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TITLE OF THESIS..... DEFERMENT AND SUBSTITUTION:  
 ... AN EXERCISE IN METHODOLOGY  
 ... OF SOCIAL ACTION .....

UNIVERSITY..... of ALBERTA .....

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED..... Ph.D .....

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED..... Fall, 1972 .....

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NL-91 (10-68)

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

DEFERMENT AND SUBSTITUTION:  
AN EXERCISE IN METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL ACTION

by



P.A.S. SARAM

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE  
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1972

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA  
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled DEFERMENT AND SUBSTITUTION: AN EXERCISE IN METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL ACTION submitted by P.A.S. Saram in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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## ABSTRACT

The title of this dissertation, "Deferment and Substitution: An Exercise in Methodology of Social Action", suggests the two inter-related problem areas, one substantive, and the other methodological, that concerned the present study. Deferment refers to the mode of response by which an individual postpones interaction in a situation. Substitution refers to the choice of alternative situations by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. Since Deferment involves meaningful behavior that is both voluntaristic and social, the Social Action perspective was seen as providing the most potential towards its investigation.

First, the study dealt with an overview and an assessment of typologies of response and behavior, with special reference to variations of the Social Action perspective, and the action frame sequence. Prominent among the writings examined were, the contributions of Weber, Merton, Dubin, and Parsons. Most typologies of response and behavior were found to be exhibiting a number of shortcomings, and these were discussed as the problems of, limited or unspecified utility, limited tendencies, dualism, labels, empathy, and motives.

Second, an attempt was made to demonstrate the justification for recognizing Deferment as a mode of response. Third, the question of Substitution was investigated in terms of a variety of patterns of behavior, objects of Deferment, and the mechanisms of Substitution. Also suggested were a series of methodological procedures by which examples of Substitution could effectively be utilized for the measurement of Deferment. An inquiry into available Sociological formulations that may account for Substitutional behavior, comprised the fourth topic of research.



The fifth and sixth topics of inquiry concerned the overall status of the Social Action perspective. As a first step, the major contributions to methodology of Social Action, and its main shortcomings were discussed. Prominent among these shortcomings were, the unresolved problem of meaning and measurement, the lack of specific procedures and methodological rigor, and the problems associated with the action frame sequence. The present study has proposed certain modifications to Social Action, without at the same time avoiding the central issues that this tradition of inquiry has posed and attempted to resolve. The utility of the proposed modifications were demonstrated with reference to two empirical examples namely, drug use, and the tourist role.

This thesis has a number of major implications which demonstrate that it is more than an exercise in such conventional discourses as a critical review of a Sociological tradition, or a comparative study of the contributions of several Sociologists. On a methodological level, the proposed modifications were seen as avoiding or minimizing the problems inherent to Social Action, and the action frame sequence. Furthermore, the modifications provide for, the comparative analysis of similar roles, the more effective investigation of voluntaristic action, and the measurement of interaction through the observation of Substitutional behavior. From a substantive position, the thesis has demonstrated the importance of Deferment and Substitution as worthwhile areas for Sociological inquiry.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank, The University of Alberta for providing me with financial support for the entire duration of my Ph.D. program, and The Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship Administration for granting me permission to continue studies at Alberta after my Master's Degree. The latter arrangement would not have been possible but for the special efforts of several persons, and in this respect I am indebted to my supervisor Professor John Forster, Mrs. J.O. Watson of the Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship Administration, and Mr. A. Kathiramalainathan, First Secretary of the High Commission for Sri Lanka in Canada.

I am grateful to the members of my thesis committee, Professors John Forster, Charles W. Hobart, Gordon K. Hirabayashi, A. Sami A. Mohsen, and Bruce Proudfoot for providing me with advice and guidance during various stages of the research. A special mention of thanks is due to Professors Forster, Hirabayashi, and Mohsen for the personal interest they took in my academic career at Alberta. Several others have helped me with suggestions, and constructive criticism during my thesis research, and in this regard I am especially grateful to Professors Richard Jung, and P. Krishnan, and to my colleagues Charles Levine, and Joel Novek.

Finally I thank, Miss Karen Reid for assisting me with the preparation of earlier drafts of this thesis, and Miss Lynda Watson for typing the thesis in its present form.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Part One

CHAPTER	Page
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION	
1. The Purpose of the Study . . . . .	1
2. A General Background to the Problem. . . . .	2
3. A Note on Concepts . . . . .	10
4. The Background of Theory and Research. . . . .	13
5. The Plan of the Study. . . . .	22
6. The Significance of the Study. . . . .	24
7. The Format of the Thesis . . . . .	26
II. PROBLEMS WITH TYPOLOGIES OF RESPONSE AND BEHAVIOR	
1. Introduction . . . . .	33
2. Limited Utility. . . . .	33
3. Limited Tendencies . . . . .	42
4. Dualism. . . . .	47
5. Labels . . . . .	50
6. Empathy. . . . .	53
7. Motives. . . . .	54
8. Summary. . . . .	56
III. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WEBER, MERTON, AND DUBIN	
1. Introduction . . . . .	60
2. Weber's Typologies . . . . .	61
3. Assessment of Weber's Typologies . . . . .	66
4. Merton's Typologies. . . . .	68
5. Assessment of Merton's Typologies. . . . .	69
6. Dubin's Typologies . . . . .	74
7. Assessment of Dubin's Typologies . . . . .	75
8. Summary. . . . .	78

CHAPTER	Page
IV. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PARSONS AND OTHER WRITERS	
1. Introduction . . . . .	82
2. Parsons' Typologies. . . . .	83
3. Assessment of Parsons' Typologies. . . . .	87
4. Other Typologies of Individual Response. . . . .	92
5. Typologies of Collective Response. . . . .	95
6. Assessment . . . . .	98
7. Summary. . . . .	101

Part Two

V. DEFERMENT AS A MODE OF RESPONSE	
1. Introduction . . . . .	105
2. The Limits of Action . . . . .	106
3. The Goals of Action. . . . .	111
4. The Ethic of Action. . . . .	115
5. The Mode of Deferment. . . . .	120
6. Summary. . . . .	124
VI. THE DYNAMICS OF SUBSTITUTION	
1. Introduction . . . . .	128
2. Patterns of Substitution . . . . .	129
3. Objects of Deferment . . . . .	132
4. Modes of Substitution. . . . .	134
5. Substitution as a Measure of Deferment . . . . .	135
6. Summary. . . . .	144
VII. FORMALIZATIONS OF SUBSTITUTION	
1. Introduction . . . . .	146
2. The Near-group . . . . .	146
3. Encounters . . . . .	149

CHAPTER	Page
VII. Continued	
4. The Sick Role. . . . .	152
5. Assessment of Formalizations . . . . .	155
6. Summary. . . . .	161
Part Three	
VIII. METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL ACTION	
1. Introduction . . . . .	164
2. Contributions to Methodology of Social Action. . .	165
3. Problems with Methodology of Social Action . . . .	171
4. Modifications to Methodology of Social Action. . .	176
5. Summary. . . . .	185
IX. THE UTILITY OF PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS	
1. Introduction . . . . .	187
2. The Inadequacy of Social Action. . . . .	190
3. The Study of Drug Use. . . . .	193
4. The Study of the Tourist Role. . . . .	204
5. Implications for Methodology of Social Action. . .	216
6. Summary and Conclusions. . . . .	222
X. EPILOGUE	
1. General Summary. . . . .	228
2. Conclusions. . . . .	233
3. Limits of the Study. . . . .	235
4. Implications of the Study. . . . .	237
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .	240

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	Page
1. Patterns of Substitution . . . . .	19
2. Weber's Typologies of Life Orders. . . . .	63
3. Parsons' Conception of Modes of Individual Response. . . . .	85
4. Variations of Noninteraction . . . . .	139
5. The Sick Role. . . . .	140
6. Delinquent Gangs . . . . .	140
7. Drug Use-Containment . . . . .	141
8. Drug Use-Isolation . . . . .	141
9. The Tourist Role . . . . .	142
10. Travel . . . . .	142

## Part One

### CHAPTER I

#### GENERAL INTRODUCTION

##### 1. The Purpose of the Study

It is proposed to study the subject of Deferment and Substitution, and its implications for methodology of Social Action.

Deferment refers to the mode of response by which an individual postpones interaction in a situation. Substitution refers to the choice of alternative situations by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. The action tendencies that link the attitudes of an individual in relation to a situation, with his behavior, constitute modes of response. Situation comprises the complex of objects of orientation for behavior. Clusters of behavior that correspond to various forms of Substitution will be called Patterns of Substitution. The term Modes of Substitution will refer to the key mechanisms that could be adopted for the enactment of alternative behaviors by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. The tradition of Sociological inquiry associated with the action frame of reference will be recognized as Social Action.

The scope of the present study will comprise of a number of research topics. These are: A critical review of typologies of response and behavior; A demonstration of the justification for recognizing Deferment as a mode of response; An inquiry into the dynamics of Substitution; A review of theoretical formalizations in Sociology that may account for Substitutional behavior; A formulation of procedures as modifications

to methodology of Social Action and; A demonstration of the utility of the proposed modifications.

## 2. A General Background to the Problem

There are a number of major issues that have generated considerable attention and controversy among Sociologists and other Behavioral Scientists. Some of these involve problems dealing with: Ontological assumptions about the nature of man and society; Individual choices that have led various researchers to adopt certain perspectives of inquiry and units of analysis in preference to others; Value judgments versus value neutrality on the part of researchers; The discrepancy between theory and empirical research, and; The conflict of meaning and measurement.

In the paragraphs to follow, an attempt will be made to present an overview of these major issues. The treatment of the first four issues will be rather brief, not only because they are seemingly insurmountable or somewhat superfluous, but also because their relation to the central problems of the present study is only peripheral. The fifth mentioned issue will receive more elaborate treatment because it points more towards possibilities rather than continuing debate and also because, the central problem investigated in the present study is interpreted as a reflection of this major issue.

The first issue, namely the ontological one, concerns the questions and controversies over assumptions about the nature of man and society. Lenski's codification of some of these assumptions provides a brief summary to the basis underlying this issue<sup>1</sup>. Among other assumptions in recent writings is that of Parsons who contends that individual actors in social



systems are motivated towards a tendency to achieve an optimization of gratification<sup>2</sup>. The important aspect of this issue is that it is perhaps irreconcilable because, first, ontological assumptions of one kind or another will continue to be adopted by those researchers who desire to utilize such models as points of departure for their investigations, and second, such assumptions may almost by definition possess the ability to elude falsification.

The second issue deals with individual preferences on the part of some researchers to utilize certain perspectives of society and certain units of analysis and not others. For example, some researchers are known to utilize a consensus or order perspective while others prefer a conflict or change perspective. Among the critics of Parsons, John Rex has attempted to show that Parsons is over concerned with presenting a fully institutionalized polar model of society much to the neglect of disorganization and conflict<sup>3</sup>. Researchers are also known to emphasize and be criticized for emphasizing different units of analysis such as the individual, groups, and collectivities. As in the case of the issue discussed in the previous paragraph, there is no basis on which one could anticipate an elimination of divergence with regard to individual preferences of researchers over choice of research perspectives and units of analysis. The few notable attempts at synthesizing conflicting perspectives seem to remain only as important landmarks<sup>4</sup>.

The third major issue, namely that of value judgment versus value neutrality on the part of the researcher, has produced fervent protagonists and a variety of copious writings on both sides of the debate. The value

debates may continue with no indications of closure, and individual researchers are only likely to subscribe to, and perform the roles that are consistent with, their own personal preferences.

The alleged discrepancy between theory and empirical research comprises the fourth major issue. This distinction has led to some Sociologists being labeled as theorists and others as researchers. For example, Glaser and Strauss deplore what they consider to be an embarrassing gap between theory and empirical research which is said to be wide as ever<sup>5</sup>. They proceed to portray a two class conception of "Theoretical capitalists" as the privileged elite, and "Proletariat testers" as the toiling masses<sup>6</sup>. The alleged discrepancy between theory and empirical research may be interpreted as a reflection of two kinds of misconceptions. First there is the misconception that the kinds of activities that certain researchers profess to, or are presumed to engage in, would necessarily justify the distinction of some being labeled as theorists and others as researchers. In this instance what may in fact be happening is that certain theoreticians or spokesmen for particular theoretical perspectives tend to be identified as theorists, while proponents or advocates of certain methodological orientations and research techniques tend to be regarded as researchers. Dahrendorf for example disagrees with the view that Sociological theory and research are two separate activities that can be divided or joined. He says, "In fact, I think that so long as we hold this belief our theory will be logical and philosophical, and our research will at best be sociographic, with sociology disappearing in the void between these two".<sup>7</sup> According to him, advocates of empirical research and abstract theory have both

largely dispensed with the prime impulse of all science and scholarship, namely the concern over specific, concrete empirical problems<sup>8</sup>. Students who seek to ascertain the discrepancy between theory and empirical research are known to consult the two well known essays by Merton<sup>9</sup>. But, Merton's essays are written with the intent of illustrating the inseparable interdependence between theory and research rather than highlighting an alleged gap. In fact Merton sees the contrasting emphases on theory and empirical research only as two extreme positions, and further contends that the two do interact and that there is even a decreasing need to emphasize their relationship<sup>10</sup>.

The second misconception yielding the alleged discrepancy is based on the confusion over empirical research and empiricist methodology. Hence there has been a tendency to identify empiricists as researchers, and to label all other investigators as theorists at the most, or as persons given to idle curiosity and speculation. As clarified by Kecskemeti, empirical research would cover all methodologies that utilize factual observational material. Differences in methodologies lie in how relations are established between data and generalizations. In empiricism, generalizations are tied to the kinds of data which are secured through controlled observation, and such data are theoretically relevant only as they exhibit statistical significance<sup>11</sup>. Similarly Kaplan has shown the philosophical basis of empiricism, where both knowledge and meaning are dependent on experience, and where the tenets of inquiry are grounded in logical positivism, operationalism, and pragmatism<sup>12</sup>. The purpose of the above discussion was to present a brief argument to the effect that there is no necessary gap between theory and empirical research, and that

the alleged discrepancy is in fact a reflection of certain misconceptions. A clarification of these misconceptions as well as a substantive and effective analysis of the alleged problem is to be found in one of Parsons' earliest works<sup>13</sup>.

The fifth major issue to be considered, is the conflict of meaning and measurement. It refers to the rather old controversy over the extent to which supposedly objective measurements of observable behavior are consistent with the subjective meanings that individuals attach to their own actions. In opposition to the view held by a tradition of scholars who advocated that, if Sociology is to be scientific, it should not deviate from the methods and procedures peculiar to the Natural Sciences, Max Weber was one of the first Sociologists to contend that it is the subjective understanding of individual action that distinguishes the Social Sciences from the Natural Sciences<sup>14</sup>.

In the Sociological tradition there are three general methodological stances that have been taken by various scholars with reference to the conflict of meaning and measurement. Two of these may for convenience be termed as the Empiricist, and the Interpretative positions. The third stance refers to attempts at reconciling the conflict. The Empiricist position lays emphasis on approximating the methodological principles of the Natural Sciences and is much concerned with procedures such as measurement of observable behavior under controlled conditions, testing hypotheses, operationalism, quantification, and statistical analysis as the basis for generalization and theory construction. The Interpretative approach on the other hand, does not claim to be scientific at least in the conven-

tional sense. Its objective is to obtain an empathetic apprehension of the human experience free from preconceptions. The writings of Vierkandt, Scheler, Hesserl, and Gurvitch reflect the early developments in this line of thinking. Recent methodological stances directed toward subjectively meaningful behavior are to be found in the "logico-meaningful" method of Sorokin, the methodology of Participant Observation proposed by S.T. Bruyn, and in the principles of research associated with the Chicago branch of Symbolic Interactionism, and Ethnomethodology. The basic difference between these two extreme stances on the conflict is that the Empiricists seem to be prepared to disregard non-scientific assessments of subjective meaning in favor of the more objective and quantitative data on observable behavior, whereas, regardless of scientific credibility in the conventional sense, the Interpretativists seem to be basically concerned with the intuitive grasp of subjective meanings that individuals attach to their behaviors. The two extreme positions have no necessary conflict with regard to the nature of subject matter being studied or the empirical nature of research. Rather, the difference is a methodological one, that is, it deals with how data is related to concepts and generalizations.

The third major stance on the conflict of meaning and measurement deals with attempts at resolution, and these could be considered under two separate categories. The first category refers to those proposals calling for a multiple methods approach to research. For example, according to Bruyn, the term Sociological covers three forms of knowledge, namely, theoretical, empirical-statistical, and personal-social, and these forms of knowledge need to be attained through correspondingly different

methodologies<sup>15</sup>. Similarly, Webb and others have pointed out that over-dependence upon any single fallible method is not likely to produce valid results. They plead for a methodology involving multiple measures that would cross-validate the findings of each<sup>16</sup>.

The second category of approaches that have attempted a resolution of the conflict could be seen in the methodological positions of certain writers subscribing to the traditions of Sociological inquiry known as Social Action, and Functionalism<sup>17</sup>. Regardless of the success of these attempts which is not of immediate concern, it could be stated that the methodological positions favored by Weber, Parsons, and Merton point toward a complementary orientation with regard to the contrasting emphasis of meaning and measurement. Stated briefly, Weber's methodology involves a two-fold approach, an interpretative understanding of subjective behavior through empathy, and a causal explanation of such behavior through the use of statistical, historical, and comparative analysis. It is a two-fold approach, not two approaches where one could be an alternative for the other. In Weber's approach "the ideal type" also occupies a position of crucial methodological importance<sup>18</sup>.

Though Parsons' methodological writings are less elaborate than that of Weber, his methodological position has been quite explicitly stated in his earliest major work<sup>19</sup>. It is clear from these writings that, although he had a rather cynical view of the utility of radical empiricism, his position was very much like that of Weber, that is an uncompromising quest for a methodology that would produce an interpretation of subjective meaning, and a scientific explanation of observable

behavior. His more recent work that reflects an extension of the action frame of reference to include systemic analysis, contains among other conceptualizations, an exercise in the socio-cultural, and motivational determinants of a variety of deviant behaviors. The typologies of individual modes of response and behavior presented by him offer an interpretation of subjective meaning, and a call for more thorough scientific investigation<sup>20</sup>.

Merton's preference for "theories of the middle range" and his clarification of the mutual inter-play between theory and empirical research are well known, and some of his writings in this connection were referred to earlier. What is not quite so explicit in his writings is his position on the conflict of meaning and measurement. This can be elucidated by examining his well known essays on anomie<sup>21</sup>. His analysis deals with the social and cultural determinants of deviant behavior. However, in its formulation Merton is obliged to develop a typology of individual modes of adaptation based on his own imputation of three kinds of response modes namely, acceptance, rejection, and rejection-substitution. The point emphasized here is that like Parsons, but less so explicitly, Merton has developed some of his conceptions using a Social Action, and a Functionalist perspective. However, Merton's concerns with meaningful behavior are aptly complemented by his desire to have such conceptions subjected to more rigorous scientific research<sup>22</sup>.

Among more recent and purposeful contributions towards a methodology attempting to resolve the conflict of meaning and measurement may be cited the preliminary statement on the issue advanced by Richard Jung<sup>23</sup>. He has

proposed a method titled "Cybernetic Phenomenology" toward constructing a General Theory of Action. Not unlike Weber, he has suggested a set of procedures that involve subjective meanings on the one hand, and scientific explanation on the other. The former has been termed Phenomenology and refers to a description of action as systems of experienced meanings, and these are to be utilized primarily for purposes of conceptualization. The explanatory procedures are termed Cybernetics to mean self and non-self regulatory observable features. Together the two sets of procedures provide for a mode of functional analysis of the sort commonplace in Physics, but unused in Sociology.

The foregoing discussion of this entire section was intended to highlight two major points. First, an attempt was made to identify and present an overview of what may be considered as five major issues in Sociology. Second, it was intended to present the conflict of meaning and measurement as the issue which is of a methodological nature and hence, one which points more towards possibilities of some resolution rather than continuing debate. Progress made in resolving this issue would have likely implications on the state of some of the other four issues as well.

### 3. A Note on Concepts

The terminology of the present study would be of three sorts, namely, terms that have gained some currency of usage in Sociological writings, terms which are more peculiar to related disciplines, and terms explicated and developed primarily for the purpose of the present



study. Some of these concepts have already been introduced in Section 1 of the present chapter, and would be clarified in the paragraphs to follow. Other concepts would be clarified as they are introduced in the course of the dissertation.

For the purpose of the present research, the term mode is used in the dictionary sense to refer to a manner or way of acting, doing, or being. The term is not used in the sense of logic, metaphysics, and statistics.

In this study the term modes of response will refer to the action tendencies that link the attitudes of an individual in relation to a situation, with his behavior. As used here, the term modes of response is synonymous with what have been called "vectors" or "action tendencies" by Murray<sup>24</sup>, "need dispositions" or "directions" by Parsons<sup>25</sup>, "modes of attachment" or "states" by Dubin<sup>26</sup>, "alternative responses" by Cohen<sup>27</sup>, and "patterns of accommodation" by Presthus<sup>28</sup>. The term is also similar in connotation to the usages of "propensities" by McDougall<sup>29</sup>, "styles" or "modalities" by Horney<sup>30</sup>, "attitudes" by Wach<sup>31</sup>, "behavior alternatives" by Simon<sup>32</sup>, and "directions" by Blumer<sup>33</sup>. The term modes of response as used in the present study has no similarity in meaning to conceptions such as "modes of individual adaptation", used by Merton<sup>34</sup>, and to conceptions such as "modes of adaptation", and "types of behavior" as used by Dubin<sup>35</sup>. In the present study the meaning attached to such usages will be termed as modes of behavior. The term, modes of response will be further clarified in Section 3 of the next chapter.

The term situation as used in this study refers to the complex

of objects of orientation for action. These objects of orientation or situational components are, ego, alters, collectivity, norms, cultural objects, and physical objects. This usage of the term situation, is consistent with its conception by Parsons<sup>36</sup>. It will receive further clarification in Chapter VI.

Deferment refers to the mode of response by which an individual postpones interaction in a situation. Substitution refers to the choice of alternative situations by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. Clusters of behavior that correspond to various forms of Substitution will be called Patterns of Substitution. The term Modes of Substitution refers to the key mechanisms that could be adopted for the enactment of alternative behaviors by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment.

In the literature, the term methodology has been used rather inconsistently. There are two major difficulties with the kinds of formulations often offered on this term. First, such formulations do not offer any explicit ideas on what is being described. Discussions on methodology have a general tendency to clarify what it is not, rather than what it is. Second, most formulations convey the impression that " . . . the most serious difficulties which confront behavioral science are 'methodological', and that if only we hit upon the right methodology, progress will be rapid and sure"<sup>37</sup>. This view has also contributed to what Kaplan calls " . . . the conception of the methodologist as baseball commissioner, writing the rules; or at any rate as umpire, with power to thumb an offending player out of the game"<sup>38</sup>.

Two useful clarifications of methodology, have been presented by Kaplan<sup>39</sup>, and Parsons<sup>40</sup>. As different from techniques, honorifics, and epistemology, the term methodology refers in Kaplan's view to the study of methods. Methods are more or less common to all sciences, and consist of procedures such as concept and hypotheses formation, observation and measurement, performing experiments, model and theory building, and explanation and prediction. Parsons too differentiates between the issues of methodology, and concerns over research techniques only. To him methodology deals with questions of legitimacy over procedures of observation and verification, formulation of propositions and concepts, and the modes of drawing conclusions. In line with the thinking of Kaplan, and Parsons, the present study will refer to methodology, as the study of how data are related to concepts and generalizations.

#### 4. The Background of Theory and Research

The behavioral sciences have no lack of typologies that are in some way related to human conduct. On the one hand Sociology itself has a long tradition in the classificatory analysis of types of societies and social relations, and the orientational and motivational bases of behavior. Some of the well known contributions such as those of Comte, Spencer, Marx, Tonnies, Durkheim, Weber, Pareto, Parsons, Sorokin, Redfield, Becker, and Riesman in this regard need no elaboration here. On the other hand a number of behavioral scientists have been concerned with developing typologies of modes of response and behavior. The present study deals almost exclusively with this second major class of typologies

and their utility in explaining social behavior.

With regard to modes of response and behavior in the Sociological tradition, the more important contributions are Weber's typology of man's solutions to the problem of meaning<sup>41</sup>, Merton's typology of modes of individual adaptation<sup>42</sup>, and extensions of Merton's typology by Parsons<sup>43</sup>, and Dubin<sup>44</sup>. Merton has attempted to develop four types of deviance on the basis of a culture bound schema of goals and means, and logically possible modes of individual behavior using a three-fold response mode criterion of acceptance, rejection, and rejection-substitution. Parsons' conceptualization is more general. He has developed eight types of deviance having taken into account the motivational elements, as well as two different areas of foci namely, social objects, and norms. Utilizing a goals, means, and norms schema, Dubin has constructed fourteen categories of deviance which include Merton's four types. The proposed study would analyse the above mentioned conceptions as the initial point of departure, and proceed to an assessment of less prominent typologies of response and behavior.

Most typologies of response and behavior could be seen as possessing one or more of six major shortcomings. These may be termed as, the problems of, limited utility, limited tendencies, dualism, labels, empathy, and motives. In the chapters immediately following, these shortcomings would be elaborated with reference to the specific contributions of respective authors. However, for the present purpose of illustrating the general nature of the problems involved in the light of the background of theory and research, it is decided to present in the paragraphs to fol-

low, an elaboration of an aspect of one of the aforementioned shortcomings, namely, that of the problem of dualism.

The most general observation that could be made in reference to the work of Merton, Parsons, and Dubin in particular, is that, while they seem to view conformity as the functional or system reinforcing behavior mode, they classify all other behavior as forms of deviance. While acknowledging that the conformity-deviance theme is a useful design according to which social behavior could be arranged, it may be pointed out that an uncritical adoption of this model would hamper Sociological inquiry at least in certain areas. Some evidence in support of this contention is presented below.

First, the conformity-deviance dichotomy creates the impression that certain behaviors are essentially dysfunctional and anti-social. In a later essay Merton has acknowledged that,

Unless the distinction between nonconformist and deviant behavior is maintained, conceptually and terminologically, sociology will by inadvertance continue on the path it has sometimes begun to tread and become that science of society which implicitly sees virtue only in social conformity<sup>45</sup>.

Second, it could be argued that, even though deviant behavior may be classified and described in abstract terms, examples of these behaviors may in fact be forms of conformity, or conformity in the form of "institutionalized evasions"<sup>46</sup>, depending on concrete situations. More recently Merton has stated that ". . . deviant behavior cannot be described in the abstract but must be related to the norms . . ." <sup>47</sup>. Some doubt as to whether certain behaviors are in fact deviant or not, can be seen in the

writings of Parsons<sup>48</sup> and Merton<sup>49</sup>.

Third, it could be stated that even at a purely abstract level, the conformity-deviance dichotomy precludes the possibility of identifying and examining modes of response and behavior that may be more neutral than strictly one sided. Parsons' own scheme is based on the fundamental bifurcation of the ambivalent motivation structure into what he calls the negative component or the alienative need-disposition, and the positive component or the conformative need-disposition. He also acknowledges that there is a difference between alienation and indifference<sup>50</sup>. However, responses such as indifference, and detachment have not been accommodated in Parsons paradigm perhaps because, they may not readily collapse in to his basic dichotomy of conformity-deviance. A somewhat similar criticism of Parsons' scheme has been made by Charles W. Hobart<sup>51</sup>. Response modes such as Deferment and Rejection too cannot be included in Parsons' scheme. Examples of such possible modes of response have been labeled by Parsons as compulsive independence and evasion under the general category of withdrawal, and analysed along two of the deviance dimensions namely, alienative dominance, and passivity<sup>52</sup>. Dubin who sub-classifies Merton's modes of innovation, and ritualism, is satisfied that no modification is called for, with regard to retreatism, and rebellion. He states that Merton's listing of retreatist types, with the addition of ". . . today's 'beatnik' adaptation of San Francisco's pad denizens . . ." exhausts the possible forms that retreatism takes<sup>53</sup>. That this conception of retreatism excludes a variety of behavior, will be apparent in the course of the proposed study. For the present, it could be stated that the response modes such as Deferment may be interpreted as attempts on the

part of the individual at gratifying both components of the ambivalent motivation, for example, by evading both conformity and deviance. Though such a " . . . fundamental possibility . . ." has been initially recognized by Parsons, he has decided to " . . . adhere to the simpler case " <sup>54</sup>, perhaps because, "At present, however, it is not possible to attempt to follow out all these complications"<sup>55</sup>.

Finally, the conformity-deviance conception of modes of response and behavior has the character of having been drawn from a model of perfect institutionalization. John Rex for example, has shown that Parsons' conceptualization of an ideal or extreme position has led to a neglect of the opposite extreme<sup>56</sup>.

The varieties and amounts of research done on specific modes of response and behavior are too numerous to be recorded. The body of theoretical insights and research endeavors in the area of Deviance alone, include reactions to the kinds of issues associated with Merton's innovation, and retreatism, and Parsons' compulsive enforcement and withdrawal. Retreatism in the specific sense of sect and cult behavior has interested Sociologists of Religion. Ritualism, and compulsive acquiescence have been explored in conceptualizations of formal organization, whereas, studies of rebellion have been almost exclusively a problem area in Political Sociology.

The major conclusion of the foregoing discussion of the problem of dualism is that, the classification of modes of response and behavior according to the conformity-deviance dichotomy has eclipsed a variety of response modes that may well deserve serious attention regardless of

whether they are conformist or deviant. Some paragraphs earlier, it was noted that certain response modes have been omitted from inclusion in the typologies considered perhaps because such modes may not readily collapse into the either conformity or deviance dichotomy. For example, termination of interaction may include not only the "deviant" behaviors associated with retreatism, and withdrawal in the sense of Merton, Parsons, and Dubin, but also the kinds of behavior such as migration, and defection. Similarly, Deferment could include patterns of interaction postponement, some of these being gatherings such as, Near-groups and Encounters<sup>57</sup>, or Fugues<sup>58</sup>. There may not be anything inherently "deviant" about such examples of behavior unless the specific contexts they operate in have been taken into consideration.

The response modes of Deferment, and Rejection in the sense of termination of interaction, can each be divided on the interaction criterion of whether an individual seeks situations of Containment or situations of Isolation as substitutes for the situations he has decided to reject or defer interaction in. The term Containment as used here means, being integrated to, a situation. Isolation refers to relative nonintegration in a situation. Therefore an individual can reject or defer interaction in a situation with the intent of seeking Containment substitutes or Isolation substitutes. The term Isolation as used here is consistent with the meanings attached to it by Simmel, and somewhat similar to Parsons' conception of "individualized deviance" and Merton's idea of "privatized" retreatism.



The mere fact that an individual does not interact with others is, of course, not a sociological fact, but neither does it express the whole idea of isolation. For, isolation, insofar as it is important to the individual, refers by no means only to the absence of society. On the contrary, the idea involves the somehow imagined, but then rejected, existence of society. Isolation attains its unequivocal, positive significance only as society's effect at a distance--whether as lingering-on of past relations, an anticipation of future contacts, as nostalgia, or as an intentional turning away from society<sup>59</sup>.

Using the concepts of Rejection, Deferment, Containment Substitutes, and Isolation Substitutes, it is possible to present four Patterns of Substitution.

	SUBSTITUTES FOR REJECTED SITUATIONS	SUBSTITUTES FOR DEFERRED SITUATIONS
CONTAINMENT SUBSTITUTES	Out-cultures	Gatherings
ISOLATION SUBSTITUTES	Dropping-out	Fugues

Figure 1. Patterns of Substitution

Some examples of the Rejection-Containment pattern are, communalism, monasticism, migration, defection, and permanent membership in sub-cultures, and counter-cultures. Examples of the Rejection-Isolation pattern are, hoboism, certain types of drug use, and mysticism. The Deferment-Contain-

ment pattern includes examples such as, participation in Near-Groups, Encounters, group meetings, rituals, excursions, games, and parties. Some examples of the Deferment-Isolation pattern are, sick role, tourist role, travel, exploration, creating and consuming of art, Bohemianism, certain types of drug use, and contemplation. The four Patterns of Substitution have been termed Out-cultures membership, Dropping-out, participation in Gatherings, and Fugues. This classification is not meant to suggest that Gatherings are absent in the role careers of the other three patterns. Gatherings are perhaps inevitable with all instances of human conduct. What is emphasized is that the role enactment of the other three patterns are not necessarily determined by the need for Gatherings. Gatherings may certainly facilitate such roles.

Behavior syndromes of the Rejection mode have been explored in the areas of Demography, Deviance, Mental Health, and Religion. Research in Medical Sociology, Religion, and Work, and Leisure have been directed at investigating examples of the Deferment-Containment pattern. The most influential general conceptualizations of this pattern are the ones offered by Yablonsky, and Goffman<sup>60</sup>. Of the four patterns summarized in the previous figure, the Deferment-Isolation syndrome seems to have received the least amount of conceptual concern. One of the few theoretical schemes of some correspondence to this pattern has been developed by Parsons<sup>61</sup>. Since Deferment constitutes the major topic of study in this thesis, the Mode of Rejection will not be henceforth elaborated.

Three observations can be made in the light of what was presented in the above paragraphs. First, there has perhaps been no serious attempt in modern Sociology to distinguish between the two classes of behavior

referred to as Deferment-Containment and Deferment-Isolation. Recently, Zurcher has developed the useful concept of "ephemeral roles" to cover a variety of behaviors such as the LSD tripper, vacationer, week-end fisherman, and other such roles that are in contrast to one's day to day roles<sup>62</sup>. While such behaviors may certainly comprise "ephemeral roles" they may also belong to two different patterns based on the interaction criterion. For instance, concrete examples of behavior such as holidaying, camping, skiing, and fishing could be classified as either Deferment-Containment, or Deferment-Isolation. There is empirical evidence to the effect that, at least for some people, camping provides opportunities for Containment in settings such as sociability, and different situations for interaction, rather than for activities such as enjoying the out-door life, being in harmony with nature, and so forth<sup>63</sup>.

Second, not much research has been directed towards ascertaining the conditions determining the choice of ephemeral roles, and the consequences of such role enactments. Zurcher himself has called for more systematic and comparative studies on these issues.

Third, it is apparent that, since Gatherings have a character of ubiquity with regard to human gatherings, it may be useful to analyze the extent to which they facilitate or support the role performance of other Patterns of Substitution as well. As noted by Simmel,

When we speak of anti-social phenomena like wretched persons, criminals, prostitutes, suicides, etc., we may refer to them as a social deficit that is produced in a certain proportion to social conditions. In a similar way, a given quantity and quality of social life creates a certain number of temporarily or chronically lonely existences, although they cannot as easily be ascertained by statistics as can these others<sup>64</sup>.

## 5. The Plan of the Study

Before describing the specific procedures that would be adopted in the present study, it may be useful to clarify the general nature of the research purpose which in turn determines the research design. Following Selltitz and others it is possible to consider the general nature of this research purpose as being formulative or exploratory<sup>65</sup>. The major emphasis in such an enterprise is on the discovery of ideas and insights, and not on accuracy of description or inferential conclusions. The topics of investigation in the present study are relatively unexplored, and it is felt that there is adequate justification for the research design to be based on a formulative objective.

The procedures to be adopted in conducting the proposed study may be described according to three convenient phases. The first phase would call for an examination of a variety of typologies of response and behavior. Of these, special focus would be placed on the work of Weber, Merton, Parsons, and Dubin. This phase would include an assessment of the theoretical and methodological adequacy of the said typologies.

In phase two, it is hoped to demonstrate the justification for considering Deferment as a mode of individual response to situations. A major portion of the subsequent analysis would be devoted to explicating Modes of Substitution that would facilitate a series of examples of behavior. Patterns of Substitution and some corresponding examples of behavior have been already suggested in Section 4 of this chapter. Certain empirical examples of such Patterns would be subjected to analysis in the

light of existing theoretical formalizations in Sociology. The general formulations of Parsons, Yablonsky, and Goffman would serve and be assessed as prominent explanatory models in this connection<sup>66</sup>.

The third phase of the study contains a formulation of methodological procedures as modifications to methodology of Social Action. Here the emphasis would be on developing a framework of research that would hopefully avoid some of the major shortcomings inherent in the Social Action frame of inquiry. The third phase also deals with a demonstration of the utility of the proposed modifications with reference to two empirical examples of a single Substitution Pattern. The examples selected for study are drug use, and the tourist role. The justification for the selection of these two examples would be clarified in Chapter IX. For the present however, it is important to make three observations with regard to this phase of the study. First, it needs to be emphasized that the investigation deals only with a demonstration of the utility of an overall methodological framework. Second, the proposed modifications will attempt to provide for the exploration of a variety of explanatory propositions regarding the kinds of phenomena being investigated. Prominent among such propositions could be voluntaristic conceptions such as freedom suggested by authors like Simmel, Christian Bay, and Charles W. Hobart<sup>67</sup>. Third, available research on the two specific topics of empirical interest would be utilized to serve as theoretical guidelines and special insights. With regard to the tourist role, the essay by John Forster would be a basic source of such information<sup>68</sup>. Of the variety of sources on drug use only a selected few would be utilized. This phase of the study would also draw on some non-Sociological literature related to the two topics. These in-

clude, other studies, economic analyses, personal documents, and literary works.

The general theoretical orientation for the entire study would be the action frame of reference both in its conventional form and in line with modifications suggested in the course of the proposed research. It is also intended to utilize theoretical insights from general, and formal Sociology, stratification, and work and leisure research to supplement the study at various stages of inquiry.

#### 6. The Significance of the Study

The overall implication of this thesis is a methodological one. The study would present a critical review of methodology of Social Action, and also propose and demonstrate the utility of certain modifications to methodology of Social Action. It may be mentioned here that at least one area of criticism of methodology of Social Action to be discussed in the thesis, namely the problem of limited tendencies, has been overlooked in the literature.

The more specific contributions of the study may be stated as follows. First, it would help explore the relatively neglected response modes of the category recognized by Parsons as "The second fundamental possibility . . .", namely that of ego seeking alternative situations in a manner so as to gratify both sides of the ambivalent motivation<sup>69</sup>. Parsons acknowledges that such response modes are very common in complex societies<sup>70</sup>.

Second, the study would attempt to assess the adequacy of Parsons' conceptualization of the therapeutic process to account for a variety of examples of behavior. He contends that his scheme provides an example that may serve in the understanding of the motivational processes of deviance, and the mechanisms of control<sup>71</sup>. Also assessed would be the formulations of Yablonsky, and Goffman.

Third, the proposed research will investigate the potential of what was earlier referred to as the Deferment-Isolation pattern, a syndrome which seems to have been regarded as a relatively sterile domain of inquiry. The discussion of two empirical examples of this pattern as envisaged in the study may be considered significant in this regard.

A fourth area of significance could be expressed in the light of Hobart's paper on Freedom<sup>72</sup>. The more prominent issues contained therein are that: An uncritical adoption of the deterministic explanatory model of social behavior has perhaps led to a premature closure of the social system; The study of topics such as freedom would help in bridging the gulf between the Humanities and the Behavioral Sciences; A sociology of freedom may serve in explaining behaviors conventionally regarded as "failures of conditioning"; It is theoretically and practically relevant to ascertain how people who hold different positions in reference to freedom distribute themselves in society and on what basis. The proposed study does not pretend to accomplish these objectives in any specific sense. However, it could be recognized that, at least three of the intended research topics namely, the elaboration of response modes regard-

less of their deviance-conformity connotations in the conventional sense, and the explication of Modes, and Patterns of Substitution that would account for a variety of examples of behavior, may have some bearing on the problems posed by Hobart.

## 7. The Format of the Thesis

In keeping with the plan of the study, this dissertation is organized as follows. The dissertation consists of ten chapters divided into three major parts.

Part One contains the first four chapters that provide a general background to the study and a critical appraisal of the problem area of concern to the thesis. Chapter I is a general introduction to the study and comprises information on such topics as purpose of the study, general background, background of theory and research, the proposed plan of the study, and its significance. Chapter II is devoted to the elaboration of evaluative criteria that may be employed in the assessment of typologies of response and behavior. Chapters III, and IV deal with an overview and an assessment of the prominent typologies of response and behavior. The contributions of Weber, Parsons, Merton, and Dubin receive special attention in this regard.

Part Two consists of Chapters V, VI, and VII and these lay the groundwork for the subject of Deferment and Substitution. Chapter V attempts to demonstrate the justification for recognizing Deferment as a mode of individual response. Chapter VI contains an elaboration of the dynamics of Substitution including how Substitution can be an effective index for the measurement of Deferment. In Chapter VII, available



Sociological formalizations of Substitutional behavior are reviewed and assessed.

Part Three comprises the remaining three chapters of the dissertation. Chapter VIII contains an overall evaluation of, and modifications to methodology of Social Action. In Chapter IX the utility of these modifications are demonstrated with reference to two examples of Substitutional behavior. Finally Chapter X consists of a general summary, conclusions, limitations, and implications of the research.

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## CHAPTER II

### PROBLEMS WITH TYPOLOGIES OF RESPONSE AND BEHAVIOR

#### 1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of the major problems associated with typologies of response and behavior. Six major problems in this connection were introduced in Section 4 of the previous chapter, and an aspect of one of them, namely, that of dualism was subjected to some discussion. The present chapter will contain an analysis of all six problems. However, the treatment of these problems will be of a general nature, that is, except for occasional references, no attempt will be made to relate these problems to the writings of specific authors. In the chapters to follow, the contributions of specific authors will be discussed in terms of their relation to these major problems.

#### 2. Limited Utility

The first major issue to be considered in this chapter may be called the problem of limited or unspecified utility. Stated briefly, this problem deals with the uses to which type constructs in general, and typologies of response and behavior in particular are employed. Three general observations can be made with regard to the use of such constructs. First, there seems to be a tendency among certain social scientists to develop and advance typologies without due consideration for the overall status of such constructs in scientific investigation. Second, and perhaps

following from the first observation, certain writers demonstrate a marked reluctance to declare explicitly the kinds of type constructs they are advancing, and the purposes such constructs are supposed to fulfill. These typologists are content with presenting constructs of one kind or another, without stating their methodological utility, and in particular their implications for empirical research. Third, with specific reference to type constructs that are designed to represent modes of response and behavior it could be asserted that, as methodological devices they fall short of expectations. These three general observations are elaborated below.

Constructs are indispensable features in scientific investigation. Basically they are of two sorts namely, concepts, and type constructs. According to Nettler, concepts refer to constructs which have evolved through usage, whereas, type constructs refer to constructs that are developed by scientists for specific purposes<sup>1</sup>. McKinney, who has perhaps made the most elaborate contribution to the subject of type constructs among Sociologists, refers to concepts as constructs whose precision value is based on selection and limitation of abstracted criteria. Constructed types on the other hand, have a precision value based on selection, limitation, combination, and sometimes accentuation of abstracted criteria. McKinney contends that the utility of type constructs lies not so much in an accurate portrayal of the world of experience, but in its explanatory potential however crude it may be. That is, the utility of type constructs depends on the extent to which description, comparison, and prediction are made possible<sup>2</sup>.



A classificatory overview of various type constructs is perhaps a first step towards ascertaining their relative statuses and utility in scientific inquiry. McKinney has provided a comprehensive statement on a typology of type constructs. He has developed six such types based on six different criteria of classification. These are first, ideal-extracted types based on perceptual experience, second, general-specific types based on degree of abstraction, third, scientific-historical types based on purpose of type, fourth, timeless-timebound types based on temporal scope, fifth, generalizing-individualizing types based on function, and finally, universal-local types based on spatial scope<sup>3</sup>.

Robert Brown has offered a less exhaustive but equally useful classification of type constructs<sup>4</sup>. He makes a clear distinction between extreme types and ideal types. Extreme types are end points of a series that are physically possible. Though often presented as or assumed to be ideal types by certain writers, extreme types are in fact only classificatory devices that permit crude generalizations and explanatory suggestions. Ideal types on the other hand are physically impossible and refer to constructs defined by a set of hypotheses that relate certain properties within a concept to each other. Such a construct serves as a methodological tool in deductive systems and calculi, and provides for an explanation of ordinary types in terms of their deviations from the ideal.

In his treatment of the status of typologies in social science, Hempel makes a distinction between classificatory types, extreme types, and ideal types<sup>5</sup>. Classificatory types are constructs of classes or groups of a phenomenon. According to Hempel, constructs representing

classificatory types should cater towards providing for generalizations and prediction and not serve as facilities for exercises in pigeonholing. Classificatory types include classes of a phenomenon which are discretely distinguishable from one another, and which cannot be placed on a continuum. Extreme types serve as ordering devices, and may also be referred to as polar types or pure types. Extreme types do not delineate explicit criteria for demarcating the boundaries between types and hence they present a polarity or continuum on which various units of analysis may be placed. Both classificatory types, and extreme types serve in early stages of inquiry and they have the potential to suggest empirical concept systems and low-grade generalizations. Ideal types are special constructs used as methodological devices to enable an explanation of a phenomenon. Whereas classificatory types and extreme types facilitate description and empirical generalization, ideal types are useful in building theoretical systems and models.

Partly in the light of the contributions of McKinney, Brown, and Hempel referred to above, it is proposed to offer some general comments on the overall problem of the status of constructed types. First, it could be asserted that there is nothing inherently scientific or for that matter scholarly about classifications except for the consolation that any classification is better than no classification<sup>6</sup>. Classification and enumeration provide the basis for man's, including primitive man's greater acquaintance with, and commonsense understanding of complex phenomena. Other than for such purposes, classification and enumeration can also be used as techniques of persuasion as in commercial advertizing, or as devices for magnifying simple or false issues, and for camouflaging

complex or vital issues. If classificatory types are to serve some purpose in scientific inquiry they need to be constructed with adequate concern for rigor, consistency and most important, a sense of purpose as a methodological device. Brown's criticism of Nettler's classification of types of explanation is of relevance here not so much for the validity of his criticisms as a whole, but for certain specific issues raised that illustrate the need for rigor in constructing classificatory types. For example, Brown argues that Nettler's four types are based on different principles of classification, such as goals, truth value, and methods of explanation. He contends therefore that, by employing Nettler's own definition of ideological explanation it is possible to refer to Nettler's other three types too as ideological explanations<sup>7</sup>.

Second, there is a tendency among some writers to refer to constructed types as theories. Martindale has cited McKinney, Watkins, and Parsons as authors who seem to confuse ideal types with theories<sup>8</sup>. Zetterberg refers to Parsons as an author who seems to confuse taxonomical diagnoses with explanations<sup>9</sup>. Confusing one element of methodological importance with another has almost become a matter of preference or inclination among certain writers. Braithwaite criticizes the trend among social scientists to use the term model in place of the term theory. He argues that model, and theory are quite different and that too not on the often assumed basis of one being modest and the other grandiose<sup>10</sup>.

Third, it has become the practice for some writers to label their constructed types as ideal types even if these types do not fulfill the criteria for ideal types. Such a practice has at least two implica-

tions. First, since ideal types have some relation to theory and explanation, these authors may imagine themselves to be perceived by others as theorists. Second, since ideal types are known to be physically impossible these authors may be of opinion that their conceptions cannot be put to test in the empirical world.

The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to elaborate on the first of three general observations on what was referred to at the beginning of this section as the problems of limited or unspecified utility. This first observation dealt with the overall status of type constructs and some related shortcomings. The second observation to be elaborated in the paragraphs to follow, deals with the methodological utility of type constructs for social science as revealed by their proponents and critics.

There is a growing concern among certain writers in the social sciences over the very utility of type constructs. The thinking seems to follow on the lines that scientific method as explicated by philosophers of science has little or no relevance to on-going empirical research in the social sciences. While voicing this general complaint, Lazarsfeld for example has made special reference to an overemphasis on typologies, notably the Weberian ideal type<sup>11</sup>. According to him, the Weberian ideal type methodology has proved to be a wasteful enterprise. Lazarsfeld has criticized Hempel and Max Black in particular, for exaggerating the importance of ideal types for social science research. Furthermore, it is alleged that the clarifications and illustrations provided by these two writers, for example Hempel's ideal gasses, and Black's dachshund

are of no relevance or guidance value to the social sciences. Lazarsfeld is skeptical enough about ideal types to declare that Black's definitional clarification can be justified only on the grounds that there are more dog lovers in the world than there are social scientists. The kind of sharp criticism as that of Lazarsfeld is a reflection on the reluctance of typologists in the social sciences, to clarify the status and methodological utility of the constructs they have advanced.

Therefore, one issue deals with the practice among certain authors to advance type constructs without specifying their status in terms of what kind of type construct is presented. The second issue deals with the reluctance on the part of the authors to specify the utility of their type constructs for empirical research. A consequence of the first issue is that type constructs could be interpreted by others as being classificatory types, extreme types, or ideal types. For example, in a recent formulation, Arthur K. Davis refers to his typology of hinterland-metropolis as a perspective, a relationship, a model, and a frame of reference<sup>12</sup>. Davis' reluctance to name his typology by such terms as ideal types, extreme types, and polar types is not only justified but has also been clarified by him. However, what he has formulated are classificatory types, but those that offer a greater methodological potential than the pigeonholing classifications deplored by Hempel. Davis is referring to one form of classificatory types namely, dialectic types. Dialectic or opposite types have the dynamic capacity for being transformed into oppositional types and even reverting back once again to opposite types. Davis' types express a dialectic, but no polarity or continuum. His twin concepts represent two facets of a single problem,

in this case an economic system based on exploitation. Therefore, his typology is a methodological tool that helps in formulating the problem. The constructs themselves are not intended as explanations or conclusions. With regard to the second issue under consideration, namely that of the reluctance on the part of certain authors to specify the methodological utility of their type constructs, the following comments may be offered. It is not rare for certain authors to advance type constructs of one kind or another and either plead for or expect others to conduct rigorous empirical research on the ideas expressed in the type constructs. Even if undertaken, such research may be futile except for heuristic reasons, because there could be a great discrepancy in meaning between what was developed as the construct and what is being observed or measured in the empirical situation. In this sense operational indicators may have no consistency with the ideas implicit in type constructs. This situation is largely a result of the fact that certain typologists do not explicitly declare the uses to which their type constructs may be employed.

The third major observation referred to at the beginning of this section deals specifically with the methodological utility of typologies of response and behavior. This observation may for convenience be clarified by examining the logic of inquiry associated with the action frame of reference. No attempt will be made at this stage to elaborate on the action frame itself. Rather, the intent is to present a sequence of the action frame of inquiry that would facilitate an assessment of the utility of its type constructs. Using the symbols, A for actor, M for motivation, O for orientation, D for decision, R for response modes,

S for situation, and B for behavior modes, it is possible to present the logic of the action frame of reference as follows:

A; M, O, D, = R x S = B = classification and labeling of action.

The actor is assumed to possess certain motives, orientations, and decision making capacities. The complex of A; M, O, D provides for a limited number of response modes that an actor could generate in relation to a situation. The assumed combinations of particular modes of response with either a situation or components of a situation provide for an enumeration of the modes of behavior. These modes of behavior in turn serve as classifications and labels for action. This short resume calls for three comments. First the logic of inquiry is based on a set of assumptions leading to a deductive sequence that accounts for action at the empirical level. Second, the typologies explicit in the sequence, namely, types of response and behavior are firmly grounded in assumptions made by the researcher about limited capacities of the actor to direct action. Third, the classification of action is logically derived and imposed on the empirical world with little concern for identification and enumeration of action itself, that is, the scheme affords little or no provision to account for concrete examples of behavior.

The methodological utility of typologies of response and behavior in this sequence is very much limited. On the merit side they provide useful insights into the possible directions in which individuals may act in relation to a situation. Second, these typologies facilitate a simple procedure by which action may be accounted for in terms of logical possibilities and abstract categories. In contrast to such advantages these typologies present a series of shortcomings. First, the criteria

underlying the selection and classification of response modes are hardly ever made explicit by the researchers. Second, the methodological status of type constructs involving response modes has not been expressed by certain typologists. Third, the status and methodological utility of modes of behavior have rarely been made explicit and where this has been attempted its importance is open to much debate. Fourth, the typologies under consideration have not facilitated much empirical research. Where such research has been undertaken some discrepancy can be observed between what was presented in the initial formulation, and what has been researched in the empirical context. Fifth, typologies of response and behavior, and the logic of inquiry associated with them have proved to be of limited utility in accounting for observable behavior. What can be accomplished in this context is to assign to specific actions an appropriate label that is consistent with the modes of behavior. Finally, typologies of response and behavior could present certain difficulties when applied on a cross-cultural dimension. The implicit cultural biases, and restrictive assumptions in some of these typologies contribute to this situation.

### 3. Limited Tendencies

The second major issue of this chapter may be introduced as the problem of limited tendencies. It deals with the assumptions made by researchers about the modes of response available to an actor to direct action, and the implications of such assumptions for methodology of Social Action.



The most general observation that could be made in reference to modes of response is that the topic of response modes or action tendencies itself has not been adequately recognized in Sociology as a subject deserving serious attention. With the exception of a few notable writings a serious examination of modes of response is in fact virtually unknown in Sociology. This situation is all the more unpardonable because some of the most prominent Sociologists have made assumptions about, and developed conceptual frameworks with the use of response modes.

The lack of general concern over the part played by response modes in Sociological analysis can be demonstrated as follows. First, the conception of response modes has either been considered unimportant or taken so much for granted that it is not even identified by a particular concept or a series of concepts. In his well known formulation of the modes of adaptation and genesis of anomie, Merton does not even have a term to represent response modes, though he in fact utilizes three response modes as the pivotal agents that make his entire scheme possible<sup>13</sup>. Among Sociologists, Parsons has made the most ambitious attempt at explicating and relating the utility of response modes at least in reference to his own conceptual schemes<sup>14</sup>. However, with the exception of Murray, and Simon, who are not strictly Sociologists, most writers including Parsons who have made reference to the conception of response modes have not taken upon themselves the task of elaborating the utility of response modes as an important domain of inquiry in its own right<sup>15</sup>.

Second, it could be contended that the lack of concern over the importance of response modes is possibly a reflection of restricted logic in certain conceptual formulations. That is, if a formulation is based on two or three logical possibilities, it is likely to employ only two or three response modes which are selected so as to allow for the assumed possibilities and no more. Such a procedure rules out both other possibilities and empirical probabilities. Examples of restricted logic in this sense can be seen in the typologies of Merton, and Dubin referred to earlier. The casual nature in which response modes have been assumed and employed in such formulations may contribute toward the plausibility of the proposed theories by camouflaging the very role played by the response modes.

Third, response modes can also be limited for matters of convenience rather than for reasons of restricted logic. That is, a writer could express awareness of a number of response modes, but would consider only some of these as relevant or important because those selected response modes would contribute to the developing of a conceptual scheme that is consistent with the perspective of the writer. Parsons' conceptualization of types of deviance can be illustrated as a case in point. While acknowledging that certain response modes or need dispositions as he calls them sometimes, have the capacity to direct action towards autonomy, creativity, freedom, and indifferent states, Parsons is careful in his research to employ only those response modes that are consistent with his perspective of the conformity-deviance dichotomy<sup>16</sup>.

Before describing some of the drawbacks of the problem of limited

tendencies it may be useful to present an overview of Murray's contribution to the subject of response modes<sup>17</sup>. He begins by stating that in all research dealing with the interaction of units, the most crucial and indispensable variables involve those of directionality. The dispositional conception of directionality is tentatively termed as need or tendency. After an elaborate examination of needs and related concepts Murray has provided some conclusive suggestions. He now refers to action tendencies as vectors, a vector being defined as a direction of transformation. There are twelve vectors, namely, renunciation, rejection, acquisition, construction, maintenance, expression, bestowal, retention, elimination, aggression, defendance, and avoidance. These vectors in combination with every value provide for a manageable number of value-vectors. Each value-vector is a certain kind of need. There are fourteen values that could combine with vectors and these are, body, property, knowledge, beauty, ideology, affiliation, sex, succorant object, authority, prestige, leader, nurturant object, roleship, and group. Despite some of its shortcomings Murray's scheme provides much insight into the overall importance of the status of response modes in Sociological inquiry, and particularly so with regard to typologies of modes of behavior.

In the light of what was discussed so far, the implications of the problem of limited tendencies may be presented as follows. First, any restrictions placed on the number of response modes an actor is presumed to be capable of, in turn restricts the scope of research possibilities that are able to account for the actor's behavior. As illustrated at the end of Section 2 of the present chapter, assumptions of this nature logically argued through deductive reasoning provide alleged explanations

which are difficult to disprove in the empirical context. Such formulations are difficult to disprove not because they are necessarily valid but because they are stated in nonfalsifiable terms. Second, insofar as the logic of the action frame of reference is concerned, assumptions based on limited tendencies serve as the sole basis for developing modes of behavior, and classification and labeling of action.

The purpose of this section was to illustrate the conceptual status and certain drawbacks in the use of response modes or action tendencies. It is not suggested that response modes should not be assumed, listed, or researched. Rather, the general conclusions of this section reflect two different observations. First, attempts should also be made through inductive research to develop sets or listings of response modes that are consistent with patterns of concrete observable actions under specified conditions. Response modes developed in this manner would also serve as corroborative checks on the kinds of response modes that have been in vogue. Second, if certain response modes are assumed and restricted by an investigator the implications of such assumptions should be subject to rigorous empirical research. If the initial formulation is improbable or nonresearchable it should be modified or abandoned. According to Merton, the assumptions underlying a theory such as his, may either be revised or replaced in the light of successive investigations. With regard to contributions on revisions and extensions he notes that ". . . they help us from behaving like social barnacles, clinging desperately to the theories we have learned in our youth or that we may have helped develop at any stage"<sup>18</sup>.

#### 4. Dualism

The third issue to be discussed in the present chapter may be referred to as the problem of dualism. This problem deals with the methodological disadvantages of adopting type constructs that are either explicitly dualistic in formulation, or which have inherent dualisms implicitly built into the formulations. It is not contended that dualisms are of no use in problem solving as it were by definition. Rather, the purpose of this discussion is to highlight the shortcomings of an uncritical adoption of dualistic conceptions as methodological devices.

Historically, different forms of dualisms have played an important role in man's comprehension of complex phenomena. In the problem area of man's anxieties over the imperfections of the world there have been according to Weber, three different religious outlooks<sup>19</sup>. These are, predestination which does not offer a rational solution of the problem of theodicy, the doctrine of karma, and dualisms. The dualistic tradition from Zoroastrianism to third century Manicheism viewed all the factors that generate questions of theodicy as a continuing dialectic between two opposing forces sometimes symbolized as light and darkness. Wach has observed the influence of this Iranian dualism on later Judaism, Christianity, and Islam<sup>20</sup>. According to Russell, the soul-body distinction which was religious in origin had a great influence on philosophical, scientific, and popular thought that may be traced back with some reliability to some of the ideas of Socrates, and to Plato's dualisms of reality-appearance, ideas-sensible objects, and reason-sense perception<sup>21</sup>. The medieval world was characterized by a variety of dualisms such as,

clergy-laity, Latin-Teutonic, kingdom of God-kingdoms of this world, spirit-flesh, and Emperor-Pope. Most Western philosophies whether analytical or popular, continued to adopt dualisms as explanatory modes, the notable exception being the work and influence of Descartes. The Cartesian model offered two parallel but independent systems of mind and matter each of which could be studied without reference to the other<sup>22</sup>.

In recent times the most effective challenge to dualisms has been offered by Dewey and others in the philosophy of Pragmatism, and in a more extreme form by the Zen philosophers<sup>23</sup>. According to Kaplan, who is one of the spokesmen for Pragmatism, modern science and technology have influenced a radical bifurcation of Western culture into systems of dualistic thought. He contends that the task of philosophy is not to mediate between conventional opposites but to make clear that the opposition is itself ill-conceived because it mistakes the formulation of a problem for its solution. Zen on the other hand would argue that it is important to transcend all conventional dualisms such as subject-object, and that traditional theses-antitheses serve only as pernicious intellectualizations<sup>24</sup>.

In Section 2 of this chapter reference was made to Hempel's clarification of type constructs. He distinguished between classificatory, extreme, and ideal type constructs. It is clear that dualistic constructs are more or less consistent with all three types. Dualisms are at least of three sorts, namely, dialectics, dichotomies, and polarities. Dialectics refer to a class of dualisms that is consistent with classificatory types.

Dialectics involve two qualitatively different, but opposite and therefore related facets of a single problem or reality. To quote Marcuse, "The two dimensions are antagonistic to each other; the reality partakes of both of them, and the dialectical concepts develop the real contradictions," and again, "This contradictory, two-dimensional style of thought is the inner form not only of dialectical logic but of all philosophy which comes to grip with reality"<sup>25</sup>. Marcuse's clarification refers to the dialectic of polarization and could be illustrated with reference to Davis' typology of hinterland-metropolis cited in Section 2 of this chapter, and Marx's two class model of society. However, the polarization conception is perhaps only one process of the dialectic model. As enumerated by Gurvitch, the dialectic has in addition to polarization, the process of complementarity, mutual implication, ambiguity, and reciprocity as well<sup>26</sup>.

As different from dialectics, there are dichotomies which are also classificatory types in Hempel's sense, and represent two qualitatively different and discrete units that do not necessarily relate to one another. Examples are extrovert-introvert, open mind-closed mind, Parsons' pattern variables, and popular conceptions of good men-bad men, and work-leisure. Parsons has been quite explicit in describing his pattern variables as dichotomies or dilemmas, and not as continua. His types refer to criteria underlying specific actions and not actions in general or for that matter actors. For example, as stated by Parsons, any specific action has to be based either on affective or neutral considerations, and hence cannot be referred to as partly affective or partly neutral<sup>27</sup>. The implications of Parsons' dualism on conformity-deviance would be of

special interest in the chapters to follow.

The third form of dualism, namely, polarities correspond with Hempel's extreme types. Polarities provide a continuum between two qualitatively distinct end points such that a phenomenon under consideration could be placed on an appropriate point along the polarity. Examples of polarities are rural-urban, traditional-modern, development-underdevelopment, and radical-conservative. All three forms of dualisms can of course be presented as ideal types as well.

Dualisms, whether they be dialectics, dichotomies, or polarities, may present methodological difficulties depending on how they are selected and utilized for specific problem analyses. The strongest criticism against dualisms is that they preclude other explanations. Improperly used they could serve as over-simplifications, exaggerations, and ideological explanations of a problem.

With regard to typologies of response and behavior it could be stated that most such constructs are quite explicitly dualistic in formulation, or have inherent properties that enable them to be collapsed into convenient dualisms. In the chapters to follow an assessment will be made of the writings of specific authors in this regard, not merely because they have adopted dualistic conceptions, but more in terms of the methodological utility of such dualisms.

## 5. Labels

The basis for labeling of behavior comprises the fourth problem.



of this chapter. Owing to cultural and value biases implicit in language systems, certain words, and constructs used in scientific inquiry may have connotations that are positive, negative, or merely neutral. The more advanced sciences employ language systems that are formal, and hence the symbols of communication are often more neutral than one sided. The social sciences have not reached a level of communication based on such formal language systems.

Though the more advanced sciences possess formal language systems of communication, the subject matter and important issues of these sciences when translated from their formal-technical language to that of the layman's language, may reflect cultural and other biases. To take one example, it could be asserted that illness whether physical or mental is considered undesirable in most cultures. However, certain diseases are often identified and labeled by laymen in association with out-cultures. Diseases which cannot be identified with out-cultures are often labeled in neutral terms. No culture seems to be proud in identifying a particular disease as truly its own. How this principle is applicable in politics, and international relations has been demonstrated by various authors. In such cases, certain actions are expressed by two terms, the positive or neutral term to describe the actions of in-cultures, and the negative term reserved for the actions of out-cultures.

It is of interest to ascertain the basis for, and the implications of how social scientists go about labeling behavior. The perspective known as labeling theory, has drawn attention to the labeling and stigmatizing processes in society that facilitate and sustain certain

deviant behaviors. Similarly, writers on inter-group relations have highlighted the role of stereotypes in the dynamics of prejudice and discrimination. But all social scientists either, have not been cautious about the ways they have set about labeling behavior.

Labels used by social scientists present a variety of patterns which are not always mutually exclusive. One such pattern is based on viewing society as a system, or a structural functional entity, and then labeling system maintaining activities as conformity, and system disturbing activities as deviance, rebellion, retreatism, and so forth. In this pattern conformity is rarely classified or accounted for in terms of concrete behaviors. The second pattern of labeling is more culture bound. An investigator's choice of labels such as lazy, apathetic, fatalistic, alienated and so forth in identifying societies, individuals, and actions is rarely consistent with the notions held by the subjects of research themselves. The third pattern includes attempts at developing more neutral terms as labels. The investigator may, as one device adopt only symbol systems that have little or no cultural or personal value preferences, in assigning labels. Second, it is possible to use terms, and concepts that have neutral connotations both in layman's language and in the tradition of social science. Third the investigator may attempt to use terms that are consistent with the meanings attached to them by the subjects of investigation. Finally, it is possible to assign a label and define it rigorously well, so that it is clear that the investigator himself has no personal preference for one kind of behavior over another.

The problems associated with the labeling process in Sociology are quite relevant to typologies of response and behavior. First, the manner in which typologies are labeled could present the view that some behaviors are acceptable, while others are undesirable for the investigator, the actor, or for society at large. Despite the claims made by various social scientists to being neutral in this regard, some of them have followed the traditions of Nosology in the ways they have set about labeling certain classes of behavior. Second, there is the possibility that the labels chosen by an investigator to identify types of behavior would have implications for the manner in which such behaviors would be studied. Third, the labels introduced by the investigator to identify certain actions may gain currency of usage in society at large leading to consequences intended or not, over which the investigator has no control. One consequence is the identification by laymen, and mass media of certain behaviors to which conceptual labels can successfully be applied. Fourth, it could be stated that most typologies of behavior are not necessarily consistent with how actors themselves view or interpret their own behavior. Finally, labels of types of behavior are of limited utility in researching observable empirical behaviors.

#### 6. Empathy

The fifth item of this chapter deals with the methodological problem of empathy. Used in the sense of verstehen, empathy refers to a way by which an investigator attempts to understand the subjective meanings that an actor attaches to his actions. This procedure involves an internalization of observable factors in a given situation, and an

application of a behavior maxim based on the experiences of the investigator. The advocates of empathetic Sociology, and their critics have contributed copious writings to the literature. Some of these writings are contained in the readers by Natanson, and Feigl and Brodbeck, and in the monographs by Bruyn, and Nettler<sup>28</sup>.

From the point of view of assessing typologies of response and behavior, the problem of empathy is relevant in the following ways. First, it is clear that most of the assumptions underlying the choice of response modes, goals, motives, and the like are based on certain writers having utilized empathetic procedures in understanding the actions of either an actor, or a hypothetical actor. In this sense the work of these writers is vulnerable to the same criticisms usually levelled against empathetic understanding. Second, empathy as a method can be seen as attempting to ascertain the inner feelings, desires, and motives underlying action. Even if such attempts are likely to produce accurate results, such an understanding of subjective states alone is no necessary explanation of an action itself. Third, it appears that most writers who have developed typologies of response and behavior, have adopted some form of empathy as the sole method of accounting for various behaviors. As a single infallible method, empathy has drawbacks that outweigh its advantages.

## 7. Motives

The concept of motive, and theories of motivation are not topics on which there is much consensus even in the discipline of Psychology. Among prominent Psychologists such as McDougall, Young, Tolman, Cattell,

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and Murray it is possible to observe writings that contain both conceptual and terminological differences on the subject of motivation. A few years back Madsen attempted to codify these and many other conceptions of theories of motivation, and his monograph too points towards possibilities rather than unanimities<sup>29</sup>. Among the Sociologists, Parsons has attempted to clarify some of these conceptions at least insofar as they are appropriate to his own writings<sup>30</sup>.

At this stage of the discussion it is not considered necessary to examine various conceptions of motivation. Rather, it is preferable in the following chapters to deal with such areas of cognitive bias as they relate to the conceptions of specific authors who have developed typologies of response and behavior. The point emphasized at this stage is that most assumptions dealing with goals, motives, drives and so on, as found in the context of the action frame of reference, and typologies of response and behavior are either a reflection of empathetic understanding, or that of ontological speculation.

## 8. Summary

In the preceding sections an attempt was made to present a general analysis of what were considered to be six major problems associated with typologies of response and behavior. These were introduced and discussed as problems of, limited utility, limited tendencies, dualism, labels, empathy, and motives. The problem of limited utility was discussed at greater length, and the issues highlighted therein were found to be of fundamental importance to the construction of modes of response and behavior,

and to overall methodological implications.

Of the five specific problems, the problem of limited tendencies was seen as playing a vital role in the formulation of typologies. The assumptions that researchers have made about action tendencies or response modes an actor is capable of, were demonstrated as in turn determining the modes of behavior, and the classification and labeling of such behaviors. Furthermore, the problem of limited tendencies borders on issues related to the methodological utility of empathy, and to the imputations of motives to acting individuals.

## Footnotes

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- 13 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, op.cit., pp. 139-157.
- 14 Parsons and Shils, op.cit., pp. 91-98, 114-120.
- 15 See footnotes 23-33 in Chapter I.
- 16 Parsons and Shils, op.cit., pp. 20, 90; Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., pp. 254, 256-259, 321-325.
- 17 Parsons and Shils, op.cit., pp. 434-464.
- 18 Merton, "Social Conformity, Deviation . . .", op.cit., p. 177.



- 19 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, op.cit., pp. 144-147.
- 20 Wach, op.cit., p. 47.
- 21 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, p. 134.
- 22 Ibid, pp. 302-303, 567.
- 23 See for example, Abraham Kaplan, The New World of Philosophy, New York: Vintage Books, 1961, esp. pp 16-19, 36-37, 328; Also, Harold E. McCarthy, "Dewey, Zuzuki, and the Elimination of Dichotomies", Philosophy East and West, 6 (April, 1956), pp. 35-48.
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- 25 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, pp. 97, 132.
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- 28 Maurice Natanson, op.cit.; Nettler, op.cit.; Bruyn, op.cit.; Herbert Feigl, and May Brodbeck, (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.
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## C H A P T E R    I I I

### THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WEBER, MERTON, AND DUBIN

#### 1.    Introduction

The purpose of Chapters III and IV is to present an overview and an assessment of typologies of response and behavior that have been advanced by certain writers. It is important to emphasize at the outset that these chapters deal with typologies of modes of response and behavior as clarified in Chapter I. Typologies of societies, social relations, motivation, orientation and so forth are not the major concern of the present research, and as such will receive no attention in the analyses to follow.

The contents of Chapters III and IV have been demarcated on the basis of the contributions of different authors. The present chapter will deal with the contributions of Weber, Merton, and Dubin. The next chapter will deal with the contributions of Parsons and a number of other writers. With regard to the contributions of these specific authors the format of the analysis would consist of two parts. First, the contributions of each author will be introduced and summarized on the basis of information obtained from original sources. The accuracy of the summary of Weber's contribution will also be ascertained in relation to available secondary sources. The second part of the analysis will consist of an assessment of the contribution of each author. This assessment will partly be based on the evaluative criteria outlined in Chapter II.

## 2. Weber's Typologies

A clarification of Weber's typologies of response and behavior has to overcome two major difficulties. First, there is the difficulty of ascertaining the context and continuity of some of Weber's specific contributions as they fit into his overall conceptual apparatus. Weber's voluminous, but incomplete scattered writings contribute to this situation. Furthermore, and as is well known, certain interpretations, and English translations of his writings are inconsistent if not incorrect.

The second major difficulty lies in the fact that only certain areas of Weber's work have been recognized and emphasized in current Sociology. There have been copious writings, and continuing debates on his ideal type methodology, position on values, ideal typifications of bureaucracy, Capitalism, and Ascetic Protestantism, and his three types of legitimacy, and four types of action. In comparison to these areas of emphasis, there has been a relative neglect of his typologies of response and behavior.

It may be recalled that, as clarified in Section 3 of Chapter I, the term modes of response refers to types of action tendencies, whereas, the term modes of behavior refers to types of action in the sense of human conduct. What are often referred to in the literature as Weber's four types of action do not entail action in the sense of behavior as such, but they do demonstrate four possible orientations underlying action. Weber himself has stated that the classification of his types of social action is done " . . . according to its mode of orientation"<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, four types are not types of social action as such, but types of

orientation to social action. It is the contention of the present research that the reference to Weber's types of response and behavior are to be found in his writings on the Sociology of Religion. The explication, and clarification of these types to be undertaken in the paragraphs to follow, are based on two different English translations of Weber's Sociology of Religion<sup>2</sup>.

For the purpose of summarizing Weber's contribution to the subject at hand it is appropriate to begin with what he referred to as the problem of meaning. As used in this context the term "meaning" connotes a religious postulate stating a unified view of the totality of the life of man and the world, and the functioning of both social, and cosmic events. It is to this "meaning" that man must orient his conduct if he is to attain salvation. The discrepancies between "meaning", as propounded in sacerdotal philosophies, and the actual conditions experienced by man in the real world, provide for the strongest tensions in his inner life as well as his relation to the external world. This inconsistency is the "problem" of meaning. The problem of meaning has been addressed to by various philosophies, priestly as well as nonsacerdotal, intellectual as well as popular versions. Religious leaders sought to resolve the theodicy problem by adopting explanations such as predestination, karma doctrine, and dualisms. Reactions to the problem of meaning by other strata varied with their class positions<sup>3</sup>. But it was the stratum of intellectuals to whom the problem constituted the greatest challenge. In Weber's words, "It is the intellectual who transforms the concept of the world into the problem of meaning"<sup>4</sup>.

Different religious orientations prescribe different roads to salvation or the ideal livelihood. However, these prescriptions always involve explicit responses that an individual should make in reference to the world he lives in. Weber has elaborated on four types of response by which an individual may direct action in relation to this world. These four response modes are accommodation<sup>5</sup>, transformation<sup>6</sup>, rejection or withdrawal<sup>7</sup>, and flight<sup>8</sup>. The corresponding modes of behavior are respectively, Confucianism, inner-worldly asceticism, world-rejecting asceticism, and contemplative mysticism. Weber also observed that the accommodation response was somewhat consistent with Judaism, and Islam<sup>9</sup>.

Mode of Response	Mode of Behavior
Accommodation	Confucianism
Transformation	Inner-Worldly Asceticism
Rejection or Withdrawal	World-Rejecting Asceticism
Flight	Contemplative Mysticism

Figure 2. Weber's Typologies of Life Orders

The above explication calls for a number of comments. First, the explication is confined to the demands of a limited scope, namely that of identifying the response modes an individual may adopt in relation to the world as a situation, and the corresponding modes of behavior that serve as a classification of human conduct. Therefore, no attempt has been made to elaborate on the other aspects of Weber's conception. Second, the above explication is based more on empirical possibilities as elaborated in Weber's writings, rather than on logical

possibilities that could be inferred from his initial formulations. Third, it is important to mention the fact that Weber developed these constructs as ideal types, or more correctly, ideal rational types of life orders. There is no evidence to support a contention that his type constructs in this context were envisaged as being either exhaustive or mutually exclusive. On the contrary his basic distinction of types into "ascetic and mystical modes of behavior" were developed as extreme types implying a polarity or continuum rather than a dichotomy<sup>10</sup>.

For the purpose of ascertaining the accuracy of the above clarification it is now proposed to review the interpretations of Bendix, Aron, Freund, and Parsons on this topic of Weber's typologies.

Bendix's clarification may be recognized as being similar to the above explication. He refers to Confucianism, and Puritanism as types of conduct that respectively reflect the modes of adjustment, and mastery in relation to the world. The non-Puritan form of asceticism is seen as rejection or withdrawal. Finally, a fourth type, mystic contemplation is recognized by Bendix as involving escape from the world<sup>11</sup>.

Aron's clarification is confined to what he calls the two fundamental religious attitudes, namely, asceticism, and mysticism. Aron sees two modalities in asceticism, one as asceticism in the world, and the other outside the world. Beyond this general idea he does not further elaborate on the subject<sup>12</sup>.

Freund's interpretation and that which was presented in Figure 2 above are consistent with regard to accommodation, and transformation or mastery. However, Freund interprets contemplative mysticism as renunciation

of the world, and world-rejecting asceticism as flight from the world<sup>13</sup>. The obverse was stated in the clarification in Figure 2 above.

Parsons has offered one of the most comprehensive interpretations of Weber's typologies of live orders<sup>14</sup>. At this stage of the inquiry it is proposed to present only those areas of Parsons' interpretation that are inconsistent with Figure 2 above and the accompanying discussion. According to Parsons, Weber postulated a "basic drive toward meaning". Explanations of the problem of meaning took one of two paths, namely, transcendence, and karma doctrine. These two solutions provided consistent philosophies of moral meaning and theodicies<sup>15</sup>. Then, moving on to "radical salvation and orientations of action" Parsons states that ". . . there are two and only two basic directions in which this radical solution can be sought . . .", namely, the transformation of, and the escape from this world. According to Parsons, "This dichotomy is a truism. . .", and is said to be ". . . very solidly grounded in both historical evidence and general action theory, and is truistic only in the sense in which general action theory is also truistic."<sup>16</sup>.

In Parsons' view the above "dichotomy" assumes two paths when applied to the behavior of individuals. The path of "mastery" is asceticism, and that of "resignment" or "adjustment" is mysticism. Then by cross-tabulating asceticism, and mysticism with inner and other-worldly orientations Weber is said to have derived four types of individual paths, namely, inner-worldly asceticism, other-worldly asceticism, inner-worldly mysticism, and other-worldly mysticism. In passing, Parsons correctly interprets Confucianism as adaptation, but

refers to Judaism, and Islam as inhibited stages toward inner-worldly asceticism<sup>17</sup>.

From the above summary it is clear that Parsons' analysis is highly selective, and biased toward dichotomous interpretations. Of special interest is the fact that his reconstruction of Weber's work is slanted towards Parsons' own conceptions and typologies of action, to be discussed in the next chapter.

### 3. Assessment of Weber's Typologies

As stated earlier, the constructs advanced by Weber were ideal types, to be utilized for the purpose of investigating empirical phenomena. Not only did he make this position explicit, but he also demonstrated the methodological utility of his constructs by examining the interplay between religious orientations and secular behavior, in particular economic conduct. Weber did comparative analyses of Protestantism, Ancient Judaism, and the religions of China, and India in this context. It is also adequate at this stage to recognize the point that he developed certain type constructs reflecting modes of response and behavior with regard to life orders. Presented as ideal types, their utility was examined in reference to the empirical world.

It appears that Weber was more reluctant than some of his successors to set restrictions on the number of possible response modes or action tendencies that an actor was capable of possessing. No where does he seem to suggest logical possibilities of response or behavior as classificatory categories. His scattered references indicate



that he was not working within a closed system of discourse.

Conceptions of unwarranted dualisms and value loaded labels too are not prominent in Weber's work. This is perhaps a reflection of his own position on such topics as functionalism, order, conformity, and deviance. According to Weber, functional analysis is useful only for purposes of practical illustration, provisional orientation, and as points of departure for ascertaining the processes of social action. However, he noted that it has serious limitations as a mode of Sociological inquiry<sup>18</sup>. Weber also distinguished between beliefs in the existence of an order, and the validity of an order, and showed that action could be oriented to an order in ways other than conformity. Thus, for Sociological inquiry, as different from legal inquiry, validity and lack of validity of an order are not rigid alternatives but extreme points of two contradictory systems of order<sup>19</sup>.

As clarified by Bendix,

The view of society as a balance between opposing forces is the reason why Weber quite explicitly rejected the attempt to interpret social structures as wholes, at least in the context of sociological investigations. For him, sociology was a study of the understandable behavior of individuals in society, and collectivities like a state or a nation or a family do not "act" or "maintain themselves" or "function" . . . Weber's approach conceived of society as an arena of competing status groups, each with its own economic interests, status honor and orientation toward the world and man<sup>20</sup>.

The problems of empathy and motives were introduced in the last chapter. With regard to Weber's types of response and behavior, it may be said that he is less vulnerable to these criticisms than some of his

successors. On the question of empathy, it is well known that Weber did not employ it as a single infallible method. This point has been already clarified in Section 1 of Chapter I. Furthermore, and contrary to popular view, Weber administered questionnaires to obtain data on religious orientations as they relate to secular conduct<sup>21</sup>.

Finally, it may be stated that despite the relative obscurity of Weber's contribution to modes of response and behavior, this very contribution seems to have inspired further work on the part of other writers. Merton's well known typology of modes of adaptation, and extensions of it by Dubin, and Parsons seem as much to be deviations from the Weberian conception, as what is conventionally regarded by various commentators to be extensions of the Durkheimian anomie tradition.

#### 4. Merton's Typologies

It is not considered necessary for the present discussion to dwell upon Merton's entire conceptual scheme involving the genesis of anomie, and available criticisms thereof<sup>22</sup>. Rather, the analysis to follow will consist of a summary and an assessment of Merton's contribution only insofar as they are relevant to an understanding of his conception of modes of response and behavior.

Merton's task is to show how, some social structures exert definite pressures upon certain persons in a society to engage in nonconforming behavior rather than conforming behavior. Taking two situational components namely, cultural goals, and institutionalized means, and by cross-tabulating them with the response modes of acceptance, rejection, and rejection-sub-

stitution, Merton arrives at five modes of individual adaptation. These are conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion. For the purpose of illustrative convenience Merton has selected monetary success as a dominant cultural goal in American society, and proceeded to portray in terms of his typology the implications of different individual responses to cultural goals and institutionalized means. With the exception of conformity, the other four modes are considered as deviant adaptations.

#### 5. Assessment of Merton's Typologies

Merton's contribution has led to substantial clarification and further research on what is known as the anomie tradition, deviant behavior, and in particular crime and delinquency. In this sense his work may be regarded as a pioneering effort representing an important milestone in the development of Sociological theory. However, the same cannot be said in respect of his typologies of response and behavior, which examined in their own right as frameworks of individual action may be seen as consisting of a series of weaknesses.

Limited utility is a major problem with Merton's typologies. Despite his recognition and encouragement of empirical studies attempted by others mainly in the anomie tradition, Merton himself has not been explicit in stating how his typologies could be utilized for further research. First, his writings provide no clear indication as to the status of his typologies, and hence his readers are not made aware as to whether these constructs are ideal types unfound in that form in the empirical world or whether they are mere classificatory devices.

Second, with the exception of certain examples provided on certain types of behavior, Merton has made no attempt to illustrate how his constructs could be utilized. Lacking in such clarifications on the methodological utility of his constructs, Merton's scheme may be useful only in the sense of facilitating insights, and interesting ideas.

Third, when applied on a cross-cultural dimension or for that matter in a non-American context, his typologies may be seen as presenting insurmountable methodological problems. For example, what to Merton are retreatism, and rebellion, and hence two modes of deviant adaptation, may well be considered conformist behavior by societies or groups that subscribe to the goals of retreatism, or rebellion as a dominant cultural goal. Made aware of such possibilities Merton has in a later essay introduced the distinction between deviant and variant behavior<sup>23</sup>. However, this distinction alone may not resolve all conflicting possibilities.

A fourth area of limited utility lies in the fact that Merton's constructs and the accompanying sequence of deductive inference do not show much success in explaining or accounting for empirical instances of specific behaviors. In other words, it is not possible to take an instance of empirical behavior and induct generalizations that are consistent with Merton's three modes of response, and two situational components. To do so would be to structure empirical investigation in the style of Merton's categories of type constructs, and such procedures are likely to promote only tautologies rather than empirical possibilities.

What was discussed in the previous chapter as the problem of

limited tendencies can be demonstrated with reference to Merton's work. This problem deals with the assumptions made by a researcher on the types and number of response modes or action tendencies an actor is capable of possessing. It was demonstrated in the last chapter that assumptions made in this respect, in turn determine the bases for classification, and labeling of behaviors. In his formulation, Merton has restricted response modes to only three possibilities namely, acceptance, rejection, and rejection-substitution. He has also restricted the situational components to two aspects namely, cultural goals, and institutionalized means. Furthermore, it is by a rather selective cross-tabulation that Merton derives his five types of adaptation. Merton's choice of response modes is so casual that he does not even have a term or concept to identify them. It appears as if he first decided upon the five modes of adaptation and then worked out the appropriate response modes and situational components that could be made consistent with the modes of adaptation. It is clear that he has not developed all the logical possibilities because all such logical possibilities are not necessarily compatible with the labels he has chosen for the types of behavior. Had he placed less emphasis on restricting response modes and situational components he may have been successful in deriving modes of adaptation that are more consistent with empirical possibilities. Some of the examples selected by Merton to illustrate his scheme may do more damage than good to his overall conception. For instance, he refers to pariahs and outcasts as examples reflecting the retreatist mode of adaptation. Pariahs, and outcasts may in fact be living in retreat not because they reject situational components such as cultural goals, and means, but

because they may be denied access to such components.

Another problem inherent in Merton's scheme is the dichotomous conception of classifying behavior. All his five modes of adaptation are in the final analysis collapsible into two general categories, namely, conformity and deviance. Therefore, any action that may be considered to belong to the modes of innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion is deviant behavior, whereas an action that does not belong to any of these four modes would be considered as conformity. According to this information, an approach to identifying conformist behavior for example, would be to establish any specific action as being consistent with the acceptance of cultural goals, and institutionalized means. The rationale for such an approach must be based on Merton's assumptions that only conformist action is oriented toward the acceptance of cultural goals and institutionalized means. However, it is quite possible that most actions are not oriented toward the acceptance of cultural goals and institutionalized means. Therefore, it is likely that there may be only two possibilities of explaining the complexities of action. One approach is to assert that most actions are deviant, and that only a very few actions are conformist behavior. A second approach is to establish the criteria by which only certain actions can be identified as being either conformist, or deviant, and set aside an infinite number of residual actions as being neither conformist, nor deviant. Only this second approach seems to be compatible with Merton's scheme. Then it would seem apparent that rather than the pressures created by certain social structures, it is often the structuring of typologies that provide for demarcations such as conformist and deviant actions.

With regard to the policy of labeling behavior, Merton has been somewhat careless in the choice of terms. First, some of his labels such as ritualism, and retreatism, could present the image that certain classes of behavior are as it were doctrines of action or social movements promoting certain kinds of action. Second, as of late Merton himself has been convinced of the unintended consequences, including certain ambiguities in the use of his labels. Thus in his more recent work, Merton has introduced new distinctions between deviant and variant behavior, and between aberrant and nonconforming behavior<sup>24</sup>.

Viewed from an action frame rather than an anomie tradition perspective of emphasis, Merton's typologies may be seen as being based upon the imputation of certain motives to the actor and also some form of empathetic understanding. In Merton's scheme, actors are motivated toward accepting, rejecting, or substituting cultural goals, and institutionalized means. That such a conception excludes a great variety of behavior has been already suggested earlier. The only justification for imputing such motives seems to be that it is compatible with the derivation of Merton's five types of adaptation. With regard to methodological procedures it appears that Merton's constructs, and the accompanying deductive sequence begins with some empathetic understanding of the motives of real or hypothetical actors. Empathy is most vulnerable to criticism if it is used as a single infallible method. With the exception of selective events and examples that illustrate his thesis, there is no evidence based on or supported by methodological procedures other than that of empathy.

It has been somewhat conventional for Merton's conceptual scheme to be interpreted in terms of the anomie tradition. Thus, his contribution is usually seen as an important contribution to the initial Durkheimian thesis, and as leading toward a more comprehensive convergence point in complementarity with conceptions such as cultural transmission, differential association, sub-cultures, and differential opportunity structures. In contrast to assessments of Merton's work in such directions, the present analysis has attempted to assess his work in terms of its typological structures, and the action frame of reference. The evaluation presented in this regard may have implications for the utility of Merton's scheme in the field of deviance research as well.

## 6. Dubin's Typologies

Dubin's task has been to examine Merton's typology for its internal logic, and its ability to model the reality it claims to represent. In the course of this venture, Dubin has extended Merton's typology to fourteen types of deviant behavior which include Merton's four deviance types as well<sup>25</sup>.

The extension of Merton's typology is accomplished through a series of operations. First, innovation, and ritualism are each subdivided on the basis of behavioral and value dimensions. Second, the situational dimension has been reclassified as comprising cultural goals, institutional means, and institutional norms. Third, these situational components are cross-tabulated with three modes of response or as Dubin calls them modes of attachment, namely acceptance, rejection, and



rejection-substitution. According to Dubin, this cross-tabulation should yield twenty six logically possible modes of deviant adaptation. Of these twenty six, Dubin has selected and elaborated on fourteen types which are said to be "active" adaptations. The remaining twelve types are considered to be possible subjective preconditions of action which are likely to develop into one or more of the fourteen active types.

The fourteen types of active deviant adaptation elaborated by Dubin are, institutional invention, normative invention, and operating invention, under the category of behavioral innovation; Intellectual invention, organization invention, and social movement under the category of value innovation; Levelling of aspirations, institutional moralist, and organization automation under the category of behavioral ritualism; Demagogue, normative opportunist, and means opportunist under the category of value ritualism; and finally, retreatism, and rebellion.

According to Dubin, the conceptions of Merton, and Dubin are not theories explaining how or why deviant behavior occurs. Rather, these conceptions are "part-theories" that provide a descriptive typology of mutually exclusive types of nonconforming behavior. These part-theories are based on "sensitizing" rather than "explicit" concepts, and are grounded in social psychological rather than sociological laws of interaction<sup>26</sup>.

#### 7. Assessment of Dubin's Typologies

The efforts of Dubin are commendable in the following areas. First, by sub-dividing the modes of innovation, and ritualism, and by re-

classifying the situational components he has provided for a wider range of modes of behavior. That is, in contrast to Merton's four types of deviance, Dubin's scheme facilitates twenty six types, though of course, he considers only fourteen of these as important.

Second, Dubin's work has contributed towards highlighting the social psychological determinants, and therefore more research to be directed towards the action frame of reference rather than an exclusive concern over structures and functions. In this sense, an action frame of inquiry, and a social psychological emphasis could complement the conventional anomie tradition interpretations of the initial formulation of Merton.

On the weakness side the following observations could be made in reference to Dubin's scheme. Some of these observations overlap with the criticisms offered with regard to Merton's scheme in Section 5 of the present chapter. To avoid repetition, such comments involving overlap would be restricted to a minimum.

As in the case of Merton, Dubin's constructs too are of limited utility. With regard to the status of his type constructs and the uses to which they could be employed particularly in empirical research, Dubin does not offer much information. In fact, with the exception of extending Merton's modes of adaptation, Dubin has been content with following Merton's assumptions, and deductive logic. It is also interesting to note that whereas Dubin has made some innovations with regard to reclassifying Merton's situational components, and two modes of adaptation, he has made no improvements on the three response modes or

action tendencies set forth by Merton. As with Merton, Dubin too has assumed that an actor is capable of possessing only three response modes, namely, acceptance, rejection, and rejection-substitution. If Dubin had not restricted himself to limiting modes of response in this manner he may have arrived at more modes of behavior that are consistent with empirical reality.

The fact that Dubin has been able to identify twenty six types of deviance in contrast to one type of conformity may illustrate his preoccupation with a dualistic conception of human behavior. As in the case with Merton's scheme, empirical evidence on Dubin's typology of behavior may represent a far greater preponderance of deviant actions in contrast to those of conformity. Such evidence, by no means difficult to obtain, may demand a re-conceptualization of deviance and conformity. That is, deviance in the sense portrayed by Dubin in his twenty six types, may be the recurrent pattern of human conduct, whereas, his conformist type may reflect the most radical deviations from such a pattern.

In addition to these problems of limited utility, limited tendencies, and dualism, Dubin's typologies are further consistent with those of Merton in the sense that they both reflect the identical problems associated with labels, empathetic understanding, and the general imputations of motives.

The following comments are applicable almost exclusively to Dubin's conceptual scheme. His labeling procedure for example, may be considered inadequate on the following grounds. First, it is possible

to assume that Dubin had already decided upon the fourteen categories of deviance he wished to develop and label. This is perhaps why the remaining twelve types have no labels at all, and are not considered as active adaptations. His distinction between the active and inactive types is not all that clear and remains dubious. Second, according to how Dubin has labeled the fourteen active types of deviant behavior, it is not clear as to whether these types refer to types of people such as demagogues, types of collective processes such as social movements, types of action such as intellectual invention, or modes of behavior such as retreatism, and rebellion.

#### 8. Summary

This chapter was devoted to presenting an overview and an assessment of typologies of modes of response and behavior as found in the writings of Weber, Merton, and Dubin. In this context, Weber's typologies of life order, Merton's typologies of modes of individual adaptation, and Dubin's extension of Merton's work were reviewed and assessed.

The presentation of Weber's work involved some explication and re-construction which are not quite consistent with the conventional interpretations offered by some of his commentators. The assessment of Weber's contribution reflects the general conclusion that his attempts at constructing ideal typologies of response and behavior have less weaknesses than those of his successors.

The conceptions of Merton and Dubin are similar to the extent that they seem to hold similar assumptions and pursue the identical logic of inquiry. Hence, there is much overlap in the areas of assessment of these two authors' work. The evaluation made in this chapter was less conventional in the sense that it was based more on an action frame of reference perspective rather than that of one of the anomie tradition.

## Footnotes

- 1 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, op.cit., p. 115.
- 2 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, op.cit.; From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, H.H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills (trans.), New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946, esp. pp. 267-359.
- 3 For these ideas see, Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Ibid., pp. 59, 144-145; From Max Weber, Ibid. pp 275, 351-353, 358-359.
- 4 Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Ibid., p. 125.
- 5 See especially, Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Ibid., pp. 239, 270; From Max Weber, op.cit., pp. 268, 293.
- 6 Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Ibid., p. 166; From Max Weber, op.cit., p. 325.
- 7 Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Ibid., pp. 166, 169.
- 8 Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Ibid., p. 169; From Max Weber, op.cit., pp. 292, 325.
- 9 Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Ibid. pp. 246, 262.
- 10 Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Ibid. pp. 172, 177; From Max Weber, op.cit., pp. 323-325.
- 11 Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber, An Intellectual Portrait, New York: Anchor Books, 1962, pp. 140-141, 193-194, 198-199, 201.
- 12 Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. II, New York: Basic Books, 1967, p. 225.
- 13 Julien Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber, New York: Vintage Books, 1969, pp. 177, 197-198.
- 14 See introduction to Weber, The Sociology of Religion, op.cit., pp xlv-liv.
- 15 For inconsistency compare, Weber, The Sociology of Religion, op.cit., pp. 144-145, with p. xlviii.
- 16 Ibid., p. 1.
- 17 Ibid., pp. li-liii.
- 18 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op.cit., p. 103.

- 19 Ibid., pp. 124-126.
- 20 Bendix, op.cit., pp. 261-262.
- 21 See for example, Weber, The Sociology of Religion, op.cit., p.139.
- 22 See for example, Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, op.cit., pp. 131-194; Also, essays by Dubin, Cloward, Merton, and others in, American Sociological Review, 24 (April, 1959).
- 23 Merton, American Sociological Review, Ibid., pp. 180-183.
- 24 Merton, Ibid., and also in, Merton and Nisbet, op.cit., pp. 829-832.
- 25 Dubin, op.cit.
- 26 Dubin, op.cit., pp. 162-164.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PARSONS AND OTHER WRITERS

#### 1. Introduction

As was suggested in Chapters I and II, there has been some neglect of the conception of response modes in Sociology, despite the fact that many prominent Sociologists have utilized the idea of response modes in their formulations of types of behavior. Among behavioral scientists such as Psychologists, and Organization Analysts, the conception of response modes has been one of foremost concern. In one of the earliest formulations of types of response modes, Karen Horney developed three modalities or styles of how people relate to one another<sup>1</sup>. These three modes involve, moving toward others, against others and away from others. These three modes deal with conceptions of love, hate and aloneness or alienation, respectively. More recently Murray has made a case for, and developed his own classification of twelve types of response modes<sup>2</sup>. The importance of the idea of response modes has been emphasized by authors such as Madsen, and Simon<sup>3</sup>.

In the previous chapter, the work of Weber, Merton, and Dubin were examined. The present chapter will consist of a similar analysis with regard to the work of Parsons and a number of other authors.

The analysis to follow will consist of three areas of discussion. The first part deals with an overview and an assessment of the contribution of Parsons. The second part is an analysis of modes of individual



response as developed by certain other authors. For convenience of discussion these typologies are subdivided as constructs dealing with modes of individual response to situations in general, and modes of individual response to specific situations. The third part will consist of an analysis of typologies of modes of collective response. Again for convenience of discussion, these typologies will be subdivided as constructs on collective behavior, and constructs on the behavior of specific collectivities.

## 2. Parsons' Typologies

Parsons' contribution to typologies of response and behavior can be ascertained by examining his analysis of deviance<sup>4</sup>. A comprehension of Parsons' analysis of deviance has to be preceded by an appreciation of his conception of conformity, for it is a departure from conformity that constitutes one of several kinds of deviance.

Parsons' fundamental paradigm of social interaction deals with what he sometimes refers to as "an established state of a social system". Such a system involves a process of complementary interaction of two or more actors in which each conforms with the expectations of the other on the basis of internalized value patterns, such that the interactive process is one of stable equilibrium that tends to continue unchanged. The "first law of social process" states that, once established, such an interactive process has the "tendency" to maintain itself without becoming "problematical". The learning process by which individuals acquire the orientations to fulfill their role obligations in such a system is known as socialization, and there are mechanisms of socialization

that ensure this process<sup>5</sup>.

However, actors may also possess tendencies to deviate from an established social system. Deviance in this sense is complete only if two more conditions are fulfilled. These are, first, that the deviant behavior should involve motivated action, and second, the actor should have had full opportunity to be socialized prior to committing the deviant act. Tendencies to deviate are held in check by mechanisms of control<sup>6</sup>. From the direction of the actor, deviance involves a motivated tendency to behave in contravention of an institutionalized normative pattern. From the direction of a social system, deviance involves a tendency on the part of an actor to behave in such a way as to disturb the equilibrium of the interactive process<sup>7</sup>.

Parsons' conception of the genesis of deviance begins with the assumption that a disturbance could be introduced into the social system. Such a disturbance dislocates the interactive pattern that is based on double complementarity of expectations. The resulting strain experienced by ego, demands of him a new adjustment to the changed situation. He could adopt one or more of the following adjustment processes by way of reacting to the frustrating behavior of alter. One of them is for ego to inhibit or repress his needs. A second alternative involves the attempt on ego's part to transfer his cathexis to a new object by way of substitution. Third, it is possible to renounce or re-define the interactive pattern with which alter is no longer conforming. Parsons has also noted two more possible outcomes namely, ambivalence, and the production of phantasies<sup>8</sup>. Here and elsewhere, Parsons has cited three

more possibilities, namely creativity, autonomy, and indifference<sup>9</sup>. Apparently, these three modes are not reactions to strain.

Ambivalence itself has inherent strains, and these could be handled by following one of two fundamental alternatives. The first alternative is to repress one component of the ambivalent structure so that the other component may express itself. If the negative component is repressed, ego will continue both attachment to alter, and conformity to norms. If the positive component is repressed ego will abandon both attachment to alter, and conformity to norms. The second fundamental alternative is for ego to gratify both components of the ambivalent structure, by ways such as seeking of substitutes<sup>10</sup>. For his elaboration of the genesis of deviance, Parsons is content with an exclusive reliance upon these two alternatives of the ambivalent pattern. In the light of what was so far presented, Parsons' conception of ego's alternative modes of response could be summarized as follows:

<u>Total Responses:</u>	Conformity; Creativity; Autonomy; Indifference; Inhibition or repression of needs; Transfer of cathexis to substitutes; Renunciation or transformation of interaction pattern; Production of phantasies; Ambivalence of repression; Ambivalence of gratification.
<u>Conforming Response:</u>	Conformity.
<u>Responses to Situational Strain:</u>	Inhibition or repression of needs; Transfer of cathexis to substitutes; Renunciation or transformation of interaction pattern; Production of phantasies; Ambivalence of repression; Ambivalence of gratification.
<u>Deviant Responses:</u>	Ambivalence of repression; Ambivalence of gratification.

Figure 3. Parsons' Conception of Modes of Individual Response

A comparison of the above explication with Figure I in Chapter I shows that, transfer of cathexis to substitutes, and ambivalence of gratification, are respectively consistent with the modes of Rejection, and Deferment.

To continue with Parsons, an ambivalent motivational structure implies an attachment to the situation. The negative, and positive components of the ambivalent motivational structure are, respectively called an alienative need-disposition, and a conformative need-disposition. By sub-dividing the responses of conformative, and alienative dominance on the criteria of active and passive orientations, Parsons develops four modes of deviant behavior, namely, compulsive performance, compulsive acquiescence, rebelliousness, and withdrawal. These modes are said to be consistent with Merton's innovation, ritualism, rebellion, and retreatism. Merton's "conformity" is seen by Parsons as being consistent with ego's action that is compatible with an equilibrated interactive system without any conflict or alienative need-disposition<sup>11</sup>.

To summarize then, Parsons has initially identified no less than ten possible modes of response. Of these, he has recognized two responses as important to his study. These are, the responses of conformity and ambivalence. Ambivalence is the only response selected for the analysis of deviance, and this response takes the form of either conformative, or alienative dominance. These two types of dominance as related to active, and passive orientations yield four modes of deviant behavior.

Parsons has then extended these four modes of deviant behavior to comprise eight types. This has been accomplished by introducing two new

variables, namely, the situational components of social objects, and norms. The eight types of deviant behavior thus derived are, dominance, compulsive enforcement, submission, perfectionistic observance, aggressiveness, incorrigibility, compulsive independence, and evasion<sup>12</sup>.

For illustrative convenience, Parsons has provided some examples of concrete behavior that are consistent with his categories of deviant behavior<sup>13</sup>. Individualized crime is an example of active alienative dominance, whereas, hoboism, Bohemianism, sick role, and schizophrenia are examples of passive alienative dominance. Group dimensions of active alienative dominance are criminal and delinquent gangs, whereas, the same dimension of passive alienative dominance could be seen in exotic religious sects. Participation in substitution patterns such as deviant sub-cultures provides an individual the opportunity to enact both the conformative, and alienative components of his ambivalent motivational structure.

### 3. Assessment of Parsons' Typologies

The major strengths of Parsons' scheme could be stated as follows. First, it is an extension of Merton's formulation, and this extension has been accomplished by the utilization of a greater number of variables and an attempt at elaborating the processes of deviant motivation and social control. Therefore, Merton's scheme can now be considered only as one aspect of the more general formulation of Parsons.

Second, Parsons has made a clear distinction between modes of response and modes of behavior. Despite his rather inconsistent terminology,

it is clear that Parsons has arrived at his eight types of deviant behavior by cross-tabulating the conformative and alienative responses with two sets of orientation namely, activity, and passivity, and two sets of situational components, namely, social objects and norms.

Third, Parsons' typologies of deviance are consistent with, and integral to his overall conceptions of action, and social system. That is, instead of being treated as a separate field or topic of study by itself, the subject of deviance and its typological structure have been integrated with Parsons' general body of sociological thinking.

On the weakness side, a number of comments can be offered with regard to Parsons' typologies of response and behavior. Parsons' work can first be criticized on the basis of the six major evaluative criteria developed in Chapter II of this thesis. To avoid repetition such criticisms will be confined to a minimum insofar as they are similar to the criticisms offered against the work of Merton in the previous chapter. As a second area of criticism, some special comments will be offered as almost exclusively applicable to Parsons' work.

As in the case of Merton's typologies, it could be stated that Parsons' work is of limited utility. Of special interest in this regard is the applicability of Parsons' scheme in comparative analysis, that is, for example, from the point of view of cross-cultural settings. Despite his insistence that the conceptions of conformity-deviance are always relative to the values and normative patterns of specific social systems, Parsons' scheme is built upon, and illustrated by his conception of American society<sup>14</sup>. The objection raised here is not against providing

examples from the American context. Rather, the objection is against the nonapplicability of Parsons' scheme in non-American cultural contexts. Parsons himself has expressed this point, but only after almost fifty pages into his chapter on deviance. He states that the discussion on deviance has been illustrated " . . . almost entirely in terms of the American or at most the modern Western institutional structure and value system". Parsons continues to state that his scheme is applicable "with proper adaptation" to the analysis of other cultures and institutional structures as well<sup>15</sup>.

As with Merton's work, Parsons' conceptions can be criticised on the grounds of limited tendencies. As indicated earlier, Parsons has listed no less than ten possible alternative modes of individual response. However, for his analysis of conformity and deviance, he has confined his attention only to two major areas of response, namely, conformity itself, and ambivalence which is subdivided into two further types. Apparently, the list of remaining response modes imply neither conformity, nor deviance.

In the final analysis therefore, Parsons' conceptions of action and system are based on the fundamental dualism of conformity-deviance. Other possible action tendencies and modes of behavior are considered unimportant. With regard to labeling procedures, and the problems of empathy, and the imputation of motives, Parsons' approach is very much similar to that of Merton, and needs no further elaboration. Sufficient it is to mention that according to Parsons' formulation, criminals, revolutionaries, and persons who protest or challenge a system seem to

fit into the category of active alienative dominance. Compulsive achievers, and persons who enforce norms, or dominate a system seem to fit into the category of active conformative dominance.

Now, the following comments will be offered as special criticisms of Parsons' work. These comments deal with two major issues. The first issue involves Parsons' basic assumption about an established social system, and therefore the norms of conformity. The second issue deals with rather conflicting assumptions about the actor and the system.

According to Parsons, the major assumption underlying the conception of an established state of a social system involves complementarity of interaction between two or more individuals based on a consensus on values and on adherence to normative patterns. Once established, such an interactive process has the tendency to maintain itself without conflict. Participation in such an equilibrated process is said to be conformity, whereas, departures from such a system comprise deviant behavior. The general validity of Parsons' conformity-deviance dichotomy and the empirical plausibility of identifying certain actions rest upon the acceptance of this basic assumption. This assumption can be challenged at least on two grounds. First, it does not seem to be consistent either with commonsense or with empirical social research. Second, Parsons himself does not provide any valid reasons as to why the assumption should be accepted. Ironically, Parsons' own clarification of his basic assumption may do more to cast doubts than to justify its validity.



It is certainly contrary to much of the commonsense of the social sciences, but it will nevertheless be assumed . . . This is clearly an assumption, but there is, of course, no theoretical objection to such assumptions if they serve to organize and generalize our knowledge. Another way of stating this is to say that no special mechanisms are required for the explanation of the maintenance of complementary interaction-orientation<sup>16</sup>.

The second major issue involves conflicting emphasis about the actor and the established state of the social system. Assumptions about the established state of the social system, in particular, the "tendency" to maintain itself, have already been clarified. According to Parsons, an actor in a social system too, has a "tendency" namely to the optimization of gratification<sup>17</sup>. Therefore, it appears that conformity occurs when an actor's gratification goals and corresponding action are congruent with the values and normative patterns of the established social system. All other types of action are either irrelevant or deviant. Since Parsons has carefully portrayed the conditions under which conformity and the eight types of deviance may occur, it is likely that there exists a residual category of a multitude of actions that is irrelevant to the conformity-deviance dimension, but consistent with empirical reality. This possibility implies at least three kinds of action, namely, conformist, deviant, and other. There are two emergent problems here. First, as far as behavior in the empirical world is concerned, it is almost impossible to ascertain which is which, and in this sense, Parsons' scheme is almost nonresearchable. Second, given the kinds of assumptions and the tautologies in logic, Parsons' scheme is also nonfalsifiable and has to be accepted or rejected on grounds of faith or empathy.

#### 4. Other Typologies of Individual Response

In this section it is proposed to present an overview of typologies of modes of individual response as developed by certain other authors. Unlike Parsons, most of these authors have developed typologies that apply to a less general context of scope, or to a less complex elaboration of the action sequence.

Wach for example, has restricted to three distinct alternatives, the general religious attitudes that man could have with regard to nature and the environment. Wach calls these, naive acceptance, vigorous rejection, and sanctification<sup>18</sup>. This typology seems to be based on the kinds of criteria used by Weber, in developing his own constructs of life orders. However, as may be recalled, Weber's typologies are more exhaustive and elaborate than those of Wach.

In his conceptualization of social disorganization, Cohen has advanced a three-fold typology of alternative responses to strain<sup>19</sup>. The first of these is, suppression and adjustment, and seems to be recognized by Cohen as a conforming tendency. The second type is avoidance and substitution. This alternative response is likely to express itself in the form of activity in group situations. Third, there is the "go it alone" syndrome which is conceived of as aberrance. According to Cohen, the second, and third types are deviant responses. This typology seems to be based on Parsons' formulation, but is less complex, and less exhaustive.

Another typology of modes of individual response and behavior

has been developed by Dusky L. Smith<sup>20</sup>. These constructs have been advanced on the basis of a critique and an extension of Merton's formulation. Smith has derived sixteen modes of individual behavior. This has been accomplished by cross-tabulating the situational components of cultural goals, and institutional means, with four modes of response, namely, acceptance, rejection, rejection-substitution, and ambivalence. Smith's scheme is said to "assume a more complex world" than that of Merton. Smith also claims that the added dimension of ambivalence as a mode of response probably characterizes the life of most Americans, and that it also demonstrates how a society may exist without a deposit of shared values. Smith's formulation has four distinguishing characteristics. First, it has incorporated an additional response mode, namely, ambivalence. Second, his modes of behavior do not represent any conformity-deviance connotations. Third, the sixteen modes of behavior have no labels whatsoever, and are represented only by numerical symbols. Fourth, and perhaps most important, it appears that Smith's sixteen modes of behavior are derived from a cross-tabulation of the modes of response and the situational components. This procedure is different from first deciding upon the modes of behavior one wants to elaborate upon, and then selecting the situational components and modes of response whose cross-tabulation is bound to yield the modes of behavior that are consistent with the earlier decision.

The typologies of Wach, Cohen, and Smith mentioned above are similar to those of Merton, and Parsons in the sense that all these typologies represent modes of individual response and behavior as they relate to an unspecified situation in terms of cultural contents and structural

arrangements.

In contrast to such typologies, Goffman has developed a set of constructs that represent individual modes of response as they relate to an "inmate's" reaction to a "total institution"<sup>21</sup>. Goffman has described four main types of individual response. These are, "situational withdrawal", "intransigent line", "colonization", and "conversion". According to Goffman's presentation, these modes imply three important features. First, they refer to modes of individual response and not to collective response on the part of the inmates. Second, the modes imply action tendencies from the point of view of the inmate, and not of the staff of the institution. Third, most inmates adopt these modes of response as transitory tendencies. Thus, "playing it cool" implies choosing from an opportunistic combination of all four modes, depending on the inmate's definition of changing situations.

Another typology of modes of response to a specific social situation has been suggested by Presthus<sup>22</sup>. He calls them "patterns of accommodation," to bureaucratic environments. The three modes of response are, acceptance, rejection, or withdrawal, and ambivalence. These responses are respectively associated with the personality types known as upward-mobiles, indifferents, and ambivalents.

The five authors referred to above are by no means the only behavioral scientists who have been concerned with modes of response. The pioneering contributions of Horney, and Murray cited at the beginning of this chapter, and the more recent contributions of writers such as Hobart, and Jung, may also be mentioned in this regard<sup>23</sup>. There have also

been a series of attempts in the tradition of Social Psychology to develop and modify certain modes of response. These are sometimes referred to as types of conformity and types of deviance. Willis' four modes of response to norms, namely, conformity, independence, anti-conformity, and variability, are significant contributions in this direction. An overview of, and further references to contributions in this tradition including the work of Willis, are to be found in the review by Boldt.<sup>24</sup>

##### 5. Typologies of Collective Response

These typologies deal with attempts made by certain authors to develop modes of response that serve as directions for collective behavior in general, or the behavior of collectivities in the sense of specified cultural and social groupings. In the case of behavior of collectivities it is apparently assumed that socio-cultural and social psychological determinants facilitate certain general tendencies on the part of acting individuals that comprise such groupings.

In developing his conception of collective behavior, Blumer mentions that there are five types of social unrest. These function as different psychological states. These five types together or singularly could produce four general tendencies of behavior. These directions are as follows. One direction is to change the external world of institutional life. A second direction attempts to leave the world intact, and seek moral transformation of individuals. Third, it is possible to flee from the existing world into some refuge of cultish or philosophical life. Finally, a fourth direction may seek to dissipate unrest within the world

by indulging in frivolity, or gratification of the senses<sup>25</sup>. It is clear that these four directions or modes of response are reactions to psychological states of unrest. No conformity-deviance dimensions are implicit in Blumer's typologies.

In a recent essay on youth and politics, Lipset has developed two sets of type constructs denoting the response modes by which different generation-units of youth react to Western Society<sup>26</sup>. The first typology deals with generation-unit responses to the component of values of Western society. Here there are two major types of response, namely, acceptance, and renunciation. Acceptance also implies the idea of owning Western society, and this response is found in backlash youth, militant black youth, and radical youth. Renunciation implies disowning Western society, and this response is found among Bohemian youth. Lipset's second set of constructs deals with generation-unit responses to the distribution system of power and rewards in Western society. Here again there are two major responses, namely, maintenance and revision. Backlash youth subscribe to the maintenance response, while the revisionist response is found in radical and black militant youth. Lipset has stated that these two sets of constructs are polarities or extreme types. He also contends that a large majority of young people accept the system, that is, the values, and the distribution pattern of power and rewards in Western society.

A two-fold typology of modes of response on the part of collectivities has been provided by Merton<sup>27</sup>. This formulation is only one aspect of Merton's conception of Social Problems. Merton's conception has at

least three components, namely, the clarification of the term Social Problems with its latent and manifest implications, the two major value orientations that underlie the responses to action, and the corresponding types of response that collectivities direct toward Social Problems.

Social problems have been identified here as the substantial, unwanted, discrepancies between what exists in a society and what a functionally significant collectivity within that society seriously (rather than in phantasy) wants to exist in it<sup>28</sup>

According to Merton, Social Problems are manifest only when people believe that something can be done to remedy them. Otherwise, Social Problems remain latent and unnoticed except to the informed observer. The perception of Social Problems depends upon the value orientations of the society, that is, depending on whether these orientations are activist, or fatalist. Activist orientations determine the response of human control of the environment, whereas, fatalism provides for passive acceptance, resignation, quietism, and retreatism. The relation between fatalism, and Social Problems is said to be one of mutual reinforcement and the corresponding mode of response of the society merely sustains the situation.

According to Merton's description, these constructs are extreme types and most societies may be placed on a continuum between those extremes. Some complex industrial societies have a high level of material wealth and advanced cultural values. Such societies are relatively more problem-ridden than other societies.

## 6. Assessment

This assessment deals with the type constructs described in Sections 4 and 5. It may be recalled that some of the criticisms made against the contributions of Merton, Dubin, and Parsons are applicable to these type constructs as well.

The typologies of Wach, Cohen, and Smith represent individual modes of response and/or behavior in relation to situations in general. The constructs by Wach, and Cohen deal only with modes of response. Wach's contribution can best be assessed as an incomplete and less elaborate version of Weber's typologies of life order. Cohen's types resemble those of Parsons because of the inherent conformity-deviance dualism and his preoccupation with single and group substitutes of aberrant behavior. Smith's typologies are extensive in terms of the incorporation of four response modes and the elaboration of modes of behavior. His work constitutes a critical extension of Merton's formulation. Furthermore, Smith has refrained from attaching labels to his modes of behavior and from imputing conformity-deviance connotations to his type constructs. As was indicated earlier, his logic of deriving the modes of behavior seems to be more rigorous than that of some of his predecessors.

The contributions of Goffman, and Presthus are significant because they provide typologies of individual response as they relate to specified social situations. Goffman's perception of an inmate's responses to a "total institution" is important for a variety of reasons. First, he has considered these responses from an inmate's point of view. Second, he has refrained from attaching any conformity-deviance connotations to



these responses. Third, and perhaps most important, Goffman views these responses as transitory phases, and not as permanent role tendencies or for that matter types of actors. Presthus' typologies are perhaps a combined extension of Merton's formulation on anomie, and Merton's description of the bureaucratic personality. Presthus' three-fold typology of modes of response may have implications for research on concrete bureaucracies. One shortcoming of his conception however, is the fact that he seems to be developing personality types rather than different roles or modes of behavior.

Blumer's typology of modes of collective response bears a close resemblance to Weber's typologies of life order. His formulation however provides interesting insights into the designing of research problems dealing with a variety of group behavior in contemporary society. The typologies of Lipset, and Merton are useful to the extent that they focus attention on possible modes of response on the part of specified collectivities. Lipset's work represents two sets of typologies linking up generation-units of youth, and the values and distribution system of Western society. Merton's work shows how types of larger collectivities relate to social problems. The conceptions of Lipset, and Merton are based on certain assumptions about the value orientations of social groupings. Unqualified acceptance of their conceptions implies an uncritical adoption of their assumptions as well.

In concluding this section it is opportune to clarify just one of a series of overall problems in the construction of typologies. This is the labeling problem introduced in Chapter II. Most of the authors

cited in Chapters III, and IV subscribe in one way or another to some style of labeling individual or collective behavior. Some of these labels not only imply positive-negative connotations in terms of linguistic meanings, but they also assume some empathetic perception of why and how certain individuals act under certain conditions. In fact there is no apparent justification for the use of labels such as, activism, apathy, indifference and so on unless their methodological utility have been demonstrated. First, certain authors do not indicate whether specific labels and the meanings attached to such labels are consistent with the world views and points of view of the acting individuals themselves. Second, it is not always clear as to the specific situations or situational components, to which individual responses are said to be those of activism, apathy, and so on. That is, for example, it is possible that individuals and collectivities may respond with activism to one situation and with apathy to another. Third, there is considerable confusion because terms such as apathy are not carefully defined by certain investigators.

The problem of labels with reference to single type constructs on modes of response on the part of collectivities, and some related issues, are highlighted in Gordon K. Hirabayashi's essay on the Metis of Alberta<sup>29</sup>. The major conclusion therein is that what may appear to an observer as Metis "apathy" may in fact be how the Metis positively respond to modernization and a rapidly changing environment. Therefore, terms such as active participation, apathy, withdrawal, and indifference, serve no useful methodological task if they are indiscriminately applied to specific collectivities. This same problem has been stated by Kaplan

with reference to another culture.

I have several times hazarded the opinion that classical Indian philosophy makes for a certain apathy and withdrawal; but I would be hard put to defend this position. Every traveller feels, I am sure, that the natives just don't do things sensibly, and that if he were running the country, things would be very different. I freely admit that when I first went to India I shared this universal reaction<sup>30</sup>.

## 7. Summary

This chapter was devoted to an overview and an assessment of typologies of modes of response and behavior in the writings of Parsons and a number of other authors. Parsons' constructs were found to be the most comprehensive, and elaborate exposition of modes of response and behavior. He had attempted to account for both the motivational and orientational bases of deviant action. Furthermore, Parsons' scheme was seen as comprising an integral part of his overall conceptions of action and system. A number of criticisms were also offered with regard to Parsons' typologies.

The typologies of Wach, Cohen, and Smith were seen as less elaborate but substantial contributions. Smith's formulation was more innovative and perhaps provides one of the more useful critical extensions of Merton's work. The typologies of individual response to specified situations as formulated by Goffman, and Presthus reflect the difference between typologies of general concern and typologies relating to concrete socio-cultural contexts. Goffman in particular has made certain observations that challenge the methodological utility of typologies that are too general to be applied to concrete situations. The contributions of

Goffman, and Presthus are most appropriate to further empirical research.

Blumer's typology of collective response, and the typologies of response of specific collectivities by Lipset and Merton were seen as providing interesting insights into the analysis of group conduct.

As a general conclusion to Chapters III, and IV, it may be stated that the major contributions to typologies of modes of individual response and behavior have been made by Weber, Merton and Parsons. Despite various shortcomings, their work provides a firm basis for extended modifications and further research. The pioneering work by Horney, and Murray, on the subject of modes of response, and the innovative ventures by Smith, and Goffman also deserve special mention in this regard.

## Footnotes

- 1 See footnote 30 in Chapter I.
- 2 See footnote 17 in Chapter II.
- 3 See footnotes 29, and 32 in Chapter I.
- 4 Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., esp. pp. 249-325.
- 5 Ibid., pp. 204-205, 251-252.
- 6 Ibid., p. 206.
- 7 Ibid., p. 250.
- 8 Ibid., pp. 252-253.
- 9 Parsons and Shils, op.cit., pp. 20, 90, 145.
- 10 Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., pp. 253-254.
- 11 Ibid., pp. 257-258.
- 12 Ibid., p. 259.
- 13 Ibid., pp. 284-288.
- 14 Ibid., pp. 250-251, 267-269, 284, 286, 294.
- 15 Ibid., p. 297.
- 16 Ibid., p. 205, Parsons' emphasis.
- 17 Ibid., p. 5.
- 18 Wach, op.cit., p. 48.
- 19 Cohen, op.cit., p. 468.
- 20 Dusky Lee Smith, "Robert King Merton: From Middle Range to Middle Road", Catalyst, 2 (Summer, 1966), pp. 11-40, esp. pp. 28-29.
- 21 Erving Goffman, Asylums, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1961, pp. 61-66.
- 22 Presthus, op.cit., pp. 164-286.
- 23 See footnotes 23 and 51 in Chapter I.
- 24 Edward D. Boldt, Acquiescence and Conventionality in a Communal Society, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada, 1968, esp. pp. 16-29.

- 25 Blumer, op.cit., pp. 73-74.
- 26 Seymour M. Lipset, "Youth and Politics", in Merton and, Nisbet, (eds), op.cit., esp. pp. 749-750, 790.
- 27 Merton, in Merton and Nisbet (eds); op.cit., esp. pp. 814-817.
- 28 Ibid., p. 817, emphasis added.
- 29 Gordon K. Hirabayashi, "Apathy as a Mode of Adjustment: A Hypothesis," in B.Y. Card et al., The Metis in Alberta Society, Edmonton, Canada: The University of Alberta, 1963, pp. 375-384.
- 30 Abraham Kaplan, The New World of Philosophy, op.cit., p. 301, Kaplan's emphasis.

## Part Two

### C H A P T E R V

#### DEFERMENT AS A MODE OF RESPONSE

##### 1. Introduction

Part One of this thesis consisted of a general introduction to the study, and an overview and an assessment of typologies of response and behavior. Part Two of this thesis is devoted to an elaboration of three major topics. The first of these involves a discussion directed towards demonstrating the justification for recognizing Deferment as a mode of response. Second an attempt will be made to discuss the dynamics of Substitution, and also to suggest certain methodological procedures for the measurement of Deferment. Third it is proposed to explore available theoretical insights in Sociology that may account for Patterns of Substitution.

It may be recalled that in Section 3 of Chapter I, Deferment was defined as the mode of response by which an individual postpones interaction in a situation. Substitution was referred to as the choice of alternative situations by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. Clusters of behavior that correspond to various forms of Substitution were termed as Patterns of Substitution. The term Modes of Substitution was used to refer to the key mechanisms that could be adopted for the enactment of alternative behaviors by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment.

The present chapter consists of four topics of analysis. First, it is proposed to review the methodological issues inherent in typologies of response and behavior that contribute to such formulations setting unwarranted limits on action. This analysis will rely partly on the conclusions derived in Chapters II, III, and IV. The second topic of the present chapter deals with the problem of action goals. The third topic is intended as an issue for the analysis of value premises and cultural biases implicit in certain formulations of action. The conclusions of the analysis of these three topics would serve as the basis for the fourth topic namely, that of establishing the justification for considering Deferment as a mode of individual response to situations.

## 2. The Limits of Action

It may be recalled that the overview and assessment of typologies of response and behavior contained in Chapters II, III, and IV were based on six evaluative criteria. For the purpose of the present discussion two of these evaluative criteria need further elaboration. These are, the problem of limited tendencies, and the problem of dualism. It will be argued below that these two problems may contribute toward exerting restraining influences not only on action itself however theoretically or abstractly conceived, but also on further Sociological investigations.

The problem of limited tendencies deals with the setting of limits on the amount or variety of responses an actor is presumed to possess. It was observed in the previous two chapters that with the



exception of Weber and Parsons, most authors seem to assume that an actor is capable of possessing only a limited number of responses, usually three or four. Weber's conception of modes of response was reconstructed for the purpose of this thesis and according to this reconstruction there is no evidence to support the contention that he intended such modes of response to be exhaustive categories. As shown in the previous chapter, Parsons certainly acknowledges the possibility of at least ten different modes of response though in fact he utilizes only two of these for his elaboration of types of response and behavior. Regardless of the number of response modes acknowledged by an investigator, the following two implications are bound to occur. First, the number of response modes utilized for the formulation of the action sequence determines the modes of adaptation or behavior, which in turn serve as the basis for classifying and labeling of social action. According to this procedure, modes of response that are not utilized by an investigator have to be considered as irrelevant to the formulation. Second, the less the number of response modes utilized by an investigator, it is likely that a variety of response modes would be assumed as being subsumed under the few that have been utilized for a particular formulation. That is, for example if only conformity and alienation are utilized as the modes of individual response in a particular formulation of action, it will have to be assumed that other possible alternatives of response are subsumed under these two categories.

The general implications of the problem of limited tendencies are therefore two-fold. First, there is the inclination on the part of the investigator to limit the action possibilities of a hypothetical actor

possibly on the basis of the investigator's world-view and his perspective of society. Second, established theoretical schemes portraying such models of limited action preclude or at least eclipse further investigations that could explore other possibilities of response and behavior on the part of hypothetical or real actors.

Some general implications of the problem of dualism are as follows. These critical comments apply more to dichotomies, and polarities than to dialectics. First, an uncritical adoption of dualisms as methodological devices precludes the possibility of other explanations. For example, a conflict presented as a confrontation between two groups often succeeds in camouflaging the role played by third parties. Second, with the exception of dialectic models, most dualisms are limited in the sense that they fail to fully portray the process of change over time. Third, unwarranted dualisms may formulate problems in such a manner so as to conceal the critical issue or issues underlying the problem being investigated. According to Andre G. Frank, theories and models of development and underdevelopment, that comprise dualistic formulations succeed in explaining away problems rather than analysing them<sup>1</sup>. Finally, the apriori deductive logic built into dualistic formulations could make certain explanations only tautological and remote from empirical reality.

With regard to typologies of response and behavior, the contributions of Merton, Dubin, and Parsons are inherently dualistic in nature. That is, in the final analysis all their constructs on response and behavior are collapsible into the either conformity or deviance dichotomies.

Of course it has to be acknowledged that these authors were setting out to examine the genesis or structuring of deviance and therefore their task was to distinguish between deviance and conformity. However, their formulations may be considered as inadequate for the following reasons.

First, conformity is used by these authors as a sponge concept or a residual category under which all nondeviant responses and behaviors could be subsumed. Second, both Dubin, and Parsons have made no elaboration or further clarification of the recognized but neglected types in their formulations. Dubin has recognized twenty six types of deviance, but has decided to utilize only fourteen of these as active deviant types. The twelve inactive types and conformity, remain unexplicated and vague in Dubin's formulation. Similarly Parsons has recognized at least ten modes of individual response, but has chosen to adopt only two of these for elaboration. Third, there is no evidence to support the contention held by the three authors that conformity as defined by them is either a modal response or a modal behavior. The action tendency to accept the goals, means, norms, social objects, and other components of an interaction situation or a system may be an ideal typical portrayal of individual behavior, that is from the point of view of a culture, a society, or a system. Conformity in this sense may constitute the most radical form of deviance in the empirical world.

The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to illustrate the point that dualistic conceptions of action set restrictions on the behaviors of actors, both real and hypothetical. Furthermore, dualisms such as conformity-deviance may serve as methodological barriers against

further investigations of individual behavior.

More recent writings in Sociology reflect an acceptance of the fact that modes of response and behavior could transgress the conformity-deviance boundaries. As observed in the previous chapter, Smith, and Presthus have developed other modes of response such as ambivalence, and indifference. In fact Smith has attempted to show that ambivalence is the modal response among contemporary Americans. Presthus has observed that indifference is the modal response among employees of bureaucracies. Goffman's typology of inmate behavior, shows that individuals make alternative choices in keeping with their perception of changing environments. In a recent study of the modes of response adopted by various classes of employees toward work and the work situation, Wilensky was able to develop three types namely, attachment, alienation, and indifference. He concluded that the central tendency seemed to be one of detachment<sup>2</sup>. That people's actions do not necessarily take the form of responses such as acceptance-rejection, or conformity-deviance may be elucidated from the writings of authors such as Thoreau. His types of life order are said to have been based on the response categories of attachment, detachment, and non-attachment<sup>3</sup>.

In conclusion it may be stated that it is perhaps immature at the present stage of knowledge in the behavioral sciences to set limits on, or to exhaust the possibilities of response and behavior that an actor is capable of directing. Given the complexities of the empirical world it may be useful to recognize and develop constructs of response and behavior that may seem consistent with the specific empirical

problems that are being investigated.

### 3. The Goals of Action

The previous section dealt with the limits of action in the sense of restrictions being placed on an actor's alternatives of response and behavior. A different but related area of concern comprises the issues that refer to the goals of action. In Sociological literature there are at least three variations of the relation to goals to action. First, there are certain authors who have apparently contended that the idea of goals was unimportant, if not irrelevant to a conception of action. A second variation of the goals theme reflects an almost unconditional acceptance of the assumption that action cannot be conceived of, without reference to the actor's goals. Third, there has been an emphasis in certain formulations to reflect the relationship of action to cultural and systemic goals rather than to the actor's goals. These three general variations and their implications are discussed below.

Weber's writings represent one of the earliest formulations of the conceptions of action and social action<sup>4</sup>. By the term action, he referred to all human behavior to which the actors attach some subjective meaning. Action is social to the extent that the acting individual takes into account the behavior of others<sup>5</sup>. Weber contended that purely as a methodological device it is useful to conceive of action as ideal-typical rational conduct, and to treat affectual and irrational behaviors as deviations from the ideal<sup>6</sup>. In his four-fold typology of orientations to action, Weber imputes this ideal-rational model only to one type of

action namely, what he referred to as Zweckrational action. The other three types are not rational actions in the sense that actors do not orient their behavior on the basis of discrete individual ends and corresponding conditions or means<sup>7</sup>. Weber accepts the fact that most actions of everyday life are traditional in the sense that they are almost reflexive reactions to habitual stimuli. Affectual and Wertrational actions are similar to the extent that such actions are carried out for their own sake and not in terms of achievements and consequences ulterior to the actions themselves. Finally, Weber is quite explicit in stating that Zweckrational action is only a marginal or limiting case in terms of empirical reality, and that in any case his typology should not be considered as an exhaustive classification that has accounted for all possible alternative orientations of action<sup>8</sup>.

According to the above summary it is clear that Weber was aware of the fact that most actions in the empirical world were not based on Zweckrational orientations. Though it is correct that he advocated the ideal-typical rational model as a methodological device, he did not adhere to this methodological principle in practice<sup>9</sup>. On the contrary, most of his research on social action in the real world shows that he related action either to the dimensions of class position, or to the role of ideas and values.

Another characteristic of action without an emphasis on the idea of goals can be seen in the essay by Richard C. Sheldon<sup>10</sup>. According to Sheldon, behavior of action is a limited abstraction of activity in all its forms. Action is that aspect of activity related by certain

principles of relationship to things outside the organism. Action in this sense comprises the basic unit in social scientific studies. This basic unit has a series of components such as, environment, situation, objects, and actor. Environment refers to things external to the organism to which action may be related. Situation refers to both the organism, and the environment without action having taken place. The elements of the environment are objects. The abstraction from the organism is the actor. Actors in situations act, whereas organisms in environments produce activity. The activities of organisms in environments may be ascertained on the basis of scientific analysis.

Two observations can be made with regard to Sheldon's conception of action. First, there is no indication on his part that action is in any way necessarily related to goals. Second, he seems to imply that the difference between organisms and actors lies in the area of meanings the latter attach to their actions.

In addition to the conceptions of Weber, and Sheldon, a third contribution to this same theme may be explicated on the basis of some of Parsons' work. In the evolution of Parsons' ideas, there is one phase during which he almost negates the importance of goals as an area of vital concern in the analysis of action. Parsons has accomplished this by fusing the idea of actor's goals with the definite relationships an actor may have with situational components<sup>11</sup>. As is well known, Parsons' initial formulation of action had the actor's goals as a fundamental component<sup>12</sup>. However in latter elaborations of the action frame of reference, the actor's goals seem to have been merged with the actor's

relation to situational objects<sup>13</sup>. In other words, behavior oriented to the attainment of individual goals has been substituted by behavior oriented to the situation.

The relative irrelevance of specific goals, or motives as goals for the analysis of action has also been recognized by contemporary writers such as Richard Jung<sup>14</sup>. Not unlike Weber's conception of the orientations of life orders directed toward reducing the discrepancies implicit in the "problem of meaning", Jung suggests that action is oriented toward the reduction of maximum amount of inauthenticity. The relative unimportance of goals as determinants of action can also be ascertained by examining various writings in comparative philosophy<sup>15</sup>.

The second major theme or variation stated at the beginning of this section deals with the idea of the actor's goals comprising an indispensable component in the analysis of action. This theme has been developed by Parsons in particular, especially in his early formulations<sup>16</sup>. The theme assumes a near-utilitarian model of action based on rational calculation, and the major shortcomings of this model have led Parsons himself to de-emphasize its importance. Though this model has been effectively utilized in the development of Economic theory, its implications seem to be rather remote when related to the complexities inherent in both action and social action.

The third theme of this section refers to the analysis of action in relation to cultural or system goals. The contributions of Parsons, Merton, and Dubin as reviewed in the previous two chapters are significant in this regard. It will be recalled that both Merton, and Dubin



recognize cultural goals as one of the key dimensions to which individual response are directed. According to their conception, the manner in which an individual responds to cultural goals determines the conformist or varieties of deviant nature of his actions. In other words, acceptance or varieties of non-acceptance of cultural goals is a way by which individual behavior could be classified and labeled. Similarly, the acceptance or varieties of non-acceptance of systemic goals or the components of an established interactive process are the indices according to which Parsons has classified and labeled individual behavior. All such formulations emphasizing the importance of cultural or system goals as a prime measure of action analysis have certain built-in shortcomings. First such formulations portray an over-socialized conception of man. Second, they de-emphasize the functioning and importance of a multitude of individual actions that are non-systemic, or for that matter asystemic in their responses. Non-recognition of such responses and actions would in the words of Hobart amount to a premature closure of the social system<sup>17</sup>.

#### 4. The Ethic of Action

The phrase, ethic of action, as used here refers to the cultural and value biases implicit in certain formulations of action which for example suggest specific responses or behaviors as being conformist or deviant. In this discussion the emphasis is not on individual responses to cultural or systemic goals in general, but on specific concrete responses and behaviors that have been recognized and commented on by certain authors.

The formulations of Merton, Dubin, and Parsons can be examined with regard to the issue of the ethic of action. It needs to be acknowledged at the outset that all these authors either explicitly or implicitly recognize the fact that conceptions of conformity and deviance are always relative to specific cultures or systems. Second, they seem to express the view that certain examples have been selected from the American context only for reasons of illustrative convenience. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine what concrete responses and behaviors within the American context itself are recognized by these authors as being conformist, and deviant or alienative, and furthermore on what basis.

To Merton, the cultural goals of American society appear as success goals, primarily goals of monetary success, and according to him a great emphasis on these goals occurs without a corresponding emphasis on institutional means<sup>18</sup>. Despite his recognition that there are also other spheres of conduct, Merton develops his formulation on the basis of his earlier assumption of cultural goals, mainly to avoid unmanageable complexities<sup>19</sup>. Because the assumed cultural goals involve monetary success Merton feels satisfied in developing the rest of his scheme as a model of economic action and deviations from such.

For this reason, we shall be primarily concerned with the economic activity in the broad sense of "the production, exchange, distribution and consumption of goods and services" in our competitive society, where wealth has taken on a highly symbolic cast<sup>20</sup>.

Given this background it is clear how Merton obtained at least three categories of deviance namely, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion.

Innovation on the other hand is deviant only because this mode rejects the institutional means that are already de-emphasized in the society. According to Merton, lower-class Americans exhibit the innovation mode, whereas lower-middle class Americans are heavily represented in the ritualism mode<sup>21</sup>. The retreatist mode is comprised of psychotics, autists, pariahs, outcasts, vagrants, vagabonds, tramps, chronic drunkards, and drug addicts. Merton observes that retreatists are severely condemned by the conformists, for it is the conformist who keeps the wheels of society running, and the innovator is at least smart and striving to better himself<sup>22</sup>.

Given this background of the distribution of adaptive modes, two further observations are in order with regard to Merton's scheme. The first is Merton's insistence that the cultural goals of monetary success was chosen only as a way of simplifying a complex problem<sup>23</sup>. Second, and at the same time Merton is satisfied in referring to conformity as the modal or most frequently occurring adaptation<sup>24</sup>.

Despite the intended generality of his scheme, Merton's conceptualizations may in fact be seen as a paradigm of economic activity specifically geared toward the realization of monetary success. Therefore, the action ethic of Merton's conformist is that of the accomplishment of financial gains, through acceptable means. As to whether this model of the American conformist is consistent with modal adaptations of the real world is an empirical question. As noted earlier, Smith has challenged the authenticity of this modality and the assumptions underlying it.

In terms of the ethic of action, Dubin's formulation is neither

a significant modification nor an extension of Merton's work. With regard to Merton's listing of psychotics and others in the retreatist category, Dubin has merely added the modern variation of beatniks. Furthermore, Dubin has attempted to highlight two variants of deviance namely, those who break the law, and those who pursue different cultural, institutional, and normative codes without violating the law. Nevertheless, in its basic conception, Dubin's model of conformity or the ethic of action is if at all even more narrowly defined than that of Merton.

Parsons' task has been to depict the directions of deviant behavior in relation to an established interactive process. But from the kinds of examples he has chosen for the purpose of illustrating types of deviance it is clear that his conception of conformity or the action ethic is not too different from those of Merton, and Dubin. According to Parsons, hoboism, Bohemianism, motivated sick role, schizophrenia, and exotic religious sects represent the category of passive alienative dominance or withdrawal. Active alienative dominance or rebelliousness is seen as crime, and delinquency<sup>25</sup>. When these and other examples of types of deviance are extracted from Parsons' formulation, what remains is in fact, the action ethic of the form already assumed by Merton, and Dubin.

In this connection it is pertinent to refer to Daniel Foss' essay that attempts to elucidate the value premises underlying Parsons' conception of action<sup>26</sup>. Foss shows that Parsons' conception of the value system of the United States is characterized by what is known as "instrumental activism". Among other things this ethic is said to be con-

cerned with economic development, productivity, and an active mastery of things external to the society. In the view of Foss, "instrumental activism" is almost a secular religion that has only the barest trace of transcendent spirituality.

Even without the conclusions of Foss' research it is apparent that the action ethic consistent with conformity in Parsons' scheme is very much close to the work ethic in the conventional sense. It is of course incorrect to make the assertion that Parsons' concept of action is synonymous with the idea of work. With the incorporation of action dilemmas such as the pattern variables, Parsons has provided ample allowance for the actor's choice of alternative behaviors. However, his conceptualization, and typologies of conformity, and deviance, and especially the concrete examples of behavior he has selected for the purpose of illustration, reflect some bias on his part in associating conformity with a particular style of action.

The implications of the foregoing discussion of the ethic of action may be stated as follows. First, if certain authors have at least some implicit assumptions or biases on what constitutes conforming behavior in concrete terms, there is the possibility that all other responses and behaviors may be treated by them as deviance and be grouped under some general conceptual label. It has already been pointed out that the work of Presthus, Smith, and Wilensky, show different modal tendencies of action than those assumed by others.

Second, if certain concrete behaviors are not seemingly deviant according to the worldviews of certain authors, such behaviors are likely

to be included under the sponge type concept of conformity or at most written off as institutionalized evasions.

Third, and not necessarily independent of the earlier two points, it is quite likely that many individual responses, and behaviors that may be important either to the acting individual or an investigator remain eclipsed under some general conceptual label. Some of these responses and behaviors may deserve serious attention in their own right.

##### 5. The Mode of Deferment

The issues discussed in the three previous sections of this chapter reflect at least one major conclusion. That is, the serious theoretical limitation placed on the scope of investigations dealing with action analyses. It has been shown that most of the conventional analyses of action have in addition to other problems, tended to restrict the limits of response and behavior. Furthermore, a somewhat unwarranted preoccupation with goals of one kind or another, and the imputation of certain biases into what are considered as conformist and deviant behavior have led to a virtual closure of research topics and methodological procedures in the realm of action analysis.

The purpose of the present section is to justify the recognition of Deferment as a mode of individual response. The first assumption underlying such an argument is that modes of response and behavior have not been exhausted in literature of behavioral science and that they are perhaps inexhaustible. The literature contains various typologies of response and behavior formulated on the basis of the worldviews and

theoretical perspectives of different authors. This however need not preclude the assumption that action may constitute unlimited tendencies, unlimited modes of behavior, unlimited goals, and for that matter no goals whatsoever.

Second, the idea of Deferment is seen as being consistent with commonsense, because regardless of the clarity of goals or motives underlying certain behaviors it is well known that individuals postpone interaction or contact with situations or situational components. On this point what is problematic is the methodological issue of how to ascertain states of Deferment and perhaps reasons for Deferment in the case of concrete behaviors, and not the commonsense issue of whether or not individuals engage in Deferment responses.

Third, and perhaps most important, the idea of Deferment as a mode of individual response seems to have already been recognized by a number of authors. Some of these authors have referred to this response under different conceptual labels, whereas others have subsumed the idea of Deferment and other similar modes under a broader conceptual category. Yet another group of writers have described states of Deferment without paying serious attention to it as a special response or concept. The writings of some of these authors are paraphrased below.

Among writers of the classical tradition, Weber was one of the few who recognized the theoretical importance of Deferment as a mode of individual response. In his writings on General Sociology, Weber has stressed the importance of temporary relationships, and relationships of varying degrees of permanence. He has also noted as an important

area of inquiry, the prevalence of and the justification for individual deviations from components of legitimate orders<sup>27</sup>. In his more substantive work, particularly studies in the Sociology of Religion, Weber has highlighted the role of religious ecstasy, orgies and other psychological states as "occasional" activities for the layman. According to Weber, such "transitory" states are facilitated by certain external stimuli that help break down ordinary organic states and inhibitions<sup>28</sup>.

The contributions of Merton, and Dubin with regard to responses of Rejection are well known and are to be found in their portrayal of retreatism. In contrast to Merton however, Dubin has made a subtle distinction between Rejection and Deferment. That is, in his description of value ritualism, Dubin refers to the two categories of normative opportunism, and means opportunism. Both these are clear indications of temporary departures from norms, and means of an established situation<sup>29</sup>.

Parsons too has taken cognizance of one important form of Deferment. This is what he refers to as the possibility for ego to make attempts toward gratifying both components of an ambivalent motivation structure by altering the objects of orientation<sup>30</sup>. Some examples of such a pattern according to Parsons are, motivated sick role, participation in gang and subcultural activities, and membership in exotic religious sects. According to Parsons, an individual who participates in such roles does not "burn his bridges" and is able to "eat his cake and have it"<sup>31</sup>.

Situations of "focused interaction" such as focused gatherings, encounters, and situated activity systems as described by Goffman, are



another such domain of activity, some examples of which may be interpreted as substitutes for deferred situations<sup>32</sup>. Yablonsky's concept of "near-groups" and Zurcher's concept of "ephemeral roles" are two examples of human conduct that suggest the Deferment response on the part of various individuals. According to Yablonsky, the "near-group" movement of the hippies provides a convenient pseudo-community for youth who need a temporary break to alleviate the personal inadequacies they experience in the "straight-society"<sup>33</sup>. More or less in the Goffman tradition, Zurcher refers to the "ephemeral role" as follows.

An ephemeral role is a temporary or ancillary position-related behavior pattern chosen by the enactor to satisfy social-psychological needs incompletely satisfied by the more dominant and lasting roles he regularly must enact in everyday life positions<sup>34</sup>.

In contrast to the conventional statics-dynamics antitheses of viewing society, there has been a recent trend towards a perspective of "transience". This trend is mainly a result of social scientific observations of modernization, and development, in both industrial and industrializing societies. The main implications of transience have been highlighted by authors such as Bennis and Slater<sup>35</sup>, and Toffler<sup>36</sup>. As stated by Toffler, man's relation to people, places, things, organizations, and ideas are rapidly becoming temporary and hence, among such elements, the time factor is emerging as the key concept<sup>37</sup>. These general conceptions of the nonpermanence of societal relations suggest not only the responses of Rejection, and transformation, but also those of suspension, and Deferment.

To conclude this section and also to return to the level of the

individual, it is possible to refer to two more examples of Deferment in the light of current literature. One is Marcuse's conception of "artistic alienation"<sup>38</sup>. The other is Leary's description of the purposes of drug use as advocated by him<sup>39</sup>. Both examples portray deliberate attempts made by individuals to postpone interaction in regular situations.

## 6. Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to justify the recognition of Deferment as a mode of individual response to situations. In the course of the chapter it was pointed out that the established constructs of typologies of response and behavior are immensely restrictive in the sense that they set limits on the scope of action analysis in at least three major areas.

First, there are limitations placed on the scope of action itself by the unwarranted restrictions of action tendencies, and the essentially dualistic conception of human behavior. Second, the relations established between action and goals as the basis for action analysis, has also restricted the elaboration of varieties of response and behavior that an individual is capable of possessing. Third, some of the cultural and value biases that certain authors may have imputed into conceptions of conformity and deviance, do in turn influence the choice of research topics for further investigations.

It was argued that an unrestricted view of action tendencies and modes of behavior is sometimes useful for the identification and investi-

gation of certain instances of human conduct. On the basis of both commonsense knowledge and certain literary evidence it was suggested that Deferment could be recognized as a mode of individual response to situations.

## Footnotes

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- 3 W. E. Nagley, "Thoreau on Attachment, Detachment, and Non-Attachment", Philosophy East and West, 3 (Jan. 1954), pp. 307-320.
- 4 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op.cit., esp. pp. 88-118.
- 5 Ibid., p. 88.
- 6 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
- 7 Ibid., p. 115
- 8 Ibid., pp. 116-117.
- 9 See Parsons' footnote in, Ibid., p. 93.
- 10 Richard C. Sheldon, in Parsons and Shils, op.cit., esp. pp. 30-31.
- 11 Parsons and Shils, op.cit., pp. 4-5, and footnote 4 on p. 5.
- 12 Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op.cit.; Parsons and Shils, op. cit., p. 53.
- 13 Parsons and Shils, op.cit., pp. 56-76.
- 14 See footnote 23 in Chapter I.
- 15 See for example, Max Weber, The Religion of China, Hans H. Gerth, (ed), Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951, esp. pp. 180-181; Max Weber, The Religion of India, Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (eds), Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958, esp. pp. 184-186, 217, 221-222; Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, op.cit., esp. pp. 171-172; Abraham Kaplan, The New World of Philosophy, op.cit., esp. Lectures 6,7,8, and 9.
- 16 Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op.cit., esp. p. 44; Parsons and Shils, op.cit., p. 53.
- 17 See footnote 67 in Chapter I.
- 18 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, op.cit., p. 136.
- 19 Ibid., p. 140.

- 20 Ibid., pp. 140-141.
- 21 Ibid., p. 151.
- 22 Ibid., pp. 153-154.
- 23 Ibid., p. 157.
- 24 Ibid., pp. 141-153, 183.
- 25 Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., pp. 284, 286, 288-289.
- 26 Daniel Foss, "The World View of Talcott Parsons", in Maurice Stein and Arthur Vidich (eds), Sociology on Trial, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, pp. 96-126, esp. pp. 97-103.
- 27 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op.cit., pp. 119, 125-126.
- 28 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, op.cit., pp. 3, 157-158.
- 29 Dubin, op.cit., pp. 159-161.
- 30 Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., pp. 253-254, 275.
- 31 Ibid., pp. 285-288.
- 32 Goffman, Encounters, op.cit., pp. 7, 8, 12, 17-18.
- 33 Lewis Yablonsky, The Hippie Trip, New York: Pegasus, 1968, esp. pp. 326-327.
- 34 Zurcher, op.cit., p. 174.
- 35 Warren G. Bennis and Phillip E. Slater (eds), The Temporary Society, New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
- 36 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, New York: Bantam Books, 1971.
- 37 Ibid., pp. 44-46.
- 38 Marcuse, op.cit., pp. 60-64.
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## CHAPTER VI

### THE DYNAMICS OF SUBSTITUTION

#### 1. Introduction

Substitution involves the choice of alternative situations by an individual whose mode of response is either Deferment or Rejection. Clusters or groupings of such alternative behaviors were referred to in Chapter I as Patterns of Substitution. Figure 1 in Chapter I represents an attempt at portraying four Patterns of Substitution that correspond to states of Deferment and Rejection. It was also stated in Chapter I that since Deferment is the major research topic of the present study, issues related to rejection would not receive any elaboration.

Patterns of Substitution deal with structural analysis or the "what" questions related to states of Deferment. Structural analysis emphasizes both a descriptive and a classificatory understanding of a phenomenon under investigation. In contrast, process analysis deals with the "how" questions. It explores the preconditions and, social and other related processes through which the phenomenon under investigation may occur. In the present study these "how" questions are analysed as Modes of Substitution. As defined in Chapter I, Modes of Substitution refer to the key mechanisms that could be adopted for the enactment of alternative behaviors by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. There are two more types of analysis namely, causal analysis, and functional analysis. Causal analysis involves the exploration of social and other determinants that produce a social phenomenon, and generally seeks answers to the "why" questions. Finally, functional analysis

attempts to discover purposes, and social and other consequences of the phenomenon under consideration. These four types namely, structural, process, causal, and functional analyses are a modified version of the types of Sociological analysis proposed by Olsen<sup>1</sup>. The present chapter will be dealing mainly with structural and process issues.

For the purpose of this study it is contended that structural and process analysis deal more with objective possibilities rather than subjective meanings. In accordance with this assertion the present chapter is designed to explore the following topics. The first topic deals with a clarification of Patterns of Substitution, and an overview of theoretical insights in Sociology that account for such patterns. The second and third topics involve a discussion of objects of Deferment, and Modes of Substitution. These lead to the fourth topic which addresses itself to the methodological problems of measuring Deferment.

## 2. Patterns of Substitution

Four Patterns of Substitution were identified in Section 4 of Chapter I on the basis of cross-tabulating the modes of Rejection, and Deferment with the interactional alternatives of Containment and Isolation. The two Patterns of Substitution corresponding to Deferment were termed as Gatherings and Fugues.

Gatherings refer to situational substitutes involving Containment alternatives such as Near-Groups and Encounters. Some examples of Gatherings are, group meetings, rituals, excursions, games, and parties.

The term Fugue refers to substitutional behaviors that involve the choice of alternative situations of little or no interactional integration. In Fugues, the individual is relatively isolated in comparison to Gatherings. Some examples of such relative isolation are, sick role, tourist role, travel, exploration, and certain types of drug use.

This distinction between Gatherings and Fugues is not meant to suggest that they are totally unrelated. It is possible and perhaps more useful to view them as being interdependent. One may be necessary for the other, and at times may reinforce one another. This aspect has been emphasized by Simmel<sup>2</sup>, and also by Merton<sup>3</sup>.

In contrast to other research topics in Sociology, both substantial and formal contributions on Gatherings, and Fugues have been relatively small. Even the more general subject of Deferment, and Substitution which is no doubt consistent with commonsense has received only cursory attention and passing references in the literature. Departures from institutionalized norms of conduct have traditionally been treated as types of deviance, sub-cultural membership, and institutionalized evasions. Zurcher's conception of "ephemeral roles", Yablonsky's "near-groups", Goffman's "encounters", and Parsons' idea of an individual attempting to gratify both components of an ambivalent motivation structure, are few instances where researchers have tried to come to grips with the Sociological problems of Deferment and Substitution. However, these authors have not been too successful in developing methodological frameworks for the analysis of this syndrome, or for that matter extending theoretical insights on their initial formulations.



The distinction between conceptions of Gatherings, and Fugues has been elaborated only by Parsons<sup>4</sup>. In his formulation of the genesis of deviance, Parsons distinguishes between group substitutes such as delinquent gangs, exotic religious sects, and radical movements on the one hand, and isolation substitutes such as individualized crime, Bohemianism, and sick role on the other. Merton has made only a passing reference to the distinction between privatized retreatism, and non-privatized rebellion<sup>5</sup>.

Perhaps the most influential of substantive, and formal contributions to the study of Gatherings has been made by Goffman, and Yablonsky. Goffman's formulation of situations of focused interaction deals with Encounters involving a relatively short time span<sup>6</sup>. His initial task has been to distinguish focused gatherings from unfocused gatherings on the one hand, and from groups on the other. Yablonsky's conception of Near-Groups was based on his observations of delinquent gangs<sup>7</sup>. It was further supplemented by his study of hippie communes<sup>8</sup>. The Near-Group conception became an effective challenge to the hitherto established subculture notions of explaining group deviance. In contrast to Goffman's situations of focused interaction, Yablonsky's Near-Groups deal with situations involving a greater time span and a relatively less intensity of interaction among participants. However, the conceptions of Goffman, and Yablonsky have certain common properties. First, they both deal with Containment substitutes for states of Deferment. Second, they involve varying degrees of situational, spatial, and time distance from objects of Deferment. Third, they both are situations of interaction, and not mere crowds or aggregates. Finally, both conceptions occupy

mid-way positions on a continuum whose extremes are organized groups, and unorganized mobs.

Parsons' formalization of the sick role constitutes the most elaborate conceptualization of Fugue behavior. He has expressed the view that this formalization may be useful in accounting for other examples of behavior where an individual may seek individualized deviant alternatives in a manner so as to gratify both components of ambivalence.

### 3. Objects of Deferment

Deferment involves a postponement of interaction in a situation, and states of Deferment are accompanied by various substitutional behaviors. Patterns, and Modes of Substitution deal with the "what", and "how" of these alternative behaviors. However, no details have been presented so far on the subject of what is being deferred. This subject is not only one of obvious curiosity, but also one of increasing methodological importance. For example, when people speak of "getting away from it all" it is of methodological importance to ascertain what constitutes the "it all", because substitutional behavior may have some correspondence to what is being substituted.

For the purpose of this study, the objects of Deferment will be taken to mean the objects of orientation for action or the situational components as they are sometimes called<sup>9</sup>. Parsons has classified the situational components into three groups namely, social objects, cultural objects, and physical objects.

Social objects comprise three components. First there is ego, that is, when an actor takes account of himself as an object of orientation. The second component refers to alters, and these are the immediate others an actor may have as objects of orientation. Third, there is the component of collectivity. It comprises the social objects of orientation other than ego, and alters. It may be assumed that alters, or the units comprising immediate others, and an actor's relations with them are identifiable, whereas the units comprising collectivity, and an actor's relations with them are perhaps nonidentifiable.

Cultural objects refer to norms and values that constitute the symbol system that an actor may view as objects of orientation for action. According to Parsons, these have to be considered as objects that are external to the actor, and not as internalized prescriptions for action.

Finally, physical objects refer to things in space, and time that an actor may view as objects of orientation. Physical objects do not respond, and as such, an actor does not interact with them.

The above mentioned situational components namely, ego, alters, collectivity, norms, values, and physical objects can also be considered as the objects of Deferment. The distance an individual maintains with one or more of these components is an index of the nature of Deferment or the amount of non-interaction in a situation. The methodological procedures by which such noninteraction may be measured, will be described in Section 5 of this chapter.

#### 4. Modes of Substitution

In this section, the focus of attention will be on the mechanisms by which Deferment, and Substitution are possible. The emphasis will be on exploring relatively objective possibilities rather than subjective meanings associated with these "how" processes. It is possible to identify certain processes that may be considered as objective possibilities by which an individual could maintain distance from a situation.

Deferment implies temporary states of noninteraction in a situation, and these situations are often substituted with alternative situations. Noninteraction in this sense refers to the distance between an individual and any given situation. Such distance is ascertainable through the measurement of Situational Distance, Geographical Distance, and Time Distance.

Situational Distance is the Distance, between an individual and one or more situational components of an established interactive system. These components also comprise the objects of Deferment. Therefore, it is possible for an individual to maintain distance from ego, alters, collectivity, norms, values, and physical objects.

The likelihood of an individual responding differently to situational components has been recognized by Merton, Dubin, Parsons, Smith, and other writers. Merton, Dubin, and Smith have emphasized the situational components such as goals, means, and norms. Parsons has distinguished between social objects and norms.

Geographical Distance refers to objective space, whereas, Time

Distance refers to objective time. These two types of distance can be combined with Situational Distance to comprise a total concept of distance that could measure noninteraction. The general advantages of combining space, and time with Situational Distance may be stated as follows. First, it is well known that all action occurs in space, and time and therefore it is useful to take account of these two variables in investigating behavior. Second, Patterns of Substitution involve specific choices of spatial and/or time mobility, and therefore, these dimensions are of great significance in understanding Deferment, and Substitution. Third, the incorporation of the space, and time variables facilitates greater methodological sophistication in terms of precision, quantification and so forth. These and further advantages will be more apparent in the next section.

In conclusion it may be stated that the maintaining of situational, spatial, and time distance represent three of the mechanisms or Modes of Substitution by which it is possible for an individual to sustain a state of Deferment. These mechanisms point towards objective possibilities that could be observed or otherwise ascertained without exclusive reliance on the subjective meanings that individuals attach to their actions.

##### 5. Substitution as a Measure of Deferment

This section is devoted to an elaboration of methodological procedures by which it may be possible to measure the nature of Deferment, or in other words, the degree of non-interaction an individual maintains in relation to a given situation.

Interaction has been a concept of vital importance in both Social Organization, and Social Psychology. It has been researched on various indices such as frequency, and duration, and under extended conceptual labels such as participation, cohesion, integration, and situational contact. Lack of interaction in the form of varieties of nonintegration has been investigated under titles such as deviance, conflict, disorganization, social distance, and alienation. The methodological procedures and findings of these studies are too numerous to be enumerated or assessed.

However, it could be stated that Coleman's critique of some of the well known propositions on interaction, and the status of Sociological research in general, is applicable to at least some of the above mentioned studies of interaction<sup>10</sup>. Coleman's observations are that: propositions are only a little more descriptive than what the layman perceives in everyday life, certain variables are not quantitative, some variables are almost nonquantifiable, some variables are not amenable to comparison, certain variables are not amenable to mathematical manipulation, and that, "theory" remains at a low level of sophistication. While emphasizing the importance of the time dimension for social analysis, Coleman acknowledges that unlike in Economics, measurable variables are lacking in Sociology.

In this section it is proposed to introduce some methodological procedures for the measurement of Deferment or noninteraction and to draw some implications for future research.

Noninteraction refers to the distance between an individual and any given situation. Distance which is the measure of noninteraction is

ascertainable through three indices. The first of these is the key variable namely, Situational Distance (SD). It refers to the distance between an individual and one or more components of a given situation. For the purpose of the present exercise, situational components, objects of Deferment, or objects of orientation for action, as they are sometimes called, are slightly revised and arranged in the following rank order to comprise SD.

Physical Objects (P); Collectivity (C); Alters (A);  
Norms (N); Values (V); Ego (E).

In the above rank order, nonorientation to P corresponds to the shortest SD, and nonorientation to E to the longest SD. It is not assumed that an individual's orientation to E for example, necessarily implies orientations to V, N, A, C, and P. Also, it is not assumed that an individual's orientation to V for example, necessarily excludes an orientation to E. Therefore, SD does not constitute a cumulative scale. It is assumed that an individual's nonorientation to E implies a greater SD than nonorientations to V, N, A, C, or P. Similarly, nonorientation to V implies a greater SD than nonorientations to N, A, C, or P.

The second variable of distance is Geographical Distance (GD). It refers to objective space, and may be represented on an interval scale, and would therefore be both summated and cumulative. The third variable is Time Distance (TD). It refers to objective time, and as a scale has the same characteristics as GD.

The three variables of distance may each be measured on an

ordinal dimension from low-low (LL), through low (L), medium low (ML), medium high (MH), and high (H), to high-high (HH). Questions formulated for the purpose of obtaining data to ascertain SD in particular, have to be constructed with due consideration for the socio-cultural contexts of specific situations that are being investigated. The conceptions of norms, values, and so forth for SD are likely to vary from situation to situation.

The three variables for measuring distance or noninteraction, and their interrelationships could be represented in the form of the following model. It presents 216 possible variations of noninteraction in a situation.






Figure 4. Variations of Noninteraction

One approach to measuring noninteraction is to investigate Substitutional behavior, that is, patterns of behavior that serve as temporary or permanent alternatives to the more established modes of conduct that are peculiar to specific socio-cultural contexts. The methodological utility of measuring noninteraction in this manner could be demonstrated by some hypothetical examples of Substitutional behavior. An appropriately modified version of Parsons' characterization of the sick role, and delinquent gangs<sup>11</sup> are graphically presented below, along with a few other examples. The values attached to the three variables of distance in these graphs are only hypothetical. Accurate data on such variables have to be obtained through observations of specific situations, or through responses to questions that are tailored to specific situational contexts.




Figure 5. The Sick Role




Figure 6. Delinquent Gangs




Figure 7. Drug Use-Containment




Figure 8. Drug Use-Isolation




Figure 9. The Tourist Role




Figure 10. Travel

Three observations can be made with reference to the above graphic representations. First, it will be noticed that the key variable SD is related to both GD, and TD. Second, GD, and TD are continuous variables and therefore have the potential of being transformed into interval scales. Third, each graphic representation produces a quantitative value based on Graphic Space (GS). Such quantitative values for each graph can be obtained as follows

$$GS = (SD \times GD) + (SD \times TD)$$

Therefore, the relative distances from a situation as reflected by various examples of Substitutional behavior are comparable on quantitative terms. According to GS, the distance values from a situation as reflected by the Substitutions of sick role, delinquent gangs, drug use-containment, drug use-isolation, tourist role, and travel would respectively be 12, 24, 5, 12, 40, and 60.

There are at least three major implications of these proposed procedures. First, there is the possibility of combining conceptions of space, and time with a social variable. Such combinations may also facilitate quantitative analysis involving greater mathematical sophistication.

Second, the emphasis on noninteraction, and Substitution may offer a new dimension of research that is complementary to the more established conformity-deviance perspective of analysing interaction.

Finally, the approach suggested here points more towards objective possibilities, and perhaps objective probabilities of observable behavior.

For example the three variables of noninteraction or distance, identify certain mechanisms that facilitate certain kinds of behavior. In this sense they enable process analysis of "how" certain social phenomena occur.

## 6. Summary

Substitution refers to the choice of alternative situations by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. This chapter examined three related topics with regard to Substitution namely, Patterns of Substitution, objects of Deferment, and Modes of Substitution. In combination, these areas of concern account for the structural, and process analysis of the subject of Deferment and Substitution. In addition, this chapter also contained a brief overview of Sociological literature that pertains to Patterns of Substitution.

The final section of this chapter consisted of an exercise in methodology. It was an attempt at suggesting certain procedures for the measurement of Deferment or amount of noninteraction in a situation. It is hoped that the suggested procedures would contribute towards more precise and quantitative analysis of objective probabilities. Also, such procedures may facilitate further research in domains of inquiry such as conformity and deviance, and interaction and noninteraction.

## Footnotes

- 1 Marvin E. Olsen, The Process of Social Organization, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston Inc., 1968, pp. 211-227.
- 2 See footnote 64 in Chapter I.
- 3 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, op.cit., p. 155.
- 4 Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., esp. pp. 283-284.
- 5 Merton, op.cit., p. 155.
- 6 Goffman, Encounters, op.cit.
- 7 Yablonsky, "The Delinquent Gang as a Near-Group", op.cit.
- 8 Yablonsky, The Hippie Trip, op.cit.
- 9 See footnote 36 in Chapter I.
- 10 James S. Coleman, Introduction to Mathematical Sociology, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964, pp. 103-104.
- 11 For these and other examples see, Parsons, The Social System, op.cit. esp. Chapter VII.

## CHAPTER VII

### FORMALIZATIONS OF SUBSTITUTION

#### 1. Introduction

The work of Yablonsky<sup>1</sup>, Goffman<sup>2</sup>, and Parsons<sup>3</sup>, may be regarded as formal, and substantive contributions to the study of Substitutional behavior. The contributions of Yablonsky, and Goffman deal with Deferment-Containment substitutes such as Gatherings, whereas Parsons' contribution may be seen as emphasizing Fugue behavior of the Deferment-Isolation syndrome. The purpose of this chapter is to present a summary of these conceptions, and to assess their theoretical and methodological adequacy.

#### 2. The Near-group

Yablonsky's initial formulation of Near-group theory is the product of four years empirical research on delinquent gangs. The theory attempts to present a conceptual scheme on the structuring of delinquent gang behavior.

As a first step Yablonsky takes the position that human collectivities can be viewed on a continuum emphasizing organizational characteristics. One extreme of the continuum consists of well organized, cohesive socio-cultural groups. The other extreme consists of mobs characterized by anonymity, impermanence, disturbed leadership, and so forth. The central thesis of Yablonsky's work is that mid-way on the group-mob continuum there are collectivities which are neither groups, nor mobs,



but which may be conceptualized as Near-groups.

It had been somewhat conventional to regard delinquent gangs as well organized groups or sub-cultures. On the one hand there was Cohen's thesis that delinquent gangs comprised sub-cultures which were organized by working class youth as a reaction and an alternative to middle class values. Other scholars tended to identify delinquent gangs as sub-cultures providing opportunities for adolescents to attain adult status. Yablonsky's observations led him to conceive of delinquent gangs as Near-groups, rather than sub-cultures.

Near groups are characterized by features such as diffuse role definition, limited cohesion, impermanence, minimal consensus of norms, shifting membership, disturbed leadership, and limited definition of member expectations. These features also prevent the Near-group from being transformed into either a group or a mob.

According to Yablonsky, gangs are characterized by three levels of membership organization. In the center of the gang are a few leaders who are the most psychologically disturbed members. They need the gang most, and also provide the most cohesive force. At the second level there are youth who claim affiliation to the gang but participate in its activities only when their own emotional needs correspond to the activities of the gang. Third, there are peripheral members who are not affiliated to the gang but occasionally participate in its activities.

The structuring of the Near-group in the above manner produces a situation where its primary function or goal is not clear. Also, its other functions are vague and transient. According to Yablonsky, the

prime function of the gang is to provide a situation for acting out hostility, and aggression, and thereby, gratify the emotional needs of its members. Violence has been identified as the activity by which such needs are gratified.

Finally, and in summary form Yablonsky has enumerated twelve features which characterize the Near-group as different from groups and mobs. These features are, individualized role definition to fit momentary needs, diffuse and differential definitions of membership, emotion-motivated behavior, a decrease of cohesiveness as one moves from the center of the collectivity to the periphery, limited responsibility and sociability required for membership and belonging, self-appointed and disturbed leadership, a limited consensus among participants of the collectivities' functions or goals, a shifting and personalized stratification system, shifting membership, the inclusion in size of phantasy membership, limited consensus of normative expectations, and norms in conflict with the inclusive social system's prescriptions.

By way of conclusion, Yablonsky has stated that delinquent gangs constitute only one type of Near-group in American society. He has suggested that Near-group may also be useful for the study of adult crime gangs, families in transition, and behavior forms expressing social and personal pathology.

Yablonsky's next major substantive contribution to Near-group theory is to be found in his study of the hippie communes. He refers to hippie culture as a para-society that exists beneath American society. He says that such a para-society should not be confused with conceptions of sub-

culture, or contra-culture. Rather, hippie collectivities may be identified as hippie Near-groups. According to Yablonsky, hippie Near-groups are convenient pseudo-communities, or paranoid pseudo-communities. Such Near-groups are functional to the kind of youth who need temporary alternatives in place of the straight society with which they have problems of adjustment<sup>4</sup>.

In addition to this general function, Yablonsky offers three reasons for the sustenance of hippie Near-groups. First, there is a covert acceptance of, or sympathy for such Near-groups on the part of many persons from the larger society. Second, the Near-group syndrome where a collectivity participates in unconventional behavior, tends to insulate the individual from being picked out as being criminal or sick. Third, the Near-group provides a situation for those seeking a rational escape from society<sup>5</sup>. However, Yablonsky's general conclusion seems to be that most youth who join hippie Near-groups are already emotionally disturbed and experience states of loneliness and alienation. Finally, it could be stated that Yablonsky has attempted to apply his Near-group theory to hippie communes. He has demonstrated that the twelve characteristic features of the Near-group conception are consistent with the structuring of hippie Near-groups<sup>6</sup>.

### 3. Encounters

Goffman's emphasis is on situations of face-to-face interaction. Initially he distinguishes between unfocused interaction, and focused interaction. Unfocused interaction consists of communication processes

that occur as a result of people being in one another's presence. Focused interaction consists of communication processes that occur as a result of two or more persons being jointly involved in a single focus of activity. The unit of social organization involving focused interaction has been termed as focused gatherings, encounters, and situated activity systems. In the preface to his book Goffman has also demonstrated the distinction between Encounters and groups.

The basic assumption underlying Encounters is that they sustain some ordered structure on the basis of complementary expectations and obligations being shared by the participants. According to Goffman, the structure of Encounters can be understood on the basis of three major principles or formalizations. These are rules of irrelevance, realized resources, and transformation rules.

Rules of irrelevance determine a definition of the equipment used in an Encounter only insofar as the activity of the Encounter is concerned. Other meanings and values attached to such equipment are considered irrelevant to the conduct of the Encounter. The second principle, realized resources, refers to the events, and roles that are accepted by the participants as being real to the Encounter situation. Such resources have to be included in an Encounter if it is to be effectively performed. Finally, transformation rules determine the allocation of realized resources among the participants on the criteria of externally based matters or attributes identifying such participants.

Next, Goffman discusses the dynamics of Encounters or how they are enacted. The first principle here is somewhat based on game-theory

and consists of a clarification of the term "gaming". Gaming refers to the kinds of interaction that are engaged in, solely for the purpose of making an Encounter possible. The second principle of the dynamics of Encounters is that of the spontaneous involvement of participants in the activity of the Encounter. The third principle refers to the ease versus tension problem produced in the participant as a result of him not being able to adjust himself to the Encounter situation. Fourth, Goffman describes what are called "incidents" that occur in Encounters. These are events that increase tension. The fifth principle is termed that of integrations. Integrations are the ways by which tension producing incidents can be redefined so as to sustain the euphoria of the situation. Sixth, there is the "flooding out" process by which one or more participants would openly express disinvolvement in the Encounter. The seventh principle namely, structure and process demonstrates how the dynamics of interaction are tied to its social structure. Such congruence is brought about through mechanisms such as "byplays", "postplays", eye-avoidance, and "flooding in". Finally, Goffman discusses the principle of the "interaction membrane", that is, the boundary of an Encounter which serves to protect the interaction situation from the milieu of the external world.

The second part of Goffman's formalization of Encounters deals with "role distance". In addition to making some contributions to what is known as role theory in Sociology, Goffman has attempted to show how role distance facilitates the sustenance of equilibrium in Encounters. In this sense role distance is said to fulfill at least two useful functions. On the one hand it serves as a defence mechanism for persons placed

in situations that are likely to produce states of embarrassment and shame. On the other hand role distance could act as a tension release mechanism in situations involving anxiety and stress.

#### 4. The Sick Role

Parsons regards motivated sick role as a type of deviant behavior. It belongs to the category of passive alienative dominance, also referred to by him as withdrawal. The withdrawal category can be sub-divided on the criterion of whether the individual in question has his focus on social objects or norms. The withdrawal category dealing with focus on norms is termed evasion, and it is to this category that the sick role seems to be best fitting.

According to Parsons, health is a functional need of an individual in society, and an illness prevents him from effectively performing the social roles expected of him. Therefore, illness is a state of disturbance not only of a biological system but also of the personal and social adjustments of an individual's relations with a social system. Motivated sick role is one way of responding to social pressures by the attempted evasion of social responsibilities. Parsons has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the case of modern medical practice with the intent of relating the principles underlying the therapeutic process to his overall conceptual scheme of action and the social system.

The therapeutic process involves the enactment of certain institutionalized roles on the part of the therapist, the patient, and immediate others. Drawing on his well known pattern variables or dilemmas

of alternative choices underlying action, Parsons maintains that the physician's role is based on specificity, affective neutrality, universalism, and collectivity orientation.

According to Parsons, some of the characteristic features of the sick role are the following. First, there is the characteristic of the dependency syndrome, that is, the sick person asks to be taken care of, on the basis of certain legitimate disabilities he claims to possess. Consequently he enjoys a fair amount of insulation.

Second, the sick role provides for the gratification of both components of an ambivalent motivational structure. This is accomplished by a temporary or relative withdrawal that does not involve "burning one's Bridges", but rather "eating one's cake and having it". The process is realized through a temporary suspension of normative responsibilities, while at the same time being in contact with social objects and cultural expectations. Therapy itself provides for situations of permissive conduct under carefully controlled conditions. According to Parsons, such situations serve as avenues for the expression of the alienative component of the patient's ambivalent motivational structure. The patient may not be held responsible for some of his actions because he is assumed to be sick.

Third, the sick role involves an individualized deviance, that is, the sick person does not team up with others or attempt to form a separate cultural entity. In this sense the sick role is an Isolation substitute despite the fact that it may be enacted in situations of Gatherings.

Fourth, in contrast to the individual criminal, the sick person enjoys a relative legitimacy to avoid social responsibility. This relative legitimacy is conditional upon the sick person's obligation to co-operate in getting well. This obligation is part of the price he pays for the relative legitimacy, and the controls that ensure the fulfillment of the obligation are usually exercised through the role of the therapist.

Fifth, at least insofar as the therapeutic process is concerned the sick person also enjoys a great deal of anonymity. This anonymity factor is as it were institutionally built into the doctor-patient relationship. Finally, illness comprises a "contingent" role which could be performed by anyone regardless of his socio-economic status and so forth.

The above six characteristics are perhaps the main features that comprise the sick role. In addition, Parsons has drawn attention to two major implications of the sick role. First, the sick person is not expected to possess a technical understanding of his condition or how he may be cured. Such technical know-how is always invested in the role of the physician. More often than not, the patient is not expected to make a rational assessment of his condition. Rather, he is liable to engage in a series of irrational or nonrational forms of conduct. Second, mainly due to his state of dependence, lack of technical competence, and emotional instability, there is some possibility of the sick person being an object for exploitation.

In conclusion it has been observed that the sick role is an acceptable form of individual deviance provided there are mechanisms that



act as controls to prevent any claims to permanent legitimacy of the role, and the possibility of group formation. These controls are invariably exercised through the therapeutic process. An agreement to cooperate with the physician implies a willingness to get well. Also, patients do not constitute a sub-culture of the sick but, ". . . become a statistical status class and are deprived of the possibility of forming a solidary collectivity"<sup>7</sup>.

##### 5. Assessment of Formalizations

The three formalizations summarized above have some basic characteristics of differentiation. First, Near-groups, and Encounters refer to conceptualizations of Containment substitutes, while the sick role refers to an Isolation substitute. Second, Near-groups, and Encounters deal with units of social organization, the former emphasizing the space, and time dimensions, and the latter the interactional dimension. The sick role deals with one form of individualized deviance and the institutionalized mechanisms through which it is sustained and controlled. Third, Near-groups and Encounters may be treated as research topics or substantive contributions in themselves, whereas, the sick role is only one aspect of an overall conceptualization of action, and social system.

Despite such fundamental differences in the three formalizations it is possible to assess their relative utility on the basis of certain evaluative criteria. These are first, the applicability of the formalizations to a wider range of examples than those described by the respective authors, second, the general explanatory potential of the

formulations, third, the relation of formulations to General Sociology, and fourth, the methodological implications of the formalizations.

With regard to the first criterion, there is not much doubt that the Near-group formulation is applicable to both delinquent gangs and hippie communes. Yablonsky's formulation involves two basic principles. First, Near-groups describe a form of social organization that lies mid-way between groups and mobs. Second, the general properties of Near-groups are reducible to twelve characteristic features. Yablonsky himself has demonstrated the applicability of these two principles to delinquent gangs and hippie communities. However, it is doubtful as to what other kinds of examples of behavior can be accounted for by the Near-group conception. Though Yablonsky has been hopeful that the conception would be useful in explaining adult criminal gangs, families in transition, and behaviors expressing social and personal pathology, such an applicability has not been demonstrated by Yablonsky himself, or for that matter by any other writers.

With regard to the same criterion of assessment, the conception of Encounters seem to pose certain inescapable difficulties. According to Goffman, some examples of Encounters are, meetings, games, discussions, parties, cigarette breaks, game of cards, a couple dancing, jury deliberations, love-making, and boxing. However, it is clear that Goffman's formulation as a whole is almost exclusively applicable to games such as playing of cards, and chess, and special activities such as surgical operations. In other words there are difficulties in attempting to apply his overall formulation to activities such as a cigarette break,

a boxing bout, or a couple dancing. However, it must be acknowledged that certain elements of Goffman's formulation are applicable to various examples of focused gatherings.

Parsons' conceptualization of the sick role has been intended by him as a general formulation that may be applicable to other examples as well. However, Parsons himself has not been very explicit in enumerating a list of such examples. In his study, the only examples of individualized deviance cited by him are roles such as individualized crime, the sick role, hoboism, and Bohemianism. Of these only sick role, and Bohemianism may be said to comprise the characteristic of an individual attempting to gratify both components of ambivalence. Here again it is not too clear as to how the analogy of the therapeutic process would be applicable to examples such as Bohemianism. On the other hand it is plausible to assume that the conceptualization of the sick role is more applicable to Isolation substitutes such as travel, tourist role, and certain types of drug use. They may present ways of responding to social pressures by the temporary evasion of social responsibilities. There are conventional roles that have to be performed by the tourist for example, and his immediate others, both in the host country and at home. Like the sick person, the tourist, and the drug user too enjoy a state of dependency, relatively legitimate evasion of responsibility, insulation, isolation, and anonymity. Furthermore, they both can be nonrational, and ignorant in their behavior patterns, and are also susceptible to exploitation .

The second evaluative criterion is the explanatory potential of

the three formalizations. In this respect the Near-group conception offers little more than an accurate description and certain identifying characteristics of the phenomenon to be investigated. In his own explanation of delinquent gangs, and hippie communities, Yablonsky has been obliged to make psychologistic statements that are almost non-falsifiable. For example, to assert that delinquents, and hippies are alienated, or emotionally disturbed is hardly an explanation. This type of explanation does not present social, and other determinants of the behaviors in question. Also to assert that delinquents manifest violent behavior in gang situations because they have no other avenues for the expression of aggression is again not an explanation but a tautology. Furthermore, the Near-group conception does not provide answers as to why only some youth become delinquent, and hippie-like, and others do not.

Goffman's formulation is similar in terms of its explanatory potential. Despite its greater generality, the conceptualization of Encounters is more descriptive than explanatory. Goffman's scheme is based on the assumption that some kind of order is maintained in Encounters through the double complementarity of participant expectations. Most of the elements of his scheme are therefore selected and elaborated insofar as they seem to promote the functioning of the activity system of the Encounter.

Parsons is more effective because he has attempted to analyze the sick role not as a topic by itself but as a special conceptual scheme that is consistent with his more general paradigm of action, and social

systems, and conformity and deviance. But, rather than establishing the social and other determinants that produce the sick role, Parsons is satisfied in stating that such behaviors owe their genesis to passive alienative dominance, or that they serve as mechanisms by which both components of ambivalence may be gratified. Parsons does not for example, account for why some persons adopt the sick role, join delinquent gangs, or exotic religious sects, while others adopt roles such as individual crime, hoboism, and Bohemianism. To assert that these diverse behaviors are conformative or alienative, active or passive, temporary or permanent, and that they focus attention on various situational components, is both descriptive and tautological, and not explanatory. As in the case of Yablonsky, and Goffman, Parsons' scheme does not provide for the specification of conditions that would allow for some degree of prediction.

The third evaluative criterion refers to the relation of formalizations to general theory. On this criterion the Near-group conception may be assumed as being an important contribution, but only insofar as it focuses attention on a unit of interaction that seems to have been relatively neglected in Social Organization theory. However, the relation between Near-groups and other forms of social organization and the conditions underlying different units of organization have not been elaborated by Yablonsky. In this sense, the Near-group conception stands out as it were a separate topic by itself.

Encounters focuses attention on another unit of social organization which has often been confused with small groups. The Encounters conception

is similar to the Near-group formulation, in the sense of its relation to Sociological theory in general.

The conceptual scheme underlying the sick role refers to one form of behavior namely, individualized deviance. It serves as an elaborate model of one of several types of deviance discussed by Parsons. The sick role formulation can therefore be viewed in the context of his overall conception of action, system, conformity, and deviance. However, it cannot for example be readily contrasted with his other types of deviance because Parsons has not developed a similarly elaborate conceptual scheme for the study of collective deviance. Nevertheless, the sick role formulation may be considered as a framework of analysis that complements various conceptions of Gatherings, notably Near-groups and Encounters. Encounters involve greater intensity of interaction and lesser time duration than Near-groups and the sick role.

Finally, with regard to the criterion of methodological utility, it may be stated that none of the three authors have made any special contributions towards clarifying the methodological issues related to their formulations. Yablonsky's research was based primarily on participant observation, and qualitative analysis. The quantitative data that have occasionally been secured in his research seem to have been utilized more for descriptive rather than inferential interpretations. In the final analysis it appears as if further study of delinquent gangs, and hippie communities should involve a replication of the approach adopted by Yablonsky. Such a replication may not necessarily minimize the problems of validity, reliability, meaning, and measurement.

Goffman's formulation does not seem to be based on any specific methodological procedures. Nor does he suggest any approaches by which Encounters may be studied or for that matter how his own contribution may be verified. His apparent lack of interest in methodological concerns seems to have contributed towards minimizing the overall utility of his formulation.

According to Parsons, his formulation of the case of modern medical practice is based substantially on his field study of medical practice in the Boston area. However, he has not specified the methodological details or problems connected with his field work. In this sense, as in the case with Goffman, his contribution is minimal.

## 6. Summary

This chapter attempted to present a summary and an assessment of three formalizations of substitutional behavior. The work of Yablonsky, Goffman, and Parsons were considered in this regard. The most serious shortcomings of these formulations were seen as being in the realms of explanatory potential, and methodological utility. These drawbacks seem to outweigh the descriptive and general conceptual utilities, which by themselves are of course commendable.

The area of common concern in all three formulations seems to be that of assuming some equilibrated model of an interactive process or a socio-cultural milieu, and then attempting to account for deviations from such an ideal model. Hence, these formulations tend to manifest the following features. First, there is a tendency to evoke psychologisms

as explanatory devices. Second, deviations are explained away, or symbolized under such titles as alienation, emotional instability, and problems of adjustment. Third, minor deviations that do not threaten to disrupt the organizational core of the phenomenon being investigated, seem somehow to be interpreted as contributing to the effective functioning of the interactive system.



## Footnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Lewis Yablonsky, "The Delinquent Gang as a Near-Group", op.cit.; also, The Hippie Trip, op.cit.
- <sup>2</sup> Erving Goffman, Encounters, op.cit.
- <sup>3</sup> Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., pp. 285-288, 312-320, 428-479.
- <sup>4</sup> Yablonsky, The Hippie Trip, op.cit., pp. 23-24, 326-328.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp. 328-329.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 330-331.
- <sup>7</sup> Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., p. 477.

## Part Three

### CHAPTER VIII

#### METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL ACTION

##### 1. Introduction

Part Three of this thesis consists of two main topics. The first topic deals with a review of, and formulation of modifications to, methodology of Social Action. The second topic is intended as a demonstration of utility of the proposed methodological procedures with reference to two empirical examples of Substitutional behavior. The first of these research topics will be considered in the present chapter.

It may be recalled that in Section 2 of Chapter I, the problem of meaning and measurement was highlighted as one of possibly five fundamental issues in Sociology. Therein, it was stated that Social Action comprises one of the prominent traditions of Sociological inquiry that has attempted to formulate this problem and also to bring about some solutions. The expressed purpose of this tradition has been to work towards a resolution of the problem rather than subscribe to an extreme position such as radical empiricism, and interpretative research.

The present chapter will first review how the problem has been formulated and approached by several authors. Second, and in relation to this review, it is hoped to discuss the problems with methodology of Social Action as to be found in the manner it has been formulated and

practised by various authors. Finally, the present chapter will attempt to formulate certain modifications to methodology of Social Action so as to minimize some of its inherent shortcomings.

## 2. Contributions to Methodology of Social Action

In current Sociology, the major recognitions of Weber's work seem to be somewhat confined to his ideal typifications of legitimacy, and bureaucracy, the position on value neutrality, and his comparative studies of religion and economic orders, notably that of, Protestantism and Capitalism. Weber's contributions to methodology have been relatively neglected on the grounds that they are either incomplete or impracticable. This contention is often supported by the rationale that Weber's position involves a nominalistic bias or that Weber himself did not practice his own methodology. Weber's methodology has also received some undeserving criticism at the hands of some writers who have mystified his methodology by advancing selective appraisals on conceptions such as verstehen, interpretation, meaning, understanding, and ideal types. Yet other commentators seem to have been pre-occupied with issues such as improper translations of what Weber exactly meant in his original writings, or speculations on whether he would have been a functionalist, a systems analyst, or a cyberneticist, had he lived longer.

For the purpose of the present discussion, Weber's methodology of Social Action may be summarized as follows<sup>1</sup>. According to Weber, Sociology attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects.

Social action refers to the subjectively meaningful behavior that takes into account the behavior of others. The terms meaning and meaningful as used in this context refer to a behavior in question making sense to an acting individual<sup>2</sup>. Meaning can be of two sorts. On the one hand it deals with a behavior in question actually making sense to an actor, or an average or approximation of behavior making sense to a plurality of actors. On the other hand it may deal with ideal typical meanings attributed to one or more hypothetical actors. The usage of the term meaning, does not in any way refer to an objectively correct meaning, or a true meaning in any metaphysical sense.

The validity of an interpretative understanding can be ascertained on two grounds. The first is rational, and involves logical or mathematical credibility. The second is based either on empathy or artistically appreciative quality. Although empathy in the sense of imaginative reconstruction or participant observation is certainly useful in ascertaining the validity of an understanding, it does not provide a sufficient condition for verifiable accuracy.

For scientific analysis, it is useful to treat all affective and irrational forms of behavior as departures or deviations from a conceptually pure form of rational action. Conceptually pure rational actions can be comprehended and symbolized in the form of ideal typifications.

From a methodological point of view, understanding may be of two kinds. There is first, direct observational understanding of the subjective meaning of a given act. It involves the observations of overt behavior including verbal utterances. Such observations can be made of

rational and irrational actions, reactions, and ideas. Second, there is explanatory understanding which involves an explication of meaning in terms of motive for an act performed at a particular time under specific circumstances. A motive refers to the subjective meaning which seems to an actor or an observer an adequate ground for the behavior in question. Explanatory understanding may deal either with rational motives or irrational motives.

With regard to all such cases of understanding the proper interpretation of meaning should be made in one of the following contexts. These are first, the actual intended meaning for concrete individual actions in a given historical context, second, the average or approximations of actually intended meanings of a collectivity, and third, the meaning attributed to an ideal typical formulation of action that assumes rationality. No interpretative understanding of subjective meaning can by itself claim to present a causal explanation. This is because first, the motives that may appear even to the actor as those determining his own behavior, may not necessarily be the actual determining motives. Second, there is no necessary correspondence between the motives imputed by an observer on the basis of empathy, and the motives as recognized by an actor himself. Third, action can be determined by opposing and conflicting impulses and therefore, it is not always possible to provide accurate interpretations. An interpretative understanding can however serve as a plausible hypothesis, but such a hypothesis must always be verified in relation to the concrete course of events. Comparative Sociology offers one such method of approximation.

A subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct that is arrived at on the basis of commonsense experience may be said to constitute "adequacy on the level of meaning". On the other hand, an interpretation may be said to be "causally adequate" if there is the statistical probability that the course of events will occur in the manner predicted by the interpretation. The main task of interpretative understanding is to facilitate such causal explanations. It is only when overt action and motives have been correctly grasped and their relationship comprehended, that a concrete course of action may be said to be causally interpreted. On the other hand a causal interpretation of typical action may be said to be arrived at, when such a typical course of action has been grasped both on the level of meaning, and at the level of causal adequacy.

The above summarized methodology of Max Weber has had a significant influence on traditions of Sociological inquiry such as Formalism, Symbolic Interactionism, Ethnomethodology, and on techniques such as participant observation. Also, the impact of Social Action may be evidenced in the writings of authors such as Mannheim, Commons, MacIver, Parsons, Merton, Dubin, C. Wright Mills, and John Rex.

Among these other Social Action theorists, Mannheim, and MacIver have directed considerable efforts towards methodological endeavors. Mannheim's contribution is similar to that of Weber in the sense that they both felt that meaningful understanding was an indispensable component of Sociological analysis<sup>3</sup>. Mannheim recognized the importance of purposes, motives, and values on the one hand, and world-views of an epoch on the other, as comprising data that are comparable with information

obtained through direct observation.

He emphasized three levels of meaning that could be probed with regard to a given act. These levels were termed as objective meaning, expressive meaning, and documentary meaning. Objective meaning deals with the imputation of motives to a given act on the basis of direct observation. Expressive meaning of an act can be ascertained through intimate knowledge of the actor so that the overt act could be interpreted in relation to what is already known about the actor. Documentary or evidential meaning is interpreted in relation to prior knowledge of a variety of contexts in which the actor has been found to act.

MacIver contended that scientific analysis involves two important procedures namely, identifying the causal factors underlying a phenomenon in question, and following it up with comparative analysis<sup>4</sup>. He has distinguished between four types of causal analysis, and two types of noncausal analysis. According to him, Physics, Biology, Psychology, and Sociology deal with different domains of causal inquiry. Statistical inference and the fulfillment of obligations are of noncausal nature.

Like Weber, and Mannheim, MacIver too accepted the importance of purposes, motives, and goals as indispensable dimensions for Sociological analysis. He was therefore concerned with the interpretation of the subjective meanings of action through an imaginative reconstruction of the reasons underlying a behavior in question. Such a reconstruction was intended to serve as the basis for ascertaining validity through a series of comparative analysis.

Among contemporary writings, the work of Richard Jung may be cited as an effort toward resolving some of the methodological problems of Social Action<sup>5</sup>. Jung has proposed a method known as cybernetic phenomenology that may be used to construct a general theory of action, that is, action pertaining to the behavior of individuals. The general theory of action is one of three general theories that may facilitate a unified theory of behavior. The other two general theories deal with interaction or the behavior of groups, and transaction or the behavior of collectivities.

The general theory of action draws on the traditions of action analysis in Psychology, Sociology, Economics, and Philosophy. The method of cybernetic phenomenology employs phenomenology or the description of actions as systems of experience as the basis for conceptualization. Cybernetics accounts for the self and non-self regulating mechanisms of action. Jointly, they both, that is cybernetics, and phenomenology are employed as a mode of functional analysis. Functional analysis as referred to here deals not with teleological conceptions of goal oriented behavior but with past and present extremum constraints influencing the essential or dependent variables. In this sense, functional analysis is identical with what is known by the same name in engineering and Physics.

According to Jung, there are three fundamental constraints governing action, each calling for a special theory of action. These special theories are, those of orientation, decision, and motivation. These special theories respectively deal with the reduction of maximum



possible amounts of uncertainty, risk, and tension. The vital imbalance of these processes allow for the fundamental propensities of action and the distinguishing characteristics of individual behaviors. The integration of action on the basis of these processes may be accounted for in terms of a general principle of action, that is, one postulating the reduction of maximum possible amounts of inauthenticity.

This principle of the reduction of maximum possible amounts of inauthenticity assumes that, action attempts to reduce any discrepancy between the state of the organism, and its definition as an actor. This discrepancy is resolved either by changing one's state as an organism to correspond with one's definition as an actor, or by changing one's definition to correspond with one's state as an organism. These two mechanisms of adjustment may respectively be illustrated by examples of behavior such as learning, and the adoption of defence mechanisms.

### 3. Problems with Methodology of Social Action

The general situation with regard to methodology of Social Action is that on the one hand it lacks specific procedures that could be integrated to comprise a viable approach to the study of social behavior. On the other hand it also lacks cumulative continuity, that is, since its initial formulation by Weber, there have been no subsequent contributions by way of substantive improvements. Rather, the stances taken and the contributions that have been made are rather selective, piece-meal, and even transitory.

Despite his pioneering contribution to the subject, Weber's methodology suffers from at least two serious shortcomings. First, he was not successful in formulating rigorous procedures on how the transition can be made from social action, and interaction, to social structures and the conduct of collectivities. Second, he also failed to provide specific guidelines on how objective possibilities could be correspondingly matched with subjective meanings so as to establish the nature of their congruence.

The contributions of Mannheim and MacIver are even less substantive than that of Weber and perhaps involve one sided accentuations. Mannheim for example has emphasized the Weltanschauung perspective to the relative neglect of more exacting measurements. MacIver on the other hand over-emphasized the utility of imaginative reconstruction for causal and comparative analysis. His antipathy towards statistical reasoning and quantitative analysis in general has contributed to his own methodology being one of the most extreme stances of the Social Action tradition.

Perhaps Jung's work comprises the most formal and rigorous introduction to methodology of Social Action. First, it has drawn upon theoretical and methodological insights from a variety of scientific disciplines including Mathematics, Physics, and Economics. Second, instead of a one sided accentuation, Jung has attempted to bring together phenomenology, and cybernetics, each of which by definition provides for a radically different mode of inquiry. Third, his approach seems to avoid or minimize some of the problems inherent in Social Action and the sequence

of the action frame of reference. Of special interest in this context are the problems of limited tendencies, dualism, and the assumption that goals constitute some of the pre-determinants of action. The three points just mentioned call for substantive modifications in methodology of Social Action. At the same time however, it is pertinent to highlight two major limitations in Jung's scheme. First, the language of his proposal is rather formal and his terminology somewhat unfamiliar to the average student in the behavioral sciences. This is partly because of the variety of scientific disciplines from which he has drawn ideas for the purpose of formulating his own proposal. Second, and perhaps more important, the methodological utility of his approach has yet to be demonstrated in an empirical context. This again may not be immanent because it appears that as yet, Jung has not developed two of the special theories namely, those of motivation, and decision, which together with the special theory of orientation are presumed to comprise the general theory of action. Therefore at the present stage it is not possible to offer any definitive assessment of his formulation.

The contributions of Parsons, Merton, and Dubin comprise three attempts at demonstrating the conformity-deviance theme by utilizing a variation of the action frame of reference. These three contributions have been assessed in Chapters III, and IV, and need no elaboration here. However it is pertinent to recognize the fact that insofar as the evolution of Parsons' thinking is concerned there have been subtle shifts in emphasis from the methodological problems of Social Action to those of system analysis. In his earliest major work Parsons has asserted that,

It is a fact however it may be interpreted, that men assign subjective motives to their actions . . . It is a fact that they manifest the subjective feelings, ideas, motives, associated with their actions by means of linguistic symbols as well as in other ways . . . These facts and others like them are those which raise the central methodological problems peculiar to the sciences concerned with human action. It is manifested by linguistic symbols to which meaning is attached. This subjective aspect involves the reasons we ourselves assign for acting as we do. No science concerned with human action can, if it would penetrate beyond a superficial level, evade the methodological problems of the relevance of facts of this order to the scientific explanation of the other facts of human action<sup>6</sup>.

The ideas expressed in the above excerpt, and Parsons' early position on the components of Social Action seem to have undergone some transformation in the three decades spanning the evolution of his ideas. According to one of Parsons' recent writings,

Action consists of the structures and processes by which human beings form meaningful intentions and, more or less successfully implement them in concrete situations. The word "meaningful" implies the symbolic or cultural level of representation and reference. Intentions and implementations taken together imply a disposition of the action system- individual or collective- to modify its relation to its situation or environment in an intended direction. We prefer the term "action" to "behavior" because we are interested not in the physical events of behavior for their own sake but in their patterning, their patterned meaningful products (physical, cultural, and other), ranging from implements to works of art, and the mechanisms and processes that control such patterning. Human action is "cultural" in that meanings and intentions concerning acts are formed in terms of symbolic systems (including the codes through which they operate in patterns) that focus most generally about the universal of human societies, language<sup>7</sup>.

From the point of view of methodology of Social Action the following observations can be made with regard to the above two

quotations. First, and from a most general point of view, it is clear that Parsons has shifted his emphasis from the methodological problems of Social Action to the theoretical issues of social systems. Second, and therefore, it appears that definitional clarifications of such terms as action, and meaning have taken somewhat revised connotations in line with the change of emphasis from Social Actionism to Cultural Determinism. In other words, the point emphasized is that apparently as a result of systemic thinking Parsons has been obliged to abandon his earlier quest for solutions to the methodological problems of Social Action.

So far in this section, the problems with methodology of Social Action were reviewed in terms of the special contributions of Weber, Mannheim, MacIver, and Jung, and the more substantive contributions of Parsons, Merton, and Dubin. The general conclusion of the foregoing synopsis is that methodology of Social Action has been non-cumulative, and perhaps discontinuous, and that it lacks definite procedures which could comprise an integrated approach to the inquiry of social behavior. At a specific level, it could be stated that Social Action has not in fact resolved the problem of meaning and measurement. Problems can also be looked at, with reference to what is commonly known as the action frame of reference. As suggested in Chapter II, this framework and the accompanying typifications of response and behavior have serious shortcomings such as the problems of limited or unspecified utility, limited tendencies, labels, empathy, dualism, and motives.

The modifications to methodology of Social Action suggested in

the next section are intended to minimize not only the problems with the action frame of reference, but also those generally associated with the Social Action tradition in general.

#### 4. Modifications to Methodology of Social Action

Some of the thinking underlying the proposed modifications may be stated as follows. The first issue, the most important from the point of view of methodology, deals with what has been referred to in this disseration as the problem of meaning and measurement. The proposed modifications would hopefully show some directions towards establishing a congruence between objective possibilities and subjective meanings of social behavior. Conventionally, objective possibilities or rather, objective probabilities have been ascertained on the basis of observation, experimentation, and comparison, ideally under controlled conditions. On the other hand subjective meanings have generally been comprehended on the basis of empathetic research strategies such as participant observation, re-living of an experience, sympathetic introspection, imaginative re-construction, and so forth. There have hardly been any conclusive efforts towards combining the derivations of each mode of inquiry so as to establish some measure of congruence. Also procedures have not been worked out whereby the conclusions of one mode of inquiry would corroborate or act as a cross-check on the conclusions of the other mode of inquiry. The suggested modifications refer to at least a minimal reconciliation of this problem.

In this connection it is of special importance to reflect on

Robert Brown's enumeration of methods of explanation<sup>8</sup>. According to him, the methods of explanation relevant to social science have been termed genetic, intentions, dispositions, reasons, functions, empirical generalizations, and theories. Brown's work represents one of the most comprehensive analysis of the distinctions between intentions, dispositions, reasons, and functions. These four types of explanatory methods are often confused in the literature. Also as noted by Brown, there is a marked reluctance on the part of social scientists to deal with explanation involving intentions, dispositions, and reasons as opposed to inquiry into unintended consequences. The difference between unintended events, and intended or dispositional actions of human conduct is of utmost importance to Social Action thinking. According to Brown, intentions deal with purposive action designed to accomplish some aims or goals. Dispositions on the other hand refer to tendencies and are of three sorts namely, unlearned reflexes, habits, and motives. Motives can be sub-classified as intention-motives, impulse-motives, and dispositional-motives. As different from intentions, and dispositions, there are also reasons that may explain action. The methods of explanation that deal with intentions, dispositions and reasons, involve a more elaborate framework of investigation than those attempting to explain roles and functions. Incidentally, it may be recalled that intentions, dispositions, and reasons, collectively include what Weber referred to as motives or meanings, that make sense as adequate grounds for any action in question. Finally, according to Brown, explanation in terms of function deals with two orders of questions. These are first, questions relating to the purposes an action in question is presumed to fulfill. Second, it may

deal with questions concerning the part an action in question is supposed to play in the operations of a greater whole or system of which it is a component.

The second underlying theme of the proposed modifications emphasizes the importance of empirical observation and inductive logic as the preliminary foundation. The methodological tradition of Social Action has not only an inherent bias, but this bias also sustains a deductive logic that rests on non-falsifiable assumptions. The shortcomings of this sequence have been highlighted in Chapter II. The major issue is perhaps the imputation of motives on the basis of ad-hoc considerations. What is of course objected to here is not the role of empathy as such but the restraining influence exerted by empathic insights on the subsequent elaboration of the action sequence. The modified proposal suggested in this thesis attempts as it were to reverse the action sequence so that objective probabilities are not restrained by subjective meanings. Rather, subjective meanings can comprise a parallel or subsequent mode of analysis to that seeking objective probabilities. In fact one mode of inquiry would cross-validate the other.

Third, the modified methodology may be said to have a phenomenological bias in the sense that the preliminaries of investigation are empirical and inductive, and minimally constrained by apriori assumptions, models, theoretical frameworks, and conventional explanations. These along with empathetic insights should be subsequent or at the most, parallel developments in the investigation process.



Fourth, investigations should best commence with the examination of patterns of recurrent and observable behavior. This practice has a number of advantages. First, it enables the investigator to select problems with minimum constraints on criteria for selection. Second, such an initial approach may facilitate the elucidation of objective possibilities that could subsequently be cross-checked with subjective meanings. Next, it of course precludes the *apriori* imputation of aims, and motives to various instances of action.

The fifth major theme underlying the suggested modifications is the view that an adequate explanation or a satisfactory understanding of a behavior in question should involve at least four major problem areas. Following Olsen, these may be termed as questions dealing with structure, process, function, and cause<sup>9</sup>. The scheme to be outlined below represents these four problem areas and how they may be explored on the basis of two operative levels namely, objective possibilities, and subjective meanings. Such an extended modification allows for a wider range of explanatory potential than that offered by the conventional action frame of reference sequence. Furthermore, an extended framework that takes into account such variables as preconditions and mechanisms of action may help in ascertaining why only certain persons engage in a particular pattern of conduct while others do not. For example, why different forms of Substitution are adopted by different persons may have more to do with the availability or nonavailability of certain preconditions and mechanisms of action rather than motives, goals, social determinants, and consequences.

Sixth, the modified methodology is intended to serve as broad guidelines allowing for certain flexibilities with regard to specific research techniques. For example, a variety of techniques may have to be employed depending upon the particular nature of a concrete problem that is selected for investigation.

Finally, the modifications are as it were facilitating a reversal of the action frame of reference, and the general logic of Social Action methodology. It is pertinent to make an important observation on this point. It should be emphasized that the proposed modifications do not constitute a radical departure from the central problems posed by the tradition of Social Action. On the contrary the modifications are designed to facilitate the more effective reconciliation of these problems such as, the apprehension of the congruence between subjective meanings and the objective possibilities that explain action, and the establishing of generalizations that take into account the structural, process, functional, and causal factors that underlie recurrent actions. Where the modifications deviate radically from conventional Social Action methodology is in the realm of the logical sequence of the research process.

Now, to briefly recapitulate the main principles of Social Action methodology, it can be asserted at the outset that the central issue it attempted to resolve was the problem of meaning and measurement. Perhaps more than any other tradition of Sociological inquiry Social Action maintains the position that subjective meanings that actors attach to their actions produce the fundamental difference between the methodologies of natural and social science. As postulated by Weber, Sociology attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in

order to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects. Since his pioneering elaboration of Social Action methodology there has been no substantial contribution to the subject in the sense of demonstrable credibility. Certainly the most established version of Social Action methodology can be seen in the sequence of the action frame of reference. This sequence has been subjected to critical appraisal in Part One of this thesis.

The modifications proposed in this thesis suggest the following sequence of investigation. The first task involves the selection of a pattern of observable behavior that is of interest to the investigators. Second, patterns of observable behavior are subjected to descriptive and classificatory analysis in terms of their structural relationships, roles and so forth as answers to "what" questions concern the behavior in question.

Third, what is required is an investigation of the process of "how" questions that underlie the pattern of observable behavior being investigated. This process analysis would explore such problem areas as the preconditions for action, and the mechanisms that make the pattern of observable behavior possible. For example, in the case of substitutional behavior, such as the tourist role, three of the preconditions underlying the enactment of that role would be the availability of disposable or discretionary income, the availability of disposable time, and the availability of avenues for mobility. The mechanisms that make the tourist role possible would be what was referred to in earlier chapters as Modes of Substitution namely, the maintenance of a

particular range of situational, spatial, and time distance. It should be clear by now that preconditions, and mechanisms underlying particular patterns of observable behavior have to be elucidated on the basis of the specific character of such patterns selected for investigation. It is not possible to prescribe the preconditions.

Fourth, it is necessary to examine the functions, both social and otherwise that derive from the pattern of observable behavior in question. These functions provide answers to questions involving explanation in terms of individual purposes, and social and other consequences in the sense clarified by Brown. Finally, investigation can be directed toward the causal or "why" questions related to the pattern of observable behavior researched. Answers to these "why" questions may take three forms. First, they may include what Brown has referred to as the functional-purpose explanations derivable from the analysis of functions, and consequences. Second, there are explanations involving what he calls intentions, dispositions, and reasons. These explanations can be derived on the basis of how the actors themselves account for their actions, and how the investigator interprets patterns of observable behavior according to some empathetic understanding and already available scientific knowledge related to the problem. Third, an examination of the social determinants of action may also provide answers to the "why" questions regarding the pattern of observable behavior in question.

The suggested sequence of inquiry can now be summarized as follows: Pattern of Observable Behavior; Structural Analysis: description, and classification of roles, relationships, and forms or patterns of the ob-

servable behavior; Process Analysis: preconditions, and mechanisms; Functional Analysis: purposes, and consequences; Causal Analysis: intentions, dispositions, reasons, and social determinants.

What is of importance in the suggested methodology is the rethinking of Weber's original dilemma that has not been effectively resolved namely, that of the problem of establishing some congruence between objective possibilities, or objective probabilities, and subjective meanings. Some suggestions in this direction may be stated as follows.

First, the investigation of objective probabilities, and subjective meanings have no necessary sequential order, and may even be parallel modes of inquiry provided that subjective meanings do not constrain the investigation of objective possibilities. The sequential order may depend largely on whether subjective meaning in the sense of actors accounting for their own behaviors is sought before, during, or after the time the pattern of observable behavior in question does take place.

Second, it is possible to establish a congruence if any, between the objective probabilities with regard to the problem areas of structure, process, function, and cause on the one hand, and the conclusions of subjective meaning with regard to function and cause on the other. Varying degrees of congruence between the conclusions of objective probability and subjective meaning would reflect varying degrees of credibility of the validity-reliability dimensions of the investigation.

Third, perhaps at a more sophisticated level it may be possible to develop and utilize appropriate computer simulations that would not only cross-check the conclusions of objective possibilities or probabilities, and subjective meanings, but would also establish the probabilities of the degree of predictable congruence.

It is opportune to conclude this section by providing some comments on more general issues related to the modified proposals. First, it needs to be emphasized that the modifications deal with a broad framework of methodological procedures that would hopefully minimize the major problems associated with the tradition of Social Action. Therefore, the proposal is not intended as a remedy for all the problems of Sociological research in general, or for that matter of other traditions of Sociological inquiry. Also, the proposed framework has not taken into account either the uses of existing Sociological theory or the question of research techniques. It is assumed that appropriate theoretical insights would be utilized at relevant stages of inquiry, and that the choice of research techniques would depend on the nature of the research design.

Second, by combining the methodological insights of Brown, and Olsen, the modified proposal has in fact attempted to go beyond Weber's initial pronouncement on Social Action. As evidenced from the preceding discussion, the modified proposals provide on the one hand for a wider and more integrated range of research possibilities. On the other hand it also facilitates a shift in emphasis towards realism, and more holistic conceptualizations, from an otherwise seemingly nominalistic bias.

## 5. Summary

In this chapter, there was first a review of the contributions to methodology of Social Action as offered by Weber, Mannheim, MacIver, Parsons, and a few other writers. It was contended that there were no demonstrable advances made in methodology of Social Action, since its initial formulation by Weber. The work of Mannheim, and MacIver were noted for their rather one-sided accentuations, whereas Parsons' contribution was seen as one of shifting emphasis from Social Action to system analysis.

This chapter also attempted to propose certain modifications to methodology of Social Action so as to extend its potential and also at the same time to minimize its inherent shortcomings. The modifications involve basically a reversal as it were of what is commonly known as the action frame of reference. The proposal also provided for a wider range of research possibilities based on inductive reasoning, and also for an extended conception of Weber's ideas on motive and meaning. A demonstration of the utility of the proposed modifications would be attempted in the next chapter.

## Footnotes

- 1 This summary is based mainly on Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op.cit., pp. 87-118.
- 2 The idea of "meaning" as something "making sense" has been suggested by Bendix, Max Weber, An Intellectual Portrait., op.cit., p. 474.
- 3 For Mannheim's contributions see, Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953; Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952.
- 4 See especially, Robert M. MacIver, Social Causation, Boston: Ginn, 1942.
- 5 See footnote 23 in Chapter I.
- 6 Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op.cit., p. 26.
- 7 Parsons, Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, p. 5.
- 8 Robert Brown, Explanation in Social Science., op.cit.
- 9 See footnote 1 in Chapter VI.



## CHAPTER IX

### THE UTILITY OF PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS

#### 1. Introduction

Various shortcomings in methodology of Social Action have been highlighted in this dissertation. Prominent among these is the central problem of meaning and measurement which has not been adequately resolved. A more general shortcoming is the fact that Social Action is rather vague, discontinuous, and lacking in procedural rigor. These shortcomings have been discussed in Sections 2, and 3 of the previous chapter. Other shortcomings inherent to the action frame of reference in particular are, the problems of, limited or unspecified utility, limited tendencies, dualism, labels, empathy, and motives. These problems have been described in Chapter II, and discussed in relation to the contributions of various authors in Chapter III, and IV.

Certain modifications to Social Action were proposed in the previous chapter with the view towards minimizing some of the problems inherent to that tradition of inquiry, and at the same time without avoiding the central issues that tradition has posed and attempted to resolve. The proposed modifications involve three basic departures from conventional Social Action methodology, and these are, first, a reversal of the deductive logic of the action frame sequence; second, a more complex elaboration of the concepts of meaning and motive than suggested by Weber; and third, an extension of the scope of the domains

of inquiry, mainly in the light of modern organization research. These and other deviations from conventional Social Action methodology were discussed at some length in Section 4 of the previous chapter.

Two clarifications are in order with regard to the proposed modifications. First, the modifications would in combination minimize the problems inherent to Social Action. Since there is considerable overlap in the implications of these modifications it is not convenient to enumerate specific modifications and their corresponding implications without resorting to numerous repetitions. Second, it was felt that the most effective manner of expressing the modifications was to present an abstract sequence of the investigation process. Such a presentation was attempted in Section 4 of the previous chapter. It portrayed an investigation process based on inductive logic, that also takes into account the study of objective possibilities and subjective meanings, a broader scope of the conceptions of meaning and motive, and a variety of domains of inquiry typically neglected in conventional Social Action inquiry.

The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate the utility of the proposed modifications with reference to the hypothetical investigation of two examples of behavior. Drug use, and the tourist role have been selected as the two examples for this exercise. The justification for selecting these may be stated as follows. As demonstrated in Section 4 of Chapter I, and also Chapters V, and VI, examples of behavior such as drug use and the tourist role may involve states of Deferment whereby an individual postpones interaction in a situation

with which he usually is in contact. It may be recalled that Deferment was sub-divided into two Patterns of Substitution on the interaction criterion namely, behaviors involving Containment substitutes and Isolation substitutes. Examples of behavior such as, sick role, tourist role, travel, exploration, creating and consuming of art, Bohemianism, contemplation, and certain types of drug use were recognized as belonging to the Fugue or Deferment-Isolation syndrome.

On the criterion of situational components or objects of Deferment, these examples of behavior could be seen as collapsible into at least three general categories within the Deferment-Isolation pattern itself. One such category may consist of examples such as, sick role, where the individual defers adherence to his customary norms of conduct as a way of maintaining situational distance. A second general category may consist of examples such as the tourist role, travel, and exploration where the individual defers adherence to his customary norms, and perhaps values, as a way of maintaining situational distance, and he also sustains a considerable distance in terms of time, and geographical space as well. Examples such as contemplation, and certain types of drug use may comprise a third category in which the individual could maintain maximum situational distance, that is, by deferring all situational components including ego. Therefore, the idea of a drug user taking a "trip" connotes a different range of Deferment than that of the roles of the tourist or the traveller. Since the sick role has already been conceptualized by Parsons, and also to avoid repetition of similar material, it is felt that the selection of one example from each of the remaining two categories would be useful and more illustrative. Hence,

drug use, and the tourist role were selected for this purpose. However, the proposed modifications would be equally applicable to the study of the sick role or for that matter, of any other examples of Deferment.

## 2. The Inadequacy of Social Action

The general inadequacy of Social Action inquiry is apparent from the fact that varieties of individual behavior including drug use, have hardly been researched by the proponents of Social Action. The modes of behavior referred to by Merton and Dubin as retreatism, and by Parsons as withdrawal are only broad conceptual labels that could classify a number of behaviors including certain types of drug use. According to the frameworks of these authors, certain other types of drug use may be considered as conformist behavior.

Similarly, according to their formulations, types of behavior such as the tourist role could be accounted for only as examples of conformity or institutionalized evasions. Such explanations do not offer much information on questions such as, the conditions underlying drug use or the tourist role, why only some individuals choose one pattern of Deferment and not another, and so forth.

It could be argued that the problems inherent to Social Action preclude the effective analysis of such topics as drug use and the tourist role. Social Action reasoning is based entirely on certain apriori assumptions about the nature of man and notably, the response modes he is capable of possessing. These assumptions in turn serve in the deduction of modes of behavior, and their labeling, and classifica-

tion. In Part One of this thesis it was shown that this sequence not only precludes the investigation of a variety of behaviors but that it also poses insurmountable problems of a methodological nature such as, the exclusive reliance on empathy, and the unwarranted imputation of motives and goals.

The modifications proposed in the present thesis have an inductive bias, and this helps the investigator to observe empirical phenomena without being constrained by a priori assumptions and categories. Furthermore, the focus on both objective possibilities and subjective meanings enables the researcher to ascertain the validity of subjective meanings in the light of observable behavior.

A rather narrow conception of meaning and motive also prevents Social Action inquiry from making satisfactory statements on such topics as drug use, and the tourist role. Most Social Action formulations attempt to impute goals, and purposes to the acting individual. Therefore certain types of drug use and the tourist role can be accounted for on the grounds that the actor was seeking goals that are consistent with those of the culture or the social system. As in the case of retreatism, and the sick role, other types of drug use would be accounted for in terms of goal conflict, deviance, and alienative dominance.

The proposed modifications suggest inquiry into a wider range of determinants such as, purposes, intentions, dispositions, and reasons. These in conjunction with other domains of inquiry are likely

to provide greater accountability for the enactment of such behaviors as drug use, and the tourist role.

Social Action inquiry is also noted for its narrow focus, that is, it generally concerns itself with the interplay of a small number of variables. This feature has led to Social Action being labeled as presenting a nominalistic bias. For example, in conventional analysis, drug use and the tourist role are likely to be viewed as the product of some individual motive, need gratification, or goal on the one hand, and the relation of these individual states to such situational characteristics as values, means, norms, and social objects. In addition to narrowing the scope of investigation, such procedures raise other problems of a substantive and methodological nature as well.

The modifications suggested in this thesis attempt to extend the scope of research so as to include a larger variety of variables that may account for the behavior being investigated. In the light of modern organization research, the domains of inquiry comprise four areas namely, structure, process, function, and cause. These areas provide for the investigation of a large number of variables typically neglected in Social Action research.

In Sections 3, and 4 of this chapter, the proposed modifications are highlighted with reference to the hypothetical study of drug use, and the tourist role. The special utility of these modifications will be elaborated in the course of these two demonstrations wherever such utility is not self-evident. Section 5 of this chapter will be devoted

to a discussion of the overall implications of the proposed modifications to methodology of Social Action.

### 3. The Study of Drug Use

The subject of drug use has received considerable attention of various contemporary writers perhaps because the use of certain types of drugs is either illegal or considered as problematic to society. Despite the popularity of the topic it is difficult to present an overview of the state of social scientific knowledge on drug use. This is so, as topics of this nature typically have not been regarded as substantive domains of inquiry in the traditions of the social sciences, hence, there has not been the cumulation of knowledge on such topics. Furthermore, the current literature on drug use is composed mainly of "on-the-spot quasi-social scientific" observations and impressions. There are only a few select studies based on social and behavioral scientific research procedures. For example, the Masters and Houston monograph on mind expanding drugs, and the Charles T. Tart symposium on altered states of consciousness are important contributions to Psychiatry, and Existential Psychology<sup>1</sup>. The work by Lindesmith, Becker, and Blumer of the Symbolic Interaction tradition constitute some of the pioneering efforts made by Sociologists towards an understanding of certain types of drug use<sup>2</sup>.

As a beginning to Sociological inquiry it is first necessary to differentiate between drugs and non-drugs. Drugs refer to any substance that alters one's state of mind. Behaviorally speaking, drugs refer to

any substance that when consumed, brings about a noticeable difference in the overt behavior of individuals. The term drug use may be referred to as the consumption of any drug with the motive of bringing about the social effect of Containment or Isolation. Here the term motive is used only in the Weberian sense to imply a conception of meaningful conduct. Also, following Simmel, the intended consequence have been related to the social variables of Containment and Isolation.

In the light of this general background, it is now possible to discuss the proposed modifications with reference to the study of drug use. This discussion will be supported by certain literary evidence drawn from the writings of various authors. Such information is used only for purposes of illustrating the proposed modifications and not with the intent of drawing any substantive conclusions.

The first task of any research sequence is to select a pattern of observable behavior which is of interest to the investigator. The emphasis in this case would be on the selection of a type of drug use, rather than that of types of drugs. Since the entire scope of drug use is considerably broad and varied, it may be necessary to limit the scope of the problem area. One approach may be to select drug use-Containment or drug use-Isolation, the latter being divisible into the "going no where", and the "trip" varieties. Another approach may be to select a type of drug use based on what McCracken refers to as the drugs of habit and the drugs of belief. Drugs of habit such as, tobacco, alcohol, cola, methedrine, and heroine are said to be used with the intent of becoming a little more human. Drugs of belief such as,



marijuana, and LSD are said to be used with the intent of becoming a little more than human. McCracken has also suggested another classification namely, the drugs of the fathers, and the drugs of the sons. The former type includes coffee, tobacco, cola, alcohol, tranquilizers, and barbituates whereas, the latter type consists of marijuana, the opiates, stimulants, and hallucinogens<sup>3</sup>. Both his classifications seem to emphasize types of drugs rather than types of drug use. Nevertheless, suggestions such as his may be useful for the demarcation of the research scope in the study of drug use. Regardless of the magnitude of the research scope it may be useful to bear in mind that types of drug use always involve meaningful conduct in Weber's sense, though not necessarily purposive or goal directed action.

As a second step, investigation may proceed on the descriptive and classificatory analysis of the objective possibilities of patterns of observable behavior. This phase may include such areas of focus as, the kinds of persons engaged in drug use, how the drugs are used, and the types of situations in which drug use takes place. Also of importance would be the different roles and relationships manifested by individuals involved in situations of drug use.

Both the Containment versus the Isolation theme, and the "going no where" versus the "trip" theme have been documented in most of the writings on drug use. For example, in hallucinogenic drug use, Masters and Houston contend that most hippies are addicted not to drugs but to cultist activities<sup>4</sup>. To use Hobart's phrase, these may be "phony" beats who have merely traded one kind of conformity for another<sup>5</sup>. Also,

Yablonsky's classification shows that only about 50% of all hippies are "pure" in the sense that they seem to reach out for something more than Containment. The other 50% are "plastics" meaning that they are either phony or week-end hippies<sup>6</sup>. The Containment versus Isolation theme has also been recognized by Leary who states that, although psychedelic spiritual voyages are usually undertaken together by small groups of people, that the quest is highly individual, and highly personal<sup>7</sup>. This same theme can also be applied to other types of drug use such as in the case of the "pot party" goer versus the junkie, and the social drinker versus the alcoholic. The Containment syndrome may necessarily involve activities such as, parties, rituals, and the playing of sociability roles.

Though belonging to the Isolation syndrome, the "going no where" versus the "trip" theme has also been recognized by a number of authors. This variation is similar to the idea of the "soak" versus the "head" theme clarified in McCracken's essay cited earlier. In his study of hippie communes, Yablonsky has noted that hippies view wine drinkers as "not going any place". In fact these communes had strict regulations forbidding the use of alcohol, opiates, and amphetamines<sup>8</sup>. Similarly Geller and Boas have reported that hippies condemn the use of "uppies" such as amphetamines, and "downies" such as alcohol, barbiturates, and opiates<sup>9</sup>. Perhaps the most elaborate clarification of this theme is offered by Leary. According to him, there are seven levels of consciousness. Four of these namely, atomic, cellular, somatic, and sensory levels may be induced through psychedelic drugs such as LSD, DMT, STP, MDA, peyote, mescaline, hashish, and marijuana. The other three

levels namely, ego, emotional stupor, and anesthetic states may respectively be induced through pep pills, coffee, tea, and cola; moderate doses of alcohol; and narcotics, barbiturates, and large doses of alcohol<sup>10</sup>.

Some of the other social characteristics of drug use involve the performance of special roles such as the "guide", the "pusher", the "head", and the novice. Two Sociological descriptions of "what" takes place in terms of role behavior and sub-cultural influence may be seen in the writings of Becker, and Blumer. Blumer states that the group inculcates the collective belief that drug use is not harmful. Furthermore, the groups have an ideology and role structure so well integrated with the drug scene that even Nancy is considered to be "one of the boys"<sup>11</sup>. Blumer's study is based on the bifurcation of drug use roles into the "rowdy dimension" involving drunkenness on alcohol, and aggressive behavior, on the one hand, and the "cool dimension" involving the "pot head", "mellow dude", "mellow chick", and the "player" on the other.

A third task of the modified methodology is to establish the preconditions, and mechanisms or processes that enable the enactment of the behavior in question. In this instance, preconditions involve the availability of certain drugs, and the availability of situations that are conducive to the use of drugs. The mechanisms or Modes of Substitution in this case comprise the Deferral of situations or situational components such as norms, values, and ego. As illustrated in Figures 7, and 8 of Chapter VI, drug use-Containment may necessitate the maintenance of situational distance from norms, and values, whereas, drug

use-Isolation may be brought about by maintaining situational distance from ego as well. As illustrated, it is likely that drug use-Isolation constitutes a longer time distance than drug use-Containment. The variable of geographical distance may not play a necessary part in the Deferment mechanisms of both types of drug use.

The availability of drugs no doubt constitutes an important precondition for their use. This is usually governed by such factors as legality, social sanctions, medical implications, and market prices. In his study of illicit drug use among Canadian youth, Unwin shows that there is an increasing trend in this age group to resort to solvent inhalations. The readily available nature of solvents such as, glues, cements, fingernail polish removers, lighter fluids, cleaning fluids, gasoline, lacquer thinners, and ether, may be contributing to their increasing popularity<sup>12</sup>. With regard to illicit drugs, the role of the "pusher" is of course indispensable. According to Geller and Boas, his role is in a way similar to that of a person who makes the organizational arrangements for travel. Geller and Boas have noted promotional buttons reading, "support your local travel agent", and "fly now, pay later", worn by certain student groups<sup>13</sup>.

Other important preconditions, especially for psychedelic drug use are the "set", and the "setting". The "set" comprises the nature of the user, that is, his personality, aspirations, capacities, socialization, and socio-cultural background. For example, capacities such as the ability or inability to "hold one's liquor" also may constitute a component of the "set". The "setting" involves all the situational com-

ponents necessary for successful drug use. These may include a variety of things such as a congenial environment, objects of special interest to the user, and in the case of psychedelic drug use an experienced and knowledgeable "guide", whose role has been so vividly described by Masters, and Houston<sup>14</sup>. As reported by Becker, and Blumer the belief and experience in certain drugs involve a learning process and in this respect the user's peer-group is also an indispensable precondition.

Situational and time distance comprise the key mechanisms of Deferment insofar as drug use is concerned. Situational distance may depend on such factors as the amount or types of drugs consumed, and the individual and social definitions attached to the purposes and consequences of drug use. In addition to these, time distance is largely based on disposable time, and there is a tendency on the part of the user to appropriately adjust the factors underlying situational distance to suit the time variable. For example, according to Geller and Boas, DMT use is characterized by a fifteen to thirty minute short lived experience, and as such is known as "lunch hour special", and the "commuter's jet". On the other hand, STP is a far stronger drug, and the experience may be expected to last from three to four days<sup>15</sup>.

As a fourth area of research recommended by the proposed modifications, the focus of investigation may be on functions. These include on the one hand individual purposes, and on the other hand social and other consequences. Social consequences may be explored in terms of objective possibilities, whereas, individual purposes can

be ascertained on the basis of the meanings the actor or the investigator attribute as adequate reasons for the behavior in question. The credibility of these subjective meanings may be assessed in relation to patterns of observable behavior and the objective possibilities of structural, process, and causal interpretations.

Some of the purposes and consequences underlying drug use have been discussed by various authors. The most frequently mentioned factors seem to be drawn from the "escapist" theme on the one hand, and the sociability theme on the other. Both themes of course refer to the Deferment of situational components, and the difference between these themes lies in the fact that the objects of Deferment are entirely different. For example, the "turn on, tune in, drop out" cycle which is a cardinal principle of the Leary-Alpert doctrine clearly indicates the alleged purposes of the LSD user<sup>16</sup>.

According to Leary, both science and religion pose and seek answers to seven fundamental questions. The "religious" experience induced through LSD involves the subjective discovery of answers to these basic questions. These questions deal with issues such as, the basic energy underlying the universe, what is life, who is man, how does man know, who am I, what are feelings, and how do I ultimately escape. Leary states that both the junkie, and the alcoholic face such questions with blackout drugs<sup>17</sup>. Leary himself does not advocate mere freedom or escape but some quest, and perhaps some arrival point. In their study, Masters and Houston found that only 11 out of 206 users of psychedelic drugs claimed to have reached such arrival points<sup>18</sup>.

As in the case of "social drinking", the sociability theme in other types of drug use has been recognized by various authors including Becker, and Blumer. Other purposes or motives consist of such factors as natural curiosity, and the desire to overcome anxiety, fear, and risk. Not unlike the track athlete who may take drugs to relieve anxiety and take his mind off the outcome of the race, the GI is said to "turn on" to overcome fear<sup>19</sup>.

According to Winick, there is 1 opiate addict per 100 US physicians, whereas, there is only 1 opiate addict per 3,000 of the general US population. Winick's study of 98 opiate addict physicians highlights the reasons given by the physicians themselves for their use of opiates. These reasons are, overwork, physical ailment, marital problems, high aspirations, euphoria, depressing effects, substitute for liquor, insomnia, and old age<sup>20</sup>.

Despite the terminology adopted by various writers, it is difficult to differentiate between purposes, functions, intentions, dispositions, and reasons underlying drug use as stated in the literature. One reference to "functions" is found in Tart's symposium on altered states of consciousness. These functions have been divided into maladaptive expressions and adaptive expressions. The former are listed as, the resolution of emotional conflicts through fugues and amnesia, defensive functions in threatening situations, breakthrough of forbidden impulses, escape from responsibilities and inner tensions, symbolic enactment of unconscious conflicts, manifestation of organic lesions and neurophysiological disturbances, and inadvertent and potentially

dangerous responses to certain stimuli such as in the case of highway hypnosis, and radar screen and sentry duty trance. The adaptive expressions are of three sorts namely, healing and therapeutic functions, avenues for new knowledge and experience, and various social functions<sup>21</sup>.

Finally, the area of causal analysis also may consist of both subjective meanings and objective possibilities. The social determinants of drug use are objectively ascertainable, whereas, imputed purposes, intentions, dispositions, and reasons, are essentially subjective meanings that need to be assessed in relation to observable behavior and the conclusions of ascertainable objective possibilities.

Insofar as psychedelic drugs are concerned, Leary contends that over 90% of users belong to three social categories namely, the young, the racially and nationally alienated, and the creative<sup>22</sup>. In Sarwer-Foner's well known monograph, Robert W. Hyde has reported the findings of his investigations into the social and psychological determinants of drug use. His study was based on the classification of the subjects into four types. These are, interactive or extrovert, inactive or introvert, reactive or dominant and submissive, and the dependent types. According to Hyde, the interactive type manifested minimal severity after LSD use, whereas the dependent type exhibited maximal severity. Hyde also noted that minimal severity was associated with married persons, those over 28 years of age, the well educated, and in particular those employed as doctors and social scientists. Maximal severity was seen in single persons of low educational levels, and in students who were essentially people oriented. The sex constant was not significant



with regard to the severity dimension<sup>23</sup>.

Most accounts of drug use such as those by Yablonsky cited earlier, may be seen as evoking the alienation theme as the most plausible explanation of the behavior in question. Other well known explanations are derivations either of the Mertonian anomie sequence, or of the sub-cultural formulations.

The writings of Becker, and Blumer cited earlier present useful insights into the social determinants of drug use. These authors contend that sub-cultural norms and beliefs contribute not only towards initial experimentation with drugs, but that they also mould the nature of the drug experience as well as its lasting effects. According to authors such as Becker, the drug experience and its effects may not be related to the use of the drug, but to the meanings, interpretations, and anxieties that users attach to the act. The study by Abu-Laban and Larsen illustrates a more specific dimension of social determinants, with reference to the use of alcohol. They have attempted to relate norm qualities of drinking behavior to actual drinking behaviors. Their research shows that different patterns of drinking behavior may be the result of distinct norm qualities such as those involving prescription, proscription, and nonscriptio<sup>24</sup>.

An examination of these problem areas may provide the necessary information not only on the performance of the activity known as drug use in the sense of what takes place, but also on how it is made possible, for which reasons, and with what consequences. The credibility of the grounds suggested as those underlying drug use is ascertained according

to the degree of congruence between the conclusions of objective possibilities and subjective meanings. As stated by Weber, and regardless of the research techniques employed, most such interpretations may remain only at the level of meaningful adequacy. Such interpretations can be considered causally adequate only when there is statistical probability that the course of events will occur in the manner predicted by the interpretations.

In the foregoing discussion an attempt was made to describe the applicability of the proposed modifications with special reference to the study of drug use. It may be recalled that the discussion involved three basic departures from the sequence of conventional Social Action inquiry. These were, a reversal of the action frame sequence, a re-formulation of the conception of meaning and motive to extend beyond their initial pronouncement by Weber, and a broadening of the scope of research beyond the focus of what is conventionally pursued in Social Action inquiry. In Section 4 of this chapter, the proposed modifications will be discussed again with reference to the study of the tourist role. The special contribution of these modifications to methodology of Social Action, and some other implications as well, will be highlighted in Section 5 of this chapter.

#### 4. The Study of the Tourist Role

Despite the increasing importance of international tourism, both as a form of leisure activity and as a means by which nations attempt to improve their foreign exchange earnings, there has been no compre-

hensive literature on the tourist role at least in English. The English literature on tourism is almost limited to the analysis of travel trends, the planning and economic implications of the industry, and a few case studies of specific projects or countries. With the exception of John Forster's essay<sup>25</sup> there has hardly been any essential Sociological analysis either of tourism or the tourist role. The general Sociological insights on travel, and the tourist role are meagre, and the contributions of work and leisure research too have not been substantial in this regard.

A quick glance through the literature on travel reveals that what is known today as the tourist role was somewhat condemned in England a few centuries ago. Such a review may also help in grasping some of the distinctions between different roles such as the traveller, an explorer, and a tourist. In an early reference to the subject, Roger Ascham who was tutor to Princess Elizabeth in the late 1540's, condemned young men travelling abroad, especially to Italy. Ascham may in fact be credited for having coined the phrase, "an Italianated Englishman"<sup>26</sup>. Writing in 1634, Peacham makes a clear distinction between travelling for pleasure and for profit. Of travelling for pleasure he writes,

For the first, euery one naturally affecteth, and the foole himself is tickled with the sight of strange townes, towers, and habits of people<sup>27</sup>.

Travel for profit which Peacham encouraged involved such pursuits as health, trade, professions, good of one's country, and observation<sup>28</sup>. Also in the seventeenth century, Bacon stated that travel provides an

education for the young and experience for adults. However, he emphasized the importance of such practices as, having prior knowledge of foreign languages, keeping a diary, and avoiding the company of one's own countrymen<sup>29</sup>.

The general attitude towards travel had not changed much even by the eighteenth century. For example, Johnson is said to have preferred " . . . to go an hundred miles to speak with one wise man, than five miles to see a fair town"<sup>30</sup>. Also according to Johnson,

Time may be employed to more advantage from nineteen to twenty four almost in any way than in travelling; When you set travelling against mere negation, against doing nothing, it is better to be sure; but how much more would a young man to improve were he to study during those years. Indeed if a young man is wild, and must run after women and bad company, it is better this should be done abroad . . . "<sup>31</sup>

The attitude towards travel in those times seem to have been fairly rigid. Travel in the sense of exploration, voyages of discovery, missionary work, empire building, trade, and education were considered praiseworthy, whereas travelling for pleasure was considered a wasteful enterprise.

In his doctoral disseration on British travel in America, Max Berger shows that around 1850, speedy, cheap, and comfortable transport facilities created the conditions necessary for tourist travel to replace travel. Berger notes that the new travellers spent less time in the US, were poor writers, and that the purposes of their travel were trivial<sup>32</sup>.

Introducing a modern anthology on travel, M.A. Michael states that the traveller travels purely for personal reasons and in search of something definite or indefinite. According to Michael, the tourist goes abroad for a holiday and his role is constrained by such factors as time schedules, destinations, and modern facilities like power driven transport systems<sup>33</sup>.

Partly in the light of the literature cited above, it is possible to enumerate some of the characteristics that may comprise an adequate definition of the term, tourist. The first criterion is of course the fact of any person taking temporary leave of his country of permanent residence and travelling within one or more other countries. Second, the tourist is solely a consumer, or a purchaser of services and facilities, and not a producer. Third, he purchases these facilities and services with money obtained from sources outside the host country. These three criteria are objective possibilities and succeed in differentiating the tourist from other roles such as visitors and travellers. Fourth, and regardless of the activities performed by the tourist, the intent of the tour is only one of pleasure, in the sense that it does not involve the fulfillment of some special aim, occupation, vocation, or calling. This criterion involves subjective meaning and further differentiates the tourist from other types such as explorers, missionaries, pilgrims, diplomats, consultants, researchers, and sportsmen. Finally, the tourist role provides an Isolation substitute for the individual, in that he does not seek any socio-cultural integration with the hosts. On the contrary he views the host culture from a distance as it were and from the vantage point of his own cultural milieu. From the

point of view of the country of origin, the objects of Deferment for the tourist are physical objects, perhaps alters, collectivity, and norms. Despite the geographical distance from his usual habitat, the tourist may not be distant from his values and cultural symbols. This criterion constitutes both subjective meanings and objective possibilities.

These five criteria taken together stand in contrast to the conventional definitions of the tourist, notably, as found in economic analyses. It may be recognized that the fourth and fifth criteria comprise social and social psychological considerations largely ignored in conventional economic studies. The neglect of such criteria has led to some exaggerations of data on tourism.

In the light of this general background, it is now proposed to portray the utility of the recommended modifications with reference to the study of the tourist role. The same general procedures applied to the study of drug use would be utilized for this demonstration as well. Various phases of the discussion will be supported by appropriate examples from the literature.

The first step in the investigation would be the selection of subjects for study. Definitional criteria such as those suggested earlier may be useful in selecting the subjects for the study. Second, the patterns of observable behavior of the tourist role may be subjected to investigation on the criteria of objective possibilities. This could constitute a descriptive, and classificatory understanding of overt actions, roles, and relationships. Such an inquiry may include such do-

mains as, duration of stay, style of life, activities performed, interpersonal relations, social and cultural distance and ostentation.

For example, the paradox of the tourist "going native" has been highlighted by Forster. Perhaps unlike the traveller, it is the tourist who is obliged to maintain considerable cultural distance from his host country. Except in the case of carefully contrived situations which are both superficial and transient, the tourist makes no attempt to seek any Containment among his hosts. On the contrary, values do not comprise an object of Deferment for the tourist. The situational components he is likely to take leave of are, certain physical objects, perhaps alters, collectivity, and norms. As noted by Anderson,

. . . there are crowds of tourists who go to the conventional resorts in the mountains or by the sea where they enjoy all the urban comforts plus the illusion of contact with country and nature<sup>34</sup>.

Farber too has remarked on the lack of intimacy that "pure" travellers manifest in their relations with the hosts. Such relations according to Farber, allow for the retention of the stereotype images of most of the hosts as "typical" and of a few of them as "exceptional"<sup>35</sup>.

Most authors seem to agree that the tourist crosses as it were the normative boundaries of his own habitat upon entering the shores of the host country. Further to this, he also seems to enjoy a fair amount of permissiveness with regard to his conduct in the host country. This may be because of the partially dependent, partially ignorant, and essentially transient nature of his stay. Insulation, and anonymity are two other factors that may be associated with the tourist role. Insula-

tion is based on the guarantee of certain kinds of protection, and privacy. Both these guarantees are adequately paid for by the tourist. The less affluent traveller may not be guaranteed these privileges. The tourist may maintain his anonymity by the impersonal, non-intimate nature of his association with the hosts, and by avoiding the company of his own alters, and countrymen. Among others, Farber<sup>36</sup>, and Toffler<sup>37</sup>, have recognized the social liberties, non-intimate relations, and privacy enjoyed by the tourist, without his corresponding concern over responsibility, and fear of authority.

The tourist must encounter what Forster calls various "social types" he comes into contact with in the host country. Such encounters may involve relations of mutual mistrust, and exploitation of the tourist. The tourist may be dependent, ignorant, and ostentatious, but at the same time determined not to be fleeced, whereas the "local" may present an image of being secure, honest, hardworking, but inadequately remunerated. Like Fred Davis' "cabdriver", some of these social types may be necessary for the tourist if only to provide him the functions of "non-persons"<sup>38</sup>.

From the tourist's pay-off point of view, he has not only to engage himself in a variety of activities that interest him in the host country, but he also has to bring home with him certain memories and evidence of what he may have observed. Most authors who have written on this subject seem to agree on two points. The first is that, what the tourist observes or participates in, are often decided for him in advance by travel organizers, and that, the choices he in fact makes



are strictly limited. The second point is that, the tourist's observation of the host country is very superficial mainly because of the telescopic distance he maintains with the hosts and their culture. This point has been elaborated by Farber in the essay cited earlier, and also by Ortegay Gasset.

Tourists although exclusively occupied with observing and thus in a position to carry home the richest booty of knowledge, are known to gather superficial information; their contact with a city or a country is not intimate enough to reveal the peculiar conditions<sup>39</sup>.

The superficial nature of the tourist's knowledge coupled with his ostentation, and alleged gullibility may have given rise to the various popular conceptions about the tourist role. One such obvious exaggeration rephrased as an irreversible proposition would read as: The shorter the duration of one's stay in a foreign place, the greater the knowledge he claims to have about that place.

A third general area of inquiry according to the proposed modifications would be, the study of preconditions for, and the mechanisms of Deferment. This focus of inquiry deals with questions on "how" the behavior in question is made possible. The tourist himself must have at least three preconditions available to him namely, discretionary or disposable income, disposable time, and avenues for mobility. Also the tourist should be able to sustain some noninteraction with his usual situation by maintaining a certain degree of situational, geographical, and time distance. These three mechanisms have already been discussed in Chapter VI, and Figure 9 of that chapter hypothetically illustrates how these mechanisms may operate with regard to the tourist role.

The preconditions for the tourist role may also be explored in terms of objective possibilities in such areas as the socio-economic structure, politico-economic relations, international status, national self-image, and exchange and travel concessions of the country of origin. Equally important may be the economic status, and types of, people, places, things, events, and activities found in the host country.

Forster has shown that in general, tourist industries are developed in less advanced regions. The cost of living in such regions is also lower than those from where most of the tourists seem to originate. The less advanced regions are apparently attempting to promote tourism with the view towards improving their foreign exchange earnings. This may be one reason why foreign hippies are becoming less welcome in most host regions. The study by Hamilton and associates highlights the fact that about 75% of all tourist arrivals originate from twelve of the more advanced countries namely, USA, West Germany, UK, France, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria. USA, and West Germany alone account for nearly 40% of world tourist arrivals. On a regional basis, North America generates more than 60%, and Europe about 16% of world tourist arrivals. From the point of view of expenditure per tourist, the more important host regions are, Central America and the Caribbean, South America, Africa, and Asia and Oceania. In terms of foreign exchange earnings among European countries, Spain, Ireland, Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and Yugoslavia are in that order, ahead of their neighbors. Some of the most increasing trends in tourist arrivals are to be found in East European host countries. Hawaii, Hong Kong, Ireland, Mexico, Panama,

and Spain derive their highest export earnings from tourism<sup>40</sup>.

In addition to such economic realities, Hamilton and associates also emphasize the importance of political and administrative considerations as preconditions for tourism. Some of these are, the political stability and a congenial bureaucracy in the host country<sup>41</sup>. As stated earlier, some of the preconditions for tourism are the availability of certain kinds of persons, places, things, events, and activities in the host country. However, the "host" nature of these countries depends largely upon the character of the local people rather than that of places and things. Hamilton and associates identify as "the key factor", the willingness of the local people to cater to the holidaymaker.

One of the reasons why the Mediterranean countries Spain, Italy, and Greece, have been so successful as holiday areas is the readiness of the local people, particularly in hotels and restaurants, to provide cheerful service at any hour of the day and well into the night. The plumbing may be primitive at times but the smiles are usually genuine<sup>42</sup>.

A more insightful look at the "hosts" has been provided by Ortega y Gasset. His assertions may be worthy of further investigation.

When we are really going to do something and have dedicated ourselves to a purpose, we cannot be expected to be ready at hand to look after every passer-by and to lend ourselves to every chance display of altruism. One of the things that most delight travellers in Spain is that if they ask someone in the street where such a building or square is, the man will often turn aside from his own path and generally sacrifice himself to the stranger, conducting him to the point he is interested in. I am not going to deny that there may be in this disposition of the worthy Spaniard some element of generosity, and I rejoice that the foreigner so interprets his conduct. But I have never when hearing or reading of this, been able to suppress the suspicion:

"was my countryman, when thus questioned, really going anywhere?" Because it might very well be, in many cases, that the Spaniard is going no where, has no purpose or mission, but rather goes out into life to see if others' lives can fill his own a little. I know quite well that my countrymen go out to the street to see if they will come across some stranger to accompany on his way<sup>43</sup>.

A fourth area of investigation according to the proposed modifications concerns functions, in the sense of both individual purposes, and social and other consequences. Unlike the investigations of structure and process, functions as used here involve both objective possibilities, and subjective meanings. Purposes may be ascertained on the basis of how the tourist himself accounts for his role or on the basis of how the investigator is able to attach some meanings to the tourist's role. These interpretations may be assessed for consistency with overt behavior, and the objective possibilities of structural, process, and causal interpretations. Consequences deal with objective possibilities and may be explored in terms of the social implications of the tourist role insofar as it affects the tourist himself both at home, and abroad.

With regard to individual purposes, and or, consequences underlying the tourist role, the literary evidence that is presently available may be said to be both suggestive and speculative. Apparently inspired by Veblen's theme of "conspicuous leisure", authors such as Max Kaplan have suggested that the motive for leisure travel is the desire of "being a somebody", and as a reaction to "status panic"<sup>44</sup>.

Along with this status dimension, Toffler has emphasized the "escapist" theme namely, the greater social freedom that may be sought

by the tourist<sup>45</sup>. As in the case with Parsons' sick role, there is no doubt that the tourist role provides for a Deferment of normative obligations. Some of the less obvious purposes underlying the tourist role could be his desire to enjoy, cheaper and better living, display of ostentation, and new situations for sociability.

Perhaps the most elaborate hypotheses on the purposes of "pure" travel have been suggested by Farber. His initial proposition involves the contention that there is a basic curiosity or exploratory drive in man. According to Farber, some of the motives underlying "pure" travel are, the realization of social prestige, anticipatory gratifications, persistent and powerful unconscious strivings, the quest for "magic helpers" who will solve all personal problems, the need to meet or avoid parent figures, the need for self-expression and self-actualization in older and richer cultures, and the desire for "anonymous" fellow travellers in whom to confide<sup>46</sup>.

Another unintended consequence that may be experienced by the tourist is the self-satisfaction derived from the fact that he is in a socio-economic position to be "hosted" in a variety of foreign settings. His own position relative to that of the hosts may reinforce his system abiding role with reference to his country of origin.

Finally, as with functions, causal analysis too deals with both objective possibilities and subjective meanings. On the one hand the social determinants of the tourist role are objective possibilities and may be investigated with reference to the tourist's relation to the

socio-cultural milieu of his country of origin. Second, there are the expressed or intended purposes as discussed in the previous paragraphs. Third, there are the intentions, dispositions, and reasons all of which may be expressed by the tourist himself or imputed by the investigator. As in the case with purposes, it is possible to examine the extent to which these interpretations are consistent with the objective possibilities of structure, process, and functional analysis.

#### 5. Implications for Methodology of Social Action

The proposed modifications may be said to have provided the following possibilities towards minimizing some of the problems inherent to methodology of Social Action.

First, the utility of the proposed modifications can be discussed with reference to the problem of meaning and measurement. It may be recalled that this problem was initially formulated by Weber as a central issue for Social Action. In the previous chapter the major contributions to methodology of Social Action were reviewed and it was concluded that the problem of meaning and measurement has not been adequately resolved.

This problem involves the question of establishing the degree of congruence between subjective meanings on the one hand, and the objective possibilities of observable behavior on the other. One of the devices that Weber advocated as an answer to this problem was the construction of ideal-rational typifications of action. Actual behaviors were to be examined as deviations from these constructed types. Some

of Weber's successors such as Parsons, Dubin, and Merton also developed type constructs of conformist and deviant behaviors based on apriori, empathetic assumptions about modes of individual response and their relation to situational components. In addition to restricting the scope of the research possibilities, such approaches also prevented the emergence of a satisfactory solution to the problem of meaning and measurement.

Some of the modifications proposed in the present thesis, could be seen as making provision for establishing the nature of congruence between subjective meanings and objective possibilities. First, since the suggested logic of inquiry consists of a reversal as it were of the action frame sequence, the proposed methodology is essentially inductive. Second, it has been suggested that the imputation of subjective meaning should not have precedence over the objective possibilities of observable behavior. Third, the scope of inquiry has been broadened to encompass a wider range of problem areas and a more extensive conception of meaning and motives. Fourth, the credibility of an explanation would depend upon the nature of congruence between subjective meanings and objective possibilities.

The first three of these procedures preclude the possibility of apriori assumptions determining and restricting the scope and sequence of inquiry. For example, as illustrated in the previous sections of this chapter, the study of drug use and the tourist role would commence with the objective possibilities of observable behavior. As illustrated, the investigation of structural relations and process factors provide an

initial base of objective criteria that is helpful to an understanding of the behavior in question. In other words, it is possible to establish "what" takes place with reference to drug use and the tourist role, and also "how" these behaviors are made possible in terms of preconditions and mechanisms. As illustrated there are some similarities and clear differences between drug use and the tourist role on these dimensions. In addition to these structural and process dimensions, the proposed modifications have suggested the inclusion of functional and causal dimensions as well. The subjective meaning aspects of these two dimensions has been extended to include purposes, intentions, dispositions, and reasons. The objective possibilities of these two dimensions are ascertainable on the basis of consequence and social determinants. The step-by-step operations of these procedures relative to the various dimensions have been illustrated with reference to the study of drug use and the tourist role. The broadened scope of the domains of inquiry provides for two advantages. These are first, that it facilitates more extensive research and therefore greater explanatory potential, and second, it provides more information that may be utilized for establishing the meaning and measurement congruence.

According to the proposed modifications, subjective meaning involves the purposes, intentions, dispositions, and reasons that may be imputed as adequate grounds for a behavior in question. As illustrated, there are a variety of such meanings that could be imputed to drug use, and the tourist role, either by the acting individuals themselves or the investigator. However, the proposed modifications provide for such meanings to be cross-checked in relation to the objective possibilities



of observable behavior. This potential for ascertaining the congruence between the conclusions of the two different modes of inquiry would in the words of Weber, lead to a "causal interpretation" of the behavior in question. As paraphrased in Section 2 of the previous chapter, Weber argued that such an interpretation would be "causally adequate" if there is the statistical probability that the course of events will occur in the manner predicted by the interpretation.

A second utility of the proposed modifications is that they provide for a more extensive and integrated set of procedures than those associated with conventional Social Action methodology. In previous discussions, methodology of Social Action was shown to be incomplete, discontinuous, and rather vague. The seemingly narrow scope of Social Action inquiry has also been associated with a nominalistic bias. The proposed modifications are likely to influence the development of a more extensive and rigorous mode of inquiry.

The utility of the proposed modifications may also be seen in a third area namely, that of avoiding or minimizing the shortcomings inherent in the action frame sequence and its accompanying typologies or response and behavior. In Part One of this thesis, these shortcomings were identified as, the problems of, limited or unspecified utility, limited tendencies, dualism, labels, empathy and motives. The fact that the first four of these problems can be avoided according to the proposed modifications has been demonstrated in the framework for the study of drug use and the tourist role. As illustrated, the re-formulation of the action frame sequence does not allow for the occurrence of these four

problems. The issues of empathy and motives were considered problematic in the action frame sequence mainly because their methodological status was weak and hence, contributed towards questionable assumptions and nonfalsifiable propositions. These two problems are greatly minimized according to the modified proposals. This possibility is the result of making provisions for cross-checking the conclusions of subjective meanings and the objective possibilities of observable behavior.

So far, the utility of the proposed modifications has been demonstrated with reference to three areas namely, the problem of meaning and measurement, the overall problem of scope and methodological rigor, and the six problems associated with the action frame sequence. The implications of the modifications can also be illustrated in two further areas.

The modified procedures provide for the kinds of information that would be useful for the comparative analysis of similar roles. For example, it is possible to make comparative statements about drug use and the tourist role provided that the kinds of information sought in various stages of inquiry have been obtained. One dimension of such comparison would be of information related to preconditions and mechanisms of Deferment. As illustrated earlier, some of the preconditions for drug use may be the availability, legality, and market price of drugs, and the amount of time the user has at his disposal for taking drugs. The preconditions for the tourist role would be such factors as discretionary income, disposable time, and avenues for mobility. Also important would be the economic status of the country of origin, and the

economic status, and kinds of, people, places, things, events, and activities of the host country. Similarly the mechanisms of Deferment for drug use would be the maintenance of a certain amount of situational and time distance, whereas, the tourist would be maintaining a different amount of situational, geographical, and time distance. On this criterion of distance alone, it is possible to compare a variety of roles such as types of drug use, the tourist role, travel, and the sick role. The provision for such comparisons has been diagrammatically presented in Chapter VI.

As in the case of preconditions and mechanisms of Deferment, it is also possible to compare these roles on other dimensions such as structural relations, functions, and determinants. For example, there is some similarity between the sick role and the tourist role. They both involve certain amounts of dependence and insulation, social freedom and anonymity, and ignorance and exploitation. Drug use and the tourist role are similar to the extent that they involve some Deferment process, and the fact that some of the suggested motives are somewhat similar. The more popular among such themes are those of social status, escapism, and natural curiosity.

Finally, the scope made available for the investigation of voluntaristic actions may be said to comprise another area for which the revised procedures have implications. It may be recalled that in Sections 5, and 6 of Chapter I, the question of freedom was raised as an important but neglected subject in social scientific research. Despite the voluntaristic bias of early Social Action research, there has

been a changing emphasis even in this tradition towards a premature closure of the social system. For example, according to Merton, freedom philosophies are crude anarchistic doctrines, the very opposite of functional analysis<sup>47</sup>. It may be recalled that the deviance-conformity variation developed by Merton, Dubin, and Parsons in particular, involves highly restrictive assumptions about the modes of response and behavior of individuals. In fact, with the exception of a few substantial writings such as those by Simmel, Mannheim, and Mills<sup>48</sup>, voluntaristic issues such as freedom are hardly investigated in the social sciences. The re-formulation of the action frame sequence, allows for a variety of reasons to be considered as adequate grounds for a behavior being investigated. Among such reasons could be those involving voluntarism, which may in turn complement other factors that are raised by Social Action inquiry.

## 6. Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter an attempt was made to demonstrate the utility of the proposed modifications to methodology of Social Action with special reference to the study of drug use and the tourist role. It was shown that the modifications are likely to have a number of important implications.

First, the modifications were seen as making some provision towards resolving one of the central problems posed by Social Action namely, the establishing of some congruence between subjective meanings and observable behavior. Second, the modifications are likely to in-

fluence the development of a more extensive and rigorous methodology of Social Action than what is currently available. Third, it has been demonstrated that the suggested revisions contribute towards the avoiding or minimization of a number of shortcomings inherent to the action frame sequence and its accompanying typologies of response and behavior. Fourth, the proposed modifications were seen as providing for adequate information with which similar roles could be subjected to effective comparative analysis. Such comparison would facilitate findings that not only highlight similarities and differences between roles such as types of drug use, travel, tourist role, and the sick role, but that would also elucidate the reasons as to what conditions allow for such differential patterns of behavior. Finally, it was demonstrated that the suggested modifications could facilitate inquiry into a variety of voluntaristic actions that may complement the more deterministic and incomplete explanations of social behavior.

In conclusion, it should be stated that the proposed modifications comprise a revision of the methodological procedures generally associated with Social Action inquiry. All it has attempted is to avoid or minimize the shortcomings that are inherent to this tradition of Sociological inquiry. The suggested procedures may not of course be regarded as something entirely new to Sociological research in general, or for that matter, as a solution to other problems of Sociological research. However, what is original about this exercise is the fact that these procedures have not been recognized or suggested by previous authors as modifications that are likely to minimize the methodological problems of Social Action. Therefore, the present thesis is more than an exercise

in such conventional discourses as, a critical review of a Sociological tradition, or a comparative analysis of the work of several Sociologists.

## Footnotes

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- 7 Leary, op.cit., p. 356.
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- 11 Blumer, op.cit., pp. 3-6.
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- 13 Geller and Boas, op.cit., p. 177.
- 14 Masters and Houston, op.cit., pp. 129-150.
- 15 Geller and Boas, op.cit., p. 238.
- 16 Leary, op.cit., pp. 223-226, 255-261, 353-355.
- 17 Ibid., pp. 19-43.
- 18 Masters and Houston, op.cit., p. 148.
- 19 Geller and Boas, op.cit., p. 148.

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- 48 See for example, Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951, pp. 15-16, 41-45, 275-284; Simmel, op.cit., pp. 118-122, 360-361; C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, pp. 165-176.

## C H A P T E R   X

### EPILOGUE

#### 1.     General Summary

The title of this dissertation, "Deferment and Substitution: An Exercise in Methodology of Social Action", suggests the two interrelated problem areas, one methodological, and the other substantive, that concerned the present research. Deferment and Substitution refer to two forms of frequent human conduct that are relatively neglected in Sociological research. Deferment refers to the mode of response by which an individual postpones interaction in a situation. Substitution refers to the choice of alternative situations by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. Since Deferment involves meaningful human conduct that is perhaps both voluntaristic, and social, the tradition of Sociological inquiry known as Social Action was seen as offering the most promising methodological potential toward its investigation.

The tradition of Social Action inquiry has long been concerned with one of the fundamental issues in Sociology namely, the methodological problem of meaning and measurement. The study of Deferment and Substitution, and its implications for methodology of Social Action therefore constituted the central task of this thesis. Toward this end, a number of research topics were formulated for intensive analysis.

The first research topic was concerned with an overview and an assessment of typologies of response and behavior, with particular refer-

ence to variations of the Social Action perspective, and the action frame sequence. Prominent among the writings examined in this regard were the contributions of Max Weber, Robert K. Merton, Robert Dubin, and Talcott Parsons. Most typologies of response and behavior were seen as exhibiting one or more of the following shortcomings. First, there has been the tendency on the part of various authors to advance typologies of response and behavior without due regard for the methodological implications of such formulations. In most cases the methodological utility of these type constructs remain unspecified. Furthermore, because of the highly restrictive and a priori nature of these formulations, their methodological utility was seen as being in any case severely limited. The second major shortcoming of these typologies was referred to as the problem of limited tendencies. That is, the arbitrary manner in which certain writers seem to have made assumptions about the number and kinds of action tendencies, or modes of response an actor is capable of possessing. These assumptions were in turn seen as determining the modes of behavior and the labeling and classification of social action. The third shortcoming was referred to as the problem of dualism. This problem dealt with the uncritical adoption of dualistic frameworks of thought whereby, almost all the modes of behavior derived by most writers are collapsible into the either conformity or deviance types of categories. Such dualistic conceptions were found to be both unrealistic and unduly restrictive. Fourth, it was shown that certain writers displayed explicit biases in the manner they labeled modes of behavior. Such labels not only reflect conceptions of desirable and undesirable behaviors from the point of view of the investigator, but also act as

restrictive mechanisms that limit the scope of further research. The fifth shortcoming was the methodological problem of empathy, the manner by which the conduct of real or hypothetical actors seems to have been reconstructed. Finally, the problem of motives or the arbitrary manner by which intentions and needs of individuals seem to have been imputed by certain writers was also seen as a major shortcoming.

In the second research topic of this thesis, an attempt was made to demonstrate the justification for considering Deferment as a mode of individual response. This was accomplished on two major grounds. One was on the basis of the critical review of typologies of response and behavior referred to in the previous paragraph. It was argued that most of these established formulations were not only highly apriori and deductive, but that they also lacked sufficient credibility in terms of empirical support. The second major ground for the justification to recognize Deferment as a mode of response was the basis provided by certain literature both of a Sociological, and non-Sociological nature. Deferment as a mode of response was seen as being consistent not only with commonsense notions of human behavior, but also with certain conceptions in these fields of literature.

The third topic dealt with the question of Substitution, that is the dynamics involved in the choice of alternative situations by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. This problem area was analysed according to a series of steps. First, investigation was made of some Patterns of Substitution that are likely to correspond with Deferment. These Patterns refer to clusters or group-

ings of alternative behaviors. They were seen as collapsible into two analytically distinct patterns namely, Deferment-Containment or Gatherings, and Deferment-Isolation or Fugues. Patterns of Substitution were also seen as providing answers to "what" questions or the structural and role behavior kinds of information with regard to a behavior in question. As a second step in this general problem area, attention was focused on objects of Deferment, or the situational components with which interaction is postponed by an individual whose mode of response is Deferment. Following Parsons' lead these were identified as ego, alters, collectivity, norms, values, and physical objects. Next an attempt was made to develop Modes of Substitutions or mechanisms that make Deferment and Substitution possible. These mechanisms were identified as the maintenance of Situational, Geographical, and Time dimensions of distance. Finally, the focus of research interest was directed towards formulating methodological procedures by which Substitutional behavior could be utilized as an effective measure of Deferment. The methodological procedures suggested in this connection provide for a new approach to the study of interaction by investigating varying degrees of noninteraction. Some hypothetical examples of Substitutional behavior were graphically represented for the purpose of illustrating these procedures. The suggested procedures were also seen as presenting a great deal of potential in terms of objective indices and quantitative research.

An inquiry into existing Sociological formalizations that may account for Patterns of Substitutional behavior comprised the fourth major topic of this thesis. Yablonsky's formulation of Near-groups, and

Goffman's formulation of Encounters were selected as prominent explanatory models that would be consistent with the Pattern of Deferment-Containment or Gatherings. Parsons' formulation of the Sick Role, and the Therapeutic Process was seen as an explanatory model for an understanding of the Pattern of Deferment-Isolation or Fugue behavior. The relative merits and shortcomings of these formulations were assessed, and it was noted that the methodological weaknesses of the three formulations contributed mostly towards some of their inherent shortcomings.

The fifth, and sixth problems of research concerned the overall status of Social Action methodology. As a first step, what is known as methodology of Social Action was introduced and the major contributions noted. The writings of Weber, Mannheim, MacIver, and Parsons were reviewed in some detail for the purpose of tracing the origins and evolution of this tradition of Sociological inquiry. The methodological writings of Weber were found to be less vague, less complex, and for that matter less mystical than how they have been interpreted by various commentators. Next, the study concerned itself with highlighting what may considered to be the major difficulties with methodology of Social Action. The most general drawback was seen as the lack of specific research procedures and the lack of any cumulative continuity. The more specific shortcomings were found to be confined to the six problems associated with the action frame of reference and already paraphrased in the third paragraph of the present chapter. In addition, it was also noted that Social Action has not in fact resolved its central issue namely, the problem of meaning and measurement.

Mainly in the light of these shortcomings, the present research has proposed certain modifications to methodology of Social Action, without at the same time avoiding the central issues that this tradition of Sociological inquiry had posed and attempted to resolve. The modifications were based on three variations of the conventional theme of Social Action. These variations were, a reversal as it were of the action frame of reference sequence, a more complex recognition of the concepts of meaning and motive than suggested by Weber, and a broader perspective of the scope of research, mainly in the light of modern organizational theory. Some of the more specific modifications involved an emphasis on, empirical investigation, inductive reasoning, patterns of observable behavior, and the analysis of structural, process, functional, and causal factors.

Finally this study has attempted a demonstration of the utility of the suggested methodological framework, with reference to two examples of Substitutional behavior. The two examples selected for this purpose were drug use and the tourist role. These examples were introduced in terms of available literature, and definitional issues. The remainder of the dissertation was devoted to an illustrative discussion of how the suggested methodology could be applied in detail to these examples of behavior, and with what implications.

## 2. Conclusions

From a methodological perspective, the following conclusions may be derived from this study. First, and from an overall point of view,

this thesis has demonstrated the fact that methodological issues constitute one of the few fundamental problems with Sociology that points more towards possibilities, rather than superficialities and continuing debates. The present study has grappled with an issue that was formulated in Sociology half a century ago, namely, what is generally referred to as the problem of meaning versus measurement, rather than the problem of meaning and measurement. The present exercise shows that research in methodology may be worth undertaking if only for the reason that Sociology cannot as yet claim to have "the methodology" for the study of social behavior. Hopefully, this thesis has shown that the demand for more methodology is as justified as the call for more theory, or more empirical research.

Second, this thesis has highlighted the utility of re-visiting, and revising the methodological position of Social Action as initially formulated by Weber. Weber's methodology has been subjected to undue criticism on the basis of selective appraisals and secondary source interpretations. In contrast to some of these evaluations, the present research has attempted to focus attention on the central methodological problems posed by him, and which remain relatively abandoned. One of the lessons of the present study is that these problems may be worth pursuing if only to minimize them.

Third, also from a methodological perspective this thesis has examined the major drawbacks of Social Action methodology in general, and also the logic of the action frame of reference, particularly the Parsonsian version. It was concluded that the conventional sequence of



action analysis is overly restrictive, and also somewhat remote from happenings in the real world. One of the contentions of the present study is that the proposed revisions may contribute toward a minimization of some of these drawbacks.

The following comments may be stated from a more substantive point of view. This thesis has tended to emphasize a bias towards more methodological pursuits, and more flexible methodologies. Such an emphasis may no doubt promote the advancements of methodology itself. But equally important is the role that methodological pursuits play in the exploration of substantive problems that may have been deliberately neglected or simply overlooked in Sociological inquiry. For example, substantive problems such as Deferment and Substitution are neglected in conventional research not because they are unimportant or unreal, but because their substantive importance may have been eclipsed by restrictive methodologies. The exploration of new substantive areas calls for a new look at some of the conventional methodologies on the one hand, and raises questions about some of the established explanatory models and theories on the other.

### 3. Limits of the Study

Before concluding this dissertation it is appropriate that some comments should be offered with regard to the limits of the study. The term limits as used here refers to limitations in the sense of restrictive scope, and not in the sense of shortcomings.

This thesis concerned itself with two interrelated problem areas, one methodological, and the other substantive. The scope of the research was therefore confined to what was considered to be an examination of these problem areas. It may be recalled that both these problem areas have hardly been researched at all, at least in the elaborate and complementary manner they were approached in the present study. As an exploratory or formulative study in the correct sense of the word, the scope of the research may therefore be amply justified.

Second, the scope of the research had to be limited to its present proportions, purely on account of practical reasons such as the availability of time, and other resources necessary for a more extensive project. Ideally, it would have been possible to follow up on the procedures outlined in Chapters VIII, and IX, by embarking on one or two empirical studies of Substitutional behavior. Another possibility would have been to further develop the suggestions expressed at the end of Chapter VI with regard to measurement of Deferment. This too would have involved an extension of the present design.

Third, it is felt that the elaborate and comprehensive analysis performed in the present study as it now stands, fully justifies the scope of the research. Had the research scope been more extensive, the dissertation may have been faced with an irreconcilable dilemma. On the one hand it may have been necessary to present a superficial introduction to the methodological and substantive questions that form the crux of this research. Given the importance and originality of the kinds of questions that were posed, such a cursory treatment would have been in-

adequate and unpardonable. On the other hand, an extension of the present scope of the thesis to include a comprehensive analysis of empirical phenomena as well, would have despite temptation and desirability, made the preparation of this dissertation unwieldy.

#### 4. Implications of the Study

It may be stated at the outset that, with the exception of Chapters I, VII, and X, the seven other chapters that comprise the body of this thesis consist of what may be termed as original contributions. Most of the questions posed in these chapters, and almost all the reasoning underlying the responses to such questions, are almost exclusively the part and parcel of the present research. In this overall sense therefore, this thesis would have numerous general implications both from methodological, and substantive points of interest.

At a more specific level, the present research may said to have the following implications. First, and perhaps most important, it has provided a pointer towards a possible minimization of the problem of meaning versus measurement, and the other difficulties generally associated with the tradition of Social Action research. It is needless to elaborate that any positive suggestions in this direction would serve not only the interests of action analysis, but would also contribute towards the re-examination of one of the fundamental problems of Sociology.

Second, the thesis has provided a re-thinking and re-examination of Social Action. The revised procedures that were proposed and demonstrated would allow not only for a more rigorous, comprehensive, and

empirically grounded mode of inquiry, but it would also facilitate the identification, investigation, and comparative analysis of substantive problems that are consistent with individual meaning, and objective possibility. For example, even within the Social Action framework, the investigator need not be restricted, to uncritically adopt the more established modes of formulating problems such as those based on systemic thinking, and the deviance-conformity dichotomy. On the contrary, even the investigation of such voluntaristic topics as freedom, autonomy, indifference, and ambivalence may be facilitated through the proposed approach.

Third, the present thesis has also proposed certain procedures for the measurement of interaction. Contrary to conventional approaches, the suggested procedures involve the measurement of Deferment or non-interaction through the observation of Substitutional behaviors. One index of this measure has been designed on the basis of a modified version of Parsons' conception of, the situation. This index illustrates one of the rare instances where Parsons' concepts has been appropriately adopted for empirical research. The proposed measure in general has immense potential in terms of objective indicators, and quantitative research.

Fourth, and from a substantive perspective, the study has highlighted the importance of recognizing Deferment and Substitution as worthwhile areas for Sociological research. Such topics have been relatively neglected in Sociological inquiry. The present study also attempted to assess the theoretical adequacy of certain prominent ex-

planatory models of Substitutional behavior. Three such formulations were assessed in relation to two Patterns of Substitution. Such analyses have implications for future research in terms of broadening substantive scope, and the continuing assessment of the adequacy of available theoretical formulations.

The four points summarized above show that the present thesis is more than an exercise in such conventional discourses as, a critical review of a Sociological tradition, or a comparative analysis of the work of several Sociologists.

Finally, from both a substantive and a critical viewpoint, this thesis has demonstrated an evaluative procedure that is appropriate to the examination of typologies of response and behavior. It was shown that the Social Action perspective provides for certain evaluative criteria often neglected by the anomie tradition sequence of thought. What was referred to in the dissertation as the problem of limited tendencies comprised one of six such evaluative criteria. This problem in particular, is hardly mentioned in Sociological literature, whereas it contributes a major share to the overall inadequacy of typologies of response and behavior, and the action frame of reference.

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