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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE BREAKDOWN OF LOGISTICS AND ITS ROLE IN THE FAILURE OF THE SPARTAN EXPEDITIONS TO ASIA MINOR, 400-394 B.C.

BY

PHILLIP R. KENNEDY

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

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Breakdown of Logistics and its Role in the Failure of the Spartan Expeditions to Asia Minor, 400-394 B.C." submitted by Phillip R. Kennedy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Ancient History.

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ΤΟΙΣ ΓΟΝΕΥΣΙΝ

Abstract

Conventional interpretations attribute the Spartans' failure to liberate the Greeks of Asia Minor from their Persian masters to the strategic ineptitude and the parochial attitudes of the Lacedaemonian generals. This analysis, however, is too simplistic; a more reasonable explanation may be found in the sphere of logistics. From a close reading of the ancient sources, it is clear that the expeditionary forces under the command of Thibron, Dercylidas and Agesilaus all suffered from an inadequate supply system; to a great extent Spartan operations were shaped by logistical concerns. It is possible that the Spartans might have enjoyed some success against the Persians if they had waged war on a smaller scale. The lasting conquest and continued defence of Asia Minor, however, was beyond the resources of the Spartans--indeed, beyond the means of any contemporary Greek coalition.

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Chapter One

Introduction

The Spartan expeditions to Asia Minor in the first decade of the fourth century were the product of a decidedly un-Laconian Panhellenism. Sparta, the very state which had refused to aid the Ionian rebels in 500 (on the grounds that they were too far away to merit Spartan assistance)[1] and had advocated the removal of the Ionians from Asia Minor in 479,[2] now risked open war with the most powerful nation in the Mediterranean world--on behalf of the same Asiatic Greeks. She would no longer deny herself the role of the προστάτης, or leading power, in Hellas. Rather, she was determined to unite the Greek world in a campaign against foreign oppression. It appeared that the time for a second Agamemnon had finally come.

As altruistic as these endeavours were, they were nonetheless in vain. After eleven years of battle and devastation, Sparta was forced to quit Asia and the Asiatic Greeks once again succumbed to the overlordship of the Persians. In retrospect, despite the great exertions and expenditures of the Spartan state, the liberation of Ionia

seems to have been little more than a grand folly. Yet why did Sparta fail?

The traditional explanation, which can be found as early as Isocrates, places the blame on Agesilaus for the breakdown of Spartan power in Asia Minor. Since the Spartan king disregarded the feelings of the Hellenes and failed to resolve their quarrels, he could not concentrate his energies against the Persians; thus, the inconstancy of the Greeks robbed them of victory.[3] Plutarch reached a similar conclusion; on the point of conquering Asia, Agesilaus receives the notice of his recall to mainland Greece. After a brief encomium, Plutarch writes that:

> As Persian coinage bore the stamp of an archer, on his retreat [Agesilaus] said that he was being forced out of Asia by the Great King with ten thousand archers. Since that much money had been conveyed to Athens and Thebes and had been given to the demagogues, these peoples made war upon the Spartiates.[4]

Hamilton speculates that Agesilaus turned his attentions to the problems in central Greece, which were caused by the Boeotians and their allies. His intense hatred of the Thebans forced him to abandon his Asian expedition.[5] Cartledge also fixes the responsibility for this fiasco on Agesilaus, but for different reasons; he believes that

Agesilaus miscalculated when he appointed Peisander, his son-in-law, as navarch of the Peloponnesian Fleet. On account of Peisander's inexperience, the Spartans were defeated decisively at sea, and were thereby forced to quit Asia.[6]

The explanation which prevails today is that of Anderson, who thinks that Agesilaus (again), who was used to defeating small *Perioikic* states, simply did not understand how to meet a great power on the field of battle.[7] However, it is highly inaccurate to attribute the failure of Spartan hegemony to the supposed foolishness of one man. The Spartans were at a strategic disadvantage in Asia Minor not because of their ignorance or their unwillingness to adapt to new situations, but rather, through their logistical inexperience.

The ancient sources do not give a contemporary military analysis of the Spartan interventions. Xenophon, our earliest source treats the Spartan-Persian war in his history of Greece, the *Hellenica*, and in his biography of Agesilaus. Although Xenophon was alive at the time of these events, his work is somewhat compromised by his pro-Spartan bias. There is much evidence that Xenophon relied on Spartan sources throughout his *Hellenica;*[8] it was also well known that the author was a friend of Agesilaus and may possibly have obtained much first-hand information about this period from the Spartan king (however useful that might have been).

Bruce suggests that Xenophon's account of Agesilaus' operations in Asia Minor was based on "the verbal report of a participant made at some later date".[9] The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, perhaps contemporary with Xenophon's *Hellenica*, is usually preferred to other accounts.[10] It is as compelling and scholarly as the work of Thucydides; unfortunately, it is also very fragmentary. Furthermore, since the work is of uncertain date and authorship, the sources which may have been used in its compilation are a matter of pure speculation.

Diodorus Siculus, who wrote a compendious world history in the late first century B.C., was more of an annalist than a historian, an uncritical copyist. His historical value varies with his sources. Occasionally he merely paraphrases Xenophon; he nonetheless preserves much valuable material from Ephorus, a third-century writer.[11] Plutarch was a notorious polymath of the late first century A.D. For the most part, his *Life of Agesilaus* follows Xenophon's historical works; it is, however, of only incidental value, as Plutarch was not writing history, but biographies for the moral improvement of his readers. Although he relies on several sources for his information, he freely mixes and matches historical facts from conflicting traditions in order to define better the moral character of his subject.

The classical accounts are rather misleading in their simplistic narration of events. One cannot simply place ten thousand hoplites on the coast of Asia Minor and expect a miraculous victory; nor can such an operation be planned competently without considering the problems of maintaining a large force in the field for several months. Van Creveld describes the modern strategic process as follows:

> Strategy, like politics, is said to be the art of the possible; but surely what is possible is determined not merely by numerical strengths, doctrine, intelligence, arms and tactics, but, in the first place, by the hardest facts of all: those concerning requirements, supplies available and expected, organization and administration, transportation and arteries of communication.[12]

There is no reason to believe, as some do, that ancient armies could operate independently of any logistical concerns. In the early era of hoplite warfare, the problems of supply and transport were easily solved; each soldier brought his own rations from home, and walked to the battlefield, returning home when the battle was over. Armies of the fourth century, however, were experiencing a period of transition. Forced to extend the scope of land operations,

the Greeks tried their best to impress an outmoded "commissariat" onto overseas campaigns of long duration.

The Spartans were no exception. Thibron, Dercylidas and Agesilaus all had to find new, creative solutions to these problems. It is here that Thibron and Agesilaus failed; by provisioning their armies through the traditional methods of markets and plunder they ignored the subtleties of Aegean politics, estranged their sensitive allies and compromised their battle plans in favour of opportunities for looting. Dercylidas attempted to reconcile the Spartans' war aims with the existing logistical infrastructure. It is not difficult to imagine that the Spartans could have achieved the partial liberation of Ionia if they had adhered to Dercylidas' plans, yet his vision of a moderate, affordable war hardly appealed to the ephors, who dreamt of conquests on a grander scale and forced their only successful harmost to endanger his position in Asia.

The fundamental reason for the failure of Spartan operations in Asia Minor from 400 to 394 is therefore a logistical one, for all of the Spartans' campaigns were directed toward two goals: securing needed supplies and relieving the Ionians of the burden of supporting the expeditionary forces. This should not, however, imply that a workable solution to logistical problems did exist in the early fourth century; rather, the Spartan generals used the

best methods available to Greek warfare at the end of the Great Peloponnesian War, and acted in a professional, competent manner (inasmuch as the ephors allowed). The total liberation of Ionia was simply beyond the means of the Spartans.

Chapter Two

Geography and Terrain

The interrelationship of terrain and strategy has been recognized for millennia. In fifth-century China, Sun Tzu exhorted the general to "know the ground, know the weather".[1] More recently, O'Sullivan and Miller have stated that "Although the question of how to fight is governed by technological and economic capabilities, it is essentially a response to environmental possibilities and limitations".[2]

It is not enough to focus only on political considerations and questions of "generalship", as most scholars have done, when examining ancient warfare. In many cases it was logistics, rather than political aims, that determined the overall direction of a campaign. Any analysis of the Asian campaigns of Thibron, Dercylidas and Agesilaus must therefore begin with a discussion of the geographical possibilities and limitations of western Asia Minor.

Asia Minor is commonly divided into seven landform regions, three of which figure prominently in this chapter: the Aegean region; the Anatolian Plateau; and the Black Sea region.[3] Even a quick glance at a map of modern Turkey

immediately reveals three distinctive features, which will recur as underlying themes throughout this discussion. First, the region is crisscrossed with mountain ranges and long, meandering rivers; there are very few large, unbroken plains. Secondly, unlike Greece, large sections of Asia Minor are landlocked; only the fringes are within reach of the sea. Finally, the peninsula itself, as compared to mainland Greece, seems vast.[4] One must remember that it was only the western tip of the great Persian Empire.

I. The Aegean Region

Roughly speaking, the Aegean region of Asia Minor stretches from the Bosporus to Rhodes, extending inland up to the Central, or Anatolian Plateau (ancient Phrygia). It encompasses the satrapies of Hellespontine Phrygia, centred on Dascyleium, and Lydia, with Sardis as its capital. This area is also characterized by numerous Greek colonies on the coast which were the eventual catalyst of a Spartan-Persian war.

The coastline itself is one of the richest in the Mediterranean. Although the straight-line distance from Adramyttium to Caunus is less than 350 km, the actual coastline is over 1200 km in length.[5] Strabo himself noticed this remarkable phenomenon:

> Along the coast, the voyage around Ionia is approximately 3430 stadia (634 km) long, on account of the gulfs and the fact that the land forms peninsulas to a great extent. The straight-line distance, however, is not great.[6]

The proximity of the western coast to the islands of the Aegean and to the crucial valley routes inland produced very favourable conditions for traders from east and west. What is profitable for the merchant, however, is problematic for the soldier; for the long and deeply-indented shoreline greatly increased the amount of coastline to be defended from enemy attack. This vulnerability to naval raiding parties was demonstrated in the Great Peloponnesian War, when Athenian land and sea forces successively attacked or occupied Pygela, Notium, Colophon and made a sortie into Lydia itself--all within the space of a few weeks![7]

A successful defence of the Aegean shoreline theoretically could be carried out by establishing several large, costly garrisons and by maintaining complete naval supremacy.[8] Even if that were possible, the coastal cities would still be vulnerable to attack from enemy forces striking westward from Anatolia. The absence of quick and reliable communications and a mobilized reserve made the Aegean coast a long, brittle chain of fortified towns.

The Aegean region is also marked by long rivers and numerous chains of foothills and mountains, almost all of which run from east to west.[9] Dewdney writes that the Ionian coast "is dominated by a strongly-marked east-west structural and topographic grain".[10] The valleys of the rivers Hermus and Maeander, stretching far inland, provide convenient access to the Anatolian Plateau. These valleys also contain almost all of the lowland terrain in Asia Minor. In modern times, the alluvial soils of this region are the most productive in Turkey.[11] Such terrain would be of immense value to foraging parties.

The ranges of Tmolus and Messogis act with the Caicus, Hermus and Maeander to form long "channels" which lead directly from the heart of the peninsula to old Ionia. Although ancient armies did not depend on well-established supply lines to the same extent as their modern counterparts, they would still be affected by adverse terrain while marching to the battlefield. Yet are these "channels" beneficial or detrimental to military operations?

According to O'Sullivan and Miller, landforms of this type may be classified as corridors or cross-compartments:

> The term corridor implies terrain favouring the movement of military forces bounded on either side by unfavourable terrain. The term cross-compartments implies linear terrain features unfavourable to military movement

> that extend across the desired direction of movement. The same features may form either cross-compartments or corridors, depending upon the direction of intended operations.[12]

For a power attempting to hold onto the Aegean coast, they would definitely be detrimental. An attacker from the east (i.e. Persia) would have a series of convenient corridors at his disposal, while the defenders would have to deal with cross-compartments when shuffling troops from north to south.[13] It appears, then, that the Aegean shore has no *natural* lines of defence.

The climate of this area is very much like that of Greece, with its mild winters and hot summers; Greek hoplites operating on the Aegean coast would have little difficulty in acclimatization.[14]

II. The Anatolian Plateau

This region provides sharp contrasts to the mild Aegean shores. It is completely land-locked, bordered on the north, east and south by two folded mountain ranges,[15] and flanked by the Aegean region to the west. In the fourth century it was home to the Phrygians, subjects of the Persian Empire.

The Anatolian Plateau contains some of the highest land in all Asia Minor; it has even been likened to the Russian

steppes.[16] An invading army would find the terrain relatively difficult. Far from the moderating influence of the Mediterranean, it has very hot, dry summers and long, cold winters.[17] The adverse climate and high, uneven ground hamper the cultivation of grain; the best soils are found in the few river basins, and scarcely compare with Aegean cropland.[18]

As it is a poor foraging region, an army could undertake only limited operations on the plateau. It would be relatively easy for an expeditionary force in Anatolia to be cut off from its supplies; additional supplies would have to be taken overland. Quintus Curtius relates that, when Alexander had taken ill in Tarsus, his troops were despondent at the fact that they might have to march back over this plateau, in which they had previously foraged.[19] Clearly, then, this region had slender resources.

It is not conceivable that any Greek army could hold such a large area as the Anatolian Plateau, which compares with Greece in its magnitude, in the face of an undefeated enemy. Alexander held it only by destroying Persian power in Asia. Agesilaus himself had not planned to occupy and garrison Phrygia; rather, according to Xenophon, in 394 the Spartan king "prepared to journey as far inland as possible, as he thought that as many nations as he kept to his rear he would cause to revolt from the Great King".[20]

III. The Black Sea Region

The Black Sea region is composed of a narrow strip of coastline, running from east to west along the Black Sea. It is bordered to the south by the Pontus Mountains, which almost completely cuts it off from the Anatolian Plateau. The Naval Intelligence Division's handbook describes the isolating nature of the terrain:

> On the north and south the mountains form continuous barriers for long distances between the interior plateau and the sea. Rarely do valleys or breaks in the ranges afford a route inland, and even then the way is difficult.[21]

As such, the region is easy to defend from the south. Its proximity to the Black Sea produces a mild, almost Mediterranean climate which is conducive to farming.[22] In the fourth century the Bithynians, erratic tributaries of the Persians, inhabited its western parts. In the Spartan campaigns against the Persians this is only a collateral area, convenient for foraging but of little value otherwise.

Chapter Three
The Background to
The Spartan Interventions

In the wake of Cyrus' defeat at Cunaxa in 401 the Asian Greeks were once again in peril. The Ionians, who had supported Cyrus and had openly revolted from Tissaphernes, feared the worst from their former satrap. Consequently, they sent envoys to Sparta to ask for help, in order that their cities and lands might not be ravaged by the Persians. Xenophon further states that the Ionian ambassadors made their appeal to Sparta on the grounds that, as the foremost of the Hellenes, the Spartans must protect their weaker kin in Asia.[1] According to Diodorus, before taking any other action, the Spartans first sent envoys to Tissaphernes, enjoining him "not to apply hostile arms to the Greek cities".[2] Tissaphernes responded by invading the territory of Cyme, and besieging the city itself. Shortly thereafter Sparta dispatched an expedition to relieve the Greeks of Asia.[3] The Spartan-Persian War was now prosecuted in earnest.

Much has been made of the political grounds for the Spartan involvement in Asia Minor. Westlake attributes this to the Spartans' desire to rehabilitate their reputation as "liberators of Hellas", which had suffered greatly on account of the Spartan-Persian treaties of the late fifth century.[4] Hamilton sees Lysander's faction at work. In his reconstruction, Spartan policy was dominated by three loose factions: King Pausanias' supporters, who wanted an isolationist Sparta; King Agis' faction, which championed the cause of a limited, Spartan-dominated mainland Greece; and that of Lysander, which wanted to revolutionize Laconian society and establish a great maritime empire. A renewed presence in Asia Minor would give Lysander an opportunity to re-establish his power base overseas.[5] At any rate, one faction in Sparta put forward many compelling reasons for going to the aid of the Ionians.

Yet the debate at Sparta cannot have focused merely on the political effects of overseas intervention; the realities of maintaining an expeditionary force in the field must also have been discussed. For, despite the many persuasive reasons for intervention, nothing concrete could be achieved in the absence of sufficient military resources. A successful general would have to assemble a sizeable force (despite Sparta's *oliganthropia*), transport it across the Aegean, and then provision it in Asia Minor. Only after

these three tasks had been addressed could the Spartan commander turn his thoughts to victory.

By the end of the Great Peloponnesian War Sparta had reached a critical stage. Spartiate manpower had been steadily declining for more than fifty years.[6] The earthquake and subsequent revolt of the Helots in 465, and the Peloponnesian Wars cannot have helped matters; it has been estimated that, at that time, the ratio of Helots to Spartiates was ten to one.[7] Sparta could therefore not afford heavy losses from the ranks of her full citizens; a costly foreign adventure could endanger the state's internal security. By necessity, the Spartans' commitment would be limited to levies of their Peloponnesian allies (the *perioikoi*), recruits from the emancipated Helots and any Asian volunteers who might be recruited to defend their cities. It is worth noting that, since the late fifth century, emancipated Helots (*neodamodeis*) were used more and more to supplement the regular Spartiate troops.[8] According to Kromayer, the *neodamodeis* begin to appear in great strength in the fourth century.[9] An expedition composed largely of such troops would require comprehensive military training (which the Spartiates and *Perioikoi* did not need).[10]

There was, however, another source of manpower available to the Spartans: mercenaries. Throughout the Hellenic world it was very easy for a wealthy employer to hire any number of

professional soldiers. One immediately thinks of the Thirty in Athens, and Clearchus' abortive tyranny in Byzantium, both of which were supported by *misthophoroi*.[11] In addition to any local mercenaries that might be recruited, a Spartan commander could attempt to enlist the remnants of the Cyreans, who were still operating in Salmydessus, under the command of Xenophon.[12] While these troops were disciplined and well-trained, they were rather expensive, and tended to mutiny for better pay. For example, when Cyrus' Greek hoplites learnt of their true destination, they complained that "they suspected that they were marching against the Great King; they said that they had not been paid for this purpose".[13] To quell the mutiny peacefully, Cyrus increased their pay from one daric to one and a half darics a month.[14] Similarly, a Spartan army composed of mercenaries would never be wholly dependable. A better offer could always be made by another employer. Sparta had no easy solution to the shortage of Spartiate manpower; her generals would be continually pressed to find new and creative ways to maintain an effective field force.

Once an adequate force had been assembled in the Peloponnese, it would have to cross to Asia Minor along one of two routes. The expedition could travel overland to Thrace, cross the Hellespont, and invade the Troad (the path which Xerxes had taken, and one which Alexander would later

take). As the political situation in central and northern Greece at this time was very unstable, such a journey was impossible; it would be too easy for a Spartan force to be isolated, too easy for its lines of communication to be cut.[15] In addition, it is not easy to dispatch a force to Asia Minor by this route. The soldiers and pack animals would have to endure very harsh terrain, and a considerable amount of time, supplies and planning would need to be spent in order to bridge the Hellespont (or, for that matter, to transport a large army across in relatively good order).

The only viable option for the Spartans was to send their troops directly across the Aegean Sea. Such a route would remain feasible so long as the Spartans kept naval superiority; were a hostile power to gain mastery over the Aegean, the Spartan forces would be totally isolated in Asia Minor. Surely they would not encounter any resistance from their fellow Greeks; Diodorus relates that, of the Hellenes, the Spartans were the masters of land and sea in 404.[16] Their earlier rivals, the Athenians, now possessed a navy of only twelve ships.[17] Presumably the Spartans could still rely on the Peloponnesian fleet, which had been created through Persian subsidies. However, the great fleet-making wealth of the Persian Empire, coupled with the large number of unemployed rowers in the Mediterranean, presented a constant threat to the Spartan Navy.

Once the army had crossed into Persian territory, it would have to be supplied. A modern force depends to a great extent on foodstuffs and armaments shipped to the battlefield from central depots. This was impractical in ancient times; the infrastructure was not adequate to support long supply lines, and there was no regular system of magazines or depots in place in the Hellenic world.[18] Only in dire emergencies do we find supplies being conveyed into a combat area. For example, during the Siege of Pylos, the Spartans were allowed to send their beleaguered countrymen emergency rations.[19] Similar arrangements for an Asian expedition were out of the question. Assuming that the minimum ration for one man in antiquity was 3 lbs. (1.36 kg) of grain per day, and that the average contingent was ten thousand men strong, 450 tons (408t) of grain would have to be transported across the Aegean, stored and distributed to the soldiers every month.[20] It would not be difficult for the Spartans to find the required number of grain-carriers; the average fourth-century cargo vessel was at least 70 to 80 tons burden.[21] If the army were to march any distance inland, however, the supplies would have to be carried by porters or baggage animals. It would take 4500 horses or mules to transport this amount of grain, or 11250 porters (this does not take into consideration the additional grain and fodder consumed by the animals, or the daily intake of the porters).[22] Direct

transport of comestibles was logistically impractical in Hellenic times.

More often, the soldiers were expected to find their own food (as in most wars up to the nineteenth century). This was not an organized procedure, as Greek military practice was ill-suited to cope with the new realities of extended campaigns over long distances. In earlier times, the citizen hoplites of the *polis* reported for duty with three days' rations: the soldier supported himself.[23] In time a makeshift supply system developed. Troops would be given a pay supplement, called *misthos* or *siteresion*, with which they would be expected to buy provisions.

It was the responsibility of the commander to arrange markets at which his men could buy food.[24] This, of course, could be done only in friendly areas, and when sufficient funds were at hand. Assuming a standard monthly wage of one daric, it would cost the Spartans approximately 33 talents to keep ten thousand men in the field for one month.[25] A year's campaign would total almost 400 talents, not including pay for the officers, the costs of maintaining cavalry and baggage animals, or the replacement of lost or damaged equipment. Unfortunately, the state of Spartan finances at the start of the Spartan-Persian War is unknown. According to Diodorus, Sparta received a yearly income of one thousand talents from her overseas possessions after the fall of

Athens. This figure is highly suspect, however.[26] What is known is that Sparta no longer received subsidies from Persia, the very factor which had enabled them to defeat the Athenians.

In the absence of regular rations distributed through a formal network, and when local markets failed to support the army, the troops would be forced to "live off the land", stealing or confiscating whatever supplies they needed. This is an accepted procedure in most ancient and modern conflicts. Here, the object was to make the enemy pay the costs of the war. This is to be distinguished from the intentional destruction of crops and farmland; foraging and plundering are generally not done with the intention of permanently destroying an enemy's agricultural capacity.[27] The Spartans might be able to provision their army in Asia Minor by plundering the territory of the Great King's non-Greek subjects. However, they would not be able to inconvenience their Greek and half-Greek allies.

The Spartans were fighting a self-professed war of liberation; they intended to set the Greeks of Asia free from Persian tyranny.[28] Adcock's cheerful depiction of supply in friendly territory is somewhat idealistic;[29] rarely would a population voluntarily give up its precious food and risk starvation. In campaigns of this type the normal relationship between attacker and terrain is reversed, for

the land which is taken in the course of a campaign does not belong to the enemy, but rather, to one's allies. Plundering friendly territory was unconscionable, even in fourth-century Greece. A "war of liberation" therefore requires considerable external support, or very astute, politically-sensitive commanders.

Although faced with such great obstacles, the Spartans nevertheless decided to send a sizeable force to Asia, risking open war with the Persian Empire. By undertaking this intervention they put tremendous pressures on their generals to recruit an army from a very limited military population, to keep a strong naval presence in the Aegean and to provision both army and navy, as inexpensively as possible. No commander could count on unlimited support from the home government, nor could any general envision the total defeat of Persia. At best, the Spartans might win the autonomy of the Greek coastal cities: the stated goal of the conflict. At worst, the war might bring military or financial ruin to Sparta. The success of the Spartan campaigns depended on creative solutions to these problems.

Chapter Four
The Campaigns of
Thibron, Dercylidas and Agesilaus

Thibron, Dercylidas and Agesilaus faced a similar strategic situation; all had to defend a mélange of Greek and half-Greek allies from the depredations of an intractable and vastly more numerous enemy. Some critics have argued that the Spartan generals were trying to impose upon Asia Minor a method of warfare more suited to the reduction of small Peloponnesian country towns; the Spartans, in this view, were simply out of their depth.[1] A tacit assumption is made here, that the Spartans were mentally--not physically--incapable of such a task. In truth, the ultimate decision in the Spartan-Persian War was produced not by the supremacy of Persian cavalry, or through the lack of a coherent battle plan on the Greeks' side, but by the subtle relationship between logistics and politics. It is here that the Spartans had fatally miscalculated.

The initial Spartan response in 400 was to send the Ionians a detachment of troops, with Thibron as harmost, or military governor. None of Thibron's force were full

Spartiates; rather, as Xenophon writes, "they gave him about a thousand *neodamodeis*, and about four thousand of the other Peloponnesians as soldiers".[2] Conscious of the fact that he would be operating against an enemy whose strength lay in mounted troops, and in terrain which favoured cavalry raids, he petitioned the Athenians for three hundred cavalrymen. Thibron added that he would personally pay them.[3] Accordingly, the Athenians sent him a small force of cavalry, partly to fulfill their obligation as allies, partly to rid themselves of politically dangerous elements (Xenophon tells us that the three hundred had been loyal to the Thirty).[4] These contingents assembled at Corinth and prepared for the journey to Ephesus.

The fact that Thibron personally paid for the Athenian cavalry points to a shortage of funds for the expedition. Westlake conjectures that Thibron's expedition was constantly in need of financial assistance:

> Although he is nowhere stated to have been hampered by financial stress, the expedients adopted by his successor to raise money from every possible source and the prevalence during his own command of looting from allies suggest that the Spartan government did not, perhaps could not, provide its expeditionary force with regular and full pay.[5]

With limited support from Sparta, Thibron must also have been expected to make the expedition profitable. This would have profound political and strategic implications. Firstly, it would cause Thibron to resort too frequently to plunder as a solution to his fiscal woes. Secondly, the Persian cavalry, which did not pose a serious threat to massed hoplites in battle formation, could quite effectively overrun foraging parties and small detachments engaged in plundering. Consequently, the war with Persia was waged in a piecemeal, fitful manner, as Thibron was alternately forced to concentrate and disperse his forces.

Upon reaching Ephesus, Thibron enlisted volunteers "from the mainland (i.e. Asian) Greek cities"; he does not appear to have encountered any difficulties, for at that time everyone heeded the word of a Spartan.[6] Diodorus adds that he obtained some two thousand recruits in Asia, "both from his own (Ionian) cities, and from others", bringing the total to seven thousand infantry and three hundred (?) cavalry.[7] With this force he immediately began to attack Tissaphernes' territory, striking at Magnesia. He quickly stormed that city,[8] and then besieged Tralles. This shows some strategic foresight; by taking both these cities Thibron would gain a foothold in the Maeander valley, from which he could threaten communications from Priene to Celaenae. By striking deep into the heart of Tissaphernes' province, he would also

compel the satrap into fighting a pitched battle. Judeich, indeed, believes that Thibron began the Magnesian campaign to divert Tissaphernes from Cyme.[9]

He failed to take the city, however, and withdrew to Magnesia. He resettled the Magnesians on Thorax, a nearby hill, thereby denying the Persians a convenient base of operations; then, in the words of Diodorus, the harmost "invaded the land of the enemy and sated his troops with all manner of plunder".[10] Thibron then quickly withdrew to Ephesus, having made no significant gains against the Persians. According to Xenophon, at this time Thibron did not dare meet Tissaphernes on open ground, but was content to defend whatever region he happened to be in.[11]

Undoubtedly he was conscious of the rather small size of his force. Tissaphernes probably had a much larger army; Diodorus writes that the satrap mustered ten thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry for use against Agesilaus in 396.[12] The arrival of the Cyreans, five thousand in number, helped considerably;[13] Xenophon states that after their rendezvous, Thibron repeatedly fought Tissaphernes, even on the plains. Shortly thereafter several cities in southern Aeolis (Pergamus, Teuthrania, Halisarna, Gambrium, Palaegambrium, Myrina, Grynium) defected to him without violence.[14]

Thibron next moved against "Egyptian" Larisa, a city overlooking the Caystrer, and a base of operations for the Persians. It appears that by attacking Larisa, he was trying to strengthen his position on the coast, "mopping up", so to speak. When the city did not surrender to him forthwith, he began a long and indecisive siege, at one point trying to starve the Larisans into submission. According to Xenophon, Thibron dug a tunnel to intercept the city's water supply. When the Larisans tried to block up the tunnel's entrance with wood and stones, Thibron had a wooden mantlet built over it; the defenders summarily burnt it down. Before the siege could have any effect, however, the ephors ordered him to march against Caria, on the grounds that he was not accomplishing anything at Larisa.[15] Hamilton conjectures that now Thibron retreated to winter quarters, and began to plunder the territory of his Greek allies.[16] This may have occurred because of the unruliness of the Cyreans, new additions to his army, and used to fending for themselves.[17] It is also quite possible that this spate of looting was caused by Thibron's impecuniosity.

At any rate, he was summoned to Sparta and condemned for plundering his allies; Diodorus merely states that he was recalled on account of his inefficiency.[18] The truth probably lies somewhere in between. While acts of looting under his command cannot be ruled out, Thibron might have appeared to

the home government to be stalling when he was taking the necessary step of consolidating his gains by besieging Larisa. Had he rashly moved inland, or had he attempted to wear down Tissaphernes' forces by unrelentingly maintaining contact with them, he would have risked all his previous victories in Aeolis on the decision of one battle. In this delay, the expedition lost its romance and started to assume the character of a serious, protracted war.

Thibron's campaigns in Asia Minor reveal the actions of a cautious general--a Spartiate *par excellence*--who nonetheless responded innovatively to strategic problems. He did the best to augment his meagre forces, and wisely realized that he could not decisively beat the Persians and dramatically eject them from Asia Minor in a lightning campaign. Rather, he was attempting what Liddell Hart called a "strategy of limited aim".[19] That is, he was trying to convince the Persians that the string of Greek settlements on the Aegean coast were not worth any further military expenditure. He was hampered from attempting anything more decisive by the Spartans' poor logistical apparatus; he could not afford to strike deeply into Tissaphernes' satrapy, and he endangered Sparta's good reputation among her allies. Had he had the resources which were available to Dercylidas or Agesilaus, he would have achieved much more.[20]

Indeed, Thibron's successor seemed to have been chosen more for his financial adroitness than for his generalship. Xenophon relates that Dercylidas had earned the nickname "Sisyphus" on account of his resourcefulness (μάλα μηχανητικός).[21] He was also politically astute, recognizing the mutual distrust of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. He "made a deal" with Tissaphernes and proceeded to attack Pharnabazus' possessions in the north, building upon Thibron's previous gains in southern Aeolis.[22] This is a classic example of dividing the forces of a numerically superior enemy.[23] Dercylidas was also protecting his rear; a truce with Tissaphernes would afford Ionia some temporary immunity from Persian attack.

Dercylidas carried his keen grasp of the political situation over to his dealings with Sparta's Asian allies. He is said to have marched through friendly country up to Pharnabazus' satrapy, without doing harm to his allies along the way.[24] Upon reaching Aeolis, he began a lightning campaign against the cities of the Troad, securing nine cities in eight days, through propaganda, stratagems and assault (not to mention the money and supplies which the cities provided).[25] In contrast to Thibron, he took Larisa in a single day (the sources are silent on his methods), as well as Hamaxitus and Colonae. This coup was both strategically and politically decisive. Spartan forces now held mastery

over most of the Aegean coastline, from Ephesus to the Hellespont. Dercylidas also had a quick and profitable campaign to his credit, which would surely improve his political standing back in Sparta.

The possession of Aeolis compelled Dercylidas to begin thinking defensively once again. As Aeolis was within easy reach of Pharnabazus' cavalry, Dercylidas came to terms with Pharnabazus in order to neutralize this threat.[26] With the Troad now safely in Spartan hands, and with the consent of Pharnabazus, Dercylidas moved his army north, into Bithynia, at the end of the year (399). He did this not only to normalize relations with Pharnabazus, who considered the Bithynians a major problem,[27] but also to supply his troops without harming any of his allies. While colorfully reported by Xenophon, Dercylidas' activities in Bithynia had little direct effect on the dispositions of either side in 398. Cartledge observes that this was hardly an anti-Persian operation; rather, it removed a source of irritation to Pharnabazus.[28]

Pharnabazus was also active during the winter of 399/398. According to Diodorus, he convinced Artaxerxes to give the Athenian Conon command of a new anti-Spartan fleet. Taking five hundred talents of silver, the satrap sailed to meet Conon in Cyprus and ordered him to start the construction of one hundred triremes. Not content with

waiting for the rest of the fleet to be built, Conon took forty ships and straightaway made for Cilicia.[29] Pharnabazus showed considerable foresight in this. For, if he could defeat the Spartans at sea, they would be forced to withdraw from Asia, or establish themselves as the tyrannical rulers of one small part of the coast; they would not have the resources to attempt anything else.[30]

At the beginning of the year Dercylidas proceeded to Lampsacus, where Aracus, Naubates and Antisthenes, envoys from Sparta, were awaiting him. They approved of his successes in the previous year, and prorogued his command as *harmost*.[31] Hamilton sees this as the result of a new sensitivity to public opinion abroad; in his opinion, the three envoys were inspectors, who were to ensure that Sparta would never send another Thibron to Asia.[32]

He renewed his pragmatic truce with Pharnabazus and, on the appeal of some residents of the Thracian Chersonese, occupied the isthmus. To protect the inhabitants from the Thracians' incessant raids, he constructed a great wall, extending from the Propontis to the Melic Gulf, thirty-seven stadia in length (about 7 km).[33] This too he managed with a certain flair, or *prothumia*. He assigned sections of the wall to his soldiers to build, offering prizes for the first to finish their alloted span, with additional prizes for the others.

Aside from the benign, altruistic reasons for this apparent diversion, Dercylidas had more selfish motives for protecting the Chersonesians. Firstly, the area was proverbially rich and fertile; it had many good harbours, a large amount of arable land, and pastures suitable for grazing.[34] The occupation of the Chersonese would substantially benefit Spartan trade. More importantly, the Chersonese dominated the Hellespont. An anti-Athenian force which controlled the Hellespont could deny Athens its regular grain supply from the Black Sea; Dercylidas' wall kept out barbarians and Greeks equally well. There also may have been deeper political reasons for this campaign. Pharnabazus may have let Dercylidas take the Chersonese; the satrap had already lost direct access to it, and would not be severely hindered by the loss of a region which was already beyond his reach.

Dercylidas then turned southward and reduced Atarneus, a citadel which served as a base for pirates and raiders; it was an obstacle he had to remove. Dercylidas simply could not afford such an unstable hinge in his lengthy coastal line of defence. Xenophon hints at another reason for the assault on Atarneus: the city contained a large grain reserve, which would prove useful on the journey back to Ephesus.[35] Although it took Dercylidas eight months to obtain Atarneus' surrender, the ephors paid no heed to this delay, which

cannot have been longer than Thibron's abortive siege of Larisa in 400/399. Perhaps the grain stockpile was too great a lure even for the ephors to ignore. Once he had secured the city as a base for further operations, Dercylidas marched back to Ephesus.

In the first two years of his command, Dercylidas had achieved most of the Spartans' limited war aims. He avoided manpower losses by refusing to meet the Persians in a pitched battle. He had occupied and successfully defended a sizeable portion of Greek Asia, and by operating in Bithynia and the Thracian Chersonese, had freed his allies from the trouble of providing for his armies. That is, he responded to the demands of logistics simply by avoiding them; by doing this he was remarkably successful, for, unlike those of Agesilaus, Dercylidas' conquests were not transitory. One may even see in the capture of Atarneus the nucleus of a mobile defence system; Greek forces on the coast of Asia Minor could be "anchored" around several strongpoints, which would serve as depots or places of refuge in the event of a Persian invasion. Perhaps Dercylidas had discovered a practical formula for campaigning in Asia Minor: employ as many non-Spartiates as possible, provision the expeditionary force by stationing it in barbarian territory, capture and garrison a modest amount of territory, and avoid the risks of a decisive confrontation.[36]

Yet the situation worsened dramatically. In 397 the Ionians agitated for the destruction of Tissaphernes' power, asserting that a diversionary attack on Caria would force the satrap to withdraw his forces from the Ionian cities. The ephors were convinced by these arguments, and issued orders for the invasion of Caria.[37] This was not a prudent idea, as events later proved. One may conjecture that Dercylidas was preparing for a further expedition northwards, as he had expressly stockpiled supplies there in the previous year.[38] It would have been wasteful for him to have squandered vital supplies in such a place, unless his attention was turned northward.

Dercylidas complied with his orders, co-operating with Pharax, the commander of the Peloponnesian Fleet. The delicate political balance which Dercylidas had created now fell to pieces. Pharnabazus, who resented the loss of Aeolis,[39] was reconciled with Tissaphernes. Both satraps joined forces and invaded Ionia. Dercylidas reacted quickly, and went to meet them. He had lost the initiative, and now was forced to fight on the terms of his enemy.

The ensuing events are described in terms of haste. The Spartans almost blunder upon the Persians.[40] Dercylidas deploys his troops as quickly as possible, stationing his peltasts and cavalry (as many as happened to be present) on his flanks. While the Peloponnesians stand firm, the Ionians

flee, leaving their weapons on the field.[41] Though Pharnabazus exhorts his colleague to act, out of mutual fear Tissaphernes and Dercylidas strike an impromptu truce and withdraw their forces to their starting positions. Later, both sides presented their terms: Dercylidas, that the Greek cities should remain independent of of Artaxerxes; Tissaphernes, that Greek forces (including *harmosts*) should withdraw from Asia.[42] An armistice was declared while both sides deliberated these counter-claims. According to Diodorus, both sides also demobilized.[43] In one non-battle, all that Dercylidas had gained politically was lost. Greeks and Persians then settled into an uneasy truce.

By the end of this year (397) Sparta was already entangled in a local war against the Eleans.[44] Nonetheless, the Spartans did not come to terms and obviate a two-front war. Rather, reports reached Sparta of a massive naval buildup in Phoenicia (upwards of three hundred triremes), for an unknown destination.[45] The Spartans reacted "excitedly" and summoned their allies. Lysander, privately hoping to restore the oligarchies which he had established years before, induced Agesilaus to volunteer his services for a new expedition to Asia Minor.[46]

This expedition was taken somewhat more seriously than the others by the government (It is unknown whether this was because of Agesilaus' royal status, or because the Spartans

finally understood the true scope of the war in Asia). Agesilaus promised that, if he were given thirty Spartiates (as a general staff, undoubtedly), two thousand *neodamodeis*, and six thousand Peloponnesians, he would bring the war with Persia to a successful conclusion.[47] In the *Agesilaus*, Xenophon attributes the motives of peacekeeping, Panhellenism and retaliation to the king. However, he also explicitly states that Agesilaus wished to fight an offensive war against the Persians, and not a defensive campaign to preserve Peloponnesian holdings in Asia. He wanted the enemy to pay for the war, and not the Spartans (καὶ τὸ τἀκείνου δαπανῶτα βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πολεμεῖν);[48] this clearly showed some consideration for the fragile state of Spartan logistics. The Spartans reacted with enthusiasm to his proposal and, in contrast to their treatment of Thibron and Dercylidas, gave him six months' worth of supplies.[49] Agesilaus finally issued orders for the allied contingents to meet in Gerastus.

Throughout his campaigns Agesilaus kept up the fiction that he was following in the footsteps of Agamemnon. Before setting sail for Ephesus, he travelled to Aulis in Boeotia to make a sacrifice. In the words of Xenophon:

> [Agesilaus] personally wanted to go and make a sacrifice at Aulis, the very place where Agamemnon had before sailing to Troy. But

> when he had arrived there, and the Boeotarchs discovered that he was sacrificing, they sent cavalry troopers and told him to stop sacrificing from now on. They also threw the sacrificial victims, which had already been sacrificed, from the altar. Agesilaus invoked the gods and flew into a rage; he boarded his ship and sailed away.[50]

Plutarch, less hostile to the Boeotians, gives a fuller account. Agesilaus was told in a dream to emulate Agamemnon and sacrifice at Aulis. When the king had reached Aulis, he had his private *mantis* perform the sacrifice, contrary to Boeotian custom, which required a local priest. Since Agesilaus was in violation of Boeotian law, the Boeotarchs declared that Agesilaus was forbidden to sacrifice in an unlawful manner; to make their point clear, they threw the illegal victims off the altar.[51] Carried away by his vision of Panhellenic leadership, Agesilaus miscalculated the effect of his propaganda. Not everyone would happily follow him to glory or defeat; some nationalists (like the Boeotians and Athenians) might even find service under a Spartan commander distasteful.

Under such a cloud of apprehension the Greek contingents arrived at Ephesus in 396. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus enlisted four thousand additional troops in Asia Minor, and even mustered a scratch force of four hundred horse; about

ten thousand supernumeraries followed their camp.[52] Agesilaus immediately took the initiative; he made a truce with Tissaphernes, on the condition that he would not invade any of Tissaphernes' territories while the satrap negotiated with the Great King on his behalf.[53] True to form, Tissaphernes asked Artaxerxes for reinforcements, in order to expel the Spartan from Asia. Despite Xenophon's idealistic portrait of Agesilaus, it is difficult to believe that anyone could be so naïve as to trust an enemy whose territory was being directly threatened. Rather, he must have used this truce to buy time for his own preparations. Indeed, he did not rest quietly either, but dispatched Lysander north, to induce Spithridates to revolt from Pharnabazus.[54]

Tissaphernes soon gave Agesilaus an ultimatum: leave Asia or be attacked by the forces of the Great King. Undeterred, Agesilaus made preparations for the invasion of Caria; he made arrangements for markets along the road to Caria, even though he had no intention of carrying out such an attack.[55] How familiar this stratagem would be to Sun Tzu![56] Agesilaus employed a similar strategy of misdirection later in the Corinthian War; about to march against Erythrae, he ordered markets to be prepared in Thespiae.[57]

Tissaphernes was convinced that an attack on Caria was imminent, undoubtedly because Agesilaus felt dishonoured by the satrap. In such an assault, Agesilaus would not only be

striking directly at Tissaphernes' personal estates, but would also be using the most likely avenue of approach; for the Persian cavalry would be all but useless against Agesilaus' infantry in mountainous Caria.[58] Tissaphernes ordered his cavalry into the valley of the Maeander as a screening force, retaining his light infantry as a reserve in Caria, should the Greeks break through his forward line and travel southwards.

Agesilaus dashed north into Phrygia. The march was quite profitable, as his men plundered the cities wantonly.[59] He advanced as far as Dascyleium, Pharnabazus' capital. There, a small detachment of Greek cavalry was attacked by a Persian mounted force of approximately equal size. The Greeks were routed, rescued only by the timely arrival of Agesilaus and the main body of his troops.[60] Agesilaus responded to this setback with great agility. Using unfavourable auspices as a pretext, he withdrew to Ephesus. He also began to enroll the locals as cavalrymen, decreeing that anyone who could provide a horse, arms and a suitable rider would himself be exempt from mobilization.[61]

Logistics were the decisive factor in Agesilaus' first year of campaigning. The march into Phrygia was made possible by his stockpile of supplies, and by the fact that Phrygia was officially enemy territory; one could plunder at will. His six months' store of provisions (or the equivalent

in cash) also allowed him to sit out the truce with Tissaphernes without exhausting the patience and resources of Ionia. In the absence of such funds, he would have been forced to quarter his army elsewhere, as Dercylidas had been compelled to do. Logistics also compelled him to attack Phrygia, as it served no military purpose--it was too far inland, too difficult to garrison effectively.[62] Yet the profits from a raid on Phrygia were beyond belief; all the ancient sources remark on the great value of the booty taken there.[63] At the end of the year, Agesilaus began to remedy his lack of cavalry; this, too, was possible only through a surplus of funds.

During the summer of 396, according to Diodorus, King Nephereus of Egypt made an alliance with the Spartans, giving his new allies 500,000 measures of grain and equipment sufficient to outfit one hundred triremes. With this support, Pharax the Spartiate, commanding 120 ships, blockaded Caunus, where Conon was with his forty triremes. Under pressure from Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, Pharax lifted the siege, thereby allowing Conon to escape, collect eighty ships and then occupy Rhodes. By a clever stratagem Conon captured the Egyptian grain; he then received an additional ninety triremes from the Persians.[64] The final defeat of Sparta at sea was inevitable, for the Persians now had naval superiority. Agesilaus was also denied a sizeable

grain supplement; it was only with such donations that he could continue to maintain an effective resistance against the Persians without becoming a burden to his allies. Once the sources of his funds had evaporated, he would be as vulnerable as Thibron had been.

In the spring of 395 he began to assemble his forces at Ephesus, turning the city into a vast barracks,[65] encouraging his troops to train themselves in a typically Greek fashion: prizes for daily fatigues. The campaigning season opened in a manner similar to that of the previous year. Agesilaus incited his men to action by saying that he would lead them to the best parts of the land by the shortest route possible; he once again prepared to assault Caria.[66] Predictably, Tissaphernes expected yet another invasion of Caria and deployed his forces just as he had done before.

Agesilaus and Tissaphernes now clashed near Sardis. There are two different, mutually exclusive versions of the Battle of Sardis; Xenophon preserves one tradition, Diodorus and P another. According to Xenophon, Agesilaus went straight for Sardis, where Tissaphernes' estates were.[67] He encountered no resistance for three days; then he came into contact with the Persian cavalry, and lost many camp-followers in a cavalry attack. In response, Agesilaus sent his cavalry against the enemy horse and drew up his infantry into a phalanx. The Persians resisted the Greek cavalry, but

buckled under the pressure of the Agesilaus' hoplites. Agesilaus crowned his victory by capturing the enemy camp, which was worth at least seventy talents (i.e., could provision the army for two months).[68]

Yet, according to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, it was Tissaphernes who was the pursuer; Agesilaus was wary of engaging the Persians in a conventional battle, since the Persians were numerically superior.[69] Somehow Agesilaus decided on a surprise attack (there is a *lacuna* in the text here), and dispatched some hoplites and peltasts, under the command of Xenocles, to set up an ambuscade in which Tissaphernes' army could be trapped.[70] On the following day the Persians attacked the Greek rear, as was their custom. Suddenly a force of hoplites appeared--Xenocles' men--and threw the Persians into confusion. There was a brief skirmish in which six hundred Persians perished. Agesilaus then descended on the abandoned Persian camp, and spent the next few days ravaging the surrounding countryside.[71] Diodorus' account differs little from this; he does, however, put the number of Persian dead at six thousand, and not six hundred.[72]

Bruce persuasively destroys the hypothesis that the traditions describe two separate battles. One might expect Xenophon to pass over the preliminary ambush; P would not omit the main battle, however.[73] He conjectures that the

version found in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* was based on "some documentary evidence, and that probably compiled during the actual course of the campaign".[74] Botha also favours P's account, basing her arguments on the geography of the region.[75] At any rate, it appears that the Battle of Sardis did not bring a decision to the war. It did not decisively weaken Persian power in Asia Minor; at best, it reduced the forces of one satrap. Agesilaus' army was also left reasonably intact, ready to continue operations against the Persians. Its greatest effect was that Tissaphernes was executed for treason.[76]

Three courses of action were now open to Agesilaus. He could have attempted to destroy Tissaphernes'/Tithraustes' power once and for all. This might have been fatal to Greek interests in Asia, for the Greek infantry would most probably have been cut down in the plains (as it is highly unlikely that the Persians would have risked battle elsewhere). The king could have marched against the large barbarian cities in the interior (such as Celaenae), which were the foundation of Persian power west of the Halys. This would have been counter-productive, as the Peloponnesians had little or no competence in assaulting walled cities.[77] He could choose to surrender the initiative and adopt a defensive strategy, withdrawing to Ephesus and waiting for the Persians to invade. The length of the coastline, and the fact that the

Greek settlements which the Spartans were ostensibly protecting were scattered throughout western Asia Minor precluded an effective defence; Agesilaus would be left, like Thibron, to defend whatever area he happened to occupy, and no more.

Or Agesilaus could strike into barbarian lands and mercilessly loot and pillage. In addition to gratifying his soldiers, he could also portray himself as an aggressive, heroic leader, unceasingly wringing gold from the weak barbarians. As Dercylidas had proved, and Thibron had not, such rhetorical deeds were not only politically impressive but also diplomatically astute. A plundering expedition would furthermore improve both the army's morale and its supplies, as Dercylidas had shown in the winter of 398/397.

In the *Agesilaus*, Xenophon glowingly describes the Battle of Sardis as an unqualified success. Because of it, all the tributaries of the Persian Empire sent envoys to the Spartan king; some even revolted, so that both Hellenes and barbarians were subject to Agesilaus.[78] More reservedly, Diodorus focuses on less radical diplomatic developments; he states that Tithraustes convinced Agesilaus to conclude a truce with him in the aftermath of the Battle of Sardis, which would last for six months (up to the beginning of the next campaigning season).[79] Xenophon describes the truce in greater detail in the *Hellenica*. Under the terms of the

agreement, Agesilaus would cease from harassing Tithraustes' satrapy and turn his attentions to Greater Phrygia, which was ruled by Pharnabazus. In return for this, Tithraustes would give him thirty talents to keep the Spartan force supplied until they reached Phrygia.[80]

Agesilaus now had a chance to prosecute the war on two fronts; the Spartan government, impressed by his accomplishments, appointed him commander of all Spartan forces in Asia, both on land and by sea. He took immediate action: one hundred and twenty triremes were added to the fleet. He also was given the authority to appoint a navarch.[81] He did not choose wisely, although Sparta's naval superiority was deteriorating day by day and the fleet required an experienced leader who could oppose Conon. Agesilaus appointed his son-in-law Peisander, who was "ambitious and brave, but lacking experience in preparing the necessities".[82] It was unfortunate for the Spartan war effort that Agesilaus paid such little attention to naval policy; his ignorance would have disastrous consequences.

The diplomatic situation was rapidly deteriorating. Agesilaus needed to push the war to its conclusion; he should have continued to press Tissaphernes and Tithraustes, exploiting his success at Sardis. Yet his lack of logistical reserves forced him to make a deal with Tithraustes and then resort to plunder; according to Xenophon, the rest of 395 was

taken up in ravaging Pharnabazus' satrapy.[83] During the winter he attempted to attract the semi-independent kingdom of Paphlagonia into an alliance with Sparta; he seems to have succeeded.[84] Agesilaus then passed a relatively uneventful winter near Dascyleium, alternately plundering the local satrapal estates and raiding neighboring territories. He suffered a minor setback when Pharnabazus' cavalry routed seven hundred Spartan infantry, which had been dispersed through the countryside in search of food; of these, Xenophon writes that one hundred were killed.[85] (P offers a slightly different account, in which the Spartan forces capture several towns in Pharnabazus' territory, and then prepare to winter in Cappadocia.)[86] In the face of numerous defections from his allies, Agesilaus concluded a truce with Pharnabazus, to the effect that the Spartans should withdraw from Greater Phrygia at the beginning of spring.[87]

Strategically, Agesilaus had achieved nothing in his second year of campaigning. The Battle, or Skirmish of Sardis had failed to bring about a decision in Asia Minor. Pressed for provisions, Agesilaus accepted money from Tithraustes and attacked Phrygia; this satrapy he also abandoned, after coming to an agreement with Pharnabazus. Although Xenophon does not mention that any money was exchanged, it is tempting to see Pharnabazus, like Tithraustes, paying Agesilaus to leave his territory. In

such a case, Agesilaus' strategy would seem to be determined more by the enemy than by himself.

Agesilaus' position had worsened considerably. He was forced to create a scratch force to defend Asia Minor by sea. He had moreover lost his Paphlagonian allies through the cupidity of Herippidas, one of his lieutenants. eager sees Agesilaus' campaign of 395 as an attempt to create "a buffer zone of rebel satraps and tribes between the territory still controlled by the King and that of the Greek cities of the seaboard".[88] Seager's analysis presupposes that Agesilaus had the freedom to act as he wished in Asia Minor, that he was not restrained from an outright offensive by his paucity of supplies. The true picture of Agesilaus was hardly as decisive; rather, we see a general attempting to salvage Spartan power, compelled to run hither and thither in search of sustenance.

This Phrygian diversion gave the Persians time to formulate a strategy to expel Agesilaus from Asia. Xenophon writes that at this time, Tithraustes sent Timocrates to Greece, with fifty talents of gold and orders to give it "to prominent men in the cities [of Greece], provided that they should make war upon the Spartans".[89] A direct threat to Spartan hegemony in Greece would quite easily bring about the withdrawal of Agesilaus from Asia. Indeed, all the ancient

sources agree that Agesilaus was recalled--with most of his army--on account of the outbreak of the Corinthian War.[90]

Nevertheless, Agesilaus planned to invade the Anatolian Plateau, and for this purpose had gathered a large force in addition to his existing army.[91] The ephors' recall in 394 brought him back to Greece; shortly thereafter Conon soundly defeated the Spartan Navy. The chance to secure the freedom of the Asian Greeks had passed. None of the earlier commanders had the resources to attempt a lasting conquest of western Asia Minor. The final Spartan presence in Asia Minor was anticlimactic; Agesilaus left Euxenus to defend Ionia with four thousand infantry.[92] Successive governors, inadequately supported by the home government, and numerically unable to defend the long coastline, lost more and more territory. Forty years later, when the next Panhellenic expedition put ashore, all Asia Minor was Persian.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

The interventions in Asia Minor, from 400 to 394, reveal an altruism which was unusual for the Spartans. When the ephors first sent Thibron to ensure the safety of the Asian Greeks, they had little idea of how to conduct an overseas occupation; they gave Thibron little financial support, if any at all. Yet Thibron still managed to protect parts of Ionia from the Persians, until he tried to solve his logistical problems by letting his army live off the land. The Spartan government seemed to have learnt some lessons from this; the next harmost they chose was Dercylidas, of considerable personal wealth. Dercylidas' success in Asia is directly attributable to his financial solvency; there are no reports of his troops pillaging friendly property. Yet, what was militarily prudent for Dercylidas was politically unappealing for the Spartans. When he was ordered to meet the Persians in a pitched battle, the situation in Asia returned to that of 399.

Agesilaus managed to get a large subsidy for his expedition from the ephors; this undoubtedly helped his

successes in 396. Yet, perhaps because of the size of his army, his campaigns in this year were directed not at the destruction of the enemy, but at the provisioning of his own army. The outcome of the Battle of Sardis in the following year was hardly decisive; had Agesilaus been better supported, he could have fielded a larger force. However, the troops he had in 395 were too few to engage the Persians effectively. His remaining time in Asia was taken up with raids and plundering expeditions.

If we are to find a reason for Sparta's failure, we need look no farther than logistics. Every campaign in Asia was dominated by the establishment of a commissariat; political aims and military goals played a secondary role. When the Spartans came to the aid of the Ionians in 400 they did so out of obligation, not out of common sense, as the Spartans perennially lacked money. Indeed, it was only with Persian help that they defeated the Athenians a decade earlier. Of all the commanders Dercylidas was the one who had found a possible solution to the defence of Asia, yet his strategy of limited aim was not appealing to the home government. Agesilaus tried to fight a quick and profitable war, but was compromised by his continual need to forage. Eventually, with the destruction of the Spartan Navy, this fragile logistical framework broke down. It would take an Alexander

to reconcile the political and military purposes of an overseas expedition.

Footnotes to Chapter One

1 "Ὦ ξεῖνε Μιλήσιε, ἀπαλλάσσεο ἐκ Σπάρτης πρὸ δύντος ἡλίου· οὐδένα γὰρ λόγον εὐεπέα λέγεις Λακεδαιμονίοισι, ἐθέλων σφέας ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τριῶν μηνῶν ὁδὸν ἀγαγεῖν". Herodotus V, 1, 3.

2 Herodotus IX, cvi, 2-3.

3 "δεῖ γὰρ μηδὲν πρότερον πράττειν, πρὶν ἂν λάβῃ τις τοὺς Ἕλληνας δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ συναγωνιζομένους ἢ πολλὴν εὔνοιαν ἔχοντας τοῖς πραττομένοις. ὧν Ἀγησίλαος ὁ δόξας εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίων φρονιμώτατος ὠλιγώρησεν, οὐ διὰ κακίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν". Isocrates, *Philippus* 86. Cf. ". . . δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλευομένους μὴ πρότερον ἐκφέρειν πρὸς βασιλέα πόλεμον, πρὶν ἂν διαλλάξῃ τις τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ παύσῃ τῆς μανίας τῆς νῦν αὐτοῖς ἐνεστώσης". Isocrates, *Philippus* 87. A similar opinion can be found in Isocrates, *Epistulae* IX, xiii.

4 "τοῦ δὲ Περσικοῦ νομίσματος χάραγμα τοξότην ἔχοντος, ἀναζευγνύων ἔφη μυρίοις τοξόταις ὑπὸ βασιλέως ἐξελαύνεσθαι τῆς Ἀσίας· τοσοῦτων γὰρ εἰς Ἀθήνας καὶ Θήβας κομισθέντων καὶ διαδοθέντων τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς, ἐξεπολεμώθησαν οἱ δῆμοι πρὸς τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας". Plutarch, *Agesilaus* XV, viii.

5 C. D. Hamilton, *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* (1991) 103-104.

6 Paul Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (1987) 358.

[7] J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (1970) 6-9.

[8] See J. K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (1974) 61-72.

[9] I. A. F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'* (1967) 155.

[10] For ease of reference, the unknown author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* will be cited as "P" for Papyrus-author.

[11] Ephorus, in turn, appears to have summarized P's account to a great extent. See P. R. McKechnie and S. J. Kern, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (1988) 8.

[12] Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (1977) 1.

Footnotes to
Chapter Two

[1] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* tr. Samuel B. Griffith (1963) 129.

[2] Patrick O'Sullivan and Jesse W. Miller Jr., *The Geography of Warfare* (1983) 7.

[3] Paul M. Pitman III (ed.), *Turkey: a Country Study* (1988) 93-96. *Contra* J. C. Dewdney, *Turkey: An Introductory Geography* (1971) 149-150.

[4] Approximately three times the size of mainland Greece.

[5] Naval Intelligence Division, *Turkey* vol. 1 (1942) 77. The original measurements were a latitudinal distance of 200 mi. from the Gulf of Edremit to the Dalaman river, with a coastline measuring 850 mi.

[6] " Ἔστι δὲ τῆς Ἰωνίας ὁ μὲν περίπλους ὁ παρὰ γῆν σταδίων που τρισχιλίων τετρακοσίων τριάκοντα διὰ τοὺς κόλπους καὶ διὰ τὸ χερρονησίζειν ἐπὶ πλεῖον τὴν χώραν, τὸ δ' ἐπ' εὐθείας μῆκος οὐ πολύ". Strabo XIV, i, 2.

[7] Xenophon, *Hellenica* I, ii, 2-6.

[8] Naval superiority alone would not suffice. The very existence of an enemy fleet would jeopardize western Asia Minor.

[9] With the exception of Mysia (mod. Balikesir), where the Rhyndacus flows northward.

[10] Dewdney, *Turkey* 162.

[11] Dewdney, *Turkey* 49. The soil of the western river valleys occupies the highest rank (Group I) in Dewdney's classification of soil management groups (based on Oakes [1957]).

[12] O'Sullivan and Miller, *Geography of Warfare* 61.

[13] Here, the Aegean coast is also taken to include a band of territory inland.

[14] Fed. Res. Div., *Turkey* 94.

[15] The ranges of the Pontus and Taurus.

[16] Fed. Res. Div., *Turkey* 95.

[17] Fed. Res. Div., *Turkey* 96.

[18] Some Group 1 soils are found in the river valleys (cf. footnote 11), but most of the cultivatable land consists of Group 3 soils, whose productivity is "restricted by moisture deficiency." Dewdney, *Turkey*. 49-50. Also see Nav. Int. Div., *Turkey* 160-161.

[19] "Sibi easdem terras quas victoria peragrassent repetendas; omnia aut ipsos aut hostes populatos". Quintus Curtius *Historiae Alexandri Magni* III,v,6. Cf. Donald W. Engels. *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (1978) 37.

[20] "παρεσκευάζετο γὰρ πορευσόμενος ὡς δύναιτο ἀνωτάτω, νομίζων ὁπόσα ὄπισθεν ποιήσαιτο ἔθνη πάντα ἀποστήσειν βασιλέως". Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV, 1, 41.

[21] Nav. Int. Div., *Turkey* 37.

[22] Fed. Res. Div., *Turkey* 93.

Footnotes to
Chapter Three

[1] Diodorus XIV, xxxv, 6; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III, i, 3. Note especially Xenophon's phrase: "καὶ ἠξίουν (οἱ πρέσβεις), ἐπεὶ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος προστάται εἰσίν, ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ σφῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Ἑλλήνων".

[2] "μὴ ὅπλα πολέμια ἐπιφέρειν ταῖς Ἑλληνίσι πόλεσιν" Diodorus XIV,xxxv, 7.

[3] For a discussion of the actual identity of the "Greeks of Asia" see Robin Seager and Christopher Tuplin, "The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia" *JHS 100* (1980) 141-154.

[4] H. D. Westlake, "Spartan Intervention in Asia, 400-397 B.C." *Historia XXXV* (1986) 408-409.

[5] Charles D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (1979) 111-112.

[6] Paul Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (1987) 37-43.

[7] G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of His Age* (1948) 219.

[8] Cf. Thucydides IV, lxxx, 5; V, lxvii, 1; VII, xix, 3. But, as Lazenby points out, they were usually employed in distant theatres, and were not brigaded with the full Spartiates. J. F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (1985) 14.

[9] "Die Bezeichnung solcher befreiter Heloten war Neodamoden und so treten sie unter diesem Namen und in großer Stärke besonders wieder im 4. Jahr. auf". Johannes Kromayer and Georg Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer* (1928) 39.

[10] One may compare the Helots, who had no true military background, with the Roman *capite censi*, who were equally bereft of such a tradition. At the time the *capite censi* were enrolled in the legions, mention was first made of special gladiatorial trainers ("drill sergeants") who were to instruct the unskilled recruits in weapons handling. Valerius Maximus II, iii, 2.

[11] On the Thirty see Xenophon, *Hellenica* II, iv, 28-29; on Clearchus see Diodorus XIV, xii, 3. Also see H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (1933) 18-19.

[12] Diodorus XIV, xxxvii, 1-4.

[13] "ὑπώπτευον γὰρ ἤδη ἐπὶ βασιλέα ἰέναι· μισθωθῆναι δὲ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἔφασαν". Xenophon, *Anabasis* I, iii, 1.

[14] Xenophon, *Anabasis* I, iii, 21.

[15] While it may be argued that ancient armies did not depend on formal supply lines to the same extent that modern ones do, they nonetheless required lines of communication as conduits for reinforcements and dispatches.

[16] "κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Λακεδαιμόνιοι καταλελυκότες τὸν Πελοποννησιακὸν πόλεμον ὁμολογουμένην ἔσχον τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ γῆν καὶ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν". Diodorus XIV, x, 1. Cf. Diodorus XIV, xiii, 1.

[17] Xenophon, *Hellenica* II, ii, 20.

[18] One may compare the extensive preparations made by Xerxes for his march over Thrace and Northern Greece. Herodotus VII, xx, 1; VII, xxv, 1-2.

[19] Thucydides IV, xvi, 1.

[20] The figure of 3 lbs./day has been calculated by Donald Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (1978) 18.

[21] Lionel Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (1971) 170-172.

[22] Assuming that a horse or mule can carry 200 lbs. and a human 80 lbs. Engels, *Alexander* 14-17.

[23] F. E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (1957) 65. W. Kendrick Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, vol. 1 (1971) 32-34. Also see Anderson's interpretation of Cyrus' commissariat in the Cyropaedia, J. K. Anderson, *Military Practice and Theory in the Age of Xenophon* (1970) 43-45.

[24] For example, Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 11.

[25] The rate of one daric/month comes from Xenophon, *Anabasis* I, iii, 21; from *Anabasis* I, vii, 18 Cook derives the equation 1 Persian daric = 20 Attic drachmae. See M. L. Cook, *Boeotia in the Corinthian War: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (1981) 111-114.

[26] "ἔταξαν δὲ καὶ φόρους τοῖς καταπολεμηθεῖσι, καὶ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον οὐ χρώμενοι νομίσματι τότε συνήθροιζον ἐκ τοῦ φόρου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν πλείω τῶν χιλίων ταλάντων". Diodorus XIV, x, 2. Cf. Westlake, "Spartan Intervention" 409.

[27] See the discussion of Greek technical vocabulary for plundering and ravaging in Victor D. Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece* (1983) 13-20.

[28] Or, at the very least, to protect the Greeks from Tissaphernes' depredations. Diodorus XIV, xxxv, 6.

[29] "While they were in the land of their friends, they were helped by their friends; and when they were in the land of their enemies, they helped themselves." Adcock, *Gk. & Maced. Art of War* 65.

Footnotes to
Chapter Four

[1] J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (1970) 8-9.

[2] ". . . δόντες στρατιώτας τῶν μὲν νεοδαμωδῶν εἰς χιλίους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων εἰς τετρακισχιλίους". Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 4. Diodorus reports that the Spartans gave Thibron a thousand citizen troops (χιλίους τῶν πολιτῶν) and authorized him to enrol as many allied troops as possible. Diodorus XIV, xxxvi, 1. Here, I believe Diodorus misinterprets his sources.

[3] "εἰπὼν (ὁ Θίβρων) ὅτι αὐτὸς μισθὸν παρέξει". Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 4. It is worth noting that the actual numbers of the Athenian contingent are unknown; Xenophon merely states that Athens sent "some horsemen".

[4] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 4.

[5] H. D. Westlake, "Spartan Intervention in Asia, 400-397 B.C.", *Historia XXXV* (1986) 412-413.

[6] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 5.

[7] Diodorus XIV, xxxvi, 2.

[8] No doubt, because of its relatively weak defences: "ταύτης δ' οὔσης ἀτειχίστου". Diodorus XIV, xxxvi, 3.

[9] "Für Thibron konnte es sich, da seine Schar zu schwach war, um einen offenen Kampf zu wagen, nur darum handeln,

Tissaphernes von der Belagerung des arg bedrängten Kyme abzuziehen". W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (1892) 43.

[10] "αὐτὸς δ' ἐμβαλὼν εἰς τὴν τῶν πολεμίων χώραν τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐνέπλησε παντοίας ὠφελείας". Diodorus XIV, xxxvi, 3.

[11] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 5.

[12] Diodorus XIV, lxxix, 1.

[13] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 6; Diodorus XIV, xxxvii, 1-4.

[14] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 6.

[15] "δοκοῦντος δ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ποιεῖν" Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 7. Cartledge postulates that the planned expedition to Caria was intended to strike at the enemy's naval power, by removing the Persian fleet's southwestern anchorages. Paul Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (1987) 209.

[16] C. D. Hamilton, *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* (1991) 89.

[17] "[I]t clearly emerges that Thibron's campaign had been marred by looting of allied property--just the way in which the Cyreans had become accustomed to support themselves". H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (1933) 44.

[18] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 8; Diodorus XIV, xxxviii, 2.

[19] "The more usual reason for adopting a strategy of limited aim is that of awaiting a change in the balance of force--a

change often sought and achieved by draining the enemy's force, weakening him by pricks instead of risking blows. The essential condition of such a strategy is that the drain on him should be disproportionately greater than on oneself". B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (1954) 335.

[20] Certainly, posterity has judged him by the achievements of his successors. "Nur war es begreiflich, daß man in Sparta über Thibron enttäuscht war, zumal wenn man seine Erfolglosigkeit mit der raschen, geschickten und energischen Kriegführung des Derkylidas verglich. So wurde Thibron für längere Zeit ausgeschaltet". Victor Ehrenberg, "Thibron" in *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* vol. 11 (1936) 274.

[21] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 8.

[22] "κοινολογησάμενος", Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 9.

[23] Dercylidas may have acted from personal feelings; he hated Pharnabazus, who had falsely accused him of misconduct several years before. Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 9.

[24] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, i, 10.

[25] Xenophon *Hellenica* III, i, 16-28; Diodorus XIV, xxxviii, 3.

[26] Pharnabazus also profited from this armistice, as Aeolis directly threatened his satrapy of Phrygia. Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 1.

[27] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 2; Diodorus XIV, xxxviii, 3.

[28] Cartledge, *Agesilaos* 210.

[29] Diodorus XIV, xxxix, 1-4.

[30] For an alternate reconstruction, see C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (1979) 114-117.

[31] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 6.

[32] C. D. Hamilton, *SBV* 113-114.

[33] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 10. Diodorus seems to mention this in conjunction with the events of the year before. Diodorus XIV, xxxviii, 6-7.

[34] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 11.

[35] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 11.

[36] Cf. Hamilton, *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* 90.

[37] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 12. Diodorus only mentions the withdrawal to Ephesus and the ensuing confrontation between Dercylidas and the satraps. Diodorus XIV, xxxix, 4-6.

[38] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 11.

[39] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 13.

[40] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 14; Diodorus XIV, xxxix, 5.

[41] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 17.

[42] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 19-20; Diodorus XIV, xxxix, 6.

[43] "οὕτω μὲν οὖν διέλυσαν τὰ στρατόπεδα". Diodorus, XIV, xxxix, 6.

[44] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, ii, 21-31.

[45] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 1. Cf. Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, vi; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* VI, i.

[46] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 2. There is no mention of Lysander's role in Diodorus or the *Agesilaus*.

[47] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 2; Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, vii; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* VI, iii-iv; Diodorus does not mention the *neodamodeis*. Diodorus XIV, lxxix, 1.

[48] Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, viii.

[49] It is more likely that the ephors gave him money for six months' worth of supplies. See D. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (1978) 20 n.29.

[50] "αὐτὸς δ' ἐβούληθη ἐλθὼν θῦσαι ἐν Αὐλίδι, ἔνθαπερ ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων ὅτ' εἰς Τροίαν ἔπλει ἐθύετο. ὡς δ' ἐκεῖ ἐγένετο, πυθόμενοι οἱ βοιώταρχοι ὅτι θύοι, πέμψαντες ἱππέας τοῦ τε λοιποῦ εἶπαν μὴ θύειν καὶ οἷς ἐνέτυχον ἱεροῖς τεθυμένοις διέρριψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ". Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 3-4.

[51] Plutarch, *Agesilaus* VI, vi-xi.

[52] Diodorus XIV, lxxix, 2.

[53] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 6; Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, x-xii.

[54] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 6; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* VIII, iii. This was also done to remove Lysander, who had become troublesome. For a discussion of Lysander's role in this expedition, see Hamilton, *Agesilaus* 91-96.

[55] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 11; Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, xiv.

[56] "It is the business of a general to be serene and inscrutable, impartial and self-controlled. He should be capable of keeping his officers and men in ignorance of his plans. . . . He changes his methods and alters his plans so that people have no knowledge of what he is doing. He alters his camp-sites and marches by devious routes, and thus makes it impossible for others to anticipate his purpose". Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, tr. S. Griffith (1963) 136-137.

[57] Xenophon, *Hellenica* V, iv, 48. Cf. Polyaenus, *Stratagemata* II, i, 11. One may compare with this the Allied preparations for D-Day. For months before the actual invasion, Allied intelligence created a fictitious invasion force, the so-called First U.S. Army Group, which was positioned to attack the Pas de Calais. On the night of 5/6 June 1944, an invasion force was simulated along the most probable invasion path; this tied down a substantial number of German units, and temporarily distracted the

Panzer divisions in the west. See J. Keegan, *The Second World War* (1989) 378-379.

[58] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 12; Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, xv; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* IX, iii.

[59] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 12; Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, xvi; Diodorus XIV, lxxix, 3; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* IX, iv.

[60] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 13-15.

[61] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 15; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* IX, v-vii.

[62] See "The Anatolian Plateau" in Chapter Two.

[63] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 12; Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, xvi; Diodorus XIV, lxxix, 3; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* IX, iv.

[64] Diodorus XIV, lxxix, 4-8.

[65] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 16-19; Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, xxv. A comparison with the Channel Ports in 1944 comes to mind.

[66] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 20.

[67] Who possesses a more credible account, according to Anderson, *Military Theory* 117-118.

[68] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 22-24.

[69] *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* XI, 3.

[70] *Hel. Oxy.* XI, 4.

[71] *Hel. Oxy.* XI, 6; XII, 1.

[72] Diodorus XIV, lxxx, 2-4.

[73] I. A. F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'* (1967) 152-154.

[74] Bruce, *Hel. Oxy.* 155. For a summary of recent scholarship, see P. R. McKechnie and S. J. Kern, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (1988) 140-146.

[75] Lorraine Botha, "The Asiatic Campaign of Agesilaus--the Topography of the Route from Ephesus to Sardis", *Acta Classica XXXI* (1988) 71-80.

[76] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 25; Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, xxxv; Diodorus XIV, lxxx, 6-7; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* X, v-vi.

[77] Note Agesilaus' failed attack on Gordium, *Hel. Oxy.* XXI, vi.

[78] Xenophon, *Agesilaus* I, xxxv. At this point, Xenophon stops his description of the Asian campaigns; according to this version, Agesilaus enjoyed great renown for his victory, and returned to Greece to fight the Boeotians.

[79] Diodorus XIV, lxxx, 8.

[80] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 26. Note that the sum of thirty talents would probably have kept the army in supply for three to four weeks (see Chapter Three). Plutarch reports a similar sequence of events, *Agesilaus* X.

[81] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 27; Plutarch *Agesilaus* X, x-xi.

[82] "φιλότιμον μὲν καὶ ἐρρωμένον τὴν ψυχήν, ἀπειρότερον δὲ τοῦ παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς δεῖ". Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, iv, 29. Cf. Plutarch, *Agesilaus* X, xi.

[83] Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV, i, 1. The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia contains an account of Agesilaus' operations in Mysia, shortly before the invasion of Phrygia in 395. It appears that the Spartan king brought some of the Mysians, who were independent of Persia, into an alliance with himself; the others he summarily reduced. *Hell. Oxy.* XXI, i-iii.

[84] Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV, i, 2-15. However, later in the winter of 395, the Paphlagonians were estranged from Agesilaus on account of a quarrel over the division of booty which had been taken from Pharnabazus. See Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV, i, 27-28.

[85] Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV, i, 17-19.

[86] *Hell. Oxy.* XXII, i-iv.

[87] Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV, i, 37-38.

[88] R. J. Seager, "Agesilaus in Asia: propaganda and objectives", *Liverpool Classical Monthly* (1977) 184. *Contra* D. H. Kelly, "Agesilaus' Strategy in Asia Minor, 396-395 B.C." *LCM* (1978) 97-98, which refutes the idea of a buffer zone.

[89] Xenophon, *Hellenica* III, v, 1.

[90] Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV, ii, 2; Diodorus XIV, lxxxiii, 1; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* XV; Isocrates, *Philippus* 86-87. The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* breaks off before the beginning of 394.

[91] Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV, i, 41; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* XV, i.

[92] Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV, ii, 5.

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

Figure I

Western Asia Minor