish an obligation between the developed and developing world

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[276] Canadian International Development Agency, *Sustainable Development Strategy: 2004–2006* (Gatineau: CIDA, 2004), ix.
[277] Ibid.
[278] Ibid.

– an obligation that seeks to ensure not only economic justice but also the continuation of a stable international system. CIDA indicates that "the prospects for sustainable development around the world are more promising today than they were a decade ago...there...is widespread consensus on how countries will work together...through the application of international principles of development effectiveness."[279]

The Canadian emphasis on the development and promotion of a substantive ethical agenda is supported within CIDA policy initiatives. The legitimacy of the solidarist norms driving Canadian policy development are attested to by the consensus on sustainable development issues. CIDA describes the advancement of substantive humanitarian ethics based on "a common foundation of values and [on]...an unprecedented consensus on the goals, conditions, and resources needed to achieve sustainable development."[280] The three Canadian foreign policy goals outlined in *Canada in the World* (namely promotion of prosperity, protection of Canadian and global security, and projection of Canadian values) provide the policy framework within which CIDA must fulfill its mandate.

Reflecting solidarist ethical principles, the interventionist economic agenda is explicitly aimed at the level of the individual, advanced and guaranteed by sovereign states. CIDA recognizes that "Canada's aid program has a central role to play in supporting the three goals of Canada's international policy...this consistent support is a reflection of values important to Canadians:

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[279] Ibid., 3- 4.
[280] Ibid., 4.

humanitarianism, generosity, equality and social justice."[281] The advancement

of these Canadian values is based on "a genuine desire to help those in need and

to make the world a better place."[282] A further assertion of the solidarist

foundations of Canada's interventionist inclinations is provided in CIDA's

Sustainable Development Strategy, 2004–2006:

> in today's interdependent world, Canadians find that their
> interests, as well as their values, are engaged in the developing
> world and on a broad range of issues with development
> implications. Economically, all countries...benefit from broad-
> based and equitable development in developing countries and
> countries in transition. This kind of growth plays a critical role
> in poverty reduction, creating jobs and income, generating tax
> revenues to invest in social programs, and creating new markets
> for trade in goods and services. Canadians realize that global
> issues like public health, the environment, and peace and
> security can only be addressed through cooperation with
> developing countries.[283]

This statement links the major elements of the solidarist project: consensually

held norms, a focus on meeting national and international interests, a sense of

international obligation, acknowledgement of the mutually reinforcing elements

of order and justice and an assertion of the continuing importance of state

sovereignty, albeit of the refined or evolved form of 'sovereignty as

responsibility' detailed by the ICISS and discussed at the end of section II.

Canadian economic aid initiatives are aimed at meeting the goals of

Canada's substantive ethical agenda, in part, through an increasing national aid

budget. In "2002-2003, Canada's aid budget was $2.3 billion. The February

2003, the federal budget increased this by an additional $1.4 billion over three

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[281] Ibid., 9.
[282] Ibid.
[283] Ibid.

fiscal years (2002–2005), the first increment toward an eventual doubling of the budget by 2010."[284] Material support is necessary for an interventionist agenda, especially one that aims to demonstrate human security initiative in practice.

As an example of Canada's substantive ethical agenda in practice, I will consider Canadian sustainable development and economic justice initiatives within the African context. Here, too, is evidence of a solidarist commitment. In 2002, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien asserted that "helping Africa get on its feet is in our interest from the perspective of our common humanity, from the perspective of creating a more prosperous world with new markets, and it is profoundly in our self-interest from the point of view of our own security."[285] In this regard, "Africa–the world's poorest continent will continue to be a particular focus: at least 50 percent of CIDA's incremental new resources will be invested in Africa, in addition to the $500 million Canada fund for Africa."[286]

To meet its rhetorical and material commitments to Africa, Canada "is...doing its part to lighten Africa's debt load...on 1 January 2001, Canada stopped collecting debt payments from eleven African countries that showed a commitment to reform."[287] Further, "Chrétien... promised that Canada would work to open western markets to African goods... [recognizing that] there is

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[284] Ibid.

[285] United Nations, "PM: Poverty Breeds Terrorism," *Canoe News*, September 16, 2002, http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWS/pmterrorism_sep16-cp.html (accessed September 16, 2002).

[286] Canadian International Development Agency, *Sustainable Development Strategy: 2004-2006* (Gatineau: CIDA, 2004), 24.

[287] Charles McLean, "World Economic Forum: Canadian Prime Minister Announces US$500 million G-8 Partnership with Africa," February 3, 2002, http://www.webforum.org/site/hopmepublic.nsf (accessed May 19, 2003).

going to be little progress in investment and trade if Africans are denied access to our markets."[288]

Another aspect of Canada's interventionist ethical agenda in Africa was predicated on the "World Bank's 1989 report on the conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa...the report argued that Africa's development problems derived from a 'crisis of governance.'"[289] Interventionist practices were implicitly called for by the World Bank; it had determined that "a failure in the 'exercise of political power to manage [the] nation's affairs'"[290] had caused Africa's crisis. Gecelovsky and Keating indicate that the World Bank called for interventionist methods because it perceived "the key to development was for those states who had good governance to assist those who did not."[291]

Through its development assistance program to Africa and other countries, Canada has "buttressed...[its] claim to be a committed and constructive international citizen."[292] Addressing Canada's interventionist inclination, Andrew F. Cooper states that through development assistance programs aimed "outwards towards the global community, Canada signaled a seriousness of intent concerning both its willingness to take on an ambitious set of international responsibilities and its desire to carve out a specific place for itself in policy terms."[293]

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[288] Ibid.
[289] Paul Gecelovsky and Tom Keating, "Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative," in *Diplomatic Departures*, eds. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 198.
[290] Ibid.
[291] Ibid.
[292] Andrew F. Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1997), 210.
[293] Ibid.

Soft Power Human Rights Promotion

Canada's substantive ethical agenda is also demonstrated through its commitment to soft power human rights promotion. It has used soft power techniques to promote a substantive humanitarian agenda efficiently and effectively. Canada's interventionist orientation in this regard focuses on skillful diplomatic maneuvering within the realm of possibility legitimated by international society. In the area of soft power persuasion, solidarist theoretical underpinnings are explicit. Soft power normative promotion depends upon a permissive environment within international society.

Given the importance of the legitimacy derived from the society of states for the norms that are advanced through soft power methods, "it is worth remembering that a constructive engagement policy can be an [effective] alternative...[to] military force and big-power bluster."[294] Axworthy reminds us that the advancement of Canada's substantive ethical agenda depends, at least in part, on "the well-endowed civil network that we possess...It gives us the capacity to carve out special niches of global activity, such as peace-building and human rights work, where we can put our social capital to work on global issues."[295] These techniques indicate the efficacy of the soft power method in relation to advancement of Canada's ethical agenda.

Axworthy states that 'soft power' advancements rely "upon the skill and talent of Canadians to negotiate, advice, organize and create, solve problems

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[294] Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2003),74.
[295] Ibid.

peaceably and look for practical solutions."[296] Importantly, he asserts that the focus on soft power techniques does not mean that Canadians "eschew military commitments or fail to cooperate with allies when there is a common threat...[or pay] less attention to our economic relations, for without a strong economy our ability and will to perform as a consequential global player we are handicapped."[297] Rather, "the key questions are how best to use our assets; what initiatives lend themselves to our particular strengths?"[298]

I will consider the Canadian attempt to advance a substantive humanitarian agenda through the use of soft power techniques in the context of the Ottawa Process on Landmines. The Ottawa Process was launched by Canada on October 5, 1996. Its purpose was a Canadian led effort to ban the use of antipersonnel landmines. In seeking to advance the ethical norms supporting it, Canada found "both a new role and a distinctive voice on international matters and helped reshape certain of our assumptions governing global affairs."[299]

The challenge for Canada was to move the normative rhetoric behind the Ottawa Process from rhetorical contribution to material practice within international society. Axworthy states: "the challenge is to...put our rhetoric into action...The challenge is also to the International Campaign to ensure that governments around the world are prepared to work with us."[300] There was an

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[296] Ibid., 75.
[297] Ibid.
[298] Ibid.
[299] Ibid., 127.
[300] Ibid., 138.

explicit call for a practical international consensus around the normative agenda being advanced by Canada through the Ottawa Process.

The Landmines Treaty[301] came into force on March 1, 1999; it was an achievement "without precedent in international arms control or humanitarian law...the treaty was [a] framework to compel state compliance and cooperation."[302] The idea of constraining and enabling state behavior is very important in the solidarist context. Not only had Canada taken an emerging norm within international society and developed and promoted it until it was legitimized in theory and rhetorical commitment, but it had also worked to ensure the translation of the norm from rhetoric to practice. As the norm gained in strength, it developed (through national and international legitimization) the ability to dictate the range of appropriate state action.

The constraining capability is emphasized by Axworthy: "even for those countries that haven't formally joined, the treaty acts as a regulator – a marker that measures their behavior and stigmatizes non-compliance."[303] The exceptionally close parallel between this statement and Skinner's statement regarding legitimacy is remarkable. Once again, Skinner's solidarist belief is that "the range of legitimating reasons that any actor can invoke is limited by the prevailing morality...any course of action is inhibited from occurring if it cannot be legitimated."[304] Substantiating the constraining ability of the treaty is

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[301] Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Reduction and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, adopted 1997.
[302] Ibid., 148.
[303] Ibid., 149.
[304] Q. Skinner in Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7.

the fact that the "U.S. has announced a ban on all exports and said that it will end all use of anti-personnel mines outside of Korea by 2003 and in Korea by 2006."[305]

While the treaty's efficacy has been established by material practice, the normative element remains vitally important to Canadian policy-makers. Axworthy indicates that "the influence of the treaty can...be seen in very practical ways...but it isn't just the numbers that are impressive, nor are they the best indicator of the treaty's effect."[306] He discusses the normative significance of the treaty. Canada's advancement of a substantive humanitarian agenda is not only about saving potential land mine victims; the Canadian normative project is much broader – it seeks to "limit the terror felt by people and communities...it [seeks to] concentrate international resources on eliminating fear caused by these high impact areas [and] formatting partnerships with local governments."[307]

Canada hopes to embed the developing humanitarian norm so firmly within the context of international society that many more victim-centered treaties will result. The Canadian project is about substantive state-based ethical advancements designed to protect people - the Land Mines Convention is only a start in the sense that many other threats to human security exist. However on the normative level, the Convention is highly significant – it marks the development of significantly more robust international humanitarian norms –

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[305] Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2003), 149 – 150.
[306] Ibid., 150.
[307] Ibid.

norms that are developing the power to constrain even the most powerful international players.

Of further significance is the fact that this was a consensually legitimated treaty. The Land Mines Convention indicated a shift "from the dominance of big-power politics towards an agenda that would put people's needs ahead of raw power interests of state."[308] An amusing outcome was that "the Ottawa Process had flummoxed the experts who didn't believe that there was anything more at stake than the exercise of naked self-interest."[309] While interests were involved, they aligned much more closely with the broader solidarist form of 'interest' than they did with the narrow state-centered pluralistic notion of 'interest'.

As if reading from a solidarist rule book, Axworthy states: "the success of the land-mine initiative gave us a concrete accomplishment in which the theory became practice."[310] It showcased the efficacy of the normative solidarist project and the power of internationally legitimated norms. Soft power was derided until "the Ottawa Process showed that it worked. No one was threatened with a bombing. No economic sanctions were imposed. No diplomatic muscles were flexed by the treaty's proponents. Yet a significant change was achieved in the face of stiff opposition."[311] Canada's ethical agenda, an agenda designed to save lives, was demonstrably advanced through international normative evolution, consensus building, a concern for international obligations, and a

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[308] Ibid., 152.
[309] Ibid.
[310] Ibid., 153.
[311] Ibid., 155.

desire to advance international justice - all within the confines of the present state system. Solidarism deals with the reality of the world – it is not an idealist utopian fantasy. Through the development of international society along solidarist lines, the efficacy of norms and ideas has been demonstrated; the Land Mines Convention attests to this.

Hard Power Human Rights Protection: Kosovo Intervention

Unfortunately, as Axworthy indicates "soft power cannot always work: the harsh realties of living in a tough, global neighborhood sometimes require forceful measures."[312]   Solidarist ideals regarding humanitarian intervention are implicit in Kofi Annan's observation that: "[the] developing international norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter…[reveals an] evolution in our understanding of state sovereignty and individual sovereignty…that we should welcome…it is a hopeful sign."[313]   It also points to the viability of solidarist ethics in foreign policy formation and practice.

Prior to the influence of solidarist principles on foreign policy, "the normal response of states to humanitarian outrages…was non-intervention: examples include the slaughter of millions of Tutsis in Burundi in the early 1960's [and] the murder of hundreds of thousands of Ibos during the war over Biafra's attempted succession from Nigeria."[314] Guided by pluralistic considerations, "Canadian governments have taken the view that humanitarian

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[312] Ibid.

[313] Kofi Annan in Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 285.

[314] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13.

intervention is not permissible…successive governments exhibited a strong commitment to the principles of state sovereignty and resisted embracing a doctrine of humanitarian intervention."[315] Demonstrating this orientation, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau posed the rhetorical question: " 'where's Biafra?' when asked in 1968 about the possibility of Canadian intervention in the Nigerian civil war."[316] Although public outrage over the plight of starving Biafran children eventually led to a Canadian donation of relief supplies, "it was clear…that the government gave no consideration to altering its policy of support for the [pluralistic] principles of sovereignty and non-intervention."[317]

As Canada sought to promote a more substantive ethical agenda through its foreign policy initiatives, it endeavored to "strengthen the norms and practices regarding the protection of civilians; mobilize the political will to act when necessary; and develop the military and civilian capacity to succeed."[318] This foreign policy project attempted to focus more directly on state interactions and on the subsequent normative developments occurring within the international society of states. In seeking to legitimize the solidarist norm of humanitarian intervention, Canada participated in constructing a new ethical model for interstate cooperation and a platform from which to pursue justice effectively.

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[315] Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, "The 'New Look' in Canada's Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), 722.
[316] Ibid.
[317] Ibid., 724.
[318] Lloyd Axworthy, "Humanitarian Intervention and Humanitarian Constraints," (Speech, DFAIT, February 10, 2000). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=2000&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).

Having discussed Canada's practical and theoretical support for humanitarian intervention as guided by solidarist ethical perspectives which encourage states to defend norms of a universal character, I will now consider how Canadian foreign policy practice in Kosovo and the Canadian justifications for its action reflect those perspectives. Though perhaps not a representative test of Canadian foreign policy on humanitarian intervention, the Kosovo intervention clearly represents Canada's world view. Axworthy stated: "we want a world where rights are respected, a world where war criminals do not act in impunity…we want to consolidate the multilateral system, which was created to make the world better, in institutions such as the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO."[319]

On 23 March 1999, NATO launched an "offensive aerial bombardment against Serbian forces and against military and non-military installations in Serbia and Montenegro in an effort to halt the Milosevic government's oppression of ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo."[320] Although the situation in Kosovo had been monitored since the late 1980s, force was ultimately utilized after diplomatic measures failed. As violence escalated, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted of number of resolutions which sought to address the situation diplomatically. However "the resolutions had little effect on the

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[319] Lloyd Axworthy, "The Conflict in Kosovo," (Speech, DFAIT, March 24, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=1999&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).
[320] Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 210.

ongoing conflict in the region and NATO issued its first warning of air attacks against Serbia in October 1998."[321]

Although the aerial bombardment was undertaken without the direct approval of the UN, Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged that force was likely necessary: "it is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace."[322] The intervention "was aimed at stopping a familiar and dreadful evil – a methodically brutal ethnic cleansing conducted by the forces of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic."[323]

Axworthy framed Canadian action in solidarist terms in emphasizing that Canada had "continuously pushed for the strongest possible UNSC engagement in the Kosovo issue."[324] However, the failure of diplomatic efforts and the looming humanitarian disaster left no potentially effective option other than force. Through Canadian foreign policy action in Kosovo, Axworthy established that Canada was willing to use the observance of basic human rights as an imperative for concerted international action. Accordingly, he normatively developed Canadian action in humanitarian terms. He stated that the Kosovo situation exemplified "human misery on a devastating scale: the exploitation of civilians, massive refugee flows (about one third of Kosovo's

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[321] Ibid., 216.
[322] Kofi Anan as cited in Ibid., 217.
[323] Ibid., 139.
[324] Lloyd Axworthy, "The Conflict in Kosovo," (Speech, DFAIT, March 24, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=1999&Language=E (accessed November 21, 2002).

ethnic Albanian population), and the gross violations of human rights and

humanitarian law – summary executions, rape and ethnic cleansing."[325]

Although it has been claimed that the bombing served only to create "the

cover of war for the ethnic cleansers…inflaming the latter's desire to extract

revenge against the defenseless Albanians they despised,"[326] I believe that the

humanitarian imperative articulated by Axworthy precludes such dismissal of

the significance of the intervention. Wheeler counters the criticism by stating

that it relies on the assumption that "in the absence of NATO bombing, the

Serbs would have ended their killing and forced expulsion of ethnic

Albanians,…*but* the justification for intervention was that without it many more

Albanians would have been killed and forcefully driven from their homes."[327]

Axworthy, likewise, framed his justification for action in solidarist terms, with

emphasis on the alleviation human suffering: "NATO's actions helped to end

the cycle of violence and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe."[328]

The Kosovo intervention seems to represent a definite shift in guiding

ethical principles toward solidarist perspectives. The implication "is that the

international reaction to the Kosovo case marks a watershed in the society of

states, and that we should expect to see it exhibiting a new solidarity in response

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[325] Lloyd Axworthy, "Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda." (Speech, DFAIT, April 7, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=1999&Language=E (accessed November 21, 2002).
[326] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 269.
[327] Ibid.
[328] Lloyd Axworthy, "Address to the North Atlantic Council Meeting - Bosnia/Kosovo," (Speech, DFAIT, December 8, 1998). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publicati…/101152.htm&bPrint=True&Language= (accessed March 23, 2003).

to any future cases where states intervene to end atrocities without Council authorization."[329] The significance of the intervention cannot be denied: "for the first time since the founding of the UN, a group of states explicitly justified their use of force against another state on humanitarian grounds."[330] Indicative of the international normative evolution that had occurred to make intervention ethically permissible is the fact that "NATO's action was for the most part greeted with either approval or acquiescence by the society of states."[331]

While there is evidence that the intervention was deemed legitimate internationally, Axworthy publicly expressed disappointment that "certain members of the Council could not reconcile yesterday's assumptions about sovereignty with today's imperatives of humanitarian emergency."[332] Nonetheless, the Kosovo intervention shows solidarist ideals such as humanitarian intervention progressing from "theoretical construct to new norm of international behavior."[333] The intervention also served to "dispel [any] misconception that military force and the human security agenda are mutually exclusive;"[334] clearly, solidarist principles may be pursued with a variety of

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[329] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 297.

[330] Ibid., 242.

[331] Ibid.

[332] Lloyd Axworthy, "Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda," (Speech, DFAIT, April 7, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=1999&Language=E (accessed March 24, 2003).

[333] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, "The Axworthy Revolution," in *The Axworthy Legacy*, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 82-83.

[334] Lloyd Axworthy, "Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda." (Speech, DFAIT, April 7, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubType ID=100002&Year=1999&Language=E. (accessed March 23, 2003).

tools ranging from diplomatic persuasion to robust force. Kosovo has served to vivify the new ethical approach behind Canadian foreign policy practice.

Examination of justifications for Canadian policy in Kosovo reveals a close correlation with solidarist principles. Canadian policy emphasizes shared values and norms, a victim centered approach, the continuing relevance of the Westphalian state system, the mutual interdependence between order and justice, and stringent legitimacy requirements for intervention.

In his justifications of Canadian foreign policy in Kosovo, Axworthy focused on the correlation between Canadian values and international norms. He stated that in Kosovo both Canadian values and interests were at stake: "the repression of human rights...[constitutes] a profound assault on our fundamental values, indeed, on the standards to which most members of the international community are bound through international human rights conventions and humanitarian law."[335] He clearly articulated the idea that Canada felt a moral obligation to respond to "acute suffering and widespread loss of life...and, if necessary, to intervene."[336]

In April 1999, Axworthy defended the appropriateness of Canada's action in Kosovo in relation to its existing ethical agenda:

> [The Canadian foreign policy agenda seeks] to construct a global society in which the safety and well-being of the individual is an international priority and a motivating force for international action; a society in which international humanitarian standards and the rule of law are advanced and woven into a coherent web protecting the individual, where those who violate these standards are held fully accountable and finally a society in

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[335] Ibid.

[336] Paul Heinbecker, *Canada World View* Issue 07, (Spring 2000) http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/wv_7/7t4-en.asp (accessed March 26, 2003).

which global, regional and bilateral institutions – present and future - are built and equipped to promote and enforce these standards.[337]

Espousing these ethical standards, Canada could not ignore the crisis in Kosovo. Axworthy was adamant that they provided a rationale for why "Canadian pilots are part of the effort, why we are providing humanitarian relief, and why we are offering sanctuary to 5000 refugees."[338]

Axworthy emphasized the role of shared norms in areas such as humanitarian intervention. He was explicitly concerned with advancing "consensus of world opinion, to create bench marks against which violators are held, and to orient and legitimize action to enforce it."[339] He sought to expand interstate cooperation and entrench existing humanitarian values internationally. Axworthy pointed out that "humanitarian intervention is not just a western concept;"[340] he perceived it, instead, as an imperative legitimated by internationally forged humanitarian standards, designed to uphold mutually agreed upon values. Axworthy believed that normative evolution, reflected in Canadian policy, had facilitated mobilization of the international community "to address subjects that affect the everyday lives of ordinary people."[341]

[337] Lloyd Axworthy, "Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda," (Speech, DFAIT, April 7, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=1999&Language=E (accessed November 22, 2002)
[338] Ibid.
[339] Lloyd Axworthy, "Civilians in War: 100 Years After the Hague Peace Conference," (Speech, DFAIT, September 24, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=1999&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).
[340] Paul Heinbecker, *Canada World View* 7, (Spring 2000). http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/wv_7/7t4-en.asp (accessed March 26, 2003).
[341] Lloyd Axworthy, "Address to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs: 1998 Foreign Policy Conference," (Speech, DFAIT, October 16, 1998). http:/webapps.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publicati.../101123.htm&bPrint=True&Language= (accessed March 23, 2003).

Canadian policy in Kosovo exemplified a victim-centered approach. Axworthy "maintained that NATO [was] engaged in Kosovo to restore human security to the Kosovars."[342] This articulation of foreign policy makes civilian security a primary goal. In the new ethical context, not only states but individuals can be the object of key international concerns. Canadian foreign policy was "aimed at putting people first by developing new concepts, adapting diplomatic practice, and updating the institutions on which the international system is based."[343] This approach was perceived necessary because civilian populations were increasingly targeted by intrastate violence. Axworthy proclaimed "the safety and well-being of the individual...has become both the measure of global security and a new impetus for global action."[344]

In the 1990s, Canada began to exhibit a solidarist foreign policy guided by ethical considerations which sought to advance human dignity and establish the foundation for further ethical advancements. It was "the plight of innocent Kosovar civilians, deprived of their livelihoods, chased from their homes, with hundreds beaten and massacred – all delivered in real time direct to our living rooms – that demanded a response from the rest of us."[345] Canadian action in

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[342] Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 218.
[343] Lloyd Axworthy, "Humanitarian Intervention and Humanitarian Constraints," (Speech, DFAIT, February 17, 2000). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubType ID=100002&Year=2000&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).
[344] Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Security and Canada's Security Council Agenda," (Speech, DFAIT, February 17, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publicati.../100237.htm&bPrint=True&Language= (accessed March 25, 2003).
[345] Lloyd Axworthy, "Address to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs: 1998 Foreign Policy Conference," (Speech, DFAIT, October 1998). http:/webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publicati.../101123.htm&bPrint=True&Language= (March 25, 2003).

Kosovo was depicted as necessary in that it provided the only way to save lives imminently about to be lost.

Canadian foreign policy statements concerning Kosovo expressed a solidarist conception of sovereignty, which is a non-traditional view. Today, "it is obvious that devotion to the privileges of the nation state to the exclusion of all else is a dangerous anachronism."[346] Although the Westphalian system is undergoing evolution, it is not "losing its potency [or] credibility."[347] States remain important instruments of international action, instruments by which to implement universal values and norms. During the Kosovo crisis, Axworthy emphasized that "state sovereignty was not eroding, but...had no meaning if a state was not accountable to its citizens."[348] Canadian foreign policy was conducted under the rationale that international promotion of basic humanitarian standards "does not weaken sovereignty, but strengthens it by reinforcing democratic, tolerant, open institutions and behavior."[349]

The formerly unquestioned rule of non-intervention had come under close Canadian scrutiny. Consequently, embedded in Canadian policy, by 1999, was the belief that Canada could "not allow the principle of non-intervention to impede an effective international response...the concept of sovereignty must

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[346] Lloyd Axworthy, "Civilians in War: 100 Years After the Hague Peace Conference," (Speech, DFAIT, September 24, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp ?PubTypeID=100002&Year=1999&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).

[347] Lloyd Axworthy, "A Blueprint for Peace, Justice and Freedom," (Speech, DFAIT, November 27, 1998). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publicati.../101148.htm&bPrint=True&Language= (accessed March 25, 2003).

[348] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, "The Axworthy Revolution," in *The Axworthy Legacy*, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 82.

[349] Lloyd Axworthy, "Humanitarian Intervention and Humanitarian Constraints," (Speech, DFAIT, February 2000). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp? PubTypeID=100002&Year=2000&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).

respect higher principles, including the need to preserve human life from wanton destruction."[350] Accordingly, Canadian foreign policy was crafted to allow Canada to take an active role in defending the ideal that sovereignty entails both rights and responsibilities. With the view that values agreed upon in international society must be upheld through state action, the Canadian government sought to establish its right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states. Its position was that "human rights must be respected; democratic institutions must be safeguarded;…national sovereignty should offer no comfort to repressors, and no protection to those guilty of breaches of the common moral codes."[351] In Kosovo this policy perspective was translated into action. With an ethically-based foreign policy that did not acknowledge borders as impermeable, Canada was ready to intervene in sovereign territory to help establish justice for a beleaguered people.

Canadian policy in Kosovo was also based on perception of mutual interdependence between order and justice, in congruence with solidarist perspectives. Axworthy saw no conflict between "upholding humanitarian values and protecting national interests…there is a mutual compatibility between order and justice…our actions are guided by a subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish."[352] The policy was based on the view that "national interests are not given but

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[350]Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, "The 'New Look' in Canada's Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), 725.
[351] Ibid., 727.
[352] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 267.

constructed"[353] through international interactions. Axworthy stated that in our

interconnected world, Canadian "security is increasingly indivisible from that of

[its] neighbors – at home and abroad."[354] Canadian policy responded to the

belief that "the security and basic rights of people – not merely the absence of

military conflict between states – are fundamental to world stability and

peace."[355]

NATO framed its action in Kosovo as a humanitarian exercise and an

attempt to reduce an acknowledged threat to international peace and security.

Axworthy stated that "the link between Kosovo's misery and our own interests

is both direct and compelling."[356] Intervening to aid the Kosovars was

considered intrinsic to Canadian interests: "suffering inflicted on Kosovo's

population creates the potential for instability in neighboring countries. This

can eventually spread and affect [Canadian] political and economic partners."[357]

Further, the crisis left unchecked would create "an enormous burden on the

resources of international humanitarian agencies for which [Canada] is the main

underwriter. It [could also] set another precedent for…repressive behavior

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[353] Ibid.

[354] Lloyd Axworthy, "Humanitarian Intervention and Humanitarian Constraints," (Speech, DFAIT, February 10, 2000). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubType ID=100002&Year=2000&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).

[355] Ibid.

[356] Lloyd Axworthy, "Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda," (Speech, DFAIT, April 7, 1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID= 100002&Year=1999&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).

[357] Lloyd Axworthy, "Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda," (Speech, DFAIT, April 7,1999). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002 &Year=1999&Language=E (accessed November 21, 2003).

elsewhere."[358] For both ethical and practical reasons, Canada could not ignore the plight of the Kosovars.

Canadian policy regarding Kosovo was painstakingly articulated in relation to solidarist requirements for legitimate intervention, to reiterate, the existence of a supreme humanitarian emergency (urgency), the use of force as a last resort, a high probability that a positive humanitarian outcome will result and meeting the requirements of proportionality. To establish the intervention as a legitimate action, Canadian policy emphasized the urgency of the situation. It was reported that "by the early fall of 1998, as many as 300,000 Kosovars had fled their homes...[and] some 2000 had been killed."[359] Secondly, as diplomatic measures had failed, force was seen as the only remaining option for responding to the crisis. Although the UN Security Council had adopted "a series of resolutions that called upon the government in Belgrade to reduce its military presence in Kosovo and refrain from using excessive force in the region...the resolutions had little effect on the...conflict."[360] Thirdly, Canadian officials believed that intervention would almost certainly "generate a positive outcome for the victims...as the intervention [was] undertaken...with adequate resources, a clear mandate and broad [multilateral] support."[361] As the military intervention wound down, Axworthy declared the action a success: "Yugoslav

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[358] Ibid.

[359] Fen Osler Hampson, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 140.

[360] Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 216.

[361] Lloyd Axworthy, "Humanitarian Intervention and Humanitarian Constraints," (Speech, DFAIT, February 10, 2000). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=2000&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).

security forces were removed from Kosovo and regional interstate peace restored."[362]

Canadian policy also focused on providing a sustainable presence in the region. Axworthy stated that "the intervention [was] part of a longer-term strategy to build and sustain peace…humanitarian intervention should not necessarily be seen as a stand alone activity."[363] He continued: "we are not in Kosovo for 12 months or 24 months…we are here no doubt for a significant number of years."[364] He avoided the pluralist's 'in and quickly out' approach, thus formulating Canadian policy in line with solidarist principles.

The one area where Canadian policy and policy justification did not meet the solidarist ideal was in the level of force applied in Kosovo (proportionality). Solidarism argues against disproportionate use of force, especially when willingness on the part of those intervening to endure casualties is lacking. However, it must be recognized that in order to retain domestic support for international action, government officials are often compelled to conduct a causality free intervention. As international norms continue to evolve, the solidarist ideal regarding proportionality will hopefully be actualized.

In a further display of accord with solidarist principles, Axworthy responded to the problem of inconsistency by acknowledging that although consistent intervention is the ideal, consistency "can never mean doing nothing

[362] Fen Osler Hampson, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 148.
[363] Lloyd Axworthy, "Humanitarian Intervention and Humanitarian Constraints," (Speech, DFAIT, February 10, 2000). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=2000&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).
[364] Fen Osler Hampson, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 147.

because we cannot do everything."[365] The solidarist view "starts from the

premise that like cases must be treated alike, but acknowledges that this does

not mean that every case can be treated the same."[366]

In conclusion, it appears that Canada's response to the crisis in Kosovo

represents a concrete expression of the solidarist dynamic at work in Canadian

foreign policy. Canada has presented an ethical inclination and a theoretical

base from which a truly viable international form of justice can be constructed.

Solidarist principles, combining necessary elements from cosmopolitan and

pluralistic theory, appear to represent the best hope for actualizing ethical

considerations in state practice. "As Kosovo showed, it was not speeches

condemning Serbian President Milosevic that stopped his actions – it was our

willingness to undertake forceful action with strong international support."[367]

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[365] Paul Heinbecker, *Canada World View* Issue 07, (Spring 2000). http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/wv_7/7t4-en.asp (accessed March 26, 2003).

[366] Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 305.

[367] Lloyd Axworthy, "Humanitarian Intervention and Humanitarian Constraints," (Speech, DFAIT, February 10, 2000). http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/ListPublications.asp?PubTypeID=100002&Year=2000&Language=E (accessed March 25, 2003).

V. The Advancement of an Ethical Agenda in British Foreign Policy

The Contextual Shift in British Foreign Policy

To Change our country, we must show that we have the courage to change ourselves. – Tony Blair[368]

In this section I will describe the shift in British foreign policy that has occurred in the years since 1997, a shift which moved the country's foreign policy orientation from a non-interventionist to internationalist agenda. I will contend that developments in British foreign policy are indicative of a commitment to solidarist principles within international society. I will argue that as solidarist principles are embraced by international society, the demonstration and advancement of interventionist humanitarian ethical agendas becomes possible, nay required, for a country to gain and retain international legitimacy.

On May 1st, 1997, the Labour government was elected to power after eighteen years in opposition. While certain changes in orientation were expected, "one almost immediate symbol of change was the unveiling of a Mission Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)."[369] The summary stated:

> the Mission of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is to promote the national interests of the United Kingdom and contribute to a strong international community....We shall work through our international forums and bilateral relationships to

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[368] Tony Blair, *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country* (London: Westview Press, 1996), 1.
[369] Chris Brown, "Ethics, interests and foreign policy," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 15.

spread the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves.[370]

Reiterating the Mission Statement, the new Labour foreign secretary, Robin Cook, expressed the Labour government's project in solidarist terms:

> The Labour Government does not accept that political values can be left behind when we check our passports to travel on diplomatic business. Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. We will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy.[371]

In framing his argument along solidarist theoretical ideals, Cook was responding to a normative shift within international society. The ideals he articulated were espoused in the context of an international society that had created an environment which was sympathetic to the advancement of the substantive agenda presented by Cook and the Labour government. The role that the British state played in advancing these norms is also significant. While international society contextually provides a basis for the development and promotion of norms, it is consensus within the society of states that actually moves normative commitments from rhetoric to practice. In this way "New Labour deserves credit for changing the atmosphere in which foreign policy is conducted and debated."[372]

New Labour was charting a different course – articulating a substantive ethical agenda – enabled by the increasing consensus within international society around solidarist principles. To appraise the significance of New

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[370] Ibid., 16.
[371] Ibid.
[372] Ibid., 31.

Labour's interventionist agenda, the pluralistic considerations which formerly guided British foreign policy formulation must be considered. Chris Brown indicates that British governments prior to 1997 took a "perverse pleasure in standing alone…their…assumption seemed to be that international isolation was in some way an indicator that Britain's national interest was being served, while the efforts…to reach agreements acceptable to all was regarded as a sign of weakness."[373] Recognizing the counterproductivity of such a stance in a globalized and interdependent world, Brown suggests that "the single most important result of the arrival of New Labour had been to de-legitimize [this pluralist] blustering."[374]

The New Labour government was vehemently opposed to the old non-interventionist position. Blair stated: "we live in world where isolationism has ceased to have a reason to exist…by necessity we have to co-operate with each other across nations…we are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not."[375] Blair and Cook were both staunch advocates for the development of an interventionist agenda… "they…maintained an unstinting belief that Britain could make a difference."[376]

As Britain moved to promote a more substantive ethical agenda, it reframed the conception of national interest in terms of adherence to international norms and legitimacy. The assertion of a broader notion of interest

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[373] Ibid., 32.
[374] Ibid.
[375] Tony Blair, "Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago," (Speech, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, IL, April 22, 1999). http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316.
[376] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Moral Britannia? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Labour's Foreign Policy," (2003), 14. www.fpc.org.uk

is indicative of the influence of solidarist theoretical principles. Brown elaborates on this point: "it is in terms...of a willingness to reconcile the national interest with the norm of international society that the true ethical dimension of foreign policy is to be found – and on its record in this area the new government passes, if not with flying colors, at least with some merit.[377]

Blair has recognized that "today more than ever before we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration....that partnership and co-operation are essential to advance self-interest."[378]

Elaborating on the relationship between normative value promotion, self-interest and order/justice, Blair asserted:

> no longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our
> actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest
> and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the
> end values and interest merge. If we can establish and spread
> the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open
> society then that is in our national interests too.[379]

In establishing the legitimacy of the substantive ethical agenda advanced by New Labour, it was clearly stated that "this image [of society] is not based on our imperial past, or on our present military strength, but in the values of a confident, creative, tolerant and inclusive society."[380] To advance its interventionist agenda, the Labour government directly appealed to commonly

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[377] Chris Brown, "Ethics, interests and foreign policy," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32.
[378] Tony Blair, "Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago," (Speech, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, IL, April 22, 1999). http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316.
[379] Ibid.
[380] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 850.

held norms within international society. New Labour indicated that its ethical
agenda sought to reconcile order and justice and that this was a legitimate
objective given the normative context of international society; "a commitment
to strengthening the pillars of international order is an obligation which follows
from being a member of the society of states."[381]

As the British foreign policy agenda evolved from a non-interventionist
to an internationalist and interventionist focus, the British view of sovereignty
also evolved from a pluralist to a solidarist understanding. Dunne and Wheeler
highlight this shift:

> the sovereignty talk, so loud under the previous government,
> was nowhere to be heard. There was no mention of 'threats' to
> national security, no elevation of the principle of non-
> intervention in Britain's domestic affairs. In their place, we
> heard 'internationalism', 'promoting democracy' and so on.[382]

The New Labour foreign policy agenda was explicitly focused on the
advancement of a substantive set of humanitarian ethics. The state was no
longer the primary holder of rights; the notion of individual security now took
center stage. Dunne and Wheeler indicate that the most significant departure in
the British foreign policy agenda concerns "the priority... accorded to the
promotion of human rights."[383] While "Cook's predecessors would have
concurred with the priority accorded to the goals of security, prosperity and
protection for the environment...they would definitively not have been

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[381] Ibid., 857.
[382] Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?," in
Ethics and Foreign Policy, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 167.
[383] Ibid.

comfortable with his…call to 'make Britain once again a force for good in the world.'"[384]

In articulating the British interventionist agenda, Blair appealed to shared norms within international society. He stated: "our task is to build a new doctrine of international community, defined by common rights and shared responsibilities."[385] The fact that Blair felt that he could legitimately make this assertion indicates the existence of a permissive normative international environment; it also indicates the guidance of solidarist principles in British foreign policy formulation. A key element in Blair's statement concerning the development of 'common rights and shared responsibilities' is the recognition that these norms must be legitimatized in material practice by states internationally. Accordingly Joanna Spear indicates that Britain's role as a 'norm entrepreneur' has been vital; a central aspect of Britain's substantive ethical agenda "has been directed toward getting other states to follow a similar agenda."[386] The Labour government was evidently keenly aware of the need to legitimize norms internationally in both theory and practice.

The humanitarian ethical agenda advanced by Britain indicated the evolution of governing theoretical principles – a move from pluralism to solidarism. No longer was Britain primarily concerned with the protection of state-sovereignty; it was focused, rather, on ensuring that sovereigns behaved responsibility towards individuals on the national and international level.

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[384] Ibid.
[385] Joanna Spear, "Foreign and Defense Policy," in *Developments in British Politics*, 6th ed, eds. Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Richard Heffernan, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 288.
[386] Ibid.

Britain's new agenda indicated recognition of a normative obligation to individuals across the globe. Blair stated:

> Duty is the cornerstone of a decent society. It recognizes more than self. It defines the context in which rights are given. It is personal; but it is also owed to society. Respect for others – responsibility to them – is an essential prerequisite of a strong and active community. It is the method through which we can build a society that does not subsume our individuality but allows it to develop healthily. It accords instinct with common sense. It draws on a broader and therefore more accurate notion of human nature than one formulated on insular self-interest. The rights we receive should reflect the duties we owe. With power should come responsibility.[387]

The primary importance accorded to the advancement of humanitarian concerns is explicit in Britain's substantive ethical agenda. Wheeler and Dunne indicate that the current interventionist focus, supported by international society and advanced by Britain, departed "from the traditional [pluralist] approach to foreign policy because it rejects the assumption that the national interest always pulls in the opposite direction to the promotion of human rights."[388] Advocating reconciliation between national interests and humanitarian obligations, Britain's interventionist agenda clearly advances the solidarist notion "that states which abuse human rights forfeit the right to be treated as a legitimate member of the international community, and should become the subject of international scrutiny and censure."[389] Through its interventionist foreign policy focus,

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[387] Tony Blair, *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country* (London: Westview Press, 1996), 237 - 238.
[388]Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 848.
[389] Ibid., 857.

Britain clearly demonstrates the solidarist normative ideals held by international society on both rhetorical and material levels.

Sustainable Development and Economic Justice

Social aims without economic means are empty wishes. By uniting the two we can build a better future for all our people...The end we seek is a society where every individual is able to develop their talents to the full, one where wealth, power and opportunity are in the hands of the many, not the few – Tony Blair [390]

The promotion of an interventionist agenda in the area of sustainable development and economic justice underscores the solidarist theoretical shift in British foreign policy initiatives. By means of its substantive ethical agenda, Britain has come to articulate progressive reforms and approaches to international economic development.

Again, issues relating to international economic development are approached from an internationalist and interventionist perspective. The domestic economic realm cannot be dealt with effectively in the old pluralistic fashion – today issues regarding poverty and economic justice spill over state borders. Blair has pointed to the need for close working relations among states, claiming that many national problems are "caused on the other side of the world. Financial instability in Asia destroys jobs in Chicago... Poverty in the

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[390] Tony Blair, *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country* (London: Westview Press, 1996), 73, 139.

Caribbean means more drugs on the streets in Washington and London.

Conflict in the Balkans causes more refugees in Germany and…in the U.S."[391]

Building on the belief that "globalization is not just economic [but]…also a political and security phenomenon,"[392] the Blair government advanced issues relating to international economic development as a legitimate concern to all members of international society. Blair perceived that a normative obligation had developed within international society to rhetorically and materially promote progressive reforms and approaches to international economic development issues. Further, he came to believe that it was in the best national interest of states to deal with economic development issues in an interventionist fashion as the related injustices, if left untreated, would threaten national and international order and stability. The need for a close relationship between order and justice was advanced again, this time from an economic view point.

The substantive ethical agenda promoted by Britain was centered on the notion of the individual as a principal rights bearer. Accompanying this notion was the view that the state's role had been normatively adjusted to include a legitimate interventionist responsibility to advance a humanitarian ethical agenda internationally. These conceptions had been normatively legitimated by international society. The 1998 British Annual Report on Human Rights indicates that the aim of the Department for International Development (DFID) is to enable the "international system to implement the agreed poverty

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[391] Tony Blair, "Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago," (Speech, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, IL, April 22, 1999). http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316.
[392] Ibid.

eradication strategy in order to create a more just and sustainable world...All governments should be committed to striving to create conditions at home and internationally that help secure...rights for all people."[393]

Thus even in the economic arena, human rights appeared as a primary concern for the Labour government. Clare Short repeatedly emphasized "Britain's role in promoting the right to development."[394] Asserting the need for an interventionist humanitarian agenda, she stated:

> in the development White Paper, we committed ourselves to a
> human rights approach to development. This means giving
> attention to the needs and voices of the poor. This year's report
> demonstrates that this commitment is central to all our work.
> The Universal Declaration of Human Rights commits the
> international community to seek to secure all rights, civil and
> political as well as social and economic, at home and overseas.
> This is a massive task but we are using our influence in
> international systems and our bilateral programs to secure a
> systematic advance toward the realization of these rights.[395]

Developments in this area have focused on advocating for reinvestment in foreign aid and on convincing G8 members to look at debt forgiveness more seriously. Blair indicated the "need for improved financial supervision both in individual countries through stronger and more effective peer group reviews, and internationally through the foundation of a new Financial Stability Forum."[396] Further, he stated that the international community needed "more effective ways of resolving crises... [in this regard] the new contingent credit

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[393] *Foreign and Commonwealth Office News*, "FCO/DFID Annual Report on Human Rights," April 21, 1998.
[394] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 853.
[395] foreign and commonwealth news – 1 21/04/98
[396] Tony Blair, "Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago," (Speech, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, IL, April 22, 1999). http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316.

line at the IMF will assist countries pursuing sensible economic reforms and prevent damaging contagion."[397]

Cook stated that the Labour government was "committed to begin the process of reversing the cuts in and under our predecessors...we will tackle global poverty and promote sustainable development."[398] Christopher Hill observed that "aid is now a priority again, after two decades of being run down...Clare Short reaffirmed Labour's promise in Opposition to head for the UN target of official development assistance at the level of 0.7 per cent GNP, from the 1997 base-line of 0.23 per cent."[399] According to Wheeler and Dunne, "Cook's interest in economic and social rights reflects the Blair administration's commitment to development issues more generally."[400] Hill indicated that "this might mean, in practical terms, focusing on reform of the international financial system through the G7, on free trade through the WTO, on reform of the UN Security Council, on Third World debt, and on cooperation between rich and poor states over the environment."[401]

Interweaving the economic development agenda into the broader foreign policy context, Cook stated that "political freedom and economic development are not in conflict, but are mutually reinforcing."[402] Spear observes that the

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[397] Ibid.

[398] Robin Cook, "Human Rights into a New Century," (Speech, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, England, July 17, 1997).

[399] Chris Hill, "Foreign Policy," in *The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997 – 2001*, ed. Anthony Seldon (London: Little, Brown and Company), 346.

[400] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 852–853.

[401] Chris Hill, "Foreign Policy," in *The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997–2001*, ed. Anthony Seldon (London: Little, Brown and Company), 341.

[402] Robin Cook, "Human Rights into a New Century," (Speech, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, England, July 17, 1997).

British believe that ethically orientated interventionist politics provide "the best way for a political economy to function in a globalized market."[403] This focus demonstrates a noticeable shift from former pluralistic conceptions of economic development issues.

Soft Power Human Rights Promotion

A society based on strong values has, at its heart, respect for others, mutual responsibilities, obligation to more than oneself. – Tony Blair[404]

The promotion of a substantive ethical agenda is also demonstrated through Britain's commitment to soft power human rights advancement. Soft power persuasion depends, I argue, on the creation and maintenance of a permissive environment for the advancement of particular norms in international society. The legitimacy derived from international society is vital. The focus on soft power human rights promotion marks a decided shift in British foreign policy – again, this interventionist agenda demonstrates a clear departure from the non-interventionist stance of the past. A shift from the former pluralist conceptions of human rights and state sovereignty to solidarist conceptions is evident.

Discussion of soft power persuasion necessitates reference to the importance of language in normative advancement. In this regard, rhetorical contribution is not irrelevant. At least at the outset, rhetoric is as important as

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[403] Joanna Spear, "Foreign and Define Policy," in *Developments in British Politics*, 6th ed, eds. Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Richard Heffernan, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 277.
[404] Tony Blair, *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country* (London: Westview Press, 1996), 200.

material practice. Rhetorical contribution helps shape the environmental context of international society; only with a permissive environment can a norm gain international legitimacy. The rhetorical contribution is key - through strong or persistent rhetorical advancement, the norm can gain credibility and ultimately become implemented in material practice. Wheeler and Dunne indicate that "the constitutive role that language plays in international relations can be seen from the fact that other governments take seriously what is said to them and about them."[405] Further, "all governments recognize the need to justify their actions and this presupposes a shared language within which these actions are endorsed or contested."[406] Although the rhetoric employed changes substance over time, "in every epoch it is central in shaping the range of permissible actions."[407]

Hill clarifies this point: "the language and the actions are intimately connected, not least because key figures in making foreign policy appear to have genuinely internalized the philosophy they articulate."[408] He continues: "it would be wrong to argue that New Labour [has] generated a new, bullish language for British foreign policy while failing to achieve any changes of substance."[409] Rhetoric is necessarily a precursor to action with regard to norm advancement. Wheeler and Dunne perceive that "'international debate'...is

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[405] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 851.
[406] Ibid.
[407] Ibid.
[408] Chris Hill, "Foreign Policy," in *The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997 – 2001*, ed. Anthony Seldon (London: Little, Brown and Company), 349.
[409] Ibid.

shaped by speeches by foreign secretaries and the rhetoric they use."[410]

Highlighting the importance of rhetorical contribution, Cook states:

> if we and others encourage reform, some countries will improve
> their police and justice systems…if we promise solidarity, some
> local NGOs and the media will have greater courage to insist on
> their freedom of expression. And if we persist in raising cases
> of prisoners of conscience, some dissidents will be released.
> These may be modest advances, but they are not negligible –
> especially to the people of the countries where they occur.[411]

The rhetoric advanced by Britain is explicitly focused on the individual and concerned with the promotion of legitimate norms. Britain views the promotion of the norms associated with its substantive ethical agenda as helping to meet the humanitarian obligation it owes to individuals internationally. Further, Britain perceives that the promotion of these norms actually serves a pragmatic function – that of ameliorating the order/justice tension. While "some commentators have been quick to level the charge of cultural imperialism against Cook's human rights agenda, the Foreign Secretary has explicitly pointed out that he is not speaking for a specifically British or even Western point of view;" rather the substantive agenda promoted by Britain is one that is normatively legitimated by international society.

While the level of international legitimacy for the norms promoted by Britain's substantive ethical agenda rests largely in rhetoric (the norms associated with the material contribution are still gaining strength and robustness), the importance of the rhetorical developments cannot be ignored.

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[410]Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 851.

[411] Robin Cook, "Human Rights into a New Century," (Speech, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, England, July 17, 1997).

Wheeler and Dunne describe the role of rhetorical advancement: "states which speak the language of good international citizenship will be mistrusted if they do not uphold principles of democratic governance at home."[412] Further, "states which practice good governance at home are likely to behave in the same way abroad."[413] Incorporating the notion of a reconceptualized form of interest, Wheeler and Dunne indicate that "in this sense, good international citizens have a long-term security interest in promoting human rights in their foreign policies."[414]

An example of Britain's attempt to promote a substantive humanitarian agenda through soft power techniques is provided by its interactions with China regarding human rights. This example illustrates the value of rhetorical developments – that rhetorical commitments must be made before material developments can occur. Accordingly, Britain has encouraged China to understand the benefits of participation with international society through the adoption of commonly held international norms – at least in terms of a basic rhetorical commitment. Britain committed itself to establishing "a new dialogue on human rights with China, with closer Chinese integration into the international human rights system."[415] The "British government's justification for not censuring China [for human rights abuses] was that the dialogue was

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[412] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 856.
[413] Ibid.
[414] Ibid.
[415] *Foreign and Commonwealth Office News*, "FCO/DFID Annual Report on Human Rights," April 21, 1998.

producing 'encouraging results.'"[416] This statement clearly indicates the importance of rhetorical advancements to the British government.

While the Blair government acknowledges that advancing norms in rhetoric alone involves a slow process, it views this approach as critical to facilitating real humanitarian change in China. Already the British government is able to cite advances that have been made in terms of China's rhetorical adherence to international humanitarian norms. As indication of the efficacy of the government's promotion of a solidarist ethical agenda in China, it points to the following material achievements:

> a decletory commitment by China to the universality of human rights; the release of the prominent Chinese dissident Wei Jing Sheng; the signature and proposed ratification of the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights; a commitment to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; China's agreement to extend an invitation to Mary Robinson, the UN's High Commissioner for Human Rights; reporting of Hong Kong issues to the UN; and finally, China's consent to a visit by the EU troika to Tibet.[417]

Regarding Britain's rhetorical interventions with China, Cook made the "bold claim that the [Blair] government's dialogue with China on human rights had achieved more in... one year than the Conservative government had achieved in the previous ten."[418] Cook's belief was that as China became increasingly enmeshed in the international normative context, this would eventually lead to practical implementation of the more robust norms. A promising start is signified by China's developing belief that adherence to

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[416] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 864.
[417] Ibid., 863.
[418] Ibid.

certain international norms is a requirement for attaining the international legitimacy it craves.

Britain's strategy with China may be understood as responding to the solidarist call for a reconciliation between order and justice. Britain views the soft power promotion of its substantive solidarist agenda as meeting its obligation to Chinese individuals – to advance individual justice in China (albeit slowly) and to help maintain international order. The British government believes that "by taking China out of the bilateral context shaped predominately by Hong Kong and placing it within a wider…one, Britain has increased its capacity to enmesh China in the global human rights regime without risking global security."[419]

Significantly, Britain's promotion of a substantive ethical agenda in China has demonstrated sensitivity to the context of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese state is vehement about the retention of its sovereignty and highly suspicious of attempts to undermine its political legitimacy. The British rhetorical interventions are based on consensually agreed upon international norms – and China seems to understand this. If China perceived Britain as advocating a change in government (communist to democratic), negotiations would fall apart and the international system would likely experience destabilizing effects.

It seems clear that Britain's soft power interventionist agenda in China has been influenced by solidarist principles. The British foreign policy strategy has been to establish a dialogue with China on human rights – to advance

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[419] Ibid., 869.

practical change through the development of rhetorical commitments to solidarist norms. This strategy has not only helped China begin to understand the importance of these norms for obtaining the international legitimacy it needs to participate in the profitable global system, it has also helped to maintain order while promoting justice - not a small task when dealing with a fiercely defensive state like China. Most compelling though, is the fact that these solidarist principles are promoted within a Communist system.

The solidarist project does not attach inherent value to any particular political system – its goal is to protect human lives, not necessarily to impose a change in government, although this could eventually result. Britain's attempts to advance a substantive ethical agenda in China are explicitly aimed at improving the lives of Chinese citizens – through the employment of a strategy that is designed so as not to destabilize the international system.

Hard Power Human Rights Protection: Kosovo Intervention

Britain's commitment to the advancement of a substantive ethical agenda is supported by its willingness to back the norms it espouses with hard power resources when necessary. The fact that it is now conceivable to overstep state sovereignty and physically intervene in a domestic matter indicates a decidedly solidarist shift in terms of guiding theoretical principles within British foreign policy. Blair indicated this in the preface to his Chicago speech: "twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo. We would have turned our

backs on it."[420] Hill observes that "the speech repays close attention for the

self-conscious way in which it attempts to signal a new departure in British

foreign policy – indeed in international relations more generally."[421] The

significance of the Chicago speech cannot be understated: "it is possible that the

speech will be seen by future historians as a landmark...a reference point for

debate about British foreign policy."[422] Continuing to detail the significance of

the Chicago speech, Hill states:

> whatever its fate, the Chicago speech is highly unusual in the
> history of British foreign policy for the explicit attention which
> it gives to the criteria for action and to conceptualization...It
> amounts to a...revolution against the pragmatic empiricism
> which has dominated the language of British foreign policy
> since the days of Cobden, Bright and Gladstone. It is to be
> commended for its thoughtful approach – in the midst of a
> major crisis – and for having opened up a debate rather than
> trying to close one off.[423]

Ultimately, "the contents of the Chicago speech...represent a radical

change in he ideology of British foreign policy,"[424] a change indicative of a

move towards reliance on solidarist theoretical principles. Joanna Spear writes

that "British foreign and defence policy under Blair is showing that the

government is prepared to use traditional tools of foreign policy (military power

and diplomacy) to fulfill a progressive agenda which takes seriously issues such

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[420]Chris Hill, "Foreign Policy," in *The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997 – 2001*, ed.
Anthony Seldon (London: Little, Brown and Company), 340.
[421] Ibid., 341.
[422] Ibid.
[423] Ibid., 342.
[424] Ibid., 343.

as human rights."[425] Britain's interventionist agenda is clearly focused on

protecting individual security and on further developing and promoting the

norms within international society which enable this policy focus. Once again,

the implication is clear – "good international citizens have a duty to use force in

order to maintain international peace and security, and to prevent or stop

genocide or mass war."[426]

In framing the British interventionist action in Kosovo, Blair appealed to

solidarist ideals. Speaking to why Kosovo was a legitimate concern to all of

international society, he was explicit: "I do not believe Kosovo can be seen in

isolation...we live in a world where isolationism has ceased to have a reason to

exist. By necessity we have to co-operate with each other across nations."[427] He

defended the war in terms of the norms or values held by international society;

"at its core the Blair government's ethical foreign policy is an attempt to

reconcile...national interest with the norms of international society."[428] The

British goal was humanitarian; "this is a just war, based not on any territorial

ambitions but on values."[429]

In contextualizing the Kosovo intervention as a matter of common

concern, Blair was appealing to commonly held norms within international

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[425] Joanna Spear, "Foreign and Define Policy," in *Developments in British Politics*, 6th ed, eds. Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Richard Heffernan, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 287.
[426]Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 869.
[427] Tony Blair, "Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago," (Speech, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, IL, April 22, 1999). http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316.
[428]Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 170.
[429] Tony Blair, "Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago," (Speech, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, IL, April 22, 1999). http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316.

society. He sought to legitimize the intervention by appealing to, and promoting, a set of normative commitments that were gaining credibility within international society. To establish the common and consensual element of international society, he stated: "today the impulse towards interdependence is immeasurably greater. We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community."[430] He sought to convince international society that the norms it rhetorically espouses had evolved to the point where intervention could legitimately be considered, where material action was needed to meet the rhetorical commitments.

Further, in seeking to legitimize the intervention, Blair appealed not only to the idea of commonly held, thus legitimate norms, but also to the notion of interest. The notion of interest he advanced bore little resemblance to the former strictly state-centered pluralist notion. Rather, Blair promoted a broader form of national interest. He asserted that:

> today more than ever before we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration... just as within domestic politics, the notion of community – the belief that partnership and co-operation are essential to advance self-interest – is coming into its own; so it needs to find its own international echo. Global financial markets, the global environment, global security and disarmament issues: none of these can be solved without intense international cooperation.[431]

In trying to persuade the international community that Kosovo was a situation where the society of states was obligated to practically back the norms they rhetorically espouse, Blair articulated a considerably evolved notion of

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[430] Ibid.
[431] Ibid.

national interest. He explained interest in terms of mutual self-interest and indicated the possible international problems associated with ignoring the Kosovo situation. Advancing his interventionist agenda, Blair stated: "when oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle neighboring countries then they can properly be described as 'threats to international peace and security.'"[432] In this way, he tried to tie together commonly recognized normative ideas relating to interest, obligation, order/justice and legitimacy. His argument was that the watching world had no choice but to respond – the normative legitimacy for these ideals was already present; the international community had, in essence, already indicated rhetorical support for the humanitarian norms involved.

Blair also addressed the issue of state sovereignty. While upholding the importance of sovereignty as an institution, he was firm that with this privilege came responsibilities to humanity internally and externally:

> the most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify
> the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in
> other people's conflicts. Non-interference has long been
> considered an important principle of international order. And it
> is not one we would want to jettison too readily. One state
> should not feel it has the right to change the political system of
> another...But the principle of non-interference must be
> qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a
> purely internal matter.

In advancing a substantive ethical agenda, Britain tried to create support for the interventionist strategies that it perceived necessary to move the rhetorical commitments within international society forward into material

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[432] Ibid.

practice. The interventionist agenda pursued by Britain marks a sharp contrast between the country's foreign policy practices before and after the election of the Blair government. Pursuit of these policies would not have been acceptable in international society without the rooting of solidarist perspectives and norms.

Conclusion

Through the course of this paper I have sought to establish that the shift in Canadian and British foreign policy toward promotion of substantive ethical agendas represents development within international society along solidarist theoretical lines – not a burgeoning illiberalism. I have contended that the substantive humanitarian ethics advanced by individual countries is paralleled by a shift in international society toward embracing broader ethical agendas and more substantively humanitarian norms. I believe that the influence of solidarist principles within international society will produce innovative and viable options for sustainable human development.

In concluding my argument, I must briefly address 'value-projection' criticisms. The solidarist project is unfairly represented by those who cry 'illiberalism' and complain that the policies it inspires are not in the projecting countries' best interests. The notion that the promotion of a substantive ethical agenda in foreign policy is contrary to a state's national interest seems misguided. Bull recognized that "the criterion of 'national interest' or 'interest of state,' in itself, provides us with no specific guidance either in interpreting the behavior of states or in prescribing how they should behave – unless we are told what concrete ends or objectives states do or should pursue."[433] He perceived national interest as a type of rational action plan for foreign policy decision making. It is well within the realm of possibility that international

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[433]Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 63.

society, through normative evolution, may come to find it beneficial to pursue humanitarian objectives rather than inevitably doomed zero-sum competitions.

Axworthy suggests that Nossal and like-minded academics are "losing touch with the changing nature of international relations and expressed pride in the defence of national interest. By redefining international norms and improving international institutions, Canada was contributing…to global peace and security."[434] Axworthy's point is that the international system and international society is in a constant state of flux; "interests are not simply 'out there' waiting to be discovered, but are constructed through social interaction."[435] Nossal does not perceive ideas, values and interests to be mutually compatible in the foreign policy arena. Disagreeing, Goldstein and Keohane provide the following clarification: "we recognize that ideas and interests are phenomenologically separate and that all interests involve beliefs and therefore ideas as we conceive them."[436] Gecelovsky and Keating state that "foreign policy has always been a reflection of Canadian values, or at least of the values held by those involved in such policy…no foreign policy can be consistent or coherent over a period of years unless it is based on some conception of human values."[437] This statement could also apply to British case.

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[434] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, "The Axworthy Revolution," in *The Axworthy Legacy*, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 78.

[435] Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 86.

[436] Ibid., 404.

[437] Paul Gecelovsky and Tom Keating, "Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative," in *Diplomatic Departures*, eds. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 194.

I contend that it is impossible to separate values and interest in the way that Granatstein implies when he cautions against subordinating values to interests. A serious oversight is evident in the pluralists' position: "they simply assume state interests, but [this] tells us little about how states come to define their interests or the process by which interests are refined."[438] The value-projection critique of Canadian and British foreign policy is ironic as no foreign policy formulation is value free; values are inherently projected through foreign policy formulation and practice. The pluralist "rational model...amounts to policy makers' ordering alternatives, making decisions, and taking actions to achieve the most efficient outcome in terms of the ends sought;"[439] this is not a value free or neutral model. Instead of evaluating value-promotion as against national interest, it makes more sense to examine the ends sought through 'value promotion.' Ultimately, Bull argued, "pluralism cannot deliver on the ethics of coexistence."[440]

It has been contended that trying to project 'Canadian values' sets impossible objectives for national foreign policy agendas, however this claim misrepresents the issue. Internationally there is a growing consensus that because of global interconnections, international obligations exist. If states perceive a humanitarian obligation to individuals in other states, "it is not acceptable to try to evade [this international] obligation by pleading that there is

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[438] Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 86.
[439] Ibid., 404.
[440]Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will," *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1996): 98.

too much evil in the world for us to put it right."[441] The Canadian and British

governments acknowledge that consistency cannot yet be achieved; "the best

that can be achieved is coherence and not consistency. Letting go of consistency

means facing up to the reality that not every case will be treated the same."[442]

The substantive ethical agendas promoted by British and Canadian foreign

policy, "at a conceptual level, [are] bold move[s] since [they] furnish

journalists, activists and intellectuals with the information necessary to hold the

government accountable for its actions."[443] Thus "there is no doubt that [the

British and Canadian leaders] would have avoided a lot of criticism…if [they]

had not claimed the moral high ground."[444] Regardless of material outcomes,

Dunne and Wheeler state that these leaders ought "to be congratulated for

giving citizens and activists a standard against which they can

scrutinize…foreign policy."[445]

Response to the pluralist allegation that the current foreign policy

articulations in Canada and Britain are hypocritical requires explanation of gaps

between rhetorical and practical commitments. In the case of Canadian and

British foreign policy, the promotion of substantive ethical agendas represents

an attempt to meet a higher level of international justice. These agendas are

based on sometimes fledgling norms that may require a great deal of promotion

and consensus building before the rhetoric and the practice can align. As

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[441] Robin Cook, "Human Rights into a New Century," (Speech, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, England, July 17, 1997).
[442] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Moral Britannia? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Labour's Foreign Policy," (2003), 33- 34, www.fpc.org.uk.
[443] Ibid., 853.
[444] Ibid., 870.
[445] Ibid.

Stanley Hoffman indicates: "in any system of law, or in any system of morals, there is always a gap between the *is* and the *ought*...the gap is necessary and inevitable. If there were no gap, people would not feel any sense of obligation, or any remorse when they violate a norm."[446] The gap marks the beginning of normative advancement; only with a discernable problem will states take the initiative to gather a coalition to rectify a situation or an inconsistency. Where there is a gap, either a new norm is being advanced or attempts are being made to close the gap between the rhetorical commitment and material practice. However the fact remains that "any government that regularly deploys moral arguments will inevitably be charged with double standards."[447]

Regarding the illiberal or cultural imperialism argument, the solidarist goal is the development of a basic humanitarian standard. The solidarist project does "not [seek] to impose some peculiarly British [or Canadian or Western] concept, but...[invites others] to observe rights which have been recognized by the whole world and formally codified in two UN covenants."[448] A main benefit of the value-projection shift is its emphasis on consensus within international society; as "an institutional principle...solidarity is very widely accepted by the members of the international society of the UN era."[449] As indicated earlier, a compelling argument in this regard concerns Britain's efforts to bring China into the international human rights dialogue from within the

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[446] Stanley Hoffman, *Duties Beyond Borders* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 28.
[447] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Moral Britannia? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Labour's Foreign Policy," (2003), 33, www.fpc.org.uk.
[448] Robin Cook, "Human Rights into a New Century," (Speech, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, England, July 17, 1997).
[449] Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 9.

confines of the Communist system. It is vital to note that Canada and Britain

try to promote their agendas through "building coalitions and presenting

diplomatic initiatives, in other words, [through] influencing the behavior of

other nations not through [illiberal, imperialistic] military intimidation, but

through a variety of diplomatic and political tools."[450]

It must be remembered that "most states at most times...respect...the

basic principles of coexistence in international society...in the same way most

states at most times take part in the working of common institutions...the idea

of 'international society' has a basis in reality...that at no stage has

disappeared."[451] If values and norms could not be commonly held, international

society would cease to exist. Further, the value-projection idea is not new;

"within the system of states that grew up in Europe and spread around the

world, notions of right and wrong in international behavior have always held a

central place."[452]

Bull's experience with bounded conceptions of justice provides ample

reason to shift focus from pluralist to solidarist theoretical conceptions of

international society. His realization "that the majority of the governments in

the South denied their citizens basic civil and political rights, and that a

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[450] W. Andy Knight, "Soft Power, Moral Suasion, and Establishing the International Criminal Court: Canadian Contributions," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 131.

[451] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 40.

[452] Ibid., 46.

minority of these states tortured and murdered them,.....[led him] to doubt the normative basis upon which pluralism rests."[453]

While various impediments make the implementation of good governance policies difficult, what is significant about these policies is that:

> [they] represent more than a slight resetting of the compass...unlike under previous governments, [Canada and Britain have] created the context for the development of this human rights culture. [They have] established human rights standards by which [they want] to be judged, and whilst [they] have failed to live up to these on many occasions, it is only possible to point to this deficiency because [they] had the courage to strive for an 'ethical dimension' to [their] foreign policy.[454]

Even if these interventionist agendas "[continue] to be buffeted by the daily round of global problems which resist simple moral solutions, the new government recognizes that foreign policy should be guided by universal moral values."[455]

I have attempted to articulate the marked shift occurring in Canadian and British foreign policy agendas, arguing that their substantive ethical focus reflects the influence of solidarist theoretical principles. I have contended that international society has evolved to a position where pluralist principles are not longer viable. I have sought to show how solidarist principles appear to be guiding national and international policy developments and that international society is increasingly embracing and legitimating solidarist norms. I have

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[453] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will," *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1996): 99.

[454] Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?," in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 184.

[455] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy," *International* Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 870.

made the claim that the foreign policy trends in Britain and Canada are not

illiberal – to claim that they are misconstrues the nature of international society;

they are, rather, indicative of hope. Solidarist theoretical perspectives provide

real hope for ethical advancements within international society in terms of both

international justice and sustainable human development. With good reason

both Canada and Britain "maintain an unstinting belief that [they can] make a

difference."[456]

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[456] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Moral Britannia? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Labour's Foreign Policy," (2003), 14, www.fpc.org.uk.

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