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THE REFERENDUM:
ON THE ROAD TO UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE

BY
ANDREW G. BENIUK



A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF SLAVIC AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1993



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DEGREE: MASTER OF ARTS

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
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29 December 1992

Dedicated to my parents:

JOHN AND KATHERINE BENIUK

ABSTRACT

On 1 December 1991, the electorate confirmed by 90.32% of the popular vote The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine that had been adopted by Ukraine's Supreme Council on 24 August 1991.

The Supreme Council had adopted The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine following the collapse of the coup in Moscow that had been lead by some top personnel within the CPSU, the KGB, and the military (19-21 August). In the aftermath of the failed coup, Russian President Yeltsin had lead an anti-CPSU upheaval in Moscow and General Secretary Gorbachev had resigned from the CC CPSU and recommended that the Central Committee be dissolved.

The news that the CPSU had officially ceased to exist prompted an instantaneous alliance among Ukraine's Communist and Non-Communist deputies in support of Ukraine's independence. Initially, the Communist deputies wanted to isolate Ukraine from the events in Moscow in an attempt to preserve their privileged positions of power and influence. Within a few days the CPU had also been dissolved and the Marxist-Leninist ideology jettisoned. The national rebirth of Ukraine became the new ideology, uniting former-Communist and non-Communist deputies.

Under the politically astute leadership of Chairman L. Kravchuk all deputies were united in the common purpose of establishing peacefully, by referendum, an independent Ukrainian state where all nationalities would be equal and their respective languages and cultures protected. All citizens of Ukraine were encouraged to participate in the referendum and to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

This thesis examines events prior to the coup, events during the coup, the various participants and their activities during the referendum campaign, and the results of the referendum.

The referendum campaign was conducted during a transition period where former Soviet institutions were collapsing and the new institutions required to serve the new Ukraine were just emerging.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply indebted to my two very accessible and dedicated thesis co-supervisors: Dr. John-Paul Himka, Professor of History, and Dr. Bohdan Medwidsky, Professor of Ukrainian Language and Folklore, for their scholarly assistance, advice, patience, and encouragement. I also wish to thank Dr. Peter Rolland for agreeing to be a member of my thesis committee.

I am indebted to Svitlana Chohlenko of Kyiv who assisted in translating the many taped interviews and long articles.

I am also indebted to Alberta Liberal Leader Lawrence Decore for his recommendation of my political organizational abilities; to the Friends of Rukh, especially B. Vitvitsky of New York who arranged for the air ticket to Kyiv; to the Kyiv university students that I worked with in Kyiv and Luhansk; to the Rukh organizers; to the pro-democracy deputies of the Supreme Council that I worked with, especially Les Taniuk, Chairman of the Narodna Rada caucus; and all the other very kind and generous citizens of Ukraine that I had the pleasure and good fortune of meeting and working with while in Ukraine. Their imprint on the thesis, as individuals and as a group, is self-evident.

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INTRODUCTION

The historic dream of Ukrainians for an independent Ukraine was achieved spontaneously as the aspirations of the nationally conscious Ukrainian deputies merged, during a moment in history, with the aspirations for survival of Ukraine's Communist deputies. There was no turning back after the Supreme Council adopted The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine on 24 August 1991. Under the politically astute leadership of Chairman Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine's political, economic, cultural, military, religious, and ethnic minority leaders were unified in their efforts to peacefully establish an independent Ukrainian state, ending centuries of subjugation and exploitation. The 1 December 1991 referendum further legitimized and consolidated Ukraine's independence, assuring Ukraine of international recognition and internal ethnic unity as 90.32% of the popular vote, by secret ballot, confirmed The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

The referendum question did not directly ask if the citizens supported or rejected the establishment of an independent Ukraine, but rather if the citizens confirmed The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine that the Supreme Council had adopted on 24 August. The distinction is important for understanding why forces previously hostile to Ukrainian national aspirations suddenly and enthusiastically endorsed Ukraine's independence. While the Communist Party of Ukraine had been

abolished, its former personnel remained in positions of influence and power. The wording of the referendum question helped mobilize the entrenched conservative (former) nomenklatura behind Ukraine's dash for independence, especially in the russified southern and eastern regions of Ukraine where the Democratic movement and Ukrainian national consciousness were weak. In the Soviet tradition, local officials fulfilled Chairman L. Kravchuk's and the Supreme Council's expectations of large voter participation and an overwhelming "Yes" vote to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

In March 1990, when the Communist-dominated Supreme Council was elected, no realist would have predicted that Ukraine would be an internationally recognized, independent state within two years. Prior to the adoption of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, Communist and Non-Communist deputies in the Supreme Council were in constant conflict. Pressure for political and economic reforms generated massive demonstrations and strikes. The abortive Moscow coup and the subsequent upheaval in Moscow changed Ukraine's destiny. Chairman L. Kravchuk skilfully seized the moment and realigned all political forces within Ukraine behind Ukraine's drive for independence. The referendum campaign bears witness to this alliance and the inevitable confirmation of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine that had been adopted by the Supreme Council on 24 August 1991.

CHAPTER 1

THE ROAD TOWARDS THE ADOPTION OF THE ACT PROCLAIMING
THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE, 24 AUGUST 1991

Ukraine's peaceful evolution towards independent statehood commenced with the resignation of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the conservative First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine [CC CPU], in September 1989. Economic and political reforms on an All-Union basis could not be attained without the full participation of Ukraine, prompting General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] to visit Kyiv and encourage the leadership change. Volodymyr Ivashko became the new First Secretary of the CC CPU, and the man who, at first, appeared to have been designated to implement essential economic and political reforms.

Composition of the Supreme Council of Ukraine

In keeping with General Secretary Gorbachev's perceived direction for implementing political and economic reforms, the first challenge was to transfer authority from the Communist Party to a democratically elected Supreme Council of Ukraine, without the Party losing power in the process. For decades the Marxist-Leninist ideology had sanctioned

the monopoly of political power by the CPSU and its CPU branch. Henceforth, political authority would reside in the Supreme Council and the popular will of the people. For the manoeuvre to succeed, the electorate had to believe that they were empowering their own choice of representatives to enact legislation and carry out government policies that they, the citizens, deemed essential. Candidates elected to the Supreme Council were required to receive in excess of 50% of the votes cast through secret, direct popular balloting.¹ Communist bureaucratic control of the registration process delayed the registration of opposition parties and groups, thereby insuring that the CPU was the only party registered in time to contest the election.² Independent candidates were further disadvantaged by communist appointees controlling the mass media.

The deputies to the Supreme Council that passed The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine were democratically elected during March 1990, by direct popular vote, in the first ever multi-

¹ Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], "Report on the March 4, 1990 Supreme Council Elections in Ukraine," Elections in the Baltic States and Soviet Republics, A Compendium of Reports on Parliamentary Elections Held in 1990. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 127; S. Tsikora, "Election Campaign is Under Way: First Deputies Named: the Ukraine," Izvestiia, 7 March 1990, 2, as reported in Current Digest of the Soviet Press [CDSP], Vol. XLII, No. 10, 29-30; S. Tsikora, "The Election Campaign is Under Way: ... Run-Off Elections in ... Ukraine," Izvestiia, 19 March 1990, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 11, 29. T. Kuzio, "Elections and National Discontent in Ukraine," Soviet Analyst, Vol. 19, No. 6 (21 March 1990): 3-5.

² CSCE, "Report on the March 4, 1990 Supreme Council Elections in Ukraine," 128-129; T. Kuzio, "Elections and National Discount in Ukraine," 3-5.

candidate elections held in the history of the Ukrainian SSR.³ Although the electoral process did not meet the standards associated with democratic elections in western industrialized nations, a total of 3,653 candidates contested the 450 Supreme Council seats, with the Democratic Bloc endorsing independent candidates in 199 of the 450 electoral districts.⁴

The 110 Democratic Bloc deputies elected primarily in Western Ukraine and in the cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv formed, on 19 May 1990, the Narodna Rada [People's Council] parliamentary caucus.⁵ By July 1990, divisions within the CPU caucus resulted in 30 deputies forming the Democratic Platform and joining the Narodna Rada caucus.⁶

Parliamentary friction between Communist and Non-Communist deputies over Ukraine's future was inevitable.⁷ CPU deputies continued their control of government and initially were insensitive to the citizens' demands. Many Narodna Rada deputies, who had spent years in prison for their political beliefs, distrusted the motives and policies

³ CSCE, "Report on the March 4, 1990 Supreme Council Elections in Ukraine," 113-136.

⁴ Ibid., 128 and 132.

⁵ M. Derimov, "What's Happening at the Session?" Pravda Ukrainy, 19 May 1990, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 20, 13.

⁶ S. Tsikora, "Deputies Who Left the Party," Izvestiia, 26 July 1990, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 30, 24; David Marples and Chrystia Freeland, "Inside Ukrainian Politics: An Interview with Dmytro Pavlychko," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 28, (13 July 1990): 23.

⁷ M. Derimov, "What's Happening at the Session?" 13; T. Kuzio, "Post-Election Blues in Ukraine?" Soviet Analyst, Vol. 19, No. 11 (6 June 1990): 3-5; M. Odinets and I. Tikhomirov, "Ukraine Supreme Council Opens New Session: At Republic Supreme Council Sessions," Pravda, 16 May 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 20, 12.

of the Communist-dominated Supreme Council and government, and were determined to challenge and obstruct the Communist majority. On 4 June 1990, the Narodna Rada caucus walked out in protest when Volodymyr Ivashko, First Secretary of the CC CPU, was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council, uniting in one person the highest CC CPU and Supreme Council offices.⁸ The Narodna Rada deputies on principle abstained from participating in the elections of: 1) Ivan Pliushch as Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council (7 June 1990),⁹ 2) Volodymyr Ivashko's protege, Vitalii Masol, as Chairman of Ukraine's Council of Ministers (27 June 1990),¹⁰ and 3) Leonid Kravchuk as Chairman of the Supreme Council (24 July 1990).¹¹

Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine

The most significant Act adopted by the Supreme Council prior to The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine was Ukraine's

⁸ Taras Kuzio, "Post-Election Blues in Ukraine?" 3; V. Ivashko resigned as First Secretary, being replaced by Stanislav Hurenko on 23 June 1990. M. Odinetz and I. Tikhomirov, "First Secretary Elected," Pravda, 24 June 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 25, 23.

⁹ S. Tsikora, "Session of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet: The Opposition Names Its Leader," Izvestiia, 7 June 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No.23, 21.

¹⁰ M. Odinetz and I. Tikhomirov, "Chairman of Ukraine Republic Council of Ministers Elected," Pravda, 29 June 1990, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 26, 19.

¹¹ S. Tsikora, "New Leader and Old Problems," Izvestiia, 24 July 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 30, 26.

Sovereignty Declaration on 16 July 1990.¹² A total of 355 deputies voted in favour, 4 against, while 26 deputies abstained.¹³ The Supreme Council's adoption of the Sovereignty Declaration followed the precedents established by the Russian Federation, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, and the independence declarations of the Baltic republics.¹⁴ Frequent and massive public demonstrations by the supporters of the Democratic Movement of Ukraine [Rukh] had a moral but not decisive influence on the Supreme Council's vote. An essential precondition to President Gorbachev's proposed Union Treaty, whereby all Soviet republics would voluntarily enter into the new Union of Sovereign (Soviet) States, mandated that these same Soviet republics must first, on paper at least, exit the former Soviet Union through their sovereignty declarations.¹⁵

The Sovereignty Declaration debate in the Supreme Council was emotionally charged and coincided with the reform-oriented 28th CPSU Congress in Moscow;¹⁶ the political and economic crises precipitated

¹² V. F. Opryshko, S. E. Demskyi and A. V. Hapon, ed. "Deklaratsiia: pro derzhavnyi suverenitet Ukrainy," in Novi Zakony Ukrainy, Uchbovyi posibnyk, Vypusk 1, (Kyiv: Ukrainaska Asotsiatsiia Vykkladachiv Prava, 1991): 5-7; Peter Shutak, "Ukraine Declares Sovereignty," Soviet Analyst, Vol. 19, No. 15, (1 August 1990): 5-7; "Declaration of Sovereignty," Pravda 17 July 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, XLII, No. 30, 8.

¹³ Peter Shutak, "Ukraine Declares Sovereignty," 5.

¹⁴ Ibid., 5.

¹⁵ John Parker, "Massed against the Past," The Economist, 20 October 1990, 8; Paul Goble, "Gorbachev's New Federalism Won't Work," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 27, (6 July 1990): 13-14.

¹⁶ General Secretary Gorbachev at the 28th CPSU Congress pushed through major reforms to revitalize the CPSU, including granting greater autonomy to the communist parties in the Soviet republics. E. Teague, "The Twenty-Eighth Party Congress: An Overview," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 29 (20 July 1990): 1-3; J. Tedstrom, "Party to Play Smaller

by the politically motivated 11 July Donbass miners strike;¹⁷ and the subsequent election of L. Kravchuk as the new Chairman of the Supreme Council. Communist deputies attending the 28th CPSU Congress were summoned home by their colleagues who appeared unable to adopt a sovereignty declaration deemed essential to resolve the miner's strike.¹⁸ Volodymyr Ivashko, elected Deputy General Secretary of the CPSU at the 28th CPSU Congress, resigned as Chairman of the Supreme Council.¹⁹ On 25 July 1990, following a two week vacancy, Leonid Kravchuk was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council with the support of 239 pro-sovereignty Communist deputies, mainly Party and local council officials, and economic managers.²⁰

Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration proclaimed that: "State sovereignty of Ukraine is the supreme, sovereign, absolute and indivisible

Role in Making Economic Policy," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 29 (20 July 1990): 4-6; M. Jacobs, "The Party and the People: A Parting of the Ways?" Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 29 (20 July 1990): 8-10; "No New Party," Soviet Analyst, Vol. 19, No. 14 (18 July 1990): 1-3; A. Sheehy, "New Party Rules Give Republican Communist Parties More Autonomy," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 29 (20 July 1990): 11-13; "The Party's Over?" Soviet Analyst, Vol. 20, No. 4 (14 February 1990): 1-2.

¹⁷N. Lisovenko, et al., "Situation in the Coal Basins," Izvestiia, 11 July 1990, 1 & 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 28, 23; David Marples, "The Background of the Coal Strike on July 11," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 30, (27 July 1990): 15-17; E. Teague & P. Hanson, "Most Soviet Strikes Politically Motivated," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 34 (24 August 1990): 1-2.

¹⁸S. Tsikora, "Kiev Recalls Delegates." Izvestiia, 7 July 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 27, 24.

¹⁹E. Teague, "Twenty-Eighth Party Congress: An Overview," 1-3.

²⁰S. Tsikora, "New Leader and Old Problems," 26; T. Kuzio, "Leonid Kravchuk - Patriot or Placeman?" Soviet Analyst, Vol. 20, No. 12 (19 June 1991): 4-6.

authority in the Republic and within its territory, independent, with equal rights in external relations."²¹ The Sovereignty Declaration also affirmed Ukraine's right to create its own monetary currency, establish a national bank, an armed forces, state borders, and other prerogatives associated with a sovereign state.²²

A parliamentary majority did not regard the Sovereignty Declaration to be a constitutional law, but rather a declaration of intent requiring numerous changes and additions to Ukraine's existing Constitution.²³ During celebrations on the first anniversary of the Sovereignty Declaration, Leonid Kravchuk stated that 46 laws had been adopted by Supreme Council specifically to establish Ukraine's constitutional foundations as a sovereign state, as he pledged that "for the third time - after Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the 1917 Revolution - history has given the Ukraine a chance to revive its statehood, and we aren't going to let the opportunity slip."²⁴

Whether out of growing personal conviction or to counter the

²¹ Opryshko, ed. "Deklaratsiia: pro derzhavnyi suverenitet Ukrainy," 5.

See Appendix A.

²² Ibid., 5-7; "Declaration of Sovereignty," Pravda, 17 July 1990, 2, as reported in GDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 30, 8.

²³ S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine: Independence Day," Izvestiia, 16 July 1991, 1, as reported in GDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 28, 13; K. Mihalisko, "The Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 30 (27 July 1990): 17; S. Tsikora, "Anxious Days in Kiev," Izvestiia, 10 October 1990, 2, as reported in GDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 41, 15; T. Kuzio, "Kravchuk and Ukrainian Communism," in Soviet Analyst, Vol. 21, No. 3, 10; S. Tsikora, "Amendments to the Ukraine's Constitution," Izvestiia, 26 October 1990, 2, as reported in GDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 43, 9.

²⁴ S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine: Independence Day," 13.

growing influence of Rukh, all of Chairman Leonid Kravchuk's speeches and interviews began to emphasize the sovereignty of Ukraine.²⁵ Chairman L. Kravchuk's pro-sovereignty position influenced a realignment of political forces within the CPU caucus into sovereignty and pro-Union factions, and increased substantially his popularity throughout Ukraine as the champion of sovereign Ukraine's interests against the centre in Moscow.²⁶

The Sovereignty Declaration raised expectations that were not immediately implemented, further alienating the nationally consciousness Ukrainians, Rukh supporters, university students, and miners, among others. Demonstrations and strikes intensified. At its Second Congress in October 1990, Rukh expanded its demands by adopting a resolution calling for Ukraine's total independence.²⁷

The October 1990 Student Hunger Strike

The October 1990 student hunger strike forced Communist and Non-Communist deputies to compromise and work together with the common objective of defusing the emotionally charged atmosphere that was accelerating events towards a possibly violent, destabilizing

²⁵ R. Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 24 (14 June 1991): 20.

²⁶ Ibid., 20-21.

²⁷ R. Solchanyk, "The Uncertain Road to Independence," Report on the USSR (4 January 1991): 22-23; S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine: Anxious Sunday in Kiev," Izvestiia, 29 October 1991, 2, as reported in CDSF, Vol. 42, No. 43, 9.

conclusion. The event commenced with over 100,000 demonstrators carrying blue and yellow flags protesting against President Gorbachev's proposed Union Treaty and demanding that Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration be implemented. The Presidium of the Supreme Council had failed to appease the demonstrators with a promise that the proposed Union Treaty would not be signed until a new Ukrainian Constitution was adopted.²⁸ The demonstrators distrusted the Communist-dominated Supreme Council and government, and they demanded: new parliamentary elections; the resignations of V. Masol as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and L. Kravchuk as Chairman of the Supreme Council; the abolition of the Communist Party and the nationalization of all its property; and the depoliticization of all state institutions, especially the military and police.²⁹

University students joined the demonstration and commenced a well organized and determined hunger strike at Lenin's statue on October Revolution Square [later renamed Independence Square] on Khreshchatyk.³⁰ The students attached to the above demands their own

²⁸ M. Odinets and I. Tikhomirov, "The Ukraine's September Ordeal: Battles of More than Local Significance," Pravda, 28 September 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 40, 9; M. Sokolov, "Which Big Brother in Renewed Union?" Soviet Analyst, Vol. 20, No. 16 (14 August 1991): 4-5.

²⁹ S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine: A Difficult Monday," Izvestiia, 1 October 1990, 1-2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 40, 9-10.

³⁰ S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine: A Difficult Monday," 9-10; S. Tsikora, "In Search of Stabilization Measures," Izvestiia, 3 October 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 40, 10. S. Tsikora, "Parliament under Siege by Students," Izvestiia, 16 October 1990, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 41, 15-16; "Let's Look the Truth in the Eye," Pravda, 25 October 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 43, 8-9; V. Savichev, "Students and Politics," Argumenty i fakty, No. 49, 7, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 49, 21-22.

demands that compulsory military service be restricted to Ukraine's territory and all Young Communist League [YCL] property in Ukraine be nationalized.³¹

The two week, 158-student hunger strike generated massive emotional support from the general public and the Narodna Rada caucus and strained relations among parliamentarians to the breaking point, generating unparliamentary pushing and shoving within the chamber.³² On 15 October, Narodna Rada deputies even joined several thousand students on a march upon the Supreme Council building, where the students established another hunger strike location.³³ Chairman L. Kravchuk's personal intervention failed to end the strike.³⁴

On 16 October, to defuse the mounting crises a non-partisan 10-member Temporary Committee was established comprised equally of Narodna Rada and Communist deputies, including S. Hurenko, First Secretary CC CPU. On the following day, the Temporary Committee recommended that V. Masol resign as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, that military service outside of Ukraine's territory be voluntary, and that Ukraine's

³¹ S. Tsikora, "Parliament under Siege by Students," 15-16; V. Savichev, "Students and Politics," 21.

³² S. Tsikora, "Parliament under Siege by Students," 15-16; S. Tsikora, "Deputies Declare Hunger Strike," Izvestiia, 11 October 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 41, 15; S. Tsikora, "Anxious Days in Kiev," Izvestiia, 10 October 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 41, 15; S. Tsikora, "Rally on the Street and in the Meeting Hall," Izvestiia, 2 October 1990, 2 as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 40, 10; "Let's Look the Truth in the Eye," 8-9.

³³ M. Odinets and I. Tikhomirov, "And in Kiev," Pravda, 17 October 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 41, 16; S. Tsikora, "Parliament under Siege by Students," 15.

³⁴ S. Tsikora, "Parliament under Siege by Students," 15.

Constitution conform fully with Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration by 30 November 1990.³⁵ Following V. Masol's resignation and the Supreme Council's decree of 17 October, essentially meeting all the student demands, the 15-day Kyiv student hunger strike ended peacefully.³⁶ The student hunger strike forced Communist and Non-Communist deputies to work together.

Two weeks later, the Supreme Council established a fifty-nine-member Constitutional Committee under Chairman Leonid Kravchuk.³⁷ After a lengthy process and over the objections of the CC CPU, in May 1991, the Supreme Council gave its preliminary approval to the new Ukrainian constitution that provided for the President to be elected by direct ballot and the unicameral Supreme Council to have veto powers over the President's legislative initiatives.

³⁵ S. Tsikora, "Students End Hunger Strike. Studies are Resumed," Izvestiia, 18 October 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 41, 17; S. Tsikora, "Parliament under Siege by Students," 15-16; "Let's Look the Truth in the Eye," 9; S. Tsikora, "They Will Serve in the Ukraine." Izvestiia, 30 April 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 17, 27-28.

³⁶ R. Solchanyk, "The Uncertain Road to Independence," 23; S. Tsikora, "Head of the Ukraine Government Resigns," Izvestiia, 17 October, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 41, 17; S. Tsikora, "Amendments to the Ukraine Constitution," Izvestiia, 26 October 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 43, 9.

Vitold Fokin was elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers a month later, on 15 November 1990. S. Tsikora, "New Chairman of Ukraine SSR Council of Ministers Means to Form Government of National Accord," Izvestiia, 15 November 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 46, 23.

³⁷ Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine Considers a New Republican Constitution," Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 37 (7 June 1991): 23-26.

The 17 March 1991 Referendums

Drafting and adopting a new Union Treaty in a state and society undergoing a major political and economic transformation exposed divisions between reformers and status-quo supporters, among advocates of a strong Union centre, a loose confederation, and complete independence for the republics. In Ukraine, deputies and citizens alike were divided, with Supreme Council Chairman Leonid Kravchuk pursuing a middle-of-the-road position supporting a Union without a centre³⁸ but acutely sensitive to the potentially volatile undercurrents in Ukraine.³⁹

USSR President Gorbachev lacked the political legitimacy and authority of an elected mandate that the leaders in Ukraine and the other republics had acquired. In his attempt to maintain a unified but a reformed and renamed Union, President Gorbachev turned to the Soviet electorate "on the premise that no one save the people themselves can

³⁸ Komsomolskoe znamia, February 13, 1991, as quoted by Roman Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 24 (14 June 1991): 22.

³⁹ "'No!' to Political Extremism. - Statement by the CC CPU," Pravda, 17 April 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 16, 22; M. Derimov, "What's Happening at the Session?" Pravda Ukrainy, 19 May 1990, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 20, 13; S. Tsikora, "Parliament under Siege by Students," 5-16; "At the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee: Speech by S.I. Gurenko, First Secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee," Pravda, 10 October 1990, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 42, 15-16; "Let's Look the Truth in the Eye," 8-9; S. Tsikora, "Ukraine Communist Party and Rukh: Confrontation Heats Up," Izvestiia, 16 November 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, XLII, No. 46, 21 and 23; V. Savichev, "Students and Politics," 21-22; S. Tsikora, "Here They Understood the Miners," 29; "Miners Go into the Square," Pravda, 15 March 1991, 6 as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 11, 6.

assume historical responsibility for the fate of the Soviet Union."⁴⁰ Through a referendum mandate President Gorbachev was attempting to undermine the leadership in the various republics to maintain the centre's dominant position.⁴¹

The republics were not consulted on the wording of the All-Union referendum question placed before the Soviet electorate:

Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal, sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?
"Yes" or "No"⁴²

In protest some republics boycotted the referendum. Ukraine's Supreme Council was divided with the Narodna Rada caucus charging that the all-Union referendum was illegal and the majority of Communist deputies supporting the All-Union referendum.⁴³ On 13 February 1991, the Supreme Council by a vote of 287 to 47 agreed to Leonid Kravchuk's compromise proposal to attach an All-Ukraine referendum question to the All-Union question to protect Ukraine's sovereignty.⁴⁴ On 27 February, the Supreme Council adopted Leonid Kravchuk's proposed All-Ukraine

⁴⁰ "Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On the Organization of and Measures for Conducting a USSR Referendum on the Question of Preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," Izvestiia, 18 January 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, 29.

⁴¹ CSCE, "Ukraine," Referendum in the Soviet Union, A Compendium of Reports on the March 17, 1991 Referendum on the Future of the USSR. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991): 2.

⁴² "Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On the Organization of and Measures for Conducting a USSR Referendum on the Question of Preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," 29-30.

⁴³ R. Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," 22.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 22; CSCE, "Ukraine," 20.

referendum question:

Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics on the basis of the declaration on the state of sovereignty of Ukraine?⁴⁵

Following the precedent established by the Supreme Council, on 16 February, the Galician Assembly, comprised of the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil oblasts, approved a question dealing with Ukraine's independence to be attached to the All-Union referendum in their respective oblasts:

Do you agree that Ukraine should be an independent state, which independently decides its domestic and foreign policies, which guarantees the equal rights of all citizens, regardless of nationality and religion?⁴⁶

The results of all three referendum questions enabled all factions to claim victory. Over 80.17 percent of the electorate in Ukraine voted "Yes" to the Supreme Council's All-Ukraine referendum question. In oblasts where ethnic Russians constituted a majority or near-majority, the "Yes" vote exceeded 80 percent, demonstrating a territorial loyalty by Russians towards Ukraine.⁴⁷ In Western Ukraine 85 percent of the electorate endorsed the independence of Ukraine, while less than 20 percent voted "Yes" to the All-Union question, and less than half voted "Yes" to the All-Ukraine question.⁴⁸

The referendum results provided the Supreme Council and the Western Ukrainian oblasts with a solid endorsement from the citizens,

⁴⁵ R. Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," 21-22.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 22.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 24.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 24-25.

including ethnic Russians, to pursue greater sovereignty and independence for Ukraine. However, 70.16 percent of Ukraine's electorate also voted "yes" to the All-Union question, thereby not resolving the centre-versus-republic conflict over the proposed Union Treaty.⁴⁹

The referendum results appear to have influenced Chairman L. Kravchuk's pro-sovereignty position. He said: "There is no road from sovereignty. There never will be, because this has entered into the blood of the people. . . . The people have taken this road, they supported us, . . . we cannot diverge from this path, we do not have the right. This is the order that we have been given by the people."⁵⁰ Prior to the abortive August coup in Moscow, Leonid Kravchuk appears to have pursued a compromise position between the pro-independence and pro-status quo forces in Ukraine. He supported a new Union, but without a centre, where the republics would make up the union of sovereign states.⁵¹ Chairman L. Kravchuk steadfastly delayed signing the proposed Union Treaty, claiming that the Union Treaty and Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration differed in many fundamental and specific ways.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 24; A. Stepovoi, "What the Referendum Showed," Izvestiia, 21 March 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No.11, 5.

⁵⁰ Holos Ukrainy, 3 April 1991, as quoted by Roman Solchanyk in "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," 21-22.

⁵¹ Radianska Ukraina, 13 December 1990, as quoted by Roman Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," 22.

The Economy and the Impetus for Sovereignty

Economic problems generated by the fragmentation of the collapsing Soviet economy compelled Ukraine's government and deputies to protect the interests of Ukraine and its citizens. Hyper-inflation, barter trading, autarky of regions and republics, and disputes over the ownership of national resources and companies necessitated bilateral economic agreements between republics and a wholesale realignment of priorities.⁵² President Gorbachev's wavering on economic reforms essential to transform the economic command structure into a decentralized market economy, characterized by market-driven input and retail prices, alienated conservatives, disillusioned reformers and politicized the economic demands of workers.⁵³ The proliferation of feelings of regional economic exploitation stimulated social and political tensions as food and consumer product shortages coincided with price increases and autarky.

Responding to stabilize the deteriorating economic situation, the Supreme Council on 3 August 1990 adopted the Law on Ukraine's Economic Sovereignty,⁵⁴ and subsequently banned the export of grain and

⁵²J. Tedstrom, "Disintegration of the Soviet Economy," Report on the USSR (4 January 1991): 4.

⁵³Ukraine News Agency and Tass, "Miners Go into the Square," 6; E. Teague and Hanson, "Most Soviet Strikes Politically Motivated," 1-2; David Marples, "Turmoil in the Donbass: The Political Situation," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 41 (12 October 1990): 13-14.

⁵⁴Opryshko, Demsky, Hapon, ed. "Pro ekonomichnu samostiinist Ukrainskoi RSR," 7-9; S. Tsikora, "Government Receives Power," Izvestiia, 4 August 1990, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 31, 30-31.

sunflower seeds from the republic,⁵⁵ introduced a coupon system in November 1990 to curtail the export of food and manufactured goods from the republic,⁵⁶ on 1 August 1991 established a prototype customs service and announced preparations for establishing Ukraine's own bank and currency to reduce future financial and economic shocks.

Rapid unilateral actions by Moscow's Union ministries in establishing incorporated companies to take possession of Union-level properties situated in Ukraine threatened Ukraine's ownership share and future control of these properties.⁵⁷ To undermine Moscow's old command-administrative structure, the Supreme Council invoked Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration and transformed, on 18 April 1991, the Council of Ministers into a Cabinet of Ministers with Vitold Fokin as Ukraine's Prime Minister.⁵⁸ As an added precaution, the Supreme Council also suspended on Ukraine's territory President Gorbachev's Decree of 12 April 1991: On Emergency Measures for Providing Enterprises,

⁵⁵ S. Tsikora, "Will Grain be Put under Customs Controls?" Izvestiia, 7 September 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 36, 28-29.

⁵⁶ S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine: Anxious Sunday in Kiev," Izvestiia, 29 October 1990, 2 as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 43, 9; S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine Eliminates Panic Buying," Izvestiia, 26 December 1990, 7, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 52, 30-31; S. Tsikora, "Against a 'Drain' of the Ukraine," Izvestiia, 17 July 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 29, 24; S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine - Selling Goods by the Coupon System Again," Izvestiia, 27 July 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 30, 26.

⁵⁷ S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine Puts All Enterprises under Its Jurisdiction," Izvestiia, 7 June 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 23, 22.

⁵⁸ S. Tsikora, "Here They Understood the Miners," 29. [Article title misleading.]

Associations and Organizations with Material Resources.⁵⁹ To further protect Ukraine's economic interests, on 7 June 1991, deputies voted 330 to 1 to transfer all Union-level enterprises and organizations in Ukraine under Ukraine's jurisdiction and re-affirmed that Union laws and decisions had no legal force in Ukraine and were not to be carried out.⁶⁰

Ukraine's Supreme Council and government were under constant pressure to implement economic and political reforms, especially from the Donbass coal miners. On 5 March, citing food shortages, some Donbass coal miners went on strike.⁶¹ Following the publication of a draft of President Gorbachev's proposed new Union Treaty on 9 March 1991,⁶² the miners on 14 March expanded their economic demands into the political sphere by supporting Ukraine's political and economic sovereignty.⁶³ On 13 April, strike committees in Kyiv announced their support for the demands of the striking miners and called for the implementation of the Supreme Council's resolution of 17 October 1990 that ended the student-hunger strike.⁶⁴ The strike coincided with

⁵⁹ Ibid., 29.

⁶⁰ S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine Puts All Enterprises under Its Jurisdiction," 22.

⁶¹ V. Filippov, "Miners Go on Strike," Izvestiia, 5 March 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 9, 23-24.

⁶² "Draft: Treaty on the Union of Sovereign Republics," Pravda, 9 March 1991, 1 and 3, and Izvestiia, 9 March 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 11, 10-13.

⁶³ Ukraine News Agency & Tass, "Miners Go Into The Square," 6.

⁶⁴ S. Tsikora, "Echo of Minsk on the Streets of Kiev," Izvestiia, 15 April 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol XLIII, No. 15, 21.

massive price increases decreed in Moscow that increased social tensions in Ukraine.⁶⁵ Ukraine's government was not providing leadership towards economic and political sovereignty, it was being pushed by the collapsing economy, strikes and demonstrations, and the actions in Moscow-centre that were hurting Ukraine's economy.

Ukraine's Bilateral Agreements before the Coup

Within the parameters of their sovereignty declarations, the Soviet republics commenced signing bilateral agreements and treaties among themselves. In hindsight, from Ukraine's perspective, the most important treaty was signed on 19 November 1990 between Russia's Boris Yeltsin and Ukraine's Leonid Kravchuk. The Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Russian SFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, recognized Russia's (12 June 1990) and Ukraine's (16 July 1990) Sovereignty Declarations while totally ignoring the proposed Union Treaty and the USSR Constitution.⁶⁶ The Treaty committed both republics for the next 10 years to recognize and respect each other's territorial integrity and

⁶⁵ Ibid., 21.

⁶⁶ S. Tsikora, "Treaty on Relations between Russia and the Ukraine," Izvestiia, 19 November 1990, 1, reported CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 47, 21-22; S. Tsikora, "Russia and the Ukraine Pool Efforts and Resources," Izvestiia, 21 November 1990, 2, as reported CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 47, 21; N. Kupry & V. Dzhibuti, "At the Session of the Russian SFSR Supreme Soviet: A Discussion and a Treaty," Sovetskaia Rossia, 21 November 1990, 1, as reported CDSP, XLII, No. 47, 22.

current republic borders.⁶⁷

Ukraine also signed bilateral treaties with other sovereign Soviet republics: on 21 February 1990 with Kazakhstan;⁶⁸ on 24 November 1990 with Turkmenia;⁶⁹ and on 5 April 1991 with Kyrgyzstan, including a provision that Ukraine would represent Kyrgyzstan's interests at the United Nations.⁷⁰ However, Moscow placed limitations on Ukraine's sovereignty and status as "an equal partner in international affairs" by objecting to Ukraine's request for observer status at the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.⁷¹

The struggle over the future spheres of authority between the centre and the republics continued unabated. On 14 January 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had decided to meet in Minsk in the near future to sign a treaty among themselves, without waiting for a Union Treaty.⁷² Other republics and the USSR government could sign the Treaty later, if they so wished.

⁶⁷ S. Tsikora, "Treaty on Relations between Russia and Ukraine," 21-22.

⁶⁸ T. Yesilbayev, "The Future is in Unity," Pravda, 21 February 1991, 4, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 8, 26.

⁶⁹ M. Volkov, "Agreement Signed," Pravda, 25 November 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 47, 26.

⁷⁰ A. Ryabushkin, "The Ukraine Represents Kyrgyzstan's Interests in U.N.," Izvestiia, 5 April 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 14, 28.

⁷¹ A. Shalnev, "Observer Status Wanted," Izvestiia, 9 November 1990, 5, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 45, 18.

⁷² I. Demchenko & V. Kurasov, "B. Yeltsin's Press Conference," Izvestiia, 15 January 1991, 2, reported CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 2, 9.

On 26 July 1991, less than a month prior to the abortive coup, representatives from all 15 republics met and informally agreed in principle to divide up the Soviet Union's hard currency reserves while accepting responsibility for their respective individual share of the \$65 billion foreign debt.⁷³ They also agreed that the Soviet Foreign-Trade Bank, as their agent, would continue to repay the foreign debt, and that each republic should establish its own customs system. This did not appear to be intended as a move towards independence but rather a continuation of implementing the sovereignty declarations and establishing the framework for a loose confederation of republics.

The Coup in Moscow

Events in Moscow

On Monday, 19 August 1991, on the eve of the signing of the Union Treaty with three republics,⁷⁴ a reactionary coup instigated and directed by some top officials within the CPSU, KGB⁷⁵ and the military,

⁷³ From special correspondent in Moscow, "Shape of the future," The Economist, 3 August 1991, 45.

⁷⁴ The Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan were to sign the Union Treaty. Belarus, Tadjikistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine were stalling. O. Figes, "The Growing Spectre of War," The Manchester Guardian, 20 August 1991, 15; S. Tsikora, "Ukraine: Independence Day," 16 & 23.

⁷⁵ On 6 May 1991 a separate Russian KGB branch had been established. "Russian SFSR State Security Committee being Created," Pravda, 7 May 1991, 6, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 18, 15.

seized power in Moscow and established an eight-man State Committee for the State of Emergency [SCSE], with Vice-President Gennadii Yanaev assuming the Presidency of the Soviet Union.⁷⁶ The first SCSE communique claimed that President M. Gorbachev was ill, and that a mortal danger loomed over the Soviet Union because his policies had made the Soviet Union ungovernable and at the verge of economic collapse.⁷⁷ The SCSE was determined to prevent the transfer of massive political and economic powers from the central government to the sovereign republics,⁷⁸ especially federal taxation powers.⁷⁹ The SCSE's first decree stressed the supremacy of the Soviet Union's Constitution over the constitutions of the republics.

The SCSE focused its primary attention on seizing power at the

⁷⁶ Members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency [SCSE] in the USSR were: O.D. Baklanov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council; V.A. Kriuchkov, KGB Chairman; V.S. Pavlov, Prime Minister of the USSR; B.K. Pugo, Interior Minister of the USSR; V.A. Starodutsev, Chairman of Farmers Union of the USSR; A.I. Tiziakov, President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial Construction, Transport, & Communication Facilities of the USSR; D.T. Yazov, Defence Minister of the USSR; G.I. Yanaev, Acting President of the USSR. Announcement of ouster was signed by G. Yanaev, V. Pavlov, and O. Baklanov.

"Collapse of a Coup-56 Hours," The Manchester Guardian, 22 August 1991, 4-5; "Gorbachev is Ousted in an Apparent Coup by Soviet Armed Forces and Hard-Liners; Accused of Steering into a 'Blind Alley'," The New York Times, 19 August 1991, A1 and A6.

⁷⁷ "'Grave, Critical Hour': A Soviet Message," The New York Times, 19 August 1991, A1 and A6.

⁷⁸ "Anatomy of a Botched Putsch," The Economist, 24 August 1991, 17; O. Figes, "The Growing Spectre of War," 15; J. Steele, "Yeltsin Rallies Resistance against 'Eternal Night'," The Manchester Guardian, 20 August 1991, 9.

⁷⁹ M. Sokolov, "Which Big Brother in Renewed Union?" Soviet Analyst, Vol. 20, No. 16 (14 August 1991): 4; Moscow Correspondent, "Shape of the Future." The Economist, 3 August 1991, 45.

All-Union level, underestimating the expectations of the republic elites as expressed through their sovereignty declarations. Republic leaders had delayed the signing of the proposed Union Treaty because they wanted more, not fewer, constitutional powers. While President Gorbachev was placed under house arrest in Crimea, the republic leaders remained at liberty, enabling Russian President Yeltsin to actively resist the coup by calling for demonstrations and a general strike against the coup.⁸⁰ The SCSE seized control of all Union-level television and radio stations, closed all Russian republic-controlled television and radio stations, and permitted only nine highly conservative Moscow-based national newspapers to publish.⁸¹

On Wednesday, 21 August, the coup collapsed. President Gorbachev returned to Moscow on Thursday, 22 August, where Russian President Yeltsin was basking in the prestige and authority generated from his leadership of the anti-coup forces.

Events in Ukraine

On the day of the Moscow coup, Ukrainian republic-controlled television and radio stations were off the air until 4 p.m., at which time Chairman Leonid Kravchuk addressed the Ukrainian nation, tactfully appealing for calm while affirming that Ukraine's Constitution was in

⁸⁰ G. Henry and M. Bunting, "All but Nine Papers Shut," The Manchester Guardian, 20 August 1991, p.4.

⁸¹ Ibid., 4.

force on its territory⁸² and declaring that the SCSE's actions were unconstitutional and that Ukraine was prepared to defend its sovereignty with all its might.⁸³ During the interval when Ukrainian Television was off the air, Soviet General Varennikov had cautioned Chairman L. Kravchuk that resistance to the coup would prompt the imposition of a state of emergency on Ukraine.⁸⁴ It appears that an unofficial understanding prevailed on the first day of the Moscow coup, whereby the SCSE controlled the Union-level apparatus in Ukraine, while Ukraine defended its sovereignty, rejecting the validity and legality of the coup's decrees in its sphere of jurisdiction.

On Tuesday, 20 August, the 25-member Presidium of the Supreme Council met and by a vote of 15 to 10, with Chairman L. Kravchuk voting in favour, adopted a resolution nullifying and voiding all SCSE decrees on Ukraine's territory.⁸⁵ Leonid Kravchuk immediately telephoned USSR Supreme Council Chairman Anatolii Lukianov in Moscow to advise him of Ukraine's decision and demanded that Gorbachev be allowed to appear

⁸² "Countering the Counter-Revolution," The Economist, 24 August 1991, 18; T. Fast, D. Hearst and J. Rettie, "Army Closes in on Baltics," The Manchester Guardian, 20 August 1991, 2.

⁸³ V. Portnikov, "Chronical of the Coup and Resistance: the Ukraine," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 22 August 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 33, 24.

⁸⁴ V. Portnikov, "Chronicle of the Coup and Resistance: the Ukraine," 24; "Countering the Counter-Revolution," 18.

⁸⁵ "Republics Beat the Drum of Freedom: Ukraine," The Manchester Guardian, 21 August 1991, 3; J. Steel and J. Rettie, "Protesters Confront Tanks in Moscow Street Fighting," The Manchester Guardian, 21 August 1991, 1; T. Kuzio, "An Independent Ukraine - But Still Communist?" Soviet Analyst, Vol. 20, No. 17 (28 August 1991): 7-8; V. Portnikov, "Chronicle of the Coup and Resistance: the Ukraine," 24.

before the USSR Supreme Soviet.⁸⁶ Rukh supported Boris Yeltsin's call for resistance against the coup. The Narodna Rada caucus formed the Independent Democratic Ukraine bloc of deputies to protect Ukraine's legitimate authorities and sovereignty.⁸⁷ Stanislav Hurenko, First Secretary of the CC CPU, supported the coup.⁸⁸ Unlike in Russia, the republic-controlled press continued to publish in Ukraine, with some newspapers reportedly condemning the coup and publishing President Yeltsin's appeals and statements by Ukraine's deputies who condemned the coup as dangerous, unconstitutional and illegal.⁸⁹ Those unhappy with President Gorbachev's policies appear also to have been concerned that the seizure of power by the SCSE was illegal and unconstitutional, thereby potentially threatening their positions and the process of transferring authority from the Party to the Supreme Council. While resistance to the coup was reportedly passive in Ukraine, the Presidium of the Supreme Council attempted to protect Ukraine's sovereignty and the Supreme Council's authority by nullifying all SCSE decrees that infringed on Ukraine's sovereignty.

⁸⁶ V. Portnikov, "Chronicle of the Coup and Resistance: the Ukraine," 24.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 24.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 24.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 24.

Collapse of the Coup, Anti-CPSU Upheaval in Moscow

The devolution of political and economic constitutional powers from the centre to the republics that the SCSE had attempted to prevent was accelerated and radicalized. The participation by many prominent officials within the CPSU, KGB, and the military, in the abortive coup had discredited, disoriented, and demoralized the status quo forces. The massive and rapid dismissals of high-ranking officials within these institutions weakened them and placed on the defensive their personnel who feared being targeted and classified as possible sympathizers of the failed coup.⁹⁰

The reactionary coup further tarnished and weakened the Union-level government, institutions, and Party, all of which President Gorbachev had employed to introduce his political and economic reforms. Gorbachev had also shown poor judgment in having appointed the coup leaders to their positions of power. During his 23 August address before the Russian Supreme Soviet and a national television audience he defended the CPSU and its members, while promising to punish those responsible for the coup.⁹¹ Russian President Yeltsin used the

⁹⁰ A. Roxburgh and agencies Moscow, "Heads Start to Roll as Political Purge Begins in Moscow," The Manchester Guardian, 24 August 1991, 2 and 28; J. Steel and J. Rettie, "The Second Revolution," The Manchester Guardian, 24 August 1991, 1; S. Schmemmann, "'Radicals' Proud Moment," The New York Times, 24 August 1991, A1; F.X. Clines, "Yeltsin is Routing Communist Party from Key Roles throughout Russia; He Forces Vast Gorbachev Shake-up," The New York Times, 24 August 1991, A1 and A4.

⁹¹ Clines, "Yeltsin is Routing Communist Party from Key Roles throughout Russia; He forces Vast Gorbachev Shake-Up," A1 and A4; J. Rettie, "Yeltsin Lays Down the Law to Gorbachev," The Manchester Guardian, 24 August 1991, 1.

occasion to further discredit the Union-level government, the CPSU, and President Gorbachev personally, by producing minutes of a Cabinet meeting for the day of the coup that allegedly implicated the entire Gorbachev Cabinet as coup sympathizers.⁹² President Gorbachev's announcement that he was firing his entire Cabinet failed to stem the anti-Communist and anti-Union-level political tide sweeping through Moscow. Angry Moscow crowds even encircled the Communist Party headquarters and toppled the statue of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, founder of the KGB, in front of the KGB building.⁹³

Russian President Yeltsin and his supporters maintained the anti-Communist momentum by launching swift and relentless attacks on the Communist Party and its assets. The Mayor of Moscow, G. Popov, suspended the activities of the Communist Party in Moscow and closed the Party's city building.⁹⁴ Russian President Yeltsin, on 23 August, 1) suspended the Russian Communist Party and froze its assets pending an investigation into its role in the coup attempt;⁹⁵ 2) banned the Communist Party from operating inside the security forces on Russia's

⁹² Rettie, "Yeltsin Lays Down the Law to Gorbachev," 1; Clines, "Yeltsin is Routing Communist Party from Key Roles throughout Russia; He Forces Vast Gorbachev Shake-Up," A1 and A4.

⁹³ F. Fleck, "Fury and a Sense of History as Crowds Lay Siege to Central Committee Offices," The Manchester Guardian, 24 August 1991, 1.

⁹⁴ M. Simmons, "Upheaval in a State of Many Nations: Ukraine," The Manchester Guardian, 24 August 1991, 3; S. Taranov, "CPSU's Property: Some Things are Clear but by No Means Everything," Izvestiia, 27 August 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 9-10.

⁹⁵ 23 August 1991 "Decree of the Russian SFSR President: On Suspending the Activity of the RSFSR Communist Party," Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 August 1991, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No.35, 11.

territory;⁹⁶ 3) decreed the removal of provincial leaders supportive of the coup and asserted his right to directly appoint regional leaders who would be directly accountable to the Russian president;⁹⁷ 4) suspended the operations of the pro-coup newspapers, including the communist party paper, Pravda, while dismissing the heads of the Union-level news services, TASS and Novosti;⁹⁸ 5) decreed Russia's control and ownership of all resources on its territory;⁹⁹ and 6) announced the formation of a new Russian National Guard.¹⁰⁰ On 24 August, President Yeltsin decreed the transfer of the CPSU central archives and all local party archives, situated on Russia's territory, to the Russian Republic.¹⁰¹

Unable to stem the anti-Communist momentum in Moscow, and determined to save the Soviet Union as a reformed and renamed Union, President Gorbachev capitulated on 24 August. He decreed the depoliticization of the armed forces, the KGB, the militia, and all

⁹⁶ A. Roxburgh and J. Rettie, "Russians Euphoric as Yeltsin Sets Pace of Reform," The Manchester Guardian, 23 August 1991, 1.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 1.

⁹⁸ A. Roxburgh, "Yeltsin Shuts down Communist Newspapers to Punish the 'Accomplices of Putsch'," The Manchester Guardian, 24 August 1991, 2; V. Nadein, "In Shutting Down Newspapers, Yeltsin Made a Mistake, He Himself Should Rectify It." Izvestiia, 24 August 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 23.

⁹⁹ A. Roxburgh and J. Rettie, "Russians Euphoric as Yeltsin Sets Pace of Reform," 1.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 1.

¹⁰¹ 24 August 1991 "Decree of the President of the Russian SFSR: On the Party Archives," Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 August 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 11.

other state law-enforcement and military agencies at the Union-level;¹⁰² and that all CPSU property be nationalized according to the laws of the USSR and the republics.¹⁰³ President M. Gorbachev then resigned as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and recommended that the CC CPSU disband itself. He left the fate of the Communist parties in the various republics and their local organizations up to themselves.¹⁰⁴ Discredited and rejected, the CPSU officially ceased to exist.

¹⁰² 24 August 1991: "Decree of the President of the USSR: On Terminating the Activity of Political Parties and Political Movements in the USSR Armed Forces, Law-Enforcement Agencies and the State Apparatus," Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 August 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 11; "Gorbachev Statement on Party," The New York Times, 25 August 1991, A14.

¹⁰³ "Gorbachev Statement on Party, A14.

¹⁰⁴ "Gorbachev Statement on Party," A14; Moscow Correspondent, "The Tide of History," The Economist, 31 August 1991, 39; "The Party has Played Itself Out," Izvestiia, 26 August 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 8.

CHAPTER 2

SUPREME COUNCIL PROCLAIMS UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE

Ukraine's Dash for Independence

The anti-Communist upheaval in Moscow prompted the Supreme Council's Communist deputies to forge an instant pro-independence alliance with the Narodna Rada caucus. Prior to the August coup, the Supreme Council deputies were positioned into three major blocs: the conservative pro-Union Communists, Leonid Kravchuk's middle-of-the-road sovereignty Communists, and the Narodna Rada caucus.¹⁰⁵ As mentioned earlier, Rukh had adopted the total independence of Ukraine as its ultimate goal at its October 1990 Second Congress.¹⁰⁶

As the emergency session of the Supreme Council commenced on 24 August, thousands of demonstrators outside the Supreme Council building demanded the immediate proclamation of Ukraine's independence,¹⁰⁷ while inside the chamber the astonishing news of President Gorbachev's

¹⁰⁵ R. Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," 20-23.

¹⁰⁶ R. Solchanyk, "The Uncertain Road to Independence," 22-23.

¹⁰⁷ V. Portnikov, "The Ukraine Proclaims Independence." Nezavisimaia gazeta, 27 August 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 12.

resignation as Secretary General of the CC CPSU and his recommendation to abolish the CPSU's Central Committee circulated among deputies.¹⁰⁸ This shattering news, combined with Russian President Yeltsin's anti-Communist Party decrees of the previous day, provided the final stimulus for Ukraine's Communists to break with the centre in Moscow or, more specifically, from the anti-Communist upheaval sweeping through Moscow. Still in shock, Ukraine's Communists joined the charge out of the former Soviet Union by supporting in principle the Narodna Rada's resolution proclaiming the independence of Ukraine, with 321 deputies voting in favour, 6 against, and 2 abstaining.¹⁰⁹ The resolution stipulated that a referendum on The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine would be held in conjunction with Ukraine's 1 December presidential election.

When the actual Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine was drafted and adopted later on the 24 August, there were two positions taken towards the wording of the Act. A number of Non-Communist deputies wanted the vote on The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine to be combined with a vote on the "departyization" of Ukraine's institutions to insure that an independent Ukraine would not become a Communist stronghold.¹¹⁰ Chairman L. Kravchuk ruled that the deputies would vote only on The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine,

¹⁰⁸ "Gorbachev Statement on Party," A1; Moscow correspondent, "The Tide of History," 39; "The Party has Played Itself out," 8; V. Portnikov, "The Ukraine Proclaims Independence," 12.

¹⁰⁹ V. Portnikov, "The Ukraine Proclaims Independence," 12; M. Dyczok and J. Rettie, "Assets Seized after Kiev Votes for Secession," The Manchester Guardian, 26 August 1991, 2.

¹¹⁰ V. Portnikov, "The Ukraine Proclaims Independence," 12.

thereby removing any perceived threat directed against the CPU and its members. This politically astute decision united all deputies firmly behind The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, insuring a united front during the referendum.

The situation was delicate in the Communist-dominated Supreme Council as evidenced by its rejection, on 24 August, of a proposal to nationalize the CPU's property. The Supreme Council delegated the fate of local Party organizations to the local labour collectives, increasing the concerns of Narodna Rada deputies that an independent Ukraine might remain a Communist Ukraine.¹¹¹ The hasty dash for independence by other Communist-dominated Soviet republics reenforced the concerns of the Narodna Rada.¹¹²

Chairman L. Kravchuk and other Communists became increasingly concerned at reports circulating that the CPU and Chairman Kravchuk had been sympathetic to the Moscow coup. In a politically astute move to perpetuate their control of Ukraine's government and Supreme Council, Communist deputies quickly distanced themselves from the liability of being associated with the discredited CPU by supporting the immediate

¹¹¹ M. Dyczok & J. Rettie, "Assets Seized after Kiev Votes For Secession," 2; V. Portnikov, "The Ukraine Proclaims Independence," 12; S. Tsikora, "What Kind of Independence has the Ukraine Proclaimed?" Izvestiia, 26 August 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 13; T. Kuzio, "An Independent Ukraine - But Still Communist?" Soviet Analyst, Vol. 20, No. 17 (28 August 1991): 7-8.

¹¹² G. Dildyayev & T. Yesilbayev, "What's Happening to the Party Now, No Split Occurred," Pravda, 9 September 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 36, 36-37; Moscow correspondent, "The Tide of History," 39-40; I. Sinyakevich, "An Ordinary Miracle in Belarus Supreme Council- The Republic's Communist Parliament Adopts a Decision on Suspending Communist Party Activity and Proclaiming Independence," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 27 August 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 13.

suspension of the CPU and the nationalization all its property and assets.¹¹³ As a consequence, the KGB, the militia, the Prosecutor's Office, and other state institutions were ordered immediately "departyized".¹¹⁴ Ukraine's national rebirth became the new ideology of the former members of the CPU, especially Chairman L. Kravchuk.¹¹⁵

As a housekeeping measure, all property on Ukraine's territory was transferred to Ukraine, and only Ukraine's laws were declared enforceable on Ukraine's territory, while the laws of the former Soviet Union were declared null and void.¹¹⁶ The Supreme Council placed all armed forces on Ukraine's territory under its control and designated Supreme Council Chairman L. Kravchuk as commander-in-chief of the armed forces with special powers equivalent to those of a president.¹¹⁷

The adoption of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine promptly distanced, and partially isolated, Ukraine from the influences of the anti-Communist decrees and upheaval radiating from Moscow. It provided Ukraine's former Communists with an opportunity to protect their positions, power, and influence during Ukraine's transition period from a Marxist-Leninist state.

¹¹³ J. Rettie & M. Dyczok, "Assets Seized after Kiev Votes For Secession," 2; J. Rettie & M. Dyczok, "Lithuania Issues Visas While Ukraine Suspends Party," The Manchester Guardian, 27 August 1991, 2; T. Kuzio, "An Independent Ukraine- But Still Communist?" 7-8.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ T. Kuzio, "Kravchuk and Ukrainian Communism," Soviet Analyst, Vol. 21, No. 3, 8-10.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 12; M. Dyczok & J. Rettie, "Assets Seized after Kiev Votes for Secession," 2.

¹¹⁷ V. Portnikov, "The Ukraine Proclaims Independence," 12.

The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine

DECREE¹¹⁸
OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF UKRAINE SSR
FOR PROCLAIMING THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE

The Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
DECREES:

To proclaim Ukraine on 24 August 1991 an independent, democratic state.

From the moment of the proclamation of independence, in effect on the territory of Ukraine are only its Constitution, laws, government regulations, and other legislative acts of the republic.

On 1 December 1991 to hold a republic-wide referendum to affirm the Act proclaiming the independence.

Head of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR,

L. Kravchuk

City of Kyiv, 24 August 1991

¹¹⁸ "Postanova Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR, Pro proholoshennia nezalezhnosti Ukrainy," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 231, 29 November 1991, 2.

See Appendix B.

THE ACT
PROCLAIMING
THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE ¹¹⁹

Because of the mortal danger that had hung over Ukraine connected with the coup d'état of 19 August 1991 in the USSR,

-continuing the 1000 year state-creating tradition in Ukraine,

-proceeding from the right of self-determination, which is foreseen by United Nations Statutes and other international legal documents,

-putting into effect the Declaration of the state sovereignty of Ukraine, the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic solemnly

DECLARES
THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE
AND THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINIAN STATE-
UKRAINE.

The territory of Ukraine is indivisible and inviolable.

As of today, on the territory of Ukraine the Constitution and laws of Ukraine exclusively are in effect.

This Act is in effect from the moment of its adoption.

SUPREME COUNCIL OF UKRAINE

24 August 1991

¹¹⁹ "Akt proholoshennia nezalezhnosti Ukrainy," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 231, 29 November 1991, 2.

See Appendix B.

The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine contained the wording: "Because of the mortal danger that had hung over Ukraine connected with the coup d'état of 19 August 1991 in the USSR." During the Moscow coup, the State Committee for the State of Emergency claimed that a mortal danger loomed over the Soviet Union because President Gorbachev's policies were leading the country into a blind alley, making it ungovernable, and bringing it to the verge of economic collapse.¹²⁰

The Act's reference to a "mortal danger" contained a double meaning, one for the conservative Communists concerned with President Gorbachev's and President Yeltsin's policies, and another for the Democrats concerned about another possible reactionary coup in Moscow.

The referendum ballot was different in size and colour from the presidential ballot and, in the russified regions, bilingual as authorized by the Referendum Act.¹²¹

The referendum ballot required the voter to cross off the choice rejected. That is, to vote "Yes, I affirm", a voter would cross off "No, I do not". A ballot was void when both answers were crossed-off or where nothing was crossed-off.

¹²⁰ "Grave, Critical Hour': A Soviet Message," A1 and A6.

¹²¹ Article 36, Zakon Ukrainskoi Radianskoi Sotsialistychnoi Respubliky pro vseukrainskyi ta mistsevi referendumy (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo "Ukraine", 1991)

See Appendix C.

Ballot¹²²
For Voting in the All-Ukraine Referendum
THE ACT
PROCLAIMING THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE

Because of the mortal danger that had hung over Ukraine connected with the coup d'état of 19 August 1991 in the USSR,

-continuing the 1000 year state-creating tradition in Ukraine,

-proceeding from the right of self-determination, which is foreseen by United Nations Statutes and other international legal documents,

-putting in effect the Declaration of the state sovereignty of Ukraine, the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic solemnly

DECLARES

THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE and the creation of an independent Ukrainian State-UKRAINE.

The territory of Ukraine is indivisible and inviolate.

As of today, on the territory of Ukraine the Constitution and laws of Ukraine exclusively are in effect.

This Act is in effect from the moment of its adoption.

SUPREME COUNCIL OF UKRAINE

24 August 1991

"Do you affirm
The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine?"

"Yes, I affirm"

"No, I do not"

Leave only one answer, cross the other off.

Ballots are void that have both "Yes, I confirm" and "No, I do not" crossed-off, or have nothing crossed-off.

¹²² See Appendix B for ballot sample used by "Yes" campaign.

Negotiations for Ukraine's Exit from the Union

The Supreme Council's adoption of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine did not automatically end the ties that had bound Ukraine to Moscow for over 300 years, including the several decades of Soviet rule. Ukraine continued to send representatives to high-level meetings, to negotiate with Moscow and the other eleven republics to establish a structure for resolving all political, economic, military, and property issues encountered during Ukraine's departure from the former Soviet Union, to prevent instability, uncontrolled disintegration and violence.¹²³ While Ukraine's representatives agreed to pay Ukraine's portion of the Soviet Union's foreign debt,¹²⁴ they refrained from signing any agreements that infringed on Ukraine's declared independence.¹²⁵

In the aftermath of the coup, Union-level power collapsed as

¹²³ V. Skachko, "The Ukraine: 'It Had to be Stifled Immediately' - The Conflict Between Russia and the Ukraine Has Been Settled," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 31 August 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 15.

¹²⁴ M. Berger, "Ministers Confirm Readiness to Pay Debts," Izvestiia, 1 October 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 39, 6; M. Berger, "In Polite Society, Debts Aren't Repudiated," Izvestiia, 22 November 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 47, 17; S. Tsikora, "V. Fokin: We Will Pay Our Debts," Izvestiia, 25 November 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 47, 17; "Borhy: Idemo v tupyk?" Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41) November 1991, 1.

¹²⁵ N. Bodnaruk, "Leonid Kravchuk, "A Leader Must Honour the People's Choice," Izvestiia, 26 November 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 47, 1991, 8-9; "Tse vzhe my prokhodyly," and "Tsyтата dnia," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 222, 16 November 1991, 1.

Russia assumed substantial control over federal institutions.¹²⁶ The new Union government consisted of a reduced legislative body composed of the Supreme Soviet and an upper chamber chosen by the republics; a State Council consisting of President Gorbachev and the heads of ten republics; and an economic committee headed by Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silaev with representatives from the republics.¹²⁷

President Gorbachev continued in his struggle to preserve the Union in a restructured and renamed form. On 30 September, 12 republic leaders and Ivan Silaev, who represented the new inter-republic economic structures, met at Alma-Ata to discuss the creation of an economic community within the framework of the former Soviet Union.¹²⁸ Prime Minister V. Fokin represented Ukraine. On 18 October, eight republics, but not Ukraine, signed in Moscow a Treaty on an economic community, agreeing that the Interstate Economic Committee chaired by Ivan Silaev

¹²⁶ Moscow Correspondent, "Irresistible Force, Movable Object," The Economist, 7 September 1991, 45-47; Moscow Correspondent, "The New Men," The Economist, 31 August 1991, 40; "Soviet Defence Superpower in Superschism," The Economist, 31 August 1991, 41-41.

¹²⁷ Moscow Correspondent, "Irresistible Force, Movable Object," 45-47.

¹²⁸ V. Ardayev & E. Matskevych, "The Leaders of 12 Republics Have Arrived in Alma-Ata," Izvestiia, 1 October 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 40, 6; V. Ardayev & E. Matskevych, "The Results of the Meeting in the Capital of Kazakhstan have Exceeded all Expectations," Izvestiia, 1 October 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 40, 6.

Note: Following the adoption of the Act proclaiming the independence of Ukraine on 24 August 1991, pro-independence supporters in Ukraine consistently referred to the "former Soviet Union" as if the Soviet Union no longer existed.

would serve as the executive body of the Economic Community.¹²⁹ On 15 November, seven republics, but not Ukraine, agreed to form a Union of Sovereign States but failed to initial the Union Treaty at their Novo-Ogarovo meeting on 25 November 1991.¹³⁰

The probability of Ukraine signing a Union Treaty was zero. Ukraine's former Communists blamed President Gorbachev for the economic and political collapse of the former Soviet Union and feared President Yeltsin's anti-Communist oratory and policies. Ukrainian nationalists rejected all ties with Moscow and regarded Russia as a re-emerging imperial power. A front page photo of Chairman L. Kravchuk with President Gorbachev illustrates Ukraine's suspicions towards any agreements with Moscow.¹³¹ President Gorbachev is pictured motioning Chairman Kravchuk to a chair. Chairman Kravchuk's facial expression

¹²⁹ G. Alimov, "Eight Sovereign States Sign the Treaty on an Economic Community," Izvestiia, 19 October 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 42, 1-2; G. Alimov, "On October 18 Economic Community Formed After All - But without the Ukraine, Baltic States and Georgia," Izvestiia, 19 October 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 42, 2-3; "A New Post for I. Silaev," Izvestiia, 1 November 1991, 1, as reported in the CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 44, 1; V. Romanyuk, "The Economic 'Eight' Pass Sentence on the Ministries," Izvestiia, 2 November 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 44, 1-2.

¹³⁰ G. Alimov, "Get Used to the Words: Union of Sovereign States (USS)," Izvestiia, 15 November 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 46, 10; A. Sorokin, "Union: It has been Decided in Novo-Ogarovo that the USSR will be Replaced by the USS," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 November 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 46, 10-11; "The Test of the Union Treaty has been Agreed Upon in Principle," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 November 1991, 1-2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 46, 11; V. Kuznechevsky, "Gorbachev's Waterloo at Novo-Ogarovo," Rossiiskaia gazeta, 28 November 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 27, 7-8.

¹³¹ "Pidpysuiete?" Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv) No. 222, 16 November 1991, 1.

See Appendix D.

reveals deep suspicion and apprehension, as if he were entering a trap. On November 30, both President Gorbachev and President Yeltsin addressed Ukraine's electorate on Moscow-Central Television and appealed for a "No" vote and the rejection of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. Both Presidents claimed that there could be no Union without Ukraine. In response, election officials in russified Luhansk reported that between 10 and 20% more voters participated in the referendum, all voting "Yes" to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.¹³²

Russia-Ukraine Border Crises

On 27 August, three days after the Supreme Council adopted The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a press statement claiming that Russia had the right to raise the question of reviewing its borders with adjacent republics that proclaim their independence from the former Soviet Union.¹³³ On 28 August, speaking before the Extraordinary Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet,

¹³² Unpublished notes, dated 1 December 1991. The author was an accredited international observer in Luhansk on 1 December. At virtually every polling station, officials reported that between 10% and 20% of all participating voters claimed to have decided to participate in the referendum and vote "Yes" for the Act only after hearing that without Ukraine there could be no Union.

See below, comparison of actual referendum results with opinion poll data.

¹³³ "Statement by the Press Secretary of the President of the Russian SFSR," Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 August 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 15; The Economist, 27 August 1991, 2.

President Gorbachev also stated that border disputes could follow a republic's secession from the former USSR, but his comments were ignored.¹³⁴ Russian President Yeltsin's statement sent shivers throughout the adjoining republics and around the world. Fears were raised that Russia might commence an expansionist policy using force to redraw its borders with its neighbours, destabilizing all the republics of the former Soviet Union and precipitating ethnic violence on a scale much greater than in Yugoslavia.

Chairman Kravchuk's response was totally different from that of Kazakhstan's President Nazarbaev. Emphasizing that both Russia and Kazakhstan were nuclear powers, President Nazarbaev called for an immediate bilateral agreement with Russia to clarify and resolve the border issue because of the danger posed by potential instability and violence along their common border.¹³⁵ Chairman Leonid Kravchuk, at a quickly convened press conference on 28 August, referred to the Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Russian SFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, signed on 19 November 1990 by which Russia and Ukraine, under Article 6, had agreed to recognize and pledged to respect each other's territorial integrity within the borders currently existing within the limits of the USSR.¹³⁶ Chairman Leonid Kravchuk stated that he had just talked by telephone with Russian President Yeltsin, and

¹³⁴ S. Chugayev and V. Shchepotkin, "As Deputies Squabble, the Union Breaks Up," Izvestiia, 28 August 1991, 1-2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 5.

¹³⁵ "Telegram from Nazarbaev to Yeltsin," Rossiiskaia gazeta, 30 August 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 16.

¹³⁶ S. Tsikora, "What Path is Ukraine Taking?" Izvestiia, 28 August 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 35, 13.

President Yeltsin had agreed with him that the border issue had been successfully resolved by the 19 November 1990 bilateral treaty and that the Treaty continues in effect even if either party leaves the former USSR.¹³⁷ Chairman Kravchuk then released a statement prepared by his press office on President Yeltsin's behalf to confirm that the Russian President agreed with Chairman Kravchuk's assessment that there was no basis to question the current Russian-Ukrainian border.

In Moscow, fears that President Yeltsin's statement could precipitate ethnic violence and totally destabilize the former republics of the Soviet Union, including Russia, brought a quick response from the Russian and Soviet-Union Supreme Soviets. On 28 August, the Russian Supreme Soviet dispatched a delegation headed by Vice President A. Rutskoi to assure Ukraine's leaders and citizens that Russian democrats and the Russian Supreme Soviet did not share President Yeltsin's view regarding the border. A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation comprised of Yu. Ryzhov, S. Riabchenko, A. Sobchak, and Yu. Shcherbakov accompanied the Russian delegation.¹³⁸ The Soviet and Russian delegations met with the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine in Kyiv and agreed on 29 August to establish a structure that would resolve all political, economic, military, and property issues encountered during the transitional period of the dismantling of the USSR, in an effort to prevent instability and the uncontrolled disintegration of the

¹³⁷ Ibid., 13.

¹³⁸ V. Skachko, "The Ukraine: 'It Had to be Stifled Immediately' - The Conflict Between Russia and the Ukraine has been Settled," 15.

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Emerging from a totalitarian system, the Union-level, Russian, and Ukrainian elites were determined to peacefully establish a new relationship among themselves without the use of force based on mutual respect and cooperation. The Russia-Ukraine border would remain stable and the citizens of Ukraine, by referendum, would determine Ukraine's future.

139 Ibid., 15.

CHAPTER 3

THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

All the presidential candidates and deputies of the Supreme Council were determined that all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic origin and socio-economic status, would confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. In Ukraine, there was no organized opposition to independence. Ukraine's mass media actively propagated the benefits to be attained through independence, while former CPU members, the apparatchyky, Rukh, university students, and Ukrainians from the Western diaspora, among others, actively campaigned for the "Yes" vote. Substantial resources of the Ukrainian state were directed towards insuring high voter participation and an overwhelming "Yes" vote confirming The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

Temporary Commission for the All-Ukraine Referendum Question

During the Soviet era, the CPU and nomenklatura structure delivered the expected voter response at elections. With the CPU abolished and a crucial referendum campaign in progress, a new coordinating body was required to mobilize all resources and propagate

the benefits of voting "Yes" to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine and to explain the Supreme Council's position on the referendum. All deputies in the Supreme Council were solidly committed to the common cause.

On 6 November 1991, Chairman L. Kravchuk issued a decree on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Council that established the Temporary Commission for the All-Ukraine Referendum Question.¹⁴⁰ The decree instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to provide the Commission with all necessary resources; the Secretariat of the Supreme Council to help organize the Temporary Commission's offices in Kyiv; and Ukraine's Ministries of Culture, National Education, and Higher Education, and the State Committees for Unity and the Press, and all the State Telecommunication Companies, to assist the Temporary Commission in its propaganda work. The decree ordered that analogous commissions be established in each of the 27 electoral regions with the active participation of local city deputies and representatives of creative and educational organizations, people's movements and political parties. The Temporary Commission and its corresponding regional commissions were expected to work closely with the Central Electoral Commission and its regional branches, and with the commissions established for the presidential election. The establishment of the Temporary Commission, with its massive material and propaganda resources, in the final month of the referendum campaign raises serious questions about the progress

¹⁴⁰ "Pro stvorennia Tymchasovoi komisii z pytan vseukrainskoho referendumu," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 222, 16 November 1991 and in Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41), November 1991.

See Appendix E.

of the campaign to that date.

Chairman L. Kravchuk named 25 prominent individuals to head the Temporary Commission for the All-Ukraine Referendum Question.¹⁴¹ Deputy-Chairman of the Supreme Council Ivan Pliushch, being the highest ranking elected official available, was named Chairman of the Temporary Commission. Supreme Council Chairman L. Kravchuk was a presidential candidate. The Chairmen of the Union of Youth Organizations, the State Committee for Unity, the State Committee for the Press, the Council of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions, and the President of Ukraine's State Television and Radio Company of Ukraine were appointed to the Temporary Commission. Government Ministers included the First Deputy-Prime Minister, and the Ministers of Transport, National Education, and Culture. A USSR deputy was included on the Commission, providing an informative insider's view into the events unfolding in Moscow. Ivan Drach, the head of Rukh, and Oleksandr Moroz the leader of the Socialist Party [hardline Communists] were on the Commission, as were leadership representatives from the Democratic Renaissance Party and the Democratic Party. In addition to Ivan Pliushch, ten other Supreme Council deputies were appointed: four deputies from Western Ukraine, three from the capital region, one each from Vinnytsia (which has a large air base), Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts. Somewhat surprising were the lack of deputies from Crimea and the other russified eastern and southern oblasts where the former CPU had been most entrenched, the Ukrainian national consciousness weak, and the "Yes"

¹⁴¹ "Skład Tymčasovoi komisii z pytan vseukrainskoho referendumu," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 222, 15 November 1991, 2; and in Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41), November 1991, 10. See Appendix E.

vote perceived to be in doubt. Perhaps Leonid Kravchuk, as a former Communist ideologue, had more faith in the former CPU members delivering the "Yes" vote than he had in the democratic movement. Two prominent members from the artistic community rounded off the Temporary Commission's membership. The organizations, institutions, and government departments represented on the Temporary Commission were undoubtedly selected for their perceived ability to deliver the vote.

On 14 November, two weeks prior to the vote, Chairman L. Kravchuk issued another decree on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine in support of the Presentation by the Temporary Commission Dealing with the All-Ukraine Referendum Question.¹⁴² The decree ordered greater emphasis to be placed on organizational work in Crimea, in all oblasts, districts, cities, settlements, and rural areas, to better inform and assist the population in understanding The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine and to insure the correct choice on referendum day. The decree ordered that the referendum question be discussed at local council meetings, executive committee meetings and at people's deputies' sessions. In addition, The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, Decrees of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and the Declaration of the Rights of the Ukrainian Nation, were to be taken into villages and to village meetings for discussion. The Federation of Independent Trade Unions and other professional unions were instructed to organize and hold discussions on the above named documents at their labour collective meetings.

¹⁴² "Pro podannia Tymchasovoi komisii z pytan vseukrainskoho referendumu," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41), November 1991, 10. See Appendix E.

On the day prior to the referendum vote, a front page article by Temporary Commission Chairman Ivan Pliushch appeared in the Cabinet of Ministers' newspaper, the Uriadovyi kurier, under a map of Ukraine that contained the words "Yes!, to Independent Ukraine" across it.¹⁴³ He wrote that the Communist Party structure in the past had insured that Ukraine's voters were informed and prepared for an election, but with the Party disbanded a vacuum had been created which the Temporary Commission was established to fill for the referendum campaign. The article emphasized that the time had come for the people to become masters of their own lives and to live in a style compatible with their hard work. To prevent alienating Russians, Ivan Pliushch reiterated a campaign theme that both Russia and Ukraine would be better off as independent states, that presently both economies were weak, and both Ukrainians and Russians were poor. He expressed confidence that the people would vote "Yes" for an independent Ukraine, that the residents of Crimea would reject the Crimean Partokrats (Party bureaucrats) who wanted Crimea to leave Ukraine, and concluded that there was no turning back to the days of the former Soviet Union.

Social Research Group's Opinion Polls

Leaving nothing to chance, and resolute that the voters should overwhelmingly confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine,

¹⁴³ I. Pliushch, "'Tak!' - nezalezhnii Ukraini," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 37 (42), November 1991, 1. See Appendix D.

the Social Research Group of the Supreme Council's Secretariat was instructed to conduct opinion polls to determine voter attitudes towards the referendum.¹⁴⁴

Opinion polls were to provide data on the percentage of voters intending to participate in the referendum, how they would vote, and what criteria were influencing their attitudes towards the referendum and The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. The results were to be used to enable the mass media, the presidential candidates, the deputies, and other active supporters of the Act to target the negative anxieties of the "No" voter, the "Undecided" voter, and "Non-participation" voter. By clarifying issues and emphasizing the positive political, economic, social, and cultural benefits to be derived in an independent Ukraine, the pro-independence forces could theoretically alter the attitudes of the voters.

The Social Research Group of the Supreme Council's Secretariat conducted four opinion polls specifically dealing with the referendum from 9 September to 22 November 1991 and reported the results in the Social Research Group's Informational Bulletins, #15, #16, #18, #19 and #20. The results of the 18-24 October opinion poll were analyzed in both bulletins #16 and #18. Opinion poll samples varied from 1,790 to 2,600 individuals.

The opinion polls assisted the referendum campaign despite certain weaknesses in research and data supplied. The only opinion poll

¹⁴⁴ V. L. Ossovsky, Head of the Social Research Group, on 15 January 1992, was interviewed in his office in Kyiv by the author. Following the tape recorded interview, V. L. Ossovsky provided the author with copies of the Social Research Group's Opinion Polls conducted during the referendum campaign.

providing data on voters' attitudes towards the referendum based on nationality was the 9-15 September opinion poll that sampled voters in only 12 oblasts, three of which were in the South: Donetsk, Mykolaiv, and Crimea. The 9-15 September opinion poll was also the only opinion poll that failed to provide the social-demographic characteristics of the individuals sampled. No information was attached to any of the opinion polls regarding the number and proportion of sampled individuals per oblast and per region.

The only specific reference to the attitudes of rural voters towards the referendum was a comment in the first report, 9-15 September, that proportionately 10% more city residents than peasants would vote "No".

The 9-15 September opinion poll provided the only information on voter attitudes towards the referendum based on sex. Twice as many women as men indicated they would not participate in the referendum, and more men than women would vote "Yes". Taking into account the male-female ratio, the Social Research Group concluded in its Information Bulletin #15 that 70.7% of the voters who intended not to participate in the referendum were women, who comprised 55% of Ukraine's total population.

There is no evidence of women specifically being targeted to encourage their greater participation and support for The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. The only exception is one sheet of campaign literature, prepared by Bakh, directed at the maternal instincts of women with small children: a 4" x 5" sheet of paper with a sketch of a small girl with pigtails, and a small boy sitting on a

pumpkin with a dog by his side, saying "Father, urge mother to vote for an independent Ukraine. For our sake!"¹⁴⁵

Information Bulletin #15 provided the only information on voter attitudes based on education. A voter's education level directly correlated with the voter's declared intention to confirm, reject, or not participate in the referendum. The lower the education level of the voter, the less likely the voter would participate in the referendum. The higher the education level, the more likely the voter would vote "Yes, I confirm" or "No, I reject" The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. As Ukraine has a highly educated voting-age population, a high voter turnout was anticipated.

The opinion polls carried out by the Social Research Group were not scientific random samples where each individual in the population had an equal chance of being included.¹⁴⁶ Introductory notes to Opinion Polls #15, #16, #19, and #20 confirm that voter samples were chosen in a multi-stepped quota fashion to represent the main social-demographic groups in Ukraine's population, according to nationality, sex, education, age, region and type of residence.

As summarized below, the Social Research Group used flexible, inconsistent standards while conducting their opinion poll surveys, making it very difficult to analyze the results and to accurately track shifts in voter attitudes. Depending on the opinion poll survey, the Social Research Group reported the responses from all individuals

¹⁴⁵ See Appendix G for campaign literature published by Rukh.

¹⁴⁶ A. Satin and W. Shastry, Survey Sampling: A Non-Mathematical Guide, Statistics Canada, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, April 1983.

questioned; only the responses of those individuals who responded with a "Yes" or "No" (omitting "Undecideds"); or only the responses of sampled individuals who actually intended to vote (sometimes omitting "Undecideds"). Comments, as in Information Bulletin #19, that voters who indicated that they were undecided about voting in the referendum would vote 85.63% "Yes" and 14.37% "No" if they actually voted simply adds to the confusion, as there were no "Undecideds" reported.

Table 1.--Summary of voters attitudes towards voting "Yes"

		9-15 Sept.	18-24 Oct.	10-15 Nov.	16-22 Nov.
All voters questioned %	Yes support	70.90	68.47	61.91	71.52
	No, reject	7.40	12.70	11.12	9.49
	Undecided		a 18.83	b 26.97	18.76
	Will not vote	16.40			
	No response	5.30			
Voters who responded %	Yes support			84.77	
	No, reject			15.23	
	Undecided				
Voters who intend on voting . . %	Yes support		84.35	87.65	84.45
	No, reject		15.65	12.35	6.22
	Undecided				9.33

Source: V. L. Ossovsky, V. A. Matuselych, V. I. Volovych, Sekretariat Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR, Hrupa sotsiologichnykh doslidzhen, Informatsiinyi biuleten #15 (1991), Tablytsia 1; Informatsiinyi biuleten #16 (1991), zapytannia 5; Informatsiinyi biuleten #19 (1991), zapytannia 5.

a. 18.83% added by author to equal 100% total.

b. 26.97% added by author to equal 100% total.

Voter Attitudes towards the Act

The 9-15 September referendum opinion poll covered only 12 electoral regions out of 27, and reported that 70.9% of sampled voters

Table 2.--Regional differences in attitudes towards the Act
(9-15 September 1991)

Regions	Yes support %	No reject %	Will not vote %
West (Lviv, Ternopil oblasts)	91.1	3.3	5.6
Northwest (Rivne oblast)	89.7	1.6	8.7
Southwest (Chernivtsi, Transcarpathia oblasts)	74.6	11.9	13.5
Kyiv (city)	72.8	4.9	22.3
North (Kyiv oblast; Nizhyn and Zhytomyr cities)	72.8	6.5	20.7
Northeast (Kharkiv oblast)	63.7	19.2	17.1
Central (Kirovohrad, Cherkasy oblasts; Kirovohrad, Oleksandriia, and Kazatyn cities)	80.8	3.8	15.4
East (Donetsk oblast; Donetsk city)	73.6	9.1	17.3
South (Mykolaiv oblast)	69.0	6.5	24.5
Crimea	47.0	14.5	38.5
Republic total	70.9	7.4	16.4

Source: V. L. Ossovsky, V. A. Matusevych, V. I. Volovych, Sekretariat Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR, Hrupa sotsiologichnykh doslidzhen, Informatsiinyi biuleten #15 (1991), Tablytsia 1.

planned to vote "Yes", 7.4% "No", while 16.4% did not plan on voting. No "Undecideds" were reported. Somewhat surprising, Kharkiv oblast at 19.2% had the highest percentage of voters indicating that they would vote "No". Based on the opinion poll, in Crimea 47.0% of voters were planning to voting "Yes" and only 14.5% "No". Opponents of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine were undoubtedly discouraged as a "Yes" bandwagon commenced.

Table 3.--Regional differences in attitudes towards confirming
The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine

Region	Only those who intend to vote 18-24 October		All voters questioned 16-22 November		
	Yes support %	No reject %	Yes support %	No reject %	Undecided %
West	93.7	6.3	88.20	2.25	9.55
Northwest	99.4	0.6	87.20	4.80	8.00
Southwest	89.2	10.7	65.75	5.48	28.77
Kyiv city	83.6	16.4	76.47	9.80	13.73
North	87.1	12.9	78.62	5.03	16.35
Northeast	75.8	24.3	60.49	12.96	26.54
Central	93.5	6.5	76.79	5.80	17.41
Southeast	78.7	21.3	60.17	11.86	27.97
East	77.3	22.7	63.20	15.20	21.60
South	72.9	27.1	79.89	7.26	12.85
Crimea	71.1	28.9	45.56	22.22	32.22
Republic total	84.4	15.6	71.52	9.49	18.76

Source: V. L. Ossovsky, V. A. Matuselych, V. I. Volovych, Sekretariat Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR, Hrupa sotsiolohichnykh doslidzhen, Informatsiinyi biuletyn #18 (1991), Tablytsia 2; Informatsiinyi biuletyn #20 (1991), zapytannia 7.

October and November opinion polls covered 26 electoral regions but differed with the October opinion poll not reporting the "Undecideds". Neither poll reported the "Non-Voters". With 84.4% indicating they would vote "Yes" in the mid-October opinion poll, the bandwagon effect would have increased. Interestingly, 71.1% of the sampled voters in Crimea planned to vote "Yes", along with 99.4% in the Northwest.

The 16-22 November opinion poll included the "Undecideds" category resulting in a decrease to 71.52% of "Yes" voters. Crimea's "Yes" vote decreased from 71.1% to 45.56% when the "Undecideds" were reported. Note that only eight percentage points separated the "Yes" vote in the West (88.20%), where Ukrainian national consciousness was strong, from the russified South (79.89%), where Ukrainian national consciousness and Rukh were very weak.

The region with the highest "Undecideds" in the 16-22 November poll was the Southwest, with 28.77%. The region has Hungarian, Romanian, and Russian national minorities and Rusyn separatists.

External Influences on Voter Attitudes

Information Bulletins #15, #19, and #20 reported that voters were influenced in their attitudes towards The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine by information obtained through the mass media, through discussions with their relatives and friends, and by associating their self-interest, especially economic considerations, with Ukraine's independence. Apparently 86% of the electorate obtained their

referendum information through the mass media,¹⁴⁷ while 80% were influenced by self-interest and economic considerations. Newspaper articles, radio and television news broadcasts, political commercials, and statements by political leaders all emphasized that Ukraine and its residents would be better off economically in an independent Ukraine.¹⁴⁸ In the more russified eastern oblasts of Ukraine, economic considerations dominated.

Concerns of National Minorities

Information Bulletin #16 reported that the national minorities expressed concerns that an independent Ukraine might not be a state ruled by law; that the civil and cultural rights of national minorities might be violated; and that the languages and cultures of national minorities might not be afforded an opportunity to flourish. Of the voters planning to vote "No", only 10.5% believed that an independent Ukraine would be a democratic state ruled by law. Of all voters sampled, only 56% were confident that Ukraine would be a more democratic state than the former Soviet Union. To counter this view, the mass media and the politicians constantly emphasized that Ukraine would be a more just and democratic state than the former Soviet Union, referring to Stalin's purges, the famine, and the exile of Tatars, Germans, and

¹⁴⁷ See sections on Television and Radio, and Newspapers.

¹⁴⁸ See sections on Television and Radio, American-Ukrainian Political Commercials, and Newspapers.
See Appendix H for campaign literature.

others from Ukraine.¹⁴⁹ To overcome anxiety over possible future violations of civil and national rights within an independent Ukraine, the Supreme Council adopted, on 1 November, a law guaranteeing equal rights for all citizens of Ukraine regardless of ethnic origin, religious or political beliefs.¹⁵⁰

Table 4.--Attitude towards referendum based on nationality
(9-15 September opinion poll)

Nationality	"Yes" voter %	"No" voter %	"Non-voter" %
Ukrainian . . .	80.3	5.3	14.4
Russian	59.0	14.7	26.3
Jews	73.3	10.7	16.0
Others	54.4	9.1	36.4
Republic total	70.9	7.4	16.4

Source: V. L. Ossovsky, V. A. Matusevych, V. I. Volovych, Sekretariat Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR, Hrupa sotsiologichnykh doslidzhen, Informatsiinyi biuleten #15 (1991), Tablytsia 4.

Proportionately three times as many Russians as Ukrainians planned to vote "No". No information was provided as to which ethnic groups were included in the "other" category, or if there was a variance in attitudes among different ethnic groups towards The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. Somewhat surprisingly, 20% of ethnic Ukrainians planned on voting "No" or not participating in the referendum.

¹⁴⁹ See sections on the First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities, Newspapers, Television and Radio, and Political Commercials.

¹⁵⁰ "Deklaratsiia prav natsionalnostei Ukrainy," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 231, 29 November 1991, 2.

Conclusion

The opinion polls conducted by the Social Research Group of the Supreme Council's Secretariat were based on a quota system that proportionately represented Ukraine's social-demographic population characteristics. The Social Research Group varied its sample size, territory covered, and maintained a flexible standard when gathering and analysing information. Subsequent opinion polls did not appear to have targeted problems flagged in a preceding poll. No opinion poll results were available for the city of Sevastopol, home of the Black Sea Fleet.

Opinion poll results were announced to the general public through television, radio, and newspapers.¹⁵¹ The first referendum opinion poll, while territorially restricted to only 12 oblasts, may have commenced a trend. It reported that 70.9% of the population would vote "Yes", while only 7.4% would vote "No". Undoubtedly, the perception among ethnic minorities, especially the Russians, would have been that Ukraine's independence was inevitable.

Ethnic origin had a powerful, emotional impact upon voters' attitudes towards The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. The ethnic minorities expressed fears as to their status in an independent Ukraine. To overcome fears that their civil, linguistic, and cultural rights would not be protected in an independent Ukraine, the Supreme Council passed a law guaranteeing equality to all citizens;¹⁵² the

¹⁵¹ Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41) November 1991, 14; Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 219, 13 November 1991, 10.

¹⁵² "Deklaratsiia Prav Natsionalnostei Ukrainy," 2.

All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities was convened in Odessa;¹⁵³ all presidential candidates and parliamentarians stressed the equality of all citizens; television, radio, and newspapers reports and commentary, and political commercials all endeavoured to overcome these fears.¹⁵⁴

Role of the National Minorities

The arbitrarily established national borders of the titular republics in the former Soviet Union did not accurately reflect historic ethnic settlements, resulting in the exclusion of millions of individuals from their titular republic. Union-level government policies that encouraged population movements and ethnic intermixing further complicated the unfolding independence process. As the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated, bloody ethnic conflicts surfaced in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldavia, Croatia, and Bosnia. In sharp contrast, Ukraine with approximately 73% of its population being ethnic Ukrainian evolved peacefully towards independence. Two emotionally-charged issues appear to have precipitated the ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia and some former Soviet republics: attempts to change by force the existing republic borders and the refusal to extend and guarantee equal rights, including cultural and linguistic rights, to the national

¹⁵³ See section on The First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities, below.

¹⁵⁴ See sections on Newspapers, Television and Radio, Political Commercials, the Temporary Commission, and the Presidential campaign.

minorities. In Georgia, the conflict is both ethnic and a power struggle among members of the Georgian elite.¹⁵⁵

Ukraine's political leaders have pursued a policy of compromise, inclusion, and stability. All residents of Ukraine have been guaranteed equal rights, regardless of nationality, faith or political views.¹⁵⁶ While a portion of ethnic-Ukrainian lands are outside of Ukraine's territorial borders, Ukraine has totally rejected adjusting its borders, emphasizing its concern for stability. All nationalities residing in Ukraine are being encouraged to regard themselves as equal "citizens of Ukraine". (It should be noted that only 9 per cent of the independent states in the world are essentially homogeneous from an ethnic viewpoint.¹⁵⁷)

The 18-24 October opinion poll highlighted the concerns of many citizens that Ukraine's independence did not necessarily mean the establishment of a democratic state ruled by law where the civil, linguistic, and cultural rights of individuals and national minorities were guaranteed. The Supreme Council moved quickly to forge a social contract with the national minorities, determined to include all citizens in the "Yes" vote confirming The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

¹⁵⁵ Economist 11 January 1992, 44-45.

¹⁵⁶ "Deklaratsiia prav natsionalnostei Ukrainy," 2.

¹⁵⁷ Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics, Vol. 24 (1971-72): 320.

Ukraine's Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities¹⁵⁸

On 1 November, the Supreme Council adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Ukraine. This Declaration proclaimed Ukraine's determination to be a democratic state where personal liberty, humanism, social equity, and the equal rights of all individuals and ethnic groups would prevail. By Article 1, the Ukrainian state guaranteed to all individuals and national groups equal political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Discrimination based on nationality is forbidden and punishable by law. Article 2 guaranteed all nationalities the right to protect and develop their language and culture. Article 3 guaranteed all individuals and ethnic groups the right to freely use their language, and in compact areas where a national minority had a large compact population their language could function equally with the Ukrainian language. The right of citizens to use the Russian language was guaranteed. Article 4 guaranteed freedom of religion and the right of national minorities to celebrate their national holidays and use their national symbols. Article 5 guaranteed the protection of historic monuments and national cultures. Article 6 guaranteed the right of all nationalities to establish their own culture centres, associations, societies, national newspapers, journals, publishing houses, museums, artists' associations, theatres, and film studios. Article 7 guaranteed the right of national minorities to unrestricted contacts with their historic Motherland.

The government was determined that all ethnic minorities would be

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 2. See Appendix F.

included in the referendum process and vote "Yes", confirming The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. The First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities was quickly organized and representatives from over 100 national-cultural associations were invited to attend the Congress that was held in the russified city of Odessa on 16-17 November 1991.

The First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities

The organizing committee for the First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities consisted of 51 prominent government and ethnic-national representatives.¹⁵⁹ Government representatives included: four Supreme Council deputies, one committee chairman and one department chairman directly responsible to the Cabinet of Ministers, four deputy Ministers of Ukraine (one from finance, one from culture, and two from education), three regional and city executive committee representatives (one from Kiev and two from Odessa), and the deputy head of the Council of Ministers in Crimea. Two individuals held administrative positions at the university level and four individuals were classified as Rukh representatives. Ethnic/national-cultural associations were represented by: eight Jews, four Russians, four Poles, four Germans, two Armenians, two Hungarians, one Lithuanian, one Czechoslovak (also a Rukh representative), one Bulgarian, one Gipsy, one Korean, one Azerbaidzhani, one Turkish speaker, and, finally, an individual simply classified as a representative of a union of national-cultural

¹⁵⁹ See Appendix F for list of individuals on the Organizing Committee of the Congress and the organizations they represented.

organizations. An attempt appears to have been made to include all ethnic/national groups and all regions of Ukraine in the organizing committee. While government representatives were numerically in a minority position on the organizing committee, their prominent titles underscore the importance of the Congress in attempting to overcome the fears expressed by various minority groups and persuade them to vote "Yes" confirming The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. The very act of holding the Congress, the publicity and good will it generated, and the crucial Resolution it passed, had a positive impact.

Supreme Council deputy D. Pavlychko read Chairman L. Kravchuk's statement to the Congress. In his statement, Leonid Kravchuk elaborated on the Declaration of Rights of Nationalities that the Supreme Council had adopted on 1 November and appealed for the Congress to consolidate all national groups behind The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.¹⁶⁰

Over a thousand specially invited delegates participated in the two day Congress, including three presidential candidates: V. Hryniiov, L. Lukianenko, and V. Chornovil.¹⁶¹ Some of speeches by delegates to the Congress were published in Holos Ukrainy.¹⁶² Speakers included: a university lecturer of history, a Rukh representative, a military officer, a people's deputy from Kiev (city), a guest speaker from

¹⁶⁰ "Pershomu Vseukrainskomu mihznatsionalnomu konhresu," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 222, 16 November 1991, 2.

See Appendix F.

¹⁶¹ "'Tak!' - nezalezhnii Ukraini," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41), November 1991, 1.

¹⁶² "Vpershe - pro nabolile," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 225, 21 November 1991, 3.

France, plus 22 speakers representing various ethnic/national-cultural association: three Germans, three Bulgarians, two Jews, two Russians, two Turkish speakers, one Pole, one Gipsy, one Armenian, one Azerbaidzhani, one Rusyn, one Buriat, one Czechoslovak, and one Crimean Tatar. Two individuals were classified as representing ethnic/national-cultural unions.

The Odessa Resolution¹⁶³

In its Resolution, the First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities, representing over 100 national-cultural associations from all regions of Ukraine, endorsed the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine and the principle that all nationalities and ethnic groups residing in an independent Ukraine will be guaranteed equal political, economic, social, and cultural rights. It recommended that a Chamber of Nations, or Committee for Nationality Affairs directly under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, be established to resolve all nationality problems, including countering chauvinism, anti-semitism, and ethnic hostility.

It requested the government 1) to provide a favourable taxation policy for national-cultural associations; 2) to turn over to the associations some of the CPSU-CPU properties and funds seized by the government; 3) to return the previously seized properties belonging to the various national-cultural associations; and 4) to help preserve the national cultural and identity of all nationalities, and to assist

¹⁶³ See Appendix F for Odessa Resolution.

them in restoring and developing a socio-economic infrastructure where they live.

The Odessa Resolution called upon the government to pass laws: 1) on National Minorities; 2) on The Rehabilitation of Repressed People, including a program for an organized and systematic return to Ukraine of the Crimean Tatars, Poles, Germans, among others, who had been deported by the totalitarian regime and are still deprived of a Motherland; 3) on the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Political Repression in Ukraine, and the return of Ukrainians who had been deported from Ukraine; 4) to permit citizens of Ukraine, regardless of nationality, political views and religious faith to leave and return to Ukraine without restrictions; 5) to simplify travel within Ukraine; 6) to establish schools and boarding schools for nationalities that live in compact areas; and 7) to establish the category "citizen of Ukraine" for passports.¹⁶⁴

The Odessa Resolution concluded by condemning violence among national groups, all conflicts using arms and reminded the government that: "National renaissance - is an important affair of a democratic state."

Conclusion

The Odessa Resolution adopted by the First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities on 16 November 1991 was broadcast on television and radio,

¹⁶⁴ During the Soviet period internal passports recorded ethnic origin.

and reported in Ukrainian newspapers.¹⁶⁵ The Congress's endorsement of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine helped consolidate the national minorities behind the "Yes" vote as Chairman L. Kravchuk had requested.

By secret ballot all nationalities residing in Ukraine overwhelmingly endorsed The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine that had been adopted on 24 August 1991 by the Supreme Council. Unofficial polling conducted ten days after the Odessa Congress revealed that 92% of Jews, 90% of Ukrainians and 87% of Russians (excluding Crimea) indicated they would vote "Yes" confirming The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.¹⁶⁶ A Social Contract had been forged by the Supreme Council and the national minorities through the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities that the Supreme Council had adopted on 1 November and the Odessa Resolution adopted by the First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities. Fears and concerns that had been expressed by the national minorities had been overcome through government guarantees of equality to all citizens of Ukraine regardless of nationality, faith or political views. In the final analysis, the national minorities applied political, economic, cultural, linguistic, and historic criteria, recalled the mass deportations and dreamed of a very different future for themselves and their families within an independent, democratic Ukrainian state ruled by law.

¹⁶⁵ "'Tak!' - nezalezhnii Ukraini," 1.

¹⁶⁶ Les Taniuk, Supreme Council deputy and Chairman of Narodna Rada, Chairman of the Supreme Council's Committee on Culture and Religion, and Chairman of the Memorial Society, provided the verbal information during an informal discussion with the author in mid-January 1992. Unpublished.

Television and Radio

Television and radio played an important and informative role during the referendum campaign with Ukrainian Television and Radio supporting the "Yes" vote, and Moscow-Central Television supporting the "No" vote. Television and radio broadcasts were not independent from political interference in either Moscow or Ukraine.¹⁶⁷ A legacy of the Soviet era, Moscow-Central Television was better equipped and funded, broadcasting over the entire territory of Ukraine in the Russian language without interference. Moscow-Central Television, especially in its news broadcasts, was very biased and hostile towards Ukraine's independence aspirations and firmly committed to undermining Ukraine's independence referendum. Since 24 August, Ukraine had the legal right and the technical ability to interfere with, and switch off, the Moscow television signal broadcast across Ukraine, but lacked the will. The Ukrainian government and Supreme Council were very concerned that such action would alienate ethnic Russians and russified Ukrainians who enjoyed and were used to watching Moscow-Central Television with its more popular programs, including films from the West.¹⁶⁸ Ukrainian

¹⁶⁷ Yarema Fridryk, First Vice-President of Ukrainian Television and Radio, tape recorded interview by the author, Kyiv, Ukraine, 24 December 1991. All information on Television and Radio section based on this interview, unless otherwise footnoted.

¹⁶⁸ 12 November 1991, the author attended a meeting with Rukh organizer, Serhii Yasinsky, and 3 Supreme Council deputies where the issue of switching off the Moscow television signal was discussed and rejected.

television and radio programs were highly politicized.¹⁶⁹

Ukrainian government-controlled television and radio stations had inadequate equipment, were underfunded, and lacked access to hard currency for new equipment, films, and news stories from the West. It broadcast low-budget folklore programs, parliamentary debates, and talk shows, over approximately 70% of Ukraine's territory. In Kyiv, viewers had a choice of four channels, two in the Ukrainian language and two in Russian. Moscow television broadcasts dominated the airwaves in the more russified eastern and southern parts of Ukraine where Ukrainian language television had a very limited physical broadcast capacity.

In an exclusive interview, Yarema Fridryk, First Vice-President of Ukrainian Television and Radio, explained the role of Ukrainian Television and Radio in the referendum campaign. Fridryk was of the firm opinion that the electronic and print mass media should receive 90% of the credit for the overwhelming "Yes" vote in the referendum. Immediately upon the adoption of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine by the Supreme Council, Ukrainian Television and Radio was instructed to focus all its resources on insuring a successful "Yes" vote. The presidential campaign was of secondary importance and all other concerns were insignificant. Special informational and literary programs were developed for television and radio, including the radio program Independence heard daily at noon. On television every Friday evening, the program December 1 Studio was broadcast featuring a variety of well-known and respected economists, writers, journalists,

¹⁶⁹ Observed by the author while in Ukraine during the referendum campaign.

philosophers, and politicians, all of whom strongly endorsed The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, emphasizing the benefits of independence. They prophesied a prosperous, democratic future for Ukraine and its citizens, regardless of nationality. The program's format consisted of five men sitting around a circular coffee table responding in a heated, emotional, free-flowing debate to questions that viewers phoned into the studio.¹⁷⁰ In the background, behind a glass partition, a young woman could be seen, phone to ear, pen in hand, writing down the questions being telephoned into the studio. On the coffee table were scattered papers, presumably questions from viewers. Ivan Drach, head of Rukh and a deputy of the Supreme Council, was usually the host and the dominant speaker on the program.

Who Are We? was a political program directed towards developing a territorial national consciousness and identification with Ukraine and overcoming any apprehensions the voters had about The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. The program's guests included deputies of the Supreme Council, the Prime Minister, and Ministers, whose task it was to reassure the voters that independence would improve everything, including the economy, medical services, and even the preservation of the environment. Through short film clips, the program also featured the activities and lives of the residents of Ukraine, of diverse nationality, from a variety of regions and cities.

Mr. Fridryk described the program Pleiada (Pleiad) as a purely cultural program that featured as guests prominent individuals from the arts and literature. These guests included painters, sculptures,

¹⁷⁰ As observed by the author.

writers, journalists, and the clergy from Ukrainian and other churches and synagogues. Their discussions were political not cultural, directed towards the referendum and obtaining a "Yes" vote for The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

Ukrainian Television and Radio targeted three specific areas of concern for the referendum campaign: 1) the nationalities question, 2) economic issues, and 3) the history and cultural achievements of the Ukrainian people. Social Research Group opinion polls conducted in September detected feelings of anxiety by ethnic minorities over the fate of their language and culture in an independent Ukraine. No statistical data was available from Ukrainian Television and Radio regarding the numbers and percentages of Russians, russified Ukrainians or ethnic minorities, watching and listening to Ukrainian language television and radio programs. Yet, special programs were developed to overcome their anxieties by explaining that all ethnic languages and cultures would prosper in an independent Ukraine. Prominent individuals were recruited from all nationalities and professions for literary and informational programs to clarify issues and encourage voters to vote "Yes" to The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

The second area targeted was economic issues. At every opportunity Ukrainian television and radio emphasized that Russians lived better today in Ukraine than they could in Russia, and that everyone in Ukraine would live even better when Ukraine became independent because Moscow's economic exploitation of the hard-working Ukrainian people would end. Independent Ukraine's economic potential and opportunities were constantly emphasized to convey the message that

greater prosperity for Ukraine and its citizens was inevitable. Deputies of the Supreme Council, economists, scientists, lawyers, and foreign specialists, participated in programs to market the idea that Ukraine and Ukrainians would be better off economically in an independent Ukraine.

The third area targeted was the previously suppressed or misinterpreted history of Ukraine and Ukrainians, and their cultural and scientific achievements from Kyivan Rus' to contemporary times. To dispel the image of Ukrainian culture and literature as being second class, special television and radio programs were developed that named and elaborated on the achievements of hundreds of previously unknown Ukrainian scholars. A constant theme that flowed through television and radio programs was that Ukrainians were an ancient and proud European nation with a high culture whose language and cultural contacts with other European nations had been suppressed. Specific items, individuals, and institutions were used to reinforce the theme. For example, the Kievo-Mohylianska Academy was referred to as one of the most ancient European academies of higher learning and was featured in a special television program. Subsequently, the Ukrainian government announced that the Academy would be reestablished as an institution of higher learning to educate, in Ukrainian and English, the future political, economic, and diplomatic elites of Ukraine.¹⁷¹ Historic events, cultural achievements, peasant and cossack traditions and songs were used extensively to forge a national consciousness among Ukrainians.

¹⁷¹ S. Tsikora, "Kyiv Mohyla Academy to Open Soon." Izvestiia, 25 October 1991, 3, as reported in GDSP, Vol. 48, No. 43, 27.

A special department was created at Ukrainian Television and Radio under the direction of Hryhorii Hlad and Volodymyr Boboshko to awaken the national consciousness of Ukrainians and to assist in the national revival through the use of folklore and material culture.¹⁷² Hryhorii Hlad hosted the program The Pearls of People's Souls that concentrated on folklore and religion, while Volodymyr Boboshko hosted the program Heritage that featured Ukrainian architecture and architectural monuments. Prior to the present department being established, both programs had been aired for several years but with difficulty in the russified South and East parts of Ukraine. Now, with official backing, both men claimed that they were successfully targeting the russified southern and eastern parts of Ukraine, especially the urban residents. Other national cultures were included, not excluded, from their programs.

As Yarema Fridryk concluded: "We seeded the field of ignorance and banned information. This field yielded before the Referendum and assisted the awakening of the national honour of Ukrainians."¹⁷³

¹⁷² Hryhorii Hlad, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of the Editorial Unit on National Revival of Ukrainian Television and Radio, and his Deputy, Volodymyr Boboshko, tape recorded interview by the author, Kyiv, Ukraine, 14 February 1992.

¹⁷³ Yarema Fridryk interview.

American-Ukrainian Jointly Produced Political Commercials

In response to a fax received from John Hewko, an American lawyer working in Kyiv, Tony Marsh and Sal Russo came to Kyiv to produce four political commercials during the second and third week of November. The Americans had considerable experience producing political commercials in the United States for Republican candidates, including Ronald Reagan and George Bush. During a 10 November meeting in First Vice-President Y. Fridryk's office on Khreshchatyk, Ukrainian Television and Radio agreed to supply two film crews, cameras, and editing facilities for the joint venture project.¹⁷⁴ Three of the political commercials that were produced were shown on Ukrainian-language television at least fifty times during the last week of the referendum campaign.¹⁷⁵ The fourth commercial was not shown out of concern that it might alienate some Russians.

John Hewko's hotel suite in Hotel Kyiv, across from the Supreme Council building, was the centre of operations. During the day the Americans directed the filming; in the evening they discussed and planned the next day's shooting; and after midnight they edited footage at the television studio. They worked eighteen hours a day for two weeks.¹⁷⁶ Tony Marsh and Sal Russo did not speak or understand the

¹⁷⁴ The author attended the meeting as an observer.

¹⁷⁵ John Hewko's comments on VHS tape recording that contains the political commercials.

¹⁷⁶ The author was in close contact with Tony Marsh, Sal Russo, John Hewko and Les Taniuk, and attended some of the meetings in John Hewko's hotel suite and at the television studio.

Ukrainian or Russian language, complicating their editing task. John Hewko acted as an translator. In addition to personnel supplied by the television station, the Americans were assisted by Supreme Council deputy Les Taniuk (a theatre director), Mark Hutel, Boris Wrzesnevskyj, among others.

The political commercials targeted the Russians, russified Ukrainians, and ethnic minorities, who were either undecided or planning on voting against The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. Great care was taken not to alienate any voter. The commercials would have had greater impact if they had been allowed to be shown on Russian-language television broadcast out of Moscow. All the interviews and scenes were filmed in Kyiv and the surrounding countryside.

The first commercial featured comments from a cross-section of average citizens, of all age groups and vocations, who responded in either the Ukrainian or Russian language in full support of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.¹⁷⁷ Diverse and recognizable background scenes and locations were used for the interviews to help project the image that all citizens supported the independence of Ukraine. The commercial was positive, with individuals emphasizing that it was historically time for Ukraine to become independent; that all citizens in an independent Ukraine would be treated equally regardless of nationality; and that all citizens would be economically better off. References were made to the German Bank's report that concluded that Ukraine was economically viable as an independent state.

All four unnamed political commercials are on a VHS tape in the author's possession.

The second commercial featured children playing together. At the end of the commercial, the viewers realized that the children had in fact been building a doll house. The scene reenforced the theme that it was time for Ukrainians to build their own house, an independent Ukraine.

The third commercial featured comments by prominent men and women in full support of Ukraine's independence. They spoke in either Russian or Ukrainian, depending on the language they normally used. To assist the viewers, a symbol associated with the individual was positioned beside the person being interviewed. The commercial included a doctor, a beauty queen, an athlete, a sculptor, and a theatre director.

The fourth commercial emphasized the economic drain of Ukraine's products into Russia. At Kyiv's railway station individuals carrying eggs, bread, and a television set into Russia were interviewed. Originally a man, symbolizing a Soviet bureaucrat, was to be interviewed as he returned from Moscow. To symbolize empty promises, the scene called for a pigeon to fly out of a briefcase when the bureaucrat opened it, but the pigeon refused to fly on cue. Then, a file was placed in the briefcase to symbolize empty promises, but the file could not be seen clearly on film. The scene with the returning bureaucrat was therefore cut from the commercial.

Two other planned commercials were cancelled owing to a lack of time.¹⁷⁸ One would have had Les Taniuk act the part of a loyal Soviet citizen, singing Soviet songs as he eats and drinks in a restaurant.

¹⁷⁸ The author was present in John Hewko's hotel suite when the types of political commercials that were being discussed.

When he is presented with the bill, however, he passes out in shock. The bill listed all the products that Ukraine sends each year to Russia and the other republics. The other commercial the Americans wanted to produce was a one-hour special talk show that would have featured prominent guests answering questions from the studio audience. The questions and answers would have been agreed upon previously but presented as if they were spontaneous. All questions and answers would have dealt with issues raised by voters regarding the referendum and Ukraine's independence.

Newspapers

In the days immediately following the adoption of the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, the Supreme Council declared that all property on Ukraine's territory was under its exclusive jurisdiction. It also nationalized all Communist Party property, including newspapers and printing presses. However, the Soviet Union's press law¹⁷⁹ continued in force until the 14 December 1991, two weeks after the referendum vote, when the Supreme Council enacted Ukraine's own press law.¹⁸⁰ During the referendum period all newspapers in Ukraine were associated with an institution or organization, while the

¹⁷⁹ "Will the New Press Law Work?" Soviet Analyst, Vol. 19, No. 14 (18 July 1990): 6-7.

¹⁸⁰ "Zakon Ukrainy pro 'Presu,' Proekt," Khreshchatyk (Kyiv) 10 January 1992, 4-5.

printing presses were owned and controlled by the state.¹⁸¹ Lack of newsprint and access to printing-press facilities determined the viability of a newspaper.

All newspapers published in Ukraine, regardless of language, were firmly committed to the "Yes" side in the referendum campaign.¹⁸² The "No" side did not appear to have received any positive newspaper coverage.¹⁸³ Uriadovyi kurier (Government Courier) and Holos Ukrainy (Ukrainian Voice) were the official organs of, respectively, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Supreme Council through which they could continuously inform the citizens of the government's position and views on various issues, and publish Decrees, Appeals, and Acts.¹⁸⁴ Some of the other prominent Ukrainian language newspapers were: the Republican Party's Samostiina Ukraina (Independent Ukraine); Rukh's Narodna hazeta (People's Newspaper); the environmentalist newspaper Zelenyi svit (Green World), and Zakhidna Ukraina (Western Ukraine) published in Ternopil. Newspapers were effectively employed to market the Act proclaiming the independence of Ukraine.

¹⁸¹ T. Kuzio, "Independent (Samizdat) Press in Ukraine under Gorbachev (1)," Soviet Analyst, Vol. 19, No. 17 (29 August 1990): 7-8.

¹⁸² Unpublished interviews by the author with Vitalii Vuddia of Holos Ukrainy, Valeriy Dzhigun of the Uriadovyi Kurier, and Oleh Skydan of the Narodna hazeta during January 1992 in their offices in Kyiv.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ "Zvernennia, Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy do narodu," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 231, 29 November 1991, 3; "'Skazhe tilky narod...'," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 231, 29 November 1991, 3; "Akt proholoshennia nezalezhnosti Ukrainy," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 231, 29 November 1991, 2; "Declaratsiia prav natsionalnostei Ukrainy," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 231, 29 November 1991, 2.

Endorsements

The positive endorsement of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine by the representatives of over 100 ethnic-cultural organizations at the First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities was prominently published,¹⁸⁵ as were some of the speeches by the delegates to the Congress.¹⁸⁶ Other respected and prominent professional, ethnic and community leaders individually published their personal endorsements of the Act, including the Chairman of the Jewish Cultural Association, a representative of the Russian cultural association "Rus", and the Metropolitan of the Russian (Ukrainian) Orthodox church.¹⁸⁷ Newspapers also published on-the-street interviews with men and women who supported the "Yes" side in the referendum campaign.¹⁸⁸

The Environment

In a concerted effort not to alienate Russia, the Chernobyl nuclear accident was not used as a major issue in the referendum

¹⁸⁵ "'Tak!' - nezalezhnii Ukraini," 1.

¹⁸⁶ L. Kravchuk, "Pershomu Vseukrainskomu miznatsionalnomu konhresu," 2; "Vpershe - pro nabolile," (6 speeches), 3.

¹⁸⁷ "Istorychnyi shans Ukrainy," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 37 (42) November 1991 (7 letters), 3; I. Kablak, "Treba tvoryty derzhavu," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 215, 5 November 1991, 3.

¹⁸⁸ "Khochemo buty hospodariamy," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv). No. 231, 29 November 1991, 10-11.

campaign.¹⁸⁹ The Kyiv electorate was already highly politicized because of the accident.¹⁹⁰ Other environmental issues were emphasized, as for example, lands damaged by the military¹⁹¹ and by industry,¹⁹² with all blame directed towards Moscow (Union-level). The newspaper Zelenyi svit even declared the Dnipro River a river of death.¹⁹³

Newspaper Cartoons and Pictures

Newspaper cartoons and pictures influenced the electorate.¹⁹⁴ All the cartoons had an anti-Union character, while the pictures illustrated the economic hardships the people were enduring due to the policies of the Union government. Prior to the referendum vote, Holos Ukrainy carried a front page picture of Taras Shevchenko, symbolizing Ukraine, and a rising sun; Uriadovyi kurier carried a map of Ukraine

¹⁸⁹ At the 10 November meeting with Tony Marsh and Sal Russo, Deputy Les Taniuk advised against using the Chernobyl nuclear accident issue out of concern not to alienate Russia.

¹⁹⁰ Students during informal discussions with the author expressed anger and deep bitterness at having marched in a May Day parade immediately after the accident.

¹⁹¹ "Zaberit svoi bomby," Zelenyi svit (Kyiv), N. 19-20 (35-36), November 1991, 2.

¹⁹² "Ne tilky Chornobyl...", Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 37 (42), November 1991, 5.

¹⁹³ "Dnipro nese smert," Zelenyi Svit (Kyiv), N. 19-20 (35-36), November 1991, 4.

¹⁹⁴ See Appendix D for some examples of newspaper cartoons and pictures.

with "'Yes!' to Independent Ukraine" printed across the map.¹⁹⁵ The message from the newspapers to the readership was always in support of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

International Recognition Inevitable

Holos Ukrainy and Uriadovyi kurier carried news stories about the inevitable recognition of Ukraine as an independent state following the referendum vote. When President Mutalibov of Azerbaijan was asked at a press conference whether Azerbaijan would recognize Ukraine's independence, he replied: "We already did that today, we are not waiting."¹⁹⁶ Uriadovyi kurier reported that the American Congress on 22 November had passed Resolution No. 65, which required the United States to establish diplomatic relations with an independent Ukraine should the 1 December referendum support independence, while Austria announced it would open a General Consulate on 1 December in Kyiv.¹⁹⁷ Canada had already announced it would recognize Ukraine following the 1 December referendum. The fact that the world was watching, waiting for Ukraine's citizens to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, added a psychological boost to the inevitability of the "Yes" vote.

¹⁹⁵ Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 231, 29 November 1991, 1; "'Tak!' - nezalezhnii Ukraini," 1.

¹⁹⁶ "Volia narodiv - harant demokratii," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 225, 21 November 1991, 1 & 6; "'Bez molodshykh i starshykh brativ'," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41), November 1991, 2.

¹⁹⁷ "Kroky do vyznannia," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 37 (42), November 1991, 1.

Economic Issues

Ukraine was undergoing an acute economic crises with people waiting for many hours in line-ups to purchase food.¹⁹⁸ Responsibility for the collapsing economy was directed against Moscow (Union-level), as were feelings of economic exploitation and mismanagement.¹⁹⁹ The highly centralized command economy of the former Soviet Union had been integrated on an All-Union basis, requiring raw resources and products to be transported over vast distances, interlocking regions and companies for political reasons.²⁰⁰ Scarce locally manufactured products were consumed in other regions, fulfilling Moscow directives but antagonizing local residents. The real-value cost of resource inputs had been unknown, with prices being arbitrarily set by state planners in Moscow. President Gorbachev's economic reforms disclosed the artificially low prices paid for products, further intensifying ethnic and regional feelings of economic exploitation.

Following the collapse of the August coup, Russia assumed control of Union-level institutions, including the ruble printing facilities and

¹⁹⁸ The author observed long line-ups for milk, bread, meat, butter, and other basic food products in Kyiv and Luhansk.

¹⁹⁹ "Ekonomika Ukrainu" Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41) November 1991, 3; A.K. Minchenko (Superintendent of Ukraine's Ministry of Economics), "Iakby tilky nam ne zavazhaly," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41) November 1991, 4; "Potentsial Ukrainy," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41) November 1991, 4; "Terytorii i natsionalnyi sklad naseleennia," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41) November 1991, 4; "Kurs: Svitovi rynky,"; L. Samsonenko, "Proekty i prozhekty," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41) November 1991, 4.

²⁰⁰ Donna Bahry, Outside Moscow: Power, Politics, and Budgetary Policy of Soviet Republics, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1987.

the distribution of the money supply. High inflation in Russia limited the outflow of newly printed rubles into Ukraine, accelerating Ukraine's economic crisis.²⁰¹ Inflation, wages, and prices were lower in Ukraine than in Russia, enabling ruble-rich Russians to purchase large quantities of products in Ukraine. Unable to compete with the ruble-rich Russians for scarce local products, citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities experienced intensified resentment at economic exploitation.²⁰² To counter the shortage of rubles and the negative effects of high inflation in Russia, Ukraine made arrangements for its own currency, the hryvna, which it predicted would be a strong, internationally exchangeable currency.²⁰³

The German Bank's economic evaluation report on the former 15 Soviet republics supported the claim that Ukraine could provide its citizens with a higher standard of living if it were independent. The German Bank concluded that Ukraine had the best potential for succeeding as an independent state, giving Ukraine 83 points, the Baltic states 77

²⁰¹ In televised speeches during the first week of January, 1992, both President L. Kravchuk and Prime Minister Fokin, discussed the acute shortage of rubles in Ukraine which had forced Ukraine to speed up the introduction of its temporary coupons on 1 January 1992. Both men claimed that President Yeltsin had refused to allocate additional rubles for Ukraine.

²⁰² During the last week of November, ethnic Russians living in Luhansk expressed anger at the outflow of products into Russia, and a territorial attachment to Ukraine during (translated) discussions with the author.

²⁰³ A. K. Stankiv, "Miniaiemo karbovantsi na hryvny?" Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 37 (42), November 1991, 5; L. Samsonenko, "Proekty i prozhekty," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41), November 1991, 16.

points, Russia 72, Belarus 55, and Tadzhikstan only 18 points.²⁰⁴ If Ukraine possessed her own currency, economists projected that Ukraine's currency would be the strongest of all future currencies that would be used by the former Soviet republics.²⁰⁵

Military

Traditionally, the Soviet military had been a highly politicized, Russian-officer dominated, unifying institution of state. President Gorbachev commenced the "depoliticization" of the military in 1990, and the Supreme Council of Ukraine in August 1991 re-affirmed and completed the process.²⁰⁶ In its 1990 Sovereignty Declaration, Ukraine had proclaimed its right to create its own military force and attempted to restrict military service of draftees to Ukraine's territory, much to the annoyance of the Moscow military establishment.²⁰⁷ Immediately

²⁰⁴ Table based on the German Bank report appears in the article: "Potentsial Ukrainy," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41), November 1991, 5.

See Appendix D.

²⁰⁵ L. Samsonenko, "Proekty i prozhekty," 16; A.K. Stankiv, "Miniaiemo karbovantsi na hryvny?" 5.

²⁰⁶ S. Foye, "Gorbachev and Depoliticization of the Army," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 37, 1990; V. Portnikov, "Ukraine Proclaims Independence," 12.

²⁰⁷ V.F. Opryshko, etc. ed. "Deklaratsiia: Pro derzhavnyi suverenitet Ukrainy," 5-7; S. Tsikora, "Parliament in a Resolute Mood," Izvestiia, 31 July 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 31, 33; S. Tsikora, "Will Ukraine Have its Own Army?" Izvestiia, 28 July 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 31, 32-33; S. Tsikora, "Deputies Declare Hunger Strike," 15.

after adopting The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine on 24 August, the Supreme Council placed the military, the security service, and the militia under its control.²⁰⁸

In Ukraine there were no reports of purges within the military, the security service, or the militia by the Supreme Council in the aftermath of the failed Moscow coup. The discredited KGB was officially abolished by the Supreme Council, being replaced by or, more accurately, renamed Ukraine's National Security Service under the command of former KGB General N. Holushko.²⁰⁹ The militia was placed under the control of Ukraine's Minister of Internal Affairs. Supreme Council Chairman L. Kravchuk became Ukraine's military commander-in-chief. On 4 September 1991 Major General Konstantyn Morozov was named Minister of Defense with instructions to establish Ukraine's Armed Forces.²¹⁰

Ukraine's political leadership courted the support of military personnel stationed in Ukraine during a time when a major shake-up was occurring within the military hierarchy in Moscow. Many top military officers stationed in Ukraine had supported the failed Moscow coup, including General Varennikov, who had cautioned Chairman L. Kravchuk not to resist the coup.²¹¹ Senior officers were more conservative and had resisted President Gorbachev's reforms, while junior officers had

²⁰⁸ S. Tsikora, "What Path is Ukraine Taking?" 13.

²⁰⁹ "KGB Abolished; Personnel Remain," *Izvestiia*, 28 September 1991, 2, as reported in *CDSF*, Vol. XLIII, No. 39, 28-29.

²¹⁰ Major General Konstantin Morozov's father is Russian and mother is Ukrainian.

²¹¹ V. Portnikov, "Chronicle of the Coup and Resistance: Ukraine," 24.

supported the reforms.²¹²

Chairman L. Kravchuk met with the commanders of the three military districts and the Black Sea Fleet, and received their support for the decree that transferred all military units and personnel stationed in Ukraine under the Supreme Council's jurisdiction.²¹³ Following that meeting, the Supreme Council adopted an appeal to all military personnel and units stationed in Ukraine: 1) guaranteeing that all current rights granted to servicemen and their families by the USSR would be honoured by Ukraine regardless of an individual's nationality, language, religion, or political beliefs; and 2) guaranteeing all lawful benefits, pensions, and allowances enjoyed previously by the servicemen and their families.²¹⁴ Fears of discrimination against the predominately Russian officer corps were neutralized and their commissions protected.

Ukraine's policy was to take over and absorb the massive Soviet military structure in Ukraine, including personnel, units, and equipment, in sharp contrast to the policy pursued by the Baltic states that insisted on the departure of the Soviet armed forces.²¹⁵ To alleviate the concerns raised by Western political leaders, Ukraine agreed to transfer gradually the approximately 4,000 nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine to Russia. Ukraine announced that it would also

²¹² S. Foye, "The Soviet Armed Forces in a Time of Change," Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 42, 11-13.

²¹³ S. Tsikora, "Ukraine Creates its Own Army," Izvestiia, 4 September 1991, 1, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 36, 18.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ The Economist, 23 November 1991, 55.

reduce the million-plus Soviet military in Ukraine through retirement and other incentives to a Ukraine Armed Force strength of between 400 - 450,000 personnel, possessing some of the most sophisticated armaments in the world.²¹⁶

Two weeks prior to the referendum, Chairman L. Kravchuk announced that all military personnel stationed in Ukraine had the right to vote in the referendum and presidential election. Rukh organizers and university student activists, in conversations with the author, raised the spectre of a massive influx of Soviet troops from Russia into Ukraine, especially into the most russified and vulnerable oblasts, to undermine Ukraine's independence effort through referendum. Some suggested that the military vote was almost guaranteed to endorse presidential candidate L. Kravchuk, and therefore L. Kravchuk had allowed the military to vote for his own personal, selfish interests, in the process jeopardizing Ukraine's independence efforts. There was, however, no influx of Soviet troops from Russia into Ukraine to vote. But by participating in the referendum, military personnel became bound by the referendum results. Even in Sevastopol, the home of the Black Sea Fleet, 63.74% of the voters participated in the referendum with 57.7% confirming The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.²¹⁷ Chairman L. Kravchuk, by allowing all military personnel on Ukraine's territory to vote, had assured Ukraine's peaceful evolution to

²¹⁶ "Armiia Ukrainy: Ne ambitsii, a neobkhidnist," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 35-36 (40-41), November 1991, 6; K. Mihalisko, "Defense and Security Planning in Ukraine," in Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 49, 6 December 1991, 15-19; "Spoils of Peace," The Economist, 21 March, 1992.

²¹⁷ "Rezultaty," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 38-39 (43-44), December 1991, 1.

independence, through the ballot box, with the full active support of the military.

The Religious Vote

Symbolically, as Ukraine was leaving the officially atheist Soviet Union, supporters of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine turned to religious leaders and religious institutions for assistance in courting the growing religious community. Under Tsarist and Soviet rule, Ukrainian churches were suppressed. Under President Gorbachev, religious tolerance and the legalization of diverse religious institutions commenced, including the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. In 1991, there were 50 different Christian churches registered in Ukraine with a total of 10,810 parishes, in addition to Jewish synagogues and Muslim mosques.²¹⁸ Chairman I. Kravchuk speaking on 19 November 1991 before the All-Ukraine Interfaith Forum emphasized that an independent Ukraine would guarantee religious freedom to all citizens.²¹⁹ Jewish and Muslim leaders, including Crimean Tatars, through newspapers, on radio and television, and at the Odessa All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities, endorsed The Act Proclaiming the

²¹⁸ Unpublished data obtained by the author from Ukraine's Commission on Religion.

²¹⁹ "Vilna tserkva - u vilnii derzhavi," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 225, 21 November 1991.

Independence of Ukraine.²²⁰

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, with 2001 parishes (1991)²²¹ located primarily in Western Ukraine, has historically been a bastion of Ukrainian national consciousness and an active supporter of Ukraine's independence movement. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church with 939 parishes (1991)²²² appeals to the increasingly nationally-conscious Ukrainians of Orthodox faith who, in 1990, elevated Metropolitan Mstyslav of the United States to the office of Patriarch of Kyiv and All Ukraine.²²³ The Russian Orthodox Church with 5031 parishes (1991) in Ukraine²²⁴ acknowledges the Moscow Patriarchate and has benefited from an advantaged position during the Tsarist and Soviet era, and since the Second World War has been used as an instrument of state, Party, and the KGB. Following the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine during the Second World War, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church property was transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church and many Ukrainian priests were sent to Siberia. Tolerance of religious diversity and the awakening of the national consciousness of Ukrainians has eroded the Russian Orthodox Church's position in Ukraine, especially

²²⁰ See sections on Newspapers, Television and Radio, the First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities, and Crimea.

²²¹ Unpublished data from Ukraine's Commission on Religion.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ "Organization Council of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church." Izvestiia, 8 June 1990, 7, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 23, 23.

²²⁴ Unpublished data from Ukraine's Commission on Religion.

in regard to valuable church property.²²⁵ In response, in January 1990, the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church authorized a name change for the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and proclaimed Metropolitan Filaret as Patriarchal Exarch of Ukraine to project an image of greater church autonomy in Ukraine.²²⁶

Metropolitan Filaret, reportedly a close colleague of former communist ideologue Leonid Kravchuk,²²⁷ in his published statement appealed in religious terms for the people of Ukraine to vote "Yes" in the referendum because: "God created man as free. The yoke of self-imposed slavery is our sin. I would wish that we would atone for our sins and obtain forgiveness and liberty so that the people would say 'Yes' and could live free."²²⁸ Considering the historic tradition of the Moscow oriented and dominated Russian (Ukrainian) Orthodox Church, and that over 50% of all parishes in Ukraine were still under the control of the Russian (Ukrainian) Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Filaret's endorsement of the "Yes" vote had impact.

In addition to prominent religious officials and religious institutions publicly endorsing The Act Proclaiming the Independence of

²²⁵ S. Tsikora, "A Struggle for Parishioners' Souls," Izvestiia, 23 October 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 43, 32.

²²⁶ "Organizational Council of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church," Izvestiia, 8 June 1990, 7, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 23, 23.

²²⁷ Les Taniuk, Chairman of the Supreme Council's Committee on Religion and Culture during a 15 January 1992 discussion with the author. Les Taniuk stated that Leonid Kravchuk as second in command of the CPU ideology department worked closely with Metropolitan Filaret.

²²⁸ "Narod maie zhyty vilno," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No.37 (42), November 1991, 3.

Ukraine, heavenly powers were summoned to help in the struggle for national independence. One example is the colour-photograph poster of St. Sophia's Mother-of-God icon appealing to "Almighty God to Protect Our Ukraine" and for the people to vote "Yes" for an independent Ukraine.²²⁹ Thus, as Ukraine moved from the confines of an officially atheist Soviet Union towards an independent and a pluralist society, religious leaders and institutions was recruited and included in the referendum process.

Democratic Movement of Ukraine [Rukh]²³⁰

Rukh's organizational structure and popular base of support is centred in Western Ukraine and Kyiv, where Ukrainian national consciousness is strong or emerging. Initially established as an umbrella organization of groups seeking political and economic reforms, Rukh has been unduly credited by many in the Ukrainian diaspora in the West for the emergence of an independent Ukraine by referendum. The diaspora has a vested interest in Rukh, having provided Rukh with substantial funds, equipment, and volunteers to assist in the referendum campaign.

At the Third Rukh Congress, held 28 February to 1 March 1992 in Kyiv, Rukh's treasurer reported that Rukh received the equivalent of 13,407,540 rubles in contributions since the last Congress, the vast

²²⁹ The author has a copy of the poster.

²³⁰ Material on the Rukh section based on the author's notes, informal discussions in November and taped recorded interview on 4 December with Rukh organizer Vasyl Turetsky in Kyiv.

majority from the Ukrainian diaspora in the West. Rukh spent 13,080,645 rubles, of which 10,725,000 was on the referendum campaign.

Vasyl Turetsky, assisted by Oleh Rozvabovsky, Iaroslav Slobus, and Serhii Yasinsky, administered the day-to-day affairs of Rukh's national referendum campaign from the Rukh building on Taras Shevchenko street in Kyiv. Approximately a dozen volunteers, mainly from Ternopil in Western Ukraine, did most of the office work. There appears to have been no effort directed to recruiting volunteers living in Kyiv to assist in Rukh's office.

Vasyl Turetsky explained how Rukh's referendum campaign was structured and directed. His team had only one telephone in the Rukh building and a telephone at Hotel Ukraine where he was staying. He also had a computer, donated from the West, in his hotel room. Rukh supporters in Ternopil were phoning from their homes people residing in Eastern and Southern Ukraine to encourage them to vote "Yes" in the referendum. There was no monitoring system in place to confirm that telephone calls were actually being made, the results of the telephone calls, or if any difficulties were being encountered by the telephoners.

Confident that the residents of Western Ukraine would vote an overwhelming "Yes" in the referendum, Rukh targeted Eastern and Southern Ukraine, including Crimea, where it lacked an organizational structure and a popular base. Rukh attempted to contact and influence voters in its targeted areas by random mailings of referendum literature from its office in Kyiv to organizations and professionals in villages, towns, cities, and collective farms. The primary recipients of the literature at the targeted institutions, organizations, and factories would have

been white-collar professionals, like teachers, doctors, engineers, and administrators, the very people who probably had been actively involved in the former Communist Party apparatus and the nomenklatura. Rukh expected these individuals to read the material and then distribute it throughout the targeted area, in addition to verbally propagating what they had read. Combined with the telephone canvass and mailings, Rukh sent volunteers into the russified parts of Ukraine to personally distribute literature for the referendum and for presidential candidate V. Chornovil. All funds expended by Rukh were carefully recorded and authorized personally by V. Turetsky. For example, two elderly women in their mid-sixties were given 600 rubles each to cover their transportation, food, and lodging for three weeks in Mykolaiv.²³¹ They were cautioned by Vasyl Turetsky that they would encounter verbal abuse and were given an opportunity to withdraw. They went to Mykolaiv each carrying four large bags of campaign material. They were given no contact names in Mykolaiv.

During the referendum campaign, Vira Yarmolenko kept the records at the Rukh office in Kyiv of the volunteers being sent into the various oblasts. The list she provided the author shows that the Crimea received 64 Rukh volunteers, Donetsk 23, Luhansk 19 (with an additional volunteer being shared by Donetsk and Luhansk), Khmelnytsky 10, Dnipropetrovsk 8, Odessa 8, Uzhhorod and Transcarpathia 8, Sumy 8, Mykolaiv 6, Zaporizhzhia 6, Poltava 6, Kharkiv 4, Zhytomyr 2, Kirovohrad 2, Rivne 1, and Vinnytsia oblast 1 Rukh volunteer. The list does not

²³¹ The author witnessed the payment and departure of the two women for Mykolaiv.

include Rukh volunteers sent from Western Ukrainian cities and oblasts that were not channelled through Rukh's head office in Kyiv. Turetsky stated that each oblast and major city in Western Ukraine was twinned with an area in Eastern or Southern Ukraine.

Turetsky confirmed that the national Rukh office in Kyiv did not keep track of its volunteers in the field, nor did it expect to receive any feedback from them unless a volunteer took the initiative and telephoned or returned to the office. In the vast majority of cases, Turetsky did not have telephone numbers or addresses of his volunteers in their assigned oblasts. The same lack of control and contact with the volunteers appears to have prevailed in the oblasts where the volunteers were working. Organizers in Rukh's hotel-room office in the Luhansk hotel were aware only of a volunteer's activity in the area when the volunteer took the initiative and maintained contact with the office. Rukh's Luhansk office had difficulty even in obtaining accommodation for its volunteers, but it did project a presence, provide a contact point, and helped increase the national consciousness of Ukrainians living in the region.

Turetsky and his team did not have a list of the deputies of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, despite the fact that some deputies were Rukh members. In fact, they did not regard such a list as important. After the author obtained for Rukh a list containing the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and a brief biography of all the deputies in the Supreme Council, Rukh organizers did not contact non-Rukh deputies, regarding them as the enemy and not as a potential ally in a common cause.

Rukh did not have a voter's list nor did it attempt to obtain such a list. Until a few days prior to the vote, Rukh organizers did not know the locations of the polling stations. Rukh regarded it the responsibility of the scrutineer to go to the oblast capital to obtain the address of the district (raion) electoral office, which in turn, provided the address of the polling station. Rukh volunteers were expected to be scrutineers on election day.

Most of Rukh's and presidential candidate V. Chornovil's campaign literature was printed on a small printing press reportedly supplied by the Friends of Rukh in Toronto and brought into Ukraine by Boris Wrzesnewskyj. The printing press was located on the third floor of the Rukh building in Kyiv and manned by Ukrainian volunteers from the diaspora. It printed material in both the Ukrainian and Russian languages.²³² Russian-language campaign material emphasized economic issues while Ukrainian-language literature emphasized both economic and national issues.

In fairness to the Rukh organization and its organizers, while Rukh lacked an organizational structure and presence outside of Western Ukraine and Kyiv, it was nonetheless instrumental in raising Ukrainian national consciousness in the russified regions of Ukraine. Rukh volunteers were enthusiastic, dedicated, determined, and tactful in not alienating the national minorities, as they toiled in their endeavour to establish an independent Ukrainian state, peacefully through the referendum process.

²³² See Appendix G for examples of campaign material published by Rukh.

Before the Supreme Council adopted The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, Rukh had been perceived as a fringe movement in the vast majority of oblasts. When Chairman L. Kravchuk and his supporters decided that the time had come to break from under Moscow's control, they instantaneously adopted most of Rukh's policies and effectively used those policies to market the dash out of the empire.²³³ One of Rukh's greatest achievement was that its existence and activities had provided the pro-independence "Yes" forces with a ready-made platform.

Kyiv University Students and the Luhansk Campaign ²³⁴

Ukrainian university students, especially members of the independent Union of Ukrainian Students, actively campaigned for educational, economic, and political reforms. Their hunger strike in the fall of 1990 forced the resignation of Ukraine's Prime Minister and extracted government promises for faster reforms and the implementation of Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration. During the referendum campaign, the Kyiv university students helped organize an international seminar in Kyiv, supported presidential candidates V. Chornovil and L. Lukianenko,

²³³ Chairman L. Kravchuk's political commercial used in his presidential campaign illustrates point. VHS copy of political commercial in the author's possession.

²³⁴ The author accompanied and campaigned with the Kyiv university students in Luhansk.

and undertook a major campaign effort in the russified eastern oblast of Luhansk.

A seminar entitled Free Elections in the West and Ukraine, was held in Kyiv on 13 November 1991, sponsored by the Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research and organized by the university students.²³⁵ The one-day seminar was to provide theoretical and practical knowledge to assist in the referendum and presidential campaigns. Invited guests included students, parliamentarians, scholars, and other political activists. Guest speakers included two Americans: Jack Walsh, an organizer with the Democratic Party, and Richard Messick, a lawyer with the Republican Party. In his presentation, Richard Messick stated that his expenses were covered by Freedom House, an organization that promotes democracy and human rights around the world, and his experiences included preparing a report on the pre-election conditions in Nicaragua.²³⁶ Some Ukrainian participants, like Supreme Council deputy M. Horyn, regarded the American presentation as too americanized and theoretical and questioned its practical value for Ukraine's situation.²³⁷ Between 30 to 40 individuals attended the seminar.

The Kyiv university students became highly concerned two weeks prior to the referendum vote that the russified Luhansk oblast appeared

²³⁵ See Appendix H for conference program.

²³⁶ Richard E. Messick, Guidelines for Evaluating Whether an Election is Free and Fair and How They Apply to the Question of Access to the Media. Freedom House, N.Y., n.d..

²³⁷ Supreme Council deputy M. Horyn made the remark to the author, an observer at the seminar.

to be neglected in the referendum campaign. Liubov Sara, a student activist, organized 41 Kyiv university students to go and campaign in Luhansk, an oblast surrounded on three sides by the Russian Federation. Only 24 students originally went,²³⁸ being joined by six others in the last three days of the campaign. Somewhat reluctantly, the students approached Rukh for funding and Russian-language campaign literature. Rukh provided enough funds for the students' train transportation, accommodation and 10 rubles per day per student for food. At the request of the students, the author agreed to accompany and assist them in their campaign efforts in Luhansk.

Upon arriving in Luhansk on 21 November, the Kyiv students learned that their reserved accommodation had been taken by other people. Adding to the difficulties was the discovery that the funds provided by Rukh had inadvertently been left behind in the Students' Union Kyiv office. The author advanced them the necessary funds and with some difficulty obtained accommodation for them in the Druzhba hotel in central Luhansk. Fully documented and up-to-date internal passports were required to register in the hotel or the hotel administrator was fined 50 rubles per violation out of a 300 ruble monthly pay. After the administrator's potential losses were covered by the author, all the students, including those with incomplete documents, registered.

The following day, the students, by two's, went to their assigned polling stations to register as scrutineers. The two students that the author accommodated were initially refused registration as scrutineers until the author asked in English if there was a problem. Somewhat

²³⁸ See Appendix H for list of Kyiv students that went to Luhansk.

surprised, the returning officer quickly registered the students as scrutineers and even insisted on driving the three of us back to our hotel.

The city of Luhansk was divided into sections with students being assigned areas for distributing literature. Voter lists were available only at the polling stations on voting day. It was not feasible to identify the "Yes" voters for "pulling" on referendum day. The objective was to distribute the campaign literature as quickly as possible, to as many people as possible. The students distributed the literature at farmers' markets, on the street, in the factories, and in apartment buildings. Some of the students also distributed literature for presidential candidates V. Chornovil and L. Lukianenko.

Two teams of students plastered pro-independence posters throughout the city and the oblast. At one point the students crossed the unmarked Ukrainian-Russian border, plastering the campaign material on all available posts and buildings until a militia officer politely informed them they were in Russia.

A one-day campaign trip through three towns located north and west from the city of Luhansk illustrates the differences in the campaign styles of Rukh, the Republican Party, and the Kyiv university students in Luhansk. Organizers from the local Republican Party requested assistance and on 28 November six Kyiv students and the author accompanied the four Republican Party organizers on a campaign trip that was hampered by severe smog conditions resulting in only three hours of actual campaigning and nine hours of travelling. The students and the Republican organizers disagreed over campaign methods. The Republican

organizers insisted on throwing campaign literature through an open window at pedestrians walking or standing by the roadside. The students wanted the minibus to stop so they could distribute the literature in a more civilized manner.

At farmers' markets, through factories and apartment buildings in the three towns, the students fanned out distributing the campaign material. In one farmers' market, a student, Lida, was hit over the head with a cardboard box by a woman upset at receiving a pro-independence leaflet. There were no other violent encounters. The students crossed paths with Rukh campaigners in one farmers market. The Rukh organizers came with a number of blue and yellow flags and a loudspeaker. They positioned themselves in one location and through the loudspeaker announced that "Rukh is here" summoning the people to approach them to be informed and to receive campaign literature.

On referendum day, the students left the hotel at five-thirty in the morning for the polling stations where they were to be scrutineers. They carried a blue and yellow flag and a copy of the referendum Act. Above each polling station the students were instructed to hoist Ukraine's blue and yellow flag. Only at one polling station did the flag of the former Soviet Union fly alone and inside a bitter confrontation continued throughout the day between the two student scrutineers and the returning officer.

The author commenced the day accompanying two student scrutineers to observe the opening of the polling station at the Luhansk Agricultural College. From noon until the polling stations closed, he visited all the polling stations in the city of Luhansk as an accredited

international observer.

When the students first arrived in Luhansk, they were accused of being Banderites. During one incident, when they insisted they were university students from Kyiv, one woman exclaimed to her friend: "You see! I told you, the Banderites have taken over Kyiv!" On referendum day, with the exception of the one polling location, the relationship between the students and polling station officials was extremely warm, with many of the students being invited to private homes to celebrate the "Yes" vote victory. Being totally exhausted, the students declined the invitations. They left Luhansk the following day for Kyiv.

Crimea

Crimea, being the only oblast where Ukrainians are in the minority, attracted special attention during the referendum campaign. The Supreme Council's newspaper, Holos Ukrainy, even carried special articles explaining the situation in Crimea and its implications for the referendum.²³⁹ With the articles appeared a cartoon showing two thieves in the middle of the night sawing off Crimea from Ukraine with the intent of stealing it. If the referendum had been defeated in Crimea, it could have precipitated a potentially volatile ethnic and border crisis destabilizing relations between Russia and Ukraine. Chairman Kravchuk on Ukrainian television warned that if Russia got

²³⁹ "Iak rozihruietsia krymska karta," and "Ukrainska federatsiia i Krym," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 193, 4 October 1991, 12-13.

Crimea, Ukraine could demand a referendum vote on adjoining ethnically-Ukrainian territories, including Kuban, to determine if they wanted to join Ukraine.²⁴⁰

Crimea is strategically located. It is a popular resort and retirement area for former CPSU officials, and it is the home of the large Black Sea Fleet. Prior to Stalin's expulsion of the Crimean Tatars and Germans during the Second World War, Tatars had accounted for 25.1% of Crimea's population in 1926.²⁴¹ Today, Crimea is linguistically russified, with Crimea's 700,000 Ukrainians having no Ukrainian-language schools, one Ukrainian-language newspaper, and 10 minutes of Ukrainian-language television per week.²⁴² Russians account for 67% of Crimea's population and Ukrainians for 26%.²⁴³ Discrimination against Tatars by the Crimean authorities has been widespread and has hampered their return to Crimea.²⁴⁴

The Russian elite in Crimea has attempted to preserve its privileged position, to isolate Crimea from President Gorbachev's reforms, Ukraine's 1989 language law, and the July 1990 Sovereignty

²⁴⁰ The author listened to Chairman L. Kravchuk's television address.

²⁴¹ Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 1984 ed., s.v. "Crimea."

²⁴² "Iak rozihruetsia krymska karta," 12-13.

²⁴³ Roman Solchanyk, "Centrifugal Movements in Ukraine on the Eve of the Independence Referendum," Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 48 (29 November 1991): 9.

²⁴⁴ "Iak rozihruetsia krymska karta," 12-13; V. Vasilets, "The USSR, Our Common Home: What Crimea Should be Like," Pravda, 8 December 1990, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 49, 24; "Situation in Crimea Deteriorates," Izvestiia, 4 October 1990, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 40, 27.

Declaration, and to prevent the return of Crimean Tatars, by obtaining through referendum autonomous status for Crimea. After 1,343,855 (93%) of Crimeans voted in a referendum in favour of autonomy,²⁴⁵ on 12 February 1991 Ukraine's Supreme Council granted Crimea autonomy within Ukraine.²⁴⁶ Autonomous status re-enforced the ethnic Russians' privileged position at the expense of Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars.

After Ukraine's Supreme Council adopted The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine on 24 August 1991, Russian residents in Crimea began debating about holding a separate referendum to decide if Crimea should remain in Ukraine, join Russia, or seek independence. On 23 October, Leonid Kravchuk attended a Crimean Supreme Council debate where it was decided not to pass a Crimean referendum law.²⁴⁷ However, the issue continued to be debated in Crimea, forcing Leonid Kravchuk to return to Crimea a week prior to Ukraine's referendum vote to insure that Crimean residents supported the Act proclaiming the independence of Ukraine.²⁴⁸ He firmly reminded the Crimeans that Crimea gets its water, electricity, and food from Ukraine, not Russia. The Russian entrenched (former) Communist elite in Crimea appeared to have been more comfortable with Chairman Leonid Kravchuk, a former Communist ideologue, than with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his anti-Communist

²⁴⁵ V. Filippov, "Residents of Crimea Vote for Autonomy," Izvestiia, 21 January 1991, 3, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, 29.

²⁴⁶ S. Tsikora, "Crimea has Gained Autonomy, but - Izvestiia, 13 February 1991, 2, as reported in CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 7, 27.

²⁴⁷ R. Solchanyk, "Centrifugal Movements in Ukraine on the Eve of the Independence Referendum," 11.

²⁴⁸ News reports heard by the author while in Ukraine.

policies.

Rukh targeted the ethnic Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatar vote in Crimea, regarding the Russians to be partokrats who were attempting to preserve Crimea as a Communist fortress, immune to democratic movements in both Ukraine and Russia. A Rukh-Crimean Tatar alliance existed. Rukh endorsed the national rights of the Crimean Tatars and their right to return to Crimea, while the Crimean Tatars supported The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.²⁴⁹ The Supreme Council and all the presidential candidates publicly supported the return of the Crimean Tatars, Germans, and others who had been deported by Stalin.²⁵⁰

Under Article 28 of Ukraine's Referendum Act, the Crimea Oblast Council was legally responsible for establishing the Crimean Electoral Commission for the referendum, electing its members, organizing and holding the All-Ukraine referendum, and counting the ballots.²⁵¹ In Crimea, 54.19% of the voters voted "Yes" to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine with the Crimean authorities, not Kyiv, directly controlling the voting apparatus.²⁵²

²⁴⁹ Vasyl Turetsky, Rukh organizer, provided an overview of the situation in Crimea from Rukh's perspective for the author on 11 November 1991.

²⁵⁰ "Deklaratsiia Prav Natsionalnostei Ukrainy," 2.
See Appendix G. Also see Odessa Resolution.

²⁵¹ Zakon Ukrainskoi Radianskoi Sotsialistychnoi Respubliky pro vseukrainskyi ta mistsevi referendumy (Kyiv: Ukraine Publishing, 1991).

²⁵² See section on Ukraine's Referendum Law and the Counting of the Ballots.

CHAPTER 4

THE REFERENDUM RESULTS

Ukraine's Referendum Act and the Counting of the Ballots

On 3 July 1991, the Supreme Council adopted a Law for All-Ukraine and Local Referendums²⁵³ to enable permanent residents, 18 years and older, to decide by secret ballot²⁵⁴ if Ukraine should be part of a federation or confederation, or a totally independent state.²⁵⁵ The Act established a hierarchial electoral structure,²⁵⁶ with each level designated specific responsibilities.

The Supreme Council was required to establish a Central Electoral Commission not later than one-and-a-half months before the referendum, composed of a chairman, deputy-chairman, secretary, and 27 other members, one for each electoral region.²⁵⁷ The Central Electoral Commission was responsible to the Supreme Council through the Minister of Justice. The Central Electoral Commission was to insure that an

²⁵³ Zakon Ukrainskoi Radianskoi Sotsialistychnoi Respubliki pro vseukrainskyi ta mistsevi referendumy.

See Appendix C.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., Section 1, Article 7.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., Section 1, Article 5.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., Section III, Article 24.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., Section III, Article 25.

electoral organization was established throughout Ukraine; that instructions and information were forwarded from the Supreme Council to the 27 Regional Electoral Commissions; that the republic total was calculated from the referendum results received in percentages (%) from each Regional Electoral Commission; and that the final republic total results were released to the public.²⁵⁸

There were to be 27 Regional Electoral Commissions, one for each oblast, Crimea, and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol. These Commissions were to be elected by their respective oblast or city supreme councils. The Crimean Supreme Council would have elected the Crimean Electoral Commission.²⁵⁹ The Regional Electoral Commissions received their instructions and information from the Central Electoral Commission and forwarded it to the District Electoral Commissions. After the vote was counted by the local commissions, the results in percentages were to be forwarded to the regional commissions where the percentage total for the entire oblast were to be calculated and then forwarded to the Central Electoral Commission.

In every city, town, and village there was a District (Local) Electoral Commission elected by the district (local) council.²⁶⁰ The District (Local) Electoral Commission received, distributed, and implemented instructions it received from above; organized the polling stations and assisted in preparing the voting lists; received the election results from the polling stations in percentages which it

²⁵⁸ Ibid., Section III, Article 26.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., Section III, Articles 27 and 28.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., Section III, Article 29 and 30.

forwarded to the Regional Electoral Commission.

There were approximately 330,000 polling stations throughout Ukraine. Voters lists were to be prepared, staff and observers provided, counting committees organized, and the votes counted. The vote results were to be forwarded to the District (Local) Commissions in percentages: 1) "Yes" votes, 2) "No" votes, 3) invalid votes, 4) and the number of people who voted or did not vote.²⁶¹

The hierarchial structure established by the Act means that only local election personnel were required to actually see and count the ballots.²⁶² All other levels simply received the voting results in percentages from below, combined them with other results received, and then forwarded the voting results up through the structure. The Central Electoral Commission received the voting results from the 27 Regional Electoral Commissions, combined them and released them as the republic total.

The electoral results for all polling stations or districts were not available from a central source in Ukraine. An individual seeking such information would be required to first go the oblast capital where the Regional Electoral Commission was located to obtain data for each district in the oblast, and then proceed to each district (local) commission to obtain data for each polling station in the district. Local referendum results were published in the local paper but it is most difficult from outside a district to acquire the district's newspaper.

²⁶¹ Ibid., Section IV, Articles 37-42.

²⁶² Ibid., Section IV, Articles 40- 42.

Republic Total Referendum Results by Oblast

Regional loyalty and individual self-interest, as well as, Ukrainian national consciousness influenced voter attitudes towards confirming The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. Prior to the referendum, concerns had been expressed over centrifugal movements in Transcarpathia and in russified Eastern and Southern Ukraine,

Table 5.--Republic referendum results by oblast

Oblasts	Votes Cast		Voted "Yes"		Voted "No"	
	# Votes	%	# Votes	%	#	%
WEST:						
Lviv	1,915,597	95.24	1,866,921	97.46	1.86	
Ternopil	836,667	97.10	825,526	98.67	0.78	
Ivano-Frankivsk	975,655	95.73	960,281	98.42	1.03	
NORTHWEST:						
Khmelnysky	1,059,021	93.44	1,019,813	96.30	2.62	
Volhynia	701,989	93.20	684,834	96.32	2.29	
Rivne	757,151	92.99	726,575	95.96	2.56	
SOUTHWEST:						
Transcarpathia	710,286	80.91	657,678	92.59	4.49	
Chernivsti	586,377	87.68	544,022	92.78	4.13	
NORTH:						
Kyiv	1,259,829	88.02	1,202,773	95.52	2.87	
Chernihiv	969,638	90.78	908,904	93.74	4.10	
Zhytomyr	1,000,425	90.53	950,976	95.06	3.58	
NORTHEAST:						
Kharkiv	1,798,977	75.68	1,553,065	86.33	10.43	
Sumy	948,278	88.48	878,198	92.61	4.90	

Continued on next page

Table 5-Continued

Oblasts	Votes Cast		Voted "Yes"		Voted
	# Votes	%	# Votes	%	"No" %
CENTRAL:					
Poltava	1,206,801	91.87	1,145,639	94.93	3.67
Kirovohrad	813,833	88.07	764,053	93.88	4.38
Vinnytsia	1,301,765	91.41	1,242,244	96.43	3.03
Cherkasy	1,040,971	90.17	999,603	96.03	2.76
SOUTHEAST:					
Dnipropetrovsk	2,354,169	81.80	2,127,089	90.36	7.71
Zaporizhzhia	1,252,225	80.59	1,135,271	90.66	7.34
EAST:					
Donetsk	2,957,372	76.73	2,481,157	83.90	12.58
Luhansk	1,682,344	80.65	1,410,894	83.86	13.41
SOUTH:					
Mykolaiv	818,538	84.10	732,179	89.45	8.17
Odessa	1,412,228	75.01	1,205,755	85.38	11.60
Kherson	753,843	80.40	679,451	90.13	7.20
CRIMEA:					
Crimea	1,036,190	67.50	561,498	54.19	42.22
CITIES:					
Kyiv city	1,537,585	80.35	1,428,001	92.88	5.28
Sevastopol	195,688	63.74	111,671	57.07	39.39
Total:	31,891,742	84.18	28,804,071	90.32	7.58

Source: "Rezultaty," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 38-39 (43-44), December 1991, 1; "Hospodari u vlasnomu domi," Demokratychna Ukraina (Kyiv), 5 December 1991, 1.

especially Crimea.²⁶³ The referendum results calmed most of these

²⁶³ R. Solchanyk, "Centrifugal Movements in Ukraine on the Eve of the Independence Referendum," Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 48, 29 November 1991, 8-13.

concerns as the electorate in all regions and oblasts confirmed The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, with 90.32% voting "Yes". In Crimea, where two-thirds of the population is Russian, 54.19% voted "Yes". In Vinnytsia oblast, where a large air base is located, 96.43% voted "Yes". With the exception of Crimea, there is little difference among the oblasts and regions in the percentage of voters voting "Yes" to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. The population of Western Ukraine, where most nationally conscious Ukrainians reside, is relatively small in comparison to Ukraine's total population of 52 million.

Participation: Comparing Opinion Polls With Actual Vote

Throughout Ukraine, 84.18% of all eligible voters participated in the referendum, compared to 66.2% projected by the 18-24 October survey and 80.9% by the 16-22 November survey.

Only in Ukraine's capital of Kyiv and in the South did fewer voters actually vote than anticipated. In the Northwest, actual voter participation in the referendum was surprisingly close to the November opinion survey. Kharkiv recorded one of the lowest turnouts in the republic at 76%. Historically, the city of Kharkiv had been the capital of Sloboda Ukraine, an important centre of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian national revival, and the first capital of Soviet Ukraine. Kharkiv elected some non-CPU deputies during the 1990 Supreme Council elections.

Of voters sampled in the November opinion survey, the South had recorded the highest percentage for the republic of voters intending to vote (92.8%). However, depending on oblast, only 75 - 84% actually voted. The 16-22 November opinion poll survey was conducted immediately following the high profile and successful First All-Ukraine Congress of Nationalities that was held on 16 November in the russified, ethnically-diverse city of Odessa. The actual voter participation in the russified

Table 6.--Comparing opinion polls to referendum participation

Regions/ Oblasts	18-24 October Participation %			16-22 November Participation %			Actual % Voted
	Yes	No	?	Yes	No	?	
WEST:	82.3	2.2	15.5	86.5	4.5	9.0	
Lviv							95.24
Ivano-Frankivsk							95.73
Ternopil							97.10
SOUTHWEST:	62.5	13.9	23.6	79.5	2.7	17.8	
Transcarpathia							80.91
Chernivsti							87.68
NORTHWEST:	76.8	2.4	20.8	92.1	2.4	5.6	
Rivne							92.99
Volhynia							93.20
Khmelnysky							93.44
NORTH:	64.9	11.9	23.2	80.5	9.4	10.1	
Zhytomyr							90.53
Kyiv							88.02
Chernihiv							90.78
NORTHEAST:	66.1	9.2	24.7	82.7	6.2	11.1	
Kharkiv							75.68
Sumy							88.48

Continued on next page

Table 6-Continued

Regions/ Oblasts	18-24 October Participation %			16-22 November Participation %			Actual % Voted
	Yes	No	?	Yes	No	?	
CENTRAL:	68.9	8.0	23.1	81.3	6.3	12.5	
Vinnitsia							91.41
Poltava							91.87
Kirovohrad							88.07
Cherkasy							90.17
SOUTHEAST:	67.9	8.2	23.9	67.0	10.2	22.9	
Zaporizhzhia							80.59
Dnipropetrovsk							81.80
EAST:	53.7	9.9	36.4	77.9	10.1	12.0	
Donetsk							76.73
Luhansk							80.65
SOUTH:	63.9	11.1	25.0	92.8	3.9	3.3	
Kherson							80.40
Odessa							75.01
Mykolaiv							84.10
CRIMEA	38.9	28.9	32.2	54.4	24.4	21.1	
Crimea							67.50
CITIES:							
Kyiv city	60.2	8.6	31.2	86.3	5.9	7.8	80.35
Sevastopol							63.74
Total:	66.2	9.3	24.5	80.9	7.7	11.3	84.18

Source: V. L. Ossovsky, V. A. Matusyevych, V. I. Volovych, Sekretariat Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR, Hrupa sotsiolohichnykh doslidzhen, Informatsiinyi biuleten #18 (1991), Tablytsia 1; Informatsiinyi biuleten #20 (1991), zapytannia 6. [Table 10]
 "Rezultaty," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 38-39 (43-44), December 1991, 1; "Hospodari u vlasnomu domi," Demokratychna Ukraina (Kyiv), 5 December 1991, 1. [Table 24]

regions of the South, Southeast, and East were similar in percentage.

In the city of Sevastopol, home of the Black Sea Fleet, close to two-thirds of the residents voted, in the process binding themselves to the referendum results.

As noted above, in the city of Luhansk on referendum day, the election staff in the polling stations visited by the author claimed that an extra 10-20% of voters participated in the referendum and voted "Yes" in response to President Gorbachev's and President Yeltsin's televised statements of November 30. However, comparing actual voter participation in Luhansk with the November opinion poll survey places in question that assertion. Either the November opinion survey was not accurate or President Gorbachev's and President Yeltsin's statements had no electoral impact.

The "Yes" Vote: Opinion Polls Compared to the Actual Vote

In all 27 electoral regions, the majority of citizens voted "Yes" to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. In fact, in 20 electoral regions over 90% of the voters voted "Yes" and in 4 electoral regions between 83.86 and 89.45% voted "Yes".

There is very little difference in the percentage of voters who voted "Yes" in the West, where candidates endorsed by the Democratic Bloc won the 1990 Supreme Council elections, and the regions where the candidates of the former CPU had won all the seats to the Supreme Council. In Dnipropetrovsk, the political power base of former Communist leaders, 90.36% voted "Yes" to confirm the Act.

There is no correlation between the opinion poll surveys of 18-24 October and 16-22 November and the actual vote. In all political campaigns the final 10 days are crucial as the "Undecided" voters

Table 7.--Comparing opinion polls with referendum "Yes" vote

Regions/ Oblasts	18-24 Oct. %		16-22 November %			Referendum %	
	"Yes"	"No"	"Yes"	"No"	"?"	"Yes"	"No"
WEST:	93.7	6.3	88.2	2.3	9.6		
Lviv						97.46	1.86
Ivano- Frankivsk						98.42	1.03
Ternopil						98.67	0.78
SOUTHWEST:	89.2	10.7	65.8	5.5	28.8		
Transcarpathia						92.59	4.49
Chernivsti						92.78	4.13
NORTHWEST:	99.4	0.6	87.2	4.8	8.0		
Rivne						95.96	2.56
Volhynia						96.32	2.29
Khmelnysky						96.30	2.62
NORTH:	87.1	12.9	78.6	5.0	16.4		
Zhytomyr						95.06	3.58
Kyiv						95.52	2.87
Chernihiv						93.74	4.10
NORTHEAST:	75.8	24.3	60.5	13.0	26.5		
Kharkiv						86.33	10.43
Sumy						92.61	4.90
CENTRAL:	93.5	6.5	76.8	5.8	17.4		
Vinnytsia						96.43	3.03
Poltava						94.93	3.67
Kirovohrad						93.88	4.38
Cherkasy						96.03	2.76

Continued on next page.

Table 7-Continued

Regions/ Oblasts	18-24 Oct. %		18-22 November %			Referendum %	
	"Yes"	"No"	"Yes"	"No"	"?"	"Yes"	"No"
SOUTHEAST:	78.7	21.3	60.2	11.9	28.0		
Zaporizhzhia						90.66	7.34
Dnipropetrovsk						90.36	7.71
EAST:	77.3	22.7	63.2	15.2	21.6		
Donetsk						83.90	12.58
Luhansk						83.86	13.41
SOUTH:	72.9	27.1	79.9	7.3	12.9		
Kherson						90.13	7.20
Odessa						85.38	11.60
Mykolaiv						89.45	8.17
CRIMEA	71.1	28.9	45.6	22.2	32.2		
Crimea						54.19	42.22
CITIES:							
Kyiv city	83.6	16.4	76.5	9.8	13.7	92.88	5.28
Sevastopil						57.07	39.39
Total:	84.4	15.6	71.5	9.5	18.8	90.32	7.58

Source: V. L. Ossovsky, V. A. Matushevych, V. I. Volovych, Sekretariat Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR, Hrupa sotsiologichnykh doslidzhen, Informatsiinyi biuleten #18 (1991), Tablytsia 2; Informatsiinyi biuleten #20 (1991), zapytannia 7. [Table 12]
 "Rezultaty," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 38-39 (43-44), December 1991. [Table 24]

finally decide how they are going to vote. The intense campaigning during the final 10 days of the referendum campaign, the Temporary Commission's election-day organization that mobilized and directed the former members of the former CPU organization, and the poor quality opinion poll surveys could account for the difference between the opinion poll surveys and the actual vote.

Impact of L. Kravchuk's Presidential Campaign

To fully appreciate the positive impact of the presidential election upon the referendum results, it is necessary to look at the wording of the referendum question. Ukraine's electorate was not directly asked whether they supported or rejected the idea of an independent Ukraine. They were asked to confirm the actions of their elected political leaders, including Chairman L. Kravchuk, a presidential candidate and one-time Communist Party ideologue, by voting "Yes" to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine adopted by the Supreme Council on 24 August 1991. While the final result was the same, an independent Ukraine, the distinction is important. The CPU had been abolished but the strategically positioned, ethnically diverse nomenklatura remained and continued to fully implement the directives from the new political elite in the Supreme Council. With the anti-Communist upheaval in Moscow, the entrenched nomenklatura in Ukraine was self-motivated to insure that Chairman L. Kravchuk was elected president and that The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine was confirmed by the voters. The other presidential candidates were very sensitive to the situation and did not attack L. Kravchuk personally or the record of the former CPU. They did not want to alienate L. Kravchuk's supporters from endorsing The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.²⁶⁴ The Temporary Commission chaired by

²⁶⁴ Supreme Council deputy Les Taniuk tape recorded interview with the author, 15 January 1992. This disadvantaged the other presidential candidates who placed Ukraine's independence ahead of their own election.

Ivan Pliushch performed a function similar to that of the former CPU in mobilizing and directing the activities of organizations, institutions, and individuals, to guarantee that the expected voter approval was delivered. Presidential candidate V. Hryniiov's published prediction that Leonid Kravchuk would win Ukraine's presidency must have reassured many in the russified southern and eastern parts of Ukraine.²⁶⁵

A few days prior to the referendum vote, on behalf of the Supreme Council, Chairman L. Kravchuk paid tribute to Ukraine's first president, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, on his 125th birthday, in the very building where the short-lived Central Rada had held its meetings in 1917-18.²⁶⁶ It was as if a symbolic mace were being passed from Ukraine's first president to Ukraine's soon-to-be-elected second president. The special occasion provided presidential candidate L. Kravchuk with an opportunity 1) to endorse the long-suppressed Hrushevsky Thesis regarding the distinct European historic and cultural roots of the Ukrainian nation; 2) to emphasize the pitfalls associated with entering into a loose union with Moscow by referring to the loss of Ukrainian independence in the 17th and the 20th centuries; 3) to restate the high price paid by Ukrainians for the loss of their independence, including the Stalinist purges, the famine, and even the Chernobyl nuclear disaster; 4) to emphasize the historic continuity from Hrushevsky's first republic to

²⁶⁵ "Mozhu zastavyty iashchik viski. Prezydentom bude Kravchuk" and "Persnyi prezident maie `z'hority'," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 215, 5 November 1991, 1 and 6; In Luhansk, many Russians and russified Ukrainians expressed fears about V. Chornovil while regarding L. Kravchuk as a "safe" presidential candidate. From the author's campaign notes.

²⁶⁶ Special issue on M. Hrushevsky by Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 226, 22 November 1991.

the present third republic (the second republic being the Ukrainian SSR); 5) and to sell the positive features associated with confirming The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.²⁶⁷

It was presidential candidate Chairman L. Kravchuk who responded on Moscow-Central Television during the evening of November 30 to President Gorbachev's and President Yeltsin's appeals to Ukraine's electorate to vote "No". An interesting cartoon in Zakhidna Ukraina showed President Gorbachev offering the people a finger on the nuclear

Table 8.--Comparing referendum votes with L. Kravchuk's votes

Oblast	Referendum Results			Kravchuk
	No. Voted	% Voted	% "Yes"	% Voted
WEST:				
Lviv	1,915,597	95.24	97.46	11.50
Ivano-Frankivsk	975,655	95.73	98.42	13.70
Ternopil	836,667	97.10	98.67	16.79
NORTHWEST:				
Volhynia	710,989	93.20	96.32	51.66
Rivne	757,151	92.99	95.96	53.07
Khmelnitsky	1,059,021	93.44	96.30	75.46
SOUTHWEST:				
Transcarpathia	710,286	80.91	92.59	58.03
Chernivtsi	586,377	87.68	92.78	43.56
NORTH:				
Kyiv	1,259,829	88.02	95.52	65.99
Chernihiv	989,638	90.78	93.74	74.15
Zhytomyr	1,000,425	90.53	95.06	77.59

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²⁶⁷ "Dopovid Holovy Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy L. M. Kravchuka," Holos Ukrainy (Kyiv), No. 228, 26 November 1991.

Table 8-Continued

Oblast	Referendum Results			Kravchuk
	No. Voted	% Voted	% "Yes"	% Voted
NORTHEAST:				
Sumy	948,278	88.48	92.61	72.35
Kharkiv	1,798,977	75.68	86.33	60.85
CENTRAL:				
Vinnitsia	1,301,765	91.41	95.43	72.34
Poltava	1,206,801	91.87	94.93	75.05
Kirovohrad	813,833	88.07	93.88	74.77
Cherkasy	1,040,971	90.17	96.03	67.14
SOUTHEAST:				
Zaporizhzhia	1,252,225	80.59	90.66	74.73
Dnipropetrovsk	2,354,169	81.80	90.36	69.74
EAST:				
Donetsk	2,957,372	76.73	83.90	71.47
Luhansk	1,682,344	80.65	83.86	76.23
SOUTH:				
Kherson	753,843	80.40	90.13	70.23
Mykolaiv	818,538	84.10	89.45	72.33
Odessa	1,412,228	75.01	85.38	70.69
CRIMEA:				
Crimea	1,036,190	67.50	54.19	56.68
CITIES:				
Kyiv city	1,537,585	80.35	92.88	56.13
Sevastopol	195,688	63.74	57.07	54.68
Total/ Average	31,891,742	84.18	90.32	61.59

Source: Compiled from: "Vidomosti pro rezultaty vyboriv Prezydenta Ukrainy," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 38-39 (43-44), December 1991.

button; Russian President Yeltsin offering the people tough economic

times; and Chairman L. Kravchuk offering the people a promise of good times, in keeping with the theme that Ukraine's citizens would live better in an independent Ukraine.

A comparison of Chairman L. Kravchuk's presidential vote with the "Yes" vote illustrates the overlap of support. In the oblasts annexed into Soviet Ukraine (Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk) during the Second World War, where Ukrainian national consciousness and anti-communist feelings are very strong, Chairman L. Kravchuk received less than 17% of the votes cast for president. But in the oblasts where the CPU structure had remained entrenched during the 1990 Supreme Council elections, Chairman L. Kravchuk received 70% plus of the votes cast in 14 oblasts, while in Crimea, where he campaigned against Crimean separatism, he received a larger percentage of votes than The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

The Rukh organization that endorsed presidential candidate V. Chornovil lacked an organizational presence and popular base in Southern and Eastern Ukraine where Ukrainian national consciousness was weak. Former CPU members remained in their positions and were able to deliver the expected vote to L. Kravchuk their "safe" candidate, and at the same time, the "Yes" vote to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

The number of ballots cast in the referendum and the presidential election were basically equal, while twice as many presidential ballots were spoiled [Table 9, below]. There is no information available as to how the "No" voters in the referendum voted in the presidential election.

Table 9.--Summary comparing referendum and presidential votes.

	Referendum	Presidential
Eligible Voters	37,885,555	37,885,555
Votes Cast	31,891,742	31,892,415
Valid Ballots	31,221,615	30,563,954
Voted "Yes"	28,804,071	
Voted "No"	2,417,544	
Spoiled Ballots	670,117	1,328,461

Source: Compiled from: "Rezultaty vyboriv Prezydenta Ukrainy," and "Rezultaty," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 38-39 (43-44), December 1991.

Table 10.--Summary of presidential results.

Presidential Candidate	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Kravchuk, L.	19,643,481	61.59
Chornovil, V.	7,420,727	23.27
Lukianenko, L.	1,432,556	4.49
Hryniiov, V.	1,329,758	4.17
Iukhnovsky, I.	554,719	1.74
Taburiansky, L.	182,713	0.57
Total	30,563,954	95.83

Source: "Rezultaty vyboriv Prezydenta Ukrainy," Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv), No. 38-39 (43-44), December 1991.

Presidential candidate Chairman L. Kravchuk received the equivalent of two-thirds of the "Yes" vote. That is, 90.32% of the electorate voted "Yes" in the referendum, while Chairman L. Kravchuk received 61.59% of the presidential votes.

Referendum Results by Oblasts

Lviv Oblast

Rukh's presidential candidate, V. Chornovil, was Chairman of the Lviv oblast council during the referendum campaign. The Lviv region was annexed during the Second World War into Soviet Ukraine and remained a centre of Ukrainian national consciousness and Ukraine's independence movement. Having totally rejected the CPU candidates during the 1990 elections, a high voter participation and "Yes" vote was anticipated.

Table 11.--Referendum result for Lviv Oblast

District	Votes cast Number	Voted %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Halych (Lviv)	107,862	89.50	101,533	94.13
Lychakiv (Lviv)	91,077	91.06	86,635	95.12
Pivden (Lviv)	129,259	90.19	120,499	93.22
Shevchenko (Lviv)	98,220	92.07	94,190	95.89
Zalizny (Lviv)	131,444	91.70	125,724	95.61
Boryslav city	31,516	94.63	30,716	97.46
Brody	48,122	96.43	47,006	97.68
Busk	38,263	98.90	37,998	99.30
Chervonohrad city	62,596	92.34	61,010	97.46
Drohobych	54,873	98.95	54,700	99.68
Drohobych city	71,793	94.23	69,840	97.27
Horodok	56,223	99.01	55,335	98.42
Iavoriv	85,063	96.55	83,657	96.34
Kamianka-Buzka	43,734	97.43	43,195	98.76
Mostyska	44,290	96.98	43,664	98.58

Continued on next page

Table 11- continued

District	Votes cast Number	Voted %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Mykolaiv	64,274	96.07	63,658	99.04
Peremyshliany	38,695	99.37	38,527	99.56
Pustomyty	79,637	98.60	79,045	99.59
Radekhiv	37,737	99.32	37,531	99.46
Sambir city	81,659	97.48	79,964	97.92
Skole	35,220	98.79	34,910	99.11
Sokal	70,615	97.77	70,061	99.21
Stryi city	96,118	95.91	93,590	97.36
Staryi Sambir	62,838	93.83	61,910	98.52
Truskavets city	18,466	94.93	17,741	96.07
Turka	36,835	96.89	36,403	98.82
Zhovkva	79,741	98.77	78,911	98.95
Zhydachiv	63,129	99.15	62,865	99.58
Zolochiv	56,568	96.96	56,100	99.17
Mostyska	44,290	96.98	43,664	98.58
Mykolaiv	64,274	96.07	63,658	99.04
Oblast total/average	1,915,597	95.24	1,866,923	97.45

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

In the presidential elections, L. Kravchuk received 11% and V. Chornovil 76% of the votes in Lviv oblast.

Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

This highly russified and industrialized oblast had been the political power base of former Communist leaders General Secretary

Table 12.--Referendum results for Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Apostolove	42,931		39,752	92.6
Dniprodzerzhynsk city	167,861		151,019	90.0
Dnipropetrovsk	50,555		47,087	93.1
Iurivka	11,289		10,804	95.7
Dnipropetrovsk city	681,482		597,073	87.6
Kryvyi Rih	29,590		27,477	92.9
Kryvyi Rih city	475,950		433,193	91.0
Krynychky	29,327		27,705	94.5
Mahdalynivka	26,952		25,400	94.2
Marhanets city	33,460		30,506	91.2
Mezhova	22,326		20,849	93.4
Nikopol city	91,111		83,732	91.9
Nikopol	32,403		29,594	94.2
Novomoskovsk city	45,666		41,534	91.0
Novomoskovsk	53,959		48,276	89.5
Ordzhonikidze city	29,654		26,893	90.7
Pavlohrad	23,558		22,064	93.7
Pavlohrad city	67,890		59,444	87.6
Pershotravensk city	16,145		13,894	86.1
Petropavlivka	24,640		22,683	92.1
Piatykhatky	37,659		34,274	91.0
Pokrovske	30,822		29,007	94.1
Shyroke	22,852		21,149	92.5
Sofiivka	21,792		20,601	94.5
Solone	31,306		29,472	94.1
Synelnykove	28,742		26,367	91.7
Synelnykovo city	21,368		19,433	90.0

Continued on next page

Table 12-Continued

District	Votes cast Number	Voted %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Ternivka city	16,784		14,448	86.1
Tomakivka	21,018		19,643	93.5
Tsarychanka	41,415		39,374	95.1
Vasylkivka	28,337		25,999	91.7
Verkhnodniprovsk	39,503		36,864	93.3
Vilnohirsk city	15,382		14,090	91.6
Zhovti Vody city	41,440		37,389	90.2
Oblast total/average	2,354,169	81.8	2,127,089	90.4

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

Leonid Brezhnev and First Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbytsky. Former CPU members remained in their positions of power and influence following the abolition of the CPU and watched with alarm the anti-Communist activities of Russian President Yeltsin. Out of self-interest they turned to the "safe" leadership offered by former Party ideologue Chairman Leonid Kravchuk. They worked to fulfil the expectations of the political elite and the instructions from the Temporary Commission by insuring that there was a high voter participation and an overwhelming "Yes" vote in the referendum. In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, 81.8% of the electorate participated in the referendum and 90.4% voted "Yes" to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. In the presidential elections, L. Kravchuk received 70% of the vote and V. Chornovil only 18% of the vote.

Kyiv Oblast

Table 13.--Referendum results for Kyiv Oblast

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Baryshivka	40,016		38,513	96.
Bila Tserkva	45,815		44,446	97.
Bila Tserkva city	110,039		101,931	96.
Bohuslav	31,111		30,351	97.
Boryspil	39,549		38,418	97.
Boryspil city	32,811		30,629	93.
Borodianka	42,590		41,220	97.
Brovary	55,080		53,296	97.
Brovary city	50,275		47,397	94.
Fastiv	29,248		28,249	97.
Fastiv city	31,960		30,044	94.
Iahotyn	29,567		28,265	96.
Irpin city	56,452		53,345	95.
Ivankiv	33,441		31,860	95.3
Kaharlyk	35,473		34,388	97.
Makariv	40,145		38,191	95.
Myronivka	31,980		30,861	96.5
Obukhiv	46,912		45,011	95.9
Olshantsia	27,053		26,134	97.
Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky	30,134		28,888	96.
Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky city	20,512		19,427	95.
Poliske	18,402		17,776	96.6
Rokytno	27,338		26,054	95.5
Skvyra	34,659		33,722	97.

Continued on next page

Table 13-Continued

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Slavutych city	8,001		7,018	87.2
Sviatoshyn (Kyiv)	96,947		92,910	96.
Teteriv	26,266		25,266	97.
Vasylkiv city	78,146		74,189	95.
Volodar (Bila Tserkva)	17,611		17,113	97.
Vyskhorod	50,913		48,492	95.
Zhashkiv	20,908		19,877	97.
Zhurivka	19,330		18,846	97.5
Oblast total/average	1,259,129	a 88.0	1,202,773	95.5

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

a. Added from Table 5.

In Kyiv oblast 95.5% of the electorate voted "Yes" as compared to 92.88% for the city of Kyiv. There was a rebirth of Ukrainian national consciousness, and expectations normally associated with a region and ethnically-diverse city soon-to-become the capital of an independent state. The Chernobyl nuclear accident, blamed 100% on the Union government in Moscow, greatly influenced the vote. In the presidential elections, L. Kravchuk received 66% of the vote and V. Chornovil 21%.

Cherkasy Oblast

It is somewhat astounding that in 17 out of 23 districts, 99% or more of the electorate voted, with one district recording 100% participation.

The exceptionally high participation and "Yes" vote in the oblast

Table 14.--Referendum results for Cherkasy Oblast

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Kaniv city		99.4		94.4
Uman city		99.6		94.3
Smila city		99.0		93.6
Cherkasy city		81.5		93.1
Horodyshe		99.8		97.5
Drabove-Bariatynska		99.9		97.3
Zhaskhivsky		99.6		96.2
Zolotohisha		99.9		95.7
Kamianka		99.9		96.7
Taranha		99.9		96.6
Zvenyhorodka		100.0		97.3
Korsun		99.9		97.7
Zvenyhorodka		99.9		97.0
Potash		99.9		97.8
Monastyryshche		93.6		97.6
Smila		95.0		97.6
Talne		99.9		97.4
Uman		97.1		97.6
Khrystynivka		99.9		95.8
Cherkasy		99.0		97.6
Fudukliivka		99.9		97.5
Zolotonosha		98.5		97.4
Shpola		99.9		96.8
Zvenyhorod		97.3		97.7
Oblast average		a 99.8		96.0

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

a. Uriadovyi kurier (Kyiv) for Cherkasy oblast records 90.17% for participation.

could be credited to the recruitment of Taras Shevchenko and the Cossacks as national symbols of Ukraine, and the continuation of former members of the disbanded CPU in their positions of influence and power. Taras Shevchenko's monument at Kaniv is situated in the Cherkasy oblast. The city of Cherkasy was an important Cossack city in the 17th century. However, the city reported the lowest "Yes" vote in the oblast at 93.1 % and the lowest participation rate at 81.5%. In the presidential election 67% voted for L. Kravchuk, and 25% for V. Chornovil.

Odessa Oblast

Table 15.--Referendum results for Odessa Oblast

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Ananiv		88.90		91.23
Arstyz		88.04		83.14
Balta		89.33		91.11
Berezivka		89.63		90.25
Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky		78.48		88.09
Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky city		66.27		84.53
Biliaivka		76.91		88.77
Bolhrad		84.70		80.44
Frunzivka		88.23		91.06
Ilichivsk city		67.25		87.63
Ivanivka		85.26		87.27
Izmail		80.00		80.04
Izmail city		59.81		86.44
Kiliia		78.12		80.53

Continued on next page

Table 15-Continued

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Kodyma		86.27		93.85
Kominternivske		77.22		87.45
Kotovsk		86.74		93.87
Kotovsk city		78.93		85.78
Krasni Okyn		93.01		91.15
Liubashivka		81.74		91.59
Mykolaivka		90.74		92.99
Odessa city		67.86		83.21
Ovidiopol		74.22		87.83
Reni		67.24		81.06
Rozdilna		75.05		85.33
Sarata		90.14		82.90
Savran		87.27		93.96
Shyriaieve		87.85		91.98
Tarutyne		88.72		85.67
Tatarbunary		88.94		85.09
Velyka Mykhajlivka		94.70		94.57
Oblast average		75.01		85.38

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

The Odessa oblast is situated in the southwest corner of Ukraine, adjoining Romania and Moldavia. In the city of Izmail, adjoining Romania, only 59.81% of the electorate participated in Ukraine's referendum. Participation and the "Yes" vote was higher in the ethnically Ukrainian rural areas than in the more ethnically diverse and russified city of Odessa, Ukraine's largest port situated on the Black Sea. In the presidential elections, L. Kravchuk received 71% of the votes while V. Chornovil received 13% of the votes in the oblast.

Transcarpathia Oblast

Table 16.--Oblast results for Transcarpathia

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Mukacheve		76.2		90.8
Uzhhorod		77.6		92.6
Berehove		87.3		93.0
Velykyi Bereznyi		96.2		97.1
Vynohradiv		78.1		94.8
Volovets		93.7		95.4
Irshava		90.0		94.3
Mizhiria		89.2		93.8
Mukacheve		84.4		94.7
Perechyn		88.4		95.1
Rakhiv		79.6		92.6
Svaliava		91.8		95.2
Tiachiv		75.2		87.1
Uzhhorod		85.6		93.7
Khust		83.4		88.8
Oblast average		82.9		92.6

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

Transcarpathia, annexed into Soviet Ukraine during the Second World War, had been ruled by Hungary for approximately 1,000 years and had been part of Czechoslovakia between the two world wars. It is an ethnically mixed region with a large Ukrainian population, Hungarian and Russian minorities, and Rusyn separatists. A cultural autonomy question was attached to the referendum. In the presidential elections, L. Kravchuk received 58% of the vote and V. Chornovil 28%.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Four basic themes were emphasized during the referendum campaign. First, all economic, environmental and social problems were blamed 100% on the Union-level government. Special care was taken not to blame Russia or Russians but only the Union-centre in Moscow. In fact, it was suggested that Ukraine and Russia would both be better off as independent states. Secondly, at a time when Ukrainians were standing in line-ups for hours to purchase food, shortages were blamed on Moscow (Union-centre) for its economic exploitation of Ukraine. It was assumed that Moscow would not be able to economically exploit an independent Ukraine, therefore shortages would end, resulting in a substantial increase in the living standards for all citizens. The German Bank's assessment report was quoted extensively by "Yes" supporters to confirm that an independent Ukraine and its citizens would be economically better off. Thirdly, it was emphasized that the Ukrainian nation was an ancient European nation with historic-state roots that went back to medieval Rus' and Cossack times, and that the Ukrainian nation possessed a distinct, but long suppressed, language, history, and sophisticated culture. And finally, all citizens of a democratic, independent Ukraine would be equal, regardless of nationality, religious or political

belief, and all minority languages and cultures would be protected and assisted by the government. Every attempt was made to include all citizens in the referendum process and the "Yes" vote to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine.

Ukraine's independence became inevitable following the Supreme Council's adoption of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine on 24 August 1991. The referendum on 1 December enabled the citizens of Ukraine to participate and overwhelmingly confirm the actions of their political elite in all oblasts and in all regions by universal, secret ballot that signalled the immediate and irrevocable reality of Ukraine's independence. The large voter participation and "Yes" response internally consolidated all regions and ethnic groups in Ukraine behind the decision, jointly and democratically delivered. It lessened the likelihood that Russia could object by force, while legitimizing and sanctioning swift international recognition of Ukraine's independence by the international community. The referendum removed any doubts about Ukraine's right to independence.

Instantaneous and unexpected alliances between (former) Communists and Non-Communists, and among all ethnic and vocational groups established an independent Ukraine. Prior to the August abortive coup in Moscow, Supreme Council deputies were divided and in conflict over Ukraine's future status. A minority of Communist deputies favoured a strong Union-centre, while the majority supported Chairman L. Kravchuk's position of a weak Union comprised of sovereign republics. Only deputies in the Narodna Rada Caucus had supported Ukraine's independence. Following the collapse of the Moscow coup and Russian

President Yeltsin's anti-Communist Party decrees in Moscow, Communist deputies were forced to reassess their positions and Ukraine's relationship to Moscow. President Gorbachev's resignation as General Secretary of the CPSU and his recommendation to the Central Committee to dissolve itself meant the end of the CPSU. The CPU continued to exist for a few more days. Communist deputies endorsed the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine initially in an attempt to isolate Ukraine from the upheaval radiating out of Moscow and to preserve the CPU and its position of influence and privilege. The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine dealt with the establishment of an independent Ukraine and not with the type of government, Communist or Non-Communist, democratic or non-democratic, that would evolve. Communist and Non-Communist deputies voted for the establishment of an independent Ukraine for different reasons, one to preserve the status quo and the other to change the status quo. Quickly realizing that preserving both the CPU and their privileged positions was not feasible, the Communists deputies jettisoned the CPU.

Chairman L. Kravchuk and his supporters jettisoned the Marxist-Leninist ideology along with the CPU, filling the void with Rukh's ready-made platform of Ukrainian national rebirth. Unlike the March 1991 referendums when Ukraine's political elite was divided, during the independence referendum all deputies were united and firmly committed to the common cause: propagating the national rebirth of Ukraine through independence. This included Oleksandr Moroz and his hard-line Communist followers. United in common purpose, the Supreme Council deputies unanimously committed the government's vast resources towards insuring

the confirmation of The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine through referendum.

The referendum campaign was conducted during a transitional period when former prominent organizations and institutions of the Soviet era were disintegrating, like the CPU, or reorganizing and realigning themselves, as with the military and the Russian (Ukrainian) Orthodox Church. New organizations and services, like Rukh and opinion polling, were emerging but had not fully matured to service fully the needs of the new Ukraine.

The alliance between former-Communist and Non-Communist deputies enabled disintegrating organizations to be partially reactivated and utilized in the service of the "Yes" vote campaign. For example, while the CPU had been abolished, former Party members remained in positions of influence and authority. The Supreme Council had established the Temporary Commission, chaired by Ivan Pliushch, to utilize the former Party members, their expertise, and electoral propaganda methods to insure a high "Yes" vote and voter participation. Both Ivan Drach, head of Rukh, and Oleksandr Moroz, head of the hard-line Communist caucus, along with representatives of other political parties were appointed to the Temporary Commission, working with top bureaucrats who had been appointed to their positions of authority during the Soviet era. Former Party members and the nomenkultura, fulfilling directives from above and out of personal self-interest, were instrumental in delivering the "Yes" vote in regions where Ukrainian national consciousness and Rukh were weak and, in the process, to their "safe" presidential candidate, Chairman L. Kravchuk. Two out of every three voters who voted "Yes",

also voted for presidential candidate L. Kravchuk.

The purges of top military and security personnel in Moscow following the collapse of the Moscow coup, disoriented and realigned the loyalties of military officers stationed in Ukraine, including the Russian conservative-oriented Generals who normally would have been energetically opposed Ukraine's independence. There were no reported purges in Ukraine of military or security personnel. Chairman L. Kravchuk's government offered the military officers security of position, pay, pensions, and equality of opportunity, regardless of ethnic origin, in return for pledging support for the establishment and the defence of an independent Ukraine. Military personnel participated in the referendum vote and were bound by the democratically achieved results. Chairman L. Kravchuk appears to have been their "safe" presidential candidate offering them a form of asylum at a time of upheaval and reprisals in President Yeltsin's Russia.

The Russian Orthodox Church, having lost its monopoly position during the Gorbachev era, faced a serious challenge from the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox churches. Millions of parishioners and invaluable church property were at stake. Prior to the Act proclaiming the independence of Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church had attempted to meet this challenge by changing its name to reflect greater autonomy from Moscow. Undoubtedly, Metropolitan Filaret realized that the very survival of his church in Ukraine could depend on endorsing Ukraine's independence when he publicly appealed to all citizens to vote "Yes". Religious institutions and personnel were courted during the referendum campaign, and religion was being used to

help awaken Ukrainian national consciousness. If the Russian (Ukrainian) Orthodox Church had refused to endorse Ukraine's independence, its property could have been transferred by the Supreme Council to the Ukrainian churches, and justified as being part of the process of establishing an independent Ukrainian state.

Ukrainian Television and Radio were not politically neutral but under direct orders from the Supreme Council to focus all their resources to insure that the citizens voted "Yes" to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine. Anatolii Kovalevsky, President of the Ukrainian Television and Radio Company, was even named a member of the Temporary Commission chaired by Ivan Pliushch. All programs, all interviews broadcast by Ukrainian Television and Radio were highly politicized and aimed at propagating the "Yes" vote. On the other hand, Moscow-Central Television was totally committed to the "No" vote, even refusing Chairman L. Kravchuk air time except for one broadcast on November 30. Moscow television refused to broadcast the jointly produced American-Ukrainian "Yes" commercials. The television and radio media were still in their Soviet mould, not having evolved into more objective and balanced sources of news coverage, analysis, and programming.

All Ukrainian- and Russian-language newspapers published in Ukraine were owned or sponsored by an institution, association, political party, or government, and were totally committed to the "Yes" vote. While providing some news coverage, newspapers were closer to election campaign literature that continuously provided the reader with material and a viewpoint that supported the "Yes" side. Printing

presses were owned by the state and controlled by the former nomenklatura. Newsprint was scarce. Ukraine's newspapers had not evolved into presenting a more objective, balanced, and diverse coverage of news.

Rukh originally had been formed as an umbrella organization of social, cultural, and political groups opposed to the CPU's monopoly of power and in favour of a democratic, pluralistic society with a mixed economic system. Rukh had advocated the total independence of Ukraine. During 1990 and 1991, Rukh supporters had organized numerous and massive pro-independence demonstrations in front of the Supreme Council, with many supporters transported in from Western Ukraine. Outside of Western Ukraine and Kyiv, Rukh had no organizational presence, few supporters, and was perceived as a fringe political movement in most oblasts and regions until Chairman L. Kravchuk and his supporters adopted Rukh's platform. It was presidential candidate L. Kravchuk and his supporters that controlled the infrastructure to propagate successfully Rukh's original platform throughout Central, Eastern, and Southern Ukraine. Ukraine's referendum campaign and the adoption of most of Rukh's platform by the former Communists greatly increased Rukh's stature in Ukraine and among the Ukrainian diaspora in the West. Rukh provided the campaign platform while Chairman L. Kravchuk and his supporters delivered the "Yes" vote outside of Western Ukraine. Rukh's presidential candidate V. Chornovil regards his 23.27% vote to closely reflect Rukh's strength throughout Ukraine. Rukh supporters refrained from criticizing the CPU's record and its former members, instead joining with other "Yes" supporters to shift all blame for all problems

in Ukraine onto the Union-centre in Moscow.

Ukrainian university students have been at the forefront of demanding political, economic, and educational change. Their 1990 hunger strike had forced the resignation of Ukraine's Prime Minister. They had established a decentralized, independent Students' Union with active members in all major cities, in all oblasts, who actively campaigned for Ukraine's independence. During the campaign the students were cautious and disillusioned with Rukh, and after the referendum endorsed the Republican and New Ukraine Parties. They are impatient and determined to build a strong Ukrainian state, placing state creation above individual and civil rights. Their organization and political ideas are still evolving, and most of the students that the author worked with expressed political aspirations, including running for the Supreme Council in the next federal election.

In Ukraine, opinion poll surveys were relatively new during the referendum campaign. Opinion polling had not been a prime necessity during the Soviet era of one-party rule. To monitor the progress of the referendum campaign the Supreme Council instructed the Social Research Group to conduct opinion poll surveys. These Opinion Polls were not scientific, random samples where each individual in the population had an equal chance of being included but rather based on a multi-stepped quota system that attempted to include representatives of all the main social-demographic groups in Ukraine's population. The Social Research Group was not consistent in its standards in gathering, analysing, and reporting information. Furthermore, the Social Research Groups failed to track through subsequent polling any problems and concerns raised by

the population sampled. For example, data from the first referendum opinion poll indicated that fewer women than men would vote and that the national minorities were concerned about their future status and rights within an independent Ukraine. However, no subsequent Social Research Group's opinion polls dealt with these issues.

In its courtship of the national minorities, the Supreme Council guaranteed by law the equality of all citizens regardless of nationality. An independent Ukraine would not be an ethnically-pure Ukrainian state but one encompassing all citizens, of all nationalities, where all national languages and cultures were guaranteed to be able to flourish. At the Odessa Congress it was agreed that every citizen was to be regarded as a Ukrainian, regardless of ethnicity, ending the Soviet practise of recording an individual's ethnic origin on internal passports. Representatives of the national minorities forged a Social Contract when they accepted the government's guarantee of equality in return for supporting Ukraine's independence. It should be noted that it is doubtful that the representatives of the national/cultural associations represented at the Odessa Congress could deliver the votes of their ethnic communities. The Odessa Resolution was important for publicizing the state's guarantee of equality to all national minorities, for sending a signal that the national minorities endorsed Ukraine's independence, and for encouraging all national minorities to become involved in the national rebirth of their Ukraine.

The referendum results confirm that the overwhelming "Yes" vote was not determined solely by the awakening of Ukrainian national consciousness and by Rukh. In oblasts and regions where Ukrainian

national consciousness was weak and Rukh's influences and presence insignificant, the "Yes" vote was as overwhelming as in nationally conscious Western Ukraine. The electorate voted "Yes" to confirm The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine for a variety of reasons. Many wanted to establish a Ukrainian state because they were nationally conscious Ukrainians. Many others voted for Ukraine's independence because they perceived presidential candidate L. Kravchuk as a "safer" head of government than what was offered in Moscow; many former CPU members endorsed Ukraine's independence to protect their privileged positions and isolate Ukraine from the upheaval in Moscow; military officers were provided with a form of asylum during the purge in Moscow; the national minorities were guaranteed equality and respect for their culture and language; reformers and student activists were promised reforms; and all citizens were promised higher living standards and better lifestyles in an independent Ukraine. By placing 100% of the blame for all problems and shortages in Ukraine on Moscow, the Union-centre had been further discredited. To many, Russian President Yeltsin did not provide an attractive alternative to Chairman L. Kravchuk. The Ukrainian state's resources and former apparatycky were mobilized and directed to insuring an overwhelming "Yes" vote and a high participation in the referendum. Ukraine's independence was achieved through alliances of former Communist and Non-Communist deputies, and of all vocation groups and nationalities in Ukraine, under the astute political leadership of Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine's Second President.

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Appendices A through H, pages 163 through 229, containing material that had been published in Ukraine has been removed due to potential copyright infringements.

APPENDIX I

ADDITIONAL OBLAST REFERENDUM RESULTS

Table 17.--Referendum results for Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Bohorodchany	47,082	97.0	46,733	99.3
Dolyna	63,195	95.8	62,417	98.8
Halych	49,948	98.1	49,740	99.58
Horodenka	46,897	99.1	46,445	99.05
Ivano-Frankivsk city	148,240	90.3	141,375	95.4
Kalush	45,052	99.3	44,834	99.5
Kalush city	45,563	92.13	44,720	98.15
Kolomyia	42,255	83.5	40,723	96.4
Kolomyia	70,878	99.2	70,451	99.4
Kosiv	65,441	95.9	64,695	98.9
Nadvirna	71,953	97.0	71,265	99.0
Rohatyn	42,879	99.1	42,730	99.65
Rozhniativ	51,199	97.0	50,823	99.3
Sniatyn	51,269	98.8	50,652	98.8
Tlumach	39,287	96.9	38,974	99.2
Tysmench	59,931	99.9	59,712	99.6
Verkhovyna	19,960	95.7	19,480	97.6
Yaremcha city	14,627	96.9	14,510	99.2
Oblast total/average	975,655	95.73	960,281	98.42

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

Table 18.--Referendum results for Zhytomyr Oblast

District	Votes Cast Number	Voted %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Andrushivka	30,261	99.9	29,413	97.2
Baranivka	34,074	99.9	32,593	95.7
Berdychiv	26,516	99.9	26,096	98.4
Berdychiv city	63,538	87.2	59,082	92.9
Bohun	87,033	80.8	80,072	92.0
Brusylivka	12,070	99.9	11,671	96.7
Chudniv-Volynskiy	35,056	99.0	32,775	93.5
Horbashi	25,068	94.2	24,495	97.7
Korolovka	76,823	76.9	71,078	92.5
Korosten	33,158	96.6	32,290	97.3
Korosten city	39,477	81.3	36,565	92.6
Korostyshiv	32,277	99.6	31,045	96.0
Kurne	18,732	96.8	18,169	97.0
Lechanivka	23,309	99.0	22,746	97.0
Luhyny	17,513	96.1	16,943	96.7
Malyn	39,850	99.9	38,633	97.0
Novohrad-Volynskiy	38,910	99.9	37,699	96.9
Novohrad-Volynskiy city	37,685	88.6	33,927	89.0
Olevsk	34,183	99.9	32,112	94.1
Ovruch	13,677	99.9	13,342	97.6
Ovruch city	57,083	99.9	54,055	94.7
Razine	25,410	99.9	24,671	96.9
Smilchyn	34,007	99.9	33,134	97.4
Turchynka	27,796	99.9	26,851	96.6
Zhytomyr	46,378	91.0	45,597	94.0
Oblast total/average	1,000,425	96.5	950,976	94.9

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

Table 19.--Referendum results for Kirovohrad Oblast

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Bobrynets	23,976		22,514	
Dobrovelyckivka	31,304		29,111	
Dolynska	26,668		25,426	
Haivoron	32,668		31,072	
Holovanivsk	27,747		26,044	
Kirovohrad	26,115		24,778	
Kirovohrad city	174,211		159,473	
Kompaniivka	13,928		13,253	
Mala Vyska	37,137		34,963	
Novhorodka	14,668		14,076	
Novoarkhanhelsk	25,099		24,067	
Novomyrhorod	27,213		26,074	
Novoukrainka	36,032		34,178	
Oleksandriia	31,158		29,652	
Oleksandriia city	66,540		61,760	
Oleksandrivka	29,484		28,778	
Onufriivka	18,276		17,518	
Petrive	20,412		19,192	
Svitlovodsk	13,668		12,959	
Svitlovodsk city	39,427		36,197	
Ulianovka	22,906		22,091	
Ustynivka	13,423		12,597	
Vilshanka	12,651		11,914	
Znamianka	24,037		22,880	
Znamianka city	25,105		23,486	
Oblast total/average	813,833	88.1	765,053	93.7

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

Table 20.--Referendum results for Mykolaiv Oblast

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Arbuzynka	19,216		17,927	
Bashtanka	28,444		25,927	
Berezanka	16,680		15,257	
Berezhneuvate	17,091		15,649	
Bratske	16,157		15,186	
Domanivka	21,168		19,808	
Kazanka	19,470		17,583	
Kryve Ozero	20,987		19,507	
Mykolaiv	25,007		22,827	
Mykolaiv city	318,264		256,868	
Nova Odesa	25,039		22,331	
Novyi Buh	24,116		22,424	
Ochakiv	10,775		9,800	
Ochakiv city	11,452		9,425	
Pervomaisk	29,869		28,082	
Pervomaisk city	51,079		45,234	
Pivdennoukrainsk city	16,399		14,345	
Snihyrivka	32,762		29,766	
Veselynove	19,569		17,638	
Voznesensk	24,448		22,238	
Voznesenk city	27,403		25,153	
Vradiivka	14,713		13,510	
Yelanets	13,725		12,521	
Zhovtneve	35,970		35,183	
Oblast total/average	819,808		732,179	

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.

Table 21.--Referendum results for Volhynia Oblast

District	Votes Cast Number	Votes %	"Yes" Votes	"Yes" %
Horokhiv city				96.0
Ivanychi				97.8
Kamin-Kashypskyi city				94.3
Kivertsi city				97.4
Kovel				95.5
Kovel city				96.6
Liubeshiv				95.5
Liuboml				95.4
Lokachi				96.6
Lutsk				95.5
Lutsk city				98.1
Manevychi				96.8
Nova Volynsk				97.2
Ratne				94.7
Rozhyshe				96.0
Stara Vyzhivka				97.2
Turiisk				97.6
Volodymyr-Volynskyi city				96.6
Oblast average				96.3

Source: Rukh's Kyiv Central Office.