

**The Transnational Politics of Canadian, Chinese-language Television
News Production: Media, immigration, and foreign policy**

by
Elim Yee-Lam Ng

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science
University of Alberta

© Elim Yee-Lam Ng, 2019

ABSTRACT

The complexities and challenges of minority media production bring sharp focus to the sprawling and nebulous politics of transnational migration. By creating news programs meant to inform people with attachments in Canada, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China, Canadian, Chinese-language television news (CCLTN) workers bring together overlapping political claims from both the Chinese and Canadian states. Each of these governments seek a specific subject-state relationship with Chinese people in Canada and so engages CCLTN production to that affect. My dissertation considers the dilemmas, strategies, and choices of the people charged with creating such news programs by asking the question: how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states? I sought answers to my question by interviewing CCLTN workers, including news directors, network presidents, advertising managers, and reporters, in May and June of 2013. Their answers revealed the resourceful ways in which these workers renegotiate the subject-state claims made by each state, even as they are marginalized in their own industry as well as serving communities marginalized by Canada and the PRC. Where the PRC government desires loyal agents through which they can project their power and influence in overseas Chinese communities, CCLTN workers selectively engage by acknowledging the importance of the Chinese state while seeking to develop independent editorial approaches to issues considered to be politically sensitive by the Chinese Communist Party. The Canadian government, by contrast, seeks news coverage which will assist in immigrant adaptation and affirm the efficacy of Canadian multiculturalism. CCLTN workers respond by not only aligning themselves with the goal of immigrant adaptation but also describe the value of their work with respect to cultural retention and minority recognition. In this way, they offer back to the Canadian state a different vision of multicultural practice in Canada.

Preface

This thesis is an original work by Elim Ng. The research project, of which this thesis is a part, received research ethics approval from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board, “Canadian, Chinese-language Television News,” No. 34890, October 2013.

Dedication

For my mother. Thank you for believing in me every step of the way.

Acknowledgements

It may appear that the writing of a dissertation is a solitary affair, but nothing is farther from the truth. A fair number of people have been involved in the completion of this dissertation, and it has been my remarkable good fortune to be engaged in academic pursuits while surrounded by so many kind and interesting people. Thank you first to the many people at the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta who made the completion of this dissertation possible. Thanks first to my supervisor, Dr. Yasmeeen Abu-Laban, whose deep and thoughtful insight is only matched by her incredible skill in graduate teaching. Thank you so much for your encouragement and support. It has been a privilege to know you. Thanks also to my committee members, Dr. Linda Trimble and Dr. Ashley Esarey. Your comments and recommendations have done so much to improve and enrich my dissertation. I could not have asked for a more talented team of advisors. Thanks also to the China Institute, who helped fund my research. To the wonderful and dedicated administrators and staff at the department, Caroline Kinyua, Cindy Anderson, and Donna Coombs-Montrose: Thank you. Your experience and foresight have saved my bacon on so many occasions. I would not have done this without your help. A warm thank you to all of my fellow occupants on the twelfth floor of the Tory building. Academic life can be so isolating, but your quirks, kindness, and friendship made the twelfth floor feel like a neighborhood. Thanks especially to my dogged writing group: Nisha, Lyubov, and Maya. We made it! Thank you to Dr. Judy Garber, who made me feel seen. Thank you to Dr. Cressida Hayes, who made me feel heard. I have never lived in a city for as long as I have lived in Edmonton. Thank you to the many people who made this place feel like home and whose friendship warmed and beautified the austerity of these long Edmonton winter nights. Thanks to the saints of St. Herman's: the Samarodens, the Perrys, the Scratches, and the Friesens. There is something very grounding about explaining to a five-year old that I am in grade twenty-five, so thanks for that and thanks to Geoff who said it first. Thanks also to Barbara, Louise, Becky, and Heather for your friendship and kindness. Thank you to Fr. Matthew Francis and Dr. Amy Borkent. Thank you both for your support amidst great difficulty. Finally, thank you to my warm and crazy family who went on this journey with me. Thank you to my mom and dad for being with me every step of the way. Thanks to my sister Carlen, who makes the world her red carpet. Thank you finally to my life partner, Stephen. Thank you for leaving your family and your people so that we could start a life together while I finished my degree. Everything I do, I do with you.

Table of Contents

List of Tables – xiii

List of Abbreviations – xiv

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION – 1

1. Nation-building in an age of transnational migration and the politics of minority media production – 4
2. The Chinese state, the Canadian state, and CCLTN production – 5
 - 2.1. The Chinese state and CCLTN production – 5
 - 2.2. The Canadian state and CCLTN production – 7
 - 2.3. China and Canada as sending and receiving states – 9
3. Key findings – 9
4. Subject-state relations and the politics of minority media production – 11
5. Sending states, receiving states, and transnational migration literature – 13
6. Television and media in the life of transnational migrant communities – 16
7. Multiculturalism and CCLTN production in a time of nationalist resurgence – 18
8. A brief note on terminology – 20
9. Conclusion – 23

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW – 25

1. Transnational migration – 25
 - 1.1 Transnationalism and its critics – 26
 - 1.2 Transnationalism and nationalism are linked – 31
 - 1.3 The lack of sending state research in transnational migration scholarship – 33
 - 1.4 Findings from sending state research – 35
 - 1.5 Building on sending state literature – 42

2. Media and communications studies – 43
 - 2.1 Journalism practice – 44
 - 2.2 The political economy of communications – 48
 - 2.3 State and society in the political economy of communications – 49
 - 2.4 The political economy of communications in Canada – 51
3. Minority media: content, consumption, and production – 56
 - 3.1 Content and consumption – 56
 - 3.2 Minority media production – 58
 - 3.3 Findings, projects, and themes in minority media research – 61
4. Conclusion: the sending state, receiving state, and minority media workers – 64

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY – 66

1. Single n case studies – 66
2. Setting the scene – 66
 - 2.1 The Chinese in Canada – 70
 - 2.2 The CCLTN producers – 72
 - 2.3 CCLTN programming – 74
3. Notes on Sources of Data – 78
 - 3.1 Rationale for interviewing CCLTN workers – 78
 - 3.2 Interview subject details – 79
 - 3.3 Print and web primary sources – 81
4. Ensuring credibility in interview research – 82
5. Difficulties encountered in my research – 85
6. Interview data collection and processing – 88
 - 6.1 Phase 1: Research into contextual information – 88
 - 6.2 Phase 2: Interview preparation and developing protocols, surveys, and interview prompts – 88

6.3 Phase 3: Recruitment – 90

6.4 Phase 4: Conducting the interviews – 90

6.5 Phase 5: Processing the interviews – 92

CHAPTER 4: CHINA AND CCLTN PRODUCTION – 94

1. China's diaspora engagement policies – 95
 - 1.1. Newspapers, revolutions, and decolonization – 96
 - 1.2. Overseas Chinese policy in the reform era – 100
 - 1.3. Overseas Chinese policy from the 1990s to the present – 101
2. China's foreign affairs and overseas Chinese policy – 109
 - 2.1. China's rise and the government's adoption of "soft power" strategies – 109
 - 2.2. Overseas Chinese and China's soft power and public diplomacy efforts – 112
3. Chinese media development and transnationalization – 118
 - 3.1. Development of media policy amidst economic reform and domestic governance concerns – 118
 - 3.2. Development of media policy and China's stepping out – 123
 - 3.3. Fragmentation in policy and process – 128
4. Conclusion – 131

CHAPTER 5: CCLTN WORKER RESPONSE TO CHINESE GOVERNANCE – 132

1. China's news content and CCLTN worker response – 134
 - 1.1 The Great Wall Television Platform and the competition for audience attention – 134
 - 1.2 CCLTN workers discuss the benefits of using content from China as a media – 138
 - 1.3 CCLTN workers identify the difficulties of working with content from China – 144
 - 1.4 Standards and techniques for working with media made in China – 149
2. Engaging CCLTN workers directly: conferences, forums, organizations, and trips – 154
 - 2.1 Overseas Chinese media forums – 155
 - 2.2 CCLTN worker response to forums – 156

- 2.3 China: too important to ignore – 160
- 3. Divided homeland origins and CCLTN production politics – 160
 - 3.1 The growth of Mandarin speakers and differing news priorities – 161
 - 3.2 Divided news rooms and conflict management – 164
- 4. Conclusion – 165

CHAPTER 6: CANADA AND CCLTN PRODUCTION – 168

- 1. Multiculturalism policy – 169
 - 1.1. Multiculturalism and its policy beginnings – 170
 - 1.2. Multiculturalism and the global economy – 174
 - 1.3. Multiculturalism in the Harper years and beyond – 176
- 2. Broadcasting policy – 179
 - 2.1. Early developments in broadcast policy – 180
 - 2.2. Canadian nationalism and the development of broadcasting policy – 183
 - 2.3. Broadcasting meets the telecommunications industry and neoliberal ideals – 187
- 3. Canada's minority media policy: Ethnic broadcasting policy – 195
 - 3.1. Canadian multiculturalism and ethnic broadcasting policy – 196
- 4. CCLTN producers – 199
 - 4.1. OMNI: The multilingual, over-the-air television network – 199
 - 4.2. Fairchild Television: Category A specialty channel – 201
 - 4.3. Global Mandarin News Hour on Shaw Multicultural Channel – 204
- 5. Conclusion – 209

CHAPTER 7: CCLTN WORKER RESPONSE TO CANADIAN GOVERNANCE – 211

- 1. CCLTN workers and the CRTC – 212
 - 1.1. The CRTC and supporting ethnic media in Canada – 213
 - 1.2. CCLTN worker response to neoliberal changes and protective regulation – 216

- 1.3. CCLTN workers and discontent with CRTC favouritism – 219
- 1.4. CCLTN worker thoughts on CRTC commitment to multiculturalism – 220
- 2. CCLTN workers and multicultural policy – 223
 - 2.1. Anti-racism and multiculturalism – 223
 - 2.2. CCLTN worker response to calls for immigrant adaptation in Canadian multiculturalism – 225
 - 2.3. CCLTN workers on recognition, voice, and contributions to Canadian multiculturalism – 229
 - 2.4. CCLTN workers on recognition and racism – 233
- 3. Conclusion: CCLTN workers and the contested meaning of multiculturalism – 138

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION – 241

- Key takeaways for policy makers – 241
- Future research about receiving states – 243
- Future research about sending states – 246
- Concluding remarks – 246

BIBLIOGRAPHY – 248

APPENDIX A: DOCUMENTS USED DURING INTERVIEWS – 288

- Interview prompts – 288
- Demographic Surveys – 291
- Checklist for each interview – 292

APPENDIX B: DOCUMENTS USED AND CREATED DURING THE CODING PROCESS – 293

- Initial list of themes from early readings of the interviews – 293
- Codes created and used in coding process – 295

List of Tables

Table 1. Canadian, Chinese-language Television News Programs – 75

Table 2. Chinese languages spoken by interview subjects – 83

Table 3. Homeland origins of interview subjects – 83

Table 4: Number of interview subjects discussing CRTC regulation and business models – 213

Table 5: Number of administrators and number of journalists discussing CRTC regulation and business models – 213

Table 6: Number of interview subjects discussing value of CCLTN to immigrant adaptation – 225

Table 7: Codes created and used in coding process – 295

List of Abbreviations

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCLTN	Canadian, Chinese-language television news
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	China Central Television
CGTN	China Global Television Network
CNN	Cable News Network
CRC	Canadian Radio-television Commission
CRTC	Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission
EU	European Union
GMD	Guomindang
GWTV	Great Wall Television Platform
MIIT	Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
OCAO	Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
PRC	People's Republic of China
SAPPRFT	State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television
SMC	Shaw Multicultural Channel
UFWD	United Front Work Department
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Canadian, Chinese-language television news (CCLTN)

Imagine an early morning on an ordinary weekday in a newsroom in Vancouver, Canada. News staff trickle into the station, checking their emails and twitter feed for the latest news and updates. At 9:00 AM, a team of journalists and their news director meet in their conference room to discuss which stories they plan to pursue for the evening news broadcast. Pitches around the table include controversies over foreign property ownership in Vancouver, the provincial response to a federal carbon tax plan, and Canada's diplomatic dispute with China. The news program is, by all accounts, Canadian. It is produced in Canada, by a Canadian owned corporation, and the staff are long-time residents in Canada choosing stories they believe matter to viewers in Canada. What might surprise onlookers, however, is that the anchorperson is not delivering the news in either of Canada's official languages—English or French—but in Mandarin, one of the most commonly spoken non-official language in Canada.¹

Chinese-language television is a form of minority media in Canada.² Minority media refers to media that is produced by and/or for linguistic, religious, ethnic, and national minorities.³ Minority media outlets vary significantly in terms of ownership, format,

¹ Cantonese and Mandarin are both spoken by 5.2% of Canadian immigrants. The next largest language group is Tagalog, which is spoken by 4.7% of Canadian immigrants (Statistics Canada, "Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity," webpage, Focus on Geography Series, 2016 Census (Ottawa: Government of Canada, February 8, 2017), <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/fogs-spg/Facts-can-eng.cfm?Lang=Eng&GK=CAN&GC=01&TOPIC=7>; Isa Lee (reporter for Fairchild TV), in discussion with author, June 6, 2014, Toronto, Ontario.

² Chinese language refers to the various dialects spoken by people in China and in Chinese communities around the world. They include Mandarin, Cantonese, and Fujianese, among others.

³ Matthew D. Matsaganis, Vikki S. Katz, and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media: Producers, Consumers, and Societies* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2011), 12. While scholars treat Canada's Francophone and Indigenous media as minority media, Canada has an additional category which the government refers to as "ethnic media," which is defined as "an ethnic program is one, in any language, that is specifically directed to any culturally or racially distinct group other than one that is Aboriginal Canadian or from France or the British Isles."

distribution, and content. Minority media can include privately owned local newspapers as well as national television programs that are broadcast from the home country to migrant audiences overseas.⁴

Despite catering to a niche audience, at the time of my fieldwork there were three Canadian corporations producing Chinese-language programming for audiences in Canada—Corus Entertainment, Rogers Media, and Fairchild Television. While all three corporations imported foreign programming to support their Chinese-language endeavours, they also produced, in-house, Chinese-language programs, such as evening news broadcasts, investigative magazine shows, call-in shows with expert panels, and current events talk shows. I refer to these programs as Canadian, Chinese-language television news (CCLTN), the corporations who produce them as CCLTN producers, and the individuals who work in CCLTN production as CCLTN workers. The politics surrounding CCLTN production is the focus of my research. My dissertation asks: How do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states? I argue that CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states by speaking pragmatically to economic incentives offered by both states while framing their engagement with each state differently. In so doing CCLTN workers are renegotiating the subject-state relationship with each state.

Subject-state relationships are created when states project an affiliation to itself onto a given population. A subject-state relationship has four defining qualities. First, subject-state relationships take place within a transnational rather than domestic space. This means that

CRTC, “Ethnic Broadcasting Policy” Public notice CRTC 1999-117 (Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), July 16, 1999), <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/1999/pb99-117.htm>. To be consistent with most other scholars, I use the term minority media to refer to all minorities in Canada—including Francophone and Indigenous. The term “ethnic media” will follow the Canadian government’s definition.

⁴ Ibid, 23.

multiple states are at work, and their claims on a given population can overlap and conflict. Congruently, the subjects in a subject-state relationship also reside in a transnational space. States may choose to target a group that resides entirely in one country, such as Russian speakers living in eastern Ukraine. Or the population in question may be spread out across several states, like the Sami who live in the northern parts of Finland, Norway, and Sweden. In either case, the targeted population is in a transnational space. Thus, the subjects in a subject-state relationship need not be citizens of the state in question or even reside within that state's territory.

Second, the subject-state relationship is a social construct in which the state imagines and creates an idealized version of itself, the subject, and their relationship through discourse and policy. The subject is also involved in the social construction of the subject-state relationship, often by embracing or rejecting the relationship and identity set forth by the state. Notably, however, without the powers of governmental organization and the systemic bias of the nation-state system, the subject's ability to shape the subject-state relationship is limited.

Third, the state's behaviour and orientation in the subject-state relationship is self-interested and self-referential. The state ascribes onto the subject a role and identity that both affirms the state's version of its national identity while also serving a strategic purpose. As such, the given population in a subject-state relationship may be more unified and more self-aware in state discourse and policy than in reality.

Finally, in a subject-state relationship, the population in question are subjects in the sense that they have been discursively created by the state and are then placed in a narrative shaped by the state's grammar and vocabulary. The population in question are also subjects in the sense of being subject to someone's authority, though this authority may be distorted by distance, fragmented by overlapping claims, or even subverted by the subjects themselves.

1. Nation-building in an age of transnational migration and the politics of minority media production

My thesis uses CCLTN to examine how transnational migration shapes the politics of minority media production. In so doing, my work reveals the ways in which CCLTN workers renegotiate subject-state relationships with both the Chinese and Canadian states. My research question—how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states—focuses on the dilemmas confronting minority media workers due to receiving subject-state claims from both the sending and receiving states. Ultimately, my efforts lead to further hypothesis generation about the politics of minority media production as well as nation building amidst transnational migration.

My data collection included three and a half weeks of field research in Vancouver and Toronto in 2013. In those cities, I visited CCLTN producer headquarters and saw the television stations where CCLTN is produced. The bulk of my field research, however, was comprised of interviews with people who are involved in Chinese TV news production in Canada. I interviewed twenty-nine people in total; of the twenty-nine interviews, I selected all of the interviews with current and former CCLTN workers to include in my research. In the end, I had twenty-two interviews to analyze.

Other forms of primary data collection included documents from the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), government websites, company websites, and newspaper articles. I consulted secondary sources, particularly with respect to learning about sending state and receiving state policies. The body of scholarship that had the most extensive research on minority media was communications studies, but here the role of the state was often undertheorized.

2. The Chinese state, the Canadian state, and CCLTN production

I encountered very little research on CCLTN, and none of it was done in the discipline of political science. Consequently, I position my research as a hypothesis generating single case study. Here, CCLTN is a case of minority media. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the sending state involved and Canada is the receiving state. Because states typically experience both emigration and immigration, any state could be studied as both a sending state and a receiving state. However, I use the term “sending state” when discussing a state's relationship and policies concerning an overseas population, such as expatriates, refugees, recent emigrants, and even communities that have been settled abroad for generations. In contrast, “receiving states” refers to states when considering their policies towards those who have been admitted or those who seek admission; this includes visitors, asylum seekers, and immigrants—both new and those that have become established minorities.

Significantly, it would be inadequate and untrue to treat CCLTN producers as merely agents of or proxies for the sending state, the receiving state, or Chinese Canadian communities. CCLTN producers are their own entities—for-profit corporations operating in an environment shaped by the diverse interests of the Chinese state, the Canadian state, and the audiences that they purport to serve. At the same time, CCLTN workers are not just empty vessels following the interests of others. Rather, CCLTN workers demonstrate agency by interpreting, prioritizing, and then responding to the perceived interests and actions of the sending state, overseas communities, and receiving state.

2.1 The Chinese state and CCLTN production

As Canadian media corporations, CCLTN producers are not subject to the regulations and governance that China exercises over its own media firms. However, China remains important

to CCLTN producers—as a market actor and as a significant political and cultural point of reference for CCLTN audiences. Significantly, the Chinese state has sought to foster relationships with overseas Chinese communities to promote economic development and financial investment.⁵ Moreover, the PRC government has sought to influence overseas Chinese in order to suppress dissent about PRC policy on Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and other legitimacy issues.⁶ The PRC government reaches out to overseas Chinese in many different ways including creating positions for them in the PRC’s political institutions, sponsoring professional associations, and changing visa regulations to permit longer stays for overseas Chinese in China.

Along with the PRC’s range of instruments and policies, Chinese-language news media has become another avenue for reaching out to overseas Chinese.⁷ This has involved creating opportunities for networking with overseas Chinese media professionals through state sponsored conferences as well as making state created and regulated content readily available abroad.⁸ To

⁵ Shaoi Zerba, “The PRC’s Overseas Chinese Policy” (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), Calhoun Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/4030/08Jun_Zerba.pdf;sequence=1; Mette Thunø, “Reaching out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas: The Trans-Territorial Scope of the PRC by the End of the 20th Century,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 168 (2001): 910.

⁶ “Meeting on China’s Peaceful Reunification Opens in Hong Kong,” SINA English, September 21, 2010, <http://english.sina.com/china/p/2010/0921/340629.html>; “Beijing Held Third World Chinese Education Conference,” *Chinascope*, February 1, 2015; Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 4 (2015): 51, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0056>.

⁷ Chinese and Chinese languages refer to all or any Chinese dialects. Where specificity is required, the actual dialect, such as Mandarin, Cantonese, and Fujianese, will be used.

⁸ Rui Zhang, “Chinese Language Media Forum Meets,” *China.org.cn*, September 15, 2005, <http://china.org.cn/english/2005/Sep/142324.htm>; Xiaoling Zhang, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China: From Propaganda to Hegemony* (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2011.), 106; “Overseas Chinese Media Talk up ‘Chinese Dream,’” *Global Times*, September 4, 2013, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/808590.shtml>; *Chinascope*, “Beijing Held Third World Chinese Education Conference”; “Jia Qinglin Voices Five-Point Hope for Overseas Chinese,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia (Government of China), accessed January 2, 2019, <http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t363128.htm>; “Top Official Hails Successes of Fuzhou Media Forum,” *China Daily*, accessed March 22, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/fujian/2017-09/13/content_31937192.htm.

that end China has launched an international news syndicate—China Global Television (CGTV)— and opened offices for them around the world. Further, news content from CGTV— both the footage and scripts—are available for free rebroadcast and republication through a blanket copyright.⁹

Engagement with overseas Chinese is certainly not the only reason for the transnationalization of media from the PRC. The PRC government is also interested in the sustainability and growth of China's domestic media industry amidst integration with global media and information markets as well as improving its image abroad by creating a global news network.¹⁰ Nonetheless, these and other changes do shape the Chinese media market both transnationally and in Canada, and this is important to CCLTN producers.

2.2 The Canadian state and CCLTN production

The Canadian state has been central to the development of CCLTN, primarily through three areas of policy: first, multiculturalism and immigration, second, broadcasting and telecommunications, and third, ethnic broadcasting policy. Immigration reforms in the 1960s led to an increase in Chinese immigration, thus creating a Chinese speaking TV audience in Canada. In the 1970s and 1980s Canadian governments began implementing and articulating multicultural policies which sought to recognize ethnic minorities and help them maintain

⁹ Zhengrong Hu, Deqiang Ji, and Yukon Gong, "From the Outside In: CCTV Going Global in a New World Communication Order," in *China's Media Go Global*, ed. Anbin Shi, Daya Kishan Thussu, and Hugo de Burgh (New York: Routledge, 2018), 71.

¹⁰ Amar C. Bakshi, "China's Challenge to International Journalism," *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 31, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2011): 147–48, <https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2011.0005>; Zhang, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China*, 4–6 and 23–25; Yuezhi Zhao, "Transnational Capital, the Chinese State, and China's Communication Industries in a Fractured Society," *JAVNOST-THE PUBLIC* 10, no. 4 (December 2003): 53–55.

distinct identities.¹¹ To that end, the CRTC was made responsible for making and upholding regulations that reflect the “multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society.”¹²

The resulting regulatory environment has been crucial to the development of CCLTN. Canadian content regulations, for instance, required Canadian broadcasters to air varying quotas of Canadian programming.¹³ Thus, CCLTN providers could not simply import all of their content from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the Chinese mainland. This led CCLTN producers to create a variety of programs in Chinese languages including news broadcasts and current events magazine programs. Other forms of protective regulation have included mandatory carriage, which requires telecommunications firms to offer Canadian Chinese-language channels if they are available, and buy-through regulations, which only allow foreign Chinese-language services to be purchased in conjunction with Canadian Chinese-language channels.¹⁴

Many of these regulations have been criticized for being too interventionist, and commentators have noted a shift towards a more neoliberal outlook at the CRTC.¹⁵ At the same time, the way in which multiculturalism has been practiced and understood in Canada has been changing. Rather than focusing on cultural retention and recognition of minority contributions, multicultural discourse in Canada has emphasized immigrant adaptation, often treating it as the

¹¹ Pertinent pieces of legislation include the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), the Multiculturalism Act (1985), and the Human Rights Act (1976). These pieces of legislation went into reshaping the CRTC’s mandate in the Broadcasting Act (1991). A more detailed explanation will be offered in Chapter 4.

¹² Wenfei Li, “Ethnic Broadcasting and Ethnic Relations: A comparative Study between Canada and China” (master’s thesis, University of Ottawa, 2010), 37; Broadcast Policy Act Section 3 (1) (c i) <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/B-9.01/page-1.html#h-4>. The CRTC is a Canadian government agency mandated to regulate telecommunications and broadcasting in Canada.

¹³ Quotas have varied over the years and differ for each license. Liora Salter and Felix Odartey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada* (Toronto : Thomson Carswell, 2008.), 505–7.

¹⁴ Chinese-language packages were often bundled together, so that Canadian products are purchased as a matter of course.

¹⁵ Robert Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 76–77; Bart Beaty and Rebecca Sullivan, *Canadian Television Today* (Calgary : University of Calgary Press, 2006.), 52–55.

opposite of cultural retention. In combination, the outcome of these two trends has been diminished support for CCLTN production and fewer market protections for CCLTN providers.

2.3 China and Canada as sending and receiving states

I decided to use China and Canada as the sending and receiving states in my study because both states are known to have made significant efforts to govern minority or overseas populations. Canadian multiculturalism is often considered to be especially accommodating and accepting of ethnocultural difference, particularly when it is compared with more assimilating models of immigrant integration in France, the United States, and Australia.¹⁶ In this way, I would be able to study receiving state influence in a situation where the receiving state is actively engaging and including in ways that, at least discursively, promote acceptance of difference.

China was chosen for similar reasons. Many sending states reach out to overseas populations; however, China's efforts in engaging overseas Chinese are becoming increasingly energetic at the same time that it has chosen to expand its international media capacity.¹⁷ Thus the incentives and capabilities for reaching out to overseas Chinese are tied to China's growing international power and presence. As such, energy and presence of the sending and receiving states in my case comprise fertile ground for research and hypothesis generation.¹⁸

3. Key findings

My research indicates that CCLTN workers speak pragmatically to economic incentives offered by both the Chinese and Canadian states—acknowledging that they use free content provided by

¹⁶ Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 189–90.

¹⁷ Zerba, "The PRC's Overseas Chinese Policy," 47.

¹⁸ Jack S. Levy, "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 1 (2008): 7.

the Chinese state while also enjoying some market protections from Canadian regulation. At the same time, however, the ways in which CCLTN workers frame and legitimate their engagement differs for each state. They tend to emphasize alignment with Canadian political values and state goals but reject the same with respect to the PRC.

As I will show, CCLTN workers emphasized their endorsement of Canadian multiculturalism and their utility to immigrant integration. In so doing, they highlight their role in fostering a specific subject-state relationship between Chinese Canadian communities and the Canadian state, thus justifying their own existence. Yet CCLTN worker alignment with the Canadian state is not without complexities. CCLTN workers often talked about the importance of their work in terms of transnational connection and minority recognition. However, the Canadian state has been changing both the way it practices multiculturalism as well as the way it talks about multiculturalism. These changes include sidelining cultural retention and minority recognition as well as sometimes treating these outcomes as impediments to immigrant adaptation. This gap has often left CCLTN workers feeling unsupported by both the Canadian government and their corporate owners.

In contrast to how CCLTN workers described their relationship with the Canadian state, CCLTN workers tended to emphasize their lack of interaction with the Chinese state in order to differentiate themselves from state-owned media in China. By positioning themselves in this way, CCLTN workers are asserting their independence from any real or perceived Chinese state goals. This allows them to claim journalistic objectivity and defend their use of content from Chinese state-owned media sources. Furthermore, it lends legitimacy and critical distance to their coverage of issues and events in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Thus, CCLTN workers are negotiating a different subject-state relationship with the Chinese state.

4. Subject-state relations and the politics of minority media production

The way in which CCLTN workers accept economic benefits from both the Chinese and Canadian states while framing their engagement with each state differently indicates that political calculations are underway amidst CCLTN production. Here, transnational migration has brought together overlapping subject-state relationships between different states over the same population. However, the result cannot simply be described as a direct conflict between the two different claims, though that is often what is expected or feared. Rather, there is a simultaneous renegotiation of the subject-state relationship with both the sending and the receiving state. Each state has made its desires and intentions understood, to which CCLTN workers respond, not simply by accepting them but by selectively engaging and adding their own sense of what seems appropriate or reasonable.

With respect to the receiving state, CCLTN workers I spoke with understand the pull of settlement. Subsequently, they found it necessary to engage with Canadian issues and identify with what the Canadian state wants for its immigrants and minorities. The Canadian state wants ethnocultural minorities to demonstrate the success of Canadian multiculturalism and the fairness of Canada's immigration system by succeeding economically and participating in mainstream social and political institutions. CCLTN workers have responded by asserting that their work promotes and assists immigrant adaptation among their viewers. In this way CCLTN workers are aligning themselves with the Canadian state on this matter.

However, many of my interview subjects also spoke extensively about how CCLTN adds to the diversity of Canadian society by giving Chinese communities a voice. Several interview subjects claimed that they tell stories and deal with issues that are not well-explored in mainstream media. The complexity of their work as well as the fact that it is made for Chinese

communities in Canada stands in stark contrast to “festival multiculturalism.” Festival multiculturalism is a term used by some critics of Canadian multiculturalism to refer to instances in which ethnocultural minorities perform and offer simplified, consumable aspects of complex cultures to the mainstream so that they can be part of the Canadian mosaic.¹⁹ The Canadian state outlines a subject-state relationship characterized by immigrant adaptation and a shallow, state-affirming performance of diversity. CCLTN workers have responded by supporting immigrant adaptation, but they have also affirmed the importance of exercising minority recognition and cultural maintenance. Notably, the way in which CCLTN workers enact diversity is tailored for the consumption of Chinese Canadian communities rather than for non-Chinese Canadians. In this way, CCLTN workers accept some of the Canadian state’s goals while offering their own sense of what is missing.

Similarly, the CCLTN workers I spoke with were also selective about how they engaged the Chinese state. Many of the interview subjects emphasized that maintaining a sense of connection to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China is very important to their viewers. Several CCLTN workers asserted that the many different strands of transnational connection—business, family, education, and culture—necessitate ongoing interest in the sending state. At the same time, the PRC government is also interested in forging connections with some elements of overseas Chinese communities. The subject-state relationship that the PRC seeks to cultivate is one in which well-connected overseas Chinese will serve as reliable and loyal agents and promoters of the PRC government. The Chinese state is looking to project its power both in overseas Chinese communities and in foreign countries more generally, and individuals with influence can be a great resource. Through these agents, the PRC government means to improve

¹⁹ Neil Bissoondath, “Multiculturalism,” *New Internationalist*, September 5, 1998, <https://newint.org/features/1998/09/05/multiculturalism>.

the image of the Chinese state abroad and assist China in controlling discourse on controversial issues such as Tibetan and Taiwanese independence.

Again, CCLTN workers find themselves caught in a state's desire to construct subject-state relations. CCLTN workers are desirable assets for the Chinese state because their involvement in mass media places them in positions of influence. Rather than completely accepting or rejecting the role offered to them by the Chinese state, CCLTN workers were selective in their engagement. For the most part, CCLTN workers affirmed their use of media content from China, and often stressed that this is necessary due to China's importance to the world and to their viewers. In this way, CCLTN workers reflect the power of the Chinese state in their work, explaining that even if they do not agree with what is done by the PRC government, they still need to report on the PRC government's position. At the same time, many CCLTN workers emphasized that their coverage of China—particularly with respect to stories about dissent within China as well as international events involving China—is independent of PRC government direction and uses other sources. Thus, while CCLTN workers have accepted the need to publicize China's position and reflect its importance in the world, they stress their continued independence and professional practice in their reporting. Where China is looking for overseas proxies in their diaspora engagement as well as public diplomacy efforts, CCLTN workers have responded by shoring up their own journalistic legitimacy even as they engage Chinese media resources.

5. Sending states, receiving states, and transnational migration literature

The findings and analyses in my research speak to transnational migration literature by offering a contextualized portrait of sending state power. As such, the primary theoretical contribution of my research is the identification of two significant intervening variables that affect the sending

state's efforts to project a subject-state relationship onto an overseas population; that is, the receiving state and the targeted population itself. My work suggests that sending states making subject-state claims on an overseas population can influence their lives. However, the degree to which the sending state succeeds depends on both the receiving state's policies towards the sending state's target population as well as the target population's own response. Based on these findings, I offer two hypotheses. First, the sending state's ability to project a subject-state relationship onto an overseas population diminishes when the receiving state also engages in creating a subject-state relationship that acknowledges and values the population in question. Second, the sending state's ability to project a subject-state relationship onto an overseas population is enhanced when the receiving state creates a subject-state relationship that marginalizes and devalues the population in question.

My findings and hypotheses highlight the agency of sending states in a nuanced manner, which is key to understanding a class of actors that do not typically receive a lot of attention in transnational migration research. Particularly in countries that experience significant and persistent immigration, like Canada, thinking on transnational migration tends to be focused on the challenges that arise when receiving states manage incoming migrants and govern settled minorities. Topics regarding immigrant integration and settlement or asylum policies are often at the forefront of scholarly journals devoted to transnational migration.²⁰

Transnational migration scholars have debated and emphasized the ways in which migrants remain connected to both sending and receiving states.²¹ Incongruously, our knowledge about sending states—how and when they reach out to migrants and why they

²⁰ Niklaus Steiner, *International Migration and Citizenship Today* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 3.

²¹ Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller, "Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society," *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 1012.

succeed or fail in their efforts—is noticeably absent from the conversation. Various research projects addressing this gap are currently underway, but besides advocating for more sending state research, many scholars have also emphasized the importance of creating a sophisticated understanding of sending state power—one that neither exaggerates nor ignores their influence.²²

Achieving this balanced insight requires investigating who or what constrains sending states and how or why they do so. By asking how CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states, my research treats CCLTN production as a site of politics in which different actors seek to influence minority media production in different ways. Here, the sending state is central to my research, but clearly, China does not operate in a power vacuum. Rather, I also account for the policies of the receiving state and the agency of CCLTN workers. In this way, I have been able to create a more complex portrayal of sending state power.

Thus, my findings indicate that CCLTN production occurs in a complex political environment in which the sending and receiving states make overlapping subject-state claims. Subsequently, the answer to how CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states is that these minority media workers renegotiate subject-state relationships with both the sending and receiving state. In so doing, CCLTN workers themselves problematize, reinterpret, and in some ways even strengthen sending state actions.

²² Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, “International Migration and Sending Countries: Key Issues and Themes,” in *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies, and Transnational Relations*, ed. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 5–6.

6. Television and media in the life of transnational migrant communities

Having established my purpose in looking at sending and receiving states, why is it important to look at news media production as an arena in which they can project power to minority communities? I chose television news because of its ability to draw people into a story about a community where they belong, sometimes in defiance of time and distance. Mirroring the power of print media in Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, television news production requires and is party to the collective imagining of people and places.²³ By creating a set of curated images accompanied by narratives given in an authoritative voice, television news production contributes to public conversations about who matters, what seems reasonable, and how we should live together.

To that end, I also chose media because news from home helps migrants stay connected with friends and family abroad. Moreover, engaging overseas communities with media fits sending state strategies and resources. Media is easy to export, and it can reach out and touch those that are far beyond sending state borders. As such, sending states can tap into minority media markets as competitors and as sources of content. By providing news updates, live broadcasts, magazine pieces, or even raw footage, sending state TV news brings the homeland into the living rooms of overseas communities with sound and colour. In my research, I look at how CCLTN workers respond to policies and initiatives from China that are pertinent to their industry.

²³ Wanning Sun, "Introduction: Transnationalism and a Global Diasporic Chinese Mediasphere," in *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce*, ed. Wanning Sun (New York: Routledge, 2009); Beng Huat Chua, "Gossip about Stars: Newspapers and Pop Culture in China," in *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce*, ed. Wanning Sun (New York: Routledge, 2009).

At the same time, television news has also been important to the receiving state.

Television news can help immigrants learn about their new home, and minority media has been employed in a variety of public information campaigns aimed at minority communities.²⁴ In the case of CCLTN, support for its production is one of the ways in which the Canadian state carries out its multiculturalism policy. To that end, Canada is significantly involved in the financial success and failure of TV news endeavours. Moreover, like many other governments, the Canadian government recognizes the nation building as well as infrastructural importance of television media. As such, Canada has long sought to regulate both the financial and journalistic aspects of news production, sometimes through seemingly contradictory measures such as guarantees for press freedoms on one hand and censorship on the other hand. The tensions in these and other regulatory tools indicate that news media plays a complex and important role in public life. Thus, television news production is a contestable site of politics and implicated in power relations between state, business, and society.

Finally, I chose to focus on television over radio and print media because television news is a more stable instance of minority media in Canada. Television programming is more expensive to produce, and so it requires more financial and organizational support. Print and radio, by contrast, typically experience more churn with firms constantly entering and exiting the market. The relatively low cost of production and start up often means that print and radio are often secondary or even tertiary forms of economic activity for owners who are typically owner

²⁴ "Welcome to Metamorphosis," Metamorphosis Project, Annenberg School for Communication, March 7, 2019, <http://www.metamorph.org/>.

operators.²⁵ Moreover, the Canadian government does not regulate print activity to nearly the same extent as it does television media.

As such, television programming, when it has the financial and organizational support to become established, is more likely to have longevity and presence in Chinese communities in Canada. CCLTN is also arguably the most significant and sophisticated Chinese-language television news programming outside of mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.²⁶ I chose a strong instance of minority media for my case study because it would be easier to generate hypotheses about minority media production if there was a significant presence to study.

7. Multiculturalism and CCLTN production in a time of nationalist resurgence

The mobilization of overseas Chinese people and Chinese culture in service of Beijing's foreign policy has created a dilemma for receiving states. Canada, in particular, has sought to deal with diverse immigrant populations through integration, inclusion, and multiculturalism. However, it is more difficult to think of Chinese Canadians as legitimate Canadian citizens when the PRC government not only seeks cultural ties with Chinese in Canada but also looks to extract political obligations meant to influence Canadian policy and public opinion.

Multiculturalism has been key to building Canadian society, and it is the ideological basis upon which the Canadian government has sought to integrate immigrants from many different backgrounds. Furthermore, multiculturalism has helped manage diversity in Canada by making ethnocultural inclusion a baseline public value. Abandoning multiculturalism would create

²⁵ Catherine A. Murray, Sherry Yu, and Daniel Ahadi, "Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC." (Simon Fraser University: Centre for Policy Studies on Culture and Communication, 2007), 106–7, <http://www.bcethnicmedia.ca/Research/cultural-diversity-report-oct-07.pdf>.

²⁶ Sherry S. Yu, "Instrumentalization of Ethnic Media," *Canadian Journal of Communication* 41, no. 2 (April 2016): 343–51; Xiaoping Li, "A Critical Examination of Chinese Language Media's Normative Goals and News Decisions," *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 97–112.

serious gaps in Canadian national identity while delegitimizing and de-valuing millions of Canadians, particularly those of non-European descent. And yet, the trend towards narrowing national identities, marginalizing minorities, and electing populist and nativist politicians signals a resurgence of nationalism in Western Europe, in the United States, and even in Canada.

Amidst this fraught backdrop in world politics, how can Canada validate the cultural heritage of its immigrants—thus fostering an open and inclusive society—while resisting attempts by an authoritarian foreign power to use immigrant minorities as agents of influence? The answer may be in what Justin Trudeau’s Liberals have chosen—to further invest in multiculturalism as a national identity and to reinforce Canada’s values of inclusion and openness to diversity. However, my research suggests that Canada will need to meet additional challenges in order to successfully adopt this course of action. First, after decades of narrowing the discourse and practice of multiculturalism while making diversity to be about festivals with easily consumed food, dancing, and costumes, Canada needs to return to a deeper practice of multiculturalism. Canada needs to bring back cultural maintenance practiced for the consumption and enrichment of minorities while recognizing minorities’ many contributions to Canada. Second, and at the same time, the Canadian government must recognize the fact that an authoritarian foreign power is seeking to govern a minority in its midst—many of whom are Canadian citizens—and attempting to use them to influence Canadian policy.

Given these realities, I suggest that Canada should seek to foster an environment in which minorities are encouraged to practice their cultural roots in a way that is both de-coupled from the political obligations to homeland governments as well as contextualized as being legitimate and recognized within the Canadian state. To that end, I recommend that the Canadian government do more to support CCLTN production. CCLTN production needs government

regulatory support to survive changes in media and television. Congruently, more should be expected from the corporations that create CCLTN as a condition of receiving protective regulation. Because the niche viewership of CCLTN cannot support an extensively competitive market, the CCLTN that does exist must offer high quality news coverage that is adequate for the support of democratic participation and integration among Chinese immigrants in Canada. Further, as my interview subjects explained, CCLTN production does vital work in the area of exploring and articulating Chinese identity in Canada. By reporting on stories about Chinese communities in Canada, CCLTN is producing a Chinese identity that is attached to and contextualized in Canada. When the Canadian government supports CCLTN, it is creating a safe space in which Chinese in Canada can reflect upon developments in China without pressure or direction from Beijing. In these ways, Chinese culture and connection to China can be maintained and practiced, but in a way that constantly reaffirms emergent Canadian identities.

8. A brief note on terminology

This dissertation brings together a number of different research projects and their accompanying literatures. In order to deal with some of the confusion that may arise from the different meanings and connotations ascribed to various terms, here I offer some notes to clarify my meaning and use.

First, I use the term overseas Chinese to refer to people who identify their ethnocultural heritage as Chinese but live outside of the PRC. This includes people of Chinese heritage living in Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, and beyond. In many cases, overseas Chinese may have lived outside of mainland China for several generations, as is the case with many Malaysian Chinese. Further, for many overseas Chinese, protracted migration patterns may be spread out across

several generations. For instance, American Chinese ancestry may include those that moved from mainland China to Taiwan and then to Vietnam and then to the United States. At the same time, overseas Chinese can and sometimes do still identify as Chinese. This may be attributed to some combination of ongoing racialization by receiving state mainstream society as well as their own continued practice of Chinese languages and culture. Whatever the cause, being Chinese remains part of how overseas Chinese are identified, both by themselves as well as by those around them. Thus, even though their migratory origins are convoluted, being Chinese remains an inescapable part of their lives.

I have decided to use the term overseas Chinese as opposed to Chinese diaspora because the term diaspora assumes a definitive unity to the identity and migration experiences of all overseas Chinese, which is neither adequate nor accurate in describing the diverse identities and affiliations of overseas Chinese. Diaspora refers to a scattering, and many overseas Chinese may think of themselves as being scattered from other countries, like Vietnam or the Philippines, if they only migrated from those countries in their life time. And yet, being a person of Chinese heritage who speaks Chinese or has a Chinese last name can remain part of their identity.

Second, I use the term “minority” largely to refer to ethnocultural minorities because the Chinese in Canada are an ethnocultural minority. Further, the Canadian policies I discuss as part of my analysis, multiculturalism and ethnic broadcasting, deal largely with ethnocultural diversity. Of course, there are other types of minorities—religious, sexual, the disabled—but my research is more concerned with transnational migration and ethnocultural minorities.

I also use the term national minority to describe Francophone and Indigenous groups in Canada. Following the categories identified by Will Kymlicka, national minorities are created with “the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a

larger state... [they] typically wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies.”²⁷ Kymlicka contrasts national minorities with other ethnocultural minorities that are created through immigration.²⁸ Further, in Canada, the term “third language” is often used to refer to the linguistic traditions of immigrant groups; these minorities have been described in policy discourse as a “third force”—or those who are not of French, British, or Indigenous ancestry.

Notably, my use of the term “national minority” should not be mistaken as an endorsement of the PRC’s official characterization of the creation of the Chinese nation. According to PRC orthodoxy, the great Chinese nation arose from an ethnic Han core which, through integrative forces, was joined together in cooperation and harmony with other ethnic groups in the area.²⁹ The other smaller ethnic groups are known as *shaoshu minzu* while the greater Chinese nation is referred to as *Zhonghua minzu*. Therefore, the doctrine on Chinese nationalism and the Chinese state is that China is a “unitary multi-ethnic nation-state.”³⁰ Contrary to this narrative, Chinese history actually shows conflict and struggle between several groups. Further, rather than arising from a primordial Han core, modern China has its origins in the contributions of many ethnic groups—several of which often had more in common with

²⁷ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 12.

²⁸ Kymlicka also notes the existence of some groups that do not fall into either of these two broad categories. African Americans, for instance, are not indigenous to the Americas, and they did not come to the West voluntarily (Kymlicka, 167.)

²⁹ Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 165.

³⁰ Zhao, 166.

people that lived in what is now modern-day Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and other Asian neighbours.³¹

9. Conclusion

How do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states? CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states by engaging in complex renegotiations of subject-state relationships. CCLTN workers demonstrate that they can be selective in how they respond to the sending and receiving state, even though their ability to make their point of view prevail is curtailed in the end. Thus, after accounting for the influence of the receiving state as well as the agency of minority media workers, the sending state still exerts influence. The receiving state can amplify or possibly mitigate sending state influence. In the case of CCLTN, the evidence suggests that changes to Canadian multiculturalism and broadcasting policy have made CCLTN production more vulnerable to sending state influence.

The chapters that follow will expand on these findings and further my argument that CCLTN workers navigate overlapping subject-state claims by renegotiating subject-state relations with each power. Chapter two examines the literature on sending states as well as on minority media and provides a justification for my study. Here, I survey the findings on each body of literature and outline how my research adds to the sum of what is now known. Chapter three discusses the methods used in my research. Here, I explain why I chose to interview CCLTN workers and give an overview of the CCLTN producers that describes the business environment in which CCLTN workers formed their perceptions and made their decisions.

³¹ Zhao, 168.

Chapters four through seven comprise a four-chapter discussion that answers my research question: how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states? Chapter four begins this discussion by looking at PRC government policies and initiatives that influence CCLTN production. These areas of policy include diaspora engagement policies, foreign policy, and media policy. Chapter five considers how CCLTN producers respond to Chinese efforts to influence their industry, and here I begin presenting the results from my interviews. Chapter six overviews how the Canadian state governs CCLTN production, focusing more specifically at multiculturalism policy and broadcasting policy. Chapter seven analyzes how CCLTN workers respond to Canadian state governance. Chapter eight concludes with the main takeaways from my research and offers some thoughts on future research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Many bodies of scholarly literature have helped inform my research, but ultimately, my work examines transnational migration and the politics of minority media production. The strengths and weaknesses of three overlapping research fields have been particularly important to my work: first, transnational migration research; second, the political economy of communications; and third, research on minority media. All three bodies of work have been helpful to my research, and I build on their findings by asking, how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states?

This question allows me to analyze the politics of minority media production with a focus on three actors critical to CCLTN production: the sending state, the receiving state, and the minority media workers themselves. The findings from transnational migration research have helped me understand the motives and behaviours of China as a sending state and Canada as a receiving state. The political economy of communications has illuminated how the Canadian government, like many others, have sought to create media and broadcasting policies amidst globalization, media ownership concentration, and advances in technology. Research on minority media has helped me compare my study with others that have also been done on minority media.

1. Transnational migration

Literature on transnational migration has been central to my research, and my findings and conclusions speak to this community of scholars. This body of literature has been essential in analyzing each set of actors in my study: the sending state, the receiving state, and the minority

media workers. However, new and emergent work on sending states has been particularly important in describing and explaining the goals and actions of the Chinese state. It is with the literature on sending states that I have been able to draw China in politically relevant and analytically rich relationship with the other two actors.

1.1 Transnationalism and its critics

The term “transnationalism” was popularized in the study of human migration in the 1990s by Nina Glick Schiller and her colleagues. They wanted to treat migration as a phenomenon that unfolds in a social field determined more by migrant behaviour and less by nation-state borders.³² They defined transnationalism as:

... the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders.³³

Working in the US, Glick Schiller and her colleagues used the term transnationalism to critique unilinear assimilation models that had been prevalent in US-centered studies of immigration.³⁴

Transnationalism, then, became a key organizing concept in scholarship on migration. Many see it as necessary for investigating social spaces, lives, and institutions spread out over different locations in multiple states.³⁵ Rather than forming a theoretically or methodologically unified body of work, transnational migration scholars have sought to work out how

³² Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, “Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration,” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 645, no. 1 (1992): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.1992.tb33484.x>.

³³ Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton, 1.

³⁴ Peter Kivisto and Thomas Faist, *Beyond a Border: The Causes and Consequences of Contemporary Immigration* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 2010.), 9.

³⁵ Peggy Levitt and B. Nadya Jaworsky, “Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 33 (2007): 133; Steven Vertovec, “Transnationalism and Identity,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 4 (2001): 574, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830120090386>.

transnational migration informs and unfolds in many different but related dimensions—identity formation, economic networks, political organizing and action, and cultural innovations.³⁶

While transnationalism has become a central line of inquiry, it has also become a point of controversy in many methodological and conceptual debates. Criticisms about work that emphasizes transnational connections are as diverse as the work itself, and not all concerns are addressed here.³⁷ Two sets of critiques do stand out as being especially salient.

First, many criticisms levelled against global studies and globalization research have been transferred onto transnational migration research. The conflation is understandable since studies focusing on globalization often emphasize the diminishing power of the nation-state while stressing the importance of globalization forces, like transnational migration.³⁸ Critics have argued that in emphasizing the power of globalization, enthusiasts have overlooked unequal access to and impact of globalization vectors like technology and migration. This results in a presumed universal program of progress that ignores persistent power inequalities based on race, class, and gender.³⁹ Such work embeds transnational migration in a triumphalist narrative in which travel, technology, and changing identities annihilate not only space but also sectarianism and prejudice endemic to nation-state maintenance.⁴⁰

³⁶ Andreea Lazăr, "Transnational Migration Studies. Reframing Sociological Imagination and Research," *Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology* 2, no. 2 (2011): 80.

³⁷ For a more thorough inventory, please see Steven Vertovec, "Trends and Impacts of Migrant Transnationalism" (Working paper 3, University of Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, 2004), 5, https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2004/wp-2004-003-vertovec_impacts_transnationalism/.

³⁸ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large : Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1996.).

³⁹ Lazăr, "Transnational Migration Studies. Reframing Sociological Imagination and Research," 83.

⁴⁰ Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, 31; Christien van den Anker, "Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism: Towards Global Citizenship?," *Journal of International Political Theory* 6, no. 1 (March 2010): 76, <https://doi.org/10.3366/E1755088210000467>; Paula Chakravartty and Yuezhi Zhao, "Introduction: Towards a Transcultural Political Economy of Global Communications," in *Global Communications: Toward a Transcultural Political Economy*, ed. Paula Chakravartty and Yuezhi Zhao (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008),

Transnational migration scholars have sought to distinguish their work from triumphalist globalization literature. Thomas Faist actually contrasts these two bodies of scholarship, explaining that research in transnational migration actually reveals deepening commitments to specific places and identities.⁴¹ Further, many key transnational migration scholars have flatly rejected the assertion that transnationalism can be treated as evidence of an emerging global consciousness, universal human rights, or cosmopolitan culture.⁴² Instead, while identity formation can be a transnational process and cultural innovations do arise, they are constituted by intersecting specificities created by global migration patterns.⁴³

The second set of critiques comes from overly strict dichotomization between assimilation and transnationalism. At first glance, it would seem that assimilation, or the “absorption of one or more minority groups into the mainstream,” is at odds with transnationalism.⁴⁴ The often-quoted research of Alejandro Portes and his colleagues on Latin American groups in the US found that only a limited number of migrants engaged in transnational behaviour. Thus, Portes and his associates argued that this should temper enthusiasm for the “the celebratory images of the extent and effect of transnational engagement

1–22. Works on cultural globalization seem to be particularly problematic in this respect. (Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship : The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 1999), 33.

⁴¹ Lazăr, “Transnational Migration Studies. Reframing Sociological Imagination and Research,” 76; Carmen E. Pavel, “Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Moral Opportunity Costs,” *Polity* 41, no. 4 (2009): 491.

⁴² van den Anker, “Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism,” 77; Thomas Faist, “Diaspora and Transnationalism: What Kind of Dance Partners?” in *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, ed. Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 15; Pavel, “Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Moral Opportunity Costs,” 490.

⁴³ For instance, it is one thing to appreciate how the binational heritage of a Mexican American poet is demonstrated in his work, but that is very different from saying that a cosmopolitan consciousness that is able to include all of humanity is clearly emergent.

⁴⁴ Rubén G. Rumbaut, “Assimilation of Immigrants,” in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd edition, ed. James D. Wright (Oxford: Elsevier, 2015), 81, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.31109-6>. The same source describes individual assimilation a little differently: “At the individual level, assimilation denotes the cumulative changes that make individuals of one ethnic group more acculturated, integrated, and identified with the members of another.”

provided by some scholars.”⁴⁵ This treatment demonstrates how assimilation and transnationalism can be treated as opposing outcomes for which scholars must find competing evidence.

Structuring scholarship along this line of debate, however, has already revealed a lack of uniform agreement about the degree, form, or even nature of transnational behaviour required for transnationalism to exist. Whether migrants engage in transnationalism, and when it matters, depends on differing conceptualizations. Peggy Levitt and her colleagues permit that migrant transnationalism may consist of transnational interaction that is far more erratic and occasional than what Portes demands, yet the influence of these actions still shape a fluid social space inhabited by both migrants and non-migrants alike.⁴⁶ Faist gives supporting context to both Portes’s findings and Levitt’s standards by asserting that most researchers agree that not all migrants exercise border-crossing behaviors, and many only do so in a specific area of life.⁴⁷

What emerges, then, are not two hermetically sealed opposites of transnationalism and assimilation, but a great variety in the forms and degrees of transnationalism. Portes himself acknowledges this, saying, “it has been recognized from the start that transnational activities are quite heterogeneous and vary across immigrant communities, both in their popularity and in their character.”⁴⁸ Findings in transnational migration research should not be treated as evidence for one or another side in an assimilation versus transnationalism debate. Rather, they should be

⁴⁵ Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller, “Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants,” *American Journal of Sociology* 108, no. 6 (2003): 1211, <https://doi.org/10.1086/375195>.

⁴⁶ Levitt and Jaworsky, “Transnational Migration Studies,” 140–45; Levitt and Glick Schiller, “Conceptualizing Simultaneity,” 1006.

⁴⁷ Thomas Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2000), 28–31; Vertovec, “Trends and Impacts of Migrant Transnationalism,” 20; Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald, “Transnationalism in Question,” *American Journal of Sociology* 109, no. 5 (2004): 1182–85.

⁴⁸ Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller, “Assimilation and Transnationalism,” 1211–12.

used to create insightful narratives about the inter-relationship between assimilation and transnationalism. Consequently, the critique that transnationalism is not a useful concept because it is a temporary state or because it is not robust among all migrants has given way to much richer and more refined understandings of transnationalism overall.

In sum, transnational migration, strictly speaking, only refers to the crossing of international borders. The way in which the experience of transnational migration continues to shape the people and places involved, however, indicates that we should also think of transnational migration as a sort of unfolding process that works at the level of individuals, communities, states, and international relations. In my research and in the work of many other scholars, transnationalism refers to the way in which migrants and migrant communities maintain connections to multiple locations across state borders.⁴⁹ Transnational connections may include importing products from countries of origin, sending remittances, or observing homeland holidays. The density of these and other cross-border interactions reshape the places where migrants live by altering the cultural, economic, and political practices therein. Changes to social expectations and human interactions continue to evolve and persist long after migrants become settled or wind down their connections to a homeland. In this way, transnationalism can alter how places and spaces are imagined and understood by both migrants and non-migrants.⁵⁰

1.2 Transnationalism and nationalism are linked

Given the way in which transnationalism can transform the political and cultural meaning of a space, transnational migration could be seen as a challenge to the state, an entity that seeks to stamp its own political and cultural meaning on its territory. As a vector of globalization,

⁴⁹ Vertovec, "Transnationalism and Identity," 577–80.

⁵⁰ Levitt and Jaworsky, "Transnational Migration Studies," 134.

transnational migration is often pitted against the nation-state, and in many ways, we see this dynamic in my research as well. After all, the Chinese and Canadian states both seek to influence CCLTN production, an activity that only exists as an outcome of transnational migration. My research, which “brings the state back in” to the conversation about transnational migration depicts states that are each, in their own ways, struggling with globalization.

However, framing transnationalism and state-led nationalism as opposites arguably obscures the more important observation that nationalisms and transnationalisms are fundamentally connected. Traditionally, nationalism asserts that nations, or those with a distinct group identity—whether its based on shared history, culture, or language—should be able to form their own state, with territory, sovereignty, and international recognition. Increasingly, however, nationalism is expressed when groups appeal to the state for recognition and protection within a multinational state. Moreover, historical anthropologies of nationalisms in societies as diverse as communities in eighteenth century Western Europe and emerging post-colonial states in twentieth century sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate that nationalisms do not typically precede states. Rather states create nationalisms to justify their existence after the fact.

Given this perspective, it is possible to discern two significant realities about the ways in which nationalism and transnationalism are related. First, transnationalism relies on the existence of nationalism. Transnationalism entails the movement of something across borders in the nation-state system, but without the construction of national identities, states would no longer cohere. Without a nation-state system or some analog, there would be no borders to transgress. Second, many of the issues that are now often associated with transnationalism, such as immigration policy and trade agreements, also typically contain some expression of nationalism. Canada’s trade agreement with the European Union (EU), for instance, includes several

provisions about cheese labeling, which several countries—especially Italy—consider to be a matter of national heritage.⁵¹ These, and many other forms of transnational activities, are rife with the actions of states creating identities and cultural claims to support political positions. In these ways, the study of transnationalisms can also be understood as an intellectual extension of the study of nationalisms.

The insight that nationalisms and transnationalisms appear together is important to my research because it suggests that amidst transnational movements, states are finding and exploiting nation building opportunities. This understanding provides a more descriptive and analytical way of framing the actions of both the sending and receiving states in my study. Thus, the Chinese state is not simply resisting transnational migration; rather they are nation building by creating exportable Chinese identity for overseas Chinese as well as treating this group as a foreign policy resource. Likewise, Canada has also found ways to engage in nation building amidst transnational migration. The creation and adoption of multiculturalism was nothing short of a nation building effort in which Canadian identity was reimagined so that it was flexible and inclusive enough to incorporate immigrant communities that are not of French or British extraction. Taken together, these insights help to create an interesting and revealing portrayal of the political environment in which CCLTN workers operate. CCLTN workers are targets of nation building efforts from both the sending and receiving state.

⁵¹ “Hard Cheese: Italy Vows to Scupper EU Free Trade Deal with Canada,” *The Guardian*, July 13, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/13/say-cheese-why-italy-wont-ratify-eu-free-trade-deal-with-canada>.

1.3 The lack of sending state research in transnational migration scholarship

Although relating nationalism with transnationalism has been useful in explaining the behaviours of both Canada and China, pivoting between nationalism and transnationalism has been particularly helpful in bringing my attention to sending state research. Because sending states have not typically been central in transnational migration research, finding a way to explain the behaviour of the Chinese state with respect to its policies on overseas Chinese was challenging. The emergent literature on sending states helped me bring together Chinese nation building with overseas Chinese and the politics of Canadian multiculturalism and CCLTN production.

Sending states have not been a central focus in transnational migration research for two main reasons. First, states themselves have not always been important in transnational migration research overall. Transnational migration researchers have sought to avoid methodological nationalism—or the uncritical use of the nation-state as a container of analysis—and many have thus chosen to focus on the migrants themselves. Moreover, political science—the discipline that analyzes the state as a central referent—is a late contributor to the interdisciplinary work of transnational migration research. Subsequently, its expertise and analysis continues to work its way through the literature and research agenda.⁵² There are now many studies in transnational migration that treat the state with sophistication and not just as a default container for social interaction.⁵³ Second, when states are studied in transnational migration, they tend to be

⁵² James Hollifield, “The Politics of International Migration: How Can We Bring the State Back In?,” in *Migration Theory : Talking across Disciplines*, 2nd ed., ed. James Hollifield and Caroline Brettell (New York : Routledge, 2008.), 183.

⁵³ Lazăr, “Transnational Migration Studies. Reframing Sociological Imagination and Research,” 78–80; Ludger Pries, “Transnationalism: Trendy Catch-All or Specific Research Programme? A Proposal for Transnational Organisation Studies as a Micro-Macro-Link,” *COMCAD Working Papers*, 34 (Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, Fak. für Soziologie, Centre on Migration, Citizenship, and Development (COMCAD), 2007), 18–20, <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/51144>.

receiving states. In a textbook meant to introduce post-secondary students to the field of transnational migration, one author characterized transnational migration research as a series of debates and topics arising from the struggle between migrants trying to enter a country and the state's efforts to control their admission and incorporation.⁵⁴ Common topics include border security for receiving states as well as considerations about the impact of migrants on state welfare and public service institutions.⁵⁵

Although research on sending states has been scant in transnational migration literature, work on diasporas has been popular and important. In both academic and popular parlance, “diaspora” is often used to describe a group of migrants when the intent is to emphasize a group identity predicated on a common origin and common migration experience.⁵⁶ The term has evolved in academic literature to encompass other themes in transnational migration including economic opportunity and resistance to assimilation. However, Rogers Brubaker asserts that the term “diaspora” continues to resonate because it connotes a strong sense of exclusion and homeland orientation.⁵⁷ For this reason, Benedict Anderson refers to diaspora as “long distance nationalists.”⁵⁸ William Safran similarly notes the importance of idealized homelands and mythic returns in diaspora communities.⁵⁹ Thus, sending states are an important part of diaspora literature, but only as a homeland that is often romanticized and represented. Problematically,

⁵⁴ Steiner, *International Migration and Citizenship Today*, 18.

⁵⁵ Many works on immigration have been undertaken in this vein. For Canadian resources, see Keith G. Banting, Thomas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidle, eds., *Belonging?: Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007).

⁵⁶ Faist, “Diaspora and Transnationalism,” 14–15.

⁵⁷ Claire Alexander, “Beyond the ‘The “Diaspora” Diaspora’: A Response to Rogers Brubaker,” *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 40, no. 9 (July 2017): 1547–49, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1300302>; Rogers Brubaker, “The ‘diaspora’ Diaspora,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005): 2–5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997>.

⁵⁸ Benedict Anderson and Gail Kligman, “Long-Distance Nationalism : World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics,” Working Paper (Center for German and European Studies: University of California, 1992).

⁵⁹ William Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return,” *Diaspora* 1, no. 1 (1991): 93–94, <https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1991.0004>.

sending states are not treated critically or as a key object of inquiry at all. Rather, diaspora literature is aimed at understanding migrant orientations and experiences. Because there has been little awareness or interest in the sending state as a political actor in and of itself, diaspora research has not typically led to further work on sending states.

1.4 Findings from sending state research

In the absence of an established body of knowledge about sending states, many insufficient generalizations about these actors circulate.⁶⁰ For instance, it is often thought that sending states do not devote significant resources or attention to engaging overseas populations.⁶¹ Moreover, sending states are either too poor or too uninterested to reach out.⁶² Recent research on sending states demonstrates that neither of those assertions is successfully descriptive.

Scholar Alan Gamlen has surveyed more than seventy countries with respect to their policies towards overseas populations, and he has found that sending states include countries with varying levels of economic development.⁶³ Gamlen's work is the most comprehensive effort to date, and his findings suggest that wealth has not been a primary determinant in whether sending states invest in overseas populations. Rather, there are examples of economically developed sending states both ignoring and engaging overseas populations, and the same is true

⁶⁰ Alan Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What Are They and What Kinds of States Use Them?" (working paper 32, University of Oxford: Centre on Migration Policy and Society, 2006), 2–4, https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2006/wp-2006-032-gamlen_diaspora_engagement_policies/.

⁶¹ Gamlen, 2.

⁶² Gamlen, 2.

⁶³ Alejandro Portes, "Migration and Development: Reconciling Opposite Views," *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 32, no. 1 (January 2009): 5–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870802483668>; Alan Gamlen, "The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination," *Political Geography* 27, no. 8 (January 1, 2008): 840–56, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.10.004>.

for less economically developed sending states.⁶⁴ Gamlen further develops his findings, naming sending state efforts “diaspora engagement policies” and dividing them into three major types.⁶⁵ First, sending states engage in “building a diaspora,” or cultivating a sending-state-centered identity among overseas populations, often employing media and symbolic recognition. The second set of policies focuses on the integration of diaspora into the nation, often through an extension of rights and benefits such as voting, dual nationality, or residency permits. Third, states then try to extract obligations from overseas populations.⁶⁶

Myra Waterbury, an expert on post-Soviet states, has also made significant contributions to theorizing sending states. Focusing largely on Eastern European states as they reassert their national identities after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, Waterbury writes about kin-states—countries that contain large diasporas from neighbouring states.⁶⁷ Drawing together insights from single case studies on sending states and her own expertise on kin-states, Waterbury offers four assertions about sending states. First, while sending states often deploy universalizing rhetoric about belonging and fraternity, their policies target only a specific portion of the overseas population. Second, states engage overseas populations because it serves a specific political or strategic purpose. Third, states expand the boundaries of citizenship or some other form of recognized belonging to co-opt and control access to diaspora resources. Fourth, when the political community is expanded as part of diaspora engagement policies, this can lead to

⁶⁴ Portes, “Migration and Development,” 6; Gamlen, “The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination,” 841.

⁶⁵ Gamlen, “The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination,” 842; Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies.”

⁶⁶ Gamlen, “The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination,” 847–50.

⁶⁷ Kin-states acquire overseas populations from border changes rather than physical emigration. Myra Waterbury, “Bridging the Divide: Towards a Comparative Framework for Understanding Kin State and Migrant-Sending State Diaspora Politics,” in *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories, and Methods*, ed. Thomas Faist and Rainer Bauböck (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 135.

backlash against the diaspora and thus create a disconnect between the rhetoric and substance of the policies.⁶⁸ Waterbury's four claims highlight the instrumental use of belonging, nationhood, and citizenship. It also depicts the state as subject to both costs and benefits in its engagement with overseas populations.

Waterbury's portrayal of sending states focuses on the state's strategic use of national identity as well as on the risks and rewards accompanying sending state policies. By contrast, Gamlen describes a give and take relationship between sending states and overseas populations in which rights are exchanged for obligations. Despite these differences, the work of Waterbury, Gamlen, and others show that there is a convergence in what researchers are learning about the strategies and motivations of sending states. I summarize convergence on sending state research into four main points.

First, sending states show fragmentation and lack coordination when creating and administering diaspora engagement policies.⁶⁹ Sending states should not be understood as unitary wholes but as a complex set of porous and interacting agents.⁷⁰ Consequently, programs and initiatives tend to vary according to different perceptions about the identities and characteristics of overseas populations. Distinct mandates often result in varied ideas about the desired relationship between the sending state and overseas populations. Moreover, government agencies sometimes lack communication and coordination, creating unintentional policy outcomes.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Waterbury, 131–37.

⁶⁹ Alan Gamlen, "Creating and Destroying Diaspora Strategies" (working paper 31, University of Oxford: International Migration Institute, 2011), <https://www.imi-n.org/publications/wp-31-11>; Østergaard-Nielsen, "International Migration and Sending Countries."

⁷⁰ Østergaard-Nielsen, "International Migration and Sending Countries," 237.

⁷¹ Gamlen, "The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination," 845.

For instance, many countries with significant emigrant populations have government organs dedicated to dealing with overseas populations, some of them at a federal level; however, these offices are often junior and less powerful. At the same time, other agents such as a foreign affairs office or the immigration department may also be invested in managing how the state engages overseas populations. These agencies tend to be more senior and are thus able to influence diaspora engagement efforts, but these issues are marginal in their portfolios.⁷² Conflict and fragmentation may also emerge from a number of other divisions within government. In both Mexico and the Dominican Republic, competing political parties took different stances towards extending voting rights to emigrants based on the capacity of each to effectively campaign among nationals in the United States.⁷³ Different attitudes towards overseas populations can also emerge between regions and between different levels of government. In Brazil, like in many other countries, emigrants tend to come from fewer locations; consequently, the influence of remittances can become concentrated in specific regions.⁷⁴

Second, sending states engage overseas populations for a specific goal and will prioritize sending state interests over that of the diaspora.⁷⁵ Two different goals are common among sending states. One goal is to boost economic development using migrant resources, mainly remittances, foreign direct investment, donations, and advanced human capital.⁷⁶ Governments

⁷² Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies," 32.

⁷³ Peggy Levitt and Rafael De la Dehesa, "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State: Variations and Explanations," *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 26, no. 4 (July 2003): 594, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987032000087325>.

⁷⁴ Levitt and De la Dehesa, "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State," 599.

⁷⁵ Marie Lall, "Mother India's Forgotten Children," in *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, ed. Eva Dr Østergaard-Nielsen (New York ; Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Levitt and De la Dehesa, "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State"; Waterbury, "Bridging the Divide."

⁷⁶ Kathleen Patrick and Erin Newland, *Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in Their Countries of Origin* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, July 2004), 12,

often promote the contribution of these goods through various means. Mexico's *tres por uno* program, for instance, adds three dollars in government funding for every one dollar sent in remittances.⁷⁷ Likewise, India has made certain bond sales only available to non-resident Indians.⁷⁸ Sending states have also sought to improve labour pools at home through recruiting overseas populations by directly informing them of employment opportunities as well as providing incentives such as housing grants and relocation subsidies.⁷⁹

Another goal is political support from overseas populations, particularly on issues seen as a threat to sending state legitimacy or sovereignty. These goals are more common among sending states in conflict or those that experience a regime change or massive emigration before post-colonial independence. Sending states may encourage overseas populations to lobby foreign governments on their behalf. The Armenian government, for instance, maintains relationships with Armenian American groups to shore up US support in Armenia's territorial dispute with Turkey as well as for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide.⁸⁰ Sending states may also encourage overseas populations to speak out against dissidents abroad to prevent international pressure from accruing or to halt the funding of domestic insurgents amongst populations abroad.

<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/beyond-remittances-role-diaspora-poverty-reduction-their-countries-origin>; Østergaard-Nielsen, "International Migration and Sending Countries," 17.

⁷⁷ Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind, "A Cross-Atlantic Dialogue: The Progress of Research and Theory in the Study of International Migration," *International Migration Review* 38, no. Issue 3 (2004): 835–40.

⁷⁸ Lall, "Mother India's Forgotten Children," 137.

⁷⁹ Patrick and Newland, *Beyond Remittances*, 11.

⁸⁰ Razmik Panossian, "Courting a Diaspora: Armenia-Diaspora Relations since 1998," in *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, ed. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 150.

Notably, sending states will remain self-interested and abandon overseas populations when it is convenient, despite the language of broadening inclusion. For instance, in situations where sending states value strong bilateral or multi-lateral relationships with receiving countries, they have overlooked the mistreatment of overseas populations to avoid conflict.⁸¹ Likewise, sending states will prioritize their own foreign policy goals over the safety and well-being of overseas populations. For example, the Indian government cut off all political claims to Indians overseas, even in situations where overseas communities were severely marginalized and subject to violence and discrimination.⁸² This was done to forge positive relations with decolonizing states in Asia and Africa, and also as part of a bid to become the leader of the non-aligned movement.⁸³

The third major point of convergence amongst sending state researchers is that sending states foster relationships with overseas communities, often by deploying gestures of recognition and inclusion or by facilitating activities that celebrate a shared cultural heritage. Shared culture and recognition have become essential elements of sending state policies because these elements are exportable and can be effective long distance. At times, sending states will offer cultural activities or educational opportunities aimed at helping younger generations appreciate their heritage. Sponsored art exhibitions, mother tongue competitions, and the celebration of religious holidays are all occasions for sending states to interact with overseas communities in a way that affirms cultural belonging.

In addition to emphasizing shared cultural heritage, gestures of inclusion in recognized forums and institutions also encourage subject-state relationships between sending states and

⁸¹ Levitt and De la Dehesa, "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State," 601.

⁸² Lall, "Mother India's Forgotten Children," 134.

⁸³ Lall, "Mother India's Forgotten Children," 133.

overseas populations. Such efforts may include awarding civilian honours to well-known emigrants. The Presidential Distinguished Service Award, for instance, is given every year by the Irish government to Irish overseas who have made significant contributions to Ireland or Irish communities abroad.⁸⁴ Poland, with funding from the EU, has established the Emigration Museum in Gdynia meant to commemorate and document the history of Polish emigration.⁸⁵ India, Ukraine, and Jamaica all hold regular conferences where government officials meet with delegates of overseas organizations in order to reproduce subject-state relations.⁸⁶

Because overseas populations are removed from sending state territory, these governments have limited options to regulate behavior. Overseas populations are difficult to tax, censor, or police, and they are less reliant if at all on sending state governments for basic welfare services. Cultural recognition and inclusion activities help create and name a group identity that sending states can draw on later. As such, persuasion, belonging, and the politics of identity become particularly important for sending states.

Fourth, sending states do not view overseas populations as homogenous blocs; rather, they recognize the diversity of their overseas constituents and categorize overseas populations according to qualities that are useful to the sending state.⁸⁷ For example, following independence, the government of Kazakhstan sought to promote “cultural rebirth” and so offered repatriation to ethnic Kazakhs. The government desired easy assimilation, however, and did not

⁸⁴ “Presidential Distinguished Service Award,” Global Irish: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed November 7, 2018, <https://www.dfa.ie/global-irish/heritage/presidential-award/>.

⁸⁵ “Idea,” Emigration Museum in Gdynia, accessed November 7, 2018, http://www.polska1.pl/en/omuzeum/idea_eng.

⁸⁶ Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, “International Migration and Sending States,” 209; Patrick and Newland, *Beyond Remittances*, 9.

⁸⁷ Waterbury, “Bridging the Divide,” 135.

make the same effort to recruit Kazakhs living in other former Soviet Republics because these individuals were assumed to be too “Russian.” Similarly, although the Hungarian government has used the rhetoric of a global nationhood, only those in neighbouring countries were granted special benefits. The government assumes that overseas Hungarians in Western Europe are too assimilated to gain national belonging.⁸⁸

Overseas populations are also often categorized as high or low skilled when sending states seek to improve their human capital. Significant outwards migration of high skilled labour often comes from countries in a development “hump.” These states can educate their workforce beyond what is necessary for light industry and unskilled labour, but they have not yet built up their science and research industries. The most able and well-educated must go abroad to receive advanced degrees, but a lack of employment opportunities appropriate to their expertise impedes their return. In order to counter such brain drain, sending states target specific groups of overseas populations with the skills and education necessary for bolstering critical industries.⁸⁹

1.5 Building on sending state literature

Summarily, sending states tend to engage overseas populations for economic resources, political support, or to cultivate a group identity for the extraction of future obligations. These goals are self-interested on the part of the sending states, but this does not prevent them from using the rhetoric of shared heritage and national inclusion. Furthermore, states will categorize overseas populations according to qualities that are useful to the sending state. However, sending states

⁸⁸ Waterbury, “Bridging the Divide,” 141.

⁸⁹ Thomas Faist, “Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round of the Migration-Development Nexus,” *Population, Space, and Place* 14, no. 1 (February 2008): 21–42, <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.471>; Portes, “Migration and Development.”

are not unitary and tend to pursue these policies in fragmented and uncoordinated ways. It is my contention that these insights about sending states are also applicable to the Chinese case, and this will become evident when I provide an overview of the PRC in Chapter four.

The comparative work on sending states thus far has revealed many common strategies and motivations. As sending state researchers continue in their work, some are beginning to consider how they might give more sophistication to our understanding of sending states. Here, I see an opportunity.⁹⁰ To build on the cataloging and typologizing of sending state goals and strategies, the research community should engage in work that assesses sending state power and efficacy. Such an effort contextualizes the sending state and ensures that transnational migration research produces a nuanced portrait of the sending state—one with capabilities and limits. This will require studies that account for sending state constraints including, but not limited to, how the actions and interests of intervening actors dilute, reinterpret, or block the effect of sending state policies. My dissertation aims to make such a contribution to transnational migration research by drawing the sending state into a case in which it must contend with both the receiving state as well as the social actors whom they seek to influence. For this reason, my research asks the question, how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states?

2. Media and communications studies

Having looked at sending state literature in transnational migration research, the second part of my literature review focuses on the multi-disciplinary field of media and communications. I do

⁹⁰ Østergaard-Nielsen, “International Migration and Sending States,” 12.

so because understanding the politics of minority media production requires bringing together industry knowledge, questions about media and society, as well as arguments about government regulation. All these elements have been useful in my analysis of the Canadian state's policies regarding CCLTN production. Media and communications studies is concerned with the human experience of exchanging, producing, and interpreting messages. While more professionally-oriented communications degrees focus on marketing, journalism, and health or public service work, academic pursuits are geared towards understanding human communication as both expressions and shapers of social interaction. The areas of communications studies most important to my research are the practice of journalism and the political economy of communications, and so I consider each of them in turn.

2.1 Journalism practice

Journalism practice is concerned with the skills and standards involved in news reporting. Elements include identification of an issue or a story angle, the craftsmanship involved in writing a piece—whether it is for TV or for print—as well as the discipline of fact checking, to name a few.⁹¹ Standards and quality in journalism practice was one of the most discussed issues among the CCLTN workers that I interviewed. For many of them, navigating the power of the Chinese and Canadian states involved deploying the skills they had at their disposal and evaluating their choices in terms of their professional training. As such, an overview of the issues and ideals that are part of journalistic training has been useful in understanding and discussing their comments.

⁹¹ Ivor Shapiro, "Evaluating Journalism: Towards an Assessment Framework for the Practice of Journalism," *Journalism Practice* 4, no. 2 (April 2010): 143–62, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17512780903306571>.

There is no shortage of commentators who are willing to label journalism as biased, objective, misleading, or brave. More professionally, journalism is constantly being evaluated for research, in educational settings, for prizes, and in newsrooms. However, no universally recognized canon exists that definitively explains what journalism is and sets standards of quality. According to one professor of journalism, "... the autonomy-fostering culture of the newsroom hardly lends itself to formal notions of quality-measurement... [such] criteria have largely taken the form of implicit, tacit assumptions based on handed down common experience"⁹² Another author notes, "as many ethnographies have shown, what constitutes a good news story is often very evident for journalists, while a new intern or a visiting ethnographer will need some time and experience before the good news story becomes evident or even recognisable."⁹³

Given that much of what defines journalism practice and standards for excellence exists as handed down common sense, the most appropriate source of a framework is, arguably, experienced journalists themselves. One of the more authoritative reflections on the purpose of journalism and guidelines for its practice is the work *The Elements of Journalism: What newspeople should know and the public should expect* (2007).⁹⁴ This book arises from a task force that was convened among prominent journalists, editors, and journalism educators in the US in 1997. The Committee of Concerned Journalists, as the task force would come to be called, was founded by Bill Kovach, former Washington bureau chief for the *New York Times*, and Tom Rosenstiel, executive director of the American Press Institute and former chief congressional

⁹² Shapiro, "Evaluating Journalism," 144.

⁹³ Ida Schultz, "The Journalistic Gut Feeling," *Journalism Practice* 1, no. 2 (May 2007): 194, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17512780701275507>.

⁹⁴ Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, *The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect*, rev. ed. (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2007).

correspondent for *Newsweek*. After four years of research including twenty public forums and a national survey of journalists, Kovach and Rosenstiel distilled their findings into nine principles of journalism, which became a teaching program and book.⁹⁵

In their program for excellence in journalism, Kovach and Rosenstiel assert that the purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with what they need to function as a free society. To that end, other groups may be involved in the production of news content—including advertisers, shareholders, and corporate bosses. However, journalists must remember that their primary allegiance is to the citizen. Journalists are obliged to provide the relevant information, points of view, and agenda items that citizens should know when they are choosing what politicians or positions to support.⁹⁶ In this way, Kovach and Rosenstiel's understanding of what journalism should do and be takes place within a liberal democratic society where citizens rule through their chosen government.

Another important element of journalistic excellence within a liberal democratic society is that journalism must be independent from faction or power. Kovach and Rosenstiel argue that journalists are not expected to be neutral—that is to not hold opinions or biases—but they must be functionally independent of political parties, particular groups of elites or even specific segments of the citizenry. Only an independent press can hold the powerful to account, be a voice for the voiceless, and offer credible opinions. An independent press is a key institution in a liberal democratic society—like a professional and independent judiciary as well as a military that is controlled by a civilian government. Further, Kovach and Rosenstiel add that journalists

⁹⁵ Kovach and Rosenstiel, *The Elements of Journalism*.

⁹⁶ Leighton Kille, "Committee of Concerned Journalists: The Principles of Journalism," *Journalist's Resource*, November 26, 2009, <https://journalistsresource.org/tip-sheets/foundations/principles-of-journalism/>.

must be allowed to exercise their personal conscience, an assertion that highlights their emphasis on autonomy in journalism.⁹⁷

The high degree of autonomy in journalism is not, however, without discipline. Kovach and Rosenstiel also demand that quality journalism is assiduously truthful and characterized by a rigorous verification of facts and claims. Both authors go as far as to say that verification of facts is the essence of journalism, meaning that this practice sets journalism apart from other forms of communication. Besides being truthful and factually accurate, journalism must also provide news of substance and relevance, and Kovach and Rosenstiel offer three critical guidelines to that end.⁹⁸

First, journalism should provide a forum for public debate, criticism, and compromise. Here, journalists are expected to accurately and fairly represent different points of view so that citizens can be exposed to a variety of perspectives. More importantly, rather than looking for dramatic disagreements journalists should acknowledge gray areas as well as points of agreement. Second, journalists must do what they can to make the significant interesting and relevant. This means that journalists must focus on what matters, and that will often require them to be well-informed so that they can anticipate what the public will need to know. At the same time, journalism must account for the public's limits; this will help journalists provide engaging and accessible storytelling. Third, journalists must keep the news both comprehensive and proportional. Here, journalists are helping to set an agenda of issues that merit public attention and concern. Journalists are not only obliged to discuss matters of importance, but they

⁹⁷ Kovach and Rosenstiel, *The Elements of Journalism*.

⁹⁸ Kovach and Rosenstiel, *The Elements of Journalism*.

must also account for the diversity of the public so that a range of issues and problems are covered in the media.⁹⁹

All these issues were, in some way, part of the interview responses. CCLTN workers mused on the relevance of their work, both to Chinese speaking communities in Canada and to Canadians at large. These standards of journalistic excellence were often the terms with which they reflected on their work, judged their competition, and evaluated their sources.

2.2 The political economy of communications

Aside from journalism practice, the area of communications research that has produced the most work relevant to my own is the political economy of communications. This area of study is shaped by the theoretical debates about the market that typically drive projects in political economy—its ontology, implication in power relations, and normative concerns therein.¹⁰⁰ Here, market-oriented approaches treat the economy as a naturally occurring phenomenon in which firms and buyers respond to price signals that will eventually return the market to a state of equilibrium in which demand and supply are equal. Proponents of market-oriented approaches assert that the market is a system of organization that is widely desirable and applicable to many areas of life.¹⁰¹ By contrast, critical approaches do not see the market as a naturally occurring phenomena. Rather, critical theorists argue that the market is a construct that is not only embedded in social and political interactions but also shaped by power relations.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Kovach and Rosenstiel, *The Elements of Journalism*.

¹⁰⁰ Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa, "Introduction: Core Concerns and Issues," in *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*, ed. Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa (Chichester, West Sussex : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 1–10.

¹⁰¹ Nicholas Garnham, "The Political Economy of Communication Revisited," in *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*, ed. Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa (Chichester, West Sussex : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

¹⁰² Wasko, Murdock, and Sousa, "Introduction: Core Concerns and Issues."

Subsequently, both market-oriented and critical approaches in the political economy of communications are part of the research on television news. The significant investments required for TV production incentivizes a profit-driven outlook; further, TV broadcasting is an industry dominated by private, profit-oriented interests. However, there is also a strong tradition of critical political economy in research about television. Broadly speaking, this is because “communications industries play a central double role in modern societies—as industries in their own right and as the major site of the representations and arenas of debate through which the overall [social and political] system is imagined and argued over.”¹⁰³ In this way, critical approaches connect economic analysis to normative questions about social justice and democratic practice. These concerns appear readily in work about media and the state as well as media and society.

2.3 State and society in the political economy of communications

In the political economy of communications, the state typically enters the literature as a regulator, and these discussions are dominated by questions about the purpose, costs, and benefits of government intervention in media markets. Here, the literature reflects developments in communications infrastructure in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. In many countries, mass communications via television and radio were recognized, since their inception, as critical governing resources, and the popularization of television in the 1950s coincided with both post-war reconstruction and the onset of the Cold War.¹⁰⁴ The importance of

¹⁰³ Wasko, Murdock, and Sousa, “Introduction: Core Concerns and Issues,” 4.

¹⁰⁴ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed.; Beaty and Sullivan, *Canadian Television Today*; Andrew Green, “The Development of Mass Media in Asia-Pacific,” *International Journal of Advertising* 22, no. 2 (May 2003): 273–301, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02650487.2003.11072845>.

communication in achieving strategic and political goals has also guided policies for communications industries and infrastructure since their inception. Thus, in many countries, governments outright owned national broadcasting systems or allowed them to be run by tightly regulated oligarchies.¹⁰⁵ The ensuing neoliberal turn of governments around the world in the 1970s and 1980s as well as developments in communications technology gave rise to withdrawn state support, globalizing communications markets, the conglomeration of media corporations, and a concentration in media ownership.¹⁰⁶

Informed by changes in governance and technology in the late twentieth century, scholars have debated how best to meet the challenge of globalizing markets and whether government interventions help or hinder media corporations as they seek to become globally competitive. In addition to questions about how governments can best foster robust industries, there are questions about the trade-off between the much lauded efficiency of open markets and deregulation versus a variety of political goals such as cultural sovereignty, social equality, and strengthened national identities.¹⁰⁷ In these discussions, media policies are often presented as part of national histories, where the formation of national media corporations and communications systems are elements of a larger nation building project.¹⁰⁸

As scholars debate the role of the state in the political economy of communications, questions about media and society also become important. Work on media and society typically highlight the different ways in which media and society both affect and reflect each other.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Andrew Green, "The Development of Mass Media in Asia-Pacific."

¹⁰⁶ Michael Curtin, *Playing to the World's Biggest Audience : The Globalization of Chinese Film and TV* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 2007.), 17; Green, "The Development of Mass Media in Asia-Pacific."

¹⁰⁷ Wasko, Murdock, and Sousa, "Introduction: Core Concerns and Issues," 4.

¹⁰⁸ Curtin, *Playing to the World's Biggest Audience*, 104; Green, "The Development of Mass Media in Asia-Pacific," 298.

¹⁰⁹ Wasko, Murdock, and Sousa, "Introduction: Core Concerns and Issues," 6.

The stakes rise quickly as media conglomerates become larger and larger in order to compete globally. Imperatives around global competition and globalization suggest that media consumers will gain access to an ever-increasing variety of media and narratives. However, many media researchers have expressed concern about whether the concentration of ownership in fact diminishes the diversity of perspectives and stories.¹¹⁰ At the same time, the development of social media platforms and the rise of super users challenge the distinction between producers and consumers.¹¹¹ Many have argued that new technologies democratize the consumption, production, and distribution of media and communications, thus also improving access for marginalized groups. However, scholars have also raised concerns about a digital gap that exacerbates inequalities and generates new forms of illiteracy and lack of access.¹¹²

2.4 The political economy of communications in Canada

Scholarship on the political economy of communications in Canada certainly reflects many of these themes. This body of literature has been important for helping me understand the broader policy and industry context in which CCLTN production occurs. Chapter six provides a more complete overview of Canadian policy and governance, particularly with respect to CCLTN production. Here, I outline the broader issues and arguments that have become important to my

¹¹⁰ John H. Downing, "Media Ownership, Concentration, and Control: The Evolution of Debate," in *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*, ed. Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa (Chichester, West Sussex : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

¹¹¹ Richeri Guiseppe, "The Media Amid Enterprises, the Public, and the State: New Challenges for Research," in *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*, ed. Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa (Chichester, West Sussex : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

¹¹² Chakravartty and Zhao, "Introduction: Towards a Transcultural Political Economy of Global Communications," 19.

understanding of Canada's broadcasting system as well as how the Canadian state regulates broadcasting.

One of the most important themes in scholarship on the political economy of communications in Canada is nation building with communications programming and infrastructure. Owing to Canada's vast distances, communications infrastructure—including the location of radio stations, television stations, and internet access—are understood as ways to unite the country. At the same time, Canada's proximity to the US has made Canadian cultural sovereignty an important issue in research about Canadian broadcasting and communications. These conversations have often been both public and scholarly as Canadian intellectuals have made several public interventions on this matter.¹¹³ Here, intervenors have criticized the lack of development in Canada's cultural industries and called for more work that reflects the lives and concerns of Canadians.¹¹⁴ In these and other ways, scholarship on Canadian broadcasting suggests that national identity and negotiations around citizenship and belonging have informed governments as they regulate and shape the development of media industries.¹¹⁵

At the same time, research on media policy in Canada have also presented challenges to the goal of fostering cultural sovereignty and national building with communications infrastructure. Efforts to promote and develop a sense of Canadian identity and heritage have been described as nationalistic and protectionist.¹¹⁶ Some have even argued that the open and

¹¹³ Paul W. Nesbitt-Larking, *Politics, Society, and the Media: Canadian Perspectives* (Peterborough, ON : Broadview Press, 2001).

¹¹⁴ David Taras, *The Digital Mosaic: Media, Power, and Identity in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 131.

¹¹⁵ Robert G. Picard et al., "Platform Proliferation and Its Implications for Domestic Content Policies," *Telematics and Informatics* 33, no. 2 (May 1, 2016): 683–92, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2015.06.018>; Gregory Taylor, "Shut-Off: The Digital Television Transition in the United States and Canada," *Canadian Journal of Communication* 35, no. 1 (March 2010): 7–25; Salter and Odartey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*.

¹¹⁶ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed.

multicultural nature of Canadian national identity is inconsistent with efforts aimed at protecting Canadian cultural industries from global competitors.¹¹⁷ For many media economists, government intervention is simply outdated in a world of such deep interconnectivity. Thus, Canadian media industries should not be sheltered from globalization but be made to compete and so contribute to a larger global project.¹¹⁸

These questions around globalization and technological changes are key elements of media shock—or the multiple overlapping crises affecting the media. David Taras, a writer and researcher on news media, provides a well-fleshed-out description of media shock in Canada in his work *Digital Mosaic*. He describes media shock in terms of ten interrelated elements. Here, I cite a few that have been especially important to the industry and policy environment surrounding CCLTN production.¹¹⁹

First, Taras notes the rapid onset and importance of web-based content. Platforms like Google, Facebook, Youtube, and Wikipedia have become a significant part of everyday life, thus concentrating power in the hands of a few major platforms and corporations. Further, web-based delivery systems have changed audience expectations for when and how they consume news media. Second, TV continues to be important in public life, but so much has changed about television. Cable and online broadcasters have drawn away audiences and advertising dollars from conventional broadcasters. Moreover, cable and online broadcasters have created both mass audiences through their hyper-serials as well as audience fragmentation through their customization features. Third, newspapers and conventional television—or traditional media—

¹¹⁷ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 198; Beaty and Sullivan, *Canadian Television Today*, 126; Nesbitt-Larking, *Politics, Society, and the Media*, 109.

¹¹⁸ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 108.

¹¹⁹ For a more complete list of the factors included in Taras's description of media shock, please see Taras, *The Digital Mosaic*, 3–4.

have lost audiences and advertising revenue to the point where they may no longer be able to sustain themselves. This is a key problem because traditional media remains the most important producer of hard news. Fourth, Taras points out that digital communications have increased global interconnectivity. This issue has raised questions about how CCLTN is positioned in the lives of their audiences, given that they are able to access content about China on their own.¹²⁰

Amidst these many changes, Canada's traditional media is struggling to adapt, and many are wondering about what the Canadian government should do about it—or if there is anything a government might be able to do at all. Traditionally, the CRTC has sought to shape Canada's broadcasting landscape through the granting of licenses for conventional radio and television. Even as web-based media grew in importance, the CRTC's policy for years was to not regulate web-based media. This is understandable given how web-based media has become a complex, sprawling, and amorphous domain of activity.

However, in June 2018, the government announced that it would do an overhaul of how Canada regulates broadcasting and telecommunications. A panel of experts were appointed for this task, and it has been given eighteen months to complete their review and recommendations. One of the main objectives of the overhaul will be to increase funding for Canadian content with no cost passed onto the consumer. Most controversially, the government has given notice that the overhaul is set to include major web-based broadcasters like Netflix.¹²¹ Thus far, web-based entities have neither been subject to any of Canada's Canadian content regulations nor have they

¹²⁰ Taras, *The Digital Mosaic*, 3–4.

¹²¹ Daniel Leblanc, "Ottawa Warns Internet Platforms Such as Facebook and Netflix the 'Free Ride' Is Over," *The Globe and Mail*, June 6, 2018, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-warns-internet-platforms-such-as-facebook-and-netflix-the-free/>.

been required to contribute to the Canada Media Fund—a public-private partnership that supports the production of Canadian programming.¹²²

Already, the Canadian government's plan to include web-based media services in their overhaul has been both praised and criticized. Artistic agencies like the Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists have welcomed the move, saying that it would boost Canadian arts and culture.¹²³ Critics, by contrast, are doubtful about the practical how-to of the CRTC's efforts to regulate web-content, particularly given the internet's sprawl and reach in Canadian life.¹²⁴ In any case, the report, which will likely be tabled by the panel after the next federal election, is almost certain to draw mixed reviews.

In addition to questions about the future and feasibility of Canadian media regulation, another topic in literature on Canada's political economy of communications is how well the system serves Canadian minorities. In addition to the many studies done on minority representation in mainstream media, several scholarly works have also focused on French language media in Canada as well as Indigenous broadcasting.¹²⁵ As bilingualism and multiculturalism became part of official discourse on Canadian national identity in the 1970s and 1980s, marginalized groups received increasing support for their broadcasting projects. Sometimes this included actual funding, and at other times it was merely space in the regulation that permitted them to undertake these works.

¹²² "About Us," Canada Media Fund, accessed February 14, 2019, <https://www.cmf-fmc.ca/en-ca/about-us>; Taras, *The Digital Mosaic*, 210.

¹²³ Leblanc, "Ottawa Warns Internet Platforms Such as Facebook and Netflix the 'Free Ride' Is Over."

¹²⁴ Michael Geist, "The CRTC's Fundamental Mistake: It Thinks It Can Regulate the Internet," *The Globe and Mail*, June 8, 2018, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-the-crtcs-fundamental-mistake-broadcasting-is-the-internet-but-the/>; Taras, *The Digital Mosaic*, 210.

¹²⁵ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 147; Lorna Roth, *Something New in the Air: The Story of First Peoples Television Broadcasting in Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005.).

Limited attention is given to third language broadcasting—that is broadcasting that is not English, French, or Indigenous. However, in works aimed at surveying Canadian media policy, the importance of multiculturalism and provision for the participation of third language groups is often noted.¹²⁶ In this way, literature on Canadian political economy of communications is typically more concerned with mainstream media—that is media for Canada’s English-speaking majority. Though this does little to address minority media, such as CCLTN, it does provide a broader sense of some of the industrial and regulatory challenges that both third language and mainstream broadcasters face.

3. Minority media: content, consumption, and production

The final body of literature that is relevant to my work is research on minority media. Most commonly, works directly dealing with minority media are done by scholars in media and communications, and typically work is focused on content, consumption, or production.¹²⁷

Research about content and consumption tends to be more prevalent, and I look at each briefly to distinguish my own work from these endeavours.

3.1 Content and consumption

In minority media research, there is an interest in what minority groups are reading and watching, how they get their news, and whether the news affects their political orientations or integration into receiving states. In this body of work, scholars are interested in how media

¹²⁶ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 150–56; Nesbitt-Larking, *Politics, Society, and the Media*, 80.

¹²⁷ Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 25.

might be used to assist minority integration and so they often look at minority media as a vehicle for conveying a variety of public service announcements such as health-related messages as well as voting information. Along the same lines, there are significant bodies of work aimed at uncovering the role of minority media in the lives of their readers. Findings reveal a wide variety of uses of minority media, from cultural and linguistic retention to seeking out local information in their own language.¹²⁸

To that end, content-oriented work is one of the most common forms of research in the study of minority media. There is an interest in what issues are discussed and how portrayals of receiving state government actions or personalities differ.¹²⁹ Research about Afro-Canadian newspapers in Montreal, for instance, compared how ethnic groups were portrayed in mainstream media versus how they were portrayed in a newspaper popular among English-speaking black readers in Montreal.¹³⁰ In research on Chinese-language newspapers and radio in Canada, it was found that Chinese-language media sources reported heavily on events local not only to Canada, but to the city and provinces—including the wins and losses of local sports teams, traffic accidents, and gas price changes.¹³¹

Studies focusing on consumption and consumers is another type of research in work about minority media. At times, this may mean profiling consumers—that is identifying the

¹²⁸ Murray, Yu, and Ahadi, "Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC," 587–611; Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 92; "Civic Engagementment," *Metamorphosis Project*, Annenberg School for Communication, n.d., http://www.metamorph.org/research_areas/civic_engagement/.

¹²⁹ S.Y. Bai, "Constructing Racial Groups' Identities in the Diasporic Press: Internalization, Resonance, Transparency, and Offset," *Mass Communication and Society* 13, no. 4 (2010): 385–411, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15205430903326197>.

¹³⁰ Tokunbo Ojo, "Ethnic Print Media in the Multicultural Nation of Canada: A Case Study of the Black Newspaper in Montreal," *Journalism* 7, no. 3 (01 2006): 343–61, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884906065517>.

¹³¹ Min Zhou, Wenhong Chen, and Guxuan Cai, "Chinese-Language Media and Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada," in *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce*, ed. Wanning Sun, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 75–79.

audience as well as their concerns and priorities.¹³² At other times, consumption-oriented research aims to measure audience impact in some way, gauging whether the communication was successful in persuading a given target audience.¹³³ Similarly, audience testing is used to gauge the efficacy of different political messages or forms of political advertising.¹³⁴

3.2 Minority media production

I was drawn to minority media research focused on production partly because it is generally less common than work on consumption and content. Here, the focus of inquiry is often the media organizations themselves as researchers attempt to further define and clarify what minority media is as well as interrogate other terms that are used. For instance, “ethnic media” is commonly used by researchers looking at minorities in receiving states.¹³⁵ For these researchers, the term “ethnic” is applied because there is a distinct set of cultural and linguistic traditions that ties a media audience together and places them outside the mainstream. While the term “minority media” is also used, researchers focused on spatial linguistic mapping find the term misleading because these audiences may be clustered together and thus not actually in the minority in their given neighbourhood.¹³⁶ I choose to continue using the term “minority media”

¹³² Aliaa Dakrouy, “The Arab-Canadian Consumption of Diasporic Media,” *Journal of International Communication* 12, no. 2 (December 2006): 35–51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2006.9752012>.

¹³³ Nabil Echchaibi, “(Be)Longing Media: Minority Radio between Cultural Retention and Renewal,” *Javnost - The Public* 9, no. 1 (March 2002): 37–50.

¹³⁴ Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 23.

¹³⁵ The term “diaspora media” and “migrant media” are also both used. I reject “migrant media” because the term seems to emphasize the physical mobility of producers and consumers which seems to both confuse and undercut nuances about their connection to sending and receiving state. “Diaspora media” is also rejected because I do not use the term “diaspora” except with respect to diaspora engagement policies. The term “ethnic media” is problematic as well because it implies a cultural universality or neutrality to mainstream language media. However, “ethnic media” is commonly used in both research and policy, and so I use it in conjunction with minority media.

¹³⁶ Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 5.

because it suggests a difference in power and indicates the group's position nationally. Thinking about minorities in terms of their national position is appropriate because despite the clustering of Chinese Canadians in the Greater Vancouver and Greater Toronto areas, policies generated at a national level engage and shape the development of CCLTN.

Some researchers have sought to stress that the application of the term “ethnic” or “minority” media is somewhat arbitrary and not reflective of a certain “mixedness” that is at work in any cultural or media production. As Annabelle Sreberny suggests in her research on minority media in Britain, basing research and policy efforts on identifying and supporting “ethnic media” can reify groups and identities that are necessarily in a state of flux given both the minority position of the ethnic groups and the fluidity of identities and cultural practice.¹³⁷

Amidst these concerns, some scholars have attempted to further conceptualize and nuance minority media research by applying qualifiers to minority media outlets. These have included ownership, staff or operators, language, funders, distribution, content, size, location, and target audience.¹³⁸ Researchers at the Metamorphosis Project, a project focused on minority media in Los Angeles, have elected to think of these qualifiers as different dimensions of minority media. In so doing, Sandra Ball-Rokeach and her colleagues expose and stress diversity among minority media outlets, asserting that there is considerable variation and complexity within each dimension of minority media.¹³⁹ For instance, the language used in a publication or broadcast may be a specific dialect but not the official language of the sending state, an official language in the receiving state, or more than one language may be used by the

¹³⁷ Annabelle Sreberny, "'Not Only, But Also': Mixedness and Media," *Journal Of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 31, no. 3 (2005): 443-459.

¹³⁸ Matsaganis Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 9 and Dan Caspi and Nelly Elias, "Don't patronize me: media-by and media-for minorities," *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 34, no. 1 (January 2011): 62-82.

¹³⁹ "Civic Engagement," Metamorphosis Project, Annenberg School for Communication.

media organization. Similarly, in work on minority newspapers in Israel, researchers differentiated between media by minorities versus media for minorities. Here, the researchers divided the qualifiers between three groups: first, initiative and design, which refers to the identity and political orientation of the founders and operators; second, functioning, or its orientation towards the mainstream and who it sees as its reference group; and third, medium control, or what pressures this organization faces and how these pressures are handled.¹⁴⁰

While research done on minority media production is relatively sparse, there is a great deal of potential here. Nothing guarantees uniform quality among minority media workers, but the need to create or at least reproduce content suggests that minority media workers will be among the more well-informed members of their community. They are more likely to be aware of the issues and events that have become important to minority communities, and in some instances, they have acted as intermediaries relaying information important in mainstream media to minority communities and vice versa.¹⁴¹ Further, the production process and the agents involved can reveal a great deal about who has an interest in minority communities and why. In the production of minority media, the presence of disparate influences demonstrates the transnationalism that is so often theorized but sometimes difficult to characterize.

¹⁴⁰ Caspi and Elias, "Don't Patronize Me: Media-by and Media-for Minorities," 16.

¹⁴¹ Gabriel Yu (guest on Fairchild TV and freelance journalist), in discussion with author, May 31, 2013, Vancouver, British Columbia; Winnie Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation), in discussion with author, May 24, 2013, Vancouver, British Columbia.

3.3 Findings, projects, and themes in minority media research

In many of the larger, longer term projects, researchers are working to map out minority media outlets, flows of communication, and target audiences in a given area. In these projects, content, production, and consumption are often all addressed. A three-phase project housed in the Simon Fraser University School of Communication, entitled *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC*, undertook efforts to sketch out the landscape of minority media outlets in BC including television, radio, and print. The first phase created a directory of minority media outlets. The second phase analyzed minority media news content to identify topics covered, geographical focus, and genre employed—that is whether the segment was editorial, interviews, soft news, or hard news. Phase three undertook interviews with policy analysts, owners, and other major stakeholders in minority media in BC.¹⁴²

The Metamorphosis Project is a much larger, ongoing undertaking, and its aim is to:

... Understand the transformation of urban community under the forces of globalization, new communication technologies, and population diversity so that our research can inform practitioner and policy maker decisions. Our site of study is Los Angeles and its many ethnic communities of both new and settled immigrants.¹⁴³

In so doing, these researchers are seeking to map out a communications ecology, or a system that

includes all media forms available in a particular area—both ethnic and mainstream—in context of each other, and in context of the other ways residents may find out about their community, such as through interpersonal communication with their neighbors and through their connections to local organizations and institutions.¹⁴⁴

Both of these projects highlight three key themes that are recurrent in minority media research: first, the role of minority media in the communities that they serve; second, the conditions for the development of minority media and questions about long term viability; and

¹⁴² Murray, Yu, and Ahadi, “Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC.,” 26.

¹⁴³ “Welcome to Metamorphosis,” Metamorphosis Project, Annenberg School for Communication.

¹⁴⁴ Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 208.

third, interest in the utility of minority media in integrating immigrant communities. I consider each of these themes in turn.

Many minority media projects aim to understand the role of minority media in the life of minority communities. Here, researchers with an interest in transnational migration assert that minority media often has both a connecting function and an orientation function. The connecting function helps migrants remain in touch with and attached to sending states while the orientation function turns their attention to living in and adapting to receiving states.¹⁴⁵ Significantly, orienting content may not be about the mainstream of a receiving society but highlight the shared experiences of the minority community. Particularly with an eye on the integrational value of minority media, many content-oriented studies have sought to quantify the amount of connecting or orienting material a given minority media outlet produces. There is also an interest in gauging the impact of minority media on consumers. In these studies, consumers often report higher levels of belonging in their communities of settlement when minority media outlets report on receiving state issues in addition to sending state news.¹⁴⁶

With respect to the conditions that foster the development of minority media, researchers have highlighted how minority media can assist communities coping with marginalization and discrimination. For instance, significant work has been done on African-American newspapers in the US, noting bursts in their development around abolition and civil rights struggles.¹⁴⁷ In these instances, minority media became a platform for articulating struggles against inequality and oppression. Similarly, work on Indigenous media in Australia, Canada, and the US highlight

¹⁴⁵ Hanna Adoni, Dan Caspi, and Akiba A. Cohen, *Media, Minorities, and Hybrid Identities : The Arab and Russian Communities in Israel* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2006), 12.

¹⁴⁶ Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 52.

¹⁴⁷ Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 57.

the importance of media in providing a different venue for storytelling, particularly when a minority is stereotyped in mainstream media.¹⁴⁸ In these instances, oppression encouraged the development of minority media as a community resources for coping and resistance.¹⁴⁹

Questions about long-term viability of minority media confront the challenge of gaining new generations of readers, viewers, and listeners. Immigration flows are typically considered to be the driving force behind the development of minority media because this supplies the audience.¹⁵⁰ When immigration flows taper off, the consumer base of a minority media outlet typically shrinks. Retention of second and third generation immigrants as consumers and subscribers was an issue of concern in interviews with minority media stakeholders in the BC minority media project. While owners expressed a desire to reach out by expanding the topics covered, many noted that language ability was a concern. Although some minority media outlets publish in dual languages, for many of the smaller operations making the transition to bilingual or multilingual publications and broadcasts may require financial investments that are beyond their means.¹⁵¹

Finally, interest in how minority media may assist in integration efforts is an ever-present concern in the research. With an eye on the fear that minority media prevents new immigrants from gaining language skills, researchers have sought repeatedly to demonstrate that minority media does indeed help immigrants become more settled in the receiving state. Research on Chinese newspapers, radio, and television in Canada found that minority media facilitates fuller

¹⁴⁸ Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 77.

¹⁴⁹ Isabel Awad and Andrea Roth, "From Minority to Cross-Cultural Programmes: Dutch Media Policy and the Politics of Integration," *International Communication Gazette* 73, no. 5 (August 2011): 246.

¹⁵⁰ Awad and Roth, "From Minority to Cross-Cultural Programmes," 248.

¹⁵¹ Murray, Yu, and Ahadi, "Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC," 212.

participation in receiving state life by conveying critical information in a language more accessible to immigrants.¹⁵² Both the *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC* project and the Metamorphosis Project have found that minority media can become useful to receiving state goals and needs. In the Metamorphosis Project, there is an emphasis on how communications infrastructure operates in the wake of a crisis as well as its utility in conveying health and safety information.¹⁵³ Similarly, researchers in BC looked at the possibility that minority media assists in improving civic engagement among minority groups.¹⁵⁴

Although multiphase research projects like *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC* as well as the Metamorphosis Project are beyond the scope of my dissertation, their findings provide a sense of the sorts of questions often pursued by minority media research. My work, which focuses on production rather than on content or consumption, is well-positioned to emphasize the way power relations are at work in minority media. My focus on the sending and receiving states render the opportunities and dilemmas created in transnational spaces apparent, particularly as I discuss CCLTN worker responses and rationales. For these reasons, my dissertation asks, how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states.

4. Conclusion: the sending state, receiving state, and minority media workers

In conclusion, there are three bodies of literature that have been important to my research: transnational migration research on sending states, literature on media and communications, and

¹⁵² Zhou, Chen, and Cai, "Chinese-Language Media and Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada," 46.

¹⁵³ "Welcome to Metamorphosis," Metamorphosis Project, Annenberg School for Communication.

¹⁵⁴ Murray, Yu, and Ahadi, "Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC," 212.

minority media research. My research question, how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states, builds on much of the work done here but also contributes to it. By drawing in the sending state, the receiving state, and minority media workers, my research also does several things that are often neglected in these three bodies of research. First, my research includes the sending state, an agent that is too often neglected in transnational migration research. Further, my work contextualizes the sending state by including the receiving state and minority media workers as well—thus drawing out agents and issues that may constrain the sending state. Second, my work uses political economy to highlight the exercise of power in Canada’s minority media governance while also accounting for the influence of the sending state. Moreover, standards used to discuss journalism practice assist as I describe and analyze the responses of my interview subjects. Third, unlike other studies on minority media, my work focuses on production rather than consumption and content and thus highlights the power relations at work in the creation of minority media.

While migration pathways may be protracted and circuitous, the three major actors in my research parallel the minimum three major points of reference in any given migration circuit: the sending state, the receiving state, and migration communities. In this way, my study joins other work by those who “bring the state back in” to transnational migration research but in a way that continues to acknowledge the agency of societal actors. Working across all three bodies of literature have helped make my research both more inclusive and more tangible. It is inclusive because it brings together a broader set of actors than those typically considered—though an exhaustive set is beyond the scope of this dissertation. And the research is more tangible because it looks at a definable segment of ordinary migrant life—the production of news media.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In every research project, key choices must be made about sources of data, methods of data collection, and project design. In this chapter, I explain how I addressed those elements in my research as well as difficulties encountered along the way.

1. Single n case studies

Single case studies are by no means anomalous in political science. Rather, they are done quite commonly, often by those who have an area specialty or came to the discipline by way of history.¹⁵⁵ At the same time, case study research, and single case studies in particular, have often been the subject of many criticisms. In his classic article on comparative politics and comparative method, Arend Lijphart talks about the perils of single case study research. He is especially concerned about scholars who are so preoccupied by the idiosyncrasies of their case that they make scant effort to relate their findings to other cases. Lijphart is especially critical of atheoretical case studies in which findings are discussed in case specific language rather than with the use of generalizable terms. After all, as Lijphart asserts, the work of comparative politics is to replace system specific names with generalizable variables.¹⁵⁶

Although my research is a single case study, I discuss my findings in terms that are frequently used by other scholars working on comparative projects. I speak particularly to those specializing in transnational migration as well as to researchers working on minority media in the

¹⁵⁵ Levy, "Case Studies," 6; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 686, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1955513>.

¹⁵⁶ Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 684–87.

field of communications.¹⁵⁷ In its immediate vicinity, my research generates hypotheses about the role of sending states and receiving states in minority media production. More broadly, however, my work raises questions about the role of sending and receiving states in the life of migrant communities and organizations overall. Thus, my work is essentially a hypothesis generating case study according to Lijphart's typology or as a heuristic case study according to a somewhat similar typology by Harry Eckstein.¹⁵⁸

While Lijphart and Eckstein assert that single case studies can indeed be useful, the writers of *Designing Social Inquiry*, another methodological classic, are less affirming. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba point out that if the results of a single case study were plotted, the graph would only show a single point on the Cartesian plane. Any number of lines, representing relationships between the dependent and independent variables, could be drawn through the point.¹⁵⁹ For King, Keohane, and Verba, this means that theories about causal effect are then neither confirmed nor denied, and then we would learn nothing new about the world. As such, these authors recommend that the single case study should be avoided and researchers ought to expand their sample.¹⁶⁰

The contention created by these authors can largely be laid to rest, however, when one considers the difference between a causal effect and a causal mechanism. Causal effects account for whether or to what degree the independent variable affects the dependent variable.

¹⁵⁷ Gamlen, "The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination"; Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*.

¹⁵⁸ Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 7, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 100; Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 692.

¹⁵⁹ Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 126.

¹⁶⁰ King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 208–2012.

Establishment of the causal effect is pursued most successfully through an accumulation of results from hypothesis testing.¹⁶¹ Here, researchers seek out rule- or precept-like theories; therefore, obtaining a representative sample is crucial. Further, discovering causal effects necessitates that the independent variables tested do not overlap with one another. It is also better to have fewer variables tested because this allows for greater parsimony in the theory and more easily falsifiable hypotheses. Larger samples will also be better than small ones as it lowers the possibility that findings are generated by chance.¹⁶²

In contrast to causal effects, which lead to parsimonious rule-like propositions, causal mechanisms delve into causal complexity. Causal mechanisms try to understand independent variables more fully and asks how and why the independent variable affects the dependent variable.¹⁶³ In *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett argue that causal complexity such as multiple interactions and path dependencies are best explored when the researcher focuses on identifying and describing causal mechanisms.¹⁶⁴ Constructing causal mechanisms demands depth and richness in the contextual knowledge of the case. My research, which devotes an entire chapter to both the sending and receiving state, offers this. The building of causal mechanisms stands in great contrast to measuring or confirming the causal effect of X on Y. Causal mechanisms address the how and why of causation with deeper descriptions, explanations, and analysis. Arguably, these aims create a situation in which small, or better yet single n case studies, would be preferred. Bigger

¹⁶¹ Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures : Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2012), 231.

¹⁶² King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 178–82.

¹⁶³ Goertz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, 242.

¹⁶⁴ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 17–24.

is not better, and having too many cases could actually impair the research by making the project too big and too unwieldy.

Thus, when considering my work in its entirety, this dissertation was an inductive investigation about the transnational politics of CCLTN production.¹⁶⁵ As my literature review shows, I explored the literature of transnational migration as well as research from communications and minority media. Neither body of work offered a theory that spoke to minority media production in a way that included all the major actors necessary for a credible political analysis. Certainly, some elements of my research included the application of the general to the specific. Transnational migration literature has been useful in describing the rationale and transnational orientations of many CCLTN workers as well as some of the concerns and interests of the receiving state. Similarly, the mid-level theorizing about sending states has been useful in explaining and describing the behaviour of the PRC. Taken together, however, the work on transnational migration has not offered a theory that could speak to the specific requirements of my work. As such, I am obliged to offer up an inductive study with the hopes of generating a hypothesis. Only then will I be able to engage in deductive work that may benefit from an enlarged sample in the future.

2. Setting the scene

It is fairly clear from the outset that my research is deeply embedded in a certain setting; CCLTN is a form of minority media that is positioned to serve Chinese communities in Canada. Further, the newsrooms producing CCLTN are all part of different companies, each with their own business models. In this section, I outline some of the particulars of my case beginning with a

¹⁶⁵ "Deduction & Induction," Web Center for Social Research Methods, William M.K. Trochim, accessed May 24, 2019, <https://socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php>.

brief history of Chinese people in Canada as well as a summation of their current standing. I also provide a short overview of the corporations that produce CCLTN and their owners. A more thorough discussion is provided in Chapter six, where I discuss at length how the Canadian government has regulated CCLTN producers. Finally, I sketch out the contents of CCLTN programming.

2.1 The Chinese in Canada

People of Chinese origin are Canada's second largest visible minority, comprising 4.6% of Canada's total population.¹⁶⁶ South Asians are Canada's largest visible minority at 25.1% of Canada's total visible minority population, but owing to the diversity of languages spoken on the Indian subcontinent, Mandarin and Cantonese are the most commonly spoken non-official languages among Canadian immigrants.¹⁶⁷ Both Mandarin and Cantonese are spoken by 5.2% of Canada's total immigrant population.¹⁶⁸ Chinese people in Canada come from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, other locations across Southeast Asia, and South America.¹⁶⁹ More than 70% of the Chinese people living in Canada reside in the Greater Toronto Area or the Greater Vancouver area, though there are also significant communities across the country.¹⁷⁰

Large-scale Chinese immigration to Canada started in the middle of the nineteenth century when many came to work in gold mines and on the transcontinental Canadian Pacific Railway. Chinese migrants at the time were considered to be a temporary necessity rather than

¹⁶⁶ Statistics Canada, "Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity."

¹⁶⁷ Statistics Canada, "Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity."

¹⁶⁸ Statistics Canada, "Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity."

¹⁶⁹ Anthony B. Chan, "Chinese Canadians," *The Canadian Encyclopaedia*, 2015, <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/chinese-canadians>.

¹⁷⁰ Tina Chui, Kelly Tran, and John Flanders, "Chinese Canadians: Enriching the Cultural Mosaic," *Canadian Social Trends* 76 (Spring 2005): 24-32, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-008-x/2004004/article/7778-eng.pdf>.

as potential new Canadians. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 was passed in the same year that the railway was finished, levying a tax on each Chinese person who entered the country.¹⁷¹ However, a shortage of white labour as well as dire conditions in southern China caused by foreign invasion, political instability, and natural disasters encouraged ongoing Chinese labour migration. Thus, Chinese continued to migrate to Canada, sometimes as indentured labour, finding work in mining, logging, farming, and canneries.¹⁷²

Punctuated by economic recessions, anti-Chinese sentiment grew in Canada in the nineteenth century. Between 1875 and 1923 the province of British Columbia, where many Chinese had found work, passed several laws discriminating against the Chinese—bans on Chinese working in underground locations, special taxes levied on Chinese labour, as well as disenfranchisement in provincial elections.¹⁷³ After significant lobbying by British Columbia, Canada's federal government passed the Chinese Immigration Act in 1923, which banned Chinese from entering the country until it was repealed in 1947.¹⁷⁴ Chinese populations in Canada dwindled in that time, but owing in part to the service of Chinese Canadians in the military, Chinese people gained the right to vote shortly after World War II. However, Chinese immigration into Canada remained minute as the Canadian government continued to favour immigrants from Europe and the United States over those from Asia and Africa.¹⁷⁵

Changes to immigration policy beginning in 1967, however, allowed for larger flows of Chinese immigration from Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland China, and various places throughout

¹⁷¹ Peter S. Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 2nd ed. (Toronto : Oxford University Press, 1998.), 6.

¹⁷² Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 48.

¹⁷³ Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 30–35.

¹⁷⁴ Chan, "Chinese Canadians."

¹⁷⁵ Statistics Canada, "The Evolution of Language Populations in Canada, by Mother Tongue, from 1901 to 2016," webpage, *Canadian Megatrends* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, February 21, 2018), <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2018001-eng.htm>.

Southeast Asia. In the 1980s, the determination that Hong Kong would be returned to the PRC in 1997 triggered waves of immigration from Hong Kong. By the mid 1990s, almost a quarter of a million immigrants had come to Canada from Hong Kong.¹⁷⁶ Today, the PRC is the largest source of Chinese immigration and the second largest source of immigrants overall.¹⁷⁷ My interview data indicates that anti-Chinese racism still occasionally surfaces in Canada today. However, the Chinese in Canada are also considered to be a significant minority, and in 2006, the federal government offered a formal apology and compensation for the Chinese head tax. Many members of Canada's Chinese communities have been recognized in Canadian public service, including a governor general.¹⁷⁸

2.2 The CCLTN producers

When I began my fieldwork in 2013, a total of three television corporations were actively producing CCLTN: OMNI TV, Global Television, and Fairchild Television. OMNI TV is a national, multilingual television network owned by Rogers Media. Rogers Media is the media division of Rogers Communications, a telecommunications corporation that sells internet, mobile service, and cable services. OMNI TV is not the only television network owned by Rogers Media, as Rogers Media also owns mainstream television channels OLN, CityTV, and others.¹⁷⁹ Owing to commitments outlined in their broadcasting license, OMNI TV provides free, over-the-air television in twenty-two languages. Over the years, OMNI TV has also provided daily news

¹⁷⁶ Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 99. A quarter of a million is a considerable outflow given that the city only contained about 4 million people before the handover.

¹⁷⁷ Chui, Tran, and Flanders, "Chinese Canadians: Enriching the Cultural Mosaic."

¹⁷⁸ The governor general is Canada's official head of state, but the prime minister is the head of government and in charge of regular executive and legislative functions of government. The governor general's role is largely ceremonial, with exceptions in moments of constitutional or electoral uncertainty.

¹⁷⁹ "Engage. Excite. Ignite," Rogers Media, accessed March 2019, <https://www.rogersmedia.com/>.

broadcasts and weekend news in a number of different languages including Punjabi, Cantonese, and Mandarin. As of 2019, OMNI TV is still on the air providing Cantonese and Mandarin news broadcasts.¹⁸⁰

Global Television was the second active CCLTN producer at the time I began my fieldwork. Global Television is also a conventional television network that engages in mainstream over-the-air broadcasting. Global Television is owned by Corus Entertainment, a company that was created and is 40% owned by Shaw Communications Inc.¹⁸¹ Shaw Communications provides television, internet, mobile, and phone services. Corus Entertainment also owns a number of other television properties including HGTV, Showcase, and YTV.¹⁸² *Global Mandarin News Hour* was a half hour, weekday evening newscast which aired on Shaw Multicultural Channel, a channel that was only available to Shaw cable customers. *Global Mandarin News Hour* operated as a small, five-person team within Global News, Global Television's flagship English-language news broadcaster. *Global Mandarin News Hour* began airing in 2012 but was taken off air in 2016.¹⁸³

The third CCLTN producer is Fairchild Television, the television wing of Fairchild Media, a subsidiary of the Fairchild Group. The Fairchild Group is a business conglomerate with assets in real estate, media, and retail. The Fairchild Group is entirely owned by Thomas

¹⁸⁰ CRTC, "Rogers Media Inc. – Licence Renewals for English-Language Television Stations, Services and Network," Decision 2017-151 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, May 15, 2017), <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2017/2017-151.htm>.

¹⁸¹ In April 2016, Global Television and all of Shaw's media holdings were transferred to Corus Entertainment. J. R. Shaw founded Shaw Communications, and the Shaw Family Trust retains majority voting share in both Corus Entertainment and Shaw Communications (CRTC, "Corus Corporate Structure," 6 July 2016. <http://crtc.gc.ca/ownership/eng/cht032c.pdf>).

¹⁸² "Corus Entertainment," Corus Entertainment, accessed March 2019, <https://www.corusent.com/>.

¹⁸³ "Global National Producing National Mandarin-Language Newscast," Global News, December 7, 2011, <https://globalnews.ca/news/186776/global-national-producing-national-mandarin-language-newscast/>.

Fung, a Chinese Canadian from Hong Kong. Notably, TVB, a Hong Kong-based media company, owns 20% of the Fairchild Group's media assets. Fairchild Television owns two TV channels—Fairchild Television and Talentvision. The channels broadcast primarily in Cantonese and Mandarin, respectively, and they both air daily newscasts along with re-broadcasts of news from mainland China and Hong Kong.¹⁸⁴

2.3 CCLTN programming

Since I began my fieldwork in 2013, there have been many changes to CCLTN programming. OMNI has, at different times, cut several departments and broadcasts, and *Global Mandarin News Hour* is no longer on air. However, I have listed the most current CCLTN programs, as of the spring of 2019, on Table 5. The descriptions attached to the programs are taken largely from the websites for the television channels, though they are consistent with my casual viewing of these programs as well. The descriptions indicate that news about Canadian politics and current events is a part of CCLTN, while international news tends to be focused on Hong Kong, mainland China, and Taiwan, more than what might be typical for mainstream news outlets. I have included *Global Mandarin News Hour* because members of their news team were interviewed for my research.

¹⁸⁴ "Company Profile," Fairchild Group, accessed March 2019, <https://www.fairchildgroup.com/>.

Table 1. Canadian, Chinese-language Television News Programs¹⁸⁵

Broadcaster	Program	Description
Global Television	<i>Global Mandarin News Hour</i>	<i>Global Mandarin News Hour</i> was a thirty-minute newscast consisting largely of stories translated from the English language version <i>Global News at 5</i> , often with one or two original segments focusing on news from Hong Kong, mainland China, and/or Taiwan. This program aired on weekdays on Shaw Multicultural Channel as well as on globaltv.com.
OMNI TV	<i>OMNI News: Mandarin Edition</i>	<i>OMNI News: Mandarin Edition</i> airs for thirty minutes every evening. The show is comprised of a mix of news from Canada, largely at a national level, as well as stories from Hong Kong, mainland China, and Taiwan.
	<i>OMNI News: Cantonese Edition</i>	<i>OMNI News: Cantonese Edition</i> airs for thirty minutes every evening. The show is comprised of a mix of news from Canada, largely at a national level, as well as stories from Hong Kong, mainland China, and Taiwan.
	<i>Focus Cantonese</i>	<i>Focus Cantonese</i> airs on weekday evenings. This thirty-minute magazine show delves into issues such as healthcare, business, and local municipal and provincial politics from the point of view of Cantonese communities in Canada. The program features guests, and viewers are invited to comment during the show via social media.
Fairchild Television	<i>FTV News</i>	<i>FTV News</i> is Fairchild Television's Cantonese news service that airs every day in the evening. It covers current events locally, nationally, and internationally with a particular interest on Hong Kong and mainland China.
	<i>Magazine 26</i>	<i>Magazine 26</i> is an investigative news magazine show that takes a deeper look at various issues in social problems, business, medicine, and many other topics. This program airs once per week for thirty minutes in Cantonese.

¹⁸⁵ "OMNI TV Schedule," OMNI TV, accessed March 2019, <https://www.omnitv.ca/ab/en/schedule/>; "FTV Schedule," Fairchild TV, accessed March 2019, https://www.fairchildtv.com/english/schedule_ftv.php; "Talentvision Schedule," Talentvision, accessed March 2019, <https://www.talentvisiontv.com/ch/schedule.php>.

	<i>Timeline Magazine</i>	<i>Timeline Magazine</i> helps Chinese audiences adjust to life in Canada by talking about politics, information technology, movies, and entertainment. This program airs once per week for thirty minutes in Cantonese.
Talentvision (under Fairchild Television)	<i>My Country My Home</i>	<i>My Country My Home</i> is a current events and politics program that covers life and politics in Canada and on international affairs concerning Canada. It airs once a week in Mandarin on Wednesdays.
	<i>Expert Hour</i>	<i>Expert Hour</i> is an interview-based talk show that discusses issues relevant to life in Canada. The show is oriented towards new-comers and questions and concerns they may have about life in Canada. The program airs on Tuesday nights.
	<i>City View</i>	<i>City View</i> airs in Mandarin on Friday. The program provides in-depth focus on the Mandarin speaking community in Toronto and largely covers community and local events. It offers information public services, immigrant life, and culture.
	<i>Straits Today</i>	<i>Straits Today</i> airs in Mandarin on Friday. It is a current-events talk show that focuses on news, politics, and public opinion. The show features expert guests, debate, as well as viewer call-ins.
	<i>Fenghua Expo</i>	<i>Fenghua Expo</i> looks at the life of Chinese people living in Canada. The program offers community information, leisure activities, community organization information, and Chinese arts. The show highlights the stories of Chinese people who are living in Canada and adapting to life here. The program airs in Mandarin on Saturdays.
	<i>TTV News</i>	<i>TTV News</i> is a Mandarin language news program that airs daily for one hour. The program includes news from both the East and West regional offices in Canada as well as international news with a focus on mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

While minority media content and audience impact studies do exist, very little of it has been directed specifically towards CCLTN. However, two notable but dated publications do stand out. The first is a joint consumer report commissioned by Fairchild Media, OMNI TV, and *Sing Tao* in 2007. Ipsos Reid surveyed 1,800 Cantonese and Mandarin speakers in the Greater Toronto Area and the Greater Vancouver area concerning their media consumption. The findings indicated that Chinese speakers in Canada are more likely to watch Fairchild Television or Talentvision compared with both other Chinese-language television choices as well as major Chinese-language newspapers.¹⁸⁶

The second publication is “Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC.”¹⁸⁷ In the second phase of their research, these researchers performed content analysis of ethnic print and television media that they had identified in their survey from phase one of the research project. The Cantonese media surveyed included Fairchild TV, Channel M, *Sing Tao*, and *Ming Pao*; only Fairchild TV was still airing when I began my fieldwork, and the two newspapers do not count as CCLTN. The Mandarin resources used for content analysis included CCTV, Channel M, and *World Journal*—all of which either do not qualify as CCLTN or were no longer airing by the time I began my fieldwork.¹⁸⁸ Further, many of the findings did not differentiate between TV and print, and so it was difficult to gain a strong sense of CCLTN content from this study.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ Ipsos Reid, “Chinese Media Monitor” (Toronto: Fairchild TV, 2007).

¹⁸⁷ Murray, Yu, and Ahadi, “Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC.”

¹⁸⁸ Murray, Yu, and Ahadi, “Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC,” 64.

¹⁸⁹ Murray, Yu, and Ahadi, “Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC,” 63–68. For a fuller discussion of the findings, please see the report, p. 63 – 104.

3. Notes on Sources of Data

The data used in my research comes from interviews with informed and consenting research subjects as well as from print sources. In this section, I offer details about my data sources.

3.1 Rationale for interviewing CCLTN workers

In trying to understand the politics of minority media production, it seemed to me that the people who would be the most aware of the different competing messages at play would be the people involved in producing the news. While China and Canada's overlapping subject-state claims are directed at Chinese people in Canada, it seemed reasonable to concentrate my focus at this point of the information chain given that mass media is one of the avenues that states can use to reach constituents. Journalists are paid to be well-informed, and I thought that I would learn more from journalists about how China and Canada want to relate to Chinese communities in Canada than I would from ordinary Chinese Canadians.

Further, work on overseas Chinese media emphasize the transnational world making at play in newspaper and television. By including specific locations across different countries, tabloids, magazines, and television programs produce worlds out of transnational spaces, which can be different for different audiences.¹⁹⁰ Rather than London, Paris, and New York, overseas Chinese audiences might focus on Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Singapore. I wanted to know more about the politics involved in this kind of world making, and so I decided to talk to the people who are directly involved in these efforts.

There are, of course, limits to my research. For instance, I will not be able to say much about audience impact because I was interviewing CCLTN workers, not conducting surveys or

¹⁹⁰ Chua, "Gossip about Stars: Newspapers and Pop Culture in China."

focus groups with viewers. Several of the CCLTN workers offered their impressions about what audiences are interested in, but I am not able to ascertain how audiences are reacting to the news and information from China. I cannot be certain about whether news from China interferes with audience attachment to Canada or whether news and information about Canada actually creates a stronger sense of attachment to Canada. Journalists are, however, supposed to be in touch with the communities they serve. Further, many of them are themselves members of Chinese communities in Canada, albeit more well-informed members. In many of their comments, they discuss belonging and provide their sense that attachment and necessity drives their viewers to consume CCLTN as it contains news and information about China and Canada. Pertaining to both audience needs and news making for Canada's Chinese communities, I consider CCLTN worker comments to be expert opinion.

3.2 Interview subject details

In addition to policy document research, much of the primary research done for my dissertation consists of interviews conducted with CCLTN workers. The job titles assigned to each of the interview subjects reflect their status at the time the interviews were done. Some have since been let go from their positions, retired, or moved on to other work. OMNI TV had just restructured their Cantonese news teams months before my fieldwork, and so I decided to interview former employees as well. In the end, twenty-two interviews have been used in my research.

- 1) *Joseph Chan*: Fairchild TV – President
- 2) *Susan Cheng*: Fairchild TV – News editor and news anchor
- 3) *Christine Cormi*: OMNI – Market research analyst

- 4) *Rita Giang*: Fairchild TV – News director
- 5) *Grant Guo*: OMNI – reporter
- 6) *Winnie Hwo*: David Suzuki Foundation – Senior public engagement specialist; formerly Fairchild TV – News Director
- 7) *Victor Ho*: *Sing Tao Daily* Limited – Editor-in-chief; guest on Fairchild TV
- 8) *Jenny Hu*: OMNI – News director
- 9) *Jack Jia*: Chinese News Group Ltd. – President and editor-in-chief; guest on Talentvision
- 10) *Danielle Kent*: Global National Mandarin Edition – Editor and technical producer
- 11) *Isa Lee*: Fairchild TV – News anchor and reporter
- 12) *Wei Li*: OMNI – News anchor
- 13) *Charles Mak*: formerly OMNI – news producer and director
- 14) *Man Sai Cheong*: Freelance journalist; guest on Fairchild TV
- 15) *Frank Qi*: Global National Mandarin Edition – News reporter, anchor, assignment editor
- 16) *Stanley So*: formerly OMNI – Retired news anchor and editor
- 17) *Jia Wang*: China Institute – Assistant director; formerly OMNI –reporter and producer
- 18) *Norman Wong*: Stormtec – Sales manager; formerly Shaw Multicultural Channel –
Program coordinator
- 19) *Todd Ye*: Fairchild TV – News director
- 20) *Gabriel Yu*: Freelance journalist; guest on Fairchild TV
- 21) *Renato Zane*: OMNI – News director, reporter
- 22) *Madeline Ziniak*: OMNI – National vice-president

3.3 Print and web primary sources

A) Newspaper articles from China.

Xinhua website: <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/>. Xinhua is the official media outlet of the PRC. Its official mandate is to communicate for the PRC government, and so it is reasonably reliable for communicating whatever official message the PRC government wants to disseminate.

B) PRC government websites

Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council:

<http://china.org.cn/english/government/130437.htm> and

http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/01/content_281474991090995.htm

China Central Television Network: <http://english.cctv.com/>

China Global Television Network: <https://www.cgtn.com/>

C) CRTC documents

CRTC Information Resource Centre: <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/irc-cir.htm>

D) Canadian newspaper articles

Database: Canadian Newsstream via University of Alberta Library: <https://library.ualberta.ca/>

E) Company websites

Fairchild Television: <https://www.fairchildtv.com/>

Global Mandarin News Hour: <https://www.globaltv.com/> There is no longer information on

Global Mandarin News Hour on this website since it has been taken off air.

OMNI: <http://www.omnitv.ca/>

Rogers Media: <https://www.rogersmedia.com/>

Shaw: <https://www.shaw.ca/store/>

Talentvision: <https://www.talentvisiontv.com/ch/>

4. Ensuring credibility in interview research

Interviewing subjects is a method of data collection that has been used extensively in political science.¹⁹¹ Still, interview research is subject to difficulties and limitations. In this section, I will discuss some of those issues and how I dealt with them in my research.

Well before I began interviewing subjects, I took steps to ensure that my research would be credible, meaning that the findings would reflect reality.¹⁹² This included grounding myself in the professional settings of my interview subjects by compiling histories of each CCLTN producer as well as familiarizing myself with all the relevant TV programs. In the spring of 2013, before I embarked on my fieldwork, I watched every CCLTN program available via the web as well as through a cable service with an enhanced Chinese-language package.

I do not have the means to guarantee that my interview subjects would provide perfectly accurate and objective accounts, but where possible I corroborated what was said with testimony from other interview subjects, CRTC documents, newspaper articles, and in some cases secondary resources.¹⁹³ Moreover, I took steps to encourage them to be forthcoming and truthful about their points of view. My strategy was to give them as much control over the interview as was feasible, and in so doing creating a sense of freedom and privacy that would encourage frank conversations.¹⁹⁴ I also developed and used a checklist which included a variety of tasks that I

¹⁹¹ Layna Mosley, *Interview Research in Political Science* (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 2013).

¹⁹² Andrew K. Shenton, "Strategies for Ensuring Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research Projects," *Education for Information* 22, no. 2 (January 1, 2004): 64.

¹⁹³ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), 20.

¹⁹⁴ Steve Mann, *The Research Interview: Reflective Practice and Reflexivity in Research Processes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 11 4.

would complete before and after the interviews. These tasks ensured that the interview subjects understood that the research was completely voluntary, for academic purposes, and that they had choices in how they participated.¹⁹⁵ I also allowed the interview subjects to choose the location where we would meet to make the setting more comfortable for them. I conducted all but three of the interviews individually.

I was also aware that there are many cleavages in Chinese communities in Canada, and that these may be pertinent to my interview subjects.¹⁹⁶ As such, I made sure to include interview subjects that would reflect various kinds of diversity. To that end, I interviewed both Cantonese and Mandarin speakers and varied interview subjects according to different homeland origins.

Table 2. Chinese languages spoken by interview subjects

	Cantonese	Mandarin	Both	Neither	Total
No. of interview subjects	10	7	1	4	22

Table 3. Homeland origins of interview subjects

	Hong Kong	Taiwan	Mainland China	Non-Chinese	Total
No. of interview subjects	9	2	6	5	22

¹⁹⁵ The checklist is included in Appendix A.

¹⁹⁶ For a fuller discussion of interview subject positionality as it pertains to interview research, please see Kalyani Thurairajah, "Practicing Reflexivity: Balancing Multiple Positionalities During Fieldwork," SAGE Research Methods Cases (2019), <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526483850>.

Finally, I gave my interview subjects the option of responding to the interviews in their language of choice. Only three of my interview subjects opted to respond largely in Cantonese, and none of my interview subjects responded primarily in Mandarin. In two of those cases, it was clear to me that the interview subjects had advanced journalistic training and experience, even beyond that of most of the other interview subjects. They wanted to express their thoughts with the intellectual depth that they required, and so those two interview subjects chose to use Cantonese. In the last instance in which Cantonese was the primary interview language, the interview subject was a fairly junior member of her news organization who was reluctant to offer her own opinions and conjectures. I interpret these behaviours as well as her overall demeanour as expressions of modesty about her abilities. As such, I see her choice to use Cantonese and avoid English the same way.

Beyond these instances of Cantonese preference, subjects typically engaged in varying amounts of code switching throughout their interviews—that is moving back and forth between English and their Chinese language of choice. Sometimes, subjects would revert to their mother tongue when trying to describe something intangible—like attitudes, orientations, or emotional and mental states. Sometimes, they were trying to describe a situation with a certain degree of nuance that eluded their English language skills. In these and other cases, both the interview subject and I would try different words in other languages in an attempt to reach a common understanding. At other times, interview subjects made use of English because the concept was learned and discussed in English more than in a Chinese language. In any case, interview subjects made language choices that they felt were necessary to give a clearer and more precise expression of their thoughts.

5. Difficulties encountered in my research

In spite of my preparations, I did still run into challenges—the first being finding participants. I had collected contact information from personal acquaintances and company websites.

However, when I began sending out emails and making calls in January 2013, I received only a few responses. On the first day of my fieldwork in May 2013, I had only six confirmed interviews. While I had planned to solicit more introductions from my interview subjects, I had no sense of how many more people I might meet. Further, just weeks prior to my trip, I discovered that OMNI had restructured their news teams and some of the people I wanted to interview would no longer be employed by them.

When I began my interview research, however, my interview subjects began providing me with names and additional contact information. Moreover, I found that potential interview subjects responded much more positively when I told them I was already in their city and asked to meet within a few days. CCLTN workers who do the reporting and news gathering must produce news shows by late afternoon each and every workday. They have to respond to developments as they happen, and so they tend to think about their time in terms of what happens day to day. Many of them also know each other. I found that a few of my interview subjects have, at different times, worked for more than one CCLTN producer. In Toronto, I learned that some of the CCLTN workers would meet for meals and professional association. It would appear that the overall convenience of meeting me—that is my proximity as well as the interpersonal connections—helped me make more contacts.

The second issue is more a matter of my personal positionality, particularly as it relates to my interview subjects. Positionality refers to the idea that people inhabit a number of different social roles, and all of these elements are part of their makeup. An individual may be a

mother, sister, police officer, and fashionista. The primary identity or identities that a person exhibits varies depending on the situation.¹⁹⁷

My parents are from Hong Kong, where I was born, but I am a Canadian citizen who grew up travelling between Canada, Thailand, and Malaysia. Most of my formal education was provided by Western teachers, but often in an international school for expatriates. Still, my family is Cantonese, and the sound of Cantonese and Mandarin or even simply their accented English-language counterparts makes me want to conform to a different set of social expectations. Operating in those languages puts me in a different psychological space where I am interacting with friends and relatives rather than working in a professional capacity. Age is also an important part of social status, and I knew that I would probably be junior to almost every person that I was to interview. I knew that when interviewing my subjects, I would feel reluctant to contradict them and that I would want to show deference because this is typically expected in a Chinese setting.

As I expected, I was younger than almost all of my interview subjects. I felt that my junior status was sometimes compounded by the fact that I am essentially a neophyte scholar interviewing professional interviewers. In one instance, after asking my initial question which was meant to help them feel at ease and warm up the conversation, the interview subject rolled her eyes and asked me if I would rather get to the other questions right away.

At the same time, I also found that my obvious lack of interview experience sometimes worked to my advantage. Most of my interview subjects felt free to wander from my interview questions at length, sometimes delving into topics that I had not considered and revealing different aspects of their situation to me. At other times, their wanderings simply made the

¹⁹⁷ Thuraijah, "Practicing Reflexivity," 1.

transcripts longer. Many were comfortable holding forth and offering their opinions and prescriptions. Particularly as the interviews went on, most of my subjects seemed to express themselves freely and with candor. Since I was their junior, I was not in a position to disagree. In the one instance that I interviewed a young woman who was about the same age as myself, her answers tended to be given in a different way. She would stay focused on the question that I asked and answered them completely with as many concrete observations as possible. She did not offer her own opinions, rationales, and conjectures as readily as other interview subjects; I had to press her for them.

People have asked me if being Chinese Canadian has helped me with my research. I did, at times, feel that could be true, but I know that I do not fit into the community as a second generation Chinese Canadian who grew up in Canada because I spent most of my adolescence in Southeast Asia. Still, when I interviewed subjects with Hong Kong origins, I felt a keen sense of familiarity; but even then, they did not all offer thoughtful and patient answers. Further, I also found good rapport with some interview subjects from both mainland China and Taiwan as well. I felt that many of my interview subjects already had chatty and gregarious personalities overall. Perhaps conversing with strangers came naturally to them.

Sometimes, speaking with my interview subjects felt both intimate and demonstrative, as if they were showing me how to be Chinese in Canada. At other times, I felt that they measured some unknowable distance between us and opted to speak to me through an adopted English-language, Canada-approved persona. It was not necessarily cold or lacking in honesty—it mostly just seemed like a shell developed for the benefit of others, one that I have seen many friends and relatives assume over the years. Fairly often, I felt that they used the time during the interview to assess whether I should be included or excluded as Chinese Canadian. I cannot be

sure exactly how this has impacted my research, but I do not think any of them purposefully mislead me. They were simply taking the time to assess the person to whom they were speaking.

6. Interview data collection and processing

6.1 Phase 1: Research into contextual information

The first phase of my data collection consisted of finding and reading contextual information about the Canadian state, the Chinese state, and CCLTN producers. I identified the different actors involved in CCLTN production, their relationships to each other, and their mandates. I kept note of different initiatives, pieces of legislation, regulations, events, or documents that might demonstrate any relationship between CCLTN producers and the Chinese and Canadian governments.

6.2 Phase 2: Interview preparation and developing protocols, surveys, and interview prompts

I wanted an interview format that would balance my need to find material that would help me address my research topic while also being open to any different perspectives and topics that I had not anticipated. A semi-structured interview supplies this kind of flexibility. Rather than using a complete list of questions, I created a series of conversational prompts based on the initiatives, legislation, and regulation found in phase one.¹⁹⁸

After developing an initial set of interview prompts, I tested them with an interview subject based in Edmonton. This first interview did not lead me to change any of the prompts.

¹⁹⁸ See Appendix A for the interview prompts.

However, it did confirm that I should continue refining and re-prioritizing the conversation prompts as I gained insights from the interviews. Moreover, I would need to continue adding new topics that seemed promising or topical. Many of the best and most useful topics were the ones I developed during my fieldwork through talking with interview subjects. Thus, the interview prompts, though they were written out and organized by topic, were, in practice, more of an evolving list.

Although my use of the prompt list was highly flexible, I prepared two questions that I intended to ask each interview subject. First, I asked interview subjects what they see as important to driving the development of CCLTN production in Canada. While my research was focused on state interventions, I was aware they could have an entirely different sense of what moves their industry, and I wanted them to have an opportunity to put those issues on the table early in our conversations. Second, near the end of my interview, I usually asked if there was anything else that they would like to tell me or anything that they would like to add. Like the first question, the second was meant to give the interview subject more control over the conversation. Asking this second question at the end of the interview also created an opportunity for them to summarize their thoughts or speak more directly about something that had been emergent in their remarks. This turned out to be a good strategy for extracting frank opinions and more carefully articulated ideas.

In addition to the verbal interview questions, I also wanted to track demographic information about my interviewees that reflected cleavages arising from my context research, including professional background and immigration history. Unfortunately, the interview subjects were not very thorough in filling out the surveys, and so the data collected from them is somewhat incomplete.

I also created a short checklist for each interview in order to ensure that I received important information and followed the university's ethnics guidelines. The checklist included permission to contact them for follow-up questions, recommendations for more interview subject recruitment, and finally confirmation about the voluntary nature of the interview and academic purpose of the research.¹⁹⁹

6.3 Phase 3: Recruitment

Names and contact information were gathered from company websites, personal contacts, CRTC documents, and from other interview subjects. I sent emails with introductions about myself and my research. I aimed to have interview subjects who spoke Mandarin and Cantonese and who came from different Chinese homelands. I was also conscious that interview subjects may feel differently about their work and about CCLTN production overall based on whether they were currently employed or if they had been made redundant. As such, I interviewed both current and former employees, and I also made sure to interview subjects involved in both the business and reporting aspects of CCLTN production. I also wanted to make sure I had interview subjects from all three CCLTN producers.

6.4 Phase 4: Conducting the interviews

I collected the interviews over a period of three and a half weeks beginning in May 2013 to June 2013. One interview was conducted in February 13, 2015. I went to Vancouver first, arriving the day after their provincial elections. This was an opportune moment because CCLTN workers had been covering the events fairly intensively. A number of notable individuals working in

¹⁹⁹ See Appendix A for the checklist.

CCLTN had resigned their posts to run in the elections, and their participation prompted a number of discussions about the role of CCLTN in Canadian life as well as media performance in covering the election.

The interviews in Toronto were also coloured by unfolding events. Shortly before I arrived, OMNI, one of the major CCLTN producers, announced another round of cutbacks to their Chinese-language services. This became a jumping off point for many of my conversations as interview subjects reflected on the difficulty of retaining corporate support, changing trends in news production and consumption, and whether the CRTC was still committed to diversity in media.

The interviews varied in length, ranging from forty minutes to almost two hours. Most of them were conducted in English, although some interview subjects spoke mostly in Cantonese. The mixing of Cantonese and English or Mandarin and English was common. I met with the majority of the interview subjects one on one, but three of them presented themselves as a group. While all the interviews were recorded, I took notes during the interviews as well. After the interviews, I diarized my observations about the interview, including how I might alter my interview prompts for the next interview, topics to investigate further, and the interview subject's body language and overall comportment.

I interviewed a total of twenty-nine people. There was one interview subject who preferred to respond to my questions over email. In the end, I only included twenty-two people in my study because only twenty-two of them were either current or former CCLTN workers. The other six also worked in Chinese-language media in Canada, but they were only working in radio or print. It is not uncommon for CCLTN workers to have backgrounds in other mediums.

A few of them were holding posts in other mediums but had been contributors and guests in CCLTN, and so those were included.

6.5 Phase 5: Processing the interviews

The first step in processing my fieldwork was to transcribe the interviews. Although different languages were used in the interviews, they were translated and transcribed entirely into English. While I was able to follow and engage the interviews given in Cantonese, I found the process of transcribing them to be especially slow, and so transcriptions were completed by a translator. I also compiled the results of the demographic survey.

I began analyzing and coding my interviews by reading all of them and summarizing the main themes and topics in each.²⁰⁰ This process yielded an initial list of twelve major recurring themes.²⁰¹ After reflecting on these findings as well as returning to scholarly literature, I began brainstorming tentative answers to my research question. These answers described how interview subjects thought about their work and about the influence of the Chinese and Canadian states in their industry. After this reflection, I created codes to label and disaggregate their comments according to the themes I had created, as well as my reflections.²⁰²

As I coded the interviews, I wanted to maintain an open coding process wherein I would be able to create new codes and labels if an unanticipated topic emerged from a deeper examination of the transcripts. As such, I created the “uncode” label, which I would apply and then add a few descriptive notes whenever I came across something interesting that did not seem

²⁰⁰ For a more detailed discussion of processing interviews by theme, please see Linda Dale Bloomberg and Marie Volpe, *Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Roadmap from Beginning to End* (Los Angeles : Sage, 2008), 100–106.

²⁰¹ For my initial list of themes, please see Appendix B.

²⁰² For a full list of the codes I used and created, please see Appendix B.

to match any of my existing codes. At the end of each interview, I would look at the uncode sections, consider creating a new code, and include some reflective notes on the precision of existing codes. I was able to refine my coding book in this way. After all the interviews were coded, I created summative tables for each code. The summative tables noted the number of times a topic came up, the number of interview subjects who spoke about the topic, and a short summary of what was said in each instance by each speaker. No specialized software was used in the coding of the interviews. I simply coded the printed-out transcripts and then entered the results onto a Word table. This ensured that I became very familiar with the interviews.

CHAPTER 4: CHINA AND CCLTN PRODUCTION

Introduction

As chapter two explains, sending states and their role in influencing transnational migration and settlement are undertheorized in transnational migration literature. My research contributes to a better understanding of sending states by looking at the relationship between CCLTN production and the Chinese state. This dissertation asks: how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states? This chapter opens a four-chapter discussion that answers my question beginning with the way in which the PRC government involves itself in CCLTN production. How does China project its power and influence into CCLTN production? China engages CCLTN production through three areas of policy: diaspora engagement policy, foreign policy, and media policy. The Chinese state's efforts are not always well coordinated, and particularly with respect to CCLTN production, the goals of different government agencies overlap. However, the combined effect of their policies is to politicize CCLTN production, reorienting it around the issue of support for the PRC government.

The Chinese state has a long history of drawing upon the resources of overseas Chinese for China's developmental needs. Diaspora engagement policies carry on this tradition and thus casts CCLTN workers into both targets of and tools for PRC government influence. In its foreign policy, China's chief concern has been to create an international environment that would be supportive of and receptive to China's continually expanding influence in the world. To that end, China has invested heavily in communicating the message that China is a powerful, prosperous state with a sophisticated culture and traditions. In this way, foreign policy aims provide the messaging and the script for overseas Chinese that CCLTN is expected to broadcast and echo. China's media policy has been focused on expanding the reach of China's messaging

around the world. Thus, China's media policy has sought to fold in CCLTN broadcasting as part of the medium and infrastructure needed to convey China's foreign policy script. In these ways, China's diaspora engagement policy, foreign policy, and media policy are bringing Chinese state interests to bear on CCLTN production.

The remainder of this chapter works through the three areas of Chinese policy. Space does not permit for a complete and detailed history of each policy area. Rather, I offer an overview that highlights developments and initiatives most directly related to the production of CCLTN, even as I attempt to retain a sense of context within the larger scope of each policy area.

1. China's diaspora engagement policies

In recent years, political discourse in the US and UK have become replete with questions about race relations and what constitutes the legitimate national identity of these countries. Against such a backdrop, it would be easy to mistake China's diaspora engagement policies as exceptional or primordial. However, this review of China's engagement with overseas Chinese shows that China's practices converge with tendencies uncovered by scholars studying the strategies and behaviours of sending states. Like other sending states, the necessity of balancing multiple, sometimes incongruent, goals and the participation of multiple actors generates fragmentation in policy processes and outcomes. Further, like other sending states, China has pursued longstanding goals in foreign relations and domestic development, prioritizing the Chinese state's well-being over that of overseas Chinese. Against the backdrop of these traditions, the PRC government sees CCLTN workers as potential targets and tools in China's foreign policy agenda.

1.1 Newspapers, revolutions, and decolonization

PRC governments have long seen overseas populations as potential resources in national development. China's first president, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, famously mobilized networks of exiles and foreign students into important forces and contributors to nationalist movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Up to and after the 1911 revolution, competing political factions within China vied for the support of overseas Chinese. In many instances, Chinatown newspapers were effectively communication organs for political organizing within China.²⁰³ Following its victory in 1927, the Guomindang (GMD) government was fairly aggressive in seeking control over overseas Chinese. The dual nationality law at the time effectively claimed all persons of Chinese heritage as Chinese citizens.²⁰⁴

At the same time, overseas Chinese were often denied franchise and citizenship in their host countries, and this was certainly the case in Canada. Legislation that excluded Chinese in immigration and settlement ensured that Chinese migrants were not permitted to imagine Canada as their new home. As such, political life—along with the experience of inclusion and empowerment through activism—was focused on homeland politics.

After the Communist revolution in 1949, however, the PRC government's policies changed to acknowledge important realities. By 1949, China had endured almost thirty years of civil conflict as well as foreign invasion and occupation. The new communist government needed to consolidate its control over China and direct more energy towards domestic

²⁰³ Xiaojian Zhao, "Disconnecting Transnational Ties: The Chinese Pacific Weekly and the Transformation of Chinese American Community after the Second World War," in *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce*, ed. Wanning Sun (New York: Routledge, 2006), 26–41.

²⁰⁴ Paul J. Bolt, *China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 56.

development.²⁰⁵ At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wanted to improve its foreign relations and China's international standing, which had dwindled considerably from the time of Yuan Shikai to the end of the GMD government.²⁰⁶ To that end, from 1949 up to the Cultural Revolution, the PRC government's policies towards overseas Chinese reflected two basic but incongruent imperatives.²⁰⁷

First, broadly speaking, the PRC wanted the security and sovereignty that comes from international support and recognition, which requires allies. In the early years of the PRC, the GMD government in Taiwan officially represented China in the UN, the PRC had placed itself in opposition to the United States partly because of the Korean War, and in January 1950 only eighteen countries recognized the PRC.²⁰⁸ Thus, when the Colombo powers—India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and what was then Ceylon—invited China to the Bandung Conference in 1955, this became an opportunity for the PRC to diplomatically reach out to the world's many newly independent countries.²⁰⁹ China attended the conference with twenty-eight other countries from Asia and Africa, including its Southeast Asian neighbours.

Decolonizing Southeast Asian states resented the GMD dual nationality law because amidst their own nationalist struggles the law was seen as an impingement upon their budding sovereignty. To make matters worse, a lack of assimilation made overseas Chinese appear as outsiders to indigenous groups in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Chinese often became

²⁰⁵ Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 2nd ed. (New York : W.W. Norton, 1999), 521.

²⁰⁶ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 551.

²⁰⁷ Stephen Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese : A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970*. (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1972), 165.

²⁰⁸ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 525.

²⁰⁹ The Bandung Conference was organized by former colonies who felt that Western powers did not give them due attention or consultation. Moreover, the Colombo powers recognized that new states were emerging at considerable speed and quantity, and that these decolonizing states shared history and to some extent position in the bipolar international system that had emerged after World War II.

dominant in several business sectors, making them prosperous outsiders in their receiving states. Most importantly, however, Cold War anxieties concerning communist infiltration via overseas Chinese proxies made Southeast Asian governments wary of their Chinese minorities. Taking responsibility for overseas Chinese overcommitted the newly formed People's Republic of China. Zhou Enlai formally recognized the dilemma created by the PRC's commitment to overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia in his speech given at the First National People's Congress in September 1954:

For the last few years, the position of overseas Chinese in those countries which are unfriendly to China has been extremely difficult.... For our part we are willing to urge the overseas Chinese to respect the laws of the local governments and local social customs. It is worth pointing out that in the past, reactionary Chinese governments never made any attempt to solve the problem of overseas Chinese nationality. This not only placed the overseas Chinese in a difficult position but was also often the cause of discord between China and the countries of residence. In order to improve this situation, we are prepared to solve this problem beginning with those Southeast Asian countries with which we have diplomatic relations.²¹⁰

As the speech entails, the PRC government began to encourage overseas Chinese to commit themselves to the various countries in which they had settled while also forging diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian states. The PRC also signed a non-aggression treaty with the Philippines and reassured Thailand that Beijing would not pursue a Thai autonomous zone in Yunan. At the same time, Beijing closed its doors to overseas Chinese who wanted to return to China for their education and in 1960 ratified a dual nationality treaty with Indonesia in which overseas Chinese were given permission to choose either Indonesian or Chinese nationality.²¹¹

This treaty with Indonesia was to be the first of many. However, in response to the Sino-Soviet rift and the nuclear test ban treaty signed by the US and USSR, China's foreign policy in the 1960s became increasingly characterized by opposition to the superpowers.²¹² The Cultural Revolution also disrupted the PRC's effort to strengthen its diplomatic relations. The Foreign

²¹⁰ Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese*, 102.

²¹¹ Bolt, *China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese*, 44–45.

²¹² Zerba, "The PRC's Overseas Chinese Policy," 18.

Affairs Ministry, like many other government departments, was placed under the control of revolutionary committees. Beijing's rhetoric became filled with calls for communist revolutionary forces to rise up in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.²¹³ China's actual influence in communist activities varied from clearly present, as in the Burmese case, to highly debated, as in the Malaysian case. It is clear, however, that the Cultural Revolution seriously undermined China's efforts to build diplomatic relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours.²¹⁴ The work of resolving Zhou's work on dual citizenship did not resume until after the Cultural Revolution ended. In 1980, the PRC government passed the *Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China*, which outlaws dual nationality and states that all Chinese nationals who voluntarily become naturalized in their new country of residence automatically forfeit Chinese citizenship.²¹⁵

Second, even though building diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries entailed distancing themselves from overseas Chinese, the PRC government needed foreign exchange to repay war loans from the Soviet Union.²¹⁶ Thus, the CCP sought to encourage remittances, often by privileging the families of overseas Chinese. Special benefits included permission to retain private property, educational guarantees, as well as the creation of special stores where only relatives of overseas Chinese or returnees were able to go and spend their remittances on scarce goods. Furthermore, with the exception of periods of extreme domestic instability, the PRC government typically sought remittances and contributions from overseas Chinese to support domestic development.²¹⁷

²¹³ Bolt, *China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese*, 46.

²¹⁴ Zerba, "The PRC's Overseas Chinese Policy," 21–22.

²¹⁵ Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, § articles 2 and 9 (1980), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384056.htm.

²¹⁶ Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese*, 160.

²¹⁷ Zerba, "The PRC's Overseas Chinese Policy," 76.

1.2 Overseas Chinese policy in the reform era

By the beginning of the 1980s, China's foreign relations had begun to improve significantly, helped by its ascension to the UN security council in 1971 as well as US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. Further, the PRC government relaxed many of its controls on travel as part of a larger change in the country's political direction known as *gaige kaifang*—or reform and loosen. Informed by the excesses of political purges during the Cultural Revolution, *gaige kaifang* was a re-orientation of Chinese governance from a Maoist ethos of perpetual socialist revolution to modernization and economic development.²¹⁸ To that end, the PRC government also began reviewing its policies towards overseas Chinese so as to bring this area of policy in line with the country's new direction. As a result, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) was re-established at the State Council level—that is the national level—with similar offices created at the municipal, autonomous region, and provincial levels.²¹⁹

These changes led to three important developments for Chinese emigration and China's diaspora engagement policies. First, patterns in Chinese migration began to change. People began migrating out of China in increasing numbers. While previous waves of migration were concentrated more in Southeast Asia, beginning in the 1980s, Western countries increasingly became the destination of choice.²²⁰ Second, although the PRC government continued to look to overseas Chinese for remittances, by the 1980s China sought more foreign direct investment from overseas Chinese. From the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the PRC government established Special Economic Zones (SEZs). In SEZs, market-oriented development was

²¹⁸ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 585.

²¹⁹ Zerba, "The PRC's Overseas Chinese Policy," 21.

²²⁰ Robert A. Saunders and Sheng Ding, "Digital Dragons and Cybernetic Bears: Comparing the Overseas Chinese and near Abroad Russian Web Communities," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 262.

encouraged by relaxing government regulation and permitting a wider scope of economic activities. SEZs were established in various locations in southern China including Shenzhen, Xiamen, and Zhuhai, among other locations. The chain migration out of these areas in China's southeast provinces meant that the SEZ locations were strategically chosen to appeal to overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and Southeast Asia. Between 1979 and 1991, approximately two-thirds of China's foreign direct investment came from overseas Chinese.²²¹

Third, in 1980, China enacted the *Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China*. Despite improving conditions, China retained the need to be at peace with its Southeast Asian neighbours, and the brain drain that would later become a point of serious concern was not yet apparent. In addition to prohibiting dual nationality, this law also put in more formal terms the difference between those who retained Chinese citizenship and those who did not. Chinese citizens living overseas would be called *huaqiao*, and they were presumed to have plans of return; foreign citizens of Chinese descent, however, were *huaren* and presumed to have settled abroad.²²² In later years, as the PRC government became more energetic in courting overseas Chinese, these categories would become increasingly blurred.

1.3. Overseas Chinese policy from the 1990s to the present

From the 1990s and into the present, China's engagement of overseas Chinese has continued to grow. Although the economic reforms of the 1980s made China the workshop of the world, the

²²¹ Elena Barabantseva, "Trans-Nationalising Chineseness: Overseas Chinese Policies of the PRC's Central Government," *Asien*, no. 96 (July 1, 2005): 11.

²²² Leo Suryadinata, "Blurring the Distinction between Huaqiao and Huaren: China's Changing Policy towards the Chinese Overseas," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2017): 108; Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, § articles 2 and 9 (1980), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384056.htm

PRC government has been keen to move China's economy up the value-added chain and into technological development and scientific research. To that end, thousands of China's most educated young people have been allowed to leave their homes and pursue advanced degrees abroad.²²³ For China, the ideal outcome would be for these individuals to return with the skills and education to stimulate economic growth in the desired sectors, and this has been the outcome to some extent. Following the 2008 financial crisis, there was a sharp increase in the number of students returning to China. A soft labour market in the US as well as China's continued economic growth was cited as reasons for the rise in returnees.²²⁴ By the 1990s, most of the students from China who studied abroad have been self-financed, with no obligations created by government scholarships.²²⁵ Further, a survey revealed that 60% of super high-income individuals in China—those possessing RMB 10 million or more—have considered emigrating from China.²²⁶ These funds are necessary given that the average cost of a year abroad is USD 36,000, about eight times the annual disposable income per capita in urban China and twenty-five times that in rural China.²²⁷

Unfortunately, China's efforts to boost its science and technology sector with a skilled labour force that has received training overseas faces key structural issues. China presently sits in a migration-development hump. Here, the sending state lacks the industry and infrastructure to support the level of scientific research and development that their best and brightest have been

²²³ Zerba, "The PRC's Overseas Chinese Policy," 4.

²²⁴ Biao Xiang, *Emigration Trends and Policies in China: Movement of the Wealthy and Highly Skilled* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016), 7, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/emigration-trends-and-policies-china-movement-wealthy-and-highly-skilled>.

²²⁵ Xiang, *Emigration Trends and Policies in China*, 6.

²²⁶ Biao Xiang, "A Ritual Economy of 'Talent': China and Overseas Chinese Professionals," *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 37, no. 5 (May 2011): 6, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.559721>.

²²⁷ Xiang, "Emigration Trends and Policies in China," 7.

trained to do. Thus, even if migrants who are highly educated in science and technology do return, they are presented with the challenge of finding work commensurate with their skills. Meanwhile, in the receiving state, their training and connections made while in school could help them find excellent positions.²²⁸ In 2011, the Ministry of Education reported that even as thousands of students annually emigrate from China for their education, 74% of them stay abroad.²²⁹

As such, the PRC does continue to encourage investment and remittances, but the PRC government has come to see overseas Chinese as an invaluable source for skilled and educated labour, particularly in science, technology, industry, and business.²³⁰ In order to address China's brain drain, the government has deployed a range of tactics to engage overseas Chinese. These include appealing directly to overseas Chinese to return, networking among overseas Chinese, and even attempting to shape the transnational identities of overseas Chinese to include a strong attachment to China.²³¹

One of the most direct ways in which China has sought out overseas Chinese as human capital is at recruitment fairs for overseas Chinese students. These recruitment fairs take place largely on a municipal and provincial level, but they typically receive support from the national level OCAO. The program and activities that take place vary somewhat. In some places, overseas Chinese professionals and scholars are invited to send proposals about their work or research, and then they present their work in several concurrent sessions for investors and local

²²⁸ Portes, "Migration and Development," 15.

²²⁹ Huiyao Wang, *China's Competition for Global Talents Strategy, Policy and Recommendations* (Vancouver : Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2012), 11.

²³⁰ Pál Nyíri, "Expatriating Is Patriotic? The Discourse on 'New Migrants' in the People's Republic of China and Identity Construction among Recent Migrants from the PRC," *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 27, no. 4 (October 2001): 42–45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830120090421>.

²³¹ Xiang, "A Ritual Economy of 'Talent,'" 821.

government. Similarly, sometimes government as well as local businesses and industry will set up booths and interested visitors can introduce themselves. The incentives offered at these events are considerable, particularly when measured against standards of living in the participating Chinese locale. Conference attendees will be plied with cash bonuses, housing, salaries sometimes five to eight times higher than that of their local colleagues, and special licenses for owning cars.²³²

One of the largest and oldest of these fairs takes place in Guangzhou on a yearly basis. It normally attracts over 200,000 participants, and anyone who has studied or worked overseas is invited. A much smaller fair also takes place in Jilin where a “less but better” strategy is deployed. Here, the government solicits 300 to 400 participants, often using alumni networks in the US. Applicants are required to have at minimum of a Masters degree with five years of work experience or a PhD with at least three years of work experience. These fairs are aimed at creating commercial enterprises in science and technology. At the end, much is made of a ceremony in which contracts and agreements are signed between overseas Chinese professionals and local agencies.²³³

While the recruitment fairs are a targeted and direct way of reaching out to overseas Chinese, China has also sought out ways of engaging overseas Chinese that are less about immediate, tangible agreements. As Alan Gamlen explains, sometimes sending states will engage in activities that are more about simply cultivating a relationship that can be drawn upon when the right opportunity presents itself in the future.²³⁴ Such efforts are meant to emphasize continued connection and shared identity.

²³² Xiang, “A Ritual Economy of Talent,” 826.

²³³ Xiang, “A Ritual Economy of ‘Talent,’” 835.

²³⁴ Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies.”

The PRC government now affirms common heritage between all overseas Chinese and those on the mainland by reviving a mix of historical figures and cultural symbols. Roots-seeking summer camps are PRC government sponsored tours in which overseas Chinese youth are invited to go to the PRC to learn about their heritage.²³⁵ With the assistance of local associations of overseas Chinese from various parts of the world, the PRC government uses these trips to invite new generations of overseas Chinese to have an attachment to China.²³⁶ Biannual conferences for overseas Chinese businesses perform similar functions, where speeches are made and participants interact, even though there is no tangible project that emerges. Another less targeted effort sits in the city of Xiamen, a major city in the coastal province of Fujian. Here, the Overseas Chinese Museum memorializes the hardships of previous overseas Chinese and celebrate the ways in which sojourners of the past have contributed to China's economic development.²³⁷ Thus, fostering a sense of shared cultural heritage is particularly useful because it reproduces relationships between the PRC and overseas Chinese without coercion.

Overall, the PRC government has done progressively more to engage overseas Chinese since the 1980s. The discourse used in these efforts often stresses a universalizing Chinese belonging for both overseas Chinese and Chinese in China. Notably, the distinction between *huaqiao*—Chinese emigrants that retain Chinese nationality—and *huaren*—ethnically Chinese people—remains unchanged according to the 1980 Nationality Law; however, in recent times, these terms have become increasingly blurred in governing discourse. In 2001, the Federation of

²³⁵ Andrea Louie, *Chineseness across Borders: Renegotiating Chinese Identities in China and the United States* (Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 2004), 31–32.

²³⁶ Sheng Ding, "Engaging Diaspora via Charm Offensive and Indigenised Communication: An Analysis of China's Diaspora Engagement Policies in the Xi Era," *POLITICS* 35, no. 3–4 (November 2015): 238.

²³⁷ Annie Wu, "Oversea Chinese Museum," *China Highlights*, updated July 18, 2018, <https://www.chinahighlights.com/xiamen/attraction/oversea-chinese-museum.htm>.

Returned Overseas Chinese Associations (FROCA) established honorary positions known as “Overseas Advisors.”²³⁸ This is an *huaqiao* specific organization effectively creating space for *huaren* as well. In 2014, Xi Jinping referred to overseas Chinese as being part of an extended “*Zhonghua*” nation in a speech for a conference of overseas Chinese associations.²³⁹ In the same speech, he used the phrase *haiwai qiaobao*, meaning overseas compatriots, to label overseas Chinese, rather than using *huaren* which would be more legally appropriate.²⁴⁰

As Myra Waterbury observes, even as sending state discourse tends to invoke a primordial and universal connection with overseas populations, their actions typically betray a highly instrumental and selective logic.²⁴¹ In this regard, China is no different than any other sending state. Tellingly, China’s outward migration includes low-skilled labourers, but official policy rhetoric has constructed a category of overseas Chinese who will be useful to China’s economic development—a *homo economicus*.²⁴² These are the migrants who comprise the *xin yimin*, or new migrants, that left China after the Cultural Revolution. The more direct and costly engagements, like fairs and conferences, are reserved for educated professionals idealized in policy discourse as resourceful and well-connected individuals who can contribute to China’s future.²⁴³

Such fairs and incentives are completely absent for those who are lower skilled workers. While there have been dips in China’s international unskilled labour migration due to events like

²³⁸ Suryadinata, “Blurring the Distinction between Huaqiao and Huaren,” 107.

²³⁹ *Zhonghua* means Chinese culture or civilization. It effectively means that all Chinese share an essential identity.

²⁴⁰ Suryadinata, “Blurring the Distinction between Huaqiao and Huaren,” 109.

²⁴¹ Waterbury, “Bridging the Divide,” 147.

²⁴² Sin Yih Teo, “‘The Moon Back Home Is Brighter’?: Return Migration and the Cultural Politics of Belonging,” *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 37, no. 5 (May 2011): 811, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.559720>.

²⁴³ Nyíri, “Expatriating Is Patriotic?,” 649.

the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2011 as well as the Japanese earthquake in 2013, the ratio of skilled and unskilled labour emigration remains the same. About 40% of Chinese migrants work in manufacturing; 25% in construction; 15% in agriculture, fishing, and forestry; and only less than 0.5% in white collared labour.²⁴⁴ Despite the high rates of low-skilled migration, little is done to encourage the return of these emigrants, even though remaining in the most common host countries in Asia and Africa is nearly impossible.²⁴⁵ Moreover, while some sending states make extensive appeals and programs to encourage remittances, this term is almost completely absent from China's current policy lexicon.²⁴⁶ When it comes to the monetary contributions of overseas Chinese, the PRC government has focused more on investments and has tended to target upper class expatriates with the funds to make those sorts of contributions. Moreover, the PRC government has focused increasingly on technology transfer from its overseas populations.²⁴⁷ Thus, there is a tremendous disparity in perceived value and treatment between low and high-skilled overseas Chinese. The inequality demonstrates that the PRC recognizes diversity among overseas Chinese and desires different kinds of engagement from different subsections of overseas Chinese.

Another part of China's strategy in reaching out to overseas Chinese is that the government promotes a more flexible form of rule as it cultivates relationships with overseas Chinese. Overseas Chinese are often valuable to the PRC government precisely because they have become settled, successful, and well-integrated in their communities abroad.²⁴⁸ As one

²⁴⁴ Xiang, "Emigration Trends and Policies in China," 16.

²⁴⁵ Xiang, "Emigration Trends and Policies in China," 13.

²⁴⁶ Xiang, "Emigration Trends and Policies in China," 14.

²⁴⁷ Xiang, "Emigration Trends and Policies in China," 14.

²⁴⁸ Barabantseva, "Trans-Nationalising Chineseness," 14; Ingrid d'Hooghe, "The Expansion of China's Public Diplomacy System," in *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy Through Communication*, ed. Jian Wang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 20.

observer notes, the ideal migrants are, "... overseas Chinese who possess strong economic and technological strength, mature marketing networks, wide-ranging political connections and business contacts, and fast-growing communication and media resources."²⁴⁹ China has made a series of reforms to its visa and permanent resident system to make it easier for overseas Chinese to remain or become interested and invested in China without a completely permanent return or citizenship. Such efforts include a special class of visas that are specifically made for overseas Chinese. These include the Q1 visa that allows relatives of Chinese citizens who qualify for permanent residence to enter and reside in China for five-year periods. The Q2 visa allows overseas Chinese who are visiting relatives to apply for a 180 day stay.²⁵⁰

Thus, China's diaspora engagement continues to reflect multiple, sometimes mismatched, goals and interests leading to contradictory and fragmented policies. Dual nationality is still prohibited, but overseas Chinese are recognized as a special group in the National People's Congress.²⁵¹ The many different goals and needs are reflected in this speech delivered by the chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference at the World Chinese Entrepreneur Convention:

1. Overseas Chinese can live harmoniously with local people and actively push forward the development and progress of the country they live in;
2. China welcomes overseas Chinese with their own advantages, to take part in China's modernization in various forms;
3. Overseas Chinese can be united closely in opposing "Taiwan Independence" secessionist activities in any form, and continuously promote personal, economic, and cultural exchanges across the Straits so as to push forward for an early realization of China's re-unification;

²⁴⁹ Ding, "Engaging Diaspora via Charm Offensive and Indigenised Communication," 238.

²⁵⁰ There has been a lot of confusion over the huayi card—essentially a Chinese green card that is only available to overseas Chinese. At this point, it is not clear whether this card has actually been rolled out or not. Ding, "Engaging Diaspora via Charm Offensive and Indigenised Communication," 230.

²⁵¹ Barabantseva, "Trans-Nationalising Chineseness," 14; Zerba, "The PRC's Overseas Chinese Policy," 80.

4. Overseas Chinese while learning from other countries can carry forward and promote Chinese culture;
5. Overseas Chinese can promote people to people friendship between China and other countries in the world.²⁵²

These many different goals speak to the needs in China's domestic development and foreign policy, and they characterize the messaging that China wants CCLTN workers to facilitate.

2. China's foreign affairs and overseas Chinese policy

The second area of Chinese governance that is relevant to Canadian, Chinese-language television news (CCLTN) production is China's foreign policy. While I have already touched on the involvement of Chinese foreign policy, I revisit it here in light of its current importance.

Historically, the PRC has been restrained in reaching out to overseas Chinese for help with foreign policy issues. Episodes of domestic upheaval as well as the desire to pacify tense relationships with Southeast Asian neighbours made overt engagement with overseas populations strategically costly outside China and politically untenable inside China.²⁵³ However, the situation of China's foreign relations has changed dramatically, and it is now more able and more inclined towards overtly folding overseas Chinese into its international objectives.

2.1 China's rise and the government's adoption of "soft power" strategies

Many different measurements have been used to describe China's ascendance in the world.

Some, preferring to keep to the cold hard reality of military statistics, point out China's 2.3

²⁵² China, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia, "Jia Qinglin Voices Five-Point Hope for Overseas Chinese."

²⁵³ Barabantseva, "Trans-Nationalising Chineseness," 9; Zerba, "The PRC's Overseas Chinese Policy," 61.

million active military personnel; the US has only 1.3 million active military personnel.²⁵⁴

Others note China's consumption of many different things, from steel to Starbucks.²⁵⁵ What is important here, however, is that there is a widespread perception that China is becoming more and more important in the world. According to former assistant secretary of defence Graham Allison, China is a textbook example of a rising power, much like Athens in antiquity.²⁵⁶ To that end, China has already superseded the United States and become number one in the world by many meaningful measures such as manufacturing and the size of its economy after accounting for purchasing power parity.²⁵⁷

For their part, Chinese leadership has been conscious of how China is perceived by the rest of the world, and the government has embraced if not cultivated the narrative around its global ascendance. At the same time, Chinese leadership has long considered a stable and friendly global environment to be critical to China's domestic development and overall success. Thus, Chinese leaders have also sought to accompany China's growth as a global power with

²⁵⁴ Alex Lockie, "How the World's Largest Military Stacks up to the US Armed Forces," *Business Insider*, August 5, 2016, <http://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-us-military-comparison-2016-8>.

²⁵⁵ China is now the world's largest consumer of steel, taking in almost half of the world's total steel consumption. "World Steel in Figures 2017," World Steel Association, May 29, 2017, <http://www.worldsteel.org/media-centre/press-releases/2017/world-steel-in-figures-2017.html>. As of January 2018, China had the world's largest Starbucks at 30,000 square feet, but a larger one opened in Chicago at 45,000 feet in 2018. Chris Dwyer, "Here's Why The World's Largest Starbucks Is A Chinese Wonderland Like No Other," *Forbes*, December 6, 2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisdwyer/2017/12/06/heres-why-the-worlds-largest-starbucks-is-a-chinese-wonderland-like-no-other/#26da3044270e>.

²⁵⁶ "Are U.S. and China Headed for War?," Transcript, *The Current*, interview with Graham Allison, CBC, June 14, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-june-14-2017-1.4158414/june-14-2017-full-episode-transcript-1.4160826>.

²⁵⁷ Noah Smith, "Who Has the World's No. 1 Economy? Not the U.S.," *Bloomberg.Com*, October 18, 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-18/who-has-the-world-s-no-1-economy-not-the-u-s>.

messaging about their peaceful intentions and ability to participate as a responsible international partner.²⁵⁸

To that end, Chinese leaders have embraced the idea of soft power as a key element in its foreign relations strategy. Soft power is the idea that a state can achieve its goals through appeal and attraction. As Joseph Nye Jr., the scholar who coined the term, explains, soft power is how one country persuades other countries to “want what it wants.”²⁵⁹ Certainly, there are other schools of thought in international relations and political science that have tackled ideational power, persuasion, or knowledge. Significant bodies of scholarship have developed around Gramsci’s ideas about hegemony and consent while Foucault’s work on knowledge and discursive power have been taken up by constructivists.²⁶⁰ I do not see Nye’s work on soft power as being more insightful or effective than that of Gramsci or Foucault, and there is arguably a stronger body of literature that accompanies these other theoretical positions.²⁶¹ However, very few Western ideas have been taken up as enthusiastically by the PRC government as soft power. Shortly after Nye’s 1991 work, *Bound to Lead*, was translated and published in Chinese, Wang Huning, a scholar who later became part of President Jiang Zemin’s inner circle, wrote an article about how China needed to strengthen its soft power. Jiang quickly took up the term, using it in speeches and linking it to China’s direction of “stepping out” or deepening China’s engagements with the outside world. “Soft power” is now a regular part of the highest

²⁵⁸ Jian Wang, ed., *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy Through Communication* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 4.

²⁵⁹ Eleanor Albert, “China’s Big Bet on Soft Power,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated February 9, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/chinas-big-bet-soft-power>.

²⁶⁰ Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York : Columbia University Press, 1986), 214; Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge* (London : Routledge, 2002), 76.

²⁶¹ Richard Devetak, “Post-Structuralism,” in *Theories in International Relations*, ed. Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, and Scott Burchill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 184.

levels of China's policy lexicon, and it has become the ideological partner to the material dimensions of China "going global."²⁶²

To that end, China has moved away from the blunt ideological messaging of the Cold War and adopted an approach to foreign relations that is closer to the branding and image management of successful advertising firms.²⁶³ Consequently, since the early 2000s, top leadership have been using slogans such as "peaceful rise" and "harmonious society" to label and explain their policies and initiatives.²⁶⁴ Similarly, Chinese investments in the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics, Confucius Institutes, and even China's belt and road initiative are intended to provide positive images and experiences of China to public audiences in other countries; in other words, China is engaged in public diplomacy.²⁶⁵ As Xi Jinping says, "We should increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China's message to the world."²⁶⁶

2.2 Overseas Chinese and China's soft power and public diplomacy efforts

The Pew Research Center has found that around the world, people tend to see China and Chinese culture more positively than the PRC government, and this has not gone unnoticed by the CCP.²⁶⁷ For their part, overseas Chinese are both tools and targets in China's soft power and

²⁶² Wang, *Soft Power in China*, 6–9.

²⁶³ Susan Leong, "Franchise Nations: The Future of the Nation?," *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 23, no. 6 (December 2009): 245, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10304310903294739>.

²⁶⁴ John Delury, "'Harmonious' in China," *Policy Review*, no. 148 (April 1, 2008): 39.

²⁶⁵ Public diplomacy refers to communicating and engaging the publics of other countries. Wang, *Soft Power in China*, 31.

²⁶⁶ Albert, "China's Big Bet."

²⁶⁷ Wang, *Soft Power in China*, 13.

public diplomacy efforts.²⁶⁸ The PRC government sees overseas Chinese as conveyers of Chinese culture overseas, and thus as tenable channels for positive messaging about China.²⁶⁹ From the 1950s to the 1980s, many aspects of Chinese culture, including Daoism and ancestor worship, were made taboo by the excesses of Maoist revolution. Since the 1980s, however, the Chinese state has supported and initiated the revival and rehabilitation of various Chinese cultural icons like Confucius.²⁷⁰ Remittances contributing to village ancestral halls are encouraged, and the romance of a strong, united, primordial China is exported via films and TV serials. These dramas are supported by the PRC government for consumption by overseas Chinese and other international viewers.²⁷¹

Further, as the PRC seeks to build its network of human resources in public diplomacy, overseas Chinese can aid in recruitment or support the PRC directly. China has sought to deepen its international linkages by partnering organizations in China, like universities, business associations, and municipal governments, with those abroad.²⁷² The PRC sees these partnerships as critical to engaging publics in foreign countries, and overseas Chinese are understood to be helpful in facilitating them.²⁷³ The PRC government believes that overseas Chinese can add to the state's human resource pool, using personal connections made through foreign education, employment, and commercial endeavours.

While many of these efforts are aimed at cultivating a denser international network and more positive international image for China overall, there are certainly also specific policy issues

²⁶⁸ d'Hooghe, "The Expansion of China's Public Diplomacy System," 22.

²⁶⁹ Ding, "Engaging Diaspora via Charm Offensive and Indigenised Communication," 233.

²⁷⁰ Delury, "'Harmonious' in China," 37.

²⁷¹ Curtin, *Playing to the World's Biggest Audience*, 129.

²⁷² Albert, "China's Big Bet."

²⁷³ Albert, "China's Big Bet"; Sheng Ding, "Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power," *Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 64 (March 1, 2010): 259.

where China expects participation from overseas Chinese. The PRC government has been aware of the importance of international sympathy on the Taiwan and Tibet issues and sees this as problematic to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Particularly with respect to Taiwan, the Taiwanese government's engagement of overseas populations has been important to the establishment of an effective and active lobby in Washington aimed at promoting Taiwanese democracy.²⁷⁴ Similarly, the Dalai Lama's international celebrity status has been important to international opinion on the Tibet issue.

As such, the PRC seeks broad overseas Chinese support on these issues. Conferences have been held specifically to promote "peaceful reunification" between Taiwan and China.²⁷⁵ At other times, conferences may focus on different issues, but attendees are still encouraged to stand firm against "secessionist activities."²⁷⁶ For instance, the PRC government regularly holds World Chinese Education Conferences where they give awards to outstanding overseas Chinese-language teachers. However, awardees only qualify for their prizes if they agree to support the One China policy and oppose "Taiwan independence, Xinjiang separation, Tibetan independence, and the Falun Gong movement."²⁷⁷ As the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) chair expressed, "Especially throughout the 1990s, the extra strengthening of determined work... has vigorously improved and increased contact with 'new migrants,'

²⁷⁴ Winberg Chai, "The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations: An Interpretation," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 29, no. 3 (September 2002): 142.

²⁷⁵ "Overseas Chinese World Conference for Promoting Peaceful Reunification of China is held in Washington D.C." September 17, 2011. <http://us.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/sghds/t947464.htm>

²⁷⁶ "Senior leader calls on overseas Chinese media to promote Chinese culture," *Xinhua*, November 21, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/21/c_131260898.htm.

²⁷⁷ *Chinascope*, "Beijing Held Third World Chinese Education Conference."

overseas Chinese, and second and third generation Chinese. It has fundamentally changed the situation within overseas Chinese communities of ‘Taiwan being strong and us being weak.’”²⁷⁸

Controlling conversations about sensitive issues in overseas Chinese communities has been important in China’s outreach to overseas Chinese; this has meant an increase in the need for united front work. United front work by the CCP was inspired by the Leninist principle of “uniting with lesser enemies to defeat greater ones.”²⁷⁹ Subsequently, China’s first United Front was the truce and cooperation between the CCP and the GMD to fight the Japanese invasion. Today, united front work in China consists of both foreign and domestic operations. In both realms, the PRC government builds relationships with groups that could become opposing forces and manages these groups so that they support CCP aims or at least no longer bear any threat to CCP governance.

The United Front Work Department (UFWD) is China’s primary agency charged with united front work. It has nine specialized bureaus, each for dealing with a different targeted group. For instance, one specialized bureau is charged with maintaining relationships with China’s eight, officially recognized non-communist political parties. In true united front work style, these eight non-communist parties do not field their own candidates for election and their leaders are chosen by the CCP and are sometimes CCP members themselves.²⁸⁰ Other

²⁷⁸ Suryadinata, “Blurring the Distinction between Huaqiao and Huaren,” 110.

²⁷⁹ Alexander Bowe, “China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States,” (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 24, 2018), 4, <https://www.uscc.gov/Research/china%E2%80%99s-overseas-united-front-work-background-and-implications-united-states>.

²⁸⁰ “Any Colour, so Long as It’s Red,” *The Economist*, March 11, 2017; Xiaofeng Wang, “What Do China’s Democratic Parties Actually Do?,” *The Diplomat*, March 3, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/what-do-chinas-democratic-parties-actually-do/>.

specialized bureau groups include one that targets intellectuals, another focused on Tibetan separatism, and one on ethnic minorities.

One of the UFWD's specialized bureaus is dedicated to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, and overseas Chinese. According to the UFWD teaching manual, "unity at home requires unity abroad."²⁸¹ Subsequently, UFWD goals with respect to overseas Chinese are very similar to their goals for potential opposition groups inside China—co-option and support for the CCP or at least neutralization. To that end, the UFWD seeks to build relationships with individuals and organizations among overseas Chinese, including and through CCLTN. The UFWD is intent on using ethnic, cultural, economic or political ties to mobilize overseas Chinese to advocate for the CCP and/or marginalize its opponents. Positive outcomes include the promotion of Confucius Institutes, republishing or rebroadcasting materials from Chinese sources, and the founding of overseas groups that promote Chinese state goals.²⁸² The overall desired effect is further legitimization of the CCP and acceptance of the party-state. In these very tangible ways, the UFWD is attempting to recreate subject-state relationships between overseas Chinese and the Chinese state.

Notably, united front work can include coercion, and experiences from the United States and Australia are likely to be instructive for Canada as well. In 2018, Cheng Yonglin, a former Chinese official who defected to Australia, told Radio Free Asia that the PRC government uses both rewards and threats to compel Chinese foreign students to become informants for the CCP.

²⁸¹ Bowe, "China's Overseas United Front Work," 4.

²⁸² Economist, "Any Colour, so Long as It's Red;" Tom Blackwell, "How China Uses Shadowy United Front as 'Magic Weapon' to Try to Extend Its Influence in Canada" National Post, January 31, 2019, <https://nationalpost.com/news/how-china-uses-shadowy-united-front-as-magic-weapon-to-try-to-extend-its-influence-in-canada>; Yik-Tung Ng and Lok-To Wong, "China's Secret Police 'Recruit Students as Agents' to Spy on Activists Overseas," trans. Luisetta Mudie, Radio Free Asia, January 30, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/recruit-01302018110158.html>.

Confirming this claim, Sulaiman Gu and Wu Lebao, students from the University of Georgia and Australian National University respectively, reported that Chinese agents had attempted to push them into being informants on overseas Chinese dissident groups. Gu included a tape recording of his interaction with the Chinese agents in which he was threatened with prison upon his return to China. Both Wu and Gu follow up their claims by saying that their friends and family in China have been repeatedly harassed in an effort to ensure their compliance with Chinese state demands.

Since Xi came to power in 2012, the UFWD has risen in importance in the CCP. In March 2018, the UFWD absorbed the OCAO, signifying that all issues around nationality and overseas Chinese would increasingly be managed with united front work. Xi also established a leading small group on united front work with himself as the head.²⁸³ The UFWD now has members in all of China's embassies, and an increasing number of UFWD personnel have been assigned to top CCP and government positions. In the first few years of his presidency, approximately 40,000 UFWD cadres have been elevated in government and CCP positions.

In summary, China seeks political and economic resources from overseas Chinese as part of its foreign relations strategies. Deliverable benefits range from industry development to articulated support for Taiwan's reunification with China. The cultural dimensions of China's soft power offensive has, in the eyes of Chinese leaders, made overseas Chinese natural and immutable extensions of China's efforts abroad. These and other overt signals of China's interests in overseas Chinese have not gone unnoticed in Chinese communities in Canada, and they are certainly part of the everyday environment in which CCLTN workers must write and

²⁸³ Bowe, "China's Overseas United Front Work" 3.

deliver the news. In these ways, the Chinese state's policies on diaspora engagement and foreign policy have politicized CCLTN production around the issue of support for the Chinese state.

3. Chinese media development and transnationalization

China's media policy is the third body of policy important to CCLTN production. The development of China's media system sits at an important intersection between China's soft power foreign policy strategy and diaspora engagement policy. Indeed, media policy is responsible for relaying China's *duiwai xuanchuan*, or foreign propaganda, to overseas Chinese and to the world. Subsequently, the PRC government has deployed China Central Television (CCTV) as a key soft power tool.²⁸⁴ CCTV is also meant to be used to engage overseas Chinese, since overseas Chinese are both tools and targets in China's soft power efforts. The PRC government wants CCTV to be a leading source among overseas Chinese for information and messaging about China as well as a key source of content for overseas Chinese media.

3.1 Development of media policy amidst economic reform and domestic governance concerns

From the start, CCP leaders have thought of the media in terms of its potential to disseminate and bring about Marxist goals.²⁸⁵ Borrowing from Soviet models, CCP leaders in the 1920s and 1930s saw the media as an extension of the state, and along these lines, they developed their own

²⁸⁴ d'Hooghe, "The Expansion of China's Public Diplomacy System," 67.

²⁸⁵ Anne-Marie Brady, "Plus Ça Change?: Media Control Under Xi Jinping," *Problems of Post-Communism* 64, no. 3-4 (May 2017): 135, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2016.1197779>.

policies about journalism which can be distilled into three major tenets.²⁸⁶ First, the news media must accept the CCP's ideology as their own. Second, the news media must broadcast party directives, programs, and policies. Third, the news media must accept CCP leadership as well as its own place within the party's organizational structure. Early CCP leaders believed that news media cannot be independent of the party but rather must be a part of it.²⁸⁷ Since China's media system has been developed along these principles, when CCTV began broadcasting as its precursor, Beijing TV, in 1958, these norms were already in place, ready to form the development of television news in China.²⁸⁸ In China, the news media is meant to be an extension of the government, specifically its "tongue and throat."²⁸⁹ These journalistic norms are in direct contradiction to the vision in liberal democracies of news and journalism as an independent check on power. Many of the interview subjects discussed these differences and considered the consequences of working with news made in China as source material.

The far-reaching economic reforms of the Deng era had an important effect on TV broadcasting in China. Reforms in the 1970s and 1980s decentralized economic planning and allowed local level governments to pursue their own development projects. This created a four-tier system in which governments at the central, provincial, autonomous region, and local or county level were all permitted to own and operate television stations.²⁹⁰ Thus, media reforms began as economic liberalization reforms rather than political ones. The goal was to help the economy develop more robustly rather than to empower journalists to report more

²⁸⁶ Brady, "Plus Ça Change ?," 133.

²⁸⁷ Zhang, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China*, 54.

²⁸⁸ Beijing TV eventually became China Central Television (CCTV), China's only national level television network. However, a completely separate, provincial level endeavour also named Beijing TV has since been created. Hu, Ji, and Gong, "From the Outside In," 79.

²⁸⁹ Brady, "Plus Ça Change ?," 120.

²⁹⁰ Local level refers to town or county level governments. Zhang, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China*, 4–6; Zhang, 23–25.

independently. To that end, policy makers in the centre saw lower level TV stations largely as relay stations for news and content from the centre, and CCTV news in particular. Permitting the creation of lower level TV stations was meant to enhance the party's ability to communicate with the public by extending CCTV's reach to a more local level.

Although CCTV became available to a larger proportion of the public, the more important consequence turned out to be the proliferation of TV stations at the county level. In 1982, there were only 47 TV stations in mainland China; by 1987, there were 366.²⁹¹ There were hardly any county level TV stations in 1980, 60 in 1985, and at the start of 2001 there were 1,262—accounting for 80% of China's TV stations.²⁹² Moreover, the economic decentralization allowed lower level TV stations to start their own channels, and so they began to air channels filled with low capital programming that was fairly easy to produce, such as music, weather, entertainment, discussions of local issues, and so on. Even though these were rather simple offerings, they did attract audiences as well as advertising revenue, and so these lower level TV stations began to become media organizations with their own content and interests rather than just relay stations for national level content. Further, these TV stations were less reliant on state subsidies because regulations on advertising had been relaxed.²⁹³

As economic reform continued, China began to experience the growing pains associated with market liberalization—pollution, corruption, and rising inequality. As part of their response to discontent around these issues, the PRC government began endorsing *yulun jiandu*, or supervision by the media. Particularly in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the government endorsed media supervision as a means of addressing corruption and poor

²⁹¹ Zhang, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China*, 32.

²⁹² Zhang, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China*, 66.

²⁹³ Zhang, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China*, 69.

governance. Media are meant to report on social problems and call out officials engaged in poor or outright criminal governance. High-level praise for *yulun jiandu* sanctioned media supervision as a mechanism for addressing these and other social issues. For example, in 1987 Zhao Ziyang, the premier of China at the time, emphasized “supporting the mass criticisms of the Party and the government’s shortcomings and misunderstandings.” He also called upon the media to “fight against all kinds of unhealthy practices.”²⁹⁴ Similarly, party secretaries threw weight behind support for *yulun jiandu* by praising this practice at party congresses held once every five years from 2002 to 2012.²⁹⁵

Notably, the Chinese state’s endorsement of media supervision was both limited and vague. *Yulun jiandu* was not part of any larger political liberalization that involved concrete changes like restructuring the CCP or a comprehensive overhaul of the legal system. Rather, support for media supervision was discursive and often lacking in concrete judgements or details. Moreover, media supervision was constantly framed as only secondary to the most important goal for China’s media—*yulun yindao*, or guiding public opinion. Rather than being at odds, media supervision as well as guidance of public opinion were spoken of as complementary tasks.²⁹⁶ In an article written for China’s government officials, the author asserts that “practice shows that the more effective *yulun jiandao* is, the more *yulun yindao* can win public confidence.”²⁹⁷

Further, while media were permitted to report on local officials and corruption at the lower levels, the CCP continued to monitor media activities closely, constantly policing the

²⁹⁴ Maria Repnikova, “Media Openings and Political Transitions: Glasnost versus Yulun Jiandu,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 64, no. 3-4 (May 2017): 143, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2017.1307118>.

²⁹⁵ Repnikova, “Media Openings and Political Transitions,” 143.

²⁹⁶ Repnikova, “Media Openings and Political Transitions,” 144.

²⁹⁷ Repnikova, “Media Openings and Political Transitions,” 145.

boundaries of what was permissible. Efforts at retaining ultimate control of the media included decentralizing supervision, expanding media-related legislation, and engaging in ongoing pre- and post-publication surveillance. With a mix of vague endorsements and ongoing disciplinary measures, the CCP has created a highly adaptive media environment in which the government is able to change its criteria and the level of freedom quickly and easily. Thus, Chinese media policy is notorious for its phases of *fang* and *shou*, or loosening and tightening, depending on the political climate.²⁹⁸

It is worth noting that there is an extensive grey zone of material that is of interest to the public but can be politically sensitive, including “official corruption, environmental degradation, local protests, societal incidents, income inequality, and crisis events.”²⁹⁹ While higher level central officials may encourage reportage on these matters as a means of extending the power of the centre or improving governance, local officials may find that these stories reflect poorly on their performance. As such, a local official can move to have the story quashed by contacting the local level propaganda office. However, journalists may reach out to other papers outside their jurisdiction and have the material published elsewhere. In some instances, journalists have simply published their banned story on social media, perhaps using a pseudonym. Even though officials may eventually have the story taken down or the social media account deleted, the story can be read and circulated before that happens. At other times, work that is initially banned may still be released after some time, when officials have had time to deal with the issue so that the news and information about it will seem less damaging.

²⁹⁸ Anne-Marie Brady, “Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era,” *Westminster Papers in Communication & Culture* 3, no. 1 (March 2006): 70.

²⁹⁹ Maria Repnikova, *Media Politics in China : Improvising Power under Authoritarianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 82.

In the end, China's media and the party-state are engaged in a complex relationship of improvised regulation and subversion. The flexibility of the system allows the party-state to move quickly to create new news bans when officials feel that this is necessary. At the same time, journalists have also found ways to push the limits of what is permissible. While censorship rules are constantly adapting, journalists have also found ways of adapting, thus outrunning government regulation in some cases.

3.2 Development of media policy and China's stepping out

While the development of China's TV sector in the reform era was driven by domestic expansion and market liberalization, the development from the 1990s onward has also been focused on China's interaction with the world. By the end of the Cold War, *gaige kaifang* had been in effect for nearly twenty years, and the importance of globalization to China had become increasingly apparent, in both PRC government and society.³⁰⁰ As such, the mid 1990s became the early years of China's contemporary outward expansion, and policy writing on "stepping out" was circulating at the highest levels of the PRC government. China had also begun its application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).³⁰¹ The PRC government saw that these changes meant that China's media sector would need to change as well.

Joining the WTO would mean greater and increasing levels of integration with world information and media markets. The central government recognized that China's TV media

³⁰⁰ Kaifang is a Chinese term that means to loosen or open. It is the name given to the overall re-orientation of Chinese policy in the 1970s and 1980s away from Maoist revolution and international isolation and towards modernization and a foreign policy of greater interaction with the world.

³⁰¹ John Jirik, "CCTV News and Soft Power," *International Journal of Communication* 10 (2016), 4, <https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/4811/1728>

sector needed to be strengthened in order to do well in a more competitive media environment both domestically and abroad.³⁰² At the same time, however, the PRC government also wanted to keep control over politically relevant information and conversations. The political chaos and economic hardship following the dual economic and political liberalization of the Soviet Union alarmed Chinese leaders, and so with the events of 1989 at Tiananmen Square still in memory, they sought economic liberalization while retaining party control.³⁰³

With these concerns in mind, orders came from the top to begin re-centralization and conglomeration of China's media system because a more centralized system was perceived to be both easier to manage politically and more viable economically. "Make it bigger and stronger"—or *zuoda zuoqiang*—became the central government's guiding principle with respect to media.³⁰⁴ In 1999, the State Council issued the "Circular on Strengthening the Construction and Management of Cable Networks," which called for subsuming county-level and autonomous-municipal-level television networks into provincial cable networks. By December 2000, three separate entities with seven channels between them were conglomerated into Hunan Television. Similarly, in April 2001, Shanghai Media Group was created by unifying several other smaller operations. In December of that same year, China officially joined the WTO.³⁰⁵ Although the commercial success of many of these conglomerates has been limited, 2001 saw the formation of many such media conglomerates.

Even as China prepared its domestic media environment for greater competition, top-level governing officials were concerned about foreign policy goals and taking Chinese media

³⁰² Zhao, "Disconnecting Transnational Ties," 98.

³⁰³ Elim Ng, "Confucianism with Party Characteristics: Democracy and China's New National Identity" (Master's thesis, Queen's University, 2009), 33.

³⁰⁴ Hu, Ji, and Gong, "From the Outside In," 59.

³⁰⁵ Zhang, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China*, 134.

abroad. The PRC government had become convinced that China's soft power was weak owing to misrepresentation by western media. In order to rectify the situation, China would need to engage in a robust campaign of external propaganda, or *duiwai xuanchuan*. China's *duiwai xuanchuan* has two important audiences: first, foreigners, and second, overseas Chinese.

The PRC government has three main goals in its messaging with overseas Chinese. First, they want to neutralize any opposition towards the CCP regime among overseas Chinese. Second, they want to generate greater antipathy towards forces that are opposed to the CCP both within China and in exile. Third, they want overseas Chinese to invest in China financially.³⁰⁶ The PRC government has also sought to persuade overseas Chinese to speak out for the regime, both in their own circles and to foreigners. In so doing, the PRC government believes that this will aid their efforts in a number of important foreign policy goals, namely reunification with Taiwan as well as support for the belt and road initiative.³⁰⁷

To that end, in 1991, the Production Office of Taiwan Programs was established. This office produced a variety show called *All Together*, which targeted audiences in Taiwan, and soon after the office began working with provincial level TV stations to broadcast their channels into Taiwan as well.³⁰⁸ Over the years, the PRC government has invested heavily in more radio shows and television programs aimed at Taiwanese audiences. With the support of the Propaganda Department, CCTV launched its channel 4 in 1992. CCTV 4 airs much of the same programming that is broadcast in the PRC, and was initially aimed at "heritage audiences," or

³⁰⁶ Brady, "China's Foreign Propaganda Machine," 53.

³⁰⁷ The belt and road initiative is China's ambitious plan to build infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and Europe that will become a modern silk road.

³⁰⁸ Ying Zhu, *Two Billion Eyes: The Story of China Central Television* (New York : New Press , 2012), 171.

those overseas Chinese living in the Asia Pacific region.³⁰⁹ By many accounts, China has largely been successful in reaching out to overseas Chinese.³¹⁰ PRC websites are now the leading source of information in Chinese about China for overseas Chinese.³¹¹ More importantly, the CCP has managed to curb Taiwan's global and commercial influence, making it clear that any actors who acknowledge Taiwan—whether state or non-state—will suffer consequences.³¹²

Following the many signals that China was intent on “stepping out” and “going global,” CCTV 9 was launched in 2000 as CCTV's 24-hour English language channel. Channels in other languages followed soon after including French, Spanish, Russian, and Arabic. In 2009, the central government announced the General Plan for Building Major Media's Capacity of International Communication (2009 – 2020), an initiative to develop and launch several internationally influential media groups from China in order to better reach out to international audiences and extend China's growing reach in the world.³¹³ That same year, it was announced that 6.6 billion US dollars would be earmarked for the overseas expansion of CCTV. In 2012, CCTV opened two regional offices—CCTV America in Washington, DC and CCTV Africa in Nairobi. In December of 2016, all of the non-Chinese-language channels were relaunched by CCTV as China Global Television Network (CGTN)—China's international news media organization. CCTV 4, which broadcasts CCTV content in Mandarin, was not part of the rebrand and simply remains CCTV 4.³¹⁴

³⁰⁹ Hu, Ji, and Gong, “From the Outside In,” 56.

³¹⁰ Brady, “China's Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 53.

³¹¹ Brady, “China's Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 54.

³¹² Anne-Marie Brady, “Unifying the Ancestral Land: The CCP's Taiwan Frames,” *China Quarterly* 223 (2015): 787–806; Bowe, “China's Overseas United Front Work.”

³¹³ Bowe, “China's Overseas United Front Work,” 10.

³¹⁴ Hu, Ji, and Gong, “From the Outside In,” 54.

Since Xi came to power in 2012, external propaganda efforts have become increasingly important.³¹⁵ In a January 2014 politburo meeting, Xi told leaders that, “China should be portrayed as a civilized country featuring a rich history, ethnic unity, and cultural diversity; and as an Eastern power with good government, a developed economy, cultural prosperity, national unity, and beautiful scenery.”³¹⁶ Further, in the same meeting, Xi stated that, “China should also be known as a responsible country that advocates peace and development, safeguards international fairness and justice, makes a positive contribution to humanity, and as a socialist country which is open and friendly to the world.”³¹⁷

To that end, several reworked talking points have now become central in China’s messaging to overseas Chinese and to the world. First, *duiwai xuanchuan* must “tell a good Chinese story,” meaning that a carefully curated version of China’s history and traditions must be offered up to foreign audiences.³¹⁸ Notably, it is very important that overseas Chinese follow this script and echo the party’s version of China’s history and culture. Second, China’s external propaganda should promote the “Chinese Dream,” meaning that the messaging should emphasize the prosperity that will come from cooperating with China, particularly with respect to the belt and road initiative. The last element of *duiwai xuanchuan* in the Xi era is to emphasize that China is a rich country with a strong military. Notably, the Chinese-language version tends to take a harder and more militaristic line. The foreign language versions soften the tone.³¹⁹

³¹⁵ “Xi: China to Promote Cultural Soft Power,” People’s Daily Online, accessed March 21, 2018, <http://en.people.cn/90785/8500899.html>.

³¹⁶ Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 57.

³¹⁷ Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 56.

³¹⁸ Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 55.

³¹⁹ Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 56.

3.3 Fragmentation in policy and process

The establishment of CGTN confirms that the PRC government has been able to make TV news content from China broadly available around the globe. At the same time, a number of different actors have influenced this outcome, and each of them has distinct goals. Conflict and fragmentation arise partly due to the sheer number of TV station operators in China. Even after eliminating county-level stations in the 1990s, relationships between CCTV and TV stations from other levels of government are often still conflictual.³²⁰

As the PRC's only national level broadcaster, CCTV retains privilege and support from the central government, much to the ire and frustration of its provincial competitors. When Hunan Media Group attempted to launch a nationally broadcast movie channel, its application was denied in order to avoid creating too much competition for CCTV. Similarly, when the Shanghai Media Group attempted to upgrade Shanghai TV from a provincial to a national level channel, its application was also denied in order to make CCTV the only national level broadcaster.³²¹

In addition to the tension between the different levels of government, various national level ministries have also come into conflict with each other over the management of Chinese-language TV. For instance, when China's Production Office of Taiwan Programs sought to broadcast satellite signals from China into Taiwan, the PRC's Ministry of Finance had no additional funds for this project.³²² The standard practice at the time was to offer only a very

³²⁰ Li Pu and Jennifer Foster, "From a Local TV to a Broadcasting Conglomerate: A Regional Chinese Media Company's History, Development and Struggle," *China Media Research* 8, no. 3 (July 2012): 15; Richard W.S. Wu and Grace L.K. Leung, "Implementation of Three Network Convergence in China: A New Institutional Analysis," *Telecommunications Policy* 36 (November 1, 2012): 960, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2012.09.005>.

³²¹ Pu and Foster, "From a Local TV to a Broadcasting Conglomerate," 18.

³²² Zhu, *Two Billion Eyes*, 43.

small budget for editing together and mailing out VHS tapes of CCTV coverage to embassies and consulates. The transnationalization of CCTV 4 was only made possible with the support of the Central Propaganda Department, one of China's more powerful government organs.³²³

The responsibility for developing and managing platforms for the delivery of media—both coming into the PRC and going out—is the shared responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT). MIIT, which is a newer ministry, manages fixed telephone lines, mobile telephones, and internet services. SAPPRFT is an older ministry that manages state owned enterprises at the national level in television, radio, and film; its local branches do likewise at lower levels of government.³²⁴ As China continues to integrate into global media and information markets, the way in which content is delivered to audiences evolves with new technologies. These developments create overlapping jurisdictions which will require that these two agencies work together. However, the history of interaction between these two government agencies shows conflict and competition.

The central government had sought to integrate telecommunications, internet, and broadcasting networks since 2001. Although MIIT was only established in 2008, it is more operationally equipped to manage the convergence between these three different elements because of a superior market position and a less challenging industry and bureaucratic environment.³²⁵ SAPPRFT, however, is more politically powerful because it is directly

³²³ Zhu, *Two Billion Eyes*, 43.

³²⁴ Wu and Leung, "Implementation of Three Network Convergence in China," 564.

³²⁵ Wu and Leung, "Implementation of Three Network Convergence in China," 570. There are relatively few providers of telecommunications in China compared with the many television and radio stations SAPPRFT must regulate. Moreover, MIIT does not have to work through multiple provincial and local offices like SAPPRFT must. Wu and Leung, "Implementation of Three Network Convergence in China," 568.

answerable to the Central Propaganda Department.³²⁶ After protracted negotiations, it was agreed that SAPPRFT would manage the network integration. Still, both agencies continue to compete for control over opportunities created by new forms of content delivery such as mobile television and internet protocol television.³²⁷

Amidst competing national level government agencies and TV stations from various levels of government, it is not clear whether the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office was influential or even included in decisions on transnationalizing China's TV industry. The OCAO was China's lead organization for engaging overseas Chinese. As part of its mandate, the OCAO is responsible to "support overseas Chinese media" and "accelerate cooperation and exchanges of overseas Chinese with China in terms of economy, science, and education."³²⁸ Moreover, the OCAO was supposed to be the government agency that coordinates all efforts to engage overseas Chinese.

At the same time, the actions of MIIT, SAPPRFT, and various state-owned TV enterprises have the ability to affect this area of China's relations with overseas Chinese. Overseas Chinese are a target audience in China's transnational TV expansion, particularly with respect to Chinese-language broadcasting. Indeed, the transnationalization of Chinese TV began with Chinese-language broadcasting overseas as CCTV 4. However, on the crowded list of actors who have been involved in taking television channels from the PRC abroad, the OCAO has not appeared to be important or even present. Even though the OCAO had been active in

³²⁶ Brady, "China's Foreign Propaganda Machine," 44.

³²⁷ Mobile television is television delivered to a handheld device whereas internet protocol television is delivered.

³²⁸ "Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council," State Council of the People's Republic of China (Government of China), accessed March 21, 2018, http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/01/content_281474991090995.htm.

engaging overseas Chinese media in a number of other ways, there is a notable lack of evidence confirming their leadership or even involvement in transnationalizing TV from the PRC.

4. Conclusion

How, then, does China project its power and influence into CCLTN production? In sum, the Chinese state influences CCLTN production through three major areas of policy: diaspora engagement policy, foreign policy, and media policy. Diaspora engagement has long been a part of Chinese politics, but it has often been constrained by foreign policy concerns and overshadowed by domestic troubles. However, China's international ascendance has brought new urgency and energy to both its media efforts and diaspora engagement policy. Now, overseas Chinese media, including CCLTN, are seen as potential tools and targets as China strives to strengthen its soft power internationally and develop its science and technology sectors domestically.

Even though significant energies and resources have been spent on reaching out to overseas Chinese, this does not demonstrate if or how China has managed to influence CCLTN production. Further, fragmentation in Chinese governance may hinder its ability to establish subject-state relations abroad. Thus, having discussed the broader policy context in which China has sought to engage CCLTN production, the next chapter reveals what the response has been to the Chinese state's efforts and initiatives by delving into the interview responses. In so doing, I address the research question originally posed: How do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states?

CHAPTER 5: CCLTN WORKER RESPONSE TO CHINESE GOVERNANCE

Introduction

As Chapter four explains, the PRC government wants to engage overseas Chinese communities to strengthen its international soft power while aiding in economic development domestically. In this context, CCLTN production presents a useful opportunity. Becoming involved with CCLTN production allows the PRC government to network with influential members of Chinese Canadian communities while also accessing institutions with the power to reach and inform Chinese-speaking people in Canada. Still, it remains unclear how all of China's efforts and energies have been received by CCLTN workers, a potentially important group given China's overall goals and strategies.

In this chapter, I delve into the rationales and considerations of CCLTN workers and draw out their reactions to the Chinese state's efforts to influence CCLTN production. After considering CCLTN worker reaction, I argue that China is able to influence CCLTN production in spite of three important impediments. The first impediment is a lack of coordination among its own government agencies. As the last chapter demonstrated, several governing agencies are involved, and CCLTN-related considerations span three distinct but overlapping policy areas. Second, as the interviews will show, communications-related goods and services offered by the PRC government are sometimes considered problematic by CCLTN workers. Their concerns arise from China's censorship laws and the historical role of Chinese media in service to the PRC government. Third, the PRC government is itself a controversial body in Chinese Canadian communities, and views on the CCP are widely understood to be a divisive issue among overseas Chinese.

In spite of all these issues and concerns, CCLTN workers find themselves using news content from China and participating in the PRC government's conferences while also distancing themselves from any real or perceived PRC government agenda. In this way, my interview subjects often appear to be caught in a situation where they feel the need to engage China in their day to day work, knowing that there may be real and perceived consequences for their professional credibility. Thus, the Chinese state does indeed influence CCLTN production, in spite of its many difficulties. But why, then, do CCLTN workers accept what the PRC government offers at all? As the interview data demonstrates in this chapter, CCLTN workers see China as simply being too important to ignore.

Does this mean that CCLTN workers have been wholly brought under China's control? During the interviews, I listened as CCLTN workers responded to my questions about CCLTN production and Chinese influence by shoring up their own media legitimacy. They did so with three types of responses. First, they argued that their audience are transnational migrants—people who are necessarily involved with and interested in both China and Canada. Second, CCLTN workers acknowledged both the pros and cons of being engaged with the Chinese state, whether it was attending media forums or using media content made in China. Third, CCLTN workers developed a set of standards in terms of how to engage the Chinese state, highlighting their own behaviour as positive examples.

How, then, do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese state? Taken together, CCLTN worker responses constitute a renegotiation of subject-state claims made by the PRC government. The PRC government desires reliable, vocal agents who will speak on their behalf in overseas Chinese communities and to the world at large. The CCLTN workers I spoke with were very clear about the necessity of reporting on China-related issues and on the

PRC government's point of view. However, they also talked about the importance of taking information from other sources and using a different, more skeptical and critical point of view, particularly with respect to issues that the PRC government treats as politically sensitive. In these ways, CCLTN workers are being selective with how they engage China, responding to the PRC government's bid to influence them with their own sense of what is appropriate, and thus renegotiating subject-state claims.

1. China's news content and CCLTN worker response

China's efforts to influence CCLTN production can be divided into two categories. First, China has made its own, state-owned media content more available overseas. Second, the PRC government has sought to engage CCLTN workers directly through conferences, forums, and other gatherings and trips. This section deals with the news content. For CCLTN producers and workers, China's entry into Canada's Chinese-language news market is experienced on two fronts. First, China is a competitor because it offers its own newscasts directly to Canadian consumers. Second, China is a source of content because China offers its news content to other media organizations as a subscriber service. I explore each of these in turn along with CCLTN worker response to them.

1.1. The Great Wall Television Platform and the competition for audience attention

The first way in which CCLTN workers encounter greater availability of media from China is as a competitor in the Canadian, Chinese-language television market. Television offers several advantages in terms of its capacity to reach out to overseas populations. Television is a tool of

mass communication, has high penetration in most countries, and does not require full literacy in Chinese, which can be more difficult in some overseas communities. Moreover, television retains a broader range of expression by transporting picture, colour, and sound. With these capabilities, TV can produce narratives that position the audience as constituents of the Chinese state without coercion. Following Benedict Anderson's ideas about nationalism and imagined community, the broadcast of TV news from China can help overseas Chinese imagine themselves as part of China.³²⁹

In 2004, the PRC government created Great Wall Television Platform (GWTV) as a way of making greater gains in Chinese television markets around the world. The GWTV is centrally coordinated and managed by the PRC government under CCTV. Including CCTV 4, GWTV offers nine television channels—seven in Mandarin, one in Cantonese, and one in Fujianese. All GWTV channels are state approved and owned by central or provincial governments.³³⁰ GWTV is now available to TV audiences on all five continents and began broadcasting in Canada in 2007.³³¹

One would think that CCLTN workers would be rattled by the entry of a government backed and funded broadcaster that produces news for a domestic audience of 1.3 billion Chinese speakers, particularly since CCLTN is essentially a niche market in Canada. Indeed, when GWTV first sought entry into the Canadian TV market in 2005, two CCLTN producers formally expressed concerns to the Canadian regulator, the CRTC. The CCLTN producers

³²⁹ Chua, "Gossip about Stars: Newspapers and Pop Culture in China," 79.

³³⁰ Zhang, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China*, 161–62.

³³¹ CRTC, "Addition of Nine Non-Canadian Chinese-Language Services to the Lists of Eligible Satellite Services for Distribution on a Digital Basis," Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 2006-166 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, December 22, 2006), <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2006/pb2006-166.htm>.

claimed that the addition of GWTV would create a degree of competition in the market that would render the production Canadian content in Chinese languages nonviable. The CRTC eventually did approve GWTV, noting that buy-through regulations protected CCLTN producers from the degree of competition that they claimed.³³²

In spite of concerns voiced by corporate bosses, the individual CCLTN workers did not, broadly speaking, show concern about the competition. Some of them followed the neoliberal reasoning of the regulators, saying that it is good to have more choices for consumers and that the Chinese-language TV market in Canada is underserved.³³³ More often, though, they sought to emphasize the importance of access to in-depth, timely information about China for their viewers. Respondents often talked about the necessity of remaining informed about China or about the personal and relational connections that their viewers had with mainland China. As one interview subject explained:

I am sure that they [Chinese in Canada] want to know about things happening back in their original country... I believe most of them continue to have a lot of connections back there. And this means they cannot totally ignore Hong Kong or those from the mainland can never ignore things happening in mainland China. Their daily living or even their jobs may be directly or indirectly related to their hometown... they need to keep up with the developments... [They have] emotional and communication needs. You say they are “home sick” or “home-country sick” ... I believe this is the major reason that Chinese radio and Chinese TV are so popular.³³⁴

Here, the interview subject is imagining his audience as individuals and communities engaged in almost textbook definitions of transnationalism—multiple, cross border connections maintained

³³² CRTC, “Addition of Nine Non-Canadian Chinese-Language Services to the Lists of Eligible Satellite Services for Distribution on a Digital Basis,” Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 2006-166 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, September 20, 2007), <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2006/pb2006-166.htm>.

³³³ Jack Jia (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.), in discussion with author, June 5, 2013, Scarborough, Ontario; Joseph Chan (president of Fairchild Television), in discussion with author, February 13, 2015, Richmond, British Columbia.

³³⁴ Victor Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited), in discussion with author, May 22, 2013, Vancouver, British Columbia.

for many different reasons and at many different levels.³³⁵ I often brought up the possibility that GWTV may be considered their competition, but when asked about the possibility of their diminished market position, several interview subjects emphasized the transnational identities of their viewers. Another interview subject remarked:

Anything about Canada and China relations will be important. For example, Canada's new immigration policy, or China's policy towards Canadian trade agreement, things like that will impact our viewers... China's policies towards overseas Chinese are very important to our viewers. Relevance to our viewers is the first criteria, and second, is it a problem of great importance to Chinese people? Many Chinese Canadians here still feel a certain amount of attachment to their country of origin. Any major event impacting people living in China will be important to our viewers...³³⁶

Many interview subjects thus responded to concerns about GWTV competition by imagining their viewers as transnationals and focusing on those unique needs rather than dwelling on what seemed like uncontrollable changes in the market and in government regulation.

Throughout the interviews, the transnationalism of CCLTN viewers became a frequent topic that several respondents would use to emphasize the relevance of their own work. A number of CCLTN workers again pointed to their viewers' transnationalism to explain why they were not concerned about competitors from China. As another respondent explained:

... there's a little bit of competition, and it depends on what you want to watch. If you just want to watch entirely Chinese news or entirely Hong Kong news, there's plenty of options out there. But if you want to look for something that's got a bit of news from the homeland but also news from local communities and delivered in the language you're most familiar with, then there are those like Omni, like Fairchild, and a few other channels... Apparently there's a market for both.³³⁷

Several noted that newsrooms in China were unlikely to cover events in Canada and asserted that their viewers are not only interested in events from their homelands but also invested in

³³⁵ Levitt and Jaworsky, "Transnational Migration Studies," 144.

³³⁶ Frank Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition), in discussion with author, May 17, 2013, Vancouver, British Columbia.

³³⁷ Jia Wang (former reporter for OMNI and deputy director for the China Institute at the University of Alberta), in discussion with author, April 11, 2013, Edmonton, Alberta.

Canada—the place where they live, work, form associations, and raise families.³³⁸ Continued commitment, contribution, and even attachment to both sending and receiving states is a key trademark of transnationalism.³³⁹ For Chinese-language reporting on issues in Canada, viewers would have to tune into CCLTN. Thus, CCLTN actually has a comparative advantage in that they report on the need-to-know information and developments for Chinese living in Canada.

A lot of the Chinese immigrants, they are highly intellectual. They are professional. They know how to search the web. They do not need our help to find those information or stories from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong. So we try to give them more of what we have here in Canada, what happened here... We want our reporters to explore the communities, so our audience can have more of what they have here instead of from the homelands.³⁴⁰

In this case, the respondent has gone a step further in identifying their viewers as well-educated, likely the high-skilled *xin yimin* so coveted by the PRC government.

1.2. CCLTN workers discuss the benefits of using content from China as a media source

The second major way in which CCLTN workers have encountered the greater availability of media from China is as a source of commentary, footage, and information for media outlets. In Canada, CCTV programming was already distributed to viewers through Talentvision. However, in 2011 CCTV also established CCTV News Content—a service that provides syndicated news content for broadcasters around the world. BBC, CNN, and NBC are all subscribers to this

³³⁸ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation); Wang (former reporter for OMNI and deputy director for the China Institute at the University of Alberta); Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition); Jenny Hu (news director with OMNI), in discussion with author, June 4, 2013, Toronto, Ontario.

³³⁹ Linda G. Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound : Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (New York : Gordon and Breach, 1994), 24.

³⁴⁰ Hu (news director with OMNI).

service. CCTV News Content essentially provides blanket copyright, so CCLTN workers can download both footage and scripts from CCTV news broadcasts.³⁴¹

The availability of content from China presents CCLTN workers with a dilemma. On the one hand, CCTV News Content provides footage and stories on topics that are of interest to CCLTN audiences. The content is not only free but also easy to access, providing CCLTN workers with material they otherwise cannot produce on their own. With one exception, CCLTN producers did not have foreign correspondents working in China. Moreover, even though CCLTN workers are able to receive news about China through other feeds like AP and Reuters, a number of interview subjects commented that these news sources do not provide as much coverage on China as they would like.³⁴² Furthermore, as one interviewee explained, he preferred to get news about China from sources in Hong Kong, “because they are Chinese speaking media as well, and they tend to understand the complexity of Chinese society, government, and people a little better than most Western journalists.”³⁴³ While his criticism may sound like a broad generalization, study after study has confirmed that coverage of China in Western media plays into a few main tropes and fails to convey the complexity of life in China.³⁴⁴

³⁴¹ Jirik, “CCTV News and Soft Power,” 19; Hu, Ji, and Gong, “From the Outside In.”

³⁴² Wang (former reporter for OMNI and deputy director for the China Institute at the University of Alberta); Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

³⁴³ Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

³⁴⁴ Qing Cao, “China Through Western Eyes. A Case Study of the BBC Television Documentary Roads to Xanadu,” *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 6, no. 2 (September 2007): 275–97, <https://doi.org/10.1163/156805807X256890>; Lutgard Lams, “China: Economic Magnet or Rival? Framing of China in the Dutch- and French-Language Elite Press in Belgium and the Netherlands,” *International Communication Gazette* 78, no. 1-2 (February 2016): 137–56, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048515618117>; Jeanne Boden, “Mass Media: Playground of Stereotyping,” *International Communication Gazette* 78, no. 1-2 (February 2016): 121–36, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048515618116>; Qing Cao, “Modernity and Media Portrayals of China,” *Journal of Asian Pacific Communication* 22, no. 1 (April 2012): 1–21; Zengjun Peng, “Representation of China: An Across Time

On the other hand, several CCLTN workers demonstrated an understanding that using CCTV coverage can hurt their credibility. On interview subject explained, "...when it comes to media, everybody knows that within China, all the media officially is state owned. There is no private owned media. Everybody is state owned. Everybody knows that since news media is state owned, what is news in China is not actually news. It's all propaganda. That's the general perception of news inside China."³⁴⁵ The footage from CCTV New Content bears CCTV logos, and the censorship and state-ownership of Chinese media is well-known.

Thus, CCLTN workers face a dilemma when it comes to using CCTV material. While it is freely available and of interest to their viewers, they also know that using it could undermine their media legitimacy, both in fact and in the eyes of their audience. It may seem that CCLTN workers are left without attractive choices. However, as in their responses to questions about GWTV, CCLTN workers instead managed to turn the dilemma into an opportunity to shore up their own media legitimacy. Following the same strategies used in responding to the introduction of GWTV into the Canadian market, CCLTN workers focused on recognizing the benefits of using media from China. They talked about how using content from CCTV can help them fill their newscasts and stressed its value to a transnationally oriented audience. As one respondent commented, "We can't send the camera crew down to China to report it, so that's the only source we can get. And our viewers would like to know what happened in their hometowns."³⁴⁶

Analysis of Coverage in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times," *Asian Journal of Communication* 14, no. 1 (March 2004): 53–67, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0129298042000195170>.

³⁴⁵ Chan (president of Fairchild Television).

³⁴⁶ Susan Cheng (anchor for Talentvision), in discussion with author, May 30, 2013, Richmond, British Columbia.

The improvement of news media in China was another common response that came up while discussing the use of content from China as part of Canadian newscasts. One interview subject commented on this theme at length:

... China has been developing so fast. Yes, the media in China has been controlled by the PRC government, but I don't see that content as a threat for brainwashing people... Of course, they are not showing you the worst things happening in China... But at the same time, in China, nowadays, there are a lot of stories about bad behaviour of China officials... they're getting more and more of those kinds of things are being reported....

Furthermore, as opposed to the stilted, Soviet-inspired broadcasting style so frequently parodied in the West, newscasts from China are now increasingly like their global competitors.³⁴⁷

Scholars watching the development of media in China have commented that reporting on several major issues has increased significantly in production value, and the overall quality of the journalism has improved as well.³⁴⁸ Reporting on the Sichuan earthquake, for instance, has been described as both timely and accurate. Details about destruction and survival emerged far more quickly than in years past when reporting on such a tragedy would have been considered bad publicity for the party-state.³⁴⁹ Similarly, CCTV's coverage of the Second Persian Gulf War has been noted as remarkable for its improvement in both quality and quantity. More reporting was done on the Second Persian Gulf War than on any other single event in CCTV history. Further, reporting of this event demonstrated the network's ability to handle live overseas broadcasts, spot connections, and expert interviews.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁷ Jirik, "CCTV News and Soft Power," 3546.

³⁴⁸ Phil Deans in Jirik, "CCTV News and Soft Power," 3549.

³⁴⁹ Xiaoling Zhang, "From Totalitarianism to Hegemony: The Reconfiguration of the Party-State and the Transformation of Chinese Communication," *Journal of Contemporary China* 20, no. 68 (January 1, 2011): 114.

³⁵⁰ Xiaoping Li, "'Focus' (Jiaodian Fangtan) and the Changes in the Chinese Television Industry," *Journal of Contemporary China*, no. 30 (February 1, 2002): 17–34; Hu, Ji, and Gong, "From the Outside In."

At times, though, interview subjects also more directly addressed concerns about political messaging in CCTV coverage. They warned against treating CCTV content as wholesale propaganda and asserted that news stories can indeed be politically neutral.

... CCTV also plays the role of telling [stories about] different topics like economic situations, technological developments, how farmers live, prices in the market, or even transportation. We have to select that news carefully and not pick up propaganda news. We have to select news that the local audience would like to see. For example, Shanghai is going to build a tall building, the tallest in the world, or Beijing is going to build a new airport. This kind of news [is] related to the livelihood of the people. The people from China in Toronto would like to see that kind of news. So, I advise that we use that news with care, but we have to provide the news because the audience has the right to know it.³⁵¹

Even in instances where there is a particular point of view, interview subjects asserted that perfect objectivity is practically impossible, and that all people have biases of some kind.

...even the most objective reporter in China, their perspective and point of view may be a little different from people from the outside world. For example, foreign journalists in China may approach a story without total objectivity, subconsciously... So, you cannot blame them because everyone comes with his own experiences, with his own observations and education. He may view the same facts from different perspectives.³⁵²

Many of these statements find echoes in more scholarly investigations of Chinese media.

Research done on CCTV news show that in its current iteration as CGTN, coverage on most topics is comparable to that of its competitors.³⁵³ Indeed, the CCTV satellite stations in Nairobi and Washington, DC have taken on significant numbers of non-Chinese staff—many of whom used to work for BBC, CNN, Al-Jazeera, and other media competitors. Further, CCTV has an extensive network of freelance correspondents working outside of China.³⁵⁴

As far as the bias of CCTV is concerned, Beijing does retain editorial control of the channel, and all content from Nairobi and Washington, DC must be routed through Beijing and

³⁵¹ Stanley So (former host and reporter for OMNI), in discussion with author, June 3, 2013, Scarborough, Ontario.

³⁵² Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

³⁵³ Jirik, "CCTV News and Soft Power," 3548.

³⁵⁴ Hugo de Burgh, "Domestic Context of Chinese Media's Globalization," in *China's Media Go Global*, ed. Daya Kishan Thussu, Hugo de Burgh, and Anbin Shi (New York: Routledge, 2018), 52–65.

reviewed before going on air. Further, and more tellingly, the most senior level of editorial staff excludes foreign hires. These positions remain staffed by Chinese nationals who can be relied upon to uphold PRC government orthodoxy on serving the party-state and avoiding stories and content which may be considered too politically sensitive for the regime. To that end, however, one China media watcher states:

CCTV does very good coverage of issues, unless they relate to China. I think people will increasingly turn, especially in the developing world, to a Chinese news channel as much as they would turn to the BBC. It'll be problematic, and it may never be the way that many people in the United Kingdom or the United States think is appropriate for journalism; but that doesn't mean it's not going to work, and that doesn't mean it won't be successful. Are the Chinese media at their worst, any worse than the American media at their worst for bias on content, coverage, and presentation? Probably not. It's not as sophisticated, [and] standards in terms of the quality aren't there yet, but they'll narrow the gap with technical standards. And it will be a heavily biased perspective; but probably no more biased than a perspective from Fox News or even in its own peculiar way the BBC, which has a very strong bias in favor of liberalism, human rights, and democracy."³⁵⁵

1.3. CCLTN workers identify the difficulties of working with content from China

The second part of CCLTN worker response was to discuss negative and problematic features of Chinese media. Even as CCLTN workers acknowledged the positive or merely acceptable aspects of media from China, they also talked about its limitations. One of the most common criticisms made by CCLTN workers was that media in China is state-owned.³⁵⁶ Interview subjects spoke at length about the different ideals informing media governance in China. While no one discussed the Marxist-Leninist roots of China's media policies, I was reminded that

the Chinese TV stations, they are all state-run. Because I used to work for [a] Chinese TV station, I know that Chinese media are said to be the tongue and throat of the Communist Party. That's their definition of what the Chinese media is... So, [from] their point of view [the media] is for that purpose."³⁵⁷

³⁵⁵ Phil Deans as quoted in Jirik, "CCTV News and Soft Power," 3559.

³⁵⁶ Chan (president of Fairchild Television); Jia (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.); Cheng (anchor for Talentvision); Todd Ye (news director for Fairchild Television), in discussion with author, May 22, 2013, Richmond, British Columbia.

³⁵⁷ Cheng (anchor for Talentvision).

There was a clear understanding on the part of the CCLTN workers that media in China follows a different philosophy than what is expected in liberal democracies. According to the principles outlined by the Committee of Concerned Journalists, in liberal democracies media must be independent from any faction or government. Journalists are expected to be loyal first to the citizenry rather than to any government. In China, the media owes its first loyalty to the CCP, which is said to stand in for the people.

Indeed, policy discourse about media governance in China is different compared with Canada. While journalists in China are given some freedom to engage in media supervision, particularly of local level officials, the news media remains an extension of the government and thus must operate within the boundaries created for them by those in power. Further, the PRC government has expressly forbidden using the term “fourth estate” to describe media. Similarly, using Habermas’s ideas about the public sphere to discuss the role of the media is also banned.³⁵⁸ This presents another clear contrast to the principles laid out by the Committee of Concerned Journalists. Rather than acting as a forum or public space where ideas might be debated by the public independent of government interference, as Kovach and Rosenstiel affirm, Chinese media is tasked with the guidance of public opinion on behalf of the government.

Interestingly, while Chinese censorship has become a defining feature of CCP authoritarianism, it was only alluded to by interview subjects rather than discussed at length. Most interview subjects tended to treat censorship more as a matter of course. As in this example, respondents were more likely to comment on it fleetingly, sometimes in comparison to themselves as free media: “...we have some stories that they won’t find from Chinese state-own

³⁵⁸ Brady, “Plus Ça Change ?,” 130.

media. For example, there were two big protests in Yunnan and Kunming... It was against the refinery project. You won't find that on CCTV, but you will find that with us."³⁵⁹ Similarly, another interview subject talked about censorship this way: "... if you're talking about *liu si*, you know the June 4th, 1989 Tiananmen incident, if you want to talk about that, you can't see that from CCTV. Right? We have [another] source. We have information from Reuters... We give the people what they cannot get from news in China."³⁶⁰

Indeed, Chinese censorship has become well-known, particularly as transnational media companies have sought entry into the Chinese market. Far from being a minor issue, censorship has been noted as problematic by many scholars. Some emphasize the narrow scope of Chinese censorship. One former CCTV employee outlines the following guidelines:

... [You] do not discuss the families of the leadership unless they are legitimately in the news; do not report any story related to the leadership that Xinhua³⁶¹ has not reported; use Xinhua as an editorial guide; only report negatively on the Dalai Lama; do not report on the Catholic Pope; ignore Taiwan unless the report is apolitical or serve's China's interests; do not question China's foreign policy; do not report positively about Japan unless so doing enhanced China's interests; and so on. What was left and permitted was a huge field of news.³⁶²

For others, however, what is notable about China's censorship policy is its extensive and multi-level mechanisms of control. To begin, the CCP has established a *nomenklatura* system in which senior media management positions are party appointed and charged with managing information flows, establishing norms for their own units, and making human resource decisions. The Central Propaganda Department also regularly issues circulars to media outlets that outline the correct terminology when discussing issues that may compromise trust in the party-state—essentially formalizing what is “politically correct.” Propaganda departments at the national and

³⁵⁹ Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

³⁶⁰ Wei Li (host and reporter with OMNI), in discussion with author, June 4, 2013, Toronto, Ontario.

³⁶¹ Xinhua is the official media organ of the PRC with its own national ministry. The Xinhua president is also a member of the CCP's Central Committee. Xinhua is also known as the New China News Agency, but I will refer to it by its Chinese name unless I am quoting a source using the translated name.

³⁶² Jirik, “CCTV News and Soft Power,” 3540.

provincial levels also have the power to allocate funding, and they have used this power to sideline media outlets that have not been sufficiently obedient. In order to adapt to the rise of the internet and social media, the government's suggestions for how to discuss sensitive issues have become broadly available. Finally, if all else fails, the PRC government deploys censors to take down the social media accounts of prominent dissenters, post pro-CCP comments, and delete controversy-stirring posts.³⁶³ In many ways, the government is internalizing censorship protocols and attempting to make them as organic to Chinese society as possible. Although Chinese authoritarianism can become temporarily relaxed, in any moment of tension—perhaps because of party infighting or international attention such as in the months preceding the Beijing Olympics—these extensive systems of control are in place and ready to tighten or loosen.

The combined efforts made at molding China's news media into a CCP instrument seem to be working fairly well. Hugo de Burgh, who has been studying journalists from mainland China for some time, has observed that journalists from mainland China do set themselves apart from their counterparts in the Anglophone world. Journalists from China, broadly speaking, find Western media to be far too negative and critical.³⁶⁴ In interviews with journalists from China, researchers found that Western media was perceived to be too aggressive and willing to publish any story and detail without regard for the problems this may cause.³⁶⁵ By contrast, journalists in China are trained to think of themselves as being helpful and informative. When journalists in China were asked how they think of themselves as being different from Western journalists, they emphasized two points. First, they claim that they consider the impact of the stories that they air. As one of my interview subjects trained in the PRC explained:

³⁶³ Brady, "Plus Ça Change ?," 129–31.

³⁶⁴ de Burgh, "Domestic Context of Chinese Media's Globalization," 54–56.

³⁶⁵ de Burgh, "Domestic Context of Chinese Media's Globalization," 68.

people who are from a more democratic society may say, okay it's a wonderful thing, this [demonstration] will lead to more openness and democracy, like it's entirely positive. And then someone from mainland China may, of course, agree with okay it's a good thing to have more freedom and access to democracy, but they may also worry about safety or family in that area. This kind of social instability will cost them money or security or cause them some harm.³⁶⁶

Second, journalists in China do not describe their jobs as being the opportunity to write the first draft of history from the front lines. Nor are they taught that the pursuit of truth is too important to be focused on the consequences. Rather, they see themselves as part of a larger picture of people struggling to achieve peace and development, and those are the outcomes on which they judge themselves.³⁶⁷

Noticeably, the considerations of journalists trained in China tend to be more focused on preventing public chaos in a way that is not really present in the program for excellence in journalism by the Committee of Concerned Journalists. Clearly, the media is disciplined and positioned in China in a distinct way. Kovach and Rosenstiel's vision of media relies upon a liberal democratic ideal that the media is a democratic institution that is independent of the government. By contrast, in China, the media is the arm of the government in charge of guiding public opinion. To that end, top party leaders have made policy announcements and signalled changes in the country's direction by writing featured editorials in major newspapers.

At times, the media has also been used as a tool to denounce and thus marginalize party members in moments of intense political infighting.³⁶⁸ While this may sound like a tactic that would have only been used during the Cultural Revolution—a period of destruction widely criticized in China—critics and scholars have noted the parallels in the current leadership's

³⁶⁶ Wang (former reporter for OMNI and deputy director for the China Institute at the University of Alberta). Notably, while I interviewed nine other people from the PRC, only one of them had this response when talking about reporting on news from China.

³⁶⁷ de Burgh, "Domestic Context of Chinese Media's Globalization," 59.

³⁶⁸ Brady, "Plus Ça Change ?," 137.

behaviour. China watchers have commented that Xi may be the most powerful leader in China since Deng Xiaoping, and with the official abolition of term limits for his position, Xi's time in power is now indefinite.³⁶⁹ Further, some have criticized Xi for using his Anti-Corruption campaign as a means of targeting his political enemies, and stories about corruption and abuse in the media can be understood as part of those efforts.³⁷⁰

In such a highly politicized environment, media regulation in China is not only politically significant but also somewhat arbitrary. As one observer notes:

Sensitivity is at the heart of the editorial system at CCTV News. It was used to refer to a vague, catch-all category that editors regularly invoked but rarely explained. Moreover, different news editors had different degrees of sensitivity: a story might be green-lighted in an editorial meeting one day then prohibited by a different editor the next.³⁷¹

Thus, it would seem that media control, like other freedoms under China's authoritarian governance, are given to moments of being tightly constrained or relaxed.

As such, professionals working in Chinese media are subject to more than moments of relaxed regulation. Rather, they are also allowed to cover stories more extensively when it gives an advantage to a winning political faction. Coverage of the Second Persian Gulf War gave CCTV excellent ratings as viewers had ringside seats to the unfolding invasion, but it did not negatively comment on the PRC government. As one interview subject explained, media and government are involved in "mutual manipulation" in which both the censorship officials and the

³⁶⁹ Jeffrey A. Bader, "7 Things You Need to Know about Lifting Term Limits for Xi Jinping," Brookings Institute, February 27, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/27/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-lifting-term-limits-for-xi-jinping/>.

³⁷⁰ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Growing CCDI Power Brings Questions of Politically-Motivated Purge," The Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2015, <https://jamestown.org/program/growing-ccdi-power-brings-questions-of-politically-motivated-purge/>; Brady, "Plus Ça Change ?"

³⁷¹ Jirik, "CCTV News and Soft Power," 3540.

media each seek to push their own agenda by influencing what is aired and when something is aired.³⁷²

1.4. Standards and techniques for working with media made in China

Given their fairly sophisticated understanding of politics and news production in China, CCLTN workers talked a great deal about what is appropriate for both producing news stories about China and working with media made in China. Interview subjects often noted that story selection is key in both situations.³⁷³ Thus, setting professional standards and using themselves as positive examples constitutes the third aspect of how they bolstered their own credibility in a politically complex environment.

CCLTN workers typically agreed that news media from China may at times simply be factual or without intended political messaging. Details about floods, unemployment rates, and development efforts may indeed simply be just that. However, many CCLTN workers also often added that some of China's news content may be more problematic or "political," and they had different ways of making this assessment.³⁷⁴ For some, it was a matter of whether or not the story was focused on public officials, or if the coverage seemed to be anchored by interest in a politician. Others concurred, noting that media in China is full of stories about public figures touring different areas or attending various meetings. These kinds of stories are understood to simply be PR for any given rising star.³⁷⁵

³⁷² Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

³⁷³ Hu (news director with OMNI); Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited).

³⁷⁴ Ye (news director for Fairchild Television).

³⁷⁵ Ye (news director for Fairchild Television); Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited).

....if the news is from mainland China, sometimes, they have some kind of influence from the government. But we probably use the factual points, like how many people died in an earthquake or how the situation is, those kinds of things. But when talking about a certain leader staying in a place for an extended period of time, we will skip it because this is not the sort of thing we will be concerned with... We will not allow ourselves to become tool of others' propaganda.³⁷⁶

Here, CCLTN workers are seeking to be both comprehensive and proportional in their coverage of the news. In this way, they hope to only pass on relevant information from China and avoid becoming drawn into China's media politics.

For one CCLTN worker, the problem was more specific: if he intended to do a story about China in world politics, he felt the need to use other sources.³⁷⁷ This distinction is an extension of the journalistic principle that the verification of facts defines journalism and sets it apart from other forms of prose. In particular, the idea here is that Chinese media is reliable, except for when China's interests are directly at stake. His instinct bears out in scholarly work where researchers have noted that CCTV news has done fairly good work on various topics but seem to fail on stories about Chinese politics, Chinese governance, and Chinese interests.³⁷⁸ Self-portraits are, at times, the most difficult to do, and in this instance, the party-state's desire to be in control of messaging about itself hurts the credibility of the very tool it has chosen to communicate with the world.

As such, there is a complication in using CCTV content when the story is focused on China. In Chinese policy circles, scholars and policy makers are divided about what they should hope to gain from all the effort and resources spent on building up CCTV. There are those who would like CGTN to become a global media resource, comparable to and a competitor for global networks like CNN and BBC. However, there are also those who say that the main purpose of

³⁷⁶ Ye (news director for Fairchild Television).

³⁷⁷ Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

³⁷⁸ Jirik, "CCTV News and Soft Power," 3562.

CGTN is to provide external propaganda.³⁷⁹ In other words, Chinese news media must be the chief source of information and messaging about China, as encapsulated in an article about a 2013 Xi speech:

China's public diplomacy must fit China's own political and cultural values; focus on explaining China's own views and policies to the outside world; and pay attention to foreign audiences' thoughts, habits, and concerns... China must develop its own messages about itself to be able to better set the terms of international communication rather than being forced to discuss itself in vocabulary coined and controlled by others.³⁸⁰

It is understandable that the PRC government would want to set its own terms in communicating about China, but where does this leave CCLTN workers? They understand that their audience demands more complex and extensive coverage on China than what mainstream media in Canada typically offers. At the same time, they understand enough about the political context of news media production in China to know that using media from China can create credibility issues.

Again, CCLTN workers I interviewed turn this quandary into an opportunity to enhance their own legitimacy as responsible media workers by outlining best practices and using themselves as examples. It was agreed that Chinese media was different from other forms of media and had to be treated differently.³⁸¹ One interview subject spoke on this topic in great detail, explaining that in his work, he sees three different kinds of news resources. First, there is content from large global networks like Reuters and Associated Press. Second, there are reports from more nationally oriented corporations including CBC, Global TV, Hong Kong-based TVB, and ATV. The first two can generally be trusted to produce journalistically responsible

³⁷⁹ Wanning Sun, "Slow Boat from China: Public Discourses behind the 'Going Global' Media Policy," *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 21, no. 4 (September 2015): 415, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2015.1043129>.

³⁸⁰ Cai as quoted in Ding, "Engaging Diaspora via Charm Offensive and Indigenised Communication," 241.

³⁸¹ Ye (news director for Fairchild Television); Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition); Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited).

content—including fact-checking, telling the story from a revealing angle, and being critical in their assessments. The third type of source, however, consists of “...news from mainland sources. These news agents have different value systems, we will have to be very careful, watch for hidden political agenda... we must do the filtering, we must watch carefully, what is purely news, what is propaganda; we will do a lot of news treatments.”³⁸²

In discussing the use of media from China, interview subjects emphasized the importance of treating such content with a different level of caution, and there was sharp criticism of simply re-airing and republishing content from China wholesale.³⁸³ For many CCLTN journalists, this was a matter of professional pride. It is also the mark of serious media outlets for their journalists to add their own work to news stories in order to create more tailored and original content for their viewers.³⁸⁴ Thus, when using CCTV footage, it was considered essential to write one's own script rather than simply downloading what was said on CCTV. Further, it was important to consider what matters to Chinese people in Canada. News from China must mean something to Chinese living in Canada in order to be newsworthy for CCLTN. While this point of view was not always very well defined, it was emphasized nonetheless; several interview subjects showed that they believed that Chinese in Canada would have a different point of view compared with

³⁸² Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited).

³⁸³ Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition); Charles Mak (former news director with OMNI and director with Happy Life Network Association), May 23, 2013, Vancouver, British Columbia; Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited); Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation); Hu (news director with OMNI).

³⁸⁴ Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited); Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

Chinese living in mainland China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong.³⁸⁵ In the words of one CCLTN

worker:

...we, the overseas Chinese community, have our own needs. And media here has to consider these needs and fulfill them through programs produced here or in the PRC. And you know, people here are not all PRC citizens. Many are citizens of Canada; they might come from HK, Taiwan, or mainland China. They are “Canadian Chinese.” Therefore, these people will have different preference...³⁸⁶

Even as many interview subjects outlined the ideal way in which CCLTN workers should use news content from China and pointed to their own behaviour as good examples, they also expressed concerns about whether everyone was doing as they should. One CCLTN worker noted,

... when I write a news story that has been redistributed—for example a CCTV story that has been redistributed by AP—I’m going to check several news websites to see if they have the same thing before I write my own story, not just rely on what AP redistributes. And I hope that everyone is doing so, but that is not the case...³⁸⁷

Interview subjects avoided being pointed in their accusations. However, sources within and outside of Fairchild TV and Talentvision confirmed that this CCLTN producer does broadcast CCTV news using both CCTV footage and CCTV scripts but simply switching in their own anchor.³⁸⁸ Although the footage continues to bear CCTV logos, having a Canada-based anchor deliver, word for word, an entire CCTV script uncomfortably resembles a news desk puppeteering act. Certainly, this sort of wholesale rebroadcast falls short of the ideal of writing

³⁸⁵ Wang (former reporter for OMNI and deputy director for the China Institute at the University of Alberta); Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited); Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

³⁸⁶ Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited).

³⁸⁷ Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

³⁸⁸ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation); Lee (reporter for Fairchild TV); Mak (former news director with OMNI and director with Happy Life Network Association).

one's own commentary, re-researching stories, and finding angles more appropriate for Canadian audiences. As one interview subject asserts:

You know CCTV, they have Channel 4, which is the Chinese channel. Channel 9 is in English. Every commercial TV channel can download their news story to use, free. But do people use it? No, because you want to keep your credibility. So, whenever you use some of the footage from CCTV, you better rewrite the script.³⁸⁹

While the PRC government may intend to reach out to overseas Chinese through its media organs, China clearly faces strong challenges in terms of public perception.

2. Engaging CCLTN workers directly: conferences, forums, organizations, and trips

Making Chinese media more available overseas is not the only way that the PRC government has sought to influence CCLTN production. The second set of PRC government initiatives most directly related to CCLTN production are the state-sponsored trips, conferences, and organizations that specifically target overseas Chinese media workers. PRC government agencies engage overseas Chinese as media professionals because they have qualities, skills, and resources that are useful to the Chinese state. Overseas Chinese working in media have access to media platforms, business and industry connections, and skills in crafting content. The on-air and print personalities even have public exposure and possibly a following. Because this group possesses more specialized skills and qualities, the PRC government tends to engage them in more personal and protracted ways, pursuing both long term relationships and specific goals.

³⁸⁹ Mak (former news director with OMNI and director with Happy Life Network Association).

2.1. Overseas Chinese media forums

Since 2001, the PRC government has hosted World Chinese Media Forums every other year. Each forum is hosted in a different city in China, and people working in overseas Chinese media are invited to attend. Attendees work in various mediums including print, radio, and television. The rotating location serves to highlight different developments and opportunities taking place all over China, and they are typically hosted through cooperation between different levels of government. Usually the government agencies involved include the national level OCAO, Xinhua, as well as the hosting municipal and provincial governments. Higher ranking officials from the government agencies involved will often come as speakers to exhort overseas Chinese attendees to pursue various goals. Objectives have included forming partnerships between overseas Chinese media firms and PRC-based media firms, promoting Chinese culture, representing the PRC's point of view, countering negative stereotypes of China in their own communities and in Western media, and promoting China's belt and road initiative.³⁹⁰ Attendees are sometimes awarded with prizes for their work, and attendees are treated to several days of sight-seeing, networking opportunities, photo-ops with public officials, and dinners.³⁹¹

When I interviewed my sources about the World Chinese Media Forum, I was only able to find two people who had actually attended. It seems that these forums are mainly for people who serve top executive functions or are owners of overseas Chinese media outlets. The numbers of possible attendees are then further reduced as many of the respondents said that it is

³⁹⁰ "On Overseas Chinese Media," Chinascope, accessed January 1, 2019, <http://chinascope.org/archives/6708>; "Overseas Chinese Media Urged to Promote Belt and Road Initiative," State Council of the People's Republic of China (Government of China), accessed March 22, 2018, http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2017/09/11/content_281475850510482.htm.

³⁹¹ Jia (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.); Chan (president of Fairchild Television).

against company policy to go on sponsored trips for media. Still, these conferences have attracted a fair number of people, with official counts ranging from 200 people from 46 countries in the early years to 470 from 60 countries at the 2017 forum.³⁹² One interview subject who had attended stated that he had the impression that most of the attendees worked in print media. I was also told that the forum goers needed to pay for their own plane tickets to and from China, but all other expenses were covered including accommodations, touring, and food.³⁹³

2.2. CCLTN worker response to forums

Both of the interview subjects who had actually been to these forums agreed that they tended to lack substance. One of them referred to the events repeatedly as “so-called forums” to indicate that what was actually said was of little consequence and meaning. Both interview subjects agreed that the event was comprised largely of entertainment and sight-seeing. Very little conversation about media and news producing actually took place. To that end, neither of them found the forums to be especially useful.

At the same time, both interview subjects noted that many of the attendees did not seem particularly critical of the event and embraced the Chinese state’s attention. One participant speculated that some of the media outfits attending may receive funding from the PRC government because they do not accept subscription fees or do much advertising and yet seem to survive and return year on year. The other participant was much more derisive, complaining that, “my fellow Chinese Canadians love that kind of thing. They don’t throw you any meat;

³⁹² Chinascope, “On Overseas Chinese Media.”

³⁹³ Jia (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.).

they throw you a bone. Sometimes it's not even a bone. Sometimes it's shit. But they are willing to take it and smile.”³⁹⁴

The same interview subject was particularly critical, complaining that he had gone to the forum hoping that they would talk about important industry issues, like the future of print media or what other challenges face overseas Chinese media professionals, and how they might work together to face these difficulties. However, no such content was to be found, and to his disappointment, it seemed that “everyone's name is like gold”—indicating that the entire event consisted of flattery and platitudes.³⁹⁵ As a result of his negative impressions, this interview subject only went once.

By contrast, the other interview subject, while certainly not glowing in his review, decided that it was worth attending and paying for the plane ticket and had gone five or six times by the time we sat down to talk. He also said that the content was not especially substantive but noted that each forum was hosted by a different city. He saw the rotating locations as an effort to expose overseas Chinese media in person to the development happening in different parts of China, which he regarded as a positive thing. Besides the sight-seeing, this respondent said that one of the more useful things about the forums was that they were a chance to network. Attendees were compiled into a directory, and he could call overseas Chinese media workers in various parts of the world if he wanted to. Although he has not needed to call anyone or use the directory, he felt that it was one of the better aspects of the forum. He also said that there had been efforts to create joint projects and platforms for all the forum attendees, but these tended to fall to naught because everyone's format was quite different.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁴ Jia (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.).

³⁹⁵ Jia (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.).

³⁹⁶ Chan (president of Fairchild Television).

In the end, it seems that these forums are an exercise in growing relationships without any one specific project in mind. As one of the interview subjects described them, they are a “very traditional, state-government networking thing.”³⁹⁷ These are the diaspora cultivating activities that Gamlen describes in which no immediate goal is sought, but the sending state lays down groundwork in the form of recognition, relationships, and affinities. In the future, when the right occasion or opportunity presents itself, the sending state can lean on these connections to extract cooperation—social, economic, or political.³⁹⁸

Both of the interview subjects seemed well aware that despite the lack of substantive content, political objectives are at the heart of these forums. One of the interview subjects put it bluntly: “they want to buy us,” but then quickly noted that Canadian actors do the same if they take media workers out for lunch.³⁹⁹ The other interview subject described the situation with more context, explaining that China is “stepping out,” that is, looking to become increasingly engaged with the outside world. The PRC government hopes that local media—that is overseas Chinese media in foreign countries—will become mouthpieces for the Chinese state as it ventures forth.⁴⁰⁰

The observations and impressions given by the interview subjects fall in line with what Chinese scholars and policy makers say about China’s needs and interests regarding China’s soft power and ability to communicate with the outside world. Among Chinese observers, there is an impression that foreign media will be better at reaching foreign audiences than Chinese media. Problematically, the foreign journalists and foreign media are also perceived to be hopelessly

³⁹⁷ Chan (president of Fairchild Television).

³⁹⁸ Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies.”

³⁹⁹ Jia (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.).

⁴⁰⁰ Chan (president of Fairchild Television).

biased against China and bizarrely insistent on focusing their coverage of China on a handful of deeply problematic issues including relations with Taiwan, Tibetan independence, and the 1989 Tiananmen incident.⁴⁰¹

Thus, Chinese thinkers on the matter of media and China's soft power have often used the phrase *jie chuan qu hai*, or borrowing a boat to go out to sea. In this case, the boats are the various vehicles that could carry information and narratives about China to the world. China needs to somehow manage and provide news and information about itself and its interests in a way that will not be so immediately associated with the party-state.⁴⁰² Although there have been many internal debates about how to make CCTV more palatable to external audiences, the PRC government has also sought to make foreign sources conveyers of Chinese messaging.⁴⁰³ Besides using CCTV News Content to provide information to other media sources, Chinese policy makers also see the media of overseas Chinese as a tool for communication.

The PRC government, for its part, has not been secretive about communicating its desires to overseas Chinese media. One interview subject remembers being exhorted by Chinese officials at a Spring Festival party held specifically for overseas Chinese media workers in Canada to write more articles in English to reach broader Canadian audiences.⁴⁰⁴ Similarly, at the 9th World Chinese Media Forum in 2017, the keynote speaker encouraged attendees to promote China's belt and road initiative as well as help China connect with people from other countries. At the end of the forum, the attendees signed the Fuzhou Declaration, which committed attendees to these tasks.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰¹ Sun, "Slow Boat from China."

⁴⁰² Sun, "Slow Boat from China," 109; Hu, Ji, and Gong, "From the Outside In," 64.

⁴⁰³ Jirik, "CCTV News and Soft Power," 3564; de Burgh, "Domestic Context of Chinese Media's Globalization," 42.

⁴⁰⁴ Jia (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.).

⁴⁰⁵ China Daily, "Top Official Hails Successes of Fuzhou Media Forum."

2.3 China: too important to ignore

What remains remarkable about this situation is that even though what is offered by the PRC government is not particularly useful, they are still able to engage overseas Chinese. These forums attract hundreds of participants; and one of the interview subjects has attended them year on year despite his fairly sophisticated understanding about the lack of content and politics at work. In the end, it seems that the sheer importance of China attracts attention and engagement, even though the engagement may be lacking in substance or be potentially threatening to CCLTN credibility. As one interview subject explained, "... [the] PRC is a power center. The country controls the media, and media produces all sort of products. Whether we like it or not, they produce lots of programs, and they are willing to spread them to all Chinese communities globally."⁴⁰⁶ Even the interview subject who only went once to the World Chinese Media Forum complained about not being invited to other events for overseas Chinese media by the PRC government, in spite of his low opinion of them.⁴⁰⁷ It seems that being ignored is much worse than engaging subpar content or activities.

3. Divided homeland origins and CCLTN production politics

To make matters more complex, China is itself divisive among overseas Chinese.⁴⁰⁸ It is not unusual that a community created through migration would have differing orientations or degrees of attachment towards the sending state. However, this tendency is perhaps even more

⁴⁰⁶ Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited).

⁴⁰⁷ Jia (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.).

⁴⁰⁸ Pei-te Lien, "Pre-Emigration Socialization, Transnational Ties, and Political Participation across the Pacific: A Comparison among Immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 10, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 455.

pronounced among overseas Chinese because of the difficult relationships between mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Since the 1997 handover, political life has become more contentious in Hong Kong with protests and discontent over changing election procedures as well as Beijing's increased control over a society that has been governed and developed separately for almost a hundred years.⁴⁰⁹ The tensions between Taipei and Beijing are even more prominent as Beijing continues to see Taiwan's status as a matter of both territorial integrity and of protecting China's external sovereignty. In contrast, many in Taiwan see Taiwan's international status as a matter of protecting democracy and self-determination.⁴¹⁰ These cleavages are part of serving Chinese communities in Canada, and they were also part of the conversations I had with CCLTN workers. The presence of these differences in Chinese communities has been key to how CCLTN workers think about the politicizing presence of Chinese media in Canadian markets and in CCLTN production. These differences even worked their way in to how these workers interacted with their colleagues in the newsroom.

3.1. The growth of Mandarin speakers and differing news priorities

When asked about the key drivers in the development of CCLTN production, the demographic change from Cantonese speakers to Mandarin speakers in Canada's Chinese communities was the most commonly cited factor. The 1980s and 1990s saw a sizeable wave of immigrants from Hong Kong arrive in Canada, bringing with them their financial resources, their language, and a distinct cultural identity. This wave of immigrants helped shape the sense of what it means to be

⁴⁰⁹ Richard C. Bush, "Hong Kong: Examining the Impact of the 'Umbrella Movement,'" Testimony to Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institute, December 3, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/hong-kong-examining-the-impact-of-the-umbrella-movement/>.

⁴¹⁰ Chai, "The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations," 451.

Chinese in Canada and also helped build the neighbourhoods and institutions where they settled and participated. As immigration from mainland China has increased, these immigrants formed a new Chinese community in Canada, which has been significant to altering linguistic, cultural, and other orientations in Canada's Chinese communities.

Certainly, the growth of Mandarin speakers in Canada has been key to the development of Mandarin CCLTN. When CCLTN producers have looked for areas in which they could expand, the growth of Mandarin communities has been at the forefront of these conversations. As one interview subject remarked,

... we could have gone with Cantonese. We could have gone with Mandarin, but we basically we thought that Mandarin was better choice at that time just because of the recent influx of immigration for the past couple years, and a lot of Mandarin folks coming from China buying property and that... then, Stats Canada had the numbers that was released saying that the Mandarin community was definitely growing.⁴¹¹

Further, many of my interview subjects knew from experience that the challenges of settling into life in Canada can be particularly challenging in the early years of immigration, and many in the Mandarin-speaking community would need more Canada-oriented news and information services. This was sometimes contrasted with the Cantonese community, which was thought of as being already fairly well-settled and integrated. For several interview subjects, this gave rise to different news preferences between Cantonese and Mandarin speaking communities. The same interview subject went on to explain:

When the Mandarin community comes... they need to learn as much as they can to assimilate themselves into the community, into the Western culture, into Canada... [they need to] figure out where it is they're at and listen to more news. Whereas a lot of the folks that have resided here for a long time are Cantonese speaking people. And the Cantonese folks, they care about the local news.⁴¹²

⁴¹¹ Norman Wong (former program coordinator for Shaw Multicultural Channel and sales manager for Stormtec), in discussion with author, May 27, 2013, Burnaby, British Columbia.

⁴¹² Wong (former program coordinator for Shaw Multicultural Channel and sales manager for Stormtec).

Another interview subject also cited different preferences in the news, but for him, this was about the degree of connection that each community felt to their homeland origins. He predicted that the Mandarin speaking community, which is newer, would be more interested in news from the homeland whereas more settled Cantonese communities would be more interested in Canadian news and issues.

Cantonese speaking viewers are more concerned about local issues. That's very important. That's their interest... when they first immigrated here, for the first three or five years, they were still focussing on things happening in their native land. But after three or four years, they [were] more focused on local issues... You can see that more and more local politicians are Cantonese. They have been here for a long time; they want to be involved in political life... But the mainland China audience is probably at the transition period, so they are focussing on their motherland and just focus a little bit on local issues.⁴¹³

3.2. Divided newsrooms and conflict management

While audiences were thought to differ in their news preferences, homeland origins also mattered in terms of how CCLTN workers viewed source material from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China. For instance, CCLTN workers from both mainland China and Taiwan viewed news from Hong Kong as being rather parochial and of limited value as hard news. One interview subject described the differences thus:

You can see that the news coming from Hong Kong, a lot of it is just given to protests and the entertainment news... [It's] very locally oriented. I can't blame them because that's where their home is. But mainland China and Taiwan combined, they have many hundred times more population and a lot more complex issues than just basically a municipality... They [Hong Kong people] are not worried about any foreign policies other than local economic developments and the wealth of its citizens. But for China and Taiwan, one of the biggest topics is the cross-Straits relationships. And then for China, there is its relationship with East Asian neighbours with United States with Russia and how China is going to play a role on the world economic stage... so their view is also different. That is the making news different.⁴¹⁴

When it came to what Hong Kong-originating CCLTN workers had to say about news from mainland China and Taiwan, the portraits could similarly be somewhat unflattering. An

⁴¹³ Ye (news director for Fairchild Television).

⁴¹⁴ Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

interview subject from Hong Kong talked about selecting news stories for the Cantonese news broadcast and compared the homeland source materials in this way:

... the tone of [mainland] Chinese news is very different, not necessarily biased but very “official.” Therefore, we try not to use them... Their format is very uniform: first, there is the national leader’s visit to certain countries. Sometimes places like South Africa or Mexico doesn’t really concern us. So, we will select those stories that relate more to HK people and our daily lives, unless the visit of national leaders are related to global leaders or relate to Canada. Then we will select those stories... HK people nowadays are very interested in politics. For example, the HK Legislative Council or the HK chief executive, and important news like HK civic education⁴¹⁵... these are hot topics that most HK people are interested in... Taiwan news is very soft... Their news is very directed by popular interest. The first headline could be that a certain popular movie star arrived in Taiwan... Taiwan’s President Ma can be the last item of news... An hour of Taiwan news can allocate more than ten minutes for the weather. Taiwan is relatively a small place.⁴¹⁶

In addition to differing points of view regarding homeland news, CCLTN workers understood that different members of their audience would have different orientations towards China, and this was a cause of concern on several fronts. Sometimes, the problem created questions around what a neutral or appropriate position might be when reporting on cross-straits issues. At times, this has necessitated some negotiation between colleagues. As one interview subject stated,

... for example, in Taiwanese news they always call their president, de facto the president this and that and minister this and that. And then for mainlanders, most people believe in the unified China, and there is only one China. So there cannot be a president of part of China, and the president of China. So they often will try to add their little quotation marks... It’s not just the president because it’s not just an independent political entity. And that often takes a bit of effort, but eventually the colleagues can agree to say things in a more neutral manner, so it doesn’t offend either side.⁴¹⁷

The typical response of most interview subjects with respect to homeland origin conflicts in the newsroom was that it could be managed with some conversation and conferring between colleagues.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁵ The reform of civic education in Hong Kong has become a lightning rod in conversations about Hong Kong’s governance since its return to the PRC. Many of the changes have been deeply controversial and seen as a deliberate attempt to undermine Hong Kong’s separate political system and the exercise of democracy. For a more detailed discussion, please see Timothy Wai Wa Yuen (2016).

⁴¹⁶ Lee (reporter for Fairchild TV).

⁴¹⁷ Wang (former reporter for OMNI and deputy director for the China Institute at the University of Alberta).

⁴¹⁸ Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition); Hu (news director with OMNI); Wang (former reporter for OMNI and deputy director for the China Institute at the University of Alberta).

On a few occasions, it was suggested that trying to cover issues from a Canadian point of view would help bridge the gap between colleagues from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. As one interview subject suggested,

We know that when we talk about certain issues that are between the straits, we have a responsibility to put forward a Canadian perspective—a Canadian Chinese perspective. That is to say, not taking sides between Beijing and Taipei, but just finding a way to express what the two views are and letting the people at home decide where they fall on the issue.⁴¹⁹

Still, CCLTN workers interviewed seemed to recognize that the differing homeland orientations of their audience would render the presence of China in CCLTN production politically divisive. As another interview subject explained, this sensibility has been part of their desire to emphasize their independence from China and from media organizations in China.⁴²⁰ Finally, with an eye on their audience, this CCLTN worker stated:

you know, even with just your accent, people perceive you to be biased to one side or another. If you are born in Taiwan and people know you are from Taiwan, and you are from mainland China watching the show, people may question if you are giving accurate or non-biased information. I mean, this is constant.⁴²¹

4. Conclusion

As this chapter shows, the Chinese state has been able to exert influence on CCLTN production despite its many impediments. PRC government agencies lack coordination, and more problematically, the goods and services offered by the PRC government are considered to be insufficiently reliable and sometimes lacking in substance. Despite their fairly sophisticated understanding of the situation and best intentions in producing quality news programming,

⁴¹⁹ Renato Zane (news director and reporter with OMNI), in discussion with author, June 11, 2013, Toronto, Ontario.

⁴²⁰ Wang (former reporter for OMNI and deputy director for the China Institute at the University of Alberta).

⁴²¹ Zane (news director and reporter with OMNI).

CCLTN workers nonetheless find themselves in a precarious position. The power of the Chinese state is not due only to their extensive mechanisms of control or persuasive diaspora engagement techniques. Rather, China is simply too important to ignore. China's growing engagement with the outside world combined with its importance to *xin yimin*⁴²² as a cultural, political, and economic point of reference means that CCLTN workers must find a way to deal with China's growing influence in their own sphere of work.

How then do CCLTN workers respond to the power and influence of the Chinese state? CCLTN workers do acknowledge the many benefits of working with Chinese media and make insistent notes about its improvement. The CCLTN workers I interviewed continue to use media produced in China and attend special events put on by the PRC government. At the same time, their knowledge about media governance in China, including state-ownership as well as censorship practices, has made CCLTN workers somewhat more cautious about content from China. Further, they have asserted their own independence, acknowledged both the benefits and pitfalls of working with Chinese media, and generated a sense of best practice, using their own behaviour as examples. CCLTN workers do make use of the goods and services offered by the PRC, though their engagement is not uncritical or without caution. In this way, the CCLTN workers are renegotiating subject-state claims made by the PRC government. Where the Chinese state desires loyal proponents and foreign agents, CCLTN workers instead offer an acknowledgement of importance and engagement but with an insistence on independence. Having discussed the role of the sending state, I now turn to the receiving state. What role does

⁴²² The term *xin yimin* refers to migrants from China in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The term is meant to include migrants from China who are part of the latest wave of outward migration.

the receiving state play in alleviating or amplifying the pressures of the sending state? I will discuss that aspect of my research in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6: CANADA AND CCLTN PRODUCTION

Introduction

In chapters four and five, I explained how the PRC government has been successful in influencing CCLTN production despite several notable impediments. Their difficulties include a lack of coordination among their own agencies, the offering of flawed goods and services, as well as an ambiguous reputation in Chinese Canadian communities. Still, CCLTN workers engage with resources from China even though the interviews showed them to be highly cognizant of what this can mean for their real and perceived journalistic legitimacy. Yet, by remaining selective about how they engage the Chinese state, CCLTN workers are renegotiating subject-state claims made by the Chinese state.

Having discussed the importance of the sending state, in this chapter I turn to the receiving state and ask: what role does the receiving state play in the success or failure of the sending state's efforts? To answer this question, I explore two key issues: first, how does the Canadian state govern CCLTN production; and second, how do CCLTN workers respond to the Canadian state's governance? This chapter focuses on the first of these two issues, and my analysis indicates that the Canadian state has provided critical support to CCLTN production through its multiculturalism policy, broadcasting policy, and ethnic broadcasting policy. However, movement away from cultural maintenance and recognition in multicultural policy as well as greater neoliberalization in broadcasting policy has meant somewhat unreliable support for CCLTN production in ethnic broadcasting policy. These findings mean that CCLTN workers do not experience governance pressures from the sending state alone. Rather, the receiving state is in an even stronger position to influence minority media production, and their policies are of significant consequence both in the presence and weakening of support.

My review of these policies show that broadcasting policy has, at many times, been influenced by Canadian nationalism, which has led to initiatives and regulations aimed at fostering Canadian media production. While these efforts often sought to bolster Canadian arts and culture in the face of American cultural dominance, they also created space in the Canadian broadcast system where minority media could grow. Multiculturalism, when it emphasizes cultural retention and recognition, legitimizes third language expression and minority media production. However, multicultural practice in Canada has increasingly moved towards the notion that cultural retention and recognition are constraints on immigrant adaptation. At the same time, an increasingly neoliberal outlook in broadcasting policy has meant that the state has become more selective about when it intervenes in the market. Combined, these trends have led to weakened support for ethnic broadcasting in a time of media shock and change. The result has been inconsistent and often flagging commitment to CCLTN production on the part of government regulators and corporate producers.

Although CCLTN production does not exist in an enclosed system with these policy areas alone, they are the policies that most directly address CCLTN production. As in chapter four, I do not offer a comprehensive review of these policy areas. Instead, I provide a discussion that highlights developments important to shaping CCLTN production and the perceptions of CCLTN workers.

1. Multiculturalism policy

Canadian multicultural policy has been important to the development of CCLTN production by providing ideological justification for regulatory supports as well as imposing operational obligations. In the context of my research, “multiculturalism” refers to approaches to managing

ethnocultural diversity created by immigration, which have been adopted by Canadian governments since 1971, when the policy was announced by Pierre Elliot Trudeau.⁴²³ As the term suggests, multiculturalism accepts and promotes the inclusion of multiple cultures within a single country, though the conditions of and rationale for this inclusion have varied over time.⁴²⁴ As this section will demonstrate, the changes in how multiculturalism has been valued and practiced have also been important to shaping the development of CCLTN production.

1.1 Multiculturalism and its policy beginnings

Given that the term was coined in Canada, multiculturalism has become an important part of Canadian national identity and is even seen as a distinct Canadian contribution to the world. However, conversations about ethnocultural diversity in Canada are not restricted to multiculturalism.⁴²⁵ Rather, Canadian conversations about ethnocultural diversity have historically existed in three conversations that are not typically cross-fertilized.⁴²⁶ The first discussion focuses on relations between French and British settler societies created by competition between European colonial empires. The second conversation addresses relationships between Indigenous Peoples in Canada and the colonizing settler societies and their governments. The third conversation focuses on multiculturalism as a means of thinking about

⁴²³ Will Kymlicka has used a similar approach in his work. Will Kymlicka, "Citizenship, Communities, and Identity in Canada," in *Canadian Politics*, 6th edition, ed. James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 21–44.

⁴²⁴ Kymlicka, "Citizenship, Communities, and Identity in Canada," 24.

⁴²⁵ Besides ethnocultural diversity, new and promising work has been done on disability as well as sexual minorities.

⁴²⁶ Sourayan Mookerjee, "Multiculturalism and Egalitarianism," *Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal* 43, no. 1–2 (2011): 42.

and managing the diversity arising from minorities that were created through later waves of immigration, which do not fit into either of the first two discussions.⁴²⁷

While these conversations about ethnocultural diversity are often separated, the histories of how these conversations emerged are linked, though not in even or equal ways. In 1961, the federal government of Lester B. Pearson appointed the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism—the B and B Commission—in response to growing Quebecois nationalism. However, commissioners encountered concerns raised by groups that were not British, French, or of Indigenous origins. In particular, Ukrainian and other minorities in Western Canada asserted that a bilingual and bicultural framework would turn them into an underclass of de-legitimized Canadians because it ignored their distinct cultural identities as well as their social and economic contributions.⁴²⁸

In 1969, as a response to this “third force,” the B and B Commission added a fourth volume to their report that provided a survey of these and other communities—their cultural and social practices and their economic and political activities. The report concluded that little was known and understood about these groups, despite their considerable size and geographic concentration. The commission made a total of sixteen recommendations aimed at three main goals: first, combatting racism and discrimination against these groups; second, recognizing their cultural contributions and achievements; and third, using government funds and institutions to help these groups retain their linguistic and cultural heritage.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁷ Roy McMurty, “Accommodating Canada’s Diversity,” in *Belonging?: Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*, ed. Keith G. Banting, Thomas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidle, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 21.

⁴²⁸ Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel, *Selling Diversity : Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization* (North York, ON : University of Toronto Press, 2008), 110.

⁴²⁹ Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, A. Davidson Dunton et al., *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, vol. 4, *The Cultural Contributions of the Other Ethnic Groups* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967), 10, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/bcp-pco/Z1-1963-1-5-4-1-eng.pdf.

The B and B Commission's recommendations regarding this third force were so extensive that had all of them been taken on, Canada would have adopted a policy of multiculturalism and multilingualism. Even as the B and B Commission asserted that public education should help children become competent in at least one of the official languages, they made several recommendations that public schools should support education in other minority languages wherever population concentrations made this feasible. They were thorough in their endorsements here, noting that education in languages other than French and English should be made available at the primary, secondary, and post-secondary levels.⁴³⁰

Further, the Report discussed at length the importance of media and broadcasting to language retention. The B and B Commission directed the Canadian Radio-television Commission—the CRC, which was the precursor to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, the CRTC—to support the growth of broadcasting in languages other than French, English, or Indigenous languages. These directives were consistent with the then-CRC's 1968 mandate, which not only empowered the newly formulated institution with the ability to grant licenses but also charged the body with fostering Canadian culture in its broadcasting system. The B and B Commission thus asserted that the then-CRC must not only remove regulatory barriers for third language groups but also learn more about how broadcasting could assist in language retention for immigrant groups. Moreover, the CRC was supposed to engage in research about the representation of ethnocultural minorities in English and French language broadcasting.⁴³¹ Similarly, the B and B Commission recommended that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), which had been established in 1936, should begin providing programming in languages other than French and English.

⁴³⁰ Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 140.

⁴³¹ Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 188–90.

In 1971, Trudeau formally announced his government's response to the B and B Commission's recommendations, and in a statement to the House of Commons, multiculturalism became official government policy but within a bilingual framework. The Trudeau government decided to pursue multiculturalism in four identified areas. First, the government would provide funds to ethnocultural groups to assist them in the practice and retention of their cultural and linguistic heritage. Second, the government would work to remove cultural obstacles that prevented people of any heritage from participating fully in Canadian society. Third, the government would encourage cultural and social interactions between all Canadians to foster national unity. Fourth, the Canadian government would help immigrants become competent in at least one official language so that they could participate fully in Canadian life.⁴³²

Notably, the B and B Commission and the Trudeau government reflected the same sense that making diversity part of Canadian national identity would be more successful if a larger group of Canadians were recognized. However, the B and B Commission and Trudeau both affirmed that immigrant adaptation is normative within a multicultural framework, even as the B and B Commission advocated for greater multilingualism. To Indigenous critics, Trudeau's multiculturalism bore striking similarities to colonial efforts to incorporate and thus subdue Indigenous people in Canada. Only two years before, in 1969, the federal government presented the *White Paper* in which they offered to abolish the *Indian Act*. For Indigenous critics, granting rights and removing obstacles, in both multiculturalism and the *White Paper*, are meant to effectively absorb all people in Canada into a settler society created by the original colonists.⁴³³

⁴³² Abu-Laban and Gabriel, *Selling Diversity*, 108.

⁴³³ David B. Macdonald, "Aboriginal Peoples and Multicultural Reform in Canada: Prospects for a New Binational Society," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 39, no. 1 (January 2014): 67.

As the multiculturalism practice and discourse evolved over time, different elements of multiculturalism have emerged, often with contested understandings and relationships. In many cases, different iterations of multiculturalism can be described in terms of their varying degrees of commitment to either adaptation-oriented or recognition-oriented goals. Adaptation-oriented goals are about making immigrants change their behaviours and attachments so that they are more easily incorporated into major cultural, social, political, and economic institutions in Canadian life. In this framework, integration closely resembles assimilation, and it is constrained rather than assisted by the retention of diverse linguistic and cultural traditions. At times, integration has been understood as a matter of mutual accommodation in which mainstream society and immigrants both show flexibility and adapt to each other.

Recognition, by contrast, is about acknowledging the contributions made by minorities to Canadian society. However, there is no clear agreement about what counts as a contribution. While some say that minorities contribute to Canada's diversity by practicing unique cultural and linguistic traditions, others may dismiss those claims and focus on less ethnoculturally specific contributions like military service or contributions to a public university. In a multicultural framework in which recognition is valued, exercises in cultural maintenance, like running a Ukrainian language school, count as contributions to Canadians society. The way in which these different elements are defined and how they are related to each other is one useful way of thinking about changes in multiculturalism in Canada.

1.2 Multiculturalism and the global economy

By the late 1980s, an emphasis on market friendly governance had begun to change the way in which multiculturalism was valued, understood, and discussed. Using the language of

globalization and business management, multiculturalism was framed as a Canadian comparative advantage. Public and official discourse framed diversity and multilingual citizens with global connections as useful tools in fostering international trade and investment.⁴³⁴ Similarly, Canadian governments had begun to cast immigrants as engines of economic growth, bringing with them skills, financial resources, and the desire for economic success.⁴³⁵

Just as bureaucrats and governments were stressing the economic utility of multiculturalism, critics began questioning its value and efficacy. A number of different issues were raised, including whether multiculturalism ignores class and gender issues. However, one of the criticisms that came to have a long-term impact on the development of multiculturalism was that it impedes the formation of a strong and unified national identity. The newly created Reform Party, which came into being in the late 1980s, were proponents of this criticism.⁴³⁶

In the mid 1990s, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien commissioned a review of multiculturalism from a private research firm to address concerns and criticisms about multiculturalism. In 1994, the resulting Brighton Report spoke to these concerns by deepening a binary that positioned recognition and cultural maintenance on one side with attachment and contribution to Canadian life on the other side.⁴³⁷ Following the submission of the Brighton Report, the government announced that they would take a different approach to multiculturalism. Although the *Multiculturalism Act* entrenches multiculturalism into Canadian policy with the force of law, the legislation allows significant discretion on the part of program administrators.

⁴³⁴ Abu-Laban and Gabriel, *Selling Diversity*, 110–15.

⁴³⁵ Elke Winter, “Rethinking Multiculturalism After Its ‘Retreat’: Lessons From Canada,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 59, no. 6 (May 15, 2015): 643–44, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764214566495>.

⁴³⁶ Abu-Laban and Gabriel, *Selling Diversity*, 111–12.

⁴³⁷ Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage, Corporate Review Branch, *Strategic Evaluation of Multiculturalism Programs : Final Report*, study conducted by Brighton Research (Ottawa: Department of Canadian Heritage, Corporate Review Branch, 1996), 3–7.

Thus, the Liberal governments of both Chrétien and Paul Martin reformulated their multiculturalism program in order to emphasize immigrant settlement and adaptation as opposed to enhancing Canadian multiculturalism through cultural maintenance.⁴³⁸

To that end, federal funding for ethnocultural organizations ceased.⁴³⁹ Rather than treating the work of ethnocultural organizations as a national public service that should receive federal support, these efforts were pushed further into the sphere of individual and privatized responsibility. Diversity is still given a symbolic place in Canadian policy discourse; however, program design, funding, and interpretation of legislation indicates fear that multiculturalism diminishes rather than contributes to unified national identity. In this way anxiety about diversity became part of multiculturalism practice.

1.3 Multiculturalism in the Harper years and beyond

The trend of moving away from legitimizing the retention of minority cultures and languages further strengthened in the Harper years. Incorporating Reform Party criticisms of multiculturalism, the newly formed Conservative Party of Canada sought to re-imagine citizenship, national identity, and multiculturalism in Canada. The Conservative government's citizenship guide—the document used in preparation for the citizenship test—reflects the Conservative government's approach. Proponents and critics agree that the guide made the Canadian military and British heritage central to Canadian identity, certainly more so than previous guides.⁴⁴⁰ The guide did discuss multiculturalism—it was mentioned in brief but

⁴³⁸ Abu-Laban and Gabriel, *Selling Diversity*, 110–13.

⁴³⁹ Abu-Laban and Gabriel, *Selling Diversity*, 115–16.

⁴⁴⁰ Winter, "Rethinking Multiculturalism After Its 'Retreat,'" 646; Raymond B. Blake, "A New Canadian Dynamism?: From Multiculturalism and Diversity to History and Core Values," *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 26, no. 1 (May 2013): 84.

glowing terms a total of three times—but multiculturalism was really included mostly as an element of the Canadian constitution or more as a technical label. By contrast, the symbols, traditions, and institutions—in other words the more affective treatments of national identity—were focused on the military and British heritage, sometimes in ways that erased key elements of Canadian diversity.⁴⁴¹

For instance, in the discussion of Canada's involvement of World War I, Canadian participation was portrayed as the loyal and principled result of its British subject-hood. No mention was made of the Conscription Crisis in which French Canadians protested their forced participation because they did not identify as British subjects.⁴⁴² The British Crown was also unreservedly identified as a key Canadian symbol, even though a significant percentage of Canadians doubt the value of continuing Canada's relationship with British monarchy.⁴⁴³

Similarly, in a section on responsibilities and duties of Canadian citizens, the guide used two highlighted boxes to emphasize the Canadian government's top priorities for new immigrants. The first box presented military enlistment as the premiere act of public service. Although Canadians can serve their communities in many different ways, the guide directs immigrants to give extra thought to serving in the Canadian Armed Forces. Readers are encouraged to consider a career in military service, and details are given about some of the

⁴⁴¹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship," study guide (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Government of Canada,] 2012), <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/discover.pdf>.

⁴⁴² The Conscription Crisis is an important precursor to Quebec's Quiet Revolution. It is, if nothing else, an important snapshot of the differences that lead to the creation of Canadian bilingualism.

⁴⁴³ In a poll conducted in April of 2016 for the Queen's 90th birthday, Canadians were asked whether Canada "should continue as a monarchy for generations to come." Forty-two percent of respondents said that it should, 38% said that it shouldn't, and 20% were undecided or had no preference. Nicole Thompson, "Canadians like the Queen, but Her Heir? Not so Much, Survey Says," *Globe and Mail*, April 18, 2016, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadians-like-the-queen-but-her-heir-not-so-much-surveysays/article29658118/>.

options and avenues open to those who join.⁴⁴⁴ The second box, entitled “The Equality of Women and Men in Canada,” highlights various forms of gendered violence as potential cultural practices that immigrants may bring with them, warning that these will not be accepted in Canada.⁴⁴⁵ The forms of gendered violence listed are already illegal under the Canadian criminal code, but the intention and assumptions are clear: “barbaric cultural practices” are common enough among immigrant populations that they deserve special attention when addressing incoming Canadians.

In the end, the citizenship guide, as published by the Harper government, made a decisive move that de-centered multiculturalism from Canadian national identity. Further, rather than seeing multiculturalism as a means of fostering diversity and legitimizing minority cultures, the government had re-interpreted multiculturalism as a vehicle for making immigrants more responsible for adopting core values built around British subject-hood and military service.⁴⁴⁶ These changes effectively turned multiculturalism from a policy meant to legitimize diversity into a policy that problematizes diversity.

The Harper Conservatives were eventually defeated in the 2015 election that brought to head many sources of dissatisfaction that had accumulated from nearly a decade of governance. For many critics, however, one of the noticeable issues in the 2015 election was the question of what multiculturalism would mean in Canada.⁴⁴⁷ The summer of 2015 would see refugees leaving the Syrian conflict in increasing numbers, and then a story broke in which a three-year-

⁴⁴⁴ Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Discover Canada,” 9.

⁴⁴⁵ Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Discover Canada,” 9.

⁴⁴⁶ Joe Friesen, “Ottawa Pumps up Military Role in Citizenship Ceremonies,” *Globe and Mail*, June 30, 2011, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-pumps-up-military-role-in-citizenship-ceremonies/article586789/>.

⁴⁴⁷ Catherine Murray, “Rethinking Multicultural/Multiracial Media and the Integrity of Immigrant Integration,” *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 6.

old child, Alan Kurdi, was found dead on a beach. It was widely reported in the media that his family's application for asylum in Canada had been rejected, despite the fact that they have Canadian citizens as family.⁴⁴⁸ Against these events and other pressures, the Conservative proposal to create a "barbaric cultural practices hotline" was increasingly framed as racist, and the Conservatives eventually lost the election.⁴⁴⁹ Notably, Justin Trudeau's government has also since promised a new citizenship guide.

In spite of these changes, Canadian discomfort with multiculturalism remains, even as it is repeatedly rhetorically re-affirmed as central to Canadian identity. In a 2016 poll by Ipsos Reid, 75% of respondents agreed that multiculturalism is a central part of Canadian identity. However, by almost the same proportion, at 68%, respondents affirmed that minorities should do more to fit in with mainstream Canadian society.⁴⁵⁰ In the end, multiculturalism, while accepted, is undergoing a reinterpretation that stresses immigrant adaptation and increasingly divides the work of contributing to Canadian society from that of practicing diverse cultures and linguistic traditions.

2. Broadcasting policy

The trends in multiculturalism policy point towards weakening government interest in minority media. However, multiculturalism policy is not directly involved in CCLTN production; broadcasting policy is. The implementation of multiculturalism in broadcasting has been part of

⁴⁴⁸ Joe Parkinson and David George-Cosh, "Image of Drowned Syrian Boy Echoes Around World," Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/image-of-syrian-boy-washed-up-on-beach-hits-hard-1441282847>.

⁴⁴⁹ Lucas Powers, "Conservatives Pledge Funds, Tip Line to Combat 'Barbaric cultural Practices,'" CBC, October 2, 2015, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-barbaric-cultural-practices-law-1.3254118>.

⁴⁵⁰ Angus Reid, "Canadians Aren't as Accepting as We Think—and We Can't Ignore It, Writes Angus Reid" CBC, October 4, 2016, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/angus-reid-poll-canadian-values-immigration-1.3789223>.

the history of broadcast policy development. The 1991 *Broadcasting Act* was written in part to update the 1968 version with the imperatives of the *Multiculturalism Act*, which was passed in 1988. With respect to effects on minority media, multiculturalism trends moving away from cultural maintenance, language retention, and recognition have been compounded by the government's hesitation to intervene in the market, especially in a time of dramatic changes in the news and media industry.

In Canada, broadcasting policy regulates the distribution of programs over radio and television—including conventional over-the-air, satellite, and cable. In the 1920s, the Canadian government conceived of broadcasting policy as a means of pursuing national goals including fostering national identity, ensuring national security, and protecting cultural sovereignty. However, the broadcasting industry has been subject to significant changes due to the rise of digital communications as well as globalizing media and information markets. Moreover, governance priorities have changed over the years, and deregulating to avoid market distortion has become a policy priority. Arguably, the pressure to adapt government regulation to address these developments now overshadows a policy agenda originally aimed at nation building.⁴⁵¹

2.1 Early developments in broadcast policy

In 1905, when the Canadian government first started regulating broadcast, officials worked from the premise that Canada's airwaves are a national public resource, much like its waterways or airspace.⁴⁵² Transmissions were only made over the radio spectrum, which has a limited

⁴⁵¹ Laurence J. E. Dunbar and Christian Leblanc, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Broadcasting Services in Canada : Final Report (Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 2007), <http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/318092/publication.html>; Salter and Odartey-Wellington, The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada, 451.

⁴⁵² The 1905 Wireless Telegraphy Act was the first piece of legislation on broadcasting passed in Canada.

bandwidth and thus only accommodates a restricted number of broadcasters at any given time.⁴⁵³

The earliest instance of government regulation came from the Department of Oceans and Fisheries when it sought to limit and prioritize the number of broadcasters on air because private use was interfering with naval communications.⁴⁵⁴

Furthermore, like multiculturalism, the development of broadcast policy has been marked by an interest in building Canadian national identity. Radio and television programs can disseminate narratives about identities, values, and cultural practices. Governments have often asserted that producing and distributing programs that construct Canadian identities strengthens national unity and sovereignty.⁴⁵⁵ As television and radio grew in their popularity throughout the twentieth century, regulators and commissions sought to define and support the public interest in broadcasting. Historically, governments cited Canada's proximity to the United States, vast geography, and diverse population as important considerations informing broadcast policy. At several points throughout the twentieth century, governments working to limit foreign ownership found ways to incentivize the production of domestic content as a means of nation building.⁴⁵⁶

The popularization of radio and the creation of the CBC provides an indicative example of these concerns at work. By the late 1920s, Canada had entered the Golden Age of radio, and private operators were providing programming in major cities across Canada. However, access across the country was uneven with much of the broadcasting done by radio stations in Montreal

⁴⁵³ The radio spectrum is a frequency band on the electromagnetic spectrum between 3Hz and 3000 GHz. Electromagnetic waves in this band are referred to as radio waves.

⁴⁵⁴ Robert Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 21.

⁴⁵⁵ F. Odarthey-Wellington, "Broadcasting Regulation and Building the Multicultural Canadian Nation: Understanding the CRTC's Al-Jazeera Arabic Decision," *Communication Law and Policy* 18, no. 2 (01 2013): 125, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2013.774894>.

⁴⁵⁶ Picard et al., "Platform Proliferation and Its Implications for Domestic Content Policies," 685; Salter and Odarthey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 8.

and Toronto. In 1928, the Department of Oceans and Fisheries created the Aird Commission and mandated it to investigate these issues. The Commission's mandate was "to determine how radio broadcasting in Canada could be most effectively carried on in the interest of Canadian listeners and the national interests of Canada."⁴⁵⁷

The Aird Commission was said to face a choice between a more American model of broadcasting, in which a free market allowed private actors to compete, versus a more European model, in which publicly owned and funded national broadcasters dominated.⁴⁵⁸ While the Aird Commission's investigations were underway, major radio stations in Toronto and Montreal began becoming affiliates of American radio networks—among them the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). Radio was still a relatively new medium, and as new broadcasters struggled to create an appropriate profit model for their businesses, amalgamation with larger US networks became increasingly attractive.⁴⁵⁹

In their report, the Aird Commission recommended that Canada end private broadcasting and establish a public broadcaster modelled after the BBC. The Canadian government responded with the *Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act* (1932), which aimed to create a robust and accessible broadcasting system that was completely publicly owned. Concerned that Canadian broadcasting could become dominated by American influence, policy makers created legislation that treated the Canadian radio broadcasting system as a key form of infrastructure, much like the railways.⁴⁶⁰ As the Great Depression continued, however, successive Canadian governments were reluctant to pursue the expensive infrastructure investments required by the 1932 Act.

⁴⁵⁷ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 54.

⁴⁵⁸ Picard et al., "Platform Proliferation and Its Implications for Domestic Content Policies," 687.

⁴⁵⁹ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 31.

⁴⁶⁰ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 34.

Ultimately, Canadian governments rolled back nationalization schemes in favour of a mix of public and private operators.⁴⁶¹

2.2 Canadian nationalism and the development of broadcasting policy

In spite of these outcomes, the developments and rationales leading to the 1932 Act became a pattern repeated many times in the development of Canadian broadcasting policy. Given the power and proximity of American broadcasting, every new form of broadcast technology—MATV in the 1950s, cable TV in the 1970s and 1980s, and satellite TV in the 1990s—facilitated better access to American programming. Thus, with the introduction of new technology, Canadian companies and consumers would adapt, leading to increased consumption of American media in Canada.

As successive Canadian governments have attempted to define the public interest in broadcasting, they have repeatedly confronted questions about Canadian sovereignty and identity. Moments of amplified Canadian nationalism—particularly after World War II and in the 1960s and 1970s—have been important for informing Canadian governments in their response to broadcasting developments. The presence of American media in Canadian broadcasting periodically prompted anxieties about the demise of nascent Canadian identity and cultural sovereignty. Thus, Canadian governments would, at each juncture of technological development, extend regulatory measures to ensure that the Canadian broadcasting system remained Canadian for a mix of nation building, defence, and logistical reasons.⁴⁶²

⁴⁶¹ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 36.

⁴⁶² Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 42–50; Taylor, “Shut-Off,” 12.

It was in this way that Canadian content regulations were introduced in the late 1950s.⁴⁶³ Canadian content regulations once required Canadian firms to broadcast a certain quota of Canadian programming over a given period of time. Television was growing in popularity after World War II, and the Canadian government had become concerned about whether American programming was exerting undue influence on the Canadian public.⁴⁶⁴ Moreover, the events of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War demonstrated the political power of arts and culture in Germany and the Soviet Union. Canadian artists began to call on the federal government to sponsor Canadian art, and the idea that arts and culture could protect and promote democracy began to circulate.⁴⁶⁵

In 1958, the Canadian government passed the *Broadcasting Act* that created the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)—the body which would eventually become the CRTC. That same year, the BBG instituted a set of Canadian content regulations.⁴⁶⁶ This move matched the fear of American dominance and the push to cultivate Canadian arts and culture, both of which were prevalent at the time. Problematically, it was these regulations that led to conflict between the CBC, private broadcasters, and the BBG. While the 1958 *Broadcasting Act* gave the BBG the power to create Canadian content regulations, the Act made no provisions for the BBG to enforce the quotas. The CRTC currently has the power to grant and reject licenses, but the BBG could only advise the Ministry of Transport on the economic and social impact of

⁴⁶³ Salter and Odarthey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 541.

⁴⁶⁴ There had been so much concern in the early 1950s over the impact of American television on Canadian audiences that the CBC was told to produce TV programming in order to “repatriate Canadians,” and the Massey Commission was charged with investigating the impact of American television on Canadian audiences. Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*.

⁴⁶⁵ J. D. M. Steward and Helmut Kallmann, “Massey Commission,” in *The Canadian Encyclopaedia*, July 29, 2016, <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/massey-commission-emc>.

⁴⁶⁶ Salter and Odarthey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 508.

license applications. Once the Ministry granted a license, the BBG had no way of holding the company accountable for its Canadian content requirements.

These and other difficulties lead to the creation of the 1968 *Broadcasting Act*, the legislation that created the Canadian Radio-television Commission (CRC). The CRC would eventually become the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) when telecommunications was added to its mandate in 1976.⁴⁶⁷ The 1968 Act mandated the then-CRC as an independent regulatory agency that reported to Parliament and gave it the power to review, grant, and deny broadcasting licenses.⁴⁶⁸ The CRTC continues in this way, thus acting in a quasi-judicial manner. The Commission is further tasked with “regulating and supervising all aspects of the Canadian broadcast system.”⁴⁶⁹ Despite the CRTC’s obligation to report to Parliament, the powers of government are limited. Cabinet may issue policy directives as well as review individual decisions and set them aside or return them to the Commission for reconsideration, but Cabinet cannot simply re-write a decision.⁴⁷⁰

If institutions are inevitably marked by the time in which they are formed, then the CRC and CRTC were informed by renewed Canadian nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s. The year 1965 saw the publication of *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism*, by then little-known academic George Grant. Grant argued that Canada had moved from British subjecthood, to independence, to becoming a de facto colony of the United States. His lament, as it were, resonated with many others who took up Canadian nationalism and resisted American

⁴⁶⁷ “CRTC 50 Years,” Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, February 23, 2018, <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/acrtc/50.htm>.

⁴⁶⁸ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 40.

⁴⁶⁹ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 68.

⁴⁷⁰ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 80.

influence.⁴⁷¹ The Committee for an Independent Canada was also formed in 1970. Founded and chaired by many Canadian notables, including Mel Hurtig, this group advocated economic nationalism and pushed for the regulation of foreign ownership and investment. Many of their ideas have since been passed into law including the creation of the Canadian Development Corporation, controls over land acquisition for non-residents, and the establishment of the Foreign Investment Review Agency. Further, the 1970s saw significant growth in Canadian arts and culture. Many Canadian publishing houses were founded in that decade, and the 1970s also saw an increase in the arts workforce by 79% compared with the 39% average for all sectors of labour combined.⁴⁷²

This re-assertion of the importance of English-Canadian nationalism in arts and commerce was not lost on the CRTC, which, by regulating the broadcasting industry, effectively brings art and commerce together. Many of the decisions made by the CRTC in the 1970s and 1980s reflect the desire to foster Canadian media and broadcasting. In response to the growth of cable television in the 1970s, for instance, the CRTC created tax incentives for advertisers to continue advertising with Canadian broadcasters even as American channels became ever more available. Most importantly, however, the 1968 *Broadcasting Act* was the effective template for the 1991 *Broadcasting Act*. Thus, both assert that “the Canadian broadcasting system should be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians... to safeguard, enrich, and strengthen the

⁴⁷¹ Michael Enright, “Why This Book on Canadian Nationalism Is Even More Relevant Today - Michael Enright,” The Sunday Edition, CBC Radio, December 6, 2015, <https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thesundayedition/george-grant-was-right-capitalism-is-force-for-good-best-female-irish-writers-frank-sinatra-1.3349666/why-this-book-on-canadian-nationalism-is-even-more-relevant-today-michael-enright-1.3350578>.

⁴⁷² Steward and Kallmann, “Massey Commission.”

cultural, political, social, and economic fabric of Canada.”⁴⁷³ In this way, the nation-building goals that informed the development of broadcasting policy have been brought into the present.

2.3 Broadcasting meets the telecommunications industry and neoliberal ideals

Summarily, broadcasting policy was created and developed with nation building goals in mind. However, the CRTC has become responsible for many other goals outside of these nation-building aims. In 1976, the CRTC was also given the task of regulating telecommunications in Canada. Broadcasters had found more ways to transmit programming—though phone lines, satellite, and mainframe computers. Thus, broadcasting and telecommunications became increasingly interconnected and overlapping as consumer products and corporations amalgamated to include both.⁴⁷⁴

Today, broadcasting is deeply reliant and inseparable from the telecommunications industry in Canada. Telecommunications is a field in which repeated technological revolutions have led to ever growing economies of scale, thus incentivizing corporate consolidation. Further, the now normalized use of internet and mobile devices has made telecommunications services a highly lucrative industry. Thus, while broadcasting is a distinct and identifiable economic activity, it depends upon the more financially rewarding work of telecommunications service provision.

As such, except for the CBC, the actors dominating the Canadian television market are typically for-profit telecommunications corporations. These corporations do hold media divisions, but they are actually incentivized by the revenue that comes from providing cellphone,

⁴⁷³ Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11, sec. 3, article 1, clause d, <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/B-9.01/page-1.html#h-4>.

⁴⁷⁴ Salter and Odartey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 321.

internet, and cable services. Their *raison d'être* is not directly tied to program production, to say nothing of investing in the exploration and expression of Canadian identity; rather, the more profitable mode of operation is to become a broadcast distribution undertaking (BDU). BDUs typically rebroadcast signals carrying the programs rather than produce their own original programs. They procure popular programs in order to make purchasing their telecommunications services more attractive. Filling air time in this manner requires less capital and risk as opposed to producing original programming.⁴⁷⁵

Consequently, the presence of the telecommunications in broadcasting has saddled the CRTC with the responsibility of regulating an industry dominated by the interests of a few corporations. Thus, as each technological innovation emerges, a small number of large, profit-seeking corporations will seek market advantages as they expand into new forms of content delivery. Arguably, for its part, the CRTC has increasingly come to identify Canada's public interest with the business interests of a few major players.⁴⁷⁶ When the popularization of cable television began in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, Canadian broadcasters raised concerns that they were losing audience members to American cable. In response, the CRTC began instituting a variety of protective regulations, including buy-through regulations, which require subscriptions to American channels to be bundled with Canadian channels.⁴⁷⁷ Meanwhile, a new trend in governance was making its way into broadcast policy, and would increasingly become the major framework for evaluating policy effectiveness and defining the public interest. This was neoliberalism.

⁴⁷⁵ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 181.

⁴⁷⁶ Taylor, "Shut-Off," 13.

⁴⁷⁷ Armstrong, *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed., 52.

Like other isms, neoliberalism is an ideology—a philosophical perspective with prescriptive consequences for politics, economics, governance, and research. Neoliberalism considers the free market to be a neutral distributor of value and the best way of ensuring that those who put the most into the economic system will also be those who reap the greatest rewards. Neoliberalism sees government intervention as inherently problematic because it disturbs the market which is operating in an otherwise natural and necessary way.⁴⁷⁸

While proponents of neoliberalism consider the laissez-faire liberalism of the enlightenment thinkers to be part of their intellectual heritage, neoliberalism is actually significantly different. Laissez-faire liberalism does value the market, but as an early form of liberalism, it assumed separation between the various spheres of life—the public, the private, and the market. Each sphere of life operates under its own goals, values, and mechanisms. Thus, even laissez-faire liberalism accepted that the state exists and acts for necessarily different reasons that are not well represented or understood as elements of the market. In contrast, neoliberalism differs in that it extends market logic into every sphere of life.⁴⁷⁹ It therefore forces all human activity to be understood and encountered analogously through the market. This way of thinking has been central to neoliberal governing projects beginning in the 1980s with Thatcherism, Reaganomics, and eventually in the liberalization of emerging economies and financial markets around the world in the 1990s.⁴⁸⁰

The economic consequences of adopting neoliberalism in finance and trade have been far reaching.⁴⁸¹ However, some of the most striking outcomes of neoliberalization have been in

⁴⁷⁸ Janine M. Brodie, “Reforming Social Justice in Neoliberal Times,” *Studies in Social Justice* 1, no. 2 (2007): 5.

⁴⁷⁹ Janine Brodie, “Elusive Equalities and the Great Recession: Restoration, Retrenchment and Redistribution,” *International Journal of Law in Context* 10, no. 4 (December 2014): 435, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552314000202>.

⁴⁸⁰ Brodie, “Elusive Equalities and the Great Recession,” 431.

⁴⁸¹ For a more thorough discussion of these issues, see Brodie, “Elusive Equalities and the Great Recession.”

realms of social policy such as healthcare and education. These areas of policy had previously been organized around entirely different goals, and yet program administrators, frontline staff, and policy makers must now consider whether any action or commitment is compatible with a market-oriented outlook. In neoliberal parlance, education, for instance, is ultimately a commodity. Having many choices at varying price points is the best reflection of consumer preference; education is not a right, nor an institution that fosters social unity, nor a necessity of a democratic society, and certainly not a social responsibility.

It is rare for doctrines and trends to be adopted in an even and wholesale manner, and important elements of nation building remain in Canadian broadcasting policy. However, there is also significant evidence that neoliberalism is present and exerting influence in Canadian broadcasting policy—even on those elements that still reflect nation building as a priority. To begin, the CRTC issued its own directive which declared its intention to work increasingly with market forces rather than with regulatory controls.⁴⁸² Further, a comparative analysis of the process of switching from analog to digital TV in the US and Canada demonstrates that the adoption of a neoliberal outlook contributes to market intervention for the sake of a few large corporations. In Canada, the process of moving from analog to digital television was primarily driven, managed, and suited to corporate interests. Industry and corporate representatives largely comprised the committees charged with planning and managing the transition.⁴⁸³ The

⁴⁸² Salter and Odartey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 451; Dunbar and Leblanc, *Review of the Regulatory Framework for Broadcasting Services in Canada*.

⁴⁸³ For a more comprehensive and comparative breakdown of committee members in Canada and the US, please see Taylor, “Shut-Off.”

subsequent report reflected their technical concerns as well as their interest in maintaining a strong market position.⁴⁸⁴

By contrast, the American transition from analog to digital was debated publicly. Interventions on the subject included public statements by high-profile lawmakers as well as pressure from several advocacy groups with significant interests in broadcasting.⁴⁸⁵ In the US, the conversation about the analog to digital conversion included questions about how broadcasters could serve democracy and take on social responsibilities. In Canada, it seemed that public interest was merged with the interest of a few corporations.

Another development that was shaped by the CRTC's neoliberal outlook is the explosion of cable licensing and its impact on conventional television. In this case, it was the CRTC's permissive attitude towards licensing which created a glut of channel offerings available via cable packages. The growth in cable and satellite has created significant competition for conventional television networks, drawing away both viewers and advertising dollars.⁴⁸⁶ Specialty channels, in particular, have the advantage of drawing a niche audience, and with it, advertisers who seek to target their advertising.⁴⁸⁷ Faced with the stiff competition created by proliferating cable channels, conventional networks have been reluctant to invest in the risky, capital intensive process of creating original content. Combined with the global recession,

⁴⁸⁴ Taylor, "Shut-Off," 19; Canada. Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television, *Canadian Television in the Digital Era : The Report of the Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television*, (Ottawa: Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television (Government of Canada), 1997), <http://publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.696377&sl=0>.

⁴⁸⁵ Taylor, "Shut-Off," 14. Law-makers included John McCain and Bob Dole. Advocacy groups included the Benton Foundation, Public Interest, Public Airwaves Coalition, Common Cause, and Freepress.

⁴⁸⁶ Taras, *The Digital Mosaic*, 130.

⁴⁸⁷ Taras, *The Digital Mosaic*, 131.

conventional television networks in Canada have dramatically cut funding to both journalism and drama from 2007 to 2011.⁴⁸⁸

In an effort to create a more inclusive discussion on the future of television in Canada, the CRTC began a multi-phase public consultation process in 2013 called “Let’s Talk TV: A Conversation with Canadians.” Canadians were invited to comment over the phone, through email, in an online forum, using surveys, and in public hearings. The process culminated in a 2015 policy report entitled, *Let’s Talk TV: The way forward—Creating compelling and diverse Canadian programming*. The report outlines the CRTC’s policy on the many issues, reflecting the diversity of items discussed—from super bowl advertising to how corporations trade program content.⁴⁸⁹ Strikingly, statements from the CRTC and members of the public reflected a neoliberal sensibility that the market is the absolute norm to which life should conform. This is evident in several major themes highlighted by the CRTC in the report and in subsequent presentations.

First, the CRTC stressed that it would work to lighten the regulatory burden on companies working in telecommunications. This included creating more classes of companies who would not be expected to hold licenses and amalgamating several license classifications. Further, a number of longstanding market interventions would be removed, including protections for special service channels and buy-through regulations. Moreover, in opening statements, the CRTC said their goals of creating consumer choice and flexibility were possible through technological innovation and market evolution, and so a light regulatory approach would be best.

⁴⁸⁸ Taras, *The Digital Mosaic*, 205.

⁴⁸⁹ “Let’s Talk TV: A Conversation with Canadians,” Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, October 24, 2013, <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/talktv-parlonstele.htm>.

The bottom line is clear: markets are the normative and natural order of human interaction; allowing them to function as freely as possible will result in the best outcomes.

Second, the CRTC has increasingly re-articulated and reimagined the public interest as a matter of consumer rights. When the CRTC issued its invitation to comment, the public was encouraged to respond as consumers—not as citizens, not as members of a society or community, not as parties to a social contract, and not as participants in a deliberative democracy. In a conversation about television, how corporate service providers treat consuming viewers should be an issue, and this approach has created tangible benefits like an ombudsperson service and ending thirty-day cancellation policies.⁴⁹⁰ However, a framework of consumer rights offers a severely limited ontology that neglects the very *raison d'être* of a telecommunications network as well as a TV system.

People purchase phone coverage and TV services not because they want to have a relationship with a corporate entity, but because that corporation facilitates their connection to other human beings. The corporation is simply an intermediary that assists in a much larger, more complex and more essential system of human interaction and relationship, to say nothing of its role in connecting an individual citizen with other citizens and the state. If the conversation about the television system was more concerned with its function in society and in the polis, then a whole other series of questions would be raised. What constitutes equitable representation in TV? How should we judge the quality of our news services? Do the stories and the voices broadcast speak to issues that matter to Canadians?

These questions lead us to the third and fourth major issues that the CRTC highlighted in its policy report—provision of news services and Canadian content regulations, respectively.

⁴⁹⁰ “Let’s Talk TV Decisions at a Glance,” Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, March 12, 2015, <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/television/services/idecisions.htm>.

These issues signal that the nation building aims embedded in the *Broadcasting Act* continue to be a part of broadcasting policy today. Indeed, the *Broadcasting Act* states that, “the Canadian broadcasting system should... [offer] information and analysis concerning Canada and other countries from a Canadian point of view.”⁴⁹¹ In the *Let’s Talk TV* report, the section on news service is the only place where democracy is mentioned: news services help “Canadians [to] participate fully in the democratic, economic, social and cultural life of their country, their regions, their provinces and their neighbourhoods.”⁴⁹² While the CRTC deferred to industry recommendations and standards regarding ethics in journalistic practice, it did make conforming to journalistic codes part of the licensing requirements for broadcasters producing national news services.⁴⁹³

The final major issue that the CRTC highlighted was Canadian content—a policy issue that has been the subject of debate and controversy for years. Here, the CRTC’s actions are a mix of the interventionist nation building from the *Broadcasting Act* as well as neoliberal faith in market mechanisms. With respect to funding, the CRTC made a key change in how it would regulate Canadian content quotas. Rather than tracking the number of hours a broadcaster airs Canadian content, the CRTC moved to tracking the number of dollars expended on airing programs of national interest.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹¹ Broadcasting Act, Section 3(1)(i)(ii).

⁴⁹² CRTC, *Let’s Talk TV: The Way Forward—Creating Compelling and Diverse Canadian Programming*, Broadcasting regulatory policy CRTC 2015-86, sec. 270 (Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), March 12, 2015), <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2015/2015-86.htm#bm5>.

⁴⁹³ CRTC, *Let’s Talk TV*.

⁴⁹⁴ CRTC, *Let’s Talk TV*. The amount of money spent on Canadian programming is measured as the percentage of the previous year’s gross revenue. The percentage differs according to different groups and licenses. For a fuller discussion, see CRTC, *Let’s Talk TV: The Way Forward*, para. 213–25.

At the same time, the CRTC also articulated the success and value of Canadian programming in neoliberal terms. To quote the *Let's Talk TV* report, "a robust Canadian production sector will be better able to offer compelling, high-quality content to Canadians and to global audiences... Investment in high-quality content that is widely available and well-promoted increases viewing and thereby generates revenue."⁴⁹⁵ Thus, Canadian content is successful when it attracts consumers, is able to earn a profit, and competes effectively in the marketplace. Further, the CRTC noted that discoverability, meaning that the media can be found by potential consumers, is key to these efforts. The Commission hosted a conference that brought together content makers with people in marketing and technology to try and find ways to make Canadian content available on more media platforms.⁴⁹⁶ This move indicates that the CRTC sees technological innovation and market compatibility as the way of bringing about a flourishing of Canadian arts and culture in television. Thus, the nation building aims that have so often accompanied Canadian broadcasting policy are still present and written into Canadian law. However, in the many places where policy is translated into both aspirations and practice, there is a neoliberal effort to make interventions and goals as market oriented as possible.

3. Canada's minority media policy: Ethnic broadcasting policy

Canada's ethnic media policy is the third area of policy that has shaped the development of CCLTN production. As is often the case in policy development, Canada's approach to ethnic media evolved out of a mix of shifts in governing ideologies as well as ad-hoc responses to changing societal expectations and economic trends. When considering the former, Canada's ethnic media policy was first created by applying multiculturalism to broadcasting policy and

⁴⁹⁵ CRTC, *Let's Talk TV*.

⁴⁹⁶ CRTC, "Let's Talk TV Decisions at a Glance."

then shaped by the advance of neoliberalism. When considering the latter, Canadian ethnic media policy is a mish-mash of exceptions and initiatives created to accommodate the growing media markets of ethnocultural communities.

3.1 Canadian multiculturalism and ethnic broadcasting policy

Minority media governance—that is governance of Francophone, Indigenous, and ethnic media—in Canada reflects the splintered and complex treatment of ethnocultural diversity pervasive in policy and popular conversation. In a reflection of the three national discussions about diversity in Canada, there are also three forms of ethnocultural minority media in Canada.⁴⁹⁷ First, francophone media is accommodated through national policies on bilingualism which guarantees bilingual service at the federal level. Thus, Canada’s national broadcast service—the Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC)—provides French language service as well. The second form of minority media in Canada is Indigenous media. Plans and funding for a broadcast network with content by and for Indigenous peoples had been promised since the 1980s. After many delays and shortfalls, the Aboriginal Peoples’ Television Network (APTN) was launched in 1992 and now services Indigenous audiences across North America.

The last form of ethnocultural minority media in Canada is often referred to as ethnic broadcasting. The term ethnic media is problematic because it implies a certain otherness that cannot be used to describe French or English language media, but this is the term that has fallen into popular usage in policy, industry, and even scholarly discourse. The CRTC defines ethnic broadcasting as, “programming directed to any culturally or racially distinct group other than one

⁴⁹⁷ It is worth noting that non-ethnocultural minorities have also made demands on the Canadian broadcasting system. Disability, for instance, has become an important topic in broadcasting policy, and the CRTC has required licensees to address accessibility issues with describe TV and closed captioning.

that is Aboriginal Canadian, or from France or the British Isles.”⁴⁹⁸ Ethnic broadcasting is also sometimes referred to as third language media, which refers to the “third force” of non-French, British, or Indigenous persons brought to light by the B and B Commission. Despite these difficulties and complications, as far as the CRTC is concerned, CCLTN is categorically a form of ethnic broadcasting and third language media.

The first time the CRTC addressed ethnic broadcasting systematically was in 1985, when the CRTC issued the public policy document, “Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity.”⁴⁹⁹ At the time, the CRTC was grappling with the growing demand for ethnic programming, new opportunities from emerging technologies, and the continued scarcity of broadcast frequencies. The 1985 policy document concluded several months of public consultation involving various ethnocultural groups from across Canada. There, the CRTC cited the 1971 Trudeau decisions as a guide and impetus for their efforts.⁵⁰⁰ Besides attempting an initial definition of ethnic broadcasting, “Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity” stresses that making the Canadian broadcasting system more ethnoculturally diverse is a matter of being consistent with multicultural policy as well as Canada’s changing demographic make up. To that end, the document also discusses the problem of ethnic representation and stereotyping as well as the importance of making Canada’s broadcasting system more accessible to and representative of the Canadian population.⁵⁰¹

The rest of the text was devoted to explaining how the CRTC would approach licensing and regulating ethnic broadcasting. Throughout the discussion, the Commission also outlined

⁴⁹⁸ Broadcasting Act.

⁴⁹⁹ CRTC, “A Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity,” Public Notice CRTC 1985-139 (Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), July 4, 1985), <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/1985/PB85-139.htm>.

⁵⁰⁰ CRTC, “A Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity.”

⁵⁰¹ CRTC, “A Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity.”

and promoted the different ways in which ethnic broadcasting could be accommodated—as specialty channels, as community channels, and as multilingual networks. Here, the CRTC specified that ethnic television stations are required to devote no less than 60% of their broadcast time to ethnic programming from 6 AM to midnight on a weekly basis.⁵⁰² The CRTC also indicated that they would begin determining the percentage of Canadian content time to be required for multilingual undertakings on a case by case basis.⁵⁰³

In the end, the CRTC’s position on ethnic broadcasting in particular and minority media overall is guided by section 3(1)(d) of the *Broadcasting Act*:

... the Canadian broadcasting system should:

- i. Serve to safeguard, enrich, and strengthen the cultural, political, social, and economic fabric of Canada
- ii. Encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing a wide range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values, and artistic creativity, by displaying Canadian talent in entertainment programming and by offering information and analysis concerning Canada and other countries from a Canadian point of view, and
- iii. Through its programming and employment opportunities arising out of its operations, serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men, women, and children, *including equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society, and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that society...* [emphasis added]⁵⁰⁴

This section has been interpreted to mean that the Canadian broadcasting system needs to reflect the diversity of the Canadian population, and the histories and circumstances of CCLTN producers discussed in the following section demonstrate the success, failures, and complications of these efforts.

⁵⁰² CRTC, “A Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity.”

⁵⁰³ CRTC, “A Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity.”

⁵⁰⁴ Broadcasting Act.

4. CCLTN producers

Finally, the most important tool in ethnic broadcasting policy is in the licensing of each individual broadcast entity. Any corporation that begins broadcasting a channel must first apply for a license from the CRTC. These licenses are the primary means through which the Canadian government pursues policy goals. Each of the CCLTN providers in this study have sought and been granted a license by the CRTC, and they are the most direct way in which the Canadian state intervenes in CCLTN production.

4.1 Global Mandarin News Hour on Shaw Multicultural Channel

Shaw Multicultural Channel (SMC) is a surviving example of the earliest kind of multilingual broadcasting, which is community channels. In 1969, when the CRTC was making its first efforts at regulating cable in Canada, the Commission mandated that cable operators would have to set aside a channel for community access. At the time, cable was important to the dissemination of American media, and community channels were meant to be a way of counterbalancing that development. They were meant to be the entry point into the Canadian broadcasting system for ordinary people.⁵⁰⁵

Well before the CRTC undertook its 1985 efforts to regulate ethnic broadcasting, would-be producers of ethnic programming approached cable companies with the request to use the community channels to disseminate their own content. Cable operators agreed, and it was in this way that Canadian ethnic broadcasting first made its way onto Canadian televisions. Community access channels are no longer required from cable companies as regulations allow companies to

⁵⁰⁵ Salter and Odartey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 80.

pay into a local expression fund instead.⁵⁰⁶ However, many have survived, and SMC is one such channel.

SMC now operates as a multilingual community channel that services at least twenty-two language groups in a month.⁵⁰⁷ Operating under a brokerage arrangement, SMC acquires the majority of its content from independent producers for free in exchange for a venue where producers can show their work. Producers, in turn, secure their own funding—whether they use their own private funds or whether they have sponsors. Sponsorships enable independent producers to credit their financial backers, but commercials are not produced or aired for these sponsors on SMC. SMC is also not permitted to sell advertising time, but it may air commercials for its own company, Shaw. SMC is only available to Shaw customers, and the financial logic of the channel is that the channel is a bonus that makes Shaw’s television and internet services more attractive to prospective customers.⁵⁰⁸

Mandarin News Hour began in 2011, when Shaw announced the creation of a Mandarin edition of its national news broadcast. It began airing on Chinese New Year in 2012, and at the time of the interviews, the staff was comprised of an anchor, reporter, and three support staff. On June 29, 2016, Shaw announced on its community page that Mandarin News Hour would be wrapping up its last broadcast on June 30, 2016. According to the website the show did not garner significant viewership, and there has been no further news about efforts to revive the program since.⁵⁰⁹ While Mandarin News Hour was relatively short-lived, its staff consisted of

⁵⁰⁶ Salter and Odattey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 284.

⁵⁰⁷ “Corus Entertainment.”

⁵⁰⁸ Salter and Odattey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 81; Wong (former program coordinator for Shaw Multicultural Channel and sales manager for Stormtec).

⁵⁰⁹ “Global National Mandarin Wrapping Up Production.” Shaw Support. 13 July 2016. <http://community.shaw.ca>.

seasoned professionals who provided interview material, and it is an example of one of the earliest formats of ethnic broadcasting in Canada.

4.2 Fairchild Television: Category A specialty channel

The second CCLTN producer differs significantly from the third in several important ways. OMNI experienced major upheavals and developments prior to and throughout the data collection. By contrast, Fairchild Television has been the portrait of stability and longevity, having celebrated its 20th anniversary in May of 2013, when the interviews began, and seems to have continued without major changes since. The licenses for these two producers have differed significantly as well, and it is these differences that have been critical to very different histories.

The license that Fairchild now holds has been through a tumultuous history, at times involving intense competition between companies and a lawsuit against the CRTC.⁵¹⁰ The license was first issued in 1982 to Worldvision. Worldvision was a multilingual broadcaster seeking to serve third language communities in British Columbia via pay television. Pay television is considered an add-on to free-to-air service that usually offers movies and special events programming to paying subscribers.⁵¹¹ In the early 1980s, multilingual broadcasters were seeking ways to enter the market, and pay television was one such avenue.⁵¹² However, attempting to meet the many different demands of the many different ethnocultural communities eventually proved untenable for Worldvision and difficult for its successor Cathay TV.⁵¹³

⁵¹⁰ For a more complete history, see Salter and Odarthey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 408.

⁵¹¹ Salter and Odarthey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 69.

⁵¹² Salter and Odarthey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 376.

⁵¹³ Salter and Odarthey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 371.

In the end, the formula that seemed to achieve the most success was to license the multilingual broadcaster as a specialty channel primarily serving the Chinese population in BC and providing limited Vietnamese and South Asian content.⁵¹⁴ A specialty TV service is also an add-on to free-to-air television, but it is typically aimed at a given audience—examples include religious channels, children’s channels, and in this case a channel largely for Chinese speakers.⁵¹⁵ Using this format, Fairchild Television has been able to successfully operate for the last twenty-five years.

Presently, Fairchild Television’s license allows it to continue focusing on serving Chinese communities in Canada. Although Talentvision and Fairchild are separate channels with different newscasts, both newscasts are produced through an integrated newsroom and news team. There are different editors for the Cantonese and Mandarin newscasts as well as different anchors, but they share the same production facilities and news director and cover stories that are typically shared by both newscasts. The main news station is based in Metro Vancouver where the Fairchild Group is headquartered with only a smaller regional station in the Greater Toronto Area.

Although OMNI’s start as CFMTV was not without its problems, they were able to sustain modest profits for some time; and the CRTC’s continued expectation has been that a multilingual television network based in Toronto should be able to service twenty ethnocultural groups in a given month. However, the ability to specialize has been clearly beneficial to Fairchild Television, and that is not the only advantage embedded in its license. Fairchild Television and Talentvision are also licensed as Category A specialty channels. Television service providers are required to carry Category A specialty channels so that they are available to

⁵¹⁴ Salter and Odarthey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 372.

⁵¹⁵ Salter and Odarthey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 70.

all subscribers, even though they are not required on the basic package. These broadcasters with Category A specialty channels are distinguished in broadcasting regulation because they help further the goals outlined in section three of the *Broadcasting Act*. That is, they assist in reflecting Canada's multicultural, multiethnic diversity.⁵¹⁶

Another important part of Fairchild Television's license is the attached buy-through policy that has been a significant asset to this CCLTN producer, particularly as more content becomes available directly from China. Buy-through regulations typically require the service provider to make the purchase of one service required for the acquisition of another service. In the case of Fairchild Television, subscribers may purchase the channels now made available by the Great Wall Television Platform, but it must purchase these services as part of a larger package of Chinese-language channels that includes Fairchild Television and Talentvision. In this way, the increased consumption of television products from China will not result in a decline in subscription fees for Fairchild Television.

Let's Talk TV has made consumer choice a priority, and this has led to promises of unbundling. That means that services will become increasingly available for sale on their own. Purchasing a bundle of ten channels when the consumer was only interested in one has been frustrating for consumers and this was a common complaint made to the Commission. It seems that the unbundling will likely apply to Chinese-language packages as well, unless the CRTC makes an exception for Category A specialty channels.

⁵¹⁶ Salter and Odartey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 72.

4.3 OMNI: The multilingual, over-the-air television network

Finally, the history of Canada's third CCLTN producer reflects the struggle to make section 3 of the *Broadcasting Act* effective in the broadcasting system. OMNI TV began as CFMTV—a multilingual television channel based in Toronto. In 1986, just a year after the CRTC issued its regulatory notice regarding ethnic broadcasting, the Commission approved Rogers' purchase of CFMTV on the condition that the ethnic television license remain intact. The ethnic television license required that OMNI broadcast 60% of its programming in a third language—that is a language other than French, English, or an Indigenous language. Primetime hours were reserved for third language programming, and OMNI was required to provide no less than 50% Canadian content overall, 10% less than the standard quota.⁵¹⁷

Another critical aspect of OMNI's license has been that the channel was required to service no fewer than twenty languages in a month.⁵¹⁸ In the 1980s, one of the important considerations for the CRTC was that the broadcasting bandwidth would not be able to support a channel for every ethnocultural group in Canada. Therefore, the CRTC was keen to have ethnic broadcasters serve as many language groups as the CRTC considered feasible.⁵¹⁹ The CRTC wrote this requirement into OMNI's license, and it has significantly shaped the way in which OMNI has developed its business strategy.

OMNI's main office is in Toronto, but it has had, at different times, television stations in Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta.⁵²⁰ In the spring of 2013, when I began the interview process, OMNI had grown into a national syndicate that provided nightly newscasts in Punjabi,

⁵¹⁷ History of Canadian Broadcasting, (website), August 2016, <http://www.broadcasting-history.ca/>.

⁵¹⁸ "CFMT-DT," History of Canadian Broadcasting, Canadian Communications Foundation, accessed June 26, 2018, http://www.broadcasting-history.ca/listing_and_histories/television/cfmt-dt.

⁵¹⁹ CRTC, "A Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada's Linguistic and Cultural Diversity."

⁵²⁰ Rogers Media, "Engage. Excite. Ignite."

Mandarin, and Cantonese—though newscasts in other languages including Italian and Korean have been produced over the years. At the time of the interviews, OMNI was restructuring their newscast division, drawing down regional offices or closing them outright.

In May 2015, after several years of dropping advertising revenue, significant changes to corporate leadership, and more cuts to OMNI newscasts, Rogers announced that all OMNI newscasts would be cancelled. They were replaced with current affairs-oriented talk shows that would discuss varying topics without including original reporting.⁵²¹ Immediately following these cuts, the Urban Alliance on Race Relations as well as UNIFOR local 723M filed a formal complaint with the CRTC, saying that OMNI had breached its conditions of license and requesting that an expedited hearing take place on OMNI's license renewal.⁵²² In 2016, Rogers executives were brought before the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage where members of Parliament asked them about the cancellation of OMNI newscasts. MPs and MLAs have both made public endorsements for their reinstatement.⁵²³

While these efforts did not succeed in reinstating OMNI newscasts, the Rogers license was set to expire at the end of August 2016. The CRTC noted concerns over the quality of third language media and OMNI's many cuts, and so the Commission stated in a decision that they would consider whether this loss of content meant that Rogers was failing its conditions of license.⁵²⁴ Understanding that its license renewal could become precarious, Rogers submitted a

⁵²¹ Simon Houpt, "Rogers Cuts 110 Jobs, Ends All OMNI Newscasts," *The Globe and Mail*, May 15, 2015, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rogers-to-cut-jobs-kill-all-omni-newscasts/article24306838/>.

⁵²² CRTC, "Requests That Rogers Media Inc. Reinstate Local Third-Language Newscasts on Its OMNI Stations," Broadcasting decision CRTC 2016-8 (Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), January 12, 2016), <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2016/2016-8.htm>.

⁵²³ Simon Houpt, "Rogers Resists Government Pressure to Reinstate Ethnic Newscasts," *The Globe and Mail*, June 3, 2015, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/books-and-media/rogers-resists-government-pressure-to-reinstate-ethnic-newscasts/article24768143/>.

⁵²⁴ CRTC, "Requests That Rogers Media Inc. Reinstate Local Third-Language Newscasts on Its OMNI Stations."

plan to the CRTC to restore the OMNI newscasts in Mandarin, Cantonese, Punjabi, and Italian if they are granted a special license that would make their channel a mandatory addition to every basic cable TV package—also known as mandatory distribution. The proposal estimated that such a channel would generate 14 million dollars in revenue, 75% of which would be used to fund and revive OMNI newscasts.⁵²⁵

The CRTC did renew OMNI's license and provided it with mandatory distribution. However, these concessions were granted as a partial renewal that would only last until 2020, not the full seven years that are normally given. The CRTC outlined four reasons for their reservations.⁵²⁶ First, the proposal is financially unsustainable. The CRTC takes a particular interest in the financial well-being of undertakings aimed at bringing diversity to the Canadian broadcast system. The Commission avoids licensing enterprises that are destined for failure because this would make their commitment to service minorities an empty promise. By the CRTC's reckoning, Rogers' plan for OMNI is not financially viable in the long run, and the network will return to this financial quandary in a few years. Second, the application does not meet the full criteria typical for channels with mandatory carriage status. The programming proposed falls significantly short of reflecting Canada's third-language communities, lacks exceptional commitments to original, first-run programming, and fails to provide programming relevant to each region in Canada.⁵²⁷

Owing to Rogers' failure to provide a sufficiently robust proposal, the CRTC has issued a call for applications to run a multilingual television service that provides third-language news

⁵²⁵ James Bradshaw, "Rogers Seeks to Revive Multicultural OMNI Newscasts in CRTC Proposal," *The Globe and Mail*, June 14, 2016, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rogers-media-seeks-to-revive-omni-newscasts-in-crtc-proposal/article30450213/>.

⁵²⁶ CRTC, "Rogers Media Inc. – Licence Renewals for English-Language Television Stations, Services and Network."

⁵²⁷ CRTC, "Rogers Media Inc. – Licence Renewals for English-Language Television Stations, Services and Network."

and information. The successful applicant will be granted mandatory carriage on cable television service, meaning that it must be included in all basic cable packages. However, the CRTC anticipates that any such undertaking may require a few years before the channel is fully functional. At the same time, Canada's ethnocultural communities continue to require news and information services. On that basis, Rogers was granted a limited renewal for its license but should not expect renewal at the end of that period.

In May of 2019, after more than a decade of struggling with its ethnic broadcasting license, Rogers won the bid to continue producing a multilingual nation-wide service. Several other corporate entities had attempted to take over Rogers' ethnic broadcasting license including Bell Media as well as a limited partnership corporation that would have been created between Telelatino Network and Asian Television Network, two of Canada's five legacy ethnic broadcasters. The offer of mandatory carriage on cable distribution had been a successful incentive in drawing the interest of other broadcasters as was the economic potential and size of Canadian immigrant audiences.

As the CRTC explained in its decision, in the end Rogers offered the application that best addresses the objectives laid out in section 3(1)(d) of the *Broadcasting Act*—to “encourage the development of Canadian expression... and reflect the circumstances and aspirations of men, women, an children, including equal rights, linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society, and the special place of aboriginal peoples within the society.”⁵²⁸ Rebranded as OMNI Regional, Rogers promised to use 40% of the network's previous year revenue to support news production. Most importantly, Roger's license stipulates that OMNI

⁵²⁸ CRTC, “Licensing of a National, Multilingual Multi-Ethnic Discretionary Service,” Broadcasting decision CRTC 2019-172 and Broadcasting order CRTC 2019-173 (Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), May 23, 2019), <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2019/2019-172.htm>.

Regional must produce daily news broadcasts, seven days a week, in six different third languages. These newscasts will be 30 minutes long as well as first run, original programming. Furthermore, OMNI would strengthen its commitment to third-language audiences by having advisory councils for each of its four regional feeds, and members of those councils must include people who represent the “specific ethnic and third-language communities residing in each of the provinces served by the feeds.”⁵²⁹

4.4. Licensing ethnic broadcasting amidst industry change

This latest decision regarding OMNI Regional indicates that the CRTC sees that market mechanisms alone cannot deliver ethnic broadcasting, including CCLTN production. Even as the CRTC continues to follow neoliberal logic in its policy discourse and in its decisions, the nation building elements of broadcasting policy do persist. The histories of these three CCLTN producers demonstrate that Canada’s broadcasting regulator is engaged in a constant struggle to adapt government interventions to changing technology and industry trends. As new mediums emerge and converge, the CRTC must decide if and how it will intervene, often balancing the difficulty of regulation and enforcement with the importance of policy goals. The desire to conform to a neoliberal aesthete while confronting regulatory media shock has meant that government support for ethnic broadcasting often flags. As the history of the three CCLTN producers demonstrate, regulatory assistance is crucial to both the survival and flourishing of CCLTN production.

⁵²⁹ CRTC, “Licensing of a National, Multilingual Multi-Ethnic Discretionary Service.”

5. Conclusion

Compared with other forms of news media, CCLTN production is a significant and complex undertaking. It is far more capital-intensive than starting in print media; and most importantly, it enters a sphere of economic activity heavily regulated by the government. The receiving state government's regulatory support has been crucial to the founding of CCLTN production.

Informed by the nationalism of the postwar years and the 1960s and 1970s, the CRTC has worked to foster Canadian media production. Further, a multicultural practice that emphasizes language retention and cultural recognition encouraged third language broadcasting. More than merely granting licenses, the CRTC recognized the lack of minority media in Canada and has sought to define and encourage ethnic broadcasting. However, trends in both multiculturalism and broadcasting policy indicate that the government has often struggled to find the right regulatory measures to help CCLTN survive. In multiculturalism policy, language retention and cultural practice has been sidelined as though they were diametrically opposed to immigrant integration and belonging in Canadian society. In broadcasting policy, a movement towards neoliberalization has made regulators reluctant to intervene.

While the television market ensures that there will always be mass media, there is no guarantee that it will be diverse enough to provide news and information to Chinese communities in Canada in the languages of their choosing. How, then, does the Canadian state govern CCLTN production? The Canadian state has provided important support to CCLTN production. However, developments in multiculturalism policy, broadcasting policy, and ethnic broadcasting policy have led to inconsistent support for CCLTN production. These findings indicate that CCLTN producers are not subject to political influence from the sending state alone. Rather, the receiving state is in an even stronger position to affect minority media production.

CHAPTER 7: CCLTN WORKER RESPONSE TO CANADIAN GOVERNANCE

Introduction

As Chapter six showed, state support and nation building efforts have been critical in supporting CCLTN production. However, changing outlooks in multiculturalism and broadcasting policy have led to diminishing interest in market intervention for CCLTN production. These developments set the stage for this last chapter of my analysis in which I continue to grapple with the question: how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states?

The interviews show that CCLTN workers are aware of and accept the benefits that they receive from the Canadian government. Further, they express resentment when they believe that the government has distributed market advantages unfairly amongst themselves and their competitors. Moreover, CCLTN workers align themselves with multiculturalism-related goals articulated by the Canadian state. In particular, CCLTN workers repeatedly assert their commitment to helping immigrants adapt to life in Canada. This alignment changes, however, in conversations about recognition for Chinese Canadian communities and their contributions to Canadian society. Here, interview subjects are working in a gap between what they see as a legitimate and meaningful exercise in multiculturalism and a contradictory lack of interest and commitment from the Canadian government. These gaps are felt strongly in the racism experienced by CCLTN workers, and racism was a topic that also elicited considerable reflection from CCLTN workers.

Therefore, how do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Canadian state? I argue the interviews suggest that CCLTN workers are navigating the power and influence of the Canadian state by renegotiating subject-state claims. The Canadian state has

reoriented its practice of multiculturalism to emphasize immigrant adaptation while marginalizing the importance of cultural retention and minority recognition. CCLTN workers expressed a strong sense of identification and alignment with the goal of helping immigrants adapt to life in Canada. However, they also asserted the importance of cultural retention and minority recognition, and they described the value of their work in those terms. In this way, they are offering their own sense of what the subject-state relationship between immigrants and the Canadian state should be rather than simply accepting the terms of the Canadian government.

1. CCLTN workers and the CRTC

Although broadcasting policy is essential to forming and shaping the landscape of broadcasting in Canada, especially for minority media, it tends to operate in the background and is not, itself, part of the day to day experience of most CCLTN workers. Regulations and licenses do not fall under the purview of journalists, anchors, and news editors. Interview subjects understandably made fewer and less extensive comments about broadcasting policy, but when they did, they often focused on the CRTC and sometimes pointed me to their superiors. By contrast, when speaking to administrators and executives who managed the business side of CCLTN production, the CRTC was central in the conversation. As tables four and five indicate, over one third of the interview subjects commented on the CRTC, and over a quarter of them talked about the business models of the CCLTN producers. This demonstrates that despite limited exposure to the financial aspect of CCLTN production in their daily work, there were interview subjects among the rank and file who thought about the profitability of their work and held opinions about that matter as well.

Table 4: Number of interview subjects discussing CRTC regulation and business models

Topic of discussion	Number of speakers	Number of times the topic appears
CRTC regulation	8	13
CCLTN business models	6	10

Table 5: Number of administrators and number of journalists discussing CRTC regulation and business models

Topic of discussion	Journalists	Administrators	Total number of speakers
CRTC regulation	5	3	8
CCLTN business models	3	3	6

1.1 The CRTC and supporting ethnic media in Canada

As a way of strengthening Canada's multicultural identity, the CRTC has used its regulatory powers to assist ethnic media producers. Ethnic media is defined by the CRTC as programming "in any language, that is specifically directed to any culturally or racially distinct group other than one that is Aboriginal Canadian or from France or the British Isles."⁵³⁰ The Commission's efforts have been particularly evident in two forms of protective regulation: mandatory carriage

⁵³⁰ CRTC, "Ethnic Broadcasting Policy."

and buy-through requirements. Both measures emerged as a way of offsetting changes to the CRTC's approach to third-language, non-Canadian, general interest TV.

Traditionally, the CRTC has only approved non-Canadian third-language services sparingly. When dealing with the issue of specialty services in 1984, the CRTC had determined that fostering third-language broadcasting with a Canadian point of view was essential to fulfilling portions of the *Broadcasting Act*.⁵³¹ There, it states that the broadcast system must reflect the diversity of the Canadian population and also provide Canadians with programming that “reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values, and artistic creativity.”⁵³² Even though it was acknowledged that foreign, third-language services could enhance broadcast offerings, they were only approved for distribution in Canada when it could be shown that they did not compete fully or even partially with a Canadian service.⁵³³

This was the outlook of the CRTC in the 1980s, when satellite television was still new. As satellite technology enabled the addition of more specialty services, the CRTC received more requests for the addition of foreign, third-language services. In 2004, following many such requests, the CRTC decided to re-evaluate its approach to these services. Many comments had been submitted in and for the public hearing, some of which supported the addition of these foreign, third-language services so that third-language communities may be better served in Canada. Others cautioned against the addition of foreign, third-language services, saying that

⁵³¹ CRTC, “Improving the Diversity of Third-Language Television Services - A Revised Approach to Assessing Requests to Add Non-Canadian Third-Language Television Services to the Lists of Eligible Satellite Services for Distribution on a Digital Basis,” broadcasting public notice CRTC 2004-96 (Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), December 16, 2004), <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2004/pb2004-96.htm>.

⁵³² CRTC, “Improving the Diversity of Third-Language Television Services.”

⁵³³ CRTC, “Improving the Diversity of Third-Language Television Services.”

they created an inoperably competitive TV environment for Canadian third-language services who have the additional burden of producing and broadcasting Canadian content.

In the end, it was decided that the CRTC's new approach would be to generally approve foreign, third-language services. It seemed that the CRTC decided regulating in the face of globalizing media systems and technological change was unfeasible. Here, we can see that decisions made about CCLTN production are made against a broader systemic change, namely media shock. However, the CRTC also recognized that the introduction of new services could become a challenge to the survival of ethnic services in Canada. These Canadian, third-language services comprised an important component of Canadian broadcasting, especially given Canada's commitment to multiculturalism made in 1971. The CRTC took the position that something was needed to support the continued work of five, well-established Canadian, ethnic analog TV services. Telelatino, Asian Television Network, Odyssey Television, and Fairchild Television had each been in operation for ten years or more. Thus, the CRTC stated that:

Given their significant contributions to the Canadian broadcasting system, and in light of the Commission's revised approach to non-Canadian, third-language services, the Commission considers that it would be appropriate that Class 1 BDUs that are currently carrying any of the five analog services be required to continue to do so.⁵³⁴

This requirement effectively became a form of mandatory distribution for these services so that they would not be abandoned by carriers in favour of the foreign services, and so these channels eventually became known as legacy services.

The CRTC also instituted buy-through regulation in the same review process. Buy-through regulation means that consumers can only buy a third-language foreign service if they

⁵³⁴ CRTC, "Improving the Diversity of Third-Language Television Services."

also purchase the Canadian service in the same third-language.⁵³⁵ This requirement works to ensure that Canadian services will not be dropped by consumers in favour of foreign services. At the same time, consumers are not required to purchase the foreign service in order to become subscribed to the Canadian service.

1.2. CCLTN worker response to neoliberal changes and protective regulation

When CCLTN workers were aware of CRTC protective regulations, they were generally accepting and considered them to be key to their current success. This was particularly true for interview subjects who had worked for Fairchild Television, the CCLTN producer with arguably the best CRTC benefits. In the early years of ethnic television, the late 1970s and 1980s, the CRTC was reluctant to grant more than one license in a third language. Individual Canadian third-language media markets were small and unlikely to support more than one service in the same language. As one Fairchild interview subject considered the history and position of their company, he commented, “At that time, for someone to operate a third-language service, it is sort of a monopoly.... It is not a good word, but it is a monopoly.”⁵³⁶

Similarly, another Fairchild-connected interview subject noted the importance of Canadian content regulations and understood them as essential in motivating corporate owners to invest in original content rather than simply streaming foreign services.⁵³⁷ Again, this CCLTN

⁵³⁵ Where a sponsored general interest, non-Canadian, third-language service offers 40% or more of its programming in any of the Cantonese, Mandarin, Italian, Spanish, Greek, or Hindi languages, the Commission will be disposed to authorize its distribution, subject to the requirement that the non-Canadian service only be distributed to customers who also subscribe to the analog service in the same language. CRTC, “Improving the Diversity of Third-Language Television Services.”

⁵³⁶ Chan (president of Fairchild Television).

⁵³⁷ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

worker saw government regulation as important to the development of CCLTN production and a booster for her work.

... for us, the saving grace was the CRTC regulation of Canadian content. It's cast in stone that these TV stations have to have Canadian content; and so if you do not meet the requirements, you can lose your license, and you can be challenged. I think that has actually helped Chinese media, especially in broadcast, to hire a lot of young reporters to maintain the size of the newsrooms. If they don't meet the original Canadian content requirements, then the local newsrooms could become totally translated material and imported material from CCTV, Hong Kong TVB...⁵³⁸

Similarly, a different interview subject felt that CRTC licensing of ethnic media was a form of government support for community endeavours. He noted that the type of license that enabled his work in ethnic media is no longer available and perhaps out of step with the current neoliberal governance at the CRTC.⁵³⁹ These responses indicate that interview subjects understood the CRTC's importance in creating ethnic broadcasting. More importantly, they are aware of some of the economic benefits that the Canadian government provides and are willing to accept them.

Another interview subject, who was more attuned to the changes and initiatives underway at the CRTC, felt that the Commission was likely to engage in greater and greater deregulation.

I would say, it's not a 100% satisfactory. We are dealing with the bureaucrats. Of course, they are not looking at us alone. They are looking at the whole picture. We are only a very small part of the whole machine... we would not get 100% of what we want to take. It's give and take. So, for example, with this Let's Talk TV, they may take away the buy-through... OK we lost something, but will they give us back something? We don't know. They may take away the category A status.⁵⁴⁰

For this person, the neoliberalization at the CRTC was experienced as a game of diminishing trade-offs. He knew about the Let's Talk TV process, a multi-year consultation process that the CRTC had launched to decide on the future of television and telecommunications policy in

⁵³⁸ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

⁵³⁹ Wong (former program coordinator for Shaw Multicultural Channel and sales manager for Stormtec).

⁵⁴⁰ Chan (president of Fairchild Television).

Canada. He was aware that the Commission's emphasis on consumer choice could include unbundling; this would undo the buy-through regulations that had supported CCLTN production for so long.⁵⁴¹ At the same time, he was aware that CRTC regulation was taking place amidst significant and complex changes in media overall. Thus, media shock is part of CCLTN regulation as well.

However, past experience had taught him that in addition to the many changes in the media industry and the overall movement towards deregulation and more market freedom, the CRTC still had its political mandate to uphold. Thus, if the Commission removed a market advantage, such as the buy-through regulation, it may also give another form of regulatory support, such as decreasing the amount of required Canadian content. Further, if the CRTC should fail to provide them with regulatory supports, he knew that the *Broadcasting Act* dictated that the Canadian broadcasting system must reflect the multicultural and multiracial diversity of Canada.⁵⁴² As such, neoliberalization can make the survival of CCLTN producers more difficult, but the multiculturalism and nation building components of the legislation offered a way for CCLTN producers to talk back to the regulators.

1.3 CCLTN workers and discontent with CRTC favouritism

While interview responses from Fairchild were largely pragmatic about CRTC regulation, interview subjects connected to OMNI tended to be more critical of the Commission. Given that OMNI had been struggling quite publicly both before and after 2013 when the majority of the

⁵⁴¹ Chan (president of Fairchild Television).

⁵⁴² Chan (president of Fairchild Television).

interviews were conducted, it is not surprising that their employees were vocal about the CRTC, OMNI's business model, and the attitudes of their corporate owners.

One OMNI-related interview subject addressed the unequal positioning of the various CCLTN producers. He pointed out that OMNI's business model, which included serving twenty-two language groups in a single month, assumed seriously outdated "appointment viewing" habits.⁵⁴³ Appointment viewing requires audiences to note when programs in their language are on and arrange their schedules so that they are seated in front of the TV at the given time. From his point of view, Fairchild TV was given an advantage here. Despite offering conventional linear television, Fairchild channels are mostly in Cantonese or Mandarin. Subscribers can simply flip on the TV and the program playing will almost always be in their desired language, even if the programming is not particularly good or exciting. Although television may just be background noise in such a scenario, it is still easier to engage than appointment viewing.⁵⁴⁴ He explained,

... you only have one channel, serving twenty-two language markets, which means that you need to have a very well planned schedule. People won't tune into the particular time slot to view your program. You need to have at least two to three hours of continuous programming in order to make your viewer stay. So, after Mr. So got the license, he thought that he would make money, but actually he was losing huge money. Because with twenty-two language markets, you need to find programs and pay for them, and then some of the markets are so small, they don't have the advertising potential, but you still need to serve them, because that is the CRTC requirement.⁵⁴⁵

Further, this interview subject pointed out that audience expectations are changing. They are able to watch what they want, and the new technology and delivery services that make this possible are part of the media shock facing the entire media industry. As such, OMNI's appointment viewing assumptions are desperately out of date and untenable.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴³ Mak (former news director with OMNI and director with Happy Life Network Association).

⁵⁴⁴ Mak (former news director with OMNI and director with Happy Life Network Association).

⁵⁴⁵ Mak (former news director with OMNI and director with Happy Life Network Association).

⁵⁴⁶ Mak (former news director with OMNI and director with Happy Life Network Association).

Another OMNI interview subject also weighed in, protesting more pointedly that the CRTC has created an unfair and unusually challenging business environment for OMNI. For instance, where other broadcasters are required to provide 50% Canadian content, OMNI was required to provide 55%. Furthermore, local advertising retail sales are only permitted for Telelatino, Fairchild, and the other legacy services. Most significantly, perhaps, OMNI was understood to be a multilingual broadcaster, and its predecessor, CFMTV, had been licensed to Rogers under those terms. Thus, OMNI has traditionally been expected to service a large number of language groups every month, and the CRTC has capped the amount of programming they can exhibit for some language groups in order to prevent them from becoming direct competition with legacy services. As such, OMNI has been limited in the extent to which they are able to focus on larger, more profitable language groups—such as the Chinese languages.⁵⁴⁷ As one OMNI interview subject asserted, “...if this government really believes that ethnic media is important to the evolution of Canada as a society, then it should give us a level playing field.”⁵⁴⁸

1.4 CCLTN worker thoughts on CRTC commitment to multiculturalism

The CRTC’s perceived lack of commitment to multiculturalism and diversity in Canadian broadcasting also animated several interview responses. Although she recognized that the CRTC has been important to the beginning of many CCLTN producing enterprises, one interview

⁵⁴⁷ Madeline Ziniak (OMNI national vice-president for Rogers Television), in discussion with author, June 11, 2013, Toronto, Ontario.

⁵⁴⁸ Ziniak (OMNI national vice-president for Rogers Television).

subject complained that the Commission seems to have lost focus or become complacent about the state of ethnic media in Canada. In her words:

I think [the] CRTC has kind of been too sleepy... I don't think they actually have people who monitor the Chinese media... Unless somebody reports there's a problem, they don't know because they don't go and monitor... Chinese media is so critical for the multicultural fabric of our country... are they really doing the job, and how well are they doing their job?... I think if we leave these entities alone for too long, it's just human nature, they're bound to lose vision.⁵⁴⁹

This interview subject expresses concern that without better monitoring from the CRTC, the quality and value of CCLTN is at stake. For this and other interview subjects, it was not enough that the CRTC ensured that CCLTN was produced. Rather, it was important to them that the reporting must be robust, professional, and of the highest quality.⁵⁵⁰ They did not only want CCLTN to exist; rather, they also wanted CCLTN to thrive.

Given that broadcasters are continually struggling to find business models that will carry a company from traditional linear television into new digital realities, corporations are increasingly incentivized to divest from all but their most profitable TV endeavours.⁵⁵¹ Several interview subjects noted that in this business environment, it is easy to let the commitment to CCLTN slide in the pursuit of other opportunities.⁵⁵²

They [OMNI corporate leadership] are focusing on something else, not ethnic media. They are focusing on the market. They want to get more money. They're changing the whole direction. In the past, when Ted Rogers was the leader, he had that mentality to keep Rogers more diverse. And now, I think that Rogers Communications are focusing on something more mainstream.⁵⁵³

⁵⁴⁹ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

⁵⁵⁰ Zane (news director and reporter with OMNI); Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition); Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

⁵⁵¹ Zane (news director and reporter with OMNI); Ziniak (OMNI national vice-president for Rogers Television).

⁵⁵² Grant Guo (reporter with OMNI), in discussion with author, June 4, 2013, Toronto, Ontario; Li (host and reporter with OMNI); Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

⁵⁵³ Guo (reporter with OMNI).

Frustration with OMNI's corporate owners was widespread among OMNI-connected interview subjects. There was a strong perception among interview subjects that OMNI's corporate leadership did not value ethnic media and would not commit the resources and attention necessary to making OMNI viable. Just months prior to the interviews, OMNI restructured their media programs and cut back on staffing, and during the interviews OMNI shut down even more programming. The cuts and restructuring experienced by OMNI happened against the backdrop of conventional TV networks struggling everywhere against the emergence of digital platforms. Again, it is clear that CCLTN governance was being influenced by media shock, a collection of changes in technology and industry that has been difficult to respond to, both on the part of media entities as well as regulators.⁵⁵⁴ Interview subjects were aware of these events, and these developments were part of conversations with OMNI-related interviewees as well as with other interviewees.

Thus, the response to CRTC governance was somewhat mixed. Those that benefited the most from CRTC regulation understood the importance of the market advantages and were pragmatic about possible changes in the future. Those who were associated with OMNI tended to be much more critical of CRTC; they were frustrated with how the Commission distributed advantages to their competitors and were also frustrated with a license that committed them to a challenging business model. At the same time, many were not satisfied with a government regulator that simply ensured that CCLTN existed. Rather, they wanted governance that would encourage excellence, professionalism, and corporate commitment to CCLTN. These frustrations culminated in a perception that the Commission was not serious in supporting ethnic

⁵⁵⁴ Taras, *The Digital Mosaic*, 7–8.

media and lacked commitment to multiculturalism and diversity in the Canadian broadcasting system.

2. CCLTN workers and multicultural policy

Multiculturalism policy does not have the same direct impact on CCLTN production that broadcasting policy does. However, conversations with interview subjects as well as the policy language around ethnic broadcasting are shot through with different facets and trends that have been part of the evolution of multiculturalism in Canada. As discussed in Chapter six, multiculturalism has been through many changes in Canada and has been presented in several different iterations.

2.1 Anti-racism and multiculturalism

When multiculturalism first made its way onto the policy agenda in the 1970s, the third force that had mobilized for it was comprised largely of ethnocultural groups of European heritage.⁵⁵⁵ By the 1980s, however, sizeable minority communities from Asia, Africa, and South America had begun to form in Canada, owing to immigration reforms that began in the 1960s.⁵⁵⁶ While multiculturalism had previously been used to enlarge Canadian national identity to include these largely European groups that were not of French, British, or Indigenous extraction, newer minority groups began to use the language of multiculturalism to address their own experiences of exclusion and discrimination. To that end, the state funding that was being distributed for ethnocultural groups helped enable more disadvantaged minorities to embrace multiculturalism

⁵⁵⁵ Canada. Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. et al., *The Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic Groups*, vol. 4, 6 vols., Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa : [Queen's Printer], 1967).

⁵⁵⁶ Statistics Canada, "The Evolution of Language Populations in Canada, by Mother Tongue, from 1901 to 2016."

as a means of inclusion into Canadian life. For many of these groups, this necessarily included the need to address racism in everyday life. While the Pierre Trudeau government had made removing cultural obstacles that might prevent people from being part of Canadian society, it did not include language that embraced anti-racism specifically. Thus, it was minority groups who, with the help of federal funding, began to connect anti-racism with multiculturalism because this was part of their experience of life in Canada.

However, the federal funding for these groups began to disappear in the 1990s, owing to the trend of engaging in neoliberal governance. These cuts to spending had an important impact on groups who were engaged in anti-racism work. In this way, the discursive and policy ground that could be addressed by multiculturalism began to shrink and move away from recognition-oriented practices in particular. The greatest narrowing and marginalization of multicultural practice came with the Harper government, whose policies on citizenship, immigration, and heritage emphasized a connection to Great Britain and the military. However, the new Trudeau government has re-invested in anti-racism and again sees it as part of Canadian multiculturalism. In 2018, the federal budget included 23 million dollars to be spent over the course of two years for multiculturalism programming, which did include anti-racism efforts.⁵⁵⁷

2.2 CCLTN worker response to calls for immigrant adaptation in Canadian multiculturalism

As table three shows, almost all of the CCLTN workers who reflected on the purpose of CCLTN also talked about how CCLTN can assist in immigrant adaptation.

⁵⁵⁷ Stephanie Levitz, "Liberals' Budget Includes \$23M for Multiculturalism, Anti-Racism Strategy," CTV News, February 28, 2018, <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/liberals-budget-includes-23m-for-multiculturalism-anti-racism-strategy-1.3823101>.

Table 6. Number of interview subjects discussing value of CCLTN to immigrant adaptation

	Commented on the purpose of CCLTN	Commented on the purpose of CCLTN and its ability to assist in immigrant adaption
Number of interview subjects	12	11

Interview subjects demonstrated a clear awareness that mainstream Canadian society expects adaptation from Canadian immigrants, and they emphasized the potential of CCLTN to contribute to immigrant settlement and adaptation.

They [Chinese Canadians] need to know what is going on [here]. It may be as simple of a thing like health and food security. If there's a food recall, then you want your viewer to know that, hey you should not be buying this brand of strawberries because it's got salmonella... They are doing this service for their audience who are Chinese Canadians, not just Chinese Chinese.⁵⁵⁸

From the interviews, one of the commonly discussed benefits of CCLTN was that it offers practical knowledge that will help Chinese Canadians settle into their new place of residence. Interview subjects referred to the knowledge that helps immigrants navigate ordinary and daily life in Canada as “live-use” information. Commenting interview subjects emphasized that immigrants are indeed tied to Canada and that they are committed and connected by necessity. Many interview subjects felt that learning more about life in Canada and their surroundings is a matter of primary importance. Moreover, interview subjects who addressed

⁵⁵⁸ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

immigrant adaptation were convinced that Chinese Canadians will find that their lives in Canada are safer and fuller when they are better informed.⁵⁵⁹

Similarly, many interview subjects stressed the importance of locality, saying that the information they offered is tailored to the lives of their viewers. In this context, locality often referred to Canada, but it could also mean municipal or provincial locality. Further, locality carried a normative sensibility. In CRTC regulation, keeping media local is a kind of virtue, not only as a response to backlash against media concentration, but also because it reflects what is real, immediate, and Canadian.⁵⁶⁰ These sensibilities have not been lost on interview subjects commenting on the locality of CCLTN; for these interviewees, the “local” is now practical, relevant, and distinctive from the morass of homogenous global media.

Furthermore, several interview subjects asserted that local news reporting made CCLTN newscasts stand out as a distinctive media product compared with news media from China. These interview subjects pointed out that news outlets in China are not focusing on life in Canada. While Chinese immigrants can find news about China from a variety of sources, for news about Canada delivered in Mandarin or Cantonese, they would need access to CCLTN. As stressed by one interviewee:

We need to make our news fit the needs of local people [Chinese in Canada]... Local news contains local stories with local living. For example, the PRC government’s news and programs won’t teach you how to apply for child benefits in Canada or how to look for better school information in Vancouver etc.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵⁹ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

⁵⁶⁰ Salter and Odartey-Wellington, *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*, 325; CRTC, “A Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity.”

⁵⁶¹ Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited).

In this way, CCLTN has a comparative advantage and offers something unique. For several interview subjects, this meant that there is space for CCLTN in Canadian, Chinese-language media markets, despite the increasing availability of foreign Chinese media.⁵⁶²

Another important element of immigrant adaptation is democratic participation. Many CCLTN workers expressed a sense that it was their duty to help immigrants with the finer points of exercising their citizenship. By reporting on interactions between citizens and government, news media can provide repeated examples of how civic engagement is done in Canada. At times, interview subjects felt that news reporting is important because it makes Chinese Canadian immigrants aware that they have rights, and also, at times, democratic and civic obligations as well. As one interviewee explained,

Before, people probably don't care... They don't want to vote. But now because the [Canadian] Chinese media is here to help them understand the election, the city, the province, then maybe people will want to vote. They will want to be involved. I think that's what [Canadian] Chinese media is doing. It connects the audience with the society where we are living.⁵⁶³

Sometimes interview subjects felt that getting Chinese immigrants engaged was a matter of helping them to understand that they can “make some noise” in order to get what they want.⁵⁶⁴

When interview subjects described the ways in which they selected stories from Chinese media, several CCLTN workers said that they avoided stories that struck them as being political. This might include stories about specific officials or even messaging about different members of the CCP. Two interview subjects expressed their concern that being “political” in the context of the PRC often meant being caught up in some kind of opaque power struggle between different individuals or factions in the party-state. Hence, media and PRC government officials were said

⁵⁶² Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition); Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited).

⁵⁶³ Hu (news director with OMNI).

⁵⁶⁴ Li, “A Critical Examination of Chinese Language Media’s Normative Goals and News Decisions,” 106.

to be engaged in attempts to forward narrow, factional agendas, which was seen negatively.⁵⁶⁵ Notably, none of the CCLTN workers interviewed made negative remarks about being involved in politics in Canada. Being an engaged citizen who is interested in politics was, by contrast, often seen positively.⁵⁶⁶

More often, however, providing the news in Chinese was understood to be a basic necessity as well as a democratic right.⁵⁶⁷ Several interview subjects voiced concerns that for many Chinese immigrants, following the news in English was beyond the English-language training that they received in school from textbooks.⁵⁶⁸

I know how Chinese people learn English. It's more like a textbook. It's not colloquial, so that's how they always have difficulty, especially understanding what people say, right? So for them, the main source of information that they get when they come here is Chinese newspapers, Chinese television.⁵⁶⁹

Even after living in Canada for some time, an immigrant who is able to function in colloquial English may find the formal way of speaking as well as the speed and density of technical or more specialized vocabulary in newscasts to be challenging. A headline such as, "Senate recalls bill over fiscal differences" may be lost on a restaurant worker or challenging for an electrical engineer. Research on Chinese-language media in North America has shown that outlets based in North America providing Chinese-language news can help otherwise isolated immigrants become well-informed about their new surroundings.⁵⁷⁰

A number of interview subjects also noted ways that CCLTN can function as a bridge to connect Chinese Canadians to mainstream society. Providing news and information about life in

⁵⁶⁵ Ye (news director for Fairchild Television); Qi (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition).

⁵⁶⁶ Hu (news director with OMNI); Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation); Ziniak (OMNI national vice-president for Rogers Television).

⁵⁶⁷ Ziniak (OMNI national vice-president for Rogers Television).

⁵⁶⁸ Cheng (anchor for Talentvision).

⁵⁶⁹ Cheng (anchor for Talentvision).

⁵⁷⁰ Zhou, Chen, and Cai, "Chinese-Language Media and Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada."

Canada gives them something in common with non-Chinese neighbours and facilitates a sense of belonging.⁵⁷¹ For many of the interview subjects, the experience of migration was often a very real and personal experience. Although I did interview CCLTN workers who were neither first generation immigrants nor of Chinese heritage, the great majority of my respondents were first generation Chinese. Indeed, in her analysis of Chinese media in Canada, Li notes that her interview subjects felt that producing Chinese-language media in Canada was about “serving the community”; moreover, the community was largely defined as first generation Chinese immigrants.⁵⁷² Similarly, for many of my interview subjects, the difficulties of settlement and desire for homeland connection were more than abstract market research themes. They saw the service they provided in personal and affective terms. As one interview subject typified:

We want to give them something like what the mainstream media gives its audience... Maybe not information that they need to know but [something that will] make them feel that they know the place. Sometimes, it makes you feel that you are isolated if you don't have the language ability and you don't know what's happening outside. But once you have a channel to see and you know what's happening every day... Then you feel, oh, I belong here.⁵⁷³

2.3 CCLTN workers on recognition, voice, and contributions to Canadian multiculturalism

Many CCLTN workers also addressed the importance of articulating and reflecting emergent Chinese Canadian identities and concerns as part of their work. While no one offered a definitive or comprehensive description of the Chinese Canadian perspective, it was clear that they believed that Chinese Canadians have their own stories and concerns. Moreover, it was

⁵⁷¹ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

⁵⁷² Li, “A Critical Examination of Chinese Language Media’s Normative Goals and News Decisions.”

⁵⁷³ Hu (news director with OMNI).

important to them that these different points of view were explored and articulated in a public manner. On interview subjected said,

...the reflection of Canadian voices, the exploration of what it means to be Chinese in Canada, and to understand how communities adapt and change, how they elect officials to public office, how they challenge themselves to raise money for charitable things, and how they organize for business organizations—we always felt that our role was to reflect those things...⁵⁷⁴

Interview subjects commenting on Chinese Canadian identity typically felt that it was important to give Chinese communities a voice because their points of view are not reflected by mainstream Canadian media or foreign Chinese media. Rather, they asserted that Chinese living in Canada would have their own take on Canadian current events. As one CCLTN worker commented, issues such as immigration, discrimination, Sino-Canadian relations, and economics are top priorities and necessarily receive more attention on CCLTN than on Canadian mainstream media outlets.⁵⁷⁵

Another CCLTN worker explained that minority communities do not always receive the kind of press attention that they would like from Canadian mainstream media. She talked about how news stories about Chinese communities were often considered too “ethnic” or narrowly focused to make it onto the nightly lineup of a mainstream news program. For that reason, Chinese communities in Canada were said to need their own media to discuss events and issues that matter to them. “I see a definitive need for editorial expression as well. It’s not only that we’re getting news in this language, but it’s also that you’re profiling success stories in your community. You’re really drilling down in stories that traditional [mainstream] media can’t cover...”⁵⁷⁶ These comments are consistent with other observations about ethnic media in

⁵⁷⁴ Zane (news director and reporter with OMNI).

⁵⁷⁵ Cheng (anchor for Talentvision).

⁵⁷⁶ Ziniak (OMNI national vice-president for Rogers Television).

Canada. Ethnic media not only differs from mainstream media in its language of broadcast or publication, but ethnic media also differs in terms of its content. They tell different stories and offer alternative points of view.⁵⁷⁷

Moreover, just as CCLTN covers Canadian news from a different point of view, so too does CCLTN cover current events from mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong from a Chinese Canadian perspective. In these instances, interview subjects were not typically addressing censorship or talking about the way in which CCLTN can cover stories banned in China. Instead, interview subjects stressed that Chinese living in Canada would necessarily have a different point of view than Chinese living in mainland China. They would be interested in different stories and maybe have different concerns. One interview subject noted,

...they [the PRC government] want to see many programs being produced in mainland China to spread all over the world's Chinese communities... But we, the overseas Chinese community, have our own needs, and the media here has to consider these needs and fulfill them... people here are not all PRC citizens. Many are citizens of Canada; they might come from HK, Taiwan or mainland China. They are "Chinese Canadians." Therefore, these people will have different preferences.⁵⁷⁸

Several interview subjects spoke on this matter at length, saying that Chinese in Canada may have or need to find different ways of approaching the same events. For one interview subject, covering sensitive issues from a "Canadian" perspective was akin to being more open about other perspectives. It was said that a Canadian perspective loosens the viewer from a hardline homeland perspective because in Canada, Chinese people come from a variety of places.⁵⁷⁹ Therefore, taking on a Chinese Canadian identity creates an obligation to see a different point of view.

⁵⁷⁷ Sherry Yu, Interview with Sherry Yu, May 16, 2013; Murray, Yu, and Ahadi, "Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC."

⁵⁷⁸ Ho (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited).

⁵⁷⁹ Zane (news director and reporter with OMNI).

Finally, the interviews revealed that CCLTN workers feel that something interesting and important is happening in Canada in the forging of Chinese Canadian identities. To them, the hyphenation of identities and blending of cultural practices are real and substantial contributions to Canadian multiculturalism. As one interview subject stated, "...you can actually add your own new way of doing things... your addition will add more flavour to what Canada is about, and that is how multiculturalism is built."⁵⁸⁰

Ethnocultural minorities help enrich diversity in Canada by practicing their distinct cultural and linguistic traditions; and as these communities settle, they make their mark on the country.⁵⁸¹ By covering stories about Chinese communities in Canada, CCLTN bears witness to this process.⁵⁸² Moreover, CCLTN production is a form of linguistic maintenance and cultural adaptation, and this too is a contribution to Canadian multiculturalism. Similarly, long term study projects on minority media in Los Angeles show that minority media plays a key role in connecting members of minority communities and making them more efficient in their collective problem solving.⁵⁸³ At the same time, a multi-country study on minority media asserts that consuming minority media assists in increasing civic engagement for minorities.⁵⁸⁴ Finally, numerous studies on ethnic media and immigrant settlement recommend that governments make greater use of ethnic media and reach out to immigrant communities through them.⁵⁸⁵ All of these findings suggest that ethnic media can play a critical role in helping Canada's ethnocultural

⁵⁸⁰ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

⁵⁸¹ Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

⁵⁸² Li, "A Critical Examination of Chinese Language Media's Normative Goals and News Decisions."

⁵⁸³ "Civic Engagement," Metamorphosis Project, Annenberg School for Communication.

⁵⁸⁴ Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media*, 209.

⁵⁸⁵ Luisa Veronis and Rukhsana Ahmed, "The Role of Multicultural Media in Connecting Municipal Governments with Ethnocultural Communities: The Case of Ottawa," *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 73–95; April Lindgren, "Municipal Communication Strategies and Ethnic Media: A Settlement Service in Disguise," *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 49–71.

minorities to redefine what it means to be Canadian in a manner that is consistent with Canada's value commitments.

2.4 CCLTN workers on recognition and racism

Interview subjects also reflected on their experiences of racism, particularly with respect to what they encounter in their professional capacities as CCLTN workers. In many ways, the racism experienced by the interview subjects show that an approach to multiculturalism that stresses immigrant adaptation to the exclusion of recognizing minority achievement and maintaining distinct cultural practices is indeed incomplete. Recognition of minority contributions is a crucial part of embracing diversity and making multiculturalism an organically affective element of national identity. Recognition creates space for both adaptation and diversity. For many of the interview subjects who discussed racism, a lack of recognition was key to their experience.

In one instance, an interview subject suggested that the lack of recognition of Chinese immigrant contributions has made Chinese minorities vulnerable to racial backlash from mainstream society. Referencing an article by an English language newspaper columnist, she talked about the complaint that many Hong Kong immigrants have actually returned to Hong Kong and reside there. The concern was that in the event of political upheaval overseas, the lower mainland of BC would be flooded with repatriating immigrants as well as their relatives.⁵⁸⁶ The interview subject felt that such an accusation would only be possible if Canadian society

⁵⁸⁶ Douglas Todd, "Many Hong Kong Immigrants Return Home" Vancouver Sun, May 18, 2013, <http://www.vancouversun.com/business/2035/Douglas+Todd+Many+Hong+Kong+immigrants+return+home/8402665/story.html>.

refuses to recognize how Chinese Canadians have helped settle and build BC's lower mainland, noting:

We built neighbourhoods here... There was no Richmond when we came—so Richmond was built, Coquitlam was built... a lot of neighbourhoods were built by Hong Kong money... also don't forget the charity money for the Children's Hospital in BC. They actually they have a separate Hong Kong Chinese donation drive evening... The mainstream community just doesn't recognize these contributions, where all this money is coming from... So those are all the contributions and footprints the Hong Kong [immigrants] and now the [mainland] Chinese immigrants have made. I think this needs to be recognized, including the Chinese media...⁵⁸⁷

From her point of view, Chinese immigrants or returnees were considered burdens because mainstream Canadian society is missing the contribution side of the equation.

Historically, Chinese people have made many contributions to Canada. In the late nineteenth century, they were critical in the building of Canada's railways—a serious nation building project. Into the early twentieth century, they provided cheap, exploitable labour for Canada's burgeoning resource industries, particularly in the area of mining.⁵⁸⁸ If mainstream Canada counted all the contributions and efforts made by the Chinese in Canada over the years, they would find that the Chinese community had done a great deal for the development of the lower mainland and for Canada more broadly. Chinese Canadians should, in turn, be cared for as citizens, not as foreign aliens.

In a similarly pointed conversation, another interview subject complained that there is still a race problem in Canada. Moreover, he felt that it was present in governing decisions as well. He referenced the controversy over the design and printing of new paper money bills, in which the likeness of an Asian scientist had been rejected. In his words,

⁵⁸⁷ Hwo (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation).

⁵⁸⁸ Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 59.

...[A] recent example is the printing of money—the new money with an Asian scientist. The problem was not the process of consultation. The problem was the Bank of Canada accepted a racist opinion that Asian females are not representative enough of Canadians for the Canadian dollar.⁵⁸⁹

He continued on and asserted that when an Asian person is rejected because she does not look Canadian enough, this affects all Asians, including those who have been born and raised here. For this interview subject, rejecting the image of an Asian person on the new bill was a form of racism that the Canadian government should reject.

Both of these encounters with racism are consistent with the ways in which Chinese people have historically been racialized and discriminated against in Canada. The policy of banning Chinese immigration was justified by the belief that Chinese are immune to adaptation and assimilation in Canadian life. They were considered to simply be too different. Fears of being overwhelmed by Chinese immigrants echo throughout the history of racism against Chinese in Canada. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, riots would break out in BC where crowds would vandalize Chinese living areas in protest against the use of Chinese labourers.⁵⁹⁰

Significantly, these racialized anxieties about the overwhelming alien interlopers were not only part of institutionalized racism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Rather, they have continued to come back at moments of racial tension. In an infamous 1979 *W5* documentary, journalists depicted Chinese students as a threatening human flood, overwhelming Canadian universities and medical schools.⁵⁹¹ Similarly, the monster house debates that have been recurrent in Vancouver since the 1990s are ostensibly about maintaining the character of

⁵⁸⁹ Yu (guest on Fairchild Television and freelance journalist).

⁵⁹⁰ Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 34.

⁵⁹¹ Tom Hawthorn, "Thirty Years Ago One Documentary Awoke a Silent Community," *Globe and Mail*, September 22, 2009, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/thirty-years-ago-one-documentary-awoke-a-silent-community/article790434/>.

established neighbourhoods, but in actuality are underwritten with racial tensions. What has been defined as poor taste, alien, and unneighbourly has also been about frustrations with increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants settling in historically white neighbourhoods.⁵⁹² In this way, the racism that interview subjects brought up are more recent examples of racial tension, but they are linked to a long history of fear and exclusion.⁵⁹³

I did encounter another response to racism and racial backlash. Before I went to do my fieldwork, there had been some signs posted in the city of Richmond that were in Chinese alone, against which were many complaints. One of the interview subjects weighed in on the controversy saying that he also disliked having the signs in Chinese only, even though he was able to read them and knew that in Richmond, visible minorities are actually the majority. However, he felt that it was important to pay respect to those who arrived earlier. He also felt that racism could be dealt with successfully through democracy and multiculturalism so that even though Canada was becoming increasingly diverse, he felt that Canadians should not worry. “If you have democracy with the institutions and practices together... nothing will change too much—just maybe some cultural things... in Canada we have multiculturalism. It is a very good format... in twenty years, I believe Canada will still be Canada, don’t worry.”⁵⁹⁴ Here, the interview subject seems to believe that racism can be avoided if everyone simply decides to keep calm and carry on.

These incidents of racism were encountered by CCLTN workers who were keeping abreast of events because this is part of their profession. There were other complaints as well,

⁵⁹² Gary Mason, “In West Vancouver, ‘Monster House’ Debate a Vicious Circle,” *Globe and Mail*, February 27, 2015, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/in-west-vancouver-monster-house-debate-a-vicious-circle/article23236546/>.

⁵⁹³ Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 150.

⁵⁹⁴ Ye (news director for Fairchild Television).

some stemming from what interview subjects felt was an expression of disregard for CCLTN production and thus for themselves as workers as well. In one instance, after a change in ownership, the management of one CCLTN producer and its unionized employees had attempted to label everyone working on ethnic media as “language workers” who would be paid at a different and lower scale than those working in English or French.⁵⁹⁵ This sort of professional marginalization was very frustrating for CCLTN workers, and many of them complained about a similar sense of being unheard and undervalued by corporate owners that were more interested in mainstream media projects.⁵⁹⁶

Thus, CCLTN worker reaction to the influence of multiculturalism has been one of both alignment and missed connection. On the one hand, they have fully embraced their roles as guides and assistants in the immigrant adaptation process. For those that experienced immigration first hand, they understand the imperative to embrace life in Canada on a personal level. They are happy to align themselves with the Canadian state’s articulated goals of immigrant integration and are eager to assert their usefulness in this endeavour. On the other hand, they also embrace the task of recognition and see their work of publicly documenting Chinese Canadian contributions as a legitimate exercise in multiculturalism; but instead of finding acceptance and support, they have too often found indifference and marginalization. Here, interview subjects have expressed a sense of being let down by their corporate owners, the Canadian government, and mainstream Canadian society.

⁵⁹⁵ Caitlyn Kent (television editor for Global News Mandarin Hour), in discussion with author, (May 31, 2013), Burnaby, British Columbia.

⁵⁹⁶ Ziniak (OMNI national vice-president for Rogers Television); Hu (news director with OMNI); Guo (reporter with OMNI).

3. Conclusion: CCLTN workers and the contested meaning of multiculturalism

How do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Canadian state? CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Canadian state by renegotiating subject-state claims made by the Canadian state. While CCLTN workers have sought to align themselves with receiving state goals by embracing multiculturalism, they have experienced a gap between the state's practice of multiculturalism and their own. For CCLTN workers, immigrant adaptation, cultural retention, and minority recognition do not conflict with each other, and so they describe the value of their work in those terms. Moreover, it seems that each element of multiculturalism reinforces the other. As immigrants practice cultural and linguistic retention, they are contributing to the diversity of multicultural Canada. When these practices are recognized as contributions along with other accomplishments, mainstream society will become more aware and more accepting of diversity. When mainstream society is welcoming and accepting, this will assist immigrants as they continue to adapt and integrate. Far from being contradictions, cultural retention, recognition, and adaptation are all necessary parts of a virtuous cycle of immigrant and receiving state integration.

However, the Canadian government has, for some time, treated recognition and cultural retention as a sort of opposite to immigrant adaptation. In this vision of multiculturalism there is a dial with settlement on one side and foreign connection on the other, and it is in Canada's best interest to push the dial farther towards settlement.⁵⁹⁷ The 1996 Brighton Report as well as post-election polling in 2016 showed that Canadians feel that immigrants need to work harder at becoming more Canadian. This is what multiculturalism is about for many Canadians.

⁵⁹⁷ Basch, Schiller, and Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound*.

Recognition and cultural maintenance seems to be too much of a threat to a nascent or emergent sense of self. There is, essentially, a difference over the meaning of multiculturalism

In the interviews, the subjects underscored that their audience is necessarily attached to events and issues in both Canada and in their homelands. Interview subjects very easily imagined their viewers as transnational subjects with lives, families, businesses, and political concerns stretched across the Pacific, from Canada to Hong Kong, to Taiwan, to mainland China. If indeed there is a dial with settlement on one side and foreign connection on the other, then the middle—the equilibrium and ideal homeostasis for new immigrants—would be transnational subject-hood.⁵⁹⁸

In the end, it becomes apparent that the receiving state does play an essential role in determining the success and failure of sending state initiatives. By shaping the environment in which the sending state operates, the receiving state's policies towards minorities and minority media can amplify or limit the sending state's influence. Further, in supporting minorities and promoting a well-rounded multiculturalism, Canada encourages the formation of identities that embrace both settlement and ongoing homeland connection.

By accepting both settlement and ongoing homeland connection, the Canadian state creates a robust sense of belonging in which Canada is essential and promotes itself in Chinese Canadian communities. In contrast, when Canada withdraws support for minority media and allows corporate owners to divest from CCLTN production, the space in which homeland connections are paired with a sense of commitment to the receiving state contracts. This leaves minorities to make sense of transnational connections on their own. In such a situation,

⁵⁹⁸ Basch, Schiller, and Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound*.

minorities are more vulnerable, both to marginalization in the receiving state as well as to the influence of sending states who are proactively seeking relationships with overseas populations.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

CCLTN workers and the Chinese and Canadian states

How do CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states?

I argue that CCLTN workers navigate the power and influence of the Chinese and Canadian states by renegotiating the subject-state claims made by each state. The Chinese state seeks to fold CCLTN production into its system of external propaganda through united front work, but CCLTN workers insist on their independence and seek ways to report critically on China-related issues. The Canadian state has sought to altar multiculturalism practice and discourse by focusing more on immigrant adaptation while sidelining minority recognition and cultural maintenance. However, CCLTN workers continue to describe and value their work as an exercise in practicing and affirming the distinct life and culture of Chinese communities in Canada. Thus, while CCLTN workers speak pragmatically to the market advantages offered by each state, they frame their political alignment with each state differently. In both cases, however, they engage the state selectively and offer up their own sense of a more ideal arrangement—retaining their independence in the case of the sending state and encouraging a different expression of multiculturalism in the case of the receiving state.

Key takeaways for policy makers

CCLTN has the potential to assist in the full spectrum of multiculturalism practice.

CCLTN can assist in immigrant integration, minority recognition, and cultural retention. CCLTN production and consumption involve using Chinese languages, and their stories document the contributions and activities of Chinese communities in Canada, thus providing communities with a sense of recognition. Finally, CCLTN workers are constantly choosing and passing on information and stories that they believe will be useful for new immigrants.

Narrow conceptions of multiculturalism do not sufficiently engender a sense of belonging or citizenship.

CCLTN workers were eager to point out their utility to immigrant adaptation, but they clearly felt that the Canadian state's commitment to recognizing Canada's Chinese communities was weak. Several interview subjects asserted that their work helps to create a Chinese Canadian point of view, and this should be valued in a multicultural society. For CCLTN workers, then, a full and realized expression of citizenship and belonging is not only about immigrants adapting to life in Canada but also about being recognized for their contributions and distinct cultural identity.

CCLTN can flourish with Canadian government support.

The comparative experiences of OMNI and Fairchild TV show that when the CRTC supports CCLTN and provides it with regulatory advantages, it can survive and be stable as Fairchild has done. However, OMNI's multilingual framework has been less successful. Further, as many of the interview subjects pointed out, their corporate owners need to be held accountable, and so regulation should aim at improving both the quality and quantity of CCLTN.

Canada and its Chinese communities are important targets in China's push to grow its foreign influence.

The PRC government is focused on immigrants with significant resources and education because this subset of Chinese migrants is more likely to be able to assist the Chinese state in furthering its foreign influence and assisting in domestic development. Owing to Canada's immigration system which favours educated, highly skilled, and wealthy immigrants, Canada's Chinese community is comprised largely of the type of overseas Chinese that draws Chinese influence. Further, they are in a developed Western country, precisely the type of foreign partner and public in which the Chinese state hopes to extend its influence.

The Chinese state has made itself felt and present in Canada's Chinese communities.

China has ramped up its united front work since Xi came to power in 2012. Its intentions to control overseas conversations and associations regarding many "sensitive" subjects has not been lost on CCLTN workers. China's extensive work in co-opting societal actors and potential opposition domestically has now been taken abroad, and this has raised the stakes of how CCLTN portrays and reports on China-related issues. CCLTN workers clearly demonstrated that China's appeal was not a simple matter of political resonance but more about a demonstration of China's power and importance. The question that policy makers should be asking and investigating is whether the Chinese state's work in Canada's Chinese communities has become a situation in which a foreign actor is constraining the Charter rights of Canadian citizens, including the freedom of expression.

Future research about receiving states

The findings from this research raise a number of questions, both for policy makers and for scholars. My research suggests that receiving states that actively support minority media production will exercise more power over this process and thus mitigate sending state influence. The next step in this line of thinking would be to test the hypothesis by comparing Chinese-language media production in Canada with Chinese-language media production in another state. Australia and the UK both host a sizeable Chinese population. However, neither Australia nor the UK have a history of multiculturalism that is as robust or as important to its sense of identity as does Canada.⁵⁹⁹ A survey of multiculturalism in both countries coupled with research into Chinese-language media in each country should reveal interesting results. Is there a tradition of Chinese-language media based in either of these receiving states? Or is all Chinese media in the UK and Australia broadcast or published by media firms in HK, Taiwan, or mainland China? Does Chinese-language media in Australia and the UK demonstrate commitment to immigrant adaptation? Or is Chinese-language media dominated by homeland-oriented issues?

Similarly, another issue that surfaced in this study is a question about the contested definition of immigrant integration. There is a tendency in Canada and in other countries to see connection with sending states as the opposite of identification with the receiving state. Moreover, cultural retention and minority recognition are often understood as impediments to immigrant adaptation. Here, civic attachment is almost understood as a zero-sum game, in which identification with one state necessarily leads to weakened ties with the other. However,

⁵⁹⁹ "Australia," Multiculturalism Policy Index, accessed October 26, 2018, <https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant-minorities/evidence/australia>; "United Kingdom," Multiculturalism Policy Index, accessed October 26, 2018, <https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant-minorities/evidence/united-kingdom>.

many of the Chinese immigrant CCLTN workers seemed to create their own constellations of attachments, often comprised of different locations in the sending and receiving states. The way in which these and other migrants seem to live a life that is organically comprised of diverse cultural and political points of reference brings into question whether there is something about the nature of attachment and the process of settlement that cannot be captured in a zero-sum game scenario.

Further research into the factors that seem most effective in aiding settlement and the role that ongoing transnational connection plays would likely be illuminating. For example, are there ways in which sending state connections aid in receiving state settlement? If so, to what extent? Many immigrant support groups are organized according to specific ethnocultural communities. In what ways are these groups a product of both sending and receiving state attachment? Are those who were politically active in their sending state more likely to be politically active in their receiving state? Another more state-centric study could compare different citizenship models to see if states that encourage cultural retention and minority recognition result in greater receiving state attachment among their immigrants. Do receiving states who cultivate citizenship open to transnational belonging experience greater connection with their immigrants?

Finally, my research raises questions about how other immigrant communities experience the challenge of gaining access to ethnic broadcasting in Canada. Do Canadian Sikhs, for instance, have a medium in which they are able to discuss and learn about the events of the day both with a focus on Canada in Punjabi? Chinese in Canada have a long history of experiencing discrimination, but they have also been considered a model minority. To that end, CCLTN production should thrive because being Chinese in Canada is supposedly no longer

threatening and Chinese immigrants integrate well. However, the way in which interview subjects experience racism indicates that old stereotypes persist, and CCLTN workers struggle to make their work valued and recognized. If this is the difficulty experienced by Chinese Canadian communities, how have other immigrant groups fared in their efforts to gain access to media in a language of their choosing? Have they been adequately included or accommodated in the Canadian broadcasting system? This question should be particularly important for minorities vulnerable to racialization and discrimination in Canada because minority media has so often been important to minorities experiencing oppression.

Future research about sending states

While more research may be done on receiving states, there is even more that could be accomplished in the realm of sending state comparative literature. China's ascendance in international relations has been an important backdrop to my research. I recommend that further work on sending states should look at the relationship between a country's international relations and its diaspora engagement policies. China occupies a unique place in the international system as a rising power, and many CCLTN workers described China's importance in the world as significant to how they responded to PRC government influence. How does a country's global status affect the way in which migrants respond to their homeland's appeals for ongoing connection, remittances, or advocacy? Moreover, how are the sending states goals or strategies informed by its foreign policy? The PRC government has sought to involve overseas Chinese in its long-term foreign policy goals of gaining greater international prestige and suppressing Tibetan and Taiwanese sovereignty conversations. Do we see similar efforts made by other sending states? Or are such efforts only made by sending states with considerable resources?

Following this line of questions, I would recommend comparing diaspora engagement policies and their efficacy for countries that also have large overseas populations but who are not major global powers. The Philippines may be a good candidate. Likewise, Turkey would be an interesting example of a regional power with significant populations abroad. Further, it would be interesting to look at situations where the sending state is wealthier, more stable, and more developed than the receiving state. For instance, how does the government of the Netherlands reach out to its overseas population in a given developing country?

Similarly, in my research, I looked at a sending state and receiving state pairing in which there is little historical animosity between the two states. However, many countries with significant minorities from neighbouring countries are more likely to have some history of conflict. How do bilateral relationships affect receiving and sending state engagement with the minority or overseas population in question? Is there a difference between countries with largely peaceful relationships versus those who have disputes? For example, have India and Pakistan ever tried to influence their overseas populations in the other country? If so, was it ever for a foreign relations issue? In another instance, there are sizeable Korean expatriate populations residing in Japan and vice versa. How do these minorities negotiate their identity in an environment of underlying mistrust and competition? These and many other questions expose new avenues for sending state research that are associated with international relations and foreign policy.

Concluding remarks

Although much has been done to “bring the state back in” in transnational migration literature, political science remains one of the under represented disciplines in this area of research.

Particularly with respect to sending states, much more needs to be done to understand their actions, motivations, and constraints. Transnational migration is more than the movement of people across borders. Rather, through the complexities and dilemmas of migrant lives and communities, transnational migration brings entire worlds together. This startling bend in space is evident in CCLTN production, where the interests and claims of distant states are held together and then renegotiated by CCLTN workers. In so doing, CCLTN workers offer their own sense of what must be done to allow minorities and migrants to live out the complexity of their transnationalisms.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abu-Laban, Yasmeen, and Christina Gabriel. *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization*. North York, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2008.
- Adoni, Hanna, Dan Caspi, and Akiba A. Cohen. *Media, Minorities, and Hybrid Identities: The Arab and Russian Communities in Israel*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2006.
- Ahadi, Daniel, and Catherine A. Murray. "Urban Mediascapes and Multicultural Flows: Assessing Vancouver's Communication Infrastructure." *Canadian Journal of Communication* 34, no. 4 (December 2009): 587–611.
- Albert, Eleanor. "China's Big Bet on Soft Power." Council on Foreign Relations. Updated February 9, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power>.
- Alexander, Claire. "Beyond the 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora': A Response to Rogers Brubaker." *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 40, no. 9 (July 2017): 1544–55.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1300302>.
- Annenberg School for Communication. "Civic Engagement." Metamorphosis Project. March 7, 2019.
http://www.metamorph.org/research_areas/civic_engagement/.
- . "Welcome to Metamorphosis." Metamorphosis Project. March 7, 2019.
<http://www.metamorph.org/>.
- Appadurai, Arjun. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
- Armstrong, Robert. *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010.

- . *Broadcasting Policy in Canada*, 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016.
- Awad, Isabel, and Andrea Roth. "From Minority to Cross-Cultural Programmes: Dutch Media Policy and the Politics of Integration." *International Communication Gazette* 73, no. 5 (August 2011): 400–418.
- Bader, Jeffrey A. "7 Things You Need to Know about Lifting Term Limits for Xi Jinping." Brookings Institute, February 27, 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/27/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-lifting-term-limits-for-xi-jinping/>.
- Bai, S.Y. "Constructing Racial Groups' Identities in the Diasporic Press: Internalization, Resonance, Transparency, and Offset." *Mass Communication and Society* 13, no. 4 (2010): 385–411. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15205430903326197>.
- Bakshi, Amar C. "China's Challenge to International Journalism." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 31, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2011): 147–51. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2011.0005>.
- Banting, Keith G., Thomas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidle, eds. *Belonging?: Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007.
- Barabantseva, Elena. "Change vs. Order: Shijie Meets Tianxia in China's Interactions with the World." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, no. 2 (2009): 129.
- . "Trans-Nationalising Chineseness: Overseas Chinese Policies of the PRC's Central Government." *Asien*, no. 96 (July 1, 2005): 7–28.
- Basch, Linda G., Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1994.
- Bauböck, Rainer, and Thomas Faist, eds. *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

Beaty, Bart, and Rebecca Sullivan. *Canadian Television Today*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2006.

Biao, Xiang. "Emigration from China: A Sending Country Perspective." *International Migration* 41, no. 3 (September 2003): 21. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00240>.

Bissoondath, Neil. "Multiculturalism." *New Internationalist*. September 5, 1998. <https://newint.org/features/1998/09/05/multiculturalism>.

Blackwell, Tom. "How China Uses Shadowy United Front as 'Magic Weapon' to Try to Extend Its Influence in Canada." *National Post*. January 31, 2019. <https://nationalpost.com/news/how-china-uses-shadowy-united-front-as-magic-weapon-to-try-to-extend-its-influence-in-canada>.

Blake, Raymond B. "A New Canadian Dynamism?: From Multiculturalism and Diversity to History and Core Values." *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 26, no. 1 (May 2013): 79–103.

Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. *Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation: A Roadmap from Beginning to End*. Los Angeles: Sage, 2008.

Boden, Jeanne. "Mass Media: Playground of Stereotyping." *International Communication Gazette* 78, no. 1-2 (February 2016): 121–36. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048515618116>.

Bolt, Paul J. *China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000.

Bowe, Alexander. "China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States." Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review

- Commission, August 24, 2018. <https://www.uscc.gov/Research/china%E2%80%99s-overseas-united-front-work-background-and-implications-united-states>.
- Bradshaw, James. "Rogers Seeks to Revive Multicultural OMNI Newscasts in CRTC Proposal." *Globe and Mail*, June 14, 2016. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rogers-media-seeks-to-revive-omni-newscasts-in-crtc-proposal/article30450213/>.
- Brady, Anne-Marie. "China's Foreign Propaganda Machine." *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 4 (2015): 51-59. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0056>.
- . "Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era." *Westminster Papers in Communication & Culture* 3, no. 1 (March 2006): 58–77.
- . "Plus Ça Change ?: Media Control Under Xi Jinping." *Problems of Post-Communism* 64, no. 3-4 (May 2017): 128. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2016.1197779>.
- . "Unifying the Ancestral Land: The CCP's Taiwan Frames." *China Quarterly* 223 (September 2015): 787–806.
- Brady, Henry E., and David Collier. *Rethinking Social Inquiry Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010.
- Broad, Garrett M., Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, Katherine Ognyanova, Benjamin Stokes, Tania Picasso, and George Villanueva. "Understanding Communication Ecologies to Bridge Communication Research and Community Action." *Journal of Applied Communication Research* 41, no. 4 (November 2013): 325–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00909882.2013.844848>.

- Brodie, Janine. "Elusive Equalities and the Great Recession: Restoration, Retrenchment and Redistribution." *International Journal of Law in Context* 10, no. 4 (December 2014): 427–41. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552314000202>.
- . "Reforming Social Justice in Neoliberal Times." *Studies in Social Justice* 1, no. 2 (2007): 93-107.
- Brubaker, Rogers. "The 'diaspora' Diaspora." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005): 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997>.
- . "Revisiting 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora.'" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40, no. 9 (2017): 1556–61. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1308533>.
- Burgh, Hugo de. "Domestic Context of Chinese Media's Globalization." In *China's Media Go Global*, edited by Daya Kishan Thussu, Hugo de Burgh, and Anbin Shi, 52–65. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Bush, Richard C. "Hong Kong: Examining the Impact of the 'Umbrella Movement,'" Testimony to Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institute, December 3, 2014. <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/hong-kong-examining-the-impact-of-the-umbrella-movement/>.
- Canada, Government of. Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11, sec. 3. <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/B-9.01/page-1.html#h-4>.
- . "Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review." June 5, 2018. <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/110.nsf/eng/home>.
- . "Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review Panel: Biographies." Accessed February 13, 2019. <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/110.nsf/eng/00002.html>.

- . Citizenship and Immigration Canada. “Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship.” Study guide. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012.
- <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/discover.pdf>.
- . Department of Canadian Heritage, Corporate Review Branch. *Strategic Evaluation of Multiculturalism Programs: Final Report*. Study conducted by Brighton Research. Ottawa: Department of Canadian Heritage, Corporate Review Branch, 1996.
- . Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television. *Canadian Television in the Digital Era: The Report of the Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television*. Ottawa: Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television (Government of Canada), 1997. <http://publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.696377&sl=0>.
- Canada Media Fund. “About Us.” Accessed February 14, 2019. <https://www.cmf-fmc.ca/en-ca/about-us>.
- Canada NewsWire. “CAJ to Rogers: Don’t Abandon Multicultural News.” May 7, 2015. <https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/caj-to-rogers-dont-abandon-multicultural-news-517706611.html>.
- . “Canadian Ethnic Media Association Unveils Award Winners for 36th Annual Gala, June 20th.” June 17, 2014. <https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/canadian-ethnic-media-association-unveils-award-winners-for-36th-annual-gala-june-20th-514465821.html>.
- . “Canadians Demand CRTC Hearing on Cuts to OMNI TV.” August 15, 2013. <https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/canadians-demand-crtc-hearing-on-cuts-to-omni-tv-512805591.html>.

- . “Improved Access for Canadians to Multilingual, Multi-Ethnic Television News and Information from a Canadian Perspective.” May 23, 2019.
<https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/improved-access-for-canadians-to-multilingual-multi-ethnic-television-news-and-information-from-a-canadian-perspective-870954123.html>.
- . “Media Advisory - CRTC to Hold Technical Briefing for Media Related to License Renewal of Large TV Groups and the Decision Concerning OMNI Regional.” May 11, 2017.
<http://search.proquest.com/canadiannews/docview/1897445306/citation/EF02FF8737A7474FPQ/9>
- . “Multicultural TV for All Canadians.” June 14, 2016. <https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/multicultural-tv-for-all-canadians-582977111.html>.
- Canadian Communications Foundation. History of Canadian Broadcasting (website). August 2016. <http://www.broadcasting-history.ca/>.
- . “CFMT-DT.” History of Canadian Broadcasting. Accessed June 26, 2018.
http://www.broadcasting-history.ca/listing_and_histories/television/cfmt-dt.
- Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. “A Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity.” Public notice CRTC 1985-139. Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), July 4, 1985. <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/1985/PB85-139.htm>.
- . “Addition of Nine Non-Canadian Chinese-Language Services to the Lists of Eligible Satellite Services for Distribution on a Digital Basis.” Broadcasting public notice CRTC

- 2006-166. Ottawa: Government of Canada, September 20, 2007.
<https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2006/pb2006-166.htm>.
- . “Call for Applications for a National, Multilingual Multi-Ethnic Television Service Offering News and Information Programming.” Broadcasting notice of consultation CRTC 2017-154. Ottawa: Government of Canada, May 15, 2017.
<https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2017/2017-154.htm>.
- . “CRTC 50 Years.” February 23, 2018. <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/acrtc/50.htm>.
- . “CRTC Launches Let’s Talk TV: A Conversation with Canadians.” News release. October 24, 2013. <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2013/2013-563.htm>.
- . “Ethnic Broadcasting Policy.” Public notice CRTC 1999-117. Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), July 16, 1999.
<https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/1999/pb99-117.htm>.
- . “Improving the Diversity of Third-Language Television Services: A Revised Approach to Assessing Requests to Add Non-Canadian Third-Language Television Services to the Lists of Eligible Satellite Services for Distribution on a Digital Basis.” Broadcasting public notice CRTC 2004-96. Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), December 16, 2004.
<https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2004/pb2004-96.htm>.
- . “Let’s Talk TV: A Conversation with Canadians.” October 24, 2013.
<https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/talktv-parlonstele.htm>.
- . “Let’s Talk TV: The Way Forward - Creating Compelling and Diverse Canadian Programming.” Broadcasting regulatory policy CRTC 2015-86. Ottawa: Canadian Radio-

- television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), March 12, 2015. <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2015/2015-86.htm#bm5>.
- . “Let’s Talk TV Decisions at a Glance.” March 12, 2015. <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/television/services/idecisions.htm>.
- . “Licensing of a National, Multilingual Multi-Ethnic Discretionary Service.” Broadcasting decision CRTC 2019-172 and Broadcasting order CRTC 2019-173 Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), May 23, 2019. <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2019/2019-172.htm>.
- . “Offering Cultural Diversity on TV and Radio.” Consumer information. December 16, 2008. https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/info_sht/b308.htm.
- . “OMNI Regional – National, Multilingual Multi-Ethnic Discretionary Service.” Broadcasting decision CRTC 2017-152 and broadcasting order CRTC 2017-153. Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), May 15, 2017. <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2017/2017-152.htm>.
- . “Requests That Rogers Media Inc. Reinstate Local Third-Language Newscasts on Its OMNI Stations.” Broadcasting decision CRTC 2016-8. Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), January 12, 2016. <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2016/2016-8.htm>.
- . “Rogers Media Inc. – Licence Renewals for English-Language Television Stations, Services and Network.” Broadcasting decision 2017-151. Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), May 15, 2017. <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2017/2017-151.htm>.

- Cao, Qing. "China Through Western Eyes. A Case Study of the BBC Television Documentary Roads to Xanadu." *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 6, no. 2 (September 2007): 275–97. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156805807X256890>.
- . "Modernity and Media Portrayals of China." *Journal of Asian Pacific Communication* 22, no. 1 (April 2012): 1–21.
- Carmel, Emma. "Mobility, Migration and Rights in the European Union: Critical Reflections on Policy and Practice." *Policy Studies* 34, no. 2 (March 2013): 238–53. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2013.778028>.
- Caspi, Dan, and Nelly Elias. "Don't Patronize Me: Media-by and Media-for Minorities." *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 34, no. 1 (January 2011): 62–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419871003743413>.
- Chai, Winberg. "The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations: An Interpretation." *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 29, no. 3 (September 2002): 131–147.
- Chakravartty, Paula, and Yuezhi Zhao. "Introduction: Towards a Transcultural Political Economy of Global Communications." In *Global Communications: Toward a Transcultural Political Economy*, edited by Paula Chakravartty and Yuezhi Zhao, 1–22. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008.
- Chan, Anthony B. "Chinese Canadians." *The Canadian Encyclopaedia*. 2015. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/chinese-canadians>.
- Chan, Joseph (president of Fairchild Television). In discussion with author. February 13, 2015. Richmond, British Columbia.
- Chen, Nien-Tsu Nancy, Katherine Ognyanova, Chi Zhang, Cynthia Wang, Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, and Michael Parks. "Causing Ripples in Local Power Relations: The Meso-

- Level Influence of a Hyperlocal News Website.” *Journalism Studies* 18, no. 6 (June 3, 2017): 710–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2015.1078738>.
- Cheng, Susan (anchor for Talentvision). In discussion with author. May 30, 2013. Richmond, British Columbia.
- Cheung-gertler, Jasmin H. “Council of Canadians.” The Canadian Encyclopaedia, last edited March 4, 2015. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/article/council-of-canadians>.
- China, Government of. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia. “Jia Qinglin Voices Five-Point Hope for Overseas Chinese.” Accessed January 2, 2019. <http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t363128.htm>.
- . Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China, § articles 2 and 9 (1980). <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgny/eng/lqz/laws/t42221.htm>.
- . State Council of the People’s Republic of China. “Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council.” Accessed March 21, 2018. http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/01/content_281474991090995.htm.
- . State Council of the People’s Republic of China. “Overseas Chinese Media Urged to Promote Belt and Road Initiative.” Accessed March 22, 2018. http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2017/09/11/content_281475850510482.htm.
- China Daily*. “Top Official Hails Successes of Fuzhou Media Forum.” Fujian edition. Accessed March 22, 2018. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/fujian/2017-09/13/content_31937192.htm.
- China.org.cn. “3rd World Chinese Media Forum to Open in Sept.” Accessed January 2, 2019. <http://china.org.cn/english/culture/138284.htm>.

Chinascopes. "Beijing Held Third World Chinese Education Conference." February 1, 2015.

———. "On Overseas Chinese Media." Accessed January 1, 2019.

<http://chinascopes.org/archives/6708>.

Christians, Clifford G., Theodore L. Glassner, Denis McQuail, Kaarle Nordenstreng, and Robert

A. White. *Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies*.

Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009.

Chua, Beng Huat. "Gossip about Stars: Newspapers and Pop Culture in China." pp. 75 – 90 In

Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce, edited

by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Chui, Tina, Kelly Tran, and John Flanders. "Chinese Canadians: Enriching the Cultural Mosaic."

Canadian Social Trends 76 (Spring 2005): 24-32.

<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-008-x/2004004/article/7778-eng.pdf>.

Cormi, Christine (advertising with OMNI). In discussion with author, June 11, 2013. Toronto,

Ontario.

Corus Entertainment. "Corus Entertainment." Accessed March 2019. <https://www.corusent.com/>.

Costigan, Catherine, Tina F. Su, and Josephine Hua. "Ethnic Identity Among Chinese Canadian

Youth: A Review of the Canadian Literature." *Canadian Psychology/Psychologie*

Canadienne 50, no. 4 (2009): 261 - 272.

The Current. Transcript. "Are U.S. and China Headed for War?" Interview with Graham Allison.

CBC Radio. June 14, 2017. [http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-june-14-](http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-june-14-2017-1.4158414/june-14-2017-full-episode-transcript-1.4160826)

[2017-1.4158414/june-14-2017-full-episode-transcript-1.4160826](http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-june-14-2017-1.4158414/june-14-2017-full-episode-transcript-1.4160826).

Curtin, Michael. *Playing to the World's Biggest Audience: The Globalization of Chinese Film*

and TV. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.

- Dakroury, Aliaa. "The Arab-Canadian Consumption of Diasporic Media." *Journal of International Communication* 12, no. 2 (December 2006): 35–51.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2006.9752012>.
- Delano, Alexandra. *Mexico and Its Diaspora in the United States: Policies of Emigration Since 1848*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Delury, John. "'Harmonious' in China." *Policy Review* 148 (April 1, 2008): 35–44.
- Deuze, Mark. "What Is Journalism?: Professional Identity and Ideology of Journalists Reconsidered." *Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism* 6, no. 4 (November 2005): 442–64. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884905056815>.
- Ding, Sheng. "Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power." *Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 64 (March 1, 2010): 255–72.
- . "Engaging Diaspora via Charm Offensive and Indigenised Communication: An Analysis of China's Diaspora Engagement Policies in the Xi Era." *POLITICS* 35, no. 3–4 (November 2015): 230–44.
- Downing, John H. "Media Ownership, Concentration, and Control: The Evolution of Debate." In *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*, edited by Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
- Dunbar, Laurence J. E., and Christian Leblanc. *Review of the Regulatory Framework for Broadcasting Services in Canada: Final Report*. Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Government of Canada), 2007.
<http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/318092/publication.html>.

Dwyer, Chris. "Here's Why The World's Largest Starbucks Is A Chinese Wonderland Like No Other." *Forbes*. December 6, 2017.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisdwyer/2017/12/06/heres-why-the-worlds-largest-starbucks-is-a-chinese-wonderland-like-no-other/#26da3044270e>.

Echchaibi, Nabil. "(Be)Longing Media: Minority Radio between Cultural Retention and Renewal." *Javnost - The Public* 9, no. 1 (March 2002): 37–50.

Eckstein, Harry. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In *Handbook of Political Science*, vol.7, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

Economist. "China's One-Party System has a Surprising Number of Parties."

<https://www.economist.com/china/2017/03/09/chinas-one-party-system-has-a-surprising-number-of-parties> March 11, 2017.

Enright, Michael. "Why This Book on Canadian Nationalism Is Even More Relevant Today - Michael Enright." *The Sunday Edition*, CBC Radio, December 6, 2015.

<https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thesundayedition/george-grant-was-right-capitalism-is-force-for-good-best-female-irish-writers-frank-sinatra-1.3349666/why-this-book-on-canadian-nationalism-is-even-more-relevant-today-michael-enright-1.3350578>.

Fairchild Group. "Company Profile." Accessed March 2019. <https://www.fairchildgroup.com/>.

Fairchild Television. "FTV Schedule." Accessed March 2019.

https://www.fairchildtv.com/english/schedule_ftv.php.

Faist, Thomas. "Diaspora and Transnationalism: What Kind of Dance Partners?" In *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, edited by Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist, 9–33. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

- . “Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round of the Migration-Development Nexus.” *Population, Space, and Place* 14, no. 1 (February 2008): 21–42. <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.471>.
- . *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.
- Fitzgerald, Stephen. *China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- Fleras, Augie. “Multicultural Media in a Post-Multicultural Canada? Rethinking Integration.” *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 25–47.
- Friend, David. “Rogers Media Cutting 110 Jobs, Mainly at Omni Multicultural TV Stations.” *Canadian Business*. May 7, 2015. <https://www.canadianbusiness.com/business-news/rogers-media-cutting-about-100-jobs-mainly-at-omni-tv-stations-report/>.
- Friesen, Joe. “Ottawa Pumps up Military Role in Citizenship Ceremonies.” *Globe and Mail*, June 30, 2011. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-pumps-up-military-role-in-citizenship-ceremonies/article586789/>.
- Gamlen, Alan. “Creating and Destroying Diaspora Strategies.” Working paper 31. University of Oxford: International Migration Institute, 2011. <https://www.imi-n.org/publications/wp-31-11>.
- . “Diaspora Engagement Policies: What Are They and What Kinds of States Use Them?” Working paper 32. University of Oxford: Centre on Migration Policy and Society, 2006. https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2006/wp-2006-032-gamlen_diaspora_engagement_policies/.

- . “The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination.” *Political Geography* 27, no. 8 (January 1, 2008): 840–56. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.10.004>.
- Garnham, Nicholas. “The Political Economy of Communication Revisited.” In *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*. Edited by Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
- Geist, Michael. “The CRTC’s Fundamental Mistake: It Thinks It Can Regulate the Internet.” *Globe and Mail*, June 8, 2018. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-the-crtcs-fundamental-mistake-broadcasting-is-the-internet-but-the/>.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2004.
- Gerring, John. *Case Study Research Principles and Practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Giang, Rita (news director with Fairchild Television). In discussion with author, June 4, 2013. Richmond Hill, Ontario.
- Glick Schiller, Nina. “A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration: Theorising Migration without Methodological Nationalism.” In *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, edited by Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist, 109–29. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.
- Glick Schiller, Nina, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton. “Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration,” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 645, no. 1 (1992): 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.1992.tb33484.x>.

Global News. "Global National Producing National Mandarin-Language Newscast." December 7, 2011. <https://globalnews.ca/news/186776/global-national-producing-national-mandarin-language-newscast/>.

———. "Global Television - About." Accessed March 2019.
<https://globalnews.ca/pages/about/>.

Global Times. "Overseas Chinese Media Talk up 'Chinese Dream.'" September 4, 2013.
<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/808590.shtml>.

Goertz, Gary, and James Mahoney. *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Green, Andrew. "The Development of Mass Media in Asia-Pacific." *International Journal of Advertising* 22, no. 2 (May 2003): 273–301.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02650487.2003.11072845>.

The Guardian. "Hard Cheese: Italy Vows to Scupper EU Free Trade Deal with Canada." July 13, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/13/say-cheese-why-italy-wont-ratify-eu-free-trade-deal-with-canada>.

Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller. "Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants." *American Journal of Sociology* 108, no. 6 (2003): 1211–48.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/375195>.

Guiseppe, Richeri. "The Media Amid Enterprises, the Public, and the State: New Challenges for Research." In *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*. Edited by Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Guo, Grant (reporter with OMNI). In discussion with author, June 4, 2013. Toronto, Ontario.

Hawthorn, Tom. "Thirty Years Ago One Documentary Awoke a Silent Community." *Globe and Mail*, September 22, 2009. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/thirty-years-ago-one-documentary-awoke-a-silent-community/article790434/>.

Ho, Victor (guest on Fairchild Television and Editor-in-Chief for Sing Tao Daily Limited). In discussion with author, May 22, 2013. Vancouver, British Columbia.

Hollifield, James. "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We Bring the State Back In?" In *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines*, 2nd ed, edited by James Hollifield and Caroline Brettell, 183–238. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Hooghe, Ingrid d'. "The Expansion of China's Public Diplomacy System." In *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy Through Communication*, edited by Jian Wang, 19–35. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Horujy, Sergey S. *Practices of the Self and Spiritual Practices: Michel Foucault and the Eastern Christian Discourse*. Translated by Boris Jakim. Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 2014.

Houpt, Simon. "Rogers Cuts 110 Jobs, Ends All OMNI Newscasts." *Globe and Mail*, May 15, 2015. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rogers-to-cut-jobs-kill-all-omni-newscasts/article24306838/>.

———. "Rogers Resists Government Pressure to Reinstate Ethnic Newscasts." *Globe and Mail*, June 3, 2015. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/books-and-media/rogers-resists-government-pressure-to-reinstate-ethnic-newscasts/article24768143/>.

Hu, Jenny (news director with OMNI). In discussion with author, June 4, 2013. Toronto, Ontario.

- Hu, Zhengrong, Deqiang Ji, and Yukon Gong. "From the Outside In: CCTV Going Global in a New World Communication Order." In *China's Media Go Global*, edited by Anbin Shi, Daya Kishan Thussu, and Hugo de Burgh, 67–76. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Hwo, Winnie (former news director for Fairchild Television and public engagement and communications specialist for the David Suzuki Foundation). In discussion with author, May 24, 2013. Vancouver, British Columbia.
- Infantry, Ashante. "Licence Obligations with OMNI Putting Pressure on Rogers: Broadcast Giant's Ethnic TV Channels Not Making Enough Money, Leaving Them in Financial Hot Water." *Toronto Star*, April 8, 2014.
- Ioannou, Theo. "Feta Cheese Exporters to Benefit from EU-Canada Trade Agreement." *Greek Reporter*, November 20, 2017. <https://canada.greekreporter.com/2017/11/20/feta-cheese-exporters-to-benefit-from-eu-canada-trade-agreement/>.
- Ipsos Reid. "Chinese Media Monitor." Toronto: Fairchild TV, 2007.
- James, Carl E. "Multicultural and Anti-Racism Education in Canada." *Race, Gender & Class* 2, no. 3 (1995): 31–48.
- Jia, Jack (guest on Talentvision and president and editor-in-chief of Chinese News Group Ltd.). In discussion with author, June 5, 2013. Scarborough, Ontario.
- Jirik, John. "CCTV News and Soft Power." *International Journal of Communication* 10 (2016): 3536–53. <https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/4811/1728>.
- Jones, Esyllt, and Adele Perry, eds. *People's Citizenship Guide: A Response to Conservative Canada*. Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2011.

- Jung, Joo-Young, Kiyoko Toriumi, and Shin Mizukoshi. "Neighborhood Storytelling Networks, Internet Connectedness, and Civic Participation after the Great East Japan Earthquake." *Asian Journal of Communication* 23, no. 6 (December 2013): 637–57.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2013.819930>.
- Karim, Karim H. "Mapping Diasporic Mediascapes." In *Media of Diaspora: Mapping the Globe*, edited by Karim H. Karim, 1–19. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Keliher, Macabe and Hsinchao Wu. "How to Discipline 90 Million People." *The Atlantic*, April 7, 2015. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/xi-jinping-china-corruption-political-culture/389787/>.
- Kent, Caitlyn (television editor for Global News Mandarin Hour). In discussion with author, May 31, 2013. Burnaby, British Columbia.
- Kille, Leighton Walter. "Committee of Concerned Journalists: The Principles of Journalism." Journalist's Resource, November 26, 2009. <https://journalistsresource.org/tip-sheets/foundations/principles-of-journalism/>.
- King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Kivisto, Peter, and Thomas Faist. *Beyond a Border: The Causes and Consequences of Contemporary Immigration*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 2010.
- Kong, S. "Space of Possibilities: Civic Discourse and Multicultural Citizenship in Locally Produced Chinese Television Programs in Metro Vancouver." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 14, no. 1 (2013): 119–38. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-011-0227-z>.

- Kovach, Bill, and Tom Rosenstiel. *The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect*, rev. ed. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2007.
- Kuo, Mercy A. "China's United Front Work: Propaganda as Policy." *The Diplomat*, February 14, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-united-front-work-propaganda-as-policy/>.
- Kymlicka, Will. "Citizenship, Communities, and Identity in Canada." In *Canadian Politics*, 6th ed, edited by James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, 21–44. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014.
- . *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995.
- Lall, Marie. "Mother India's Forgotten Children." In *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies, and Transnational Relations*, edited by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, 121–39. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. "Growing CCDI Power Brings Questions of Politically-Motivated Purge." The Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2015. <https://jamestown.org/program/growing-ccdi-power-brings-questions-of-politically-motivated-purge/>.
- Lams, Lutgard. "China: Economic Magnet or Rival? Framing of China in the Dutch- and French-Language Elite Press in Belgium and the Netherlands." *International Communication Gazette* 78, no. 1-2 (February 2016): 137–56.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048515618117>.
- Laselva, Samuel. "Understanding Canada's Origins: Federalism, Multiculturalism, and the Will to Live Together." In *Canadian Politics*, 6th ed., edited by James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, 3–20. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014.

Lawlor, Andrea, Nathan Allen, and Katerina Graham. "Is Canada's Print Media Fair on China?"

Vancouver, BC: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, May 2018.

<https://www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda/canadas-print-media-fair-china>.

Lazăr, Andreea. "Transnational Migration Studies. Reframing Sociological Imagination and Research." *Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology* 2, no. 2 (2011): 69–83.

Leblanc, Daniel. "Ottawa Warns Internet Platforms Such as Facebook and Netflix the 'Free Ride' Is Over." *Globe and Mail*, June 6, 2018.

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-warns-internet-platforms-such-as-facebook-and-netflix-the-free/>.

Lee, Isa (reporter for Fairchild Television). In discussion with author, June 6, 2014. Toronto, Ontario.

Leong, Susan. "Franchise Nations: The Future of the Nation?" *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 23, no. 6 (December 2009): 855–70.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/10304310903294739>.

Levitt, Peggy, and Rafael De la Dehesa. "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State: Variations and Explanations." *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 26, no. 4 (July 2003): 587–

611. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987032000087325>.

Levitt, Peggy, and Nina Glick Schiller. "Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society." *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (2004): 1002–39.

Levitt, Peggy, and B. Nadya Jaworsky. "Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33 (2007): 129–56.

- Levitz, Stephanie. "Liberals' Budget Includes \$23M for Multiculturalism, Anti-Racism Strategy" CTV News, February 28, 2018. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/liberals-budget-includes-23m-for-multiculturalism-anti-racism-strategy-1.3823101>.
- Levy, Jack S. "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 1 (2008): 1–18.
- Lewis, Michael. "Omni Cancels Its Multi-Language Newscasts: Move Comes after Rogers Slashes 110 Jobs from Its Struggling TV Operations." *Toronto Star*, May 8, 2015.
- Li, Peter S. *The Chinese in Canada*, 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Li, Wei (host and reporter with OMNI). In discussion with author, June 4, 2013. Toronto, Ontario.
- Li, Wenfei. "Ethnic Broadcasting and Ethnic Relations: A Comparative Study between Canada and China." Master's thesis, University of Ottawa, 2010.
- Li, Xiaoping. "A Critical Examination of Chinese Language Media's Normative Goals and News Decisions." *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 97–112.
- . "'Focus' (Jiaodian Fangtan) and the Changes in the Chinese Television Industry." *Journal of Contemporary China* 30 (February 1, 2002): 17–34.
- Liang, Zai, and Qian Song. "From the Culture of Migration to the Culture of Remittances: Evidence from Immigrant-Sending Communities in China." *Chinese Sociological Review* 50, no. 2 (April 2018): 163–87. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21620555.2018.1426988>.
- Lien, Pei-te. "Pre-Emigration Socialization, Transnational Ties, and Political Participation across the Pacific: A Comparison among Immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 10, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 453–82.

- Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 682-93. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1955513>.
- Lin, Wan-Ying. "Communication and Community-Building: The Role of Ethnic Media in the Chinese Immigrant Community of Los Angeles." PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2004.
- Lindgren, April. "Municipal Communication Strategies and Ethnic Media: A Settlement Service in Disguise." *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 49–71.
- Liu, Hong. "An Emerging China and Diasporic Chinese: Historicity, State, and International Relations." *Journal of Contemporary China* 20, no. 72 (November 1, 2011): 813–32.
- Lockie, Alex. "Chinese Military Compared to US Armed Forces." *Business Insider*, August 5, 2016. <https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-us-military-comparison-2016-8/#overview-of-chinas-military-forces-1>.
- Louie, Andrea. *Chineseness across Borders: Renegotiating Chinese Identities in China and the United States*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004.
- Macdonald, David B. "Aboriginal Peoples and Multicultural Reform in Canada: Prospects for a New Binational Society." *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 39, no. 1 (January 2014): 65–86.
- Mahoney, James. "After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (2010): 120 – 147.
- Mak, Charles (former news director with OMNI and director with Happy Life Network Association). In discussion with author, May 23, 2013. Vancouver, British Columbia.
- Mann, Steve. *The Research Interview: Reflective Practice and Reflexivity in Research Processes*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Manuel, Anja. "China Is Quietly Reshaping the World." *The Atlantic*, October 17, 2017.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/china-belt-and-road/542667/>.

Mao, Yuping. "Investigating Chinese Migrants' Information-Seeking Patterns in Canada: Media Selection and Language Preference." *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 113–31.

Maple Leaf Web. "Official Bilingualism in Canada: History and Debates." Accessed March 27, 2018. <https://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/official-bilingualism-canada-history-and-debates.html>.

Marx, Anthony W. "The Nation-State and Its Exclusions." *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 103–26. <https://doi.org/10.2307/798096>.

Mason, Gary. "In West Vancouver, 'Monster House' Debate a Vicious Circle." *Globe and Mail*, February 27, 2015. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/in-west-vancouver-monster-house-debate-a-vicious-circle/article23236546/>.

Matsaganis, Matthew D., Vikki S. Katz, and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach. *Understanding Ethnic Media: Producers, Consumers, and Societies*. Los Angeles: Sage, 2011.

McCready, L. "Militarization, Multiculturalism and Mythology: Canadian National Identity in a New Age of Empire." PhD diss., McMaster University, 2012.

McMullin, Stanley E. "Canadian Studies." *The Canadian Encyclopaedia*, last edited December 16, 2013. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/canadian-studies>.

McMurty, Roy. "Accommodating Canada's Diversity." In *Belonging?: Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*, edited by Keith G. Banting, Thomas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidle. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007.

Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen Walt. *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.

Mehta, Diana. "Rogers Axes CityNews Channel, Parts of OMNI TV Programming." *The Canadian Press*, May 30, 2013.

"Migration Studies." Oxford Academic. Accessed January 3, 2019.

<https://academic.oup.com/migration>.

Mok, Ka Ho, and Xiao Han. "From 'Brain Drain' to 'Brain Bridging': Transnational Higher Education Development and Graduate Employment in China." *Journal of Higher Education Policy & Management* 38, no. 3 (June 2016): 369–89.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/1360080X.2016.1174409>.

Mookerjee, Sourayan. "Multiculturalism and Egalitarianism." *Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal* 43, no. 1–2 (2011): 41.

Mosley, Layna. *Interview Research in Political Science*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013.

Multiculturalism Policy Index. "Australia." Accessed October 26, 2018.

<https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant-minorities/evidence/australia>.

———. "United Kingdom." Accessed October 26, 2018.

<https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant-minorities/evidence/united-kingdom>.

Murray, Catherine. "Rethinking Multicultural/Multiracial Media and the Integrity of Immigrant Integration." *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 5–14.

Murray, Catherine A., Sherry Yu, and Daniel Ahadi. "Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Media in BC." Simon Fraser University: Centre for Policy Studies on Culture and Communities, 2007. <http://www.bcethnicmedia.ca/Research/cultural-diversity-report-oct-07.pdf>.

- Nath, Nisha. "Defining Narratives of Identity in Canadian Political Science: Accounting for the Absence of Race." *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique* 44, no. 1 (2011): 161-93. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423910001071>.
- National Post*. "How China Uses Shadowy United Front as 'Magic Weapon' to Try to Extend Its Influence in Canada." January 28, 2019. <https://nationalpost.com/news/how-china-uses-shadowy-united-front-as-magic-weapon-to-try-to-extend-its-influence-in-canada>.
- Nesbitt-Larking, Paul W. *Politics, Society, and the Media: Canadian Perspectives*. Peterborough, ON : Broadview Press, 2001.
- Ng, Elim. "Confucianism with Party Characteristics: Democracy and China's New National Identity." Master's thesis, Queen's University, 2009.
- Ng, Yik-Tung, and Lok-To Wong. "China's Secret Police 'Recruit Students as Agents' to Spy on Activists Overseas." Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Radio Free Asia, January 30, 2018. <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/recruit-01302018110158.html>.
- Niagara This Week*. "Omni Media Productions." December 11, 2014.
- Nyíri, Pál. "Expatriating Is Patriotic? The Discourse on 'New Migrants' in the People's Republic of China and Identity Construction among Recent Migrants from the PRC." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 27, no. 4 (October 2001): 635-53. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830120090421>.
- Odartey-Wellington, F. "Broadcasting Regulation and Building the Multicultural Canadian Nation: Understanding the CRTC's Al-Jazeera Arabic Decision." *Communication Law and Policy* 18, no. 2 (01 2013): 121-54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2013.774894>.

- Ojo, Tokunbo. "Ethnic Print Media in the Multicultural Nation of Canada: A Case Study of the Black Newspaper in Montreal." *Journalism* 7, no. 3 (01 2006): 343–61.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884906065517>.
- OMNI TV. "OMNI TV Schedule." Accessed March 2019.
<https://www.omnitv.ca/ab/en/schedule/>.
- Ong, Aihwa. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999.
- Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. "International Migration and Sending Countries: Key Issues and Themes." In *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies, and Transnational Relations*, edited by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, 3–30. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- . "Turkey and the 'Euro-Turks': Overseas Nationals as an Ambiguous Asset." In *International Migration and Sending Countries Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, edited by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, 77–98. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Oxford English Dictionary Online. "Subject, n." 2000. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/192686>.
- Panossian, Razmik. "Courting a Diaspora: Armenia-Diaspora Relations since 1998." In *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, edited by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, 140–68. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Parkinson, Joe, and David George-Cosh. "Image of Drowned Syrian Boy Echoes Around World." *Wall Street Journal*, September 3, 2015. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/image-of-syrian-boy-washed-up-on-beach-hits-hard-1441282847>.

- Patrick, Kathleen, and Erin Newland. *Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in Their Countries of Origin*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, July 2004. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/beyond-remittances-role-diaspora-poverty-reduction-their-countries-origin>.
- Pavel, Carmen E. "Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Moral Opportunity Costs." *Polity* 41, no. 4 (2009): 489–513.
- Peng, Zengjun. "Representation of China: An Across Time Analysis of Coverage in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times." *Asian Journal of Communication* 14, no. 1 (March 2004): 53–67. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0129298042000195170>.
- People's Daily Online*. "Xi: China to Promote Cultural Soft Power." Accessed March 21, 2018. <http://en.people.cn/90785/8500899.html>.
- Picard, Robert G., Charles H. Davis, Franco Papandrea, and Sora Park. "Platform Proliferation and Its Implications for Domestic Content Policies." *Telematics and Informatics* 33, no. 2 (May 1, 2016): 683–92. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2015.06.018>.
- Popa, Eugenia. "Worldwide Trade Policies For The Cultural Sector." *The Yearbook of the "Gh. Zane" Institute of Economic Researches* 22, no. 1 (2013): 61–67.
- Portes, Alejandro. "Migration and Development: Reconciling Opposite Views." *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 32, no. 1 (January 2009): 5–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870802483668>.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Josh DeWind. "A Cross-Atlantic Dialogue: The Progress of Research and Theory in the Study of International Migration." *International Migration Review* 38, no. Issue 3 (2004): 828–51.

Powers, Lucas. "Conservatives Pledge Funds, Tip Line to Combat 'Barbaric Cultural Practices.'"

CBC, October 2, 2015. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-barbaric-cultural-practices-law-1.3254118>.

Pratt, Geraldine, and Caleb Johnston. "Filipina Domestic Workers, Violent Insecurity, Testimonial Theatre and Transnational Ambivalence." *Area* 46, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 358–60.

Pries, Ludger. "Transnationalism: Trendy Catch-All or Specific Research Programme? A Proposal for Transnational Organisation Studies as a Micro-Macro-Link." COMCAD Working Papers, 34. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, Fak. für Soziologie, Centre on Migration, Citizenship, and Development (COMCAD), 2007.
<https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/51144>.

Pu, Li, and Jennifer Foster. "From a Local TV to a Broadcasting Conglomerate: A Regional Chinese Media Company's History, Development and Struggle." *China Media Research* 8, no. 3 (July 2012): 11–23.

Qi, Frank (reporter with Global News Mandarin Edition). In discussion with author, May 17, 2013. Vancouver, British Columbia.

Reid, Angus. "Canadians Aren't as Accepting as We Think—and We Can't Ignore It, Writes Angus Reid." CBC, October 4, 2016. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/angus-reid-poll-canadian-values-immigration-1.3789223>.

Repnikova, Maria. "Media Openings and Political Transitions: Glasnost versus Yulun Jiandu." *Problems of Post-Communism* 64, no. 3-4 (May 2017): 141–51.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2017.1307118>.

- . *Media Politics in China : Improvising Power under Authoritarianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Rickwood, Roger. “Committee for an Independent Canada.” *The Canadian Encyclopaedia*, last edited March 4, 2015. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/committee-for-an-independent-canada>.
- Rogers Media. “Engage. Excite. Ignite.” Accessed March 2019. <https://www.rogersmedia.com/>.
- Roth, Lorna. *Something New in the Air: The Story of First Peoples Television Broadcasting in Canada*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005.
- Roth, Lorna, Leen d’Haenens, and Thierry Le Brun. “No Longer ‘the Other’: A Reflection on Diversity in Canadian Fiction Television.” *International Communication Gazette* 73, no. 5 (2011): 380–99. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048511405815>.
- Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, A. Davidson Dunton, Jean-Louis Gagnon, Clement Cormier, Royce Frifh, Paul Lacoste, Gertrude Laing, et al. *The Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic Groups*. Vol. 4 of *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967.
- http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/bcp-pco/Z1-1963-1-5-4-1-eng.pdf.
- Rumbaut, Rubén G. “Assimilation of Immigrants.” In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed., edited by James D. Wright, 81–87. Oxford: Elsevier, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.31109-6>.
- Safran, William. “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return.” *Diaspora* 1, no. 1 (1991): 83–99. <https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1991.0004>.
- Salter, Liora, and Felix Odartey-Wellington. *The CRTC and Broadcasting Regulation in Canada*. Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2008.

- Saunders, Robert A., and Sheng Ding. "Digital Dragons and Cybernetic Bears: Comparing the Overseas Chinese and near Abroad Russian Web Communities." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 255–90.
- Schultz, Ida. "The Journalistic Gut Feeling." *Journalism Practice* 1, no. 2 (May 2007): 190–207. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17512780701275507>.
- Shapiro, Ivor. "Evaluating Journalism: Towards an Assessment Framework for the Practice of Journalism." *Journalism Practice* 4, no. 2 (April 2010): 143–62. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17512780903306571>.
- Shenton, Andrew K. "Strategies for Ensuring Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research Projects." *Education for Information* 22, no. 2 (January 1, 2004): 63–75.
- Simons, Paula. "TV Station's Move Means Downtown Needs a Bold New Enterprise Mission." *Edmonton Journal*, December 8, 2015.
- SINA English. "Meeting on China's Peaceful Reunification Opens in Hong Kong." September 21, 2010. <http://english.sina.com/china/p/2010/0921/340629.html>.
- Smith, Noah. "Who Has the World's No. 1 Economy? Not the U.S." *Bloomberg*, October 18, 2017. <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-18/who-has-the-world-s-no-1-economy-not-the-u-s>.
- Smith, Tony. *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- So, Stanley (former host and reporter for OMNI). In discussion with author, June 3, 2013. Scarborough, Ontario.
- Spence, Jonathan D. *The Search for Modern China*, 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999.
- Sreberny, Annabelle. "'Not Only, But Also': Mixedness and Media." *Journal Of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 31, no. 3 (2005): 443–59.

- Statistics Canada. "The Evolution of Language Populations in Canada, by Mother Tongue, from 1901 to 2016." Canadian Megatrends. Ottawa: Statistics Canada (Government of Canada), February 21, 2018. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2018001-eng.htm>.
- . "Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity." Focus on Geography Series, 2016 Census. Ottawa: Statistics Canada (Government of Canada), February 8, 2017. <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/fogs-spg/Facts-can-eng.cfm?Lang=Eng&GK=CAN&GC=01&TOPIC=7>.
- Steiner, Niklaus. *International Migration and Citizenship Today*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Steward, J. D. M., and Helmut Kallmann. "Massey Commission." The Canadian Encyclopaedia, last edited July 29, 2016. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/massey-commission-emc>.
- Stockmann, Daniela. *Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Stockmann, Daniela, and Mary E. Gallagher. "Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China." *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 4 (April 2011): 436–67. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010394773>.
- Sun, Wanning. "Introduction: Transnationalism and a Global Diasporic Chinese Mediasphere." pp. 1-25 In *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce*, edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- . "Slow Boat from China: Public Discourses behind the 'Going Global' Media Policy." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 21, no. 4 (September 2015): 400–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2015.1043129>.

- Suryadinata, Leo. "Blurring the Distinction between Huaqiao and Huaren: China's Changing Policy towards the Chinese Overseas." *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2017): 101–14.
- . *The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2017.
- Szklarski, Cassandra. "OMNI TV Seeking Cultural Newscast Channel." *Telegraph-Journal; Saint John, NB*, June 17, 2016.
- Talentvision. "Talentvision Schedule." Accessed March 2019.
<https://www.talentvisiontv.com/ch/schedule.php>.
- Taras, David. *The Digital Mosaic: Media, Power, and Identity in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015.
- Taylor, Gregory. "Shut-Off: The Digital Television Transition in the United States and Canada." *Canadian Journal of Communication* 35, no. 1 (March 2010): 7–25.
- Teo, Sin Yih. "'The Moon Back Home Is Brighter'?: Return Migration and the Cultural Politics of Belonging." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 37, no. 5 (May 2011): 805–20.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.559720>.
- Thompson, Nicole. "Canadians like the Queen, but Her Heir? Not so Much, Survey Says." *Globe and Mail*, April 18, 2016. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadians-like-the-queen-but-her-heir-not-so-much-surveysays/article29658118/>.
- Thunø, Mette. "Reaching out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas: The Trans-Territorial Scope of the PRC by the End of the 20th Century." *The China Quarterly* 168 (2001): 910–29.
- Thurairajah, Kalyani. "Practicing Reflexivity: Balancing Multiple Positionalities During Fieldwork." *SAGE Research Methods Cases*, 2019.
<https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526483850>.

- Thussu, Daya Kishan, Hugo de Burgh, and Anbin Shi, eds. *China's Media Go Global*. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Todd, Douglas. "Many Hong Kong Immigrants Return Home." *Vancouver Sun*, May 18, 2013. <http://www.vancouversun.com/business/2035/Douglas+Todd+Many+Hong+Kong+immigrants+return+home/8402665/story.html>
- Trochim, William M.K. "Deduction & Induction." Web Center for Social Research Methods. Accessed May 24, 2019. <https://socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php>.
- Unifor. "Cuts to Ethnic Programming by Rogers Lead CRTC to Call OMNI Stations to Early Renewal Hearing, Raising Concerns about Lack of Local Programming." Media release. December 5, 2013. <https://www.unifor.org/en/whats-new/press-room/cuts-ethnic-programming-rogers-lead-crtc-call-omni-stations-early-renewal>.
- . "OMNI Violating Licence by Contracting Work to Competitor: Unifor." October 2, 2017. <https://unifor.org/en/whats-new/press-room/omni-violating-licence-contracting-work-competitor-unifor>.
- Unifor Local 830M, Peter Murdoch. "Rogers Reneges on Commitments to Ethnic Communities by Cuts to OMNI TV." May 30, 2013. <http://www.cep830m.com/union-response-to-omni-cuts/>.
- van den Anker, Christien. "Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism: Towards Global Citizenship?" *Journal of International Political Theory* 6, no. 1 (March 2010): 73–94. <https://doi.org/10.3366/E1755088210000467>.
- Veronis, Luisa, and Rukhsana Ahmed. "The Role of Multicultural Media in Connecting Municipal Governments with Ethnocultural Communities: The Case of Ottawa." *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 8, no. 2 (July 15, 2015): 73–95.

- Vertovec, Steven. "Transnationalism and Identity." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 4 (2001): 573–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830120090386>.
- . "Trends and Impacts of Migrant Transnationalism." Working paper 3, University of Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, 2004.
- https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2004/wp-2004-003-vertovec_impacts_transnationalism/.
- Waldinger, Roger, and David Fitzgerald. "Transnationalism in Question." *American Journal of Sociology* 109, no. 5 (2004): 1177–95.
- Wang, Huiyao. *China's Competition for Global Talents Strategy, Policy and Recommendations*. Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2012.
- Wang, Jia (former reporter for OMNI and deputy director for the China Institute at the University of Alberta). In discussion with author, April 11, 2013. Edmonton, Alberta.
- Wang, Jian, ed. *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy Through Communication*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Wang, Xiaofeng. "What Do China's Democratic Parties Actually Do?" *The Diplomat*, March 3, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/what-do-chinas-democratic-parties-actually-do/>.
- Wasko, Janet, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa. "Introduction: Core Concerns and Issues." In *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*, edited by Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa, 1–10. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
- Waterbury, Myra. "Bridging the Divide: Towards a Comparative Framework for Understanding Kin State and Migrant-Sending State Diaspora Politics." In *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories, and Methods*, edited by Thomas Faist and Rainer Bauböck, 131–48. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

Watkins, Mel. "Waffle." *The Canadian Encyclopaedia*, last edited February 10, 2015.

<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/waffle>.

Winter, Elke. "Rethinking Multiculturalism After Its 'Retreat': Lessons From Canada."

American Behavioral Scientist 59, no. 6 (May 15, 2015): 637–57.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764214566495>.

Wong, Norman (former program coordinator for Shaw Multicultural Channel and sales manager for Stormtec). In discussion with author, May 27, 2013. Burnaby, British Columbia.

Wong, Tony. "OMNI Regional Launches amid Diversity Controversy: Objections Raised by Groups over Production Outsourcing of Chinese-Language Shows." *Toronto Star*, September 1, 2017.

———. "OMNI Regional Launches Sept. 1 amid Controversy over Contracting out Newscasts."

Toronto Star, August 31, 2017.

<http://search.proquest.com/canadiannews/docview/1934195822/citation/EF02FF8737A7474FPQ/3>.

World Steel Association. "World Steel in Figures 2017." May 29, 2017.

<http://www.worldsteel.org/media-centre/press-releases/2017/world-steel-in-figures-2017.html>.

Wu, Annie. "Oversea Chinese Museum." *China Highlights*, updated July 18, 2018.

<https://www.chinahighlights.com/xiamen/attraction/oversea-chinese-museum.htm>.

Wu, Doreen D., and Patrick Ng. "Becoming Global, Remaining Local: The Discourses of International News Reporting by CCTV-4 and Phoenix TV Hong Kong." *Critical Arts* 25, no. 1 (March 2011): 73–87. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02560046.2011.552211>.

- Wu, Richard W.S., and Grace L.K. Leung. "Implementation of Three Network Convergence in China: A New Institutional Analysis." *Telecommunications Policy* 36 (November 1, 2012): 955–65. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2012.09.005>.
- Xiang, Biao. *Emigration Trends and Policies in China: Movement of the Wealthy and Highly Skilled*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016.
<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/emigration-trends-and-policies-china-movement-wealthy-and-highly-skilled>.
- . "A Ritual Economy of 'Talent': China and Overseas Chinese Professionals." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 37, no. 5 (May 2011): 821–38.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.559721>.
- Ye, Todd (news director for Fairchild Television). In discussion with author, May 22, 2013.
Richmond, British Columbia.
- Yin, Robert K. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 5th edition. Los Angeles: Sage, 2014.
- Yu, Gabriel (guest on Fairchild TV and freelance journalist). In discussion with author, May 31, 2013. Vancouver, British Columbia.
- Yu, Sherry S. "Instrumentalization of Ethnic Media." *Canadian Journal of Communication* 41, no. 2 (April 2016): 343–51.
- Yuen, Timothy Wai Wa. "Civic Education Stuck in a Quagmire: A Critical Review of Civic Education in Hong Kong?" *Citizenship, Social and Economics Education* 15, no. 2 (August 1, 2016): 69–82.
- Zane, Renato (news director and reporter with OMNI). In discussion with author, June 11, 2013.
Toronto, Ontario.

- Zerba, Shaoi. "The PRC's Overseas Chinese Policy." MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. Calhoun Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School.
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/4030/08Jun_Zerba.pdf;sequence=1.
- Zhang, Hong. "The Globalization of Chinese Television: The Role of the Party-State." *International Communication Gazette* 73, no. 7 (November 2011): 573–94.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048511417156>.
- Zhang, Rui. "Chinese Language Media Forum Meets." China.org.cn, September 15, 2005.
<http://china.org.cn/english/2005/Sep/142324.htm>.
- Zhang, Xiaoling. "Breaking News, Media Coverage and 'Citizen's Right to Know' in China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 16, no. 53 (November 1, 2007): 535–45.
- . "From Totalitarianism to Hegemony: The Reconfiguration of the Party-State and the Transformation of Chinese Communication." *Journal of Contemporary China* 20, no. 68 (January 1, 2011): 103–15.
- . *The Transformation of Political Communication in China: From Propaganda to Hegemony*. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2011.
- Zhao, Suisheng. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Zhao, Xiaojian. "Disconnecting Transnational Ties: The Chinese Pacific Weekly and the Transformation of Chinese American Community after the Second World War." In *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce*, edited by Wanning Sun, 26–41. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Zhao, Yuezhi. "Transnational Capital, the Chinese State, and China's Communication Industries in a Fractured Society." *JAVNOST-THE PUBLIC* 10, no. 4 (December 2003): 53–73.

Zhou, Min, Wenhong Chen, and Guxuan Cai. "Chinese-Language Media and Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada." In *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce*, edited by Wanning Sun, 42–74. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Zhou, Min, and Xiangyi Li. "Remittances for Collective Consumption and Social Status Compensation: Variations on Transnational Practices among Chinese International Migrants." *International Migration Review* 52, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 4–42.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12268>.

Zhu, Ying. *Two Billion Eyes: The Story of China Central Television*. New York: New Press, 2012.

Ziniak, Madeline (OMNI national vice-president for Rogers Television). In discussion with author, June 11, 2013. Toronto, Ontario.

APPENDIX A: DOCUMENTS USED DURING INTERVIEWS

Interview prompts

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (V5)

Introductory questions

Question 1: (personal info)

What made you interested in journalism?

About history/evolution of Chinese Canadian TV news and future trajectory

Question 2: (past and present)

There have been some changes in Chinese TV news in Canada over the last 10 years. From your perspective, what stands out as some major trends or developments?

Follow up/other directions:

- A) Major factors/actors involved: _____
 - Are there any factors or players overseas that you see as being particularly important to the development and production of Chinese-language TV news in Canada?
- B) Some kind of qualitative change in its coverage: _____
 - What about changes in the coverage? In terms of focus or editorial strategy?

How has China affected them?

Question 3: (directly available to viewers)

TV news programming from China has become more available to viewers in Canada directly. What do you think of these developments? (conversational follow up, do you watch CCTV? Or Phoenix News?)

Follow up/other directions?

- A) Competitive advantage/niche specialization _____
 - i. Do you have any thoughts on why viewers might choose your news program over others?
 - ii. Do you have any thoughts on how your station competes with these other channels?
- B) Healthy competition _____

- Another respondent suggested that having more channels available directly from overseas would actually be good for Canadian newscasters. What do you think of that?

Question 4: (content sharing agreements/indirect availability)

I understand that like other media firms, _____ has content sharing agreements with companies in China. What do you think of these agreements? (What does it mean for the day to day work of news gathering?)

Follow ups:

- A) Allocation of resources/specialization
 - i. Would it be fair to say that they offer some opportunities and some challenges? Can you give me some examples?
 - ii. Can you tell me something about how it impacts day to day work at your news station?
 - iii. Other topics too look out for: extending international coverage, allocation of resources, extending local coverage, etc.

Editorial Strategy _____

There is a lot of news and information coming out of Greater China. Can you talk about how stories are selected?

Every news story has a number of different angles. Could you take me through your thought process as you're thinking about how to present information to your viewers?

Is this decided by the individual reporters? Or as a group? If there is disagreement about how something is covered, how might this be managed? What about cross-straits issues? (Taiwan and PRC staff issue) _____

- i. Are you ever concerned about losing content sharing privileges for being over critical? (censorship question): _____

C) Long term implications: _____

What do you think greater availability of content from China means for Chinese TV news stations in Canada in the future?

Soft close with this first, only if there is time

Question 5: (future of Chinese TV news in Canada)

What do you hope to see in the future of Chinese TV news, and what do you think is needed for this to happen?

Questions about specific China initiatives

Question 6: (PRC initiatives)

The last few questions are just about some speculations and reports I've seen in academic literature. I want to follow up and see if you've ever heard of noticed any of these initiatives:

- A) Have you ever heard of or interacted with the Overseas Chinese Media Cooperation Organization? (probably need the Chinese name for it)
Follow up: Can you please describe your involvement with them? What do you gain from membership with this organization? Are there any drawbacks to belonging to OCMCO?
- B) Have you ever heard of or attended Overseas Chinese Media Forums?
Follow up: How did you find them? Where they useful? In what ways? What do you see as the incentives of attending? Are there any drawbacks?
- C) Study programs for overseas Chinese journalists in China? They're hosted by Renmin University as well as the State Council's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.
Follow up: How did you find them? Do you feel that they provide reliable information? Were they useful to you? What are some of the incentives for attending these programs? Are there any risks involved?

Hard close with this, maybe skip to this if it feels like you've been talking around something

Question 7: (participant's choice)

Is there anything else you would like to tell me or think that I should know?

Demographic Surveys

Survey Questions

Name: _____

Contact information: _____

Current Position: _____

Current Organization: _____

Year of Birth: _____

Place of Birth: _____

Years spent in Canada: _____

Nationality: _____

Other positions held:

Job Title	Employer and location	Year Began

Checklist for each interview

Name: _____

Verbally reminded of

Purpose of the interview: _____

Voluntary participation: _____

Opt. of keeping comments “off the record”: _____

Opt. of keeping comments “in deep background”: _____

Consent:

Consent form signed and returned: _____

OR

Verbal consent: _____

Time allotted for my interview: _____

Has his/her own copy of information letter and consent form with my contact info: _____

Filled out survey form: _____

Agrees to be contacted in case I have a follow up question: _____

Version of the interview: _____

Questions discussed:

Further contacts:

Other notes:

APPENDIX B: DOCUMENTS USED AND CREATED DURING THE CODING PROCESS

Initial list of themes from early readings of the interviews

1. Demographic change: Cantonese to Mandarin in audience and newsroom
2. CRTC:
 - a) Canadian content regulations, necessity of
 - b) Unfair rulings
3. CCTV: treatment of their footage and criticality (vs. other feeds sometimes)
 - a) Judging content too political or less political, or use to represent Chinese gov't views rather than just "reality"
 - b) Emphasize use of major stories (disasters)
 - c) Other feeds available and more prominent
4. PRC influence: how to position selves against it, different answers/strategies
 - a) Juxtapose own impartiality and professionalism against "communist mouth and throat"
 - b) Deny influence
 - c) Emphasize overall bias of all, not a property of CCTV or China
5. Technology:
 - a) Changes since they've started => how to integrate/take advantage of new opportunities, how much to put online

- b) Competition – how to compete with online resources
- 6. Local content: this is where they add value, fear of being axed
 - a) Specifically voice of Chinese Canadian community
 - b) Necessary live use information not offered by other language services
 - c) Their competitive edge?
- 7. Integration and multiculturalism:
 - a) Existence of Chinese media adds to Canadian multiculturalism b/c it makes for a more diverse landscape, their raison d'être is diversity
 - b) Adds to multiculturalism by helping become "more Canadian"
 - c) Fear of backlash – emphasizing their interest
- 8. Diverse communities:
 - a) Necessity of serving all the communities with different content, not just language but different stories
 - b) Balancing different points of view from HK, PRC, Taiwan
- 9. Changing viewership habits: event programming vs. internet tv
- 10. Professionalism:
 - a) mixing and originality of content
 - b) "balanced" reporting

As professional as "mainstream" more like them

Table 7. Codes created and used in coding process

Code	Description
Cdn reg CRTC	Comments about CRTC and CRTC regulation
Cdn reg owners	Comments about how owners have reacted or might react to CRTC regulation
Contr community	Contributions made by CCLTN to mainstream Canadian communities
Contr bridge	Bridge building or lack thereof by CCLTN between Chinese communities and mainstream Canada
Racism	Citations or descriptions of racism from mainstream and reactions to that
Value local	The value of CCLTN is in providing information about Canada or useful to living in Canada
Value rights	Protection or celebration of minority rights; democratic rights
Value ID POV	CCLTN building or expressing a distinct Chinese, Canadian, or Chinese Canadian point of view or identity
Value multi	Any mention about multiculturalism or diversity
Value connect	CCLTN helps people connect to HK, TW, and/or PRC
Value PRC censor	CCLTN can offer sensitive stories without China government without PRC influence, bias, or censorship
China media pos	Positive comments about media from China, justifications of use, countering accusations or criticisms
China media neg	Propaganda, state-ownership, very political, censorship
China media use	How media from China is used or should be used (quantity and manner)
Story select	How stories about China selected (not about material from China)
China outreach describe	Descriptions of what happens at forums, sponsored trips etc.
China outreach eval	Evaluations of the outreach programs – forums etc.

China goals step out	Interpretation of China's motives in transnationalizing and reaching out as going abroad
China goals infl	Interpretation of China's motives in transnationalizing and reaching out as desire for power and influence
TM origin	Chinese Canadians have ongoing connections to HK, TW, and PRC
TM settle	Necessity of facing reality of living in Canada, necessity of adaptation; Changing interests as settlement progresses
TM pop 1	Demographic shift from Cantonese to Mandarin
TM pop 2	Demographic shift from first to second generation
TM diverse	Describing or asserting difference between HK, TW, and PRC communities
TM conflict	Conflict, discrimination or unease between Chinese Canadian communities
TM manage	Any forms of conflict management asserted, explained, idealized
Industry change	Any changes in consumption, technology, competition, etc.
Advert	Anything to do with advertising
Model 1	Business model of OMNI
Model 2	Business model of Shaw/global
Model 3	Business model of Fairchild
Uncoded	Anything that I wanted to note but doesn't fit any of the codes