

**University of Alberta**

Constructing the Patriarch in the Personal Responsibility Act



by

Alexa DeGagne

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 2008



Library and  
Archives Canada

Bibliothèque et  
Archives Canada

Published Heritage  
Branch

Direction du  
Patrimoine de l'édition

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

*Your file* *Votre référence*  
*ISBN: 978-0-494-46955-2*  
*Our file* *Notre référence*  
*ISBN: 978-0-494-46955-2*

**NOTICE:**

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

**AVIS:**

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

---

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.

■ ■ ■  
**Canada**

## **Abstract**

This thesis examines how the father is defined through the provisions relating to paternity testing, child support payments, fatherhood programs and marriage promotion in the United States' Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and its funding mechanism, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). In addition to the discursive construction of these programs, I examine social conservative influences in congressional debates and social movement rhetoric at the time that the PRWORA was initially passed (1996) and during its re-authorization in 2005. As will be seen, the PRWORA defines the father, and male citizen, in terms of three fundamental familial roles: provider, protector and authority. Fathers thus become true citizens by taking financial responsibility for their families, by representing their families in the larger society as well as shielding their families from society's most negative effects, and by being moral and disciplinary authorities. Moreover, in assuming these roles, fathers also embody the ideal citizen and personify a specifically socially conservative articulation of the American nation.

## **Acknowledgements**

Lois Harder, your guidance, commitment and encouragement ensured the success of this project.

To the members of my committee, Judith Garber and Andre Grace, thank you for engaging so enthusiastically with my work.

Mom, Dad, Kent, and Brenda thank you for the years of love and unquestioning support.

Dave, Derrique, Liz and Jean, I love you guys. Thank you for keeping me grounded and entertained.

Sarah Yahn, I am grateful for your love and unwavering faith in me and this work.

Megan Gaucher your friendship, passion and sense of humour got me through every step of this project.

Alison McEwen, Matthew Gordner, Greg Queyranne, Stephanie Fletcher and Kit Darling, thank you for the never ending discussions, the nights out and the therapy sessions. Your friendships are invaluable to me.

For Mom

## Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter One: Theoretical Framework	9
Introduction	9
Defining Social Conservatism	11
Family Values and the Nation	14
The Strict Father State and Moral Strength	22
Social Conservatives' American Nation	26
The Characteristics of the Strong Father	36
A) Father as Protector	38
B) Father as Provider	40
C) Father as Authority	44
The Collapse of Fatherhood	46
Conclusion	53
Chapter Two: Bringing the Father Back	56
Beyond the Paper Dad: Paternity Tests and Child Support	60
Fatherhood Programs	70
Marriage as All Encompassing	85
Conclusion	101
Conclusion	104
Bibliography	109

## **Introduction**

This thesis examines how the father is defined through the provisions relating to paternity testing, child support payments, fatherhood programs and marriage promotion in the United States' Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and its funding mechanism, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). In addition to the discursive construction of these programs, I examine social conservative influences in congressional debates and social movement rhetoric at the time that the PRWORA was initially passed (1996) and during its re-authorization in 2005. As will be seen, the PRWORA defines the father, and male citizen, in terms of three fundamental familial roles: provider, protector and authority. Fathers thus become true citizens by taking financial responsibility for their families, by representing their families in the larger society as well as shielding their families from society's most negative effects, and by being moral and disciplinary authorities. Moreover, in assuming these roles, fathers also embody the ideal citizen and personify a specifically socially conservative articulation of the American nation.

Feminist scholars have argued that the implementation of the PRWORA punishes single-mothers (Mink 2003; Dubler 2003), promotes heterosexuality (Snyder 2003), and is particularly punitive to non-white women (Hirschmann 2003). While the class and racialized effects of PRWORA on women have received considerable attention, less work has engaged how the PRWORA envisions masculinity and fatherhood. My aim is to shift the analytical framework of feminist scholarship toward men and fatherhood, and to explore the relationship between the social conservative articulation of the family and its vision of the American national identity.

Mere living within certain borders may determine political membership, but it does not determine citizenship. Rather, citizenship entitlements are granted on the basis of the degree to which an individual has or can assimilate to specific normative criteria that are claimed as defining the national identity. And of course, national citizenship has historically been constructed through religion, race, ethnicity and gender (Stychin 1998, 2-3; Yuval-Davis 1997, 11-12). Citizenship is regulated by various state<sup>1</sup> agencies but its content is influenced by contestation among political parties, social movements, advocacy organizations, think tanks, religious groups, public opinion, media reports, and international pressures (Yuval-Davis 1997, 76-77). Because citizenship is a social construction, criteria for belonging are subject to change and manipulation. Access to public goods and to positive social status are a function of a person's willingness to subscribe to the state's view of the model citizen. Thus criteria of belonging are often used as tools for creating and maintaining hierarchal power, creating a powerful elite, and excluding and punishing certain groups of people. In short, certain rights are curtailed, restricted or retracted until the citizen conforms to state and socially-sanctioned roles and associated conduct (Stychin 1998, 13-18).

---

<sup>1</sup> For this thesis, I have adopted Bob Jessop's definition of the state. Jessop enumerates several considerations pertaining to his theory of the modern state. First, the state is based on the "territorialization of political power." (Jessop 2003, 30) This implies that the state has exclusive power over a given territory. Jessop explains that the legitimacy of state power is based on "socially constructed division of the global political order into many territorially exclusive, mutually recognizing, mutually legitimating sovereign states." (Jessop 2003, 31) Second, Jessop distinguishes between the national state and the nation-state. National states refers to territorial statehood. He argues that few states are nation-states in which state territory is defined exclusively according to a dominant nation. The American state, as such, cannot be defined as a nation-state as multiple nations exist, to varying degrees of power and influence, within the state territory. Third, in most liberal economies, states influence and are influenced by the economic sphere. This is to say that "the state plays a key role here not only in securing the general institutional framework for profit-oriented, market-mediated economic activities but also in shaping their specific forms, organization and overall dynamic." (Jessop 2003, 32) As will be seen, the current American state, under neo-conservative and neo-liberal influence, is heavily involved in upholding the liberal capitalist economy.



Currently in the United States, social conservative ideology, which champions Judeo-Christian morality, white and western European history, and the patriarchal heterosexual family model, plays a commanding, if contested, role in defining the American national identity. Heteronormativity and its attendant form of patriarchal hierarchy marks the continuity among the nuclear, reproductive family, a fundamentalist Christian morality and a paternalistic conception of the nation-state (Yuval-Davis 1997, 15). This is to say that the Conservative vision of the American nation is built on certain non-negotiable beliefs about gender. Male citizens are understood to be strong, independent, rational and protective. Female citizens are presumed to be weak, dependent, emotional and fragile (Cusack 2000). Carole Pateman and Wendy Brown argue that this conception of men and women is based on a gendered division of labour, the divide between the public and the private spheres and the sexual contract (Pateman 1988; Brown 1995). Essentially, within a sexual (marriage) contract women are relegated to the private sphere where they perform domestic and child raising duties. Complementarily, men perform their citizenship roles predominantly in the public sphere as contributing members of the political and economic arenas. For Conservatives, these beliefs about gender and citizenship are reinforced through their connection to specific moral conduct. Essentially, it would be immoral, irrational, unnatural and ungodly to act against one's gender role. The nation state and its families would be rendered weak, dependent and open to invasion, and the nation's families would collapse if men abdicated their natural roles as protectors (Lakoff 1996).

According to social conservatives, their idealized form of the American nation is under constant attack. William Bennett argues that anti-American radicalism finds its

roots in 1930s communist activism in the United States. By pitting communists and left-wing ‘radicals’ as the attackers of the American nation, Bennett is able to define the nation according to ideological lines and thereby exclude individuals and groups from the nation if they do not conform to a right-wing definition of membership. Anti-American movements experienced ebbs and flows of influence throughout the twentieth century (Bennett 2002, 131-155).<sup>2</sup> By the early 1960s, the Civil Rights movement, feminists, and gay rights advocates were gaining significant momentum and influence throughout American society. Although these counter-cultural movements each had unique goals, tactics, and political bases, the movements had a commonality: they all fundamentally challenged the heteronormative hierarchy of the American nation envisioned by social conservatives. In particular, the feminist and gay rights movements challenged traditional gender roles and rejected the notion that the nuclear family was the only moral form of kinship (Johnson et al. 2007).

Not surprisingly, the political and economic elites (generally conservative, white, upper class men) believed that these movements were a threat to their conception of the nation and to their political, economic and social power. According to Grossberg:

Much of the [social conservative] rhetoric starts with a ‘rupture theory of history,’ locating the ‘fall’ of ‘America’ somewhere between 1965 and 1975, marked by such events as the counterculture, Vietnam, Watergate, and the growing power of the media/popular culture. (Grossberg 2001, 265)

According to Grossberg, various right-wing constituencies viewed the counter-culture movements of the 1960s as having gutted the American nation of its values, traditions and strength. These right wing groups further claimed that there was a moral and

---

<sup>2</sup> Bennett emphasizes that after September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 the left-wing attack on the integrity, legitimacy and actions of the American nation was reinvigorated. According to Bennett, left-wing academics, media and politicians jumped on the opportunity to blame the actions and ethos of the American nation for the attacks (Bennett 2002, 131-155).

emotional void that was growing among Americans. Women were in the workforce, men were dodging the draft and children were being raised in 'broken' homes. People lacked ethical commitments, leading to a kind of 'soullessness' as they rejected 'natural' and traditional gender roles and hierarchies (Grossberg 2001, 265).

These apocalyptic assessments were articulated in a right-wing backlash movement against feminists, homosexuals and liberals in general. Since the 1960s, the social conservative wing of the American right, in particular, has attempted to rebuild its moral nation by promoting traditional gender roles.<sup>3</sup> Groups holding this ideological commitment argue that the best way to maintain traditional gender roles is within the structure of the nuclear family (Faludi 1991). To restore their vision of the nation and uphold the heterosexual family, the right generally, has invoked nationalistic discourse and rhetoric. Proponents of right-wing ideology have manipulated political debate, by monopolizing discussions on morality, family values and the nation (Lakoff 1995). Alarmingly, the right's social conservative definitions and interpretations of gendered moral conduct have widely influenced national social policy innovations since at least the 1980s.

Policies surrounding same-sex marriage, abortion and welfare policy are deeply affected by the social conservative conception of the nation (Cossman 1995; Page 2006; Smith 2001-2002). For example, in support of a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage, President George W. Bush stated in 2004:

The union of a man and a woman is the most enduring human institution, honored and encouraged in all cultures and by every religious faith [...] Marriage cannot be severed from its cultural, religious and natural roots without weakening the good influence of society. (CNN, February 25, 2004)

---

<sup>3</sup> Refer to p.9-12 for a complete definition and discussion of the various elements of conservatism that will be employed in this paper.

As these comments indicate, policy initiatives regarding these issues have been debated, written and regulated according to certain gendered and moral notions of citizenship. Yet according to Anna Marie Smith, analyses of welfare policies and critical interrogations of sexual politics have largely ignored each other. Smith views this mutual ignorance as intellectually galling and politically dangerous. She argues that

Welfare policy has become a prominent site of sexual regulation; that the rights of poor single mothers are at stake in this respect; and that given the precise structure of contemporary American welfare reform. (Smith 2001-2002, 125)

Similarly, Johnson et. al. draw a connection between welfare policy and gender. They state that the PRWORA explicitly addresses and regulates issues of family structure, child raising, women and labour, and the “sexual behavior of virtuous citizens.” Federal and state governments regulate citizens’ sexuality, familial form and function and gender identities by setting up rigid lifestyle, behavior and work requirements for individuals to qualify for and receive aid (Johnson et. al. 2007, 12). Smith, Johnson et.al. and other feminist welfare theorists argue that the current welfare model embodied by the PRWORA restricts women’s personal freedom as the government surveys women’s private lives, controls women’s sexual behavior, job status, and actions as mothers and wives. In an attempt to relinquish the economic burden of national welfare policy, the federal government has made it more difficult for people to qualify for welfare, reduced the amount of time people are allowed to receive welfare, and placed an emphasis on the importance of the nuclear family as the primary economic unit of society (Smith 2001-2002). Smith and Johnson et. al. therefore argue that the PRWORA is a blatant case of civic behavior modification based on certain notions of gender and morality (Smith 2007; Johnson et al. 2007; Abramovitz 2000; Mink 2003).

Because of Smith's important insight regarding the analytical failure to address sexuality and welfare policy, it is also important to turn our gaze to the role of men and masculinity in this set of policy prescriptions. Just as the civic rights of poor women and mothers have been threatened through the PRWORA, so too have the rights of poor men and fathers. The PRWORA regulates the sexual, gendered and familial conduct of poor men according to a social conservative conception of the American nation. Essentially, fathers fulfill their national citizenship role by taking financial, moral and authoritative responsibility for their children and the mothers of their children.

Accordingly, this thesis will be comprised of two chapters. The first chapter presents the theoretical framework for the paper. I define American social conservatism, analyze how social conservatives define and use the rhetorical power of family values to promote their ideal family and nation, define the social conservative's articulation of the American nation, described the associated male and female citizenship roles, and present the history of the American Backlash movement that has problematized fatherlessness, demonized independent women and sought to re-empower the nuclear family. Essentially, social conservatives have mounted an ideological, political, moral and national campaign to return fathers to their former position as the breadwinning patriarch. As such, in the second chapter I will analyze the PRWORA, and its 2005 reauthorization, to exemplify the influence, power and manifestations of the social conservative articulation of the American nation and the corresponding role of the male citizen. Specifically, I will be using PRWORA congressional debates during its establishment and reauthorization, and PRWORA policies and programs to discern how the male citizen is conditioned through this policy. The PRWORA's paternity testing, child

support, fatherhood programs and marriage promotion programs will be analyzed in turn to show that each program promotes the breadwinning patriarch, albeit through different tactics. It will be shown that the PRWORA focused on marriage promotion as a primary solution to welfare dependency because the marriage contract assures that the father is legally obliged to take financial responsibility for his wife and children. Through these four welfare programs, the male citizen is conditioned to assume the gendered, hierarchal and familial roles of provider, authority and protector within his family. These fathers thereby embody the ideal American male citizen and uphold the social conservative monopoly over the articulation of the American nation.

## **Chapter One: Theoretical Framework**

### **Introduction**

This chapter draws on the work of Carl Stychin, Tricia Cusack, Nira Yuval Davis, and Wendy Brown to present a theoretical grounding for my argument that the nation, as envisioned by American social conservatives is a social construction in which citizenship roles are gendered and performed according to familial structures and hierarchies. I also draw on the contributions of Heidi Nast, Stephen Ducat and George Lakoff who argue, from different perspectives, that the political right conceives of the American nation as a family in which the state is necessarily the patriarchal, father-like authority (Nast 1998; Ducat 2004; Lakoff 1996). Lakoff has established the ‘Strict Father’ model to articulate and analyze the right’s conception of the patriarchal state in relation to the national family (Lakoff 1996, 21). A mutually reinforcing relationship is established in which the social conservative model imagines that the nation-state should be administered by a patriarchal state and the family is to emulate that nation state structure. Within the family fathers are to assume a state like position by being the protector, provider and authority.

Membership within the nation is coveted as it offers status, representation, protection and rights (Stychin 1998, 15-18). In the social conservative imaginary, national citizenship would be strictly limited to people willing to perform heterosexual gender roles and establish nuclear family structures. In order to fortify the connection between the nation and the family, social conservatives have used morality, specifically “family values,” to render both institutions sacred, uncontestable and powerful. As will be seen, social conservatives have used family values rhetoric to argue that the patriarchal

nuclear family is the only family model that should be accepted and promoted by the state (Stacey 1998, 2-3).

A profoundly gendered hierarchy is thus perpetuated through this particular vision of the American nation-state. To discern, articulate, analyze and dismantle the gendered nature of the American nation-state, Wendy Brown asserts that theorists must deconstruct the terms and discourse that “configure and organize” political ideology, public policy and popular consciousness (Brown 1995, 138). Accordingly, this chapter will lay out the social conservative conception of the family, the nation and their relationship to each other. On this basis I will turn, in the next chapter, to show that the power and influence of the social conservative conceptualization of the nation is manifested in both the political context in which welfare reform emerged on the political agenda and in the content of the 1990s overhaul of American welfare policy in the form of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).

This chapter will be divided into six sections. I begin by defining the current state of American social conservatism. I will then demonstrate that social conservatives have used and monopolized family values rhetoric to promote their conception of the nation. Third, I will elaborate Lakoff’s argument that social conservatism is based on interconnected metaphors of Moral Strength and Strict Father governance. In the fourth section I will extend this argument to examine how social conservatives use gender, the family and morality to construct and maintain their conception of the American nation. In particular, this section will show how the nation is constructed as a family and how mothers are charged with producing the nation. I then establish the metaphorical and practical relationship between fatherhood and statehood. As such, this section will be



sub-divided according to the three shared roles of fatherhood and statehood: protector, provider and authority. I conclude with an analysis of the so-called collapse of fatherhood and its implications for the survival and strength of the social conservative nation. As we will see, social conservatives have been highly successful in using their conception of the nation to influence public policy, sustain social movements and define citizenship according to the nuclear family structure.

### **Defining Social Conservatism**

My analysis combines the insights of George Lakoff, Johnson et. al. and Brenda Cossman concerning the current preoccupations of the social conservative movement in the United States. Admittedly there are several factions within social conservatism, including moral conservatism and various religious conservatisms. Johnson et. al. argue, however, that social, moral and religious conservatism can be best analyzed by classifying them as traditionally conservative or social (neo) conservative (Johnson et. al. 2007, 41). Traditional conservatism is based on a meritocracy: “the individual rises to a level of merit inside the capitalist market structure with minimal regulation.” (Johnson et. al. 2007, 41) Thus, hard work and self-reliance are essential personal characteristics if an individual is to survive in a market economy. Individuals are to rely on familial and communal private solutions rather than depend on social programs provided by a welfare state. Social conservatism is also structured around meritocracy and the economic freedom of the individual. Yet social conservatism differs from its traditional variant as it emphasizes a moral social order that is based on patriarchal notions of family, gender and religion. Most interestingly, social conservatives want to use state power to create and

enforce these moral ideals. Johnson et. al. call this a 'reinstitutionalized tradition.' (2007, 43) Reinstitutionalized tradition results in social order dominating an individual's freedom. Citizens are rewarded, punished or neglected by the state based on whether or not they conform to the prevailing moral order and norms. Despite advocating for a smaller government, social conservatives wish to use public policy to reinforce morals and traditions in the private lives of citizens (Johnson et. al. 2007, 41-44).

While Johnson et. al. differentiate between traditional and social conservatism, it is clear that the factions overlap in terms of their fundamental attachments to individualism and government intervention to ensure social order. George Lakoff defines American conservatism since the 1980s as being based on a classical conservative ideology. Accordingly, conservatives are described as very reactionary; they are nostalgic for an earlier, mythic era devoid of social decay and chaos. Their policies and politics are heavily based on a certain moral order; they believe in hierarchy and therefore oppose egalitarianism; and they are pessimistic about human nature (Lakoff 2006, 83-101). Brenda Cossman adds that social and moral conservatism are distinguished from fiscal conservatism. Fiscal conservatives hold that the individual is a rational, self-interested unit in society whose freedom is dependent on a lack of state intervention. The state should not be responsible for maintaining moral order or value systems. The state exists to assure the economic and social freedom of its citizens (Cossman 2005, 433). Conversely, social conservatism reflects traditional conservative philosophy's focus on community, family, patriarchal authority, social order and traditionalism. As Cossman states:

Individuals are first and foremost members of communities, united by common morals, values and traditions. While conservatives are wary about arbitrary state

power, they are not adverse to the state but rather see it as a necessary component of social order and the promotion of virtue. Within this vision, the family is the basic unit of society, forging individuals together through its moral authority, instilling children with moral values and traditions. (Cossman 2005, 433)

Since the New Right movement of the 1970s, American conservatism has been fragmented as factions contest the role of the state in individuals' private lives. According to Cossman, social and moral conservatives began to attribute all of society's social and economic problems to the breakdown of the traditional family. Interestingly, social conservatives claimed that the federal government was promoting a skewed and detrimental vision of the American family. Since the 1970s, social conservatives have attacked government programs and laws that pertained to welfare, divorce, day-care, affirmative action, abortion, and gay rights as causing moral, social and national decay. Admittedly, all of these programs and laws allowed the structure and definition of the family to evolve away from the patriarchal, nuclear model. But according to social conservatives, the disappearance of morality, structure, social roles and self-reliance that came with the breakdown of the traditional family also contributed to the nation's rising poverty, crime rates, and welfarism (Cossman 2005, 435). Mimi Abramovitz counters this social conservative claim, arguing that the social changes of the 1970s, including increased welfare take-up rates and poverty, occurred as a result of a nationally slowing economy, the loss of American dominance in the world economy, cheap foreign labour, and a diminished welfare state that was initiated by President Carter in the late 1970s. Women, single-mothers and their children were particularly vulnerable to poverty and welfare dependence under these conditions due to the gendered wage gap and labor force discrimination (Abramovitz 2000, 17-18). Regardless of this alternate explanation, social

conservatives continue to push policy makers to promote and restore the gendered, hierarchical roles and structure of the traditional family.

Thus a combination of Johnson et. al., Lakoff and Cossman's definitions provide a compelling description of the current state of American social conservatism. Lakoff states that social conservatives are very reactionary, pessimistic about human nature and hierarchical. They therefore believe that the government should maintain moral order through public policy. Further, Johnson et. al. articulate that the difference between traditional and social conservatism is that the latter believes that the state should uphold a particular gendered moral order. Finally Cossman articulates that the family is the moral and economic base unit of society for social conservatives. When taken together, these three views help us to understand the social conservative demand for governmental intervention to privilege, empower and reward the traditional family in order to stop moral decay, and uphold economic meritocracy and social hierarchy.

### **Family Values and the Nation**

During the Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush Administrations, the Moral Majority and other 'pro-family' Christian groups worked to shift the Republican party toward overt support for anti-feminist, anti-gay and anti-abortion rhetoric, politicians and policies (Stacey 1998, 2-3). Family values rhetoric, which championed the nuclear family as the most moral, stable, healthy, and efficient family model, emerged as a very effective and emotive tool of social conservative groups. Moreover, as Judith Stacey argues, in the 1990s family values rhetoric expanded beyond the right's monopoly and original focus. (Stacey 1998, 52-55). Liberals, conservatives, feminists and especially gay rights

activists attempted to redefine family values to include ‘alternative families’ that were not based on traditional gender roles, hierarchies or structures. Essentially, these groups hoped to reclaim family values language in order to end the social conservative monopoly on the rhetorical and moral power of the term (Stacey 1996, 3-5).

As will be seen in the next chapter, some Democrats and liberals have knowingly or unknowingly capitulated to conservative influence, and adopted and promoted social conservative family values. Yet despite the political dominance of the ‘traditional’ patriarchal vision of the family, social conservatives nonetheless assert that their preferred family structure is endangered. Social conservatives claim that the liberal ‘post-modern family’ has replaced the nuclear family as the preferred and dominant American family. The ‘post-modern family’ is defined as a liberal attack on the traditional family in that it lacks structure, tradition, and ‘proper’ gender roles (Stacey 1996, 7). It is therefore devoid of the morality, values and sacredness of the patriarchal family. The ‘post-modern family’ is said to represent the “contested, ambivalent and undefined character of our current family cultures” (Stacey 1996, 7).

Nonetheless, social conservative family values have gained political saliency, in large part, I argue, because of the popular appeal of the claim that fatherlessness is a serious social problem and that it has reached crisis proportions. Wade Horn, George W. Bush’s Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, asserts that fatherlessness has become an epidemic and that the patriarchal nuclear family is an institution that needs to be revalued, respected and widely practiced (Horn 1999, 3). Fatherlessness has been blamed for the social, moral and economic failures of American families since the 1980s.

Accordingly, feminists, liberal and queer family activists have been blamed for attacking, weakening and dismantling the moral integrity of American families.

I argue that the social conservative definition of family values has dominated political debate since the 1960s for several reasons. Family values have been used to justify re-entrenching tradition, maintaining patriarchal gender roles, using government intervention to enforce moral order, and maintaining a hierarchal society.

Marriage proponents construct the monogamous, heterosexual, and married lifestyle as the hallmark of gendered normality, maturity and morality, and they maintain that everyone who does not conform to this pattern is unfulfilled or deviant. On the bases of nature's or God's order, marriage proponents insist that for children and adults to be complete the marital union is necessary and must consist of a male and female. It is common for marriage proponents to use such concepts as "complementarity" and "parenting equation" to argue for the necessity of male-female and mother-father duality. In their campaigns, pro-marriage organizations frame their versions of social order as beyond politics and special-interests. (Gavanas 2004, 44)

Social conservative marriage-advocates use legislation, government intervention, nationalism, moral and religious rhetoric to normalize and naturalize heterosexuality and gender duality. They then claim that this heterosexual social order should be maintained by the state because it is an inherent and timeless aspect of American society, values and morality (Lakoff 1996, 31). As such, the social conservative definition of family values has dominated political discourse because it harnesses American familial, national, and moral affect and rhetoric. Social conservatives have done so by defining family values in three particular ways: family values now focus on the importance and social benefits of fatherhood; family values are based on Judeo-Christian morality that is both gendered and hierarchal; and family values are used to perpetuate, fortify and strengthen the American nation.

First, as Stacey and Lakoff argue, social conservatives' definition of family values has dominated political discourse because they have entrenched family values in discourse about the importance of fathers and the social consequences of fatherlessness (Stacey 1998, 52; Lakoff 1996, 31). Anna Gavanas observes that social conservative family values are founded on what she calls an "androcentric trinity:" men, marriage, and children (Gavanas 2004, 49). Women and mothers are taken for granted in this account. Women are necessary for the family to form but social conservatives have oriented family values rhetoric to focus on the father's role in the family.

Women are a necessary but marginal appendage within this male-centered trinity. While marriage proponents argue that marriage is good for men and children, they have little to say about what women get out of it, except perhaps protection and occasional assistance with tasks women are presumed to be biologically 'called' to anyway. (Gavanas 2004, 49)

Mothers' primary task is to reproduce a male-defined and male-lead family. Her agency is determined, conditioned and restricted by her role within the family, and ultimately by the authority of her husband. The father completes and validates the family because he renders the family self-sufficient and strong. Pro-marriage advocates then hold that the androcentric trinity is the foundation to social and moral order.

Liberals and queer activists have attempted to redefine family values by completely reconfiguring family structures to include queer, non-monogamous arrangements. Within these arrangements, fathers can be absent or non-patriarchal. By contrast, social conservatives argue that the strongest, most moral, financially stable and healthy family is lead by a father. Fatherhood movement advocate Dan Coats argues:

Of all the institutions that comprise civil society, the institution of the family is the most essential and the most endangered. Here we need to be specific: The most serious problem is absent, irresponsible fathers. It should not be

controversial, though it often is, to say that fathers are not expendable and families are not optional. (Coats 1999, 119)

Social conservative family values purport that the father-mother-child nuclear family is natural, moral, and financially interdependent. As Lehr adds: “There is a single, natural family, and that family is both patriarchal and self-sufficient.” (2003, 128) The nuclear family’s self-sufficiency hinges on the father as bread winner protector while the mother is to bear and raise the children in the private realm of the home. Martha Fineman defines the social conservative justification for the ‘sexual family’ accordingly: “The appropriate form of family because it is able to take advantage of the complementary roles that men and women play to deal with ‘inevitable dependencies.’” (Lehr 2003, 129) Social conservative family values are based on the notion that men and women are biologically different from each other in terms of physical strength and ability, intelligence, social intelligence, rationality, and emotionality. Harvard academic, and noted conservative, Harvey Mansfield asserts that men are stronger, more aggressive, rational, intelligent and social, and should therefore work directly in the public realm as political and economic actors (Mansfield 2006, 16-17). In tandem, social conservatives cite countless sociological studies to show that children born to fatherless families are more likely to be engaged in criminal, sexually promiscuous and welfare dependent lifestyles (Johnson et. al. 2007, 142). Only fathers can offer proper financial and moral support. Accordingly, single mother and queer family arrangements are cast as fragile immoral and potentially financially unstable social units (Popenoe 2005, 56).

Lehr states that since the early twentieth century, family structure has been used as a way to differentiate primitive societies from modern ones and that the nuclear family is a marker of civilization (Lehr 2003, 130-132). Social conservatives, and some



feminists, believe that male sexuality is a dangerous power. Men are 'by nature' sexually aggressive and feel a need to spread their seed. Thus social and moral conservatives argue that male sexual aggression can and must be contained within a marital relationship (Lehr 2003, 130-132). It is important to underscore that women are not understood as agents within this formulation. Social conservatives view women as lacking the rationality, cunning and power that are required to civilize men: women are therefore mere dependents and responsibilities. Rather, the civilizing force of marriage resides in the responsibility the institution conveys to men, requiring them to provide for and protect their families. (Griswald 1998, 16). Thus the father is a vital component of the family as he offers economic stability and moral direction. In turn, the institution of marriage can harness male aggression towards the protection and support of the nation's women and children.

Second, social conservatives shroud family values in Judeo-Christian morality. By attaching morality and religion and to the gendered roles and the structure of the family, social conservatives are able to establish a moral order.

The underlying purpose of all social institutions is to guide behavior in socially useful ways, toward the maintenance of an orderly social life in which citizens practice the social virtues of being kind and considerate, trusting and trustworthy, responsible and hardworking, honest and cooperative, and respectful to rules and legitimate authority. These virtues are essential underpinnings not only of social order but of civilization itself. They are the essence of the kind of society most people want and in which they thrive. Too seldom realized is the fact that only in such a society can true self-fulfillment be achieved. Marriage and the family are the pivotal institutions. They are the seedbeds of social virtue. They teach, cajole, promote, and reinforce moral and civil behavior [...] An individualism unencumbered by families and other social institutions, then, brings personal freedom of a sort, but it also brings a high level of individual deviance and social disorder in which the social virtues are largely absent or are 'used' cynically, as in financial scams and dishonest relationships. (Popenoe 1996, 46-47)

According to David Popenoe, traditionally Judeo-Christian values of self-sacrifice, loyalty, community, family and personal responsibility are American national values. And national social institutions, specifically the family, exist to promote moral stability and unity among citizens. Thus the family is the most important social institution in American society (Popenoe 1996, 46-47).

Moral order, it should be underscored, is determined and administered by men. Women are said to be more emotional and therefore better suited to tend to children and depend on their husbands. Johnson et. al. call this the “patriarchalism” of social conservatism. Patriarchalism is a gendered ideology that is founded on the belief that gender is God-ordained and biologically determined. Individuals can find moral self-fulfillment and social belonging through their gendered duties in the family. Based on fundamentalist religious tenets, patriarchalism holds that men (not women) were created in God’s image, are said to represent God’s presence on earth, and therefore should rule the private and public spheres. Although women are allowed to enter the public sphere to ‘fight for god’, women must submit to the dominance of the private patriarch (Johnson et. al. 2007, 61). Akin to Johnson et. al., Laqueur argues that for social conservatives, men are perceived as a conduit between God’s divinity and morality, and their families (Laqueur 1990, 209). Men are to act as the spiritual and moral ambassadors to the family. Based on their divine connection, fathers ultimately represent the moral authority within the family. As Johnson et. al. state: “Moral order is important, and moral men have the responsibility – and burden – to set the terms for all others. Men therefore should control public power, but they must do so in ways that enhance society.” (Johnson et. al. 2007, 62) Fathers are charged with being the moral authority over the family in order to assure

that their children are raised as loyal, disciplined, self-sacrificing citizens. Children are disciplined by the father according to certain social morals pertaining to sexual conduct, work ethic and respect for authority. Family values manifest social values as the hard working, sexually responsible and loyal child will be an asset to a society and nation based on a Judeo-Christian and social conservative nationalism.

Family values also propagate, promote and impose a social conservative vision of the American nation. As Coat states:

Families are the source not only of our personal values and security, but of our political, economic, and social order, as well. Any nation whose families are weak will eventually find itself without strong institutions of any kind (Coat 1999, 199)

Coat is asserting that the strength, structure and institutional integrity of the American nation are dependent on American families. The family offers social, political and economic order and - by extension - national strength. The father needs to be the head of the household in order to direct the members of the family towards select purposes: procreation, discipline and self-sufficiency. Women's primary role is to contribute to society by bearing and raising future citizens. Accordingly, the state should reward women who help the nation by raising children and by tending to their husbands (Johnson et. al. 2007, 63). Women are rewarded with the moral, social and economic status that accompanies heteronormative monogamous marriages. The state, like the father, is thereby responsible for assuring that this moral order is maintained and can thus enforce compliance. Those unwilling to fit into conventions must pay the price for deviation, primarily through stigmatization, abandonment and neglect.

National membership is thus attached to the moral nuclear family. As David Popenoe argues, a nation is built on common values and common values will assuredly

grow within nuclear families. In order to discern the rhetorical and ideological connection between nationalism, the family and morality, I will now turn to George Lakoff's argument that conservatives endorse a "Strict Father" model for the nation state that is gendered, hierarchical and punitive.

### **The Strict Father State and Moral Strength<sup>4</sup>**

George Lakoff defines the 'Strict Father' model of the family and the nation-state accordingly:

This model posits a traditional nuclear family, with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set overall policy, to set strict rules for behavior of children, and to enforce rules. The mother has the day-to-day responsibility for the care of the house, raising the children, and upholding the father's authority. Children must respect and obey their parents; by doing so they build character, that is, self-discipline and self-reliance [...] Once children are mature, they are on their own and must depend on their acquired self-discipline to survive. Their self-reliance gives them authority over their own destinies, and parents are not to meddle in their lives. (Lakoff 1996, 33)

The fatherly state in Lakoff's model is to run the nation according to certain morals and values in order to train citizens to be good, independent, and loyal. Accordingly, the

---

<sup>4</sup> Lakoff argues that both liberals and conservatives cast the family as a microcosm of the nation. As has been seen, the conservative national family model dominates because of its connection to the rhetorical power of family values. But for Lakoff it is also possible to discern a liberal conception of the nation through liberal family values. Lakoff explains that political liberalism:

Characterizes the cluster of political positions supported by people called 'liberals' in our everyday political discourse: support for social programs; environmentalism; public education; equal rights for women, gays, and ethnic minorities; affirmative action; the pro-choice position on abortion; and so on. (Lakoff 1996, 21)

In contrast to the "Strict Father" model of conservatives, liberals have adopted the 'Nurturant Parent' model. The 'Nurturant Parent' model is based on a fluid family structure consisting of any combination of parents. Unlike the 'Strict Father' model, the 'Nurturant Parent' model does not focus on its structure to dictate familial roles and responsibilities. Rather, the 'Nurturant Parent' model is focused on the care, upbringing and education of children through non- corporal but disciplinary tactics. Both models share the goal of producing self-reliant, self-disciplined and responsible citizens. But the 'Nurturant Parent' model seeks these ends by creating a nurturing, supportive environment. Most importantly, under this model, children are subordinate to their parents but the parents are equally responsible for the children in terms of specific tasks performed and roles played (Lakoff 1996, 108-110).

virtues of self-discipline and self-reliance are centrally important as traditional conservatives, neo-conservatives and social conservatives all hold that society is a meritocracy in which hard working, independent, self-reliant individuals necessarily rise to the top of the social hierarchy. Conservatives instill status, power and respect for rugged individuality by connecting these traits with morality. Under the 'Strict Father' model, a certain kind of moral conduct that is based on Judeo-Christian moral order is accepted, valued, and enforced by the state.<sup>5</sup>

According to Lakoff, conservative morality can be understood within a system of moral concepts and a metaphor, namely of Moral Strength (Lakoff 1996, 41-43)<sup>6</sup>. The concept of Moral Strength has an important set of entailments: the world is divided into good and evil; to remain good in the face of evil (to "stand up to" evil), one must be morally strong; one becomes morally strong through self-discipline and self-denial; someone who is morally weak cannot stand up to evil and so will eventually commit evil; moral weakness is a form of immorality; and lack of self-control (the lack of self-discipline) and self-indulgence (the refusal to engage in self-denial) are therefore forms of immorality (Lakoff 1995, 7). Conservatives believe that morality is not natural: people must be conditioned and learn to behave morally. In a metaphorical sense, Lakoff

---

<sup>5</sup> To prove that men are more aggressive and risk-takers, Mansfield points to the gender gap in recent American presidential elections. He argues that men have historically voted for Republicans because men are attracted to the risky Republican policies of self-reliance, a diminished welfare system, and aggressive foreign policy. Women, on the other hand, tend to support the Democratic party because women want and need the protection and security that the Democratic party has historically offered through the New Deal and the Great Society. Mansfield goes as far as to say that Democrats are the 'Mommy party' and Republicans are the 'Daddy party.' (Mansfield 78) Mansfield's analogy resembles Lakoff's distinction between Strict Father and Nurturing Mother governments.

<sup>6</sup> In his 1995 and 1996 works, Lakoff refers to Moral Strength, in different instances, as a metaphor and a system of moral concepts. In terms of the metaphor, Lakoff explains that right-wing ideology conceives of morality in terms of strength. Physical strength becomes a metaphor for Moral Strength in that an individual can be conditioned and trained to become morally stronger just as a one would train their body (Lakoff 1995, 7). In terms of a system of concepts, Lakoff states that Moral Strength evokes the concepts of self-discipline, self-denial, self-reliance in relation to the force of evil (Lakoff 1995, 7).

compares this moral conditioning to building physical strength. Both activities require the individual to sacrifice, experience pain and show self-discipline and self-denial. By building Moral Strength, an individual will have the strength to stand up to evil threats and resist immoral temptations. Under this assumption, evil is perceived as a force and a threat that will morally corrupt and further weaken the individual (Lakoff 1996, 71-73). One's moral character can be eroded and one can fall into a life of self-indulgence, selfishness, and dependency.

Lakoff states that there are two forms of Moral Strength that change depending on whether the threat is perceived as being internal or external. Whereas courage is needed in the face of an external threat, self-control is called for in the face of internal threats. As Lakoff states:

What has to be strengthened is one's will. One must develop will power in order to exercise control over the body, which is seen as the seat of passion and desires. [...] The seven deadly sins is a catalogue of internal evils to be overcome: greed, lust, gluttony, sloth, pride, envy and anger. It is the metaphor of Moral Strength that makes the 'sins'. The corresponding virtues are charity, sexual restraint, temperance, industry, modesty, satisfaction with one's lot, and calmness. It is the metaphor of Moral Strength that makes these 'virtues'. (Lakoff 1995, 8)

By setting up the dichotomy of vices and virtues, the Moral Strength metaphor also sets up a dichotomy of idealized and demonized citizens. The conservative model citizen is a hard working, contributing member of society who has succeeded in a free market capitalist economy because he/she is self-disciplined and independent. Conservative demons, on the other hand, are people who violate and rebel against conservative morality. To this end, Lakoff states that there are categories of demons (Lakoff 1996, 73). The first category is comprised of anyone who rejects conservative, Strict Father morality. Feminists and homosexuals are especially vilified. Relatedly, conservatives use

the notion of virtue to control sexuality and gender. Sexual and gendered conduct are understood as being about self-control, restraint and modesty. Therefore sexual deviance is seen as immoral. The second category of demons consists of people who lack self-discipline and self-reliance. Here Lakoff cites single mothers on welfare and drug users as examples of people who have resorted to depending on the state because they were too weak to defend themselves against the temptations of careless sex and self-indulgent drug use (Lakoff 1996, 73-76). For example, poor and welfare dependent women have been degraded and portrayed as irrational by social conservatives. Since the 1980s, some politicians have claimed that single mothers are poor, not because of their gender, but because they had squandered the opportunities of 'equal rights' by making 'bad choices'. In a Congressional hearing on welfare policy in the mid-1980s Lawrence Mead argued: "Unlike us the poor are remarkably unresponsive to ... economic incentives." (Solinger 1999, 28) Mead went on to argue that he found poor people's behavior to be a mystery: they were semi-socialized but were unable to make sensible choices and therefore became dependent on the welfare system (Solinger 1999, 28). Mead is invoking a collective sense of American identity by categorizing the poor as an other in relation to moral, responsible, contributing citizens.

Moral weakness is condemned by conservatives precisely because the morally weak individual becomes dependent on society. If the purpose of public policy is to produce hard working, self-reliant, loyal individuals, then it follows that the existence of moral weakness is a reflection of a morally weak and failing state. Lehr adds:

The natural power of the father to provide for protection is parallel to that of the state; if the father's power is illegitimate, so too is the state's power. Declining paternal power is perceived as leading to social and political chaos. (2003, 129)

The power of the father, and by extension the state, exists because the American nation has been conceived, by both liberals and conservatives, as a family. Lakoff's metaphor of the nation as family has three components: the nation is a family, the state is a parent (predominantly the father), and the citizens are children (Lakoff 1996, 154). Lakoff argues that the structure of the nation can change depending on how the family model is used. As stated, conservatives depend on the Strict Father model in which men are the authority over their land and families. Unfortunately, Lakoff does not elaborate on the intricate relationship between nationalism, and family structure and values. As well, Lakoff's argument does not explain how the father can be the state-like authority over his family while at the same time capitulating to the authority of the state as a national citizen. To address these issues I will now turn to Nast and Ducat's reading of social conservatism's patriarchal state and nation-as-family model, Pateman and Brown's sexual contract, and Stychin's theory of gendered citizenship.

### **Social Conservatives' American Nation**

Heidi Nast and Stephen Ducat deploy a feminist theoretical framework to demonstrate the deeply gendered character of the American nation as it is envisioned by social conservatives. Nast and Ducat hold that the American national identity is based on masculine notions of strength, loyalty, hierarchy, pride, and independence (Nast 1998, 192; Ducat 2004, 2, 219). Further, Nast asserts that the modern nation state was founded and is maintained on heteronormative constructions of identity, power, and hierarchy. Essentially, the values and structures of a mother-father-child heterosexual family can be applied to the nation state.



The state became shaped by a family fiction of nuclear unity achieved through hierarchy: state fathers headed unified homelands -- women, children, and racialized others occupying instrumentally lower evolutionary parts of the family-homeland ladder. (Nast 1998, 199)

Nast makes three important points. First, direct correlations can be drawn between national territories and nuclear families, and between states and fathers. Second, a national and familial hierarchy assures that rulers can take advantage of the agency of their subordinates. In terms of the family, fathers can impose child rearing and domestic duties on their wives. On a national level, the state benefits from the production, procreation and solidarity of its subjects. Third, these hierarchies are purported to be based on biological dispositions and evolution. By depending on pseudo scientific reasoning, proponents of the social conservative, patriarchal American nation have justified the establishment of gendered and racialized hierarchies within the nation and family. Social conservatives argue that men are naturally endowed with rationality, intelligence and aggression and should therefore be given the power and authority to govern the nation-state and their families (Mansfield 2006, 16).

Here Nast is explicitly stating that the construction of the nation and the nuclear family are interdependent and mutually beneficial (Nast 1998, 198). They emerged as contemporaneous socio-historical developments and they rely on each other for their points of reference. The institutions share social values, hierarchies and gendered roles. The American nation and the nuclear family are heteronormative in nature and privilege masculinity. Existence and participation in one realm of society legitimizes, reinforces and empowers patriarchy in the complementary realm. Yet as Nast warns, the heterosexual nature of the nation is obscured in naturalized national and familial discourse and consciousness (Nast 1998, 196). Drawing on the works of Judith Butler,

Nast claims that heterosexuality is normalized and therefore forms the default lifestyle. Challenges to this mode of social organization – most obviously articulated by homosexuals and feminists – are resisted and derided as they disrupt foundational assumptions. Heterosexual men are privileged by the normative strength of the heterosexual and patriarchal status quo (Nast 1998, 192). This is not to say that every facet of society is consciously established to uphold a patriarchal structure. Rather Nast is stating that through layers of cultural, media, religious, educational and governmental articulations, society has developed in a way that unapologetically privileges heterosexuality and masculinity.

The institution of marriage is the most obvious site for the privileging of heteronormativity and masculinity. The marriage contract conditions male and female citizens in particular and systemic ways. Women are not equal partners or subjects in the contract; rather they are the contested property; the object of the marriage contract. Carole Pateman has articulated the relationship between the social contract and the sexual contract. The social contract can only be established by men who willingly consent to be governed by the state. As compensation for their consent and subsequent loss of authority, men become masters of their households. The sexual contract legitimizes this relationship and the husband becomes the legal master over his wife and children (Pateman 1988, 1-5). Pateman argues that the marriage/sexual contract maintains patriarchy in the private and public spheres. The sexual contract is not limited to the private sphere and does not limit patriarchy to the private sphere (Pateman 1988, 12). The sexual contract is dependent on its civil nature and consequent legal power. According to Rousseau, the social contract allows individuals, voluntarily, to “subject

themselves to state and civil law: freedom becomes obedience and, in exchange, protection is provided.” (Pateman 1988, 7) Pateman terms this relationship ‘civil mastery’ and ‘civil subordination.’ (1988, 7) Pateman expands upon the function and structure of marriage and writes that marriage is, in fact, a three party sexual contract among the husband, wife and the state. Pateman states: “the marriage contract is not, in fact, a contract between the spouses, but rather they agree together to accept a certain (externally defined) status.” (1988, 166) In fact, the state, not the spouses, negotiate the terms of the contract. In turn, the spouses who chose to engage in the contract gain public status (Pateman 1988, 166). Social conservatives therefore maintain that the marriage contract should be limited to heterosexual couples in order to privilege and perpetuate the heterosexual family structure (Duggan and Kim 2005, 234).

According to Pateman and Brown, the marriage contract maintains a patriarchal structure through all of society, in both the public and private realms (Brown 1995; Pateman 1988). The ‘individual’ in civil society is defined as the antithesis to woman in the private realm. The latter is natural, necessary and non-voluntary while the former requires a conscious and voluntary commitment. Thus, when women enter a sexual contract, they are incorporated into civil society through their membership in the family, but they do not become full or legitimate citizens like their male counterparts. Under the sexual contract, women become legally subordinate to male citizens. Women contribute to society by reproducing future citizens and attending to the domestic needs of their husbands, who are already citizens. Yet wives and mothers do not gain recognition outside of the family, legally or economically, for their contributions to society (Pateman 1988, 11). Pateman states:

The story of the social contract is treated as an account of the creation of the public sphere of civil freedom. The other, private, sphere is not seen as politically relevant. Marriage and the marriage contract are, therefore, also deemed politically irrelevant. (1988, 3)

Thus the private remains an invisible yet vital part of civil society. Wendy Brown adds that liberal discourse has divided society into the state, economy (civil society), and the family. Brown states, however, that these realms of society are fluid and interdependent (Brown 1995, 144). As Lehr, Pateman and Griswald argue, the gendered structure of the family, for example, influences the role and powers of men and women in civil society and in relation to the state (Lehr 2003, 130-132; Pateman 1988, 7; Griswald 1998, 16). Liberal discourse marks a stark separation between the realms in order to diminish the relative power and influence of the family structure, its hierarchies and gendered roles (Brown 1995, 144).

Under this social conservative paradigm, membership in the American nation is gendered in the same way as the patriarchal model of the nuclear family (Stychin 1998, 2). As noted above Carl Stychin holds that nations are ideological constructions. Gender, sexuality, race and religion are used to define membership and ascribe citizenship. Stychin adds that membership in a nation is both porous and exclusive. Depending on the political circumstances, the nation can change; for example, it might expand its population in the interest of buttressing its strength and defensive capacity. Conversely, the nation could invoke discourses of exclusion in order to foster a sense of belonging, national solidarity, and patriotism. Stychin explains that a nation is very much defined by what it is not. In creating an 'other,' the nation defines itself as distinct from the traits and qualities that are ascribed to that dichotomous 'other.' Nationals are further justified in

excluding, demonizing and attacking the other in an attempt to fortify and invigorate national solidarity and strength (Stychin 1998, 3-8).

According to Popenoe, the America nation is built by assimilating people with different national identities and from different nation-states. New-comers are taught American national values through public schools, media, employment, and community living (Popenoe 1996, 47). Popenoe enumerates two factors that have lead to the individualization of American citizens since the 1960s: economic independence and cultural changes. First, in America's current economy there is alleged to be more opportunity for the accumulation of personal wealth and economic independence than in the first half of the century. Historically, one of the family's primary characteristics was its function as an economic unit. Consequently, family members were not expected to depend on outside sources, specifically the state, to assure economic stability (Popenoe 2005, 47)<sup>7</sup>. Second, Popenoe claims that since the 1960s, there has been a substantial demographic shift in the United States. According to Popenoe, increased immigration from non-western countries has created 'cultural complexity' in which various religions, races, and nations attempt to co-exist within the American nation. He states: "faced with the weakening of a widely shared and stable culture – with new, different, and often conflicting norms, values, and worldviews – people's decisions about appropriate

---

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that some social, religious and neo- conservatives believe that it is acceptable for families to depend on church and charitable organizations for economic and social aid. These three tenets of conservatism support church and charitable organizations for different reasons. Neo-conservatives believe that the government can be down-sized if private, religious and charitable organizations administer welfare programs. Social and religious conservatives believe that the church is an appropriate form of private dependence. Further, through the administration of welfare programs, churches and private charities would be able to distinguish between the deserving and undeserving poor: the former being citizens who are temporarily in need of economic assistance due to sudden economic down-turns; the latter being citizens who are pathologically poor due to moral weakness, a lack of self-discipline, irrationality, and lethargy. In both cases, the church can interject to aid the individual on a strictly financial basis, or on a moral and religious level (Smith 2001, 315).

behavior must be based more strongly on personal attitudes than on traditional cultural standards.” (Popenoe 2005, 47-48) Popenoe concludes by arguing for the reinvigoration of national values and morals through the promotion of the nuclear family. As Popenoe states, national solidarity is assured through a framework of common values. Popenoe is implying that American citizens need to comply with a particular national moral order that is based on the nuclear family. (Popenoe 2005, 55). And the best avenue toward national assimilation is through assimilation into the nuclear family model.

Thus the nuclear family is used to assimilate people into specific cultural and national forms of gendered identity. Stychin, Nast and Ducat all point to the gendered nature of national membership (Stychin 1998, 8-15; Nast 1998, 198; Ducat 2004, 2, 219) Stychin says that the gendered terms of membership into European and Western nations is fixed but people are not predisposed to membership. Stychin means that there are specific and unchanging terms of gendered membership, however, men and women are not necessarily born into their proper roles. Rather, aspiring citizens must be trained and coerced into assuming the morally correct and gendered national roles (Stychin 1998, 9). As stated, Lakoff says that social conservatives believe that morality must be taught through the family (Lakoff 1996, 71-71). Ideally, the nuclear family serves as the training grounds for future national citizens in both morality and proper gender roles.

In tandem with Stychin’s theory of national membership, V. Spike Peterson argues that nations are built on constructed identities and that these identities embody a patriarchal purpose. National identities are constructed according to race, class, religion, and language. Ultimately, these identity markers are used to articulate and justify social hierarchy and male dominance (Peterson 1996, 6). As Peterson states:

What emerges in this discussion is the centrality of gender hierarchy in processes of identification and group reproduction. Specifically, the reproduction of nationalist groups under patriarchal conditions involves a gendered (also class and often ethnic/race) division of power and labor that institutionalizes inequality or inequalities within the group: dividing women from men and *from each other* (insofar as their identification with women as a group is disrupted in favor of identification with the male-defined group). (Peterson 1996, 7)

Women are brought into the national fold but only to reproduce the male dominated nation (Peterson 1996, 7).<sup>8</sup> According to Ducat, women are seen as virtuous and necessarily desexualized. Women are controlled when they are idealized; they are not allowed to express themselves freely as that would undermine their virtue (Ducat 2004, 27-30). Cusack goes on to explain that women are valued only as symbolic representations of the nation. Women fulfill their national duty and roles by reproducing the nation and but they are discouraged from engaging directly in the public sphere.

Masculine hegemony in the modern state has frequently been maintained by social networks based on male bonding. While women are thus given a special symbolic status in relation to the nation, they are distanced from active membership of the polity: consequently they are constructed as 'other' to men in the nation. (Cusack 2000, 544)

Women are thus dispossessed of their own agency.

The American mother has developed into an ideal and mythical character. The virtuousness of the mother's position in relation to the nation is venerated through the idealization of what Johnson et. al. term the "Republican Mother." (Johnson et. al. 2007, 107)

A white woman, married to a good enough white man, was always a subtext of republican motherhood, one that curtailed interpretations of worthiness. Further,

---

<sup>8</sup> As discussed earlier, there are multiple contributors to the construction of the nation including social custom, public policy, media and educational institutions. As such, men are not the sole constructors or supporters of the nation. Women are often complicit with the national identity while some men do not benefit or agree with the national identity (Peterson 1996, 6-8). Accordingly, Peterson is not arguing that men are the sole constructors, actors or beneficiaries within the nation, but rather that the nation was founded on a patriarchal structure which depended on the private subordination of women, akin to Pateman's sexual contract.

in classic liberal tradition, the concept was used to mark women as outside the body politic by not treating women the same as men. (2007, 107)

The Republican Mother thus reinforced ideas of reproducing the white, conservative nation. These mythical women were the bearers of pride, purity and morality (Johnson et. al. 2007, 107). Obviously, this position could only be attained by white affluent women who were able to devote their lives to raising their children and to charitable service while depending on their breadwinning husbands for their economic well-being. In contrast, American welfare policy exposes the perils of failing to be the Republican Mother. Stychin's theory, that a primary tool of identifying and maintaining national identity is to clearly define its dichotomous opposite, is pertinent to this discussion. The welfare dependent, often Black, mother becomes the anti-thesis to the American nation's Republican Mother. In the latter years of AFDC and certainly with the PRWORA, women receiving welfare were portrayed as non-contributors to society. Johnson et. al. note:

to make this depiction convincing, what women on welfare actually did had to be negated. Because AFDC was available primarily to single mothers with children and because most children receiving welfare were young, the condemnation of welfare required denying the mothering done by these women. (2007, 110)

The single-mother on welfare was portrayed as being the worst mother possible.

"Welfare mothers" did not represent the family values, or embody the work ethic or morality of the America nation. Without the guidance of the patriarchal husband, her children were doomed to an anti-social life of crime, drugs, sexual deviance and cyclical dependence on the state (Johnson et. al. 2007, 111-112). While the antithesis to Moral Strength is dependency, we must remember that according to social conservative logic, women are not strong enough to be independent in public. They need to depend on a



man. Conservatives hold that more liberal welfare policies give women false hope for independence and shift their inevitable dependence onto the state (Smith 2001-2002, 185).

Women's national citizenship is manifest in the private realm. As has been seen, the rhetorical and political relationship between the nation and the family is expressed in layered discourses of family values, sexuality and citizenship. Nast and Ducat advance the argument that the nation state should be understood as emulating the nuclear family in that the father is the state-like authority within the national family. Nast's warning that the patriarchal nature of the nation state is manifest in masculine privilege and heterosexuality is exemplified by Pateman and Brown's theorizations of the sexual contract. Pateman and Brown argue, from different perspectives, that society is structured according to a gendered division of labour that creates and reinforces the public and private realms. These realms are mutually dependent as women are restricted to the private realm to reproduce and raise current and future national citizens, and men are thereby free to engage in the public realm as rights-bearing citizens. Stychin elaborates on the relationship between gendered identities and the nation, arguing that nations are social constructions in which national citizenship can be and is gendered. To belong to a nation, men and women must fulfill their prescribed roles. Peterson is more explicit. She asserts that the masculine state articulates criteria for belonging, which, not surprisingly, favor male citizens, masculinity and heterosexuality. Finally, Johnson et. al. define the ideal female citizen in terms of the Republican Mother. What remains unexamined thus far, however, are the characteristics of the male citizen. Accordingly, the next section will discern and analyze the characteristics of the male citizen in relation

to the Strict Father model, the masculine state and the social conservative vision of the American nation.

### **The Characteristics of the Strong Father**

As noted above Lakoff's metaphor of the Strict Father fails to explain how men can assume an authoritative role in the public realm and as the head of the household while simultaneously acting as national citizens subordinate to the authority of the sovereign nation-state. In this context, Michelle Lazar offers an excellent explanation.

She states:

the 'politics' involved in gender relations in this case is double-layered. The represented power dynamic between women and men in families at the micro-level (small 'p' politics) is embedded within state interventionist practices that (re)articulate the norms of gender relations in the service of achieving national procreationist objectives (politics with a big p). (Lazar 2005, 141)

According to Lazar, fathers assume a state-like role within the family by tending to the micro-level needs of their family. The father is charged with protecting the family home and its members, providing the daily material necessities, and maintaining moral order and discipline. The state, in which fathers are active members, is in charge of the macro level protection and reproduction of the nation. The state establishes, maintains and protects national borders, trades and acquires material goods on an international and national basis, and governs that nation-state by creating and enforcing public policy (Johnson et. al. 2007, 41-44). Social conservatives extend the power of the state to include the maintenance of a moral order (Johnson et. al. 2007, 41-44).

Male identity is exclusionary in order to maintain hierarchal power. For example, homosexual men are often seen as feminized, and thereby excluded from assuming male

identity, because they are said to adopt seemingly feminine traits such as emotional sensitivity and sexual subordination to another man (Ducat 2004, 31, 48-50).<sup>9</sup> Male identity is defined in exclusive terms in order to foster pride, strength and hierarchal power among those who successfully portray the male identity. Ducat explains that this exclusiveness is mobilized in order to protect against invasion, and avoid being weakened or affected by external forces or circumstances (Ducat 2004, 50). Mansfield defines manliness as being synonymous with confidence, decisiveness and risk taking. Each of these qualifiers will be analyzed in this section. For now, suffice to say that Mansfield explicitly states that the three aforementioned natural characteristics of manliness make men perfectly suited for the public worlds of politics and business (Mansfield 2006, 64-66). As Nast warned, Mansfield, and proponents of social conservative ideas of the family more generally, are stating that men are built for the current political and economic system and not the other way around. America's economic and political systems are set to privilege masculinity (Nast 1998, 199) and operate through patriarchal principles. It therefore makes sense that a man would not want to be seen as effeminate; he would not survive in either system. Just as most women have historically been relatively powerless in these patriarchal institutions, so too would be a feminized male. Mansfield's position therefore fits Nast and Ducat's theory of the heteronormative nation. For social conservatives, the world of politics should be exclusively masculine, the nation is to be protected by men, and women should fulfill their reproductive duties.

---

<sup>9</sup> Conversely, Ducat argues, women can adopt supposedly male characteristics and do not suffer from the social humiliation that plagues effeminate men. He states that "Tomboys", for example, are harrassed far less than "sissy boys." (Ducat 2004, 25)

The characteristics of the state-like father have thus far been discussed casually. It is important, however, to explicitly define and analyze the shared roles of the state and fatherhood. As Lakoff argues, both institutions assume three primary roles: the protector, the provider and the authority (Lakoff 1996, 33,65). Based on Lakoff's 'Strict Father' model, this section will proceed by analyzing the origin, terms and implications of each of these three state and fatherhood roles in relation to the nation and the family.

#### A) Father as Protector

The family values story is based on distinct and unequal gender roles. Men are supposedly stronger, and more aggressive and assertive than women. Men should therefore protect and administer their families. David Popenoe provides a succinct articulation of this view. He claims that

despite the rise of police forces, armies and criminal justice systems, the male as protector has by no means outlived his usefulness. Fathers act as protectors of their daughters from child abuse from strangers, protectors of their sons from violence, protectors of their wives from rape and assault, and protectors of their homes and neighborhoods from intrusion and disorder (Popenoe 1996, 140).

Further, Harvey Mansfield insists that protection and its associated masculine and 'manly' traits are characterized by honor.

Honor is a claim to protect one's person, family, and property – and the beliefs embodied in them. A sense of honor is the source of the protectiveness so characteristic in manliness. Honor joins together private circumstance and public belief so that those who desire it feel entitled to act as they do; through the assertion of honor they surpass mindless aggression not devoted to a cause. (Mansfield 2006, 65)

The man or father can only protect his person, land and family if he has a strong sense of masculine character: he must be strong, assertive, and aggressive. It follows, then, that

when the father is weak or absent, his family is fragile and defenseless; like a stateless nation.

According to the right, invasion invariably leads to the corrosion of internal structures such as the morals, traditions, roles and hierarchies of the accosted territory. The protective responsibilities inevitably fall onto men as they are portrayed as stronger, more rational and therefore better able to protect the nation than are women (Horn 1997, 11; Mansfield 2001, 65; Mincy and Puncy 1999, 84; Popenoe 1996, 140). The weak elements of the nation can be offset and controlled by the structure and resolve of the state. Of course, the nation can also be attacked from within, and in this context, social conservatives are particularly focused on homosexual men.

In the American national narrative, gay men are seen as effeminate, and thus unable to assume their roles as protectors.<sup>10</sup> Further, the homosexual community's persistent desire to be accepted by society (for example through same-sex marriage) threatens to radically and irrevocably change America into a weak and immoral nation. In his 2008 Presidential concession speech for the Conservative Political Action Committee, Governor Mitt Romney said the following regarding same-sex marriage and the strength of the nation:

The development of a child is enhanced by having a mother and father. Such a family is the ideal for the future of the child and for the strength of a nation. I wonder how it is that unelected judges, like some in my state of Massachusetts, are so unaware of this reality, so oblivious to the millennia of recorded history. It is time for the people of America to fortify marriage through constitutional

---

<sup>10</sup> In 1993 President Clinton passed the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," Bill pertaining to homosexual men and women in the military. As reported by the San Francisco Chronicle, the government's official justification for the bill was twofold: keeping soldier's sexuality private would insure that homosexual soldiers were safe from harassment and "straight soldiers will not be able to do their jobs properly if gay men and women are allowed to serve openly. Their unit cohesion and morale will suffer, to use the sanitized language that the Pentagon prefers." (San Francisco Chronicle, November 30, 2003). Thus gay men and women were seen as a threat to the strength, resolve and moral of their units and fellow soldiers.

amendment, so that liberal judges cannot continue to attack it! (CNN Website, February 7, 2008)

As well, gay men, in particular, fail to uphold their masculine duty to the nation by their relative lack of involvement in procreation. William Bennett, for example, asserts that homosexual white males are weakening the white race and America by not breeding and therefore allowing immigrants and minorities to take control of society (Bennett 2001, 133-134). This denigration of homosexuality thus reveals that the antithesis to the male protector is not a female dependent, but rather an effeminized and/or gay man. The female dependent and children are, by contrast, complementary to the male protector, defining the site of his protective labour (Pateman 1988, 11).

#### B) Father as Provider

Along with protective duties, social conservatives also envision breadwinning as a central function of fatherhood. Johnson et. al. state that American conservatives want the economy to be based on a meritocracy. A meritocracy requires hard work and self-reliance as essential personal characteristics for an individual to survive in a market economy. Individuals are to rely on familial and communal private solutions rather than depend on social programs provided by a welfare state (Johnson et. al. 2007, 41).

Traditionally, all of these tasks were performed by fathers. Akin to Lakoff's argument that moral strength is measured in terms of sexual conduct and self-reliance, Lehr adds: "There is a single, natural family, and that family is both patriarchal and self-sufficient." (2003, 128) Fathers must support, defend and rule their families.

With regard to the patriarchy of male breadwinning, Mansfield says fatherhood is an expression of manliness and manhood. To regain male honour and pride, men must

reclaim their position as the primary providers for their family (Mansfield 2006, 64).

Mansfield argues that men's disposition to be the providers and protectors of the family is connected to their instinctual need to defend their turf (2006, 30).

Modern biologists, overlooking what is specifically human, have taught us to say that manly types defend their *turf*. Thus they connect aggression to defense of whatever is one's own. They point to the behavior of other mammals which first create their own turf, marking out its boundaries with any convenient means, and then defend it. The biologists are not wrong to point to our human animality and to draw inferences from the differences that can be observed between males and females in almost all species of animals. It's an impressive fact that aggressive masculinity is not unique to humans but runs rampant throughout the animal kingdom among both wild and tame beasts. (Mansfield 2006, 64)

According to Mansfield, men's natural disposition toward aggression and violence needs to be harnessed and channeled by the responsibilities of fatherhood into the acquisition of material needs and the defense of familial dependents. According to Mansfield, and social and neo-conservatives, acquiring property is the first expression of human agency, supremacy and power. It is this power and agency that assures physical survival. And it is supremacy that assures social survival in light of the world's limited amount of resources and territory. Freedom is therefore needed to assure that people can fulfill their ends and survive (2006, 64). In simplistic terms, the Right associates this need for physical survival with raw physical strength. Under this logic, men are seen as being best suited to assume the role of provider and protector. As stated by Ducat, once societies and then nations develop, men maintain the roles of protector and provider as members of the state and the breadwinners for the household (Ducat 2004, 65-68).

As mentioned, Lazar states that based on a heteronormative model, the father expresses his national citizenship by assuming a state-like provider role over the family. Just as states claim and defend territory, acquire resources for their citizens, and engage

in international trade, fathers are to render their families self-sufficient by producing, defending and consuming for their material needs (Lazar 2005, 141). Each authority is able to fulfill its role because of the other's existence: the state is alleviated from supporting individual citizens, and fathers are free from state intervention to raise their families, and engage in civil society so long as they adhere to the national values of self-sufficiency, moral discipline and family values. Once they deviate from the national values and identity by choosing a life of selfishness, irresponsibility and dependence, he removes himself from the national community and actually becomes a detriment to its strength and survival (Lakoff 1996, 33). Gavanas stresses that nation building is and always has been the task of wealthy white men:

The ideal man uses The Force to benefit society as a married and responsible father and breadwinner. Marriage proponents distinguished between "constructive" and "destructive" masculinities, in contrast to the fragile-families representatives who focus on race/ethnicity and socioeconomic structural differences between men. Nevertheless, pro-marriage distinctions implicitly correspond to socioeconomic and racial stereotypes, evoking the U.S. history of equating white men with civilization and citizenship. Low-income/poor and minority men are thought to more typically misdirect The Force into violent, non-monogamous, irresponsible "hyper"/ "protest masculinity," or "masculine excess." Such notions have contributed to the stigmatization of African American fathers throughout U.S. history and have asserted white men's centrality to the nation and civilization. (Gavanas 2004, 56)

Thus white rich men are able to harness their masculine powers toward the construction of the American nation. Poor and minority men are the antithesis of the ideal American citizen. Their masculinity is irrational, violent and selfish. They are poor because they are unable to harness their masculinity in constructive ways.

Social conservatives such as Mansfield, along with pro-father advocates like Blankenhorn, argue that women want to depend on the fathers of their children for financial stability and general security. Blankenhorn and Mansfield argue, along with



other pro-father advocates, that feminism has gone too far: women are seeking independence but have neither the means nor the cunning to become self-sufficient (Blankenhorn 1995, 110-117; Mansfield 2006, 11). As Pateman says, female citizens are cast as complementary to the male citizen. By assuming a passive and subordinate position in the private sphere, the wife enables her husband to exist and succeed, unchallenged, in the public sphere (Pateman 1988, 11). Nast explains that social conservatives see feminists as a threat to the strength of the family and nation. Feminists, and homosexuals, deviate from the national nuclear family model by stepping outside of traditional gender roles. By doing so, women are usurping male roles. Yet some social conservatives argue that women are unable to fulfill the role's function. Women are demographically poorer, they argue, because they lack the natural inclination toward breadwinning. Therefore the nation's families are weakening in the absence of manly fathers (Nast 1998, 191-193).<sup>11</sup> Women's poverty, and resulting welfare dependence, is not caused by systemic gendered discrimination or the 'double burden' of child raising and breadwinning that plagues single-mothers. Rather, when women chose to reject the financial support of men, their inevitable dependence is shifted to the state (Marecek 2003, 260). Women's 'decision' to be dependent on the state, instead of men, is chastised in the character of the Welfare Queen who is used to exemplify welfare abuse and irresponsible dependence. The Welfare Queen chooses to have children that she cannot support, rejects the financial support of the father(s) of her children, and depends on the

---

<sup>11</sup> Interestingly, some Men's Rights groups in Canada distinguish between 'adolescent feminist' and 'adult feminist'. 'Adolescent feminists' are said to want all the privileges of equality without the corresponding responsibilities. Men's Rights movement advocates often state that single mothers are 'adolescent feminists' because they are fighting for full custody in order to demand full child support and thereby reap the monetary benefits of the later. Essentially, they are arguing that women are using child support, and by extension the fathers' earned income, to dodge the responsibilities of financial independence (Boyd 2004, 271).

state for 'easy' money (Hirschmann 2003, 140). The Welfare Queen is the anti-thesis to the American female citizen. She is dependent but she is also lazy and selfish. She does not exhibit the loyalty, selflessness, or family ethic that is required of American women.

If women are too irrational and weak to successfully usurp the male provider role in the family, they are likewise unable to be the authorities of their families. According to social conservatives and fatherhood movement supporters, men are naturally disposed to be the family's moral, social and financial authority.

### C) Father as Authority

According to Pateman, Rousseau uses a certain characterization of women to argue that women cannot participate in civil society as free individuals. Pateman explains:

women are excluded from the status of free and equal individual because they lack the capacities to undergo that remarkable change that, Rousseau tells us, occurs in men when civil society and 'justice as a rule of conduct' are created. Only men are able to develop the sense of justice required to maintain the civil order and uphold the civil, universal law as citizens. (Pateman 1998, 101)

Akin to Peterson's theory, a heteronormative model is further developed in American history, as the state is said to be founded by 'fathers' (Peterson 1996, 11). This subconsciously removes female agency from the founding and building of the state (Nast 195). According to Mansfield, men's disposition to provide and protect also implies that men should rule the nation and their families. To this end, Mansfield once again speaks of honour as the driving force behind male action. "Honor is an asserted claim to protect someone, and the claim to protect is a claim to rule." (Mansfield 2006, 66) When these ideas of honour and masculinity are applied to the relationship between the familial

nation and the male state, it becomes more apparent that the state's integrity, strength and authority needs to be maintained and supported in order for a society to thrive under its rule.

According to Mansfield, manliness is about authority and the confidence to recognize and exert that authority.

We are attracted to the manly man because he imparts some of his confidence on to everyone else. With his self-assumed authority he vindicates justice and makes things turn out right or at least enables us to get even. He not only knows what justice requires, but he acts on his knowledge, making and executing the decision that the rest of us tremble to define. (Mansfield 2006, 18)

Mansfield's argument is akin to Lakoff's metaphor of Moral Strength and the Strict Father model. Mansfield is insinuating that only manly men should hold authority because they have an innate sense of justice – of right and wrong. In the Strict Father model, nation-states and fathers are expected to live according to certain moral laws and to train their citizens and dependents to be moral and loyal as well (Lakoff 1996, 154-155).

A conceptualization of masculinity in which men are hardwired to uphold the role of strong, courageous ruler, provider and protector fosters anxiety. It is not enough for a man to be biologically male, a man has to assert himself, and prove his masculinity repetitively to himself and society (Ducat 2004, 25-29). Anxiety is further compounded as authors such as Mansfield argue that women still need and want male protection. Mansfield states that: "Of course women are still women. While they want men to be sensitive to women, they don't necessarily want them to be sensitive in general. That's why the traditional male – who is protective of women, but a sorry flop when it comes to sensitivity – is far from a disappearing species." (2006, 33) Here Mansfield invokes

women's desire for male authority and insists that it is women, not men, who would ultimately be disappointed if gender roles were eroded completely.<sup>12</sup> Thus if men failed to fulfill their role as the authority, provider and protector, they should feel shame for being effeminate men and for abandoning the women that depend on them.

### **The Collapse of Fatherhood**

American President Ford's capitulation and withdrawal from the war in Vietnam in 1975 is said to mark a low moment in modern American foreign military history. The end of the American occupation of South Vietnam resulted in the humiliation of the American people and signified a weakening of American moral strength and national values (Fasteau 1980, 377-380). In the 1960s, the civil rights, feminist and gay rights movements were reshaping American ideology, political discourse and even legislation. Key to these movements' victories was their challenge to American values by virtue of critiquing the gendered and familial hierarchies upon which, it was claimed, American society had thus far been founded. Specifically, the patriarchal nature of the family was being contested. People were rejecting the traditional gender roles of the breadwinning father and the domesticated housewife. New family forms were emerging which empowered women. According to social conservatives, men's rights groups, and

---

<sup>12</sup> In *The Promise of the Ultra-Right*, Andrea Dworkin explains why some women support the conservative movement and she analyses the effects of this support on the feminist movement. Written in 1983, this work maintains its pertinence for the contemporary situation. Dworkin's theories on the motives, roles, effects and strategies of the Right in relation to women's liberation serve as an excellent foundation for further discussion on the subject. Dworkin begins by stating that the Right promotes the idea of the 'biologically conservative' woman who, by definition, is to have children, and generally follow a biological imperative. Assuming this role as nurturer necessitated that women hold traditional family and gender values as sacred. Historically women have been more traditional in regard to their morals and values. To some, this conformity is seen as a sign of female weakness, irrationality, and dependence. Dworkin asserts, however, that this conformity is a fearful precaution against the violence, ostracization and ridicule that has threatened women who questioned the social structure. Following from the biological imperative and traditional gender roles is an attempt to prove one's usefulness to society. Historically, women have had to prove their utility and functional contributions as child bearers and producers of the nation to thereby solidify their loyalty.

fatherhood movement advocates, women were gaining power and equality at the expense and detriment of men and fathers (Blankenhorn 1995, 16). Men's sense of siege in the face of these social changes and the apparent compliance of the state with the claims of these groups were compounded by a failing economy, a deteriorating welfare state and massive unemployment. The failure of the economy was blamed not on strained foreign engagements, inconsistent economic policy, or a dramatic transformation in global markets, but on the fragmentation and deterioration of traditional gendered social networks and employment roles (Fasteau 1980, 412).

In the face of these political and human rights struggles, a backlash movement began to grow among disenchanted, middle class, white, male Americans in the 1970s. This backlash grew out of a variety of connected sources. First, conservative and anti-feminist groups attempted to persuade men that male power could only be maintained within the confines of a hierarchical, historical, traditional, religious and biologically based society. Crudely, these groups asserted that men could only assure their power through the 'natural' oppression of women.<sup>13</sup> Second, the American Right suggested that the war was lost not because the American military strategy was a failure, but rather because the nation was morally weak and unsupportive of their troops abroad. Therefore these men were being asked to die for a morally weak, fragmented and unsupportive society (Fasteau 1980, 404).

---

<sup>13</sup> During the backlash movement of the 1970s Men's Rights groups formed, in the United States and Canada in tandem and in support of 1960s and 1970s feminist movement. Factions grew within the movement as members began to believe that the feminist movement was moving forward and succeeding at the expense of men. Men's Rights groups emerged as a backlash movement against feminist movements. They focused on men's custodial and child support rights: either in terms of dodging both or assuming half of the responsibility for each (Faludi 1999, 14-15).

The backlash movement, that began in the 1970s, continued to maintained influence in social conservative circles and was reinvigorated in fatherhood campaigns of the 1980s and 90s. The fatherhood movement, an element of the backlash movement, is most pertinent to this study. Fatherhood movement co-founder, Wade Horn claims that Dan Quayle defined and galvanized the fatherhood movement. During a speech in 1992, Dan Quayle criticized the Murphy Brown television show for promoting out-of-wedlock birth, celebrating a supposedly intelligent, strong, independent woman, and belittling fathers (Horn 1999, 5). Quayle characterized Murphy Brown as an iconic affront to the morality, strength and effectiveness of the nuclear family. Specifically, Quayle was insinuating that an intelligent, strong, independent woman would recognize the necessary role that fathers play in assuring the moral and economic stability of American families.

According to Horn's definition, the fatherhood movement exists to reinvent and revitalize gendered identities. Horn has ascribed specific characteristics to each gender. In the fatherhood movement's 1999 Manifesto "A Call to Action," Horn enumerated three core beliefs of the fatherhood movement accordingly:

- (1) responsible and committed fatherhood ought to be a norm of masculinity;
  - (2) fathers are different from mothers in important ways;
  - (3) the father-child bond is important to the healthy development of children.
- (Horn 1999, 8)

It thus follows that the fatherhood movement has attacked feminism for challenging the traditional patriarchal nature of the family. Horn blames the "collapse of fatherhood" between the 1960s and 1990s on the feminist movement's promotion of androgyny, specifically androgynous parenthood. Horn explains that in an effort to gain political and economic equality, feminists sought to eradicate gender difference and promote androgyny as the solution to sexist oppression. In terms of parenthood, fathers were told

to be more nurturing and to share domestic duties. Horn warned, however, that fathers were beginning to feel useless, disposable and replaceable because they no longer had a distinctive role in the home. He stated:

The androgynous father has proven to be an awfully uninspiring model for most men. And no wonder. Essentially, the androgynous message says, "Fathers, you are doing it wrong. To be a good father, you must be more like a mother." The result: fatherhood has been feminized, and the father is disappearing from the home. (Horn 1997, 4)

Horn is not really arguing that feminism succeeded in attaining androgyny but rather, that feminists took the patriarchy out of fatherhood and have thereby rendered fatherhood redundant and ultimately useless. Lacking a dominant breadwinning, authoritative and protective position, fatherhood has been weakened and men have been disempowered. The 'true problem' is that fathers and mothers no longer perform unique roles and that fathers have lost power in the bargain. Horn would have us believe that he is arguing for distinctiveness when in reality he and his fellow fatherhood movement members are demanding status.

Anna Gavanas states that there are four commonalities among the wings and sects of the fatherhood movement:

(1) a concern with child well-being, (2) a view of the family as foundational to society, (3) an attribution of importance to fathers and a link between "father absence" and "social ills" (although the perceived causes, consequences, and fixedness of that link differ among representatives), (4) an agenda to redefine the role of fathers in a family, labor market, and government policy from being solely financial providers to being emotionally involved, nurturing mentors as well. (Gavanas 2004, 28)

Various proponents of the fatherhood movement attempt to position the movement 'outside' of politics by claiming that they are chiefly concerned with the welfare of children and families. In this case, politics is a means of protecting the family; politics is

not an end in itself. But Gavanoas protests, and I agree, that the fatherhood movement is deeply political. Not only is the movement putting forward very particular notions of gender and family, the movement is asking to embed these notions of gender and family into federal and state legislation pertaining to marriage and welfare. As will be shown, I agree with the first three commonalities that Gavanoas enumerates. I distinguish myself from Gavanoas, however, as I argue that breadwinning has taken central importance within the fatherhood movement. In terms of Gavanoas' last commonality, I argue that the "pro-marriage" wing of the fatherhood movement is chiefly concerned with re-establishing men as primary breadwinners. The organizations and spokespersons' rhetoric do speak of broadening the definition of fatherhood to include domestic tasks and child nurturing. In reality, however, bread-winning is a constant desired characteristic of fathers in all fatherhood movement wings and throughout their various interpretations of masculinity and fathering. It is far easier for the state to oblige fathers to be economically accountable for their children than it is to force fathers to be more nurturing and emotionally involved. As such, the cries of state agents and fatherhood advocates for 'engaging fathers' in the affective dynamics of the family is more rhetorical than real. As will be seen in the next chapter, most fatherhood groups focus on re-establishing economically independent families by promoting marriage to assure that fathers are the primary breadwinners in the family unit.<sup>14</sup> In tandem, the American government has successfully

---

<sup>14</sup> According to Smith, the fatherhood movement includes anti-feminist fathers' rights activists, pro-marriage conservatives, and 'fragile families' advocates (Smith 2007, 182). Similarly, Gavanoas divides the fatherhood movement into two main wings: the fragile-families wing, and the pro-marriage wing. The fragile-families wing focuses on developing, funding and promoting programs and organizations to help low-income fathers acquire and education and job training to ultimately be able to support their children. Fragile Families supporters look at fatherhood from the perspective of low-income African American men. They focus on employment and 'team parenting' rather than fiercely promoting marriage. Conversely, the pro-marriage wing believes that marriage is the only solution to fatherlessness, reducing illegitimate births, and addressing poverty (Gavanoas 2004, 3). The National Fatherhood Initiative, for example is a conservative pro-marriage movement that push for policies that favor and privilege heterosexual couples (Smith 2007, 182).



used many public policy mechanisms, such as enforcing child support and promoting marriage, to impose breadwinning on fathers.

According to Susan Faludi, the conservative backlash movement claimed that women were abandoning their children and husbands by choosing to attend university and pursue careers. As Faludi states:

Economists have argued that well-paid working women have created a 'less stable American family'. And demographers, with greatest fanfare, have legitimated the prevailing wisdom with so-called neutral data on sex ratios and fertility trends; they say they actually have the numbers to prove that equality doesn't mix with marriage and motherhood. (1991, 4)

Additionally, some 'liberated' women gained media attention by proclaiming that they felt morally empty for having chosen careers over family life (Faludi 1991, 4). Not only were women abandoning their families, but they were also overcrowding the labour market and taking men's jobs. According to conservative backlash rhetoric, the economy, children and society in general were all suffering because women were selfishly choosing to become economically independent. Therefore, as has been shown, men were made to feel powerless on a moral, political and economic level by the 1980s. Yet proponents of the Backlash movement ignored the fact that most women engaged in 'paid work' also had to perform the majority of the domestic duties. As a result, women were forced to work a "double-shift" by first working outside the home and then performing their traditional domestic duties afterwards (Marecek 2003, 260). Further, women were not 'liberated' when they entered the work force. Their wages were lower, on average, than men's, but more importantly, it was nearly impossible for a single parent to survive economically let alone a single-mother. In large part women entered the work force because their earnings were essential to the family income. Ultimately, the Backlash

movement ignored the growing reality that the single breadwinner model was only attainable by a minority of upper-middle class and predominantly white Americans (Glauber 2008, 12).

Thus, beginning with the Backlash movement of the 1970s and the crisis of American national identity associated with the debacle of Vietnam, social conservatives seized the opportunity to reinvigorate and promote ‘traditional’ American values and morals through the nuclear family. Lehr states that social conservatives were interested in building a white middle-class nation based on the idealized nuclear family of the 1950s and 1960s. They focused on an internal enemy: deviants who live outside the traditional nuclear family and who did not teach morality to their children (Lehr 2003, 130). These deviant citizens were a threat to the moral strength of the nation.

Advocates of the fatherhood movement such as Horn, Popenoe and Blankenhorn and social conservatives such as Mansfield argue that masculinity needs to be re-attached to fatherhood. The fatherhood movement’s solution to the epidemic of fatherlessness is founded on the notion that men and women are biologically different and that this sex difference necessarily translates into parenting differences. Fathers are to be strong, authoritative, and productive while mothers are to be emotional and nurturing caregivers. By attaching a specific, valued and powerful status onto fatherhood, it is thought that men will feel an increased desire to become and remain active fathers. In the social conservative view, the easiest way to attach value and power to fatherhood is to recreate a patriarchal relationship between mother and father in which the father is to reclaim his position as the authority, protector and provider of the family. Mothers and children are to assume a subordinate, dependent role. It is thought, after all, that mothers

and children want and need the patriarchal father to ensure their financial, emotional and physical security. Women should therefore be willing to abdicate some of their hitherto attained independence and power for the well-being of their children and themselves. Social conservative advocacy for men to be the breadwinners and authority is deeply rooted in traditional notions of gendered power relations.

### **Conclusion**

As has been seen, the concepts of family values, nationalism, moral strength and patriarchalism are mutually reinforcing. All four elements contribute to social conservatives' fundamental belief that the state should govern society according to a certain moral order: the American nation is built and sustained through the moral strength of the nuclear family. Conservatives use any combination of these four forces to support their ideology, gain political power, and change policy and governance. For example, to gain sufficient political support to ensure the passage of the federal 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, social conservatives used all four tools to argue that allowing homosexuals to marry would weaken the sanctity of marriage, threaten the traditional family, which is the foundation of society, and breed immorality, all of which would eventually lead to the weakening of society and the nation (Cossman 2005, 482).

Evidently, family values, patriotism, moral strength and patriarchalism have been used by social conservatives to advocate for the regulation of citizens' personal, social, familial and civil behavior. The American Right's vision of the nation currently prevails and has infused the offices and actions of the American state. Regardless of the party configuration of Congress, it will be shown that the ideology, rhetoric and values of the

Right's nation, and specifically social conservatism, has dominated politics over the last thirty years. The regulatory power of the social conservative strategy is especially evident in the restructuring of American welfare policy through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996. The PRWORA was conceived and framed in terms of a 'moral panic' about the decline of the traditional family, the rise of single-parent families, sexual promiscuity among teenagers and the rise of out-of-wedlock births. Single-parents, and single-mothers in particular, represented the poorest demographic in the country. Supporters of the PRWORA argued that single-parents are poor precisely because they are single. The nuclear family was seen as the only family unit that assures financial survival with a bread-winning father and a child-rearing domesticated housewife. As Campbell states:

Conservatism delegitimizes the welfare state by displacing blame from the differential effects of social structure and public policy onto individual attitudes, beliefs, and decisions about family formation and configuration, sexual and reproductive practices, and employment. (Campbell 2003, 113)

The government should thus promote marriage as a solution to welfare dependency instead of creating a social safety-net or allowing the government to account for changing economic patterns (Smith 2001-2002).

The next chapter analyzes the nationalistic and gendered rhetoric that was used to create, justify, promote and uphold the PRWORA. It will be shown that the PRWORA dictates very particular and separate roles for women and men. I will establish the sexually regulative character of the PRWORA, and define and analyze why and how the PRWORA constructs the father's obligations to his children as reducible to those of a bread-winning patriarch. Social and neo-conservatives, fatherhood movement advocates, and even some liberals have pointed to fatherlessness as a moral, social and national

crisis. They argue that fatherlessness has led to poverty, delinquency, sexual promiscuity and welfare dependency. Most alarmingly, fatherlessness has weakened America's national strength as families, and specifically children, are left without the moral guidance, financial support and discipline of a father figure. Proponents of this view assert that children lacking strong father figures in their everyday lives will inevitably become disloyal, dependent, and morally weak national citizens. To break this cycle, social conservatives seek to reauthorize the masculine power of the state over the distribution of public resources by making them contingent upon private behavior (Campbell 2003, 122). By regulating the private lives of its citizens, the Strict Father state can assure that it has established moral order, maintained a strong nation, and produced loyal, productive, and self-sufficient citizens.

## **Chapter Two: Bringing the Father Back**

### **Introduction**

Johnson et al., Lakoff and Cossman's varying definitions of social conservatism are indicative of the complicated and dynamic character of right-wing movements and ideologies in the United States. Still, all three theorists agree that social conservatives hold the heterosexual family as the base unit of society and that national citizens should contribute to society according to their gendered familial roles (Johnson et al. 2007; Lakoff 1996; Cossman 2005). Based on this social conservative ideology, a particular definition of fatherhood has been articulated and become operative within American public policy. The social conservative understanding of fatherhood is reinforced and dependent upon a particular definition of family values which promotes the necessity, power and importance of fatherhood, and the morality of gendered familial roles. The rhetorical power of social conservative family values has been used to promote a particular conception of the American nation since the 1970s in which a citizen is morally strong if he/she fulfills his/her appropriate gender role. For women, this means that they procreate in wedlock, depend on their husbands for financial stability and tend to domestic labour. Men must also procreate in wedlock, and they must be the authorities, providers and protectors of their families (Lakoff 1996).

Social conservative groups, politicians (both Republican and Democrat) and individual American citizens have subscribed to this ethos of patriarchal fatherhood (Stacey 1996). Supporters see various ways to effect social change toward the reinstitutionalization of tradition, including influencing media, allying with religious communities, and establishing think tanks (Gavanas 2004, 99-125; Horn 1999, 9-13).

But none of these cultural forces are as effective as directly influencing and controlling public policies that can impact the private and sexual lives of citizens. Most obviously, state involvement in and regulation of abortion and gay marriage has allowed various governments, social organizations and political parties to regulate the sexual and gendered conduct of citizens (Cossman 2005; Page 2006). As Smith argues, welfare policy has also been a site of sexual regulation because the gendered configuration of a family has been interpreted as either causing or alleviating poverty (Smith 2001-2001, 125). Poor Americans have been especially vulnerable to government regulation because of their financial dependence on the government and community organizations, and this vulnerability has intensified with the advent of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Poor citizens have had to modify their sexual conduct, family configuration and employment situation in order to receive welfare benefits (Abramovitz 1996). The PRWORA is a complicated national policy involving millions of people, fifty different state economies and various demographic situations.<sup>15</sup> Yet social conservatives have reduced the welfare debate to a discussion of proper sexual conduct, family configuration and national morality, and are thereby hinging individuals' civil rights on their ability to assimilate to the national ideology (Johnson et. al. 2007). Ultimately, social conservatives have recognized that welfare policy can be used to impose their particular views of fatherhood onto American citizens.

To this end, the fatherhood movement has been a dominant, vocal and influential contingent of the social conservative attempt to revalue and promote their definition of

---

<sup>15</sup> State populations vary in their demographic characteristics, making each one unique. Pertinent demographic characteristics include: race, age, disabilities, mobility (in terms of travel time to work or number of vehicles available), educational attainment, home ownership, employment status, and location (whether rural or urban) (Johnson et. al. 2007).

fatherhood through and within American public policy. As will be seen, members of the fatherhood movement were able, and continue, to influence public policy in three main ways.

First, the fatherhood movement has directly influenced welfare policy and administration because its co-founders, Wade Horn and Don Eberly, worked in the Bush Administration (Coltrane 2001, 39). Wade Horn was the Assistant Secretary for Children and Families under the Bush Administration from 2001 until his resignation in 2007 (Office of Family Assistance Responsible Fatherhood Demonstration 2008). Don Eberly was also a co-founder of the fatherhood movement and later became the Deputy Director of the White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives under the Bush Administration in 2001 (The White House 2008). Horn and Eberly thus worked for the Bush Administration during the re-authorization of the PRWORA in 2005, adjudicated which marriage and fatherhood programs received PRWORA government funds, and generally supported and conditioned the Bush Administration's marriage promotion mandate. Consequently, it will be shown, President Bush's reauthorization emphasizes marriage as the primary solution to welfare dependence.

Second, the fatherhood movement indirectly influenced PRWORA policies as many fatherhood and marriage programs were started, maintained and funded by various fatherhood movement groups. In the fatherhood movement's 1999 manifesto, Wade Horn claims that the National Fatherhood Initiative (NFI), founded in 1993 by Wade Horn, David Blankenhorn, David Popenoe and Don Eberly, is a core organization of the fatherhood movement (Horn 1999, 10). As will be seen, the NFI has created multiple fatherhood and marriage programs and has consequently received substantial government



funding through the PRWORA to operate these organizations. Through the NFI, the fatherhood movement has been able to promote their brand of fatherhood on a national and state level (Office of Family Assistance Responsible Fatherhood Demonstration 2008).

Finally, the fatherhood movement has influenced PRWORA policies by using a network of politicians, think tanks, and media<sup>16</sup> to disperse the message to the general public, academia and conservative political organizations, that responsible, moral fathers are breadwinning patriarchs. The fatherhood movement encompasses a large network of right-wing civil society groups and think tanks (Horn 1999, 9). The NFI is one focal point in a larger network of pro-marriage, family values, and fatherhood programs including the Heritage Foundation (Horn as cofounder)<sup>17</sup>, the National Marriage Project (founded by Popenoe)<sup>18</sup>, and the Institute for American Values (supported by Don Eberly and David Blankenhorn)<sup>19</sup>. According to its website: “the National Fatherhood Initiative engages all sectors of society through strategic alliances and partnerships. The National Fatherhood Initiative has partnered with organizations such as The Salvation Army, 100 Black Men of America, YMCA, Boeing, Boy Scouts of America, Head Start, and Franklin Covey to carry the message of responsible fatherhood to a diverse audience.”(National Fatherhood Initiative 2008). The influence and power of the NFI cannot be understated as it is connected directly to the government’s welfare program, is supported by several influential academics and members of the fatherhood movement, and is associated with many powerful civil society organizations.

---

<sup>16</sup> Although it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the relationship between media organizations and the fatherhood movement, Coltrane elaborates on the breadth of the fatherhood movement’s national media and popular culture campaigns (Coltrane 2001).

<sup>17</sup> Heritage Foundation 2008. <http://www.heritage.org/>

<sup>18</sup> National Marriage Project. <http://marriage.rutgers.edu/codirectors.html>

<sup>19</sup> Institute for American Values. <http://www.americanvalues.org/>

This chapter demonstrates how social conservatives have successfully injected their vision of family values into political debate and public policy. And more specifically, the fatherhood movement's vision of fatherhood as embodying the roles of provider, protector and authority of the family has been promoted in the policies and programs of the 1996 PRWORA and its reauthorization in 2005. In an attempt to reduce welfare dependency and reinstate the centrality of paternal authority in the American family, the PRWORA initiated several national programs and policies including paternity testing, fatherhood programs, and marriage promotion. This chapter will examine how each of these programs promotes a particular understanding of fatherhood. Akin to Nast, Stychin, Ducat and Yuval-Davis' theories, the PRWORA is an example of American national policy that is designed to promote a certain ideal of fatherhood by regulating the gendered and sexual conduct of its citizens (Nast 1998, Stychin 1998; Ducat 2004; Yuval-Davis 1997). The Bush Administration, under the guidance of Wade Horn, has increased funding and support for PRWORA marriage promotion programs. For social conservative welfare reformers, marriage is held as the best solution to welfare dependency. With a valued and respected authority at the helm, the family, like the nation-state, thereby becomes balanced, strong and self-sufficient.

### **Beyond the 'Paper Dad': Paternity Tests and Child Support**

Beginning with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the precursor to PRWORA, paternity testing has been used to identify biological fathers in order to compel child support payments. The normative implication of paternity testing and its ensuing financial obligations, is that the primary responsibility of fatherhood is

breadwinning. (Smith 2007, 118-20). The PRWORA continued to use paternity testing to impose child support. But the PRWORA has also used paternity testing to identify fathers so that they can be conscripted to marriage promotion and fatherhood programs (Smith 2007, 179). Fatherhood movement advocates claim that they are pressuring the government to pursue marriage promotion and fatherhood programs in order to broaden the role of the father beyond financial responsibilities. I argue, however, that despite their rhetoric, fatherhood movement advocates are deeply concerned with maintaining the breadwinner role of the father. They see the marriage contract as the most efficient and permanent way to assure that financial dependence is privatized, and that men reclaim their civic and familial roles as the providers, as well as the protectors and authorities of their families. Thus, the ends to which paternity testing are used are dependent on the state's definition of fatherhood. As will be seen, the fatherhood movement's conception of the American father and the male citizen have resonated in PRWORA policies.

The importance, power and agency of fathers is evident in the opening statements of the PRWORA which cast fatherlessness as a social problem that needs to be remedied. Section 101 of the PRWORA enumerates the following 'findings':

- (1) Marriage is the foundation of a successful society.
- (2) Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society which promotes the interests of children.
- (3) Promotion of responsible fatherhood and motherhood is integral to successful child rearing and the well-being of children.
- (4) In 1992, only 54 percent of single-parent families with children had a child support order established and, of that 54 percent, only about one-half received the full amount due. Of the cases enforced through the public child support enforcement system, only 18 percent of the caseload has a collection. The number of individuals receiving aid to families with dependent children [in this section referred to as "AFDC"] has more than tripled since 1965. More than two-thirds of these recipients are children. Eighty-nine percent of children receiving AFDC benefits now live in homes in which no father is present. (PRWORA 1996, Section 101)

Gavanas' "androcentric trinity" of men, marriage and children is evident in these "findings" (2004, 46). Marriage is emphasized, in the first two points, as foundational to society. The focus then shifts to the well-being of children and the necessity of fathers. Discussion of single-parenthood is gender neutral: women and sole parent mothers are absent from this discussion despite the fact that they are the majority of the welfare and child support recipients (Abramovitz 2000, 98-102). Instead, the PRWORA has cast fatherlessness as a major social problem. In this context, men, as fathers, are the agents of change, who, are charged with resurrecting American society from its thirty year slump into poverty and moral decay by reclaiming their role within their families.

The PRWORA established Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) as a federal program to partially fund and regulate state welfare programs for low-income families (Smith 2001-2, 123).<sup>20</sup> The purpose of TANF is described in the PRWORA as follows:

- (1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives;
- (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage;
- (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and
- (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. (PRWORA 1996, Section 401)

Thus in keeping with the PRWORA's opening findings, TANF focuses on the necessity of marriage and the importance of fatherhood - the latter implied in the focus on out-of-wedlock births, which statistically result in single-motherhood not single-fatherhood

---

<sup>20</sup> The American welfare state is divided into three sections: social insurance programs, public assistance programs, and private sector welfare programs. The term 'welfare' is casually used to refer to programs for poor citizens, but the term technically encompasses the aforementioned low-income, universal and private programs (Abramovitz 2000, 23-7).

(Abramovitz 2000, 41). Ninety percent of child support payees are men (cited in Smith 2007, 97). Fathers therefore became the target of child support enforcement in order to take the burden off the state and assume the responsibility for supporting their families.<sup>21</sup> Through TANF, the federal government obliges states to administer paternity tests as the first step toward ending single-parent childbearing and rising rates of welfare dependency.<sup>22</sup> States, under federal pressure, force paternity testing and identification upon single mothers.<sup>23</sup> To maintain or revive welfare payments, single-mothers must identify the father of their children and prove that they have sought child support without success.<sup>24</sup> Anna Marie Smith coined the term “paternafare” to define the current PRWORA welfare policy that depends on the combination of child support and paternity testing (Smith 2007, 3).

The PRWORA orders the states to make maternal cooperation a condition of welfare eligibility, to assess each single mother’s cooperation, to punish those women who do not appear to be doing all that they can to identify the absent fathers, and to assist in the collection of support from them by reducing or eliminating their benefits. (Smith 2001-2002, 144)

---

<sup>21</sup> According to Smith, child support enforcement has been the least contested element of the PRWORA and welfare debate in general. Congressional and media debate about child support often turns to conservative ‘common sense’ rhetoric about forcing fathers to take responsibility for their children and thereby irradicating welfare dependency among single mothers (Smith 2007, 97).

<sup>22</sup> Paternity identification is emphasized and enforced by the federal government in the PRWORA as states that do not cooperate with paternity testing and child support enforcement will have their TANF grants cut by five to ten percent (Lurie 1997, 85).

<sup>23</sup> According to the PRWORA, genetic testing will be administered in ‘contested cases’ regarding paternity identification. In cases where paternity is contested or unknown, the PRWORA outlines the following policies: “(i) Genetic Testing Required in Certain Contested Cases.—Procedures under which the State is required, in a contested paternity case (unless otherwise barred by State law) to require the child and all other parties (other than individuals found under section 454(29) to have good cause and other exceptions for refusing to cooperate) to submit to genetic tests upon the request of any such party, if the request is supported by a sworn statement by the party.” (PRWORA 1996, Section 331)

<sup>24</sup> The PRWORA states that single-mothers must establish paternity and pursue child support: “(5) Failure To Comply With Paternity Establishment and Child Support Enforcement Requirements Under Part D.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, if the Secretary determines that the State agency that administers a program funded under this part does not enforce the penalties requested by the agency administering part D against recipients of assistance under the State program who fail to cooperate in establishing paternity or in establishing, modifying, or enforcing a child support order in accordance with such part and who do not qualify for any good cause or other exception established by the State under section 454(29), the Secretary shall reduce the grant payable to the State under section 403(a)(1) for the immediately succeeding fiscal year (without regard to this section) by not more than 5 percent.” (PRWORA 1996, Section 409)

Essentially, the single-mother can only receive state assistance once she has established paternity, pursued child support and proven that the father is unwilling or unable to pay.<sup>25</sup>

The primary function of paternity testing under the PRWORA is to hold the father responsible for the financial needs of his children. Paternity testing is only administered when a poor mother makes a claim for income assistance. And at that point, paternity is established with the primary goal of child support enforcement (Abramovitz 2000, 81-83). Ultimately the state, through the PRWORA, is attempting to establish a non-negotiable relationship of dependency between the father and his children and their mother.

According to Cossman, since the 1970s, two different conservative visions have shaped the welfare debate: social and neo-conservatism. For social and neo-conservatives, the bottom line is that the state should not have to support the offspring of able-bodied, independent, strong, male citizens. V. Spike Peterson notes that men in the public realm have used their power to regulate sexual practices to assure that their nation is reproduced (Peterson 1996, 6). Women are used to reproduce a nation to which they belong but from which they receive little social esteem and few benefits. Thus, the idea of fatherhood is not only indicative of a civilized society, but unites the nation between generations.

History has been written almost exclusively as the history of men and therefore man-as-father has been subsumed under the history of a pervasive patriarchy – the history of inheritance and legitimate descent, the history of public authority and its transmission over generations. (Laqueur 1990, 205)

---

<sup>25</sup> To receive a public good, a poor woman must curtail her private life. First, The mother is forced to interact with the father of her child in order to receive social assistance. Second, if paternity is contested by the father, the single mother is obliged to give the state a complete sexual history.<sup>25</sup> Her sexual behavior is scrutinized and judged. Women's privacy rights are completely violated. The father, on the other hand, only needs to prove that he is or is not the father of that particular child. Genetic testing clearly affirms that connection and he does not need to divulge his sexual history (Smith 2001-2002, 148).

Social conservatives and pro-fatherhood advocates thus define fathers as the creators of the family. Both wings of conservatism maintain that procreation and child bearing are personal choices. Consequently, children should be a private, individual obligation. Citizens should take individual, if gendered, responsibility for the well being of their offspring. In relation to welfare policy, survival becomes synonymous with economic stability. Economic stability is seen as a “private familial obligation,” in which fathers are held responsible for the economic self-sufficiency of the family.

But the role of the father is contested among social and neo-conservatives, as they have divergent conceptions of the normative family (Cossman 2005, 442). Neo-conservatives emphasize the financial utility of the family and therefore define fatherhood in terms of breadwinning. Ultimately, neo-conservatives see child support as a means to reduce public spending on income support (Cossman 2005, 441).<sup>26</sup> This rationale was already present in the Social Services Amendments-Child Support Act of 1974, in which Congress made it obligatory for welfare recipients to participate in child support enforcement (Abramovitz 2000). The PRWORA extended state child support enforcement with the following provisions and regulations: states must continue to demand child support from all non-custodial parents; states should implement and test new programs to identify and pursue non-custodial parents who refuse to pay child support; and uncooperative, non-custodial parents must be forced to pay, or attend a work or parenting program.<sup>27</sup> The aggressive nature of the enforcement policies indicates that

---

<sup>26</sup> Haney and March argue that neo-conservative are less focused on men being sole wage earners and more focused on making fathers breadwinners because of men’s higher earning potential (Haney and March 2003, 467).

<sup>27</sup> The PRWORA’s child support policies are enumerated as follows: “(a) States should diligently continue their efforts to enforce child support payments by the non-custodial parent to the custodial parent, regardless of the employment status or location of the non-custodial parent; and (b) States are encouraged to pursue pilot programs in which the parents of a non-adult, non-custodial parent who refuses to or is unable to pay child support must— (1) pay or contribute to the child support owed by the non-custodial parent; or (2) otherwise fulfill all financial obligations and

the PRWORA's child support regulations were constructed as neo-conservatives wanted - to reduce state and federal funding for single parents dependent on welfare.

Conversely, social conservative fatherhood movement advocates such as Horn, Popenoe and Blankenhorn envision a larger role for the father. They want public policy to engage the traditional family and father for purposes of enforcing the values of personal responsibility, discipline, loyalty and self-sufficiency on the nation's children.

This vision is evident in a statement made by Wade Horn and Andrew Bush:

as state officials launch new welfare reforms, they must not lose sight of the larger issues of fatherhood and marriage. At the least, this requires addressing the ability of fathers to financially support their children. But fathers are important to the well-being of children for far greater reasons than merely the economic. Their involvement as nurturers, disciplinarians, teachers, coaches, and moral instructors is also critically important to the healthy development and maturation of children. (1997, 39)

The patriarchal nuclear family must be revalued, not just for economic reasons, but also to hedge off moral decay, strengthen families, and ultimately rebuild America as a united, loyal nation. Social conservatives do acknowledge and promote the economic function of the family but also believe deeply that the family is the political, social and civic foundation of society (Cossman 2005, 441).

In terms of the PRWORA, instead of addressing the father's financial obligations through child support, some social conservatives prefer to emphasize marriage promotion as a solution to welfare dependence (Johnson et. al. 2007, 147). Horn makes this stance clear as he argues that child support enforcement reduces the father to a bread winner. The fatherhood role becomes smaller and men are easily replaced by mothers or the state.

---

meet all conditions imposed on the non-custodial parent, such as participation in a work program or other related activity." (PRWORA 1996, Section 904)



Establishing paternity and enforcing child support are, of course, not without merit. And a just and good society ought to do all it can to increase job opportunities in low-income communities. But an emphasis on child support ignores the many non-economic contributions that fathers make to the well-being of their children. Indeed, emphasizing fatherhood in largely economic terms has helped to contribute to its demise. After all, if a father is little more than a paycheck to his children, he can easily be replaced by a welfare payment. If we want fathers to be more than just money machines, we will need a culture that supports their work as nurturers, disciplinarians, mentors, moral instructors, and skill coaches, and not just as economic providers. To do otherwise is to effectively downgrade fathers to, in the words of Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, 'paper dads.' (Horn 1997, 14-15)

According to Johnson et. al., social conservatives believe that a united nuclear family is the strongest possible family unit (Johnson et. al. 2007, 147). While forcing men to pay child support casts men in their 'natural' gender roles and thereby assures the survival of the family, social conservatives believe that marriage is absolutely fundamental to the development of full, loyal, law-abiding citizens. Fathers need to be in their children's lives on a permanent, influential basis in order to provide protection, independence, guidance, structure and authority (Lehr 2003, 130). Child support enforcement is a weak replacement for the social conditioning, self-regulation and moral development that is produced through marriage and the nuclear family.

Interestingly, Blankenhorn argues that single-mothers receive less money from fathers through child support than they would if they were married to the father of their child(ren). Blankenhorn reasons that under child support, the father's monetary contribution is a fixed percentage of his income calculated according to the minimum monies that are needed by the mother to raise a certain number of children. But if the father marries the mother of his children, a higher percentage of his income naturally goes toward the "family fund." This is to say that the father would pay for housing, food and health services for himself and within a marriage, the family can benefit from his

ability to pay for these necessities (Blankenhorn 1995, 137-40). Blankenhorn argues that the father will be less likely to pay child support if he is not fulfilling any other fatherhood functions. The form of marriage and the family is thought to produce the function of fatherhood (Haney and March 2003, 447). Thus, Blankenhorn values the breadwinning role of the father and even argues that the father's role as the financial supporter should be widened beyond child support and entrenched through the marriage contract.

Further complicating the debate surrounding the appropriate connection of fathers to families are some social conservatives, fatherhood movement advocates, and PRWORA supporters who believe that fatherhood can be established, valued, performed and effective outside of marriage. Gavanas terms adherents of the latter view the "Fragile Family" contingent. The Fragile Family perspective is not anti-marriage, but rather, it holds that marriage should not be used as the first or sole solution to poverty among single-mothers. Fragile Family advocates argue that instead of marriage, fatherhood programs should be used to educate, train and council fathers, both married and single, on the proper roles and responsibilities of fatherhood. There is thus a focus on the function of fatherhood rather than a reliance on its form (Gavanas 2004, 21-28). Still, all of these pro-fatherhood groups uphold the notion that, ideally, children should be raised by married, heterosexual parents who fulfill traditional gender roles and that even if this objective can't be realized immediately (as the Fragile Family exponents recognize), the re-establishment of the nuclear family household is the long-term goal (Gavanas 2004, 3-13; Smith 2007, 182). Regardless of how strongly and immediately various fatherhood programs advocate marriage, they all promote the notion that fathers, as male citizens,

should assume an authoritative, productive and protective position over their dependents and thus emulate the state's relationship to the nation.

In sum, social and neo-conservatives, from both parties, have agreed that paternity testing is the first step to solving the problem of fatherlessness and welfare dependency. For neo-conservatives, paternity testing is used to open the door to child support enforcement. Social conservatives, specifically fatherhood movement supporters, acknowledge that paternity testing is needed to identify the father and hopefully oblige him to participate in fatherhood and marriage programs. Accordingly Horn prescribes the following policy initiative:

We could integrate premarital educational services with existing services, and increase the access that low-income families have to such services. For example, we currently very coercively enforce a paternal identification program. We tell the moms they don't get welfare unless she identifies her child's father. Now we can put a new arrow in our quiver of services. If we believe the Fragile Families data on the "magic moment," we can say to these families, "There's another option. If this is something you're interested in, we can give you coupons so you can access premarital services or counseling or education. (Horn 2002, 6)

Horn wants the state to be able to influence mothers and fathers to consider marriage as soon as possible, at the 'magic moment' of the birth of the child, or shortly thereafter with paternity establishment. In the following sections I will show that the fatherhood movement's welfare agenda has focused almost entirely on marriage promotion and fatherhood programs, and their efforts have paid off. Fatherhood movement members have successfully influenced welfare policy, created numerous fatherhood and marriage programs, and have shifted public discourse toward supporting the productive as well as protective and authoritative father and male citizen.

## **Fatherhood Programs**

Anna Marie Smith states that fatherhood promotion initiatives have received substantial bi-partisan support. Democrats and Republicans alike argued for fatherhood programs during the PRWORA debates in the mid-1990s (Smith 2007, 179). When discussing Fatherhood programs, congressional debate was often framed in terms of the well-being of children, as is seen in the following statement made by Senator William Frist (R-Tenn.):

Mr. President, few in Washington understand this fact more than I do. As the father of three young boys, it is my belief that we should not be asking the question "what should the Government do for our children?" Instead our question should be "what must we do to get parents to do more?" I strongly believe that our children do not need more Government spending but a mother and a father who care about them. (Representative Frist 1996)

In this social conservative political climate it was difficult for Congress members, of any political leaning, to argue against the interests of children. Much of the Congressional debate exemplifies the social conservative monopoly on family values rhetoric (Stacey 1998, 52-55; Lehr 2003, 128). As is seen with Senator Frist, while social conservatives were framing the debate to focus on children, they were also insisting that the heterosexual nuclear family was the best family structure. Smith states that fatherhood programs were birthed out of the notion that heterosexual families were the desired solution to poverty and that within those heterosexual families, parents must maintain their traditional gender roles.

Fatherhood promotion initiatives are the fruit of an influential pro-marriage and pro-fatherhood movement that enjoys massive bipartisan support. The movement's supporters [...] share a fundamental belief that if we had more households led by heterosexual parent couples, with each parent fulfilling the traditional gender role, we would see a substantial improvement in the well-being of children and an increase in orderly behavior among male adults as more unruly

bachelors were exposed to the disciplining impact of patriarchal obligation. (Smith 2007, 179)

As Smith says, traditional gender roles are enforced within fatherhood programs because fathers are seen as the moral, social and economic leaders of the family, and children, especially young boys, need to learn how to respect authority and how to assume authority within their own families when they are adults. Thus the PRWORA is relying on the heteronormative family to instill, promote and reward citizens who adhere to their gendered citizenship roles.

A fatherhood program is defined as a religious and/or community-based not-for-profit program that educates, guides and supports fathers on parenting, child support law, 'healthy' marriages, and job training (Smith 2007, 178). The PRWORA funds a variety of fatherhood programs. Some are educational and involve counseling organizations for low-income married and single-fathers; some are essentially marriage promotion programs disguised as fatherhood programs; some are unapologetic in their belief that fatherhood is a divine institution; and some blatantly emphasize the authoritative and protective role of fathers. Most predominantly, fatherhood programs emphasize fathers' breadwinning, their potential and the necessity for authority, and the functions and benefits of marriage. Regardless of their tactics, it will be shown that all of these programs target low-income fathers with the goal of returning them to their 'natural' position as the patriarch of the family (Johnson et. al. 2007, 178; Mink 2003, 213).

In 1996, the PRWORA set up a \$50 000 minimum annual grant system for each state under the Administration for Children and Families.<sup>28</sup> The annual grant was

---

<sup>28</sup> The details of the PRWORA's grant system are outlined as follows: "(b) Amount of Grant.—The amount of the grant to be made to a State under this section for a fiscal year shall be an amount equal to the lesser of (1) 90 percent of State expenditures during the fiscal year for activities described in subsection (a); or (2) the allotment of the State under

intended to support non-profit, community and religious organizations that promote marriage, enforce child support, offer job training and job searching resources, and encourage biological fathers to become more involved in the lives of their children (Smith 2007, 178)<sup>29</sup>.

The government agency, the Child Welfare Information Gateway, has outlined guidelines for establishing successful Fatherhood programs. The section entitled “Effective Fathering” outlines seven dimensions of fathering including:

fostering a positive relationship with the children’s mother; spending time with the children; nurturing children; disciplining children appropriately; serving as a guide to the outside world; protecting and providing; and serving as a positive role model. (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2008, Section 1.4)

With regard to the first dimension, the agency makes suggestions for building a positive relationship with the children’s mother by focusing on respect, anger management, constructive conflict resolution and co-parenting (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2008, Section 1.4). Interestingly, this section talks exclusively in terms of marital relationships. Fatherhood organizations are not given any state advice or information about how to counsel non-married parents or how to define the role of a father outside of marriage (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2008). It can be assumed that fatherhood programs are established, ultimately, to promote marriage as a solution to poverty among single-mothers.

---

subsection (c) the fiscal year. (c) Allotments to States. (1) In General.—The allotment of a State for a fiscal year is the amount that bears the same ratio to \$10,000,000 for grants under this section for the fiscal year as the number of children in the State living with only 1 biological parent bears to the total number of such children in all States.(2) Minimum Allotment.—The Administration for Children and Families shall adjust allotments to States under paragraph (1) as necessary to ensure that no State is allotments less than (A) \$50,000 for fiscal year 1997 or 1998; or (B) \$100,000 for any succeeding fiscal year.” (PRWORA 1996, Section 469B)

<sup>29</sup> The Federal government’s regulations and policies for fatherhood programs are described in the PRWORA accordingly: “In General.—The Administration for Children and Families shall make grants under this section to enable States to establish and administer programs to support and facilitate non-custodial parents’ access to and visitation of their children, by means of activities including mediation (both voluntary and mandatory), counseling, education, development of parenting plans, visitation enforcement (including monitoring, supervision and neutral dropoff and pickup), and development of guidelines for visitation and alternative custody arrangements.” (PRWORA 1996, Section 469B)

The second dimension of fatherhood, which calls for spending time with one's children, focuses on the masculine traits that differentiate fathers and mothers. Akin to Blankenhorn and Mansfield's assertion that fatherhood is necessarily masculine<sup>30</sup> this section of the guidebook focuses on themes of male aggression, personal responsibility, and intellectual growth (Blankenhorn 1995, 89; Mansfield 2006, 18). First, fathers are encouraged to interact with their children so that their children can learn how to respond to new social and emotional contexts. Most interestingly, the guidebook reminds fathers to teach their sons how to properly "keep aggressive impulses in check." (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2008, Section 4.1) A blatant connection is thus made between the civilizing nature of the family, and the need for fathers to control their own impulses as well as foster that discipline within their children (Griswald 1998, 16). Second, fathers are told to encourage their children to do daily chores in the hopes that the children will learn responsibility and discipline. Both of these characteristics were vital to Mansfield, Blankenhorn and Popenoe's belief in the necessity of fatherly authority (Mansfield 2006, 65; Blankenhorn 1995, 122; Popenoe 1996, 15). As stated, the father is needed to act as the authority to train his children to be disciplined, self-sufficient, loyal citizens. Third, the agency makes the following statement regarding a father's role in the intellectual development of children:

Fathers should spend time fostering their children's intellectual growth. Some studies suggest that fathers' involvement in educational activities—from reading to their children to meeting with their child's teacher—is more important for their children's academic success than their mothers' involvement. (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2008, Section 4.2)

---

<sup>30</sup> Mansfield and Blankenhorn's notions of gendered parenting should be juxtaposed against the liberal notion of non-gendered parents as noted in the first chapter (Lakoff 1996).

The suggestion here seems to be that men are more intellectually advanced than women, and thus fathers will make a more profound contribution to their children's intellectual development than will mothers. Once again fathers are portrayed as the agents of change while women exist to perform the menial tasks of child raising. Fathers are to be engaged in the activities of civilizing, instilling responsibility and developing the minds of their children. As well, fathers are to be the primary moral, behavioral and social role model. Building on this assertion, the fifth dimension of fatherhood involves acting as a guide to the outside world for their children. After all, a father is the primary breadwinner and the authority of the family. He therefore functions primarily outside of the family, as a citizen in the public realm. Accordingly, the father is to teach his children about social interaction, self-reliance, independent thinking and, once again, a respect for authority. This is subsumed under the logic that fathers interact with the outside world more than mothers and, according to Eberly, that fathers represent children's first encounter with authority (Eberly 1999, 29). Fathers should therefore use their position of power to instill social and national morals. Much like states represent the nation internationally, fathers represent, speak for and defend the family in relation to greater society (Lakoff 1996, 33).

Interestingly, the agency's third dimension of fatherhood is to be more nurturing and the seventh dimension of fatherhood is to be a masculine role model. Initially, this seems like a contradiction, as fathers are being asked to be nurturing and masculine at the same time. As Horn warned, the former leads to feminized or androgynous fatherhood (Horn 1997, 4). But the agency is suggesting that fathers be nurturing in a masculine way. This is to say that men should be strong role models of manliness. Johnson et. al. state that fatherhood programs have been designed to serve as role models to fathers.



Fatherhood programs are based on the idea of gendered parenting and the gendered transmission of this knowledge [...] Moreover, men have to be taught how to be fathers by other men. Fathering is a male role, and one that is culturally and socially transmitted by men. (Johnson et. al. 2007, 156)

Fatherhood programs should thus be administered by men. In many cases, it is assumed that men are 'bad' fathers because they were raised by single-mothers. Fathers therefore need strong male role models to teach them about parenting, and in turn, enable them to serve as role models for their children. Boys learn to emulate their father's masculinity and girls learn to seek that same model of masculinity in their future husbands.

Ultimately, the guidelines imply that children of both sexes develop more successfully if they can learn from, emulate and yearn for the authority of a manly man (Popenoe 1996, 140). The loyalty, respect and yearning for authority that is fostered within the family will then manifest in the children's future relations with their state and nation.

The fourth dimension of fatherhood is discipline. Lakoff argues that conservatives believe that people must be taught how to conduct themselves morally. Under the Moral Strength metaphor, people, especially children, must be trained to defend themselves against immoral temptations such as self-indulgence, selfishness, and dependency (Lakoff 1996, 71-73). The Child Welfare Information Gateway argues for fatherly discipline accordingly:

The role that fathers play as disciplinarians cannot be underestimated. The way this role is understood and implemented within the individual family can have an enormous impact on how the family responds to efforts to prevent further child maltreatment. One advantage of having two parents rather than one is that two parents can share the load of parenting. Discipline often is difficult and frustrating; hence, fathers can make raising children easier for all in the family by taking up a substantial share of child discipline. Fathers seem to be uniquely successful in disciplining boys, perhaps in part because boys are often more likely to respond to discipline by a man. (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2008, Section 4.4)

This set of claims invokes Lakoff's Strict Father, who, unlike the Nurturing Parent, is firm, resolved, level-headed, rational and distinctly gendered. Given his interaction in the outside world, the Strict Father has a knowledge and respect for national values, predominantly self-sacrifice, self-discipline and self-reliance. The state runs the nation according to these specific morals and values and applies them to an ethos of family values, work ethic and patriotism (Lakoff 1996, 33). Fathers become the conduits of these national values in two ways. First, fathers must assume an authoritative position, and much like the state, the father is responsible for controlling and regulating his dependents according to the national values. Second, by establishing order, respect for authority and self-discipline, the father creates future citizens who will show loyalty and patriotism toward the nation-state.

Finally, fathers are to be the providers and protectors of the family. The agency reflects the social conservative and fatherhood movement stance that men are naturally stronger, more aggressive and productive than women.

Certainly the role of father as protector and provider has changed over the years. Historically, fathers were viewed as chief financial provider for and protector of their children. As the traditional roles of mother and father, and likewise man [sic] and wife, have changed over the years, the distinctions have blurred, especially when it comes to who is the breadwinner. One study, however, found that men view marriage "as a partnership of equals, albeit one in which the man is the partner ultimately responsible for the provision of income and the family's protection." The ability to provide and protect is still, today, very much tied up with the average man's sense of self and sense of manhood. Research consistently shows that fathers who are employed full-time express more happiness with family life and have better relationships with their children, compared to fathers who are underemployed or unemployed. (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2008, Section 4.6)

Akin to Horn and Mansfield's theories, the fatherhood role is fundamentally expressed through the man's ability to provide for his family (Horn 1997, 4; Mansfield 2006, 64).

It seems fitting that welfare policy would focus on re-establishing and engraining the notion that men should be naturally inclined to provide for their families and should feel shame for failing to do so.

The influence of the Child Welfare Information Gateway's perspectives on fatherhood is seen in several states' experimentation with fatherhood programs since 1996. According to Johnson et. al., all fatherhood programs are based on the notion that poor American men need support and instruction on how to be competent fathers. Yet in most states, fatherhood programs are forced upon fathers; often in lieu of jail time or the suspension of state issued licenses (Johnson et. al. 2007, 156).<sup>31</sup>

During the PRWORA re-authorization debates in 2003, Republicans proposed to allocate \$20 million to fatherhood programs run by faith-based and community groups to: "encourage and help fathers to support their families and avoid welfare, improve fathers' ability to manage family affairs, and encourage and support healthy marriages and married fatherhood." (Mink 2003, 213) The proposal did not pass, but under the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act, which ultimately did include a reauthorization of the PRWORA, \$50-\$150 million was set aside by the federal government for a fatherhood program grant

---

<sup>31</sup> There have been debates in Congress about mandating fatherhood programs as part of child support enforcement. Essentially, the proposal is that the biological father would have his child support payments reduced if he attended a fatherhood program. Such a plan has already been introduced in Kansas City, Minneapolis, and Yakima, Washington. (Johnson et. al., 157). Most fatherhood programs target the biological fathers of poor children. A welfare mother's partner is not allowed to access these programs. Only the child support payee may benefit from any of these services (Smith 2007, 180). These policies are premised on the notion that the fatherhood role can and should extend beyond breadwinning. The biological father is pursued with the hope that he will feel a deeper and more long-term connection with the children than the partner of the single-mother ever would. Still, in the context of welfare policy, the first priority should be the financial stability of the single-mother and her children. The mother is being forced to interact with the father of her children while potentially being denied child support payments because the father is attending a fatherhood program. As such, these proposals perpetuate patriarchy because the rights of mother are not considered. The state is effectively deciding how the family is structured and how it is going to function. There are provisions in the PRWORA that allow women to refuse any contact with the father of her children if he was abusive. But even if the father is not abusive the mother should have the freedom to decide when and if a non-custodial father will interact with her children (Smith 2007, 181).

fund (Smith 2007, 180). With regard to the emphasis on fatherhood in the PRWORA re-authorization, John Buntin stated:

a decade ago, when Congress wrote the TANF welfare reform law, nearly all the emphasis was on mothers – how get them off the dole and into the workforce. Fathers figured primarily as a source of child support payments. Now, as welfare reauthorization comes up, state and local governments are concluding that the next step should involve helping low-income fathers become productive partners as a stable family structure demands. (Buntin 2005, 24)

Buntin observes that after the 1996 passage of the PRWORA, state governments began to focus on fatherhood programs that encouraged and taught fathers to become involved in the day to day lives of their children. During re-authorization, however, the Bush administration has abandoned ‘pure’ fatherhood programs that focus on job training, parental education, and family counseling for low income married and single fathers. Due to budget constraints in the 2000s, state experimentation, and wavering public support, fatherhood programs have assumed a less prevalent role in welfare policy (Johnson et. al. 2007, 158). Fatherhood programs still exist but the Bush administration has changed the core goals of fatherhood programs toward marriage promotion, as was seen in the guidelines set out by the Child Welfare Information Gateway.

That said, there are some states, including Massachusetts, Michigan, South Carolina and California that are making efforts to establish fatherhood programs that do not necessarily focus on marriage promotion (Buntin 2005, 28). For example, Michigan spends \$1 million a year on fatherhood programs that focus on counseling programs for poor absentee fathers. The goal of the Michigan program is to help men become responsible citizens by taking financial, and physical care of their children and their children’s mothers without necessarily promoting marriage (Smith 2007, 180).

The South Carolina Center for Fathers and Families (SCCFF) is an example of a fatherhood program that is entirely focused of the breadwinner/provider role of the father. In 2007, the SCCFF received a \$499,456 grant that was co-funded by the South Carolina Welfare Department and the Administration for Children and Families (United States Department of Health and Human Services, #90FR0021). The SCCFF proposed to use the grant to established job training, social entrepreneurship, and employment opportunity programs for low-income fathers. According to their mission statement, the SCCFF:

Provides the needed mechanism for a father to meet his financial requirements to his children, reduces the cost on the State of South Carolina and, most importantly, allows him to maintain his dignity by providing for himself and his family. (South Carolina Center for Fathers and Families 2006)

There are two important ideas that need to be extracted from their mission statement that pertain to my discussion of welfare policy and the gendered nature of American citizenship. First, the SCCFF defines the fatherhood role chiefly in terms of breadwinning and financial support. Second, the SCCFF wants to end families' dependency on the state and enable them to be self-sufficient. The SCCFF is claiming that men's dignity rests in their ability to provide for their families. As Mansfield and Blankenhorn said, a man's honour is dependent on his ability to support his dependents (Mansfield 2006, 18; Blankenhorn 1995, 114). Similarly, Popenoe and Horn argue that a father should feel shame for allowing his children to depend on an external body such as a state welfare program (Popenoe 1999; Horn 1997). Essentially, the SCCFF is defining the male citizen as naturally and morally obliged to be the primary breadwinner for his dependent family.

Regardless of these state initiatives that downplay the significance of marriage as long as the father fulfills his breadwinner role, the George W. Bush administration is

adamant that the marital form is of primary importance, establishing a contractual and moral agreement obliging the father to support his family. Cohabitation, child support, and fatherhood programs were not comparable to the legal, moral, and social bonds of marriage (Johnson et. al. 2007, 158). This emphasis on the link between marriage and paternal obligation is evident in the Center for Fathers and Families of Arkansas (CFFA), which received a \$49,862 grant from the Department of Welfare's TANF fund.<sup>32</sup> The CFFA's mission statement defines the father as being the leader of the family.

The Center for Fathers and Families of Arkansas is a Christ-centered organization, partnering with other organizations to equip fathers to be responsible family leaders. (Center for Fathers and Families of Arkansas 2008)

The CFFA helps and encourages fathers to establish themselves as the familial leaders and authorities by assuming presence in the home; taking responsibility for the well-being of one's wife and children; providing for the family; staying committed through marriage vows; and practicing non-violent and nurturing parenting (Center for Fathers and Families of Arkansas 2008). One of several fatherhood classes offered by the CFFA is entitled: "How to Show Affection While Still Being the Protector." The CFFA justifies paternal leadership by citing the connection between fatherhood and divine creation (Center for Fathers and Families of Arkansas 2008). As I noted in the previous chapter, pro-fatherhood social conservatives operate according to patriarchal ideology which

---

<sup>32</sup> In 2005, Arkansas' TANF allotment was \$60, 265, 000 from the federal government (Federal Funds Information Service). Therefore the CFFA's \$49,862 federal grant represents 0.075% of Arkansas' total TANF funds. Interestingly, an alarmingly low number of Arkansas' population receives TANF support: 0.5% (or 14,503 people) receive welfare aid despite the fact that 16.4% (or 460,983 people) live below the poverty line (American Radio Works). Unfortunately, the data was not available regarding the amount of welfare recipients that were served by the CFFA. Still, it seems that the CFFA is receiving a high amount of money given the fact that it serves a limited porportion of Arkansas' population: married and single-fathers who have children that are below the poverty line and seeking welfare aid and/or child support (Center for Fathers and Families of Arkansas). Given that 15.9% of Arkansas' poor population is not receiving welfare aid, it can be deduced that a high proportion of the state's TANF allotement is going towards programs such as the CFFA which serve to judge and condition poor citizen's familial and gendered behavior rather than offer direct financial aid.

holds that men (not women) were created in God's image (Johnson et al. 2007, 61). As Johnson et. al. warned of fatherhood advocates, the CFFA holds that fathers reflect God's power on earth. Because of their divine connection, men are disposed to understand, value and act according to a religious moral code. Men are therefore fulfilling their gender role morally by agreeing to be religious and civic leaders of their families.

In what is a blatant conflict of interest, the National Fatherhood Initiative has been given a five year, \$5 million grant from the Administration for Children and Families, which was under the administration of Horn when the initial award was granted in 2006 (Office of Family Assistance Responsible Fatherhood Demonstration 2008). The grant was awarded to promote marriage and develop fatherhood programs. The NFI was founded by Don Eberly and Wade Horn during a national conference in 1993, which assembled pro-fatherhood and pro-marriage advocates. The conference is reported to have concluded in the founding of the NFI as a national movement to "combat father absence and promote responsible fatherhood." (National Fatherhood Initiative 2008) The four tenets of the NFI's mission statement focus on re-valuing and re-empowering the idea of fatherhood in culture and the role of individual fathers in their families. The four tenets are:

Fathers make unique and irreplaceable contributions to the lives of children; father absence produces negative outcomes for their children; societies which fail to reinforce a cultural ideal of responsible fatherhood get increasing amounts of father absence; and widespread fatherlessness is the most socially consequential problem of our time. (National Fatherhood Initiative 2008)

The NFI thus seeks to influence media, politicians at all levels, educational programs and school curriculum, and public policy to promote their vision to end single-motherhood and fatherlessness (National Fatherhood Initiative 2008).

The largest NFI fatherhood program is the “24/7 Dad” educational program. Following the mission statement of the NFI, 24/7 Dad was established as a nation-wide community-based program that would teach men to become responsible, strong and valued fathers. To do so, 24/7 Dad teaches men that mothering and fathering are necessarily distinct (National Fatherhood Initiative 2003, 2). The NFI is unwavering in its attempt to stop the feminization of fatherhood. The first characteristic of a “24/7 Dad” is that he is self-aware. A self-aware man is aware of his unique masculine temperament, aggression, emotions, strengths and limitations (National Fatherhood Initiative 2003, 7). The “24/7 Dad” has developed an understanding of proper parenting skills as a father. He must learn to use discipline as a method to teach and guide his children. The Facilitator’s Guide makes no mention of the disciplinary or parenting role of mothers. This silence recalls Mansfield’s claim that men have a better sense of justice and should therefore make and enforce the house-hold rules (Mansfield, 18). The Child Welfare Information Gateway’s third and seventh guidelines are apparent as fathers are encouraged to be nurturing in a manly way (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2008). As such, the discussion follows Lakoff’s Strict Father model of fathering and focuses on discipline, implying that the father should assume a position of authority in the family to instill certain expectations, morals and a work ethic into his children (Lakoff 1996, 155).

In addition the NFI’s own fatherhood programs, the organization also funds and promotes several other pro-father and pro-marriage organizations around the country such as the Resource Center for Fathers & Families (National Fatherhood Initiative 2008). The Resource Center is a Minnesota based fatherhood organization that received \$550,000 in 2007 as part of the Healthy Marriage Demonstration Award of the



Administration for Children and Families (United States Department of Health and Human Services, #90FE0048). The Resource Center holds that the father-mother-child family is the strongest, healthiest and most moral family model (Resource Center for Fathers and Families). The Resource Center therefore works to reconnect low-income fathers with their families. Fathers, however, must provide for their families.

Accordingly, the Resource Center offers job training and opportunities. Intriguingly, the Resource Center also offers legal aid to help fathers reduce or avoid child support, thus encouraging men's participation in fatherhood programs by reducing their child support payments (Johnson et al 2007, p. 158; Smith 2007, 180). The Resource Center claims that the fatherhood role needs to be defined as more than a breadwinner (Resource Center for Fathers and Families), and in pursuit of this objective, the Resource Center is seemingly prepared to sacrifice the well-being of single-mothers and their children. If the father is working to become a more prominent member of the family, and is 'rewarded' through reduced child support payments, the mother may feel compelled to marry the father in order to regain the financial support that was lost. Thus in an effort to make fathers more than just breadwinners, the Resource Center is helping fathers to reclaim their position as the head of the family.<sup>33</sup>

Horn and Bush acknowledge that single mothers are less likely to marry the father of their children if the father earns less than the mother's welfare benefits or income. With marriage as their primary objective, Horn and Bush resist the call for

---

<sup>33</sup> The Resource Center's solution is ill-conceived because if the father even wants to marry, there is no guarantee, much less any supporting evidence, that the father will choose to "work hard" in lieu of making child support payments. Also, as Smith warns, solutions such as this proposal of the Resource Center forces women to remain economically dependent on the father regardless of the abusive or violent nature of their relationship. Many mothers leave their relationships precisely because their partners are abusive. Sixty to eighty percent of women on welfare have been in abusive relationships. Women therefore risk becoming financially unstable to escape a potentially deadly relationship (Smith 2001, 312).

reducing the gendered wage gap and encouraging women's employment. In their view, doing so would only make men even less appealing as potential husbands (Horn and Bush 1997 , 45). Thus Horn and Bush suggest that the state should focus on getting men, not women, to work.

Smith states that fatherhood programs have the potential to aid welfare recipients because the programs could offer personal counseling, job training and placement, and parenting classes. Yet most fatherhood programs are geared towards marriage promotion, avoidance of divorce and child support policies (Smith 2007, 180). Guided by the Child Welfare Information Gateway's handbook on "Effective Fathering," all of the fatherhood programs that I have studied propagate a particular definition of fatherhood in which the father is to be the provider, protector and authority of the family. The CFFA and NFI both emphasize the leadership role of the father but from different angles. The CFFA calls on the divinity of fatherhood to justify patriarchy. The NFI is trying to revalue the authoritative and power-laden role of the father by distinguishing him from mothers. As such, the father should be seen as the disciplinarian within the family. By being the disciplinarian, the father becomes the law-maker and the law-enforcer of the family. Alternatively, the SCCFF and the Resource Center emphasize the breadwinning role of the father. The SCCFF offers employment programs with the goal of enabling fathers to support their families regardless of their marital status. Conversely, the Resource Center emphasizes fathers' breadwinning abilities in order to reconnect them with their families, preferably through marriage. Given President Bush's recent focus on marriage promotion within fatherhood programs, it is not surprising that programs like the Resource Center are emerging. The final section in this Chapter is going to look into the marriage

promotion programs of the PRWORA. Suffice to say for now, that regardless of the marriage agenda, the PRWORA's fatherhood programs reflect the nuclear family model in which the father is the authority and is conditioned to exist in the private and public spheres as the breadwinner, protector and authority.

### **Marriage as All Encompassing**

The PRWORA was conceived according to the belief that marriage is a sacred, privileged and necessary institution for the survival and strength of the nation and society. Yet, membership in the American nation is gendered according to the patriarchal model of the nuclear family. The nuclear family has been cast, through family values rhetoric, as a self-sufficient unit in which its members are provided for and protected (Stacey 1996, 65). Some neoconservatives see marriage as one of several economic solutions to welfare dependency. Other solutions include job training and child support enforcement. Social conservative fatherhood movement advocates, such as Blankenhorn, Popenoe and Horn, see marriage as the primary solution to fatherlessness – and by extension – welfare dependence. These social conservatives and fatherhood movement advocates believe that government policy needs to refocus and honour the biological facts of fatherhood: that fathers do not feel an innate biological connection to their children, that men need to be coerced into caring for their children and the mothers of their children and that within a marriage, men want and need to express their manly honor by protecting and providing for their families (Blankenhorn 2005; Popenoe 2005; Horn 2006). Haney and March say that many fatherhood movement advocates believe that if the form of fatherhood is promoted through marriage, then men will eventually fulfill the

function of fatherhood (2003, 447). With fathers leading, protecting and supporting the family, the government would be relieved from supporting welfare dependent single-mothers. PRWORA marriage promotion initiatives were devised according to social conservative ideology which seeks to bring fathers back into their families as breadwinning patriarchs. PRWORA marriage policies promote a certain form of fatherhood and assume that the function will follow (Haney and March 2003, 447).

David Blankenhorn founded the right-wing think tank “Center for Marriage and Families.” The Center for Marriage and Families is focused on re-orienting American culture, values and legislation to focus on, support and encourage marriage. An excerpt from the Center’s mandate reads as follows:

Culture Changers: Culture Changers seek to shift cultural values in a pro-marriage direction. They believe that the most important thing we need to change is our minds. Through publications, public speaking, media interviews, conferences, research, and other activities, they strive to persuade their fellow citizens on the benefits of marriage, the importance of marriage as a social and legal institution, the harmful consequences of divorce and unwed childbearing, and the ingredients of successful marriages. They also strive to bring together the diverse sectors of the movement into a unified and more powerful whole. (Center for Marriage and Families)

Popenoe echoes the Center’s mandate as he says that American culture needs to shift back to pre-1960s morality and family values. Popenoe insists that the sexual revolution needs to be stopped and that abstinence, monogamy and heterosexuality need to be reinstated in government policy and championed as fundamental social values (Popenoe 2005, 211). Popenoe also suggests that the state should promote and reward the nuclear family, and discourage and punish ‘alternative families’ that do not fit the nuclear family ideal (Popenoe 2005, 211). Similarly, a section of the Center’s mandate targets the

PRWORA as a major avenue for governmental intervention and heterosexual marriage promotion:

Our Shared Goals through 2006 [...] We will work with members of Congress and our fellow citizens to win passage of national legislation increasing federal funding for marriage education and support programs serving low-income communities, as a part of the reauthorization of the federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, and we will work to encourage state governments to take advantage of those funds. (Center for Marriage and Families)

To assure that marriage promotion remains a vital part of the PRWORA, the Center states that it will actively influence legislators, politicians, media, state governments, and political parties to assure that heterosexual marriage maintains social and political status (Center for Marriage and Families). It follows that public policy should be used to entice people to get or remain married. Marriage will hold a privileged position in society if married couples receive benefits, tax incentives and welfare aid. Horn and Bush say that the state needs to take an active and explicit role in promoting marriage through welfare policy and programs (Horn and Bush 1997, 42-44). They concede that certain benefits should remain universally accessible such as nutrition, immunization, and health-care programs, but on the other hand, they claim that ‘limited-supply’ welfare benefits such as Head Start, public-housing units, financial aid for education, and job training should be restricted to married couples (Horn and Bush 1997, 43). Horn and Bush admit that it ‘seems’ like they are discriminating against the most destitute demographic in the population – poor single-mothers, but they justify their position on the grounds that the numbers of poor single mothers has increased since the advent of post-1960s welfare policy that ‘favoured’ and ‘rewarded’ single mothers (Horn and Bush 1997, 43).<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> Abramovitz argues: “By the mid-1970s, the welfare critics had concluded that too few women on AFDC entered the labor market despite the availability of jobs increasingly dependent on cheap female labor, and too many lived outside of marriage. From their vantage point AFDC’s low benefits and strict work rules had failed to discourage poor women

The PRWORA was centrally devised around the idea that responsible, heteronormative behavior was the cure for poverty. Accordingly, the PRWORA allocated \$20 million annually for four years to the five states that are most successful in reducing illegitimacy, and have a lower ratio of live births to abortions than they did in 1995.<sup>35</sup> State governments have tried a variety of tactics such as birth control, the morning after pill, abstinence education, adoption promotion, family planning programs, family caps on welfare benefits, paternity testing, and marriage promotion to reduce out-of-wedlock births (Smith 2001-2002, 136-180). Since the passage of the PRWORA, however, marriage promotion continues to be many social conservatives, fatherhood movement advocates and politicians' preferred solution to single-mothers' welfare dependence.<sup>36</sup> In fact under the 2005 reauthorization, states can cut funding to anti-poverty programs such as childcare and cash benefits if they reallocate that money towards marriage promotion programs (Smith 2007, 177).

---

from choosing public assistance over wedlock or work. Although many women on AFDC worked, to opponents the program appeared to help poor women avoid both low-paid jobs *and* unhappy or unsafe marriages, and to consider social welfare benefits as a right. Welfare reform began to reverse potentially "subversive" trends in the early 1980s, first by making it harder for poor women to qualify for AFDC and then by forcing them to work or change their family life choices as a condition of receiving aid." (1996, 351)

<sup>35</sup> The PRWORA established state bonuses to reduce illegitimacy: "(2) Bonus To Reward Decrease In Illegitimacy: (A) In General.—Each eligible State shall be entitled to receive from the Secretary a grant for each bonus year for which the State demonstrates a net decrease in out-of-wedlock births. (B) Amount of Grant. (i) IF 5 Eligible States.—If there are 5 eligible States for a bonus year, the amount of the grant shall be \$20,000,000 (ii) If fewer than 5 Eligible States.—If there are fewer than 5 eligible States for a bonus year, the amount of the grant shall be \$25,000,000." (PRWORA 1996, Section 401)

<sup>36</sup> The federal government does not give states guidelines on how they can or should reduce non-marital births. The government does suggest, however, that states focus on promoting marriage, adoption, long-term contraceptives, and abstinence. The states are given the freedom to experiment with ineffective and dangerous tactics to reduce illegitimacy and often end up focusing on marriage promotion (Dye and Presser 2007, 144). As Smith has revealed, Arizona allocated \$1 million of its TANF budget to marriage promotion and established free marital counseling for poor couples, and produced a 'healthy marriage' handbook that was distributed with marriage licenses (2007, 174). Using more aggressive tactics, Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee devoted TANF funds to a high profile media campaign to promote marriage and discourage divorce (Smith 2007, 174). More alarming still, is that Huckabee worked with religious leaders to change churches' policies to make it more difficult for couples to get divorced. In Florida, high school students cannot receive their diplomas until they have completed a marriage and relationship skills course. In Oklahoma, 10% of the state's TANF budget has been devoted to marriage promotion, and counseling. As with Arkansas, the governor of Oklahoma has aligned himself with religious leaders and has even given them monetary incentives to actively promote marriage within their parish communities. Several states such as Utah and West Virginia are giving a marriage bonus of between \$100 and \$350 to couples who got married when both members were on welfare (Smith 2007, 174-175).

In the context of legislation designed to reauthorize the TANF program, the administration planned to provide the marriage promotion funds to the states so that they could establish experimental programs, such as premarital counseling for poor heterosexual couples, divorce-avoidance counseling for poor people in troubled marriages, and publicity campaigns aimed at the general population about the virtues of heterosexual marriage. (Smith 2007, 173)

Congressional debates were laden with social conservative discourse about the virtues, strengths and values of the nuclear family. Democratic Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala) remarked:

This bill also contains provisions to strengthen families and personal responsibility, something I think is essential to getting at the root of our welfare problems. In a scant few decades, we have seen the demise of families and family values in our country. And illegitimacy rates are rising to almost dangerous levels. These are the things that are contributing most to the decline in our society. More and more children are growing up without a father, without a solid family to support them, and crime statistics show that kids who are raised without a father commit more crimes. I think our welfare system, though designed to assist folks and born of good-hearted intentions, has served to fuel some of the social problems we face today. It is clear that our present welfare system encourages young mothers to have children, and many of those children are not being cared for. Though it is impossible to legislate, this bill takes a giant step forward in addressing these problems by encouraging families to stay together. (Representative Heflin 1996)

Senator Heflin essentially argued that American families, society, and the nation could be strengthened if illegitimacy and fatherlessness were reduced. He concludes by stating, like Blankenhorn, Popenoe and Horn, that welfare reform should be “encouraging families to stay together.” In this way fathers, not the state, will assume the responsibility of providing for and protecting their families.

During the 2001-2003 PRWORA reauthorization, Senators Hillary Clinton, Joe Lieberman and President Bush all made proposals that promoted marriage as a solution to welfare. Specifically, President Bush proposed to redirect \$100 million from the ‘illegitimacy bonus’ to fund marriage promotion research projects. He proposed to

allocate another \$100 million in 'high-performance bonus' funds to support state-level promotion of marriage (Mink 2003, 207). Evidently, the Bush Administration took a marked interest in marriage promotion as a solution to welfare dependency.

I know that the welfare bill, the reauthorization, needs to encourage marriage and family [...] It is also important to understand that a more hopeful society is one in which we encourage strong marriages and families. (Applause.) I understand building and preserving a family is not always possible; I know that. But it should be a national goal. We ought to aspire for what's best. And what's best is for our families to remain intact. (Bush, July 29, 2002)

Similarly, President Bush stated the following in a February 2002 speech:

Congress recognized the fact that two-parent, married families represent the ideal environment for raising children when it enacted TANF in 1996. TANF features a variety of family formation provisions. However, state efforts to promote healthy marriages represent just one percent of total TANF program expenditures. The limited attention paid to family formation by states is due in part to the lack of knowledge about how to implement successful marriage and family formation programs. Our proposal will place a greater emphasis in TANF on strengthening families and improving the well-being of children. Enhanced funding will be made available for research, demonstrations, technical assistance, and matching grants to states. An increased focus on marriage and child well-being will be added to both the purposes of the program and the state plan requirements. (Bush, February 2002)

Through speeches, debates and press releases, the Bush Administration made it clear that families, marriage and an end to fatherlessness were a major focus of their welfare strategy. Accordingly, during the 2002 PRWORA re-authorization debates, the Bush administration proposed to allocate \$300 million of the TANF budget for marriage promotion programs.

All you've got to hear is from the man I met today, Patrick, talk about the fatherhood initiative. He talked in compelling terms about what it's like to have dads want to be a dad; and when dad is reunited with their families, how vital and how real that person's life becomes and, more importantly, how hopeful the life becomes for the children. He works for the Sisters of Charity Foundation on the fatherhood initiative. There are such initiatives throughout our society -- many in the faith community, by the way. Initiatives that ought to be supported by the federal government. And so, therefore, the bill that the House passed, that I



proposed -- in my budget, I have \$300 million on an annual basis to support education programs and counseling programs -- out of the faith community and out of the charitable community and out of the government community, all aimed at encouraging marriage; all aimed at helping couples to build and sustain healthy marriage in our society. (Applause.) (Bush, July 29, 2002)

The \$300 million was to be used primarily to fund community, religious, and non-profit organizations that administered marriage education, marriage promotion and marital counseling to low-income couples and single-parents.

Wade Horn, speaking on behalf of the Bush Administration, has tried to argue that the administration is not pursuing a policy that would coerce poor people to get married or encourage them to stay in violent or destructive marriages (Horn 2002, 2-6). Yet, the Bush administration has set a national goal of saving 70% of America's "very troubled" marriages that are experiencing "severe marital problems" including alcoholism, infidelity and gambling. Thus a portion of the \$300 million will be devoted specifically to marital counseling to encourage couples to stay together despite severe or dangerous marital problems (Bush, February 26, 2002). Horn even argues that many low-income couples want to marry but lack the financial incentive and do not have access to marriage programs as do their wealthier fellow citizens. Horn states that 80% of low-income parents are in an exclusive relationship and 50% of these want to get married (Horn 2002, 5-6).

The president's Healthy Marriage Initiative is a centerpiece of welfare-reform reauthorization bills currently before both houses of Congress. The reason why the president's Healthy Marriage Initiative mainly targets low-income couples is not because we believe marriage is particularly problematic in low-income communities, but because unlike more affluent couples, low-income couples either do not have the resources to purchase marriage-education services or those services are not currently available in their community. The aim, then, of the president's Healthy Marriage Initiative is to give low-income couples greater access to marriage-education services and thereby improve their chances of forming healthy, stable marriages. (Horn 2002,7)

Interestingly, Horn also states that a national survey has indicated that 67% of Americans think that surplus welfare funds should be used to reduce divorce and promote marriage (Horn 2002, 7). The validity of that survey is unknown, but regardless, Horn's point is clear: the state should be actively involved in promoting, encouraging and facilitating marriage among low-income and welfare dependent parents..

Although Bush's 2002 reauthorization proposal was not accepted, the federal government was able to divert 25 percent of a \$2.2 billion child support enforcement program to marriage promotion initiatives (Smith 2007, 173). The 2005 TANF reauthorization has devoted \$150 million annually in grant funds to states in creating and supporting "Healthy Marriage and Fatherhood Programs" (Administration for Children and Families 2007).<sup>37</sup> According to the Administration for Children and Families, Healthy Marriage and Fatherhood Programs must adhere to six core goals: to increase the percentage of children raised by two parents in a healthy marriage; to increase the percentage of married couples in healthy marriages; to increase the percentage of premarital couples who have the skills and knowledge necessary to form and sustain a healthy marriage; to increase the percentage of youth and young adults who have the skills and knowledge to make informed decisions about healthy relationships and marriage; increase public awareness about the value of healthy marriages; encourage and support research on marriage and marriage education; and to increase the percentage of

---

<sup>37</sup> As Assistant Secretary for Children and Families under the Bush Administration, Horn reported that of the funds allocated to Healthy Marriage and Fatherhood programs, two-thirds will go to research and technical assistance for states, counties and cities to create "healthy marriage demonstration programs." (Horn 2006, 6) The remaining funds will support a state matching-grant program that could be used for additional marriage promotion programs or to administer and support state marriage promotion legislation (Horn 2006, 6).

women, men and children in homes that are free of domestic violence (Administration for Children and Families 2007).

In 2006 the Heritage Foundation held a conference to discuss the state of the PRWORA ten years after its establishment. Wade Horn was a one of the keynote speakers and directed the conference to focus on marriage promotion as a solution to poverty. As Assistant Secretary for Children and Families under the Bush Administration, Horn oversaw the PRWORA's shift towards marriage promotion.

Just 10 years ago it was impolite to even use the word 'marriage,' and now we have a dedicated \$100 million funding stream to not only mention the word, but to promote and encourage marriage [...] I oversee \$46 billion, part of a \$2 trillion federal budget, and \$100 million for the Healthy Marriage Initiative out of my \$46 billion is not a lot of money. So a much more important task is to integrate the idea of marriage into all of the social programs that support low-income families. (Horn 2006, 6)

Arguably, \$100 million is a substantial amount of money to put towards marriage promotion, especially when that money is being diverted from other welfare programs such as child support enforcement (Smith 2007, 176) Still, Horn felt that marriage promotion should become an even more important tool in the fight against welfare dependence. Accordingly, I will now discuss several marriage programs across the United States that have won substantial grants from the Healthy Marriage and Fatherhood fund since 2005. I will analyze the degree to which these programs promote a social conservative and fatherhood movement definition of American fatherhood.

The "Building Strong Families" (BSF) initiative is funded entirely by the Administration for Children and Families. The BSF is a national policy initiative which works with civil service organizations nationwide. BSF has based its policies on the research of the 'Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study,' which found that: "at the

time of their child's birth, many unmarried couples have high hopes for marriage, but few couples succeed in that goal." (United States Department of Health and Human Services) This sentiment emulates Horn's argument that low-income and welfare dependent parent couples want to marry but need government intervention to assure that they marry and remain married (Horn 2002, 5-6). As Johnson et. al. warned of social conservatives, the BSF is pushing the government to "reinstitutionalize tradition." (Johnson et. al. 2007, 41-44). The BSF was thus created to investigate how, not if, governments should intervene to promote and maintain marriages among low-income or welfare dependent Americans. Cossman's theory that social conservatives use public policy to assimilate citizens to the national identity, project and agenda is evident in the BSF which exists to promote certain national values of work and family (Cossman 2005, 439).

Based in Modesto, California, the Stanislaus County Healthy Marriage Coalition (SCHMC) works to: "Preserve marriages, increase marital happiness, increase marriage among singles and to help build public awareness on the value of marriage." (Stanislaus County Healthy Marriage Coalition) In 2006, the SCHMC received a \$50,000 grant under the TANF (United States Department of Health and Human Services). The SCHMC reports that those funds will be used according to the mandate of their organization: to promote that communities are stronger if mothers and fathers are involved in the lives of their children; to prevent out-of-wedlock births; to advocate for the strong, healthy, life-long marriages between "one man and one woman." (Stanislaus County Healthy Marriage Coalition) Ultimately, the SCHMC holds that a two-parent heterosexual marriage is in the best interest of children, the family and the nation. The

nation will be stronger, they say, when fathers are present in the home to provide for their families. The SCHMC has proposed the following goals to be achieved by 2016:

Reduce the number of divorce filings by 30 percent; increase the marriage rate by 30 percent (decrease cohabitation); reduced the number of out-of-wedlock pregnancies by 30 percent; increase father involvement in the community.  
(Stanislaus County Healthy Marriage Coalition)

As with the opening statements of the PRWORA, there is no discussion of women's agency or power in the goals of the SCHMC. Marriage and fatherhood are cast as the solutions to the morally and financially bankrupt single-mother families that are depending on welfare. The SCHMS intends to disseminate traditional values of family and fatherhood through advocacy, communication and collaboration with other community and religious organizations (Stanislaus County Healthy Marriage Coalition).

The Center for Self-Sufficiency, Inc. was awarded a \$1,097,000 grant from the TANF Healthy Marriage and Fatherhood program in 2006 (United States Department of Health and Human Services). The Center for Self-Sufficiency defines itself accordingly:

The Center for Self-Sufficiency, Inc. is the lead agency for the Milwaukee Marriage Partnership (MMP), a coalition of diverse agencies committed to strengthening the institution of marriage. The Center for Self-Sufficiency, Inc. and its partners take a community-wide approach in promoting the value and benefits of healthy marriage and offer skills-based training and education to high school-aged youth, non-married pregnant women and expectant fathers, engaged couples and individuals interested in marriage as well as married couples." (The Center for Self-Sufficiency)

Like SCHMC, the Center for Self-Sufficiency holds that marriage is the foundation of society and adds that teen pregnancy, out-of-wedlock births and single-motherhood are social problems that need to be addressed through marriage and fatherhood promotion. To encourage family and fatherhood values, the Center seeks to use its government grant to establish programs for pre-marital counselling marriage and sexuality educational

services for youth, marriage monitoring, “Marriage Enhancement Programming,” domestic violence counseling, and public awareness and education (The Center for Self-Sufficiency). The Center for Self-Sufficiency is reflecting the social conservative notion that the nuclear family, like nationhood, is a civilizing force. The Center for Self-Sufficiency holds that the patriarchal structure of heterosexual marriage fosters interdependence, discipline, authority, and above all, self-sufficiency among its members.

In 2007, the National Association of Marriage Enhancement (NAME) received a \$250,000 grant from the Administration for Children and Families as part of President Bush’s Healthy Marriage and Fatherhood program (United States Department of Health and Human Services). While organizations such as BSF, SCHMC and the Center for Self-Sufficiency allude to the strength and form of the nation through their propagation of the value of the family for a strong society, and of the need for fathers to be authorities, providers and protectors, NAME draws a direct connection between the nuclear family, fatherhood and the nation. NAME presents the following mandate:

NAME is committed to our nation. America was founded on godly principles set forth in God's Word. The deterioration of the family has weakened the moral fiber of the nation-politically, economically, and spiritually. Now, our nation is seeing a gathering of leaders from every sector, every denomination, every race, and every culture who are tired of watching our society's moral foundation crumble before their eyes. NAME is leading the way in networking groups, organizations, and leaders to rally for righteousness in the context of biblical truths. Myths about God are being dispelled, visions are being birthed, and opinions once set against God are softening to a realization that we can make a difference in our nation, that society can be transformed for the better, and that we can see God glorified in America's homes. (National Association of Marriage Enhancement)

NAME claims that the nation is crumbling politically, economically, and spiritually because families have been devalued and weakened. First, in terms of American politics, America’s leaders are immoral, un-authoritative and irresolute in their spiritual vision for

the nation. Second, America is becoming a spiritually bankrupt nation. According to NAME, God deemed that America was to be the religious and moral example for the world. American leaders were to act according to God's example. This can be connected to Blankenhorn's belief that men, specifically fathers, can be likened to God because fathers are the creators of life (Blankenhorn 1999, xv). And by extension, men must assume a fatherhood role, a Godly role, as creators, protectors and moral or religious authorities over the nation (Nast 1998, 191-193). Third, the economic survival of the family is dependent on the breadwinning capabilities of a father. The nation, according to NAME, is built on economically self-sufficient, male-headed families.

NAME founder, Pastor Leo Godzich, published an article in the Washington Times Weekly Edition in 2003 in which he commended the pro-marriage vision of President Bush and Wade Horn. Godzich also said that NAME approved of, and benefited from, the use of government funds to promote marriage, specifically among low-income and welfare dependent single and coupled parents. He argued that the government should have a vested interest in promoting marriage to end the cycle of poverty and rejuvenate America. Quoting the Heritage Foundation, Godzich reasoned, like many fatherhood movement advocates and social conservatives, that children and the nation are physically, financially and socially better off when fathers are married to the mothers of their children. To contribute to the marriage promotion effort, NAME has established 140 marriage counseling centers nation-wide. The marriage counseling centers aim to promote the values and benefits of heterosexual marriage on a national level.

The President's Healthy Marriage Initiative, as part of welfare reform reauthorization legislation, would specifically target low income, unmarried

families to benefit from part of an experimental \$300 million earmarked to educate couples on the benefits and value of marriage as well as provide marriage skills and intervention to support long-term marital success [...] The President's proposal to spend \$300 million per year, on his pilot program to promote healthy marriages, according to the Heritage Foundation's analysis, represents a very modest sum, spending only one penny to promote healthy marriage for every five dollars the government currently spends subsidizing single-parent families. Isn't it high time that we started to build a guardrail at the top of the cliff, rather than continuing to fund the dispatching of expensive ambulances to the bottom of the hill. The children of America and the benefits to society are well worth it. (Godzich 2003)

The allusion of the ambulance and the guardian fit into Lakoff's theory of Strict Father and Nurturing Parent politics (Lakoff 1996, 24-40). NAME, like President Bush, Horn, Blankenhorn, Popenoe and Mansfield, is arguing that the state needs to train its citizens to be independent and self-sufficient. The state, like the father, cannot coddle its dependents. Welfare policy should thus be oriented to push citizens into self-sufficiency by privatizing poverty within a wedded, male-headed family.

As discussed above, the National Fatherhood Initiative is also involved in marriage promotion initiatives.

The Administration for Children and Families defines the NFI accordingly: The National Fatherhood Initiative (NFI) is a non-partisan and non-sectarian organization founded in 1994. NFI is widely recognized as the leading fatherhood capacity building expert and national voice on fatherhood issues. The NFI has provided national leadership on the issue of father absence. (Office of Family Assistance Responsible Fatherhood Demonstration)

The NFI's official mandate, goals and philosophies are shrouded in the language of fatherlessness, family breakdown, and child well-being. Interestingly, and perhaps strategically, the NFI makes little mention of marriage promotion, but it is clear that the organization is deeply invested in this project. For example, the NFI's research initiatives have addressed topics such as "Religion, Race, and Relationships in Urban America," "Marriage and Mental Health in Adults and Children," and "The Other Marriage Penalty:



A New Proposal to Eliminate the Marriage Penalty for Low-Income Americans.”

(National Fatherhood Initiative 2008) The first two research initiatives focus on how marriage can aid low-income families in urban centers and outline the mental, emotional and financial benefits of marriage and in-home fathering. The third research project, written by David Blankenhorn and Alex Roberts, outlines how the government can stop ‘punishing’ low-income couples who choose to marry.

Government assistance currently tends to create marriage penalties for two main reasons. First, it targets benefits towards needier families. After a family’s income rises past a certain economic threshold, its benefits are gradually reduced. Some programs such as Medicaid actually cut all benefits at once after a certain level of income is attained. Second, *the assistance system allows a married-couple family to have only very slightly more income before its benefits are cut*—or, to use an analogy, the government does not significantly increase a married couple’s “tax brackets.” This policy means that almost any income brought into the household by a new spouse will lead to a loss of benefits for the family. Thus, in the same way marriage might move a couple into a higher tax bracket or cause their standard deduction to be reduced, marriage can quite suddenly transfer a low-income family to a significantly reduced level of benefits. (Blankenhorn and Roberts 2006, 3)

Blankenhorn and Roberts propose, as part of the PRWORA, that the government give low-income couples a refundable tax credit for the exact amount of their marriage penalty (Blankenhorn and Roberts 2006, 9). Blankenhorn and Roberts state that the Administration for Children and Families funded the BSF to investigate this proposition with the hope that the BSF findings will lead to a new tax credit pilot project (Blankenhorn and Roberts 2006, 10). Blankenhorn and Roberts’ proposal for tax reform that will eliminate financial disincentives for marriage clearly expresses their belief that marriage needs to be promoted by the state. While the NFI claims to be chiefly concerned with the well-being of children, their research interests, policy initiatives, and

high-profile and pro-marriage political advocates all point to their belief that American welfare policy should promote marriage as a primary solution to welfare dependence.

All of these marriage promotion programs that have won grants from President Bush's Healthy Marriage and Fatherhood program reflect Horn, Popenoe and Blankenhorn's pro-marriage and pro-fatherhood ethos. Horn stated:

it is important that we win the rhetorical debate on this issue. It was not too long ago that we were in danger of losing the idea of marriage as an important social institution in America. Marriage is important not only as an expression of the love and affection that two people have for each other, but also because it is critical to the common good in our culture and society. (2006, 6)

The connection that Horn draws in this quote between marriage and society is suggestive of the metaphorical power of the patriarchal family for the nation. Accordingly, politicians from both political parties used the PRWORA to enforce the morals and lifestyle of the patriarchal family as its favored solution to welfare dependency but also as an object lesson for all Americans. As was seen through an analysis of PRWORA debates, fatherhood initiatives, and marriage promotion policy, the institution of marriage is being used as a public policy tool to force fathers to become state-like authorities and take social, moral and financial responsibility for their children and the mothers of their children/wives. Men's natural tendency towards aggression and productivity will thus be appropriately channeled into the strength of the nation. The state and the nation will then reciprocally benefit as families become self-sufficient and strong foundations of society.

## **Conclusion:**

The PRWORA was conceived according to two core social conservative beliefs: that society should function as a meritocracy and that a nation should be grounded in certain gendered morals and modes of conduct. Individuals should thus be both self-sufficient and responsible for their dependents. If someone is poor or dependent, it is because they lack the work ethic, moral resolve and discipline that are necessary to survive in a free market economy. To eradicate welfare dependency, the state must implement policies to change social behavior and reinstate national values. For Johnson et. al., the PRWORA represents a reinstitutionalization of tradition (Johnson et. al., 41-44). Popenoe argues that tradition is needed to ensure national assimilation, loyalty and strength.

We must be [...] concerned about maintaining national solidarity. No nation can survive without a framework of common values. A “natural-communities policy” is a different strategy than the one followed successfully for the first two hundred years of our nation, which typically was oriented to promoting rapid assimilation to the dominant European-based culture [...] Utmost care will be necessary, therefore, to avoid the furtherance of moral exclusiveness in local communities. A natural-communities policy must be counterbalanced by strongly fostering those common values and traditions that have held us together at the national level. If these shared values and traditions were to be lost, we as a nation would be bound together solely by the market and its ally, the mass media. What could be called amoral communalism would then reign supreme over the land. (Popenoe 2005, 55)

Popenoe is calling for ‘moderate’ assimilation to the American nation and national morals. As Lakoff stated, social conservatives conceptualize morality in terms of sexual conduct and self-sufficiency. Therefore, social conservatives use the nuclear family to control gender conduct and economic stability and thereby force people to assume American national values, lifestyles and gendered citizenship roles.

According to Stychin, membership in the nation is gendered. Nast and Ducat add that membership is gendered according to the nuclear family model. Therefore when Stychin is taken in association with Nast and Ducat, membership in the American nation is dependent on one's ability to fulfill her/his 'natural' role as a mother or father. Accordingly, fathers are to govern the family by providing protection, authority and material provisions on a micro and private level, much like the state provides defense, governance and resources on a macro, national level. Complementarily, mothers are to assume a subordinate position in which they respect, follow and rely on authority, while contributing to the family mainly through fulfilling the tasks of reproduction. Likewise, the citizens of a nation contribute to its survival through their loyalty, hard work and their regeneration.

Each of the four PRWORA policies discussed in this Chapter was designed, in part, to contribute to the fatherhood movement's rejuvenated definition of fatherhood in relation to the American nation. Paternity testing identifies the father so that he can be held responsible for his children. In the PRWORA context, paternal and financial responsibility are synonymous. Yet for fatherhood movement advocates, child support enforcement is a weak and damaging replacement for the economically dependent relationships that are guaranteed through marriage. Fatherhood programs were implemented to expand the role of fatherhood beyond the breadwinner. In order to prevent the family from slipping into anarchy, fathers must assume an authoritative role as the head of the household. Accordingly, fatherhood programs are being used to teach, motivate, encourage, support and even force fathers to assume that position. As the leaders of the family, fathers are then able to teach, condition and regulate their children's

behavior. Under the rule of the father, children learn to respect and yearn for authority, and to be loyal, disciplined, moral and self-sufficient citizens. But as Blankenhorn, Popenoe, Horn and President Bush argue, marriage assures that fathers exhibit all three of the vital father characteristics: protector, provider and authority. The influence and power of these fatherhood movement advocates is obvious as the Bush Administration has invested, both rhetorically and financially, in marriage promotion. Consequently, the fatherhood movement's ideal male citizen has been revalued and empowered, at least in policy discourse. Once the father agrees to legally enter a marriage, social conservatives hope that he will feel culturally and socially compelled to fulfill fatherly, state-like functions. And above all, it seems that PRWORA supporters hope that economic dependence will be privatized, individualized and erased from the political agenda. Yet as Pateman, Johnson et. al. and Lakoff warn, the marriage contract and the nuclear family model is dangerous, in large part, because it has been naturalized, moralized and attached to national citizenship.

## Conclusion

Anna Marie Smith argues that federal and state governments have always used welfare to force a single breadwinner, patriarchal, heteronormative family structure onto poor Americans (Smith 2007, 94). I have argued thus far that the PRWORA is a clear indication that social conservative ideology has a heavy influence on American social policy because the PRWORA is based on a meritocracy in which the masculine citizen is privileged and the nuclear family is upheld. Smith further claims that the PRWORA is the result of decades of American welfare policy that was slowly dismantling the social safety-net and entrenching a social conservative moral order. The PRWORA institutionalized sixty years worth of welfare policy experiments (Smith 2007, 94). According to Smith, the AFDC and its predecessors intervened in poor people's lives to instill morality, family values and a work ethic. One difference between the AFDC and the PRWORA is that the latter institutionalizes morality and family structure to push people off of welfare. Contrarily, the AFDC regulated citizens' behavior in order to raise them out of poverty. Smith also observes that the PRWORA is unique, not because it problematizes legitimate births and single-motherhood, but because it promotes marriage as the primary solution to both 'problems'. No other welfare policies or acts were so overt in their promotion of the nuclear family. Smith asserts that the PRWORA is both the product of ideological evolution and a policy revolution (Smith 2007). I agree that social conservative ideology, nationalism, morality and gendered familial structure are the basis of this welfare bill that completely restructured how welfare is administered. The institutionalization of this social conservative nationalism indicates a dangerous shift in welfare politics and policy, and American politics in general.

As has been shown, the PRWORA embodies foundational assumptions regarding the gendered character of citizenship and articulates a normative position that people's conduct can and should be conditioned and regulated in order to assure assimilation and membership within the nation. Liberals, feminists, homosexuals and some immigrants have been excluded from this social conservative nation because they challenge the heterosexual paternalistic family model (Stychin 1998, 9). As Campbell argues with regard to the women's movement:

Attempts to control women – or at least to contain their power and harness it to state-sanctioned projects – arose in the wake of successful mass movements to expand civil rights, sexual and reproductive rights, and women's rights. (Campbell 2003, 115)

'Rebellious' women have been punished for attempting to engage in the public realm, homosexuals have been denied the right to marriage and protection against hate crimes, and immigrants have been forced to deal with a racist and xenophobic immigration system, all in an attempt to belong to and reap the benefits of the American nation (Stychin 1998; Yuval-Davis 1997). Membership in the American nation is, however, attainable by these groups. Membership is administered on the state's terms. This is to say that homosexuals, liberals and feminists can become and are recognized as national citizens as long as they conform to nationally determined criteria of gender, sexuality and sexual conduct (Stychin 1998, 91-92). Supporters of this American nation have successfully grounded citizenship in such strict terms by using Judeo-Christian morality, the "natural" differentiation of the sexes, the gendered division of labour, the separation of the public and private realms, and the sexual contract (Lakoff 1996; Yuval-Davis 1997; Pateman 1988). These norms assure that women will be relegated to the private sphere to birth and raise future citizens while their husbands contribute to society as

active and rights-bearing members of the public sphere (Pateman 1988; Brown 1995).

Women's unpaid labour effectively becomes the cost of social reproduction. Campbell argues that social conservatives continue to regulate women's sexual behavior not out of fear that poor single-mothers will depend on the state, but because they fear that women will be uncontrollable and rebel, in large scale, against dominant social structures (Campbell 2003, 115).

Yet just as women's rebellion might dismantle the heteronormative patriarchal system, so too might rebellion among male citizens. As fatherhood movement and social conservatives argue, when men abdicate their roles as fathers, they threaten the stability and strength of society. Fatherlessness is said to lead to a myriad of social problems, but more catastrophic still is the disruption of the social hierarchy. Popenoe warns, citizens must be committed to their community and to do so, individuals must abide by social values and civic virtues such as self-sacrifice and personal responsibility. Most importantly, they must learn to sacrifice their individual freedom for the sake of their community.

Our social decline can be phrased in terms of a failure of social values. People no longer conduct themselves, to the same extent as prior generations, according to the civic virtues of honesty, self-sacrifice, and personal responsibility. People have become strong on the individual rights and weak on community obligations [...] At the heart of the problem lies an erosion of personal relationships. People no longer trust others as they once did; they no longer feel the same sense of commitment and obligation to others. This is certainly not a new or original observation. The perceived erosion of 'primary relationships' that associated with modernity was one of the formative conceptions of the discipline of sociology in the last century. But the early sociologists could not have known the great extent to which their conception would prove correct. (Popenoe 1996, 13)

Based on his pro-marriage and fatherhood movement advocacy, it can be deduced that Popenoe's 'primary relationships' refer to familial relationships. And Popenoe, along



with Horn, Blankenhorn, Mansfield, President Bush and other social conservatives locate the strength of society in those ‘primary’ familial relationships which are necessarily gendered and hierarchal. It is therefore men’s duty to their family, community and nation to reclaim their position at the top of the hierarchy. The state has assured this revaluing and empowering of fatherhood, in the PRWORA through paternity testing, which gives the father the obligation and right to stake claims to his children and hopefully their mother; the promotion of marriage, which contractually maintains a husband’s social position in relation to his wife; and the establishment of fatherhood programs that teach fathers how to reassert their position as the head of household. Each of these programs, in different ways, renders the wife financially dependent and subordinate to the father of her children. Thus men are rewarded as citizens with status, power and rights for their personal sacrifice within their families.

Smith, Abramovitz and other feminist welfare scholars have suggested that welfare policy needs to undergo another radical shift in order to end its punitive practices towards single-mothers (Smith 2001-2; Abramovitz 2000). Specifically, Smith suggests that welfare policy focus on creating well-paying employment opportunities and establish social services, including child care, for parents who are at risk of falling into poverty or who are already unable to support themselves (Smith 2001-2, 188). Smith bases her prescription on the belief that domestic care duties should not remain the unpaid responsibility of women, nor should women have to depend on men economically (Smith 2001-2, 189). A national child care program is one step toward assuring that women and men could break free from their prescribed gender roles and live successfully in a “post-modern” family of their choosing. Conversely, Blankenhorn has suggested that the

PRWORA legislation is merely the first step in a national movement to revalue fatherhood and further privilege marriage. Blankenhorn has gone as far as to recommend that:

The U.S. Congress should pass, and the president should support, a resolution stating that the first question of policy makers regarding all proposed domestic legislation is whether it will strengthen or weaken the institution of marriage. Not the sole question of course, but always the first (Blankenhorn 1995, 231).

It would be incredibly dangerous and discriminatory to make the maintenance of the institution of heterosexual marriage the first concern of all domestic policy. But as long as social conservatives continue to influence policy-making by setting the terms of the debate around morality, family and national integrity, and by determining citizenship accordingly, they are ensuring that American citizens have no choice but to conform to prescribed gender roles and social positions or risk further alienation, neglect and subordination within the nation.

## Bibliography

- Abramovitz, Mimi. 2000. *Under Attack, and Fighting Back: Women and Welfare in the United States*. New York: Cornerstone Books.
- , 1996. *Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present*. Boston: South End Press.
- Administration for Children and Families. 2007. "Healthy Marriage Fact Sheet." [http://www.acf.hhs.gov/opa/fact\\_sheets/healthy\\_marriage\\_factsheet.html](http://www.acf.hhs.gov/opa/fact_sheets/healthy_marriage_factsheet.html)
- American Radio Works. n.d.  
<http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/welfare/states.swf>
- Baskerville, Stephen. 2002. "The Politics of Fatherhood," *Political Science and Politics* 35 (4): 695-699.
- Bennett, William. 2002. *Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism*, Washington D.C.: Regenery Publishing Inc.
- , 2001. *The Broken Hearth: Reversing the Moral Collapse of the American Family*. New York: Random House, Inc.
- Blankenhorn, David. 2005. *Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social Problem*. New York: Basic Books.
- 1999. "Introduction: Toward Fatherhood." In *The Fatherhood Movement: A Call to Action*, ed. Wade F. Horn, David Blankenhorn, and Mitchell B. Pearlstein, xi-xv. London: Lexington Books.
- Blankenhorn, David and Alex Roberts. September 2006. "The Other Marriage Penalty: A New Proposal to Eliminate the Marriage Penalty for Low-Income Americans," *Institute for American Values: Center for Marriage and Families*.
- Brott, Armin. 1999. "Not Just Another Pair of Hands." In *The Fatherhood Movement: A Call to Action*, eds. Wade F. Horn, David Blankenhorn, and Mitchell B. Pearlstein. London: Lexington Books, pp 35-42
- Boyd, Susan B. 2004. "Backlash Against Feminism: Canadian Custody and Access Reform Debates of the Late Twentieth Century," *Canadian Journal of Women and the Law* 16: 255-290.
- Brown, Wendy. 1995. *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Buchbinder, Howard. 1987. *Who's on Top?: The Politics of Heterosexuality*. Toronto: Garamond Press.
- Buntin, John. March 2005. "Fathertime: There's a growing focus in welfare policy on a long-neglected part of the problem: Fatherhood," *Governing* 18(6): 20-29.
- Bush, George W. February 2002. "Working Toward Independence: Promote Child Well-Being and Healthy Marriages," *Office of President George W. Bush*.
- Bush, George W. February 26, 2002. "President Announces Welfare Reform Agenda." *Office of President George W. Bush*.
- Bush, George W. July 29, 2002. "President Urges Senate to Pass Compassionate Welfare Reform Bill," *Office of the Press Secretary*.
- Campbell, Nancy D. 2003. "Reading the Rhetoric of 'Compassionate Conservatism,'" In *Fundamental Differences: Feminists Talk Back to Social Conservatives*, ed. Cynthia Burack and Jyl L. Josephson. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp113-126
- The Center for Fathers and Families of Arkansas. 2008. <http://centerforfathers.org/Aboutus.html>
- The Center for Marriage and Families. 2004. "What Next for the Marriage Movement?" <http://center.americanvalues.org/?p=11>
- The Center for Self-Sufficiency. n.d. <http://www.centerinc.org/marriage.html>
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1996. "Whose Imagined Community?" In *Mapping the Nation*. ed. Gopal Balakrishnan. London: Verso. pp 214-225
- Child Welfare Information Gateway Website. 2008. "The Importance of Fathers in the Healthy Development of Children," <http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/fatherhood.cfm>
- Chunn, Dorothy E. and Shelley A.M. Gavigan. 2004. "Welfare Law, Welfare Fraud, and the Moral Regulation of the Never Deserving Poor," *Social & Legal Studies* 13(2): 219-243.
- CNN Website. February 25, 2004. "Bush calls for ban on same-sex marriages. Democrats: President using amendment issue for re-election bid." <http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/02/24/elec04.prez.bush.marriage/>
- CNN Website. February 07, 2008. "Transcript of Romney's Speech Withdrawing from the Race." <http://thepage.time.com/transcript-of-romneys-speech-withdrawing-from-the-race/>

- Coats, Dan. 1999. "Beyond Government," *The Fatherhood Movement: A Call to Action*, ed. Wade F. Horn, David Blankenhorn and Mitchell B. Pearlstein. London: Lexington Books. pp 117-126
- Coltrane, Scott. 2001. "Marketing the Marriage "Solution": Misplaced Simplicity in the Politics of Fatherhood: 2001 Presidential Address to the Pacific Sociological Association," *Sociological Perspectives* 44(4): 387-418.
- Cossman, Brenda. 2005. "Contesting Conservatism, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency," *Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law* 13 (3): 415-510.
- Curran, Laura and Laura S. Abrams. 2000. "Making Men Into Dads: Fatherhood, the State, and Welfare Reform," *Gender and Society* 14(5): 662-678.
- Cusack, Tricia. 2000. "Janus and gender: women and the nation's backward look," *Nations and Nationalism* 6(4): 541-558.
- Dye, Jane Lawley and Harriet B. Presser. 2007. "The State Bonus to Reward a Decrease in 'Illegitimacy': Flawed Methods and Questionable Effects," *Family Planning Perspectives* 31(3): 142-147.
- Dubler, R. Ariela. May 2003. "In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women, and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State," *The Yale Law Journal* 112(7): 1614-1715.
- Ducat, Stephen J. 2004. *The Wimp Factor: Gender Gaps, Holy Wars, and the Politics of Anxious Masculinity*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Duggan, Lisa and Richard Kim. 2005. "Beyond Gay Marriage," In *Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political Culture*. Eds. Lisa Duggan and Nan D. Hunter. New York: Routledge. pp 231-238
- Dworkin, Andrea. 1983. *Right-wing Women*. New York: Perigee Books.
- Eberly, Don. 1999. "No Democracy without Dads," In *The Fatherhood Movement: A Call to Action*, Ed. Wade F. Horn, David Blankenhorn, and Mitchell B. Pearlstein. London: Lexington Books. pp 25-43
- Faludi, Susan. 1999. *Stiffed: The Betrayal of the American Man*, New York: Harper Collins Books.
- , 1991. *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women*. New York: Anchor Books.

- Fasteau, Marc. 1980. "Vietnam and the Cult of Toughness in Foreign Policy," In *The American Man*, ed. Elizabeth Pleck and Joseph Pleck. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. pp 317-416
- Federal Funds Information Service. National Governors Association.  
<http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/welfareTANF.pdf>
- Fitzgerald, Jenrose. 2003. "A Liberal Dose of Conservatism: The 'New Consensus' on Welfare and Other Strange Strategies," In *Fundamental Differences: Feminists Talk Back to Social Conservatives*, ed. Cynthia Burack and Jyl L. Josephson. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. pp 95-112
- Frist, William (R-Tenn). August 1, 1996. U.S Senate. Senate Proceedings and Debates of the 104th Congress. *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 Conference Report*. 104<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess.
- Gavanas, Anna. 2004. *Fatherhood Politics in the United States: Masculinity, Sexuality, Race, and Marriage*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Glauber, Rebecca. February 2008. "Race and Gender in Families at Work: The Fatherhood Wage Premium," *Gender and Society* 22(1): 8-30.
- Godzich, Leo. July 13, 2003. "Special Report," *Washington Times Weekly Edition*.
- Goode, Erich and Nachman Ben-Yehuda. 1994. *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Griswold, Robert L. 1998. "The History and Politics of Fatherlessness," In *Lost Fathers: The Politics of Fatherlessness in America*, ed. Cynthia R. Daniels. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp 11-32
- Grossberg, Lawrence. 2001. *We Gotta Get out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Post-Modern Culture*, New York: Routledge.
- Haney, Lynne and Miranda March. November 2003. "Married Fathers and Caring Daddies: Welfare Reform and the Discursive Politics of Paternity," *Social Problems* 50 (4): 461-481.
- Heflin, Howel (D-Ala). August 1, 2006. U.S. Senate. Senate Proceedings and Debates of the 104th Congress. *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 Conference Report*. 104<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess.
- Heritage Foundation. 2008. <http://www.heritage.org/>
- Hibberd, James. April 24, 2008. Fow Zeroes in on 'Bad Dads: Unscripted Series Focuses on Making Deadbeat fathers pay. *The Hollywood Reporter*.

[http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/content\\_display/news/e3i682058b8e22c9d193658582e5e4c7894](http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/content_display/news/e3i682058b8e22c9d193658582e5e4c7894).

Hirschmann, Nancy J. 2003. *The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Horn, Wade F. May 22, 2006. "The Collapse of Marriage and the Rise of Welfare Dependence," *Heritage Lectures* 959: 1-11.

-----.. December 5, 2002. "Marriage, Poverty, and Child Well-Being," *Human Services Policy Center Evans School of Public Affairs & The Center for Research on Families*, University of Washington.

-----.. 1999. "Did you say 'Movement'?" In *The Fatherhood Movement: A Call to Action*, ed. Wade F. Horn, David Blankenhorn and Mitchell B. Pearlstein. London: Lexington Books. pp 1-16

-----.. July/August 1997. "You've come a long way, daddy." *Public Policy* 84: 24-43.

Horn, Wade F. and Andrew Bush. 1997. "Fathers and welfare reform," *The Public Interest* (Fall): 38-49.

Institute for American Values. n.d. <http://www.americanvalues.org/>

Jessop, Bob. 2003. "The Future of the State in an Era of Globalization," *International Politics and Society* 3: 30-46.

Johnson, Cathy Marie, Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Noelle H. Norton. 2007. *Creating Gender: The Sexual Politics of Welfare Policy*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kentucky Government Website:

<http://kentucky.gov/Newsroom/aag/childsupportevaders.htm>

Lakoff, George. 1996. *Moral Politics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

-----.. 1995. *Metaphor, Morality and Politics: Why Conservatives have Left Liberals in the Dust*. <http://www.wwcd.org/issues/Lakoff.html>.

Laqueur, Thomas W. 1990. "The Facts of Fatherhood," In *Conflicts in Feminism*, ed. Marianne Hirsh and Evelyn Fox Keller. New York: Routledge. pp 205-221

Lazar, M. Michelle. 2005. "Performing State Fatherhood: The Remaking of Hegemony," In *State Fatherhood: Remaking of Hegemony*, ed. M. Michelle Lazar. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp 139-163

- Lein, Laura. 2005. "Barriers to Self-Sufficiency: Are Wages and Welfare Enough?" In *Good Parents or Good Workers? How Policy Shapes Families' Daily Lives*, ed. Jill Duerr Berrick and Bruce Fuller. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp 19-32
- Lehr, Valerie. 2003. "'Family Values': Social Conservative Power in Diverse Rhetorics," In *Fundamental Differences: Feminists Talk Back to Social Conservatives*, ed. Cynthia Burack and Jyl L. Josephson. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp 127-142
- Little, Margret Jane Hillard. 1998. *No Car, No Radio, No Liquor Permit: The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers in Ontario, 1920-1970*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Lurie, Irene. Spring 1997. "Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: A Green Light for the State," *The Journal of Federalism* 27(2): 73-87.
- Mansfield, Harvey. 2006. *Manliness*. London: Yale University Press.
- Marecek, Jeanne. 2003. "Mad Housewives, Double Shifts, Mommy Tracks and Other Invented Realities," *Feminism & Psychology* 13(2): 259-264.
- Mincy, Ronald B. and Hillard Puncy. 1999. "There Must be 50 Ways to Start a Family," In *The Fatherhood Movement: A Call to Action*, ed. Wade F. Horn, David Blankenhorn, and Mitchell B. Pearlstein. London: Lexington Books. pp 83-104
- Mink, Gwendolyn. 1999. "Aren't Poor Single Mothers Women? Feminists, Welfare Reform, and Welfare Justice," in *Whose Welfare?* ed. Gwendolyn Mink. London: Cornell University Press. pp 171-188
- Mink, Gwendolyn. 2003. "From Welfare to Wedlock: Marriage Promotion and Poor Mothers' Inequality," In *Fundamental Differences: Feminists Talk Back to Social Conservatives*, ed. Cynthia Burack and Jyl L. Josephson. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. pp 207-218
- Nast, Heidi J. 1998. "Unsexy Geographies," *Gender, Place and Culture* 5 (2): 191-206.
- National Association of Marriage Enhancement. 2008.  
[http://www.nameonline.net/pages/about\\_mission.php](http://www.nameonline.net/pages/about_mission.php)
- National Fatherhood Initiative. 2008. <https://www.fatherhood.org>
- National Fatherhood Initiative. November 2003. 24/7 Dads Facilitator's Guide.  
<https://www.fatherhood.org>
- National Marriage Project. 2008. <http://marriage.rutgers.edu/codirectors.html>



- Office of Family Assistance Responsible Fatherhood Demonstration. 2008.  
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/hmabstracts/region3fr.htm>
- Page, Cristina. 2006. *How the Pro-Choice Movement Saved America: Freedom, Politics and the War on Sex*. New York: Basic Books.
- Pateman, Carole. 1988. *The Sexual Contract*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack. 1981. "Antiabortion, Antifeminism and the Rise of the New Right," *Feminist Studies* 7(2): 206-246.
- Peterson, V. Spike. 1996. "The Politics of Identification in the Context of Globalization," *Women's Studies International Forum* 19 (1/2): 5-15.
- Popenoe, David. 2005. *War Over the Family*. London: Transaction Publishers.
- 1999. "Challenging the Culture of Fatherlessness," In *The Fatherhood Movement: A Call to Action*, ed. Wade F. Horn, David Blankenhorn, and Mitchell B. Pearlstein. London: Lexington Books. pp 17-24
- 1996. *Life Without Father*. New York: Martin Kessler Books.
- Resource Center for Fathers and Families. n.d. <http://www.resourcesforfathers.org/>
- Roberts, Dorothy. 1999. "Welfare's Ban on Poor Motherhood," In *Whose Welfare?* ed. Gwendolyn Mink. London: Cornell University Press. pp 152-170
- San Francisco Chronicle. November 30, 2003. "Gays in the Military; 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' -- 10 years and 10,000 discharges later." <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/11/30/EDGTH39QR51.DTL>
- Smith, Anna Marie. 2007. *Welfare Reform and Sexual Regulation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , 2001-2002. "The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview," *Michigan Journal of Gender & Law*: 121-218.
- , 2001. "The Politicization of Marriage in Contemporary American Public Policy: The Defense of Marriage Act and the Personal Responsibility Act," *Citizenship Studies* 5(3): 303-320.
- Solinger, Ricky. 1999. "Dependency and Choice: The Two Faces of Eve," In *Whose Welfare?* ed. Gwendolyn Mink. London: Cornell University Press. pp 7-35

- Stacey, Judith. 1998. "Dada-ism in the 1990s," In *Lost Fathers: The Politics of Fatherlessness in America*, ed. Cynthia R. Daniels. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp 51-84
- , 1996. *In the Name of the Family: Rethinking Family Values in the Postmodern Age*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Stanton, Glenn T. 1999. "The Core of the Universe," In *The Fatherhood Movement: A Call to Action*, ed. Wade F. Horn, David Blankenhorn, and Mitchell B. Pearlstein. London: Lexington Books. pp 147-160
- The Stanislaus County Healthy Marriage Coalition. n.d.  
<http://www.stancomarriage.org/Home.html>
- Stychin, Carl F. 1998. *A Nation by Rights: National Cultures, Sexual Identity Politics, and the Discourse of Rights*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- The South Carolina Center for Fathers and Families. 2006.  
<http://www.scfathersandfamilies.com/economic.php>
- U.S. Congress. 1996. Senate and House of Representatives. *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996*. 104<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess.
- United States Department of Health and Human Services. 2008. Tracking Accountability in Government Grants System. <http://taggs.hhs.gov>
- The White House. 2008. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/index.html>
- William Bennett's Morning in America. 2008. <http://www.bennettmornings.com/>
- Woolsey, Lynn. 2008. <http://woolsey.house.gov/default.asp>
- Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. *Gender and Nation*. London: Sage Publishing Inc.