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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Inuit Educational and Language Programs in Nouveau Quebec 1912 - 1991

by

Brian Callaghan

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education

IN

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommended to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled Inuit Educational and Language Programs in Nouveau Quebec 1912 - 1991 submitted by Brian Callaghan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education in International/Intercultural Education.

Dr. R. J. Carney - Supervisor

Dr. A.M. Decore - Committee Member

Dr. C.S. MacKinnon - Committee Member

December 10, 1991

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the Inuit of Nunavik, especially to Jaco and Lavina Angnatuk of Tasiujaq, who took me into their family and took me out on the land. To Annie Alaku, Elisapie Yuliusie and Nunavak Papigatuk of Salluit who worked with me as teachers and who taught me about Inuit children. Lastly, to Evie Ikidluak, the first Inuit B.Ed. graduate from Nouveau Québec, who served as Director of Education for the Kativik School Board until her untimely death in 1982. She taught me about Inuit hopes and goals of education. Nakumik.

Abstract

This thesis is an historical study of Inuit education, language and cultural programs as well as relations between the Inuit and the federal and provincial governments in Nouveau Québec from 1912, when the Québec Boundary Extension Act was passed, to 1991, by which time the Inuit controlled Kativik School Board, created by the signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (1975), had been in operation for 15 years.

The thesis will review the relationship between the Inuit and Euro-Canadian explorers, missionaries, fur traders and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The intent of this review is to establish the historical dominance of the English language in the region.

The Supreme Court ruling of 1939, that the Inuit were a federal responsibility, will also be reviewed. Supported by this ruling between 1939 and 1963 the federal government exercised exclusive jurisdiction for the Inuit of Nouveau Québec.

During the 1940s the federal government began to develop its plan for the development for the Canadian Arctic including Nouveau Québec. Included in the plan were the areas of education, social services and the economy. By 1949 the first federal day school was in operation in Nouveau Québec. The federal school system continued to expand throughout the next two decades. In 1963 the provincial government moved to challenge federal authority and presence in the region. The province argued that the federal government had abdicated its

responsibilities for the Inuit because it had failed to pass special legislation pertaining to the Inuit as a result of the court ruling. Furthermore the province took issue with the fact that federal services were delivered exclusively in English. The provincial position was that the Inuit should be integrated into the French provincial majority. The jurisdictional dispute was not resolved until the signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement in 1975. The language issue intensified after 1977 with the passing of Bill 101 by the provincial government.

The terms of the Agreement radically altered the relationship between the two levels of government and the Inuit. The Agreement also included a model of Inuit regional government and an Inuit controlled school system, the Kativik School Board.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Robert Carney, my thesis supervisor, for his guidance in the planning of the thesis and his patience during the years required to gather the data. I also wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Ann-Marie Decore for her early encouragement to take on the topic and to Dr. Stuart MacKinnon, who helped me expand my knowledge of the Canadian Arctic.

I am particularly grateful to Helmi Braco, my wife, for her unwavering support and technical assistance and to my children Annaliisa, Laura, Alex and Ben, who encouraged me daily.

Throughout the length of my studies I have been encouraged and assisted by the Commissioners of the Kativik School Board, of Montreal, Québec, the Trustees of Northland School Division, Peace River, Alberta, and Mount Rundle School Division, Canmore, Alberta.

Financial assistance was received from the Boreal Institute for Northern Studies now known as the Canadian Circumpolar Institute, University of Alberta.

Table of Contents

Glossary

Inutitut	English	French
Kuujjuarapik	Great Whale River	Poste de la Baleine
Umujuak	Richmond Gulf	
Inukjuak	Post Harrison	Inoucdiuak
Povungnituk	Povungnituk	Povungnituk
Akulivik	Cape Smith	
Ivujivik	Cape Wolstenholme	
Salluit	Sugluk	Saglouk
Kangirsujuaq	Wakeham Bay	Maricourt
Quartaq	Cape Hopes Advance	Koartak
Kangirsuk	Payne Bay	Balin
Aupaluk	Aupaluk	Aupaluk
Tasiujaq	Leaf Bay	Baie aux Feille
Kuujjuaq	Fort Chimo	Fort Chimo
Kangirsualujjuaq	George River	Port Nouveau Québec
Killiniq	Port Burwell	

Chapter I

Introduction

The subject of this thesis is an historical study of the development of Inuit education in Nouveau Québec with particular reference to language and culture programs. The thesis will also examine the concomitant development of conflicts between the Inuit and agents of the federal and provincial governments, and conflicts between these two levels of government. This study covers the period from 1912, when the area known as Ungava was ceded to the Province of Québec, to 1991. By this time the Inuit-controlled Kativik School Board, established as a result of the signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement in 1975, was well established.

Prior to 1949 the Government of Canada had shown little or no interest in the welfare of the Inuit people residing in the lands above the 55th parallel in Québec. Intermittent contact with the Inuit was made by a majority of Euro-Canadian traders, missionaries, and law enforcement officers, whose mother tongue was English. Between 1912 and 1949 this triumvirate dispensed relief, rudimentary education and law enforcement on behalf of an anglophone federal government.

In the post World War II period, the federal government was politically embarrassed by published stories of indigent Inuit which revealed its apparent lack of concern for the welfare of these isolated Canadians. Yet the promise of abundant natural resource wealth contributed to federal interest in the region. This

led to increased federal social policy planning and an expansion of the federal presence in Nouveau Québec. Between 1949 and 1963, the federal government enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction in the region. The federal presence was evident by the establishment of communities, nursing stations, economic development initiatives and a federal day school system, which remained in operation until 1978.

Notwithstanding the fact that the geographic area was under provincial jurisdiction, a Supreme Court ruling in 1939 had determined that the Inuit population of Nouveau Québec were a federal responsibility. Accordingly, when the federal government formulated its plans for northern development throughout the Canadian Arctic it included the Nouveau Québec Inuit with no regard for the fact that they lived in a francophone province. Whether this was by accident or design is of little concern to this study. What does matter was that the federal government reinforced and expanded an anglophone presence that would not go unnoticed or unchallenged by the provincial government.

Until 1963, the Québec government wanted nothing to do with the Inuit of Nouveau Québec. From 1963 to the present, provincial interest in the region has been stimulated by a desire to develop the hydroelectric and mineral resources of the region and a desire to replace the anglophone federal civil service.

Upon turning its gaze towards its northern frontier, Québec discovered that a vast area of its domain was administered by the federal government. Concomitant with the rise of nationalist sentiment, the provincial government took

umbrage with the anglophone federal presence. From the provincial perspective, the central theme of the conflict was the delivery of social and education services exclusively in the English language. This situation was further complicated by the "maître chez nous" paradigm which roused the provincial government to assert its sovereignty throughout the province.

The new-found provincial interest ushered in an era of concurrent services from 1963 to 1976. This era was marked by overt attempts on the part of both levels of government to gain and secure the loyalty of the Inuit population. The victor in this struggle for the hearts of the Inuit would be able to carry out its plans to integrate the Inuit into either the greater Canadian anglophone society or the provincial francophone majority. The Québec government saw the school system as the main vehicle for integration and established provincial schools in Nouveau Québec under the authority of the Direction Générale du Nouveau Québec (DGNQ) in 1963, which became the Commission Scolaire du Nouveau Québec (CSNQ) in 1968.

The signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA) in 1975 created numerous Inuit-controlled agencies to take over responsibilities in the areas of education, social services, regional government and economic development. By 1976, the era of concurrent services was at an end.

Since 1977, the primary relationship between the Inuit and government has been at the provincial level. Due to Inuit concerns over implementation of the

JBNQA, particularly in the areas of education funding and language rights, the relationship has often been strained.

The study will examine historical events which are germane to the development of relations between the Inuit and the two levels of government with particular emphasis on language and education programs. Historical events of particular interest include the Supreme Court ruling of 1939 which established federal responsibility for the Inuit; the rapid expansion of federal services throughout the Canadian Arctic; the expansion of federal authority in Nouveau Québec; the rise of Québec nationalism and separatism; and the development of Inuit self government and control of education.

The study seeks to explore the rationale and motives behind policies and agreements that were put forth in dealing with Nouveau Québec's Inuit population. A feature element of this study will be to bring forward the comments of the Inuit people, whose views have often not been heard.

Need for the Study

In looking at the contemporary scene in Nouveau Québec there now exists a regional government, regional health board, and an Inuit-controlled school board with approximately 2400 students. Outside each school flies a provincial flag. Inside, three languages are used to teach the provincial curriculum, in a context where Inuit, francophones, and anglophones work side by side. In all the schools

an Inuit administrator is responsible for the overall operation of the school with the school principal providing pedagogical leadership. Throughout the villages airstrips are being up-graded, hospitals and houses are being built, and whole new communities are being constructed. The apparent level of upgrading and peaceful harmony in the schools contrasts with a time when cooperative social planning and improvements in infrastructure were hard to come by.

This study attempts not only to trace the historical development of this new order, but also explores the causal roots of the many conflicts which arose between the two levels of government and the Inuit. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine events that are outside the realm of education, but that nonetheless had an influence on policies that were subsequently developed for the region. Consideration of these external factors will be limited to the extent to which they affect the relations between the Inuit and government agents and the development of education and language programs.

Statement of the General Problem

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine federal-provincial-Inuit relations concerning education and language programs in Nouveau Québec from 1912 to 1991, with particular reference to the gradual diminution of the traditional dominance of the English language in the region.

Statement of the Sub-problems

1. To trace the role of the missionaries, fur traders and law enforcement officers and the establishment of an early anglophone presence.

2. To trace the development of federal and provincial education policies for Inuit.

3. To review federal and provincial legislation pertaining to responsibility for Inuit welfare and aboriginal rights.

4. To review federal and provincial policies to determine their influence upon relations with the Inuit.

5. To examine the provisions of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement and the impact this agreement had on education and Inuit/Quadlunat[1] relations.

6. To review the schism which developed between the signatories of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement and the Inuit Tunavingat Nunamini (ITN).

7. To review the present tension that exists between the Kativik School Board and Makivik Corporation.

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[1] The term used in the Nouveau Québec Inutitut dialect for all non-Inuit regardless of the language they speak. Quadlunatitut is used for those who speak English and Wewetitut for those who speak French. In the Northwest Territories the term kabloona is used for non-Inuit.

Delimitations of the Study

The study will not assess the overall effectiveness of the federal or provincial educational systems with respect to their goals of assimilation nor the anticipated advantages of the Inuit-controlled Kativik School Board.

Although the study examines socio-economic conditions, it does not examine such enterprises as the Co-operative movement or the entrepreneurial ventures of Makivik Corporation.

The study does not examine the activities and influence of the evangelical movement in Nouveau Québec.

Furthermore, the study will not examine the present role and position of Makivik Corporation on constitutional matters.

Although the Cree Indians of Nouveau Québec were often allied with Inuit in the 1970s, their treaty status afforded them a distinct relationship with the federal government. The problems that the treaty Cree have encountered with the two levels of government will not be discussed in this study.

Sources of Data

The sources of data for this study can be classified into five general categories: printed public documents, personal interviews, unpublished materials, periodicals and secondary sources.

Printed Public Documents

The following printed public documents were used in the study; House of Commons Debates; sessional papers of the House of Commons; Statutes of Canada; Québec National Assembly Laws and Regulations; Government Communiques; annual reports of the Province of Québec; annual reports of the Departments of Indian Affairs and Interior and their lineal descendants; census of Canada and Québec; the minutes and annual reports of the Kativik School Board; the Parent and Gendron Commission Reports; the Moore, Lamberton and Low Reports; and the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement.

Personal Interviews

I served as a teacher and school administrator in Nouveau Québec for ten years. I first went North in 1976 as a teacher at Kuujjuarapik. Between 1978 and 1980 I held the position of Head Teacher in Tasiujak. From 1980 to 1987 I held the positions of Executive Assistant to the Director of Education at central office in Montreal and Principal of Ikusik School in Salluit. I came to know all of the people interviewed. They were professors, teachers, administrators, politicians, commissioners, senior education department officials and teacher training counsellors, all of whom were directly involved in the operation of the competing school systems. Extensive interviews were conducted with Mr. Putulik Papigatuk, President of the Kativik School Board, Mrs. Annie Popert, Director General of the

Board, Mr. Gilbert Legault, Deputy Director General and Director of Education Services for the Board, Senator Charlie Watt, President of Makivik (formerly the Northern Québec Inuit Association), Louisa Cookie, former teacher and student counsellor, Annie Alaku, former principal and teacher training counsellor, and the Rev. Daniel Alpalu. Over twenty interviews were conducted. Half of the interviewees were Inuit.[2]

Unpublished Materials

The most important source of unpublished materials were the school organizational reports of the Kativik School Board. They were useful in tracing the pattern of language choice and the allocation of teachers for regular, language, cultural and religious programs.

Periodicals

Extensive references were made to Tagralik, Anngutivik, North, The Beaver, Études Inuit Studies, The Journal of Canadian Studies, The McGill Journal of Education, Canadian Geographical Journal, Recherchés Amerindiennes au Québec, Arctic, Polar Record and the Anthropological Journal of Canada.

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2 Throughout the thesis I have used the name which the Inuit call themselves. I used the name Eskimo only when it appears in a quotation.

Secondary Sources

The secondary sources used in this study were primarily social and historical in nature. In the main they cover a wide range of topics including, but not always specifically dealing with education. Morris Zaslow (1971) reviews the early contact period, Diamond Jenness (1964) focuses on northern policy development and administration, Richard Diubaldo (1981) succinctly reviews the Supreme Court ruling of 1939, Louis-Edmond Hamelin (1978) and Jacques Rousseau (1969) cover the era of concurrent services, Susan Trofimenkoff (1982) examines the "quiet revolution" and the rise of Québec nationalism and Harvey Feit (1980) and Wendy Moss (1989) thoroughly review the implementation of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. A complete list is found at the end in the References.

Method of Procedure

The narrative is divided into four chapters: **Early Contact With Euro-Canadians 1912-1949**; **Federal Jurisdiction 1949-1963**; **Concurrent Services: The Conflict Era 1964-1976**; and **Inuit Education: Provincial Relations 1977-1991**.

Chapter Two begins with an introduction of the Inuit inhabitants and the political formation of Nouveau Québec. The chapter also examines the role of the missionaries, fur traders and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as agents of the

federal government in establishing an anglophone presence and in delivering educational and other services.

Chapter Three begins with a brief overview of the social changes that led to an expansion of federal initiatives in Nouveau Québec. A review of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in Nouveau Québec demonstrates the need for federal intervention. A review of the Moore, Lamberton and Low reports provides the rationale for the creation of the federal day school system. Québec's reluctance to become involved in the region is also examined.

Chapter Four examines the era of concurrent federal-provincial services. Beginning with the Quiet Revolution in Québec, the chapter examines the socio-economic environment of the province and the provincial response to the presence of federal agents and the federal day school system in Nouveau Québec. There follows a review of the Parent and Gendron Commission Reports and their recommendations for a provincial school system in Nouveau Québec. The school system established by the Direction Générale du Nouveau Québec will be examined from the point of view that its main goal was to lure Inuit students away from the federal system. In the discussion of these parallel systems, the focus will be on language of instruction and Inuit resistance to provincial services. The chapter will also examine the difficulties encountered by the provincial government in the implementation of its policies concerning Nouveau Québec. This discussion will be followed by an examination of the rise of the Inuit control movement as

seen in through the activities of the Northern Québec Inuit Association (NQIA). Particular attention will be paid to its role during the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement negotiations.

Chapter Five examines Inuit-provincial relations. The signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement brought the Inuit into a close relationship with the provincial government. The general satisfaction with the 1975 signing was tempered by the announcement of Bill 101 in 1977. The Inuit response to this legislation will be examined in light of its perceived threat to education, language and cultural rights. As a result of implementation problems with the Agreement, education and community infrastructure development suffered serious problems. This resulted in a further deterioration of relations between the Inuit and the provincial government. The newly formed relationship between the Kativik School Board and the province is also examined in this chapter. Of particular interest will be the review of the disagreement concerning funding and programming. The chapter will also examine the schism between the Kativik School Board and Makivik Corporation.

The study concludes with some general observations on the present state of education and Inuit-provincial relations in Nouveau Québec together with recommendations for further study.

There are two maps. The map entitled Québec Territorial Evolution features the territorial evolution of the Province of Québec from 1763 to 1912 and Inuit

place name designations. The second map entitled Lands of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement marks the boundaries of the land set aside by the Agreement for the Inuit and Cree.

Chapter II

Early Contact With Euro-Canadians 1912-1949

From 1912, the year of passage of the Québec Boundary Extension Act, to 1949, the date for the opening of the first federal day school in Inukjuak, the Inuit of the territory subsequently known as Nouveau Québec[1] continued to be in contact with Euro-Canadians whose language was English and whose religion was Protestant. Over this 37 year span the nature and reasons for this contact would change from a laissez-faire style of governance to the development of formal policies for the region. These years also established the background for a federal provincial conflict which started in the 1950s and which to some extent continues today.

The aims of this chapter are fourfold. Firstly, a brief overview of the pre-history and contact period of Nouveau Québec will be given. The intent is to demonstrate that the Inuit inhabitants of Nouveau Québec had a vibrant culture

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1 As the Inuit communities of Nouveau Québec have been known by English, French and Inutitut names, for clarity I will use the official Inutitut names. The official names of the Inuit communities located in Nouveau Québec, from west to east, are; Kuujjuarapik (Great Whale River), Umujuaq (Richmond Gulf), Inukjuak, Povungnituk, Akulivik (Cape Smith), Ivujivik (Cape Wolstenholme), Salluit (Sugluk), Kangirsujuaq (Wakeham Bay), Quartaq (Cape Hope's Advance), Kangirsuk (Payne Bay), Aupaluk, Tasiujaq (Leaf Bay), Kuujjuaq (Fort Chimo), Kangirsualujjuaq (George River), and Killiniq (Port Burwell). Killiniq was under dispute between Québec and the NWT. It was closed down in the early 1970s and the people of the community voted to relocate to Baffin Island, and to Kuujjuaq, Kangirsualujjuaq and Tasiujaq.

which sustained itself through an identifiable education process. Secondly, there follows an examination of the legislative and boundary development of Nouveau Québec. The same general area is also known as Ungava and more recently as Nunavik.[2] This second objective is important to my study as I will describe the origins of the concept of aboriginal rights and the legal status of the Inuit. Thirdly, I will establish the fact that most Euro-Canadian contact agents among the Inuit of Nouveau Québec were English-speaking and Protestant. My purpose is to show that early explorers such as William Wakeham and A.P. Low, Anglican missionaries, English speaking fur traders and anglophone government agents and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were the primary outsiders in contact with the Inuit of Nouveau Québec during the years 1912-1949. Lastly, I will discuss the socio-economic history of the Nouveau Québec Inuit from 1912 to 1949. These topics intertwine to form the background to a discussion on formal education in Nouveau Québec.

Prehistory

It is accepted that Native peoples have been in North America for at least 10,000 years (Brody, 1981, p.14). Paleo-Eskimo remains found in Nouveau

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2 In 1895 the area north of the Eastmain River was given the name Ungava. The approximate land mass was ceded to the Province of Québec in 1912. The name Nouveau Québec first appeared in the provincial bill accepting the new lands (Rouland, 1978, p.15). For clarity I will use the name Nouveau Québec throughout.

Québec at Salluit reveal that Pre-Dorset, Dorset and Thule cultures flourished in the region from between 1000 to 4000 years ago (Wright, 1979, p.92; Graburn, 1969, p.31). Through all these centuries the traditional educational process had imparted all that was necessary to survive.It is a testimony to their resourcefulness, adaptability, and stamina that vibrant cultures have been sustained in the region of Nouveau Québec. Education was the instrument by which Inuit societies assured that what was necessary to perpetuate their culture was learned. The assumption and emphasis was that the individual would learn something that everyone agreed he would wish and need to know (Mead, 1978, p.98). In the traditional Inuit world this transmission was carried out on an informal basis by parents, relatives and peers. The Inuit survived because there has been a deliberate attempt on the part of the members of these cultures to impart "...that complex whole which include[d] knowledge, beliefs, art, morals laws,...and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society" (Taylor, cited in Morris and Pai, 1979, p.409).

This traditional model of education is a form of enculturation. Traditional informal education included both deliberate and non-deliberate learning, that is, teaching and learning through imitation, with no specific time frame for mastery. The child would move on to the next skill level when he or she was ready.

While the research methodology of this study is largely based on documents, reports and surveys written by non-Natives, such an approach is not

intended to trivialize Inuit oral history or to imply that Inuit culture has no significance other than in terms of its relationship to white society. I have drawn on interviews with Inuit leaders and educators conducted between 1986-1991. This research methodology was required as a result of the lack of historical data written by the Inuit.

The Siquinirmuit, Taqramiut and the Itivimiut of Nouveau Québec travelled the waters of Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait and Ungava Bay with little regard for territorial or provincial boundaries.[3] Where they lived was dictated by the seasons and the availability of game. It is only since the beginning of the twentieth century that the Inuit made sustained contact with Euro-Canadians and made their permanent dwellings close to these non-Natives. As a result of this settlement pattern non-Native governments were compelled to address the issues of boundaries, residence, and jurisdictional responsibility for the Inuit. These issues are examined in the following section.

The Creation of Nouveau Québec

The aims of this section are to trace the political formation of the Nouveau Québec region and to examine the early threat to British and Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic as the catalyst for the first federal explorations into this region. While

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3 People of the sun; Hudson Bay coast: people of the shadow; Hudson Strait: people of the other side; Ungava Bay.

there was never a direct threat concerning Nouveau Québec, the federal concern about control of the High Arctic brought the Nouveau Québec Inuit into direct contact with federal agents beginning in the late nineteenth century.

The early boundaries of Canada and Québec were formed by proclamation and charter. In 1670, "Prince Rupert and seventeen associates obtained from King Charles II, a charter as the Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay" (Nicholson, 1979, p.16). Over this land the Company was to be "true and absolute lord." Its domain included all the "seas, straits, bays, rivers, lakes, creeks and sounds in whatever latitude they shall be, that lie within the entrance of the straits commonly called Hudson's Strait" (Ibid, p.16). Thus when Rupert's Land was created, it included a large portion in what is now known as Nouveau Québec.

In 1763, King George III issued a Royal Proclamation which defined the boundaries of the British colonies in North America including Québec (see Map, Québec Territorial Evolution, p.19). The Québec Act of 1774 extended the provincial boundaries northward to include the Indian Territory. What is interesting to note is that the rights of the Indians, based on occupation of the land, were assumed and safeguarded (MacDonald, 1970, pp.42-43). Though there was no specific mention of the Inuit, in time they too would come to have the same legal status as Indians.


QUEBEC
TERRITORIAL EVOLUTION
Killiniq
Salluit
DISTRICT OF
Ivujivik
UNGAVA
1895
Kangirsujuaq
Quartaq
Kangirsuk
Kangirsualujjuaq
Aupaluk
Akulivik
Povungnituk
Tasiujaq
Kuujjuaq
NEWFOUNDLAND 1927, 1949
NOUVEAU QUÉBEC
1912
1898
Inukjuak
DISTRICT OF
UNGAVA
1895
HUDSON BAY
Umujuak
Kuujjuarapik
NEWFOUNDLAND 1927, 1949
1867
Anticosti I.
NWT (1898) UNGAVA
James Bay
1867
1763
St. Lawrence River
1898
Sources:
The National Atlas of Canada,
5th. Edition, 1982
Territorial evolution of Canada, 1967
1763
Quebec 1763
Quebec 1867
Quebec 1898
0
300 KM.

After Confederation, the Canadian and British governments and the Hudson's Bay Company tried to work out the financial terms of transfer of Rupert's Land to Canada. On July 31, 1868, the Rupert's Land Act was passed authorizing the "British government to assign Rupert's Land and the Territories between it and British Columbia to the Dominion of Canada" (Galbraith, 1957, p.419). However, this transfer was subject to terms of agreement to be concluded between the Company and the Canadian government.

The Company's bargaining terms included a payment of £1,000,000, no taxation or duties, and extensive land grants. The Canadian counter proposal consisted of a cash payment of £106,000 and substantially reduced land grants. It was clear to the British government that the two positions were irreconcilable. Lord Granville, the Colonial Secretary, imposed terms of settlement in March 1869, which called for a cash payment of £300,000 and modifications to the land grant question. Both parties were dissatisfied with the enforced settlement. Canada wanted the region to consolidate the land mass of the country and thus was compelled to agree.

In 1868, the Hudson's Bay Company surrendered its territory to the British Crown. Diamond Jenness has speculated that since Canada was still preoccupied with the many problems of a newly confederated country little thought was given to the official declaration of ownership of the islands of the northern archipelago: "Demarcation of the extreme northern and eastern boundaries of the Dominion of

Canada was tacitly left in abeyance" (Jenness, 1964, p.17). It would take almost fifty years and three separate boundary reviews to assemble the present map of Québec (Linteau, Durocher and Robert, 1979 p.18).

In June 1869, the Canadian Parliament passed the "Act for the temporary government of Rupert's Land and the North Western Territory when united with Canada" (Statutes of Canada 1869, Vict., c.3, pp.32-33). On July 15, 1870, the Company received payment from the Canadian representative Sir John Rose, and Rupert's Land officially became part of Canada (Galbraith, 1957, p.427). In keeping with the provisions of Section 91 (24) of the British North America Act (BNA), which assigned legislative jurisdiction over Indians to the federal government, the deed provided that "any claims of Indians to compensation for lands required for purposes of settlement shall be disposed of by the Canadian Government..." (Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, Vol.VI. Appendix III, pp.127-130).

Between 1875 and 1896, the Northwest Territories were the responsibility of the "Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba and his North-West Council with the newly established Department of the Interior maintaining overview from the capital at Ottawa" (Lingard, 1947, cited in Dawson, 1947, p.4). With the passing of the Northwest Territories Act in 1875, (Statutes of Canada, 1875, 38 Vict., c.49), the Northwest Territories became a political entity, subject to the control of the federal government.

For administrative reasons the Northwest Territories was divided into the provisional Districts of Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, Alberta and Athabaska in 1882. This was followed in 1895 with the creation of the districts of Yukon, Mackenzie, Franklin and Ungava (Lingard, 1947; Smith, 1961, p.69). The provinces of Manitoba (1870), Saskatchewan (1905), Alberta (1905) and the Yukon Territory (1898) were subsequently carved out of this territory as were the boundaries of Manitoba (1880) Ontario (1912) and Québec (1898 and 1912). The District of Ungava remained a Territorial responsibility until 1912.

With the passing of the Québec Boundary Extension Act of 1912, Ungava became part of Québec. The Québec government was desirous of obtaining this extension. The Indian Territory held extensive timber resources, hydroelectric power and agricultural potential (Hastings, 1983, pp.72-73). The Nouveau Québec territory farther north held the same timber and hydroelectric resource potential for the provincial government.

Between 1912 and 1949, passive administration of this area was provided solely by agents of the federal government. It was the position of the provincial government that based on the Indian Act of 1876 Indians and Inuit were a federal responsibility. Although there had been a provincial census in 1871 and again in 1901, it was not until 1931 that the provincial government identified that there were 1159 Inuit living in Nouveau Québec (Linteau et al, 1979, p.60).

Prior to the era of passive administration from 1912 to 1949 federal interest in the North and Nouveau Québec was motivated by external pressures. In a response to a threat to Canadian sovereignty, the federal government sponsored numerous exploration voyages into the area and brought the Inuit into contact with non-Natives. The following section examines the events that led to the above mentioned voyages.

Threat to Sovereignty: Contact With Euro-Canadians

In 1874, a potential threat to British sovereignty over the Arctic islands shook the British and Canadian governments. Lieut. William A. Mintzer, of the United States Navy, filed an application with the British government for a land grant in Cumberland Sound. In response, the British government offered to transfer all territories adjacent to those of the Dominion to the Canadian government, so there would be no "possible future inconvenience" (Sir H.T. Holland, cited in Smith, 1961, p.54), and provided that Canada was willing and "prepared to assume the responsibility of exercising such surveillance over [the Arctic Islands] as may be necessary" (Millwood, 1930, cited in Jenness, 1964, p.17). Six years elapsed before an Imperial Order in Council in 1880 officially passed title and ownership of these British possessions to Canada. Within the British Empire this transfer of ownership may have been binding, but as Jenness points out it carried no force in foreign countries:

> It is today accepted internationally that neither discovery (which was the main basis presumably, of British title) nor propinquity, nor any unilateral proclamation can by itself confer possessory rights in perpetuity to any territory (Jenness, 1964, p.19).

International law maintained that recognition of possession demanded that the claiming country must display a continuing interest in the territory and a concern for the welfare of its inhabitants. Early in the nineteenth century, the Danish government in response to reports of starvation and hardship among its Inuit population closed off Greenland to all foreign traffic and built schools and health facilities for all the Inuit[4] (Orvik, 1975; Jenness, 1954, pp.24-26).

In 1890, the American government in responding to a report stating that the living conditions of the Alaskan Inuit were deplorable, sent in a revenue cutter to maintain law and order. The American government built post offices and schools in every populated area. A special education bureau was established to train Inuit and help them achieve economic independence. The revenue cutter was used to supply the schools and also served as a seamanship school (Jenness, 1954, p.26).

Although in possession of Rupert's Land since 1870, Canada waited more than thirty years before opening its first police post at Fullerton Harbour (NWT) in 1903, which was charged with overseeing Inuit-whaler relations and with collecting

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4 Greenland Inuit are known as Katladlit. Alaskan Inuit are known as Inuppiat.

taxes and duties. A second post was opened at Killiniq in Nouveau Québec in 1920 with the same mandate. Before the opening of the RCMP posts at the turn of the century Canada's initial efforts to substantiate her claim were limited to sponsoring numerous exploratory voyages.

During the 1880s, A.R. Gordon undertook three trips into Arctic waters. During one of his voyages he explored the coast between Kangirsujuaq and Salluit. In 1897, William Wakeham's assignment from the federal government was to claim Baffin Island and further explore Hudson Strait (Francis, 1977, p.60). In 1903-4, aboard the Neptune, A.P. Low set out "... to explore and survey as many of the Arctic islands as the length of the navigational season permitted" (Francis, 1977, p.63; Ross, 1976, pp.87-103). Between 1906 and 1911, Capt. Joseph Bernier aboard the Arctic visited "all the major islands of the archipelago...and mapped areas of Baffin Island never seen by white men" (Francis, 1977, p.66).

Records for the 1904-06 Low expedition make reference to encounters with destitute Inuit families at Salluit in 1904. Low's explorations also took him to Kuujjuaq, Kuujjuarapik and along the coast line of Nouveau Québec from Ivujivik on Hudson Strait to Kangirsualujjuaq on the east side of Ungava Bay. Other federally sponsored explorers who travelled through the area included F.F. Payne, G.A. Young, and Robert Bell (Cooke, 1964, p.152).

Notwithstanding the wide range of exploration activities sponsored by the Canadian government in an attempt to establish and consolidate its claim to the

Arctic islands and coastline, the government did not demonstrate any concern for the welfare of the Inuit population as would have been expected under international law. The result of this activity was that it brought the Inuit of Nouveau Québec into intermittent contact with Euro-Canadians who were English speaking, with the exception of Bernier who was French.

At the beginning of the twentieth century Québec faced the problem of increasing emigration of French speaking Canadians to New England. As a result of a growing economy the province was eager to expand its boundaries. "For Québec, the North evolved as a new frontier" (Morissonneau, 1978, cited in Hastings, 1983, p.76). Ungava was seen as rich in timber lands, minerals, hydroelectric power, and agricultural potential (Hastings, 1983, pp.76-77). The main focus of the negotiations between Ottawa and Québec City was on political representation and the potential wealth of the land to be ceded to Québec. The issue of safeguarding aboriginal rights was neglected. This oversight would have serious consequences in the decades ahead and would become a central point in the conflict that developed between the two levels of government.

Québec Boundary Extension Acts of 1898 and 1912: Establishing Aboriginal Rights

The Boundary Extension Act of 1898 extended Québec's northern boundary to the Eastmain River. The Extension Act of 1912 extended the provincial boundary

to include the remaining part of Rupert's Land which was within the land mass of Québec. The exact border with Labrador was not established until 1927.[5] These boundary adjustments came about as a result of federal legislation. The provincial response to the land transfers was to pass acts officially accepting the lands. In the 1912 provincial act the name Nouveau Québec was used for the first time to identify this additional territory (Rouland, 1978, p.15; Müller-Wille, 1983, p.139).[6] According to Moodie (1975), the provincial act of acceptance omitted the following important and vital paragraph of the federal transfer act:

> That the Province of Québec will recognize the rights of the Indian inhabitants in the territory above described to the same extent, and will obtain surrenders of such rights in the same manner, as the Government of Canada has heretofore recognized such rights and has obtained surrender thereof, and the said province shall bear and satisfy all charges and expenditures in connection with or arising out of such surrender (Statutes of Canada, 1912, Geo.V.,c.45. p.304, cited in Moodie, 1975, p.46).

Moodie suggests that the omission of this clause by the provincial government in its statute can be explained by its intent not to accept responsibility

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5 This boundary was under dispute. It was known as the Québec/Labrador Conflict. The problem was referred to the Privy Council in 1907 and not resolved until 1927 (Hastings, 1983, p.82).

6 Extension de 1912: Loi concernant l'Ungava et erigeant ce territoire sous le nom de "Nouveau Québec".

for making treaties with Indians. The difficulty with this position is that the federal legislation clearly stated that the province would have to negotiate with Indian people. Québec historian Paul André Linteau commented on this point as follows:

> il est stipulé dans l'entente fédérale provincial que le gouvernement québécois devra négocier avec les Amérindens l'extinction de leur droits sur ce territoire. Le gouvernement Gouin et les gouvernements subséquent, par indifférence ou incurie, négligeront de s'acquitter de ce devoir (Linteau el al., 1979, p.60).

Furthermore, this position broke a promise made by Premier Lomer Gouin, who in a letter to the Prime Minister Robert Borden, stated that he accepted the responsibility of the Province of Québec to "...settle any claims which the Indian inhabitants therein might have..." (Canada Sessional Papers, 1912, No.95,). It is also interesting to note that the act was introduced into the Legislative Assembly by Premier Gouin and that it was passed in its initial form (Canada Sessional Papers, 1912, p.576). At this time there was no reference made concerning the Inuit or their status.

It is fair to say that neither level of government was much interested in the Inuit inhabitants of the region. Throughout all the debates which took place in the House of Commons concerning the Boundary Extension Act of 1912, no reference was made as to which government would be responsible for the Inuit. The major concern of the debates on the Extension Act of 1912 was that Québec not receive

increased representation in the House of Commons (Canada House of Commons Debates, 1911-1912, Vol.IV, pp.6160-6175). It should also be noted that while Québec may have omitted the above mentioned paragraph (C) of the Extension Act of 1912, it did adopt paragraph (E) which stated:[7]

> That the trusteeship of the Indians in the said territory and the management of any lands now or hereafter reserved for their use, shall remain in the Government of Canada subject to control of Parliament (Canada, Québec Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, 2 George V. Chapter 45.).

The federal government's recognition of aboriginal rights was in keeping with the Royal Proclamation (Sanders, 1973, p.22). Regardless of federal motives behind the land transfer, what is significant is that in 1912, the federal government acknowledged in legislation that the Indians in the region had aboriginal rights and that it was responsible for them (Ibid, p.22). Furthermore, the provincial government in passing identical legislation to Ottawa, acknowledged aboriginal rights and the requirement to obtain treaties with Indians. The absence of any mention of Inuit status in the Commons debates makes it clear that the issue was of little concern to government officials at either level.

During the 1920s the federal government spent modest sums on relief efforts for the Nouveau Québec Inuit. By the early 1930s, the federal government

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7 Sanders (1973) maintains that Québec adopted paragraph (C) as well as paragraph (D) "That no such surrender shall be made or obtained except with the approval of the Governor in Council" (p.22).

disclaimed responsibility for the Inuit. The federal position was that the Inuit were a provincial responsibility (Diubaldo, 1981, p.35). Under Premier Louis-Alexandre Taschereau, for reasons of economy, Québec adopted the position that the Inuit were a federal responsibility. Intransigence on the part of both governments led to the matter being referred to the Supreme Court. Moodie maintained that the failure on the part of the provincial government to recognize paragraph (C) implied a denial of aboriginal rights and that this denial served to negate any notion of responsibility by Québec to or for the Inuit. Moodie's argument based on paragraph (C) may be weakened in light of the position taken by Douglas Sanders who stated that Québec adopted paragraph (C). Whatever the case it is reasonable to suggest that the provincial government saw no direct link between Indians and Inuit. The disagreement between Ottawa and Québec had little to due with aboriginal rights. The disagreement focused on jurisdictional responsibility. Québec's position that the Inuit were a federal responsibility was based on the argument that although prior to 1924 "no government department assumed consistent responsibility for the Eskimo" (Ibid, p.34), a recent "amendment to the Indian Act brought the Eskimoes in the Territories under the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs" (Ibid, p.35). This included the Inuit of Nouveau Québec. Within thirty years the provincial government would reverse its position and claim full responsibility for the Inuit.

The federal government's recognition of aboriginal rights and responsibility for the Inuit in Nouveau Québec did not lead to any new policy development for the Inuit even though their presence in the region was recognized by Prime Minister Robert Borden who informed the House that there were some "543 Esquimaux" inhabitants in Nouveau Québec (Canada House of Commons Debates, 1911-1912, Vol.IV, p.6616).

To conclude, early federal responsibility and activity in Nouveau Québec was limited to the sponsoring of numerous voyages of exploration. Federal response to the needs of the Inuit was minimal. As will be discussed later, the recognition of aboriginal rights by one level of government and their denial by another level was to become the basis of serious disagreements in the areas of education and social welfare policy. Despite the federal recognition of aboriginal Indian rights as seen in the Québec Boundary Extension Act of 1912, the government's response to the needs of the Inuit was carried out on a moral rather than legal basis. The status of the Inuit was left undefined. When the Inuit needed help from time to time, minimal amounts of relief were administered through the missionaries, traders, and the RCMP who acted as agents for the federal government.

The Early Years: Missionaries, Traders, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries groups of traders, missionaries, and the RCMP played important roles in the social, economic and religious education of the Inuit. One group attended to their spiritual well being, another supplied some of their economic needs, and another maintained law and order. Until other federal agencies became active in Nouveau Québec in the late 1940s, the federal government worked through this triumvirate which provided a strong anglophone influence in Nouveau Québec.

Firstly, I want to examine the role of the Moravian, Oblate, and Anglican missionaries and the way the English-speaking Anglican missionaries were successful in establishing themselves among the Inuit.

MISSIONARIES

The Moravians, Anglicans, and Oblates were all active in Nouveau Québec.[8] The common notion was that the Inuit needed "Christianizing" based on the assumption that they were heathen (Marsh, cited in Malaurie, 1964, p.428). The goal of "Christianizing" was "to wean them from their ancient and often harmful superstitions" (Jenness, 1964, p.16). Since most Inuit still pursued a traditional

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[8] In reviewing the journals of the Moravian's early nineteenth century voyages into Nouveau Québec, A. Copeland demonstrates that the journals were written in English. It is interesting to note the names which the Moravian's gave to some of the sites they visited such as, Pilgrim's Rest and Unity Bay.

nomadic lifestyle, mission schooling operated on an irregular basis throughout the period.

As early as 1811, the first Christian Moravian missionaries, Brothers B. Kohlmeister and G. Kmoch, visited the Kangirsualujjuaq and Kuujjuaq region from Labrador (Cook, 1964, p.142). Being favourably impressed with the rich game resources of the area, they tried to secure a foothold in the region by approaching the Hudson's Bay Company for land on which to establish a mission. The Moravians supported their missions by trading with Natives. Though the Hudson's Bay Company was not active in Nouveau Québec at the time, Governor George Simpson was impressed with the report of rich game reserves noted by the two Moravians and refused their request (Ibid, p.143; Copeland, 1970, p.39). As the Hudson's Bay Company was at that time locked in a bitter trade war with the North West Company, it could not afford to lose a prospect for trade (Cook, in Malaurie, 1973, p.216). The withdrawal of the Moravians back to Labrador left the field open for the Anglicans and a Roman Catholic missionary group, the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI).

The first Oblate missionary to travel into the interior of Nouveau Québec was Father Charles Arnaud, who ascended the Manicuagan River in 1853 where he wintered with the Naskapis south of Kuujjuaq. Cooke (1964) states that between 1853 and 1900 Oblate missionaries made 25 trips into the interior of Nouveau Québec. As a result of their work in the latter half of the nineteenth century,

missions were subsequently established at Kangirsujuaq 1936, Ivujivik 1938, Salluit 1947, Quartaq 1947 and Kuujjuaq 1948.

During the period 1853 to 1900 in Nouveau Québec, the Oblates played a major role in socializing the Inuit:

> Le travail de conversion est lent, mais le missionnaire ne négligé pas l'enseignement religieux et, dans toutes les mission, on à etabli une école ou l'on donne à la population les rudiments de la culture (Carrière, 1964, p.421).

However, despite the best efforts of the Oblate missionaries the Inuit of Nouveau Québec did not embrace Roman Catholicism in great numbers. By 1961, for example, after fourteen years of operation in Salluit, they had no conversions from a population of 200. In Kuujjuaq, with a population of 525 they had but 2 conversions by 1961 (Ibid, pp.422-423; Rousseau, 1969, p.11). In the mid 1960s, most of the Oblate missions were closed probably because of the lack of conversions and the declining influence of Catholic religious organizations in the province generally.[9] In the Québec Government Annual Report for 1964-65, note was made that "a l'exception d'une soixantaine de catholiques, tous les Esquimaux québécois sont anglicans" (Annuaire du Québec, 1964-65, p.142).[10]

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[9] In 1991 only the Catholic missions at Kangirsujuaq, Kuujjuaq and Povungnituk remain open or are served on a fly-in basis.

[10] The 1964-65 annual report was prepared by the Québec Statistics Bureau. Nouveau Québec was featured in every section of the report.

Starting with Rev. E.J. Peck's trip to Kuujjuaq in 1884 and continuing to the present, the Anglican Church has enjoyed more acceptance among the Inuit in Nouveau Québec than other Christian churches (Marsh, in Malaurie, 1964). Peck's message laid the foundation for the work of the Church: "Our object in taking the journey was to reach the Eskimo living in these parts, and to lay before them the glad tidings of salvation" (Lewis, 1908, p.160). Perhaps the reason for this early success is found in an 1899 letter from Bishop La Trobe of the Moravian Church to Peck in which he stated that the "Eskimoes" were learning to read and write using the syllabic characters introduced by Peck and the Anglican Church. La Trobe's final compliment to Peck in recognition of the work done by the Anglican Church was the observation that the "Eskimoes have fully broken with heathen practices and sorcery" (Ibid, p.161).

At Kuujjuaq in the 1930s, when families came to the post to replenish supplies, as most did during the summer, the Anglican missionaries gave instruction in simple arithmetic and writing in syllabics. The federal government contributed a small amount of money to this infrequent type of schooling. The federal government believed that "...[t]he educational requirements of the Eskimo...[were] very simple, and [that] their mental capacity to assimilate academic teaching [was] limited" (Bethune, 1934, p.55). As game was often scarce around the Kuujjuaq post and the Hudson's Bay Company managers wanted the Inuit out trapping and hunting, the Inuit were discouraged from remaining in close

proximity to the post. However, during times of famine relief could be found at the post. Mobility patterns were very much the same for other Nouveau Québec Inuit. As a result of the differing views of the missionaries and the Bay managers, no permanent mission school was established until 1932, when the Anglicans opened one at Kuujjuaq (Marsh in Malaurie, 1964).

For the period under discussion, research indicates that the Anglican missionaries and Hudson's Bay Company personnel were both predominantly English speaking and protestant. James Scanlon (1975) in his book on the work of the Anglican missionaries in the lower James Bay area said: "Generally the HBC officers and servants were members of the Church of England (p,46). Daniel Alpalu, an Anglican minister, told me that the early Anglican missionaries and Bay employees were from England and Scotland and that they often travelled together. Paine (1977) states that "the missionaries often travelled to these posts with the help of HBC transportation and pilotage (p.9). Therefore, the Inuit were more inclined to accept the English speaking personnel of the Anglican Church. While the Company and the Anglican Church held differing opinions as to whether the Inuit should be kept out on the land in pursuit of furs or allowed to stay near the post, both groups shared a common religious and language background (Duhaime, 1983, p.31). For the Nouveau Québec Inuit, learning English as a second language was useful as it enabled them to conduct trade at the post and communicate with most outsiders who came into the region. The link between the

Anglican Church and the Hudson's Bay Company is further demonstrated by the words of Bishop Donald Marsh: "To appreciate the work of the Anglican Church in the far north and the Arctic, one must have some understanding of the fur trade" (Bishop D. Marsh cited in Paine, 1977, p.9).

Alpalu also stated that during the 1940s and 1950s his father was employed by the Hudson's Bay Company as a handyman and guide. His father spoke some English. When asked where he and his father learned English he replied, "On the jobs, I only went to school for one and a half years" (Personal interview, May, 1991). Our conversation examined the country of origin of the Anglican missionaries and the relationship between the missionaries and HBC personnel:[11]

> (Q) Why do you think the Inuit have supported the Anglican Church?
> (A) Maybe one reason the people are sticking with the Anglicans is because they were the first ones to bring the gospel.
> (Q) When the first Anglican missionaries came, when you were a boy, were they close or friendly with the Hudson's Bay people?
> (A) I think so.
> (Q) Where did they come from?
> (A) England, Scotland.

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[11] Daniel Alpalu's father also worked for Father André Steinmann OMI at Povungnituk in the 1950s. Daniel stated that although Steinmann was French he spoke English and Inutitut and taught reading and math in English.

> (Q) Did you know some of the early missionaries? Do you remember their names?
> (A) I knew Donald Woodbridge before he went up to Baffin Island, Brian Bellows, Roger Briggs, Denis Harry and others.
> (Q) And the fellows you met over the years who worked for HBC were they from England and Scotland?
> (A) Yes.
> (Q) Do you think that the HBC employees may have helped the missionaries get around to other communities by dogteam?
> (A) I think they did (Personal interview, May, 1991).

Semionnie Amaroalik, an elder from Inukjuak, stated that to the best of his recollection English had been the language of communication and instruction for both the federal agents and the Anglican missionaries.

> Even though ships have been arriving now, I have never seen anyone who speaks French. Thirty seven years have passed since the children of Inukjuak started being taught how to speak English by the federal government and before that, they were taught by the missionaries in English only (Amaroalik, 1977, p.4).

Amaroalik went on to state that it was only with the arrival of the C.D.Howe in the early 1950s, that the Inuit first heard French.

With the early withdrawal of the Moravians, the Catholic and Anglican Churches vied for the spiritual loyalty of the Nouveau Québec Inuit. It appears that

from the outset the Anglicans enjoyed more sustained success. By sharing a common language and ancestry with many Hudson's Bay Company employees, Anglican missionaries were able to move about more freely and often accompanied Company personnel on their travels. This anglophone influence was felt by the Inuit as they were encouraged to learn at least a few words to conduct business with traders. For the Inuit of Nouveau Québec, traders included Révillon Frères and the Hudson's Bay Company. The relationship between the traders and the Inuit had a profound effect upon Inuit society.

Traders

The earliest Hudson's Bay Company trading post in Nouveau Québec opened in Kuujjuarapik in 1820. Nicol Findlayson opened the Kuujjuaq post in 1830 (Moccasin Telegraph, 1970, pp.85-88; Cooke, 1973, p.220). John McLean, Findlayson's successor, opened a post at Kangirsualujjuaq in 1839. Another post was built at Ivujivik in 1909. By 1921, there were Hudson's Bay posts at Inukjuak, Povungnituk, Kangirsujuaq, Quartaq, Kangirsuk and Tasiujaq. The establishment of these posts followed the decline of the whaling industry and was directly related to the high price of white fox fur during the first two decades of the twentieth century.

The Hudson's Bay Company was not the only trading company operating in the arctic. Zaslow (1971) states that Révillon Frères, which opened its first

establishment in Edmonton in 1899, was operating in Nouveau Québec by 1911. Zaslow also states that Révillon Frères traders enjoyed the favour of the Oblate French speaking missionaries. Perhaps the financial failure of Révillon Frères in 1936 (Bernard, 1977, p.7), and their alleged default on payments to the Inuit contributed to a rejection of their French-speaking countrymen, the Oblates. Semionnie Amaroalik and Tumasi Kudluk both expressed the view that Révillon Frères traders cared little for the Inuit. Amaroalik said, "there were some French people that arrived in Inukjuak with a trading post. They were welcome by the Inuit but when the HBC arrived, the French trading company just left the Inuit behind" (Amaroalik, 1977, p.3). Kudluk states that the Révillon Frères of Kuujjauq played a subordinate role to the Hudson's Bay Company. When asked, "How did the French people treat the Inuit?", he replied:

> They did not seem to have any particular affairs with the Inuit. It appears that they were subordinate to the Hudson's Bay Company. The Hudson's Bay Company would be first in doing something and the French would do the same thing secondly (Kudluk, 1978, p.31).

Traders, with their interest in furs and material goods, provided an economic education. Through the fur trade the Inuit were introduced to the capitalist economic system. Until the 1930s, they had produced only goods for domestic consumption. As cash was not used, furs were traded for tokens (tutauti) or thin match sticks, which in turn were traded for manufactured goods. The terms of

trade favoured the trader. The cost of operating the Nouveau Québec posts would have required that they did more than pay their minimum operational costs (Cooke, in Malaurie, 1973, pp.220-221). Once the Inuit entered this cycle, there was no turning back.

It is difficult to calculate the actual standard of living for the Inuit during the first half of the 20th century. While there is evidence to suggest that hardship brought upon by illness and starvation was not unknown to the Nouveau Québec Inuit, it does not suggest that the fur trade interfered with the natural cycles of availability of food. Through the records and actions of the traders one can trace the extent of the relief provided to the Inuit. Reports of relief efforts indicate that the traders were heavily involved in the distribution of relief (Bethune, 1934; Dunbar, 1952; Kudluk, 1978). An examination of the fur market conditions from the late 1920s to the late 1940s demonstrates that fur prices fell drastically and as a result of this living conditions for the Inuit were increasingly difficult.

Fur prices for the Nouveau Québec region for the four year cycle starting in 1928-1932 show that the average price of a fox pelt was $26.99. In the next cycle it dropped to $16.86 and by the end of the 1930s had plummeted to $11.76. These were indeed the dirty 30s for the Inuit. Alain Bernard (1977) states that in the 1930s Bay managers were informed not to buy any more polar bear skins as the bottom had dropped out of this market as well. By 1948 fox prices had fallen to $3.50 a pelt. As a result of this decline many Company posts in Nouveau

Québec were closed down further exacerbating an already poor situation for the Inuit. When all of these factors are considered one can conclude that the Inuit of Nouveau Québec, who were recognized as being worse off than the Inuit of the western Arctic, must have had a very poor standard of living (Dunbar, 1952, p.7; Robinson, 1944, p.7).

Although each Hudson's Bay Company post was in the business of making money, individual managers extended lines of credit beyond what would be considered sound business practice. During the famine of the 1930s in Nouveau Québec, the Hudson's Bay Company, under the direction of the RCMP, distributed relief to the Inuit.

A.D. Copeland, who was post manager at Kuujjuaq and Ungava Section Manager from 1932 to 1934, recorded that the federal government paid the relief accounts and that the Government of Québec did nothing in this regard. "All that I knew of the Québec Provincial Government during my time at Fort Chimo (Kuujjuaq) was that it collected a higher royalty on furs than that levied by the federal government" (Copeland, 1985, p.148).

Senator Charlie Watt told a federal committee studying the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement in 1977, that the Bay posts often handed out relief on their own accord. He said that the relief consisted of such items as: "...8 pounds of flour, half a pound of tea, half a pound of lard, 2 pounds of molasses

or 2 pounds of sugar. These were the provisions given to a family for one week" (Watt, 1978, p.6).

Another interesting activity of the Hudson's Bay Company was the manner in which it presented itself to the Inuit. In 1931, the Company published the Eskimo Book of Knowledge .[12] Inuit who could read English would learn that the trading posts were built so that "the traders might live according to customs of England" (Binney, 1931, p.44). Furthermore, the traders were commanded by the King "to rule the new lands firmly and justly." The Company depicted the traders as "just men, stern with evil doers, [and] fair with the honest workers." The trader was to be seen as a "father" who healed the sick, whose advice should be sought, and "in times of famine and shortage of furs saw that no man starved" (Ibid, pp.44-46).

In keeping with this profile, many early post managers were often called upon to provide medical assistance. Such was the case in 1927, when during a celebration for the departure of the S.S. Nascopie from Kangirsujuaq, a small boy was seriously injured by a metal fragment from a cannon shell. With no hope of signalling the ship to return, Hudson's Bay manager "Bill Watt pushed the eyeballs back into their sockets, poured iodine over the wound and stitched it up, with sterilized rubber bands between the stitches for drainage" (Felton, 1959, p.36).

The presence of the Hudson's Bay Company in Nouveau Québec brought the Inuit into contact with consumer goods. The hunting, fishing and trapping

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12 The book was rendered into the Labrador Inuit dialect by Rev. W.W. Perrett.

implements that became available through trade made life easier. The availability of store-bought food and relief programs all but guaranteed that mass starvation would be a thing of the past. Though motivated by profit Hudson's Bay Company personnel played an important role in the everyday life of the Inuit. Often strict and businesslike, they could also be generous and caring.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police

The last member of the triumvirate, and by profession, the least motivated by either economic or religious interests, was the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

In 1905, Inspector J.D. Moodie of the RCMP recommended that a detachment be opened at Killiniq, Nouveau Québec, as a "convenient port of customs entry for all vessels passing through Davis Strait" (Steele, 1936, p.116). Although the detachment was not opened until 1920, Killiniq had always been a natural stop off for vessels moving through the area. In 1920, the post had a semi-permanent Inuit population of about 100. Once the detachment was opened the entire Nouveau Québec region was patrolled either by ship or by dogteam from this post.

In 1936, the detachment was moved to Inukjuak. The police had to deal with instances of theft and a few homicides. The most famous case involved the murder of eight Inuit at the Belcher Islands in 1941. The main task of the RCMP was to fly the Canadian flag and enforce Canadian laws in Nouveau Québec (Vallee, 1969,

p.26). This was done through voyages of the police patrol ship St.Roch captained by Inspector Henry Larsen. Jenness (1964) states that while the RCMP was not responsible to the Northwest Territorial Council, it did report to that agency on Inuit conditions. The police also compiled vital statistics and authorized the issuing of rations to destitute, aged or infirm Inuit.

In researching the activities of the RCMP in Nouveau Québec it is worth noting that all of the reports written from the posts at Killiniq, Kuujjuarapik and Inukjuak were written in English. Furthermore these three detachments were administered by G Division whose offices were in Ottawa as opposed to D Division with its headquarters in Montreal (Annual Reports of the RCMP 1920-1965).[13] The researcher was not able to locate any information written by the RCMP concerning Nouveau Québec in the French language.

Socio-Economic Conditions of the Nouveau Québec Inuit

To the end of the 1940s the federal government's responsibilities in Nouveau Québec were carried out by the missionaries, traders and the RCMP. The level of support granted by the federal government was minimal. Federal response was limited to providing the missionaries with small sums of money to buy consumable school supplies, the payment of relief accounts during times of great

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[13] Sections of the original reports submitted by the constables are included in the annual reports and they are all written in English.

starvation, and to maintaining law and order. In light of the legal responsibilities that sovereignty brought upon the federal government, one must ask why the government chose such a passive policy in fulfilling its responsibilities for the welfare of the Inuit during the first half of the twentieth century.

Diamond Jenness suggests the main reason for government inaction was that it received a distorted picture of living conditions in the Arctic in reports by the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior. At this point in time, members of parliament were being told that the living conditions of the Inuit were favourable and that there was no reason for alarm, notwithstanding reports from the field of increased deaths due to tuberculosis or starvation. A review of the Québec Annual Statistical Yearbook for the years 1926-1949, confirms the field reports. While there is no exact figure as to how many Québec Inuit died of tuberculosis before 1946, the figures for that year can only lead one to conclude the worst. In 1946, the death rate per one hundred thousand from tuberculosis was 72/100 000 for the Province of Québec, 54.6/100 000 in Montreal and 777.7/100 000 in Nouveau Québec (Annuaire Statistique du Québec, 1959, p.138). Once the true nature of what was taking place was revealed, hospitals were built in Kuujjuaq and Inukjuak under the auspices of the federal government by the end of the 1940s.

Secondly, the "wilderness equation" advanced by Robert Carney (1971) which maintains that the Inuit were viewed basically as hunters and trappers and

thus should be left alone, was a widely held belief among politicians, government officials and their agents in Nouveau Québec.

Thirdly, and perhaps the most well known reason suggests that both governments were reluctant to assume responsibility for the Inuit because their legal status was unclear. The provincial government's position was that the Inuit of Nouveau Québec were Indian as defined by Section 91 (24) of the BNA Act and thus were a federal responsibility. The ultimate decision as to which level of government was responsible for the Inuit rested with a judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada.

During the 1920s, the Inuit were treated as Indians for purposes of administration, but they were not given the same rights as Indians under the Indian Act. In 1924, the Liberal Minister of the Department of the Interior, Charles Stewart introduced a bill to Parliament which would have brought the Inuit into the Indian Act with the same rights as Indians. While on the surface the bill appeared to deal with the issue of status, it was in fact a means of reasserting the federal government's claims of territorial sovereignty in the Arctic. While not rejecting the sovereignty claim, Arthur Meighen, leader of the Conservative opposition, opposed the legislation maintaining that it would transform these "independent" people into "wards" of the state. Meighen maintained that the Inuit should be treated like any other non-Native group. Amendments to the bill were made which placed the Inuit under the administrative responsibility of the Department of Indian Affairs in both

the Northwest Territories and Nouveau Québec, but without the same status as Indians.

Throughout the first three decades of the 20th century the Inuit encountered periods of starvation. The drastic decline of the Kangirsualujjuaq caribou herd in 1918 was the cause of much starvation (Dunbar, 1952, p.8). Towards the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s living conditions for the Nouveau Québec Inuit continued to deteriorate. Death due to starvation and disease was commonplace and especially severe in Nouveau Québec (Diubaldo, 1981, p.35). Since the provincial government had not shown an interest in the area or its people, the federal government felt compelled to act in some way. Before 1928, the Dept. of Indian Affairs had distributed food, clothing and medicine to the Inuit on the same basis as Indians through the police, Révillon Frères and the Hudson's Bay Company. Jenness (1964) estimates that this relief amounted to $10,000 to $12,000 dollars per year in Nouveau Québec in the 1920s.

Between the years 1929 and 1932, relief to Québec Inuit, provided by the Dept. of the Interior, totalled $54,648.00 dollars or about $9.00 dollars per person per year based on a population of about 2000 (Jenness, 1964, p.40). The bill for this relief was sent to Québec which reimbursed Ottawa (Diubaldo, 1981, p.35).

As a result of the growing effect of the depression on the Québec economy, the provincial government in 1932 refused to reimburse Ottawa claiming that the Inuit no matter where they lived were in the same category as Indians and thus

were a federal responsibility. Faced with this refusal to pay and the reasons stated by the province, the federal government referred the matter to the Supreme Court of Canada. In 1939, the court ruled that the Inuit were subject to Section 91 (24) of the BNA Act (Diubaldo, 1981, pp.36-39).[14] Before the decision came down from the court, the Québec government agreed to make one last payment until the question of liability had been definitely settled. In making the payment Québec made it clear to Ottawa that the payment "must not be taken as an admission of liability in connection with Eskimo relief in this Province" (Ibid, p.35). The refusal of the provincial government to look after the welfare of the Inuit after 1932, can be seen as evidence of their disinterest in the region and its inhabitants. The federal government's response to the court decision indicates that they too, did not want to be responsible for the Inuit. The federal Minister of the Interior wanted to have the decision overturned by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. Cooler heads prevailed and no further action in this regard took place (Ibid, p.39).

The Supreme Court decision should have clarified the status of the Inuit as the jurisdictional responsibility of the federal government, however it did not. Jenness speculates that the federal government's failure to enact special legislation concerning the Inuit was motivated by financial concerns. Furthermore, he states that the government held the view that as long as the Inuit lived within the law they

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[14] Section 91 (24) assigns legislative jurisdiction for Indians to the federal government.

"...would not be deliberately transformed into white men, who would inevitably demand public schools, medical care, and the other services that would entail a considerable expenditure of public funds..." (Jenness, 1964, p.32).

The neglect on the part of the federal government to enact legislation concerning the Inuit would have serious consequences. Within twenty years of the Supreme Court ruling, the absence of special legislation pertaining to the Inuit would become a major plank in the provincial government's argument asserting that they had jurisdiction over education for all citizens in the province except for those citizens covered by the Indian Act or other special legislation. Though Québec "was delighted with the win in the Supreme Court" at the time, the provincial government would rue the day it had bypassed an opportunity to assert its claim for responsibility for the Inuit within the province (Hamelin, 1978, p.163). In later years the Inuit would come to regard the provincial government's response as proof of its lack of concern for their welfare.

As for the Inuit, they had few allies to champion their cause. One was O.S.Finnie, who became Director of the Northwest Territories Branch in 1921. During the 1920s, he lamented the actions of the federal government as he believed that "...territorial rights carr[ied] obligations [and] that it was the duty of the Federal Government to civilize the Eskimo and to safeguard their health and welfare" (Finnie, cited in Jenness, 1964, p.30).

Finnie's pleas for concerted government action fell on unsympathetic ears. The federal policy of minimal involvement coupled with a "laissez-faire attitude" continued until the end of the 1930s (Finnie, cited in Jenness, 1964, p.64).

To the mid 1940s, the failure to enact legislation pertaining to the Inuit as a result of the Supreme Court ruling, inaccurate departmental reports, and the inaccessibility of the north had combined to leave the Nouveau Québec Inuit in legal, administrative and geographical isolation. However, this was to soon change.

The discovery of petroleum in the 1920s, gold and radium (1930s) and the Second World War brought many changes. By the late 1940s federal authorities believed that the North now had strategic importance and resource potential (Weick, et al, cited in Malaurie, 1973, p.197; Rousseau, 1969). The North was seen as vital to future air transport and the Canadian economy. It was no longer viewed as simply a financial drain. Federal authorities further believed that the region could pay its own way, but careful planning would be necessary (Weick, et al, cited in Malaurie, 1973, p.202). With the growing importance of the North the inadequate educational system of the mission schools would have to give way to a more "...comprehensive system operated by the government and patterned after those in Canada's provinces" (Jenness, 1964, p.123).

Conclusion

At the start of the 20th century, the first glimpses of the Nouveau Québec Inuit come from the records of explorers, missionaries, Hudson's Bay Company personnel, RCMP and government reports. During the first decade of the twentieth century the federal government was still in the process of establishing provinces. By the second decade the Canadian government was occupied by the demands of the First World War. The Depression of the 1930s and the beginning of the Second World War which lasted through the first half of the 1940s further limited government involvement in the North. It can be argued that both federal and provincial governments were too absorbed by these and other matters to contemplate the needs of a group of unenfranchised Natives. A direct result of the lack of federal or provincial intervention in Nouveau Québec was that the RCMP became the executive arm of the government enforcing law and order. In the area of health care, those in need of help went to whomever they could for assistance. Education was left to the missionaries, who relied on their own resources to offer an irregular and inadequate program (Jenness, 1954, p.30). Jenness believed "the missions had failed to prepare the natives for their entry into the civilized world" and that only a government with substantial resources at its disposal could finance and direct education programs that "civilization and industry demanded." Jenness also believed that mission schools had failed because along with a lack of money

and personnel they also lacked "...a clear perception of the objectives at which a secular education should aim" (Jenness, 1964, p.123).

Furthermore, the Inuit were caught between differing political views on how they should be treated, i.e., as "wards of the state" or "like all other non-natives." Given their disadvantaged situation it is not clear that either point of view would have been of any help to them. The issue was further complicated in that the two levels of government were at odds over who should exercise legal authority. Though the matter of legal authority was resolved in 1939, significant federal involvement resulting in improved social services did not occur until 1949. Until this time the living conditions of the Nouveau Québec Inuit had continued to deteriorate.

Based on the research evidence it is clear that the early agents of the federal government conducted their business in the English language. The names and the country of origin of Anglican missionaries and Hudson's Bay Company personnel indicate that they were English speaking. Furthermore, it is suggested that due to this common language, the Anglican missionaries in Nouveau Québec enjoyed an advantage over their rivals, the Oblates. The predominance of the English language was also corroborated by Inuit who worked for the Bay and the Anglican Church as well as by a francophone who lived among the Inuit for thirty years. As already noted there were no RCMP records in French. The names of the key individuals associated with the RCMP in Nouveau Québec were anglophone.

Believing that the Inuit should be integrated into Canadian society, and in anticipation of future Arctic development in which the Inuit could have a place if trained, a comprehensive and suitable education policy for the mid 20th century was required before the advent of the federal day school system in 1949, two educational needs reports were completed. A third report was written in 1952, and together they formed the basis upon which the federal government would develop its educational policy for the North including Nouveau Québec.

Education was to become a major issue of conflict between the federal and provincial governments. The next chapter will review these education reports in detail. The focus of the review will be to identify the kind of educational system envisioned by the federal government and to identify the issues that would form the basis of Québec's jurisdictional claim of responsibility for Inuit education and other services.

Chapter III

Federal Jurisdiction 1949 -1963

To the end of the 1930s, the Inuit of Nouveau Québec lived in relative obscurity and isolation from the rest of Canada. Their main contact with the outside world came as a result of contact with explorers, Hudson's Bay Company personnel, missionaries, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The advent of the Second World War heralded the beginning of a new era of government involvement and contact with the Inuit. It had been apparent for some time that the Inuit culture and economy had been under stress. Poor health conditions were prevalent in the North and starvation was not unknown.

With the decision in the early 1940s to build airfields in the Eastern Arctic at Kuujjuaq and Iqaluit (Frobisher Bay) and a radar station at Kuujjuarapik in 1955, an opportunity for journalists and writers to observe firsthand the living conditions of the Nouveau Québec Inuit presented itself.

From 1949, the opening of the first federal day school, to 1963, the opening of the first provincial school in Nouveau Québec, the federal government maintained sole responsibility for education services. Exclusive federal jurisdiction in the areas of law enforcement and social services approximates these dates. Louis-Edmond Hamelin suggested that the date for exclusive federal jurisdiction

is 1949 to 1960. He maintained that the end of this period was signalled by the replacement of the RCMP by the Québec Provincial Police (QPP) at Inukjuak in 1960. This gesture he maintained was "a manifestation of Ottawa's symbolic withdrawal" and a realization on the part of the Québec government that its authority had to extend all the way to Hudson Strait. However, he does concede that "proper provincial administration structures were not established in [Nouveau] Québec until 1963" (Hamelin, 1978, p.166).

The aims of this chapter are threefold. Firstly, to understand the basis of the federal-provincial dispute that was to develop, it is important to review three education reports that were commissioned by the federal government in preparation for its Northern education policy statement issued in 1955. These reports formed the basis of a general education for the Dene, Whites and Inuit in the Northwest Territories and Nouveau Québec. No thought appears to have been given to the unique circumstances of the Nouveau Québec Inuit and especially to their relationship with the francophones of that province. The recommendations contained in these reports became the foundation for the Federal Day School system.

Secondly, I will examine the socio-economic conditions of the Nouveau Québec Inuit for this period and review some of the measures taken by the federal government to alleviate hardship in the area.

Thirdly, I will examine some of the reasons suggested in the literature as to why Québec was tardy in assuming a stronger role in Nouveau Québec and discuss the factors that awakened its interest in the area.

To bring life to these topics I will incorporate into the narrative the personal recollections of Inuit who experienced the school system and the living conditions at that time.

The first of these educational reports was written by Andrew Moore. Though written a few years before the period under review, it formed an integral part of education policy for the Inuit of Nouveau Québec.

The Moore Report

In 1944 Andrew Moore, a school inspector from Manitoba, was asked jointly by the Canadian Social Science Research Council and the Northwest Territories Administration to prepare a report on education in the Western Arctic. In recognition of the growing importance of the Arctic he stated that "it behooves Canada to become as thoroughly familiar as possible with her vast little-known northland and the education of its people cannot be further neglected" (Moore, 1944, p.3).

The Moore Report in itself did not force the federal government to act in the area of education. At about the same time that the report was written, stories of the deplorable living conditions of the Kuujjuaq Inuit were being told by

servicemen, construction workers and journalists, who were drawn to Kuujjuaq by the construction of the Crimson Air Staging Route base (Dunbar, 1952, p.7). These politically embarrassing revelations put an end to any exotic notions southerners held of the Inuit. It was this political and public embarrassment that led to an active commitment not only to the region but to the people.

At the time that the Moore Report was submitted to the Territorial Council one of its members was Dr. H.L. Keenleyside (Keenleyside, 1982, p.310). Unlike other members of the Council who were from the Dominion Department of Mines and Resources, he was Deputy Minister, Department of External Affairs and was well acquainted with Canada's international status, obligations and responsibilities in the North. During World War II he had been a member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which was established following a meeting between Mackenzie King and President Franklin Roosevelt to coordinate the joint defence of the North American continent (Diubaldo, 1977, pp.179-195). Keenleyside was well aware of the potential threat American interests posed to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, especially as the Cold War intensified. In 1946, he was appointed Commissioner of the Northwest Territories. Under his direction a string of nursing stations was constructed to help cope with the deplorable health conditions throughout the entire Arctic region including Nouveau Québec. Based on his subsequent actions in the area of education, he came to be regarded as the master architect of the Federal Day School system:

> Before he retired in 1950 there were schools built in Tuktoyaktuk in 1947, and in 1949 schools opened in Coral Harbour, Lake Harbour, Kuujjuaq, and Inukjuak, both in Nouveau Québec, and in 1950 schools opened in Cape Dorset, Coppermine and Aklavik. By 1961 there were 31 Federal Schools dotting the Arctic coastline (Jenness, 1964, p.79).

Underpinning this massive construction project was an unstated view of schooling and of the Inuit themselves. Although lacking an explicit philosophical position related to Inuit education, the social function of the new school system was very clear. If the stated role of the mission school was to Christianize the Inuit, then the federal schools would make them "responsible citizens" (Moore, 1944, p.10). Schooling was supposed to bring these people out of their ignorance and underdevelopment into a condition of enlightenment. Coupled with these lofty goals was the practical function of providing skills training. Moore acknowledged that "...the white man's civilization [was] thrusting itself upon [the] natives at a rapidly increasing rate and [that] appropriate educational measures should be adopted" (Ibid, p.10). Recognizing that the social and economic condition of the Native people in the Territories, including Nouveau Québec Inuit, was very depressed, it was perhaps with a degree of alarm and frustration that Moore said that it would take "more than a generation to fit them to assume the full responsibility of citizenship" (Ibid, p.10).

In an attempt to address the problem of a Native and non-Native clientele, Moore recommended a "middle-of-the-way curriculum" which had two main objectives:

> First it should include as much of the white man's knowledge and behaviours as will assist them (Natives) to enjoy a more abundant and efficient life in their own environment. Secondly, it should equip them to cope satisfactorily with the impact of the white man's civilization upon their lives not only at the present moment, but also with the long-range objective of gradually enabling them to utilize as much of his civilization as will function satisfactorily in their changing world (Moore, 1944, p.10).

It is clear from Moore's recommendations that the Inuit were to be integrated into Canadian society. The task in theory would take more than a generation. With the influx of non-Natives, the Inuit would have to learn the white man's ways. In this way the Inuit would become more efficient in their own environment. Little attention or credit was given to Inuit knowledge even though white people had often depended on these traditional skills to survive the harsh climate. The basic assumption was that if the Inuit became more like white people they could then take on the responsibilities of citizenship. Moore's recommendations were not immediately efficacious. Moore's prediction of the time required to accomplish the goals of citizenship, language fluency and job related

skills was accurate. Not surprisingly, the ethnocentric views expressed in the report were commonplace at the time.

One year before the construction of the school in Inukjuak in 1949, another education report was commissioned by the NWT administration. H.R. Lamberton's analysis of the Inuit people and their needs contributes to our knowledge of how society of the late 1940s viewed the Inuit. His recommendations would also influence Inuit educational programs.

The Lamberton Report

In 1948, Lamberton prepared a report for the Territorial Administration entitled Report on Educational Facilities in the Eastern Arctic. He began by acknowledging that the Eastern Arctic had "unique features." The "typical Eskimo" was depicted as living in a canvas tent in summer and either a tent banked with snow or a snow igloo in winter. Seal and oil lamps provided heat and light, while caribou and seal skins provided clothing: "The very existence of the Eskimo demands that they be incessantly on the move in search of food, clothing, light and heat" (Lamberton, 1948, p.4). This was a reasonable assessment of Inuit life at the time. Furthermore, the Inuit were portrayed as being able to "work industriously under supervision...Possessed of a kindly and friendly disposition...generous...[and] honest" (Ibid, p. 4). He also noted that the Inuit still [had] their "pride of race" and [felt] "superior to the white man since the latter [was] in many ways dependent upon them while residing there" (Ibid, p.4).

Lamberton rationalized that this superiority was caused by the fact that "very few natives speak or understand the English language" (Ibid, p.4).

Finally the Inuit were described as patient, intelligent, loving of children, fine navigators and having a good business sense. Thus portrayed the Inuit were seen as in need of help "to cope with the white man's way of doing things" (Ibid, p.6). Without taking issue with Lamberton's ethnocentric observations, his report did have one positive aspect. For a number of government officials Lamberton's observations may have served to demystify the Inuit and influence education and social services policy.

The recommendations made to help the Inuit cope were of dubious pedagogical value. No provisions were made to improve Inuit living conditions at this time, yet they were to be taught clean living habits. It was also assumed that whites were better hunters for they would teach the indigenous population how to live more efficiently in the Native manner. Lastly, the superiority of the English language was established in that the Inuit were expected to learn to speak English: "The children need training in clean health habits. They need to be taught how to live more efficiently in the native manner. They must learn how to speak the white man's language" (Ibid, p.18).

Throughout Moore's and Lamberton's reports it was implied that Native compliance with educational and social objectives would be rewarded through the ability to integrate into the non-renewable resource economy (Lotz, 1969, p.8). The

fact that this did not happen in the decades that followed for significant numbers of Inuit undermined the work of the schools and highlighted the fact that the schools could not be used as an effective ameliorative agent for a wide range of social problems. It should be noted that the recommendation to formalize instruction in the English language was seen to be the key to the Inuit's ability to become productive citizens. The recommendation for the use of English as the universal language of instruction was not an enlightened recommendation considering Québec's unique linguistic make up. Within a few years the Québec government would argue that the Inuit in Nouveau Québec should learn French for the same economic reasons.

The specific educational recommendations of the Lamberton Report were integrationist and threatened the survival of the Inutitut language.[1] The evidence, as the forthcoming recommendations show, speaks for itself.

Despite the fact that French was recognized as an official language of the province, instruction in the federal schools built in Nouveau Québec was to be in English. Anthropologist Frank Vallee stated that the federal planners' rationale for this unilingual policy was the assumption that economic development in the North would bring the Inuit into further contact with people who would be doing business in English. Vallee also stated that "educators in the Canadian Arctic regarded the

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[1] Inutitut is the language spoken by the Inuit. In the Northwest Territories it is spelled Inuktitut.

question of the language of instruction primarily from an instrumental point of view: namely, 'how is this language going to help the person make a living? How is it going to help him fit into the larger society'" (Vallee, 1969, p.18). The recommendation to use English in federal schools built in Nouveau Québec failed to take into consideration the special circumstance of the Inuit being a homogenous group living in a francophone province. From the viewpoint of an anglophone bureaucracy, which was developing one universal policy for the entire Canadian Arctic region, this view of language appears reasonable. Louis-Edmond Hamelin stated that the unilingual federal policy permitted an interchangeability of services and administrators. From the Moore Report of the mid 1940s until 1978 when the federal schools closed in Nouveau Québec, the language of instruction was always English. French was not used as a language of instruction. This language issue would contribute to the federal-provincial conflict in the years to come.

Vallee argued that the federal authorities believed that syllabics should be replaced with Roman characters. In the years ahead provincial authorities would take the position that this policy was unacceptable:

> the present syllabic system of writing the Eskimo language should disappear in the long run. The consensus opinion is that this system should now be replaced by writing with Roman characters. Retention of the syllabic system would only serve as a hindrance to the educational

> advancement of the natives (Vallee, 1969, p.19).

Children were to be taught how to read and write English and do "simple" arithmetic. It was stated that the students would not be taught how to read and write their own language using Roman characters. However, Lamberton thought that maybe some children would acquire this ability on their own (Ibid, p.20). The Arctic District Superintendent of Schools responsible for the schools in Nouveau Québec recruited staff from his base in Ottawa (Wattie, 1968, p.301). Given the fact that few if any of the teachers hired from the South would have had special training in cross-cultural education or could speak Inutitut, one must ask who was to lend assistance in learning Inutitut if the teachers could not?

While acknowledging that Inuit children lived in tents and igloos, the students were to be taught the "rudiments of electricity" and other subjects such as elementary science, geography "...and kindred topics [which] will be of interest and value to them" (Ibid, p.20). It is clear that the curriculum recommended was more sympathetic to what non-Native teachers knew than to a goal of utilizing local knowledge.

Margery Hinds, a federal teacher with fourteen years experience in the Inuit communities of Inukjuak and Kuujjuaq, wrote Jenness in 1964 to express her disappointment over the curriculum being used. She was alarmed that her students had not reached the level of proficiency necessary to write university

entrance exams as had students in English schools from Asia and Africa (Jenness, 1964, p.136). She suggested that southern teachers be encouraged to learn Inutitut and that the curriculum be built around knowledge already possessed by the Inuit children (Hinds, 1959, pp.13-17). Her assessment of the situation was based on a professional and humanitarian evaluation of the inappropriateness of using the Ontario Program of Studies in Nouveau Québec during the 1950s.[2] Furthermore, the specific recommendation to replace syllabics with a Roman orthography and the lack of teachers qualified to teach Inutitut was seen by Hinds to have grave consequences in that the children would soon lose their mother tongue (Ibid, p.16).

In terms of the Moore and Lamberton Reports the Western and Eastern Arctic education programs were based on the same blueprint. Accordingly, Keenleyside inaugurated the federal day school system as a tool to demonstrate responsible sovereignty over the Native population in the Arctic as required by international law. The intentions behind the development of the school system and a network of nursing stations were benevolent.

While the ultimate responsibility for what was done to the Inuit rests with the federal government at least until 1963, it was unfortunate that a government concerned with the welfare of indigenous people could devise a system of

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2 Margery Hinds opened the first federal school in Inukjuak in 1949. She also taught in Kuujjuaq during the 1950s (Hinds, 1958, pp.166-167).

education for the Inuit that was totally devoid of Inuit knowledge, values and beliefs. One might have expected that in developing an education policy for the Inuit, the government would have learned from some of the mistakes it had made in its relations with aboriginal people in southern Canada.

Vallee argued that the agents of change in the Arctic were bent on a policy of "cultural replacement" (Vallee, 1969, p.17). Furthermore, I agree with Jacques Rousseau's analysis of the federal language policy in Nouveau Québec which he summed up as follows:

> to impose upon them [the Inuit] the language of the majority [English] in order to bring them as rapidly as possible to our civilization and thereby induce them to reject their own dialects, to be ashamed of their culture, and to forget entirely about the past (Rousseau, 1969, p.5).

Another major deficiency of the schooling system was that there was no mechanism in place that could serve to bring Native people and their concerns into the policy planning process.

In keeping with the recommendations in the Moore and Lamberton Reports the government decided that the Ontario Program of Studies would be used in the federal schools in Nouveau Québec. Included in the curriculum were courses on housekeeping and table manners. I have seen, in old supply boxes found in the basement of the Salluit federal school, books on etiquette that were part of the

new curriculum. A former student told me that they used to practice eating with forks, knives and spoons in class. These skills were to prepare the Inuit to live in the matchbox houses that were built during the 1950s and 1960s.

As the 1950s unfolded, the federal government began work on policy development for the North. With the implicit goal of integrating the Inuit into white society, education was to play a prominent role (Weick, in Malaurie, 1973, p.202). In preparation for this major policy initiative a third education report was written. Though there were no special recommendations for the Nouveau Québec Inuit, the Low Report contained recommendations that had a different view of the Inuit and their educational needs.

The Low Report

By Order in Council dated May 25th, 1950, H.R. Low was appointed Advisor on Education to the Northwest Territories Council. He was commissioned to "study what was being done in Northern education and to suggest steps by which the educational needs of the people of the area could be more completely and efficiently met" (Low, 1951, p.1). This report along with those of Moore and Lamberton formed the basis of a major federal government policy statement on Northern education issued in 1955 by the Minister of Northern Affairs, Jean Lesage. While Low had visited only Western Arctic settlements his

recommendations were seen to be applicable throughout the Arctic including Nouveau Québec.

Many of the minor recommendations of the Low Report, such as skills training and the need for courses in personal hygiene, echoed those already found in the two previous reports. His major recommendations are reviewed below.

Of the three reports the Low Report was unique in that it recognized the different needs of individual students, communities and the state. Inexplicably, many of the more enlightened recommendations were never translated into education policy or teaching practices.

Once again the desire to have the Native people integrated into Canadian society was expressed. To accomplish this "a system of free and universal education was to be established" (Ibid, p.3). The main objective of the new school system was to:

> (a) Bring every child into school at the earliest practicable age.(b) Keep them in school long enough to profit significantly and permanently from his school experience.(c) Provide him with further opportunities for continuing his education after leaving school (Ibid, p.3).

Vocational education was recommended as a means of equipping the student with the capabilities of finding work and hence contributing to the family and the community. The system was to be flexible in "that it [would] enable all persons of varying capacities and aptitudes to make the most of themselves" (Ibid,

p.4). Both vocational and academic programs were to be backed up by scholarships and grants which would allow students to further their educational goals. Provisions were also spelled out for educating the physically or mentally handicapped. Furthermore, the school was to be a co-operative venture, interacting with all other agencies to be found in a particular village. These recommendations were quite a departure from those which had been made previously.

The most enlightened recommendations of the report concerned the curriculum for Native children. Low recognized that Native or Inuit children must have a curriculum that offered them a wide variety of activities that would help them learn English. While Native languages were once again overlooked at least the difficulty of learning a second language was recognized. Low's vocational curriculum was to include technical knowledge and activities from traditional life. He recognized that children had different interests. This was in itself no great discovery. What makes his position refreshing is that he considered the child's environment as an integral part of the education process. A point of major significance was that Low also recognized that "Nativeness" would pose a pedagogical challenge to the teacher:

> The half-breed and native children come to school with a different language background, a different experience with activities in the home and with games and informal play; with different ideology,

> which they have heard adults express as explanations, admonitions, and proverbs, and even different motives and interests that impel them to (do) effective work (Ibid, p.40).

The emphasis in Low's school was to be placed on fostering confidence, pride and security in one's own culture. Skills training, in his opinion, could only be effective if these conditions prevailed. Native students were to be encouraged to sing traditional songs and to perform their dances. There was to be an opportunity to learn folk lore: "These are traditional characteristics which should not be despised or forgotten or replaced..." (Ibid, p.43). These recommendations were in keeping with the cautions voiced by experienced teachers such as Hinds, who believed that curriculum should be built around what was already known so that there could be a continuous development from the known to the unknown. He also stated that the Alberta curriculum planned for the Mackenzie area was not suitable for the primary schools of the Eastern Arctic.

Given Low's astute awareness that the curriculum selected for use in the new northern school system would be a critical factor in determining success, his recommendation that the Alberta Department of Education curriculum be used for Native and non-Native students alike in the Western Arctic was surprising. In the Eastern Arctic which included Nouveau Québec, the Ontario curriculum was to be used. For white students in places like Yellowknife this would appear to have been a sensible recommendation. It would have been an equally good recommendation

if it implied that the federal government was going to develop a different curriculum for Native students. However, this was not to be the case. Gaetz (1984) correctly maintains that during this period the federal government paid only lip service to the notion of Native cultural content (p.8).

There were those who suggested that Native culture and language classes be taught in the schools to preserve the record of Inuit achievements. Jenness referred to these people as "idealists." The language of instruction policy of the federal government suggests that there was support for the view that:

> ...our Eskimos lack all cohesion outside of their family groups, and cannot comprehend the structure of a nation or understand the fires of nationalism...They are a fragmented, amorphous race that lacks all sense of history, inherits no pride of ancestry, and discerns no glory in past events or past achievements (Jenness, 1964, p.128).

Low recognized that some Native students might want to know more about their history. Accordingly he advised teachers to encourage the students to pursue this interest on their own. However, one can surmise the bias against Natives that one was likely to find in texts of that era.

For the most part no money was allocated to Native curriculum development. Any efforts to make teaching materials more relevant to the student were strictly a matter of local teacher initiative. Without specialized curriculum training and in-depth knowledge of the Inuit culture, one can only visualise the

confusion of the Inuit student attempting to solve 4 polar bears + 4 polar bears when the traditional number system was base 20 (M. Mallon, Personal interview, February, 1987).

In the homogeneous area of Nouveau Québec, where there were very few white students, the Ontario curriculum was to be taught in English. This incensed Québec education officials who requested in the 1950s that at least the curriculum of the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal (PSBGM) be used (Moodie, 1975, p.39). This request was officially denied but local informants have indicated that within the federal schools of Nouveau Québec material from the PSBGM was available. I found these materials still in use in the Kuujjuarapik federal school in 1976.

Most of the recommendations made by Low and the cautious warnings of teaching professionals such as Hinds were overlooked. While recognizing the unique educational needs of Native children, no attempt was made to discover how they assimilated knowledge and viewed the world around them or to determine what were their aspirations. No consideration was given to community input or parental involvement. The fact remained that the Inuit were in every way excluded from curriculum development and the policy formation process. In the years to come the provincial government would focus on these omissions and attempt to offer alternatives. Louis-Edmond Hamelin argued that the lack of consideration of the second language needs of the Nouveau Québec Inuit was

motivated by what he called a "homogeneous Canadianization" policy which was an implicit Anglophone view established on a Canada-wide scale. The thrust of this policy was that "from this pan-Canadian viewpoint a differentiated status, whether Québécois, Eskimo or Indian would be undesirable" (Hamelin, 1978, p.174).

By the end of 1952, with these three reports in hand the federal government started to formulate its educational policy for the Canadian Arctic as a whole. In 1955, a policy document entitled "New Education Programme in the Northwest Territories" was released. The new school system would be universal and free to all with compulsory attendance. Further[illegible] school was to be linked to southern programs (Berger, 1977, p.91; Thomson, 1984, p.55). It would provide job skills training which would allow the Inuit to enter the mainstream of Canadian life (McDowell, 1970, p.11). The era of isolation was officially over. Integration through education was to be the key to success. All the cautions and recommendations concerning the special curriculum needs of Native students were overlooked. Native language and culture were discouraged. Inuit informants who attended the federal schools at Salluit, Kuujjuarapik, and Churchill, Manitoba[3] told me that they were subjected to corporal punishment if they were caught speaking Inuktitut during school hours (Putulik Papigatuk and Paul Oqituk, Personal

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3 The Churchill Vocational Centre (CVC) was opened in 1966. Students from Nouveau Québec were sent there. The programming focus at CVC was occupational, opportunity or pre-vocational. Carney (1983) states "most would agree they [occupational programs] became the route followed by most Inuit students" (p.108).

interviews, May ,1991). Vallee also reported that there were specific rules that forbade speaking Inutitut in the classroom and on the playground (Vallee, 1969, p.18). The Kativik School Board Annual Report 1978-85 also mentioned that the "use of the mother tongue in [federal] schools was a punishable offence" (KSBAR, 1978-85, p.6). Furthermore we are informed by Jack Cram that in 1957, the Education Division of the Department of Northern Affairs issued a memorandum on the use of speaking Inutitut in the communities:

> People charged with administering or teaching the Eskimo should avoid speaking Eskimo simply because they like doing so, for in a day, they could do the people lasting disservice and jeopardize the whole education set up (Cram, 1985, p.117).

Once again no provisions were made for local consultation or input. This oversight would be capitalized upon when the provincial school system was developed.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s Inuit children began to attend federal schools in Nouveau Québec. In personal interviews with men and women who went to these schools there is a consistent recollection that the teachers were very strict. Mr. Putulik Papigatuk, President of the Kativik School Board, attended the school in Salluit from 1959 to 1965. He said that "I got slapped around in school a few times, came home crying but my father brought me right back. If that happened right now parents go after teachers" (Personal interview, May, 1991). By

the age of thirteen he was sent to the Churchill Vocational Centre (CVC) where he stayed for two years living in a dormitory with 30 other children from Northern Québec.

If there was one positive side to these residential schools it was that many of today's Inuit leaders met and formed friendships. It was at CVC that Putulik met William Tagoona who was to become an early member of the Northern Québec Inuit Association and who is now a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reporter in Iqaluit. John Amaqoalik, former head of the Inuit Committee on National Issues and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, told me that he has known Senator Charlie Watt and Zebedee Nungak since they were teenagers together in school in Churchill[4] (J. Amaqoalik, Personal interview, June, 1986).

Upon returning to Salluit, Putulik stayed in school a short while longer before being sent to the vocational school at Kuujjuarapik where he was put in an administration class where he did "paper work and stuff...and typewriting." After spending one year there he quit school to work for Falconbridge Nickel Mines at Raglan, Nouveau Québec.

During an interview with Daniel Alpalu, I was told of the first school in Povungnituk established by Father André Steinmann in 1956. Daniel was born in an igloo near Ivujivik in 1943. He said that at that time there were seasonal camps

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[4] Senator Charlie Watt is President of Makivik Corporation. Mr. Nungak is the 1st Vice President of Makivik and was elected Secretary Treasurer of the Northern Québec Inuit Association at the age of twenty in 1972.

in the area but no formal community. In 1949, when Daniel was six years old, his father was hired by the Hudson's Bay Company to work at their Akulivik store. They stayed there until the post was closed in 1954. They then moved to Povungnituk to work for Father Steinmann who built them a stone house. By late 1956, Father Steinmann had started to take in children for the purposes of teaching them some arithmetic, reading and writing. Daniel remembered that "the priest was not so hard to learn with because he used to translate it from English books into Inutitut" (Personal interview, May, 1991). The reason for English instruction was not discussed. However, Zaslow states that throughout the Arctic: "The French-speaking orders of priests and nuns who supplied the Roman Catholic missionary endeavour had to defer to the [federal] administration's preference for English as the language of instruction" (Zaslow, 1988, p.157). I also asked Daniel about the stories that family allowances were cut off if children did not go to school. He replied that while he heard it said, he never knew of anyone who lost their money. He said that it was "maybe a threat." When asked about the establishment of the provincial school in Povungnituk in the late 1960s, Daniel had no recollection as he was not involved with the school or any of its committees (Personal interview, May, 1991).

One positive federal program was the Inuit assistant project established in 1956 to train classroom assistants, including some candidates from Nouveau Québec. Thirty-seven such assistants graduated between the years 1958-1968

(Simpson and Wattie, 1968, p.25). This seemingly bold and innovative plan accomplished two things. On the positive side Inuit role models entered the classroom. On the negative side not all graduates were allowed to teach by their white supervising teachers. Many were assigned menial tasks like washing the children and making soup. However, while it did create employment, more importantly it brought Inuit into the classrooms. It was not until the early 1970s that Inuit language teachers in Nouveau Québec federal schools started teaching the Inutitut language. As will be discussed later, the provincial school system expanded this training program. It was the intention of the provincial government to offer instruction in all subjects in Inutitut, thus requiring more highly trained personnel than at the teaching assistant level. I will discuss this topic in a later chapter.

The federal day school system was a major institution in the communities. From an economic point of view local residents found jobs as teaching assistants, bus drivers, custodial and support staff. Throughout the period 1949 to 1963 Inuit also found jobs at the two military bases at Kuujjuaq and Kuujjuarapik and with the Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources (DNANR) as construction workers and heavy equipment operators (Zaslow, 1988, p.228). All these jobs were created as a result of the federal government sedentarisation[5] program which

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5 According to the "Dictionnaire Moderne Larousse, 1981" sedentarisation translates as settling (p.683).

induced the Inuit to settle in permanent villages where services and resources could be centralized (Duhaime, 1983, p.25). The federal northern development plan called for simultaneous action in the areas of education, health, and economic development. Initiatives in all three areas had to be addressed at the same time as it was felt that they were interdependent (DNANR, 1954, p.6). In this action plan schools had a significant role to play. The education program was one part of the overall community development plan. The regional economy of Nouveau Québec was another area deemed in need of development. The socio-economic conditions of the region and federal programs aimed at infrastructure and economic development are reviewed in the next section.

Socio-economic Conditions

From the 1940s, the federal government had been aware that the Nouveau Québec region was not as well off as the other sections of the Eastern Arctic (Robinson, 1944, p.7). Robinson's position was that Nouveau Québec was overpopulated and that this stressed the ability of the land to support the population. He further stated that the cost of relief distribution in most, if not all settlements, in Nouveau Québec was "relatively high" though he did not mention specific amounts (Ibid, p.7). Health conditions were as precarious as those that prevailed in the economic sphere. As a result of an alarming drop in the seal, caribou and fox populations in the early 1950s, the majority of Nouveau Québec

Inuit lived or visited the posts to "...pick up large quantities of relief rations issued on the authority of the police" (Riches, 1973, p.526; Dunbar, 1952, p.7). At Kuujjuaq, site of an American military base, relief was also handed out (Duhaime, 1983, p.31; Zaslow 1988, p.228).

Nursing stations were built initially at Kuujjuaq and Inukjuak and the services provided by them appear to have had a positive effect (Dept. of National Health and Welfare, 1949-50, p.80). By 1955, tuberculosis deaths per one hundred thousand had been reduced in Nouveau Québec from a high of 777/100 000 in 1946 to 39.9/100 000 (Annuaire Statistique du Québec, 1959, p.138).

Infant mortality was harder to bring under control. After ten years the mortality rate was still six times that found in southern Canada. Between 1946 and 1950, in Nouveau Québec, the infant mortality rate per thousand live births was 199.7/1000. By 1956, it had dropped to 170/1000. In Montreal the rates for the same years were 44.9/1000 and 29.1/1000 (Ibid, p.132).

It is evident that improved health facilities played a major role in bringing down death rates due to tuberculosis and infant mortality. For those afflicted with tuberculosis, treatment was generally administered in a southern sanatorium. It has been reported that patients were often taken away from their home villages and sent away to sanatoria or hospitals for extended periods of time. As a result of long periods of separation from family some people lost contact with relatives.

Others found that upon their return to their home villages they would often have difficulty conversing as they had lost their ability to speak Inutitut.

Louisa Cookie was one who lived this experience. She was born at a camp outside of Kuujjuarapik in 1951, adopted by her grandmother and grandfather, and lived with them in a walled tent. She remembers the federal agent coming by to register children for school. At the age of 6, as a result of active tuberculosis, she was sent with her sister to a hospital in Moose Factory where they stayed for two years. They did not receive any mail or parcels. Louisa said that the nurses read to her infrequently from "Dick and Jane" readers.

When she returned to the community her grandmother kept her home from school to help. Within a year her tuberculosis became active again. This time she was sent to Hamilton, Ontario where she stayed for another two years. During this time she received no formal schooling. At age 11 she returned to her home community and started school. By the age of 16 she was in Grade 5.

In 1967, she attended a national Girl Guide jamboree in Toronto. She was picked to be flown to Montreal to have supper with the Queen, who was in Montreal for Expo 67. In the Fall of 1967, Louisa was sent to Churchill Vocational Centre for three years to attend junior high.

At eighteen she was sent to Ottawa to finish Grades 11 and 12. During this time she had a baby. Louisa told me that the baby was taken away from her against her will and given up for adoption to a non-Native family. Despite her

requests for information about the child over an eighteen period, Social Services told her nothing. Within the last three months Social Services has indicated that it will initiate contact with her son. Concerning this experience Louisa said that when she was out on the land fishing and camping she often thought of the child she has never known and that she felt depressed every March, the month of the child's birth. Now, with the hope of contacting her son Louisa said that she feels a great sense of relief and happiness. She said that the experience of being away from home was difficult as she was often lonely. Concerning the presence of the federal government and the Anglican Church Louisa replied, "the feds and the church took away our peace...the peace that comes with being on the land. The new way was competitive" (Personal interview, May 1991).

To carry out the federal government's master plan of community development in Nouveau Québec, Northern Service Officers (NSO) were hired and sent into the communities. By 1955, they were stationed in every major Arctic centre to administer and implement federal policy (Zaslow, 1988, p.312). The NSOs were known as "inuliriji" or "those who concern themselves with Eskimos" (Graburn, 1971, p.114). They registered children for school, registered Inuit names, sometimes inventing new ones if they could not spell the Inuit name given them.[6]

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6 Given the difficulties that non-Natives had in the spelling of Inuit names a disc number was assigned to each Inuk adult and newborn child. The letter E stands for Eskimo. The program started in the late 1940s in Nouveau Québec and was discontinued with the signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement in 1975.

Louisa told me her grandfather's name was changed from Puayungie to Paul because the NSO could not spell the Inutitut name (Personal interview, May 1991). The NSOs were also responsible for the population lists of all Inuit who had been given an "E" or disc numbers by the RCMP. Lastly, the NSOs also tried to find work for the Inuit in their home districts.

Another major federal program was housing. The Inuit Leasing program resulted in the construction of 1250, 4m x 7m houses between 1956-1965.[7] In reviewing this housing program in 1985, Norbert Robitaille and Robert Choinière concluded that of the 1315 built for the Inuit population of the N.W.T., Yukon, and Nouveau Québec between 1946 and 1970, 245 were built in Nouveau Québec.[8] The federal government rejected all local building materials such as wood and stone as being unsatisfactory. The "matchboxes" were pre-fabricated in British Columbia and brought to the communities on the annual sea-lift (Duhaime, 1983, p.41). Father Steinmann build numerous stone houses in Povungnituk and wood was available in Kuujjuaq and Kuujjuarapik.

By the end of 1963, the federal government had established schools in ten communities: Inukjuak (1949), Kuujjuaq (1949), Kangirsualujjuaq (1962), Quartaq

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7 These small houses were known as "Matchboxes" or "512s".

8 Starting in 1966 an expanded housing program supplied 1500 three bedroom houses throughout the north. Many of the houses were built in Nouveau Québec (Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Housing Program, 1980, pp.9-12).

(1960), Kangirsuk (1960), Kangirsujuaq (1960), Salluit (1957), Ivujivik (1960), Povungnituk (1958) and Kuujjuarapik (1957). The RCMP were also in Inukjuak, Kuujjuaq and Kuujjuarapik. Nursing stations had also been built in most communities. Annual visits by doctors and dentists were made aboard the C.D.Howe, an icebreaker supply ship that toured the Nouveau Québec communities (MacKinnon, 1991, pp.98-101).

With schools, nursing stations and houses in place the other major area of federal concern was the economy. In the Annual Report of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources for 1954-55 the economy of Northern Québec was described as "precarious." To help stabilize the economy an Eskimo Loan Fund was established to help individuals or groups initiate projects that would increase individual incomes. Some examples of the initiatives supported by the fund include sheep raising, poultry husbandry and commercial fishing for Arctic char. Small boat building operations and tourism were also supported by the fund (DNANR, 1954-55, pp.8-18). Soapstone carving and other handicrafts were also purchased through the Bay and marketed by the Canadian Handicrafts Guild throughout Canada and in other countries. Zaslow states that:

> A particularly successful promotional campaign was mounted in the early 1960s to market Oopik, an engaging toy owl made of seal fur with round moosehide eyes, designed by Jeannie Snowball, a Fort Chimo woman [Kuujjuaq] (Zaslow, 1988, p.275).

By the mid 1950s the Inuit were being encouraged to move to settlements. Many were reluctant to do so but the offer of housing, medical facilities and schools was a strong temptation. Recent memories of starvation and death also added weight to the decision to settle down in the communities:

> Avant, explique un Inuk de Kuujjuarapik, les Inuit ne venaient ici que pour la traite des fourrures; ils venaient aussie parfois en hiver, à Noël, mais ils ne passaient pas l'année ici. C'est la misére et la famine qui ont forcé les gens à se regrouper (Entrevue dans Duhaime, 1983, p.31).

This massive undertaking to get the Inuit to settle in federally-sponsored settlements was in sharp contrast to the position previously held by government agents and the RCMP. To the end of the 1940s and to a lesser extent into the early 1950s, the Inuit were forcefully discouraged from settling around the trading posts. In 1949, the infamous "Flour and Sugar Order" of Inukjuak was issued by the RCMP. This heavy handed directive was issued to discourage permanent settlement. The Inuit opposed this order and did not comply. The order stipulated that:

> Les allocations versées jusque là principalement en farine et en sucre, seront remplacées par des munitions, afin de les encourager à chasser davantage et à moins compter sur cette assistance. Ainsi est combattue la tendance à la sédentarité motivée par la hantise de la famine et de ses

> consequences, et par la relative sécurité d'un sac de farine comparée à l'incertitude d'une boîte de munitions (Ibid, p.33).

In 1953, it was reported that the Hudson's Bay Company in Kuujjuarapik would not sell building materials to the Inuit: "ne vend aucun matériau de construction, conformément aux instruction de l'administration fédérale" (Duhaime, 1983, p.33). This directive, issued by the federal government, was designed to discourage the Inuit from attempting to build year-round accommodation in the community.

The last recorded example of this policy was in 1957. By RCMP order, all non-working Inuit were told to leave the community of Inukjuak for the winter. In summer, when they were needed to unload the annual sea lift, they could come back to the settlement (Ibid, p.33). As there were no similar incidents in the communities that did not have an RCMP post, it is clear that the implementation of the settlement policy caused considerable confusion in the minds of the Inuit.

The federal government's support for the policy of sedentarisation of the Inuit population and its subsequent actions in establishing these capital projects, served notice that the federal government was firmly committing itself in Nouveau Québec. In ever increasing numbers throughout the later 1950s, the Inuit left the land and established permanent residences in the settlements. Between the years 1956 and 1963 eight settlements were assigned schools. Between 1960 and 1963

every settlement received a staffed nursing station. It has been suggested by Graburn (1969) and Bigué (1980) that schools played a major role in encouraging the Inuit into settlement living.

> L'instauration de l'école prend l'allure d'un facteur lourd dans l'ensemble de la region...le rapport annuel du ministere constatent un lien entre l'école et la progression de la sédentarité (DIAND, 1969, cited in Duhaime, 1983, p.38).

Aiding the NSOs were the teachers and nurses, who on a number of occasions told the people that they were "obligées d'envoyer leurs enfants a l'école, sans quoi elles ne recevraient pas les allocations familiales" (Duhaime, 1983, p.38).

The building program, aided by federal employees who encouraged the Inuit at every opportunity to live in the settlement, achieved the government's goal of settlement development by the early part of the 1960s. The presence and stature of the federal government in Nouveau Québec reached its zenith by this time. It remains to be seen how the provincial government would respond to this federal activity within its boundaries.

Provincial Government Presence in Nouveau Québec: Tardy or On Time?

It is apparent that the years between 1949 and 1963 were ones of intense federal activity in Nouveau Québec. However, the provincial government was able

to attack the federal government's education practices and policies as being pedagogically weak.

In the early 1960s, the Québec provincial government pointed to some federal education practices as being inhumane, unjust and undemocratic. A key issue was language. Jacques Rousseau, in his 1969 review of the Federal Day School system in Nouveau Québec, took the position that the federal government's language policy was motivated by the fact that everything the federal government did was for the English majority, even in communities where the Inuit were surrounded by French Canadians. An example of this would be the naming of geographical features in Nouveau Québec after English explorers such as Wakeham and Payne Bay. Furthermore, he suggested that since social relations were based on linguistic competence, the forced anglicization deprived the Inuit of employment opportunities in Québec and other francophone areas. Expanding this line of reasoning, he concluded that Native people living in Alberta and Ontario should learn English or the language of the provincial majority (Rousseau, 1969, p.6). At no time did he suggest that the Inuit or any other Native group be given a choice in the matter. Whether the provincial government and its school system would be any more enlightened, humane or democratic remains to be seen.

It must be noted that Québec was not unaware of its northernmost regions. The provincial government had carried out numerous geological and topographic surveys. The surveys, and high nickel prices brought on by the Korean War,

prompted Falconbridge Mines to open a mine at Raglan, south of Salluit. This venture provided some employment for the Inuit of the area. In 1958, the Québec government gave Murray Mining Corporation Ltd. title to a 20 million ton body of asbestos discovered at Asbestos Hill, 90 kilometres southeast of Salluit. At that time the ore was valued at $400 million (Jones, 1969, pp.98-105). Fully aware of the rich iron ore deposits in Nouveau Québec, the Québec government created the town of Schefferville[9] in 1954 (Zaslow, 1988, p.238).

Why then did the provincial government wait more than a decade after the federal government had become actively involved in Nouveau Québec, and nearly 50 years since the area had been transferred to the province before acting? Some of the plausible reasons suggested by Jacques Rousseau and Louis-Edmond Hamelin, who both defend Québec's lack of involvement, include the impact of two World Wars and the Depression. Under these conditions, Hamelin maintains, "provincial northern structures scarcely had a chance to become established prior to mid-century" (Hamelin, 1978, p.167). The research would suggest that the provincial government did not want to take on any added responsibility for the Inuit. This was certainly its position during the 1930s and little had happened to change that attitude to the end of the 1950s. The self-effacement on the part of Québec resulting in the Supreme Court ruling set the stage for Ottawa to play the

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9 The town of Schefferville is located south of Kuujjuaq but within the boundary of Nouveau Québec which has its southern boundary at the 55th parallel.

major role in the region. Other than the mining interests previously mentioned, the Québec government to the end of the 1950s had given no thought to the Inuit living in the area or the hydroelectric resources in Nouveau Québec.

A more pointed explanation for Québec's non-involvement is Kenneth Hare's thesis that the entire history of Nouveau Québec had been the pursuit of economic profit (Hare, cited in Cooke, 1964, p.170). In the main both Rousseau and Hamelin suggest that because of the economic problems caused by the Depression and two world wars Québec did not have the financial resources to establish itself in Nouveau Québec. Their position is revisionist history as they have chosen to overlook the position of the provincial government in the 1930s concerning the status of the Inuit. It must also be remembered that the federal government was equally, if not more so, burdened by the effects of the Depression and the Wars. Yet the federal government, although initially somewhat reluctant, found the will and resources to assume responsibility for the Inuit in Nouveau Québec. Therefore, I am more inclined to accept Hare's analysis that Québec's interest in the Inuit coincided with its desire to tap the wealth of the area's resources over the reasons suggested by Hamelin and Rousseau.

In 1960, Jean Lesage, former Federal Minister of Northern Affairs, was elected Premier of Québec. Lesage appointed René Lévesque as Minister of Natural Resources. Both men advocated that the province should develop its own northern policy. Knowing that the provincial government needed more information

on the region, Le Centre d'études nordiques de l'Université Laval was created in 1961 by ministerial order and with government funding (Marcil, 1981, pp.25-27). In the next few years such people as Michel Brochu, Jacques Rousseau, Benoit Robitaille would come to teach at the Centre under Louis-Edmond Hamelin who was appointed Director (Ibid, p.26). During the 1960s this group would enjoy considerable influence with the provincial government. The Direction Générale du Nouveau Québec (DGNQ) was created in 1963 to coordinate all government activity in Nouveau Québec. The DGNQ had the following mandate:

> a) To ensure an appropriate Québec presence in the territory of Québec (sovereignty);[10]
> b) To place at the disposal of the inhabitants of Nouveau Québec services of the same type as those already provided for other citizens of Québec and to encourage their cultural and linguistic survival;
> c) To establish the conditions and the schedule for Ottawa's withdrawal from a field of activity constitutionally reserved for the provinces (Hamelin, 1978, p.168).

One of the first actions of the DGNQ was to construct schools at Kangirsujuaq and Kuujjuaq in 1963 (Kativik School Board Annual Report, 1978-1985, p.6). A detailed examination of the DGNQ and the provincial school system will be given in the next chapter.

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10 The word sovereignty is found in the original text as supplied by Hamelin.

Conclusion

The three reports reviewed in this chapter became the founding directional documents for the federal day school system which made its first appearance in Nouveau Québec in 1949 and which continued to expand until 1963. The focus of the federal curriculum was to make the Inuit productive and responsible citizens. The methods used in the school ranged from benign integration, which left room for some cultural content in the curriculum, to a policy of comprehensive "cultural replacement." The ethnocentric views found in the reports coupled with the lack of effort and vision to safeguard and perhaps enhance the values, beliefs and traditions of the Inuit through schooling, would become the rallying point for the Québec provincial governments of the 1960s, which were responding to a tide of growing nationalism. Zaslow (1988) states that during the early 1960s the provincial government became committed to the view that "strengthening the French fact [in Nouveau Québec] was of great importance" (p.258).

While the federal government was perhaps embarrassed into action in Nouveau Québec, once it decided to act it did so with alacrity. The Supreme Court ruling of 1939 established the legal basis for the wide range of federal initiatives in Nouveau Québec. The argument that the federal programs constituted an incursion into provincial jurisdiction was muted by the reluctance of the provincial government to do anything in the area throughout the 1940s and 1950s. In response to obvious human and social needs the federal government used its

resources to establish a network of schools and health facilities that for their time were modern and suitably equipped. There is no doubt that the nursing stations and the annual visits of the C.D.Howe with its team of doctors and other medical personnel did much to improve the health and general condition of many Inuit. In 1951, the average life expectancy of a Nouveau Québec Inuit was 35 years as opposed to 69 years for the general population. By 1971 it had increased to 59 years in contrast to 73 years for the general Canadian population (Robitaille and Choinière, 1985, p.23). Furthermore, serious consideration was given by the federal government to the economic future of the Nouveau Québec Inuit. If some of the initiatives put forward were unsuccessful it was not from lack of effort. On balance it should be considered that the federal government did all of this with little to gain financially, as there was never any doubt that the mineral and hydroelectric resources of Nouveau Québec were firmly in the hands of the provincial government. One interesting result of the relationship between the federal government and the Inuit was that they came to regard the federal government as the "big government" and the provincial government as the "guvamaapik" or "little government." This perception would prove significant in the years ahead as the Inuit would have to choose between the two levels of government for the delivery of social services. According to Hamelin, in the eyes of the Inuit, Québec was seen as being not in the same league as Ottawa (Hamelin, 1978, pp.175-185).

By 1963 the DGNQ, which reported to René Lévesque directly, had been established and given a specific mandate to negotiate a federal withdrawal from Nouveau Québec. Furthermo[illegible]o provincial schools had been opened and the Québec Provincial Police [illegible]ow established in Kuujjuaq and Kuujjuarapik. Hamelin (1978) stated that at that time the province was working hurriedly to recruit administrators and staff who had some northern experience (p.172). Once organized, the provincial government would make its presence felt and mount a serious and ultimately successful challenge to federal institutions in Nouveau Québec.

Chapter IV

Concurrent Services: The Conflict Era 1964-1976

The federal initiatives had started as a result of discoveries of natural resource wealth and a desire to integrate the Inuit into Canadian society. Through education and vocational training it was hoped that the Inuit would have a meaningful role in the development of the post-war Arctic region. As previously mentioned, between 1949 and 1963 the federal government built 10 schools and nursing stations in Nouveau Québec. On its part, the provincial government had built two schools and set up five small administrative offices between the years 1961 to 1963.

The development and implementation of federal programs in the North was sustained by both Liberal and Conservative federal governments between 1949-1963. John Diefenbaker launched the 1958 election campaign by proclaiming his "Northern Vision." He believed that northern development was a national duty and that its theme was "unifying rather than disruptive" (Zaslow, 1988, pp.332-333). Furthermore, Diefenbaker believed that northern development would improve the living conditions of the North's inhabitants and place them on a more equal footing with other Canadians (Ibid, p.333). Thus, after-school training programs, middle-size local schools and vocational schools were established at northern regional

centres such as Churchill and Kuujjuarapik (Ibid, p.282). By 1963, federal activity in Nouveau Québec was at its peak.

The election victory of the provincial Liberals in 1960 signalled the dawn of a new era in federal-provincial relations in Nouveau Québec, when Jean Lesage became Premier and René Lévesque Minister of Natural Resources. Since both men advocated the development of a Northern Québec policy, their vision of a new secular Québec was to set the province on an ambitious course that would bring it into sharp conflict with Ottawa. One battleground for this conflict would be Nouveau Québec; the issues would be education, social services and sovereignty. Caught in the middle of this conflict were the Inuit. It is fair to say that until 1964 the decisions taken in the region which affected the lives of the Inuit were taken without their consultation. This subordinate position would dramatically change over the next thirteen years.

This chapter will cover the years 1964 to 1976. The Québec Annual Report for 1964, prepared by the Statistical Services Branch as the primary report to the National Assembly, signalled a change. The report was unique in that each chapter describing a service of government started with a focus on Nouveau Québec. Every aspect of life and social organization in Nouveau Québec was examined. The message from the provincial government to the people of Québec was very clear. The province was going to make a concerted effort to establish its

sovereignty in Nouveau Québec. Given the solid presence of the federal government in the region a conflict was inevitable

By 1976, the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA) had been ratified. It was the first "comprehensive land claim" settled in Canada.[1] The provisions of the agreement would drastically redefine the relationship between the Inuit and the two levels of government.

The aims of this chapter are fivefold. Firstly the socio- political climate of the time will be reviewed. During these years the province redefined the role of the French language in Québec society and its relationship with the Inuit. Secondly, the creation of the Direction Générale du Nouveau Québec (DGNQ) and the Commission Scolaire du Nouveau Québec (CSNQ) will be examined. During the 1960s and 1970s it was through education that the province hoped to establish the French language and culture in the lives of all minorities including the Nouveau Québec Inuit. Of specific interest will be the recommendations concerning cross-cultural education contained in the Parent and Gendron Commission Reports. Thirdly, the difficulties encountered by the provincial government in implementing

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1 Prior to 1973 the federal government took the position that aboriginal title did not exist as a concept in Canadian common law. The Supreme Court decision in "Calder" which established that aboriginal title did exist in common law caused the government to reverse its position and to issue a formal policy to govern an out of court process for negotiating the settlement claims based upon unextinguished aboriginal title. Such claims have been termed "comprehensive claims" because settlement agreements are expected to deal with a wide range of issues from land entitlement to wildlife management (Moss, 1989, pp.1-21).

policy in the areas of education and social services for Nouveau Québec will be examined. Fourthly, the rise of the Inuit control movement will be examined. In this regard the birth of the Northern Québec Inuit Association (NQIA) and its subsequent role during the JBNQA negotiations will be reviewed (See Map, Lands Regime, p.99).[2] Until the JBNQA was signed the NQIA served as the official voice of Inuit political opinion in Nouveau Québec. Fifthly, the creation of the Kativik School Board will be discussed.[3] A comprehensive review of the Board's activities from 1977 to 1991 will be the main feature of the following chapter.

Socio-Political Environment of Québec: Looking North From Québec City

During Premier Maurice Duplessis' time in office he refused many federal initiatives. He took no federal money on the province's behalf for the construction of the Trans Canada Highway or for health insurance. However, because of its popularity, he did not oppose the introduction of the family allowance in 1945. He took the position that it undercut the role of the male in the French Canadian family and that it was once again an intrusion by the federal government into an area of provincial authority. Duplessis tolerated the allowance system only because he

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2 Inuit Tunavingat Nunamini was formed to express opposition opinion to the James Bay Agreement. Its supporters were located in Povungnituk, Ivujivik and to a lesser extent in Salluit.

3 The Kativik School Board was established in Chapter 17 of the Agreement.



CATEGORY I, II, III LANDS ACCORDING TO THE JBNQA AND THE NEQA

	NASKAPI COMMUNITY includes	CREES COMMUNITIES include	INUIT COMMUNITIES include
I	■ IAN, IBN	■ IA, IB, special IB	■ I, special I
II	■ II N	■ II	■ II
III	□ category III lands		
	not delimited (dissident communities)		

11

LANDS REGIME

FIGURE 3

- the JBNQA and the NEQA territory limit
- James Bay municipality limit
- 55 th parallel limit (inuit administration to the north)

CHISASIBI • native locality

QUÉBEC non-native locality

Fort-George category land toponymie

Source: La répartition des terres selon la Convention de la Baie-James et du Nord québécois et la Convention du Nord Est québécois, Ministère de l'Energie et des Ressources, Service de la Cartographie, Québec, 1980, carte 1 : 2 000 000

hoped that it would induce women to leave the labour market and resume their traditional role in the home - thus providing more job openings for men (Trofimenkoff, 1982, pp.264-271).

Although Duplessis was concerned about federal activities in the province, he was content to let federal authorities administer to the needs of the Nouveau Québec Inuit. In a review of history texts on the Duplessis era by Robert Rumilly, Pierre Laporte, Leslie Roberts and Conrad Black it is of interest to note that none of the authors indicate any interest on the part of the Duplessis government in Nouveau Québec nor concern about the federal presence in the region.[4]

For many Québécois politicians, fighting with Ottawa was good politics. Those in favour of increased provincial autonomy supported such conflicts. This style of government continued after Duplessis' death in 1959.

Family allowances for the Inuit were directly tied to school attendance. This universal plan did not come with the same freedom to spend that other Canadian parents enjoyed. Inuit spending of family allowance money was restricted: "the Eskimos are not free to purchase any item they please; they must make purchases from prescribed lists which are prepared, having in mind the basic needs of children" (Clancy, 1987, p.192; Dept.of National Health and Welfare, 1949-50, p.100).

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4 Duplessis was in power from 1936 to 1939 and again from 1944 to 1959.

At the turn of the decade the newly elected Liberal provincial government looked northward. To demonstrate that its interest in Nouveau Québec was more than just another squabble with Ottawa, the provincial cabinet voted to fund the creation of the Le Centre d'Études Nordique (CEN) at Laval University in 1961.[5]

This extraordinary action was deemed necessary because the provincial government felt that it did not know the area very well. If the government was to pursue a more active presence in Nouveau Québec, it would have to be better informed. In Québec until the early 1960s "chez les francophones, le Nord soulève toujours l'hilarité" (Marcil, 1981, p.25). Hamelin, quoted in Marcil, said "le Nord était en effet ignoré et ridiculisé" (Ibid, p.26). The early mandate of the CEN was "les recherches ont porté principalement sur les sciences physique;" however, this expanded to include "une orientation en science humaines avec l'engagement d'anthropologues" (Ibid, pp.26-27). Furthermore, Hamelin stated that the provincial government soon realized that its planning and information needs would quickly exceed the capabilities of the CEN (Hamelin, 1978, pp.167-168). A more powerful government agency was needed. As previously noted, this led to the creation of the Direction Générale du Nouveau Québec in 1963.

Lévesque's decision to proceed along these lines was no doubt reinforced by his trip to Kuujjuaq in late 1961. Lévesque was upset by the high degree of

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[5] A teaching chair in northern studies had been established by McGill University in the late 1940s for Arctic specialists such as Vilhjalmur Stefansson (Marcil, 1981, p.25).

anglicization of the Inuit in Kuujjuaq: "il fut trés frappé par le haut degré d'anglicisation des Inuit et résolut d'adopter une série de mesures pour, si possible, faire échec à ce phénomène (Rouland, 1978, p.19).

Rouland stated that as a result of this trip, Lévesque became determined to replace the federal anglophone government presence in Nouveau Québec. Lévesque's trip also led to the notorious "turkey story." Both Senator Charlie Watt and Mrs. Madge (May) Pomerleau[6] who were Inuit teenagers living in Kuujjuaq at the time said that they were present when Lévesque made his visit. Lévesque was accompanied by provincial officials. Lévesque and his entourage toured the Kuujjuaq settlement handing out turkeys to the Inuit telling them that they would never go hungry again if they let the provincial officials take care of them instead of federal authorities.[7] The Inuit thought that this was all quite hilarious.

In 1962, a group of ten provincial researchers was sent to Kuujjauq to study the feasibility of transferring administrative services from the federal to the provincial government (Daignault, 1981, p.128). In the same year the l'Office de la langue Francaise (OLF) was created to oversee the francisation of geographical names throughout the province and in particular in Nouveau Québec.

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6 Mrs. Pomerleau's father was a Hudson's Bay Company employee in Kuujjuaq during the 1940s, 50s and 60s.

7 In 1955 the federal government had sponsored a chicken farm run by Sammy Snowball in Kuujjuaq. It was said, although not confirmed in the literature, that Lévesque told the Inuit that the turkeys were in fact large Québec chickens.

In 1963, Lévesque appointed Eric Gourdeau to head the newly created Direction Générale du Nouveau Québec (DGNQ). The Parent Commission of 1967 stated that the Nouveau Québec administration was made up of "personnel thoroughly familiar with the problems of the Far North and of the Eskimo people" (Parent, 1967, p.128). Hamelin challenged this statement directly. He maintained that part of the reason for the bungling of policy implementation in Nouveau Québec was that the DGNQ was not as successful as it claimed in recruiting competent field personnel. Hamelin stated: "The people of Québec were not prepared for doing their northern thing and hence Québec did not possess the advantage of a pool of competent northern personnel (Hamelin, 1978, p.172). Hamelin further maintained that the DGNQ caused problems for the provincial government because its actions were not directed by cabinet but by ministerial order. This led to considerable confusion between government departments in the field.

One of the first projects of the DGNQ and the OLF was to implement a decree of the Minister of Lands and Forests to rename all geographical places in Nouveau Québec. This was part of an "encompassing three phase program to establish the French fact and presence in the region" (Müller-Wille, 1983, p.140). With total disregard for Inuit place names the decree stipulated "...de changer entierément la toponymie de cette immense région québécoise dont les richesses

naturelles commenceent à peine d'être exploitées" (Brochu, 1962, p.125, cited in Müller-Wille, 1983, p.140).

Québec's reluctance to become involved in its northern regions had left place naming "to the federal, anglophone oriented government" (Ibid, pp.139-140).[8] Québec was now determined to remedy this situation. Accordingly, the first phase called for either the translation of English names (such as Leaf Bay to Baie aux Feuilles) or the "embroidering of some Inuit names with religious connotations, such as Quartaq with Notre Dame de Quartaq, which embarrassingly had to be rectified" (Ibid, p.140). Although Müller-Wille does not elaborate as to why the religious names were dropped, I suspect that given the desire to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church in the province using such names would have been inconsistent. Furthermore, using Catholic names for communities that were predominantly Anglican would have raised concerns among the Inuit.

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8 Phase Two of the francisation program began in 1977 once Bills 22 and 101 were in place. Inuit place names were to be considered an integral part of Québec's cultural and political sovereignty. At this time Native toponyms were to be treated as cultural assets. However, it took considerable pressure by Inuit communities to have their own settlement names re-established as the official names. Phase three was made possible only with the JBNQA. The Avataq Cultural Institute was directed by the provincial government to establish the official Inuit place names for the entire Nouveau Québec region (Müller-Wille, 1983, pp.140-141).

Major Reforms in Education

In the area of education, major reconstruction was taking place. Until 1963, provincial schools in Québec had been parochial both under Catholic and Protestant control. The provincial government took the position that the power and influence of these religious groups had to be neutralized in a more secular Québec. In 1963 in a daring move, Lesage appointed the respected cleric Monseigneur Alphonse Marie Parent, vice-rector of Laval University, to head a commission to examine all aspects of education in the province.

The Commission report argued for a modernization "of the old department of public instruction, independent of all political authority since the 1870s" (Trofimenkoff, 1982, p.302). Parent recommended a streamlining of the education system to match the North American pattern in terms of length of studies and accessibility. It also recommended that education should be administered by a secular authority. In the name of "modernity, science and technology, of urbanization and the mass media and of the enlarged role of women" Parent argued that "...only the state had the resources to undertake the task" (Trofimenkoff, 1982, p.302). While Parent was still writing the report, the Lesage government introduced Bill 60, which called for the creation of a Department of Education. The bill was severely attacked on the grounds that there would be political interference in education and that this new government department would bring added cost to the taxpayer. In response to the protests the bill was

temporarily withdrawn. Trofimenkoff stated that Lesage and Paul Gérin-Lajoie, the first Minister of Education "intended to have their way" (p.302). As a compromise the government incorporated the Commission's recommendation that a Superior Council of Education be established with representation from the Catholic Church as well as Protestant denominations. The schools would not be secular, but they would be run by the state. Gérin-Lajoie said "that the creation of the Council was the result of a compromise between opposing ideological tendencies which had clashed during the debate" (Trofimenkoff, 1982, p.302). The Commission also called for the school leaving age to be raised to sixteen and free access to all secondary schools and the new junior colleges

Hydro Québec and the Expansion of the Provincial Government

Another major piece of legislation of significance to this study was the nationalization of all privately owned provincial electric companies under Hydro Québec. This ambitious plan became the symbol of a rejuvenated Québec. At the risk of losing office, the provincial Liberals fought and won the 1963 election on this issue. Lesage claimed that this project was the key to Québec's economic future and that it would put an end to "economic colonialism." In a speech written for him by Claude Morin, Lesage said that Québecers would now be "maîtres chez nous" (Trofimenkoff, 1982, p.306). The magnitude of social reconstruction taking place at that time can be seen by the growth of government and its budget:

> In six years the Lesage ministry tripled the provincial budget. And the major recipients of government largesse were health, welfare and education whose portion of the budget increased from thirty-five percent in 1960 to sixty-eight percent in 1965 (Ibid, p.307).

Included in the expansion of the provincial government was the creation of the Ministry for Inter-Governmental Affairs[9] as well as the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. The provincial government also moved to take over federal responsibilities in the areas of pensions, family allowances, manpower and immigration.

The desire to take over responsibility for these areas did not imply a complete severing of ties with Ottawa. The Québec government wanted to manage the funds internally and to be compensated for assuming responsibility in these areas. This brand of economic nationalism implied provincial authority with federal financial support at arm's length.

Internal forces were also having an effect on provincial-federal relations. The rise of violent separatist groups and hardline nationalists in Québec in the early 1960s made Ottawa cautious in its dealings with the provincial government. In 1963 "homemade bombs struck military targets and then boxes of the Royal Mail in the upperclass and largely English Montreal suburb of Westmount" (Trofimenkoff, 1982, p.312). Fanning the nationalist flame were the virulent writings

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9 This portfolio was responsible for negotiations between the federal and provincial governments.

of Michel Brochu. Hired as a federal geographer he spent a short period in Nouveau Québec doing cartographic work. In 1963 he joined the faculty at the Centre d'Études Nordiques (Marcil, 1981, p.25). As one might expect, after many years of a federal anglophone administration, there were not many francophones or French-speaking Inuit in Nouveau Québec. This enraged Brochu. He found the anglophone federal employees firmly entrenched throughout the communities of Nouveau Québec and English the sole language of administration and instruction. With Inutitut forbidden in the federal schools Brochu concluded that the aim of the federal system was acculturation and "génocide":

> Un génocide avèré était en voie d'être perpetré sur le territoire québécoise, en outre la moitié nord du Québec, ou déjà, sur le point d'être administrée dans le domain des écoles et de la santé par des fonctionnaires d'un gouvernement autre que celui du Québec et, naturellement, dans un langue autre que celle de la grande majorité des québécois (Brochu, 1962, p.219).

Through his association with the CEN Brochu had access to provincial government members. Initially, Brochu had little success in getting Lesage to listen to his concerns. Although concerned with the situation in Nouveau Québec, Lesage was in a difficult position for two reasons. Firstly, he was very much preoccupied with the massive social reconstruction process taking place in southern Québec. Lévesque was in the process of nationalizing all privately owned

hydroelectric companies into the provincially-owned Hydro Québec (Provencher, 1974, p.174). Financing the major social reforms in the south was a higher priority than those reforms that had been proposed for Nouveau Québec. Secondly, as suggested by Moodie, and perhaps more politically embarrassing, was the fact that it was Lesage himself who was responsible for the policies and conditions then in effect in Nouveau Québec. As the Federal Minister of Northern Affairs from 1953 to 1957 he had implemented many of the policies Brochu was railing against. To attack them would be to question his own work.

Believing that Lesage was not going to act on the matter, Brochu directed his efforts to others within the cabinet. He found a ready and willing ally in René Lévesque. With Lévesque's support Brochu aroused much public sympathy for his cause. By 1964, sensing the shifting political importance of the issue, Lesage reversed his position and backed reforms that were directed at asserting provincial sovereignty in Nouveau Québec (Moodie, 1975, pp.51-52).

This was not the only time during his stay in office that Lesage changed his position on major issues after reconsidering the political climate. Trofimenkoff stated that when first presented with the plan to nationalize the hydroelectric companies "he had stamped 'JAMAIS' on the dossier" (Trofimenkoff, 1982, p.305). Guy Rocher, who was a member of the Parent Commission, wrote "Jean Lesage n'a pas été le leader de la reforme de l'enseignement. Je crois qu'il l'a acceptée, parfois a contrecoeur" (Rocher, 1989, p.168). Trofimenkoff also stated that Lesage

"stamped 'Jamais' " on the Education dossier which suggested that a genuine Ministry of Education control all the administrative, financial, and pedagogical aspects of schooling as well (p.302).

Rocher informs us that it was the force of will of Paul Gérin-Lajoie that brought about the dramatic overhaul of the education system. Given the temperament of René Lévesque, coupled with his Kuujjuaq experience and his success with the hydroelectric nationalization program, it is reasonable to suggest that his force of will carried the day on the issue of expanding Québec sovereignty in Nouveau Québec. As evidence of this, the mandate of the DGNQ speaks for itself. To legitimize the provincial challenge, the Supreme Court ruling of 1939 was given special scrutiny by Québec officials.

By the mid-1960s the provincial government cited the federal government's failure to enact special legislation after the court ruling which had established that the Inuit were to be included in Section 91 (24) of the BNA Act. As a result, the provincial government argued that the federal government had abdicated its rights and responsibilities for the Inuit in the province. Since no special legislation had been passed by the early 1960s to establish federal responsibility for the Inuit, Québec argued that the Inuit were in fact full citizens and as such came under provincial jurisdiction with regards to education and social services (Rousseau, 1969, pp.6-7). At this time there was no official Inuit position on the matter of jurisdictional authority. However, according to Senator Charlie Watt, the Inuit people felt that it

had been the federal and not the provincial government that had looked after their welfare. Although the issue of jurisdiction was once again being actively discussed, neither level of government consulted the Inuit to learn their views on whether they preferred federal or provincial services.

The position of the federal government was that the Inuit enjoyed all the benefits of "full citizenship." This made them "eligible for old age pensions, baby bonuses and disability pensions as well as the pleasure of paying income tax " (McAlpine, 1961, p.30). The federal recognition of "full citizenship" status for the Inuit also served to augment Québec's contention that as "full citizens" the Inuit were a provincial responsibility.

Nationalist writers such as Brochu accused Ottawa of committing genocide in insisting on English-only instruction in Inuit schools. Fuelled by the cultural nationalism that arose during the "maîtres chez nous" era the French and Inutitut languages became the rallying point for Québec's northern planners.

In southern Québec schools integration was the key word. All immigrants were to be assimilated into the mainstream of Québec society. Given the francophone majority of the province, the question of language of instruction was the focal point of numerous language laws. The first of two language laws passed in the late 1960s and early 1970s was Bill 63. This 1969 Union National bill had no effect on the schools in Nouveau Québec. The salient feature of the bill was that it guaranteed freedom of choice in regard to language of instruction. The

government came under severe criticism on the grounds that the bill did not go far enough to protect the French language or to actively integrate non-francophones into Québec society. Bill 22, which became law in 1974, attempted to impose some restrictions on access to an English education. The law called for language testing.[10] A child had to pass an English proficiency exam in order to receive instruction in the English language. Bill 22 was not enforced at either the federal or CSNQ schools.[11] The focus of Bill 22 was directed more at immigrant children than towards the Inuit. However, with the passage of Bill 101 in 1977, the threat of integration was extended to include the Inuit. The Inuit response to this Bill will be reviewed in the next chapter.

The early 1960s were a time of rapid growth and expansion in provincial government programs. The ambitious plans for social reconstruction included initiatives in the provincial economy as well as in the area of education. The major reorganization of hydroelectric resources would bring the provincial government

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10 When asked about the impact of Bill 22 on the Inuit Judd Buchanan, Minister of Indian Affairs replied, "his government could not do much. It was up to the Inuit and Québec government to work things out" (Taqralik, July, 1976, pp.21-22).

11 The first of three language laws passed during this time period was Bill 63 adopted in 1969 by the Union National government which guaranteed freedom of choice in regards to language of instruction for all students. Bill 22 introduced in 1974 repealed freedom of choice. Bill 101 adopted in 1977 was more wide-sweeping in its reforms. The right to an English education was now severely restricted. A child would be allowed to enroll for English instruction only if one parent had received schooling in that language.

into direct contact with the Inuit. A result of this contact with the Inuit was that the province moved to implement many of the recommendations it received from the Parent Commission concerning education in Nouveau Québec. This time it was the provincial government which formulated its education policies with little regard for Inuit educational desires and without consultation. In the context of education, the assimilative goals of the English language federal policy were about to be challenged and replaced by an equivalent French provincial policy.

The Parent and Gendron Commissions: Recommendations Concerning the DGNQ/CSNQ Provincial School System

During the 1960s and 1970 the provincial government established two commissions to make recommendations on education and language policy. The Parent (1967) and Gendron Commissions (1972) both contained sections on education in Nouveau Québec with reference to the DGNQ/CSNQ school system. The recommendations pertaining to education in Nouveau Québec are reviewed in the next two sections.

The Parent Commission Recommendations

As previously mentioned the first provincial schools in Nouveau Québec commenced operation in 1963 under the authority of the Direction Générale du Nouveau Québec. It is interesting to note that the Parent Commission

recommended that the Nouveau Québec schools remain the responsibility of the Department of Natural Resources on the understanding that it would report on its activities to the newly formed Department of Education (Parent, 1967, p.128). The Parent Commission reported that since the DGNQ possessed personnel "thoroughly familiar with the problems of the Eskimo people...it would be needlessly burdensome and certainly less effective to set up a specialized service for Eskimo education in the Department of Education" (Ibid, p,128). Furthermore the Commission recommended the continued use of Inutitut as the language of instruction for kindergarten to grade two followed by a choice of English or French as the language of instruction for grade three and beyond. This was seen as an improvement over the federal system where the Inuit had been "exclusively subjected to English cultural influences" (Parent, 1967, p.129). The Commission acknowledged that the language issue would "give rise to a delicate religious problem, since the great majority of the Eskimos are Anglican" (Ibid, p.129). To avoid unwanted conflict provincial schools were warned to "respect religious freedom, and avoid taking advantage of this situation to indulge in religious proselytism" (Ibid, p.129). The report directly cautioned Anglican missionaries to respect the preferences of their parishioners for French. With respect to religious instruction, each community could hire the religion teachers of their denomination. The overall thrust of the education program envisioned for Inuit students was one that:

> intended to develop in them knowledge of their region as well as to cultivate their great manual dexterity, imparting to them some appreciation of local fauna, meteorology, geography, biology, geology, hygiene and domestic economy. Such Instruction, however, is difficult to organize for it must be adapted to the needs and living conditions of the Eskimos (Parent, 1967, p.129).

The Parent Commission also recommended that teachers wishing to teach in Nouveau Québec should prepare themselves by "attending lectures and seminars or properly supervised reading courses' (Ibid, p.130). The Commission also called for a greater role for parents as a buttress against continued paternalism. The Commission expressed the opinion that under the federal administrative system Inuit parents had no say in the decisions that affected their children. In the federal schools, parent committees did not exist. The school principal had full authority over school operations and the children. For education to be successful parental input was seen as a vital. In the provincial system the Commission was very emphatic on the role it envisioned for parents:

> Paternalism must be avoided, and in order to do this parents must be associated as closely as possible with educational efforts. The school committees of which we shall propose the establishment should afford them an opportunity to share directly in the school management and to intensify their new interest in the education of their children

> as well as in their own self-improvement
> (Parent, 1967, p.131).

Lastly, the Commission recommended that the DGNQ/CSNQ be given the "means necessary to continue the pedagogical experiments presently under way among Eskimo children" (Ibid, p.132).

The Gendron Commission Recommendations

The Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language Rights in Québec, chaired by Laval University linguist Jean-Denis Gendron, (The Gendron Commission 1972) undertook as part of its mandate a review of the education system in operation in Nouveau Québec. In reviewing the DGNQ/CSNQ school system, the Gendron Commission found that the guiding principle of offering instruction in Inutitut stemmed from the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Committee (UNESCO) recommendations on education which considered the sudden rupture between the cultural milieu of the family and the school as harmful in acquiring a second language (Gendron, 1972, p.431). The Commission reiterated the recommendation that instruction be in Inutitut only for the first three years of schooling with a choice of English or French as the language of instruction thereafter. The Commission also advocated Inutitut language classes from grades four through eleven. The Commission advised that "a qualified teaching body be developed as far as possible from among members

of the same ethnic origin [Inuit] and that text-books in the corresponding ethnic language be used" (Ibid, p.436). The Commission also urged that "all bias and defamatory or discriminatory references concerning Eskimo culture be removed from history books" (Ibid, p.437). In the area of municipal government, the Commission suggested that the "Eskimos set up their own municipal councils and that these councils be legally recognized by the Québec Government" (Ibid, p. 437). Lastly, the Commission advocated that "French Canadian officials working in areas inhabited by Indians and Eskimos provide their professional services in French" (Ibid, p.437). It was hoped that in time the Inuit would come to see the economic advantages in learning French. Furthermore, provincial authorities hoped that a school system designed around these principles would lead to the closing down of the federal school system.

To its credit, the provincial school system adopted all of the Gendron Commission's educational recommendations. The offer of Inutitut instruction for the first three years of schooling was a dramatic departure from federal educational policy. Although the role of the parents committee was strictly advisory and did not contribute much to such matters as curriculum development and hiring, the concept of parental input and influence had been introduced and would subsequently become more significant. However, despite the provincial government's desire to follow the recommendations of the Commission report, the

provincial administration failed to successfully implement many of its recommendations.

Nouveau Québec Policy: Problems With Implementation

The long term goal of the provincial school system in 1963 was to replace the English federal school system. The provincial government was concerned that the federal education policies had introduced into Nouveau Québec a "homogeneous Canadianization approach...and a 'national' rather than a Québec structure, [as well as] the English language in preference to the Amerindian or French tongues" (Hamelin, 1978, p.176). From the very start the provincial government failed to clearly outline its plan for comprehensive educational and social reform in Nouveau Québec. Hamelin stated that the problems of implementation were further complicated because major statements concerning the region were being made by government employees rather than at the cabinet level. Hamelin quoted an unidentified source as saying: "The (Québec) Department of Natural Resources is preparing to take in hand the administration of Ungava, which is at present controlled by federal officials." Hamelin also quoted a highly placed Québec civil servant as saying: "We will have the Eskimo" (Hamelin, 1978, p.169). When such statements were not refuted by Lesage or René Lévesque, minister responsible for the area, federal officials wondered if these views were not the true objectives of the province. Past experience had taught federal authorities

to be concerned about such statements. When Lévesque announced his hydroelectric nationalization plan to the media before having cabinet approval, Lesage took the position that Lévesque was stating his personal opinion. However, this turned out not to be the case. As a result of these poorly timed announcements and the distrust they caused, the first round of Ottawa-Québec discussions concerning the transfer of federal responsibilities in Nouveau Québec was very tense. Hamelin stated that by the time Québec got to the bargaining table it had antagonized:

> The Northwest Territories, which ran the risk of losing certain islands; federal civil servants, who were in danger of losing their jobs; the pilots, who were in danger of losing the names of landmarks which had been known around the world for centuries; the Inuit who were disturbed by the French language; the Anglican Church, which was afraid of the Catholics; Newfoundland, which was threatened with losing Labrador; and the federal government which would lose its jurisdiction (Hamelin, 1978, p.169).

By the end of the 1960s, after three rounds of federal-provincial negotiations, the Federal/Provincial Joint Administration Commission[12] had reached a deadlock. Québec's objective had shifted from "withdrawal of Ottawa

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12 The Commission members were F.J. Neville (federal), Benoît Robitaille (DGNQ), Rev. Jimmy Clark (Anglican Church), Fr. Robert Lechat (Catholic Church) and Jean-Jacques Simard, Secretary. Clark and Lechat served as interpreters for the Commission (Therrien, 1979, p.7).

from provincial matters, to the provision of federal sources of revenue equivalent to a withdrawal" (Hamelin, 1978, p.178). Hamelin contended that Ottawa's intransigent position was caused by its fear of the rise of the independence movement. The fact that by 1967 René Lévesque was leading the movement did not sit well with federal authorities. The federal actions taken during the October Crisis of 1970 also contributed to a further polarization of the federal and provincial positions. In this context the reluctance of the federal government to cede authority to Québec is quite understandable. Another major impediment to the two levels of government in reaching an agreement centred on the notion of consultation. The provincial position was that the transfer of federal to provincial authority would take place regardless of what were the results of consultation with the Inuit. The federal position was to provide federal services as long as they were in demand by the Inuit (Moodie, 1975, pp.75-78).

By the early 1970s the federal and provincial governments were once again back at the bargaining table. This time the Inuit were making themselves heard through their community council representatives. The Inuit's major concerns were language choice in education and administrative services; hunting and fishing rights; and the merchandising of soapstone carvings and other crafts. The solutions agreed upon included recognition of the rights of religion, language and culture. The Inuit would be given greater control over their own affairs with mandatory consultation to take place in the areas of housing, medical services and

economic development. It was agreed that some French would be taught in all schools and that the existing dual administration would become one. The Québec government would provide services in the name of the federal government. The timetable for the withdrawal would take ten years. While it appeared that a deal had been reached, Hamelin stated that this was not so:

> No matter what the results of the Commission, its orientation would not have changed the decisions of certain high level authorities in the South. For Québec, pseudo-consultation by way of the Commission was offered as a diversion: the members of the Commission could not have been unaware that the Inuit of Québec would clearly manifest their preference for the federal government in the imminent referendum concerning the government they desired (Ibid, pp.180-181).

As Rouland noted, the Inuit were not unaware that a jurisdictional battle was taking place. The brash manner in which provincial agents were conducting themselves did not instill confidence:

> L'absurdité practique de ces situations de duplication était évidente aux yeux de Inuit (ce qui les portait à considérer l'irruption brutals de Québec et de sa concurrence vis-à-vis du Fédéral comme un élément perturbateur) (Rouland, 1978, p.24).

As already stated, the provincial government had great difficulty implementing its northern sovereignty policies in Nouveau Québec, especially in

the areas of education and social services. The following discussion will specifically deal with these areas.

Implementation Problems in the Area of Education

Whether by design or just bad planning the provincial system failed to deliver on some of its pedagogical promises. By promising total Inutitut instruction in the first three grades and Inutitut language classes thereafter, the provincial government had to recruit and train Inuit as teachers. Professor Jack Cram informs us that:

> When the DGNQ/CSNQ decided to offer early schooling in [approximately 1968] Inutitut there were no trained Inuit teachers in northern Québec. Thirty-five competent but non-qualified Inuit, most of whom had been [former] Federal Classroom Assistants, were appointed (Cram, 1985, p.117).

The training plan required that instructors come from the south to teach the courses in the northern communities. Upon arrival it was soon discovered that most of these instructors, hired in haste from Laval University, spoke only French or limited English (Personal interview, Annie Alaku, May, 1991). The Inuit trainees, if they had a second language, spoke English learned at the federal day school or through contact with missionaries or traders. It was ironically and painfully obvious to the government that these courses would have to be taught in English.

As a result, the first few years of this training program were politically embarrassing. It was not until the early 1970s that this experimental teacher training program began to show more positive results. The Commission Scolaire de Nouveau Québec (CSNQ) which had been created in 1968 by Bill 67, assumed the program.[13] Under the auspices of McGill University the first official courses were offered in 1975 in Kuujjuaq (Ibid, p.118). It should be noted that the Minister of Education granted a "letter of tolerance" to those enrolled in the training program.[14] In this way these teacher trainees could legally teach in the classroom (Cram, 1985, p.117). When the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement was signed, the McGill/CSNQ training program was incorporated into the newly formed Kativik School Board. The promise to train Inuit teachers was one promise that the provincial government kept.

Despite the promise of a choice between English and French as the language of instruction for grades three and beyond, few English speaking teachers were hired. Annie Alaku, who was hired to teach in the CSNQ school in Salluit in the late 1960s, said that there were times when there were no children in

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13 Under Bill 67 the Commission Scolaire de Nouveau Québec was created in 1968. Its administrator took up his duties in April of 1970 and the CSNQ assumed operational responsibility in 1971 (Gendron Commission, 1972, p.432).

14 A Letter of Tolerance in Québec is equivalent to a Letter of Authority in Alberta.

the school beyond Grade Two where Inutitut instruction ceased.[15] As a result, some parents put their children in the provincial school for the first three years to take advantage of the benefits of Inutitut language instruction and then transferred them back to the federal school where they would be instructed in English. It is reasonable to suggest that one of the underlying factors for the Inuit resistance to the French language was the memory of the poor treatment they had received at the hands of Révillon Frères.[16] Furthermore, the French language was also associated with the Roman Catholic Oblates whose faith they never embraced.

Throughout the 1960s the provincial government's handling of Inuit education did little to instill confidence. As provincial governments changed, so did the education policy. Based on the recommendations of the Parent Commission the provincial Liberal government made promises in 1963 concerning the language of instruction which supported the use of Inutitut for the first three years of school and a choice of English or French for the remaining school grades. The Union National government, when elected in 1966, reneged on the promise when it insisted that French be taught in the provincial schools. The Union National

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15 Ms. Alaku first worked as a federal school teaching assistant in the early 1960s. She joined the CSNQ in the late 1960s and stayed in its employ until the operations of CSNQ were taken over by Kativik. With Kativik she has been a teacher, teacher training counsellor, centre director and principal.

16 The Federal Provincial Joint Administration Commission of 1970 stated "the Inuit reject Québec because it has a bad image. Rumours frequently invoked are those concerning the Paris based Révillon Frères (Commission Report in Hamelin, 1978, p.183).

government the reversed itself in 1969, with the passing of Bill 63 which guaranteed freedom of language choice. The uncertainty caused by the broken promises and the failure to successfully implement recommendations pertaining to instruction in English did not pass unnoticed by the Inuit.

As a result of the poor implementation of the language of instruction recommendations which promised a choice of English or French, the problem with the teacher training program and a growing mistrust of provincial policies Inuit parents were reluctant to enroll their children in CSNQ schools. In the 1971-72 school year, the federal schools enrolled (966) five times as many elementary students as the provincial schools (180) (DIAND, 1973, pp.101-102).

Implementation Problems in the Area of Social Services

Another example of the Inuit preference for federal services was in social aid. Under Bill 26, the provincial base payments for social welfare were higher than the federal plan. However, under the federal plan the base payment was supplemented by payments in the specific areas of groceries, clothing, shelter and special needs. Furthermore, the federal payments were calculated on a scale that acknowledged that it was more expensive to live in Salluit than Kuujjuaq. Allowances were divided into zones corresponding to the degree of isolation from southern service centres. Thus when all the different categories were calculated

into the payment, federal welfare cheques amounted to more money. (Ornstein, 1973, pp.216-217). As a result the Inuit registered with the federal agency.

In the area of health care the Gendron Commission was informed by Dr.M. Savoie that "[provincial] services are provided in English by a staff composed for the most part of bilingual French Canadians" (Gendron, 1972, p.428). It is apparent that after ten years of active provincial presence in Nouveau Québec, the Inuit still preferred all services, regardless of their source to be delivered in English.

As noted the Inuit were somewhat amused and perplexed by the rivalry between the two governments. Though promising better times ahead if the Inuit would submit to the designs of the provincial government, it can be demonstrated that provincial agents were often uncaring in their dealings with the Inuit. The stories of the following informants illustrate this position.

Thomassie Angotigirk lives in Salluit. He is an elder whose opinions are respected. In the late 1970s and early 1980s his son was the mayor of the community. In an interview for the NQIA submission to the Canadian Radio and Television Commission entitled Taqramiut, he told the story of wanting to improve his provincially supplied house. The house had three bedrooms and a common room which was used as kitchen, dining room and living room. The bathroom with the ubiquitous "honey bucket"[17] was merely a partition with no door and was

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17 The name honey bucket is used to identify a five gallon metal pail lined with green garbage bags which serves as an indoor toilet. The commercial chemical "Misto Van" is used as a disinfectant. The resulting aroma is less than pleasant.

adjacent to the kitchen. In an attempt to alleviate this unhealthy situation, he approached the DGNQ agent to ask permission to use the scrap materials left over from official work to build a proper bathroom. He was refused (Taqramiut, 1974, p.14).

Tumasie Kudluk, an elder from Kangirsuk, tells of being part of a delegation invited in 1972 to meet with Premier Robert Bourassa concerning the James Bay development project. Kudluk said that the "Big Boss" listened for a few minutes and then said "finished" and walked out of the meeting without saying a word. Kudluk had wanted, "to say to the Big Boss, why should white people live in light while the Inuit perish? I wanted to talk back and forth to him like men do. I'm still upset about that meeting" (Ibid, p.15).[18]

Lastly, on the issue of the federal-provincial conflict Padli Ilisituk, former President of the Salluit Community Council, said: "We sometimes think that it is the Inuit they are both after; both of them want to control us. We want to live in a situation where the white man does not dominate us" (Ibid, p,53).

Thus by 1974-75, the provincial government had not achieved its goal to replace the federal government in Nouveau Québec. A combination of historical factors beyond its control and poor planning had reinforced the notion that Québec was out of its depth. The poor credibility of the provincial government was

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[18] Harvey Feit 1980 also makes reference to this infamous meeting in which Premier Bourassa walked out on the Inuit delegation.

reflected in a nickname assigned to it by the Inuit, "guvamaapik" (little government). Hamelin stated that the federal government was the "big government" and that "Ottawa's superiority itself became a major argument in the choice which the indigenous peoples might be led to make as to their preferred government" (Hamelin, 1978, p.175). The continued Inuit preference for federal education services is seen in the statistics provided by DIAND on student enrollment for the 1974-75 school year. There were four times as many children in federal schools (1080 students) than in provincial schools (296 students) (Ministére des Affaires Indiennes et Esquimaudes, 1975, p.345).

It is interesting to note that though the provincial government had not made the rapid gains it desired in regards to government services, by 1974-75 the DGNQ was in operation in eleven communities.[19] To its credit the CSNQ was operating ten schools and a successful teacher training program. Though not completely successful in attracting students the CSNQ influenced the federal day schools with respect to their programs and organization. As a direct result of the innovative ideas suggested by the CSNQ, the federal system reconsidered its position on Inutitut instruction, parental involvement and language of instruction. Starting in 1973 the federal school system in Nouveau Québec moved to establish

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19 Of the eleven administrative posts established nine were established between the years 1963-1966. No new centres were established until the mid-1970s (Inuksiutiit, Laval University, 1974).

advisory parent committees. Inutitut language programs were also introduced in the same year.

In the early 1970s, the two competing school systems provided the Inuit with the opportunity to observe two ideologically similar, yet operationally different systems. The schools and parents' committees provided a training ground for a generation of Inuit politicians, administrators, teachers and support personnel. The talent and energy of these people would prove a valuable resource between 1971 and 1975.

However, before turning to a new chapter of Inuit education, the Inuit had to endure a four year period of intense negotiations that redefined their relationship with the two levels of government. The federal government had instituted community councils during the 1960s, but their views were as disparate as the communities themselves. Senator Watt stated that the community councils had no power and that they were controlled by the federal community administrator. Watt felt that this was unsatisfactory and that these councils did not and could not speak for the Inuit people (Personal interview, May, 1991). For the Inuit the desire to control their own destiny was perhaps prompted by the announcement of the "Projet du siècle" (Gourdeau, 1974, p.23).[20] As a voice for Inuit political opinion during the subsequent negotiations, the Northern Québec Inuit Association (NQIA)

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20 On April 30, 1971 Robert Bourassa announced the James Bay Project without any prior consultation with the Inuit or Cree of the affected region.

was created. Until this group was founded there was no unified Inuit voice. From 1971 to 1975 the Inuit would exercise power and to a large extent direct their own destiny for the first time.

Inuit Control: The Northern Québec Inuit Association

The White Paper of 1969, when released by the federal government proposed a radical shift in government policy towards Native Canadians. The federal government believed that its proposed policy was appropriate given the concerns that had been raised by Native groups about their relationship with the federal government. In a 1969 address to the Empire Club of Toronto, Jean Chrétien, Minister of Indian affairs, characterized the relationship between the federal government and Native groups as being both, "paternalistic and bureaucratic" (Speech by J. Chrétien, 1969, p.1). He went on to say that Indians and Inuit were entitled to the same rights and freedoms enjoyed by all Canadians.

Recommendations in the proposed policy called for the dismantling of the reserve system and an end to the unique relationship between Indians and the federal government. Furthermore, the proposals stated that the provinces should extend the same services to Indians that they extended to all provincial residents and that the federal government would transfer funds to help the provinces. The federal government planned to phase out the Department of Indian Affairs. The main thrust of the policy was so severely criticized by Indian people that it was

abandoned. Specifically in the area of education Indian leaders did not want the provinces to assume federal responsibilities. The Indian position was that any transfer of jurisdiction for Indian education could only be from the federal government to Indian Bands or to contracts for education services negotiated between Band Councils, provincial school jurisdictions and the federal government (National Indian Brotherhood, 1972, p.5). As previously stated, federal-provincial negotiations on this very topic regarding the Nouveau Québec Inuit were at a standstill. The need for Native organizations to speak out for themselves was underscored by this incident.

In 1969, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada was founded to speak for Inuit groups in the Northwest Territories. In Nouveau Québec, various Inuit leaders were coming to the foreground; Zebedee Nungak from Kangirsuk, Tommy Cain from Tasiujaq and Charlie Watt from Kuujjuaq. They not only questioned the role of the two governments in Nouveau Québec, they were also determined that the Inuit should have a stronger say in any matter affecting them. By 1970, the nucleus of the NQIA was coming together and the announcement of the James Bay Project in 1971 was the catalyst for its formation.

On the national scene discussions of aboriginal issues made constant references to local control. The term local control covered a wide range of meanings from consultation to outright autonomy. After the failure of the White

Paper, the federal government was forced to reconsider its relationship with all Native people.

In 1972 the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) released its policy paper on education entitled "Indian Control of Indian Education." In the report, the notion of control was extended beyond political control of education, such as school boards, to include control and development of curriculum. As it was through the curriculum that acculturation took place, control of the curriculum was vital. Under the provisions of the report "Indian culture, dance, music, handicrafts and language" would be taught in the school (NIB, 1972, p.10). Although the Inuit were not involved in the writing of the report, these key recommendations found their way into the founding principles of the Northern Québec Inuit Association. Despite a brief history (1971-1977) the NQIA's contribution to the political development of Nouveau Québec was enormous.

In 1973, Chrétien approved a new federal policy on Indian education. The new policy, based on the NIB recommendations, supported upgraded teacher training, and mechanisms for consultation involving Native people in all areas related to social and economic development. The policy also guaranteed the right to preserve Indian languages and culture (Canadian Educational Report, 1984, p.13).

A lengthy interview with Senator Charlie Watt covered his early political activities in Kuujjuaq, the formation of the NQIA, the James Bay and Northern

Québec Agreement negotiations, relations with the two levels of government, education, and the formation of the Kativik School Board. His statements reveal that federal and provincial attitudes toward the Inuit people were invariably paternalistic and heavy-handed.

In the early 1960s the federal authorities were the kingpins in the communities of Nouveau Québec. The federal government had encouraged the formation of community councils which served in an advisory capacity to the community administrator. Watt said that the councils had no real power: "When I talked to them [councillors] I used to say, what is your role, what is your function? They did not have good answers." In the fall of 1961 René Lévesque visited Kuujjuaq. Two representatives from each of the communities had been brought in by the DGNQ to hear what he had to say. Senator Watt remembers thinking:

> What the hell is going on? I knew that they [provincial authorities] had won the case in 1939. They were happy. They did not want us then so what did they want now? I knew that they did not want anything for the people. They wanted the resources (Personal interview, May, 1991).

Feeling that something had to be done Watt organized a separate public meeting to "air out my feelings." Watt said he tried to better inform the people about the goals of the provincial government. With no long term goal in mind and not holding political office, he was forced to follow the debate from the sidelines.

He also realized that he needed to get elected and thus accepted a plea from his uncle that he run for office. With his successful election to the Kuujjuaq Community Council his passive role quickly changed:

> The next thing I knew I was the president of the Community Council. As soon as I got elected to the Community Council I started having dialogues with Ottawa, with John Diefenbaker, when he was in opposition to the Liberals. Questions about what the government was doing in Northern Québec were being asked (Ibid, 1991).

As a federal government employee, his actions were not well received. He was summoned to a meeting by his boss in Kuujjauq. Watt was told that as an employee of the government he was not allowed to contact politicians and talk about politics. A few weeks later his superior told him that the deputy minister for the Department of Indian Affairs wanted to see him in Ottawa.

According to Watt, the deputy minister challenged his right to speak on behalf of the Inuit. In defence of his actions Watt replied that his ancestry entitled him to speak for the Inuit. "I'm an Inuk" he replied. The deputy minister then told him that the only one that could speak for the Inuit was Bishop Donald Marsh (Anglican Bishop of the Eastern Arctic Archdiocese in Toronto). This surprised him, he said, "because the Bishop was my friend."

Realizing that Watt was not going to be persuaded to give up politics, the deputy minister said, "Why don't we rearrange things and you be spokesman for

the Inuit as a whole?" Watt replied, "I'm not for sale." Upon his arrival back home in Kuujjuaq the community administrator informed him that he had a choice to make - either accept a transfer to Kangirsualujjuaq or resign. With two children and no other means of support, he accepted the forced transfer and exile. Watt said that between 1969 and 1972 he did his job as a mechanic but started to meet informally with other Inuit who were equally concerned with the negotiations between the federal and provincial governments. These meetings led to discussions about forming an Inuit association.

In April 1971, Inuit delegates gathered at Inukjuak for a special meeting called by the Indians of Québec Association (IQA). The main reason for the meeting was that the Inuit had been asked to join the Association. The delegates represented the Inuit community councils, Inuit Cooperatives and the Federation of Northern Québec Cooperatives. Watt opposed the union believing that the Inuit should form their own group. After four days of debate Watt's idea of forming the Northern Québec Inuit Association was accepted by his Inuit colleagues and the Association was established:

> The need for an organized representation was becoming more apparent to deal with governments and other "outside" forces which were becoming as active as ever in the Inuit communities, often without proper consultation or consideration for the wishes of the general [Inuit] population (Taqralik, May, 1974, p.13).

The potential threat to the Inuit way of life as a result of the James Bay project and the increasingly hardline attitude of provincial and federal authorities made it clear to the Inuit that events were moving at an accelerated pace. The need to form a group which had the mandate to speak for the Inuit was imperative. Thus the NQIA was established in response to what were seen to be:

> rapidly changing conditions over which the Inuit were to have little or no control. We were alarmed by assumptions on the part of the white people in government and elsewhere that we were to be somehow looked after by white people in the future (NQIA mimeograph, 1974, p.2).

It is evident that the Inuit of Nouveau Québec would no longer sit idle as governments and other outside forces directed their future. At the April 1971 meeting the delegates elected the six founding directors: Charlie Watt, Lazarusie Epoo, Johnny Watt, Jacob Oweetaltuk, Silas Cookie and Tommy Cain. Their guiding principles as established by the assembly were:

> To unite all Inuit of Northern Québec; To protect the rights of Inuit hunters, fisherman, and trappers; To improve communication among the Inuit communities; To assist the Inuit to become aware of their own situation, governmental plans, aboriginal rights, legal matters and educational opportunities so that they may determine these things of the social, economic and educational spheres; To assist Inuit in their rights to full participation in and sense of belonging to Canadian society

> and to promote public awareness of these rights (Taqralik, May, 1974, p.13).

On June 8,1972[21] the NQIA was incorporated; an event that came not a moment too soon.[22] On June 25, Premier Robert Bourassa tabled Bill 50, which formally introduced the "project of the century." With no prior consultation with either the Inuit or the Cree, the provincial government announced that the hydroelectric resources of the James Bay area were going to be developed for the prosperity of all Québecers.[23] A month prior to tabling the legislation Bourassa told reporters:

> La Baie James est la clef du progres économique et social du Québec, la clef de la stabilité politique au Québec, la clef de l'avenir du Québec...Québec pourra enfin briser le cercle vicieux du marasme économique dans la province, répondre aux angoisses de milliers de jeunes qui arrivent sur le marché du travail, impliquer la collectivité dans le développement des resources naturelles du Québec (La Presse, Mai, 1971, pp.2-3 cited in Gourdeau, 1974,).

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21 By 1974 the NQIA was receiving money from the Secretary of State. Senator Watt remembers that the amount was about $150 000 for a two or three year period.

22 The Association's Executive Director was Keith Crowe who wrote A History of the Original Peoples of Canada.

23 Approximately one fourth the land mass of the province would be affected by the project (Gourdeau, 1974, p.23).

Within the first three weeks of its mandate the NQIA would have to take on the provincial government, the James Bay Development Corporation, the James Bay Energy Corporation, and Hydro Québec. In a struggle that lasted from 1971 to 1975, the Inuit and Cree negotiated Canada's first comprehensive land claim settlement.

Up until 1971 the Inuit had, for better or worse, maintained a working relationship with the federal government. Although the actions of the federal government were paternalistic the Inuit acknowledged that the federal government did provided relief, built hospitals and schools, and financed many local business ventures. Once the James Bay project was announced, the NQIA approached the federal government for assistance in the fight against the James Bay project. Watt said that he and Billy Diamond[24] wanted the federal government to intervene on behalf of the Inuit and Cree and enforce the provisions of the Extension Act of 1912 (Personal interview, May,1991). The federal government did not agree to this request. Furthermore, the Inuit relationship with the provincial government was tenuous. Given the provincial government's record in the areas of education and social services, the Inuit felt suspicious. Coupled with the arrogant position taken by the provincial government concerning James Bay, the prospects for a negotiated settlement with the NQIA appeared slight.

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[24] Billy Diamond was the Chief of the Grand Council of the Cree which he founded upon breaking away from the Indians of Québec Association.

The James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement: Negotiating for the Future

From the opening round of the JBNQA negotiations the provincial government's position was that:

> the project plans were not negotiable and that the indigenous people had no special rights or at least none that warranted anything more than an expropriation of their interest in the land and monetary compensation for that interest (Feit, 1980, p.160).

The NQIA thought that the federal government would help the Inuit and Cree cause. Feit maintains that the federal government was reluctant to become involved in a province "where separatist sentiments were active." The federal position was one of "alert neutrality"[25] (Ibid, p.160). The Inuit realized that they would have to align their resources with the Cree. In an information brief prepared by the IQA and the NQIA on James Bay, representatives of the groups stated:

> In the final analysis, it does not seem that the Indian and Inuit people can depend upon the federal government to change the provincial government's thinking nor does it seem that the federal government will take proceedings on its own or on behalf of the Indian and Inuit people to stop the project. The Indian and Inuit people must rely upon themselves to do this (IQA and NQIA, 1972, p.10).

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[25] The two Native groups established a task force to review the environmental impact of the project. The federal government gave $250 000 to the task force for research purposes (IQA and NQIA, 1973, p.5).

Following the previously mentioned meeting between Premier Bourassa and Inuit and Cree leaders in which Bourassa walked out, the Native groups decided to accelerate legal proceedings. The advice given to the leadership by their lawyers was that their case would be based on the argument that aboriginal rights had never been extinguished. The provincial position was:

> the indigenous people had no rights and that if they did have rights these would simply be the rights to provisions such as are found in old treaties...Québec also argued that the indigenous people were just like Euro-Canadians" (Feit, 1980, p.161).

In November 1973, Mr. Justice Charles Malouf granted an interlocutory injunction stating that "the Province of Québec cannot develop or otherwise open up these lands for settlement without the prior agreement of the Indians and Eskimo" (Malouf cited in Feit, 1980, p.161). The initial granting of the injunction was significant for three major reasons (Feit, 1980, p.162). Firstly, it demonstrated that government business could be seriously interrupted. Secondly, in granting the injunction the court had accepted that there was a prima facie aboriginal right which allowed the Indians and Inuit to stop the project. Thirdly, within five days of the judgement the provincial government was back at the bargaining table.

Senator Watt said that during the injunction Premier Bourassa offered the Inuit a cash settlement which he refused (Personal interview, May, 1991). Feit suggests that the judgement "pushed into the forefront the possibility of defining

and seeking recognition of aboriginal rights which the court had unexpectedly gone so far towards claiming existed" (Ibid, p.162). Encouraged by the court decision, the Native groups now had to decide if they should continue negotiating or rely exclusively on the courts realizing that either negotiations or court proceedings entailed considerable risk.

Senator Watt stated that during a three hour meeting between Jean Chrétien, Bill Diamond and himself in January 1974 in a Montreal hotel room, Chrétien forcefully suggested that the Native groups negotiate with the province. Watt said that Chrétien feared that the Indians and Inuit would lose their bargaining position if they lost through the courts. I asked Senator Watt why he thought the federal government had not responded to the Inuit's request for assistance. He replied that "their attitude was, look, here is your opportunity. Take it and we'll wash our hands" (Personal interview, May, 1991). In weighing the considerable impact on the Native way of life should they lose a court challenge, a negotiated settlement was deemed more acceptable than an all or nothing strategy.

Watt explained that once the decision to negotiate had been taken, the NQIA drafted its position containing its key objectives for the negotiations. He stated that what the Inuit wanted more than anything else was a form of regional government which would include control of social services, health care, economic issues, and education, the ultimate goal being self-government. According to Feit,

"the Inuit sought to establish both ethnic and non-ethnic regional structures in which Inuit control would continue for the foreseeable future" (Ibid, p.164).

On November 11, 1975, the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement was signed by Charlie Watt on behalf of the Inuit of Nouveau Québec. The landmark document contained provisions for regional government and control of health services and education (Rouland, 1978, p.36). According to Watt the most significant feature of the Agreement was that the Inuit had for all intents and purposes aligned themselves with the provincial government, thus breaking their traditional ties to the federal government. Watt believed that this position was deemed acceptable as it was seen as the only way that the Inuit could obtain a degree of self-government. Because the areas of education, social services, the environment and, to a large extent, the economy of the region were provincially controlled, Watt maintained that the future of the Inuit was linked to closer relations with Québec. It is important to note that the financial terms of settlement called for the provincial government to share with the federal government in paying a cash settlement. Québec was to contribute 75 per cent of the Inuit settlement, and 25 per cent of the Cree. This marked a sharp departure from the former relationship between the federal government and aboriginal groups in which the government paid 100 per cent of support costs. It is also interesting to note that the federal contribution for the treaty Cree in the James Bay area had dropped to 75 per cent from the customary 100 per cent. The capital and operational funding ratio is the

same and continues to the present. The especially high provincial contribution to the Inuit portion of the settlement indicates a complete reversal of the position it had held since 1912 concerning its responsibility for the Inuit of Nouveau Québec.

Feit maintained that the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement may be seen as both a partial victory and a partial defeat. Victory came with the achievement of many of the goals sought by the Inuit. The defeat or perhaps disappointment came with the severing of the once close ties with the federal government. The hesitant and non-supportive role played by the federal government was a bitter experience for the Inuit. This outcome coupled with the Inuit's desire for control over their own destiny led to the realignment of their politics.

A final critique on the role played by the two governments during the negotiations was delivered in the House of Commons by H.R. Holmes, a Conservative M.P.:

> ...for Aupaluk, Leaf Bay and Payne Bay, Inuit people have been used as pawns by powerful interest groups. Yet this federal Liberal government persisted with its policy of "alert neutrality"...Hydro Québec, the James Bay Energy Corporation and the James Bay Development Corporation are not the government of Québec, are not the government of Canada and do not represent the will of the people. There is no evidence from their record that social impact is an integral part of their policies.

> By staying in the background and allowing the native people to negotiate their birthright with Crown corporations, both the federal and provincial governments have committed an unpardonable offence (H.R. Holmes, House of Commons Debates Vol.120, No.390, 1763, Dec.7, 1976).

As previously stated, one of the main goals of the Inuit during the negotiations was the establishment of an Inuit-controlled school board. On this point they were successful. Senator Watt explained that between 1975 and 1978, the NQIA (forerunner of Makivik Corporation) played a major role in assisting the Kativik School Board.[26] The Board's organizational years (1975 to 1978) are discussed below.

The Kativik School Board (1975-1978)

Chapter 17 of the JBNQA established the Kativik School Board (KSB). This non-ethnic board was to offer educational services to all residents of Nouveau Québec. The board's program drew upon some of the progressive ideas found in the CSNQ schools. Inutitut would be the language of instruction in the first three years of school with a choice between English and French from grade three

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26 With the signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement the NQIA became Makivik Corporation, a holding company established to administer the provisions and funds of the agreement. The NQIA remained active until the end of 1977. Under provincial law the Kativik School Board is an autonomous body. Kativik does not receive any capital or operational budget funds from Makivik.

onward. Culture classes and religion were to be taught by Inuit teachers. The teacher training program would be maintained and Education Committees would be formed through open elections in all communities. Each community could also elect one Commissioner. This position was open to Inuit and non-Natives. Non-Natives were eligible for office after permanent residency of two years in the community.

The first school Commissioners were elected in the spring of 1976 and held their first meeting in Kuujjuaq that September. They were joined by the representative of the NQIA, Zebedee Nungak.[27] At this time the board was not incorporated nor did it have any operating money. The NQIA, in a one time cash allocation advanced KSB operational funds until such time as it could be incorporated and draw provincial funding. Throughout the 1976-77 year, the Commissioners main task was to draft a budget for the coming year and to hire a Director General and senior staff (Taqralik, Nov, 1976, pp.14-15).[28]

As the provisions of the JBNQA started to make themselves felt in the communities there was apprehension concerning education services. From the

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27 The first group of elected Commissioners was; Adamie Inukpuk (Inukjuak), Noah Inukpuk (Pres. Kuujjuarapik), George Kauki (Kangirsujuaq), Stanley Annanack (Kangirsualujjuaq), Josepee Qaqutuk (Akulivik), Sala Padlayat (Salluit), Tuniq Qamugaluk (Kangirsuk), Putulik Kululak (Quartaq). Johnny Akpahatuk (Alpaluk), Jacko Angnatuk (Tasiujaq) and Harriet Ruston (Kuujjuaq). No commissioners were elected in either Povungnituk or Ivujivik.

28 The Director General in the Québec school system is equivalent to a Superintendent of Schools in Alberta.

date of signing of the JBA it would take three years for Kativik to assume operational control of education services throughout Nouveau Québec. During that time, the federal day schools and the CSNQ schools continued to operate. This time delay caused some confusion. "Some people are afraid that the DNA school system is moving out while the Nordic (CSNQ) school board is taking over" (Taqralik, July, 1976, p.27). In fact when Kativik was ready to take over, it amalgamated both school systems into one system under provincial control.

I asked Senator Watt what the NQIA hoped to achieve by taking control of education. He said they hoped to be able to do better than either government had done in the past. Teacher training and Inuit language programs were to be an integral part of Inuit-controlled education. He went on to say that though the NQIA was represented on the Board he was not directly involved in the recruitment of the senior administration. This he now regrets. His feelings were that the autonomous school board: "sunk their teeth into what was already there instead of taking a fresh look at education for Inuit children. They did not correct any of the old problems. That's what I wanted to do." In the years to come the NQIA and Kativik would come to hold differing opinions concerning education. These differences will be examined in the next chapter.

Conclusion

Driven by the desire to control all areas of public administration within the provincial boundaries and to establish the dominance of the French language, consecutive provincial governments advanced policies aimed at the assimilation and acculturation of all non-francophone groups including the Inuit. Citing the dominance of the English language in Nouveau Québec, the provincial government reverted to the old tradition of draping itself in the fleur-de-lys for another battle with Ottawa. Provincial francisation policies demonstrated both the thrust of their nationalism and a disregard for Inuit input. In the area of education services both the provincial and federal governments held little regard for Inuit opinion. The province planned to supplant federal government programs by offering education and social service programs which were attractive to the Inuit population. Unfortunately, poor implementation militated against the acceptance of innovative educational reforms. Provincial agents did not ask the Inuit what they wanted. Perhaps if they had simply consulted the Inuit many long years of frustration could have been avoided.

Since the provincial government has succeeded in establishing its sovereignty in Nouveau Québec, the issue of language has receded in overall importance. Though various pieces of provincial legislation have implanted the French language in the work place in southern Québec, the historical reality of an anglophone North has been treated with high degree of tolerance and respect.

Putulik Papigatuk, President of Kativik School Board in 1991, stated that when he meets with provincial government officials in Québec they speak to him in English. He said "they are proud that they speak two languages also. It's best if the Inuit learn both of the white man's languages."

Though initially hard hit by the actions of the provincial government and abandoned in their hour of need by the federal government, the Inuit managed to successfully negotiate in the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement government structures that granted them a more forceful role in determining their social and economic priorities. Watt commented that another outcome of the negotiation process was that the Inuit learned how to play power politics.

Though the historically close relationship between the federal government and the Inuit underwent a profound change as a result of the JBNQA the relationship was not entirely severed. The federal government continued to play an advisory role and to provide medical services until the early 1980s.

It was once thought that the sheer magnitude of federal government services would assure Inuit loyalty. However, when it came down to the choice of gaining a measure of autonomy or continuing in a paternal relationship with Ottawa, the Inuit chose the former. The concept of self-government triumphed despite the financial bidding wars fought for Inuit loyalty.

It is evident that the Inuit see education as the key to future success and economic development. The coming chapter will examine the development of the

Kativik School Board and its relationships with the provincial government and Makivik Corporation.

Chapter V

Inuit Education - Provincial Relations 1977-1991

The signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA) in 1975 introduced a new relationship between the Inuit and the two levels of government. Prior to this event and despite the 1939 Supreme Court ruling, it was not clear which level of government was responsible for the well being of the Inuit of Nouveau Québec. For over a hundred years the federal government and its agents had responded with varying degrees of intensity to the needs of the Inuit. Warren Allmand, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, stated after the Agreement was signed that the Inuit would be in a position "to determine their own future political, economic and social evolution" thus bringing to an end Inuit dependency on the federal government (Allmand, 1976, p.2). The JBNQA brought the Inuit into a closer relationship with the province than they had previously experienced. Implementing the Agreement would indeed prove to be a test of the new relationship.

The financial terms of the settlement included a $90 million payment to be held in trust by Makivik Corporation for use as investment capital. Budgets for the Kativik School Board, Kativik Health Board, and Kativik Regional Government would be developed between the Inuit and the provincial government.[1] The time

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1 These agencies were to be established under provincial law.

table for the transfer of federal services would also be established at the provincial level with Inuit consultation. Although the federal government contributed 25 per cent of the cash [illegible]nent, and continued to contribute the same percentage for the operational costs of the above mentioned agencies, for all intents and purposes the signing of the Agreement signalled the beginning of the withdrawal of an active federal presence in Nouveau Québec. As the Inuit were in the position of dealing directly with the province, their relationship with Ottawa became dormant until the early 1980s at which time the Inuit would allege before a Commons committee that both the federal and provincial governments were guilty of non-performance. Events from 1977-1986 illustrated that the adversarial relationship between the provincial government and the Inuit had not dissipated and that a harmonisation of the relationship had yet to occur.

The Inuit also had to come to terms with the dissension within their own ranks. A significant group of Inuit residing in Povungnituk, Ivujivik and Salluit refused to accept the extinguishment of "outstanding aboriginal rights claims" (Feit, 1980, p.166).

The focus of this chapter will be the changing state of federal, provincial and Inuit relations with particular reference to the development of the Kativik School Board (KSB). Four main events will be discussed to illustrate the changing dynamics of these intricate relationships and their impact on educational programs. Firstly, the Inuit response to Bill 101 will be reviewed. This major piece of language

legislation had a profound effect upon provincial-Inuit relations as it threatened cultural and linguistic freedom of choice. Secondly, some of the implementation difficulties of the JBNQA will be examined to illustrate the on-going tension between the Inuit and the provincial government. Thirdly, the relationship between the Kativik School Board and the provincial government will be examined with particular emphasis on education funding and programming. Lastly, the relationship between Makivik Corporation, formerly the NQIA, and KSB will be discussed. Since the signing of the JBNQA the relationship between the two Inuit groups has at times been strained. The two organizations hold divergent views on a number of educational issues, that if not resolved may do long term harm to Inuit children.

Inuit Response to Bill 101

On July 12, 1977, Camille Laurin, Parti Québécois Minister of State for Cultural Development, introduced Bill 101. The law radically redefined the role of the French language in the province. Trudeau said that the law was "narrow and retrograde" and "that it would lead to the creation of a monolithic society dominated by a single language" (Fraser, 1984, p.106). The Inuit perceived an immediate threat to their language and cultural rights. With the words of the former Minister of Indian Affairs, Judd Buchanan concerning Bill 22 to serve as a reminder, the Inuit knew they would have to deal with Québec unassisted.

In 1974, Bill 22 had called for Québec schools to test non-anglophone students to determine their proficiency in the English language and thus determine their eligibility for English language instruction. The Inuit were affected by Bill 22. The provincial Liberal government of the day kept its promise to the Inuit to offer a language choice after Grade three. As there had been no consultation with the Inuit before Bill 101 was tabled, this exemption could not be counted upon a second time. Of further concern to the Inuit was that the new language law had been introduced by a separatist Parti Québécois government.

Bill 101 transformed the schools. Laurin believed that Bills 63 (1969) and 22 (1974) had not gone far enough to protect the French language and to establish its dominant role in the integration of non-francophones. Laurin believed that the past Union National and Liberal provincial governments had given in to the demands of the anglophone community which supported freedom of choice when it came to the language of instruction. With Bill 101 Laurin said "[schools] are no longer the defensive preserve of an ethnic group: [schools] are an open, integrating force in society" (Fraser, 1984, p.110). Once again, for the Inuit and other minorities, the issues of language, freedom of choice in education, and government services were matters of great concern.

Emotion ran high on both sides of the issue. One nationalist called the passing of the law: "the greatest moment in our history since the founding of Québec in 1608" (Ibid, p.110). The Inuit response was no less unequivocal. As the

debate escalated in southern Québec, the Inuit magazine Taqralik received many letters denouncing Bill 101 and the provincial government. The following letter written by J.A. Weetan typified Inuit feelings on the matter:

> I would like to write an article about Bill 101 which the Québec Government is trying to ram down our Inuit-English speaking throats. ...Québec says that it will keep Northern Québec but ...the federal government is now saying it might fight for Northern Québec if Québec decides to separate from Canada. The Inuit are being sandwiched in the middle now (Weetan, letter in Taqralik, May/June, 1977, p.8).

Although the Kativik School Board had begun to hold organizational meetings in 1976, it had not yet been incorporated. Although it had the assistance of a new senior management, the Board was not prepared to respond to the new legislation. Just prior to the tabling of Bill 101, the Inuit response came from NQIA President Charlie Watt who said "the Inuit do not want the French language pushed on them" (Taqralik, May/June, 1977, p.22). The NQIA was worried that certain provisions of the Bill were in direct conflict with the JBNQA. The NQIA was also concerned and annoyed with the attitude of the provincial government in general. Since the November 1976 election victory, the provincial government had communicated with the NQIA exclusively in French. The NQIA sensed that the ramifications of Bill 101 would have serious consequences for the Inuit language, culture and education:

> If the government does not make the necessary changes to Bill 101, and enforces it to the full extent possible, it would just about make some sections of the Agreement useless. For example, it would be very difficult to set up the municipal and regional governments in the north if they were supposed to be able to operate in French and issue all official documents of public administration in French. The same problem would also apply to setting up the Health and Social Services. And what about the Makivik Corporation? How would Makivik be able to establish local industries and businesses that would be of use to the Inuit, if the working language of the province is to be French? (Taqralik May/June, 1977, p.23).

Given the intense and divisive debate that had surrounded the JBNQA, Bill 101 was seen as a renewed threat to Inuit language and cultural freedom that had to be challenged at all costs. All the promises of economic and social development inherent in the Agreement now appeared to be in jeopardy.

Since the first DGNQ schools were built, the provincial government had supported the principle of Inutitut as the language of instruction for the first three years of schooling. The James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement stated that the Kativik School Board could determine which language to teach when instruction was not in Inutitut (Statutes of Québec, 1978). The provincial government interpreted this section to mean that Bill 101 would apply if instruction was not in Inutitut. Once again the Inuit saw the provincial government reneging

on a promise. This manoeuvring by the province was reminiscent of the Union National government's flip-flop on freedom of language choice in the late 1960s.

In May 1977 Charlie Watt, representing the NQIA, met with Camille Laurin, the minister responsible for Bill 101, for a frank discussion concerning the overall impact of the Bill. The Inuit wanted their language rights guaranteed in the legislation and a committee appointed to review the overall impact of the Bill in terms of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. Laurin refused both equests saying that the Bill concerned only the French language and any delay for further committee study was unacceptable to the government. The NQIA found the provincial position equally unacceptable and said it would be taking the matter to the Inuit population. Laurin reiterated that the Inuit would be exempt with respect to education issues and other sections of the Bill which would conflict with the provisions of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (Watt, May, 1991; Taqralik, May/June, [Summer] 1977).

Notwithstanding the commitments made by the Minister and the provincial committee subsequently established to review the impact of Bill 101 on the provisions of the JBNQA, the Bill when passed did not contain the full extent of exemptions promised the Inuit.[2] The provincial government had added caveats limiting the applicability of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement and

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2 Camille Laurin met with the people of Kuujjuaq and Povungnituk during the summer of 1977 to explain the provincial government's position and to give assurances that the government would protect Inuit language and culture.

the power of the Kativik School Board (Charter of the French Language [Bill 101] Ch. 8, Sec. 88), Although Inuit children of Nouveau Québec were exempt from the language of instruction provisions of the Bill, amendments to this section excluded Inuit children from Labrador and N.W.T. Inuit who moved to Nouveau Québec. The law required that these children receive instruction in French. The Inuit felt that this could split families or impede the free movement of families who frequently moved between the three areas (Taqralik, Sept,Oct,Nov, [Fall] 1977, p.7). The result of this clause would have forced Inuit who were resettling from Killiniq or Resolute and Grise Fjord to attend French language schools.[3]

The Inuit also took exception to being included in a section of the law which referred to the special rights of "Amerinds." The government said, that for the purposes of the law, it would consider the Inuit as "Amerinds". The Inuit, having heard a similar promise before, took the position that the terms Amerind and Inuit had to be used in the legislation (Ibid, p.16). Although given assurances that the Inuit position on this matter would result in changes to the wording this was not carried out (Charter, Ch.8, Sec. 87, Par. 530).

In the area of business, the government had promised that agencies created out of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement and companies

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3 In 1953 the federal conducted a relocation project for the Inuit living in Nouveau Québec. Promising the Inuit better hunting areas and shelter, 14 families from Inukjuak were relocated into the High Arctic (Globe and Mail, Sept. 30, 1991). During the 1970s and 1980s some of the families returned to Nouveau Québec.

formed by Makivik Corporation would be exempt from the requirement to conduct all business in French. This appeared acceptable. However, when the Bill was passed, it had been amended to state that businesses were only to enjoy the exemption if they remained in the North. The Inuit saw this as a move to limit the freedom of movement for the Co-operative movement and other commercial enterprises envisioned by Makivik Corporation.[4] It was also perceived as an attempt to "restrict Inuit from participation in their own businesses" (Taqralik Fall, p.17).

Lastly, another major concern surrounded the use of the French language in the administration of Inuit regional government and the Kativik School Board. It appeared to the Inuit that implementation of the Agreement would be hopelessly complicated by the requirement that the French language be used exclusively in administration. This provision was seen as an attempt to limit Inuit involvement in the development of their own structures (Ibid, pp.17-18). Without explanation the provincial government failed to redress these concerns before passing the bill. Perhaps it was hoped that Bill 101 would in one major thrust make Nouveau Québec as francophone as it had once been anglophone and that the Inuit would capitulate quietly.

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[4] The Inuit were seriously considering purchasing controlling interests of two regional air lines whose headquarters were outside Nouveau Québec.

The Parti Québécois government failed to implement Bill 101 fully in Nouveau Québec for three reasons. Firstly, provincial planners failed to gauge accurately the degree of affiliation the Inuit had with the English language and their determination to safeguard their own language and cultural rights. Secondly, the government overlooked the legal impact of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. Lastly, the provincial government failed to anticipate the vehemency of the Inuit response which left no doubt that the Inuit would not be subordinated by Bill 101.

The Inuit were not satisfied with the limitations Bill 101 placed on their language and the JBNQA. Convinced that the provincial government would not accede to their demands, the NQIA spearheaded public opposition in Nouveau Québec. The NQIA called a special meeting in August 1977 in Sanikiluaq, Belcher Islands (NWT). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss plans for a response to the Bill. The rationale for a public display of disaffection was reported in the [Fall] 1977 issue of Taqralik:

> The amendments made by the Québec Government in the bill regarding Inuit language rights puts them [Inuit] in a difficult position and for the reason that the Québec government has **broken many of their promises to ensure adequate protection of Inuit language rights**; in protest the representatives of the communities decided that...it [the provincial government] should no longer have the right to operate in Northern

> Québec communities (Ibid, p.18, emphasis added).

With an objective of evicting provincial government agents from all communities, demonstrations were organized outside DGNQ offices and CSNQ schools in September 1977. Provincial government workers were told that their government had refused a number of Inuit demands and that they were no longer welcome. A CSNQ teacher in Tasiujaq at that time said that all provincial employees were instructed to close down operations and leave the community, which they did. The provincial flag was taken down from outside the DGNQ office and burned in a garbage bin (Ann Grace, Personal interview, April, 1991).[5] Throughout Nouveau Québec this scene was repeated over the next few days until all provincial agencies were closed. For three weeks in late September and early October 1977 Inuit leaders from all the communities in Nouveau Québec gathered in Kuujjuaq to plan their strategy.

In Kuujjuaq, the regional director of the DGNQ was asked to advise his employees not to return to work. Inuit leaders also met the Québec Provincial Police to advise them that the actions of the Inuit were non-violent. The provincial flag was taken down and handed to the director who was told: "the flag will not fly in the community again until your government has met our demands" (Taqralik [Fall], 1977, p.20). In its place the Canadian flag was raised to half mast. Although

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5 Ms. Grace told me that all CSNQ teachers were flown to Montreal where they were kept on payroll until the schools reopened in January 1978.

non-violent in nature, the protest was very stirring and effective. Uncertain and fearful that Inuit actions would escalate, it seems that the provincial government overreacted to the situation:

> Two teams of [Québec] Provincial Police (QPP) were sent from the south to Kuujjuaq and Kuujjuarapik...By sending riot police to the north it looked as if the Québec Government was expecting a battle with the Inuit. They only wasted their time getting bored in a crowded little police station playing cards or taking pictures (Taqralik, [Fall], 1977, p.20).

In Kuujjuaq the provincial employees had not acceded to the request of the Inuit leaders that they leave the community. Fearing trouble, the Provincial Police set themselves up in the DGNQ offices ostensibly to protect the workers from harm. The Community Council's response was to cut off the water supply to the building. Under the armed protection of the QPP, DGNQ employees built a ply-wood water reservoir which they attached to a pick-up truck. The QPP accompanied the employees to the water depot where they stood guard as provincial workers filled their home-made water truck.

After spending three weeks in Kuujjuaq the Inuit community representatives announced that they were returning to their villages to resume their lives, leaving behind a small delegation headed by Charlie Watt. They all agreed that the Québec flag would not fly until the dispute was settled and that there was to be a total boycott of provincial services. Furthermore, they requested that the

provincial government act in a reasonable manner to "rectify this deplorable situation." The level of frustration felt by the Inuit is evident in the following report concerning the Province's response to questions from the Inuit about Bill 101:

> When the governments need something from the northland or when they need signatures from the Inuit on some document they are always around but when the Inuit need their assistance and understanding they do not want to know them and pretend that they do not exist. In Inuit history this has always been so...When asked questions by the Inuit, the (provincial) government officials answered many of them indirectly or their answers didn't make any sense at all (Taqralik, [Fall], 1977, pp.14-22).

In a series of communiqués sent between Kuujjuaq and Québec City during October, René Lévesque eventually promised that Inuit culture and language rights would be safeguarded and that they would be exempt from the restrictions previously mentioned. These promises were delivered to the Inuit by Lévesque's emissary, David Payne (PQ, MNA), who flew to Kuujjuaq in November to meet with the Inuit leadership.[6] To demonstrate Inuit goodwill, Charlie Watt recommended that the public demonstrations cease. In the end, Inuit determination won the day.

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6 Though David Payne was not in cabinet he was a personal friend of Camille Laurin. Other reasons which may have led to his appointment as the provincial government representative were his British ancestry and his former status as a Catholic priest (Fraser,1984, p.95).

By January 1978, the CSNQ schools were reopened to run out the course of their mandate.[7] The Inuit had demonstrated that they could win the kinds of exemptions needed to safeguard their interests. According to Senator Watt, during the JBNQA negotiations the Inuit had learned to use the media to affect public opinion. However the use of the armed QPP was of great concern. Watt said, "we never thought that they [provincial government] would go so far. In the end they looked stupid."[8]

With the exemptions from Bill 101 in place the Inuit were now eager to take on the major restructuring of their society as promised by the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. The lack of goodwill demonstrated by the provincial government during the passage of Bill 101 was a foreshadowing of events to come. This display of insensitivity and stubbornness by the provincial government had taken place less than one year after J.R. Holmes (a Conservative member of parliament) had warned the House of Commons that "the ultimate success or failure of the existing settlement will depend on the good will...and complete trust of the signatories" (Commons Debates, 1976, p.1772). The end result of the

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7 The 1977-78 school year was the last operational year for both the federal and provincial school systems. The Kativik School Board assumed operational authority at the beginning of the 1978-79 school year.

8 Senator Watt explained that the desired amendments to the legislation did not materialize. The Inuit settled in the end for ministerial exemptions which have proven workable. Upon request the provincial government will supply English documents. However, only the French copies have official status.

implementation of Bill 101 in Nouveau Québec was that an opportunity to demonstrate a sincere interest in the aspirations of the Inuit was squandered. With the singular focus of making the French language "a way of life" for francophones at the expense of minority language rights, the provincial government once again seemed willing to forswear its promises to the Inuit. This incident did not bode well for the delicate implementation negotiations that were to follow.

Implementation of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement

As the first "comprehensive land claim settlement" in Canada the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement covered a wide range of issues. Land, social services, economic development, local and regional government and education were but a few of the areas addressed. The tripartite funding formula made the issues even more complex. The time frame for full implementation was to cover a twenty year period. In order to implement the Agreement, thirty pieces of provincial legislation had to be redrafted. Feit (1981) maintained that in the subsequent negotiations surrounded by numerous pieces of legislation needing amendments, both governments demonstrated considerable insincerity:

> ...[they] often tried to turn the legislative drafting itself into a renegotiation of the provisions. The governments have also tried to delay implementation and considerable effort [by the Inuit] has been necessary to force implementation (Ibid, p.168).

It must be remembered that the negotiations leading to the Agreement took a relatively short period of time. The Dorion Commission Report of the provincial government (1971) recommended that the province settle land claims with the Cree and Inuit. The provincial government chose to disregard this advice and proceeded with the James Bay project without consulting either the Inuit or Cree. The 1973 injunction and resulting financial loss as a result of the work stoppage, coupled with modest pressure by the federal government, brought the provincial government immediately to the bargaining table.[9] Within two years the negotiations on the Agreement were complete.[10] Both sides realized that due to time constraints during negotiations many sections of the Agreement would be subject to interpretation upon implementation.

Wendy Moss stated that many of the problems of implementation stemmed from a reluctance by both the federal and provincial governments to fully recognize their responsibilities and obligations. For instance, by failing to cost out the provisions prior to signing, the federal government then claimed it lacked the funds to implement all the terms of the Agreement. The problems were further exacerbated by the lack of federal and provincial agencies to co-ordinate and plan

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9 By the end 1973 the federal government had provided the Cree and Inuit organizations with $981,000 for research. By the conclusion of the negotiations DIAND had provided $5.5 million in the form of grants and loans to cover court and negotiating costs (Allmand, 1976, pp.5-6).

10 The JBNQA was signed in November 1975 subject to a ratification vote. It was ratified by the Inuit population on November 11, 1976.

the implementation of various services. This resulted in interdepartmental and intergovernmental disputes (Moss, 1985, p.688).

A further example of these problems was the fact that while the Inuit still continued to deal with the Secrétariat des Activités Gouvernmentales en Milieu Amerindien et Inuit (SAGMAI), the Cree would have nothing to do with the Secretariat, and dealt with the provincial and federal departments directly.[11] According to Moss, SAGMAI's inability to respond effectively to the provisions of the Agreement stemmed from "its inability to both understand and communicate with its Native constituency" (Ibid, p.689). An example of provincial inaction was in the area of construction of community infrastructures such as water and sewer treatment plants, schools and hospitals. While contributing 75 percent of the settlement cost for the Inuit and 25 percent for the Cree, the provincial government refused to fulfil its obligations. The deadlock between the two levels of government meant all projects in these areas were delayed. Québec was trying to force the federal government to abandon all of its responsibilities in the province whether to the Cree or Inuit. To accomplish this, the province had adopted an interesting strategy: "Québec often tied proper performance of its obligations to a reduction of remaining federal jurisdiction" (Ibid, p.689).

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11 In 1978 the DGNQ was dissolved with the objective of returning the responsibilities for northern affairs to specific departments. Later the same year SAGMAI was created. This Secretariat was dedicated to serving all indigenous people of the province. Its first head was Eric Gourdeau, former head of the DGNQ (Hamelin, 1978, p.191).

By 1980, implementation of the provisions of the JBNQA had reached a critical point. Key sections of the Agreement concerning health, education, and community infrastructures had not been implemented. Inuit concerns were not taken seriously in either Québec or Ottawa. The Inuit claimed that "in our communities conditions have significantly and steadily deteriorated" (Watt, cited in Moss, p.691). As a result of government non-performance, the Inuit claimed that they had spent $9.6 million of the cash settlement just to remedy the conditions brought about by years of government neglect (DIANA, 1982, p.87).

By 1981, through court action and political pressure, the Inuit and Cree forced the House of Commons Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development to hear their testimony. After hearing representations from the Inuit and Cree, the Committee endorsed the allegations of federal non-performance made by the two Native groups (Ibid, p.1). The Department of Indian Affairs undertook an internal review of the implementation of the Agreement and its findings, which were contained in the Tait Report, were made public in July 1982.[12] The report concluded that "the spirit (of the Agreement) has frequently been violated and acknowledged the federal government's poor performance on

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12 According to Moss the Tait Report was written by a senior federal civil servant by that name (p.692).

several aspects" (Moss, 1985, p.692; April, 1982, p.20). On the subject of school facilities the report observed:[13]

> the facilities are seriously inadequate...overcrowded, lacked proper sanitation and fire protection facilities and are in general disrepair. Many of the buildings used as schools were not intended as such and have not been properly adapted for school use. Some do not even provide adequate basic shelter let alone a proper learning environment (DIANA [Tait Report], 1982, pp.44-45).[14]

On July 8, 1982, John Munro, federal Minister of Indian Affairs, announced that the cabinet had allocated $29 million to the Inuit for immediate application to some of the infrastructure projects. It is a credit to the federal government that it moved expeditiously once it became aware of the full extent of the problem.

It was clear that the implementation of the Agreement did not meet Inuit expectations. Holmes' warning that the success of the Agreement depended on good will and trust now appeared prophetic. However, the recommendations of the Tait Report provided an opportunity for both levels of government to renew

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13 Over the course of the review federal authorities made 28 trips into Nouveau Québec to hear the concerns of the Inuit and Cree. (April, 1982, p.20)

14 During the winter of 1982 I took Mr. R.Chenier, Parliamentary Secretary to Mr. J.Munro, Minister of Indian Affairs, on a tour of the school facilities in Salluit. He viewed a garage and previously condemned matchbox house that we were using as classroom space. Other unsuitable spaces that were used as classrooms included a warehouse and the basement of a house.

their commitment to the Inuit. The federal government took immediate corrective measures to make good its obligations.[15] With respect to the response of the provincial government the same cannot be said. Federal authorities reported that the province would participate only on an ad hoc basis (DIAND, 1982, p.98).

The difficulties associated with the implementation of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement also affected education. Between 1977-78 and 1979-80 school years, the first three years of operation, the province let the Kativik School Board implement the kinds of basic services which it felt necessary. A former senior Kativik official speculated that the provincial government's hands off approach for this three year period was motivated by a desire to appease Inuit after Bill 101. In 1977-78 the budget for the non-operating Board was $1,061,969. By the end of its third operational year the budget was $9,828,897 (KSB, 1985, p.80). In the 1980-81 school year, the provincial government intervened with stiffer controls over the budget. The issue of education funding became an area in which the relationship between the province and the Inuit could be characterized as stressful.

The Kativik School Board was also contending with a significant segment of the population which had not accepted the terms of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. Children of the parents who belonged to the Inuit

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15 The Cree were awarded $32.34 million for the same purpose (Moss, 1985, p.692).

Tunavingat Nunamini (ITN) would not attend a Kativik school. The Board said that it would live with the terms of the Agreement and not allow an independent Inuit school system to operate. However, the Board did enter into negotiations with the ITN with the hope of finding a workable solution.[16]

The Kativik School Board and Provincial Government Relations

The Kativik School Board was created as a non-ethnic board mandated to deliver both regular and adult education programs to the entire population of Nouveau Québec. During the organizational year 1977-78, the commissioners held 26 official meetings throughout the jurisdiction (Taqralik June, 1978, p.6). After extensive consultation it was decided that a temporary administrative office was to be set up in Dorval, a suburb of Montreal.[17] The long term goal was to eventually decentralize the services of the Board into the Arctic communities and

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16 In the villages of Povungnituk and Ivujivik it would take five years to reach a settlement with the Board. Between 1978 and 1983 the children attended infrequent classes taught by unpaid volunteers. As a result of an agreement reached between Kativik and ITN representatives, the schools resumed full-time operation between 1983 and 1986. Starting with the 1986-87 school year, Kativik took over full operational control of the schools in Povungnituk and Ivujivik. In Salluit the children of ITN parents did not go to school for two full years between 1978 and 1980 after which time they attended on a regular basis.

17 Montreal was chosen for two reasons. One, the Dorval International Airport served airlines which flew to Kuujjuaq and Kuujjuarapik. Secondly, the Baldwin Cartier School Commission leased a surplus school to Kativik for the sum of $1.00 a year.

to establish the head office in either Kuujjuaq or Kuujjuarapik. The Board planned to have an Inuit CEO in charge of education in each of the communities.[18]

In deciding upon the program of studies to be followed in the schools, the commissioners elected to incorporate some of the positive aspects of the former CSNQ system as well as some of the recommendations of the Low Report. In response to the long standing desire for meaningful parental input, Education Committees were established in each community. The mandate of the Education Committees was established by the commissioners. The commissioners also adopted the policy that instruction would be in the Inuit language for the first three years of school followed by a choice of English or French for Grades 3 to 11.[19] Culture classes as well as excursion classes on the land to learn survival skills would be taught. Religious studies could be taught as directed by the local Education Committee. Courses followed the Québec provincial curriculum in English or French.

Another program initiative assumed by KSB was the teacher training program first established by the CSNQ and McGill University. Board authorities were concerned that Inuit men and women trained as teachers in a non-Native

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18 In 1981, Ernest Manuel, Director General, announced the creation of the position entitled Centre Director. In each school the Inuit Centre Director was to be the chief administrative officer liaising with the Education Committee. The principal was to concentrate solely on pedagogical matters.

19 In Québec, schools go from kindergarten to grade 11.

university model might cause more harm than good. The unique focus for the teacher training program soon evolved as school authorities and educators realized that they knew very little about Inuit learning styles. The Child Observation Project-Inuit Teacher Training (COPITT) was developed, headed by Dr. Arlene Stairs of McGill University. The proposal was submitted to the provincial government which funded the project from 1979 to 1982 after which it was maintained from the operational funds of the Board.

Starting with the 1980-81 school year, the provincial government placed the Board under a fixed budget. As a result of reduced revenues class sizes increased to the point where classes with three or more grade levels were not uncommon. Restrictions on travel budgets limited the number of Board meetings. Furthermore, the high cost of essential services and maintenance accounted for a reduction in funds available for program adaptation. All the above difficulties were compounded by the deficiencies noted by federal agents who were investigating the concerns raised during the standing committee's hearings of March 1982. Notwithstanding the federal government's allocation of $29 million to Makivik, no increased operational funds were made available to the school board.

By the mid 1980s, the Board was in crisis. The Board maintained that since 1980 it had been systematically underfunded. Furthermore, it claimed that it had not yet assumed all of its responsibilities as outlined in the Agreement and that the cap on funding was not in the spirit of the Agreement. The Board argued that its

mandate to develop curriculum to meet the specific needs of the Inuit culture, language, and the special concerns posed by cross-cultural education was being thwarted due to limited funds. With no taxation base to supplement capital and operational revenues [illegible] had to depend exclusively on the largesse of the provincial government.

While the use of the Québec curriculum was required in the school system, teachers working in either English or French spent considerable time [illegible]ifying texts and teaching materials. All of this was done by the teacher. The support of a teaching assistant was no longer available. Kativik had eliminated this position when it took over. With small class sizes teachers were expected to do what was required concerning curriculum modification. It should be remembered that Inuit teachers who were enrolled in the teacher training program were given a "letter of tolerance" and could teach in the classroom. The Board wanted to encourage Inuit to train and work at the higher position of teacher, not as a teaching assistant.

Another major concern was the underfunding of the teacher training program. Since 1981, the Kativik/McGill program had been gaining in enrollment and recognition.[20] This training program was designed for Inuit trainees who would be entering the classroom as homeroom teachers for Kindergarten, Grade one and Grade two classes. However, no funds were made available to train Inuit

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20 In May, 1981, the McGill Senate gave official approval for a Northern Québec Teaching Diploma requiring 45 credits (Cram, 1985, p.118).

as specialist teachers in the areas of culture, language and religion. Kativik also wanted to train Inuit to teach in other specialist areas such as Industrial Arts, and eventually to teach in either English or French in the higher grades. To meet this goal more teacher education funding was essential.

Between 1980 and 1985 the number of Inuit students requiring post secondary education opportunities slowly increased. Previously, the federal government had maintained full support for these students. The provincial government maintained that the Board was responsible for neither post secondary education or adult training. Thus the provincial government did not allocate any funds for this service. The Board maintained that article 17.0.84 of the JBNQA gave them jurisdiction in this area: "Québec and Canada will jointly maintain, through the Kativik School Board, adequate funding for educational services and programs presently available to the population in the territory"[21] (Anngutivik, March/May, 1986, p.2). Prior to the signing of the Agreement the federal government had maintained funds for post secondary education. Therefore, the Board reasoned that it was entitled to these funds.[22]

The Board was also very distressed by the cap the government had put on the number of teachers it could hire. As result of the cap, class sizes increased.

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21 The Implementation Report written by DIAND (1982) agreed that the Inuit were entitled to the same services that they received when under the authority of the federal government.

22 This publication is sponsored by the Kativik School Board.

The Board maintained that the government had failed to consider the unique factors faced by teachers and Board. Firstly, no provisions were made for special education needs. Multi-level classes created tremendous workloads for teachers developing curriculum for several groups. Young Inuit children, all second language learners, were not getting the teacher contact time they urgently needed. The Board also argued that teacher turn-over was high and that the majority of its staff were in the beginning years of the profession: "Of southern teachers, 50% are on probation (in their first two years of teaching), while 80% have less than 5 years experience; 80% of Inuit teachers are still in training and 20% of the students have serious hearing losses" (Ibid, p.3). The Board's proposals included special allocations for special education teachers, Inutitut culture and religion teachers and negotiated guidelines for the grouping of children.[23]

As a result of a May 1986 meeting between the Board and the Liberal government's Minister of Education, Claude Ryan, the Board made considerable advances in its request. Mr. Gilbert Legault, Director of Education Services for Kativik, said that as a result of the meeting with the Minister some provincial civil servants responsible for the funding crisis were given other assignments.[24]

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[23] The teacher's union was supportive of the concept of staffing guidelines and contributed to the discussions which led to an agreement in 1987.

[24] A senior Kativik administrator who had to work closely with one senior provincial civil servant said, "it was his [provincial civil servant] job to keep us under thumb" (Informant, May, 1991).

Legault also said that relations between the Board and the current Liberal provincial government are a great improvement over the days of the Parti Québécois. Lastly, Legault added that under the Liberal government, the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement has "helped them [the provincial government] look at us a new way." In my discussions with other senior Kativik administrators it was made clear that since the Liberal election victory of 1986, all departments were enjoying good working relationships with provincial departments. As an example of this new cooperative relationship, Legault pointed out that the provincial government was supporting the spending of approximately $500,000 per year in language curriculum development (Legault, Personal interview, May, 1991).

According to KSB personnel, the election of the Liberal government was like a breath of fresh air. One factor that may have contributed to improved relations between Kativik and the Québec government was the increasing demand for French language services in the schools. Although the French language has not to date become the principal language of instruction, it has made gains over the last 15 years. Records show that over the past 15 year period the percentage of parents choosing French as the language of instruction has increased 100 per cent:

Year	English	French
1974-75	78%	22%
1983-84	70%	30%
1990-91	55%	45% [25]

There can be no doubt that the provincial government finds these figures pleasing. In due course the goal of René Lévesque will likely be realized and the French language will become the majority choice as the language of instruction.

More importantly the provincial government, with an eye to future hydroelectric development, is keen to cultivate good relations with Makivik and Kativik. Senator Watt stated that in regards to the second phase of the James Bay development, the Inuit are presently negotiating with the government whereas the Cree are trying to block further development until all the sections of present Agreement have been fully implemented. Watt said that Makivik's position has caused some tension between the Inuit and the Cree especially in the community of Kuujjuarapik, home to both groups. He also stated that insofar as Makivik is concerned, the negotiations were proceeding smoothly. It should be remembered that although the Liberals signed the Agreement in 1975, it was a Parti Québécois government that was responsible for its implementation until 1986. In 1986, the newly elected Liberal government looked forward to working with the Agreement for the first time.

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25 Source: Kativik School Board Annual Report 1978-85, pp.64-65; School Organization Plan 1990-1991.

As stated previously, the Inuit did not unanimously endorse the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. Those that would not vote on the issue formed a group known as Inuit Tunavingat Nunamini (ITN). Their position on education was that local Education Committees be given full autonomy from central office and the freedom to develop curriculum at the local level. After numerous unsuccessful meetings between Kativik and ITN representatives, the provincial government appointed Guy Rocher, who had served on the Parent Commission, as mediator in February 1983. By September of the same year he had been unsuccessful in bringing the two sides to a settlement. Later in the fall of 1983, Eric Gourdeau, Director General of SAGMAI, called the two parties back to the negotiating table one more time. After five days of intensive negotiations the ITN leadership agreed to reopen the schools in Povungnituk and Ivujivik by that November. The Board's offer was that:

> la Commission scolaire affirme sa juridiction en conservant la pouvoir de signer les contrats des enseignants et de présenter les budjets au ministère de l'Éducation du Québec, ainsi que la propriété des édifices, le contrôle des dépenses en capital et, enfin, le pouvoir d'organiser les études des élèves qui étudient a l'extérieur des villages. Les Comités d'école de Povungnituk et de Ivjivik, eux, sont assurés du contrôle administratif: systéme de paye, achets, transport, formation de maîtres, fabrication du matériel pédagogique en

> fançais, en anglais et en inuktitutt (McKenzie, 1983, p.319).[26]

This agreement stayed in place for three years. In 1986, the Kativik Commissioners served notice that the two schools would be administrated on the same basis as the other Kativik schools. It was felt that the issue must be resolved. To have two parallel schools systems in place in the territory would threaten the chances of obtaining self-government. This split, especially in Salluit where the community was divided, caused friction between families. At times the arguments grew quite heated. It is a credit to the Inuit people that they resolved their differences without a settlement being imposed upon them by the provincial government.

From 1978 to 1985 the relationship between the Kativik School Board and the Parti Québécois government was not very productive. The Board maintained that the provincial government was not living up to the spirit of the Agreement and that as a result of funding restrictions, the Board was unable to fulfil its mandate. The Board's problems were not limited to just the provincial government. The federal government as a 25 per cent contributor had also been guilty of non-

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[26] In September 1980, I met with Qupaq Tayara, leader of the Salluit ITN. At this point the ITN children had been out of school for two full years. Upon instructions from the Board I promised to take the children back "unofficially". However, the Board was not confident that the children would return to school and thus they were reluctant to hire the extra staff required to accommodate the influx of 75 students. After a flurry of calls the Board relented and agreed to the hiring of new staff. As promised by Qupaq, the children entered school in time to be enrolled before the end of the month deadline for provincial grants.

performance. However, once provided with evidence to that effect in the Tait Report (1982), the federal government moved quickly to make amends. With the election of the provincial Liberals and the appointment of Claude Ryan as Education Minister in 1986 relations between the Board and government warmed considerably. Notwithstanding this positive development the commissioners and education officials have had to face such social problems as substance abuse and student suicide. These problems and the demand for immediate answers have placed the Board under a great deal of pressure. The pressure on the school system has also been increased as a result of its inability to significantly increase the number of post secondary Inuit graduates.[27] Makivik Corporation has been very vocal in its criticisms regarding these social problems and the alleged deficiencies of the educational system in Nouveau Québec. This has resulted in growing tensions between these two Inuit organizations. The next section will examine this relationship and the roots of the tension.

Kativik School Board and Makivik Corporation: Strained Relations

The signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement created the ethnic trust company known as Makivik Corporation to administer the monetary settlement and to oversee the workings of the overall Agreement. Makivik does not control Kativik School Board, but exerts considerable influence on its operation.

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[27] Source: Statistics Canada 1986. "Percentage of Groups Attaining a University Degree" All Canadians 10%, Northern Aboriginals 0.5%. As provided by Dr. Don Taylor of McGill University.

Senator Watt stated that at one time Makivik wanted to contribute to Kativik's budget so it could have a say in how the Board operated. The proposal was refused by the Board.

As previously mentioned, Senator Watt felt that the newly formed Kativik School Board was given too much autonomy from the beginning. His concern was that once Kativik was incorporated as an agency outside the control of Makivik's Inuit leadership, the Inuit commissioners would be overly influenced by non-Native managers. He said that since these managers were put in place they have not initiated very much innovation. In effect he has accused the Board of teaching the same unsuccessful programs that had been delivered by the federal and provincial governments.

With respect to the teacher training program, Watt said that "anyone off the street can get into the program and become a teacher." He also stated that the marking standards on tests within the schools were too low. Furthermore, he felt that teachers gave easy marks to students so that their parents would not complain. Watt said that in the long run this had negative affects on students who went on to study in southern schools. It did not take long for their weaknesses to show up and the students arrive back home as failures.

Lastly, one of his most controversial views was that the principle of teaching in Inutitut for the first three years was "a waste of time." This opinion is based on the belief that there is not enough good quality Inutitut teaching material available

to challenge the interest and intellect of the child. He believes that the teaching of Inutitut is a parental responsibility. He lamented the lack of standardization of the Inutitut language and was concerned that too much freedom to choose amongst education programs could cause difficulties for parents who were not aware of the long term implications.

Despite these alleged deficiencies, Senator Watt commended Kativik for its early organizational work in the area of facilities improvement. He was clear in stating that his criticisms were motivated by a desire to see a system of Inuit control of education that would amount to something very unique. As a result of his strongly held opinions, substantiated by embarrassing statistics on dropouts, the annual general meeting of Makivik Corporation of March 21, 1989 voted to establish the Nunavik Educational Task Force with a mandate to review education policy and programs at all levels. The Task Force was given specific direction to examine six key areas:

> 1 The languages of education including the importance of Inutitut and the acquisition of second language fluency in English or French;
> 2 The content and quality of the school curriculum required for the academic or vocational needs of Inuit students according to their choice of language of instruction;
> 3 The Inuit and non-Inuit teacher training programs required to develop a qualified core of professionally competent teachers;

> 4 The academic requirements needed for Inuit students to be successful in post secondary education and advanced technical training;
> 5 The adult education programs that will best upgrade academic and vocational skills of Inuit;
> 6 The role of the family and community to support and encourage educational objectives (Nunavik Task Force, Newsletter, April 1990, p.7).

Although the Kativik School Board is providing half the funding for the Task Force, its members are suspicious about the activities of the Task Force. Mrs. Popert, Director General of the Board, cited numerous incidents in which Task Force members had failed to attend special meetings. Furthermore, she stated that the Task Force members have not seen the materials they are criticising. At the present time commissioners and officials are bracing themselves for the political repercussion they believe will follow the tabling of the report sometime during the 1991-1992 school year. Board officials said they were disappointed that the two Inuit organizations could not have resolved their differences in a more productive manner.

Conclusion

The Inuit response to Bill 101 (1977) signalled the beginning of a new and different relationship between the Nouveau Québec Inuit and the provincial

government. Senator Watt stated that the experience gained during the JBNQA negotiations served the Inuit well in subsequent negotiations about language. Although the Inuit negotiated an exemption from the full force of Bill 101, Watt said that they did not get exactly what they were after; namely, the entrenchment in Bill 101 of Inuit language and cultural rights. The ministerial exemption which for the time being excludes the Inuit from Bill 101 is subject to change at the whim of any future minister of education. According to Watt the Inuit must be always vigilant in the protection of their rights.

The same vigilance is required concerning the implementation of all sections of the JBNQA. During the negotiations the Inuit and Cree both realized that as a result of the hurried time frame for negotiating the settlement, definitions and clarifications would have to take place at a later date. The federal and provincial governments' non-performance in the funding of education programs was a disappointing experience for the Inuit. However, the Inuit were able to prevail by appearing before a standing committee of the federal government, and pushing their concerns before the public. Their calculated and professional response combined to enhance the reputation of the Inuit as skilful negotiators. The experience gained by Inuit during these political skirmishes with Ottawa and Québec proved invaluable in their quest to improve education.

Although Kativik was given a free rein in the post-Bill 101 era (1977-1980), it soon found itself hampered by an unsympathetic and intransigent provincial

bureaucracy. Politically, to promise the Inuit control of education made it easy to sell the provisions of JBNQA. Full implementation was soon checkmated at the bureaucratic level, however, and Kativik's education plans became mired in red tape. An example of this is seen in the government practice of sending official documents and income tax forms to Inuit in Nouveau Quebec in French thus necessitating the spending of education dollars on the operation of a translation department.[28] While Bill 101 was introduced by a Parti Québécois government, the present day Liberal government has maintained that only French language documents have official status.

It is to the credit of the leadership of the Kativik School Board that their comprehensive proposal to government concerning budget and staff requirements, which was first tabled in early 1987, was finally accepted. The salient features of the agreement called for full funding of Inutitut language teachers and by-the-lesson teachers,[29] and a staffing formula based on class size which enables the Board to calculate the number of teachers it can hire. The maximum number of

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28 Although the province promised the Inuit services in the language of their choice, municipal councils and Kativik Regional Government offices maintain translation departments to deal with communications with Québec.

29 The schools frequently hire local experts to teach a component of a program. An example would be a seamstress would come into the school to teach parka sewing for five to ten one hour lessons. A hunter may be hired to take a class out on the land to teach survival skills. These teachers would not be under contract and would be paid by-the-lesson.

students per class being "15 at the preschool level, 17 at the primary level, 19 at the secondary level and 12 for special education classes" (KSB, April, 1990).

Realizing that it must deal exclusively with the provincial government in all matters, the Board has worked hard since its inception to maintain open lines of communication with different provincial regimes. Since the mid-1980s, the province has reciprocated with an openness that has seen a vast improvement in educational facilities.

When I asked about the original plan to locate the central office in the North, Mrs. Popert[30] said that the plan to move north is still in place, but no steps will be taken to implement this goal until all communities have the required school facilities and staff accommodations.

It is ironic that the two Inuit organizations most in need of mutual support now find themselves on the verge of a schism that may inflict irreparable harm to the concepts of self-government and local control of education. The issues are complex. The mandates of Makivik Corporation and Kativik School Board are different. Senator Watt, who has gained prominence as a spokesperson for the Inuit, feels that Inuit education should be subservient to Makivik's will and vision. Unfortunately for Makivik it must now learn the lesson that all parents do. While Senator Watt may have helped create Kativik, he must let it go its own way.

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30 Mrs.(Locke) Popert is an Inuk from Kuujjuaq who served as a Centre Director and Director of Adult Education prior to her appointment as Director General in February 1983.

Senator Watt and the other Makivik directors must respect the electoral process that voted the commissioners into office. It is the mandate of the commissioners to determine, after consultation, what is the best education for Inuit children. Just as Makivik deplored the paternalism of the federal and provincial governments, Makivik must now respect the choices made by Inuit voters, and the education leaders they elect. In this struggle Makivik and its leadership should be mindful of the trap into which Native control movements sometimes fall. Paulo Freire warns that in replacing a colonial master the new order should beware of the temptation to replace one form of domination with another: "In order for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not become in turn the oppressors of the oppressors [or themselves]"(Freire, 1968, p.28).

Necessity dictates that Makivik and Kativik maintain a close relationship. In some cases members of the same family sit as Kativik commissioners and/or Makivik directors. The issues are very close to home. Both organizations care very deeply for the present and future welfare of the Inuit. The tension that exists is a result of differences of opinion concerning the role each should play in the overall development of their homeland (Nunavik). The Board does not direct economic activity, and neither should Makivik seek to direct education. To think that the Board can cure the myriad of social and economic problems facing Inuit society is wishful thinking on the part of Makivik. It would be equally wrong for the school Board to think that Makivik alone can rejuvenate a depressed economy. To its

credit Kativik has implemented many new and innovative educational programs. As a result, the Inutitut language and culture are strong in Nouveau Québec. Unfortunately, like most Native school boards, Kativik is learning as it goes along, often learning from its own mistakes. However, despite the Board's best efforts Makivik has placed its concerns regarding the long term goals of schooling on the record. As a result tension exists between the two organizations. Although the Board feels that some of the criticism is unfair the commissioners should listen to their constituents including Makivik. Much can be learned in the sharing of collective experiences, hopes, and dreams. If the tension surrounding the role and form of education for Inuit children is left unchecked, the greater danger would be that the two organizations will stop talking to each other. Makivik and Kativik must find a way to remain united. It will take patience and diplomacy from both organizations to survive this crisis and forge a common vision for education.

Chapter VI

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Study

Prior to 1949, Inuit education in Nouveau Québec was carried out on a traditional basis. Inuit parents taught their children the skills that were required to survive in the harsh Arctic conditions. The late 19th and early 20th century saw the arrival of Euro-Canadians - the missionaries, traders and the RCMP. During intermittent contact with missionary groups some informal schooling took place among the Inuit. The federal government believed that the education requirements of the Inuit were minimal. Furthermore, federal authorities took the position that the Inuit were too isolated to warrant extensive and expensive government services.

Early Nouveau Québec Inuit relations with federal agents arose out of the Québec Boundary Extension Act of 1912, with its ensuing problems concerning the legal status of the Inuit population. During the difficult socio-economic conditions of the 1920s and 1930s, the Inuit suffered the physical and psychological trauma brought on by starvation and the collapse of the fur market. In an effort to alleviate such hardships relief was distributed by missionaries and by the Hudson's Bay Company under the auspices of the federal government. Although the federal government arranged for relief to the Inuit, they maintained that the Inuit were the responsibility of the provincial government. As a result the federal government requested reimbursement for the relief provided between 1928

and 1932. The province acceded to Ottawa's request but indicated that it did not accept Ottawa's position on the matter. Québec claimed that the Inuit were a federal responsibility under Section 91 (24) of the B.N.A. Act. This led to the matter being referred to the Supreme Court of Canada. In 1939, the court ruled in Québec's favour. Strangely, the federal government did not adopt any special legislation as a result of the court ruling. Throughout the next decade the federal government pursued a policy of passive involvement in Nouveau Québec.

As the construction of military installations at Kuujjuaq and Iqaluit (Frobisher Bay) during the Second World War led to increased access to the North, journalists and writers exposed the true plight of the Inuit to the Canadian population. The discovery of mineral resources throughout the northern regions prompted the federal government to reconsider its presence in the North and the future role of the Inuit in Canada. During various periods of expanding federal activity in the North, it became clear to the public that the federal government had been neglecting the welfare of the Inuit.

As part of federal policy formation the government determined that the education practices of the past were woefully inadequate to prepare the Inuit for a meaningful role in post-war Canada. In preparation for a move into the area of formal education, the government reviewed the recommendations of the Moore, Lamberton and Low Reports. These three reports became the founding

documents of the federal day school system which first appeared in Nouveau Québec in 1949 and expanded throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

The federal system used English as the language of instruction. Little consideration was given to the special needs of the Nouveau Québec Inuit who lived in a francophone province. The federal system made no provisions for the teaching of Inuit or traditional skills. In fact, these elements of Inuit culture were discouraged. Despite the concerns of some northern educators the Ontario provincial curriculum was used in the Nouveau Québec schools. No provisions were made to involve Inuit parents in any participation in school governance or curriculum development. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the federal government expanded an anglophone presence in Nouveau Québec.

By the early 1960s the Province of Québec, under the leadership of Jean Lesage, displayed a renewed and assertive nationalism. In the areas of economics and education, the province redefined itself. Issues pertaining to sovereignty were high on the provincial government's list. The "maître chez nous" paradigm forced the provincial government to address all instances of perceived federal intrusion into provincial jurisdiction. Setting aside its historical refusal to take responsibility for the welfare of the Inuit, the provincial government launched a massive initiative to displace the anglophone federal government from Nouveau Québec pointing out that the federal government had not passed any special legislation concerning the Inuit. Suddenly the Inuit were full Québec citizens.

Spearheading the drive was René Lévesque, Minister of Natural Resources. In 1963, he created the Direction Générale du Nouveau Québec (DGNQ) to co-ordinate all provincial activity in the region. Immediately the DGNQ established a provincial school system with the intent of challenging the federal presence and luring the Inuit into the provincial system. Despite a program of studies recommended by the Parent and Gendron Commission reports that offered Inutitut instruction for the first three years of school, a choice of instruction in English or French thereafter, and direct parental involvement in key areas of school operations, the Inuit did not abandon the federal school system. Policy implementation in Nouveau Québec was inconsistent and as a result many of the promises made by provincial education officials were not delivered. Implementation problems were also exacerbated by events in southern Québec. Education and language legislation which threatened Inuit language and culture coupled with three changes in the government of the province during the 1960s left the Inuit suspicious of provincial motives. Linked with these feelings of suspicion and uncertainty were memories of the French-speaking traders, Révillon Frères, and of former provincial politicians such as Maurice Duplessis who had abandoned the Inuit during their years of need.

By the early 1970s, the federal and provincial governments were engaged in negotiations designed to bring about a withdrawal of federal services in Nouveau Québec. The federal position was that it would transfer its operations to

the province only if it were the expressed wish of the Inuit that it do so. Given the historical attitude of the provincial government the Inuit leadership was reluctant to accept provincial offers. Leading into the negotiations of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement in 1972, relations between the Inuit and the two levels of government were severely strained.

There is no doubt that the presence of the provincial school system influenced the programming in the federal system. Competing for enrollment, the federal system adopted some of the progressive features of the provincial system. Education Committees were formed, and the teaching of Inutitut and traditional skills was approved. The training of Inuit teachers was also encouraged. Throughout the first half of the 1970s the federal and provincial school systems were remarkably similar. Despite the province's efforts, however, the tri-lingual provincial school system still had five times fewer students than the exclusively English federal system.

Without consulting the Inuit of Nouveau Québec, Robert Bourassa announced the "project of the century" in April 1971. The James Bay hydroelectric development project signalled a turning point in Inuit-government relations leading to changes in the area of education. The ensuing court battles and difficult negotiations served notice to the Inuit that the federal government could no longer be counted upon to safeguard their aboriginal rights. After decades of assuming responsibility for the welfare of the Inuit the federal government adopted a position

of "alert neutrality." The province's initial attitude of intransigence offered little hope for a better relationship with the Inuit.

Financed by federal grants and loans, the newly established Northern Québec Inuit Association formulated and delivered the Inuit position during the negotiations. Headed by articulate leaders such as Charlie Watt and Zebedee Nungak, this organization developed into the driving force of the local control movement in Nouveau Québec. The James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement was signed on November 11, 1975. The Agreement marked the beginning of a new conceptual approach in terms of the historical relationship between the Inuit and the federal and provincial governments. The funding arrangements made it clear that the Inuit had severed the once close ties with the federal government in favour of a closer relationship with the province. For its part the province had assumed the major share of the compensation payments to the Inuit. Furthermore the province contributed a share of the compensation for the treaty Cree. These contemporary positions represent a significant change if not an outright reversal of the historical positions held by the two levels of government in Nouveau Québec.

One of the main demands of the Inuit during the negotiations was the control of education. For the Nouveau Québec Inuit this required the amalgamation of the federal and provincial education systems into one Inuit controlled system. With the signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement in 1975, the

Kativik School Board was created, although the board did not begin instructional operations until September 1978.

By 1977, the Inuit were once again faced with a threat to their language and cultural rights from the new legislation of a recently elected Parti Québécois. With the Kativik School Board still in its infancy, the Inuit response to Bill 101 was organized by the NQIA. The Inuit leadership presented a united front. The outpouring of resentment by the Inuit served notice that the Inuit would not remain silent in the face of threats to their cultural and linguistic sovereignty. Nor would they allow the provincial government to renege on any of the clauses of the Agreement.

The Kativik School Board assumed operational responsibility for all aspects of educational services at the start of the 1978 school year. Although this non-ethnic school board was controlled by Inuit commissioners it was incorporated into the provincial school system and thus required to follow the provincial curriculum. The newly created board established itself as a tri-lingual board. Based on educational research and UNESCO recommendations supporting the use of the mother tongue as the primary language of instruction, Inutitut became the language of instruction for the first three years of school. Other features of Inuit culture incorporated into the board's program included traditional skills such as hunting, fishing, igloo building, preparing food from the land and sewing. The teacher training program initially developed between the Commission Scolaire du

Nouveau Québec and McGill University was also assumed by the board. An amended School Act dealing with the operations of the Kativik School Board entitled Education Committees to exercise power in a wide range of areas as delegated by the commissioners. This authority included such areas as responsibility for all hiring personnel and approval of all locally developed courses. The authority of the Education Committee coupled with the role of the Centre Director as chief administrative officer of the school gave the local governance and administrative structure a very unique profile. Although the school board had been given free rein to establish its operations during the first three years of its mandate, the Parti Québécois provincial government soon moved to limit the funds available to the board. As a result the board was in a state of crisis by 1985 and relations with the province were strained. The situation did not improve until the provincial Liberals were elected in 1986 and Claude Ryan was appointed Minister of Education. Since then Kativik has enjoyed a supportive and co-operative relationship with the province. As result in the past few years the province has approved the allocation of half a million dollars per year for curriculum development in all three languages.

It has now been 15 years since the anglophone federal school system closed its doors. In that time the issues of education, language and culture have continued to be major topics of discussion between the Inuit and provincial government representatives. Over that same time span, yet following a more

passive policy, the provincial government has seen the French language as a language of instruction, make steady gains. At the present rate, French will become the majority choice for language of instruction before the turn of the century. The hope that the Inuit would in time come to see the benefits of learning French as expressed by the Gendron Commission appears to have come true. The President of the Kativik School Board has been quoted previously as saying that the Inuit should learn both English and French.

While a co-operative relationship appears to exist between Kativik and the provincial government, the same can not be said for the relationship between Kativik and Makivik Corporation.

Recent criticism aimed at the board by Makivik Corporation has centred on the perception that since its inception, the board has done little that is new or innovative. Past and present board administrators are accused of simply repackaging existing programs. Problems such as substance abuse, high dropout rates and adolescent suicide frustrate many Inuit leaders.

It is easy to target the school board as a scapegoat for all the problems associated with culture shock, rapid acculturation and a depressed economy. From a different angle, the problems may also stem from personality differences and conflicting visions. Whatever his faults, history has shown Senator Watt to be a man capable of shaping events. He sees through hindsight where Makivik lost the opportunity to control the operations of the school board. Now Makivik wishes

to assert control over policies and programs implemented by the duly elected school commissioners. In an attempt to give credibility to his concerns, the Nunavik Education Task Force was established by Makivik with the mandate to investigate virtually all board activities. Though the full report of the task force is still pending, initial damage has been done. Since its creation suspicion and intrigue have surrounded the work of the task force. The Director General of the school board has requested that the board be given six months to prepare its response to the report before it is made public. To date Makivik has refused this request. In light of the fact that the board contributed 50 per cent of the costs associated with the task force, the board's request appears reasonable. Makivik's intransigence on the matter perhaps suggests an ulterior motive.

This thesis has traced the development of relationships between the Nouveau Québec Inuit and anglophone Euro-Canadians; and Inuit relations with the federal and provincial governments, with a special focus on education and language programs. The first people in contact with the Inuit were predominantly anglophone. Over many decades the influence of the English-speaking Canadians was absorbed by the Inuit to such an extent that the Inuit came to prefer their governmental services. The increased accessibility of Nouveau Québec to the rest of the province has contributed to the declining influence of the English language in the region. For the generation of Inuit children who went through the federal

system, English remains the dominant language. For those who have entered the school system since 1978 English is still dominant but on the decline.

The research has demonstrated that both the federal and provincial school systems were motivated by issues of "sovereignty" and "responsibility." Each level of government implemented its education policies with little regard for what the Inuit desired for themselves. The Inuit and their children were pawns in a federal-provincial conflict that had existed since the 1920s.

Though the tension that now exists between Makivik and Kativik has the potential to cause damage, such rigorous debate in the Inuit population concerning the goals of education is a healthy sign. Regardless of the outcome of the debate it is hoped that the children will not once again be used for political purposes.

Suggestions for Further Study

With the Nunavik Education Task Force due to table its report within the next few months it will be interesting to examine the comments of Inuit students and parents regarding their school system. Their ideas for improving the school system and ameliorating the effects of acculturation are of interest to the whole education community.

It has been demonstrated that both levels of government felt that the road to economic opportunity was paved by second language fluency. The federal government forced English upon the Inuit students who came to the day school.

While the provincial school ostensibly offered a language choice, the ultimate goal was the francisation of the Inuit student. It would be interesting to examine the link between economic opportunity and second language ability to see if the promise was or is true.

The recently announced Royal Commission on Native Issues can look to Nouveau Québec for a model of Native self-government. A continued examination of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement may prove informative. This first comprehensive land claim settlement left in abeyance a full definition of aboriginal rights. The Agreement is unique because the relationship between a Native group, the Inuit, and the federal government has been superseded by a stronger relationship with the provincial government. During the negotiations this was seen as very risky. An in-depth examination of this particular relationship, however, may prove useful as more land claims negotiations take place in the years ahead.

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